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THE

HISTORY

OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION.

BY

M. A. THIERS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE LAST PARIS EDITION,

WITH NOTES.

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PREFACE.

I PURPOSE to commit to writing the History of a most extraordinary Revolution, one that has caused a deep sensation, and upon which public opinion is still divided. I have not concealed from myself the difficulties of my task; for strong political feelings, which it was considered had expired under military despotism, are now awakening from their slumber. All at once, men, borne down with age and toil, have experienced the revival of passions apparently extinct, and have imparted those passions to us their descendants and inheritors. But although we may have to maintain the same cause with them, we are not, therefore, obliged to defend their errors, more especially as we have the faculty of distinguishing between liberty and those who, whether with good or evil intentions, have devoted themselves to her service, possessing also, as we do, the advantage of having seen and conversed with those veterans who, yet absorbed in their recollection, and impressed with the emotions of the past, instruct us to identify our associations with the memory of long past events. Perhaps the moment when the actors of this great drama are about to quit the scene, is the most proper period to write their history, for then we can receive their testimony without being made parties to their prejudices or political inclinations.

Be this as it may, I have done my best to soften in my own bosom every feeling of personal bias. I have alternately supposed myself as either drawing my earliest breath in a cottage, inspired with a laudable ambition, and striving to attain that eminence from which I was debarred by the pride of the higher classes; or else as having been brought up in a palace, the inheritor of ancient privileges, feeling the mortification of being compelled to disclaim a possession which I had reason to consider as conferring a lawful title. The moment I entered on this train of reflection, all partiality or bias lost its hold upon my mind. I have mourned for the losers in the conflict, and have consoled myself by the admiration of elevated characters.

TRANSLATOR'S ADVERTISEMENT.

The celebrated work of which the following pages contain a translation, was originally published in Paris in 1824 and 1825, and since then has passed through twelve editions, being considered as the best written, and the most authentic and statesmanlike history of the great and extraordinary events of which it treats, and is supposed to have been one of the causes of Mons. Thiers being subsequently exalted to the high political honour of minister of France. The publishers of the present edition issued a translation of the first three volumes on the first appearance of the work, which has now been carefully corrected, and re-translated where necessary. The subsequent volumes have been carefully translated from the last French edition, which in numerous and essential points varies from the earlier editions by the insertion of new, and the omission of unauthenticated or erroneous matter.

The rapidity of events, a circumstance tending to confuse the reader, has been considerably obviated in the present translation, by the careful reduction of the text into headlines, and by giving dates, at the head of every page. The translator has also added some concise yet explanatory notes, and it has been his unremitting endeavour to render the text with the utmost fidelity. The whole of the appendices have been for the first time given to the English reader, and a copious index added, as a work comprising so vast a series of important facts is one not only for perusal but constant reference. The present translation, it is therefore hoped, is one worthy of the popular original, and of the momentous events it professes to record.

HISTORY

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THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.

CHAPTER I.

THE MORAL AND POLITICAL STATE OF FRANCE TOWARDS THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY—THE ACCESSION OF LOUIS XVI.—THE MINISTRIES OF MAUREPAS, TURGOT, AND NECKER. CALONNE. ASSEMBLY OF NOTABLES. —THE MINISTRY OF BRIENNE—OPPOSITION BY THE PARLIAMENT OF PARIS, ITS EXILE AND RECAL—THE DUKE OF ORLEANS BANISHED THE COURT—ARREST OF COUNCILLOR D'ESPRÉMÉNIL—NECKER RECALLED TO FILL THE PLACE OF BRIENNE—NEW ASSEMBLY OF NOTABLES—DISCUSSIONS TO WHICH THE STATES-GENERAL GAVE RISE —CLUBS FORMED—THE PROXIMATE CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION—THE FIRST ELECTION OF DEPUTIES TO THE STATES-GENERAL—THE FIRING OF THE MANUFACTORY OF RÉVEILLON—THE DUKE OF ORLEANS; HIS CHARACTER.

WITH the revolutions of the French monarchy, history is well acquainted; it is well known that first the Greeks and then the Romans carried their arms and civilization among the half-savage Gauls; that after these conquerors, the barbarians established their military hierarchy; and that this system of government transferred from individuals to the land, became as it were permanently secured, and thus formed the feudal system. Power was then divided between the feudal chief, styled king, and sub-chiefs named vassals, who in their turn became kings over their own subjects. In our time, when a new spirit of inquiry has rendered us more acute in detecting the faults of others, we have learnt with sufficient certainty, that the possession of power was first disputed by the vassals, which those who are placed very near its reach are always inclined to do; that this power was afterwards divided between them,—thus forming the feudal anarchy; and that, finally, it returned to the throne, where it became concentrated in despotism under Louis XI., Richelieu, and Louis XIV. The condition of the French population became progressively ameliorated by industry, the first source of riches and freedom. First in an agricultural, afterwards in a commercial and manufacturing point of view, she acquired sufficient importance to form a distinct nation. When introduced in the character of a petitioner to the States-General, she appeared not but on her knees there to be reviled with pity and contempt*. Soon afterwards even Louis XIV. said that he would have no more of such abject assemblies, and declared it to the parliament, booted and with whip in hand. From this period a king was seen at the head of the state, fortified by a power badly defined in its theory but absolute in its practice, with grandees who had abandoned their feudal dignity in favour of the monarch, and disputed among themselves by intrigue that portion of the property of the people which was delivered into their hands; besides this, an immense population existed, having no connexion with this royal aristocracy, except that of an habitual submission and the payment of taxes. Between the court and the people parliaments intervened, invested with power to distribute justice, and to register the royal ordinances. Supreme authority is always disputed: when this is not the case in the lawfully constituted assemblies of the nation, it takes place in the very palace of the prince. It is a known fact, that by a refusal to register, the parliaments suspended the effect of the royal ordinances, which always finished by a "lit de justice*" and an agreement when the king was weak, and a perfect submission when he was strong. Louis had not even to bind himself by any articles, for under his reign no parliament dared make remonstrances. He dragged the nation along with him in his train, and she covered him with the glory of the wonders she wrought in war and the arts and sciences. Both subjects and monarch were unanimous, and drove towards the same end. But Louis XIV. had hardly expired, when the regent offered an opportunity to the parliament of revenging themselves of their long nonentity. The expressed desire of a monarch so respected during his life, was disregarded after his death, and his will violated. Power was now contested in earnest, and a long struggle commenced between the parliaments, the clergy, and the court, in presence of a nation exhausted by long wars

* In the States-general, the tiers état, or third estate, a class not dissimilar to the burgesses when first summoned to English parliaments, remained uncovered, and never spoke but on their knees: but Mignet tells us on the present occasion, that these days were past. Mignet, i. 31. *Transl.*

* This expression means no more than that the king seated on his throne in parliament (lit de justice), ordained the measure he desired to pass. *Transl.*

and weary of ministering to the caprices of its masters, alternately voluptuous and warlike, and sometimes both at once. Up to this time all the energies of the nation had been devoted to the service or pleasures of its monarch: they were now directed to their proper use,—the examination of their own interests. The human mind traverses incessantly from one object to another. From the theatre and the pulpit the genius of the French people hurried precipitately into the study of ethics and politics; and then of a sudden all was changed. Let the reader figure to himself the usurpers of every national right for a full century, disputing for a worn-out authority; the parliaments threatening the clergy, the clergy denouncing the parliaments; all contesting the power of the court; and the court careless and tranquil in the midst of this struggle, devouring the substance of the people, while surrounded by the greatest disorders; the nation enriched, and roused to a sense of its wrongs, administering to these contentions, the powerful, enlightened, and active population of France inflamed by the spirit of these divisions, profiting by all the disclosures of the contending parties, deprived of political rights, dogmatising in the most violent extravagant manner, for the subject matter of dispute was purely theoretical, and vainly tendering its riches and its blood to regain that station which the weakness of its governors had lost: such was the eighteenth century.

Its iniquity had reached its height when Louis XVI., equitable, moderate in his inclinations, carelessly educated, but naturally a benevolent prince, while yet very young, ascended the throne. He elevated an old courtier to the highest place in his counsels, and divided his confidence between Maurepas and the queen, an Austrian princess of lively and amiable disposition, who had obtained the greatest ascendency over him. But Maurepas and the queen not agreeing together, and the king yielding sometimes to his minister and sometimes to his wife, began very early to shew his unstable disposition. Not disguising from himself the state of his kingdom, he believed the philosophers on this point; but having been educated in severely religious principles, he was decidedly estranged from them. Public opinion, which at that time became clamorous, pointed out to him, as a proper person to call to his counsels, Turgot, a member of the Society of the Economists, a virtuous and simple man, of a steady character, of dull parts, but obstinate and reserved. Convinced of his honesty and charmed with his projects of reform, Louis XVI. often declared, "There are none but myself and Turgot who are the friends of the people." Nevertheless the reformations of Turgot were thwarted by the resistance of the nobles, who were interested in preserving all those kinds of abuses which that austere minister wished to destroy. Louis dismissed him with regret. During his whole life, which was nothing but one long martyrdom, he had the misfortune to perceive how good might be effected, and sincerely to desire it, but also to be destitute of the strength necessary to put it into execution.

The king, placed between the court, the parliament, and the public, exposed to intrigues and suggestions of every description, changed in succession all his ministers; and yielding finally to the public voice and the necessity of reform, called to the finances Necker, a Genevese who had accumulated great wealth as a banker, a partisan and disciple of Colbert, as Turgot had been of Sully. He was a skilful financier, and an upright economist, but a vain man, who set himself up as moderator and judge in every question, whether of philosophy, religion, or liberty; and deceived by the praises of his friends, and by the transports of a populace, flattered himself that he could lead the public mind into the adoption of his own views.

Necker re-established order in the finances, and found means sufficient for the large expenses of the American war. His genius being less comprehensive but more supple that than of Turgot, and trusting especially to the confidence of the capitalists, he obtained for the moment unexpected resources, and public confidence revived. But something more than financial artifices were necessary to terminate the embarrassment of the treasury, and he essayed the means of reform. The higher orders were not more tractable with him than they had been with Turgot: the parliaments, informed of his designs, combined against him, and compelled him to retire.

The conviction of abuses was universal; it was acknowledged on all sides; the king was apprised of it, and suffered by it cruelly. The courtiers who enjoyed the fruits of these abuses wished to have seen the termination of financial difficulties, so long as it did not cost them a single sacrifice. They harangued at the court, and there retailed their philosophical maxims; when at the chase, they affected to commiserate the petty oppressions exercised against the rustics; they have been even heard to applaud the freedom of the Americans, and received with marked respect young Frenchmen who returned from the New World. The parliaments also pompously discussed the interests of the people, stated in measured language the sufferings of the poor, yet nevertheless opposed an equal distribution of taxes, as well as the abolition of the relics of feudal barbarism. All spoke of the public good, little as they cared for it; and the people, not as yet distinguishing their true friends, applauded all those who resisted power, an enemy always before their eyes.

By discarding Turgot and Necker the state of things was not changed, financial distress was still the same; yet the intervention of the nation would have been for a long time dispensed with, but that the means of ministering to the prodigalities of the court were wanting. The difficulty, removed one moment by the dismissal of a minister, by a loan, or by the forced establishment of a tax, re-appeared the next with increased magnitude, as indeed does every neglected evil; and the time appeared fast approaching when it would be requisite to take a fearful but necessary step. A political intrigue brought forward Monsieur de Calonne, no favourite in the public opinion, for he had promoted the persecution of le Chalotais. Calonne, intelligent, brilliant, and fertile in resources, trusted to his genius and fortune, and delivered himself up to the future with the gayest carelessness. His idea was not to give way to the premature alarm, and not to prevent the evil until the very eve of its appearance. He gained over the court by his manners, in-

fluenced it by his anxiety to accord every thing, procured for the king and every one some moments of ease, and caused a short season of happiness and blind confidence, to succeed to the most dark and sinister appearances.

This future, on which every one had calculated, at last approached; decisive measures evidently became necessary. The people were unable to bear the weight of new taxes; and the public purse was empty. There was but one way of meeting the impending evil, a reduction of the civil list; and this measure not being sufficient, the including the nobility and clergy amongst the payers of taxes. The financial projects already attempted by Turgot and by Necker, and adopted by Calonne, did not appear to him likely to meet with the consent of the privileged orders; Calonne consequently determined to try the experiment of uniting them in an assembly composed entirely of *notables*, there to open his plans, and obtain his object, either by his address, or by the conviction of his arguments.

The too-confident minister was mistaken. The public opinion had not forgiven him for taking the places of Turgot and Necker. The people were delighted at the idea of a minister being rendered accountable, and supported the resistance of the *notables*. The most animated discussions took place. Calonne incurred the odium of attributing to his predecessors, and partly to Necker, the low state of the treasury. Necker replied and was banished, and the opposition only became the more vigorous. Calonne, with great calmness and presence of mind, withstood all his adversaries; and at his instigation Monsieur de Miroménil, keeper of the great seal, who had joined the parliaments, was deprived of his place. But his triumph only lasted two days. The king, who had a strong regard for him, engaged to more than he could perform, when he promised to support him. His resolution was shaken by the *notables*, who promised to accede to the plans of Calonne, if their execution was committed to a minister more upright and worthy of confidence. The queen, by the suggestions of the Abbé de Vermont, proposed a new minister, Monsieur de Brienne, Archbishop of Toulouse, one of the *notables* who had been most active in ruining Calonne, in the hopes of succeeding him.

The Archbishop of Toulouse, a man of obstinate mind and feeble character, had dreamt of the ministry from his boyhood, and pursued by every means this object of his ambition. His chief support was in the ladies, whom he endeavoured to please, and succeeded. He on every occasion boasted of his administration of Languedoc, and if he did not, on arriving at the ministry, obtain that favour which had surrounded Necker, he had in the eyes of the public the merit of making amends for Calonne. He was not at first prime minister, but became so soon. Seconded by Monsieur Lamoignon, keeper of the seals and the obstinate enemy of parliaments, he commenced his career with sufficient advantage. The *notables*, engaged by the promises they had made, consented with alacrity to all which they had before refused: the land-tax, the timber-tax, the suppression of *corvées*, and provincial assemblies, were all consented to with the greatest affectation of willingness. It was not the measures themselves, but their author, whom they pretended to have resisted; public opinion triumphed. Calonne was pursued with maledictions, and the *notables* invested with public favour, regretted nevertheless an honour gained at the price of such great sacrifices. If Monsieur de Brienne had now known how to make use of the advantages of his position; if he had pursued with activity the execution of those measures consented to by the *notables*, if he had presented them all at once and without delay to the parliament at that critical moment when consent on the part of the nobles seemed absolutely necessary, then was the time to have done so: for then the parliament, pressed on all sides, must have conceded every thing, and this measure, although partial and forced, would probably have prevented that struggle in which it was so soon engaged.

But nothing of the kind took place. By ill-timed delays time was given for repentance; edicts were presented singly, and the parliament were thus allowed time to discuss them, to gain courage, and recover from the advantage obtained over the *notables*. After long discussions, the act respecting the edict for the second abolition of the *corvées* *, was passed and registered, and also another, permitting the free exportation of grain. The greatest opposition was made to the land-tax subsidy, but it seemed dangerous by an open refusal to enlighten the public, and thus permit them to see that their opposition was purely from self-interest. Parliament at first merely hesitated, but afterwards, by making the land-tax subsidy and the timber-tax taken together the subject of one act, all difficulty was obviated, for by opposing the timber tax, which affected the bulk of the tax payers, the public interest seemed to be promoted, and under the cloak of this popular measure the question of the land-tax subsidy was easily passed by. During one sitting, where the peers were present, they loudly complained of the excesses, follies, and prodigalities of the court, and demanded a statement of its expenses. One member, playing upon the word, exclaimed, "It is not statements, but states-general that we want." This unexpected requirement struck every one with astonishment. Hitherto the resistance of the parliament had been occasioned by their own grievances; every kind of opposition, whether favourable or not to the popular cause, had been seconded, provided it was directed against the court, to which all the evils complained of were attributed. Nevertheless the real object of complaint was hardly as yet clearly defined: the parliaments had always possessed so little influence with government, that they complained rather from a habit of complaining, than from any idea that their remonstrances could occasion a revolution. One single expression suggested an unexpected termination, every one echoed the cry, and the states-general were loudly demanded.

D'Espréménil, a young councillor, a violent ora-

* Corvée was, in the language of the Feudists, the *Averapium*, days-work or blind-days, viz. drudging services performed by feudal tenants to their lords, in harvest and at other seasons. This was one of the most oppressive incidents of feudality; and bore hardest on the tiller of the soil. In England it was compounded for by a payment called *reap silver*, from a very early period. See Monastic and Social Life in the 12th century, p. 46. (*note.*)

tor, a reckless agitator, a demagogue in the parliaments, and aristocrat in the states-general, and who was afterwards declared to be in a state of insanity by a decree of the constituent assembly, this D'Espréménil, I say, showed himself on this occasion one of the most violent parliamentary declaimers. But the opposition was secretly conducted by Duport, a young man of distinguished talent, and of a firm and persevering character, who alone perhaps in the middle of these troubles, proposed to himself a definite object, and wished to lead his party, the court, and the nation, to an end entirely distinct from a parliamentary aristocracy.

The parliament was divided into old and young councillors. The first sought a countervailing balance against the royal authority for the honour of their own body; the latter, more ardent and more sincere, wished to introduce liberty into the state, without overturning, nevertheless, that political system under which they had been bred. The parliament made a grave declaration, declaring itself unauthorised to consent to taxes, and maintaining that that power solely belonged to the states-general; and it also demanded from the king an account of the public receipts and expenses.

This declaration of incompetency, and even of usurpation, for the parliament had until then arrogated to itself the right of consenting to taxes, astonished every one. The prelate minister irritated by this opposition, commanded the parliament to assemble immediately at Versailles, and had the two acts registered in a "lit de justice." (Aug. 6, 1787.) The parliament on their return to Paris, made protests, and ordered an inquiry into the prodigalities of Calonne. Suddenly a decision of the council broke up its proceedings, and banished it to Troyes. (Aug. 15, 1787.)

Such was the situation of things on the 15th day of August, 1787. The two brothers of the king, Monsieur and the Count d'Artois, were sent, one to the Court of Accounts, and the other to the Court of Aids, to have the edicts there registered. The first, who had become popular by the opinions he had manifested in the assembly of *notables*, was received by an immense crowd with acclamation, and reconducted to the Luxembourg in the midst of universal plaudits. The Count d'Artois, who was odious on account of the support he had given to Calonne, was saluted by murmurs of discontent; his suite was attacked, and he himself was obliged to have recourse to an armed force for his protection.

As to the parliaments*, at this time they were protected by numerous defenders, composed of lawyers and persons employed in official capacities in the palace, of clerks, students, and an active population, disposed to insurrection. To these natural allies of the parliaments were to be added those capitalists who apprehended a national bankruptcy, the enlightened classes who were devoted to all who formed an opposition, and lastly, the mob, which always ranges itself on the side of agitation. The disturbances assumed a grave aspect, so much so, that the constituted authorities found it difficult to repress them.

The parliament sitting at Troyes, assembled every day, and called the causes. Neither advocates nor solicitors appeared, and justice was suspended, an event which had often happened during the course of the century. In the meanwhile, the parliament remained in exile, and Mons. de Brienne was without money; he maintained with assurance that he should not want any, and tranquillized the court, who were uneasy on that sole account; but his funds soon became exhausted; and incapable of terminating his difficulties by an energetic resolution, he negotiated with some members of parliament. The conditions demanded were, the loan of 440 millions, the whole to be paid by equal yearly dividends in four years, at the end of which the states-general were to be convoked. At this price Brienne gave up the two taxes, the subject of so much discord; and being sure of the co-operation of some members, he trusted to the whole body, and the parliament was recalled on the 10th of September.

A royal sitting took place on the 20th of the same month; the king came in person to present an edict relative to the creation of a successive loan, and the convocation of the states-general in five years. The nature of this sitting was not explained, nor was it known whether it was a "lit de justice" or not. A solemn silence was preserved by the whole assembly, whose faces were clouded with melancholy. The Duke of Orleans rose, his features agitated with all the marks of violent emotion. He addressed himself to the king, and demanded, if this assembly was a "lit de justice," or a free consultation? "It is a royal sitting," replied the king. The councillors Fréteau, Sabatier, and D'Espréménil, spoke after the Duke of Orleans, and declaimed with their usual violence. The recording of the edicts was immediately forced. Fréteau and Sabatier were banished to the isles of Hyères, and the Duke of Orleans to Villers-Cotterets. The states-general were discharged for five years.

Such were the principal events of the year 1787. The year 1788 commenced by new hostilities. On the 4th of January the parliament passed an act against "lettres de cachet," and for the recall of exiled persons. The king annulled this act, and the parliament confirmed it anew.

During this time the Duke of Orleans, exiled to Villers-Cotterets, was unable to support his banishment with resignation. This prince, embroiled with the court, had reconciled himself with public opinion, which had not at first regarded him favourably. But being devoid either of the dignity of a prince or the firmness of a tribune, he could not endure the slightest pain, and to obtain his recall, condescended to solicit the good offices of the queen, his known enemy.

Brienne, although irritated by the obstacles he had met with, had not the energy to overcome them. Weak in Europe against Prussia, to which he had sacrificed Holland; powerless in France against the parliament and the grandees of the state, he was no longer supported by any save the queen, and moreover was frequently disabled from attending to business by bad health. He could neither re-

* The parliaments of France bore scarcely any analogy to the English parliament. The French parliaments were supreme courts, assigned by charter and ancient prescription, to cities and provinces, within which their jurisdiction was absolute. The parliament at Rouen was termed the *Exchequer*. *Transl.*

press revolts, or put into execution the reductions decreed by the king; and in spite of the approaching exhaustion of the treasury, he affected an inconceivable security. Nevertheless, in the middle of so many difficulties, he did not neglect to provide for himself new offices, and to load his family with fresh dignities.

Lamoignon, the keeper of the seals, not so weak, but possessing less influence than the archbishop of Toulouse, concerted with him a new plan for the accomplishment of their chief object—that of striking a blow at the political power of the parliament, for there was the principal seat of power at that period. It was necessary to keep this secret. All was prepared in silence: sealed letters were sent to the commandants of the provinces; the press where the edicts were prepared was surrounded by guards. It was intended that this project should not be known till the moment of its promulgation to the parliaments. The time approached, and a report was spread abroad that a great political act was in preparation. The councillor D'Espréménil succeeded in corrupting, by money, a printer's workman to procure him a copy of the edicts. He then proceeded immediately to the palace, assembled his colleagues, and boldly announced to them the ministerial project (May 1, 1788.) According to this project, six great bailiwicks* were to be established within the district of the parliament, whose office was to be that of restraining their too extensive jurisdiction; the power of pronouncing final judgment, and of registering laws and edicts, was transferred to a full court, composed of peers, prelates, magistrates, and military officers, all chosen by the king. The captain of the guard also was to have had a deliberative voice. This plan militated against the judicial power of the parliament, and annihilated altogether its political power. The entire body, astonished at this proceeding, were at a loss how to meet it. It could not deliberate on a measure which had not been submitted to it, nor passively submit to such a blow without resistance. In this embarrassment it had recourse to an expedient which in respect of the occasion discovered great firmness and ability—that of revising and re-establishing, by an express act, all the constituent laws of the monarchy, not forgetting to comprehend in this number its very existence and rights. By this measure, it by no means anticipated the supposed designs of government, and parliament gained its object, and maintained all it had a right to maintain.

It was in consequence declared on the 5th of May by the parliament of Paris:

"That France is a monarchy governed by the king, according to the laws; and that these laws, many of which are fundamental, comprehend and settle, 1st. The right of the reigning family to the throne, descending from male to male by order of primogeniture; 2d, the right of the nation freely to grant subsidies by the organ of the states-general regularly convened and constituted; 3d, the customs and capitularies of the provinces; 4th, the permanency of magistrates; 5th, the right of courts to execute in every province the ordinances of the king, but not to order their registry, unless they be in conformity with the constitutional laws of the province, as well as the fundamental laws of the state; 6th, the right of each citizen never in any manner to be delivered up to any other than his natural judges, who are those which the law appoints; and 7th, that right, without which all others are useless, of every individual, not to be arrested, whatsoever the order be, unless for the purpose of being committed without delay to the custody of judges exercising a competent jurisdiction. The said court protested against every attempt that should be directed against the principles hereunder expressed."

To this energetic resolution the minister replied by empty threats, a course on all occasions badly advised and inoperative: he used rough language against certain members of the parliament. D'Espréménil and Goislart de Monsalbert, hearing that they were menaced, took refuge in the body of the assembled parliament. An officer, named Vincent D'Agout, proceeded there at the head of a company, and not knowing the magistrates named in his warrant, called them by their names. The profoundest silence reigned at first in the assembly; then the members cried out that they were all of them one D'Espréménil. At last, the real D'Espréménil declared himself, and followed the officer commissioned to arrest him. The tumult was then at its height; the people accompanied the magistrates with acclamations. Three days after, the king, holding a "lit de justice," had the edicts registered, and the princes and peers assembled presented the image of that plenary court which was to succeed the parliaments.

The Châtelet passed immediately a decree against the edicts. The parliament of Rheims declared those infamous who entered the plenary court. At Grenoble the inhabitants defended their magistrates against two regiments. The troops themselves, excited to disobedience by the military nobles, soon refused to act; and when the commandant of the Dauphiné assembled his colonels to know if their soldiers could be depended on, they all kept silence. The youngest, who was interrogated first, said that his, commencing from the colonel, were not to be trusted. To this resistance the minister opposed the decrees of the grand council, which annulled the decisions of the sovereign courts, and condemned eight of them to exile.

The court, harassed by the nobility, who had occasioned the hostility of the parliament, by appealing to the people, had recourse in its turn to the same means. It resolved to call the *tiers état* to its aid, as the kings of France had done before to exterminate feudality. The convocation of the states-general was therefore hurried on with all possible speed; precedents were ordered to be searched as to the best mode of their assembling; authors and learned societies were invited to impart their intelligence; and whilst the assembled clergy declared on their part that their convocation must be hastened, the court accepting the defiance, at the same time suspended the meeting of the plenary court, and fixed the opening of the states-general for the first of May, 1789. At this juncture, the Archbishop of Toulouse retired, (Aug. 24, 1788,) who, by hardy projects inefficiently executed, had provoked a resistance, which ought neither to have been excited or suppressed. In retiring he left the

* *Bailliage*, the jurisdiction or precinct of a bailiff or magistrate appointed by the crown. *Transl.*

treasury in poverty, the rents of the Hotel de Ville suspended, all the authorities at war, and all the provinces in arms. As for himself, enriched with eight hundred thousand francs from benefices, with the archbishopric of Sens, and with a cardinal's hat, if he did not amend the commonwealth, he at least made his own fortune. As his last advice, he recommended the king to recal Necker to the ministry of the finances, in order that his popularity might be effectual to check those popular encroachments which seemed to be inevitable.

It was during the two years 1787 and 88, that the French nation first conceived the idea of advancing from idle theories to practice. The struggle of the chief authorities excited this desire, and afforded the means of satisfying it. During the whole of this century, the parliament had been attacking the clergy, and discovering their transalpine inclinations; after the clergy, the parliament next attacked the court, pointed out its abuses of power, and impeached its irregularities. Threatened with reprisals, and in its turn disturbed in its existence, it proceeded at last to restore those prerogatives to the nation which the court had been desirous of stripping itself, in order that they should be revested in an extraordinary tribunal. Having thus apprised the people of their rights, the parliament exerted every effort to incite them to insurrection; on their part, the high clergy by issuing mandates, the nobility in inciting the military to insubordination, had joined their efforts to those of the magistracy, and stirred up the people to arms in defence of their privileges.

The court, pressed upon by these different enemies, made but a weak resistance. Feeling the necessity of action, and deferring always the opportunity, it had extinguished sometimes some abuses, rather for the advantage of the treasury than the interest of the people, and relapsed again into inactivity. Finally, being attacked on all sides, and observing that the nobility called the people to the contest, it also resolved upon introducing them into the convocation of the states-general; and, although opposed during the whole century to the spirit of philosophy, the court on this occasion appealed to its principles, and determined to deliver up to its examination the constitution of the kingdom. Thus the principal authorities presented the singular spectacle of unjust usurpers, who, having a long time disputed the right of a possession in presence of its lawful owner, at last conclude by calling upon him as an umpire in the contest.

Things were in this situation, when Necker reentered the ministry. (Aug. 1. 1788.) Confidence accompanied him; credit was forthwith re-established; the most pressing difficulties of the treasury were discharged. By various expedients he provided for the necessary expenses until the convocation of the states-general, which was the remedy anxiously called for by all parties.

Great questions began now to be agitated relative to its organization. It was asked what part the *tiers état* would take; if it would appear there as an equal or as a petitioner; whether it should possess an equal number of representatives with the two first ranks; whether its deliberations should be carried on individually or collectively, and whether the *tiers état* should have but one voice against the two voices of the nobility and clergy.

The first question agitated was that of the number of deputies, and never did a philosophical controversy of the eighteenth century excite equal ferment. The absolute importance of the question heated the minds of all. A concise, energetic, bitter writer took in this discussion the place which the great geniuses of the age had occupied in philosophical quarrels. The Abbé Sieyes, in a publication which gave a strong impulse to the public spirit, asks, What is the *tiers état*? and answers, Nothing. What ought it to be?—Every thing!

The states of the Dauphiné met in spite of the court. The two first ranks, more powerful and more popular in this country than any where else, decided that the representatives of the *tiers état* should be equal to that of the nobility and clergy. The parliament of Paris seeing already the consequence of its imprudent provocations, perceived that the *tiers état* would not come as an auxiliary, but as a controlling power; and in registering the edict of convocation, it enjoined as an express clause the maintenance of the precedents of 1614, which virtually annulled the influence of the third class. Having already lost the popular favour by the difficulties it had opposed to the edict of toleration to the protestants, the parliament was now entirely unmasked, and the court completely avenged. They were the first to experience the instability of popular favours: and if at a later period the nation became ungrateful to her favourites whom she abandoned one after another, on this occasion she certainly acted justly against the parliament, for it stopped short before she had recovered any one of her rights.

The court, not daring to decide by its own authority these important questions, or rather wishing to deprive the two first ranks of their popularity to its own advantage, asked their advice, with the intention of not following it, if (as was probable) this advice was against the *tiers état*. A new assembly of the *notables** was convoked, in which all questions relative to the holding of the states-general were agitated. The dispute was animated. On the one side ancient observances, and on the other the natural rights of man were upheld. In reference even to the former, the *tiers état* had still the advantage; for to the forms of 1614, cited by the nobility, were opposed other precedents of a still more ancient date. Thus in some assemblies, and on certain points, votes had been collected individually; sometimes the deliberations of the states had been carried on by province and not by rank; oftentimes the deputies of the *tiers état* had equalled in number those of the nobility and clergy: how then could the ancient usages be alleged? had not the powers of the realm been in a continual state of revolution? Had not the royal authority itself been subject to constant vicissitude? at one time sovereign, then vanquished and despoiled, afterwards raising itself anew by the aid of the people, and finally concentrating all power in itself. The clergy were informed that if they went back to the ancient times, they were no longer an order; in respect of the nobles, it was agreed that the possessors of fiefs

* The Assembly opened at Versailles on the 6th November, and closed its session on the 8th December following.

alone could be elected, and that therefore the majority of them ought to be excluded; in regard of the parliament itself, that they were but the unfaithful officers of royalty; and all of them were told that the French constitution was nothing but one long revolution, during which each power had in turn the predominance; that all had been innovation; and that in such a wide conflict reason ought alone to decide.

The *tiers état* comprehended nearly the whole of the nation, all the useful, industrious, enlightened classes; although the *tiers état* did possess but a portion of the landed interest, at least they had farmed it all, and, according to the dictates of reason, it was not unreasonable that there should be granted to this order a number of deputies equal to that of the two other orders.

The assembly of the *notables* declared itself against this doubling of the *tiers état*, as they called it. Only one committee, the same over which Monsieur the king's brother presided, voted for it. The court, then taking into consideration, to use its own expression, the advice of the minority, the opinion pronounced by many princes of the blood, the desire of the three orders of the Dauphiné, the demand of the provincial assemblies, the example of many countries of the state, the counsel of several authors, and the wish expressed by a great number of addresses, ordered that the total number of deputies should be a thousand at least; that it should be formed as reason required, and consist of the population and tax-payers selected from every bailiwick; and that the number of deputies of the *tiers état* should be equal to that of the two first orders joined together. (Decree of the Council of 27th December, 1788.)

This declaration excited an universal enthusiasm. Attributed to Necker, it gained him the favour of the nation, and the hatred of the great. Nevertheless this declaration decided nothing as to the voting individually or collectively, but impliedly it reduced the question to one point, for it was useless to augment the number of voices, if they were not to be counted. Thus the third class obtained virtually that which had been expressly denied them. It also gave an idea of the weakness of the court, and even of Necker himself. This court presented such an assemblage of various opinions, that it became impossible to attain a definite result. As for the king himself, although equitable and desirous of pleasing, he was too mistrustful of his own abilities; and, though willing to redress the grievances of his people, he was seized sometimes with panical and superstitious terrors, and thought he could see anarchy and impiety marching hand-in-hand with liberty and toleration. The spirit of philosophy, in its first flight, had committed some errors; and a timid and religious king naturally became terrified. Thus sinking every moment under weakness, terror, and vacillation of mind, Louis XVI. determined upon every sacrifice, so far as he himself was concerned, but he had not resolution enough to impose any upon others: a victim to his leaning towards the court, and of his complaisance to the queen, he expiated faults which were not of his own commission, but which became his as being the head of the state. The queen, devoted to her pleasures, revelling in the empire of her own charms, would have been perfectly happy if her husband had been tranquil, and the treasury full, and herself adored by the court and her subjects. At one time, when the necessity appeared urgent, she joined the king in endeavouring to bring about a reform; while, at another, when she imagined the supreme authority to be menaced, and her court friends despoiled, she stayed the king's intentions, caused the popular minister to be dismissed, and destroyed all means and hope of doing good. Above all, she yielded to the influence of one party of the nobility, who lived in the royal circle, and were fostered in its luxuries and excesses. This court nobility, as did the queen herself, undoubtedly wished that the king should have the means of indulging their prodigalities; and, from this motive, were the enemy of parliaments when they refused the supplies, but became their friends when they defended their privileges, by refusing, under specious pretexts, their assent to the territorial subsidy. In the midst of these contrary influences, the king, not daring to look danger in the face, to judge of abuses and destroy them by his authority, yielded alternately to the court and public opinion, and satisfied neither the one nor the other.

If, indeed, during the whole of the eighteenth century, when the philosophic spirits of the nation assembled in a green walk of the Tuilleries, contenting themselves merely with expressing their hearty desires for the success of Frederic and the Americans, for Turgot and for Necker; if when their ambition was not to govern states, but simply to enlighten princes, and their foresight merely perceived a revolution at a distance, which the signs of discontent and the absurdity of the government institutions made sufficiently presumable,—if at this period the king had spontaneously introduced some moderation into his expenses, and given some guarantees, all would have been tranquillized for a long period, and Louis XVI. would have been adored as the equal of Marcus Aurelius. But when all the authorities found themselves degraded by a long struggle, and all the abuses of the state unveiled by an assembly of *notables*, and when the nation, made a party to the quarrel, had conceived the hope and the will of acquiring importance, she haughtily insisted upon her claim. The states-general had been promised to the nation; she demanded that the period of its convocation should be hastened; the period having been accelerated, the nation claimed the preponderance; it had been refused her; but by the doubling her representatives, the means of victory had been imparted. Thus the very concessions of the government were ungracious, and were rather forced from it than freely granted. The nation felt her strength, and determined upon attaining all that could be grasped. A continual opposition urged her ambition, and quickly rendered her insatiable. But even now, if a great minister, in giving strength to the king, conciliating the queen, and keeping in check the privileged orders, had anticipated, and satiated at once the popular ambition, by becoming himself the organ of the gift of a free constitution, and had satisfied the thirst for action which the nation experienced, by calling it, not to reform the state, but to discuss the annual interests of a state already formed, perhaps the fearful struggle which ensued might have been prevented. Such a minister would

have anticipated rather than yielded to difficulties, and above all, would have made it his object rather to silence than listen to the numerous pretensions of all ranks. The times called for a man of an energetic mind, able and willing to act up to his conviction, and such a man, bold, powerful, and perhaps passionate, would have intimidated a court reluctant to assent to his measures. To please the public, without sacrificing ancient pretensions, and to satisfy the pressing wants of the treasury, the court took half-measures. It chose a minister half-philosopher and only half-bold, who enjoyed an immense popularity, because half popular intentions in an agent of power, went beyond all the hopes, and excited the enthusiasm of a people whom, shortly after, their demagogue leaders could hardly satisfy.

The approaching crisis threw the whole kingdom into an universal ferment. Assemblies were formed all over France, from the example of England, under the denomination of *clubs*. Abuses to be destroyed, reforms to be made, and a constitution to be formed, were the only subjects there discussed. This examination into the state of the country produced a general irritation. In fact the state of politics and economy were intolerable. All was privilege; in individuals, in classes, cities, provinces, and even in trades. The industry and genius of man was everywhere shackled. Civil, ecclesiastical, and military dignities were exclusively reserved for certain classes, and in those classes for certain individuals. No one could enter into a profession without certain titles and certain pecuniary conditions. Cities had their privileges for the assessment, receipt, and proportion of taxes, and for the choice of magistrates. Even crown gifts, converted by reversions into family property, hardly permitted the monarch to indulge in preferences. There only remained to him the liberty of conferring some pecuniary donations, and he has been seen obliged to dispute with the Duke de Coigny respecting the abolition of an useless office*. Every thing, then, was permanently established in certain hands, and on all sides the small number were opposed to the great majority who were despoiled. The expenses of the state weighed on one class alone. The nobility and clergy possessed nearly two-thirds of the land. The remainder, the property of the people, paid a multitude of feudal rights to the nobility, and tithes to the clergy, and was exposed to the devastations of noble hunting parties and of game preserves. All taxes on articles of consumption weighed upon the majority, and consequently on the people. The mode of collecting them was extremely vexatious; the gentry were, with impunity, in arrears; the people, on the contrary, exposed to every harsh severity, were condemned to imprisonment if their produce was insufficient, and though they nourished with their sweat, and defended by their blood, the higher classes of society, they themselves could hardly, with the greatest difficulty, obtain the bare means of existence. The lot of the citizens, an enlightened and industrious class, was certainly less unhappy than that of the people; but yet, while enriching the kingdom by their industry, and adorning it by their talents, they were precluded from all those advantages which they had a right to enjoy. Justice, administered in some provinces by the gentry, and in the royal jurisdictions by magistrates who purchased their offices, was slow, often partial, always ruinous, and above all, cruel in criminal prosecutions. Individual liberty was violated by *lettres de cáchet*, and the liberty of the press by the royal censors. Finally, the state, ill-defended from without, betrayed by the mistresses of Louis XV., and compromised by the weakness of the ministers of Louis XVI., had been recently dishonoured in Europe by the shameful sacrifice of Holland and of Poland.

* See the Memoirs of Bouillé.

The masses of the population had begun already to agitate; riots took place many times during the altercations of the parliaments, particularly on the retirement of the Archbishop of Toulouse; his effigy was burnt by the populace, and the armed force which endeavoured to disperse the mob, were insulted and even attacked; agitators were insufficiently prosecuted, the ferment was universal, and the excited mind of the public was full of the idea of an approaching revolution. The parliament and the nobility already saw that the arms they had given to the people would be turned against themselves. In Britany, the doubling of the *tiers* was opposed by the noblesse, who had refused to nominate deputies; and the citizens of that district, who had been such powerful opponents to the court, now turned against the noblesse, and terrible conflicts ensued. The court, not thinking itself yet thoroughly avenged on the noblesse of Britany*, not only refused them its aid, but imprisoned some of their members who came to Paris to require assistance.

The elements themselves seemed to join in the general turbulence. A hail storm, on the 13th of July, had destroyed the harvests, and rendered the provisioning of Paris most difficult, in addition to the distraction that appeared to be brewing. All the activity of commerce was scarcely sufficient to collect the quantity of provisions necessary for that great capital; and an apprehension gained ground, that when confidence in the public wealth was shaken, and communications with the provinces interrupted by political tumults, the very means of subsistence would hardly be found. Since the severe winter which followed the disasters of Louis XIV., and which immortalized the charity of Fenelon, a more rigorous one than that of 1788 and 1789 had not been witnessed. A benevolence equal to that which then shone forth in the most affecting manner was not sufficient to alleviate the miseries of the people. Destitute vagabonds, without money or food, might be seen crowding together in the streets of Versailles and Paris, displaying their misery and nakedness in solicitation of the public charity, and appearing, on the slightest symptom of every tumult, to take part in the fray and seek to profit by chance, always favourable to those who have every thing to gain, even to brand for the passing day.

Thus every thing conspired to bring about a revolution. The events of an entire century had contributed to unveil abuses; the last two years had excited a general spirit of revolt; and the interference of the populace in the quarrel of the

* See the Memoirs of Bouillé.

privileged orders, had disciplined the popular mobs. A concurrence of political circumstances and natural calamities seemed also to hasten the impending catastrophe, whereof the period might have been delayed, although the fulfilment would, sooner or later, become inevitable.

It was in the midst of these circumstances that the elections took place. They were tumultuous in some provinces, contested throughout, but carried on with great unanimity and order at Paris. In the distribution of the lists there was a spirit of unity and mutual understanding; merchants, lawyers, and men of letters, astonished to find themselves for the first time associated together, by degrees became elevated to the same level by the spirit of liberty which united them. The first act of their authority was the re-nomination of the committees constituted by the king; but as this was merely done to manifest and confirm their powers, the persons who filled these several offices were still left in possession of their places. One of the most celebrated of the electors was Bailly: this modest and learned man quitted his retreat at Chaillôt to take part at this interesting crisis in the public affairs: a stranger to intrigue, and possessed of a high sense of the importance of his noble mission, he presented himself singly and on foot before the assembly. He stopped on his route upon the terrace of the Feuillans; an unknown young man approached him with respect. "You will be nominated," said he to him. "I know nothing of it," replied Bailly; "this honour ought neither to be refused nor solicited." The modest academician resumed his walk, presented himself at the assembly, and was nominated successively elector and deputy.

The election of Count Mirabeau was tumultuous; rejected by the nobility, and welcomed by the *tiers état*, he threw Provence, his country, into agitation, and came shortly afterwards and presented himself at Versailles.

The court did not wish to influence the elections; they were not sorry to see in them a great number of curates, and reckoned on their opposition to the great dignitaries of the church, and at the same time their respect for the throne: in other respects they did not foresee all; and in the deputies of the *tiers* descried rather the adversaries of the nobility than of themselves. The Duke of Orléans was accused of taking an active part to cause himself and his partisans to be nominated. Already signalized among the adversaries of the court, an ally of the parliaments, and appealed to by the popular party as their leader, whether he liked it or not, he was accused of many secret plots. A deplorable scene took place at the Faux-bourg St. Antoine, and as an originator is readily ascribed to all events, he was accused of it. Réveillon, a manufacturer of painted paper, who from the extent of his business maintained large workshops, improved our manufacture, and gave subsistence to three hundred workmen, was accused of intending to reduce his wages to one half. The populace threatened to burn his house. They were, however, dispersed, but returned the next day; the house was attacked, burned, and destroyed. (27th April, 1789.) In spite of the menaces thrown out the evening before by the assailants; in spite of the appointed rendezvous which had been openly made, the authorities did not interfere till very late, and then acted with excessive vigour. They waited till the people were masters of the house, and then attacked them with fury, and slaughtered a great number of a ferocious and intrepid class of men, who afterwards appeared upon every occasion of tumult, and were known by the name of *brigands*.

All parties mutually accused each other of the blame of this transaction. The court was reproached with its tardy interference at first, and its cruelty afterwards; and it was supposed that the people had been intentionally allowed to commence their attack, for the purpose of making an example, and testing the fidelity of the soldiery. The money found upon the persons of some of the rioters at Réveillon's house, together with the expressions which escaped from some of them, created a suspicion that they were instigated by some concealed influence; and the enemies of the popular party accused the Duke of Orléans of having wished to make a trial of these revolutionary forces.

This prince had received from his birth the most felicitous qualifications; he was the inheritor of immense riches, but, having devoted himself to evil pursuits, he had abused all these gifts of nature and fortune. Devoid of consistency in his character, alternately careless of the public opinion, and greedy of popularity, he was daring and ambitious one day, and submissive and fluctuating the next. Being embroiled with the queen, he became an enemy to the court. When parties began to form, he allowed them to make use of his name, and even, it is said, his money. Flattered with a confused prospect of the future, he did enough to make himself the subject of accusation, but not enough to succeed; and if his partisans really had projects, they should have despaired of success, from his inconstant ambition.

THE STATES GENERAL.

CHAPTER II.

THE CONVOCATION AND OPENING OF THE STATES-GENERAL—THE DISCUSSION AS TO THE VERIFICATION OF POWERS, AND AS TO THE VOTING INDIVIDUALLY OR COLLECTIVELY—THE ORDER OF THE TIERS ÉTAT DECLARES ITSELF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY—THE HALL OF THE STATES IS CLOSED, THE DEPUTIES MEET IN ANOTHER PLACE—THE OATH AT THE TENNIS COURT, (JEU DE PAUME)—ROYAL SITTING (SÉANCE ROYALE) OF THE TWENTY-THIRD OF JUNE—THE ASSEMBLY CONTINUE THEIR DELIBERATIONS IN SPITE OF THE KING'S COMMANDS—DEFINITIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE THREE ORDERS—THE FIRST OPERATIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY—POPULAR TUMULTS AT PARIS—THE MOB RESCUE THE GUARDS CONFINED AT THE ABBAYE—SECRET PLOTS OF THE COURT; A CONGREGATION OF MILITARY TOWARDS PARIS—DISMISSAL OF NECKER—THE EVENTS OF THE TWELFTH, THIRTEENTH, AND FOURTEENTH OF JULY, 1789—THE STORMING OF THE BASTILLE—THE KING JOINS THE ASSEMBLY AT VERSAILLES AND AFTERWARDS AT PARIS—THE RECAL OF NECKER.

THE moment of the convocation finally arrived; in the common danger the highest ranks drew near the court, and crowded about the princes of the blood, and the queen. They endeavoured to gain by their flatteries the country-gentlemen, and laughed behind their backs at their rusticity; the clergy used every effort to gain over the plebeians of their order, and the military nobility those of their own. The parliaments, who had thought to occupy the highest place in the states-general, began to fear that their ambition would be thwarted. The deputies of the *tiers état*, strong in their superiority of talent, and the energetic expression of their papers, supported also by their continual communications with the provinces, and even stimulated by the doubts many entertained of their success, determined to assume a commanding appearance.

The king alone, who had not enjoyed a moment's rest since the commencement of his reign, regarded the meeting of the states-general as the termination of his embarrassments. For himself he was very little jealous of his authority; but he looked upon it as his duty to the queen and his children to keep his patrimony inviolate; and had it not been for this consideration would have been well content to resign part of it, and throw the cares of government from his own shoulders upon those of the nation. He therefore hastened with joy the preparations for the convocation. A spacious hall had been hurriedly prepared for the occasion; the costumes were fixed upon; and an humiliating regulation imposed upon the *tiers état*. Men are not less jealous of their dignity than of their rights; with a just pride therefore their papers forbade the deputies to submit to any degrading ceremonial. This new fault of the court originated, as did all the others, in a desire of maintaining at least the shadow of power when the substance was no more; and this might well excite a deep indignation, at the very moment when the nation was, as it were, measuring it with its eye, previous to commencing the attack.

On the 4th of May, the evening before the opening of the states-general, a solemn procession took place. The king, the three estates, and all the dignitaries of the state, proceeded together to the church of Notre Dame. The court displayed extraordinary magnificence: the two first estates were dressed with splendour: princes, dukes, and peers, were attired in purple, and wore hats and feathers: the deputies of the *tiers*, clothed in simple black cloaks, followed; and in spite of their exterior humble appearance, seemed strong in number, and elate with hope. It was observed that the Duke of Orléans, who followed in the rear of the nobility, lagged behind and mixed with the first of the deputies of the *tiers*.

This national, military, and religious procession; the pious chaunts and warlike music which accompanied its march, and above all, the greatness of the event it celebrated, deeply affected the hearts of all. The sermon of the bishop of Nanci, which was full of generous sentiments, was applauded with enthusiasm, in spite of the sanctity of the place, and the presence of the king. Great assemblies elevate the soul, divest it of selfishness, and fill it with sympathy. A general excitement pervaded all bosoms; the enmities of all hearts seemed to be suddenly appeased; and humanity and patriotism appeared, for the moment, to be the paramount sentiments*.

The opening of the states took place the next day, May the 5th, 1789. At this solemnity, the king was seated on an elevated throne; the queen near him; the court in stalls; the two first orders of the state on the two sides; and the *tiers état* at the bottom of the hall, or lower benches†. A general movement took place on the appearance of Count Mirabeau, and indeed his look and manner made an impression on the assembly. The members of the *tiers état*, in spite of the established usage, covered their heads with the two other orders. The king made a speech in which he recommended disinterestedness to some, prudence to others, and spoke to all of his love for his people. The keeper of the seals, Barentin, then addressed the assembly; and was followed by Necker, who read a report upon the state of the kingdom; spoke at great length of the finances, which he charged with a deficiency of

* See Note 1 in the Appendix.

† Gradins, disposed in the form of an amphitheatre, were filled with a brilliant assembly of spectators; the deputies were introduced and arranged according to the order established in the last convocation, in 1614. The clergy sat on the right, the nobles on the left, the commons in front of the throne. Aimon. i. 183.

fifty-six millions; and fatigued by his prolixity those whom he did not wound by his censures.

The next day, the deputies of each order had separate chambers assigned them. Besides the common hall, which was sufficiently spacious to contain the three orders together, two others had been constructed for the nobility and clergy. The common hall was appropriated to the *tiers état;* by which arrangement they possessed the advantage of being in their own place and that of the estates at the same time. The first thing to be done was the verification of powers. Whether this should be a general, or separate transaction effected by each order independent of the others, was the question now discussed. The deputies of the *tiers*, pretending it was of consequence that each chamber of the states-general should be assured of the legitimacy of the other two, demanded a common verification; while the nobility and clergy, wishing to maintain a distinction of ranks, insisted that each order should constitute itself separately. This question was not that of individual voting, for the powers might be verified in common, and the votes collected separately, but it greatly resembled it. It caused, as might have been foreseen and prevented by terminating the difference beforehand, a division on the very first day. But the court never had firmness enough either to deny or accord anything; and besides, perhaps, hoped to turn the quarrels of the states to its own advantage.

The deputies of the *tiers état*, having taken their places in the common chamber, remained inactive, waiting, they said, to be joined by their colleagues. On the contrary, the nobility and clergy, having retired each to their respective hall, discussed the question of the verification. The clergy voted for a separate verification by a majority of 133 against 114, and the nobility by a majority of 168 against 114. The *tiers état* were still unmoved, and continued the next day the conduct of the former evening. They avoided every measure that could give countenance to the idea of their being a separate order. For this reason, when they sent some of their members to the two other chambers, no express mission was given them: these members were sent to the nobility and clergy, to inform them, that the deputies of the third class were waiting for them in the common chamber. The nobility, not at that instant sitting, returned no answer; the clergy were assembled, and offered to nominate commissioners to reconcile the differences which had arisen between them. This they immediately did, and invited the nobility to do the same. In this altercation, indeed, the clergy showed a disposition very different from that of the nobility; and although they had suffered more than any other of the privileged classes from the attacks of the eighteenth century, their very political existence contested, and their revenue diminished by the increase of curates, still their profession suggested moderate measures, and accordingly they acted, as we shall presently see, in the character of peacefulness and moderation.

The nobility, on the contrary, refused all terms, and declined to name commissioners. Less prudent than the clergy, conceiving loftier notions of their rights, they disregarded moderation, and thought that everything must give way to their absolute superiority. These men, who did not excuse passion in others, abandoned themselves to their own intemperance, and in public committed the most violent extravagances. Casalès and D'Espréménil, who had both been lately ennobled, adopted the most outrageous notions which they had concocted at particular meetings. In vain did the minority, composed of men more wise or more prudently ambitious endeavour to enlighten the nobility; they would listen to no counsel, but talked of defending their rights with their blood and lives; and added, that their cause was one of right and justice. These extravagancies had no effect on the *tiers état;* they still continued immovably obstinate, and received every insult with the greatest calmness; they nursed their anger in silence, allowed no symptom of it to appear, and were careful that their whole conduct should be marked by discretion and firmness; and they thus gained the plaudits of the galleries, which, though first designed for the court, were soon filled by the people.

Many days had already elapsed; the clergy had in vain laid several snares to entrap the *tiers état*, in seeking to involve them in certain acts tending to compromise them as a constituted order. But the *tiers état* had constantly rejected these questions: none but the indispensable measures of its own interior government were transacted by the *tiers état;* the appointment of a *senior*, or president, and associates to collect the votes, were almost their sole act. All letters addressed to them were left unopened; and they declared themselves to form not merely an order, but *an assembly of citizens, associated by legitimate authority, waiting to be joined by other citizens.*

The nobility, after their first refusal to nominate conciliatory commissioners, at last consented to send them; but the instructions their commissioners received were rendered useless, inasmuch as they were ordered to declare that the nobility would not depart from their decision of the 6th of May, which insisted on a separate verification. The clergy, on the contrary, consistent with themselves, suspended the verification which they had commenced in their own chamber, and declared themselves not constituted during the conferences of the conciliatory commissioners. The conferences were at last opened: the clergy were silent, the deputies of the commons set forth their reasons with calmness; those of the nobility with violence. The latter became only exasperated by the dispute; and the *tiers état*, determined to yield nothing, secretly rejoiced at the ill-success of the conference. The nobility were daily assured by their commissioners, that the advantage in every conference was on their side; this proportionably exalted their pride; nevertheless a passing glimmer of prudence made the two first orders voluntarily renounce their pecuniary exemptions. The *tiers état* accepted of this concession, but persisted in preserving its inaction, and in its constant demand of a common verification. The conferences still continued open; a new method of adjustment was proposed: that of confirming the powers of the whole states by commissioners selected from the three ranks. The delegates of the nobility expressly refused to assent to this arrangement, and they retired without fixing a day for a new conference. Thus all accommodation was broken off. On the same day the nobility passed a resolution, by which they now

The *tiers-état* disclaim being a separate order.

Consequent disputes, which the clergy are unable to reconcile.

declared that, for the present session, they should separately verify; but that it should be left to the states to determine upon some other mode in future. This resolution was communicated to the commons on the 27th of May. They had been assembled since the 5th; twenty-two days had elapsed, and they had done nothing. It now seemed time to determine upon something. Mirabeau, who was the chief mover of the popular party, observed that the consideration of the public good had been too long retarded; that something must be finally decided on. He proposed then, (after the communication of the decision of the nobility,) that the clergy should be called *on for* the last time to explain themselves, and declare whether they would or would not join the commons. This proposition was instantly adopted. The deputy, Target, at the head of a numerous deputation, entered the chamber of the clergy. "The gentlemen of the commons invite," said he, "*in the name of the God of peace*, and the national interest, the deputies of the clergy to join them in the hall of Assembly, to consult on the best means of re-establishing that concord which is so necessary at the present minute, to the safety of public affairs." This solemn invitation produced a great effect; it was answered by great numbers with acclamations, and many would have accepted of it immediately, but they were prevented, and answer was returned to the commons, that the clergy would take their message into consideration. On the return of the deputation, the *tiers état*, as not to be swayed from its purpose, resolved to await the reply of the clergy at the present sitting; this answer not arriving, a message was sent stating that they were waiting for a reply. The clergy complained of being hurried, and demanded a longer time. They were answered that the commons would await their reply all day and all night.

Their situation was a delicate one; knowing that after their answer a decisive part would immediately be taken, they wished to temporize and consult with the court; they demanded therefore a delay till the next day, which was most unwillingly granted. On the following day, the king, who, in this emergency, was appealed to by the two first orders, determined to interfere. The sudden and rapid elevation of the popular power caused all recent enmities to be forgotten, and united the court, nobility, and clergy, in their opposition to the deputies of the *tiers état*. The king finally appearing at the states, invited the three orders to resume their conferences in presence of his keeper of the seals. The *tiers état*, whatever may be said of their projects, which have been judged of by the event, did not extend their wishes beyond a qualified monarchy. Knowing the benevolent intentions of Louis XVI., they entertained the highest respect for his person; and besides, not wishing to injure their cause by any blameable act, they answered, that in deference to the king, they would consent to the resumption of the conferences, although, from the declarations of the nobility, they had reason to believe they would prove useless. This answer was accompanied by an address which the senior was commissioned to give to the king. This senior was Bailly, a simple and virtuous man, an illustrious, learned, and modest scholar, who had been suddenly transported from the silent studies of his closet into the midst of civil discord, and was chosen to preside over the assembly of popular deputies. He was intimidated at first at his new task, and thought himself unworthy of fulfilling it, and indeed only undertook the office as a matter of public duty; but the spirit of liberty which animated him soon gave him new thoughts: he found in himself an unexpected firmness and presence of mind; and in the midst of such conflicts he made the majesty of the assembly respected, and as its representative, conducted himself with all the dignity of virtue and intelligence.

Bailly had the greatest trouble to obtain an interview with the king. As he insisted upon being introduced, the courtiers spread the report that he had not even respected the grief of the king, afflicted by the death of the Dauphin. But he at last obtained admittance; and passing over every humiliating ceremony, presented himself before his sovereign with firmness and respect. The king received him with kindness, but without explaining his intentions.

The government, having made up its mind to make some sacrifices for the sake of the treasury, was not sorry to see a conflict between the different orders of the states, and thought to turn it to its own advantage by becoming their arbiter: first, by depriving the nobility of their pecuniary privileges by means of the *tiers état*; and, secondly, by checking the ambition of the latter with the aid of the nobility. As to the nobility, not caring for the embarrassment of the treasury, and considering nothing but the great sacrifices it was likely to cost them, they wished to bring about a dissolution of the states-general, and thus render their convocation inoperative. The commons, whom the court and first ranks would not recognise under that title, but called always by the name of the *tiers état*, acquired daily fresh strength, and felt determined to brave all dangers rather than allow an opportunity so favourable to their interests, as that which now offered, to escape them.

The conferences demanded by the king took place. The commissioners of the nobility raised every kind of difficulty as to the title of commons which the third class had assumed, and objected to the form of the signature of their *procès verbal*. At last they entered into discussion, and were nearly reduced to silence by the arguments of the popular deputies, when Necker, in the name of the king, proposed a new method of reconciliation. According to his plan, each order was to examine separately their powers, and communicate their examinations to the others; in case difficulties arose, the commissioners were to make report of them to each chamber, and if the decision of the different orders was not uniform, the king was to be judge of the last resort. Thus the court turned the differences of the states to its own profit. The conferences were immediately suspended to consider this new proposal. The clergy accepted the project purely and simply. The nobility received it at first with favour, but, hurried on by their ordinary instigators, they disregarded the advice of their wisest members, and modified this conciliatory design. All their misfortunes may be dated from that day.

The commons, informed of this resolution, quietly waited till their turn came to discuss what had been communicated to them; but the clergy, with their ordinary cunning, wishing to lower that order

in the eyes of the nation, sent them a deputation to employ themselves jointly with them in the consideration of the daily increasing scarcity, that some remedy might be quickly devised by their united endeavours. The commons, exposed to popular disgrace if they appeared indifferent to such a proposition, played stratagem against stratagem, and answered that, impressed with a sense of the same duties, they were ready to attend the clergy in the great hall, to enter with them on that important subject. At the same time the messengers of the nobility arrived, and communicated solemnly their resolution to the commons. They adopted, they said, the plan of reconciliation, but persisted in a separate verification, and in not submitting to the united states, and the supreme judgment of the king, save only in such difficulties as might arise concerning the entire deputations of a single province.

This resolution put an end to the embarrassment of the commons. Had the new plan been adopted, it being only acceptable to them after having undergone material alterations, they would have been obliged to yield, or declare themselves alone at war with the highest ranks of the state and the throne. The moment was decisive. To yield upon the point of a separate verification was not, it is true, to yield to a voting by classes, but to be weak on one occasion was always to be weak. They must either submit to a part which would almost render them cyphers, give resources to power, and content themselves with destroying some abuses, at a time when they saw the possibility of destroying all; or enter at once into a firm determination of seizing by violence a portion of the legislative authority. This was the first revolutionary act, but the assembly did not hesitate; consequently all the "proces verbaux" being signed, and the conferences finished, Mirabeau rose up. "Every proposition to conciliate," said he, "being rejected by one party, cannot be examined by the other; a month has elapsed; a decisive part must be taken; a deputy of Paris has an important motion to make; let him be attended to." Mirabeau having opened the deliberation by his boldness, introduced Sieyès to the tribune, a man of profound, systematic, and unbending genius. Sieyès took a brief retrospect of the conduct and motives of the commons. "They have waited," said he, "and are ready for all conciliatory propositions; their long submission has become useless; they can delay public business no longer without failing in their duty as deputies; consequently a last invitation should be given to the two other orders to join them and commence the verification." This proposition, enforced by the acutest reasoning *, was received with enthusiasm. The commons wished even to summon the two orders to join them in an hour, (10 June, 1789). In the meantime the term was prorogued. The next day, Thursday, being devoted to religious ceremonies, it was deferred till Friday. On Friday the last invitation was given. The two orders answered that they must deliberate; and the king said that he would make known his intentions. The calling over of the bailiwicks commenced. On the first day, three clergymen joined the commons, and were received with acclamation; on the second six came; and on the third and fourth, ten, among whom was the Abbé Grégoire.

During the calling over of the bailiwicks and the verification of the powers, a weighty dispute arose, concerning the title the assembly should take. Mirabeau proposed that of *Representatives of the French People*; Mounier, that of *The Majority deliberating in the absence of the Minority*; the deputy Legrand, that of *The National Assembly*. The last was adopted after a long discussion, which was prolonged to the hour of midnight, on the 16th of June. At one o'clock in the morning the commons were deliberating whether they should constitute themselves a national assembly during the present sitting, or put it off till the next day. One party of the deputies were unwilling to lose a minute in acquiring a legal character, in order to obtain importance in the eyes of the court. A small number, wishing to put a stop to the operations of the assembly, became violent, and exclaimed loudly against its proceedings. The two parties, ranged on opposite sides of a long table, uttered mutual reproaches. Bailly, placed in the centre, was called upon by one side to break up the assembly, and by the other to put the proposition to the vote. Unaffected in the midst of cries and outrageous language, he remained more than an hour inflexibly silent. The sky was stormy, and the wind blew in gusty blasts through the chamber, and added to the turbulence of the scene. At last the violent members having retired, Bailly addressed the assembly, now rendered quiet by the retreat of those who had disturbed it, and persuaded them to put off till the next day the important act which had been proposed. His advice was adopted, and he retired highly applauded for the firmness and wisdom he had displayed.

On the next day, the 17th of June, the proposition was put to the vote, and by a majority of 491 against 90, the commons constituted themselves a *National Assembly*. Sieyès, again called upon to give reasons for this decision, did it with his accustomed acuteness.

"The assembly, deliberating after the verification of its powers, declares that it is composed of representatives, chosen by ninety-six hundred parts at least of the nation. Such a mass of deputations cannot remain inactive on account of the absence of the deputies of some bailiwicks, or of some classes of the citizens; for the absentees, *who have been summoned*, cannot debar those present from exercising the plenitude of their rights, especially when the exercise of these rights is an imperious and pressing duty.

"Furthermore, since it belongs only to those representatives who have been verified, to concur in the desires of the nation, and inasmuch as all the verified representatives ought to be in this assembly, it must of necessity be concluded, that to it, it belongs, and to none but it, to interpret and represent the general will of the nation.

"There cannot exist between the throne and this assembly any 'Veto,' or negativing power.

"The assembly declares, then, that the general business of national redress can and ought to be begun without delay by the deputies present, and that they ought to pursue it without any interruption as without impediment.

* See note 2, in the Appendix.

"The denomination of National Assembly is the only one which suits the assembly in the actual state of things: whether it be because the members who compose it, are the only representatives legitimately and publicly known and verified; or as being deputed by nearly the entire of the nation; and lastly, because representation being one and indivisible, no deputy, in whatever order or class he may be chosen, has a right to exercise his powers separately from this assembly.

"The assembly will never quit the hope of uniting in its own person all the deputies at present absent. It will never cease to call upon them to fulfil the obligation which is imposed upon them, of joining the session of the states-general. At whatever period in the session which is about to open, the absent members may present themselves, the assembly declares beforehand, that it will with alacrity receive them, and after the verification of powers, cordially co-operate with them in the cause of those grand operations which ought to ensure regeneration to France."

Immediately after this declaration, the assembly, wishing at the same time to display an act of their power, and to prove that they did not intend to stop the course of their administration, legalized the receipt of taxes, although established without the national consent; and providing for their own dismemberment, added, that this act should become null on the day on which that event took place; foreseeing also a bankruptcy, the only remaining method of terminating the embarrassment of the treasury, and dispensing with the national interference, they satisfied both prudence and honour, by putting the creditors of the state under the safeguard of French loyalty. Finally, they announced their intentions of occupying themselves unceasingly with the causes of the scarcity and public poverty.

These measures, which manifested as much courage as ability, created a deep impression. The court and highest ranks were terrified at such boldness and energy. Meanwhile the clergy deliberated in a tumultuous manner, whether they should join the commons. The mob awaited out of doors the result of their deliberations. The lower ranks of that order finally carried the point in the favour of the junction, by a majority of 149 against 115. Those who had voted for this measure were received with enthusiasm, the others were insulted and mobbed by the people.

This event should have brought about a reconciliation between the court and the aristocracy. They were both in equal jeopardy. The last resolution militated against the king as against the first ranks themselves, with whom the commons had virtually declared they could dispense. The aristocracy threw themselves at the feet of the monarch. The Duke de Luxembourg, the Cardinal de Larochefoucauld, and the Archbishop of Paris, implored him to repress the audacity of the *tiers état*, and to defend their injured rights. The parliament offered to dispense with the states, and promised to consent to all taxes. The king was hemmed in by the princes and the queen, and as these were not sufficient to prevail upon his weakness, he was hurried off to Marly, that he might more easily be persuaded into the adoption of some rigorous measure.

The minister, Necker, who was attached to the popular cause, contented himself with useless representations, which the king thought just, when his mind was free; but the effect of which the court speedily destroyed. From the moment Necker saw that the royal interference was necessary, he formed a project which appeared to him a very bold step. He proposed that the monarch, in a royal sitting, should order the assembly of the orders, but solely for the consideration of measures of general interest; that he himself should give his sanction to all the resolutions taken by the states-general; that he should prospectively disallow every institution repugnant to a limited monarchy, such as that of a single assembly; and that he should promise the abolition of privileges, and the equal admission of all Frenchmen to civil and military employments, &c. Necker, who had not sagacity enough to anticipate the proper time for such a plan, had still less the ability of ensuring its execution.

The council had followed the king to Marly; Necker's plan, approved of at first, became the subject of discussion; suddenly a note was put into the hands of the king; the council was suspended, resumed, and adjourned till the next day, in spite of the urgent necessity for great celerity. The next day new members were added to the council, among whom were the brothers of the king. The project of Necker was modified; he resisted, and made some concessions, but finding himself overcome, he returned to Versailles. A page came thither three times to give him notes relative to new modifications; his plan was altogether spoilt, and the royal sitting was fixed to the 22nd of June.

It was now only the 20th, and already the chamber of the states was shut, under pretence of some preparations which were necessary for the presence of the king. These preparations could have been made in half a day, but the clergy, having determined the evening before to join the commons, the court wished to prevent this junction. An order from the king suspended the sittings till the 22nd. Bailly, considering himself bound to obey the assembly, which on Friday the 19th had adjourned till the next day, Saturday, went to the door of the chamber. A body of the French guards were posted there, with orders to prevent any one entering. The officer on duty received Bailly with respect, and permitted him to enter the court, to make his protest. Some young and indignant deputies wished to break through the orders of the sentry. Bailly ran up, appeased them, and took them away with them, that he might not injure the generous officer who executed his superior's orders with so much moderation. The assembly collected together in a tumult, and persisted in assembling. Some proposed holding their sitting under the very windows of the king, and others assembling in the Tennis court, (*le salle de jeu de paume*) where they proceeded immediately, and the master gave it up to them joyfully.

The court was large, but the walls were gloomy and bare; there were no seats; a chair was offered to the president, who refused it, and remained standing with the assembly; a bench served for a table; two deputies were placed at the door to guard it, but were soon relieved by

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the provost-marshal of the king's household, who came to offer his services. The people ran together in crowds, and the deliberation commenced. Indignation was expressed from all parts against the suspension of the sittings, and many methods were proposed to prevent it for the future. The angry feelings of the assembly became heightened by discussion, and measures of the last extremity began to offer themselves to the imagination. It was proposed to go to Paris. This proposition, which was received with enthusiasm, was discussed in the most animated manner; it was nearly agreed that they should proceed thither in a body and on foot; but Bailly, alarmed at the violences which the assembly might encounter on their route, and fearing besides a schism, opposed this project. Then Mounier proposed, that the deputies should bind themselves by an oath not to separate before a constitution was established. This proposal was received with transport. The form of the oath was immediately made out: Bailly demanded the honour of binding himself first, and read the form thus expressed: "You take a solemn oath never to separate, and to assemble wheresoever circumstances may force you, until the constitution of the kingdom is established and settled on solid foundations." This oath, pronounced in a loud and clear voice, was heard even out of doors; at the same moment every mouth pronounced it, and every arm was extended towards Bailly, who standing upright and motionless, received this solemn engagement of the assembly to assure by means of the law the full maintenance of national right. The mob immediately uttered the cries of "*Vive l'Assemblée, Vive le Roi,*" as if to prove that they as an act of duty to themselves were determined to recover their rights without anger or hatred. The deputies then proceeded to sign the declaration which they had just made. One man alone, Martin D'Auch, adds to his name the word "opposer." A disturbance gathered around him. Bailly, for the purpose of being heard, mounts on a table, and addressing himself with moderation to the deputy, represents to him, that he has the right of refusing his signature, but not that of making a protest. The deputy persists, and the assembly, out of respect for his political freedom, allow the word, and permit it to remain on the "proces verbal."

This new act of energy excited the greatest alarm in the nobility, who, the next day, carried their grievances to the foot of the king, to apologize in some manner for the restriction they had put upon his plan of reconciliation, and to beg his assistance. The minority of the nobles protested against this proceeding, maintaining, with reason, that it was no longer time to demand the royal intervention, after having so unwisely refused it. This minority, too little attended to, was composed of forty-seven members, among whom were the Duke de Liancourt, the generous friend of his king, and liberty; the Duke de Larochefoucauld, distinguished for his virtue and great talents; Lally-Tolendal, already celebrated by the misfortunes of his father and by his brilliant advocacy; Clermont-Tonnerre, distinguished by his eloquence; the brothers Lameth, young colonels celebrated for their wit and bravery; Duport, already alluded to for his vast capacity, and resolute character; and, finally, the Marquis de Lafayette, the defender of American liberty, who united to French vivacity the firmness and simplicity of a Washington.

Intrigue relaxed every operation of the court. The sitting, fixed first for Monday the 22nd, was put off till the 23rd. A note, written very late to Bailly at the breaking up of the grand council, announced this adjournment, and thus demonstrated the agitation which prevailed in the minds of the court-party. Necker was resolved not to be present at this sitting, that he might not seem to authorize, by his presence, projects of which he disapproved.

Petty devices, the ordinary resource of a weakened authority, were employed to prevent the sitting of Monday the 22nd. The princes bespoke the tennis-court for their own diversion on that day. The assembly, therefore, met at the church of St. Louis, where they received the majority of the clergy, at whose head was the Archbishop of Vienne. This meeting, brought about with the greatest dignity, excited the most lively joy. Even the clergy, it was said, had submitted to the common verification.

The next day, the 23rd, was that appointed for the royal sitting. It was arranged that the deputies of the commons should enter the chamber by a by-way door, and different from that which was appointed for the nobility and clergy. In lieu of violence, humiliations were not spared. Exposed to a heavy rain, they remained in waiting for a considerable time. The president rapped at the door frequently, but was answered from within, that it was yet too early. The deputies were now about to retire, Bailly knocked once more; the doors at last were opened, and, on entering, they found the two first orders in possession of their seats, which they had desired to secure by this previous occupation. This assembly was not like that of the 5th of May. The hopes of all parties were then high, and the solemnity majestic and affecting. A numerous band of soldiers in gloomy silence distinguished the present solemnity from the former. The deputies of the commons had resolved to maintain the utmost taciturnity. The king first addressed the assembly; but his expressions, too energetic for his character, only betrayed his own weakness. Reproaches and commands had been put into his mouth. He ordered the separation of each order; annulled the preceding acts of the *tiers état*, and promised to sanction the abdication of pecuniary exemptions when they were resigned by their possessors. He required the maintenance of all feudal rights, both practical and honorary, as inviolable property; and concluded by saying, that, although he did not enjoin the united assembly as to measures which concerned the public interests, he left it as a matter not unlikely to be effected by the moderation of the higher orders. Thus he endeavoured to force the obedience of the commons, and contented himself with presuming upon that of the aristocracy. He left the nobility and clergy judges of what particularly concerned themselves, and finished by saying, that if he met with any further obstacles, he should take the good of his people solely into his own hands, and regard himself as their only representative. This tone and lan-

guage deeply irritated the minds of the commons, not against the king, who represented feebly those passions which were not his own, but against the aristocracy, of whom he was the organ.

As soon as he had finished his speech he ordered the assembly to break up instantly. The nobility and part of the clergy followed him: the other ecclesiastical deputies remained: the commons kept their seats, and preserved a profound silence. Mirabeau, who always took the lead, first rose. "Gentlemen," said he, "I confess that what we have just heard might redound to the benefit of the country, were it not that the presents of despotism are always dangerous .... What! an array of arms, and the violation of the national temple, to command you to be happy! .... Where are the enemies of the nation? Is Catiline at our gates? .... I call upon you, gentlemen, to assert your dignity, and legislative power, and to call to mind the religious obligation of your oath, which will not suffer you to separate, till you have established a constitution."

The Marquis de Brézé, grand-master of the ceremonies, then entered, and addressed Bailly: "You have heard," said he, "the orders of the king;" and Bailly replied, "I am going to receive those of the assembly." Mirabeau then advanced: "Yes, sir," cried he, "we have heard the intentions which have been suggested to the king; but you have neither voice, place, nor right, to speak here. Nevertheless, to avoid delay, go and tell your master, that we are here by the power of the people, and will not be torn from hence but by the power of the bayonet." Monsieur de Brézé retired, and Sieyes pronounced these words: "We are to-day as we were yesterday; let us deliberate." The assembly now gathered together, to deliberate on the maintenance of its former acts. "The first of these acts," said Barnave, "has declared what you are; the second relates to taxes, to which you alone have a right to consent; the third is the oath to do your duty. None of these measures require the royal sanction, the king cannot prevent that to which he has not to consent." At this moment the workmen came to take away the seats; armed soldiers traversed the hall, and others surrounded it from without. The body-guard advanced even to the door. The assembly, without the least interruption, remained on their seats, but lowered their voices. The maintenance of all their preceding acts was carried with unanimity; but this was not all. In the heart of the royal city, in the midst of the servants of the court, without the aid of that people afterwards so formidable, the assembly might have been attacked. Mirabeau, therefore, ascended the tribune, and proposed to decree the inviolability of each member. This was immediately carried into effect; and the assembly, opposing to force nothing but the majesty of its own will, declared every one of its members inviolable, and proclaimed as traitor, infamous, and guilty of a capital offence, whosoever should offer violence to a member.

Meantime, the nobility, who believed the state to be saved by this "lit de justice," presented their congratulations to the prince, who had first suggested it, and from him carried them to the queen. The queen, holding her son up in her arms, in exhibiting him to her devoted servants, received their promises and oaths, and unhappily abandoned herself to a blind confidence. But this joy was of short duration. Presently the shouts of the populace, congratulating Necker at not having assisted at the royal sitting, were heard. Terror now succeeded to exultation. Necker was immediately sent for by the king and queen, and those august personages condescended to supplicate the minister not to resign his office. He consented, and transferred to the court part of that popularity which he had gained by absenting himself from this fatal sitting.

In this manner was the first act of the revolution brought about. The *tiers état* had recovered the legislative power, and their adversaries had lost it, by endeavouring to keep it all to themselves. In a few days this legislative revolution was entirely accomplished. Some petty devices were still employed against it; such as embarrassing the interior communications in the chambers of the states; but they were without success. On the 24th the majority of the clergy joined the assembly, and demanded a verification in common, that they might forthwith deliberate on the propositions made by the king at the sitting of the 23rd of June. The minority of the clergy continued to deliberate in their own chamber. Juigné, Archbishop of Paris, a virtuous prelate, and the benefactor of the people, but an obstinate *privilégie*, was insulted by the populace, and forced to promise to join the assembly; and in fact he did join them, accompanied by the Archbishop of Bordeaux, a popular prelate, who ought at least to have been a minister.

The greatest agitation was manifest in the nobility. Their ordinary instigators inflamed their passions. D'Esprémenil proposed to publish a decree against the *tiers état*, and to prosecute them by the procurator-general; the minority proposed their joining with them. The motion was lost in the midst of uproar. The Duke of Orleans supported this motion, after having the evening before promised the contrary to the Polignacs*. Forty-seven members, having resolved to join the general assembly in spite of the decision of the majority, proceeded there in a body, and were received with acclamation. Nevertheless, in spite of this joy caused by their presence, their countenances remained serious. "We yield to the dictates of our conscience," said Clermont-Tonnerre, "but it is with grief that we separate from our brethren. We come to assist in the redress of the public grievances, and each of us will let you know the extent of the power which his commission allows."

Every day produced new accessions, and the assembly saw the number of its members increase. Addresses poured in from all quarters, expressing the aspirations and approbation of cities and provinces. Mounier procured those of the Dauphiné; Paris presented its own; and even the Palais-Royal sent a deputation, which the assembly received, that they might not alienate the multitude. At that period the assembly did not foresee the excesses that followed; on the contrary, it had need of relying on the energy of the multitude, and to trust to its support; this was a subject of doubt to many. The enterprise of the people was at that time little else than a pleasing illusion. For

* See Ferrieres.

this reason, the applauses of the galleries, frequently troublesome to the assembly, were permitted. Bailly once, indeed, endeavoured to put a stop to them, but his voice and motion were stifled by boisterous clapping of hands.

The majority of the nobility continued their sittings in the midst of tumult and uproar. Their leaders became alarmed; and the first signs of a disposition to join the assembly originated with those very persons who had, till now, persuaded them to resistance. But these passions, already too much excited, were not easily directed. The king was obliged to write a letter, and the court and grandees were reduced to supplications. "The union with the assembly will be but for a short time," said they, to the most obstinate; "the military are gathering: yield to save the king. Consent was thus, with difficulty, obtained; and the majority of the nobility, accompanied by the minority of the clergy, joined the assembly on the 27th of June. The Duke de Luxembourg, speaking in the name of all, said that they came to give the king a mark of their respect, and the nation a proof of their patriotism. "The family is complete," answered Bailly; and supposing that the re-union was perfect, and that they came there, not to verify, but to deliberate in common, he added—"We can now occupy ourselves, without intermission, and without distraction, upon the regeneration of the kingdom, and the commonweal."

More than one little art had still to be employed, to make it appear that what had been done was not exacted by necessity. New comers arrived in companies always after the opening of the sittings, so as to appear banded together as an order. They affected to remain standing behind the president, and as it were not to appear to join the assembly by sitting down. Bailly, with much discretion and firmness, overcame all their objections, and contrived to make them take their seats. They wished also to dispute his presidency, not by open force, but sometimes by a secret negotiation, and sometimes by a mere quibble. Bailly kept his place; and in retaining it was actuated not by motives of ambition, but by a sense of duty. Thus a simple citizen, remarkable only for his virtues and talents, presided over the grandees of the church and state.

It was now too evident that a legislative revolution had been already accomplished. Although the first differences between the states had no other object than the mode of verification, and did not relate to the manner of voting; although the one party had declared that they only united for a common verification, and the others in obedience to the royal will, expressed on the 23rd of June, it was clear that individual voting was inevitable, and all protestation against it was useless and impolitic. Nevertheless the Cardinal Delarochfoucauld protested against it in the name of the minority, and declared, that he had only joined the assembly to deliberate on general subjects, reserving to himself always the right of forming a separate order. The Archbishop of Vienne replied with warmth, that the minority could not decide on any thing in absence of the majority of the clergy, and that the majority had not the right of speaking in the name of that order. Mirabeau forcibly opposed this design, and said it would be strange that one party should protest in the assembly against the assembly, and that it should either acknowledge the sovereignty of the assembly, or at once retire from it.

The question concerning imperative mandates * was now discussed. Most of the papers expressed the will of the electors upon the reforms to be effected, and made this will obligatory on the deputies. It was necessary to ascertain to what point the assembly could go, before they commenced acting. This question then was the first. It was taken up and resumed several times. Some wished the papers to be returned to the constituents, and others thought that they could not be received from them; that the business of representatives was to vote for their constituents, after the subjects under consideration had been discussed and examined by the deputies of the whole nation; but not to receive beforehand ready prepared instructions. Whether it be true, that a law can only be made by a general council, either because greater intelligence is to be found at the highest point of elevation, or that fuller instruction can be obtained by a mutual understanding of all parties of the nation than by a few individuals, it follows that deputies should be free, and without any obligatory mandate. Mirabeau adding irony to argument, said that those who believed mandates to be imperative, were to blame in coming to the assembly; they had nothing to do, but leave their papers in their places, and that their papers would sit quite as well as they would. Sieyès, with his usual sagacity, foreseeing that in spite of the just decision of the assembly, a great number of the members would cleave to the obligation of their oaths, and pleading conscience, would become inflexibly resolute, moved for the order of the day, under the assumption that every one is best judge of the importance of the oath he has taken. "Those who believe themselves bound by their instructions," said he, "will be regarded as absent, just the same as those were who refused to verify their powers in general assembly." This wise opinion was adopted. Had the assembly used constraint upon the dissentients, it would have furnished them with a variety of pretences; whereas by thus leaving them free, she was sure to bring all over to her own side; for, from henceforth, victory was in her hands.

The object of the new convocation now, was the reform of the state, that is to say, the establishment of a constitution, of which France was destitute, in spite of all that could be said to the contrary. If relations between the governed and the government could be thus called, without doubt France had possessed a constitution: for a king had commanded and the subjects obeyed; ministers had imprisoned arbitrarily; revenue officers had wrung from the people their very last farthing; and the parliaments had condemned unfortunate victims to the wheel †. The most barbarous nations possess these kinds of constitutions. France had possessed her States-generals, but without any defined political attributes, without any stated period for re-assembling, and always without any

* The commissions or instructions given by the electors to the members or deputies, or electoral pledges. *Trans.*

† Alluding to the fate of Calas. *Trans.*

effective result. There had existed, it is true, a royal authority alternately absolute and powerless. There had been tribunals or sovereign courts, which often united to judicial authority the legislative power; but there never had been any law which ensured the responsibility of the agents of power, assured the liberty of the press, individual liberty, and finally, all those safeguards which in a social state are substituted for the fiction of natural freedom*.

This want of a constitution was generally avowed and felt; all the papers energetically expressed it, and formally explained themselves as to the fundamental principles of this constitution. They had unanimously prescribed a monarchical form of government, hereditary from male to male; the exclusive attribute of executive power to the king; the responsibility of all agents; the mutual concurrence of the nation and the king in making laws; the institution of taxes by vote; and the liberty of individuals. But on the questions as to the creation of one or two legislative chambers; the permanency, periodical meeting, and dissolution of the legislative body; the political existence of the clergy and the parliaments; and as to the extent of the liberty of the press, the sentiments of the electors seemed very much divided. So great a variety of important questions settled or proposed by the papers, proved clearly enough to what extent the public attention had been aroused, and how generally the longing aspiration for liberty was expressed throughout the kingdom†. But to rear the edifice of an entire new constitution from amidst the crumbling remains of an ancient form of legislation, was a great and difficult undertaking, particularly when the disorganized state of the times, and the violent resistance of all the privileged orders is considered. Besides the dissensions which a contrariety of interests would produce, a natural conflict of opinions was to be feared. The idea of an entire new code of legislation to be given to a great nation, so strongly excited the minds of all, and inspired them with projects so vast, and hopes so chimerical, that it was natural to expect either vague or exaggerated, and sometimes hostile measures. To prevent this, therefore, as much as possible, a committee was nominated to consider, as near as was practicable, the extent of the work to be performed, and to arrange the method of its distribution. This committee was composed of the most moderate members of the assembly. Mounier, a person of great ability, although self-willed, was its most laborious and influential member. It was he who drew up the order in which they were to proceed.

The difficulty of forming a constitution was not the only one the assembly had to overcome. Placed between a government who looked upon them with an unfavourable eye, and a famishing people who required prompt relief, it was difficult not to interfere with the administration. Mistrusting the constituted authorities, and urged to relieve the people, they were forced, even without ambition, to invade little by little the executive power. The clergy had already given the example, by their insidious proposal to the third class, to enter into immediate consideration of provisioning the public. The assembly was scarcely formed before it named a committee of sustenance, required all necessary information upon this matter from the ministry, proposed circulating supplies of provision from province to province, particularly to those places were they were most wanted, and made large gifts of alms, and provided for these expenses by loans. The government acquainted the assembly with the measures which had already been taken, and which had been anxiously furthered by Louis XVI. Lally Tolendal proposed passing acts relative to a free circulation, but this was objected to by Mounier, who observed that such acts required the royal sanction, and that the sanction not yet being regulated, exposed the assembly to weighty difficulties. Thus all obstacles were united against the legislators. It was necessary to watch over the administration without invading authority; to make laws without the legislative forms being fixed; and to stand up against so many difficulties, in spite of the malevolence of power, the opposition of various interests, diversities of opinions, and the exigencies of a people newly awakened and violently agitated by political controversies, in the heart of an immense metropolis, no more than a few leagues distant from the hall of assembly itself.

A very small space separates Paris from Versailles, and it may be visited several times in one day. All the agitations of the capital, therefore, were felt immediately at Versailles, in the court and in the assembly. Paris, at that time, presented an extraordinary spectacle. The electors of sixty districts, who had met for the purpose of election, continued to assemble daily together, either to give instructions to their deputies, or from the necessity of thus meeting to debate together, a desire inherent in the heart of man, and which bursts forth with greater violence the more it is repressed. They had, in the first instance, met with the same fate as their deputies: the place of their meeting was shut against them, but they met in another, and at last gained admittance into the Hotel de Ville, where they continued to assemble, and to correspond with their deputies. There were, at that time, no public newspapers giving an account of what took place at the sitting of the National Assembly; it was therefore the custom for people to meet together in knots, to inform themselves of, and discuss, passing events. The garden of the Palais Royal was the place of the most numerous assemblages. This magnificent garden, surrounded by the richest shops in Europe, and forming an adjunct of the palace of the Duke of Orleans, was the "rendezvous" of strangers, débauchés, and idlers, and especially of the most violent. The most intemperate agitators' discussions were there held in the coffee-houses, or in the garden itself. An orator might be seen mounted on a table, collecting a crowd around him, and exciting them to rebellion by the most violent speeches, words always uttered with impunity, for there the multitude reigned supreme. Men supposed to be devoted to the Duke of Orleans were observed, on these occasions, to be the most fiery orators. The riches of this prince, his known prodigalities, his enormous loans, his near neighbourhood, and his vague and aimless ambition, all caused him to be accused. The historian, without

* See note 3 in the Appendix.

† See note 4 in the Appendix.

fixing on any name, can at least assert that gold was profusely scattered; for, if the sound reasoning part of the nation had ardently wished for liberty, and if the restless and suffering part had been inclined to insurrection to better their lot, still it is manifest that instigators were often busy in directing their blows. To conclude, money is not to be reckoned among the causes of the revolution, for it is not with a little gold and secret designs that a nation of twenty-five millions of men is shaken to its centre.

An opportunity for an outbreak shortly presented itself. The French guards, who were chosen troops, and destined to compose the life-guards of the king, were stationed at Paris. Four companies were alternately detached to do duty at Versailles. Besides the barbarous severity of the new discipline, these troops had to complain of their new colonel. In the pillage of the house of Réveillon, it is true, they had shewn some exasperation against the people; but they afterwards repented of it, and living always among them, yielded to their influences. Added to this, both soldiers and subalterns felt that every opening to preferment was shut against them: it wounded their feelings to see their young officers, exempt from almost every service, never appear among them except on parade-days, and then never accompany them to their barracks. There was here, as well as elsewhere, a *tiers-état*, who did every thing without bettering their condition. Insubordination displayed itself among them, and some soldiers were imprisoned in the Abbaye.

A crowd immediately assembled at the Palais Royal, calling out "*A l'Abbaye!*" The multitude instantly broke open the doors of that prison, and led out in triumph the soldiers, whom it was attempted to seize again. (June 30, 1789.) While the populace guarded them at the Palais Royal, a letter was sent from thence to the assembly, praying that liberty might be granted them. Thus placed between the people on one side, and the government on the other, who became the subject of hatred in simply asserting itself, the assembly could have no desire to interfere, and thus commit an impropriety by meddling with the public police. Adopting therefore a resolution, at once ingenious and discreet, the assembly wrote first to the Parisians, recommending to them the maintenance of the public tranquillity; and then sent a deputation to the king, imploring his clemency, and pointing it out as the only means of re-establishing concord and peace. The king, influenced by the moderate course taken by the assembly, promised the exertion of his clemency when order should be re-established. The French guards were, therefore, immediately replaced in prison, and a pardon from the king instantly released them.

Thus far all went on well; but the nobility, in joining with the two orders, had made a concession with repugnance, and under the promise of its being but of short duration,—the nobility, therefore, protested every day against the proceedings of the national assembly. Their numbers became gradually less and less: on the 3rd of July, one hundred and thirty-eight members were counted present; on the 10th, there were no more than ninety-three; and on the 11th, eighty. Nevertheless, the most obstinate among them still persisted in their opposition; and on the 11th had determined on a protest, which the events which followed prevented them from putting into execution. The court, on their part, had not yielded without regret, or without design. Recovered from their terror after the sitting of June the 23rd, they had promoted the general union of the assembly, for the purposes of impeding the proceedings of the commons by means of the nobility, and in the hope of dissolving it shortly by sheer force. Necker had only been retained in their service, to cover by his presence the secret manœuvres they had devised. From a certain embarrassment and reserve which was used towards him, he suspected that some grand machination was carrying on. The king himself was not informed of all; for the court party intended, no doubt, to go to greater lengths than he wished. Necker, who thought that the business of a statesman should be confined to reasoning with his sovereign, and had just sufficient energy to make his reports, on this occasion did so to no purpose. Associated with Mounier, Lally, and Clermont-Tonnerre, he, as well as they, meditated the establishment of the English constitution. The court, meanwhile, continued its secret preparations; and the deputies of the nobility, although desirous to withdraw, were persuaded to remain, by the announcement of a forthcoming event.

Military musters were taking place; the old marshal de Broglie was appointed to the chief command, and the baron de Besenval was placed at the head of those who surrounded Paris. Fifteen regiments, nearly all composed of foreigners, were quartered in the environs of the capital. The boasts of the courtiers revealed the meditated danger, and these conspirators, too prompt to threaten thus, compromised the success of their projects. The popular deputies, informed not of all the details of a plan, which to this day is not perfectly known, and which the king himself knew only partially, but which induced the apprehension that violence was meditated, became greatly indignant, and immediately provided means of resistance. It is not, and probably never will be, known what were the secret springs which prompted the insurrection of the 14th of July; but it little signifies. The aristocracy conspired, and the popular party might justly conspire also. The means employed being equal, the justice of the cause remains to be considered, and justice certainly was not on their side who wished to break up the union of the three orders, dissolve the national representation, and persecute its most courageous deputies.

Mirabeau thought that the surest means of intimidating power, was to force its agents publicly to explain the measures which they were taking; for this purpose it became necessary openly to denounce them, and if they hesitated to answer, or eluded the inquiry, they stood condemned; the nation was warned, and put on its guard.

Mirabeau suspended the proceedings of the assembly in the formation of a constitution, and proposed demanding of the king the dismissal of the troops. He mingled in the discourse which he delivered on this occasion, respect for the monarch, with the severest reproaches against government. He remarked that every day new troops advanced; he observed that all the streets were blocked up;

that the bridges and walks were converted into military posts; that events were public, and yet concealed; that precipitate orders and counter-orders were continually given and countermanded, and that every thing announced war. Adding to this comment on facts bitter reproaches: "We see," said he, "more soldiers menacing the nation than an invading enemy perhaps would meet, and a thousand times, at least, more than could on a late occasion be assembled to succour our friends, martyrs of their fidelity, or to preserve the alliance of Holland, so precious, so dearly gained, and so shamefully lost."

His discourse was received with applause, and the address which he proposed immediately carried; but, as in calling for the dismissal of the troops he had demanded the establishment of a body of citizen guards in their stead to preserve the public peace, this article was suppressed; and the address then unanimously carried, with the exception of four votes. In this celebrated address, which is said to have been perfectly extempore, Mirabeau foresaw nearly all that was about to happen: the irritation of the multitude, and the defection of the troops, occasioned by their intimacy with the people. With a peculiar adroitness and boldness, he dared to assure the king that his promises should not be in vain. "You have called us," said he, "to regenerate the kingdom; your wishes shall be accomplished in spite of the snares, the difficulties, the perils," [that beset us] &c.

This address was presented by a deputation of twenty-four members. The king, not wishing to explain himself, answered, "That the assemblage of troops had no other object than the maintenance of public tranquillity, and that protection which was due to the assembly; and further, that if the assembly still retained their fears, he should transfer their sittings to Soissons or Noyon, and that he himself would go to Compiègne.

The assembly could not rest content with such an answer, especially the intention of removing to a distance from the capital, and thus placing them between two camps. The Count de Crillon proposed trusting to the word of a king and a gentleman. "The word of a king and a gentleman," replied Mirabeau, "is a bad guarantee for the conduct of his ministry; our blind confidence in our kings has ruined us; we have demanded the withdrawal of the troops, and not permission to fly before them; we must still insist upon it, and that without delay."

This opinion was not supported. Mirabeau insisted too much on open measures to tolerate the employment of secret machinations, if indeed they were ever used.

On the 11th of July, Necker, having several times told the king that if his services displeased him he would humbly retire, "I take you at your word," answered the king. On the evening of the same day, he received a note from Louis XVI. claiming the fulfilment of his declaration, pressed him to depart, and added that he trusted in him sufficiently to hope, that he would conceal his departure from every one. Necker, justifying the honourable confidence of the monarch, departed immediately, without intimating his intention to his company, or even to his daughter; and in a few hours was far from Versailles. The next day, the 12th of July, was Sunday. The report spread in Paris that Necker had been dismissed, as also the Messieurs de Montmorin, de La Luzerne, de Puységur, and de Saint Priest. It was announced also, that the Messieurs De Breteuil, De la Vauguyon, De Broglie, Foulon, and Damécourt, nearly all of them notorious for their opposition to the popular cause, were to replace them. The alarm was spread in Paris. The populace assembled at the Palais Royal. A young man, Camille Desmoulins, since known by his republican elevation, but endowed nevertheless with a susceptible and enthusiastic mind, mounted on a table, displayed his pistols, and crying "To arms," plucked the leaf of a tree, and stuck it in his hat as a cockade. The whole multitude imitated his example. The trees were soon stripped, and the populace went away to a depository of waxen busts. They carried away those of Necker and the Duke of Orleans, menaced, as they said, with exile; and then spread through all the quarters of Paris. In traversing the Rue Saint Honoré, they were met by a detachment of the royal German regiment; a conflict ensued, several persons were wounded, and, among others, a soldier of the French guards. These guards were as favourably disposed towards the people as they were hostile to the royal German regiment, with whom they had had a quarrel a few days before; they were in barracks near the Place Louis Quinze; these guards fired upon the royal German regiment. The Prince of Lambesc, who had the command of this regiment, defiles his corps into the garden of the Tuileries, and charges the crowd of persons who were there quietly promenading, kills an old man, and clears the garden; in the meanwhile the military stationed around Paris mustered in the Champ de Mars and the Place Louis Quinze. The public alarm now knew no bounds, and was converted into fury. The populace spread throughout the city, crying "To arms." They ran to the Hotel-de-Ville to demand them. Those electors composing the general assembly were there assembled, and the arms, when they could no longer be refused, were delivered up. The electors constituted, at this time, the only established authority. Deprived of all active power, they assumed that which circumstances exacted, and ordered the convocation of the districts. A meeting of citizens was, in consequence, held, to deliberate concerning the best means of preserving themselves, both from the fury of the multitude, and the attacks of the royal troops. During the night, the people, who always run after that which particularly concerns them, forced open and burnt the barriers, dispersed the commissioners, and made all the entrances of Paris free. The shops of all the armourers were plundered; the *Brigands*, who had already signalized themselves in the affair of Réveillon, and who were observed on every occasion of tumult to spring as it were, out of the earth, re-appeared, armed with clubs and pikes, and spread terror on every side. These events took place during all Sunday the 12th of July, and the whole of Sunday night till Monday the 13th. Early on the morning of Monday, the electors, always assembled at the Hotel de Ville, considered it necessary to give a more legal form to their authority; they therefore summoned the provost of the merchants, the ordinary governor of the

city; but he refusing to yield obedience, unless upon a formal requisition, they were obliged to compel his attendance upon those terms, and then associated with him a certain number of electors, thus forming a municipality invested with all necessary authority. This municipality called to its assistance the lieutenant of police, and, in a few hours, a plan was formed of arming a citizen militia.

This militia was to be composed of forty-eight thousand men, furnished by the different districts. Their distinguishing mark was, instead of the green cockade, the Parisian cockade, red and blue, and every one taken in arms with this cockade, without having been enrolled by his district in the citizen guard, was liable to be arrested, disarmed, and punished. Such was the first origin of the national guards. This plan was adopted by all the districts, who hastened to put it into execution. In the course of this same morning, the populace broke into the building of Saint-Lazare, for the purpose of obtaining corn; forced open the magazine to carry off the arms, and brought to light many pieces of ancient armour, which they fitted on, and sallied out with their helmets and pikes, to spread over the city. The people however appeared to discountenance pillage, and with their proverbial fickleness, suddenly respected property, took nothing but arms, and even themselves apprehended the plunderers. The French guards and the guards of the prisons offered their services, and were enrolled in the citizen guard.

Arms were always demanded with vociferation. The provost Flesselles, who had at first resisted his fellow-citizens, now displayed his zeal, by promising twelve thousand muskets that very day, and more on the days following. He pretended to have made a bargain with an armourer, whose name was not mentioned. The thing appeared improbable, considering the little time which had elapsed. However, the evening having arrived, the chests of musketry announced by Flesselles, were carried to the Hotel de Ville, but on being opened were found to contain nothing but old rags. At the sight of this the multitude became irritated against the provost, who declared he had been deceived. To appease them, he directed them to the Carthusian friars, assuring them that they would find arms there; the astonished Carthusians received this furious crowd with dismay, introduced them into their retreat, and succeeded in convincing them that they possessed nothing of the description which the provost had announced.

The people, more irritated than ever, returned crying out, "Treason." To satisfy them, fifty thousand pikes were ordered to be made. Boats of powder, which were going down the Seine to Versailles, were seized; and an elector distributed their contents among the people, in the midst of the greatest disturbance.

The most horrible confusion reigned at the Hotel de Ville, the seat of the authorities, the head-quarters of the militia, and the centre of all operations. Here it was necessary to provide for the exterior safety of the city, threatened by the court, and its interior safety, menaced by rioters; it became every moment more than ever necessary to calm the suspicions of the people, who believed themselves betrayed, and to save from their fury those who excited their mistrust. Carringes were in one place observed to be stopped, messengers intercepted, and travellers in waiting for permission to continue their journey. During the night the Hotel de Ville was again menaced by the rioters. An elector, the courageous Moreau de Saint Méry, who was posted to keep guard there, had some barrels of powder brought thither, and threatened to blow them all up if any violence was attempted. At the sight of this the robbers departed. Meanwhile the citizens retired to their own houses, and held themselves ready for every species of attack. All the streets were unpaved, trenches opened, and every means taken for resisting a siege.

During these troubles of the capital, a general consternation pervaded the assembly. The deputies met on the morning of the 13th, dismayed at the threatening appearance of affairs, but as yet ignorant of that which had passed at Paris. The deputy Mounier rose first, and complained of the dismission of the minister; Lally-Tolendal next addressed the assembly, and made a magnificent eulogium on Necker; and both united in proposing an address to the king, wherein they prayed for the recall of the disgraced ministers. One of the deputies of the nobility, Mons. de Virieu, even proposed confirming the resolutions of the 17th of June, by a new oath. Mons. de Clermont-Tonnerre opposed this proposition as useless; and calling to mind the engagements already entered into by the assembly, cried out, "The constitution shall be, or we will perish." The discussion had already been much prolonged, when the assembly were informed of the tumults which had taken place at Paris on the morning of the 13th, and the calamities with which the capital was threatened, between the undisciplined French, who, according to the expression of the Duke de Larochefoucauld, were under the direction of no one, and the disciplined foreigners who were weapons in the hands of despotism. A resolution was passed for sending a deputation to the king, to depicture the disasters of the capital, and to pray him to send away the troops, and establish a citizen guard. The king returned a cold and phlegmatic answer, which ill accorded with the sentiments of his heart, and said over and over again that Paris could not guard itself. The assembly then, by a noble assumption of courage, entered into a memorable resolution, in which it insisted upon the dismission of the troops, and the establishment of a citizen guard; declared ministers and all agents of power responsible, and charged the responsibility of the calamities which threatened the country on the counsellors of the king, *of whatever rank they might be.* It also consolidated the public debt, proclaimed the name of bankruptcy infamous, insisted upon the validity of its former acts, and ordered the president to express their sympathy with Mons. Necker, and the other ministers.

After these well-timed and energetic measures, the assembly, in order to preserve their members from all personal violence, declared themselves permanent, and nominated Mons. de Lafayette vice-president, to relieve the respectable Archbishop of Vienne, whose advanced age did not permit him to sit up day and night. The night of the 13th and 14th passed away in this manner in the midst

of turmoils and alarms. Every instant calamitous reports were circulated and contradicted. No one knew all the projects of the court; but this was known, that many deputies were menaced, and that physical force was about to be directed against Paris, and the most conspicuous members of the assembly. The sitting, suspended for a few hours, was resumed at five o'clock in the morning of the 14th of July. The assembly with an impressive tranquillity resumed their proceedings relative to the formation of a constitution, and discussed with great propriety the means of accelerating this great measure, and ordering it with wisdom. A committee was nominated to examine the propositions. It was composed of Messrs. the Archbishop of Autun, the Archbishop of Bordeaux, Lally, Clermont-Tonnerre, Mounier, Sieyès, Chapelier, and Bergasse. Thus the morning elapsed: towards evening, fresh intelligence arrived, (it was always of an unfavourable character,) that the king was to quit [Versailles] during the night, and leave the assembly at the mercy of several foreign regiments. At the very moment when this intelligence arrived, the princes, the duchess of Polignac, and the queen, were seen walking in the orangery, condescendingly conversing with the officers, and distributing refreshments among the soldiers. It appeared plainly that some great design had been conceived, which was to be executed during the night of the 14th and 15th, that Paris was to be attacked on seven points, the Palais Royal surrounded, the assembly dissolved, and the declaration of the 23rd of June referred to parliament, and that finally, the necessities of the treasury were to be provided for by a bankruptcy, and state debentures (*billets d'état*). This one thing is certain, that the commandants of the troops had received orders to march from the 14th to the 15th, that debentures had been made out, that the Swiss barracks were full of ammunition, and that the governor of the Bastille had removed all his furniture, with the exception only of such articles as were indispensable for his own accommodation. In the after part of the day, the alarm of the assembly increased. The Prince de Lambesc was seen to pass by fully equipped; the noise of cannon was heard; [and terror so fully possessed all, that] the deputies listened attentively to the slightest noise, and put their ears to the ground to catch it more distinctly. Mirabeau then proposed suspending all discussion, and sending a new deputation to the king. The deputation set out immediately to make fresh solicitations. At this moment, two members arrived from Paris in the greatest haste, and assured the assembly that the work of slaughter had begun; one of them declared that he had seen a headless body in black clothes. The night began to draw on: the arrival of two electors was announced: the most profound silence reigned in the chamber: the very sound of these electors' steps was heard in the darkness; and the assembly learnt from their mouths, that the Bastille was attacked, that the firing of cannon had commenced, that blood was already spilt, and that the people were threatened with the most frightful calamities. A new deputation, before the return of the preceding, was instantly dispatched. At the very moment of its departure the first returned, and brought back the answer of the king. "He had ordered," he said, "the dismissal of the troops encamped on the Champ de Mars, and having been informed of the formation of the citizen guards, had nominated the officers who were to take their command." At the arrival of the second deputation, the king, with increased agitation, said to them, "Gentlemen, you rend my heart more and more by the recital you give me of the calamities of Paris. It is not possible that the orders given to the troops should be the cause of them." The assembly had not yet obtained the removal of the army. It was two o'clock in the morning. An answer was sent to the city of Paris, saying, "that two deputations had been sent to the king, and that their solicitations should be renewed on the morrow, until they obtained that success which they had to expect from the heart of the king, when left freely to its own emotions." The sitting was for a short time suspended; and in the evening information was brought of the events of the 14th.

The people, from the night of the 13th, had been collecting towards the Bastille; some musquet shots had been fired, and it appeared that the instigators of the multitude had several times prompted the cry "*A la Bastille.*" The desire for its destruction had been expressed in some papers, so that the ideas of the people had already taken this direction. The cry for arms was heard on every side. The report spread that the Hotel des Invalides contained a considerable store of them: the multitude ran there immediately. The commandant, Monsieur de Sombreuil, forbad their entrance, saying that he must first receive orders from Versailles; but the people, who would hear of no denial, rushed into the hotel, and carried off some pieces of cannon and a great quantity of musketa. Already, nay at this very time, an immense mob had commenced the siege of the Bastille. The besiegers said that the cannon of the place pointed on the city, and intimidated it, and consequently they should be prevented from firing on it. The deputy of a district required to be admitted within the fortress, which the commandant did not refuse: he thus ascertained that it was garrisoned only by thirty-two Swiss and eighty-two invalids: this garrison promised him faithfully not to fire, provided they themselves were not attacked. During this conference, the people, not seeing their deputy appear, became impatient, and he was obliged to show himself to appease the multitude: he left the fortress shortly before eleven o'clock. Half an hour had scarcely elapsed, when a new armed gang arrived, shouting "We want the Bastile." The garrison warned the assailants to retire, but they disregarded the warning. Two men most courageously climbed upon the roof of the guard-house, and broke the chains of the bridge, by blows of an axe, which immediately fell down; the crowd rushed in and ran to the other bridge to pass over it in like manner. A discharge of musketry stopped them: they drew back, but fired in return. The conflict lasted some minutes. The electors, assembled at the Hotel de Ville, heard the report of the musketry, and becoming more and more alarmed, sent two deputations, one immediately after the other, to order the commandant to allow of a detachment of Parisian soldiery to be introduced into the

place, by reason that all military force in Paris ought to be under the direction of the city. These two deputations arrived successively. But in the midst of this popular siege it was very difficult to make themselves understood. The sound of a drum and the sight of a flag suspended the firing for a short time. The deputies advanced; the garrison held a parley with them; but mutual explanation was difficult. Musket shots were fired, it was not known from whence, and the people, persuaded that they were betrayed, rushed forward to set fire to the place. The garrison then began to discharge their heavy artillery. The French guards arrived with some pieces of cannon, and a regular attack commenced.

During these transactions, a note, addressed by the Baron de Besenval to Delaunay, commandant of the Bastille, was intercepted, and read at the Hotel de Ville. In this letter Besenval urged Delaunay to hold out, assuring him that he would be speedily relieved; nevertheless Delaunay, receiving no assistance, and seeing the exasperation of the people, seized a lighted match and would have blown up the place, had not the garrison prevented him and compelled him to surrender. Signals were made, and a bridge lowered; the besiegers drew near, promising to do no injury, but the crowd rushed on, and stormed the courts. The Swiss contrived to save themselves. The *invalides* were assailed, and only snatched from the fury of the people by the humanity of the French guards. At this moment a young, beautiful, and terrified girl came forward: supposing her to be daughter of Delaunay, the crowd seized her, and were on the point of burning her, when a brave soldier rushed in, and snatching her away from the infuriated populace, hastily carried her to a place of safety, and returned to the engagement.

It was now half past five o'clock. The electors were suffering the most intense anxiety, while they heard a prolonged and buzzing murmur—a crowd rushed in, shouting "Victory!" the hall is instantly filled, a French guard, covered with wounds and crowned with laurels, is carried in triumphantly by the people; the regulations and keys of the Bastille are on the point of a bayonet; a bloody hand, raised above the crowd, shows a curl in buckle, taken from the neck of the governor, who had just been beheaded. Two French guards, Elie and Hulling, had defended him to the last extremity. Other victims had fallen, although defended with heroism against the ferocity of the multitude. A species of violence began to be exhibited against Flesselles, the provost of the merchants, whom they accused of treason. They pretended that he had merely amused the people in promising them arms, which he never had any intention to give them. The hall was filled with an immense multitude, highly excited by a long combat, and urged by a hundred thousand men, who remaining without, awaited their chance of gaining admittance. The electors made an effort to justify Flesselles. He soon began to lose his assurance, and already pale with fear, cried out, "Since I am suspected, I will retire." "No," replied the people, "come to the Palais Royal to be tried." He immediately prepared to proceed there. The multitude pressed upon him and shook him; and as soon as he had arrived at the Quai Pelletier, he fell by a pistol-shot from some unknown hand. It was reported that they had found a letter upon Delaunay, in which Flesselles said to him, "Hold out while I amuse the Parisians with cockades."

Such had been the unfortunate events of this day. A feeling of alarm quickly succeeded the intoxication of victory, and the conquerors of the Bastille, astonished at their own audacity, and expecting to be exposed to punishment by the formidable authority of the law, dared not acknowledge their exploit. Reports were spread every moment, that troops were advancing to sack Paris. Moreau de Saint-Méry (the same who, the evening before, had threatened the *brigands* to blow up the Hotel de Ville,) remained undaunted, and gave more than three thousand orders in a few hours. The moment that the taking of the Bastille was known at the Hotel de Ville, the electors informed the assembly of it, who received the intelligence at about midnight. Their sitting was at that time suspended, but the news spread with rapidity. The court, having no opinion of the energy of the people, made light of the efforts of an ignorant multitude, who endeavoured to take a place, in former times fruitlessly besieged by the great Condé. The court, I say, were tranquil, and bandied forth their witticisms. Nevertheless the king began to be uneasy, his last replies had in fact disclosed his anxiety. The king had retired to rest. The Duke de Liancourt, so distinguished for his liberal feelings, who was the particular friend of Louis XVI., could, in his quality of grand master of the wardrobe, obtain access to him at all times. Informed of the events which had happened at Paris, he hastened immediately to his sovereign, awoke him in spite of the remonstrances of his attendants, and informed him of all that had taken place. "What, a revolt!" cried the prince. "Sire," replied the duke, "rather call it a revolution." The king, enlightened by his statements, consented to meet the assembly in the morning; in the propriety of this the court also assented, and this act of confidence was determined on. Meanwhile the assembly had resumed its sitting, and not knowing the new sentiments of the king, were about to send a last deputation, and to make one more effort to make a due impression on him, and obtain at his hands all that remained for him to grant. This deputation was the fifth since the commencement of these tragical events: it was composed of twenty-four members, and was now leaving the assembly, when Mirabeau, with greater vehemence than ever, thus addressed them. "Tell the king," cried he, "tell him, that the foreign hordes by whom we are surrounded, received yesterday a visit from the princes, princesses, and their favourites; that they received from them caresses, exhortations, and presents: tell him that during the whole night these foreign satellites, gorged with gold and wine, predicted, in their impious songs, the slavery of France, and in their brutal expressions called for the destruction of the national assembly: tell him, that in his very palace, the courtiers danced to the sound of that barbarous music, and that such were the scenes which preceded the massacre of Saint Bartholomew!!

"Tell him that that Henry, whose memory

the whole universe reveres, and whom, of all his ancestors, he wishes to take for a model, sent food into Paris, when it was in a state of revolt, and when he was besieging it in person; but that *his* cruel councillors will not allow that corn which commerce has provided to enter into Paris, when faithful and famishing."

The deputation were on the point of setting out for the palace, when they were informed that the king himself, of his own inclination, had arrived, without guard or escort. The chamber rung with shouts and clapping of hands. "Wait," said Mirabeau with gravity, "till the king makes known to us his good intentions. A mournful respect should be the first reception given to a monarch at this season of calamity. The silence of the people is a lesson for kings."

Louis XVI. entered, accompanied by his two brothers. His simple and affecting discourse excited the most lively enthusiasm. He re-assured the assembly of his good will, which, for the first time, he called "the national assembly," and meekly complained of the mistrust they had conceived. "You distrust me," said he; "well! it is I who trust in you." These words excited the most ardent applause. The deputies immediately rose up, surrounded the monarch, and conducted him on foot to the palace. The crowd pressed around him; tears ran from all eyes, and he could scarcely open a passage through this numerous retinue. The queen, seated with the court in a balcony, contemplated at a distance this impressive scene. Her son was in her arms, and her daughter, standing by the side of her, played innocently with the ringlets of her brother's head. The princess, powerfully affected, seemed delighted by this expression of love from the people. Alas, how many times during the fatal discords of the revolution, has a reciprocal burst of feeling reconciled all hearts! How often for a moment have all enmities seemed forgotten; but on the morrow, nay, on the very day itself, has the court returned to its pride, the people to their mistrust, and implacable hatred resumed its career!

Peace was now made with the assembly, but it had still to be made with Paris. The assembly immediately sent a deputation to the Hotel de Ville, to carry the happy news of the reconciliation wrought between the king and the nation. Bailly, Lafayette, and Lally-Tolendal, were among the number of the delegates. Their presence spread the most lively joy. The speech of Lally caused such ardent transports, that he was carried in triumph to a window of the Hotel de Ville, to be shown to the people. A crown of flowers was placed upon his head, and he received the homage of the people opposite the very place where his father had expired with a gag in his mouth. The death of the unfortunate Flesselles, chief of the municipality, and the refusal of the Duke d'Aumont to receive the command of the citizen militia, left a provost and a commander-in-chief to be nominated. Bailly was pointed out; and, in the midst of the most animated acclamations, appointed successor to Flesselles, under the title of mayor of Paris. The crown which had been on the head of Lally was transferred to that of the new mayor; he wished to tear it away, but the archbishop of Paris held it there in spite of him; the virtuous old man shed some tears, and resigned himself to his new functions. A worthy representative of a great assembly in the presence of the majesty of the throne, he was less capable of resisting the storms of a commonwealth, where the multitude struggled tumultuously against their magistrates. Nevertheless, acting upon a principle of self-denial, he unhesitatingly devoted himself to the anxious cares of providing subsistence for a people who repaid him with reproaches and ingratitude. It still remained to nominate a commandant to the military. There was in the chamber a bust, sent by emancipated America to the city of Paris. Moreau de Saint-Méry pointed to it, and immediately all eyes were directed thither: it was that of the Marquis de Lafayette. A general acclamation proclaimed him commandant: a "Te Deum" was immediately voted, and all present hastened in crowds to Notre Dame to celebrate it. The new magistrates, the archbishop of Paris, and the electors, mixed with French guards, and the soldiers of the militia marching arm in arm, proceeded to the ancient cathedral in a species of intoxication. On their route, some foundlings fell at the feet of Bailly, who had already exerted himself much for the hospitals; they called him their father; Bailly took them up in his arms, and called them his children. The assembly quickly arrived at the church; the ceremony was celebrated with pomp; and every one strolled about the city, where a delirious joy had succeeded to the terror of the preceding evening. It was then that the people visited that so long dreaded den, to which an entrance had been at length obtained. The people flocked to the Bastille with a greedy curiosity, not unmingled with terror. They then beheld its deep cells and instruments of torture, especially an enormous fragment of rock placed in the middle of a dark and damp dungeon, to the centre of which was affixed a heavy chain.

The court, as blind in its fears as it had been in its self-assurance, at this time so greatly feared the people, that they imagined every moment that a Parisian army was marching upon Versailles. The Count D'Artois and the Polignac family, so dear to the queen, immediately quitted France, and were the first emigrants. Bailly, however, inspired the king with confidence, and engaged him to make a visit to Paris, which he determined upon in spite of the resistance of the queen and the court.

The king prepared to set out. Two hundred deputies were ordered to accompany him. The queen bade him adieu with profound grief. The body guard escorted him to Sèvres, where they stopped to await his return. Bailly, at the head of the municipality, received him at the gates of Paris, and presented to him the keys given formerly to Henry IV. "That good king," said Bailly to him, "conquered his people; but at present, it is the people who have re-conquered their king." The nation, legislative at Versailles, was militant at Paris. Louis XVI. on entering the city, saw himself surrounded by a silent and embodied multitude. He arrived at the Hotel de Ville, (17th July, 1789,) passing under an arch of swords crossed over his head, in token of respect. His address was simple and affecting, and the people being no longer able to repress their feel-

ings, burst forth and lavished on him their accustomed applause. These acclamations somewhat relieved the mind of the prince; however, he was unable to conceal a feeling of satisfaction on perceiving the body-guard stationed on the heights of Sèvres; on his return, the queen, throwing herself on his neck, embraced him as if she had feared she should never have seen him more.

Louis XVI., to satisfy entirely the public wishes, ordered the return of Necker, and the dismission of his new ministers. M. de Liancourt, the friend and able counsellor of the king, was elected president by the assembly. The deputies of the nobility, who although part of the deliberative assembly, had refused to take a part therein, were at last persuaded to take an active part in its deliberations, and give them their votes. Thus all distinction of rank was virtually abolished. The revolution might now be looked upon as accomplished. The Nation, mistress of the legislative power by means of the assembly, and sole controller of public authority, could now realize all that was necessary for her interests. It was in refusing an equalization of taxes that the states-general were rendered necessary; it was by refusing a just distribution of authority among these states, that the court had lost all influence; and it was, finally, by endeavouring to recover this influence, that Paris was excited to insurrection, and the whole nation incited to have recourse to public force.

CHAPTER III.

THE CARES OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS—LAFAYETTE COMMANDANT OF THE NATIONAL GUARD; HIS CHARACTER, AND THE PART HE SUSTAINS IN THE REVOLUTION—MURDER OF FOULON AND BERTHIER—RETURN OF NECKER—STATE AND DIVISION OF PARTIES AND THEIR LEADERS—MIRABEAU; HIS CHARACTER; HIS SCHEMES AND GENIUS—THE BRIGANDS—DISTURBANCES IN THE PROVINCES AND THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY—NIGHT OF THE FOURTH OF AUGUST—ABOLITION OF ALL FEUDAL RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES—DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN—DISCUSSION UPON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE VETO—FERMENT AT PARIS; TUMULTUOUS CONCOURSE AT THE PALAIS ROYAL.

All now was agitation in the metropolis, where a new authority had just been established. The same considerations which had instigated the electors to take an active part, urged all other classes to do the same. The assembly was taken for a model by the Hotel de Ville, the Hotel de Ville was followed by the districts, and the districts by all the corporations. Tailors, cordwainers, bakers, and servants, held formal deliberations at the Louvre, at the Place Louis Quinze, and in the Champs Elysées, in spite of the reiterated orders of the municipality to the contrary. In the midst of these conflicting parties, the Hotel de Ville, opposed by the districts, and annoyed by the Palais Royal, became altogether embarrassed, and was hardly able to sustain the duties of its immense administration. It united in itself the civil, judicial, and military authority. It was there that the militia had their general quarters assigned them. The judges, at first, dubious as to their powers, handed over the accused to them; the Hotel de Ville, indeed, might be said to possess legislative power, being commissioned to constitute itself. Bailly had, for this last purpose, required two commissioners from each district, who, under the name of representatives of the *commune*, were to regulate its constitution. That they might effectually fulfil such various duties, the electors divided themselves into several committees; one, named the committee of inquiry, took charge of the police; and another, the committee of subsistence, looked to the supply of provisions, the most difficult and hazardous appointment of them all. It was in this last, that Bailly was compelled to be engaged night and day. This committee was obliged to make continual purchases of wheat, then to have it ground, and afterwards carried across famishing provinces to Paris. The convoys were frequently stopped, and numerous detachments were necessary to prevent its being pillaged on its journey, and in the markets. Although the state sold corn at a loss, that the bakers might lower the price of bread, the people were not satisfied; it was still necessary to diminish this price, and the scarcity at Paris was augmented by this diminution, because the provinces came there to buy their provisions. The fear of want on the morrow made every one provide himself abundantly, so that a large stock being accumulated by some, left others destitute. Public confidence promotes the success of commerce, causes abundance in provisions, and renders their distribution equal and easy; but when it ceases, commercial activity disappears; the objects of our wants no longer anticipate us; and the fear of destitution adds confusion to famine, and prevents the just distribution of the little which remains. The duty of providing subsistence for the capital was, therefore, the most toilsome of all. Bailly and the committee were subjected to the most excruciating anxieties. The labour of the day scarcely sufficed for the necessities of the day, and on the morrow the same anxieties had to be undergone.

Lafayette, commandant of the citizen militia *, had an equal share of labour. He had incorporated in this body the French guards devoted to the revolution, some Swiss, and a great number of soldiers, who deserted from their regiments, in hopes of gaining larger pay. The king himself had concurred in this arrangement. These mixed troops composed what was called the companies of the centre. The militia took the name

* He had been nominated to this appointment at the Hotel de Ville on the 15th of July.

of the *national guard*, were dressed in uniform, and added to the two colours (red and blue) of the Parisian cockade, that of white, which was the colour of the king. This is that tri-coloured cockade, whose destiny Lafayette predicted, prophesying that it would go round the world.

It was at the head of this troop, that Lafayette, for the two succeeding years, endeavoured to maintain public tranquillity, and carry into execution those laws which the assembly daily passed. Lafayette was descended from an ancient family, which had remained pure in the midst of the corruption of the great; endowed with an intelligent mind, and intrepid courage; enamoured of true glory, he was heartily disgusted with the frivolities of the court, and the pedantic discipline of our army. His country presenting to him no elevated object of ambition, he determined to embark in the most liberal enterprise of the age, and set out for America, the day after the report was spread in Europe that she had been humbled. He there fought by the side of Washington, and decided the question of the emancipation of the new world by the alliance of France. Having returned to his own country as a distinguished character in Europe, caressed at the court as a remarkable person, he conducted himself there with all the freedom and simplicity of an American. When philosophy, which had hitherto been to the indolent nobility nothing but a literary pastime, demanded attention at their hands, Lafayette, nearly alone, retained his own opinions, called for the states-general, contributed powerfully to the union of orders, and then, as his due, was appointed commander-in-chief of the national guard. Lafayette possessed not that enthusiasm of passion and genius which always hurry their possessors into the abuse of power: with an evenness of temper, a fine and comprehensive understanding, and an invariable principle of disinterestedness, he was the most fit actor for the part circumstances had assigned him, that of enforcing obedience to the laws. Adored by his troops without having captivated them by victory, remarkably calm and full of resources in the midst of the raging multitude, he maintained order with the most persevering vigilance. Those who had found him incorruptible accused him of want of ability, because they were unable to attack his character. In the meantime he did not deceive himself either in his estimation of events or men: did not over-estimate the court and the leaders of parties, protected them at the peril of his life, although he did not esteem them: and often hopelessly struggled against factions with the constancy of a man who will never abandon the cause of the public, even though he can no longer rest in hope.

Lafayette, in spite of all his vigilance, could not always succeed in checking popular commotions; for however active the military force might be, it could not be present everywhere, against a people every where in insurrection, and who saw an enemy in every one. The most ridiculous reports were continually propagated and believed. Sometimes it was said that the soldiers of the French guards had been poisoned; sometimes that the corn had been purposely wasted, or its arrival prevented; and those who devoted themselves to the arduous service of bringing it to the capital were exposed to the caprice of an ignorant rabble, who overwhelmed them with abuse or applause, according to the whim of the moment. Nevertheless, it is certain, that the animosity of the populace, who generally speaking neither knows how to select or to delay in seeking her victims, often appeared under some guidance, whether by means of wretched hirelings, who were to be rendered more desperate by being imbrued in blood, or whether it were to be effected by persons of deeper malice than ordinary. Foulon and Berthier were pursued and arrested far from Paris, with an evidently pre-determined plan. There was nothing spontaneous so far as they were concerned, but the fury of the multitude who murdered them. Foulon was an old intendant of taxes, a man of a cruel and avaricious disposition; he had certainly committed the most detestable exactions, and had been one of the ministers pointed out to succeed Necker and his colleagues. He was arrested at Viry, although he had spread a report of his own death [to elude his pursuers]. He was conducted to Paris, amidst reproaches for having said that the people ought to be made to eat hay. They tied nettles round his neck, put a bouquet of thistles in his hand, and a bundle of hay behind his back; and in this state he was drawn to the Hotel de Ville. At the same time, Berthier de Sauvigny, his son-in-law, was arrested at Compiègne, by colour of orders from the commune of Paris, which in fact had never been issued. The commune had without delay written for their release; an order that was not obeyed. They brought him to Paris at the very moment when Foulon was at the Hotel de Ville, exposed to the rage of an infuriated mob, who desired to kill him at once: the representations of Lafayette calmed the fury of the rabble for a moment, and they consented that their victims should be tried: but they insisted on sentence being passed instantly, that they might speedily revel in its execution. Several electors were chosen as judges, but had under divers pretexts refused this terrible office. At last Bailly and Lafayette were fixed upon, and reduced to the cruel extremity, either of exposing themselves to the rage of the people or sacrificing a victim. Nevertheless, Lafayette temporized with much firmness and address, and appealed to the people several times with success. The unhappy Foulon, placed on a seat by his side, had the imprudence to applaud his last words. "See," said one of the spectators, "they understand one another!" This idea immediately fired the mob, who would no longer listen to his remonstrances. They rushed in upon their victim, and carried him off. Lafayette made incredible efforts to extricate him from the assassins, but in vain. The unfortunate old man was hung at a street lamp, his head cut off, fixed on the point of a pike, and carried about Paris. At this moment Berthier arrived in a cabriolet, conducted by the guards, and followed by the mob. They showed him the bloody head of his father-in-law, which he did not recognize. He was conducted to the Hotel de Ville, and, far from being daunted, in a few words manifested the greatest intrepidity and indignation. Again seized by the mob, he extricates himself for a moment,

gets hold of a weapon, defends himself with spirit, and soon falls, as did the unfortunate Foulon *. These murders were planned, either by the enemies of Foulon, or of the common weal; for although the fury of the people was spontaneously aroused at seeing them, as in other instances, their arrest was certainly pre-concerted. Lafayette, filled with grief and indignation at these outrages, gave in his resignation. Bailly and the municipality, alarmed at his determination, endeavoured to dissuade him from it; and it was at last agreed that he should give in his resignation, to make the people feel his displeasure, and afterwards allow himself to be prevailed upon to resume it, by solicitations which would be made him. In fact, the people and the military both pressed round him, and promised him the most implicit obedience. He resumed the command on these conditions; and henceforward had the satisfaction of preventing most of the tumults—thanks to his energy, and the devotion of his soldiers.

During this time Necker had received at Bâle the orders of the king, and the solicitations of the assembly. The Polignacs, whom he left triumphant at Versailles, and met fugitives at Bâle, were the first who informed him of the misfortunes of the throne, and the sudden return of favour which awaited him. He immediately set out for Paris, and came through France, drawn in triumph by the people, to whom according to his custom he recommended peace and good order. The king received him with embarrassment, the assembly with eager joy, and he determined to pay a visit to Paris to enjoy his day of triumph. It was Necker's intention to ask of the electors, the pardon and enlargement of the Baron de Besenval. In vain Bailly, not less an enemy to measures of rigour than himself, but who more justly considered the circumstances of the times, represented to him the danger of such a step, and explained to him that this favour, granted unwillingly, would be revoked the next day as illegal, because a purely administrative body could neither condemn nor pardon: Necker was self-willed on this point, and experimentalized upon his influence in the capital. He visited the Hotel de Ville, on the 30th of July. The people on this day surpassed his hopes, and in witnessing the transports of the multitude, he might well believe himself all powerful. Deeply affected, and with his eyes full of tears, he demanded a general amnesty, which was granted with acclamations. The two assemblies, of the electors, and of the representatives, showed themselves equally eager: the electors decreed a general amnesty, and the representatives of the "Commune" gave an order for the liberation of Besenval. Necker retired intoxicated, congratulating himself on the applauses which were the forerunners of his disgrace. But from this day he was to be undeceived: Mirabeau aroused him from his delusive dream. In the assembly and districts a general cry was raised against the sensibility of the minister, excusable, it was said, but mistaken. The district of the "Oratoire," instigated, as it was asserted, by Mirabeau, was the first to annul the act of the electors and communes. It was maintained, on all sides, that a purely administrative body could neither condemn nor pardon. The illegal act, therefore, of the Hotel de Ville was revoked, and the detention of Baron de Besenval confirmed. Thus the opinion of the discreet Bailly was verified, and with this opinion Necker had declined to concur.

At this period, parties began to take a more decided character. The parliament, the nobility, the clergy, and the court, menaced with the same ruin, had blended their interests, and acted in concert *. At present, the court no longer possessed either the Count d'Artois, or the Polignacs. That kind of consternation which borders on despair, bore sway among the aristocracy. Not being able to prevent that which they called evil, they now desired that the people should perpetrate as much disorder as they could, in order that they might, by means of the very excess of the evil committed, bring forth good. This malicious and perfidious system, which may be truly termed political Pessimism or the basest policy, originated with those parties who having lost so much already, renounced what was left them, in the hopes of recovering all. The aristocracy from this time concurred in this policy, and were now often seen to vote with the most violent members of the popular party.

The abilities of men are called forth by circum-

* These outrages took place on the 22nd July.

* The Constituent Assembly was composed of 1128 persons, of whom about two-thirds were 'non-proprietors' (*i. e.* not land-holders). They were arranged in the following manner:—

Clergy.		*Nobles.*	
Archbishops and Bishops	48	Prince of the Blood	1
Abbots and Canons	35	Magistrates	28
Curates	210	Gentilhommes	241
	293		270

Tiers état.

Ecclesiastics	2
Gentilhommes	12
Mayors	18
Magistrates	62
Lawyers	279
Physicians	16
Merchants, Farmers, &c.	176

Nobles and Clergy 563—Tiers état 565

After the Assembly was united, and the parties were divided, they stood thus:—

Côté Droit, Royalists.		*Côté Gauche, Democrats.*	
Archbishops and Bishops	39	Prince of the Blood	1
Abbots and Canons	25	Lawyers	160
Curates	10	Curates	80
Nobles	180	Gentilhommes	55
Magistrates	10	Merchants, Farmers, &c.	30
Lawyers	18		
Farmers	40		
	322		326

Centre or undecided.

Clergy	140
Nobles	20
Magistrates	9
Lawyers	101
Tiers état	210
	480

Thus the Côté Gauche, which ultimately obtained the complete command of the Assembly and France, was at first less than a *third* of its number. Alison, i. 195-6.

stances. The peril of the nobility raised up a defender for them. The young Cazalès, captain of the queen's dragoons, all at once displayed a fund of talent and facility of expression which astonished every one. Simplicity and conciseness, promptness and propriety, distinguished all he said; and it is to be regretted that a mind so accomplished was devoted to a cause in whose favour no good arguments could be furnished, till it had been persecuted. The clergy found a defender in the Abbé Maury. This abbé, a practised and imperturbable sophist, joined to great abilities a frigidity and obstinacy of disposition, which enabled him to resist tumult courageously, and oppose evidence with audacity, and admirably adapted him to support his tottering party. Such were the means and resources of the aristocracy.

The ministry were without either objects or projects. Necker alone, who was hated by the court, who only endured him by compulsion, had no settled plan, but merely an aspiration. He had always desired the English constitution, the best, without doubt, which could be adopted as an accommodation between the throne, the aristocracy, and the people; but this constitution, proposed by the bishop of Langres before the establishment of a single assembly, had been rejected by the first orders. He would not have two chambers, because it implied a species of submission; the lesser nobility also rejected it, because they would then be excluded from the upper chamber; and by the popular party, because, still scared by the aristocracy, their object was to deprive them of all influence. A few members alone, some from a principle of moderation, and others because it was really their own opinion, wished for English institutions, and formed the sole party of the minister, a feeble party enough, because it offered nothing but conciliatory views to irritated passions, and brought nought in opposition to their adversaries but mere reasonings and explanation.

The popular party became divided among themselves, because they were getting the upper hand. Lally-Tolendal, Mounier, Malouet, and the other partisans of Necker, approved of all that had been done hitherto, because its result had been to lead the government into their views, that is to say, the English constitution. At this time they considered that their object had been attained. Having made friends with government, they were desirous of giving over. The popular party, on the contrary, considered that they had no reason to cease from what they had thus begun. This question was agitated with the utmost vehemence in the Breton club*. A sincere conviction influenced the majority; yet nevertheless personal pretensions began to display themselves, and already motives of self-interest had succeeded to the first burst of patriotism. Barnave, a young advocate of Grenoble, endowed with a prompt and luminous genius, and possessing in the highest degree the talent of speaking with propriety, formed, with the two Lameths, a triumvirate, rendered interesting by the youth of the parties who composed it, and soon possessed great influence by their activity and abilities. Duport, that young counsellor of the parliament whom we have already mentioned, soon joined them. It was said, that Duport was the head, Barnave the tongue, and the Lameths the hands, of this association. As yet these young deputies were on friendly terms with each other, without being the declared enemies of any one.

But of all the popular chiefs, Mirabeau took the lead in every bold and perilous debate. The absurd institutions of the old monarchy had stung the minds of the unprejudiced, and offended the well constituted; it was not possible, therefore, that they could fail in outraging and exasperating an enthusiastic and passionate mind. Such was the mind of Mirabeau, who encountering from his birth all kinds of despotism,—that of his father, of the government, and the courts of justice, spent his youth in hating and combating them. He was born in Provence, and descended from a noble family. He distinguished himself early by his debauched life, his quarrels, and his vehement eloquence. His travels, observations, and extensive reading, had given him knowledge on every subject, and he had retained everything. Extravagant, eccentric, and sophistical, even without the aid of passion, he became quite another man when under its influence. Excited by the warmth of a debate, or the presence of his opponents, his soul became on fire; his first ideas were confused, his sentences broken, and his body nervously agitated; but, quickly, as light broke in upon him, his genius displayed in an instant the acquirement of years; and even in the very act of speaking, his animated and rapid expressions gave point and illustration to his subject, and flashed conviction on his auditors. If opposed again, he returned to the charge still more forcible and more clear, and displayed the truth in striking or terrible images. If the situation of affairs was difficult, and the minds of all wearied by a long discussion, or intimidated by danger, some single expression, or decisive sentence, would escape from him, his countenance at such moments becoming terrible, from the combined expression of deformity and genius; and the assembly, enlightened or confirmed in their opinions, passed wise laws, or entered into vigorous resolutions.

Proud of his great qualities, and making vice his amusement; alternately haughty or courteous and flattering, he seduced some, intimidated others by his boldness and irony, and brought all into his train by a singular power of fascination. His party was every where—among the people, in the assembly, in the court itself, and in all those to whom he addressed himself at the moment. Mixing familiarly with all men, and acting with justice and expediency, he applauded the rising talents of Barnave, although he did not like his young friends; he appreciated the profound genius of Sieyes, and flattered his wild humour; he feared the purity of Lafayette's life; and he abhorred in Necker an extreme severity of principle, a pride of reasoning, and the pretension of governing a revolution, which he knew was a part that belonged only to himself. The Duke of Orleans, and his vague ambition, but little suited him; and, as will be shortly seen, had never possessed a single interest in common with him. Thus singly, and without any support but from his own genius, he attacked that despotism which he had sworn

* This Club was formed at the latter end of June. It was afterwards known as the Association of the Friends of the Constitution (*Société des Amis de la Constitution*).

to destroy. Yet, if he was an enemy to the vanities of monarchy, he was no less so to the ostracism of republics; but not being yet sufficiently avenged on the great, and on power, he still continued his hostilities. In addition to this, being harassed by poverty and discontent with the present, he pushed forward to an unknown future, making every thing to depend upon his talents, his ambition, his vices, and the bad state of his fortune; and countenancing, by the imprudence of his discourses, every kind of suspicion and description of calumny.

Thus was France and its parties divided. The first differences between the popular deputies were occasioned by the excesses of the multitude. Mounier and Lally-Tolendal proposed that a solemn proclamation should be issued, in disapproval of these outrages. But the assembly, perceiving the inutility of this measure, and the necessity of not alienating the multitude, who had supported them, at first refused it; yielding, however, at last to the pressing remonstrances of some of its members, a proclamation was issued, which, as had been foreseen, was altogether useless, for a people in a state of insurrection are not calmed by words.

The agitation was universal. A sudden consternation spread throughout the country. The name of those *brigands* who, as has been seen, appeared in the different commotions, was in every one's mouth, and their image in every one's imagination. The court laid the blame of their havoc upon the popular party, and the popular party threw back the reproach upon the court. Couriers were immediately despatched, and, traversing France in all directions, brought intelligence that the *brigands* were advancing, and cutting down in their way the harvests before they were ripe. The people assembled together in all quarters, and in a few days the whole of France was in arms, in expectation of the *brigands*, who never appeared. This stratagem, which rendered the revolution of the 14th of July universal, by provoking the nation to arms, was attributed to all parties, and has since been ascribed to the popular party, who reaped the profit. It is astonishing that a stratagem more ingenious than culpable, should have been denied on all sides, and its imputation bandied from one to the other. It was attributed to Mirabeau, who was applauded as its author, but who nevertheless disavowed it. It was thought accordant to the genius of Sieyès, and some believe that he suggested it to the Duke of Orleans. Others after all imputed it to the court. It was thought that the couriers had been stopped, at every step, without the consent of government, and that the court, never having looked upon the revolution as general, and regarding it as a simple insurrection of the Parisians, wished to arm the provinces to subdue Paris. Whatever truth there may be in these conjectures, the event was of advantage to the nation, which it armed, and put in a state to watch over its safety and its rights.

The inhabitants of the cities having shaken off their fetters, those of the provinces wished also to follow their example. They refused to pay feudal rights, persecuted those lords who had oppressed them, set fire to their châteaux, burnt their titles of property, and exercised in some places the most atrocious outrages. A melancholy accident contributed more than anything else to produce this universal commotion. A gentleman at Mesmai, lord of Quincey, gave a fête in the grounds of his château. All the country people were assembled there, and, when giving loose to joy and merriment, a barrel of powder took fire, and suddenly blew up, with a tremendous explosion. This accident, which was known afterwards to have been occasioned by imprudence, and not intentionally, was laid to the charge of the landlord of Mesmai. The report was quickly propagated, and provoked on every side the ferocity of the peasants, hardened by a miserable life, and rendered cruel by their long sufferings. The priests came in bodies, to make a representation to the assembly of the deplorable state of France, and to demand from them the means of re-establishing order: these unhappinesses, which were of every possible description, took place after the 14th of July. The month of August had begun, and it became indispensably necessary to re-establish the action of the government and the laws; but to attempt this with success, it was requisite to commence the reformation of the state, by the reform of those institutions which most sensibly aggrieved the people, and disposed them chiefly to insurrection. One portion of the nation, subject to the other, had to discharge a multitude of services called feudal; of which some, termed beneficial, imposed upon the peasants ruinous duties; and others, termed honorifical, submitted them to the most humiliating respect and services towards their lords. These were the barbarous remains of feudality, and their abolition was a mere act of common justice. These privileges, regarded as rightful property, and even so styled under this appellation by the king, on the 23rd of June, consequently could not be abolished by mere discussion. It was necessary, therefore, by a sudden and energetic impulse, to induce their possessors to resign them themselves.

The famous declaration of the rights of man was at this crisis under discussion in the assembly. The first question was, whether one should be made out; and, on the morning of the 4th of August, it was decided in the affirmative, and settled that it should be placed at the head of the constitution. On the evening of the same day, the committee brought up their report of the troubles of the kingdom, and of the best means of appeasing them. The Viscount de Noailles and the Duke d'Aiguillon, both members of the nobility, on this occasion addressed the assembly, and represented, that it would be of little avail to re-establish order among the people by force; that the cause of their complaints should rather be destroyed, and that the disorders which sprung from it would immediately be calmed. Explaining themselves afterwards more clearly, they proposed the abolition of all those vexatious rights, which, under the denomination of feudal rights, weighed so heavily upon the inhabitants of the provinces. Monsieur Lequen de Kerendal, a proprietor in Brittany, presented himself at the tribune, in the dress of a husbandman, and delineated a frightful illustration of the feudal system. Hereupon, generosity exciting some, and pride drawing in others, induced a sudden disinterestedness, and every one hurried to the tribune to abdicate his privileges. The

nobility set the first example, and the clergy, not less eager, hastened to follow it. A species of transport pervaded the assembly, superseding an useless discussion, certainly not necessary to demonstrate the justice of such sacrifices; all orders, all classes, all possessors of prerogatives, whatsoever they might be, hastened to execute their renunciation of them. After the deputies of the first orders, those of the commons came in their turn to make their resignations, and having no personal privileges to sacrifice, they offered those of the provinces and cities; the equality of rights established among individuals, was also extended to all parts of France. Some delivered up their pensions, and one member, having nothing else to give, promised his devotion to the public cause. All the passages to the public registry were crowded with deputies who had just entered the act of their renunciations. The assembly at this point contented themselves with enumerating the sacrifices of the aristocracy, and adjourned to the next day their formation into articles. The feeling became general; but in the midst of this enthusiasm, it was easy to perceive certain privileged persons perfectly insincere, whose object was to push things to the worst. Everything was to be feared from the effect of that night, added to the violence of public feeling, when Lally-Tolendal, perceiving the danger, passed a note to the president. "Everything is to be apprehended," said he, "from the enthusiasm of the assembly; break up the sitting." At the same moment a deputy sprang towards him, and grasping his hand with emotion, said to him: "Give us the royal sanction, and we are friends." Lally-Tolendal, immediately perceiving the necessity of again identifying the revolution with the king, proposed to proclaim him the restorer of French liberty. The proposition was received with enthusiasm: a "Te Deum" was decreed, and the assembly broke up at about midnight.

During this memorable night, the following acquisitions to liberty were obtained:—

The abolition of the condition of serfship;
The power of commuting of seignorial rights;
The abolition of seignorial jurisdictions;
The suppression of the exclusive rights of the chase, of dove-houses, and free warren, &c.;
The amortization of tithes;
The equalization of taxes;
The admission of all citizens to civil and military employments;
The abolition of the practice of selling offices;
The annulling of all the privileges of cities and provinces;
The abolition of jurats or aldermen;
And the suppression of pensions obtained without services.

These resolutions were decreed under a general form, but it remained to reduce them into acts; and it was then, that the first burst of generosity having subsided, and the minds of all being restored to their natural bent, some wished to extend, and others to limit the concessions which had been obtained. The discussion became lively, and a prolonged and ill-judged opposition destroyed every sentiment of gratitude.

The abolition of feudal rights had been determined; but it was necessary to distinguish between those which were to be entirely abolished, and those which were to be commuted. These rights had originated from the ancient conquerors of the country, who, on their first occupation, had imposed services on the inhabitants, and tribute on the land. The land itself was only restored gradually to its cultivators, in consideration of perpetual rents. A long possession, followed by numerous conveyances, constituting ownership, all the burdens imposed upon the inhabitants and the land had acquired that character. The assembly was therefore reduced to the necessity of attacking these properties, not by objecting to the lawfulness of their acquisition, but by insisting on their burdensomeness to society. They abolished personal services; and many of these services having been changed into rents, those rents were also abolished. Among the duties imposed upon land, those were abolished which were evidently the remains of slavery, such as that placed on aliens. All perpetual rents were declared redeemable, although they were evidently the price for which the nobility had in old time granted a part of their territory to the tillers of the soil. Nothing therefore is more absurd than to accuse the constituent assembly of having violated property, for that had been done long before; and it is strange that the nobility, having so long violated, either by imposing tribute, or by not paying taxes, all the principles of private right and public justice, should have now shown themselves so tenacious of them when they concerned their own prerogatives. Seignorial jurisdictions were also called property, having been for ages transmitted as hereditary; but the assembly did not suffer itself to be abused, and abolished them, ordering nevertheless, that they should be continued till a substitute could be provided for them.

The exclusive right of the chase was also a subject of animated disputes. In spite of the vain objection, that the whole population would shortly be in arms if that right was accorded, it was granted to every one within the extent of his own fields. Privileged dove houses were also prohibited. The assembly decided that every one might possess them; but at the harvest season the pigeons might be killed as common game on the ground where they alighted. All commanderies were abolished; but it was added, out of respect for the king, that the royal diversions should be provided for in a manner compatible with the interests of liberty and property.

One article, that of tithes, excited, more than all the others, violent disputes, on account of the more important questions of which it was the preiude, and of the interests which it attacked. On the night of the 4th of August, the assembly had declared tithes to be redeemable. But, at the time of passing these resolutions into acts, they abolished them without redemption; adding, that the maintenance of the clergy should be provided for by the state. Undoubtedly there was a defect of form in this decision, as it contradicted an act already passed. Monsieur Garat replied to this objection, that according to the proposed plan the state would redeem the tithes in taking on itself to provide for the clergy; so that redemption was equally understood by this arrangement as by any

other. The Abbé Sieyès, who occasioned surprise by being found amongst one of the assertors of tithes, and who was not deemed a disinterested defender of this tax, agreed, that in fact the state truly redeemed the tithes, but that it robbed the great bulk of the nation, in throwing on it the weight of a debt, which ought only to weigh on landed proprietors. This objection, enforced in a sarcastic manner, was accompanied by this satirical remark, since so often repeated: "You wish to be free, and you don't know how to be just"—Although Sieyès did not believe it possible to reply to this objection, the reply was easy. The expense incurred by public worship belongs to all; and whether it was fairer to make it weigh only on landed proprietors or on every one subject to taxation, was a question for the state to decide. A distribution most advantageous to the general interests could, in reality, injure no particular class of men. Tithes, by oppressing small proprietors, destroyed agriculture; the state therefore was bound, by every consideration of justice, to abolish this tax; this was proved by Mirabeau, with the most conclusive evidence. The clergy, who preferred tithes to every other mode of provision, because they foresaw that the salary given them by the state would be in proportion to their real wants, pretended to be proprietors of tithes by immemorial concessions, and renewed the oft repeated argument of long possession, which proves nothing, for then everything, even to tyranny, would be legitimized by long possession. To this it was replied, that tithes were merely an usufruct, which was not transmissible, and had not the characteristic marks of property; that it was evidently a tax established in their favour, and that the state took upon itself to change this tax into another. The pride of the clergy disdained the idea of being pensioned; their expostulation against the proposed measure was violent; but Mirabeau, who excelled in masterly strokes of argument and irony, rejoined to these interruptions, that he only knew three ways of existing in society: to be either a robber, beggar, or receiver of wages. The clergy perceived that it was requisite to abandon that which they could not defend. The curates especially, knowing that they had every thing to gain from the spirit of justice which reigned in the assembly, and that it was the opulence of the prelates at which it was particularly desired to strike, were the first to desist. The entire abolition of tithes was therefore decreed, and the state took upon itself the expenses of public worship. But, till this act should be carried into practical force, the clergy were permitted to levy tithes as usual. This last clause, full of consideration for that order, was, it is true, useless. The people had long ceased to be amenable to this article of taxation, and even before the abolition of the feudal system, had virtually cast off their obligation to pay tithes.

On the 13th of August, all the articles were presented to the king, who accepted the title of Restorer of French liberty, and assisted at the *Te Deum*, having at his right hand the president, and in his suite all the deputies.

Thus was accomplished the most important reform of the revolution. The assembly had displayed, in acquiring it, as much strength as moderation. Unhappily, the people never possess the wisdom of regaining their rights with equanimity. The most atrocious outrages were committed throughout the kingdom. The country was overrun by sportsmen, who spread themselves over the fields hitherto reserved for the exclusive pleasure of their oppressors, where they committed frightful devastations. Every usurpation has a painful retribution, and he who commits an usurpation ought to reflect upon this, at least for the sake of his descendants, who, in almost all cases, bear the punishment. Numerous accidents also took place.

On the 7th of August, the ministers were anew presented to the assembly, in order to make a report upon the state of the kingdom. The keeper of the seals depicted the alarming disorders which were every day taking place; Necker had displayed the deplorable state of the finances. The assembly received this double intelligence with sorrow, but without despondency. On the 10th, an act to ensure the public tranquillity was passed. By this act all municipalities were authorized to maintain the public peace, by dispersing all seditious assemblages; all rioters were made amenable to the sentence of the courts of justice; and those who spread false alarms, used false orders, or in any other way excited the populace to violence, were condemned to imprisonment. The national militia and regular troops were placed at the disposal of the municipalities, and were obliged to take an oath of fidelity to the nation, the king, and the laws, &c. This oath has since been termed the oath of civism.

Necker's account of the state of the finances was most alarming. Absolute want of subsidies compelled him to have recourse to a national assembly. This assembly had scarcely met, before it became engaged in a contest with government; and thinking of nothing else but the pressing necessity of establishing safeguards [against that formidable enemy], had neglected to provide for the revenues of the state. On Necker, therefore, alone fell all the harassing cares and anxieties of the finances. While Bailly, having the charge of providing for provisioning the capital, suffered the most cruel solicitude; Necker, tormented by necessities, perhaps less pressing, but greater in extent, and busied in the most laborious calculations, distracted by a thousand cares, made every effort to meet the public exigencies; and whilst he thought of nothing but financial questions, was unable to comprehend that the assembly considered nothing but politics.

Thus, Necker and the assembly, pre-occupied with their different objects, left every other matter unattended to. But, if the actual distress of the treasury justified the fears of Necker, the confidence of the assembly was equally justified by the elevation of their views. This assembly, taking a comprehensive view of France, and her future prosperity, could not believe that so fine a country, although for the moment in debt, had been stricken with irretrievable poverty.

Necker, on entering his ministry in August, 1788, had only found four hundred thousand francs in the treasury. He had at first, by great care, provided for the most pressing emergencies; but since then, circumstances had increased these wants, in diminishing his resources. It had been necessary to make purchases of wheat, to sell it

again below the prime cost; to expend large sums in charities; and to provide public works to occupy the labouring classes. Twelve thousand francs per diem went out of the treasury for this last purpose; and instead of any proportionate augmentation of funds to meet these increasing demands, the revenue was daily diminished. The reduction of the price of salt, the delay of payment of taxes, and often the absolute refusal to pay them; the system of smuggling, which was carried on in defiance of all prohibition, the destruction of the barriers, the embezzlement of the very registers, and the murder of the commissioners, had annihilated a great part of the receipts. In consequence of this, Necker demanded a loan of thirty millions. The first impression made by his representation was so powerful, that the demand was on the point of being voted by acclamation; but this first impulse soon subsided. A repugnance was manifested against new loans, and a species of inconsistency was committed, by consulting the papers, the authority of which had been formerly renounced; and which prohibited the consent to taxes before a constitution was formed. Even a calculation was gone into as to the sums received since the preceding year, as if in distrust of the minister. Nevertheless, the necessity of providing for the wants of the state made consent to a loan indispensable; but the plan of the minister was changed, and the interest reduced to four and a half per cent., from a false expectation of exciting a patriotic feeling, which not only had no real existence in the nation, but certainly was not to be found among the stock-jobbers, the only people who usually pay any regard to financial operations. This first blunder of the assembly was one of those into which assemblies ordinarily fall, because they supersede the immediate views of the minister who negociates, by the general views of twelve hundred speculators. It was easy to perceive that the spirit of the nation no longer accommodated itself to the timidity of the minister.

After this indispensable attention had been given to the public tranquillity and the finances, the assembly turned their thoughts to the declaration of rights. The first idea of this had been suggested by Lafayette, who, himself, had borrowed it from the Americans. The consideration of this question, interrupted by the revolution of the 14th of July, renewed on the first of August, and interrupted again by the abolition of the feudal system, was resumed and definitively settled on the 12th of August. This topic possessed great importance in the eyes of the assembly. These violent emotions of the mind directed them to every thing that was intrinsically great; from these transports proceeded their unanimity, their courage, their good and their evil resolutions. If the only question had been to lay down some principles entirely unknown to the authority whose yoke they had just shaken off, such as the vote for the general taxation, religious liberty, the liberty of the press, or ministerial responsibility, nothing would have been more easy. This had been done already in England and America. France might have also laid down, in a few clear and positive maxims, those new principles which she wished to impose on her government; but disregarding the experience of past ages, and wishing to go back to the most primitive times, she aspired at the formation of a complete declaration of the rights of the man and the citizen. The necessity and danger of such a declaration became the subject of great discussion; for there was no necessity, nor did any danger exist in framing a declaration composed of articles which the people were unable to comprehend; it served no other purpose than that of gratifying some of those philosophic minds, who did not take any prominent lead in the popular tumults. As it was decided that it should be drawn up, and placed at the head of the constitutional act, it became necessary to digest it, and here was the difficulty. What is the definition of the word *right?*—that which is due to man: consequently it might be said, that every benefit that could be conferred on man was his due; every wise measure of government is therefore a right. Likewise all proposed resolutions comprehended the definition of a law, the mode of its operation, the principle of its authority, &c. It was then objected that this was not an elucidation of rights, but of general maxims. Nevertheless it was necessary to express these maxims. It was therefore agreed that, in such cases, general maxims should be substituted for positive right. But the embodying of these maxims was extremely difficult; Mirabeau, in a fit of impatience, cried out, "Don't use the word *right*, but say, For the benefit of all it has been declared." .... Nevertheless, the more imposing title of 'Declaration of rights' was preferred, in which maxims, principles, and definitions, were all mixed together; and this celebrated declaration, compounded of such various materials, was placed at the head of the constitution of 91. The greatest evil that accrued from it was the loss of a few sittings in the commonplace cant of philosophy; in other respects it was perfectly harmless. But who will reproach the assembly for being intoxicated with such a subject? And who has a right to despise the unavoidable weaknesses of their new political existence?

Although it was full time that something decided should be done towards forming a constitution, a general wariness was manifested in regard to preliminary matters, and fundamental points were already the subject of discussion out of doors. The English constitution, as it united the interests of the king, the aristocracy, and the people, was the model which naturally presented itself to many minds, seeing that it involved a mere agreement, as the consequence of a conference between the king, lords, and commons. This constitution essentially resided in the establishment of two chambers, and in the royal sanction; and was well adapted to reconcile together the extremes of despotism and democracy. But a people long enslaved, and suddenly emancipated, have no idea of mediating between evils. A nation who declared their will, and a king who executed it, appeared to such zealots for liberty the only legitimate form of government. To give to the aristocracy a part equal to that of the nation by means of an upper chamber, and to give to the king the right of annulling the national will by means of his sanction, were things abhorrent to all their notions of equality. *The nation wills, the king executes*, comprised their simple system of government; and because a king was left at the head of the state as

an executor of the national will, those who wished to reduce him to such insignificancy, persuaded themselves that they were advocates for monarchy. But real monarchy, such as it exists even in states reputed free, is the dominion of a single man, whose power is limited by the necessity of a national concurrence in his measures. The will of the prince is in reality nearly all; and that of the nation is confined to the prevention of evil, either in disputing taxation, or in consenting, as a third party, to the laws. But from the moment that a nation can command all its wishes, without the king having the power to oppose it by a *veto*, such king is no more than a magistrate. The state is then a republic, with one consul instead of many. The government of Poland, although it had a king, was never called a monarchy, but a republic; that of Lacedæmonia had also a king.

Monarchy, to be well understood, exacts great concessions from the people. But it is not after a long privation, and in their first enthusiasm, that a nation is disposed to such concessions; consequently, a republican form of government alone suited their views, without being expressly named, and they insensibly became republicans without intending it.

But the assembly did not explain themselves clearly in their discussions on this point; thus, notwithstanding the genius and knowledge which abounded in it, the question was badly handled, and little understood. Necker, Mounier, and Lally, the partisans of the English constitution, did not know exactly in what monarchy ought to consist; and if they had known it, they would not have dared to tell the assembly plainly, that the national will should not be omnipotent, and that it should possess rather a negative than positive authority. They contented themselves with repeating that the king should have the power of checking the excesses of an assembly; that for the purpose of effectively executing the law, he should co-operate in the formation of the laws; and that, finally, some relationship should exist between the executive and legislative powers. These arguments were bad, or at least weak; and in truth, it was ridiculous to acknowledge the sovereignty of the nation, and attempt, at the same time, to annihilate it by the single will of the king *.

There were more able advocates of the two chambers, because, even in republican forms of government, gradations of ranks must subsist; and it is highly expedient that the upper classes should have the power of putting some check to those bold novelties and experiments that might be expected from popular legislators. But this upper chamber, more indispensable than the royal prerogative, since there is no example of a republic without a senate, was still more violently the subject of opposition than the royal sanction, as the assembly were more irritated against aristocracy than royalty. The establishment of an upper chamber was therefore impossible; the lower nobility opposed it, because they were not admitted into it; so did the privileged orders, now past hope, because they desired the worst should take place at all events; and so did the popular party, because they were unwilling to leave a single hold to the aristocracy, from whence they might domineer over the national will. Mounier, Lally, and Necker, were almost single in their aspirations for this upper chamber. Sieyès from the wanderings of an arbitrary spirit, was opposed both to the two chambers and the royal sanction. He conceived the idea of a society perfectly united: according to his idea, the mass of the people, without distinction of classes, should be empowered to express their will, and the king, as sole magistrate, be entrusted to fulfil it. Thus he was sincere when he said, that monarchy or a republic were the same thing, since the difference was only in the number of magistrates commissioned to execute the laws. The peculiarity of the genius of Sieyès was a systematic concatenation and strict congruity of his own ideas. He understood well within himself, but he could not understand the nature of things, or those opinions which differed from his own. He obtained supremacy by the mere force of absolute maxims, but he rarely possessed the power of persuasion, consequently not being able to divide his systems, nor yet ensure their entire adoption, he expressed himself capriciously. Mirabeau, though possessing an accurate, prompt, and pliant mind, was not in point of fact a whit more advanced in political knowledge than the assembly itself. He opposed the two chambers, not from any moral conviction, but from a knowledge of its actual impracticability, and thorough hatred he bore to the aristocracy. He defended the [royal] *sanction* from a bias to monarchy; and had been constantly declaring, ever since the opening of the states, that without the *sanction* he would rather live at Constantinople than at Paris. Barnave, Duport, and Lameth, in this instance, disagreed with him. They neither desired an upper chamber nor the royal sanction; but they consented to modify their opinions, and were willing to grant the king and the upper chamber a suspending *veto*, that is to say, the power of temporarily opposing to the will of the nation, as expressed in the lower chamber.

These preliminary discussions engaged the assembly during the 28th and 29th of August. The party of Barnave wished to confer with Mounier, whom his own obstinacy had made chief of the English constitution party. He was the most unbending of those whom it was necessary to gain over, and to him therefore court was made. Conferences took place, when it was plain enough that it was impossible to alter a mode of thinking which in him had increased to a habitude of opinion; Mounier agreed to the adoption of the English forms he so strenuously insisted upon, provided that, in opposing to the popular chamber an upper chamber and the king, he would not allow to them both but one suspending *veto*, and moreover deny the king the power of dissolving the assembly. Mounier answered like one fully convinced; he said, that truth was not exclusively his, and that he was unable in sacrificing one party to save another. He therefore threw up two institutions because he was unwilling to qualify them. And if it be true, that the constitution of 91, by the suppression of the upper chamber overturned the throne, which, as will be seen hereafter, was not the case, he had

* See note 5 in the Appendix.

great cause to reproach himself. Mounier was not so passionately attached to his opinions, but merely wilful; he was as absolute in his notions as Sieyès, and preferred losing all, rather than conceding any thing. The conferences were broken off with ill-temper. Mounier was threatened with Paris and the public opinion, and his adversaries, said he, left him with the determination of putting their threats into execution*.

These questions were discussed by the people in a manner equally as animated as they were by the assembly. The very mob took part in the discussions, nor was their ignorance of the question any impediment to their forming the most decisive opinions; every thing was summed up in that terse and short word *veto* †. To have the *veto* and not have the *veto*, became in common parlance the same thing as to say one would or would not submit to a tyranny; the people not understanding it quite in that spirit, considered the *veto* as a tax that ought to be abolished, or considered it in the same light as an enemy they ought to get rid of, and whom they were desirous of hanging from a lamp-post.

But the Palais Royal was distinguished, above all, for its extended agitation. This was the rendezvous of the most violent demagogues, who being unable even to bear the restraints imposed by the districts, mounted themselves upon chairs and addressed the people uncalled for, and were either hissed or carried in triumph by that immense mob, who were perfectly ready to execute whatever they suggested. Camille Desmoulins, already mentioned in this history, distinguished himself by mad sallies, originality of mind, and selfish imprudence; and without being of cruel disposition, yet suggested the most cruel acts. There also was to be observed Saint-Hurugue, an aged marquis, who had been a long time kept prisoner in the Bastille, on account of some family feuds, and, irritated against the nobility to a pitch of perfect madness, was busy in stirring up the people to insurrection. There it was from day to day that these demagogues insisted that the Parisians should march to Versailles, to call the king and the assembly to account for their hesitation in according the wishes of the people; Lafayette had much ado to prevent this by means of a constant Patrol; the mob already began to accuse the national guard of aristocracy. There was no patrol, said Desmoulins, at Athens,—already were the names of Cromwell and Lafayette coupled together; at last, on Sunday the 30th of August, at a mob convocation at the Palais Royal, held for the purpose, the deputy Mounier was accused, Mirabeau represented as in great danger, and a proposition made of marching to Versailles to watch over the latter.

Mirabeau had in the meantime defended the *veto*, but this did not interfere with his character as a tribune of the people, or make him appear a bit the less frequently in the eyes of the people. Saint-Hurugue, at the head of some fanatics took the road to Versailles. They intended, they said, to solicit the assembly to dismiss their faithless representatives, and nominate others, and to supplicate the king and the dauphin to reside in Paris, and there place themselves in safety, in the middle of the people. Lafayette hastens after them, stops them short and turns them back. On the next day, however, Monday, the 31st, they met again, and drew up an address to the *commune*, in which they demanded a convocation of the districts to express their disapprobation of the *veto* and the deputies who defended it, proposing, at the same time, their recall and the nomination of others. The commune repulsed them twice with the greatest firmness.

Meanwhile, agitation prevailed in the assembly. The malcontents had written letters to the principal deputies, full of menaces and invectives; one of them was signed with the name of Saint-Hurugue. On Monday the 31st, at the opening of the sitting, Lally complained of a deputation which he had received from the Palais Royal. This deputation had exhorted him to separate himself from the bad citizens who defended the *veto*, and added, that an army of twenty thousand men was ready to march [to Versailles]. Mounier read also letters which he had received, and proposed searching for the secret authors of these troubles, by offering a reward of five hundred thousand francs to any one who would inform against them. A disorderly wrangle ensued: Duport maintained that it did not become the dignity of that assembly, to pay attention to such trifles. Mirabeau afterwards read letters which had been addressed to him, in which the enemies of the popular cause did not treat him a whit better than Mounier. The assembly then moved the order of the day, and Saint-Hurugue, as having signed one of the letters, was imprisoned by order of the commune.

The three questions of the permanency of the assembly, the two chambers, and the *veto*, were discussed together. The permanency was voted nearly unanimously. The nation had suffered too much from the long intervals of national assemblies, not to pronounce for their permanence. They passed, then, immediately, to the great question of the unity of the legislative body. The galleries being occupied by a numerous and noisy multitude, many of the deputies retired, in spite of the efforts of the president, the bishop of Langres, to keep them in their seats. They went out in numbers. The vote was loudly called for from all sides. Lally demanded, again, liberty to address the assembly, but this was denied him, while the president was accused of having sent him to the tribune. One member went so far as to ask the president whether he was not weary of fatiguing the assembly. Offended at these words, the president quitted his seat, and the decision was again delayed. On the next day, the 10th of September, an address was read from the city of Rennes, declaring the *veto* inadmissible, and those traitors to their country who voted for it. Mounier and his party became irritated, and proposed to snub the municipality, but Mirabeau replied, that the assembly was not obliged to teach ignorant municipal officers good manners. The question of the two chambers was then put to the vote, and amidst bursts of applause, the unity of the assembly was

* See note (6) in the Appendix.

† Two countrymen talked thus about the *veto*. "Do you know what this *veto* is?" said one. "No." "Well it is this; you have your plate full of soup; the king says to you, 'Spill your soup,' and you must spill it."

decreed. Four hundred and ninety-nine voices declared themselves for having one chamber, and ninety for having two; an hundred and twenty-two were lost, from the apprehension entertained by a large number of the deputies.

At last comes the question of the *veto*. [To reconcile the wide differences which existed on this subject,] a middle term had been found, that of a suspending *veto*, which stayed the passing of the law only for a time, during one or more legislative sittings. This was considered as an appeal to the people, because the king, in having recourse to new assemblies, and yielding to them if they persisted in the measures he opposed, in reality would appear to defer to the national authority; Mounier and his party resisted this plan; they drew their inference from the constitution of the English monarchy, where the king advises with the national representation, and does not obey it; but they were in the wrong, considering the situation of things. Their only object was, said they, to frustrate a precipitate act. Now the suspending *veto* produced this effect as well as the absolute *veto*; if the national representation should persist, the national will would be manifested; and in admitting its sovereignty it would be difficult to resist it indefinitely.

The ministry, in point of fact, felt that the suspensive produced, in a great measure, the effect of the absolute *veto*; and Necker counselled the king to give himself the advantage of a voluntary concession, by addressing a memorial to the assembly, in which he should demand the suspensive *veto*. The report of this intended communication spread with rapidity, and its spirit and object was known before it was presented, which was on the 11th September. One would think that Mounier, advocating the cause of the throne, would have had no other views than the throne itself; but parties obtain very soon an interest distinct from those they serve. Mounier therefore repelled this communication, in observing, that if the king renounced a prerogative useful to the nation, it should be given him in spite of himself, as well as for the common weal. The tables were now turned, and the adversaries of the king here defended his mode of proceeding; but their efforts were useless, and the memorial was harshly rejected. The assembly now explained themselves again on the word *sanction*; arguing the question upon the point of its being indispensable to the constitution. After having determined that the constituting power was superior to constituted authorities, it was settled that the *sanction* could only be exercised on legislative, and in no wise on constitutional acts; and that these last merely required promulgation. Six hundred and seventy-three voices declared for the suspensive, and three hundred and twenty-five for the absolute *veto*. Thus were the fundamental articles of the new constitution passed. Mounier and Lally-Tolendal immediately laid down their commission as members of the constitutional committee.

Hitherto the assembly had passed a multitude of acts, without presenting any of them for the royal assent. It was now resolved to present to the king the articles of the 4th of August. But the previous question to be decided was, whether they required the *sanction*, or a simple promulgation; that is, whether they were to be considered legislative or constitutional acts. Maury, and even Lally-Tolendal, had the bad taste to maintain that they were legislative, and required the *sanction*, as if they had expected some obstacle to their passing from the royal prerogative. Mirabeau, with remarkable propriety, argued, that some abolished the feudal system, and were peculiarly constitutional; that the others were entirely a gift from the nobility and clergy, and that they could have no wish that the king should revoke their bounties. Chapelier added, that it was not to be supposed that even the consent of the king was necessary, since he had already approved of them, by accepting the title of the Restorer of French liberty, and assisting at the *Te Deum*; consequently, the assembly demanded of the king merely a simple promulgation *.

A member suddenly proposed a declaration of the hereditary descent of the crown, and the inviolability of the royal person; and the assembly, who sincerely wished for a king as their first hereditary magistrate, carried these two articles by acclamation. The inviolability of the person of the heir-presumptive was then proposed; but the Duke de Mortemart presently remarked, that sons had sometimes endeavoured to dethrone their fathers, and that it was necessary to preserve some means of checking such attempts. Upon this suggestion, the proposition was rejected. The deputy, Arnoult, then, in reference to the act relating to the hereditary descent of the royal power from male to male, and branch to branch, proposed confirming the exclusion of the Spanish branch by the terms of the treaty of Utrecht. But the present was not thought a proper time to deliberate on this subject, more especially as it might alienate a faithful ally. Mirabeau agreed to this opinion, and the assembly passed to the order of the day. But suddenly, Mirabeau, for the purpose of making a badly conceived experiment, desired to revive the very question he had himself assisted to delay. The house of Orleans was in competition with the house of Spain, in case of the extinction of the reigning branch. Mirabeau had observed an earnest desire in the assembly to pass to the order of the day. Stranger as he was to the duke, although on familiar terms with him, as he was well able to be with every body, he wished to know the state of parties, and to know who were the friends, and who the enemies, of the duke. The question of the regency presented itself. In the case of a minority, the brothers of the king could not be guardians of their nephew, because, as successors of the royal ward, they were not interested in his preservation. The regency devolved then upon the nearest relation; this was either the queen, the duke of Orleans, or the family of Spain; and Mirabeau therefore proposed that the regency should not be bestowed upon any one who was not a native of France. "The knowledge," said he, "that I have of the geography of this assembly, and the point from whence proceed the cries of the order of the day, prove to me, that there is question here of nothing less than a foreign domination, and that the proposal of not deliberating on the subject, although apparently Spanish, is perhaps of Austrian origin."

* These articles were presented to him on the 20th September, 1789.

At these words loud cries drowned his voice, and the discussion re-commenced with extraordinary violence; all its opponents still called out for the order of the day. In vain Mirabeau repeated to them, over and over again, that they could have but one motive, that of bringing upon France a foreign domination. To this no reply was attempted, because, in fact, they preferred a stranger to the duke of Orleans. Finally, after a discussion of two days, it was again declared, that the present was not the proper time for this deliberation. But Mirabeau had obtained what he wanted, in seeing how parties declared themselves. This experiment, however, could not fail to expose him to a popular charge, and he passed from that time for an agent of the duke of Orleans *.

The assembly, while quite out of temper by this discussion, received the answer of the king to the articles of the 4th of August. The king, approving of the spirit in which they were conceived, gave to some of them only a conditional assent, in the hope that they would be modified in their execution; he renewed, for the most part, all the objections which had been made during their discussion, and repelled by the assembly. Mirabeau made his appearance in the tribune. "We have not," said he, "examined the superiority of the power constituent over the power executive; we have in some measure thrown a veil over this question (the assembly had in reality explained, for its own satisfaction, the manner in which it should be understood, without passing any decree with regard to it); but if our constituent power is withstood, we shall be obliged to declare it. Let the king act frankly and without dissimulation. We are agreed as to the difficulties of executing our acts, but we do not exact their unconditional performance. Thus, we demand the abolition of some offices, but decree at the same time a future compensation, and a compensation fund for that purpose: we declare the tax levied for the salary of the clergy destructive of agriculture, but till a substitute can be found, we order the perception of tithe: we abolish seignorial jurisdictions, but allow them to exist till other tribunals can be established. It is the same in every thing else; they involve principles which must be rendered irrevocable by their promulgation; and even if they were bad, public opinion calls for their adoption, and we can no longer refuse it. We should repeat frankly to the king, that which the fool of Philip II. said to that despotic prince, 'What would you do, Philip, if all the world should say yes, when you say no?'"

The assembly again ordered the president to wait upon the king, and demand his promulgation. The king granted it, and the assembly, deliberating on the duration of the suspensive veto, extended it to two legislative sessions. But the assembly did wrong in suffering it to appear that this concession was, in some sort, a recompense to Louis XVI. for the concessions he was making to public opinion.

Hitherto the assembly had pursued its object in spite of the obstacles raised by the ill-will of the privileged orders, and the excesses of the popular fury; but another embarrassment now arose, which threatened to terminate its proceedings, and caused its enemies to triumph. It was expected that their course would be delayed by financial embarrassments, as that of the court had previously been. The first loan of thirty millions had not succeeded: a second of eighty, voted on account of a new proposition of Necker *, did not lead to happier results. "Let us go on with our discussions," said M. Degouy D'Arcy; "let delays be continued, and at the expiration of these delays, we shall no longer exist. I am going to disclose to you terrible truths."—"To order, to order," cried some; "No, no, speak," said others. A deputy rose up,—"Go on," said he to Mons. Degouy, "spread alarm and terror! What will be the consequence? we shall give a part of our fortunes, and that will settle every thing." M. Degouy continued, "The loans which you have voted have furnished nothing. There are not ten millions in the treasury." At these words he was again mobbed, reproached, and begged to hold his peace. The Duke D'Aiguillon, president of the committee of finance, contradicted his statement by proving that twenty-two millions yet remained. Nevertheless, it was ordered that Fridays and Saturdays should be particularly devoted to finance questions.

Necker finally arrived. A sufferer in every way from his continual labours, he renewed his never-ceasing complaints; he reproached the assembly with having neglected the finances after five months' business. The two loans were of no permanent service, because the disorders of the nation had destroyed its credit. The capitalists concealed themselves; those of foreign countries had not come forward. Emigration, and the great infrequency of all travellers, had still more diminished the currency, and there was not enough remaining for daily necessities. The king and queen had sent their plate to the mint. The sequel was, that Necker demanded an extraordinary levy of a fourth of the revenue, assuring the assembly that this supply appeared to him insufficient. A committee, employed three days in the examination of this plan, approved of it entirely. Mirabeau, the known enemy of the minister, was the first who endeavoured to persuade the assembly to consent to it without a discussion. "Not having time," said he, "to form their opinion, they ought not to charge themselves with the responsibility of the event, either in approving or condemning the proposed means." From this motive he advised the voting for it off-hand with confidence. The assembly thus hurried on, adopted his advice, and ordered him to retire and draw up the act. Meantime their enthusiasm became calmed; the enemies of the minister pretended to have found resources which he had not perceived; and his friends, on the contrary, attacked Mirabeau, and complained that he wished to crush Necker with the responsibility of events. Mirabeau re-entered, and read his decree. "You are rendering the plan of the minister fatal to himself," cried M. de Virieu; and Mirabeau, who never yielded without answering, frankly avowed his motives: he agreed that they had been truly conjectured when it was said that he sought to charge Necker with the responsibility of events; he said, that he had not the honour of being his friend, but that if he was his most intimate friend, and above all considera-

* See note 7 in the Appendix.

* Decree of the 27th August, 1789.

tions as a citizen, he would not hesitate to sacrifice Necker rather than the assembly; that he did not believe the kingdom would be in danger even if M. Necker were in error; but on the other hand, the public safety would be sacrificed if the assembly lost its credit, and failed in a decisive operation. He then proposed an address to excite the national patriotism, and to support the minister.

He was applauded, but the debate was not at an end. A thousand different propositions were made and rejected, and the time wasted in vain subtleties. Wearied with so many contradictions, and impressed with the emergencies of the occasion, he ascended for the last time the tribune, seized the point, put the question once more with admirable clearness, and showed the impossibility of withdrawing from the necessity of the moment. Becoming more animated as he proceeded, he painted the horrors of a bankruptcy with wonderful force; described it as a disastrous tax, which instead of weighing lightly on all, only bears upon a few whom it crushes; he represented it as a gulf, into which living victims were precipitated, and which does not even close after having devoured them; for one does not owe the less by a refusal to pay; finally, filling the assembly with terror, "the other day," said he, "in reference to a ridiculous motion of the Palais Royal, the people cried out, Catiline is at the gates, and yet you deliberate! and certainly there was neither Catiline, nor danger, nor Rome; but to-day here is an hideous bankruptcy, which threatens to devour yourselves, your honour, and your fortunes, and yet you deliberate!"

At these words, the assembly in a transport of emotion, rose up and uttered cries of enthusiasm. A deputy wished to reply; he advanced, but, as if alarmed at his own efforts, stood stock still and silent. The assembly immediately declared, that having heard the report of the committee, they adopted in confidence the plan of the minister of finance. This was the effect of a happy burst of eloquence, which could only happen to one who had at the same time the abilities and the passions of Mirabeau*.

* These debates took place at the Sittings from the 22nd to 24th September, 1789.

CHAPTER IV.

COURT INTRIGUES—ENTERTAINMENT GIVEN BY THE OFFICERS OF THE LIFE-GUARDS AND THE FLANDERS REGIMENT AT VERSAILLES—EVENTS OF THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH OF OCTOBER; RIOTOUS AND SANGUINARY OCCURRENCES—ATTACK OF THE PALACE OF VERSAILLES BY THE MOB—THE KING FIXES HIS ABODE AT PARIS—POSITION OF POLITICAL PARTIES—DUKE OF ORLÉANS QUITS FRANCE—NEGOCIATIONS OF MIRABEAU WITH THE COURT—THE ASSEMBLY TRANSFERS ITSELF TO PARIS—THE ESTATES OF THE CLERGY BILL—OATH OF CIVISM—COALITION OF MIRABEAU WITH THE COURT—BOUILLÉ—TRIAL OF FAVRAS—COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY SCHEMES—CLUBS OF THE JACOBINS AND FEUILLANS.

WHILST the assembly thus laid their hands on every part of the edifice of the constitution, great events were in preparation. By the assembling of the orders the nation had recovered its legislative and constitutional omnipotence; and by the affair of the 14th of July, it became armed to support its representatives. Thus the king and the aristocracy remained alone and unarmed, having nothing left to them but that notion of their rights in which no one participated, and placed in the presence of a nation ready to conceive any thing and carry it into execution. Nevertheless the court, retired within a little town entirely peopled by its servants, was in some measure out of the range of popular influence, and was rather in a situation to attempt a design upon the assembly. It was natural that Paris, situated a few leagues from Versailles, the capital of the kingdom, and the habitation of an immense populace, should wish to bring back the king into its own circle, for the purpose of withdrawing him from all aristocratical influence, and recovering the advantages which attach upon a town when it becomes the seat of the court and of the government. After having reduced the authority of the king, it only remained to secure his person. To this the course of events tended, and from all sides was heard the cry of *Le Roi à Paris*. The aristocracy thought no longer of defending themselves from new defeats. They underrated too much the advantages they still possessed, to trouble themselves about preserving them, and desired a violent change as much as the popular party. A revolution is inevitable when both parties concur in desiring it; in that case both contribute to the event, and the stronger secures the advantage resulting from it. Whilst the patriots hoped to bring the king to Paris, the court meditated carrying him to Metz. In that strong fortification, he could have carried all his designs, or rather what others had designed for him, into execution. The courtiers, therefore, formed plans, and set schemes on foot, sought to enlist every one in them, and relying upon vain hopes, betrayed themselves by their imprudent designs. D'Estaing, formerly so celebrated at the head of our squadrons, commanded at this time the national guard of Versailles. It was his ambition to be, at once, faithful to the nation and the king, a difficult part to play, and as being always subject to aspersions, requiring great firmness of character to render his position respectable. When he was informed therefore of the conspiracies of the court, and learnt by witnesses the most worthy of credit, that persons of the highest rank were involved in them, he wrote a very celebrated letter to the queen, in which he represented with a respectful firmness, the impropriety and danger of such designs. He disguised nothing; and named all parties con-

cerned*. The letter did no good. The queen should not have been astonished at remonstrances which were provoked by the encouragement she gave to such enterprises.

At about the same period numerous strangers appeared at Versailles; and strange uniforms were observed. The company of the body-guard, the term of whose service was expired, were retained; and some dragoons and light horse of the Trois Evêché's were added to them. The French guards, who had quitted the service of the king in disgust, because the care of his person was entrusted to others, now desired to resume their former situation, and advanced to Versailles for that purpose. They had undoubtedly no reason to complain, as they had abandoned this service voluntarily; but they were particularly induced so to do. At the time it was said, that it was the work of the court faction, who wished, by this means, to frighten the king, and draw him to Metz. A single fact sufficiently proves this intention; since the riots of the Palais Royal, Lafayette, in order to defend the passage from Paris to Versailles, had stationed a detachment at Sèvres, but was obliged to withdraw it on the demand of the deputies of the right side. However, Lafayette succeeded in stopping the French guards, and diverting them from their design; he then wrote confidentially to the minister Saint-Priest, informing him of what had passed, and assuring him that all was then safe. Saint-Priest, abusing the confidence of this letter, shewed it to D'Estaing, and he communicated it to the officers of the national guard of Versailles, and to the municipality, as a means of informing them of the jeopardy to which the town had been already exposed, and to put them on their guard against similar dangers in future. It being proposed to send for the Flanders regiment, a great number of battalions of the guard stationed at Versailles set themselves against it; but the municipality did not the less press its requisition, and the regiment was sent for. This, it is true, was too small a force to be directed against the assembly, but it was strong enough to carry off the king, and cover his escape. D'Estaing informed the national assembly of the measures that had been taken, and obtained its approbation. The regiment arrived; the military stores which followed it, although inconsiderable, did not fail to excite murmurs. The body-guard and courtiers welcomed the officers, and loaded them with attentions; and, as before the 14th of July, the court and troops appeared perfectly to understand each other, and to entertain great expectations.

The self-confidence of the former augmented the suspicion of Paris; and the fêtes, which were held shortly after, exasperated the misery of the people. On the 2nd of October the life-guards made preparations for giving an entertainment to the officers of the garrison. This entertainment took place in the saloon of the theatre. The boxes were filled with spectators of the court party. The officers of the national guard were among the number of guests. The most lively gaiety prevailed during the repast, which wine quickly converted to inebriation. The soldiers of the regiments [quartered at Versailles] were introduced. The guests with drawn swords in their hands, drank the health of the royal family; that of the nation was refused, or at least omitted; the trumpets sounded the charge; the boxes were escaladed with shouts, and this expressive and well-known song was thundered forth; *O, Richard! ô mon roi! l'univers t'abandonne!* Every one pledged himself to die for the king, as if he were in the greatest danger, and the excitement of the assembly knew no bounds. Black or white cockades, but all of a single colour, were distributed on every side, and the youth of both sexes felt themselves animated by the most chivalrous associations. At this moment it was said the national cockade was trampled under foot. It is true this was afterwards denied, but does not wine render every thing credible, nay, quite excusable! Besides, what object is there in such meetings, which can only produce on the one side a false devotion, and on the other side a real and terrible exasperation. Whilst the enthusiasm of the party was at its height, some persons are despatched to fetch the queen, who consented to join the entertainment. The king, who had just returned from hunting, is also over-persuaded to attend; and they both receive the most lively demonstrations of regard from the revellers, and then are re-conducted as it were in triumph to their apartments. Doubtless it must have been pleasing to the king, when he believed himself destitute and menaced, to find friends; but why deceive himself concerning his rights and the strength of his means!

The report of this fête was quickly spread abroad; and undoubtedly the imagination of the people, in propagating the facts connected with it, added its own exaggeration to that which inebriation had produced. The promises made to the king were considered as so many menaces against the nation; the prodigality of the entertainment as an insult to the poverty of the people; and the cries *A Versailles*, became more violent than ever. Thus trivial causes conspired to aid the effect of general causes. Some young people were seen at Paris with black cockades; they were pursued; one of them was dragged through the streets by the multitude; and the *commune* found themselves obliged to forbid the wearing cockades of a single colour.

The day following this fatal entertainment, a new scene, nearly similar, took place at a breakfast given by the body-guard at the Ride. The revellers presented themselves again to the queen, who told them how gratified she had been by the entertainment of Thursday. Whatever the queen said was eagerly attended to, because, being less reserved than the king, the nation expected to hear from her the sentiments of the court; and her words were repeated. The public exasperation was then at its height, and no event was too violent to be expected. The king was the object on which the desires of the people and the court both centred; the people wished to have the possession of his person, and the court, by working on him by fear, to carry him off to Metz. This last project suited also the views of the duke of Orleans, who might expect to obtain the lieutenancy of the kingdom if the king should absent himself; it was even said that he went so far as to hope for the crown, which is scarcely credible, for it required a bolder spirit than his to entertain such lofty ambition.

* See note 6 in the Appendix.

The advantages which he had reason to anticipate from this new insurrection, have occasioned him to be accused of having participated in it; however, there is nothing to show that he did. He could not have directed the impulse of the public mind, for it resulted from uncontrollable events; the utmost he could have done was to encourage it; but on this point, a long scrutiny, and time which reveals everything, have not brought to light a single trace of a preconcerted plan. Without doubt, in this instance, as during the whole revolution, he followed the popular impulse, scattering, perhaps, a little gold, and affording occasion for surmises, but having no settled expectations on the subject.

The people, excited by the discussions upon the *veto*, irritated by the black cockades, annoyed by continual patroles, and suffering from hunger, were stirred up to rebellion. Bailly and Necker had done all that could be done to provide food; but either from the difficulty of transporting it to the capital, or from the plunder which took place on the road, and above all, from the impossibility of compensating for the spontaneous action of commerce, the supplies of flour failed. On the 4th of October the agitation of the populace was greater than ever. They talked of the departure of the king to Metz, and of the necessity of seeking him at Versailles; black cockades were every where seen; bread was loudly called for. Numerous patroles kept the people within bounds, and that night was sufficiently quiet. On the morning of the next day, the 5th, vast crowds were gathered together. The women thronged the bakers' shops, and finding no bread, ran to the Hotel de Ville, to complain of it to the representatives of the *commune*. The commune had not commenced their sittings; and a battalion of the national guard was drawn up round the court-yard. Some men soon joined this female gang, but they were unwilling to admit them, saying, that men did not know how to act: they then rushed upon the battalion, and made them retreat, by throwing stones at them. At this moment a gate having been broke open, the Hotel de Ville was taken by force; the *brigands*, armed with pikes, rushed in with the women, and endeavoured to set it on fire. Means were taken to dislodge them, but yet they got possession of the gate which led to the great clock tower, and sounded the alarm bell (*le tocsin*). The faubourgs were now in motion. A citizen named Maillard, one of those who had signalized themselves at the taking of the Bastille, consulted the officer who commanded the battalion of the national guard, concerning the best means of delivering the Hotel de Ville from these furious women. The officer did not dare to approve of the method he proposed; it was that of assembling them together under the pretext of going to Versailles, but without taking them thither. Nevertheless, Maillard decided on the expedient, and by the beating of a drum, soon drew them in his train. They carried in their hands, clubs, handles of brooms, firelocks, and short swords. With this extraordinary army, he went down to the *quai*, crossed the Louvre, was obliged in spite of himself to lead them across the Tuilleries, and came to the Champs Elysées. There he contrived to disarm them, by persuading them that it was more suitable to present themselves to the assembly as suppliants, rather than as furies in arms. They agreed to this, and he was obliged to lead them to Versailles, for it was no longer possible to divert them from their resolution. Every thing now seemed to lead to a crisis: several groups were seen setting out for Versailles dragging cannon; others surrounded the national guard; and the national guard itself beset its chief, urging him to march them to Versailles, the main object of their determinations.

Meantime the court still remained in tranquillity; but the assembly, whilst yet in the greatest agitation, received a message from the king. They had presented the constitutional articles, and the declaration of rights for his acceptance. The answer should have been a simple acceptation, with the promise of their promulgation. But for the second time, the king, without entering into any clear explanations, addressed some observations to the assembly, and gave his "*accession*" to the constitutional articles, but without approving of them; he said there were many good principles contained in the declaration of rights, but they required qualifications; and, to sum up in a word, he said the entire could not be decided upon until the formation of every part of the constitution had been accomplished. This was undoubtedly a defensible opinion, and many public writers entertained the same; but was it expedient to declare it at the present period? The reading of this declaration was scarcely finished, when it called forth a general expression of complaint. Robespierre said that it was not the business of the king to criticise the assembly; Duport, that his answer should have been countersigned by some responsible minister. Pétion took this opportunity of noticing the circumstance of the fête of the body-guard, and declared that at that fête imprecations had been directed against the assembly. Grégoire dwelt upon the scarcity of provisions, and noticed the circumstance of a letter having been written to a miller, with a promise of two hundred pounds per week if he would cease grinding. This letter proved nothing, for it might have been written by one party as well as another; nevertheless it caused great excitement, and Mons. de Monspey called upon Pétion to sign his impeachment. Then Mirabeau, who disapproved of the conduct of Pétion and Grégoire, came forward to answer Mons. de Monspey. "I have disapproved of, from the very first," said he, "these impolitic denunciations; but since it is insisted on, I myself will denounce; and I will sign, when it shall be declared that there is nothing inviolable in France but the king." At this terrible apostrophe the assembly were silent, and returned to the answer of the king. It was eleven o'clock in the morning. The report of the commotions of Paris was brought to the assembly. Mirabeau advanced towards the president Mounier, who had been recently elected in spite of the Palais Royal, and displayed on this fatal day an unyielding resolution. Mirabeau approached him. "Paris," said he to him, "is marching upon us; feign yourself ill, go to the palace, and tell the king to accept purely and unconditionally." "Let Paris march, so much the better," replied Mounier, "let them slaughter us all, yes, all; and the state will be the gainer."—"A very pretty notion this," replied Mirabeau, and returned to his place. The

discussion continued till three o'clock, when it was decided that the president should go the king to demand his pure and unconditional acceptation. At the moment when Mounier was setting out to go to the palace, a deputation was announced; it was Maillard, and the women who had followed him. Maillard demanded admittance that he might speak to the assembly. He was introduced, and the women, rushing after him, entered the chamber. He related all that had passed, the want of bread, and despair of the people; he spoke of the letter which had been addressed to the miller, and said, that a person he had met on the road, had declared that a curate was commissioned to accuse him before the assembly of it. This curate was Grégoire, and, as has been seen, he made his impeachment. A voice then accused Juigné, archbishop of Paris, of being the author of the letter. Expressions of indignation were raised to repel the imputation from the virtuous prelate. Maillard and his deputation were called to order. He was answered, that means had been taken to supply Paris with provisions; that the king had omitted nothing; and that they were now going to pray him to take new measures; and the speaker added, that the women must now retire to their homes; that disturbances were not the means of making the scarcity cease. Mounier now set out for the palace, but the women surrounded him, and insisted on accompanying him. This he refused to allow at first, but was afterwards obliged to admit six. He passed through hordes of people who had arrived from Paris, armed with pikes, axes, and clubs tipped with iron. It rained heavily. A detachment of the body-guard charged on the crowd who surrounded the president, and dispersed them; but the women soon rejoined Mounier, and he arrived at the palace, where the Flanders regiment, the dragoons, the Swiss, and the national guard of Versailles, were drawn up in order of battle. Instead of six women, he was obliged to introduce twelve. The king received them with the greatest kindness, and lamented their distress; they were moved; and one of them, a young and beautiful female, was so overcome by the sight of the monarch, that she could scarcely pronounce the word "some bread." The king, powerfully affected, embraced her, and the women returned softened by this reception. Their companions received them at the gate of the palace, but would not believe their report, said they had suffered themselves to be seduced, and were about to tear them to pieces, when the body-guard, commanded by the Count de Guiche, hastened to their rescue. Musket shots were fired from many directions; two guards fell, and many women were wounded. Not far from this, one of the popular demagogues, at the head of some women, forced his way through the ranks of the battalions, and advanced so far as the gate of the palace. Mons. de Savonnières pursued them, but he received a shot which fractured his arm. These skirmishes produced on both sides the greatest irritation. The king, being informed of the danger, ordered the guards not to fire, and to retire to their quarters. Whilst they were retiring, some shots were exchanged between them and the national guard of Versailles; but from which side the first shot came could not be distinguished.

While this disturbance was taking place the king held a council, and Mounier awaited impatiently for his reply. He repeated every moment that his public functions called him to the assembly; that the news of the *sanction* would act as a sedative; that he would retire if he received no answer, and that he could no longer absent himself from his post. The question agitated in the council was whether the king should depart; it lasted from six till ten o'clock in the evening; and the king, it is said, would not consent to leave his palace vacant for the Duke of Orleans. The court, however, wished to make the queen and children set out; but the crowd stopped the carriages the instant they appeared, and, what was more, the queen had courageously determined not to separate herself from her husband. Finally, towards ten o'clock, Mounier received a pure and unconditional acceptation, and returned to the assembly. The deputies had by this time separated, and the women now occupied the chamber. Mounier informed them of the acceptation of the king, which they received without any expression of satisfaction, and asked if it would make their lot any better, or provide them with bread. He replied to them in the mildest manner he could, and had all the bread that could be procured distributed among them. During this night, the blame of whose events it is so difficult to fix upon any one, the municipality were certainly liable to censure, for not providing for the necessities of this famished multitude, whom want of bread had driven from Paris, and who had not been able to procure any on the roads.

Almost immediately after, news came of Lafayette's arrival from Paris. He had struggled against the national guard for more than eight hours, who desired to go to Versailles. One of his grenadiers said to him, "General, you do not deceive us, but you yourself are deceived. Instead of turning our arms against women, let us go to Versailles, and fetch the king, and assure ourselves of his good dispositions, by placing him in the midst of us." Lafayette, however, still resisted the entreaties of his troops, and the tumults of the multitude. His soldiers were not attached to him by victory, but by opinion, consequently had their good opinion abandoned him, he could no longer have commanded them. Nevertheless he succeeded in delaying their departure till the evening, but his voice was confined to a small circle, and beyond that nothing checked the fury of the populace. His life was frequently menaced, yet still he held out. But, as he knew that hordes of people departed continually from Paris, and the insurrection was thus transferred to Versailles, he felt it his duty to follow it. Finally, the commune ordered him to go thither, and he accordingly went. On the road he halted his army, and made them take an oath to be faithful to the king; he arrived at Versailles at about midnight, and assured Mounier that the army had promised to fulfil their duty, and that nothing should be done contrary to law. He then hastened to the palace, and with respect and grief in his countenance, acquainted the king with the precautions that had been taken, and assured him of the devotion both himself and the army bore to his cause. The king appeared tranquillized, and retired to rest. The guard-house of the palace

had been refused Lafayette; none but outside quarters were assigned them. The other quarters were occupied by the Flanders regiment, of whose fidelity some doubts existed, and the Swiss and body-guard. These regiments had received orders to return into the country, but they were afterwards countermanded; not, however, being able to agree, very few were ever found together at their posts. In the midst of the disturbances which every where prevailed, all accessible points to the palace had not been defended; even a gate had been left open: Lafayette therefore occupied the outside quarters which had been confided to him, and not one of these posts were forced or even attacked.

During this time the assembly, notwithstanding the tumult that was every where raised, had resumed their sitting, and entered into a discussion on the penal laws, in the most impressive manner. From time to time the people interrupted the debate by demanding bread. Mirabeau, harassed, called out in a loud voice, that the assembly would not allow itself to be dictated to by any one, and that the galleries should be cleared. The people drowned his exclamation with plaudits; and it was not prudent for the assembly to resist them any further. Lafayette having by this time communicated to Mounier that all appeared to him tranquil, the assembly separated at about midnight, and adjourned till the next day, the 6th, at eleven o'clock.

The people were now dispersed here and there, and Lafayette, who had good reason to assure himself of the implicit fidelity of his army, in which he had never been deceived, and particularly relying upon the general appearance of tranquillity which seemed to prevail, had secured the quarters of the body-guard, and sent out numerous patrols; and at five o'clock in the morning he was still up and about; thinking that all danger was over, he drank a glass of wine and threw himself on his bed, to take that repose of which he had been deprived for four-and-twenty hours *.

At about this time the people began to stir about, and already some were roaming about the environs of the palace. A quarrel took place with a life-guardsman, who fired from the window. The *brigands* darted from their hiding places, ran through the gate which had remained open, mounted a staircase which they found unoccupied, and were finally stopped by two guards, who defended themselves heroically, and fought every step of their ground, as they retired from door to door. One of these generous servants of the king was Miomandre. "Save the queen," cried he. The cry was heard, and the queen saved herself by flying trembling to the king. Whilst she fled, the *brigands* rushed on, and finding the royal couch abandoned, endeavoured to penetrate further; but they were stopped again by the life-guard, who were collected in great numbers at this point. At this moment the French guards belonging to Lafayette, and posted near the chateau, hearing the uproar, hastened to the chateau, and dispersed the *brigands*. They presented themselves at the door behind which the body-guard were collected. "Open to us," cried they; "the French guards have not forgotten that at Fontenoi you saved their regiment!" The door was immediately opened, and they embraced one another.

All was uproar without; Lafayette, who had scarce lain down a few minutes, and who was not yet asleep, heard the noise, sprang upon the first horse he could find, rushed into the middle of the fray, and found many of the life-guard on the point of being slaughtered. Whilst he rescued them, he ordered his troop to hasten to the palace, and remained nearly alone in the middle of the *brigands*. One of them took aim at him; Lafayette, perfectly composed, commanded the people to take him away; and they immediately seized the culprit, and, before the eyes of Lafayette, dashed his brains out against the pavement. Lafayette, after having saved the soldiers of the life-guard, flew to the palace with them, and found his grenadiers already arrived there, who immediately surrounded him, and pledged themselves to die in defence of the king. At this moment, the soldiers of the life-guard, who had been snatched from death, cried out, *Vive Lafayette!* The whole court, who saw themselves saved by him and his troop, acknowledged that they owed their life to him; these testimonies of acknowledgment were general. Madame Adelaide, aunt of the king, ran to him, and taking him in her arms, said, "General, you have saved us."

The people now loudly demanded that Louis XVI. should go to Paris. A council was held. Lafayette was invited to take part in it, but refused, that he might not be a restraint upon its freedom of discussion. It was finally decided that the court should yield to the wishes of the people; and billets, making known this determination, were thrown out of the window. Louis XVI. then presented himself at the balcony, and was received with cries of *Vive le Roi!* But it was not thus with the queen; menacing voices were raised against her. Lafayette approached her. "Madame," said he, "what is it your intention to do?" "To accompany the king," replied the queen, courageously. "Follow me, then," resumed the general, and he conducted her in a state of astonishment to the balcony. Some threatening expressions were uttered by the popular demagogues. A fatal blow might hit her; words could not be heard; it was necessary to make a sudden impression: bending down, therefore, and taking the hand of the queen, the general kissed it respectfully. The people were transported at this sight, and confirmed their reconciliation by cries of *Vive la Reine! Vive Lafayette!* Peace was still to be made with the body-guard. "Will you do nothing for my guards?" said the king to Lafayette. He immediately conducted one of them to the balcony, and embraced him, at the same time fixing on him his baudelier. The people again express their satisfaction, and confirm this second reconciliation by acclamation.

The assembly had not considered it consistent with their dignity to attend the monarch, although it had been required. They contented themselves with sending a deputation of thirty-six members to wait upon him; and as soon as they were informed of his departure, they passed an act, rendering themselves inseparable from the person of the monarch, at the same time appointing a hundred deputies to accompany him to Paris. The king received the decree, and set out on his journey.

* See note 9 in the Appendix.

Most of the gangs of wretches had already departed; Lafayette ordered a detachment of the army to follow them to prevent their return. He also gave orders for disarming the *brigands*, who carried the heads of two life-guardsmen on pikes. This horrible trophy was torn from them; and it is not true that it was carried before the carriage of the king.

Louis XVI. finally arrived in the midst of an immense concourse of people, and was received by Bailly at the Hotel de Ville. "I return with confidence," said the king, "to the midst of my people." Bailly reported these words to those who were able to hear them, but he forgot the word *confidence*. "Add *with confidence*," said the queen.—"You are more fortunate," said Bailly, "than if I had pronounced these words."

The royal family took up their abode at the Palace of the Tuilleries, which had not been inhabited for a century, and in which there had been no time to make the necessary preparations. The guard was confided to Parisian militia, and Lafayette found himself bound to answer to the nation for the person of the king, which was the subject of dispute with all parties. The nobles desired to get him into their keeping, that they might convey him to some strong place, and under his name to keep up despotism; and the popular party, who never conceived the idea of not gratifying their desires, wished to have the custody of the king's person for the purpose of perfecting the constitution, and to deprive civil war of a leader. Therefore the malice of the privileged orders has given to Lafayette the name of gaoler; and yet his vigilance proves but one thing—his sincere desire to have a king.

From this period, parties began to assume a different character. The aristocracy, driven, as it were, from the protection of Louis XVI. and not being able to execute any enterprise in their own favour, dispersed themselves abroad in foreign countries, and the provinces. It is from this period that emigration commenced on a large scale. Great numbers of nobles fled to Turin, to the Count d'Artois, whose father-in-law afforded him an asylum. There their policy consisted in exciting the departments of the south to insurrection, and feigning that the king was not free. The queen, who was Austrian, and a decided enemy to the new court formed at Turin, turned her hopes towards Austria. The king, in the middle of these plots, saw every thing, prevented nothing, and awaited his preservation from whatever quarter it might come. Meantime he made the retractations required by the assembly; and in point of fact was no more really free, than he would have been at Turin or Coblentz, nay, not more than he would have been under Mazzeppa; for it is ever the fate of weakness to be dependant.

The popular party, henceforwards triumphant, was subdivided between the Duke of Orleans, Lafayette, Mirabeau, Barnave, and the Lametha. The public rumour accused the Duke of Orleans and Mirabeau of having been the authors of the last insurrection. Witnesses, who were not unworthy of credit declared that they saw the Duke and Mirabeau on the calamitous scene of action of the 6th of October. These facts were disproved afterwards; but at the moment they were believed. The object of the conspirators was to make the king fly, and even to assassinate him, said the boldest calumniators. The Duke of Orleans, it was added, had aimed at the lieutenancy of the kingdom, and Mirabeau was to have been his minister. Neither of these projects having succeeded, Lafayette in appearing to have thwarted them by his presence, passed for the deliverer of the king, and as conqueror of the Duke of Orleans and Mirabeau. The court, who had not yet time to become ungrateful, acknowledged him as their deliverer, and at this period the power of the general appeared to be immense. The high patriots were startled, and already murmured the name of Cromwell. Mirabeau, who, as will be shortly seen, had no common interest with the Duke of Orleans, was jealous of Lafayette, and called him Cromwell Grandison. The aristocracy backed his suspicions, and added their imputations to his; but Lafayette was determined, in spite of all obstacles, to support the king and the constitution. For this purpose, he resolved to get rid of the Duke of Orleans, whose presence gave occasion to many reports, and might furnish, if not the means, at least the pretext, for further disturbances. He therefore had an interview with the prince, intimidated him by his firmness, and obliged him to consent to absent himself. The king, who took part in this project, pretended, with his usual weakness, to be forced to it; and in a letter to the Duke of Orleans, told him that it was necessary that either he or Mons. de Lafayette should retire; that in the present state of the public opinion the choice could not be doubtful, and that consequently he gave him a commission for England. It has since been ascertained, that Mons. de Montmorin, minister for foreign affairs, in order to free himself from the ambition of the Duke of Orleans, had directed him to the Netherlands, then in insurrection against Austria, and inspired him with hopes of the title of the Duke of Brabant*. His friends, when they heard of this determination, were indignant at his weakness. Being more ambitious than he was, they were unwilling that he should yield; and engaged Mirabeau to complain in the assembly of the violences which Lafayette practised against the prince. Mirabeau, already jealous of the popularity of the general, informed both him and the Duke that they would both be impeached at the tribune if the departure for England took place. The resolution of the Duke was shaken; but a new summons from Lafayette decided him; and Mirabeau, when he received in the assembly the note which announced the departure of the prince, cried out with indignation, *He does not deserve the trouble which is taken for him* †. This expression, and many others equally as inconsiderate, have caused him to be frequently accused of being one of the agents of the Duke of Orleans, although in reality he never was. His pecuniary distresses, his indiscreet language, his familiarity with the Duke of Orleans, (although he was on the same terms with every one else) his proposition in respect of the Spanish succession, and, finally, his opposition to the departure of the Duke, all naturally excited sus-

* See the Memoirs of Dumouriez.

† See note 10 in the Appendix.

picion; yet it is nevertheless true that Mirabeau was without any party, and even without any other object than that of the destruction of the aristocracy and arbitrary power.

The authors of these suppositions should have learnt, that Mirabeau was at that time obliged to borrow the most paltry sums, which certainly would not have been the case had he been the agent of a prince immensely rich, and who is supposed to have been nearly ruined by his partisans. Mirabeau had already a presentiment of the approaching dissolution of the state. A conversation which he held with an intimate friend, in the park of Versailles, which lasted nearly the whole night, determined him to adopt a plan entirely new; and he resolved, for his own glory, for the safety of the state, and, finally, for the purpose of making his fortune, (for Mirabeau was a man who could attend to all these interests together,) to remain firm and immovable between the demagogues and the throne, and to consolidate the monarchy, by providing a place in it for himself. The court had endeavoured to gain him over, but made its attempts awkwardly, and without those suitable regards so necessary for a man of such lofty pride, and who was determined to preserve his popularity in lieu of that private esteem which his character could not command. Malouet, the friend of Necker, and allied by party to Mirabeau, endeavoured to bring about an interview between these two characters. Mirabeau, certain that he could never agree* with the minister, frequently refused, but at last consented. Malouet introduced him, and the incompatibility of these two characters was still better understood after this interview, in which, as it was allowed by all present, Mirabeau displayed all the advantages he possessed in conversation as well as in the tribune. It was reported that he wished to have been bought, and that Necker, having made him no overture, he said as he went out, *The minister shall hear from me*. This again is a party interpretation, but it is false. Malouet had proposed to Mirabeau, who was known to be satisfied with the measure of liberty already acquired, his placing himself on a good footing with the minister, and nothing more. Besides, it was at this period, that a direct negotiation was entered into with the court. A foreign prince, allied with men of all parties, made the first overture. A friend of Mirabeau, who acted as go-between, gave the Court to understand that Mirabeau would sacrifice none of his principles; but if the court were determined to adhere to the constitution, they would find in him a most unshaken support; that, as to conditions, they were dictated by his situation; that it was necessary, even for the interest of those who wished to employ him, to render his situation honourable and independent, that is to say, to pay his debts; and that, finally, it was requisite to attach his interests to that of the new social compact, and without actually giving him the ministry, allow him to hope for it at some future time†. These negotiations were not entirely finished till two or three months after, that is, till the beginning of the year 1790. Some historians, uninformed of these details, and deceived by the perseverance of Mirabeau in opposing government, have fixed the time of this treaty at a later period. Nevertheless it was all but concluded about the commencement of 1790, which we will show in its place.

Barnave and the Lameths could only rival Mirabeau by a more disinterested patriotism: being informed, therefore, of the negotiations which were carrying on, they gave credit to the report already afloat, that the ministry was about to be conferred upon him, resolved to deprive him of the power of accepting it. An opportunity of throwing an obstacle in his path to office very soon presented itself. Ministers were not allowed to speak in the assembly, and Mirabeau was not willing to lose, on arriving at that dignity, his right of speech, with him the most influential acquirement; and besides, he wished to lead Necker to the tribune, that he might overwhelm him by his eloquence: he proposed, therefore, giving a deliberative voice to ministers. The popular party, in alarm, opposed him without assigning sufficient reasons, and appeared to fear ministerial corruptions; but their fears were unfounded, for it is not by their public communication with the chambers that ministers generally corrupt the national representation. The proposition of Mirabeau was rejected, and Lanjuinais, pushing the severity of his principles still further, proposed prohibiting the admission of deputies to the ministry altogether. The discussion was violent. Although the motives of these propositions were known, they were not avowed; and Mirabeau, to whom dissimulation was not possible, at length cried out, that it was not necessary on account of one man to take a measure fatal to the state; that he would agree to the decree, on condition that admission to the ministry should be prohibited, not to all the actual deputies, but to Mons. de Mirabeau, deputy of the jurisdiction of Aix. Such frankness and boldness produced its effect, and the decree was unanimously adopted.

The division of the state parties between the emigrés, the queen, the king, and the several popular chiefs, such as Lafayette, Mirabeau, Barnave, and the Lameths, has already been shown. It was impossible that any decisive event, such as that of the 14th of July, or the 5th of October, could again occur for a long time. New disagreements between the court and the people, necessarily exasperated both parties, and led to a grand rupture.

The assembly had transferred itself to Paris*, after having received reiterated assurances of tranquillity on the part of the "commune," and the promise of perfect freedom in their debates. Mounier and Lally-Tolendal, indignant at the events of the 5th and 6th of October, had given in their resignation, saying, that they would neither be spectators nor accomplices of the crimes of faction. But they ought to have regretted this desertion of the public cause, especially when they saw Maury and Cazalès, after having been driven from the assembly, return to it immediately, to defend courageously and to the end, the cause which they had espoused. Mounier retired to Dauphiné, and

* Messrs. Malouet and Bertrand de Molleville have not hesitated to contradict this, but the fact which we advance is attested by most credible evidences.

† See note 11 in the Appendix.

* It held its first sitting at the Archbishop's palace, the 19th of October, 1789.

assembled the states of the province; but they were soon unresistingly dissolved by a decree of the assembly. Thus Mounier and Lally, who at the period of the union of orders, and of the oath of the tennis court, (*Jeu de Paume*) were the heroes of the people, no longer possessed any degree of popularity. The parliaments had been the first who were pulled out by the power of the people; Mounier, Lally, and Necker were the second; and many others were soon to follow them.

The scarcity of provisions, an exaggerated but nevertheless real cause of the troubles which prevailed, occasioned the commission of a dreadful crime. A baker named François was murdered by some *brigands*; Lafayette succeeded in seizing the culprits, and delivered them to the Châtelet, which was invested with an extraordinary jurisdiction concerning all crimes which were caused by the revolution. There, Besenval, and all those who had been accused of taking a part in the conspiracy of the 14th July, were brought to trial. This court was conducted according to the new forms; till juries were established, the assembly had ordered publicity, a peremptory defence, and every form of procedure tending to protect innocence to be observed. The assassins of François were condemned; and the public tranquillity re-established. Lafayette and Bailly proposed putting in force martial law on this occasion. This was strongly opposed by Robespierre, who from this time became the constant apologist of the people and the poor; but the measure was nevertheless adopted by the majority *. By virtue of this law the municipalities were made responsible for the public tranquillity; in case of riots, they were empowered to call in the aid of the troops or the militia; and after three summonses were enabled to make use of military force against seditious meetings. A committee of inquest was also established at the commune and in the national assembly, to watch over those numerous enemies whose stratagems beset them in all directions; and all these methods were not more than sufficient to thwart the host of adversaries who had conspired against the new revolution.

The labours of the assembly in the formation of a constitution were pursued with activity. They had abolished the feudal system, but there remained still to take final measures for the destruction of those great bodies, who had been as so many enemies constituted in a state to be in conflict with the state. The clergy enjoyed immense possessions. They had received them from princes under the title of feudal grants, and from the faithful under the title of legacies. If the property of individuals, the fruit and reward of labour, ought to be respected, that which had been bestowed on a body of men on conditions altogether different, ought to yield to the empire of the law. It was for the service of religion that they had been given, or at least under this pretext; but religion being a public service, the law might provide means of accomplishing this object in any way deemed most advantageous to the public interest. The abbé Maury, on this question, displayed his imperturbable genius; he sounded the alarm to proprietors, menacing them with an approaching invasion; and pretended to believe that the provinces would be sacrificed to the stock-jobbers of the capital. His sophism is sufficiently singular to be recorded. He said, that it was to pay the public debt that the property of the clergy was disposed of. The creditors of this debt were the great capitalists of Paris; the property to be devoted to their payment was in the provinces; and from hence this undaunted reasoner concluded that the provinces were to be sacrificed to the capital; as if the provinces did not, on the contrary, gain by a new division of those immense territories, reserved hitherto for the luxury of certain lazy ecclesiastics. All his efforts were useless; the bishop of Autun, author of the proposition, and the deputy Thouret, overturned these vain sophistications. Already were the assembly about to decree, without further delay, that the goods of the clergy belonged to the state; nevertheless the opposers of the motion insisted on the question of property being more fully discussed. This question was met thus; admitting the right of property to be in the clergy, it was maintained that it might still be seized on by the state, as in periods of urgent necessity had often been done. This the ecclesiastics did not deny. Taking advantage, therefore, of this avowal, Mirabeau proposed that the word *belong* should be changed into *are at the disposal of the state*, and the discussion was terminated immediately by a great majority *. In this manner the assembly destroyed the formidable power of the clergy, and the luxury of the dignitaries of that order; and secured to itself those immense financial resources which so long supported the revolution. At the same time the inferior clergy were provided for, and it was enacted that their salaries should not be less than twelve hundred francs; and that besides, they should have the enjoyment of a parsonage-house and a garden. Religious vows were no longer sanctioned, and freedom was given to all cloisters, allowing, at the same time, to all who wished it, the liberty of continuing the monastic life. And inasmuch as their property was taken away, pensions were substituted. Pushing even their foresight still further, the assembly established a distinction between the rich and mendicant orders, and proportioned the provision of each to their former situations. They acted in the same manner with regard to the pensions granted to the clergy; and although the Jansenist, Camus, wishing to bring things back to their evangelical simplicity, proposed reducing them all to the same standard, which was excessively small, the assembly, on the motion of Mirabeau, reduced them only in a relative proportion to their actual value, having regard also to the former condition of the pensioners. Tenderness for the respective situations of all religious orders could not have been extended further, and it is in this feeling that *true respect for* property consists. In the same spirit, when the expatriated protestants, after the revocation of the edict of Nantes, reclaimed their property, the assembly only restored that to them which remained unsold.

Although prudent and full of consideration for persons, the measures of the assembly were bold, particularly in constitutional matters. The prerogatives of the highest authorities were already fixed. The question of the division of the king-

* Act of the 21st October.

* Act of 2nd Nov. 1789.

dom was the next that came forward. Hitherto it had been divided into provinces, which had been successively united to ancient France. These provinces, differing in laws, privileges, and manners, formed a most heterogeneous assembly. Sieyès conceived the idea of confounding them together by a new division, which would destroy all the ancient landmarks, and restore all parts of the kingdom to the same laws and the same principles. This was effected by the division into departments. The departments were divided into districts, and the districts into municipalities; and in all these sub-divisions, the right of representation was admitted. The administration of the *departments*, that of the *districts*, and that of the *communes*, were confided to one deliberating and another executive council, each of which was elective. These different authorities mutually aided each other, and had, in the extent of their jurisdiction, the same privileges. The departments regulated the subdivision of taxes among the districts, and the districts among the communes, and the communes among individuals.

The assembly then defined the quality of a citizen enjoying his political rights. To be constituted a citizen, in the full sense of the word, it was necessary to be twenty-five years of age, and to have contributed the silver mark. Every citizen possessing these qualifications, had the title of an active citizen, and those who had not were called passive citizens. These simple denominations were much ridiculed, for names are always attacked when things are to be depreciated; yet they were natural appellations, and expressed their signification very well. The active citizen took part in elections, either for the formation of administrations, or for that of the assembly. The elections of deputies had two divisions. No condition was necessary to be eligible; for as it was declared in the assembly, every man was an elector by his existence in society, and every one ought to be eligible solely by the confidence of the electors.

These proceedings, interrupted by a thousand discussions as to the details of the measure, were nevertheless hurried on with extreme activity. But the right side contributed nothing but their opposition to these acts, and were anxious only to lose no opportunity of disputing any accession of influence to the nation. The popular deputies, on the contrary, although forming different parties, united together or separated, following their own personal opinions, without mutual conflict. It was easy to perceive, that among them conviction governed their alliances. Thouret, Mirabeau, Duport, Sieyès, Camus, and Chapelier, might be seen alternately supporting or opposing each other. As to the members of the nobility and clergy, they never shewed themselves except in party questions. If the provincial parliaments had passed decrees against the assembly or any writers attacked it, they stepped forward immediately in their defence. They supported the military commanders against the people, and the negro merchants against the negroes. They voted against the admission of Jews and protestants to the enjoyment of the common rights of the citizen; and finally, when Genoa rose against France, on account of the emancipation of Corsica, and the junction of that island to the kingdom, they were for Genoa against France. In a word, being estranged from and indifferent to all useful discussions, they paid no attention to them, but conversed among themselves whilst such discussions lasted, and never rose but when the rights or liberties of the nation were to be opposed *.

We have already stated that it was no longer in the power of the royal party to concert any grand conspiracy, since aristocracy had been put to flight, and the court was surrounded by the assembly, the people, and the national militia. Partial operations therefore were all that the malcontents could effect. They fomented the discontent of those officers who were attached to the ancient order of things, whilst their soldiers, who expected to profit by any change, favoured the new. Violent quarrels frequently happened between the army and the populace, and the soldiers several times delivered up their officers to the fury of the multitude, who butchered them; sometimes, however, on other occasions, jealousies were happily pacified, and peace entirely restored when the commandants of cities had been cautious enough to use a little address, and had taken the oath of fidelity to the new constitution. The clergy inundated Brittany with protestations against the alienation of their property; and endeavoured to rekindle the dormant fanaticism of those provinces where ancient superstition still prevailed. The provincial parliaments were also resorted to, and the effect of a last effort of their authority tried. They were now on the eve of a final dissolution, and to avoid all contest with them, the assembly had prorogued their recesses; in the meanwhile justice was administered by the vacation chambers. In spite, however, of this precaution, the parliaments of Rouen, Nantes, and Rennes met, and passed decrees, in which they deplored the ruin of the ancient monarchy, and the violation of the laws, and without attributing these grievances to any particular party, seemed to point their censures against the assembly. They were called to the bar of the assembly, and mildly reproved. The parliament of Rennes, as the most culpable, was declared incapable of fulfilling its functions. That of Metz had insinuated that the king was not a free agent. This, as we have before shewn, was the policy of the discontented: not being able to avail themselves of the king's person, they represented him as in a state of durance, and the acts to which he had given his consent as of no validity. He himself seemed to second this policy. He still remained guarded by the national militia; and knowing himself in perfect safety under their protection, intentionally neglected to recal his body guard; his policy was to appear in captivity. This stratagem, however, was entirely defeated by the commune of Paris, who solicited him to recal his life guard. This he refused to do under vain pretexts, through the interference of the queen †.

The year 1790 was now on the point of commencing, and a general agitation pervaded all ranks of society. Three months had quietly enough elapsed since the 5th and 6th of October, but the

* As to the mode in which the deputies of the right conducted themselves, see an extract from the Memoirs of Ferrière, note 12 in the Appendix.

† See note 13 in the Appendix.

troublous state of the nation seemed to be renewed. Great agitations were followed by periods of tranquillity, and these by petty events leading to a still more momentous crisis. The clergy, the nobility, the court, and even England, who ordered her ambassador to justify her, were accused of being the authors of these troubles. The paid companies of the national guard were themselves tinctured with the general dissatisfaction. Some soldiers who had met at the Champs Elysées demanded an augmentation of pay; Lafayette, with his usual activity and firmness, quickly dispersed and punished them, and re-established order among his troops, who, in spite of these slight interruptions of discipline, were always faithful to him.

But the public mind at this period was chiefly occupied with the conspiracy of the Marquis de Favras against the assembly and the municipality. He was openly arrested and delivered over to the Châtelet. A report was immediately propagated that Bailly and Lafayette were to have been assassinated; that twelve hundred cavalry were ready at Versailles to carry off the king; and that an army, composed of Swiss and Piedmontese, were to receive him, and then march upon Paris. The alarm spread wide; it was said that Favras was only the secret agent of still more exalted personages. Suspicion attached to Monsieur, the brother of the king; Favras had been in his guards, and had besides negotiated a loan on his account. Monsieur being intimidated by the public indignation, presented himself at the Hotel de Ville, explained his connections with Favras, dwelt upon those dispositions so favourable to the people, which he had formerly manifested in the assembly of the notables, and begged to be judged of, not by the public reports, but by his known and undeniable patriotism *. His discourse was received with great applause, and the multitude carried him home in triumph.

The trial of Favras was still continued. This person had travelled all over Europe, married a foreign princess, and entered into many projects to re-establish a broken fortune. He had made some attempts, with this intention, on the 14th of July, the 5th and 6th of October, and in the concluding months of 1789. The witnesses who accused him, stated the particulars of his last plan. The assassination of Bailly and Lafayette, and the carrying off the king, appeared to make part of it; but there was no proof as to the twelve hundred cavalry who had been got for this occasion, nor that the Swiss and Piedmontese army had been in motion. Circumstances, however, were unfavourable to Favras. The Châtelet had just enlarged Besenval and others, implicated in the plot of the 14th of July, which occasioned great public dissatisfaction. Nevertheless Lafayette endeavoured to remove the apprehensions of the judges of the Châtelet, called upon them to be just, and promised them, that let their sentence be what it would, he would ensure its execution.

This trial renewed the suspicions of the nation against the court. These new designs made it appear incorrigible; it was manifest, that even in the very heart of the metropolis conspiracies from the royal quarter still continued to be carried on. To avoid the public suspicion, therefore, the king was advised to take some decisive step on the occasion, and to put his favourable dispositions to the people beyond the reach of doubt. On the 4th of February, 1790, the assembly were astonished to see many changes in the arrangement of the chamber. A carpet, in which lilies were interwoven, covered all the steps to the table (*bureau*). The chairs of the secretaries were placed in a lower situation than usual, and the president stood by the side of a seat where he usually sat. Suddenly the door-keepers announced the king; and Louis XVI. entered the chamber the instant after. The assembly rose at his presence, and he was received in the midst of applauses. A crowd of spectators rushed rapidly in, occupied the galleries, filled every corner of the chamber, and awaited with the greatest impatience the royal address. Louis XVI. spoke standing, while the assembly sat. He spoke first of the troubles to which France had fallen a prey, the efforts which had been made to calm them, and to provide subsistence for the people; he recapitulated the proceedings of the assembly, glancing at the efforts he himself had made to attain the same objects in the provincial assemblies; and he showed, finally, that he had all along manifested a desire for those measures which had been lately adopted. He added, that he thought it particularly incumbent on him to ally himself more closely to the representatives of the nation, at the moment when decrees had been submitted to him, destined to establish a new system of government in the kingdom. He would endeavour to promote, he said, with all his ability, the success of this vast organization; and declared that every attempt against it should be considered by him as highly criminal, and punished by every legal means. At these words, plaudits resounded through the chamber. The king continued his speech; and noticing the sacrifices he himself had made, he called upon all those who had lost any of their privileges to imitate his resignation, and to consider themselves indemnified for their losses by the advantages which would accrue to France from the new constitution. After having promised to defend the constitution, he added, that he would go still further, and that, in concert with the queen, he would early instil into his son a love for the new system of government, and habituate him to expect his happiness from the happiness of France. At these words, exclamations of devotion burst from all parts; every hand was stretched towards the monarch, and every voice demanded the queen and her son; these transports of joy were universal. The king finally terminated his discourse, recommending concord and peace to *that good people, the assurance of whose love could console him in the midst of his calamities* *. These last words called forth bursts of grateful acclamations from all present. The president made a short answer to the king's speech, in which all the distracted feelings which prevailed in the assembly were well described. The king was carried in triumph to the Tuileries by the multitude, and the assembly passed a vote of thanks to him and the queen. A new consideration presented itself: the king had just promised to maintain the constitution: this was an appeal to the deputies to enter into the like engagement on their part. The civic oath

* See note 14 in the Appendix.

* See note 15 in the Appendix.

was proposed, and every deputy swore to be faithful *to the nation, the law, and the king, and to maintain to the utmost of his power the constitution as decreed by the national assembly, and accepted by the king.* The commissioners of supply, and the deputies of commerce asked to take their oath in their turn; the galleries and amphitheatres imitated them; and from all sides nothing was heard but these words—*I swear it.*

This oath was repeated at the Hotel de Ville and from commune to commune throughout France. Public rejoicings were ordered, and the effusion of joy appeared general and sincere. This was the time undoubtedly to commence a new line of conduct, and not to nullify this reconciliation as all the previous reconciliations had been; but on that very evening, whilst Paris was illuminated in celebration of the happy event, the court had resumed its old state of feeling, and the popular deputies met with a reception at the palace far different from that experienced by the deputies of the nobles. In vain Lafayette, whose advice, full of good sense and zeal, had not been followed, repeated every day at court, that it was no longer time to hesitate, that the king should attach himself entirely to the popular party, and be determined on gaining its confidence; that for this purpose it was not only necessary to proclaim his intentions at the assembly, but to manifest them in the smallest actions; that he should receive with indignation every proposition of the least equivocal signification, and repel every doubt intimated of the sincerity of his intentions; that he should neither show constraint or discontent, and leave no shadow of hope to the aristocracy; and that, finally, his ministers ought to be united to, and not be in controversy with, the assembly, and so oblige it continually to have recourse to the public opinion. In vain did Lafayette repeat this prudent advice, with the most respectful earnestness. The king highly esteemed him, and received his letters as tokens of regard. The queen, however, rejected them with ill-temper, and even appeared offended with the general. She received in a much more gracious manner Mirabeau, whose manners were more captivating, but whose life certainly was less irreproachable than Lafayette's.

The communications of Mirabeau with the court continued. He had even entered into some negociations with Monsieur, whose opinions rendered him more accessible to the popular party, and he expressed to him that which he ceased not to repeat to the queen and to Mons. de Montmorin, that the monarchy could only be saved by liberty. Mirabeau finally settled his negotiations with the court, by means of a go-between. He declared his principles in a kind of confession of faith; declared he would never swerve from them; and promised to support the court so long as it maintained the same line of conduct. In return, the court granted him sufficiently advantageous terms. Morality undoubtedly condemns such negotiations, and demands the performance of duty for its own sake. But did Mirabeau sell himself? A weak man would have sold himself, without doubt, by sacrificing his principles; but the powerful Mirabeau, far from sacrificing his, brought the court to embrace them, and received from it, in exchange, that assistance, which his pressing wants, and his disorganized passions, rendered indispensable for him. Unlike those who sell at a great price feeble talents and cowardly conscience, Mirabeau, firm to his principles, opposed alternately his party and the court, as if he did not depend upon the first for his popularity, and upon the second for the means of his existence. He carried his opposition to such an extent, that many historians, not believing that he was allied to the court which he opposed, have fixed the time of his negotiation in the year 1791, which however was nevertheless in the first months of 1790. Mirabeau, immediately after this negotiation, was presented to the queen, who was charmed by his superiority, and gave him a welcome which flattered him extremely. This extraordinary man was open to all pleasurable sensations; as well those of vanity as those of the passions. It was necessary to make use both of his strength and weakness, and employ him for the advantage of the common cause. Besides Lafayette and Mirabeau, the court still possessed Bouillé, whom it is now time should be introduced to the reader.

Bouillé, courageous, upright, and full of talent, identified himself with the prejudiced of the aristocracy, and was only distinguished from other members of that body by a greater liberality of mind, and greater skill in business. Having retired to Metz, and being there commandant of a vast extent of frontier, and of a great part of the army, he endeavoured to sow discord between his troops and the national guard, that he might keep his soldiers faithful to the court*. Placed there, as it were, on the watch, he alarmed the popular party, and appeared the general of the monarchy, as Lafayette was of the constitution. Nevertheless, being displeased with the conduct of the aristocracy, and disgusted with the weakness of the king, he had intended to resign his command, but was induced by the pressing entreaties of the king to retain it. Bouillé was a most honourable man. His oath being once taken, he devoted himself to serve the king and the constitution. The object of the court, therefore should have been to unite Lafayette, Mirabeau, and Bouillé. By this means it would have possessed the national guards, the assembly, and the army, that is, the three dominant powers of the time. It is true, there were some private causes which disunited these three personages. Lafayette, full of good will to all, was ready to go hand in hand with any one, who desired to serve the king and the constitution; but Mirabeau was jealous of his power, and feared the purity of his life, so extolled, and which seemed to reproach him. Bouillé hated the high-minded conviction with which Lafayette maintained his opinions, and, perhaps, considered him an irreproachable enemy; he preferred Mirabeau, whom he thought more manageable, and less rigorous in his political faith. It should have been the business of the court to unite these three men, by destroying their particular motives of alienation. But there was only one method of doing this, viz. by a free monarchy. The king should therefore have resigned himself up to it without hesitation, and have promoted it with all his ability. But being in a continual state of uncertainty, without absolutely repelling Lafay-

* He himself relates this fact in his Memoirs.

ette, he received him coldly; paid Mirabeau, who alternately opposed and supported him; encouraged the dislike of Bouillé against the revolution; looked to Austria with hope, and concerted the emigration to Turin. Such is the character of weakness: it looks out for outlets of hope, instead of commanding success; and brings ruin on itself, by giving rise to suspicions, which irritate parties quite as much as would the reality itself, for it is better to strike at once than play the swaggerer.

In vain did Lafayette, who wished to do that which the court left undone, write to his relation, Bouillé, to persuade him to serve the throne in conjunction with himself; and by the only means possible, those which freedom and liberty suggested. Bouillé, under the evil instigation of the court, answered him coldly, and in an evasive manner; and without attempting any thing against the constitution, still continued to render himself formidable by the secresy of his intentions, and the strength of his army.

The reconciliation of the 4th of February, which ought to have had such important effects, was therefore vain and useless. The trial of Favras was concluded; the Châtelet, either through fear of the people, or real conviction, found him guilty, and sentenced him to be hung. This unfortunate man displayed in his last moments a firmness more worthy of a martyr than a conspirator. He protested his innocence, and requested permission to make a declaration of it before his death. His scaffold was placed on the *Place de Grève*. He was conducted to the Hotel de Ville, where he remained till the night. The people longed to see a marquess hung; and waited with impatience for this example of equality of punishments. Favras confessed that he had had communications with a grandee of the state, who had persuaded him to gain over the affections of the people to favour the king; and as it was necessary to incur some expenses, that this grandee had given him a hundred louis, which he had accepted of. He declared that his crime terminated here, but mentioned no names. Meanwhile, he asked if the publication of the names of the parties could save him, but the answer he received not satisfying him, "Is that case," said he, "I shall die with my secret;" and he advanced towards the place of execution with great firmness. The night was perfectly dark, but up to the gibbet itself there was torch light. The people rejoiced at this spectacle, and were delighted to find that equality extended even to the scaffold. They indulged their cruelty in atrocious railleries, and made the execution of the unfortunate Favras the subject of several brutal songs. His body was given to his family; and new events soon obliterated the recollection of his death from the minds both of those who had punished, and those who had employed him.

The clergy, now driven to desperation, employed themselves in exciting petty disturbances all over France. The nobility had great expectations from their influence over the minds of the people. Whilst the assembly contented itself with placing their property at the disposition of the nation, they still hoped that the execution of the decree would never take place; and to render it needless, devised a thousand measures for providing for the necessities of the treasury. The abbé Maury suggested a tax upon all articles of luxury, and the abbé of Salsède answered him by proposing that no ecclesiastic should have an income of more than a thousand crowns. The rich abbé was silenced by such a proposition. On another occasion, in the discussion of the national debt, Cazalès proposed examining, not only the validity of the titles of each debt, but the debts themselves, their origin and consideration; which was in effect to renew the national bankruptcy, by the odious means so often resorted to by the intemperately zealous chambers. The clergy, being enemies of the state-creditors, to whom they fancied themselves sacrificed, supported this motion, in spite of the severity of their principles with regard to property; and Maury was so carried away by the violence of his passions, that he failed in proper respect for the assembly, declaring that some of its members only possessed that *courage which springs from shame*. The assembly were offended, and meditated expelling him; but Mirabeau, although he might have applied this attack to himself, represented to his colleagues, that every deputy belonged to his constituents, and that, consequently, they had not the right of expelling any one. This moderation displayed true superiority, and consequently succeeded; Maury was more effectually punished by a censure than he would have been by exclusion. All these expedients, devised by the clergy for substituting the state creditors for themselves, came to nought; the assembly decreed the sale of the value of 400 million francs of demesne and church territory. The clergy, now losing all hope, scattered pamphlets among the people, in which they spread the report that the project of the revolutionists was to attack the catholic religion. It was in the provinces of the south that they hoped to obtain the greatest success. It has been seen that the first emigrations were directed towards Turin. With Languedoc, therefore, and Provence, they kept up their principal communications. Calonne, so celebrated under the notables, was the minister of the fugitive court. It was split between two parties; the object of the greater nobility was to maintain their own power, and they dreaded the intervention of the provincial nobility, and above all of the citizens. Therefore they did not wish to have recourse to foreign aid for the re-establishment of the throne. Moreover, to make use of the pretext of religion, as the emissaries of the provinces had suggested, appeared ridiculous to those who, during the whole of that century, had been accustomed to amuse themselves with the witticisms of Voltaire. The other party, composed of the lesser nobility and expatriated citizens, conceived the idea of opposing the desire of liberty by a still stronger passion, that of fanaticism; and to gain the victory by their sole endeavours, without placing themselves at the mercy of a stranger. The former endeavoured to exclude the intervention of foreigners, on the plea of the horrible personalities of civil war. The latter maintained that a civil war allowed the spilling of blood, but that it did not follow as a matter of inevitable consequence, that it was to be identified with treason. It was impossible, however, for these latter, who were not only more courageous, more patriotic, but more ferocious, to

succeed in a court where Calonne was to preside. Nevertheless, as no assistance was to be neglected at this period, the communications between Turin and the south provinces were still continued. It was at last decided, that the revolution should at the same time be attacked by a foreign and also civil war, and to forward this last purpose, the ancient fanaticism of the south provinces was rekindled by every possible means *.

The clergy neglected nothing to second this plan. The protestants of the south provinces excited the jealousy of the catholics. The clergy took advantage of these feelings, especially at the solemnities of Easter; and at Montpellier, Nimes, and Montauban, the ancient fanaticism was effectually revived.

Charles Lameth complained that the solemnities of Easter were abused by the priests; and that they endeavoured to excite the opposition of the people against the new laws. At these words, the clergy made a movement, as if for the purpose of quitting the assembly. The bishop of Clermont threatened to do so; and a great number of ecclesiastics, already on their legs, were on the point of departing, when Charles Lameth was called to order, and order was restored. In the meantime, the sale of the church property was proceeded with; this had greatly embittered their feelings; and they lost no opportunity of showing their resentment. Dom-Gerle, a Carthusian friar, sincere both in his religious and patriotic feelings, one day requested to be heard, and then proposed declaring that the catholic religion should be the only religion of the state †. Many deputies immediately acceded to this proposition, and wished to vote it by acclamation, saying, that the present was the time for the assembly to clear itself from the reproach which had been cast upon it, of attacking the catholic religion. Nevertheless, what object could such a proposition have? Either the proposed decree must give a privilege to the catholic religion, which no religion ought to possess, or it was a declaration of a matter of fact, that the majority of the French nation were catholic; but this fact had no need of declaration. Such a proposition, therefore, could not be received. In spite, then, of all the efforts of the nobility and clergy to hurry on the question, the debate was adjourned till the next day. On this day, the assembly was unusually crowded, and surrounded by throngs who could not obtain admittance; Lafayette, being informed that some malcontents had determined to excite disturbances, doubled the guard. The debate was opened; one priest threatened the assembly with ecclesiastical malediction; Maury bellowed forth his accustomed exclamations. Menou answered all their reproaches with the utmost calmness, and declared that the assembly could not be reasonably accused of wishing to abolish the catholic religion, at the very time when it was placing the expenses of its worship among those of the state. He then proposed passing to the order of the day. Dom-Gerle, convinced of his error, withdrew his motion, and expressed his regret at having been the cause of so much tumult. Mons. de Larochefoucauld placed the same question in a new light, and his motion succeeded to that of Menou. But suddenly a member of the right side rose up, and complaining that he was under constraint, challenges Lafayette, and asks of him why he had doubled the guard. His motive in this was not suspected; for it was not the left side who could dread the people, and it was not his friends that Lafayette sought to protect. This question augmented the disorder; the debate however was not discontinued. During the debate, an act of Louis XIV. was cited: "I am not astonished," exclaimed Mirabeau, "that that reign is cited, in which the edict of Nantes was revoked; but from this very tribune whence I speak, I perceive the fatal window from which a king, the assassin of his people, mixing his worldly interests with those of religion, gave the signal for the massacre of Saint Bartholomew!" This terrible apostrophe did not terminate the discussion, which was still prolonged. The proposition of the duke de Larochefoucauld was finally adopted. The assembly declared that their sentiments on this subject were well known, but that out of respect for liberty of conscience, they neither could nor ought to deliberate upon the proposition which had been submitted to them.

A few days had hardly elapsed, when a fresh plan was devised to overawe and dissolve the assembly. The new organization of the kingdom having been accomplished, the people were about to be summoned upon the election of their magistrates, and it was suggested that they should nominate fresh deputies at the same time, to replace those who composed the present assembly. This measure had been proposed and debated once before, and had been repelled. It was again revived in April 1790. Some of the papers had limited the powers to one year, and in fact it was nearly a year since the assembly had met; it opened in May 1789, and April 1790 was close at hand. Although these papers had been annulled, yet the assembly had entered into an engagement not to separate till a constitution was established: these men, for whom there had been neither act passed, or oath taken, when they set about fulfilling the very object of their election, proposed to choose other deputies, and to give place to them. Maury, who took upon himself the task of enforcing this motion, acquitted himself with his usual boldness, and more than his ordinary address. He appealed to the sovereignty of the people, and said, that the assembly could no longer occupy the place of the nation, and prolong the possession of those powers which were only temporary. He wished to be informed by what title the assembly were invested with sovereign attributes; he maintained that the distinction between the legislative and constituent power was a chimerical distinction; that a sovereign convention could not exist except in the absence of all government; and that if the assembly was this convention, it had only to depose the king, and declare the throne vacant. Loud exclamations interrupted these expressions, and manifested the general indignation. Mirabeau then rose up. "Information is required," said he, "as to how long since it is when the deputies of the people became the national convention? I answer, since the day when they found the entrance of the chamber blocked up by soldiers, and they betook themselves to the first place where they could assemble, and in that place to take an oath rather to

* See note 16 in the Appendix.
† Sitting of the 12th April, 1790.

perish than betray or abandon the rights of the nation. Our powers, whatever they might originally have been, have changed in their nature from that day; and whatever may be the powers we have exercised, our efforts and labours have rendered them lawful, and the consent of the whole nation has sanctified them. You all recollect the expression of that great man of antiquity who had neglected legal forms to save his country. Being summoned by a factious assembly to declare if he had observed the laws, he replied, 'I swear that I have saved my country.' Gentlemen," then exclaimed Mirabeau, addressing himself to the deputies, "I swear that you have saved France!"

"This spirit-stirring adjuration," says Ferrières, "carried away the whole assembly, as if by sudden inspiration; the discussion was closed, it was decreed that the electoral convocations should not elect new deputies."

Thus this new device was frustrated, and the assembly were enabled to continue their labours. But the disturbances throughout France were by no means abated. The commandant De Voisin was murdered by the people; the forts of Marseilles were carried by the national guard; movements of a contrary description took place at Nimes and Montauban. The delegates from Turin had excited the Roman catholics. They presented addresses, in which they declared the monarchy to be in danger, and demanded that the Roman catholic religion should be declared the only religion of the state. It was in vain that a royal proclamation answered them; they replied. The protestants now came to close quarters with the Catholics, and the latter, waiting in vain for the aid which had been promised them from Turin, were at last overthrown. Many regiments of national guards put themselves in motion to assist the patriots against the rebels; the struggle was thus commenced, and the Viscount de Mirabeau, the declared adversary of his illustrious brother, in announcing civil war from the tribune, appeared, by his gestures and words, to threaten the assembly with its consequences.

Thus, whilst the most moderate party of the deputies endeavoured to appease the revolutionary ardour, an indiscreet opposition excited a fever which tranquillity might have subdued, and furnished the popular orators with the most powerful pretext for violence. The clubs now became more extravagant than ever. That of the Jacobins, the offspring of the Breton club, which was first established at Versailles, and afterwards at Paris, by its superiority in number, talents, and violence, took the lead of all the others*. Its sittings were regulated in the same manner as those of the assembly; all the questions which were discussed by the former were taken up by the latter; its anticipated decisions were published, which even at this time informed legislators themselves how they were to act. There indeed the principal popular members of the assembly were accustomed to meet, and there it was that the most opinionated found strength and exciting influences. Lafayette, to oppose the terrible influence of this association, in concert with Bailly and some of the most enlightened citizens, formed another club, first called the 89, afterwards the *Feuillans*†. But this expedient was feeble; an association of a hundred calm and enlightened men could never appeal to the mob as the Jacobins did. Forcibly to prohibit such associations was the only method of destroying their influence; but the court possessed too little sincerity, and inspired too much suspicion, for the popular party to think of employing this remedy. The Lameths ruled supreme in the Jacobin club. Mirabeau attended both; it was evident to all that his place was between the two parties. An occasion soon presented itself in which the part he intended to play was more clearly developed, and in which he gained a memorable advantage for the monarchy, as we shall presently observe.

* This club, called the Friends of the Constitution, was transferred to Paris in October, 1789, and was known at that time by the name of the Jacobin Club, (*Club de Jacobins*,) because they held their meetings in a hall of the Convent of Jacobins, in the Rue St. Honoré.

† Formed the 12th May, 1790.

CHAPTER V.

STATE OF POLITICS AND INCLINATIONS OF FOREIGN POWERS IN 1790—DEBATES UPON THE RIGHT OF MAKING WAR AND PEACE—INTRODUCTION OF PAPER MONEY, OR ASSIGNATS—JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION—CIVIL CONSTITUTION OF THE CLERGY—ABOLITION OF TITLES OF HONOUR—ANNIVERSARY OF THE 14TH JULY—FÊTE OF THE FIRST FEDERATION—MUTINY OF THE MILITARY AT NANCY—RETIREMENT OF NECKER—THE CAMP AT JALES FORMED—OATH OF CIVISM DIRECTED TO BE TAKEN BY ECCLESIASTICS.

At the period to which we have now arrived the French revolution began to attract the regard of foreign sovereigns; its language was so elevated and so firm, that it possessed a character of universality which seemed to render it not unsuited to other nations, so much so that foreign potentates began to fear its attraction. They had looked upon it at first as a passing insurrection, but the success of the assembly, its firmness, and unexpected perseverance, and above all the ultimate object which it had in view, not only for France, but for all other nations, drew upon it the attention and hatred of foreign potentates, and entitled it to the honour of consideration from foreign cabinets. Europe was then divided into two grand hostile confederacies; the Anglo-Prussian confederacy on one side, and the imperial courts on the other.

Frederick William had succeeded the great Frederick to the throne of Prussia. This feeble and fluctuating prince, renouncing the policy of his illustrious predecessors, had abandoned the alliance of France for that of England. United

to this power, he formed that famous Anglo-Prussian league, which attempted such great things, and executed nothing; which raised up Sweden, Poland, and the Porte in arms against Russia and Austria; abandoned all those it had excited, and contributed even to despoil them by the partition of Poland.

The joint object of England and Prussia had been to ruin Russia and Austria in stirring up Sweden, then governed by the chivalrous Gustavus; Poland, still suffering from the effects of her first partition; and the Porte, harassed by Russian invasions. The real object of England, in this league, was to take vengeance on France for the assistance she had afforded the American colonies, without expressly declaring war with her. By promoting war between the Russians and Turks, this was accomplished: for France could not remain neuter between these two nations without alienating the Turks (who counted on her assistance), and losing all commercial power in the Levant. On the other hand, by taking part in the war, she lost the alliance with Russia, with whom she was about concluding a treaty highly advantageous to France, and which would have secured to her timber and all those articles of commerce in reference to shipping, which the North so plentifully supplies. Meanwhile England prepared her forces, and put them in readiness for employment in case it should be necessary. But observing the disorder of the finances under the *notables*, and the popular disturbances under the constituent assembly, she altered her plan of operations, and preferred ruining France by means of its intestine troubles than by the force of arms. This was generally believed to be the motive of England's policy at this period; therefore it is, that she has been accused of fomenting the disorders of the nation.

This Anglo-Prussian league caused its ministers to engage in several battles, with tolerably even success. Gustavus came out of the contest, in which he had engaged merely as an adventurer, as a hero. Holland, which was in a state of insurrection, had been forced to submit to the stadtholder, by the intrigues of England and the arms of Prussia. Thus, the skilful policy of England had deprived France of a powerful maritime alliance; and the Prussian monarch only sought for such success as might gratify his vanity and avenge an outrage perpetrated by the states of Holland against the wife of the stadtholder, who was his own sister. Poland, having settled its internal constitution, took up arms. Turkey had been beaten by Russia. But the sudden death of Joseph the second, emperor of Austria, which happened in January, 1790, changed the face of events. The enlightened and pacific Leopold, whose happy reign was blessed by the whole of Tuscany, succeeded him. Leopold, with as much skill as prudence, attempted to put an end to the war; and to accomplish his object, endeavoured to seduce the fickle imagination of Frederick William. He represented to that prince the sweets of repose, the evils of war, which had so long afflicted his people, and, finally, the dangers of the French revolution, which proclaimed such fatal principles. He awakened in his mind dormant ideas of absolute power, and even made him conceive the hope of chastising the French revolutionists as he had those of Holland. Frederick William allowed himself to be seduced by these representations at the very moment when he was about to reap the advantages of the confederacy, which had been so daringly conceived by his minister Hertzberg. It was in July 1790, that the peace was signed at Reichenbach. In August, Russia also made peace with Gustavus, and was now only at war with Poland, by no means very formidable, and with the Turks, who were beaten in every encounter. We shall enlarge on these events by-and-by. The attention of these several powers had for its object the closely watching the progress of the French revolution.

Some time before the peace between Prussia and Leopold, while yet the Anglo-Prussian league menaced the two imperial courts, and was directed secretly against France as well as Spain, our constant and faithful ally, some English ships were seized in Nootka Sound by Spanish vessels. The most indignant remonstrances were urged against this capture, and were followed by a general naval armament in all the ports of England. Upon this, Spain, according to the articles of treaty, demanded aid from France, and Louis XVI. ordered the equipment of fifteen vessels. England was accused on this occasion of endeavouring to augment our embarrassments. The clubs of London, it is true, had many times complimented the national assembly, and the English government allowed a few philanthropists to indulge in their philosophical flow of soul; but, at the same time, paid, it was said, those demagogues, who to the astonishment of all, suddenly re-appeared every where, and cost the national guard of the kingdom so much trouble to suppress the riots they excited. These disturbances were greatly increased at the moment of the general armament, and it was impossible not to observe some connexion between the threats of England and the renewal of internal discord. Above all, Lafayette, who spoke but little in the assembly, except on subjects which concerned the public tranquillity, declared, at the tribune, that he believed there was some secret influence which excited the people to outrages. "I cannot help pointing out to the assembly," said he, "this new and combined insurrection, which reaches from Strasbourg to Nimes, from Brest to Toulon, and which the enemies of the people would without purpose attribute to them, since it carries with it all the appearance of secret influence. If we endeavour to establish peace in the departments, the country is laid waste. If neighbouring powers take arms, disorder is immediately spread in our ports and arsenals." Many commandants had in fact been murdered; and were it by chance or design, our best naval officers had been the victims. The English ambassador was ordered by his government to rebut these imputations; but we know very well the credit which such messages deserve. Calonne had also written to the king* to justify England, but Calonne, when speaking in favour of a foreigner, exposed himself to distrust. He said, but in vain, that every expense of a representative

* See in the Iron Chest, No. 25, letter of Calonne to the king, of the 9th of April, 1790.

government was known, that even the secret service money was avowed as such, and that there was no item of this kind in the English budget. But experience has shown that responsible ministers are never destitute of the command of money. The argument in favour of England is, that time which discovers every thing, in respect to this accusation has developed nothing, and that Necker, who had the means of forming a correct judgment, never believed in any secret influence*.

The king, as we have just seen, had notified to the assembly the equipment of fifteen sail of the line, conceiving, he said, that they would approve of this measure, and vote the necessary supplies. The assembly received this message with the greatest good temper, but perceived in it a constitutional question, which they thought should be settled before they answered the king. "The measures have been already taken," said Alexander Lameth, "our discussion, therefore, cannot retard them; it therefore first becomes necessary to ascertain to whom the right of making peace or war belongs, whether to the king or the assembly." In truth, this was nearly the last prerogative of importance to be settled, and one of those which excited the most lively interest The popular imagination was so pre-occupied with the errors of courts, and their alternations of ambition and weakness, that it was generally desired that the king should not have the power either of plunging the nation into dangerous wars, or dishonouring it by pusillanimities. Nevertheless, of all acts of government, the responsibility of making peace or war is one which mostly consists in action, and necessarily belongs to the executive authority. To ensure, therefore, a voluntary and able execution of such measures, great latitude and liberty should be allowed to him with whom they are entrusted. The opinion of Mirabeau on this question, who was said to have been gained over by the court, was pronounced beforehand. The present occasion was a favourable one for depriving this orator of his so much envied popularity. The Lameths perceived it, and incited Barnave to bear down Mirabeau. The right side of the chamber stood aloof, as it were, and left the field open to these two rivals.

The debate was anxiously looked for and commenced†. After a few speakers had launched some preliminary ideas, Mirabeau was heard, and he put the case altogether in a new light. War, he said, was almost always unforeseen; hostilities preceded threats. It was the duty of the king, who was charged with the maintenance of public safety, to repel them; and thus the war commenced before the assembly could intervene. The case was the same with respect to treaties: the king alone could seize upon the proper moment for negotiation, conference, or disputation with foreign powers; the assembly could do no more than ratify the conditions which were obtained. In both cases the king only could act, and the assembly approve or disapprove. Mirabeau, therefore, proposed that the executive power should be confined to the ratification of hostilities already commenced; and that the legislative power should, according to circumstances, either permit the continuation of war, or require peace. This opinion was applauded, as the opinions of Mirabeau always were. Nevertheless Barnave replied, and passing over other speakers, answered no one but Mirabeau. He agreed that the sword was often drawn before the nation could be consulted, but maintained that hostilities were not war, and that the king should repel them, and immediately inform the assembly, which then, as sovereign, would declare its intentions. Therefore the whole distinction is purely verbal; for Mirabeau gave to the assembly the right of disapproving of war, and requiring peace; Barnave, that of declaring both the one and the other: but, in both cases, the will of the assembly was obligatory, and Barnave gave it no more latitude than Mirabeau; yet for all this Barnave was applauded, and carried in triumph by the people, whilst it was reported that his adversary had sold himself, and a pamphlet was hawked about the streets of Paris, intituled *The High Treason of Count de Mirabeau*. The moment was decisive. Every one expected a terrible effort from this redoubtable champion; he demanded the liberty of reply, and having obtained it, ascended the tribune in the midst of an immense crowd who had collected together to hear him, and declared that he would either descend it dead or victorious. "I also," said he, in the commencement of his speech, "have been carried in triumph, and nevertheless to-day the people cry out, *The High Treason of the Count de Mirabeau*. I had not need of this example to know that there is but one step from the Capitol to the Tarpeian rock. But these falls from the greatest height to the lowest depth shall not arrest me in my career." After this impressive exordium, he declared that he should only reply to Barnave, and that from the commencement. "Explain yourself," said he; "you have, in your opinion, reduced the king to the mere notification of hostilities already commenced, and you have given to the assembly alone the right of declaring, in this instance, the national will. On this point I stop you short, and refer you to our established principles, which divide the expression of the national will between the king and the assembly. By attributing this singly to the assembly, you have violated the constitution; I call you to order. —You cannot answer.—I continue."

There was, in fact, nothing to rejoin to this; Barnave remained exposed during a long reply to this thundering rhetoric. Mirabeau answered him article by article, and showed that his adversary had given nothing more to the assembly than he had given himself; but that, in reducing the king to a simple declaration, he had deprived him of his necessary assent to the expression of the national will. He finished at last, by reproaching Barnave with having excited a criminal rivalry between men who ought to live together as true companions in arms. Barnave had enumerated the partisans of his opinion; Mirabeau, therefore, enumerated his in turn, and pointed out among them those moderate men who were the first founders of the constitution, and who had maintained liberty for the French; whilst their vile calumniators sucked the milk of courts, (he alluded to the

* See what Madame de Staël says, in her Considerations on the French Revolution.

† Sittings of the 14th to 22nd of May.

Lameths, who had received benefits from the queen); "Such men," added he, "will boast even to the grave of their friends and their enemies."

Mirabeau sat down in the midst of the most unanimous applause. There was in the assembly a considerable number of deputies, who belonged neither to the right nor left side of the chamber; and who, unattached to any party, decided according to the impression of the moment. It was through their medium that genius or reason triumphed, because, by joining either the one side or the other, they created the majority. Barnave wished to reply, but the assembly opposed it, and called loudly for the vote. The motion of Mirabeau, after having been improved in a most superior manner by Chapelier, was finally adopted to the general satisfaction; for these rivalries did not extend beyond the circle in which they originated, and the popular party believed themselves as much conquerors with Mirabeau as with the Lameths.

This act conferred on the king and the nation conjointly the right of making peace or war. The king was intrusted with the disposition of the forces, was to notify the commencement of hostilities, call together the assembly, if they were not met, and propose the question of peace or war; the assembly was to deliberate on his proposition thus expressed, and the king immediately to sanction their decision. The express proposition and definitive sanction was an amendment of Chapelier's. This decree, which was conformable to the principles already established by the assembly, excited the sincere joy of the constitutionalists, and silly expectations among the counter-revolutionists, who thought that public feeling was about to change, and that this victory of Mirabeau would in fact be theirs. Lafayette, who on this occasion agreed with Mirabeau, wrote to Bouillé, pointed out to him the hopes he entertained of tranquillity and moderation; and endeavoured, as he always did, to reconcile him to the new order of things.

The assembly continued its financial labours. These consisted in disposing of the property of the clergy to the best possible advantage; and its sale, which had been a long time decreed, could not be delayed either by their protestations, mandates, or intrigues. To deprive a powerful body of men of a great part of their landed property, then divide it in the most advantageous manner, so as to increase its produce by the division; to render thus a considerable portion of the population proprietors, who had not been so before; finally, to liquidate, by the same operation, the national debt, and to re-establish order in the finances, was the object of the assembly; and it appreciated too well its utility to be frightened at obstacles. The sale of the value of four hundred millions of demesne and church property had already been ordered; but it was necessary to find a method of selling it without incurring the risk of its undervaluation by bringing all to sale at once. Bailly, in the name of the municipality of Paris, proposed a well-conceived scheme, and this was, to transfer this property to the different municipalities, that they might make purchase of the whole, in order to dispose of it by a gradual resale, so that the total sale should not take place at one time. The municipalities, not having funds to pay for this purchase immediately, entered into engagements for an appointed time, and gave the state creditors bonds on the communes, which they engaged successively to pay. These bonds, which were called in the discussions *municipal paper*, gave the first idea of *assignats*. Following the plan of Bailly, the assembly laid hands on all ecclesiastical property, which was divided among the *communes*, and the state creditors had a nearer prospect of payment, by acquiring a claim upon the municipalities instead of the state. Their security was also augmented as the time of their payment approached; and it depended on themselves to effectuate this, since with their bonds or assignats they might acquire a proportional value of the property brought to sale. Much therefore had been done for them, but all was not yet accomplished. They might not wish to convert their bonds into land, either from scruples of conscience, or some other motive; in which case they were obliged to keep them; and as they had not the circulation of money, they thus became simple titles not reduced into possession. In this extremity there was only one measure to be taken: that of giving the bonds or titles the property of circulation; then they would become a true circulating medium; and the creditors, being able to pay with them, were in fact paid by them. There was another important consideration—the scarcity of coin; this was attributed to emigration, which carried a great deal of specie out of the country; to the payments which had been made to foreign nations; and, finally, to the desire which some evil-minded men had acted on, of driving things to their worst extremity. The true cause was the want of confidence which the troubles of the kingdom produced. Coin is apparent by circulation; when public confidence prevails, the activity of exchange is extreme; coin then circulates rapidly, is seen in abundance every where, and appears more considerable than it really is, because it is unsparingly used; but when public disorders have spread distrust, capitals stagnate, and the circulation of coin creeps: it frequently vanishes altogether, and its absence is without cause made a subject of complaint.

The necessity of supplying the deficiency of a metallic currency, of giving to the state-creditors something more than a mere claim, and of meeting many other present wants, induced the assembly to give to the bonds, or "assignats," the current value of money. The creditor was thus paid, as he could enforce the reception of the paper which was given him, and supply by it all his wants. If he did not wish to purchase land, those who received the circulating paper from him, in the course of its circulation, could do so. The bonds which, in this manner, were rendered current, were destined to be afterwards destroyed; the lands of the clergy would in a short time be disposed of, and the paper money suppressed. Interest at so much per diem accrued on the bonds, and they consequently increased in value by remaining in the hands of their possessors.

The clergy, who perceived in the proposed project, a method of putting the decree against their property into execution, opposed it violently. Their allies, both the nobility and others, hostile to every measure which facilitated the progress of the re-

volution, cried out against paper money. The name of Law resounded through the chamber, and the recollection of his bankruptcy was awakened. But the comparison was not just; for the paper of Law was pledged upon expected successes from the East India Company, whilst the bonds, at present in question, rested upon a territorial capital, actually existing and easily available. Law had involved the country in a mist of deception, and exaggerated greatly the presumed value of the capital of the company; the assembly, on the contrary, could not contemplate, with the new forms just established, the possibility of similar frauds. And besides, the sum of the created assignats was only a very small part of the capital which was appropriated to their redemption. But it is true that the paper, however secure it might be, was not, like silver, a substantive reality, or, according to the expression of Bailly, an "actualité physique." Coin carries in itself its own value; paper, on the contrary, requires another operation, either a purchase of land, or some other realization. It ought, therefore, to be above coin in value; and, from the very moment it is so, coin, which no one will give for paper, will shun the market, and finally disappear. Besides all this, if disorders should take place in the administration of the property, or immoderate issues of paper should destroy the proportion between the effects in circulation and the capital, public confidence would in all probability vanish; the nominal valuation of the paper would still be the same, but its real value would cease; he who gave this conventional money would rob him who received it, and a grand crisis must necessarily take place. All this was very possible, and with a little more experience would have appeared a certainty. As a financial measure, the issue of assignats might be found very questionable; but as a political measure, it was absolutely necessary, for it furnished means for providing for the pressing wants of the state, and divided property without the aid of an agrarian law. The assembly therefore could not prudently hesitate; and, in spite of Maury and his party, it decided on the issue of four hundred millions of assignats bearing interest. (1st April, 1790.)

Necker had long ago lost the confidence of the king, the accustomable deference of his colleagues, and the enthusiasm of the nation. Engrossed in his calculations, he nevertheless entered sometimes into discussion with the assembly. His reserve on the subject of extraordinary expenses, was the occasion of calling for the red book, that famous register, wherein, it was said, were to be found an account of all secret expenses. Louis XVI. yielded it up with reluctance, but wafered down the leaves, in which the expenses of his predecessor Louis XV. were detailed. The assembly respected his delicacy, and confined themselves to the expenses of his reign. In this book nothing objectionable was found personal to the king himself; all prodigalities bore reference entirely to the courtiers. The name of the Lameths was inserted there for a bounty of sixty thousand francs, dedicated by the queen to their education. They were compelled to return that sum to the public treasury. Pensions for a double proportion of services, or as equivalents for former situations held by individuals, were reduced. The assembly displayed in every instance the greatest moderation; it prayed the king to fix the amount of the civil list himself, and voted unanimously the twenty-five millions he demanded.

This assembly, strong in its numbers, genius, power, and acts, had conceived the mighty project of regenerating all parts of the state, and had just regulated the new system of administering justice. The judicial tribunals were distributed in the same manner as the several administrations—by districts and departments. The judges were left to popular choice. This last measure had been strongly opposed. Political metaphysicians again exerted their abilities to prove that judicial authority heightened the executive power, and that the king should appoint the judges. Many arguments in support of this opinion were gathered from different quarters; but the only one proper to enforce on the assembly, who professed the intention of establishing a monarchy, was, that royalty, successively deprived of all its prerogatives, became a simple magistrature, and the state a republic. But to define clearly the nature of a monarchy was too bold an undertaking; it requires concessions too great for a newly-awakened people to consent to. It is the lot of nations to demand either too much or else nothing. The assembly wished sincerely the continuance of the king, were full of respect for him as an individual, and proved it on every occasion; but whilst they cherished the person of a sovereign, they, without knowing it, destroyed royalty.

After this uniformity had been introduced into the courts of justice and the administration, it remained to regulate the service of religion, and to distribute its establishments in the same manner as the others. Thus, when a tribunal of appeal, and a superior administration had been established in each department, it was only natural to fix a bishopric there also. How indeed could certain bishoprics be permitted to embrace fifteen hundred square leagues, whilst others comprehended no more than twenty? or certain cures to contain ten leagues of circumference, whilst others hardly counted fifteen houses? How could it be suffered that many curates should have at most an income of seven hundred livres, whilst beneficed clergymen, living in the same neighbourhood, enjoyed revenues of ten or fifteen thousand. But the assembly, in reforming these abuses, did not intrench upon ecclesiastical doctrines, or with the papal authority, knowing that temporal power has always been confined within due limits. Their object was to form a new division of church establishments, and to subject the curates and bishops to a popular election; but even in this they encroached only upon temporal power, as it was the king who nominated, and the pope who instituted the ecclesiastical dignitaries. This act was called the *civil constitution of the clergy*, and brought more scandal on the assembly than all it had before done, although it was the work of the most pious deputies. Camus and some other Jansenists, wishing to establish religion in the state, endeavoured to put it in harmony with the new laws. It is certain that, equity having been introduced into every department, it would have been strange if the ecclesiastical administration had been neglected. Yet

except Camus and a few others similarly disposed, most of the members of the assembly, educated in the school of the philosophers, would have treated Christianity as all other religions admitted into a state, and not have troubled themselves about it. But adhering to those opinions which, in our new morals, it is the custom not to oppose, even when they do not accord with our own sentiments, they assisted the sincerely Christian and religious project of Camus. The clergy, however, took their interference in very ill part, pretended that the spiritual authority of the pope was encroached upon, and appealed to Rome. The fundamental articles of the project were nevertheless adopted *, and immediately presented to the king, who demanded time to refer them to the chief pontiff. The king, whose enlightened religion perceived the wisdom of this plan, wrote to the pope with the sincere desire of gaining his consent, and of destroying by every method the objections of the clergy. The intrigues which hindered the accomplishment of these wishes will shortly be seen.

The month of July was at hand; it was now nearly a year since the taking of the Bastille, when the nation had obtained possession of supreme authority, and by the organ of the assembly had pronounced her decisions, and was executing them by herself or her delegates. The 14th of July was considered as the commencement of a new era in the national existence, and the people were determined to celebrate its anniversary by a great national solemnity. The provinces and cities had already given an example of forming federations, to resist in common the enemies of the revolution. The municipality of Paris proposed on the 14th of July a general federation of all France, to be celebrated in the midst of the capital, deputies of all the national guards, and of the entire body of the army. This design was received with enthusiasm, and great preparations were made to render the fête worthy of its subject.

Foreign nations, as has been seen, had for a long time fixed their eyes upon France; sovereigns began to hate and fear, the people to esteem us. A society of foreign enthusiasts presented themselves at the assembly, each in the costume of his own nation. Their prolocutor, Anacharsis Clootz, a Prussian by birth, a man of extravagant ideas, demanded, in the name of the human race, to take part in the federation. Scenes like these, which would appear ridiculous to those who did not witness them, deeply affected those who assisted at these ceremonies. The assembly granted their request; and the president assured the foreigners that they should be admitted, if it was only that they might relate to their countrymen what they had seen, and teach them the joys and blessings of liberty.

The emotion caused by this scene led to another. An equestrian statue of Louis XIV. represented him trampling under foot the allegorical picture of many conquered provinces: "We must not suffer," said one of the Lameths, "these monuments of slavery in these days of liberty. It is not fitting that the Franche-Comtoïs, on arriving at Paris, should see their image in chains." Maury opposed this unimportant measure, which it was necessary to grant for the satisfaction of the general enthusiasm. At the same instant a voice proposed the abolition of the titles of counts, marquesses, and barons, &c.; the prohibition of liveries, and the destruction of all hereditary titles. The young Montmorenci maintained this proposition. A noble asked what could be substituted for these words; "Such an one has been made count for service rendered to the state!" "It will be recorded simply," replied Lafayette, "that such an one has saved the state on such a day." The motion was adopted *, in spite of the extraordinary irritation of the nobility, who were more galled by the suppression of their titles, than by the more substantial losses they had sustained during the whole revolution. The most moderate party of the assembly wished, in abolishing titles, not to prohibit their assumption by those who desired it. Lafayette hastened to warn the court of this step, before the decree was sanctioned, and endeavoured to persuade the king to return it to the assembly, who consented to amend it. But the king delayed not a moment to give it his assent, and many believed they saw in his conduct the sinister intention of driving things to the worst.

The object of federation was, the civic oath. The question was agitated, whether the confederates and the assembly should receive the oath from the king, or whether the king, considered merely as the first public functionary, should swear simultaneously with the other public authorities upon the altar of the country (*autel de la patrie*). The last method was preferred; the assembly thus succeeded in putting its ceremonial in harmony with its other laws; and the king was in this ceremony on the same level as he was in the constitution. The court, to whom Lafayette was, at this period, the object of constant suspicion, alarmed itself at a report that had gained ground, of his being on the point of being nominated commandant of all the national guards of the kingdom. These suspicions, to those who did not know Lafayette, were very natural; and his enemies on all sides endeavoured to augment them. How indeed could people persuade themselves that a man enjoying so much popularity, and general of a very considerable force, would not abuse his power! Nevertheless he had not the most distant idea of it; he was resolved to be nothing more than a mere citizen; and whether it were virtue, or a well-directed ambition, the merit is the same. Human pride must have some object, and virtue consists in placing it in the exercise of benevolence. Lafayette, foreseeing the fears of the court, proposed that the same individual should not command more than the guard of one department; the decree was passed with acclamation, and the disinterestedness of the general received its full meed of applause. He was appointed to make all the preparations for the fête, and nominated chief of the federation, in his capacity of commandant of the Parisian guard.

As the day approached, preparations were made with the greatest activity. The fête was to take place on the Champ-de-Mars, an extensive plain, which extends itself between the military school and the banks of the Seine. It had been determined to carry the earth from the middle of this

* Act of the 12th July.

* Act and sitting of 19th June, 1790.

plain to the sides, so as to make an amphitheatre sufficient to contain the mass of spectators. Twelve thousand labourers worked at it without intermission; and yet it was doubtful if it would be finished by the 14th of July; the inhabitants therefore joined the labourers. Suddenly the whole population was transformed into workmen. The religious, the military, and men of all classes, seized the shovel and the spade; and even elegant females contributed to the work. This enthusiasm soon became general; the populace hastened to the Champ de Mars by sections, with banners of different colours, and at the sound of the drum. When there they mixed together, without any distinction, and all partook of the common labour. When the night came on, the signal for departure was given, and every one joined his company, and returned to his home. This delightful harmony prevailed to the end of the work. During this time the federalists arrived continually, and were welcomed with the greatest eagerness, and the most amiable hospitality. The effusion of joy was general and sincere, in spite of the alarms which a small number of men, who remained inaccessible to these sensations, endeavoured to excite. It was said, that the *brigands* would take advantage of the moment when the people were at the confederation to rob the city. The Duke of Orleans, who had returned from London, was suspected of mischievous projects; nevertheless the national gaiety was unchanged, and none of these ill-boding prophecies were accredited.

The 14th at last arrived: all the federalists deputed from the provinces and the army, ranged under their officers and banners, set out from the place of the Bastille, and met at the Tuilleries. The deputies of Bearn, in passing by the place de la Ferronnerie, where Henry IV. had been assassinated, did homage to his memory, which, in this hour of enthusiasm, manifested itself by tears. The federalists being arrived at the garden of the Tuilleries, received the municipality and the assembly into their ranks. A battalion of young children, armed like their fathers, preceded the assembly; a group of old men followed it, and forcibly recalled to every mind the ancient recollections of Sparta. This train advanced, accompanied by the shouts and applauses of the people. The quays were covered, and the houses filled with spectators. A bridge that had been, within a few days, thrown over the Seine, conducted the procession by a road strewed with flowers from one bank side to the other, and led them opposite the plain destined for the reception of the confederation. The procession then passed through, and each band occupied its particular station. A magnificent amphitheatre had been prepared at the bottom of the plain, for the reception of the national authorities. The king and the president were seated by the side of each other on seats of equal height, inlaid with golden lilies. A balcony raised behind the king, contained the queen and the court. The ministers were seated at some distance from the king, and the deputies were ranged on each side. Four hundred thousand spectators occupied the sides of the amphitheatre; sixty thousand armed federalists went through their evolutions in the plain that was before them; and in the centre rose the magnificent altar of the country (*autel de la patrie*) on a base of twenty-five feet. Three hundred priests, clothed in white garments and tri-coloured scarfs, occupied the passages to it, and were appointed to officiate at the mass.

The arrival of the federalists lasted three hours. During this time the sky was black and lowering, and the rain fell in torrents. The heavens, whose brightness is so accordant with human felicity, at that time were destitute of serenity and light. One of the battalions, after their arrival, laid down their arms, and struck up a dance; all the others immediately imitated them, and in a moment the plain was covered with sixty thousand men, soldiers and citizens, whose gaiety formed a striking contrast to the storminess of the weather. At last, the ceremony commenced: the weather by a happy chance cleared up, and the sun shone propitiously on this solemn scene. The Bishop of Autun began the mass; the choristers accompanied the voice of the pontiff; and the cannon mingled its roar with these sacred sounds. The sacrifice being finished, Lafayette dismounted from his horse, ascended the passage to the throne, and attended to receive orders from the king, who handed him the form of the oath. Lafayette carried it to the altar, and instantly every banner was unfurled, and every sabre flashed in the air. The general, the army, the president, and the deputies, all cried out at once, "*I swear it!*" The king, standing up, his hand pointing to the altar, said, "*I, king of France, swear to employ the power which the constitutional act of the state has conferred upon me, to maintain the constitution framed by the national assembly, and accepted of by me.*" The queen, now inspired by the general enthusiasm, took in her arms the august infant, heir to the throne, and from the top of the balcony, where she was seated, showed him to the assembled nation. This action excited the most extraordinary exclamations of joy, love, and enthusiasm, both towards the mother and the child, and every one seemed captivated with her. It was at this moment that all France, assembled from the eighty-three chief cities of the departments, took the same oath to love the king who loved them. Alas! on such occasions as this, even hatred must melt into softness, pride must sink into humility, and all must feel happy in the general felicity, and jealous of the dignity of all. How is it that these deeply felt joys of unanimity are so soon consigned to oblivion?

This august ceremony being completed, the procession marched back; and the people abandoned themselves to the public joy. The public rejoicings lasted many days. A general review of the federalists took place; and sixty thousand men under arms, presented a magnificent spectacle, at once military and national. In the evening Paris was enlivened by most delightful fêtes. The principal places of assemblage were the Champs Elysées, and the Bastille. On the ground where that ancient prison stood, which had been overturned into a Square, the words "*ici on danse*," was written in large characters. Brilliant illuminations, arranged in the form of garlands, supplied light as clear as day. Opulence was forbidden to disturb this peaceful fête by the presence of carriages. Every one had to make himself one of the people, and to consider himself happy in so doing. The Champs Elysées presented an affecting scene. Every one rambled

about without noise, without tumult, without rivalry or hatred. All classes, intermingled indiscriminately, promenaded, or danced, under the soft light of illuminations, and appeared happy in being together. Thus in the very bosom of advanced civilization, the times of primitive fraternity seemed to be revived.

The federalists, after having assisted at the splendid discussions of the national assembly, the pomps of the court, and the splendid entertainments of Paris; after having been witness to the graciousness of the king, whom they all visited, and from whom they received the most affecting expressions of attachment, returned to the provinces intoxicated with joy, and full of the purest sentiments and happiest illusions. The historian, having already related so many heart-rending scenes, and on the point of recounting scenes still more terrible, lingers with pleasure over these evanescent seasons of joy, when all hearts were filled with one sentiment—that of love for their country*.

This fête of the federation, though so affecting a spectacle, excited only a momentary emotion. On the next day all hearts returned to their old animosities, and the war of parties was renewed. Petty ministerial quarrels recommenced. The assembly complained that a passage had been given to the Austrian troops, who had taken up their quarters in the country of Liége. Saint-Priest was charged with having favoured the escape of many of those who were accused or suspected of counter-revolutionary machinations. The court, in retaliation, again brought forward the proceedings commenced at the Châtelet, against the authors of the disturbances of the 5th and 6th of October, in which the duke of Orleans and Mirabeau were implicated. This singular proceeding, which was several times abandoned and resumed, laboured under the contradictory influences under which it had been first set on foot. It was full of inconsistencies, and made good no sufficient charge against the two principal persons accused. The court, although it had conciliated Mirabeau, had no settled plan with regard to him. It caressed and discarded him alternately, and endeavoured rather to quiet him than follow his counsels. In renewing the proceedings of the 5th and 6th of October, he was not the object of resentment, but the duke of Orleans, who had been loudly applauded since his return from London, and harshly repelled by the court when he begged to be restored to the good graces of the king†. Chabroud was charged to lay the report of the Châtelet before the assembly, that they might judge if there were or were not sufficient grounds for an accusation. It was the wish of the court that Mirabeau should maintain silence, and abandon the Duke of Orleans, who alone was the object of its pursuit. Nevertheless he spoke, and showed how ridiculous were the imputations which were levelled against him. In point of fact, he was accused of warning Mounier that Paris was treading upon the heels of Versailles, and of having added these words:—"We wish for a king, but what signifies it whether it is Louis XVI. or Louis XVII.;" of having traversed the ranks of the Flanders regiment, sword in hand and of having cried out, "this j... f..... does not deserve the trouble which is taken for him." Nothing was more futile than such complaints; Mirabeau in demonstrating their weakness and absurdity, said only a few words respecting the Duke of Orleans, and exclaimed at the end of his speech, "Yes, the secret of this infernal proceeding is finally out; it all originates from that quarter," said he (pointing at the right side), "it is from the influence of those whose testimonies and calumnies have woven the tissue of its falsehoods; it is from their resources that the enemies of the revolution have been furnished with matter; it is .... it is but in the hearts of the judges, such as it will shortly be graven in history, by the most just and implacable vengeance."

Shouts of applause accompanied Monsieur Mirabeau to his place; the two accused were exculpated by the assembly, and the court had the disgrace of an ineffectual attempt to criminate popular characters.

The revolution made progressive advances every where, in the army as well as among the people. The army, as the last strong-hold of power, was also the last object that excited the fear of the popular party. All the military commanders were enemies of the revolution, because, being the exclusive possessors of rank and favour, they observed that personal merit would be placed on the same footing with themselves. From a contrary motive, the soldiers were inclined to the new order of things; and, undoubtedly, a dislike to discipline, and the desire of higher pay, acted as powerfully upon them as the love of liberty. A dangerous spirit of insubordination manifested itself nearly throughout the army. The infantry especially, perhaps because they mixed more with the people, or had less military pride than the cavalry, were in a state of complete insurrection. Bouillé, who saw with pain his army slip away from him, employed every possible means to stop the contagion of this revolutionary spirit. He had received from Monsieur Latour-du-Pin the fullest powers, which he took advantage of by changing the quarters of his troops continually, and so preventing them becoming familiarized with the people, by a long stay in the same place. He prohibited especially the frequenting of clubs, and neglected nothing to maintain military subordination. Bouillé, after a long resistance, had finally sworn to be faithful to the constitution; and being a man of honour, from that moment he appeared determined to devote himself to its service, at the same time preserving his fidelity to the king. His aversion to Lafayette, whose disinterestedness he could not mistake, had been overcome; and he seemed more disposed to come to some understanding with him. The national guards of the vast country over which his command extended, offered to make him their general; but he refused to accede to their wishes, from feelings of pique and discontent, which, however, he afterwards regretted, when he contemplated the good such an authority would have enabled him to do. Nevertheless, and in spite of his being irreconciled to the clubs, he still enjoyed the popular favour.

Revolt first broke out at Metz; the soldiers

* See note 17 in the Appendix.
† See Memoirs of Bouillé.

there imprisoned their officers, seized upon the colours and money-chests, and endeavoured even to make the municipality contribute to the latter. Bouillé exposed himself to the most imminent danger, but succeeded in repressing this seditious demonstration. Shortly after, another revolt of the same description took place at Nancy. In this the Swiss regiments were implicated, and it was to be feared, that if such out-breakings were not promptly checked, the whole kingdom would become shortly a prey to the combined excesses of the soldiery and the populace. The assembly itself trembled at this prospect. An officer was charged with the execution of the sentence passed against the rebels, but he was unable to enforce obedience to his orders, and Bouillé was obliged to march upon Nancy to support the authority of the law by force. He had only a few soldiers in whom he could trust, but happily the troops who had formerly revolted at Metz, feeling humbled because they were not confided in, offered to march against the rebels; the national guards made the same offer, and Bouillé advanced upon Nancy with this combined force, and a sufficiently numerous band of cavalry. His situation was embarrassing, not being able to bring his cavalry into action, and his infantry not being strong enough to attack the rebels, aided as they were by the populace. Nevertheless he addressed them with the greatest firmness, and succeeded in making an impression upon them. They were even on the point of yielding, and evacuating the city, conformably to his orders, when some shots were fired from an unknown quarter. An engagement now became inevitable. The troops of Bouillé, thinking themselves betrayed, fought with the greatest ardour; but the action was obstinate, and they were obliged to advance step by step across a most destructive fire*. Having at last made himself master of the principal places, ensured the subordination of all the regiments, and made them evacuate the city; he freed the officers and authorities who were imprisoned, selected the principal criminals, and delivered them over to the national assembly.

This victory spread universal joy, and calmed the fears which had been entertained for the tranquillity of the kingdom. Bouillé received from the king and the assembly congratulations and praise. At a later period, he was calumniated, and accused of cruelty. Nevertheless his conduct was irreproachable, and at the moment was applauded as such. The king at this period enlarged Bouillé's command, which made it very considerable, extending from Switzerland to the Sambre, and comprehending the chief part of the army. Confiding more in the cavalry than the infantry, he now fixed his quarters on the banks of the Seille, which falls into the Moselle; he here possessed the advantage of plains whereon to exercise his cavalry, forage to feed them, strong places to entrench himself in, and above all a very scanty population to fear. Bouillé was determined to do no act repugnant with the constitution, but he distrusted the patriots, and took precautions to aid the king, if it should become necessary.

The assembly had abolished parliaments, instituted juries, destroyed corporate monopolies, and was about to order a new issue of assignats. The property of the clergy giving an immense capital, and the assignats rendering it always convertible, it was nothing else than natural that the assembly should turn it to account. All the objections already urged were renewed with still more violence on this occasion; the Bishop of Autun himself opposed this new issue, and foresaw, with great sagacity, all its financial results*. Mirabeau, chiefly regarding its political consequences, insisted obstinately and successfully on its necessity. The issue therefore of eight millions of assignats was ordered; but on this occasion it was arranged that they should no longer bear interest. It was useless in fact to attach interest to that which was money. For nothing can be more just than that interest should attach on a mere security, which is not negotiable as currency, and remains idle in the hands of its holder; but to do so with respect to that which became of actual value by its forced circulation, was an error which the assembly could not a second time commit. Necker also raised objections against this new issue, and made a report to the assembly to which no one paid attention. The times were much changed with him; he was no longer that minister, to the preservation of whom the people attached so much importance a year before. Deprived of the confidence of the king, and embroiled with all his colleagues except Montmorin, he was neglected by the assembly, and did not receive that consideration which he might justly have expected. The error of Necker was in believing that reason was sufficient for every thing, and that when displayed with a mixture of sentiment and logic, it would triumph over the pride of the aristocrats, and the vehemence of the patriots. He possessed that high-minded faculty of reasoning talent, which can form a judgment of the deviations of the passions from wisdom, and censure them, but he wanted another species of talent more elevated, and less haughty, which does not confine itself to censure, but knows how to give them a proper direction. Thus to all parties he was more an annoyance than a restraint. Since the departure of Mounier and Lally he had remained without any partisan, except the rapid Malouet. He wounded the self-pride of the assembly, by recalling its attention incessantly to the most difficult of all tasks, that of the finances; besides, he drew upon himself ridicule by the manner in which he spoke of himself. His resignation was accepted of with pleasure by all parties. His carriage was stopped on his leaving the kingdom, by the same people who had formerly drawn him in triumph; and an order from the assembly was requisite to obtain him an egress from Paris. This was immediately given him, and he retired to Coppet, to contemplate at a distance a revolution which he was fitter to moralize upon than conduct†.

The ministry was now reduced to the nullity of the king himself, and nothing but a few intrigues, either useless or criminal, engaged their attention. Saint-Priest communicated with the emigrants; Latour-du-Pin gave himself up to the will of the military commanders; Montmorin possessed the confidence but not the esteem of the court, and

* August 31, 1790.

* See note 18 in the Appendix.

† Necker resigned the 4th September, 1790.

was made the medium of carrying on intrigues with the popular chiefs, to whom his moderation recommended him. New conspiracies breaking out, they were all made the subject of accusation by the assembly. "I also," said Cazalès, "would accuse them, if it were generous to persecute men so destitute of resources; I would also accuse the minister of finances of not having enlightened the assembly as to the true resources of the state, and for not having conducted to a termination that revolution which he first promoted; I would accuse the minister of war for having allowed the army to become disorganized; the ministers of the provinces for not having compelled obedience to the orders of the king; and, finally, all of them for their mere nonentity, and for the dastardly counsels they have given their master." Supineness is a crime in the eyes of parties eager to attain their object: therefore the right side condemned the ministers, not for what they had done, but for what they had left undone. Nevertheless, Cazalès and his party in condemning them entirely, yet opposed the proposal for requesting their dismissal of the king, because they regarded this request as an infringement on the royal prerogative. This recall of the ministers was not requested, but (with the exception of Montmorin) they all successively sent in their resignations, and were succeeded by others of more popular character. Duport du Tertre, a plain honest advocate, was appointed keeper of the seals; and Duportail, who was recommended to the king by Lafayette, and shewed himself more favourably disposed towards the popular party, replaced Latour-du-Pin in the war department. One of the first measures of the latter was to deprive Bouillé of the general discretion he exercised in his command, and particularly of the power of changing the quarters of his troops at his own pleasure, a power which Bouillé had availed himself of, to hinder the soldiers from fraternising with the people.

The king had particularly studied the history of the English revolution. The fate of Charles the First had always forcibly struck him, nor could he help entertaining fears of a like termination to his own career. He had especially remarked the causes which led to the condemnation of that monarch: this was civil war; and he had consequently imbibed an invincible horror against every measure which could cause the shedding of blood, and constantly opposed all projects of flight which were proposed by the queen and the court.

During the summer of 1790, which he spent at St. Cloud, he could certainly have made his escape, but would never suffer it to be spoken of. Such a measure was as much feared by the popular party as himself, as it would in all probability have led to a civil war. The aristocrats alone desired it, because, becoming masters of the king's person by withdrawing him from the assembly, they flattered themselves they should be able to govern in his name, and re-enter the capital with him at the head of foreign troops, not considering that it must have been their fate merely to follow in their train. To the aristocrats were joined, perhaps, some few persons who had begun to entertain some rambling notions of a republic, a thing which as yet had hardly entered into the mind of any one, and of which even the name was never mentioned, except perhaps by the queen, in her transports of anger against Lafayette and the assembly, whom she accused of favourably regarding such a termination. Lafayette, the chief of the constitutional army, and of all the sincere friends of liberty, watched constantly over the person of the sovereign. The two ideas—absence of the king and civil war were so closely associated in the minds of all men since the commencement of the revolution, that his departure was looked upon as the greatest calamity they had to fear.

Nevertheless the expulsion of a ministry, who, if they possessed not the confidence of Louis XVI. were at least of his own choice, alienated him from the assembly, and made him fear the entire loss of his executive power. The new religious debates, to which the double dealing of the clergy had given rise, in respect of their civil constitution, also alarmed his timorous conscience, and from that moment he contemplated flight. It was towards the end of 1790, that he intimated his designs to Bouillé, who resisted them at first, but afterwards yielded, that his zeal might not be suspected by the unfortunate monarch. Mirabeau, on his part, had digested a plan to support the monarchical cause. His communications with Montmorin had been continually kept up; but he had hitherto undertaken nothing serious, because the court, hesitating between foreign aid, emigration, and the national party, entered into nothing with sincerity, and of all projects feared that most which imposed upon it a man so sincerely constitutional as Mirabeau. Nevertheless, up to this period, the court and Mirabeau were upon the most perfect understanding with each other. Every thing was promised him if he succeeded, and all possible resources were placed at his disposal. Talon, the lieutenant-civil at the Châtelet, and Laporte, recently called into the councils of the king for the administration of the civil list, were ordered to communicate unreservedly with him, and to lend themselves to the execution of his plans. Mirabeau condemned the new constitution. For a monarchy it was, he said, too democratic, and for a republic it had too much of the king. Observing, too, the daily encroachments of the popular power, he determined to put a stop to them. At Paris, under the empire of the multitude and an all-powerful assembly, such an attempt was impossible. He perceived but one resource, and that was, to remove the king from Paris, and fix him at Lyons; there he could have explained himself more freely, and have energetically expressed the reasons which made him condemn the new constitution, at the same time proposing another, which was already prepared. At the very same time, a first legislative assembly could then have been convoked. Mirabeau, in a written conference with the most popular members, artfully contrived to wring from them all disapproval of one article of the present constitution. By joining together all these dissentient voices, the whole constitution stood condemned by its authors themselves*. It was his intention to attach this avowal to the manifesto of the king, and thus make the necessity of a new constitution the more clearly perceived. All his appliances were not communicated; all they knew was, that, by means of the

* See note 19 in the Appendix

police government of Talon, the lieutenant-civil, he had managed matters with the pamphleteers, the orators of clubs and mobs; and by his extensive correspondence, he was enabled to ascertain the dispositions of the thirty-six departments of the south. Without doubt he reckoned on the aid of Bouillé, but would not place himself in his power. While that general was encamped at Montmédy, he would have the king remain at Lyons; and he himself should, according to circumstances, transport himself to Paris, or to Lyons. A foreign prince, a friend of Mirabeau's, visited Bouillé, on the part of the king, and communicated to him this project; but not with the privity of Mirabeau*, who never thought of Montmédy, whither the king set out, but too late. Bouillé, struck with the genius of Mirabeau, declared that every effort should be made to secure the success of such a man; and that as for himself, he was ready to second all his plans.

Monsieur de Lafayette was not privy to this project. Although sincerely attached to the person of the king, he had not the confidence of the court, and, besides, excited the envy of Mirabeau, who was unwilling to associate with himself such a companion. In addition to this, Lafayette, it was known, would not deviate from the straight path; and the plan in contemplation was too bold for his character, and swerved too much from those lawful views which were conformable to his ideas of rectitude. But however this might be, Mirabeau was determined to be the sole executor of his own project; and, in reality, he alone conducted its operations from the winter of 1790 to 1791. Whether he would have finally succeeded cannot undoubtedly be known; but it is certain, that if he had not turned the torrent of the revolution, he would, at least, have altered its direction, and without changing its inevitable result, would have modified its events by his powerful opposition. It may still be asked, whether, supposing him to have succeeded in subduing the popular party, he could also have rendered himself master of the aristocracy and the court. One of his friends proposed this objection to him:—"They have promised me every thing," said Mirabeau.—"But if they don't keep their word with you?"—"If they forfeit their word, I will turn republican."

The principal articles of the civil constitution, viz. as to the new division of bishoprics, the abolition of some, the institution of others, and the election of all ecclesiastical functionaries, had at last passed the assembly.

The king referred this decree to the pope, and received an answer of mingled severity and friendliness, his holiness at the same time appealing in his turn to the clergy of France. The clergy took advantage of the opportunity thus presented, and pretended that the spiritual interests of the church were injured by the measures of the assembly. They also published mandates, forbidding dispossessed bishops to retire from their sees except when constrained by force, enjoining them to hire houses, and continue to pursue their ecclesiastical functions; and commanding those of the faithful who still remained, not to acknowledge any other than themselves. La Vendee, and certain departments of the south, were the principal theatres of these intrigues, where they also concerted their plans with the emigrants. A federalist camp was at this time formed at Jallez*; and under the pretext of federalism, the pretended federalists aimed at establishing there a central point of opposition against the measures of the assembly. The popular party became exasperated by these conspiracies, and feeling themselves strong in power, and being weary of moderation, determined to employ decisive measures to put them down. We have already seen the causes which brought about the adoption of the civil constitution. This constitution was promoted by the most sincere Christians of the assembly, who, being irritated by the unjust opposition of the ecclesiastics, were determined to meet and overbear it by some measure of decisive operation.

It has been already observed, that a decree of the assembly obliged all public functionaries to take an oath of fidelity to the new constitution. But whenever the question of this civic oath had been discussed, the clergy had always endeavoured to make a distinction between the political and ecclesiastical constitution, and their attempts had hitherto been overlooked; on the present occasion, however, the assembly were determined to subject the ecclesiastics to a more rigorous oath, which would either oblige them to retire, if they refused it, or faithfully to fulfil their duty if they took it. They also took care to declare, that it was not their intention to force the conscience of any, and that they should respect the sincerity of those, who, believing religion compromised by the new laws, declined taking the oath; but at the same time insisted on the necessity of knowing who these persons were, that they might not be intrusted with clerical authority in the new episcopacy. In this instance the pretensions of the assembly were just and candid. It was further provided, that those who refused to take the oath should be deprived of their situations and salaries; and, moreover, to show that they were in earnest, all those ecclesiastics who were deputies, were called upon to take the oath in the assembly, eight days after it received the sanction of the king.

The right side opposed this measure. Maury gave way to his accustomed violence, and endeavoured to provoke the assembly to interrupt him, that he might have cause of complaint. Alexander Lameth, however, who occupied the chair, defended his liberty of speech, and thus deprived him of the pleasure of being driven from the tribune. Mirabeau, more eloquent than ever, defended the assembly. "You," cried he, "the persecutors of religion! You who have honoured it with the most noble and affecting homage, in the most excellent of your decrees! You who consecrated public money to its service, of which your prudence and justice have rendered you so oeconomical! You who have provided for religion in the division of the kingdom, and planted the sign of the cross

* Bouillé seems to think in his Memoirs, that it was on the part of Mirabeau and the king that these overtures were made to him. But this is a mistake. Mirabeau was ignorant of this double plan, and never thought of putting himself in the hands of Bouillé.

* This camp was formed in the early part of September, 1790.

on the limits of all the departments! You, finally, who know that God is as necessary to men as liberty!"

The act for taking the oath was passed* The king referred it immediately to Rome. The bishop of Aix, who had at first opposed the civil constitution, perceiving the necessity of a pacification, joined the king and some of his most moderate colleagues in soliciting the consent of the pope. but the emigrants of Turin, and the opposition bishops of France, wrote to Rome with a contrary intention, and the pope, under several pretexts, deferred his answer. The assembly, irritated by these delays, insisted upon having the sanction of the king, and he, having made up his mind to give way, had recourse to the ordinary subterfuges of weakness. He wished to appear to be forced, that it might seem that he did not act freely. He therefore waited till disturbances took place, and then hastened to grant his sanction. The decree being sanctioned, the assembly were anxious to put it into immediate execution, and obliged its ecclesiastical members to take the oath in their presence. But multitudes of both sexes, who until then had shown themselves little attached to religion, suddenly made every effort to incite the ecclesiastics to refuse†. Some bishops and some curates took the oath; but the greater number refused, with a feigned moderation, and an apparent attachment to their principles. The assembly did not the less delay to proceed in the nomination of new bishops and curates, and was fully seconded by the several administrations. The ancient ecclesiastical functionaries still enjoyed the liberty of exercising their worship privately, and those who were acknowledged by the state, took their place in the churches. The dissidents, therefore, hired the church of the Théatins at Paris, to perform their divine services. This the assembly permitted; and the national guard afforded them all the protection in its power against the rage of the populace, who by no means permitted them to exercise their separate ministry in peace. The assembly has been censured for having given rise to this new schism, and for having added a fresh cause of discord to those that already existed; but as to their rights, it is evident to every unprejudiced mind, that they did not exceed them in interfering in the temporal concerns of the church. As to prudential considerations, it may well be said that they did not add materially to the difficulties of their position, and in point of fact, that the losses of the court, the nobility, and the clergy, and the acquisitions of the people, were quite sufficient to render them irreconcileable enemies, in order that the revolution should produce its inevitable consequences, setting aside the consequences of the new schism. Besides this, when all other abuses had been destroyed, could the assembly consistently suffer those of the ancient ecclesiastical organization to remain? Could they suffer lazy bishops to live in luxury, whilst the pastors, the only useful members of the church, scarcely possessed the necessaries of life?

* Act of 27th November, 1790.
† See note 20 in the Appendix.

CHAPTER VI.

INCREASE OF EMIGRATION—THE PEOPLE IN OPEN REBELLION ATTACK THE DUNGEON OF VINCENNES—CONSPIRACY OF THE CHEVALIERS DU POIGNARD—DEBATES UPON THE EMIGRATION BILL—DEATH OF MIRABEAU—COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY INTRIGUES—FLIGHT OF THE KING AND HIS FAMILY; HE IS STOPPED AT VARENNES AND BROUGHT BACK TO PARIS—INCLINATION OF FOREIGN POWERS—PURPOSES OF THE EMIGRANTS—THE DECLARATION OF PILNITZ—PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW AT THE CHAMP DE MARS—THE KING ACCEPTS THE CONSTITUTION—CLOSE OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

THE long and last struggle between the national party and the privileged order of the clergy, the chief points of which we have just related, broke up all unity. Whilst the clergy exerted their influence in the provinces of the west and the south, to stir up the inhabitants to insurrection, the emigrants of Turin made various attempts of a like nature, which their weakness and anarchy rendered futile. A conspiracy was entered into for this purpose at Lyons. The arrival of the princes was announced, an abundant distribution of pardons took place, and the city itself was promised to be converted into the capital of the kingdom instead of Paris, which had deserted the court. The king being informed of these plots, not believing, and perhaps not desiring, that they should succeed, for he despaired of being able to govern a victorious aristocracy, did all he could to prevent it. This conspiracy was discovered towards the end of 1790, and its principal agents delivered over to the tribunals of justice. This last reverse of fortune decided the emigration to remove from Turin to Coblentz, where they established themselves in the territory of the elector of Trèves, and at the expense of his authority, which they entirely invaded. It has been already observed, that the nobility who escaped from France were divided into two parties; the one, composed of the old servants of the crown, maintained by grants from the crown, and composing what is generally termed the court, whilst they derived support from the nobility of the provinces, were unwilling that they should divide their influence with them, and therefore rather looked to foreign aid; the other party, trusting more to the sword, endeavoured to promote insurrection in the provinces of the south by awakening their fanaticism. The first transmigrated, and fixed themselves at Coblentz on the northern frontier, there to await their foreign allies. It was in vain that those who desired to make the south the scene of battle, insisted on the necessity of calling in the aid of Piedmont, Switzerland, and

Spain, disinterested and faithful allies, and entreated their colleagues to leave in that neighbourhood some principal leader of their party; the aristocracy, who were guided by Calonne, turned a deaf ear to this remonstrance. This aristocracy still retained their old character; they were as frivolous, haughty, impracticable, and prodigal at Coblentz as at Versailles, and displayed their vices in the strongest light in the midst of difficulties, exile, and civil war "The name of *bourgeois* must be in your commission," said they to those intrepid men who offered to fight their battles for them in the provinces of the south, and who asked under what title they should serve *. None but subaltern agents were left at Turin, who, being mutually jealous, reciprocally thwarted each other, and hindered the success of every undertaking. The prince of Condé, who seemed to possess all the energy of his family, was not in favour with this part of the nobility; he therefore separated from their councils, and took his station near the Rhine, accompanied by all those who, like himself, wished not to intrigue, but to fight.

Emigration increased daily, and all the roads of France were covered with a fugitive nobility, who believed themselves fulfilling a sacred duty, in running to take up arms against their country. Even women seemed to consider it incumbent on them to attest their horror against the revolution, by abandoning the land where it reigned; and in a nation where every thing is done by general excitement; emigration soon became the fashion; they hardly thought it worth while to bid adieu to their friends, so short did they consider the journey, and so speedy their return. The revolutionists of Holland, betrayed by their general, and abandoned by their allies, had yielded in a few days; those of Brabant had hardly held out longer: thus the emigrants imagined the French revolution would be put down after a short campaign, and absolute power renew itself over enslaved France.

The assembly, more irritated than alarmed at the presumption of these men, had proposed many measures to check emigration, and these had always been deferred. The aunts of the king, finding it against their consciences to stay at Paris, thought it their duty to seek their safety near the pope; they therefore set out for Rome†, but were stopped on the road by the municipality of Arnay-le-Duc. The people, hearing of this, rushed to the house of Monsieur, who, it was said, was preparing to make his escape. Monsieur made his appearance, and promised not to abandon the king. This assurance calmed the people; and the assembly took into consideration the departure of Mesdames. This deliberation was prolonged for some time, until Menou terminated it by a joke. "Europe," said he, "will be greatly astonished, when it is informed that a great assembly has spent many days in deciding whether two old women shall hear mass at Rome or at Paris." The constitutional committee was, notwithstanding, commissioned to frame a law to enforce the residence of public functionaries, and establish some regulations respecting emigration. This act, which was adopted after violent discussions, obliged public functionaries to reside in the place whither their duties called them. The king, as the head of this body, was constrained not to absent himself from the legislative body during the session, and at no time whatever to quit the kingdom. In case of violation of this law, the penalty inflicted upon all functionaries was the forfeiture of their office. One other act concerning emigration was now demanded from the committee.

Meanwhile the king, no longer able to suffer the constraint imposed upon him, and the diminutions of power to which the assembly subjected him, and being much disturbed in his conscience since the passing of the new acts against the clergy, had made up his mind to escape by flight. The whole winter was spent in preparations, the zeal of Mirabeau had been stirred up, he was overwhelmed with promises, in case he succeeded in putting the royal family at liberty; and, on his part, he certainly pursued his plan with the greatest activity. Lafayette came to a rupture with the Lameths. These persons found the former too devoted to the court; and not being able to suspect his integrity, as they did that of Mirabeau, they attacked his capacity, and reproached him for suffering himself to be made a mere tool. The enemies of the Lameths accused them in turn of being jealous of the military power of Lafayette, just as they had been envious of the oratorical power of Mirabeau. These Lameths had united themselves, or at least appeared to belong, to the party of the Duke of Orleans, and were suspected of contriving to obtain the command of the national guard for one of themselves. It was Charles Lameth who was said to have been ambitious of obtaining this command; and to these causes the oft-renewing difficulties which were created against Lafayette may be attributed.

On the 28th of February, the people, spurred on, it was said, by the Duke of Orleans, rushed to the prison of Vincennes, which the municipality had reserved for the prisoners, of late much increased in the prisons of Paris, and attacked this dungeon as a new Bastille. Lafayette arrived in time to disperse the rabble of the Faubourg Saint Antoine, who were led on to this expedition by Santerre. Whilst he re-established order in this part of Paris, other difficulties were preparing for him at the Tuilleries. On the report of this uproar, many dependants of the palace had assembled in that quarter, to the number of some hundreds. They were armed with concealed weapons, such as knives and daggers; and the national guard, astonished at this concourse, became alarmed, and disarmed, and treated some of them very roughly. Lafayette came up, made them evacuate the palace, and seized all the arms found therein. The news of this affair spread quickly; it was reported that there had been discovered many who carried daggers or poignards; therefore those persons were afterwards called "chevaliers du poignard." In their defence they declared that they had only assembled to defend the person of the king; their accusers, however, insisted that their intention was to carry him off, and, as usual, the affair terminated in mutual accusations. This scene displayed clearly the true situation of Lafayette; it was manifest, placed between the most opposed parties, he was in that position for the purpose of protecting the person of the king and the constitution.

* See note 21 in the Appendix.

† They commenced their journey the 19th February, 1791.

His double victory augmented his power, his popularity, and the hatred of his enemies; and Mirabeau, who had always done him the wrong of increasing the suspicions of the court against him, represented his conduct as profoundly hypocritical: under the appearance of moderation, and opposition to all parties, he aimed, said Mirabeau, at usurpation. In his petulance he represented the Lameths as evil-minded or senseless demagogues, identified with the Duke of Orleans, and declared that they had not more than thirty partisans in the assembly. He considered the right side a mere nullity; and for himself, he relied, he said, solely on three or four hundred members, who were disengaged from all party ties, and decided according to the impression of reason and of the eloquence which wrought the impulse of the moment.

There was nothing true in this picture, than as demonstrating his estimate of the respective strength of parties, and his opinion as to the means of governing the assembly. He governed it, in truth, by gaining an ascendancy over those who had entered into no engagements; and on this very day, the 28th of February, he exercised nearly for the last time his empire over them, displayed his hatred of the Lameths, and exerted his formidable power against them.

The law concerning emigration was now about to be discussed. Chapelier presented it in the name of the committee; he joined, he said, in the general indignation against those who abandoned their country, but declared, that after many days' reflection, the committee found the impossibility of framing a law on the subject of emigration. In truth, it was a very difficult task. The first question that occurred was, whether the assembly had a right to tie any man to his native soil. If the safety of the country required it, they undoubtedly had. But it was necessary to make a distinction between the motives of travellers, and that which might be inquisitorial; to distinguish their quality as Frenchmen or strangers, as emigrants, or simply commercial travellers; the law therefore presented great difficulties, if it were not altogether impracticable. Chapelier added, that the committee, in obedience to the assembly, had, however, framed a bill; which, if it were desired, he would read; but he warned them beforehand that it violated all their principles. "Do not read it!" "Read it!" was cried out on all sides. A crowd of deputies rose to speak, Mirabeau required to speak in his turn, obtained it, and what was more, commanded silence. He read a most eloquent letter, addressed by him formerly to Frederick-William, in which he defended the liberty of emigration as one of the most sacred rights of man, who not being fixed to the earth by roots, has no necessity to be attached to it further than his welfare is concerned. Mirabeau, perhaps to satisfy the court, but more particularly from conviction, repelled as tyrannical every measure against the liberty of passing to and fro. Doubtless this liberty was being abused at this very moment, but the assembly, relying on its own strength, had suffered so much abuse from the press, had endured so many vain attempts against itself, and had so victoriously spurned them with contempt, that it might fairly be advised to adhere to the same system of conduct. The opinion of Mirabeau was applauded, but the reading of the projected law was nevertheless insisted on. Chapelier, therefore, read it. It proposed, in case of public disturbances, to institute a dictatorial commission, composed of three members, who were to point out by name, and at their own pleasure, those who should have the liberty of migrating from the kingdom. This sanguinary irony, which explained the impossibility of the law, excited murmurs throughout the assembly. "Your murmurs console me," cried Mirabeau; "your hearts sympathize with mine, and reject this absurd tyranny. As for myself, I should consider myself freed from every oath towards those who should be infamous enough to admit of a dictatorial commission." Cries interrupted him from the left side. "Yes," repeated he, "I swear"—he was interrupted again. "This popularity," resumed he, "which has been the object of my ambition, and which I have enjoyed as others, is not a fragile reed—I will plant it deep in the earth, and make it bud in the soil of justice and reason." Applauses burst from all parts of the chamber. "I swear," added the orator, "that if the law of emigration is passed, I swear to disobey you."

He descended from the tribune after having astonished the assembly, and imposed silence on his enemies. Nevertheless the discussion was still protracted; the one party desired an adjournment, to have time to make a better law: the other, for the purpose of calming the people, and allaying the agitation of their minds, required that it should be declared immediately that no law would be made. Cries, murmurs, and plaudits, pervaded the assembly. Mirabeau requested again the liberty of speaking, and, indeed, seemed by his manner to demand it. "What is the title of the dictatorship," exclaimed Monsieur Goupil, "that Monsieur de Mirabeau exercises here?" Mirabeau, without attending to him, sprang to the tribune. "I have not granted the liberty of speech," said the president; "let the assembly decide." But, without deciding any thing, the assembly listened to Mirabeau. "I entreat my interrupters," said he, "to recollect that I have all my life opposed tyranny, and that I shall oppose it every where, where it appears." And, in pronouncing these words, he surveyed the assembly from right to left. Applause followed this sentence; he resumed:—"I beg Monsieur Goupil to recollect that he has already mistaken for a Catiline him whom he now repels from a dictatorship*. I beg the assembly to remark, that the question of adjournment, although simple in appearance, involves others, and, for instance, supposes a law is to be made." Fresh murmurs rose from the left. "Silence! you thirty voices!" cried the orator, fixing his eyes on the seats of Barnave and the Lameths. "Finally," added he, "if it is wished, I also will vote for the adjournment, provided that it is decreed that from this time to its expiration no sedition shall take place." Unanimous

* Monsieur Goupil, in attacks on Mirabeau formerly, exclaimed with the right side of the chamber, "Catiline is at our gates!"

Illness, dying moments, and funeral of Mirabeau.—His remains placed in the Pantheon, by the side of Descartes.—Reflections on the decease of Mirabeau.

acclamations accompanied his last words. Nevertheless the adjournment was carried, but by so small a majority, that its decision was contested, and a second collection of votes demanded.

Mirabeau, on this occasion, astonished all who heard him by his audacity: perhaps he never more imperiously domineered over the assembly; but his end was approaching, and these were his last triumphs. Presentiments of death mingled with his vast projects, and sometimes arrested their course. Nevertheless his conscience felt satisfied, the public esteem had incorporated his own; and if he had not performed sufficient for the safety of the state, he had at least done enough for his own glory. His pale countenance and deep sunk eyes spoke plainly of the ravages of disease, and his appearance in the tribune, where he was frequently seized with fainting fits, caused a general anxiety. The excesses of pleasure and business, and the violent emotions he experienced in the assembly, had gradually broken down his strong constitution. The baths also he was accustomed to use, which contained a solution of sublimate, had given that greenish hue to his complexion, which is generally considered as the effect of a poison. The court was terrified, and all parties astonished; and even before his death the cause of his illness was eagerly inquired into. The last time he spoke, he addressed the assembly in five different speeches, but left it exhausted, and never appeared there again. His death-bed received him but to yield him up to the Pantheon. He begged Cabanis, his attendant, not to call in physicians; but in this he was disobeyed, and on their arrival they found death fast approaching, which had already seized upon his feet. His head was the last part of his body attacked, as if nature permitted his genius to shine on to the last moment. An immense crowd, preserving the most profound silence, thronged round his dwelling. The court sent messengers after messengers to inquire of his state; bulletins of his health were transmitted from mouth to mouth, and spread grief among the people at every new progress of his disorder. He himself, surrounded by his friends, expressed some regret at the interruption of his projects, and at the same time some pride in his last labours. "Support," said he to his servant, "support this head, the ablest head in all France." The anxiety of the people affected him; the visit of Barnave, his enemy, who came in the name of the Jacobins, gave him a pleasing sensation. He gave some thoughts to public affairs. The assembly was about to be engaged on the question of testaments; he therefore called for Monsieur de Talleyrand, and handed to him a discourse which he had written on the subject. "It will be pleasant," said he, "to hear a man speak against testaments who is no more, and who ought to be making his own." The court, indeed, wished him to make one, and promised to take upon itself the payment of all his legacies. Speaking of his views on Europe, and guessing the projects of England; "That Pitt," said he, "is the minister of preparations; he governs by menaces; I would give him some trouble if I lived." The curate of the parish came to offer his services, he thanked him with politeness, and said, smiling, that he would have accepted of them willingly, if his superior ecclesiastic, the Bishop of Autun, had not been in the house. He then begged to have the windows opened: "My friend," said he to Cabanis, "I shall die to-day: envelop me in perfumes, crown me with flowers, and surround me with music, so that I may deliver myself up peaceably to sleep." Poignant pains interrupted from time to time these noble discourses. "You have promised," said he to his friends, "to spare me useless suffering," and he immediately demanded opium with great eagerness. This being refused, he insisted on compliance with his accustomed violence; for the purpose of satisfying him, his attendants deceived him, and gave him a cup which they persuaded him contained opium. He received it calmly, swallowed the beverage which he believed mortal, and appeared contented. A moment after he expired. This was on the 20th of April, 1791. The news of his death immediately reached the court, the city, and the assembly. All parties had placed their hopes in him, and all, except the envious, grieved at his death. The proceedings of the assembly were suspended, a general mourning ordered, and a magnificent funeral prepared. Some deputies being invited to attend, "We will all go," exclaimed the whole assembly. The church of Saint Geneviève was remodelled as a Pantheon, with this inscription, which, at the time I relate these passages, no longer exists:

AUX GRANDS HOMMES LA PATRIE RECONNAISSANTE.

Mirabeau was the first that was admitted there, and was laid by the side of Descartes. His funeral took place the day after his death. All the authorities, the department, the municipalities, the popular clubs, the assembly, and the army, accompanied the procession, and this simple orator obtained more honours than ever had been conferred on the pompous funerals which had gone in procession to Saint Denis. Thus terminated the career of this extraordinary man, who, after having attacked and vanquished the old generation, had turned round upon the new generation who had contributed to his victory, arrested their course by his eloquence, and commanded their admiration even while he provoked their hostility: in fine, this man, who acted up to his duty by the conviction of reason, by the impulse of genius, not for the gold thrown as a bribe to his passions, enjoyed the singular honour (since popularity is generally followed by a popular disgust) of seeing the admiration of the people descend with him to the tomb. But could he have imparted resignation to the court, or moderation to the ambitious? Could he have said to the popular tribunes, eager to distinguish themselves, *Remain in your obscure faubourgs?* Could he have said to Danton that Mirabeau of the populace, *Remain in your present situation, and mount no higher?* This question cannot be solved; but at the time of his death, all these uncertain interests were placed in his hands, and depended upon him. His death was long regretted; and in the confusion of disputes which arose shortly afterwards, many cast their eyes on the place which he had formerly occupied, and seemed to invoke his

* The revolution of 1830 has restored this inscription, and rendered this monument applicable to the purpose decreed by the national assembly.

presence who had so often terminated their doubts by some decisive burst of eloquence. "Mirabeau is no longer here," bawled out Maury one day, when ascending the tribune, "therefore I shall not be prevented from saying my say."

The death of Mirabeau deprived the court of all resolution, and new events hurried on its resolution to escape by flight. On the 18th of April the king attempted to pay a visit to Saint Cloud. It was immediately reported, that being unwilling to avail himself of the offices of a priest who had taken the oath, for the services of Easter, he had determined to absent himself during the Easter week. Others declared that he designed to make his escape. The people assembled in crowds, and stopped his horses. Lafayette hastened to his rescue, entreated the king to remain in his carriage, and assured him that he was about to open a passage for his departure. The king, however, got out, and would not permit him to make the attempt; this was his old policy, of not appearing free from restraint. Afterwards, by the advice of his ministers, he complained to the assembly of the outrage he had encountered. The assembly received him with their usual attention, and promised that every thing which depended on them should be done to secure him his liberty; and Louis XVI. quitted the chamber amidst the applauses of all except the right side. On the 23rd of April, according to advice that had been given him, he wrote, through M. de Montmorin, a letter to the foreign ambassadors, in which he denies the intentions which were attributed to him abroad, declares to foreign powers that he would adhere to the oath which he had taken, to be faithful to the constitution, and avows those to be his enemies who insinuated any thing to the contrary. The expressions of this letter were voluntarily exaggerated, in order that it might appear to have been forced from him by violence; this is what the king himself acknowledged to the envoy of Leopold. That prince was then travelling through Italy, and at that period was at Mantua. Calonne was in negotiation with him. Monsieur Alexander de Durfort, an envoy from his court, was despatched to the king and queen, to ascertain their real dispositions. He questioned them first as to the letter which had been written to the ambassadors; and they assured him, that as to its language, he might well see that it had been forced from them. He then questioned them as to their expectations, and they answered that they entertained none since the death of Mirabeau; and, finally, as to their inclination towards the Count d'Artois, and they declared them to be most favourable.

To comprehend the motive of these questions, it must be known that the Baron de Breteuil was the declared enemy of Calonne; that his hostility had not terminated with emigration; and that, though charged with full powers to treat with the court of Vienna by Louis XVI.*, he thwarted every measure of the princes. He assured Leopold that the king was unwilling to be saved by the emigrants, because he dreaded their encroachments, and that the queen was personally embroiled with the Count d'Artois. His projects for the re-establishment of the throne were always exactly contrary to those of Calonne, and he omitted nothing to destroy the effect of his new negotiation. The Count de Durfort returned to Mantua; and on the 20th of May, 1791, Leopold promised to send thirty-five thousand men into Flanders, and fifteen thousand into Alsatia. He declared, also, that an equal number of Swiss were ready to march to Lyons, as many Piedmontese on the Dauphiné, and that Spain was about to muster twenty thousand men. The emperor likewise promised the co-operation of the King of Prussia, and the neutrality of England. A protest, made in the name of the house of Bourbon, was to be signed by the King of Naples, the King of Spain, the infant of Parma, and the expatriated princes. Until then, it was to be kept perfectly secret. Louis was also recommended not to think of flight, of which he had frequently expressed a desire; while Breteuil, on the contrary, advised him to escape. It is possible that, on both sides, the advice was sincere; but it must be remarked, that in this each party consulted his own interest. Breteuil, who was bent on opposing the negotiations of Calonne at Mantua, counselled departure; and Calonne, who would have lost his ascendancy had Louis XVI. reached the frontier, suggested to him that it was better to remain where he was. Be that as it may, the king decided on departure, and often ill-humouredly declared afterwards, that it was Breteuil who persuaded him*. Being resolved upon flight, he informed Bouillé that he would defer no longer. His intention was, not to leave the kingdom, but to retire to Montmédy, where he should, in case of need, derive support from Luxembourg, or receive foreign aid. The route of Châlons, by Clermont and Varennes, in spite of the advice of Bouillé, was preferred, and all preparations for departure were ready by the 20th of June. The general assembled those troops in whom he most confided, prepared a camp at Montmédy, procured forage, and gave as a pretext for all these preparations, the movements which he perceived to be taking place on the frontier. The queen had got everything in readiness for her journey from Paris to Châlons, and Bouillé the same from Châlons to Montmédy. Several small bodies of cavalry, under the pretence of escorting a treasure, were ordered to approach Châlons in different directions, and fall in with the king on his line of road. Bouillé himself intended to advance to some distance from Montmédy. The queen had constructed a secret door to lead out of the palace; and the royal family were to travel under a foreign name, and with a feigned passport. Everything was ready for the 20th; nevertheless, fear retarded the journey till the 21st, a delay which was fatal to the unfortunate fugitives. Mons. de Lafayette was completely ignorant of the intended escape; Mons. de Montmorin himself, although in the confidence of the court, knew nothing of this secret; no one took part in it but those who were indispensably necessary for its execution. Some reports, however, of the intended flight, had been spread abroad, whether it were from the design getting wind, or whether it were one of those public apprehensions so common at that time. Whatever it were, the committee of inquiry had been forewarned, and the vigilance of the national guard was kept on the alert.

* See Bertrand de Molleville as to this fact.

* See Bertrand de Molleville.

On the 20th of June, near midnight, the king, the queen, Madame Elizabeth, and Madame de Tourzel, governess of the infants of France, successively quitted the palace in disguise. Madame de Tourzel, with the children, proceeded to the Petit Carousel, and got into a carriage which was driven by Mons. de Fersen, a foreign gentleman, disguised as a coachman. The king soon joined them; but the queen, who had quitted the palace with a *garde-du-corps*, caused them the greatest anxiety. Neither she nor her guide knowing the quarters of Paris, mistook their road, and did not reach the Petit Carousel till an hour afterwards. On her way she met the carriage of Mons. de Lafayette, whose people walked with torches. Being afraid of discovery, she hid herself under the wickets of the Louvre, and, having escaped this danger, succeeded finally in reaching the carriage, where she was impatiently expected. After being thus brought together, the whole family commenced their journey; they arrived, after a long ride, at the Porte St. Martin, and got into a berlin drawn by six horses, which was placed there in waiting. Madame de Tourzel, under the name of Madame de Korff, passed for a mother travelling with her children. The king assumed the character of her *valet-de-chambre*, and three disguised *gardes-du-corps* preceded the carriage as couriers, or followed it as servants. The whole party finally departed, accompanied by the prayers of Mons. de Fersen for their success, who returned to Paris to take the road to Brussels. Meantime Monsieur was on his way to Flanders, pursuing a different route from Mons. de Fersen, that he might not excite suspicion, or meet with delays from want of horses.

The royal family travelled all night without their flight being known at Paris. Mons. de Fersen hastened to the municipality to see whether they knew anything about it; at eight o'clock in the morning it was still undiscovered; but soon afterwards the news got wind, and circulated with rapidity. Lafayette called together his aides-de-camp, and ordered them to depart immediately, in pursuit of the fugitives, saying at the same time, that they undoubtedly would not overtake them, but that it was necessary to do something. He took the responsibility of this order on himself, and affected to believe that the royal family had been carried off by the enemies of the public. This respectful presumption was adopted by the assembly, and all the authorities. At this period the people, who were hunting in all directions, reproached Lafayette with having favoured the escape of the king; and some time afterwards the aristocratic party accused him of having allowed him to fly, for the purpose of intercepting his escape, and thus ruining him by the vain attempt. Yet had Lafayette connived at the flight of Louis XVI. would he have sent off two aides-de-camp to apprehend him before he received any order from the assembly? and if, according to the supposition of the aristocrats, he had permitted him to escape for the mere purpose of retaking him, would he have given him the start of a whole night's travel by coach? The people were very soon undeceived, and Lafayette re-established in their good graces.

The assembly met at nine o'clock in the morning, in an attitude quite as imposing as during the earliest days of the revolution. The supposition they arrived at was, that Louis XVI. had been carried off. The most perfect calmness, and the greatest unanimity prevailed during this sitting. They approved of the measures which had been spontaneously taken by Lafayette. The people had arrested his aides-de-camp at the barriers, the assembly, every where obeyed, procured them a pass through the gates. One of these aides-de-camp, the young Romeuf, was the bearer of the decree which confirmed the orders of the general, and enjoined all public functionaries to stop (*arrêter*), by every possible means, the course of the said abduction, and to prevent the continuance of the journey. Romeuf instantly took the road to Chalons which had been pointed out by the people as the most probable route, and which they desired should be followed; a carriage drawn by six horses, which had been seen on that route, pointed it out as the right direction. The assembly then called in the ministers, and ordered them in future to receive their orders from them alone. Louis XVI., on his departure, had commanded the minister of justice to send him the seal of state. The assembly therefore countermanded this order, and retained the seal to affix to their decrees; they resolved, at the same time, that the frontiers should be put in a state of defence, and that the minister for foreign affairs should assure foreign powers, that the disposition of the French nation with respect to them remained unaltered.

Mons. de Laporte, comptroller of the civil list, was then heard. He had received several messages from the king, and among others a note, which he begged the assembly not to open, and a paper containing the motives of his departure. The assembly, respecting all the rights of society, restored the note which Mons. de Laporte did not wish to make public, without opening it, and ordered the other paper to be read. The perusal of this was listened to with the greatest tranquillity. It produced no impression. The king complained of his diminution of power uncompensated by sufficient dignity, and seemed as much hurt at the expenses of the civil list being reduced to thirty millions of francs, as at having lost all his other prerogatives. The assembly listened to his grievances with attention, lamented his weakness, and passed to the order of the day.

At this period very few desired that Louis XVI. should be stopped. The aristocrats saw in his flight the very earliest of all their wishes realized, and flattered themselves with the prospect of approaching civil war. The most decided members of the popular party had already begun to be tired of him, and his absence afforded them a pretext for dispensing with royalty; and they conceived the idea and hope of a republic. All the moderate party, who at this time were ascendant in the assembly, hoped he would escape safe to Montmédy; and trusting to the natural equity of his disposition, flattered themselves that an accommodation between the throne and the nation would be facilitated by his flight. They were much less alarmed at this present time at the sight of a monarch menacing the constitution from the midst of an army. The people alone, upon whom this fear had been unceasingly impressed, still entertained this apprehension, which the assembly no longer shared with them, and ardently desired the

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arrest of the royal family. Such was the state of affairs at Paris.

The carriage of the fugitives, which departed on the night of the 20th and 21st had gone over great part of the route easily enough, and arrived without any obstacle at Châlons on the 21st, at about five o'clock in the afternoon. There the king, who was indiscreet enough to constantly put his head out of the window, was recognised; the person who made the discovery, at first wished to reveal the secret, but the mayor, who was a faithful royalist, prevented him. On arriving at the bridge of Sommeville, the royal family were disappointed in not finding the detachments which should have received them. These detachments had waited many hours for their arrival, but the rising of the people, who were alarmed at this movement of the troops, obliged them to retire. Nevertheless, the king reached Saint-Menehould. At that place, by constantly shewing his head at the window he was discovered by Drouet the son of the postmaster and a violent revolutionist. This young man not having time to stop the carriage at St. Menehould, hastened to Varennes. A loyal quartermaster, who had noticed his eagerness, and suspected his motives, flew after him in order to stop him, but could not effect his purpose. Drouet made so much haste, that he arrived there before this unfortunate family. He immediately gave his information to the municipality, and made them take without delay every measure necessary for their being stopped. Varennes is built upon the banks of a narrow but deep river; a detachment of hussars were placed on guard there; but the officer, not seeing the treasure which had been expected arrive, ordered his troops to return to their quarters. The carriage arrived and passed the bridge; but scarcely had it proceeded to an arch under which it was obliged to pass, when Drouet, aided by another companion, stopped the horses. "*Your passport!*" cried he, and, with a firelock in his hand, bade the travellers advance at their peril. His order was obeyed, and the passport was delivered up. Drouet seized it with eagerness, and said that he must carry it to the commune to have it examined. The royal family was then conducted to the house of a solicitor, whose name was Sausse. Having examined the passport, and dissembled as if he had found it correct, he begged the king, with much politeness, to wait for a few minutes. In point of fact he waited for a considerable time, when Sausse, who had assembled a sufficient number of the national guard, laid aside all dissimulation, and told the king plainly that he was recognized and arrested. High words ensued. Louis pretended that he was not the person they supposed him to be, and the dispute became violent,—"Since you acknowledge him to be your king," cried the indignant queen, "address him with the respect you owe him."

The king, seeing denial was useless, gave up the idea of concealing himself any longer. The little parlour into which he had been conducted was filled with spectators. He addressed them with a warmth which was very uncommon to him, protested that his intentions were good, assured them that he had determined to go to Montmédy for no other purpose than to hear more freely the wishes of his people, by tearing himself from the tyranny of Paris; and demanded permission to continue his route, and a safe conduct to the end of his journey. This unhappy prince, overcome by his misfortunes, embraced Sausse, and implored him to save his wife and children. The queen joined her supplications to his, and taking the dauphin in her arms, conjured him to save them. Sausse was affected by this scene, but resisted all entreaties, and persuaded the king to return to Paris to prevent a civil war. The king, on the contrary, alarmed at the prospect of this return, persisted in his intention to proceed to Montmédy. At this critical moment, the Messrs. de Damas and de Goguelas arrived with the detachments, posted in several points of the city. The royal family thought themselves saved, but there was no reliance to be placed on the hussars. The officers informed their men that the king and royal family were arrested, and endeavoured to incite them to their rescue. But the soldiers replied that they were for the nation. At that very instant, the national guards, assembled from all the environs, arrived in crowds, and filled the streets of Varennes. The whole night elapsed whilst things were in this situation. At six o'clock in the morning, Romeuf arrived with the decree of the assembly. He found the carriage drawn by six horses, with their heads towards Paris. He went up stairs, and handed the act to the king with grief in his countenance. A cry of indignation burst from the whole royal family against Lafayette, who was the cause of their arrest. The queen even appeared astonished that he had not perished by the hands of the people. Romeuf replied to this remark, that both his general and himself had merely done their duty in pursuing the royal fugitives, but they had hoped not to overtake them. The queen, however, was not to be pacified; she seized the act, threw it on the bed of her children, then snatched it away, saying it would contaminate them. "Madame," said Romeuf, who was much attached to the queen, "would you not rather that any other but myself was witness to this passion?" Upon this, the queen came to herself, and regained her dignified bearing. The arrival of several corps, which had been placed in the environs by Bouillé, was now announced. But the municipality ordered these troops to withdraw, and the royal family were obliged forthwith to get into their carriage, and again take road to Paris, that road so fatal and so much dreaded. Bouillé being in the middle of the night informed of what had happened, immediately mounted a regiment of cavalry, and set out to rescue the king with shouts of *Vive le Roi!* This brave general, on the rack of anxiety, marched with all possible speed, and traversed nine leagues in four hours. On his arrival at Varennes, he there found many corps already assembled. But the king had left it more than an hour and a half; Varennes was barricadoed and defended in a very able manner; the bridge had been broken down, and the river was not fordable. Thus, to save the king, Bouillé had first to engage, and carry the barricades, then the river was to be crossed; and after this great loss of time, the carriage, which had the start of an hour and a half, was to be overtaken. These obstacles rendered the attempt impracticable; for nothing short of an impossibility could have stopped a man so devoted to the king,

and so enterprising as Bouillé. He drew off, distracted with emotions of concern and grief.

When the news of the king having been stopped arrived at Paris, it was believed that he was already out of reach. The people exhibited extraordinary joy at this event. The assembly deputed three of its members, chosen from the three sections of the left side, to accompany the monarch, and reconduct him to Paris. The members were Barnave, Latour-Maubourg, and Pétion. They met at Châlons; and from the time they joined the court, all orders solely emanated from them. Madame de Tourzel occupied the carriage with Latour-Maubourg; Barnave and Petion were placed in that of the royal family. Latour-Maubourg, a distinguished individual, was a friend of Lafayette, and like him as much devoted to the king as the constitution. In yielding to his two colleagues the honour of being with the royal family, his intention was to interest them in fallen grandeur. Barnave was seated in the back of the carriage between the king and the queen; Pétion in front, between Madame Elizabeth and the Princess Royale; the young dauphin reposed sometimes on the knees of one, and sometimes of the other. How rapid had been the course of events! a young advocate of two or three and twenty years of age, remarkable solely for his talent, and another, distinguished chiefly by his intelligence, but, above all, by the severity of his principles, were seated by the side of a prince, formerly the most absolute in Europe, and directed all his movements! The journey was slow, from the necessity of following the national guard. It took eight hours from Varennes to Paris. The heat was extreme, and clouds of dust raised by the crowd suffocated the travellers. The commencement of the journey was silent; the queen could not disguise her ill-temper, but the king entered, after some time, into conversation with Barnave. The conversation wandered to various subjects, and at last to the flight to Montmédy. Both parties were astonished to find themselves so intimate. The queen was surprised at the superior genius and delicate politeness of the young Barnave. She lifted her veil, and joined in the conversation. Barnave was affected by the kindliness of feeling exhibited by the king, and the graceful dignity of the queen. Pétion's behaviour was rather rude than otherwise, and showed, and consequently obtained, less respect and consideration. By the time the carriage arrived at Paris, Barnave had become devotedly attached to this unhappy family; and the queen, charmed with the merit of the young senator, had admitted him high in her esteem; and in all the communications she afterwards held with the constitutional deputies, he possessed the greatest share of her confidence. Parties would surely pardon one another if they could mutually place themselves in each other's situation".

As Paris the reception to be given to the royal family had been already determined. A placard was fixed up in all quarters of the city, containing these words: *Whoever applauds the king shall be beaten: whoever insults him shall be hanged.* This order was executed to the letter, and neither applauses nor insults were heard. The travellers made a circuit to avoid traversing Paris, and entered by the Champs Elysées, which leads directly to the palace. An immense crowd received them covered and in silence. Lafayette, followed by a numerous guard, had taken every precaution to prevent disturbances. The three *gardes-du-corps* who had aided in the flight were seated on the coach-box exposed to the view and indignation of the people; yet no violence was offered them. The moment the carriage stopped, the royal family hastily got out, and passed through a double file of national guards placed there for their protection. The queen, who was the last to alight, found herself almost borne in the arms of Messrs. de Noailles and D'Aiguillon, persons opposed to the court, but the generous sympathisers with the unfortunate. Seeing them approach, she had at first some doubt of their intentions, but put herself under their protection, and arrived safe and sound at the palace.

Such was this journey, whereof the fatal termination cannot justly be attributed to any of those who had planned it. An accident caused its failure; an accident might have insured its success. If, for instance, Drouet had been stopped by the quartermaster who followed him for that purpose, the king would have been saved. Perhaps also the king did not show sufficient energy when he was recognised. Under no circumstances ought the issue of this journey to be made a matter of reproach to any one, either to those who advised or those who executed it. It was the result of that fatality which always pursues the weakest side in every revolutionary crisis.

The effect produced by the journey to Varennes was to destroy all respect for the king, and by familiarizing the minds of men to dispense with the idea of royalty, to suggest the notion of a republic. On the morning of his arrival, the assembly passed an act to provide for this contingency. Louis XVI. was suspended from exercising his functions; a guard was appointed for the custody of himself, the queen, and the dauphin, and made responsible for their security*. Three deputies, D'André, Tronchet, and Duport, were then ordered to receive the declarations of the king. The greatest delicacy was observed in their expressions, for the assembly was never wanting in conventional decencies, but the result was evident, and the king was provisionally dethroned.

The responsibility imposed upon the national guard made them severe, and often over-strict in their service towards the royal personages. Sentinels were placed on watch night and day at their door, and never lost sight of them. The king one day wishing to see if he was really a prisoner, went to a door; the sentinel prevented his passage. "Do you know who I am?" said Louis XVI. "Yes, sire," replied the sentinel. The only liberty he enjoyed, was that of walking in the garden of the Tuileries in the morning, before it was opened to the public.

Barnave and the Lameths now did the very same thing which they had so greatly reproached Mirabeau for doing; they came to the relief of the throne, and were admitted into the confidence of the court. It is true they received no money;

* See note 22 in the Appendix.

* Sitting of Saturday, the 25th June, 1791.

but it was not less the price of the alliance than the alliance itself, with which they had reproached Mirabeau; and after having been formerly so rigid in their principles, they now followed the common track of all popular leaders, that of taking up the defence of power in proportion as they get closer to it. Nevertheless, nothing was more praiseworthy, in the actual state of things, than the service which they rendered the king; and on no occasion did they display more address, ability, and talent. Barnave dictated the answer of the king to the commissioners appointed by the assembly. In this answer Louis XVI. declared the motive of his flight was to acquaint himself more perfectly with the public opinion; he assured the assembly that he knew it better since his journey than he had done before, and he proved by every kind of argument that he had never conceived the intention of going out of the kingdom. As to his protestations contained in the paper he had sent to the assembly, he said with reason, that they referred, not to the fundamental principles of the constitution, but to the means by which they were to be carried into effect. At present, he added, that as the general will of the nation was known to him, he should make no hesitation in submitting to every sacrifice necessary for the public welfare *.

To avert still further the indignation of the assembly from the king, and draw it upon himself, Bouillé addressed a letter to them, which might have been called foolishly extravagant, had it not been for the generous motive which dictated it. He avowed that he alone was the person who persuaded the king to escape, whilst in reality he had opposed it; he declared, in the name of the sovereigns of Europe, that Paris should be responsible for his safety, and that the slightest outrage offered to his person should be most amply revenged. He added, what he also knew was not the fact, that the military resources of France were very insignificant; that he knew that views of invasion were entertained by foreign powers; and that he himself would lead the armies of the enemy into the bosom of his country. The assembly affected to believe the truth of this generous bravado, and threw all the blame of the king's flight on Bouillé, who had nothing to fear, for he was already in a foreign country.

The court of Spain, fearing that the slightest demonstration would only irritate the French nation, and expose the royal family to still greater dangers, prevented a descent about to be fitted out against the south frontier, in aid of which, the knights of Malta had contributed two frigates. They now assured the French government, that their friendly dispositions were not changed with respect to them. The northern powers were less guarded in their conduct, and in this quarter the foreign powers, excited by the emigrants, assumed a threatening aspect. Envoys were despatched by the king to Bruxelles and Coblentz; their object was to keep up a good correspondence with the emigrants; to acquaint them with the favourable inclinations of the assembly, and of the hopes he had conceived of an advantageous arrangement. But they met with a most unworthy reception, and returned immediately to Paris. The emigrants now raised bodies of troops in the name of the king, and thus obliged him formally to deny them his authority. They then pretended that Monsieur, who was at that time with them, was regent of the kingdom; that the king being a prisoner, had no longer any will of his own; and that that which he expressed was merely the will of his oppressors. The peace of Catherine with the Turks, which was concluded about this time, added greatly to their senseless satisfaction; and they imagined they should have all the powers of Europe immediately at their disposition; and considering the disarmed state of all the strong places in France, and the disorganization of the army, abandoned by its officers, they could not think an invasion doubtful, or its term far distant, and that it would not be successful. Yet they had been absent from France two years; and though always flattering themselves with hopes of success, had not yet entered it victorious! Foreign powers seemed to promise much, but hitherto had performed nothing. Pitt appeared inclined still to delay; Leopold, exhausted by the war, and discontented with the emigrants, desired peace; the king of Prussia promised much, but had no interest to hold him to his engagements: Gustavus was ambitious of commanding an expedition against France, but he was too far distant; and Catherine, who ought to support him, was hardly delivered from the Turks, and had still Poland to suppress. And besides, to bring about this coalition, there were so many interests to be reconciled, that one could scarcely expect it could be brought about.

The declaration of Pilnitz * ought to have enlightened the emigrants as to the zeal of the European sovereigns. This declaration, made by both the king of Prussia and the emperor Leopold, declared that the situation of the king of France was one of common interest to all sovereigns; that it called upon them all to make a combined effort for his relief, and thus to afford him the means of establishing a government suitable to the interests of the throne and the people; and that the king of Prussia and the emperor were ready to join the other princes of Europe, to accomplish this object. Meantime their troops were put in readiness for war. It has since been discovered that this declaration contained secret articles, declaring that Austria should not throw any obstacles in the way of Prussia's pretensions to a part of Poland; and thus called upon Prussia to abandon her more ancient connections in uniting herself with Austria against France. What was to be expected from a zeal excited by such means? And if it were so reserved in its expressions, what was to be looked for from its acts? France, it is true, was in a disarmed state, but a whole people rising to resist invasion are soon armed; and, as the celebrated Carnot afterwards said, what is not possible to twenty-five millions of men! It is true also, that the army was abandoned by its officers; but they were for the most part young men, and being appointed by court interest, were without experience, and disliked by the soldiery. The impulse, however, which had been given to every resource might be expected to produce both officers and generals. Yet, it must be confessed that the success of any resistance

* See note 23 in the Appendix.

* This bore date the 7th August, 1791.

France might have opposed to an invasion, at a later period, might have been doubted even without the presumption of Coblentz.

Meantime the assembly sent messengers to the frontier, in order to make every necessary preparation. All the national guards requested to be put in action, many generals offered their services, and among others Dumouriez, who afterwards saved France in the defiles of the Argonne.

Whilst these preparations were making for the exterior safety of the state, the assembly hastened to finish their constitutional labours, and reinstate the king in the exercise of his functions, and, if possible, in some of his prerogatives.

All the subdivisions of the left side, except those who had assumed the new name of republicans, were advocates for a system of moderation. Barnave and Malouet were in perfect accord, both in their opinions and actions. Pétion, Robespierre, Buzot and some others had adopted the idea of a republic; but they were few in number. The right side still persevered in their imprudent conduct, and instead of joining the moderate majority, made protest. This majority did not the less govern the assembly. Their enemies, who would have branded them with infamy had they dethroned the king, now reproached them with having brought him back to Paris, and replaced him on a tottering throne. But what could they do? To substitute a republic for a king was too hazardous an enterprise. To change the dynasty would have been useless, for if they were determined to have a king, it was as well to keep the one they had; and, besides, the duke of Orleans could never be preferred to Louis XVI. In both cases, to dispossess the present king was to violate established rights, and to furnish the emigrants with a leader, who would have given them a weight of authority, which, as yet, they did not possess. On the other hand, the restoration of Louis XVI. to his authority, and his reinstation in as many of his prerogatives as possible, was but to fulfil their constitutional task, and remove all pretext for a civil war; in a word, the assembly merely performed their duty; for, after all the engagements that had been entered into, they were certainly bound to establish a free, although monarchical form of government.

The assembly did not hesitate, but they had great obstacles to overcome. The new word *republic* had offended some opinions already somewhat absorbed in the words *monarchy* and *the constitution*. The absence and the suspension of the king had, as has been already observed, accustomed men's minds to dispense with his presence altogether. The journals and the clubs had stripped the person of the sovereign of that respect of which he had hitherto been the object. His departure, which, according to the terms of the decree concerning the residence of public functionaries, rendered his dethronement a matter of expectation, gave room to maintain that he was no longer king. Yet, according to this decree, nothing but an absolute departure out of the kingdom and resistance to the summons of the legislative body, could incur that penalty. But these circumstances were little regarded by men who entertained extreme opinions, and they declared the king criminal and *ipso facto* dethroned. The Jacobins and Cordeliers discussed this question with their usual violence, and affected not to comprehend how the nation, once freed from the burden of a king, could again charge itself with that form of government. Had the duke of Orleans ever conceived hopes of the crown, this had been the time for them to have awakened. But he must have seen how little influence was attached to his name, and how little a new sovereign, however popular he might be, was suitable to the present state of affairs. Some journalists, devoted to his service, perhaps without his knowledge, endeavoured, as Anthony did to Cæsar, to place the crown on his head, and proposed giving him the regency; but he found himself compelled to disavow them by a declaration which met with as little consideration as his own person. *No more king*, was the general cry with the Jacobins and Cordeliers, and in all public places, and in the daily papers.

Addresses on this subject were presented from all parts of France, and republican placards were stuck up on all the walls of Paris, and even on those of the assembly itself. One was signed with the name of Achilles Duchatelet, a young colonel, and addressed to the French nation; it reminded them of the tranquillity they enjoyed during the journey of the monarch to Varennes, and reasoned from thence, that the absence of the king was more to be desired than his presence; it added, that his desertion of his post was an abdication; that the nation and Louis XVI. were therefore discharged from all mutual ties; and concluded by declaring that history was full of the crimes of kings, and that it was high time to disavow the intention of furnishing themselves with another.

This address, though attributed to the young Duchatelet, was the production of Thomas Paine, an Englishman, and a principal actor in the American revolution. It was reprobated by the assembly, who, after animated debates on the subject, deemed it proper to proceed to the order of the day, and, according to its constant practice, treat such opinions and scandalous libels with the most utter indifference.

Finally, the deputies who were ordered to make their report on the affair of Varennes, presented it to the assembly on the 16th of July. The journey, they declared, had nothing culpable in it, and even if that had been the case, that the person of the king was inviolable; and that a forfeiture could not result from it, because he had not remained long enough absent, and had not offered any resistance to the summons of the legislative body.

Robespierre, Buzot, and Pétion, repeated all the hackneyed arguments against the inviolability of the king's person. Duport, Barnave, and Salles, replied to them; and it was at last decreed that the king could not be brought to trial for his escape. Two articles merely were added to the act of inviolability. As soon as this decision was confirmed by the majority, Robespierre rose, and protested loudly against it, in the name of human nature.

On the evening which preceded this decision, a great disturbance had taken place at the Jacobins. A petition was there drawn up, addressed to the assembly, in which they were called upon to declare the king deposed, as a recreant and traitor to his oaths, and to provide a substitute for his authority by every constitutional means. It was resolved that this petition should be carried the

next day to the Champ de Mars, and that every petitioner should sign it on the altar of the country. On the following day it was accordingly carried to the appointed place, and a great number of persons, drawn by curiosity to witness the scene, joined a mob of seditious individuals. But at this moment the act of restoration was passed, and the petition was therefore too late to answer any purpose. Lafayette now arrived, and broke through the barricades which the people had already raised for their defence. He was menaced, and even fired at, but, though within shot, remained unhurt. The municipal officers soon joined him, and at last prevailed upon the populace to retire; the national guard, however, were so stationed as to have an eye on their retreat, and hopes were entertained, for an instant, that the multitude had dispersed; but presently the disturbance recommenced. Two invalides, somehow or other, found under the altar of the country, were slaughtered, and then the disorder knew no bounds. The assembly called upon the municipality, and charged them to preserve the public tranquillity. Bailly immediately betook himself to the Champ de Mars, unfurled the red flag, and proclaimed martial law. The adoption of coercive measures, whatever may be said upon the subject, was perfectly right. Were new laws required, or were they not? If they were, it was necessary that they should be executed, and have some fixed authority, that insurrection might not be perpetual, nor the acts of the assembly controlled by the *plebiscita* of the mob. Bailly was therefore right in enforcing the execution of the law. He advanced into the ranks of the insurgents with undaunted courage, and was several times fired at, but fortunately missed; and was unable, in the midst of the tumult, to make the legal requisitions. Lafayette then ordered his soldiers to fire in the air; upon this the crowd abandoned the patriotic altar, but soon rallied again. Being now reduced to the last extremity, he gave the word to fire. The first discharge killed some of the rebels. The number was exaggerated on both sides. One party reduced it to thirty, the other augmented it to four hundred; and the most furious to some thousands; the last computation was believed at the moment, and terror became general. This severe example quieted for a time the disturbers of the public peace*. As is generally the case, all parties were reproached with this outbreak, and it is probable that many had a hand in it, for the disorder suited many. The king, the majority of the assembly, the national guard, and the authorities, both of the municipalities and the departments, were agreed, however, at present, in their wish to establish constitutional order; and they had to combat with a democracy within, and the aristocracy from without. The assembly and the national guard composed the moderate, enlightened, and wise part of the nation, who desired the re-establishment of order and the laws; and they naturally should, at this moment, have allied themselves with the king, who appeared, on his part, to be contented with a limited power. But if it suited their views to stop at the point at which they had arrived, it did not suit those of the aristocracy, who desired a national convulsion, nor those of the populace, who were still greedy of further acquisitions and greater power. Barnave, as Mirabeau had formerly been, was the orator of this enlightened and moderate party; and Lafayette was its military chief. Danton and Camille Desmoulins were the orators, and Santerre the general, of this mob, who, in its turn, wished to exercise its power. A few fanatic and enthusiastic spirits represented this body, either in the assembly or the new administration, and hurried on their reign by their declamations.

The affair of the Champ de Mars was reproachfully attributed to Lafayette and Bailly. But considering it their duty to yield obedience to the law, and sacrificing their popularity and lives to its execution, they felt no regret, and entertained no fears from what they had done. The energy they had displayed silenced the factious, and the most prominent already thought of avoiding the blows which they believed were about to be dealt against them. Robespierre, who, until now, had advanced the most extravagant propositions, trembled in his obscure abode; and notwithstanding the inviolability of his person as a deputy, he sought an asylum from all his friends. Thus this example of severity had its effect, and, for the moment, the turbulent propensities of the rioters were subdued by the fear of retribution.

The assembly, at this period, entered into a determination which has since been greatly blamed, but which was not so fatal in its results as some have thought. It decreed that none of its members should be re-elected. Robespierre was the author of this proposition. Envy against his colleagues, excited by a sense of his own inferiority, was supposed to be the cause of his motion; it was at least natural that he should wish to exclude them from the legislative, having been always opposed to them in the constituent assembly; and considering the opinions he held, it is possible there might have been both conviction, envy, and hatred in his motives. Thus the assembly, which had been accused of wishing to perpetuate its powers, and had forfeited its popularity by its moderation, became most anxious to reply to all these attacks by a disinterestedness, perhaps somewhat affected, in deciding that its members should be excluded from the next assembly. The new assembly was thus deprived of men whose violence had given place to moderation, and whose legislative knowledge was ripened by the experience of three years. Nevertheless, by observing the causes of the revolutions which supervened, we may judge of the small importance of this measure, which has been so often condemned.

The present was the moment for the assembly to complete their constitutional labours, and terminate, during a season of tranquillity, their stormy career. The members of the left side had determined to revise certain parts of the constitution. For this purpose they resolved that it should be read through, that the assembly might thus be enabled to form a judgment of the whole, and harmonize its different parts. This process has been termed the "Revision," and progressed too slowly according to the notions of hot-headed republicanism. Barnave and the Lameths had concerted a plan

* This event took place in the evening of Saturday, the 27th July, 1791.

The national assembly, approaching its dissolution, review the articles of the constitution. —The constitution accepted by the king. 1791. Sept. 13-30.

with Malouet, for reforming certain articles which struck a blow at the royal prerogative, and at that which was termed the stability of the throne. It was even said that they went so far, as to meditate the establishment of two chambers. It was arranged that the moment the reading of the constitution was finished, Malouet should make his attack upon it; that Barnave should reply to him with vehemence, the better to conceal his intentions, but that, in defending the greater part of the articles, he should abandon some as evidently dangerous, and condemned by settled experience. Such was the project whose execution was prevented by the ridiculous and dangerous protests of the right side, who resolved now to withhold their votes from every question. No accommodation was any longer possible; the left side would hear nothing more; and when the proposed attempt took place, the cries which arose from all parts of the chamber hindered Malouet and his party from proceeding *. The reading of the constitution was therefore finished with precipitation, and presented to the king for his acceptation. From that moment he was restored to liberty, or, to speak more properly, the strict guard on the palace was taken away, and he could retire whenever he wished, to examine and without personal restraint accept of the constitution. What therefore could Louis XVI. at this time do? Refuse the constitution? that would have been to abdicate in favour of the republic. The safest measure, therefore, even according to his own system of conduct, was to give his assent, and await, from the course of events, that reinstatement in power which he believed to be his due. He consequently, after a few days, declared his acceptance of the constitution (September 13). A burst of extraordinary rejoicing was the consequence of this intelligence; as if, in point of fact, they had dreaded some objection on the part of the king, or as if his consent had been the effect of an unlooked-for concession. He then went to the assembly, and was received with as much enthusiasm as in the days of his greatest popularity. Lafayette, who never omitted an opportunity of repairing the inevitable evils of political troubles, proposed on this occasion a general pardon for all crimes caused by the revolution. This was proclaimed in the midst of the shouts of the populace, and the prisons were immediately thrown open. Finally, on the 30th of September, Thouret, the last president, informed the chamber, that the constituent assembly had terminated its sittings.

* See note 34 in the Appendix.

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.

CHAPTER I.

REFLECTIONS UPON THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY—OPENING OF THE SESSION OF THE SECOND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, STYLED THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY; ITS CONFORMATION—NOTICE OF THE CLUBS; THEIR INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS—PÉTION, MAYOR OF PARIS—POLICY OF FOREIGN POWERS—EMIGRATION; ACTS PASSED AGAINST THE EMIGRANTS AND AGAINST THE NONJURING PRIESTS—CHANGE IN THE MINISTRY—PREPARATION FOR WAR STATE OF THE ARMIES.

The constituent assembly had now finished its long and laborious career; and, notwithstanding the undaunted courage and perfect equity it had displayed, and the Herculean labours it had sustained, it was abhorred as revolutionary at Coblentz, and as aristocratical at Paris. To form a just judgment of this memorable assembly, where such a combination and variety of talent was concentred, from whence issued such bold and energetic resolutions, and which displayed, perhaps for the first time, a convocation of all the enlightened men of a nation, assembled with the will and power of realizing the perfection of philosophy, it is necessary to consider the state in which it found France, and that in which it left it.

The French nation, in the year 1789, felt and understood the nature of all the evils which oppressed her, but had never conceived the possibility of their eradication. Suddenly, on the unexpected demand of the parliaments, the states-general were convoked; and the constituent assembly stood in the presence of a throne, blasted with the pride of its ancient power, and disposed, at most, to suffer only the redress of a few grievances. Having a strong sense of her rights, she states that she is a nation, and boldly announces it to the astonished government. Being menaced by the aristocracy, the court, the army, and not foreseeing popular insurrections, it declared itself inviolable, and forbade power to stretch forth her hand against her. Convinced of her rights, she addressed herself to her enemies, who were not convinced of their rights, and, by a simple expression of her will, gained the ascendancy over a power consolidated by a duration of many centuries, and an army of thirty thousand men. This was the sum of the revolution; this was its first act, the most noble of all; it was just, it was heroic; for never did a nation seek to gain its rights with greater justice and at greater peril.

Power being now reduced to weakness, it was necessary to re-establish it on a just and beneficial scale. But at sight of this social ladder, at the summit of which every thing was in abundance—power, honours, fortune; whilst at its foot every thing was wanting, even to bread for the support of life, the constituent assembly experienced a violent re-action in their minds, and naturally felt

an inclination to level all distinctions. It decided, therefore, that the whole mass of citizens, placed on a complete equality, should express their will, and that the king should be charged with the burden of its execution.

Its error here was, not in reducing royalty to a simple magistrature, for the king had still sufficient power to maintain the laws, and more than magistrates can be said to possess in a republic; but, in believing that a king, with the recollection of what he had been, could submit to such a reduction of authority; and that a people, just awakened, and who had recovered a great portion of public power, would be content without the acquisition of the whole. History, in fact, proves that magistratures should be multifariously divided, or that if one chief magistrate is established, he should be so amply gifted, that no desire of usurpation should harbour in his mind. The kings of Denmark, Sweden, and Poland, being placed near the attainment of power, could not content themselves with a moderate share of it, but, in the end, grasped the whole.

When nations, greatly occupied with their private interests, feel it needful to charge their sovereign with all the cares of government, they may perhaps act wisely in appointing one; but it might follow, that this sovereign, like the kings of England, possessing the authority of convoking and dissolving national assemblies, not receiving their will as obligatory, nor sanctioning it but in proper cases, and although only prevented from committing excesses, yet possesses in reality the greatest portion of supreme power. The dignity of man may very well be upheld under such a government, so long as the law is rigorously observed, and so long as each citizen feels his own station, and knows that such great powers committed to the hands of his prince, are not the result of an abandonment of right, but a concession to human inability.

But it is not at the moment when a nation is suddenly recalled to a sense of its rights, that it can renounce all its prerogatives, be content to play a secondary part, and yield up its omnipotence to a sovereign, lest his ambition might prompt him to usurp it. The constituent assembly was as little inclined as the nation itself to make such an abdication. It reduced the king, therefore, to a simple hereditary magistrate, trusting that the nation would leave him in possession of that title, and that he would content himself with that magistrature, which still shone with honours, riches, and power.

But whether the assembly expected this or not, could they, on account of any doubt they might entertain, cut the question short? Could they dethrone the king, or give him all the power possessed by English monarchs?

In the first place, they could not depose Louis XVI.; for if it be always necessary to make the rule of justice an essential ingredient in a government, it is not to change its form when justice is parcel of its character, or suddenly convert a monarchy into a republic. In the next place, possession should always create respect; and if the assembly had dispossessed the reigning dynasty, what would not their enemies have said, who accused them of violating property when they attacked the feudal rights?

On the other side, they could not give the king the absolute *veto*, the nomination of the judges, and other like privileges, because the public opinion was opposed to it; and as public opinion constituted their whole strength, they were obliged to yield to it.

As to the establishment of a single chamber, their error, perhaps, was more substantial, but quite as inevitable. If it were deemed inexpedient to leave nothing but the recollection of having possessed power to a king who had been absolute, and that in the face of a people who were desirous of stripping him of what remained, it was certainly much more false in principle to acknowledge inequalities of rank and social gradations, since republics themselves admit them, and, among all nations, either an elective or hereditary senate will be found to exist. But we must not, at a particular period, exact from men and from opinion more than the spirit of the times will allow them to perform. How could the necessity of gradations of rank be admitted at the moment of revolt against its excesses? How could an aristocracy be constituted at the moment of war against the aristocracy? To maintain the necessity of royalty would have been more practicable, because, being placed at a greater distance from the people, the king had been less oppressive than the nobility, and, moreover, would have performed those functions which seem of most acknowledged necessity.

But, I repeat it, if these errors had not been predominant in the assembly, they would have existed in the nation; and the course of events will prove, that if the assembly had left with the king and the aristocracy all those powers of which they deprived them, the revolution would nevertheless have taken place, and proceeded to its worst excesses.

To be convinced of this, it is necessary to distinguish between those revolutions which burst forth among a people who have been long enslaved, and those which take place among a free people; that is to say, who possess a certain degree of political activity. At Rome, at Athens, and elsewhere, the people and their chiefs, we observe, often contended for the possession of more or less authority. But among modern nations, which have been totally divested of their rights, the course must be different. Being completely enslaved, they lie long dormant. Their awakening takes place first among the most enlightened classes; and these, by their energetic efforts, recover a portion of that power to which they are entitled. The awakening is gradual, and so is also the ambition: it reaches the lowest classes, and the whole mass of the population is thrown into a state of excitement. The enlightened classes, soon satisfied with their acquisitions, would wish to stop, but cannot, and are hurried on by those who follow after them. Those who do stop in their career, even if only one step above the lowest, become in their eyes an aristocracy, and are branded with the name. Thus the simple tradesman is called an aristocrat by the labourer, and is persecuted as such.

The constituent assembly present to our ideas that enlightened class of citizens, who first take up arms against authority still all-powerful. With discrimination enough to perceive what is due to those who possessed all, and to those who were ut-

terly destitute, they would willingly have left to the former a portion of what they possessed, because they always had been in possession, and, above all, have procured for the latter those rights which would have secured to them liberty and enlightenment. But regret is with the one, and ambition with the other; regret desires to recover everything, ambition to conquer everything. Thus a war of extermination commences. The constituents then are those worthy characters, who shaking off the yoke, and endeavouring to establish a just mean, make the effort without alarm, and even accomplish this great undertaking, but at last fail by endeavouring to make the one party concede something, and the other not to demand everything.

The constituent assembly, in their equal repartition of rights and property, had shown a desire to spare their ancient possessors. Louis XVI. having the title of king of France, thirty millions of revenue, the command of the armies, and the right of suspending the national will, still possessed sufficiently powerful prerogatives. The recollection of absolute power could alone excuse his want of resignation to such a brilliant relic of authority.

The clergy, deprived of their immense property, which they had received for the purpose of administering to the necessities of the poor, whom they neglected, and of supporting the expenses of a worship, which they left to indigent curates, were no longer a political body. But their ecclesiastical dignities were preserved, their dogmas respected, and their scandalous riches reduced to a competent revenue, which might even be called profuse, for it was still sufficient to support great episcopal luxury. The nobility were no longer an order; they possessed no longer the exclusive rights of the chase, and others of a similar nature; and they were no longer exempt from taxes; but could these things be made objects of reasonable regret? for their immense properties were left untouched. Instead of enjoying the exclusive favour of the court, they might climb to the highest eminence by merit. They might still be elected representatives of the people; the gown and sword were the prizes held out to their talents. Why did not a generous emulation at once animate them? What a shameful acknowledgment of incapacity did their lingering regrets of past privileges demonstrate!

The ancient pensioners met also with like consideration; the ecclesiastics received compensations; every one obtained consideration; that equal lot which the constituent assembly had dealt to all, had it become so insupportable?

The constitution being now firmly established, there remained no hopes of the king recovering, by debates and conferences, those prerogatives, the loss of which he regretted. He had but one course left him, and that was, to resign himself to his loss, and to maintain the constitution, unless indeed he relied upon foreign powers; but he entertained little hope from their sympathy, and had little faith in the exertions of the emigrants. He appeared cordially to conform to the necessity of his situation, and his intention of pointing out to the assembly what he conceived to be the defects of the constitution, proved the sincerity of his views. He was however diverted from this intention, and determined to await, from the course of events, those restitutions of power, which he believed were his due. The queen was not less resigned. "Courage," said she to the minister Bertrand, who introduced himself to her, "all is not yet lost; the king will adhere to the constitution; this line of conduct is certainly the best;" and it may be believed that, if she had other thoughts to express, she would not have hesitated before Bertrand de Molleville *.

The first assembly being dissolved, some of its members returned to their families in the provinces, and some still continued in Paris. Some of the more influential members, such as Lameth, Duport, and Barnave, held constant communications with the court, and offered their advice; but Louis decided, that inasmuch as he was to adhere to the constitution, he ought not to suffer himself to be persuaded to follow the advice received from these counsellors; for they exhorted him, not only to abstain from violating the constitution, but to make it be believed, by his actions, that he was sincerely attached to it. These members of the former assembly, joined by Lafayette since the Revision, were the leaders of that revolutionary generation, who may be said to have first prescribed the limitations of absolute liberty, with the desire to adhere to them. They were at this period supported by the national guard, whose long services under Lafayette had entirely attached them to him and to his principles; the constituents then did themselves the injury of despising the new assembly, whom they irritated by their contempt. Indeed, a species of aristocratical vanity seems to have possessed these first legislators, and they appear to have thought that all legislative science had disappeared when they had ceased to be legislators.

The new assembly was composed promiscuously of all classes of men; among them were some enlightened partisans of the early period of the revolution. Ramond, Girardin, Vaublanc, Dumas, and others, who styled themselves constitutionalists, and occupied the right side, where there was no longer one single individual of the ancient privileged orders. Thus, by the natural and progressive course of the revolution, the left side of the first assembly had become the right of the second †. Besides these constitutionalists, the assembly contained many men of distinguished talents, but of exaggerated ideas, and heated imaginations. Having been witnesses of the proceedings of the constituent assembly, and possessing all the impatience of those who long to take an active part, they thought that enough had not yet been accomplished; they did not, however, dare to avow themselves republicans, because, from all sides, they were recommended to be faithful to the constitution; but the notion of a republic, which had been imbibed during the journey of Louis XVI. ‡, and the suspected intentions of the court, occasioned that idea to unceasingly recur to their minds; and that state of continual hostilities with which they found themselves well opposed to the government, attached them still more powerfully to this notion of republicanism.

* See note 25 in the Appendix.

† See p. 27, note.

‡ The consequences of the king's journey to Varennes, was a discussion whether he had not forfeited his crown, ante, p. 70.

Among this new generation of talents, the deputies who were principally remarkable were those of the Gironde, from whom an entire party, though composed of men from all the departments, took its name, and were called *Girondists*. Condorcet, an author celebrated for the extent of his capacity and the severity of his principles and character, was its writer; and Vergniaud, an extempore speaker, who possessed a pure and flowing style of eloquence, its orator. This party, continually augmented by all who distrusted the court, were yet far from desiring such a republic as befel them in 1793; their minds were actively employed in producing such a republic, with all its illusory notions, its rigid virtues, and strict morality. Consequently enthusiasm and vehemence were the principal characteristics of such a republic.

Yet even this party must have its extremes; Chabot, Merlin de Thionville, and others, inferior in talent, went much beyond the other Girondins by mere audacity, and became, after the overthrow of the throne, when they separated from the Gironde, the party of the *Mountain*. This second assembly also possessed, as did the first, an undetermined mass, who, without any predetermined engagement, voted sometimes with one party, and sometimes with the other. Under the constituent assembly, while substantial liberty prevailed, this body continued independent; but as its neutrality did not spring from conviction, but from indifference, in later assemblies, and during the reign of terror, its cowardly and contemptible conduct procured it the vulgar and degrading appellation of the *belly* (*centre*).

The clubs *, at this period, acquired altogether a new importance. Agitators under the constituent, they became domineering under the legislative assembly. The national representation not affording a theatre sufficiently ample to give scope to the ambition of all, those who could not gain admission there, took refuge in the clubs, where they formed a tribune and stormy debates. In these societies, all who possessed the faculty of public speaking, and all who loved discussion, and delighted in kindling the passions of party, that is, nearly the whole nation, were accustomed to assemble. The people crowded to this new spectacle, and occupied all the galleries; and found there, it is said, a lucrative employment, for orators began now to pay for applauses. The minister Bertrand acknowledged that he himself had paid for these venal acclamations.

The oldest of the clubs, that of the *Jacobins*, had acquired an extraordinary importance. The church where they assembled could scarcely contain their members and auditors. An immense amphitheatre, constructed in the form of a circus, occupied the spacious nave of the church of the Jacobins *. The "bureau" of the president and secretaries, where the votes of the society were collected, and its decisions registered, was placed in the centre; and an active correspondence stirred up the zeal of all the societies spread over the entire surface of France, these were styled affiliated societies (*sociétés affiliées*) †. This club, by its priority and organized violence, had constantly kept an ascendancy over all others, who wished to show themselves rather more moderate or more extravagant in their principles. The Lameths, and all its most distinguished members, had, however, after the journey to Varennes, abandoned it, and gone over to the *Feuillans*. In this latter society the principles of all the moderate clubs were united; principles that never could have succeeded, because they were repugnant to the very purpose which induced them to run to these clubs, that of agitation. It was at the Feuillans that the constitutionalists, and all the partisans of the first revolution, were accustomed to meet. Thus the name of *Feuillant* became a title of proscription, with that of *modéré*.

Another club, that of the *Cordeliers* ‡, endeavoured to rival, by its violence, that of the Jacobins. Camille Desmoulins was its writer, and Danton its leader. This last, although he had failed at the bar, succeeded in gaining the admiration of the multitude, on whom he produced a powerful effect by his violent gestures, sonorous voice, and extremely popular passions. The Cordeliers could not yet, with all their extravagances, gain the ascendancy over their rivals, to whom long custom carried the tide of the populace. Nearly all its members, however, belonged to the Jacobin club, and, on urgent

* Clubs were then of recent introduction into France, and were evidently borrowed from the English. The first Club was established in Paris in the year 1782, and was little else than a newspaper reading room; politics being prohibited as a subject of conversation. On the breaking out of the Revolution, the avowed object of these associations was the discussion of political questions; they were formed with that view, and became of an exclusive character. The *Breton* Club was a meeting of those deputies of Brittany who sat in the States-General at Versailles, where this club was first formed in 1789, and where most of their members were admitted. After the national or constituent assembly had been transferred to Paris, this club took the appellation of the *Club of the friends of the Constitution* (*Club des amis de la Constitution*) and at last obtained the name of *the Jacobin Club* (*Club des Jacobins*), from the locality of its meetings. The *Club of 89*; this Association was formed in the month of May, 1790, by Siéyes, Lafayette, Larochefoucauld, and others who were alarmed at the extravagancies which were exhibited by the *Club of the Friends of the Constitution*. This new club declared its object was to diffuse the true principles of liberty, and therefore was also styled *Club de la propagande*. *The Impartial Club*. This was a meeting formed in 1790, of the most moderate members of the *right side*; it held but two sittings when it became the *Monarchical Club*, the members became the object of hatred to the mob, who used them roughly, and it was soon closed by the municipal authority. The *Club of the Feuillans*; this club, in 1791 and 1792, opposed the republican opinions of the Jacobin Club. Its motto was: the Constitution, the whole Constitution, and nothing but the Constitution. The *Cordeliers Club*; this club was founded by Danton, Camille Desmoulins, Fabre d'Egiantine, and others. The *Pantheon Club*; this was an association of the Revolutionists formed during the Directory (1795), they held their meetings in the Pantheon. The *Clichy Club*; a monarchical club, which was formed during the Directory (1797) and was dissolved, 3rd August, 1797. The *Salm Club*, better known as *the Constitutional Circle*. A meeting, formed in 1797, in opposition to the Clichy Club, or *Clichyens*. *Club de Manège*; this was a revolutionary club opened during the Directory, and was soon dissolved. *Trans.*

* The church of the convent of the Dominicans, familiarly termed *Jacobins*. *Trans.*

† Or corresponding societies.

‡ *Cordeliers* as well as *Feuillans* were also the names of two religious orders or communities in France. *Trans.*

occasions, assembled there, in the train of Danton, to determine a majority in favour of their principles.

Robespierre, who, as has been seen, distinguished himself in the constituent assembly by the severity of his principles, was excluded from the legislative by the decree of non-election, of which he himself had been the mover. He entrenched himself now among the Jacobins, where he domineered with absolute sway, by the dogmatism of his opinions, and a reputation for integrity, which had gained him the epithet of *the incorruptible*. Although panic-struck at the moment of the Revision, he afterwards regained his assurance, and persevered in acquiring popularity. He had met, however, lately two rivals, Brissot and Louvet, who provoked all his animosity; Brissot had been intimate with all the deputies of the first assembly; was the friend of Mirabeau and Lafayette, known to be a republican, and one of the most distinguished members of the legislative assembly; yet he possessed but little weight, although his talents were undoubtedly great. Louvet, who united to a warm temperament, a considerable degree of talent, and great civil intrepidity, was among the number of those who having been in the constituent assembly, had contemplated a republic, his lot therefore was naturally cast with the Girondists, and his contests with Robespierre confirmed this alliance. This party of the Gironde, which was without any particular purpose, formed by men who had too much merit to ally themselves to the populace, and sufficient splendour to be envied by the rabble and its chiefs, were being held together more by their relative situation than by any concerted combination: such a party must naturally have been brilliant though powerless, and must have fallen before the more organized factions which exalted themselves around it.

Such was then the state of France; the ancient privileged orders had retired beyond the Rhine. The partisans of the constitution occupied the right side of the assembly, the national guard, and the club of the Feuillans; the Girondins possessed the majority in the assembly, but not in the clubs, where plebeian violence carried the day: and finally, the most extravagant demagogues of this new epoch, seated on the highest benches of the assembly, and thence named "The Mountain," (*La Montagne*,) were all-powerful in the clubs and with the mob.

Lafayette, who had divested himself of all military rank, was accompanied to his privacy by the homage and regret of his companions in arms. His command had not been delegated to a new general, but six captains commanded alternately the whole national guard. Bailly also, the faithful ally of Lafayette during three calamitous years, laid down the office of mayor. The opinions of the electors seemed divided between Lafayette and Pétion; but the court, who would not upon any consideration that the choice should fall upon Lafayette, although their private inclinations were favourable to him, preferred Pétion, republican as he was. The court had hoped to turn to advantage that frigid demeanour in Pétion, mistaken for stupidity, (which it certainly was not,) and spent largely to secure him the majority, which he obtained, and he was appointed mayor. Pétion had an enlightened intellect, but in his mind and manners he was reserved, and seemed unmoved by anything but reason; he with considerable dexterity made himself useful to the republic against the court; a conformity of opinion attached him to the Girondins, and the envy which his new dignity excited in the Jacobins confirmed this alliance.

Nevertheless, in spite of these political inclinations, if the king could have been trusted, it is possible the suspicions of the Girondins might have been calmed, and then there being no pretext for any disturbances, the demagogue would have had no longer the means of inflaming the minds of the people.

The intentions of the king were certainly at this period decided; but, thanks to his weakness, they were at no time irrevocable. Proof of them was requisite before they could be believed; and before this proof could be displayed, he was exposed to more than one outrage. His character, although mild, was not without a certain disposition to resentment; his resolutions, therefore, might be easily shaken by the first errors of the assembly. This assembly having constituted itself, took the oath in an impressive manner upon the book of the constitution. Its first decree, relative to ceremonies, abolished the title of *Sire*, and of *Majesty*, usually given to the king, and enjoined, that when he appeared in the assembly, he should be seated on a chair exactly similar to that of the *president**. These were the first effects of the republican spirit, and the pride of Louis XVI. was cruelly wounded by them. To avoid that which he considered as a humiliation, he resolved not to appear at the assembly, but to send his ministers to open the sessions. The assembly, however, regretting this first act of hostility, revoked its decree the next day, and thus gave a rare example of reconsideration. The king then met the assembly, and was received in the most gratifying manner. Unfortunately, however, it had been decreed that, if he sat down, the deputies might seat themselves also; this they did, and Louis XVI. saw in it a new insult. The plaudits he received could not heal this wound. He returned to the palace pale and with altered features, and so soon as he was alone with the queen, he threw himself on a seat, and with sobs exclaimed:—"Ah! Madame, you have witnessed this humiliation! What did you come to France to see!"—The queen endeavoured to console him, but his heart was deeply wounded, and his good resolutions shaken†.

Yet if, from henceforward, he meditated the having recourse to foreign powers, the inclinations of those powers could have given him but little hope. The declaration of Pilnitz had produced no effect, either from a coldness on the part of the sovereigns, or on account of the danger Louis XVI. would have run by their interference, having been, since his return from Varennes, the prisoner of the constituent assembly. The acceptance of the constitution was another motive for waiting for the results of experience before acting. This was the advice of Leopold, and the minister Kaunitz. Besides, when Louis XVI. notified to the foreign courts his acceptance of the constitution, and that

* Decree of the 5th October, 1791.

† See Madame Campan, vol. ii. p. 129.

it was his intention faithfully to observe it, Austria returned a very pacific reply, and Prussia and England did the same, professing their amicable relations. It is to be observed, that the neighbouring powers acted with more reserve than those who were more distant, such as Sweden and Russia, because they were more immediately compromised by a war. Gustavus, who contemplated a brilliant enterprise against France, replied to the notification, that he did not regard the king as free. Russia delayed explaining herself. Holland, the Italian principalities, and especially Switzerland, gave satisfactory answers. The electors of Trèves, and of Mayence, in whose territories were many emigrants, made unsatisfactory replies. Spain, besieged by emissaries from Coblentz, did not speak more plainly, and pretended that she desired time to ascertain if the king were really a free agent; but, at the same time, declared she had no intention of disturbing the tranquillity of the kingdom.

Such answers, none of which were decidedly hostile, the professed neutrality of England, the fickleness of Frederick-William, and the well-known pacific dispositions of Leopold, all seemed to tend to peace. It is difficult to know what passed in the vacillating mind of Louis XVI., but his evident interest, and the fears with which the idea of war inspired him at a later period, inclines us to believe, that he also desired the preservation of peace. In the midst of this general quiescence the emigrants alone breathed nothing but war, and made warlike preparations.

They assembled together in crowds at Coblentz, armed themselves with expedition prepared magazines, established markets of military stores, formed squadrons which were never completed, for none of these grandees would become soldiers, created captaincies which they sold; and, though they attempted nothing really dangerous, made great preparations, which they themselves thought formidable, and calculated to make an impression upon the people.

The great question now was, whether Louis XVI. inclined to them or not; and it was very difficult to believe that he was not very much disposed to encourage relations and subjects who armed themselves to restore him to his ancient privileges. Nothing less than the greatest sincerity, and the most continual proof, was necessary to convince the people to the contrary. The letters of the king to the emigrants invited, and even ordered, them to return to France, but he carried on, it was affirmed *, a secret intercourse, which belied his public correspondence and destroyed its effect. It is undoubtedly true that secret communications were carried on with Coblentz, but there is no reason to suppose that Louis XVI. availed himself of them to annul the injunctions he had publicly given to the emigrants. It was evidently his interest that they should return. Their presence at Coblentz could be in no way useful, without they intended to commence hostilities immediately; and Louis XVI. feared a civil war more than any thing else. Not wishing, therefore, to employ their swords on the Rhine, it was much more to his advantage that they should be near him, that they might be at hand in case of need, and unite their efforts to those of the constitutionalists, to protect his person and his throne. Besides, their presence at Coblentz provoked the enacting of severe laws which he would not sanction; his refusal of the *sanction* would compromise him with the assembly; and it will be seen, that it was the use which he made of the *veto* which completely deprived him of all popularity, and made him looked upon as the coadjutor of the emigrants. It would have been strange if he had not perceived the justice of these reasons, which all his ministers felt. They unanimously considered that the emigrants should return, to be nearer his person, and thus afford him their protection, put an end to the alarms which were continually raised, and deprive the agitators of every justification for civil war. This was even the opinion of Bertrand de Molleville, whose inclinations were any thing but constitutional. "It is necessary," said he, "to employ all possible means to augment the popularity of the king. The most efficacious and most useful of all, at the present moment, is to recal the emigrants. Their return, so generally desired, would re-embody the royalist party, which the emigration has so entirely disorganized. This party, fortified by the discredit thus brought upon the assembly, and recruited by the numerous deserters from the constitutional party, and all the discontented, would soon become sufficiently powerful to render that explosion, which must sooner or later take place, decisively in favour of the king *."

Louis XVI., in conformity with this advice of his ministers, addressed exhortations to the heads of the army and the officers of the navy, to recal them to their duty and their posts. But these exhortations were useless, and the desertion continued without interruption. The minister of war announced the desertion of nineteen hundred officers. The assembly could no longer restrain their indignation, and resolved to take vigorous measures in support of their authority. The constituent assembly had contented themselves with pronouncing the deprivation of public functionaries who left the kingdom, and with imposing a triple taxation on the property of the emigrants, to indemnify the state for the loss of their services during their absence. The new assembly proposed still more severe penalties.

Many bills were brought in. Brissot divided the emigrants into three classes; the instigators of desertion, public functionaries who abandoned their duties, and, finally, those who, through fear, fled from their native country. "It is necessary," said he, "to punish the former, and despise and pity the latter."

It is certain that the liberty of man does not permit of his being chained to his native soil; but when it is made plainly evident, that citizens who abandon their country do so for the purpose of assembling in a foreign land to assume an hostile attitude, it is clearly justifiable to take precautions against such dangerous projects.

The debate on the subject was protracted and obstinate. The constitutionalists opposed all the measures which were suggested, and maintained that the vain efforts of the emigrants should be

* See note 26 in the Appendix.

* Vol. vi. p. 42.

despised by the assembly, as they had always been by their predecessors. Yet the Girondins carried their point, and a preliminary act was passed, which ordered Monsieur, the king's brother, to return to France in two months, in default of which he would lose his eventual right to the regency. The second act, against the emigrants in general, was more severe; it declared that the French assembled beyond the frontiers of the kingdom were suspected of a conspiracy against France; that if, on the first of January next, they still continued in a state of muster, they should be deemed conspirators, treated as such, and punished with death; and that the revenues of the contumacious should be received for the profit of the nation, without prejudice to the rights of women, children, or legitimate creditors *.

The act of emigration not being reprehensible in itself, it is difficult to define a case which renders it penal. All that the law could do was to warn the emigrants beforehand, that they would be deemed criminal in certain cases; and those who did not wish to be treated as such, had only to obey the law, and those who knew that prolongation of absence from the kingdom would constitute crime, and did not return, declared themselves content to be deemed criminals. Those who, without any motives of war or policy, were out of the kingdom, were bound to hasten their return; and an abridgment of a journey of pleasure or interest was a light sacrifice when put in comparison with the safety of the state.

Louis XVI., to satisfy the assembly and the public, consented to the decree which ordered the return of Monsieur, under pain of losing his right to the regency; but he placed his *veto* on the law against the emigrants. The ministers were ordered in a body to wait on the assembly to announce the will of the king †. Several decrees were first read, to which the *sanction*‡ was given; when that concerning the emigrants came to hand, a profound silence took place in the assembly; and when the keeper of the great seal pronounced the official formulary, "the king will advise upon this" (*Le Roi examinera*§) great discontent was manifest on all sides. The minister then wished to express the motives of the *veto*; but a multitude of voices were raised against this attempt, and he was told that the constitution gave the king the right of refusing his assent, but not of explaining his reasons. The minister was obliged therefore to retire, leaving the assembly in the greatest irritation. This first resistance of the king was a definitive rupture with the assembly; and although he sanctioned the decree which deprived his brother of the regency, they could not prevent themselves from observing that a marked affection for the insurgents at Coblentz was perceptible in his refusal to assent to the second decree. It was recalled to mind, that the king was their relative, their friend, and in some manner united to them by the same interest; and therefore it was concluded that it was impossible for him not to make common cause with them against the nation.

* Acts of the 28th October, and 9th November, 1791.
† Sitting of 12th November.
‡ Royal assent. *Trans.*
§ Equivalent to the term *Le Roi s'avisera*, when the sovereign in this courteous language refuses his assent to an act in the English parliament. *Trans.*

On the next day Louis XVI. published a proclamation to the emigrants, and two private letters to each of his brothers. The arguments with which he enforced both of them are excellent, and possess the appearance of sincerity. He prayed them to destroy, by their return, the suspicions which ill-disposed people delighted in propagating. He implored them not to force him to use severe measures against them; and said that, as to his want of liberty, on the pretence of which many justified their disobedience, he gave them a proof to the contrary by the *veto* which he had just opposed in their favour *. Be this as it may, these reasons neither produced at Coblentz or at Paris the apparently intended effect. The emigrants did not return; and in the assembly, the tone of the proclamation was thought to be too gentle, and even the right which the executive power had of making one was contested. The public, in fact, were too much irritated to be content with a proclamation, and, above all, to permit the king's substitution of an useless measure for the vigorous measures which they had resorted to.

A new demonstration of the same kind was fastened upon the king at this juncture, and led to a result equally unfortunate. The first religious disturbances had broken out in the west; and the constituent assembly had sent two commissioners into that part of the country, of whom one was Gensonné, afterwards so celebrated in the party of the Gironde. Their report was made to the legislative assembly, and although very moderate, excited great indignation. It will be recollected, that the constituent assembly, whilst they deprived the nonjuring priests of their situations, they left them a pension, and the liberty of practising their worship apart. These priests had not ceased, since then, to excite the animosity of the people against their brethren who had taken the oath, and to represent them as impious, and their ministry dangerous. They drew the peasants in their train to mass at long distances from their homes, who became irritated at seeing their church used for the purposes of a worship which they believed bad, and at being obliged to travel so far to seek that which they thought good. Many also took part with the constitutional priests. Civil war was imminent †; new information was brought to the assembly, which displayed the danger of the nation in a still more striking point of view. The assembly then contemplated taking measures against these new enemies of the constitution, similar to those which had been taken against those beyond the Rhine, and making a new experiment as to the inclinations of the king.

The constituent assembly had ordered the oath of civism to be administered to all the priests. Those who refused to take it forfeited the office of ministers of the public worship paid by the state, but they still retained the pensions of simple ecclesiastics, and the liberty of privately exercising their ministry. Nothing could be more gentle and moderate than this step. The legislative assembly again administered the oath, and deprived those who refused it of all conditions. As they had abused their liberty by exciting civil war, the

* See note 27 in the Appendix.
† See note 28 in the Appendix.

assembly decreed that, if their conduct required it, they should be transported from one place to another, and even condemned to imprisonment if they refused to obey. Finally, they were deprived of the free exercise of their private worship, and administrative bodies were ordered to send a list of these non-jurors to the assembly, with comments on their conduct*.

This measure, as also that against the emigrants, sprung from the desire of self-preservation, a desire which takes strong hold of threatened governments, and causes them to fortify themselves with excessive precautions. It is not so much the perpetrated act which they punish, it is the presumed attack which they prosecute; and the measures of the assembly became arbitrary and cruel in exact proportion to the suspicion they harboured.

The bishops and priests who remained at Paris, and still kept up some communication with the king, addressed a petition to him against this decree: the king, whose religion was so scrupulous, and who had always reproached himself with having sanctioned the decree of the constituent assembly, did not need their persuasions to induce him to withhold his assent. "As to this decree," said he, speaking of the new bill, "I would rather lose my life than sanction it." The ministers were nearly of the same opinion; and Barnave and Lameth, whom the king sometimes consulted, advised him to refuse his *sanction*; but to this counsel they added other exhortations which the king could not make up his mind to follow: it was, in opposing the decree, not to leave any doubt as to inclinations, and, for that purpose, to dismiss from his person all priests who rejected the oath, and to allow none but constitutional ecclesiastics to officiate in his chapel. But of all the advice which was given him, the king only followed that portion which suited his own weakness and devotional feeling. Duport-Dutertre, the keeper of the seals, and the ministerial organ of the constitutional party, approved of their advice; and when the council had determined, to the great satisfaction of Louis XVI., that the *veto* should be opposed to the decree, they added, that it would be highly proper that the king's person should be approached by none but unsuspected priests. At this proposition, Louis XVI., ordinarily so pliant, displayed an invincible obstinacy, and said that the liberty of worship which had been granted to every one, should also be granted to him equally with his subjects, and that he certainly should retain the power of calling about him such priests as he chose. The council did not persist; and, whilst the assembly was still ignorant of what had passed, the *veto* was decided on.

The constitutional party, to which the king seemed to lean at this time, imparted to him another species of advantage; it was that of the Directory of the department. This Directory was composed of the most considerable members of the constituent assembly. Among them were the Duke de la Rochefoucauld, the Bishop of Autun, Baumetz, Desmeuniers, Ansons, &c. They drew up a petition to the king, not as an administrative body, but as an assembly of petitioners, and begged the king to oppose the *veto* to the decree against the priests.

"The national assembly," said the petition, "has certainly intended well; we rejoice to shield it from the calumnies of base detractors; but a laudable intention has driven it into measures which neither the constitution, justice, nor prudence, can admit of. The payment of the pensions of all the ex-official ecclesiastics has been made to depend upon their taking the oath of civism, whereas the constitution has expressly and literally placed these pensions in the rank of national debts. Can the refusal to take any oath destroy an acknowledged title of credit? The constituent assembly has already done all that can be done with regard to the non-juring priests; they have refused to take the prescribed oath, and have been deprived of the exercise of their functions; and, by this rejection of their services, they have been reduced to a pension. The legislative assembly now desires that all the ecclesiastics who have not taken the oath, or who have since retracted it, should, in the midst of the religious distractions which prevail, be temporarily banished, or imprisoned if they should not obey the order brought them to that effect. Is not this to renew the system of arbitrary orders, since it is permitted to punish with exile, and shortly after with imprisonment, one who is not convicted of being refractory to any law? The national assembly also refuses to all those who refuse to take the oath of civism, the free exercise of their worship. But this liberty can never be taken from any one; it is for ever consecrated by the declaration of rights."

These reasons were, undoubtedly, excellent, but neither the resentments or fears of party are appeased by mere appeals to reason. How was it possible to persuade an assembly, that obstinate priests ought to be permitted to excite discord and civil war? The Directory incurred the most abusive calumny, and its petition to the king was opposed by a multitude of others addressed to the legislature. Camille Desmoulins presented one remarkable for its boldness. An increasing violence of language, and a disregard to all that respect which had hitherto been observed towards the constituted authorities and the king, might be observed in it. Desmoulins told the assembly that a great example was necessary; that an impeachment should be drawn up against the Directory; that eminent men were the proper objects of punishment; that they should strike at the head and hurl thunder against the conspirators; that the power of the royal *veto* had a limitation; and that no *veto* could hinder the taking of the Bastille. Louis XVI., although determined to refuse his sanction, deferred communicating it to the assembly. He wished first to conciliate their opinion. He had chosen his ministers from the constitutional party. Montmorin, fatigued by his laborious career under the constituent, and his disagreeable negotiations with all parties, determined not to brave the storms of a new legislature, and retired, in spite of the entreaties of the king to retain him. The ministry of foreign affairs, refused by many persons, was accepted of by Delessart, who gave up for it that of the Interior*. Delessart, an upright and talented

* Act of the 27th November, 1791.

* Or Home department.

man, was under the influence of the constitutionalists; but he was not strong enough to impart resolution to the intentions of the king, to make an impression on powers abroad, or on factions at home. Cahier de Gerville, a decided patriot, of rather distant than attractive manners, was placed in the office of the Interior, to satisfy the public opinion. Narbonne, a young man, full of activity and ardour, a zealous constitutionalist, and very much adapted to gain popularity, was placed in the war department by the ministerial party. He would have possessed a salutary influence in the council, and, perhaps, conciliated the assembly to the king, if Bertrand de Molleville, a counter-revolutionist, and preferred to all others by the court, had not been his adversary. Bertrand de Molleville, detesting the constitution, artfully adhered to its text, the better to attack its spirit, and sincerely desired the king to attempt its strict execution, "but solely for the purpose," said he, "of testing its impracticability." The king could not make up his mind to dismiss him, and it was, therefore, with this discordant ministry that he endeavoured to pursue his course. After having attempted to conciliate the public opinion by his choice of ministers, he tried other means with the same intention, and appeared to take part in all the diplomatic and military measures which were proposed against the musters of emigrants formed on the Rhine.

The last repressive laws had been quashed by the *veto*, yet nevertheless new information was brought to the assembly every day of the preparations and threats of the emigrants. The *procès-verbaux* of the municipalities of the departments bordering on the frontier, and the reports of merchants coming from beyond the Rhine, declared that the Viscount de Mirabeau, brother of the celebrated constituent, was at the head of six hundred men, in the bishopric of Strasbourg; that, in the territory of the elector of Mayence near Worms, numerous corps of fugitives were embodied, under the orders of the Prince de Condé; that the same thing was taking place at Coblentz, and in the electorate of Treves; that excesses and violences had been committed against the French; and that, finally, the proposition had been made to general Wimpfen, of delivering up Neuf-brisach. These reports, added to all that was known by public notoriety, aggravated the assembly to the highest pitch of irritation. The draught of an act requiring the electors to make the emigrants lay down their arms was immediately proposed. A final decision on this measure was postponed for two days, that it might not appear too precipitate. The postponement having elapsed, the debate opened.

The Deputy Isnard was the first to speak: he pointed out the necessity of securing the tranquillity of the kingdom, not merely in a temporary way, but in a permanent manner; and of putting a term to disturbances by prompt and vigorous measures, a course which would exhibit to all Europe the patriotic resolutions of France. "Do not fear," said he, "to provoke war with the great powers; interest has already decided their intentions; your measures will not change them, but merely oblige them to explain themselves.—The conduct of the nation should be answerable to its new destiny. Enslaved under Louis XIV., it was nevertheless grand and intrepid; at present, enjoying freedom, should it be feeble and timid? 'Those are deceived,' said Montesquieu, 'who believe that a people in a state revolution can easily be conquered; they are more likely, on the contrary, to conquer others.' (*applauses.*)

"Capitulations are proposed to you! There are those who wish to augment the royal prerogative, to augment the power of the king, of a man whose will can paralyze that of the whole nation, of a man who receives thirty millions, whilst millions of citizens die of want.—(*Renewed applause.*) There are those who wish to bring back the nobility! If all the nobles of the earth came to assail us, Frenchmen, guarding their property in one hand, and grasping their swords in the other, would crush this haughty race, and force them to endure the yoke of equality!

"Speak to the ministers, to the king, and to Europe, the language which becomes the representatives of France. Tell the ministers, that hitherto you have not been well satisfied with their conduct, but that by *responsibility* you mean *death*. (*Prolonged applauses.*) Say to Europe that you respect the constitutions of all empires, but that if a war of kings is declared against France, you will declare a war of the people against kings! (*Applauses were here again renewed.*) Respect," exclaims the speaker, "have respect for my enthusiasm, it is for liberty. Tell them," added he, "that the wars people enter into by the order of despots resemble the quarrels of two friends, excited by a perfidious instigator, and are carried on in darkness! If light breaks in upon them they embrace one another, and revenge themselves on their deceivers. So it would be if hostile armies fought with ours; light would burst in upon them, and the people would embrace one another, in the face of their dethroned tyrants, the tranquillized earth, and the congratulating heavens!"

The enthusiasm excited by this speech was so great, that the assembly pressed round the orator to embrace him. The decree which he supported was adopted immediately. M. de Vaublanc was ordered to carry it to the king, at the head of a deputation of twenty-four members. By this decree the assembly declared that they deemed it necessary to require of the electors of Trèves, Mayence, and of the other princes of the empire, to put an end to the assemblages formed on the frontier. They prayed the king, at the same time, to hasten the negotiations entered into with regard to the indemnities due to the princes possessing territories in Alsace.

M. de Vaublanc presented this decree, accompanied by a most firm and respectful discourse, which was very much applauded by the assembly. "Sire," said he, "if the French driven from their country by the revocation of the edict of Nantes had assembled in arms on the frontiers, if they had been protected by the princes of Germany, Sire, we ask you, what would have been the conduct of Louis XIV.? Would he have suffered these musters? That which he would have done for the support of his authority, may it please your majesty to do for the maintenance of the constitution!"

Louis XVI. being resolved, as we have already said, to diminish the effect of his *veto*, by acts conciliatory of public opinion, determined to go in person to the assembly, and answer their message by a speech of a conciliatory nature.

On the evening of the 14th of December, the king proceeded to the assembly, after having announced his intention in the morning by a simple note. He was received in profound silence. He said that the message of the assembly called for the most attentive consideration, and that on an occasion when the honour of the nation was concerned, he thought it his duty to come personally among them; that having the same intentions as the assembly, but dreading the calamities of war, he had endeavoured to bring the emigrant French to a sense of their duty; that amicable overtures being useless, he had anticipated the message of the representatives, and had signified to the electors, that if, before the 15th of January, all musters had not ceased, they would be considered as the enemies of France; that he had written to the emperor to demand his intervention in his quality of head of the empire, and that in case satisfaction should not be obtained, he would declare war. He finished by saying, that it was in vain any one endeavoured to make the exercise of his authority disagreeable to him, that he would faithfully adhere to the constitution, and that he felt deeply the honour of being the king of a free people.

Plaudits succeeded to the silence which had been first observed, and recompensed the king for the reception he had received on entering. The assembly having ordered in the morning that he should be replied to by a message, could not express at the moment its satisfaction, but determined that his speech should be sent to the eighty-three departments. Narbonne entered immediately afterwards to acquaint the assembly with the measures which had been taken to assure the effect of the injunctions addressed to the empire. "An hundred and fifty thousand men are ordered," said the minister, "to be assembled on the Rhine. Three generals are appointed to command them, Luckner, Rochambeau, and Lafayette." Applause accompanied the announcement of this last name. Narbonne added, that he was about to visit the frontiers, to ascertain the state of the fortified towns, and to put the construction of all necessary fortifications in the greatest state of forwardness; that undoubtedly the assembly would grant the necessary funds, and would not act niggardly in the cause of liberty. "No, no," resounded from all parts. Finally, he required to be informed whether the assembly, although the legal number of marshals were complete, would permit the king to confer that rank on the two generals, Luckner and Rochambeau, who were appointed the guardians of liberty. Acclamations announced the consent of the assembly, and the satisfaction which the activity of the young minister gave. By such a conduct as this Louis XVI. would soon have become popular, and have conciliated the republicans, who only wished for a republic, because they believed the king was not capable of regarding and defending liberty.

The king took advantage of the satisfaction produced by these measures to signify his *veto* upon the act against the clergy. On the morning, care was taken to insert in all the journals the dismissal of the former diplomatic agents accused of aristocratical opinions, and the appointment of others in their place. With these precautions, the message was received without a murmur. The assembly had expected it, and the sensation it produced was not so angry a one as might have been expected. Here it is to be observed to what a number of contrivances the king was obliged to have recourse in order to exercise his prerogative, and how dangerous it was for him to avail himself of it. Even if the constituent assembly, who have been accused of ruining him by depriving him of it, had granted him the absolute *veto*, would it have made him more powerful? Had not the suspensive *veto* in this instance all the effect of an absolute *veto*? Was it legal power, or the control of public opinion, which the king wanted? The result has clearly answered this question; it was not the want of sufficiently powerful prerogatives which ruined Louis XVI., but the inconsiderate use of those which he possessed.

The expedition which the assembly had been led to expect, did not relax; the motions for the expences of the war, and for the appointment of the two field-marshals, Luckner and Rochambeau, were passed without the slightest opposition. Lafayette, snatched from the retreat whither he had retired to repose after his three years of fatigue, presented himself to the assembly, and received the most cordial welcome. The battalions of the national guard accompanied him out of Paris; every thing proved to him that the name of Lafayette was not forgotten, and that he was looked upon as one of the founders of liberty.

In spite of all these preparations, Leopold, who was of a pacific disposition, did not desire war, for he knew that it did not suit his interests, but he wished a congress to be held, supported by a commanding force, to bring about an accommodation, and some reforms in the constitution. The emigrants wished for no reforms, but a complete destruction of the new fabric of government. The emperor, more wise and prudent, knew that much must be conceded to the new opinions, and that all that could be accomplished, was, at most, the restoration of a few prerogatives to the king, and a change in the formation of the legislative body, by admitting two chambers instead of one*. This last measure was that most feared, and oftenest made the subject of reproach to the *feuillantine* and constitutional party. It is certain that this party had, in the early days of the revolution, rejected the idea of an upper chamber, because they feared the nobility might entrench themselves in it; their apprehensions at present were no longer the same; they possessed, on the contrary, the reasonable expectation that it would afford them the means of almost their exclusive admittance to such a chamber. Many of the constituents, now reduced to complete nonentity, would there obtain an opportunity of appearing once more upon the theatre of politics. If, therefore, this upper chamber had not been the object of their views, still less did it identify itself with their interests. It is certain that the journals frequently spoke of it, and that it was a reproach against the constitutionalists in every one's mouth. How rapid had been the course of the revolution. The present right side was com-

* See note 29 in the Appendix.

posed of the members of the old left side*; and the attempt at present feared, was no longer the return of the ancient régime, but the establishment of an upper chamber. How wonderfully all things had revolved since the year 1789, and how rapidly had an ill-advised resistance precipitated the course of events!

Leopold, therefore, saw that nothing but this amelioration could be effected for Louis XVI. Meanwhile, his object was to draw out the negotiations to a great length, and, without breaking with France, to make an impression on it by his firmness. But his reply marred his object: this reply consisted in referring to the conclusions of the diet of Ratisbonne, which refused to accept of any indemnities for the princes who had possessions in Alsace. Nothing could be more ridiculous than such a decision, for every territory comprised under one denomination should be subject to the same laws; if the princes of the empire possessed land in France, they ought to have submitted to the abolition of the feudal rights; the constituent assembly had already done much for them by granting them indemnities. Many of them having treated with the French government on this subject, the diet annulled their proceedings, and forbade them to enter into any arrangement. The empire pretended, in this manner, not to recognize the revolution in that which concerned itself. As to that which regarded the musters of the emigrants, Leopold, without explaining himself concerning their dispersion, answered Louis XVI., that the elector of Trèves, not being able, according to the desires of the French government, to prevent the approaching hostilities, general Bender had been ordered to give him prompt assistance.

No reply could have been more unwise than this; it compelled Louis, that he might not seem to compromise himself, to take vigorous measures, and declare war. Delessart was immediately sent to the assembly to inform them of this answer, and to express the astonishment which the conduct of Leopold caused the king. The minister hinted that probably the emperor had been deceived, and had been falsely assured that the elector had fulfilled all the duties of a good neighbour. Delessart communicated, besides, the reply which had been returned to Leopold. It had been signified to him that, notwithstanding his reply, and the orders given to general Bender, if the electors had not at the prescribed time satisfied the requisition of France, arms would be employed against them. "If this declaration," said Louis in his letter of the 31st of December to the assembly, "does not produce the effect I hope from it, if it be the fate of France to enter into a contest with her children and allies, I will make known to Europe the justice of our cause, the people of France will courageously support it, and the nation shall see that its interests and mine are inseparably connected, and that I shall always regard the maintenance of its dignity, and the preservation of its safety as the most essential of all my duties."

These expressions, by which the king seemed, in a case of common danger, to identify himself with the nation, were loudly applauded. The papers were handed to a diplomatic committee, that they might make a speedy report on them to the assembly.

* *Ante*, page 27, col. 2, note.

The queen was once again applauded at the opera, as in the days of her splendour and power, and she returned intoxicated with joy to her husband to tell him she had been welcomed by the public with as much enthusiasm as ever. But these were the last marks of admiration which she ever received from a people who formerly idolized her truly royal accomplishments. The sentiment of equality which remains so long stifled in the bosoms of men, and which is ungovernable when it is roused, already manifested itself on all sides. The year 1791 was now at its close; the assembly abolished the ancient ceremony of the new year's day, and decreed that the respect paid to the king on that anniversary should not be renewed in future. At about the same period, a deputation from the king complained that the folding doors of the council-room had not been opened for his entrance. The discussion which this gave rise to was scandalous, and the assembly, in writing to Louis XVI., suppressed the titles of *Sire* and of *Majesty*. On another occasion, a deputy entered the apartments of the king with his hat on his head, and in a slovenly dress. This conduct was often provoked by the bad reception the court gave to the deputies, and in these reprisals the pride of both parties kept pace with each other.

Narbonne pursued his appointed route with extraordinary celerity. Three armies were established on the menaced frontier. Rochambeau, an old general, not unpractised in the art of war, but at present in an ill state of health, peevish and discontented, commanded the army posted in Flanders, called the army of the north. Lafayette obtained that of the centre, and encamped towards Metz; and Luckner, an old warrior, a tolerable general, a brave soldier, and very popular in the camp by his military manners, commanded the division of Alsace. Such were the generals which a long peace and a general desertion had left us.

Rochambeau, discontented with the new system of things, and harassed by the undisciplined state of the army, did nothing but reiterate complaints, and gave the ministry no hopes of success. Lafayette, young, active, talented, and burning to distinguish himself in the defence of his country, re-established discipline among his troops, and surmounted all the difficulties which the ill-will of the officers, who were the aristocracy of the army, threw in his way. He called them together when he first assumed his command, and addressing them as gentlemen of honour, begged them to quit the camp if they were not determined to serve their country loyally; that if there were any who wished to retire, he would take upon himself to procure them even retreats in France, or passports into foreign lands: but that if they persisted in remaining with the army, he expected from them zeal and fidelity. He thus succeeded in establishing a better discipline among his troops than that which prevailed in either of the other divisions. As to Luckner, having no political opinions, and, consequently, easily yielding to any system, he promised the assembly much, and in truth, succeeded in gaining the attachment of his soldiers.

Narbonne, having travelled with the greatest celerity, returned, in a short time, to give an account to the assembly of his rapid expedition. He informed them that the reparation of all fortifi-

cations were already much advanced; that the army from Dunkirk to Besançon presented a mass of two hundred and forty battalions, and a hundred and sixty squadrons of cavalry, with the necessary artillery for two hundred thousand men, and provisions for six months. He bestowed the warmest praises on the patriotism of the volunteer national guards, and assured the assembly that, in a short time, their equipment would be complete. The young minister without doubt acquiesced in the illusions of zeal, but his intentions were so noble, and his commission executed so promptly, that the assembly declared his report called for the public gratitude, and sent it to all the departments—the ordinary method they observed in manifesting their satisfaction.

CHAPTER II.

DIVISION OF PARTIES UPON THE QUESTION OF WAR—THE CHARACTER ASSUMED BY THE DUKE OF ORLEANS AND HIS PARTY — THE EMIGRANT PRINCES ARE IMPEACHED — FORMATION OF A GIRONDIST MINISTRY — DUMOURIEZ, HIS CHARACTER, HIS GENIUS, AND DESIGNS; CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE NEW MINISTRY—INTERVIEW OF DUMOURIEZ WITH THE QUEEN — DECLARATION OF WAR WITH THE KING OF HUNGARY AND BOHEMIA — THE FIRST MILITARY OPERATIONS—THE PANICS OF GUIÉVRAIN AND TOURNAY—MURDER OF GENERAL DILLON.

At the commencement of the year 1792, war was then the great question of the moment; war to be waged in defence of the very existence of the revolution. Its enemies being all abroad, it only remained to seek them, and conquer them. The king, as the head of the armies, would he act sincerely against his relatives and former courtiers? This was the doubt concerning which it was necessary to satisfy the nation.

It appears singular that the violent Jacobins, with Robespierre at their head, on this occasion advocated peace, whilst the moderate Jacobins, or Girondins, favoured war. Brissot and Louvet supported the latter opinion by their talents and influence. They thought with all the Girondins, that it would be advantageous to the nation, by putting an end to a dangerous uncertainty, and discovering the true intentions of the king. These men, judging of the result from their own enthusiastic estimation of the courage of France, never imagined the possibility of the nation being conquered, and they also thought that if the treacherous conduct of the king interposed any temporary check to the successful progress of hostilities, France would at once know how to act, and would depose her faithless king. How happened it that Robespierre and the other Jacobins did not desire an event which would have brought about so prompt and decisive a crisis? This can only be explained by conjectures. Was the timid Robespierre afraid? or did he oppose the war because Brissot and Louvet advocated its necessity with so much eloquence and ability? Whatever were his reasons, he contended for peace with great obstinacy. The Cordeliers, who were Jacobins, supported Robespierre in this opinion. They seemed to fear that war would give too many advantages to Lafayette, and eventually procure him a military dictatorship. This was the constant bugbear of Camille Desmoulins, who never ceased to figure him as being at the head of a victorious army, crushing, as at the Champ de Mars *, both Jacobins and Cordeliers under his feet. Louvet and the Girondists supposed the Cordeliers to be actuated by another motive, and that they pursued Lafayette as the enemy of the Duke of Orleans, with whom it was said they were secretly connected.

* Alluding to Lafayette's repressing the insurgents of 27th July, 1791, *ante* p. 71. Trans.

The Duke of Orleans, who again appears as being the object of suspicion to his enemies rather than a prominent object in the revolution, was at this time almost entirely eclipsed. At the commencement of the revolution some persons availed themselves of his name, and he himself conceived some hope from those to whom he lent it; but every thing was much changed since then. He himself, feeling how much he was out of his place in the popular party, had endeavoured to obtain the pardon of the court towards the close of the constituent assembly, but had been rejected. Under the legislative assembly, he retained his rank among the admirals, and made new attempts to gain the favour of the king. On this occasion he was admitted into the king's presence, had a long conversation with him, was not badly received, and was invited to return to the palace. On his return the queen's dinner table was set, and the courtiers assembled in great numbers. The moment he made his appearance he was attacked on all sides by the most insulting expressions. "Take care of the dishes," was echoed from all parts, as if poison had been feared. The courtiers crowded round him, trod on his toes, elbowed and pushed him from one corner of the apartment to the other, and obliged him to retire. In descending the stairs he received new outrages, and quitted the palace in indignation, believing that the king and queen had prepared this scene of humiliation for him. Yet they were perfectly ignorant of what had happened till afterwards, and were greatly grieved at the imprudence of the courtiers *. The duke was more exasperated against the court than ever; but this did not make him a more active or a more able head of any party than before. His friends, however, who occupied the Jacobin club, and the assembly, undoubtedly made more stir; from that point, his faction seemed to re-appear, and his hopes and pretensions appeared to revive with the dangers of the throne.

The Girondists believed that the violent Cordeliers and Jacobins only contended for peace, to deprive Lafayette, the rival of the Duke of Orleans, of the advantages which war might procure him. But whatever there might be in this supposition, war, opposed by the Jacobins, but maintained by

* See note 30 in the Appendix.

the Girondists, prevailed in the assembly, where the latter were ascendant. The assembly commenced their operations by drawing up an impeachment against Monsieur, the brother of the king, the Count d'Artois, the prince de Condé, Calonne, the young Mirabeau, and Laqueuille, as having since the 1st of January been engaged in hostilities against France. An act of impeachment not being subject to the *sanction*, they had no *veto* to fear on this occasion. The sequestration of the property of the emigrants, and the appropriation of their revenues to the expenses of the state, decreed by the unsanctioned act, were ordered anew by another decree, which met with no opposition from the king. The assembly seized upon these revenues under the title of indemnities of war, and Monsieur was deprived of the regency by virtue of the former act.

The report of the last communications with the emperor was presented to the assembly by Gensonné. He remarked that France had always been liberal in her money and soldiers to Austria, without ever obtaining any return; that the treaty of alliance, concluded 1756, had been violated by the declaration of Pilnitz*, whose object was to form an armed coalition of sovereigns; that it had been again broken by the arming of the emigrants, which was permitted and even seconded by the princes of the empire. He added, that although orders had been recently given for the dispersion of musters, these colourable orders had never been executed; that the white cockade had been constantly worn beyond the Rhine, the national cockade outraged, and French travellers ill-treated; and that consequently it was necessary to demand of the emperor a final explanation upon the treaty of 1756. This report was ordered to be printed, and its consideration adjourned.

On the same day, January 14th, 1792, Guadet ascended the tribune:—"Of all the facts," said he, "which have been communicated to the assembly, that which has most astonished me is the project of a congress, whose object will be to obtain the modification of the French constitution; this project has long been spoken of, and is finally announced as possible by the committees and the ministers. If it be true," added Guadet, "that this intrigue is conducted by men who believe that they therein see the means of their rising out of that political nonentity into which they have fallen; if it be true that some agents of the executive power second with all their ability this abominable conspiracy; if it be true that they wish to bring us, by lengthened negotiations and discouragements to accept of this shameful mediation, ought the national assembly to shut its eyes to such dangers? Let us swear," exclaimed the orator, "let us swear to die all here rather . . ." He was not suffered to finish the sentence; all the assembly rose up, and cried out:—*Yes, yes, we swear it*; and in the enthusiasm of the moment every one was immediately declared infamous, and a traitor to his country, who should take part in any congress for the purpose of modifying the constitution. This decree was particularly directed against the constitutionalists and the minister Delessart. It was particularly the latter who was accused of protracting the negotiations with foreign powers. On the 17th, the discussion on the report of Gensonné was resumed, and it was decreed that the king should never negotiate in future but in the name of the French nation, and that he should require of the emperor a definitive explanation of his intentions before the 1st of March. The king replied, that fifteen days ago positive explanations had been demanded from Leopold.

During this interval, the assembly were informed that the elector of Trèves, alarmed at the firmness and activity of the French government, had given fresh orders for the dispersion of all musters, for the sale of the magazines formed in the states, and for the prohibition of recruiting and military exercises, and that these orders had in fact been put into execution. In their present disposition, this news was coldly received by the assembly. They were determined to see in it nothing but vain demonstrations without any result, and persisted in demanding a definitive answer from Leopold.

Divisions existed in the ministry between Bertrand de Molleville and Narbonne. Bertrand was jealous of the popularity of the minister of the war department, and blamed his condescension to the assembly. Narbonne complained of the conduct of Bertrand de Molleville, and of his unconstitutional opinions, and wished the king to dismiss him from his service. Cahier de Gerville endeavoured to reconcile matters between them, but without success. It was pretended that the constitutional party wished to promote Narbonne to the dignity of prime minister, and it appeared that even the king had been deceived, that he was alarmed at the popularity and ambition of Narbonne, who was represented to him as a presumptuous and aspiring young man, who would control the cabinet. The journals coming to the knowledge of these divisions, Brissot and the Gironde warmly defended the minister threatened with disgrace, and violently attacked his colleagues and the king. A letter written by the three generals of the north to Narbonne, in which they expressed their fears for his dismissal, which they said was on the point of taking place, was published. The king dismissed the popular minister immediately; but, to balance the effect of this dismission, that of Bertrand de Molleville was announced at the same time. It had not, however, the desired effect; an extraordinary ferment demonstrated itself, and the assembly declared, as it had formerly done in the case of Necker, that Narbonne possessed the confidence of the nation, and that the remainder of the ministry had lost it. They excepted, however, Cahier de Gerville from this condemnation, who had always opposed Bertrand de Molleville, and had only lately been engaged in a violent altercation with him. After the agitation caused by this dismissal had in some measure subsided, Brissot requested to be allowed to prove that Delessart had betrayed the confidence of the nation. This minister had confided to the diplomatic committee his correspondence with Kaunitz; this correspondence was found perfectly destitute of dignity, and even gave Kaunitz an unfavourable idea of the state of France, and seemed to have authorized the conduct and language of Leopold. It is necessary to bear in mind that Delessart, and his colleague Dupont-Dutertre, were the two ministers most particularly attached to the club of the Feuillans,

* Ante, p. 69, col. 2.

and whom the assembly regarded with most aversion, because they were accused of favouring the plan of a congress.

In one of the most stormy sittings of the assembly, the unfortunate Delessart was accused of having compromised the dignity of the nation, of not having warned the assembly of the concert of foreign powers and of the declaration of Pilnitz, of having professed in his notes unconstitutional doctrines, of having given Kaunitz a false idea of the state of France, and of having protracted foreign negotiations, to the great detriment of the interests of the country. Vergniaud followed Brissot, and added fresh charges against the accused minister. He reproached him with having, when minister of the interior, kept much longer than was necessary in his portfolio, the act which united the Comtat to France, and of having thus caused the massacres of Avignon. "From this tribune whence I speak," continued he, "I perceive the palace of those perverse councillors, who mislead and deceive that king which the constitution has given us. I see the windows of that palace where a counter-revolution is planned, and means devised to replunge us into slavery .... Terror has often, in former times, under the name of despotism, stalked forth from that famous palace; it should now re-enter thither in the name of the law, and penetrate deeply into the hearts of its possessors; that all those who there inhabit may know that our constitution grants inviolability to none but the king."

The act of impeachment was immediately put to the vote, and adopted; and Delessart was sent to the high national court established by the constitution at Orleans for the trial of state crimes. The king saw him depart with the greatest grief; he had given him his entire confidence, and encouraged his moderate and pacific views. Duport-Dutertre, a minister of the constitutional party, was also threatened with an accusation, but he anticipated it, demanded the liberty of justifying himself, was absolved by order of the day, and immediately after gave in his resignation. Cahier de Gerville also did the same; and in this manner was the king deprived of the only ministers who had any reputation for patriotism in the eyes of the assembly.

Separated from the ministers which the Feuillans had given him, and not knowing where to look for support in the midst of the storm which surrounded him, Louis XVI., who had dismissed Narbonne because he was too popular, thought now of uniting himself to the Gironde, which was republican. It is true they were only so through distrust of the king, and if once he had delivered himself up to their councils, it is possible they might have become attached to his person and to royalty. But, to accomplish this, he should sincerely have adopted their views; but the everlasting question as to his sincerity was raised again upon this, as indeed it was upon every occasion. Assuredly Louis XVI. was sincere when he trusted himself entirely to one party; but it was never done without ill temper and regret; thus, when this party imposed upon him a difficult but necessary condition, he rejected it; distrust immediately took place, asperity of feeling was the consequence, and a rupture concluded these ill-assorted alliances between persons occupied too exclusively by opposite interests. It was thus that Louis XVI., after having taken the constitutional party into his confidence, dismissed Narbonne who was its chief; and to appease the storm which was raised about him, was obliged at last to abandon himself to the Gironde. The example of England, where the king often takes his ministers from the opposition, was one of the motives of Louis XVI. The court then conceived hopes, for in the saddest conjuncture no one is without hope, they hoped that Louis XVI., by promoting incapable and ridiculous demagogues, would destroy the reputation of the party from which he had chosen them. But this did not take place, and the new ministry was not such as the wickedness of the courtiers would have desired.

It was little more than a month since Delessart and Narbonne had called into their councils a man whose talents appeared most valuable: this was Dumouriez, who had displayed great military abilities both in Normandy and La Vendée, where he had held a command. At one time he offered his services to the court, at another to the constituent assembly; both parties were alike to him, provided they gave occupation to his activity, and extraordinary talents. Dumouriez, who could make no figure in such an age as the present, had passed some part of his life in diplomatic intrigues; yet with all his boldness, his military and political genius, and his fifty years' experience, he was nothing more than a brilliant adventurer at the opening of the French revolution. He still retained, however, all the fire and hardihood of youth; and the moment a war or a revolution threatened, he made plans and addressed himself indiscriminately to all parties, caring little about opinions, and only desirous of being employed for some one or other. He thus habitually considered the merits of a cause as of no importance; but although too little governed by conviction, he was generous, sensitive, and capable of attachments, if not to principles, at least to persons. With a mind so apt, prompt, and comprehensive, and a courage by turns calm and impetuous, he was admirably calculated to serve in any cause, but was incapable of commanding. He possessed neither the dignity of a moral conviction, or the pride of a despotic will, and could govern none but soldiers. If, with his genius, he had been actuated by the passions of Mirabeau, the determination of a Cromwell, or merely the dogmatism of Robespierre, he would have governed the French revolution.

Dumouriez, when called into the confidence of Narbonne, formed with the greatest celerity a vast plan of military operations. He suggested the idea of a war at the same time offensive and defensive. Every where within the natural limits of France, the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the sea, he proposed merely a defensive war; but in the Low Countries, where our territory does not extend as far as the Rhine, and in Savoy, where it does not reach to the Alps, he urged immediate hostilities, and that when he had reached the natural limits of the country, he proposed to act on the defensive. This was to reconcile, at the same time, our interests and our principles; and to profit by a war which we had not provoked, by regaining our true natural limits of territory. He also suggested the expediency of a fourth army of occupation in the south, and asked for the command of it, which was promised him.

Dumouriez had ingratiated himself with Gen-

sonné, one of the commissioners employed in La Vendée by the constituent assembly, since deputy of the legislative assembly, and one of the most influential members of the Gironde. Having remarked that the Jacobins were the predominating power, he was introduced to their club, and there read several papers which were very much applauded, and nevertheless continued his old friendship with Delsporte, intendant of the civil list, and devoted friend of Louis XVI. Attaching himself thus to the different powers who were on the point of coalescing, Dumouriez could not fail of being called to the ministry. Louis XVI. offered him the portfolio of foreign affairs, which the impeachment against Delessart had rendered vacant; but being still attached to the accused minister, the king merely tendered it to him during the interim. Dumouriez, however, feeling himself strongly supported, and not wishing to appear to hold a situation in reserve for a feuillant minister, refused it on such terms, and obtained it without the interim. He found in the ministry none but Cahier de Gerville and Degraves. Cahier de Gerville, although he had given in his resignation, still continued to give his attention to the duties of his former office. Degraves, a pliant and inexperienced young man, had succeeded Narbonne. Dumouriez knew how to take advantage of this character, and thus gained possession of the exterior relations of the military administration, that is to say, the causes and the plan of the contemplated war. So enterprising a genius could hardly do less. Scarcely had he arrived at the ministry, when he assumed the red Jacobin cap, a new decoration borrowed from the Phrygians, and now become the emblem of liberty. He promised them to govern for them, and by them. Being presented to Louis XVI., he fully explained himself as to his association with the Jacobins, succeeded in destroying the suspicions he had entertained against him, pleased him by his ardent demonstrations of devotion, and dissipated his sadness by his wit. He persuaded the king that he endeavoured to become popular for the interests of the throne, and for his own re-establishment; but, in spite of all his flattery, he did not hesitate in telling him that the constitution could not be avoided, and assured him that, with the constitution, he could yet become very powerful. His first despatches, which were full of argument, vigour, and boldness, changed the nature of the pending negotiation, placed France in a new situation, and as immediately threatening war. It was natural that Dumouriez should wish for war, since his genius took that direction, and he had studied the military science thirty-six years; but it must be confessed that hostilities had become unavoidable, and that the conduct of the cabinet of Vienna, and the irritation of the assembly, had made a war inevitable.

Dumouriez, by his association with the Jacobins, and by his known connexions with the Gironde, must necessarily have embroiled himself with the Feuillans even without disliking them; besides, he had displaced them. Thus he was in a constant opposition to all the leaders of that party, and braving the raillery and disdain which they cast upon the Jacobins and the assembly, he determined to pursue his career with his accustomed self-possession.

It was necessary now to complete the cabinet; Pétion, Gensonné, and Brissot, were consulted as to its formation; the ministers could not, according to the existing law, be taken either from the present, or the last assembly; the choice therefore was extremely limited. Dumouriez recommended an old secretary for the marine—Lacoste, a man of great experience in business, a self-willed patriot, who nevertheless loved the king, was loved by him, and remained in his confidence longer than any of the other ministers. The ministry of justice was about to be given to Louvet, who had recently distinguished himself among the Jacobins, and had obtained the favour of the Gironde by his eloquent support of Brissot, in favour of the war; the envious Robespierre immediately denounced him; he justified himself with success, but a man of contested popularity was not desirable, and Duranthon, a talented, upright, but weak man, was pitched upon for that office. A minister of the finances, and of the interior, were still wanting. The Gironde again proposed Clavière, who had gained great celebrity by some valuable financial essays. Clavière was a man fertile in ideas, self-willed in his own opinions, and indefatigable in business. The minister of the interior was Roland, formerly inspector of the manufactures, and known by some useful works on industry and the mechanic arts. This man, of austere manners, inflexible opinions, and cold repulsive aspect, insensibly yielded to the superior genius of his wife. Madame Roland was young and beautiful. Having imbibed from her childhood philosophical and republican ideas, her understanding was superior to that of her sex in general, and she had formed opinions which had all the characteristic severity of the times. Living in the most intimate friendship with her husband, she lent her pen to his cause, communicated to him all her female vivacity, and inflamed not only his ardour but that of all the Girondists, who, being enthusiasts of liberty and philosophy, adored in her, beauty, wit, and their own opinions.

The new ministry united in themselves qualifications sufficiently great to ensure success, but it was necessary not to disgust Louis XVI., and to continue their alliance with the Girondists. This at the present moment was not impracticable; but any mistakes or faults of individuals, added to the incompatibility of the parties united, would certainly prove fatal to all their schemes; and this could not but take place, and that in a very short time. Louis XVI., surprised at the activity of his two ministers, was at first delighted with their economical reforms; a means of benefiting the nation which he had always regarded, inasmuch as it demanded no sacrifice of power or principle. Had he retained this confiding disposition, or could he have separated from the court party, he might easily have maintained the constitution. He repeated it with sincerity to his ministers, and was able to satisfy Roland and Claviere, the two most difficult members of the new ministry. Both sides were persuaded of this. The Girondists, who were only republicans through distrust of the king, now ceased to be so, and Vergniaud, Gensonné, and Guadet, entered into a correspondence with Louis XVI., a circumstance afterwards made a principal charge against them. The

mand more attention, and appeal to the reason of that society with greater effect than you, that you wish in this assembly to avenge your wounded vanity? You assume that that celebrated association is degenerated; why not then demand a decree of accusation against it? I shall then be ready to stand up in its vindication, and we shall see whether you will be more successful than Leopold or Lafayette. You assert that I did not take my place in the commune till two days after the 10th, and that then I established myself, on my own authority, in the bureau. But I must inform you that I was invited some time before to become a member of the commune, and when I presented myself at the bureau, it was not to install myself in power, but to prove my legal competency. You add, that I have insulted the legislative assembly, and menaced them with the tocsin. This is false. I was indeed questioned about sounding it, and answered my interrogator that the real sounders of the tocsin were those whose injustice exasperated the minds of the people; and upon this, one of my colleagues, less reserved than the others, added, that it should be sounded. Behold the sole foundation on which my accuser has fabricated this fable? It is true that in the electoral assembly I addressed the electors, but it was previously agreed that this liberty should be allowed to all, and many availed themselves of it as well as myself. I neither accused or recommended any one. That man whom you accuse of being in my service, Marat, was never my friend, nor was he recommended by me as a deputy. If I judged of him by his accusers, he would be absolved, but I offer no opinion on this point; I shall only declare that he has always been a stranger to me, and that he never was in my house but once, when I made some observations to him upon his writings, on their exaggeration, and the regret which the patriots experienced in seeing him compromise this cause by the violence of his opinions; but he thought my views too narrow, and declared it the next day in his paper. It is therefore mere calumny to suppose me the instigator or ally of this man." Having thus replied to the personal accusations, he passed on to those which had been directed against the commune. He echoed the assertion of all its advocates, that the 2nd of September followed as a natural consequence after the 10th of August; that the exact point at which a popular insurrection should stop could not be determined; that without doubt the executions in the prisons were illegal, but that without illegal measures the yoke of despotism could never have been shaken off, and that the reproach of illegality might be applied to the whole course of the revolution; that the taking of the Bastille, and the overthrow of the throne, were both illegal acts! He then painted, in strong colours, the dangers to which Paris was at that time exposed, the indignation of the citizens, their concourse around the prisons, and the irresistible fury with which the thought of leaving conspirators behind them to assassinate their families animated them. "It has been asserted," continued the orator, "that one innocent person has perished, one only. Citizens, bewail this cruel mistake! we have long lamented it; he was a good citizen, and one of our friends! We must deplore even the fate of those who should have been reserved for the sentence of the laws, but who fell under the sword of popular justice. But let your grief have some term. Keep some tears for still heavier calamities. Weep for the fate of a hundred thousand patriots who became the victims of tyranny! Deplore the fate of those citizens who expired in their flaming abodes, whilst their children were massacred in their cradles, or in the arms of their mothers! Weep for human nature crushed under the iron yoke of tyrants!—But, if, discarding the suggestions of vile and petty passions, you are determined to provide for the welfare of your country, console yourselves for the past, and rejoice in the prospect of the future.

"That sensibility which is interested only for the enemies of liberty, appears to me of a very suspicious nature. Cease to display before my eyes the bloody robe of a tyrant, or I shall believe you wish to put Rome again in fetters."

With this jumble of crafty logic and revolutionary declamation, Robespierre succeeded in captivating his audience, and obtained universal applause. That part of his defence which related to himself was certainly just; and the Girondists were much to blame in imputing a project of usurpation to one who merely desired to enjoy an ascendancy with his party, and construing the acts of the commune into a proof of an extensive conspiracy, when they were merely the natural effects of a strong excitement of popular passions. This line of conduct brought great odium upon the Girondists with the assembly. Gratified by seeing the leader of the pretended conspirators forced to justify himself, delighted at having to impute all the crimes of September to an inevitable insurrection, and flattering themselves by a delusive prospect of the future, the assembly determined to discard all personalities, and thereupon proposed to pass to the order of the day. But Louvet darted forwards in conflict with this determination, and demanded the liberty of reply. Many other orators came forward at the same moment, some for, and others against going to the order of the day. Barbaroux, despairing of gaining a hearing, sprang to the bar, that at least he might be heard as a petitioner. Lanjuinais proposed the immediate discussion of those important questions to which the report of Roland gave rise. At last Barrère obtained a hearing. "Citizens," said he, "if there existed in the republic any man with the genius of Cæsar, the audacity of Cromwell, and the capacity of Sylla, possessing at the same time dangerous resources; if there existed any legislator among us of extraordinary genius, vast ambition, and of a reflecting mind, a general, for instance, crowned with laurels, domineering over the laws and trampling upon the rights of the people, I should move for a decree of accusation against him. But why confer such honour on characters of mere mushroom importance, on contemptible fomenters of disorder, whose civic crowns are inwreathed with cypress, whose baneful verdure will wither and die of itself!"

This singular mediator then proposed to frame the order of the day thus. "The national convention considering it their duty to devote their time solely to the interests of the republic"—"I am against," exclaimed Robespierre, "any proposition to pass to the order of the day which includes any preamble injurious to myself." The assembly

thise with the anxieties of the palace? But why are men, men? At this last question we must pause, conform ourselves, and resign ourselves to human dispensations, and pursue our painful narrative.

Leopold II. was dead; the loss of this pacific prince, who contributed greatly to preserve the tranquillity of Europe, was much to be regretted; the same moderation was not be expected from his successor and nephew, the king of Bohemia and Hungary. Gustavus, king of Sweden, had also been assassinated at a fête *. The enemies of the Jacobins attributed this assassination to that faction; but it has since been clearly proved to have been the crime of the nobility of the kingdom, humbled by Gustavus in the last revolution of Sweden. Thus the aristocracy, who inveighed against the revolutionary fury of the people in France, were presented with an example of what they themselves had formerly been and still were, in countries less civilized than their own. What an example, what a lesson, did this afford to Louis XVI., if at the time he could have comprehended it! The death of Gustavus rendered abortive the enterprise which he had meditated against France, for which Catherine was to have furnished soldiers, and Spain subsidies. It is doubtful, however, whether the perfidious Catherine would have fulfilled her promises, and the death of Gustavus, the consequences of which were so greatly exaggerated, was, in reality, an event of very little importance †.

Delessart had been impeached for the inefficient tone of his despatches; both the character and interests of Dumouriez preserved him from incurring the same censure; his communications with foreign powers, which exhibited a combination of determination and propriety, appeared to give satisfaction to Louis XVI. About this period M. de Noailles, ambassador to Vienna, and an insincere servant of the court, sent in his resignation to Dumouriez, saying that he could not hope to make the chief of the empire attend to the language which had been dictated to him. Dumouriez hastened to inform the assembly of this event, which so much roused their indignation, that they immediately brought charges against M. de Noailles. A new ambassador was also immediately sent off with fresh despatches. Two days after, Noailles retracted his resignation, and forwarded the categorical answer which he had demanded of the court of Vienna. This answer of M. de Cobentzel is, among all the faults of the foreign powers, one of the most impolitic they committed. M. de Cobentzel demanded in the name of his court, the re-establishment of the French monarchy, on the foundations fixed by the royal declaration of the 23rd of June, 1789. This was, to require the re-establishment of the three orders, the restitution of the property of the clergy, and that of the Comtat-Venaissin ‡ to the pope. The Austrian minister moreover demanded the restoration of the territories of Alsace to the princes of the empire, with all their feudal rights. A knowledge of France derived only from the passions of the emigrants, must have been the source of these conditions. It was in fact to demand at once the destruction of a constitution sworn to by the king and the nation; the revocation of an absolute determination with regard to Avignon; and, finally, an inevitable national bankruptcy, by the restitution of the property of the clergy, already sold. Moreover, what right had the emperor to require such submission? What right had he to interfere in our concerns? What complaint could even be raised with regard to the princes of Alsace, since their territories were subject to the French sovereignty, and were therefore justly forced to submit to its laws?

The king and Dumouriez lost no time in informing the assembly of the contents of this despatch. The assembly became justly indignant; and a declaration of war was now generally desired. Another event had transpired, with which Dumouriez did not acquaint the assembly; Austria, whom he had menaced with a new revolution at Liége, had sent an envoy to treat with him on this subject; and the language of this envoy being very different from that which the Austrian minister held, it was evident that the despatch just received was the effect of a sudden resolution. The assembly now annulled the decree of accusation against Noailles, and demanded of him a prompt report of the state of affairs. The king could not recede, this fatal war was finally on the point of being declared. In every case it was unfavourable to his interests; if conquerors, the French would become more encroaching and inexorable than ever; and if conquered, would attribute its failure to the king, and accuse him of having inefficiently supported the war. Louis XVI. perfectly foresaw this double danger, and it therefore cost him more pain to make this declaration than to participate in any other act of the revolution *. Dumouriez digested his report with his ordinary celerity, and carried it to Louis XVI., who kept it by him three days. He made it his business to ascertain whether the king, forced to take the initiative with the assembly, would require them to declare hostilities, or content himself with consulting them on the subject, in announcing to them that, according to his commands given, *France was in a state prepared for war*. The ministers, Roland and Claviere, advised the first measure, and all the members of the Gironde were of the same opinion, and wished to dictate the speech from the throne. Nevertheless, Louis XVI. was averse to an explicit declaration of war, and preferred declaring *France in a state prepared for war*. The difference was of small importance, yet it was more consonant to his feelings, and, indeed, the liberty of such a choice was not more than might have been justly conceded to the difficulty of his situation. Dumouriez, less inexorable than the majority of the Girondists, disregarded the advice of the ministers, and, supported by Degraves, Lacoste, and Duranthon, advocated the opinion of the king, and caused its adoption. This was his first difference with the Gironde. The king himself prepared his speech, and went in person to the assembly to deliver it, followed by all his ministers. A considerable concourse of spectators added to the effect of the sitting, which was about to decide on the fate of

* Gustavus III. was assassinated at a masked ball at Stockholm the 15th March, 1792. *Trans.*

† See note 22 in the Appendix.

‡ A territory, surrounded by Provence, which formerly belonged to the Pope. *Trans.*

* See note 23 in the Appendix.

France and Europe. The features of the king were careworn, and demonstrated deep consideration. Dumouriez read a detailed report of the negotiations with the Emperor; he showed that the treaty of 1756 was *ipso facto* broken, and that it was only as a last ultimatum that France had *placed herself in a state of war*. He added, that the king, for the purpose of consulting the assembly, having no other legal means of doing so than the *formal proposition of war*, determined to demand its advice through that medium. The king then addressed the assembly; his manner was dignified, but his voice seemed tremulous with emotion: "Gentlemen," said he, "you have just heard the result of the negotiations which I have entered into with the court of Vienna. The determinations to which it has forced me have been unanimously advised by my council, and I have adopted them myself. They are conformable to the wishes which the national assembly have several times manifested, and to the sentiments which a great number of citizens, from various parts of the kingdom, have frequently expressed; all prefer war, to seeing the dignity of the French people any longer outraged, or the national safety menaced.

"It was my duty previous to proceeding to extremities, to exhaust every expedient for the maintenance of peace. I now propose to the national assembly, according to the terms of the constitution, war against the king of Hungary and Bohemia."

This proposition met with the most flattering reception; cries of "*Vive le Roi*" echoed from all sides. The assembly answered Louis XVI., that they would deliberate on the subject, and that he should be informed of the result of their deliberations by a message. The most violent discussion then began, and was prolonged to a very late hour. The arguments on both sides of the question were again repeated; but the act was finally passed, and war resolved upon by a great majority.

"Considering," said the assembly, "that the court of Vienna, in contempt of treaties, has not ceased to grant full protection to French citizens in open rebellion against their king and country; that it has formed a league with many powers of Europe against the independence and safety of the French nation;

"That Francis I., king of Hungary and Bohemia*, has, by his despatches of the 18th of March and the 7th of April last, refused to renounce this league;

"That, in spite of the proposition made to him on the 11th of March, 1792, to reduce the troops on the frontiers to a peace establishment, he has continued and augmented his hostile preparations;

"That he has formally attacked the sovereignty of the French nation, by declaring himself willing to support the pretensions of the German princes having possessions in France, to whom the French nation has not ceased to offer indemnities;

"That he has endeavoured to divide the French citizens, and to arm them against one another, by offering support to all the discontented in league with the powers.

"Considering, finally, the refusal to answer the last despatch of the king of France, which leaves no longer any hope of obtaining the redress of these different grievances, by means of an amicable negotiation, to be equivalent to a declaration of war, &c., the assembly declare, that there is an urgent necessity for it."

It must be acknowledged that this cruel war, which so long afflicted Europe, was not provoked by France, but by the foreign powers. France, in announcing it, merely declared, by a decree, the state in which she had been placed. Condorcet was employed to make a statement of the motives actuating the nation. This valuable composition should be preserved in history, as a model of argument and an example of moderation*.

The intelligence of war gave general satisfaction. The patriots perceived in it the termination of those alarms which caused emigration and the vacillating conduct of the king; the moderate party, alarmed above all by the danger of the division of parties, hoped that the common danger would put an end to this also, and that the field of battle would become a fitting theatre of action for all those unquiet spirits who had been called into life by the revolution. A few feuillants alone, inclined on every occasion to censure the assembly, reproached them with having violated the constitution, according to which France ought never to be in a state of aggression. But it is very evident that France was not the aggressor. Therefore, with the exception of the king, and a few discontented persons, the war met with universal approbation.

Lafayette now prepared himself to serve his country gallantly in the new career which was opened to him. On him the task of executing the plan of Dumouriez, apparently ordered by Degraves, particularly devolved. Dumouriez had imagined, and not unreasonably, and had given every patriot the hope, that the invasion of Belgium would be an easy enterprise. This country, lately agitated by a revolution which had been suppressed by Austria, would naturally be disposed to rise in insurrection at the first approach of the French; and thus the declaration of the assembly to the sovereigns of Europe would be realized: *If you send us war we will return you liberty.* Moreover, it was in fact putting in execution the plan of Dumouriez, which consisted in extending France to its natural frontiers. Rochambeau commanded the army most ready to act in this operation; but his sickly constitution and peevish temper rendered him unfit for the service, and Lafayette was every way more adapted to command an expedition, partly military and partly popular. It was to have been wished that Lafayette had obtained the general command; but Dumouriez refused to accede to the arrangement, prompted to this refusal, without doubt, by party malevolence. The chief command of so important an expedition could not be given, he said, to a simple general in preference to a field-marshal, and added, with far better reason, that Lafayette was suspected by the Jacobins and the assembly. It is certain, that his youth, activity, and the devotion of his army, alarmed many, and this, added to his influence, gave occasion for injurious surmises. Be that as it may, he most willingly undertook to execute the plan of

* He was not then elected emperor.

* See note 34 in the Appendix.

the diplomatic military minister; at the same time he required fifty thousand men, with whom he purposed to proceed, by Namur and the Meuse, to Liége, from whence he proposed making himself master of the Low Countries. This plan, very well understood, was approved of by Dumouriez; a few days had as yet elapsed since the declaration of war; Austria had not had time to secure her possessions in Belgium, and the success of Lafayette appeared to be certain. He consequently received orders to proceed, first, with ten thousand men from Givet upon Namur, and from Namur upon Liége or Bruxelles, and to be immediately followed by the entire of his army. Whilst he executed this movement, Lieutenant-General Biron was to set out from Valenciennes and march upon Mons. Another officer had orders to direct his march towards Tournay and occupy it suddenly. These movements performed by the officers of Rochambeau, were only intended to support, and mask the real attack commanded by Lafayette.

The time allotted to the execution of these orders was from the 20th of April to the 2nd of May. Biron commenced his march, left Valenciennes, seized upon Quiévrain, and found some detachments of the enemy near Mons. Suddenly two regiments of dragoons, without even being within sight of the enemy, cried out, *We are betrayed!* and fled, drawing the whole army after them. In vain the officers endeavoured to stop them; the fugitives threatened to fire on them, and continued their flight. The camp was deserted, and all the military stores carried off by the imperialists. While this event took place at Mons, Theobald Dillon, according to the predetermined plan, left Lille, with two thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry; and at the very hour in which the unfortunate desertion of Biron's army took place, his own cavalry, on the approach of some Austrian troops, turned their backs, crying out that they were betrayed. The infantry followed their example, and all the baggage was again abandoned to the enemy. Theobald Dillon, and Berthois, another officer of merit, were massacred by the officers and the people of Lille, who accused them of being traitors. Meantime, Lafayette, warned too late of these events, had advanced from Metz to Givet, having surmounted unheard of difficulties and traversed many leagues in so short a time, by nearly impassable roads. Nothing but the zealous devotion of his soldiers enabled him to traverse, in so short a time, the great space he had to go over. Being informed there of the disasters which had happened to the officers of Rochambeau, he thought it prudent to halt. These unfortunate events took place at the latter end of April, 1792.

CHAPTER III.

SCHISM IN THE GIRONDIST MINISTRY—THE PRETENDED AUSTRIAN COMMITTEE—ACT FOR THE FORMATION OF A CAMP OF TWENTY THOUSAND MEN NEAR PARIS—LETTER OF ROLAND TO THE KING—THE DISMISSAL OF THE GIRONDIST MINISTRY—RESIGNATION OF DUMOURIEZ—FORMATION OF A FEUILLANTINE MINISTRY—DESIGNS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY—LETTER OF LAFAYETTE TO THE ASSEMBLY—THE SITUATION OF THE POPULAR PARTY AND ITS LEADERS; PLAN OF THE DEPUTIES OF THE SOUTH; THE PART PETION TOOK IN THE EVENTS OF JUNE—THE EVENTS OF 20th JUNE, 1792—INSURRECTIONARY MOVEMENTS OF THE FAUBOURGS; THE SCENE THAT TOOK PLACE IN THE ROYAL APARTMENTS AT THE TUILLERIES.

The news of the unfortunate events of the battles of Quiévrain and Tournay, and of the murder of General Dillon, caused general discontent. Judging from their concurrence and simultaneous character, it was natural to suppose they had been previously concerted. Parties naturally accused each other: the Jacobins and extravagant patriots declared them attempts to betray the cause of liberty. Dumouriez not accusing Lafayette, but suspecting the feuillans, imagined their object was to destroy his plan, deprive him of his popularity, and thus ruin him by withdrawing from him the support of public opinion. Lafayette complained, but less bitterly than his party, that he had received orders to march too late, and had not been furnished with the necessary means to accelerate his arrival. The feuillans spread a report that Dumouriez desired to ruin Rochambeau and Lafayette, by tracing for them a plan of operations, without furnishing the means of its execution. But such an intention cannot be for a moment supposed to have actuated Dumouriez, for, by drawing up a plan of the campaign, he had exceeded his functions as minister for foreign affairs, and exposed himself to heavy rebuke by its failure. Besides, the junction of Belgium to France, and its emancipation from despotic rule, was one of his oldest projects, and part of a scheme he had long meditated. How, therefore, can it be supposed that he wished to thwart its success! It is evident, indeed, that neither the generals or ministers were instrumental in these disasters, for the interests of all parties were equally promoted by the success of the expedition. But to substitute men for things is an injustice all factions commit in their desire to seek an object on whom they may charge the blame of a miscarriage.

Degraves, alarmed at the agitation occasioned by the late military events, wished to free himself from the burden of a duty which had long weighed heavily upon him, and Dumouriez acted unwisely in not permitting it. Louis XVI., entirely under the conduct of the Gironde, gave his office to Servan, an old soldier, known to entertain patriotic opinions. This new choice added strength to the Gironde, who could now generally command a majority in the council, having Servan, Claviere, and Roland, at their command. From this period estrangement began to disunite the ministers. The Gironde became more and more suspicious, and

consequently required still further manifestations of sincerity on the part of Louis XVI. Dumouriez, whom public opinion influenced very little, and who was deeply affected by the confidence the king reposed in him, always advocated his cause. Lacoste, who was strongly attached to his sovereign, did the same. Duranthon remained neuter, or showed a preference only to the weakest parties. Servan, Clavière, and Roland, retained their inflexibility, and entertaining all the fears of their friends, became daily more strict and inexorable in the council. Another circumstance finally completed the separation of Dumouriez from the principal members of the Gironde. He had on entering on his ministry required six millions of francs for secret expenses, unembarrassed by any obligation to give an account of their expenditure. The feuillans had objected to this requisition, but the Gironde readily supported it, and the six millions were granted. Pétion had also demanded funds for the police of Paris, and Dumouriez allowed him thirty thousand francs per month; but, ceasing to be a Girondist, he allowed but one payment. Besides this, it was either known or suspected that he had devoted a hundred thousand francs to his private pleasures. Roland, at whose house the Gironde were accustomed to meet, resented this supposed delinquency with great warmth of language, and was joined in his indignation by all his party. The ministers, at this time, usually dined alternately at each other's houses, to discuss public affairs: but when they were received at the house of Roland, his wife and all his friends were present, and it might then be said, that a council-table of the whole Gironde was formed. At one of these meetings, remonstrances were made to Dumouriez concerning the nature of his secret expenses. At first he replied in a witty and sprightly manner, but on being pressed further, became offended, and, finally, quarrelled with Roland and the Girondists. He appeared no more at their accustomed meetings, and said that he did not wish to treat of public affairs, either before a woman, or the friends of Roland: yet he sometimes still visited Roland, but never conversed on public affairs, or at least very seldom. Another circumstance detached him still more completely from the Girondists: Guadet, the most petulent member of his party, read a letter to the assembly, by which he urged ministers to persuade the king to take for his confessor a priest who had taken the oath; Dumouriez maintained that ministers could not interfere in the religious exercises of any individual. His opinion, it is true, was approved of by Vergniaud and Gensonné; but the quarrel was not less bitter on that account, and the rupture between him and his former friends became more decided than ever.

The journals now commenced their attacks upon Dumouriez. The Feuillans, who had already taken up the pen against him, were aided by the Jacobins and Girondists. He bore up, however, bravely against the storm, and prosecuted some journalists.

An accusation against Marat, the author of *The Friend of the People*, an abominable work, which openly advocated the murder of the royal family, and heaped the grossest insults on them, and every body else who happened to be objects of suspicion to the delirious imagination of its author, had been already prepared. But to balance the effect of this measure, Royou, the author of *The Friend of the King*, and who abused the republicans with the same violence as Marat did the royalists, was also prosecuted.

The Austrian committee had now been long the object of general attention. It was spoken of in the same manner by the patriots at the Hôtel de Ville as the Orleans faction was talked of at court. To this committee public opinion attributed a secret and disastrous influence carried on through the medium of the queen. But if indeed, during the constituent assembly, something resembling an Austrian committee existed, nothing of the same description had existence under the legislative. During the first period, it is certain that a great personage from the Low Countries communicated with the queen, and, in the name of her family, gave her very prudent advice; yet even this intercourse passed through the hands, and received alterations of a French gentleman, who acted as mediator. But under the legislative assembly, these private communications ceased; the family of the queen, it is true, continued their correspondence with her, but constantly recommended patience and resignation. Bertrand de Molleville and Montmorin alone were accustomed to frequent the palace, since their dismission from the ministry; against them, therefore, all suspicions were directed, and they were, in reality, the agents of all the secret commissions of the court. Being, however, publicly accused by the journalist Carra, they determined to prosecute the calumniator, and summoned him to produce evidence in support of his assertion. He referred to three deputies, Chabot, Merlin, and Bazire, as the authors of the accusations he had published; and the magistrate, Larivière, being devoted to the cause of the king, prosecuted this matter very closely against them, and had the hardihood to issue a summons to bring the three deputies before him. But the assembly, offended that any one should dare to attack the inviolability of its members, answered the magistrate by an act of impeachment, and sent the unfortunate Larivière to Orleans.

This abortive attempt at a prosecution only augmented the general discontent, and the animosity that prevailed against the court. The Girondins felt themselves no longer masters of Louis XVI. since their quarrel with Dumouriez, and, therefore, resumed that violent opposition which they had lately suspended.

The new constitutional guard of the king had been recently formed. According to an existing law, the civil household of the palace should have been composed in like manner; but the nobility, in that case, would have been excluded, as they certainly would not consent to occupy situations created by the constitution, and thus acknowledge its authority. Besides, the introduction of a new household was disagreeable to the royal family, and the plan was, therefore, discarded. "How is it, madame," said Barnave, writing to the queen, "that you allow those people to entertain the least doubt of your sentiments! When they appoint you a military and civil household, like the young Achilles among the daughters of Lycomedes, you seize hastily the sword, in contempt of simpler ornaments*." The ministers and Bertrand himself

* Memoirs of Madame Campan, vol. ii. p. 154.

Suspicions arise of the king's sincerity, and the assembly declares itself permanent—The proposed camp near Paris.

entertained the same opinions as Barnave, but they could not prevail upon the king to adopt them, and the composition of a civil household was abandoned.

The military guard, formed on a plan proposed by Delessart, was composed of a third of the troops of the line, and two-thirds of young citizens taken from the national guards. This arrangement appeared very fair; but the officers were chosen in a manner which gave alarm to the patriots. The soldiers of the line were also chosen with the same care, and by a coalition with their officers, disgusted all the young national guards, who were attached to the national cause, and who were even obliged, by ill treatment, to quit the service. Those who, in this manner, retired, were soon replaced by sure men; the number of the guard was gradually augmented, and instead of eighteen hundred, the number fixed by law, it soon amounted, it was said, to near six thousand. Dumouriez informed the king of this circumstance, to which he replied, that the old Duke de Brissac, who commanded the guard, could not be regarded as a conspirator. Yet the conduct of the guards was such at the palace and elsewhere, that suspicion burst forth on all sides, and the clubs took cognizance of them. At the same period, twelve Swiss displayed the white cockade at Neuilly; a great number of papers were burnt at Sèvres, which caused much suspicion *. The alarm then became general; the assembly declared itself permanent, as if the same danger existed as when thirty thousand men menaced Paris. It is true that disturbances were general; that the non-juring priests excited the people to insurrection in the southern provinces, and abused the practice of confession, to kindle fanaticism in their minds; that the concert of foreign powers was manifest; that Prussia was about to join Austria; that foreign armies assumed a threatening aspect; and that the disasters of Lille and Mons still occupied the imaginations of the people. It is true, also, that the power of the people gives very little confidence, that it is never trusted in before it is called into action; and that an irregular multitude, however numerous, is not an equivalent force to oppose six thousand men, armed and disciplined, whose profession it is to fight and die. The assembly hastened, therefore, to declare itself permanent †, and called for an exact report of the military household of the king, and of the number and conduct of those who composed it. After having declared the constitution violated, they passed an act for disbanding the guard, and another of impeachment against the Duke de Brissac, and sent them both for the royal sanction. The king intended at first to oppose his veto to these two decrees, but Dumouriez recalled to his recollection the dismissal of his old body-guard, much longer in his service than his new military household, and persuaded him to make a sacrifice of his feelings now, as he had done then, when it must have been much more painful. He pointed out to him also the real misdemeanours of his guard, and, finally, procured the enforcement of the act. But the king immediately insisted on its being reimbodied, and, either from a renewal of his first policy of appearing oppressed, or from a confidence in his disbanded guard, whose appointments he kept open, refused to substitute others, and thus left himself, without protection, exposed to the fury of the people. The Gironde, despairing of any change on the part of the king, followed up their attack with the most obstinate perseverance. They had already passed a new act against the priests, to supply the place of that which he had refused to sanction. Reports of their factious conduct succeeding one another without interruption, the assembly finally condemned all delinquents to transportation. Particular proof as to the culpability of guilty individuals being difficult to obtain, and this measure, as all measures of security must, resting on open suspicion, public notoriety was deemed sufficient evidence for conviction. On the information of twenty active citizens, with the approbation of the directory of the district, the directory of the department was to pronounce the sentence of transportation: the condemned priest was obliged to leave the canton in twenty-four hours, the department in three days, and the kingdom in a month. If poor, three francs per day were allowed him till his arrival at the frontiers. This severe law demonstrated the measure of indignation entertained by the assembly *. Another decree followed immediately after it. The minister Servan, without having received orders from the king, or having consulted his colleagues, proposed, on the occasion of the approaching confederation of the 14th of July, the formation of a camp of twenty thousand federalists, for the protection of the assembly and the capital. It is easy to imagine how eagerly this project was embraced by the majority, composed of Girondists. At this period their power was at its height. They were supreme in the assembly, where the constitutionalists and republicans were in the minority, and where the pretended neutrals were but pusillanimously indifferent, always becoming more and more submissive as the majority increased in strength. Besides this, by means of Pétion, the mayor, who entirely accorded with their views, they were masters of Paris. Their project was to gain dominion over the king, and thwart his suspected designs, which they hoped to accomplish by the formation of a camp; and in this they were actuated, not by personal ambition, but by that of party and opinion.

As soon as the proposition of Servan was made public, Dumouriez, in full council, demanded by what authority he had presumed to make it. He answered, by his own personal authority. "In that case," replied Dumouriez, "the title of minister of war must not in future be affixed to the name of Servan;" and the dispute between them became so animated, that, but for the presence of the king, blood would certainly have been shed in the council-room. Servan offered to withdraw his motion; but that would have been useless, for the assembly had already adopted it, and the king would have gained nothing by such a step but the appearance of violently constraining his minister. Dumouriez therefore opposed it with all his might; and it was also combated by a petition signed by eight thousand national guards, who were offended at the idea of their services being insufficient for the protection

* See note 35 in the Appendix.
† Sitting of the 12th May.

* This act is of the 27th May; the next act relative to the camp of 20 000 men is of the 8th June.

of the assembly. Nevertheless, the decree passed, and was sent to the king. There were now, therefore, two important measures to be sanctioned, and it was doubtful whether they would obtain the royal approbation. The determination of Louis was anxiously awaited, and regarded as a criterion of his future intentions.

Dumouriez maintained, in full council, that this measure would be fatal to the throne, and especially to the Girondists, because the new army would be formed under the influence of the most violent Jacobins; but he added, that notwithstanding this, it ought to be adopted by the king, as, if he refused to embody twenty thousand men regularly enlisted, forty thousand would spontaneously rise, and seize upon the capital. He declared besides, that there was a method of neutralizing the effect of this measure, and that he would make it known at the proper time. He further maintained, that the decree concerning the transportation of priests ought to be sanctioned, both because they were culpable, and because transportation would withdraw them from the fury of their adversaries. Louis XVI., however, still hesitated, and determined to take further time for reflection. In the same council, Roland read, in the presence of the king, a letter which had already been addressed to him, and which it was, consequently, useless to bring to his notice again. The idea of this letter had been suggested by Madame Roland, and was composed by herself. It had first been intended to write it in the name of all the ministers. They, however, refused to comply with this proposition, and Madame Roland persuaded her husband to take this step in his own name. In vain Duranthon, who possessed a correct although weak understanding, observed to him, and with great reason, that the tone of his letter, so far from persuading the king, would rather exasperate him against the ministers who possessed the public confidence, the result of which would be a fatal rupture between the throne and the popular party. Roland obstinately adhered to the opinion of his wife and his friends. The Gironde, in fact, wished for an explanation, and preferred a rupture to uncertainty.

Roland, therefore, read the letter to the king, who was obliged to endure its severe remonstrances in full council.

This famous letter was as follows:—

"Sire,

"The present state of France is such as cannot last long; it is a state of crisis, exposed most eminently to violence; and it must terminate in a result as interesting to your majesty, as it will be important to the whole kingdom.

"Honoured by your confidence, and placed in a situation in which it is my duty to tell you the truth, I am emboldened to speak plainly; it is an obligation which you yourself have imposed on me.

"The French nation have given themselves a constitution; this has produced disaffection and rebellion in many; the majority of the nation, however, desire its maintenance; they have sworn to defend it with their blood, and see with joy a war entered into which offers them the means of securing so invaluable a possession. Nevertheless the minority, supported by deceitful hopes, have united all their efforts to gain the ascendancy. By this intestine struggle against the laws, this anarchy, under which all good citizens groan, and which the ill-affected having taken advantage of to calumniate the new system; by this disunion every where prevalent, and every where fomented, for a neutral indifference has no existence, either the triumph, or change of the constitution is aimed at; to maintain or to alter it are the objects of the whole kingdom. I shall abstain from examining what it is in itself, to consider what circumstances require; and, with all possible impartiality, I shall point out what is to be expected from the temper of the times, and what is the most upright course of conduct to be pursued.

"Your majesty has formerly enjoyed great prerogatives, which you believed belonged to royalty; brought up in the idea that it was your duty to preserve them, you could not naturally see yourself deprived of them with pleasure: a desire to regain them is as natural as regret at having lost them. Such is the reasoning on which the enemies of the revolution build their hopes; they calculate on secret favour, until circumstances permit an open protection from your majesty. These dispositions could not escape the observation of the nation, and they have naturally excited suspicion.

"Your majesty has, therefore, been constantly placed between the alternatives of yielding to early habits and your personal inclinations, or of making sacrifices, dictated by philosophy, and exacted by necessity; either of emboldening the rebels, by irritating the nation, or of tranquillizing the latter, by uniting yourself to it. Every thing has its season, and that of uncertainty has finally arrived.

"Your majesty may at present ally yourself openly to those who pretend to reform the constitution; but ought you not rather generously to devote yourself without reserve to those who would ensure its triumph? Such is the true question, whose solution the actual state of things renders inevitable: as to that metaphysical question, whether the French are ripe for liberty, its discussion is improper here, for we are not called upon to decide what we may be in a century, but to observe what the present generation is capable of.

"From the agitation in which we have lived for four years, what has been produced? Privileges burdensome to the people have been abolished; ideas of justice and equality are now naturalized in all minds; the declaration of the rights of the people has justified the instinctive sentiment of those rights; the solemn acknowledgment of them has become a sacred doctrine; and hatred to the nobility, inspired so long ago by the feudal system, has been increased by the open opposition of most of that order to the constitution, which annihilates them.

"During the first year of the revolution, the people saw in the nobility men odious from the oppressive privileges which they possessed, but whom they would have ceased to regard with animosity after the destruction of those privileges, had their conduct, since that period, not strengthened every motive to fear and resist them, as irreconcileable enemies.

"Attachment to the constitution has increased in the same proportion; the people have not only derived from it sensible benefits, but look for still greater, since those who formerly imposed every

burden on their shoulders, have manifested so much anxiety to modify or destroy it.

"The declaration of rights has become a political gospel, and the French constitution a religion, in defence of which the people are ready to die.

"Thus, zeal has sometimes supplied the place of law; and when the latter has not been able to repress disturbers, the citizens have inflicted punishment themselves.

"Thus the property of the emigrants has been exposed to the ravages which vengeance inspired; and so many departments have thought themselves bound to exercise severity against the priests whom public opinion has proscribed, and to which some of them have fallen victims.

"In this shock of interests, our political opinions are not held loosely and indifferently, but passionately espoused. Our country is not a mere fanciful idea, which we have chosen to embellish; it is a being to which we have made sacrifices, and to which we become daily more attached by the solicitude which it creates; it has been begotten in painful labour, has sprung up in the midst of troubles, and is loved as much on account of what it has cost us, as what we hope from it; and all the attacks which are made upon it are only the means of inflaming our enthusiastic attachment. To what a pitch is this enthusiasm carried at the present moment, when the forces of our enemies assembled without, are in concert with interior intriguers, for the purpose of dealing the most fatal blows to the constitution! The ferment of the public mind in all parts of the empire is extreme, and a terrible explosion must follow, at least, if a firm reliance cannot be placed in your majesty's intentions; but this reliance can never be established on protestations, it must have facts for its foundation.

"It is evident to the whole French nation, that the constitution will be free in its operations, and the government possess all its necessary force, from the moment that your majesty, heartily desiring the triumph of the constitution, supports the legislative body with all the power of the executive, taking away every pretext for disturbances among the people, and depriving the discontented of all hope.

"For instance, two important decrees have been passed; in both, the public tranquillity and the safety of the nation are vitally concerned: the delay of their sanction inspires suspicion; if prolonged, it will generate discontent; and it is my duty to tell you, that it is impossible to guess to what results the irritated state of the public mind may lead.

"It is no longer time to retreat; there is no longer even the means of temporizing: the revolution is accomplished in the public mind; it will attain its object at the price of blood, and be cemented by it, if wisdom does not prevent those calamities which it is still possible to avoid.

"I know that there are those who imagine that every thing may be effected, and the whole kingdom kept in subjection by extreme measures; but should force be employed to constrain the assembly, should fear hold Paris in captivity, and spread disunion and stupor through the environs, all France would rise with indignation, and would develop, in the horrors of civil war, that gloomy energy, which is the mother of virtues and crimes, and always fatal to those who provoke it.

"The safety of the state, and the happiness of your majesty, are bound up together; nothing can separate them. Cruel and certain calamities surround your throne, if it is not supported by yourself on the basis of the constitution, and does not derive stability from that concord and tranquillity, which the maintenance of the new system of things will finally procure. Thus, the dispositions of the people, the course of the revolution, reasons of policy, and the interest of your majesty, render it indispensably obligatory on you to unite yourself closely to the legislative body, and thus fulfil the wishes of the nation. These combined considerations render that necessary which principle makes a duty. But the natural sensibility of the French people would discover in such conduct a motive for gratitude. Those who would inspire you with distance and distrust towards this people, cruelly deceive you. By contradictory counsels and harassing circumstances, you have been driven to assume a part calculated to alarm the nation; but let it see that you are resolved to give free scope to the constitution, to which its felicity is so inseparably attached, and you will soon become the object of its most fervent attachment.

"The conduct of the priests in many places, and the pretexts which fanaticism has afforded to the ill-affected, have occasioned the passing of a salutary law against those disturbers. May your majesty give it your sanction! the public tranquillity demands it, and the safety of the priests solicits it. If this law is not put in force, the departments will be forced to substitute in its place, as has already been done in many districts, violent measures, and the people, irritated by your majesty's opposition, will rush into excesses.

"The attempts of our enemies, the agitation which is every where manifested in the capital, the extreme inquietude which the conduct of your guard has occasioned, and the testimony of satisfaction which your majesty has given them, by a proclamation truly impolitic, considering all circumstances; the situation of Paris, and its proximity to the frontiers, have clearly pointed out the necessity of a camp in the neighbourhood. This measure, whose wisdom and necessity has struck all unprejudiced minds, only waits for your majesty's sanction; why should delays give an air of regret and constraint to an act, which a speedy compliance would entitle to gratitude!

"The attempts of the staff of the national Parisian guard against this measure, have already excited suspicions that they have acted at the instigation of a superior authority; the declamations of some outrageous demagogues have also given them the appearance of being allied with those interested in the overthrow of the constitution. The public doubt, even now, of the intentions of your majesty; a little more delay, and the unhappy people will think they perceive in their king the friend and accomplice of the conspirators.

"Just Heavens! have you struck with blindness the kings of the earth, and will they never take any counsels but those which lead to their ruin!

"I know that the austere language of truth is seldom spoken near a throne; I know also, that because it is so seldom heard, revolutions become

necessary; I know, above all, that I should hold it to your majesty, not only as a citizen subject to the laws, but as a minister honoured by your confidence, and invested with functions which make its avowal an essential part of my office; and nothing can prevent me fulfilling a duty which lies upon my conscience.

"It is in the same spirit that I reiterate my representations to your majesty, on the obligation and utility of executing that law which prescribes the necessity of having a secretary for the council. The simple existence of the law speaks so powerfully, that the execution of it should follow without delay; besides, it is necessary to employ every means of preserving gravity, wisdom, and mature reflection in our deliberations; and, for responsible ministers, some means of stating their opinions is also requisite: if such existed, I should not now address myself by writing to your majesty.

"Life is a very inferior consideration to a man who esteems his duty above everything; but, after the happiness of having fulfilled it, the satisfaction to which he will be further sensible, is the reflection of having done it with fidelity, and even this is obligatory on a public man.

(Signed) "ROLAND."

"*Paris*, June 10th, 1792,
"Fourth Year of Liberty."

The king listened to this lecture with extraordinary patience, and left the council-room, saying he would make known his intentions.

Dumouriez was immediately called to the palace. He found the king and queen together. "Ought we," said they, "to endure any longer the insolence of these three ministers?" "No," replied Dumouriez. "Will you take upon yourself to deliver us from them?" replied the king. "Yes, sire," added again this bold minister; "but to succeed, it is necessary that your majesty should consent to one condition: I have become unpopular; I am about to become still more so by dismissing three colleagues, leaders or members of a powerful party; there is only one way of persuading the people that they are not dismissed on account of their patriotism." "What is it?" asked the king. "It is," replied Dumouriez, "to sanction the two decrees;" and he repeated the arguments he had already made use of in full council. The queen declared that the condition was too hard, but Dumouriez made her understand that twenty thousand men were not to be feared; that the decree did not point out the place where they were to be encamped; that they might be sent to Soissons, and there continually occupied in military exercises, from whence they could be gradually despatched to the armies, as troops might be wanted. "But in that case," said the king, "you must be my minister of war." "In spite of the responsibility, I consent to it," said Dumouriez, "but your majesty must sanction the decree against the priests; I can only serve you at that price; this decree, far from injuring the ecclesiastics, withdraws them from the fury of the people; your majesty should have opposed the first decree of the constituent assembly, which enforced the oath; at present it is too late to retreat." "I was to blame, then," cried Louis XVI., "but that will not justify me in committing the same error again." The queen, who did not partake of his religious scruples, joined her arguments to Dumouriez's, and the king appeared at the moment to give his consent.

Dumouriez then suggested out new ministers to be appointed in the place of Servan, Clavière, and Roland. They were, Mourgues for the interior, and Beaulieu for the finances. The war department was given to Dumouriez, who, for the moment, united in his own person two offices, till that of foreign affairs could be otherwise filled up. The order was then immediately given, and on the 13th Roland, Clavière, and Servan, received their dismission. Roland, who had audacity to execute all that the bold genius of his wife devised, presented himself immediately to the assembly, and read the letter he had written to the king, for which he was dismissed. This conduct, in an open state of hostility, was certainly allowable; but when a promise had been made to the king to keep the letter secret, it was undoubtedly a very ungenerous proceeding.

The assembly highly applauded the letter of Roland, ordered it to be printed, and sent to the eighty-three departments; and moreover declared that the three dismissed ministers possessed the confidence of the nation. It was at this very moment that Dumouriez, so far from fearing the consequence of these acts, had the hardihood to appear at the tribune with the new title of minister of war. He had hastily prepared a circumstantial report on the state of the army, and on the faults of the administration and the assembly. He was not accustomed to spare those who he knew were disposed to give him a bad reception. The moment he appeared he was assailed by hootings from the Jacobins; the feuillans observed a profound silence. He first gave an account of a slight advantage gained by Lafayette over the enemy, and of the death of Gouvion, an officer, a deputy, and a man of substance, who, being driven to despair by the misfortunes of his country, had voluntarily put an end to his existence. The assembly lamented the loss of this generous citizen; but listened coldly to Dumouriez's expressions of regret, and particularly the desire he avowed of escaping the same calamities by the same fate. But when he gave his report as minister of war, murmurs of indignation rose from all sides. This, however, did not in the least disconcert him, and he calmly resumed his discourse, and finally obtained silence. His remonstrances irritated some deputies. "Do you hear?" exclaimed Guadet; "he presumes to give us advice." "And why not?" coolly replied the intrepid Dumouriez. Silence being restored, he finished his speech, and was both hooted and applauded by the several factions which divided the assembly. He then folded up his papers, to take them away. "He flies!" exclaimed a voice. "No!" resumed he, and boldly replaced his papers on the bureau, signed them, and walked across the assembly with the most unruffled serenity of aspect and manner. He was pressed upon and impeded in his passage, and some deputies cried out, "You will be sent to Orleans." "So much the better," replied he, "I shall then take baths and whey, which I greatly require, and rest myself after my labours."

His firmness imparted confidence to the king, who expressed to him his satisfaction; but this un-

happy prince was already tormented by conflicting scruples; besieged by pretended friends, he had already returned to his former resolves, and would not give the royal assent to the two acts.

The four ministers assembled in council begged the king, as he had seemed to promise, to give his *sanction* to both the acts. The king drily answered, that he would only consent to the act for the twenty thousand men; that, as to that against the priests, he was decided on opposing it, that his mind was fixed, and that threats had no terrors for him. He read the letter by which he announced his determination to the president of the assembly. "One of you," said he to his ministers, "must countersign it;" and he pronounced these words in a different tone of voice than he had ever been heard to utter.

Dumouriez then wrote to him to demand his dismissal. "This man," cried the king, "has made me dismiss three ministers, because they endeavoured to oblige me to adopt the decrees, and yet he now desires I should give my royal assent to them." This reproach was unjust, for it was only on condition of the double *sanction* that Dumouriez consented to survive his colleagues. Louis XVI. had a personal interview with him, and asked him if he persisted in his determination. Dumouriez was unshaken. "In that case," said he, "I accept your resignation." All the ministers followed Dumouriez's example, except Lacoste and Duranthon, whom the king persuaded to remain with him. Messrs. Lajard, Chambonas, and Terrier de Mont-Ciel, chosen from the feuillans, occupied the offices which had become vacant.

"The king," says Madame Campan, "at this period, fell into a dejection of spirits, which amounted almost to an alienation of mind. He was ten days without articulating a word, even in his own family, except, perhaps, at a game of backgammon, which he played with Madame Elizabeth after dinner, when he only pronounced those words which were indispensable for the game. The queen recovered him from this state of mind, so fatal in his critical situation, in which he was hourly called upon to act, by throwing herself at his feet, and rousing him by images of terror, as well as expressions of tenderness. She recalled to his mind what he owed to his family, and went so far as to tell him, that if they must perish, it ought to be with honour, and that they should not wait to be strangled on the floor of their apartment *."

It is not difficult to conceive in what temper of mind Louis returned to himself and the care of his affairs. After having once abandoned the party of the feuillans to throw himself into the arms of the Girondists, he could not return to the former either with much pleasure or hope. He had demonstrated a double evidence of his incompatibility with one party and with the other, and what was more grievous, he had done this with every body. From this time, it was natural he should look to foreign aid, and place all his hopes in that quarter. This disposition was evident to every one, and alarmed all those who saw, in the invasion of France, the fall of liberty, the death and degradation of its defenders, and, perhaps, the partition and dismemberment of the kingdom. Louis did not perceive this, for we always conceal from ourselves the disadvantages of that in which we have placed all our hopes. Alarmed at the tumult which the desertion at Mons and Tournay had produced, he sent Mallet-du-Pan into Germany, with instructions written in his own hand. He there recommended the sovereigns to advance with caution, to treat with the greatest consideration the inhabitants of the provinces through which they marched, and to send a manifesto before them to declare their pacific and conciliatory intentions *. However moderate this design might be, it did not the less convey an invitation to invade the country; and, besides, if the heart of Louis was thus free from hostility, were the dispositions of foreign princes, rivals of France and those of the exasperated emigrants, equally mild? Was the king himself sure that he would not be drawn in, and go farther than he intended? Even the ministers of Prussia and Austria expressed to Mallet-du-Pan the distrust with which the extravagant conduct of the emigrants inspired them, and it appears he had much trouble in reassuring them on that subject †; the queen also distrusted them, and feared Calonne, as the most dangerous of her enemies ‡; but she did not the less entreat her family to act with the greatest promptitude for her deliverance. From this moment, the popular party might regard the court as an enemy, the more formidable, from its having at its disposal all the resources of the state; and the impending struggle between them was one of life or death. The king, in composing his new ministry, took care not to choose any man whose opinions were publicly known. In the expectation of his approaching deliverance, he had only to pass a few days, as he imagined, in his present thraldom, and thought that the most insignificant ministry would answer him for so short a time.

The Feuillans endeavoured to profit by the present occasion to attach themselves again to the court, but less, it must be confessed, from personal ambition, than from a desire to serve the king. They thought little of the invasion; they saw in it an attempt, the danger of which threatened the court as much as the nation. They foresaw, and with reason, that the king would probably fall a sacrifice to popular indignation before succour could reach him; and after the invasion, they dreaded a cruel retribution, perhaps the dismembering of the kingdom, and certainly the abolition of all liberty.

Lally Tolendal, who, it has been seen, quitted France the moment the establishment of two chambers was rejected, Malouet, who had again attempted to carry that measure, on the Revision §, and Duport, Lameth, Lafayette, and others, whose sole object it was to preserve the liberty which had already been acquired, now concerted means for the fulfilment of the common views. This party was not (as indeed was the case with all of them)

* See Madame Campan, vol. ii. p. 266.

* See note 26 in the Appendix.

† See note 27 in the Appendix.

‡ See note 28 in the Appendix.

§ The revision of the declaration of rights, at the closing of the constituent assembly. p. 71, col. 2. *Transl.*

on better terms with itself than the court or the Jacobins, but at present the single object, that of saving the king from the consequence of his own errors, and to save the constitution with him, kept them united. Every unsuccessful party compelled to act in the dark, has to depend upon its own plans, which are termed intrigues when they prove unsuccessful. In this sense, the Feuillans intrigued. When they saw the dismission of Servan, Clavière, and Roland brought about by Dumouriez, they proposed allying themselves to him, on condition that he would countersign the veto against the decree concerning the priests. Dumouriez, perhaps from petulance, perhaps from want of confidence in their means, and without doubt also because he had engaged to get that decree sanctioned, repeated these overtures, and joined the army, with the hope, as he wrote to the assembly, that a shot from a cannon might reconcile all opinions with regard to his conduct.

Lafayette remained still in the party of the Feuillans, and, without entering into their secret intrigues, partook of their ill opinions against Dumouriez, and desired, above all things, to save the king without effecting a change in the constitution. Their means, however, were few. The court whom they wished to save, did not wish to be saved by their interference. The queen, who confided voluntarily in Barnave, always employed the greatest precautions in her interviews with him, and never received him but in secret: for the emigrants and the court would never have pardoned her for conferring personally with a constitutionalist; they recommended her, in fact, not to treat with that party, but rather to prefer the Jacobins, because, said they, engagements must be entered into with the former, but with the latter no terms need be kept*. If the personal hatred of the queen to Lafayette, is added to these oft-repeated counsels, it will easily be comprehended how little the court was disposed to avail itself of the service of either the Constitutionalists or Feuillans. Besides these inconsistencies of the court with regard to itself, the inefficiency of their means against the popular party must be considered. Lafayette, it is true, was adored by his soldiers, and could count on the devotion of his army; but he had the enemy before him, and could not leave the frontier exposed, to march towards the interior. Old Luckner, on whom, in that case, he must have solely relied, was feeble-minded, fluctuating, and easily intimidated, though brave in action. But, although their military resources were considerable, the Constitutionalists had no civil means. The majority of the assembly were Girondists; the national guard certainly were partly disposed to favour them, but they were disunited, and nearly disorganized; the Constitutionalists therefore were reduced to employ their military force to march from the frontier to Paris, that is to say, to attempt an insurrection against the assembly; and insurrections favourable to a violent party taking the offensive, are fatal and grievous to a moderate party, who is anxious, while acting on the defensive, not to violate the law.

In the mean time, Lafayette was beset by this party, who concerted with him the plan of a letter which was to be addressed to the assembly. This letter, written in his name, was to contain his true sentiments respecting the king and the constitution, and his disapprobation of whatever militated against the one or the other. His friends were divided in opinion on this subject, some incited and others repressed his zeal; but as he himself had no object in view but that of serving the king, to whom he had sworn fealty, he wrote the letter, and braved all the dangers to which it exposed him. The king and queen, although resolved not to avail themselves of his services, allowed him to write the letter, for they did but see in this expedient the friends of liberty at variance. The letter was presented to the assembly on the 18th of June. Lafayette began by disapproving of the proceedings of the last ministry, whom, he said, he was about to impeach when he heard of their dismissal. He continued as follows:—

"It is not enough that this branch of the government be delivered from a pernicious influence; the state itself is in danger, and on the representation of the people does the nation principally place its reliance; but having acquired a constitution, it alone must be the medium of maintaining the national welfare."

Protesting, then, his inviolable attachment to the laws, he described the state of France, and represented her as placed between two enemies, internal and external.

"It is absolutely necessary to conquer them both, but constitutional and just measures can alone give you that power. Look around you. Can you deny that a faction, and, to prevent all misconception, the Jacobin faction, has been the source whence all disorders have sprung? I accuse them openly! Forming a distinct corporation in the metropolis, and in the provinces by their affiliated societies, they usurp the power of the nation, and domineer over its representatives in the assembly.

"In the sittings of this club attachment to the laws is termed aristocracy, and their violation patriotism; there the assassins of Desilles receive their triumphs; there the crimes of Jourdan find panegyrists; there the massacres which have disgraced the city of Metz excite infernal acclamations!

"Think you to escape reproach by shielding yourselves behind an Austrian manifesto, in which these sectaries are mentioned? Have they become sacred since Leopold has pronounced their name? And because we are obliged to declare war with those foreign powers who have interfered in our affairs, are we, for that reason, freed from the obligation of delivering our country from a domestic tyranny?"

Referring then to the services he had rendered to the cause of liberty, and enumerating the guarantees he had given to his country, the general answered for the fidelity of himself and his troops, and declared that the French nation, unless it were the basest in the universe, could and ought to resist the conspiracy of kings that had been formed against her. "But," added he, "if it is desired that we, the soldiers of liberty, should not fight and die for our country in vain, the strength of our army should be made to bear some proportion to that of the enemy; our stores should be

* See note 39 in the Appendix.

increased, that our movements may be facilitated; and the welfare of the troops, their clothing, payment, &c., should not be made subject to such fatal delays."

Many other salutary admonitions were added, of which the following was the last and most important:—"May the reign of the clubs, overturned by you, give place to the reign of the law; their usurpations, to the firm and free action of the constituted authorities; their disorganizing maxims, to the true principles of liberty; their delirious fury, to the calm and constant courage of a nation appreciating its rights and defending them with energy; finally, their sectarian combinations, to the true interests of the country, which, in this moment of danger, should unite all those heart and hand to whom its slavery and ruin are not objects of atrocious exultation and infamous speculation!"

This was saying to exasperated passions, be calm; to the parties themselves, voluntarily immolate yourselves; or to a torrent, stop! Although, however, his advice was useless, it was still the duty of the general to urge it. His letter was much applauded by the right side, the left remained silent; and as soon as the reading of it was finished, it was proposed to print it, and send it to the departments.

Vergniaud then rose. He observed that the liberty which Monsieur Lafayette had hitherto so well defended, required that a distinction should be made between the petitions of private citizens, who might either offer a piece of intelligence, or demand the execution of some act of justice, and the advice of a general at the head of an army. The latter, he observed, should confine his communications with the assembly to the channel of the ministry, or it would be impossible to preserve the existence of liberty. He therefore proposed passing to the order of the day. Thevenot replied, that it was the duty of the assembly to receive from the mouth of Lafayette truths which it had not dared to disclose to itself. This last observation occasioned much uproar. Some members denied the authenticity of the letter. "Even if it had not been signed," exclaimed M. Coubé, "none but M. Lafayette could have written it." Guadet required leave to make a single observation; he remarked, that the letter could not have been written by M. Lafayette, as it spoke of the dismissal of Dumouriez, which had not taken place on the 16th inst., which was its date. "It is impossible," added he, "that the subscriber should speak of a fact which could not have been known to him. Either, therefore, the signature is not M. Lafayette's, or a blank space must have been left for it, to be filled up at the will of a faction." This observation caused a great sensation. Guadet resumed his speech, and declared that, judging from the known sentiments of M. Lafayette, he should think him incapable of having written the letter in question. "He ought to know," added he, "that when Cromwell"——Dumas, not being able to contain himself at this last word, demanded to speak—the assembly was now full of disorder—nevertheless, Guadet regained possession of the tribune, and continued: "I said"—— here he was interrupted again. "You were making an observation about Cromwell," exclaimed many voices. "I observed, that M. de Lafayette ought to have known that when Cromwell held similar language, the liberties of England were destroyed. We must ascertain the truth; either some skulking poltroon has masked himself with the name of M. Lafayette, or, if we discover that the letter has really been written by him, we shall be called upon to prove, by a great example, to the nation, that the oath you have taken to maintain the constitution was not made in vain.

Many members attested the signature of M. Lafayette, nevertheless it was sent to the committee of twelve, that its authenticity might be ascertained. This prevented its being printed and sent to the departments.

The generous conduct of Lafayette was therefore perfectly useless, as might have been expected, and he himself became almost as unpopular as the court; for although the Girondists might not believe Lafayette capable of betraying his country because he had attacked the Jacobins, the mass of the people, by dint of hearing it repeated in the clubs, the journals, and the public places, did believe it.

Thus the conduct of the general only added to the alarms which the court occasioned to the popular party, who, driven to despair, resolved to strike a blow at its enemies before they could put into execution those designs whereof they were accused.

The composition of the popular party has already been described. Their principles became daily more clearly developed, and new characters became conspicuous among them. Robespierre had already acquired much celebrity at the Jacobin club, and Danton among the Cordeliers. The clubs, the municipality, and the sections, contained many zealots, ready for any enterprise. In this number were included Sergent and Panis, who were afterwards identified with a formidable event. In the faubourgs many commandants of battalions had rendered themselves formidable, the chief of whom was a beer brewer named Santerre. By a lofty stature, a sonorous voice, and a certain gift of the gab, he succeeded in pleasing the people, and acquired a species of absolute control over the Faubourg St. Antoine, whose battalion he commanded. Santerre had already distinguished himself in the attack on Vincennes, quelled by Lafayette in February, 1791; and like all weak men was governed by the impulse of the moment. He assisted at all the popular convocations which were held in any of the faubourgs. In these he allied himself with the journalist Carra, who had been prosecuted for libelling Bertrand de Molleville and Montmorin; a man of the name of Alexandre, commandant of the Faubourg St. Marceau; another individual, better known as Fournier the American: Legendre the butcher, who afterwards became a deputy of the convention: Rossignol a goldsmith's foreman; and several others; who, by their intimacy with the populace, kept the faubourgs in continual agitation. Through the most respectable of these they communicated with the leaders of the popular party, and could thus subject their proceedings to a superior direction.

The deputies who gave this direction to the multitude cannot be distinctly pointed out. The most distinguished members of them were strangers to Paris, and possessed no influence except what

their eloquence obtained for them. Guadet, Isnard, and Vergniaud were all inhabitants of the provinces, and kept up more intercourse with their departments than with Paris. Besides, although warm in the tribune, they had no activity out of doors, and were incapable of stirring up the multitude. Condorcet and Brissot, deputies of Paris, were equally as inactive; and, by their conformity of opinion with the deputies of the west and south, had become Girondists. Roland, since the dismissal of the patriot ministry, had led a perfectly retired life. He inhabited a small and retired house in the Rue St. Jaques. Being persuaded that the king had determined to deliver up France and liberty into the hands of foreigners, he deplored, with a few of his friends, deputies of the assembly, the misfortunes of his country, yet it does not appear that he ever meditated an attack upon the court. All he did, was to encourage a journal called the *Sentinel*, which Louvet, who had distinguished himself in his controversy with Robespierre on the question of the war, edited in a manner truly patriotic. Roland, during his ministry, had appropriated certain funds to the support of periodical works, whose object was to inform the public mind on political affairs; it was with the remainder of those funds that the expenses of the *Sentinel* were now defrayed.

About this period, there was at Paris a young Marseillais, ardent, courageous, and inspirited by republican illusions, who obtained the name of Antinöus from his remarkable personal beauty. He had been returned by his commune to the assembly, for the purpose of making complaints against the directory of his department; for these dissensions between the inferior and superior authorities, between municipalities and departmental directories were common enough throughout France. The real name of this young Marseillais was Barbaroux. Possessing great talent and activity, he was well adapted to serve the popular cause. He visited Roland, and deplored with him the calamities which menaced the patriots. They agreed, that as these dangers grew every day darker in the north, it would be necessary, in case of extremity, to retire to the southern provinces, and there found a republic, which might gradually enlarge its limits, as Charles VII. had formerly extended his kingdom of Bourges. They examined the map with the ex-minister Servan, and observed that, driven from the Rhine, and beyond, liberty could retreat behind the Vosges and the Loire; that, driven from these entrenchments, there yet remained in the east, the Doubs, the Ain, and the Rhône; in the west, the Vienne and the Dordogne; and in the centre, the rocks and rivers of Limousin. "Still further on," added Barbaroux, "we have the Auvergne, its precipitous steeps, its ravines, its ancient forests, and the mountains of Velay, enveloped with volcanic explosions and covered with woods of fir; uncultivated haunts, where the inhabitants labour in the snow, but preserve their independence. The Cévennes also opens to us an asylum too well known not to be formidable to tyranny; and at the extremity of the south, we find few barriers, the Isère, the Durance, and the Rhône from Lyons to the sea, the Alps, and the ramparts of Toulon. Finally, if all these holds should be forced, Corsica would still remain—Corsica, where the Genoese and French have never been able to naturalize tyranny, and which wants nothing but hands to fertilize, and philosophers to enlighten it *."

It was natural for the natives of the south to contemplate taking refuge in their provinces, if Paris should be invaded. Yet they did not neglect the north, for they wrote to their departments, urging the spontaneous formation of a camp of twenty thousand men, although the decree relative to this measure was not sanctioned. They reckoned with strong assurance on the co-operation of Marseilles, a rich, populous, and democratic city. This city had sent Mirabeau to the states-general, and had since been active in diffusing her animating spirit over the provinces of the south. The mayor of this town was the friend of Barbaroux, and joined in all his republican opinions. Barbaroux directed him to lay up a large provision of corn, to send men in whom confidence could be placed into the neighbouring departments, and to the armies of the Alps, Italy, and of the Pyrenees, to prepare the public mind, to sound Montesquieu, the general of the army of the Alps, and make his ambition serviceable to the cause of liberty; and, finally, to concert measures with Paoli and the Corsicans, to bespeak their aid, and as it were to provide for the patriots a last resource and safe asylum. He further recommended this same mayor to retain the revenues of the taxes collected in the department, that the executive government might be deprived of them, and that, if need were, they should be made available against the government. The example of Barbaroux at Marseilles, was followed by others in most of the provinces. Thus, distrust being converted into despair, every preparation was made for a general insurrection, and in these preparations a variance might already be discerned between Paris and the departments.

The mayor, Pétion, connected with the Girondists, and afterwards identified and proscribed with them, was, owing to his situation, constantly in communication with the rioters of Paris. He was a very steady magistrate, and possessed much of that coolness which his enemies mistook for stupidity, with a downright honesty highly extolled by his partisans, and which his enemies never denied. The people surnamed him "Virtue Pétion." We have already spoken of him as one of the deputies who escorted the king on his return from Varennes, and whom the court preferred to Lafayette, when candidate for the mayoralty of Paris. The court desired to corrupt his integrity, and their panders promised them success. These persons required a sum of money for the purpose, and kept it for themselves, without even making overtures to Pétion, whom they knew to be inaccessible to bribery. The self-gratulation of the court in procuring some support, and at the same time corrupting a public magistrate, was of short duration. They soon discovered their mistake, and found that the virtues of their adversaries were not so venal as they had imagined.

Pétion was one of the first who could not believe that the notions of a king whose birthright was an absolute monarchy, could ever be qualified. Pétion

* Memoirs of Barbaroux, pp. 28, 29.

was, consequently, a republican before even a republic was ever hinted at; and in the constituent assembly maintained those principles from conviction, which Robespierre advanced from motives of bitterness and malevolence. Under the legislative assembly, he became still more convinced of the incorrigibility of the court, being persuaded that they would call in foreign aid: and having first been a republican in theory, he next became one in a practical view, as the only means of security. From this time, therefore, he himself declared that he gave every encouragement to a new revolution, checking all insurrections which appeared badly directed, favouring those which seemed to promise a successful result, and endeavouring to reconcile their acts with the letter of the law, of which he himself was a rigid observer, and which he was unwilling to violate, except in a case of the last extremity.

Without being able to point out precisely the part Pétion took in the disorders which were now being fomented, or to ascertain whether he consulted with his Girondist friends on the subject, it may be safely asserted that he threw no obstacles in their way. It has been reported, that towards the end of June, Pétion, together with Robespierre, Manuel the procureur syndic of the commune, and Sillery, an ex-constituent, met at the house of Santerre; that Chabot an ex-capuchin and deputy then harangued the section of Quinze Vingts, and informed them that the assembly awaited their co-operation. Whether this took place or not, it is certain that popular meetings were held at this period, and, judging from their avowed opinions and subsequent conduct, it is highly probable that these individuals, whom we have just named, did not scruple to take an active part in their proceedings*. It was about this time that the idea of celebrating the 20th of June, the anniversary of the oath of the tennis-court, by a popular fête, was first started in the faubourgs. It was proposed to plant the tree of liberty on the terrace of the Feuillans, and to address a petition to the assembly and the king. This petition was to be presented by an armed multitude, and its object was evidently to terrify the court by a display of forty thousand pikes.

On the 16th of June, a formal demand was addressed to the council-general of the commune, calling upon them to authorize the presentation of a petition to the king and the assembly on the 20th, by the armed citizens of the faubourg St. Antoine. The council-general, without paying attention to this demand, passed to the order of the day, and ordered their resolution to be communicated to the directory and municipality. The petitioners did not consider themselves as prohibited, and declared loudly that they should nevertheless hold their meeting. The mayor, Pétion, delayed the communications of the 16th till the 18th, and then merely laid them before the department, and not before the municipal body.

On the 19th, the directory of the department which, we have observed, signalized itself on every occasion by its activity against the rioters, issued an order which prohibited all armed meetings, and called upon the commandant-general to neglect no means of dispersing them. This order was presented to the assembly by the minister of the interior, and the question was agitated whether it should be read. Vergniaud opposed its reception, but without success; it was therefore read, and followed immediately by the order of the day.

Two events of great importance had just happened in the assembly. The king had signified his dissent from the two acts, of which one was relative to the non-juring priests, and the other to the establishment of a camp of twenty thousand men. This communication was received in profound silence. At the same moment a body of Marseillais presented themselves at the bar of the chamber to read a petition. The effects of Barbaroux's correspondence with his native city will now be perceived. Roused by his exhortations, the Marseillais had written to Pétion, offering him all their forces, and to this offer was joined a petition addressed to the assembly, of which the following is an extract.

"The liberty of France is in danger, but the patriotism of the South will defend it. The day of the people's wrath has arrived. Legislators! the physical strength of the people is in your hands; make use of it. Patriotism calls upon you—march with the most commanding forces towards the capital and the frontiers. You will not surely refuse the authority of the law to those who are willing to perish in its defence."

The reading of this petition provoked long debates in the assembly. The members of the right side maintained, that to send it into the departments would be to incite them to insurrection. In the assembly, nevertheless, the sending of it was decreed, in spite of these just but useless reflections, for the majority were persuaded that nothing but a new revolution could save the nation.

Such were the events of the 19th. In the mean time crowds were assembling in the faubourgs, and Santerre, according to report, is said to have spoke thus to those of his associates, who were somewhat intimidated by the directory, "*What do you fear? The national guard will not receive orders to fire, and M. Pétion will be there.*"

At midnight, the mayor, either thinking the approaching insurrection irresistible, or being willing to favour it, as he did that of the 10th of August, wrote to the directory, soliciting them to legalize the assemblages of the people, by permitting the national guard to receive the citizens of the faubourgs into their ranks. This expedient perfectly satisfied those who, without desiring to promote disorders, wished to intimidate the king; and every thing proves that this was the object of Pétion and the popular leaders. The directory replied to this letter at five o'clock in the morning of the 20th of June, that it persisted in its former orders. Pétion then ordered the commandant-general to furnish all his military posts with their full complement of men, and to double the guard of the Tuilleries; but he did nothing more; and desiring neither to renew the scene of the Champ-de-Mars, or to disperse the assemblage of citizens, he waited till nine o'clock for the meeting of the municipal body. At this meeting, they came to a contrary decision from that of the directory, and it was enjoined the national guard that they should open their ranks to the armed petitioners. Pétion, in not

* See note 40 in the Appendix.

opposing this resolution, though it violated the administrative constitution, placed himself in a species of opposition to the law, which was afterwards made a matter of reproach to him. However, whatever was the character of this order, its purposes were never put into execution, for the national guard had not time to form itself, and the armed meeting became so considerable, that it was no longer possible to alter either its form or direction.

It was now eleven o'clock. The assembly met in expectation of some great event. The members of the directory took refuge among them, and informed them of the inefficacy of all its efforts to prevent the insurrection which was on the point of breaking out. The procurateur syndic Roederer, now addressed the assembly. An extraordinary concourse of citizens, he said, had assembled together in defiance of the law, and in spite of the injunctions issued from several of the constituted authorities; that the avowed object of this concourse was to celebrate the 20th of June; and renew their homage to the assembly; but that it was to be feared the evil-intentioned among them would take advantage of the opportunity thus offered them, to enforce an address to the king, which should never be presented except in the simple and pacific form of a petition. Noticing, then, the orders issued by the directory, and the council-general of the commune, and the laws which were in force against armed meetings, and those which limited the number of citizens authorized to present petitions to twenty, he exhorted the assembly to enforce their execution: "For," added he, "although, in the present instance, the armed petitioners have assembled together by a civic impulse, to-morrow a band of rioters may intrude themselves into this chamber, and I then ask you, gentlemen, what shall we then say to them?"

In the midst of the applauses of the right, and the murmure of the left, side, who, disapproving of the alarm and precaution of the directory, evidently approved of the insurrection, Vergniaud ascended the tribune, and observed, that the impropriety the procureur syndic so much feared should take place was already established; that armed petitioners had been several times received; that they had been before permitted to march through the chamber; that in permitting this the assembly were perhaps to blame, but that the present petitioners would have reason to complain if they did not meet with the same treatment as others had; that if, as it was said, they intended to present an address to the king, they would undoubtedly send it by unarmed petitioners; and that if any danger was thought to menace him, the assembly had only to send a deputation of sixty of its members for his protection.

Dumoulard admitted the truth of Vergniaud's statement, and confessed that the impropriety complained of was already established, but maintained that it was necessary to abolish it altogether, especially upon the present occasion, unless the assembly wished that both themselves and the king should appear in the eyes of Europe as the slaves of a disorganizing faction. He agreed with Vergniaud in the propriety of sending a deputation for the protection of the king, and insisted upon the responsibility of the municipality and the directory for the maintenance of the laws. The tumult increased every moment. A letter from Santerre was announced; it was read in the midst of the applauses of the galleries. The inhabitants of the faubourg St. Antoine, said this letter, are now celebrating the anniversary of the 20th of June; they have been calumniated, and beg to be admitted to the bar of the assembly to confound their detractors, and prove that they preserve that character which they acquired on the 14th of July.

Vergniaud then replied to Dumoulard, that if the law had been violated, the precedent was not new; that to attempt to prevent its infraction on the present occasion would be renewing the sanguinary scene of the Champ de Mars; and that, after all, the sentiments of the petitioners contained nothing reprehensible. "Justly anxious for the future," added he, "they wish to prove that, in spite of all the intrigues which are carrying on against liberty, they are always ready to defend it." Here, as it was very evident, the real feeling of the day discovered itself, by one of the usual effects of a debate. The disorder still continued. Ramond wished to speak, but an order of the assembly was necessary to obtain him permission. At this moment the number of the petitioners was stated to the assembly to be eight thousand. "They are eight thousand," exclaimed Calvet, "and we but seven hundred and forty-five! Let us retire." "Order, order," cried a multitude of voices. Calvet was called to order, and Ramond pressed to speak quickly, as eight thousand citizens were waiting out of doors. "If eight thousand are waiting," replied Ramond, "it must be recollected that eight millions of Frenchmen are waiting for me also." He then repeated all the arguments of his friends of the right side. Suddenly the petitioners broke into the chamber. The assembly, indignant at this intrusion, rose up, the president put on his hat, and the petitioners retired in an orderly manner. The assembly, thus satisfied, consented to receive them.

This petition, the tone of which was the most audacious, expressed the sentiments of all the petitions of this period. "The people are ready; they only wait for you; they are disposed to have recourse to decisive measures, to execute the second article of the declaration of rights, *resistance to oppression* . . . Let that small number who do not agree with our sentiments purify the land of liberty by flying to Coblentz . . . Seek out the cause of the evils which menace us; if they arise from the executive power, let it be annihilated!"

The president, after an answer in which he assured the petitioners of the vigilance of the representatives of the people, and recommended to them obedience to the laws, gave them, in the name of the assembly, permission to pass before them. The doors were then opened, and the concourse, which swelled in a moment to thirty thousand persons at least, traversed the chamber. It is easy to imagine the manner in which the phantasies of a people, abandoned to their own direction, displayed itself on this occasion. Large tablets, on which were inscribed the declaration of rights, preceded their march. Around them danced

women and children, carrying in their hands an olive-branch and a pike, that is to say, peace or war at the option of the enemy, chaunting the famous air of *ça ira*. Then followed the sturdy market-people and labourers of all classes with pikes, old muskets, sabres, and weapons fixed upon clubs. Santerre and the Marquis of St. Hurugues, already notorious in the events of the 5th and 6th of October, brandishing naked swords, marched in front. Some battalions of the national guard who took part in this procession for the purpose of preserving peace, then came forward in good order. Another band of women, and another of men in arms, succeeded them. Streamers, on which were inscribed, "The constitution or death!" waved in the air. Ragged breeches were elevated on poles to the simultaneous shout of *Vivent les sans culottes!* Finally, an atrocious emblem added to the extravagancy of the spectacle. On the top of a pike was stuck the heart of a calf, under which was written *Cœur d'aristocrate*. At seeing this, a burst of sorrow and indignation was demonstrated by the assembly; this frightful emblem immediately disappeared, but only to reappear instantly at the gates of the Tuilleries. The applauses of the galleries, the shouts of the people, the civic songs, the deafening murmurs that filled the air, and the anxious silence of the assembly, formed altogether a strange and distressing scene even to those deputies who looked upon the multitude as their auxiliaries. Alas! how is it that, in these times of civil disorder, there is no medium? How is it that those who called to their aid the disciplined barbarians of the north, should have compelled their adversaries to have recourse to another species of barbarians, who, mingling gaiety with ferocity, wallowed in the sinks of cities, and remained stagnant in corruption during the most enlightened era of civilization!

This scene lasted three hours. At last Santerre again appeared, to return the thanks of the people to the assembly and present them with a flag in testimony of their gratitude and respect.

The multitude now made towards the garden of the Tuilleries, whose gates were shut. Numerous detachments of the national guards surrounded the palace, and formed a line from the [terrace of the] Feuillans to the river, presenting an imposing array. By an order from the king, the gates were opened, and the multitude immediately rushed into the garden, marched under the windows of the palace, and before the ranks of the national guard, but manifested no hostile intentions. *A bas le veto, et vivent les sans culottes!* were the most frequent exclamations; and some added, speaking of the king, "Why does he not show himself! .... We shall do him no harm." The old cry of "*He is deceived*," was still heard occasionally, but rarely. The people, prompt to receive the opinions of their leaders, were as much in despair as themselves.

The multitude, evacuating the garden by the gate which faces the Pont Royal, now ascended the quay, and, passing through the wickets of the Louvre, occupied the Place de Carousel. This space, at present so extensive, was then divided into many streets, which formed a species of arcades*. Instead of the spacious court which now extends between the palace and the gate, and from one wing to the other, there were many little courts, separated by walls and houses. Old fashioned wickets from each of these opened upon the Carousel. The people swarmed all about, and presented themselves at the royal entrance. This entrance was closed against them; some municipal officers harangued the crowd, and they appeared as if they had made up their minds to retire. It was said that, at this moment, Santerre, quitting the assembly, where he had remained behind to present the flag, returned, reanimated the fury of the people, which already seemed somewhat abated, and ordered a cannon to be placed before the château. It was now near four o'clock*: suddenly two municipal officers countermanded the sentinel's orders; and thus the vigilance of the troops, who were numerous at this point, and consisted of battalions of national guards and several detachments of gendarmerie, was paralysed: the mob rushed *pêle-mêle* into the court, and from thence to the vestibule of the palace. Santerre, who was threatened at this moment (as it is said) with a prosecution for the violation of the royal residence, exclaimed, addressing the assailants, "*Bear witness that I refuse to enter the apartments of the king.*" This declaration, however, did not stop the multitude, who were possessed with the excitement of the moment; they soon spread themselves through all parts of the palace, possessed themselves of the staircases, and succeeded in carrying a piece of artillery to the first floor. At the same time, the doors which had been shut against the assailants, were forced open by strokes of hatchets and sabres.

Louis XVI. at this moment sent away a great number of his dangerous friends, who, without being able to save him, had so often endangered his life. They had flocked round him on the present occasion, but he made them quit the Tuilleries, knowing that their presence could only irritate but not repel the multitude. There only remained with him the old Marshal de Mouchy, the commandant of the Acloque battalion, a few of his household, and many devoted officers of the national guard. It was then that the shouts of the people and the hatchets against the door were heard. The officers of the national guard then entreated him to show himself to the people, and promised to die at his side. He did not hesitate a moment to comply with their request, but at the very instant when he was ordering the doors to be thrown open, a panel of one of them fell at his feet from a violent blow. A free passage being now opened to the multitude, a forest of pikes and bayonets burst on the view of the king. "Here I am," said Louis XVI. showing himself to the unrestrained rabble. Those who surrounded him pressed upon him, forming a rampart about him with their bodies; "Respect your king," cried many voices, and the multitude, who certainly had no particular end in view, and who could be accused of nothing further than a threatening invasion of privacy, slackened the press, and presented a petition personally to the king. Numerous voices called for

* *Chemins couverts*, covered ways. *Transl.*

* All the witnesses who were examined on this point agreed in their testimony as to the fact, but varied as to the name: of the municipal officers.

the petition, and required that it might be heard. Those who were near the person of the king then persuaded him to pass into another apartment which was more spacious, where he might listen to the reading of the petition. This he did, and the people, satisfied to see themselves obeyed, followed the prince, who, by a happy idea, was placed in the recess of a window; he was obliged to get upon a bench; several others, as well as a table, were placed before him; those who accompanied him ranged themselves around him, and some grenadiers of the guard, and officers of the household, augmented the number of his defenders, and formed a barrier, behind which he could hear with less danger the terrible *plebiscitum** about to be read. The apartment was now filled with tumult, and cries of "No veto!" "No priests!" "No aristocrats!" "The camp at Paris!" arose from all parts. The butcher, Legendre, approached the king, and demanded, in rough language, the sanction of the decree. "This is neither the time nor place to grant it," replied the king firmly; "I shall do all that the constitution requires." This resistance produced a good effect: "Long live the nation! Long live the nation!" cried the assailants. "Yes," resumed Louis XVI., "Long live the nation! I am its best friend." "Show it," replied a man of the mob, presenting him with a red cap on the top of a pike. A refusal would have been dangerous, and certainly the dignity of the king did not require him to provoke instant death, by rejecting a vain party-symbol, but rather called upon him to sustain the assault of the multitude with firmness, which he did. He placed, therefore, the cap upon his head, and thus gained universal approbation. Being nearly stifled by the heat of the day and the crowd, a man, half-drunk, who held a bottle in one hand, and a glass in the other, offered him some wine to drink, and although he had long feared poison, he drank without hesitation, and was loudly applauded.

Madame Elizabeth, who tenderly loved her brother, was the only one of the family who succeeded in getting near him, which she effected by following him from window to window. The people seeing her, took her for the queen, and cries of "There's the Austrian woman!" ran through the apartment in a terrific manner. The grenadiers of the national guard, who had surrounded the princess, wished to undeceive the people. But this generous sister endeavoured to prevent them; "Leave them in their mistake," said she, "and save the queen!"

The queen, with her son and daughter, had not been able to join her royal consort. She had fled from the lower apartments, and arrived at the council-chamber, but could not reach the king on account of the crowd which blocked up every part of the palace. She did not, however, give up her determination of joining him, but eagerly demanded to be led into the chamber where he was. She was at last persuaded to renounce this resolution, and seated behind the council-table with some grenadiers, saw the people pass before her, her heart beating with terror, and her eyes moist with tears. On one side of her was placed her daughter, who wept bitterly, and on the other her son, who, though frightened at first, was soon tranquillized, and smiled upon the scene, with the happy carelessness of his age. A red cap was given him, which the queen placed upon his head. Santerre, who was near her, recommended respect to the people, and assured her that she was perfectly safe; he repeated to her the hackneyed declaration of the deception that was practised on her: *Madame, you are deceived, you are deceived*, said he. Then observing that the young prince was incommoded by the red cap which had been placed on his head, "The child is being suffocated," said he, and freed him from his ridiculous incumbrance.

Being informed of the dangers of the palace, many deputies hastened to the king, and addressed the people, exhorting them to respect their sovereign. Others hurried to the assembly, to inform them of all that was passing; and the tumult which prevailed there was greatly augmented by the indignation of the right side, and the efforts which the left made to palliate this irruption into the residence of the monarch. A deputation of twenty-four members was despatched immediately to surround the king. Another deputation, to be relieved half-hourly, was sent to collect and communicate information constantly to the assembly. These deputies, raised on the shoulders of grenadiers, alternately addressed the multitude. Pétion now appeared, but was reproached with having arrived so tardily. He asserted that he had only been informed, at half-past four o'clock, of the invasion which took place at four; that he had lost half an hour before he could reach the Tuilleries; and that the numerous obstacles which separated him from the king had prevented his getting near his person till half-past five. He now approached the monarch; "Fear nothing," said he, "you are in the midst of the people." Louis, in reply, took the hand of a grenadier, and placed it on his heart. "Observe," said he, "whether it beats faster than usual." This noble answer was highly applauded. Pétion then mounted on a chair, and addressing the multitude, told them that having made their representations to the king, it only remained for them to retire peaceably, without tarnishing the honour of the day. Some have asserted that he made use of the words *just* representations, but this would only prove that he felt the necessity of not wounding the feelings of the people. Santerre joined his influence to his, and the palace was soon evacuated. The crowd retired in a peaceable and orderly manner. It was then about seven o'clock in the evening.

The king, the queen, her sister, and children, now joined each other, shedding torrents of tears. The king, bewildered by the scene which had just passed, still kept the red cap on his head, and perceiving it for the first time after many hours, flung it from him with indignation. New deputies now arrived to inform themselves of the state of the palace. The queen accompanied them over the apartments, pointed out to them the shattered doors and broken furniture, and expressed her grief at the commission of so many outrages. Merlin de Thionville, one of the most fiery republicans, was among the number of these deputies; the queen perceived tears in his eyes. "You weep," said she, "to see the king and his family treated so cruelly by a people whom he has always desired to

* *Plebiscitum*, was an order made by the Roman people alone, without the consul or senate. Tyrrel.

make happy." "It is true, Madame," replied Merlin, "that I weep at the misfortunes of a sensitive and beautiful woman, the mother of a family; but do not misunderstand me, my tears are neither for the king nor the queen; I hate kings and queens*."

* Memoirs of Madame Campan, vol. ii. p. 218.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SUBSEQUENT EVENTS OF THE 20TH JUNE—ARRIVAL OF LAFAYETTE AT PARIS; HIS COMPLAINTS TO THE ASSEMBLY—RUMOURS OF WAR; APPREHENDED INVASION OF THE PRUSSIANS; VERGNIAUD'S SPEECH—RECONCILIATION OF ALL THE PARTIES IN THE PRESENCE OF THE ASSEMBLY THE 7TH JULY—THE COUNTRY DECLARED TO BE IN DANGER—THE DEPARTMENT SUSPENDS THE MAYOR PÉTION FROM HIS FUNCTIONS—THREATENING ADDRESSES TO THE ASSEMBLY AGAINST ROYALTY—LAFAYETTE PROPOSES TO THE KING A SCHEME OF FLIGHT—THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE 14TH JULY; DESCRIPTION OF THE FÊTE—PRELUDES TO A NEW REVOLUTION—THE INSURRECTIONAL COMMITTEE—REMARKS UPON THE MOST CELEBRATED REVOLUTIONISTS OF THAT PERIOD; CAMILLE DESMOULINS, MARAT, ROBESPIERRE, DANTON—MEASURES TAKEN BY THE FRIENDS OF THE KING FOR HIS PROTECTION—THE COURSE ADOPTED BY THE GIRONDIST DEPUTIES AS THE MEANS OF AVOIDING AN INSURRECTION.

On the morrow of this day of rebellion of the 20th, of which we have been noting the principal events, Paris yet bore a threatening aspect, and each party was more and more violently excited. An universal indignation was naturally expressed by the partisans of the court, who considered its dignity outraged, as well as by the constitutionalists, who were aggrieved at the breach of the laws, and the disturbance of public tranquillity. The outrage was certainly one of a very heinous nature, but party spirit exaggerated it. It was supposed that a design had been formed to assassinate the king, and it was reported that this was only prevented by a fortunate accident. Thus, by a natural re-action of feeling, the royal family, exposed to so many dangers, became an object of public concern, and the supposed authors of the outrage met with general dislike.

In the assembly, the countenances of all wore an appearance of solemnity. Some deputies strongly reprobated the events of the preceding evening. M. Bigot proposed a law against armed petitions, and against the custom of allowing bands of petitioners to enter the chamber; and although there already existed laws against this practice, they were renewed by a decree. M. Daveirhoult proposed that an information should be laid against the insurgents. "How," he was answered, "could forty thousand men be prosecuted?" "Well," replied he, "if one cannot distinguish among forty thousand men, punish the guard for not having defended themselves; at all events do something." The ministers now came to make a report of what had passed; and a discussion took place concerning the nature of the facts themselves. A member of the right side proposed that Vergniaud, being an unexceptionable witness, should give his testimony as to what he had seen. But Vergniaud did not rise at this appeal, but kept silence. Nevertheless, the boldest members of the left side, towards the end of the sitting, shook off their constraint, and resumed their courage. They even ventured to propose that it should be considered whether, in decrees of importance, the *veto* was necessary; but this proposition was rejected by a great majority.

As the evening drew on, a new scene, similar to that of the preceding, was apprehended. The people, on retiring, had declared they would return, and it was believed they would keep their promise. But whether it was that this menace was thrown out before the passions of the evening had subsided, or that a new attempt was disapproved of by the popular chiefs, it was easily prevented; and Pétion hastened to the palace, to assure the king that order was re-established, and that the people, having made their representations, were calm and content. "That is not true," said the king. "Sire ——" "Silence!"—"The magistrate of the people is under no obligation to keep silence when he has done his duty and speaks the truth." "The responsibility for the tranquillity of Paris rests upon your head." "I know my duties and how to fulfil them." "Enough; go and fulfil them; retire."

The king, in spite of the extreme gentleness of his disposition, was subject to fits of ill-humour, which the courtiers called *coups de bâtoir*; and the sight of Pétion, who was accused of having favoured the scenes of the preceding evening, irritated him, and produced the conversation just related. The report of it soon spread throughout Paris. Two proclamations were immediately issued, one from the king, and the other from the municipality; and these two authorities seemed to be in conflict.

The municipality exhorted the citizens to remain tranquil, to respect the king, to respect and to *compel respect* to the assembly; not to attend armed meetings, because the laws forbade them; and, above all, to distrust the disaffected who endeavoured to excite them again to insurrection.

It was, in fact, reported, that this last design was meditated by the court, that they might have an opportunity of firing on the people with grape-shot. Thus, the palace suggested the idea of assassination, and the faubourgs that of a massacre.

In his proclamation, the king expressed himself as follows:—"Frenchmen will not hear without grief, that the populace, misled by the factious, have entered by force of arms into the habitation of the king . . . The king opposed nothing to the

threats and insults of the factious but conscious integrity and his desire to promote the common weal.

"He is ignorant of the object of this infuriated faction, and at what point they intend to arrest their lawless proceedings; but to whatever excesses they may proceed, they will never force from him his consent to any thing he believes to be contrary to the public interest, &c.

"If those who wish to subvert the monarchy think one crime more necessary, they can commit it.

"The king orders all administrative and municipal bodies to watch over the safety of persons and property."

The opposite language of these two proclamations echoed the prevalent opinions of the day. Those whom the conduct of the court had driven to despair, only became the more irritated, and more bent upon carrying their projects into execution by every possible means. The popular clubs, the municipalities, the pike-men, a portion of the national guard, and the left side of the assembly, well understood the proclamation of the mayor of Paris, and determined to be prudent only so long as prudence was necessary, that they might not expose themselves to be cannonaded with grape-shot, without a decisive result. Being doubtful how to act, they waited for their opportunity, still retaining the same distrust and hatred towards the court. Their first care was to oblige the ministers to appear before the assembly to give an account of the precautions they had taken on two important points, *viz.*:—

I. The religious dissensions excited by the priests; and,

II. The safety of the capital, which the camp of twenty thousand men, refused by the king, had been destined to secure.

Those who were called aristocrats, the sincere constitutionalists, a part of the national guard, many provinces, and especially the directories of the departments, uttered their sentiments on this occasion in an energetic manner. The laws having been violated, they had the argument against their adversaries, and used it unsparingly. Crowds of addresses came from all parts to the king. At Rouen and Paris a petition was drawn up, signed by twenty thousand names; this petition was as odious to the people as that already signed by eight thousand Parisians against the camp at Paris. Finally, an examination into the conduct of Pétion and Manuel, who were both accused of having promoted by their inactivity the insurrection of the 20th of June, was ordered by the department. The conduct of the king, during that fatal day, was spoken of with admiration; his character appeared to be perfectly re-established, and those who were inclined to favour him, reproached themselves with having formerly accused him of weakness. But it was immediately seen that this passive courage which acts on the defensive, is widely distinct from that active and enterprising courage which braves the peril instead of awaiting it with resignation.

The constitutional party resumed their activity and their hopes. Those who had concerted with Lafayette the letter of the 16th of June, again conferred together, for the purpose of making a grand attempt to save the king. Lafayette, indignant at what had happened at the palace, was perfectly disposed to enter into all their plans. Many addresses were sent to him from his army expressing the same indignation; whether these addresses were suggested by others, or were mere voluntary effusions, he put a stop to them by an order of the day, and promised himself to make known the sentiments of the military. He determined to repeat in person to the assembly the contents of his letter of the 16th of June. For this purpose he entered into preliminary arrangements with Luckner, who, being a mere military veteran, and uninformed on every subject but that of war, was easily led to adopt any line of conduct that might be suggested to him. He, therefore, at the instigation of Lafayette, wrote a letter to the king containing the same sentiments as the latter was about to express in person at the bar of the assembly. Lafayette then took every necessary precaution to prevent his absence impeding the military operations of the troops, and reluctantly quitted his army to rush into the midst of the most imminent dangers at Paris.

Lafayette reckoned with confidence on the fidelity of the national guard of Paris, and on a new exertion on their part. He also expected the zealous co-operation of the court, whom he could not look upon as his enemy, at the moment when he was about to expose himself to the greatest dangers in its service. Having already proved his chivalrous love for liberty, he was ready now to display his sincere attachment to the king; and it is probable that his heart, filled with the most romantic heroism, was not insensible to the glory of this double devotion. He arrived at Paris on the morning of the 28th of June. The report of his arrival spread with rapidity, and every one said with great astonishment and wonder that general Lafayette was in Paris.

The attention of the assembly had been lately very much distracted by a great variety of petitions opposed to each other. Those of Rouen, Havre, the Ain, the Seine and Oise, the Pas-de-Calais, and the Aisne, strongly reprobated the excesses of the 20th of June; while those of Arras and the Hérault seemed almost to approve of them. On the one side, the letter of Luckner to the king was presented, and on the other, the most frightful placards against him. These conflicting testimonies of the public opinion created much agitation in the assembly for many days.

On the 28th, the galleries of the chamber were thronged by an immense multitude, as it was expected that Lafayette, whose intentions were yet unknown, would on that day appear at its bar. These expectations were realized. At about half-past one o'clock he demanded admittance, and was received by the applauses of the right side, and the silence of the galleries and the left.

"Gentlemen," said he, "I must first assure you, that in consequence of the arrangements that have been entered into between the Marshal Luckner and myself, my presence here in no way compromises the success of our arms, nor the safety of that army I have the honour to command."

The general then declared the motives which brought him to Paris. It had been asserted, that the letter of the 16th was not his; he now came to avow it, and to make this avowal, he had quitted a camp where he was devotedly beloved by his sol-

diers. But another and more powerful reason had prompted him to take this step: the events of the 20th of June had excited the indignation of his army, who had presented to him a multitude of addresses on that subject. These he had stopped, and had promised personally to communicate, by making himself the organ of the sentiments they contained. "The troops already require to be satisfied," added Lafayette, "whether it be really the cause of liberty and the constitution that they are defending?"

He then solicited the national assembly:

1st—To prosecute the ringleaders of the outrages of the 20th of June:

2nd—To annihilate a faction that usurped the national sovereignty, and whose public debates left no doubt of the iniquity of their designs:

3rd—And finally, to enforce respect for the laws, and thus satisfy the army that the constitution would receive no detriment from within, while they shed their blood to protect it from without.

The president replied to this expostulation, that the assembly would remain faithful to the law, and that the petition of the general should be examined. He was then invited to partake of the honours of the sitting.

The general was about to take his seat with the members of the right side; but Kersant observed that the petitioners' bench was his proper place. "Yes! no!" arose from all parts of the chamber, and the general rose quickly and seated himself on the petitioners' form. Applauses accompanied him to this new situation. Gaudet first spoke, and, giving a plausible turn to his observations, asked if the enemies of the nation were vanquished, if the country was delivered from their hostilities, since M. Lafayette was at Paris. "No," continued he, "the country is not delivered, our situation is not changed, and yet the general of one of our armies is at Paris!" He would not inquire, he said, whether M. Lafayette, who saw nothing in the French nation but factions, circumventing and menacing the constituted authorities, was not himself surrounded by a staff which directed all his movements; but he would observe that M. Lafayette was wanting in his duty to the constitution by making himself the organ of an army legally incapable of deliberating on political subjects; and he was not sure that he had not also committed himself with the supreme military power by coming to Paris without the authority of the minister of war.

Gaudet then called upon the minister of war to inform the assembly whether he had given leave of absence to M. Lafayette, and further demanded that the extraordinary commission should declare whether a general could bring before the notice of the assembly matters purely political.

Ramond then presented himself to reply to Gaudet. He commenced by making an observation very natural and applicable in many instances, which was, that the interpretation of the law was frequently varied by circumstances. "The assembly," said he, "has never been scrupulous with regard to the right of petitioning. When an armed rabble lately presented themselves they were not asked the nature of their mission, nor were they reproached with menacing the independence of the assembly by an array of arms; but when M. Lafayette, whose whole life, both in America and Europe, has been devoted to the sacred cause of liberty, presents himself singly, and in the garb of peace, suspicions are awakened! If two sets of weights and measures must be used, if there are two mediums of viewing the same circumstances, if any exceptions are to be admitted of, at least let the preponderance favour, let our partiality plead for the eldest son of liberty!"

Ramond concluded by moving that the petition be sent to the extraordinary commission, not to examine the conduct of M. Lafayette, but the petition itself. After much tumult, and a second collection of votes, this motion was adopted; and Lafayette left the assembly, surrounded by a numerous retinue of deputies and soldiers of the national guard, his partizans, and former companions in arms.

The present was a moment decisive of the fate of the court, of his own fate, and that of the popular party. He hastened to the palace. The most injurious slanders were there circulated in his presence in various knots of courtiers. The king and queen received with coldness that man who came to sacrifice his life in their service. Lafayette quitted the palace grieved at what he had seen, not on his own account, but for that of the royal family. On leaving the Tuilleries he was received by an immense crowd, who accompanied him to his house with the shouts of *Vive Lafayette!* and planted a may-bush at his door. These testimonies of old attachment sensibly affected the general, and intimidated the Jacobins. Now was the time to make the most of his remaining popularity, and to revive it, in order to render it serviceable. Some of the commandants of the national guard, who were much attached to the interests of the court, applied to the king, to know in what manner they were to act. He and the queen were both determined not to second M. Lafayette *. He thus found himself abandoned by the only part of the national guard which could be relied on. Yet being still willing to serve the king in spite of himself, he consulted with his friends on the subject. They, however, were divided in their opinions. Some, and among the rest Lally-Tollendal, advised attacking the Jacobins in their clubs; others, who were members of the department and the assembly, were unwilling to violate the law, from the rigid observation of which they derived their sole advantage over their adversaries. Nevertheless, Lafayette preferred the boldest of these two counsels, and appointed a rendezvous with his partizans, to put it into execution, by driving the Jacobins out of their chamber of assemblage and walling up its doors. But only a few of his friends met him at the place of rendezvous, and he found it impossible to carry out his attempt. In the mean time the Jacobins, also ignorant that he was in despair at the defection of his partizans, were seized with a panic, and abandoned their club. They ran to Dumouriez, who had not yet joined the army, to put himself at their head, and march against Lafayette, but their offer was not accepted. Lafayette remained still

* See Madame Campan, vol. ii. p. 224, a letter of M. Lally to the King of Prussia, and also all the Historians of the Revolution.

at Paris another day, though encompassed by threats of impeachment, and designs of assassination, and finally left, deeply regretting his useless zeal and the fatal infatuation of the court. And yet it is this man, so completely exposed while he risked his life to save the king, who has been accused of betraying Louis XVI. The court historians have asserted that his designs were unskilfully arranged, and his means insufficient. The aid of eighty thousand Prussians appeared to them, no doubt, a much more safe and effectual way of accomplishing the rescue of the king. But to those who looked not to foreign assistance, no other method of effecting this purpose remained but that which Lafayette wished to adopt, by putting himself at the head of the national guard, and dispersing and overawing the Jacobins.

Lafayette left Paris, designing still to serve the king, and determined, if possible, to procure him the means of quitting the capital. He wrote a letter to the assembly, enforcing, with extreme energy, the sentiments contained in his former communications, against those whom he denominated the factious.

Scarcely were the popular party freed from the apprehensions which the presence of the general caused them, when they recommenced their attacks upon the court, and persisted in demanding an account of the measures which had been taken for the defence of the territorial line of France. It has already appeared that the Prussians, although the executive power had made no notification on the subject to the assembly, had violated their neutrality, and were advancing in the direction of Coblentz, with a large army, eighty thousand strong, composed of the veteran troops of the great Frederick, and commanded by the duke of Brunswick, a celebrated general. Luckner, having but a small force, and placing little confidence in the Belgians, had been obliged to retire on Lille and Valenciennes. In this retreat an officer had set fire to the suburbs of Courtray, and it was believed that the object of this cruel act was to alienate the Belgians. The government took no measures to augment our armies, which, on the three frontiers, amounted at most only to a hundred and thirty thousand men; and no means were resorted to, to awaken the zeal and enthusiasm of the nation, though the enemy might be at Paris in six weeks.

The hopes of the queen were much revived by this expectation, which she communicated in confidence to one of her ladies. She had in her possession a map of the route of the emigrants and the king of Prussia. She knew on what day they would arrive at Verdun, on what day at Lille, and that it would be necessary to take the last place by siege. This unfortunate princess hoped, she said, to be set at liberty in a month*. Alas! why did she not believe those sincere friends who represented to her the danger and inefficacy of foreign aid; who told her that it would arrive soon enough to compromise, but not soon enough to save her! Why did she not give credence to her own fears in this point, and the melancholy presentiments which sometimes oppressed her!

It has been already observed, that the establishment of a camp of reserve at Paris was the great object which occupied the attention of the popular party at this period. The king, as we have before said, opposed this design. He was now summoned, in the persons of his ministers, to declare the precautions he had taken to supply the place of the decree he had refused to sanction. In reply to this summons, he offered a new proposition to the consideration of the assembly; that of establishing an army of reserve at Soissons, composed of forty-two battalions of national volunteers, to occupy the place of a former depôt which had been exhausted by draughts sent to the principal armies. This was, in some measure, the first decree of the assembly, with a slight alteration,—a very important one in the opinion of the patriots, inasmuch as the camp of reserve was to be formed between Paris and the frontier, and not near Paris itself. The proposition was received with murmurs of discontent, and sent back to the military committee.

Many of the departments and municipalities, excited by their constant correspondence with Paris, now determined to execute the act of the assembly relative to the camp of twenty thousand men, although it had not received the royal assent. The departments of the Bouches-de-Rhone, of the Gironde, and the Hérault, set the first example, and were soon imitated by many others. Such was the commencement of the insurrection.

So soon as these voluntary levies became publicly known, the assembly, modifying the intention of raising forty-two new battalions proposed by the king, decreed, that the troops which their zeal had sent on their march before they were legally embodied, should pass through Paris to be registered by the municipality of that city; that they should then resume their route to Soissons, to encamp there; so that those who would be able to reach Paris before the 14th of July, the day of the confederation, should assist at that national solemnity. The celebration of this anniversary had been prevented in the year 1791, by the flight of the royal family to Varennes; it was therefore intended to solemnize it in 1792 with extraordinary splendour. The assembly added, that immediately after its celebration, the federalists should pursue their route to their destination.

This was, at the same time, to authorise the insurrection of the departments, and little else than insisting on the execution of the unsanctioned decree. The only difference was, that, by the last decree, the federalists would merely pass through Paris; but the object was to get them there: being once there, a thousand pretexts might be devised to retain them. This decree was immediately sent to the king, and received the royal assent the following day.

To this important measure the assembly added another. A part of the national guards, and especially their staffs, who, as they progressed towards power, manifested a disposition to support it, excited much suspicion in the minds of the patriots. The national guard of Paris, more particularly, incurred these suspicions; but as the assembly could not exclusively designate them in a legislative act, they decreed that all the staffs of the national guards should be disbanded and re-elected*. They

* See Madame Campan's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 230.

* Act of the 2nd July.

clearly foresaw that, in the agitated state of France, which daily increased the influence of aspiring characters, this re-election would turn entirely in favour of those who were attached to the popular and republican party.

These were important measures carried forcibly against the right side and the court; yet they did not appear sufficient protection against the imminent dangers with which the people believed themselves menaced. Forty thousand Prussians, and as many Austrians and Sardinians, were advancing towards our frontiers; the court appeared to be in concert with the enemy; no means were employed to augment the army, or rouse the nation. On the contrary, the *veto* was made use of to thwart the measures of the legislature, and the civil list to procure partisans in the interior; and a general was at the head of the army who was believed capable of joining with the court to deliver up France, because he had taken up its defence against those who unjustly calumniated the king. All these circumstances combined, greatly agitated the public mind. "The country is in danger," was the general cry; but how the danger was to be met was the difficulty. The public were not even agreed as to its cause. The constitutionalists and partisans of the court, as much terrified as the patriots themselves, imputed every danger to the factious, trembled only for royalty, and dreaded above all things the effects of the disunion which prevailed among themselves. The frightened patriots, on the contrary, apprehended only the danger of an invasion, and attributed every evil to the refusals, delays, and secret intrigues of the court. Petitions from all parts of the kingdom daily increased; some imputed every disaster to the Jacobins; and others to the court, which was designated by the name of the *Palace*, (*Château*,) the *Executive* power, and the *Veto*. The assembly, having read these petitions, sent them all to the extraordinary commission of twelve, which had been for some time occupied in devising means to secure the public safety. The plan of this commission was desired with impatience. Meanwhile menacing placards every where met the eye; and the public papers, equally bold, spake openly of a forced abdication and dethronement. This was the subject of conversation every where; nor was the least moderation of language on this topic observed any where but in the assembly. There indeed the attacks upon royalty were still indirect. It was proposed, for instance, to suppress the *veto* in decrees of importance; the question of the civil list and its culpable expenditure, was many times discussed; and a limitation of its expenses, or its subjection to public scrutiny, had been seriously considered.

The court had never refused to yield to the representations of the assembly on the subject of augmenting the defensive force of the country. This could not have been done without too openly declaring its objects; and besides, the numerical increase of an army believed to be in a complete state of disorganization, was little feared by the partisans of royalty. The popular party, on the contrary, wished to see such extraordinary measures resorted to, as would announce an energetic resolve; such as has frequently caused the most desperate enterprise to triumph. These measures the commission of twelve suggested, and proposed to the assembly, who settled the following formulary.

When the danger of the country should become imminent, the legislature of the country are required to declare it in this solemn form of words: "*The Country is in danger.*"

Whenever this announcement should be made, all the local authorities, the councils of the communes, those of the districts and departments, and the assembly itself, as the first of all the constituted authorities, were to be considered as permanent, and to hold their sittings without interruption. All citizens were required to deliver up to the respective authorities under which they lived, the arms they might possess, to be distributed as most expedient for the public service. Both the young and the old who were capable of serving as soldiers, were to be enrolled in the national guard. Of these, it was proposed, that some should be sent to the seats of the different authorities of the districts and departments, and there remain stationary; and that others should hold themselves in readiness to act wherever the exigencies of the country might require them, either on home or foreign service. A uniform was not exacted from those who could not procure it. The pay of volunteers was to be given to all the national guards who were removed from their own residence. The constituted authorities were made responsible for the provision of all necessary stores. Every sign of rebellion, coupled with an overt act, was made punishable with death; and every cockade and flag, except the tri-coloured, was deemed seditious.

This proposition put the whole nation in arms, and on its guard; it was thus prepared at a moment's notice either to deliberate or fight; it presented a front to every enemy, and could dispense with the sluggish operations of the government. Thus the entire population of France was set in motion, yet all riots, insurrections, and disorders were provided against by the superintendence of those well-organized authorities, in which this universal agitation originated, and by which it was directed. If, after this appeal, Frenchmen did not assert their rights, they would no longer deserve that others should make those exertions for them which they would not second themselves. A most animated discussion, as may be well supposed, took place on this proposed law.

The deputy Pastoret made the preliminary report upon the 30th of June. His speech was perfectly unsatisfactory; he accused all parties in turn; gratifying each alternately by abusing the others; but he proposed no positive measures for averting the impending dangers. After him, the deputy Jean de Bry explained with clearness and moderation the project of the commission. The discussion once opened, shortly became nothing else but a bandying of reproaches. This drove many who were more remarkable for warm imaginations and fiery tempers than for sound wisdom, into violent extremes. The all-important law, concerning public safety, that is, the dictatorship, or power of absolute direction, with the chance of its being used cruelly though powerfully, this law which should not have been enacted but in the convention, was nevertheless proposed in the legislative assembly.

M. Delaunay D'Angers proposed that the assembly should declare, that till after the dangers which at present threatened the kingdom had passed away, they would consult no other law than *the imperative and supreme law of the public safety.*

This was, by means of an indefinite and mysterious formulary, equivalent to suppressing royalty, and declaring that the absolute sovereignty existed in the assembly. M. Delaunay declared that the revolution was not yet completed; that those were deceived who imagined it to be so; that the established laws could apply only to a revolution already accomplished, and not to one in need of defence; he concluded by repeating all that is usually said in defence of a dictatorship, the idea of which so forcibly presents itself to the mind in times of public danger, as it concentrates the forces of a nation to overwhelm its enemies. The reply of the deputies of the right side may easily be imagined. They observed that such a measure would violate the oaths taken to preserve the constitution, by creating an authority which would absorb all others. Their adversaries answered by saying that the example of its violation was already given, and that it would be silly to allow themselves to be surprised without defence. "But prove then," resumed the partisans of the court, "that this example has been given, and that the constitution has been violated." This retort produced new accusations against the court, and these accusations were again repelled by reproaches against the factions. "You are demagogues—you are traitors." Such were the reciprocal and eternal accusations — such was the question to be solved.

M. de Jaucour advised sending the proposition to the Jacobin club, so violent did it appear to him. M. Isnard, with his usual intemperance, wished the question to be taken into consideration, and the speech of M. Delaunay sent to the departments, as an antidote to that of M. Pastoret, which he said was *a dose of opium given to a man in dying convulsions.*

M. de Vaublanc succeeded in making himself heard, by saying that the security of the nation might be preserved by the resources which existed in the constitution, without resorting to any extraordinary remedies; that the project of M. Jean de Bry proved this; that he had no objection to the speech of M. Delaunay being printed, if it were thought necessary, but that it ought not to be sent to the departments; and that the asembly should return to the consideration of the proposition of the commission. This discussion was resumed on the 3rd of July.

One of the principal deputies, Vergniaud, had not yet spoken. Although a member of the Gironde, and its greatest orator, he was, nevertheless, free from party bondage, and, in a great measure, independent. Whether this arose from indifference, or true elevation of mind, he appeared to be superior to the passions by which his friends were agitated; and whilst he partook of their patriotic ardour, seemed free from their prejudices and extravagances. When he gave his decision in a public question, he drew after him, by his eloquence and his acknowledged character for impartiality, that fluctuating part of the assembly which Mirabeau had formerly governed by his argumentative vehemence. Men of unsettled opinions are always subservient to talent and reason*.

It having been announced that he would speak on the grand question of the project of the commission, on the 3rd of July, immense crowds filled the chamber, to hear this great orator on a subject which was regarded as one of life or death†.

In the opening of his speech, he took a view of the general state of France. "If," said he, "the love of the people for liberty was not unquenchable, it might be doubted whether the revolution is retrograding, or advancing to its grand conclusion. Our armies of the north, after having advanced into Belgium, have suddenly retreated; the theatre of war is now brought back again into our own territory; and the unfortunate Belgians have nothing to remember us by but the conflagrations which lit up our retreat; and a formidable army of Prussians is menacing the Rhine, although we had been given vain hopes that their march would not have been so speedy.

"How comes it to pass that this moment has been chosen to dismiss the popular ministers, to break the chain of their operations, to deliver the empire into inexperienced hands, and to repel the efficacious measures which we thought it our duty to propose? Is it true that our triumphs are feared? Is it our blood, or the blood of Coblentz, that the court are so anxious to spill? Is it so sweet to reign over deserted cities and devastated plains? Or what are the objects in view? And you, gentlemen, what grand measure are you about to adopt to meet the public danger?

"You, whom our adversaries flatter themselves they have intimidated; whose consciences they fancy they have alarmed, by calling your patriotism faction, as if those who took the oath of the Tennis-court had not also been called factious; you, who have been so much calumniated, because you are estranged from that haughty set whom the constitution has hurled to the dust; you, who have been supposed to harbour culpable intentions, as if you were invested with any power except that of the law, or possessed a civil list; you, whom, by an hypocritical moderation, some wish to blind to the dangers of the people; you, who, although you have been disunited by the intrigues of our enemies, will, at this moment of danger, put an end to your animosities and miserable dissensions, and sacrifice the infernal joys of hatred to the safety of your country; you, gentlemen, listen to me. What are your resources? What does necessity command? What does the constitution allow?"

This exordium called forth bursts of applauses which drowned the voice of the orator. He continued, and pointed out two kinds of dangers, internal and external.

"To meet the first, the assembly has proposed a decree against the priests; but whether it is that

* The *Paris Journal*, at that time so celebrated for its opposition to the majority of the assembly, and the great ability with which it was written, (its chief support being the unfortunate and immortal Andre Chenier) has done justice to Vergniaud.—*See the paper of the 4th of July*, 1792.

† It is not necessary, perhaps, to apprise the reader, that I here merely abridge the speech of Vergniaud, without giving it verbatim.

the genius of Medicis wanders still under the arches of the Tuilleries, or that a Lachaise, or a Letellier, still pervert the understanding of the prince, the decree has been rejected by the throne. I cannot believe, without doing injustice to the king, that he desires the continuance of religious dissensions. He thinks, therefore, undoubtedly, that the old laws are sufficiently powerful to maintain the public tranquillity. Let the ministers, therefore, answer for it, at their peril, since they possess every necessary means for that purpose!

"To meet foreign dangers, the assembly has proposed the plan of a camp of reserve; this also has been refused. It would be doing injustice to the king to believe he wishes to betray France. He has, therefore, a sufficient force to protect it; and his ministers must answer to us, at their peril, for the safety of the country."

Thus far the orator confined himself to the ministerial responsibility. "But," added he, "it is not enough to hurl the ministers down into the abyss which their wickedness or weakness has created. Listen to me with calmness, and do not anticipate my meaning."

At these words the attention of all became still more anxious, and a profound silence pervaded the assembly. "It is in the name of *the king*," said he, "that the French princes have endeavoured to raise all Europe; it was to avenge the *dignity of the king* that the treaty of Pilnitz was concluded; it is to *come to the aid of the king* that the sovereign of Bohemia and Hungary has declared war with us, and that Prussia is marching towards our frontiers. And, I read in the constitution, that 'If the king puts himself at the head of an army, and directs its force against the nation, or if he does not oppose, by a formal act, such an enterprise, executed in his name, he shall be considered as having abdicated the throne.

"What is a formal act of opposition? If an hundred thousand Austrians march towards Flanders, and an hundred thousand Prussians towards Alsace, and that the king opposes them by ten or twenty thousand men, has he manifested *a formal act* of opposition?

"If the king, being informed of the movements of the Prussian army, neglects to give information of it to the assembly; if a camp of reserve, necessary to arrest the progress of the enemy in the interior, is proposed, and the king substitutes, in its place, an uncertain and dilatory plan; if he gives the command of the army to an intriguing general, suspected by the nation; if another general, a stranger to corruption, and familiar with victory, demands a reinforcement, and that, by a refusal, the king says, *I forbid you to conquer;* can it be said that he has manifested a formal act of opposition?

"I have exaggerated many facts," resumed Vergniaud, "to take away all pretexts for hypothetical applications. But if, whilst France was swimming in her blood, the king should say to you:—'It is true, the enemy pretends to act for me, for my dignity, and my rights, but I have proved that I am not his accomplice: I send my armies into the field; these armies, I confess, were too weak, but the constitution does not fix the degree of their strength: I called them together too tardily, but the constitution does not fix the time of their embodying: I arrested a general, on the point of conquest, but the constitution does not order victories: I have confided in ministers who deceived the assembly, and disorganized the government, but their nomination was my privilege: the assembly has passed useful decrees which I have not sanctioned, but I had a right to refuse: I have done all that the constitution prescribes; is it, therefore, possible to doubt of my fidelity to it?'"

Loud applauses burst from all parts. "If then," resumed Vergniaud, "the king should hold this language to you, would you not have a right to reply:—'O king, thou who, like the tyrant Lysander, hast chosen lies instead of truth, who hast feigned a love of the laws only to preserve that power which would enable you to brave them, is it for our defence that such an inferiority of force is opposed to our enemies as will leave no doubt of our defeat? Is it for our defence that all plans tending to fortify the interior are crushed? Is it for our defence that a general who violates the constitution remains unchecked, whilst the courage of those who serve it is repressed? Does the constitution give you the choice of ministers for our welfare or our ruin? Does it place you at the head of our armies for our glory or our shame? Does it give you the right of sanction, a civil list, and so many prerogatives, constitutionally to ruin the constitution and the empire? No! no! O man, whom the generosity of the French nation cannot render grateful, and whom alone the love of despotism can touch . . . . you are no longer any thing to that constitution which you have so unworthily violated, or to that people whom you have so basely betrayed!'

"But no," resumed the orator, "if our armies are not complete, the king undoubtedly is not culpable; without doubt, he will take the necessary measures to save us; without doubt the march of the Prussians will not be so triumphant as they hope; but it is necessary to anticipate all that may happen, and to speak out, for open dealing alone can save us."

He finished by proposing a message to Louis XVI., firm but respectful, requiring him to make his option between France and foreign countries, and assuring him, that the nation was resolved to perish or triumph with the constitution. It besides proposed that the country should be declared in danger, to kindle those enthusiastic affections of the heart which always animate great nations, and which, undoubtedly, would burn brightly in the bosoms of the French; "for," said he, "it is not in regenerated France of 1789, that nature can show itself degraded." It finally recommended the termination of all dissensions among the friends of the people, between the natives of Rome and the inhabitants of Mount Aventine.

The last words of this speech were pronounced in a tone of great emotion. Its effect was electrical. Applauses, in which the galleries joined, rose from all sides. On quitting the tribune, the orator was surrounded by a crowd of congratulators. He alone had dared to speak openly in the assembly of the deposition of the king, a common topic of discourse in public, but he had not presented this proposition other than as a mere hypothesis, and yet in a respectful manner com-

pared with the language suggested by the political fury of that period.

Dumas rose to reply; and, whilst his auditors were yet under the impression of Vergniaud's eloquence, endeavoured to turn their feelings into another channel. He called several times for silence, but could obtain no attention. He laid great stress upon the reproaches which had been directed against the government. "The retreat of Luckner," said he, "is attributable to the chances of war, which cannot be regulated in the cabinet. Undoubtedly, you have confidence in Luckner?" "Yes, yes!" was answered from all sides. Kersaint then proposed passing a decree which should declare that Luckner retained the national confidence. This was carried without opposition; and Dumas continued. He said, and with reason, that if that general possessed the confidence of the assembly, the motive of his retreat could not be regarded as culpable, or even suspicious; that, as to the deficiency of sufficient force to cope with the enemy, which was complained of, the marshal himself knew that all the troops which were at the disposition of government were employed in the war; that, besides, all hostile preparations had been made by the Girondist ministry, to whom alone, as authors of the war, the blame of every deficiency was to be imputed; that the new ministers could not repair all the errors of former ones in so short a time as had elapsed since their installation in office; and that, finally, they had given full powers to Luckner to act as circumstances might require.

"The camp of twenty thousand men has been refused," added Dumas, "but the ministers are not responsible for the use that may be made of the veto; and besides, the plan they have proposed, as a substitute, is much the more preferable than that proposed by the assembly, as it does not paralyse the means of recruiting. The decree against the priests has also been rejected, but there is no necessity for new laws to maintain the public tranquillity; nothing is required but confidence, respect for the laws, personal liberty, and liberty of worship; wherever these things have been respected, the priests have not been seditious." Dumas finally justified the king, by reminding the assembly that the former had never been favorable to the war, and Lafayette, in reminding them also that he had been, from his earliest days, the friend of liberty.

The decree, proposed by the commission of twelve, to regulate the form in which the declaration of the danger of the country should be made, was passed in the midst of loud applauses. But the declaration itself was adjourned, there being, as yet, no fit occasion for proclaiming it. The king, without doubt driven to it by all that had transpired, notified to the assembly the hostilities threatened on the part of Prussia, which, he said, the convention of Pilnitz, the reception which had been given to the rebels, the violence committed against French merchants, the dismissal of our minister, and the departure of the Prussian ambassador from Paris, had led him to expect; and which expectations were confirmed by the march of fifty-two thousand men. "Every thing proves," added the message of the king, "that there is an alliance between Vienna and Berlin. (These words excited laughter.) According to the terms of the constitution, I therefore notify these events to the legislative body."—"Yes," replied many voices, "when the Prussians are at Coblentz."—The message was referred to the commission of twelve.

The assembly continued the discussion of those details which render the declaration of *the danger of the country* requisite. It was decreed that this declaration should be considered as no more than a simple declaration; and, consequently, should not be subject to the royal sanction; which, as it involved legislative measures, was certainly not a justifiable step. Thus, the law of public safety, though not yet promulged, was nevertheless acted upon.

Political disputes became daily more and more embittered by party spirit; the hope Vergniaud had expressed of reconciling those who were in Rome, as well as those on the Aventine Hill, were far from being realized; and the terror which parties mutually inspired was soon converted into the most irreconcileable hatred.

There was in the assembly a deputy named Lamourette, constitutional bishop of Lyons, who had never considered the term liberty other than as applying to a renewal of primitive fraternity, and was as much afflicted as astonished at the divisions of his colleagues. Not believing they were actuated by feelings of hatred, but rather influenced by unjust suspicions and want of mutual confidence, he, on the 7th of July, addressed his colleagues in the most persuasive and dignified manner, pointed out to them that the most violent measures were daily proposed to meet the danger of the country, and that he, for his part, believed that gentler methods would be more efficacious. That the disunion of the representatives was the source from whence all the evils complained of flowed, and that it was to this disunion that a remedy should be applied. "He," exclaimed this worthy pastor, "who shall succeed in re-uniting you, will be the true conqueror of Austria and Coblentz! I hear it daily affirmed that this is impossible, considering the length to which your differences have been carried. The thought of this makes me tremble! But surely in this I do not do you justice: nothing is irreconcileable but virtue and vice. It is true, honest men may dispute with warmth, because their opinions are founded on sincere conviction; but as to feelings of hatred, it is impossible that they should obtain admittance into their hearts! Gentlemen, the public safety depends upon you, and yet you delay to secure it!

"How is it that the two parties of the assembly mutually reproach each other! The one accuses the other of wishing to modify the constitution by the intervention of strangers, and the latter accuses the former of aiming at the overthrow of monarchy for the establishment of a republic. Let us put an end to these reproaches, gentlemen; let us hurl the same anathema against a republic and the two chambers; let us devote them both to common execration by a final and irrevocable oath! Let us swear to be unanimous and accordant in our views and sentiments; let us solemnly bind ourselves in the bonds of an eternal brotherhood! Let the enemy know that we are only animated by one will, and the country is saved!"

Scarcely had the orator finished his speech,

when the whole assembly rose, and the hostile parties rushing into one another's arms, applauded his generous sentiments, and seemed completely to have forgotten their mutual animosities. The project of altering the constitution by two chambers or a republic, was renounced for ever, without a dissentient voice. Those who had accused, and those who had defended Lafayette, the veto, the civil list —the *factious*, and the *traitors*, mutually embraced each other. All distinctions seemed to be confounded, and M. Pastoret and Condorcet, who had reciprocally abused one another in the public papers the evening before, were now folded in each other's arms. There was no longer a right or left side; all the deputies were promiscuously seated together: Dumas by the side of Basire, Jancourt by the side of Merlin, and Ramond by Chabot.

It was immediately determined that the provinces, the army, and the king, should be informed of this happy event; and a deputation, headed by Lamourette, was sent to the palace. Lamourette quickly returned, and announced the arrival of the king, who instantly followed him into the chamber. He came, he said, as on the 4th of February, 1790, to testify his satisfaction to the assembly, and to express to them "how much he was grieved at having waited for a deputation, which had so far delayed his arrival as to prevent his hastening into the midst of them."

The enthusiasm of all was carried to its highest pitch by these words, and the unanimous cry of "The country is saved" echoed through the chamber. It has been said that this scene presented the spectacle of a king and eight hundred hypocritical deputies, forming, on the impulse of the moment, a plan of common dissimulation, and feigning forgetfulness of injuries, that they might, with the more certainty of success, accomplish their several objects. But this is impossible; no such design could ever enter suddenly into the heads of so many men, without some premeditation. The irksomeness of the passion of hatred, and the delight of shaking it off, even for a moment, may very well account for so strange a scene; besides, what party, on the prospect of the many portentous events with which the country was then threatened, and considering the uncertain issue of the contest about to be entered on, would not consent to give up their favourite projects, for the sake of preserving the acquisitions they had already obtained? The fact itself proves that distrust and fear alone produced animosity; that it disappeared altogether whenever confidence was restored; and that the party which was called republican only embraced republicanism in despair, and not from partiality to it as a system. Why did not the king, on his return to the palace, write immediately to Austria and Prussia, and why, to these secret measures did he not add others of a public and important nature? Why did he not identify himself with the nation by declaring, as his grandfather Louis XIV. had before done: "*We will all of us go.*"

On the same evening, the result of the proceedings against Pétion and Manuel was brought to the assembly. This was the suspension of the two magistrates. By what has since been learnt from the mouth of Pétion himself, it is probable he could have prevented the insurrection of the 20th of June, as he afterwards prevented others. The presumption, therefore, is strongly in favour of his connivance with the insurgents, but the fact was never certainly established. Other infractions of the law were also laid to his charge, viz., having been very dilatory in his communications to the several authorities, and having suffered the council of the commune to enter into a resolution contrary to that of the department, by declaring that the petitioners should be received into the ranks of the national guard. The suspension, therefore, pronounced by the department, was legal and courageous, but impolitic. After the reconciliation of the morning, a greater imprudence could not have been committed than that of signifying, on the same evening, the suspension of two magistrates enjoying the greatest popularity. It is true, the king referred the decision to the assembly; but they did not conceal their discontent, and sent it back to him, that he might incur the odium of pronouncing it himself. The galleries re-commenced their accustomed cries of disapprobation on this occasion; a crowd of petitions were presented, demanding *Pétion or death*; and the deputy, Grangeneuve, who had been personally insulted, required that the author of that outrage should be proceeded against. Thus the recent reconciliation was already forgotten. Brissot had before been on the point of speaking on the question of the public danger, but had deferred his intention for the purpose of modifying the expressions of his speech, on account of the reconciliation which had intervened; yet he could not help alluding to the many instances of delay and negligence the conduct of the court had displayed; and, in spite of the pretended reconciliation, finished by declaring that the question of the king's deposition should be seriously and solemnly considered; that the ministers should be impeached for having delayed so long to give information of the hostilities committed on the part of Prussia; that a secret commission, composed of seven members, should be created for the purpose of watching over the public safety; that the property of the emigrants should be confiscated; that the military preparations of the country should be accelerated; and, lastly, that without delay they should declare that the country was in danger.

The assembly were, at this time, informed of the conspiracy of Dumaillant, a nobleman of ancient family, who, at the head of some insurgents, had taken possession of the fort of Bannes, in the department of the Ardeche, and from thence threatened all the adjacent country. The dispositions of foreign powers were also laid before the assembly by the ministry; the house of Austria having attached Prussia to its interests, had decided to march against France, although the disciples of Frederick murmured at this impolitic alliance. The Electorates were all our open or concealed enemies. Russia had formerly been the first to declare herself against the revolution: she had acceded to the treaty of Pilnitz, flattered the projects of Gustavus, and seconded the emigrants; all for the purpose of deceiving Prussia and Austria, and inducing them to march against France, that she might avail herself of that opportunity of attacking Poland. At the present moment, she was treating with Messieurs de Nassau and D'Ester-

hazy, chiefs of the emigrants; nevertheless, in spite of her pompous promises, she had only supplied them with one frigate, and that for the sake of getting rid of them from Petersburgh. Sweden, after the death of Gustavus, could not be stirred up, and allowed our vessels to enter her ports. Denmark promised a strict neutrality. The Court of Turin might be regarded as an enemy. The Pope was preparing his thunderbolts. Venice was neuter; but evinced an inclination to protect Trieste by her navy. Spain, without entering openly into the coalition, did not seem disposed to execute *the family compact* *, and afford France that aid which she had received from her. England promised to remain neuter, and gave new assurances of such being her disposition. The United States would have been happy to assist us by every possible means; but those means had no effect, by reason of their great distance, and want of population.

On the strength of this representation, the assembly wished immediately to declare the country in danger; nevertheless, the declaration was again referred to the decision of all the assembled committees; and their answer being given on the 11th July, the President, in the midst of the most profound silence, pronounced this solemn formulary: CITIZENS, THE COUNTRY IS IN DANGER.

From this moment the assembly was declared permanent; and repeated discharges of cannon announced to the public this important and critical declaration; all the municipalities, all the councils of the districts and departments, held uninterrupted sittings; and all the national guards began to prepare for active service. Amphitheatres were raised in the middle of the public squares, where the municipal officers, seated at a table supported by drums, received and registered the names of all volunteers who enlisted themselves. The total number of these enrolments on one day amounted to fifteen thousand.

The reconciliation of the 7th July, and the oath which had succeeded it, had not, as we have just now observed, quieted the suspicions of the people; their principal object was still to guard against the projects of the palace; and the deposition or abdication of the king presented itself to every one's mind as the only remedy for the evils which menaced France. Vergniaud had only started this idea in the form of a supposition; others, and particularly the deputy Torné, wished it to be considered as a measure more positively contemplated; and a multitude of petitions from all parts of France, expressing the same sentiment, spurred on the patriot deputies to the execution of a desperate design they had secretly formed.

The city of Marseilles had already presented a menacing petition, which had been read to the assembly on the 19th of June. Many others arrived at the moment when the country was declared in danger. One of them proposed the impeachment of Lafayette, the suppression of the *veto* in certain cases, the reduction of the civil list, and the re-installation of Manuel and Pétion in their municipal capacities. Another demanded the total suppression of the *veto*, and the publicity of the king's councils. But the city of Marseilles, which had given the first example of these acts of boldness, carried them to the greatest excess. It sent an address to the assembly, praying for the abolition of royalty in the reigning family, and for the substitution of an elective royalty without the *veto*, that is to say, a mere executive *magistracy*, as in ancient republics. The silent astonishment which the reading of this produced was followed by the applauses of the galleries; and one member had boldness enough to request that it might be printed. It was, notwithstanding, sent to the commission of twelve, that it might incur the censure of the law, which declared every proposition to alter the constitution infamous.

The audacity of these petitions was little calculated to quiet the consternation of the court, and the consequent fears of the patriotic party. The king believed his life to be in danger, and imagined that, on the 20th of June, a design of assassinating him had been formed; but had failed. This idea was certainly unfounded, for nothing would have been easier than the perpetration of that crime, had it been contemplated. He suspected also that attempts would be made to poison him. To prevent which, both he and his family ate their meals with a lady in the confidence of the queen, and left untouched the dishes which were prepared in the kitchen of the palace *. As the day of federation was fast approaching, the queen also prepared for him a quilting, composed of many folds of stuff, calculated to resist the first plunge of a dagger. But, as time elapsed, and the public fury augmented, without any attempt at assassination, he began better to understand the nature of his danger. He foresaw that it was not an assassination, but a judicial condemnation, that he had to fear; and the fate of Charles I. continually haunted and tormented his imagination.

Although he had met with a rebuff from the court, Lafayette was not the less resolved in his intention of saving the king, and, therefore, proposed to him a plan, which was conceived with the greatest boldness. His first step had been to secure the co-operation of Luckner, from whom he obtained all he desired, even to the extent of consenting to march upon Paris, if it should be found necessary. Lafayette then suggested to the king the idea of commanding the attendance of himself and Luckner at Paris, under the pretext of assisting at the confederation. His object in this was to impose awe upon the people, and preserve the king from the menacing dangers of that day. The day after the ceremony, Lafayette proposed that Louis should publicly quit Paris, under the pretence of going to Compiègne, to prove his liberty in the eyes of all Europe. In case of resistance, he asked only for fifty dragoons devoted to the service of the king, to accomplish the escape of all the royal family from Paris. Being arrived at Compiègne, a relay of troops were to be stationed there, to conduct the king into the middle of the French armies, where Lafayette determined to leave him, trusting to his probity for the preservation of the new institutions of the kingdom. Finally, in case neither of these plans should succeed, the general was prepared to march upon Paris with his whole army †.

* A treaty known by this name, see Koch's Revolutions of Europe, p. 147.

* See note 41 in the Appendix.
† See note 42 in the Appendix.

Whether it was that this project required a boldness which the king was not capable of exerting, or that the queen's repugnance to Lafayette prevented him from accepting of his assistance, he a second time refused it, and returned him an answer which was an ill requital for the zeal which the general had shown in his service. "The best advice I can give to M. Lafayette," said this answer, "is to make himself feared by the factious by strictly fulfilling his duty as a general *."

The day of the federation was now fast approaching. The people and the assembly were unanimous in wishing that Pétion should be present at that solemnity. It has already been seen that the king had desired to discharge himself by casting upon the assembly the burden of approving or disapproving the sentence against this magistrate, and that the assembly had forced him to take it on himself. He was now daily pressed to give his final decision, that the question might be terminated by the 14th of July. On the 12th, the king confirmed the suspension. The news of this augmented the discontent of all parties. The assembly lost no time in adopting its measures in its turn, and it is not difficult to divine what they were. On the following day, the 13th, it reinstated Pétion; but prudently adjourned its decision relative to Manuel, who had been seen walking in the midst of the riots of the 20th of June, dressed in a scarf, without exercising his authority to repress them.

Finally, the 14th of July, 1792, arrived; and what a contrast did it present to that of 1790! No magnificent altar, at which three hundred priests officiated; no spectacle of sixty thousand national guards, richly accoutred and regularly drawn up in regiments; no elevated tiers of benches crowded with people in the buoyant spirit of joy and hope; no balcony occupied by the ministers, the royal family, and the assembly, gave on this occasion an appearance of triumph and exultation to the scene! All was changed! The recent reconciliation had only embittered the hatred of both parties; and the very emblems of this solemnity announced the approach of a sanguinary contest. Eighty-three tents represented the eighty-three departments. At the side of each tent was a poplar tree, from the top of which streamed the tri-coloured flag. A large tent was reserved for the king and the assembly, and another for the administrative bodies of Paris. Thus all France appeared to be encamped in presence of the enemy. A broken column, raised on some steps which had remained since the first ceremony, served for the altar of the country. On one side was erected a monument in commemoration of those who had fallen, or might fall in the service of their country on the frontiers; on the other stood a tree, called the tree of feudality. It arose from the midst of vast piles of wood, and on its branches were suspended crowns, blue ribbons, diadems, cardinals' hats, keys of St. Peter, cloaks of ermine, doctors' caps, lawyers' bags, titles of nobility, escutcheons, arms, and various other emblems of a degraded aristocracy, to all which the king was to be invited to set fire.

The oath of fidelity was to be administered at noon. The king awaited the national retinue at the military school, for it had not yet returned from the Bastille, whither it had proceeded to lay the first stone of a column to be erected on the former foundation of that prison. He was dignified and calm in his manner; but the queen vainly endeavoured to repress that emotion which was visible in her countenance. Before quitting her apartments, she had dropped some touching expressions, which drew tears from the eyes of more than one of her attendants. The national retinue finally arrived; until then the Champ de Mars had been nearly empty; but by the sudden irruption of the multitude it became overthronged in a moment. The king was stationed in a balcony which had been destined for his reception, and no sooner did he enter it than a crowd of degraded women and children and drunken men thronged under it, and rent the air with cries of *Long live Pétion! Pétion or death!* wearing on their hats the same words they bandied from their mouths. Meanwhile the federalists walked about arm in arm, some carrying remnants of the Bastille, and a printing press, which was from time to time placed on the ground for the purpose of printing and distributing patriotic songs. The national guard and regiments of the line followed, preserving with difficulty, amid the press of the multitude, any regularity in their ranks; last came the public authorities and the assembly. The king then descended from the balcony, and advanced, in the midst of a square of troops, towards the altar of the country. His progress, amid the assembled concourse, was slow; after many efforts, however, on the part of the military, he reached the altar. During this anxious interval, the queen watched his motions through a glass. The confusion seemed to augment, and the king at one moment appeared to fall; at sight of this, the queen could no longer contain her emotion, but uttered a scream which spread terror around her: nevertheless, the ceremony terminated without any accident happening. The people then hurried to the tree of feudality. They at first wished to bring the king along with them that he might set fire to it with his own hands; but he excused himself by a happy reply to their invitations, saying that feudality no longer existed. He then returned to the military school, and the soldiers, delighted at having preserved him unhurt, shouted with reiterated acclamations, *Vive le Roi!* The people repeated the shout, and appeared as ready now to applaud as they had a moment before been to insult him. The unfortunate Louis seemed once more to possess the affections of his subjects, and they themselves were willing for an instant to admit so pleasing an illusion; but self-deception to either party was no longer possible. He returned to the palace satisfied that he had escaped dangers, which he believed to have been imminent, but still very much alarmed at those which threatened him for the future.

The news which daily arrived from the frontiers increased the terror and tumult which prevailed in the capital. The declaration of the danger of the country had put all France in motion, and hastened the departure of a crowd of the federalists for Paris. Only two thousand of this band were at Paris on the day of the federation; but they arrived daily, and their conduct justified all the hopes and fears that had been entertained from their presence in

* See note 43 in the Appendix.

the metropolis. All of them, enrolled as volunteers, formed themselves into a club, and comprehended within themselves the extravagances of every club in France. The assembly allowed them individually thirty sous a day, and reserved for their use the galleries of the chamber, which gave them so uncontrolled an ascendancy over the deliberations of the deputies, that their hisses and applauses soon decided the event of every debate. Allied with the Jacobins, and associated in a club which surpassed all others in violence, they were ready for any enterprise which might be proposed to them, and declared this to the assembly in a formal address. They would not depart, they said, for the frontiers, till the enemies of the interior were overthrown; thus the scheme of assembling an insurrectional force at Paris was effected in spite of the opposition of the court.

To the resources which this federation furnished, the popular party added others. The veterans of the French guards had been distributed among the regiments of the line; the assembly ordered that they should now be formed into a corps of gendarmerie, as, having commenced the revolution, their patriotism, it was thought, might be relied upon. In vain was it objected that these soldiers, nearly all non-commissioned officers, composed the principal strength of the army. The assembly would listen to nothing which thwarted their plans; and, besides, feared their internal more than their external enemies. After having provided a military force for their own protection, it remained to dispossess the court of theirs. For this purpose the assembly ordered the departure of all regiments out of Paris. So far the constitution was not violated; but not content with this measure, they shortly after commanded these troops to march to the frontier, and in this they certainly usurped that disposal of the public force which was the prerogative of the king.

The grand object of this measure was to send away the Swiss guards, whose fidelity to the king was unquestionable; but to parry this blow, the ministry induced M. D'Affry, their commandant, to insist upon the terms of a stipulation which had been entered into with him, and which confined the quarters of the Swiss regiments to Paris. The assembly pretended to take this stipulation into their consideration, but, nevertheless, ordered the departure of two Swiss battalions.

The king, it is true, could oppose his *veto* to these measures, but he had lost all influence, and could no longer safely make use of his prerogative. The assembly itself could not always resist the motions made by some of its members, as they were supported by the applauses of the galleries, but never lost an opportunity of displaying its moderation when it was possible; at the same time that it passed the most insurrectional decrees, it approved and welcomed the most moderate petitions.

The measures lately taken, the petitions which daily arrived, and the ordinary language of conversation, portended an approaching revolution. The Girondists foresaw and desired it; but not perceiving distinctly the means by which it would be brought about, they feared its result. Those whose views were still more extravagant than theirs, complained of their inactivity, and accused them of timidity and incapacity. All the chiefs of the clubs and sections, fatigued by their ineffectual eloquence, loudly demanded active and unanimous leaders, that the energies of the people might not be exhausted in vain struggles. At the Jacobin club, an office of correspondence was established; the federalists also formed there a central committee, and that the resolutions of this committee might be as secret and energetic as possible, the number of its members was limited to five, and it was named by themselves, the *insurrectional committee*. These five members were Vaugeois, Vicar-General; Debessé, de la Drôme; Guillaume, a professor of Caen; Simon, the editor of a journal at Strasbourg; Gallisot, of Langres; and shortly afterwards were added to these, Carra; Gorsas; Fournier, the American; Westermann; Kienlin of Strasbourg; Santerre; Alexander, commandant of the faubourg St. Marçeau; a Pole named Lazouski, captain of engineers in the battalion of St. Marçeau; Antoine of Metz, an ex-constituent; Lagrevy and Garin, two electors; Manuel and Camille Desmoulins and Danton, joined them afterwards, and exercised there the greatest influence*. This committee carried on secret intercourse with Barbaroux, who assured them of the aid of his Marseillois, whose arrival at Paris was daily expected. They also held communications with the mayor Pétion, who promised not to impede the meditated insurrection, and was assured, in return, that a guard should be placed round his house to justify his inactivity, by an appearance of constraint, if the insurrection should fail. The project finally agreed upon was to invade the palace with an armed multitude, and depose the king. But how to rouse the people to such an enterprise was the question. Some extraordinary circumstance was necessary to effect this purpose; and, at the Jacobin club, several methods of producing some stirring event were proposed. The deputy Chabot harangued, with his usual turbulence, on the necessity of coming to some determinate resolution, and said that to settle such resolution, it were much to be wished that the court should attempt the life of a deputy. Grangeneuve, a deputy himself, listened attentively to his speech; this deputy was a man of weak intellects, but frantically devoted to any cause he happened to espouse. When Chabot, therefore, had finished his harangue, he took him apart. "You are right," said he to him, "a deputy must perish, but the court is too cunning to furnish us with the occasion we require. I will be the victim, and will kill myself in the environs of the palace, as soon as I can arrange my affairs. Keep my secret, and prepare for the event." Chabot, fired with enthusiasm, offered to join in his suicidal act; Grangeneuve accepted his offer, and they appointed the day, hour, and means for killing themselves, and, not *to bungle the affair*, to use their own expressions when they separated, resolved to sacrifice themselves to the common cause. Grangeneuve, determined to make good his promise, arranged his domestic affairs, and at half-past ten in the evening proceeded to the place of rendezvous. Chabot was not there. He waited; but no Chabot appearing, he imagined he had changed his mind. But com-

* See note 44 in the Appendix.

forted himself, that so far as he was concerned, the self-execution would have taken place. Still he paced to and fro, waiting to carry his purpose into effect; at last he was obliged to return home safe and sound, regretting that he could not commit a suicide to disseminate a calumny.

The committee impatiently waited for an opportunity to put their designs into execution, but none offered, and reciprocal reproaches of weakness, incapacity, and disunion took place. The Girondist deputies, Pétion, and all those who were conspicuously situated, were obliged to speak the language of the law, and discovered more and more a disposition to shrink from the consequences of the meditated conspiracy, and complained of the continual tumults of the people, which compromised them without leading to a decisive result. Those on the contrary who busied themselves privately in fomenting discontent, accused Pétion and the Girondists of the pusillanimity of their public speeches, which they represented as tending to repress the energies of the people. Both parties felt the want of some leader to direct their councils and invigorate their acts. But where was this leader to be found? Certainly not among the deputies. They were merely orators; besides, the elevation of their stations kept them widely apart from the multitude. Pétion by reason of his office could easily have held communications with the mob; but Pétion was cold, incapable of bearing with them, and more fit for a death-bed than for prompt action. Conceiving that the turbulence of the people was likely to become weakened by their daily excesses, his system was to repress petty disturbances the more effectually to promote a general insurrection; but by this he thwarted the movements of every day, and lost the favour of the rioters, so that without checking their designs, he aggravated their passions All that was wanting was a leader, who not having ceased to be identified with the people, had preserved his influence over them, and who had received from nature the gift of persuasion.

The clubs, sections, and revolutionary journals presented a various assortment of such characters, but no one had as yet gained the pre-eminence by any marked superiority. Camille-Desmoulins, it is true, was distinguished for the vigour, cynicism, and intrepidity of his mind, and never lost an opportunity of attacking those who seemed to slacken in their revolutionary career. He was also familiar with the rabble, but possessed not the lungs of a popular orator, and, besides, wanted the activity and influence which are the essential qualities of a leader.

Another journalist had acquired a frightful celebrity: this was Marat, called *the friend of the people*, and who had become, from his frequent advocacy of murder, an object of marked abhorrence to all those who yet retained any feelings of humanity. A native of Neufchatel, he had cultivated, in the former part of his life, the science of medicine, and had boldly attacked the best established systems, displaying thus early the convulsive disorganization and restless activity of his mind. He was veterinary-surgeon to the Count D'Artois at the commencement of the revolution. When that new scene of things opened, he involved himself immediately in its disorders, and soon became remarkable in his section. His person was extremely repulsive; he was a man of low stature, a large head, and expansive forehead, features strongly marked, his complexion livid, his eyes fiery, and his dress slovenly. His person would not have attracted attention but as a ridiculous or hideous object; but from this strange body there issued a medley of the most perverted and atrocious maxims, accented by a harsh voice, and proclaimed with the most insolent familiarity. Many thousand heads, he declared, must be brought low, and all the aristocrats, who stood in the way of liberty, must be got rid of. Horror and detestation formed a circle about him. Whenever he appeared he was hissed, insulted, and ridiculed for the deformity of his person; but being habituated to logical contests, and the most extraordinary propositions, he soon learnt to despise those who despised him, and asserted that they were incapable of understanding his opinions. He made his poisonous pages the medium of giving vent to the frightful doctrines with which he was imbued. The hermit-like life he had been accustomed to lead, in order to conceal himself from the detection of justice, had embittered his temper, and the detestation of the public still further enraged his savageness. Our polished manners he considered but as vices which were opposed to republican equality; and in his fervent hatred against all obstructions that stood in the way of his designs, he saw but one method of safety—extermination. His medical studies and experience of the physical structure of man had enabled him to witness the pain of others without emotion, and his fervid passions not being checked by any feelings of sensibility, were directed to their purpose through paths of blood. He had only one means of attaining his end, the destruction of his foes, and this he gradually formed into a system of action, for the purpose of putting which into execution, he desired the appointment of a dictator, not to confer on him the enjoyments of omnipotence, but to impose on him the terrible office of purging society. This dictator, to use his own expression, he would have tied by the leg, that he might be always in the hands of the people. He would have invested him with only one prerogative, that of designating his victims, and inflicting on them the single punishment of death. Marat took no cognizance of any other than this penalty, because it did not repress but absolutely removed the obstruction.

Observing on every side aristocrats conspiring against liberty, he diligently collected all those facts against them which seemed to fortify his system. He denounced with fury and with a carelessness which proceeded from the very fury of the man, all those who were pointed out to him, and frequently imaginary persons who had no existence. These denunciations were made without any feelings of personal animosity, he was fearless of consequences and without dread of vengeance, for he was considered as an outlaw of society, and no one regarded his ravings.

Having been made the object of an impeachment by the assembly, together with Royou, the editor of *l'ami le Roi*, he concealed himself in the house of an obscure and petty advocate, who gave him an asylum. Being in this difficulty, he applied to

Barbaroux, who had formerly also cultivated the medical profession and had been acquainted with Marat. Thus summoned, Barbaroux could not refuse to call on him, but in listening to his conversation concluded him deranged. The French people, in the opinion of this strange being, were but niggardly revolutionists. "Give me," said he, "two hundred Neapolitans, armed with poniards, and carrying on the left arm a buckler, and with those I would overrun France, and complete the revolution." He wished that the assembly, to mark out the aristocrats, should order them to wear a white ribbon on their arms, and give free permission to any one to kill them when they were found three together. Under the name of aristocrats he comprehended the Royalists, Feuillans, and Girondists; and if the difficulty of distinguishing them was suggested, he declared that nothing was more easy, for that the patriots could not be deceived, if they fell upon all those who possessed carriages, who kept valets, wore silk, or who attended the theatres, they were certainly aristocrats.

Barbaroux left him horrified. Marat, engrossed by his atrocious system, thought little of the means of bringing about an insurrection, and, besides, was incapable of devising any. In his murderous reveries, he pleased himself with the idea of retiring to Marseilles; the republican enthusiasm of that city gave him hopes of a welcome reception there. There, therefore, he thought of taking refuge, and wished Barbaroux to give him a letter of recommendation to the inhabitants; but the latter would not consent to make so hateful a present to his native city, and quitted the insensate monster, whose apotheosis he did not imagine was so near at hand.

The systematic and atrocious Marat was not, at that time, the active leader who was necessary to unite the popular mass into one body, under one head. Robespierre would have been fitter for this task, creating, as he had done, for himself, at the Jacobins, a numerous auditory, who are usually more easily stirred up than the partisans of a journalist; yet he was destitute of some very requisite qualities. He had been formerly an advocate, of very moderate practice, at Arras, and was deputed by that city as its representative in the states-general. He there allied himself with Pétion and Buzot, and maintained with asperity those opinions which they defended with calm conviction. The slowness of his utterance, the want of animation in his manner, and the mediocrity of his eloquence, at first provoked ridicule; but his obstinacy soon attracted attention, particularly at the period of the Revision of the Declaration of Rights. After the scene of the Champ de Mars, also, when a report was spread that the subscribers of the petition of the Jacobins would be prosecuted, his terror and youth inspired Buzot and Roland with a lively interest in his favour. They offered him an asylum, and he soon resumed his courage. On the dissolution of the first assembly, he took refuge in the Jacobin club, and there, by his dogmatic and turgid harangues, quickly obtained the ascendancy. Being appointed public accuser, he refused to accept of this office, and aimed solely at gaining the reputation of an incorruptible patriot and eloquent orator.

His earliest friends, Pétion, Buzot, Brissot, and Roland, were now in the habit of receiving him at their houses, and observed with pain his assuming pride, which discovered itself in all his looks and gestures. Being, however, much interested in his favour, they merely regretted that, whilst his thoughts were directed so intensely to the public interests, they also appeared to be so greatly engrossed by himself. But he was of too little importance to provoke resentment, and the mediocrity of his talents and fervour of his zeal pleaded an excuse for his pride. He was also remarkable for his silence in society, giving rarely his opinion, but on the next day displaying the ideas he had treasured up the evening before in the tribune. This was mildly pointed out to him, but it stung him to the quick, and stirred up in him as much animosity against those superior characters, in whose company he dwindled to his natural dimensions, as he cherished against the constituents of the first assembly. He now confined himself altogether to the Jacobin club, where, as has been seen, he differed with Brissot and Louvet on the question of the war, and declared them, and perhaps believed them to be, bad citizens, because they disagreed with him, and maintained their opinion with eloquence. Was he sincere, then, in his suspicions against those who wounded his pride, or did he wilfully calumniate them? This is an intellectual mystery. But with a narrow and commonplace mind, and with a great susceptibility of temper, he was easily made angry, and with difficulty set right; it is possible, therefore, that that animosity which first originated in wounded pride, might have been confirmed into a principle by his bigoted politics, and that he really believed all those who had offended him were actuated by evil intentions.

Be this as it may, in the narrow circle in which he moved, he excited enthusiasm by his dogmatism and his reputation for incorruptibility. He founded his popularity on the blind passions and limited views of faction. Austerity and a chilling dogmatism are apt to captivate enthusiastic minds, and even often impose on persons of superior understanding; in point of fact, there were many men willing to consider Robespierre endued with superior energy and loftier talent than themselves. Camille Desmoulins used to call him his Aristides, and even admitted him to be eloquent. Others considered him as without talents, but, silenced by his pedantry, used to declare over and over again, that the revolution could not go on unless he was placed at its head. He himself permitted his partisans to express these sentiments freely, yet never appeared in the meetings of the conspirators, and even complained that he was compromised by one of them, who inhabited the same house with himself, because that person had once assembled the insurrectional committee at that place. Thus he kept himself in the back-ground, and left the dangerous work of uniting the people to insurrection to Panis, Sergent, Osselin, and others, all members of the sections and municipal councils.

Marat, who looked for a dictatorship, was desirous of ascertaining whether Robespierre was a fit person to hold that office, and he called upon him for that purpose. The contrast between these two characters appeared striking in this interview.

He found the latter retired in an elegant cabinet, dressed with the most scrupulous care, and surrounded by engravings, paintings, and busts of his own person. Here he was accustomed to pursue the most unremitting studies, and to consult the works of Rousseau with great diligence, for the purpose of transplanting his arguments into his own performances. Marat conversed with him, and discovered in him nothing but petty animosities; no grand designs, none of that sanguinary audacity derived from his monstrous ideas, and no glimmering of genius. He took leave of this *little man* with the most perfect contempt, declared him incapable of saving the state, and became still more convinced that he alone possessed the secret of the grand social system.

The partisans of Robespierre gained over Barbaroux, and were anxious to introduce him to Robespierre, declaring that *a man* was what was wanting, and that none but Robespierre could play the man. This language displeased Barbaroux, whose pride repelled the idea of a dictatorship, and whose fervid imagination had already been seduced by the virtue of Roland and the talents of his friends. He nevertheless went to Robespierre. At this interview, the name of Pétion was mentioned; but Robespierre envying his popularity, he was declared incapable of assisting the revolution. Barbaroux replied, with some ill temper, to the reproaches which he cast upon Pétion, and defended with animation a character he admired. Robespierre spoke of the revolution, and repeated, as he usually did, that he had quickened its march: he concluded by saying, in the language of the day, We want a Man. Barbaroux replied, that he wanted neither dictator nor king. Fréron declared that Brissot aimed at this. This calumny was flung back, and a mutual misunderstanding ensued. On taking leave, Panis, wishing to destroy the bad effect of this conversation, told Barbaroux that he had mistaken the object which his party had in view; that it was only a temporary authority which they wished to establish, and that Robespierre appeared to be the fittest person on whom it could be conferred. It was these vague propositions, these petty rivalries, that induced the Girondists falsely to surmise that Robespierre desired to usurp supreme authority. They mistook envy for ambition. This was one of those errors which the confused sense of party feeling is constantly committing. Robespierre, capable at most of hating merit, had neither the force nor the genius of ambition; and his partisans conceived those pretensions which he had not dared to entertain for himself.

Danton was better qualified than any one else to become that leader to whom public attention pointed. He had made an effort at the bar, but had not succeeded. Poor, and a prey to his passions, he threw himself into political agitations with a fiery zeal, and probably not without some expectations. Although uneducated, his natural abilities were very great; and his athletic form, marked and somewhat creolian features, stentorian voice, and his extravagant though grand imagery, powerfully captivated his audience at the Cordeliers and sections. His countenance alternately expressed all the animal passions, as well as gaiety, and even benevolence. Danton neither hated or envied any one, but his audacity was extraordinary; and in certain moments of violent impulse, he was capable of executing all that the atrocious imagination of Marat could conceive.

A revolution whose effect, although unforeseen, was yet inevitable, and had made the lower rebel against the higher classes of society, necessarily awakened envy, generated new systems, and called brutal propensities into action. Robespierre personated the envious, Marat the systematically wicked man, and Danton was the passionate, violent, fluctuating, and alternately cruel or generous man, according to the freak of the moment. If the two former, the one engrossed by the most absorbing envy, and the other by the most sinister designs, were very little accessible to corruption; on the contrary, the latter, the slave of passion, and greedy of every species of self-indulgence, was in fact any thing but incorruptible. Under pretext of recompensing him for the loss of his former situation, that of advocate to the council, the court had bestowed on him considerable sums of money, but did not succeed in gaining him over to their party by this liberality. He did not the less continue to harangue the multitude in the popular clubs; and when reproached with not fulfilling the terms of his bargain, he replied, that to preserve the means of serving the court, it was necessary to take part apparently with the enemy.

Danton was certainly the most formidable of the popular orators; but, although bold and decisive in a particular emergency, he possessed not that assiduity, perseverance, and singleness of aim, which springs from views of ambition; and, although exercising great influence over the conspirators, he possessed no absolute ascendancy or control over their designs. The most he could do was to rally them in the moment of hesitation, and by an energetic impulse, give the final direction to their plans.

Many members of the insurrectional committee were not yet agreed in the objects they had in view. The court, informed even of their slightest acts, had taken measures for its protection in case of a sudden attack, and hoped to hold out till the arrival of the allied armies. A club, called the French club *, had been formed and established near the palace, it was composed of artisans and soldiers of the national guard. This club had all their arms concealed in the very place where they met; and, in case of necessity, were ready to afford prompt assistance to the royal family. This single association cost the civil list 10,000 francs daily. In addition to these partisans, a Marseillais, named Lieutaud, supported a band of royalists to attend the assembly, the clubs, the coffee-houses, and all the public places, there to advocate the royal cause, and repress the continual tumults raised by the patriots †; the most violent disputes indeed everywhere took place, which generally ended in riotous frays; but, in spite of all the efforts of the court, its partisans were few, and even the most devoted part of the national guard became perfectly discouraged.

* This can scarcely be termed a *club*, in the meaning in which this word has been used in the present work, and the acts of this club are evidently confined to a paid service. *Transl.*

† See Bertrand de Molleville, vols. viii. and ix.

A great number of faithful adherents of the king, who till now had kept at a distance from the throne, at this time returned to its defence. They frequently met in great numbers at the palace, and thus increased the distrust of the nation. Since the 2nd of February, 1791, these royalists had been called by the people *chevaliers du poignard* *. Orders had been given to secretly muster the national guard, who although disbanded, had yet received their pay. In the meantime, the king was beset by opposite counsels, which involved his weak and naturally wavering mind in sad perplexity. The most prudent friends, and among others, Malsherbes †, advised him to abdicate; others, and the greater number, recommended him once more to attempt flight; but with regard to the means of escape, and the place of refuge, they were not agreed; neither were they determined upon what the result of the escape might be. To reconcile these different plans, the king desired Bertrand de Molleville to consult with Duport the constituent. The king placed great confidence in the latter, and was obliged to give a positive order to Bertrand before he would consent to an interview with him, as Bertrand affected that he would not communicate with such a constituent as Duport. In this committee were associated Lally-Tollendal, Clermont Tonnerre, Governet, Duport, and others, all attached to Louis XVI. These were all devoted to the service of the king, but except in this particular, were very much divided in their opinions, as to how royalty was to be dealt with should she escape. However, the flight of the king to the castle of Gaillon in Normandy was resolved upon. The Duke de Liancourt, the friend of Louis XVI., who possessed his entire confidence, commanded that province. The duke declared that he could rely upon his troops and the loyalty of the inhabitants of Rouen, who had avowed themselves by an energetic address against the transactions of the 20th of June. He offered to receive the royal family in that city, and thence to conduct them to Gaillon, or, if they preferred it, to escort them to Lafayette, who was to leave them under the protection of his army. He offered, besides, to devote his whole fortune to the execution of this enterprise, reserving only an income of a hundred louis for his children. This project suited the views of the constitutionalists, because instead of placing the king in the hands of the emigrants, it left him under the protection of the Duke de Liancourt and Lafayette. For the same reason, it displeased the court, and hazarded the displeasure of the king and queen. The castle of Gaillon possessed a great advantage in not being more than thirty-six leagues from the sea. The province of Normandy was favourably disposed towards the king; and a passage into England, should circumstances require it, would thence be of easy execution. It also possessed another advantage, it was not more than twenty leagues from Paris. The king, therefore, could retire there without violating the constitution, which, with him, was a weighty consideration.

Another plan of escape was devised by M. de Narbonne and Madame de Staël, the daughter of Necker. The emigration-party also proposed a plan of its own: this was to transport the king to Compiègne, and from thence to the banks of the Rhine through the forest of Ardennes. Every one is desirous of offering advice to a weak-minded king, because every one is ambitious of directing that volition which he is not able to exercise. So many contrary opinions increased the natural indecision of Louis XVI.; and this unhappy prince, beset with contradictory advice, struck with the reasonableness of some of his counsellors, carried away by the passions of others, distracted by anxiety for the fate of his family, and harassed by scruples of conscience, hesitated in the midst of a thousand projects, and saw the waves of insurrection advancing upon him, without daring either to brave or flee before them.

Meanwhile the Girondist deputies, who had so boldly discussed the question of the dethronement, though on the eve of an insurrection, remained still undecided in their views. Although the court was nearly reduced to impotency, and the people appeared all powerful, the approach of the Prussians—the fear which a long established authority, even when disarmed, always inspires, inclined them rather to come to some arrangement with the court than run the risk of a conflict. Even should this conflict end in a popular victory, they still apprehended that the arrival of foreign forces might render it unavailing, and that their momentary success against the palace, would be followed by a terrible retribution. Yet, notwithstanding these fears, they opened no negociation with the court, but listened to some overtures from Bozè, the painter of the king, and the intimate friend of Thierry, the valet-de-chambre of Louis XVI. The painter Bozè, alarmed at the threatening appearance of things, persuaded them to address a letter to him, such as they might deem expedient, in the present extremity, to preserve monarchy and liberty. This letter was signed by Guadet, Gensonné, and Vergniaud; and commenced with these words:—"Sir, Since you ask our opinion of the present state of France." This beginning sufficiently proves that this negociation was first opened by Bozè. The three deputies told him that it was no longer time for the king to dissemble; that he must be sadly deceived if he did not perceive that he alone was the cause of the general agitation that prevailed; that new protestations on his part would be useless and ridiculous; that decisive acts were requisite to give confidence to the people; that, for instance, every one was convinced that it was in the power of the king to send away the foreign armies; that he should, therefore, begin by making them evacuate the French territory; that he should then form a patriot ministry; discharge Lafayette, who, from the present state of things could no longer be of service; propose the passing of a law for the constitutional education of the young dauphin; submit the civil list to public scrutiny and accountability; and, finally, solemnly declare that he would accept of no augmentation of his power except with the free consent of the nation. By these means, added the Girondists, it is to be hoped that the irritation of the people may be pacified, and that in process of time and by persevering in this line of conduct, the king may regain that confidence which at the present time he has entirely lost.

* Ante, p. 61, col. 2.

† See Bertrand de Molleville, vols. viii. and ix.

Certainly the Girondists were now near the attaining their end, if, in point of fact, they had up to that moment, and long before, been conspiring to effect the establishment of a republic; and can it be supposed they would have stopped short all at once at the very point of its accomplishment, merely for the sake of giving the ministry to three of their friends? Certainly not. It is evident, therefore, that a republic only became desirable, as placed in juxta-position with the inefficiency of the monarchy; that in fact it never had existence, and that even on the eve of obtaining a republic, those who are accused of so long conspiring to bring it about, did not wish to compromise the common weal by the success of this system of a republic, but rather consented to preserve a constitutional monarchy so long as it was confined within certain limits. The anxiety they manifested, that the allied armies should evacuate the French territory, sufficiently proves that the dangers to which they were exposed influenced their counsels, and gave them views they would not otherwise have entertained; their attention to the education of the dauphin also makes it clear that monarchy was by no means so insupportable a prospect to them as it has been represented.

It has been assumed that Brissot on his side had offered his services to the court, to prevent a dethronement, on condition of receiving a large sum of money; this allegation proceeds from Bertrand de Molleville, who has always misstated matters from two causes: sheer malice and a lying spirit. But he has produced no proof; and the known poverty and exalted character of the accused are sufficient to repel such calumnies. It is by no means impossible, indeed, that the court delivered money at Brissot's direction, but this does not prove that he either demanded or received it. The attempts made to corrupt Pétion, which we have noticed above, show the degree of credit accusations of this kind, which are so often and easily hazarded, deserve. But, even supposing that this could be true of Brissot, the three deputies, Gensonné, Gundet, and Vergniaud, have not ever been accused, and they were the only persons who signed the letter to Bozé.

The king, suffering under his accumulated sorrows, became daily more incapable of listening to salutary advice. He rejected the letter which Thierry presented him with harshness, and answered, as he usually did, that it was not him but the patriot ministry who had provoked a foreign invasion, and that so far as the constitution was in question, he conserved it, whilst others took every pains to destroy it *. This mode of reasoning was not strictly correct; for, even allowing that he had not provoked war, it was not the less his duty to maintain it vigorously; and as to his scrupulous adherence to the letter of the law, it amounted to no more than an observance of its text, if its spirit was compromised in calling in the aid of foreigners.

The unwillingness of the Girondists to enter seriously into the question of the dethronement, which formed the daily topic of all the clubs, undoubtedly arose from the hopes they entertained that their advice might still be listened to. But these hopes few participated. On every occasion, when in the name of the commission of twelve, the danger of the country and the means to meet it were alluded to, *Trace it to its cause*, exclaimed the most violent party; *Trace it to its cause*, repeated the galleries. Vergniaud, Brissot, and the Girondists, replied to these and similar expressions, that the commission of twelve did not overlook *the cause*, and that at the proper time they would explain it, but that at the present moment it would not be prudent to throw in more of the leaven of discord.

But it was settled that all these means and appliances should prove abortive; and the catastrophe, not unforeseen and so dreadful, soon arrived, as we shall hereafter see.

* See note 45 in the Appendix.

CHAPTER V.

ARRIVAL OF THE MARSEILLAIS AT PARIS; THE DINNER AND SANGUINARY SCENES AT THE CHAMPS-ELYSÉES—MANIFESTO OF THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK—THE SECTIONS OF PARIS DEMAND THE DETHRONEMENT OF THE KING—THE KING REFUSES TO ESCAPE BY FLIGHT—THE ASSEMBLY REJECTS THE PROPOSITION TO IMPEACH LAFAYETTE—PREPARATIVES OF THE INSURRECTION; MEANS OF DEFENCE ADOPTED BY THE PALACE—INSURRECTION OF THE 10TH AUGUST, 1792; THE FAUBOURGS POSSESS THEMSELVES OF THE TUILERIES AFTER A BLOODY CONFLICT; THE KING SEEKS REFUGE WITH THE ASSEMBLY; SUSPENSION OF ROYAL AUTHORITY; CONVOCATION OF A NATIONAL CONVENTION.

At a fête given to the federalists it was settled by the insurrectional committee, that on the morning of the 26th of July they should advance upon the palace in three columns, displaying the red flag with this inscription: *Whoever fires upon the columns of the people shall be instantly put to death.* The object of this attack was to make the king prisoner, and confine him at Vincennes. The national guard of Versailles had been gained over to second this enterprise; but they were informed so late of the intentions of the conspirators, and so little mutual understanding existed between them, that they applied to the mayor of Paris on the morning of the 26th to know in what manner they were to act. The secret of this conspiracy was also so badly preserved, that the report of it had reached the court, the royal family were prepared, and the inmates of the palace on their guard Pétion, perceiving that the measures of the committee were badly devised, fearing treason, and considering that the Marseillais had not yet arrived, hastened to the suburb where the fede-

ralists were assembled, to check the intended insurrection, which, if unsuccessful, would prove the ruin of the popular party.

A frightful tumult reigned in the faubourgs; the clang of the tocsin had been heard during the whole night, and a report that a quantity of arms had been collected in the palace was diligently propagated in order to rouse the people. Pétion at last succeeded in restoring order; Champion de Cicé, who attended him, received several sabre wounds; but, finally, the people consented to retire, and the insurrection was adjourned.

Quarrels and frays, the ordinary preludes of an approaching explosion, continued unceasingly to disturb the metropolis. Since the 20th of June the gardens of the Tuileries had been kept shut by the order of the king. The terrace of the feuillans, which led to the assembly, remained alone open, and the sentries received orders to allow no one to pass. Desprémenil being once seen there, in animated conversation with a deputy, was hooted, followed into the garden, and borne along to the Palais Royal, where he received several wounds. The orders which prohibited all entrance into the gardens being thus violated, it was proposed to supply their place by a decree. This however was not done; but a notice, expressed in these words, was written up over the gates: *No thoroughfare, trespassers will be prosecuted.* This was sufficient to prevent the trespassing on the royal premises, although the king shortly after withdrew his orders to the sentinels.

At last, on the 30th, the Marseillais arrived. They formed a band of about five hundred of the most turbulent citizens of Marseilles. Barbaroux met them at Charenton. On this occasion a new project was concerted with Santerre. Under pretext of meeting the Marseillais, it was proposed to assemble the faubourgs, to march them to the Place de Carrousel, and there quietly form a camp until the assembly should have suspended the king, or until he should have voluntarily abdicated. This suggestion pleased all those who were averse to the effusion of blood. But it failed, Santerre being unable to assemble the faubourgs, and only succeeding in collecting a very small number of citizens to meet the Marseillais. He then immediately invited the latter to an entertainment which was prepared in the Champs-Elysées. On the same day and same hour, another entertainment was spread for a part of the national guards, of the battalion of the Filles-Saint-Thomas, and many other individuals, civil and military, all devoted to the court, near the spot where the Marseillais were assembled. There was certainly no premeditated design in this unfortunate encounter on either side, for the invitation of Santerre must have been perfectly unforeseen; but it was impossible for adversaries so bitterly opposed, to remain long in each other's presence without coming to hostilities. The populace insulted the royalists; the latter showed a determination to defend themselves: the assistance of the patriots was then solicited by the people, and a combat immediately commenced between the two parties of revellers. The Marseillais, rushing upon their adversaries, soon put them to flight; one of the royalists was killed, and many wounded. In a moment the disorder became general throughout Paris. The federalists dispersed themselves through the streets, and plucked off the cockades of riband, upon the pretext that they should have been made of wool.

Some of the fugitives hastened, covered with blood, to the Tuileries, where they were received with kind and humane attention, for the court considered them as victims to their attachment. The national guards who were in the service of the palace reported this fact, and added that the ladies of the court wiped away the blood from their wounds with their handkerchiefs. These reports greatly aggravated the animosity of the people, and it was believed that the scene of the Champs-Elysées was the effect of a premeditated design; and this formed the basis of a new accusation against the Tuileries.

The national guard of Paris petitioned the assembly to send the Marseillais immediately into the country, but their petition was hooted down by the galleries, and met with no attention from the assembly.

Whilst these events were taking place, there was published a manifesto, attributed to the Duke of Brunswick, and soon ascertained to be genuine. We have already spoken of the mission of Mallet-du-Pan. He had furnished, in the king's name, the idea and the draught of a manifesto; but this notion soon took quite another direction. Another manifesto, expressing the sentiments of the emigrants at Coblentz, and bearing the name of Brunswick, was published in front of the Prussian army. This document was expressed in the following terms:

"Their majesties the Emperor and the King of Prussia, having intrusted to me the command of their combined armies, which they have assembled on the frontiers of France, I feel it necessary to announce to the inhabitants of this kingdom the motives which have determined the measures of these two sovereigns, and the intentions which guide them.

"After having arbitrarily deprived the German princes in Alsace and Lorraine of their rights and possessions; after having disturbed the peace of the provinces, and destroyed all legitimate government; after having practised against the sacred person of the king and his august family the most heinous indignities and outrages, which are daily renewed, those who have usurped the reins of government have finally filled up the measure of their iniquities by declaring an unjust war against his majesty the Emperor, and attacking his provinces situated in the Low Countries; some of the possessions of the Germanic Empire are now subject to the same oppression, and many others have only escaped the like danger by yielding to the dominant party and its emissaries.

"His majesty the King of Prussia, allied to his imperial majesty by the bonds of a defensive alliance, and a member himself of the Germanic body, has conceived himself bound to march to the assistance of his ally and the German estates; and it is under this double obligation that he now takes part in the invasion of France.

"Besides these great interests, the sovereigns are equally sensible to another not less important: that of suppressing anarchy in the interior of France; of beating down the blows which are aimed at the throne and the altar; of re-establishing the power of the law; restoring to the king that security and liberty of which he is now

deprived, and of reinstating him in the exercise of his legitimate authority.

"Convinced that the healthy portion of the French nation abhors the excesses of a tyrannising faction, and that the great majority of the inhabitants of France await with impatience the moment of succour to declare themselves openly against the hateful acts of their oppressors, their majesties the Emperor and King of Prussia solicit and invite them to return without delay to the path of duty, reason, order, and peace. It is with these views that I, the undersigned general, commander-in-chief of the two armies, declare :—

"I.—That, drawn into the present war by irresistible circumstances, the two allied courts propose no other object to themselves than the welfare of France; and that they have no design of enriching themselves by their conquests.

"II.—That they have no intention of interfering with the internal government of France, their single aim being to deliver the king, queen, and their family from captivity, and to place his most Christian majesty in such a state of security as will enable him, without risk or impediment, to call together such convocations of his subjects as he may judge fit to promote their welfare, in pursuance of his promises to that effect.

"III. That it is the object of the allied armies to protect all the cities, and villages, and persons, and properties of those who submit to the king, and concur in the instantaneous re-establishment of order throughout France.

"IV. That the national guards are hereby called upon to watch, provisionally, over the tranquillity of the cities and provinces of the kingdom of France, and the safety of the persons and property of its inhabitants, till the arrival of the troops of their imperial and royal majesties, or until they receive contrary orders, under the penalty of personal responsibility; and that, on the other hand, those national guards who may oppose the troops of the allied courts, or may be taken in an hostile attitude, with arms in their hands, shall be treated as enemies, and punished as rebels to their king, and disturbers of the public peace.

"V. That the generals, officers, under-officers, and soldiers of the French line, are called upon to return to their former allegiance, and submit immediately to the king, their legitimate sovereign.

"VI. That all the members of the departments, districts, and municipalities, are equally responsible, at the peril of forfeiting their lives and properties, for all misdemeanours, outrages, assassinations, and pillages, which they suffer to be committed, or do not unequivocally make every exertion to repress in their respective territories; and that they are bound provisionally to retain the exercise of their functions, until his most Christian majesty, being set at liberty, shall otherwise fill their situations, or that this be done in his name in the interval.

"VII. That the inhabitants of all cities, burghs, and villages, who shall dare to defend themselves against the troops of their imperial and royal majesties, or to fire on them, either in the open country, or through the windows and doors of their houses, shall be immediately subject to all the rigour of martial law, and their houses shall be burnt or otherwise destroyed; that, on the contrary, all the inhabitants of the said cities, burghs, and villages, who submit to their king, and open their gates to the troops of their majesties, shall be immediately placed under their protection; their persons and property shall be kept inviolate, and the personal safety of each and all of such inhabitants shall be provided for in the general security of the nation.

"VIII. That the city of Paris, and all its inhabitants without distinction, are called upon to submit immediately and without delay to the king, to restore him to perfect liberty, and to invest him and all the royal personages with that inviolability, and pay them that respect, which, by the right of nature and nations, are due from subjects to their sovereign. Their imperial and royal majesties further declare, that all the members of the assembly, of the department, of the district, of the national guard of Paris, the justices of the peace, and all others exercising authority, are responsible for all events which may happen at Paris, and that their crimes will be punished by martial law, leaving them no hope of pardon. Their majesties further declare, on their royal and imperial word, that if the palace of the Tuileries is assaulted, or menaced, or the least violence, or the smallest outrage offered to their majesties the king and queen, or to the royal family; and that if their safety, security, and liberty, is not immediately provided for, they will take an exemplary and ever-memorable vengeance on the city of Paris, by delivering it over to a military massacre and total subversion; and that the rebels shall meet that condign punishment their crimes have so well merited. Their imperial and royal majesties promise, on the contrary, to exert their influence with his most Christian majesty to obtain pardon for all their crimes and errors, and to take the most vigorous measures to protect their persons and possessions, on condition of their prompt and literal obedience to the above injunction.

"Finally, their majesties, acknowledging the validity of none of those laws which have not emanated from the king in the enjoyment of perfect liberty, protest against the authenticity of all those declarations which have been, or may hereafter be made in the name of his most Christian majesty, whilst his sacred person, that of the queen, and all the royal family, remain under constraint; to deliver him from which, their imperial and royal majesties solicit his most Christian majesty, to designate that city of his kingdom, in the neighbourhood of his frontiers, to which he may judge it most expedient to retire with the queen, and his family, under a safe escort, which shall be sent him for that purpose; that his most Christian majesty, being placed in perfect safety, may call into his councils such ministers as he may be pleased to point out, make such convocations of his subjects as may seem to him expedient, take measures for the re-establishment of good order, and regulate the administration of his kingdom.

"Finally, I myself declare, and engage in my capacity as commander-in-chief, to maintain perfect discipline among my troops, and to treat with gentleness and moderation all who may show themselves peaceably disposed and submissive, and to employ force only against those who resist and rebel.

"From the above reasons, I require and expect all the inhabitants of this kingdom not to oppose the march and operations of the troops under my command, but to grant them everywhere a free entrance into their cities, and to afford them such aid and assistance as circumstances may require.

"Given at the head quarters at Coblentz.

"25th July, 1792.

"(*Signed*) CHARLES WILLIAM FERDINAND,
"Duke of Brunswick-Lunebourg."

That which appeared the most extraordinary circumstance in this declaration was, that being dated the 25th, at Coblentz, it arrived at Paris on the 28th, and was inserted in all the royalist journals. It produced a great impression, from the conflict of emotions it superinduced. It effectually roused the people to resist to the utmost an enemy, whose language was so haughty, and whose threats were so fierce. As things then were, it is not to be wondered at, that the court and the king were accused of this new crime. Louis XVI., therefore, hastened to disavow it by a message, and this he could undoubtedly do with perfect sincerity, for it was very different from the model which he had proposed; but this example should have shown him how much his views would be overdone by his own party, if they should conquer. Neither his disavowal, nor the expressions of fidelity to the constitution, and love to the nation, which accompanied it, produced any effect on the assembly. Speaking of his people, whose happiness, he said, had always been near his heart, he added: "How many sorrows would be obliterated by the slightest symptom of returning affection." These affecting expressions excited no longer that enthusiasm they were wont to call forth; nothing was seen in them but the language of deceit, and many deputies moved that the message of the king should be printed, in order, as they said, that the striking contrast between his words and actions might appear. From this moment, the public ferment unceasingly increased, and events began to wear a more threatening aspect than ever. By a decree of the department of the Bouches-du-Rhone, the taxes levied in that province were retained for the payment of the troops sent against the Savoyards, and the same decree made complaint against the insufficient measures of the assembly. This was the effect of an idea of Barbaroux. The decree was quashed by the assembly, although its execution could not be prevented. It was reported, at the same time, that the Sardinians were advancing, to the number of fifty thousand. This was contradicted by the minister for foreign affairs, who assured the assembly that, at most, their numbers did not amount to more than from eleven to twelve thousand. Another report succeeded to this. It was asserted that the federalists, who had actually proceeded to Soissons, had been poisoned by pieces of glass kneaded up with their bread. It was even said, that sixteen hundred were already dead, and eight hundred sick. Reference was afterwards made to the informants themselves, when it appeared, that the flour with which this bread was made, having been deposited in a church where some bottles had been broken, some pieces of glass had been discovered in the bread; however, none were either dead or even ill.

On the 20th of July, all the sections of Paris were rendered permanent by an act of the assembly. They had met together, and had commissioned Pétion to propose to the assembly, in their name, the dethronement of Louis XVI. The mayor of Paris, emboldened by this authority, presented himself on the morning of the 3rd of August before the assembly, and delivered the message of the forty-eight sections in the shape of a petition. He recapitulated the conduct of Louis XVI. since the commencement of the revolution; he enumerated the benefits the nation had conferred upon the king, and the return he had made; he depicted the dangers which threatened the country, the approach of foreign armies, the scanty means of defence that had been provided, the revolt of one of our generals against the assembly, the opposition of many directories, and the terrible threats and absurd acts which had been proclaimed in the name of the Duke of Brunswick; and finally, he concluded by proposing the dethronement of the king, and begged the assembly to take that important question into their immediate consideration.

This great question, which hitherto had only been earnestly discussed by the clubs, the federalists, and the communes, now acquired a new character, by being presented to the assembly in the name of Paris and its mayor. It was received, however, rather with astonishment than favour in the morning sitting; nevertheless its discussion commenced on the same evening, but was thence adjourned till Thursday the 9th of August. And the assembly was continually receiving and reading petitions expressing in even stronger language than that of the mayor, the same wish and the same sentiments.

The section of Mauconseil, going further than any of the others, did not confine themselves to demanding the dethronement, but on their own authority pronounced it. They declared that they could no longer acknowledge Louis XVI. as king of the French nation; that they were about to demand of the legislative body, whether they were thus willing to save France, nay more, that they invited every section of the empire (for they no longer called it the kingdom) to imitate their example.

The assembly, as has already appeared, did not catch the spirit of insurrection so soon as the inferior authorities, because being charged with the preservation of the laws they were rather bound to respect them. The assembly found itself frequently outstripped by the popular bodies, and perceived that their authority was sliding from them. The assembly therefore annulled the decree of the section of Mauconseil; Vergniaud and Cambon used the harshest expressions against this act, which they termed an usurpation of the sovereignty of the people. Nevertheless, it appeared that in this act, they did not so much condemn the violation of principles as the precipitancy of the petitioners, and above all the impropriety of their language with respect to the national assembly.

The term of all these incertitudes at last approached. On the same day, the insurrectional committee of the federalists and the friends of the king, who had provided for his flight, held their several meetings; the former adjourned the insurrection to the time when the dethronement ques-

tion would be debated, that is to say, to the evening of the 9th of August. On their part, the friends of the king assembled in the garden of M. de Montmorin, and there concerted measures for his flight. The Duke de Liancourt and M. de Lafayette renewed their offers; every thing was prepared for the departure of the royal family, but money was wanting; Bertrand de Molleville had uselessly exhausted the civil list, by paying the royalist clubs, the speakers of the tribunes, and the mob orators, the pretended go-betweens, who gained over no one, and kept for their own use the funds of the court; this deficiency, however, was generously supplied by the friends of the king, who were eager to expend their private fortunes in his service. The offer of M. de Liancourt has been already related; he gave all the gold he could scrape together. Others also contributed all they could call their own. Some devoted friends made themselves ready to follow the carriage that was to bear the royal family, and if necessary, to perish in its defence. Every thing was now ready, and the friends of Louis, who met at the house of Montmorin, after a consultation which lasted the whole evening, were accordant in their opinions that it should be hurried on without delay. The king, who saw him immediately afterwards, gave his consent to this resolve, and gave orders that Messrs. de Monteiel and de Sainte Croix should duly be acquainted. Whatever had been the opinion of those men who had met together on this affair, they experienced a momentary joy at the prospect of the monarch's speedy deliverance *.

But, on the next day, all was changed; the king declared that he would not go, as he should then have to reproach himself with commencing a civil war. His friends were struck with consternation, and they soon learnt that the motive he had given for his refusal to comply with their solicitations was not the real one; but that the supposed speedy approach of Brunswick, the adjournment of the insurrection, and especially the reluctance of the queen to trust herself with constitutionalists, had induced him to change his mind; she had most decidedly expressed her repugnance, saying, that it was better to perish at once, than trust themselves to the hands of persons who had done them so much mischief †.

Thus all the efforts of the constitutionalists, and the dangers to which they had exposed themselves for the king, were ineffectual. Lafayette was deeply compromised. He had agreed with Luckner that, in case of necessity, he should march on the capital to rescue the king. The latter, summoned before the assembly, disclosed this intention to the extraordinary commission of twelve: feeble and fluctuating, this old general was easily persuaded to pass from one party to another, and to communicate all he knew of those whom he deserted, to those by whom he was gained over. In his excuse, he pleaded his ignorance of the French language, wept, and complained that he was surrounded by factions. Guadet had the address to get from him all the design of Lafayette; and Bureau de Puzy being implicated as an accomplice with the general, was called to the bar of the chamber to explain his conduct. This man was one of the friends and officers of Lafayette. He denied all the charges which were brought against him with the greatest assurance, and with an air that induced the assembly to believe that he never had been cognizant of the negotiations of his general. The question of the impeachment of Lafayette was still adjourned.

The day fixed for the debate on the dethronement question was now near at hand. The insurrection which was then to take place was regularly planned and publicly known. The Marseillais, whose barracks were situated at one of the extremities of Paris, were removed to the section of the Cordeliers, near the club of that name. This was in the centre of Paris, and very near the intended scene of action. Cartridges were distributed among these troops by two municipal officers, and every thing was ready for the 10th of August.

On the 8th, it was debated what was to be done with Lafayette. He was exculpated by a great majority. Some deputies, much enraged at this acquittal, demanded a new collection of votes, by calling individually over the names of all the members of the assembly. On this new trial, four hundred and forty-six had still courage to declare themselves in favour of Lafayette, against a minority of two hundred and twenty-four. The mob, who had bestirred themselves on this intelligence, collected in crowds round the door of the assembly, and insulted the deputies as they left the chamber, and in particular maltreated those who were recognized as belonging to the right side of the assembly, such as Vaublanc, Girardin, Dumas, &c. On all sides, the people were indignant with the national representation, and declared that the safety of the nation could not be looked for from those who had absolved *the traitor Lafayette*.

On the next day, the 9th, an extraordinary agitation prevailed amongst the deputies. Those who had been insulted the evening before complained, either personally or by letter, of the outrages they had sustained from the mob. Among other complaints, it was asserted that M. Beaucaron had hardly escaped being hung from a lamp. This occasioned a burst of savage laughter from the galleries; and when M. de Girardin declared that he himself had been struck, he was asked, in an ironical manner, by those who knew more about it than he did, where and how had he been assaulted. "Cowards," replied he, "always strike behind!" At last, a member moved the order of the day; and, in the mean time, the assembly decided that Rœderer, the procurator-syndic of the commune, should be summoned to the bar, and charged, on his personal responsibility, to preserve the safety and inviolability of all the members of the assembly. Some wished to interrogate the mayor of Paris, and oblige him to declare, yea or nay, whether he could answer for the public tranquillity. Guadet repelled this motion by another. He proposed that, at the same time, the king should also be interrogated, and obliged to declare, yea or nay, whether he was able to answer for the safety and inviolability of the French territory.

In the midst, however, of these contrary propositions, it was easy to perceive that the assembly dreaded the approaching moment of decision, and

* See note 46 in the Appendix.

† See Memoirs of Madame Campan, vol. ii. p. 125.

that the Girondists themselves would have preferred bringing about the dethronement by a decree, rather than by a dubious and murderous attack upon the palace. While things were in this state, Rœderer arrived, and announced the determination of one of the sections to ring the tocsin, and to march immediately upon the assembly and the Tuileries, if the dethronement of Louis XVI. was not instantly pronounced. Pétion then came forward; without avowing explicitly all that he knew, he acknowledged that dangerous designs were harboured by the people; he enumerated the precautions he had taken to prevent their taking effect, and promised to consult with the department, and adopt their measures, if they appeared more efficacious than those of the municipality.

Pétion, as well as his friends the Girondists, would have preferred that the dethronement of Louis XVI. should rather be the result of a decision of the assembly, than of a popular attack on the palace. A majority for the dethronement being almost a matter of certainty, he was more disposed to repress the intentions of the insurrectional committee. He then presented himself before the committee of *surveillance* of the Jacobins, and endeavoured to persuade Chabot to suspend the insurrection, assuring him that the Girondins had made up their minds for dethronement, and for the immediate convocation of a national convention; that they were sure of a majority; and that there was no necessity to expose themselves to an attack of which the result might be doubtful. Chabot replied, that no reliance could be placed on an assembly who had acquitted *the wretch Lafayette;* that he, Pétion, suffered himself to be deceived by his friends; that the people were determined to take their cause into their own hands; and that, on that very evening, the tocsin would resound through all the faubourgs. "You always will have such strange notions," replied Pétion; "woe be to us, if the people rise! I know the influence you possess, but I also possess influence, and I will employ it all against you." "You shall be arrested," replied Chabot, "and prevented from acting."

The public mind was too much excited to be able to comprehend the fears of Pétion, or to be diverted from its purpose by his exertions. A general ferment prevailed in Paris; the drums beat to arms in all its quarters; the battalions of the national guards took up their several posts with very different inclinations; the sections were filled, if not with the greatest number, at least with the most violent citizens. The insurrectional committee divided itself into three parts. Fournier and some others were posted at the faubourg Saint-Marceau; Santerre and Westermann occupied the faubourg Saint-Antoine; and Danton, Camille Desmoulins, and Carra, were at the club of the Cordeliers with the battalion of Marseilles. Barbaroux, having placed torch-bearers at the assembly and the palace, had got couriers in readiness to take the road to the south, and had provided himself with a dose of poison, so uncertain was he of success; and he awaited at the Cordeliers the event of the insurrection. As for Robespierre, nobody knew where he was. Marat was hidden in a cellar of the section by Danton, who then immediately hastened to occupy the tribune of the Cordeliers. Every one faltered, as upon the eve of a great event; but Danton, proportioning his audacity to the importance of the event about to transpire, thundered out against the unhappy Louis XVI.; he enumerated what he called the crimes of the court; he reminded his audience of the hatred they had ever displayed to the constitution; he dwelt upon the deceitful and hypocritical promises of the king, which had always been belied by his actions; and, finally, he pointed out his evident machinations to introduce foreign armies into the country. "The people," continued he, "can only now have recourse to themselves, for the constitution is not able to help them, and the assembly has acquitted Lafayette; it remains only, therefore, for you to save yourselves. Hasten, then, this very night to accomplish your deliverance, for the satellites of the palace will doubtless sally forth on the people, to butcher them, before their departure for Coblentz. Hasten, then! Save yourselves! save yourselves! To arms! to arms!"

At that moment a shot was fired in the Court of Commerce; the cry "*To arms*" became general, and the insurrection openly proclaimed. It was then half past eleven o'clock. The Marseillais formed themselves before the door of the Cordeliers, seized on several pieces of cannon, and were quickly augmented by an immense mob pursuing the same object. Camille Desmoulins, and others, hastened to ring the tocsin, but all the sections did not display the same excitement; their zeal, however, was soon stirred up; they quickly met, and named commissioners, who were to proceed to the Hotel de Ville, to displace the former municipality, and usurp all their powers. At last they repair to the clock-tower, take possession of it by main force, and then the tocsin begins ringing. The solemn clang resounds through the vast extent of the city. It is heard from street to street, and from house to house. It summons the deputies, the magistrates, the citizens, to their posts, and finally reaches the palace, as the harbinger of that fatal night that has at last arrived—a night of terror, destruction, and blood, warning the monarch that this is the last night he is to pass in the palace of his fathers.

The emissaries of the court now came to inform the king that he stood on the brink of some fatal catastrophe; they had, they said, overheard the speech of the president of the Cordeliers; that he told the people that they were not on this occasion to conduct themselves as on the 20th of June, as forming a simple civic procession; that is to say, that if the 20th of June had conveyed the threat, the 10th of August should strike the decisive blow; in fact, it was no longer a matter of doubt. The king, the queen, their two children, their sister, Madame Élizabeth, had not retired to rest, and after supper, had gone to the council-chamber, where all the ministers and a great number of officers of high rank were assembled. They there deliberated in the midst of this agitation upon the measures to be taken to save the royal personages. Their means of resistance were but few, indeed almost none, for the distrust of the assembly, and the imprudence of the court, had left them almost in a perfectly defenceless state.

The constitutional guard, disbanded by the assembly, had not been replaced by the king, who

had preferred continuing its pay, than forming it anew; this was a loss of eighteen hundred men to the palace. The regiments whose inclinations had appeared favourable to the king during the last federation, had been sent away from Paris, by the ordinary means of an act of the assembly. The Swiss could not have been sent away, thanks to the convention which allowed their service, but they had been deprived of their artillery; and the court, at the time the flight into Normandy was determined upon, had sent one of these faithful battalions into that province, under pretext of escorting a store of grain. This battalion had not yet been recalled. Some few Swiss only, barracked at Courbevoie, had been sent back by the order of Pétion, and these altogether consisted of no more than eight or nine hundred men. The gendarmerie had just been recomposed of the old soldiers of the French guards, the originators of the disorders of the 14th of July. In fine, the national guard had neither the same commanders nor the same devotion to the king as they had manifested on the 6th of October, 1789. The staff, as we have already observed, had been recomposed. A host of citizens had quitted the service in disgust, and those who had not deserted their post, were intimidated by the fury of the populace. The national guard, therefore, was, as was every place in the kingdom, composed of a new revolutionary generation. They were divided, as France itself was divided, into constitutionalists and republicans. The whole battalion of the Filles-Saint-Thomas, and a part of that of the Petits Pères, it is true, were devoted to the king; all the other corps were either indifferent or enemies to the royalist party; above all, the cannoneers, who comprehended the principal strength, were decided republicans. The severe discipline of this part of the army had driven away the rich citizenry; locksmiths and blacksmiths were now masters of the cannon, and identified themselves with that people, of which they formed a portion. Thus were left to the king but eight or nine hundred Swiss, and a little more than one battalion of the national guard.

It will be recollected that since the retirement of Lafayette, the command of the national guard was alternately held by six captains. On that day, the command had fallen on the commandant Mandat, an old soldier, who although somewhat offensive to the court by his constitutional opinions, nevertheless inspired the king with the most perfect confidence in his firmness, intelligence, and inflexible adherence to his duty. Mandat, who was general-in-chief on that fatal night, had hastily made the best defences possible.

The floor of the great gallery leading from the Louvre to the Tuileries had already been broken in, to stop the passage of the assailants at that approach. Mandat, therefore, did not think it necessary to bring any additional defence to that quarter of the palace, but was solicitous chiefly to guard the avenues of the courts and the garden. Notwithstanding the urgent necessity of the moment, but few of the national guards had assembled. The battalions were not complete; the most zealous officers had hastened individually to the palace; Mandat ordered these latter to mingle with the ranks of the Swiss, and he then fixed them at their posts in the courts, the garden, and the apartments. He placed one piece of cannon in the Swiss court, three in the middle court, and three in the court of the princes.

These pieces of artillery were unfortunately confided to the cannoneers of the national guard, that is, to the enemy. But the courageous and faithful Swiss eyed them with suspicion, and were ready, in a moment, to seize their guns, and thrust them out from among them.

Mandat had also placed some advanced posts of gendarmerie at the colonnade of the Louvre, and at the Hotel de Ville; but this gendarmerie was, as we have said, composed of the old French guards.

To these defenders of the palace, we must add many old servants of the king, whose age or moderation prevented them from emigrating, and who came now generously to die by the side of their prince. They were armed with such weapons as they could find in their haste, or procure in the palace, with old swords or pistols tied round their waists with handkerchiefs. Some took the shovels and tongs from the fire-places, not laying aside, even in this awful moment, their absurd jokes, when, for once, the court might be expected to be serious. This concourse of useless persons, so far from being of service, only bewildered the national guard, and added to the confusion, which was already great.

All the members of the directory of the department betook themselves to the Tuileries; the virtuous Duke de Larochefoucauld was there; Rœderer, the procureur-syndic of the commune, had also arrived; Pétion, being summoned, at last appeared with two municipal officers. He was then required to sign the order to repel force by force, and that he might not appear an accomplice of the insurgents, he complied with this demand. The court were rejoiced at having him in their possession, and were resolved to retain an hostage so dear to the people. Being informed of this design, the assembly summoned him to appear before them. Some counselled the king not to let him go, but he rejected this advice, and the mayor left the Tuileries without meeting with any impediment.

The order for repelling force by force having been obtained, many opinions were offered as to the manner in which it should be used. In this difficult situation, various means were suggested. One of them, which was boldly conceived, might have succeeded: it was to disperse the insurgents by a sudden onset, who, with the Marseillais, did not altogether at that time amount to more than a few thousand men. The inhabitants of the faubourg Saint Marceau had not yet assembled. Santerre hesitated at the faubourg Saint Antoine; Danton alone, and the Marseillais, were drawn up in order at the Cordeliers, and impatiently awaited the arrival of the rest of the insurgents on the Pont St. Michael.

A sudden attack at this moment might certainly have dispersed the multitude, and put down the insurrection at a blow. But a more safe and legal plan was suggested by Mandat: this was to suffer the insurgents to collect their forces and march towards the palace, and then to attack them suddenly on two decisive points, first, while one body debouched upon the place of the Hotel de Ville, by the arcade of Saint Jean, they were to be

suddenly charged, and that the same mode should be adopted at the Louvre, against those who should come by the Pont Neuf, along the quay of the Tuileries. Orders had been actually given to the gendarmerie who were stationed at the colonnade, to let the insurgents file off, and attack them in the rear, whilst the gendarmerie stationed at the Place de Carrousel were ordered to rush out upon them through the narrow gateways adjoining the Louvre, and attack them in front. The success of these measures was almost certain. Mandat had already given the necessary orders to the commanders of the different posts, and particularly to that at the Hotel de Ville.

We have already observed that a new municipality had been formed at the Hotel de Ville, Danton and Manuel were the only members of that body who were returned. The order of Mandat was shown to this insurgent municipality, who immediately summoned the commander to appear at the Hotel de Ville. This summons was communicated to the court, who were perfectly ignorant of any change having taken place in the municipal body. Mandat at first hesitated to obey, but finally yielded to the persuasions of every one present; even the members of the department, in ignorance of what had taken place, judged it unwise in him to violate the law by refusing to make his appearance before a legally-constituted authority. Having decided to obey the summons, he delivered over the order for repelling force by force to his son, and left the palace for the municipality. It was now about four o'clock. He was surprised on his arrival to find that a change had taken place in the magistracy. He was immediately brought before them and interrogated upon the order he had given; he was immediately remanded to his post, and in remanding him, the president accompanied his order with a significant gesture, which served as an order to put the commandant to death. In point of fact, the unfortunate commandant had scarcely quitted the threshold of the Hotel de Ville, when he was seized and pistolled. His clothes were stripped off, in the hopes of finding the warrant which he had given up to his son before he quitted the palace, the rabble threw his corpse into the river, which shortly afterwards became the receptacle of so many others.

This act of barbarity paralysed the measures that had been provided for the defence of the palace, it destroyed all unity, and obstructed the execution of the plan of defence. However, all was not yet lost; the insurrection was not yet consummated. The Marseillais, after having waited with the utmost impatience for the faubourg Saint Antoine, which had not come up, at the moment despaired of success, but Westermann putting his sword to Santerre's breast had compelled him to march. The faubourgs then arrived in due succession, some by the Rue St. Honoré, and others by the Pont Neuf, the Pont Royal, and the small wickets of the Louvre. The Marseillais and the federalists marched in front of the columns, with the federalists of Bretagne, and pointed their pieces against the palace. The force of the insurgents gradually increasing, presented an appearance more formidable than they really were, owing to the crowds which flocked about them from curiosity. Whilst they were advancing upon the Tuileries, Santerre hastened to the Hotel de Ville, to endeavour to get himself nominated commander-in-chief of the national guard; Westermann remained on the field of battle to direct the assailants. However, every thing there indicated the greatest confusion; so much so, that the body of insurgents which had been destined to guard Pétion's house, in order that his acquiescence in the insurrection might appear a matter of necessity, were not despatched to perform that duty. Pétion sent a message to the Hotel de Ville to repair this omission ere it was too late, and shortly after a band of some hundred men arrived and surrounded his house, in order that he might appear to be under compulsion.

The palace was at this time beset on all sides. As the morning dawned, and they could see beyond the old gates of the court-yard, they perceived loop holes which discovered their artillery pointing upon the palace, and heard their savage yells, and menacing songs. It was intended to make the preconcerted attack, but when intelligence had arrived of Mandat's death, the ministers and the departments thought it best to allow the insurgents to be the first aggressors, that the court might retain that advantage which the observance of the law gave them.

Rœderer had now inspected the ranks of the garrison, and made in the presence of the Swiss and the national guards the legal proclamation which forbade them to act on the offensive; but enjoined them to repel force by force. The king was also prevailed upon to review in person the servants who were making ready to defend him. This unfortunate prince had passed all the night in listening to the various opinions of his counsellors. The few moments he was left to himself he spent in prayer to the Almighty on behalf of his royal consort, his children, and his sister, the objects which entirely engrossed his thoughts. "Sire," said the queen, "now is the time to summon up all your energies;" and it is positively asserted, that, snatching a pistol from the elder D'Affry's side, she with animated gestures presented it to him. The eyes of the princess were streaming with tears, but her head seemed elevated with pride, and her nostrils inflated with anger and pride. The king himself manifested perfect self-possession, and betrayed no symptom of fear in this extraordinary danger; but his alarm on account of his family was extreme, and so overwhelmed was he with grief at the dangers to which they were exposed, that it was strongly visible in every feature. He, nevertheless, made his appearance with great firmness. He wore on this occasion a violet coloured dress, and carried a sword, but his wig not dressed since the preceding evening was half tumbled. On presenting himself at the balcony, he perceived a formidable array of artillery pointed against the palace, but beheld it without exhibiting any symptom of alarm. His presence among the troops called forth expressions of enthusiasm. The grenadiers hoisted their caps on the tops of their sabres and bayonets, and the old cry of "Long live the king," echoed for the last time under the arches of the palace of his ancestors. The last remains of courage re-animated them, hearts that were dispirited recovered again, and a gleam of confidence and hope exhibited itself.

At this moment there arrived some new battalions of the national guard, which had formed not quite so quickly as the others, and who came pursuant to the order previously given by Mandat. They entered before the shouts of "Long live the king" had ceased. Some immediately joined those who were thus cheering the monarch; whilst others, who were infected with the popular opinions, recollecting all the fables that had been circulated concerning the *Knights of the Poignard*, (*Chevaliers de Poignard*,) imagined they were about to be delivered up to their vengeance, and crying out that they were betrayed by *that wretch* Mandat, excited a kind of tumult. The cannoneers following their example, turned their guns against the front of the palace. This occasioned a fray between them and those regiments that remained faithful, which terminated in the former being disarmed and given in charge of a detachment. The men newly arrived were posted in the garden.

The king, after having shown himself at the balcony, descended the staircase, in order to review the troops stationed in the courts. His arrival being announced, all fell into their ranks. He maintained, during the review, an unruffled composure of countenance; and as he regarded his few and faithful adherents with an affectionate and melancholy sedateness of aspect, their hearts seemed to be deeply penetrated with determined devotion. He addressed them in the most cordial tone of confidence, and expressed his heartfelt gratitude for the many instances of attachment they had shown him; assured them that it was his determination to fight by their sides, and said that, in defending him, they were defending their wives and children. He then left them to cross into the garden; but at that very instant, the cry of "*Down with the veto*," that was uttered by the battalion that had just entered, reached his ears. Two of the officers that attended his person advised him not to make the review in the garden; others exhorted him to visit the post at Pont Tournant, and he boldly determined on doing the latter. To reach this post, he had to pass along the terrace of the feuillans, which was thronged with the mob. While he was passing along, he was only separated from the maddened crowd by a tri-coloured ribbon; he nevertheless proceeded, and experienced the insults of the rabble at every step. He observed at this moment the battalions stationed in the gardens join the people on the Place de Carrousel.

This desertion, coupled with that of the engineers, and the cries of "*Down with the veto*," which was vociferated on all sides by the populace, had driven the king to a state of despair. The gendarmes also, stationed at the colonnade of the Louvre, now abandoned their post, and mingled with the insurgents. On their part, the national guard in the apartments expressed too much aversion to their companions the gentlemen of the court, who were to them objects of suspicion. The queen endeavoured to allay their distrust. "Grenadiers," said she, "these are your comrades; they will die by your sides." Yet, in spite of this apparent courage, despair was in her heart. After the review, she lost all hope, and complained that the king had not shown sufficient energy. I must again repeat, that this unfortunate prince feared nothing on his own account. He again refused, as on the 14th of July, to wear a leather quilting in his bosom, saying, that in battle he would remain as unprotected as the lowest of his subjects. Far from being deficient in courage, he frequently displayed the most sublime and noble traits of it, but he wanted boldness to act on the offensive; he wanted self-confidence; and, after having invited foreign foes into his country, a reluctance to shed blood in his own defence was the extreme of inconsistent weakness. It is certain that, had he headed his few and faithful adherents on horseback, the insurrection would have been dispersed.

At this juncture, the members of the department, perceiving the general disorder which pervaded the palace, and giving up all hopes of a successful resistance, advised the king to retire to the assembly. This advice, so often condemned, as indeed are all unsuccessful counsels given to kings, was the only beneficial advice to follow at the moment. By this retreat all effusion of blood was prevented, and the royal family were saved, for it is certain that, had the Tuileries been taken by assault, they would have been put to death. Nor could any doubts be entertained respecting the success of the assailants; but even had any existed, there were sufficient reasons for removing the royal family from so dangerous a situation.

The queen strongly opposed this step. "Madam," said Rœderer, "you are exposing the life of your husband, as well as that of your children; reflect upon the responsibility you are taking on yourself." A lively altercation ensued; at last the king decided on retiring to the assembly, and said, with a resigned air, "We must quit the palace." The queen then turning to Rœderer, addressed him in these words, "Sir, you are responsible for the life of the king and that of my children." "Madam," replied the procurator-syndic, "I undertake to die by their side, but I cannot promise more than that."

The royal family then immediately proceeded through the gardens of the Tuileries, and along the terrace of the feuillans, to the assembly. All the gentlemen of the court and the household of the palace eagerly pressed forward to follow them; but as such a concourse might have endangered their safety, and displeased the assembly, Rœderer, after many vain efforts, at length succeeded in dispersing the greater number of this train, and then proceeded with the remainder to the assembly. A detachment of the Swiss and national guard attended the royal family, and a deputation was also sent by the assembly to conduct them into their presence. At this time the crowd was so great, that it was almost impossible to force a passage through them. A grenadier of tall stature, taking the young Dauphin in his arms, and holding him over his head, in this manner pressed through the throng. At sight of this, the queen, thinking her son was about to be carried off, uttered a shriek, but she was soon quit of her fears; the grenadier entered the assembly, and placed the young Dauphin on the table.

The king and his family, followed by two ministers, then entered the chamber. "I am come among you," said Louis XVI., "to prevent the perpetration of a great crime; and I think, gentle-

men, that I shall not be in greater security than in the midst of you."

Vergniaud, the president, assured the king, that he might confidently put himself under the protection of the members of the national assembly, who had sworn to sacrifice their lives in defence of the constituted authorities.

The king then seated himself by the side of the president, but it being observed by Chabot that his presence might be a restraint upon the freedom of the assembly's deliberations, he was removed to the office of the clerk of the journals, and the iron railing which separated it from the chamber was broken down, that, in case the chamber should be attacked by the multitude, he could, with his family, take immediate refuge among the deputies.

Rœderer then related to the assembly the occurrences that had taken place at the palace; he depicted the fury of the multitude, and the danger to which the palace was exposed, the courts of which were already invaded. The assembly, in consequence of this representation, sent twenty of its members to harangue the mob, and endeavour to allay their fury. These members had hardly quitted the chamber, when reiterated discharges of artillery were heard. A general consternation prevailed in the assembly. The king informed the deputies that he had forbidden the Swiss to fire. But at that very instant a fresh discharge of artillery and musketry was heard. The agitation of the assembly increased every moment. Soon after a messenger brought intelligence that their deputation had been dispersed. At the same instant the door of the hall of the assembly was attacked, and awfully resounded from the blows with which it was struck; armed citizens having broken in at one of the entrances, "The chamber is invaded," exclaimed a municipal officer; the president put on his hat; many deputies rushed from their seats, to expel the assailants: finally, the tumult was appeased. And to the uninterrupted roar of cannon and musketry, the deputies join in the cry of "The nation, liberty, and equality for ever."

Meantime a murderous contest had commenced at the Tuileries. The king having abandoned it, it was thought that the people would feel no exasperation against his deserted dwelling; besides, the disorder in which it was, would have prevented their occupying it, and consequently no order had been given that it should be evacuated. The troops stationed in the courts had been ordered to enter the apartments, where they remained in a state of perfect disorder with the servants, gentlemen, and officers of the household. This concourse was so great, that in spite of the spaciousness of the apartments, all communication from one to another was almost blocked up.

The people, perhaps ignorant of the king's departure, after waiting for a considerable time at the principal wicket, at last attacked the gate, broke it to pieces with hatchets, and pressed into the court royal. They next formed in columns, and, taking possession of the cannon which had been imprudently left there after the retreat of the troops, turned it against the palace: nevertheless, the attack did not commence instantly. The people made signs to those within, intimating that their intentions were pacific, and requiring an unresisting surrender of the edifice. The Swiss, manifesting an equally amicable disposition, threw their cartridges out of the windows. Some, however, of the assailants, more bold than the rest, advanced to the vestibule of the palace. At the foot of the great staircase, a barrier of wood had been constructed, behind which were entrenched, and huddled together, the Swiss guards and the national guards. Those who from without had got so far, wished to enter the palace, and remove the barrier. After a pretty long struggle, but which did not induce an actual battle, the barrier was removed. Then it was that the assailants rushed up the stairs, and demanded over and over again the surrender of the palace. It is positively asserted that some pikemen who remained outside caught hold of some of the Swiss sentries who were outside with hooks, and coolly put them to death; it was also affirmed that some shots were fired in at the windows, and that the Swiss, thus exasperated, immediately answered it with a fire of musketry. In point of fact, a terrible discharge of fire arms resounded through the palace, and those who had got inside fled, crying out that they were betrayed. It is difficult to decide from which side the first shots proceeded. The assailants declared that their intentions were amicable, but that they were suddenly attacked when they had advanced too far to extricate themselves, and in that situation slaughtered by the Swiss. This account is improbable; first, because the Swiss had no reason to feel a desire of revenge against the insurgents; and secondly, because, the king's life being saved, it was natural that they should rather endeavour to protect than hazard their own, and treason was not the way in which this was to be effected. But even allowing that upon the act of aggression the guilt of all that ensued rests, it must be admitted that the insurgent party were from the commencement the aggressors. All that followed, after the palace was once attacked, was inevitable, and the effect of accident. But be that as it may, those of the mob who first ventured over the threshold and ascended the great staircase, being terrified at the report of the fire of the assailants without, and the volley it provoked from the Swiss within, betook themselves to flight, and in their retreat received a shower of shot upon the staircase itself. The Swiss then descended in good order, and when at the bottom of the steps, debouched by the vestibule into the court. They then seized upon the piece of cannon that was lying there, and, although under a heavy fire, pointed it against the Marseillais, who immediately fell in great numbers. The Marseillais rallied, and, the fire continuing, they evacuated the court. A feeling of alarm got ground amongst the people, who fled on all sides, and got back again to the faubourgs. Had the Swiss followed up their advantages, and the gendarmes not deserted their post at the Louvre, a charge upon the repelled besiegers would have decided the contest in favour of the palace.

But at this moment, M. de Hervilly produced an order from the king forbidding the troops on any account to fire. M. de Hervilly arrived at the vestibule at the time when the Swiss had been first repelling the besiegers. He stopped their fire, and commanded them in the name of the king to follow him to the assembly. The Swiss accordingly followed M. de Hervilly to the feuillans in

the midst of a murderous fire. Thus it was that the palace was deprived of the greatest part of its defenders. There still, however, remained on the staircase and in the apartments a considerable number of unfortunate Swiss whom the king's order had not reached, and who were shortly exposed, without any means of resistance, to the most appalling danger.

During this interval the besiegers had time to rally. The Marseillais united with the Bretons, ashamed of having given way, resumed their courage, and returned to the charge with redoubled fury. Westermann, who afterwards discovered great talents, commanded them. They rushed forward and fell in great numbers before reaching the door of the palace, but having finally reached the vestibule they got possession of the staircase, and became undisputed masters of the palace, and a merciless massacre commenced. The pike-bearing mob rushed in after them, and what followed was immediately a scene of massacre. The unfortunate Swiss in throwing down their arms, vainly implored for quarter, they were mercilessly butchered. The palace was immediately set on fire; and the gentlemen who remained in it were hunted from their places of concealment; some fled and some were slaughtered. Amongst the people there were a few humane conquerors. "Spare the women—do not dishonour the nation!" cried one of these; and some ladies of the queen, begging for mercy on their knees, with drawn swords held over their heads, were saved. There were many victims who met their fate with courage; many, also, whose courage failing them displayed a ready ingenuity in saving themselves. There were also amongst these furious besiegers instances of honesty, and the gold found at the palace, whether it were from popular vanity, or that disinterestedness which springs from enthusiasm, was delivered up to the assembly.

Meantime the assembly awaited the issue of the combat with the most painful anxiety. At about eleven o'clock they were relieved from all suspense. Shouts of victory rent the air; the doors of the assembly were burst open, and a multitude, drunk with triumph and fury, rushed in and filled the chamber. The Swiss whose lives had been spared, were brought prisoners to the assembly as monuments of popular clemency. Meanwhile, the king and the royal family, remaining in the narrow room of the secretary's office, were obliged passively to take part in the downfall of the throne, and to witness the exultation of their conquerors. Vergniaud, the president, quits for a moment his seat to draw up the decree of the dethronement, he re-enters, and the assembly pass this celebrated act, in pursuance whereof,

Louis XVI. is provisionally suspended from the exercise of the royal authority; and,

A plan of education for the prince royal is ordered to be drawn up.

A national convention is convoked.

Could it then have been a long settled plan this, to abolish monarchy, since the legislative assembly after all did no more than suspend the functions of the king, and, at the same time, prepared for the education of the dauphin? What timidity characterized their decisions against this ancient constituted authority! What internal conflicts are manifest in the debates! What irresolution was produced by the recollections of the antiquity of the French monarchy and its royal family! What hesitation was created by their reflections on the blended glories and sufferings of the nation under the dynasty they were about to destroy! But a self-ruling public is always prompt to act; the few vestiges of royal honour which remained, and which recalled to their minds the memory of past times, did not long survive; the suspension of the royal authority only preceeded its dissolution; and it was exterminated, not by the downfall of a Louis XI., or a Charles IX., or a Louis XIV., but by the death of a king of the purest and most amiable character that had ever sat upon the throne of France.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CONSEQUENCES AND TERMINATION OF THE EVENTS OF THE TENTH OF AUGUST—RECALL OF THE GIRONDIST MINISTRY; DANTON APPOINTED MINISTER OF JUSTICE—STATE OF THE ROYAL FAMILY—CIRCUMSTANCES OF PARTIES IN THE ASSEMBLY AND WITHOUT AFTER THE TENTH OF AUGUST—ORGANIZATION AND INFLUENCE OF THE COMMUNE; THE NUMBERLESS POWERS IT ARROGATED: ACTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE ASSEMBLY—ELECTION OF AN EXTRAORDINARY CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL—STATE OF THE ARMIES AFTER THE TENTH OF AUGUST—LAFAYETTE ACTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT—LAFAYETTE IMPEACHED, QUITS THE ARMY AND FRANCE; IS IMPRISONED BY THE AUSTRIANS—POSITION IN WHICH DUMOURIEZ IS PLACED—INCLINATIONS OF FOREIGN POWERS, AND RECIPROCAL SITUATION OF THE ALLIED ARMIES AND THE FRENCH ARMIES—LONGWY TAKEN BY THE PRUSSIANS; FERMENT IN PARIS AT THIS INTELLIGENCE—REVOLUTIONARY MEASURES TAKEN BY THE COMMUNE; ARREST OF SUSPECTED PERSONS—MASSACRES IN THE PRISONS ON THE SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH OF SEPTEMBER—PRINCIPAL INCIDENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THESE MURDEROUS DAYS.

THE courage displayed by the Swiss in defence of the Tuileries proved ineffectual. The grand staircase was soon forced, and the palace invaded. The victorious mob immediately penetrated into every part of the royal residence; and this supposed abode of extraordinary wealth, illimitable pleasure, formidable power, and mischievous intrigue, was quickly ransacked by plebeian hands. Such was the vengeance wreaked upon riches, grandeur, and power, all at one swoop.

In this conflict eighty Swiss grenadiers were slaughtered in a most pitiless manner, not having been able to effect their retreat. The multitude then rushed confusedly into the apartments, and

wreaked their vengeance upon those useless friends of the king who had collected together in the palace, for the purpose of affording him all the protection in their power, and who were known by the people under the name of the *Knights of the Poignard*. Their arms, unable to resist the fury of the conquerors, irritated them the more, and gave an appearance of truth to the reported designs of the court. Every closed door was broken open without a moment's delay. Two doorkeepers, who defended the entrance of the grand council-chamber, and thus sacrificed themselves to a vain ceremonial, were instantly massacred. The numerous household of the court were now seen hurrying tumultuously through the long galleries; throwing themselves out of the windows; or seeking, in the immensity of the palace, some obscure hiding-place, where they might remain unobserved. The ladies of the queen took shelter in one of her apartments, and expected every moment to be attacked in their place of refuge. The Princess of Tarento had all the doors thrown open, that the irritation of the mob might not be increased by resistance. The assailants then rushed on without further impediment, and had already seized on one of the female attendants of the queen, who was on the point of being murdered, when a voice exclaimed, "Spare the women; do not dishonour the nation!" This expression had an electric effect. The ladies of the queen were not only spared, but escorted from the palace under the care of those who, a moment before, were thirsting for their blood, but who now made every exertion to save them. After the massacre of all who fell into the hands of the populace was accomplished, the work of devastation began. All the magnificent furniture of the palace was destroyed with a Gothic frenzy, and the wrecks of its former splendour scattered far and near. The private apartments of the queen were burst open, and profaned by indecent ribaldry. The most secret corners were ransacked; every closet broken open; and all the papers which could be found were read with eager curiosity. But to the horrors of massacre and devastation, those of fire were now added. The exterior courts of the palace had caught fire, and the flame seemed spreading rapidly towards the grand edifice, menacing that magnificent abode of royalty with complete ruin. This scene of desolation was not confined to the precincts of the palace. The streets were blocked up by broken pieces of furniture and the carcases of the dead. Those who fled from the scene of action, or were even supposed to fly, were treated as enemies, and fired at as they retreated. A continual discharge of musketry had succeeded to the sound of the cannon, and told a tale of fresh murders every moment. Such were the horrors which followed this popular victory, whatever might have been the conquered, the conquerors, and the cause for which they contended.

The executive power being dissolved by the suspension of Louis XVI., there remained in Paris but two authorities, the commune and the assembly. It has been already stated, in relating the events of the 10th of August, that the deputies of the sections, having assembled at the Hotel de Ville, seized upon the municipal authority, by expelling the previous magistrates, and had directed the course of the insurrection during the day and night of the 10th. In fact, they possessed the only effective power; and being inflated with all the pride and presumption of victory, represented that class of fiery revolutionists who had, during the whole session, set themselves against the tardy proceedings of the assembly; which was nevertheless composed of men more enlightened and wise, though less active and enterprising than themselves. The first act of these deputies was the ousting of all the higher authorities, fearing their attachment to power from their near vicinity to it. They also suspended the staff of the national guard, and by removing Mandat from the palace, had disorganized the defence of the Tuileries, and bestowed the command of the national guard on Santerre. There was not the less anxiety to suspend the functions of the department which, from the high estate in which it was placed, had constantly been opposed to the passions of the populace, having, in fact, no sympathy with them. As to the municipality, they suppressed its general council, and substituted themselves in its place, retaining only the mayor Pétion, the procurator-syndic Manuel, and the sixteen municipal officers. All this took place whilst the people were making their attack on the palace. Danton presided over this tumultuous assembly; and at one moment, when the sharp fire of the Swiss had driven the people back, and they were observed retreating along the quays, he cried out, "Our brethren require our assistance; let us go and give it them," and immediately sallied out to join the mob. His presence brought them back to the scene of battle, and decided the victory. The combat being over, the people demanded the enlargement of Pétion, who had been placed in the custody of the guard, that he might resume his office of mayor. Nevertheless, either through regard for his safety, or a fear that his scrupulous disposition might disapprove of the measures that had been taken during the insurrection, the deputies decided that he should still remain under the protection of the guard for a day or two, pretending that his life would otherwise be endangered. During the same sitting it was also declared, that the busts of Louis XVI., Bailly, and Lafayette, should be removed from the council chamber. The new order who had thus elevated itself threw off the earliest demonstrations of the revolution, in order to substitute their own.

It now remained for this insurrectionary commune to put themselves in communication with the assembly. It is true, they had accused it of tardiness, and even of monarchical principles; but as it was the only existing sovereign authority, they felt by no means disposed to treat it with contempt. Even on the morning of the 10th, a deputation approached its bar, to announce the formation of the commune, and to inform the assembly of their proceedings. Danton was among the members who formed this deputation. "The people, who have sent us to you," said he, "have charged us to declare that they have always considered you worthy of their confidence, but that they will acknowledge no other judge of those measures which necessity has obliged them to have recourse to, than the French people, as well our sovereign as yours, met together in primary assemblies." The assembly

replied to these deputies by their president, that they approved of all that the commune had already done, but recommended to them the preservation of order and peace. They also communicated to them the decrees which they had that day passed, and begged that they would promulgate them. After this, a proclamation, calling upon every one to respect persons and property, was drawn up, and some of the members of the assembly were ordered to distribute it among the people.

Their grand object, however, at the present crisis was, to substitute some authority in the place of the regal power, which was now no more. The ministers, meeting under the name of an *executive council*, were provisionally entrusted with the duties of the administration, and the execution of the laws. The minister of justice was the keeper of the great seal, which being affixed to the decrees of the assembly, stamped them with the authority of the legislative power. The present question, was the choice of persons to compose this ministry. The restoration of Roland, Clavière, and Servan, who had been dismissed for their attachment to the popular cause, naturally occurred to the assembly, as the best selection that could be made. These three ministers were, therefore, unanimously restored to their former situations, Roland to the home department, Servan to the war-office, and Clavière to the finances. But a minister of justice, one for foreign and another for naval affairs, were still wanting. Here was an opportunity to make a free choice, and the desire formed some time since in favour of obscure merit or ardent patriotism, could now be realized without any impediment. Danton, from his influence over the multitude, and the very leading position he had lately assumed, was judged the fittest person for the first of these offices; and although by no means favoured by the Girondists, as being the choice of the rabble, he was nominated minister of justice by a majority of two hundred and twenty-two, out of two hundred and eighty-four. After this concession to the wishes of the people, and this place having been granted to an energetic character, a philosopher was chosen for the marine, this was the learned mathematician Monge, who was proposed and elected on the suggestion of his friend and admirer Condorcet. Finally, Le Brun was appointed to the office of foreign affairs, and the public rewarded in his person one of those painstaking individuals who themselves perform all those operations, of which ministers reap the credit.

After having thus re-established the executive power, the assembly declared that all those decrees to which Louis XVI. had opposed his *veto*, should be deemed in force. The formation of the camp near Paris, which had been the occasion of such animated discussions, was immediately ordered; and the engineers were authorized, on the same day, to commence their fortifications on the heights of Mont Martre. This revolution being thus accomplished at Paris, it was necessary to secure its success in the departments, and especially in the army, which was commanded by suspected generals. Commissioners chosen from the assembly were consequently sent into the departments, and to the army, to carry information respecting the events of the 10th of August, and also to displace, if it should appear necessary, both the civil and military chiefs then in authority, and to substitute others in their room.

These decrees were all passed in a few hours; and even whilst they were being passed, the attention of the assembly was frequently called to other subjects. Many of the valuables which had been carried off from the Tuileries were brought to the assembly. The Swiss, the household of the palace, and all those who had been arrested in their flight, or saved from the fury of the people, were conducted to its bar, and thus sheltered for a time. Crowds of persons came in, one after another, to give information of the discoveries they had made of the supposed plots of the court. Accusations and calumnies of every description were uttered against the royal family, who overheard them all from the contracted apartment in which they were placed. This apartment was the lodge of the clerk of the journals. Louis XVI. listened calmly to all that was said, and conversed, in the intervals, with Vergniaud and other deputies who were seated near him. Having been confined fifteen hours, he had asked for some refreshment, which he partook of with his wife and children. This afforded occasion for many to indulge themselves in indecent and ungenerous raillery concerning his supposed propensity to the pleasures of the table! Such consideration did misfortune receive at their victorious hands! The dauphin reclined on the bosom of his mother, and slept heavily, being overcome by the excessive heat. The young princess and Madame Elizabeth sat beside the queen, their eyes red and swoln with tears. At the further end of the lodge were a few lords attached to his person, who had not deserted him in his misfortunes. Fifty soldiers, chosen from those who had escorted the royal family from the palace to the assembly, constituted a guard for their persons in this narrow apartment. It was from this place the fallen monarch contemplated the spoils of his palace, beheld his regal power crumbled into ruins before his eyes, and saw the small remnant that was left distributed among the popular authorities.

The tumult of the people had not yet ceased; it still continued to rage with extreme violence. The suspension of the royal authority was not enough to satisfy the populace; they demanded its utter abolition. Petitions after petitions were presented to the assembly on this subject, and their answer was awaited with extreme impatience. Multitudes had collected outside the doors of the assembly; the streets and avenues were all blocked up; and the dethronement of the king was the only topic of conversation among this immense mass. The doors of the assembly were absolutely assailed, and, at one time, with so much violence, that it was thought they were broken open, and the most lively fear for the safety of the royal family prevailed among the deputies. Henry Larivière was sent with some others to endeavour to calm the people, and at the moment when the fears of the assembly were at their height, returned and exclaimed with animation, "Yes, gentlemen, I assure you from what I have seen, I am confident that the mass of the people are determined rather to perish than dishonour the cause of liberty by any act of inhumanity. Believe me," added he, "there is nothing to fear, and every gentleman in this assembly may

with confidence rely upon the loyalty of the French people." These animating expressions were applauded. Vergniaud then rose, and answered the petitioners, who required that the suspension should be altered to dethronement:—"I am delighted," said he, "with this opportunity of explaining the sentiments of the assembly in the presence of my fellow-citizens. It has decreed the suspension of the executive power, and nominated a convention to decide irrevocably on the question of the dethronement. In doing this, the assembly has done all that is consistent with her powers, which do not permit her to be a judge between herself and royalty. Meantime, the executive power has been so disposed of, that it cannot be abused. Thus this assembly has fulfilled all its duties, and at the same time has not exceeded the limits of her prerogative." These words produced a favourable effect, and the petitioners, being satisfied, took upon themselves the task of satisfying and appeasing the people.

It was now necessary to put an end to this long sitting. The valuables, therefore, which had been brought from the Tuileries, were ordered to be deposited with the commune. The Swiss and the other persons who had been arrested, were either put in the charge of a guard of the feuillans, or taken to various places of confinement; and, finally, it was decided that the royal family should be kept under a guard in the Luxembourg till the meeting of the national convention; but that whilst the necessary preparations were making for their reception, they should be lodged in some place under the care and control of the assembly. Consequently, at one o'clock in the morning of Saturday the 11th, they were carried to the lodging which had been prepared for them, and which consisted of four cells in the old feuillans. Those lords who had not deserted the king, established themselves in the first; the king occupied the second; the queen, her sister, and children, the two others; the woman of the porter's lodge attended upon the princesses, in the place of a numerous train of ladies, who, the evening before, were all anxiety to minister their attendance.

The sitting of the assembly was delayed till three o'clock in the morning. There was still great disorder in Paris. To prevent disturbances, the environs of the palace were illuminated, and the greater part of the citizens under arms.

Such were the events of this terrible day. The king and his family were prisoners at the feuillans; the three disgraced ministers were replaced in their situations; Danton, who the evening before was concealed at an obscure club, was now minister of justice; Pétion was guarded at his home, but his name was hailed as the *Father of the people*. Marat, having emerged from the mean hiding-place where Danton had concealed him during the attack of the palace, now promenaded the streets of Paris, brandishing his sabre, and heading a battalion of Marseillais; Robespierre, whom no one had seen figure in these terrible scenes, now came forward, made harangues at the Jacobins, conversed with some members who stayed at his house, as to the use they should make of their victory, of the necessity of breaking up the present assembly, and of impeaching Lafayette.

On the day following it still became necessary to quell the enraged populace, who yet continued to massacre those who were taken for fugitive aristocrats. The assembly resumed their sitting at seven o'clock in the morning, and the royal family were replaced in the lodge they had occupied the preceding day, that they might assist in the measures about to be taken, and be present at the scenes which were about to take place in the legislative body. Pétion had been freed from custody by the people; and now came, escorted by an immense multitude, to give the assembly an account of the state of Paris, which he had every where visited, endeavouring to diffuse the spirit of peace wherever he appeared. The citizens seemed to have constituted themselves the guardians of the life of this man. He was received most cordially by the assembly, and left them only to reiterate his pacific exhortations to the people. The Swiss soldiers, who had the evening before been confined in the feuillans, were fiercely menaced. The populace, with great outcries, called for their blood, declaring them the accomplices of the court, and the assassins of the people. They were at last, however, appeased, by being assured that the offenders should be brought to trial, and that a court-martial was about to be formed for the punishment of those who have since been denominated *the conspirators of the 10th of August*. "I require they be taken," exclaimed the bloodthirsty Chabot, "to the *Abbaye* to be tried. . . In the land of equality the law should spare none, not even those that have sat on a throne." The officers were immediately taken to the Abbaye, but it was with much difficulty that the people could be persuaded to desist from executing summary vengeance on the soldiers, and it was only after reiterated assurances that they should be brought to trial without delay, that they would consent to their escaping from their hands.

This thirst for vengeance on the defenders of royalty which the populace experienced, solely occupied their minds, and became the cause of most bitter divisions. In tracing the progress of the insurrection, we have already pointed out the differences which began to divide the popular party. The assembly, composed of enlightened and moderate men, had manifested a spirit of opposition to the clubs and municipalities. These latter were the rendezvous of persons of low birth, mean education, and inferior talents, but of a daring ambition, which prompted them to rush into every extreme. Even on the evening of the 10th of August, Chabot and Pétion had disagreed concerning the dethronement of the king; the latter wishing it to be declared by a decree, and the former effected by force. The advocates of violence and bloodshed now stood before the assembly, and emboldened by their late victory, reminded them of their acquittal of Lafayette, and assured them, with expressions of equivocal respect, that the safety of the people must not be again endangered by the incompetence of their measures. These furious victors composed the whole commune, with the exception of a few ambitious tradesmen and rioters of a still inferior class. They occupied the clubs of the Jacobins and Cordeliers, and some few of them had seats on the lower forms of the legislative body. Chabot,

the most violent of his party, was constantly passing to and fro from the tribune of the assembly to that of the Jacobins, and was continually threatening all who differed from him with the pike and the tocsin.

The assembly had pronounced the suspension, and the Jacobins who were most imperious called for a dethronement. In appointing a governor for the dauphin, the assembly had acknowledged regality, but these required a republic. The majority of the assembly thought that all the energy and activity of the nation should be directed against its foreign foes, but that the vanquished should be pardoned. These maintained, on the contrary, that it was altogether as necessary to resist a foreign force as to punish those who, intrenched in the palace, designed the massacre of the people, and contemplated the introduction of the Prussians into Paris. Carrying their views still further, they insisted that the electoral bodies were not necessary in order to form a new assembly, but that every citizen, indiscriminately, was entitled to a vote on such an occasion; it was even proposed by a Jacobin that the women should partake of the same political rights as the men. It was loudly proclaimed that the people ought to present themselves in arms before the legislative body, to make known to them their sovereign will. Marat was the author of this extravagant suggestion; it was his object to incite the people to take vengeance on the assembly, because he thought that it would be, according to his frightful scheme, necessary for the purification of the kingdom. Robespierre, although less sanguinary, and not so much attached to such a system of purification, seconded this design, out of envy to the assembly, and from this motive continually dwelt upon its weakness, and reproached it violently with entertaining principles favourable to monarchy. The darling of the Jacobins, and having been proposed before the 10th of August as a dictator, he was now considered as the most eloquent and incorruptible defender of the rights of the people. Danton, on the contrary, neither envying the praises of the multitude, nor anxious to display his eloquence, never aspired to the dictatorship, yet he certainly gained the victory of the 10th of August by his intrepidity. At present, neglecting all unnecessary display, he only thought of obtaining the ascendancy in the executive council of which he was a member. Being free from the passions of hatred or envy, he entertained no malevolent sentiments against those deputies, the brilliancy of whose talents so much offended Robespierre; but their inactivity occasioned his neglect, and he preferred the more energetic characters of the inferior classes, relying mainly upon them to maintain and accomplish the revolution.

The knowledge of these political divisions had not, yet obtained circulation beyond Paris. All that the public of France perceived was the resistance of the assembly to the desires of the people, and the acquittal of Lafayette, in spite of the opposition of the commune and the Jacobins. But these acts were imputed to the royalist and feuillantine majority. The Girondists were still regarded as patriots, and Brissot and Robespierre equally esteemed by the inhabitants of the provinces; but Pétion, who had been so persecuted by the court, was the general favourite, and no one cared to know whether Pétion was considered as too moderate by Chabot, had excited the envy of Robespierre, was regarded as an honest but weak man by Danton, or looked upon as a conspirator and fit subject for his purifying system, by Marat. Pétion was as yet extremely popular with the multitude; but, like Bailly after the 14th of July, he soon became odious, by disapproving of those excesses which it was not in his power to check.

The principal rendezvous of the new revolutionists was the Jacobin club, and the commune. At the former, all public measures were proposed and discussed, and executed immediately afterwards by the same men at the Hotel de Ville, by virtue of their municipal powers, and which they could not but have proposed at their club. This general council of the commune was in itself a species of assembly as numerous as the legislative body. Like it, it had its tribune, its committee, its more noisy plaudits, and a power of action much more extensive. The mayor presided over this assembly, and the office of speaker was held by the procureur-syndic, whose duty it was to enforce all the requisitions which were deemed essential. Pétion, however, soon withdrew from this conspicuous post, and confined himself to his more immediate duty of supplies; but Manuel rushed into the opposite extreme, and by his daily declamations appeared to have abandoned himself to every species of revolutionary excess.

Robespierre, however, was the ruling spirit of this assembly. During the three days ensuing the 10th of August, he had remained in the background, but after the consummation of that insurrection, he presented himself to the committee for the purpose of submitting the powers with which he had been invested to examination, and appeared rather to command than sue for their confirmation. This pride, instead of creating disgust, rather increased the respect that was on all sides paid him. The reputation of his talents, and the general opinion of his uprightness and fidelity, altogether formed a grave and respectable character, which these assembled citizens were proud to see amongst them. While he waited for the meeting of the national convention, of which he was certain of being a member, he exercised in the commune a power more substantial and effective than any he could acquire by the homage of public opinion which he enjoyed in the Jacobin club.

The first object of the commune was to secure the police, for the power of seizing and pursuing our enemies is, in time of civil dissension, of all others the most important and the most desirable. The justices of the peace had been expected to use this power to support the popular cause, but, having displayed great activity against the instigators of the populace, they had alienated the public mind; and, either from private conviction, or the official necessity of their situations, had opposed themselves to the patriotic party. It was not forgotten, too, that one of their number had dared, in the case of Bertrand de Molleville, and the newspaper editor Carra, to summon two deputies before them. The justices of peace were, therefore, deprived of their functions, and every thing connected with that department was vested in the municipal authorities. Agreeing

with the commune of Paris on this point, the assembly decreed that the police, called the police of *general safety*, should be attached to the departments, districts, and municipalities. It was the office of this body to take cognizance of all crimes which threatened *the interior or exterior safety of the state;* to scrutinize the character of all citizens whose conduct or opinions might bring them under suspicion; and to provisionally imprison, disperse, or disarm, any whose supposed designs should render such a measure necessary. The municipal councils themselves performed this office, and the whole body of the people were thus called on to observe, denounce, and prosecute, the hostile party. It may easily be imagined that this democratic police would act with a vigour, often carried to severe and arbitrary lengths. A denunciation was first submitted to the whole council, and then referred to the committee of *surveillance*, which issued its warrant for the arrest. The national guard was permanently in requisition, and municipal towns, whose population exceeded twenty thousand, were permitted to add particular regulations to this law of the *general* safety. Little did the legislative assembly perceive, that they were thus paving the way for those bloody executions which had otherwise approached with slower steps; but beset by enemies within and without, it now called upon the people to keep guard, as it had before summoned them to take part in the government, and fight for their rights.

The commune of Paris hastened to exercise their new powers, and numerous arrests took place. Irritated by the recollection of the dangers of the evening, and the greater perils of the morning, these conquerors determined to crush their enemies whilst in their power, and to prevent the possibility of their regaining their former strength by the intervention of foreign aid. The committee of *surveillance* of the commune of Paris was composed of the most violent men. Marat, who, during the revolution, audaciously assailed everybody, was its chief; and, of all men, a more terribly formidable one could not have been chosen for such an office.

Besides this principal committee, the commune of Paris established a particular committee in each section. According to their plan, passports could only be issued through the medium of the assemblies of the sections; all travellers were obliged to be accompanied, whether it were to the municipality, or to the gates of Paris, by two witnesses, who were to identify the person who demanded the passport with the traveller himself. Thus the escape of all suspected characters under assumed names was effectually prevented. A list of the enemies of the revolution was also drawn up, and the citizens were called upon to make every exertion to discover the culprits of the 10th of August. All the public writers who had defended the royal cause were placed under arrest, and their presses given to the patriot editors. Marat made restitution to himself in a triumphant manner of four presses, of which he had been deprived, by the orders, as he said, of the *traitor Lafayette*. Commissioners visited the prisons, to liberate those prisoners who were confined for crimes against the court. Ever prompt to meddle with everything and everybody, the commune, imitating the assembly, sent deputies to carry intelligence to the army of Lafayette, and to gain them over, a subject which occasioned much anxiety to the patriots.

The commune was furthermore charged with a responsibility by no means of small importance, which was to have the custody of the royal family. The Luxembourg had been first thought of as the fittest place of custody for these august personages; but, as it was observed that it would be difficult to guard it strictly, the hotel of the minister of justice was preferred. But the commune, who now governed the police of the capital, and who considered the charge of the king's person an office particularly belonging to them, objected to this arrangement, and declared they could not be responsible for his security, unless the tower of the Temple was fixed on as the place of confinement. The assembly acquiesced in this, and placed the royal prisoners under the care of the mayor and commandant, General Santerre, on their own personal responsibility*. Twelve commissioners of the general council were then appointed to keep an uninterrupted watch in the Temple. Some exterior works had been thrown out, to form a species of parade ground. Numerous detachments of the national guard, alternately relieving each other, formed a garrison; and admittance within it was given to none except by the express permission of the municipality. The assembly also voted a supply of five hundred thousand francs for the maintenance of the royal family till the approaching meeting of the national convention.

The functions of the commune were, as has already been shown, extremely extensive. Placed in the centre of all functions of the state where it exercised the highest powers, and carried away by its energy to execute itself whatever had been too lightly performed by the high authorities, it was continually induced to encroach upon them. The assembly saw the necessity of placing some limits to these popular encroachments, and ordered an election of a new council of the department to replace that which had been broken up on the day of the insurrection. The commune, perceiving itself menaced with the yoke of a superior authority, which, in all probability, would take a high range, opposed the decree, and ordered the sections to defer the election, which had already commenced. The procurator-syndic, Manuel, was also immediately despatched from the Hotel de Ville to the feuillans, to declare explicitly the protestations of the municipality. "The deputies of the citizens of Paris," said he, "have need of an unlimited power; a new authority intervening between them and you can only cause dissensions; and the people will be forced again to have recourse to arms, to deliver themselves from an authority so destructive of their sovereignty."

Such was the menacing language which the people already dared to address to the assembly, which not only listened to but obeyed it, thinking it either impossible or imprudent to resist the energy of the commune, and whether it were that it was considered impossible or imprudent to resist, or whether it were that the assembly looked upon it as a dangerous experiment to fetter the energy of

* The king and his family were conducted to the Temple in the evening of the 30th August, 1792.

the commune at that particular period, they decided that the new council should have no authority over the municipality, but should merely constitute a commission of finance to superintend the public contributions in the department of the Seine.

But another question of still greater importance soon succeeded to this, which manifested still more strikingly the opposition of feeling and opinion which existed between the commune and assembly. The punishment of those who had fired on the people, and who were supposed determined to join the enemy as soon as they approached, was loudly demanded. These were sometimes called *the conspirators of the 10th of August*, or *the traitors*. The court-martial, appointed on the 11th to try the Swiss, was not deemed sufficient, because its commission was confined to the prosecution of military offenders. The criminal tribunal of the department of the Seine appeared to be regulated by formalities too tardy for the present purpose; and moreover, all courts of justice which had existed anterior to the 10th were much suspected. The commune demanded, therefore, on the 13th the constitution of a tribunal for the trial of the *crimes of the 10th of August*, possessing a sufficient latitude of power to reach all the *traitors*. The assembly sent this petition to their extraordinary committee, which had been sitting since the month of July, and were employed in devising measures of general safety.

On the 14th a new deputation was sent from the commune to the assembly. They demanded the decree relative to the extraordinary tribunal, and declared, that if it was not yet passed, they had it in charge to wait for it. In reply to this, the deputy Gaston made some severe observations; and the deputation retired. The assembly persisted in refusing the creation of an extraordinary tribunal, and contented themselves with declaring that those already existing were perfectly competent to take *cognizance of the crimes of the 10th of August*.

On the news of this refusal, a violent feeling of indignation spread through Paris. The section of the *Quinze Vingts* presented themselves to the council general of the commune, and intimated that the tocsin would be rung in the fauxbourg St. Antoine if the decree was not immediately passed. The general council then dispatched another deputation, at the head of which was Robespierre. He, in the name of the municipality, addressed the assembly, and, among other insolent remonstrances, uttered the following: "The tranquillity of the people depends upon the punishment of the guilty, and yet you have done nothing to convict them. Your decree is insufficient. It does not explain the nature of the crimes to be punished; for it mentions only *the crimes of the 10th of August*, whereas the crimes of the enemies of the French revolution are not confined to that day or to the city of Paris. By a similar indefinite expression the traitor Lafayette escaped the vengeance of the law! As to the form of a tribunal, the people can no longer tolerate that already established. Appeals from one court to another are attended with interminable delays; and, besides, all the old authorities are very much suspected; new ones must be instituted; and that at present demanded must be composed of deputies taken from the sections, so that it may be enabled to pronounce final judgment with sovereign authority and without appeal."

This imperious petition acquired additional harshness by the tone of Robespierre. The assembly replied to the people of Paris, by utterly repelling the idea of consenting to an extraordinary commission for the trial of public offences, as unworthy of a free people, and could only be a fit engine for despotism.

These reasonable observations had no other effect, but that of increasing the irritation of the people. Nothing was talked of in Paris but the tocsin, and on the following day a representative of the commune presented himself at the bar of the assembly. "As a citizen," said he, "and magistrate of the people, I think it my duty to inform you that to-night, at twelve o'clock, the tocsin will be rung, and the drums will beat the *generale*, if the decree is not passed. The people are weary of restraining their wrath. Take heed lest they should do themselves justice in spite of you! I now demand," added the audacious petitioner, "that you do this instant decree, the nomination of a citizen from each section for the formation of a criminal tribunal."

This menacing address greatly roused the indignation of the assembly, and the deputies Choudieu and Thuriot severely reprimanded the messenger of the commune. Nevertheless the subject was again discussed; and being strongly supported by the popular members of the assembly, the decree so loudly called for was finally passed; and thus the populace gained the most complete victory. An electoral body was immediately ordered to assemble for the purpose of electing the members of an extraordinary tribunal, ordained to try *the crimes committed on the 10th of August, and all others in any way connected with them*. This tribunal, divided into two sections, had the power of pronouncing judgment in the last resort, and without an appeal. Such was the first specimen of a revolutionary tribunal, and the first accelerator impulse given by vengeance to the forms of law. This tribunal was called the tribunal of the 17th of August.

The effect which the last revolution had produced on the armies, and the manner in which they had received the decrees of the 10th, was not yet known. This was a most important point, for on it depended the fate of the new revolution. The frontier was always distributed among three divisions of the army; that of the north, the centre, and the south. Luckner commanded the north; Lafayette the centre; and Montesquieu the south. Since the unfortunate affairs of Mons and Tournay, Luckner, at the instigation of Dumouriez, had again acted on the offensive in the Low Countries, but soon retired, and on evacuating Courtray, set fire to its fauxbourg, which had formed one grand article of accusation against the ministry on the eve of the dethronement. Since that time, the armies had remained in complete inactivity, living in fortified camps, and only occasionally engaged in slight skirmishes. Dumouriez, upon quitting the ministry, joined Luckner as lieutenant general, but was badly received by the army, where the party of Lafayette had the ascendancy. Luckner being at that time perfectly under its influence, de-

tached Dumouriez to the camp of Maulde, and left him there occupied in forming entrenchments, and occasionally engaging in slight skirmishes.

Whilst the king was in danger, Lafayette felt great anxiety to approach nearer to Paris; and therefore wished to take the command of the army of the north. Not being able, however, to quit his troops, by whom he was much beloved, he entered into an arrangement with Luckner for a change of position, each with his own division, and both of them to shift their camps, the one to bear to the north, the other to the centre. This shifting of the armies in the presence of the enemy might have been attended with much danger, if happily the war had not been completely inactive. The head-quarters of Luckner were thus removed to Metz, and that of Lafayette to Sédan. This cross movement was however accompanied by some risk. Dumouriez, in following the grand army with his small body of troops, came suddenly before the enemy, who threatened him with an attack; and he was obliged to remain in his camp, or leave the entrance of Flanders open to the Duke of Saxe-Teschen. He therefore joined himself with other generals who afterwards arrived, and came to an understanding with Dillon, who commanded a part of the army of Lafayette, the result of which was the calling a council of war at Valenciennes to justify his disobedience to Luckner, on the plea of necessity. Meanwhile Luckner had arrived at Metz, and Lafayette at Sédan; and had it not been for the events of the 10th of August, Dumouriez would certainly have been placed under arrest, and brought to a court-martial for disobedience of orders, for his refusal to march in advance.

Such was the situation of the armies when the intelligence of the overthrow of the crown first reached them. One of the first acts of the assembly, after the accomplishment of that event, was, as has been seen, to despatch messengers to the army to make known their decrees, and administer to them a new oath of allegiance to the present authorities. The three messengers who were intrusted with this mission were received on their arrival at Sédan by the municipality, who held from Lafayette orders to put them under arrest. The mayor first interrogated them concerning the events of the 10th of August, and when they had given a full history of the terrible scenes of that day, declared, according to secret instructions from Lafayette, that it was evident that the assembly were not free agents when they pronounced the suspension of the king; and therefore that they themselves must be considered merely as the emissaries of a faction, and expect only to be treated as such. By the orders of Lafayette, who took the responsibility of this action on himself, they were consequently imprisoned; and instead of administering the new oath, he ordered the old one, of fidelity to the law and the king, to be repeated throughout the army under his command. He determined to attempt to overthrow the revolution of the 10th of August, and to effect this, depended on the co-operation of the seventy-five departments who had adhered to the sentiments of his letter of the 16th of June. Dillon, who was at Valenciennes under the orders of Lafayette, and who possessed a superior command to Dumouriez, obeyed his commander-in-chief, and administered the oath of fidelity to the law and to the king to his troops. He then ordered Dumouriez to do the same in his camp at Maulde; but he, forming a correct judgment of the future, and besides being irritated against the feuillans, seized upon this opportunity of resisting them, and gaining the favour of the new government for himself and his troops by refusing to comply with this order.

On the 17th of August, the same day in which the new tribunal had been so tumultuously established, the news of the arrest and imprisonment of the messengers sent to the army of Lafayette reached Paris. This intelligence excited even more indignation than alarm: the rage of the people against Lafayette became exasperated to a higher pitch than ever. Charges against him were clamorously called for, and the assembly reproached for not having impeached him long before. A decree was also immediately passed against the department of Ardennes; new messengers were despatched with the same powers as the former, and with a commission to set at liberty the three prisoners; other messengers were also sent to the army of Dillon; and on the morning of the 19th, the assembly declared Lafayette a traitor to his country, and framed articles of impeachment against him.

The situation of affairs was now extremely critical; for if the resistance of the army was not conquered, the new revolution would presently come to ruin. France, divided between the republicans of the interior and the constitutionalists of the army, must, in that event, have been greatly enfeebled before the enemy, and exposed at once to a foreign invasion, and a terrific re-action of politics at home. Certainly the revolution of the 10th of August, and the abolition of the constitution of 1791, must have been odious to Lafayette. It indeed accomplished all the prophecies of the aristocracy, and justified completely the hatred of the court to liberty. It was the triumph of democracy; it confirmed the ascendancy of a bloody anarchy, and introduced the prospect of an interminable confusion in the disorganization of all government. Those who have lived to see the term of these calamities can rejoice that the defence of the country against foreign foes was not abandoned on any account; but to Lafayette the future seemed enveloped in terrific uncertainty. The possibility of defending the nation whilst agitated by such great political convulsions appeared dubious; yet he felt a desire to oppose himself to this chaos, and at the same time, to resist both its exterior and internal enemies. His army was devoted to him, but armies are not governed by their own personal wills, but by that of superior authorities. When indeed a revolution breaks out with the violence of that of 1789, they may be carried away by the blind force of the general impulse, and abandon their former masters, because the later impulse is the most powerful; but this was not the case in the present instance. Proscribed as he was, and stricken by the decree of the assembly, the popularity of Lafayette, however great, was not sufficient to turn the arms of his troops against the authorities of the interior; and his personal influence came short of the effect produced by the influence of Paris. Placed between two enemies, and uncertain as to what his

duty called upon him to do, he hesitated how to act. This gave great advantage to his adversaries. Decrees after decrees were fulminated against him, and followed up by the most energetic measures. This increased the hesitation of the general, and confirmed the popular inclinations of the army. In fact, the troops, after wavering for some time, seemed to abandon their commander. The civil authorities became intimidated, and obeyed the new emissaries. The conduct of Dumouriez, who declared himself for the revolution of the 10th August, drew every thing along with it, and Lafayette, who declared himself in the opposition, was left alone with his staff, composed of feuillans or constitutional officers.

Bouillé, whose energy was undoubted, and Dumouriez, whose great talents were incontestible, were at different periods compelled to act in the same manner, and found themselves obliged to take flight. Lafayette could not have been more fortunate. Before his departure, he wrote to the several civil authorities who had seconded his resistance, and took upon himself the responsibility of orders which had been issued against the commissioners of the assembly, and quitted his camp on the 20th of August, with a few officers, his companions in arms, professing the same opinions with himself: Bureau de Puzy, Latour Maubourg, and Lameth accompanied him. They left the camp, not taking with them more than their month's pay, and attended by a few servants. Lafayette left every thing in the most perfect order, and every preparation made for resisting the attack of the enemy. Some officers, who accompanied him in the beginning of his journey, he sent back, that he might not deprive France of a single defender; and on the 21st he and his friends took the road to the Low Countries. On their arrival at the advanced posts of the Austrians, these first emigrants of liberty were arrested; and, contrary to the rights of nations, made prisoners of war. The joy was great, when the name of Lafayette resounded through the camp of the allied powers, and that he had become the prisoner of the aristocratic league. To have the opportunity of tormenting one of the earliest friends of the revolution, and to have the power of imputing to the revolution itself the persecution of its first originators, and to see verified all the excesses they had predicted, this was more than sufficient to diffuse an universal satisfaction amongst the European aristocracy.

Lafayette, on his own part, and the part of his friends, claimed the right of individual liberty, but in vain. It was offered him at the price of a retractation, not of all his opinions, but of that alone which related to the abolition of nobility; he refused compliance with these terms, and threatened, if any false construction was put on his words, to give the lie to the public officer who recorded it. Chains were the reward of his constancy; and the fortitude and consistency he displayed at this period were quite admirable. The utter annihilation of liberty, which seemed to be now effected, did not disheartenhis courage; nor did the dreadful abuse which it had suffered blind him to its true value. He continued to consider it as the most precious of blessings, and maintained this sentiment both before his oppressors, who detained him in their dungeons, and in his private letters to his old friends in France. "Cherish," said he to the latter,—"cherish always a love of liberty, in spite of the excesses it has apparently led to, and devote yourself to the service of your country." Compare this conduct with that of Bouillé or Dumouriez; the former flying from his country only to return to it under the banners of an enemy, and the latter deserting the party he had engaged to support, not from conviction, but from a quarrel with the Convention he had served; and justice ought now to be rendered to that man who did not abandon France until Truth, in which he had faith, was proscribed; and who neither disavowed or calumniated liberty in the midst of hostile enemies; for who is there to profess and maintain such doctrines in a dungeon?

Yet we must not too hastily condemn Dumouriez. We shall be called upon presently to appreciate his memorable services. He foresaw clearly that the irresistible energy of the people would gain the ascendancy, and, by his disobedience to Luckner, in refusing to quit the camp of Maulde, after his refusal of the oath as ordered by Dillon, he was rewarded by the supreme command of the armies of the north and the centre. Dillon, who was brave and impetuous, but headstrong, was at once dismissed for having obeyed Lafayette; but was afterwards restored to his command by the good offices of Dumouriez, who, desirous to accomplish his own ends, and to hurt as few persons as possible in his progress, did his best to support him with the commissaries of the assembly. Dumouriez was now commander-in-chief of the whole frontier from Metz to Dunkirk. Luckner was stationed at Metz, with his army, the same that was stationed formerly in the north. He had, indeed, in the first instance, whilst supported by Lafayette, appeared to resist the revolution of the 10th of August, but was at last prevailed upon by his troops and the messengers of the assembly to obey the decrees. He shed a few unavailing tears, and yielded to the new order of things.

The events of the 10th of August, and the advance of the season, decided the allied powers to carry on the war with activity. The dispositions of the foreign powers had undergone no alteration with regard to France. England, Holland, Denmark, and Switzerland, maintained a strict neutrality. Sweden, since the death of Gustavus, sincerely embraced the same part. The Italian principalities, indeed, were extremely hostile to France, but, fortunately, very weak. Spain still wavered, and was open to the intrigues of all parties. Russia and the two principal courts of Germany openly declared themselves enemies; but the former had as yet confined its hostility to the dismissal of the French ambassador, and Prussia and Austria alone appeared in arms on the frontiers. Of all the German states, two ecclesiastical electors and the Landgraves of the two Hesses, alone took an active part in the coalition; the remainder appeared to wait to be summoned. In this state of affairs, a large army of the enemy was, however, in the field, a force of a hundred and thirty-eight thousand strong, in an admirable state of discipline, threatened France, who had, to oppose to this force, at most, a hundred and twenty thousand raw and undisciplined recruits, scattered over an extensive frontier, and divided into three bodies,

neither of which was strong enough, at one point, to oppose the enemy with any probability of success. Add to this, they had neither confidence in their officers nor themselves, and had hitherto been every day driven from the posts they had occupied. The intent of the allied powers was boldly to enter France by the route of Ardennes, and to make their way directly to Paris through Chalons. The two sovereigns of Prussia and Austria were in person at Mayence. Sixty thousand Prussians, inheritors of the glory of the great Frederick, advanced in a single column on the French centre; they marched through Luxembourg upon Longwy. Twenty thousand Austrians, commanded by General Clerfait, supported them on the right, and occupied Stenay. On the left, sixteen thousand Austrians, commanded by Prince Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, and ten thousand Hessian troops, flanked the left of the Prussians. The Duke of Saxe-Teschen occupied the Low Countries, and menaced its strong places. The Prince de Condé, with six thousand French emigrants, marched towards Philipsbourg. Several other corps of emigrants were embodied in the Prussian and Austrian armies. It had been first intended to enrol them promiscuously in the German regiments; but they were afterwards permitted to form distinct regiments, and were divided between the allied armies. These regiments were composed chiefly of officers, who had consented to become soldiers, and formed a splendid corps of cavalry; more calculated, however, to display a valorous intrepidity in the perilous day of battle, than to sustain the fatigues of a long campaign.

The French armies were ill prepared to resist this powerful force. Their situations, at this critical period, were peculiarly unfortunate. At Maulde, Maubeuge, and Lille, thirty thousand men, occupying three camps, were commanded by the three generals Beurnonville, Moreton, and Duval. This composed the whole defence of the north, and the Low Countries. The army of Lafayette, about twenty-three thousand strong, disorganized by the departure of its general, and abandoned to the greatest contrariety of sentiments, lay encamped at Sédan; Dumouriez took the command of Lafayette's army. The army of Luckner, consisting of about twenty thousand soldiers, was stationed at Metz, and on the point of receiving a new commander, General Kellermann. The assembly, although displeased with Luckner, did not wish to dismiss him from their service altogether. In appointing, therefore, Kellermann to his command, he received, apparently, still higher promotion; and, with the title of generalissimo, had the task of organizing the new army of reserve conferred on him, together with another, purely honorary, that of giving his counsel to the generals when he might deem it necessary. Besides the troops we have enumerated, Custine commanded fifteen thousand men at Landau, and Biron thirty thousand in Alsace. But the latter was too far removed from the principal theatre of the war to have any influence on the fortune of the campaign.

The only two bodies which were capable of opposing any resistance to the grand army of the coalition, were the twenty-three thousand men Lafayette had commanded, and the twenty thousand of Kellermann, quartered around Metz. If, therefore, the grand army of invasion, duly considering the object of these operations, had marched rapidly on Sédan, whilst the troops were without a general, in a state of disorganization, divided in opinions, under no efficient director, as not yet under the command of Dumouriez, such a movement could not have failed to have cut off the defensive division, and have opened a passage through the Ardennes; whilst, at the same time, it would have obliged the other generals to retreat rapidly, and unite their forces behind the Marne. Perhaps even the enemy might have pushed their success still further, and have advanced from Lille and Metz, to Chalons and Rheims. Paris would then have been open before them, and no other expedient have remained for the new government, but the absurd one of a camp near Paris, or taking flight beyond the Loire.

But if the operations of France were weakened by the disorders of the revolution, those of the enemy were equally so by the different interests of the coalition. The King of Prussia, intoxicated with the idea of an easy conquest, flattered also and deceived by the emigrants, who represented the invasion as a simple *military promenade*, was inclined to undertake something more adventurous. But the prudence of the Duke of Brunswick checked this presumption, or it might have had the happy effect of a vigorous promptitude. The duke, considering the advanced state of the season, the disposition of the country, which was very different from what the emigrants had represented it, and the energy of the people, as displayed on the 10th of August, thought it most advisable to secure himself a solid basis of operations on the Moselle, by laying siege to Metz and Thionville, and renew hostilities the next season, with the advantage of the preceding acquisitions by conquest. Thus the opposition between the presumption of the king, and the prudence of the general, together with the dilatory and ineffective co-operation of the Austrians, who, instead of fifty, furnished only eighteen thousand men, under the command of the Prince Hohenlohe, prevented the execution of any decisive measure. Nevertheless, the Prussian army continued to march towards the centre, and reached Longwy, one of the strongest and most advanced posts on that frontier, on the 20th.

Dumouriez, who had all along thought that the invasion of the Netherlands would produce a revolution in that country, and thus protect France from the attacks of the Germans, had every thing in preparation to march forward, as soon as he obtained the command of the two armies; and was on the point of acting on the offensive against the prince of Saxe-Teschen, when Westermann, who had so distinguished himself by his activity on the 10th of August, and sent as a commissary to the army of Lafayette, brought information of the events which had happened on the theatre of the grand invasion. On the 22nd, Longwy, after a bombardment of a few hours, had opened its gates to the Prussians. The disorder of the garrison, and the incompetence of the commandant, were the sole cause of this. This conquest, together with the captivity of Lafayette, greatly exalted the confidence of the Prussians, who seemed more than ever to desire some service in

Popular imagination terrified at the approach of the Prussians, suggests the extirpation of the royalists.

which they could act on the offensive. The army of Lafayette would now have been annihilated almost without resistance, had not its new general appeared, to revive its courage, and direct its movements.

Dumouriez, therefore, abandoned his favourite design, and on the 25th or 26th, arrived at Sédan, where he was received at first with murmurs of discontent, and inspired only sentiments of detestation. Lafayette was still beloved among the troops; his enemy, consequently, was proportionably disliked: besides, he was considered as the author of the present unhappy war, it having originated in his ministry; and was regarded rather as a statesman and writer than a general. These ideas were expressed freely in the conversations of the soldiers, and frequently reached the ears of Dumouriez. They did not, however, disconcert his projects. To revive the zeal and courage of his troops was his first object; and by a firm and determined command he sought to corroborate his own authority. Nevertheless the situation of twenty-three thousand men in a state of disorganization, in the presence of an enemy eighty thousand strong, and under perfect command, was appalling in the extreme. The Prussians having taken Longwy, and blockaded Thionville, advanced upon Verdun, a fort much less capable of resistance than the fortifications of Longwy.

The opinion of the council of generals called by Dumouriez was unanimous. To wait for the enemy they represented as dangerous in the extreme, and counselled a retreat behind the Marne as the only step that remained to be taken. There, they said, the fortifications should be rendered as strong as possible; the retreating army might wait to be joined by the others; and thus reinforced might afford effectual protection to the capital, distant only forty leagues from the enemy. They were also of opinion that by exposing themselves to a defeat in their endeavouring to resist invasion, the rout would be complete, that a discomfited army could not make a stand between Sédan and Paris, and that the conquerors would march thither directly and at a conqueror's pace. Such was the military situation of France, and such the pronounced opinion of her generals.

At Paris affairs were not viewed in a more favourable light; and the exasperation of the people increased in proportion to the danger which seemed to threaten them. Nevertheless, that immense metropolis, which had never as yet known the calamity of contending with an enemy within its walls, feared not so much its foreign adversaries, as a perilous re-action on the part of the royalists, at present abased to the very dust. Thus whilst the generals on the frontier were engrossed wholly in the danger threatened by the Prussians, at Paris nothing was thought of but the aristocrats secretly plotting against liberty.

The king, it was said, was a prisoner, but his party were not the less active, and that they still carried on their conspiracies, and were ready, as before the 10th of August, to open the gates of Paris to the enemy. All the great houses at Paris were supposed to be filled with bodies of armed men, in readiness to appear at a moment's notice, to release the king, seize upon all authority, and deliver over France to the sword of the emigrants and the allied powers. This supposed correspondence between the *interior* and *exterior* enemy, was the topic of universal conversation. "We must get rid of the *traitors*," was the general cry; and the frightful idea of sacrificing the vanquished party, an idea which with the majority was nothing but the effect of a terrified imagination, yet was a notion which some men, either more bloodthirsty, more furious, or more inclined to violent acts, could reduce into a practical and meditated design.

We have already observed, that a desire had been expressed of avenging the people in respect of the affair of the 10th of August; and the dissensions which took place between the assembly and commune on the subject of the extraordinary tribunal, have been already recorded. This tribunal, by whose sentence Dangremont and the unfortunate Laport, (intendant of the civil list,) had already lost their heads, did not display sufficient activity to satisfy the fury of the people. Forms, therefore, still more summary for the punishment of the *traitors*, were called for, and sentence against those whose trial had been referred to the high court at Orleans was loudly demanded. The dilatory process of these trials was complained of, and it was proposed that they should be transferred to the tribunal of the 17th of August. The persons principally arraigned by the court at Orleans were ministers, and other considerable functionaries of the state: among these was Delessart; the crime of which he was accused, like that of the others, contained nothing of a positive nature; for he was not charged with any specific act of public delinquency, but with prevarication in the execution of his ministerial duties. To effect the transfer of these causes to the new tribunal, the assembly, instead of being consulted, were rather summoned, to pass a decree of transference, but courageously resisted the demand. The high national court of Orleans, they said, was a constitutional establishment, which they could not change, as not possessing constituent powers; and besides that, the accused had a right to be judged by laws made anterior to their accusation. This question had again raised up a cloud of petitioners, and the assembly had to resist at the same time a furious minority, the commune, and the unrestrained sections. The assembly confined itself to accelerating some of the forms of the high court, but declared that the prisoners brought before it should still remain at Orleans, and be tried by that jurisdiction which the constitution had provided for them.

Thus two parties were formed, the one desirous of sparing the vanquished, and directing all their energies against the foreign enemy; the other thirsting for the blood of those victims already in their power, and deeming the extirpation of their secret adversaries a necessary step, preparatory to their resistance of their avowed foes. This latter notion was not so much the result of reflection, as of a blind and brutal impulse, made up of rage and fear, and exasperated by an increasing danger.

The progress of the enemy greatly alarmed the Parisians for the safety of the city, the scene of all these insurrections, and the principal object of the enemy's march. They accused the assembly, which was composed of deputies of the depart-

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ments, of being desirous of retiring to their respective provinces. The Girondists, particularly, who formed the moderate majority, so odious to the commune, were charged with being influenced by motives of hatred to the capital. This was imputing feelings to that party which the conduct of the Parisians might have justly called forth; but those deputies loved both their country and their cause too well to think of abandoning the metropolis. It is true they had frequently declared, that if the north was conquered, the government should retire to the south; and, even at the present juncture, some thought it would be prudent to retreat beyond the Loire; but the idea of sacrificing Paris, though rendered by late events odious in the extreme, had never entered into their minds. They possessed too much magnanimity to entertain such a thought; and, besides, were yet very powerful, and expected too much from the approaching convention to think of detaching themselves from Paris.

The Girondists, then, laboured under the odium of a double accusation, indulgence towards the traitors, and dislike to the capital. Having to resist the most violent characters, they were but ill prepared for the struggle; for, although they possessed a majority, and triumphed in the superior strength of reason, they were inferior in activity to their opponents, and wanted energy sufficient to check the popular excesses. In the executive council they had the advantage in the proportion of five to one. Servan, Clavière, and Roland were taken from among themselves; and Monge and Lebrun were members of their own choice: nevertheless, Danton alone threw this majority into the shade; and their moderation and arguments proved but weak barriers against the resistless energy of his eloquence and his measures. Whilst Clavière was employed in his financial labours, Servan busied in procuring reinforcements for the armies, and Roland in circulating exhortations through the provinces, calculated to direct the local authorities, prevent all encroachments on power, and repress the spirit of insurrection; Danton was occupied in filling up all the vacant places of the administration with his own creatures. He sent forth his faithful *Cordeliers* everywhere; and whilst he advanced his friends out of the spoils of the revolution, he strengthened himself by their support. His colleagues in the council, perceiving his great power, or wrought upon by his artful address, were either terrified, or seduced into compliance with his measures; and Roland alone opposed him with anything like effectual resistance. The inflexible rigidity of this minister's character, indeed, sometimes gained him a victory; nevertheless, Danton continued on a good footing with him; and, contented with his general ascendancy, submitted patiently to occasional defeats.

Danton, whose practicable influence was in Paris, was anxious to preserve it, and had made up his mind to prevent every transference of power to beyond the Loire. Having, on the 10th of August, with unparalleled audacity, proclaimed the insurrection, while every one else had hesitated, he was not the man to draw back, and he considered that he ought to fix himself in the capital. Possessing the ascendancy in the council, united with Marat, a member of the committee of the commune, the orator of all the populace, in the midst of the multitude, as in a congenial element, he certainly was the most powerful man in Paris; and this power, founded upon a naturally violent temper, spurred on by the passions of the populace, it was fearful to contemplate in regard to his victims. Danton indulged in every notion of hostility against the Girondists. He was the leader of that Parisian party who declared, "Let what will happen, we will not draw back. If we perish, it shall be under the ruins of the capital, and our enemies shall first become our victims." Thus were their minds tainted with such dreadful associations, and these frightful ideas were exhibited in the most terrific consequences.

On the 26th, the news of the capture of Longwy reached Paris, and, as it spread, the spirits of the people became ruffled with uncommon agitation. During the first day its truth was doubted, but at last it could no longer be disputed, and the public were acquainted that the fortification had opened its gates after a bombardment of several hours. The public excitement rose to such a pitch, that the assembly pronounced sentence of death against any one who should propose terms of capitulation in a besieged town. At the suggestion of the commune, it was also decreed, that Paris and the neighbouring departments should furnish, in a few days, thirty thousand men armed and equipped. The enthusiasm of the moment rendered this levy a matter of easy execution; and the sudden alarm which the success of the enemy imparted was soon abated, though the spirit of indignation it excited renewed its strength daily. The Parisians, feeling their own might, and their undaunted resolution to stand by the cause they had espoused, could not imagine it possible that a hundred thousand Prussians could subdue millions of freemen, whose unshackled energies were bent upon the work of self-defence. Preparations for the formation of a camp near Paris were continued with redoubled activity; and even females assembled together in the churches to contribute their aid in expediting this object.

Danton took his place in the commune, and proposed the most extreme measures. At his suggestion, it was resolved that all the paupers of the nation should be enlisted in the service of the government, and provided with pay and arms; and that those suspected of disaffection should be disarmed and arrested. All who had signed the petition of the 20th of June, and that against the formation of a camp near Paris, were included among the latter. To effect the last part of this project, domiciliary visits were resorted to, and carried into execution with terrible rigour. All the barriers of the city were ordered to be kept closed for forty-eight hours, commencing from the evening of the 25th August, and no permission to pass through them was allowed to be granted on any pretext whatsoever. Vessels were stationed in the river to prevent all possibility of escape by that outlet; and the communes of the neighbouring departments were charged to arrest all who might be discovered in the fields or on the roads. The visits of the inquisitors were announced by beat of drum, when all were obliged to retire to their homes, or they fell under the suspicion of disaffec-

tion, and were exposed to be dealt with as traitors. The assemblies of the sections and the grand tribunal itself were subject to this regulation, and all their proceedings were suspended for two days. Commissioners of the communes, assisted by an armed force, performed these visits, and seized upon the arms, and arrested the persons of all the suspected: that is, of all those who had signed the above-mentioned petitions; of all the non-juring priests, denounced citizens, or equivocal characters whatever, &c. After ten o'clock at night, the appearance of any carriage in the streets was prohibited; and the city was illuminated the whole night.

Such were the measures taken to get possession of *the wicked citizens who had concealed themselves since the 10th of August.* On the evening of the 27th, the visits commenced, and one party being exposed to the denunciations of the other, were in mutual danger of being thrown into prison. All those who had been attached in any way to the court, either by their services, rank, or benevolent attentions to their fallen sovereign, or who were so unfortunate as to possess enemies base enough to seek vengeance by a denunciation, were immured in dungeons; and from twelve to fifteen thousand individuals met with this fate during the two fatal days this inquisition was in active operation. It was the committee of superintendence of the commune that pronounced these sentences, and saw them carried immediately into effect. Those who were arrested, were conducted first from their own houses to the committee of their section, and from thence to that of the commune. There they were briefly interrogated concerning their opinions and actions. This was frequently performed by one member alone of the committee; whilst the others, overcome by fatigue, slept in their chairs or on the tables. Those condemned were first sent to the Hotel de Ville, and afterwards lodged in the prisons, where there was yet room. These were imprisoned all those whose opinions had at any time been triumphant or ascendant previous to the 10th of August. All being equally subverted, found one common receptacle; and humble tradesmen were accused with the same bitterness of being aristocrats as princes and dukes.

Terror prevailed throughout Paris. The republicans were kept in a state of fear by the Prussian armies; and the royalists lived under dread of republican vengeance. The committee of *general defence*, constituted by the assembly, for the purpose of considering the best means of defence against invasion, met on the 30th, and called for the co-operation of the general council, to devise the best means of securing the public safety. This meeting was very numerous; for many deputies, besides those who composed it, attended, and joined in its consultations. Several measures were proposed. The minister Servan declared, that he placed no confidence in the armies, and thought it impossible for Dumouriez with his twenty-three thousand men to arrest the progress of the Prussians. Between Paris and the enemy, he observed, there were no places sufficiently strong to make head against them and stop their march. Every one was of the same opinion in this respect, and having proposed to place the whole population in arms and in readiness to resist the enemy, with the courage of desperation, outside the walls of the city, a retreat to Saumur was suggested, that a greater number of obstacles might intervene between the government and the hostile armies. Vergniaud and Gaudet did not concur in the proposal to quit Paris. After them Danton rose.

"It has been proposed," said he, "to quit Paris; but you surely are not ignorant, that Paris, in the opinion of the enemy, represents France; and that therefore to give up this post, is to abandon the revolution. To retreat would be ruin; we must stand our ground, and place our safety in our courage.

"Among the several measures that have been submitted to our consideration, not one appears to me to have a sufficiently decisive character. We must not conceal from ourselves the situation in which the 10th of August has placed us. The whole community is now divided between royalists and republicans: the first numerous, and the latter few. We are placed between two fires, and exposed to the arms of the enemy without, and the machinations of that within. It is an undoubted fact, that an assembly of royalists secretly meet, and correspond with the Prussian army. It is impossible to point out their place of rendezvous, or designate the persons who compose this assembly; but if we would disconcert their projects, and cut off their correspondence with the enemy, we must have recourse to measures of severity; we must, I repeat it, we must make the royalists afraid of us."

These expressions, accompanied by a gesture of marked ferocity, caused a shudder to run through the audience:—"I must repeat it again," resumed Danton, "we must make the royalists *fear* us. . . . It behoves us, especially in Paris, to maintain our power, and this is not to be effected by exhausting our strength in uncertain conflicts with our foreign foes." The assembly were wrapt in dumb astonishment. Not a single word was added to this address, and every one went his way without precisely comprehending, may even without daring to discover the nature of the design which the minister meditated.

He immediately hastened to the committee of superintendence of the commune, which possessed sovereign power over the persons of all the citizens, and where Marat was all-powerful, supported by Panis, and Sergent, already distinguished on the 20th of June and 10th of August, and those named Jourdeuil, Duplain, Lefort, and Lenfant, his ignorant and brutal colleagues. There it was, that on the night of the 30th and 31st of August, were designed the most horrible intentions against the poor wretches confined in the prisons. Lamentable and dreadful instances of the exasperation of political passions! Danton, who was always free from personal enmities, and often accessible to emotions of pity, brought his extreme hardihood to bear on the atrocious reveries of Marat's imagination; they together formed a conspiracy, of which, indeed, many periods have furnished a parallel, but which, at the end of the eighteenth century, cannot plead in its excuse the ignorance of the times and the ferocity of manners. It will be recollected that, three years before, a person named Maillard figured at the head of the band of women who marched to Versailles on the famous 5th of October.

This Maillard was a bailiff by occupation; in mind intelligent; in disposition blood-thirsty; and he had collected together a band of ignorant and low-born associates, who were prepared for every desperate undertaking. Such, indeed, as are always to be found in these classes, where education has not purified the passions in diffusing intelligence. He himself was captain of this band; and, if we may credit a discovery which transpired so long a time after the event to which it refers, he was employed by Danton and his party in the execution of the most atrocious cruelties. He was ordered to place himself in a situation best calculated to effect his dire intention; to prepare instruments of death; to take every precaution to stifle the cries of his victims; and to have vinegar, holly-brooms, quick lime, and covered carriages in readiness for all these purposes.

About this time the report of a terrible execution secretly spread through Paris. The relations of those in prison became terrified for their safety. The plot itself, like that of the 10th of August and the 20th of June, could only be vaguely guessed; nevertheless the necessity of some fearful example being made to strike terror into the conspirators, who were said to correspond with the enemy, even from the depth of their dungeons, was every where repeated. The dilatory proceedings of the tribunal of the 17th of August excited universal complaints; and a more speedy process of justice was loudly demanded. On the 31st the former minister Montmorin was acquitted by this tribunal. This added still more to the indignation of the people; and they declared that corruption everywhere prevailed, for that the guilty were allowed to escape with impunity. On the same day it was reported that a condemned criminal had made important discoveries; that on that very night the prisoners would break from their chains, seize upon arms, spread through the city, commit every species of outrage, satiate their vengeance by the blood of the patriots, carry off the king, and open the gates of Paris to the Prussians; whilst, at that very moment, the poor victims trembled for their lives, their relations were struck with consternation at the fate that seemed to await them, and the royal family expected nothing but death.

It is certain that among the Jacobins, in the sections, in the council of the commune, and in the minority of the assembly, there were some who believed in these supposed conspiracies, and were not ashamed to declare that the extermination of the prisoners was a lawful measure. It is easier to believe that nature does not create men such monsters in one day, than that the spirit of party alone could blind so many men all at once. This reflection should convey a lesson of deep and melancholy import to the people of every country. Observe the progress of crime! Dangers first arise; they beget a resolution to repel them. This heightens into a passionate frenzy against those by whom we are threatened; and, whilst some inconsiderately call for vengeance, others deliberately perpetrate it with bloodthirsty alacrity.

On Saturday, the 1st of September, the forty-eight hours, fixed for the closing of the barriers and the execution of the domiciliary visits had elapsed, and the public communication no longer prohibited. But, suddenly, in the course of the day, the news of the capture of Verdun arrived. This was not true, for Verdun was only invested, not taken; yet, the belief gained ground that the fortifications were carried, and that it had been surrendered in pursuance of a treasonable act, just the same as at Longwy. On the motion of Danton, it was immediately decreed by the commune, that, on the next day, the 2nd of September, the *générale* should beat to arms, the tocsin sound, the alarum-guns be fired, and all citizens capable of bearing arms should muster in the Champ de Mars, encamp there for the remainder of the day, and march on the following morning for Verdun. In the midst of these terrible preparations, it was easy to perceive that vengeance against domestic foes was not lost sight of. Those who had any relations in prison made every effort for their enlargement. Manuel, the procurateur-syndic, supplicated by a generous lady, is said to have released two prisoners of the Latrémouille family. Another lady, Madame Frusse-Leudry, was bent upon following her uncle, the Abbé de Rastignac, into captivity; and upon requesting permission to do this, Sergent replied to her: "Madam, you commit a great imprudence; the prisons are not safe."

On the following day, the 2nd of September, the idleness of the people augmented the general tumult. Companies of military were seen in all parts of the city; and it was reported that the enemy might arrive before Paris within three days. The commune informed the assembly of the steps they had taken to arm the whole body of the citizens; and Vergniaud, fired with patriotic enthusiasm by the impending danger and the courage displayed by the Parisians, pronounced a spirited eulogium on their conduct.

"It appears," said he, "that the plan of the enemy is to march direct upon Paris, leaving all the strong places in their route behind them. This design will surely be our safety and their ruin. Our armies, although too weak to stop their march, are strong enough to harass them in the rear. Thus, upon arriving at Paris, they will find an army of citizens ranged before them, and of soldiers behind them. Surrounded on every side, they must sink, overcome by such united forces, and the spot of their anticipated triumph will become the sepulchre of their hopes and themselves together. Yet, in the midst of these flattering prospects, there is a danger to be apprehended which we must not hide from ourselves; and which we must anticipate that we may guard against. I mean, a sudden panic. Our enemies calculate upon this, and spare no trouble or gold to infuse it among us; and you know there are men of so dastardly a nature as to conceive terrors on the slightest appearance of danger. I wish, indeed, we could separate these pusillanimous automatons from the remainder of the citizens, and send them to Longwy, that city of cowards, and refuge of dastards, that they might no longer infest us with their fearful forebodings, magnify dwarfs into giants, and fancy the dust raised by a few *hulans** to be a cloud in which an army is enveloped.

"Parisians! now is the time to display the

* Uhlans or hulans, horse soldiers in the Austrian army, being a kind of lancers, of Tartar origin. *Trans.*

energy of your character! Why are the entrenchments of the camp in such a state of backwardness? By what means was the altar of the federation raised? or the Champ de Mars levelled? You have manifested a great zeal for fêtes, doubtless you will display an equally ardent one for battles. You have celebrated liberty in your songs; you must now defend it with your swords. You are no longer summoned to overturn kings of brass, but real and living kings, armed with all their power. I call, therefore, upon the national assembly to give the first example of energy, and to send twelve of its members, not to exhort the people, but to work themselves with shovels and pickaxes."

This proposition was adopted with the greatest enthusiasm. Danton rose after Vergniaud. He first took notice of the measures which had been already adopted, and then proposed new ones. "One part of the people," said he, "are about to move towards the frontiers; another to be employed in digging entrenchments; and a third armed with pikes will defend the interior of our cities. But this is not enough; messengers and couriers must be sent to all parts of France to stir up the inhabitants to imitate the example of Paris; and a decree must be passed obliging every citizen, either to serve in person, or deliver up his arms."—He afterwards added, "The cannon you are about to hear is not the cannon of alarm, but the signal for charging the enemies of your country. To conquer and annihilate them, only one thing is necessary—BOLDNESS: this should pervade all your measures; and be the beginning, middle, and end, of every thing you undertake."

The expressions and gestures of the minister produced a powerful effect on his hearers. His motion was adopted, and he left the assembly to attend the committee of *surveillance*. All the authorities, and every administrative body, the assembly, the commune, the sections, and the Jacobins, were at the present moment sitting. The ministers assembled at the Hotel of the Marine Department only waited for Danton, to hold their council. The whole city was on tiptoe. Extreme terror prevailed in the prisons. The royal family, to whom every noise seemed to convey a threat, anxiously inquired the cause of so much agitation. The gaolers of the several prisons appeared struck with consternation. The keeper of the Abbaye sent away his wife and children in the morning. Dinner was served to the prisoners two hours before the accustomed time; and the knives were taken from their plates. Alarmed at these circumstances, the victims demanded the cause with importunity, but could obtain no answer. At two o'clock the *générale* beat to arms; the tocsin sounded, and the alarum cannon resounded through the precincts of the capital. Crowds of citizens met at the Champ de Mars; others surrounded the commune and the assembly; and all the public places were, in like manner, thronged to excess.

There were at the Hotel de Ville twenty-four nonjuring priests, who, taken into custody by reason of their refusal to take the oath, were to be removed from the prison-room to the prisons of the Abbaye. Whether by intention, or whether by chance, this was the time chosen for their being conveyed from one place of custody to the other. They were removed in six hackney coaches, escorted by the Breton federalists and Marseillais, and conducted at a slow pace towards the faubourg St. Germain, along the quays, the Pont Neuf and the rue Dauphine. The rabble surrounded the carriages, and heaped upon them every species of insult. The federalists pointed them out: "Behold," said they, "the conspirators who had designed to murder us, our wives, and children, whilst we were on the frontiers." These words heightened the indignation of the multitude. The doors of the coaches were opened, and the unfortunate priests within endeavoured to shut them to shelter themselves from the outrages which assailed them, but the attempt was ineffectual, and they were forced to sit patiently under the assaults of the infuriated populace. They at last arrived at the court of the Abbaye. An immense crowd had collected there to meet them. This court led to the prisons, and communicated with the hall where the committee of the section of the *Four Nations** held their sittings. The first carriage drew up before the door of the committee, and was immediately surrounded by a throng of furious looking men. Maillard was already there. The coach-door being opened, the priest nearest to it descended, and was making his way towards the committee, when he fell covered with a thousand wounds. The second endeavoured to draw back, but was dragged out by force, and suffered the fate of the former. The two others shared the same fate, and their murderers then abandoned the first carriage, and betook themselves to those which followed. These entered, one after another, the fatal court, and the last of the eighty priests was butchered amidst the savage acclamations of the furious rabble†.

At this very moment, Billaud-Varennes, a member of the council of the commune, arrived on the spot. Of all those concerned in these frightful massacres, he alone dared constantly to approve of them, and appear personally active in their perpetration. He now came forward, wearing his scarf of office, walked in the blood, and trampled on the bodies of the murdered priests, addressing at the same time the butcher throng about him: "People," said he, "you sacrifice your enemies, you do your duty." The voice of Maillard was immediately after heard above the crowd: "There is nothing more to be done here," cried he, "let us go to the church of the Carmelites." His gang immediately follow him, and they simultaneously rush to the church of the Carmelites, where two hundred priests were confined. They broke into the church, and butchered the unhappy priests, who ejaculated a prayer to heaven and embraced one another, on seeing death so near. The archbishop of Arles was first sought out, with loud cries, and, being soon discovered, was despatched by a sabre-cut over the neck. After having employed their sabres, they next used their fire-arms, and general discharges of musquetry quickly strewed the church with the bodies of the

* A committee who sat at the *College des quatre Nations*, a building at Paris now appropriated to the institute. *Trans.*

† With a single exception, that of the Abbé Sicard, who was saved almost by a miracle.

dead; some also fell in the garden, others in attempting to climb over the walls, and some in the trees, where they had endeavoured to conceal themselves.

Whilst this massacre was being committed at the church of the Carmelites, Maillard, with a party of his band, returned to the Abbaye. He presented himself at the committee of section of the *Four Nations*, covered with perspiration and blood, and demanded "wine for his brave comrades, who had delivered the nation from its enemies." The committee, themselves trembling, granted him twenty-four pints.

This was served out upon tables in the court, in the midst of the mangled bodies of those slain in the afternoon. They drank, when suddenly Maillard pointing to the prison, cried out, "*à l' Abbaye*," (to the Abbey.) He then led the way, and was followed by his gang, who assaulted the gate of the prison with violence. The poor wretches within hear the din, a signal for their death. The doors burst open. The first prisoners who are laid hold of are dragged out by the feet, and thrown bleeding into the court. While they massacred without distinction those who first came to their hands, Maillard and some of his trusty comrades demanded the prison papers, and the keys of the several prisons. One of the gaolers, advancing towards the wicket of the door, mounted on a stool, addressed the multitude: "My friends," said he, "I see you are bent upon the destruction of the aristocrats, the enemies of the people, who would have butchered your wives and children while you were on the frontier. In this you are undoubtedly right; but you are good citizens, you love justice, and would be shocked to dip your hands in innocent blood." "Yes, yes," cried out the executioners. "Well, then," resumed the gaoler, "do you not expose yourself to the danger of confounding the innocent with the guilty, when you rush like tigers upon your prey, making no distinction, and listening to no appeals." Here he was interrupted by one of the gang, who, flourishing his sabre, exclaimed: "Would you have us go to sleep? If the Prussians and Austrians were at Paris, would they distinguish between guilt and innocence? I have a wife and children, whom I will not leave in danger. If you think fit, give the scoundrels arms, and we will engage an equal number of them, but before we go, Paris must be purified." "Right, right," exclaimed many voices, and a push was made forward; nevertheless, they were at last prevailed on to desist, and consent to a species of trial. The gaol book was then given up, and it was decided that one of them should be appointed president, to read the names and the cause of every prisoner's detention, and that immediate sentence should be passed on all the culprits. "Maillard, Maillard, for president," screamed several voices, and he immediately enters upon his office. This horrible president seats himself at a table, places the gaol book before him, is surrounded by a few of his gang chosen at random to assist him by their advice, gets some of the prison officers to bring in the prisoners, and leaves it to others at the gate to complete the work of massacre. To spare the recital of these horrors, it was arranged that these words should be uttered: "*Monsieur à la Force*," (to the prison of La Force), and then, thrust through the wicket, the prisoner should be exposed to the sabres which awaited him.

The first who were brought before this dreadful tribunal were the Swiss soldiers imprisoned in the Abbaye, whose officers had been removed to the Conciergerie. "It was you," said Maillard, "who assassinated the people on the 10th of August." "But we were attacked," replied the unfortunates, "and obeyed our commanders." "For the matter of that," resumed Maillard, coldly, "all that's to be done, is to send you to the Force," (*à la Force.*) The wretched victims could not mistake the dire import of these words, for they perceived the menacing sabres on the other side of the wicket; they hung back, and crowded behind one another in fearful recoil, till one, more bold than the rest, asked, "Whither he must pass." The door was opened to him; and, stooping his head, he rushed with hopeless desperation into the midst of sabres and pikes. The rest dashed after him, and shared his fate.

The executioners return to the prison, cram all the females together in one room, the other prisoners are brought forward. Some prisoners accused of forging assignats next suffered. After them, the celebrated Montmorin, whose acquittal had caused so much discontent, but which had not gained him his freedom, was led out. Being presented to the blood-stained president, he declared that he had been tried by the regular tribunal, and could acknowledge no other. "Be it so," replied Maillard; "you will therefore go *to the Force* to await a different sentence." The ex-minister, who understood not this language, asked for a carriage. He was answered he would find one at the door. He then demanded permission to take with him a few necessaries, but, receiving no answer, he advanced towards the wicket, and there met his death.

After him, Thierry, the valet-de-chambre of the king, was led forward. "Like master, like man," exclaimed Maillard, and he was instantly assassinated. Next come the justices of peace, Buob and Bocquillon, accused of having been members of a secret committee held at the Tuileries, this was sufficient for their being butchered. The night was now fast approaching, and the prisoners, on hearing the howlings of the assassins, felt that they had but a few moments to live.

But what were the constituted authorities, the assembled committees, and citizens of Paris, doing all this time? Tranquillity and tumult, security and terror, could simultaneously prevail in that immense capital, so far distant is one part of the capital from the other. It was not till very late that the assembly heard of the fatal transactions at the prisons; and then, struck with horror at their recital, they despatched some of their deputies to appease the people and save the victims from their fury. The commune also sent messengers to set free all the debtors; to separate, as they termed it, the *innocent* from the *guilty*. But the Jacobins, although then sitting, and acquainted with all that was passing, preserved a determined silence. The ministers, assembled at the office of the Marine, were not yet informed of the scenes which were transacting, and awaited the presence of Danton, who was at the committee of *surveillance*. He declared to the commune that the commandant-

general Santerre had given orders which were not obeyed, and that nearly all his men were occupied in guarding the barriers. It is certain, that secret and contradictory orders were issued, and there was every appearance of the existence of a clandestine authority opposed to those publicly established. At the Court of the Abbey, a post of the national guard, the soldiers were permitted to give free admission to all, but to allow none to repass. At all the other posts, the guards waited for, but received no orders. How is this to be accounted for? Had Santerre suddenly lost his reason, as on the 10th of August, or was he engaged in the conspiracy? While the commissioners publicly sent by the commune had been advising how to quiet and check the people, other members of the same commune presented themselves as the committee of the *Four Nations*, who continued their sittings amidst the carnage which surrounded them, and discovered the nature of their message in their first salutation: "Does all go on as well here as at the church of the Carmelites? the commune has sent us to offer our aid if you have need of it."

The commissaries sent by the assembly and the commune were utterly unable to put a stop to the murders. There was to be seen an immense crowd, who had collected round the prison, and assisted at this dismal scene by cries of "Long live the Nation!" The aged Dussaulx, mounted on a chair, attempted to proclaim forbearance; but his voice could not be heard. Basire, with more skill, pretended to partake of the indignation of the multitude; but the moment he spoke of mercy, he could obtain no hearing. Manuel, the procurateur of the commune, touched with pity, exposed himself to the greatest dangers to save the wretched victims, but did not succeed in rescuing even one. These fruitless efforts being reported to the commune, they appeared rather more touched with pity than at first, and sent a new deputation *to calm the excitement of the people, and enlighten them as to their true interests*. This deputation proved as powerless as the first, and merely succeeded in delivering a few women and debtors.

This frightful massacre lasted the whole of this terrible night. The executioners and judges alternately exchanged their situations. Wine stimulated their thirst for blood, and the goblets out of which they drank were marked with the prints of their blood-dropping fingers. Yet, in the midst of this carnage, some victims were spared, and their lives were granted to them with every frantic demonstration of drunken joy. One young man, who was claimed by one of the sections, and declared free from aristocracy, was acquitted in the midst of acclamations of "Long live the Nation!" and carried in triumph in the blood-stained arms of the executioners. The venerable Sombreuil, governor of the Invalides, was afterwards led forth, and condemned to be taken to the *Force*. His daughter, from the middle of the prison, hears his fate pronounced, and, springing forward, darts into the midst of the pikes and sabres, clings round her father, and implores mercy from the murderers in such an heart-piercing accent, and such torrents of tears, that their fury is for a moment suspended. To put her sensibility to a new proof, they offer her a goblet full of blood. "Drink," said they to this self-devoted daughter, "drink the blood of the aristocrats!" She drinks, and her father is saved. The daughter of Cazotte also, by twining herself about him, and by the most heart-rending supplications, succeeded in rescuing her parent; but she is still more happy, and has obtained his safety without undergoing such a horrible test of her affection. These scenes cause tears to stream from the eyes of the assassins, and yet they return immediately to demand fresh victims. One of those who had displayed this sensibility, instantly resumes his dreadful office of leading out the prisoners to death; he learns that the unfortunates whom he has just been slaughtering have not had water for the last twenty-two hours, and now he wants to kill the gaoler. Another interests himself in a prisoner whom he is leading to the wicket, because he heard him speak the language of his country. "Why are you here?" says he to M. Journiac de Saint Méard. "If you are not a *traitor*, the president, *who is no fool*, will do you justice. Do not tremble, but answer me." He was presented to Maillard, who, looking over the register—"Ah," said he, "M. Journiac, you are he who wrote in the journal of the court and the city." "No," replied the prisoner, "it is a calumny; I never wrote in it." "Take care," replied Maillard, "falsehood is punished here with death. Did you not recently absent yourself to join the army of the emigrants?" "This is another calumny," replied he, "I have a certificate attesting that I have been for the last twenty-three months in Paris." "Whose certificate is it? Is the signature authentic?" Happily for M. de Journiac, a person was present to whom the subscriber of the certificate was personally known. The signature was, therefore, declared worthy of credit. "You see, then," resumed M. Journiac, "that I have been calumniated." "If the calumniator was here," replied Maillard, "he should receive terrible justice. But answer me; were you imprisoned here for nothing?" "No," answered M. de Journiac, "I was known for an aristocrat." "Aristocrat!" "Yes, aristocrat; but you are not here to judge of opinions, but actions; mine are blameless; I have never conspired; my soldiers, in the regiment which I command, are devoted to me, and, when at Nancy, urged me to seize on Malseigne." Struck with such courage, his judges fixed their eyes on him with astonishment, and Maillard gave the signal of pardon. Immediately the cries of "Live the Nation!" resounded from all parts. All hastened to embrace him; and two of the bystanders, inclosing him in their arms, led him safe and sound through the hedge of swords and pikes which a few minutes before menaced his life. M. de Journiac offered them money, but they refused it, and only asked permission to embrace him. Another prisoner, saved in the same manner, was conducted to his house with similar enthusiasm. The executioners, all covered with blood, begged to be permitted to witness the joy of his family, and immediately after returned to the carnage. In such a state of overwrought excitement, the mind is keenly alive to all the emotions and instincts of its nature; they succeed each other rapidly and convulsively, alternately melting and firing the soul, and hurrying those who have resigned themselves to their unrestrained sway from one extreme to the other with

wild caprice; the passions which seemed one moment quenched in tears, rise the next in flame; the whole man is subject to delirious changes, and he weeps and assassinates with the same heartfelt sincerity in the short space of a few minutes. Whilst wading in blood, he is arrested by admiration of courage or devotion; he is sensible of the honour of appearing just, and vain of the semblance of disinterestedness. The events of the deplorable period which we are now narrating afford many instances of these striking contrarieties; and among this number must be recorded the circumstance of the robbers and murderers of this night depositing the blood-stained trinkets found on some of the prisoners, with the committee of the Abbey.

During this night of horrors, a gang of wretches detached themselves, and committed their deeds of blood in the other prisons of Paris. At the *Chatelet*, at the *Force*, the *Conciergerie*, the *Bernardins*, at *Saint-Firmin*, at the *Salpetrière*, and the *Bicêtre* prisons, similar massacres had been perpetrated, and streams of blood flowed there, as at the Abbaye. When the morning of Monday the 3rd of September dawned upon the havoc of this frightful night, the spectacle it presented to the broad glare of day was as sickening as it was horrifying. Billaud-Varrennes repaired early to the Abbey, where the evening before he had encourged *the workmen*, as he termed them. He now again addressed them. "My friends," said he, "in slaughtering these wretches, you have saved your country. France owes you an eternal debt of gratitude, and the municipality is at a loss how to acknowledge your merit. It, however, offers you twenty-four livres a-piece, and you will be paid immediately." These words excited shouts of applause, and those to whom they were addressed followed Billaud-Varrennes into the committee, to receive the payment which he had promised them. But here a difficulty arose. "Where shall we find the funds," said the president to Billaud, "to pay this debt?" Billaud replied by again eulogizing the massacres, and declared that the minister of the interior ought to have money to be expressly devoted to this purpose. The crowd then immediately hastened to the house of Roland, who had just been informed of the crimes of the preceding night; but he sent them back with indignation, and refused to listen to their demands. The assassins, thus disappointed, returned to the committee, and threatened its members with instant death if they were not immediately paid the wages of their dreadful deeds; every one, therefore, was obliged to empty his pocket, to satisfy them. The commune afterwards repaid these contributors; and their disbursement-book is still to be seen, wherein allusion is made to the payment of the executioners of September. In particular, it appears by these accounts, that 1463 francs were paid to the executioners at the date of the 4th of September.

The recital of these horrors quickly spread through all the quarters of Paris, and produced an universal disgust. The Jacobins still continued to preserve a profound silence; the commune appeared slightly touched with pity, but declared that the people had justice on their side, that none but the guilty had fallen; and that their vengeance had done no more than anticipate the sword of justice. The general council despatched new messengers *to calm the ferment, and bring them back to those principles from which they had wandered.* Such was the language of the public authorities; and, indeed, everywhere the massacre of the prisoners was partly excused: — "If," said those most influenced by feelings of justice and pity, "if they had been permitted to live, we ourselves should have fallen their victims in a few days." Others palliated the horrors of the carnage by anticipating the victory of the Prussians. "If," said they, "we are conquered and massacred by the Prussians, they have fallen before us." Such are the terrible consequences of the fear which party-spirit infuses, and of the hatred which that fear engenders.

The assembly appeared deeply affected with grief at the disastrous disorganization which on every side surrounded them. They passed decree after decree, demanding of the commune an account of the state of Paris, and the commune replied that they had made every exertion to re-establish order and the authority of the laws. Yet this assembly, composed almost entirely of those Girondists who discovered so much courage in prosecuting the September murderers, and braved and welcomed death rather than renounce this prosecution, never conceived the idea of taking themselves, as a body, from their seats to the prisons on the night of the carnage, and interposing themselves between the murderers and their victims. If such a generous idea did not tear them from their benches and lead them to the scene of carnage it must be attributed to the stupor of astonishment, a feeling of their own impotency, or, perhaps, to the weak and insufficient devotion which the danger of an enemy inspires; and, finally, to the unfortunate opinion which prevailed with some of the deputies, that the victims were conspirators, at whose hands that death which they suffered would otherwise have been received.

One man, in the midst of these perils, exerted himself with great energy against the assassins. On the second day of their three days' reign, he protested boldly against them. On the Monday morning, the instant he heard of the crimes of the preceding night, he wrote to the mayor Pétion, who was yet ignorant of them, to Santerre, who still continued inactive, urging them both to exert themselves; and, at the same time, addressed a letter to the assembly, which was received with the greatest applause. This worthy man, who has been so undeservedly calumniated by several parties, was Roland. In his letter, he protested against every species of disorder, against the usurpations of the commune, the fury of the people, and added that he was ready to die at the post which the law had assigned him. Yet, if we would form an idea of the state of the public mind, of the animosity which raged against those who were called *traitors*, and the management which was necessary to address the frantic passions of the people, we may do so by reading the following passage. Certainly, the courage of the writer, who alone publicly affixed the responsibility of all the massacres on the constituted authorities of the nation, cannot be doubted; yet observe the guarded way in which he was compelled to express himself in this respect:

"Over the events of yesterday, perhaps, it would

be better to throw a veil; I know that the people, terrible in their vengeance, are yet influenced in it by some sort of justice; they do not seize indiscriminately upon all who present themselves to their fury, but point their wrath against those whom the sword of the law has too long spared, and whose death the peril of the moment seems to call for without delay. But I know also how easy it is for traitors and ill-disposed persons to abuse and mislead this indignation, which should be checked and not encouraged. We owe to all France the declaration that the executive power neither foresaw nor could prevent the late excesses. The constituted authorities are bound by every obligation of duty to put an end to them, or they must consider their own power annihilated. I know that this declaration of my sentiments will expose me to the rage of some agitators. Well, let them take my life. I wish only to preserve it for the defence of liberty and equality; if these are violated or destroyed, either by the reign of foreign despots or the excesses of an abused people, I shall have lived long enough; but until my latest breath I will do my duty. This is the sole object of my ambition, and no power on earth can deprive me of it."

The assembly read this letter with great applause; and, on the motion of Lamourette, demanded of the commune an account of the state of Paris. The commune replied again that tranquillity was restored; and, being enraged at the courage displayed by the minister of the interior, Marat and his committee became angry, and had the audacity to issue an order of arrest against him. So blind was their fury, that they dared attack a man still enjoying all his popularity. Danton, when he heard of this, expressed himself strongly against those members of the committee whom he called the *enragés* (madmen). Although opposed daily by the inflexibility of Roland, he was far from disliking him; and, besides, in the terrible system of politics, he was afraid of taking any useless step, and thought it quite extravagant to seize, in the midst of his official duties, the first minister of state. He immediately, therefore, hastened to the office of the marine, and then to the committee, where he expressed himself very indignantly against Marat. But he was quickly reconciled to him; and the order of arrest was put into his hands, which he immediately shewed to Pétion; and, relating to him what he had done, "See," said he to the mayor, "what these madmen are capable of: but I know how to bring them to reason." "You have been to blame," replied Pétion, coldly; "this act could only have ruined its authors."

On his part, Pétion, though less ardent, did not demonstrate less courage than Roland. He wrote to Santerre, who, with real weakness or duplicity, replied that his heart was convulsed with grief, but that he could not get his orders executed. He then went personally to the several theatres of carnage. At the *Force*, he pulled out of their blood-stained seats two municipal officers, who, in their scarfs of office, exercised the same functions Maillard had exercised at the Abbey; but scarcely had he quitted this place to visit others, when these same officers returned, and continued their executions. Pétion, every where powerless, returned to Roland, who had received so deep an impression of the horrors which were transacted as to make him ill. Of all the prisons, the Temple alone was preserved inviolate, although the charge it contained greatly excited the popular fury. The mode of defence adopted here by the military was very dexterous. A tri-coloured ribbon was stretched between the walls and the populace, and this kept off the mob, and saved the royal family.

The monsters, who had continued to spill blood since the preceding Sunday, became only more and more excited with their horrible task, and had contracted a disposition for murder, which they could not restrain. They even established a species of regularity in their executions, suspending them to carry away the dead and take their meals. The very women visited the prisons to bring their dinner to their husbands, who, they used to say, *had business to do at the Abbaye.*

At the *Force*, *Bicêtre* and *Abbaye*, the massacres were of longer continuance than at the other prisons. It was at the *Force* that the unfortunate princess de Lamballe, so celebrated at the court for her beauty, and her intimacy with the queen, was confined. She was conducted, half dead, to the terrible wicket. "Who are you?" asked the executioners. "Louise of Savoy, princess of Lamballe." "What was your station at the court? Do you know any thing of the plots of the palace?" "I have never known of any plots." "Swear, then, to love liberty and equality; swear to hate the king, the queen, and royalty." "I will take the first oath, but I cannot the second; it is not in my heart."

"Swear, then," said one of the assassins, who wished to save her; but the unfortunate princess no longer possessed any presence of mind; she neither heard nor understood anything. "Let madam *go at large*," said the chief of the wicket; for here, as at the Abbaye, a word had been fixed on as a signal for death. The unhappy lady was then led out, not with the intention, say some narrators, to put her to death, but to set her free. Nevertheless, she was received at the door by furies thirsting for blood. The first sabre stroke fell on the back of her head, and the blood spurted forth; yet she still advanced, supported by two men, who were perhaps willing to save her; but she had scarcely proceeded a few steps further when she sunk under a second blow; her beauteous form was torn to pieces, the murderers outraged, mutilated, and divided it in pieces among themselves. Her head, her heart, and other portions of her dead body, were carried on the point of a pike about Paris. "We must," said these men, with their abominable language, "take these to the foot of the throne." Upon which they hastened immediately to the Temple, and awakened the unfortunate prisoners by their outcries, who demanded with terror the occasion of the disturbance. The municipal officers endeavoured to prevent their seeing the furious crowd assembled under their windows, and the bloody head raised on the top of a pike. At last one of the national guard said to the queen, "*It is the head of the Princess Lamballe which we wish to prevent your seeing.*" On this intelligence the queen fainted away. Madame Elizabeth, the king, and the valet-de-chambre, Clery, carried her out of the room; while the shouts of the ferocious

gang yet resounded through the precincts of the Temple.

The day of the 3rd, and the night of the 3rd and 4th, continued to be stained with these massacres. At the Bicêtre especially, the carnage was more protracted and terrible than anywhere else. There were some thousand prisoners confined there for different crimes. When they were attacked, they defended themselves, and cannon was obliged to be employed to subdue them. One member of the general council of the commune had even the audacity to demand a force to reduce the prisoners, who defended themselves, but his request was not attended to. Pétion again visited the Bicêtre, but found his interference quite vain. A thirst for blood animated the murderous multitude. A rage for combat and carnage had succeeded to their political fanaticism, and they now murdered their victims from a love of murder itself. The massacre lasted until Wednesday, the 5th of September.

Nearly all the marked victims had now perished, the prisons were empty, yet the assassins called out for more blood; but the dark devisers of so many murders seemed to show themselves accessible to some touch of pity; the expressions of the commune began to soften. Profoundly grieved, as they said they were, by the rigours exercised against the prisoners, they issued new orders to put a stop to them, and this time they were better obeyed. But there were hardly any prisoners left whom their pity could serve. The calculation of the number of victims differs in every report of the time. This calculation varies from six to twelve thousand, who fell in the prisons of Paris*.

But if these massacres spread the uttermost amazement, the hardihood which was demonstrated by their open avowal and recommendation of them, as an example to imitate, was not less the subject of astonishment. The committee of surveillance was shameless enough to send a circular to all the communes of France, which history should preserve, with the seven signatures attached thereto. The following is the composition now consigned to posterity as a record of infamy:—

Paris, September 2nd, 1792.

"Brothers and Friends,—A dreadful plot laid by the court, to destroy all the patriots of the French empire, a plot in which a great number of the members of the national assembly are compromised, having been prepared on the 9th of last month, the commune of Paris have been driven by cruel necessity to have recourse to the power of the people, and have neglected nothing to merit the approbation of their country. After the testimonies which the assembly itself has given in their favour, who could have thought that at the moment when new plots were preparing in silence, and ready to burst out, it would hasten to strip them of all power, as a reward for their ardent patriotism, and in forgetfulness of its own declaration, that they had saved the country? But being informed of these conspiracies, the people, by the clamorous expression of their fears, have made the assembly feel the urgent necessity of uniting themselves more closely with the nation, and restoring to the commune the power with which it had been previously invested.

"Proud of enjoying all the plenitude of the national confidence, which it is determined to merit more and more, placed in the very midst of all conspiracies, and resolved to die for the public safety, the commune will not glory in having done its duty till it has obtained your approbation, which is the object of its desires, and of which it cannot be certain till after all the departments have sanctioned its measures for the public safety; and professing principles of the most perfect equality, having no other ambition than that of placing itself first in the breach, it will always be ready to bring itself to the level of the least numerous commune in the empire, till there shall be nothing left to fear.

"Being aware that Barbarian hordes are advancing against them, the commune of Paris hasten to inform their brothers in all the departments, that a party of ferocious conspirators, confined in the prisons, have been put to death by the people; acts of justice which appeared indispensable to strike terror into the legions of traitors enclosed within the walls of the city, at the moment when all the citizens are about to march against the enemy; and, without doubt, the nation, after the long succession of treasons, which has brought her to the brink of destruction, will hasten to adopt this measure, so useful and necessary; and all, perchance, will say with the Parisians: When we march against the enemy, we will not leave behind us assassins to cut the throats of our wives and children."

(*Signed.*) DUPLAIN, MARAT,
PANIS, LEFORT,
SERJ. LENFANT, JOURDEUIL.
Officers of the committee of surveillance, established at the Mairie.

* See note 47 in the Appendix.

CHAPTER VII.

CAMPAIGN OF THE ARGONNE—MILITARY PLANS OF DUMOURIEZ—CAPTURE OF THE CAMP OF GRAND-PRÉ BY THE PRUSSIANS—VICTORY AT VALMY—RETREAT OF THE ALLIES; REASONS ASSIGNED FOR THIS RETREAT.

THE perusal of this document can impart some idea to what a degree of fanaticism the approach of dangers had excited the mind of the people. But it is now time we should turn our eyes to the theatre of war, where we meet with nought but glorious associations. The council of war held by Dumouriez at Sédan has already been mentioned. Dillon had there given his opinion that the army should retire to Chalons, so as to have the Marne in our front, and defend its passage. The disorganized

state of the twenty-three thousand men left under the command of Dumouriez, their perfect incapacity to resist eighty thousand Prussians, disciplined and accustomed to war, and the project of a rapid invasion without stopping before the fortified places, the design attributed to the enemy, were the reasons which induced Dillon to believe that the march of the Prussians could not be arrested, and that he must necessarily retreat before them, and take up such strong positions as might compensate for the weakness and bad condition of the army. The council was so struck with these reasons, that they unanimously adopted his opinion; and Dumouriez, on whom the final decision, as commander-in-chief, depended, replied that he would consider of the subject.

On the evening of the 28th of August, a resolution was taken which saved France. Many have contended for the honour of its authorship, but every thing tends to prove that it belongs to Dumouriez; be this as it may, the execution of it made it his own, and merits for him all the praise of the discovery. France, as every one knows, is defended on the east by the Rhine and the Vosges; on the north by a range of strong places devised by the genius of Vauban, and by the Meuse, the Moselle, and various other streams, which, together with the fortified towns, compose an aggregate of obstacles sufficient for the protection of this frontier. The enemy had entered France by the north, and pursued their march between Sédan and Metz, leaving the attack of the strong places of the Low Countries to the Duke of Saxe-Teschen, and covering, by one of their corps, Metz and Lorraine. To follow up this plan of invasion, they should have advanced rapidly, turned the disorganization of the French army to their own advantage, have alarmed them by decisive attacks, and, finally, cut off Lafayette's twenty-three thousand men, before a new general had united and re-animated them with confidence. But the conflict between the presumption of the King of Prussia, and the prudence of the Duke of Brunswick, was fatal to the execution of every resolution, and suspended the allied armies in a neutral indecision between boldness and prudence. The capture of Verdun still heightened the vanity of Frederick William and the ardour of the emigrants, but communicated no activity to the duke, who still continued to disapprove of an invasion with the resources he possessed, and the dispositions of the country to be invaded. After the taking of Verdun on the 2nd of September, the allied army remained several days on the plains which border the Meuse, confined themselves to the occupation of Stenay, and made not a single step in advance. Dumouriez was at this time at Sédan, with his army encamped in the environs.

The forest of Argonne, a name for ever famous in our history, extends from Sédan to Passavant. This covers a space from about thirteen to fifteen leagues; and from the inequalities of its ground, and the varied distribution of its woods and watercourses, is altogether impenetrable to an army, except in a few principal passes. Through this forest the enemy might have passed to Chalons, and thence proceeded in their route to Paris. With this intention, it is astonishing they had not before occupied all the passes, and anticipated Dumouriez, who was distant from them the whole length of the forest. The evening after the sitting of the council of war, the French general and Thouvenot, an officer, in whose talents he placed the greatest confidence, attentively observed the map of the country, and pointing with his finger to Argonne, and the woods which traverse it, "These," said Dumouriez, "are the Thermopylæ of France, and if I can be there before the Prussians all is safe."

This was enough to fire the genius of Thouvenot, and they both immediately set to work to consider the details of their plan. Its advantages were immense; for, besides avoiding a retreat, and the last resource in their power, the defence of the Marne, the progress of the enemy would be at least delayed, the time so opportune for their success lost, and themselves obliged to remain in Champagne, a miserable, uncultivated, swampy, and barren country, incapable of provisioning an army, and unlike the Three Bishoprics (*Les Trois Evêchés*), a rich and fertile soil, which they would have occupied in case of the retreat to Chalons, and wintered in most plentifully, even supposing they had not forced the Marne. By this disposition, also, if the enemy, having lost some time before the forest, should return towards Sedan, the strong places of the Low Countries, which they could not be supposed able to reduce, obstructed their progress; or should they direct their march towards the other extremity of the forest, Metz and the army of the centre would be ready to receive them. In this possible dilemma, the army of Dumouriez, joining that of Kellermann, and forming a mass of fifty thousand strong, supported by Metz and several places of strength, might take up the offensive, and pursue the enemy with advantage. In any case, their project of marching to Paris would be frustrated, and the campaign lost, for it was already September, and time to enter into winter quarters. This project was certainly well devised, but its execution was by no means certain. The Prussians were encamped along the side of the forest, whilst Dumouriez was at one of its extremities. Thus the success of this grand scheme and the safety of France depended upon a chance, or rather an oversight in the enemy.

Argonne is crossed by five defiles; that of the Chêne-Populeux, the *Croix-aux-Bois*, Grand-Pré, the Chalade, and the Islettes. Of these, Grand-Pré and the Islettes were the most important, and, unfortunately, the farthest distant from Sédan, and the nearest to the enemy. Nevertheless, Dumouriez was determined to occupy them with his whole force. But he first ordered General Dubouquet to quit the department of the north, and take possession of the passage of the Chene-Populeux, which was very important, but near Sédan, and consequently not demanding so hasty an occupation as the others. Two routes offered themselves to Dumouriez in his march to Grand-Pré and the Islettes, the one behind the forest, the other before it, in front of the enemy. The first was the safest, but longest; but it discovered our intentions to the enemy, and afforded him time to frustrate them. The second was the shorter, but that also betrayed our design, and exposed our march to the attacks of a formidable army. It was necessary, in fact, to advance along the woods, and pass before Ste-

nay, where Clerfait and the Austrians were stationed. This route was, however, preferred; for Dumouriez imagined that Clerfait, with Austrian prudence, would, on sight of the French, entrench himself in his excellent camp at Brouenne, and thus afford him an opportunity of escaping to Grand-Pré and the Islettes.

On the 30th [August], Dillon was put in motion, and with eight thousand men marched to Stenay, between the Meuse and Argonne. He there found Clerfait, who occupied the two banks of the river, with twenty-five thousand Austrians. General Miaczinsky attacked his advanced posts with fifteen hundred men, whilst Dillon supported him with the whole of his division. A brisk fire was for some time kept up; but Clerfait immediately repassing the Meuse, betook himself to Brouenne, as Dumouriez had happily foreseen. Meantime Dillon boldly pursued his course between the Meuse and the Argonne; Dumouriez followed close after him with fifteen thousand men, who composed his main body, and they both advanced towards the posts assigned them. On the 2nd of September, Dumouriez was at Beffu, not more than one day's march from Grand-Pré, and Dillon arrived on the same day at Pierremont, and boldly proceeded, without stopping, towards the Islettes. Fortunately, General Galbaud, who had been sent to reinforce the garrison of Verdun, arriving too late, had fallen back upon that pass, and thus held it in reserve. Dillon came up on the 4th with his eight thousand men; and, having established himself there, also placed a guard over the Chalade, another passage of secondary importance, which was confided to him. Meantime Dumouriez reached Grand-Pré, found the post vacant, and took possession on the 3rd. Thus on the 3rd and 4th the passes were all occupied by our troops, and the defence of France was much advanced.

This was a bold march, and at least as meritorious as the first idea of occupying the Argonne, for it placed Dumouriez in a situation to resist the invasion: but this was not all; it was necessary now to make the passes impregnable; and, for this purpose, a multitude of positions were requisite, of which the success depended on a variety of chances.

Dillon secured himself in the possession of the Islettes; he cleared the ground, raised intrenchments, and, making the best disposition of his artillery, which was numerous and excellent, constructed batteries, which rendered the passage unapproachable. At the same time he occupied the Chalade, and thus made himself master of the routes which lead to Saint-Menehould, and from thence to Chalons. Dumouriez had established himself at Grand-Pré in a camp which both nature and art rendered formidable. He took up his position on heights ranged in the semicircular form of an amphitheatre. At the foot of these heights were spread extensive plains, through which the Aire took its course, forming a defence in front of the camp. Two bridges were thrown over the river; and two very strong advanced guards were there posted, with instructions, in case of attack, to set fire to them and retire.

After having dislodged these advanced guards, the enemy would then have to cross the river without the assistance of bridges, and under the discharge of all our artillery; and even when they had cleared the river, a lap of meadows would still have to be traversed, exposed to a cross fire from a thousand different directions, and, finally, to storm intrenchments very steep, and almost inaccessible. Assuming that all these obstacles should be surmounted, Dumouriez, retiring along his heights, might descend on the rear of the enemy, cross the Aisne, pass over its two bridges, afterwards destroying them, and still have a river between himself and the Prussians. This camp might be regarded as almost impregnable, and Dumouriez was so secure in its strength, that he could devote himself without anxiety to devising future plans of operation on the large scale of the whole probable theatre of the war.

On the 7th, general Dubouquet occupied with six thousand men the pass of the Chêne-Populeux; that of the Croix-du-Bois, the least important, which was situated between the Chêne-Populeux and Grand-Pré, was the only one that now remained unoccupied; and, by the order of Dumouriez, its roads were broken up, its trees felled, and a colonel with two battalions and two squadrons sent to its defence. Thus stationed in the centre of the forest, in an impregnable camp, the general kept the principal pass with fifteen thousand men, having Dillon on his right, at four leagues' distance, who protected the Islettes and the Chalade with a force of eight thousand men; Dubouquet on his left, with six thousand troops, in guard over the Chêne-Populeux; and in the interval, between this post and Grand-Pré, a colonel and a few companies, who defended the road of the Croix-aux-Bois, which was considered but of secondary importance.

Thus, his whole plan of defence being completed, Dumouriez had leisure to wait for reinforcements, and lost no time in giving orders in consequence. He sent instructions to Beurnonville to quit the frontier of the Low Countries, where the Duke of Saxe-Teschen attempted nothing of importance, and to be at Réthel on the 13th of September with ten thousand men; he fixed upon Châlons as the depôt for live stock and ammunition, and as a rendezvous for any recruits or reinforcements that might be sent him. In this manner he collected behind him every thing necessary for a resistance; and, at the same time, informed the executive power of his occupation of Argonne:—"Grand-Pré and the Islettes," said he, in his communication, "are our Thermopylæ, but I shall be more successful than Leonidas." He moreover required that some regiments of the army of the Rhine, formerly under the command of Kellermann, should be detached to join the army of the centre; and requested that, since it was evidently the intention of the Prussians to march to Paris, which was proved by their not stopping before Montmedy and Thionville, Kellermann might be ordered to hem them in on the left, and thus take them both in flank and rear during their offensive march. According to these arrangements, if the Prussians, renouncing the attempt to force Argonne, directed their course higher up, Dumouriez would succeed them and meet Kellermann arriving from Metz with the army of the centre; or should they descend towards Sédan, he would again follow them, join Beurnonville with ten thousand men, and

await Kellermann on the banks of the Aisne; in both cases, this junction would produce a force sixty thousand strong, capable of taking the field.

The executive neglected nothing to second the skilful plans of Dumouriez. Servan, the minister of war, although in ill health, attended incessantly to the provisioning of the army, the transportation of all necessaries and ammunition, and the assembling of the new levies. From fifteen hundred to two thousand volunteers issued daily from Paris. A military fervour had seized upon all, and the citizens enlisted in crowds into the army. The patriotic societies, the councils of the communes, and the assembly, were continually filled with companies spontaneously levied, who marched immediately to Châlons, the general rendezvous of volunteers. These young soldiers wanted nothing but discipline and the experience of the field of battle; and this a skilful general could easily impart to them.

The Girondists were the personal enemies of Dumouriez, and placed little confidence in him, since he had driven them from the ministry; they had even wished to supersede him in his command by another general, named Grimoard; but perceiving now that the destinies of the country depended upon him, they laid aside all their animosities, and Roland, the best and the most disinterested among them, wrote him an affecting letter, assuring him that all was forgotten, and he desired nothing now but to celebrate his victories.

Dumouriez having vigorously occupied the frontier, made himself the centre of the extensive military movements of the nation. He had fortunately possessed himself of the defiles of the Argonne, which gave the other armies time to assemble and take their several positions behind him; he brought all the corps to their respective posts, and thus created an imposing force; he obliged Kellermann to receive orders from him, commanded with vigour, and acted with celerity; he inspired his soldiers with courage, by mixing frequently with them, and testifying the confidence he reposed in their conduct, making it his business to encourage them to long for the approaching contest with the enemy.

Things were thus situated on the 10th of September. The Prussians came up successively to all our posts, skirmished before the intrenchments, and were every where repulsed. Dumouriez had established secret communications in the interior of the forest, and despatched unexpected succour to the posts which were attempted, which, in the opinion of the enemy, doubled the real force of our army. On the 11th a general attack was made on Grand-Pré; but the generals, Miranda and Stengel, the former posted at Mortanne, the latter at Sant-Jouvin, repelled every attempt with complete success. At many points the soldiers, confident in their position, and encouraged by the opinion of security evinced by their commander, issued from behind their intrenchments, and received with their bayonets the onset of the enemy. These conflicts gave occupation to the army, which was sometimes destitute of live stock, a want occasioned by the inevitable scarcity of provisions attendant on a sudden service; but the cheerfulness of the general, who fared the same as his men, produced a cheerful resignation; and in spite of symptoms of dysentery which began to appear, the soldiers were sufficiently comfortable in the camp of Grand Pré. The superior officers alone, who doubted the capability of the army to hold out long, and the ministry who entertained the same suspicions, spoke of a retreat behind the Marne, and beset Dumouriez with their advice. In answer to these representations, he wrote energetic letters to the ministers, and imposed silence on his officers, telling them that when he wished for their opinions he would call a council of war.

Great qualities have always some deficiencies. The extreme promptitude of the genius of Dumouriez often demonstrated a want of circumspection; and in the heat of conception, he frequently omitted to calculate the obstacles his designs were likely to encounter. This had already happened to him when he ordered Lafayette to remove from Metz to Givet. Here he committed a capital error, which would have lost him the campaign had he not retrieved it with admirable skill and self-possession. Between the Chêne-Populeux and Grand-Pré was another pass which had been thought of very small importance, and which was only defended by two battalions and two squadrons. Engrossed by the numerous cares of his extensive command, Dumouriez had not personally visited this pass; and besides, having but few men to spare for its defence, he easily suffered himself to be persuaded that two or three companies would be sufficient to guard it. To complete his misfortune, the colonel whom he had placed there, induced him to withdraw a part of his men, and represented to him that, if the roads were broken up, a few volunteers would be amply enough for its protection. Dumouriez allowed himself to be deceived by this colonel, an old soldier, whom he considered worthy of confidence.

All this time, the Duke of Brunswick had examined all our different posts, and, at one time, contemplated marching along the forest towards Sédan, in order to take us at this point. It appeared that, whilst this movement was making, spies revealed the negligence of the French general. The Croix-aux Bois was attacked by the Austrians and emigrants commanded by the Prince de Ligne. The trees had only just been felled, the roads were not broken up, and the pass was occupied without resistance on the morning of the 13th. As soon as Dumouriez learnt this fatal intelligence, he sent General Chazot, an officer remarkable for his great boldness, with two brigades, six squadrons, and four eight pounders, to repel the Austrians and retake the passage. He ordered him to charge with the bayonet without delay, allowing no time to the enemy to entrench themselves. The 13th and 14th elapsed before General Chazot could execute his orders; but on the 15th he attacked and repelled the Austrians, who retreated from their post with the loss of their commander, the Prince de Ligne. He was, however, again attacked himself two hours after by a very superior force, before he could make any entrenchments, and was entirely dispossessed of the Croix-aux-Bois. In addition to this reverse, he was cut off from Grand-Pré, and not being able to join the principal body of troops,

it was considerably weakened by his absence. He retired upon Vouziers. General Dubouquet, who commanded at the Chêne-Populeux, and who had been hitherto successful in retaining his post, seeing himself separated from Grand-Pré, thought it no longer prudent to remain in his position, exposed to be surrounded by the enemy, who, having broken the line to the Croix-aux-Bois, were about to bring their whole army into active operation. He resolved therefore to decamp and retire by Antigny and Somme-Puis upon Châlons. Thus the fruit of so many well-combined positions, and such brilliant hopes, was lost. The forest of Argonne, the only obstacle to the invasion, was free, and the road to Paris open.

The army of Dumouriez, separated from Chasot and Dubouquet, was reduced to fifteen thousand men; and, if the enemy had, debouching rapidly by the Croix-aux-Bois, forced the position of Grand-Pré, and occupied the passages of the Aisne, the French general would have been lost. With forty thousand Prussians in front, and twenty thousand Austrians in his rear, Dumouriez shut up with his fifteen thousand men, and surrounded by sixty-five thousand men, by two rivers and the forest, would have had nothing to do but lay down his arms, or uselessly sacrifice his soldiers; and thus the only army on which France placed any reliance would have been destroyed, and the enemy could have taken their route to Paris without opposition.

In this desperate situation, the general did not lose his courage, but preserved an admirable self-possession. His first care, that same day, was to secure his retreat. He considered that Dillon was on his right, still in possession of the Islettes and the road of Saint Menehould, and that by retiring on his rear, they would present two entrenched fronts to the enemy, the one towards the Islettes, and the other facing Saint Menehould. There they might wait to be joined by the two generals Chasot and Dubouquet, also by Beurnonville, who had been ordered to be at Rethel on the 13th, and finally by Kellermann, who had been already ten days on his march, and could not fail to arrive shortly. This plan was the best, and most adapted to the system of Dumouriez, which consisted in avoiding a retreat into the interior, an open country, maintaining his ground in one full of difficulties, temporising, and putting himself in a position to be joined by the army of the centre. If, on the other hand, he had preferred retiring to Châlons, he would have been pursued as a fugitive, and executed a retreat with disadvantage, which he might have accomplished before with much more credit and utility; and would besides have been effectually cut off from the possibility of being joined by Kellermann. This perseverance in his system, after experiencing such a check as that which he sustained at the Croix-aux-Bois, and in spite of the reiterated advice to retire behind the Marne, which he received from all sides, discovered great firmness and intrepidity. But how many fortunate chances he had yet to encounter in carrying his plan into execution! and how difficult to succeed in a retreat with his small body of troops, whilst so diligently watched by a powerful enemy!

His first measure was to order Beurnonville, already on his march to Rethel, Chasot, from whom he had just received favourable news, and Dubouquet, who had retired to Attigny, to proceed to Saint Menehould. At the same time, he repeated his orders to Kellermann, to continue his march, fearing that otherwise he might again fall back on Metz upon the news of the loss of the defiles. After having made all these dispositions, and received a Prussian officer who demanded a parley, and to whom he showed his camp in the most perfect order, he decamped at midnight, and marched towards the two bridges which were the only passages of escape behind Grand-Pré. Happily for him, the enemy had not yet thought of seizing on the French positions. A cloudy sky concealed his retreat. He marched all the night through bad roads, and the army, which fortunately had not had time to become alarmed, retired without knowing the motive of this change of position. On the next day, the 16th, all his troops had crossed the Aisne; Dumouriez had completed his escape, and halted in battle array on the heights of Autry, four leagues from Grand-Pré. He was not pursued, and therefore thought himself safe, and advanced to Dammartin-sur-Hans, to pitch an encampment for the day, when suddenly some fugitives arrived, crying out that all was lost, that the enemy, having attacked him in the rear, had put the army to the rout. Dumouriez immediately hastened to the rear-guard, where he found Miranda and the old general Duval stopping the fugitives, and restoring order in the ranks, which the Prussian hussars had for a moment surprised and thrown into confusion. The inexperience of these young troops, and the fear of treason which at that time possessed every one, rendered these panics very frequent. Nevertheless order was soon re-established, thanks to the generals Miranda, Duval, and Stengel, who were posted on the rear-guard. The troops bivouacked at Dammartin, hoping shortly to fall back on the Islettes, and terminate successfully this perilous retreat.

Dumouriez had been twenty hours on horseback. He dismounted at six o'clock in the evening, when suddenly the *sauve qui peut* were again heard, with imprecations against the generals, and especially the commander-in-chief, who had, said the soldiers, purposely fallen into the hands of the enemy. Horses were put to the heavy guns, and the artillery corps attempted to take refuge on a hill. All the troops were in confusion. Dumouriez ordered fires to be lighted, and his men to remain in their position during the night. Ten hours were thus passed in mud and darkness. More than fifteen hundred fugitives escaped across the country to spread through Paris and all France the intelligence, that the army of the north, the last hope of the nation, was lost, and had fallen into the hands of the enemy.

On the next day, order was again restored, and Dumouriez wrote to the national assembly with his usual confidence: "I have been obliged to abandon the camp of Grand-Pré. My retreat was already accomplished when a panic seized the army; ten thousand men fled before fifteen hundred Prussian hussars. The loss we have sustained does not amount to more than fifty men and a small quantity of baggage. Every thing is now repaired, and I will answer for our success." Nothing less than this assurance was necessary to calm Paris and the

executive council, who were about again to press the general to pass the Marne.

Saint Menehould, whither Dumouriez was proceeding, is situated on the Aisne, one of the two rivers which surrounded the camp of Grand-Pré. Dumouriez had, therefore, to re-ascend to its source, and before he arrived there, to cross three rather deep streams which fell into it, the Tourbe, the Bionne, and the Auve. Beyond these three streams was the camp he was about to occupy. Before Saint Menehould is a circular ridge of heights extending three quarters of a league. At their base lies a marshy plain, through which the Auve runs, flooding the adjacent grounds before it flows into the Aisne. This marshy plain is bounded on the right by the heights of the Hyron, in front by those of La Lune, and on the left by those of Gisaucourt. In the centre are several lesser elevations. On one of them stands the mill of Valmy, which directly faces La Lune. The high road from Châlons to Saint Menehould crosses this level, nearly parallel to the course of the Auve. It was at Saint Menehould, and above this level, where Dumouriez took up his position. He immediately occupied the most important posts in his neighbourhood, and, together with Dillon, now presented two points to the enemy: he commanded the latter to maintain his ground firmly. Thus he occupied the high road to Paris at three points, the Islettes, Saint Menehould, and Châlons.

Nevertheless the Prussians could, by passing through Grand-Pré, leave him at Saint Menehould, and advance to Châlons. Dumouriez, therefore, ordered Dubouquet, whose fortunate arrival at that town he had learnt, to place himself with his division at the camp of the Epine, assemble all the volunteers there, and, finally, protect Châlons from a sudden attack. He was shortly after joined by Chasot, and at last by Beurnonville. The latter had arrived in sight of Saint Menehould on the 15th, and seeing an army in good order, supposed it was that of the enemy, for he could not believe that Dumouriez, who was reported to have been beaten, had so soon extricated himself from the dilemma he was placed in. Under this impression he fell back on Châlons, and being there informed of the truth, returned and took up his position on the 19th, at Maffrecourt, on the right of the camp. He brought with him the ten thousand men whom Dumouriez had disciplined, during a whole month, in the camp of Maulde. Reinforced by Chasot and Beurnonville, Dumouriez could now muster thirty thousand men. Thus, thanks to his firmness and presence of mind, he was again placed in a strong position, and could still temporize for a long time. But, if the enemy, by a prompt movement, had left him behind and advanced upon Châlons, what would have become of his camp at Saint Menehould? This event was always to be feared, and his precautions at the camp of the Epine were far from sufficient to prevent this danger.

Two adverse movements were slowly at work in his neighbourhood: that of Brunswick, who hesitated in his march, and that of Kellermann, who having left Metz on the 4th, had not yet arrived at the point he should have reached, although he had been fifteen days on his route. But if the dilatoriness of Brunswick served Dumouriez, that of Kellermann had singularly compromised him. Kellermann, prudent and irresolute, although personally very brave, alternately advanced and retreated; and on the 17th, when he heard of the loss of the defiles, he fell back and retreated. Nevertheless, on the evening of the 19th, he sent to inform Dumouriez that he was only two leagues from Saint Menehould. Dumouriez had reserved, as his post, the heights of Gisaucourt, situated on the left, and commanding the road to Châlons, and the stream of the Auve, pointing out to him, that, in the event of a battle, he could range some troops on the lesser hills, and on Valmy beyond the Auve; but not having time himself to post his colleague, Kellermann passing the Auve on the night of the 19th, stationed himself at Valmy, in the centre of the valley, and neglected the heights of Gisaucourt, which formed the left of the camp of Saint Menehould, and commanded those of La Lune, whither the Prussians had now arrived.

In point of fact, the Prussians, debouching by Grand-Pré, had now come within sight of the French army, and, having ascended the heights of Lune, discovered the ground, on the summit of which Dumouriez was stationed. Renouncing the idea of a rapid march to Châlons, they rejoiced to find the two French generals together, that they might cut them off at a single blow. Their object was to render themselves masters of the road to Châlons, then to advance to Vitry, to force Dillon at the Islettes, and thus to surround Saint Menehould on all sides, and oblige the two armies to lay down their arms.

On the morning of the 20th, Kellermann, who, instead of possessing himself of the heights of Gisaucourt, had taken his station in the centre of the hollow near Valmy, saw himself commanded in front by the heights of Lune occupied by the enemy; on one side he had the Hyron, in the possession of the French, but which they might easily lose; and on the other, Gisaucourt, which he had left unoccupied, and where the Prussians were about to establish themselves. In the event of being beaten, he would have been driven into the swamps of the Auve, behind the mill of Valmy, and been overwhelmed in this amphitheatre of hills which surrounded him before he could have rejoined Dumouriez. He immediately summoned his colleagues to his aid; but the King of Prussia seeing an extensive movement in the French army, and thinking it was the intention of the generals to retreat to Châlons, determined to block up their passage, and ordered the attack. The advanced guard of the Prussians encountered, on their road to Châlons, that of Kellermann, who was with his main body on the hill of Valmy. They attacked each other with great spirit; the French were at first repulsed, but were afterwards reanimated and supported by the carbineers of General Valence. From the heights of La Lune the guns of the enemy played upon Valmy, and were briskly answered by those of the French.

Yet the situation of Kellermann was very hazardous; his troops were confusedly crowded together on the hill of Valmy, and too much confined to be brought fully into action. From the heights of La Lune a continual cannonade was kept up; from those of Gisaucourt, the fire of the Prussians galled his left; the Hyron, which flanked his right, was,

it is true, occupied by the French; but Clerfait, attacking this post with vigour, with twenty-five thousand Austrians, might carry it; and then, assailed on all sides, Kellermann would probably have been driven from Valmy into the Auve, before Dumouriez could come to his assistance. The latter despatched Stengel with a strong division, and Beurnonville with sixteen battalions, to support the troops upon the Hyron, and protect the right of Valmy; he directed Beurnonville to support Stengel with sixteen battalions; he also despatched Chasot with nine battalions and eight squadrons to the Châlons road, to occupy Gisaucourt and flank the left of Kellermann; but Chasot passing near Valmy in his way, requested orders from Kellermann instead of proceeding immediately to Gisaucourt, and gave the Prussians time to occupy that hill, and from thence pour upon us a murderous fire. Nevertheless, supported on the right and left, Kellermann could still maintain his post upon the hill of Valmy. Unfortunately, a shell falling on an ammunition waggon, produced an explosion, and threw the infantry into disorder; the cannonade from La Lune augmented upon this appearance of confusion, and the first line already began to give ground. Kellermann perceiving this movement, ran through his ranks, and rallied and encouraged his men. The Duke of Brunswick now thought it was the moment to ascend the hill, and put the French to the rout at the point of the bayonet.

It was mid-day before the thick fog which had enveloped the two armies cleared away. They could now perceive each other distinctly, and the young soldiers saw the Prussians advance in three columns with all the assurance of old troops accustomed to war. This was the first time that they had been on a field of battle of an hundred thousand men, about to cross bayonets; and knowing as yet neither their own nerve nor that of the enemy, they regarded each other with trepidation. Kellermann entered the entrenchments, disposed his troops in columns of battalions in front, and ordered them, when the Prussians should be at a certain distance, not to wait, but to advance upon them with fixed bayonets. He then raised his voice and cried out, "Long live the Nation!" Whether brave or cowardly, all were inspired with courage at this exclamation, and the young soldiers marched on, repeating the above watchword. At sight of this, the duke, who had attempted the attack with great repugnance and the utmost fear for its result, halted his columns, hesitated a few moments, and concluded by ordering a return to the camp.

This proof was decisive. The courage of those cobblers and tailors, of whom the emigrants had said the French army was composed, could no longer be doubted. The Prussians saw them well equipped, well clothed, and full of intrepidity; their officers splendidly attired, and displaying great military experience; General Duval, whose handsome person and white locks commanded respect; Kellermann, and, finally, Dumouriez, acting with as much firmness as skill in presence of an enemy so superior in numbers. The French revolution was, from this moment, properly estimated; and that which seemed before only a ridiculous chaos of discordant elements, now appeared a terrible reaction of national energy.

At four o'clock, Brunswick attempted a fresh attack; but the confident aspect of our troops again disconcerted him, and he turned his columns back for the second time. Being more than ever surprised, and finding all that he had heard of the French army to be false, the Prussian general proceeded with the greatest circumspection; and although he has been reproached with not having vigorously pushed on the attack and overthrown Kellermann, good judges think he acted prudently in relinquishing his attempt. Kellermann, supported on the right and left by the whole of the French army, could have made a strong resistance; and if the duke, driven into a narrow hollow, and into the low and swampy grounds, had been once beaten, he would have risked the destruction of his whole force. Besides, he had by this day's result occupied the Châlons road; the French were separated from their depôt; and he hoped in a few days to oblige them to quit their position. He had not considered that, being masters of Vitry, they had only to make a larger circuit, and to suffer some delay in the arrival of their ammunition.

Such was the celebrated day of the 20th of September, 1792, a day in which more than twenty thousand cannon were discharged, since called "The cannonade of Valmy." The loss on both sides was equal, the loss of each army amounting to about eight or nine hundred; but gaiety and confidence prevailed in the French camp, reproach and disappointment in that of the Prussians. It is even said that on that very evening, the emigrants received the most lively remonstrances from the King of Prussia, and that the influence of Calonne, the most presumptuous, the most lavish of extravagant promises and false information of all the emigrant ministers, visibly diminished.

On the same night, Kellermann repassed the Auve with as little noise as possible, and encamped on the heights of Gisaucourt, which he ought to have occupied from the first, and of which the Prussians had availed themselves the previous day. They still remained on the heights of La Lune. On the opposite plain, and to the left of Kellermann, Dumouriez had placed himself. In this singular position the French force had their faces towards France, and seemed to be the invading party, and the Prussians, who were bearing towards France, appeared to be on the defensive. Here Dumouriez laid the plan of a new line of conduct, replete with energy and firmness, whether as against the enemy, his own officers, or the French authority. With nearly seventy thousand men, in a good camp, well supplied with live stock, he could hold out for a long time. The Prussians, on the contrary, were short of provisions; disease began to make ravages in their army, and in this situation they could do nothing but wait the result of their perseverance. A severe season in a clayey and humid soil, would not suffer them to protract their stay long; and if, resuming activity and energy too late, they determined upon marching towards Paris, Dumouriez was prepared to follow and surround them so soon as they got engaged with the troops in advance.

These views were just and prudent; but in the camp, where the officers were tired of suffering privations, and where Kellermann felt somewhat galled at being subject to a superior authority,

and at Paris, where the citizens saw only their separation from the principal army, and perceived nothing between themselves and the Prussians; where they themselves witnessed the arrival of *hulans* within fifteen leagues of the city since the forest of Argonne had been open, the plan of Dumouriez was not at all approved. The assembly and council complained of his obstinacy, and wrote him the most imperative letters to induce him to abandon his position and repass the Marne. The camp at Montmartre, and an army between Châlons and Paris were the double rampart which was necessary to quiet the terrified imaginations of the Parisians. "The *hulans* harass your minds," wrote Dumouriez; "well then, kill 'em; this does not concern us. I shall not change my plan on account of their bravadoes." Nevertheless, he still continued to be plagued with orders and urgent entreaties to renounce his plan of operations. The officers of his camp vented their discontent in various observations. The men alone, cheered by the liveliness of their general, who was continually in their ranks, encouraging them, and explaining the critical situation of the Prussians, endured patiently all their privations. At one time, indeed, Kellermann wished to depart, but Dumouriez, like Columbus, asked for only a few days, and promised that if the Prussians did not beat a retreat in a given number of days, he would decamp.

Meantime the fine army of the allied powers was reduced to a deplorable state; dysentery and famine combined, made great ravages among them. The arrangements of Dumouriez contributed not a little to produce these effects between the two armies; the cannonading upon the front of the camp had been judged inexpedient, because it did not lead to any fixed result, it was therefore arranged between the two armies to suspend it, but Dumouriez stipulated that it should only be suspended in the front. He then immediately detached all his cavalry, especially those troops newly raised, and scattered them over the surrounding country, that they might intercept the convoys of the enemy, who having marched through Grand-Pré, and ascended the Aisne, to follow our retreat, were obliged to have their provisions brought by the same circuit. The cavalry officers soon acquired a taste for this lucrative species of warfare, and carried it on with great success. Meantime the season had greatly advanced; it was the end of September; the sufferings of the Prussian army became intolerable, and some officers were sent to the French camp to hold a parley. An exchange of prisoners was at first the only question between the two armies; the Prussians demanded this also for the emigrants, but it was refused. Great politeness prevailed on both sides. From an exchange of prisoners, the conversation turned upon the motives of the war; and, on the part of the Prussians, it was nearly confessed to be of a very impolitic nature. The character of Dumouriez here again discovered itself. Not having now to fight, he betook himself to negotiation; he made representations to the King of Prussia, in which he pointed out to him how little advantage he could gain by joining the house of Austria against France. At the same time he sent him twelve pounds of coffee, the last which remained in the two camps. These representations, which could not fail to have been duly appreciated, were yet badly received, as might have been expected. The Duke of Brunswick replied, in the name of the King of Prussia, by a declaration as arrogant as the first manifesto, and the negotiation was broken off. The assembly, who were consulted on this occasion by Dumouriez, answered, like the Roman senate, that they could not treat with the enemy so long as he continued in France.

These negotiations brought a great deal of scandal upon the general; he was suspected henceforward of holding secret communications with the enemy, and incurred the pretended contempt of that haughty monarch, who was so much humbled by the event of the war. But such was the character of Dumouriez, uniting civil and military courage, and possessing talents of almost every description, he wanted that dignity of character which imposes on men, whilst genius commands their attention. The Prussians, as Dumouriez had foreseen, being no longer able to withstand scarcity and disease, began to decamp on the 1st of October. It was a great subject of astonishment and conjecture in Europe to see so fine and powerful an army retire before a band of labourers and shopkeepers, whom it expected to see led back to their cities in disgrace, and chastised for their insurrectionary insolence. But the inefficiency with which the Prussians were pursued, and the impunity with which they were allowed to repass the defiles of the Argonne, gave countenance to the supposition of secret stipulations, and even of some arrangement having taken place with the King of Prussia; but facts are about to explain, better than all suppositions, the retreat of the allied army.

To remain in so unfortunate a situation was no longer possible. The time for an invasion had elapsed, and the advanced and inclement season rendered such an attempt impracticable. The only resource, therefore, that was left to the enemy, was to retire towards Luxembourg and Lorraine, and to make that country the base of their operations, to be recommenced in the campaign of the following year. Besides, there is reason to believe that Frederick William at this time thought of seizing his share of Poland; for this prince, having formerly excited Russia against the Poles, was now desirous of partaking of its spoils. Thus the badness of the season, disgust at the failure of his enterprise, regretting his alliance with the house of Austria against France, and, finally, his new interests in the north, were sufficient to determine the King of Prussia on a retreat. This he accomplished in the greatest order; but this enemy, who consented to abandon his enterprise, was still very powerful. To attempt to cut him off from a retreat, and oblige him to open a passage by a victory, was an imprudence which Dumouriez could not for a moment think of. He was necessarily forced to content himself with harassing his march; and for not having done this with sufficient activity, he and Kellermann were both justly liable to censure.

All danger was now over. The campaign was finished, and every one returned to his own particular designs. Dumouriez contemplated his enterprise in the Low Countries, and Kellermann his command at Metz; and the pursuit of the Prussians did not obtain that attention from the gene-

rals which it merited. Dumouriez, however, hastened to despatch General d'Harville to the Chêne-Populeux to chastise the emigrants; ordered General Miaczinski to lie in wait for them at Stenay, the outlet of that passage, to complete their destruction; despatched Chasot in the same direction to occupy the road to Longwy; posted the generals Beurnonville, Stengel, and Valence, with more than twenty-five thousand men in the rear of the grand army, to pursue them with vigour; and at the same time ordered Dillon, who had all along kept his position at the "Islettes" with the completest success, to advance by Clermont and Varennes, and so block up the road to Verdun. These dispositions were undoubtedly good, but they ought to have been executed by the general himself; he ought, as M. de Jomini justly and ably observed, to have made directly for the Rhine, descended its course with his whole army; and carrying all before him in a moment of success, he would have conquered Belgium in a march. But he preferred coming to Paris to prepare for an invasion by Lille. On their part, the three generals, Stengel, Beurnonville, and Valence, not being very well agreed together, pursued the Prussians with laxity. Valence, who belonged to Kellermann's division, suddenly received an order to join his general, that he might resume his route to Metz. It must be confessed that this movement was rather singular, for it was bringing back Kellermann into the interior, to proceed to the Lorraine frontier. The natural route was to advance by Vitry or Clermont, and this might have been combined with the pursuit of the Prussians according to the order of Dumouriez, who, so soon as he heard of the order given to Valence, commanded him to pursue his march, saying that whilst the armies of the north and centre acted in concert, he held the superior authority. He also remonstrated warmly with Kellermann, who consented at last to resume his first determination, and march by Sainte Menehould and Clermont. Nevertheless, the pursuit was still conducted in a very dilatory manner. Dillon alone harassed the Prussians with great activity, and, by advancing too rapidly, was even engaged in action.

The disagreement of the generals, and their several personal estrangements after the danger was over, was evidently the reason why the Prussians escaped so easily. It was said that their retreat was bought, and that it was paid for by the proceeds of a great robbery, of which we are about to give an account; that it had been previously settled with Dumouriez, and that one of the stipulations was the free retreat of the Prussians; finally, that Louis XVI. had requested it from his prison. But sufficient reasons have been given for this retreat, which can be explained by natural causes; but independent of these motives, it is not credible that a monarch, whose vices were not associated with such base avarice, should suffer himself to be bought. Besides, Dumouriez would have been justified, in the eyes of all military men, in not pursuing the enemy, by avowing a convention which brought no dishonour on himself. Finally, Clery, the valet-de-chambre of the king, declared that nothing like the pretended letter addressed by Louis to Frederick William, and forwarded by Manuel, the procureur of the commune, was ever written. The whole story, therefore, must have been a fabrication, and the retreat only the natural effect of war. Dumouriez, therefore, in spite of all his faults; in spite of his oversight at Grand Pré, of his negligence during the escape of the Prussians, was, nevertheless, the saviour of France, and of a revolution which has, perhaps, advanced Europe many centuries. Assuming the command of a disorganized army, divided in feeling and destitute of all self-confidence, he united it in mutual confidence, and imparted a vigour and singleness to its views; never despairing in the midst of the most disastrous circumstances, and affording a singular example of self-possession. After the loss of the defiles, and persisting in his first plan of temporizing in spite of the danger of his army, and the remonstrances of the government, in a manner which proved the vigour of his mind and character, he, we repeat, saved the nation from foreign dominion and a counter-revolution, and furnished the impressive spectacle of a citizen saving his fellow countrymen in spite of themselves. No conquest, however extensive, is so glorious as this, or presents so moral a lesson.

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.

CHAPTER I.

RENEWED MASSACRES OF THE PRISONERS AT VERSAILLES—ABUSE OF POWER AND EXCESSIVE EXPENDITURE OF THE COMMUNE—ELECTION OF DEPUTIES TO THE CONVENTION—THE MODE IN WHICH THE REPRESENTATION OF PARIS WAS FORMED—THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND SCHEMES OF THE GIRONDISTS; CHARACTER OF THE LEADERS OF THAT PARTY—FEDERALISM—STATE OF THE PARISIAN PARTY AND COMMUNE—OPENING OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION, THE 20TH SEPTEMBER, 1792; ABOLITION OF ROYALTY; ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC—THE FIRST CONTENTION BETWEEN THE GIRONDISTS AND THE MOUNTAIN PARTY; IMPEACHMENT OF ROBESPIERRE AND MARAT—THE REPUBLIC DECLARED ONE AND INDIVISIBLE—DISTRIBUTION AND STRENGTH OF PARTIES IN THE CONVENTION—CHANGES IN THE EXECUTIVE POWER—DANTON QUITS HIS MINISTRY—CREATION OF VARIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEES AND OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE.

WHILST the French armies on the frontier checked the march of the Prussians, the greatest tumult and confusion prevailed in Paris. The excesses of the commune, the fury of the people, the impotency of the authorities, and the inactivity of the military during the disastrous days of September, have already been related. The audacity with which the committee of *surveillance* avowed and recom-

mended the massacres of Paris to the imitation of all France, has also been recorded. The commissaries sent by the commune into the provinces for this last purpose, were, however, every where repelled with indignation, because France, being free from the dangers of the capital, partook not of its fury; but the murders in the environs of Paris are by no means comprehended in those we have noticed. In that city, there existed a gang of assassins whom the massacres of September had familiarized with blood, and who still thirsted for more. Some hundreds of men had set out for Orleans, to drag from its prisons those accused of high treason. These unfortunate victims, by virtue of a late decree, were to have been conducted to Saumur; but their destination was changed on the road, and they were led towards Paris. On the 9th of September, it was said they were to arrive at Versailles on the 10th; and the gang of assassins, either receiving fresh orders, or stimulated in their sanguinary fury by the news of their arrival, occupied Versailles from the 9th to the 10th, and instantly the report of new massacres about to be committed spread through Paris. The mayor of Versailles took every precaution to prevent the threatened calamities. The president of the criminal court hurried to Paris to inform the minister Danton of the dangers which menaced the prisoners; but to all his representations he only obtained one reply: "Those men are very criminal." "Be it so," added the president, Alquier, "but the law alone should execute justice."—"See you not," replied Danton in a terrible voice, "that I should have answered you in another manner, if it had been in my power! What are those prisoners to you! Return to your duties, and do not trouble yourself about those persons."

The next day the prisoners arrived at Versailles; a crowd of unknown persons immediately rushed towards the carriages, succeeded in surrounding them, and separating them from their escort; threw the commandant Fournier, from his horse, carried off the mayor, who had generously determined to die at his post, and massacred the unfortunate prisoners, to the number of fifty-two. There it was that Delessart and D'Abancour, the impeached ministers, perished with Brissac, chief of the constitutional guard under the legislative assembly. Immediately after this execution, the assassins rushed into the prisons of the city, and renewed the scenes of the beginning of September, employing the same means, and observing a mock form of justice, as they had done at Paris. This last massacre happening five days after the first, produced an universal terror. At Paris, the committee of *surveillance* did not relax their activity; as soon as the prisons were emptied, they began to replenish them by issuing new orders of arrest, in such great numbers, that Roland, complaining of these arbitrary acts to the assembly, produced five or six hundred; some signed by one person alone, others by two or three at most, and nearly all containing no accusation, but simply a suspicion of incivism.

Whilst the commune exercised its power in Paris, it despatched commissaries into the country to justify its conduct, urge the imitation of its example, recommend to the electors deputies of its choice, and decry those who opposed its measures in the legislative assembly. It also appropriated to itself immense treasures, by seizing on all the sums found with the treasurer of the civil list, Septeuil, by robbing the churches of their silver, and laying hands on all the rich moveable furniture of the emigrants, and by extracting from the treasury considerable sums, under the pretence of supplying a *caisse de secours*, and completing the works of the camp. All the property of the poor wretches who were massacred in the prisons of Paris, and on the road to Versailles, was sequestrated, and deposited with the committee of surveillance: never would the commune render an account either of its nature or value, and even refused to give any answer on this subject either to the minister of the interior, or to the directory of the department, who, as has been explained, were intrusted with all levies. But the commune did not stop here. They put up to sale, on their own authority, the moveable furniture of the great mansions, which had hitherto remained sealed since the absence of their proprietors. In vain did the superior authorities forbid this sale: the subordinate class of citizens, who were commissioned to execute their orders, either belonged to the municipality, or were too weak to oppose that body, and their commands were entirely disregarded.

The national guard, recomposed under the denomination of armed sections, and filled, under this title, with men of all descriptions, was in the most complete state of disorganization, sometimes taking part in the tumults of the city, and at others permitting them to prevail through negligence. The military posts were completely abandoned, because the guards, not being regularly relieved, even after forty-eight hours, retired from their duties fatigued and disgusted. All peaceable citizens had quitted this corps, formerly so regular and useful; and Santerre, who commanded it, had neither talent nor strength of character enough to restore it to any degree of order.

The safety of Paris, therefore, was left to chance; for the commune and populace combined might undertake and carry out any enterprise. Among the spoils of royalty, the most precious, and therefore the most coveted, were those contained in the *Garde-Meuble*, the rich depôt of all the valuables which formerly decorated and gave splendour to the throne. Since the 10th of August, it had excited the cupidity of the multitude, and more than one circumstance had induced the inspector of the establishment to keep a strict watch on it. He sent requisitions after requisitions to obtain a sufficient guard for this purpose; but whether it was from the general disorder which prevailed, or from the difficulty of supplying all the posts, or from a voluntary negligence, he was not furnished with the complement of men he demanded; and, as might have been expected, the *Garde-Meuble* was, on the night of September 16, plundered, and the greatest part of its contents passed into unknown hands, which a subsequent authority has made useless efforts to discover. This robbery was attributed to the secret authors of the massacres. Yet in this instance they could neither have been instigated by revolutionary fanaticism nor their sanguinary policy; and supposing them to have been stimulated by cupidity, they had sufficient in the charge of the commune

to satisfy the greatest ambition. It has been said, indeed, that the motive of this robbery was to pay for the retreat of the King of Prussia, but this is absurd; and also to maintain the expenses of party, which is more probable, but quite unsupported by any proof. The judgment, however, we must form of the commune and its leaders can be but little affected by the fact. Whether they were guilty of the crime or not, it is certain they were in possession of property and sums to an immense value, of which they would never give any account; that the seals affixed to the drawers of the *Garde-Meuble* were broken, but the locks not forced, which pre-supposes a cool abstraction, and does not look like a popular pillage; and that all the precious articles they contained disappeared for ever. One part of these valuables was stolen with impunity by subalterns, such as Sergent, surnamed *Agathe*, from a precious jewel he had seized as his part of the plunder; another part went to defray the expenses of an extraordinary government, instituted by the commune; and was also devoted to the payment of the gangs of assassins, and the messengers sent into the departments. The revolution was a war made against the old system of society: every war has its reprisals, and these are generally stained with murder and pillage.

Such was the state of Paris during the election of the deputies of the national convention. To this new assembly all good citizens looked for that energy which was necessary to restore order; they hoped that the forty days of confusion and crime which had elapsed since the 10th of August might be considered only as a disastrous but passing insurrection. The deputies of the legislative assembly also felt their weakness, and seemed, as it were, to reserve their energies for the meeting of the convention, the common hope of all parties.

The approaching election agitated the whole nation, and the clubs exerted their influence with great earnestness. The Jacobins of Paris printed and circulated a list of all the votes of the legislative session, that they might serve as a document to guide the electors. Those deputies who had opposed popular decrees, and especially those who had acquitted Lafayette, were particularly marked out. Nevertheless, in the provinces, where the divisions of the capital did not prevail, the Girondists, even these most odious at Paris, were nominated; and nearly all the members of the legislative assembly were re-elected. Many of the constituents, whom the decree of non-re-election had excluded from the last session, were also returned to make part of the convention, and in this number were Buzot and Pétion. Among the new members were all those who had signalized themselves in the departments by their energy and patriotism, and those writers who, like Louvet, had become celebrated by their talents in the capital and the provinces.

In Paris, that violent faction which had domineered over the city since the 10th of August, carried all opposition before it, while it returned deputies of its own choice. Robespierre and Danton were the first elected; the Jacobins and the commune received the news of this event with the most vociferous applauses. After them, Camille Desmoulins, celebrated by his writings; David, the painter; Fabre d'Eglantine, the comic author, who had taken an active part in all the revolutionary troubles; Legendre, Panis, Sergent, and Billaud Varennes, infamous for their conduct in the commune, were nominated to be deputies. To these were added the procurateur-syndic Manuel, young Robespierre, the brother of the celebrated Maximilien; Collot D'Herbois, formerly a comedian; the Duke of Orleans, who had resigned his titles and assumed the name of Philip Egalité; and finally, the aged Dussaulx, one of the electors of 1789, who had constantly opposed the multitude, and shed so many tears over their excesses. The recollection of the year 1789, or probably his mild and inoffensive character, injurious to neither party, was the cause of his election. There was only now wanting the cynical and sanguinary Marat to complete this singular assembly. But this extraordinary man astonished by the audacity of his writings even those who had been witnesses of the bloody days of September. Nevertheless, the capuchin Chabot, who was ascendant in the Jacobin club, and gained triumphs there which he would have sought for in vain in the legislative assembly, undertook to make his apology; and his election, proposed in this association, was soon carried in the electoral assembly. Another journalist, Fréron, and a few more obscure individuals, completed this famous deputation, composed of shopkeepers, a butcher, a comedian, an engraver, a painter, an attorney, three or four writers, and a self-deposed prince; and this motley assemblage very well represented the confusion and variety of orders which agitated the metropolis of France.

The deputies arrived successively in Paris; as their numbers became greater, and as the days of terror became more distant, the assembly began to resume their courage, and take a decided part in suppressing the disorders of the capital. The fear inspired by the enemy was much diminished by the confidence of Dumouriez, and his position in the forest of the Argonne; hatred against the *aristocrats* had become converted into pity, since the horrible massacres of Paris and Versailles; and those horrible crimes, which had found so many deluded advocates, and so many timid censurers, crimes rendered still more revolting by a combination of robbery and murder, excited general execration. The Girondists, indignant at so many atrocities, and exasperated by the personal oppression they had suffered for a whole month, became more firm and energetic than ever. Strong in their abilities and animated with courage, invoking justice and humanity to support their cause, they had the public opinion on their side, and already began to threaten their adversaries with a high hand.

In the meantime, although the Girondists were equally indignant at the excesses of Paris, they failed to excite that personal resentment which the animosities of party produce. Brissot, for example, never having ceased to contend for the palm of eloquence with Robespierre in the Jacobin club, had created in him feelings of the bitterest hatred. By his various acquirements and splendid talents, Brissot produced a great effect, but he had not that personal consideration, nor was he possessed of sufficient skill in politics to be the leader of a party,

Brissot—The Sentinel. The Girondists peculiarly obnoxious to the Jacobins — Madame Roland the centre of the Girondist party—Vergniaud.

although the hatred of Robespierre elevated him by imputing to him this distinction. When, on the eve of the insurrection, the Girondists wrote a letter to Boué, the king's painter, the report of a negotiation being on foot was spread abroad, and it was pretended that Brissot, amply furnished with money, was about to set out for London. There was no truth in this; but Marat, who, on the most insignificant and false reports, fabricated his accusations, issued an order of arrest against Brissot at the very time of the general imprisonment of the pretended conspirators of the 10th of August. The troubles which immediately followed prevented the execution of this arrest; but the Jacobins nevertheless maintained that Brissot had sold himself to Brunswick; and Robespierre repeated and believed it, so much was his jaundiced mind inclined to believe those criminal who were personally odious to him. Louvet had also incurred his hatred, by supporting Brissot at the Jacobin club, and in the journal called the *Sentinel*. As bold as he was talented, he assailed his adversaries by direct attacks; and his virulent personalities, republished daily in the Sentinel, made him the most dangerous and detested enemy of the party of Robespierre.

The minister Roland had displeased the whole Jacobin and municipal party by his courageous letter of the 3rd of September, and by the resistance he opposed to the encroachments of the commune; but not being the rival of any one, he gave occasion only to a general dislike. He had personally offended no one but Danton, and that was by opposing him in the council, but this was not attended with much danger, for of all men Danton was the least liable to be moved by feelings of resentment. His wife, however, excited great detestation. Proud, austere, courageous, and talented, this singular woman drew around her all the Girondists, so remarkable for the cultivation of their minds, and the brilliancy of their abilities, animating them by her smiles, rewarding them with her esteem, and preserving in her circle, with republican simplicity, that politeness which is so odious to the vulgar and uneducated. Roland was already subject to the low raillery of his opponents. His wife, they said, governed for him, directed his friends, and rewarded them with her favours; and Marat, in his ignoble language, called her the *Ceres* of the party.

Guadet, Vergniaud, and Gensonné, although they had been prominent figures in the legislative assembly, and were opposed to the Jacobin party, had not yet provoked the full measure of that hatred which they afterwards incurred. Guadet had even gratified the republicans by bold attacks on Lafayette and the court. Animated, prompt in taking the lead, passing suddenly from bursts of passionate eloquence to the most deliberate coolness and self-possession, and perfectly master of himself in the tribune, he always knew how to hit exactly the mind of the assembly. But he was too fond of displaying the talents he so eminently possessed, and delighted in vanquishing by his eloquence those who soon avenged themselves by his death.

Vergniaud had not gained so much popularity with violent partisans as Guadet, because he had discovered less ardour against the court; neither had he provoked the same enmity, because the indolence and nonchalance of his mind was less frequently roused to make personal attacks on his opponents. The passions of this stormy period little disturbed him; he slipped through them all, and avoiding contests, he escaped, at the same time, the animosities to which they gave rise. Yet he was not indifferent: he possessed a noble heart, a fine and luminous understanding, and a genius full of fire, which broke out at intervals with great splendour. Though not so quick in reply, or happy in repartees as Guadet, he became animated by more lengthened discussions, his exuberant eloquence then came into full display, and he expressed himself with a facility, a luxuriance of expression, and a happy modulation of voice that has never been equalled. The eloquence of Mirabeau was, like his character, powerful but unequal; that of Vergniaud, always elegant and dignified, rose into the grand and terrible as his subject seemed to call for their display. But all the exhortations of Madame Roland were scarcely sufficient to rouse this indolent athlete, who often opposed the imprudent sallies of his friends, and besides thought words could have little efficacy when opposed to brute force.

Gensonné, full of sense and integrity, but possessing only a moderate facility of expression, and capable at the most of inditing good reports, had not as yet cut a very prominent figure in the assembly. Yet strong passions and an obstinate disposition gave him great influence among his friends, and provoked the hatred of his enemies, which is always rather directed against character than talent.

Condorcet, formerly a marquis, and always a philosopher, elevated in his views, impartial, and discriminating, perceived the faults of his party, yet was incapable of abandoning them. Being, however, little adapted to take part in the terrible agitations of a democracy, he kept himself rather in the back-ground, provoked no enmities, and was reserved for more suitable occupations in the composition of works of profound meditation.

Brissot was remarkable for his fine sense, elevation of mind, and courage, which, when joined to a handsome person, and a firm and simple elocution, had an imposing effect, and gave a great moral ascendancy to their possessor in the assembly.

Barbaroux, who had been just elected by his fellow-citizens, with one of his friends, Rebecqui, had only just arrived from the south. This Rebecqui was an uncultivated, bold, enterprising person, and entirely devoted to the opinions of his friend. It will be recollected, that Barbaroux was greatly attached to Roland and *Pétion*, that he considered Marat as an atrocious barbarian, and Robespierre as a person devoted to an ignoble ambition, especially since Paris had proposed him as indispensably necessary for a dictator. Disgusted at the crimes which had been committed during his absence, he willingly imputed them to those whom he already detested; and declared his conviction, from the moment of his arrival, with so much warmth and energy, as to make an irreconcileable breach between himself and the mob faction. Although inferior to his friends in the extent of his capacity, he was nevertheless intelligent and eloquent, handsome in person, and heroic in mind; and,

as he spared not his threats, he incurred in a few days as much enmity as those who had daily attacked both measures and men, during the whole legislative session.

The person around whom all this party ranged themselves, and who at that time enjoyed universal consideration, was Pétion. Elected mayor during the legislative session, he had, in his contest with the court, become, as it were, the organ of the revolution, and was greatly endeared to the people by this circumstance. It is true he had, on the 9th of August, preferred a debate to a personal conflict; he had also since expressed himself decidedly against the scenes of September; and had separated, like Bailly in 1790, from the commune; but this silent opposition, not amounting to a breach with the faction, only made him feared, not detested. Possessing an enlightened mind, rarely speaking in the assembly, calm in his deportment, and a rival to none, he exercised around him, and even over Robespierre himself, the ascendant of a cold, equitable, and universally respected reasoner. Although deputed a Girondist, all parties wished for his suffrage, all feared him; and in the new assembly, not only the right side, but all the moderate party, and even many of the left side, courted his countenance and support.

Such was the situation of the Girondists in the face of the Parisian faction; the public opinion favoured them: a great part of the deputies who daily arrived at Paris went over to their side: all the ministers, except Danton, who often carried every thing before him in the council, but who exerted more of his influence against them, belonged to their party; finally, the mayor Pétion was at their head. But at Paris they were not at home; they were in the midst of their enemies; the violence of the lower classes was to be feared; while the prospect of the future was full of terror.

The first reproach that this party incurred, was their supposed desire to sacrifice Paris. They had been before suspected of wishing to take refuge in the departments beyond the Loire; and the displeasure of Paris being increased since the 2nd and 3rd of September, they were still supposed to harbour the same intention. These suspicions gradually assumed the shape of an accusation. It was pretended that they wished to destroy the national unity, and to convert the eighty-three departments into as many equal states, held together simply by a bond of federalism; and that they aimed at annihilating the supremacy of Paris, and acquiring a personal dominion in their respective departments It is true, that when France was menaced by an invasion of the Prussians, they had meditated, in case of extremity, fortifying themselves in the provinces of the south; and it is also true that the excesses and tyranny of Paris made them often turn their thoughts towards the departments; but there is a wide difference between these ideas and the project of establishing a confederacy of states; and besides, as the only distinction between a federal and central government consists in the comparative degree of energy that may exist in local institutions, the crime of such a project, if any such existed, was rather vague, and not easily to be discovered. The Girondists seeing nothing culpable in the accusation brought against them, did not defend themselves from the charge; and many of the party, indignant at the absurdity of their supposed design, demanded if, after all, America, Holland, and Switzerland, were not happy and free, although a confederacy of states, and if it would be any very great crime to meditate a similar system for France. These conversations becoming public, added weight to the calumny. At the Jacobin club, the question was gravely discussed, and the most furious indignation became excited against the Girondists, who, it was declared, wished to destroy the revolutionary power, by breaking up that unity which constituted its strength, and afterwards to make themselves kings in their own provinces.

The Girondists replied to these accusations by others more substantive, but unfortunately quite as exaggerated. They reproached the commune with having rendered itself absolute, with having, by its usurpations, encroached upon the national sovereignty, and with having assumed to itself a power that only belonged to the whole nation. They added, also, that it aimed at domineering over the convention, as it had over the legislative assembly; they declared that by holding their sittings in its neighbourhood, the national deputies were not in safety, and that they sat in the midst of the assassins of September. They accused it of having dishonoured the revolution during the forty days which followed the 10th of August, and with having filled the Parisian deputation with men signalised in those horrid saturnalia. So far all was true. But they added reproaches as vague as those which had been directed against themselves. Marat, Danton, and Robespierre were openly accused of aspiring to the supreme power; Marat, because he daily declared in the public journals that a dictator was necessary to purge society of the impure members which corrupted it; Robespierre, because he dogmatized at the commune, and addressed the assembly with insolence, and because, on the eve of the 10th of August, Panis had proposed him to Barbaroux as dictator; and Danton, because he exercised in the ministry, over the people, and everywhere, the ascendant of his powerful mind. These men were called the triumvirs, and yet they were not united among themselves. Marat who was a systematic madman; Robespierre, jealous of every one, but without sufficient greatness of soul to entertain any ambitious views for himself; and Danton, an active leader, passionately devoted to the revolution, and who intermeddled with every thing, more from the natural ardour of his mind, than from any personal views of ambition. But neither of these men was an usurper, nor were they conspirators acting in concert; and it certainly was imprudent in the Girondists to give their adversaries the advantage of a false accusation. Yet with Danton they still contrived to keep some terms, as there was no personal animosity between them; Marat was too much despised to provoke a direct attack; but on Robespierre their whole indignation found vent. The consistency of this man's conduct, which the people called virtue, and his eloquence, greatly irritated them, and they felt all the resentment towards him, that a jealous and highly-extolled mediocrity can provoke from real superiority.

Nevertheless, these discordant parties endeavoured to come to some understanding before the

opening of the national convention, and held several meetings for this purpose. Danton, having the success of the revolution solely at heart, and being uninfluenced by any personal pique, sincerely* desired a reconciliation. Pétion displayed in these conferences his usual coldness and reasonableness; but Robespierre felt sore and irritated from the virulent attacks he had sustained; and the Girondists conducted themselves as men, proud, austere, innocent, and indignant, who believed they had already vengeance in their power. Barbaroux declared that an alliance between virtue and guilt was impossible; and all separated, more alienated from each other than ever. The Jacobins rallied round Robespierre, and the Girondists and all the moderate party round Pétion. The latter advised a cessation from all accusations, as it was impossible to discover the authors of the massacres of September, and of the plunder of the *Garde-Meuble*; he also recommended his party to speak no more of triumvirs, since the ambition of the suspected was not sufficiently proved to call for punishment; and added that the few evil-disposed persons who had been introduced into the assembly should be suffered to remain unmolested in unnoticed contempt, whilst the convention hastened to fulfil their duties in settling the constitution, and deciding on the fate of Louis XVI. and his family. Such was the advice of all temperate men, but it did not suit the warm and the fiery dispositions of many, who entered into projects, whose execution being distant, were subject to the discovery and the consequent irritation of their adversaries. One of these projects was to break up the municipality,—to remove, in case of necessity, the convention,—and to transfer their sittings to some place out of Paris; to constitute themselves a court of justice, —to pass sentence, without appeal, on the conspirators,—and to embody a guard chosen from the eighty-three departments, to maintain their own security and independence, and that of the other public establishments. This design produced no other effect at the moment than that of irritating the animosities of the Jacobins and the mob. The Girondists relied solely on the public, whose moral feelings, so long silenced by terror, they trusted to revive by their eloquence, and by the recital of those crimes they were about to hold up to abhorrence; and they took refuge from their enemies in the tribune of the convention, whence they believed they should soon gain the completest triumph.

Finally, on the 20th of September, the deputies of the convention met at the Tuileries. Their numbers being sufficient, they constituted themselves provisionally, verified their powers, and proceeded immediately to the nomination of the cabinet (*bureau*). Pétion was almost unanimously proclaimed president; and Brissot, Condorcet, Raband Saint Etienne, Lasource, Vergniaud, and Camus, were appointed secretaries. These elections prove that the influence of the Girondist party still prevailed in the assembly.

The legislative assembly, which had been permanently sitting since the 10th of August, were informed on the 21st, by a deputation, that the convention was formed, and that their authority had consequently expired. The two assemblies had only to mix together, and the convention, thus composed, immediately occupied the chamber of the legislature.

On the 21st, Manuel, who had been suspended on the 20th of June with Pétion, and had become very popular on account of that suspension, who had been since associated with the furious faction of the commune, but was afterwards disgusted with their proceedings, and driven by the massacres of the Abbaye to approach more closely to the Girondists, on the very day of the opening of the convention made a proposition, which excited a great sensation among the enemies of the Girondists: "Citizen representatives," said he, "everything in this assembly should bear a character of dignity and grandeur, to make an impression upon the world. I demand that *the president of France* be installed in the palace of the Tuileries; that he be preceded there by the public force and all the insignia of the law; and that the citizens rise up in his presence." The Jacobin Chabot, and Tallien, the secretary of the commune, declaimed vehemently against this imitative ceremonial of royalty. Chabot declared that the representatives of the people should assimilate themselves to those from among whom they were chosen, down to the unbreeched mob (*sans-culottes*), who formed the majority of the nation; and Tallien added, that the president of the convention should rather be found in a fifth story than in a palace, for that was the most frequent abode of genius and virtue. The proposition of Manuel was rejected, and the enemies of the Girondists pretended that they wished to decree sovereign honours to their leader *Pétion*.

After this proposition, a multitude of others succeeded one another without interruption. All were anxious to exhibit the sentiments which prevailed in the assembly, by authentic declarations. That absolute equality should be the basis of the new constitution, that the sovereignty of the people should be decreed, that hatred should be sworn against royalty, dictatorships, triumvirates, and all individual authority, and that the penalty of death should be affixed to the offence of proposing such establishments, were some of the propositions vented on the first day of the convention. Danton put an end to all these motions, by carrying a decree that the new constitution should have no validity till sanctioned by the people. To this decree it was added, that the abrogated laws should continue in force,—that the authorities, which had not been replaced, should provisionally exercise their functions,—and that taxes should be collected as formerly, till a new system of contribution could be devised. After these propositions, Manuel, Collot d'Herbois, and Gregoire, took up the question of royalty, and demanded that its abolition should be pronounced immediately. "The people," said they, "have just been declared sovereign, but they will not be so in reality till they are delivered from a rival authority, that of kings." On this appeal, the assembly expressed their unanimous reprobation of royalty. Nevertheless, Bazire desired, he said, a solemn discussion to decide on so important a question. "What need is there of discussion," resumed Gregoire, "where all are of one mind! Courts are the nurseries of crime, and hot-beds of corruption; the history of kings is

* See Durand-Maillane, Dumouriez, Meillan, and all contemporaneous writers.

nothing but the martyrology of nations. Whilst we are all equally convinced of these truths, what need is there of discussing them?"

The debate was in fact closed. A profound silence reigned in the assembly; and on the unanimous declaration of the convention, the president declared that royalty was abolished in France. This decree was received with universal applause; its publication was ordered immediately, and messengers were sent to the armies, and all the municipalities, to convey the joyful intelligence.

When the republican institution was decreed, the Prussians still menaced the nation. Dumouriez, as has been related, had marched to Sainte Menehould, and the cannonade of the 21st was not yet known at Paris. On the next day, the 22nd, Billand-Varennes proposed that the manner of dating should be altered, and that instead of dating of the 4th year of liberty, of the 1st year of the republic should be adopted. This proposition was acceded to; the year 1789 was no longer considered as the commencement of liberty, and the new republican era commenced on the 22nd of September, 1792.

On the evening of this day intelligence of the cannonade of Valmy reached Paris, and spread universal joy throughout the city. On the requisition of the citizens of Orleans, who complained of their magistrates, it was decreed that all the members of the administrative bodies, and of the tribunals, should be re-elected, and that the conditions of eligibility, fixed by the constitution of 1791, should be considered as null. It was no longer necessary to choose judges from among the lawyers, or magistrates from a certain class of landed proprietors. The legislative assembly had already abolished the qualification of the silver mark, and given to all citizens of age an electoral capacity. The convention finished the work of effacing all distinctions, and thus a system of absolute equality was commenced.

On the 23rd audience was given to the ministers. The deputy Cambon made a report of the state of the finances. The preceding assemblies had decreed the issuing of two thousand seven hundred millions of assignats; two thousand five hundred millions had already been expended; two hundred millions still remained, of which seventy-six were not yet prepared, and eighty remained in the treasury. The taxes had been retained by the departments for the purchase of the grain which had been ordered by the last assembly; new extraordinary resources were now wanting, and it was necessary to issue new assignats. The national property augmented daily by the emigration; the convention did not, therefore, hesitate to issue the paper by which it was represented, and a fresh creation of assignats was ordered.

Roland next gave an account of the state of France and of the capital. Quite as severe and still more bold than he had been on the 3rd of September, he dwelt upon the agitations of Paris, exposed their causes, and pointed out the means of preventing them for the future. He recommended the establishment of a strong and vigorous government, as the only guarantee for the preservation of order in free states. His report was received favourably, and with great applause, yet it did not provoke any retort from those who considered themselves as accused of having taken part in the disturbances of Paris.

But scarcely had the assembly time to cast a first glance over the situation of France, when intelligence was brought of the repetition of disorders in certain departments. Roland wrote a letter to the assembly announcing these fresh excesses, and demanding their repression. The reading of this was hardly finished, when the deputies Kersaint and Buzot hastened to the tribune, and complained of the numerous acts of violence which had begun to take place every where. "The assassinations of Paris," said they, "are now imitated in the departments. It is not of anarchy we have to complain, but of tyrants of a new species, who have sprung up in a nation so newly emancipated. It is from Paris that these fatal incentives to crime daily emanate. On all the walls of the capital are affixed placards, inciting to murder and pillage, and lists of proscription designate every day new victims. How is it possible to preserve the people from the most frightful poverty, if so many citizens are condemned to conceal their existence? How is it possible to give France the hope of a constitution, if the convention, from whom she expects it, deliberates under the points of poniards? We must, for the honour of the revolution, put a stop to so many excesses, and distinguish between the civic courage which braved the despotism of the 10th of August, and that cruelty which, since the 2nd and 3rd of September, has been subservient to the purposes of a mute and hidden tyranny.

In conclusion, these speakers required the establishment of a committee, charged—

1st. To give an account of the state of the republic, and of Paris in particular.

2nd. To frame a law against the instigators to murder and assassination.

3rd. To consider the means of giving to the national convention a public force at its disposal, taken from the eighty-three departments.

This proposition greatly roused the indignation of the left side, which was composed of the most violent members of the convention. They filled the assembly with tumultuous and confused cries. "The troubles of France," they said, "were exaggerated; and the hypocritical complaints which had just been heard, proceeded from the depth of those dungeons where the suspected, who had for three years been provoking their country to civil war, had been justly immured. The evils complained of they maintained to be inevitable, and declared that a people in a state of revolution were justified in resorting to energetic measures to secure their safety. At present the critical period which called for such measures," they said, "had passed over, and the declarations which the convention had just made would be sufficient to appease all disturbances. Besides, what necessity," they asked, "was there for an extraordinary jurisdiction? Did not the ancient laws exist, and were they not competent to deal with the instigators of the murders of September? Did the assembly," they demanded, "wish to establish anew martial law?"

The tables were turned. Those who had demanded the extraordinary jurisdiction of the 17th of August, and had wished to establish a revolutionary tribunal, now cried out against the pro-

posed law as one of a sanguinary description!—"Sanguinary," replied Kersaint, "when its tendency, on the contrary, is to prevent the effusion of blood!"—An adjournment was loudly called for—"To adjourn the repression of murderers," exclaimed Vergniaud, "is to allow them! The enemies of France are in arms in our territories, and there are those who would rather that French citizens should slaughter one another, like the soldiers of Cadmus, than repel them!"

Finally the proposition of Kersaint and Buzot was adopted. It was decreed that laws for the punishment of the instigators to murder should be prepared, and for the organization of a guard to be composed from the departments.

This sitting of the 24th created a great emotion in Paris; yet no name was particularly marked out for public indignation, and the accusations yet remained general on both sides. On the next day, the resentments of the previous evening revived. The Jacobin faction murmured at the decrees which had been passed, and the Girondists regretted that they had not expressed themselves with sufficient warmth against that faction which they termed *the disorganizers*. Whilst on one side, the late acts of the convention were attacked, and on the other defended, Merlin, formerly a municipal officer at Thionville, since a deputy in the legislative assembly, where he identified himself with the most avowed patriots, this Merlin, so famous for his violence and audacity, demanded the attention of the assembly. "The order of the day," said he, "is to discover, as Lasource assured me yesterday, if there exists in the national convention a faction desirous of establishing a triumvirate or dictatorship; let these suspicions either be silenced altogether, or let Lasource point out the guilty, and I will poniard them in the presence of the assembly." Lasource thus called upon to explain himself, repeated the conversation he had had with Merlin, and again declared his belief that a faction of ambitious men existed, who aimed at exalting themselves on the ruins of the monarchy, but he mentioned no names. "They are those," added he, "who have instigated the mob to murder and pillage, who have issued orders of arrest against the members of the legislative assembly, who have destined the most courageous deputies of the convention to the poniard, and who impute to the people those excesses of which they themselves are the concealed authors. When the proper time shall arrive, he will lift up the veil which he had partially raised, even if it were to perish under their blows."

Yet the triumvirs were not pointed out. Osselin then ascended the tribune. "He was persuaded," he said, "that it was against the deputation of Paris that these accusations were directed, but that they were neither so extremely silly or so profoundly wicked, as to have entertained any idea of a triumvirate or dictatorship; that he would pledge his oath to the contrary, and demanded that sentence of death should be passed upon the first person detected in meditating such projects. Let every one," added he, "follow me to the tribune and make the same declaration." "Yes," replied Rebecqui, the courageous friend of Barbaroux, "the party accused of these tyrannical projects does exist, and I will name it—it is the party of Robespierre. Marseilles is aware of this, and has sent us here to oppose this party."

This daring apostrophe caused great tumult in the assembly; all eyes were turned towards Robespierre; and Danton hurried to the tribune to appease these divisions and divert the accusations which he knew to be partly directed against himself. "That will be a happy day for the republic," said he, "when a frank and fraternal explanation shall take place, and put an end to all suspicions—dictators and triumvirs are spoken of, but such accusations are vague, and ought to be signed." "And I will sign it," exclaimed Rebecqui, again springing towards the bureau. "Do so," replied Danton; "if there are any really guilty, may they suffer the penalty of their crime, even though they were my best friends. For myself, my life is known. In the patriotic societies, on the 10th of August, and in the executive council, I have served the cause of liberty, without any personal object, with all the energy of my nature. I fear, therefore, no accusations, so far as I myself am concerned, but I wish to shield others from them. There is, I confess, a man in the Paris deputation, who may be called the *Royou* of the republicans, Marat. I have often been accused of having instigated him in the publication of his placards. But I appeal to the president, and I call upon him to declare, if I have not been frequently at variance with Marat in the commune and in the committees. And let it be recollected that this writer, so loudly accused, has passed part of his life in cellars and dungeons; suffering has altered his character, and much allowance should be therefore made for his violence. But let us quit all individual discussions, or endeavour to make them serviceable to the public cause. Let us affix the penalty of death to any one who shall venture to propose a dictatorship or triumvirate." This motion was received with great applause. "But I do not stop here," resumed Danton, "there is another suspicion got abroad among the public, which it is necessary also to destroy. It is said that a party of the deputies is meditating the establishment of a federal system, and the division of France into a multitude of sections. It behoves us to be united. Let us declare then, by another decree, the unity of France and its government. These fundamental positions being laid down, let us banish all mutual distrust, and proceed without dissension to the great objects we have in view."

Buzot replied to Danton, that a dictatorship would be an usurpation, not a grant from the convention; and that therefore to make laws against it would be illusory. As to a federal system, he declared it had never entered into any one's head; and he considered the guard which had been decreed for the security of the assembly as the best guarantee for their unity, as all the departments would be thus called upon to watch over the national representation; with regard to the law proposed by Danton, he said it might be salutary, but ought to be maturely reflected upon, and consequently its consideration should be submitted to the commission of six, which had been constituted by a decree the evening before.

Robespierre having been personally accused, now came forward in reply. He first premised

that he was not about to defend himself, but the cause of the public, which had been attacked in his person. Addressing himself to Rebecqui: "Citizen," said he, "you have not feared to accuse me; I thank you. Your conduct very well represents the courage of that celebrated city of which you are a deputy. The country, you, and myself, will all be gainers by this accusation.

"A party," continued he, "which meditates the establishment of a new species of tyranny has been pointed out, and I have been named as its chief. The accusation is vague; but, thanks to my own exertions in the cause of liberty, it will be easy for me to answer it. Have not I, in the constituent assembly, during three years, opposed all factions, whatever name they might have assumed? Have not I continually contended with the court, and despised all its presents? Have not I?"—"That is not the question," cried many deputies.—"He must be allowed to justify himself," replied Tallien.—"As I am accused," resumed Robespierre, "of betraying my country, am I not at liberty to oppose the tenor of my whole life to such an accusation?" He then recommenced the enumeration of his services against the aristocracy, and against the false patriots, who had assumed the mask of liberty. These last expressions were pointed at the right side. At last, Osselin himself, fatigued with his enumerations, interrupted him, and demanded a frank explanation. "What you may have formerly done," said Lecointe Puiravaux, "is not disputed; what you are accused of now is the question before the assembly." Robespierre again, however, recurred to the support he had given to liberty; dwelt upon the sacred right of defence, and upon the public welfare, as much endangered as himself by this accusation. He was again requested to be a little more brief, but he continued with the same diffuseness. Referring to the famous decrees passed at his suggestion against the re-election of the constituents, and the nomination of deputies to vacant places, he asked if these were the proofs of ambition. Then entering into a recrimination against his adversaries, he renewed the accusation of federalism, and concluded by demanding the adoption of the decrees proposed by Danton, and a serious examination into the accusation against himself. Barbaroux, who had been impatiently waiting for the close of this harangue, now hastened to the bar of the chamber. "Barbaroux of Marseilles," cried he, "offers to sign the accusation made by Rebecqui against Robespierre." He then related an insignificant story, already repeated, that before the 10th of August, Panis had conducted him to the house of Robespierre, and, on leaving it, represented him (Robespierre) as the only man, as dictator, capable of saving the nation; upon which Barbaroux replied, "that the Marseillais would never bow down either to a king or a dictator."

We have before related these facts, but such vague and insufficient declarations of the friends of Robespierre certainly did not warrant a formal accusation against him. Barbaroux replied severally to all the imputations which had been cast upon the Girondists. He demanded the proscription of federalism by a decree; and called upon all the members of the convention to swear that they would rather suffer themselves to be blocked up in Paris and die there, than quit it on any consideration. After great applauses, Barbaroux resumed his speech, and said, that as to the scheme of a dictatorship, the fact could not be contested; that the usurpations of the commune, the orders of arrest issued against the members of the national representation, and the messengers sent into the departments, all proved the design of establishing some such domination; but Marseilles watched over the safety of the deputies; that always prompt to support beneficial decrees, she had sent a battalion of federalists in spite of the royal *veto*; and that now she had sent eight hundred of her citizens, whose fathers had given them two pistols, a sabre, a gun, and an assignat of five hundred livres; that she had added to them two hundred cavalry, well equipped; and that this force would serve as a commencement to the departimental guard which had been decreed for the security of the convention. As to Robespierre," added Barbaroux, "I experience much regret at having accused him, for I still regard him, and formerly esteemed him. Yes, we all both regard and esteem him, and yet we have accused him! Let him acknowledge his errors, and we will desist. Let him cease to complain, for if he has served liberty with his pen, we have defended it with our persons. Citizens, when the day of peril shall arrive, then we shall see if the makers of placards are ready to die with us." Great applause followed this harangue. Placards having been alluded to, Marat demanded permission to be heard; but Cambon, making the same request afterwards, obtained the preference. He assured the assembly that he had read placards in which a dictatorship was represented as indispensable, and that these placards were signed by the name of Marat. On this information every one shrunk from the accused, but he only smiled at the contempt he met with. Cambon was succeeded by other accusers of Marat and the commune. Marat made many efforts to obtain a hearing; Panis, however, occupied the tribune before him, and attempted to answer the allegations of Barbaroux. He denied awkwardly many facts which were true, but which proved little, and which it would have been better to have avowed at once, relying on their insignificancy for his justification. He was then interrupted by Brissot, who demanded the reason why an order of arrest had been issued against his person. Panis, in answer to this interrogation, referred to the circumstances of that period, so soon forgotten; he dwelt upon the terror and disorder which then prevailed, on the multitude of denunciations against the conspirators of the 10th of August, on the weight of the reports spread against Brissot, and the necessity there existed of examining their truth.

After these long explanations, broken off and resumed every moment, Marat, insisting on being heard, at last obtained a hearing when it was no longer possible to deny it him. This was the first time he had ever appeared in the tribune; his aspect there produced a feeling of tumultuous indignation in the assembly, and a general cry of "Down, down!" assailed him from all sides. Negligently dressed, carrying in his hand a cap, which he placed on the tribune, and casting a contemptuous smile upon his audience: "I have," said he, "a great number of personal enemies in

this assembly."——"All! all!" cried the greater part of the deputies.——"I have in this assembly," resumed Marat, "a great number of personal enemies. I would bring them to some sense of shame. Let them spare their furious clamours against a man who has served liberty and themselves more than they think.

"Triumvirates and dictatorships have been spoken of, and the project of establishing them has been attributed to the deputation of Paris. But I must do them justice, and declare that my colleagues, especially Robespierre and Danton, have frequently opposed me on this point. I am the first and the only writer in France who has ever thought of this measure, as the only means of crushing all traitors and conspirators. I alone am guilty, and alone should suffer; but before I am punished, I must be heard." Here a few applauses were heard. Marat continued: "surrounded by the continual machinations of a perfidious king, a hateful court, and of false patriots, who in the two former assemblies put the public liberty up to sale; do you reproach me with having devised the only means of safety, and of having brought vengeance down on their guilty heads? No, the people would then disavow your reproaches; for they themselves felt that the mean I proposed was the only one possible, and in constituting themselves a dictator, they have delivered the nation from traitors.

"I trembled perhaps more than any one else at the idea of these terrible executions; and that they might not be in vain, I should have wished them to have been directed by a just and firm hand. If, at the taking of the Bastille, the necessity of this measure had been understood, five hundred criminals would have fallen, and peace would at present have been perfectly established. But, not having acted with this wise and necessary severity, a hundred thousand patriots have been sacrificed, and a hundred thousand more are still threatened with the same fate! To prove that I would not make this species of dictator, tribune, or triumvir (the name signifies nothing,) a tyrant, such as might foolishly be imagined, but a victim devoted to his country, whose situation no ambitious man would envy, I would, at the same time that I limited his authority to a short period, and confined it to the condemnation of traitors, have placed a clog on his leg, and thus kept him always in the hands of the people. My ideas, however revolting they may appear to you, tend only to the public good. If you are not enlightened enough to understand me, so much the worse for you!"

A profound silence prevailed till he pronounced the last sentence, when he was interrupted by bursts of laughter, which however did not disconcert the orator, who was more calculated to inspire terror than excite ridicule. He continued: "Such is my opinion, written, signed, and publicly defended. If it is false, confute me, enlighten me, but accuse me not of despotism.

"I have been accused of ambition! Bet see, and judge. If I had even fixed a price on my silence, I might have been gorged with gold, and I am poor! Persecuted incessantly from one cellar to another, I have preached the truth from a stack of billets.

"As to yourselves, open your eyes, and instead of consuming your time in scandalizing discussions, reform the declaration of rights, establish the constitution, and lay the foundation of a just and free government, which is the proper object you should have in view."

Universal attention was given to this extraordinary man; and the assembly, stupified by a system so frightful and premeditated, preserved a profound silence. A few partisans of Marat, emboldened by this silence, ventured to applaud him, but their example was not imitated; and he returned to his seat without either applause, or incurring any tokens of anger.

Vergniaud, the most upright and temperate of the Girondists, now attempted to awaken the indignation of the assembly. He first deplored, he said, the misfortune of having to reply to a man who stood charged with decrees of accusation! Chabot and Tallien took great offence at these words, and asked if the decrees alluded to were those issued by the Chatelet against Marat for having unmasked Lafayette. Vergniaud repeated his regret at having to reply to a man who had not purged himself of the impeachments with which he stands charged, and dropping with calumnies, gall, and blood! These expressions excited fresh murmurs; but he continued with firmness; and, after having made some distinction between David, Dussaulx, and some other members, and the Paris deputation, he noticed the famous circular of the commune, which has been mentioned before, and read the whole of it to the assembly. But, as it was already known, it did not produce so much effect as another paper which the deputy Boileau read afterwards. This was a sheet publication printed by Marat on the very day of the discussion, in which were the following words: "One reflection overwhelms me; it is, that all my efforts to save the people will have been in vain without a new insurrection. From the dispositions of the majority of the deputies of the convention, I despair of the public safety; if in their first eight sittings the foundation of a constitution is not laid, expect nothing further from that assembly. Fifty years of anarchy are before you, and nothing can deliver you from it but a dictator who is a true patriot and statesman.——*Oh babbling people, did you but know how to act!*"

The reading of this paper was frequently interrupted by bursts of indignation. Scarcely was it finished, when a number of members exclaim, in unmeasured language, against the author. Some threatened him, and cried out, *A l'Abbaye! à la guillotine!* others expressed the bitterest contempt for him. A smile was all the answer he returned to these attacks. Boileau demanded an act of impeachment against him, and many wished to put it immediately to the vote. Marat insisted, with the greatest *sang froid*, on being heard. It was proposed that he should be heard at the bar, but he at last obtained the tribune. According to his accustomed mode of expression, he began by saying *he would bring his enemies to a sense of shame.* As to the accusations which his adversaries had not blushed to bring against him, he gloried in them, he declared, as the reward of his courage. Besides, the people, in making him their representative, had acquitted him of every charge, and decided between his opponents and himself. As to the paper which had just been read, he would not disavow it, for he was incapable of falsehood, and fear was a stranger to his heart. "To demand

from me a retractation," added he, "is to ask me to deny the evidence of my eyes and understanding, and no power under the sun is capable of producing such a derangement in my ideas. I can answer for the purity of my heart, but I cannot change my thoughts; they are such as the nature of things suggests to me."

He then informed the assembly that the paper which had been read, printed ten days previously in placards, had been reprinted, against his will, by his publisher; but that he had just been giving, in his first number of a journal, entitled "The Journal of the Republic," a new exposition of his principles, with which the assembly would be satisfied, if they would hear it.

The assembly consented to the reading of this paragraph, and softened by the moderate expressions contained in this article, intituled "*His new plan*," treated him with more forbearance, and he even obtained some marks of approbation. He then reascended the tribune with his accustomed audacity, and presumed to give a lesson to his colleagues on the danger of passion and prejudice. If his journal had not appeared on this day, he said, to exculpate him, he would have been loaded with irons. "But," added he, showing a pistol which he always carried in his pocket, and which he put to his forehead, "I have the means of keeping myself free; and if you had passed a decree of accusation against me, I would have blown out my brains in this tribune. Behold the fruit of all my labours, dangers, and sufferings! I will remain among you to brave your fury!" These last expressions of Marat roused the indignation of his colleagues, who called him a madman and a wretch, and a protracted disorder was the consequence.

This debate had now lasted many hours, and what was the result? Nothing had come to light respecting the pretended project of a dictatorship or triumvirate; but the character of parties, and their respective force, had been fully developed. The placability and good will of Danton towards all his colleagues, provided they did not look narrowly into his conduct; the envy and pride of Robespierre; the astonishing cynicism and audacity of Marat, repelled by his own party, but trying to habituate men's minds to his atrocious system; all three succeeding in the revolution, by different qualities and vices; disagreeing among themselves, disavowing each other's principles, and having nothing in common but that love of influence, natural to all men, but which can by no means be construed into a design to establish a tyranny; such were the traits exhibited in this discussion. These men agreed with the Girondists in the necessity of holding up to abhorrence the horrors of September; they even allowed them that esteem which was due to their talents and integrity, but considered their accusations exaggerated and imprudent; and could not help perceiving some personal feelings in their resentment. The assembly now divided itself into a right and left side, as it had during the first days of the constituent assembly. The right side was composed of all the Girondists, and of those who, without being attached to them as a party, partook of their generous indignation against the outrages of September. In the centre of the chamber, a considerable number of honest and peaceable deputies took their seats, who, for the most part, agreed with the Girondists, but were neither qualified by their characters or talents to take any other part in the debates than to give their vote; and sought, in confounding themselves with the multitude, oblivion and security. The great number of these professed neutrals, the great respect in which the assembly was still held, and the anxiety which the Jacobin and municipal party manifested to justify themselves in their eyes, all tended to inspire them with courage. They hoped that the authority of the convention would in time put down the demagogues; nevertheless, they were not unwilling to repress their energy, and declared that they thought the Girondists too precipitate in their accusations. They were as yet only reasonable and impartial; they, however, soon became a little more jealous of the brilliant eloquence of the right side; and, once face to face with tyranny, they displayed their weakness and cowardice. This party was called the *Plain*, in opposition to the left side, which was styled the *Mountain*, where all the Jacobins were heaped up, as one may say, one above the other. On the graduated benches of this mountain were to be seen all the deputies of Paris, and those of the departments who owed their nomination to the influence of the clubs, and of those whom the Jacobins had gained over since their arrival, by persuading them of the necessity of giving no quarter to the enemies of the revolution. In this party were also included some men of distinguished abilities, but of precise, rigorous, and positive characters, who disapproved of the philanthropic theories of the Girondists, as mystical abstractions. Nevertheless the mountain party were still few in number. The *Plain*, united to the right side, composed an immense majority; this party had appointed Pétion president, and approved of the indignation of the Girondists against the massacres of September, excepting always their personalities, which appeared premature and unfounded*.

The convention now, dismissing their mutual accusations, passed to the order of the day; but the decree of the preceding evening was insisted upon; and three measures were resolved on—1st. To call on the minister of the interior for an exact and faithful account of the state of Paris. 2nd. To enact a law against the instigators to murder and pillage; and 3rd. To form a departmental guard for the safety of the assembly. As to the account of the state of Paris, the energy with which this duty would be performed might be anticipated, from the character of Roland, to whom it was committed; and with regard to the two other measures, against seditious publications, and the establishment of a guard, every thing might be hoped from the committee to whom they were intrusted, which was entirely composed of Girondists, Buzot, Lasource, and Kersaint being members of it.

These two last measures were vehemently opposed by the mountain party. They asked, if the convention wished to renew martial law, and the massacres of the Champ-de-Mars; and if they wished to surround themselves with satellites and body guards, as the late king. They renewed thus, as the Girondists declared, all the arguments made use of by the court against the camp at Paris.

* See an extract from the Memoirs of Garat, note 46, in the Appendix.

Many of the most violent members of the left side were, in their characters of deputies of the convention, decidedly opposed to the usurpations of the commune, and none of the Paris deputation defended it when attacked, which happened every day. Thus acts were constantly passed against it without opposition. As the commune had delayed to re-elect new members, in obedience to the decree which ordered the re-election of all administrative bodies, the executive council were commissioned to keep a watchful eye upon its resuscitation, and report to the assembly thereupon in three days. A committee of six members was also nominated to take the declaration signed by all those who had deposited property in the Hotel de Ville, to ascertain the use which had been made of these effects by the municipality. The directory of the department, which the commune had degraded to a simple administrative commission, was likewise reinstated in all its prerogatives, and took again its style of *Directory*. The elections of the communes for the nomination of the mayor, the municipality, and the council-general, which the commune had wished to make public in order to intimidate the weak, were again made secret by a confirmation of the existing law on that subject. The elections effected in this illegal manner were annulled, and the sections acquiesced in, proceeding upon them anew according to the prescribed form. Finally, it was determined that all prisoners confined without a warrant of arrest should be enlarged forthwith; this was a great blow to the committee of *surveillance*, who were particularly exasperated against individuals.

All these decrees were passed in the beginning of October; and the commune, so vigorously assaulted, was obliged to bend under the ascendancy of the convention. Nevertheless, the committee of surveillance did not yield without resistance. Its members presented themselves before the assembly, and said they were about to confound their enemies. Being the depositories of the papers found on Laporte, the keeper of the civil list, and who was condemned by the tribunal of the 17th of August, they had discovered, they said, a letter, in which the price paid for the passing of certain decrees in the two preceding assemblies was detailed; and they now came to unmask those deputies who had sold themselves to the court, and expose their false patriotism. "Name them," exclaimed the assembly, with indignation. "We cannot," replied the deputies of the commune, "do so immediately." To repel the idea of mere libellous accusation, a committee was forthwith appointed, composed of twenty-four deputies, who had not sat either in the constituent or legislative assemblies, to examine the papers, and make their report on them. Marat, the inventor of this expedient, exulted in his journal that he had paid the *Rolandists*, the accusers of the commune, "*in their own coin;*" and announced the pretended discovery of the treason of the Girondists. Yet, in the papers under examination, none of the deputies were at all compromised, and the committee of *surveillance* were branded as calumniators. The papers were too voluminous for the twenty-four deputies to continue their examination of them in the Hotel de Ville, and they were, therefore, transferred to one of the committees of the assembly. Marat seeing himself thus deprived of the rich materials for his daily accusations, became greatly irritated, and pretended that the convention wished to destroy every proof of treason.

After having thus repressed the extravagances of the commune, the convention turned their attention to the executive power, and determined that the ministers should not in future be chosen from the assembly. Danton being thus obliged to make choice between the situation of minister of justice and that of member of the convention, preferred, like Mirabeau, that which afforded the privilege of the tribune, and quitted the ministry without giving an account of its secret service money, saying he had already settled that account with the council. This was certainly not very regular conduct, but it was not looked into, or rather it was passed over. Francois de Neufchatel having refused to succeed this minister, Garat, a distinguished writer, but more brilliant than profound, and who had become famous by the superior manner in which he got up "The Paris Journal," was appointed to the ministry of justice. Servan, fatigued by a laborious administration, not beyond his abilities but his strength, preferred the command of the army of observation, stationed along the Pyrenees. The minister Lebrun was provisionally intrusted with the affairs of the war department, in addition to those of the foreign office. Finally, Roland also offered his resignation, being wearied with an anarchy so opposed to his probity and his inflexible regard of order. The Girondists proposed offering him the portfolio of the interior, but the mountain party, and particularly Danton, whom he had so often resisted, opposed this motion, as unbecoming the dignity of the assembly. Danton complained that he was a man of weak understanding, and governed by his wife. To this reproach of incapacity, the Girondists replied, by referring to his letter of the 3rd of September; and they might have instanced the opposition Danton himself had experienced from him in the council. Nevertheless, the assembly passed to the order of the day. Roland, pressed by the Girondists, and other persons of moral consideration, to remain in the ministry, yielded to their solicitations. "I continue in the ministry," wrote he to the assembly, "because calumny attacks me, danger awaits me, and the convention appears to desire it. It is a glorious consideration for me," added he, in concluding his letter, "that my enemies could find nothing to reproach me with, but my union with courage and virtue."

The assembly now divided itself into several committees; one of surveillance composed of thirty members; another of war, composed of twenty-four; a third of accounts, of fifteen; a fourth of criminal and civil legislation, forty-eight; and a fifth, of finances, composed of forty-two. To these committees, another still more important was added, to devise the project or prospectus of a constitution, which was composed of nine members, nearly all in the interest of the right side. In this committee, philosophy had its representatives, in the persons of Sieyes, Condorcet, and the American Thomas Paine*, lately made a French citizen and member of the convention; the Girondist party

* This is an error: Thomas Paine was born in England, at Thetford, in Norfolk.

was represented by Gensonné, Vergniaud, Pétion, and Brissot; the centre by Barrere; and the mountain by Danton. It is certainly strange that this turbulent demagogue, who had so little speculation in his character, should have been chosen to make one of a committee of philosophers. Robespierre was extremely desirous of that distinction, and much chagrined at not having obtained it. Danton, however, was preferred, on account of the pliability of his disposition, and because no bitter animosities separated him from his colleagues. It was this diversity of opinions in the committees which so long delayed the organization of the constitution.

After having provided for the re-establishment of order in the capital, the organization of the executive power, the distribution of the several committees, and for the formation of a constitution; the attention of the assembly was turned to another subject of the most weighty importance, the fate of Louis XVI. and his family. The most profound silence on this topic had hitherto been preserved by the assembly. In the Jacobin club, the commune, in private and in public, it was discussed; indeed, everywhere but in the convention. Some emigrants had been seized with arms in their hands, and conducted to Paris to suffer the sentence of the law. On this occasion (for the first time), a member asked why the convention, instead of condemning petty criminals, did not think of passing sentence on those confined in the Temple? A profound silence succeeded this interrogatory. Barbaroux first rose; and said, before he asked if it was intended to bring Louis XVI. to trial, he wished to know whether the convention was to be constituted a judicial body, for there were many other criminals besides those in the Temple to be tried. In starting this question, Barbaroux alluded to the project of converting the convention into an extraordinary court, to pass sentence on the *agitators, triumvirs, &c.*; after a few debates, the subject was referred to a committee of legislation to examine the questions to which it gave rise.

CHAPTER II.

THE MILITARY SITUATION OF FRANCE AT THE END OF OCTOBER, 1792—BOMBARDMENT OF LILLE BY THE AUSTRIANS; CAPTURE OF WORMS AND MAYENCE BY CUSTINE—OVERSIGHT OF OUR GENERALS—INJUDICIOUS OPERATIONS OF CUSTINE—ARMY OF THE ALPS; CONQUEST OF SAVOY AND NICE—DUMOURIEZ RETURNS TO PARIS; HIS CIRCUMSTANCES WITH RELATION TO PARTIES—INFLUENCE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE JACOBIN CLUB—STATE OF FRENCH SOCIETY; THE WITHDRAWING ROOMS OF PARIS—INTERVIEW BETWEEN MARAT AND DUMOURIEZ—AN ANECDOTE—SECOND CONTENTION OF THE GIRONDISTS WITH THE MOUNTAIN PARTY; LOUVET IMPEACHES ROBESPIERRE; DEFENCE OF ROBESPIERRE; THE ASSEMBLY DECLINES TO PROSECUTE LOUVET'S IMPEACHMENT—THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE TRIAL OF LOUIS XVI.

THE military situation of France was now greatly changed. It was about the middle of October; the enemy was already repulsed from Champagne and Flanders; and the foreign power was invaded on three sides, the Palatinate, the Savoy, and the Compté of Nice.

We have seen the Prussians retiring from the camp at La Lune, taking the route of the Argonne, having lost a great part of their army by disease, and only saving the remainder through the negligence of our generals, who possessed no unity of design. The Duke de Saxe Teschen did not succeed better in his attack upon the Low Countries. Whilst the Prussians marched on the Argonne, this prince determined to remain behind, and attempt something dashing. Yet although our northern frontier was almost naked, his means were little more than our own, and he could scarce muster fifteen thousand men, with but a scanty supply of artillery. Feigning, however, false attacks on all the line of our strong places, he put many small camps to the rout, and marched immediately upon Lille to attempt the siege of that place, which the greatest generals with powerful armies, and well supplied with artillery, had failed to effect. Nothing but a possibility of success can justify cruelty in war. The duke could not approach Lille but on one point, and he there established batteries, which bombarded the city six following days, and destroyed more than two hundred houses. It has been said that the arch-duchess Christine was delighted on beholding this awful spectacle. If so, she must have been a witness of the heroism of the besieged, and of the inutility of Austrian barbarity. The inhabitants resisted nobly; and on the 8th of October, when the Prussians abandoned the Argonne, the Duke Albert was also obliged to quit Lille. General Labourdonnaie arriving from Soissons, and Beurnonville from Champagne, forced them to retire with precipitation from our frontiers, and the resistance of the inhabitants, published throughout France, augmented the general enthusiasm.

It was about this time, that Custine attempted some bold enterprises in the Palatinate, but with a brilliant rather than a solid success. Being attached to the army of Biron, which was encamped along the Rhine, he was posted, with seventeen thousand men, at some distance from Spires. The grand army of invasion had but inefficiently protected his rear in advancing into the interior of France. Spires, Worms, and Mayence were only defended by petty detachments; Custine perceiving this, marched upon Spires, and entered it without resistance on the 30th of September. Emboldened by this success, he proceeded to Worms, met with the same good fortune, and obliged the garrison of two thousand seven hundred men to lay down their arms. He then took Franckenthal, and did not overlook the importance of Mayence, which was

the most essential place of retreat for the Prussians, and in which they had imprudently left only a small garrison. Custine, with his seventeen thousand men, and no artillery, could not attempt the siege of this place, but he could try a sudden attack (*coup-de-main*). The new opinions which had been started in France agitated all Germany, particularly the university cities; Mayence was one of these, and Custine determined to practise on its credulity by false intelligence. He first approached its walls, then retired, on the pretended news of the arrival of an Austrian force, again advanced, and by making extensive movements, deceived the enemy as to the strength of his army. A formal deliberation took place in the city. The necessity of capitulating was strongly maintained by the partisans of the French, and on the 21st of October the gates were opened to Custine; and the garrison, except eight hundred Austrians, who rejoined the grand army, laid down their arms. The news of these successes occasioned great joy, and caused an extraordinary sensation. They had certainly been cheaply bought; and when compared with the intrepid constancy of the inhabitants of Lille, and the cool magnanimity displayed at Sainte-Menehould, could not claim much praise; yet the transition from a mere defensive resistance to conquest, captivated the imagination of the people. So far Custine had acquitted himself with great credit; but to make his success complete, he should have terminated the campaign by a movement which was as practicable as it would have been decisive.

At this moment the three armies of Dumouriez, Kellermann, and Custine, were, by a most fortunate coincidence, so situated as to be able to destroy the Prussians, and conquer in one march the whole line of territory, from the Rhine to the sea. If Dumouriez, less pre-occupied with another project, had kept Kellermann under his command, and pursued the Prussians with his eighty thousand men; and Custine had at the same time descended the Rhine, from Mayence to Coblentz, and thrown himself on the rear of the retreating army, they must infallibly have been utterly overwhelmed. Then, following the course of the Rhine to Holland, the Duke Albert, cut off from all retreat, would have been obliged to lay down his arms, and the Low Countries forced to submit; Treves and Luxembourg being comprehended in the line we have described, must necessarily have fallen; the Rhine would have been the boundary of France, and the campaign finished in a month. Dumouriez, although certainly possessing great military genius, overlooked this plan, his mind being occupied with another project. Anxious to return into Belgium, he thought only of hastening to succour Lille, and confronting the Duke Albert; he therefore left Kellermann to pursue the Prussians. This latter might still have marched to Coblentz, passing between Luxembourg and Treves, whilst Custine came down from Mayence. But Kellermann having nothing enterprising in his disposition, and not placing sufficient confidence in his troops, who appeared harassed, encamped in the environs of Metz. Custine, on his part, wishing to render himself independent, and make brilliant incursions into the country, had no desire to join Kellermann, and confine himself within the limits of the Rhine. He never intended to go to Coblentz. Thus this fine plan, which has been so clearly developed by the greatest of our military historians*, was totally neglected.

Custine joined to a great deal of talent a fiery, haughty, and eccentric disposition. He endeavoured to render himself independent of Biron, and of all the other generals, and conceived the idea of extending his conquests all around him. To take Manheim, exposed him to violate the neutrality of the Elector Palatine, and was besides forbidden by the executive council. He therefore meditated quitting the Rhine to advance into the interior of Germany. Frankfort, situated on the Maine, appeared a prize worth contending for, and he resolved to march upon it. Yet this free commercial city, which had always remained neuter, and was well-disposed towards the French, did not deserve this fatal preference. Not being defended, it was easy to take, but difficult to keep, and consequently useless to occupy. Its capture could have therefore but one object, the levying of contributions; and there was little justice in thus taxing a people habitually neuter, and trusting to their known inclinations for their protection, and by those very inclinations deserving favour at the hands of France, whose principles she approved, and whose success she desired. Custine committed this violation of justice in entering the city on the 27th of October. He levied contributions, alienated the inhabitants, converted them into enemies, and exposed himself, in thus throwing himself upon the Maine, to being cut off from the Rhine, either by the Prussians, supposing they had ascended towards Bingen, or by the Elector Palatine, if, breaking through his neutrality, he had issued from Manheim.

The news of these incursions into the enemies' territory gave great joy to the nation, who was as much delighted as astonished at obtaining conquests a few days after the fear of being conquered. The Prussians being alarmed at these successes, threw a flying bridge over the Rhine, for the purpose of re-ascending by the right bank of the river, and driving the French army out of the country. But happily for Custine, they spent twelve days in passing the river. Distress, disease, and separation from the Austrians, had reduced this army to fifty thousand men. Clerfait, with eighteen thousand Austrians, had followed the general movement of our troops towards Flanders, and hastened to the succour of the Duke Albert. The corps of emigrants had been disbanded, and those who composed it had either joined the regiment of Condé, or entered into some foreign service.

Whilst these events were passing on the northern frontier and the Rhine, we also gained other advantages on the Alpine frontier. Montesquieu, who commanded the army of the south, invaded Savoy, and occupied the Comté of Nice by one of his lieutenants; this general, who had displayed in the constituent the talents of a statesman, and who, before he had time to exhibit those of a warrior, which he was said to possess, was summoned to the bar of the legislative assembly, to give an account of his conduct, being accused of sloth and incapacity. He, however, succeeded in convincing

* Jomini.

his accusers that want of means, not want of zeal, was the cause of his delays, and he was suffered to return to the Alps. Yet, as he evidently belonged to the first revolutionary generation, his opinions and conduct were incompatible with the new; and being summoned again to appear before the assembly, he would have been deprived of his command, if he had not at that moment made his entry into Savoy; he was consequently allowed to retain his situation, and complete the conquest he had begun.

According to the vast plan conceived by Dumouriez, when, in his capacity of minister for foreign affairs, he presided over the diplomatic and war departments, France should have pushed forward its armies to the limits of its natural frontiers, the Rhine, and the higher chain of the Alps. To effect this, it would be necessary to conquer Belgium, Savoy, and Nice. France had also the advantage in recurring to the natural principles of her policy, that of despoiling none but those enemies who had made war with her, the house of Austria, and the court of Turin. This plan was frustrated in Belgium in April, and had been deferred until now in Savoy, where Montesquieu was about at present to carry it into execution. For this purpose he intrusted one division of his troops to General Anselme to pass the Var, and march upon Nice at a given signal; he proceeded himself, with the greatest part of his army, from Grenoble to Chambery; menaced the Sardinian troops at Saint-Geniès, and, advancing from fort Barraux on Montmélian, he succeeded in dividing them, and driving them into the valleys. Whilst his lieutenants pursued the fugitives, he himself marched to Chambery, and on the 28th made his triumphal entry, to the great satisfaction of the inhabitants, who loved liberty like true mountaineers, and the French as men possessing the same language, manners, and religion as themselves. He immediately called an assembly of the inhabitants, to deliberate on a question which could not be doubted, that of their being united to France.

At the same time Anselme, reinforced by six thousand Marseillais, whom he had required as auxiliaries, approached the Var, an unequal torrent, as indeed are all those high mountain-streams, alternately overflowing and dry, and consequently unable to hold a permanent bridge. Anselme boldly crossed the Var, and occupied Nice, which the Count Saint André had just abandoned, and which the magistrates pressed him to enter, to repress the disorders of the populace, and deliver them from their lawless pillage. The Sardinian troops had retired to the upper valleys; Anselme pursued them, but halted before Saorgio, a formidable post, from which the Piedmontese had never yet been dislodged. Meanwhile the squadron of Admiral Truguet, acting in concert with Anselme, had reduced Ville Franche, and had marched to the petty principality of Oneille. Great numbers of corsairs generally found an asylum in this port, and consequently its capture was by no means unimportant. But while a French boat was advancing to hold a parley, the right of nations was violated, and many men killed by a general discharge of artillery. The admiral then drawing up his vessels before the place, assaulted it with a brisk fire, and immediately disembarked some of his troops, who sacked the city, and made great carnage among the monks, who were very numerous, and had instigated, it was said, the inhabitants to the breach of faith which provoked this retaliation. Such is the nature of martial law, that this unfortunate town of Oneglia was subjected to all its rigour, without exciting the least pity. After this expedition, the French squadron returned to Nice, where Anselme, separated by the swelling of the Var from the rest of his army, was placed in a very dangerous dilemma. Yet by vigilantly protecting himself against Saorgio, and preserving the favour of the inhabitants better than he had hitherto done, his position might be tenable, and he might still retain his conquest.

During these events, Montesquieu advanced from Chambery on Geneva, and was about to enter the territory of the Swiss, who were very differently disposed towards France, and pretended to discover in the invasion of Savoy a breach of their neutrality.

The sentiments of the Cantons with regard to France were very much divided; all the aristocratical republics condemned the revolution: Berne, and its chief magistrate (*avoyer*) Stinger, looked upon it with utter detestation, and the more so, as the Pays de Vaud, so oppressed a country, had been most favourably disposed to the revolution. The Helvetic aristocracy, incited by Stinger and the English ambassador, endeavoured to provoke war against us, and to give a colour to their object, complained of the massacre of the Swiss guards on the 10th of August, of the disarming a regiment at Aix, and finally, of the occupation of the passes of Porentruy, which belonged to the bishopric of Bâle, and which Biron had occupied for the purpose of blocking up the Jura. Yet the moderate party triumphed, and an armed neutrality was resolved upon. The Canton of Berne, however, more indignant and distrustful, marched some troops to Nion, and under pretext of a request from the magistrates of Geneva, placed a garrison in that city. According to the articles of a former treaty, Geneva, in case of hostilities between France and Savoy, had bound herself to receive no garrison from any power within her walls. Some troops of ours having entered the town were obliged to evacuate it immediately; and the executive council, urged on by Claviere, formerly banished from Geneva, and anxious to see the revolution get footing there, ordered Montesquieu to enforce the execution of the treaty; and further enjoined him to place a garrison there himself, which was to imitate the conduct objected to against the Bernese. Montesquieu, however, knowing that he had not the means of taking Geneva, and that by violating the neutrality he provoked a war with Switzerland, opened the east of France, and exposed the right flank of our defence, resolved, at the same time, to intimidate Geneva, and endeavour to persuade the executive council to desist from their present plan. He therefore imperatively demanded the departure of the Bernese troops, and tried to convince the French ministry that they could not, in prudence, exact any further concessions. His intention was, in case of extremity, to bombard Geneva, and make a rapid march into the Pays de Vaud, and thus throw it into a state of revolution. But Geneva consented to the departure of the Bernois

troops, on condition that Montesquieu would retire ten leagues, with which he immediately complied. This concession was condemned at Paris; and Montesquieu, placed at Carouge in the midst of Genevese exiles, who were anxious to be restored to their country, and harassed by the fear of embroiling France and Switzerland, and that of disobeying the executive council, who in this instance proved themselves wanting both in military and political wisdom, was certainly most perplexingly situated. The negotiation between him and Paris was necessarily very much prolonged from the distance which separated them, and it was not terminated at the end of October.

Such was the situation of our army, from Dunkirk to Bâle, and from Bâle to Nice, in October, 1792. The frontier of Champagne had been delivered from the grand invasion; the troops employed there had moved towards Flanders, to succour Lille and invade Belgium; Kellermann took up his quarters in Lorraine; Custine separated from Biron, master of Mayence, having advanced imprudently into the Palatinate as far as Maine, gave satisfaction to France by his conqueste, terrified Germany, and exposed himself to be cut off by the Prussians, who had reascended the right bank of the Rhine, and though sick and exhausted, were nevertheless numerous, and still capable of surrounding his little army. Biron was encamped along the Rhine; Montesquieu, master of Savoy, by the retreat of the Piedmontese beyond the Alps, and preserved from fresh attacks by the falls of snow, had determined the neutrality of Switzerland, either by his arms or by his negotiations; and finally Anselme, having gained possession of Nice, and being supported by a squadron at sea, could retain his present position in spite of the swelling of the Var, and the Piedmontese posted above him at Saorgio.

Whilst the war was thus transferred from Champagne to Belgium, Dumouriez had demanded permission to come to Paris for two or three days, to concert with the ministers a plan for invading the Low Countries. His enemies declared that his object was applause, and that he quitted the duties of his command for a frivolous indulgence of vanity. These reproaches were greatly exaggerated, for his army did not suffer by his absence; simple marches might be conducted without him, and his presence was very useful to the council in devising a general plan of military operations; besides, the love of praise may easily be pardoned when it does not entrench upon duty.

On the 11th of October he arrived at Paris. His situation was embarrassing, for he was not exactly at home with either of the two prevailing parties. The violence of the Jacobins repelled him; and he had committed a deadly breach with the Girondists, by driving them a few months before from the ministry. Yet he was very well received, and especially by Roland, who always sacrificed his personal resentments to public considerations. On the 12th, he presented himself to the convention, and scarcely was his name announced, when applauses and acclamations arose from all parts. He delivered a simple and energetic speech, in which he briefly retraced all the events of the campaign of the Argonne, and eulogised his own and Kellermann's troops with great warmth. His staff then presented a flag taken from the emigrants, and offered it to the assembly as an emblem of the vanity of their projects. The deputies now flocked round the general, and adjourned their sitting to give a free vent to the felicitations with which he was welcomed. *The Plain*, comprising the greatest part of the convention, the *impartials*, as they were termed, who having nothing with which to reproach him, either rupture or revolutionary lukewarmness, were most cordial in the reception they gave him. Nor were the Girondists backward in their welcome; yet, on whichever side was the fault, their reconciliation was not complete, and an air of coldness and reserve was plainly perceptible. The Mountain party, who had formerly accused him of attachment to Louis XVI., and thought him too like the Girondists in manner, merit, and the elevation of his views, observed the testimonies of favour he received from them with much ill-will, and supposed them to be more sincere than they really were.

After having waited on the convention, Dumouriez visited the Jacobin club, for this association had become so powerful, that a victorious general found it necessary to pay his court there also. It was here that public opinion in a state of ferment, formed all her notions, and settled her judgment. Was any important law, any great political question, or any revolutionary measure about to be agitated; the Jacobins hastened to open the discussion, and pass their judgment. They then communicated their views to the commune and the sections, and wrote to all the corresponding clubs: thus any opinion they might express, or any project they might form, was sure to be presented to the assembly, in the form of an address from all parts of France, and in the form of an armed petition from all the quarters of Paris. If it so happened that the municipal councils, the sections, or the other popular authorities hesitated from some remaining respect for the law, the Jacobins, who considered themselves perfectly free from all restraint, boldly solved their doubts; and no insurrection ever broke out that was not previously determined upon in this club. That of the 10th of August was the fruit of a whole month's deliberations. But besides thus taking the lead in every public question, they arrogated to themselves the power of prying with inexorable severity into all the details of the government. If a minister, a secretary, or a commissary was accused of any delinquency, messengers were immediately despatched from the Jacobins, who examined their desks, and demanded their accounts with magisterial imperiousness, and which were delivered up as to an acknowledged authority without resistance. If any complained of an act of the government, he had nothing to do but present himself to this society, and official advocates were commissioned to see justice done him. Sometimes the soldiers complained of their officers, and workmen of their employers; and on one occasion, an actress lodged her complaint against her manager, and a Jacobin demanded reparation for the seduction of his wife by one of his colleagues. Every one was anxious to attest his patriotic zeal by becoming a member of the society, and nearly all the new deputies joined it immediately on their arrival at Paris; a hundred and thirteen were added to its number in one week, and even those who had no intention of attending its sittings never-

theless demanded admission. So great was its influence, that the affiliated or corresponding clubs were accustomed to write from the provinces, to know if their representatives had caused themselves to be admitted members, and if they were assiduous in their duties. The rich sought to avert odium from their opulence, by adopting Jacobin principles, and wearing the red cap; and their equipages might be seen daily rolling up to the door of this rendezvous of equality. It often happened that whilst the hall was full of members, and the galleries crowded with spectators, immense multitudes waited at the entrance, and loudly demanded admission. Sometimes this multitude, dripping in the rain, became impatient, and then some member would stand up and demand admission for the *good people* who were waiting at the door. Marat was generally their advocate on these occasions; and when admission was granted, and frequently before, a crowd of men and women would rush in upon the society, and mix familiarly with its members. Its sittings were held towards the close of the day, when all the heat and fire of party, at the same time fanned and smothered at the convention, broke out with a terrible explosion. Night, the crowd, and the orators, all contributed to inflame the passions; and frequently when a sitting was prolonged, interminable confusion and tumult ensued; and the disturbers of the public peace wrought up their courage for some desperate enterprise on the next day. Yet this society, so ripe for demagogue excesses, had not yet reached its climax. The equipages of those who came to abjure the inequality of the states and conditions of men, were still permitted to drive up to its doors. Some members had indeed attempted to speak with their hats on, but they were obliged to uncover. It is true Brissot had just been expelled by a solemn vote of the house; but Pétion still continued to preside there with universal applause. Chabot, Collot-d'Herbois, and Fabre d'Eglantine were the favourite orators; Marat still appeared strange, and Chabot described him in the language of the place, as a porcupine, impervious on all sides.

Dumouriez was received by Danton, who presided during that session. He was welcomed by unanimous applauses, and the Jacobins seemed to pardon his supposed intimacy with the Girondists. He delivered a short and suitable address, and promised *before the end of the month to be at the head of sixty thousand men, to conquer kings, and save their people from tyranny.*

Danton, replying to him in a similar style, told him that in the affair of Sainte Menehould he had deserved well of his country; but that another career was now opening to him; that the glory of humbling crowns before the red cap with which the society had honoured him had been given into his hands, and that if he proceeded in this object, his name would figure among the most distinguished characters of France. Collot d'Herbois then harangued the general, and his speech is a good specimen of the style of that period, and shows the dispositions of the Jacobins with regard to Dumouriez.

"It is not a king, O Dumouriez, who has appointed thee to the command of the army, but thy fellow-citizens. Bear in mind that the general of a republic should serve none other. Thou hast heard of Themistocles; he, after having saved his country at Salamis, being calumniated by his enemies, was driven to seek an asylum in the land of a tyrant, who endeavoured to bribe him to take up arms against his country; his answer was a dagger in the tyrant's heart. Dumouriez, thou hast enemies, thou wilt be calumniated; remember Themistocles!

"An enslaved people look to thee for succour; thou wilt shortly deliver them. What a glorious mission!——But thou must beware of an excess of generosity towards thy enemies. *Thou hast sent back the King of Prussia a little too much in the French fashion.* But we hope Austria will be made to pay double.

"Thou art about to go to Brussels, Dumouriez. I see I need say nothing on this subject.——Yet if thou shouldest there find an execrable woman who came under the walls of Lille, to regale her ferocity by the spectacle of the conflagration of the city! ——But this woman does not expect thee.——

"At Brussels, liberty is about to spring up under thy feet.——Men, maidens, women, and children will press around thee; what happiness art thou about to enjoy;——My wife is from Brussels, she will also embrace thee * !"

Danton then left the club with Dumouriez, whose company he had engaged, and to whom he did the honours of the new republic. Danton having displayed as much courage at Paris as Dumouriez at Sainte Menehould, they were regarded as the two saviours of the revolution, and received joint applause whenever they appeared. An instinctive attraction seemed to unite these two men, in spite of the difference of their habits and opinions. They very well personified the eccentric aberrations of two systems of society: Danton that of the people; Dumouriez that of courts: but more fortunate than his colleague, the latter had waged a generous open war against enemies with arms in his hands, whereas the former had stained a great character by the atrocities of September.

The brilliant withdrawing rooms in which the great men of the last century, Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert, and Rousseau, had received the homage their splendid talents commanded, no longer existed. A simple and select society at the house of Madame Roland was now the only rendezvous of wit and distinction. Here the handsome Barbaroux, the intellectual Louvet, the grave Buzot, the brilliant Guadet, and the eloquent Vergniaud were accustomed to assemble; here a pure discourse, interesting conversations, and polished manners might still be found; here the ministers met twice a week, and partook of a plain repast, consisting of a single course. Such was the character of this republican society, which united the graces of the ancient regime with the seriousness of the new, but which shortly disappeared, and gave place to demagogue brutality. Dumouriez was invited to one of these simple entertainments, and experienced at first some embarrassment at being thus placed in the midst of his former friends, whom he had a few months before driven from the ministry, and confronted with a woman whose principles he thought too rigid, and who considered his as too licentious; but he acted his

* See note 49 in the Appendix.

part with his accustomed spirit, and was extremely touched by the sincere cordiality of Roland. Except the society of the Girondists, that of the artists was the only one that had survived the downfall of the ancient aristocracy. Nearly all the artists had warmly espoused the cause of the revolution, which avenged them of the disdain they had encountered from the nobles, and held out the prize to nothing but genius. They also in their turn welcomed Dumouriez, and gave him a fête, in which all the talent of the capital was brought together. But in the midst of this fête, an extraordinary scene interrupted it, which astonished as much as it disgusted every one.

Marat, always prompt in his suspicions, was not satisfied with the conduct of the general. The bitter calumniator of all those who enjoyed the public favour, he had always anticipated, in his disgusting invectives, the odium which any of the popular leaders afterwards incurred. Mirabeau, Bailly, Lafayette, Pétion, and the Girondists, had all been attacked by his calumnies, even while at the height of their popularity. Since the 10th of August, especially, he had given loose, without restraint, to the perverse depravities of his mind; and although still hideous to all reasonable and honest men, and even exciting the astonishment of the most extravagant revolutionists by his cold-blooded villainy, he had been encouraged by a successful opening. He looked upon himself, in some measure, as a public man, essential to the new order of things; and spent a great part of his time in picking up injurious reports, and publishing them in his journal, and in interfering with all the public offices, to redress, as he declared, the grievances of the people. Making his life the public property, he asserted in one of his papers*, that his duties overwhelmed him; that of the twenty-four hours, he gave but two to sleep, and one to the table and his domestic cares; that besides the hours devoted to his avocations as a deputy, he regularly employed six in collecting the complaints of the unfortunate and oppressed; and that he consecrated the remaining hours to reading a number of letters and answering them, to writing observations on passing events, to receiving accusations, and ascertaining the veracity of the accusers, to preparing his paper, and superintending the impression of a great work. For the three last years he had not, he said, allowed himself a quarter of an hour's recreation. This destructive activity was indeed astonishing, and the effects it was likely to produce in the heart of a revolution were frightful to contemplate.

Marat affected to see in Dumouriez nothing but an aristocrat of licentious habits, whom he ought to distrust. To increase his suspicions, he had gained information that the general had exercised great severity against two battalions of volunteers, who had put to death some emigrant deserters. With this information, he hurried immediately to the Jacobin club, accused Dumouriez, and demanded two commissaries to accompany him, to interrogate him concerning his conduct in that affair. Montaut and Bentabolle were ordered to attend him, and he immediately set out in quest of the general. He was not at his own house. Marat, therefore, hastened to the public theatres; he was not there: at last he learnt that the object of his pursuit was at a fête given him by the artists at the house of Mademoiselle Candeille, at that time a celebrated woman. Marat did not hesitate to follow him, in spite of his disgusting apparel. The equipages, the detachments of the national guards stationed at the outer gates, the presence of their commandant Santerre, the crowd of deputies, and the preparations for an entertainment, only irritated his ferocity. He advanced boldly, and called out for Dumouriez. A feeling of disgust was manifested at his presence. On the announcement of his name many of the guests disappeared, who, as he himself said, fled from his denouncing aspect. Advancing straight towards the general, he interrogated him sharply, and demanded of him an account of the discipline he had exercised in respect of the two battalions of volunteers. Dumouriez regarded him steadily; then, with a contemptuous recognition, replied, "Ah! you are the person called Marat!" then, again regarding him from head to foot, he turned upon his heel, without deigning to give him a single word of explanation. The Jacobins who accompanied him, however, being more mild in their deportment, he explained his conduct to them, and they departed satisfied. But Marat was greatly exasperated. He raised a great outcry in the ante-chamber; said that the gourmand Santerre was a mere lackey to the general; declaimed against the national guard, which contributed to the splendour of the fête; and retired, menacing with his vengeance all the aristocrats of which the party was composed. He then hastened home to give an account of this ridiculous scene in his journal, which so truly displayed the situation of Dumouriez, the ferocity of Marat, and the manners of the day*.

Dumouriez had now spent four days in Paris, but, during this time, he had not come to any understanding with the Girondists, although he had an intimate friend among them in the person of Gensonné. He counselled the latter to reconcile himself with Danton as the most powerful man in Paris, and who, in spite of his vices, might be essentially useful to well-intentioned men. Neither was he upon a better footing with the Jacobins, with whom he was greatly disgusted, and by whom he was suspected, on account of his supposed intimacy with the Girondists. His visit, therefore, to Paris, had been of little service to him with regard to those two leading parties, but it had been more useful with respect to military matters.

According to his usual method, he had devised a general plan of military operations, which had been adopted by the executive council. In pursuance of this plan, it was agreed Montesquieu should keep along the Alps, securing the grand chain of those mountains for his boundary, by completing the conquest of Nice, and preserving the neutrality of Switzerland. Biron was to be reinforced, that he might keep possession of the Rhine from Bâle to Landau. A body of twelve thousand men, under the command of general

* *Journal de la Republique Française*, No. 92, Wednesday, 9th January, 1793.

* See the statement of Marat himself. *Note 10* in the Appendix.

Meusnier, were to support the rear of Custine, and keep open his line of communications. Kellermann had received orders to quit his quarters, and passing between Luxembourg and Treves, to hasten to Coblentz; in fact, to do what he had long since been recommended to do, and which he and Custine ought to have performed long ago. Finally, Dumouriez, with twenty-four thousand men, acting on the offensive, was to complete the extent of the French territory by the projected acquisition of Belgium. Thus keeping on the defensive on all the frontiers protected by natural ramparts, an active warfare could not be carried on; but upon the open frontier, that is, the Low Countries, where, as Dumouriez observed, a defence could only be maintained by gaining battles.

Dumouriez also, through the influence of Santerre, persuaded the Parisians to abandon the absurd idea of a camp under Paris, and the men, artillery, ammunition, and stores which had been collected for that purpose, were to be transported to Flanders, for the service of his army, which was at present destitute of every thing. Besides this, a supply of shoes and great coats, and an allowance of money as advance-pay for his soldiers, till he established himself in the Low Countries, were granted him, after which time he hoped to be able to maintain himself. He left Paris on the 16th of October, with no very lively sense of the public gratitude, rather more estranged from the two dominant parties than ever, and only recompensed for his journey by the military arrangements he had made with the executive council.

During this interval the assembly had not remitted its exertions against the commune, hurrying on a new election, and keeping a strict watch upon all its acts. Pétion had been nominated mayor by a majority of thirteen thousand eight hundred and ninety-nine votes, whilst Robespierre only obtained twenty-three, Billaud de Varrennes fourteen, Panis eighty, and Danton eleven. Yet we must not measure the popularity of Robespierre and Pétion by this circumstance; the latter having been once before mayor, the people were desirous he should retain that situation, whilst in the former they beheld merely a deputy of the assembly, and were not anxious to see him in any other character; yet the immense majority in favour of Pétion proves clearly the popularity this leader of the Girondist party then enjoyed. We must not forget to mention here that Bailly obtained two votes in this election, a singular token of regard to this virtuous magistrate of 1789. Pétion refused the mayoralty, harassed as he was with the convulsions of the commune, and preferring as he did the duties of a deputy of the national convention.

The three principal measures which had been projected in the famous sitting of the 24th of September, were an act against incitement to murder, a decree for the formation of a departmental guard, and finally, an exact account of the state of Paris. The two first, which were placed in the hands of the commission of nine, gave great discontent to the commune, the Jacobins, and the sections. Yet the commission of nine did not the less remit their exertions, and several departments, and among others those of Marseilles and Calvados, sent four battalions to Paris, before the decree had passed. Roland, to whom the execution of the last measure was committed, that is, the report of the state of the capital, performed it with his usual vigour, and with scrupulous veracity. He described, and, at the same time, excused the inevitable confusion of the first insurrection, but reprobated with great severity the crimes of the 2nd of September. He displayed the excesses of the commune, its abuse of power, its arbitrary imprisonments, and extensive depredations, and concluded in these words:—

"A prudent but powerless department; an active and despotic commune; a population well disposed, but of which the sound thinking part is intimidated and overborne by a violent and infuriated party, while the other part is excited by demagogues, and inflamed by false reports; a confusion of authorities; an abuse and contempt of all law; a feeble and useless public force, made so by a wretched system of command; such is Paris!"*

This report was received with great applause by the ordinary majority, although, during its reading, some murmurs were heard to burst from the Mountain party. But a letter which was produced, written by a private individual to a magistrate, and bringing to light the design of another 2nd of September, against a party of the convention, occasioned great tumult in the assembly. The following was one of the expressions of this letter: "*They* (the conspirators) *talk of no one but Robespierre.*" All eyes were now directed towards him who had been thus marked out; the one party testifying the greatest indignation, and the other urging him to defend himself. At last he rose, and endeavoured to efface the impression made by Roland's report, which he called a defamatory romance, and maintained that it ought not to obtain publicity, before those whom it accused, and particularly himself, had been heard in their defence. He then began his own justification, but from the noise which filled the chamber could not be heard. "Speak out," said Danton, "speak out—all good citizens will listen to you." He at last obtained a hearing, recommenced his apology, defied his adversaries to accuse him openly, and produce against him a single proof. On this defiance, Louvet sprang forward: "I," said he," I accuse you," and as he finished these words, he stood at the foot of the tribune; Barbaroux and Rebecqui followed him, to support his accusation. Robespierre appeared much moved, and changed colour. He demanded, however, a hearing for his accuser, and afterwards for himself. Danton then rose; he complained of the system of calumny which was levelled against the Paris deputation; repeated what he had before declared, that he was no friend of Marat's, said that his *volcanic* and *unsocial disposition* had been fully proved, and that the idea of a triumviral coalition was absurd. He concluded by proposing that a day should be fixed for taking into consideration the report of Roland. The assembly then ordered it to be printed, but delayed its distribution in the departments, on account of the accusation of Louvet against Robespierre.

Louvet was as bold as he was patriotic, but in his contest with Robespierre personal resentment hurried him on; this resentment was first excited at the Jacobin club, continued in the *Sentinel*, re-

* Sitting of the 29th October.

newed in the electoral assembly, and carried to the highest pitch ever since he found himself face to face with his jealous rival in the national convention. To an extreme petulance of temper, he united a credulous imagination, which misled him, and made him fancy conspiracies where they did not exist. He believed sincerely in his own suppositions, and endeavoured to force his friends into the same belief. But in the cold good sense of Pétion and Roland, and in the indolent impartiality of Vergniaud, he met with obstacles which greatly disconcerted him. Buzot, Barbaroux, and Guadet, without being equally credulous, believed in the evil designs of their adversaries, and seconded the attacks of Louvet by their indignation and courage. Salles, the deputy of the Meurthe, and the obstinate enemy of all anarchists, both in the constituent assembly and the convention, whose mind was tinctured with gloom and violence, was alone accessible to all the suggestions of Louvet, and believed, like him, in extensive plots devised in the commune, and reaching into foreign countries. Being both passionate zealots of liberty, Louvet and Salles could not consent to impute foreign policy to so many evil designs, they rather supposed that the *mountaineers*, but especially Marat, were paid by the emigrants and England, to involve the revolution in crime, dishonour, and a general confusion. Less certain as to the particular manner in which Robespierre was implicated in this plot, they nevertheless saw in him a tyrant, eaten up with pride and ambition, and advancing, by all possible means, to the supreme power.

Louvet having determined to vigorously attack Robespierre, and to give him no rest, had his speech ready on the day Roland gave in his report; he was therefore fully prepared to support his accusation when he occupied the tribune, which he did immediately after Roland.

The Girondists were already sufficiently inclined to put an evil construction on most of the late events, and to suspect the existence of a plot, where there was only a collision of violent passions; but to the credulous Louvet it was evident beyond a doubt, that a conspiracy was formed and combined in the most dangerous manner. In the increasing extravagance of the Jacobins, and in the ascendancy which the domineering pride of Robespierre had obtained among them during the year 1792, he saw circumstances confirming the truth of all his suspicions. He described Robespierre as surrounded by satellites, to whose violence he delivered over all his opponents; he declared, that he had made himself an object of idolatrous worship among his partisans, and accused him of having propagated a report before the 10th of August, that he alone could preserve the liberties of France; on the 10th, he described him as hiding himself from public observation, re-appearing after all danger had passed over; taking a most active part in the acts of the commune, in spite of his promise to accept of no place, and in full authority seating himself at the bureau of the general council; gaining an unlimited control over the multitude, urging them to commit all manner of excesses, and in their name insulting the legislative assembly, by threatening them with the tocsin, if they did not issue decrees; directing secretly the massacres of September, to support the municipal authority by terror; sending emissaries to all parts of France to hold up the crimes of September to imitation, and persuading the provinces to acknowledge the superiority and the authority of Paris. His object, added Louvet, was to destroy the national representation, to substitute the commune, of which he was perfect master, in its place, and to establish the government of Rome, when, under the title of municipalities or dependencies, the provinces would be subject to the metropolis. Thus being supreme in Paris, he would have had all France under his control, and would have succeeded to the throne of annihilated royalty. Seeing, however, the near approach of a new representation, he had passed from the general council to the electoral assembly, and by the influence of terror, directed its choice of deputies, hoping to become master of the national convention by means of the Paris deputation. In addition to these charges, he pointed out Robespierre as the person who had recommended to the electors that man of blood, whose incendiary placards had filled all France with astonishment and horror. This libeller, with whose name, said Louvet, he would not pollute his lips, he described as the adopted child of assassination, who possessed more courage in preaching crime and calumniating others than the timid Robespierre. As for Danton, Louvet did not include him in the present accusation, and expressed his astonishment that he had rushed to the tribune to repel an attack which was not directed against him. Yet he did not exculpate him from all the odium attached to the massacres of September; as when all the authorities, the assembly, the ministers, and the mayor lifted up their voices in vain to put a stop to those horrors, he alone, the sole minister of justice, was silent, and moreover was exempt from the calumnies with which the most upright citizens were assailed. "And can you," exclaimed Louvet, "can you, O Danton, ever wash out from your reputation, in the eyes of posterity, this dishonourable exception." These imprudent but noble expressions were followed by great applause.

This accusation, though it gave general satisfaction, was nevertheless interrupted by frequent murmurs; one word in particular frequently repeated during the sitting, had repressed them. "Command silence for me," said he, "*for I am about to probe the wound.*" "Go on," replied Danton, "probe it;" and every time that murmurs arose, "*Silence*," cried they, "*silence ye wounded.*"

Louvet then resumed his accusation. "Robespierre," cried he, "I accuse you of having calumniated and proscribed the most honourable citizens, of having made yourself an object of idolatry to your partisans, and of having given out that you were the only man capable of saving the country; I accuse you of having slandered, insulted, and persecuted the national representation; of having tyrannised over the electoral assembly of Paris, and of having aimed at the acquisition of supreme power, by spreading calumny and terror around you, and resorting to every species of violence; and I demand a committee to examine into your conduct." Louvet then proposed the passing of a law which should condemn to banishment all those who should make their names rallying points of divisions in the state; to which he added another proposition: viz., that the armed force of the nation

should be placed at the disposition of the minister of the interior. "Finally," said he, "I demand an immediate decree of accusation against Marat!—gods!" exclaimed he, "gods! I have at last named him!"

Robespierre, stunned by the applauses with which his adversary was saluted, attempted to make some reply to his accusations; in the midst of the uproar and murmurs of indignation excited by his presence, he hesitated, his countenance became pale, and his voice faltered; yet he succeeded in making himself heard, and demanded time to prepare his defence. This was granted, and his defence was adjourned to the 5th of November. This was a fortunate delay for him, for the assembly were wrought up to a high pitch of indignation by the eloquence of Louvet.

In the evening this caused a great sensation at the Jacobin Club, who passed judgment upon every sitting of the Convention. A host of members hastened thither, almost at their wits' end, to narrate, the *horrible conduct* of Louvet, and demanded his immediate expulsion. He had, said they, calumniated the society, criminated Danton, Santerre, Robespierre, and Marat, demanded an accusation against the two last, proposed sanguinary laws hostile to the liberty of the press, and finally suggested the renewal of the *ostracism of Athens*. Legendre observed that his attack was a got-up affair (*un coup monté*), as he had previously prepared his speech, and that the report of Roland was undoubtedly only brought forward to introduce this diatribe. Fabre d'Églantine complained that "the slanders of those who made a virtue of calumniating Paris and the patriots increased every day. From petty conjectures and suspicions, a vast conspiracy had been hatched, but where it existed, who were its agents, and what its means, none could tell. If any impartial man, the friend to truth, and well acquainted with, and disposed towards, both the Jacobin and Girondist parties, could be found, he surely would be able to throw some light on this subject. This man was Pétion; let him be called upon for a declaration of all he has seen, and let him decide upon the truth of the crimes imputed to the patriots. However compliant he may be to his friends, he would venture to say that their intrigues had not corrupted him; that he still remained sincere and upright, and that he should therefore be called upon to explain himself."

Merlin opposed the idea of making Pétion a judge between Robespierre and Louvet, for this would be violating equality, and making one citizen supreme over others. In other respects, Pétion was certainly highly respectable; but he was capable of erring: he was the friend of Brissot and Roland, and received Lasource, Vergniaud, Barbaroux, and all that intriguing faction who compromised the cause of liberty.

The motion of Fabre was therefore abandoned, and the younger Robespierre, affecting a tone of lamentation (as the relations of the accused used at Rome), expressed his grief at what had happened, and regretted being exempt from the calumny with which his brother was attacked. "The present moment," said he, "is full of danger; all the people are not for us; none but the citizens of Paris are yet sufficiently enlightened; the remainder are but imperfectly so. It is possible, then, that innocence may fall on Monday, for the convention have listened to the long fabrications of Louvet. Citizens," cried he, "I tremble greatly; it appears to me that assassins are about to stab my brother. I have heard some say that he should perish by their hands; and another declared to me that he would be his executioner." Many members now rose, and declared that they also had been menaced by Barbaroux, by Rebecqui, and several other citizens of the tribune; and that those who menaced them said to them, "they must get rid of Marat and Robespierre." The younger Robespierre was then surrounded by the members of the club, who promised to watch over the safety of his brother; and it was agreed that all those who had friends or relations in the departments should write them an account, to explain what had happened. The younger Robespierre, before he quitted the tribune, did not fail to give vent to a falsehood, for he declared that Anacharsis Clootz had assured him that he was every day at the house of Roland, breaking lances against federalism.

The turbulent Chabot now rose. That which wounded him most in the speech of Louvet, was his attributing the 10th of August to himself and his friends, and the 2nd of September to two hundred assassins. "For myself," said Chabot, "I recollect addressing myself, on the evening of the 9th, to the gentlemen of the right side, and proposing to them the insurrection, to which they replied by a contemptuous smile. I do not see, therefore, what right they have to attribute the 10th of August to themselves. As to the 2nd of September, its authors are the same people who obtained the victory of the 10th, and followed it up with vengeance. Louvet has declared that there were not two hundred assassins; but I can assure him that I passed under an arch of ten thousand sabres, with the messengers of the legislative assembly; and among this multitude I recognised more than a hundred and fifty federalists. There are no such things as crimes in revolutions; and Marat, who had been so frequently accused, is only persecuted on account of revolutionary acts. To-day, Marat, Danton, and Robespierre are accused; to-morrow, it will be Santerre, Chabot, and Merlin."

Emboldened by these hardy expressions, a federalist presented himself to the club, and acknowledged, which no one had as yet dared to do, that he had *done business* with a great number of his comrades at the prisons, but that he believed none but conspirators and forgers of false assignats were put to death; that he thanked the society for the goodwill they had ever testified towards them, and that, the army being about to quit Paris on the morrow, they were unwilling to leave the patriots exposed to such great perils.

This frightful declaration terminated the sitting. Robespierre did not appear during the whole week, being engaged in preparing his defence, leaving to his partisans the task of acting upon public opinion. Meantime the commune persisted in their old system, and pursued the same line of conduct as before. It is said that they had taken ten millions of francs out of the chest of the treasurer of the civil list; and they even now were busy in circu-

lating a petition through the forty-four municipalities against the project of giving a guard to the convention. Barbaroux proposed the passing of four formidable acts, which were perfectly adapted to accomplish their object:

By the first, the capital ought to be deprived of the right of national representation, the moment she became unable to protect it against insult or violence.

By the second, the federalists and national gendarmes were ordered, in concert with the armed sections of Paris, to mount guard over the national representation and the other public establishments.

By the third, the convention was constituted a court of justice to pass sentence on all conspirators.

And by the fourth, the convention dissolved the municipality of Paris.

These four acts were certainly well adapted to the circumstances of the period, and were well calculated to avert the danger of the moment, but in order to pass them it was requisite to possess that power which could only be the result of the acts themselves. To effect the consequences of energy, energy itself is required, and every moderate party who desires to stop a violent party in its career is confined within a vicious circle, the limits whereof it can never pass. Undoubtedly the majority, who inclined to the opinions of the Girondists, could have passed these decrees, but that very moderation which gave such a tendency to their inclinations, made them dilatory, temporising, distrustful of the future, and averse to vigorous measures. A decree of a less energetic nature, the first of those which had been confided to the committee of nine for their approval, had been lately rejected. This latter had been proposed by Buzot, and was directed against the concealed authors of the scenes of September. By this decree, a direct instigation to murder or pillage was made punishable by death, and an indirect one by ten years' imprisonment; the first the majority deemed too severely retaliatory, and the latter too vaguely defined. In vain did Buzot repeat that there existed a necessity for revolutionary, and consequently arbitrary measures, to subdue adversaries who were at open war with the assembly. He was not listened to; revolutionary measures were what the majority condemned in the Jacobin party, and therefore were not likely to tolerate them when employed against that society. The consideration of this law was adjourned, and the committee of nine, appointed to devise means of securing the public tranquillity, were thus rendered useless. The assembly, nevertheless, displayed somewhat more energy in repressing the extravaganees of the commune. They then appeared to defend their authority with a kind of jealousy and vigour. The council-general of the commune was called before the bar of the assembly, to explain their conduct in disseminating a petition against the project of a departmental guard. In justifying themselves, they were met, said the assembly, the same council as that of the 10th of August; there were them among them, they avowed, many equivocal characters, who justly were amenable to accusation, but asserted that they were no longer in any way connected with those individuals; they begged the assembly not to confound the innocent with the guilty, and solicited that confidence from them of which they stood so much in need, and by means of which alone they should be enabled to establish that tranquillity in the public mind, which was so necessary to the convention, before they could frame laws for the good of the community. As to the petition, they declared that it was at the suggestion of the sections it had been sent into the provinces; that they were merely subordinates, but that they would engage to desist from this practice.

This submission disarmed even the Girondists, and at the request of Gensonné the honours of the sitting were accorded to the council-general. If, however, this tractability of the heads of the council might gratify the pride of the assembly, so far as concerned the truest sentiments of the Parisians it could do nothing. The turbulence of the people increased as the 5th of November approached, the day fixed for the defence of Robespierre. On the previous evening, contradictory reports were afloat; bands paraded the city, some crying out "to the guillotine with Robespierre, Danton, and Marat;" and' others crying out "Death to Roland, Lasource, and Guadet." It was made the subject of a formal complaint of the Jacobins, that nothing was spoken of but these exclamations against Robespierre, Danton, and Marat. These exclamations were imputed to dragoons and federalists, who were then devoted to the convention. The younger Robespierre again appeared in the tribune, again lamented the dangers to which innocence was exposed, and rejected a plan of conciliation proposed by a member of the society, by saying that the adverse party was decidedly counter-revolutionary, that neither peace nor truce could be made with them, that undoubtedly innocence would perish in the struggle, but that it was better she should sacrifice herself, and Maximilian Robespierre be permitted to fall, when it was considered that the destruction of one single individual did not involve that of liberty itself. These fine sentiments were loudly applauded, and the club assured the younger Robespierre that his fears were needless, and that his brother should not perish.

Complaints of quite a different nature were made in the assembly, and the menaces thrown out against Roland, Lasource, and Guadet, met with condemnation. Roland complained of the neglect of his requisitions to the department and to the commune for the purpose of obtaining an armed force. A long debate ensued; mutual reproaches took place, and the day elapsed without any measure being taken. On the day following, the 5th of November, Robespierre at last appeared in the tribune.

The crowd was immense, and the result of the solemn discussion about to be entered into impatiently awaited. The speech of Robespierre was very elaborate, and prepared with great care, and his answers to the accusations of Louvet were such as are always resorted to on similar charges. "You accuse me," said he, "of aspiring to tyrannical dominion; but to accomplish this object, there must be means, and where are my funds and my armies? You pretend that I have reared the edifice of my power in the club of the Jacobins. But how do you prove this? Is it because I com-

therefore left out the preamble of Barrère, and passed to the order of the day without specifying their motive.

The Jacobins celebrated this victory with great rejoicings, and Robespierre was received as having obtained a complete triumph. The moment he appeared at the club, he was received with the most extravagant applause. One member requested that he might be allowed to recite the particulars of his victory, but another declared that his modesty would not permit him to undertake this recital. He himself enjoyed this enthusiastic admiration in silence, and left to others the task of adulation. He was called Aristides, his *simple and masculine* eloquence was highly praised, and these praises were made so conspicuously prominent as proved the knowledge his eulogisers had of his taste for this species of flattery. The convention was re-established in the good graces of the society; the triumph of truth, they said, had commenced, and that they no longer despaired of the welfare of the republic.

Barrère was now interrogated as to his expression of *contemptible fomenters of disorder;* and he explained himself by declaring that he intended to designate by those words, not the patriots accused with Robespierre, but their adversaries.

Such was the result of this celebrated accusation. It certainly was extremely imprudent, and very well characterized the general conduct of the Girondists. They experienced a generous indignation at the sight of crime, but this indignation was mingled with much personal resentment, and many false and chimerical suppositions, which gave those who wished to remain blind to danger, a pretext for withholding credit from their exaggerated pictures of impending calamity, and made the timid hesitate, and those who pretended to impartiality suspend their decisions; it was these three classes who composed the whole of the *Plain*. Pétion, however, was not carried away by the exaggerations of his party; he caused to be printed the speech he had prepared, wherein all matters were discreetly weighed. Vergniaud also, whose good sense and fastidious indolence placed him above the reach of his passions, partook not of the irregular bias of his party, and the conduct of the Girondists had no other effect than that of rendering any reconciliation between themselves and the Jacobins impossible, of having employed and expended in a profitless conflict the most powerful and yet the sum of their available resources, accusation and indignation, and of aggravating the animosity and fury of their adversaries, without obtaining a single advantage.

Wo to the conquered, when their conquerors fall out! The latter then animate their fury against their down-trodden enemies, and endeavour to surpass each other in zeal in their inflictions of vengeance. A thunder-cloud of revolutionary passions was now about to burst on the heads of the prisoners in the Temple. Monarchy, aristocracy, and all that excited the hatred of the people, appeared to be personified in the unfortunate Louis XVI. And the way in which the dethroned prince was treated, in itself was sufficient to demonstrate how much the idea of a counter revolution was abhorred. The legislative assembly, too nearly attached to the constitution which declared the king inviolable, not having dared to decide upon his fate had merely suspended or imprisoned him, they had not abolished royalty, but had committed these measures to be decided on by the convention. Royalty being abolished, a republic decreed, and the labours of framing a constitution being intrusted to the consideration of the most distinguished intellectual ornaments of the assembly, all that remained was to determine the lot of Louis XVI. Six weeks had already elapsed, and the multiplied avocations of the assembly, the well ordering of the victualling department, the superintendence of the armies, the cares of the public provisioning which was constantly defective, as is always the case in troublous times, the burden of the police, and all the burdensome details of government, which had not been, since the fall of royalty, transferred to an executive council, without extreme misgivings; lastly, violent dissensions had prevented their turning attention to the prisoners in the Temple. Once indeed the subject had been alluded to, and its consideration, we have seen, had been referred to the committee of legislation. Meantime, it formed the topic of all conversations; at the Jacobin club, every day, the judgment of Louis XVI. was called for, and the Girondists were accused of diverting attention from this subject by quarrels, in which it must be confessed each took quite as active a part as they themselves. On the first of November, during the interval which elapsed between the accusation and defence of Robespierre, a section complained of the publication of a new placard inciting to murder and pillage, and, as was always the case, the Girondists called for a trial against Marat. They assumed that he and his colleagues were the instigators of every disorder. Their enemies, on the contrary, affirmed that the origin of all disturbances was to be traced to the Temple; that the new republic could not be established, and that tranquillity and security could never be restored, till the ex-king should be immolated, and the conspirators by this terrible blow be thus deprived of all hopes of success in their designs. Jean de Bry, that deputy who in the legislative assembly proposed that *the law of public safety* should be the only rule of action to the national representation, on this occasion proposed that Marat and Louis XVI. should be brought to trial together. "Marat," said he, "has merited the title of man-eater; he is worthy of being a king, he is the cause of those troubles of which Louis XVI. is the pretext; let us pass sentence on them both together, and restore the public tranquillity by this double example of justice." The convention, in consequence of this representation, ordered that the charges against Marat should be prepared during the present sitting, and that in the course of eight days, at latest, the committee of legislation should give in their opinion as to the forms to be observed in the trial of Louis XVI. If at the expiration of these eight days, the committee should not have presented their report to the assembly, every member should be at liberty to discuss the question without farther delay. Fresh altercations, and fresh cares, delayed the report against Marat, which was not presented till long afterwards; but the committee were diligent in preparing their plan of proceedings against the august and unfortunate family imprisoned in the Temple.

The eyes of Europe were at this juncture anxiously fixed upon France. With astonishment did every one behold subjects, at first deemed so feeble, but now become victorious, bold enough to hurl defiance at thrones. Their evident intentions were the subject of much anxiety, and it was yet hoped their audacious policy was approaching its termination. Meantime military events were preparing, which, in their sequel, increased the intoxication of the French republicans, and spread a panic through the civilized world.

CHAPTER III.

THE SEQUEL OF DUMOURIEZ'S MILITARY OPERATIONS—ALTERATION IN THE MINISTRY, PACHE MINISTER OF WAR—VICTORY OF JEMMAPES—MORAL AND POLITICAL CONDITION OF BELGIUM; POLITICAL CONDUCT OF DUMOURIEZ—THE CAPTURE OF GHENT, MONS, BRUSSELS, AND ANTWERP; CONQUEST OF BELGIUM UP TO THE MEUSE—CHANGES IN THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT; MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN DUMOURIEZ, THE CONVENTION, AND THE MINISTRY—THE STATE OF OUR AFFAIRS AT THE ALPS AND THE PYRENEES.

Dumouriez set out for Belgium towards the end of October, and on the 25th arrived at Valenciennes. His general plan of operations was regulated in conformity to his favourite idea, that of attacking the enemy in front, and thus taking advantage of their great numerical superiority, to increase the glory of his own triumphs. It was possible, by following the course of the Meuse with the greatest part of his army, to hinder the junction of Clerfait, who had just arrived from Champagne, to attack the Duke d'Albert in the rear, and to execute that which he had formerly omitted to do, by neglecting to direct his march upon the Rhine, and from the Rhine to Cleves; but his plan did not then admit of this movement, and he preferred a brilliant action, which redoubled the courage of his soldiers, already excited by the cannonade of Valmy, to a skilful march. The cannonade of Valmy had already destroyed that opinion which had prevailed in Europe for fifty years, that the French, though admirably adapted for a *coup-de-main*, were incapable of gaining a pitched battle. The enemy's superiority of number afforded him an opportunity of making a fair trial of his present plan, and this idea was quite as talented as the manœuvres which he was reproached for not adopting. Yet he neglected nothing to turn the enemy's flank, and to prevent the junction of Clerfait. Valence, stationed for this purpose along the Meuse, was ordered to march from Givet upon Namur and Liége, with the army of Ardennes, eighteen thousand strong. D'Harville, with twelve thousand men, received orders to march between the grand army and Valence, to turn the enemy at a nearer point. Such were the dispositions of Dumouriez on his right; on his left, Labourdonnaie, quitting Lille, was ordered to traverse the coast of Flanders, and seize upon all its maritime towns. On his arrival at Antwerp, he was commanded to keep along the Holland frontier, and take up his station on the Meuse at Ruremonde. Belgium was thus perfectly enclosed in a circle. Dumouriez occupied the centre, with a mass of forty thousand men, and was ready to overwhelm the enemy at the first point where they could make head against the French.

Impatient to open the campaign, and to commence upon the vast career, whither his ardent imagination had transported him, Dumouriez endeavoured to hasten the arrival of the stores he had been promised from Paris; and which should have reached Valenciennes on the 25th. Servan had given up the ministry of the war department, preferring the less turbulent functions of a military command, to the confusion and anarchy of the present administration; he added to his experience, and restored his health in his camp at the Pyrenees. At the recommendation of Roland, Pache, a man of simplicity, talents, and industry, who had formerly quitted France to reside in Switzerland, was chosen as his successor. This minister had, at the commencement of the revolution, returned to France; he gave up a pension he had received from the Marshal de Castrie, and distinguished himself greatly in the office of the interior, by extraordinary talent and application to business. Carrying in his pocket a piece of bread, and not even quitting the office to take his meals, his diligence and simple habits completely captivated Roland. Servan had demanded his assistance during his difficult administration of August and September, and Roland parted with him with much regret. Pache was equally zealous and industrious in this post as in the former, and when the ministry of the war department became vacant, he was immediately proposed to fill it, as one of those retired but praiseworthy beings who are entitled by justice and the public interest to rise rapidly in estimation. Pache, who by his retiring and modest manners gained the favour of all who conversed with him, could not fail to be universally acceptable. The Girondists naturally expected that a man so calm and prudent would be moderate in his political views, and counted on the co-operation of one who owed his rise to their good offices. The Jacobins, who perceived in his manners much deference towards themselves, praised his modesty, and contrasted it with the pride and inflexibility of Roland. Dumouriez, for his part, was delighted with a minister who appeared more manageable than the Girondists, and more disposed to adopt his own views. He had indeed new causes of complaint against Roland. This latter had written him a letter, in which he reproached him with endeavouring to force his plans on the ministry. Roland, however, was a generous adversary, and what he gave vent to in a private correspondence, he would have disputed in public. But Dumouriez, mistaking the upright intentions of Roland, made his complaints to Pache, who received them willingly,

and consoled him with flattery, and mistrust of his colleagues. Such was the new minister of war. Placed between the Jacobins, the Girondists, and Dumouriez, and giving an attentive ear to the complaints of each, he gained the favour of all by his soft speeches and compliant manners, and each party hoped to find in him a supporter and a friend.

Dumouriez attributed the delay of the arrival of stores to this change of ministry; not more than the half of what he had been promised had yet reached him, and he renewed his march without waiting for the rest; writing to Pache, at the same time, that it was indispensably necessary that thirty thousand pairs of shoes, twenty-five thousand blankets, camp equipage for forty thousand men, and two millions of money in specie, to pay the soldiers, as the assignats would not pass in an enemy's country, should be sent him without delay. A compliance with all these demands was instantly promised, and Dumouriez, exciting the ardour of his troops, and encouraging their hopes of a speedy and certain conquest, advanced rapidly, although destitute of the necessary stores for the maintenance of a campaign entered on in the winter, and ill-protected from the inclemency of the climate.

The march of Valence being retarded by a diversion on Longwy, and by a want of military stores, which he was not furnished with till November, permitted Clerfait to pass from Luxembourg into Belgium without impediment, and to join the Duke d'Albert with twelve thousand men. Dumouriez, renouncing, for the moment, the idea of availing himself of the co-operation of Valence, ordered the division of General d'Harville to approach nearer to head-quarters, and then, marching through Quarouble and Quievrain, he hastened to encounter the enemy. D'Albert, faithful to the Austrian system, had formed a line from Tournay to Mons; and although he had an army of thirty thousand men, he could hardly collect twenty thousand before the latter city. Dumouriez arrived, on the 3rd of November, before the mill of Bossu, and ordered his advance guard, commanded by the brave Beurnonville, to drive off the enemy posted on the heights. This attack, though successful at first, was afterwards repulsed, and his advance guard were obliged to retire. Dumouriez, feeling how important it was that his troops should receive no check in the commencement of the campaign, ordered Beurnonville in advance again, routed all the enemy's outer posts, and on the evening of the 5th found himself in presence of the Austrians, who were entrenched upon the heights which overlook the city of Mons.

On these heights, which take a circular form before the place, are situated three villages, Jemmapes, Cuesmes, and Berthaimont. The Austrians, who expected to be attacked in this position, had formed the imprudent resolution to maintain it, and had long been diligently employed in rendering it as difficult of access as possible. Clerfait occupied Jemmapes and Cuesmes; a little further on, Beaulieu was encamped below Berthaimont. Steep declivities, wood, felled trees, fourteen redoubts, a formidable line of artillery ranged in tiers, and twenty thousand men, protected these positions, and made them almost inaccessible. Tyrolese sharp-shooters were posted in the woods, which extended along at the foot of the hills. The cavalry placed in the valleys which divided them, and more particularly in that which separates Jemmapes from Cuesmes, held themselves in readiness to debouche and charge upon our columns so soon as they should be disordered by the fire of the batteries.

It was in the face of this camp, so strongly fortified, that Dumouriez established himself. He drew up his army in the form of a semicircle, facing the enemy's position. General d'Harville, who had joined the principal force on the evening of the 5th, was posted on the extreme left of our line. On the morning of the 6th, he was ordered, by keeping along the positions of Beaulieu, to get round at the back, and seize upon the heights behind Mons, the only retreat to which the Austrians could have recourse. Beurnonville, forming then the right of the attack, received orders to march upon the village of Cuesmes. The Duke de Chartres, who served in the French army with the rank of general, and who commanded the centre, was directed to approach Jemmapes in front, and to attempt at the same time to gain possession of the vale which separates Jemmapes from Cuesmes. Finally, General Ferrand, commanding the left, received instructions to pass through a little village called Quaregnon, and march upon the skirts of Jemmapes. All these attacks were to be executed by battalion columns, and the cavalry were ready to support them in rear and in flank. Our artillery was so disposed as to open a fire upon all the enemy's redoubts in flank, and, if possible, to silence the fire of their artillery. A reserve of infantry and cavalry was stationed behind the brook of Wame, where they awaited the event of the engagement.

During the nights of the 5th and 6th, General Beaulieu proposed making a sudden sally from the trenches upon the French, and thus put them to the rout by an unexpected and nocturnal assault. This energetic proposition was not complied with, and at six o'clock in the morning the French were drawn up in battle array, animated with hope and intrepidity, though under a murderous fire, and within sight of intrenchments almost impregnable. Sixty thousand men covered the field of battle, and a hundred pieces of artillery roared responsive in front of both armies.

The cannonade commenced early in the morning. Dumouriez ordered the generals Ferrand and Beurnonville to commence the attack, whilst he himself waited in the centre for the proper moment to bring it into action; and d'Harville, keeping along the positions of Beaulieu, hastened to cut off all possibility of retreat from the enemy. Ferrand conducted his attack inefficiently, and Beurnonville did not succeed in silencing the fire of the Austrians. It was already eleven o'clock, and the enemy was not yet sufficiently disconcerted in flank to justify an assault in front. Dumouriez then dispatched his faithful Thouvenot to the left wing with an additional force, to decide the day. Thouvenot, ordering the cessation of an ineffectual cannonade, traversed Quaregnon, and marching silently and secretly round by Jemmapes with fixed bayonets, ascended its height, and reached the flank of the Austrians. Dumouriez being informed of this movement, resolved to commence his attack

in front, and advanced the centre directly upon Jemmapes. The infantry marched forward in columns, and the hussars and dragoons were so posted as to cover the vale between Jemmapes and Cuesmes, where the enemy's cavalry were stationed, ready to dart forward at a moment's notice. The French troops traversed without hesitation the intermediate space, except one brigade, who, seeing the Austrian cavalry issue from their covert, were thrown into confusion, retrograded, and discovered the flank of our columns. At this moment the youthful Baptiste Renard, a servant of Dumouriez, incited by that intrepidity and prompt sagacity which a critical emergency so frequently calls forth, hastened to the general of this brigade, reproached him with his pusillanimity, pointed out to him the danger, and succeeded in leading him back to the valley. The centre was now observed to waver; and our battalions began to give way under the fire of the batteries. The Duke de Chartres rallied his troops, placed himself in the midst of a battalion, which he named at the moment, the *Battalion of Jemmapes*, and advanced undauntedly upon the enemy. The attack was then renewed with redoubled vigour, and Clerfait already assailed in flank, and menaced in front, nevertheless resisted with heroic firmness.

Dumouriez observing all these movements, but still doubtful of success, hastened to the right, where the battle was still undecided in spite of the efforts of Beurnonville. He determined now either to bring the combat on this point to a sudden and decisive issue in his favour, or to recall the right wing to protect the retreat of the centre, if a retrograde movement should become necessary.

Beurnonville, having exhausted all his efforts against the village of Cuesmes, was about to retreat, when Dampierre, who commanded one point of the attack, taking with him a few companies, intrepidly threw himself into the midst of the redoubt. Dumouriez arrived at the moment Dampierre had executed this bold attempt; he found the remainder of his battalions without their general, exposed to a terrible fire from the enemy, and wavering in presence of the imperial hussars, who were about to charge them. These were the battalions who at the camp of Maulde had become so strongly attached to Dumouriez. He reanimated their courage, and exhorted them to remain firm against the enemy's cavalry. A discharge of musketry arrested the charge of the enemy's cavalry for the moment, and the hussars of Berchini coming up opportunely, put them to flight altogether. Dumouriez then placing himself at the head of his battalions, and chaunting with them the song of the Marseillais, led them forward with rapidity, got possession of the entrenchments, carried all before him, and seized upon the village of Cuesmes.

This exploit being completed, Dumouriez galloped off to the centre, followed by a few squadrons, but before he arrived there, the Duke de Montpensier met him, and announced the victory of the centre, attributable principally to the exertions of his brother the Duke de Chartres. Thus Jemmapes being besieged in flank and in front, and Cuesmes being carried, Clerfait could no longer resist, and was obliged to retreat. He quitted his position after a noble defence, leaving Dumouriez a dearly bought victory. It was now two o'clock; the troops were exhausted with fatigue, and demanded a short interval of rest. Dumouriez granted it, and halted upon the heights of Jemmapes and Cuesmes. He relied upon d'Harville for the pursuit of the enemy, who had been directed to cut off the rear of the Austrians. But this order, not being sufficiently clear, or being badly understood, d'Harville remained before Berthaimont. Clerfait retired under the protection of Beaulieu, who had not been attacked, and both took the road to Brussels, which d'Harville had left open.

In this battle the Austrians lost fifteen hundred prisoners, and four thousand five hundred killed and wounded, and the loss of the French was nearly equal. Dumouriez, however, concealed the truth, and acknowledged only the loss of a few hundreds. He was afterwards reproached with not having marched on his right, and turned the enemy on that point, and with not having assailed him in the rear instead of obstinately persisting in his attack on the left and centre. He indeed, at one time, had thoughts of following this plan, when he despatched d'Harville to keep along by Berthaimont; but he abandoned this idea; but his extreme promptitude, which often prevented deliberation, and his desire to gain a splendid victory, made him prefer at Jemmapes, and indeed during the whole campaign, an attack in front. Besides all this, with the greatest presence of mind and vigour in the midst of action, he had encouraged our troops, and imparted to them his own heroic courage. The sensation produced by this victory was prodigious. The victory of Jemmapes filled France with joy, and afforded Europe a new source of surprise. No one knew which to admire most, either the self-possession which braved the enemy's artillery, or the boldness with which the enemy's redoubts were occupied. The peril and the victory were both enlarged upon, and Europe once more confessed that French soldiers were capable of gaining great battles.

At Paris, all sincere republicans rejoiced at the news of this victory, and prepared to celebrate it with brilliant fêtes. The young Baptiste Renard, the servant of Dumouriez, was presented to the assembly, and honoured with the civic crown and an officer's epaulet. The Girondists, from feelings of justice and patriotism, applauded the success of the general. The Jacobins, although suspecting the intentions of Dumouriez, also lauded him, their praises being rather called forth by the prosperous course of the revolution, than by any sentiment of gratitude towards the general. Marat alone grumbled at their transports, and maintained that Dumouriez must have concealed his losses; that he could not even have attacked a mountain at so small a price; that he had taken neither baggage or artillery; that the Austrians had departed without molestation; that they were not defeated, but merely forced to retreat; and, mingling with this sagacity of remark a rabid spirit of calumny, he added that the attack in front had only been ordered to sacrifice the brave battalions of Paris; that his colleagues at the convention, at the Jacobin Club, and all the nation, so prompt to admire this victory, were light-headed; and that, for himself, he should pronounce Dumouriez a good gene-

ral when the whole of Belgium should be subjugated without a single Austrian escaping; and a good patriot when that country should be completely revolutionized and made perfectly free. "You Frenchmen," said he, "with this inclination to admire everything off-hand, are yet constantly exposing yourselves by your inconsistency. One day you off-hand condemn Montesquieu; the next day, on hearing that he has conquered Savoy, you dote upon him. You then proscribe him again, and thus become a laughing-stock by this running backwards and forwards. As for me," continued he, "I distrust, I always accuse; and as to the inconveniences attending such a disposition, they are incomparably less than those of a contrary turn of mind, for they never compromise the public safety. Without doubt they expose me to be misunderstood by some individuals; but, considering the corruption of the age, and the many enemies liberty has to encounter, it is a thousand to one but I am right in looking upon most men as intriguers and scoundrels, ready to undertake any evil enterprise. I am, therefore, little likely to be deceived in my estimate of public functionaries; and, whilst the fatal confidence which the generality of men place in them, induces them to conspire against their country with as much audacity as security; the constant suspicion with which the public would regard them, according to my principles, would not suffer them to take one step without trembling, for fear of being unmasked and punished*."

The battle of Jemmapes opened Belgium to the French, but singular difficulties surrounded Dumouriez; and two striking pictures presented themselves to his view in the conquered territory: the French revolution being held up as an example, tended to accelerate the course of neighbouring revolutions, or assimilate them to their grand prototype; and in their army, the military code being founded on demagogue principles, no discipline could be preserved.

Belgium was divided into many parties: the first, that of the Austrian domination, was confined to the imperial army, put to flight by Dumouriez; the second, consisting of the whole nation, nobles, priests, magistrates, and people, unanimously repulsed a foreign yoke, and ardently desired to establish their independence; but this latter was subdivided again into two other parties,—the nobles, priests, and privileged orders wished to preserve the ancient institutions, distinctions of rank, the old divisions of the provinces, and finally everything in its present state, with the exception of the Austrian power, which they wished to throw off; this party were supported by the superstitious part of the population, who remained attached to the clergy. Finally, the demagogues, or Belgian Jacobins, longed for a complete revolution, to establish the sovereignty of the people. With these, absolute equality formed the basis of what they called liberty. Thus each party adopted that part of the French revolution which seemed to suit their own views. It was thought that Dumouriez would preserve a medium in his own conduct towards them. Repelling Austria, and condemning the exclusive pretensions of the privileged orders, he was yet unwilling to transplant the Jacobin principles of Paris to Brussels, and to raise up new Chabots and Marats in that city. His object then was, without subverting the ancient organization of the country, to reform the feudal parts of its institutions. The enlightened part of the population came into his views immediately, but it was difficult to unite them in one common bond, on account of the slight relationship that existed between the cities and provinces; and by convoking an assembly, there was danger lest this temperate party should be overborne by their violent opponents. Dumouriez, however, notwithstanding these difficulties, meditated, either by an alliance or an union, to attach Belgium to the French empire, and thus complete the natural boundaries of our territory. He also took great pains to prevent his soldiers from committing any outrages, either by devastating the country or destroying property, that the immense resources of the nation might be at his disposal for the prosecution of the war, and that no class of the inhabitants might be alienated from his interests, or tempted to impede the progress of his army, or otherwise frustrate his objects by hostile insurrections. His chief care was to soothe the clergy, who still possessed great influence over the minds of the people. He aimed at attaining those objects which all experience in revolutions proves are impracticable, and which every administrative and political faculty must, at the very onset, entirely renounce. We shall shortly see how his projects and plans were developed.

On entering Belgium, he pledged himself by a proclamation to respect property, persons, and the national independence. For this purpose he ordered that all public functionaries should retain their situations, that the taxes should continue to be collected, and that the first assemblies should be called together immediately, that they might form a national convention, empowered to decide on the fate of the Belgic nation.

Other weighty difficulties now arose. Motives of policy, the public welfare, and the common feelings of humanity, naturally made Dumouriez desire that a prudent and moderate revolution should take place in Belgium, but his most pressing solicitude was the subsistence of his own army. As a general, his first object was victory; discipline and resources were absolutely necessary to secure this. On entering *Mons*, on the morning of the 7th, in the midst of the joyful acclamations of the Brabançons, who honoured him and the brave Dampierre with a crown of victory, he found himself in the greatest embarrassment. His commissariats were still at Valenciennes; none of the promised stores had arrived. Clothing for his soldiers, almost bare, live stock, horses for the artillery, baggage waggons, and, above all, money to pay his troops, as the assignats would not pass in Belgium, were all wanting. The emigrants having circulated a great number of false assignats, they had lost all credit; besides, no nation is willing to participate in the difficulties of another, by accepting that paper which represents its debts.

The impetuosity of Dumouriez's character, which amounted frequently to imprudence, makes it very probable that he would not have remained from the 7th to the 11th at Mons, nor have suffered the Duke of Saxe-Teschen to have retired without mo-

* *Journal de la Republique Française*, by Marat. *The Friend of the People*, No. 43, Monday, November 12, 1792.

lestation, if the details of the commissariat department had not detained him in spite of himself, and had not entirely absorbed that attention which should have been exclusively occupied with military preparations. In this difficulty he adopted a very well conceived expedient, that of making himself the medium of all commercial intercourse with the Belgians. This plan afforded him many advantages. The objects of consumption were upon the spot, and no delay had to be apprehended. These purchases interested many of the Belgians in the presence of the French army; in paying the sellers in assignats, they were interested in promoting their currency; this also dispensed with the necessity of a compulsory circulation, an important point: for every individual who receives a compulsory circulating medium regards it as stolen property by the authority who prescribes it, and this is the sure way to damnify it in the eyes of the public. He also entertained another plan, that of borrowing money from the clergy on the security of the French nation. This would have afforded him funds in specie, and although it seemed to bear hard upon the ecclesiastical body, it was calculated to inspire them with confidence, by acknowledging their existence as an order, and the personal nature of their property. Finally, France having to demand of the Belgians the liquidation of the expenses of a war undertaken to procure their freedom, the sums thus obtained might have repaid the clergy, so that with a small balance the whole cost of the war would have been defrayed at a very slight charge, whilst Dumouriez fulfilling the promises of his proclamation, would have subsisted his army in Belgium free of expense, without either galling the inhabitants, or disorganizing their government. But these plans only demonstrated great talent, and, in times of revolution it would seem that talent is called upon to act methodically; and either to anticipate the disorders which are about to take place and immediately retire, or else foreseeing them, to permit them to take their course, and in assenting to a state of disorder, continue to be serviceable at the head of the military or civic power. No man has ever been so detached from the affairs of the world as to be able to adopt the former line of conduct; but there has been a description of character, who, having been in an elevated station, found it practicable to be virtuous, in pursuing the latter course, it was he*, who being a member of the Committee of Public Safety, without participating in its public acts, dedicated himself to the labours of the war department, and *organized the means of obtaining victory*, which, under every form of government, is deemed honourable, legitimate, and under every circumstance, patriotic.

Dumouriez, in his financial operations, and his mercantile arrangements with the Belgians, obtained much assistance from Malus, the commissary of war, a man skilful and active, who had gained his esteem by his useful talents, and whose accounts the general did not therefore inspect with much accuracy; he also employed d'Espagnac, formerly a libertine abbé, one of those corrupt intellectuals of the old regime, and one of those men whose versatile talents accommodate themselves with grace and aptitude to all occupations. Dumouriez despatched this man to the ministry to explain his plans, and to obtain the ratification of all the engagements he had entered into. He had already excited sufficient prejudice against himself by the species of administrative dictatorship he had assumed, and by the moderation he had manifested with regard to the Belgians, without allying himself to men already suspected, or, if they were not, on the eve of becoming so. At this time, in fact, a general murmur was raised against the old administrations, which were filled, said the people, with rogues and aristocrats.

After having provided for the subsistence of his soldiers, Dumouriez turned his attention to accelerating the march of Labourdonnaie. This general having obstinately persisted in remaining in the rear, did not enter Tournay till very late, and then took part in scenes worthy of the Jacobins, and levied heavy contributions. Dumouriez ordered him to march rapidly on Ghent and the Scheldt on his way to Antwerp, and then to complete the circuit of the country to the Meuse. Valence finally arrived in line, after many involuntary delays, and immediately received orders to reach Nivelles on the 13th or 14th. Dumouriez, believing that the Duke de Saxe-Teschen had retired behind the canal of Vilvorden, directed that Valence, by going round the forest of Soignies should get behind this canal, and there should receive the duke at the passage of the Dyle.

On the 11th Dumouriez left Mons, and came up slowly with the enemy, who retired with order, but also very leisurely. From the delay of his baggage and stores, he was not able to arrive in time to make up for the many days he had unavoidably lost. On the 13th, however, advancing with only the advanced guard, he found himself unexpectedly in the midst of the enemy at Anderlecht, and hardly escaped being surrounded; but with his usual promptitude and courage he drew up his men, and arranged the few pieces of artillery he had with him in such a manner as to make the Austrians believe that he occupied the field of battle with his whole army. He thus succeeded in checking the enemy and gained time for the arrival of his main body, who hearing that he was in jeopardy, hastened with all speed to relieve him.

On the 14th he entered Brussels, and there was again impeded by the same commissariat embarrassments, having neither coin or any of those resources necessary for the maintenance of his troops. Here he learnt that the ministry had refused to consent to any of the contracts he had made with the exception of one, and that all the old military commissariat establishments had been replaced by a committee called the committee of supply.

This committee had alone, for the future, the right of entering into contracts, and making purchases for the supply of the armies, and no general was allowed in any way to interfere with their proceedings. This was the first measure of a revolution which was about to introduce a complete temporary disorganization into all the departments of the administration of the country.

Those departments of government which require long study to fulfil their duties, are commonly the last affected by a revolution, because they are less the objects of ambition, and there is an absolute

* Alluding to Carnot. Trans.

necessity that persons competent to fill such situations should be preserved from revolutionary fury. Thus hardly any change had taken place in the staffs of the army, in the offices of the several ministries, in the commissariat department, and especially in the naval administration, which of all others requires a peculiar kind of knowledge and information. But a cry was now raised against the aristocrats who filled these several offices, and the executive council were reproached with not having removed them and substituted other officers in their place. The administration against which the most violent outcries were raised was the commissariat. The commissaries, who taking advantage of the troubled state of public affairs, exacted the most exorbitant prices for their goods, which they took care should be of a very inferior description, and who robbed the nation with unparalleled effrontery, became objects of just and bitter reproaches. The deputy Cambon of Montpelier was their most implacable adversary. Passionately attached to financial studies, and watchful in preserving the public economy, this deputy had obtained a great ascendancy in questions of this nature, and possessed the entire confidence of the assembly. Although a decided democrat, he had loudly inveighed against the exactions of the commune, and astonished those who did not perceive that he condemned, as a financier, those disorders which as a Jacobin he would have pardoned. He declaimed with great energy against the commissaries, and sought to bring them to punishment with all that violence of temper for which he was remarkable. He daily brought to light new frauds; and in demanding their prevention in future, he found his audience all of one mind; all honest men desired the punishment of delinquents, the Jacobins were eager to persecute the aristocrats, and intriguing characters were delighted at the prospect of so many places becoming vacant.

The idea of a committee of supply, which we have before alluded to, was then started. It was thought that this committee, forming one body, and made responsible, would prevent the state being imposed upon by the frauds of individual commissaries, and by laying in stores of every description, would not be subject, in a moment of need, to purchase supplies at an exorbitant price, which ministers had hitherto been obliged to do; for the commissaries, forming a combination, always refused to sell their goods under the standard price they might fix among themselves. This institution was established with the concurrence of all the ministers, and Cambon was particularly its chief partisan; more especially, as this new and simple process was in accordance with his vigorous turn of mind. It was, therefore, immediately signified to Dumouriez that in future he was forbidden to form any contracts in his own name, and that those he had already entered into must be immediately annulled. At the same time the commissariat fund was suppressed, and the assembly made some difficulty in paying out of the national treasury a sum which a Belgian merchant had lent to the army, on the security of a promissory note from Dumouriez.

This change in the commissariat department, which was certainly effected with laudable intentions, unfortunately, in concurrence with other circumstances, turned out extremely disastrous in its effects. Servan, during his ministry, had to provide for the subsistence and other wants of the troops which were so hastily assembled in Champagne; and it was as much as he could do to furnish the necessary supplies at that embarrassing moment. After the campaign of the Argonne, the stores collected with so much labour were found to be exhausted; the volunteers who had left their homes with a single coat were almost naked; each army required a perfect equipment; and this new requisition was to be complied with in the midst of winter, and in spite of the rapidity of the Belgian invasion. Pache, the successor of Servan, had then a difficult task to accomplish; but unfortunately, although diligent and talented, he was also weak and supple, and being disposed to gain the favour of all, especially the Jacobins, possessed no commanding authority over any one, and his ministry was perfectly destitute of that decisive vigour which the exigencies of the moment made so necessary. If to the pressing necessities of the army we join the consideration of the difficulties incident to the winter season, the urgent call for extreme promptitude, the weakness of the new minister, the general disorder of the state, and consequently of the whole revolution in the administrative system, we may form some idea of the confusion of this moment, the destitution of the armies, their bitter complaints, and the violent reproaches which were interchanged between the generals and the ministers.

The news of these changes of administration excited the indignation of Dumouriez in a very high degree. Whilst the new system was organizing, he saw his army exposed to perish through privations, if the contracts he had entered into were not fulfilled. He took upon himself, then, the responsibility of enforcing them, and ordered his agents, Malus, d'Espagnac, and a third named Petit Jean, to superintend their execution. He wrote at the same time to the ministry in so lofty a tone as increased the suspicions of the demagogues, who were disgusted at his lukewarmness, and at the administrative dictatorship he appeared to assume. He declared that he would not continue his services without he was allowed to provide as he thought proper for the wants of his army. He maintained that the committee of supply was an absurdity; that they would be obliged to transport with great labour from a distance that which he could furnish himself with, with more facility, on the spot; that this transportation would be attended with enormous expense, and be subject to delays, during which his army might perish of hunger, cold, and privation; that the Belgians, according to the proposed system, would lose all interest in the presence of the French troops in their country, and would no longer favour the circulation of assignats; that the peculations of commissaries would in no wise be prevented, as the facility of robbing the state by affixing exorbitant prices to goods would always call into existence public peculators; that nothing could prevent the members of the committee of supply becoming interested speculators, in spite of all the prohibitions of the law; that thus their proposed plan was nothing more than a mere dream of economy, which, even if it were not chimerical, would, at

the moment, be attended with the most disastrous effects, by interrupting the services of public officers. The composition of the committee of supply, which was filled by the creatures of the minister Clavière, whom he believed to be selected from motives of distrust, exercised by the Girondists towards himself, also greatly irritated Dumouriez. Yet this selection was one certainly made in good faith, and approved of by all parties, and certainly had no reference whatever to party feeling.

Pache, as a firm and patriotic minister, should have endeavoured to satisfy Dumouriez, for the sake of the republic. For this purpose it was necessary to examine his demands, to attend to those which were just, to reject the rest, and conduct everything with authority and vigour, so as to silence reproaches and disputes, and prevent confusion. Far, however, from acting this part, Pache, already reproached with inefficiency by the Girondists, and therefore somewhat alienated from them, allowed the general, the Girondists, and the convention, to continue their altercations. At the council he read those inconsiderate letters of the general, in which he complained of the suspicions of the Girondist ministers; at the convention they promulgated his imperious demands, in which he offered his resignation in case they were not complied with. Censuring nothing, but explaining nothing, and putting on the hypocritical semblance of fidelity, his communications produced the most disastrous effects. The Girondists, the convention, and the Jacobins, were all offended at the lofty tone of the general. Cambon thundered his invectives against Malus, d'Espagnac, and Petit Jean; mentioned the prices of their articles, which were exorbitant; depicted the shameful luxury in which d'Espagnac indulged; enumerated the former delinquencies of Petit Jean, and induced the assembly to impeach all three. He pretended that Dumouriez was surrounded by intriguers, from whom he should be immediately freed; he maintained that the committee of supply was an excellent institution; that to provision the army from the theatre of war would be robbing the trades of France, and exposing the country to mutinies for want of work; that as to the assignats, no address was necessary to force their currency; that the general was to blame in not authoritatively enforcing their reception, and in not transporting the French revolution into Belgium with all its financial and other systems; that the Belgians to whom France had given liberty should accept of it with all its advantages and disadvantages. At the tribune of the convention Dumouriez was looked upon as the dupe of his agents; but at the Jacobin club, and in Marat's newspaper, he was thought to be in concert with them, and even to be a partaker of their robberies, a suspicion which rests upon no probability but that of the frequent examples of other generals.

Dumouriez was obliged to deliver up his commissaries, and was himself personally affronted by their being arrested in spite of the assurance of protection he had given them. Pache assured him, with his accustomed smoothness of language, that his demands should be examined, that his wants should be provided for, and that for this purpose the committee of supply had already made considerable purchases; he announced at the same time numerous arrivals of stores which had never taken place. Dumouriez not receiving them, complained incessantly; so that in reading the letters of the minister one would have thought that every thing was in abundance, and in reading those of the general that he was perfectly destitute. Dumouriez had recourse in his difficulties to many expedients, and among others to borrowing money from the chapters of churches; he subsisted also for some time on a purchase of Malus, which, in consideration of his pressing necessities, he was permitted to make use of. He had been now kept at Brussels from the 14th to the 19th.

Meantime Stengel, detached with the advanced guard, had taken Malines; this was an important capture, on account of the ammunition in powder and arms of all descriptions which this place contained, and which indeed was the arsenal of Belgium. Labourdonnaie had entered Antwerp on the 18th, where he established clubs, and alienated the Belgians by the encouragement he gave to popular agitations; meanwhile he conducted the siege of the citadel but very feebly. Dumouriez, no longer able to endure a lieutenant so much occupied with clubs and so little by war, replaced him by Miranda, an intrepid Peruvian, who had arrived in France during the revolution, and had attained to a high rank in the army through the friendship of Pétion. Labourdonnaie, deprived of his command and recalled into the department of the north, omitted nothing to excite the zeal of the Jacobins against *Cæsar Dumouriez*. This was the name which was already given to the general.

The enemy, on his repulse from Jemmapes, had first meditated taking up his position behind the canal of Vilvorden, and keeping up a communication with Antwerp. He thus committed the same error that Dumouriez had fallen into by attempting to approach the Scheldt, instead of hastening to the Meuse, which they should have both done, the one to retire, and the other to prevent the retreat. Finally Clerfait, who had assumed the command, felt the necessity of speedily repassing the Meuse, and abandoning Antwerp to its fate. Dumouriez then directed Valence to march from Nivelles upon Namur, and to besiege that place, and in this he certainly committed a very serious error, for he should rather have despatched him to the other side of the Meuse to cut off the retreat of the Austrians; the defeat of the defensive army would naturally have led to the reduction of Namur. But the new system of war had hardly been begun to be known, and Dumouriez proved himself in this instance, as in many others, deficient in reflection. He left Brussels on the 19th; on the 20th, he marched through Louvain; and on the 22nd, came up with the enemy, and cut off four or five hundred of his troops. Here again absolute want of necessary provisions stopped him; he started again on the 26th, and on the 27th arrived before Liége, and was warmly engaged with the rearguard of the enemy at Varoux. General Staray, who commanded it, defended himself nobly, and received a mortal wound. Finally, on the morning of the 28th, Dumouriez entered Liége, amidst the acclamations of the people, who, in that city, were extremely friendly to the revolution. Miranda took the citadel of Antwerp on the 29th, and could now

complete the circuit of Belgium, by marching straight to Ruremonde. Valence occupied Namur on the 2nd of December. Clerfait directed his march towards Roer, and Beaulieu towards Luxembourg.

The whole of Belgium, as far as the Meuse, was now occupied, but it still remained to subdue the territory extending to the Rhine, and great hindrances here presented themselves to Dumouriez. Either from the difficulty of transporting stores in the winter season, or through official negligence, nothing had yet reached his army, and although provisions were abundant at Valenciennes, they were wanting altogether on the Meuse. Pache, to satisfy the Jacobins, had thrown open the desks of his office for their inspection, and the greatest disorder prevailed there. All official duty was neglected, and, owing to inattention, the most contradictory orders were given. All business was thus fatally impeded, and whilst the minister believed that the stores had already reached their destination, the operations of Dumouriez were suspended from absolute want. The institution of the committee of supply had greatly augmented this disorder. The new commissary, Ronsin, who succeeded Malus and d'Espagnac, found himself in the greatest embarrassment. Badly received by the army, he was frightened at the task he had undertaken, and by the orders of Dumouriez, in spite of the late decisions of the convention, he continued to make purchases on the theatre of war. By this means, the army obtained bread and meat, but clothes, carriage, money, and fodder for their cattle, they were perfectly destitute of, and their horses died daily of hunger. Another calamity afflicted the army, this was desertion. The volunteers, who, in a moment of enthusiasm, had hurried to Champagne, felt their courage cool after the danger had passed over; they were besides disgusted with the varied privations they were obliged to endure, and they deserted in companies. The body which Dumouriez personally commanded had already lost at least ten thousand men, and its numbers daily dwindled. The Belgian levies, which had been promised, never took place, for it was almost impossible to embody or discipline the different classes of a population, and the different provinces of a country, which were greatly at variance with each other. Liége was friendly to the revolution, but Brabant and Flanders observed with distrust the growing ascendancy of the Jacobins in the clubs which had been established at Ghent, Antwerp, Brussels, and other towns. The Belgians were not very cordially disposed towards our soldiers, and manifested a great unwillingness to receive their assignats; indeed they would not upon any account accept our paper money, and Dumouriez refused to give it a forced currency. Thus, although victorious, and master of the country, the French army found itself most unfortunately situated, from the combined effects of scarcity, desertion, and the dubious and almost unfavourable dispositions of the inhabitants. The convention beset by the contradictory representations of a general, who complained haughtily of his destitute situation, and of a minister who certified modestly, but with assurance, that the most abundant supplies had been sent to the army, despatched four commissaries, taken from among themselves, into Belgium, to ascertain the true state of the case. These four commissaries were Danton, Camus, Lacroix, and Cossuin.

Whilst Dumouriez was engaged, during the month of November, in occupying Belgium, as far as the Meuse, Custine, keeping near Frankfort and the Maine, was threatened by the Prussians who had reascended the Lahn. He would have desired that the whole war should have been carried on in the neighbourhood of his army, to protect him in the rear, and enable him to repeat his irregular incursions into Germany. Thus he complained continually of Dumouriez, because he did not arrive at Cologne, and of Kellermann, because he did not march on Coblentz. We shall see, immediately, the difficulties which hindered Dumouriez advancing more speedily: and to have made it possible for Kellermann to quit his present post, Custine must have renounced those incursions on the enemy which made the galleries of the Jacobin club, and the journals, ring with acclamations, have confined himself within the limits of the Rhine, and fortifying Mayence, have occupied Coblentz himself. But he wished the other generals to take their posts behind him, that he might have the honour of assuming the offensive in Germany. Pressed by his solicitations and complaints, the executive council recalled Kellermann, replaced him by Beurnonville, and gave the latter instructions to capture Treves whilst the season was yet much advanced, and in the heart of an impoverished country which was extremely difficult of occupation. There was only one way of carrying this enterprise into effect, and this was at first to march between Luxembourg and Treves, and thus arrive at Coblentz, whilst Custine reached the same city by the Rhine. By this means the Prussians, not yet recovered from their defeat in Champagne, would have been crushed, and assistance have been rendered to Dumouriez, who ought by that time to have arrived at Cologne, or in case he had not arrived, could have aided him in his march thither. In this manner, Luxembourg and Trèves, cities impossible to take by main force, would have fallen by famine, cut off, as they would have been, from all possibility of succour. But Custine having persisted in his incursions into Wétéravia, and the army of the Moselle having remained in its cantonments, there was no time, at the end of November, to march against these places for the purpose of supporting Custine against the Prussians, who were now reascending the Rhine with renewed courage. Beurnonville urged these arguments, but the nation being emulous of conquest, and desirous of punishing the Elector of Treves for his conduct towards France, Beurnonville received orders to commence the attack, which he attempted with as much spirit as if he had approved of the enterprise. But after some brilliant and well fought engagements he was obliged to renounce his undertaking and retire towards Lorraine. Thus situated, Custine found his successes on the banks of the Mayence greatly endangered, but being unwilling to acknowledge his temerity and the instability of his conquest by a retreat, he still persisted in maintaining it as long as it was possible. He had stationed a garrison of two thousand four hundred men in Frankfort, and although this force was altogether insufficient

for the protection of an open town, inhabited by a population greatly alienated by unjust impositions, he ordered the officer commanding to defend it to the last; and he himself, posted at Ober-Ysel and Homburg, a little below Frankfort, affected a vain and ridiculous show of spirit. Such was the situation of the army in this quarter, towards the end of November and at the beginning of December.

Nothing had yet been done on the borders of the Rhine. At the Alps, Montesquieu whom we left negotiating with Switzerland, and endeavouring at the same time to make Geneva and the French ministry listen to his reasonable arguments, had been obliged to emigrate. An accusation had been directed against him, for having, so said his accusers, compromised the dignity of the nation, by allowing an article by which our troops were forced to evacuate Geneva and its neighbourhood, to be inserted in his capitulation with that city, and more especially by enforcing the execution of this article. An impeachment was launched against him, and he took refuge in Geneva. But his diplomacy was confirmed by the discretion which characterised it, and whilst he was subjected to impeachment, the ministers carried on their negotiations with Geneva, upon the terms of the fundamental articles settled by him. The troops of Berne retired; the French troops took up their cantonments within the required limits; the all-important neutrality of Switzerland was confirmed to France, and one of her frontiers was protected for many years. This important acquisition was not properly estimated, thanks to the suggestions of Clavière, and thanks also to the vanity of the *parcenus*, that we were diverted from the path on the eve of attaining our victories.

In the Comté of Nice, the ministry had gloriously recaptured the post of Sospello, of which the Piedmontese had, for a moment, deprived us, and which they had lately lost after sustaining a considerable check. This success was attributable to the skill of general Brunet. Our naval force, mistress of the Mediterranean, sailed to Genoa and Naples, where branches of the house of Bourbon reigned, and to all the states of Italy, to obtain their acknowledgment of the new French republic. This was not extorted from Naples till after a cannonade had been opened on the town, and our fleets returned encouraged by the concessions wrung from the enemy. In the Pyrenees every thing remained perfectly stationary. Servan, for want of means, had great difficulty in re-organizing the army of observation. In spite of the enormous expenses which the nation sustained, of a hundred and eighty to two hundred millions of francs per month, the armies of the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Moselle, were in the same distress, by the disorganization of the service, and by the confusion which prevailed in the war department; yet, in the midst of these afflicting circumstances, the pride and intoxication of victory was still undiminished. At this juncture, the extravagant spirit of France triumphing in the victory of Jemmapes, the capture of Frankfort, the occupation of Savoy and Nice, and the sudden estimation to which we had risen in the eyes of Europe, beheld, in imagination, thrones tumbled to the ground, and all the nations of the world forming themselves into independent republics. "Ah, if it were true," said a member of the Jacobin club, in reference to the union between Savoy and France, "if it were true that the moment of the awakening of nations had arrived; if it were true that the overturning of thrones would be the immediate consequence of the success of our arms and of the revolutionary volcano; if it were true that the virtues of republics were about finally to avenge the world for all the crimes that royalty had committed; that every nation liberated from slavery were about to establish a government, conformable to the extent of dominion which nature has assigned it; and that from the national conventions of all people, a certain number of extraordinary deputies would form an universal convention in the centre of the globe, to watch incessantly over the rights of man, the liberty of commerce, and the peace of the human race*!"

About this time, the assembly being informed of some acts of tyranny exercised by the Duke de Deux-Ponts against some of his subjects, in a moment of enthusiasm issued the following decree.

"The national convention declares that she will afford succour and fraternity to all nations who wish to recover their liberty; and she has given it in charge to the executive power to give orders to the generals of the French armies to aid all citizens who may have been, or shall be oppressed in the cause of liberty.

"The national convention order the generals of the French armies to have printed, and publicly to promulgate this decree, wherever the arms of the republic may be carried.

"Paris, November 19th, 1792."

* Speech of Milhaud, deputy of Cantal, delivered in the club of the Jacobins, in November, 1792.

CHAPTER IV.

STATE OF PARTIES AT THE TIME OF THE TRIAL OF LOUIS XVI.—CHARACTERISTICS AND OPINIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINISTRY AT THIS PERIOD, ROLAND, PACHE, LEBRUN, GARAT, MONGE, AND CLAVIÈRE—REMARKS UPON THE DOMESTIC LIFE OF THE ROYAL FAMILY WHILE IN THE TOWER OF THE TEMPLE—COMMENCEMENT OF THE DISCUSSION AS TO PUTTING LOUIS XVI. ON HIS TRIAL; SUMMARY OF THE DEBATES; OPINION OF SAINT-JUST—UNFORTUNATE STATE OF THE PROVISION MARKET; REMARKS AND REFLECTIONS UPON POLITICAL ECONOMY—SPEECH OF ROBESPIERRE UPON THE KING'S TRIAL—THE CONVENTION DECREES THAT THE KING SHALL BE TRIED AT THE BAR—PAPERS FOUND IN THE IRON CHEST—THE FIRST INTERROGATORY ADMINISTERED TO LOUIS XVI. BY THE CONVENTION—CONFLICTING OPINIONS AND INTERESTS DURING THE PROCESS; RESTLESSNESS OF THE JACOBINS—CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DUKE OF ORLEANS; HIS BANISHMENT PROPOSED.

THE trial of Louis XVI. was at last about to commence; parties were about to measure their strength, discover their intentions, and exhibit their real characters to each other. The Girondists, to check the slightest symptom of pity, accused those who appeared touched by the contemplation of fallen grandeur of *royalism*.

The Jacobins, who attacked in Louis XVI. monarchy personified, had undoubtedly made some progress, yet they still met with strong opposition in Paris, and a still stronger in the remaining part of France. They domineered over the capital by their club, by the commune, and by the sections; yet the middle class, resuming their courage, offered some resistance. Pétion having refused the mayoralty, the physician Chambon had obtained a great majority of suffrages, and accepted, with regret, of a situation, which was little suited to his moderate and unambitious character. This choice proves that the middle classes of Paris still possessed great influence. The landholders, traders, and in fact all persons of the middle classes, had not as yet deserted either the municipal councils, those of the departments, or the popular societies, and sent up addresses to the majority of the convention, which always breathed moderation and attachment to the laws. Many affiliated Jacobin societies disapproved of the mother institution, and demanded in a high tone the expulsion of Marat; and even some of them, of Robespierre. Finally, the Bouches-du Rhone, the Calvados, the Finisterre, and the Gironde, despatched new federalists, who, anticipating the decrees of the assembly, as they had done on the 10th of August, came, they said, to protect the convention and maintain its independence.

The Jacobins at present had no hold on the armies; the staffs and military officers continued to repel all their approaches. They had, however, invaded the ministry of the war department. Pache had weakly suffered them to do this, and had dismissed all his former clerks to replace them by members of the Jacobin club. They took possession of his office, attended in slovenly and dirty dresses, made motions, and introduced into its service a quantity of married priests recommended by Audouin, who was himself a married priest. One of the leading members in this ministry was Hassenfratz, formerly an inhabitant of Metz, who becoming a bankrupt, had been obliged to fly the country, and who, like many others, had risen to a high rank in the public estimation by his demagogue zeal. Thus the organization of the army was completely altered, and so far as it was practicable, the army itself was filled with a new class of very opposite opinions to their predecessors; and thus, whilst Roland incurred the hatred of the Jacobins, Pache was cherished and eulogised by them. His gentleness, his modesty and vast capacity, were contrasted invidiously with the unbending firmness of Roland, which they miscalled pride. Roland, indeed, had excluded the Jacobins entirely from the ministry of the interior. To watch over the conduct of the constituted authorities, to retain them within the proper limits of their administrations, to maintain the public tranquillity, to keep a watchful eye on the popular societies, to provide for the subsistence of the population, and to protect commerce and property, was the arduous task of Roland, and he fulfilled it with extraordinary ability and energy. He daily denounced the commune, and made every effort to put a stop to its various excesses; he intercepted its correspondence, as also that of the Jacobins, and substituted in the place of their violent letters, others full of moderation, which produced everywhere a more salutary effect. He preserved inviolate the emigrant property, which had devolved on the state, repressed those disorders to which scarcity gave rise, and exerted the authority of the law, and even force, when it was possible, to keep down those revolutionary passions which occasioned so many tumults. The difference which the Jacobins found between Pache and Roland may easily be conceived, and the families of the two ministers rendered this difference still more striking. The wife and daughters of Pache attended the clubs and sections; they might be seen even in the barracks of the federalists, whose favour it was important to gain, and distinguished themselves by a low Jacobinism, which strikingly contrasted them with the wife of Roland, remarkable chiefly for a proud mind, a cultivated understanding, and polished manners, and above all, the centre of attraction to those orators so brilliant and so much hated.

Pache and Roland, then, were the two persons around whom all the members of the council ranged themselves. Claviere, minister of finances, although frequently embroiled, by the irascibility of his temper, with all parties, when appeased, always returned to the party of Roland. Lebrun, a weak man, but strongly attached to the Girondists by their superior intellect, had frequently associated Brissot with him in his diplomatic labours; and the Jacobins, denominating the latter an intriguer, maintained that he was master of

the whole government, because he often lent his assistance to Lebrun. Garat, contemplating all parties from the height of metaphysical elevation, contented himself with forming a judgment of their respective characters, but felt himself by no means called upon personally to oppose their errors. He seemed to believe, that because he had discovered the faults of the Girondists he was freed from all obligation to support them, and considered his own indolence in the light of true discretion. Nevertheless, the Jacobins felt that the neutrality of so able a man was an important advantage, and repaid him with occasional praise. Finally, Monge, a dry mathematical genius, a decided patriot, perfectly uninfluenced by the moral theories of the Girondists, thought it safest to follow the example of Pache, allowed his administration to be seized upon by the Jacobins, and, without disavowing the Girondists, to whom he owed his elevation, accepted the eulogiums of their adversaries, and took his share of popularity with the minister of war.

Thus, the Jacobin party, though possessing two truckling slaves in Pache and Monge, and though assured of the neutrality of Garat, found an inexorable adversary in Roland, who was sure of the co-operation of Clavière and Lebrun, and frequently prevailed on the other ministers to grant him their support. The Jacobins, therefore, could by no means be said to have a controlling power in the state; they repeated daily that there was not one king the less in the new order of things, but that on the other hand, the same despotism, the same intrigues, and the same treasons existed; and that the revolution would never be complete and certain in its effect, until the originators of all these secret machinations and opposing influences, already imprisoned in the Temple, should be utterly destroyed.

Such, we see, was the respective strength of parties, and the state of the revolution at the time when the process against Louis XVI. was commenced. This prince, with his family, was confined in the great tower of the Temple. The commune having the disposal of the armed force and charge of the police of the capital, had consequently under their command the guard of the Temple, and it was, therefore, to their ungenerous suspicions and scowling authority that the royal family were subject. This unhappy family, being guarded by a class of men very inferior to that of which the convention was composed, could neither expect that lenity or respect which minds refined by education are always inclined to pay to misfortune. They had been at first imprisoned in the small tower, but were afterwards removed to the great one, which was deemed the most secure. The king occupied one floor, and the princesses and children another. They met daily, and were permitted to spend the sad season of their captivity in each other's society. A single domestic had been allowed to follow them to their prison; this was the faithful Clery, who, having escaped the massacres of the 10th of August, had returned to Paris, to offer his services, in their calamity, to those whom he had formerly served in all the splendour of their power. This devoted servant endeavoured to supply the place of the numerous attendants by whom his master had in former days been surrounded. Breakfast was always served at nine o'clock, in the chamber of the king. At ten the whole family met in the queen's room. Louis XVI. there employed himself with the education of his son. He taught him to repeat passages from Racine and Corneille, and gave him instructions in geography, a science he had cultivated with much success himself. The queen occupied herself in the education of her daughter; or, with her sister, whiled away the heavy hours with needlework tapestries. At one o'clock, when the weather was fine, the whole family were conducted into the garden to take a short walk. Several municipal officers and officers of the guard accompanied them, and sometimes they had the mournful satisfaction of perceiving these attendants softened into commiseration, and sometimes obdurate and contemptuous. Men of uncultivated minds are seldom generous; and fallen grandeur, to such characters, is only an object of scorn. When we figure to ourselves this illustrious family, who were reproached with having so long been elated by power and pampered by luxury, ruled by gross and ignorant mechanics, we can easily imagine with what low malevolence and petty tyranny they would naturally treat them! The king and queen frequently overheard the most base and cruel conversations, and saw written up on the walls, courts, and corridors of their prison, sentences expressive of all the hatred the ancient system of government had inspired, but which Louis XVI. and his consort had done nothing personally to deserve. Yet they experienced some consolation from the useless expressions of interest and pity their misery sometimes called forth; and they continued their melancholy walks on account of their children, to whom exercise was necessary. Whilst they paced with sad steps the gloomy court of the Temple, they perceived, at the windows of some of the neighbouring houses, a throng of faithful subjects who remained still attached to monarchy, and who had come to contemplate, with melancholy interest, the narrow bounds in which their fallen monarch was imprisoned. At two o'clock their walk was finished, and dinner was served. After dinner the king was accustomed to take a nap, and, whilst he slept, the queen and her sister pursued their needlework occupations in silence, and Clery, in another room, amused the young prince with such juvenile plays as were suited to his age. In the evening, one of the family read aloud, to respite their grief with a short entertainment; and, having supped, every one retired to his own chamber, after taking an affectionate and melancholy leave of each other, for they never separated but with emotion. Before he went to bed, the king usually read for many hours. Montesquieu, Buffon, Hume's History, the Imitation of Christ*, and some of the Latin and Italian classics, were his favourite studies. He had finished the perusal of about two hundred and fifty volumes when he left the Temple.

Such was the life of this monarch during his sad captivity. Restored to private life, he was restored to all his virtues, and became worthy of the esteem of all good men. His enemies themselves, observing him so simple, so calm, and so pure from all bad passions, found it impossible to sup-

* Better known in this country as Thomas à Kempis, to whom this pious work has been attributed. Trans.

press an involuntary emotion, and ought, in consideration of the virtues of the man, to have pardoned the errors of the prince.

The commune, however, disquieted by suspicion, had recourse to the most vexatious precautions. The municipal officers never lost sight of any of the royal family, and would hardly consent to be separated from them by a closed door when they were retiring to rest. They placed beds for themselves at the entrance of each chamber, so as to preclude all egress. Santerre, with his staff, visited the whole tower daily, and sent in a regular report to the commune. The municipal officers of the guard formed a species of permanent council, who, having a chamber in the tower allotted to their use, gave all orders, and replied to all the demands of the prisoners. At first, pens, ink, and paper had been left in the prison, but they were shortly taken away, as likewise all edged instruments, such as knives, razors, scissors, and penknives, for the discovery of which the most minute and offensive search was made. This was very vexatious to the princesses, who were thus disabled from mending their clothes, which were much in want of it, not having been repaired since their first arrival in the Temple. In the sack of the Tuileries nearly everything personally useful to the royal family had been destroyed. The wife of the English ambassador* sent some linen to the queen, and the commune, on the demand of the king, had some made up for all the family. As to other articles of dress, the king and queen never thought of asking for them, but would, doubtless, have obtained them, had they expressed any wish of the kind. With regard to money, they were given, in September, the sum of two thousand francs for their expenses; but subsequently the commune were unwilling to grant any further supply, fearing the use that might be made of it. A sum had been deposited in the hands of the governor of the Temple, and, on request by the prisoners, many articles were bought with it, of which they stood in need.

We must not exaggerate the crimes of human nature by supposing that the guardians of the royal family, adding the most execrable malevolence to the fury of fanaticism, imposed upon them ungenerous privations, and endeavoured thus to aggravate the bitterness of their recollections of former grandeur. Distrust was the sole cause of many denials. Thus, whilst the fear of plots restricted the number of the king's attendants to one servant in the interior of the prison, many domestics were employed in preparing his food at a small distance from the tower. The reports of the expenses of the Temple, in which the greatest decorum is observed, in which the prisoners are mentioned with respect, in which their temperance is highly commended, and in which Louis XVI. is justified from the reproach of fondness for the luxuries of the table,—these reports, which have never been suspected, make it appear that the expenses of the table of the Temple amounted in two months to the sum of twenty-eight thousand seven hundred and forty-five francs. Of the thirteen servants who were employed in the kitchen, one alone had permission to enter the prison and assist Clery in his attendance on the royal family at their meals.

* The then Duchess of Sutherland.

And, such is the ingenuity which captivity exercises, that it was by this servant, whom Clery had interested in the misfortunes of his master, that news from abroad found admission sometimes into the Temple. The unfortunate prisoners were kept in perfect ignorance of public events; or if there were any exceptions to this rule of treatment, the representatives of the commune confined themselves to communicating to them information of the victories of the republic, which were calculated to deprive them of all hope.

Clery, in order to make the royal family acquainted with the public news, imagined an expedient which succeeded well enough. By means of the communications he secretly carried on out of doors, he had taken into his hire a public crier, who, under the pretext of selling his journals, placed himself under the window of the Temple, and uttered with a loud voice the principal news of the day. Clery, at the appointed hour, stationed himself at this window, and thus obtained a knowledge of every thing which was passing, of which he informed the king, leaning over his bed, at the moment when he appeared to be drawing the curtains around him. Such was the situation of the unhappy family who had fallen from a throne to a dungeon, and such were the expedients by which their zealous, faithful, and industrious servant endeavoured to counteract the effects of the gloomy distrust of their jailors.

The committee finally presented their plan of proceedings against Louis XVI. to the assembly. Dufriche-Valazé first made a report of the facts laid to the charge of the monarch, and of the evidence by which they were supported. This report, too long to be heard throughout, was printed by order of the convention, and a copy of it given to each of its members. On the 7th, the deputy Mailhe, speaking in the name of the committee of legislation, presented a report on those great questions to which the proceedings against the king had given rise; the first of which was, can Louis XVI. be brought to trial. What tribunal is competent to pass sentence upon him?

Such were the two essential questions now to be discussed, and which deeply agitated the public mind. The printing of the report was immediately ordered. Translated into all languages, it immediately circulated through France and Europe. The discussion was adjourned to the 13th, in spite of the opposition of Billaud-Varennes, who wished the first question to be carried by acclamation at the moment.

A last struggle was now about to take place between the opinions of the constituent assembly and those of the convention; and this struggle, as might be expected, was extremely violent, as the life or death of the king depended on its result. The constituent assembly was democratic in its ideas, and monarchical in its feelings. Thus whilst all their institutions were republican, a relic of affection and respect for Louis XVI. induced them to preserve royalty, together with those attributes which have been deemed necessary for its maintenance, in a limited system of monarchical feudality. Hereditary descent, executive power, a participation in legislative acts, and personal inviolability, are the prerogatives which are acknowledged at the throne of modern monarchies, and

such were the prerogatives which the first assembly had left in the possession of the reigning family. Participation in legislative acts and the executive power, are functions which may be variously modified, and are not so essential to modern royalty as hereditary descent and personal inviolability. Of these two last, the former secures the perpetual and natural transmission of monarchical power; the second places the person of each inheritor beyond the reach of personal attack; and, in fine, both of these establish an uninterrupted perpetuity of authority, inaccessible and unimpeachable. Obliged to act through the medium of its ministers, who are responsible for their actions, royalty is open to attack but on that one point, where it may be stricken without being shaken. Such is the character of feudal monarchy, as gradually modified by lapse of time, and made compatible with that degree of liberty to which nations of the present age have attained.

Yet the constituent assembly had, in some measure, restricted the sense of royal inviolability, for the flight to Varennes, and the conduct of the emigrants, had led them to believe that ministerial responsibility did not sufficiently protect the nation from all the crimes of royalty. They therefore excepted the case of a monarch putting himself at the head of an enemy's army to attack the constitution of the state, or not opposing an enterprise of this nature by a *formal act*, and in his own name. In such a case, they declared the monarch to have fallen under the sentence of the common laws against felony, and dethroned. He was then *considered as having abdicated royalty*. Such is the technical language of the law on this subject. Their offer of the constitution to the acceptance of the king, and his acceptance of it, rendered the contract irrevocable; and the assembly entered into a solemn engagement, with this exception, to hold the persons of their monarchs sacred.

The convention found themselves confronted by this engagement, in deciding on the fate of Louis XVI. But the new legislators united under the name of a national convention, thought themselves no more bound by the engagements of their predecessors, than they themselves had been by the ancient institutions of feudality. The public mind had been carried forward by the train of events so rapidly, that the laws of 1791 appeared as absurd to the present generation as those of the thirteenth century appeared to the generation of 1789. The convention, then, not believing themselves restricted by a law which they deemed absurd, declared themselves as much opposed to that, as the states general had against the separation of the three orders.

The moment therefore that the discussion opened on the 13th of November, these two opinions came into conflict. The one party maintained the inviolability of the royal person, as in itself expedient, and the other absolutely rejected it. The ideas of all had undergone so great a change, that no member of the convention ventured to defend the inviolability as good in itself; even those who took the part of the king, insisted that, as it had passed into a law, it was only just that Louis XVI. should derive the benefit of it; and that its validity could not be disputed without violating a national engagement. But the number of deputies who argued upon it in this light was very small, and the Girondists decidedly dissented from such a view of the question. Nevertheless they remained perfectly neutral, and left the discussion to the few partisans of inviolability and its numerous adversaries.

"In the first place," said the opponents of the doctrine of inviolability, "it is necessary, to make an engagement good, that he who engages himself should have the power of doing so. The national sovereignty is inalienable and cannot be fettered. The nation might wisely, by enacting the inviolability of the person of the king, protect the executive power from attacks of the legislature. The motive of this political precaution is plainly observable in the system of the constituent assembly; but if it has rendered the present king inviolable so far as concerns all constituted authorities whatever, the constituent assembly could not have rendered the person of the king inviolable so far as concerns herself, for she can never be said to renounce for ever her own omnipotency: the nation, therefore, can have entered into no engagement with Louis XVI., nor can it be confronted with one it has never had the faculty of creating.

"Secondly, it is necessary, even supposing the constituent assembly had the power of engaging the nation to maintain any act of theirs, that this engagement should be reciprocal. But there has been none on the part of Louis XVI. This constitution, to which he appeals now for support, he has never willingly adopted, he has always protested against, and has never ceased to aim at its destruction, not only by internal conspiracies, but by the sword of the enemy. What right has he then to avail himself of it?

"But admitting even that the engagement was both valid and reciprocal, it is still necessary that it should not be in opposition to reason, if it is to have any weight whatever. Thus all the ostensible acts of the monarch, resting upon the responsibility of the ministers, who stand in the situation of the king, the nation in this case possesses some guarantee against the abuse of ministerial power, and inviolability, not being understood as impunity, ceases to be absurd. But for secret proceedings, concealed plots, intercourse with an enemy, and hidden treasons, how can a minister be accountable, how can he countersign these acts? But these last, although the most criminal of all, may be carried on with impunity. This is absurd; and we must therefore acknowledge that, though a king be unaccountable for the open acts of his administration, he is liable to answer for any secret and criminal proceedings, which may endanger the public welfare. Thus a deputy, though irresponsible for the exercise of his legislative functions, as well as an ambassador in his diplomatic negotiations, they are both accountable for acts they commit in their private capacities. Inviolability has then its limits. Will it be said, that dethronement is the penalty denounced against those acts of criminality for which a minister is not responsible? That is to say, that the simple privation of power shall be the only punishment inflicted on a monarch for having so dreadfully abused it? Shall the people whom he has so basely betrayed, delivered over to the sword of the enemy, and exposed to many calamities at once, content themselves with saying

Question debated as to the personal inviolability of a monarch in a free state, and its limitations therein, as to the competency of the national convention to try Louis XVI.

to him, 'Retire!' This would be a very illusory kind of justice, and a people cannot be so wanting to themselves as to permit a crime committed against their liberty and their very existence, to escape with such impunity.

"It is necessary," added the same orators, "we acknowledge, that a known penalty should be affixed to every crime by an anterior law. But are there not penalties already denounced against treason? Are not these penalties contained in every code? Was not the king sufficiently warned by the morality of all times and places, of the criminality of treason; and by the laws of all nations, that it was punishable with the most terrible chastisement? But, besides a penal law, we want a tribunal. Behold a nation invested with sovereignty, concentrating in itself all power, judicial as well as legislative: it is here in all its omnipotency, in all its universality, and is capable of exercising every function; the convention is this nation, whom it represents, having received authority to act in her name, to avenge her, to give her a constitution, and to save her. The convention therefore is competent to try Louis XVI.; it has sufficient power, it forms the most independent tribunal; it is the most elevated court to which the accused could appeal; and as he does not want partisans here, or the bribes of the enemy, the monarch could not desire other judges. It is true the same men will be both accusers and judges. But although, in ordinary tribunals, it is necessary to separate these functions, in the council general of the nation, placed far above personal motives and interests, such precautions are not requisite. *The Nation cannot err*, and the deputies who represent it partake of its infallibility and its power.

"Thus," said the adversaries of the king, "the engagement contracted in 1791, not binding the national sovereignty, not being reciprocal, and containing an absurd clause which gives impunity to treason, is altogether null; and Louis XVI. can certainly be brought to trial. As to the penalty affixed to the crime of which he is accused, it is common to all times; it is to be found in all laws. As to the tribunal, the convention, invested with all legislative, executive, and judicial power, is the only proper one." These orators echoed then the demand to the committee that Louis XVI. should be brought to trial; that he should be tried by the national convention; that an act announcing the crimes imputed to him should be prepared by deputies selected for that purpose; that he should appear in person to reply to it; that he should be allowed counsel in his defence; and that immediately after having heard it, the convention should pronounce sentence by an appeal to each deputy personally and by name.

The defenders of the inviolability of the king left none of these arguments unreplied to, and refuted the whole system of their adversaries.

"It is maintained," said they, "that the nation cannot alienate its sovereignty, and divest itself of the power of punishing crimes committed against itself; and that the law of inviolability decreed in 1791, though binding on the legislative body, cannot fetter the nation. In the first place, if it be true that the national sovereignty cannot be alienated, nor deprived of the power of renewing the laws, it is also true that it has no retrospective power, that is, that it cannot prevent that which has already taken place, nor hinder laws already passed from taking their effect. The nation may declare that, in future, monarchs shall not be inviolable, but, for the past, she cannot prevent them being so, since she herself has declared them such; she cannot break a contract entered into with third persons, so far as concerns them she has become simply a party by treating with them. Thus the national sovereignty may be tied up for a time. The nation has determined in a positive manner, not only that the legislature, but that she herself is incompetent to prosecute the king by any judicial action; for the political object of the law of inviolability would be frustrated, if royalty had not been secured from every attack, both on the part of the constituted authorities, and on that of the nation itself.

"As to the want of reciprocity in the execution of the engagement, this also has been provided for," added the same orators. "Breach of faith in the contract has been provided for by the contract itself. Every mode of manifesting this dereliction of fidelity is comprised in one single instance, the most serious of all, war against the nation, which is punishable by dethronement, according to the terms of the engagement between the nation and the king. A want of reciprocity cannot therefore release the nation from its obligation to observe the law of inviolability.

"The engagement then is real and positive, equally binding on the nation and the legislature; the want of reciprocity has been provided for, and cannot render it null and void. We shall see presently that this engagement, in the monarchical system, was not unreasonable, and that it cannot fall to the ground on the score of absurdity. Ministerial responsibility equally applies to all regal acts, as a king can no more conspire than govern without agents, and thus public justice might always be satisfied. Finally, secret crimes, distinguished from administrative delinquencies, are foreseen and rendered punishable with dethronement by this act of legislation. It has been insisted on, that dethronement is not a punishment, that it is nothing but a simple *deprivation* of abused power; but, in that system which rendered the person of the king inviolable, *severity* of punishment is not so much regarded, as the political result of the act of dethronement, and this result is attained by a simple *privation of power*. But is not the loss of the first throne in the universe a punishment? Is it no punishment to be stripped of a crown which the possessor inherited at his birth, wore for years with honour, and by virtue of which he gained the adoration of millions for nearly a quarter of a century? Is not this infliction to those brought up in the extreme rank of society, equally severe as that of death? Allowing, however, that it is too lenient a chastisement, it is nevertheless that stipulated by the sovereign nation, and an inadequacy of punishment can never render a law invalid. In all criminal judicature, it is agreed that all legal flaws shall tend to the advantage of the accused. Thus having proved that this contract is valid and positive; that it contains nothing absurd, that it gives no impunity, but, on the contrary, affixes a penalty to treason, it is neither necessary to have recourse to the

natural rights of man, nor to the sovereignty of the nation, as the dethronement has already been pronounced by an anterior law. To this penalty the king has submitted without the decision of a tribunal, and on the verdict of the only authority to which he could be amenable, that of a popular insurrection. Dethroned from that moment, and deprived of all power, France has no right to proceed further against him, and has only now to take precautions for his security. She may banish him out of her territory, or detain him till the war shall be terminated, or suffer him to live in her bosom as a private individual. But this is all that she ought, this is all she can do. It is not therefore necessary to constitute a tribunal, or to examine the competency of the convention; the 10th of August decided the fate of Louis XVI.; on the 10th of August he ceased to be a king; on the 10th of August he was brought to trial, condemned, and deposed, and all relation between him and the nation was then dissolved."

Such was the reply of the supporters of the law of inviolability; and the national sovereignty being understood as it then was, this reply was unanswerable, and the reasonings of the committee of legislation were nothing but laboured sophistication, destitute of candour and truth.

We are now about to furnish extracts of the various speeches of both parties of the assembly in the regular discussion of this question; but we must first take notice of the new ideas to which the extravagance of principles and passions had given birth. At the Jacobin club, in the ranks of the *Mountain*, the necessity of any discussion to rid the nation of a tyrant, taken with arms in his hands, and shedding in wantonness the blood of the people, was already questioned. This opinion found a terrible advocate in the young Saint-Just, an austere and cold-blooded fanatic, who at the age of twenty, meditated the formation of an ideal society founded on the basis of absolute equality, simple and severe in its principles, and protected by an indestructible force. Long before the 10th of August, he conceived, in the gloomy profundity of his mind, the notion of this supernatural system, and had reached, by the enthusiasm of fanaticism, that extreme point of theoretical extravagance, to which Robespierre had arrived by the mere impulse of personal resentment. Having but very lately taken any active part in the revolution, as yet uninitiated in contention and in crime, he took his station in the ranks of the *Mountain*, charmed the Jacobins by his audacity, astonished the convention by his talents, but had not hitherto obtained any popular celebrity. His ideas, always powerfully conceived, but not always well expressed, did not produce all their effect, till rendered more clear and familiar by the plagiarising declamations of Robespierre.

He spoke, on the present occasion, after Morrison, the most zealous defender of the law of inviolability, and not using invectives against his adversaries, not having yet had time to contract personal animosities, he appeared at first merely indignant at the pettiness of the assembly, and the paltry astuteness of their discussions *. "What," said he, "you the committee, the adversaries of Louis XVI. Do you rack your brains to discover proper forms to pass sentence on the ex-king? Do you attempt to elevate him to the rank of a citizen, that you may find laws applicable to his crimes? I, on the contrary, maintain that he is no citizen, that he should be considered as an enemy, that our duty is rather to crush him than to bring him to trial, that being altogether out of the contract which unites all Frenchmen, forms of procedure against him are to be sought for, not in the civil law, but in the *right of nations!*"

Thus Saint-Just regarded this question, not as one of justice, but of war. "To try a king as a citizen! This will indeed astonish posterity. Trial is a reference to the law, it is an institution of justice; but what relation of justice is there between kings and human nature!

"The act of reigning is in itself a crime; it is an usurpation which nothing can excuse, which the people are culpable in allowing, and against which every man has a personal right to exercise vengeance. It is impossible to reign innocently, the wickedness of kings is too great to permit them to do that. We should treat such usurpation as kings themselves treat that against their pretended authority. Is not the memory of Cromwell execrated for having usurped the authority of Charles I.? and certainly he was no more an usurper than the other; for when people are sufficiently base to suffer themselves to be domineered over by tyrants, this domination belongs to him who first seizes it, and is not more sacred or more legitimate in one man than in another."

Passing then to the question of the forms to be observed, Saint-Just regarded them all but as new and illogical errors. The forms of the process he considered but as a mere piece of grimace, and maintained that it is not the method of procedure which had justified every kind of vengeance known to the people to be exercised against kings; but the right of repelling force by force.

"Posterity will be astonished," cried he, "that the world is less advanced in the eighteenth century than it was in the time of Cæsar: then the tyrant was cut off in a full senate, without any other formality than twenty-three stabs of a dagger, and without the sentence of any other law than the liberty of Rome. But in the present times, we seek for forms of proceeding against a man, the assassin of his people, taken in the flagrant perpetration of his crimes."

Regarding the question in another point of view, quite distinct from the question of Louis XVI., Saint-Just raised his voice against the subtle and crafty reasonings of the assembly, which operated, as he said, with disadvantage to great considerations. The life of Louis XVI. he looked upon as of no consequence, one way or the other; but the spirit manifested by his judges struck him most forcibly. "The men," said he, "who are about to pass sentence on Louis XVI. have to lay the foundations of a republic; but those who attach any importance to the just chastisement of a king will never be the founders of a republic. Since the report of the committee has been given in, a certain timidity and hesitation has been evident in the conduct of many deputies. Every one considers the question of the process against the king through the medium of his own peculiar opinions. Some appear to fear future

* Sitting of the 13th November.

retribution, and others have not yet renounced their attachment to monarchy; these shrink from an example of virtue that will prove a bond of amity——.

"We judge each other with severity, I may say with fury; we think only of repressing the energies of the people, and moderating the spirit of liberty, whilst our common enemy provokes only gentle censures, and the many, effeminated by weakness, or engaged in crime, regard each other with doubt, and hesitate to strike the first blow!

"Citizens! if the Roman people, after six hundred years of virtue and of hatred to kings, and if Great Britain, after the death of Cromwell, were obliged again to submit to the yoke of tyrants, ought not we, good citizens, and friends of liberty, to fear, when we feel the axe to tremble in our hands, and find that a people, just emancipated, can still respect the memory of their former servitude? What republic can you establish in the midst of our general dissensions and common weakness? We must ever bear in mind that our republic must be founded in the same spirit with which Louis XVI. is condemned. The measure of your philosophy in this sentence will also be the measure of your liberty in the constitution!"

Some members, less fanatic than Saint-Just, placed the question in a more equitable point of view. "Behold," said Rouzet*, "the real situation in which the king was placed by the constitution of 1791. He was so circumstanced as necessarily to become the rival of the national representation. Was it not natural that he should endeavour to recover as great a portion as possible of the power he had lost? Did not you open the lists of contention to him, and invite him to the struggle? He has been conquered; he is alone, unarmed and humbled, at the feet of twenty-five millions of men, and these twenty-five millions of men will be base enough to make a victim of the vanquished! Besides," added Rouzet, "does not the love of dominion rule in the hearts of all men, and has not Louis XVI. repressed its influence more than any other sovereign in the world? Did he not in 1789 make a voluntary sacrifice of part of his authority? Did he not renounce many of the rights which his predecessors had exercised? Did he not abolish servitude in his dominions? Did he not call into his councils philosophic ministers, even to those empirics whom the public opinion pointed out? Did he not convoke the states-general, and deliver up to the third class a portion of their rights?"

Faure, the deputy of the Lower Seine, displayed still greater boldness. Referring to the conduct of Louis XVI., "The people," said he, "might have raged against Titus as well as against Nero, and might have found crimes to lay to his charge, if they were only those which he committed before Jerusalem. But where are those which you impute to Louis XVI.? I have paid the greatest attention to the charges against him, and I find nothing criminal; but I perceive a weak man, who suffered himself to be deluded by every hope of recovering his ancient authority; and I maintain that all the monarchs who have died on their beds have been more guilty than him. The good Louis XII. himself, in sacrificing fifty thousand Frenchmen in Italy to avenge a private quarrel, was a thousand times more culpable! A civil list, a veto, the choice of ministers, women, relations, courtiers—behold the seducers of Capet! I invoke Aristides and Epictetus; let them answer whether their firmness could have withstood such temptations. Upon a knowledge of weak human nature, I base my principles or my errors. Elevate yourselves, then, to all the grandeur of the national sovereignty; conceive in your own minds that magnanimity which should be associated with so vast a power. Summon Louis XVI. before you, not as a criminal but as a Frenchman, and say to him, 'Those who have formerly elevated thee to the throne, and called thee their king, do this day depose thee. Thou didst promise to be our father, and this thou hast not been. Make reparation by the virtues of a citizen for the conduct thou hast pursued as a king.'"

In the extraordinary excitement of mind which this question occasioned, every one was led to consider the question in different points of view. Fauchet, that constitutional priest who had gained great celebrity in 1789 by introducing revolutionary topics into the pulpit, questioned the right of society to inflict the penalty of death. "Has society," said he, "the right of taking away that life she has not bestowed? Doubtless she is bound to watch over her own preservation, but is it true that this can only be effected by the death of criminals? If it can be compassed by other means, certainly the infliction of capital punishments ought to be avoided. This truth is more applicable to the present question than to any other. Is it not to promote the public interest, and to strengthen the young republic, that you would now sacrifice Louis XVI.? But will his whole family be annihilated by the stroke which cuts him off? According to the hereditary system, one king is succeeded immediately by another. Will, therefore, the death of Louis XVI. free you from the claims which his whole family feel to be justly theirs from their possession of dominion for many centuries? The destruction of one alone will be useless. Let, then, the present head of that family live, if it is only to debar the remainder from all hope; let him drag on a wretched existence, despised and hated by all aristocrats for his concessions and timidity, contemptible by his weakness, and degraded by his defeat, and you will have less to fear from him than from any other. Let this dethroned king exist in the bosom of your republic, deprived of all grandeur and pomp; show the world how insignificant a king is when stripped of external decorations; manifest an utter contempt for his former state, and the recollection of it will be no longer dangerous. By this conduct, you will hold out a grand moral lesson for the instruction of mankind, and you will provide for the safety of the republic much more effectually than by shedding blood which is not yours to shed. As to the son of Louis XVI., added Fauchet, "if it is possible to make a man of him, we will make him a citizen, like the young Egalité. He will then fight for the republic; or should he be base enough to become a traitor to his country, certainly no soldier of liberty will second his treasonable designs. Let us show to all nations that we fear nothing; let us induce

* Sitting of the 15th November, 1792.

them to follow our example, that we may all, united in a bond of fraternity, form an European Congress. May they depose their sovereigns, and dismiss those contemptible beings to drag out an obscure and ignominious life in the heart of republics; may they even give them small pensions, for those creatures are so devoid of all capacity, that even want would not teach them how to gain their bread! Let us give this first example of the abolition of a barbarous penalty! Let us put a stop to the effusion of blood, and at once quell the blood-thirsty propensities of the people. Let us appease that turbulent spirit which evil-minded men endeavour to excite, that they may avail themselves of it to overthrow the republic. Recollect that these barbarians still cry out for the immolation of fifty thousand persons, and that, after having delivered over the ex-king to their fury, it will be impossible to refuse to them any other victim. Let us put a stop to those crimes which have so long destroyed the peace of the republic, dishonoured liberty, impeded the progress of the revolution, and checked the march of improvement, and the diffusion of happiness over the face of the world."

This discussion lasted from the 13th to the 30th of November, and caused a general excitement. Those who were not enthusiasts of the new order of things, and who still retained a pleasing recollection of 1789, of the goodness of the monarch, and the love of which he was then the object, could not conceive him to be all at once transformed into a tyrant, and devoted to the scaffold. Admitting that he had carried on secret intercourse with foreign powers, they attributed this error to his weakness, to the difficulties of his situation, and to his invincible love of that power which he had derived from his ancestors, and their hearts revolted at the idea of inflicting on him an ignominious punishment. Yet they dared not openly defend him. The danger to which the nation had been exposed by the invasion of the Prussians, and the general opinion that they had been invited to the frontiers by the court, had excited a general feeling of indignation, which fell upon the head of the unfortunate monarch, and against which he dared not stand up. His advocates, therefore, were obliged to content themselves with resisting, in a general manner, those who cried for vengeance against him; they described these men as the instigators of every disorder, and as Septembrizers *, who wished to cover the face of France with blood and ruins. Without defending Louis XVI. by name, they called for moderation towards all vanquished enemies. They warned all against trusting to a deceitful show of energy, which, whilst it appeared to maintain the cause of the republic by measures of vigour, in reality sought only to subject it to the dominion of terror, or else to compromise it with Europe.

The Girondists had not yet spoken. Their opinions were rather supposed than actually known, and the *Mountain*, in order to secure a pretext for accusing them, pretended that they were anxious to save Louis XVI. However, their opinions were not very decided on this question; one party repudiating the doctrine of inviolability, and regarding Louis XVI. as concerned in the invasion of the Prussians; the other party, softened by the contemplation of fallen grandeur, endeavoured on every occasion to oppose the violence of their adversaries; but, not knowing what part to take, preserved an equivocal and sullen silence.

Another question at this time agitated the public mind, that of provisioning, which had occasioned much disagreement at every period of the revolution.

We have already seen the anxiety and trouble this subject occasioned Bailly and Necker in 1789*. The same difficulties occurred again with increased magnitude in 1792, and were accompanied by popular tumults of a still more dangerous nature. The suspension of commerce, even in those articles which are only remotely necessary, is a great check upon industry, and must eventually affect the working classes; but when corn, which is requisite for the support of life, fails, trouble and disorder must immediately ensue. Thus the former police had placed the provision of public stores among the number of its most important duties, considering it as one in which the welfare and tranquillity of the nation was most vitally concerned.

Corn had not been wanting in 1792, but the harvest had been retarded by the badness of the season, and the wheat remained long unthreshed from a deficiency of labourers. This was not, however, the great cause of the scarcity which then prevailed. In 1792 as in 1789, fear of pillage on the roads, and the vexatious practices of the markets, kept the farmers backward in their supplies. A cry was raised against monopoly. The rich farmers were called aristocrats, and their extensive farms, it was said, ought to be divided. The higher the public indignation rose against these men, the less they were disposed to show themselves in the markets, and the scarcity proportionably augmented. The assignats had also contributed to produce this calamity. Many farmers who only brought their property to sale for the purpose of amassing money, preferred accumulating their corn to acquiring paper wealth of variable value. Moreover, as corn became every day more scarce, and the assignats more abundant, this disproportion between the sign of property and property itself increased daily. As it commonly happens, too, in such emergencies, the providence of all only increased the general dread of famine—every one was anxious to collect a store of provisions for the time of universal distress. Families, municipalities, and the government, made large purchases, and thus rendered the little that remained more dear and scanty in its distribution. At Paris particularly, the municipality committed a very old but not the less serious error; it bought corn from the neighbouring departments and sold it again at a reduced price, with the double intention of satisfying the wants of the people and increasing its own popularity. The result of this was, that the corn merchants, crushed by the competition, withdrew themselves from the markets, and that the population of the provinces, attracted

* This was the name given to those who assisted in the September murders. The appellation when first bestowed was considered facetious. *Trans.*

Ante, page 25, col. 1.

they had no intention of abolishing religion, but they still persisted in rejecting the *maximum*. Thus unmoved in the general shock, and preserving still some liberty of opinion, the majority of the convention maintained the freedom of commerce against all prohibitory systems. If we consider what was at this time passing in the armies, in the several administrations of the country, and in the proceedings against Louis XVI., we shall behold a terrible and singular spectacle. The violent party, in their extravagancy, aimed at remodelling entirely both the army and the civil administration of the empire, to get rid of the lukewarm and the suspected; they wished to force commerce into activity, and to inspire their enemies with dread, by the infliction of terrific vengeance. The moderate party, on the contrary, feared that to remodel would be to disorganize the armies, that commerce would be destroyed by constraint, and that terror would only urge people to revolt; but their adversaries, irritated by these apprehensions, only became the more determined to carry every thing before them by force. Such was the spectacle which the right and left side of the convention presented at this period.

The sitting of the 30th was much disturbed by the complaints against Roland, the improprieties of the municipality, and by the report of the Commissioners sent into the department of the Eure and Loire. Every thing is ripped up when once a detail of grievances is stated. On one side, the massacres of September and the inflammatory publications of the Jacobins, and on the other, the hesitation of the moderate party, the remains of royalism, and the delays by which they had impeded the national vengeance, were reciprocally retorted. Marat spoke on this occasion, and provoked, as usual, a general murmur of disgust. Robespierre then rose in the midst of tumult; "He was about," he said, "to propose the most effectual method of restoring the public tranquillity, of introducing peace and impartiality into the assembly, of confounding the enemies of the national convention, of imposing silence on all calumniators, and of frustrating the effect of their calumnies." "Propose it, propose it," cried many voices. Robespierre continued: "It is," said he, "to pass sentence of death to-morrow on the French tyrant, and destroy thus the rallying point of all conspirators. The day after to-morrow you may then settle the question of provisioning; and on the day following you may lay the foundations of a free constitution."

This crafty and emphatic manner of proposing means of ensuring the public safety, and of coupling it with a measure resisted by the right side, roused the Girondists, and obliged them to explain themselves on the great question of the process. "You speak of the king," said Buzot, "but the cause of all disturbances is to be found in those who wish that another should fill his place. When the proper time for debating what is to be done with him shall have arrived, I will not fail to explain myself on that subject with due severity; but the topic is foreign to the question now before us; we are engaged in considering the cause of the provincial disturbances; disturbances necessarily arise from anarchy, and anarchy from the non-execution of the laws, and this cause will continue to operate so long as the convention does nothing to ensure order. Legendre succeeded Buzot, and entreated his colleagues to throw aside all personalities, and to give their attention only to public concerns, and to seditions, which as they had no other object than that of saving the king, would cease when he should be no more. He proposed then that the opinions which had been delivered concerning the process should be laid upon the table, printed and distributed to all the deputies, and that it should be immediately decided whether Louis XVI. should be brought to trial, without losing any further time in protracted debates. Jean-Bon-Saint-André declared that there was no necessity for any preliminary questions, and that nothing remained to be done but to pronounce at once the condemnation of Louis XVI., and determine the manner of his punishment. The motion, however, of Legendre was finally adopted, and the discussion adjourned to the 3rd of December.

On this day, the order for the trial, the framing the act of accusation, and the forms to be observed on the trial were called for on every side. Robespierre claimed to be heard, and although it had been decided that the various opinions on this subject should be printed and not read, he obtained a hearing, "as he was about," he said, "to speak not upon the process, but against the process itself, and to demand condemnation without trial."

He maintained that to enter into a judicial process would be opening a deliberation, and that a deliberation supposed doubt, and the possibility of a result favourable to the accused. Now, by admitting the crime of Louis XVI. to be a matter to be resolved, was to accuse the Parisians, the federalists, and all the patriots, who had taken part in the revolution of the 10th of August. It was to absolve Louis XVI., the aristocrats, foreign powers, and their manifestoes from blame; thus, in a word, monarchy wolud be declared innocent, and the republic culpable.

"Observe, also," continued Robespierre, "the insolence of the enemies of liberty since you have proposed this doubt. In the month of August last, the partisans of the king hid themselves. Whosoever had undertaken his apology would have been punished as a traitor. But at present they come forward with effrontery; at present their insulting publications inundate Paris and the departments; armed men, invited within these walls without your knowledge, make the city resound with the cries of sedition, and demand impunity for Louis XVI.! You have only to open the breach which these men long for the honour of defending! What do I say! Even now the opinions of the people are divided. Two months ago would any one have thought that the question of inviolability would have admitted of a moment's discussion? But," added Robespierre, "since the citizen Pétion has proposed it as a serious question, the doctrines of the constituent assembly have re-appeared in this place. Oh, guilt! Oh, shame! the tribune of the French nation has resounded with panegyrics on Louis XVI.! We have heard the virtues and the acts of a tyrant applauded! Although we have found the greatest difficulty in saving our best citizens from the injustice of precipitate decisions, the cause of a tyrant is deemed so sacred, that it is considered impossible to give a too free or too lengthened discussion!

If we believe his apologists, these proceedings will last many months: they will be protracted to the next spring, when the despots of Europe intend to make a general attack on us. What a career will this open to the conspirators! What a field will it afford for intrigue and aristocracy to engage in!

"Just heavens! the ferocious hordes of despotism are already prepared to ravage our country in the name of Louis XVI. He still carries on war with the republic from the depths of his dungeon, and his guilt is yet doubted, and we hesitate to treat him as an enemy! It has been asked by what laws he is condemned. The constitution has been appealed to in his defence! The constitution condemns you for what you have already done. If dethronement is the only legal punishment you can inflict upon him, you were not empowered to pronounce it without a trial; you have no right to detain him in prison, he may justly demand his enlargement; the constitution condemns you; throw yourselves, therefore, at the feet of Louis, and implore his pardon."

These declamations, so full of gall, which amounted to no more than what Saint-Just had already said, made, nevertheless, a deep impression on the assembly, who were anxious to settle the question at the present sitting. Robespierre had required that Louis XVI. should be tried immediately; nevertheless, many members, and particularly Pétion, persisted in demanding that before the form of trial was fixed upon, Louis XVI. should be declared under a decree of accusation; for, said they, whatever celerity may be necessary in this proceeding, this is an indispensable preliminary. Robespierre attempted now again to address the assembly, and seemed, by his manner, to exact permission to do so, but his insolent demand gave offence, and the tribune was denied him. The assembly finally passed the following decree:—

"The national convention declares that Louis XVI. shall be tried by the same, (3rd December)."

On the 4th, the forms of proceedings to be observed were discussed. Buzot, who had been often heard speaking of royalism, now demanded permission to speak on the order of the day; to banish all suspicion, he commenced by proposing that the penalty of death should be pronounced against all those who should endeavour to establish monarchy in France. Such are the methods often resorted to by those who wish to prove themselves innocent of the charges of which they are suspected. This useless motion was hailed with universal applause; but the *Mountain*, who according to their own system could not prevent this measure, opposed it with ill temper, and Bazire requested liberty to reply to it. The cry of *Question, question*, was, however, loudly called for. Philipeaux then, seconding Bazire, proposed that the assembly should confine their attention exclusively to Louis XVI., and hold a permanent sitting until sentence should be finally pronounced upon him. It being asked what interest the *Mountain* could have in rejecting the proposition of Buzot, for there was no one who could regret that royalty was no more, Lejeune replied, that it was, in point of fact, renewing a question which had already been decided by the abolition of royalty. "But," said Rewbell, "it is necessary to add a penal denunciation to the decree of abolition; it is not, therefore, renewing a question already decided." Merlin, less cautious than his predecessors, suggested excepting the case of a proposition for the re-establishment of monarchy being made in primary assemblies. This amendment excited universal cries of indignation. "Behold the mystery discovered!" exclaimed many voices. "They wish for a king, but issuing from primary assemblies—from those assemblies which have produced a Marat, a Robespierre, and a Danton!" Merlin endeavoured to justify himself, by saying that he intended merely to pay homage to the sovereignty of the people. But he was silenced, as being considered a royalist, and it was proposed to call him to order. Guadet then rose, and with that bad faith which the most upright characters sometimes carry into violent debate, maintained that freedom of opinion should be respected; the more so, as thereby an important secret had been discovered. "The assembly," said he, "ought not to regret having heard this amendment, which demonstrates that a new species of despotism, to succeed to that just destroyed, is meditated; and Merlin, instead of being called to order, ought to receive the thanks of the convention." The voice of Guadet was now drowned in a general murmur. Bazire, Merlin, and Robespierre cried out that it was a falsehood; and it is true that the reproach of intending to substitute a plebeian king in the place of Louis XVI. was as absurd as that of the federalism objected to the Girondists. The assembly finally decreed the penalty of death against any one who should attempt to re-establish royalty in France, under whatsoever denomination it might exist.

The assembly then returned to the order of the day, and to the proposition of forming a permanent sitting. Robespierre demanded again that sentence should be passed immediately. Pétion, supported by the majority, was again victorious, and it was decided that neither the sitting of the convention should be permanent, or the sentence instantaneous, but that the assembly should attend every day solely to this subject, to the exclusion of every other, from eleven o'clock in the morning to six in the evening.

The following days were occupied in reading some papers found in the house of Laporte, and others discovered in a secret chest which the king had caused to be constructed in the body of the wall of the palace; the door was of iron, and it was afterwards called the *iron chest*. The workman employed in its fabrication had informed Roland of its existence, and he, anxious to ascertain the truth of this information, hastened to the Tuileries to examine it himself, without taking any witness with him, which gave occasion to his enemies to accuse him of having withheld some of the papers which were deposited there. Roland discovered in this closet all the documents relative to the communications which the court had held with the emigrants, and with several members of the former assemblies. The negotiation of the king with Mirabeau was also brought to light, and the memory of this great orator was about to be proscribed, when Manuel, his warm admirer, requested that these papers should be placed in the hands of the committee of public information, to be more minutely ex-

amined *. A committee was also appointed to frame from these documents a state of facts declarative of the acts imputed to Louis XVI. This state of facts, when prepared, was to be submitted to the assembly, for their approval. Louis XVI. was then to appear before the convention, there to be interrogated by the president upon every article contained in the state of facts. After his appearance, two subsequent days were to be allowed for his defence, and on the day following sentence was to be passed on Louis, singly and by each member of the convention. The executive power was ordered to take every measure to maintain the public tranquillity whilst the king was conveyed to the assembly. These arrangements were ordered on the 9th.

On the 10th the state of facts was presented to the assembly, and the appearance of Louis XVI. was ordered to take place on the next day, the 11th of December.

This unfortunate monarch was now about to enter into the presence of the national convention, and to be subjected to an interrogatory concerning every act of his reign. The news of these proceedings had come even to the knowledge of Cléry, by secret intelligence which he had obtained out of doors, who did not communicate them to the wretched family in the Temple without trembling for the result. Not daring, however, to give direct information on the subject to Louis, he had confined this intelligence to Madame Elizabeth, and told her besides, that the commune had determined to separate the king from his family during the proceedings against him. In concert with this princess, he devised an expedient, by which he might hold intercourse with the queen and herself during this separation. Cléry, being permitted to accompany the king, he agreed to send a handkerchief to the princesses if his master should be ill. This was all the communication the unhappy prisoners could then hold with each other. The king was informed by his sister of his approaching appearance before the assembly, and of the separation which would then take place. He received this news with perfect resignation, and prepared to support with firmness the distressing scene to which he was about to be summoned.

The commune ordered that, on the morning of the 11th, all the administrative bodies should be assembled, that all the sections should be armed, that the guards of all the public places, dépôts, &c. should be augmented two hundred men each, that numerous corps of reserve should be posted at several points, with a strong complement of artillery, and that a chosen escort should accompany the carriage in which the king was conveyed to the assembly.

On the morning of the 11th the beating of the *générale* announced the approach of this sad and novel scene. A numerous body of military surrounded the Temple; and the noise and bustle occasioned by the arrival of the soldiers, horses, and carriages, reached the prisoners, who pretended to be ignorant of the cause of these preparations. At nine o'clock, the family, as usual, met in the king's room for breakfast. The municipal officers, more vigilant than ever, repressed by their presence the slightest mutual communication. They were at last separated. The king requested in vain that his son might be left with him a few minutes longer. In spite of his entreaties the child was taken away, and he remained alone for about two hours. The mayor of Paris and the *procureur* of the commune then arrived, and communicated to him the order of the convention, which summoned him to their bar under the name of Louis Capet,—"Capet!" replied the prince, "that is the name of one of my ancestors, but it is not mine." He then rose, and took his seat in the carriage of the mayor, who attended him. Six hundred chosen men formed his escort. The advance and rear guard was composed of a strong body of cavalry. Numerous throngs of the population contemplated in silence this sad procession, and submitted with grief to this act of unjust rigour, as they had submitted to many of a similar nature under the old government. A few exclamations of indignation indeed broke forth, but they were very few. The king was not moved, and diverted his attention, with the greatest tranquillity, by observations called forth by different objects on his road. Being arrived at the Feuillans, he was conducted into an apartment, and there awaited the orders of the assembly.

Meanwhile many motions were made relative to the manner in which Louis should be received. It was proposed that no petition should be heard, that no one should be allowed to speak, that no sign of approbation or disapprobation should be permitted. "We must," said Legendre, "strike terror, by observing the silence of the tomb." A murmur of disapprobation condemned these cruel expressions. Defermont requested that a chair should be allowed the accused; this was consented to without discussion, and a chair was placed at the bar. From a ridiculous feeling of vanity, Manuel proposed that the question of the order of the day should be discussed, that the assembly might not appear to give importance to the king by paying exclusive attention to him; "Ought we not," added he, "to make him wait at the door?" A bill respecting the emigrants was then debated.

Santerre finally announced the arrival of Louis. Barrère, the president, then rose up. "Citizens," said he, "the eyes of Europe are fixed upon you; posterity will judge you with inflexible severity; preserve then the dignity and unruffled demeanour of judges; recollect the solemn silence with which Louis was received when he was brought back from Varennes."

Louis remained at the bar of the convention for about two hours and a half. The mayor, and the generals Santerre and Wittengoff, were stationed at each side of him. A profound silence prevailed in the assembly. The dignity of Louis, and the calm tranquillity of his countenance in so calamitous a situation, affected every one. The deputies of the centre were strongly moved. The Girondists experienced a powerful emotion. Saint-Just, Robespierre, and Marat, felt their fanaticism die within

* This discovery took place at the sitting of the 5th of December. A desire was expressed of breaking Mirabeau's bust to pieces, and to order that his remains should be removed from the Pantheon: but on that day the assembly contented themselves with covering his bust with a cloth.

them, and were astonished to find that, in condemning a king, they would sentence also a man to death.

"Be seated," said Barrère to Louis, "and answer the questions that are about to be put to you." Louis sat down and listened to the perusal of the act of accusation, article by article; in this all the faults of the court were made to bear personally on Louis XVI. The interruption of the sittings of the 20th of June, 1789; the Royal Session (*lit de justice*) held on the 23rd of the same month; the conspiracy of the aristocracy, frustrated by the insurrection of the 14th of July; the fêtes of the garde-du-corps; the outrages against the national cockade; the refusal to sanction the declaration of rights, and many other constitutional articles; nay, facts which manifested a new conspiracy in October, followed by the scenes of the 5th and 6th of the same month; the speech of reconciliation which succeeded these events, and promised repentance, which proved to be insincere; the violation of the oath taken at the confederation on the 14th of July; the negociations entered into with Talon and Mirabeau, for the purpose of producing a counter-revolution; the money appropriated to the corruption of numerous deputies; the meeting of the *chevaliers du poignard*, on the 28th of February, 1791; the flight of Varennes; the firing on the people at the Champ de Mars; the silence observed with regard to the convention of Pilnitz; the delay of the promulgation of the decree which united Avignon to France; the insurrections of Nimes, Montauban, Mende, and Jallès; the continuation of pay granted to emigrant body-guards, and to the licensed constitutional guard; the secret correspondence with the emigrant princes; the insufficiency of the armies on the frontiers; the refusal to sanction the camp of twenty thousand men; the disarmament of all the strong places of France; the tardy announcement of the march of the Prussians; the organization of secret associations in the interior of Paris; the review of the Swiss and other troops, which formed the garrison of the palace on the morning of the 10th; the doubling of the guard on that day; the summoning of the mayor to the Tuileries; and, finally, the effusion of blood which had been occasioned by this military array, were all laid to the charge of Louis.

By denying the position, that the regret which the king experienced on the loss of his former authority was natural, his whole conduct was made to appear highly criminal, for his whole bearing had exhibited nothing but a continued regret, mingled with some timid efforts to regain what he had lost. At the end of the reading of each article the president turned to Louis, and said, *What answer have you to make.* The king with a firm voice denied some of the charges, referred others to his ministers, and appealed constantly to the constitution, from which he declared he had never swerved. His answers were delivered in moderate language. But to this charge, *You have shed the blood of the people on the 10th of August*, he exclaimed in an animated manner: "No, Sir, no, it was not!"

He was then showed all the papers which had been found in the palace, some of which he refused to acknowledge, and he even denied the existence of the *iron chest*, which produced an unfavourable impression, and was very impolitic, as the fact was already proved. He then demanded a copy of the act of accusation and the other papers, and also counsel to assist him.

The president now signified to him that he might retire. He was offered some refreshments in an adjoining apartment, and then, re-entering the carriage, was conducted back to the Temple. He arrived at his prison at half-past six o'clock, and his first request was to see his family; but this was refused, as the commune had ordered a separation whilst the proceedings lasted. At half-past eight, when supper was announced, he requested again permission to embrace his children; but the suspicions of the commune made all his jailers barbarians, and he was again denied this consolation.

Meantime, the assembly was thrown into confusion by reason of the demand of Louis for counsel. Treilhard and Pétion insisted warmly that this request should be granted; Tallien, Billaud-Varennes, Chabot, and Merlin opposed it with equal ardour, saying that sentence would be delayed by the quibbles of law. Finally, however, the assembly allowed counsel. A deputation was commissioned to carry this information to Louis, and to ask on whom his choice fell. He named Target, or Tronchet, or both, if possible. He asked besides for pens and ink, that he might draw up his defence, and begged permission to see his family. The convention decided immediately that his requests should be complied with, and that those whom he had chosen for his counsel should be informed of this selection and be permitted to communicate freely with him; they also allowed him access to his family.

Target declined the office with which Louis had charged him, saying that since 1785 he had given up pleading. Tronchet then wrote immediately to say he was ready to undertake the defence of Louis; and whilst the assembly were occupied in finding a new counsellor in place of the former, they received a letter from a citizen of sixty years of age; it was from the venerable Malesherbes, the friend and companion of Turgot, and the most respected magistrate in France. This noble-minded old man thus expressed himself: "I have been called twice into the councils of him who was formerly my master, at the time when this office was an object of ambition to all; I owe him the same service now, when it has become an office dangerous to many!"

He begged the president to inform Louis that he was ready to undertake his defence.

Many other citizens made the same offer, all which Louis was informed. He returned them all his thanks, but accepted only of the services of Tronchet and Malesherbes. The commune resolved that these two defenders should undergo a most rigorous examination before they were permitted to communicate with their client. The convention again gave permission for a *free communication*, renewed their orders to this effect, and informed Tronchet and Malesherbes that they were at liberty to enter the Temple. Louis, at first sight of the latter, ran to embrace him; the venerable old man fell at his feet, bursting into tears. The king raised him, and they remained long in a mutual embrace. They then commenced the defence

without further delay. Messengers from the assembly brought fresh papers daily, which they had orders to communicate to the unfortunate monarch. Louis perused them with much attention and tranquillity, which on each occasion increased the astonishment of the messengers.

The only consolation he had requested, that of seeing his family, had not yet been granted him, notwithstanding the decree of the convention. The commune, throwing obstacles in the way, called for a copy of this decree. "It was in vain to order it," said Tallien, "if the commune does not allow it, it will never take place." These insolent expressions excited much tumult. Nevertheless, the assembly, modifying their decree, permitted the king only to see his two children, but on condition that they returned to their mother during the proceedings. Louis, feeling that they were more necessary to the queen than himself, determined not to deprive her of this solace, and submitted to this new affliction with a resignation which was perfectly unalterable throughout all his sufferings.

As the proceedings advanced, the importance of the question became more and more evident. The one party foresaw that to destroy, by regicide, the ancient monarchy, would be to embark upon an inexorable system of vengeance and cruelty, and to commence a war of extirpation against the old order of things; and although they were desirous of abolishing this system, they wished to effect it in a less violent manner. The other party, on the contrary, were eager to enter upon this war of extirpation, which would admit neither of hesitation or withdrawal, and would interpose a gulf between monarchy and the revolution. The person of the king was altogether lost in the consideration of this grand question; and the only question was, whether it were needful to dissever the present from the past by an act at once terrible and decisive. The result was all that was looked at, and the victim upon whom the blow was to fall was entirely lost sight of.

The Girondists inveighed bitterly against the Jacobins, dwelt continually upon the crimes of September, and represented them as anarchists, who aimed at domineering over the convention by terror, and desired the death of the king only to substitute triumvirs in his place. Guadet succeeded in driving them nearly all from the convention, by causing the adoption of a decree by which electoral assemblies were to be convoked, to confirm or recall their deputies. This proposition, which was moved and carried in a few minutes, terribly dismayed the Jacobins. Other circumstances gave them still further alarm. The federalists continued to arrive from all quarters. The municipalities sent a multitude of addresses, approving of a republic, and congratulating the assembly on having established it, and condemned the crimes and excesses of anarchy. The corresponding societies reproached the mother institution with cherishing men of blood in its bosom, who perverted the public morals, and would even attempt the safety of the convention. Some of them even disclaimed their political mother, declared that they did not wish to belong to her, and intimated their intention to fly to Paris to protect the assembly. All demanded the expulsion of Marat, and some that of Robespierre himself.

The Jacobins, in despair, declared that the public mind of France was corrupted; recommended union to their club, and lost no time in writing to the provinces, to enlighten their deluded brethren; they also accused the traitor Roland of having intercepted their correspondence, and substituting hypocritical communications in their place, which perverted the public opinion. They proposed a voluntary donation for the circulation of good publications, especially the *admirable* speeches of Robespierre, and they tried every means of insuring their arrival at their several destinations, in spite of Roland, who violated the secrecy of the post. They, however, agreed in one point, that Marat compromised their popularity; and they deemed it needful that the mother institution should point out to France the difference between this man, whose exasperated mind urged him beyond all bounds, and the wise and virtuous Robespierre, who kept himself always within the limits of moderation, and who aimed only at what was at the same time just and practicable. A great controversy existed in respect of these two individuals. They acknowledged that Marat was a bold and hardy partisan, but too exaggerated in his views. He had been useful, they said, to the cause of the people, but he knew not where to stop. His defenders replied that he did not consider it necessary to bring all his speculations into practice, and that no one knew better at what point it was proper to check the people. They cited many of his expressions to confirm the truth of their assertions, such as the following: "More than one Marat is not needful in the republic."—"I demand the most that I may obtain the least—I would rather that my hand should wither than write what I do write, if I believed the people would literally execute what I counsel.—I only overcharge the people, because I know they beat me down in price." The galleries ratified the justification of Marat by their applauses. Nevertheless, the club resolved to publish an address, in which to describe the difference between the character of Robespierre and Marat; and distinguish the vehemence of the one from the wisdom of the other*. After this measure, they proposed to adopt many others, and resolved not to cease urging the departure of the federalists to the frontiers. If, for example, they learnt that the army of Dumouriez became weakened by desertion, they cried out for a reinforcement of federalists. Marat, in his journal, asserted that the volunteers who had joined the army first, had now been a year on active service, and that it was time they should be relieved by those who remained at Paris: the public had just received intelligence that Custine had been obliged to abandon Frankfort, and that Beurnonville had failed in his attempt upon the Electorate of Trèves; and the Jacobins maintained, that if these two generals had been supported by the federalists who uselessly clogged the capital, they would not have experienced this check.

The fruitless attempt of Beurnonville, and the retreat of Custine, singularly agitated the public mind. Yet these events might have been anticipated; for Beurnonville, undertaking his enter-

* See note 51 in the Appendix

bins to press their measures against the king.

Situation of Philippe Egalité, Duke of Orleans.

prise in a bad season, with an insufficient force, and in a country difficult of access, could not but fail; and Custine, who would fall back upon the Rhine, to avoid confessing his temerity, was necessarily forced to retreat to Mayence. Public misfortunes always become an occasion of mutual reproach to parties. The Jacobins, hating the generals suspected of aristocratic principles, called them Feuillans and Girondists. Marat clamoured again against the rage of conquest which possessed the public mind, which he said he had always condemned, and which originated in a disguised ambition of the generals to obtain a formidable degree of power. Robespierre's reproaches, springing from his private animosities, lighted upon the infamous faction, as he called them, which domineered over the assembly, and upon the executive power, which he maintained were alone blameworthy, and not the generals of the armies. The perfidious Roland, the intriguing Brissot, and the wretches Louvet, Guadet, and Vergniaud, were the authors, he declared, of all the calamities of France. He hoped, he said, that he should be the first to be assassinated by them; but he wished, previously, to have the pleasure of impeaching them for their crimes. Dumouriez and Custine, he added, knew them well, and took care to join their party: but everybody else feared them, because they had wealth, places, and all the influence of the republic, at their disposal. Their intention, he asserted, was to enslave the nation, and they therefore endeavoured to cripple the exertions of all true patriots, and thus expose France to be conquered by her enemies. Their principal object, he said, was to destroy the Jacobin club, and to assassinate whosoever should have the courage to resist their iniquitous designs; and as for myself, exclaimed Robespierre, I ask only to fall by the dagger of Roland*!

This furious hatred communicating itself to the entire club, agitated it as a stormy sea; every one prepared for a deadly struggle; every idea of reconciliation was rejected, and as there had been a proposal of an arrangement, they resolved never to "kiss and make it up."

The same scenes took place in the assembly during the interval in which Louis XVI. was preparing his defence. It was repeated every where that the royalists menaced the patriots, and circulated pamphlets in favour of the king. Thuriot proposed a meth d of silencing these clamours; it was to proclaim the penalty of death against any one who should attempt to destroy the unity of the republic, or detach any portion of society from it. This decree was directed against the idle story of federalism, that is to say, against the Girondists. Buzot hastened to rebut it by another, demanding the exile of the family of Orleans. Both parties thus reciprocated falsehood and calumnies. Whilst the Jacobins accused the Girondists of federalism, the latter reproached the former with the intention of placing the Duke of Orleans on the throne, and of desiring the death of Louis XVI. only for the purpose of rendering his place vacant.

The Duke of Orleans still resided in Paris, endeavouring in vain to escape observation by mixing with the assembly. This situation, in the midst of furious demagogues, undoubtedly little suited him; but where could he fly? In all parts of Europe he would have fallen into the hands of the emigrants; and outrages, and perhaps death, awaited this scion of royalty, who had renounced his birth and his rank. In France he endeavoured to conceal both under the most humble title, and took the name of *Equality* (*Egalité*). But the memory of his former state in society was not to be effaced; his immense riches still recalled it incessantly to recollection. Unless he had clothed himself in rags, and made himself contemptible by assuming plebeian manners, how could he have escaped suspicion! In the ranks of the Girondists he would have been irretrievably ruined, and all the reproaches of attachment to royalty which were levelled against that party, would have received a colour of truth from his presence. Among the Jacobins he was supported by the violence of Paris; but he did not escape the accusations of the Girondists, and, in point of fact, it was that which did befal him. These latter, who could not pardon his joining the party of their adversaries, openly hinted that he could only render himself supportable, by lavishing his riches on the anarchists, and thus furnishing them with resources from his immense wealth.

The suspicious Louvet went further, and believed that the duke still cherished the hope of attaining to regal power. Without partaking of this opinion, but merely for the purpose of rebutting the motion of Thuriot, Buzot ascended the tribune: "If the decree," said he, "of Thuriot is calculated to restore confidence to the public, I am about to propose another not less so. Monarchy is overthrown, but it still lives in the recollections of its creatures; let us imitate the Romans; they expelled both Tarquin and all his family; let us, in like manner, drive out from among us all the family of the Bourbons. A part of this family is in chains, but there is another part still more dangerous, because more popular; I mean the Orleans branch. The bust of the Duke of Orleans has been paraded through the streets of Paris; his sons have distinguished themselves in our armies; and the very merits of this family make them dangerous to the cause of liberty. Let them, then, make a last sacrifice to their country; let them carry elsewhere the misfortune of having been allied to a throne, and the still heavier one of bearing a name which is odious to us, and which cannot fail to wound the ears of a free man." Louvet, following Buzot, addressed the duke personally, reminded him of the voluntary exile of Collatinus, and urged him to imitate so noble an example. Lanjuinais referred to the elections of Paris, of which *Egalité* was a deputy, and bade the assembly recollect that these elections had taken place under the daggers of a violent faction; he dwelt upon the efforts which had been made to nominate a chancellor of the house of Orleans minister at war; he alluded to the influence the sons of this family had acquired in our armies, and from all these reasons, he finally demanded the banishment of all the Bourbons. Bazire, Saint-Just, and Chabot, resisted this motion, rather from a spirit of opposition to the Girondists, than from any feeling to the Duke of Orleans. They maintained that the present was not the time to treat as an enemy the only

* Sitting of the Jacobins, 12th December.

SERVANTS' SOCIETY POONA.

Bourbon who had conducted himself loyally towards the nation; that the Bourbon in prison should be first punished, the constitution then established, and that it would afterwards be quite time enough for the assembly to turn their attention towards citizens then become dangerous; that to banish the Duke of Orleans from France, would be to sentence him to death, and that this cruel measure should be at least postponed. Nevertheless the decree of banishment was passed by acclamation. It only now remained to determine the time of its duration in drawing up the act: "Since you have recourse to ostracism against Egalité," said Merlin, "employ it equally against all dangerous men; and, first, against the executive power"—"Against Roland," exclaimed Albitte—"Against Roland and Pache," added Barrère, "who have become authors of division among us. Exclude them both from the ministry, and tranquillity and union will be restored."—Kersaint, however, apprehended that England would take advantage of this disorganization of the ministry, to inflict upon us a disastrous war, as she had formerly done, on the disgrace of d'Argenson and Machau in 1757.

Rewbell questioned the right of the assembly to banish a representative of the people, and asked if Philip Egalité, under this [illegible] did not belong to the nation, by whom he had bee[illegible]ly. These observations caused some hesitation in the convention. The discussion was interrupted, and resumed, and, without revoking the decree of banishment against the Bourbons, the question was adjourned for three days, in order to tranquillize themselves, and afford time for reflecting gravely on the question whether they could banish Egalité, and safely deprive themselves of the two ministers, of war and of the interior.

After this debate, it is easy to imagine the disorder that prevailed in the sections, the commune, and at the Jacobin club. A cry was raised against the ostracism of the assembly, and petitions were got up to be presented upon the resumption of the debate. After three days the debate re-commenced, and the mayor, at the head of the sections, demanded the annulment of the decree. This petition being read, the assembly passed to the order of the day; but Pétion observing the tumult it had occasioned, proposed adjourning the question till sentence should have been passed upon Louis XVI. This middle course was adopted, and the popular passions again raged with undivided fury against their victim in the Temple. This remarkable procedure was now immediately resumed.

CHAPTER V.

CONTINUATION OF THE PROCESS AGAINST LOUIS XVI.; HIS DEFENCE—STORMY DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION—THE GIRONDISTS PROPOSE THE APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE; OPINION OF THE DEPUTY SALLES; SPEECH OF ROBESPIERRE; SPEECH OF VERGNIAUD—THE PUTTING OF THE QUESTIONS. LOUIS XVI. IS DECLARED GUILTY, AND CONDEMNED TO DEATH WITHOUT APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE, AND WITHOUT DELAY OF EXECUTION—REMARKS UPON THE DEBATES AND THE VOTES AS GIVEN—ASSASSINATION OF THE DEPUTY LAPELLETIER-SAINT-FARGEAU—PUBLIC FERMENT AT PARIS—THE PARTING OF LOUIS XVI. WITH HIS FAMILY; HIS LAST MOMENTS IN PRISON AND UPON THE SCAFFOLD.

The time granted to Louis to prepare his defence was scarcely sufficient to compare the documents on which it was to be established. His two defenders demanded a third, more young and active than themselves, who might draw up and deliver the defence, and leave to them only the task of preparing the materials. This young associate was the advocate Desèze, who had defended Bezenval after the 14th of July. The convention, who had allowed the king to make a defence, did not deny him the means of doing so, and Desèze was permitted, as well as Malesherbes and Tronchet, free access to the Temple. The papers by which the charges were supported were daily laid before him; he received them with an air of perfect indifference, "as if," said the report of the commune, "the proceedings *had rather concerned any other than himself.*" He behaved towards the commissaries with the greatest politeness, and offered them refreshments when they were detained long in his apartment. Whilst these proceedings were going on, he found out a method of corresponding with his family. He wrote to them with the pens and paper which were given him for his defence, and the princesses scratched their answers on the same paper with the point of a pin. They sometimes folded up their notes in balls of thread, which the servant who attended the king at meals threw under the table; and they were often obliged to convey them to this servant by letting them drop down the stairs by means of a string. The unhappy prisoners thus informed themselves of each other's health, and derived great consolation from this secret intercourse.

Finally, M. Desèze, working day and night, brought the defence to a conclusion. The king made him suppress those parts which were too rhetorical, and wished to confine him to the simple details of his government. At half-past nine o'clock on the morning of the 26th, all the armed forces of Paris were prepared for the transfer of Louis from the Temple to the Feuillans, the same precautions and order being observed as on the former occasion. Having entered the carriage of the mayor, he conversed on the road with his usual tranquillity; the topics of his conversation were Seneca, Livy, and the hospitals, and he even made a jocose and finely pointed observation on one of the municipal officers keeping himself covered while inside the carriage. On his arrival at the Feuillans he manifested much anxiety for his defenders; he was seated by their side in the assembly; he regarded, with perfect tranquillity, the benches where sate his judges and accusers; seemed to be trying to discover in their

countenances the effect which the pleading of M. Desèze would produce, and conversed sometimes, with a smiling aspect, with Tronchet and Malesherbes. The assembly listened to the defence in solemn silence, and testified no disapprobation.

M. Desèze began with examining the line of defence Louis had a right to follow, and then dwelt upon the facts laid to the charge of Louis XVI. Although the assembly had implicitly decreed that the law of inviolability could not be appealed to, M. Desèze proved very conclusively that nothing could limit the right of defence, and that the accused was at liberty to avail himself of every topic which could tend to his exculpation, in spite of the decisions of the convention; that consequently, if Louis deemed the law of inviolability defensible, he was free to maintain it. He was first obliged to acknowledge the sovereignty of the people, and with all the defenders of the constitution of 1791, he contended, that this sovereignty, as being absolute mistress, could bind herself by an engagement; that it had done so with respect to Louis XVI. in conceding inviolability, and that this was not unreasonable in the monarchical system; that consequently this compact was binding, and that whatever crimes the king might have committed, they were only punishable by dethronement. He declared, that if this were not true, the constitution of 1791 became a cruel snare laid for Louis XVI., as its maintenance was promised with the secret intention of its being violated. He added, that if Louis was denied the rights of a king, he should at least be left in possession of those of a citizen; and he asked, where were those forms preservative of justice which every citizen was at liberty to claim, such as a distinction between the grand jury and the petty jury, the power of the right of challenge, a majority of two-thirds, secrecy of votes, and the silence of the judges whilst they were forming their opinions. He asserted boldly that he looked on every side for judges, and found only accusers. He then passed to the discussion of the facts, which he divided into two classes, those which had followed and those which preceded the acceptance of the constitutional act. The first, he said, were rendered unimpeachable by this acceptance, and the latter by the law of inviolability. Yet he did not shrink from their examination, and this he entered into with great advantage to the accused, because, for want of positive proof of the communications of Louis with foreign powers, many insignificant facts had been accumulated, rather of presumptive than conclusive evidence. He successfully repelled the accusation which made the king the cause of the effusion of blood shed on the 10th of August. In fact, the aggressor on that day was not Louis XVI., but the people. It was lawful for him, being attacked, to defend himself, and he only took the precautions necessary for that purpose. The magistrates themselves had approved of these precautions, and had given the troops an express order to repel force by force. The king, however, said M. Desèze, was unwilling to exert this authority, which he had received both from nature and from the laws, and had retired to the legislative assembly to avoid all effusion of blood. In the conflict which followed he was not at all implicated, and rather deserved thanks than blame for the order he had given under his hand to the Swiss, which was the cause of their abandoning the defence of the palace. It was therefore, he maintained, a manifest injustice to accuse Louis XVI. of having shed the blood of the people, for on this point he was beyond reproach; in fact, he had displayed the utmost forbearance and propriety.

M. Desèze finished his speech in the following just and concise manner, in which he touched, for the first time, upon the private virtues of the king.

"Louis XVI. ascended the throne at the age of twenty, and at that early season of life afforded an example of blameless morals to monarchs. He brought with him to the supreme power, no criminal weaknesses, no corrupt passions; he was economical, just, and temperate in his habits, and showed himself the constant friend of the people. The people desired the abolition of a grievous tax; he abolished it: they demanded the abolition of servitude; he commenced by abolishing it in his own domains: they solicited the reform of judicial legislation; he made these reforms: they desired that the great mass of the French nation, whom the rigour of our ancient customs had till then deprived of their rights, should acquire or recover them; these he gave them the enjoyment of by his laws: they cried for liberty, and he granted it! He even anticipated their wants by his personal sacrifices, and yet it is in the name of this same people that his blood is this day demanded! Citizens, I cannot conclude—History will give her verdict: recollect she will pass judgment on your sentence, and her decision will stand for ages yet to come!"

Louis then briefly addressed the assembly immediately after his defender had concluded, from a written memorandum of his own dictation. "You have just heard," said he, "my defence; I shall not further insist upon the arguments there urged; but, as I am addressing you, perhaps, for the last time, I feel it incumbent on me to declare that my conscience is free from guilt, and that my defenders have spoken the truth.

"I have never feared the public examination of my conduct; but I am deeply grieved to find that the effusion of blood of the 10th of August is laid to my charge.

"The multiplied proofs which I have ever given of my love to the people, and my general conduct towards them, appear to me sufficient to prove that I did not fear to expose myself, to prevent the effusion of this blood, and should for ever relieve me from so foul an imputation."

The president then asked Louis XVI. if he had any thing further to say in his defence, and, having received an answer in the negative, informed him that he might retire. He was then conducted into an adjoining apartment, where he manifested the most amiable solicitude about the young Desèze, who appeared fatigued with his protracted address. Having again taken his place in the carriage, he conversed, with serenity, with those who escorted him, and arrived at the Temple about five o'clock.

Scarcely had Louis quitted the convention, when a violent tumult arose. Some wished to open a discussion on his conduct; others complained of the eternal delays which retarded the final sen-

tence, and called for the instant vote; saying that every tribunal, having heard the accused, immediately gave their verdict. Lanjuinais, from the commencement of the proceedings, had manifested a warm feeling of indignation against the adversaries of the king, which his impetuous temper would not suffer him to conceal. He sprang to the tribune, whilst the most uproarious cries filled the assembly, and demanded, not a delay for the purposes of a debate, but the annulment of the judicial process altogether. "The times of ferocity," exclaimed he, "have gone by; the assembly will eternally dishonour itself by passing sentence on Louis XVI.; France has no right," said he, "to pass this sentence, and the convention are particularly incompetent to exercise such authority. As a political body," continued he, "we can only take measures of safety against the ex-king; but as a tribunal, we act in defiance of every principle of law, for the conquered is thus tried by his conquerors, nearly every member present having declared himself one of the conspirators of the 10th of August." At the word *conspirators*, a most awful tumult prevailed on all sides. "*Order! order! To the Abbaye;*" and cries were heard of "*Come down from the tribune!*" Lanjuinais endeavoured in vain to justify his offensive expression, saying that he used it in the honourable sense, and that the insurrection of the 10th of August was a glorious conspiracy. He proceeded in his speech, notwithstanding the stunning clamour which surrounded him, and concluded by declaring that he would rather perish than condemn even the most odious tyrant, against every principle of law.

A host of speakers succeeded him, and the disorder increased every moment. There was no hearing one another; the deputies quitted their seats, grouped together, insulted and menaced each other, and the president was at last obliged to put on his hat. After the lapse of about an hour, the uproar subsided, and the assembly, adopting the notions of those who demanded a debate upon the question of the process against Louis XVI. declared the debate to have commenced, and that it should be continued without interruption, until a final sentence were passed.

This discussion was resumed on the 27th; many orators, who had already spoken, repaired to the tribune. Saint-Just again presented himself. The appearance of Louis XVI. humiliated, vanquished, and serene in the midst of his misfortunes, had given rise to unpleasant reflections in his mind. But these he satisfied, by calling Louis a supple and modest tyrant, who had oppressed the people with a modest demeanour, and defended himself with similar decorum; and he maintained, that the convention should be most especially on their guard against this insinuating softness of manner. He acknowledged that the king had called together the states-general, but contended that his object in this was only to humble the nobility, and strengthen his own power, by weakening theirs: thus, when he observed the rapid elevation of the states, he had endeavoured to disperse them. On the 14th of July, and on the 5th and 6th of October, he was observed to have in secret got together the means of overwhelming the people: whenever his conspiracies were thwarted by the national energy, he feigned acquiescence in the views of the people, and manifested an unnatural and hypocritical joy at their victories. "Afterwards, being no longer able to resort to force, he had corrupted," said Saint Just, "the representatives of the nation, tampered with foreign powers, and driven the ministers to despair, so that one of them was obliged to declare to him, *Your secret communications prevent the execution of the laws, and I must retire.* Finally, added Saint-Just, having constantly engaged in the most perfidious designs against the nation, till the 10th of August, he now affects the semblance of inoffensive gentleness, to impose upon his judges and escape justice."

Thus were the natural and timid hesitations of Louis XVI. represented by the violent demagogues, who mistook weakness and simple regret for the past, for the premeditations of perfidy. Other orators succeeded Saint-Just, but the Girondists had not yet spoken, and their opinions were anxiously awaited, for it was high time that they avowed their real principles. We have already mentioned their indecision, their tendency to be affected, and their inclination to excuse in Louis XVI. a resistance which they were more capable of considering with propriety than their adversaries. Vergniaud admitted before some friends that he had been deeply moved by the late scene. Others, perhaps, though not so much affected as himself, likewise felt much interest in the illustrious victim; in this difficulty, they imagined a method, concealing their emotion, and at the same time of freeing themselves from their present embarrassment, this was by an appeal to the people. They thus sought to exonerate themselves from a dangerous responsibility, and to throw the ignominy of the king's condemnation, or the reproach of royalism, should he be acquitted, from their own shoulders on those of the nation. This was certainly an expedient of weakness. Being moved by the calamitous situation of Louis, they ought undoubtedly to have courageously undertaken his defence themselves, and not have provoked a civil war, by referring a question the most likely to awaken the furious passions of an agitated population, to the forty-four thousand sections which divided France. They should have manfully exerted that influence they possessed, and not have cast upon the people a duty which they were utterly incompetent to perform, and which was pregnant with such fearful consequences to the country. Here it was that the Girondists gave their adversaries a great advantage, by authorising them to foment a civil war, and by bringing their own courage and candour under suspicion. Thus the Jacobins were ready enough to acknowledge that those who contended for the acquittal of Louis XVI. were more frank and estimable than those who proposed an appeal to the people. But such is the usual conduct of moderate parties. On this occasion, as on the 2nd and 3rd of September, the Girondists were unwilling to endanger their power and popularity for the sake of a king whom they regarded as an enemy, and who had, as they thought, attempted to put them down by the sword of Prussia and Austria; yet, softened by the miseries of this vanquished foe, they were desirous of defending him, were indignant at the ungenerous treatment he received, and, in fact, did quite enough

to ruin themselves, but not sufficient to rescue the object of their solicitude.

Salles, who adopted all the suspicious conceptions of Louvet, and who even surpassed him in his suppositions of plots and intrigues, was the first who proposed and defended the appeal to the people on the 27th. Acknowledging the criminality of Louis XVI. as imputed to him by the republicans, and avowing that he merited every severity that could be demonstrated, he observed, nevertheless, that the assembly was not about to inflict a penalty of vengeance, but to execute a great political act; and he maintained that it was in this point of view that the question should be considered. In the case either of acquittal or condemnation, he perceived the greatest inconveniences. If acquitted, the king would become the rallying point of all parties, and the cause of perpetual discord. The memory of his attempt against the liberties of the nation would constantly reproach the indulgence of the assembly: his impunity would scandalize the public, and perhaps give occasion to popular revolts, and afford a pretext for all sorts of agitators. Those who had already disorganized the state of society by their crimes, would consider this act of clemency as justifying the commission of new excesses, as they had fancied themselves authorized by the dilatoriness of justice to perpetrate the massacres of September. On every side the convention would be accused of deficiency of courage, in not having put a stop at once to the public disorders, and in not laying the foundations of a republic, by a terrible and energetic example.

On the other hand, if condemned, Louis would leave to his family all the pretensions of his race, and would also bequeath them to his brothers, more formidable than himself, because less disrespected by reason of incapacity. The people also, forgetting his crimes, and only recollecting his sufferings, might pity his unhappy lot, and the factions might thus find occasion to exasperate them against the national convention. The sovereigns of Europe now preserved a solemn silence, awaiting an event which they hoped would excite general indignation; but, the king once executed, they would seize upon this pretext, and fall in concert upon France, in order to tear the country in pieces. The nation then, perhaps, groaning under its calamities, might reproach the convention with having perpetrated an act which had provoked so cruel and disastrous a war.

"Such," said Salles, "is the fatal alternative which presents itself to the consideration of the national convention. In this situation, the nation itself must be appealed to, to decide its own fate by pronouncing that of Louis XVI. The danger of a civil war is perfectly chimerical; on the convocation of the primary assemblies for the election of the national convention no civil war broke out. Why then should we fear one on an occasion equally important, especially when we intend to refer to these very assemblies to sanction the constitution?" In vain did the adversaries of this measure urge the difficulties and delays which a new discussion in forty-four thousand assemblies would occasion; they were answered, that these assemblies would not be called upon to deliberate, but to choose between two propositions presented by the convention. These propositions would be thus stated. shall Louis XVI. be punished with death, or detained in prison until the peace? The answer should be couched in these words: *Detained*, or, *Put to death*. Extraordinary couriers being employed, a definitive answer might arrive in fifteen days from the most distant part of France.

This opinion had been listened to under various impressions of feeling. Serres the deputy of the Upper Alps retracted his first opinion, which was for an immediate sentence, and demanded an appeal to the people. Barbaroux contended against the justification set up by Louis, without coming to any conclusion, for he dared not acquit him against the wishes of his constituents, or condemn him contrary to the opinions of his friends. Buzot advocated the appeal to the people, but modified the motion of Salles, requiring the convention to pronounce the sentence of death, and referring to the primary assemblies merely for their sanction to this sentence. Rabaut-Saint-Etienne, a protestant minister, who had already distinguished himself in the constituent assembly, was indignant at the cumulated powers exercised by the convention. "As for me," said he, "I am weary of my share of despotism; I am jaded, harassed, and oppressed with the tyranny in which I am obliged to take my individual share, and I sigh for the arrival of that moment when you will have created a tribunal in which I shall not see the form and aspect of a tyrant.—You seek reasons of policy; these are to be found in history.—The people of London, who so urgently demanded the death of their king, were the first to execrate his judges, and prostrate themselves before his successor. When Charles II. ascended the throne, that city invited him to a magnificent repast, manifested the most extravagant joy, and were eager to assist at the execution of those judges whom Charles sacrificed to the shade of his father. People of Paris, parliament of France, do you understand me?"

Faure demanded a statement of all those decrees which warranted the putting the accused upon his trial. Finally, the gloomy Robespierre reappeared, swelling with rage and rancour. "I also," said he, "have been moved; I felt my republican virtue shaken in the presence of a criminal humiliated before the sovereign power. But the greatest proof of devotion any man can give to his country is to stifle every emotion of sensibility." He repeated, then, all the arguments in favour of the competence of the convention; he reprobated the delay of national vengeance, and the superfluous consideration which was paid to a tyrant, whilst the warmest friends of liberty could meet with none; he pretended that this appeal to the people was nothing but a subterfuge similar to what Guadet had devised, in requiring the purifying scrutiny; that its object was to place every thing in an equivocal light—the present deputation, the 10th of August, and the republic itself. Recurring always to himself and his enemies, he compared the present situation of the country to that in July 1791, when there was a question of bringing Louis XVI. to trial for his flight to Varennes. Robespierre had played an important part on that occasion. He recapitulated all his dangers, and the successful

efforts of his adversaries to replace the king on the throne; the massacre of the Champ de Mars which had followed, and the perils which Louis XVI. re-established on his throne had caused the commonwealth. He perfidiously ranked his present opponents with those of that period, declared that France and himself were exposed to the same danger from the intrigues of knaves, who called themselves, to the exclusion of all others, honest men. "At present," added Robespierre, "they are silent on questions involving the most important interests of the country; they shrink from pronouncing their opinion on the last king, but their silent and pernicious activity produces all the calamities which afflict the country; and, to mislead the reflecting, but often deluded, part of the population, they persecuted the most zealous patriots under the denomination of a factious minority. The minority," exclaimed he, "often becomes the majority, by enlightening deluded assemblies. Virtue is ever in the minority on this earth! How else could the world have been peopled with tyrants and slaves! Hampden * and Sydney were in the minority, for they expired on the scaffold. Such men as Critias, Anitus, the Cæsars and Clodius, have ever belonged to the majority; but Socrates was in the minority, for he swallowed poison; and Cato was in the minority, for he tore out his entrails." Robespierre then recommended tranquillity to the people, as his adversaries represented the applauses which they lavished on their faithful deputies as signs of rebellion. "People," cried he, "restrain your applause, fly the spectacle of our debates! We shall not cease to maintain your cause when out of your sight." He concluded by requiring that Louis XVI. should be declared guilty and condemned to death.

Many speakers succeeded him, during the 28th, 29th, till the 31st; Vergniaud finally came forward, and was listened to with extraordinary attention; the Girondists thus speaking through the medium of their greatest orator, terminated a silence, of which Robespierre was not the only one to accuse them.

Vergniaud first explained the principle on which the sovereignty of the people was founded, and pointed out those cases in which the representatives of the nation were bound to appeal to it. It would, he said, be difficult and impracticable to refer every legislative measure to the decision of the community, but that there were acts of the first importance in which this would be necessary. The constitution, for example, had been made previously subject to the popular sanction. But this was not the only act which merited the like distinction. The verdict to be passed on Louis was of so weighty an importance, whether the powers exercised by the assembly, or the inviolability which had, by the constitution, been granted to the monarch, or the political effects which might result from his condemnation, were considered, that the necessity of submitting it to the decision of the people appeared evident. Having thus stated the grounds of the motion of Salles, and refuted the sophisms of Robespierre, he came to the political inconveniences attending an appeal to the people, and touched upon all the great questions which divided the two parties.

He first endeavoured to prove that there was no reason to fear that an appeal to the people would give occasion to discord. He repeated all the arguments already enforced by other Girondists, and maintained that if a civil war was not feared as a consequence of calling together the primary assemblies to sanction the constitution, he could not see why it should be from a similar convocation to ratify the sentence passed upon the king. This argument, so often reiterated, was of little weight, for the constitution was not the essential question of the revolution, as it could be nothing more than the stated regulation of a republican institution which had been already decreed and consented to. But the fate of the king was a question of immense importance; whether or not the revolution should pursue its career with inexorable energy, by aiming a death-blow at the throne, was the point to be decided. And if a consideration so pregnant with the most terrible consequences divided so equally the national convention, the danger to be feared from proposing it to forty-four thousand sections was formidable in the extreme. In all the theatres, and in popular societies, this question was discussed tumultuously, and the assembly should certainly have summoned up courage to decide it, and not have subjected France to have recourse for its decision, perhaps, to arms.

Vergniaud partaking, however, of the opinions of his friends, maintained that a civil war was not to be feared. "The disturbers of the public peace in the departments," he said, "had not acquired that preponderance which they had usurped at Paris." He then refuted the calumnies which had been heaped upon the majority, who had been described as intriguers, royalists, and aristocrats, and combated with indignation the assertion, that virtue was always in the minority. "Citizens," exclaimed he, "Catiline was in the minority in the Roman senate; and, if this minority had prevailed, Rome and liberty would have perished. In the constituent assembly, Maury and Cazalès were in the minority; and, had they prevailed, what would they have done with you! Kings also form the minority of the earth. When they design to enslave a nation, they also declare that virtue is always in the minority. They too, when they wish to preserve empires from being overthrown, assert that the majority are intriguers, who must be silenced by terror."

Vergniaud wished to know whether, to form a majority conformable to the views of some, it was necessary, by banishment and death, to change France into a desert, and then turn it over to be dealt with according to the notions of a few ruffians.

Having defended the majority and France, he next took up the defence of himself and his friends, whom he represented as resisting always, and with equal courage, every species of despotism,—that of the court, and that of the *brigands* of September. He described them holding their legislative sittings undismayed, amidst the roar of cannon, on the 10th of August, and pronouncing the dethronement before the victory of the people; whilst these very Brutuses who were now so eager to slaughter fallen tyrants, concealed their fears in

* This the reader will instantly recollect to be erroneous, Hampden received his death at Chalgrave-Field. *Trans.*

the bowels of the earth, awaiting the issue of a dubious conflict, in which liberty struggled against despotism.

He then retorted the reproach of provoking a civil war upon his adversaries. "Yes," said he, "those, indeed, really long for civil war, who, preaching assassination against the partisans of tyranny, apply that name to all the victims whom they desire to immolate to their fury; those who point their daggers at the representatives of the people, and demand the dissolution of the government and of the convention; those who wish the minority to domineer over the majority, because they can legitimatize their decisions by insurrections, and would introduce Catilines to reign in the senate; those who preach such doctrines as these in all the public places, who call reason *feuillantism*, justice pusillanimity, and the sacred dictates of humanity conspiracy; those, indeed, are the real provokers of civil war.

"What! will civil war be the consequence of appealing to the sovereignty of the people? You were more modest in July, 1791. You did not, then, wish to paralyze the national sovereignty, that you might reign in its place. You then circulated a petition, calling upon the people to consult together about bringing Louis, who had just returned from Varennes, to trial. You then wished to appeal to the sovereignty of the nation, and did not seem to think that it would be the occasion of civil war. But then this appeal would have promoted your secret views, whereas now it thwarts them."

The orator now passed to other considerations. It had been asserted that the assembly ought to display all its grandeur and courage, in taking upon itself to execute its judgment, without looking for support to the people. "Courage," said Vergniaud, "was indeed necessary to attack Louis XVI. in all his power; but is it so needful to send him to the block, now that he is vanquished and disarmed? A soldier entered, formerly, into the prison of Marius to slay him, but, frightened at the aspect of his victim, he dared not strike. If this soldier had been the member of a senate, think you he would hesitate to vote for the death of a tyrant? What courage is there, then, in an act of which a coward is capable?"

He then spoke of another species of courage, namely, that to be exerted against foreign powers. "Since," said he, "this has been continually called a great political act, it will be to the purpose to examine the question in this point of view. It is beyond a doubt that foreign powers await only the perpetration of this deed to fall all together upon France. They will, undoubtedly, be conquered; the heroism of French soldiers warrants us in confidently expecting this result; but what heavy expenses, what an expenditure of resources, will not such a war bring upon the nation! If it should necessitate a new emission of assignats, and proportionably raise the price of provisions; if it should deal a deadly blow to commerce, and cause the effusion of torrents of blood, both by land and sea; what shall we have to boast of? What services shall we have rendered to the human species? What reparation could you make to your country, for having, in her name, and in contempt of her sovereignty, inflicted an act of vengeance, become the source and pretext of such calamitous events? I dismiss," cried the orator, "every idea of defeat; but what will you have to boast of, supposing yourselves successful? There will not be a family in France but will have to weep over a father or a son; the agriculturist will want labourers; the manufactures will be abandoned; your exhausted funds will call for new taxes; the energies of the nation, worn out by the assaults of a foreign enemy, and the disorders of faction at home, will sink into a mortal languor; and France, it is to be feared, though crowned with victory, will resemble those famous monuments of Egypt, which have triumphed over time—the traveller stands astonished at their grandeur, but should he enter them, what does he discover? inanimate ashes, and the silence of the tomb!"

Besides these, other fears presented themselves to the imagination of Vergniaud, which were suggested by the history of England, and by the conduct of Cromwell, the principal, though concealed author of the death of Charles I. This man, always instigating the people, first against the king, and afterwards against the parliament, broke the government to pieces, and finally arrived at the supreme power. "Have you not," added Vergniaud, "have you not here and elsewhere, heard some cry out: '*If bread is dear, the cause is in the Temple; if specie is scarce, if our armies are ill provided, the cause is in the Temple; if we suffer daily the spectacle of penury, the cause is in the Temple!*'

"Yet those who hold this language are not ignorant that the dearness of bread, the scarcity of provisions, the evil administration of our armies, and the penury we complain of, spring altogether from other sources. What is it then that they seek? Who will assure me that these same men who continually seek to degrade the convention, and who might, perhaps, have succeeded, if the majesty of the people, which resides within it, could be imposed upon by their perfidy; who will assure me that these men, who proclaim that a new revolution is necessary, who declare such or such a section in a state of permanent insurrection; who assert that since the convention has succeeded to Louis, a change of tyrants has merely taken place; that another 10th of August is needful; who will assure me that these same men, who speak for ever of plots, death, traitors, and proscriptions; who maintain in the assemblies of the sections, and in their diurnal publications, that a *defender* of the republic should be appointed, and that there is but one man competent to save the state; who will assure me, I say, that these same men will not cry out, after the death of Louis, with still more violence: '*If bread is dear, the cause is in the convention; if specie is scarce, and our armies ill provided, the cause is in the convention; if the wheels of government are clogged, the cause is in the convention; if the calamities of war are increased by the hostile declarations of England and Spain, the cause is in the convention, who have provoked these declarations by the precipitate condemnation of Louis?*'

"Who will assure me that these seditious cries of anarchy will not rally round the banner of faction, the aristocracy thirsting for vengeance, the poor eager for a change, and even the pious and prejudiced indignant at the fate of Louis? Who

will assure me that this tempest, which will call from their retreats the slayers of September, will not bring prominently forward one of these wretches dropping with blood, and present him as the liberator, the *defender* and chief which is so necessary for the republic. A chief! ah, if such was their audacious design, he would only appear to be pierced through with a thousand daggers! But to what horrors would not Paris become a prey! Paris, to be admired by posterity for its heroic contention with kings! And shall this glorious city be delivered over to the ignominious bondage of a gang of robbers, the refuse of the human species, to be torn by the convulsive throes of their bad ambition and delirious fury? Who could inhabit a city lorded over by terror and death? And you, ye industrious citizens, to whom industry is the source of riches, what would you do when deprived of the means of existence? you who have made such great sacrifices to the revolution, and whose very virtues and patriotism have rendered you liable to seduction, what would become of you? What would be your resources? What hand would wipe away your tears, and bring succour to your despairing families?

"Would you have recourse to those false friends, those perfidious flatterers who had precipitated you into an abyss of misery? Ah! fly them rather! dread their reply! thus would they address you: '*You demand bread: plunge into the fray, contend for the bloody rags of the victims you have slaughtered!*' or, '*Will you have blood? Blood and carcases are the only food we can offer you!*'—— You shudder, citizens! Oh, my country! I will exert all my efforts to save you from this deplorable crisis!"

This eloquent and extempore oration of Vergniaud produced a profound impression on his auditors, and excited universal admiration. Robespierre had been prostrated by this frank and persuasive eloquence. But although Vergniaud had shaken, he had not gained over the assembly, who still hesitated between the two parties. Many orators were successively heard for and against the appeal to the people. Brissot, Gensonné, and Pétion defended it in their turn. One orator at last gave a decisive turn to the question—this man was Barrère. His trimming principles, his shuffling and unimpassioned eloquence, had made him the oracle of the centre. He spoke with prolixity on the process, considered it in all its bearings of fact, law, or policy, and decided all those weak persons who were influenced by specious arguments to vote for the condemnation. His plausible reasonings were admirably adapted to prevail with the timid, and from this moment the unfortunate king was condemned. The discussion, however, was prolonged to the 7th; all were now tired of hearing the repetition of the same facts and the same arguments; the debate was, therefore, closed without opposition; but the proposition of a new adjournment excited much tumult; it was finally decided that the questions should be put, and the votes collected by the call of each individual's name on the 14th of January.

On that fatal day, an extraordinary concourse of spectators surrounded the assembly, and filled the galleries. Many orators presented themselves to propose different modes of stating the question; finally, after long debates, the convention embodied the question under the three points following:

"*Is Louis Capet guilty of conspiring against the liberty of the nation, and the general safety of the state?*

"*Shall the sentence, whatever it be, be referred to the sanction of the people?*

"*What punishment shall be inflicted?*"

The 14th was wholly occupied in the putting of these questions. The 15th was the day assigned for the call by name, to be made to each deputy. The assembly, in the first instance, decided that each member should pronounce his vote in the tribune; that he should give his reasons for voting as he intended, and that these should be written down and signed; that those who were absent without a cause, should be censured, but that if any entered after the call of the name had been made, they might deliver their vote. At last, this fatal call began on the first question. Eight members were absent from illness, and twenty on the business of the assembly. Thirty-seven, giving various reasons for their votes, acknowledged that Louis XVI. was guilty, but declared themselves incompetent to pronounce sentence upon him, and demanded measures of general safety against him. Six hundred and eighty-three members declared Louis XVI. guilty. The assembly was composed of seven hundred and forty-nine members.

The president, then, in the name of the national convention, proclaimed *Louis Capet guilty of conspiring against the liberty of the nation, and of treasonable acts against the general safety of the state.*

The call by name upon the second question then took place. Twenty-nine members were absent, of whom four, Lafon, Wandelaincourt, Morisson, and Lacroix, refused to vote. A member of the name of Noel excused himself. Eleven gave their opinion with different conditions. Two hundred and eighty-one voted for an appeal to the people; four hundred and twenty-three rejected it. The president then declared, in the name of the national convention, *that the sentence against Louis Capet should not be referred to the sanction of the people.*

The whole day of the 15th had now elapsed in the putting of these two questions. The third, therefore, was reserved for the morrow.

Paris became the more agitated as the decisive moment approached. At the theatres some signs of favour were shown to Louis on the occasion of the presentation of a piece, called "The Friend of the Laws" (*L'Ami des Lois*). The commune ordered the suspension of all plays; but the executive council revoked this order, as abridging the liberty of the press, which included that of the theatre. The utmost consternation prevailed in the prisons. It was reported that the terrific scenes of September were about to be renewed, and the prisoners and their relations beset the deputies with supplications to snatch them from death. The Jacobins, on the other hand, spread a report, that conspiracies were carrying on in all directions, to rescue the king and re-establish royalty. Their rage being excited by the delays and obstacles which had been interposed between Louis and his fate, they became more menacing than ever, and the two parties thus mutually alarmed each other, and supposed each other guilty of harbouring the most

Conduct of the Jacobins, who exercised intimidation upon the members as they voted—The Duke of Orleans votes for the death of Louis XVI.

dangerous projects. The sitting of the 16th drew a concourse together more numerous than that on the preceding days. This was the sitting that was to decide everything, for the declaration of guilt was of little consequence, if Louis should be simply condemned to banishment, and the object of those who desired to save him would thus be accomplished, for all that could be expected at that juncture was to save him from the scaffold. The galleries were early in the morning seized by the Jacobins, from whence they sternly eyed each member as he appeared in the tribune to pronounce his vote. A great part of the day was devoted to taking measures to preserve the public peace, to summoning and giving audience to the ministers, and to demanding of the mayor why the barriers had been closed, which it was reported had been closed during the day. The convention decreed that they should remain open, and that the federalists, in concert with the Parisians, should occupy the military posts of the city. As the day was already much advanced, it was resolved that the sitting of the assembly should be permanent until the call of the names on the third question should be concluded. At the moment this was about to commence, some members asked what number of votes should be decisive of the guilt of the accused. Lehardy proposed a majority of two-thirds, which was required in other criminal tribunals. Danton, who had just arrived from Belgium, vigorously opposed this notion, and demanded only a simple majority. Lanjuinais again exposed himself to new attacks, by requiring that after so many violations of the forms of law, at least that form should be observed which absolutely required two-thirds of the votes. "We vote," exclaimed he, "under the dagger and cannon of the factious." These expressions excited new clamours, and the convention finally terminated the debate, by declaring that the form of its decrees was single, and that according to this form, they pass by the vote of the simple majority.

It was half-past seven o'clock in the evening, before the call, which lasted during the whole night, commenced. Some pronounced, simply, the sentence of death; others voted for detention, and for banishment when peace should have been obtained; many denounced death, with a restriction, to examine whether it would not be expedient to defer its execution. Mailhe was the author of this restriction, which might have saved Louis, for time in this case was every thing, and a delay would have been equivalent to an acquittal. A great number of deputies went over to this opinion. The call continued in a tumultuous manner; the interest which Louis inspired had at this moment reached its height, and many members determined to vote in his favour; but the exasperation of his enemies had also increased, and the people had come at last to identify the cause of the republic with the death of the last king, and to regard the republic as condemned, and royalty as re-established, if Louis XVI. should be saved. Terrified by the popular fury which this idea had roused, many members feared a civil war, and although much affected by the fate of Louis, they were alarmed at the consequences which might follow his acquittal. This fear was much heightened by the scene which was now passing. As each member ascended the steps of the tribune, all was silence to hear what he said; but the moment after his vote was given, clamours of approbation or censure resounded through the chamber, and followed him to his seat; the galleries received with murmurs of strong dissatisfaction every vote which was not for death: frequently, indeed, they endeavoured to terrify the assembly by menacing gestures. The deputies answered them from the centre of the hall, and a tumultuous reciprocation of threats and insults ensued. This gloomy and terrific scene had shaken the minds of many, and had changed the resolutions of many more. Lecointre of Versailles, whose courage was by no means questionable, and who had not ceased by his gestures to endeavour to impose silence on the galleries, was so much intimidated, that on his arrival in the tribune, he pronounced with hesitation and terror the word *Death*. Vergniaud, who had appeared so deeply moved by the fate of Louis, and who had declared to his friends that he could never condemn the unfortunate prince, was so possessed with the fear of civil war, that he pronounced the verdict of death, adding however the amendment of Mailhe. Being interrogated as to this change of his opinion, he replied, that he thought he perceived civil war on the point of breaking out, and that he did not dare to balance the life of an individual against the safety of the country.

Nearly all the Girondists adopted the amendment of Mailhe. The vote of the Duke of Orléans excited an extraordinary sensation. Obliged to support the Jacobins or to perish, he pronounced for the death of his relative, and returned to his place in the midst of the agitation caused by his vote. This dreadful sitting lasted through the whole night of the 16th, and the day of the 17th, till seven o'clock in the evening. The enumeration of the votes was now awaited with extraordinary impatience. All the avenues around the assembly were thronged to excess, and every one anxiously inquired of his neighbour the result of the scrutiny. In the convention, all were still in doubt; the words *detention*, and *banishment*, appeared to recur as frequently as that of *death*. According to some, one vote was wanting to pronounce the condemnation; according to others a majority existed, but it was that of one voice. From all sides it was acknowledged, that one suffrage more would decide the question, and every one anxiously looked out for the arrival of a new voter. At this moment a man appears at the tribune with tottering steps, whose wrapped-up head proclaimed his illness. This was Duchastel, the deputy of the Two Sèvres, who had been torn from his bed to give his vote. At sight of this member, tumultuous cries arose. They pretend the conspirators had been to fetch him in order to save Louis XVI. They wished to interrogate him, but the assembly would not permit this course, and allowed him the faculty of voting, by virtue of their decision which permitted them to receive suffrages after the appeal by name had been concluded. Duchastel boldly ascended the tribune, and, whilst regarded on all sides with intense anxiety, pronounced the sentence of banishment.

Fresh incidents occurred. The minister for foreign affairs demanded the liberty of addressing the assembly to communicate a note he had re-

ceived from the Chevalier d'Ocariz, the Spanish ambassador. This ambassador promised the neutrality of Spain, and her mediation with all the other powers of Europe, if the life of Louis XVI. were spared. The Mountain party, who were quite impatient, pretended that this incident had been premeditated to create new obstacles, and called for the order of the day. Danton at once required that war should be declared with Spain. The assembly returned to the order of the day. A new demand was then announced. The defenders of Louis desired to appear before the assembly, to make a communication of importance. This excited fresh clamour from the Mountain. Robespierre maintained that, the defence being terminated, the counsel of the king could have nothing further to say to the assembly, that the verdict had been given, and that sentence should be immediately passed. It was decided that the defenders of Louis should be introduced after the final declaration of the verdict.

Vergniaud presided. "Citizens," said he, "I am about to proclaim the result of the scrutiny. You will observe, I hope, a profound silence. When justice has spoken, humanity should take its turn."

The assembly was composed of seven hundred and forty-nine members; fifteen were absent on business of the assembly, eight from indisposition, and five had refused to vote, which reduced the number present to seven hundred and twenty-one, and the absolute majority to three hundred and sixty-one voices. Two hundred and eighty had voted for imprisonment or banishment with different conditions. Two had voted for a rigorous imprisonment, and forty-five for capital punishment, to be delayed until the peace, or until the ratification of the constitution. The sentence of twenty-six had been death, who, adopting the idea of Mailhe, had required an examination into the expediency of suspending its execution. Their vote, however, was independent of this last clause. Three hundred and sixty-one had unconditionally voted for death.

The president therefore, with accents of grief, declared, in the name of the convention, *that the punishment pronounced against Louis Capet was death.*

The counsel of Louis were now introduced to the bar. M. Deseze first spoke; he was sent, he said, by his client to claim an appeal to the people against the sentence passed by the convention. He grounded the justice of this appeal upon the small number of votes which had decided the condemnation, and maintained, that as so many doubts had arisen on this question, it was only fair to refer it to the nation at large. Tronchet added, that the rigour of the penal code had been observed, but that its clemency in the forms of judgment resorted to had been totally neglected; and that that which required a majority of two-thirds to find the accused guilty should have been adhered to. The venerable Malesherbes then came forward, and with a voice broken with sobs, "Citizens," said he, "I am not in the habit of speaking—with grief I observe that I shall not have time allowed me to collect my ideas on the manner of counting the votes.—I have reflected much formerly on this subject; I have many observations to communicate to you.—But,—Citizens,—Pardon my confusion,—give me till tomorrow to collect my ideas."

The assembly was deeply moved by the tears and white locks of this venerable old man. "Citizens," said Vergniaud, "the convention have heard your protestations; you have fulfilled a sacred duty by making them. Shall we," added he, addressing the assembly, "decree the honours of the sitting to the defenders of Louis?" "Yes, yes," exclaimed all unanimously.

Robespierre then ascended the tribune, and opposed the demand of the counsel of Louis. Guadet, without admitting the propriety of an appeal to the people, insisted that Malesherbes should be allowed twenty-four hours, and referring to the decree of the assembly which forbade an appeal to the people, argued against the request of the defenders. Merlin of Douay maintained that he could have nothing to observe on the manner of counting votes: for if, said he, the penal code exacts a majority of two-thirds to substantiate a fact, it demands only a simple majority in the pronunciation of the penalty. And, in the present case, the guilt of Louis has been declared almost unanimously; and it therefore signifies but little that the sentence awarded has been obtained by a simple majority.

After various observations on this subject, the convention passed to the order of the day, declared the claim of Louis to an appeal to the nation inadmissible, and adjourned the question of suspending the execution to the next day. On this day, the 18th, some pretended that the enumeration of the votes was not correct, and demanded a new scrutiny. The whole day was passed in bickerings on this point; finally, the enumeration was acknowledged to be exact, and the question of suspending the execution was again put off to the following morning.

Finally, on the 19th, this last question was agitated. Its object was nothing less than to render the whole proceedings uncertain in their effect, for a delay would have been to Louis XVI. the same as life itself. The Girondists, and those who wished to save Louis XVI. having exhausted all their arguments in the previous discussions, were now reduced to a nonplus; they still endeavoured to enforce reasons of policy, but they were answered, that if Louis XVI. were dead, foreign powers would arm themselves to avenge him; and if he was permitted to live and detained a prisoner, they would likewise have recourse to arms to deliver him; and that consequently the result, in both cases, would be the same. Barrère affected indignation at the idea of thus parading a head in foreign courts, and of stipulating for the life or death of a criminal, as an article of treaty. He declared that this delay also would be a cruelty to Louis XVI., as it would be condemning him to the tortures of a protracted death, which every movement of the enemy would make more imminent. The assembly then, closing the discussion, decided that each member should vote by yea and nay. On the 20th of January, at three o'clock in the morning, the call terminated, and the president announced, that the suspension of the execution of the sentence on Louis Capet was rejected by a majority of three hundred and eighty voices, against a minority of three hundred and ten.

At this moment, a letter was received from Kersaint, giving in his resignation. He could no longer, he said, endure the disgrace of sitting in the assembly in the company of men of blood, whose opinions, pre-occupied by terror, kept the upright members of the convention in subjection, and that he could not continue to take part in a representation in which Marat prevailed over Pétion. This letter caused an extraordinary tumult. Gensonné rose, and took this occasion to avenge himself on the Septembrizers for the decree of death they had just passed. "It is of little avail," said he, "to punish the crimes of tyranny, if others still more to be dreaded are allowed to escape with impunity. The convention will only have half fulfilled their duty, if the massacres of September are overlooked, and they do not order an inquiry to be made for the authors of those dreadful excesses." This proposition was seconded by the greatest part of the assembly with acclamation. Marat and Tallien, however, opposed it. "If you punish," cried they, "the authors of the scenes of September, punish likewise the conspirators who took refuge in the palace on the 10th of August." The assembly according to all these demands, ordered at the same time the minister of justice to prosecute the instigators of the massacres committed in the first part of September, and the persons found in arms in the palace during the night of the 9th, and the day of the 10th of August, together with those public functionaries who had quitted their posts in the provinces to return to Paris and conspire with the court.

Louis was now finally condemned; every attempt to delay the execution of his sentence had proved abortive, and every device suggested as a means of retarding the fatal moment had been exhausted. All the members of the right side, whether secret royalists or republicans, were struck with consternation at the severity of this verdict, and at the ascendency which the Mountain had acquired. In Paris a stupified astonishment prevailed; the bold measures of the new government had produced the usual effect that force produces upon the multitude, it had paralysed and reduced the majority to silence, inciting only the intrepid few to express their indignation at the act about to be perpetrated. A few old and attached servants of Louis XVI., some young lords, and a few of the body-guard it was said, intended to fly to his rescue, and snatch him from his intended punishment. But to concert measures for this enterprise, whilst surrounded by so vigilant a police, and in the midst of the terror which reigned throughout the city, was impossible, and all that they could attempt were a few isolated acts of despair. The Jacobins, exulting in their triumph, were nevertheless astonished at their success, and exhorted each other to remain strictly united for twenty-four hours, and to send commissaries to all the authorities, the commune, the staff of the national guard, to the department, and the executive council, to awaken their zeal, and assure the execution of the sentence. This execution would certainly take place, they said; it was quite inevitable; yet their constant repetition of this assurance betrayed the doubts they still harbourred; it appeared indeed problematical to all, whether a king, whose fate had excited so general an interest, would be executed, in the heart of a country which three years before, had in its manners, customs, and laws, been an absolute monarchy; and the event was never deemed credible till after it had taken place.

The executive council was charged with the sad duty of executing the sentence. All the ministers, assembled in the chamber of their sittings, appeared struck with consternation. To Garat, as minister of justice, was assigned the most painful part of all—that of signifying to Louis XVI. the decrees of the convention. For this purpose, he betook himself to the Temple accompanied by Santerre, a deputation of the commune, and of the criminal tribunal, and by the secretary of the executive council. The king had waited with anxiety for the last twenty-four hours the arrival of his counsel, and demanded in vain permission to see them. On the 20th of January, at two o'clock in the afternoon, he still expected them, when suddenly the tread of many feet reached his ears; he advanced, and perceived the messengers of the executive council. He stopped with a dignified air at the door of his chamber, and did not appear agitated. Garat told him, with grief, that he was commissioned to communicate to him the decrees of the convention. Grouvelle, the secretary, then read them. The first declared Louis XVI. guilty of conspiring against the general safety of the state; the second condemned him to death; the third rejected the appeal to the people; and the fourth ordered his execution in twenty-four hours. The king, regarding these messengers of death with a serene countenance, took the decree from the hands of Grouvelle, put it in his pocket, and read Garat a letter, in which he demanded of the convention three days to prepare to die, a confessor to attend him in his last moments, permission to see his family, and liberty for them to quit France. Garat received the letter, and promised to deliver it immediately to the convention; the king gave him, at the same time, the address of the clergyman whose assistance he demanded.

Louis returned to his chamber with perfect tranquillity, called for dinner, and ate as usual. The knives had been taken away, and the domestics refused to bring them back. "Do they believe me coward enough," said he, with dignity, "to take away my own life! I am innocent, and I can die without fear." He was obliged to dispense with a knife, finished his meal, returned to his apartment, and awaited, calmly, the reply to his letter.

The convention still refused any delay, but all his other demands were complied with. Garat sent for M. Edgeworth of Firmont, the clergyman whom Louis had chosen, took him into his carriage, and conducted him to the Temple. He arrived at six o'clock, and presented himself at the Great Tower, accompanied by Santerre. He informed the king that the convention had granted him the minister of religion whom he had pointed out, and permitted him to see his family without witnesses, but that they had refused to accord him the delay he had required.

Garat added, that M Edgeworth was arrived, that he was in the council hall, and about to be conducted to the king. He then retired, astonished and affected by the serene magnanimity of the illustrious prisoner.

The moment M. Edgeworth was introduced, he threw himself at the feet of the king, who immediately raised him, and they shed tears of mutual sympathy in each other's arms. The king then demanded, with anxious curiosity, news of the clergy of France, and of many bishops, especially the archbishop of Paris, and begged M. Edgeworth to assure the latter that he died faithfully attached to his communion. At eight o'clock he rose, begged M. Edgeworth to wait, and left the room with emotion, saying that he was going to see his family. The municipal officers, determining not to lose sight of their charge, even whilst he was with his family, had determined that he should visit them in the dining-room, which was closed by a glass door, through which they could perceive all his movements without hearing what passed. The king, having entered this apartment, had a glass of water placed upon the table for the princesses, should they need it. He paced the room with anxiety, awaiting with impatience the appearance of those who were so dear to him. At half-past eight o'clock the door opened, and the queen, holding the dauphin by the hand, and Madame Elizabeth, and Madame Royale, rushed into the arms of Louis XVI., sobbing with grief. The door was closed, and the municipal officers, together with Cléry and M. Edgeworth, placed themselves behind it to witness this heart-rending interview. At first it appeared nothing but a scene of confusion and despair. Nothing but sobs and lamentation could be distinguished. At last their tears dried up, and the conversation became more calm, and the princesses, constantly keeping the king locked in their arms, spoke for some time to him in a very low tone of voice. After a somewhat long interview, mingled with silence and despondency, the king rose to tear himself from this distressing scene, promising to see them again at eight o'clock the next morning. "Do you promise us?" asked the princesses with earnestness. "Yes, yes," replied the king, with an accent of grief. At this moment, the queen held him in her embrace by one arm, Madame Elizabeth by another, Madame Royale flung her arms round the middle of his body, and the young prince stood before him, giving one hand to his mother and the other to his aunt. As he left the chamber, Madame Royale fainted away; she was immediately carried out, and the king returned to M. Edgeworth, overwhelmed with this tender scene. In a few minutes his self-possession returned, and he entirely recovered his tranquillity.

M. Edgeworth then proposed to say mass, which the king had not for some time heard. After some difficulties, the commune consented to this ceremony, and the necessary ornaments, for the next morning, were procured from a neighbouring church. The king retired to rest at midnight, begging Cléry to wake him before five o'clock in the morning, M. Edgeworth threw himself on a bed; Cléry remained up by the side of his master, and saw him enjoying the most profound and peaceable sleep on the eve of his execution.

Whilst these circumstances were going on in the Temple, a terrific scene took place in Paris. Some few generous souls dared to express their indignation, but the multitude, either indifferent or terrified, remained passive. One of the body-guard, named Pâris, had resolved to avenge the death of the king on one of his judges. Lepelletier-Saint-Fargeau, like many others of his rank, had voted for the death of Louis, to avert the odium caused by his birth and fortune. He had excited great indignation among the royalists, on account of the class of society to which he belonged. On the evening of the 20th he was pointed out to Pâris at a tavern in the Palais-Royal, whilst he was seating himself at table. This young man, wrapped in a great coat, went to him, and said, "Is it you, scoundrel Lepelletier, who voted for the death of the king?" "Yes," replied he; "but I am not a scoundrel, for I voted according to my conscience." "Hold," resumed Pâris, "here is your recompense!" and he plunged his sabre in his side, and disappeared before any one had time to seize him.

The news of this event spread with rapidity through all parts of Paris. It was announced at the convention, the Jacobin club, and at the commune. This incident gave countenance to the report of the conspiracy of the royalists, who, it was said, meditated massacring the left side, and rescuing the king when at the foot of the scaffold. The Jacobins declared their sittings permanent, and sent new messengers to all their authorities, to rekindle their zeal, and to call the whole population to arms.

On the next day, the 21st of January, as the Temple clock struck five, the king awoke, called for Cléry, and dressed himself with the most perfect tranquillity. He congratulated himself on having recomposed his mind by sleep. Cléry lighted the fire, and moved a chest of drawers, which served for an altar. M. Edgeworth put on his sacerdotal vestments, and commenced solemnizing the mass; Cléry assisted at it, and the king, on his knees, gave deep attention to the ceremony. He then received the communion from the hands of M. Edgeworth, and the mass being finished, rose with increased strength, and awaited with serenity the moment in which he was to be transported to the scaffold. He demanded scissors to cut his hair himself, to avoid this humiliating operation from the hands of the executioner; but the commune, suspecting the possibility of suicide, refused his request.

The drum now beat through the streets of the capital. All those who belonged to the armed sections joined their companies with the most perfect submission. Those who were not obliged to make their appearance on this terrible day, concealed themselves in their houses. Their doors and windows were all shut, and they awaited at home the tidings of this heart-rending event. It was reported that four or five hundred men, devoted to the king, had designed to burst their way to the carriage and carry him off. The convention, commune, executive council, and Jacobins were all assembled in full session.

At eight o'clock in the morning, Santerre, with a deputation of the commune, of the department, and of the criminal tribunal, proceeded to the Temple. The king hearing the noise of their approach rose, and prepared to depart. He had determined not to renew the sad scene of the preceding evening by seeing his family again. He charged Cléry to give his adieu to his wife, sister, and children. He also begged him to carry them

a seal, a lock of his hair, and some jewels, which he gave him for that purpose. He then squeezed his hand, and thanked him for his services. He afterwards addressed one of the municipal officers, begging him to transmit his will to the commune. This officer, named Jaques Roux, had formerly been a priest; he answered him in a brutal manner, that it was his business to conduct him to the scaffold, not to run on his errands. Another charged himself with this commission, and Louis, turning towards his conductors, gave, with firmness, the signal of departure.

Officers of the gendarmerie were placed in front of the carriage in which Louis was conveyed to the place of execution; he himself, and M. Edgeworth were seated behind. During this journey, which was rather long, the king read, from the breviary of M. Edgeworth, the prayers appropriate to his situation, and the two gendarmes were astonished at his piety and tranquil resignation. They had orders, it was said, to stab him if the carriage should be attacked. No hostile attempt, however, was made from the Temple to the Place de la Revolution. An armed multitude lined the passage, and the carriage advanced slowly, in the midst of an universal silence. At the Place de la Revolution, a large vacant space was left round the scaffold. This space was surrounded by artillery; the most outrageous federalists were placed round the scaffold, and the worthless rabble, always ready to insult genius, virtue, and misfortune, when they received the signal from higher authorities, pressed behind the ranks of the federalists, and they alone demonstrated any satisfaction, whilst everywhere else all manifestation of feeling was suppressed. At ten minutes after ten the coach stopped. Louis XVI. alighted firmly from the carriage at the place of execution. Three executioners came forward; he rejected their interference, and disrobed himself. But when he perceived that they desired to bind his hands, he exhibited a movement of indignation, and seemed involuntarily about to defend himself. M. Edgeworth, whose expressions were at this moment full of sublimity, addressed him for the last time, and said to him, "*Suffer this indignity, as a last resemblance to that God who is about to become your recompense.*" The victim became resigned, and suffered himself to be bound, and led to the scaffold. Suddenly he advanced one step in front of the executioners, and addressed the people. "Frenchmen," said he, in a strong voice, "I die innocent of the crimes imputed to me; I pardon the authors of my death, and I pray that my blood may not rest upon France." He would have continued, but the drums were now ordered to beat; the voice of the king was drowned in their noise, the executioners seized upon him, and M. Edgeworth spoke to him these words: "*Son of Saint Louis, ascend to Heaven!*" The furious wretches who surrounded his scaffold then dipped their pikes and handkerchiefs in his blood, spread through Paris, shouting *Long live the nation! long live the republic!* and even went to the gates of the Temple, to manifest that brutal and insane joy which the multitude always display at the birth, the accession, and at the downfal of princes.

CHAPTER VI.

STATE OF PARTIES AFTER THE DEATH OF LOUIS XVI.—CHANGES IN THE EXECUTIVE POWER; RETIREMENT OF ROLAND; BOURNONVILLE APPOINTED MINISTER OF WAR IN THE ROOM OF PACHE—CIRCUMSTANCES OF FRANCE IN RELATION TO FOREIGN POWERS; DEMONSTRATION BY ENGLAND; POLICY OF PITT—SITUATION OF OUR ARMIES IN THE NORTH; BELGIUM IN A STATE OF ANARCHY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT — DUMOURIEZ REVISITS PARIS; HIS OPPOSITION TO THE JACOBINS—THE SECOND ALLIANCE AGAINST FRANCE: GENERAL DEFENSIVE PLANS SUGGESTED BY DUMOURIEZ—LEVY OF THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND MEN—INVASION OF HOLLAND BY DUMOURIEZ; REMARKS UPON THESE PLANS AND MILITARY OPERATIONS —PACHE NOMINATED MAYOR OF PARIS—POLITICAL FERMENT CAUSED BY THE DOMINANT PARTIES IN THE CAPITAL; THEIR APPEARANCE, THEIR LANGUAGE, AND THEIR MOTIONS AS DEMONSTRATED IN THE COMMUNE, THE JACOBINS, AND IN THE SECTIONS—RIOTS AT PARIS ON ACCOUNT OF THE GENERAL SCARCITY OF PROVISIONS—PILLAGE OF THE GROCERS' SHOPS—CONTINUATION OF THE ACCOUNT OF THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GIRONDISTS AND THE MOUNTAIN PARTY; THEIR FORCES AND APPLIANCES—REVERSES SUFFERED BY OUR ARMIES IN THE NORTH; REVOLUTIONARY DECREES FOR THE PUTTING THE COUNTRY IN A STATE OF DEFENCE—PERMANENCE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL; STORMY DEBATES IN THE ASSEMBLY UPON THIS SUBJECT—EVENTS OF THE EVENING OF THE TENTH OF MARCH; THE DESIGN OF ATTACKING THE CONVENTION IS BAFFLED.

THE death of the unfortunate Louis XVI. spread a general terror throughout France, and excited in Europe a mixed feeling of astonishment and indignation. As the most enlightened and moderate revolutionists had foreseen, an inevitable conflict now ensued, from which there was no retreat. A contest was now to be entered into with a coalition of foreign powers, and to conquer or perish under their attack, was the only alternative left. Thus both the assembly and the Jacobins were agreed that they should give their undivided attention to devising means of exterior defence; and from this time, questions of war and finance were constantly in the order of the day.

We have already seen the mutual fear inspired by the two parties which divided the capital. The Jacobins thought they perceived, in the resistance that had been opposed to the king's condemnation, a dangerous remnant of royalism, and this apprehension stimulated several departments to the excesses committed since the 10th of August. They had deemed their victory doubtful to the

last moment! but the easy execution of the 21st of January had given them fresh confidence, and they now believed that the cause of the revolution might still prosper, and prepared addresses to enlighten the departments, and complete their conversion. The Girondists, on the contrary, already deeply affected by the unhappy fate of the royal victim, and alarmed at the victory of their adversaries, now began to perceive that the event of the 21st of January would be but the prelude to a long series of sanguinary outrages, and the first act of that unflinching system they had deprecated. It is true they had obtained the prosecution of the originators of the September murders; but it was a concession leading to no result. By abandoning Louis to his fate, they wished to show themselves guiltless of royalism; and the other party, by leaving the Septembrizers in the lurch, were equally anxious to make it appear that they afforded no protection to crime; but this double demonstration did not satisfy or assure a single individual. The first were always regarded as lukewarm republicans inclined to royalism, and the latter as men dyed in blood, and thirsting for carnage. Roland, completely discouraged, not by the dangers which threatened, but by his utter inability to render further service, gave in his resignation on the 23rd of January. The Jacobins congratulated themselves on this event, but still clamoured against the traitors Clavière and Lebrun, who yet remained in office; they declared that the intriguing Brissot had gained an absolute ascendency over these ministers; that the evil was not entirely rooted out; and that, so far from slackening their exertions, they should, on the contrary, redouble their zeal, till all *intriguers, Girondists, Rolandists and Brissotins*, were finally expelled from the administration. The Girondists now demanded a new minister of war, Pache having thrown that department into the most deplorable state of disorder, by his weak concessions to the Jacobins. After many violent debates, he was finally dismissed as incapable of performing the functions of his office. Thus the two ministers whose names had become rallying words to their respective parties, were excluded from the government, and the majority of the convention flattered themselves that this exclusion would not tend a little to restore tranquillity; as if in suppressing the names which served as watchwords to contending passions, these passions themselves would not survive, were it only to fix upon new names, and continue the conflict. Beurnonville, the friend of Dumouriez, who was surnamed the *French Ajax*, was called to the administration of the war department. He was principally distinguished at this time, for his military intrepidity, but his love of discipline went nigh to provoke the opposition of the turbulent Jacobins. After this measure had been decided on, finance questions, which, as at this time the revolution was about to enter into a contest with all the powers of Europe, were most important, came on. The committee of the constitution were also ordered to give in a report of the progress of their labours within the space of fifteen days at latest, and the convention then determined to enter immediately upon the task of collecting information respecting the causes of the disorders which everywhere prevailed. Many believed that all the troubles of the nation took their origin in the non-execution and inadequate state of the laws, and, in many instances, in their total deficiency, and that, consequently, the constitution would quickly apply a remedy to these evils. Several Girondists, and all the members of *the Plain*, ceased not, therefore, to call urgently for this constitution, complained of the delays which were continually interposed, asserting that such was the object of their duty. In point of fact, they imagined that they had been called together solely for the accomplishment of this work, and that the task might be completed in a few months. They did not yet perceive that they were destined, not to constitute the state, but to contend in a sanguinary struggle; that it would be their terrible task to defend the revolution against Europe and La Vendée; that the administrative body to which they belonged would be quickly converted into an implacable dictatorship, proscribing its enemies at home, giving battle to Europe and the revolted provinces, and defending itself by every species of violence; that their laws, transitory as the crisis itself, would not be considered but as mere passionate acts; and that the only durable record they would leave behind them of their work would be the reputation of a defence, a terrible and unparalleled performance, to which fate had appointed them, and which they themselves should not consider as the sole object of their mission.

Yet, either from the exhaustion arising from the lengthened internal conflicts which had agitated the nation, or from a sincere unanimity of opinion on the question of war, all were agreed upon the necessity of assuming an attitude of defence, or even of hostility; and a short interval of tranquillity succeeded to the tumults and disorders which had been occasioned by the proceedings against Louis XVI., and Brissot gained credit for his diplomatic reports against foreign powers.

Such was the interior situation of France, and the state of parties at this period. Its position with regard to Europe was frightful. A rupture with all foreign powers was inevitable. Until now France had but three declared enemies to contend with, Piedmont, Austria, and Prussia. The revolution, favoured by the people of all nations in proportion to the degree of their mental advancement, and odious to all governments in proportion to the magnitude of their fears, had been regarded in a new light since the events of the 10th of August, the 2nd and 3rd of September, and the 21st of January. Less contemned, since its energetic defence of its principles, and also less esteemed since it had become stained by crimes, it had ceased to excite a lively interest with the communities of other countries, and had provoked an increased measure of hatred in foreign cabinets.

A war, then, was about to become general. We have already seen Austria, influenced by family considerations, engaging in a contest little favourable to her public interests; we have seen Prussia, though obviously interested in seeking an alliance with France against the head of the Germanic empire, prompted by the most frivolous motives, marching her armies beyond the Rhine, and endangering their safety at the Argonne; we have beheld Catharine, though celebrated for her wisdom and sagacity, abandoning, as all true courtiers do, a cause she had at first espoused from vanity,

attacking the revolution by habitude and from motives of policy, and finally inciting Gustavus, the emperor of Austria, and king of Prussia, to withdraw themselves from Poland, and address themselves towards the west; and we have observed Piedmont, instigated by enmity to the revolution, and in defiance of every prudential consideration, attacking France. The petty courts of Italy, though detesting the new republic, had not yet dared openly to avow their sentiments, and had even acknowledged the republican flag; Switzerland had preserved a perfect neutrality; Holland and the Germanic Diet had not yet explained themselves, but took no pains to conceal a deep-seated hostility; Spain had observed a prudent neutrality, under the discreet d'Aranda; finally, England, leaving France a prey to internal distractions, her colonies running to waste, and Europe exhausting its resources, thus permitted her revenge to be effected by those disorders which are inevitably attendant upon revolutions.

The new revolutionary impetus was about to put an end to all these probable neutralities. Hitherto Pitt had acted wisely. In England, a semi-revolution had only half regenerated the social compact, and had still left in existence many feudal institutions, which became objects of attachment to the aristocracy and court, and a subject of grievance for the opposition party to descant upon. The design of Pitt was twofold: first, to moderate the animosity which prevailed against the aristocracy, and to contain the spirit of reform within bounds, and thus to preserve his own place in the ministry, by governing the two parties; and, secondly, to overwhelm France by the indignation which she had roused in Europe, and by her own internal disorders. It was his aim, in a word, to render his country mistress of the world, and himself master of his country. This was the double object of his policy, and he followed it up with all the egotism and ability of a great statesman. Neutrality suited his purposes exactly. By opposing the war, he concealed the hatred of the English court against liberty; and whilst he allowed the French revolution to proceed to its worst excesses without any attempt at prevention, he daily contradicted the apologists of this revolution,—a resistance which demonstrated nothing, but which produced the desired effect. He replied to the apology of Fox, the most eloquent member of the opposition party, by citing the crimes of reformed France. Burke, a vehement declaimer, took upon himself to enumerate these crimes, which he did with the most absurd violence; and on one occasion he went so far as to throw a dagger on the floor of the house, saying it had been manufactured by the Jacobin propagandists. Whilst Pitt was accused at Paris of fomenting the disorders of the nation, by distributing money for that purpose among the factious, he complained that the revolutionists made use of the same means to excite disturbances in England, and the emigrants accredited these reports by echoing them. By this Machiavelian logic, he brought French liberty into disgrace with the English, and roused Europe, by his envoys, to arms against the revolution. In Switzerland, he had not yet succeeded; but, at the Hague, the docile Stadtholder, alarmed at the revolution which had taken place in his own country, placing no confidence in his own subjects, and having no other support than the English navy, gave him every satisfaction, and had, by many hostile demonstrations, testified his ill will to France. Spain, however, was the principal field of Pitt's intrigues, and he succeeded in persuading her to enter into an alliance with England against France, her sole maritime ally, which was the greatest error she ever committed. The Spaniards had felt themselves very little interested in the revolution, and motives of policy or safety had less influence than those of kindred, or even the repugnance naturally displayed by all governments in these matters, in disposing the cabinet of Madrid to take up arms against France. The discreet Count d'Aranda, by resisting all the intrigues of the emigrants, at the persuasions of the Spanish aristocracy, and the suggestions of Pitt, had succeeded in a measure in humouring the irascibility of the conventional government. Being finally, however, dismissed, and replaced by Manuel Godoy*, since known as Prince of the Peace, he left his unhappy country a prey to the worst of counsels. Hitherto, the cabinet of Madrid had refused all explanation with regard to its views towards France; it had even offered to acknowledge the republic, and its mediation with the other powers of Europe, if the life of the dethroned monarch were but spared. In reply to this offer, Danton had proposed an immediate declaration of war, and the assembly had passed to the order of the day. Since that time, the direction the war would take had not been doubtful. Troops arrived daily in Catalonia. Naval armaments were prepared in all the ports, and a speedy attack was resolved upon. Pitt so far triumphed; but, still delaying definitively to declare his intentions, lest he should too hastily compromise himself, he took time to raise a formidable navy; he satisfied the aristocracy of his own nation by his preparations; he endeavoured to make the revolution as unpopular as possible, by paying his creatures to declaim against its excesses; and, whilst he thus prepared his resources in silence, he leagued together the powers of Europe for the destruction of France, conjecturing, that by giving employment to all her forces, the colonies would be left without succour, and the success of England in India meet no impediment.

Never did Europe appear to be struck with so general a blindness to its own interests as at this period. In the west, Spain, Holland, and all the maritime powers, urged on by aristocratic passions, leagued with their enemy England, against France their only ally. Prussia, by an inconceivable vanity, was again observed to ally herself with the head of the Germanic empire against France, whose alliance the great Frederick had always deemed so necessary. The petty king of Sardinia committed the same error, but from motives certainly more natural, those of relationship. In the east, and north, Catharine was suffered to oppress Poland and endanger the safety of Germany, for the trifling advantage of acquiring possession of a few provinces, and for the power of causing further dis-

* A contemptible individual, who sharing the favours of the queen of the imbecile Charles IV. in his name reigned over Spain: the power he thus acquired was infamously abused. Godoy was originally a private in the guards. *Trans.*

traction to France, without interruption. All the states of Europe renounced their former and most advantageous alliances, and yielded to the perfidious suggestions of the two most formidable powers of the civilized world, in order to arm themselves against France, the former protectress and ally of those who now proposed to attack her. All the cabinets united in this enterprise, freely lending themselves to the designs of Pitt and Catharine; while infatuated Frenchmen contributed, by their co-operation, to this fatal renunciation of policy and prudence, and endeavoured to bring down on their native land the most frightful calamities. But what were the motives which prompted these designs? Poland was to be given up to Catharine, and France to Pitt, because she had wished to acquire that liberty which she had never possessed! Undoubtedly France had committed some excesses, but these excesses would naturally increase as the struggle became more violent; and thus, without extinguishing the spirit of this liberty they so much abhorred, foreign potentates were about to enter upon a murderous war of thirty years' duration, to provoke extensive invasions, and to give rise to the most calamitous disorders, terminating in the establishment of those two colossal powers which at present bestride Europe upon the two elements, England and Russia.

In the midst of this general conspiracy, Denmark, governed by a skilful minister, and Sweden, delivered from the ambitious schemes of Gustavus, alone observed a prudent reserve, which Holland and Spain should have imitated by persevering in the system of an armed neutrality. The French government formed a correct judgment of the general inclinations of Europe, and the ardent impetuosity which at this time characterized its counsels could brook no delay, and prompted the nation rather to provoke, than to wait for, a declaration of war. Since the 10th of August, the assembly had never ceased to demand the recognition of foreign states, and had still endeavoured to keep terms with England, whose neutrality was important, on account of the many enemies France had already to contend with. But after the 21st of January, all prudential considerations were disregarded, and the convention prepared for a general war. Considering concealed hostilities no less dangerous than those which were openly avowed, they were impatient to make their enemies declare themselves; and on the 22nd, the assembly, passing in review all the cabinets of Europe, determined to declare war immediately with those who hesitated to explain categorically and satisfactorily their intentions with regard to France.

Since the 10th of August, England had withdrawn her ambassador from Paris, and had not received M. de Chauvelin in any other light than as the envoy of dethroned royalty. All these diplomatic subtilities had no other object than to preserve an appearance of respect to the king imprisoned in the Temple, at the same time to defer those hostilities which it did not suit the minister to commence at that very moment. Nevertheless, Pitt demanded a secret envoy from Paris, to whom he might explain the nature of his complaints against the French government. The citizen Maret was sent on this mission in the month of December, and had a private interview with the English minister. They separated, mutually promising to give out that this interview was of a private, not of an official nature; that nothing but what was amicable had passed between them; and that they had no other object than to bring the two nations to a satisfactory adjustment of their mutual causes of disagreement. Pitt complained that France menaced the allies of England, and in proof of this cited Holland. The principal alleged grievance was the opening of the Scheldt, perhaps an imprudent but yet a liberal measure, which the French had taken on entering the Low Countries. It was, in fact, absurd to interdict the general use of that river, for the purpose of preserving to Holland a monopoly of navigation. Austria had not dared to deliver the country from this servile restriction, but Dumouriez had so done by the order of his government, and the inhabitants of Antwerp beheld with joy vessels again sailing up to their city. The answer of France to this complaint was obvious; for France, in respecting the rights of neutral neighbours, had not pledged herself to consider any iniquitous policy sacred, merely because the neutrality might be interested therein. Besides, the government of Holland had displayed too much ill-will to the revolution to expect any very great consideration from the French nation. The second grievance complained of, was the decree of the 15th of November, in which the national convention promised their aid to all those who should strive to shake off the yoke of tyranny. This imprudent decree, passed in a moment of enthusiasm, could not, however, bear the construction which Pitt put upon it, who pretended that it was an invitation to all people to revolt against the governments under which they lived, for it applied only to those nations which were in an open state of hostility with France. Finally, Pitt complained of the continual menaces and declamations of the Jacobins against all governments; but in this respect both governments were not behindhand with the Jacobins; and upon the score of bitter words the balance was equal.

This conversation led to no result; it was evident that England sought only to defer a war, which she desired should take place, but which it was not convenient for her to declare at that moment. However, the remarkable process of the month of January hurried on events; the English parliament were suddenly assembled, and before the usual time. An inquisitorial act was passed against all Frenchmen travelling in England. The Tower of London was put in a state of defence; a levy of soldiers was ordered, and active preparations every where announced the approach of war. The prejudices of the populace of London were excited, and that blind passion, which in England has always considered a war with France as a national benefit, was completely roused; finally, two vessels laden with corn were prohibited from entering French ports; and when news of the event of the 21st of January arrived, the French ambassador, whom till then they had in some degree refused to recognise, was ordered to quit the kingdom in eight days. The national convention immediately ordered a report to be made of the conduct of England towards France, and of her relations with the Stadt-

holder of the United Provinces; and on the 1st of February, Brissot, having addressed the assembly on these subjects, and received for once the applause of both parties, war was forthwith declared against England and Holland. War with the Spanish government was also impending, and although not yet announced, was considered as certain. France had thus all Europe to contend with, and the condemnation of the 20th of January was the act which caused a decisive rupture with all the throned heads of Europe, and bound her irrevocably to pursue the revolution in its full career, and thus she was borne down the current of the revolution with resistless impetuosity.

She had now to sustain the terrible assault of all the combined powers of Europe, and however populous or rich in resources, to resist so general an attack directed against one nation, was an arduous and difficult task. The revolutionary leaders, however, were not the less bold and confident; the unexpected successes of the republic at the Argonne and in Belgium, had persuaded them that any man, especially a Frenchman, could become a complete soldier in six months; the general agitation which pervaded the nation led them also to believe that the whole population might be brought to the field of battle, and that they had thus at their disposal four or five millions of men capable of bearing arms; beyond comparison superior in zeal and courage to any the sovereigns of Europe could bring into action. A small body of men, recruited with difficulty, said they, and having interests entirely distinct from the community at large, compose the armies of foreign kingdoms, and one constantly observes that a small handful of regimentalized individuals decide the fate of the greatest empires. But suppose on the other hand the case of an entire nation, abandoning all the private pursuits of life, and taking arms in its own defence, does not this displace every ordinary calculation? *What cannot twenty-five millions of men do?* As to the charges of the war, the French government were just as little disquieted on this subject. The national capital augmented daily by the emigration, and greatly exceeded the public debt. At the present moment, this capital, it is true, was of little value, as the territory by which it was represented, remained unpurchased, but the assignats supplied this defect, and their factitious value corresponded with the future value of the property they represented. It is true that the real value of these assignats was one-third less than the nominal appreciation which was set upon them; but it was only necessary to augment their circulation by a third, and the capital thus afforded would be so enormous as to be sufficient, and would even exceed what it might be expedient to issue. After all, these men who were about to be transferred to a battle field, possessed a competence at home, and indeed, some lived in luxury: why should they not live quite as well during a campaign? could land and provisions ever be wanting wherever men happen to be? Besides, as society in its present state possessed more than enough to supply the wants of all, a more equal distribution should be made, and therefore it was proposed that wealth should be taxed and compelled to defray the charges of the war. Moreover, the states into which the armies were about to penetrate, had also a long settled state of things to be overturned, abuses to be destroyed, and immense profits were thus to be derived from the clergy, nobility and royalty, it was therefore but just that they should compensate France for the assistance she promised them.

Thus reasoned the fiery spirit of Chambon, and his ideas were soon adopted by all. The former policy of cabinets was to calculate on two hundred thousand soldiers, paid by some taxes and demesne revenues. But now this was a mere mass of men that raised itself and said, *I shall form an army*; which looked at the gross amount of wealth, and then further said, *This sum is sufficient, and divided among all will provide for the wants of all.* Undoubtedly this was not the language of the whole nation, but of the most extravagant party, who resorted to every means of propagating their opinions among the mass of the nation. Before we illustrate the imaginary resources of the revolutionists, we must carry ourselves back to our frontiers, and there observe how the last campaign had been concluded. Its opening had been brilliant, but an opening success badly followed up, had only served to extend our line of operations, and to provoke on the part of the enemy a greater and more decisive effort. Thus our defence became more difficult in proportion to the extent of our operations; and the beaten enemy would naturally rally his forces with energy, and by redoubling his exertions, go far to bring about the general disorganization of our armies. Added to this, the hostile league had also been greatly augmented in numbers, for the English on the coasts, the Spaniards on the Pyrenees, and Holland on the side of the Low Countries, threatened France with new attacks.

Dumouriez had halted on the banks of the Meuse, and been prevented, by causes which have not been sufficiently accounted for, from pushing on to the Rhine; for it is impossible to reconcile the tardiness of his subsequent motions with the rapidity of his former operations. On arriving at Liege, he found his army in a complete state of disorder. His soldiers were nearly naked; for want of shoes they wrapped straw round their feet; they were destitute of everything but meat and bread, which were sufficiently abundant, owing to the contract which the general had insisted on carrying into execution; but money was absolutely wanting for the soldiers' pay, and the peasants were pillaged by the troops, or forced, by violence, to receive their assignats. The horses perished daily for want of forage, especially those of the artillery, who nearly all died. These privations, and the relaxation of the war, disgusted the troops; the volunteers deserted in bands, defending their conduct by the decree of the assembly, which declared the country no longer in danger. The convention passed another decree to put a stop to this desertion; and though it was somewhat severe, the gendarmerie posted on the roads but partially succeeded in arresting the fugitives. The strength of the army was reduced one-third. These combined causes had prevented Dumouriez from pursuing the Austrians with the necessary vigour; Clerfait had time to intrench himself on the banks of the Erft, and Beaulieu on the borders of Luxembourg; while the French general found it impossible, with an army of thirty or forty thousand

men, to drive before him an enemy intrenched in mountains and woods, and supported by Luxembourg, one of the strongest places in the world. If Custine, instead of making incursions into Germany, had marched upon Coblentz, joined Beurnonville, and afforded him his co-operation in his attempt against Trèves, and these two generals had then descended the Rhine in concert, Dumouriez could then have marched thither by the way of Cologne; and all three combining their forces, Luxembourg might have been invested, and, cut off from all communication with the enemy, would certainly have fallen. But nothing of this sort took place; Custine being desirous of making the neighbourhood of his own army the principal theatre of the war, had only provoked an hostile declaration from the Imperial Diet, irritated the vanity of the King of Prussia, and engaged him more warmly in the schemes of the coalition; Beurnonville, alone and unaided, had failed in his enterprise against Trèves; and the enemy had been enabled to maintain their position at the same time in the Electorate of Trèves and the Duchy of Luxembourg. Such being the respective situations of the French and allied armies, Dumouriez, by advancing towards the Rhine, would have left his right flank and rear unprotected, and, in the present disorganized state of his forces, could not, with any prospect but that of failure, have undertaken the invasion of that extensive country, which stretches from the Meuse to the Rhine, as far as the frontiers of Holland, a country difficult of access, and affording no facilities for the transport of baggage, intersected by mountains and woods, and occupied by an enemy by no means to be despised. Certainly Dumouriez, if he had had the means, would have preferred pursuing his conquests on the Rhine, to coming and making solicitations for Louis XVI. The zeal for royalty which he attributed to himself when in London, in order to advance his own merit, and which the Jacobins laid to his charge in France as a means of destroying him, was surely not sufficiently ardent to induce him to renounce his victories and rush into dangers in the midst of the factions of the capital. In fact, he never quitted the field of battle till he found his presence there perfectly unserviceable; and his object in taking this step was to terminate, by a personal conference with the ministers, the difficulties which the military administration had thrown in his way in Belgium.

We have already seen the embarrassments in which the general was involved after his first success. The conquered country was anxious for a revolution; but not for one so radically subversive as that of France. Dumouriez, from his natural disposition, his political opinions, and love of military subordination, felt strongly inclined to adopt the moderate views of the country which he occupied. We have already seen the efforts he made to protect the Belgians from the grievances of the war, to give them the advantage of provisioning his army, and finally to persuade rather than compel them to receive the assignats. The invectives of the Jacobins were the only recompense he received for these anxieties. Chambon had proposed the decree of the 15th of December, for the purpose of frustrating his views. "We must," said he, "declare ourselves *a revolutionary power* in every nation we enter. It is useless to conceal our intentions; the despots know well what it is we want. We must therefore loudly proclaim it, while they are guessing at our object; and besides this, let the justice of our designs be avowed. Our generals must proclaim in every city they enter, the sovereignty of the people, the abolition of feudality, of tithes, and all other abuses; they must declare the dissolution of all the old authorities; and new local administrations should be provisionally established under their direction, empowered to govern the country, and convoke national conventions, for the purpose of deciding ultimately on the fate of the nation; the property of our enemies, that is, of the nobility, the priests, of lay and religious communities, and of churches, &c., should be forthwith sequestrated, and committed to the keeping of the French nation, to be accounted for to the local administrations, and to serve as a pledge for the liquidation of the expenses of the war, to which all emancipated nations are bound to contribute their share, the object of this war being to deliver them from their chains. If it should be found after the campaign that the republic has received more than enough to defray its military expenses, the surplus should be restored; but, if the contrary should be the case, it will then be obligatory on the liberated nations to make up the deficiency. Our assignats, also, arising out of the new distribution of property, must be received in the conquered country, and the principles to which they owe their origin, together with the assignats themselves, should both be adopted by every people among whom the revolution is introduced; and, finally, the executive council should despatch messengers to confer with these provisional administrations, to enter into a bond of fraternity with them, and to execute the sequestrations decreed. Let us have no half revolution," added Chambon: "those people who are not willing to accede to the terms which we here propose, should be considered as our enemies, and treated as such: peace and fraternity to all the friends of liberty; war to all cowards and partisans of despotism; *war with palaces, amity with cottages!*"

These principles were sanctioned by an act passed immediately after the delivery of this harangue, and were put in practice throughout the conquered provinces. A cloud of agents chosen by the executive council from among the Jacobins instantly spread through Belgium. Provisional administrations had been established there under their auspices, and on principles the most violently republican. The populace, rising against the middle classes, committed the greatest excesses. This was the anarchy of 1793, to which four years of disorder had progressively brought us, and which had suddenly demonstrated itself without any transition from an old to a new order of things. These proconsuls, invested with power nearly absolute, imprisoned men, and sequestrated estates at their pleasure; they seized upon all the silver found in the churches, which greatly alienated the unhappy Belgians, who were much attached to their forms of worship, and gave occasion to many scandalous accusations. They likewise formed a species of convention for the purpose of deciding on the fate of each country; and under their despotic influence, the union of France to Liege, Brussels,

Dumouriez becomes unpopular, but his army is reinforced, and he commences a second campaign in the Austrian Netherlands.

and Mons, &c., had been effected. These inevitable calamities were much increased by the military ferocity which in this country was added to revolutionary violence. Another cause of discord shortly arose. The agents of the executive power attempted to subject the generals to their orders in all commissariat questions; and if these generals were not Jacobins, as it frequently happened, quarrels and bickerings ensued which augmented the general disorder. Dumouriez, indignant at seeing his military success so much compromised by the distressed state of his army, and by the ill-will of the Belgians, had already treated some of these proconsuls very roughly, and set out for Paris to give vent to his displeasure, with all the natural impetuosity of his character, and all the haughtiness of a victorious general, who considered himself as an indispensable adjunct to the republic.

Such was the situation of affairs on the principal theatre of the war. Custine, obliged to retreat to Mayence, complained of the manner in which Beurnonville had executed his attempt on Trèves; Kellermann maintained his position in the Alps, Chambery and Nice; Servan endeavoured in vain to get together an army in the Pyrenees; and Monge, equally as incapable as Pache, had suffered the administration of the marine to fall into the greatest disorder. The defence of the frontiers was at this moment the great object of public attention. Dumouriez had passed the end of December and the whole month of January at Paris, where he increased his unpopularity by some expressions in favour of Louis XVI. and by absenting himself from the Jacobin club, where his presence was continually promised, but where he never made his appearance, and finally, by his intimacy with his old friend Gensonné. He presented to the assembly four memorials, the first on the subject of the decree of the 15th of December, the second on the organization of the army, the third on the method of providing for the army, and a fourth proposing a plan of military operations for the ensuing year. At the foot of each of these documents he offered in his resignation in case their demands were not complied with.

The assembly, besides its diplomatic and military committee, had established a third, denominated the committee of *general defence*. This committee was very numerous, and all the members of the assembly were at liberty to associate themselves with it. Its chief object was to conciliate the members of conflicting parties, and thus inspire them with mutual confidence by their co-operation in a work in which all were equally interested. Robespierre, however, annoyed at seeing the Girondists there, seldom made his appearance; but the latter, on the contrary, were remarkably assiduous in their attendance. It was there that Dumouriez appeared with his plans, which were not always perfectly understood; his haughtiness, likewise, frequently gave offence; and he abandoned his memorials to their fate. He then retired to some distance from Paris, little disposed to resign his command, although he had threatened the assembly so to do, and was awaiting the opening of the campaign.

He was thus entirely out of favour with the Jacobins, and withal daily calumniated in Marat's journal, for having maintained a mere half-revolution in Belgium, and for having demonstrated so much severity against the demagogues. He was accused of having voluntarily suffered the Austrians to escape, and some, going still further back, publicly asserted that he had opened the passages of the Argonne to Frederick William, when he had it in his power utterly to destroy him. Nevertheless, the members of the council and of the committees, being less blinded by the passions of the demagogues, appreciated his services, and still endeavoured to keep on terms with him. Even Robespierre defended him, by attributing all his errors to his false Girondist friends. Every one was ready enough to give him every possible credit, consistent with the decrees already passed, and with the rigorous principles of the revolution. His two commissaries, Malus and Petit-Jean, were restored to him; numerous reinforcements were granted, sufficient provisioning was promised, and all his ideas with regard to the general plan of the opening campaign were adopted; but he obtained no concession as to the decree of the 15th of December, or the new administration of the army. The nomination of his friend Beurnonville to the ministry of the war department was further advantageous to him, as he might confidently expect from his zeal every necessary provision for the army.

At one time he was induced to believe that England would make use of him as a mediator between herself and France, and he set out for Antwerp with this flattering idea. But the convention, wearied out by the double-dealing of Pitt, had declared war with Holland and England. The news of this declaration reached him at Antwerp. And now observe what had been resolved upon, partly from his plans, for the defence of this territory. It was settled that the army was to be augmented to five hundred thousand men, and this, in comparison with the idea that had been formed of the power of France, and with respect to the force which was afterwards raised, was not deemed a very considerable levy. In the east and south, a defensive plan was to be strictly adhered to, the movements of the enemy were to be closely watched along the Pyrenees and by the sea coasts, and all the boldness of the offensive was to be displayed in the north, where, according to Dumouriez, "it was impossible to maintain a defence without gaining battles." To execute this design, a hundred and fifty thousand men were to occupy Belgium, and to cover the frontier from Dunkirk to the Meuse; fifty thousand were to keep possession of the territory between the Meuse and the Sarre; a hundred and fifty thousand to extend along the Rhine and the Vosges, from Mayence to Besançon and to Gex; and finally, a reserve was to be stationed at Châlons, with necessary requisites, so as to be able to march wherever they might be required. Savoy and Nice were to be protected by two armies of sixty thousand men each; the Pyrenees by a force forty thousand strong; and a post of observation occupied by forty thousand men was to be established on the sea coast, and the coasts of Brittany, and a part to be ready for embarkation if necessary. Such was the strength of the army as originally intended; but the actual force was considerably less, not amounting to more than two hundred and sixty thousand men, of whom a hundred thousand were

scattered through Belgium, twenty-five thousand stationed on the Moselle, forty-five thousand at Mayence, under the orders of Custine, thirty thousand on the upper Rhine, forty thousand in Savoy and at Nice, and thirty thousand at most in the interior. But to make up the full complement, the assembly decreed that a levy should be made from the national guards, that every member of this guard, unmarried or without children, should be at the disposal of the executive council, from the age of eighteen to that of forty-five. They added, that three hundred thousand men were still necessary to resist the coalition, and that the recruiting should be continued till this number was made up*. At the same time, an issue of eight hundred million of assignats was ordered, and it was resolved that trees should be felled from the woods of Corsica for the construction of ships of war.

While these plans were in the course of completion, the campaign was opened with two hundred and sixty thousand men. Dumouriez had under his command thirty thousand on the Scheldt, and about seventy thousand on the Meuse. The rapid invasion of Holland was the bold enterprise which now created a popular ferment, and into which Dumouriez had been forcibly drawn by the general opinion. Many plans had been proposed. One, suggested by the Batavian refugees, who had quitted their country after the revolution of 1787, consisted in invading Zealand, and thus seizing on the Dutch government, which was about to retire thither. Dumouriez pretended to lend himself to this scheme; but he considered it profitless, inasmuch as it limited his operations to the occupation of a small and very unimportant part of Holland. The second plan was peculiarly his own; it was to descend the Meuse by Venloo as far as Grave, from Grave to break suddenly in upon Nimeguen, and from thence to fall unexpectedly upon Amsterdam. This design would have been more safe than the former, could the future have been foreseen. But, stationed at Antwerp, Dumouriez conceived a third plan, more hazardous and prompt, better suited to the revolutionary views of France, and more fertile in decisive results, had it succeeded. Whilst his lieutenants, Miranda, Valence, Dampierre, and others, should descend the Meuse, and occupy Maestricht, which he had not thought it necessary to take possession of in the preceding year, and Venloo, which could not long hold out, Dumouriez meditated marching himself, with all secrecy and despatch, upon Bergen-op-Zoom and Breda with twenty-five thousand men, from whence he might proceed, without impediment, to Moerdyk, cross the little sea of Bielbos, and advance rapidly by the mouths of the rivers as far as Leyden and Amsterdam. This hazardous project did not appear very feasible, but many others equally dubious in appearance have succeeded, and although full of difficulties, it also possessed advantages greatly superior to that of opening an attack directly upon Venloo and Nimeguen. By adopting the latter plan, Dumouriez would have assailed the Dutch army in front, who had already made all their preparations between Grave and Gorkum, and have given them time to be reinforced by the English and the Prussians. Whereas, by adhering to the former, he might have penetrated into the interior of Holland, which was entirely destitute of defence, and all obstacles being thus surmounted, have gained entire possession of the country. On his return from Amsterdam, he would have taken the defended posts in the rear, and the enemy have become surrounded by himself and his lieutenants, who were to join him by Nimeguen and Utrecht.

It was natural that he should take the command of the army destined for this expedition, as it required promptitude, boldness, and generalship in an eminent degree. This enterprise, however, was exposed to the danger to which all offensive plans are subject, that of exposure to an invasion in leaving oneself unprotected. Thus the Meuse would have been left open to the Austrians; but where the warfare is offensive on both sides, the advantage remains with that party who most courageously opposes himself to the danger, and is less disposed to yield to the fear of an invasion.

Dumouriez despatched Thouvenot, in whom he placed the greatest confidence, to the Meuse; he informed Miranda and Valence of his plans, which he had hitherto kept secret; he urged them to hurry on the sieges of Maestricht and Venloo, and, in case of delay, to move gradually off from before those places, so as to be continually advancing towards Nimeguen. He ordered them also to fix rallying posts round Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle, as points of union to all dispersed detachments, and for the purpose of resisting the enemy, who might attempt to impede the sieges about to be opened on the Meuse.

Dumouriez then immediately left Antwerp with eighteen thousand men, got together in great haste. He divided his little army into several corps, for the purpose of summoning the fortresses in his route to surrender, but they were not to stop and actually lay siege to them. His advanced guard was to be employed in seizing boats and every practicable means of transportation; and he himself, with the main body of his troops, held himself in readiness to relieve any of his lieutenants who might need his assistance. On the 17th of February, 1793, he entered the territory of Holland, publishing a proclamation, in which he promised friendship to the Batavians, and war only against the Stadtholder, and the English influence. He advanced, leaving general Lieleve before Bergen-op-Zoom, despatching General Berneron to Klundert and Williamstadt, and ordering d'Arcon, who was an excellent engineer, to feign an attack on Breda, which was a very important place. Dumouriez remained with his rearguard at Sevenberghe. On the 25th, General Berneron carried the fort of Klundert, and came before Williamstadt. D'Arcon threw a few shells into Breda. This place was reputed very strong; its garrison was sufficiently numerous, but badly commanded, and after a few hours, it surrendered to an army of besiegers scarcely exceeding its own garrison. The French entered Breda on the 27th, and seized upon a considerable store of arms and ammunition, which consisted of two hundred and fifty mortars, three hundred thousand cartridges of powder, and five thousand muskets. Leaving a garrison in Breda, General d'Arcon came, on the 1st of March, before Gertruydenberg, and carried it the same day from all the advanced works. Dumouriez

* Decree of the 24th of January.

arrived at Moedyk, and made amends for all the delays of his advanced guard. This succession of fortunate surprises upon places capable of a long resistance, was a brilliant opening to the campaign; but unforeseen delays retarded the passage of the sea, the most difficult part of the plan. Dumouriez had hoped that his advanced guard would have acted more promptly, crossed the Bielbos by means of some boats, occupied the isle of Dort, defended at most by a few hundred men, and capturing a numerous flotilla of small vessels, would have brought them back on the other side, and thus afforded the means of transportation to his army. But inevitable delays prevented the execution of this part of his plan. He endeavoured, however, to overcome the difficulty by taking possession of all the boats he could find, and employing his carpenters in the construction of others. But celerity was above all things necessary; for the Dutch army were assembling at Gorkum, at Stry, and at the isle of Dort; some enemies' sloops and an English frigate hovered over his embarkation, and cannonaded his camp, which was called the Beavers' camp by the French soldiers. They had constructed huts of straw, and, encouraged by the presence of their general, braved cold, privations, and dangers, and the event of an enterprise so exceedingly hazardous, and awaited with impatience the moment of crossing to the opposite bank of the river. On the 3rd of March, General Deflers arrived with a new division; on the 4th, Gertruydenberg opened its gates; and every preparation for the passage of the Bielbos was completed.

During this period, the struggle between the two parties in the interior continued with unabated violence. The death of Lepelletier had afforded a pretext to the *Mountain* to declare themselves menaced, and the assembly did not know how to refuse them the re-establishment of the committee of *surveillance*. This committee was entirely composed from the *Mountain*; its first act was the arrest of Gorsas, a deputy and journalist attached to the interests of the Girondists. The Jacobins had obtained another advantage—the suspension of the prosecutions against the originators of the September murders. Hardly had these prosecutions commenced, when the most overwhelming evidence was brought to light against the chief revolutionists, and against Danton himself. The Jacobins, then, roused by the danger which threatened them, pretended that all were equally guilty of the events of those days, because every body had believed that they were not without their use, and had suffered their continuance; they even dared to maintain that they were only to blame for leaving their work incomplete; and they therefore demanded the suspension of proceedings, which afforded, they said, a handle of attack against the purest revolutionists. Their demands were complied with; the proceedings were suspended, that is to say, annulled; and a deputation of Jacobins immediately presented themselves before the minister of justice, praying that extraordinary couriers might be despatched into the country to stop the prosecutions which had already commenced against *their brethren of Meaux*.

We have already mentioned that Pache had been obliged to quit the ministry, and that Roland had voluntarily given in his resignation. This reciprocal concession had not appeased the animosity of parties. The Jacobins, by no means satisfied, demanded the impeachment of Roland. They asserted that he had peculated enormous sums, and had remitted to London more than twelve millions of francs; that his riches were employed in perverting the public opinion by his publications, and in exciting seditions, by monopolizing grain; they called likewise for similar proceedings against Clavieres, Lebrun, and Beurnonville, whom they called traitors, and accomplices in the intrigues of the Girondists. At the same time they procured quite a different sort of compensation for their truckling friend out of place. Chambon, the successor of Pétion in the mayoralty of Paris, had resigned his functions as beyond his powers of performance. The Jacobins immediately thought of Pache to succeed him, in whom they perceived the wise and impartial character of a magistrate. They congratulated themselves on this idea, which they communicated to the commune, the sections, and all the clubs; and the Parisians, overpowered by their wide-spread influence, avenged Pache of his disgrace by nominating him mayor. Provided he had been found as tractable in the mayoralty as he had been in his ministry of war, the dominion of the Jacobins in the capital had been established; and in this appointment, therefore, they consulted as much their interests as their passions.

The difficulty of obtaining provision for the population, and commercial embarrassment, still continued to be sources of disorder and complaints; and, from December to February, these evils had considerably increased. The fear of disturbances and pillage, the repugnance of the farmers to receive paper-money which diminished in value every day, and the high prices of all articles of trade, were, as we have already said, the causes which hindered the free sale of corn, and brought about the scarcity which prevailed. Nevertheless, the exertions of the commune gave, to a certain extent, some activity to commerce, and provisions were not wanting in the markets; but their prices were exorbitant, and the continual issues of paper-money constantly increased their dearness. The value of the assignats diminishing daily, in proportion to their abundance, the payment of a larger sum became necessary to acquire the same articles, and thus the rates of the markets rose to an excessive height. The people receiving no increase of remuneration for their work, could no longer obtain the necessaries of life, and gave vent to their sufferings in complaints and threats. Bread was not the only article which had considerably augmented in price; sugar, coffee, candles, and soap, had risen to double their former value. The laundrywomen complained to the convention, that they were obliged to pay thirty sous for the same quantity of soap for which they had formerly paid no more than fourteen. It was in vain that the people were told to demand a higher remuneration for their labour, and thus to create a relative proportion between their means and their wants: they could not enter into a concerted agreement among themselves to carry this into execution, therefore they clamoured against the rich, the monopolists, and the mercantile aristocracy, and demanded the im-

position of the forced tax and the *maximum*. The Jacobins, and the members of the commune, although themselves the people in relation to the convention, but who might be called enlightened assemblies when compared with the still lower classes, perceived the inconveniences of this tax. Though more inclined than the convention to adopt such an imposition, they nevertheless resisted it; and at the Jacobin club, Dubois de Crancé, the two Robespierres, Thuriot, and other members of the *Mountain*, daily raised their voices against the establishment of the *maximum*. Chaumette and Hebert did the same at the commune; but the galleries murmured, and sometimes even hooted down these orators. The deputations of the sections frequently reproached the commune with their moderation and their connivance with the monopolists. In the assemblies of these sections the lowest class of agitators were accustomed to meet, and a revolutionary fanaticism, more ignorant and violent than that which prevailed among the Jacobins or in the commune, drove them blindly into the greatest extravagances. Allied with the club of the Cordeliers, which was frequented by the most desperate characters in Paris, they became the source and centre of all the disorders of the capital. Their ignorance and obscurity, whilst it rendered them liable to be led into excesses on every occasion, exposed them likewise to dangers of another description. It was in these assemblies that the remnant of the aristocracy ventured to show their faces, and make some feeble attempts at resistance. The creatures of the former nobility, the domestics of the emigrants, and all those turbulent idlers, who, between the two causes, had chosen that of the aristocracy, sheltered themselves here behind the opposition of some honest citizens, who endeavoured to keep the Girondists in favour, and made every effort to bring disgrace upon the *Mountain*, and to promote, in an underhand manner, the interests of foreign puwers and of the old system of government. In the struggles which frequently took place in these associations, the respectable citizens generally retired early, and left this region of discord to the contests of the two extreme parties, who contended together with fearful violence. Dreadful scenes daily took place on the questions of petitions to be presented to the commune, the Jacobins, or the assembly; and, as victory declared itself in favour of the one side or the other, addresses were issued against the outrages of September, and the *maximum*, or against aristocrats and monopolists.

The commune generally rejected the incendiary petitions of these sections, and put them on their guard against those who wished to urge them into excesses, thus acting the same part towards these furious fanatics as the assembly acted towards themselves. The Jacobins, not having, like the commune, any administrative functions to perform, occupied themselves, by way of retaliation, in discussing all subjects, set up for great philosophers, and pretended to understand the science of social economy, better than the Cordeliers and the sections. They affected, on many questions, not to be influenced by the vulgar passions of these subaltern assemblies, and condemned the *maximum* as a tax dangerous to liberty and commerce. But for the purpose of substituting some other means of relief for that which they rejected, they proposed to force the circulation of the assignats at their nominal value, and to punish with death any one who should refuse to receive them on these terms, as if this measure would not have been liable to the same objections as the former, as militating against the liberty of commerce. They also entered into a mutual engagement among themselves, to use neither coffee nor sugar, so as forcibly to reduce their prices; and, finally, they suggested that no further issue of assignats should take place, but that forced loans should be required from the rich, in proportion to the number of their servants, horses, &c., to supply their place. All these propositions, however, did not prevent the evils complained of from increasing daily, and it appeared evident that they must soon arrive at a crisis. Meanwhile, and until this crisis burst forth, the public calamities were made subjects of mutual reproach. The Girondists were accused of favouring the rich and the monopolists, for the purpose of instigating the people, by famine, to insurrection, and thus have a pretext for passing new martial laws; some even hesitated not to assert that their object was to invite foreign powers into the country, by provoking disorders,—an absurd reproach, but which afterwards became fatal. The Girondists retorted similar accusations on their adversaries; they declared them the authors of the scarcity, and all the troubles which prevailed, by laying commerce under the restriction of terror, and maintained that their aim was, by tumultuous proceedings, to bring about an anarchy, and by means of an anarchy, to attain supreme power, and perhaps to establish a foreign domination.

The end of February was at hand, and the difficulty of procuring provisions had driven the people to the last extremity of distress. The women, apparently more affected by this species of suffering than the men, complained bitterly. They presented themselves at the Jacobin club on the 22nd, and begged the use of their chamber, that they might deliberate on the dearness of food, and prepare a petition for the national convention. It was known that the object of this petition would be to propose the *maximum*, and the demand was refused. The galleries then treated the Jacobins as they had formerly treated the assembly; "*Down with the monopolists, down with the rich,*" was the general cry. The president was obliged to put on his hat to appease the tumult, and this failure of respect was explained by supposing there were disguised aristocrats in the chamber. Robespierre and Dubois de Crancé again inveighed against this tax, and recommended the people to remain tranquil, and not to give a pretext to their adversaries to calumniate them, and furnish them with an occasion for passing murderous enactments.

Marat, who always pretended that he was capable of devising the most prompt and simple means of relief, declared in his journal, on the morning of the 25th, that monopolies would never cease till more effective measures were resorted to than those which had been hitherto suggested. Inveighing against *monopolizers, venders of articles of luxury, pettifoggers, lawyers, and ex-nobles*, whom the faithless representatives of the nation, he said, encouraged in crime, by allowing them to pursue their iniquities with impunity, he added, "In

every country where the rights of the people are any thing more than empty titles pompously inscribed on paper,-the pillage of a few magazines, and the hanging up of a few monopolizers at their gates, would soon put an end to those calamities which reduce five millions of men to despair, and cause thousands to perish with hunger! The deputies of the people do nothing but babble about these evils,—they propose no remedy *."

It was on the morning of the 25th that this insensate madman wrote these words; and whether it was that they really wrought upon the irritated minds of the people, or that their sufferings had driven them to a pitch of frenzy, which it was no longer possible to contain within bounds, a multitude of women assembled before the shops of some grocers. They first complained of the prices of provisions, and demanded tumultuously their reduction; the commune was not informed of this assemblage; the commandant Santerre was at Versailles, on military business, and no order was given to call in the aid of the soldiers. Thus the rioters met with no obstacles, and from menaces proceeded to acts of violence and pillage. The first mobs collected in the streets of La Vieille-Monnaie, Cinque Diamans, and the Lombards; they required the reduction of all articles to half price, soap to sixteen sous, refined sugar to twenty-five, moist sugar to fifteen, and candles to thirteen. A great quantity of provisions were forcibly carried off on these terms, and the prices paid down to the grocers. But the rabble soon got tired of paying, and seized upon whatever they felt inclined to take, without giving in exchange any part of their value. The military who had gathered hastily together to one point were checked, and the cry of "Down with the bayonets" arose from all sides. The assembly, the commune, and the Jacobins were sitting. The convention received a report on the subject of the prevailing distresses; the minister of the interior proved that provisions were abundant in Paris, and that the grievances complained of proceeded from the disproportion between the value of the assignats, and that of all articles of exchange. The assembly, to parry off the difficulty of the moment, again granted funds to the commune, to enable them to supply the people with provisions at a reduced rate. The commune, displaying equal zeal, took care to propagate the news of these resolutions, and to arrange measures for preserving the public peace. On the report of every new measure of relief already taken, the galleries cried out, *So much the better;* but as new propositions were made which appeared not immediately remedial, *Down with it*, rose from all quarters. Chaumette and Hébert, having proposed beating the drums to summon the military to arms, were hooted down. Nevertheless, it was decreed that strong patrolcs, preceded by two municipal officers, should be despatched to establish order, and that twenty-seven of the latter should be commissioned to make the proclamations in the sections.

The disorder spread farther and further; open pillage was carried on in several streets, and the mob proposed quitting the grocers to plunder other shopkeepers. Meantime, all parties mutually reproached each other with these disorders. "When you had a king," exclaimed, in the streets, the partisans of the abolished regime, "you were not obliged to pay so dear for provisions, neither were you exposed to be pillaged." "See," said the partisans of the Girondists, "the consequence of the system of violence, and of the impunity of revolutionary excesses."

The Mountain party were at their wit's end, and maintained that disguised aristocrats, Lafayettists, Rolandists, and Brissotines, stimulated the people to commit these outrages. They declared that they had observed among the mob women of high rank, persons wearing hair-powder, servants of people of high rank who distributed assignats among the people to draw them into the shops. Finally, after the lapse of many hours, a sufficient military force was collected; Santerre returned from Versailles, and the necessary orders were given. The battalion of Brest, who were quartered at Paris, displayed much zeal and courage, and succeeded in dispersing the mob.

In the evening, an animated discussion took place at the Jacobin club. The disorders of the morning were loudly deplored, in spite of the cries of the galleries, and in spite of their contradiction. Collot d'Herbois, Thuriot, and Robespierre, were unanimous in recommending tranquillity to the people, and throwing the blame of their excesses upon the aristocrats and the Girondists. Robespierre made a long harangue on this subject, and maintained that the people *could do no wrong*, that they could never be to blame, and that unless they were misled, they would never commit any errors. He declared that, in the groups of the plunderers, some complained of the death of the king, that the right side of the assembly was applauded in his own hearing, and that, consequently, no doubt could exist as to who were authors of the outrages of the day. Marat himself advised the preservation of good order, condemned the pillage which he had recommended that very morning in his journal, and charged it all upon the Girondists and royalists.

On the next day, the usual and useless complaints were taken up in the assembly. Barrère inveighed vehemently against the crimes of the preceding day. He remarked on the dilatoriness exhibited by the several authorities in repressing these disorders. In point of fact, the pillage commenced at ten in the morning, and at five in the evening the military had not been called out. Barrère demanded that the mayor and the commandant should be summoned to explain the cause of this delay. A deputation of the section of Bon-Conseil supported this demand. Salles then moved for a decree of accusation against the instigator to these excesses, in fact against Marat, and read the article which had been inserted in his journal of the preceding evening. Accusations of this description had been frequently called for, and more particularly against Marat; the present occasion was very suitable for a prosecution, for it was impossible that riot could follow the exciting cause quicker than these did. Marat, in the coolest manner possible, maintained in the tribune, "that it was only natural for the people to do themselves justice against the monopolists, and that *those who moved for an accusation against him ought to be sent to the house of correction.*" Buzot called for the order of the day on the proposition of instituting a judi-

* *Journal of the Republic*, 25th of February, 1793.

cial process against *Monsieur* Marat. "The law," said he, "is explicit, but *Monsieur* Marat may explain away his expressions; a jury will not know what verdict to return, and we must not prepare a triumph for *Monsieur* Marat in the presence of justice itself." One member demanded that the convention should proclaim to the republic, that yesterday morning Marat recommended pillage to the people, and that yesterday evening the pillage took place. Many motions succeeded; and it was finally determined that all the authors of public disorders should be given up to the ordinary tribunals. "Well, then," exclaimed Marat, "pass an act of accusation against me alone, that you may prove that the convention is lost to all sense of shame." These expressions occasioned much tumult, and the assembly immediately handed over Marat, and all the other authors of the excesses committed during the day of the 25th, to the constituted tribunals. The proposition of Barrère was adopted; Santerre and Pache were summoned to the bar of the assembly; new depositions were taken against the supposed agents of foreign powers, and the emigration. At this juncture the belief of the existence of foreign influence was universal; domiciliary visits were again established in all parts of France, to arrest all emigrants and suspected travellers. Passports were renewed; and all tavern-keepers and those who let lodgings were obliged to declare what foreigners lodged at their houses; finally, a new census of the population was ordered.

Marat being now about to be subject to a legal accusation, inserted the following paragraph in his journal.

"Indignant at beholding the enemies of the commonwealth eternally intriguing against the people; disgusted by observing monopolists of every description leaguing together to drive the people to despair by privation and hunger; distressed by perceiving that the measures taken by the convention to put a stop to these conspiracies do not attain their objects; and pained by the complaints of those unfortunate sufferers who come to beg bread of me every morning, I took up my pen to explain the most effectual means of putting an end to the machinations of the enemies of the public, and to the sufferings of the people. The most simple ideas always present themselves most readily to a well-constituted mind, which aims at the promotion of the general welfare without any selfish interests; why then, I asked myself, do we not turn against the public robbers the same means which they have recourse to to ruin the people and destroy liberty? In reply, I remarked, that in a country where the rights of the people are any thing more than empty titles, pompously inscribed on paper, the pillage of a few magazines, and the hanging up of all monopolists at their gates, would soon put an end to their delinquencies! What was the consequence? The leaders of the state faction seized greedily upon this expression; they sent emissaries among the women assembled before the shops of the grocers, to stimulate them to carry off soap, candles, and sugar at their prime cost, whilst these emissaries themselves pillaged the goods of the poor patriot grocers; these wretches kept a profound silence during the whole day, and met together at night at the house of that counter-revolutionary caitiff Valazè, to concert falsehoods; and the next day appeared in the tribune to denounce me as the instigator of those excesses which entirely originated with themselves."

The exasperation of party spirit daily increased; menaces were openly exchanged; many deputies never stirred out without being armed; and it was declared, with as much boldness as in the months of July and August of the preceding year, that an insurrection was necessary to save the country, and to cut off the *gangrened* part of the national representation. The Girondists were accustomed to meet in great numbers at the house of Valazè every evening; but were very undecided as to the part they should take. Some apprehended, but others did not, the approaching perils. A few, and among others, Salles and Louvet, supposed the existence of mere imaginary conspiracies, and by calling the attention of their colleagues to these chimeras, diverted them from the consideration of the real dangers with which they were threatened. Wandering from scheme to scheme, and stationed in the heart of Paris, without any military force at their command, and relying only upon the favourable, it is true, but inert opinion of the provinces, they were exposed daily to the risk of being struck down by a sudden blow from their adversaries. They had not succeeded in organizing a departimental force; the troops of the federalists, who had voluntarily arrived at Paris since the meeting of the convention, were only partially gained over; some had joined the armies; and they could only reckon, at most, on the support of about four hundred soldiers of Brest, whose firmness had put down the riots of the 25th. In lieu of the departimental guard, they had essayed in vain to transfer the command of the public force from the commune to the minister of the interior. The Mountain party, rendered furious by this idea, had intimidated the majority, and prevented the convention from voting such a measure. At this very time they could not rely upon more than eighty members who were inaccessible to fear, and undaunted in their deliberations. In this state of things, only one resource remained to the Girondists, which was as impracticable as all the others which they had resorted to; it was to dissolve the convention: but here again the fury of the Mountain party had prevented them from obtaining a majority. In these uncertainties, which proceeded, not so much from weakness, as from want of effect, the Girondists trusted in the constitution. In their exigency they flew to hope, and flattered themselves that the restraint of the laws would keep down the passions of the multitude, and put an end to all these stormy contests. Theorists, in particular, always cherish this idea. Condorcet had read his report in the name of the committee, which excited much indignation. Roth himself, Pétion, and Sièyes, were loaded with the imprecations of the Jacobins; and their republic was termed a complete aristocracy, only calculated to advance to power a few talented, proud, and despotic men. The Mountain party were desirous of desisting from their labours, and many members of the convention perceiving already that their task would be, rather to defend the revolution than form a constitution, openly maintained that the constitution should be deferred till the following year, and that, at the present

moment, the assembly should give their undivided attention to the cares of government and fighting. Thus the long reign of this stormy assembly began now to be more clearly developed. It had already ceased to regard the brevity of its legislative mission, and the Girondists saw their last hope of fettering faction by the restrictions of the law expire.

Their adversaries, however, were not less embarrassed than themselves. They had, it is true, all the violent passions of the rabble in their favour, they had the Jacobins, the commune, and the majority of the sections; but they had no hold on the ministers, and they feared the departments, where the two opinions which divided the nation conflicted with extreme fury, and where the superior strength of their opponents was evident; they were apprehensive, besides, of foreign powers, and although, in all revolutions, victory is sure to declare for the most violent party, being ignorant of this, they derived no assurance from the reflection. Their schemes were quite as vague as those of their adversaries. To attack the national representation was a difficult and audacious enterprise, and their minds were not yet habituated to this idea. There were some thirty agitators, it is true, who dared everything, and proposed everything in the sections; but these designs were disapproved of by the Jacobins, the commune, and the Mountain party, who being daily accused of conspiracies, and daily obliged to justify themselves from these accusations, felt that propositions of this description would criminate them in the eyes of the assembly and of the departments.—Danton, who had kept free from the embroilments of private quarrels, was only solicitous for two things; to shield himself from all prosecution for his revolutionary acts, and to prevent the revolution from retrograding, or falling under the attacks of the enemy. Marat, so sanguinary and heartless in the means by which he attained his objects, Marat himself hesitated; and Robespierre, notwithstanding his hatred against the Girondists, Brissot, Roland, Guadet, and Vergniaud, dared not think of attacking the national representation; not knowing what measure to resort to, he became discouraged, doubted whether the revolution would stand its ground, and told Garat that he was jaded with it, and sick at heart, and that he believed it would involve the destruction of every one of the defenders of the republic*.

While at Marseilles, Lyons, and Bordeaux, the two parties were violently contending with each other, the proposition of getting rid of the *appealers*, and excluding them from the convention, proceeded from the Jacobins of the former city, who were in contention with the Girondists. This proposition, being received by the Jacobins of Paris, was discussed in their club. Desfieux maintained that this requisition was supported by a sufficient number of corresponding societies, so as to be considered a petition, and to be presented to the assembly. Robespierre, fearing that the dissolution of the convention might thus be brought about, and that, in the subsequent elections, the Mountain party might be beaten, opposed it strongly, and succeeded in causing the rejection of the proposition by the usual arguments applied against all proposals to effect a dissolution.

Our military reverses hurried on the course of events. We left Dumouriez encamped on the banks of the Bielboa, and preparing to undertake a hazardous but barely practicable passage across to Holland. Whilst he was making the necessary preparations for this expedition, two hundred and sixty thousand men were marching from the upper Rhine into the Dutch territory. Fifty-six thousand Prussians, twenty-four thousand Austrians, and twenty-five thousand Hessians, Saxons, and Bavarians, menaced the Rhine from Bâle, as far as Mayence and Coblentz. From this point to the Meuse, thirty thousand men occupied Luxembourg. Sixty thousand Austrians, and ten thousand Prussians, marched towards the French stations on the Meuse, to prevent the sieges of Maestricht and Venloo. Finally, forty thousand English, Hanoverians, and Dutch, advanced from the extremity of Holland upon our line of operations. The design of the enemy was to bring us back from Holland upon the Scheldt, to make us again cross the Meuse, and finally to halt on the banks of this river till the fortress of Mayence should be retaken. His intention was to advance gradually and equally upon every point at once, but not to push forward vigorously upon any one point, and thus to preserve his flanks. This timid and methodical plan would have permitted us to carry on an offensive enterprise against Holland much farther, and with much more activity, if unfortunate errors or accidents, and too much precipitation in taking alarm, had not obliged us to renounce it altogether. The Prince of Cobourg, who had distinguished himself in a late campaign against the Turks, commanded the Austrians who advanced upon the Meuse. Great disorder prevailed among our stations, scattered as they were between Maestricht, Aix-la-Chapelle, Liége, and Tongres. In the beginning of March, the Prince of Cobourg crossed the Röer, and proceeded, by Duren and Aldenhoven, upon Aix-la-Chapelle. Our troops, being suddenly attacked, retreated in disorder towards that town, abandoning even the gates to the enemy. Miaczinsky held out for some time, but after a destructive conflict in the streets of the city, he was forced to yield and retire in disorder towards Liége. At this time, Stengel and Neuilly, separated from the main body by this movement, were driven back to Limbourg; Miranda, who, carrying on the siege of Maestricht, might have been cut off also from the main body of the army, retired to Liége, abandoned the left bank of the river, and retreated upon Tongres. The Imperialists immediately entered Maestricht, and the Archduke Charles, pushing on a vigorous pursuit beyond the Meuse, reached Tongres, and there obtained some advantage. In the next place, Valence, Dampierre, and Miaczinsky, who had fallen in with each other at Liége, determined to join Miranda with all possible despatch, and, for this purpose, marched upon Saint Tron, where Miranda met them. This retreat was so precipitate, that some ammunition was lost; nevertheless, after encountering great hazards, the greatest part of the army effected a junction at Saint Tron. Lamarlière and Champmorin, posted at Haremonde, had time also to reach the same point by Dietz; and Stengel and

* See note 52 in the Appendix.

Neuilly, altogether separated from the army, and thrown back towards Limbourg, were joined at Namur by the division of General D'Harville. Finally, being collected together at Tirlemont, the French troops resumed somewhat of their courage and assurance, and awaited the arrival of Dumouriez with impatience.

Scarcely was this general informed of this first defeat, when he ordered Miranda to assemble his entire force at Maestricht, and to continue the siege with seventy thousand men. He was persuaded that the Austrians would not dare to give battle, and that the invasion of Holland would quickly bring round the allies upon his rear. This opinion was well formed, and founded on the correct experience, that in all reciprocal hostilities, that party is sure to come off victorious who can tire the other out. The timid plan of the imperialists, who were not desirous of pushing upon any given point, gave increased weight to this argument; but the inactivity of the generals, their disorders after the first repulse, their inability to rally their troops in the presence of the enemy, and the want of some man of superior authority and influence, rendered the execution of this order of Dumouriez impracticable. Several letters were sent to Dumouriez, to recal him from Holland. The terror became general; more than ten thousand deserters had already abandoned the army, and spread through the interior. The commissaries of the convention hastened to Paris, and caused an order to be sent to Dumouriez, to give the command of the expedition into Holland to another, and to return himself immediately to the grand army on the Meuse.

Dumouriez received this order on the 8th of March, and left his camp on the 9th, after having experienced the vexation of seeing his plans defeated. He returned more than ever disposed to criticise severely the revolutionary system which had been introduced into Belgium, and to charge the Jacobins with the bad success of all his plans for the campaign. Indeed, he really found much to complain of and to censure. The agents of the executive council in Belgium had exercised a despotic and vexatious authority. They had everywhere thrown the populace into a state of insurrection, and had frequently resorted to violence in those assemblies where the union of Belgium to France had been decided. They had seized on all the silver found in the churches, sequestrated the revenues of the clergy, confiscated the property of the nobles, and excited the most lively indignation among all classes of the community. An insurrection against the French began already to make head in the neighbourhood of Gramont.

All these events were more than sufficient to dispose Dumouriez to treat the commissaries of the assembly with asperity. He commenced by arresting two, and sending them under an escort to Paris; addressed the rest with the greatest haughtiness, made them confine themselves to the performance of their functions, and prohibited their interference in any military affairs, which had not immediate reference to the commissariat department; he dismissed General Moreton, who had made common cause with these emissaries; he closed their clubs, made them restore to the Belgians a part of their church ornaments, and to these measures he added a proclamation, disavowing, in the name of France, the vexations which had been exercised against the inhabitants; he called those who had been guilty of these acts of tyranny *brigands*, and acted, in every particular, the part of a dictator, which, whilst it attached Belgium to his interests, and rendered the abode of the French army in that country more safe and comfortable, roused the anger of the Jacobins to the very highest pitch. He held also, about this time, an animated conversation with Campus, to whom he expressed, in a most unequivocal manner, his contempt for the government of the day; and, forgetting the fate of Lafayette, and reckoning too confidently on his military power, he assumed the lofty tone of a general capable of making the revolution retrograde if he wished, and disposed to do so, should he be driven to extremities. He communicated the same spirit to his staff: the rabble who governed Paris, and the impotent conventionalists who allowed themselves to be oppressed by this mob, were spoken of with disdain; those who were suspected of Jacobinism were harshly treated, and their society shunned; and the soldiers, happy in again seeing their general in the midst of them, in the presence of these emissaries affected to stop his horse when he rode out, and kiss his boots, calling him their father.

The news of these events excited great tumult in Paris, and provoked fresh clamours against the counter-revolutionary traitors. The deputy Choudieu took advantage of this occasion to require, as in fact he had often done, the sending out of the federalists quartered at Paris. This requisition was always made whenever any bad news arrived from the seat of war. Barbaroux wished to speak on this subject, but his presence caused so much clamour, that he found it impossible to proceed. Buzot in vain urged the firmness of the Brest soldiers during the days of pillage; Boyer Fonfrède carried a single point by a species of arrangement; viz., that the federalists of the maritime departments should be sent to reinforce the army, which was still very inefficient on the sea coasts. The remainder were allowed to continue at Paris.

On the next day, the 8th of March, the convention ordered all officers to join their respective corps without delay. Danton wished to give the Parisians another opportunity of saving France. "Ask them," said he, "for thirty thousand men, send them to Dumouriez, and Belgium is safe, and Holland conquered." In fact, it was not difficult to enlist thirty thousand men at Paris; they afforded a timely relief to the army of the North, and gave additional importance to the capital. Danton further proposed sending commissaries of the convention to the departments and sections, to accelerate the recruiting service by every possible means. All these propositions were adopted. The sections were ordered to assemble together in the evening; commissaries were nominated to attend them; the theatres were closed, more fully to engage the attention of the public; and the black flag was hoisted at the Hotel de Ville, as a signal of distress.

In the evening this meeting took place; the commissaries were received most cordially in the sections. Every body's head was turned; and the proposition of running to arms in defence of the

nation was everywhere welcomed. But on this occasion, as it had before happened on the 2nd and 3rd of September, the people demanded the punishment of all traitors before they quitted the capital. Ever since that time, a set phrase had been adopted. "*They would not*," they said, "*leave behind them conspirators ready to slaughter the families of the absent.*" It was necessary, then, to avoid new popular massacres, to organise legal and terrible executions, which without formal delays, and without appeal, should reach all those counter-revolutionists and concealed conspirators, who now threatened the revolution from within, in the same manner as it was menaced from without. It was necessary to suspend the sword over the head of those generals, ministers, and faithless deputies, who compromised the public safety. Further, it was not deemed just that those rich egotists who were averse to the system of equality, who were indifferent whether they served the convention or Brunswick, and who consequently did not present themselves to assist in filling the battalions of the army, it was not right that they should remain aliens to the public cause, and do nothing in its behalf. Consequently it was proposed that all who possessed a revenue of more than fifteen hundred francs, should be obliged to pay a tax proportioned to their income, to recompense those who generously devoted themselves to their country, and to defray their expenses during the campaign. These two propositions, for a new tribunal to try the enemies of the republic, and for a contribution from the rich in favour of the poor, were almost universally insisted on in all the sections. Many repeated these demands to the commune; the Jacobins echoed the same request, and, on the following day, the convention were confronted with the irresistible force of these combined associations.

In fact, upon the following day, 9th of March, all the deputies of the Mountain were present. The galleries were filled by Jacobins. They had driven away all the women, *because*, said they, *they were going upon a warlike expedition*. Many carried pistols with them. The deputy, Gamon, attempted to complain of this, but he was not listened to. The Mountain party and the galleries, determined to carry their point, intimidated the majority. The mayor, arriving with the council of the commune, confirmed the report of the commissaries of the convention as to the attachment of the sections, but yet repeated their hankering for an extraordinary tribunal, and a tax upon wealth. Many sections followed the commune, and required the tribunal and the tax; some required that a law should be passed against monopolists, and called for the establishment of the *maximum* of the price of provisions, and the abrogation of the decree which placed merchandize upon the same footing in exchange with metallic currency, and allowed it to circulate at a different rate than a paper currency. After it was insisted that these proposed measures should be put to the question, an immediate decision by vote was required as to the principle involved in the establishment of an extraordinary tribunal. A few deputies opposed it. Lanjuinais rose, and requested that, at least, if they sanction the iniquity of a tribunal without appeal, such a calamitous institution ought not to extend its dominion further than the department of Paris. Guadet and Valazé made several vain efforts to support Lanjuinais, but were savagely interrupted by the vociferations of the Mountain. Some deputies even required that the tribunal should assume the style of *Revolutionary*. But the convention, without permitting further discussion, "decreed the establishment of an *extraordinary criminal* tribunal; to try without appeal, and without recourse to the court of cassation, all conspirators and counter-revolutionists; and commissioned the committee of legislation to present to them, on the next day, a plan of organization."

Immediately after this decree, a second was passed, striking a blow at wealth by way of an extraordinary war tax; a third followed, appointing forty-one commissions, each consisting of two deputies, to be despatched immediately into the departments, to accelerate the recruiting service, to disarm those who refused to join the armies, to arrest all *suspected* persons, to seize all horses used for purposes of pleasure, and, in fine, to exercise the most absolute dictatorship. To these measures others were added. Exhibitions of colleges were to be given in future only to the sons of those who engaged in the war; all bachelors occupied in offices were to be replaced by fathers of families; and corporal restraint abolished. The right of making a will had been done away with some days before. All these measures were adopted on the motion of Danton, who knew perfectly well how to attach the personal interests of the community to the cause of the revolution.

The Jacobins, satisfied with their day's work, congratulated themselves on the zeal they had displayed, on the manner in which they had filled the galleries, and on the impressive spectacle which the sacred ranks of the Mountain presented. They recommended to each other to continue their attendance, and to be all present at the sitting of the next day, when the plan of the extraordinary tribunal was to be organized. Robespierre, said they, has strongly recommended it to us. Yet they were not perfectly content with what they had obtained, and one of them proposed drawing up a petition to demand the renewal of the committees and the ministry, the arrest of all public functionaries at the moment of their dismissal, and of all counter-revolutionary journalists. This petition was about to be prepared instantly; but the president observed that the society were not competent to perform a collective act, and therefore they should seek some other place where they might meet in the character of individual petitioners. They then dispersed themselves through Paris. The city was in tumult. Two hundred of the ordinary promoters of all disorders, headed by Lasouski, rushed to the house of the journalist Gorsas, armed with pistols and sabres, and broke his presses to pieces. Gorsas fled, and succeeded in getting off safe, defending himself with much courage and presence of mind. A similar scene took place at the house of the editor of the *Chronicle*, whose presses were also destroyed.

The next day, the 10th, threatened to be still more tumultuous. This was Sunday; an entertainment had been prepared at the section of the corn-market, (*Halle-aux-Blés*,) to treat the recruits who were about to set out for the army. The idleness of the people, joined to the bustle and prepa-

rations for the festival, might easily be made subservient for the worst purposes. The chamber of the convention was as full as it had been the day before. The galleries were as crowded, and the benches of the Mountain were as menacing as ever. The discussion opened on topics of ordinary interest. A letter from Dumouriez was then read. Robespierre supported the demands of the general, and required that Lanoue and Stengel, both generals of the advanced guard at the time of the last defeat, should be brought to trial. This was assented to. It was necessary that the deputies who had been nominated commissaries should set out for the provinces without delay. But their votes being essential to ensure the establishment of the extraordinary tribunal, it was resolved that this question should be decided immediately, and the commissaries sent off the next day. Cambacérès then demanded the formation of the extraordinary tribunal, and of a new ministry. Buzot sprang to the tribune, but he was interrupted by violent marks of disapprobation which drowned his voice. "These clamours," said he, "teach me what I knew before, that courage is necessary to oppose the despotism that is being prepared for us." He was again interrupted: "I will resign my life," continued he, "willingly, but I will save my memory from disgrace, by opposing the despotism of the national convention. It is proposed that you should unite in your own persons every possible authority"—"We must act, and not babble," cried a voice.—"You are right," résumed Buzot, "the supporters of monarchy also say, that we must act, and that, consequently, the government of a single despot is far better——" New clamours arose; the greatest confusion prevailed in the assembly; and it was finally agreed to adjourn the organization of the new ministry, and attend only, during the present sitting, to that of the extraordinary tribunal. The report of the committee was called for. It was not yet drawn up; their settled plan however was produced. Robert Lindet, at the same time deploring its severity, read it to the assembly. See what is here proposed, said he, in a tone of anguish: The tribunal is to be composed of nine judges, nominated by the convention, independent of all forms, obtaining a conviction by all practicable means, and divided into two sections, always permanent, to prosecute, on the demand of the convention, or at their own will, all those who, by their conduct or opinions, shall attempt to mislead the people, or those who, by the stations they formerly occupied under the abolished system, recall the recollection of the prerogatives usurped by despots.

On the perusal of this fearful bill, applauses resounded from the left, and a violent agitation was manifested on the right. "I would rather die," exclaimed Vergniaud, "than consent to the establishment of this Venetian inquisition!"—"It is necessary for the people," replied Amar; "we must either adopt this measure of safety, or be exposed to an insurrection."—"My taste for revolutionary power," said Cambon, "is sufficiently well known; but if the people have been deceived in their elections, we also may deceive ourselves in the choice of these nine judges, who would then be insupportable tyrants imposed upon us by ourselves!" "This tribunal," cried Duhem, "is too good for the counter-revolutionary wretches!" A long tumult ensued, and the time was consumed in menaces, outrages, and all manner of insults. "We will have it," cry the one side; "We will not have it," reply the other. Barrère demanded the institution of juries, and insisted upon their necessity with great force of argument. Turreau required that these juries should be chosen from Paris, and Boyer Fonfrède, from the whole republic, "as," said he, "the new tribunal will be called upon to judge crimes committed in the departments, in the armies, and everywhere." The day wore on—the night was fast approaching. The president, Gensonné, recapitulated the several propositions, and prepared to put them to the vote. The assembly, overcome by fatigue, appeared disposed to yield to violence. The members of the Plain began to retire; and the Mountain to intimidate them called loudly for the vote. "Ay," exclaimed Feraud, indignantly, "vote loudly, that all the world may know who are the men who wish to assassinate innocence under the colour of law!" This vehement appeal re-animated the right side and the centre, and, contrary to all probabilities, the majority declared—1st, that there should be juries; 2nd, that these juries should be chosen, in equal number, from all the departments; and 3d, that they should be nominated by the convention.

After the admission of these three propositions, Gensonné thought fit that an hour's rest should be granted the assembly, who were overcome with fatigue. The deputies rose to retire. "I call upon," cried Danton, "all good citizens to remain in their places." Every one resumed his seat. "What!" continued Danton, "is it at this moment, when Miranda, perhaps, is beaten, and Dumouriez, attacked in the rear, is, probably, obliged to lay down his arms, that you think of deserting your post*? We must complete the establishment of these extraordinary laws, which are destined to strike terror into our domestic foes. They must be arbitrary, because it is impossible to make them applicable to every emergency; and because, however terrible they may be, they will be preferable to popular massacres, which now, as they were in September, will be the consequence of judicial delays. Besides this tribunal, we must organize an energetic executive power, in immediate contact with yourselves, capable of bringing into activity all your resources both in men and money. To-day then we must settle the question of the extraordinary tribunal, to-morrow that of the executive power, and the day after we may despatch our commissaries into the departments. Let any one calumniate me who will; let my memory perish, but let the republic be saved."

In spite of this violent address, the respite of an hour was granted. It was about seven o'clock in the evening. The idleness of Sunday, the entertainments given during the day, and the question which had been discussed in the assembly, all contributed to augment the general agitation. Without any premeditated plot, as the Girondists supposed, the mere association of circumstances disposed the populace to sudden riot. The Jacobins were assembled at their club; Bentabole had

* At this very instant it was not known that Dumouriez had quitted Holland to fall back upon the Meuse.

moderate party by the Jacobinical and Mountain party, and during a fearful riot.

Insurrectionary riot of the night of 10th March, 1793, which threatens 1793. Mar. 10.

hurried thither to make his report of the sitting of the convention, and to complain that the patriots had not been so energetic as the day before. The council-general of the commune was likewise in session. The sections, abandoned by the peaceable citizens, were occupied only by a few furious persons who passed incendiary resolutions. In that of the *Four Nations*, eighteen of these madmen had determined that the department of the Seine ought at that moment to assume the supreme command, and that the electoral body of Paris should be immediately assembled to cut off from the national convention those faithless deputies who connived at the conspiracies of the enemies of the revolution. The same resolution was passed in the club of the Cordeliers, and a deputation from the section and the club immediately set out to communicate these resolutions to the commune. At the same moment, the rioters, according to their custom in all popular movements, ran to close the barriers.

At this very time the yells of an infuriated populace resounded through the streets; the recruits who had dined at the corn market, intoxicated with wine and madness, and armed with pistols and sabres, advanced towards the chamber of the Jacobins, shouting songs of terrific import. They arrived at the moment when Bentabole finished his report of the sitting of the convention. Having reached the door, they demanded permission to pass through the chamber; and they traversed it in the midst of applauses. One of them, addressing the club, said; "Citizens, at this moment of danger, the conquerors of the 10th of August, rise up to exterminate both foreign enemies and domestic foes."—"Yes," replied the president, Collot d'Herbois, "in spite of all intriguers, we with you will protect liberty." Desfieux then rising up, declared that Miranda was the creature of Pétion, and that he had committed treason, that Brissot had caused war to be declared with England, for the purpose of ruining France. "There is only one means of salvation left," added he, "and that is to cut off all traitors, to place all the *appealers* in arrest at their own dwellings, and to call upon the people to nominate other deputies." A man dressed in military uniform now came forward out of the crowd that was filing through the chamber, and declared that an arrest would not be enough, and that the people could not be satisfied without vengeance. "What is this inviolability," said he, "so much boasted of! I will trample it under my feet." While these words were being spoken, Dubois de Crancé spoke against these propositions; his opposition created a fearful tumult. It was proposed that they should divide themselves into two columns, the one to join their brothers the Cordeliers, and the other to present themselves to the convention by defiling before them, to state what it is they require at their hands. The club hesitated to depart, but the galleries occupied the chamber and extinguished the lights, and the whole divided into two bodies, and hastened away, the one to the convention, and the other to the Cordeliers.

At this fearful crisis, the wife of Louvet, who inhabited a house in the Rue St. Honoré, on hearing the vociferations issuing from this hall, went thither to inform herself of what was passing. She was present at the scene we have just detailed, and hastened to warn her husband and many other members of the right side who had quitted the convention, where, it was said, they were about to be assassinated. Louvet, armed as he usually was, taking advantage of the darkness of the night, ran from house to house, to give his friends intelligence of the outrages which were preparing, pointing out, at the same time, a place of meeting where they might remain concealed, and escape the daggers of the assassins. He found them assembled at the house of Pétion, quietly deliberating on some decrees which were shortly to be passed. He informed them of his alarms, but could not succeed in disturbing the stoical mind of Pétion, who looking up, and seeing the rain fall, said coldly—*There will be nothing to-night.* Nevertheless, a place of meeting was fixed upon, and one of the deputies hastened to the barracks of the battalion of Brest to get them immediately under arms. Meantime the ministers assembled at the house of Lebrun, having no force at their disposal, were at a loss in what manner to defend the convention and themselves, for they also were menaced. The assembly, struck with consternation, awaited the fearful explosion; and at every noise and every yell which reached their ears, believed the assassins were upon them. Forty members alone of the right side remained in their places, and, expecting every moment an attack to be made upon their lives, they had swords and pistols with them ready to defend themselves. They had agreed to rush upon the Mountain on the first symptom of hostility, and to slaughter as many of them as possible. The galleries and the Mountain had assumed the same attitude, and both sides awaited with stern determination a sanguinary conflict.

But the people had not yet acquired sufficient audacity to re-enact the scene of the 10th of August against the convention; this was but a preliminary movement, it was no more than a mere 20th of June. The commune dared not favour an insurrection, for which popular opinion was not ripe, and sincerely expressed their indignation against it. The mayor, at the very moment the two deputations of the Cordeliers and the section of the *Four Nations*, showed themselves, turned them away without even granting them an audience. Being attached to the Jacobins, he undoubtedly felt little regard towards the *Girondists*, and perhaps even desired their fall, but he might think an insurrection dangerous; besides, like Pétion on the 20th of June and the 10th of August, stayed by the illegality of the act, he wished rather to yield by constraint than willingly. He therefore refused to receive the two deputations, and in this Hébert and Chaumette, procurators of the commune, supported him. Orders were sent to have the barriers opened, and an address was prepared, directed to the sections and the Jacobins to reduce them to order. Santerre, in the commune, energetically inveighed against those who demanded a new insurrection; he said, that the tyrant being overthrown, this second insurrection could only be directed against the people who at present were the sole sovereign; that, if they happened to have had deputies, they should be patiently endured, as Maury and Cazales had been before; that Paris was not the kingdom of France, and was, there-

fore, bound to accept of the representatives of the departments; that as to the minister of war, if he had dismissed some of his agents, he had a right so to do, since he was responsible for their conduct; that at Paris a few deluded and incapable men, fancying they possessed ability to govern the nation, threw every thing into disorder; and that, in short, he should call out the military and reduce the rioters to order.

For his part, Beurnonville, whose mansion was inclosed, climbed over the walls of his garden, collected together as large a force as he could, put himself at the head of the battalion of Brest, and made some impression on the rioters by this warlike attitude. The section of the Four Nations, the Cordeliers, and Jacobins, returned to their respective clubs. Thus the resistance of the commune, the decided conduct of Santerre, the courage of Beurnonville and the battalion of Brest, and perhaps also the rain which fell in torrents, marred the progress of this insurrection. Moreover, the passions of the mob had not yet acquired sufficient strength against all that was noble and generous in the infant republic. Pétion, Condorcet, and Vergniaud, were still to display for some time longer their courage, genius, and seductive eloquence in the convention. All became quiet again. The mayor, being summoned to the bar of the assembly, assured them of the tranquillity of the city, and on this very night, the decree which constituted the extraordinary tribunal had peaceably been carried into execution. This tribunal was composed of a jury and five judges, of a public accuser, and two associates, all to be nominated by the convention. The juries were to be chosen before the month of May, and provisionally they might be taken alone from the department of Paris, and the four neighbouring departments. The juries were to deliver their verdict aloud.

The consequence of the event of the 10th was to awaken the indignation of the members of the right side, and to cause some embarrassment among those of the left, who were greatly compromised by these premature demonstrations. On all sides the attempted insurrection was disavowed as illegal, and considered as treasonable against the national representation; those even who did not disapprove of the idea of a new insurrection, disapproved of this as badly conducted, and recommended caution against those disturbers of the public peace, paid by the emigration and England to promote disorders. Both sides of the assembly seemed to heartily concur in this opinion; both supposed the existence of some secret influence, and reciprocally accused each other of being concerned in it as accomplices. A singular scene confirmed this prevalent opinion. The section of the fish-market (*Poissonnière*), on presenting volunteers, demanded a decree of accusation against Dumouriez, the general on whom all the hopes of France now reposed. The reading of this petition by the president of the section, called forth a general exclamation of indignation. "He is an aristocrat," cried some, "paid by the English." At the same moment the banner carried by the section attracted notice, and all were astonished on observing that its decoration was white, and that it was surmounted by a *fleur-de-lis*. This excited an universal burst of fury; the decoration and lily were torn to pieces, and a tri-coloured riband, which was thrown by a woman from the galleries, substituted in their place. Isuard then demanded a decree of accusation against the president of this section. More than a hundred voices supported this motion, and among the number, that which attracted most attention was that of Marat. "This petition," said he, "is part of a plot; it is necessary to read it throughout; the heads of Vergniaud, Guadet, Gensonné,—and others, are required; and you must perceive," added he, "what a triumph such a massacre would afford our enemies! It would be the entire destruction of the convention!" Universal applause interrupted him. He resumed, and accused one of the principal agitators, named Fournier, and demanded his arrest. This was immediately ordered; the whole affair was put into the hands of the committee of general safety; and the assembly resolved that a copy of the proceedings should be sent to Dumouriez, to convince him that they did not identify themselves with the falsehoods uttered by mere libellers.

Young Varlet, the friend and companion of Fournier, hastened to the Jacobins, to ascertain the reason of his arrest, and to propose that he should be permitted to go at large. "Fournier," said he, "is not the only one menaced; Lasouski, Desfieux, and finally myself are the same. The revolutionary tribunal, which is about to be established, will be directed against the patriots, as that of the 10th of August, and the brothers who hear me are no longer Jacobins if they do not follow me." He next became desirous of accusing Dumouriez, but at this point an extraordinary confusion took place; the president put on his hat, and said that there was a desire to destroy the Jacobins. Billaud-Varennes himself ascended the tribune, complained of these incendiary propositions, and justified Dumouriez, for whom, as he said, he had no regard, further than as at the present moment he did his duty, and had proved himself willing to defend his country vigorously; he complained of the design to dissolve the national convention by insurrectionary attempts, declared Varlet, Fournier, and Desfieux suspicious characters, and maintained the necessity of a purifying scrutiny, to deliver society from those secret enemies who sought to betray it. The opinion of Billaud-Varennes was adopted; and satisfactory news from the army, and intelligence of the acknowledgment of the republic by the Porte, restored tranquillity. Thus Marat, Billaud-Varennes, and Robespierre, who spoke also in the same spirit, were agreed in their condemnation of the rioters, and seemed all of them to concur in the notion that they were in the pay of the enemy. This is of itself an incontestable proof that no secret plot, as supposed by the Girondists, had existence. If such a conspiracy had been formed, assuredly Billaud-Varennes, Marat, and Robespierre, would have been more or less implicated in it, and would have been obliged, at least, to remain neuter, as the left side of the legislative assembly had been, after the 20th of June, and would certainly not have demanded the arrest of one of their accomplices. But in the present instance the insurrection was the effect of a popular fermentation, and being premature or badly managed, was disclaimed by the Jacobins. Besides, Marat, Robespierre, and Billaud-Varennes, although de-

siring the overthrow of the Girondists, yet were actually possessed with the apprehension of foreign intrigues, were in dread of the disorganization of the state in the face of a victorious enemy, were kept in awe by the sentiments expressed by the departments, were embarrassed by the accusations which the popular tumults daily brought upon them, and probably meditated at this time no more than possessing themselves of the ministries, domineering over all the committees, and driving the Girondists from every place in the government, without violently excluding them from the legislature. One man alone was open to suspicion, although he was the least excited of all the personal enemies of the Girondists,—this was Danton; his influence was all-powerful with the Cordeliers, the prime movers of the disturbance; he was not hostile to the members of the right side, but rather to their system of moderation, which, in his opinion, relaxed the vigour of the government; he was, above all things, urgent for the establishment of an extraordinary tribunal, and of a supreme committee, invested with an all-powerful dictatorship, because he was, above all considerations, anxious for the success of the revolution; and it is possible that he secretly instigated the rioters to the excesses of the 10th of March, to intimidate the Girondists, and overcome their resistance. It is certain, at least, that he was in no haste to disavow any connexion with the authors of the disturbance; but, on the contrary, he was observed to renew his exhortations for the organization of government in a prompt and terrible manner.

Be this as it may, it was agreed on all hands, that the aristocrats were the secret promoters of the disturbances; every one, indeed, either believed, or affected to believe this. Vergniaud, in a speech of overpowering eloquence, in which he forcibly condemned the whole conspiracy, supposed this to be the case; he was blamed by Louvet, who would rather that he had attacked the Jacobins in a more straightforward manner; but he succeeded in passing a resolution, that the first charge of the tribunal should be the prosecution of the promoters of the disturbances of the 10th of March. The minister of justice, in making his report of the events of that day, declared that he had made no discovery of any act of participation on the part of the revolutionary committee, to whom they were imputed; that he had observed nothing but the violence of the clubs, and some propositions made in a moment of enthusiasm; and that the only fact which had any appearance of premeditation was the assemblage of a few members of the club of the Cordeliers at the Corraza coffee-house. These members of the Cordeliers were Lasouski, Fournier, Gusman, Desfieux, and Varlet, the ordinary agitators of the sections. They were accustomed to meet together after their sittings, to discuss political subjects. No one attached any importance to this discovery; and indeed the assembling of a few subordinate individuals at the Corraza coffee-house being all that was brought to light, it cast a ridicule upon the supposition of deep-laid plots.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SEQUEL OF OUR MILITARY REVERSES; OUR DEFEAT AT NEERWINDEN—THE COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS BY DUMOURIEZ WITH THE ENEMY—HIS SCHEME OF A COUNTER-REVOLUTION; HE NEGOCIATES WITH THE ENEMY.—EVACUATION OF BELGIUM—COMMENCEMENT OF DISTURBANCES IN THE WEST; INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENTS IN LA VENDÉE—REVOLUTIONARY DECREES. SUSPECTED PERSONS DISARMED.—CONVERSATION OF DUMOURIEZ WITH THE EMISSARIES OF THE JACOBINS—HE CAUSES THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE CONVENTION TO BE ARRESTED AND HANDED OVER TO THE AUSTRIANS.—DECREES PASSED AGAINST THE BOURBONS. THE DUKE OF ORLEANS AND HIS FAMILY IMPRISONED—DUMOURIEZ, ABANDONED BY HIS ARMY IN CONSEQUENCE OF HIS TREASONABLE PRACTICES, TAKES REFUGE IN THE AUSTRIAN CAMP; REMARKS UPON THIS GENERAL—ALTERATIONS IN THE COMMAND OF THE ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND THE RHINE; BOUCHOTTE IS APPOINTED MINISTER OF WAR IN THE ROOM OF BEURNONVILLE, WHO IS DISPLACED.

We have already noticed, in the preceding chapter, the state of mutual exasperation which influenced both parties at home, and the extraordinary measures that the revolutionary government had adopted to resist the coalition of foreign powers, and to suppress the factions that threatened the nation from abroad. Such was the state of things, daily becoming more and more emergent, when Dumouriez, returning from Holland, rejoined his army at Louvaine. We have already seen him exerting his authority against the emissaries of the executive council, and repressing, by every means in his power, the jacobinism which they sought to introduce into Belgium. To all these measures he added another still more hazardous, which had a direct tendency to lead to the same results as similar conduct had done in the case of Lafayette: he wrote, on the 12th of March, a letter to the convention, in which, referring to the disorganization of the armies brought about by Pache and the Jacobins, to the decree of the 15th of December, and to the vexations exercised against the Belgians; he imputed all the evils which then prevailed, to the spirit of subversion and disorder which had spread through Paris, over France, and beyond France, into those countries which had been emancipated by our armies. This letter, full of the boldest remonstrances, which it was not the province of a general to make, reached the committee of safety at the moment when numerous accusations appeared against him, and when his friends were making continual efforts to preserve to him some measure of popularity, and to attach the defence of the republic to his services. It was kept for awhile secret, and Danton was despatched immediately to persuade him to retract it.

Dumouriez rallied his army before Louvaine, re-assembled his dispersed divisions, and threw out a corps to his right hand, to protect Campine, and to co-operate with the rear-guard of the troops which had been destined for the expedition into Holland. Immediately afterwards he resolved to resume the offensive, to restore confidence to his soldiers. The Prince of Cobourg, having occupied the banks of the Meuse from Liege to Maestricht, and having pushed on as far as Saint Tron, had stationed an advanced corps at Tirlemont. Dumouriez retook this city; and perceiving that the enemy had neglected guarding the important position of Goidsenhoven, which commands the whole space between the two streams called the Gettes, marched thither with a few battalions, and got possession of it without difficulty. On the 16th of March, the next day, the enemy attempted to recover this lost position, and commenced a vigorous attack. Dumouriez, who had expected this, maintained the post, and endeavoured to reanimate his troops by the combat. The imperialists, being repelled after having lost seven or eight hundred men, repassed the smaller Gette, and took up their station among the villages of Neerlanden, Landen, Neerwinden, Overwinden, and Racour. The French, encouraged by this advantage, posted themselves on their flank before Tirlemont, and in many villages in front of the Little Gette, which had now become the line of separation between the two armies.

Dumouriez, from that very moment, made up his mind to engage the enemy, an idea as prudent as it was bold. A campaign carried on by the rules of military tactics was little adapted to troops who were as yet very undisciplined. To impart glory to the French arms, to satisfy the convention, to attach the Belgians more firmly to France, to drive the enemy beyond the Meuse, and keep them there for a time, then to return to Holland, enter the capital of the coalition, and introduce the revolution there, were the objects of Dumouriez. To these plans he also, it was said, added another: the re-establishment of the constitution of 1791, and the overthrow of the demagogues, with the aid of the Dutch, and of his own army. But this addition is not accordant with the fact, not only with regard to the present occasion, but even when he was at Moerdyk: he aimed only at what was prudent, practicable, and proper; and this was to recover his own influence, to re-establish our military reputation, and to be enabled to return to the prosecution of his plans by gaining a battle. The reviving ardour of the troops, and his military position, both gave him a well-founded hope of success; besides, his situation made it necessary to run every hazard, and he could not therefore hesitate for a moment.

Our army extended two leagues in front of the Little Gette, at Neer-Heylissem, reaching to Leaw. Dumouriez determined, by a manœuvre, to drive the enemy between Leaw and Saint Tron. His left being supported by Leaw, as it were upon a centre, it was requisite to wheel his right by Neer-Heylissem, Recour, and Landen, and thus compel the Austrians to retreat before him to Saint Tron. For this purpose, it was necessary to cross the Little Gette, to climb the opposite steep banks, take Leaw, Orsmäel, Neerwinden, Overwinden, and Racour. These three last villages, presenting a front to our right, which was to pass through them by wheeling round, formed the principal point of attack. Dumouriez, dividing his right wing into three columns, under the command of Valence, ordered them to pass the Gette by the bridge of Neer-Heylissem: one was to outflank the enemy; the other to occupy the rising ground of Middelwinden, and from this height to cannonade and capture the village of Overwinden; and the third to attack the village of Neerwinden on its right. The centre, committed to the Duke de Chartres, and forming two columns, were ordered to cross at the bridge of d'Esemaël, pass through Laer, and attack Neerwinden in front, already threatened on its first flank by the third column. Finally, the left, commanded by Miranda, was to divide itself into two or three columns, and occupy Leaw and Orsmäel, and maintain themselves there, whilst the centre and the right marching in advance, after having gained a victory, would effect our movement of wheeling round to meet the enemy's flank, which was the main object of the battle.

These arrangements were resolved upon on the evening of the 17th of March; on the 18th, at nine o'clock in the morning, the whole army were drawn up, and were in high spirits. The Gette was crossed at all the points. Miranda occupied Leaw by Champmorin; he himself seized upon Orsmäel, and opened a cannonade upon the enemy, who retired to the heights of Halle, and there strongly entrenched himself. The object of the manœuvre was so far attained. At the centre and at the right the manœuvre was effected at the same instant; the two divisions of the army passed through Elissem, d'Esemaël, and Neer-Heylissem; and, notwithstanding a destructive fire was kept up by the enemy, courageously scaled the steep heights that bordered the Gette. The column of the extreme right passed through Racour, issued out on the plain, and instead of forming a line there, according to their orders, committed the error of falling back upon Overwinden, to seek the enemy. The second column of the right, after having met with a check in its march, sprang forward with heroic impetuosity upon the high ground of Middelwinden, and drove the imperialists from it; but instead of establishing itself there, it merely passed over it, and took possession of Overwinden. The third column entered Neerwinden, but, misunderstanding their orders, committed the error of forming a line extending beyond the village, and thus exposing themselves to be driven back by the Imperialists. Nevertheless the French army had all but attained its object; but the Prince of Cobourg, having in the first instance neglected to outflank the French at the moment of their crossing the Gette, and ascending its steep banks, now endeavoured to repair this error by giving a general order for resuming his abandoned posts. A superior force marched upon the left against Miranda. Clerfait, profiting by the mistake of the first column in not attacking him, and by that error of the second column, which had not established itself on the high ground of Middelwinden, and of the third and two other columns composing the centre being confusedly huddled together in Neerwinden, passed over the plain of Landen, retook Racour, Middelwinden, Overwinden, and Neerwinden. At this moment, the French were in a

perilous situation. Driven from all the points they had occupied, thrown back upon the very edge of precipitous steeps, outflanked on the right, cannonaded in front by a superior artillery, threatened by two corps of cavalry, and having a river at their backs, they were exposed to utter destruction, and, in point of fact, they would have been totally destroyed, if the enemy, not directing the greatest part of his force against the left, had vigorously attacked the centre and right. Dumouriez, hastening to this critical post, rallied his columns, retook the high ground of Middelwinden, and himself marched upon Neerwinden, which had been already taken twice by the French, and as often also retaken by the imperialists. Dumouriez for a third time entered it, after a terrible carnage. This unfortunate village was crammed full of men and horses, and, in the confusion of the attack, our troops were there crowded together, and completely disorganized. Dumouriez, perceiving the danger, abandoned this spot, choked with human carcasses, and drew up his columns at a small distance from the village. He surrounded this position with artillery, and prepared to defend it. At this moment two corps of cavalry broke upon him, the one from Neerwinden, and the other from Overwinden. Valence met the first at the head of the French cavalry, charged impetuously, repelled the enemy, and, covered with honourable wounds, was obliged to yield his command to the Duke of Chartres. General Thouvenot received the second corps of cavalry with calm intrepidity, and allowed them to engage the infantry, whose ranks were opened, then suddenly ordered a double discharge of grape shot and musketry, which being accompanied by a charge of bayonets, overwhelmed the imperial cavalry, and nearly annihilated them altogether. Dumouriez thus remained master of the field of battle, and established himself there, to complete, on the next day, his manœuvre of wheeling round upon the enemy's position.

This had been a bloody day, but the most difficult part of the undertaking appeared to be got over. The left wing stationed in the morning at Leaw and Orsmael, had accomplished their object, and all firing having ceased since two o'clock in the afternoon, Dumouriez concluded they had kept their ground. He considered that he had gained a victory, inasmuch as he had kept the field of battle. As night drew on, the right and centre lighted their fires, but no officer had yet arrived to inform Dumouriez, on the part of Miranda, of what had passed on his left flank. He then began to have his doubts, and soon became extremely anxious. He set out on horseback with two officers and two attendants to satisfy his mind on this point, and found the village of Laer abandoned by Dampierre, who commanded, under the Duke of Chartres, one of the two centre columns. He there learnt, that the left being completely routed, had crossed the Gette and had fled to Tirlemont; and that Dampierre, being thus left exposed to the enemy, had fallen backward upon the post he had occupied the morning before the battle. The general then, accompanied by his two officers and his two attendants, hastened, with every precaution of secrecy, towards Tirlemont, and narrowly escaped being taken by the Austrian *hulans*, arrived there about midnight, and found Miranda, who had retreated two leagues from the field of battle, and that Valence, who had been taken thither on account of his wounds, had vainly endeavoured to persuade him to re-occupy his advanced post. Miranda, who entered Orsmael in the morning, had been attacked the moment when the imperialists resumed their posts. The greatest part of the enemy's forces having assaulted his wing partly composed of the national volunteers, they were soon thrown into confusion, and fled to Tirlemont. Miranda drawn along with them, had neither time or ability to rally his troops, although Miaczinsky had come to his aid with a fresh corps; he had not even thought of giving the commander-in-chief intelligence of this event. As to Champmorin, who was posted at Leaw with the last column, he maintained his position till the evening, and had not considered it necessary to re-enter Bingen till late in the day.

The French army thus found itself separated, one part behind the Gette, and the other part in front; and if the enemy, less intimidated than he really was by so obstinate an action, had followed up his advantages, he might have cut off our line, annihilated our right wing encamped at Neerwinden, and put the left, already forced to retire, to the rout. Dumouriez, preserving his presence of mind, resolved upon a retreat, which he prepared to execute the next morning. For this purpose, he endeavoured to revive the courage of the wing under the command of Miranda, and determined to lead them forward to act as a check upon the enemy on the left of the line, whilst the centre and the right in the line of their retreat should endeavour to repass the Gette. But this part of the army, dispirited by the defeat of the preceding evening, advanced slowly and unwillingly. Luckily, Dampierre, who had crossed the Gette with one column of the centre, supported Dumouriez powerfully, and displayed much skill and courage in this dangerous emergency. Dumouriez himself, always in the midst of his battalions, encouraged them, and was now about to lead them on to the rising ground of Wommersem, which they had occupied the evening before the battle. The Austrians, having since erected batteries there, opened a murderous fire. Dumouriez placed himself at the head of these disheartened soldiers, and made them understand how much better it were to open an attack, than to be under a continual fire; that after one charge it would be much less destructive than receiving passively the continued discharge of a thundering artillery. Twice he led them on, and twice, discouraged by the recollection of their late defeat, they halted; and, whilst they manifested the most heroic constancy under the fire of the Austrians from the heights of Wommersem, they could not summon up courage to charge the enemy at the point of the bayonet. At this moment the horse of Dumouriez was shot under him; he was dismounted and thrown to the ground. The soldiers at sight of this were in dismay, and ready to fly; but he rose immediately, mounted another horse, and succeeded in retaining them on the field of battle.

Meantime, the Duke of Chartres managed to retreat with the right wing and one half of the centre. Commanding his four columns with as

much bravery as skill, he retired at the head of his four columns with great coolness and intrepidity, in the face of a formidable enemy, and crossed the three bridges of the Gette without being disordered. Dumouriez then drew back his left wing as well as Dampierre's column, and regained the post he had occupied the evening before in the face of the enemy, who were wrapt in admiration in witnessing such a masterly retreat. On the 19th, the army were again stationed as on the 17th, between Hackenhoven and Goidsenhoven, having lost in the late engagement four thousand men killed, and about ten thousand by desertion, who fled to the interior, spreading the disastrous tidings of the defeat.

Dumouriez, vexed and agitated by contending emotions, thought sometimes of fighting with the Austrians to the last extremity, and sometimes of destroying the Jacobin faction, to whom he attributed the disorganization of his army and all his reverses. In the transports of his rage, he inveighed aloud against the tyranny of Paris, and his expressions, repeated by his staff, circulated through the army. Nevertheless, although much disturbed by the violence of his passions, he did not lose that presence of mind which was necessary to conduct a retreat, and he made the finest arrangements for enabling himself to keep possession of Belgium, by the occupation of its fortified towns, if he should be incapable of maintaining himself in the field. He ordered d'Harville to throw a strong garrison into the citadel of Namur, and to keep his ground there with one division. He sent General Ruault to Antwerp, to collect the twenty thousand men who had been destined for the expedition into Holland, to guard the Scheldt, whilst effective garrisons occupied Breda and Gertruydenberg. His object was thus to form a semicircle of fortresses, taking in Namur, Mons, Tournay, Courtray, Antwerp, Breda, and Gertruydenberg; to place himself in the centre of this semicircle, and there wait for the necessary reinforcements, to enable him to resume the campaign with fresh vigour and activity. On the 22nd, he again contested a post before Louvain with the imperialists, which was as severe as that of Goidsenhoven, and cost quite as many men. In the evening, he had an interview with Colonel Mack, an officer who exercised great influence over the operations of the allied army, from the reputation he enjoyed in Germany. They agreed to come to no more decisive engagements, but to follow one another in good order, to spare the lives of their soldiers, as well as the country which might be the theatre of the war. This species of armistice, which was very favourable to the French, who would have been altogether dispersed, had they been vigorously attacked, also perfectly suited the timid system of the allied powers, who having recovered the Meuse, were not anxious to attempt any thing decisive till the capture of Mayence should have been accomplished. Such was the first negotiation of Dumouriez with the enemy. The politeness of Colonel Mack, and his engaging manners, might naturally dispose him, whilst under perturbation of mind, to have recourse to foreign assistance. He began to consider that the career he was now pursuing presented no prospect of future advantage; whether he had a few months since anticipated success, glory, and influence by commanding the French armies, or whether this expectation had made him look with an indulgent eye on the violence of the revolutionists; certain it was that as things then were, beaten, stripped of his popularity, and imputing the disorganization of his army to the Jacobin faction, he now regarded with horror those disorders which he had before contemplated with indifference. Educated in courts, and knowing by experience with what strength that machine of government should be organized, which is intended to ensure the durability of a state, he could not conceive how a rebellious set of citizens could possess the faculty so complicated as that of the art of government. Situated as he was, it was natural that this general, statesman as well as warrior, having the means in his own power, should conceive the design of employing them, to terminate those disorders which terrified his imagination and threatened his person. Dumouriez was bold enough to entertain such an idea; and having no longer any object in promoting the objects of the revolution by obtaining victories over its enemies, he meditated re-establishing the constitution of 1791, and reconciling France with Europe on these terms. According to this scheme it would be necessary to have a king, and as one man was to Dumouriez quite as good as another, therefore he gave himself little uneasiness on that subject. It was at that time imputed to him that he designed to place the house of Orleans on the throne. His affection for the Duke of Chartres, to whom he had assigned the most honourable post in his army, gave rise to this suspicion; but this affords very slight grounds of inference, for the duke merited all that he obtained, and nothing in his conduct proved him to be in concert with Dumouriez. Another consideration also weighed much in the public opinion, which was that no other choice than this would have been consistent with the idea of establishing a new dynasty. The king's son was too young, and besides, the regicide city could not become so quickly reconciled to the dethroned family. His uncles were in a state of hostility with France, and there remained, therefore, only the Orleans branch, who were as much implicated in the revolution as the Jacobins themselves, and who appeared alone capable of quieting all the fears of the revolutionists. If Dumouriez had fixed upon a choice, he could have made no other than this; and these considerations caused him to be accused of designing the elevation of the house of Orleans to the throne. He denied it to the emigration, but this interested denial proves nothing, and is no more worthy of credit than his assertion that his projects were of a very early date. He would in fact have declared, that he had long meditated the overthrow of the Jacobins, but this is false. It was not till now, that is to say, till one career of success was closed to him, that he thought of opening another. He was stimulated to this enterprise by personal resentment, and his military reverses; and finally by a sincere, though tardy indignation against those disorders, which he no longer regarded through a deceptive medium.

On the 22nd, he met Danton and Lacroix at Louvaine; they came to demand explanations of his letter of the 11th to the convention, which had hitherto been kept secret by the committee of general safety. Danton, with whom he was on terms of intimacy, hoped to appease his anger, and

attach him to the common cause. But Dumouriez treated the two emissaries, and Danton himself, with much ill temper, and allowed them to discover his alienated sentiments. He reiterated his complaints against the convention and the Jacobins, and would not retract his letter. He merely consented to write a line, saying that he would shortly explain it. Danton and Lacroix departed without being able to obtain any further concession, and left him in the most violent agitation.

On the 23rd, after an animated resistance, which lasted during the whole day, many corps abandoned their posts, and he was obliged to quit Louvaine in disorder. Fortunately the enemy perceived nothing of this movement, and therefore did not so far profit by it as to complete the confusion of our army by pursuing our retreat. Dumouriez then separated the troops of the line from the volunteers, mingled the artillery among them, composed a body of picked men, fifteen thousand strong, to form the rear-guard, and placed himself at their head. There, by shewing himself in the midst of his soldiers, and familiarizing himself with them, he contrived to conduct his retreat in an orderly manner, and to retain no despicable appearance. He caused Brussels to be evacuated, passed through that city on the 25th, and encamped on the 27th at Ath. Here he held new conferences with Colonel Mack, who behaved towards him with the greatest delicacy and respect; and this interview, which had no other object than that of regulating the details of the armistice, was soon converted into a more important negotiation. Dumouriez communicated the state of his feelings to the foreign colonel, and disclosed to him his plans for overturning the national convention. Thus, the saviour of France at the Argonne, carried away by his passions, and highly excited at the self-generated idea of a general disorganization, tarnished his glory by treating with an enemy, whose ambition should have rendered his intentions suspected, and whose power was to us extremely formidable. There is but one alternative, as we have already said, for a great man when placed in a difficult situation, such as that of Dumouriez: either to retire, and resign all influence, in order to avoid being a participator in a system he disapproves; or else to separate himself from that evil which he cannot prevent, by undertaking an employment (distinct from all political considerations) which is always honourable and glorious—the defence of his country.

Dumouriez agreed with Colonel Mack that a suspension of hostilities should take place between the two armies; that the imperialists should not advance upon Paris, whilst he marched there himself; that the evacuation of Belgium should be the condition of this concession; that Condé should be temporarily given up as a guarantee; that if Dumouriez should need the assistance of the Austrians, they should be at his disposal; that the fortified towns of France should be garrisoned by an equal number of Imperialists and French, but under the command of French generals, and that at the peace all these places should be restored. Such were the culpable conditions entered into by Dumouriez with the Prince of Cobourg, through the intervention of Colonel Mack.

Nothing more was at this time known at Paris, than the defeat of Neerwinden, and the consequent evacuation of Belgium. The intelligence of the loss of a great battle, together with a precipitate retreat, arriving with the news which had been lately received from the west, greatly agitated the capital. A plot had also been discovered at Rennes, which appeared to have been laid by the English, the Breton nobility, and the non-juring priests. Insurrections had before broken out in the west, occasioned by the dearness of provisions, and by the threat which had been thrown out of no longer supporting the expenses of religious worship; but now the avowed object of these commotions was the restoration of an absolute monarchy. The peasants, assembling in large bodies, demanding the re-establishment of the clergy and the Bourbons, had assumed a very hostile attitude in the neighbourhood of Rennes and Nantes; Orleans was in a state of complete insurrection, and its representative, Bourdon, had hardly escaped being assassinated. The insurgents already amounted to many thousands; and nothing less than armies and generals were able to put them down. Many large towns sent off their national guards for this purpose; General Labourdonnaie advanced with his division, and every thing announced the approach of a most bloody civil war. Thus, on one side, our armies had to retire before the allies, and on the other, La Vendée rose in insurrection, while a general perturbation, and that never without greater cause, pervaded the nation from one extremity to the other.

After the 10th of March, the idea of uniting the two parties which divided the capital, for the purpose of coming to some mutual understanding, had been started. Danton was the author of this proposition. Having no personal resentments to gratify, and fearing an inquiry into his own conduct, which the bitterness of party quarrels tended to provoke, he was anxious to appease those animosities which retarded the progress of the revolution. He displayed the utmost frankness in the interviews which took place at his suggestion, and if he himself accused the Girondists, it was only to avoid those reproaches of which he might otherwise have been the object. The Girondists, that is, Buzot, Guadet, Vergniaud, and Gensonné, with their accustomed delicacy, justified themselves from his accusations as if they had been serious, but in arguing it with Danton they argued with one already persuaded of their innocence. It was not the same, however, with Robespierre; in their endeavours to convince him, the dispute became animated, and they pointed out to him all his errors, as if that had been likely to appease his hatred. As for Marat, although it was deemed necessary that he should take part in these conferences, no one deigned to give him any explanation, and even his friends, who felt themselves disgraced by such a colleague, studiously abstained from addressing him. These interviews, far from reconciling, only served to exasperate the two parties, and no other effect, indeed, could be expected from a reciprocal enumeration of the faults of both sides. Such was the situation of things when the events of Belgium became known at Paris.

Mutual recriminations immediately ensued. The Jacobins were reproached as occasioning all the calamities which happened, by throwing every thing into a state of disorder, and the reproach of relaxing the vigour of the government was retorted

upon the Girondists. Explanations of the conduct of Dumouriez were loudly called for. His letter of the 12th of March was read: he was accused of treason; his conduct was compared with that of Lafayette, whose treason had been preceded by insolent letters addressed to the assembly. A second epistle, dated the 27th of March, which was even stronger than that of the 12th, rendered him still more suspected; and from all quarters, Danton was urged to explain the nature of his interviews with the general. It was generally known that these two characters entertained a mutual regard for each other; that Danton had insisted on keeping the letter of the 12th secret, and that he had set out for the army to obtain its retractation on the part of Dumouriez. It was even said that they had shared in the plunder of Belgium. Danton was called upon by the Jacobin club and the committee of general safety to explain himself. Embarrassed by the suspicions of the Girondists, and the doubts of the Mountain party, he experienced, for the first time, some difficulty in replying to these interrogatories; the great talents of Dumouriez, he said, merited much consideration; that it had been deemed necessary to see him personally before he was denounced as one disaffected to the republic, to point out his errors to him, and attach him by gentle means, if possible, to the interests of the commonwealth; that the emissaries of the assembly had hitherto seen nothing in his conduct but what was the natural effect of evil suggestions, and of the vexation occasioned by his late reverses; but that they thought, and still continued to think, that his talents might still be made serviceable to the revolution.

Robespierre replied that if this was the case, it was useless any longer to hold any terms with the general. He then renewed the motion which Louvet had before made against the Bourbons who remained in France, that is, against the members of the Orleans family; and it appeared strange that Robespierre, who had so stoutly defended them in January against the Girondists, should now attack them with so much fury; but his suspicions had suddenly suggested the existence of sinister conspiracies. "A former prince of the blood," said he, "cannot be truly resigned to his new situation; and although he may call himself *Egalité* (*equality — pantisocracy*), he cannot be sincere in his professions. All our generals belong to him. Biron, who holds the command in the Alps, is his intimate friend. Valence, general of the army of Ardennes, is the son in-law of his confidant, Sillery; his two sons occupy the highest ranks in the army of Belgium; and Dumouriez is warmly attached to them, and takes a lively interest in their promotion. It is true the Girondists attacked the family of Orleans last January, but this attack was a mere feint, to banish suspicion from themselves. Brissot, the friend of Sillery, is the chief mediator in this conspiracy. The throne will be re-established, and France ruined, if the conspirators are not immediately proscribed." Such were the conjectures of Robespierre; and what was the most frightful of all in this line of reasoning was, that Robespierre gave credit to these calumnious ideas, which sprung from the innate hatred engendered in his own heart. The Mountain, utterly astonished, repelled his proposition. "Produce your proofs," said they. "I have no proofs," replied he, "but I have a *moral conviction* of the truth of what I assert." It was immediately settled, as indeed was always done in time of danger, that a new impetus should be given to the action of the executive power and of the criminal tribunals, in order to guard both against domestic and foreign foes.

The commissaries nominated to hasten the recruiting service were now despatched without further delay; and the question, whether the convention ought not *to take a more active part in the execution of the laws, was discussed.* The mode in which the executive power was organized appeared insufficient; there were the ministers, who had no seat in the assembly, acting under the superintendence of their leaders; a committée had been established to devise means of ensuring the general safety; but all these authorities mutually controlling each other, eternally deliberating, and acting inefficiently and partially, appeared very inadequate to the accomplishment of the immense task they had to fulfil; besides, this ministry and these committees were suspected on account of their moderation; and, at the present juncture, when promptitude and vigour were indispensably necessary to attain success, dilatoriness and a middle course of action were liable to the reproach of conspiracy. A committee, therefore, uniting the functions of the diplomatic and military committees, and of the committee of general safety, which might, according to circumstances, either command or act under its superior, and either retard or supply the action of the ministerial government, was sought to be established. Many projects for the organization of this committee were presented, and handed over to a commission authorized to examine them. The means of apprehending the interior foe, that is the *aristocrats and the traitors*, were then discussed. France, said every one, is full of the nobility and the non-juring priesthood, of their old dependants and servants, and this class of retainers, as yet very numerous, entirely surrounds and betrays us, and threatens us with as much danger as the bayonets of the enemy. We must drag them forth into the light, and thus prevent them from doing us any harm. The Jacobins then proposed, and the convention decreed, that, in accordance with a custom originating in China, the names of all persons inhabiting the same house should be written on the door*. All *suspected* citizens were ordered to be disarmed, in which number were included all non-juring priests, all the nobility, the late lords of manors and seignories, dismissed public functionaries, &c. The disarming was to be executed by means of domiciliary visits, and the only alleviation to this measure was that these visits were not to take place at night. After having thus obtained the means of pursuing and apprehending, at a moment's notice, those who gave the least umbrage, the revolutionary tribunal was established, to strike them more effectually with terror, and to paralyze all their designs. This terrible instrument of suspicion was first adopted on the motion of Danton. This dreadful man, although he had anticipated its abuse, yet sacrificed everything to the attainment of his object. He was well aware that hasty condemnations always pre-suppose superficial examina-

* Decree of the 29th March.

tions; that these, especially when party spirit runs high, are eminently liable to involve innocence and guilt in the same condemnation, and that atrocious injustice must be continually committed by mere mistake. But in his eyes, the revolution was an emblem of society in its height of noon, accelerating its action in justice, government, and war. "In times of tranquillity," said he, "society would prefer that the guilty should escape rather than that the innocent be punished, because the guilty are then not so dangerous; but as the danger increases, society also becomes more implacable; and when danger becomes so imminent as to threaten destruction, suspicion is considered as proof, and all are regarded as criminal whose conduct is in any degree equivocal. Such is the character of a dictatorship; it is rapid, arbitrary, indiscriminating, but irresistible."

Thus the concentration of supreme authority in the convention, the establishment of a revolutionary tribunal, the commencement of an inquisition against the suspected, and an increased malevolence against those deputies who opposed these measures, were the results of the battle of Neerwinden, of the retreat from Belgium, of the threatening acts of Dumouriez, and of the insurrections of La Vendée.

The ill-humour of the general increased with his reverses. He had just learnt that the army of Holland had retired in disorder, and had abandoned Antwerp and the Scheldt, leaving the two French garrisons in Breda and Gertruydenberg; that d'Harville had not been able to keep the citadel of Namur, and had been obliged to fall back on Givet and Maubeuge; and finally, that Neuilly, far from being able to maintain himself at Mons, had been forced to retire towards Condé and Valenciennes, because his division, instead of taking their position on the heights of Nimy, had pillaged the stores and taken to flight. Thus by the disorders of that army, he found that his plan of forming in Belgium a semicircle of strong places from Namur to Flanders and Holland, became perfectly impracticable. In a short time he had nothing to offer as an exchange of concessions to the Imperialists, and as his resources became weaker, he daily became more dependant on the enemy. His irritation increased as he approached France, where he beheld the general disorganization of society more nearly, and heard the expressions of indignation which were vented against him. He no longer concealed his designs, and his words spoken in the presence of his staff, and repeated throughout the army, made what was passing in his mind clear to all. The sister of the Duke of Orleans, and Madame Sillery, flying from the proscriptions which menaced them, had come into Belgium, to seek protection near their brothers. They were now at Ath; and this circumstance afforded fresh cause for suspicion.

Three Jacobin envoys, Dubuisson, a Brussels refugee; Proly, a natural son of Kaunitz; and Pereyra, a Portuguese Jew, proceeded to Ath, under the pretext, were it false or true, of being entrusted with the execution of a commission from Lebrun. They visited the general in the assumed character of government spies, and had no difficulty in discovering those projects which he took no pains to conceal. They found him in company with Valence and the sons of the Duke of Orleans, were very badly received, and heard a conversation by no means complimentary to the Jacobins and the convention. On the next day, however, they returned, and obtained a private interview. Dumouriez now entirely threw off the mask. He began by declaring that he was strong enough to combat his foes both in front and in rear; that the convention was composed of two hundred *brigands* and six hundred fools; that he scorned at their decrees, and that their force would not extend beyond the precincts of Paris. "As to the revolutionary tribunal," added he, with increasing indignation, "I will overthrow it from its base; whilst I carry a sword by my side, that horrible thing shall never exist." He then broke out against the volunteers, whom he called cowards; said that he would have none others but the troops of the line, and with those he would soon put an end to the disorders of Paris.—"Do you not desire the establishment of a constitution?" asked one of the envoys.—"The new one imagined by Condorcet, is a master-piece of folly."—"But what would you substitute in its place?"—"That of 1791, bad as it is."—"But then a king would be necessary, and the name of Louis is execrated."—"It signifies little what he is called, Louis or John"—"Or Philip," replied one of the envoys.—"But how would you replace the present assembly?" Dumouriez considered for a moment, and then added, "there are local administrations all chosen by and with express confidence of the nation, and the five hundred district presidents should be the five hundred national representatives." "But before they meet, who could do the first act towards effecting this revolution?"—"The Mamelukes; that is to say, my army. They will express this wish, the district presidents will confirm it, and I shall make peace with the allies, who, if I prevent it not, will be in Paris in fifteen days."

The three envoys, who either, as Dumouriez thought, wished to sound him as to his dispositions towards the Jacobins, or were desirous of making him discover his projects still farther, suggested to him another idea. "Why not," said they, "put the Jacobins, who are a deliberating body already assembled, in the place of the convention." Expressions of indignation mingled with astonishment broke from the general in reply to this hint, and they withdrew their proposition. They then spoke of the danger to which his design would expose the Bourbons who were imprisoned in the Temple, and in whose fate he appeared to interest himself. "If the whole and the last member of the family, both at Paris and Coblentz, were to perish," replied Dumouriez, "France would not have to seek a sovereign (*un chef*), and would be saved; and for the rest, he declared that if Paris committed fresh barbarities against the unfortunate captives in the Temple, he should be there immediately with twelve thousand men, and would soon render himself master of the city. "I shall not imitate," said he, "the imbecility of Broglie, who with thirty thousand men, allowed the Bastille to be taken; but, taking up two posts, at Nogent and Pont-Sainte-Maxence, I will cause the Parisians to die with hunger. Your Jacobins may then expiate all their crimes; if they spare the unfortunate prisoners, and drive the seven hundred and forty tyrants from the assembly, they shall be pardoned."

The envoys then spoke of the dangers which threatened himself. "I shall always have time," said he, "to gallop towards the Austrians."—"You then wish to partake of the fate of Lafayette." "I shall pass over to the enemy with a very different character from his; besides, foreign powers have another opinion of my talents, and they have not to reproach me with the events of the 5th and 6th of October."

Dumouriez indeed had no reason to fear a similar fate to that of Lafayette; his talents were too great, and the firmness of his principles were in too little credit, to entitle him to an honourable captivity at Olmutz. The three envoys quitted him, saying, they would sound Paris and the Jacobins on this subject.

Dumouriez, although he believed these envoys to be pure Jacobins, had not the less boldly expressed his sentiments on that account. His designs were now evident; the troops of the line and the volunteers regarded each other with suspicion, and every thing predicated that the standard of revolt was about to be raised.

The executive council having received these alarming accounts, a decree was passed on the suggestion of the committee of general safety, summoning Dumouriez to the bar of the assembly. Four emissaries, accompanied by the minister at war, were ordered to set out for the army, to communicate this decree to the general, and to bring him to Paris. These emissaries were Bancal, Quinette, Camus, and Lamarque. To these Beurnonville was added, and the part he had to act was very difficult, on account of his intimate friendship with Dumouriez.

This commission left Paris on the 30th of March. On the same day Dumouriez removed to the camp at Bruille, whence he threatened at the same time three important places, Lille, Condé, and Valenciennes. He was very doubtful what part to take, for his army were much divided in opinion. The artillery, the troops of the line, the cavalry, and all the disciplined regiments, appeared devoted to him; but the national volunteers began to murmur, and to separate themselves from the other corps. In this situation, there was only one thing to be done; to disarm the volunteers; but this exposed him to a dubious combat, for the troops of the line might feel some repugnance to slaughtering their companions in arms; beside, among these volunteers, some had fought with great intrepidity, and appeared strongly attached to him. Hesitating to attempt this rigorous measure, he determined to seize on the three places, in the centre of which he had now taken his position. By them he was enabled to obtain live stock, and they afforded him support against that enemy he most dreaded. But the public opinion was very much divided in these three places. The popular societies, aided by the volunteers, had risen up against him, and threatened the troops of the line. At Valenciennes and Lille, the emissaries of the convention busily stirred up the zeal of the republicans, and in Condé only, the influence of the division of Neuilly gave the advantage to his partisans. Among the generals of the divisions Dampierre behaved towards him, as he himself had towards Lafayette after the 10th of August; and many others who had not yet openly avowed their sentiments, were ready to desert him.

On the 31st, six volunteers, having the words *republic or death*, inscribed with chalk upon their caps, made towards his tent, and pretended even that they designed to seize on his person. Aided by his faithful Baptiste, he repelled them, and gave them over to the vengeance of his hussars. This event caused a great sensation in the army; but several corps sent him, in the course of the day, addresses which revived his confidence, and he immediately raised the standard, and detached Miaczinsky, with several thousand men, to march upon Lille. Miaczsinsky advanced towards this place, and confided to the mulatto Saint George, who commanded a regiment of the garrison, the secret of the enterprise. This latter persuaded him to enter the city with a small escort. The unfortunate general suffered himself to be drawn into this act, and the moment he entered Lille, he was apprehended and given up to the authorities. The gates were closed, and the division remained without a commandant on the glacis of Lille. Dumouriez immediately despatched an aid de-camp to rally them. But he also was taken, and the troops dispersed. After this fruitless attempt, he tried a similar one on Valenciennes, where general Ferrand commanded, whom he believed inclined to favour him. But the officer who was ordered to surprise the place betrayed him, and joined Ferrand and the emissaries of the convention, and thus Valenciennes was also lost. Condé only now remained; being situated between France and the enemy's territory, this was his last support, and if he failed to capture it, he must necessarily submit to the Imperialists, throw himself entirely into their hands, and expose himself to the indignation of the army, by uniting them with the allied troops.

On the 1st of April, he removed his head-quarters to the low grounds of Saint Amand, for the purpose of approaching nearer to Condé. He arrested the son of Lecointre, the deputy of Versailles, and sent him as an hostage to Tournay, requesting Clerfait the Austrian to keep him prisoner in the citadel. On the evening of the 2nd, the four deputies of the convention, preceded by Beurnonville, arrived at the head-quarters of Dumouriez. The hussars of Berchiny were drawn up before his door, and he was surrounded by all his staff. Dumouriez first embraced his friend Beurnonville, then required of the deputies the object of their mission. They refused to explain themselves before the train of officers, whose appearance was rather formidable, and expressed a desire to retire to an adjoining apartment. Dumouriez consented, but his officers insisted that the door should remain open. Camus then read the decree, and enjoined him to submit thereto. He replied, that the state of his army required his presence, and that when it should be perfectly re-organized, he should see what was to be done. Camus insisted peremptorily; but Dumouriez answered that he was not such a simpleton as to go to Paris, and give himself up to the revolutionary tribunal; that the tigers wanted his head, which he had no mind to give them. The emissaries in vain assured him that nothing of this kind was meditated against him; that they would answer for his safety, that his compliance would satisfy the convention, and that he would be soon restored to the army. Du-

The emissaries of the convention arrive at Dumouriez's tent, where in executing their commission to arrest him, they themselves were made prisoners.

mouriez turned a deaf ear to their solicitations, begged them not to drive him to the adoption of an extreme measure, and advised them to make a discretionary report, by which they might declare that the general Dumouriez had appeared too necessary to his troops to permit them to separate him from them. Saying these words, he begged them to come immediately to their decision. He then passed into the other apartment with Beurnonville, where he found his staff, and awaited in the midst of them the resolution of the commissaries of the convention. The latter, with undaunted firmness, quitted the apartment immediately after, and repeated to him their summons. "Will you obey the assembly?" said Camus. "No," replied the general. "Well, then," resumed Camus, "you are suspended from your functions, your papers will be immediately seized, and your person arrested." "This is too much," exclaimed Dumouriez; "here, hussars!" The hussars rushed in. "Arrest these gentlemen," said he, in German, "but do them no injury." Beurnonville begged to share their fate. "Yes," replied Dumouriez, "and in this I consider that I render you a great service, by snatching you from the revolutionary tribunal."

He then offered them refreshments, and despatched them immediately afterwards to Tournay, to be kept as hostages by the Austrians. On the morning of the next day, he mounted his horse, and made a proclamation to the army and to France, and observed in his soldiers, and especially in the troops of the line, apparently the most favourable dispositions.

The news of these events arrived successively at Paris. His interview with Proly, Dubuisson, and Pereyra was known, and also his attempts upon Lille and Valenciennes, and finally, the arrest of the four commissaries. The convention, the municipal assemblies, and the popular associations immediately declared their sittings permanent, a price was put on the head of Dumouriez, all the relations of the officers in his army were arrested to serve as hostages, the levy of forty thousand men for the protection of the capital was ordered, and Dampierre received the command of the army of Belgium. These vigorous measures were accompanied, as usual, by reciprocal abuse. Dumouriez and the Orleans family were supposed to be united in the same conspiracy, and the Girondists were considered as accomplices. Dumouriez, it was said, was one of those military aristocrats, who belonged to the old staff establishment, whose disaffected principles were ever the topic of animadversion; Orleans was declared to be the first of the great who had feigned a love for liberty, and who now threw off the mask, after having borne it for years; the Girondists, finally, were represented as deputies who had become faithless, as all members of the right side had ever been, and who abused their functions for the destruction of liberty. Dumouriez had only done at last what Lafayette and Bouillé had done at first; Orleans had followed the steps of all the other members of the Bourbon family, and had only held out his feigned attachment to the revolution a little longer than the Count of Provence; and the Girondists, like Maury and Cazales, in the constituent, and like Pastoret in the legislative assembly, had betrayed their country by the same line of conduct, but only at different periods. Thus Dumouriez, Orleans, Brissot, Vergniaud, Gundet, and Gensonné were all considered either the traitors or accomplices in treason for the time being.

The Girondists replied by maintaining that they had always been opposed to Orleans; that it was the *Mountaineers* who had defended him; that they had always been on terms of disagreement with Dumouriez, and had not been connected with him; and that, on the contrary, those who had been sent to him in Belgium, those who had followed him in all his expeditions, those who had always shown themselves his friends, and who still endeavoured to palliate his conduct, were the *Mountaineers*. Lasource, carrying his boldness still further, was imprudent enough to point out Lacroix and Danton, and to accuse them of having damped the zeal of the convention, by disguising the conduct of the general. This reproach revived the suspicion which had been before awakened by the behaviour of Lacroix and Danton in Belgium. It was actually said that they had entered into a mutual engagement of forbearance with Dumouriez; that he had connived at their rapine, and that they had excused his defection. Danton, who required nothing of the Girondists but silence, rendered furious by this accusation, sprung to the tribune and declared mortal and implacable war against them. "There can be no longer either peace or truce between us and you," exclaimed he; then, his frightful countenance becoming still more terrific by the agitation of passion, and shaking his fist at the right side of the assembly: "I have entrenched myself," said he, "in the citadel of reason; I will sally forth from it with the cannon of truth, and shall pulverise those wretches who have dared to accuse me."

The result of these reciprocal accusations was, 1st. The nomination of a committee, to examine the conduct of the envoys sent into Belgium; 2nd. The adoption of a decree, calculated to produce fatal consequences, which decided, regardless of the inviolability of the representatives, that they might be brought to trial when any strong presumption existed of their being accomplices with the enemies of the state; and finally, the arrest of Philip of Orleans and all his family, and their confinement in the prisons of Marseilles*. Thus, this prince, the football of all parties, alternately suspected by each, and accused of conspiring with all, because he conspired with none, afforded a striking proof that no living monument of bygone grandeur could possibly exist in the face of the present revolution, and that however deep or voluntary his abasement, it was insufficient to quiet suspicion, or elude the scaffold.

Dumouriez felt that he had not a moment to lose; seeing Dampierre and many other generals of the division abandon him, several waiting only for a favourable opportunity to do the same, and, finally, a crowd of emissaries tampering with his troops, he determined immediately to put them in motion, in order to attach both officers and soldiers to him by active service, and to take them out of the reach of any influence but his own. Besides, he was critically situated, and a delay might be

* Decree of the 6th of April.

fatal. He therefore appointed an interview with the Prince of Cobourg for the morning of the 4th, that he might definitively settle with him and Colonel Mack the operations which he meditated. This interview was to take place near Condé. His scheme was to take immediate possession of this city, to expel all the disaffected from the garrison, and then, marching with all his army upon Orchies, to threaten Lille, and attempt its reduction by a display of all his forces.

On the morning of the 4th, he accordingly set out for the place of rendezvous, to proceed thence to Condé. He had only ordered an escort of a troop, fifty strong, of cavalry to attend him, and as they did not arrive sufficiently early, he started without them, leaving orders that they should immediately follow him. Thouvenot, the sons of the Duke of Orleans, a few officers, and some attendants, accompanied him. But scarcely had he reached the road to Condé, when, to his astonishment, he met two battalions of volunteers. Not having commanded their removal from quarters, he dismounted, to enter a neighbouring house, to write an order for their return; but scarcely had he put his foot to the ground, when shouts and firing commenced from the armed multitude. The battalions divided; the one body pursuing him, crying out, *Stop him!* and the other endeavouring to cut off his flight towards a ditch. He instantly galloped off with those who accompanied him, and got ahead of the volunteers, who were pursuing him as hard as they could. Being arrived at the banks of the ditch, and his horse refusing to leap it, he flung himself in, climbed the other bank, in the midst of a shower of shot, and accepting the horse of a servant, set off at full gallop towards Bury. After a rapid flight during the whole day, he arrived there in the evening, and was joined by Colonel Mack, who had been informed of what had passed. He sat up writing the whole night, agreed to all the conditions of Colonel Mack and the Prince of Cobourg respecting their alliance, and astonished them by proposing to return to his army after what had happened.

In fact, that very morning, he remounted his horse, and, accompanied by some imperial cavalry, re-entered Maulde, and was again in the midst of his army. Some of the troops of the line immediately surrounded him, and gave him the most lively demonstrations of attachment; yet many faces looked very grave. The news of his flight to Bury into the arms of the enemy, and the sight of the imperial dragoons, produced impressions unfortunate for him, but honourable to our soldiers, and favourable for the fortune of France. He was informed that the artillery, on the news of his having gone over to the Austrians, had quitted the camp, and the retreat of this influential portion of the army had discouraged the rest. Entire divisions had fled to Valenciennes, and rallied round the standard of Dampierre. He was, therefore, obliged to abandon his army, and return to the imperialists. He was followed by a numerous staff, in which were the sons of the Duke of Orleans, and Thouvenot, and by the whole regiment of the hussars of Berchiny, the whole of which regiment insisted on accompanying him.

The Prince of Cobourg and Colonel Mack, with whom he had by this time contracted a friendship, treated him with the greatest consideration, and wished to renew their projects with him, by making him the chief of a new emigration of a very different character from that of Coblentz. But, after two days' reflection, he told the Austrian prince that it was with French soldiers, accepting of the imperialists only as auxiliaries, that he had designed to execute his projects against Paris; but that, as a Frenchman, he could not consent to put himself at the head of foreigners; and he demanded passports to retire into Switzerland. These were given him; and the great notion that was entertained of his talents, and the light estimation in which his political principles were held, procured for him that consideration which the virtues of Lafayette, who now reaped the reward of his patriotism in the dungeons of Olmutz, could not obtain. Thus ended the career of this extraordinary man, who had displayed every kind of talent; that of a diplomatist, a statesman, and a warrior; and civil as well as military courage, braving equally the storms of faction and the perils of war, defending himself in the most desperate situations, and undertaking the most hazardous enterprizes; but without principle, possessing no moral elevation, exercising no influence but that of genius, which, in the rapid succession of events, talents, and renowned characters which this epoch produced, soon lost its power, and ceased to attract or to astonish. Such was the character who had entered into a contest with the revolution, and who proved, by a striking example, that no individual, however powerful, can prevail against a national passion till it becomes exhausted. In going over to the enemy, Dumouriez had not for his excuse the aristocratic wilfulness of Bouillé, or the highmindedness of principle which characterized Lafayette, for he had tolerated all disorders till they thwarted his private views. By his defection, he certainly had to accuse himself of having accelerated the fall of the Girondists, and hurried on the grand revolutionary crisis: yet it should not be forgotten that this man, without being attached strongly to any one cause, preferred that of liberty from choice; it must not be forgotten that he had a tender affection for France; and that when the whole nation believed it impossible to resist foreign powers, he tried the experiment, and was himself more confident in our ability than even ourselves; that at Saint Menehould, he taught us to confront an enemy with cool courage; that at Jemappes he stimulated us by aspirations for military glory, and restored us to our rank among the greatest nations; and, lastly, it must never be forgotten, that if he did ultimately abandon us, he also had saved us. Besides, he spent his old age in melancholy retirement, far from his country*; and it is impossible to help regretting that of the life of such a man, fifty years should have passed in the intrigues of a court, thirty in exile, and only three in a manner worthy of his transcendant genius.

Dampierre received the command in chief of the army of the north, and entrenched himself in the camp of Famars, so as to guard those of our for-

* Dumouriez, after a residence in Germany, spent his latter days in England, at Turville Park, near Henley-upon-Thames, where he died, March 14, 1823, in his 85th year. He left behind him some memoirs of the troubles he had witnessed. *Trans.*

tresses which were exposed to the enemy. The strength of this position, as well as the plan itself of the campaign, as designed by the allies, according to which they had determined not to advance further till Mayence should be taken, necessarily retarded the course of the war in this quarter. Custine, who, to excuse his own errors, ceased not to blame the other generals and the ministers, was favourably heard when speaking against Beurnonville, who was regarded as an accomplice of Dumouriez, although given up by him to the Austrians; and he obtained a wide command, from the Rhine, the Vosges, and the Moselle, as far as Huningen. As the defection of Dumouriez had commenced by negotiations, the penalty of death was denounced against any general who should listen to the propositions of an enemy, without making him previously acknowledge the sovereignty of the people and the French republic. Bouchotte was then appointed minister of war, and Monge, although very popular with the Jacobins on account of his complying disposition, was displaced as incapable of fulfilling the multiplied duties of his office. It was besides determined that three envoys of the convention should remain constantly with the armies, and that one of them should be renewed every month.

CHAPTER VIII.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE "COMMITTEE OF THE PUBLIC WELFARE" — INCREASED IRRITATION OF THE DOMINANT PARTIES AT PARIS. POPULAR MEETING OF THE SOCIETY OF L'EVÊCHÉ; THE OBJECTS OF SEDITIOUS PETITIONS. —RENEWED CONTEST BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES OF THE ASSEMBLY.—THE ORATION AND IMPEACHMENT MADE BY ROBESPIERRE AGAINST THE ASSOCIATES OF DUMOURIEZ AND THE GIRONDISTS—REPLY OF VERGNIAUD.—MARAT IS IMPEACHED AND SENT BEFORE THE REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL.—PETITION FROM THE SECTIONS OF PARIS REQUIRING THE EXPULSION OF TWENTY-TWO MEMBERS OF THE CONVENTION.—THE COMMUNE SETS ITSELF IN OPPOSITION TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE ASSEMBLY.—ITS INCREASE OF POWER—MARAT IS ACQUITTED AND CARRIED IN TRIUMPH—THE STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND INCREASE OF THE REVOLUTION IN THE PROVINCES.—THE POLITICAL TENDENCIES OF THE PRINCIPAL CITIES, LYONS, MARSEILLES, BOURDEAUX, ROUEN.—PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING BRITTANY AND LA VENDÉE—DESCRIPTION OF THESE PROVINCES; THE CAUSES WHICH INDUCED AND CAUSED THE PERMANENCE OF CIVIL WAR—THE FIRST SUCCESSES OF THE VENDEANS. THEIR PRINCIPAL LEADERS.

THE defection of Dumouriez, the unfortunate state of our armies, and the imminent danger to which the revolution, nay the country itself was exposed, induced, as a matter of sheer necessity, all those violent measures which we are about to relate, and compelled the convention at last to occupy itself with the consideration of the oft renewed scheme of communicating more vigour to the action of the government, by concentrating all its power in the convention. After considering several plans, the assembly adopted that which proposed the constitution of a committee *of the Public welfare*", composed of nine members. This committee was to deliberate in secret. Its office was to superintend and subsequently of twelve, was installed the 1st of June, 1793. Under the immediate direction of Robespierre's party, it contrived to concentrate every species of power and authority within itself: in fact, it exercised dictatorial authority from the fall of the *Dantonists* to the 9th *Thermidor*.

The Committee of the General Safety operated as an Auxiliary to the Committee of the Public Welfare, in administrative details and matters of lesser importance.

After the 9th Therm dor, the Convention organized sixteen government committees, each independent of the other. The Committee of the Public Welfare, whose duties were limited to diplomatic and military operations; the Committee of the General Safety, charged with the high police; and fourteen others, among which several branches of the administration were allotted, such as the Finance Committee, the Legislative Committee, the Educational Committee, the Agricultural Committee, &c.

Besides these, at different stages of the revolution were committees of which mention has already been made, whose functions were of a temporary character, and whose power was exhausted by the performance of almost single acts, or by the organization of particular measures. Such were the Committee of Electors, who merged in the commune shortly after the destruction of the Bastile, who organized the national guard. The Insurrectional Committee, and the Central Revolutionary Committee, self-composed associations of factious anarchists, who methodized popular tumults and insurrections in aid of the dominant Jacobinical party.

The term "Committee" was also conferred either in derision or opprobrium upon meetings or associations in the nature of clubs (*note, p. 75, note*). Such was the committee which the Jacobins accused the Queen of presiding over at the Tuileries, as having for its object a correspondence with the Emperor of Austria, her brother, and termed the *Austrian Committee, &c. &c.* *Trans.*

* It may not be amiss to notice some of the names and objects of the numerous associations either of a political or administrative character termed Committees, which distinguished the revolution, and the mention of which so frequently occur. Committees of government (*comités de gouvernement*) were formed by selecting from the body of the assembly certain members who were to make inquiry and report upon the expediency of proposed laws or measures, and this general definition of a committee applies particularly to those committees charged with various branches of the administration, and possessing greater or lesser authority in respect of the objects of their appointment. After the defection of Dumouriez (April, 1793,) as related in the preceding chapter, the convention delegated the supreme administration of the affairs of the nation, whether home or foreign, to two government committees, known by the names of *The Committee of the Public Welfare*, and *the Committee of the General Safety*. The object of the Committee of the Public Welfare is stated in the text, as providing for the defence of the republic by prompt and energetic measures. It was to superintend and accelerate the motions of the executive power, and possessed a general control over all the other committees. This Committee of the Public Welfare, originally composed of nine members,

and accelerate the action of the executive power, and it might even suspend the orders of the latter if deemed contrary to the public welfare, informing the convention, at the same time, of this suspension. It was empowered further, in cases of great urgency, to take measures of exterior and interior defence, and resolutions signed by the majority of its members were to be executed immediately by the executive power. Its existence was limited to one month, and its warrant of arrest was not to be issued but against those who personally committed the act complained of *.

Barrère, Delmas, Bréard, Cambon, Jean Debry, Danton, Guithon, Morveaux, Treilhard, and Lacroix d'Eure-et-Loir †, were nominated members of this committee, which though yet somewhat limited in its power, possessed an overpowering influence. It corresponded with all the commissaries of the convention, gave them instructions, and might substitute for the measures of the ministry any others it might be pleased to imagine. By means of Cambon it possessed a control over the finances, and with Danton it acquired the audacity and influence of this powerful party chief. Thus, as the danger increased, rapid strides were made towards an absolute dictatorship.

Recovered from the terror which the desertion of Dumouriez had occasioned, each party began again to impute to each other a privity with his treasons, and the strongest necessarily obtained the mastery over the more feeble. The sections, and the popular societies, who always commenced every attack, now took the lead, and accused the Girondists in various petitions and addresses.

There had been formed, on the principles of Marat, a new association still more violent than any which had hitherto existed. Marat had said that up to this time there had been nothing but mere babble upon the subject of the sovereignty of the people, but that if the doctrine were well understood, every section would be sovereign within the limits of its district, and could, at its pleasure, revoke the powers it had given. The most turbulent of the agitators, acting upon this doctrine, pretended that they had been deputed by their sections, to ascertain how this power was used, and to consult upon measures of public safety. They assembled at L'Evêché, and declared themselves authorized to correspond with all the municipalities of the republic. They called themselves, *the central committee of public safety*, and from this association the most seditious propositions emanated; they resolved to present themselves in a body before the assembly, and demand what were their means of saving the country. They had already attracted the observation of the convention, and also drew upon themselves that of the commune and the Jacobins. Robespierre, who undoubtedly looked forward to the result of that insurrection which soon took place, but who always dreaded the use of such an engine, and who always experienced terror upon the eve of any outbreak, inveighed against the violent resolutions which were passed in these inferior debating clubs, and persisted in his favourite line of policy, which consisted in defaming those whom he denominated faithless deputies, and ruining them in the public opinion, before he employed any more decisive measures against them. Ready to accuse, he feared physical force, and preferred verbal contentions and the conflicts of the galleries to insurrections, as by them he obtained honour without running any danger. Marat, who courted the praise of moderation, complained, as others did, of the association of L'Evêché, although he had furnished them with their principles of action. Commissaries were sent to ascertain whether its members were men stimulated by an immoderate zeal for the cause of the revolution, or hired disturbers of the public peace. Being assured that they were patriots carried away by an extravagant zeal, the society, instead of excluding them, as had been proposed, merely took a list of their names, and expressed a public disapprobation of their conduct, as, according to the Jacobins, there should be no other centre of public safety than their own club. It was in precisely the same manner that the insurrection of the 10th of August had been concocted and previously condemned; and all those who were too timorous to act boldly, or sorry to see their own designs anticipated, disapproved of these first attempts, whilst they desired the result they had in view. Danton alone preserved a profound silence on this subject, and neither disavowed his connexion with, or disapproved of the proceedings of these agitators. He was not fond of seeking a triumph in the tribune by long accusations, but preferred the means of action, which in his hands possessed enormous strength, he being the most turbulent and reckless mob-leader in all Paris. Yet after all it was not positively known that he was secretly concerned in the insurrection, but his silence gave rise to suspicions.

Many sections condemned the association of L'Evêché; and that of Mail addressed an energetic petition to the convention on this subject. The section of Bonne-Nouvelle, on the contrary, read an address to the assembly, in which Brissot, Vergniaud, Guadet, and Gensonné, &c. were accused as the accomplices of Dumouriez, and in this address it was required that they should be stricken by the sword of justice. After tumultuous debates, the petitioners received the thanks of the assembly; but it was declared, that, in future, it would not hear accusations against its members, but that charges of this description should be laid before the committee of public safety.

The section of the Corn-Market, which was remarkable for its violence, prepared, under the presidency of Marat, a new petition, and sent it to the Jacobins, the sections, and the commune, to receive their approbation, that it might be finally presented by the mayor to the convention. In this petition, which was hawked about from place to place, and publicly exhibited everywhere, it was declared that part of the convention was corrupt, that some of its members were the accomplices of the monopolists and of Dumouriez, and that their places ought to be vacated, and filled by others. On the 10th of April, whilst this petition was circulating from section to section, Pétion, indignant at what was passing, demanded liberty to address

* The Committee of Public Welfare was constituted at the sitting of the 6th of April.

† To this committee were added supplementary members, Robert Lindet, Isnard, and Cambacérès.

the assembly. He expressed himself with a vehemence which was very unusual with him against the calumnies which were levelled against part of the convention, and demanded the adoption of measures of repression. Danton, on the contrary, made honourable mention of the petition which was preparing. Pétion, revolted by this commendation, required that its authors should be given up to the revolutionary tribunal. Danton replied again, that faithful representatives, strong in conscientious rectitude, had no reason to fear defamation; that in a republic, it was impossible to prevent it, and that as yet neither the Austrians had been defeated, or a constitution settled, and that consequently it was very doubtful whether the convention had merited eulogium. He insisted that the assembly should no longer give its attention to private quarrels, but that those who felt themselves aggrieved should apply to the legal tribunals. The question was then dismissed; but, being renewed again by Fonfrède, it was again put aside. Robespierre, delighting in personal discussions, reproduced it once more, and demanded permission to unmask the enemies of the state. His request was granted, and he commenced a more malignant and infamous defamation of the Girondists than he had ever before indulged in. We must take a brief notice of his speech, which exhibits the colours in which the conduct of his enemies appeared to his dark and disordered intellect*.

According to him, there existed besides the aristocracy of the great who were driven out in 1789, a civic aristocracy as haughty and despotic as the former, whose treasons had succeeded to those of the nobility. A thorough revolution did not suit this party, but they desired a king, and the constitution of 1791, to secure their own domination. The Girondists were the leaders of this aristocracy. Under the legislative assembly they had seized on the ministry by means of Roland, Clavière, and Servan; having lost these posts, they sought to avenge themselves by the events of the 20th of June; and on the eve of the 10th of August, they had treated with the court, offering to make peace on the condition of being restored to power. On the 10th, they had contented themselves with suspending the king, and shunned the abolition of royalty, and appointed a governor for the young prince; they then seized again on the ministry, and calumniated the commune, to deprive it of all influence, and to attain to an exclusive domination. On the formation of the convention they had, in like manner, obtained an ascendancy over all the committees, and continued to defame Paris, representing that city as the source and centre of all crimes, perverting the public opinion by means of their journals, and by the immense sums which Roland had devoted to the distribution of the most pernicious publications; and, finally, that, in January, they had opposed the execution of the tyrant, not from any attachment to his person, but from a love of royalty. "This faction," continued Robespierre, "is the sole cause of the disastrous war which now afflicts us. It has been their desire to expose us to the invasion of Austria, who promised a congress in conjunction with the civic constitution of 1791. This war has been conducted by the most perfidious counsels, and after having employed the traitor Lafayette, this faction has availed itself of the traitor Dumouriez, all for the purpose of accomplishing that object it has so long aimed at. This faction at first feigned to be at variance with Dumouriez, but this was a mere subterfuge; for otherwise it would not have given him the ministry by means of his friend Gensonné, and would not have allowed him six millions of francs for secret service money." That Dumouriez had conspired with this faction, to allow the Prussians to escape in the Argonne, when he might have destroyed them: in Belgium, it was true, he said, that he had gained a great victory, but a great victory was indispensable before he could obtain confidence, which, being once obtained, he had abused in every possible manner: that he had not invaded Holland, which he might have occupied from the commencement of the first campaign; that he had hindered the union of the conquered territory with France, and that the diplomatic committee, in concert with him, had neglected nothing to alienate the Belgian deputies who demanded that union. Those envoys of the executive power whom Dumouriez had so harshly treated, because they had been severe upon the Belgians, had been every one of them chosen by the Girondists, who had previously determined to send disorganizers into Belgium, against whom they might have an opportunity of inveighing, that they might thus throw disgrace upon the cause of republicanism. Dumouriez having, after many delays, attacked Holland, returned into Belgium, and lost the battle of Neerwinden; and that it was Miranda, the friend and creature of Pétion, who by his retreat had completed his defeat. Returning then into France, the general had raised the standard of revolt, at the very moment when insurrections in support of royalty took place in the west. Every thing was prepared to render these simultaneous attempts successful. A perfidious minister had been nominated to the war department for this very purpose; the committee of general safety had been composed entirely of Girondists, except seven or eight faithful deputies who never attended its consultations, and it had done nothing to ward off the dangers which threatened, whilst nothing had been neglected to insure the success of the conspiracy. As to the reinstating of a king, all the generals belonged to the Egalité family; his family had ranged themselves round Dumouriez; his sons, his daughter, and even the intriguing Sillery had fled to him for protection. This general commenced his treasons by a manifesto, and what does he say! Precisely what the writers and orators of the Girondist faction declare in their journals and speeches; that the convention is composed of wretches, with the exception of a few members; that Paris is a centre of every crime, and that the Jacobins are the subverters of society, the propagators of disorders, and the fomenters of civil war, &c.

Such was the construction which Robespierre put on the defection of Dumouriez, and the opposition of the Girondists. After having drawn out at length this artful tissue of calumnies, he proposed sending all the accomplices of Dumouriez, all the Orleans family, and all their friends, to the revolutionary tribunal. "As to the deputies Guadet,

* See note 53 in the Appendix, which presents a faithful delineation of Robespierre's character.

Gensonné, Vergniaud, &c., it would," said he, "be sacrilege to accuse such honest gentlemen; I feel my own impotence against them, and I therefore leave them to the wisdom of the assembly."

The galleries and the Mountain applauded this *virtuous* orator. The Girondists were indignant at his infamous conduct, in which a perfidious rancour of heart had as great a share as an habitual suspicion; for he had in this speech artfully connected distinct facts, to obviate all objections: indeed, Robespierre displayed more ability in this base and cowardly accusation than in his ordinary declamations. Vergniaud, oppressed with contending emotions, rushed to the tribune, and demanded the liberty of reply with so much warmth, energy, and resolution, that it was granted him, and even the galleries and the *Mountain* desisted at last from interrupting him. To the laboured charges of Robespierre he replied by an unpremeditated harangue, which glowed with all the animation and eloquence of innocence.

"I have no hesitation," said he; "nor shall I employ either time or art in replying to M. Robespierre, for I seek only to give vent to the emotions of my soul; neither shall I speak with a view chiefly to my own defence, for I know that in revolutionary times the very refuse of mankind frequently domineer over the most noble and upright; but my principal object is to enlighten France. My voice, which has frequently carried terror into the palaces of princes, and precipitated tyranny to the dust, shall also strike with consternation the consciences of those reprobate villains who desire to substitute their own despotism for that of royalty."

He then replied to every imputation of Robespierre, what every one who confined himself to a narration of the simple facts might have done. He had, he said, by his speech in July, first started the idea of the dethronement: A little before the 10th of August, doubting the success of the meditated insurrection, and not knowing whether it really would take place, he had intimated to a messenger of the court the steps which were necessary on the part of the king to reconcile himself with the nation, and to save the country. On the 10th, he had sat in the assembly amidst the roar of artillery, whilst M. Robespierre lay hid in a cellar; he had not then pronounced for the dethronement, because the pending combat was still doubtful, and he had proposed nominating a governor for the Dauphin, because, in case royalty should have survived the present struggle, a good education given to the young prince would have tended to secure the future welfare of France. He and his friends had caused the declaration of war to be made, as it had already commenced, and it was better to announce it openly and assume an attitude of defence, than to suffer it passively. He and his friends had also obtained the ministry, and been nominated to the committees by the public voice. In the commission of twenty-one in the legislative assembly, they had opposed the idea of their quitting of Paris, and had prepared those means of defence which had been so successfully employed in the forest of the Argonne. In the committee of general safety of the convention, they had been unremittingly assiduous in their labours, and in the face of their colleagues, who might have afforded them assistance. As for Robespierre, he had altogether deserted the committee, and had never made his appearance there. They had not calumniated Paris, but had fought against those assassins who usurped the name of Parisians, and dishonoured Paris as well as the republic; they had not perverted public opinion; that, for his own part, he had never written a single letter, and those which Roland had published were well known to every one. He and his friends had proposed an appeal to the people in the proceedings against Louis XVI., because they believed that in a question so important, the national consent could not be dispensed with. As for himself, he scarcely knew Dumouriez, and had never seen him but twice: on his first return from the Argonne, and on his second return from Belgium; but that Danton and Santerre visited, congratulated, and caressed him with the most prodigal demonstrations of attachment, and invited him to dine at their houses every day. As to Egalité, he was equally unacquainted with him: the *Mountaineers* alone were his friends; and whenever the Girondists attacked him, the *Mountaineers* as constantly took up his defence. What, therefore, could be brought against him and his friends? Were they intriguers and conspirators? How happened it, then, that they did not frequent the sections, and throw them into agitation by inflammatory discourses? that they did not fill the galleries with their partisans, to carry their decrees by terror? that they had never wished to apprehend the ministers in those assemblies of which they were members?—or were they moderates? They were not so on the 10th of August, when Robespierre and Marat hid themselves; but they were so in September, when the prisoners were assassinated and the 'Garde-Meuble' pillaged!

"You know," said Vergniaud in conclusion, "that I have borne with silence the bitter calumnies of which I have been the object for the last six months; that I have sacrificed the most just resentments upon the altar of my country; that I have, though exposed to the reproach of cowardice, though by my forbearance I might be thought tacitly to acknowledge myself guilty, though I thus denied myself the performance of some of those small services I am still permitted to render to the nation, you know that I have avoided bringing all the flagitious falsehoods of Robespierre into the broad light of truth. May this day be the last which we throw away in such scandalous and disgraceful debates!" Vergniaud then demanded that the section of the Corn-market should be summoned, and compelled to produce its registers.

The eloquence of Vergniaud captivated even his enemies; his candour, and his touching persuasiveness, interested and won the great majority of the assembly, and from all sides he received the most animated applause. Guadet now came forward, and the Mountain, who had hitherto maintained silence, roused into rage by his appearance in the tribune, uttered yells of fury. The sitting was adjourned; and it was not until the 12th that Guadet obtained permission to reply to Robespierre, which he did in a manner calculated to excite more powerfully the passions of the assembly than did even the speech of Vergniaud. He acquitted all parties of conspiracy, but appear-

ances, he said, were much stronger against the Mountain, and the Jacobins, who had been intimately connected with Dumouriez and Egalité, than against the Girondists, who had always been at variance with both. "Who was it," exclaimed Guadet, "who attended Dumouriez to the Jacobin club and the theatres!—Your own Danton." "Ah! dost thou accuse me!" replied Danton; "thou knowest not my power!"

The conclusion of the speech of Guadet was adjourned to the following day. He insisted that no conspiracy existed; but that if there was one, the Mountain alone were implicated in it. He read, in conclusion, an address, which, like that of the Corn-market, was signed by Marat; it was from the Jacobins, and Marat had signed it as president of the society. It contained these words, which Guadet read to the assembly: "*Citizens, let us arm ourselves. The counter-revolution is in the government; it is in the heart of the convention. Citizens, let us march there,—let us march.*"

"Yes," cried Marat, from his place, "let us march!" Upon this exclamation, the assembly rose, and demanded an impeachment against Marat. Danton opposed this motion, and said, that as it appeared that both sides of the assembly were agreed to accuse the family of Orleans, that they should immediately be sent before the tribunals, and that as for Marat, he could not be justly accused for an exclamation which had escaped him in the heat of a violent debate. Danton was answered that the family of Orleans were not to be tried at Paris but at Marseilles. He again wished to reply, but he was not listened to, and a priority was given to the impeachment against Marat, and Lacroix demanded that he should be immediately arrested. "Since I have enemies," exclaimed Marat, "who are lost to all shame *, I only ask one thing: This decree is calculated to produce a commotion among the people; allow me, then, accompanied by two gendarmes, to go to the Jacobin club, that I may recommend them to be peaceable." Without regarding this ridiculous proposition, he was immediately arrested by order of the assembly, and the act of impeachment was ordered to be ready by twelve o'clock the next day.

Robespierre hastened to the Jacobins to give vent to his indignation; he applauded the energy of Danton, and the moderation of Marat, and recommended peace to the people, that it might not be said that Paris had risen in insurrection to deliver a Jacobin.

On the next day, the act of impeachment was read and approved of by the assembly, and the prosecution being once commenced against Marat, was seriously followed up by the revolutionary tribunal.

It was the form of a petition which had been drawn up against the Girondists, that had led to these violent explanations on both sides of the assembly; but no determinate decision had been come to on this subject; and, in fact, it was impossible to come to any, for the assembly was not sufficiently strong to check the movements which gave rise to these petitions. The idea of a general address from all the sections had been followed up with activity; one general form had been resolved upon, and out of forty-three sections, thirty-five adhered to it; the council-general of the commune approved of this address, and the fifteen commissaries of the thirty-five sections, having the mayor, Pache, at their head, presented themselves at the bar of the assembly. This might be called a manifesto by which the commune of Paris declared their intentions, and were determined to rise in insurrection if they were not complied with. They had pursued the same line of conduct before the 10th of August, as they did now before the 31st of May. Rousselin, the speaker and commissary of one of the sections, read this petition. After having dwelt upon the criminal conduct of a certain number of deputies, the petition demanded their expulsion from the convention, and named them one after the other. These deputies were twenty-two in number; viz., Brissot, Guadet, Vergniaud, Gensonné, Grangeneuve, Buzot, Barbaroux, Salles, Biroteau, Pontécoulant, Pétion, Lanjuinais, Valazé, Hardy, Louvet, Lehardy, Gorsas, Fauchet, Lanthénas, Lasource, Valady, and Chambon.

The galleries manifested the greatest delight on the reading of these names. The president informed the petitioners that the law obliged them to sign their petition. This they lost no time in doing; but Pache alone, wishing to protract his neutrality, remained behind. His signature was demanded; he replied that he was not of the number of the petitioners, and that he had been merely ordered by the council-general to accompany them; but, seeing that he could not retreat, he advanced and signed it. The galleries rewarded him by loud applauses.

Boyer-Fonfrède then presented himself in the tribune, and said, "that if modesty did not forbid him, he should ask to be added to the honourable list of the twenty-two deputies." The majority of the assembly, fired with the most generous indignation, cried out, "Let them include us all in their list of proscription!" The twenty-two deputies were immediately surrounded, and received the most lively testimonies of esteem and attachment; the debate, interrupted by this scene, was adjourned for a few days.

At the appointed time it recommenced; the imputations and justifications of the two sides of the assembly had again taken place. But the deputies of the centre, taking advantage of some communications which had been made on the state of the armies, proposed that the assembly should exclusively confine their attention to the general interests of the republic, and pass over private topics of dispute. This was consented to; but on the 18th, a new petition against the right side, brought forward that of the thirty-five sections. Many acts of the commune were, at the same time, complained of; by one of these it declared itself in a continual state of revolution, and by another established within itself a committee of correspondence with all the municipalities of the kingdom. The commune, in fact, had long endeavoured to give its local authority a character of generality, which would enable it to speak in the name of France, and thus rival the power of the convention. The committee of L'Evêché, which had been dissolved by the advice of the Jacobins, had also attempted to open a communication between Paris and all the other

* This appears to have been with Marat an ordinary mode of expression. *Trans.*

cities of France, and the commune now adopted this idea, by organizing this correspondence within itself. Vergniaud addressed the assembly on this subject, and attacking, at the same time, the petition of the thirty-five sections, the acts which were imputed to the commune, and the designs which its conduct made evident, demanded that the petition should be declared seditious, and that the municipality should be obliged to lay their registers before the assembly, that the resolutions into which they had entered might appear. These motions were adopted, notwithstanding the opposition of the galleries, and the left side. At this time the right side, supported by the Plain, began to carry every question. Lasource, one of their warmest partisans, had been nominated president, and they still possessed the majority, that is to say, the legal majority, which, however, is but a weak resource against force, and indeed only serves to exasperate it the more.

The municipal officers who had been summoned to the bar, boldly gave up the registers of their deliberations, and appeared to wait for the approval of their contents. These registers purported: 1st. That the council-general should declare itself in a state of revolution, till some remedy should be provided for the public scarcity. 2nd. That the committee of correspondence with the forty-four thousand municipalities should be composed of nine members, and enter immediately on its functions. 3rd. That twelve thousand copies of the petition against the twenty-two deputies should be printed and circulated by the committee of correspondence. 4th, and lastly. That the general council should regard the prosecution of one of its members, or even of a president or secretary of section or club, for his opinions, as an attack upon itself. The last resolution was framed for the protection of Marat, who was accused of having signed a seditious address in the capacity of president of a section.

Thus the commune disputed every inch of ground with the assembly, and came to a decision diametrically opposite on every contested point. Was the question of supplies under discussion—they declared themselves in a state of revolution, if their violent measures were rejected. Was Marat accused—they covered him with their ægis; was there any question concerning the twenty-two deputies, they appealed to the forty-four thousand municipalities, and opened a correspondence with them, requiring the means of opposing the convention. Their opposition was directed against every question; and what was more, associated with the preparations for an insurrection.

Scarcely was the reading of the registers finished, when the younger Robespierre demanded the honours of the sitting for the municipal officers. This motion was opposed by the right. The Plain hesitated, and observed that it might be dangerous to take from the magistrates any part of the consideration and respect with which they were regarded by the people, by refusing them a common privilege granted to every petitioner. In these tumultuous debates, the sitting was prolonged to eleven at night; the right side and the Plain retired, and one hundred and forty-three members remained solely with the Mountain to admit the municipality of Paris to the honours of the sitting. Declared in the same day scandalous libellers, repelled by the majority, and admitted to the honours of the sitting only by the faction of the Mountain and the galleries, the municipality could not be otherwise than highly irritated, and naturally became a rallying point for the party which aimed at crushing the legal authority of the convention.

Marat was at length brought before the revolutionary tribunal. It was solely the energetic feeling displayed by the right side, who carried the Plain with them, that decided the measure of his impeachment. But every energetic step, while it confers honour on a party struggling against a superior power, only hastens its destruction. The Girondists, in resolutely prosecuting Marat, were in fact preparing a triumph for him. The substance of the act of impeachment was, that Marat, having by his newspapers promoted murder and massacre, and sought to bring about the degradation and dissolution of the national convention, was impeached and brought before the revolutionary tribunal. The Jacobins, the Cordeliers, and all the restless spirits of Paris, interested themselves deeply in the fate of "*this austere philosopher, brought up,*" as they said, "*in the school of adversity and meditation; in whom were united genius, extraordinary sagacity, and a profound knowledge of human nature; who could detect traitors on their car of triumph, at the very moment when the deluded mob were offering up their incense! Traitors,*" they exclaimed, "*shall pass away, but the reputation of Marat now begins to flourish!*"

Although the revolutionary tribunal was not then composed as it afterwards was, nevertheless Marat could not be condemned there. The consultation lasted but a few seconds, and he was unanimously acquitted on the 24th of April, amidst the acclamations of a numerous concourse assembled to witness the trial. He was immediately surrounded by a throng of women, Sans-culottes armed with pikes, and detachments from the armed sections, who carried him in triumph to the convention, and placed him on his seat as deputy; two municipal officers headed the procession. Marat, crowned with a garland of oak-leaves, and raised on the shoulders of two pioneers, was brought in this triumphant manner into the middle of the chamber. One pioneer, leaving the procession, advanced to the bar. "Citizen president," said he, "we bring you the worthy Marat. Marat has always been the friend of the people, and the people will always be friends to Marat! If the head of Marat must fall, that of a pioneer must fall with it." The wretch, as he uttered these words, brandished his axe, and the galleries yelled forth savage applause. He then desired permission for the procession to file through the chamber. "I shall consult the assembly," said the president Lasource, alarmed by this terrific and revolting scene; but the multitude did not wait for him to do this, but rushing in on all sides, filled every corner. A promiscuous throng of men and women occupied the vacant seats of deputies, who had retired with disgust and dismay. Marat at last arrived, and was hugged from one to the other with the most vociferous applause, and, freed from the embraces of the petitioners, he was passed on to his colleagues with the most cordial demonstrations of joy. He immediately afterwards, withdrawing himself from the congratulations of the

Mountain, ascended the tribune, and declared to the legislators that he came to offer to them a pure heart and a spotless name, and pledged himself to die in defence of the liberties and rights of the people.

New honours awaited him at the Jacobin club. Many chaplets had been prepared for him by the women; the president offered him one of these; and a child, four years of age, mounted the table, and placed another on his head. Marat threw off these chaplets with insolent disdain. "Citizens," exclaimed he, "indignant at beholding an iniquitous faction betray the republic, I endeavoured to unmask them, *and put a rope about their necks.* They opposed me, and an impeachment was the consequence; but I have come off victorious. This faction is humiliated, but it is not yet crushed. Why waste your time, then, in decreeing triumphs! be on your guard against enthusiasm. I resign the crowns you have offered me; wait till I have finished my career, and you will then be able to determine whether I deserve them."

This display of insolent modesty was rewarded by acclamations of applause. Robespierre was present, and undoubtedly he both envied and despised the base popularity of his colleague. Nevertheless, he contributed to swell the vanity of this victor of the day. These congratulations being over, the ordinary discussions were again debated; the means of purging the government, and expelling all traitors, Rolandists, Brissotines, &c. were the questions agitated. For this purpose, it was proposed to draw up a list of all the agents of the various administrations, and to point out those deserving of dismissal. "Send this list to me," said Marat, "and I will make the selection, and notify it to the ministers." Robespierre observed that the ministers were nearly all accomplices of the traitors, that they would pay no attention to the representations of the society, and that it would be better to make application to the committee of public welfare, placed by its functions above the executive power; and, besides, the society could not, without compromising itself, communicate with ministers whose designs were so evil, and whose conduct was so equivocal. "These are frivolous arguments," replied Marat, disdainfully; "a patriot as pure as I am might *hold parley with the devil himself;* I shall address myself to the ministers, and call upon them, in the name of the society, to satisfy me as to their intentions."

The *virtuous* and *eloquent* Robespierre always commanded a respectful consideration, but the audacity and effrontery of Marat astonished and led captive the imaginations of impetuous and fiery spirits. His odious familiarity had made him a favourite of the porters of the market-places, who were flattered by their intimacy with *the friend of the people* *, and were always ready to afford to his insignificant person the protection of their brute force, and the terror they inspired in places of popular resort.

The Mountain, foreseeing the obstacles they would have to encounter, only became the more exasperated on that account; these obstacles were of a more formidable nature in the provinces than at Paris; and the impediments which their commissaries, who had been sent into the departments to hasten the recruiting service, met with, aggravated their irritation into fury. All the provinces were disposed to favour the revolution, but they had not all espoused its cause with the same ardour, nor had they proceeded to the same extremities as the city of Paris. The ambitious, the unoccupied, the turbulent, and the talented, are always the first to engage in a revolution; and a metropolis always contains more men of this description than provinces, because it is the resort of those who have emancipated themselves from all the bonds of society, and shaken off their attachment to the opinions, prejudices, and traditions of their forefathers. Paris therefore necessarily contained the most violent revolutionists. Situated at a short distance from the frontiers, pre-eminently exposed to the attacks of the enemy, encountering unparalleled dangers, the seat of government, it had witnessed the agitation of all the great questions. Thus the danger, the contest, everything conspired to produce the highest state of excitement and the greatest excess. The provinces not being subject to the same violent perturbations, regarded these excesses with horror, and partook of the sentiments of the right side and the Plain. Extremely dissatisfied with the treatment experienced by their deputies, they thought they perceived in the capital, beyond the extravagance of the revolution, the ambitious design of domineering over France, as Rome had domineered over her conquered provinces. Such were the notions the peaceable, industrious, and moderate part of the nation entertained with respect to the revolution of Paris. Yet these sentiments were more or less developed, according to local circumstances. Every province and every city possessed its violent revolutionists, for adventurous and turbulent characters are everywhere to be found. The municipalities were almost exclusively governed by these men, who had taken advantage of the reorganization of all the authorities, ordered by the legislative assembly after the 10th of August, to instal themselves in those situations. The inactive and moderate must always yield to the more resolute and violent; and it was therefore natural that men of the latter character should possess themselves of the municipal functions, the most responsible of all, and which require the utmost diligence and activity. The majority of the peaceable citizens confined themselves to their sections, where they sometimes gave their votes and exercised their civic rights. The departmental authorities had been assigned to the more wealthy and respectable *notables*, who from that very cause were a less active and energetic sort of men. Thus all the violent revolutionists had intrenched themselves in the municipalities, whilst the rich and middling classes occupied the sections and departmental posts.

The commune of Paris, aware of this circumstance, was anxious to open a communication with the municipal bodies, but was thwarted, as we have seen, by the convention. The parent Jacobin society had made up for this by its own correspondence; and that sort of connexion which they had failed in establishing between municipality and municipality, already existed from club to club, which amounted nearly to the same thing; for those who assisted at the discussions of the Jaco-

* The title of his newspaper.

bin clubs, were the same that managed the affairs of the general councils of the communes. Thus the entire Jacobin party of France, united in one compact body in the municipalities and clubs, and maintaining a correspondence from one extremity of France to the other, was arrayed against the whole mass of persons observing a middle course; a very numerous body, but divided into a multitude of sections, neither actively employed nor holding any communication with each other, meeting only occasionally to give their votes, having a few clubs of a moderate description, and but feebly governed by the departmental authorities, timid and undecided as moderation and opulence invariably are in presence of a revolutionized people, headed by factious leaders.

The strength of the position thus occupied by the revolutionists, led them to aim at extending their control over the great body of the people. The people were well disposed towards the republic, but were revolted by its excesses, and at this period they had the advantage in every province. Since the municipality, aided by a formidable police, and invested with authority to make domiciliary visits, and hunt out foreigners and disarm suspected persons, had the power of exercising the most vexatious severities against peaceable and inoffensive citizens, there had been a sudden reaction in the sections, which had united to check the power of the municipalities. In almost every town in France they had assumed an attitude of determination, had taken up arms, and were in avowed opposition to the municipalities, resisting their inquisitorial police, supporting the right side, joining loudly in their demand for order, peace, and respect for persons and property. The municipalities and Jacobin clubs, on the contrary, were clamorous for new regulations of police, and the establishment of revolutionary tribunals in the departments. In some places they were near proceeding to violence on these points, but the sections were so strong in numbers that the vigour of the municipalities was considerably daunted, and the Mountain deputies, despatched to hasten the recruiting and excite the revolutionary ardour of the provinces, were terrified at the resistance they experienced, and filled Paris with alarm.

Such was the situation of almost the whole of France, and such the state of parties. The struggle demonstrated itself with more or less violence, and the opposing parties more or less threatening, according to the circumstances and danger of each particular city. Wherever the cause of the revolution was in the greatest jeopardy, there were the Jacobins disposed to employ the most violent measures, and the moderate party to resist them. But that which especially roused the fury of the revolutionary passions, was rather the dread of treason at home than the danger of a foreign enemy, so that on the northern frontier, exposed to the attacks of the enemy, and little disturbed by factions, but one opinion prevailed; all were united in the common defence, and the commissaries from Lille to Lyons had made tolerably favourable reports to the convention. But at Lyons, where secret cabals concurred with its geographical and military situation to expose it to great dangers, similar and equally violent excesses had taken place as those of Paris. By its eastern situation, and vicinity to Piedmont, Lyons had always attracted the regard of the counter-revolutionists; and the first emigration of Turin had essayed to establish a party in that city in 1790, and had even wished to send one of the French princes there. Mirabeau had also devised such a plan after his fashion. Ever since Coblentz had been the head-quarters of the emigration, an agent had been left in Switzerland, to correspond with Lyons, and, through the medium of Lyons, with the camp of Jallès and the fanatics of the south. These machinations had provoked a re-action of Jacobinism, and the efforts of the royalists only tended to produce a Mountain party at Lyons. These latter had formed an association called the *central club*, which was composed of delegates from the other clubs of the adjacent country. At its head was a Piedmontese, whose restless disposition had driven him from one place to another, till at last he established himself at Lyons, where his ardour in the cause of the revolution had successively procured for him the situation of municipal officer and president of the civil tribunal. The name of this man was Chalier, and the language which he held at the *central club* would not have been borne by the Jacobins of Paris, but would have subjected him to be accused by Marat, of receiving pay from the foreign enemy, to promote anarchy and confusion. Besides this club, the *Mountaineers* of Lyons possessed all the offices of the municipality, with the exception of the mayoralty, which was held by Nivière, the friend and disciple of Roland, and the head of the Girondist party at Lyons. Overborne by so many stormy violences, Nivière had, like Pétion, given in his resignation, and had, like him, been re-elected by the sections, who were more influential and energetic at Lyons, than in any other part of France. Of eleven thousand voters, nine thousand had obliged Nivière to resume the mayoralty, but he had resigned a second time, and the municipality at last succeeded in nominating a mayor of its own choice. On this occasion each party resorted to physical force; the younger members of the sections had driven Chalier from his club, and stripped the hall where he poured forth his fanatic ravings. The department, in dismay, had appealed to the commissaries of the convention, who at first, expressing themselves strongly against the sections, then against the excesses of the commune, had alienated all parties, and were denounced by the Jacobins, and finally recalled by the convention. Their task was confined to remodelling the *central club*, uniting it to the Jacobins at Paris, and as a means of preserving it in full vigour, in expelling some few members who could not be tolerated. By May, animosity had reached its highest pitch; on one side, the commune, composed entirely of Jacobins, and the *central club*, over whom Chalier presided, demanded the establishment of a revolutionary tribunal at Lyons, and paraded in all the public places a guillotine, brought for the express purpose from Paris, which they thus exposed to public attention in order to terrify the *traitors* and aristocrats; and, on the other side, the sections, in arms, were determined to resist the violence of the municipality, and prevent the establishment of that sanguinary tribunal, from which the Girondists at Paris had not been able to free the capital. In this state of things, the secret

agents of royalism at Lyons awaited the favourable moment to take advantage of the indignation of the Lyonese, which was ready to break out.

In every other part of the south, as far as Marseilles, a moderate republican spirit prevailed and was more equally diffused, and the Girondists still possessed the affections of the people. Marseilles, jealous of the supremacy of Paris, became indignant at the insults offered to her favourite deputy Barbaroux, and was ready to rise against the convention, the moment any hostile attempt should be made upon the national representation. Although one of the richest cities in France, she was not favourably situated to resist external counter-revolutionists, for her only point of contiguity was Italy, where no mischief was brewing, and her port did not, like that of Toulon, attract the anxious regard of England; neither had the idea of secret plots so exasperated the public mind as at Paris and Lyons, and the municipality, weak and exposed to threats, were on the point of being thrust out by the ascendancy of the overpowering sections. The deputy Moses-Bayle, who met with an unwelcome reception, found that the recruiting service was forwarded with the greatest enthusiasm, and that the populace were entirely attached to the Girondists.

From the Rhine, east and west, to the sea-side, fifty or sixty departments exhibited similar demonstrations; in fact, at Bordeaux these sentiments were universal. There, the sections, the municipality, and the principal club, proud of their Girondist deputation, were unanimous in resisting the violence of the Mountain, and in supporting that distinguished party, whom they regarded with feelings of pride, as having originated with them. The opposite party, on the contrary, had gained admission into no more than one section, where they were unsupported, powerless, and silenced. Bordeaux required neither taxes, provisions, or revolutionary tribunal; and prepared petitions against the commune, and at the same time equipped several battalions for the service of the republic.

But along the sea-side, drawing a line from the Gironde to the Loire, and from the Loire to the mouth of the Seine, very different inclinations demonstrated themselves, and dangers of the most formidable aspect threatened. There, the implacable Mountain had to contend not only with the moderate and generous republican spirit of the Girondists, but with the constitutional royalism of 1789, which stigmatised the revolution as illegal, as well as with the fanaticism of the feudal times, which, equally hostile to the revolution of 1793 and that of 1789, acknowledged no other temporal authority than that of their lords, or any other spiritual authority than that of their pastors.

In Normandy, and particularly at Rouen, its chief city, the inhabitants had always been devotedly attached to Louis XVI.; and, in the constitution of 1790, they saw all the hopes they had cherished for liberty and monarchy realised. But since the abolition both of royalty and the constitution, that is to say, since the 10th of August, a condemnatory and hostile silence prevailed in Normandy. In Brittany still more hostile inclinations had been manifested; the people there were still subject to the influence of their lords and pastors. In the neighbourhood of the Loire, this attachment went so far as to goad them to insurrection, and on the left bank of that river, in Le Bocage, Le Louroux, and La Vendée, they were in a state of complete insurrection, and took the field with armi s ten thousand men strong.

It is here necessary to give some account of this unfortunate district, inhabited by a people so determined and heroic, who brought so many miseries upon France, indeed, nearly caused her destruction, and goaded on the revolutionary dictatorship to its worst excesses.

On both sides of the Loire the people had always retained the most fervent attachment for their ancient customs, and especially for their priests and their religious worship. When, therefore, in consequence of the civil constitution, the members of the clerical body were set at variance, a complete schism took place. The non-juring priests, who refused to subscribe to the new limitations concerning the churches, were preferred by their flocks; and when, dispossessed of their cures, they were obliged to retire, the people congregated round them in the woods, and regarded both themselves and their religion as objects of persecution. They assembled together in small companies, acted with hostility to the constitutional priests as being intruders, and frequently committed the most grievous excesses against them. In Brittany, and in the environs of Rennes, revolts more formidable and general, caused by the dearness of provisions, and the threat of abolishing religious observances, which seemed to be implied by the words of Cambon, "*Those who want mass must pay for it*," took place. The government, however, succeeded in repressing these partial risings on the right side of the Loire; but the co-operation of these insurgents with those of the left bank of the river, the theatre of the principal insurrection, was still very much to be feared.

It was particularly upon this left bank of the river, in Anjou and Lower and Upper Poitou, that the famous war of La Vendée first broke out. This district of France had been less affected by the silent and imperceptible changes wrought by time, than any other portion of the empire. The feudal system, from its ancient date and long duration, had received a patriarchal character, and the revolution far from producing a reform in this country, wounded all the cherished prejudices and superstitions of the inhabitants, and instead of being welcomed as a benefit, was felt as a persecution. It is necessary to give some account of the Bocage and the Marais, before its manners and the state of its society can be understood. Leaving Nantes and Saumur, and journeying along the Loire, as far as the sands of Olonne, Lucon, Fontenay, and Niort, the traveller discovers a variegated and undulating country, intersected by ravines, and divided by hedges, which have given it the name of the *Bocage*. Approaching the sea, the soil becomes more flat and less elevated, and terminates at last in salt marshes, in which a variety of ditches have been cut, thus rendering the country difficult of access; this part is called the *Marais*. The principal product of this country is pasturage, consequently cattle are plentiful. The peasants cultivated no more wheat than was sufficient for their own consumption, and procured the remaining necessaries of life by the sale of their flocks and herds. Nothing

could be more primitive than this simple industrious life. No great cities existed in these secluded districts, but only a few great villages, whose population did not exceed two or three thousand inhabitants. Between the two great roads which lead, the one from Tours to Poitiers, and the other from Nantes to Rochelle, a space of thirty leagues intervenes, which is traversed only by cross-roads, leading to villages and hamlets. The land was parcelled out into a multitude of small farms, bringing in no more than a rent of five or six hundred francs, and tenanted by single families, who divided with their landlords the profits arising from the sale of their cattle. By this division of property, a frequent familiar intercourse was kept up between the possessors and cultivators of the soil. The utmost simplicity of life was exhibited even in the manor-houses; the abundance of game in these countries, made the sports of the field a frequent and delightful exercise; the peasants followed their lords to the chase, where every one distinguished himself by his dexterity and spirit. The priests exercised a truly paternal authority over their flocks, and the purity of their morals, for riches had not corrupted their character, or exposed them to the invidious malevolence which wealth provokes; and the lower classes cheerfully submitted to the government of their superiors, and believed the doctrines of their pastors, for they were neither oppressed by the one, or scandalized by the other. Between civilization and barbarity, there is an intermediate state of simplicity, ignorance, and innocence; and perhaps it might be quite as well to stop here, if it were not the lot of man to press onwards to the highest degree of civilization through a medium of evil.

When the revolution, which had elsewhere produced such beneficial results, reached this country, with its iron rule, it caused the deepest distress. To adapt it to the state of society in these districts, it should have been modified, but this was impossible; and those who have accused the revolutionists of not conforming their new laws and government to local circumstances, neither understand the impracticability of exceptions, or perceive the necessity of insisting on a universality and uniformity of principles in the new social system. The revolution was not understood in these regions, and the inhabitants only viewed it through the medium of the misrepresentations of their priests and landlords. Although the feudal rights had been abolished, they had not ceased to pay them. They held assemblies for the nomination of their mayors, and always conferred that office on their lords. But when the destitution of the non-juring priests deprived the peasants of those pastors in whom they repused their confidence, their distress was aggravated into irritation, and they followed them (as was the case in Brittany) into the woods to great distances to assist at those religious ceremonies, which, in their eyes, appeared the only true worship. From that moment, their minds became inflamed with the most deadly hate, and the priests did not neglect to take advantage of these feelings. The events of the 10th of August had sent many nobles of Poitou back to their estates; the 21st of January entirely alienated them, and they imparted their sense of indignation to those connected with them. Nevertheless, they entered into no conspiracy, as was generally believed; but the known estrangement of the country suggested to others who had no connection with the country the scheme of a conspiracy. One conspiracy was certainly formed in Brittany, but none in the Bocage; the people there had no pre-determined plan in view; they suffered themselves to be pushed to extremity. Finally, the levy of three hundred thousand men, in the month of March, excited a general insurrection. After all, it did not much concern the peasants below Poitou what passed in France; but the destitution of their clergy, and especially their obligation to join the armies, exasperated them. According to the old system, the quota of a district was only composed of those whose natural desire for change induced a departure from the place of their birth; but the present laws struck equally at all, without regarding their tastes or inclinations. Forced, therefore, to take arms, they preferred battling against the republic than in her defence. At the same time, that is, in the commencement of March, the draft of soldiers occasioned a revolt in the Upper Bocage and in the Marais. On the 10th, a draft was to take place at Saint-Florent, near Ancenis, in Anjou; the young men refused to enlist, the guard determined to force them, and the military commandant ordered a piece of artillery to be pointed on the mutineers. On this, they sprang forward with their sticks, seized on the cannon, disarmed the guard, but seemed dismayed at their own temerity. A carrier, named Cathelineau, much looked up to in this country, and remarkable for his intrepidity and eloquence, hearing this news, quitted his farm, and hastened into the midst of his compatriots, rallied them, rekindled their courage, and imparted a consistency to the insurrection by adopting measures for its continuance. On the same day, he determined to attack a republican post, defended by eighty men; the peasants followed him with their clubs and fire-arms, and after one discharge, every shot of which told, for they were great marksmen, they rushed upon the post, disarmed the soldiers, and rendered themselves masters of the position. On the following day, Cathelineau marched upon Chemillé, and carried it, in spite of two hundred republicans, and three pieces of cannon. A gamekeeper at the Chateau of Maulevrier, named Stofflet, and a young peasant of the village of Chauzeau, collected each a troop of their countrymen, and hastened to join Cathelineau, who daringly conceived the project of attacking Chollet, the chief town of the district, and garrisoned by five hundred republicans. Their method of warfare was precisely the same. Taking advantage of the hedges, and the inequalities of the soil, they succeeded in surrounding the enemy's battalion, and opened an unerring fire upon them under cover. After having thrown the republicans into some confusion by this destructive sharp-shooting, they availed themselves of the first moment of hesitation that manifested itself, and rushed suddenly upon them, surrounded their ranks, routed and disarmed the soldiers, and despatched them with their clubs. Such were the military tactics common sense had suggested, and indeed they were well adapted to the nature of the country. The troops whom they attacked drew up in a line, and, without any cover, received, but could not return their fire, for they could neither

make use of their artillery, or come to the bayonet, against enemies who were dispersed on every side. In this situation, not being veterans in war, they could not, for a moment, withstand such a well-directed and brisk fire, which could never be equalled by troops of the line. But, when they saw these furious men burst upon them in front, rear, and flank, uttering appalling shouts as they advanced, a panic and confusion was almost inevitable. Their destruction was then certain, for flight, so easy to the country people, was impracticable for troops of the line. To have contested with these difficulties, veterans should have been despatched, for those who had first to attack the rebels were but national guards, lately drafted, and taken from the villages, almost all of them violent republicans, and whose zeal was the main cause of their first appearing in battle.

The victorious band of Cathelineau entered Chollet, and seized upon all the arms and ammunition they found there, and made cartridges out of the charges of the cannons. It was thus that the Vendeans always procured military supplies. Their defeat imparted no advantage to the enemy, for they carried nothing with them but a musket or club across the fields, whereas each victory on their part procured for them considerable ammunition for carrying on the war. The victorious insurgents celebrated their success with the money they found*, and then burnt all the official papers of the government, which they regarded as so many instruments of tyranny. They then returned to their villages and farms, which they never cared to quit for any length of time.

Another insurrection, much more general, broke out in the Marais and the department of La Vendée. At Machecoul and Challans, the recruiting was the occasion of a general rising. A perruquier named Gaston killed an officer, assumed his uniform, put himself at the head of a troop, carried Challans, then Machecoul; or his company burnt the papers of the various republican administrations, and committed massacres previously unheard of in the Bocage. Three hundred republicans were shot by companies of twenty and thirty. The insurgents first made them confess, and then led them to the bank of a ditch, at the side of which they shot them, to save themselves the trouble of removing their bodies. Nantes immediately sent some hundred men to Saint-Philbert, but, hearing of a rising at Savenay, recalled them, and the insurgents of Machecoul remained masters of the conquered country.

In the department of La Vendée,—that is to say, towards the south of the theatre of this war,—the insurrection was still more serious and formidable. The national guards of Fontenay, who set out to march upon Chantonnay, were defeated. Chantonnay was pillaged. General Verteuil, who commanded the eleventh division of military, hearing of this defeat, sent off General Marcé with twelve hundred men, partly taken from the troops of the line, and partly from the national guards. He came up with the rebels, first at Saint-Vincent, where they were defeated, and the general had time to add twelve hundred men and nine pieces of cannon to his little army. Marching upon Saint-Fulgent, he again met the Vendeans in a bottom, and halted to rebuild a bridge which they had destroyed. At four o'clock in the evening, on the 18th of March, they attacked him. Taking advantage of the inequality of the ground, they commenced their sharp-shooting with their ordinary superiority, and perceived the republican army, dismayed by their murderous fire, and obliged to await the appearance of an enemy concealed behind rising grounds, rapidly dispersing on all sides. Finally, they became assailants in their turn, spread disorder through the ranks of the republicans, and made themselves master of their artillery, as well as of the ammunition and arms which the soldiers threw away in their retreat, to remove every impediment to their flight.

This success, more distinguishable in the department of La Vendée, properly so called, procured for the insurgents the name of *Vendeans*, which they afterwards retained, although the war was much more actively carried on out of La Vendée. The robberies committed in the Marais also gained for the inhabitants the appellation of *brigands*, though the great majority did not deserve that title. The insurrection spread in the Marais from Nantes as far as Sables; and in Anjou and Poitou as far as the environs of Vihiers and Parthenay. The success of the Vendeans is attributable to many causes: the nature of their country and its local peculiarities, their address and courage, and finally the inexperience and rash impetuosity of the republican troops, who, levied in haste, were too precipitate in their attack, and thus gave the Vendeans not only victory, but its consequences,—that is to say, ammunition, confidence, and assurance.

The Easter season brought the insurgents back to their homes, from which they never liked to be long absent. The war was for them little else than a kind of hunting-party, on which they would have to be out but for a few days; they took with them provisions sufficient for a few days, and then returned to their villages to inflame their neighbours with the recital of their exploits. They formed similar appointments for the month of April. The insurrection now became general, and spread through the whole breadth of the country. This theatre of war may be said to be comprehended within a line, extending from Nantes, through Pornic, the Isle of Noirmoutiers, Sables, Luçon, Fontenay, Niort, and Parthenay, and returning in its course through Airvault, Thouars, Doué, and Saint-Florent, as far as the Loire. The insurrection, although commenced by men scarcely superior to the peasants they commanded, other than by their natural accomplishments, was soon taken up by men of a far superior rank. The peasants presented themselves in crowds at the chateaux, and forced their lords to place themselves at their head. The whole of the Marais assisted on being commanded by Charette. This man belonged to a family of shipowners at Nantes; he had served in the navy, where he had risen to the rank of lieutenant, and at the peace he retired to a chateau belonging to his uncle, and devoted his time chiefly to the sports of the field. His delicate com-

* The chief, nay almost the sole luxury of these primitive and secluded districts, was festivity and hospitality. *Trans.*

plexion and slight frame seemed little capable of enduring the hardships and fatigues of war; but having been long accustomed to the rough life of a huntsman, passing whole months in the woods, sleeping in the open air, and on the bare earth, he had invigorated his constitution, had acquired a perfect knowledge of the country, and was celebrated by the peasantry around for his address and courage. He hesitated at first to accept the command which was offered him, pointing out to the insurgents the dangers of their enterprise. But he yielded at last to their solicitations, and by suffering them to commit excesses, he placed their lives in jeopardy, and engaged them irrevocably in his service. Clever, crafty, stern, and obstinate, he became the most formidable of all the Vendean chiefs. The whole of the Marais implicitly obeyed him, and with fifteen and sometimes twenty thousand men, he threatened Sables and Nantes. As soon as his followers were assembled, he seized on the Isle of Noirmoutiers, an important position, where he might establish his head quarters, and opened a communication with England.

In the Bocage, the peasants made a similar demand upon MM. de Bonchamps, d'Elbée, and de La Rochejacquelein, and forced them to abandon their chateaux, and place themselves at their head. M. de Bonchamps had formerly served under M. de Suffren, and had become an excellent officer, of great personal intrepidity, and noble and dignified in his deportment and sentiments. He commanded all the insurgents of Anjou and the banks of the Loire. M. d'Elbée was also experienced in military service, and joined to a warm devotion for the cause he had espoused, a perseverance of character and a complete acquaintance with that species of rustic warfare in which he was about to engage. He was at this time the most popular leader in the Bocage. He commanded all the parishes around Cholet and Beaupréau. Cathelineau and Stofflet still retained that command which they had earned by the confidence they imparted, and joined MM. de Bonchamps and d'Elbée, to march upon Bressuire, where General Quétineau was stationed. This latter had carried off from the chateau of Clisson the family of Lescure, whom he suspected of conspiracy, and detained them prisoners at Bressuire. Henry de La Rochejaquelein, a young man who had formerly belonged to the king's guard, but had since retired to the Bocage, was at that time at Clisson, the house of his cousin De Lescure. He escaped, and raised the standard of insurrection at Aubiers, his native village, and at all the parishes in the neighbourhood of Chatillon. He soon joined the other chiefs, and, with their assistance, forced General Quétineau to retire from Bressuire. M. de Lescure and his family were then set at liberty. He was a young man, of the same age as Henry de La Rochejaquelein. He was a calm, prudent, cool, and undauntedly courageous man, and added to these qualities a strong feeling of justice. Henry, his cousin, also possessed the courage of a hero, and frequently was too impetuous; he was also excitable, and generous in his sentiments. M. de Lescure then put himself at the head of his peasants, who flocked around him, and the four leaders united their forces at Bressuire, to march from thence upon Thouars. The wives of all these leaders distributed cockades and flags; the men marched out singing songs of enthusiasm, and considered that they set out upon a crusade. This army was not encumbered with baggage, for the peasants would never remain long from their homes; they, therefore, carried with them bread enough for a few days, and, in extraordinary cases, the several parishes through which they passed, upon receiving notice, supplied them with whatever they might require. This force was composed of about thirty thousand men, and was called the grand royal and catholic army. It showed itself before Angres, Saumur, Doué, Thouars, and Parthenay. Between this army and that of the Marais, commanded by Charette, several other considerable bodies had been assembled, the chief of which, under the orders of M. de Royrand, might amount to ten or twelve thousand men.

The main body, commanded by Bonchamps, D'Elbée, De Lescure, De la Rochejacquelein, Cathelineau, and Stofflet, arrived before Thouars on the 3d of May, and prepared for an assault on the morning of the 4th. But it was necessary previously to pass over the Thoué, which surrounds Thouars on almost every side. General Quétineau defended the passages. The Vendeans opened a cannonade with the artillery they had taken from the republicans, and played upon the bank with the same success as on former occasions. M. de Lescure, thinking it was now time to carry the passage, advanced in the midst of a heavy fire from the enemy, which riddled his clothes, but could not procure more than one peasant to accompany him. But La Rochejaquelein perceiving this, rushed forward; his troops followed, the bridge was crossed, and the republicans driven back into the town. It was necessary now to make a breach, but the Vendeans had no means of effecting this. Henry de La Rochejaquelein, therefore, mounting on the shoulders of his men, began to scale the ramparts. D'Elbée commenced a vigorous attack on his side, and Quétineau, not being able to hold out, consented to surrender the town to avoid the horrors of the town being sacked. The Vendeans, thanks to their leaders, behaved with the greatest moderation; no outrages were committed against the inhabitants, but the tree of liberty and the papers of the several administrations were burnt. The generous Lescure now returned the civilities he had received, when prisoner, from Quétineau, and wished to persuade him to remain with the Vendean army, that he might thus escape the severities of the government for having delivered up the town. Quétineau magnanimously refused this offer, and determined to return to the republicans, and demand a trial.

CHAPTER IX.

LEVY OF A PARISIAN ARMY OF TWELVE THOUSAND MEN; FORCED LOAN; FRESH REVOLUTIONARY MEASURES AGAINST SUSPECTED PERSONS.—INCREASING ALARM OF THE JACOBINS ON ACCOUNT OF THE DISORDERS IN THE DEPARTMENTS—CUSTINE APPOINTED GENERAL OF THE ARMY IN THE NORTH.—ACCUSATIONS AND THREATS OF THE JACOBINS; VIOLENT CONTEST BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES OF THE CONVENTION—A COMMISSION OF TWELVE MEMBERS IS FORMED FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXAMINING THE ACTS OF THE COMMUNE.—THE INSURRECTIONAL ASSEMBLAGE AT THE MAIRIE. DESIGNS AND CONSPIRACIES AGAINST THE MAJORITY OF THE CONVENTION AND AGAINST THE LIVES OF THE GIRONDIST DEPUTIES; THE SAME SCHEMES ENTERTAINED BY THE CLUB OF THE CORDELIERS.—THE CONVENTION ADOPTS MEASURES FOR ITS OWN PRESERVATION—THE ARREST OF HEBERT, SUBSTITUTE OF THE PROCURATOR OF THE COMMUNE—IMPERIOUS PETITIONS OF THE COMMUNE.—TUMULT AND SCENES OF DISORDER IN EVERY ONE OF THE SECTIONS.—THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE 28TH, 29TH, AND 30TH MAY, 1793. THE FINAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE MOUNTAIN PARTY AND THE GIRONDISTS—THE EVENTS OF THE 31ST MAY AND THE 2ND JUNE—MINUTE OCCURRENCES AND CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE INSURRECTION KNOWN AS THE 31ST MAY.—THE TWENTY-NINE GIRONDIST DEPUTIES ARE ARRESTED—THE CHARACTER AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENTS OF THIS DAY. A GENERAL VIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION—REFLECTIONS UPON THE GIRONDISTS.

THE disastrous intelligence from La Vendée, concurring with that received from the north, which announced the reverses of Dampierre, in conjunction with the news from the south, which apprised the republican government that the Spaniards had assumed a threatening attitude upon the Pyrenees, as well as from several provinces where hostile feelings had demonstrated themselves, these tidings threw the capital into great agitation. Many departments adjacent to La Vendée, being informed of the success of the insurgents, thought themselves authorized to send troops against them. The department of the Hérault raised six million francs and six thousand men, and forwarded an address to the people of Paris, urging them to imitate their example. The convention, to encourage this enthusiasm, approved of the conduct of the department of the Hérault, and thereby authorized all the communes of France to exercise acts of sovereignty, by raising men and money.

The commune of Paris was by no means behindhand. She held forth that it depended on the Parisians to save France, and hastened to prove her zeal, and employ her new power, by raising an army. The commune immediately passed a resolution, declaring, that, *in accordance with the solemn approbation given by the convention to the conduct of the Hérault*, there should be levied within the precincts of Paris twelve thousand men, to march against La Vendée. In imitation of the convention, they chose from the council-general commissaries to accompany this army. These twelve thousand men were to be taken from the companies of the sections, in the proportion of fourteen from every hundred and twenty-six men. In conformity with the practice of the revolutionists, a species of dictatorial power was given to the revolutionary committee of each section, to point out those fittest for the service for which they were intended. "Consequently," so said the order of the commune, "all unmarried clerks of all the offices of Paris, except principals and their head assistants, and the clerks of notaries and solicitors, the foremen of bankers and merchants, shopmen, messengers of public offices, &c., are liable to be drawn for the army in the following proportions: out of two one shall go; of three, two; of four, two; of five, three; of six, three; of seven, four; of eight, four; and so on. Those clerks of offices who were drawn were allowed to retain their places, and one-third of their salaries; no refusal is to be allowed. They are to communicate their wants, and then to be immediately provided by the committee of their section with whatever is necessary for their equipment. They are then to assemble together to nominate their officers, and to become immediately afterwards subject to their orders."

But to raise an army and to ensure its formation with such a show of compulsion, was not enough; how to support it was now the question, and therefore application must be made to the rich. "The rich," it was said, "do nothing for the defence of their country and the revolution; they live in a happy state of indolence, and leave it to the people to shed their blood for their country; they must at least be forced to contribute some portion of their wealth for the common safety." For this purpose, a forced loan was suggested, to be furnished by the citizens of Paris in proportion to the amount of their respective incomes. All those possessed of a yearly income from a thousand to fifty thousand francs, were to contribute accordingly from the sum of thirty francs to that of twenty thousand. All those who possessed more than an income of fifty thousand francs, were permitted to retain thirty thousand, and forced to give up the rest. The personal effects and real property of such who refused to comply with this patriotic demand were liable to be seized and sold by the revolutionary committee, and their possessors were marked out as persons suspected of disaffection.

Such measures as these, which affected all classes, whether it were those who were impressed into the military service, or those who were forced to support its expenses, provoked a powerful opposition in the sections. We have already seen that these sections were a good deal divided, and were more or less violent in proportion to the preponderance therein of the lower classes. In some, especially those of the Quinze Vingts, the Gravilliers, and Corn-Market, they declared that they would not leave Paris so long as any fede-

ralists and troops of the line, who, said they, were the *body-guard* of the convention, remained behind. The resistance of these originated in their jacobinism, but that of many others had a very different cause. All the clerks, foremen, and apprentices, had manifested a strong opposition to the two orders of the commune. The former dependants of the emigrant aristocracy, who were always busy in stirring up disturbances, joined this discontented multitude; they thronged together in the streets and public places; *Down with the Jacobins! down with the Mountain!* was their cry; and the same obstacles which the revolutionary system had encountered in the provinces, it had to contend with on this occasion in Paris.

A general cry was now raised against the aristocracy of the sections. Marat declared that Messieurs the grocers, the attorneys, and the clerks, conspired with Messieurs of the right side and the rich against the revolution; that it would be a good plan to forcibly apprehend them, and reduce them to the condition of the *sans-culottes, without a rag to cover their nakedness*.

Chaumette, procurator of the commune, delivered a long harangue upon this occasion, in which he deplored the miseries of his country, originating, he said, in the perfidy of the ministers, the egotism of the rich, the ignorance of the people, and the recklessness of many citizens, in regard of the common weal. He then proposed, and caused a resolution to be passed, that the convention should be applied to, to furnish the means of educating the people, of overcoming the egotism of wealth, and assisting the poor. Also, that an assembly should be formed of the presidents of all the revolutionary committees of the sections, and the deputies of all the administrative bodies, and that it should meet every Sunday and Thursday at the Commune, to provide for the safety of the common weal, and, lastly, that it should call upon every good citizen to meet in the sectional assemblies to give full effect to their patriotism.

Danton, always prompt in discovering resources in a moment of danger, conceived the project of embodying two armies of *sans-culottes*, the one to march upon La Vendée, and the other to remain in Paris, to keep the aristocrats in awe, and to support them at the expense of the rich. He, also, for the purpose of commanding a majority in the sections, suggested the idea of paying those who attended their sittings. Robespierre, borrowing these notions from Danton, more fully developed them at the Jacobin club, and pointed out other classes of citizens quite as much to be suspected: not confining himself any longer to the late nobles, priests, or financiers, he included all those citizens who had in any way committed a demonstration of *incivism*, and proposed that these should be imprisoned until the peace; that the action of the revolutionary tribunal should be accelerated, and that new sources of communication should be opened to counteract the effect of disaffected journals. By availing oneself of these resources, he said, the right side and its machinations might be effectually resisted, without resorting to illegal measures, or violating the laws.

All these ideas had but one object, that of arming the people; of placing one party within, who was to combat another from without; of arming the people at the expense of the rich; and, in fact, causing the people to attend at their own deliberative assemblies for payment out of the pockets of the rich; to imprison all persons opposed to the revolution, under the denomination of *suspected*, a term more comprehensive in its designation than it had ever yet been; to establish a correspondence between the sections and the commune, and for that purpose to constitute a new revolutionary assembly, which was to devise fresh plans of securing the *public welfare*, in plain language, an insurrection. The assembly of the Evêché, which had been recently dissolved, but again renewed upon the motion of Chaumette, and altogether with a more serious aspect, had evidently this object in view.

From the 8th to the 10th of May, the most alarming news constantly succeeded each other; Dampierre, who commanded the army of the north, had been killed; in the interior, the provinces continued in a state of revolt. Normandy appeared on the point of making common cause with Brittany. The insurgents of La Vendée, advancing from Thouars to Loudun and Montreuil, had taken those two cities, and nearly reached the banks of the Loire. The English, disembarking on the coasts of Brittany, were about, it was said, to join them, and carry their attacks into the heart of the republic. The inhabitants of Bordeaux, indignant at the treatment which their deputies experienced, had assumed the most menacing attitude, and disarmed the sections wherein the Jacobins had intrenched themselves. At Marseilles, the sections were in a state of absolute insurrection; disgusted with the excesses committed under the pretext of disarming *suspected* persons, they had met together, dissolved the commune, transferred its powers to a committee called the *central committee of the sections*, and instituted a popular tribunal to prosecute all originators of massacre and pillage. Besides these measures in their own city, they sent deputies to the sections of the town of Aix, to enforce the imitation of their example throughout the province. Paying no respect to the commissaries of the convention, they seized their papers, and ordered them to quit the city. Disorders equally serious prevailed at Lyons. The administrative body, in concert with the Jacobins, had, after the example of Paris, commanded a levy of six million francs and six thousand men to be made, had determined to disarm *suspected* persons, and to establish a revolutionary tribunal; the sections became disgusted with these measures, and seemed ready to come to an open rupture with the commune. Thus, whilst the enemy advanced towards the north, the insurrection, which had already broken out in Brittany and La Vendée, appeared on the point of being propagated throughout France, by gaining admission into Bordeaux, Rouen, Nantes, Marseilles, and Lyons. The intelligence of this general disaffection arriving in the brief space of two or three days, from the 12th to the 15th of May, greatly alarmed the *Mountaineers*, and the Jacobins. The proposed measures were urged with increased violence; they desired that all the waiters of coffee-houses and taverns, and that all servants, should join the army immediately; that the popular societies should all of them set out on their march in a body, that the commissaries of the assembly should immediately join their sections, in

order to induce them to provide their quota; that thirty thousand men should be forthwith transported to the theatre of war, in the private carriages of the rich; that the latter should be made to contribute without delay the tenths of their fortunes; that *suspected* persons should be imprisoned and kept as hostages; that the conduct of the ministers should be scrutinised; that the committee of public welfare should have it in charge to circulate an address to those citizens whose political opinions had been misled; that all civil operations should be suspended, that the civil tribunals should cease to exercise their functions; that the theatres should be closed; that the tocsin should be rung, and the alarum guns should be fired.

Danton, to inspire his colleagues with courage in the midst of the dangers which seemed to threaten them, made two remarks: the first was, that the apprehension that Paris would be deserted by her good citizens, whose presence was so necessary for her preservation, ought not to impede the recruiting operations, for there would always remain at Paris at least a hundred and fifty thousand patriots ready to rise, at a moment's notice, to exterminate the aristocrats who dared openly show themselves. The second was, that the agitation produced by civil warfare, so far from holding out encouragement to foreign enemies, was on the contrary calculated to strike them with terror: "For," said he, "Montesquieu has already made this observation, when speaking of the Romans; a people all armed, and habituated to war, whose passions are entirely absorbed in martial fury, have nothing to fear from the cold and mercenary courage of foreign soldiers. The feeblest of the two parties would be strong enough to exterminate automatons, whose discipline can neither inspire them with animation or spirit."

It was then immediately resolved that the ninety-six commissaries should join their sections, in order to obtain their quota, and that the committee of public welfare should continue to exercise its functions for a month more at least. Custine was appointed general of the army of the north, and Houchard of that of the Rhine. A general distribution of the armies upon the frontiers took place. Cambon presented the draught scheme of the forced loan to be obtained from the rich, and chargeable upon the property of the emigrants. "This is one way," said he, "of making the rich take part in the revolution, by obliging them to acquire a portion of the national possessions, if they wish their security to stand upon the national credit that is pledged for its payment."

The commune, on its own part, ordered that a second army of *sans-culottes* should be levied and stationed in Paris, to keep aristocracy within due bounds, whilst the first army marched against the rebels; that a general imprisonment of all *suspected* persons should take place, and that the central assembly of the sections, composed of the administrative authorities, of the presidents of the sections, of the members of the revolutionary committees, should meet together as soon as possible to make the apportionment of the forced loan, and to settle the lists of *suspected* persons, &c.

Internal commotion had attained its height; on one side the aristocrats abroad, it was said, were in agreement with those at home; that the conspirators of Marseilles, La Vendée, and Normandy acted in concert; that the members of the right side directed the operations of this vast insurrection; and that the violence of the sections of the former town resulted from their intrigues with Paris: on the other side, every excess was attributed to the Mountain, who were accused of designing to disorganize the whole of France, and to assassinate twenty-two deputies. On both sides it became a mutual question how the peril was to be avoided, and what means should be adopted to save the republic. The members of the right side, resuming their courage, prepared for some act of great energy. Some sections, viz., those of the Mail, the Butte des Moulins, and many others, gave them powerful support, and refused to send deputies to the central assembly. They also rejected the forced loan, saying that they themselves would defray the expenses of their volunteers, and were opposed to new lists of *suspected* persons, repeating that their revolutionary committee were competent to give efficiency to all measures of police within their own district. On the other hand, the Mountaineers, the Jacobins, the Cordeliers, and the members of the commune, cried out treason, and repeated everywhere, that all true patriots should unite their efforts to save the republic from the conspiracy of the twenty-two deputies. At the Cordeliers, it was openly maintained that they should be apprehended and put to death. In one assembly, where a concourse of fanatic females were accustomed to congregate, it was proposed that the opportunity afforded by the first tumult in the convention should be seized upon to assassinate them. These furies carried daggers about their persons, daily disturbed the assembly by their clamour in the galleries, and declared that they themselves would save the republic. It was everywhere stated that many hundreds of these daggers had been made by a single armourer in the Faubourg St. Antoine. Neither party ever stirred out without arms and without weapons of attack or defence. No settled design had as yet been agreed upon; but all minds were in such a state of ferment and agitation, that the slightest occasion would have sufficed to produce a simultaneous explosion. At the Jacobins, measures of every description were proposed. It was declared, that since the accusations of the commune against the twenty-two deputies did not prevent them from holding their sittings in the convention, a more energetic measure was necessary; that the citizens appointed for La Vendée ought not to quit Paris till they had saved the country; that the people had the means of saving the country in their hands, but that it was necessary to point out the means to them; and that, for this purpose, a committee of five members should be appointed, who should be permitted by the society to be the depository of all secret communications. To this others replied, that every thing should be stated openly in the club, and that there was no occasion to conceal anything from it, and that it would be much safer to act in an undisguised manner. Robespierre, who considered these notions imprudent, opposed them. Before he could consent to have recourse to illegal acts, "he must be certain," he said, "that the measures which he himself had proposed would be insufficient. Have you yet," said he, "raised your revolutionary

army? Have you enforced those measures which are necessary for the payment of the *sans-culottes*, whether in arms, or sitting in their sections? Have you arrested all *suspected* persons? Have you converted your public places into armourers' workshops, and magazines of military stores? You have adopted none of those prudent and salutary measures which by no means compromise the patriots, and you suffer men who understand nothing of public affairs, to propose acts which are the cause of all the calumnies of which you are the object. It is not until all legal measures are exhausted, that recourse is to be had to violent means, and even then it is not proper to suggest them in a society which is expected to act with wisdom and discretion. I know," added Robespierre, "that I am accused of *moderatism*, but I am too well known to fear such imputations."

Now, as on the eve of the 10th of August, all feeling the necessity of siding with one party hesitated and rambled from plan to plan, but suggested a meeting to come to some understanding with each other. The assembly of the Mairie had already been formed, but the department as yet took no part in it; only one of its members, the Jacobin Dufourny, had attended it; many sections held back; the mayor had not yet made his appearance, and its next sitting was adjourned till Sunday, the 19th of May, to consider the object of its meeting. Although the object for which this assembly was called together was clearly defined by the commune, yet the same notions were broached there as at any other place, and it was there stated as it had been elsewhere, that a new 10th of August was wanted. Hitherto, it had not gone beyond violent language, and the ordinary blusterings of a club. There had also been noticed women mixed with the men, but this tumultuous assemblage had not exhibited greater licence in its opinions and language than any other of the popular assemblies.

The 15th, 16th, and 17th of May were stormy days, and every question gave rise to bitter discussion and furious conflicts in the assembly. The people of Bordeaux sent in an address, in which they declared their resolution of rising in the defence of their deputies, and intimated that one division was to march against the insurgents of La Vendée, and the other upon Paris, to exterminate the anarchists who dare to threaten the national representation with violence. A letter from Marseilles announced the continued opposition of the sections in the town; and a petition from Lyons demanded the aid of the assembly, to release those who had been imprisoned as *suspected* persons, and who were menaced with the revolutionary tribunal, by Chalier and the Jacobins. The reading of these addresses excited a fearful tumult; both the assembly and the galleries seemed on the point of proceeding to personal violence. Nevertheless, the right side, roused by the dangers which threatened them, communicated their courage to the Plain, and it was resolved by a great majority that the petition of the inhabitants of Bordeaux was a noble display of patriotism; every revolutionary tribunal established by the local authorities was abolished, and those citizens who might be forced thither, were authorized to repel force by force. These resolutions, at the same time, aggravated the indignation of the Mountain, and exalted the courage of the right side. On the 18th, the fury of both parties had reached its height. The Mountain, deprived of many of its members, who had been sent into the departments, cried out against the oppression they suffered. Guadet requested permission to address the assembly, in order to present an historical parallel, and indeed he seemed to foretel in a most impressive manner the fate of the opposing parties. "When formerly in England," said he, "a patriotic majority attempted to resist a factious minority, the latter cried out against oppression, and by these clamours succeeded at last in oppressing the majority itself. They called themselves *patriots*, to the exclusion of all others. With this title, also, did the deluded multitude, who were instigated by the promise of plunder, and the partition of property, plume themselves; and by such perversion of honourable appellations, and such iniquitous bribes held out to penury, avarice, and base ambition, were they led on to the commission of that act of outrage against the nation called *the purying of the parliament*, of which *Pride*, formerly a butcher, but then a colonel, was the author and chief perpetrator. A hundred and fifty members were driven out of the House of Commons, and the minority, consisting of fifty or sixty at most, remained masters of the state.

"But what followed? These patriots, the instruments of Cromwell, and whom he forced to commit the most absurd iniquities to promote his own advancement, were at last driven out themselves, and their crimes furnished a pretext for the final accomplishment of the designs of the usurper." Here Guadet, pointing out the butcher Legendre, Danton, Lacroix, and all the other deputies who were infamous for their immorality, added: "Cromwell at last entered the house of parliament, and addressing these same members, who alone in their own opinions were capable of saving the country; you, said he to one, are a robber; to another, you are a drunkard; to a third, you are a peculator of the public money; and to a fourth, you are a whoremonger: fly, said he to all, and leave your places for honest men. They yielded without a word, and Cromwell assumed the supreme power."

This striking and affecting allusion made a deep impression on the assembly, who continued silent. Guadet continued, and in order to prevent this "Pride's purge" (*purgation Pridienne*), proposed several measures of police, which were adopted by the assembly in the midst of outcries of dissatisfaction. Immediately after, a shameful scene took place in the galleries. A woman attempted to thrust one of the men out of the chamber; she was seconded on all sides; and the unfortunate man, who made a stout resistance, was nearly crushed to death by the people. The guard in vain endeavoured to restore silence and tranquillity. Marat cried out that this man whom they wanted to turn out was an aristocrat. The assembly were indignant at Marat, inasmuch as it increased the danger of the unfortunate being who was exposed to assassination. He replied that tranquillity would never be restored till the nation was delivered from all aristocrats, the accomplices of Dumouriez and *statesmen* (*hommes d'état*), for such was his designation of the members of the right side, on account of their reputation for superior intelligence.

The president Isnard at this moment took off his hat, and demanded permission to make an important declaration. He was listened to in profound silence, and in a tone of deep anxiety he spoke as follows. "A conspiracy of England has been brought to my knowledge, of which it is my duty to inform the assembly. It is the design of Pitt to arm one part of the people against the other, by instigating them to insurrection. This insurrection is to be commenced by women, many deputies are to be assassinated, and the convention dissolved, and at the same time a descent of the English on our coasts is to take place.

"Such is the declaration," said Isnard, "which I feel it my duty to make."

The president was applauded by the majority; his declaration was ordered to be printed, and it was decreed that the deputies should not in future separate, so that each might share the common danger. The tumult which had taken place in the galleries was then explained. The woman who had first commenced this disturbance belonged, it was said, to a society called *the Fraternity*, who were accustomed to occupy the galleries, to the exclusion of strangers, and the federalists of the departments, and thus disturbed the debates by their hootings. The popular societies were then spoken of, and immediately clamours burst forth on every side. Marat, who had been continuously running in and out of the lobbies, and crossing from one bench in the hall to another, all the time speaking against the *statesmen*, pointed out one of the members of the right side, and said to him, "*Thou art one, but the people will give thee and others their due.*" Guadet then sprang to the tribune, and endeavoured to inspire the assembly with courage to come to a bold determination; he enumerated all the disorders of which Paris had become the theatre, the propositions which had been made in the popular societies, the terrible language uttered at the Jacobins, and the designs that had been openly avowed in the assembly of the Mairie. He maintained that the disturbance which they had just witnessed had no other object than to bring about a scene of confusion, that the meditated assassinations might be perpetrated the more effectually. Although interrupted every moment, he yet succeeded in gaining a hearing to the end, and proposed two measures heroically bold, but, unfortunately, utterly impracticable.

"The anarchical authorities of Paris," said he, "are the great sources of every evil we complain of. I propose, then, to annul them, and to replace them by all the presidents of the sections.

"The convention not being free, I propose also that another should be assembled elsewhere, and that all new members should meet at Bruges, ready to constitute a convention on the first signal they may receive from you, or the moment they hear of the dissolution of the present convention."

These two propositions produced a fearful tumult. All the members of the right rose up, crying out, that this was the only means of saving the republic, and seemed to acknowledge the audacious genius of Guadet, who possessed the means of communicating this truth. The left side, on the contrary, also rose, and menacing their adversaries in their turn, exclaimed that the plot was at last discovered, the conspirators unmasked, and that their machinations against the indivisibility of the republic were at last avowed. Danton then would have rushed to the tribune, but he was not permitted, and Barrère, in the name of the committee of public safety, took precedence.

Barrère, with his usual insinuating address and conciliatory tone, said "that if he had been permitted to speak before, he could have discovered many facts illustrative of the state of France, which had come to his knowledge within the last few days." He then spoke of the scheme of dissolving the convention; that the president of his section had collected from the conversation of the procurator Chaumette, a line of argument demonstrative of that intention; that at the Evêché, and at another assembly of the Mairie, the same question had been discussed; that to attain this object, it was proposed to excite a tumult, that the women were to be employed for this purpose, and that twenty-two deputies were to be assassinated in the confusion. Barrère added, that the minister for foreign affairs and the minister of the interior must have procured information on this subject, and that they ought to be heard. Alluding then to the measures which had been proposed, "He agreed," he said, "in opinion with Guadet as to the character of the authorities of Paris; the department," he said, "was perfectly impotent; the sections usurped the sovereignty of the nation, and the commune was urged into every kind of extravagance and excess by its procurator Chaumette, who had been formerly a monk, and consequently, like all nobles and priests, an object of suspicion; but he believed that the dissolution of these authorities would rather occasion a tumultuous anarchy. As to the assembling of new members at Bruges, that course would neither be able," said he, "to save the convention or supply its place. There was but one means, he thought, of defending oneself from the real dangers which threatened, without having recourse to extreme measures: this was to nominate a commission of twelve deputies, who should have it in charge to verify all the acts of the commune which had been passed during the last month, to gain information respecting any plots which might be carrying on in the interior, and to bring to light all the designs which had been formed against the national representation, to interrogate ministers, to collect from all the committees and all the authorities every needful information, and finally, be authorized to have at their disposal the necessary means of securing the persons of the conspirators."

The first flash of admiration and excitement past, the majority were very glad to adopt this conciliatory project of Barrère. Nothing was more common than the nomination of these commissions. On every fresh event, on every danger, on every new occasion, the assembly nominated a committee for the purpose of providing for the contingency, and from the very moment that individuals were appointed to carry any measure into execution, the assembly seemed to consider that the measure would, as a matter of course, be carried out, and that the committees should always possess energy, intelligence, or power, sufficient for the purpose of the assembly. The present committee, however, was not deficient in energy, for it was composed almost exclusively of members of the right side,

of which number were Boyer Fonfrède, Rabaut Saint-Etienne, Kervelegan, and Henry Larivière, all members of the Gironde. But the very energy of these deputies only hastened their downfall. Appointed for the purpose of protecting the convention from the violence of the Jacobins, they only aggravated their fury, and augmented that danger which they were called upon to avert. The Jacobins had daily menaced the Girondists in their harangues; the Girondists replied to these menaces by the constituting a commission; and to this menace the Jacobins finally prepared to reply by one fatal blow, in originating the events of the 31st of May and the 2nd of June.

This commission had scarcely been instituted when popular societies and sections cried out as usual, against an inquisition and martial law. The assembly of the Mairie, which had been adjourned to Sunday the 19th, again met, and was much more numerously attended than it had been before; but the mayor was not present, and an administrator of police presided. Some sections were also absent, and hardly thirty-five sent their commissaries. This assembly called itself *the central revolutionary committee*. It was agreed that no register should be kept, that nothing which transpired should be committed to writing, and that no one should be suffered to retire till the sitting was broken up. The questions to be discussed were then fixed upon. The avowed objects for which this association had been formed was to consider the best means of enforcing the loan, and to frame a new list of the *suspected*. But the first words that were uttered began by declaring the patriots of the convention incapable of saving the commonweal, that it therefore became necessary to make provision for such incapacity, consequently there was a necessity of apprehending *suspected* persons, whether they existed in the administrations, the sections, or in the assembly itself, and to put it out of their power of committing any mischief. One member coolly and deliberately asserted that he knew no suspicious characters but what were in the convention, and that the blow should first alight there. He then proposed a simple method of effecting this: it was, to seize upon the twenty-two deputies, to carry them off to a certain house in the faubourgs, and there murder them, and then to forge letters giving out that they had emigrated. "We need not do this ourselves," added he, "for if we pay for this service, it will be easy to find executioners." Another member replied that this proposition was impracticable, and that it would be better to wait till Robespierre and Marat had brought forward their measures of insurrection, which doubtless would be found more effective. "Silence," cried many voices, "no names." A third member, a deputy from the section of 92, considered it unjustifiable to resort to assassination, so long as tribunals existed to pass judgment upon the enemies of the republic. This observation produced much tumult; the doctrine it contained was loudly exclaimed against; it was observed that none were suffered there but those who could bring themselves to a level with existing circumstances, and that every one ought to accuse his neighbour if he had any suspicion of his want of energy. And instantly that person who had shewn his hankering after laws or tribunals was expelled the assembly. It was perceived, at the same time, that a member of the section of the Fraternity, a section very unfavourably disposed towards the Jacobins, was taking notes, and he was forthwith expelled in the same manner as the former. The assembly then continued, in the same tone, to set about the proscription of the deputies, discussed the locality that was to be the scene of this *Septembrization*, and ordered the imprisonment of other *suspected* persons both in the commune and the sections. One member wished the execution to take place that very night, but he was answered that it was impracticable; he replied, that they had men all ready, and added, that at midnight Coligny was at the court, and that at one o'clock he was dead *.

The time elapsed in these and similar propositions; the discussion of these different measures was put off to the following day, and it was settled they should discuss three questions: 1. the carrying off of the deputies; 2. the proscription list of the *suspected*; 3. the purging of all the public offices and committees. They then adjourned till six o'clock the following evening.

On Monday, the 20th, this assembly met again; on this occasion Pache was present. He was presented with several lists of *suspected* persons, containing names of every degree. Some members observed that it was necessary that no handwriting of a member should be known, and that therefore the lists should be re-copied; others declared that the republicans had nothing to fear. Pache said that it mattered little to him how many knew he had been furnished with these lists, for they concerned the police of Paris, which was under his charge. The subtle and reserved character of Pache did not fail in consistency, and he was not desirous of taking any part in what was required of him, beyond what was prescribed by the law and by his office.

One member, taking notice of these precautions, remarked that he must certainly be ignorant of what had passed the evening before, that he could not know the order of the questions, and that the first was the carrying off the twenty-two deputies. Pache then observed that the persons of all the deputies were confided to the protection of the city of Paris, and that to use personal violence against them would compromise the capital with the departments, and provoke a civil war. He was asked, why then had he signed the petition of the 15th of April against the twenty-two? He replied, that in that case he did no more than his duty, in placing his signature to a petition which had been given him to present to the convention; but that the question at present proposed travelled out of the commission of the assembly, who had met solely for the purposes of taking expedient measures with regard to the loan and the *suspected* persons; and that if such discussions as the present were continued, he should be obliged to break up the sitting. These observations caused a great disturbance;

* In evident allusion to the fate of Coligny, who perished in the massacre of St. Bartholomew, in August, 1572, which lasted seven days: the present dark reference to this parallel of the September murders, seems to confirm what the author of *Curiosities of Literature* has asserted, *viz.* that this massacre, called by the world *religious*, was by the French cabinet considered at that time merely as a political or state expedient. *Trans.*

and as in the presence of Pache nothing could well be done, and as they had no taste for merely employing themselves upon the lists of *suspected* persons, they adjourned *sine die*.

On Tuesday, the 21st, there were no more than a dozen members present. Some were unwilling to assist at so tumultuous and violent a meeting; and others found that they were not able to deliberate there with sufficient energy.

It was at the club of the Cordeliers, therefore, that all the fury of the conspirators was on the next day, the 22nd, to discharge itself. The men, as well as women, uttered the most horrible yellings. It was an immediate insurrection that they wanted, and the blood of twenty-two deputies would not now satisfy them, but they thirsted for that of three hundred. One woman, speaking with the vehemence of her sex, proposed that all the citizens should assemble at the *place de la Revolution*, to present in a body a petition to the convention, and not go away until they had forced from them all those decrees which were indispensable to the public welfare. The young Varlet, who had been lately particularly conspicuous in every riot, presented some articles of a plan of insurrection; he proposed proceeding to the convention with the Rights of Man covered with crape, and carrying off all the deputies who belonged to the constituent and legislative assemblies, dismissing all the ministers, and putting the remainder of the Bourbon family to death. Legendre hastened to the tribune to protest against such proposals. The utmost pitch of his voice could hardly surmount the groans and the hootings which were directed against him, and with the greatest difficulty he proceeded with the utmost energy to combat the incendiary notions of young Varlet. Nevertheless, they would have a time fixed for the insurrection; they must needs appoint a day to go and demand of the convention what they desired: the night, however, being advanced, they all went away without having come to any decision whatever.

All Paris had been already apprised of what had been said, as well in the two assemblies held at the mayoralty on the 19th and 20th, as in the sitting of the Cordeliers of the 22nd. A great number of members of the *central revolutionary committee* had themselves denounced the designs which had there been then avowed, as well as the propositions which had been made; and the report of a conspiracy against a considerable body of citizens and deputies was every where circulated. The commission of twelve was informed of it with great minuteness, and prepared to put in action against the reputed authors of this plot the most violent measures.

The section of the Fraternity denounced them formally on the 24th, in an address to the convention; they reported what had been said and done in the assembly of the Mairie, and loudly accused the mayor himself of having assisted at the meeting. The right side seconded with their acclamations this spirited denunciation, demanding that Pache should be summoned to the bar. Marat replied, that the members of the right side were themselves the sole conspirators, and that Valazé, at whose house they were accustomed to meet every day, had advised them to arm themselves, in consequence of which they had repaired to the convention provided with pistols. "Yes!" exclaimed Valazé, "I did give this advice, because it became necessary to defend our lives, and by adopting my suggestion, we certainly should have preserved them." "Yes, yes!" energetically shouted all the members of the right side. Lasource added a fact of a very grave nature, namely, that the conspirators, apparently under the impression that the execution was to have taken place in the preceding night, came to his house for the purpose of carrying him off.

At this period, it was understood that the commission of twelve was supplied with all the necessary means for developing the conspiracy, and prosecuting its authors, and they announced their report thereon for the next day. The convention at the same time declared, that the section of the Fraternity had deserved well of the country.

On the evening of the same day, there was a great outcry at the municipality against the section of the Fraternity, who have, said they, calumniated the mayor and the patriots, by imagining that they were desirous of murdering the national representatives. Since the thing had been merely proposed, and had been opposed amongst others by the mayor, Chaumette, and the commune inferred that it was calumnious to characterize it as an absolute conspiracy, it certainly could not be deemed one in the strict sense of the word; it did not resemble those plots hatched in profound secrecy, such as are often concerted within the walls of palaces, but was, on the contrary, such as the multitudinous populace of a great city might form; it was the commencement of those popular movements tumultuously proposed and tumultuously executed by the deluded mob, as on the 14th of July and on the 10th of August. In this sense, it was undoubtedly a conspiracy; but it is almost useless to endeavour to arrest the progress of these general commotions, for they do not aim at attacking unawares that power which is unsuspicious and slumbering, but strike openly and fearlessly at that authority which is awake and vigilant.

On the succeeding day, the 24th, two other sections, those of the Tuileries and the Butte-des-Moulins, joined themselves to that of the Fraternity, for the purpose of denouncing the same proceedings. "If reason," said the section of the Butte-des-Moulins, "is not sufficient to weigh with them, make an appeal to the good citizens of Paris, and we can assure you, beforehand, that our section will itself contribute not a little to prostrate again to the dust these disguised royalists, who insolently assume the designation of *sans-culottes*." On this very day, the mayor wrote to the assembly an explanation of what had passed at the Mairie. "It was not," said he, "a conspiracy; it was a mere deliberation upon framing the lists of *suspected* persons. Certain hot-headed individuals had, it is true, interrupted the proceedings by the introduction of some unreasonable propositions, but as for Pache he had himself called to order those who had travelled out of the commission; but these ebullitions of the imagination were productive of no result." Little regard, however, was paid to this letter of Pache, whilst they listened to the Commission of Twelve, who presented themselves in order to suggest a decree of general safety. This decree placed the national representation, and the depôts

which contained the public treasure, under the safeguard and protection of the good citizens. All were required, at the sound of drum, to repair to the point for mustering the company of the quarter, and to march at the first signal which should be given. No one was to be absent from the appointed place; and, during the nomination of a commandant-general, to fill the situation of Santerre, who had departed for La Vendée, the oldest officer of the legion was to have the superior command. The meetings of the section were to be closed at ten o'clock in the evening, and their presidents were made responsible for the execution of this article. The draft of this decree was adopted without amendment, notwithstanding several debates, and the opinion of Danton, who said, that in thus putting the assembly and other public establishments under the protection of the citizens of Paris, they *decreed an acknowledgment of their own pusillanimity* (*on decrétait la peur*).

Immediately after having proposed this decree, the commission of twelve at once arrested the two administrators of police, Marino and Michel, who were accused of having, at the assembly of the Mairie, made those propositions which had been productive of so much alarm. Besides these, they also arrested the deputy of the procurator of the commune, named Hébert; a man who, under the style of *Père Duchêne*, had written a newspaper sheet still more abominable than that of Marat, and which he had, by a style of language, at once grovelling and revolting, levelled to the capacity of the lowest dregs of the populace. Hébert, in this newspaper, openly printed and published all the obnoxious things which the aforesaid Michel and Marino were accused of having verbally suggested at the Mairie. The commission appeared to think it their duty to prosecute both those who recommended, and those who would have executed a new insurrection. Scarcely was the mandate of arrest sent forth against Hébert, before he repaired in all haste to the commune to announce what had happened to him, and to show to the general council the mandate of arrest by which a blow had been struck at him. It would tear him away, he said, from the execution of all his functions, but nevertheless, he would obey it. The commune, he was sure, would not forget the oath they had taken, to consider themselves as collectively attacked in the person of one of their members. He did not invoke the recollection of this oath on his own account, for he was ready to lose his head on the scaffold, but on the part of his fellow-citizens, thus menaced with a new kind of slavery. Numerous cheers followed this harangue of Hébert. Chaumette, the procurator-in-chief, embraced him, as did also the president, in the name of the whole council. The sitting was declared permanent until they should receive tidings of Hébert. The members of the council were recommended to carry their condolements and assistance to the wives and children of all those who had been or should be imprisoned.

The sitting accordingly became permanent, and from hour to hour messengers were sent to the commission of twelve, to obtain news of their magistrate, who had been, to use his own expression, torn away from his functions. At half-past two o'clock in the morning, they learnt that he had undergone an interrogatory, and that Varlet had likewise been arrested. At four o'clock, it was announced that Hébert was imprisoned in the Abbaye. At five o'clock, Chaumette presented himself at the door of this prison, in order to obtain an interview with him, but he could not gain admission. In the morning, the council-general prepared a petition to the convention, and caused it to be carried by expresses through each of the sections, in order to secure their support. In almost every one of the sections great contrarieties existed. They were every moment constantly desiring to change the bureaux and the presidents, to make or to annul arrests, to support or oppose the system of the commune, to sign or reject any petition emanating from it. In the sequel, this petition, approved by a great number of sections, was presented on the day of the 25th, to the convention. The deputation of the commune complained of the calumnies circulated against the magistrates of the people; they required that the petition of the section of the Fraternity should be referred to the public prosecutor, in order that the culpable parties, if any, or else the calumniators, should be brought to punishment. In short, they demanded justice to be done upon the commission of twelve, who had perpetrated violence on the person of one of the public magistrates, in abstracting him from his functions, and imprisoning him in the Abbaye. Isnard was at this time president, and in that character addressed the deputation. "Magistrates of the people," commenced he, with a grave and severe tone, "it is especially necessary that you hearken to important truths. France has confided her representatives to the city of Paris, and she charges herself with their preservation. If the national representation has been violated by either of those conspiracies by which we have been surrounded since the 10th of March, an evil from which the magistrates have been the last to preserve us; I declare, in the name of the republic, that Paris should have felt the vengeance of France, and her name should have been rased from the list of cities." This reply, solemn in itself, and delivered impressively, produced in the assembly a profound emotion; a multitude of voices demanded that it should be printed. Danton asserted that this was calculated to augment the division which had begun to display itself between the capital and the departments, and that there was no necessity for doing any thing which might be likely to add to that unhappiness. The convention, being of opinion that sufficient impression had been made by the delivery of the speech, and by the energetic proceedings of the Twelve, passed at once to the order of the day, without giving any directions for the proposed printing of the president's reply.

The deputies of the commune were thus dismissed without obtaining any thing. The remainder of the 25th, and the whole of the next day, the 26th, passed in the exhibition of disorderly scenes among the sections. They disputed on all hands, and different opinions were alternately uppermost, according to the hour of the day, or the greater or lesser number of persons of each party present. The commune continued to send messengers to inquire into the state of M. Hébert. At one time, they found him asleep; at another,

he would beseech the commune to feel quite tranquil on his account. They complained that he was suffered to lie on a miserable truckle-bed. Some of the sections took him under their protection: others prepared themselves to demand anew his enlargement, with a superior degree of energy to that evinced by the municipality. Even women, running through the streets with a flag, did their utmost to draw a mob to the Abbaye, in order to liberate their dearly beloved magistrate.

On the 27th, the tumult had arisen to its height. There was nothing but going about from section to section, and fighting with chairs by way of settling the question; at length, towards evening, about twenty-eight sections had agreed to publish a resolution that Hébert should be released, and to draw up a peremptory petition to the convention. The commission of twelve, seeing the disturbance which was preparing, had intimated to the commandant on service, the necessity of requiring the armed force of three sections, and proceeded to specify those of the Butte des Moulins, of Lepelletier, and of the Mail, the most devoted to the right side, and even ready to fight for it. These three sections were, indeed, eager for the service, and they were, towards six o'clock in the evening of the 27th May, placed within the courts of the national palace, on the side of the Carousel, with their arms, field-pieces, cannon, and lighted matches. They accordingly presented an imposing appearance, and seemed capable of protecting the national representation. But the crowd which pressed round their ranks, and at different doors of the palace, the tumult which prevailed, the difficulty experienced in gaining admission to the hall, gave to this scene altogether the semblance of a siege. Several deputies obtained entrance with much ado, and had even borne numerous insults in the midst of this populace, and when they did obtain admission, they communicated the greatest alarm to the assembly, by declaring that it was in a state of blockade. However, such was not the fact, and although the entrances were obstructed, access was not denied. However, the appearance of things was quite sufficiently exciting for their heated imaginations, and there was nothing but confusion in the assembly. Isnard presided. The section of the city presented itself, and demanded the liberty of its president named Dobsen, who had been arrested by command of the commission of twelve, for having refused to communicate to them the registers of his section. They demanded, besides, the enlargement of several other prisoners, the suppression of the commission of twelve, and the impeachment of the members composing it. "The convention," replied Isnard, "pardons you, in consideration of your inexperience; it will never submit to be influenced by any mere popular party." The convention approved of this answer, which, on the other hand, was objected to by Robespierre. The right side opposed him, and a scene of indescribable uproar and struggling ensued; in fact, the tumult inside the assembly was in perfect keeping with that outside; the whole contributing to produce a commotion of the most appalling kind. At this moment, the mayor and the minister of the interior arrived at the bar, believing, as was reported throughout Paris that the convention was actually besieged. At the sight of the minister of the interior, a general cry was raised on all sides, to demand of him the state of Paris, and of the neighbourhood of the hall. The situation of Garat was embarrassing in no small degree, since both his timid, conciliating character, and his sceptical policy, forbade him to decide between the two parties. Notwithstanding this hesitation in forming his opinion, which proceeded, in fact, from real impartiality of spirit, he would have been happy that they should at that moment have heard and comprehended him; he proceeded, reverting to the origin of the troubles. The first cause, according to him, was the report bruited about of a seditious meeting formed at the Mairie, to conspire against the national representation. Garat then stated, according to Pache, that this meeting was not an assembly of conspirators, but a lawful meeting, having an avowed object in view; that if, in the absence of the mayor, some heated minds had suggested improper propositions, those propositions, which were rejected with indignation when the mayor was present, had produced no results, and that it was impossible to regard such acts as a conspiracy in the true sense of the word; that the institution of the commission of twelve, for the prosecution of this pretended plot, and the arrests made by its order, had been the cause of the troubles then existing; that he was unacquainted with Hébert, that he knew nothing unfavourable of him; that he merely knew Hébert to be the author of a sort of writing sufficiently contemptible, but which it was absurd to regard as dangerous; that the constituent and legislative assemblies had treated with silent contempt all the disgusting publications which had issued from the press against them, and that the rigour exercised towards Hébert had the air of novelty, nay, was perhaps unseasonable; that the commission of twelve, although undoubtedly composed of excellent and uncorrupted patriots, were possessed with singular prejudices, and appeared to be rather too much governed by the motive of exhibiting great energy. These words were enthusiastically applauded by the left side and also by the Mountain. Garat, coming at length to the consideration of immediate circumstances, assured the convention that it was in no possible danger, and that the citizens who then surrounded the palace were by no means deficient in respect for the members. On this, a deputy interrupted the speaker, by averring that he had been insulted. "Be it so," replied Garat, "I cannot answer for what may have happened to an individual in the midst of a crowd composed of men of every degree; but let the assembly collectively present itself at the entrance, and I will engage that the entire multitude will give way before it with the utmost deference, that they will greet its presence, and obey its command."

Garat concluded by directing their attention to various conciliatory plans, and demonstrated with the greatest address, that it was in attempting to repress the violences of the Jacobins that they had run the risk of exciting them still more. Garat doubtless was right. It was the effort to restrain and to act on the defensive against that party which irritated it still higher, and which precipitated the catastrophe: but when the contest is inevitable, is it natural to yield without one struggle? Such

was the situation of the Girondists; their institution of the commission of twelve was an act of great imprudence, but yet an imprudence they could hardly avoid committing, and its motive was generous.

Garat, having concluded, placed himself nobly on the right side, which had been considered as in jeopardy, and the convention voted the printing and distribution of his speech. Pache was next heard, and he took pretty nearly the same grounds that had been gone over by Garat: he reminded the convention that it was guarded by three sections wholly devoted to their service, and summoned thither by the commission of twelve itself: he even asserted, that in taking that step, the commission had exceeded its powers, since it did not legally possess the right of calling out an armed force: he added, that a strong detachment protected the prisons of the Abbaye from the risk of any infraction of the laws, that all danger was dispelled, and that the assembly might regard itself as being in perfect security. He demanded, in conclusion, that the convention should, on its own part, lend an attentive ear to those citizens who required the enlargement of the arrested persons.

At the end of this speech there arose expressions of great discontent, which ran through the assembly. "It is ten o'clock," cried one on the right side, "the president should adjourn the sitting!" "No, no," exclaimed several voices on the left; "hear the petitioners." Henry Larivière persevered in getting possession of the tribune. "If," said he, "you will give audience to every one, you should also hear your commission of twelve, whom you accuse of tyranny, and who at least should have an opportunity of explaining their proceedings, to the end that you may be enabled justly to appreciate them." Noise and confusion drowned the orator's voice. Isnard, the president, being quite unable to control this disorder, quitted the chair, and was succeeded by Hérault-Séchelles, who was greeted by the warm applauses of the galleries. He put the question to the assembly, who, influenced by intimidation and uproar, voted in the midst of the confusion, that the sitting should be continued.

The orators now stood at the bar; they were followed by a cloud of petitioners. They imperiously demanded the suppression of an odious and tyrannical commission, the enlargement of the prisoners, and the *triumph of virtue*. "Citizens," exclaimed Hérault-Séchelles, in reply, "*the force of reason and that of the people is the same thing.*" Shouts of approbation followed this dogmatical nonsense. "You demand justice," proceeded he; "justice is our first duty, it shall be extended to you."

Other bodies of petitioners succeeded these. Sundry orators addressed the assembly, and the form of a decree was proposed, whereby the incarcerated citizens were released, the commission of twelve dissolved, and its conduct submitted for examination to the committee of general safety. The night advanced, the petitioners were admitted in crowds, and obstructed the hall. The time of night, the shouts, the uproar, the huge masses of people, all contributed to augment the anarchy which prevailed. The decree was put to the vote, and carried, although it was impossible to discover whether fairly or not. Some said that the president had not been heard; others that the votes were not sufficient in number; others, again, that the petitioners themselves had voted in the place of absent members, and that consequently the decree was invalid. Notwithstanding all these objections, it was proclaimed, and the persons in the galleries and petitioners ran off, and set about announcing to the commune, the sections, Jacobins, and Cordeliers, that the prisoners were freed, and the commission annulled.

This intelligence diffused the greatest joy amongst the populace, and imparted a momentary repose to Paris. The countenance even of the mayor seemed to display sincere pleasure on seeing the disturbances quieted. However, the Girondists, determined, although despairingly, to protract the contest, and not to yield the victory to their adversaries, re-assembled on the following day with the loudest expressions of indignation. Lanjuinais, more particularly, who had taken no part in the haughty animosities of the two sides, and whose opinionated spirit had been overlooked because he seemed incapable of being actuated by personal resentment,—Lanjuinais himself came down, stirred up by excitement, and the determination of making the assembly feel ashamed of the pusillanimity of its last night's sitting. No sooner had Osselin required the settling of the decree and its definitive confirmation, for the purpose of the immediate enlargement of the prisoners, than Lanjuinais rushed forward to the tribune, and asked for leave to move that the decree was null, and had not been properly carried. Violent expressions of dissatisfaction interrupted him. "Don't interrupt me," exclaimed he, to the left side, "for I am resolved to remain here until you shall have heard me." Still they would not consent to listen to Lanjuinais, unless in reference to the form of the decree. However, after two ineffectual endeavours, it was at length decided to give him a hearing. He then explained himself, and maintained that the question which agitated them was one of vital importance to the general safety. "Upwards of fifty thousand citizens," said he, "have been incarcerated throughout France by your commissaries: they have made more arbitrary arrests in one month than took place under the old government in a century; and yet you now complain of the imprisonment of two or three men, who have preached murder and anarchy at the rate of two sous a sheet. Your commissaries are proconsuls, who being placed far from your immediate control, are left to act as they please, whilst you distrust and suppress the commission at your very side and under your actual superintendence. Last Sunday it was proposed at the Jacobins to perpetrate a massacre in Paris, and this evening the same proposition has been discussed at the Evêché: the proofs of this have been furnished; they are offered you, and you reject them. You are affording protection to men of blood!"—The uproar increased at these words, and drowned the voice of Lanjuinais. "We can deliberate no longer," exclaimed Chambon; "nothing remains to be done, but for us to retire to our departments." "Your doors are besieged," replied Lanjuinais. "That is false," shouted the left side. "Yesterday," continued Lanjuinais, with all his energy, "yesterday

you were not free; you were domineered over by those who preached up murder." Legendre, from his place, loudly exclaimed, "Their aim is to make us lose our sitting! I protest that if Lanjuinais continues his slanders, I will hurl him to the foot of the tribune!" This scandalous threat drew down censure from the assembly, and plaudits from the galleries. Guadet soon after demanded that the words of Legendre should be inserted in the minutes and circulated throughout France, that she might know how her deputies were treated. Lanjuinais, continuing, repeated that the decree of the past night had not been lawfully carried, since the petitioners had voted along with the deputies; or, even were that not the case, the matter should be reconsidered, as, at all events, the assembly was not then unbiassed. "When you are free," added Lanjuinais, "you do not vote impunity to crime." On the left, it was affirmed that Lanjuinais falsified the facts: that the petitioners had not voted, that they had even retired into the passages On the right, the contrary was maintained; and without being heard at all on this point, they put to the vote the repeal of the decree, which was carried by a majority of fifty-one. "You have done," then exclaimed Danton, "a great act of justice, and I hope that, before the end of the sitting, it will be again brought forward. But if the commission which you are now about to re-establish retains the exercise of its tyrannical powers, if the magistrates of the people are not restored to liberty and their functions, then I declare to you that, after having proved that we surpass our enemies in prudence and sagacity, we shall also prove *that we are capable of going beyond them in audacity and revolutionary vigour.*" The provisional enlargement of the arrested parties was then put to the vote, and carried unanimously. Rabaut St. Etienne wished to be heard on the part of the commission of twelve; he called for attention in the name of the public safety, but could not make himself be heard; in conclusion, he gave in his resignation.

The decree was thus repealed, and the regaining of the majority by the right side appeared to prove that it had only appertained to the left during some moments of distraction. Although the magistrates in question had been released, although Hébert had been restored to the commune, where he was received with garlands, notwithstanding this, the repeal of the decree had raised up a multitude of passions, and the storm which had appeared to have subsided for a moment, began to blister anew with terrible violence.

The same day, the assembly which had been held at the Mairie, and which had ceased to meet since the mayor had prohibited the discussion of the propositions denominated those of the *public welfare*, was called together again at the Evêché in the electoral club, whither several electors occasionally resorted. This assembly was composed of commissaries of the sections, chosen in the committees of superintendance, of commissaries of the commune, of the department, and of various clubs. Even the women were represented there, and out of a number of five hundred persons a hundred females might be counted, at the head of whom one was placed who had been rendered conspicuous by her political ravings and popular eloquence. On the first day there appeared at this meeting no more than the deputies from thirty-six sections; there remained twelve who had not deputed any commissaries; and to these a fresh summons was addressed. The assembly occupied itself at length in naming a commission of six members, charged with the consideration of, and report upon, the measures to be adopted for ensuring the general safety. After this preliminary act, they adjourned till the morrow, the 29th.

The same evening, a great tumult occurred among the sections; in spite of the decree of the convention, by virtue of which their sittings were to close at ten o'clock, they prolonged them considerably later, constituting themselves at that hour into patriotic societies, under which new designation they carried their debates far into the night. In some of these meetings, fresh addresses were framed against the commission of twelve; in others, they drew up petitions to the assembly, demanding an explanation of the words of its president, Isnard,—"*Paris shall be razed from the list of cities.*"

At the commune, Chaumette made a long speech on the palpable conspiracy which had been devised against liberty, the ministry, and the right side, &c. Hébert having come among them, related the particulars of his imprisonment; upon this, he received a garland (which he deposited upon the bust of J. J. Rousseau) and finally returned to his section, accompanied by the commissaries of the commune, who paraded in triumph the magistrate thus delivered from his fetters.

Next day, the 29th, the convention was afflicted with new intelligence of a distressing kind, coming from the two most important military points; the North and La Vendée. The army of the north had been repelled between Bouchain and Cambray, and the latter town and Valenciennes were deprived of all communication. At Fontenay the republican troops had been completely defeated by general Lescure, who had taken possession of Fontenay itself. This news occasioned the greatest consternation, and rendered the state of the moderate party more dangerous. The sections came in procession with banners bearing these words—*Resistance to oppression.* Some among them required, as they had announced the preceding night, an explanation of the words of Isnard; others declared, that there was no other inviolability except that of the people, and that consequently those deputies who had sought to arm the departments against Paris should be impeached; that the commission of twelve should be annulled; that a revolutionary army should be organized, &c.

At the Jacobins the sitting was not without its special object. On all sides, it was proclaimed that the moment had arrived when it was at length necessary to save the people; and whenever a member presented himself to suggest the measures to be employed, he was referred to the *commission of six*, nominated at the central club. "That," said they, "has it in charge to provide for every thing, and to pursue the means of securing the public welfare." Legendre, wishing to speak of the dangers of the day, and of the necessity of exhausting lawful measures before recourse was had to extremities, was treated as a double dealer. Robespierre, without explaining himself, said that it was for the commune to *closely identify itself with the*

people; that, as for himself, he was incapable of prescribing the means of security; that such a service was not to be accomplished by any single man, certainly not by him, worn out by four years of revolution, and consumed by a fever, slow, yet mortal.

These words from the tribune made a great sensation, and called forth animated cheers. These words sufficiently indicated that he as well as every body else deferred taking any settled course until it had been settled by the municipal authority at the Evêché what they would do. This assembly of the Evêché, again met, and, as on the preceding night, a considerable number of females mixed with the members. Its first act was to impart confidence to *propriétaires* by swearing to respect property. Property was respected, said they, even on the 10th of August and 14th of July; and instantly they took the oath to respect it on the 31st of May, 1793. After this, Dufourny, member of the commission of six, said that, without a commandant-general of the Parisian guard, it would be impossible to answer for any favourable result, and that he felt himself called on to demand the nomination of one without delay by the commune. A woman, the celebrated Lacombe, seconded the motion of Dufourny, declaring, that without prompt and vigorous measures it would be impossible to protect themselves. On this, they despatched deputies to the commune, and that body replied much in the language adopted by Pache, that the mode of nominating a commandant-general was by the regulated decrees of the convention, and inasmuch as this mode prohibited the commune from naming one itself, all they could do therefore was to wish them success. It was in point of fact nothing more than a recommendation to the club to consider this appointment among the number of those extraordinary measures it behoved them to take for that public welfare which they were bound to protect. The assembly subsequently invited all the cantons of the departments to unite themselves with it, and despatched deputies for that purpose to Versailles. A blind confidence was required in the name of the six, and a promise was exacted that all their suggestions should be executed without examination. Silence was prescribed on every subject which regarded the grand question of *the means*, and they adjourned until the following morning at nine o'clock, in order then to commence a sitting which should be permanent and decisive.

The commission of twelve was apprized of all this the same evening: the committee of public safety knew it also, and learnt besides, by means of a placard printed in the course of the day, that there had been suspicious private meetings at Charenton, at which Danton, Marat, and Robespierre had attended. The committee of public welfare, profiting by a moment at which Danton was absent from it, commanded the minister of the interior to make the most active inquisition for the discovery of this secret suspicious meeting. Nothing, however, was discovered, and every inquiry tended to prove that the rumours were groundless. It appeared altogether a fabrication, originating with the municipal assembly Robespierre ardently desired a revolution which should be openly directly against his antagonists the Girondists, but he did not choose to compromise himself in order to forward such a scheme; it was enough for him to let it take its course, as he had repeatedly done in former instances during the month of May. In fact, his language held to the Jacobins, wherein he said that the commune ought to closely identify itself with the people, and devise those means he was unable of himself to suggest, was an actual connivance at insurrection *. This acquiescence was quite sufficient, and there was excitement enough at the central club to operate, without mixing himself up with their proceedings. As for Marat, he aided the movement by his newspapers, and by his outrageous behaviour every day at the convention, but he was not one of the commission of six, absolutely charged with the insurrection. The only man who could be suspected to have been the concealed author of this movement was Danton, but he was irresolute; he desired the abolition of the commission of twelve, yet at the same time he did not wish that any interference with the national representation should take place. Meilhan, meeting him in the course of the day, at the committee of public safety, accosted him, conversed with him amicably, and gave him to understand the distinction the Girondists made between him and Robespierre, what consideration they had for his great influence, and ended by observing what a grand part he would be enabled to play by using his power for the general benefit, and the support of honest men. Danton, affected by these words, hastily raised his head, and said to Meilhan, "You Girondists have no confidence in me." Meilhan renewed his former assertions. "They have no kind of confidence," repeated Danton, who parted without desiring to continue the conversation. These expressions completely demonstrated the bias of this man. He despised this municipal populace; he had no taste either for Robespierre or Marat, and would have preferred to place himself at the head of the Girondists, had he not known them destitute of all confidence in him. A difference both of conduct and principles separated them entirely; besides this, Danton could not discover, either in their character or opinions, that energy which was requisite in order to preserve the revolution, the grand object which he regarded beyond every thing else. Danton, indifferent to persons, sought but to distinguish *that* one of the two parties who could ensure to the revolution the most certain and rapid progress. Possessing entire control over the Cordeliers and the commission of six, it is to be presumed, that he had a great part in the movement which was then preparing, and it appeared as if he would first of all have overthrown the commission of twelve, sure enough of seeing what he wished come to pass afterwards with respect to the Girondists.

At length, the scheme of the insurrection was formed in the heads of the conspirators of the central revolutionary club. They did not intend, to use their own expression, to create a *physical* insurrection, but one *altogether moral*; to respect persons and property; in short, to violate, in the most methodical manner possible, both the laws and the liberty of the convention. Their scope was to put the commune into a state of insurrec-

* See note 54 in the Appendix.

tion, to summon in its name all the armed force which it had the right of calling out, to surround the convention with this armed body, and to make an address to it, which should in form seem nought else than a petition, but in substance should operate as a command; they meant, in a word, to petition sword in hand.

On Thursday, the 30th, the commissioners of the sections assembled at the Evêché, and formed themselves into what they called the *Republican Union*. Invested with full powers from all the sections, they declared themselves in insurrection for the purpose of preserving the common weal, menaced by an *aristocratical and liberty-oppressing faction*. The mayor, persisting in his ordinary line of conduct, made certain representations as to the character of this measure, which, however, he contented himself by mildly protesting against, and concluded by rendering obedience to the insurgents, who ordered him to repair to the commune to proclaim what they were about to decree. It was in the sequel resolved that the forty-eight sections should be assembled for the purpose of promulgating, that same day, their resolution in regard to the intended insurrection, and that immediately afterwards the tocsin should be rung, the barriers closed, and the *générale* beaten in all the streets. The sections accordingly did assemble, and the day passed in collecting, in an uproarious manner, the vote in favour of the insurrection. The committee of public welfare, and the commission of twelve, sent messengers to the authorities to ascertain what all this meant. The mayor informed them, with a show at least of apparent regret, of the plan formed at the Evêché. L'Huillier, procurator-syndic of the department, declared openly and with a calm confidence of manner, the present scheme of this *entirely moral* insurrection, and he then quietly rejoined his colleagues.

Thus terminated the proceedings of the day, and at dusk the clang of the tocsin, and the beating of the *générale*, resounded through every street, the barriers were closed, and the citizens asked each other in amaze whether new massacres were not about to dabble the capital with their blood. All the deputies of the Gironde, as well as the threatened ministers, passed that night from home. Roland went to hide himself at the house of a friend. Buzot, Louvet, Barbaroux, Guadet, Bergoing, and Rabaut St. Etienne, intrenched themselves in a detached room, furnished with good weapons of defence, and ready, in case of attack, to defend themselves to the last drop of their blood. At five o'clock in the morning, they issued forth with the intent of delivering themselves up to the convention, where, under favour of the early dawn, several members had already assembled, summoned thither by the tocsin. Their arms, which they carried openly, prevented their being attacked by the crowds through whom they passed, and they arrived at the convention, where they already found several *Mountaineers*, and where Danton was chatting with Garat. "Observe," exclaimed Louvet to Guadet, "what horrible expectation lightens up those countenances." "Doubtless," replied Guadet, "it is to-day that Clodius exiles Cicero." Garat, who on his part had been astonished to find Danton thus early at the assembly, observed him attentively. "Why all this uproar?" said he to Danton, "and what would they have?" "Nothing will come of it," replied the latter, dryly, "we must let them break up a few printers' presses", and send them about their business afterwards." Twenty-eight deputies were present. Fermont occupied, for a moment, the chair; Guadet sat boldly as his secretary; the number of deputies continued to increase, and they awaited the moment to open the sitting.

Meanwhile, the insurrection was carried into effect at the commune. The delegates of the central revolutionary committee, having at their head the president Dobsen, presented themselves at the *Hôtel de Ville*, provided with full revolutionary powers. Dobsen commenced his address by declaring to the council-general that the people of Paris, deprived of their rights, were about to annul all the constituted authorities. The vice-president of the council required to be apprized of the powers of the committee. He examined them, and finding they expressed the resolution of thirty-three sections of Paris, he declared that the majority of the sections abrogated the constituted authorities. In consequence, the council-general and its officers retired; Dobsen, with the commissaries, assumed the vacant place amidst shouts of "Long live the Republic!" He subsequently deliberated with this new assembly, and proposed to reinstate the municipality and council-general in all their functions, seeing that neither the one or the other had ever been wanting in their duty towards the people. Immediately on this, they restored the old municipality and council-general with loud acclamations. The intent of these apparent formalities was no other than to revive the municipal authorities with additional powers, which should, indeed, be unlimited, and sufficient for the purposes of the insurrection. Immediately after this, a new provisional commandant-general was proposed. This person was named Henriot, a coarse sort of man, devoted to the commune, and commandant of the battalion of *sans-culotte*. In order to ensure the assistance of the people, and to keep itself in an armed state during these moments of agitation, it was decreed that forty sous per day should be given to each of the poorer citizens on service, and that these should be immediately chargeable on the produce of a forced loan, to be levied on the wealthy. This was a sure means of arming in the interests of the commune and against those of the sections, all the working-men, who preferred gaining forty sous a day, by taking part in these revolutionary measures, to earning thirty by working at their customary employments.

During the time that all these determinations were forming at the commune, the citizens of the capital assembled at the sound of the tocsin, and collected round a flag, posted at the door of each captain of a section. A great number knew not what to think of these movements; many inquired of each other why they had assembled, ignorant of the measures which had been taken during the night, both by the commune and sections. In this state of mind, they were incapable either of acting for themselves, or showing any resistance to what might strike them as being wrong; and thus, while they all heartily disapproved of the insurrection, they appeared to be countenancing it by their pre-

* Alluding to a previous act of this description, *ante*, p. 220. col. 2.

sence. Upwards of 80,000 armed men traversed the streets of Paris with the utmost tranquillity, suffering themselves to be quietly led, by the audacious authority which had thus assumed the reins of government. The sections of the Butte-des-Moulins, Mail, and the Champs Elysées, who had long declared themselves against the commune and the Mountain, were alone prepared to offer resistance, inasmuch as the danger which they partook in common with the Girondists, inspired them with a little more courage. They assembled together, armed, and awaited what should take place, in the attitude of men who believed themselves menaced, and stood on the defensive. The Jacobins and *sans-culottes*, dismayed by these manifestations of resistance, and always apt to magnify appearances, ran about in the Faubourg St. Antoine, crying out that the revolted sections were about to hoist the cockade and white flag, and that it was necessary to resort to the centre of Paris, in order to put a stop to a royalist explosion. In order to excite a more general impulse, it was proposed to fire the alarm gun. This had been placed at the Pont Neuf, and the punishment of death was awarded against any one who should fire or cause it to be fired without the decree of the convention. Henriot, however, gave orders to fire, but the commandant of the post had refused to obey this order, and required a decree to warrant him in so doing. The messengers of Henriot being reinforced, the commandant and his adherents were overcome, and in a moment the report of the alarm-gun was added to the noise occasioned by the tocsin and the beating of the *générale*.

The convention having met early in the morning, issued warrants on the instant to all the various authorities, requiring to be informed of the actual situation of the capital. Garat, who was present in the hall, and had been employed in attendance upon Danton, was the first of those who appeared at the tribune, and he reported nothing but what was already well known, namely, that an assembly had been held at the Evêché, which had demanded a reparation of the injuries that had been inflicted upon Paris, as well as the abolition of the commission of twelve. Scarcely had Garat finished speaking, when the new commissaries, styling themselves the administration of the department of the Seine, presented themselves at the bar, and declared that they were carrying on nothing but a *purely moral* insurrection, which had for its object reparation for the outrages that had been inflicted upon the city of Paris. They added, that the greatest order was preserved, that each citizen had sworn to respect both persons and property, that the armed citizens traversed the streets inoffensively, and that all the assembled authorities would arrive in the course of the day to communicate to the convention their professions of attachment and their requisitions.

The president, Mallarmé, immediately communicated a note from the commandant of the post at the Pont Neuf, reporting the contest which had arisen respecting the alarm-gun. Dufriche-Valazé instantly demanded that the authors of this movement should be looked to, as well as those who had reprehensibly rung the tocsin, and that the commandant should be arrested who had been audacious enough to cause the alarm-gun to be fired without the decree of the convention. At this demand, the galleries and the left side raised an outcry which it was no more than natural should excite some apprehension. It did not, however, discourage Valazé. He said that they should not induce him to compromise his character; that he was a representative of twenty-five millions of men, and that he would persevere in his duty to the last. He demanded, in conclusion, that they should on the instant give audience to the commission of twelve, which had been so calumniated, and that they should listen to its report, for that what had occurred afforded proof of those conspiracies which it had never ceased to denounce. Thuriot replied to this speech of Valazé; words ran high, and a disturbance commenced. Mathieu and Cambon endeavoured to act as mediators; they implored silence from the galleries, and moderation from the orators of the right side, and strove to impress on all parties that, at this precise time, a conflict in the metropolis would be fatal to the revolutionary cause; that quiet was the only means of maintaining the dignity of the convention, which dignity was, in its turn, the sole means by which that assembly could succeed in making itself respected by the malcontents. Vergniaud, disposed, like Mathieu and Cambon, to employ conciliatory methods, professed that he also regarded the contest in which they seemed ready to engage as fatal to liberty and the revolution. He confined himself, afterwards, to reproaching Thuriot, although mildly, with having sought to aggravate the dangers under which the commission of twelve already lay, by depicturing it as the scourge of France, at the very moment when every popular movement was directed against it. He was of opinion that if it had been guilty of arbitrary exercises of power, it was just to dissolve it; but that it should first be heard; and that since its report would necessarily tend to rouse the passions, it would be politic to delay it until a calmer moment. This, according to his notion, was the only means to maintain the dignity of the assembly, and to demonstrate that it was not acting under restraint. For the present, it was most desirable to ascertain who had given, in Paris, the order to sound the tocsin and to fire the alarm-gun; they ought not, at least, to hesitate in summoning to their bar the provisional commandant-general. "I repeat to you," exclaimed Vergniaud, in conclusion, "that, whatever may be the issue of the combat in which we may engage to-day, it will bring with it, in its train, the destruction of liberty; let us swear, then, to remain firm to our duty, and to die each of us at his post, rather than abandon the common weal." The assembly rose immediately, and took the oath proposed by Vergniaud. Subsequently, they debated on the proposition of summoning the commandant-general to the bar. Danton, upon whom, at this moment, all eyes were fixed, and of whom the Girondists and the *Mountaineers* had appeared to demand whether he were the originator of the movements of the day, presented himself at the tribune, and at once obtained the most profound attention. "What we must first do," said he, "is to suppress the commission of twelve. That is a far more important point than to summon to our bar the commandant-general.

It is to men endowed with political understanding that I address myself. To call Henriot before us will answer no purpose in the present state of things; for it is not desirable to trouble ourselves with the instrument, but with the cause of these disturbances. Now this cause is the commission of twelve. I do not pretend to decide on its conduct or its actions; it is not for having committed arbitrary arrests that I attack it—it is as being an impolitic institution that I call upon you to put it down." "Impolitic!" exclaimed they on the right side, "we do not quite comprehend that." "Do not you comprehend it!" rejoined Danton; "then it is necessary to explain it to you. This commission was constituted for no other purpose than to repress the popular energy, and it has not been considered that it is this very spirit of *moderatism* which will destroy the revolution and France itself. This commission has devoted itself to the prosecution of those energetic magistrates whose only fault was the awakening of the public ardour. I will not pause to examine whether these prosecutions have not been made subservient to personal resentments, but it has unequivocally shown a disposition which we ought this day to condemn. You yourselves, on the report of your minister of the interior, whose character is so mild, whose spirit is so impartial, so pure, have enlarged those individuals whom the commission of twelve had imprisoned: what then are you about with the commission itself, since you annul its acts! The cannon has pealed, the people have risen, and we should do right to thank the people for their energy in the interest of that self-same cause which we support; and if you are *politic legislators*, you will yourselves applaud their spirit, you will retrace your own errors, and you will abolish your commission. I address myself," again exclaimed Danton, "only to those men whose eyes are open to our situation, and not to such dull beings as, in the midst of these grand movements, listen but to the language of their own passions. Hesitate not, therefore, to satisfy the people." "What people!" shouted the members on the right side. "What people!" returned Danton, "this immense population, which is our advanced sentinel, which hates vehemently both tyranny and the cowardly *moderatism* which would restore it. Hasten to satisfy it; save it from the aristocrats; save it from the effects of its own fury; and if, when it shall have been satisfied, any perverse men (no matter to what party they may appertain) should desire to prolong an insurrection then become useless, Paris itself will compel them to shrink back into their own nothingness."

Rabaut St. Etienne sought to justify the commission of twelve on the score of good policy, and set himself to prove that nothing could be more politic than to create a commission to discover the plots of Pitt and of Austria, who fomented by the influence of their secret service money, all the disturbances that existed in France. "Down!" cried some, "let us hear no more of Rabaut!" "No!" exclaimed Bazin, "leave him to himself; he is a liar! I will prove that his commission has organized civil war in Paris." Rabaut endeavoured to proceed. Marat requested the admission of a deputation from the commune. "Permit me first to conclude," said Rabaut. "The commune! the commune! the commune!" shouted the galleries and the Mountain. "I must declare," replied Rabaut, "that when I would address to you the words of truth, you have interrupted me." "Well, then, conclude!" said they to him. Rabaut then finished by suggesting that the commission might be suppressed if they pleased; but that the committee of public welfare should be immediately charged to pursue all those inquiries which they had already commenced.

The deputation from the insurrectional commune was now introduced. "A grand conspiracy has been formed," said this deputation, "but it has also been discovered; the people, who aroused themselves on the 14th of July, and the 10th of August, to overthrow tyranny, have risen anew to stop the counter-revolution. The council-general has sent us to explain to you the measures which it has adopted. The first has been, to place property under the safeguard of republicans: the second, to allow forty sous a day to those citizens who consent to remain under arms; the third, to frame a commission for the purpose of communicating with the convention during the period of agitation. The council-general conjure you to appoint for this commission a hall immediately proximate to your own, where its members may sit and co-operate with you."

Scarcely had the deputation ceased its address, when Guadet presented himself, for the purpose of replying to their demands. This was not the member among the Girondists whose presence was best calculated to allay the excitement of the passions. "The commune," said he, "in pretending to have discovered a conspiracy, is only deceived in one word: it should have said that it has executed one." Groans from the galleries interrupted him. Vergniaud moved that they should be cleared. A horrible tumult arose on this, and nothing could be heard but confused outcries during a considerable space of time. The president, Mallarmé, repeated, but in vain, that if the convention were not respected, it would put in force the authority with which the laws had invested it. Guadet occupied the tribune throughout the uproar, and hardly contrived to get a sentence heard now and then in the intervals of this disorder. In the end, he proposed that the convention should suspend its deliberations until its liberty should be secured, and that the commission of twelve should be charged to prosecute, on the instant, all those who had sounded the tocsin and fired the alarm-gun. Such a proposition as this was not calculated to appease the tumult. Vergniaud would have re-appeared at the tribune to restore a little calm, but a fresh deputation from the municipality arrived to reiterate the requisitions it had already made. The convention, pressed anew, could no longer hold out, and decreed that the workmen embodied to watch over public order and property, should receive forty sous per day*; and that a chamber should be provided for the commissaries of the

* 1s. 6d. sterling, being an excess in the proportion of a fourth part over the wages of an ordinary mechanic; indeed, considering the scarcity of provisions and the value of money at that period, the present employment might be said to exceed by one-half the average earnings of an able workman. *Trans.*

city authorities, that they might act in concert with the committee of public welfare.

After this decree, Couthon was about to reply to Guadet, and the day, already far advanced, was consumed in discussions destitute of any result. All the male population of Paris, assembled under arms, continued to march through the city, with the greatest regularity, and in the same uncertainty of object. The commune occupied itself in framing new addresses relating to the commission of twelve, and the assembly ceased not to agitate itself either for or against the commission. Vergniaud, who happened to go for a moment out of the hall, and who had thus witnessed the singular spectacle of a whole population not knowing what part to take, and ready to obey blindly the first authority which should assume the direction of it, considered in what way there was a chance of profiting by this tendency, and brought forward a motion, the scope of which was to distinguish the agitators of the Parisian people, and to attach the latter to himself by a demonstration of confidence. "I am," said he to the assembly, "far from accusing either the majority or minority of the city of Paris; this day will serve to render evident the great affection Paris has for liberty. It is sufficient to walk through the streets, in order to perceive the order which reigns therein, the numerous patrols which promenade there. The sight of this touching spectacle affords sufficient ground to declare that Paris has deserved well at the hands of the whole country."

At these words, all the assembly rose, and voted with acclamations that Paris had deserved well of the country. The Mountain and the galleries applauded, surprised to hear such a proposition issue from the mouth of Vergniaud. This motion was, doubtless, but a mere flattering demonstration, exceedingly well managed, but could not afford the means of awakening the zeal of the sections, nor could such a mark of confidence bring round him those who had all along approved of the proceedings of the commune, or infuse sufficient courage and spirit to enable them to successfully resist the progress of the insurrection.

At this moment, the section of the Faubourg St. Antoine, excited by the emissaries who had come to tell them that the Butte-des-Moulins had displayed the white cockade, came down towards the interior of Paris with its guns, and stopped at some paces from the Palais-Royal, where the section of the Butte-des-Moulins had intrenched itself. The latter had put itself in order of battle in the garden, had closed all the gates, and held itself ready with its guns, to stand a siege in case of attack. Outside, the people still circulated the report that it had mounted the white cockade and flag, and urged the section of the Faubourg St. Antoine to commence the attack. Nevertheless, several officers of the latter represented that, before proceeding to these extremities, it was requisite to assure themselves of the facts, and endeavour to put matters upon a right footing. They presented themselves at the gates, and demanded to speak with the officers of the Butte-des-Moulins. They were admitted, and found no colours but the national flags. Then followed explanations and mutual embraces: the St. Antoine officers returned to their battalions, and immediately after, the reconciled sections united with each other, and traversed the streets of Paris together.

Thus the submission became hourly more general, and they left the new commune to continue their squabbles with the convention. At this moment, Barrère, always ready to suggest temporizing plans, proposed, in the name of the committee of public welfare, to abolish the commission of twelve, but at the same time to place the armed force at the disposal of the convention. Whilst he was explaining his scheme, a third deputation arrived, to express their final intentions to the assembly, in the name of the department, of the commune, and of the commissaries of sections, at a special meeting at the Evêché.

The procurator-syndic of the department, L'Huillier, addressed the assembly.

"Legislators," said he, "for a long time past, the city and department of Paris have been calumniated in the eyes of the world. The same men who have sought to ruin Paris in the public estimation are those who favoured the massacres of La Vendée; they are those who flatter and support the hopes of our enemies; they are those who degrade the constituted authorities, and seek to mislead the people, in order that they may possess the right to make complaints against them; they are those who have denounced to you imaginary plots, in order to create real ones; they are those who have demanded at your hands the commission of twelve to oppress the liberty of the people; they are those, in short, who, by a wicked agitation, by addresses stuffed with false suggestions, and by their correspondence, maintain animosities and divisions in your hearts, and deprive their country of the greatest of benefits, that of a good constitution, which it has earned by so many sacrifices."

After this vehement apostrophe, L'Huillier denounced projects of federalism, declared that the city of Paris would perish in order to sustain the unity of the republic, and demanded justice for the celebrated words of Isnard, "*Paris shall be razed from the list of cities.*"

"Legislators!" exclaimed he, "was the project of destroying Paris well formed? Would you have desolated this sacred depôt of the arts and of human knowledge?" After these affected lamentations, he demanded vengeance against Isnard, the twelve, and *many other culprits*, such as Brissot, Guadet, Vergniaud, Gensonné, Buzot, Barbaroux, Roland, Lebrun, Clavière, &c.

The right side remained silent, the left applauded, as did also the galleries. The president, Grégoire, replied to L'Huillier by emphatic praises of Paris, and invited the deputation to the honours of the session. The petitioners who composed it were mixed up with a great crowd of people, too numerous to be accommodated at the bar; they went and placed themselves by the side of the Mountain, who received them with eagerness, and made way for them. A multitude of unknown persons was then dispersed throughout the hall, and mixed with the assembly itself. The galleries, at this spectacle of *fraternity* between the people and their representatives, reiterated their plaudits. Osselin immediately moved that the petition should be printed, and that they should deliberate upon its contents, according to a draft framed by Barrère. "President," exclaimed Vergniaud, "con-

sult the assembly, and ascertain whether it will enter into a debate in its present state." "Put the project of Barrère to the vote," cried they on the left. "We protest," returned the members on the right, "against all debate." "The convention is not free," said Doulcet. "Well, then," replied Levasseur, "let the left side go over towards the right, and then the members will be distinct from the petitioners, and can then debate." At this suggestion, the Mountain hastened to pass over to the right side, and for a moment the two parties were confounded together, and the benches of the Mountain were entirely abandoned to the petitioners. They put to vote the printing of the address, which was carried. "To the vote with the project of Barrère!" was then shouted. "We are not free," replied several members of the assembly. "I propose," exclaimed Vergniaud, "that the convention should go and join the armed force, by which it is surrounded, in order to seek protection against the violence it is now suffering." On concluding these words, he left the hall, followed by a great number of his colleagues. The Mountain and the tribunes applauded ironically on this departure of the right side. The Plain remained undecided and alarmed. "I propose," immediately exclaimed Chabot, "that the names of the members shall be called over, in order to distinguish the absence of those who have deserted their post." At this moment, Vergniaud and those who had followed him re-entered, apparently quite overwhelmed with chagrin; for this retreat of theirs, which would have been imposing had it been adopted by the assembly, now became petty and ridiculous. Vergniaud attempted to speak, but Robespierre would not give up to him the tribune, which he occupied. He kept possession of it, imploring the adoption of prompt and energetic measures, in order to satisfy the people; and he proposed that, besides the suppression of the commission of twelve, severe measures should also be adopted against its members. He went afterwards, at great length, into the consideration of the draft of Barrère's bill, and stated his objection to that article which placed the armed force at the disposal of the convention. "Now make an end!" impatiently exclaimed Vergniaud. "Yes," answered Robespierre, "I shall make an end, but it shall be with you! With you, who, after the revolution of the 10th of August, have endeavoured to lead to the scaffold those who made it! Against you, who have never ceased to call for the destruction of Paris! With you, who would have saved the tyrant! With you, who have conspired with Dumouriez! My ending is, an impeachment against all the accomplices of Dumouriez, including those names specified by the petitioners."

After long and vehement acclamations, a decree was drafted, put to the vote, and adopted, amidst a tumult so great that it was not without great difficulty that the fact of its containing a sufficient number of voters could be ascertained. It purported that the commission of twelve should be suppressed; that its papers should be seized, and their contents reported within three days; that the armed force should remain in permanent requisition; that the constituted authorities should render an account to the convention of the means taken to secure general tranquillity; that the detected conspiracies should be prosecuted, and that a proclamation should be issued, for the purpose of conveying to all France a correct statement of the proceedings of this day, which the evil-disposed would doubtless strive to misrepresent.

It was now 10 o'clock at night, and already the Jacobins and the commune complained that the day had passed away without producing any result. The decree adopted, although it did not decide anything as to the persons of the Girondists, yet was the first point gained at which they rejoiced, and at which they obliged the oppressed convention to rejoice also. The commune immediately caused the entire city to be illuminated. They formed a civic procession by the light of flambeaux; the sections walked mixed with each other, that of the Faubourg St. Antoine with those of the Butte-des-Moulins and of the Mail; the deputies from the Mountain, together with the president, were compelled to bear part in this procession, and the victors even forced the vanquished to celebrate their own defeat.

The character of this day was sufficiently obvious. The insurgents wished to do every thing according to form, they did not desire to abolish the convention, but whilst obtaining from it whatever it required, they made a show of preserving respect for it. The timid members of the Plain lent themselves willingly to this deception, which tended to impress a belief that they were still free, although acting under restraint in everything they did. They had, in effect, abolished the commission of twelve, and suspended the decision on its conduct for three days, in order to prevent the appearance of having been compelled to yield. They had not awarded to the convention the disposal of the armed force, but had decided that a statement should be submitted to it of the arrangements that were made, in order that the show of sovereignty might be maintained; in conclusion, a proclamation was suggested, for the purpose of declaring officially, that the convention had no cause for fear, and that it was perfectly free.

The next day, Barrère was charged with the framing of this proclamation, and he disguised the proceedings of the 31st of May with that dexterity which he was known to possess, and which made him always seek to furnish to the weak an honest pretext for submitting to the strong. Too rigorous measures, he said, had excited discontent; the people had risen calmly but energetically; had proclaimed, in the first place, respect for property; notwithstanding they had displayed themselves throughout the day, covered with their arms, they had respected the liberty of the convention, and the life of every one of its members, at the same time demanding an act of justice, which the convention had been eager to render. It was thus that Barrère expressed himself with regard to the abolition of this commission of twelve, an institution originating with himself.

On the 1st of June, tranquillity was far from being re-established. The meeting continued at the Evêché; the department, and the commune always specially summoned, were in session; the uproar had not subsided in the sections, and on all hands it was said, that only one-half had been obtained of what was desired, since the twenty-two preserved their seats in the convention. Disturbance, there-

fore, still prevailed in Paris; and new scenes were anticipated for the succeeding day, Sunday the 2nd of June.

In point of fact, all essential and substantive power was merged in the insurrectional assembly at the Evêché, while the legal authority was in the committee of public welfare, which had been invested with all the extraordinary powers of the convention. A hall had been appropriated on the 31st of May, where the constituted authorities might be enabled to correspond with the committee of public welfare. During the whole day of the 1st of June, the committee of public safety continued to send for the members of the insurrectional assembly, to learn from them what this revolted commune still required. What it wanted was but too evident; it was the arrest or the expulsion of those deputies by whom they had been so courageously resisted. All the members of the committee of public welfare were deeply affected by this measure. Delmas, Treillard, Bréard, were sincerely afflicted, Cambon, a grand advocate, as he always called himself, for *revolutionary power*, but scrupulously attached to legal forms, became indignant at the audacity of the commune, and said to Bouchette, successor of Beurnonville, and like Pache, a truckler to the Jacobins, "Minister of war, we are not blind; I see perfectly well that the employés of your Bureau are amongst the leaders and promoters of all this." Barrère, in spite of his customary discretion, began to grow indignant also, and exclaimed, "It is necessary to see, in this sad day's business, whether it be the commune of Paris, or whether it be the convention that represents the French republic." The Jacobin Lacroix, the friend and lieutenant of Danton, appeared in the eyes of his colleagues embarrassed by the outrage which was preparing to be attempted against the laws and the national representation. Danton, who had confined himself to the approving and strongly recommending the abolition of the commission of twelve, because he would have nothing done which might check the popular energy, Danton himself had desired that the national representation should be respected; but he foresaw, on the part of the Girondists, new disturbances and fresh resistance to the progress of the revolution, and had heartily wished to discover any method short of proscription for removing them. Garat suggested to him one plan for this purpose, and he eagerly grasped at it. All the ministers were present at the committee; Garat repaired thither with his colleagues. Deeply afflicted at the situation in which he found the leaders of the revolution with regard to each other, he conceived a generous idea, which might have the effect of restoring unanimity. "Recollect," said he, to the members of the committee, and particularly to Danton, "the quarrels of Themistocles and Aristides; the obstinacy of one in rejecting whatever was proposed by the other, and the dangers which they consequently brought upon their country. Recollect the generosity of Aristides, who, deeply affected with a sense of the evils they were mutually causing to the public, had the magnanimity to exclaim, 'O Athenians, you cannot become tranquil and happy, until you shall have cast both Themistocles and myself into the Barathrum.' Now," added Garat, "let the chiefs of the two sides of the assembly repeat the words of Aristides, and let them go in equal numbers into voluntary exile; from that moment our discords will be calmed; there will remain in the assembly sufficient talent to provide for the common weal, and the country will, in exercising this noble-minded ostracism, cherish the memory of those men who have withdrawn themselves for the purpose of preserving to it the blessings of peace." All the members of the committee were moved with this generous and politic suggestion. Delmas, Barrère, even the impetuous Cambon, were enchanted with the idea. Danton, who would thus be the first sacrificed, rose, with tears in his eyes, and said to Garat,—"You are right; I will go to the convention and propose this, and I will offer to be the first to repair, as hostage, to Bordeaux." They now separated, impressed with this noble-minded idea, in order to go and communicate it to the leaders of the two parties.—They addressed themselves particularly to Robespierre, with whom, however, such an act of self-denial by no means agreed, and who replied that it was nothing else than a snare laid for the Mountain, to get rid of its most courageous defenders. So that only a portion of this suggestion could be carried out, and that was the voluntary banishment of the Girondists, the Mountaineers having absolutely refused to conform to this self-sacrifice. Barrère, who was charged in the name of the committee of public welfare, to make the proposal to the former, in which the latter had not had the magnanimity to agree, then framed the draught of a decree, that a proposal should be made to the twenty-two and the members of the commission of twelve, that they should voluntarily resign their functions.

During this time, the definitive plan of the second insurrection was resolved upon in the assembly at the Evêché. It was complained, both there and among the Jacobins, that the energy of Danton had relaxed since the abolition of the commission of twelve. Marat proposed that they should go and demand of the convention, that the twenty-two should be put upon trial, and he recommended that this requisition should be obtained by compulsory measures. A short and energetic petition was accordingly drawn up for this purpose. The plan of insurrection was settled, not in the assembly, but in the executive committee charged with what were denominated *measures for the public welfare*, and composed of Varlet, the Dobsens, the Guamans, and all those who had been constant agitators since the 21st of January. This committee agreed to surround the convention with an armed force, and not allow any of its members to leave the hall until they had passed the required act. To this end, it was necessary to recal to Paris the troops which had been destined for La Vendée, and which they had taken good care to detain in the barracks of Courbevoie. They believed they could obtain from these battalions as well as from some others under their control that co-operation which they might not have been able to have obtained from the guard of the sections. By surrounding the National Palace with these devoted troops, and keeping, as on the 31st of May, the remainder of the armed force at their command and in ignorance, they conceived it would be easy to forestall all resistance from the

convention. It was Henriot to whom was again confided the command of the troops collected round the National Palace. It was this then that they promised themselves for the next day, Sunday the 2nd of June. But in the evening of Saturday, they wished to see whether one last resource would not avail them, and to experimentalize upon some new requisition. As it was, this evening they beat the *générale* and rung the tocsin: upon this the committee of public welfare lost no time in summoning the convention to a session in the midst of this new political tempest.

At this juncture, the Girondists, assembled for the last time, dined together in order to consult on what remained for them to do. It was evident, in their eyes, that the existing insurrection had no longer for its object, either the breaking of printing presses, as Danton had said, or even the suppression of a commission, and that its real object was pointed against their own persons.—The advice of some amongst them was, to remain firm at their posts, and to die on the curule chair in defending to the last that authority with which they had been invested. Pétion, Buzot, Gensonné adopted this solemn and magnanimous resolution. Barbaroux, heedless of consequences, and following only the inspirations of his heroic mind, would have gone to brave his enemies with his presence and his courage. Others again, and also Louvet, who most warmly maintained this latter notion, were for instantly deserting the convention, where they could be of no further use, where the Plain had not courage enough to give them their suffrages, and where the Mountain and the galleries were determined to drown their voices with hooting. They were for retiring each one to his department, to foment the insurrection already well-nigh proclaimed there, and to return in full strength to Paris, to avenge the laws and national representation. Every one, in fact, proposed his own plan, and they knew not how to decide. The noise of the tocsin and of the drums compelled these unfortunate companions to quit the table, and seek an asylum without having come to any resolution whatever. They then repaired to the house of one of their members less compromised than themselves, and not included in the famous list of the twenty-two. This man, whose name was Meilhan, had already received them, and had, in the Rue Des-Moulins, a large dwelling, wherein they might assemble in arms. They repaired thither in haste, with the exception of a few, who had other means of concealment.

The convention had assembled at the sound of the tocsin; very few, however, of the members were present, and every member of the right side was absent. Lanjuinais alone, eager to brave every danger, had gone thither in order to denounce the conspiracy, the revelation of which made nobody any wiser. After a brief and stormy sitting, the convention replied to the petitioners, that considering the decree, which enjoined the committee of public safety to make a report upon the twenty-two, it had nothing to enact upon the new demand of the commune. They separated in disorder, and the conspirators suspended until the next morning the definitive execution of their project.

The *générale* and tocsin were heard throughout the whole night of Saturday until Sunday morning, June 2nd, 1793, when the alarm-guns were fired, and all the population of Paris were in arms by break of day. Nearly eighty thousand men were collected round the convention, but upwards of sixty-five thousand of these took no part in the event, contenting themselves with remaining under arms. Several devoted battalions of artillery were ranged, under the command of Henriot, around the National Palace. They had one hundred and sixty-three pieces of ordnance, military waggons, machines for heating shot, lighted matches, and all the warlike apparatus calculated to strike the imagination. Since the morning, those battalions, the departure of which for La Vendée had been retarded, had re-entered Paris; these men were excited by being persuaded that fresh conspiracies had just been discovered, that the leaders of these conspiracies were in the convention, and that it was necessary to root them out from thence. It was said that to this mode of reasoning was added that of assignats for one hundred sous each. These battalions, thus led away, marched from the Champs Elysées to La Madelaine, from thence to the Boulevard, and from the Boulevard on to the Carousel, ready to execute whatever the conspirators might direct.

Thus the convention, surrounded by not more than some thousand madmen, now appeared besieged by eighty thousand men. Although the convention might be said not to be really in a state of siege, they were not on that account exposed to less danger, since the thousand men who actually surrounded them were prepared to commit any kind of outrage.

The deputies of either side had repaired to the sitting. The Mountain, Plain, and the Right Side, occupied their respective benches. Most of the proscribed deputies, assembled at the house of Meilhan, where they had passed the night, were desirous likewise of repairing to their posts. Buzot made efforts to extricate himself from those who would have restrained him, in order that he might go and perish in the midst of the convention. However, they succeeded in preventing him going thither. Barbaroux, alone successful in getting away, went immediately to the convention, to demonstrate during this day a noble-minded courage. The remainder were constrained to remain in their asylum, and await the issue of the fearful sitting.

The day's business being commenced at the convention, Lanjuinais, whom neither the galleries, the Mountain, or the imminence of the danger, were sufficient to intimidate, was first to endeavour to speak. His attempt excited the most violent uproar. "I come," said he, "to engage your attention with the means of warding off the fresh perils to which you are exposed." "Down, down," exclaimed they, "he would create a civil war!" "So long as civil war shall be permitted to make its voice heard, even here," replied Lanjuinais, "I will not suffer the character of a representative of the people to be degraded in my person. Until now you have done nothing, but have suffered every thing. You have sanctioned whatever has been exacted of you. An insurrectional assembly meets, it names a committee charged with the execution of revolt, it appoints a provisionary commandant to head the revolters; and this as-

sembly, this committee, this commandant, you countenance, and suffer all!" A tremendous confusion drowned at this moment the voice of Lanjuinais. At length his anger mounted to such a pitch, that several deputies of the Mountain, including Drouet, the younger Robespierre, Julien, and Legendre, rose from their benches, rushed to the tribune, and would have dragged him from it. Lanjuinais resisted, and kept his post by main force.

The disorder now spread throughout the whole assembly, and the yellings from the galleries contributed to render the present scene the most appalling of any that had yet been acted. The president put his hat on, and at last succeeded in making himself heard. "The scene which is now taking place amongst us," said he, "is most distressing; liberty must be sacrificed, if you continue to conduct yourselves thus. I call you to order; you who have thus misconducted yourselves at the tribune." A little calm followed this appeal, and Lanjuinais, who dreaded not chimerical propositions so long as they were courageous, also demanded that they should proceed to abrogate the revolutionary authorities of Paris, that is to say, that unarmed persons should domineer over the armed. Scarcely had he finished, before the petitioners of the commune presented themselves anew. Their language was more brief and more energetic than ever. "*The citizens of Paris have not quitted their arms since four o'clock. Since that hour, they have not ceased to claim of their representatives their rights, unworthily violated, and during this time, their representatives have been deriding their indolence and inertness. It is necessary, therefore, to put them under arrest; it is necessary to save the people instantly, or the people will protect themselves.*" Scarcely had the petitioners finished speaking, when Billaud Varennes and Tallien required a report upon this petition, during the present sitting and without separating; others, in great numbers, required the order of the day. At length, in the middle of this tumult, the assembly, animated by its danger, arose and voted the order of the day, upon the ground that a report had been ordered of the committee of public safety within three days. At this decision, the petitioners rushed forth, aggravating their cries and menaces, and exposing to view their concealed weapons. All the men who had been in the galleries retired, as if to execute some design, and only the women remained. A great noise was heard outside the hall, and shouts of "*Aux armes! Aux armes!*" were plainly distinguishable. At this moment, several deputies strove to represent to the assembly that the determination it had taken was imprudent, and that it was necessary to terminate this dangerous crisis by conceding what was required, and by putting under provisional arrest the twenty-two accused deputies. "We will go, all of us, to prison," exclaimed Larévellière Lépeaux. Cambon then announced, that in an half hour the committee of public safety would make its report. The report had been ordered within three days, but the danger becoming more and more urgent, the committee had been induced to hasten it. In fact, Barrère presented himself at the tribune, and proposed the former suggestion of Garat, which the evening before had so worked upon all the members of the committee, which Danton had embraced with fervour, while Robespierre had repelled it, and which consisted in the voluntary and reciprocal exile of the leaders of the two parties. Barrère, not being able to propose it to the *Mountaineers*, proposed it thus to the twenty-two. "The committee," said he, "has had no time to develope any fact, or to examine any testimony; but, viewing both the political and moral state of the convention, it is of opinion that the voluntary suspension of the obnoxious deputies would produce the happiest effect, and would save the republic in this fatal crisis, the issue of which it is terrific to anticipate."

Barrère had hardly concluded his speech, when Isnard ascended the tribune, and said, that since they had put individuals in the balance against the country, he would never hesitate, and not only would he renounce his functions, but his life also, if it were necessary. Lanthenas imitated the example of Isnard, and abdicated his functions. Fouchet offered his resignation and his life to the republic. Lanjuinais, who thought he ought not to make this voluntary concession, presented himself at the tribune, and said, "I believe that up to this moment, I have shown sufficient energy to prevent your anticipating from me either resignation or voluntary suspension." On these words, a great outcry was made in the assembly. Lanjuinais cast a look of assurance on those who had interrupted him. "The sacrificer," cried he, "who led in old times a victim to the altar, covered it with flowers and garlands, and did not insult it. We would make a sacrifice of our powers, but these sacrifices should be free, and we are not so. We cannot go from hence, not even by descending through the windows; the cannon are pointed; it is useless to put any thing to the vote, and I am therefore silent." Barbaroux succeeded to Lanjuinais, and refused with equal courage the resignation which was demanded of him. "If the convention," exclaimed he, "ordains my resignation, I will submit; but how can I consent to dispossess myself of my functions, when a number of departments write to me, assuring me that I have discharged them well, and engaging me to fill them again? I have sworn to die at my post, and I will keep my oath!" Dussaulx offered his resignation. "What!" cried Marat, "ought we to afford to these culprits the honour of voluntary sacrifice? It is necessary to be pure, in order to be enabled to offer sacrifices to our country. It is for me, a true martyr, to devote myself. I offer, then, my suspension from that moment at which you shall have decreed the arrest of the accused deputies. But," added Marat, "the list is ill drawn out; instead of the old dotard, Dussaulx, of the poor-spirited Lanthenas, and of Ducos, culpable only on account of certain erroneous opinions, we should substitute Fermont and Valazé, who deserve to be in it, and yet are not."

At this moment a great noise was heard at the doors of the hall. Lacroix entered, in great agitation, and screaming out, he declared that they were no longer even personally free; that he had attempted to leave the place, and was restrained from doing so. Although a *Mountaineer*, and a partisan for the arrest of the twenty-two, Lacroix could be very indignant at the behaviour of the

commune, who had thus imprisoned the deputies in the National Palace.

Since the refusal of the convention to enact any thing upon the subject of the petition of the commune, the watchword had been given at all the doors to prevent the departure of a single deputy. Several had vainly endeavoured to evade it. Gorsas alone contrived to escape, and he went directly to the house of Meilhan, to persuade the Girondists assembled there to hide themselves wherever they could, and by no means to venture to the assembly. All the rest who endeavoured to leave the assembly were forcibly pushed back. Boissy d'Anglas presenting himself at one door, was very roughly treated, and returned into the hall, exhibiting his torn garments. At the sight of this, the whole assembly felt one common indignation, and the Mountain itself was astonished. They demanded the authors of this watchword, and put forth an ineffective decree, which summoned to the bar the commandant of the armed force.

Barrère now began to speak, and expressing himself with an ardour that was by no means common to him, said that the assembly was now, indeed, no longer free, and that it deliberated under the control of tyrants in the back-ground; that in the insurrectional committee, men were to be found for whom no one could answer, suspected strangers, such as Guaman, the Spaniard, and others; that at the door of the hall, assignats had been distributed of five livres* each to the battalions destined for La Vendée, and that it was now become indispensable to ascertain whether the convention was still respected or otherwise. In consequence, he proposed to the assembly that it should repair in a body into the midst of the armed force, in order to assure itself that it had nothing to fear, and that its authority was still recognized. This proposition, which had been previously made by Garat on the 25th of May, and renewed by Vergniaud on the 31st, was now adopted. Hérault-Séchelles, whom they made use of on all emergencies, was put at the head of the assembly as president, and all the right side, and the Plain, arose to follow him. The Mountain alone remained on their benches. The deputies of the right then returned, and reproached the Mountain for not consenting to take part in the common danger: the galleries, on the contrary, implored them, by signs, to keep their seats, as if a great peril menaced them out of doors. Nevertheless, the *Mountaineers* yielded from a sentiment of shame, and the whole convention, with Hérault-Séchelles at its head, presented itself in the court-yard of the National Palace, on the side of the Carousel. The sentinels gave way, and suffered the members of the assembly to pass, who then arrived in the presence of the artillery, who were headed by Henriot. The president addressed himself to this officer, requiring him to open a free passage for the members. "You sha'nt go," replied Henriot, "until you have delivered up the twenty-two." "Seize this rebel," exclaimed the president, turning to the soldiers. Henriot, on this, backing his horse, addressed himself to his cannoniers, "Cannoniers, to your guns!" Some one immediately grasped Hérault-Séchelles by the arm, and pushed him aside. The assembly then went to the garden, where they experienced similar treatment. Several groups exclaimed, "Long live the nation!" others, "Long live the convention." "Long live Marat!" "Down with the right side!" Outside the garden, certain battalions, who were far differently disposed towards the convention than those who had surrounded the Carousel, made signs to the deputies to come and join them. In order to do this, the convention advanced in the direction of the Pont-Tournant, but found a new battalion there, which opposed their egress from the garden. At this moment, Marat, surrounded by some children, shouting out *Vive Marat!* approached the president, and said to him, "I summon the deputies who have thus abandoned their posts to return thither."

Finally, the assembly, who now perceived that these repeated and fruitless attempts only tended to prolong their humiliation, re-entered the hall, each taking his place. Couthon first ascended the tribune. "You see clearly," exclaimed he, with a degree of assurance which surprised the assembly, "how you are respected and obeyed by the people. You perceive that you are free, and that you may proceed to vote on the question before you. Hasten then to satisfy their wishes." Legendre proposed to exclude from the list of the twenty-two those who had offered their resignation; and to except from the list of the twelve, Boyer-Fonfrede and Saint-Martin, who had opposed the arbitrary arrests, and to replace them by Lebrun and Clavière. Marat insisted that they should strike out of the list, Lanthenas, Ducos, and Dussaulx, and that they should add to it Fermont and Valazé. These propositions were adopted, and they were ready to pass to the vote. The Plain, intimidated, began to say, that after all, the obnoxious deputies, were they put under arrest, would not have so much to complain of, and that it was necessary, at all events, to put an end to so terrible a scene. The right side upon this demanded the vote by call of names, in order to put to shame these members of the Ventre*, in the very outset of their weakness; but one of them furnished to his colleagues a capital plan of extricating themselves from this perplexing situation. "I will not vote," said he, "because I am under restraint." Following his example, the others refused to vote; and, subsequently, the Mountain alone, with a few other members, voted for the arrest of the deputies denounced by the commune.

Such was the celebrated event of the 2nd of June, better known under the name of the 31st of May. As against the national representation, it was nothing else than a 10th of August†; for, these unhappy deputies once put under arrest, nothing remained but to make them ascend the scaffold, a measure attended with little difficulty. At this point terminates one of the principal eras of the revolution, which served as a preparation to the most awful and the grandest of all, and of which, that it may be thoroughly appreciated, it is necessary to take a comprehensive retrospect.

* The livre or livre tournois, so called from Tours, the place where it was originally coined, answers to the present franc, worth 10d. sterling. *Trans.*

* *Ante*, p. 75, col. 1.
† *Ante*, p. 123, col. 2.

On the 10th of August, the revolutionists, no longer contented with mere threats, attacked the palace of the monarch, to deliver themselves from apprehensions which had become insupportable. The first measure was to suspend Louis XVI., and to refer his fate to the approaching national convention. The monarch being thus suspended, and the power remaining in the hands of different popular authorities, hence arose the question as to how that power was to be exercised. Then the divisions which had already begun to demonstrate themselves between the respective partisans of moderation and those of an inexorable energy, burst forth unrestrained. The commune, composed altogether of energetic men, attacked the legislative body, and insulted it by threatening it with the tocsin. At this juncture, the coalition, revived on the 10th of August, rapidly advanced, aggravated the danger, moreover provoked fresh outrages, cried down all moderation, and stimulated the passions to the greatest possible excess. Longwy and Verdun fell into the hands of the enemy; and on perceiving the approach of Brunswick, they outstripped all the cruelties which that general had threatened in his manifestoes, striking terror into the hearts of his concealed adherents by the dreadful acts which marked the month of September. Ere long, saved by the good management and temper of Dumouriez, France had time to agitate itself anew with the great question of a lenient or inexorable use of power. The proceedings of September became an irksome subject of reproach: the moderate party was full of indignation; the violent wished them to be silent respecting evils which they affected to regard as inevitable and irreparable. Unfeeling personalities aggravated these individual dislikes into polemical hatred. Discord reached its highest point; and in this state of things arrived the moment which was to decide the fate of Louis. Two systems were experimentalized upon his person; that of moderation was subdued, that of violence carried everything with it, and thus, in sacrificing their king, their revolution came definitively to a rupture with royalty and the throned heads of Europe.

The coalition, re-animated by the events of the 21st of January, as it had formerly been by those of the 10th of August, renewed its agitations, and made us experience reverses. Dumouriez, arrested in his progress by untoward circumstances and by the disorder which prevailed in every branch of administration, felt irritated against the Jacobins, to whom he imputed these reverses, and throwing aside his ordinary political indifference, declared himself altogether for moderation, which he compromised by engaging in its interest both his own sword and that of the foreigner, and, in short, run counter to the revolution, after having placed the republic in the most perilous situation. At the same point of time, La Vendée was in arms: the departments, all of them attached to the moderate party, put themselves into a menacing attitude: never had the existence of the revolution been so completely perilled. Defeats and treasonable practices afforded to the Jacobins a pretext for calumniating the moderate republicans, and a motive for demanding a judicial and executive dictatorship. The Jacobins proposed the experiment of a revolutionary tribunal and a committee of public welfare. Vehement disputes arose on these propositions. The two parties proceeded, respecting these questions, to the bitterest extremities; they could no longer bear each other's presence. On the 10th of March, the Jacobins attempted to crush the leaders of the Girondists, but this attempt, too premature, was unsuccessful: they then went to work in a more cautious manner; they promoted petitions, stirred up the sections, and rebelled according to form of law. The Girondists presented against these measures a commission, instituted for the purpose of prosecuting the conspiracies of their adversaries: this commission operated against the Jacobins, excited their vengeance, and was carried away in a political whirlwind. Re-constituted on the succeeding day, it was again swept away by the hurricane of the 31st of May. In short, on the 2nd of June, its members, and those deputies, who ought to have been protected by the national representation, were torn from its presence, and, as was the case with Louis XVI., the decision of their fate was postponed to a period sufficiently violent to conduct them to the scaffold.

Such then is the space which we have traversed from the 10th of August to the 31st of May: it was a protracted struggle between the two systems upon measure of each other's strength. The danger, which was increasing, always rendered the dispute more earnest and envenomed; and the generous-minded deputation of the Girondists, exhausted by their endeavour to avenge the outrages of September, and to prevent the event of the 21st of January, the erection of the revolutionary tribunal and the committee of public welfare, expired when the danger become more urgent, had made violence more impatient, and rendered moderation less practicable. At length, all form of justice being overthrown, every claim stifled with the suspension of the Girondists, and the peril become more imminent than ever by the insurrection itself, which sought to avenge the Gironde, the reign of terror was enabled to manifest itself unchecked, and the dreadful dictatorship, of the revolutionary tribunal and of the committee of public welfare, went far to complete it. Here, then, commenced scenes a hundred times more awful and horrible than all those which had previously roused the Girondists. As to them, their history is finished; nothing remains to be added to it but a recital of their heroic death. Their opposition had been fraught with danger, their indignation was impolitic, they had compromised the revolution, liberty, and France; they even compromised that moderation itself for which they strove, by defending it with too much acrimony; and in dying, they involved in their own ruin all that was most liberal and intelligent in France. But who is there who would not have acted their part? who is there who would not have committed their errors? In fact, is it possible to witness the shedding of blood without demonstrating repugnance and indignation?

CHAPTER X.

THE SCHEMES OF THE JACOBINS AFTER THE 31ST MAY.—RESTORATION OF THE COMMITTEES AND OF THE MINISTRY.—POLITICAL TENDENCIES OF THE DEPARTMENTS AFTER THE 31ST MAY. THE GIRONDISTS UNDER PROSCRIPTION PUT THEMSELVES IN OPEN OPPOSITION TO THE CONVENTION—DECREES OF THE CONVENTION AGAINST THE REVOLTING DEPARTMENTS.—INSURRECTIONAL AND ARMED MEETINGS IN BRITTANY AND NORMANDY.—MILITARY EVENTS UPON THE RHINE AND IN THE NORTH.—INVASION OF THE EASTERN FRONTIERS BY THE ALLIES; CUSTINE'S RETREAT.—SIEGE OF MENTZ BY THE PRUSSIANS.—LOSSES SUSTAINED BY THE ARMY OF THE ALPS; POSITION OF THE ARMY OF THE PYRENEES.—THE VENDEANS POSSESS THEMSELVES OF FONTENAY AND SAUMUR—PERILOUS EMERGENCIES OF THE REPUBLIC AT HOME AND ABROAD.—ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS OF THE CONVENTION; THE CONSTITUTION OF 1793.—REPULSE OF THE FEDERALIST REBELS AT EVREUX—DEFEAT OF THE VENDEANS BEFORE NANTES.—VICTORY OVER THE SPANISH IN THE ROUSSILLON.—MARAT ASSASSINATED BY CHARLOTTE CORDAY; MARKS OF RESPECT PAID TO HIS MEMORY; TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF CHARLOTTE CORDAY.

THE Act passed on the 2nd of June against the twenty-two deputies of the right side, as well as against the commission of twelve, provided that they should be confined to their own homes, and under the personal restraint of sentinels. Some of them submitted to this act with a very good grace, and placed themselves under arrest, to testify their obedience to the law, and in order to call for a trial which should put their innocence beyond doubt. Gensonné and Valazé could very easily have evaded the watchfulness of their keepers, but they constantly refused to seek safety in flight. They remained in custody, with their colleagues Guadet and Pétion, Vergniaud, Birotteau, Gardien, Boileau, Bertrand, Mollevaut, and Gommaire. Some others, not considering obedience was due to a law procured by intimidation, and not expecting to have justice done them, withdrew themselves from Paris, or concealed themselves there until an opportunity of escape presented itself. Their design was to meet together in the departments, in order to excite a rebellion against the capital. Those who took this resolution were Brissot, Gorsas, Salles, Lesuvet, Chambon, Buzot, Lydon, Rabaut, Saint-Etienne, Lasource, Grangeneuve, Lesage, Vigée, Lariviere, and Bergoing. The two ministers, Lebrun and Clavière, immediately deprived of their functions after the 2nd of June, were stricken by a warrant of arrest issuing from the commune. Lebrun contrived to elude this process. The same course was adopted against Roland, who having resigned so far back as the 21st of January, fruitlessly solicited leave to pass his accounts. He managed to escape the vigilance of the commune, and hid himself at Rouen. Madame Roland, who was in the same situation as her husband, had no other care than to assist in his escape; and after placing her daughter under the protection of a sure friend, she surrendered herself with a noble disinterestedness to the committee of her section, and was thrown into prison in company with a vast number of other victims of the 31st of May.

The Jacobins were indeed rejoiced. They congratulated themselves upon the energy of the people, upon its good conduct during the latter days, and upon having compassed the complete overthrow of all those impediments which the right side had unceasingly opposed to the progress of the revolution. At the same time they settled amongst themselves, as indeed they did after every important event, the mode in which the last insurrection should be presented to the public. "The people," said Robespierre, "have confounded all their calumniators by their behaviour upon this occasion. Eighty thousand men have turned out for nearly a week, without a single violation of the rights of property, without a single drop of blood being shed, and they have shown plainly enough whether their object was, as was imputed to them, to take advantage of the public confusion for the purposes of murder or pillage. Their rising has been purely voluntary, because it was the effect of a public conviction; and the Mountain itself, powerless as she was, astonished at witnessing this movement, has thus clearly demonstrated that she had been no party to it, therefore this insurrection has been peculiarly a moral one, and in every respect may be said to have emanated from the people."

This, in fact, was at one and the same time to express a favourable idea of the insurrection, to point an indirect censure at the Mountain, who had on the 2nd of June demonstrated some reluctance to act, to avert the reproach of conspiracy directed against the leaders of the left side, and to pass a flattering compliment upon the popular party, who had managed every thing so well and perfectly by itself. After this construction had been allowed with acclamation by the Jacobins, and afterwards repeated by all the echoes of the victorious party, no time was lost in calling Marat to account for one expression which had been the source of considerable disturbance. Marat, who possessed but one single idea with regard to the termination of the revolutionary vacillations, and that was the appointment of a dictator, Marat, perceiving that some tergiversation was exhibited on the 2nd of June, had repeated on this very day as he had upon other occasions, "*We must have a Head.*" Called upon to explain the meaning of this expression, he justified himself after his fashion, and the Jacobins at once did not care to press the matter further, being quite satisfied at having demonstrated their scrupulosities and the sternness of their republican principles. At the same time some remarks were made upon the lukewarmness of Danton, who appeared to have been considerably softened ever since the suppression of the commission of the twelve, and whose energy, which had maintained its character until the 31st of May, had not continued till the 2nd of June.

Danton was absent; Camille Desmoulins, his friend, defended him with some warmth, and an end was soon put to this explanation, on account of the importance of the personage himself, as well as to get rid of some very delicate disclosures; for although the insurrection had been carried out in a masterly manner, it was far from meeting with entire approval from the victorious party. In point of fact, it was well known that the committee of public welfare, and a great many of the *Mountaineers*, had witnessed with dismay the effect of this popular demonstration. However, the act having been done, it was more expedient for them to avail themselves of its advantages, than to make it the subject of debate. They, therefore, immediately set about turning this victory to good account, and that in the most prompt and effectual manner.

To do this, there were several measures to be adopted. The restoration of the committees, in which were placed all the partisans of the right side,—to possess themselves, by means of the committees, of the direction of affairs,—to change the ministers,—to superintend the correspondence,—to intercept at the post office dangerous publications,—to take charge that none but those of acknowledged utility found their way into the provinces (for, said Robespierre, the liberty of the press ought certainly to be inviolate, but yet it should not be employed for the destruction of liberty,)—to forthwith form the revolutionary army, of which the organization had been already ordered, and whose intervention was absolutely necessary for the execution in the interior of the decrees of the convention,—to effectuate a forced loan of one thousand millions from the pockets of the wealthy. Such were the measures proposed, and unanimously adopted by the Jacobins. But one last measure was considered of more importance than all the others, and that was the digesting, within eight days, a republican constitution. It was a point of consequence to prove that the opposition of the Girondists had solely impeded the perfection of this grand work, which was to restore confidence to France by the operation of good laws, and to present her with a pact of union, round which she might rally as an indivisible empire. Such was the desire expressed at the same time by the Jacobins, the Cordeliers, the sections, and the commune.

The convention, in obedience to this irresistible desire, and which had been frequently uttered under so many forms, restored all her committees of general safety, of finances, of war, of legislation, &c. The committee of public welfare, already overburdened with business, and which, not as yet in such bad odour as to cause the peremptory dismissal of all its members, was the only one that had been kept in action. Lebrun was succeeded in foreign affairs by Desforgues, and Clavière in the finances by Destournelles. The draught of a constitution, framed according to the ideas of the Girondists by Condorcet, was considered as incomplete. The committee of public welfare had to present another within eight days. Five members were added to it to assist in this labour. Lastly, it was ordered to prepare a scheme for effectuating the forced loan, as well as a plan of organization of the revolutionary army.

The sittings of the convention presented a totally different appearance after the 31st of May. They were not noisy, and almost all the acts were passed without debate. The right side, and part of the centre, no longer voted; they appeared to protest by their silence against all the decisions taken since the 2nd of June, and to wait for news from the departments. Marat had thought it right, as a matter of justice, to keep himself under restraint, until his adversaries, the Girondists, were tried. Till this took place, he disclaimed, as he said, his functions, and confined himself to enlightening the convention through the medium of his newspaper. The two deputies, Doulcet and Fonfrède, of Bourdeaux, were the only persons who broke the stillness of the assembly. Doulcet accused the insurrectional committee, which had still continued to meet at the Evêché, and who, intercepting the packets at the post office, opened the seals, and then forwarded them still unsealed to their address, under its own stamp, with these words, "*Revolution du 31st Mai.*" The convention passed to the order of the day. Fonfrède, a member of the commission of the twelve, but excepted from the order of arrest, because he had opposed the measures of this commission, Fonfrède ascended the tribune, and required the execution of that decree, which ordered within three days a report to be made concerning the prisoners. This demand caused some disturbance. "We must," said Fonfrède, "instantly prove the innocence of our colleagues. I do not remain here but for the very purpose of defending them, and I declare to you that an armed force is now on its way from Bourdeaux, to avenge the acts committed against them." A grand outcry was made on hearing these words, the call for the order of the day repelled the requisition of Fonfrède, and the assembly relapsed into the deep silence that previously prevailed. This was, as the Jacobins expressed themselves, *the last croaking of the frogs in the fen.*

The threat thrown out by Fonfrède from the tribune was by no means imaginary, for not only the Bordelais, but the people of almost every one of the departments, were ready to take up arms against the convention. Their cause of dissatisfaction was of older date than the 2nd of June; it had originated with the quarrels between the *Mountaineers* and the Girondists. It should be recollected that throughout all France, the municipalities and the sections were in opposition to each other. The partisans of the *Mountaineer* system engrossed the municipalities and the clubs; the moderate republicans, who in the midst of the crisis of the revolution were desirous of maintaining impartial justice, were on the other hand to be found in the sections. Already had open dissension burst forth in numerous towns. At Marseilles the sections had stripped the municipality of its powers, in order to transfer them to a *central committee;* moreover, they had of their own motion constituted a popular tribunal for the trial of those patriots accused of committing revolutionary excesses. The commissaries Bayle and Boisset had in vain declared the illegality of this committee and this tribunal; their authority was always contemned, and the sections were now permanently adhering to a settled insurrection against the revolution. At Lyons a sanguinary conflict had already taken place. The question was whether a municipal order authorizing

the raising of a revolutionary army as well as a tax upon large incomes, should be carried into effect. The sections who acted in disobedience to these measures had declared themselves permanent; the municipality had attempted to dissolve them; but by the assistance of the directory of the department they had acted in open opposition to the municipality. On the 29th of May, they came to personal conflict, notwithstanding the presence of the two commissaries of the convention, whose efforts to prevent this combat were in vain. The victorious section, after having taken the arsenal and the Hotel-de-Ville by assault, had displaced the municipality, closed the Jacobin club, where Chalier had excited the most dreadful broils, and possessed themselves of the sovereign power of Lyons. Some hundreds lost their lives in this conflict. The representatives Nioche and Gauthier were in confinement a whole day; at last set at liberty, they withdrew to their colleagues Albite and Dubois-Craucé, who, like them, had commission for the army at the Alps.

Such was the state of Lyons and the South during the latter end of May. Bordeaux did not present a more promising aspect of affairs. This town, as did all those of the west of Brittany and of Normandy, only delayed their operations until those threats which had been so long repeated against the deputies of the provinces were actually put in execution. It was while the departments were in this mood, that they learnt what had taken place at the end of May. The events of the 27th May, when the commission of twelve had for the first time been suppressed, had already caused great excitement, and on all sides it became a point of discussion, whether resolutions condemnatory of what had taken place at Paris, should not be passed. But the events of the 31st May and the 2nd June wrought their indignation to the highest pitch. Report, which enlarges upon every thing, exaggerated the real facts. It was rumoured that thirty-two deputies had been massacred by the commune; that the public treasuries had been pillaged; that the *brigands* of Paris had assumed supreme power, and were about to transfer it either to the foreign powers, or to Marat, or to Orleans. Public meetings were held for the purpose of petitioning, and to enable them to arrange the mode of their hostile attack against the capital. At this very moment the fugitive deputies themselves came to relate all that had taken place, and to impart some consistency and method to the hostilities which demonstrated themselves from every quarter.

Besides those who had already escaped, several had got away from the gendarmes; others also had even left the assembly in order to heighten the insurrection. Gensonné, Valazé, and Vergniaud persisted in staying behind, saying, that if it were expedient that some of them should go and arouse the zeal of the departments, it was on the other hand quite as proper that the others should remain as hostages in the hands of their enemies, so that they might make manifest by an open trial, and at the hazard of their lives, the entire innocence of them all. Buzot, who had never been desirous of paying obedience to the decree of the 2nd June, transferred himself to his department of the Eure, there to excite the Normans to hostilities; Gorsas followed him thither with the same view. Brissot repaired to Moulins; Meilhan, who had not been arrested, but who had afforded an asylum to his colleagues on the nights between the 31st May and the 2nd June, Duchâtel, whom the *Mountaineers* termed the ghost of the 21st January, because he got out of his bed to vote in favour of Louis XVI., left the assembly in order to cause an excitement in Brittany. Biroteau escaped from the gendarmes and went with Chasset to direct the movements of the Lyonnais. Rebecqui, preceding Barbaroux who was still in confinement, repaired to the Bouches-du-Rhone. Rabaut Saint-Étienne lost no time in getting to Nimes to procure the concurrence of Languedoc in the general hostility against the oppressors of the convention.

So early as the 13th of June, the department of the Eure assembled, and demonstrated the first outbreak of the insurrection. As the convention, it declared, was no longer free, and as it became the duty of all good citizens to restore it to its freedom, it was resolved that a force of four thousand men should be raised to march against Paris, and that commissaries should be despatched to all the neighbouring departments to solicit them to follow their example, and to combine with their operations. The department of Calvados in its session at Caen, caused the arrest of the two deputies, Rome and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, who were sent by the convention to urge the organization of the army of the coasts of Cherburg. It was arranged that the departments of Normandy should hold a special meeting at Caen for the purpose of federation. All the departments of Brittany, such as those of the Côtes-du-Nord, of Finisterre, of Morbihan, of Ile-et-Vilaine, of Mayenne, and of the Loire-Inferieure, entered into similar resolutions, and dispatched commissaries to Rennes to establish at that place the central authority of Brittany. The departments of the basin of the Loire, with the exception of those occupied by the Vendeans, followed the general example, and even proposed to send their commissaries to Bruges, to form at that place a convention consisting of two deputies from each department, and to set out and destroy the convention which, alternately usurping or oppressed, was sitting at Paris.

At Bordeaux a very great sensation was experienced; all the constituted authorities met in an assembly styled *The popular Commission of Public Welfare*, and declared that the convention was no longer free, and that it was incumbent upon them to preserve her freedom; consequently they resolved that an armed force should be forthwith raised, and that in the mean while, a petition should be addressed to the national convention, requiring an explanation and a true statement of the case with regard to the events of June; they also immediately sent commissaries to all the departments, to persuade them to join in a general coalition. Thoulouse, an ancient parliamentary city *, where numerous partisans of the old regime

* The parliament of Thoulouse was one of the *twelve parliaments* of France, analogous to the parliaments of Paris. The parliament of Thoulouse was founded in 1302, suppressed in 1312, and incorporated with the parliament of Paris, restored in 1419, transferred to Beziers in 1437,

still concealed themselves under cover of the Girondists, had already organized a departimental force of a thousand men. The administrative authorities of this town had declared in the face of the commissaries sent to the army of the Pyrenees, that they would no longer recognize the convention; they discharged numerous individuals from their prisons, and sent many others accused of being *Mountaineers* to take their place, and they openly announced that they were ready to federalize with the departments of the south.

The upper departments of the Tarn, of the Lot-et-Garonne, of the Aveyron, of the Cantal, of the Puy-de-Dome, and of the Herault, followed the example of Toulouse and Bordeaux. Nimes declared herself in a state of open opposition; Marseilles prepared a petition expressive of the utmost indignation, re-established her popular tribunal, commenced a proceeding against the *murderers* (*tueurs*), and organized a force of six thousand men. At Grenoble, the sections were summoned together, and their presidents, who acted in conjunction with the constituted authorities, assumed all their powers, appointed deputies for Lyons, and would have arrested Dubois-Crancé and Gauthier, commissaries of the convention for the army of the Alps. The department of the Ain adopted precisely the same course. That of the Jura, who had already levied a body of cavalry and a departimental force of eight hundred men, protested on her own part against the authority of the convention. Finally, at Lyons, where ever since the conflict of the 29th of May the sections reigned supreme, they received and sent forth deputies to effect a combination with Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Caen; proceedings were immediately ordered to be instituted against Chalier, president of the Jacobin club, as well as against many other of the *Mountaineers*. All that could now be said to be subject to the authority of the convention were the departments of the north, and those which formed the basin of the Seine. The insurgent departments now amounted to between sixty or seventy, and Paris had with fifteen or twenty to make head against the others, and to carry on the war against Europe.

At Paris different notions were entertained as to the course to be adopted in this perilous situation. The members of the committee of public welfare, Cambon, Barrère, Bréard, Treilhard, and Mathieu, patriots of note, howsoever they had disapproved of the events of the 2nd of June, would yet have wished that some mode of conciliation were adopted; according to their notions, it was necessary that the freedom of the convention should be demonstrated by the adoption of energetic measures against the agitators, and instead of irritating the departments by severe decrees, to reclaim them by convincing them of the danger of a civil war in the face of the foreign enemy. Barrère proposed, in the name of the committee of public welfare, the draught of a decree entirely conceived in this spirit. In this draught, the revolutionary committees, who had rendered themselves so formidable by their numerous arrests, were to be annulled throughout France, or put upon their proper footing, which was the superintendence of suspected foreigners; that the primary assemblies should be congregated in Paris to name another commandant of the armed force, in the place of Henriot, who had been appointed by the insurrectionists; and lastly, that thirty deputies should be sent to the departments as hostages. These measures seemed highly calculated to quiet and impart confidence to the departments. The suppression of the revolutionary committees would put an end to the inquisitorial measures exercised against suspected persons; the choice of a good commandant would ensure the quiet of Paris; and the thirty deputies sent as hostages would be subservient to the purposes of pledge and conciliation. But the Mountain party was not altogether disposed to enter into negotiations. Availing themselves with a high hand of what was termed the national authority, they discountenanced conciliatory means. Robespierre caused this committee bill to be adjourned. Danton again raising his voice in this perilous emergency, adverted to the famous revolutionary crisis, the dangers of September at the period of the invasion of Champagne and the taking of Verdun; the perils of January before the condemnation of the late king had been finally decided upon; lastly, the much greater emergencies of April, at the time when Dumouriez was marching upon Paris, and Vendée was in rebellion. According to him, the revolution had overcome all the dangers which had threatened her, she had come off victorious in every crisis, and she would again come off victorious in this last emergency. "It is at the very instant," cried he "of the birth of a great event that bodies politic, like bodies physical, ever seem threatened with speedy destruction. Well then! the thunder rolls, and it is in the midst of its pealing that the great work, which shall establish the happiness of twenty-four millions of human beings, shall have birth." Danton was desirous that by a single decree affecting all and each of the departments, it should be enjoined them, that within twenty-four hours after notice, they should disclaim their assumed power, upon pain of outlawry. The powerful voice of Danton, never heard in moments of extraordinary danger but to impart self-confidence, on this occasion produced its accustomed effect. The convention, although it had not precisely adopted the proposed measures, nevertheless enacted the most energetic decree. In the first place she declared, in respect of the 31st of May and the 2nd of June, that the people of Paris had by their uprising deserved well of the country *; that those deputies who at first were to be detained in custody at their own houses, (and some of whom had got clear off,) should be transferred to some common prison, there to be detained as ordinary prisoners; that a call should be made of all the deputies, and that those who should be absent without commission or leave should be expelled and replaced by others chosen in their stead; that neither the departimental or municipal authorities could retire or transfer themselves from one place

again reunited to the parliament of Paris the same year, and at last reinstated at Thoulouse in 1443. The parliaments of France were abolished by two decrees of the constituent assembly, dated 24th of March and 7th of September, 1790. *Ante*, p. 4. col. 1, *note*. *Trans.*

* Decree of the 13th June.

to another; that they could not correspond with each other, and that every commissary sent from department to department as a medium of communication and for the purpose of forming a league, should be instantaneously arrested by the good citizens, and sent to Paris well guarded. After passing these general measures, the convention quashed the resolution of the Department of the Eure; informations were filed against the members of the department of the Calvados, who had arrested two of the commissaries of the convention; the same course was taken with regard to Buzot, the party who instigated the Norman revolt: two deputies, Mathieu and Treilhard, were dispatched to the departments of the Gironde, the Dordogne, and the Lot-et-Garonne, to know what it was they wanted before they revolted. The authorities of Thoulouse were summoned to appear, the tribunal and central committee of Marseilles were inhibited, Barbaroux was attainted, and the imprisoned patriots were placed under the custody of the lawfully constituted authorities. At last the convention despatched Robert Lindet to Lyons, in order to enquire into circumstances there, and to specially report upon the condition of that town.

These acts, which were successively passed in the course of June, did not cause a little consternation among the departments, who were not accustomed to contest with the central authority. Intimidated and hesitating, they resolved to await the issue of the course those departments would take, who were either most powerful, or more deeply involved in the contention.

The administrative authorities of Normandy, excited by the presence of those deputies who had attached themselves to Buzot, such as Barbaroux, Guadet, Louvet, Salles, Pétion, Bergoing, Lesage, Cassy, Kervélégan, pursued their original intentions, and fixed at Caen the seat of a central committee of the departments. The Eure, the Calvados, and the Orme, sent their commissaries thither. The departments of Brittany, who had previously entered into a federation at Rennes, made up their minds to join the assembly of Caen, and that they would send off their deputies thither. In short, on the 30th of June, the delegates of Morbihan, of Finisterre, of the Côtes-du-Nord, of the Mayenne, of the Ile-et-Vilaine, and of the Lower Loire, united with those of the Eure and the Orme, constituted themselves a *central assembly of resistance to oppression*, promising to maintain equality, and the unity and indivisibility of the republic, but swearing hatred to the anarchists, and solemnly binding themselves to use their best endeavours in preserving the respect due to persons and property as well as to the sovereignty of the people. After thus constituting themselves, they settled that the committee should be furnished from each individual department with the necessary contingents for organizing a sufficiently armed force, which was to proceed to Paris, and re-establish the national representation in its former state. Felix Wimpfen, general of that army which was to be stationed along the coast of Cherburg, was nominated commander-in-chief of the departimental army. He accepted this command, and immediately assumed the title which had just been conferred upon him. On being summoned to Paris by the minister of war, he replied by saying that there was but one way of making peace, and that was to revoke all the decrees passed since the 31st of May; that upon this condition the departments would fraternize with the capital, but that, on the contrary, he could not appear at Paris in any other manner than at the head of sixty thousand Normans and Bretons.

The minister, at the same time that he required the presence of Wimpfen at Paris, gave orders for the dragoons of La Manche, stationed in Normandy, to forthwith set out for Versailles. On receipt of this intelligence all the federalists who had already joined each other at Evreux, put themselves in battle array, the national guard attached itself to them, and they cut off the road to Versailles from the dragoons. These latter, by no means desirous to come to blows, promised on their part not to go to Versailles, and so far as appearances were concerned fraternized with the federalists. Their officers wrote privately to Paris, stating that they could not obey their orders without commencing a civil war, and therefore they were permitted to remain where they were.

It was arranged by the assembly at Caen, that the Breton battalions already arrived should be sent onwards from Caen to Evreux, the head quarters of the combined forces. It was to this point were despatched provisions, arms, ammunition, and money taken from the public treasury. Thither also were expedited the officers gained over to the cause of federalism, with a great number of concealed royalists, who threw themselves into every commotion, and assumed the mask of republicanism for the purpose of warring against the revolution. Among the counter-revolutionists of this kind, was a man by name Puisaye, who affected great zeal in the Girondist cause, and whom Wimpfen, himself a royalist in disguise, appointed Brigadier-General, and charged with the command of the advance-guard, already mustered at Evreux. This advance-guard might amount to some five or six thousand men, and was daily reinforcing itself by fresh contingencies. The brave Bretons hastened from all sides, and gave intelligence of other battalions who were about to follow them in still greater number. One single circumstance prevented their coming altogether in one body, and that was the necessity that existed for protecting the sea coasts from the English fleet, and for sending off battalions against La Vendée, whose rebellion extended to the Loire and appeared ready to cross that river. Although the rustic population of Brittany were devoted to the clergy, the inhabitants of the towns were steady republicans, and while altogether engaged against Paris, they were not a whit the less desirous of continuing a pertinacious war against La Vendee.

Such was the situation of affairs in Brittany and Normandy towards the commencement of July. In the departments near the Loire, the excitement had cooled down; the commissaries of the convention, who had been directed thither for the purpose of organizing the new levies against La Vendée, had prevailed upon the administrative authorities to ponder and weigh the course of events before they compromised themselves. There, for the present, no desire was exhibited of sending deputies to Bruges, and a great reserve was manifested.

At Bordeaux the insurrection had obtained permanency and was carried on with spirit. The deputies Treilhard and Mathieu had ever since their arrival been closely watched, and it next became a question whether they should not be detained in the character of hostages; however, without pushing matters so far, they were summoned to appear before the popular commission, where the townsfolks, who looked upon them as emissaries of Marat (*envoyés Maratistes*), received them badly enough. They were interrogated upon what was taking place at Paris, and after hearing what they had to say, the commission declared that even according to their own account the convention was not free upon the 2nd of June, nor had the convention been free from restraint from that time to the present; that they were nothing else than the delegates of an assembly possessing no legal character whatever, and consequently they must quit the department. In point of fact, they were conducted back to the frontiers, and immediately afterwards the same measures which had just been enacted at Caen, were ordered to be carried into execution at Bordeaux. Every preparation was made for provisioning an armament; the public money was applied to this purpose, and an advance-guard was marched to Langon to await the arrival of the principal body, which was to set out in a few days. These occurrences took place at the latter end of June and in the beginning of July.

The deputies Mathieu and Treilhard, meeting with less opposition, and being enabled to make themselves better understood in the departments of the Dordogne, the Vienne, and the Lot-et-Garonne, contrived to soothe the public agitation, and succeeded by the conciliatory character of their acts to put a stop to hostilities and gain time as a matter of expedience to the convention. But in the more mountainous departments, among the mountains of the Upper Loire, and on the other side in the Herault and the Gard, and all along the banks of the Rhône, the insurrection was general. The Gard and the Herault put their battalions in marching order, and sent them off to Pont-Saint-Esprit, in order to seize upon, at that point, the passages of the Rhône, as well as to effect their junction with the Marseillais who were to ascend this river. In point of fact, the Marseillais, refusing to render obedience to the decree of the convention, kept up their tribunal, did not release the imprisoned patriots, and even began to execute some of them. They formed an army of six thousand men, which advancing from Aix to Avignon, and attaching itself to the Languedocians mustered at Pont-Saint-Esprit, was to stir up the inhabitants of the banks of the Rhône, the Isère, and the Drôme, and lastly fall in with the mountaineers of the Ain and the Jura. At Grenoble the federalized administrations were in opposition to Dubois-Crancé, and even threatened to arrest him. Being fearful of the consequences of levying troops at this juncture, they had despatched deputies who were to fraternise with Lyons. Dubois-Crancé, with the disorganized army of the Alps, found himself in the midst of a town on the point of an outbreak, which every day more plainly told him that the south did not require the assistance of the north; he had to keep watch upon Savoy, where the illusory notions at first excited by liberty and French conquest were fast dissipating, where a great dissatisfaction was manifested with the levies of men and the assignats, and where no one seemed to understand any thing with regard to this revolution, now discovered to be so turbulent and so entirely different from what it was at first supposed to be. On his flanks he had Switzerland, where the emigrants were bestirring themselves, and where Berne was desirous of again dispatching a garrison to Geneva; and finally, on his rear there was Lyons, who intercepted his correspondence with the committee of public welfare.

Robert Lindet had been received at Lyons; but even before his face they had taken the federalist oath: UNITY AND THE INDIVISIBILITY OF THE REPUBLIC; HATRED AGAINST THE ANARCHISTS, AND NOTHING BUT THE NATIONAL REPRESENTATION. So far from sending the arrested patriots to Paris, they had continued the proceedings commenced against them. A newly formed authority, composed of the deputies of the communes and members of the constituted bodies, had been created under the style of *The popular and republican commission of the public welfare for the Rhone and Loire.* This assembly had just been ordering the organization of a departmental force for the purpose of effecting a junction with the brethren of the Jura, the Isère, the Bouches-du-Rhône, the Gironde, and the Calvados. This force was already perfect in its appointments, and moreover the raising of a subsidy had been agreed upon; and there, as in every one of the departments, all that they waited for, was the signal to put themselves in motion. In the Isère, ever since the intelligence had arrived that the two deputies Bassal and Garnier of Troyes, sent thither to re-establish obedience towards the convention, had mustered at Dôle fifteen hundred men, troops of the line, upwards of fourteen thousand mountaineers had taken arms and were preparing to entirely surround them.

If we reflect upon the state of France at the commencement of July 1793*, we shall see that one column issuing from Brittany and Normandy and bearing upon Evreux, was not in fact more than a few leagues from Paris; that another column was advancing from Bordeaux, and was able to draw in its train all those departments of the basin of the Loire who were as yet undecided; that six thousand Marseillais posted at Avignon, waiting for the Languedocians at Pont-Saint-Esprit, already occupied by eight hundred men of Nimes, were ready at a moment's notice to form a junction at Lyons with all the federalists of Grenoble, the Ain, and the Jura, to push through Burgundy upon Paris. Till this general junction could be effected, the federalists seized upon all the public money, intercepted the provisions and communications sent to the armies, and threw into circulation the assignats produced by the sale of the national property. It is a remarkable fact, which peculiarily characterises the spirit of party, and that is, that the two factions addressed the same reproaches to each other, and imputed to each other the same motive. The Paris party and the Mountain party imputed to the

* Cambon's Report upon the acts of the committee of public welfare, from the 10th April to the 10th July.

federalists a desire to ruin the republic by dividing it, and of entertaining a correspondence with the English for the purpose of setting up a king, who was to be either the Duke of Orleans, Louis XVII., or else the Duke of York. On their part, the party of the departments and of the federalists accused the Mountain party of a desire to bring about a counter-revolution by means of an anarchy, and stated, that Marat, Robespierre, and Danton, were either in the pay of England or the Duke of Orleans. Thus on either side, it was the salvation of the republic for which they expressed such solicitude, and that the restoration of monarchy was the very thing they considered as mostly to be deprecated. Such is the deplorable and ordinary blindness of party interest.

But this was only a portion of the dangers to which our unhappy country was exposed. The enemy at home had mostly to be feared because of the enemy abroad, who now caused more apprehension than ever. At the same time the armies of the French were advancing from the provinces towards the centre, the armies of foreign powers were encircling France itself, and threatened an invasion which seemed unavoidable. Ever since the battle of Neerwinden and the defection of Dumouriez, a frightful series of reverses caused us the loss of our conquests together with our northern frontier. The reader will call to mind that Dampierre, appointed commander-in-chief, had rallied his army under the walls of Bouchain, and had there imparted to it a little unanimity and confidence. Luckily for the cause of the revolution, the allied powers, strictly adhering to the methodized plan, resolved upon at the commencement of the campaign, were unwilling to make an inroad at any one point, and according to this rule could not enter France until that the king of Prussia, after having taken Mentz, was enabled to march into the heart of our provinces. If there had existed among the generals of the alliance a spark of genius or unanimity, the cause of the revolution would have been lost for ever. After the battle of Neerwinden and the defection of Dumouriez, they ought to have marched forwards, and not to have stopped until our dispirited army, suffering from the effects of disunion and treason, should have been made prisoners, or compelled to seek refuge in the fortified towns, and then our plains would have afforded an open passage to the victorious enemy. As it was, the allies held a congress at Antwerp, in order to methodize the ulterior operations of the war. The duke of York, the prince of Cobourg, the prince of Orange, and several generals, settled amongst themselves what ought to be done. They resolved upon taking Condé and Valenciennes, in order to give the house of Austria some new fortified towns in the Netherlands; and to seize Dunkirk, in order to confirm to England the possession of this desirable continental port. These matters being settled, they recommenced the campaign. The English and Dutch forces had come up in line. The duke of York had the command of twenty thousand Austrians and Hanoverians; the prince of Orange had fifteen thousand Dutchmen, and the prince of Cobourg had forty-five thousand Austrians and eight thousand Hessians. The prince of Hohenlohe kept possession of Namur and Luxembourg with thirty thousand Austrians, and formed a junction between the allied army of the Netherlands with the army of the Prussians who were to besiege Mentz. Therefore eighty or ninety thousand men threatened the north of France.

Already had the allies blockaded Condé, and it was a very great point with the French government to reduce the blockade of that place. Dampierre, a brave man, but placing no dependence upon his soldiers, was not so rash as to attack these formidable masses. Nevertheless, pressed by the commissaries of the convention, he brought back our army to the camp of Famars near Valenciennes, and on the 1st of May he led an attack upon several columns of the Austrians entrenched within the forests of Vicogne and Saint Amans. These military tactics were still conducted with extreme caution; to form a mass, to seize upon the enemy's weakest point and to strike at it boldly, was a combination entirely unknown to both parties. Dampierre threw himself forward with great bravery, but in small bodies, upon an enemy divided within itself, and whom it would have been easy enough to have overwhelmed upon any one given point; his mistake brought its own punishment with it, and he was repulsed after an obstinate conflict. On the 9th of May he again commenced the attack; he was not so much divided as on the former occasion, but the enemy now put upon their guard had adopted the same precaution, and while he was making the most heroic exertions to carry a redoubt, and the capture of which would have effected the junction of two of his columns, he was struck by a cannon ball and mortally wounded. General Lamarche, invested provisionally with the command, ordered a retreat, and brought back the army to the camp of Famars.

The camp of Famars, situated under the walls of Valenciennes and a suburb of that place, prevented its being besieged. The allies therefore resolved to make an attack upon it the 23rd of May. They spread their troops abroad here and there, according to their usual mode of warfare, and thus uselessly dispersed one part over numerous points, all of which it should have been a matter of prudence with the Austrians to have preserved, and did not attack the camp with all the force they could have commanded. Kept in check one entire day by the artillery, the pride of the French army, it was evening before they crossed the Ronelle, which defended the front of the camp. Lamarche effected his retreat that same night in good order, and then posted himself at Cæsar's camp, which bore the same relation to Bouchain, as the camp at Famars did to Valenciennes. Here again he ought to have pursued and dispersed us; but egotism and a pedantic adherence to rule kept the allies around Valenciennes. A portion of their army, placed as corps of observation, were stationed between Valenciennes and Bouchain, and faced Cæsar's camp. Another division undertook the siege of Valenciennes, while the remaining part continued the blockade of Condé, already straitened for provisions, and which they had hopes of reducing in a few days. The regular siege of Valenciennes was begun. One hundred and eighty pieces of cannon arrived from Vienna, one hundred more from Holland, and ninety-three mortars were already prepared. Thus in June and July Condé

was starved out, Valenciennes was burnt, and our generals occupied Cæsar's camp with a disheartened and disorganized army. Condé and Valenciennes being thus reduced, there was every reason for apprehending the worst.

The army of the Moselle, connecting the army of the North with the army of the Rhine, had been transferred to the command of Ligneville at the time when Beurnonville was appointed minister of war. This army faced that of prince Hohenlohe, and had nothing to fear from that position, because that prince, occupying Namur, Luxembourg, and Trèves, all at one time, with not more than thirty thousand at the most, and having before him the fortified towns of Metz and Thionville, did not possess the means of attempting any hazardous movement. His force had been just before rendered still more inoperative by detaching seven to eight thousand men from his division to join the Prussian army. From that time it became more than ever practicable and expedient to join the active army of the Moselle to that of the Upper Rhine, with a view to attempt important military operations.

Upon the Rhine, the preceding campaign had terminated at Mentz. Custine, after his ridiculous actions in the neighbourhood of Francfort, had been obliged to fall back and shut himself up in Mentz, whither he had collected a considerable force of artillery drawn from our fortresses, and particularly from Strasburg. There it was, that he formed a thousand schemes; at one time, he desired to act upon the offensive, at another time, he must needs keep within Mentz, and at some other time he was for abandoning it altogether. At last it was resolved that he should protect it, and he himself contributed not a little to induce the executive council to come to that determination. The king of Prussia found himself compelled to lay siege to it, and it was the stand that was made at this point, that prevented the allies from marching to the north.

The king of Prussia passed the Rhine at Bacharach, a little above Mentz; Wurmser, with fifteen thousand Austrians, and some few thousand men from Condé, crossed the Rhine a little further up; and the Hessian corps of Schomfeld remained upon the right hand bank before the suburb of Cassel. The Prussian army was not near so strong as it ought to have been, considering the engagements Frederic William had entered into. Having despatched a considerable force into Poland, there remained no more than fifty thousand men, inclusive of the different Hessian, Saxon, and Bavarian contingents. Thus, after reckoning the seven to eight thousand Austrians detached from Hohenlohe, the fifteen thousand Austrians of Wurmser, the five or six thousand emigrants of Condé, and the fifty-five thousand men of the king of Prussia, the army which was directed against the eastern frontier might be computed at nearly eighty thousand soldiers. Our fortresses upon the Rhine contained nearly thirty-eight thousand men in garrison, the army in operation amounted to between forty and forty-five thousand men; the army of the Moselle to thirty thousand; and if these two last had been placed under a single command, and with such a position of support as Mentz, they might have set out to seek the king of Prussia themselves, and afforded him plenty of employment on the other side of the Rhine.

The two generals of the Moselle and the Rhine ought at least to have been upon better terms of correspondence with each other than they evidently were; they might have disputed, nay even prevented the passage of the river, but they did nothing. During the whole course of the month of March, the king of Prussia passed the Rhine without opposition, and his path was never crossed, save by advanced guards, which he repelled without any difficulty. During this period, Custine was at Worms. He had not cared to defend either the banks of the Rhine, or the other side of the Vosges, which forming the circuit of Mentz, could have easily checked the march of the Prussians. He came up it is true, but conceived a panic at the checks experienced by his advanced guard; he believed that he should have had one hundred thousand men upon his hands; above all, he ran away with the idea that Wurmser, who had to debouch upon the Palatinate, and above Mayence, was gaining upon his rear, and would thus cut him off from Alsace; he asked for assistance from Ligneville, who, on his own part, being greatly alarmed, durst not transfer a single regiment; he then fairly took to flight, retreated with the utmost celerity to Landau, next to Wissemburgh, and even thought of seeking protection under the cannon of Strasburg. This unaccountable retreat opened the way for the Prussians, who came thick upon Mentz, and invested it upon both banks.

Twenty thousand men were garrisoned in that place, and if that number were more than sufficient for the purposes of defence, it was much greater than necessary having regard to the provisions, which could not suffice for so large a garrison. The uncertainty of our military plans had prevented our taking any measures to secure the provisioning of that town. Fortunately it contained two representatives of the people, Rewbell and the heroic Merlin de Thionville, the generals Kléber, Aubert-Dubayet, and the engineer Meunier, in short a garrison endued with every military virtue, courage, sobriety, and steadiness. The investment of this town began in April; general Kalkreuth conducted the siege with a corps of Prussians. The king of Prussia and Wurmser kept themselves in observation at the foot of the Vosges and faced Custine. The garrison made frequent sallies, and extended its defences to a considerable distance. The French government perceiving the error that had been committed in separating the two armies of the Moselle and the Rhine, consolidated them under the command of Custine. This general having the disposal of from sixty to seventy thousand men, having the Prussians dispersed before him, and beyond them Mentz, protected by twenty thousand Frenchmen, never took the opportunity of attacking the corps of observation, dispersing it, and thus effecting a junction with that brave garrison who stretched out its hand to him. Towards the middle of May, becoming sensible of the consequences of his inertness, he made one attempt, badly conceived and badly seconded, which terminated in a complete rout. According to his usual course, he complained of the subalterns, and was transferred from the army of the north to introduce good discipline and courage to Cæsar's camp. Thus the allied

powers who were besieging Valenciennes and Mentz, were enabled after the capture of two places to advance upon our centre, and effectuate their invasion without our being able to interpose any obstruction.

From the Rhine to the Alps and the Pyrenees, a connected series of revolts threatened the rear of our armies, and interrupted their communication with each other. The Vosges, the Jura, the Auvergne, and the Lozère form, from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, almost one connected mass of mountains of different extent and height. Mountainous countries are places peculiarly adapted for the preservation of institutions, manners, and customs. In almost every one of those which we are about to describe, the population preserved a relic of attachment for their ancient mode of life, and without being so bigoted as La Vendée, they were nevertheless ready enough to rise against the new order of things. The Vosges, half Germans, were urged on by the nobility and the clergy, and evinced tendencies more and more alarming as the army of the Rhine became more and more unsteady. The Jura was entirely revolted to the Gironde; and if it did, in its rebellion, demonstrate more of the spirit of liberty than the others, it was not the less dangerous for that, for from fifteen to twenty thousand mountaineers gathered themselves round Lons-le-Saulnier, and joined the revolters of the Ain and the Rhône. It has been already seen in what state Lyons was. The mountains of the Lozère, which divide the Upper-Loire from the Rhône, were filled with insurrectionists precisely similar to the Vendeans. Under the command of an ex-member of the constituent assembly, of the name of Charrier, they already had increased to the number of thirty thousand, and were able to effect a junction by the Loire with La Vendée. After these came the rebellious federalists of the south. Thus it was that extended rebellions, different in views and principles, but all equally formidable, threatened the rears of the armies of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees.

Along the Alps, the Piedmontese were in arms, their object was to recover from us Savoy and the Comté of Nice. The snow delayed the commencement of hostilities along St. Bernard, and no one stirred from his post in the three valleys of Sallenche, the Tarentaise, and the Maurienne. On the maritime Alps, and with that army called the army of Italy, things were not in the same state. There, hostilities had been resumed in good time, and ever since the month of May they had recommenced the contest as to the important post of Saorgio, upon which depended the protection of Nice. In point of fact, this post once fairly gained, the French would become masters of the Col-de-Tende, and have held the key of the great chain of the Alps. Consequently, the Piedmontese had exhibited as much energy in defending it as we did in attempting to get possession of it. The Piedmontese had, as well in Savoy as on the side of Nice, forty thousand men, reinforced by eight thousand Austrian auxiliaries. Their troops, subdivided into various divisions of equal force from the Col-de-Tende to the Great St. Bernard, had followed, as did all those of the allies, the system of *cordons*, and guarded all the valleys. The French army of Italy was in a most deplorable state; composed at the utmost of fifteen thousand men, in want of every thing, badly regulated, no great attempts could be expected from that quarter. General Biron, who had commanded it for a short period, increased it by five thousand men, but he was unable to provide the necessary requisites. Had one of those enlarged conceptions, which would have ruined us in the north, have originated in the south, our ruin could not have been the less certain in that quarter. The Piedmontese could, by taking advantage of the frost, which utterly paralyzes all warlike preparations in the quarter of the high Alps, have conveyed all their forces to the southern Alps, and debouching upon Nice with a mass of thirty thousand men, have overthrown our army of Italy, driven it back upon the insurgent departments, have dispersed it entirely, have fomented the rebellion on both sides of the Rhône, have advanced perhaps as far as Grenoble and Lyons, engaged our army in the rear, already engaged upon the plains of Savoy, and in this manner invaded one entire portion of France. But there was no more an Amadis with them than there was an Eugene with the Austrians, or a Marlborough with the English. They, therefore, confined themselves to the defence of Saorgio.

Brunet, who succeeded Anselm, had made the same efforts against the post of Saorgio, that Dampierre had made in the quarter of Condé. After numerous bloody and fruitless conflicts, an engagement of a decisive character took place, which terminated in a complete rout. Even then, if the enemy had borrowed a little boldness from his success, he could have dispersed us altogether, have compelled us to evacuate Nice, and to recross the Var. Kellermann had lost no time in leaving his head quarters in the Alps, had rallied the army at the camp of Donjon, appointed posts of defence, and gave orders that no movement whatever should be made until new forces should come up. The situation of this army was rendered more particularly perilous by one circumstance, and that was the appearance of the English admiral Hood in the Mediterranean, who had issued from Gibraltar with thirty-seven sail, and of the admiral Langara, who had sallied from the Spanish ports with nearly as large a naval force. Soldiers might thus have been landed, have occupied the line of the Var, and taken the French in the rear. As it was, the presence of the squadrons prevented our sending provisions by sea, was favourable to the rebellion of the south, and induced Corsica to throw herself into the arms of the English. Our fleets repaired in the harbour of Toulon the damage they had suffered in the unfortunate expedition against Sardinia, and were with difficulty enabled to protect the coasting vessels importing corn from Italy. The Mediterranean we no longer called our own, and the commerce of the Levant was diverted by way of Marseilles to the Greeks and the English. Thus the army of Italy had in front the Piedmontese, victorious in so many engagements, and at their back the insurrectionists of the south and the two squadrons.

At the Pyrenees, the war with Spain, which had been proclaimed the 7th of March, as a consequence of the death of Louis XVI., had hardly commenced. The preparations were slowly conducted on both sides, because Spain, who was

slothful, indolent, and wretchedly administered, could not hasten; and because France had upon her hands another class of enemies, who occupied all her attention. Servan, commander-in-chief at the Pyrenees, had spent several months in regulating his army, and in accusing Pache with quite as much bitterness as ever Dumouriez had done. Things had remained in precisely the same state under Bouchotte, and when the campaign opened, the general still reiterated his complaints against the minister, who, he said, had suffered him to be destitute of necessaries. The two countries communicate with each other by two points, Perpignan and Bayonne. To conduct a vigorous invasion against Bayonne and Bordeaux, and thus touch upon La Vendée, was too bold an experiment for that time; the more so as the enemy imagined that we were better able to cope with him on that quarter than we really were; besides, he must have crossed the Landes, the Garonne, and the Dordogne, and difficulties such as these were quite enough to have diverted him from this design, even if he had meditated such a plan. The court of Madrid preferred an attack by Perpignan, because she possessed in that quarter a more firm footing by reason of her fortresses, because, also, she relied upon the royalists of the south in consequence of the promises of the emigrants, and because she had not been able to forget her ancient pretensions to the Rousillon. Four or five thousand were left to protect Aragon; fifteen or eighteen thousand, half of them regulars, and the other half militia, were to fight under general Caro in the western Pyrenees; and lastly, general Ricardos, with twenty-four thousand men, had the command of an important expedition against the Rousillon.

Two great valleys, that of the Tech and that of the Tet, break off from the chain of the Pyrenees, and spreading out towards Perpignan, form our two outermost lines of defence. Perpignan is situated on the second, that of the Tet. Ricardos, who had received intelligence of our deficiencies, hit upon a bold expedient: he covered the forts of Bellegarde and Les Bains, situated on the first line, and boldly marched onward with the design of falling upon all our detachments scattered through the valleys, by getting beyond them. This attempt proved eminently successful. He defiled into the valley on the 15th of April, beat off the detachments under General Villot sent to stop his progress, and struck a panic terror over the whole frontier. Had he marched on with ten thousand men, he would have made himself master of Perpignan, but he had not hardihood enough for that; besides, he had not made preparations for going further, and so gave the French time to recover themselves.

The command, which appeared too great for a single general, was divided. Servan took the command of the western Pyrenees, and general Defiers, who, we have already observed, was engaged on the expedition against the Dutch, the eastern Pyrenees. The latter rallied the army before Perpignan, at a position called the *Mas d'Es*. On the 19th of May, Ricardos, having contrived to collect eighteen thousand men, made an attack upon the French camp. The brave general Dagobert, who retained to an advanced age all the spirit of a young man, and combining with his bravery the advantage of great experience, succeeded in keeping his ground on the field of battle. Defiers came up with a reserve of eighteen hundred men, and the ground was kept. The day declined, and the conflict seemed to promise a successful issue; but towards nightfall, our soldiers, tired out by the length of the engagement, gave ground, and fled in disorder, to seek shelter under Perpignan. The intimidated garrison shut the gates, and fired upon our troops, whom they took for Spaniards. Now had been the time to have assailed Perpignan off-hand, and to have seized upon this place, which could not have held out; but Ricardos, who had done nothing beyond covering Bellegard and Les Bains, did not conceive that he ought to venture further, and returned to the siege of these petty fortresses. He possessed himself of them towards the end of June, and showed himself once more to our troops, who had rallied to nearly the same positions as before. Therefore, in July, a lost battle might have caused the capture of Rousillon.

We now observe how calamities increase, as we come to the consideration of another theatre of war, far more bloody and more terrible than those we have hitherto noticed. La Vendée, involved in fire and blood, was about to vomit forth to the other side of the Loire a formidable column. We left the Vendeans, warmed with their unhoped-for successes, in possession of the town of Thouars, which they had taken from Quétineau, and beginning to contemplate designs of greater importance. Instead of marching upon Douai and Saumur, they bent their march southwards of the theatre of war, and were anxious to clear the country in the quarter of Fontenay and Niort. MM. de Lescure and de Larochejaquelin, who had the conduct of this expedition, attacked Fontenay upon the 16th of May. Being checked at the onset by general Sandos, they fell back some distance, but almost immediately taking advantage of the blind confidence which possessed the republican general upon his early success, they came up again, from fifteen to twenty thousand in number, took possession of Fontenay, in spite of the exertions displayed by the young Marceau upon this day, and compelled Chalbos and Sandos to retire to Niort in the utmost disorder. Here they found a great quantity of arms and ammunition, and enriched themselves with new resources, which, in conjunction with those they had procured from Thouars, enabled them to push the war with every expectation of fresh successes. Lescure addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants, and threatened them with the most dreadful punishment if they afforded assistance to the republicans. After which the Vendeans separated, as they usually did, to return to their agricultural pursuits, and they were appointed to meet again upon the first of June in the environs of Doué.

In Lower Vendée, where Charette had the sole command, without as yet connecting his movements with those of the other leaders, the success had been evenly balanced. Canclaux, commandant at Nantes, could but with great difficulty keep his position at Machecoul; general Boulard, who had the command at Sables, owing to the good conduct and the discipline of his army, had occupied for two months Lower Vendée, and had even kept his advanced posts up to the environs of Pal-

luan. However, upon the seventeenth of May, he was compelled to retire to Mothe-Achard very near Sables, and he was there placed in the greatest embarrassment, because his two best battalions, entirely manned by citizens of Bordeaux, desired to return to attend to their affairs, which they had abandoned upon the earliest intelligence of the successes obtained by the Vendean bands.

The labours of the field had induced some tranquillity in the Upper as well as in the Lower Vendée, and, for some days, the war was less active in its character, and stood over for the early part of June.

General Berruyer, whose orders originally extended over the whole theatre of war, had been discharged, and his command was apportioned between different generals. Saumur, Niort, and Sables composed what was called the army of the Rochelle coast, which was confided to Biron; Angers, Nantes, and the Lower Loire, formed that army known as the coasts of Brest, which was committed to Canclaux, commander-in-chief at Nantes. Finally, the coasts of Cherburg had been given to Wimpfen, who since became, as we have already noticed, commander of the Calvados insurgents.

Biron, transferred from the frontier of the Rhine to that of Italy, and from this latter place to La Vendée, did not appear upon this theatre of devastation without evincing considerable repugnance, and thus his aversion to identify himself with the horrors of civil war became the cause of his own ruin. He arrived at Niort upon the 27th of May, and found the army in a most awful state of disorder. This army had been formed of wholesale levies made by force or enlistment in the neighbouring country, and thus confusedly thrown into La Vendée without drilling, without discipline, and without provisions. Composed of peasants and the hard-working mechanics of the towns, who had reluctantly abandoned their occupations, they were in a state ready to disband themselves upon the very first opportunity. It would have been much better to have sent the greater part of them away, for they committed improprieties in the open country and villages, they incumbered to no purpose the revolted country, they caused a famine by their number, they were the means of creating disorders and panics, and often drew along with them in their flight well-disciplined battalions, who, if they had been left to themselves, would have made a better stand. All these companies came accompanied by some leader or other appointed in their own locality, who styled himself "general," and talked of "his army," became impatient of control, and thwarted all the arrangements of his superior officers. In the Orleans quarter, battalions were formed, known during this war by the name of *the Orleans battalions*. The men who formed these battalions were clerks, shopmen, and servants, together with all the young men that could be collected from the sections of Paris and despatched in the train of Santerre. These were distributed amongst the troops which had been drawn from the army of the north, by taking fifty men from each battalion. But it was necessary to assimilate these heterogeneous elements and to find them arms and clothing. Nothing of the sort was to be had, even the pay could not be forthcoming, and as a distinction was made between the troops of the line and the volunteers in that respect, that circumstance of itself frequently became the subject of mutinies.

In order to organize this multitude, the convention sent commissaries upon commissaries. They had them at Tours, at Saumur, at Niort, at Rochelle, and at Nantes. They thwarted each other and obstructed the generals. The executive council also entertained a set of agents, and the minister Bouchotte had the country swarming with his creatures, chosen from the Jacobins and Cordeliers. These played counter with the representatives, imagining that they demonstrated their zeal by overwhelming the country with requirements, and accused of despotism and treasonable practices those generals who attempted to check the insubordination of their troops, or prevented vexatious acts which had no purpose to serve. This conflict of authorities gave rise to a chaotic mass of accusations and confusion of powers calculated to produce serious mischiefs. Biron was unable to enforce obedience to himself, and he dared not put his army under marching orders, for fear that it should disband itself at the earliest opportunity, or plunder all that came in its way. Such is a correct description of the forces of the republic at this period in La Vendée.

Biron repaired to Tours, and eventually settled a plan with the representatives, which consisted, after this confused multitude should have been put into a little better order, in bringing four columns, each of ten thousand men, from the circumference to the centre. The four points from which they were to start, were the bridges of Cé, Saumur, Chinon, and Niort. In the mean time he went to visit the Lower Vendée, where he considered the danger greater than any where else. Biron provided, and with reason, against some communications that might be taking place between the Vendeans and the English. A supply of ammunition and an embarkation of troops in the Marais might have the effect of aggravating the evil and rendering the war interminable. A squadron of ten sail had been distinguished in the offing, and it was a well known fact that the Breton emigrants had been ordered to repair to the islands of Jersey and Guernsey. Thus every thing justified the apprehensions of Biron, and demonstrated the propriety of his visit to the Lower Vendée.

In the mean time the Vendeans had mustered again upon the first of June. They had introduced some regularity amongst themselves, and had appointed a council of government for the country occupied by their armies. An adventurer, who contrived to make himself pass for the bishop of Agra and a legate from the pope, presided in this council, and in giving his benediction to the flags and celebrating solemn masses, excited the fanaticism of the Vendeans, and so far rendered them a service by his imposture. They had not as yet chosen a commander-in-chief, and each leader took the command of the peasants from his quarter, and it had been arranged that all their operations should be settled amongst themselves. These leaders had published a proclamation in the name of Louis XVII., and of the count of Provence, regent of the kingdom during the minority of the young prince, wherein they styled themselves com

manders of the royal and Catholic armies. Their plan was first to occupy the line of the Loire, and to advance upon Doué and Saumur. The enterprise was bold, but easy of execution in the present state of things. On the 7th they entered Doué and came up before Saumur on the 9th. From the very moment that their march was ascertained, general Salomon, who was at Thouars with three thousand men, effective soldiers, was ordered to march upon their rear. Salomon put his orders into execution, but he found the enemy too strong for him; he could not have attempted the attack upon them without certain destruction to himself; he returned to Thouars, and from Thouars to Niort. The troops of Saumur had taken their post in the environs of the town, on the road to Fontevrault, in the entrenchments of Neuilly and upon the heights of Bournan. The Vendéans drew near, attacked the column of Berthier, were repelled by a well directed fire from the artillery, but returned again to the charge and compelled Berthier, who was wounded, to fall back. The foot soldiers, the two Orleans battalions, and the cuirassiers still held out, but the latter lost their colonel; then it was they turned their backs, and all were brought back into the fortress, the Vendéans following close upon them. There still remained outside the walls general Coustard, commander of the battalions posted upon the heights of Bournan. He found himself separated from his republican troops, who had all flown back into Saumur, and took the bold resolution of gaining an entrance by taking the Vendéans in their rear. He had to cross a bridge where the conquerors had just raised a battery. The brave Coustard ordered a troop of cuirassiers under his command to charge the battery. "Whither are you sending us?" say the latter; "To death," answered Coustard; "the welfare of the republic requires it." The cuirassiers dashed forward, but the Orleans battalions dispersed and left the general and the cuirassiers who charged the battery to their fate. The cowardice of the one neutralized the heroism of the others, and Coustard, unable to gain an entrance into Saumur, retreated to Angers.

Saumur was taken on the 9th of June, and the next day the citadel surrendered. The Vendéans having the command of the course of the Loire, were enabled to march either upon Nantes or La Fleche, Le Mans and Paris. Terror preceded them, and every thing gave way before them. During this period Biron was in Lower Vendée, where by attending to the sea coast he considered himself able to avert dangers of a more substantive and serious nature.

At this time we were exposed to every kind of danger. The allies, laying siege to Valenciennes, Condé, and Mentz, were on the eve of capturing these fortresses, the bulwarks of our frontiers. The Vosges in agitation, and the Jura in rebellion, afforded the most easy entrance to the invaders in the quarter of the Rhine. The army of Italy, repelled by the Piedmontese, had at their back the rebellion of the south, and the English squadrons. The Spaniards now before the French camp under the walls of Perpignan, threatened to carry it by storm, and thus make themselves masters of the Roussillon. The rebels of the Lozere were now ready to extend their hand to the Vendéans along the Loire, and this was the scope of the originator of this rebellion. The Vendéans, masters of Saumur and the course of the Loire, had only to do whatever they chose, for they possessed every means of executing the boldest attempts upon the interior. Lastly, the federalists, marching from Caen, Bourdeaux, and Marseilles, set themselves about raising a rebellion in France under their very footsteps.

Our situation in the month of July, 1793, was more than ever desperate, the more so, as from every point a mortal blow could have been inflicted upon France. The allies in the north had no necessity to trouble themselves about the fortified places; all they had to do was to march upon Paris, and they would have thrown the convention back upon the Loire, where it would have been received by the Vendéans; the Austrians and the Piedmontese could have carried out an invasion by the Maritime Alps, have destroyed an army, and marched up throughout the South in the character of conquerors. The Spaniards were in a condition to advance by Bayonne, and to form a junction with La Vendée; or, if they had preferred the Roussillon, to march boldly towards the Lozère, by no means distant from the frontier, and to set the South in flames. Lastly, there were the English, who instead of cruising in the Mediterranean had the means of disembarking troops in La Vendée, and to convey them from Saumur to Paris.

But the enemies of the convention, both abroad and at home, did not possess those appliances which secure victory in a war of revolution. The allied powers acted without unanimity, and under the pretence of a holy war, concealed the most personal interests. The Austrians wanted Valenciennes; the King of Prussia, Mentz; the English, Dunkirk; the ambition of the Piedmontese was to recover Chambéry and Nice; the Spanish, the least interested of them all, nevertheless had a slight hankering after Roussillon; in short, the English had it more to heart their covering the Mediterranean with their fleets, and gaining some seaport in that part of the world, than the affording timely assistance to La Vendée. Setting aside this universal egotism, which prevented the allies from looking beyond their immediate advantage, they were all of them far too pedantic and timorous in their warfare; indeed, they defended after the old military fashion the old political habitudes, for the preservation of which they had taken arms. As for the Vendéans, who had rebelled as mere untaught individuals against the genius of the revolution, they fought like brave but undisciplined sharpshooters. The federalists, who were scattered over the whole surface of France, having to correspond at a great distance from each other before they could agree upon their operations, not rebelling with sufficient firmness against the central authority, and not acting under the influence of excited passions, could not do otherwise than carry on the contest in an uncertain and inefficient manner. Besides all this, they laboured under the self-reproach of having injured their country by a misconducted diversion. They began to find that they were highly to blame in taking upon themselves to judge whether Pétion and Vergniaud, or Robespierre and Danton were to be the correct standard of revolutionary feeling, at the very time that all Europe

was pouring forth her strength against us; and they also felt that, under such circumstances, there was but one good course to pursue, that is to say, the most energetic. In point of fact, all the factions already gathering around them had pointed out their criminality. It was not only the constituents, but the agents of the old court, the followers of the old clergy, in short, all the partizans of absolute power, who rose, as it were, as one man, and they plainly perceived that every opposition to the revolution must necessarily benefit the enemies of liberty and indivisible nationality.

Such were the causes which rendered the allies so inefficient and timorous, the Vendéans so limited in their views, the federalists so uncertain, all which mainly assured the victory of the convention over its enemies both at home and all over Europe. The *Mountaineers*, who were solely inspired by one grand desire, one single feeling, for the welfare of the revolution, and demonstrating that elevation of mind which brings into action the most unheard-of and the boldest means, which considers nothing too hazardous or too costly, so that it be serviceable, could hardly do other than confound by an unforeseen and grand scheme of action, their slothful, pedantic, and hole-and-corner enemies, and, at the same time, strangle in their birth those factions who wanted the old *regime* in all its vigour, as well as the revolution in all its vigour, and who possessed neither consistency or determination of object.

The convention, in the midst of the extraordinary circumstances in which it was placed, did not experience a single hour of disturbance. While fortresses or intrenched camps were for a short time obstructing the advance of the enemy upon the several frontiers, the committee of public welfare laboured night and day in re-organizing the armies, by affording them their full complement by means of the levy of three hundred thousand men ordered in March, by sending instructions to the generals, and by dispatching funds and ammunition. The convention held parley with all those local administrations who showed a desire of withholding for the federalist cause the supplies appointed for the armies, and prevailed upon them, out of pure consideration for the public welfare, to desist from such courses.

While these expedients were being employed with regard to the enemy abroad, the convention did not resort to less efficacious measures with regard to the enemy at home. The most available resource against an adversary who doubts his right as well as power, is not to have the least doubt upon one's own. Upon this principle it was that the convention acted. We have already remarked upon the energetic decrees which it promulgated on the first demonstration of the outbreak. Numerous towns refusing to yield obedience, the idea never crossed their minds for one instant to hold any terms with those whose actions bore the decided impress of rebellion. The Lyonnese having refused to yield obedience, and to send back to Paris the incarcerated patriots, the convention ordered its commissaries stationed near the army of the Alps to use force, and that without giving itself any thought as to the difficulties and dangers which these commissaries would experience at Grenoble, where they had the Piedmontese in their front, and all the rebels of the Isère and the Rhône in their rear. The convention also charged them to bring back Marseilles to a sense of duty. No more than three days were allowed for all the administrative powers to retract their equivocal resolutions; and, in short, the convention despatched to Vernon some light horse, and some thousand citizens of Paris, to put down, in an offhand manner, the rebels of Calvados, who were the nearest to the capital.

The grand expedient of the constitution was not neglected, and eight days sufficed for the completion of this work, which was rather meant to serve as a rallying point, than as really a scheme of legislation. Herault de Séchelles was the person who digested it. According to his plan of legislation, every Frenchman, at the age of twenty-one, became a citizen, and of capacity to exercise his political rights without any regard to fortune or property. The citizens in assembly were to nominate a single deputy for every fifty thousand souls. The deputies, who were to form of themselves an assembly, could not sit longer than one year. They were to issue decrees in respect of all matters concerning the emergencies of the state, and these decrees were to be carried into execution forthwith. They were to enact laws in respect of all general and less emergent matters, and these enactments were not to be sanctioned, unless after some delay had intervened the primary assemblies did not protest against them. On the 1st of May the primary assemblies were to meet as a matter of inherent right, and without being summoned for that purpose, for the purpose of renewing the deputies. The primary assemblies were enabled to demand special meetings for qualifying the constitutional act. The executive power was confided to twenty-four members nominated by the electors, and this was the only mediate election. The primary assemblies nominated the electors; these electors in their turn nominated the candidates, and the legislative body was to reduce them by striking out the names of the candidates to twenty-four. These twenty-four members of council were to appoint generals, ministers and agents of every description, and were to take them from among their own body. They were to direct them, to oversee them, and were perpetually responsible. The executive council was to be renewed as to one half every year. In short, this form of a constitution, so brief and so democratic, whereby the government was reduced to a mere temporary commission, yet left untouched one remaining vestige of the old *regime*, the communes, and neither altered the limits of their administration, or their powers. The energy which they had demonstrated, was the means of preserving them upon this rased tablet, whereon no trace of the past was suffered to remain. Almost without discussion, and in eight days, this constitution was adopted*, and at the moment when it passed in its complete state, the guns echoed throughout Paris, and shouts of joy were heard on every side. Several thousand copies were printed for the purpose of being sent to every part of France. It experienced but one single mark of opposition, and that emanated from some of the agitators who had planned the events of the 31st of May.

* It passed into law the 24th June. The draft had been laid on the table the 16th.

The reader will recollect young Varlet making prosy harangues in places of public resort, also the young Lyonnese, Leclerc, so intemperate in his orations at the Jacobins, and even suspected by Marat for his excesses, as well as Jacques Roux, who acted with such inhumanity towards Louis XVI., who wished him to take charge of his will; all these persons made themselves very notorious in the late insurrection, and possessed great influence at the committee of the Evêché and at the Cordeliers. They found fault, because the constitution contained no enactment against monopolizers; they prepared a petition, got it signed in the streets, and ran to excite the Cordeliers, in declaring that the constitution was incomplete, because it contained no proviso against the greatest enemies the people had. Legendre in vain did his best to oppose this motion; he was considered as a *moderatist*, and the petition as adopted by the society was by them presented to the convention. On hearing it read, the Mountain became quite indignant. Robespierre and Collot d'Herbois were in a great chafe; got the petition refused, and went themselves to the Jacobins to demonstrate the danger of these perfidious exaggerations, which had no other tendency, as they said, than to lead the people astray, and could only proceed from persons in the pay of the enemies of the republic. "The most popular constitution that has ever existed," said Robespierre, "has but recently emanated from an assembly formerly counter-revolutionary, but since purged of those men who thwarted its operations and impeded its progress. At this time, being in a pure state, this assembly has produced the most complete, the most popular production that ever yet was imparted to man; and now it is that a single individual, under the mask of patriotism, who boasts that his love for his country is far greater than ours, stirs up the citizens of every class, and wishes to demonstrate that this very constitution, around which all France ought to rally, does not suit them! Beware of such manœuvres—beware of these *ci-devant* priests now identified with the Austrians! Take heed of the new disguise in which the aristocrats wish to shroud themselves! I have a glimmering of some new crime about to take place, and which perhaps will not be long before it bursts upon our view; but let us unveil it, and we shall be able to crush the enemies of the people under whatsoever form they may appear." Collot d'Herbois spoke in quite as animated a tone as Robespierre; he maintained that the enemies of the republic wished to have it in their power to say to the departments, "*Ye see now, Paris approves of the language of Jacques Roux.*"

These two orators were received with unanimous acclamations. The Jacobins, who piqued themselves upon their method of blending policy with revolutionary excitement, and prudential considerations with energetic measures, despatched a deputation to the Cordeliers. Collot-d'Herbois was its prolocutor. He was received at the Cordeliers with the consideration considered due to one of the most distinguished members of the Jacobins as well as of the Mountain. The Cordeliers professed to entertain the deepest respect for the society which had sent him thither. The petition was withdrawn, Jacques Roux and Leclerc were expelled, Varlet only obtained remission on account of his youth, and Legendre received an explanation of the not very warrantable expressions which had been applied to him the evening before. The constitution thus vindicated, was sent to every quarter of France to receive the sanction of all the primary assemblies.

Thus the convention presented to the departments with one hand the constitution, and with the other the decree which gave them no longer than three days to decide upon its merits. The constitution justified the Mountain against the imputation of desiring to usurp the supreme power, furnished it with a pretext to rally round a lawfully constituted authority; and the decree limiting three days afforded no time for hesitation, and compelled the departments to range themselves on the side of obedience.

In point of fact, a great number of departments gave way, while others persisted in their former designs. But these latter, by their reciprocating addresses, and sending round deputations to each other, appeared to wait for each other before they would make up their mind how to act. The distance at which they were situated from each other did not allow them to correspond with rapidity and to form an union. Moreover, the entire absence of that genius which characterized the revolution, was an insuperable bar to their success. Let the masses be as favourably disposed as can be imagined, they have no inclination themselves to make every sacrifice, unless they are compelled thereto by men of impassioned minds. Very violent measures indeed would have been requisite to excite the unimpassioned mechanics of the towns, before they could be compelled to march, contribute, and use their utmost exertions. But the Girondists, who condemned such measures in the *Mountaineers*, could not adopt them as their own expedients. The merchants of Bordeaux thought they had done a great deal when they had spoken with some slight animation in the sections, but they never went beyond the walls of their town. The Marseillais, who were a little more decisive, had despatched six thousand men to Avignon, but they themselves formed no part of this small army; they sent their substitutes. The Lyonnese were awaiting the junction of the Provençals and Languedocians; the ardour of the Normans seemed somewhat cooled; the Bretons were the only persons who acted consistently with their declarations, and themselves filled the squares of their own battalions. There were considerable disturbances at Caen, the principal seat of the rebellion. The columns who were to proceed from this point, would be the first to engage with the troops of the convention, and therefore this first engagement could not but be regarded with some anxiety. The proscribed deputies who gathered around Wimpfen made sad complaints of his inertness, and thought they perceived some glimmerings of his being a royalist. However, Wimpfen pressed on all sides, gave orders to Puisaye to take his advance guard to Vernon on the 13th of July, and announced that he himself would set out on his march with all his forces. In fact, on the 13th, Puisaye advanced towards Pacy, and fell in with the levies of Paris, who were accompanied by a few hundreds of light horse. A slight firing was exchanged on

both sides in the woods. On the next day, the federalists possessed Pacy, and appear to have a little the advantage. But on the following day the troops of the convention made their appearance with cannon. At the very first discharge the ranks of the federalists exhibited great fear; they dispersed, and fled confusedly to Evreux. The Bretons, who manifested more firmness, retired in much better order; but they were involved in the retrograde movement of their companions. The department of the Calvados was astounded on receiving the intelligence, and all the public administrations began to repent of their misconducted proceedings. The moment that this defeat was known at Caen, Wimpfen called the deputies together, and proposed to them that they should entrench themselves in that town, and stand out at all hazards. Wimpfen, in further explanation, told them that he saw but one course to be pursued for continuing this contest, and that was to provide themselves a powerful ally, and that if they agreed in this sentiment, he would procure them one; he even went so far as to lead them to suppose that he alluded to the English Cabinet. He added, that for his part he conceived the republic was an impracticable affair, and that so far as his opinion was concerned, he did not consider a return to a monarchical form of government was a thing so much to be dreaded. The Girondists repelled most strongly every offer of this nature, and openly expressed their indignation. Some of them had already begun to consider the imprudence of their designs, and the danger that presented itself in raising any standard whatever, since every one of the factions would proceed to rally round it as a means of overturning the Republican system. They did not however despair, but thought of retiring to Bordeaux, where some of them thought some movement of a truly Republican character might be brought about, which might terminate more favourably than that of Calvados and Brittany. They therefore set out with the Breton battalions who returned homewards with them, and intended to embark at Brest. They assumed a soldier's uniform, and mixed themselves with the ranks of the Finisterre battalion. It was indeed necessary for them to conceal themselves ever since the check received at Vernon, for all the administrative authorities, most anxious to submit themselves, and afford testimonies of their zeal for the convention, would most certainly have caused them to be arrested. They thus traversed a part of Normandy and Brittany in the midst of constant apprehensions and terrible privations, and managed at last to conceal themselves in the environs of Brest, in order to get from thence to Bordeaux. Barbaroux, Pétion, Salles, Louvet, Meilhan, Guadet, Kervélégan, Gorsas, Girey-Dupré, an assistant of Brissot, Marchenna a young Spaniard, who had just come to seek liberty in France, Riouffe, a young man who was attached to the Girondists from purely enthusiastic motives, composed this band of illustrious fugitives, hunted down as traitors to their country, although ready at a minutes' warning to lay down their lives for her good, and even considering that they were pursuing the best means to render her service, while they were jeopardising her by the most perilous distraction.

In Brittany, in the departments of the West, and the Upper Basin of the Loire, the administrative authorities showed an extreme anxiety to retrace their steps to avoid being outlawed. The constitution, circulated everywhere, became an excuse for an universal submission. The convention, as it was said, demonstrated neither any intention of perpetuating herself, or a desire to usurp supreme power until she had presented a constitution; this constitution would therefore at once put an end to the prevalence of factions, and seemed to comprise the most simple mode of government ever known. During this period, the Mountaineer municipalities, and the Jacobin clubs, redoubled their efforts, and the single-minded partisans of the Gironde were compelled to submit to a revolution which they neither possessed weight enough to oppose, or could have had strength enough to defend. From that time, Thoulouse endeavoured to justify herself. The Bordelais, who had exhibited greater determination, did not tender a formal submission, but withdrew their advance guard, and forebore to proclaim their intended march against Paris. Two other important events had a tendency to put an end to the perils of the convention in the West and South; these were the defence of Nantes, and the dispersion of the rebellers of the Lozère.

We have already noticed the Vendéans at Saumur, masters of the country along the Loire, and thus enabled if they had but known the strength of their position, to have made an attempt upon Paris, which might in all probability have succeeded, for La Flèche and Mans were totally defenceless. The younger Bonchamps, who alone carried his ideas beyond La Vendée, would have desired that an inroad should be made into Brittany, so as to allow them one seaport, and then to march upon Paris. But his companions in arms did not possess sufficient military genius to make them comprehend this. The only capital upon which their march should be directed, was, in their notion, Nantes; neither their intelligence or hopes went a jot farther than that point. However, they had many reasons for acting as they did, for Nantes would open a communication with the sea, would also ensure the possession of the whole country, and nothing would, after the capture of this town, prevent the Vendéans from attempting the boldest enterprises. Besides, they would not have their soldiers torn from their homes, a great consideration with peasants, who never liked to lose sight of their church-steeple. Charette, master of Lower Vendée, after having made a feint attack upon Sables, had seized upon Machecoul, and was already before the gates of Nantes. He had never yet acted in unison with the chiefs of La Vendée, but on this occasion he offered to regulate his operations by theirs. He undertook to make an attack upon Nantes on the left bank, while the main body of the army was to make the attack on the right bank, and with such a combination of resources it seemed scarcely possible not to succeed.

The Vendéans, then, having evacuated Saumur, went down towards Angers, and put themselves in order to march from Angers upon Nantes, defiling along the right side of the river Loire. Their army had been sadly diminished, because the peasants would not engage themselves in so remote an expedition. Nevertheless it was not composed of

less than thirty thousand men, or thereabouts. They appointed a commander-in-chief, and fixed upon Cathelineau, a carrier, in order to pay a compliment to the peasantry, and to attach them in future to their cause. M. de Lescure, who was suffering from a wound, was to stay in the country to procure fresh musters, for the purpose of keeping the troops of Niort in check, and to prevent any interruption being offered to the siege of Nantes.

In the meanwhile the commission of the representatives, sitting at Tours, sought for relief in every quarter, and urged Biron, who was surveying the coast, to bring himself up without delay upon the rear of the Vendeans. Not contenting itself with recalling Biron, the commission regulated military movements in his absence, and despatched to Nantes all the troops which could be got together at Saumur. Biron immediately replied to the suggestions of the commission; he acquiesced, as he said, in the movements executed without his orders, but he was obliged to guard Sables and La Rochelle, places of far greater importance in his eyes than Nantes; the battalions of the Gironde the flower of the army were about to leave him, and there was an absolute necessity for his replacing them; it was impossible to set his army in motion without witnessing its disorganization and love of pillage, it was so very undisciplined; all that he could do, at the utmost, was to send a detachment of three thousand organized men, and it would be the height of absurdity for him, added he, to march upon Saumur, and to station himself in the midst of that country with so inefficient a force. Biron at the same time wrote to the committee of public welfare, tendering his resignation, since the representatives were thus in the habit of arrogating to themselves the right of command. The committee answered him, that it was no more than reasonable that the representatives should advise or propose certain operations; but they had no right to order them, and that it solely belonged to him to take such measures as he considered expedient to preserve Nantes, Rochelle, and Niort. Biron, upon this, did not the less relax his endeavours to form a small army more easy of transference, and with which he might be able to proceed to the relief of the besieged town.

The Vendeans, in this interval, quitted Angers the 27th, and on the 28th came in sight of Nantes. They made a threatening summons to the town, which was not even heard, and made ready for the attack. It was arranged to take place upon both sides of the river on the 29th, at two o'clock in the morning. Canclaux had no more than five thousand regular troops to guard an immense area intersected by various branches of the Loire, and about the same number of national guards. He made the best arrangements possible, and imparted the highest confidence to the garrison. On the 29th, Charette, at the appointed hour, commenced the attack on the quarter of the bridges; but Cathelineau, who conducted his operations on the right bank, and had the difficult portion of the enterprise, was stopped by the post of Niort, where some hundred men made the most heroic defence. The attack, thus delayed on that quarter, consequently became more obstructed. Nevertheless, the Vendéans spread themselves behind the hedges and in the gardens, and very nearly hemmed in the town. Canclaux, the commander-in-chief, and Beysser, commandant of the citadel, everywhere supported the republican troops. On his part, Cathelineau redoubled his exertions; already he had pushed far into a suburb, when he was mortally wounded by a musket-ball; his soldiers retired in dismay, bearing him off upon their shoulders. From that moment the besiegers slackened in their attack. After an eighteen hours' fight, the Vendeans dispersed themselves, and the place was saved.

Every one on this day had done his duty. The national guard had rivalled in their exertions the troops of the line, and the mayor himself received a wound. The next day the Vendeans threw themselves into their boats, and returned back into the heart of the country. From this time no opportunity of carrying any great enterprise was afforded them, and they could no longer aspire to the performance of any important operation; indeed all they could expect to do was to occupy their own country. At this period, Biron, hastening on his way to relieve Nantes, arrived at Angers with whatever troops he had been able to collect, while Westermann was repairing to Vendée with his Germanic legion.

Nantes had hardly been relieved, before the administrative authority, favourably inclined towards the Girondists, desired to join the insurgents of the Calvados. In point of fact, the administration passed a resolution demonstrative of its hostility to the convention. Canclaux opposed this resolution with all his might, and succeeded in bringing the Nantais to order.

Thus the greatest dangers were now surmounted in this quarter. A no less important event took place in the department of the Lozère; this was the submission of thirty thousand rebels, who might have otherwise been able to have put themselves in communication with the Vendeans, or with the Spaniards of Roussillon.

By a series of most favorable occurrences, the deputy Fabre, a delegate to the army of the eastern Pyrenees, happened to be upon the very spot at the moment of the outbreak; he thereupon displayed that energy which subsequently precipitated him on a premature death in the Pyrenees. He seized upon the administrative authorities, placed the entire population under arms, and called about him all the forces of the environs, consisting in light horse and regular troops; he raised the Cantal, the Upper Loire, the Puy-de-Dome; and the rebels, stricken at the very outset, pursued on all sides, became dispersed, were thus driven into the woods, and their chief, the ex-constituent Charrier, himself fell into the hands of the conquerors. From his papers, it was clearly shown that his design was closely identified with the great conspiracy, discovered six months previous in Brittany, and the promoter whereof, La Rouarie, had died before he could carry his schemes into execution. Order was now restored in the mountains of the centre and the south, the rear of the army of the Pyrenees was protected, and the valley of the Rhône had no more than one of its flanks covered by mountains in rebellion.

An unexpected victory over the Spaniah in the Roussillon, completed the subjection of the south. We have noticed them, after their first march into the valleys of the Tech and the Tet, retreating to

effect the capture of Bellegarde and Les Bains, and then coming back and taking up their quarters in front of the French camp. After having made their observations for a considerable time, they attacked the camp on the 17th of July. The French had scarcely twelve thousand recruits; the Spanish, on the contrary, numbered fifteen or sixteen thousand men, well-appointed and disciplined. Ricardos, intending to surround us, had divided his attack more than was necessary. Our young volunteers, supported by General Barbantane and the brave Dagobert, held out courageously in their intrenchments, and, after the most unheard of exertions, seemed to have made up their minds to retreat. Dagobert, who was looking out for this movement, dashed upon them; but one of his battalions altogether separated and fell into confusion. Fortunately, Deflers and Barbantane, observing this incident, rushed to the assistance of Dagobert, and they all darted onwards with such violence, that the enemy was driven from the field. This action of the 17th of July raised the courage of our soldiers, and, to use the words of an historian, it caused at the Pyrenees the same effect that Valmy had produced in Champagne the year before.

In the quarter of the Alps, Dubois-Crancé, stationed between Savoy in a state of discontent, Switzerland who had not declared herself, and Grenoble and Lyons in open rebellion, conducted himself most energetically, and made the most of his advantages. So long as the sectionary authorities were taking before his face the federalist oath, so long did he cause to be taken the opposite oath by the club and by his army, and waited for the earliest opportunity to put himself in motion. In short, having seized the correspondence of the authorities, he therein discovered the proof that they were seeking to associate themselves with Lyons; he then denounced them to the people of Grenoble, as desiring to bring about the dissolution of the republic by means of a civil war; and, striking while the iron was hot, he displaced them, and restored all the powers to the old municipality. From that instant, being at ease with respect to Grenoble, he occupied himself with the reorganization of the army of the Alps, so as to preserve Savoy, and to carry into execution the decrees of the convention against Lyons and Marseilles. He remodelled all the staffs, restored order in his battalions, incorporated the recruits scorning from the levy of three hundred thousand men; and, although the departments of the Lozère and of the Upper Loire, had employed their contingent in quelling the revolt of their mountainous districts, he did his best to supply their place by calls upon the public authorities for assistance. After these preliminary attentions, he sent out General Carteaux with some thousand infantry, as well as with the legion raised in Savoy, under the style of the Legion of the Allobroges, to proceed to Valence, there to command the course of the Rhône, and to prevent the junction of the Marseillais with the Lyonnese. Carteaux set out early in July, conveyed himself quickly to Valence, and from Valence to Pont Saint-Esprit, where he took up the corps of the Nimois, disbanded some, embodied others, and made himself sure of both sides of the Rhône. He then made all the haste he could to get to Avignon, where the Marseillais had for some time previously fixed themselves.

While these occurrences took place at Grenoble, Lyons, on all occasions affecting the greatest fidelity to the republic, making promises to maintain its *unity* and its *indivisibility*, did not, for all that, render obedience to that decree of the convention which transferred to the revolutionary tribunal of Paris the procedures directed against certain patriots. The commission and the staff of Lyons were mostly filled by concealed royalists. Rambaud, president of the commission, and Précy, commandant of the departimental force, were secretly devoted to the cause of emigration. Led astray by insidious suggestions, the unhappy Lyonnese were about to compromise themselves with the convention, who, from this time in a situation to compel obedience and also victorious, was about to pour forth upon the last remaining rebellious town all the chastisement which had been reserved for prostrate federalism. In the mean time, the Lyonnese furnished themselves with arms at Saint-Etienne, and enlisted deserters of every degree; but being by no means desirous of committing an open act of rebellion, they permitted the supplies appointed for the frontiers to pass, and ordered the release of the deputies Noël-Pointe, Santeyra, and Lesterpt-Beauvais, who had been arrested by the neighbouring communes.

The Jura was somewhat tranquillized; the representatives, Bassal and Garnier, whom we have seen were with fifteen hundred men surrounded by fifteen thousand, had sent away their too insufficient forces, and did their utmost to open a negotiation. They succeeded in this, and the revolted administrative authorities had promised the convention to extinguish this movement by the acceptance of the constitution.

Nearly two months had elapsed since the 2nd of June (for it was now near the end of July); Valenciennes and Mentz had been always threatened; but Normandy, Brittany, and nearly all the departments of the west, had returned to their allegiance. Nantes had just been rescued from the Vendeans, the Bordelais dared not to stir outside their walls, the Lozère had submitted, the Pyrenees were for the time being in perfect security, Grenoble was quiet, Marseilles was cut off from Lyons by the success of Carteaux, and Lyons, although refusing to render obedience to the decrees of the convention, nevertheless did not dare to declare open war. The authority of the convention was thus nearly quite re-established in the interior. On the one side the inertness of the federalists, their want of unanimity, and their half-measures; on the other side, the energy of the convention, the unity of its might, its centrality, its long usage of the tone of command, its policy alternately clever and vigorous, had decided the triumph of the Jacobins over this last effort of the Girondists. Let us congratulate ourselves upon this result, for at the very moment while France was attacked on every side, the fittest person to have the command was the most vigorous. The vanquished federalists condemned themselves by their own words: "Honest folks," said they, "have never known what it is to possess energy."

But while the federalists were borne down on all sides, one closing incident served to excite the most violent prejudices against them.

As this period there was living in the department

of the Calvados a young woman, aged twenty-five years, uniting to great personal beauty a resolute and independent character. Her name was Charlotte Corday d'Armans; her life was unblemished, but her mind was active and restless. She had left her father's house, in order to live with more freedom with one of her friends at Caen. Her father had formerly, by his writings, protested in favour of the privileges of his province, at a period when France was reduced to the necessity of insisting upon the privileges of her towns and province. The youthful Corday, as did many women of her time, had excited herself in the cause of the revolution, and, like Madame Roland, she was intoxicated with the idea of a republic properly constituted, and rising in moral elevation. The Girondists seemed to her as the persons most likely to realize her day-dream; the Mountaineers appeared to her as the only persons who interposed obstacles to the accomplishment of her reveries, and when she heard the news of the 31st of May, she resolved to avenge her darling orators. The war of the Calvados had commenced; she believed that the death of the anarchist leader, operating in concurrence with the insurrection of the departments, would insure victory to the latter; she therefore resolved to perform a grand act of self-immolation, and to offer up for her country a life, for which neither a husband, children, or family, presented attraction or solace. She concealed her intentions from her father, and wrote to him that as the troubles of France were growing every day more frightful, she had gone to seek quiet and safety in England. Immediately after writing this letter, she set out for Paris. Before her departure, she was desirous of seeing at Caen those deputies who were the subjects of her enthusiasm and self-devotion. In order to gain an introduction to them, she invented a pretext, and requested from Barbaroux a letter of introduction to the minister of the Interior, having, as she said, some papers to claim for a friend, an old canoness. Barbaroux gave her a letter addressed to the deputy Duperret, the friend of Garat. His colleagues, who saw her as he did, and as well as he, heard her give utterance to her hatred against the *Mountaineers*, and witnessed her enthusiastic aspirations for a pure and well-regulated republic, were struck with her beauty, and affected by her sentiments. All of them, however, were unconscious of her designs.

On her arrival at Paris, Charlotte Corday considered upon the choice of a victim. Danton and Robespierre were quite enough distinguished among the Mountain party as worthy of being stricken by her; but Marat was the one who had appeared in more frightful colours to the provinces, and he was also the person who was looked upon as the chief of the anarchists. She at first conceived the idea of striking the blow at Marat on the very pinnacle of the Mountain, and in the midst of his friends; but this she could not effect, for Marat was at this time in a state that prevented his sitting at the convention. It will doubtless be recollected, that he had voluntarily suspended himself from his functions for the space of fifteen days; but observing that the process against the Girondists could not yet be brought to a termination, he put an end to this ridiculous farce, and appeared again in his place shortly afterwards. One of those inflammatory disorders, which during revolutions cut off those turbid lives that do not expire upon the scaffold, compelled him to retire, and to return to his own home. There, nothing could satisfy his morbid activity; he was accustomed to pass one portion of the day in his bath surrounded by pens and paper unceasingly writing, composing his newspaper, addressing letters to the convention, and complaining that they did not pay him sufficient attention. He wrote one final letter, stating, that if they did not read it, he should cause himself to be carried, sick as he was, to the tribune, and there read it himself. In this letter he denounced two generals, Custine and Biron. "Custine," said he, "transferred from the Rhine to the North, was doing just what Dumouriez always did; he was speaking against the anarchists, he modelled his staffs just as he chose, armed some battalions, disarmed others, and never distributed them but in conformity to his own designs, which doubtless were those of a conspirator." (It will be recollected, that Custine was taking the opportunity of the siege of Valenciennes to reorganize the army of the North in Cæsar's camp). "As to Biron, he was an old hanger-on at court; he was affecting to be possessed with a great horror of the English, for the purpose of keeping himself in the Lower Vendée, and to connive at the enemy's taking possession of the Upper Vendée. He evidently was temporising, and was waiting till the English had made a descent, in order to join them, and deliver our army into their power. The Vendean war ought to have been finished by this time. A person of any judgment, having once had the opportunity of seeing the Vendeans fight, ought to discover the means of destroying them. As for himself, who was well acquainted with military tactics, he had invented an infallible manœuvre, and if his health had not been so impaired, he should have gone himself to the banks of the Loire to put his experiment in execution. Custine and Biron were the Dumouriez's of the day; and after having had them arrested, some new course should be taken which should stop the mouths of all calumniators, and should firmly bind all the deputies, beyond the power of retracting, to the revolution; and this was to put to death the imprisoned Bourbons, and to put a price upon the heads of those who had fled. After this, one party could not accuse the other with a design of placing villains on the throne, and would thus effectually prevent the others from ever making their peace with the Capet family." Here were constantly exhibited, as we see, the same self-conceit, the same rage, and the same promptitude in anticipating popular apprehensions. Custine and Biron were, in point of fact, about to become the two objects of the general hatred, and it was Marat, who, ill and in a dying state, had once more the honour of taking the lead.

Charlotte Corday was therefore obliged to seek him at his own home before she could get at him. At first she delivered him the letter which she had for Duperret, performed her commission at the minister of the interior's, and prepared to carry her design into execution. She asked a hackney-coachman for Marat's address, went thither, and was refused admission. She then wrote to him, stating, that having arrived from the Calvados, she had important matters to communicate. This

proved quite sufficient to procure her an introduction. In short, on the 13th July, she presented herself for admittance at eight o'clock in the evening. The housekeeper of Marat, a young woman of twenty-seven, whom he treated as his wife, seemed to deny him. Marat, who was then in his bath, hearing Charlotte Corday, ordered her to be introduced. Remaining alone with him, she related what she had observed at Caen, next listened to, and surveyed him attentively, before she struck the blow. Marat with great eagerness desired to know the names of the then present deputies at Caen; she informed him, and he, snatching up a pencil, set about writing them down, adding, "Good, good; they shall all of them go to the guillotine." "To the guillotine!" replied the youthful and indignant Corday; and immediately she drew forth a knife from her bosom, struck Marat under the left breast, and plunged the steel into his heart. "Here!" cried he; "here, my dear!" His housekeeper darted forth on hearing his cry; a messenger who was folding newspapers hurried along with her; they both found Marat weltering in his blood, and the youthful Corday calm, serene, and perfectly still. The messenger knocked her down with a chair, the housekeeper spurned her with her feet. The disturbance attracted a crowd, and shortly the whole neighbourhood was stirring. The youthful Corday got up, and endured, with a dignified air, the outcry and the clamorous rage of those who surrounded her. The members of the section, who had hastened thither on hearing the uproar, struck with her beauty, her courage, and the serenity with which she avowed the act, protected her from being torn to pieces; and took her to prison, where she still continued to confess every thing with the same composure.

This assassination, as did that of Lepelletier, caused a great sensation. A report got immediately afloat, that it was the Girondists who had instigated Charlotte Corday to the commission of this act. The same thing was said in respect to Lepelletier, and such statements as these will always have currency upon similar occasions. Persecuted opinions generally distinguish themselves by the stroke of an assassin; and, although the conception and execution of the act proceed from the mind of some individual more keenly exasperated than others, yet the act itself is laid to the charge of all those who advocate the same opinions, and furnishes a pretext for a fresh display of vengeance, and the infliction of greater cruelties against them. There was a great difficulty as to what crimes should be laid to the charge of the imprisoned deputies; the departimental rebellion furnished the first pretence for sacrificing them, by declaring them accomplices of the fugitive deputies; the death of Marat filled up the measure of their supposed offences, and gave additional weight to the arguments which were urged for bringing them to the scaffold.

The Mountain, the Jacobins, and, above all, the Cordeliers, who boasted of having been the first to know him, to have been particularly associated with him, and in never having disavowed him, displayed great regret for his loss. It was arranged that he should be buried in their garden, and at the foot of those very trees where he was wont to read his newspaper to the people. The convention resolved upon attending his funeral in a body. At the Jacobins', it was proposed to decree extraordinary honours to his memory; it was desired that his body should be buried in the Pantheon, although the law did not allow the removal of a body thither until twenty years after decease. It was also required that the whole club should attend in a body at his funeral procession, that the presses of "The Friend of the People" should be purchased by the club, to prevent their falling into unworthy hands; that his newspaper should be continued by competent successors, who, if they could not equal, should at least be able to recall him to mind, and afford some substitute for his vigilance. Robespierre, who always directed his attention towards making the Jacobins more impressive in their appearance, in checking their extravagances, and who besides was desirous of calling that attention to himself which was rather too much fixed upon the martyr, spoke upon this occasion. "If I speak to-day," said he, "it is because I feel I have the right so to do. Daggers are the subject of your debates; it is the fate that awaits myself; I have deserved it; and it is purely the effect of chance that Marat was stricken before myself; I therefore assume the right of interposing in the debate, and to express my surprise that your energy is thus exhausting itself in idle declamations, and that your only care is for empty ceremonies. The best means of avenging Marat is to inexorably pursue his enemies. That vengeance which seeks its own satisfaction in empty funeral honours is soon at rest, and cares not to exert itself in a more effective and serviceable manner. Cast aside these useless debates, and avenge Marat in a manner more worthy of his memory!" All discussion was entirely put an end to by this address, and no more notice was taken of the propositions that had been made. Nevertheless, the Jacobins, the Convention, the Cordeliers, all the popular societies, and the sections, came in procession to strew flowers upon his coffin. The president of each company made an harangue. The section of the republic was the first: "He is dead," exclaimed its president; "he who was the friend of the people is no more; he met his death from the hand of an assassin—let us not pronounce his eulogy upon his inanimate remains! His best eulogy is the tenor of his conduct, his writings, his still bleeding wound, and his death! Ye citizenesses, (citoyennes) strew flowers upon the pallid corpse of Marat! Marat was our friend, he was the friend of the people, he lived for the people, and it was for the people that he died!" After this address, young maidens walked round the coffin, and strewed flowers upon the corpse of Marat. The speaker proceeded: "Enough of lamentation; hearken to the mighty soul of Marat, who awakens and speaks to you thus: 'Republicans, cease your tears; republicans ought to shed but one natural tear, and then think of their country! It is not myself they wished to assassinate, it is the republic; it is not myself whom you are to avenge, it is the republic; it is the people; it is yourselves!'"

All the clubs, and every one of the sections, thus came one after the other round the coffin of Marat; and if history records such scenes as these, it is but for the purpose of teaching men to reflect upon the prejudices of the moment, as well as to call upon them to examine themselves carefully before they

lament the victorious, or censure the vanquished of the passing hour.

While this scene was taking place, the trial of the youthful Corday was being conducted with that rapidity so characteristic of revolutionary procedures. Two deputies were implicated in this affair; the one was Duperret, with whom she had been in communication, and who had been the means of introducing her to the minister of the interior; the other was Fauchet, formerly a bishop, who had become an object of suspicion on account of his connection with the right side, and more particularly because a woman, either mad or else extremely wicked, had falsely averred she had seen him in the galleries in company with the prisoner.

Charlotte Corday maintained the same serenity of aspect during her trial. The indictment was read to her, after which they proceeded to examine witnesses. Corday interrupted the first witness, and without giving him time to commence giving his evidence; "I am the person," said she, "who has killed Marat." "Who was it that induced you to commit this assassination?" asked the president. "His crimes." "What do you mean when you say 'his crimes?'" "The evils he has occasioned from the commencement of the revolution." "Name the persons who have induced you to do this." "No one but myself," answered this young maiden, with a dignified air. "I had made up my mind to do it a long time since, and I never should have conferred with others upon a deed of this description. My desire was to give peace to my country." "But do you suppose that you have slain all the Marats?" "No," sorrowfully replied the prisoner, "no." She after this forbore to interrupt the taking of the evidence; but after each deposition had been concluded, she repeated every time, "It is true, the deponent is correct." The only point on which she made a defence was in respect of her alleged connexion with the Girondists. There was but one witness that she contradicted, and that was the woman who wanted to identify Duperret and Fauchet with her cause; she then seated herself, and attended to the subsequent proceedings with the most perfect tranquillity. "You must needs observe," said Chaveau-Lagarde the advocate for the defence, "the prisoner avows every thing with the most undaunted assurance. This serenity of mind, and this self-denying principle, most elevated in one point of view, can only be referred to one cause, and that is, the most extravagant political fanaticism."

Charlotte Corday was condemned to death. Her beautiful countenance betrayed no emotion; she returned to her prison with a smile playing on her lips; she wrote to her father to ask his pardon for having thus disposed of her own life; she wrote to Barbaroux, wherein she related the incidents of her journey and the act she committed in a most inimitable letter, written in a graceful, animated, and elevated style; she told him that her friends ought not to mourn for her, for an ardent imagination and a susceptible temperament, generally ensure a troublesome life to those who are endowed with such gifts. She added that she had well revenged herself on Pétion, who at Caen temporarily doubted her political principles. Lastly, she begged him to inform Wimpfen that she had assisted him to gain more than one battle. She concluded in these words: "What a sad set of people to form a republic! At least they should establish peace; a constitution will then follow somehow or other."

On the 15th, Charlotte Corday underwent her sentence with the same composure of mind she had always retained. The correctness and propriety of her demeanour was the only reply made to the abuse of the vile rabble. However, all did not insult her; many felt great sorrow for this maiden, so young, so handsome, and so self-devoted in her act, and accompanied her to the scaffold with marks of sympathy and admiration.

Marat was borne with great pomp to the garden of the Cordeliers. "This ceremony," so said the report of the commune, "was characterised by simplicity and patriotism; the people assembled under the banners of their sections, came thither peaceably—a slight confusion, in some measure of an impressive character, a respectful silence, and a subdued feeling afforded a most affecting spectacle. The procession lasted from six in the evening to midnight; it was composed of citizens from every one of the sections, of the members of the convention, as well as members of the commune, electors and popular societies. When received at the garden of the Cordeliers, the corpse of Marat was placed beneath the trees, whose leaves, gently agitated, reflected and increased a soft and chastened light. The people crowded round the coffin in silence. The president of the convention first delivered an eloquent oration, in which he predicted that the time would soon arrive when Marat would be avenged; but that care should be taken, lest by hasty and injudicious measures the enemies of the country should expose themselves to censure. He added, that liberty could never perish, and that the death of Marat would only strengthen it the more. After numerous orations, which were warmly applauded, the corpse of Marat was deposited in the grave. Tears were shed in abundance, and every one retired oppressed with grief.

The heart of Marat, for which numerous societies contested, remained with the Cordeliers. His bust distributed everywhere with those of Lepelletier and Brutus, was made a conspicuous object at all meetings and places of public resort. The seal placed upon his papers was removed. Nothing was found in his house but one five franc assignat, and his poverty afforded a fresh theme of admiration. His housekeeper, whom, in the words of Chaumette, he espoused "on a beautiful day, in the face of the sun" (*un jour de beau temps, à la face du soleil*), was styled his widow, and was supported at the public charge.

Such was the end of this man, the most singular of all that appeared at this period, so prolific in remarkable characters. Thrown into the arena of the sciences, he desired to overturn all settled theories; cast among political agitations, he at once conceived a frightful idea, an idea which revolutions every day practically embody in proportion to the dangers that threaten them, but which they will never openly avow, and that is, the destruction of all their adversaries. Marat observing, that although the revolution condemned his notions, they nevertheless adopted them, that the persons he had denounced were stripped of their popularity, and sacrificed at the very time he predicted, began to consider himself as

one of the greatest statesmen of modern times, was possessed by an ungovernable pride and audacity, and continued dreadful to his enemies, and, at last, eccentric in the eyes even of his friends. His career was terminated by an event in full keeping with the singularity of his life, and he fell at the very moment when the republican leaders, combining among themselves to establish a cruel and gloomy government, could no longer have temporized with a colleague so maniacal, systematic and audacious, and who must have deranged all their plans by his eccentricities. In short, utterly incapable of becoming an active and influential leader, he became the apostle of the revolution, and when there was no further necessity for his apostolical mission, but rather for energy and perseverance, the dagger of a young and indignant maiden came just in the very nick of time to create him a martyr, and present him as a saint to the people, who being tired of their old idols, must needs set about occupying themselves with the new.

CHAPTER IX.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF PARTIES SINCE THE 31ST MAY, IN THE CONVENTION, IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE PUBLIC WELFARE, AND THE COMMUNE.—DISSENSIONS IN THE MOUNTAIN PARTY.—DANTON'S DECLINE OF POPULARITY.—THE POLICY OF ROBESPIERRE.—EVENTS IN LA VENDÉE—DEFEAT OF WESTERMANN AT CHATILLON AND OF GENERAL LABAROLIÈRE AT VIHIERS.—THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF MENTZ BY THE PRUSSIANS AND AUSTRIANS—THE CAPTURE OF VALENCIENNES.—THE PERILOUS STATE OF THE REPUBLIC IN AUGUST, 1793.—STATE OF THE FINANCES—DEPRECIATION OF THE ASSIGNATS.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE "MAXIMUM" TAX.—PUBLIC DISTRESS.—STOCK JOBBING.

Of those triumvirs so celebrated there remained but Robespierre and Danton. In order to impart some correct notion of their influence, we must observe how the authorities were distributed, and what was the state of public feeling since the suppression of the right side.

From the very day of its institution, the convention was essentially in possession of all the authorities. However, in order to avoid all appearance of despotic authority, she was not desirous to keep them ostentatiously in her hands; she therefore permitted to exist, as apart from herself, the phantom of an executive power, and kept a ministry on foot. Dissatisfied with the administration of the ministers, because their energy did not keep pace with existing circumstances, she established, immediately after the defection of Dumouriez, a committee of public welfare, which entered upon its office the 10th of April, and exercised a superintendence over the government. It possessed the power of suspending the execution of measures adopted by the ministers, to re-inforce them when it considered them insufficient, or to revoke them when it judged them pernicious. This committee framed the instructions of the representatives despatched upon particular missions, and no one else could correspond with them. In this manner, having a control over the ministers and the representatives, who themselves possessed a control over all functionaries whatsoever, it had the entire government under its own hand. Although, if we were to judge from its title, this authority was nothing more than a simple right of overseeing, it practically involved the right itself of acting, for the principal person in a state does not by himself carry anything into execution, but is content to see every thing done under his eyes, to choose his agents, and to direct his operations. Now by its mere right of inspection the committee was enabled to do all this, and in fact, it did effect this object. It regulated military operations, ordered supplies of provisions, provided measures of safety, appointed the generals and agents of every description, and the trembling ministers considered themselves but too happy in discharging themselves from all responsibility by acting the parts of simple clerks. The members who composed the committee of public welfare, were Barrere, Delmas, Bréard, Cambon, Robert Lindet, Danton, Guyton-Morveau, Mathieu and Ramel. They had the character, and that deservedly, of being competent or diligent men, and although they were slightly suspected of *moderation*, suspicion was never carried so far as to induce the belief, as was the case with the Girondists, that they were in league with the foreign enemy. In a short time they got into their own hands all the affairs of the state, and although their appointment had been limited to a month, it was not desirable that they should be interrupted in their labours, and their term of office was enlarged from month to month, from the 10th of April to the 10th of May, from the 10th of May to the 10th of June, from the 10th of June to the 10th of July. Independent of this committee, the committee of general safety exercised the functions of high police, so important a matter in times of jealousy; but in the application of its functions, it was dependant upon the committee of public welfare, who being charged in general with every thing that concerned the welfare of the state, was rendered competent to inquire into all conspiracies against the republic.

Thus by means of her decrees, the convention possessed the supreme power; by her representatives and her committee, she had the power of carrying them into execution; so that, although she was not desirous of concentrating all the authorities in her own hands, she had been irresistibly induced so to do by circumstances, and by the necessity of causing to be executed, under her own eyes and by the members of her own body, that which she considered had been badly managed by agents not identified with herself.

Notwithstanding the supreme authority was reposed in the convention, she did not interfere with the proceedings of the government without

permission, and never made them the subjects of her deliberation. The great questions of social organization were settled by the constitution, which founded a pure democracy. The question as to its resorting to the most revolutionary measures for its own preservation, and whether it was to abandon itself to every extravagant excitement that might be called into action, was resolved by the events of the 31st of May. Thus the state-constitution and moral policy were settled. All that remained for further examination were mere measures of administrative policy, financial and military. Now, subjects of this nature can seldom be well understood by a large assembly, but are handed over to the management of those who concern themselves most in such matters. The convention very willingly consigned these matters to those committees who were charged with the conduct of affairs. She had no reason to suspect either their probity, intelligence, or zeal. She was, therefore, reduced to a state of silence; and the last revolution, in depriving her of the freedom of debate, also annihilated the subjects of discussion. She was, in fact, no more than a mere council of state, whither committees appointed for particular purposes came to make reports, which were always received with approbation, and to propose decrees which were always adopted. The sittings now became taciturn, dull, in every respect short, and were not now protracted for whole days and nights as they formerly had been.

Independent of the convention, which occupied itself with general concerns of government, the commune attended to the regulation of the municipal system, and there a complete revolution was effected. The commune which, since the 31st of May, no longer possessed any motive in conspiring and employing the local militia of Paris against the convention, turned its attention to matters of police, provisions, markets, performance of divine worship, public shows, and even to prostitutes, and promulgated upon all these subjects of internal and domestic government, regulations which, in a short time, were adopted throughout France. Chaumette, procurator-general of the commune, who, on account of his requisitions, was always listened to with approbation, was the person who framed this municipal legislation. Unceasingly occupied upon new subjects for regulation, and continually invading the privacy of life, this legislator of the sale rooms and markets every day became more importunate and vexatious. Pache, always indifferent, suffered every thing to be done under his inspection, approved of the proposed measures, and entirely abandoned to Chaumette the honours of the municipal commune.

The convention, thus permitting its committees to act without control, and the commune being exclusively occupied with its own affairs, the discussion of all political matters remained open for the Jacobins. They alone, with their characteristic audacity, discussed the measures of the government, as well as the conduct of its agents. For a long time, as we have noticed already, they acquired great influence by their numerical force, by the celebrity and the high rank of a great number of their members, by the enormous accompaniment of their corresponding societies, and lastly by their long standing and early influence upon the revolution. But since the 31st of May, having completely silenced the right side of the assembly, and having called into predominance the action of an illimitable energy, they had acquired a most powerful accession of opinion, and seemed to have succeeded to that freedom of speech which the convention, in some measure, may be said to have abdicated. They persecuted the committees by an unceasing superintendence, and instituted examinations with regard to their conduct, as well as that of the representatives, ministers, and generals with that personal grossness so peculiar to themselves; they thus called into action an inexorable censorship over every one of their agents, often unjust, but always serviceable, on account of the terror it excited and the extreme attention it exacted from every one. The other popular clubs were not without their freedom and their influence, but they nevertheless submitted themselves to the superior power of the Jacobins. The Cordeliers, for example, who were more turbulent, and more prompt in action, nevertheless acknowledged the superior reasoning of their elder brethren, and suffered themselves to be brought within bounds whenever, from an excess of revolutionary impatience, they happened to outstrip the period appointed for a particular measure. The petition of Jacques Roux against the constitution, which, upon the suggestion of the Jacobins, was withdrawn by the Cordeliers, afforded proof of this deference to their opinion.

Such, therefore, was the classification of authorities, and their respective influences. At the selfsame time were to be seen, a committee of government, a commune exclusively attending to municipal regulations, and the Jacobins keeping up a continual and rigorous censorship upon the acts of the government.

Two months had scarcely elapsed before public opinion began to express its opinion with some severity upon the present administration. Public excitement could not stop at the point of the 31st of May; something more was yet wanting, and it was nothing more than natural that fresh demands should more than ever be made with greater celerity, and with additional results. In the general remodelling of the committees required on the 1st of June, it was determined to spare the committee of public welfare, composed as it was of pains-taking men, unconnected with any party, and taking charge of those measures which it had been dangerous to interrupt; but it was recollected that this committee had since exhibited some vacilation from the 31st of May to the 2nd of June; that it had desired to temporize with the departments, and to send them hostages, and therefore the conclusion was, that it was inefficient for the circumstances. Instituted, as it was, at a very difficult crisis, it lay open to the imputation of defects arising rather from our unfortunate situation than from any deficiency in itself. As forming the centre of all operations, it was overwhelmed with business, it was reproached with being buried beneath its papers, and entirely absorbed in petty details, in short, of being worn out and superannuated. However, established at the very period of Dumouriez's defection, at a time when all the armies were disorganized, when La Vendée was in a state of rebellion, and when Spain was commencing war, it

ters, and leads to a general distrust and suspicious jealousy.

Danton an object of distrust, which may be considered the prelude to his fall.

had organized the army of the North and that of the Rhine, it had embodied the armies of the Pyrenees, and the Vendée which, till then, had no existence; and had victualled one hundred and twenty-six places, or fortresses; and although much yet remained to be done, in order to place our forces upon the proper footing, yet it was a great deal to have performed so much in so short a time, and amidst the impediments created by the departmental insurrection. But the public distrust was constantly demanding more than had been effected, nay more than could be done, and it was by this means that an energy so vast, and yet so correspondent to the peril, was called forth. To increase the strength of the committee, and to revive its revolutionary energy, Saint-Juste, Jean-Bon-Saint-André, and Couthon, had been added to its members. Nevertheless, the public expressed dissatisfaction, and said that the new comers were, doubtless, excellent men, but that their influence was neutralized by the others.

Public opinion was not a whit less severe upon the ministers. Garat, the minister of the interior, who at first was well received by reason of his neutrality between the Girondists and the Jacobins, was nothing more or less than a *moderate* ever since the 2nd of June. Being ordered to prepare a report for the purpose of affording the departments the fullest information upon the recent events, he entered into a long dissertation, wherein he explained and balanced the faults on both sides with certainly a most philosophical impartiality, but very ill adapted to the tendencies of the period of its publication. Robespierre, to whom he communicated this too wise report, entirely dissented from it. The Jacobins soon took the matter up, and they condemned Garat for not having counteracted the tainted doctrines of Roland. It was the same with the minister of the marine, D'Albarode, who was accused of leaving in the staff of the squadrons all the old aristocrats. It is, in point of fact, true that he had retained many of them, and the events of Toulon demonstrated this quickly enough; but the purifying system was much more difficult to be put in execution in the navy than in the army, because the peculiar acquirements so necessary in the marine, will not allow the substitution of new officers for old ones, and, as in the army, to turn a peasant into a soldier, a subaltern, or a general. The only person who preserved himself in the public esteem was Bouchette, because he had, like his predecessor Pachè, given up his papers to the Jacobins and to the Cordeliers, and had lulled their suspicions by calling them in to assist in his administration. Nearly every one of the generals was subjected to accusations, and particularly the nobility; but the fate of two of them was destined to become the bugbear of the day: Custine at the North, and Biron on the West. Marat, as we have already observed, had denounced them some days previous to his death; and ever since this accusation had been made, every body wondered how it was that Custine was suffered to remain in Cæsar's Camp without removing the blockade from Valenciennes; and how came it that Biron, who was doing nothing in Lower Vendée, had allowed the enemy to take Saumur, and lay siege to Nantes.

The same suspicious jealousy prevailed at home; every one was suspected, and even the best patriots were distrusted. As there was now no right side, upon whom the blame was to be always thrown; as there was no longer a Roland, a Brissot, or a Guadet, who were to be charged with treason upon every new alarm, the common reproach was directed against the most decided republicans. There existed a most incredible rage for suspicious jealousies and accusations. The longest and most consistent revolutionary life was no longer a protection, and any one was subject, in the course of a day, to be identified with the greatest enemies of the republic. The public imagination was not so soon able to dispel the witcheries of that Danton whose audacity and eloquence had supported public confidence in every critical emergency; but Danton, in engaging himself in the revolution, possessed the most ardent desire for its attainment, without entertaining a personal hatred against individuals. Now this was not thought sufficient. The spirit which actuates a revolution is governed by an ardent desire for the attainment of the object, coupled with intense hatred against those who interpose the obstruction. Danton was only governed by one of these motives. In respect of revolutionary measures, the avowed objects of which were to attack the wealthy, impart energy to the undecided, and develope the national resources, he had been far from mincing matters, and had devised measures of the boldest and most violent character; but, forbearing and goodnatured so far as individuals were concerned, he did not consider every one his enemy, but discriminated in his considerations of men, as to whom he thought worth gaining over, or considering as retainers to his cause, according to their respective degrees of energy. He had never looked upon Dumouriez as a traitor, but merely considered him as a discontented man, driven to his last shifts; he never considered the Girondists as connected with Pitt, but merely as well meaning folks of no capacity, and he would rather have thrown them aside than sacrificed them. It was even said that he felt angry at the order for non-egress, given by Henriot on the 2nd of June*. He took noble generals by the hand, dined with the government contractors, and was accessible to men of all parties, addicted to the pleasures of society, and had his fill of enjoyment during the revolution. All this was generally known, and very equivocal reports were got abroad respecting his energy and integrity. On one particular day, it was said that Danton never made his appearance at the Jacobins; remarks were made upon his indolence, of his continual recreations, and it was broadly stated that the revolution had not been without its pleasurable enjoyments, so far as he was concerned. On another occasion, a Jacobin asserted in the tribune, "Danton left me to go and shake hands with a general." Sometimes complaints were made of the individuals he had recommended to the ministers. Not daring to attack him openly, remarks were levelled at his friends. The butcher Legendre, his colleague in the deputation of Paris, his *locum tenens* in the streets and faubourgs, and a copyist of his brutal and ferocious eloquence, was treated as a *moderate* by Hébert and the other turbulents at the Cordeliers.

* Ante, p. 276, col. 1.

"Me a *moderate*," exclaimed Legendre at the Jacobins, "when I sometimes call myself to account for my exaggeration, when it is published in every newspaper that I seized Lanjuinais by the collar, and dragged him on the pavement!" Another friend of Danton was also treated as a *moderate*, although an approved patriot of note, Camille Desmoulins, altogether the most ingenuous, the most pleasing, and the most able writer of the revolution. Camille was well acquainted with General Dillon, who, stationed by Dumouriez at the post of the Islettes in the Argonne, had there displayed so much courage and intrepidity. Camille felt convinced that Dillon was nothing else than a brave man, not impregnated with any political opinion, but endowed with a great military genius, and sincerely attached to the service of the republic. All of a sudden, as a consequence of that extraordinary distrust then so very prevalent, a report obtained, that Dillon was about to head a conspiracy for setting Louis XVII. on the throne. The committee of public welfare immediately caused him to be arrested. Camille, who was internally convinced that such a report was a mere fabrication, was desirous of justifying Dillon to the convention. Immediately, from all sides, was said, "You are in the habit of dining with the aristocrats." Billaud-Varennes cut him short, exclaiming, "Don't let Camille disgrace himself."—"You won't let me speak, then," replied Camille, "well, I shall betake myself to my escritoire," and he immediately published a pamphlet, intituled "*Lettre à Dillon*," distinguished by elegance of expression and good sense, wherein he laid about him on all sides. He thus addresses the committee of public welfare: "You have usurped every single authority, taken all affairs into your own hands, and have brought none of them to an end. Hence, if you look upon the conduct of the war department, one is absent, the other is ill, and the third does not know what he is about; you allow the Custines, the Birons, the Menous, the Berthiers, all of them aristocrats, Lafayettists, or incompetents, to be at the head of our armies." He said to Cambon, "I understand nought of thy system of finance, but thy paper is very like unto that of Law, and passes as rapidly from hand to hand." In addressing himself to Billaud-Varennes, "Thou bearest enmity to Arthur Dillon, because when thou wast commissary to his army, he led thee into the fight;"—To St. Just, "Thou hast too much respect for thyself, and dost hold up thy head like a *Saint-Sacrament**;"—To Bréard, Delmas, Barrère, and others, "Ye desired to give in your resignation on the 2nd of June, because you were not able to survey coolly that revolution which, in your eyes, appeared so terrible." He adds, that Dillon is neither a republican, federalist or aristocrat, that he is a soldier, and that all he wants is to serve as such; that so far as patriotism is concerned, he is quite as good as the committee of public welfare, and all the staffs appointed for the heads of the army put together; that, at any rate, he is a great commander, that it is a matter of gratulation to have a few such as he at our command, and that the public must not run away with the idea that every serjeant can make a general. "Ever since," added he, "an obscure officer, Dumouriez, has been a conqueror in spite of himself at Jemappes, and has taken possession of the entire of Belgium and Breda, like a quarter-master *with his chalk*, the successes of the republic have thrown us into the same intoxication that the successes of his reign inflicted upon Louis XIV. He appointed his generals from his ante-chamber, and we now fancy we can take ours out of the streets; we have at last gone so far as to say that we possess three millions of generals."

It is plain enough by this language, and from these cross-fires, that there existed considerable disunion in the Mountain. This is generally the situation of every party who has been recently victorious, who is about to divide itself into new parties, but whose divided parts are not clearly distinguishable. There had not yet been a new party founded from among the victorious party: the imputation of *modéré* or *exagéré*, hovered over the heads of all, but did not alight upon any one. In the midst of this conflict of opinions, the reputation of one man remained constantly impervious to attack,—this was Robespierre. He certainly had never possessed the slightest fellow-feeling for any individual; he had never shown regard for any one under proscription, or maintained any acquaintance with general, financier, or deputy. No one could lay it to his charge, that he had been revelling during the revolution, for he lived obscurely at a cabinet-maker's, and, as it is said, kept up a connexion with one of his daughters, of which no one possessed any knowledge. As a man of austere, rigid, and single mind, he was, and indeed had the reputation of being, incorruptible. All that could be laid to his charge was pride, a species of vice which does not, like corruption, taint the mind, but which is nevertheless the author of great evils in civil dissensions, and which becomes terrible in men of austere dispositions, or when associated with religious or political bigotry, because, being an absorbing passion, they give way to it unreservedly and without remorse.

Robespierre was the only individual who was able to repress certain revolutionary impulses, without his forbearance being laid to the account of selfish and interested ties. Whenever he opposed any of these movements, his opposition was never considered but as proceeding from an unbiassed judgment. He felt the advantages of this position, and then, for the first time, began to found a system for himself. Up to this period, quite in accordance with his hatred, his only care was how to turn the revolution against the Girondists; however, apprehending danger to the patriots from new excesses in the public mind, he considered that respect for the convention and the committee of public welfare should be maintained, inasmuch as all authority was reposed in them, and could not be transferred into other hands without most awful confusion. Moreover, he was a member of the convention, and could not fail, in a short time, to have a seat in the committee of public welfare; so that, in defending them, he was at the same time supporting an all-necessary authority, and one in which he was to have a share. As every opinion received its first impression at the Jacobins', he, therefore, was the more desirous of taking the lead there, so as to

* The silver or golden vessel in which the host is elevated at high mass. *Trans.*

link them with the convention and the committee, sure enough to detach them afterwards, if he judged it necessary. Constant in his attendance, but constant only in his attendance upon them, he paid them a compliment by his presence, and seldom taking part in any debate at the convention, where, as we have already noticed, there was scarcely any speaking, he often made himself heard from the tribune at the Jacobins, and never permitted an important question to pass without discussing its merits, qualifying or perhaps repealing it. In this respect, his conduct was much more measured than Danton's. Nothing so much hurts a man, and gives colour to equivocal reports, as absence. Danton, like most men of a fervid and impassioned mind, altogether of a careless disposition, was too little at the Jacobins. When he resumed his attendance, he was obliged to make an apology, to assure them that he would always be a good patriot, and to say, "that if, on some occasions, he had temporized somewhat for the purpose of bringing back to their duty weak but excellent understandings, they might rest assured that his energy was not diminished; that he still watched over the interests of the republic with the same ardour as heretofore, and that she would prove victorious." Vain and dangerous excuses. From the very moment that a man offers explanation or justification, he is treated as an inferior by those to whom he addresses himself. Robespierre, on the contrary, who was always present, and always at hand to avert insinuations against him, was never reduced to the necessity of justifying himself; on the other hand, he assumed the tone of an accuser; he called his faithful Jacobins somewhat imperiously to account, and he precisely seized that point when the impulse that one excites, already decided in its character, is only increased by the severe application of its principles.

We have seen how he treated Jacques Roux who had brought forward a petition against the constitutional act; he acted in the same manner on every other occasion when any one interfered with the convention. That assembly, he would say, has been purified; she has deserved nothing but respect; whosoever raises his voice against her is a bad citizen. The committee of public welfare had certainly not done all that it ought to have done, (for invariably, in defending, Robespierre never failed to censure those whom he did defend) but this committee was now better conducted; to attack it would be the destruction of the rallying point of all the authorities so necessary for their existence, to exhaust the energy of the government, and to compromise the republic. Whenever an insinuation was manifested to fatigue the committee or the convention with oft-repeated petitions, he opposed them, saying that the influence of the Jacobins was being unduly expended, and that they were wasting the time of the depositaries of the supreme authority. One day, it was desired that the sittings of the committee should be public; he angrily argued against this proposition, saying, that there were concealed enemies, who, under the mask of patriotism, were promoters of the most inflammatory proposals, and he began to maintain that the foreign enemy had in pay two sorts of conspirators in France: the *enragés*, who pushed everything on to utter confusion; and the *modérés*, who would paralyze everything from their want of firmness.

The committee of public welfare had been prorogued three times; on the 10th of July, it was either to be prorogued a fourth time, or renewed. On the 8th, there was a special meeting at the Jacobins. On all sides it was said that the members of the committee ought to be changed, and that there was no necessity to prorogue it again, as had been done for three successive months. "Certainly," said Bourdon, "the committee means well; I have no desire to lay blame to it; but it is a defect incident to human nature to limit its energy to some few days. The present members of the committee have already passed that period; they are superannuated: let us change them. We are now in want of revolutionary characters; men to whom the fate of the republic can be confided, and who will answer *for* it, body for body."

The fervid Chabot followed Bourdon. "The committee ought to be renewed, and ought not to suffer a fresh prorogation. It will not suffice to add to it some few more members, patriots of note, for we have had the experience of the past. Couthon, Saint-Just, Jean-Bon-Saint-André, recently added, are excluded by their colleagues. There is precisely the same reason for not renewing the committee by secret ballot; for the new will not be a whit better than the former, which is worth nothing at all. I have heard Mathieu," continued Chabot, "hold the most incivic language at the club of the female revolutionists. Ramel has written to Thoulouse, that the landholders were the only persons who could preserve the commonweal, and that they must take care how they put arms in the hands of the *sans culottes*. Cambon is a simpleton, who views every object magnified, and is frightened at them when a hundred paces off. Guyton-Morveau is an honest man, a quaker who is always in a tremble. Delmas, who had the office of making the appointments, has made but a sorry choice, and has filled the army with counter-revolutionists. In fact, this committee was the friend of Le Brun, and is the enemy of Bouchotte."

Robespierre was all haste to answer Chabot. "At every turn of expression, at every word," said he, "of the speech of Chabot, I seem to inhale the purest patriotism; but I also perceive therein that extravagant patriotism which expresses indignation because everything does not turn out as desired, which excites itself because the committee of public welfare has not, in its operations, arrived at an impracticable perfection, and which Chabot will nowhere find.

"I am inclined to believe with him, that this committee is not composed of men of equal intelligence, or all equally virtuous; but what public body will he find that is so constituted? Can he prevent men from being subject to error? Has he not seen the convention, since she has expelled from her body those traitors who have disgraced her, recovering fresh energy, an elevation to which she had till this day been a stranger, and a more august character through the medium of her representation? Is not this example a sufficient demonstration that destruction is not always a matter

of necessity, and that it is sometimes more prudent to confine oneself to reform?

"Yes, indeed, there are to be found, in the committee of public welfare, men fully capable of winding up the machine, and giving a new impulse to its motions. The least we can do is to encourage them. Who can ever forget the services that this committee has rendered to the commonweal, the innumerable plots it has discovered, the felicitous suggestions we have received at its hands, the sagacious and far-sighted views it has developed?

"The assembly has not appointed a committee of public welfare for the purpose of exercising influence over herself, nor for the purpose of directing her decrees; but this committee has been highly serviceable in distinguishing, in the measures proposed, that which has been good from that which, under an attractive appearance, might have entailed the most dangerous consequences. This committee has also given the first impulses to numerous essential resolves, which perhaps may have saved the country; it has also spared the assembly the inconveniences of a painful and often fruitless labour, in presenting to her the results of inquiries already fortunately discovered, and relieved her from a toil of which she was hardly cognizant, and with which she had not been familiarized.

"All this is sufficient to prove that the committee of public welfare has not been such a petty resource as people affect to consider. It has doubtless committed its errors; is it likely I should cloak them? Have I any such inclinations to indulgence, I who am one of those who think that the country is insufficiently served while anything remains undone? Yes, it has committed its errors, and I have no objection to join with you in their censure; but at this moment it would be the height of impolicy to draw down the disfavour of the people upon a committee which at this time ought to enjoy its perfect confidence, to whom such great concerns are confided, and from whom the country expects great assistance; and although it may happen not to possess the entire approbation of the female republican revolutionists, I do not consider this committee less adapted for the performance of its important functions."

The reflections of Robespierre terminated all further discussion; on the next day but one the committee was reinstated, and reduced to nine individuals, of which it originally consisted. The new members were Barrère, Jean-Bon-Saint-André, Gasparin, Couthon, Hérault Séchelles, Saint-Just, Thuriot, Robert Lindet, and Prieur de la Marne. All those members who were accused of weakness were dismissed, except Barrère, whose great dexterity in digesting reports and conforming himself to circumstances caused the past to be forgotten. Robespierre had not then taken his seat among them; but some few days afterwards, when there was a little more apprehension respecting the frontiers, and some alarm existed in the convention, he lost no time in getting thither.

Robespierre had yet numerous other occasions upon which his new policy might be employed. The state of the marine department beginning to excite some uneasiness, complaints were continually made of the minister Albarade, of his predecessor Monge, of the deplorable state of our ships at sea, which having returned from Sardinia to the dockyards of Toulon, were still unrepaired, and were commanded by old officers, nearly all of them aristocrats. Complaints were also made of certain individuals recently associated with him in the navy-office. Among others, frequent accusations were made against a man of the name of Peyron, who was sent to reorganize the army at Toulon. "He had not done," said his accusers, "all that he ought to have done: the minister was made responsible, and the minister cast the responsibility upon a patriot of note, who had recommended Peyron to him." The party accusing affected the use of the expression, "noted patriot," without daring to mention the name. "His name," exclaimed several voices. "Well, then," replies the accusing party, "this noted patriot is neither more or less than Danton." At these words, tokens of dissatisfaction burst forth. Robespierre hurried to the tribune. "I require," said he, "that this farcical mode of proceeding be put an end to, and the sitting be opened. An accusation is made against Albarade; I only know him by common report, which proclaims him as a patriotic minister; but what is it that is laid to his charge? An error. What man is there who is not liable to error? An appointment that he has made has not given general satisfaction. Bouchotte and Pachè also have appointed improper objects, and yet both of them are true republicans, and both sincerely attached to their country. A man is appointed to a situation; that is quite enough, and he is libelled. Eh! when shall we ever cease to give credence to all the idle or perfidious statements that come thick and threefold upon us from all sides?

"I notice that to this rather loose denunciation against the minister, a particular denunciation has been annexed, levelled against Danton. Is he the person they want to make you suspect? If indeed, instead of discouraging the patriots, by attempting to convert slight omissions into crime, you were to occupy yourselves somewhat in facilitating their labours, and rendering their toil less entangled with difficulties, and less rugged, that would be by far the most straightforward course, and the country would reap some benefit from it. They have denounced Bouchotte, Pachè has been also denounced, for it has been written, that the best patriots shall always be denounced. It is high time to put a stop to these farcical and distressing scenes; I heartily wish that the club of the Jacobins would confine themselves to some regular course of business, which they could conduct with advantage, and that she would keep within bounds a great number of those who excite disturbances in her body, and who, for the most part, are quite as contemptible as they are dangerous."

Thus it was that Robespierre, apprehending the danger that would arise from a new popular outbreak, which would have annihilated the entire government, endeavoured to attach the Jacobins to the convention and the old patriots. Everything was turned to his own account by this laudable and useful policy. In preparing the way for the power of the committee, he paved the way to his own; by defending the patriots of the same standing and energy as himself, he provided for himself, and prevented public opinion from sacrificing those

who were on his side; and he placed those of whom he became the protector far beneath him; in short, he became by his austerity alone the idol of the Jacobins, and obtained for himself a high reputation for superior understanding. In this, Robespierre exhibited no other ambition than that which actuated all the revolutionary leaders, who up to that period had been desirous of staying the progress of the revolution at the very point where they themselves had halted; and this policy which had entirely divested them of popularity, would not have the same effect upon himself, because the revolution was fast approaching the climax of its perils and its excesses.

The imprisoned deputies had been impeached immediately after the death of Marat, and preparations were made for their trial. Already was it said, that the heads of those Bourbons who were yet remaining must needs fall, although these included two females, one of them the wife and the other the sister of the late king, as also the Duke of Orleans, so faithful to the revolution, and at this time a prisoner at Marseilles, as a reward for his services.

A *fête* had been ordered on the occasion of the constitution being accepted. All the primary assemblies were to send deputies, who were to express their sentiments, and would meet at the field of the federation, as forming a solemn festival. The date of this celebration was no longer appointed for the 14th of July, but was fixed for the 10th of August; for the storming of the Tuileries had brought about the republic, while the taking of the Bastile, leaving monarchy untouched, had only been the cause of the abolition of feudality. Thus the republicans and the constitutional royalists distinguished themselves in this, that the one celebrated the 10th of August, and the other the 14th July.

Federalism was expiring, and the acceptance of the constitution became general. Bordeaux still maintained the greatest reserve, and did nothing decisive, either as demonstrating submission or hostility, but accepted the constitution. Lyons prosecuted those proceedings which had been transferred to the revolutionary tribunal; but rebellions in no other instance than this, so far as other matters were concerned, she made submission, and also adhered to the constitution. Marseilles alone refused her adhesion; but her small army, already separated from that of Languedoc, had just been, during the latter end of July, driven out of Avignon, and compelled to recross the Durance. Thus federalism was vanquished, and the constitution became triumphant. But for all this, the danger became more alarming upon the frontiers, and it was more than ever imminent in La Vendée, upon the Rhine, and in the North. The Vendéans made themselves amends for the check they received before Nantes by fresh victories, and Mentz and Valenciennes were pressed with greater spirit than ever by the enemy.

Our narration of military events was interrupted at the period when the Vendéans, after being repelled from Nantes, were returning to their own country, and we have observed that Biron came up to Angers after the deliverance of Nantes, and settled further operations with general Canclaux. During this period also, Westermann had gone to Niort with his Germanic legion, and had obtained from Biron permission to march into the heart of the country. Westermann was the same Alsatian who had so distinguished himself upon the 10th of August, and had decided the success of that day; and he, after having gloriously served under Dumouriez, connected himself with him and Danton, and was at last denounced by Marat, whom, as the report goes, he had cudgelled for his abuse. He was one of the number of those patriots whose great services had been acknowledged, and also one of those whom the people began to censure for their enjoyments during the revolution, and with whom the public were already disgusted, merely because they enforced discipline in the armies and intelligence in the officers, and did not seem inclined to turn off every general who was noble by birth, nor stigmatise every beaten general as a traitor. Westermann had formed a legion called *The Germanic Legion*, of four or five thousand men, inclusive of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. At the head of this small army, of which he had made himself master, and where he kept a rigorous system of discipline, he had displayed the greatest daring, and had performed some brilliant exploits. On his being transferred to La Vendée with his legion, he had regulated it anew, and had driven from it those cowardly wretches who had gone to denounce him. He showed the utmost contempt for those undisciplined battalions who pillaged and sacked the country; he publicly avowed the same sentiments as Biron, and therefore was ranked with him among the military aristocrats. The minister of war, Bouchotte, had, as we have already seen, dispersed his agents from the Jacobins and Cordeliers throughout La Vendée. There they played the rival with the representatives and the generals, authorized pillage and extortion under the title of necessaries for war, and insubordination under the pretence of protecting the soldier from the despotism of the officers. The first clerk in the war department under Bouchotte was one Vincent, a young hot-headed Cordelier, one of the most dangerous and turbulent spirits of that period; he entirely governed Bouchotte, filled up all his appointments, and persecuted the generals with the most pertinacious rigour. Rossin, the paymaster, sent out to Dumouriez when his contract* system was set aside, was the friend both of Vincent and Bouchotte, and the chief of their agents in La Vendée, under the style of Assistant-Minister. Under him were to be found the names of Momoro, a printer; and Grammont, a comedian; together with many others who acted in precisely the same spirit, and with the same violence. Westermann, already on no very good terms with them, entirely alienated them by one energetic act. One Rossignol, formerly a working goldsmith, who had made himself notorious on the 20th of June and the 10th of August, who had the command of one of the Orleans battalions, and was one of those officers who were looked upon with favor by the Cordelier minister. This man on one occasion, while drinking with some of Westermann's soldiers, said that the soldiers ought not to be the slaves of the officers, that Biron was a *ci-devant* and a traitor, and that it was but right that the townspeople should be driven from their houses to billet the troops. Westermann caused him to be arrested, and handed him over to the military tribunals.

* Ante, p. 186. col. 2.

Ronsin lost no time in claiming him, and sent off, post-haste, a denunciation against Westermann.

Westermann, who gave himself no further trouble about the matter, set out on his march with his legion, in order to advance into the heart of the country of La Vendée. Setting out from that quarter opposite to the Loire, that is to say, from the south of the theatre of the war, he at first possessed himself of Parthenay, next entered Amaillon, and set fire to this latter town, as reprisals against M. de Lescure. The latter, in fact, on entering Parthenay, had exercised some severities against the inhabitants, who were accused of entertaining revolutionary sentiments. Westermann removed all the inhabitants of Amaillon, and sent them on to Parthenay, as a means of reparation: he finally burnt the mansion of Clisson, the property of Lescure, and spread universal terror by the celerity of his march and the exaggerated accounts of his military executions. Westermann was not naturally cruel, but he commenced those disastrous reprisals, which absolutely ruined neutral countries, accused by each party with having shown favour to the contrary side. All had fled to Chatillon, whither were assembled the families of the Vendéan leaders, and the wreck of their armies. On the 3rd of July, Westermann, who felt no apprehension in venturing into the heart of the rebel country, made his entrance into Chatillon, and drove from thence the chief council and the staff, who resided there as in their capital. The report of this hair-brained exploit spread far and wide; but the position of Westermann was by no means secure. The Vendéan chiefs had retreated, rung the tocsin, got together a considerable army, and prepared to surprise Westermann from the quarter where he least expected it. He had stationed at a mill and out of the town of Chatillon a post which commanded the whole neighbourhood. The Vendéans stealthily advancing, according to their ordinary tactics, surrounded this post, and set upon attacking it on every side. Westermann, who was not very quickly informed of this manœuvre, hastened to the relief of the post, but the detachments he despatched were driven back and brought into Chatillon. The alarm soon spread throughout the republican army. Chatillon was abandoned in the utmost confusion, and Westermann himself, after having performed prodigies of valour, was involved in the general rout, and compelled to save himself as he best could, leaving behind a great number of dead or prisoners. This repulse caused discouragement in precisely the same ratio as the rashness and success of the expedition had given rise to presumptuous reliance and false expectations.

While these things were taking place at Chatillon, Biron had just then been settling upon an expedition with Canclaux. They were both of them to follow the course of the river downwards to Nantes, sweep the left bank of the Loire, then wheel round towards Machecoul, fall in with Boulard, who was to set out from Sables; and after having thus cut off the Vendéans from the sea, to march in the direction of Upper Vendée, to reduce the whole country. The representatives did not approve of this plan; they assumed that he ought to set out from the point where he then was, in order to advance into the country, and consequently to march upon the bridges of Cé with the troops mustered at Angers, and to cause himself to be supported on the opposite side by a column, which was to advance from Niort. Biron, finding himself thwarted, gave in his resignation; but at that very time intelligence arrived of the defeat at Chatillon, and every thing was laid to the charge of Biron. He was blamed for having allowed Nantes to be besieged, and for not having supported Westermann. Upon the denunciation of Ronsin and his agents, he was summoned to the bar, Westermann was put upon his trial, and Rossignol instantly set at liberty. Such was the fate the generals in La Vendée met with from the agents of the Jacobins.

General Labarolière undertook the command of the troops left at Angers by Biron, and made arrangements, according to the suggestion of the representatives, to march up the country by the bridges of Cé; he directed his course towards Brissac, where he had stationed a post to ensure his communications. This undisciplined army committed the most frightful devastations upon a country entirely devoted to the republic. On the 15th, his army was attacked at the camp of Fline by twenty thousand Vendéans. The advance-guard, composed of regulars, made a vigorous defence. Nevertheless, the main body was on the point of giving way, when the Vendéans, more ready to run away, retired in great confusion. The new battalions then demonstrated somewhat more spirit than at first; and to encourage them those praises were bestowed upon them, which were much better merited by the advance-guard. On the 17th, they advanced near Vihiers, and a fresh attack, received and sustained with the same vigour by the advance-guard, and with the same wavering by the body of the army, was again driven off. In the course of the day, the army arrived at Vihiers. Several of the generals, considering that the Orleans battalions were in too bad order to keep the field, and that with such an army there was no remaining in the heart of the country, advised a retreat. Labarolière decided that he ought to halt at Vihiers, and defend himself if he was attacked at that place. On the 18th, at one o'clock in the afternoon, the Vendéans showed themselves: the republican advance-guard conducted itself with the same bravery; but the remainder of the army wavered at the sight of the enemy, and fell back in spite of the exertions of their generals. The battalions of Paris, rather preferring to cry treason than fight, retired in great disorder. The confusion became general: Santerre, who had most courageously thrown himself forwards in the thick of the fight, narrowly escaped being made prisoner; the representative Bourbotte exposed himself to the same danger; and the army fled so quickly, that in a few hours it got to Saumur. The division of Niort, which was about to march, remained where it was; and on the 20th, it was settled that it should await the reorganization of the column of Saumur. As some one must needs be made answerable for this defeat, Ronsin and his agents denounced Berthier the chief of the Staff, and General Menou, who, both of them, had the character of being aristocrats, because they enforced discipline. Berthier and Menou were forthwith summoned to Paris in the same way that Biron and Westermann had been. Such had been, up to this period, the state of this

war. The Vendéans, on their sudden outbreak in April and May, had taken Thouars, Loudun, Doué, and Saumur; thanks to the inferiority of the troops which had been formed of new recruits. Having got down as far as Nantes in June, they had been driven off from Nantes by Canclaux, and from Sables by Boulard, two generals who possessed the means of introducing a good system of discipline among their soldiers. Westermann, making a bold movement, and possessing some good soldiers, had pushed as far as Chatillon towards the beginning of June; but betrayed by the inhabitants, and surprised by the rebels, he had suffered a defeat; and lastly, the column of Tours, in attempting to advance into the country with the Orleans battalions, had experienced the fate which usually attends ill-regulated armies. At the end of July, the Vendéans were completely masters throughout the whole extent of their territory. So far as concerns the brave and unfortunate Biron, who was accused of not being at Nantes, at the very time he was surveying Lower Vendée, and of not being near Westermann while he was settling upon a plan of operations with Canclaux,—thwarted, interrupted in all his movements as he was, he had only been recently removed from the army without having had time allowed him for action, and indeed he had never appeared with his army but to be perpetually accused. Canclaux remained at Nantes; but the brave Boulard was no longer commander at Sables, and the two battalions of the Gironde had just retreated. This, therefore, was the picture of La Vendée in July: defeats of all the columns in the upper country; complaints and denunciations of the ministerial agents against the generals, who were assumed to be aristocrats, and complaints of the generals against the disorganizers sent out by the ministry and the Jacobins.

At the east and in the north the sieges of Mentz and Valenciennes were making alarming progress.

Mentz, situated upon the left bank of the Rhine, on the French side, and opposite to the mouth of the Main, forms a large arc of a circle, of which the Rhine may be considered as the chord. A large suburb, Cassel, seated on the opposite bank, communicates with the fortified town by a bridge of boats. The island of Petersau, situated above Mentz, stands out in the river, and its point stretches out high enough to batter the bridge of boats, and thus occupy a position, whence it was enabled to maintain an oblique fire upon its fortifications. On that side next the river, Mentz has no other protection than a brick wall; but on the side facing the country it is very well fortified at every point. In going from the river to the height of the point of Petersau it is defended by an enclosure and a ditch, through which the rivulet of Zalbach flows as it falls into the Rhine. At the extremity of this ditch, the fort of Hauptstein takes the whole length of the ditch, and forms an additional protection to the water by the position of its guns. Taking it up from this point, the enclosure extends and stretches onward to the upper channel of the Rhine; but the ditch is not continued, and a double enclosure parallel to the first is substituted for it. Thus, on this side two lines of wall require a double siege. The citadel, which is connected with this double enclosure, serves to increase its strength.

Such was Mentz in 1793, even before the fortifications had been improved. The garrison amounted to twenty thousand men, because general Schaal, who was to have made his retreat with one division, had been thrown back upon the fortifications, and consequently had not been able to rejoin Custine's army. The place was insufficiently provisioned. In the uncertainty that prevailed as to keeping Mentz, little care had been taken to victual the place; at last Custine gave directions to that effect. The Jews offered to contract, but the bargain they wanted to drive was a hard one; they required that all the baggage-waggons intercepted in their passage by the enemy should be included in the contract price. Rewbell and Merlin declined this offer, apprehending that the Jews themselves might cause the capture of the waggons. Nevertheless, there was no want of corn, but it was foreseen that if the mills seated on the river should be destroyed, it never could be ground. There was but little meat, and, in particular, the forage was utterly inadequate to supply the three thousand horses of the garrison. The artillery consisted of one hundred and thirty pieces of brass, and sixty of iron, which were there previously, and in a very bad condition; the French, however, had brought thither eighty pieces in good condition. Thus there was sufficient cannon to man the ramparts, but then there was a bad supply of gunpowder. The skilful and heroic Meunier, who had executed the fortifications of Cherbourgh, was commissioned to defend Cassel and the posts on the right bank; Dorpré took the direction of the operations by the soldiers in the fortress; Aubert-Dubayet and Kléber took the command of the troops; and the representatives Merlin and Rewbell animated the garrison by their presence. The encampment was formed in the space between the two enclosures, and occupied in the distance some very advanced posts. The army was animated by the very best spirit, possessed great confidence in the fortifications, its officers, and its strength; and, what was more, it was well understood, that it had to make good its ground at a point of the utmost importance for the welfare of France.

General Schœnfield, whose encampment was upon the right bank, hemmed in Cassel with ten thousand Hessians. The Austrians and the Prussians together led the principal attack on Mentz. The Austrians occupied the right of the besiegers. In front of the double enclosure, the Prussians formed the centre of Marienburg, where the head-quarters of the king of Prussia were stationed. The left likewise was composed of Prussians, encamped in front of Hauptstein, and the ditch overflowing with the water of the brook of Zalbach. Nearly fifty thousand men composed this army of siege, under the direction of old Kalkreuth. Brunswick commanded the army of observation in the quarter of the Vosges, where he kept up a constant communication with Wurmser in order to afford protection to this important operation. Being in want of heavy siege-artillery, they treated with the states of Holland, who again partially exhausted their arsenals for the purpose of assisting the progress of their more formidable neighbours.

The investment of Mentz commenced in April.

Until the trains of artillery could arrive, the garrison acted upon the offensive in continually making the most spirited sallies. On the 11th of April, and some few days after the investment, our generals resolved to attempt a surprise against the ten thousand Hessians, who had extended their line rather too far upon the right bank. On the night of the 11th they issued from Cassel in three columns. Meunier marched straightforwards to Hockheim; the two other columns went down the right bank towards Biberich; but a careless musket-shot from the column of general Schaal caused a general disorder. The troops, who were yet quite undisciplined, did not yet possess that steadiness they so soon acquired under their generals. They consequently were obliged to retreat. Kléber with his column covered the retreat in the most masterly manner. This sally brought the besieged forty kine, which were salted.

On the 16th, the enemy's generals attempted to carry the post of Weissenau, which, situated as it was near the Rhine, and on the right of their attack, caused them considerable uneasiness. The French, notwithstanding the firing of the village, entrenched themselves in a cemetery; Merlin, the representative, posted himself there with them, and they were enabled, by performing prodigies, to retain possession of the post.

On the 26th, the Prussians despatched a false parley, who stated that he was sent by the general of the army of the Rhine to engage the garrison to surrender. The generals, the representatives, and the soldiers, already attached to the place, and feeling convinced that they were rendering a great service in checking the army of the Rhine upon the frontier, rejected all terms. On the 3rd of May, the king of Prussia made an attempt upon a post on the right bank opposite Cassel, that of Costein, and Meunier defended it. The attack, which was supported on the 3rd of May with great obstinacy, and recommenced on the 8th, was repelled with considerable loss to the besiegers. Meunier, on his part, did his utmost to maintain an attack upon the islands situated in the mouth of Maine; he gained, and ultimately lost them, and on each occasion displayed the most undaunted bravery.

On the 30th of May, the French settled upon making a general sally upon Marienburg, where the king Frederick-William then was. Favoured by the night, six thousand men passed through the enemy's lines, took possession of their entrenchments, and got up to the head-quarters. In the mean time, the alarm then raised, brought the entire army down upon them, and they got back after having lost many of their brave comrades. The next day, the king of Prussia, in a chafe, kept up a constant fire upon the fortress. The same day, Meunier made a fresh attempt upon one of the islands of the Maine. Being wounded in the knee, he died, not so much from the wound itself as from the consequences of the irritation he felt at being compelled to absent himself from the operations of the siege. The entire garrison attended his funeral: the king of Prussia ordered a cessation of the firing while the last honours were being paid to this hero; and gave a salute with one salvo of artillery. The body was deposited at the point of the bastion of Cassel, which had been constructed under his superintendence.

The great train of artillery had arrived from Holland. It was full time, therefore, for the enemy to commence the operations of the siege. A certain Prussian officer strongly advised them to seize upon the Isle of Petersau, the point of which elevated itself between Cassel and Mentz, to place batteries there, to destroy the bridge of boats and the mills, and to assault Cassel at the very time when they would have cut it off, and prevented its receiving relief from the fortifications. He next proposed to make an advance towards the ditch through which the Zalbach flowed, to throw himself therein, under the protection of the batteries of Petersau, which cover the whole length of the ditch, and to essay an assault upon that front, which consisted of no more than a single enclosure. The scheme was both bold and dangerous; for he must have landed at Petersau, and afterwards have thrown himself into the dyke full of water, and under the fire of the Hauptstein; but then the results would also soon demonstrate themselves. It was thought preferable to open a trench all along the double enclosure, and opposite the citadel, although this was sure to cause a double siege.

On the 16th of June, a first parallel was opened at eight hundred paces distant from the first enclosure. The besieged interrupted the works; they had to fall back. On the 18th, another parallel was opened much further off, that is to say, at fifteen hundred feet; and this distance excited the contempt of those who had proposed the bold attack by the Isle of Petersau. From the 24th to the 25th, they got nearer; they fixed themselves at eight hundred paces, and raised batteries. The besieged again interrupted the works, and spiked the cannon; but they were at last repelled, and overwhelmed by a continued firing. On the 18th and the 19th, two hundred pieces of cannon were brought to bear upon the place, and covered it with projectiles of every description. Some floating batteries, stationed on the Rhine, burnt the interior of the town on the most unprotected side, and inflicted considerable devastation upon that quarter.

However, the last parallel was not yet opened, the first enclosure had not yet been gained, and the garrison, in high spirits, never once thought of surrendering. In order to rid themselves of the floating batteries, some brave Frenchmen threw themselves into the water to swim, and set about cutting the cables of the enemy's boats. One was seen towing, while in the water himself, a boat containing eighty soldiers, who were made prisoners.

The distress of the garrison was at its height. The mills had been burnt, and it became necessary to use handmills for grinding the corn; but there was no procuring any one to work them; for the enemy, who were acquainted with the fact, kept up a continual play of howitzers on the spot where they were placed. In addition to this, there was scarcely any corn left; for a long time the garrison had nothing but horseflesh; the soldiers ate rats, and went to the side of the Rhine to fish out the dead horses that floated down the river. This kind of food became fatal to many of them; it became absolutely necessary to prohibit it, and to prevent their obtaining it, by posting guards on the banks of the Rhine. A cat fetched six francs; horseflesh sold for forty-five sous the pound. The

officers were not better off than the soldiers; and Aubert-Dubayet having invited his staff to dine with him, served up as a great treat a cat flanked by a dozen mice. But the most miserable part of the affair for this unhappy garrison was the total privation of every species of intelligence. All communications had been so effectually intercepted, that for three months they were kept in utter ignorance of what was taking place in France. They had done their utmost to make their distress known: on one occasion, by means of a lady who was travelling into Switzerland; on another occasion, by a priest who was going to the Netherlands; and lastly, on another occasion, by a spy who was to pass through the enemy's camp. But none of these intelligences reached their destination. Hoping that perhaps it might occur to their friends to send them intelligence from the Upper Rhine by means of bottles thrown into the river, the besieged placed nets, which they dragged every day, but never found any thing there. The Prussians, who had practised every species of stratagem, had caused forged *Moniteurs* to be printed at Francfort, stating that Dumouriez had overturned the convention, and that Louis XVII. governed by a regency. The Prussians placed at the outposts conveyed these forged *Moniteurs* to the soldiers of the garrison; and their perusal diffused the greatest uneasiness, and added, to the sufferings they already were enduring, the mortifying consideration that they might be at that very time defending a lost cause. However, they patiently waited, in saying among themselves, The army of the Rhine will soon be here. Sometimes it was reported, It has come. One night, a brisk cannonade was heard a long way off from the fortifications. Everybody joyfully got up, hurried to their arms, and made ready to march in the direction of the French cannon, so as to place the enemy between two fires. Vain hope! the noise ceased, and the army that was to deliver them never made its appearance. At last the general distress became so intolerable, that two thousand inhabitants requested to leave the place. Aubert-Dubayet gave the required permission; but they were not recognised by the besiegers, and remained between the firing on both sides, and most of them perished under the walls of the fortifications. The next morning, the soldiers were seen bringing under their cloaks the wounded children into the town.

During this period, the army of the Rhine and the Moselle made no progress. Custine had been its commander-in-chief until the month of June. Still being entirely disheartened by his retreat, he had been continually in a state of uncertainty during the months of April and May. He said that he was not sufficiently reinforced; that he wanted much more cavalry to enable him to stand his ground on the plains of the Palatinate against the strength of the enemy's cavalry; that he had not sufficient forage to keep his horses; that he must needs wait till the rye was ripe enough for forage, and then he would lose no time in marching to the assistance of Mentz*. Beauharnais, who was as indecisive as himself, lost the opportunity of saving the place. The chain of the Vosges, as is well known, runs along the Rhine, and does not break off far from Mentz. By occupying the two slopes of the chain, and its principal passes, an important advantage may be secured, because a force can be brought to bear either on one side or the other, so as to overwhelm an enemy by compact masses. This was the position the French, in fact, occupied. The army of the Rhine occupied the eastern slope, and that of the Moselle the western slope. The forces of Brunswick or Wurmser were scattered at the end of the chain of mountains over a long extended cordon. Having the possession of the passes, the two French armies could either bring themselves together on either of the slopes, overwhelm Brunswick or Wurmser, fall upon the besiegers in their rear, and thus save Mentz. Beauharnais, who, though not deficient in courage, had not the spirit of enterprize, made a few unproductive movements, and did not relieve the garrison.

The representatives and the generals shut up in Mentz,—considering that there was no necessity for pushing matters to the worst; that if they waited eight days or so longer, they would be destitute of every thing, and after all be compelled to surrender the garrison as prisoners; and that, on the other hand, by capitulating they would be able to secure for themselves free egress with the honours of war, and also preserve twenty thousand men, who had become the best soldiers possible under Kléber and Dubayet,—decided upon the necessity of surrendering the place. There is no doubt, but that in a few more days Beauharnais could have saved the town; but after having waited so long, it was no longer reasonable to entertain any hopes of relief, and the reasons which urged their surrender were peremptory. The king of Prussia was not hard in his terms; he allowed them to march out with arms and baggage, and insisted but upon one condition, and that was, that the garrison should not serve for one whole year against the allies. But there remained enemies enough in the interior to occupy these admirable soldiers, since named the *Mayençais*. They were so attached to their post, that they would not obey their generals until it became absolutely necessary to quit the place: a remarkable instance of that *esprit de corps* which characterizes itself upon one point, as well as of the affection which is contracted for a place which one has defended for some months. However, the garrison evacuated; and while it filed off, the king of Prussia, struck with admiration at the bravery it had exhibited, called those officers by name who had distinguished themselves during the siege, and complimented them in a spirit of chivalrous courtesy. This evacuation took place on the 25th of July.

We left the Austrians at the blockade of the fortified town of Condé, and laying regular siege to Valenciennes. These operations, carried on simultaneously with those of the Rhine, were now about to terminate. The Prince of Cobourg, at the head of an army of observation, lay opposite to Cæsar's camp; the Duke of York commanded the besieging army. The attack, at first pointed against the citadel, was subsequently directed against the suburb of Marly and the bridge of Mons. This front presented a much more extended line; but it was not so strongly defended, and it was preferred as being more attainable. It was settled that the fortifications should be battered by day, and that

* See Custine's trial

the town should be fired by night, in order to add to the privations of the inhabitants, and as a means to effect their speedy discouragement. The place was summoned to surrender on the 14th of June: General Ferrand, and the representatives Cochon and Briest, answered with a dignified firmness. They had mustered a garrison of seven thousand men, who all evinced the most kindly feelings towards the inhabitants, whom they formed into companies of gunners, and rendered us the most effective services.

Two parallels were opened, one after the other, on the nights of the 14th and 19th of June, armed with formidable batteries. They caused the most frightful havoc in the town. The inhabitants and the garrison replied to the attack with a corresponding vigour, and several times effected the destruction of the besiegers' operations. The 25th of June was particularly dreadful. The enemy fired upon the fortifications till noon without any reply being made; but at this time a terrible fire from the ramparts was poured upon the trenches, threw all into confusion there, and carried thither the same terror and destruction which had been prevailing in the town. On the 28th of June, a third parallel was opened, and the constancy of the inhabitants began to be shaken. Already a portion of this opulent town had been burnt down. The children, old men, and the women, had been put in the cellars. The surrender of Condé, which had been recently taken by famine, had a further tendency to discourage the besieged. Emissaries had been despatched to them, in order to work upon their feelings. Meetings were formed, which had for their object the compelling a capitulation. The municipality identified itself with the inclinations of the inhabitants, and combined secretly with them. The representatives and General Ferrand replied, with great force, to the requirements thus addressed to them; and, by the assistance of the garrison, whose courage was worked up to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, they dispersed these meetings.

On the 25th of July, the besieged prepared their mining operations, and made ready for the assault of the covered way. Luckily for them, three shells burst at the very moment when the mines of the garrison were beginning to play upon and destroy their works. The besiegers then rushed forwards in three columns, cleared the palisades, and pushed into the covered way. The garrison, in alarm, made a retreat, and was already leaving the batteries, but General Ferrand brought them back upon the ramparts. The artillery, who had performed prodigies during the whole siege, did further execution upon the besiegers, and stopped them almost at the gates of the fortifications. The next day, the Duke of York summoned General Ferrand to surrender; he fairly told him that, after the lapse of that day, he would turn a deaf ear to all proposals, and that the garrison and the inhabitants should be put to the edge of the sword. At this threat, great gatherings of the people took place; one mob in particular, in which were a vast number of men armed with pistols and daggers, surrounded the municipality. Twelve individuals became spokesmen for all, and made a formal request that the town should surrender. A council of war was held in the midst of this uproar; none of its members were allowed to depart from it, and sentinels were stationed to keep guard over them until they had come to the resolution to decide in favour of the surrender. Two breaches, the disaffection of the inhabitants, and an active besieging enemy, did not justify their holding out any longer. The place was surrendered the 29th of July. The garrison issued forth with the honours of war, were compelled to lay down their arms, but were at liberty to return to France, provided they abstained for one entire year from serving against the allies. There were still seven thousand brave soldiers available against the enemies at home. Valenciennes had undergone a forty-one days' bombardment, and had been exposed to eighty-four thousand cannon-balls, twenty thousand howitzer-shot, and eighty thousand bombs. The general and the garrison had done their duty, and the artillery had entitled itself to great honours.

At this precise period, the war of federalism reduced itself to these two practical disadvantages; the rebellion of Lyons on one side, and that of Marseilles and Toulon upon the other.

Lyons had certainly acknowledged the convention, but refused to render obedience to two decrees: the one, which transferred to Paris the proceedings commenced against the patriots; and the other, which displaced the authorities and ordered the formation of a new provisional municipality. The aristocrats who lay concealed in Lyons had excited an alarm in that city against the return of the former *Mountainear* municipality, and thus, by indistinct apprehensions of danger, engaged them in the practical dangers of an open rebellion. On the 15th of July, the Lyonnese caused the two patriots Chalier and Richard to be put to death, and from that day they were declared to be in a state of rebellion. The two Girondists, Chasset and Biroteau, perceiving that royalism was in the ascendency, withdrew themselves. In the mean time, the president of the popular commission, who was entirely devoted to the emigrants, having been displaced, the sway of public opinion had become of a less hostile character. They acknowledged the constitution, and offered to be bound by it, but always upon the condition of non-performance of the two principal decrees. In this interval, the leaders of this rebellion were casting cannon, and engrossing military stores, and there seemed no way of settling the question other than by a recourse to arms.

Marseilles bore a much less formidable appearance. Her battalions, driven beyond the Durance by Carteaux, were not able to maintain a protracted struggle; but she had communicated to Toulon, hitherto so republican, her rebellious spirit. This port, one of the most important in the world, and the first port of the Mediterranean, had excited the envy of the English who cruised off its coasts. It was there that the emissaries of England conducted a clandestine intrigue, and concocted a dishonourable piece of treachery. The sections had assembled there on the 13th of July, and, proceeding in the same manner with all those of the south, had displaced the municipality, and closed the Jacobin club. The executive authority, thus transferred to the hands of the federalists, was in danger of passing in succession from faction to

faction, to the emigrants and to the English. The army of Nice, in its then state of weakness, was unable to prevent such an unfortunate occurrence. There was every thing to fear; and that vast storm, blown up under the horizon of the south, hung over two points, Lyons and Toulon.

For the last two months, the state of things was more clearly seen, and the danger, although less general and not so astounding in its character, yet became more settled and more serious in its aspect. In the west, there was the destructive wound of La Vendée; at Marseilles, deeply-seated sedition; at Toulon, subtle treachery; at Lyons, open rebellion and a siege. On the Rhine, and in the north, there was the loss of two bulwarks, which had so long stood between ourselves and the allies, and prevented the enemy from marching up to the capital. In September, 1792, when the Prussians were marching up to Paris, and had taken Longwy and Verdun; in April, 1793, after the retreat from Belgium upon the defeat at Neerwinden, the defection of Dumouriez, and the first outbreak of the Vendée; on the 31st of May, after the universal insurrection of the departments, the invasion of Roussillon by the Spaniards, and the loss of the camp of Famars;—at these three periods, the dangers had certainly been most alarming, but perhaps never so distinctly visible as at this fourth period of August, 1793. This was the fourth and last crisis of the Revolution. France was less ignorant, and also more acquainted with war, than she was in September, 1792; felt less alarmed at treasonable practices than in April, 1793, was less involved with insurrectionary movements than on the 31st of May and the 12th of June; but if she was more inured to war and better obeyed, she was also invaded upon every point at once,—at the north, on the Rhine, at the Alps, and at the Pyrenees.

However, we shall never make ourselves acquainted with all the evils which at that time afflicted the republic, if we confine ourselves to the sole consideration of the five or six fields of battle, on which so much human blood was spilt. The interior showed a state of things altogether quite as deplorable. Corn was always dear and scarce. One had to knock at the doors of the bakers to procure even a small piece of bread. It was useless to dispute with shop-keepers to compel them to accept assignats in exchange for necessary articles. The distress was at its height. The people uttered complaints against the monopolizers who forestalled the supplies; of brokers who made them still more dear, and who in their dealings would not accept of assignats. The government in every respect suffering as much as the people, had no other means of existence than the assignats, which it was compelled to deliver in much more than treble or quadruple the amount as payment for identical services, and which they were fearful of issuing, as that might tend to depreciate them still further. In fact, nobody knew how the government or the people contrived to exist.

Nevertheless, the natural products of the earth sustained no diminution. Though the night of the 4th of August had not produced its mighty effects, France was neither in want of corn, or raw materials, or wrought goods; but their lawful and peaceable distribution became impracticable by the effects of a paper currency. The revolution, who in abolishing monarchy had been equally desirous of fulfilling her engagements; who in abolishing the sale of offices felt bound to offer a compensation, who in defending the new order of things against all Europe united against her, was compelled to bear the charges of an universal warfare, had for the purpose of answering these charges, the national property taken from the clergy and the emigrants. To put the value of this property into circulation, the revolution had devised the assignats which represented this property, and these assignats by the ordinary course of purchases were to be presented to the treasury and then burnt. But as the accomplishment of the revolution, and the stability of the sales, became a matter of doubt, no one purchased any of the property. The assignats remained in the circulating medium upon the same footing as an unaccepted bill of exchange, and became depreciated, from the doubt that existed respecting them, as well as by their number.

Current money alone had always remained as the real measure of value; for nothing is so prejudicial to a questionable money, as the rivalry of a money bearing a specific and undoubted character. The one withdraws itself from circulation, and refuses to show itself, while the other offers itself in abundance, and detracts from its own value by offering itself. Such was the situation of the assignats with respect to money. The revolution, doomed to violent measures, knew not where to stop. She had put into *forced* circulation the anticipated value of national property, she tried the experiment of keeping up their value by compulsory measures. On the 11th of April, in spite of the opposition of the Girondists, who nobly but imprudently struggled against the fatality of that revolutionary necessity, the convention punished by six years' imprisonment whosoever sold current money, that is to say, exchanged a certain quantity of silver or gold against a higher nominal quantity of assignats. She also visited with the same punishment whosoever should ask a different price for his goods, by making a distinction whether the payment was to be made in current money or in assignats.

These measures did not prevent the difference from rapidly demonstrating itself. In the month of June a metallic franc was worth three francs in assignats; and in August, two months afterwards, one silver franc was worth six francs in assignats. The relative diminution in value, which at first bore the proportion of one to three, now raised itself to the proportion of one to six.

Under these circumstances the shopkeepers refused to affix the same prices to their goods as before, because the money that was tendered them was not more than a fifth or sixth of its nominal value. They therefore closed their shops, and refused to deal with their customers. Certainly, this diminution in value would not have affected the assignats at all, supposing everybody receiving them at no more than their real value, had received and paid them according to the same standard. In such a case they might still have designated the rate of exchange, and done as well for the purposes of circulation as any other money; but the capitalists who lived upon their income, and the creditors of the state who received either an annual interest or the compensation for an office,

were compelled to accept the paper at the rate of its nominal value. Debtors of every description hastened to discharge their obligations, and creditors forced to accept a fictitious value, never received more than the fourth, fifth, or even the sixth of their capital. Lastly, the operative classes, always compelled to offer their services, and to afford them to those who will accept of them, unable to enter into a combination to raise their wages to double or treble the amount, in the same ratio that the assignats decreased in value, only received a portion of what they earned as a means of obtaining in exchange the necessaries they required. The capitalists half-ruined, became dissatisfied and taciturn; but the people now became furious, styled those tradesmen who refused to sell at the ordinary price monopolizers, and raised an outcry for sending all monopolists to the guillotine.

This unsatisfactory state of things was the necessary consequence of creating assignats, just the same as the assignats were introduced by the necessity for paying off old debts, buying up the offices, and by a ruinously expensive war; and from precisely similar causes, the *maximum* would soon be the consequence resulting from the assignats. It mattered little, so far as practical purposes were concerned, whether this money was to have a forced currency, if the dealer, by raising his price, could elude the necessity of receiving it in payment; the rate of commodities should have been forced precisely in the same way as money. From the time when the law said, "The paper is worth six francs," it ought to have said, "Such commodities are worth no more than six francs;" for otherwise the dealer by raising the price of his goods to twelve francs would save the difference in the exchange.

There certainly should have been established the *maximum* price of corn, notwithstanding what was urged by the Girondists, who had given excellent reasons, deduced from the ordinary economy of things. The greatest privation the people can suffer is the want of bread. Corn was not deficient; but the farmers, who were unwilling to face the disturbances of the markets, or deliver their corn at the rate of the assignats, concealed themselves together with their supplies. The small quantity of corn that made its appearance was quickly taken off by the communes, and by those individuals whose apprehensions suggested their laying in a stock. The scarcity was thus more severely felt at Paris than in any other town of France, because the furnishing of provisions for that immense city was more difficult, the markets more subject to disturbance, and the timidity of the farmers greater. On the 3rd and 4th of May, the convention could no longer forbear passing a decree, according to which all the farmers and corn-merchants were compelled to make a declaration of the quantity of corn they possessed, to thresh out what was in sheaf, to take it to the markets, and to the markets alone, and there sell it at a mean price to be fixed by each commune, and based upon the prices anterior from the 1st of January to the 1st of May. No person was allowed to purchase more than would serve him for a month: those who had sold or bought at a price above the *maximum*, or made false declarations, were punishable with forfeiture of the corn itself, and by fine from three hundred to a thousand francs. Domiciliary visits were established to obtain evidence of the fact; and in addition to this precaution, a tabular digest of all the declarations was to be sent by the municipality to the minister of the interior, in order to afford a correct statistic of the supplies France was enabled to yield. The commune of Paris, superadding its own police regulations to the decrees of the convention, had, moreover, taken upon itself to regulate the mode of dealing out the bread at the bakers' shops. No person was allowed to go thither unless he had tickets of safety (*cartes de sûreté*). Upon this ticket, which was issued by the revolutionary committees, was inscribed the quantity of bread that the bearer was enabled to require, and this allowance was in proportion to the number of individuals of which each family was composed. Even the mode of each party taking his turn to be served at the baker's door was the subject of a specific regulation. A rope was to be fastened to their doors; each person was to hold it in his hand, so as not to lose his place, and to avoid disorder. However, abandoned women not unfrequently cut this rope, a frightful scuffle was the consequence, and the military were then obliged to be called in to restore order. We, in this instance, have some idea of the overwhelming anxieties to which a government is subjected, and to what harassing measures it is compelled to have recourse, from the moment it is placed under the necessity of attending to everything. But in the present state of things one matter involved another. To force the currency of assignats led to forcing the exchanges, to forcing prices, to even forcing the quantity, the time, and the mode of dealing; the last act was the result of the first, and the first was quite as unavoidable as the revolution itself. In the mean time, the rise in the price of provisions, which had led to their *maximum*, extended itself to all articles forming the necessaries of life. Meat, vegetables, fruit, groceries, fuel and candle, liquors, articles of clothing, and leather, had every of them risen in exact proportion to the depreciation of the assignats, and the people were every day more pertinacious in looking upon those traders as monopolizers who refused a worthless currency. It will be recollected that in February there had been a general pillage of the grocers' shops, upon the suggestion of Marat. In July, some boats, laden with soap, which came *viâ* the Seine, to Paris, were plundered in a similar manner. The indignant commune had passed the most severe regulations in reference to these offences, and Pache published the following simple and laconic notice.

"PACHE, MAYOR, TO HIS FELLOW-CITIZENS:

"Paris contains seven hundred thousand inhabitants: the soil of Paris contributes nothing to their food, their clothing, or their subsistence. It is a natural consequence, therefore, that Paris should derive everything from the other departments and from abroad.

"If the inhabitants commit spoliation upon the remittances and goods sent to Paris, they will no longer be sent.

"In that case, Paris will be destitute of food, clothing, and the means of enabling its numerous inhabitants to subsist.

"And thus seven hundred thousand persons, entirely destitute, will devour each other."

The people, indeed, had not committed further

spoliation; but they were constantly clamouring for terrible examples to be made of the traders, and the reader will recollect the priest Jacques Roux stirring up the Cordeliers, in order to obtain the insertion of an article in the constitution specially comprehending the monopolizers. Public clamour was also let loose against the stock-brokers, who were the main cause, as the saying was, of the increased price of goods, by their speculations in the assignats, gold, silver, and foreign paper.

The imagination of the people had conceived such monstrosities, and upon every quarter had considered themselves exposed to inveterate enemies, while, in fact, there only existed a greedy sort of gamesters, profiting by the evil, it is true, but not originating it, and, what is more, totally incompetent so to do. The depreciation of the assignats may be traced to numberless causes: the great quantity in which they were issued; the uncertainty of their ever being paid off, an event that would never take place if the revolution failed to keep its ground; their relative disproportion between money (which never divested itself of its substantive value) and merchandizes (which, in retaining their value, would not put themselves in point of exchange upon a level with a money divested of its worth). In this state of things, capitalists would not invest their capital in assignats, for, if invested in that shape, they would be utterly lost. At first, they had done their best to procure money; but six years of trouble had alarmed the sellers and purchasers of metallic currency. They next thought of purchasing goods, but they only afforded a temporary investment, because they could not be long kept on hand, and were, in fact, a dangerous employment of capital, now the popular rage against monopolizers was at its height. They therefore sought for foreign securities. All those who held assignats used their utmost exertions to procure bills of exchange upon London, Amsterdam, Hambro', Geneva, or on any other place in Europe; they paid for these foreign securities national securities to an enormous amount, and thus caused the depreciation of the assignats, in thus abandoning them. Some of these bills of exchange were realized out of France, and their value got into the hands of the emigrants. These bills of exchange, which were transmuted into guineas or ducats, were paid for by the proceeds of splendid furniture, the spoils of former luxury, consisting of carvings, clocks and watches, mirrors, gilt bronzes, porcelain, pictures, rare editions of valuable works; and it was but a small portion of these that was ever expected to be reduced into money. These bills were anxiously sought for by the alarmed capitalists, who never desired to emigrate, but simply desired to impart stability to their fortune; they did not generally circulate far from the spot where the most alarmed capitalists negotiated them amongst each other. These bills thus formed a peculiar species of funds, secured upon foreign parties, and competing with our assignats. There is some reason for believing that Pitt had induced the English bankers to accept a vast quantity of this paper, and had even opened for them a considerable credit to augment the gross amount, and by this contrivance to contribute, on all occasions, to the depreciation of the assignats. Great anxiety was also exhibited to obtain shares in the various stocks, which seems to be quite beyond all the influences of the revolution and a counter-revolution, and which, moreover, offered a desirable investment. Those of the discount company were very much liked, but those of the East India company were, above all, sought after with the greatest avidity, because in some measure their security depended upon a pledge that could not be seized, the subject of credit consisting in vessels and factories in every quarter of the globe. In vain was it that they had been charged with a heavy transfer duty; the directors evaded the law, by abolishing the actual transfers, and substituting for such transfers a simple entry upon the books of the company, which required no legal formality. The revenue was thus defrauded to a considerable extent; for there were several thousand transfers a day, and they rendered of no avail the precautions taken to prevent stock-jobbing. To no purpose was it, that in order to diminish the preference for these shares, a duty of five per cent. had been charged upon their value; the dividends were distributed to the share-holders as a repayment of a part of the capital, and by this scheme the directors again evaded the law. Thus it was, that shares of 600 francs rose to 1000, 1200, and even 2000 francs. These were so many modes of investment which stood in competition with the revolutionary currency, and materially assisted to depreciate it.

Not only were all these species of funded securities, but even certain portions of the public debt, and even of other specific assignats, in operation against the assignats. In point of fact, there existed loans subscribed for at all periods and in every shape. There were even some which dated their commencement from Louis XIII. Among the later stocks subscribed for under Louis XIV. there were some of different creations. A marked preference was generally exhibited for those which were prior to the constitutional monarchy, over those that had been opened for the purposes of the revolution. Every one disliked the assignats charged upon the property of the clergy and the emigrants. In short, there were distinctions made between the assignats themselves: out of about five thousand million issued since their creation, one thousand million had been received from the purchases made of national property; nearly four thousand million remained in circulation; and out of those four thousand million, five hundred million may be said to have been created under Louis XVI., and bearing the king's head. These last, it was said, would meet with more consideration in case of a counter-revolution, and would be recognised for at least some portion of their nominal value. Thus they advanced in price ten or fifteen per cent. above the others. The republican assignats, the sole resource of government, the only circulating medium, were therefore in every respect depreciated, and were placed in competition at one and the same time with money, merchandise, foreign paper, stocks and funded securities, and the various government securities, and, lastly, the royal assignats.

The compensation money in respect of abolished offices, the payment of the great supplies for the purposes of the war, the readiness of numerous debtors to release themselves from their engage-

ments, had placed a vast amount of capital in a few hands. The war, and the fear of a terrible revolution, had interrupted numerous commercial operations, had led to great settlements of accounts, and had still further increased the mass of unemployed capital requiring investment. The capitals thus accumulated, formed the subject of a perpetual stock-jobbing on the exchange at Paris, and were alternately converted into gold, silver, provisions, bills of exchange, shares in companies, old government securities, &c. There, as usual, resorted those adventurous gamblers, who plunge themselves into every species of hazard, who speculate upon the accidents of commerce, upon the army contracts, upon the good faith of governments, &c. By constantly watching the course of exchange, they turned to good advantage every rise of the funds upon the constant fall of the assignats. The fall of the assignats first began at the exchange with reference to money and moveable property. The next fall bore evident relation to the value of merchandise, which rose in price in shops and markets. Nevertheless, goods were not so rapid in their rise as money, because the markets are at some distance from the exchange, consequently they are not so soon affected, and more especially as merchants cannot quote the price with such rapidity as is done by stock-jobbers met together in one hall. The difference in prices first settled at the exchange, was not declared in other places, until more or less time according to circumstances had intervened; the five-franc assignat, which at one time was not current for more that two francs at the exchange, yet passed for three francs in the market, and the stock-jobbers thus obtained the necessary interval to enable them to speculate. Having thus their capitals always at hand, they procured money before the rise; as soon as it had obtained a rise in reference to assignats, they exchanged against the latter; they of course had always a quantity of assignats, and as commodities had not had time to rise also, with this quantity of assignats they bought a greater quantity of goods, and sold them again when they came to par. Their scheme consisted in possessing themselves of either cash or merchandise while one or the other were rising, against the assignats. Their profit therefore was obtained by the continual rise of every thing above the assignat; and it was nothing more than natural that this sort of gain, which always was made at the expense of a public calamity, should be looked upon with an evil eye. Their speculations comprehended the rise and fall of every description of security, such as foreign bills, shares of companies, &c. They took advantage of every circumstance that was calculated to cause a change in the funds, such as a defeat, a motion or a false report. These persons composed a class by no means inconsiderable. In their number might be comprehended, foreign bankers, contractors, usurers, persons who had formerly been priests or nobles, revolutionary upstarts, and also a few deputies, who, to the honour of the convention be it spoken, did not count more than five or six, and who availed themselves of the paltry means of adding to the changes in the funds by motions made for that purpose. They led a careless life with actresses, and women who had been either nuns or countesses, who, from being simple mistresses, not unfrequently took upon themselves to engage in this business. Those deputies who were principally engaged in these intrigues were, Julien of Toulouse and Delaunay of Angers, both living in open concubinage, the first with the countess of Beaufort, and the latter with an actress of the name of Descoings. It has been hinted that Chabot, who as an ex-capuchin was extremely debauched, and not unfrequently meddled with questions of finance, entered into this brokerage system in partnership with two brokers of the name of Frey, exiles from Moravia on account of their revolutionory opinions and now set up in Paris as bankers. Fabré d'Eglantine also dabbled in this traffic; and Danton was accused, but without foundation, of being no stranger to these proceedings.

The most scandalous stock-jobbing trick was that which identified the Baron de Batz, a banker and expert loan-contractor, with Julien of Toulouse and Delaunay of Angers, the deputies who seemed most bent upon making their fortunes. They entered into a conspiracy to charge the East India Company with certain corrupt practices, and thus to cause its bonds to fall,—to purchase them immediately, and then cause them to rise gradually by a gentle counteraction, and thus realize the difference of the rise. That profligate abbé, D'Espagnac, who was contractor for Dumouriez in Belgium, and had since obtained the general contract for waggons, and whose interests Julien took special care to protect at the convention, was, in return for the obligation, to furnish the capital for this speculation. Julien also had in view the engagement of Fabre, Chabot, and others, who were likely to prove useful, as members of various committees, in this conspiracy.

The greater part of these men were attached to the revolution, and had no desire to lower it in public estimation; but, at all events, they wished to make their fortunes. All their secret devices were not made public, but inasmuch as they speculated upon the fall of the assignats, they were charged with the whole extent of that evil of which they had taken advantage. As their association included many foreign bankers, they were said to be agents of Pitt and of the allied powers; and here it was that the people fancied they saw that mysterious and so-much-dreaded influence of the English ministry displayed. The people were, in short, equally clamorous against the stock-jobbers and the monopolizers, and required that both should be subjected to the same punishment.

Thus, while the north, the Rhine, the South, and the Vendée, were invaded by our enemies, our financial resources consisted of a repudiated currency, of which the security was quite as uncertain as the revolution itself, and which, upon every miscarriage, diminished in a value proportionate to the threatened danger. Such was our singular situation: in exact proportion as the danger increased, and the means to oppose should have increased with it, they diminished in the contrary ratio; supplies for the army were quite beyond the power of the government to furnish, and provisions were out of reach of the people. It therefore became imperatively necessary, at one and the same time, to obtain soldiers, arms, and money for the service of the state and the people, and, after that had been accomplished, to assure ourselves of victory.

CHAPTER XII.

THE ARRIVAL AND MODE OF RECEPTION AT PARIS OF THE COMMISSARIES OF THE PRIMARY ASSEMBLIES.—THE RETREAT OF THE ARMY OF THE NORTH FROM CÆSAR'S CAMP.—FETE OF THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE TENTH OF AUGUST, AND THE INAUGURATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1793.—EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE PUBLIC WELFARE.—THE DECREE ENACTING A LEVY EN MASSE.—MEANS TAKEN TO ENSURE ITS EXECUTION—INSTITUTION OF THE "GREAT-BOOK:" REMODELLING OF THE NATIONAL DEBT.—FORCED LOAN.—A DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIOUS FINANCIAL OPERATIONS AT THIS PERIOD.—NEW DECREES RESPECTING THE "MAXIMUM."—DECREES AGAINST LA VENDÉE, CONCERNING FOREIGNERS, AND AGAINST THE BOURBONS.

THE commissaries despatched by the primary assemblies to celebrate the anniversary of the tenth of August and to accept the constitution in the name of entire France, had just arrived at Paris. A desire was evinced to seize upon the present moment as a means of calling a movement of enthusiasm into action, of reconciling the provinces with the capital, and stimulating heroic resolves. A splendid reception was indeed prepared for them. Applications were made to every merchant in the neighbourhood. An immense store of provisions was collected, so that the general scarcity should not interfere with the *fête*, and that the commissaries might at the same time enjoy the spectacle of peace, plenty, and tranquillity. So much attention was paid to these commissaries, that all the administrations * of public conveyances were ordered to afford them places therein, notwithstanding they might previously have been booked by travellers. The administrative authorities of the departments, who equalled those of the commune in the sternness of their language and proclamations, made an address *to the brethren* of the primary assemblies. "There," said they, "men who wear the mask of patriotism, will talk to you enthusiastically of liberty, equality, the unity and indivisibility of the republic, while at the bottom of their heart they breathe forth and use their exertions for the re-establishment of royalty, and the distraction of their country. These are the wealthy, and the wealthy have ever shunned virtue and extinguished morality. There, you will meet with misconducted women, too seductive in their attractions, who will mutually endeavour with them to beguile you by their vicious allurements. Beware, above all things beware, of the *ci-devant* † Palais Royal; it is in that garden you will meet with those traitors. That famous garden, the cradle of the revolution, late the asylum of the friends of liberty and equality, is at this day, in spite of an active superintendence, nothing else than the filthy sink of society, the resort of wretches, the den of all the conspirators. Fly from this pestiferous place; prefer, to the dangerous example of luxury and debauchery, the useful pictures of industrious virtue; visit the suburbs, the founders of our liberty; enter the workshops, where men of active minds, simple, and well-regulated as yourselves, and, like you, ready to defend their country, have long been waiting to rivet the links of fraternity. Above all, attend our popular societies. Let us be unanimous! let us acquire new vigour from the dangers that threaten our country, and let us, once for all, swear death and destruction to tyrants.

The first attention that was paid them, was to take them to the Jacobins, who received them with the greatest satisfaction, and offered them the use of their hall for their meetings. The commissaries accepted this *offer*, and it was settled they should hold their deliberations in the very body of the club, and should also mix with them during the day. The only consequence of this was, that there were only four hundred more Jacobins at Paris. The club, which sat every second day, now wished to meet every day, in order to confer with the commissaries of the departments upon those measures which concerned the public welfare. It was said that among the number of those commissaries, some of them had a leaning towards indulgence, and that they had been desired to demand a general amnesty on the day the constitution was accepted. In point of fact, some persons had conceived this measure for the purpose of saving the imprisoned Girondists and all others in custody in respect of political offences. But the Jacobins were averse to any accommodation; for all they required was energy and vengeance. The commissaries of the primary assemblies, said Hassenfratz, were slandered by the report that they had desired an amnesty; they were utterly incapable of doing any such thing, and would unite with the Jacobins in demanding not only prompt measures for the public welfare, but the punishment of all traitors. The commissaries took the hint, and if some few of them had any idea of an amnesty, not one of them dared to propose it.

On the 7th of August in the morning, they were conducted to the commune, and from the commune to the Evêché, where the electors' club held its sittings, and where the events of the 31st of May had been concocted. It was there that the reconciliation of the departments with Paris was arranged to take place, because it was from thence that the attack upon the national representation had issued. Pache the mayor, the procurator Chaumette, and the entire municipality marching before them, introduced the commissaries to the Evêché. Speeches were made by both parties

* In France every thing is done by means of an "administration," which may be termed a subdivided apportionment of public functions. The subject of these administrations, however, are not unfrequently those which, in England, are confined to private enterprise. The sale of milk, and the establishment of public conveyances, are two well-known subjects of these "administrations." *Trans.*

† This term, which has occurred before, was a bitter reproach used by the revolutionists against those who were presumedly attached to the old regime. *Trans.*

to each other: the Parisians declared that they had never desired to slight or usurp departmental rights; the commissaries in their turn admitted that an unauthorized imputation had been cast upon Paris; thereupon they immediately embraced one another, and abandoned themselves to the most perfect flow of soul. It suddenly occurred to them, that they should repair to the convention in order to make them parties to this reconciliation. Business was suspended, and one of the commissaries addressed the convention. "Citizens representative," said he, "we are come hither to acquaint you with the melting scene that has just taken place in the hall of the electors, whither we had repaired to give our brethren of Paris the kiss of peace. We trust that it will not be long before the heads of those who had uttered unworthy imputations against this republican city, shall fall under the sword of the law. All of us are *Mountaineers*; long live the Mountain!" Another of the commissaries requested that the representatives should give the commissaries a fraternal embrace. Instantly the members of the assembly quit their seats, and fling themselves into the arms of the commissaries of the departments. After some few minutes devoted to this scene of tender emotion and flow of soul, the commissaries file off through the hall, shouting out "Long live the Mountain! long live the republic!" and singing

La Montagne nous a sauvés
En congédiant Gensonné,
La Montagne nous a sauvés
En congédiant Gensonné.
Au diable les Buzots
Les Vergniauds, les Brissots!
Dansons la Carmagnole *, &c.

They next went to the Jacobins, where they prepared, in the name of all the commissaries of the primary assemblies, an address, declaratory of the fact that false imputations had been made against Paris. "Brethren and friends," wrote they, "cease your apprehensions. We all of us here are quite agreed. Our souls are as one, and liberty triumphant bestows her smiles on none but Jacobins, brethren, and friends. The *Marats* is no more. We constitute here but one vast and terrible MOUNTAIN, which is about to pour forth her fiery stream upon all royalists and advocates of tyranny. Perish the infamous libellers who have scandalized Paris! We are watching here night and day, and are labouring in company with our brethren of the capital for the common weal. We shall not return to our hearths till we announce to you that France is free and the country saved." This address, when read, was most enthusiastically applauded, and was forthwith sent to the convention for the purpose of its being entered on their votes for the day. The intoxication of the moment became general; a crowd of speakers rushed to the tribune of the club, every one's head seemed turned by the excitement. Robespierre perceiving this ferment, immediately required leave to speak. Every one most willingly made way for him. Jacobins, commissaries, and all, overwhelmed with applause the celebrated orator, whom some of them had neither seen or heard.

Robespierre commenced by congratulating the departments, who had just then saved France. "They saved it," said he, "for the first time in the year '89, in voluntarily putting themselves in a state of defence; the second occasion was when they came to Paris to carry out the 10th August; a third time, when they came to present, in the midst of the capital, an example of unity and absolute reconciliation. At the time I am now speaking, untoward events have oppressed the republic, and placed her in jeopardy; but republicans have nothing to fear, they should rather repress any emotion that may involve them in excesses. A design had been broached of procuring a factitious dearth, and inducing a riot; a scheme was agitating for gathering the populace to the arsenal, to destroy the ammunition, or set it on fire, as had been done in many other towns; in short, every endeavour was made to excite a sensation in the prisons, for the mere purpose of libelling Paris, and dissolving the union which has just been ratified. Beware of these snares," added Robespierre, "be ye calm and intrepid, boldly brave the dangers to which the country is exposed, and do your utmost to save her." Tranquillity was restored by this address, and they did not separate without first complimenting the discreet orator with repeated plaudits.

The next ensuing days did not witness any commotion in Paris, but nothing was omitted which had a tendency to operate upon the public mind, and encourage a lofty enthusiasm. There was no concealing any danger, there was no making a mystery of any adverse event; the public was in due course informed of the defeats in La Vendée, the alarming intelligence (daily getting worse and worse) from Toulon, the retreating movement of the army of the Rhine, which fell back before the conquerors of Mentz, and, lastly, of the extremely perilous state of the army of the North, which had retreated to Cæsar's camp, and which the Imperialists, the English, and the Dutch, who having made themselves masters of Condé and Valenciennes, and forming an irresistible mass, were able to carry by storm. The intervening space between Cæsar's camp and Paris was now no more than forty leagues, and there was not a single regiment, or a single impediment, to obstruct the march of the enemy. If the army of the North had been taken prisoners, all had been lost, and the slightest reports from that quarter were eagerly laid hold of.

These apprehensions were not without good foundation, and at this juncture Cæsar's camp was in the greatest possible jeopardy. On the evening of the 7th of August, the allies came up to it, and threatened it on all sides. Between Cambray and Bouchain a line of heights extends itself, and the

* This was the name of a revolutionary song of the year 1790, the burden or chorus of which (*refrain*) *Dansons la Carmagnole*,—*a.* was repeated as the singers danced in a ring. The word *Carmagnole* was first applied to the most extravagant members of the Jacobin club, who affected to wear a vest called a Carmagnole, which term probably was associated with a town of that name in the Sardinian States. The song of the Carmagnole seems to have been sung to a popular air, *Malbrough s'en va-t-en guerre*, —*a.* the burden of which is supposed to be extremely ancient. The air suddenly started into extreme popularity in the year 1781, from the circumstances mentioned in *Chambers's Edinb. Journal*, I. 38. (*N. S.*) *Trans.*

Scheldt protects them by running at their base. This is the place which is called Cæsar's camp, supported by two fortresses, and bordered by a stream of water. On the evening of the 7th, the Duke of York, whose duty was to surround the French, debouched in sight of Cambray, which formed the right of Cæsar's camp; he summoned the place to surrender; the only answer made by the commandant was by shutting the gates, and burning the suburbs. The very same evening, Coburg, with a mass of forty thousand men, arrived in two columns, on the banks of the Scheldt, and bivouacked in face of our camp. The heat of the weather, which was intense, paralyzed both men and horses; many soldiers died in the course of the day from exposure to the sun's rays. Kilmaine, who had been appointed to succeed Custine, and who had accepted the command, but only provisionally, considered that he could not keep his ground in so dangerous a position. Exposed on his right to be surrounded by the Duke of York, and having scarcely more than thirty-five thousand disheartened men to act against seventy thousand men,—flushed with victory, he thought it more prudent to think of retreating, and to gain time by shifting his position. The course of the Scarpe, placed behind that of the Scheldt, appeared to him a good position to occupy. Between Arras and Douay the heights bordered by the Scarpe form an encampment similar to Cæsar's camp, and, like that camp, are supported by two fortresses, and bordered by a stream of water. Kilmaine arranged his retreat for the next morning the 8th of August.

His main body was to cross the Cense, a little river which flowed along the back of the ground he occupied, and he himself was to bear, with a strong rear-guard, towards the right, where the Duke of York was ready to debouche. In fact, the next morning, at break of day, the heavy artillery, the baggage-waggons, and the infantry, put themselves in motion, crossed the Cense, and destroyed all the bridges. An hour afterwards, Kilmaine, with some batteries of light artillery, and a strong division of cavalry, bore towards the right, in order to shelter his retreat from the English. He could not have arrived there more opportunely. Two battalions, who had missed their way, were engaged with the enemy in the little village of Marquion, and made an obstinate defence against the English. In spite of their exertions, they narrowly escaped being surrounded. Kilmaine, directly coming up, placed his light artillery upon the flank of his enemies, pressed them with his cavalry, and compelled them to fall back. The battalions were then relieved, and were able to rejoin the main body of the army. At this time the English and the Imperialists, both debouching at the same time upon the right, and upon the face of Cæsar's camp, found it completely evacuated. At last, towards the close of the day, the French were collected at the camp of Gavrelle, supported by Arras and Douay, and having the river Scarpe flowing in front.

Thus, on the 8th of August, Cæsar's camp was evacuated, precisely as that of Famars had been; Cambray and Bouchain were abandoned to their own resources in precisely the same manner as Valenciennes and Condé. The course of the Scarpe, situated behind that of the Scheldt, is not, as every one knows, between Paris and the Scheldt, but between the Scheldt and the sea. Kilmaine had been marching on the side, instead of marching retrograde, and thus one part of the frontier was unprotected. The allies could have established themselves throughout the entire department of the North. But what should they do? Should they, after one day's more march, go and attack the camp of Gavrelle, and make prisoners the enemy who had escaped them? Should they direct their march upon Paris, or should they return to their former design against Dunkirk? However, they sent detachments so far as Peronne and Saint Quentin; and the alarm was soon communicated to Paris, where it was reported with dismay, that Cæsar's camp had been lost, as that of Famars had been; and that Cambray had been delivered to the enemy, as Valenciennes had been. On every side there was an outburst of reprobation against Kilmaine, forgetting the great service he had just performed by his masterly retreat.

The preparation for that annual *fête* of the 10th of August, which was intended to electrify the public mind, took place in the midst of these unfavourable rumours. Upon the 9th, a report was made to the convention, upon the result of the enumeration of the votes. The forty-four thousand municipalities had accepted the constitution. The only deficiency in the census of the votes arose in Marseilles, Corsica, and La Vendée. One single commune, that of Saint Tonnant, in the department of the Côtes-du-Nord, had been so audacious as to require the re-establishment of the Bourbons upon the throne.

On the 10th, the fête opened the day. The arrangements connected with this fête had been committed to the celebrated painter, David. At four o'clock in the morning, the company who were to form the procession met at the place de la Bastille. The convention, the commissioners of the primary assemblies, from whom eighty-six elders had been chosen to represent the eighty-six departments, the popular clubs, and all the sections in arms, ranged themselves around a large fountain, called the fountain of *Regeneration*. This fountain was formed by a large statue of nature, who from her breasts spouted water into a spacious basin. As soon as the sun had gilded the tops of the houses, he was saluted by some stanzas from the air of the Marseillaise. The president of the convention took a cup, poured in the direction of the sun some of the water of regeneration on the ground, then drank of it and handed the cup to the elders of the departments, who each drank of it in their turn. After this ceremony, the procession moved along the Boulevards. The popular clubs, having a banner whereon was depicted an all-seeing eye, went first. Next came the whole convention; every one of the members of the convention held a bouquet of ears of corn, and eight of them, placed in the centre, bore an ark, the Constitutional Act, and the Rights of Man. The elders of the departments formed a circle round the convention, and, as they walked, were linked together by a tricolored cord. They held in their hands a branch of olive, as a token of the reconciliation of the provinces with Paris, and also a pike, intended to form part of the national fasces made up by the eighty-six departments. At the tail of this portion of the procession, came

groups of people with instruments denoting their different employments. In the midst of these, there came a plough, on which were seated an old man and his aged wife drawn by their youthful children. This plough was closely followed by a war-chariot, upon which was placed the cinerary urn inscribed to those soldiers who had died for their country. Lastly, the procession was closed by tumbrils laden with sceptres, crowns, heraldic escutcheons and tapestry interwoven with fleurs-de-lis.

The procession passed all along the Boulevards, and directed its course towards the place de la Revolution. The president of the convention, as he passed by the Boulevard Poissonière, presented the heroines of the 5th and 6th of October, who were seated on their guns, with a branch of laurel. At the place de la Revolution he again stopped, and set fire to all the insignia of royalty and nobility drawn in the tumbrils. He next plucked off a veil thrown over a statue, which, when exposed to full view, displayed the features of liberty. Salvoes of artillery denoted the moment of its dedication, and at the same moment, thousands of birds, bearing light pennons, were let loose, and seemed to announce, as they darted into air, that the earth was made free.

They next proceeded to the Champ-de-Mars by the Place-des-Invalides, and there they passed singly before a colossal figure, representing the French people who having prostrated federalism, were suffocating her in the slough of a marsh (*marais*). At last, they came to the field of the federation itself. At this place, the procession divided itself into two columns, who extended themselves around the altar of the country. The president of the convention and the eighty-six elders occupied the summit of the altar; the members of the convention, and the bulk of the commissaries of the primary assemblies, occupied the steps. Each company of people alternately came, and placed around the altar the products of their occupations, stuffs, fruit, and articles of every kind. The president of the convention next collecting the acts on which the primary assemblies had inscribed their votes, deposited them upon the altar of the country. A general discharge of artillery instantly pealed; an immense multitude joined their shouts to the noise of the cannon, and they swore, with the same enthusiasm as on the 14th of July 1790 and 1792, to defend the constitution; an oath empty enough, if one considers the letter of the constitution, but heroic enough and sufficiently enough observed, if we dismiss from our considerations every thing except the country where it was made, and even the revolution itself! The constitutions, in point of fact, had passed away, but the country and the revolution were defended with a most heroic intrepidity.

After this ceremony, the eighty-six elders returned their pikes to the president, who with them made a *faxes*, and confided them together with the constitutional act to the deputies of the primary assemblies, and added his recommendation that they should concentrate all their strength around the ark of the new covenant. The company then divided itself; one portion of the procession accompanied the cinerary urn of those Frenchmen who had died for their country, to a temple prepared for its reception; the remaining portion of the procession attended to deposit the ark of the constitution in a place where it should remain till the next day, when it was to be finally brought back into the hall of the convention. A grand imitative representation of the siege and bombardment of Lille, and the heroic defence by its inhabitants, occupied the remainder of the day, and predisposed the ideas of the people to warlike associations.

Such was the third federation of republican France. We do not perceive on this occasion, as in 1790, all the classes of a great people, both rich and poor, noble and simple, mingling altogether without distinction in the general excitement, and weary of their conflicts, dismissing for some hours their differences of rank and opinion; on the present occasion was seen an immense population, no longer breathing the spirit of forgiveness, but rather that of danger, devotion, and desperate resolves, and also surrendering themselves to the intoxicating enjoyments of these gigantic pomps, before rushing the next day to the field of battle. One circumstance enhanced the character of this scene, and threw into the shade what persons of a scornful or hostile turn of mind might consider ridiculous, and this was the danger, and the general feeling of self-devotion with which it was braved. On the first 14th of July 1790, the revolution was still pure and benevolent in her character, but she had not then learnt to be serious, and might have been terminated as a ridiculous farce by the bayonets of foreign powers. In August 1793, she was tragic but elevated, as being the subject of observation in respect of her victories and reverses; and serious, as characterising an heroic and irrevocable resolution.

The moment for the adoption of extended measures had arrived. Upon every side the most extraordinary notions were fermenting. It was proposed to exclude all nobles from office, to order the general imprisonment of all suspected characters and against whom no precise enactment was in force, to raise the people as one body, to seize upon all articles of consumption and convey them to the stores of the republic, who was to charge itself with their distribution to each individual; in short, some expedient was required, which no one knew how to devise, for obtaining at a moment's notice the necessary supplies. Above all, it was demanded that the convention should continue in office, and that no transference of its power should be made to the new legislature which was to succeed it, and that the constitution should be veiled in the same manner as the statue of the law, until an absolute defeat of the enemies of the republic should take place.

It was at the Jacobins that these notions were successively proposed. Robespierre, who no longer was striving to soften the burst of popular feeling, but, on the contrary, to stir it up, insisted most particularly upon the necessity there was of retaining the national convention in its functions, and there his advice was good. To dissolve at this particular crisis an assembly possessed of the entire government and who were unanimous, in order to replace it by a newly constituted and inexperienced assembly, and which must in its turn have become a prey to contending factions, would have been a most mischievous plan. The deputies of the provinces gathering round Robespierre, ex-

claimed that they had sworn not to separate until the convention had taken measures for the public welfare, and they declared that they should compel it to remain in office. Audouin, the son-in-law of Pache, next spoke, and moved the question of demanding the levy *en masse*, and also the imprisonment of suspected persons. Forthwith the commissaries of the primary assemblies prepared a petition, and upon the morrow the 12th attended to present the same to the convention. They required that the convention should take upon herself the care of saving the country, that no act of oblivion whatever should be enacted, that suspected persons should be arrested, that the commissaries of the primary assembly should be first sent against the enemy, and that the people raised *en masse* should march behind them. A portion of these propositions was adopted, the apprehension of suspected persons was in effect decreed; but the plan of a levy *en masse*, which appeared too violent a measure, was referred to the inquiry of the committee of public welfare. The Jacobins, who were discontented, insisted upon, and never ceased to repeat in their clubs, that no partial, but a general movement was the thing needful.

A few days afterwards the committee made its report, and proposed an enactment of too uncertain a character, as well as some proclamations deficient in vigour.

"The committee," exclaimed Danton, "has not stated every thing; it has not stated that if France be vanquished, that if she is torn in pieces, the wealthy will be the first victims of the rapacity of the tyrants; it has not stated that the vanquished patriots will rend and burn this republic, rather than see it pass into the hands of their insolent conquerors! This is what these wealthy egotists must be taught. What can you expect," added Danton, "you who will not exert yourselves for the salvation of the republic. Are you aware what will befall you if liberty should fall? A regency under the direction of an incompetent person, an infant king, whose minority will be protracted, and lastly, the dismembering of our provinces and a most frightful internal commotion! Yes, ye wealthy, they would overtax you, and would squeeze you more, ay a thousand times more than you will have to spend for the salvation of your country, and the perpetual establishment of liberty. The convention," further added Danton, "holds in her hands the thunderbolts of popular power; let her use them and launch them forth against the heads of tyrants. She has the commissaries of the primary assemblies, she has her own members, let her send the one and the other to carry into execution an universal resort to arms."

The draughts of the proposed enactments were again referred to the committee. The next day the Jacobins again despatched the commissaries of the primary assemblies to the convention. The latter came to demand once more, not a partial enlistment, but a levy *en masse*, because, as they observed, half measures are abortive, and for this reason it is far easier to make a strong impression upon an entire nation than upon a portion of its citizens. "If you require," added they, "a hundred thousand soldiers, they will not be found; but millions of men will assemble to a general call. Let there be no exemption for that citizen who is of physical ability to bear arms, whatever may be his occupation: let agriculture alone retain those hands, without which the fruits of the earth cannot be preserved; rather let the current of commerce be momentarily stopped in its course, nay, let all business cease, let the grand and all-absorbing and sole business of the French be the salvation of the republic.

The convention was unable to resist a summons so urgently pressed. Partaking herself, in some measure, of the excitement of the petitioners, she gave instructions to her committee to withdraw for the purpose of instantly preparing the draught of a decree for a levy *en masse*. The committee returned in a few minutes, and presented the following rescript, which was adopted in the midst of general rejoicing.

"Article 1. The French people declare, through the medium of her representatives, that it will rise as one man in the defence of its liberty and its constitution, as well as for the conclusive deliverance of its territory from its enemies.

"2. The committee of public welfare will to-morrow present the mode in which this great national movement shall be carried into effect."

By the tenor of other articles there were named eighteen representatives, who were commissioned to distribute themselves throughout France, and to direct the commissaries of the primary assemblies in their requirements for men, horses, ammunition, and provisions. The great impulse once given, every thing would become practicable. When it had been once declared that all France, its population and property, belonged to government, that government would then be able to effect every thing that she might deem useful and necessary, having regard to the extent of the danger, her own intelligence, and her increasing energy. Certainly it was not necessary to raise the entire population *en masse*, and thus interrupt the course of natural increase, and even that labour which was indispensable for alimentary purposes, but it was requisite that the government should call for every thing, with this reservation, that she was not to demand more than should suffice for the emergencies of the occasion.

The month of August was the period of issuing those mighty decrees which put all France in agitation, and all her resources in full action, and which terminated in favour of the revolution,—its last and its most terrible crisis.

It therefore became necessary to call the entire population out, to provide it with arms, and to defray, by a new financial expedient, the expense of this mighty change. It was more than ever necessary that the paper-money should bear some relation to the price of necessaries and provisions; it became expedient to distribute the armies and the generals in a suitable manner with reference to each theatre of war; and, lastly, to appease revolutionary vengeance by marked and terrible executions. We shall now see what the government did towards satisfying all at once these urgent necessities, and administering to those evil passions to which it must necessarily be subservient, since they are inseparable from that energy which saves a people on the brink of destruction.

To compel the contribution from every locality of a determinate quota of men, was not at all in

keeping with the occasion,—that would have been to express a doubt as to the enthusiasm of France at this period; and one mode of inspiring this enthusiasm was to pre-suppose its existence. This German mode of requiring from every country a levy of men, just like so much money, was, moreover, inconsistent with the principle of a levy *en masse*. A general enlistment, by way of conscription, by lot, was also quite as inapplicable. As everybody was not called upon to serve, everybody would have endeavoured to claim exemption, and would have made their being compelled to serve a matter of hardship. Certain it is, that the levy *en masse* exposed France to an universal confusion, and called forth the ridicule of the moderates and counter-revolutionists. The committee of public welfare devised the most suitable means for the occasion, and this was to put the whole population at the entire disposal of government, to classify it by generations, and to send off these according to the rate of age, one after the other, as they might be wanted. "From this time," such were the words of the decrees*, "until that the enemies shall be driven from the territory of the republic, every Frenchman shall be in permanent requisition for the service of the armies. The young men shall go forth to battle; the married men shall forge the arms, and convey the supplies to their destination; the women shall make tents and clothes, and attend in the hospitals; the children shall convert rags into lint; the aged men shall resort to public places, to animate the courage of the warriors, to preach up hatred of regal government and the strongest regard for the republic."

All young unmarried men, or widowers without family, from the age of eighteen to forty-five, were to form the first levy, styled the *first requisition*. They were to assemble forthwith, not in the chief towns of the departments, but in those of the district; for ever since federalism had demonstrated itself, there was a dislike of these great departmental assemblies, which gave them a notion of their own strength, and suggested the idea of a revolt. Moreover, there was another reason for adopting this course, and that was the difficulty of procuring in the chief towns the necessary articles of consumption, and the requisite provisions for such vast masses of people. The battalions which were formed in the chief towns were to enter upon their military training forthwith, and to hold themselves in readiness to depart at a day's notice. That class of men who were from twenty-five years to thirty had notice to hold itself in readiness, and in the mean time was employed upon service in the interior. Lastly, the remaining class, from thirty to sixty, were disposable at the option of the representatives sent to effect this graduated levy. Notwithstanding these general arrangements, an instantaneous levy *en masse*, including the whole population, was imperatively ordered in certain more exposed places, such as La Vendée, Lyons, Toulon, the Rhine, &c.

The means adopted for arming, billeting, and providing for the levies, were in conformity to circumstances. All horses and beasts not absolutely required for agricultural and manufacturing purposes were demanded, and placed at the disposal of the commissariats. The class ordered to march was to be provided with muskets; fowling-pieces and pikes were reserved for the service of the interior. In those departments where manufactures of arms could be established, the squares, public promenades, and those mansions which were national property, were to serve for the erection of factories. The principal establishment of this nature was appointed at Paris. Smiths' forges were placed in the gardens of the Luxembourg, and machinery for boring cannon on the banks of the Seine. Every working gunsmith was put in requisition, as well as journeymen clockmakers, as they at that time were mostly out of work, and also could be made useful in certain parts of the manufacture of arms. Thirty millions were placed at the disposal of the minister of war, for the sole purposes of this manufacture; and these extraordinary means were to be applied until the manufacture could furnish a thousand muskets a day. This vast establishment was planted at Paris, because at that place no negligence could escape the scrutinizing eyes of the Jacobins, and they were thus assured that the most extraordinary exertions would be called into operation to ensure celerity and diligence. In point of fact, this manufactory was not long in effectuating the purposes of its establishment.

As there was a deficiency of saltpetre, it was suggested that it might be obtained from the mold of excavated cellars. It was therefore resolved to cause all of them to be inspected, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the earth out of which they were excavated furnished any particle of that substance. In consequence, every individual was compelled to undergo the visitation, and the digging in his cellars, for the purpose of lixiviating the earth whenever it contained saltpetre. The houses which had become the national property were appropriated as barracks and magazines.

In order to procure the necessary articles of consumption for these great armed masses, several measures were adopted, not less extraordinary than the preceding. The Jacobins had been desirous that, after a general report had been made of the articles of consumption, the republic should purchase them all, and thus have the distribution of them, were it by victualling the army, or by sale to other citizens at a reasonable rate. This desire to perform every thing, to supersede nature herself when she does not answer our inclinations, was not so blindly pursued as the Jacobins themselves desired. However, it was settled that the tabular statements of articles of consumption already called for from the municipalities should be immediately made up and despatched to the minister of the interior, for the purpose of furnishing a general statistic of the things required and the means of their supply; that the threshing of corn should be finished wherever it had been omitted or postponed, and that the municipalities should thresh it out themselves if individuals refused so to do; that the farmers or proprietors of corn should pay up their taxes in arrear, as well as two-thirds of those due for the year 1793, in kind; and, in short, that the farmers and bailiffs of the recently acquired national property should pay their rents also in kind. The execution of these extraordinary measures could not be otherwise than extraordinary. It would

* 23rd of August.

neither have suited the nature of the measures decreed or the emergency itself, for the convention to have availed herself of limited powers entrusted to local authorities, who might, at every step, have been overwhelmed with opposition, and who, besides, would not all of them have possessed either the same uniformity of devotion and energy; the dictatorship exercised by the commissaries of the convention was in this instance the sole available means that could be put in operation. They had been already called into operation in respect of the first levy of the three hundred thousand men decreed in March, and they had promptly and effectually fulfilled the object of their appointment. These commissaries, who were despatched to the armies, kept a close watch upon the generals and their movements; and though they sometimes put themselves in opposition to consummate military commanders, yet they everywhere excited zeal for the cause, and communicated most vigorous resolves. When shut up in fortresses, they had suffered in the heroic sieges of Valenciennes and Mentz; when distributed throughout the interior, they had mainly contributed to stifle federalism. They were, then, upon this occasion, again called into action, and were endowed with unlimited powers, in order to execute this forced supply of men and necessaries. As they had under their command the commissaries of the primary assemblies, and could direct them according to their discretion, and depute to them a portion of their authorities, they had the absolute disposal of men devoted to the service, perfectly acquainted with the state of each district, and possessing no other authority but what had been imparted to them for the express purposes of this extraordinary service.

There had been several representatives despatched into the interior, either to La Vendée, or to Lyons and to Grenoble, to accomplish the final destruction of federalism. There were now appointed eighteen more, who were commissioned to distribute themselves in certain districts of France, and to apply themselves, in conjunction with those previously appointed, towards putting in motion the young men of the first requisition, arming and victualling them, and sending them off to the most suitable stations under the advice and requirement of the generals. Furthermore, they were commissioned to effect the absolute subjection of the federalist administrations.

In addition to these military plans, it became necessary to settle some scheme of financial operations, to provide for the expenses of the war. We have seen how France was circumstanced in this respect. A confused national debt, composed of debts of every description, of every date, and those debts acting detrimentally to the debts contracted by the republic; depreciated assignats, operated upon by their being put in competition with money, foreign paper, and shares of financial companies no longer available to government for payment of public services or to the people for the necessaries of which they stood in need: such, then, was our situation. What were we to do under such circumstances? Were we to effect a loan or issue assignats? To effect a loan was impracticable in the present confused state of our national debt and in the low state of credit the engagements of the republic then were. To issue assignats was easy enough, and, indeed, all that was requisite for that purpose was the national printing-house. But before the most petty expenses could be liquidated, vast quantities of paper must be issued; that is to say, five or six times more than its nominal value; and by this very act, the great distress attendant upon its depreciation would necessarily be increased, and another rise in the price of articles of consumption would be the consequence. We now are about to see what suggestions the law of necessity imparted to those men upon whom the salvation of France rested.

The first and most indispensable measure was to arrange and methodize the national debt, and to reduce it to some uniformity, so that it should no longer consist of loan contracts of every species and date, which also, by reason of their differences of origin and nature, maintained a dangerous and counter-revolutionary kind of stock-jobbing. The very knowledge of these old titles, their identification, and their classification, required a peculiar information, and introduced a most frightful complication in their statement. It was only at Paris that the dividends were payable, and not unfrequently the sub-division of the share into numerous parts compelled the public creditor to apply to twenty different pay-clerks. There was the constitutional debt, the debt redeemable at a fixed period, and the debt redeemable by instalments; and in this manner the public treasury was daily exposed to the calls for these redemptions, and compelled to negotiate for fresh capital to pay off the loans thus falling due. "We must reduce this debt to one system of uniformity, and republicanise it," said Cambon; his proposal was the consolidation of all the claims of the public creditors into one stock, to be as one inscription in one book, which should be called "The Great Book of the Public Debt." This inscription, and the note from it which was to be delivered to the stock-holders, was to constitute from that period their only title. To obviate any anxiety as to the custody of this book, it was to be deposited in duplicate in the archives of the treasury; so far it was not more liable to exposure or accidents than the notarial registers. The stock-holders, therefore, were required within a specified period, to transmit their titles, that they might be then duly entered and then subsequently burnt. The notaries were ordered to bring thither all the titles of which they were the depositaries, and they were to be punishable by ten years' imprisonment if before they transmitted them they either preserved or delivered copies. If the stock-holder permitted six months to elapse without making his inscription, he lost the interest; if he suffered a year to pass, he was absolutely excluded and lost his capital. "In this manner," said Cambon, "the debt contracted by despotism can no longer be distinguished from that contracted since the revolution, and I defy *Monseigneur le despotisme*, if he were to revive again, to recognise his old debt, since it is blended with the new. This operation accomplished, you will see the capitalist who desires a king, because he has a king for his debtor, and who also is fearful of losing his stock if his debtor be not restored, become a wellwisher for the republic who will have become his debtor, for this simple reason, he will be fearful that if the republic is lost, his capital will also be lost."

This was not the only advantage derivable from this institution; others quite as important resulted from it, and laid the foundation of a system of public credit. The capital of each credit was converted into a perpetual rent at the rate of five per cent. Thus the creditor of a sum of one thousand francs was inscribed in the Great Book for an annual payment of fifty francs. In this manner the former debts, some of which bore enormous interest, while others were liable to unjust deductions, or were saddled with certain taxes, were restored to one uniform and equitable rate of interest. The state commuting its debt into a perpetual annuity, became no longer exposed to calls for redemption, and never could be compelled to repay the capital so long as it paid up the interest. Moreover, an easy and advantageous expedient of redemption was discovered, and that was to repurchase the annuity the moment that it fell below par; thus, when an annuity of fifty livres of income derivable from one thousand francs capital was worth no more than nine or eight hundred livres, the state, according to Cambon, would gain a tenth or a fifth of the capital in repurchasing it at once. This mode of redemption was not yet fully matured by means of a sinking fund; but this scheme had partially suggested itself, and the knowledge of public finance was fast improving.

Thus the inscription upon the Great Book would simplify the form of titles, would identify the existence of the debt with that of the republic, and would commute the loans into a perpetual annuity, whereof the capital would never be redeemable, and whereof the interest was uniform howsoever the inscription was divided. This was a very simple idea, and partly borrowed from the English; but it required great nerve to apply this system to France: it also possessed the merit of being introduced at that particular juncture. Without doubt this was somewhat an arbitrary proceeding, but the effect was in this rough manner to change the nature of titles and credits, and bring back the interest to a single and uniform rate, and to inflict the penalty of forfeiture upon those stock-holders who dissented from this commutation; but in respect of the state it was effecting an act of justice of the most elevated character, and this great and energetic uniformity of the debt was perfectly consistent with a boldly carried out and perfect revolution, the great object of which was to render all considerations subservient to the rights of the community.

The scheme of Cambon associated with this bold act a scrupulous regard for all engagements made with foreigners, who had been promised repayment at fixed periods. This scheme provided that as the assignats possessed no currency out of France, foreign stock-holders should be paid in money and at determinate dates. Besides all this, the communes having contracted particular debts, thereby occasioning inconvenience to their unpaid creditors, the state was to take upon itself the discharge of their debts, and were only to take possession of their property as a security to the extent of the sums expended in their repayment. This plan was entirely adopted *, and was as well executed as it had been conceived. The capital of the debt, thus made uniform, was consolidated into annuities of two hundred millions per annum. It was thought necessary to make a substitution of the different kinds of old duties with which it had been encumbered, and thus to make it liable to a general duty of one fifth, which would reduce the payment of the interest to one hundred and sixty millions. It was thus that every thing was simplified and rendered intelligible. A grand source of stock-jobbing was put an end to, and confidence was restored, inasmuch as a partial bankruptcy with respect to this or that species of stock could no longer take place, and as to the entirety of the debt, a general bankruptcy was not so much as thought of.

From this period it became more easy to have recourse to a loan. We shall soon see how that measure was made subservient to the purpose of keeping up the price of the assignats.

The available property of which the revolution had the disposal in order to meet its extraordinary expenses, never consisted of any thing else than the national property. This available property as represented by the assignats floated in the circulating currency. It was therefore expedient to encourage sales for the purpose of calling in the assignats, and raising their price, by making them less common. Victories afforded a better, but not the most ready means to expedite the sales. To supply this deficiency of purchasers several expedients were devised. For instance: the purchasers had been allowed to distribute their payments over several years. But this measure, devised for the mere purpose of giving a preference to the peasants and making them freeholders, was rather a means of encouraging purchasers than of calling in the assignats. At last, in order to diminish more effectually the quantity in circulation, it was decided that the compensation-money for offices should be paid, partly in assignats and partly in *receipts of payment* (*reconnaissances de liquidation*). The compensations, amounting to less than three thousand francs, were to be paid off in assignats; the remainder were to be made in *receipts of payment*, which had no currency as money, and could not be divided in sums less than ten thousand livres, and, being transferable as other effects to bearer, were received in payment on the purchase of national property. By this means that portion of national property converted into forced currency would be diminished; for all that which had been transmuted into *receipts of payment* consisted of large sums, not easily transferable, fixed in the hands of the wealthy, and withdrawn from circulation and from being the subject of brokerage.

In order to still further promote the sale of the national property, it was declared, on the creation of the Great Book, that the inscriptions of annuities should be taken in half-payment for this property. This facility was expected to bring fresh purchasers and a further return of assignats.

But all these clever schemes were insufficient, and the bulk of the paper money was still too great. The constituent assembly, the legislative assembly, and the convention, had each in their turn decreed the creation of five thousand one hundred millions of assignats; four hundred and eighty-four millions had not yet been issued but remained in the treasury; therefore, there had not been circulated more than four thousand six hundred and sixteen

* 24th of August.

millions. Part had been called in by means of sales; and as the purchasers were enabled to take different terms for the payment, there still remained due, in respect of the purchases made, from twelve to fifteen millions. There had been returned, in all, eight hundred and forty millions of assignats, which had been burnt; consequently there remained in circulation in the month of August, 1793, three thousand seven hundred and seventy-six millions.

The first thing to be attended to was to strip those assignats which bore the king's head of their legal value; these had been bought up, and were very prejudicial to the republican assignats, by reason of the superior credit which attached upon them. Although they were thus deprived of their legal value, they did not cease to have a price; they were transmuted into bills payable to bearer, and could be taken in payment either of taxes, or in part of the purchase-money of the national domains up to the first of January ensuing. After that period, they were not to be considered as possessing any value whatever. These assignats amounted to five hundred and fifty-eight millions. This measure, consequently, caused their disappearance from circulation within four months; and as the fact was well known, that these were all in the hands of counter-revolutionary speculators, an act of justice was exhibited in not annulling them, but simply calling them into the treasury.

It will be recollected that, in the month of May, when it was a declared principle that revolutionary armies should be established, it was at the same time decreed, that there should be a compulsory loan of one thousand millions from the wealthy, for the purpose of defraying the charges of a war, of which they, as well as the aristocrats, were considered the originators, and to which they would neither devote their persons nor their fortunes. This loan, apportioned as we shall soon see, was applied, in furtherance of Cambon's scheme, to cause the withdrawal of one thousand million of assignats from circulation. To afford an option to the better-disposed citizens, and to present them some advantages, a benevolence (*emprunt volontaire*) was opened; those who presented themselves to fill it up, received in return an inscription of annuity at the rate already decreed of five per cent, and thus obtained an interest upon their capital. They were enabled, by virtue of this inscription, to exempt themselves from contributing to the compulsory loan, or, at least, to the extent of the amount they invested in the benevolence. Those wealthy individuals who were not favourably disposed towards the revolution, who waited for the forced loan, received a title which bore no interest, and, in point of fact, was nothing else than an inscription for an annuity, a republican title without the five per cent. Lastly, inasmuch as, after the new law, the inscriptions were available as a half-payment for national property, the voluntary lenders received in return an inscription for an annuity, with the power of obtaining immediate repayment in national property, while, on the other hand, the certificates of the compulsory loan were not to be taken in payment of the domains acquired until two years after the peace. It became necessary, so said the words of the bill, to make the wealthy feel an interest in the speedy termination of the war and the pacification of Europe.

The forced loan or benevolence ought to have called in one thousand millions of assignats, in order to be burnt. Moreover, there ought to have been returned, by payment of the taxes in arrear seven hundred millions, whereof five hundred and fifty-eight millions were in royal assignats already denuded of their value, and received solely in payment of duties. There was a certainty, therefore, in the first place, that in two or three months there would be withdrawn from circulation the thousand millions loan, and subsequently seven hundred millions of taxes. Thus the floating capital of three thousand seven hundred and seventy-six millions would be reduced to two thousand and seventy-six millions. Assuming, as was very probable, that the power of giving these inscriptions upon the national debt in exchange for national property would induce new purchases, it might fairly be presumed that in this way from five to six hundred millions would be cancelled. The sum total, therefore, would perhaps be still further reduced by fifteen or sixteen hundred millions. Thus, by reducing, at the present juncture, the whole of the floating capital of assignats to less than half, the assignats would regain their primitive value; the four hundred and eighty-four millions remaining in the treasury becoming capable of being turned to some account. The seven hundred millions cancelled by duties, and whereof five hundred and fifty-eight were to bear the symbol of the republic, and to be re-issued, would also, by this means, be restored to their original value, and could be employed for the service of the ensuing year. The assignats would, for the present, be raised, and that was the point to be gained. If the republic should get clear of her difficulties, a victory would at once bring them up to their standard value, and would thus afford an opportunity of making fresh issues, and realizing the national property yet undisposed of, which yet was of no small amount, and was daily increasing as a consequence of emigration.

The mode in which this compulsory loan was effected was, in its very nature, prompt, and of necessity arbitrary. How difficult is it to pass a correct and fair estimate upon property even in times of public tranquillity, taking also into consideration the concurrences of the period, and consulting all the ordinary contingencies! Therefore, how impracticable is it to do that in a time of violence and hurry, which it is difficult to perform even under the most favourable circumstances! But so long as there existed a necessity to disquiet the circumstances of so many persons, and to attack so many individuals, can it be wondered at if the republic were incurious as to the exact estimation of property, or nicely considered any inequalities of apportionment! For the purpose, therefore, of carrying out this scheme of a forced loan, a species of dictatorship had been established, as had been done in respect of the forced levies, and this dictatorship was vested in the communes. Every person was compellable to declare the exact amount of his income. The general council appointed examiners for each commune; these examiners made their assessments from their own local intelligence, if the declarations were consistent; and if there was reason to presume them false, they had the power to make a double assessment upon the

party. In estimating the income of each family, the sum of one thousand francs was allowed in advance for each individual, husband, wife, and family; all above that was considered surplus income, and, as such, subject to taxation. In respect of a taxable income, from one thousand to ten thousand francs of taxable income, the tax was one-tenth. One thousand francs of superfluous income paid one hundred francs; two thousand francs of superfluous income, two hundred francs; and so of the like. All superfluous income exceeding ten thousand francs was charged with a sum equal in amount. So that every family who, possessing an income beyond the one thousand francs allowed for each individual, and the ten thousand francs superfluous income subjected to the payment of the tenth, yet enjoyed an income beyond these sums, was compelled to pay the entire excess to this loan. Thus a family composed of five individuals, and worth fifty thousand livres income, had five thousand francs as deemed necessary for its subsistence, ten thousand francs chargeable with a tenth, reducing it to nine,—making, in the whole, fourteen thousand; and was, moreover, compelled, for that year, to give up the remaining thirty-six thousand francs either to the forced loan or the benevolence. It was not, after all, such a very hard measure, to take from the opulent classes the superfluous excess of a year's income, while so many individuals were going forth to perish upon the field of battle; and this sum, which, after all, could have been unconditionally seized as an indispensable war-tax, could be exchanged for a republican debenture, convertible either into government annuities or into portions of the national property*.

This gigantic operation consisted, therefore, in withdrawing from circulation a thousand millions of assignats, by abstracting so much from the opulent, by divesting this thousand million of its monetary quality and circulating value, and in constituting it a charge upon the national property, which the wealthy classes might, as they pleased, exchange for a corresponding portion of this property. So it was that they were compelled to become purchasers, or, at least, to furnish the same amount of assignats as they would have had to procure, had they been purchasers. In short, it was a compulsory investment to the extent of one thousand million of assignats.

In addition to these measures, all of them calculated to uphold the paper currency, others were superadded. After having annihilated the conflicting differences between the former state-loans and the assignats stamped with the king's head, it was quite as necessary to put an end to the competition of the shares in the stock-creating companies. An act was therefore passed for the abolition of the life insurance company, the discount and banking company, and, in short, of all those companies whose stock consisted of shares transferable without indorsement, in negotiable securities, in inscriptions or entries in a book, and passing from hand to hand. It was settled that they should close their accounts within a short period, and that, for the future, none other than the government should found these institutions. A prompt report was called for in respect of the East India Company, which, on account of the magnitude of its transactions, called for special inquiry. There was no putting a stop to the negotiation of outland bills, but those were declared traitors to the country of the French who invested their capital upon the banks or counting-houses of those countries with whom the republic was at war. Lastly, new severities were devised against money, and the gain derivable from its traffic. A penalty of six years' imprisonment had already been awarded against whomsoever should sell or purchase money, that is to say, who should either receive or pay it in exchange for other than the same sum in assignats; the same punishment had been enacted against every seller or purchaser of articles of consumption, who should stipulate for the price, having regard whether the payment was to be made in hard money or in assignats. As such transactions could hardly be reached, the legislature avenged itself by increasing the measure of punishment. Every individual convicted of having refused a payment tendered in assignats, or of having paid or received them at a rate below their nominal value, was liable to be fined three thousand livres, and to suffer imprisonment for six months, for the first offence, and for every subsequent offence, to double fine and twenty years' imprisonment. Lastly, as a metallic currency was indispensable in places of public sale and could not be readily supplied, it was ordered that the church-bells should be used for the coining of decimes, demi-decimes, &c. equivalent to two sous, one sou, &c. But whatever means might be employed for causing a rise in the value of assignats, and destroying those competitions which affected them so seriously, there was no reason to expect that they ever would be placed upon the same level with the price of commodities; therefore it became necessary to depress the latter by arbitrary means. Added to this, the people still believed that a spirit of malevolence was rife among the dealers in commodities; they believed that articles of consumption were engrossed, and whatever might be the notion entertained by legislators on this subject, they were unable to restrain, in this particular respect, a populace that, upon other occasions, they suffered to run wild at will. It therefore became a point of necessity to place commodities on the same footing as corn. An act was passed which made every species of monopoly a capital offence and punishable with death. The definition of an offender of this description was, *he who withdrew from circulation the necessaries of life*, without first offering them to sale. Those articles that were declared as *necessaries of life* were, bread, meat, corn, meal, vegetable productions, fruits, coal, wood, butter, tallow, hemp, flax, salt, leather, liquors, salted meats, cloth, wool, and all woven stuffs, save silks. The mode of putting such an act as this in execution was necessarily inquisitorial and vexatious. Preliminary declarations were to be made by every trader as to the bulk of his stores. These declarations were to be tested by domiciliary visits. Every fraud upon the act, or connivance at deception was, like the major offence, punishable with death. Commissaries, appointed by the communes, were authorized to certify the bills of parcels, and from the bills of

* The Decree for this forced loan bore date the 3rd of September.

parcels to fix a price which, by affording a moderate profit to the trader, should not exceed the sufficiency of the customer. If, however, added the act, the high price at which the goods were sold to the trader should render it impossible for him to realise a profit, the sale shall nevertheless take place at such price as the purchaser can best afford. Thus, according to this act, as in that which decreed the declaration of corn and its *maximum* price, it was left to the communes to assess the price according to the state of things in each locality. This soon led to a further generalization of these measures, and to render them more arbitrary as they proceeded.

The military, administrative, and financial operations of this period were conceived with as much accuracy as the state of affairs would permit, and certainly their vigour was commensurate with the peril. The entire population was at the disposal of the representatives, and were liable to be called out either to fight, to manufacture weapons, or to dress the wounded. All the former government debts, now transmuted into one republican debt, were exposed to the same fate, and were of no more value than the assignats. The multiplied competitions of the old loan contracts, royal assignats, shares of companies, were all done away with. Capital could no longer be invested in these privileged funds, as all were reduced to uniformity; as the assignats were cancelled, a thousand million was thus abstracted from the wealthy, which was transmuted from being a state currency to a mere charge upon the national property. Lastly, in order to establish a compulsory relation between money and the necessaries of life, the government burdened the communes with the charge of providing all necessary commodities and goods of every description, and of selling them again at a reasonable price in each district. Never did any government at once adopt measures so gigantic or so boldly devised; and before we ought to accuse their originators of violence, we must put out of the question the danger of an universal invasion that then threatened, and the necessity cast upon them of living upon the unpurchased national property. The entire system of compulsory measures owed its origin to these two causes. At the present day, a superficial and ungrateful age is inclined to judge harshly of these operations, considers some too arbitrary, deems others contrary to sound principles of political economy, and joins the folly of ingratitude to that of utter ignorance of the period we are now relating, and the real state of affairs at that time. Let us abide by the facts, and thus render justice to those men who underwent such labours and perils to ensure our salvation.

Consequent upon these general administrative and financial measures, others were adopted more particularly appropriated for each theatre of war. The extraordinary measures which had for a long time been resolved upon with regard to La Vendée were at last decreed. The character of such measures was in the mean time well understood. The forces of the rebellion did not consist of disciplined troops, which could be annihilated by repeated victories over them, but consisted of a people who, apparently of a peaceable character and simple agriculturists, rose up as one man upon a given signal, and then overwhelmed by sheer numerical force, and took by surprise the republican armies by its unforeseen mode of attack; this people also, in case of defeat, concealed themselves in the woods and in the country round about, and resumed those occupations which prevented the soldier being distinguished from the peasant. An obstinate struggle lasting for upwards of six months, risings of the people, sometimes amounting to a hundred thousand men, exploits of the greatest hardihood, a formidable reputation, and a confirmed notion that this civil and destructive war was the greatest peril the revolution had to encounter,—all these things called loudly for the government to turn its attention to La Vendée, and to suggest in that behalf the execution of the most energetic and exasperated measures. An opinion had long been expressed that the only method of bringing this unhappy country back to its obedience, was not to contend with it, but to ensure its utter destruction, since its armies were never to be found and yet existed every where. These views were evidently the groundwork of a fundamental decree, wherein La Vendée, the last of the Bourbons, and all foreigners, were at one stroke of the pen doomed to extermination. As a consequence of this decree the minister of war was required to send into the revolted countries, combustibles in order to set fire to the woods, the copses, and the bushes. "The forests," so said this decree, "shall be laid open, the haunts of the rebels shall be destroyed, the crops shall be cut down by gangs of labourers, the cattle shall be seized and every thing carried out of the country. The old men, women, and children, shall be removed from the country, and then shall be provided for as humanity requires." It was furthermore enjoined the general and the representatives in commission, to take the necessary steps for provisioning a great body of people, and immediately after that had been done, to call out from the neighbouring departments, not a mere graduated levy as in other parts of France, but a sudden and general levy, and thus pour forth one population against another. The men chosen for this purpose were well adapted for carrying out these measures. We have seen how Biron, Berthier, Menou, and Westermann, were compromised and displaced, merely for having enforced good order and discipline, and how Rossignol, the man who promoted insubordination, was released from prison by ministerial agency. The triumph of the Jacobinical system was complete. Rossignol, from being a mere commander of a battalion, was all of a sudden appointed a commander-in-chief of the army on the coast of Rochelle. Ronsin, the principal of those ministerial agents who introduced into La Vendée all the bad feelings of the Jacobins, and who maintained the notion that there was no necessity for experienced generals, but that pure republicans were all that were wanted, and that a war conducted upon regular principles was not necessary, but solely a war of extermination, that every new enlisted man became a soldier, and that every soldier was qualified to become a general; Ronsin, the principal of these ministerial creatures, was in four days made a captain, commander of a company of artillery, and a general of brigade, and was associated with Rossignol with all the powers of the minister himself, in order to preside over the execution of this

new systematic feature in war. It was also ordered that the garrison of Mentz should be conveyed post-haste from the Rhine to La Vendée. So great had been the universal jealousy, that the commanders of this brave garrison had been put under arrest, for having entered into a capitulation. Fortunately for them, the brave Merlin, who always commanded the attention due to his heroic character, offered his testimony to their self-devotion and courage. Kléber and Aubert-Dubayet were restored to their soldiers, who were about to rescue them by main force, and they repaired to La Vendée, where there was ample need of their talents to retrieve the misfortunes caused by the ministerial agents. It is a truth which cannot be too often repeated, that strongly excited feeling acts without judgment or foresight, but yet nothing short of this excitement can save nations in urgent extremities. The appointment of Rossignol was an act of foolhardiness, but yet it indicated a course firmly resolved upon; it no longer allowed half measures in this disastrous war with La Vendée, and it compelled all those local administrations who had not yet declared themselves, to choose at once the side they intended to take. Those fiery Jacobins that were distributed throughout the armies caused great confusion, but they imparted that resolute energy, without which they would never have had either equipment, victualling, or necessaries of any description. So far as concerned the generals, their conduct was perversely unjust, but they never suffered any one to falter or waver. We shall soon see that their hot-headed intemperance, when combined with the discretion of men of greater sedateness than themselves, produced the greatest and most fortunate results.

Kilmaine, who had conducted that admirable retreat which had saved the army of the North, was forthwith replaced by Houchard the late general of the army of the Moselle, and possessed of high reputation for his courage and devotion to the cause. Some alteration had taken place in the committee of public welfare. Thuriot and Gasparin resigned on account of ill health. One of them was replaced by Robespierre, who thus pushed his way into the government, and whose enormous influence was thus acknowledged and submitted to by the convention, who, up to this period, had never placed him in any committee. The successor of the other was the celebrated Carnot, who already, as a commissary sent to the army of the North, had acquired the character of an able and intelligent military officer.

To all these administrative and military designs were added measures having revenge for their object, according to the old plan of following up energetic exploits by acts of cruelty. We have already seen that, on the requisition of the commissaries of the primary assemblies, a law against suspected characters had been resolved upon. The draught bill had only to be brought in. It was every day called for, inasmuch as the decree of the 27th of March, so they said, which outlawed all aristocrats, did not go far enough. That decree required a trial of the party suspected, but now an act was called for which should allow the imprisonment, without trial, of citizens whose opinions had rendered them suspected, merely for the purpose of securing their persons. While this act was being passed, it was decided that the property of all those who were outlawed should belong to the republic. Subsequently, still more severe enactments were called for against foreigners. Already had they been placed under the superintendence of those committees who styled themselves revolutionary, but yet more than that was required. The notion of a foreign combination, supposed to have originated with Pitt, absorbed more than ever the public mind. A letter case found upon the ramparts of one of our frontier towns, contained some letters written in English, and which English spies in France had addressed to each other. Enquiries were made in these letters as to considerable sums remitted from spies dispersed in our camps, our fortified towns, and our principal cities. Some were commissioned to obtain an intimacy with the generals for the purpose of seducing them, to obtain precise information as to the state of our armies, our fortresses, and the state of our victualling department; others were instructed to obtain access to our arsenals and our stores, and set them on fire with phosphoric matches. "Get up the exchange," said these letters, "to two hundred livres for one pound sterling. The assignats must be depreciated in every practicable manner, and refuse all those which do not bear the king's head. Get up the price of all sorts of provisions, employ your merchants to buy up all articles constituting the necessaries of life. If you can, persuade Cott . . . i to purchase tallow and candles at any price, and charge them to the public as high as five francs the pound. My lord is highly satisfied in the way B. t. z. has acted. We hope that the assassins will conduct themselves with prudence. Priests in disguise and women are more fit to carry out this plan of operation."

All that these letters demonstrated, came to no more than that England had some military spies in our armies, and some agents in our commercial towns, for the purpose of aggravating the distress occasioned by the dearth, and that perhaps some of them might have taken money under the pretence of committing some convenient assassinations. But all these things were far from being in themselves alarming, and certainly were extremely magnified by the common boasting of the agents employed in this description of intrigue. True it certainly was, that fires had burst out at Douay, at Valenciennes, at the sail-cloth-manufactories of Lorient, at Bayonne, and at the parks of artillery near Chemillé and Saumur. It may be possible that these agents had been the originators of these fires, but certain it is, they had not pointed the dagger of the life-guardsman Pâris against Lepelletier, or that of Charlotte Corday against Marat, and if they did speculate as stock-jobbers upon foreign paper and assignats, and even if they did make some purchases of commodities upon a credit opened at London by Pitt, their influence upon our commercial and financial situation, which depended upon more general and important causes than these contemptible intrigues, was very slight indeed. However, the discovery of these letters taking place at the same time with these fires, two assassinations, and the speculation in foreign bills, excited a general indignation. The convention issued a decree, condemnatory of the English go-

vernment, and declaring Pitt to be the enemy of the human race. At the same time it was ordered that all foreigners domiciliated in France since the 14th of July 1789, should be forthwith put under arrest *.

At last it was decreed, that the proceedings against Custine should be brought to a conclusion. Biron and Lamarche were also put upon their trial. The impeachment of the Girondists was again urged forward, and orders were given to the revolutionary tribunal to institute the process against them with the least possible delay. Lastly, the wrath of the assembly was directed against the remaining Bourbons, as also against that unfortunate family who mourned in the tower of the Temple the death of the late king. It was decreed that all those Bourbons then remaining in France, should be banished, save those who were under the sword of the law †; that the Duke of Orleans, who had been transferred in the month of May to Marseilles, and whom the Federalists had shewn a reluctance to try, should be brought back to Paris, to appear before the revolutionary tribunal. His death should serve for a reply to those who would accuse the Mountain of desiring to make him king. The unhappy Marie-Antoinette, notwithstanding her sex, was like her husband devoted to the scaffold. She was supposed to have been the promoter of the intrigues of the old court, and was deemed as much more to blame than Louis XVI. Above all, she had the misfortune of being the daughter of Austria, at this moment the enemy most to be feared of all the foreign powers. Following the usual course of most boldly defying their most powerful enemy, a strong desire existed in the people, that the head of Marie Antoinette should fall the very instant the imperialist armies should set foot upon our territories. She was therefore transferred to the Conciergerie to be tried as an ordinary culprit by the revolutionary tribunal. Madame Elizabeth, who was to be banished, was detained to appear as a witness against her sister. The two children were to be brought up and educated by the republic, who was to settle when peace should have been established what was then to be done with them. Hitherto the establishment of the Temple had been conducted upon a certain scale which corresponded with the rank of the imprisoned family. It was now decreed that no more than what was actually necessary should be allowed. In short, to crown all these acts of revolutionary vengeance, it was decreed that the royal tombs at Saint-Denis should be destroyed.

Such were the measures which the imminent dangers of the month of August 1793, called forth in aid of the defence and for wreaking the vengeance of the revolution.

* Decree of the 1st of August. † 1st of August.

CHAPTER XIII.

MOVEMENT OF THE ARMIES IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 1793—INVESTMENT OF LYONS BY THE ARMY OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION—TOULON BETRAYED BY THE INHABITANTS, AND SURRENDERED BY THEM TO THE ENGLISH—FORTY THOUSAND VENDÉANS DEFEATED AT LUÇON—THE GENERAL PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST LA VENDÉE—DISSENSIONS BETWEEN THE GENERALS ON THIS THEATRE OF WAR—MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH—DUNKIRK SEIZED BY THE DUKE OF YORK—VICTORY OF HONDSCHOOTE—THE GENERAL REJOICING WHICH IT OCCASIONS IN FRANCE—FRESH REVERSES—DEFEATS OF MENIN, FIRMASENS, PERPIGNAN, AND AT TORFOU IN LA VENDÉE—CARCLAUX RETREATS UPON NANTES—ATTACKS MADE UPON THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC WELFARE—A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED—DECREE ORGANISING A REVOLUTIONARY ARMY OF SIX THOUSAND MEN—LAWS AGAINST SUSPECTED PERSONS—DICTATORIAL POWER CONCENTRED IN THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC WELFARE—THE PROCEDURE AGAINST CUSTINE; HIS CONDEMNATION AND EXECUTION.—IMPEACHMENT OF THE GIRONDISTS; ARREST OF SEVENTY-THREE MEMBERS OF THE CONVENTION.

After the retreat of the French from Cæsar's camp to the camp of Gavrelle, the allies should have followed up an irregular army, which from the opening of the campaign had been constantly unsuccessful. In fact, from the month of March, after having been beaten at Aix-la-Chapelle and at Neerwinden, it had lost Dutch Flanders, Belgium, Cæsar's camp, the camp at Famars, and the fortresses of Condé and Valenciennes. One of its generals had gone over to the enemy, and another had been slain. Thus ever since the battle of Jemmappes there had been nothing but a succession of retreats, certainly well-managed, but by no means likely to impart confidence in the army. Without even taking into consideration the question of marching to Paris, in itself a fool-hardy design, the allies could well have destroyed this nucleus of an army, and then they would have experienced no obstruction whatever, in taking all those strong places which it suited their selfish policy to occupy. But immediately after the taking of Valenciennes, the English, by virtue of the treaties made at Antwerp, now required that siege should be laid to Dunkirk. Then it was, while the prince of Cobourg, remaining in the neighbourhood of his camp of Hérin, between the rivers Scarpe and Scheldt, intended to engage the French, and was considering how to effect the recapture of Quesnoy, that the duke of York, on his march with the English and Hanoverian army by Orchies, Menin, Dixmude, and Furnes, sat down before Dunkirk between the Langmoor and the sea. The carrying on of two sieges, therefore, gave us a little breathing time. Houchard, who had been despatched to Gavrelle, mustered thither every disposable force, so as to enable him to fly to the relief of Dunkirk. To deprive the English of a seaport on the continent, to beat single-handed our most powerful enemies, to prevent their acquiring the slightest advantage from this war, and at the same time to strengthen the English opposi-

tion against Pitt, were the reasons which induced them to consider Dunkirk as the most important point of the entire theatre of the war. "The welfare of the republic is identified with the place," wrote Houchard to the committee of public welfare; and Carnot feeling perfectly convinced that the troops collected between the frontier of the north and that of the Rhine, that is to say, on the Moselle, were ineffective there, decided that a reinforcement should be drawn from them to be dispatched into Flanders. Twenty or twenty-five days thus passed away in making preparations, a delay that well might be accounted for on the part of the French, who had to collect together their troops at great distances from each other, but utterly unaccountable on the part of the English, who had only four or five days' march to make in order to bring them under the walls of Dunkirk.

We left our two armies of the Moselle and Rhine doing their best to advance, but too late, towards Mentz, and not coming up in time to prevent the capture of that fortress. Subsequently, they had fallen back upon Saarbruck, Hornbach and Weissenburg. We must give the reader some notion of the theatre of war that he may better comprehend these various movements. The French frontier presents a singular delineation of boundary on the north and east. The Scheldt, the Meuse, the Moselle, the chain of the Vosges and the Rhine converge towards the north, forming nearly parallel lines. The Rhine when it arrives at the termination of the Vosges makes a sudden bend, no longer running in a parallel with these lines, and terminates them by flowing round the base of the Vosges, receiving the Moselle and the Meuse in its course. The allies upon the northern frontiers had advanced between the Scheldt and the Meuse, but had made no progress between the Meuse and the Moselle, because the inefficient corps left by them between Luxembourg and Trèves had been unable to attempt any thing, but they possessed more strength between the Moselle, the Vosges, and the Rhine. We have already observed that they were posted *a cheval* upon the Vosges, partly on the eastern slope and partly upon the western. The plan that should have been followed as we formerly intimated was simple enough. In considering the ridge of the Vosges as a river whereof all the passages were to be occupied, the entire masses could be brought to bear upon one slope so as to overpower the enemy on one side, and then return so as to overwhelm him on the other. Neither the French or the allies ever once thought of this, and ever since the capture of Mentz, the Prussians placed upon the western slope, were directly opposite to the army of the Rhine. We had retired within the famous lines of Weissenburg. The army of the Moselle, amounting to twenty thousand men, was posted at Saarbruck upon the Sarre, the division of the Vosges amounting to twelve thousand was stationed at Hornbach and Kettrick, and communicated by the mountains with the left extremity of the army of the Rhine. The army of the Rhine, forty thousand strong, protected the river Lautre all the way from Weissenburg to Lauterburg. These form the lines of Weissenburg; the Savre runs from the Vosges to the Moselle, the Lauter from the Vosges to the Rhine, and these two rivers both form a single line, which almost perpendicularly bisects the Moselle, the Vosges, and the Rhine. The mastery of this line could be obtained by occupying Saarbruck, Hornbach, Kettrick, Weissenburg, and Lauterburg, and it was this that we had accomplished. We had scarcely sixty thousand men upon the whole of this frontier, because we had been obliged to send assistance to Houchard. The Prussians had been two months in coming up towards us, and at last brought up at Pirmasens. Reinforced as they were by forty thousand men who had just brought the siege of Mentz to an end, and joined by the Austrians, they might have completely overwhelmed us on either of the two slopes, but there was an absence of cordiality between Prussia and Austria by reason of the partition of Poland. Frederic William, who still remained in the camp of the Vosges, by no means responded to the fervid impatience of Wurmser; this man, who despite of his age retained his natural impetuosity, was every day making some fresh attack upon the lines of Weissenburg, but his attacks confined to a single point were unsuccessful, and only caused a useless slaughter of our soldiers. Such therefore was the state of things upon the Rhine in the early part of September.

In the south, events were demonstrating their effects. The protracted uncertainty of the Lyonnese had at last ended in an open defiance, and the siege of their city had been determined upon. We have already remarked upon the offer they made of submitting themselves and recognizing the constitution, but reserving their intentions as to the decrees which required them to send the imprisoned patriots to Paris, as well as to dissolve the newly constituted authority of the sections. They had indeed displayed their disobedience to these decrees in the most striking manner, by sending Chalier and Riard to the scaffold, by making daily preparations for war, by appropriating the public money, and in detaining the supplies despatched for the armies. Numerous partisans of the emigration party had gained admittance among them, and inspired them with a horror of the former *Mountainner* municipal authorities. Moreover, they held out strong hopes of the arrival of the Marseillais, who, as they said, were coming up the Rhône, as well as of the advance of the Piedmontese, who were about to debouch from the Alps with sixty thousand men. Although the Lyonnese, who were staunch federalists, hated both foreign powers and emigrants, yet the Mountain and the old municipal authorities had caused such terror that they were rather desirous of exposing themselves to the hazard and infamy of a foreign alliance than to the vengeance of the convention.

The Saône, which runs between the Jura and the Côte-d'Or and the Rhône, taking its course from the Valais between the Jura and the Alps, both unite at Lyons. This wealthy city is therefore placed upon the confluence of these two rivers. Following the course of the Saône in the neighbourhood of Mâcon, the country was entirely republican, and the deputies La Porte and Reverchon having got together some thousand of the requisitionaries, cut off all communication with the Jura.

Dubois-Cranté with his reserve of the army of the Savoy was on his way from the quarter of the Alps, and protected the upper course of the Rhine, but the Lyonnese made themselves entirely masters of the lower course of the river, and of its right bank up to the mountains of the Auvergne. They also had the entire control of the Forez, making frequent incursions therein, and had recently obtained a supply of arms from St. Etienne. An eminent engineer had erected some good fortifications, and a foreigner had cast some pieces of ordnance for their batteries. The population consisted of two divisions: the young men accompanied the commandant Précy in his excursive attacks; the married men and fathers of families protected the city and its fortifications.

At length on the 8th of August, Dubois-Cranté, who had quelled the revolt of the federalists of Grenoble, put himself in marching condition against Lyons, in pursuance of the decree which commanded him to reduce this rebellious city to obedience. The army of the Alps amounted altogether to not more than twenty-five thousand men, and was soon about to have to deal with the Piedmontese, who, taking advantage of the month of August, prepared for their debouche by the grand chain of the Alps. This army, we have just observed, had just been reduced by the two detachments despatched for the reinforcement of the army of Italy, and the suppression of the Marseillais.

The Puy-de-Dôme, who was to furnish its quota of recruits, had retained them for the purpose of suppressing the revolt of the Lozère, a subject we have already noticed. Houchard had kept back the legion of the Rhine which had been appointed for the Alps; and the ministry were constantly holding out promises of a reinforcement of a thousand horse, which after all never came. However, Dubois-Cranté formed a company of five thousand regular troops, and added to them seven or eight thousand young requisitionaries. With this force he managed to station himself between the Saône and the Rhône so as to occupy the upper course of these rivers and intercept the supplies coming to Lyons by water, to maintain his line of communication with the army of the Alps, and to cut off the communication the besieged possessed with Switzerland and the Savoy. By these arrangements he constantly left the Forez open to the Lyonnese, and what was more, the important heights of Fourvieres; but his situation hardly permitted him to act otherwise than as he did. The most material point was to gain possession of the two streams, and thus cut off all communication between Lyons and Switzerland and Piedmont. Dubois-Cranté had, to wait some time before he could effectuate the blockade, for the new forces which had been promised him, as well as the siege-ordnance which had to be drawn from our fortresses in the Alps. The conveyance of this ordnance required five thousand horses.

On the 8th of August he summoned the town to surrender; the conditions he named were the absolute submission of all the citizens, their shutting themselves up in their houses, the surrender of the arsenal, and the formation of a provisional municipality. But at this juncture the concealed emigrants who were in the commission and the staff, renewed their deception upon the Lyonnese, by frightening them with the idea of the restoration of the *Mountainer* municipality, and by informing them that sixty thousand Piedmontese were about to debouche upon their city. An engagement which took place between two advanced posts, and terminated in favour of the Lyonnese, animated them to the greatest excess, and induced them to defend the place and thus decide their fate. Dubois-Cranté began his cannonade upon the quarter of the Croix-Russe, between the two rivers, where he had taken up his position, and from the day that he began his fire committed the greatest devastation. Thus one of the most important of our manufacturing towns was reduced to the horrors of a bombardment, and we had to carry this bombardment into execution in sight of the Piedmontese, who were coming down from the Alps.

While these things were taking place, Carteaux had marched against Marseilles, and had crossed the Durance in the month of August. The Marseillais had retreated from Aix to their own city, and had made up their minds to defend the passes of Septèmes, crossed by the road from Aix to Marseilles. On the 24th General Doppet attacked them with the advanced guard of Carteaux; the action was very hot, but one section who had always been opposed to the other, passed over to the side of the republicans and decided the combat in their favour. The passes were carried by storm, and on the 25th Carteaux entered Marseilles with his small army.

This event decided another, the most disastrous of any that had yet oppressed the republic. The town of Toulon, which had always appeared actuated by the most violent republican feeling, so long as the municipality had been maintained there, had changed its political opinions under the newly constituted authority of the sections, and was about to undergo a change in its dominant party feeling. The Jacobins joining with the municipality, expressed themselves with the utmost violence against the aristocratic officers of the navy; they never ceased their complaints of the negligence and delay in repairing the squadron, of its being thus detained in port, and made a grand outcry for the punishment of those officers to whose misconduct they imputed the adverse issue of the Sardinian expedition. The moderate republicans of that place replied, as indeed they did on every other occasion, that none but senior officers were capable of undertaking the command of the squadrons, that the vessels could not be put in a state of reparation sooner than they were, that it would be extremely hazardous to send them out against the allied English and Spanish fleets, and that in short the officers against whom such an outcry was made were not traitors, but merely unsuccessful commanders. The moderate party carried the majority in the sections. The consequence of this was, that a swarm of underhanded agents intriguing for the emigrants as well as the English, immediately insinuated themselves into Toulon, and induced the inhabitants to go much further than they had at first intended. These agents put themselves in communication with admiral Hood, and were assured that the squadrons of the allied fleet who were hovering on the coasts, would be in readiness to show themselves on the first signal. The first

thing they did was to follow the example of the Lyonnese, by trying and executing one Sevestre, the president of the Jacobin club. The next thing they did was to restore the refractory priests to the exercise of their sacred functions, and cause to be disinterred and borne in triumph, the bones of some unfortunate persons who in the previous troubles had perished in the royalist cause. The committee of public welfare having ordered the squadron to intercept the vessels bound to Marseilles, so as to be better able to reduce that city, the Toulonnais prevented the execution of this order, and made a merit of it with the sections of Marseilles. They next began to speak of the dangers to which they were exposed in resisting the convention, of the necessity there was for protecting themselves against its vindictiveness, and as to the possibility of obtaining the assistance of England to proclaim Louis XVII. The paymaster of the navy was, so far as it could be made appear, the principal promoter of this conspiracy; he possessed himself of the public money, sent coastwise to obtain additional funds even so far as the department of the Herault, and wrote to Genoa requiring them to withhold the supplies, thus rendering the situation of Toulon still more critical. The staff officers had been changed; a naval officer involved in some accusation arising out of the Sardinian expedition, was released from prison, in order that he might assume the chief command of the town, an old life-guardsman had been placed at the head of the national guard, and the fortifications were entrusted to some returned emigrants, and lastly, they managed to secure admiral Trogoff, a foreigner on whom France had heaped favours. Under the pretence of negotiating an exchange of prisoners a communication was opened with admiral Hood, and at the very moment when Carteaux was about to enter Marseilles, when the general consternation was at its height in Toulon, and when eight or ten thousand provençals, the most anti-revolutionary of the country, had just taken refuge thither, then it was that they dared to make to the sections the shameful proposal of receiving the English, who were to occupy the place for the use, and in the name of Louis XVII. The navy, who were highly indignant, sent a deputation to the sections to remonstrate against the shameful act about to be committed. But the anti-revolutionists, as well Toulonnais as Marseillais, now more audacious than ever, turned a deaf ear to the expostulations of the navy, and ratified the proposition of the 29th of August, and thereupon immediately the signal agreed upon was given to the English. Admiral Trogoff putting himself at the head of those who were for giving up the port, signalled his squadron to near him by hoisting the white flag. The brave rear-admiral Saint-Julien at the same time declaring Trogoff a traitor, hoisted on board his own ship the signal of his assuming the chief command, and made an effort to rally round him such part of the navy as remained faithful to their service. But at this very moment the traitors, who were already in possession of the forts, threatened to burn Saint-Julien with his ships, he was therefore compelled to shear off with a few officers and sailors; every one else was hurried away without being made acquainted what was to be done with them. Admiral Hood, who had for a long time seemed uncertain how he should act, at length appeared, and under the pretence of taking the port of Toulon for the use in trust for Louis XVII. received possession for no other purpose, in fact, than to burn and destroy the town.

In the meantime, no movement whatever had demonstrated itself in the Pyrenees; in the West, measures were on foot to ensure the execution of the decrees of the convention.

We left the columns of Upper Vendée putting themselves in order at Angers, Saumur, and Niort. The Vendéans had during this interval seized upon the bridges of Cé, and such was the terror they inspired, that Saumur was placed in a state of siege. There was only the column of Luçon and Sables capable of acting on the offensive, and that column was commanded by one Tuncq, one of those generals reputed to belong to the military aristocracy, and whose dismissal Ronsin required at the hands of the ministry. There were with him the two representatives, Bourdon of the Oise, and Goupilleau of Fontenay, men whose political feelings were the same as his own, and entirely opposed to Ronsin and Rossignol. Goupilleau especially, from his being a native of the country, and by reason of his family connections, was induced to treat the inhabitants with indulgence, and to mitigate those severities which Ronsin and those about him were bent upon inflicting.

The Vendéans, who felt some anxiety at seeing the column of Luçon, resolved to put their forces, hitherto always successful, in array against it. They were particularly desirous of affording relief to the division of M. de Röirand, which stationed before Luçon, and standing detached between the two great armies of the Upper and Lower Vendée, was solely dependent upon its own resources and required support. In point of fact, during the early part of August, a few companies had been conveyed in the direction of Luçon, but they were effectually driven back by General Tuncq. They then resolved upon making a more decisive effort. MM. d'Elbée, de Lescure, de La Rochejaquelin, and Charette mustered forty thousand strong, and on the 14th August, again made their appearance in the environs of Luçon. Tuncq had scarcely six thousand men. M. de Lescure, confident in his numerical superiority, gave the fatal counsel that the republican army should be attacked on the plain; MM. de Lescure and Charette took the command of the left wing, M. d'Elbée the centre, and M. de La Rochejaquelin that of the right wing. MM. de Lescure and Charette pushed forward with great energy with the right wing, but on the centre the soldiers who had to measure their strength against regular troops did not well stand their ground; M. de La Rochejaquelin, who had missed his road, did not come up in good time to support the left wing. Then it was general Tuncq, bringing seasonably his light artillery to bear upon the centre, already prepared to turn their backs, spread utter confusion among them, and in a few minutes sent the whole body of Vendéans, amounting to forty thousand, to the right about. Nothing could have been worse for the Vendéans than the consequences of this action, for they lost the whole of their artillery, and retreated into the country in the utmost consternation.

At this very period the dismissal of General Tuncq, which had been sent down at the suggestion of Ronsin, came to hand. Bourdon and Goupilleau, who were highly indignant at this proceeding, still held themselves in command, and wrote to the convention in order to obtain a revocation of the minister's order, and made fresh complaints against the disorganizing party at Saumur, who, as they said, only caused general confusion, and were seeking to substitute ignorant demagogues for experienced generals. At this same time also it was, that Rossignol, who was reviewing several columns under his command, came to Luçon. The interview he there had with Tuncq, Goupilleau, and Bourdon consisted of nothing else but mutual reproach; notwithstanding two victories, he was dissatisfied, because they had engaged without first consulting him; for his opinion was, and so far he was right, that no engagement ought to have taken place before the armies had been entirely formed and put in order. They parted in the same mood, and immediately afterwards Bourdon and Goupilleau, being informed of some acts of extreme severity inflicted by Rossignol in the country, had the hardihood to issue an order for his removal from office. Upon this, those representatives who were at Saumur, being Merlin, Bourbotte, Choudieu, and Rewbell, quashed the order of Goupilleau and Bourdon, and restored Rossignol. The matter was taken before the convention, and Rossignol, who was confirmed anew, defeated his adversaries. Bourdon and Goupilleau were recalled, and Tuncq was suspended.

Such was the situation of affairs when the garrison of Mentz arrived in La Vendée. It now had to be settled what plan should be adopted, and on what quarter this efficient garrison should be brought to bear, that is to say, whether it should be attached to the army of La Rochelle, and placed under the orders of Rossignol, or should it go to the army of Brest, and be committed to Canclaux? This became a question. Either was for having the command of this garrison, as success was supposed to attend it wherever it was ordered. They came to the conclusion that the country should be overwhelmed by simultaneous attacks, which being directed upon every point of its circumference, would necessarily converge to the centre. But inasmuch as that column which would have the Mayençais would have to take a decidedly offensive part, and drive back the Vendéans upon the other columns, it became a matter for consideration to ascertain upon what point a repulse of the enemy would be most effectual for the object intended. Rossignol and his party maintained that the best course would be, to march the Mayençais to Saumur, so as to drive the Vendéans back upon the sea and upon the Lower Loire, where they would be utterly destroyed; that the columns of Angers and Saumur, too inefficient by themselves, would require the support of the Mayençais in action; that standing by themselves, they would be totally incapable of marching into the field, so as to co-operate with the other columns of Niort and Luçon; that they would not even be able to stop the Vendéans when driven back upon them, or prevent them from being dispersed over the interior; and that in short, by marching the Mayençais by Saumur, no time would be lost, while if they went by Nantes, they would be compelled to make a considerable circuit, and lose ten or fifteen days. Canclaux, on the other hand, was impressed with the dangerous consequences of leaving the sea open to the Vendéans. An English squadron had been just discovered in the offing of the west, and there was no doubt but that the English intended making a descent upon the Marais. Such was the general opinion; and although it turned out to be erroneous, it yet formed the general topic of conversation. However, the English had been recently sending a spy into Vendée. He had arrived thither in disguise, and enquired as to the names of the leaders, their available force, their intentions, and their ultimate object. So little was then known in Europe of the events that were then taking place in the interior of France! The Vendéans had replied by a request for money and ammunition, and by promising that they would bring fifty thousand men upon the point where it was resolved a descent should take place. Every design of this nature was still very remote; but yet in every quarter it was looked upon as immediately to take place. We must, therefore, said Canclaux, set the Mayençais in motion by Nantes, so as to cut off the sea from the Vendéans, and throw them back upon the upper country. Assuming that they would disperse themselves throughout the interior, added Canclaux, they would soon be destroyed; and as for losing time, that is not worth thinking about; for the army of Saumur could not be in an effective state for ten or twelve days, even if they had the Mayençais with them. One reason which was not openly avowed was, that the army of Mentz, regularly trained, and in good discipline, would much rather serve with experienced men, and would prefer Canclaux an experienced general to Rossignol who was inexperienced, as well as the army of Brest, known by the fame of its glorious achievements, to the army of Saumur, already notorious from its defeats. The representatives who were attached to the disciplinarian party were of the same opinion, and were fearful of compromising the character of the army of Mentz, by placing them in the midst of the jacobinical and disorderly soldiers of Saumur.

Philippeaux, who among the representatives was the most zealous opponent of Ronsin's party, repaired to Paris, and there obtained an order of the committee of public welfare in favour of Canclaux. Ronsin procured the revocation of this order, and it was finally settled that a council of war to be holden at Saumur should finally arrange the application of the forces. The council was holden on the 2nd of September, at which many representatives were present. There existed a great disagreement of opinions; Rossignol, who was very candid in his views, offered Canclaux to resign the command in his favour, if he was desirous of permitting the Mayençais to commence their operations by Saumur. However, the opinion of Canclaux had greatest weight; the Mayençais were attached to the army of Brest, and the principal attack was to be carried from the Upper to the Lower Vendée. The minutes of the plan were signed, and it was settled that upon a given day, they should start from Saumur, Nantes, the Sables, and Niort.

The Saumur party were extremely chagrined at

this arrangement. Rossiguol was energetic and sincere in his professions, but was inexperienced and weak in body; and although he might be a staunch partisan, he could never render any effective service. He himself did not feel so affronted as did his satellites, Ronsin, Momoro, and all the agents of the ministry. These latter wrote without delay to Paris, to make complaint of the injudicious step that had been taken, of the slanderous reports against the *sans-culotte* generals, and of the prejudices which had been instilled into the garrison of Mentz; they thereby demonstrating that there was no great reason to hope on their part that they would concur in the plan of the campaign arranged at Saumur. Ronsin suffered his ill-temper to get the better of him so far as to interrupt the delivery of stores to the Mentz troops, under the pretence that as this corps was passing over from the army of Rochelle to the army of Brest, it was the duty of the latter to furnish the provisions. The Mayençais set off without loss of time for Nantes, and Canclaux put every thing in order for carrying out the plan agreed upon in the early part of September.

Such had been the general course of things upon the various theatres of war during the months of August and September. We must now pursue the narrative of those great operations which were the consequences of these preparatives.

The duke of York had arrived before Dunkirk, with twenty-one thousand English and Hanoverians, and twelve thousand Austrians. Marshal Freytag was at Ost-Capelle, with sixteen thousand men, and the prince of Orange at Menin, with fifteen thousand Dutchmen; these two latter divisions were stationed at that place as an army of observation. The remainder of the allies dispersed in the neighbourhood of Quesnoy, and up to the Moselle, amounted to about one hundred thousand men. Thus one hundred and sixty, or one hundred and seventy thousand men were distributed over that immense line, their occupation consisting in laying siege to, and protecting all the passes upon that line. Carnot, who had begun to direct the operations of the French, had already settled in his own mind that this was not a case where every point was to be made the subject of a battle; but where an overwhelming mass should be opportunely brought to bear upon a decisive point. His advice had therefore been to convey thirty-five thousand men from the Moselle and the Rhine to the North. His counsel had been adopted, but no more than twelve thousand were able to reach Flanders. Nevertheless with this reinforcement and the various camps stationed at Gavrelle, Lisle, and Cassel, the French could have formed a mass of sixty thousand men, and in the scattered state in which the enemy then was discovered to be, they might have struck some severe blows. To be convinced of this, the reader has only to cast his eyes over the theatre of the war. In following the coast of Flanders towards France, you first find Furnes, and then Dunkirk. These two towns, bordered on one side by the sea, and on the other by the extended marshes of the Grande-Möer, have no communication with each other, save by a narrow strip of land. The Duke of York, who got thither by Furnes, which first presents itself to the party coming from Flanders, had placed himself upon this strip of land, between the Grande-Moër and the ocean, in order to lay siege to Dunkirk. Freytag's corps of observation was not situated at Furnes, so as to afford a protection to the rear of the besieging army; on the contrary, it was at a considerable distance, in the front of the marshes of Dunkirk, so as to cut off that assistance which might proceed from the interior of France. The Dutchmen under the command of the prince of Orange, stationed at Menin, three days' march from this point, were become of no use whatever. A mass of sixty thousand men, making a forced march between the Dutchmen and Freytag, might bear down upon Furnes in the rear of the duke of York, and thus, by a series of manœuvres between the three hostile divisions, might successively overwhelm Freytag, the duke of York, and the prince of Orange: for this manœuvre a single mass and forced marches were all that was requisite. But at that time, all that was thought of was to push forwards in front, by opposing to one detachment another detachment of equal calibre. However, the committee of public welfare had almost conceived the same plan. It had ordered the formation of a single division to march against Furnes. Houchard comprehended this idea at the moment it was given, but he did not retain it, and only thought of marching against Freytag, driving the latter upon the rear of the duke of York's army, and then doing his best to harass the operations of the besiegers.

While Houchard was hastening his preparations, Dunkirk was making a vigorous defence. General Souham, assisted by young Hoche, who conducted himself at this siege in an heroic manner, had already repelled numerous attacks. The besiegers experienced considerable difficulty in opening a trench in a sandy soil, at the bottom of which they came to water when they dug to three feet. The flotilla which was to have come down from the Thames to bombard the place never came, but, on the contrary, a French flotilla came out of Dunkirk, and laying broadside to the sea-shore, harassed the besiegers, who were pent up on their narrow strip of land, in want of water, and exposed to every possible danger. This was a case for hasty and decisive action, and it was the end of August. According to the old system of tactics, Houchard began his operations by making a movement against Menin, which only brought about a bloody and unprofitable battle. After having given this preliminary alarm, he advanced by various routes towards the course of the Yser, a small stream which lay between him and Freytag's corps of observation. Instead of getting between the corps of observation and the besiegers, he desired Hédouville to march against Rousbrugghe, merely for the purpose of harassing the retreat of Freytag to Furnes, while he himself went to meet Freytag in his van, by marching with his entire army by Houtkercke, Herséele, and Bambeke. Freytag had stationed his division upon a rather extended line, and he had but one portion of it about him when he received the first charge of Houchard. He made a stand at Herséele, but after sharp fighting, he was compelled to recross the Yser, and to fall back upon Bambeke, and from thence to retreat to Rexpœde and Killem. In thus retreating beyond the Yser, he left the wings of his army

much exposed in front. Walmoden's division got detached from him on his right, and his own retreat in the direction of Rousbrugghe was exposed to an attack from Hédouville.

Freytag then endeavoured, on the same day, to advance and recapture Rexpœde, in order to make it serve as a rallying point for Walmoden's division. He got to Rexpœde at the very instant the French were entering that village. A very sharp engagement ensued, and Freytag was wounded and made prisoner. In the meantime, towards evening, Houchard, who apprehended a night attack, got out of the village, and left behind him no more than three battalions. Walmoden, who was on his retreat with his shattered division, came up at the same time, and decided on vigorously attacking Rexpœde, to clear a passage for himself. A bloody contest took place in the middle of the night, the passage was cleared, Freytag rescued, and the enemy retired in a body to the village of Hondschoote. This village, situated opposite the Grand-Moër, and on the road to Furnes, was one of the points by which he must needs pass in his retreat to the latter place. Houchard had abandoned the principal intention of manœuvring in the direction of Furnes, between the besieging army and the army of observation: all that he could now do was constantly to keep pushing against the front of Marshal Freytag's army, and to throw himself impetuously upon the village of Hondschoote. The whole of the 7th was spent in observing the enemy's posts, which were protected by a strong range of artillery; and on the 8th, a decisive attack was resolved upon. Since the dawn, the French army were advancing towards the whole line, so as to attack the front. The right wing, under the command of Hédouville, was extended between Killem and Béveren; the centre, commanded by Jourdan, marched direct from Killem upon Hondschoote; the left wing made the assault between Killem and the Furnes canal. The engagement commenced among the copses which covered the centre, and on both sides the principal forces were brought to bear upon this point. The French returned several times to the assault of the enemy's posts, and at last made themselves masters of them. While they were victorious in the centre, the entrenchments were carried on the right, and the enemy made up his mind to retire upon Furnes by the roads of Houthem and Hoghestade.

While these events were taking place at Hondschoote, the garrison of Dunkirk made a vigorous sally, commanded by Hoche, and placed the besiegers in a very critical position. The next day after this battle, the latter held a council of war, and finding themselves too much exposed on their rear, and some delay taking place with respect to the naval force that was to have assisted in bombarding the town, they resolved upon raising the siege, and to retire to Furnes, whither Freytag had just arrived. They joined each other at that place on the evening of the 9th of September.

Such were those three battles, which had for their object and result the compulsory retreat of the army of observation upon the rear of the army of the besiegers, by advancing straightforwards. The last battle has imparted its name to this military achievement, and the battle of Hondschoote was considered as having saved Dunkirk. This achievement was a new incident, entirely at variance with the series of our reverses in the north, and personally subjected the English to a check, disappointed them of their dearest hopes, delivered the republic from a misfortune she must have severely felt, and imparted a feeling of self-confidence to France.

The victory of Hondschoote was the cause of great rejoicings at Paris, animated the aspirations of our youth, and gave us reason to entertain hopes that our energetic mode of action would produce the desired effects. The reverses we suffer are of small importance, provided that they are not entirely unmixed with that success which imparts hope and self-confidence to the dejected. The alternative only increases the energy and raises the enthusiasm of self-defence.

While the duke of York was before Dunkirk, Cobourg had resolved upon the assault of Quesnoy. This fortress was entirely destitute of the means of defence, and Cobourg had invested it very closely. The committee of public welfare, far from neglecting this part of the frontier, had immediately thereupon issued orders that some detachments should be despatched from Landrecies, Cambray, and Maubeuge. Unfortunately these detachments could not at once be rendered effective for this service; one of them lay besieged in Landrecies, and the other surrounded by the enemy in the plain of Avesnes, and forming in square, was broken after making a most gallant defence. At length on the 11th of September, Le Quesnoy was obliged to capitulate. This loss was of little importance when put in comparison with the relief of Dunkirk; but it detracted considerably from the public satisfaction produced by the latter event.

Houchard, after having compelled the duke of York to concentrate his forces at Furnes with Freytag, could hope for no further success in that direction. All that was left for him was to throw himself impetuously with equal forces upon soldiers of a more warlike character than his own, and that without any of those favourable opportunities or pressing urgencies which form an adequate motive for hazarding a battle dubious in its event. Circumstanced as he was, the best he could do was to fall upon the Dutch, who were in dispersed detachments in the neighbourhood of Menin, Halluin, Roncq, Werwick, and Ypres. Houchard, who took his measures very cautiously, ordered the camp at Lille to make a sally upon Menin, while he should be doing the same at Ypres. For several days the advanced posts of Werwick, Roncq, and Halluin, were the subject of obstinate contest, and on both sides there was a great display of personal bravery, with a very slight knowledge of military tactics. The prince of Orange, although pressed on all sides and having lost his outposts, made a most resolute defence, because he had been apprised of the surrender of Quesnoy, and that Beaulieu was on his road to relieve him. At length on the 13th of September he was compelled to evacuate Menin, after having lost upon these different occasions two or three thousand men and forty pieces of cannon. Although our army did not make the most of its position, and although in default of orders from the committee of public welfare it had performed its operations by masses too much detached, yet it

managed to occupy Menin. Upon the 15th our army left Menin and marched to Courtray. At Bisseghem it fell in with Beaulieu. The battle began favourably enough on our side, but the unlooked for appearance of a division of cavalry bearing upon the wings of our army, caused a panic fear which the circumstances did not justify; every thing was lost and the army fled to Menin. But even this unaccountable rout did not end there; the alarm spread to all the encampments and posts, and the entire army sought refuge under the cannon of Lisle. This panic terror, which we had experienced upon other occasions and as the consequence of the youth and inexperience of our troops, might also have been the effect of a traitorous cry of *sauve qui peut*, deprived us of numerous advantages, and brought us back to Lisle. The receipt of the news of this event at Paris created the most gloomy sensation, caused Houchard the loss of the fruits of his victory, raised against him the most violent prejudices, which partly recoiled against the committee of public welfare itself. A new series of repulses immediately ensued, and threw us back to the same situation of peril from whence we had just for a short time emerged by the victory of Hondschoote.

The Prussians and the Austrians stationed upon the two slopes of the Vosges facing our armies of the Moselle and Rhine, at last commenced making some movements of a serious nature. Old Wurmser, more animated than the Prussians, and perceiving the advantages derivable from the passes of the Vosges, resolved to occupy the important post of Bodenthal in the direction of the Upper-Lauter. In short, he put a division of four thousand men in the greatest jeopardy, who had to pass over most frightful crags before they could occupy Bodenthal. The representatives of the army of the Rhine, who on their part assented to the general impulse which in every quarter had resolved upon calling increased energy into action, now ordered that a general sally should be made from the encampments of Weissenburg on the 11th of September. The three generals, Desaix, Dubois, and Michaud, simultaneously charged the Austrians, but exerted themselves ineffectually and were brought back within the lines. The movements directed particularly against the Austrian division posted at Bodenthal were totally unsuccessful. Nevertheless, they prepared for a fresh attack on the 14th. While General Ferrette should march upon Bodenthal, the army of the Moselle putting itself in motion upon the opposite slope was to attack Pirmasens, situated on the side corresponding to Bodenthal, and where Brunswick was posted with a part of the Prussian army. This attack of General Ferrette was perfectly successful, our soldiers assaulted the posts of the Austrians with a most heroic disregard of the danger, carried them, and recovered the important pass of Bodenthal. But it was far otherwise on the reverse of the slope. Brunswick had been fully aware of the importance of Pirmasens, which closed the passes, he had a considerable force and had taken up most excellent positions. While the army of the Moselle was turning itself on the Sarre so as to face the rest of the Prussian army, twelve thousand men were detached from Hornbach upon Pirmasens. The only chance the French had was to carry Pirmasens by surprise, but being perceived and smartly received with grape-shot on their earliest movement in that direction, they could but retreat. This was what the general judged best, but the representatives thought otherwise, and they ordered an assault to be made by the three columns, and by the three ravines which terminated at the height on which Pirmasens is situated. Already our soldiers, thanks to their intrepidity, were far advanced, the column on the right was even ready to clear the ravine in which it marched, and to fall round upon Pirmasens, when a cross fire pointed against both flanks unexpectedly overwhelmed it. Our soldiers at first stood their ground, but the firing increased, and, in short, they were brought back along the ravine in which they had been fighting. The other columns fell back much in the same manner, and they all fled along the valleys in the utmost confusion. The army was obliged to get back to the position from whence it had started. Fortunately for us, the Prussians did not care to pursue the fugitives, and did not take possession of the camp at Hornbach, which the army had quitted in order to march upon Pirmasens. This affair caused us a loss of twenty-two pieces of cannon, four thousand killed, wounded, or prisoners. This repulse of the 14th of September might have produced important results. The allies encouraged by this success began to put all their forces in motion, they prepared to march in the direction of the Sarre and the Lauter, and thus to dispossess us of the encampments of Weissenburgh.

The siege of Lyons was not prosecuted very vigorously. The Piedmontese in debouching by the upper Alps into the valleys of Savoy had effected a diversion, and compelled Dubois-Crancé and Kellermann to divide their forces. Kellermann had conveyed himself into Savoy. Dubois-Crancé, who remained before Lyons, insufficiently supplied as he was, was showering to no purpose iron and fire upon that unhappy city, which having made up its mind to undergo every extremity, was no longer to be reduced by the terrors of blockade and bombardment, but only by an assault.

At the Pyrenees we had recently experienced a bloody defeat. Our troops had been remaining during the late events in the environs of Perpignan, the Spaniards kept within their camp at Mas-d'En. As they mustered strong, were of a warlike temperament, and under efficient command, they were animated and confident. We have already given a description of this theatre of war. The two valleys of the Tech and the Tet forming nearly parallel lines with each other, diverge from the great chain and spread out towards the sea; Perpignan lies in the latter of these valleys. Ricardos had crossed the first line of the Tech, inasmuch as he had got to Mas-d'En, and he had resolved to pass the Tet considerably above Perpignan, so as to be able to get behind that place and compel our army to abandon it. In order to effect this, he first considered as to possessing himself of Villefranche. This small fortified town, situated high on the course of the Tet, would protect his left wing from the intrepid Dagobert, who with three thousand men was making progress in Cerdagne. Consequently towards the commencement of August he detached general Crespo with some battalions. This man had only to present himself before

Ville-franche, for the cowardly commandant opened the gates to receive him. Crespo left a garrison in charge of the place and went to rejoin Ricardos. In the mean time, Dagobert with a very small body of men overrun all Cerdagne, drove back the Spanish up to the Seu-d'Urgel, and even had it in contemplation to make them retreat to Campredon. Nevertheless, the weakness of Dagobert's detachment and the fortress of Ville-franche made Ricardos dismiss all apprehensions as to the advantages obtained by the French over the left wing of his army, and therefore Ricardos continued to act upon the offensive. On the 31st of August he made threatening movements against our camp at Perpignan, crossed the Tet above Soler, and then drove before him the right wing of our army, which made its retreat to Salces, some leagues behind Perpignan, and very near the sea. In this position, the French army, one part shut up in Perpignan, and another part pent up at Salces, having the sea at their backs, found themselves in a most perilous situation. Dagobert certainly was gaining fresh advantages in Cerdagne, but these were not of sufficient importance to alarm Ricardos. The representatives Fabre and Cassaigne, who had retired with the army to Salces, resolved to call Dagobert on the dismissal of Barbantane, with a view to restore the influence of fortune over our flags. While they were awaiting the arrival of the new general they planned a combined movement, to be executed between Salces and Perpignan, to extricate ourselves from this perilous situation. They gave orders that one column should advance to Perpignan and attack the Spaniards in the rear, while themselves, shifting their position, should charge the enemy in front. In point of fact, on the 15th of September general Davoust issued from Perpignan, with six or seven thousand men, while Perignon advanced in the direction of Salces upon the Spaniards. Upon a given signal they threw themselves forward upon both sides of the enemy's camp; the Spaniards pressed on all sides were obliged to take refuge the other side of the Tet, leaving behind them in their flight twenty-six pieces of cannon. They immediately re-stationed themselves at the camp of the Mas-d'En, from whence they had started upon this bold but ill-starred expedition.

While these events were taking place Dagobert arrived, and this warrior, who at the age of seventy-five combined the spirit of a young man with the consummate experience of an old general, lost no time in making his arrival known by an attempt upon the camp at Mas-d'En. He divided his attack into three columns. The first was to set out from our right, and marching by Thuir upon Sainte-Colombe was to get in the rear of the Spaniards; the second moving from the centre was to attack the enemy in front and overthrow them; and lastly, the third, directing its operations towards the left, was to station itself in a wood and cut off the enemy's retreat. This latter, under the command of Davoust, made a lame attack and fled in confusion. The Spaniards were then enabled to bring all their forces to bear upon the two other columns of the centre and the right. Ricardos assuming that all the danger was to the right, brought thither his most effective forces and contrived to defeat the French. In the centre, by himself, Dagobert encouraging every one by his presence, carried the entrenchments which were before him, and was himself nearly deciding the victory, when Ricardos returning with his troops flushed with success both on the right and left, overwhelmed his enemy by his combined forces. Nevertheless, the intrepid Dagobert still held out, until a battalion threw down its arms, shouting forth, *God save the king!* (*Vive le roi.*) Dagobert indignant, turned two pieces of artillery upon the traitors, and while he thundered these against them, he rallied round him a handful of the brave men who yet remained true to the cause, and got off with some hundred men, for the enemy, who were intimidated by his daring behaviour, did not venture to pursue him.

Certain it was that this brave general deserved nothing but a laurel wreath for his manly bearing under such reverses, and if the left column had behaved better, and if his battalions of the centre had not dispersed themselves, his arrangements would have been followed by the most absolute success. Nevertheless, the gloomy distrust of the representatives imputed this miscarriage to him. Stung to the quick by this injustice, he returned to take the subordinate command of the Cerdagne. Our army, therefore, was once more driven back upon Perpignan, and placed in danger of losing the important line of the Tet.

The plan of the campaign of the 2nd of September had been executed in La Vendée. The division of Mentz was, as we have seen, to commence operations by Nantes. The committee of public welfare, who had received intelligence of an alarming nature as to the designs the English entertained upon the west, in every respect approved of the idea of bringing the most effective forces to bear upon the coasts. *Rossignol* and his party took great umbrage at this, and wrote letters to the ministry which did not lead them to expect a very fervid co-operation in the arrangements as settled. The division of Mentz therefore marched to Nantes, where it was received with great demonstrations of satisfaction and welcomed by fêtes. A banquet was prepared for them, and before they partook of it they prepared themselves for the festive occasion by a sharp skirmish with the enemy's parties scattered on the banks of the Loire. If the column of Nantes had congratulated themselves on being joined with the famous army of Mentz, the latter was not less satisfied in serving under the brave Canclaux and with his division, who had already earned a high reputation by the defence of Nantes and by a multitude of brave exploits. In accordance with the arranged plan, several columns starting from every point of the theatre of war were to join at the centre and there crush the enemy. Canclaux, general of the army of Brest, starting from Nantes was to go down by the left bank of the Loire, wheel round the wide lake of Grand-Lieu, sweep the Lower Vendée, then go up towards Machecoul and arrive at Léger on the 11th or the 12th. His arrival at this latter point was the signal of departure for the columns of the army of La-Rochelle, who were commissioned to make war on the country by the south and the east. It will be recollected that the army of La-Rochelle under the orders of Rossignol the commander-in-chief was composed of several divisions; the division of Sablon was

commanded by Miaszkouski, that of Luçon by Beffroy, that of Niort by Chalboe, that of Saumur by Santerre, that of Angers by Duhouse. At the instant that Canclaux should arrive at Léger, the column of Sables was to be ordered to put itself in motion, to be at Saint-Fulgent on the 13th, at Herbiers on the 14th, and finally on the 16th to be with Canclaux at Mortagne. The columns of Luçon and of Niort were by supporting each other to advance towards Bressuire and Argenton, and to have reached that height on the 14th; lastly, the columns of Saumur and Angers, starting from the Loire ought also to arrive on the 14th in the neighbourhood of Vihiers and Chemillé. Thus according to this plan the whole country would be completely scoured from the 14th to the 16th, and the rebels would shortly be enclosed by the republican columns between Mortagne, Bressuire, Argenton, Vihiers, and Chemillé. Their destruction would then be inevitable.

It has been already observed that the Vendéans, having been twice driven back from Luçon with considerable loss, had a strong desire to have their revenge. They mustered all their strength before the republicans had executed their plans, and while Charette laid siege to the camp of Nandières in the neighbourhood of Nantes, they attacked the division of Luçon, which had marched so far as Chantonay. These two assaults took place on the 5th of September. The assault of Charette upon the camp of Naudières was repelled, but the attack upon Chantonay being unforeseen and also well managed, threw the republicans into the greatest confusion. The youthful and brave Marceau performed prodigies of valour in order to avert a defeat, but his division, after having lost its baggage and artillery, retreated *pêle mêle* to Luçon. This repulse was calculated to operate prejudicially against the settled plan, because the disorganization of one of the columns left an empty space between the division of Sables and that of Niort; but the representatives used the most active exertions to form this column anew, and couriers were despatched to Rossignol to apprize him of the circumstance.

All the Vendéans were at this time collected together at Herbiers under the command of Elbée their generalissimo. Like their opponents, they had their mutual bickerings, for the heart of man is every where the same, and nature does not exclusively appropriate purity of motive and every species of virtue to one party, and leave nothing but pride, selfishness, and the practice of vice to the other. The Vendéan leaders had their jealousies of each other in precisely the same manner as the republicans. The generals exhibited but little respect for the superior council, which affected a character of sovereignty. Being in possession of substantive power, they were by no means disposed to implicitly obey a power which owed its factitious existence to their own act. In particular, they were envious of d'Elbée the commander-in-chief, and asserted that Bonchamps was far better qualified to have the absolute command. For his part, Charette desired to remain the sole master of Lower Vendée. They were therefore little disposed to freely communicate their opinions with each other, and to concert the means of defending themselves from the republicans. An intercepted dispatch had just made them acquainted with the designs of their enemies. Bonchamps was the only one amongst their generals who proposed a bold line of conduct, and distinguished himself by enlarged views. He was of opinion that it would not long be practicable for them to defend themselves from the republican forces collected together in La Vendée; that it now became a matter of urgent necessity for them to tear themselves from these forests and ravines, wherein they would be buried to all eternity, without knowing who their allies were, or being even known to them; consequently his advice was, that instead of exposing themselves to certain destruction, they had much better march forth in close column from La Vendée and proceed to Brittany, where their presence would be desirable, and where the republic did not expect an attack would be made. His counsel also was, that they should march even to the sea side, seize upon a seaport, put themselves into communication with the English, there receive an emigrant prince, and from thence convey themselves to Paris, and thus carry on the war both offensively and defensively. This advice, which is said to have emanated from Bonchamps, was not adopted by the Vendéans, whose views were always contracted, and who on all occasions evinced the strongest repugnance to quit their native country. All that their leaders seemed to think about was how to divide the country into four districts, that they might singly exercise unlimited power within the same. Charette was to have had the Lower Vendée, M. de Bonchamps the banks of the Loire in the environs of Angers, M. de La Rochejaquelin the remaining portion of Upper Anjou, and M. de Lescure the whole of the district of Poitou at that time in actual rebellion. M. d'Elbée was to retain his empty title of generalissimo, and the superior council its factitious authority.

Upon the 9th, Canclaux put himself in motion, but left a strong reserve under the command of Grouchy and Haxo at the camp of Naudières, in order to protect Nantes, and conducted the column of Mentz in the direction of Léger. In the meantime, the former army of Brest, under the command of Beysser, making the circuit of Lower Vendée by Pornic, Bourneuf, and Machecoul, was to fall in at Léger with the column of Mentz.

These movements, emanating from Canclaux, were carried into effect without any difficulty. The Mentz column, whose advanced guard was commanded by Kléber, and the main body by Aubert-Dubayet, drove all its antagonists out of the field. Kléber with his advanced guard, in a spirit of loyalty and heroism, compelled all his soldiers to encamp themselves anywhere but in the villages, in order to prevent acts of plunder. "As we passed," said he, "in front of the delightful lake of Grand-Lieu, we observed the most beautiful landscapes, and also bursts of scenery equally charming and diversified. Upon an immense open pasturage appeared innumerable flocks and herds without even a shepherd. I could not repress the bitterness of soul I experienced when I contemplated the fate of these unfortunate inhabitants, who, led astray and deluded by their priests, rejected the blessings held out to them under the new order of things, in order to rush upon inevitable destruc-

tion." Kléber did his utmost to protect the country from the soldiery, and in most cases he was successful. A commission of civilians had been attached to the staff to carry into execution that decree of the 1st of August, which gave order for laying waste the country and removing the population to some other place. The soldiers were forbidden to set fire to any thing, and the work of destruction was to be effected solely under the direction of the generals and the civil commission.

On the 14th they arrived at Léger, and the column of Mentz at that place fell in with that of Brest commanded by Beysser. Meanwhile the column of Sables under the orders of Mieszkouski had advanced to Saint-Fulgent, according to the prescribed plan, and had already communicated with the army of Canclaux. The column of Luçon, momentarily retarded by the defeat it experienced at Chantonay, had been lagging in the rear, but by the zealous exertions of the representatives who had appointed a new general, Beffroy, it was again advancing. The column of Niort had got so far as Châteigneraie. Thus although the general movement had been delayed one or two days upon every point, and although Canclaux had not reached Léger till the 14th, where he ought to have arrived on the 12th, the same delay occurred with respect to every one of the columns, the unity of action was not disturbed, and they were enabled to pursue the execution of the plan of the campaign. But in this interval, the news of the defeat experienced by the division of Luçon reached Saumur; Rossignol, Ronsin, and the whole staff, had conceived the greatest alarm, and being apprehensive that similar mischances might befal the two other columns of Niort and Sables, of whose strength they felt themselves by no means assured, they decided upon bringing them back to their former posts. This was one of the most misadvised orders possible, yet it by no means emanated from a traitorous imagination, or with the intention of exposing Canclaux or the wing of his army, but they entertained no confidence in his plan, and were but too ready upon the appearance of the slightest obstacle to declare it impracticable and throw it up. It was doubtless the same motive which actuated the staff of Saumur in issuing orders for the retrograde movement of the columns of Niort, Luçon, and Sables.

Canclaux in following his march had obtained fresh advantages, he had made an attack upon Montaigu on three points: Kléber by the Nantes road, Aubert-Dubayet by the Roche-Servière road, and Beysser by the road of Saint-Fulgent, all three fell upon it at one and the same time, and soon effected a dislodgment of the enemy. Upon the 17th Canclaux took Clisson, and not hearing of Rossignol, he resolved to halt, and to confine himself to reporting what had been done, and to await further instructions.

Canclaux therefore established himself in the environs of Clisson, left Beysser at Montaigu, and expedited Kléber with the advanced guard to Torfou, whither he arrived on the 18th. The counter order issued from Saumur reached the division of Niort, and had been communicated to the other divisions of Luçon and Sables; they had immediately retreated, and by their retrograde movement had amazed the Vendéans and grievously embarrassed Canclaux. The Vendéans were about one hundred thousand strong. An immense number of them had collected in the direction of Vihiers and Chemillé, facing the columns of Saumur and Angers; a still greater number in the neighbourhood of Clisson and Moriagne were on Canclaux's hands. When the columns of Angers and Saumur saw how numerous they were, they said that it was the Mentz army that threw them upon their hands, and complained bitterly against that plan of operations which exposed them to the onset of so formidable an enemy. This complaint was without foundation, and the Vendéans had from all quarters turned out in such numbers that the republicans had quite enough to do to keep their ground. On the same day, so far from falling upon the columns of Rossignol, they bent their course against Canclaux; and d'Elbée and Lescure quitted the Upper Vendée to meet the Mentz army.

By a remarkable complexity of events, Rossignol when he heard of the successes of Canclaux, who had advanced into the heart of La Vendée, countermanded his first orders to retreat, and ordered his columns to bring themselves forward to the point they had left. The columns of Saumur and Angers stationed at his side were the first to engage the enemy, with whom they had some skirmishing, one column at Doué, and the other at the bridges of Cé. The advantage on each side was nearly equal. On the 18th, the column of Saumur, under the command of Santerre, were about to advance from Vihiers to a small village named Coron. By some mismanagement, artillery, cavalry, and infantry were confusedly jammed together in the streets of this village, which lay low. Santerre endeavoured to remedy this blunder, and ordered the troops to fall back, in order to put them in order for fighting upon a neighbouring eminence; but Ronsin, who in Rossignol's absence arrogated to himself the supreme command, found fault with Santerre for ordering a retreat, and opposed it. At this very time, the Vendéans poured down on the republicans, and a most awful confusion in the entire division was the consequence. This division contained many men of the recent enlistments raised at the sound of the tocsin, and these retreating in disorder, it became nothing else than a confused flight from Coron to Vihiers, Doué, and Saumur. On the next day, the 19th, the Vendéans marched against the division of Angers, commanded by Duhoux. With the same good fortune that had favoured them the preceding day, they drove back the republicans beyond Erigné, and again possessed themselves of the bridges of Cé.

Upon the quarter where Canclaux remained there was the same hard fighting. The same day twenty thousand Vendéans stationed at the environs of Torfou fell upon Kléber's advance guard, which did not consist of more than two thousand men. Kléber placed himself in the midst of his soldiers, and supported them against this rush of assailants. The ground where he had taken his stand was a road commanded by heights, but notwithstanding the disadvantageous nature of the position, he managed to effect a well-conducted and orderly retreat. However, a piece of artillery having fallen from its carriage, a slight confusion was the con-

sequence, and his brave fellows were for the first time about to give ground. Kléber seeing this, stationed an officer with a few soldiers near a bridge, and said to them: *My friends, you must defend this even to death.* This command was obeyed with the most heroic intrepidity. In the meantime the main body came up and renewed the fight, the Vendéans at last were driven back a great distance, and gained nothing by their transitory advantages.

All these events took place on the 19th; the order to advance, which had been of so little service to the two divisions of Saumur and Angers, had not yet, by reason of the distance, been transmitted to the columns of Luçon and Niort. Beysser was constantly at Montaigu, forming the right wing of Canclaux's army and remaining exposed. Canclaux, who desired to make use of Beysser as a shelter for himself, sent him orders to quit Montaigu and draw nearer to the main body. He directed Kléber to advance in the direction of Beysser, in order to cover his movement. Beysser, who was too careless, had left his column badly protected at Montaigu. MM. de Lescure and Charette came on him by surprise, and but for the intrepidity of two battalions, who by their steadiness interrupted the rapidity of the pursuit and the retreat, this column would have been utterly annihilated. The artillery and baggage were lost, and the wreck of this column made the best of their way to Nantes, where they were welcomed by the brave reserved force stationed there to protect the town. Canclaux then made up his mind to retrograde, so that he should no longer remain *en flèche* in the country and exposed to every attack of the Vendéans. He managed to effect his retreat to Nantes with his brave Mayençais, who had not suffered, owing to their commanding appearance, as well as to the refusal of M. Charette, who would not join with MM. d'Elbée and de Bonchamps in pursuing the republicans.

The cause which marred the success of this fresh expedition against La Vendée is plain enough. The staff of Saumur had expressed dissatisfaction with the arrangement which allotted the column of Mentz to Canclaux; the defeat of the 5th of September afforded the staff a sufficient pretext to distrust and countermand this arrangement. A counter order was immediately given to the columns of Sables, Luçon, and La Rochelle. Canclaux, who had so far advanced without being attacked, thus found himself exposed, and the defeat of Torfou rendered his position still more critical. In the meantime, the army of Saumur, on gaining advices of his progress, marched from Saumur and Angers to Vihiers and Chemillé, and if this army had not been so utterly in disorder, it is very probable that the retreat of the wings would not have marred the complete success of the enterprise. Thus the extreme readiness to countermand a settled arrangement, the faulty organization of the new levies, together with the strength of the Vendéans, who were more than one hundred thousand strong, were the main causes of these fresh disasters. Indeed, there was neither treason on the part of the staff of Saumur, or defect in the arrangement of Canclaux. The effect of these reverses was to us most fatal, for the renewed defence made by La Vendée revived all the hopes of the counter-revolutionists, and peculiarly augmented the dangers to which the republic was subject. In short, if no impression had been made upon the armies of Brest and Mentz, the army of Rochelle would have found itself once more disorganised, and all the recruits accruing from the levy *en masse*, would have gone back to their friends under a deep sense of failure.

The two parties in the army seemed anxious to lose no time in reproaching each other. Philippéaux, always very intemperate, wrote to the committee of public safety a letter couched in the most indignant terms, wherein he imputed treason to the countermand sent to the columns of the army of Rochelle. Choudieu and Richard the commissaries for Saumur, answered in quite as injurious language, and Ronsin hurried to the ministry and the committee of public welfare, to expose the defects in the arrangements for the campaign. Canclaux, said he, having brought greater masses than necessary into action, in Lower Vendée, had thrown back upon Upper Vendée the entire bulk of the rebellious population, and thus had induced the defeat of the columns of Saumur and of Angers. Lastly, repelling aspersion by asperion, Ronsin answered the imputation of treason by that of aristocracy, and at once denounced the two armies of Brest and Mentz, as being filled with suspected persons and evil disposed characters. Thus it was that the animosity of the Jacobin party was becoming more and more embittered against that party, who was resolved upon maintaining discipline and the regular conduct of war.

The news of the unaccountable rout at Menin, the ineffective and sanguinary attack upon Pirmasens, the defeats experienced at the Eastern-Pyrenees, the disastrous termination of the renewed expedition against La Vendée, all came to Paris about the same time, and produced the most gloomy sensation in that quarter. The intelligence successively came to hand from the 18th to the 25th of September, and according to what had been already experienced, fear provoked violence. We have already observed, that the most fervid agitators assembled at the Cordeliers, where there was even less occasion for reserve than at the Jacobins, and these agitators governed the war department under the weak-minded Bouchotte. Vincent was their leader at Paris, just as Ronsin was in La Vendée, and they seized upon this opportunity to renew their oft-repeated grievances. Being rendered independent of the convention, they would willingly have got rid of its inconvenient authority, an authority which crossed their measures when with the armies in the persons of the representatives, and at Paris in the committee of public welfare. The representatives in commission did not permit them to carry out the revolutionary measures with all the violence they desired; the committee of public welfare, directing with sovereign authority every operation according to the most elevated and just views, was constantly thwarting them, and this was the obstacle that of all others fretted them the most; therefore they not unfrequently entertained the idea of establishing a new executive power in accordance with the mode adopted by the constitution.

To have enforced the constitution in all its rigour, a course repeatedly and mischievously called for by the aristocrats, would have been a

very dangerous measure. It would necessarily have required new elections, substituted another assembly for the convention; this assembly must, as a self-evident proposition, have been deficient in experience, not commanded the respect of the country, and would have at once comprehended within itself every one of the factions. The revolutionary enthusiasts clearly apprehending this danger, abstained from pressing for a renewal of the national representation, but yet demanded that the constitution should be put in force so far as it accorded with their views. As nearly all of them held office in the *bureaux*, all they wanted was the formation of a constitutional ministry, which should be independent of the legislative authority, and consequently be independent of the committee of public welfare. Vincent therefore had the audacity to frame a petition addressed to the Cordeliers, thereby demanding the organization of a constitutional ministry and the recall of the deputies in commission. The excitement this caused was one of the most animated scenes ever witnessed. It was in vain that Legendre, the friend of Danton, and already classed with those whose energy appeared to be getting lukewarm, opposed this petition, and indeed it was adopted, with the exception of that article that required the recall of the representatives on commission. The benefit derived from these representatives was so great, and there was in this article something so personal against the members of the convention, that they did not venture to persist in retaining it. This Petition caused considerable disturbance in Paris, and seriously diminished the rising authority of the committee of public welfare.

Besides these intemperate opponents, this Committee had still many more among the new moderatists, who were accused of reviving the system of the Girondists and of thwarting the energy of the revolution. This party, who openly condemned the Cordeliers, the Jacobins, and the disorganizers of the armies, never ceased to urge their complaints to the committee, nay, even reproached it for not being sufficiently severe in condemning the anarchists.

The committee therefore had opposed to it the new parties who now began to form themselves. As usual, these parties took advantage of adverse events in order to found an accusation against the committee, and both of them having agreed in condemning its acts, passed their opinions thereupon after their own fashion.

The total defeat of the 15th at Menin had already been made known; and the late events in La Vendée began to be confusedly so. There was a vague intelligence of a defeat at Coron, Torfou, and at Montaigu. Thuriot, who had declined being a member of the committee of public welfare, and who was accused of being one of the new moderatists, spoke in strong terms at the opening of the sitting against the intriguers and the disorganizers who had been very recently making some novel and very arbitrary proposals upon the subject of articles of consumption. "Our committee and the executive council," said he, "are harassed and surrounded by a nest of intriguers, who only profess patriotism as a matter of private gain to themselves. Yes, the time has come, when we must drive away these men of rapine and incendiarism, who only consider the revolution as created for them, while the good man and the upright uphold it solely for the good of the human race." The propositions, which were opposed by Henriot, were rejected. Briez, one of the commissaries despatched to Valenciennes, next read a critical essay upon the military operations. He maintained that no other than a dilatory war, and in fact a war totally inconsistent with the French character, had been carried on; that the war had been carried on bit by bit, by insignificant masses, and that it was to this system that the reverses we had suffered were to be imputed. Then, without openly attacking the committee of public welfare, he appeared to insinuate that this committee had not let the convention know every thing; and that, for example, there had been near Douay a corps of six thousand Austrians, who might have been every one taken, but this had not been done. The convention after having heard Briez added him to the committee of public welfare. At this instant there came particular intelligence from La Vendée, contained in a letter from Montaigu. These alarming details occasioned a general burst of feeling. "Instead of being daunted," cries one of the members, "let us swear to save the republic." At these words the whole assembly rose and swore once more to save the republic, whatever might be the perils that environed it. The members of the committee of public welfare, who had not yet come, at that very moment entered. Barrère, the reporter in ordinary, addressed the assembly. "Every suspicion levelled against the committee of public welfare will be a victory gained by Pitt. We ought not to give our enemies the greatest of all advantages, that of ourselves vilifying the power commissioned for our special protection." Barrère next made the assembly acquainted with the measures taken by the committee. "For some days past," he continued, "the committee has had reason to believe that great miscarriages were committed at Dunkirk, where we could have cut off the English to the last man; as well as at Menin, where no exertion was made to counteract the extraordinary effects of the panic terror. The committee has dismissed Houchard, as well as the brigadier-general Hédouville, who did not do at Menin what he ought to have done, and therefore it will without loss of time investigate the conduct of these two generals; the committee will next institute a purifying of every one of the staffs and army administrations; the committee has established the fleet upon a footing that will enable it to measure its strength with our enemies; the committee has just now raised eighteen thousand men, it has recently systematised the attack *en masse*; lastly, it is at Rome itself that Rome is to be assailed, and a hundred thousand men landing on the coasts of England will march to London to strangle the machinations of Pitt. It is unjust then to accuse the committee of public welfare; it has never ceased to deserve that confidence which the convention has always manifested towards it even until now."

Robespierre next spoke. "For a long time," said he, "a desire has manifested itself of scandalizing the convention and that committee which is the depositary of her power. Briez, who ought to have died at Valenciennes, left it like a poltroon to go to

Paris, and serve Pitt and the allies in vilifying the government. It is not enough," added he, "that the convention still continues to repose confidence in us, she ought to solemnly proclaim it, and communicate her decision to Briez, whom she has just now added to our number." This demand was received with applause, it was ultimately arranged that Briez should not be added to the committee of public welfare, and it was declared by acclamation that this committee still possessed the entire confidence of the national convention.

The moderatists were in the convention, and they had just been defeated, but the most dreaded adversaries of the committee, that is to say, the fervid revolutionists, were to be met with at the Jacobins and at the Cordeliers. It was against the latter that it had to defend itself. Robespierre repaired to the Jacobins and exercised his ascendancy over them; he explained the conduct of the committee, he defended it from the combined attacks of the moderatists and exaggeratists, and demonstrated the dangerous tendency of petitions which demanded the formation of a constitutional ministry. "There must be," said he, "some kind of government to succeed to that which we have destroyed; the system of organising at this very time the constitutional ministry is in fact nothing short of ousting the convention herself, and crumbling her power in the face of the hostile armies. No one else than Pitt could have originated this idea. His agents have propagated it, those agents have seduced sincere patriots; and the credulous and oppressed people, always ready to complain against government, who cannot afford a remedy for every evil, have become the ready echo of their calumnious representations and proposals. Ye Jacobins," exclaimed Robespierre, "too staunch to be gained over, too enlightened to be seduced, you will defend the Mountain that is now assailed; you will uphold the committee of public welfare whom they are desirous of scandalizing in order to ensure your destruction, and in like manner with yourselves will it triumph over all the devices of the enemies of the people."

Robespierre was applauded, and so was the whole committee in his person. The Cordeliers were brought back to order, their petition was no more thought of, and Vincent's attack, victoriously repelled, produced no result whatever.

However, it became a matter of urgency that some course should be adopted in respect of the new constitution. To abandon the government to the new-fangled revolutionists, equivocal and unknown as they were, and in all probability divided against themselves, as being the offspring of all those factions deriving their existence from the convention, would have been a perilous affair. It therefore became necessary to inform all parties that the government would possess itself of the supreme power; and before the republic would be left entirely to her own guidance, and to the operation of those laws which had been laid down for her governance, she would be governed revolutionarily until she should be saved. Numerous petitions had already exhorted the convention to continue at her post. On the 10th of October, Saint-Just, speaking in the name of the committee of public welfare, proposed a new form of government. He drew a very mournful picture of France; he made the gloomy colours of his morbid imagination predominate in this picture; and by the aid of his rare talent, and by the assistance of facts in other respects perfectly true, he produced a species of terror in the minds of those he addressed. He therefore presented, and caused to be adopted, a decree which involved the following propositions. By the first article, the government of France was declared to be *revolutionary* until peace, signifying thereby that the constitution was temporarily suspended; and that an extraordinary dictatorship was constituted to endure till all danger was over. The convention and the committee of public welfare were invested with this dictatorship. "The executive council," said the decree, "the ministers, the generals, and the constituted bodies, are all of them placed under the immediate superintendance of the committee of public welfare, who is to make its report concerning them every eight days. We have already explained how superintendance was converted into supreme authority, because the ministers, generals, and every description of functionaries, finding themselves compelled to submit all their acts to the committee for its approbation, were at last afraid to act upon their own responsibility, and obeyed the orders of the committee itself. It was then said, "Revolutionary laws ought to be executed with dispatch. The indolence of the government having been the cause of the late defeats, the delays in the execution of these laws shall be specifically defined. The commission of any of these delays shall be punished as a crime against liberty." Regulations in respect of articles of consumption were appended to these government measures, for bread is the people's right, as Saint-Just observed. The tabular statement of articles of consumption, when finally settled, was to be transmitted to the authorities. The victualling stock of the departments was to be estimated, and secured as closely as possible; as to the superfluous quantity that might remain in any department, it was made subject to be called into requisition, either for the armies, or for those provinces where there happened to be a deficiency. These requisitions were regulated by a commission for victualling. Paris, as a fortified town, was to be victualled for one year, to take effect upon the 1st of March next ensuing. Lastly, it was enacted, that a tribunal should be instituted, where the conduct and property of those who had the administration of the public money should be made amenable.

By this grand and important declaration the government, thus composed of the committee of public welfare, the committee of general safety, and of the extraordinary tribunal, found itself perfect and maintainable so long as the danger lasted. It was, in point of fact, to declare that the revolution was in a state of siege, and to apply thereto the extraordinary rules of such a state of things, so long as it should last. To this extraordinary government were added several institutions which had long been called for, and had now become a matter of necessary consequence. A call was made for a revolutionary army, that is to say, a force specially employed to execute the orders of government in the interior. It had, in fact, been decreed long since, and was at length constituted by a new decree *. This army was to be composed of six

* Decree of the 3rd of September.

thousand men, and twelve hundred cannoneers. It was not to be stationary, and was to repair from Paris to any town where its presence might be required, and there to remain as a garrison at the expense of the wealthier inhabitants. The Cordeliers wanted one for every department; but this was not agreed to, upon the ground that to accord to each department an army specially appropriated for itself, would be nothing else than a return to federalism. The same Cordeliers further required, that each detachment of the revolutionary army should have in its train a guillotine mounted on wheels. Every species of extravagance gains ascendancy in the public mind when once it becomes unrestrained. The convention refused to listen to these demands, and abided by what she had already decreed. Bouchotte, who was entrusted with the formation of this army, enlisted for its service the greatest vagabonds in Paris, and who were ready to do whatever the ruling power required of them. He composed the staff entirely of Jacobins, especially the Cordeliers; he hurried Ronsin away from La Vendée and from Rossignol, in order to put him at the head of this revolutionary army. He submitted the list of this staff to the Jacobins, and subjected each officer to the test of the ballot. In point of fact, not one of them had his appointment confirmed by the minister, until he had been approved of by this club.

To the institution of the revolutionary army was lastly added the act against suspected persons, so frequently called for, and the principle whereof was allowed, the same day that the levy *en masse* was enacted. Although the revolutionary tribunal was in a manner calculated to provide against ordinary probabilities, yet it was by no means satisfactory to the revolutionary imagination. There yet lingered the desire of imprisoning those whom they could not put to death, and there was also a call for regulations which should permit their persons to be secured. That decree, which put the aristocrats out of the pale of the law was too vague, and moreover, it required a trial of the party. Now what was required was, that upon the mere denunciation of the revolutionary committee, a suspected individual should at once be cast into prison. In fact, there was passed a decree for the provisional arrest until the peace, of every suspected individual *. Those who were deemed such were, 1. Those who by their conduct, or by their connexions, or by their language or writings, were declared partisans of tyranny, federalism, and opposed to liberty; 2. Those who were unable to give an account, in the form prescribed by the act of the 20th of March previous, of their means of livelihood, and their performance of their civic duties; 3. Those who had declined to take out certificates of civism; 4. Public functionaries, either suspended or dismissed from their functions by the national convention, and by its commissaries; 5. The *ci-devant* nobles, the husbands, wives, fathers, mothers, sons, or daughters, and the agents of the emigrants, who had not continually manifested their adherence to the revolution; 6. Those who had emigrated in the interval of the 1st of July, 1789, to the proclamation of the act of the 8th of April, 1792, although they might have returned to France within the time allowed.

The prisoners were to be detained in the national buildings, and kept at their own charges, and they were permitted to move to these places of custody such furniture as they required. The committees authorized to order the arrest could only act by a majority, and were bound to transmit to the committee of general safety the list of suspected persons and the cause assigned for each arrest. Their functions becoming from this period of a very onerous nature, and almost incessant, occupied the whole time of the members just as a profession would have done, consequently it was but right they should be paid. Thenceforward they received a salary as an indemnification.

To these regulations, upon the urgent requirement of the commune of Paris, was yet added one more, and the last, which rendered this act against suspected persons more formidable than ever, and that was, the revocation of that decree which prohibited domiciliary visits being made during the night. From that moment every citizen who had become obnoxious was constantly kept in dread, and had no longer a momentary repose. Suspected persons, by concealing themselves in ingeniously constructed and narrow places of retreat, of which their necessity had suggested the contrivance, had hitherto possessed the liberty of breathing the fresh air at night; however, they could do so no longer, and the arrests, now multiplied both by day and night, soon filled every prison throughout France.

The sectional assemblies were held every day, but the common people could not find time to attend them, and as they were absent, revolutionary motions were no longer carried. It was therefore arranged at the express instance of the Jacobins and of the commune, that these assemblies should be held but twice a week, and that each citizen who assisted therein by his presence should be paid forty sous for each sitting. This certainly was the most effectual mode of gaining over the people, the not calling them too frequently together, and paying them for their attendance. The fervid revolutionists were irritated because some limits were set to their political fanaticism, by restricting the sittings of the sections to two a week. They therefore prepared a very inflammatory petition, complaining that the rights of the sovereign [people] were infringed, in restricting them from meeting together so often as they chose. It was young Varlet who was the originator of this petition; it was rejected, and no more attention was paid to it than to numerous other requirements emanating from the revolutionary ferment that prevailed.

Thus the machine was perfect in respect of two considerations of the greatest importance in a jeopardized state, war and police. In the convention, a committee took charge of all military operations, selected the generals and delegates of every description, and was empowered by the decree authorising the permanent requisition, to dispose alike of men and things; and this committee did all this either by its own order or through the medium of representatives sent out upon commission. Under this committee the committee of general safety had the direction of the high police, and made use of it as a means of exercising a superin-

* This famous decree was passed the 17th of September. It is known as the *loi des suspects*.

tendance of the revolutionary committee appointed in each commune. Individuals who were suspected of hostility or even of indifference to government, were imprisoned upon the slightest grounds; others who were more deeply implicated were stricken by the extraordinary tribunal, but happily these latter were as yet by no means numerous, for this tribunal previous to this period had passed but few condemnations. An army specially appropriated for this purpose, and in every sense of the word a moveable column of *gendarmerie* attached to this system, carried into execution the orders of government, and lastly, the people who were paid for meeting in the sections were always ready to support it. Thus war and police both centred in the committee of public welfare, who being absolute master, having the means of putting into requisition the entire wealth of France, and possessing the power of sending the citizens either to the field of battle or to the scaffold, or into dungeons, became invested, as a means of protecting the revolution, with a supreme and terrible dictatorship. It certainly was obliged to render an account to the convention of its labours every eight days, but this statement was approved of as a matter of course, for condemnatory opinion was the peculiar privilege of the Jacobins, and this committee was master of that club ever since Robespierre's appointment. There was nobody to oppose this power, except it were the moderatists who did not go so far, and the new exaggeratists who went much further, but there was little to apprehend from either the one or the other.

We have already seen that Robespierre and Carnot had been appointed to the committee of public welfare in the room of Gasparin and of Thuriot, who were both ill. Robespierre had carried thither his powerful influence, and Carnot his military science. The convention was desirous of joining Danton with his colleague and rival in renown, Robespierre, but Danton, harassed with his labours, and little qualified to enter into the minutiæ of administration, and moreover disgusted by the calumnies in which each party indulged, declined an appointment to any committee whatever. He had already done quite enough for the revolution; he had imparted resolution in all time of danger, it was he who had conceived the idea of the revolutionary tribunal, the revolutionary army, the permanent requisition, the tax on wealth, and the allowance of the forty sous a sitting to the members of the sectional committees; in short, every one of those measures, which although practically cruel in their execution, yet imparted to the revolution that energy which effected its salvation, had originated with Danton. It was at this period that Danton began to be considered as no longer so serviceable as he had been, for ever since the first invasion by the Prussians, the public had become reconciled to a sense of danger. The vengeance that was in preparation against the Girondists was repugnant to his notions; he had very recently married a young wife to whom he was exceedingly attached, and whom he had endowed with Belgic gold, to use the phrase adopted by his enemies, but according to the testimony of his friends, the compensation money for his abolished office of advocate of the council; he was attacked much in the same way as Mirabeau and Marat with an inflammatory disorder; in short he required rest, and he requested leave of absence to spend some time at Arcis-sur-Aube, there to enjoy the beauties of nature, of which he was passionately fond. He had been recommended to make this temporary retirement as an expedient of putting a stop to the calumnious reports against him. The victory of the revolution would henceforth be accomplished without him; two months of war and energy would suffice for that purpose, and he proposed to himself to return after victory had been attained, to make his mighty voice heard in favour of the vanquished and of a better state of things. Vain illusion, the fruit of indolence and loss of spirits. To abandon for two months, nay for one month, a revolution so rapid in its events, was to become, so far as the revolution was concerned, indifferent and powerless.

Danton, therefore, declined to become a member of the committee of public welfare, and obtained his leave of absence; Billaud-Varennes and Collot-d'Herbois were added to the committee, and carried with him thither, the one his frigid and implacable character, and the other his fiery temper and his influence with the turbulent Cordeliers. The committee of general safety was formed anew, from eighteen members it was reduced to nine, and those known as the most uncompromising.

While the government was thus organizing itself in the most strenuous manner, an increased energy was indicated by all its resolves. The grand measures adopted in the month of August had not yet produced their results. La Vendée, although assailed in a systematic manner, had made a defence. The repulse at Menin had nearly neutralized the advantage gained by the victory at Hondschoote; fresh exertions were still requisite. The revolutionary enthusiasm suggested this idea, that in war as in every thing else, where there is a will there is a way, and for the first time an army was ordered to gain a victory within a limited period.

All the dangers to which the republic was exposed in La Vendée were duly considered. "Destroy La Vendée," Barrère had already said, "and then Valenciennes and Condé will no longer be in the power of the Austrians. Destroy La Vendée, and the English will not trouble themselves further about Dunkirk. Destroy La Vendée, and the Rhine will be freed from the Prussians. Destroy La Vendée, and Spain will find herself harassed and conquered by the southern departments, when acting in unison with the victorious soldiers of Mortagne and Cholet. Destroy La Vendée, and one portion of that army of the interior will go to reinforce that intrepid army of the north, so often betrayed, so frequently disorganized. Destroy La Vendée, and then Lyons will make no further defence, Toulon will rise against the Spanish and the English, and the spirit of Marseilles will again rise to the full height of the republican revolution. Lastly, every blow that you strike against La Vendée will cause a corresponding shock in the rebellious cities, the federalist departments, and on the invaded frontiers. La Vendée, ay La Vendée. It is there that we must strike the blow, between this time and the 20th of October, before the winter, before the roads shall have become im-

passable, and before the *brigands* shall be protected by the climate and inclemency of the season.

"The committee in one comprehensive and hasty glance has noted in the few following words all the faults of La Vendée:

"Too many representatives.

"Too much moral disagreement.

"Too many military dissensions.

"Too little discipline when flushed with success.

"Too many mis-statements in the relation of events.

"Too much greediness, and too great avarice in one party of the chief officers and administrative authorities."

In consequence of these observations the convention reduced the number of representatives in commission, consolidated the two armies of Brest and Rochelle under one, styled the army of the west, and gave the command of this army, not to Rossignol or to Canclaux, but to Lechelle, brigadier-general in the division of Luçon. Lastly, the convention settled the day by which the war against La Vendée was to be concluded, and this day was the 20th of October. The following is the proclamation which accompanied the decree *.

"THE NATIONAL CONVENTION TO THE ARMY OF THE WEST.

"Soldiers of Liberty, the brigands of La Vendée must be exterminated before the end of the month of October; the welfare of the country demands it; the nervous irritation of the French people commands it, and their courage ought to accomplish it. The gratitude of the nation will at that period be manifested to those whose valour and patriotism shall have irrevocably established liberty and the republic."

No less prompt and energetic measures were adopted with respect to the army of the north, to efface the recollection of the defeat at Menin, and to ensure future success. Houchard, who had been removed from his command, was put under arrest. General Jourdan, who had commanded the centre at Houdschoote was appointed commander-in-chief of the army of the north with that of Ardennes. His orders were to collect at Guise considerable masses, in order to make an irruption upon the enemy. There was but one unvarying clamour against partial attacks. Without taking into consideration either the plan or the operations of Houchard at Dunkirk, they said he was never beaten when he attacked *en masse*, and this mode of warfare was exclusively insisted upon as being the more suited to the impetuosity of the French character, as the saying was. Carnot had set out for Guise so as to be at the side of Jourdan, and thus carry into execution a new system of warfare entirely revolutionary in its character. Three new commissaries had very recently been added to Dubois-Cranté, who were to make levies *en masse*, and then make a rush upon Lyons. The generals were ordered to abandon the system of attacking according to the rules of art, but were to assault the rebellious city out of hand. Thus in every quarter increased efforts were made to ensure a victorious termination to the campaign.

But measures of severity always go hand in hand with energy. The process against Custine, too long delayed in the opinion of the Jacobins, was at length commenced, and was conducted with all the violence and barbarity of the new judicial forms of procedure. As yet no commander-in-chief had made his appearance on the scaffold; an eagerness to strike some exalted victim, as well as to make the commanders of the armies quail before the authority of the people, was now manifested; above all, it was looked for that some one of the generals should in his person expiate the defection of Dumouriez, and Custine was fixed upon, as his opinions and sentiments had caused him to be considered as another Dumouriez. The very moment that had been settled to make his arrest, was when, holding the command of the army of the north, he temporarily visited Paris, in order to arrange the plan of his operations with the ministry. He was at first simply thrown into prison, but shortly a decree for transferring him to the revolutionary tribunal was required and granted.

Let us review Custine's campaign on the Rhine. When entrusted with a division of the army, he had found Spires and Worms inefficiently protected, because the allies who were pressing to march against Champagne, had left the wings and the rear of their army exposed. The German patriots flocking from all quarters had offered him their cities; he advanced, took Spires and Worms, which they surrendered to him, passed by Manheim, which lay on his road, out of consideration for the neutrality of the Elector palatine, and also because he thought he should not easily obtain an entrance there. At length he came to Mentz, made himself master of the place, rejoiced France by his unlooked for conquests, and thus obtained an appointment which rendered him independent of Biron. At this time, Dumouriez had just defeated the Prussians, and made them fall back upon the Rhine. Kellermann was near Trèves. It was Custine's duty then to proceed down the course of the Rhine to Coblentz, to fall in with Kellermann, and thus to make himself master of the whole side of the river. Every reason concurred in favour of this plan. The inhabitants of Coblentz invited Custine, those of Saint-Goard and Rheinfelds also invited him; there is no knowing how far he might have proceeded had he confined himself to the course of the Rhine. It was by no means impossible for him to have gone as low down as Holland. But from the interior of Germany there were other patriots who also invited him, every one imagined from the boldness of his march that he had a hundred thousand men. To advance into the heart of the enemy's country and beyond the Rhine, was more flattering to the imagination and the vanity of Custine. He hurried on to Frankfort, there to levy forced contributions, and carry his misadvised extortions into effect. There he was again pressed with solicitations. Some hairbrained advisers urged him to proceed as far as Cassel in the heart of the electorate of Hesse, and there seize upon the elector's treasures. The more prudent recommendation of the French government called upon him to return to the Rhine, and to march to Coblentz. But he was deaf to these suggestions,

* Decree of the 1st of October.

and indulged his dream of exciting a revolution in Germany.

However, Custine was sensible of his dangerous position; he saw plain enough that if the elector broke the neutrality, his rear would be exposed to Manheim, indeed he would have taken possession of that place which offered itself to him, but he dared not. When upon the point of being attacked at Frankfort, where he was unable to keep his position, he yet was unwilling to leave that city and return to the course of the Rhine; in fact, he could not bring himself to throw up his delusive acquisitions, and concur with the other commanders in marching downwards in the direction of Coblentz. In this situation he was surprised by the Prussians, lost Frankfort, was driven back upon Mentz, hesitated whether he should or should not keep possession of that place, threw into it some of the artillery taken at Strasburg, gave no orders for its being victualled till it was too late, was in the midst of his doubts and fears again taken by surprise by the Prussians, retired from Mentz, and seized with a panic, fancying himself pursued by a hundred and fifty thousand men, retired into Upper Alsatia, almost under the cannon of Strasburg. Posted as he was upon the Upper Rhine with a considerable army, he was well able to have marched against Mentz, and placed them between cross fires, but he durst not do this; at length, becoming ashamed of his inertness, he made the unfortunate attack of the 15th of May, was beaten, and repaired with visible disappointment to the army of the North, where he sealed his own destruction by moderate measures, and by advising very prudently that the army should be left in Cæsar's camp, instead of making an unsuccessful assault for the relief of Valenciennes.

Such had been the career of Custine. It exhibited many faults, but proved no treason. His trial was proceeded with, and there were called as witnesses against him the representatives sent upon commission, the agents of the executive power, both of them obstinate opponents of the generals, discontented subalterns, members of the clubs at Strasburg, Mentz, and Cambray, and last of all, the terrible Vincent, that tyrant of the war department under Bouchotte. His trial was nothing else but a clamorous crowd of witnesses, who heaped false and inconsistent charges, charges perfectly inconsistent with true military criticism, but resting solely upon accidental mishaps, for which a general was not to be deemed answerable, and which could never be laid to his charge. Custine replied with a certain tone of military vehemence to all these charges, but he was overwhelmed. The Jacobins of Strasburg told him that he refused to make himself master of the passes of Porentruy, when Lukner had issued orders to that effect; he proved, but to no purpose, that the thing was impracticable. A German reproached him with not having taken Manheim since he had been invited thither. Custine's excuse was, the neutrality of the Elector, and the extreme difficulty of the thing. The inhabitants of Coblentz, Rheinfelds, Darmstadt, Hanau, and all the towns who had invited him to come to them, and whose territories he declined to occupy, generally accused him. As to his refusal to march to Coblentz, his answer was irrelevant, and threw an imputation upon Kellerman, who, as he said, refused to assist him; as to his declining to take the other places, he replied reasonably enough, that every one of the German enthusiasts invited him, and that in order to have satisfied them all, he must have had to occupy a hundred leagues of open country. By a singular inconsistency, while he was blamed for not having taken this town, or for not levying forced contributions from that, it was laid to his charge as a crime, that he had taken Frankfort, pillaged the inhabitants, had not made the necessary arrangements for defending himself against the Prussians, and had thus exposed the French garrison to the chance of being massacred. The brave Merlin of Thionville, who gave evidence against him, justified him in this respect with equal candour and reason. Even had he left, said Merlin, twenty thousand men at Frankfort, he would not have been able to retain possession of it; it was his duty to have withdrawn himself from Mentz, and all that could be laid to his charge in that respect was, that he had not done so sooner. But at Mentz, rejoined a crowd of other witnesses, he had not made the necessary arrangements, he had neither provided victuals nor ammunition, but had only packed the artillery of which he had plundered Strasburg, in order that the Prussians might get it, together with twenty thousand men and two of our deputies. Custine proved that he had issued orders for victualling the place, that the artillery was scarcely sufficient, and that it had not been uselessly accumulated for the purpose of its falling into the hands of the enemy. Merlin supported all the assertions of Custine, but what he would not forgive in him was, his pusillanimous retreat, and his inertness on the Upper Rhine, while the garrison of Mentz were performing prodigies of valour. Custine to this made no reply. He was next charged with having burned the stores of Spires on his retreat; a frivolous charge, for having once been compelled to retreat, it were much better to have burnt the stores than have left them for the enemy. A charge was made against him of having caused some volunteers at Spires to be shot for committing acts of spoliation; to this his answer was, that the convention had approved of the course he had pursued. He was furthermore accused of having spared the Prussians in a marked manner, of having exposed his army to defeat on the 15th of May, of having improperly delayed his return to his command in the North, of having attempted to deprive Lille of its artillery for the purposes of Cæsar's camp, of having interposed obstacles to the relief of Valenciennes, of not having made preparations to prevent the landing of the English, charges which vied with each other in absurdity. "Lastly," said his accusers, "you have shown respect to the memory of Louis XVI., you were out of spirits on the 31st of May, you wanted to hang Dr. Hoffman, the president of the Jacobins at Mentz, you have prohibited the circulation in your army of the *Pere Duchesne* and the *Mountain Journal* newspapers; you have said that Marat and Robespierre were disturbers of the peace, you have surrounded yourself with aristocratic officers, you have never had good republicans at your table." These were deadly accusations, and contained the real grievances for which he was hunted down.

The procedure was extremely protracted; all

the charges were of so indefinite a character that the tribunal paused. The daughter of Custine, and a great number of persons who felt deeply for him, had interested themselves very strongly in his behalf; for at this period, great as was the influence of terror, some interest might still be manifested on the behalf of doomed victims. Immediately upon this the revolutionary tribunal itself was denounced to the Jacobins. "It is a most painful task," said Hébert at the Jacobins, "for me to have to denounce an authority of which the patriots had conceived such hopes, which at first merited their confidence, but soon will become their scourge. The revolutionary tribunal is on the point of exculpating a guilty wretch, in whose behalf, it is true, some of the handsomest women in Paris have been stirring heaven and earth. The daughter of Custine, quite as clever an actress as her father was at the head of the armies, is calling upon every body, and promises every thing so that she can but get him off." Robespierre on his part denounced the chicanery and the hankering after the forms of law which had possessed this tribunal, and maintained that were it only for his attempt to strip Lisle of her means of defence Custine deserved to die.

Vincent, one of the witnesses, had ransacked the portfolios of the ministry, and had brought thither the letters and the orders with which Custine was charged as having indited them, and which certainly did not constitute crimes. Fouquier-Tinville concluded by comparing Custine with Dumouriez, and thus sealed the doom of the unfortunate general. "Dumouriez," said he, "had made a rapid march into Belgium in order to abandon it with the like rapidity, and thus deliver it into the hands of the enemy, soldiers, magazines, representatives and all. In the very same manner did Custine march with similar celerity into Germany, left our soldiers to shift for themselves at Frankfort and at Mentz, and would have abandoned to the enemy, together with this latter town, twenty thousand men and two representatives, together with all our artillery, which he had wickedly withdrawn from Strasburg. In the same manner as Dumouriez has be slandered the convention and the Jacobins, and under the pretence of maintaining discipline and good order, he has caused some of our brave volunteers to be shot." This parallel had full weight with the tribunal. Custine for two hours defended his military operations. Tronçon-Ducoudray defended his conduct in his civil as well as in his administrative character, but he made no impression. The tribunal declared the general guilty, to the great joy of the Jacobins and Cordeliers, who filled the hall, and who uttered loud demonstrations of satisfaction. Custine, however, was not unanimously condemned. Upon the three questions put, he had successively against him ten, nine, and eight voices out of eleven. The president having asked him if he had any thing further to say, he looked around him, and not seeing his counsel, he answered, "I have no longer any one to defend me, I die at peace, and am not guilty."

He was executed the next morning. This warrior, whose courage was unquestionable, betrayed great emotion on seeing the scaffold. However, he knelt at the foot of the scaffold, uttered a short prayer, recovered himself, and met his death with firmness. Such was the end of this unfortunate general, who was not deficient either in intelligence or character, but who was inconsistent as well as presumptuous, and committed three grand faults: the first, in departing from his correct line of operation, in betaking himself to Frankfort; the second, in not returning thither, since he was exhorted so to do; and the third was, his timid inertness during the siege of Mentz. However, none of these faults deserved the punishment of death; but he underwent the punishment which could not be inflicted upon Dumouriez, but which like Dumouriez, he had not called upon himself by vast and guilty projects. His death was a terrible example for every one of the generals, and operated as a signal for their absolute obedience to the orders of the revolutionary government.

After this act of severity, executions were by no means to be the less frequent. The order of the day for expediting the trial of Marie-Antoinette was revived. The impeachment of the Girondists so often called for and never prepared, was laid before the convention. Saint-Just was the person who prepared the impeachment, and the petitions in support of this impeachment, which emanated from the Jacobins, compelled the convention to allow it. It not only included the twenty-two and the members of the commission of twelve, but also seventy-three members of the right side who, since the Mountain had obtained the complete ascendancy, had maintained an absolute silence, and had drawn up a well-known protest against the events of the 31st of May, and the 2nd of June. Some extravagant *Mountaineers* wanted the accusation, in other words, the sentence of death, to include the twenty-two, the twelve, and the seventy-three; but Robespierre dissented from this, and proposed a middle course, and that was to send the twenty two and the twelve before the revolutionary tribunal, and to put the seventy-three under arrest. It was done as he wished; the doors of the hall were immediately secured, the seventy-three were arrested, and Fouquier-Tinville commanded to take charge of the unfortunate Girondists. Thus it was that the convention, getting more and more tractable, permitted the order for sending to their death a portion of her members to be thus extorted from her. In good sooth, she could no longer parley, for the Jacobins had sent no less than five most imperious applications, one after the other, in order to procure these latter impeachments.

CHAPTER XIV.

CONTINUATION OF THE SIEGE OF LYONS. CAPTURE OF THIS CITY. TERRIBLE DECREE AGAINST THE REBEL LYONNESE.—PROGRESS OF THE ART OF WAR; INFLUENCE OF CARNOT.—THE VICTORY OF WATIGNIES. OPENING OF THE BLOCKADE OF MAUBEUGE.—THE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LA VENDÉE RESUMED.—THE VICTORY OF CHOLET. FLIGHT AND DISPERSION OF THE VENDEANS BEYOND THE LOIRE.—DEATH OF THEIR PRINCIPAL LEADERS.—DEFEATS ON THE RHINE—LOSS OF THE LINES OF WEISSEMBURG.

Every reverse that we suffered only served to rouse more effectually the revolutionary energy, and this energy it was that produced success. This had always been the case throughout this memorable campaign. Ever since the defeat of Neerwinden up to the month of August a continuous series of disasters had at length called the most desperate exertions into action. The extinguishment of federalism, the defence of Nantes, the victory of Hondschoote, the raising of the siege of Dunkirk, had been the result of these exertions. Fresh reverses at Menin, at Pirmasens, at the Pyrenees, at Torfou and Coron in La Vendée, had begun to stir up an increased energy, which was sure to produce the most decisive successes upon every one of the theatres of war.

The siege of Lyons was, of all the military operations, that of which the result was awaited with the greatest anxiety. We left Dubois-Crancé encamped before this town with five thousand regular troops, and from seven to eight thousand requisitionary recruits. He had every reason to expect that the Sardinians, whom the ill-appointed army of the Great Alps could no longer keep in check, would shortly fall upon his rear. As we have already said, he had stationed himself northward between the Saône and the Rhône, in front of the redoubts of La Croix-Rousse, and not upon the heights of Saint-Foy and Fourvières, situate westward, from which the assault ought in all propriety to have been made. The cause of this preference was founded upon more than one reason. It was above all a matter of importance that he should continue in communication with the Alpine frontier, where the greatest part of the republican army was stationed, and from which quarter the Piedmontese would be enabled to come to the relief of the Lyonnese. In this position, he possessed the further advantage of occupying the upper part of the two rivers, and thus could intercept the supplies which would come down the Saône and the Rhône. True it is, that the west thus continued open to the Lyonnese, and gave them the opportunity of making frequent excursions in the direction of Saint-Etienne and Montbrison; but every day intelligence was received of the forthcoming contingents from the Puy-de-Dôme, and when once he had been joined by these reinforcements, Dubois-Crancé could well complete the blockade on the western side, and then select the most fit point whereon to make his attack. In the meantime, he contented himself by hemming in the enemy, cannonading La Croix-Rousse on the north, and opening his trenches on the east, in front of the bridge of la Guillotière. The conveyance of ammunition was difficult and tardy; in fact, they had to be brought from Grenoble, Fort Barraux, Briançon, and Embrun, and thus traverse sixty leagues of mountainous country. These extraordinary baggage convoys could never indeed have been effected without the assistance of pressing every one into the service, and by putting five thousand horses in motion, for there had to be conveyed to the siege of Lyons fourteen thousand bombs, thirty-four thousand cannon-balls, three hundred thousand pounds of gunpowder, eight hundred thousand cartridges, and one hundred and thirty pieces of artillery.

In the earlier part of the siege intelligence arrived of the march of the Piedmontese, who debouched from the Little Saint-Bernard and from Mount Cenis. Kellermann upon the urgent solicitation of the department of the Isère immediately set out, and left general Dumuy to take his place at Lyons. In point of fact, Dumuy was only his substitute in appearance, for Dubois-Crancé, a representative as also a skilful engineer, directed alone all the operations of the siege. In order to expedite the levy of the supplies from the Puy-de-Dôme, Dubois-Crancé sent off general Nicholas with a small detachment of cavalry, but the latter was taken in the Forez and fell into the hands of the Lyonnese. Dubois-Crancé next despatched in the same direction a thousand disciplined troops, under the command of the representative Javoques. The expedition of the latter was more successful, he repressed the aristocrats of Mont-Brison and Saint-Etienne, and raised from seven to eight thousand peasants, whom he brought back with him to the siege of Lyons. Dubois-Crancé stationed them at the bridge of Oullins, situated to the north-west of Lyons, so as to annoy the communications of that place with the Forez. He caused the deputy Reverchon, who had raised some thousand requisitionaries at Maçon, to draw nearer to him, and stationed him high up the Saône quite to the north. By this the blockade began to be somewhat closer, but the operations were tardy, and assaults were quite out of the question. The fortifications of La Croix-Rousse between the Rhône and the Saône could not be carried by storm. On the eastern side, and upon the left bank of the Rhône, the bridge of Morand was defended by a horse-shoe redoubt, very skilfully constructed. On the west, the important heights of Saint-Foy and Fourvières could not be taken without the assistance of a competent army, and for the present all that was considered necessary was to intercept the supplies, hem in the town and then burn it. From the early part of August to the middle of September, Dubois-Crancé had not been able to make greater progress, and complaints began to be made of his

tardiness, without making him every proper allowance. Nevertheless, he had committed great devastations on that ill-fated city. The magnificent palace of Bellecour, the Arsenal, the quarter of St. Clair, the gate of the Temple, had fallen a prey to the flames, which had in particular caused great injury to that fine building the hospital, which towers so majestically above the Rhône. The Lyonnese on their part made the most determined defence. A report had obtained among them, that fifty thousand Piedmontese were about to debouch upon their city, the emigration party made great promises, but by no means identified themselves with the citizens, and these brave characters, sincere republicans as they were, were by their inconsistent position compelled to call for the disastrous and disgraceful aid of the foreign ally. These feelings manifested themselves very strongly on more than one occasion, so as not to be misunderstood. Précy, who had been desirous of hoisting the white flag, soon perceived that course to be impracticable. An obsidional paper currency having been created for the purposes of the siege, and fleurs-de-lis appearing upon the water-mark of the paper, they were obliged to destroy it, and make another description of paper. Therefore, although the Lyonnese were republicans, yet the terror excited by the vengeance of the convention, the false hopes held out to them by Marseilles, Bordeaux, Caen, and above all by the emigration party, had involved them in a vortex of errors and calamities.

While they were sustaining themselves by the hope of the arrival of fifty thousand Sardinians, the convention had issued orders to the representatives, Couthon, Maignet, and Châteauneuf-Randon, to repair to Auvergne and the neighbouring departments, to effect a levy *en masse* in that quarter, and Kellermann was losing no time in marching to the valleys of the Alps to meet the Piedmontese.

On this occasion, a fine opportunity presented itself to the Piedmontese for effectuating a bold and masterly attempt, which could not have failed of success: it was to concentrate their principal forces upon the little Saint-Bernard, and from thence to debouch upon Lyons with fifty thousand men. It is well known that the three valleys of Sallenche, the Tarentaise, and La Maurienne, lying close to one another, wind in a sort of spiral form, and that commencing from the little Saint-Bernard, they open upon Geneva, Chambéry, Lyons, and Grenoble. A few French divisions were dispersedly posted along these valleys. To make a rapid descent by one of these valleys, and to station themselves at their entrance, would have been a sure method, and in accordance with all scientific principles, of cutting off the detachments engaged in the mountains, and making them lay down their arms. There was little to have apprehended from the attachment of the Savoyards for the French; for the assignats and the requisitions had made them associate the idea of liberty with its charges and severities. The duke of Montferrat, who had the command of this expedition, did not take with him more than twenty to twenty-five thousand men, stationed a division on his right in the valley of Sallenche, descended with the main body to the valley of the Tarentaise, and left general Gordon to traverse the valley of La Maurienne with the left wing of his army. So tardy was he in this movement, that it occupied him from the 14th of August into the month of September. The French, although much inferior to him in numerical force, made a vigorous defence, and protracted the retreat for eighteen days. On his arrival at Moustier, the duke of Montferrat was desirous of joining Gordon on the chain of the Grand-Loup, which divides the two valleys of Tarentaise and La Maurienne, for it never occurred to him to make a quick march upon Conflans, the point where the three valleys meet. This slothful march, and his twenty-five thousand men, are quite sufficient to testify whether he was desirous of proceeding to Lyons.

In the meanwhile, Kellermann, who had hurried from Grenoble, had raised the national guard from the Isère and the adjacent departments. He had infused confidence in the Savoyards, who had begun to exhibit apprehensions of the Piedmontese government, and he had managed to get together not much less than twelve thousand men. He next reinforced the division in the valley of Sallenche, and bent his steps in the direction of Conflans, to the outlet of the two valleys of the Tarentaise and La Maurienne. This took place about the tenth of September. At this period the duke of Montferrat received orders to advance. But Kellermann, who forestalled the Piedmontese, did not hesitate to attack them in their station at Espierre, which they had taken upon the chains of the Grand-Loup, so as to secure a communication between the two valleys. As he could not approach this station in front, he caused it to be attacked in the rear by a single detachment. This detachment, composed of half naked soldiers, nevertheless made the most heroic exertions, and by mere manual labour lifted the cannon upon almost inaccessible heights. All at once the French artillery unexpectedly thundered upon the advanced guard of the Piedmontese, who were exceedingly alarmed. Gordon immediately retreated into the valley of La Maurienne on Saint-Michel; and the duke of Montferrat conveyed himself back to the centre of the valley of the Tarentaise. Kellermann having harassed the duke of Montferrat on the flanks of his army, shortly compelled him to fall back as far as Saint-Maurice and Saint-Germain, and at length drove him on the 4th of October beyond the Alps. Thus the short and successful campaign which the Piedmontese might have accomplished by defiling into the valleys with an increased mass, and then descending through only one of the valleys upon Chambéry and Lyons, failed in this instance for the same reasons that had operated against every attempt the allies had made, and which had saved France.

While the Sardinians were thus driven back beyond the Alps, the three deputies despatched into the Puy-de-Dôme to effect a levy *en masse* in that quarter, raised the country people, by preaching up a kind of crusade, and by persuading them that Lyons, so far from being a defender of the republican cause, was rather the strong-hold of the foreign and emigration factions. Couthon, although paralytic, exerted an activity that his infirmities could not affect, and excited a general enthusiasm. He first despatched Maignet and Chateauneuf

with a first column of twelve thousand men, and remained behind to bring up with him an additional one of twenty-five thousand men, and to procure the necessary supplies of provision. Dubois-Crancé stationed the new recruits on the west side in the direction of Saint-Foy, and thus made the blockade complete. At the same time, he was joined by a detachment from the garrison of Valenciennes, who, according to the conventions already made, were, like the garrison of Mentz, prohibited from serving except in the interior; he placed detachments of regular troops in advance of the requisitionary levies, so as to form effective advanced guards to the columns. His army might then be said to consist of twenty-five thousand requisitionaries, and from eight to ten thousand soldiers who had seen service.

On the 24th, at midnight, he carried by assault the redoubt of the bridge of Oullins, which led to the base of the heights of Saint-Foy. The next day general Doppet, a Savoyard, who had distinguished himself under Carteaux in the war against the Marseillais, arrived to supersede Kellermann. The reason why Kellermann came to be discharged was the lukewarmness of his zeal in the cause, indeed he had only been permitted to retain his command some few days, to give him time to bring his expedition against the Piedmontese to a conclusion. General Doppet immediately settled with Dubois-Crancé for his attack upon the heights of Saint-Foy. All the preparations had been made for the night between the 28th and the 29th of September. Simultaneous assaults were directed, on the north in the direction of La Croix-Rousse, on the east in front of the bridge of Morand, on the south by the bridge Mulatière which is situated above the town at the confluence of the Saône and the Rhône. The main assault was to be made by the bridge of Oullins on Saint-Foy. This, however, did not begin until five o'clock in the morning of the 29th, one or two hours after the others. Doppet encouraging his soldiers, made a rush with them upon a first redoubt, and then engaged them upon a second in a most spirited manner. The great and little Saint-Foy were carried. In the mean time the column appointed to make the attack upon the bridge Mulatière gained it, and got as far as the isthmus at the point where the two rivers meet. The column was on its way to gain an entrance into Lyons, when Précy hurrying thither with his cavalry, managed to repel it and thus saved the place; on his part, Vaubois, who took the command of the artillery, and had conducted a very fierce attack upon the bridge of Morand, got into the horse-shoe redoubt, but was obliged to leave it.

Of all these attacks one only could be said to have been completely successful, but then that was the main attack, that of Saint-Foy. What remained to be done was to pass from the heights of Saint-Foy to those of Fourvières, far more regularly fortified, and much more difficult to carry. The course Dubois-Crancé, who acted upon acknowledged principles and as a skilful tactitian, took, was to act so as not to expose himself to the chances of a renewed assault, and these were his reasons: he was well aware that the Lyonnese, who were now reduced to eat pea-flour, had no more provisions than would last them for a few days, and that then they would be obliged to surrender. He had experienced the effect of their bravery in their defence of the bridge of La Mulatière and the bridge of Morand; he was fearful, therefore, lest an assault upon the heights might fail, and that in such case a check might disorganize his army and compel him to raise the siege. "It would be," said he, "the best thing I could do for the brave and desperate besieged, to give them the opportunity of saving themselves by a battle. Let us leave them to perish from the effect of a few days' famine."

It was at this time that Couthon, on the 2nd of October, came up with a new levy of twenty-five thousand peasants of Auvergne. "I am coming," wrote he, "with my rocks of Auvergne, and I shall hurl them upon the Faubourg of Vaise." He found Dubois-Crancé in the midst of an army of which he had absolute command, where he had established the orders and regulations of military discipline, and where he more frequently exhibited the uniform of a superior officer than the appearance of a representative of the people. Couthon was irritated in witnessing a representative displacing equality by means of a military hierarchy, and above all, would not hearken to him when he spoke of the rules of warfare. "I know nothing," said he, "of tactics, I come here with the people, their enthusiastic fury will bear all before them. We must inundate Lyons with our masses, and carry it by storm. Moreover, I have promised my peasants leave of absence next Monday, and they must go and look to their vintages." It was then Friday, Dubois-Crancé, an experienced man in his profession, and accustomed to regular soldiers, testified some contempt for these peasants, confusedly got together, and insufficiently armed; he proposed that the youngest of them should be picked out and incorporated with the battalions already disciplined, and to send the others home. Couthon would not hearken to any one of these prudential suggestions, and settled that Lyons should be assaulted by storm at every point with the sixty thousand men, of which they had now the command, for such was now the numerical force of the army in consequence of the recent levy. At the same time he sent despatches to the committee of public welfare to procure the recall of Dubois-Crancé. In the council of war it was settled that the assault should be made on the 8th of October.

In the interval the recall of Dubois-Crancé, as well as his colleague Gauthier, came to hand. The Lyonnese had conceived the utmost terror of Dubois-Crancé, whom they had observed for two months so inveterate against their city, and they declared that they would not surrender to him. On the 7th, Couthon summoned them for the last time, and wrote to them that it was himself and the representatives Maignet and Laporte to whom the convention had confided the conduct of the siege. The firing ceased until four o'clock in the afternoon, and then opened again extremely heavy. They were about to make ready for the assault, when a deputation came to offer terms on the behalf of the Lyonnese. It appeared that the object of this negotiation was to afford to Précy and to two thousand of those inhabitants who were deeply implicated, the opportunity of saving themselves in close column. They therefore took advantage of this pause, and issued from the town by the Faubourg

of Vaise, in order to retreat in the direction of Switzerland.

The parley had scarcely begun, when a republican column made its way to the Faubourg Saint-Just. It was too late to make terms, and what was more, the convention would allow of none. On the 9th, the army made its entry into the town, with the representatives at its head. The inhabitants kept themselves close, but all the persecuted *Mountaineers* issued forth in a body to meet the victorious army, and prepared to greet it by performing a sort of popular triumph. General Doppet compelled his soldiers to observe the strictest order, and left to the representatives the exclusive charge of executing the revolutionary vengeance reserved for that unhappy city.

In the mean time Précy with his two thousand fugitives marched toward Switzerland. But Dubois-Cranté foreseeing that this expedient would be his only resource, had for a long time past kept all the passes. The unhappy Lyonnese were pursued, dispersed, and slain by the peasants. According to Précy, no more than eighty persons contrived to reach the Helvetic territory.

Couthon had hardly entered, before he restored the former *Mountaineer* municipality, and commissioned it to apprehend and identify the rebels. He empowered a popular commission to try them according to military law. He next wrote to Paris with information that there were three classes of inhabitants. 1. Wealthy culprits; 2. Wealthy egotists; 3. Ignorant mechanics not identified with any party, and alike incapable of distinguishing good from evil. The first were to be guillotined and their houses levelled; the second were to be muleted of their entire property; and the third were to be transplanted to some other country, and a republican colony founded in their stead.

The capture of Lyons occasioned the utmost satisfaction at Paris, and made amends for the disastrous intelligence at the close of September. Notwithstanding these successful results, complaints were made of the indolence of Dubois-Cranté; and the flight of the Lyonnese by the Faubourg of Vaise, which had only been the means of preserving eighty persons, was made a subject of animadversion. Couthon, in particular, accused him of having made himself an independent general in his army, of having more often made his appearance in the costume of a superior officer than in the dress of a representative, of having affected the arrogance of a military tactician, in short, of having shown a preference for the regular system of besieging a town, rather than to attacks *en masse*. An enquiry was therefore immediately set on foot by the Jacobins against Dubois-Cranté, whose activity and vigour, however, had been of such service at Grenoble, in the south, and before Lyons. Meanwhile, the committee of public welfare prepared decrees of dreadful import, in order to render the authority of the convention more formidable and more readily obeyed. The following is the decree which was presented by Barrère and adopted forthwith.

"Art. 1. There shall be nominated by the national convention upon the appointment of the committee of public welfare, a commission consisting of five representatives of the people, who are to proceed to Lyons without delay to apprehend and try according to military law all those counter-revolutionists who have taken up arms in that town.

"2. All the Lyonnese shall be disarmed; arms will be allowed to those of whom shall be declared that they have not tampered with rebellion, as well as to the defenders of their country.

"3. The town of Lyons shall be destroyed.

"4. No part of it shall be preserved except the poor-house, the manufactories, the studios of artists, the hospitals, the public monuments, and those commemorative of events.

"5. This town shall no longer be called Lyons. It shall be called '*Commune Affranchie*.'

"6. Upon the ruins of Lyons shall be erected a monument, on which shall be inscribed these words: '*Lyons made war against Liberty, Lyons is no more*.'"

The intelligence of the capture of Lyons was forthwith conveyed to the two armies of the north and La Vendée, where the decisive blows were to be stricken, and a proclamation exhorted them to imitate the army of Lyons. It thus addressed the army of the north. "The Standard of Liberty waves over the walls of Lyons and purifies them. There contemplate the presage of victory; victory is the meed of valour. Victory is yours; strike home, exterminate the satellites of tyrants! The country has her eyes upon you, the convention encourages your generous self-devotion; a few more days and tyrants shall exist no more, and the republic will owe to you its prosperity and glory." To the soldiers of the Vendéan army it said: "and you, also, brave soldiers, you also will gain a victory; too long has La Vendée vexed the republic; march, strike, and make an end! All our enemies must fall at once; each army marches forth to victory. Would ye be the last to gather the palm and to merit the glory of having exterminated the rebels and saved the country!"

The committee, as we have already seen, did not omit to make the most of the capture of Lyons. This event, in point of fact, was of the utmost importance. It freed the eastern part of France from the last remains of the rebellion, and deprived the intriguing emigrants in Switzerland of all hope, as it also did the Piedmontese, who could not in future calculate upon making any diversion. It quelled the Jura, protected the rear of the army of the Rhine, opened the transit for men and stores, the want of which was beginning to be felt, to Toulon and the Pyrenees; and lastly, it struck terror into all those towns which demonstrated a tendency to rebellion, and ensured their absolute submission.

It was in the north that the committee was anxious to display more energy than ever, and where it was expected that the generals and soldiers were to exert themselves most extraordinarily. Scarcely had Custine's head been brought to the scaffold, when Houchard was sent before the revolutionary tribunal for not having done all that he could have done at Dunkirk. The recent complaints addressed to the committee in September last, had compelled it to remodel all the staffs. It had just completely renewed them, and had

* Decree of the 18th day of the first month of the year II. of the republic.

elevated mere subalterns to the highest promotions. Houchard, who at the opening of the campaign was a colonel, and before its termination became commander-in-chief, who now stood accused before the revolutionary tribunal; Hoche, a subaltern at the siege of Dunkirk, and now promoted to the command of the army of the Moselle; Jourdan, a *chef de bataillon*, afterwards commanding the centre on the day of Hondschoote, and finally appointed commander-in-chief of the army of the north, were amongst the most striking examples of the vicissitudes of fortune in the republican armies. These sudden promotions not only prevented soldiers, officers, and generals from being well acquainted with, and well understanding one another, but imparted a dreadful idea of that exertion of power which thus was directed against the life of every individual, not only in the case of evident treason, but simply for a suspicion, for a meagre demonstration of zeal in the cause, or for a victory half-gained; but the result was a most absolute devotion on the part of the armies, and of unlimited expectations to those talents who were daring enough to aspire to the dangerous chances of the generalship.

To this period must be referred the first advances of the art of war. Certain it is, the principles of this science have been known and practised from the earliest times by captains who have combined boldness of conception with boldness of character. In comparatively recent times, Frederic afforded an example of the finest strategic combinations. But so soon as the man of genius disappears, and his place is supplied by men of ordinary character, the art of war degenerates into mere outward caution and routine. There used to be an interminable fight for the protection or for the attack of a line; it was a great point to calculate with precision the advantages of a ground, and to make it available for the purposes of that warfare for which it was best suited; but with all these appliances, there used to be a contest for whole years for a province which an adventurous commander might have gained by a single manœuvre; and this timid mediocrity occasioned a greater sacrifice of blood than the hardihood of a rash genius, for men were lost without results being obtained. This had been the practice of the skilful tacticians of the coalition. Against one battalion they set another, they kept all the roads that were exposed to the enemy, and at a time when by a bold advance they might have annihilated the revolution, they never had the courage to make a bold stroke, for fear of exposing themselves. The art of war required regeneration. To form a compacted mass, to inspire it with self-confidence and audacity, to convey it with celerity beyond a particular river, or a chain of mountains, and then fall upon an enemy unexpectedly, by dispersing his forces, by separating him from his resources, by seizing upon his capital, was a grand art, difficult of attainment, and which required a genius which could not but demonstrate itself during the excitement of the revolution.

The revolution, by causing agitation in the public mind, immediately preceded the period of great military combinations. In the beginning, the revolution called to her aid enormous masses of men, far greater in number than all those that had ever been raised for the purposes of kings. The revolution next effected a nervous desire to gain military successes out of the usual course of things, exhibited a marked dislike of protracted and scientific warfare, and suggested the idea of sudden and numerous irruptions upon one selected point. The common saying now was, You must fight in mass. This was the cry of the soldiers upon the frontiers, and of the Jacobins in the clubs. Couthon, when he came to Lyons, had made but one reply to all the arguments of Dubois-Crancé, and that was, that the assault must be made in mass. Lastly, Barrère had made an able and well-digested report, wherein he demonstrated that the cause of our reverses was to be traced to our piecemeal system of fighting. Thus, by forming masses, by inspiring them with self-confidence, by freeing them from the shackles of methodical routine, by impressing them with the spirit and the hardihood of innovating principles, the revolution paved the way for the revival of war upon a large scale. Such a change as this could not be wrought without disorder. Peasants and labourers, when transferred to fields of battle, were, when they first went thither, ignorant, undisciplined, and constantly liable to panic fears, the natural consequences of a defective organization. The representatives, who came for the purpose of promoting a revolutionary feeling in the camps, frequently required that which was impracticable, and committed great acts of injustice towards their brave generals. Dumouriez, Custine, Houchard, Brunet, Canclaux, and Jourdan, all perished or fled from this overwhelming force; but in a month these labourers, who at first were mere Jacobin declaimers, became brave and intelligent soldiers. These representatives imparted an unprecedented, and an extraordinary faculty to the armies; and by dint of peremptory requirements and changes, they concluded by being able to distinguish those courageous talents best adapted to their purposes.

At length, one man came to impart regularity to this grand movement—this man was Carnot. Formerly, a most ingenious officer, and lately become a member of the convention, as well as of the committee of public welfare; as in some measure participating in its inviolability, he was able to impart arrangement and method to the most disjointed operations without being subjected to imputations, and above all, to give them a certain impress of consistency, which no ministry before him had been sufficiently powerful to have effected. One of the principal causes of our preceding reverses, was the utter absence of system which accompanies a great agitation. The committee now established, and become irresistible, and Carnot being invested with all the authority of that committee, deference was paid to the talented ideas of an experienced man, who, forming his judgment from a general view of the whole, prescribed evolutions in perfect harmony with each other, and all of them directed to one object. Generals were now no longer able, as Dumouriez or Custine had formerly done, to act each of them in their own sphere, by drawing all the war and all the means to themselves. Representatives were no longer able either to order or thwart manœuvres, or in any respect to interfere with superior orders. The supreme will of the committee was to be obeyed, and the uniformity of plan which it directed was to be strictly adhered to. Thus placed in the centre, and casting his eyes

over the frontiers, the genius of Carnot naturally enlarged itself in proportion to its elevation; he conceived the most extended plans, in which prudence and boldness were equally combined. The instructions sent to Houchard afford a demonstration of this. Doubtless, his designs possessed something of that inaptitude which attaches on all official plans; and when his orders came to hand they were not always applicable to the places for which they were designed, nor could they be executed at the moment; but they compensated by the completeness of the whole for any difficulty attendant on its details, and ensured us in the following years triumphs in every quarter.

Carnot had hastened to the Northern frontier where Jourdan then was. It had been resolved to attack the enemy boldly, although he appeared formidable. Carnot required a plan from the commander-in-chief, in order to form a judgment upon his views, and reconcile them with those of the committee, in fact his own. The allies on their return from Dunkirk, towards the middle of the line, had joined each other between the Scheldt and the Meuse, and thus composed a formidable mass, capable of effecting decisive results. We have already made the reader acquainted with the theatre of the war. Several lines divide the space lying between the Meuse and the sea, that is to say, the Lys, the Scarpe, the Scheldt, and the Sambre. The allies had, in capturing Condé and Valenciennes, secured two important positions on the Scheldt. Le Quesnoy, of which they had very recently made themselves masters, afforded them a support between the Scheldt and the Sambre; but they possessed none upon the Sambre itself. They fixed their thoughts upon Maubeuge, which, by its position upon the Sambre, would have nearly made them masters over the space comprised between this river and the Meuse. At the opening of the ensuing campaign, Valenciennes and Maubeuge would have afforded them an excellent support for their operations, and their campaign of 1793 would not have been so entirely fruitless. Their last plan, therefore, consisted in occupying Maubeuge.

On the part of the French, among whom the spirit of calculating the probabilities of success began to develop itself, the course intended was to make a movement by Lille and Maubeuge upon both wings of the enemy, and in thus approaching him upon both his flanks, it was expected that his centre would give way. True enough, that the French would in this mode have to expend all their strength upon one or the other of the enemy's wings; but they would still possess the entire advantage derivable from their mass; there was certainly less of the old methodical system in this idea than in those that had preceded it. However, the most pressing matter was the relief of Maubeuge. Jourdan leaving nearly fifty thousand men in the camps of Gavrelle, Lille, and Cassel, who were to form his left wing, got together at Guise as many reinforcements as he was able. He had formed one mass of about forty-five thousand men, already disciplined, and lost no time in making up his regiments from the new levies that accrued from the permanent requisition. However, these levies were in such confusion, that he was obliged to leave behind him some detachments from the troops of the line, for the express purpose of guarding them. Jourdan then appointed Guise as the place where all the recruits were to muster, and advanced at the head of five columns to the relief of Maubeuge.

Already had the enemy invested that fortress. Like those of Valenciennes and Lille, it was supported by an intrenched camp, posted upon the right bank of the Sambre, on the very side by which the French were advancing. Two divisions, under the command of generals Desjardins and Mayer, guarded the course of the Sambre, the one above, the other below Maubeuge. The enemy, instead of advancing in two closely compacted masses, to turn Desjardins back upon Maubeuge, and to throw Mayer back behind Charleroy, where he would have been lost, crossed the Sambre in small divisions, and let the two divisions of Desjardins and Mayer join each other in the intrenched camp of Maubeuge. It was well done to detach Desjardins from Jourdan, and thus to have prevented him from augmenting the active army of the French; but in allowing Mayer to effect a junction with Desjardins, they had permitted these two generals to form near Maubeuge a division of twenty thousand men, who could no longer support the character of a mere garrison, particularly upon the approach of the main army of Jourdan. However, the burden of having to provide for such a concourse of people became a matter of serious inconvenience to Maubeuge, and might, in a certain degree, form an excuse for the enemy's generals for having suffered this junction to have taken effect.

The prince of Cobourg stationed the Dutch, to the number of twelve thousand, upon the left bank of the Sambre, and made an effort to burn the store-houses of Maubeuge, in order to increase the scarcity. He placed General Colloredo on the right bank, and commissioned him to invest the intrenched camp. In advance of Colloredo, Clerfait, with three divisions, formed a company of observation, and was to obstruct Jourdan's march. The allies amounted to nearly sixty-five thousand men.

Had the prince of Cobourg possessed either talents or boldness, he would have left fifteen or twenty thousand men, at most, to invest Maubeuge; he would next have marched with forty-five or fifty thousand against Jourdan, and would have infallibly beaten him; for with the advantage of taking the offensive, and having an equal number, his troops would have carried every thing against ours, which were still badly disciplined. Instead of adopting this course, the prince of Cobourg left about thirty-five thousand men round the place, and remained on the look-out with about thirty thousand in the positions of Dourlers and Watignies.

In this state of things it was practicable for General Jourdan to break through on one point the line occupied by the corps of observation, to march down upon Colloredo, who was engaged upon the investment of the intrenched camp, to place him between cross fires, and having overwhelmed him, to effect a junction with the entire army of Maubeuge, to form with that army a mass of sixty thousand men, and to beat all the allies stationed on the right bank of the Sambre. In order to have done this, he must have directed a single assault upon Watignies, the weakest point

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of all; but by bearing exclusively to that side, he would have left unprotected the road to Avesnes, which led to Guise, where our head-quarters were, and the place where all our stores were concentrated. The French general preferred a more prudent, though less brilliant course, and caused the corps of observation to be attacked upon four points, and so as to always protect the road to Avesnes and Guise. On his left, he detached Fromentin's division to Saint-Waast, with orders to march between Sambre and the enemy's right. General Balland, with several batteries, was to post himself in the centre, fronting Dourlers, to keep Clerfait in check by a heavy cannonade. General Duquesnoy advanced with the right upon Watignies, which formed the enemy's left, a little behind the central position of Dourlers. This point was inefficiently occupied. A fourth division, that of General Beauregard, stationed still more on the right, was to support Duquesnoy in his attack upon Watignies. These various movements were not very connected, and were not directed upon the most important points; they were executed on the morning of the 15th of October; General Fromentin captured Saint-Waast; but not having taken the precaution to keep close along the woods, to shelter himself from the enemy's cavalry, he was assaulted and thrown back into the ravine of Saint-Rémy. At the centre, where it was believed that Fromentin was master of Saint-Waast, and where it was known that the right had succeeded in nearing Watignies, they wanted to go further, and, instead of cannonading Dourlers, thought of taking it. This, it seems, was the advice of Carnot, who settled that the attack should take place, against the opinion of general Jourdan. Our infantry rushed into the ravine which divided it from Dourlers, clambered up the heights exposed to a murderous fire, and reached a level ground, having formidable batteries in front, and in flank a large body of cavalry ready to charge. At the same moment, a fresh company, which had just assisted in putting Fromentin to the rout, again threatened to surround it on his left. General Jourdan exposed himself to the greatest hazard to support our infantry, but it gave way, threw itself in great confusion down the ravine, and very fortunately took up its positions without having been pursued. We had lost nearly a thousand men in this attempt, and our left, under Fromentin, had lost its artillery. General Duquesnoy, on the right, was the only one who was successful, in being able to approach Watignies.

After this attempt, the French became better acquainted with the position. They were sensible that Dourlers was too strongly defended for the principal assault to be directed on that point; that Watignies, which was loosely guarded by General Tercy, and situate behind Dourlers, was easily to be carried, and that this village, once occupied by our main force, the position of Dourlers must necessarily yield. Jourdan, therefore, sent off a detachment of from six to seven thousand men towards his right, to reinforce General Duquesnoy; he ordered General Beauregard, who was too far removed with his fourth column, to turn off from Eule upon Obrechies, so as to effect a concentric effort upon Watignies in conjunction with General Duquesnoy, but he persisted in continuing his course to the centre, and to make Fromentin march towards the left, in order to constitute enclose the entire front of the enemy's line.

The next day, the 16th, the attack commenced. Our infantry, debouching by the three villages of Dinant, Demichaux, and Choise, approached Watignies. The Austrian grenadiers who connected Watignies with Dourlers, were thrown back upon the woods. The enemy's cavalry was kept in check by light artillery judiciously posted, and Watignies was carried. General Beauregard, less fortunate, was surprised by a brigade which the Austrians had dispatched against him. His company, conceiving that the enemy's force was greater than it really was, dispersed and gave up their ground. Both armies had kept each other in check at Dourlers and Saint-Waast, but Watignies was in our possession, and that was the main point. In order to secure its safe possession, Jourdan further reinforced his right at that place by five or six thousand men. Cobourg, too apprehensive of danger, made his retreat, notwithstanding the advantages obtained over Beauregard, and notwithstanding that the duke of York was coming up by a forced march from the opposite side of the Sambre. The probability is, that the fear of seeing the French form a junction with twenty-thousand men in the intrenched camp, prevented him from a continued occupation of the right bank of the Sambre. Certain it is, that if the army of Maubeuge, on hearing the sound of the cannon at Watignies, had fallen upon the inefficient company that were investing the camp, and have done their best to march in the direction of Jourdan, the allies might have been overwhelmed. The soldiers called for this with a great outcry, but General Ferrand was opposed to it, and General Chancel, who was unjustly deemed guilty of this refusal, was sent to the revolutionary tribunal. The successful attack of Watignies decided the raising of the siege of Maubeuge, in precisely the same manner as the victory of Hondschoote had decided the raising of the siege of Dunkirk. It was called the Victory of Watignies, and produced the greatest possible impression upon the public mind.

The allies were thus concentrated between the Scheldt and the Sambre. The committee of public welfare were desirous to derive immediate advantage from the victory of Watignies, from the discouragement which it had caused to the enemy, and from the energy which it had imparted to our army, and resolved to make one last effort, which before the winter should repel the allies from our territory, and leave them with the disheartening conviction that the campaign had been entirely lost. The opinion of Jourdan and of Carnot was opposed to the opinion of the committee. They considered that the rains, already very heavy, the bad state of the roads, and the rest required by the troops, were sufficient reasons for their entering into winter quarters, and their recommendation was, that the bad weather should be turned to account in reducing the army to discipline and order. However, the committee insisted that the French territory should be freed from the enemy, also arguing that in this season a defeat could not be attended with any very important results. In

conformity with the newly suggested ideas that a movement should be made upon the wings, the committee issued orders for marching by Maubeuge and Charleroy on one side, and by Cysoing, Maulde, and Tournay on the other, and thus to entirely enclose the enemy upon the very territory he had invaded. The minute was signed the 22nd of October. The orders were in consequence issued; the army of the Ardennes was to join Jourdan, and the garrisons of the fortresses were to quit them, and their place occupied by the new requisitions or forced levies.

The war with La Vendée had been very recently resumed with renewed activity. We have seen that Canclaux had retreated to Nantes, and that the columns of the Upper-Vendée had returned to Angers and Saumur. Before the recent decrees, which consolidated the two armies of La Rochelle and Brest into one, and conferred the command on general Léchelle, were made public, Canclaux was making ready for a new movement on the offensive. The garrison of Mentz was already reduced by war and disease to nine or ten thousand men. The division of Brest defeated under Beysser was almost disorganized. Canclaux, nevertheless, resolved to hazard a bold march into the heart of La Vendée, and at the same time he earnestly solicited Rossignol to assist him with his army. Rossignol immediately called a council of war at Saumur on the 2nd of October, and caused it to be settled that the columns of Saumur, Thouars, and La Chataigneray should join on the 7th at Bressuire, and should march from thence to Chatillon, so as to make their attack concurrent with that of Canclaux. At the same time he gave orders to the two columns of Luçon and Sables to keep on the defensive, because of their recent miscarriages, and the dangers to which they were exposed from the quarter of Lower-Vendée.

In the meantime, Canclaux had advanced, on the 1st of October, as far as Montaigu, sending before him intelligences as far as Saint Fulgent, with a view to do his best to form a communication by his right with the column of Luçon, in case it should have to take the offensive. Emboldened by the success of his march, he issued orders on the 6th to the advanced guard, always under the command of Kléber, to proceed to Tiffanges. Four thousand Mayençais encountered Elbée's army at Saint-Symphorien, routed it after a sanguinary contest, and drove it entirely away. That same evening, the decree which displaced Canclaux, Aubert Dubayet, and Grouchy, came to hand. This caused great discontent in the column of Mentz; and Philippeaux, Gillet, Merlin, and Rewbell, who were sensible that the army was deprived of an excellent general at the very moment they were lying exposed in the heart of La Vendée, were exceedingly indignant. Doubtless, the consolidation of the command of the West in one person was an excellent measure, but some other individual should have been selected to bear the burden. Léchelle was an ignorant man, and a coward, says Kléber in his Memoirs, and never once stood fire. A subaltern in the army of La Rochelle, he had been suddenly promoted in the same manner as Rossignol, on account of his reputed patriotism; but nobody seems to have been aware, that neither possessing the natural spirit of Rossignol or his courage, he was quite as bad as a soldier as he was inefficient as a general. Until his arrival, the command devolved upon Kléber. They occupied the same positions between Montaigu and Tiffanges.

At length Léchelle arrived, on the 8th of October, and a council of war was holden in his presence. They had just received intelligence of the march of the columns of Saumur, Thouars, and of La Chataigneraye, upon Bressuire; it was then settled that the army should continue its march upon Cholet, where they should fall in with the three columns mustered at Bressuire; and, at the same time, orders were issued to the remainder of the division of Luçon to advance towards the general place of meeting. Léchelle could not comprehend the reasoning of the generals, and approved of every thing, saying, *We must march majestically and "en masse."* Kléber folded up his map with the strongest feeling of contempt. Merlin said that they had chosen the most ignorant of men to command an army most awfully exposed. From this period, Kléber was commissioned by the representatives to take upon himself the entire direction of the operations, subject, however, as a matter of form, to his reporting upon them to Léchelle. The latter took advantage of this arrangement to keep himself far enough from the field of battle. Out of the reach of personal danger himself, he hated the brave fellows who were fighting for him; but there is this to be said for him, he permitted them to fight when and how they pleased.

It was at this time that Charette, perceiving the dangers which threatened the leaders of Upper Vendée, detached himself from them, feigning pretended reasons of dissatisfaction; and he made a precipitate retreat to the coast, with the design of seizing upon the island of Normoutiers. In point of fact, he did make himself master of it on the 12th by a surprise, and by the treason of the officer who commanded it. He was thus satisfied that he would save his division, and be able to enter into communication with the English; but he left the party in Upper Vendée exposed to almost inevitable destruction. He could have acted in a manner much more beneficial for the common cause; he might have attacked the column of Mentz in its rear, and perhaps have annihilated it. The officers of the grand army sent him letter upon letter, exhorting him so to do, but they never received any answer.

These unhappy officers of the Upper Vendée were pressed on all sides. The republican columns, who were to join at Bressuire, repaired thither by the specified time; and on the 9th, they were on the road from Bressuire to Chatillon. In their way, they encountered the army of M. de Lescure, and threw it into confusion. Westermann, now restored to his command, was constantly in the advance-guard, at the head of some hundreds of men. He was the first to enter Chatillon, on the evening of the 9th; the entire army entered it on the next day, the 10th. During this movement, Lescure and Larochejaquelein had summoned the grand army to their relief; and indeed it was not far from them: for being already very closely hemmed in, in the midst of this country, they fought at no great distance from each other. All

the assembled generals resolved to proceed to Chatillon, and they commenced their march on the 11th. Westermann had already advanced from Chatillon upon Mortagne with an advanced guard of five hundred men. At first, he did not consider that he should have to deal with an entire army, and therefore did not apply for any great assistance from his commanding officer; but being suddenly surrounded, he was compelled to make a hasty retreat, and he re-entered Chatillon with his company. The confusion communicated itself to the town, and the republican army abandoned it with the utmost precipitation. Westermann, in conjunction with Chalbos, the commander-in-chief, collecting around him a few brave fellows, stopped the flight, and even managed to get back nearly as far as Chatillon. At nightfall, he said to some of his soldiers who had fled, "You have this day lost your reputation; you must recover it." He immediately took a hundred horsemen, mounted a hundred grenadiers behind them, and at night, while the Vendéans, confusedly dispersed in Chatillon, were asleep or intoxicated, he had the hardihood to enter therein, and to throw himself into the midst of a whole army. The disturbance was indescribable, and the carnage was most frightful. The Vendéans, not recognising each other, fought with each other in mistake; and in the midst of the most terrible confusion, women, children, and old men were butchered. Westermann at daybreak quitted the place, with thirty or forty soldiers, who were left, and went to rejoin the main body of the army, which lay at about the distance of one league from the town. On the 12th, a most dreadful sight harrowed the Vendéans; they themselves had to quit Chatillon drenched with gore, and a prey to the flames, and bent their steps towards the quarter of Cholet, whither the Mayençais were marching. Chalbos, after having restored order in his division, on the next day but one, the 14th, re-entered Chatillon, and made his arrangements to march again in advance, so as to fall in with the army of Nantes.

All the Vendéan leaders, d'Elbée, Bonchamps, Lescure, and Larochejaquelein, were assembled, together with their forces, in the environs of Cholet. The Mayençais, who had commenced their march on the 14th, were fast approaching them; the column of Chatillon was not far distant; and the division of Luçon, which had been sent for, was also on its march, and was to station itself between the columns of Mentz and Chatillon. The time for the general junction of all these forces was close at hand. On the 15th, the army of Mentz marched, in two masses, towards Mortagne, which had just been evacuated. Kléber, with the main body, formed the left, and Beaupuy the right. At the same instant, the column of Luçon arrived near Mortagne, in the expectation of finding a battalion of direction, which Léchelle ought to have stationed on his route. But this general, who never did any thing, had not even discharged himself of this accessary duty. The column was therefore surprised by Lescure, and was assailed on all sides. Fortunately, Beaupuy, who happened to be in the neighbourhood, by reason of his position towards Mortagne, hastened to his relief, and managed to extricate him. The Vendéans were repulsed. The unfortunate Lescure received a ball above the eyebrow, and fell in the arms of his soldiers, who carried him off, and took to flight. The Luçon column then joined that of Beaupuy; young Marceau had very recently assumed its command. On the left, and at the very same time, Kléber had maintained a fight in the direction of Saint-Christopher, and repelled the enemy. On the evening of the 15th, all the republican troops bivouacked in the fields before Cholet, whither the Vendéans had retreated. The Luçon division consisted of about three thousand men; and this, with the column of Mentz, amounted to nearly twelve or thirteen thousand men.

The next morning the Vendéans, after a few cannon-shot, evacuated Cholet, and retreated to Beaupréan. Kléber immediately entered the place, and, prohibiting spoliation upon pain of death, caused the greatest order to be observed. The column of Luçon had conducted itself in the same manner at Mortagne. Therefore, all those historians who have stated that Kléber burnt Cholet and Mortagne, have either committed an error or advanced a falsehood.

Kléber immediately made all his arrangements, for Léchelle was two leagues behind. The river Moine runs in front of Cholet; beyond it is a hilly, uneven ground, forming a semicircle of heights. To the left of this semi-circle is the wood of Cholet; in the centre is Cholet itself; and on the right a mansion situated on an eminence. Kléber stationed Beaupuy, with the advance guard, before the wood; and Haxo, with the reserve of the Mayençais, behind the advance guard, and so as to support it: he posted the column of Luçon, under the command of Marceau, in the centre; and Vimeux, with the remainder of the Mayençais, on the right upon the heights. The column of Chatillon came up in the night between the 16th and 17th. Its number amounted to near nine or ten thousand men, and made the total republican forces amount to about twenty-two thousand strong. A council was held on the morning of the 17th. Kléber did not feel confident in his position before Cholet, because it left him no more than one retreat, and that was the bridge of Moine, communicating with the town. He, therefore, was desirous of marching forwards, so as to get round at the rear of Beaupréau, and to cut off the Loire from the Vendéans. The representatives did not agree with him, inasmuch as the column from Chatillon required a day's rest.

In the meantime, the Vendéan leaders held their council at Beaupréau, in the midst of the most horrible confusion. The peasants took away with them their wives, children, and cattle, and formed an emigration of upwards of one hundred thousand individuals. Larochejaquelein and d'Elbée were for holding out to the last upon the left bank; but Talmont and Anticharap, who possessed great influence in Brittany, were extremely anxious that their force should be shifted to the right hand side of the river. Bonchamps, who conceived that a great enterprise might be achieved by his making an excursion towards the north, and who, as it was currently reported, entertained some design connected with England, was for crossing the Loire. Nevertheless, he was by no means unwilling to attempt a final effort, and to hazard a general engagement before Cholet. Before the battle com-

menced he despatched a detachment of four thousand men to Varades, so as to secure a passage over the Loire in case of a defeat.

It was settled that they were to fight. On the 15th October, at one o'clock in the afternoon, the Vendéans advanced to the number of forty thousand men upon Cholet. The republican generals, not expecting that they would be attacked, had allowed one day for the soldiers to refresh themselves. The Vendéans were composed of three columns; one pointing to the left under Beaupuy and Haxo; the second, to the centre, under the command of Marceau; the third to be entrusted to Vimeux to the right. The Vendéans marched in rank and file, like regular soldiers. Every one of the wounded leaders who were able to sit their horses, were in the midst of their peasants, and encouraged them on that day, which was to decide their fate, and the possession of their homes. Between Beaupréan and the Loire, as well as in every commune that was left them, mass was solemnized, and solemn prayers offered up for the protection of that cause which had suffered so much, and stood exposed to such great peril.

The Vendéans put themselves in motion, and joined the advanced guard of Beaupuy, stationed as we have already noticed on a level ground in advance of the wood of Cholet. One company of the Vendéans advanced in a compacted mass, and charged in the same manner as troops of the line; the others were scattered here and there as sharpshooters, for the purpose of getting at the rear of the advance guard, and even the left wing, by forcing their way into the wood of Cholet. The republicans overwhelmed, were compelled to fall back. Beaupuy had two horses killed under him, as he fell his foot was caught by his spur, and he was within an ace of being made prisoner, when he jumped behind a baggage-waggon, got upon a third horse, and rejoined his column. At this critical moment, Kléber hastened towards the exposed wing; he gave orders to the centre and the right not to stir from their places, and sent instructions to Chalbos to send one of his columns from Cholet to assist the left wing. He himself taking his place near Haxo, imparted renewed confidence to his battalions, and brought back to the firing those who had given way to numerical force. The Vendéans were in their turn repulsed, and although they resolutely returned to the charge, they were again driven back. Meanwhile, the battle raged at the centre and on the right with the same fury. On the right, Vimeux was so advantageously posted that all the exertions proved utterly ineffectual.

However, the Vendéans made better way against the centre than they did against the two wings, and pushed into the hollow where young Marceau was placed. Kléber hastened thither to support the column of Luçon; and at that very time, one of the divisions of Chalbos which he had required, four thousand strong, issued from Cholet. At this juncture, this reinforcement would have been of the utmost importance; but at the sight of the firing, which extended the whole length of the plain, this undisciplined division, as indeed were all those which belonged to the army of La Rochelle, dispersed and returned in confusion to Cholet. Kléber and Marceau, therefore, remained in the centre, with no more than the column of Luçon. Young Marceau, under whose command this column was, was not alarmed; he suffered the enemy to approach within musket-shot, and then suddenly unmasked his artillery, and thus, by his unexpected firing, checked and overwhelmed the Vendéans. The latter, for some time, stood their ground, then rallied and closed their ranks, exposed to a shower of grape-shot; but it was not long before they gave ground and fled in confusion. At this time, their rout became complete at the centre, the right, and the left; Beaupuy, who had rallied his advanced guard, pursued them without mercy. None other than the Mentz and Luçon columns had any share in this battle. Thus, thirteen thousand men had beaten forty thousand. On both sides, the greatest valour had been displayed, but regularity and discipline had decided the advantage in favour of the republicans. Marceau, Beaupuy, and Merlin, who himself pointed the guns, had distinguished themselves by the greatest heroism. Kléber had shown his comprehensive judgment, and his accustomed vigour on the field of battle. On the side of the Vendéans, d'Elbée and Bonchamps, after having performed prodigies of valour, were mortally wounded; Larochejaquelein was the only one that was left of all the Vendéan leaders, and he had exposed himself to be a sharer in these honourable wounds quite as much as they had. The battle lasted from two till six in the afternoon.

By this time it was dark; the Vendéans fled in the utmost haste, throwing away their wooden shoes in their flight. Beaupuy followed them up as hard as he was able. Beaupuy had been joined by Westermann, who not desiring to be as inert as the troops of Chalbos, had headed a company of cavalry, and pursued the fugitives at full speed. After a protracted pursuit, Beaupuy and Westermann halted, and gave their soldiers some rest. However, said they, we are more likely to find bread at Beaupréan than at Cholet, and they actually ventured to march to Beaupréan, whither it was supposed the Vendéans had retreated *en masse*. But their flight had been so rapidly conducted, that one party of them had got to Saint Florent, on the banks of the Loire, the remainder evacuated Beaupréan in confusion on the approach of the republicans, and ceded to them that position, where they might have defended themselves. On the morning of the next day, the 18th, the entire army marched from Cholet in the direction of Beaupréan. The advance-guards of Beaupuy, stationed on the road to Saint-Florent, perceived a great number of individuals run towards them shouting, *Vive la république, vive Bonchamps!* When asked the meaning of this, they answered by stating that Bonchamps was their deliverer. In point of fact, this young hero, stretched on a mattress, and on the point of death, from a shot in the lower part of the belly, had asked and obtained mercy for four thousand prisoners, whom the Vendéans had hitherto dragged along with them, and whom they were about to shoot; the prisoners now rejoined the republican army.

There were at this time eighty thousand individuals, women, children, old men, and armed men, on the banks of the Loire, who, with the remains of their property, were disputing for a score of barks, in order to gain a passage over to the other side. The superior council, consisting of those

leaders who were still capable of advising, considered whether they ought to disperse or carry the war into Brittany. Some of them were for dispersing themselves throughout La Vendée, and concealing there till things should come round. Larochejaquelein was of this number, and his advice was to hold out to the last extremity upon the left side, rather than cross over to the right side of the Loire. Nevertheless, the majority were of a different opinion, and it was settled that they should remain together and cross over. But Bonchamps had just breathed his last, and there was nobody competent to prosecute the designs he had formed in regard to Brittany. D'Elbée, who was in a dying state, had been sent to Normoutiers; Lescure, mortally wounded, was borne upon a litter. Eighty thousand individuals had quitted their pastures for the mere purpose of carrying devastation among their neighbours, and there inviting extermination, and for what purpose, gracious God! for an unreasonable cause, one that was on every side either deserted, or hypocritically defended! While these unfortunates thus generously exposed themselves to such dreadful evils, the allied powers scarcely gave them a thought, the emigrants were intriguing in courts, some few of them, perhaps, might be fighting bravely on the Rhine, but in foreign armies; and not one of them ever thought of sending a soldier or a crown-piece to poor unhappy Vendée, already the scene of twenty heroically contested fights, and now vanquished, exiled, and desolate.

The republican generals assembled together at Beaupréau, and there it was arranged that they should separate, and proceed, some of them to Nantes, and some of them to Angers, in order to present an off-hand attack on both those towns. The opinion of the representatives, but in which Kléber did not concur, was that La Vendée should be destroyed. "*La Vendée is no more!*" wrote they to the convention. The army had been allowed till the 20th of October to accomplish their mission, and they had concluded their operations by the 18th. On that same day the army of the north had gained the battle of Watignies, and had thus terminated the campaign by opening the blockade of Maubeuge. Thus in every way the convention seemed to have nothing else to do than to decree a victory as a means of ensuring it. Enthusiasm was at its height at Paris, and throughout France, and every one began to believe that before the end of the season the republic would become victorious over all the thrones which had conspired against her.

There was but one single event to disturb this general satisfaction, and that was the loss of the lines of Weissenburg on the Rhine, which had been forced upon the 13th and the 15th of October. After the defeat at Pirmasens we left the Prussians and the Austrians before the two lines of the Sarre and the Lauter, and every minute appearing ready to carry them by assault. The Prussians having harassed the French upon the banks of the Sarre, compelled them to fall back. The division of the Vosges driven beyond Hornbach, retreated a long way behind to Bitche, in the heart of the mountains; the army of the Moselle, driven back up to Sarreguemines, became separated from the division of the Vosges and from the army of the Rhine. In this position it were a very easy matter for the Prussians, who had on the western slope passed beyond the common line of the Sarre and the Lauter, to get round at the back of the lines of Weissenburg by their extremity on the left. Consequently these lines must be taken. This indeed did actually take place on the 13th of October. Prussia and Austria, between whom there had been, as we have already observed, a want of cordiality, were at length upon better terms; the king of Prussia had gone into Poland, and had relinquished the command to Brunswick, who had orders to hold himself in communication with Wurmser. From the 13th to the 14th of October, while the Prussians marched along the line of the Vosges up to Bitche, considerably above the heights of Weissenburg, Wurmser was to attack the lines of the Lauter in seven columns. The first under the command of the prince of Waldeck, which had orders to cross the Rhine at Seltz and to get round at the back of Lauterburg, encountered, both from the nature of the locality and the courage of a semi-battalion of the Pyrenees, insurmountable obstacles; the second, after having passed the lines above Lauterburg, was repulsed; the others, after obtaining higher up and in the neighbourhood of Weissenburg some advantages, balanced by the vigorous defence of the French, nevertheless made themselves masters of Weissenburg. Our troops fell back upon the position of Gejsburg, situated somewhat in the rear of Weissenburg, and much more difficult to carry. Still the lines of Weissenburg could not yet be considered as irretrievably lost, but the intelligence of the march of the Prussians upon the western slope compelled the French general to fall back upon Haguenau and upon the lines of the Lauter, and thus to make a cession of one part of the territory to the allies. On this point the frontier was then invaded, but the victories in the north and La Vendée neutralised the effect of this unpleasant news. Dispatches were forwarded to Saint-Just and Lebas in Alsatia, to counteract the movements that the Alsatian nobility and the emigrants excited at Strasburg. Numerous levies were being made with an eye to that quarter, and the French consoled themselves by resolving to obtain the mastery on that point as on every other.

The fearful apprehensions that had been entertained during the month of August, before the victories of Hondschoote and of Watignies, before the capture of Lyons, and the retreat of the Piedmontese beyond the Alps, and before the victories in La Vendée had been obtained, were now dispelled. At this period France witnessed the deliverance from the enemy of the northern frontier, the most important and the most exposed of all, the restoration of Lyons to the republic, La Vendée in subjection, every rebellion in the interior repressed, from the Italian frontier to the place where Toulon still held out, but who was the only one who did offer any resistance. One more victory at the Pyrenees, Toulon, and at the Rhine, and the republic would be in every respect victorious, and this threefold success did not seem to be more difficult of attainment than the others were. Doubtless the task was by no means finished, but there was nothing to prevent its soon being completed

by continually applying the same exertions and the like means: the republic was not entirely recovered it is true, but she was no longer in danger of a speedy dissolution.

CHAPTER XV.

EFFECTS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LAWS: PROSCRIPTIONS AT LYONS, MARSEILLES, AND BORDEAUX—PERSECUTIONS INFLICTED UPON "SUSPECTED PERSONS." INTERIOR OF THE PARISIAN PRISONS; STATE OF THE PRISONERS AT THE CONCIERGERIE.—QUEEN MARIE-ANTOINETTE IS SEPARATED FROM HER FAMILY AND CONFINED IN THE CONCIERGERIE; THE INFLICTIONS TO WHICH SHE IS COMPELLED TO SUBMIT.—THE ABOMINABLE CONDUCT OF HÉBERT. HER TRIAL BEFORE THE REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL. SHE IS CONDEMNED TO DEATH AND EXECUTED. —RELATION OF THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF THE GIRONDISTS.—EXECUTION OF THE DUKE OF ORLEANS, BAILLY, MADAME ROLAND. UNIVERSAL TERROR. THE SECOND LAW OF THE "MAXIMUM." STOCK-JOBBING. FORGERY OF A DECREE OF THE CONVENTION BY FOUR DEPUTIES—ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW SYSTEM OF WEIGHTS, MEASURES, AND OF THE REPUBLICAN KALENDAR. DIVINE WORSHIP ABOLISHED; ABJURATION OF GOBEL THE BISHOP OF PARIS. INSTITUTION OF THE WORSHIP OF REASON.

THE revolutionary measures decreed for the welfare of France were put in execution throughout the length and the breadth of the land with the utmost severity. As having emanated from men of the most fervid ideas, they enunciated the most violent principles; as not being carried into effect under the eye of those persons in authority who had conceived them, but by those in a lower station, where the passions being less intelligent were more brutal, they became still more violent in their application. Some citizens were compelled to leave their homes, others were imprisoned as suspected persons; provisions and articles of daily consumption were seized for the purposes of the armies, corvées* were imposed to expedite their conveyance to their destination, and nothing was given in exchange for articles required, or services demanded, save assignats; in other words, a debenture upon the state which possessed no credit. The assessment of the compulsory loan was rapidly proceeded with, and the assessors of the commune would say to some: "Your income is ten thousand livres;" to others, "You have twenty;" and all so addressed, without having the power of being heard in reply, were compelled to bring forth the sum demanded. This universal arbitrary system was productive of great abuses; but the armies were filled with men, provisions in plenty were on their road to the government stores, and the thousand millions in assignats which were to be called in, began to be received. It is not without inflicting great sufferings that such rapid operations can be effected, and that a state exposed to peril can be saved.

In all those localities where the imminence of the danger had called for the presence of the commissaries of the convention, the revolutionary measures were in those places more strictly executed. In the neighbourhood of the frontiers, and in all those departments where royalism or federalism was supposed to exist, these commissaries had enlisted the population *en masse*; they had put every thing in requisition for the public service, levied heavy revolutionary taxes upon the wealthy over and above the proceeds of the forced loans; they had expedited the imprisonment of suspected persons; and in short, they had even on some occasions tried them by revolutionary commissions instituted by themselves. Laplanche, who had been sent into the department of the Cher, said, on the 29th Vendemiaire, to the Jacobins, "Wherever I have been, I have made terror the order of the day; I have every where levied heavy sums upon the wealthy and the aristocrats. Orleans provided me with fifty thousand livres, and two days were all I wanted to raise two millions from Bourges. As I could not be in more than one place at a time, my delegates filled my place: one individual, of the name of Mamin, a man worth seven millions, and assessed in respect of that sum by one of my delegates at forty thousand livres, complained to the convention, who has approved of my conduct; and if he had been assessed by myself, he would have had to pay two millions. I have made my delegates render at Orleans a public account: these accounts were passed at the popular club in that town; and this account has been ratified by the people. I have every where caused the bells to be melted down, and have consolidated several parishes. I have turned all federalists out of office, imprisoned suspected persons, and have called out the *sans-culottes*. The priests retained all their articles of luxury in the houses where they were confined; the *sans-culottes* lay upon straw in the prisons; the former have furnished me with good mattresses for the latter. I have every where compelled the priests to get married. Wherever I have been, I have electrified the hearts and the minds of men. I have organised manufactories for arms, visited the workshops, the hospitals, and the prisons. I have several battalions from the levy *en masse*. I have reviewed a great number of the national guards, in order to republicanise them; and I have guillotined a great number of royalists. In a word, I have followed my imperative commission. I have on every occasion, in my character of a revolutionary representative, conducted myself as a hot *Montagnard*."

It was particularly in the three principal federalist cities, Lyons, Marseilles, and Bordeaux, that the representatives had caused a deep sensation of terror. The formidable decree passed against Lyons enacted, that the rebels and their accom-

* The meaning of this term, which the reader will perceive is here used in an analogous sense, is explained, *ante*, p. 2. col. 2. *note*.

plices should be tried by a commission, according to a military law, that the *sans-culottes* should be maintained at the expense of the aristocrats, that the houses of the wealthy should be destroyed, and that the name of the town should be changed. The execution of this decree had been confided to Collot d'Herbois, Maribon Montaut, and Fouché of Nantes. They had gone to Commune-Affranchie*, bringing down with them forty Jacobins, in order to organise a new Jacobinical club, and propagate the doctrines of the parent society. Ronsin had followed them with two thousand men of the revolutionary army, and had immediately displayed their fury. The representatives struck the first blow with a hammer upon one of the houses sentenced to be demolished, and eight hundred labourers had instantly been set to work in destroying the finest streets. The proscriptions also commenced at the same time. Those Lyonese who lay under the suspicion of having borne arms, were either guillotined or shot at the rate of fifty or sixty a day. Terror, indeed, reigned supreme in this devoted city. The commissaries who had been sent to punish her, maddened and intoxicated with the shedding of blood, believing that at each cry of agony they saw the revival of rebellion, wrote to the convention that the aristocrats were by no means entirely brought to submission, that they were only watching the opportunity to effect a counteraction; and that in order to rid themselves of all apprehension, they must displace one part of the population and destroy the other. As the means employed did not appear to be sufficiently expeditious, Collot d'Herbois devised the idea of mining in order to destroy the buildings, and grape-shot as a means of killing the proscribed; and he wrote to the convention, that very soon he should avail himself of some more prompt and efficacious means for the punishment of the rebellious city. At Marseilles numerous victims had been sacrificed. But the direst wrath of the representatives was directed against Toulon, the siege whereof was most vigorously prosecuted.

In the department of the Gironde, revenge displayed itself with still greater fury. Isabeau and Tallien were stationed at La Réole: at that place they occupied themselves with forming the nucleus of a republican army, which was to penetrate into Bordeaux, and, as subservient to this intention, they used their utmost exertions to dissolve the sections of that town. To effect this they availed themselves of one section which was entirely *Mountaineer*, and this section, by dint of intimidating the others, caused the federalist club to be closed, and the departimental authorities to be turned out, so that they had entered Bordeaux in triumph, and had entirely restored the municipality and the *Mountaineer* authorities. Immediately afterwards they issued an order, declaring that Bordeaux should be subjected to military law, that all the inhabitants should be disarmed, that the aristocrats and the federalists should be tried by a special commission, and that an extraordinary tax should be levied upon the wealthy, to defray the expenses of the revolutionary army. This order was forthwith put in execution, the citizens were disarmed, and numbers perished on the scaffold.

It was at this particular period that the fugitive deputies, who had embarked in Brittany for the Gironde, arrived at Bordeaux. They all of them sought an asylum with a relation of Guadet, in the cellars of Saint-Emilion. There was a notion that they lay concealed in this quarter, and Tallien made the most strenuous exertions to discover their hiding place. Hitherto they had not succeeded, but he had unfortunately contrived to seize Biroteau, who had come from Lyons to embark at Bordeaux. This latter person was outlawed. Tallien immediately caused his identity to be evidenced, and executed him. Duchatel was also discovered, but as he was not outlawed, he was transferred to Paris, there to be tried by the revolutionary tribunal. With him were sent the three young friends, Riouffe, Girey-Duprey, and Marchenna, who were, as we have already seen, attached to the fortunes of the Girondists.

Thus all the great cities of France were subjected to the vengeful fury of the Mountain. But Paris, filled with more illustrious victims, was now about to become the scene of still greater atrocities.

While the proceedings against Marie-Antoinette, the Girondists, the Duke of Orleans, Bailly, and a host of generals and ministers were in preparation, the prisons were crammed with suspected persons. We have already stated that the commune of Paris had arrogated to itself a species of legislative authority upon all matters relating to police, provisions, traffic, divine worship, &c., and to each decree it appended a declaratory order, having the effect of extending or limiting the orders of the convention. Upon the requisition of Chaumette, it had particularly enough extended the definition of suspected persons, as declared by the law of the 17th of September. Chaumette had in a municipal notice specified the characters which it was intended to comprehend under this definition. This notice, addressed to the sections of Paris, and immediately afterwards to every section of the republic, was couched in the following terms:—

"Those are to be deemed suspected persons:

1st. "Who in the public meetings check their energy by crafty addresses, turbulent cries, and threatening language. 2nd. Those who, more prudent in their conduct, speak mysteriously upon the misfortunes of the republic, affect to commiserate the people, and are always ready to circulate bad news with an affected sorrow. 3rd. Those who have trimmed their language and demeanour according to the course of events; who, although silent upon the subject of the crimes of the royalists and federalists, emphatically declaim against the slight failings of the patriots, and affect, in order that they may appear to be republicans, an austerity of manner, and a studied severity of demeanour, but make allowances whenever a moderatist or an aristocrat is concerned. 4th. Those who sympathize with those farmers and greedy tradesmen whom the law is compelled to prosecute. 5th. Those who, although constantly having the words, *liberty*, *republic*, and *country* upon their lips, yet associate with *ci-devant* nobles, priests, anti-revolutionists, aristocrats, *feuillans*, and mo-

* The new name given to Lyons by the decree of the convention, *ante*, p. 348, col. 1.

deratists, and interest themselves on their behalf. 6th. Those who have not taken an active part in everything that concerns the revolution, and to excuse themselves, set up the payment of their taxes, their patriotic donations, their service in the national guard, be it by substitute or otherwise. 7th. Those who have received the republican constitution with indifference, and have exhibited false apprehensions as to its establishment, and its probable duration. 8th. Those who, although they have committed no act against liberty, have yet done nothing for liberty. 9th. Those who do not frequent their sections, excusing themselves by pleading their inexperience in public speaking, or that they are prevented by business. 10th. Those who are in the habit of speaking contemptuously of the constituted authorities, of the symbols of the law, of the popular societies, and of the defenders of liberty. 11th. Those who have signed petitions of a counter-revolutionary tendency, or attended at anti-civic societies and clubs. 12th. Those who are well known as having been insincere in their professions, partisans of Lafayette, and those who have marched at a military pace in the Champ-de-Mars."

After such a definition the number of suspected persons must necessarily have been unlimited, and it soon rose in the prisons of Paris from a few hundreds to three thousand. At first they were detained at the Mairie, the Force, the Conciergerie, the Abbaye, Saint-Pelagie, the Madellonettes, and in every state prison; but these large establishments being insufficient, it became necessary to provide new places of detention, specially appointed for persons confined on political charges. As the charges of imprisonment were payable by the prisoners, houses were hired at their expense. One had been selected in the Rue d'Enfer, known by the name of *maison de Port-Libre*; there was another in the Rue de Sevres, called *maison Lazare*. The College of Duplessis became a prison-house, and lastly, the palace of the Luxembourg, at first appropriated for the reception of the twenty-two, became filled with a vast number of prisoners, and there were shut up, without distinction, all those that remained of the brilliant society of the Faubourg Saint Germain. These sudden arrests had induced some confusion in the prisons, the prisoners at first being badly accommodated. No distinction being made between these prisoners and criminals, and having to lie upon straw, the first period of their imprisonment was bitter indeed. However, it was not long before time brought better arrangements, and some conveniences. Communications from without were permitted; the prisoners had the consolation of embracing their relatives, and the means of procuring money. They then hired beds, or had them brought thither; they no longer lay upon straw, and were separated from the criminals. They also were allowed all those accommodations which could render their state more supportable: for the decree permitted the transfer to the prison-houses of every thing that the prisoners required. Those who became inmates of the newly-established prison-houses were still better accommodated. At Port-Libre, in the maison Lazare, and at the Luxembourg, where wealthy prisoners were detained, decency and plenty were observable. Their tables were supplied with luxuries upon payment of some fees for such indulgence. However, as the influx of visitors increased very much, and communications from without appeared too great an indulgence, the prisoners were deprived of this consolation, and they could no longer communicate with any one save by writing, and even that was restricted to the procuring such things as they required. From that time the society that existed between these unfortunate persons, who were doomed to live exclusively with each other, became linked by closer ties. Every one chose his acquaintance from a conformity of taste, and small societies were thus formed. Rules were framed, domestic offices were distributed among them, and they served them each in his turn. A subscription was opened to defray the charges of rent and housekeeping, and the wealthy thus contributed to the necessities of their poorer brethren.

After having attended to their domestic concerns, the occupiers of the different rooms met together in the common room, and forming themselves into small companies around a table, a stove, or a fire-place, amused themselves with working, reading, or conversation. Poets, who had been thrown into prison, with those who by exhibiting any superiority whatever had excited suspicion, here recited their poems. Musicians gave concerts, and very fine music was every day to be heard in these abodes of proscription. Expensive habits quickly became associated with these pleasurable enjoyments. The females attired themselves to the best advantage; connections of friendship and of love were formed, and up to the eve of the scaffold the ordinary scenes of life were exemplified here, forming a singular elucidation of the French character, of its thoughtlessness, its gaiety, and its tendency to pleasurable associations under every possible change of circumstances.

Delightful poems, romantic adventures, acts of mutual kindness, a singular confusion of ranks, fortune, and opinion, marked these first three months of the detention of suspected persons. A sort of voluntary equality realized in these places that ideal equality which its self-willed votaries desired should every where prevail, and which they failed in establishing, except in the prisons. It is true that the pride of certain prisoners was repugnant to this equality of misfortune. While men, very unequal in regard to fortune and education, were seen living on the best terms together, and with admirable disinterestedness congratulating themselves upon the victories of that republic which persecuted them, some *ci-devant* nobles and their wives, found by chance in the deserted mansions of the fauxbourg Saint Germain, yet dwelt apart, still called themselves by the proscribed titles of count and marquis, and manifested their ill-nature when they were told that the Austrians had fled at Watignies, or that the Prussians had not been able to pass over the Vosges. Affliction however it is that revives the dictates of nature and of humanity; and soon, when Fouquier-Tinville, knocking daily at these miserable abodes, began incessantly to call for more heads, when friends and relatives were every day parted by death, those who remained mourned together, and imparted

mutual consolation, and entertained but one feeling amidst the universality of the misfortune.

All the prisons, however, did not exhibit the same scenes. The Conciergerie, adjoining the palace of Justice, and for this reason containing the prisoners destined for the revolutionary tribunal, presented the painful spectacle of some hundreds of unfortunates who had no more than three or four days to live. They were removed thither the day before their trial, and it was there that they spent the short period that intervened between their trial and execution. There were to be seen the Girondists, who had been taken from their previous prison, the Luxembourg; Madame Roland, who, after she had assisted her husband in making his escape, had suffered herself to be imprisoned, not even thinking of flight; the younger Riouffe, Girey-Dupré, and Bois-Guion, attached to the cause of the proscribed deputies, and transferred from Bordeaux to Paris, to be tried at the same time with them; Bailly, who had been arrested at Melun; Clavières, ex-minister of the finances, who had not, like Lebrun, been lucky enough to escape; and the Duke of Orleans, transferred from the prisons of Marseilles to those of Paris; the generals Houchard and Brunet, all reserved for the same fate; and, lastly, the unfortunate Marie Antoinette, who was destined to precede all these illustrious victims to the scaffold. There the inmates took no heed to procure for themselves those conveniences which soothed the lot of the persons confined in the other prisons. They were placed in dull, dreary cells, whither neither light, consolation, or pleasure, ever penetrated. Scarcely were the prisoners allowed the privilege of sleeping on beds instead of upon straw. Unable to divert their attention from the consideration of death like the merely suspected, who imagined that they should not be detained longer than the peace, they strove to amuse themselves with its horrors, and strangely parodied the forms of the revolutionary tribunal, and even the guillotine itself. The Girondists in their prison extemporized and performed singular and terrible dramas, of which their fate and the revolution were the subject. It was at midnight, when the turnkeys had retired to rest, that the melancholy representations commenced. One of those which they devised was as follows; each of them sitting upon a bed, personated the judges and the jury of the revolutionary tribunal, and in particular Fouquier-Tinville. Two of them placed opposite to each other were to represent the accused and his defender. Following the usage of that sanguinary tribunal, the accused was in every case condemned, and then immediately stretched upon a bedstead turned upside down, he underwent the semblance of the punishment even to its minutest details. After many executions the accuser came in his turn to be the accused, and fell in his turn: then it was that, covered with a sheet in the character of the accuser's ghost, he described the torments which he was enduring in hell, proclaimed their fate to all these unjust judges, and seizing them with frightful cries, dragged them with him to the infernal regions. "It was thus," said Riouffe, "that we made sport with each other in the very jaws of death, and that, in our prophetic diversions, we spoke our real sentiments in the midst of spies and executioners."

Since the death of Custine the public began to be accustomed to those political trials, in which mere errors of judgment were transmogrified into crimes worthy of death. Accustomed to these sanguinary practices, the public mind dismissed all compunctious visitings, and looked upon it as quite a natural course of things, that every member of an adverse party should be sent to the scaffold. The Cordeliers and the Jacobins had obtained a decree for bringing the queen to trial, as well as the Girondists, several generals, and the Duke of Orleans. They peremptorily insisted that the promise made with them should be kept, and it was with the queen that they were particularly anxious to commence this long series of immolations. One would think that a woman ought not to have been exposed to political fury, but Marie Antoinette was hated more cordially than even Louis XVI. To her were attributed the duplicities of the court, the waste of the public money, and, above all, the implacable hostility of Austria. Louis XVI., it was said, had suffered every thing to be done, but it was Marie Antoinette who had done every thing; and that she was the person who ought to be punished.

We have already observed as to the alterations that had been made in the Temple. Marie Antoinette had been separated from her sister, her daughter, and her son. By virtue of a decree which gave orders for the trial or banishment of the last members of the family of the Bourbons, she had been removed to the Conciergerie; and there, alone, in a narrow prison, she was reduced to bare necessaries, precisely upon the same footing as the other prisoners. The imprudence of a devoted friend had rendered her situation still more painful. Michonnis, a member of the municipality, in whom she had excited a warm interest, was desirous of introducing to her a person who, he said, wished to see her out of curiosity. This man, a courageous emigrant, threw her a pink, enclosing a slip of very fine paper with these words: *Your friends are at hand.* False hope! and equally pernicious to her who entertained as to him who communicated it. Michonnis and the emigrant were detected, and forthwith apprehended; and the vigilance exercised in regard to the unfortunate prisoner became from that day more severe than ever. Gendarmes were to keep incessant watch at the door of her prison, and they were expressly forbidden to answer any thing that she might say to them.

That wretch Hébert, the deputy of Chaumette, and editor of the disgusting newspaper of *Père Duchêne*, a writer of the party of which Vincent, Ronsin, Varlet, and Leclerc were the leaders,—this Hébert had made it his particular business to torment the unfortunate survivors of the dethroned family. He affected that the family of the tyrant ought not to be better treated than any *sans-culotte* family; and he had caused a resolution to be passed, which prohibited a certain description of liberality that had been shown towards the prisoners in the Temple, in respect of their diet. They were no longer to be allowed either poultry or pastry; they were reduced to a single article of food for breakfast, and to soup or broth, and a single dish, for dinner; to two dishes for supper, and half a bottle of wine apiece. Tallow candles

were substituted for wax, pewter for silver plate, and common earthenware (*faïence*) for porcelain. None but the wood and water carriers were permitted to enter their room, and even then accompanied by two commissioners. Their food was given them by means of a turning-box. The well-appointed household was reduced to a cook and scullion, two men-servants, with a woman-servant for the linen.

Immediately after this order had been issued, Hébert went to the Temple, and inhumanly took away from the unfortunate prisoners even the most trifling articles, which they valued exceedingly. Eighty louis, which Madame Elizabeth had saved, and which she had received from Madame de Lamballe, were also taken away. No character is more dangerous or more obdurate than a brutal uneducated man invested with a brief authority. Above all, if he should be of a grovelling nature; if, like Hébert, who was check-taker at the door of a theatre and embezzled the receipts, he should be destitute of every natural decency, and if he happen to start, all at once, from the slime of his dirty origin, into power, he will exhibit himself in his true colours, and become as detestable as he is wicked. Such was Hébert in his conduct at the Temple. He did not confine himself to the annoyances we have just alluded to; he and some others conceived the idea of separating the young prince from his aunt and his sister. A shoemaker named Simon, and his wife, were the instructors to whom it was deemed right to consign him, for the purpose of giving him a *sans-culotte* education. Simon and his wife were confined in the Temple, and becoming prisoners with the unfortunate child, were directed to bring him up in their own way. Their food was better than that of the princesses, and they were fed from the table of the municipal commissaries who were on duty. Simon was permitted to go down, accompanied by two commissaries, to the court-yard of the Temple, with the young prince, for the purpose of giving him a little exercise.

Hébert conceived the detestable idea of wringing from this child statements against his unhappy mother. Whether this wretch communicated to the child false statements, or abused his tender age, and his condition, to extort from him whatsoever he pleased, he obtained a revolting deposition; and as the youth of the prince did not admit of his being brought before the tribunal, Hébert appeared, and detailed the infamous particulars which he had himself either dictated or fabricated.

It was on the 14th of October that Marie-Antoinette appeared before her judges. Dragged before the sanguinary tribunal by the inexorable vengeance of the revolution, she appeared there without the slightest chance of acquittal, for the Jacobins had brought her thither for a far different purpose than to get her acquitted. It was necessary, however, to state some complaints. Fouquier, therefore, collected the rumours current among the populace ever since the arrival of the princess in France; and in the act of accusation, he charged her with having wasted the public money, first, for the maintenance of her pleasures, and afterwards, in order to transmit money to her brother the emperor. He laid great stress upon the scenes of the 5th and 6th of October, and on the entertainment given by the life-guards, alleging that she had at that period contrived a plot, which compelled the people to go to Versailles to frustrate it. He afterwards accused her of having exclusively controlled her husband, of having interfered in the choice of ministers, of having herself been the contriver of the intrigues with the deputies gained over by the court, of having made preparations for the journey to Varennes, of having induced the war, and imparted to the enemy's generals all our plans of the campaign. He further accused her of having prepared a fresh conspiracy on the 10th of August; of having on that day caused the people to be fired upon; of having induced her husband to defend himself by taxing him with cowardice; lastly, of having never ceased to conspire and correspond with the foreign enemy since her captivity in the Temple, and of having there treated her young son as king. We here have presented to us the fact that every thing is distorted, and considered as a crime on that terrible day, when popular vengeance, long deferred, at length bursts forth with uncontrollable force, and smites those princes who have not merited the stroke; we are here also led to observe in what light the profusion and fondness for pleasure, so natural to a young princess, the attachment she displayed towards her native country, her influence over her husband, her complaints always accompanied with less discretion in a woman than in a man, nay, even her more uncompromising spirit, appeared to their excited or malignant imaginations.

Witnesses had to be produced. Lecointre, deputy of Versailles, who had been an eye witness of the events of the 5th and 6th of October, Hébert, who had frequently visited the Temple, various clerks in the government offices, and several domestic servants of the old court were summoned. Admiral d'Estaing, formerly commandant of the national guard of Versailles; Manuel, the ex-procurator of the commune; Latour-du-Pin, minister at war in 1789; the venerable Bailly, who, it was said, had been, with Lafayette, a party implicated in the journey to Varennes; lastly, Valazé, one of the Girondists, doomed to the scaffold, were taken from their prisons, and compelled to appear against her.

No specific fact was proved. Some of the witnesses had seen the queen in high spirits when the life-guards demonstrated their loyal feelings; others had seen her vexed and irritated on her being taken to Paris, or when brought back from Varennes; this person had been present at splendid balls, which must have cost enormous sums; that person had heard it said in the government offices, that the queen was adverse to the sanction of the decrees. An ancient waiting woman of the queen had, in 1788, heard the Duke de Coigny say, that the emperor had already received two hundred millions from France, to support him in his war against the Turks.

The obscene wretch, Hébert, being brought against the unfortunate queen, at length ventured to prefer the charges extorted from the young prince. He said that Charles Capet had given Simon an account of the journey to Varennes, and mentioned Lafayette and Bailly as having concurred therein. He then added that this boy was

addicted to odious and precocious vices, considering his age, that Simon having detected him, and having questioned him, had been informed that he derived from his mother the vices in which he indulged. Hébert said that there was no doubt but that Marie-Antoinette had intended, by weakening thus early the physical constitution of her son, to secure to herself the means of obtaining complete ascendancy over him, in case he should ever ascend the throne.

The rumours which had been whispered for twenty years by a profligate court, had given the people the most unfavourable opinion possible of the morals of the queen. Notwithstanding this, the audience, although wholly Jacobin, were disgusted at the accusations of Hébert. However, he did not the less asseverate their truth. The unhappy mother made no reply. Again urged to answer, she said with extraordinary emotion, "I had thought that human nature would have excused me from answering such an imputation, but I appeal from it to the heart of every mother here present." This reply, so noble and yet so simple withal, affected all who heard it. However, all was not of this vindictive character that appeared in the depositions of the witnesses against Marie-Antoinette. The brave d'Estaing, whose enemy she had been, declined to say any thing against her, but merely mentioned the courage she had shown on the 5th and 6th of October, and of the noble resolution she had expressed, to die beside her husband rather than turn her back. Manuel, in spite of his enmity to the court during the time of the legislative assembly, declared that he could not say any thing against the accused. When the venerable Bailly was brought forward, the Bailly who had on former occasions so often predicted to the court the calamities which its imprudences would draw down upon it, appeared painfully affected; and when he was asked if he knew the wife of Capet, "Yes," said he, bowing respectfully, "I have known *Madame*." He declared that he knew nothing, and maintained that the declarations extorted from the young prince relative to the journey to Varennes were false. In consequence of his deposition, he was assailed with the most violent abuse, from which he might readily infer the fate that awaited himself.

From the whole of the evidence there could be collected but two serious facts, evidenced by Latour-du-Pin and Valazé, and they deposed to them merely because they could not deny them. Latour-du-Pin declared that Marie-Antoinette had applied to him for an accurate statement of the armies while he was minister-at-war. Valazé, always cold in his demeanour, but preserving his respect for misfortune, would not say any thing to criminate the accused; yet he could not help declaring that, being a member of the commission of twenty-four, commissioned along with his colleagues to examine the papers discovered at the house of Septeuil, treasurer of the civil list, he had seen bonds for various sums signed *Antoinette*, in which was nothing extraordinary; but he added, that he had also seen a letter, in which the minister begged the king to transmit to the Queen the copy of the plan of campaign which he had in his hands. The most unfavourable construction was immediately put upon these two facts, namely, the application for a statement of the armies, and the communication of the plan of campaign; and it was concluded that they could not be wanted for any other purpose than to be sent to the enemy; for it was not supposed that a young princess should occupy herself, merely for her own curiosity, with matters of administration and military plans. After these depositions several others were put in, respecting the expenses of the court, the influence the queen exerted in public affairs, the scene of the 10th of August, and what had passed in the Temple; and the most vague rumours and most trivial circumstances were eagerly caught at as proofs.

Marie-Antoinette frequently repeated, with presence of mind and force of argument, that there was no specific fact against her, and that moreover, as being the wife of Louis XVI., she was not answerable for any of the acts of his reign. Fouquier nevertheless declared her to be sufficiently convicted; Chaveau-Lagarde made unavailing efforts to defend her; and this unfortunate queen was condemned to undergo the same punishment as her husband.

Conveyed back to the Conciergerie, she there passed with a great degree of composure the night preceding her execution, and on the morning of the following day, the 16th of October, she was conveyed, amidst a great concourse of the populace, to the fatal spot where, ten months before, Louis XVI. had perished. She listened with composure to the exhortations of the ecclesiastic who accompanied her, and cast an indifferent look at the people who had so often applauded her beauty and her graceful motion, and who now as warmly applauded her execution. On reaching the foot of the scaffold, she perceived the Tuileries, and appeared to be agitated, but she hastened to ascend the fatal ladder, and submitted with courage to the executioner. The infamous wretch exhibited her head to the people, as he was always accustomed to do whenever he had sacrificed an illustrious victim.

The Jacobins were overjoyed. "Let these tidings be carried to Austria," said they; "the Romans sold the ground occupied by Hannibal; we strike off the heads that are dearest to the sovereigns who have invaded our territory."

But this was only the commencement of vengeance. Immediately after the trial of Marie-Antoinette, the tribunal was to proceed to that of the Girondists confined in the Conciergerie.

Before the revolt of the South, nothing could be laid to their charge but opinions. It was said, to be sure, that they were connected with Dumouriez, La Vendée, and Orleans; but this connexion, which it was easy to impute in the tribune, it was impossible to prove by evidence, even before a revolutionary tribunal. On the contrary, ever since the day that they raised the standard of civil war, and when specific facts could be adduced against them, it was easy to condemn them. True it is also, that the imprisoned deputies were not those who had excited the insurrection of Calvados and of the South, but they were members of the same party, and maintainers of the same cause; there existed a moral conviction that they had corresponded with one another, and though the letters which had been intercepted, did not sufficiently prove the existence of the connexion, they

proved quite enough to satisfy a tribunal that, from the term of its constitution, was to content itself with mere probability. All the moderation of the Girondins was, therefore, magnified into a vast conspiracy, which had developed itself by a civil war. Their reluctance in the time of the legislative assembly to act personally against the throne, their opposition to the project of the 10th of August, their struggle with the commune from the 10th of August to the 20th of September, their energetic protestations against the massacres, their pity for Louis XVI., their resistance to the inquisitorial system which disgusted the generals, the opposition they made to the extraordinary tribunal, the *maximum*, to the forced loan, and, in short, to every revolutionary measure; lastly, their efforts to create a controlling authority by instituting the commission of twelve, their despair after their defeat in Paris—a despair which made them have recourse to the provinces, all this was construed into a conspiracy, of which each fact formed so many connecting links. According to this system of accusation, the opinions which had been uttered in the tribune were merely the indications, the matter of inducement for the civil war which had immediately burst forth; and whoever had expressed, in the legislative assembly and in the convention, the same sentiments as the deputies who had assembled at Caen, Bordeaux, Lyons, and Marseilles, was quite as guilty as they. Though there existed no direct evidence of concert, yet that was to be inferred from their community of opinion, from the friendship which had united most of them together, and from their regular meetings at the houses of Roland and Valazé.

The Girondists, on the contrary, conceived that if they could but argue with the people, they could never be condemned. Their opinions, they said, had been free. They might have differed from the Mountaineers respecting the mode of revolutionary action, without being guilty of a crime. Their opinions neither evidenced personal ambition or premeditated conspiracy. On the contrary, they demonstrated that upon an infinity of points they were by no means entirely agreed. Lastly, their identity with the revolted deputies was but a mere supposition; and their letters, their friendship, their habit of sitting on the same benches, were by no means sufficient to lead to a conclusive demonstration. "If we are only suffered to speak," said the Girondists, "we shall be saved:" a fatal notion, which, without ensuring their acquittal, detracted from that dignity which is the only compensation for an unjust death.

If the parties had exhibited greater candour, they would at least have been more noble. The victorious party might then have said to the vanquished party, "You have carried your attachment to your system of moderate means to such a height as to make war upon us, and to bring the republic within an ace of destruction by a disastrous diversion: you are conquered; you must die." The Girondists, on their part, might fairly have had a good answer to make to their conquerors. They might have said to them, "We look upon you as wretches who overthrow the republic, who dishonour her while you affect to defend her; and we were determined to fight and to destroy you. Yes, we are all equally guilty. We are all the personal friends and of the same opinion with Buzot, Barbaroux, Pétion, and Guadet. These men are great and virtuous citizens, whose virtues we proclaim to your face. While their object was to avenge the republic, we have remained here to proclaim it in the face of our executioners. You are conquerors; put us to death."

But the mind of man is not so constituted as to seek to simplify every thing by candid admissions. The conquering party wishes to convince, and it uses deception. A shadow of hope induces the vanquished party to defend itself, and it avails itself of falsehood; and in civil dissensions we witness those shameful trials, where the stronger party listens, predetermined not to believe, and where the weaker speaks, but not to induce conviction. It is not till sentence is pronounced, not till all hope is lost, that human dignity recovers itself; and it is not till brought within sight of the axe, that it is seen to display itself without diminution.

The Girondists were resolved, therefore, to defend themselves; and they were then obliged to have recourse to concessions and mental reservations. Their adversaries determined to prove their crimes, and, in order to ensure a conviction, sent them before the revolutionary tribunal, all of whom were their enemies—Pache, Hébert, Chaumette, Chabot, and many others, either equally false or equally base. The crowd was great, for it was quite a novel spectacle to witness the condemnation of so many republicans on account of the republic. The accused were twenty-one in number, in the flower of their age, in full possession of their noblest faculties, some even in their prime of youth and manly beauty. There is something affecting in the mere recapitulation of their names and ages.

Brissot, Gardien, and Lasource, were thirty-nine years of age; Vergniaud, Gensonné, and Lehardy, thirty-five; Mainvielle and Ducos, twenty-eight; Boyer-Fonfrède, and Duchastel, twenty-six; Duperret, forty-six; Carra, fifty; Valazé and Lacase, forty-two; Duprat, thirty-three; Sillery, fifty-seven; Fauchet, forty-nine; Lesterp Beauvais, forty-three; Boileau, fifty-one; Antiboul, forty; Vigée, thirty-six.

Gensonné was tranquil and frigid in his demeanour; Valazé, indignant and contemptuous; Vergniaud, more agitated than usual. Young Ducos was gay; and Fonfrède, who had been spared on the 2d of June, because he had not voted for the arrests ordered by the commission of twelve, but who, by his reiterated appeals in favour of his friends, had since deserved to share their fate—Fonfrède seemed, for so noble a cause, to relinquish cheerfully his large fortune, his young wife, and his existence.

Amar had drawn up the act of accusation in the name of the committee of general safety. Pache was the first witness heard in support of it. Cautious and prudent as he always was, he said that he had long perceived a faction adverse to the revolution, but he adduced no fact proving a premeditated conspiracy. He merely said that, when the convention was threatened by Dumouriez, he went to the committee of finance to obtain funds for the victualling of Paris, and that the committee refused them. He added, that he had been ill-used in the committee of general safety, and that Guadet had

threatened him to demand the arrest of the municipal authorities. Chaumette narrated all the struggles of the commune with the right side, just as they had been reported by the newspapers. He added only one particular fact, namely, that Brissot had obtained the appointment of Santonax as commissioner for the colonies; and that Brissot was, consequently, the author of all the calamities of the new world. The wretch Hébert detailed the circumstances of his apprehension by the commission of twelve, and said that Roland bribed all the public writers, for Madame Roland had wished to buy his paper of *Père Duchêne*. Destournelles, minister of justice, and formerly a clerk to the commune, gave his deposition in an extremely vague manner, and repeated what every body knew; namely, that the accused had attacked the commune, inveighed against the massacres, and had been desirous to institute a departimental guard, &c. The witness whose deposition was the longest as well as the most hostile, for it lasted several hours, was Chabot, the ex-Capuchin, an impatient, weak, and grovelling soul. Chabot had always been treated by the Girondists as an extravagant person, and he never forgave their contempt of him. He arrogated much to himself for having contributed to the 10th of August, contrary to their advice; he affected to say that if they had consented to send him to the prisons, he would have saved the prisoners as he had saved the Swiss: he was desirous, therefore, of wreaking his vengeance on the Girondists; and, above all, to recover by calumniating them his popularity, which was on the wane at the Jacobins, because he was strongly suspected of having had a hand in the late stock-jobbing transactions. He invented a long and malicious accusation, in which he represented the Girondins, seeking first to make a tool of the minister Narbonne, then, after ejecting Narbonne, occupying three ministerial departments at once; bringing about the 20th of June to encourage their creatures, and exerting themselves in opposition to the 10th of August, because they were not desirous of having a republic; lastly, invariably pursuing a self-interested and ambitious part, and what was more atrocious than all the rest, suffering the massacres of September, and the robbery of the Garde Meuble, to take place for no other purpose than to ruin the political reputation of the patriots. "If they would have consented," said Chabot, "I could have saved the prisoners. Pétion gave the murderers money for drink, and Brissot did not wish them to be stopped, because in one of the prisons there was an enemy of his, Morande!"

Such are the vile wretches who persecute worthy characters, as soon as power has given them permission to do so. The moment, therefore, that the leaders cast the first stone, every living thing that crawls in the mud rises up and overwhelms the victim. Fabre d'Eglantine, who, like Chabot, had become suspected of stock-jobbing, and was anxious to regain his popularity, made a more subtle but so much the more perfidious deposition, in which he insinuated that the intention of suffering the massacres, and the robbery of the Garde Meuble, to be perpetrated, was far from being inconsistent with the policy of the Girondins. Vergniaud, who could hold out no longer, exclaimed with indignation, "I am not bound to justify myself against the charge of associating with robbers and assassins."

Inasmuch as no specific case was made out against the accused, the only charge alleged against them was in respect of their opinions openly maintained, and they replied that those opinions might have been erroneous, but that they might deceive themselves if they pleased. It was objected to them that their doctrines were not the result of an involuntary, and therefore an excusable error, but of a conspiracy got up at the houses of Roland and Valazé. Again they replied, that so far were these doctrines from being the effect of any previous concert among them, that there were many points on which they were not agreed. One said, I did not vote for the appeal to the people; another, I did not vote for the departimental guard; a third, I by no means concurred with the opinions expressed by the commission of twelve, I disapproved of the arrest of Hébert and Chaumette. All this was true enough; but then the defence no longer applied to all the defendants, they seemed almost to abandon one another, and to condemn those measures in which they had not taken a part. The defendant Boileau, in his anxiety to clear himself, exhibited great pusillanimity, and disgraced himself. He admitted that there had existed a conspiracy against the unity and the indivisibility of the republic; that he was now convinced of this, now confessed it, that he could not point out the guilty persons, but that he wished for their punishment; and he proclaimed himself a staunch *Mountainseer*. Gardien had also the weakness to absolutely disavow his connexion with the commission of twelve. However, Gensonné, Brissot, Vergniaud, and more especially Valazé, removed the bad impression the conduct of their two colleagues had created. They alleged fairly enough, that they had not always thought alike, and that, consequently, their opinions were not preconceived; but they disavowed neither their friendship or their doctrines. Valazé frankly admitted that meetings had been held at his house, and maintained that they had a right to meet and to enlighten each other with their ideas, like any other citizens. When at length their connivance with the fugitives was objected to them, they denied it. "What!" exclaimed Hébert, "the accused deny the conspiracy! When the senate of Rome had to pronounce upon the conspiracy of Catiline, if it had questioned each conspirator, and been content with a denial, they would all have escaped the punishment which awaited them; but the meetings at Catiline's, the flight of the latter, and the arms found at the house of [M. Porcius] Lecca, were material proofs, and they were sufficient to determine the judgment of the senate*." "Very well," replied Brissot, "I will proceed with the parallel drawn between us and Catiline: Cicero said to him, 'Arms have been found at thy house; the ambassadors of the Allobroges accuse thee; the signatures of Lentulus, of Cethegus, and of Statilius, thy accomplices, prove thy infamous projects.' Here the senate accuses us, it is true; but have arms been found upon us? Are there signatures to produce against us?"

* Dico te priori nocte venisse inter falcarios (non agam obscurè) in M. Leccæ domum, &c. &c. *Cic. in 1 Orat. in Catil. Trans.*

Unfortunately there had been discovered letters sent to Bordeaux by Vergniaud, expressive of the strongest indignation. A letter from a cousin of the defendant Lacase had also been found, in which the preparations for the insurrection were mentioned; and, lastly, a letter from Duperret to Madame Roland had been intercepted, in which he stated that he had heard from Buzot and Barbaroux, and that they were making preparations to punish the outrages committed in Paris. Vergniaud, on being called upon to explain, replied, "Were I to acquaint you with the motives which induced me to write, perhaps I should appear to you more to be pitied than censured. I had reason to believe, after the plots of the 10th of March, that a design to murder us was connected with the plan for dissolving the national representation. Marat wrote an article to this effect on the 11th of March. The petitions since presented against us with such acrimony have confirmed me in this opinion. It was under these circumstances that my soul was wrung with anguish, and that I wrote to my fellow-citizens, that I was in extreme jeopardy (*sous le couteau*). I have expostulated against the tyranny of Marat. He was the only person whom I have named. I respect the opinion of the people concerning Marat, but in that particular Marat was my tyrant ———." At these words one of the jury rose and said, "Vergniaud complains of having been persecuted by Marat. I observe, that Marat has been assassinated, and that Vergniaud is still here." This stupid observation was applauded by part of the spectators; and all the candid statement, all the sound reasoning, of Vergniaud were thrown away upon the blind multitude.

Vergniaud, however, had succeeded in making himself heard, and recovered all his eloquence in expatiating on the conduct of his friends, on their devotedness, and on their sacrifices for the republic. The whole audience had shown signs of emotion; and this condemnation, though previously settled, no longer seemed to be irrevocable. The arguments had lasted several days. The Jacobins, enraged at the tardiness of the tribunal, addressed to the convention a fresh petition for the purpose of expediting the proceedings. Robespierre caused a decree to be passed, by which the jury, after three days' discussion, were empowered to declare that they had made up their minds, and to proceed to judgment without hearing any thing further. And to render the appellation more conformable with the subject of nomenclature, it was moreover settled on his motion, that the name of "extraordinary tribunal" should be changed to that of Revolutionary Tribunal.

Although this decree was passed, the jury did not venture to avail themselves of it immediately, and declared that they had not then made up their minds. But on the following day they made use of their new power to shorten the arguments, and insisted that they should be closed. The accused had now lost all hope, and were resolved to die nobly. They attended with a tranquil air the last sitting of the tribunal. While they were being searched at the gate of the Conciergerie, in order that all instruments with which they could commit suicide should be taken from them, Valazé, giving a pair of scissors to Riouffe, in the presence of the gendarmes, said, "Here my friend is a prohibited weapon. We must not make any attempts on our lives."

On the 30th of October, at midnight, the jury entered to pronounce their verdict. The features of Antonelle, their foreman, appeared changed. Camille-Desmoulins, on hearing the verdict pronounced, cried out, "Ah! it is I who am the death of them, it is my 'Brissot displayed' (*Brissot dévoilé* *). Let me go," he added, and rushed out in despair. The accused were brought in. On hearing the fatal word pronounced, Brissot dropped his arms, and his head suddenly dropped upon his breast. Gensonné would have said a few words as to the application of the law in this case, but could not obtain a hearing. Sillery letting fall his crutches exclaimed, "This is the happiest day of my life!" Some hopes had been conceived for the two young brothers, Ducos and Fonfrède, who appeared to be less identified with the others, and who had attached themselves to the Girondists, not so much from conformity of opinion, as from admiration of their character and talents. They were nevertheless condemned with the others. Fonfrède embraced Ducos, saying, "Brother, I am the cause of your death." Be of good cheer," replied Ducos, "we shall die together." The Abbé Fauchet, with downcast look, seemed to utter a prayer to heaven; Carra retained his stern expression; Vergniaud's appearance had something in it of lofty contempt and disdain; Lasource repeated the saying of one of the ancients, "I die on the day that the people have lost their reason, you will die on that when they shall have recovered it." The weak-spirited Boileau and the timid Gardien were not spared. The former, throwing his hat into the air, exclaimed, "I am innocent." "We are all of us innocent," repeated all the accused; "people, they are deceiving you!" Some of them had the bad taste to throw some assignats among the multitude, as if to cause the people to fly to their relief, but no one stirred. The gendarmes then summoned them for the purpose of conducting them back to their prison. One of the condemned suddenly fell at their feet. They lifted him up weltering in his blood. It was Valazé, who, when giving his scissors to Riouffe, had kept a dagger, with which he had stabbed himself. The tribunal immediately decided that his body should be carried in a tumbril after the condemned. As they left the court, they struck up altogether, by a spontaneous movement, the Marseillais hymn,

> Contre nous de la tyrannie
> L'étendard sanglant est levé.

Their last night was sublime. Vergniaud was provided with poison; he threw it away, that he might die with his friends. They took a last meal together, at which they were by turns gay, serious, and eloquent. Brissot and Gensonné were grave and pensive; Vergniaud spoke of expiring liberty in the noblest terms of regret, and of the ultimate destination of man with persuasive eloquence. Ducos repeated verses which he had composed in prison, and they all joined in singing hymns to France and liberty.

* The title of a pamphlet of which he was the author, directed against the Girondists.

Next day, the 31st of October, an immense crowd collected to see them pass. On their way to the scaffold, they chanted that hymn of the Marseillais which our soldiers sung when marching against the enemy. On reaching the Place de la Revolution, having alighted from their cars, they embraced one another, shouting *Vive la Republique!* Sillery first ascended the scaffold; and after gravely bowing to the people, in whom he still regarded faulty and misguided human nature, he received the fatal stroke. All of them imitated Sillery, and died with the same dignity. In thirty-one minutes the executioner had caused these illustrious heads to fall, and thus destroyed, in a few moments, youth, beauty, virtue, and talents! Such was the end of these noble and courageous citizens, victims of their Utopian principles. Comprehending neither human nature, or its vicious propensities, or the means of steering it through a revolution, they felt indignant because they could not make it better; and in persisting to act contrary to its passions, they became its victims. Respect to their memory! Never were greater virtues or greater talents displayed in a civil war; and to their glory be it said, if they did not comprehend the necessity of violent means for saving the cause of France, most of their adversaries who preferred those means, decided from the impulse of feeling rather than from reflection. The only one who could stand in a more elevated position was that Mountaineer, who could decide in favour of revolutionary measures out of pure political feeling, and not from the warping influence of personal hatred.

No sooner had the Girondins expired, than fresh victims were sacrificed. The sword stayed not itself for a single moment. On the 2d of November, the unfortunate Olympe de Gouges was put to death for writings styled counter-revolutionary; as was Adam Lux, deputy of Mentz, accused of the same crime. On the 6th, the hapless Duke of Orleans, transferred from Marseilles to Paris, was brought before the revolutionary tribunal, and condemned on account of the suspicions which he had excited in all parties. Odious to the emigrants, suspected both by Girondists and Jacobins, he excited none of that sympathy which affords some consolation for an unjust death. Being rather an enemy to the court than an enthusiast for the republic, he felt not that moral conviction which gives support at the last moment; and of all the victims that suffered, he received least compensation, and was most to be pitied. A disgust of life, and an absolute scepticism, were his expiring sentiments; and he went to the scaffold with extraordinary composure and indifference. As he was drawn along the Rue Saint-Honoré, he beheld his palace with a dry eye, and never for a moment belied his disgust of men and of life. His aid-de-camp, Coustard, who like him was also a deputy, shared his fate. Two days afterwards the interesting and courageous wife of Roland followed them to the scaffold. This woman, combining with the graces of a Frenchwoman the heroism of a Roman matron, had to suffer every species of misfortune. She loved and reverenced her husband as a father. She experienced for one of the proscribed Girondists a vehement passion, which she had always repressed. She left a young and orphan daughter to the care of friends. While agitated on account of so many and such dear objects, she considered the cause of liberty to which she was enthusiastically attached, and for which she had made such great sacrifices, as for ever lost. Thus she suffered in all her affections at once. Condemned as a party concerned with the Girondists, she heard her sentence with a sort of enthusiasm, seemed to be under the influence of elevated feelings from the moment of her condemnation to that of her execution, and excited a kind of holy awe in all those who visited her. She went to the scaffold dressed in white, and exerted herself the whole way to cheer the spirits of a companion in misfortune, who was to perish with her, but who did not possess the same firmness of character. She even succeeded so far as to draw from him a smile on two occasions. On reaching the place of execution, she bowed to the statue of Liberty, exclaiming, *O Liberty! what crimes are committed in thy name!* She then submitted to her fate with unshaken resolution (10th of November). Thus perished that charming and elevated woman, who deserved to share in the fate of her friends, but who, more retiring and acting more in accordance with the passive part allotted to her sex, did not shrink from meeting the death due to her talents and her virtues, and spared her husband and herself the ridiculous and calumnious aspersions to which she must have been exposed.

Her husband had fled to the neighbourhood of Rouen. On receiving intelligence of her tragic end, he resolved not to survive her. He quitted the hospitable house where he had received an asylum, and, to avoid compromising any friend, put an end to his life on the high road. He was found pierced to the heart by a sword, and lying against the foot of the tree against which he had placed the destructive weapon. In his pocket was a paper relative to his life and to his conduct as a minister.

Thus, in that frightful delirium which had rendered genius, virtue, and courage suspected, all that was most noble and most generous in France, perished either by suicide or by the axe of the executioner.

Among the deaths of so many illustrious and courageous individuals, there occurred one still more lamentable and more sublime than all the others, it was that of Bailly. It was not very difficult to imagine from the manner in which he had been treated during the queen's trial, what reception he would meet with from the revolutionary tribunal. The scene in the Champ de Mars, the proclamation of martial law, and the firing which followed, were the events most frequently and most bitterly laid to the charge of the constituent party. It was upon Bailly, the friend of Lafayette, and the magistrate who had ordered the red flag to be unfurled, that all the alleged offences of the constituent assembly were to be visited. He was condemned, and was to be executed in the Champ de Mars, the theatre of what was termed his crime. His execution took place on the 11th of November, the weather being cold and rainy. Conducted on foot, and amidst the insults of an inhuman populace, whom he had, when mayor, saved from starving, he exhibited the utmost tranquillity and composure of mind. During the whole way from the Conciergerie to the Champ

de Mars, they shook in his face the red flag which had been discovered at the mairie, enclosed in a mahogany box. On reaching the foot of the scaffold it might be supposed that his punishment would immediately have taken place; but one of the abandoned wretches who had made a point of persecuting him, cried out that the field of the federation ought not to be polluted by his blood. A rush was immediately made by the people towards the guillotine, which they forthwith took down, bore off with the same eagerness they had formerly exhibited in digging in that same field of the federation *; they hastened to erect it again upon a dung-heap on the bank of the Seine, and opposite to the quarter of Chaillot, where Bailly had passed his life and composed his works. This operation lasted some hours. Meanwhile, he was obliged to walk several times round the Champ de Mars; bareheaded, and with his hands pinioned behind him, he could scarcely drag himself along. Some pelted him with mud, others kicked and struck him with sticks. He at last fell from sheer exhaustion. They lifted him up again: rain and cold had communicated to his limbs an involuntary shivering. "Thou tremblest," said a soldier to him. "My friend," replied the old man, "it is from cold." After he had been for several hours exposed to this torture, they burned the red flag under his nose, and at length the executioner seized him; when one more illustrious scholar, and one of the most virtuous men that ever honoured our country, was taken from it.

Ever since the time that Tacitus witnessed the applauses the vile populace bestowed upon the crimes of emperors, no change has taken place. Always gross in its actions, at one time it raises an altar to the country, at another it erects scaffolds, and only exhibits a beautiful and a noble spectacle when, incorporated with the armies, it rushes upon the hostile battalions. Let not despotism impute its crimes to liberty, for under despotism it was always quite as guilty as under the republic; but let us rather continually call education and intelligence to the aid of those barbarians who are nurtured in the dregs of society, and are but too ready to stain themselves with the commission of every possible crime, at the instigation of every superior power, and for the dishonour of any cause with which they may be identified.

On the 25th of November, the unfortunate Manuel was also put to death, who had from procurator of the commune become a deputy to the convention, and had resigned his seat at the time of the trial of Louis XVI., because he had been accused of having taken away the balloting-box. The charge against him before the tribunal was his having induced the massacres of September, for the purpose of raising the departments against Paris. It was Fouquier-Tinville who was commissioned to devise these atrocious calumnies, more atrocious even than the condemnation. On the same day was condemned the unfortunate General Brunet, because he had not sent off part of his army from Nice to Toulon; and on the following day, the 26th, sentence of death was pronounced upon the victorious Houchard, because he had not understood the plan laid down for him, and had not been so rapid in his movements upon the causeway of Furnes as to take the whole English army. His was a gross blunder, but it did not call for a capital punishment.

These executions began to spread general terror, and to render the supreme authority formidable. The alarm they excited was not confined solely to the prisons, the hall of the revolutionary tribunal, and the place de la Revolution; it prevailed every where, in the markets and in the shops, where the *maximum* and the laws against forestalling had recently been rigorously executed. We have already seen how the depreciation of the assignats and the increased price of commodities had led to the decree of the *maximum*, for the purpose of putting merchandise and money upon the same footing. The first effects of this *maximum* had been most disastrous, and had occasioned the shutting up of a great number of shops. By establishing a tariff for articles of primary necessity, the government had done no more than subject to its regulations those goods which had found their way to the retail dealer, and were ready to pass from the hands of the latter into those of the consumer. But the retail dealer who had bought them of the wholesale trader before the *maximum*, and at a higher price than that of the new tariff, suffered enormous losses, and complained bitterly. Even when he had made his purchases after the *maximum* had been settled, the losses sustained by him were not a whit the less. In point of fact, in the tariff of those commodities termed necessaries of life, they were not so called until they were made up, and ready for consumption, and it was not till they came under this latter description that their price was fixed. But no mention was made as to what price they should bear in shape of the raw material, or what wages were to be paid to the mechanic who worked them up; to the carrier, or the navigator, who conveyed them from place to place; consequently the retailer, who was obliged to sell to the consumer according to the tariff, and who could have no dealings with the workman, the manufacturer, or the wholesale trader, according to that same tariff, could not possibly continue so ruinous a mode of trade. Greater part of the tradesmen shut up their shops, or fraudulently evaded the law. They sold only goods of the *worst* quality at the *maximum*, and reserved the best for those who came secretly to pay for them at their true value.

The populace who detected these frauds, and saw a great number of shops shut up, did not restrain themselves, but also assailed the commune with their remonstrances. They insisted that all traders should be obliged to keep their shops open and to continue their trade, whether they liked it or not. Being in the humour to complain of every thing and every body, they denounced those butchers and porkmen who bought diseased animals, or such as had died naturally, as well as those who, in order that the meat might weigh heavier, did not bleed the carcases sufficiently; those bakers who, in order to keep back the best flour for the rich, sold the worst to the poor, and baked the bread too slack, that it might weigh the heavier; those wine-merchants who mixed the most deleterious drugs with their wines; those dealers in salt who, to increase the weight of that

* *Ante*, p. 56, col. 1.

commodity, adulterated it grossly; those grocers, and, in short, all those retail dealers who adulterated commodities in a thousand ways.

Some of these abuses had always existed, and some were peculiar to the present state of things, but when the impatience of wrong seizes the minds of the people, they complain of every thing, they endeavour to reform every thing, and to punish every body.

The procurator general, Chaumette, made a flaming harangue against the traders in reference to this subject. "It will be recollected," said he, "that in '89 and the following years all these men carried on a great trade, but with whom? with foreigners. It is well known that it was they who caused the fall of the assignats, and that it was by jobbing in paper money that they enriched themselves. What have they done since they made their fortune? They have retired from business; they have threatened the people with a dearth of commodities; but if they have gold and assignats, the public has something still more valuable—it has arms. Arms, not gold, are wanted to put our trades and manufactures in motion. If, then, these individuals leave off trade, the republic will take them on hand, and put in requisition all the raw materials. Let them remember that it rests with the republic to reduce, whenever it pleases, to dust and ashes, the gold and the assignats which are in their hands. That giant the people must crush the mercantile speculators.

"We feel for the hardships of the people, because we ourselves are the people. The entire council is composed of *sans-culottes*. This is the legislating people. It is of little consequence if our heads fall, provided posterity will deign to preserve our skulls ———! It is not the Gospel I shall quote, but Plato: 'He who shall strike with the sword,' says that philosopher, 'shall fall by the sword; he who shall destroy by poison, shall perish by poison; famine shall pine him who would famish the people ———.' If commodities and provisions run short, to whom shall the people betake themselves? The constituted authorities? no. The convention? no. They will betake themselves to the contractors and provision-merchants. Rousseau, who was also one of the people, said: '*When the people shall have nothing more to eat, they will devour the rich.*'" (Commune 14, October.)

Forced measures lead on to forced measures, as we have elsewhere observed. The scope of the first laws did not extend to other than wrought goods. It was now become necessary to notice the raw material; nay, the idea of taking to the raw material and the workmen for the account of the republic began to float in some minds. It is a dreadful obligation, that of forcing nature, and attempting to regulate all her movements. We are soon compelled to supply the act of volition in every particular, and to substitute even our existence for obedience to the law. The commune and the convention were obliged to take new measures, each according to its respective department.

The commune of Paris obliged every dealer to declare the quantity of articles of consumption he had on hand, the orders which he had given to procure more, and the expectations which he had of their arrival. Every shopkeeper who had been in business for a year, and either relinquished it or suffered it to be at a stand-still, was declared a suspected person, and imprisoned as such. To prevent the confusion and the accumulation arising from an anxiety to lay in a stock, the commune also decided that the consumer should apply only to the retailer, and the retailer only to the wholesale dealer: and it fixed the quantities which each should be allowed to order. Thus the grocer could not order more than twenty five pounds of sugar a time of the wholesale dealer, and the vender of lemonade not more than twelve. It was the revolutionary committees that delivered the tickets for purchasing and that assessed the proportions. The commune did not confine itself to these regulations. As the throng about the doors of the bakers still continued the same, as there was still the same tumult there, and as many people were kept waiting part of the night to be served, it was ordered, on the suggestion of Chaumette, that those who came last should be served first, which diminished neither the tumult or the eagerness which was exhibited. As the people complained that the worst flour was reserved for them, it was ordered that in the city of Paris there should be made in future but one sort of bread, composed of three-fourths wheaten flour, and one-fourth rye. Lastly, a commission of inspection for provisions was instituted, to certify the state of commodities, to take cognizance of frauds, and to punish them. These measures, imitated by the other communes, and frequently even embodied in decrees, immediately became general laws; and thus, as we have already observed, the commune exercised an enormous influence in every thing connected with the internal management and the police.

The convention, urged to reform the law of the *maximum*, devised a new one, which included every process of manufacture, and even the raw material. It required that a statement should be made out of the cost price of goods at the place of manufacture in 1790. To this price was to be added, in the first place, one-third more, according to circumstances; secondly, a fixed sum for carriage from the place of manufacture to the place of consumption; thirdly, and lastly, five per cent. for the profit of the wholesale dealer, and ten for the retail dealer. From all these elements the future price of necessaries of life was to be sought. The local administrations were directed to see these regulations enforced, each of them according to the manufacture and consumption that took place within the district. A bounty was granted to every retail dealer, who, possessing a capital of less than ten thousand francs, could prove that he had lost that capital by the *maximum*. The communes were to judge of the case by personal inspection,—a mode of decision at that time universally adopted, as in fact it is in all times of dictatorship. Thus this law, without considering every process of manufacture, from the raw material to its being worked up, assessed the price of the commodity on its leaving the manufactory, the price of carriage, and the profit of the wholesale and retail dealer, and by absolute rules compensated for the fickleness of nature in at least half of the social operations. But all this, we repeat, was an inevitable consequence of the first *maximum*: the first *maximum* proceeded from the assignats, and the as-

signats from the imperative necessities of the revolution.

To administer to this system of control, instituted in respect of commercial transactions, a commission of provisioning and victualling was appointed, whose authority was to extend over the whole republic, and was composed of three members appointed by the convention, enjoying nearly the importance of the ministers themselves, and having voices in the council. This commission had it in charge to carry the tariffs into execution, to superintend the conduct of the communes in this respect, to continually ascertain the quantities of articles of general consumption and food, to order their transfer from one department to another, and to fix the requisitions for the armies, in accordance with the celebrated decree which instituted the revolutionary government.

The financial situation of the country was not less extraordinary than all the rest. The two loans, the one forced, the other voluntary, were filled up rapidly. A general eagerness was manifested to subscribe to the second, because the advantages which it held out rendered it far preferable; and thus the moment approached, when one thousand millions of assignats were about to be withdrawn from circulation. There were in the treasury, for current expenses, four hundred millions, or thereabouts, remaining from the old loans, and five hundred millions of royal assignats, called in by the decree which divested them of their monetary character, now converted into a like sum in republican assignats. There remained, therefore, for the public service a sum of about nine hundred millions, or thereabouts.

That which appears most extraordinary is, that the assignat, which had fallen three-fourths, and even four-fifths, had risen to a par with specie. In this rise there was something substantive and something factitious. The gradual extinction of a floating thousand millions, the success of the first levy, which had produced six hundred thousand men in the space of a month, and the recent victories of the republic, which almost ensured its existence, had accelerated the continual sale of the national possessions, and restored some credit to the assignats, but still not sufficient to place them on the same footing with money. The causes which put them apparently upon the footing of a monetary currency were these. It will be recollected, that a law forbade, under very heavy penalties, the traffic in specie, that is, the exchange at a loss to the assignat, when put in competition with money; another law also enacted very severe penalties against those who, in making purchases, should bargain for different prices, having regard to the fact whether payment was to be made in paper or in money. In this manner specie could not maintain its real value, either as against the assignat, or as against merchandise; and people had no other resource than to hoard it. But by a recent law it was enacted that hoarded gold, silver, or jewels, should belong partly to the state, partly to the informer. Thenceforth people could neither employ specie in trade, or conceal it; it became a burden, it exposed the possessor to the risk of being considered as a suspected person, people began to be afraid of it, and preferred the assignat for daily purposes. This it was that had momentarily re-established the par which, so far as paper was concerned, had never really existed, even on the first day of its creation. Many communes, annexing their own regulations to those of the convention, had even prohibited the circulation of money, and ordered that it should be brought in chests to be exchanged for assignats. The convention, it is true, had abolished all these particular regulations of the communes; but the general laws which it had passed had, nevertheless, rendered specie useless and dangerous. Many people disposed of it for payment of taxes, or to the loan, or handed it over to foreigners, who carried on a great traffic in it, and came to the frontier towns to receive it in exchange for merchandise. The Italians and the Genoese, in particular, who brought us great quantities of corn, frequented the southern ports, and bought up gold and silver at low prices. Specie had, therefore, made its appearance again, owing to the effect of these terrible laws; and the party of fervid revolutionists, apprehending lest its appearance should again prove prejudicial to the paper money, were desirous that specie, which hitherto had not been excluded from circulation, should be absolutely prohibited; they required that its circulation should be forbidden, and that all who possessed it should be ordered to bring it to the public coffers to be exchanged for assignats.

Terror had almost even extinguished stock-jobbing. Speculations upon specie had, as we have just seen, become impracticable. Foreign paper, now branded with reprobation, no longer circulated as it did two months before; and the bankers, accused on all sides of being agents of the emigrants, and addicting themselves to stock-jobbing, were in the utmost consternation. For a moment, the seal had been put upon their effects; but the danger of interrupting banking operations, and thus checking the circulation of all capital, was soon felt, and the seals were removed. Nevertheless the alarm was so great, that nobody thought of engaging in any kind of speculation.

The East India Company was at length dissolved. We have noticed the conspiracy which had been formed by certain deputies to speculate in the shares of that company. The Baron de Batz, in concert with Julien of Toulouse, Delaunay of Angers, and Chabot, had arranged, by means of making motions of alarming import, to make shares fall, then to buy them up, and afterwards by more moderately framed motions to produce a re-action, and then sell out, and realize the profits of this fraudulent rise. The Abbé d'Espagnac, whose patron Julien was at the committee of contracts, was to furnish the funds for these speculations. These unhappy men actually succeeded in causing the shares to fall from four thousand five hundred to six hundred and fifty livres, and they made considerable gains. The extinction of the company, however, could not be prevented. They then put themselves in motion to make a bargain with it for favourable terms to be inserted in the bill for its abolition. Delaunay and Julien of Toulouse talked the matter over with the directors in their way, and said to them, "If you will give us such a sum, we shall bring in the draft of such a decree; if not, we will bring in such a one." It was agreed that they should be paid the sum of five hundred thousand

francs, for which they were, in proposing the abolition of the company, which could no longer be deferred, to cause the matter of its dissolution to be assigned to itself, which might prolong its duration for a considerable time. This sum was to be divided among Delaunay, Julien, Chabot, and Bazire, whom his friend Chabot had acquainted with the intrigue, but who refused to take any part in it.

Delaunay brought in the bill for the abolition, on the 17th of Vendémiaire. He proposed to abolish the company, to oblige it to refund the sums which it owed to the state; and, above all, to make it pay the duty on transfers, which it had evaded by changing its shares into inscriptions upon its books. Finally, he proposed to leave the business of winding up its affairs to itself. Fabre d'Eglantine, who was not yet in the secret, and who speculated as it appeared upon other views, immediately opposed this motion, saying, that to permit the company to wind up its affairs itself was perpetuating it, and that upon this pretext it might continue to exist for an indefinite period. He proposed, therefore, to transfer to the government the matter of this dissolution. Cambon moved, as a sub-amendment, that the state, in undertaking the matter of the dissolution, should not be charged with the debts of the company if they exceeded its assets. The decree and the two amendments were adopted, and referred to the commission to be definitively settled. The members in the plot immediately thought it necessary that they should bring over Fabre to their plan, so as to obtain, in the settling of the decree, some provisos in therein. Chabot was despatched to Fabre with one hundred thousand francs, and secured his concurrence. Now see what they next did. The decree was drawn up as it had been passed by the convention, and submitted for signature to Cambon and to those members of the commission who were not accomplices in the scheme. To this authentic copy were then added certain words which entirely reversed the sense. In the clause respecting the transfers which had evaded the duty, but which were subjected to its payment, were added these words: *excepting those fraudulently made*, which tended to revive all the pretensions of the company, in regard to the exemption from the duty. On the subject of the matter of the dissolution these words were added: *Agreeably to the statutes and rules of the company*, which gave to the latter the right of interference in settling the matter of the dissolution. These interpolations materially altered the effect of the decree. Chabot, Fabre, Delaunay, and Julien of Toulouse, afterwards signed it, and delivered the falsified copy to the commission for the promulgation of the laws, who caused it to be printed and promulgated as an authentic decree. They hoped that the members who had signed before these slight alterations were made, would either not recollect or not perceive them, and they divided among themselves the sum of five hundred thousand francs. Bazire alone refused his share, saying that he would not be a party to such disgraceful transactions.

Meanwhile Chabot, whose luxurious style of living began to attract the eye of the accuser, was sorely afraid lest he should find himself compromised. He had hung up in bags the hundred thousand francs which he had received as his share, in water-closets; and as his accomplices saw that he was ready to betray them, they threatened to be beforehand with him, and to denounce the whole affair if he abandoned them. Such had been the issue of this scandalous conspiracy between the Baron de Batz and three or four deputies. The general terror which threatened every body's life, however blameless, communicated itself to them, and they were apprehensive of being detected and punished. For a time, therefore, all speculations were suspended, and nobody ever thought of engaging in stock-jobbing.

It was precisely at this time, when there was no care of acting in repugnance to all generally received notions and to all established habits, that the plan for introducing a new system of weights and measures, and changing the calendar, was carried into execution. An affectation of general uniformity, and a contempt for every impediment, could scarcely fail to distinguish a revolution which was at once philosophical and political. It had divided the country into eighty-three equal portions; it had imparted uniformity to the civil, religious, and military administrations; it had reduced to a system of uniformity every description of public engagements. It therefore did not wish to be behindhand in reducing weights, measures, and the division of time, to the same uniformity. It is true that this affectation for uniformity, degenerating into a spirit of system, nay, even into a rage, caused the indispensable and attractive varieties of nature to be too often forgotten; but it is only in paroxysms of this kind that the human mind effects extensive and difficult regenerations. The new system of weights and measures, one of the most admirable inventions of the age, was the result of this audacious spirit of innovation. The idea was conceived of taking for the unit of weights and for the unit of measures, those quantities which were natural, and invariably recognised in every country. Thus, distilled water was taken for the unit of weight, and a part of the meridian for the unit of measure. These units, multiplied or divided by ten, *ad infinitum*, formed that beautiful system known by the name of the system of decimals (*calcul decimal*).

The same regularity had to be applied to the division of time; and the difficulty of changing the associations of a people in those points which are most difficult to unsettle, was not capable of deterring men so determined as those who then presided over the destinies of France. They had already changed the Gregorian era into a republican era, and dated the latter from the first year of liberty. They made the year and the new era begin with the 22nd of September, 1791 *, a day which, by a fortunate coincidence, was that of the institution of the republic and of the autumnal equinox. The year would have been divided into ten parts, in conformity with the decimal system, but in basing a division of the months upon a system correspondent with the twelve revolutions of the moon round the earth, it became absolutely necessary to admit twelve months. Nature here commanded the infraction of the decimal system. The month consisted of thirty days;

* Consequently the last day of the year answered to the 21st of September. *Trans.*

it was divided into three portions of ten days each, called *decades*, as a substitute for the four weeks. The tenth day of each decade was set apart for rest, and answered to the former Sunday. Thus there was one day of rest less in the month *. The Catholic religion had multiplied holydays to infinity. The revolution, preaching up industry, deemed it right to reduce them as much as possible. The months were named after the seasons to which they belonged. As the year commenced with autumn, the first three months belonged to that season, they were called *Vendémiaire, Brumaire, Frimaire*; the three following corresponded to the winter months, and were called *Nivose, Pluviose, Ventose*; the next three, answering to spring, were named *Germinal, Floréal, Prairial*; and the last three, comprising summer, were denominated *Messidor, Thermidor, Fructidor*†.

These twelve months, of thirty days each, formed a total of only three hundred and sixty days. There remained five days for completing the year. These were called *complementary* days, and by a felicitous thought they were to be set apart for national festivals by the name of *sans-culottides*, a name which must be conceded to the passions of the time, and which is not more absurd than many others adopted by the people of other countries. The first was to be consecrated to *genius*; the second to *labour*; the third to *noble actions*; the fourth to *rewards*; and lastly, the fifth to *opinion*. This last festival, absolutely original in its conception, and perfectly adapted to the French character, was to be a sort of political carnival of twenty-four hours, during which time every one was to be allowed to say or to write respecting every public character whatever he pleased. It was for opinion to do justice upon opinion itself; and all magistrates were to protect themselves by their virtues against the truths and the calumnies of that day. Nothing could be more grand or moral than this idea. We ought not now, because a more mighty destiny has swept away the thoughts and the institutions of that period, to make its vast and bold conceptions the butt of ridicule. The Romans have not been held ridiculous, because on the day of triumph, the soldier placed behind the car of the triumphant general, was at liberty to utter whatever his hatred or his mirth suggested. As in every four years the leap-year brought six *complementary* days instead of *five*, this sixth *sans-culottide* was to be called the festival of the *revolution*, and was to be consecrated to a grand solemnity, in which the French should celebrate the epocha of their enfranchisement, and the institution of the republic.

The day was divided according to the decimal system into ten parts or hours, these into ten others, and so on. New dials were ordered for the purpose of putting in practice this new method of

* A specimen of one month will serve to make the others understood. The reader will suppose, *Nivose* (or the *snowy month*), which began on the 21st of December, 1797, and ended on the 19th of January, 1798. And one thing is to be remarked, that the republicans mentioned the date as they had used to do, changing only the name of the month, and without noticing the *Decadi*, or whether it were *Primidi, Duodi, Tridi*, &c. for they said, Cette Bataille se donna le 26 Nivose, that battle was fought on the 26 Nivose, just as we should say, that event took place on the 20th of such a month, without mentioning whether it were Monday or any other day.

NIVOSE.

1	Primidi	first day	before Decadi.
2	Duodi	second day	
3	Tridi	third day	
4	Quartidi	fourth day	
5	Quintidi	fifth day	
6	Sextidi	sixth day	
7	Septidi	seventh day	
8	Octidi	eighth day	
9	Nonidi	ninth day	
10	*Decadi* I.	The first tenth day.	
11	Primidi	first day	after 1st Decadi.
12	Duodi	second day	
13	Tridi	third day	
14	Quartidi	fourth day	
15	Quintidi	fifth day	
16	Sextidi	sixth day	
17	Septidi	seventh day	
18	Octidi	eighth day	
19	Nonidi	ninth day	
20	*Decadi* II.	The second tenth day.	
21	Primidi	first day	after 2nd Decadi.
22	Duodi	second day	
23	Tridi	third day	
24	Quartidi	fourth day	
25	Quintidi	fifth day	
26	Sextidi	sixth day	
27	Septidi	seventh day	
28	Octidi	eighth day	
29	Nonidi	ninth day	
30	*Decadi* III.	The third tenth day.	

Trans.

† These names were intended to signify, or have relation to, the state of the atmosphere, or the productions of nature.

I. VENDÉMIAIRE.—*Vintage month*, which contained the nine last days of September and the twenty first days of October.

II. BRUMAIRE.—*Foggy month*, which contained the ten last days of October and the twenty first days of November.

III. FRIMAIRE.—*Sleety month*, which contained the ten last days of November and the twenty first days of December.

IV. NIVOSE.—*Snowy month*, which contained the eleven last days of December and the nineteen first days of January.

V. PLUVIOSE.—*Rainy month*, which contained the twelve last days of January and the eighteen first days of February.

VI. VENTOSE.—*Windy month*, which contained the ten last days of February (when it was not leap year) and the twenty first days of March.

VII. GERMINAL.—*Budding month*, which contained the eleven last days of March and the nineteen first days of April.

VIII. FLORÉAL.—*Flowery month*, which contained the eleven last days of April and the nineteen first days of May.

IX. PRAIRIAL.—*Meadow month or month for grass*, which contained the twelve last days of May and the eighteen first days of June.

X. MESSIDOR.—*Harvest month*, which contained the twelve last days of June and the eighteen first days of July.

XI. THERMIDOR.—*Hot month*, which contained the thirteen last days of July and the seventeen first days of August.

XII. FRUCTIDOR.—*Fruit month*, which contained the fourteen last days of August and the sixteen first days of September. *Trans.*

calculating time; but not to attempt too much at once, this latter reform was postponed for one year.

The last revolution, the most difficult, the most obnoxious to the accusation of tyranny, was the experiment made in respect of religion. The revolutionary laws relative to religion had been left precisely as the constituent assembly had framed them. It will be recollected that this first assembly, desirous of bringing the ecclesiastical administration to the same description of uniformity as the civil administration, determined that the extent of every diocese should be commensurate with the department, that the bishop should be elective like all the other functionaries, and that, in short, without having regard to any particular doctrine, its discipline should be regulated, as all the parts of the political organization had just been. Such was the civil constitution of the clergy, to which the ecclesiastics were compelled under oath to observe. From that day, it will be recollected, a schism had taken place. Those who had adhered to the new institution were called constitutional or sworn priests, and those who refused to do so, refractory priests. These latter were merely deprived of their functions, and provided for by a pension. The legislative assembly, seeing that they made it their business to excite a strong feeling against the new system, placed them under the surveillance of the authorities of the departments, and even decreed that upon conviction before those authorities, they might be banished from the territory of France. Lastly, the convention, more severe in proportion as their conduct became more seditious, condemned all the refractory priests to transportation. As the public mind became daily more extravagantly outrageous, it began to be questioned why, when all the old monarchical superstitions were abolished, there should yet be retained a shadow of religion, in which scarcely any one continued to believe, and which formed a most striking contrast with the new institutions and the new manners of republican France. Laws had already been called for in favor of married priests, and for protecting them against certain local administrations, which wanted to deprive them of their functions. The convention, extremely reserved on this point, would not make any new enactments in regard to this subject, and by this course the priests were authorized by them to retain their functions and their salaries. Moreover, certain petitions had been preferred against the payment of salaries in support of any religion, and to leave it to each sect to pay its own ministers, to prohibit external ceremonies, and to oblige all religions to confine themselves to their own places of worship. The convention confined itself to reducing the income of a bishop to the *maximum* of six thousand francs, since there were some of them whose income amounted to seventy thousand. On every other point the convention declined to interfere, and kept silence, leaving it to France to take the initiative in the abolition of every species of religious worship. The convention was apprehensive lest, by meddling itself with creeds, it should alienate part of the population still attached to the Catholic religion. The commune of Paris, who were less scrupulous, seized this glorious opportunity for a great reform, and was anxious to set the first example of the abjuration of Catholicism.

While the patriots of the convention and of the Jacobins, while Robespierre, Saint-Just, and the other revolutionary leaders, stopped short at deism, Chaumette, Hébert, and all the *notables* of the commune and the Cordeliers, placed in a far lower station by their functions and their intelligence, could not fail, according to the common course of things, to overstep all bounds, and proceed to atheism itself. They did not openly profess that doctrine, but there were grounds for imputing it to them. In their speeches and in their writings the name of God was never mentioned, and they were incessantly repeating that a nation ought to be governed by reason alone, and to allow no other worship but that of reason. Chaumette was neither so grovelling or malignant or ambitious as Hébert: he did not seek, by overacting the prevailing opinions, to supplant the actual leaders of the revolution; but destitute of political views, full of a common-place philosophy, and possessed with an extraordinary propensity for declamation, he preached with all the zeal and the bigotry of a missionary in favour of good morals, industry, the patriotic virtues, and lastly reason, always abstaining from the mention of the name of God. He had inveighed with vehemence against the pillages; he had severely reprimanded the women who neglected their household concerns to take a part in political commotions, and he had had the courage to abolish their club; he had induced the prohibition of mendicity, and the establishment of public workshops for the purpose of giving employment to the poor; he had thundered against prostitution, and prevailed on the commune to prohibit the profession of women of the town, everywhere tolerated as inevitable. These unfortunates were forbidden to appear in public, or even to carry on their deplorable profession in the interior of houses. Chaumette said that they belonged to monarchical and Catholic countries, where there were idle citizens and unmarried priests, and that industry and marriage ought to drive them from republican territories.

Chaumette, therefore, taking the initiative in the name of that system of reason, launched out at the commune against the publicity of the Catholic worship. He insisted that this was a privilege which that religion ought not to enjoy more than any other; and that if each sect had that exclusive allowance, the streets and public places would soon become the theatre of the most ridiculous farces. As the commune was invested with the local police, he obtained a resolution, on the 23d of Vendémiaire (October the 14th), that no ministers of religion whatever should be allowed to exercise their worship, save in the places consecrated thereto. He instituted new funeral ceremonies for rendering the last duties to the dead. None but friends and relatives were to accompany the coffin. All the religious symbols in cemeteries were suppressed, and were replaced by a statue of Sleep, following Fouché's example in the department of L'Allier. Instead of cypress and mournful shrubs, the burial-grounds were to be planted with those of a more cheerful appearance and of a more fragrant nature. "The beauty and the perfume of the flowers," said Chaumette, "will naturally excite more consolatory associations. I would fain, if it were possible, be able to inhale the spirit of my father!" All the outward signs of religion

were entirely abolished. It was also settled by the same regulation, and always upon the representations of Chaumette, that there should not be sold in the streets *any kinds of jugglery, such as consecrated napkins, Saint-Veronica's handkerchiefs, Ecce Homos, crosses, Agnus Dei, Virgins, bodies and rings of Saint-Hubert, nor any powders, medicinal waters, and other adulterated drugs.* The image of the Virgin was every where suppressed; and all the Madonnas in niches at the corners of streets were taken down, to make room for the busts of Marat and Lepelletier.

Anacharsis Clootz, the same Prussian baron who, possessing an income of one hundred thousand livres, had left his own country to come to Paris, as the representative, he said, of the human race; who at the first federation in 1790 had figured at the head of the self-styled envoys of all nations; and who had afterwards been elected deputy to the national convention,—this Anacharsis Clootz was unceasingly preaching an universal republic and the worship of reason. Full of these two ideas, he incessantly illustrated them in his writings; and at one time by manifestos, at another time by addresses, he submitted his notions to all nations for their approval. To him Deism appeared quite as culpable as Catholicism itself. He never ceased to call for the destruction of tyrants and gods of every description, and held forth that all that liberated and enlightened humanity required was pure reason and her beneficent and immortal worship. To the convention he said, "I found no other way of getting free from all the tyrants, sacred and profane, but by incessant travel; I was in Rome when they would have imprisoned me in Paris, and in London when they would have burned me in Lisbon. It was by thus running hither and thither, from one extremity of Europe to the other, like a weaver's shuttle, that I escaped the alguazils and the spies, all the masters and all the servants. My emigrations ceased when the emigration of the wretches commenced. It was at the greatest place on the face of the globe, it was at Paris that the orator of the human race took his station. I have not quitted it since 1789. It was then that I redoubled my zeal against the pretended sovereigns of earth and heaven. I boldly preached that there is no other God but nature, no other sovereign but the human race, the godlike people. The people is sufficient for itself. It will subsist for ever. Nature kneels not before herself. Judge then of the majesty of the liberated human race by that of the French people, who compose but a fraction. Judge of the infallibility of the whole by the sagacity of a part, which singly makes the enslaved world tremble. The committee of superintendence of the universal republic will have a less care than the committee of the smallest section of Paris. A general confidence will succeed an universal distrust. In my commonwealth there will be few public offices, few taxes, and no executioner. Reason will unite all men into a single representative fascex, without any other tie than epistolary correspondence. Citizens, religion is the only impediment to this Utopia. It is high time to destroy it. The human race has burst its swaddling-clothes. 'The people exert no vigour,' said one of the ancients, 'except on the day that follows a bad reign.' Let us profit by this first day, which we will prolong till the morrow for the deliverance of the world!"

The requisitions of Chaumette revived all the hopes of Clootz. He called upon Gobel, an intriguer of Porentruy, who had become constitutional bishop of the department of Paris, by that rapid movement which had elevated Chaumette, Hébert, and many others, to the highest municipal functions. He persuaded him that the moment had arrived for abjuring, in the face of France, the Catholic religion, of which he was the chief pontiff; that his example would be followed by all the ministers of that communion; that it would enlighten the nation, produce a general abjuration, and thus oblige the convention to decree the abolition of Christianity. Gobel did not exactly wish to abjure his own belief, and thereby admit that he had been playing the part of a deceiver all his life; but he consented to go and abdicate the episcopacy. Gobel then prevailed upon the majority of his vicars to follow his example. It was agreed with Chaumette and the members of the department that all the constituted authorities of Paris should accompany Gobel, and form part of the deputation, to invest it with the greater solemnity.

On the 17th of Brumaire (November 7, 1793) Momoro, Pache, Lhuillier, Chaumette, Gobel, and all his vicars, repaired to the convention. Chaumette and Lhuillier, both of them procurators, one of the commune, the other of the department, announced to the convention that the clergy of Paris had come to pay a glorious and sincere homage to reason. They then introduced Gobel, with a red cap on his head, and who holding in his hand his mitre, his crosier, his cross, and his ring, thus addressed the assembly: "Born a plebeian, a curate of Porentruy, sent by my clergy to the former assembly, then raised to the archbishopric of Paris, I have never ceased to obey the people. I have accepted the functions which that people formerly bestowed on me, and now, in obedience to the people, I am come to resign them. I suffered myself to be made a bishop when the people wanted bishops. I cease to be a bishop now when the people no longer desire to have any." Gobel added, that all his clergy, actuated by the same sentiment, charged him to make the like declaration for them. When he had finished speaking, he laid down his mitre, his crosier, and his ring. His clergy confirmed his declaration. The president replied, with great address, that the convention had decreed perfect freedom in religious worship, that she had felt it her duty to leave it unrestricted to every sect, that she had never interfered in their creeds, but that she applauded those who, enlightened by reason, came to renounce their superstitions and their errors.

Gobel had not abjured either the priesthood or Catholicism, and had not ventured to declare himself an impostor who had brought himself at last to confess his lies; but others assume that his declaration went that length for him. "Renouncing," said the curé of Vaugirard, "the prejudices which fanaticism had implanted in my heart and mind, I lay down my letters of ordination." Several bishops and curates, as members also of the convention, then followed this example, and laid down their letters of ordination or abjured Catholicism. Julien of Toulouse abdicated also his title of Protestant

minister. These abdications were hailed with tumultuous applause by the assembly and the galleries. At this moment, Gregoire, bishop of Blois, entered the hall. He was informed of what had passed, and was requested to follow the example of his colleagues. He resolutely refused. "If it be," said he, "a mere question as to the income attached to the episcopal functions, I resign that without regret. Is it my quality of priest and bishop? I cannot strip myself of that; my religion forbids me. I appeal to the freedom of religion." The words of Gregoire finished amidst tumult, but they did not check the explosion of joy which this scene had excited. The deputation quitted the assembly attended by an immense concourse, and proceeded to the Hotel de Ville, to receive the congratulations of the commune.

After the example had been once set, it became no difficult matter to excite all the sections of Paris, and all the communes of the republic, to follow it. The sections soon met, and came one after another to declare that they renounced the errors of superstition, and that they acknowledged no other worship than that of reason. The section of L'Homme-Armé declared that it acknowledged no other worship than that of truth and reason, no other fanaticism than that of liberty and equality, no other doctrine than that of fraternity and the republican laws decreed since the 31st of May, 1793. The section of La Reunion intimated that it would make a bonfire of all the confessionals, and of all the books used by the catholics, and that it would cause the church of Saint Méry to be closed. The section of William Tell renounced for ever what it termed the worship of error and imposture. The section of Mucius Scævola abjured Catholicism, and declared that on the next decadi it would celebrate at the high altar of Saint Sulpice the inauguration of the busts of Marat, Lepelletier, and Mucius Scævola. The section of Les Piques that it would adore no other god than the god of liberty and equality. The section of the Arsenal also abjured the Catholic religion.

Thus the sections, taking the initiative, abjured Catholicism as the established religion, and took possession of its edifices and its treasures, as it would of buildings and treasures appurtenant to the communal demesnes. The deputies on mission in the departments had already incited a great number of communes to seize the moveable property of the churches, which they said was not necessary for religion, and which, besides, like all public property, belonged to the state, and might therefore be appropriated for its purposes. Fouché had sent several chests of plate from the department of L'Allier. A great quantity had arrived from other departments. This example, followed in Paris and the environs, soon brought piles of wealth to the bar of the convention. All the churches were stripped, and the communes sent deputations with the gold and silver accumulated in the shrines of saints, or in places consecrated by antique devotion. They went in procession to the convention, and the rabble indulging their taste for the burlesque, caricatured in the most ludicrous manner the ceremonies of religion, and took as much delight in profaning as they had formerly done in celebrating them. Men wearing surplices, chasubles, and copes, came singing *Alleluia*, and dancing the *carmagnole* at the bar of the convention; there they deposited the ostensories and the boxes in which the host was kept, and the images of gold and silver; they delivered themselves of satirical speeches, and sometimes addressed the most singular harangues to the saints themselves: "O ye," exclaimed a deputation from Saint Denis, "O ye instruments of fanaticism! blessed saints of every degree, be at last patriots, rise *en masse*, serve the country by going to be melted for money, and give us in this world that felicity which you desired to obtain for us in the other!" These scenes of merriment were followed all at once by scenes of reverence and devotion. The same persons who trampled underfoot the saints of Christianity bore a canopy; the curtains were thrown back, and pointing to the busts of Marat and Lepelletier, "These," said they, "are not gods made by men, but the images of worthy citizens assassinated by the slaves of kings." They then filed off before the convention, again singing *alleluia* and dancing the *carmagnole*; they then carried the rich spoils of the altars to the mint, and placed the revered busts of Marat and Lepelletier in the churches, now become the temples of a new worship.

At the requisition of Chaumette, it was resolved that the metropolitan church of Notre Dame should be converted into a republican edifice, called the *Temple of Reason*. A fête was appointed for the days of the decades, which fête was to supersede the catholic ceremonies of Sunday. The mayor, the municipal officers, and the public functionaries, repaired to the temple of reason, where they read the declaration of the rights of man, as also the constitutional act, discussed the news from the armies, and related the brilliant actions which had been performed during the decade. A letter-box of truth (*une bouche de vérité*), resembling the letter-boxes of denunciation which formerly existed at Venice, was placed in the temple of reason, to receive opinions, censures, or advice, likely to prove of utility to the public. These letters were examined and read upon every decade, an orator then delivered a moral sermon, after which pieces of music were performed, and the performance concluded by singing republican hymns. There were in the temple two tribunes, one for aged men, the other for pregnant women, with these inscriptions: *Reverence for old age—Respect and attention to pregnant women.*

The first festival of reason was held with pomp on the 20th of Brumaire (the 10th of November.) All the sections, together with the constituted authorities, repaired thither; a young woman representing the Goddess of Reason. She was the wife of Momoro, the printer, one of the friends of Vincent, Ronsin, Chaumette, Hébert, and the like. She was dressed in a white drapery; a mantle of azure blue hung from her shoulders; her flowing hair was covered with the cap of liberty. She was seated upon an antique seat, entwined with ivy, and borne by four citizens. Young girls dressed in white, and crowned with roses, preceded and followed the goddess. Then came the busts of Lepelletier and Marat, musicians, troops, and all the armed sections. Speeches were delivered, and hymns sung in the temple of reason; they then proceeded to the convention; Chaumette spoke in these terms:—

"Legislators! fanaticism has given way to reason. Her bleared eyes could not endure the brilliancy of the light. This day an immense concourse has assembled beneath these fretted vaults, which for the first time have echoed to the voice of truth. There it is that the French have celebrated the only true worship, that of liberty, that of reason. There it is that we have formed wishes for the prosperity of the arms of the republic. There it is that we have abandoned inanimate idols, for reason, for that animated image, the masterpiece of nature." As he uttered these words, Chaumette pointed to the living goddess of reason. The young and beautiful woman descended from her seat, and went up to the president, who gave her the fraternal embrace, amidst universal bravos, and shouts of *The republic for ever! Reason for ever! Down with fanaticism!* The convention, who had not yet taken any part in these representations, was hurried away, and obliged to follow the procession, which returned to the temple of reason, and there sang a patriotic hymn. An important piece of intelligence, that of the re-taking of Noirmourtiers from Charette, augmented the general joy, and furnished a more substantial cause for this rejoicing, than the mere abolition of fanaticism.

It is impossible to view with any other feeling than that of disgust these scenes, possessing neither reflection or sincerity, exhibited by a nation that had changed its worship, without comprehending either the previous, or the present, form of adoration.

When is the multitude sincere? When is it capable of comprehending the doctrines that are submitted to its belief? What does it generally want? Great meetings, which pander to its desire of being assembled, symbolic spectacles, which incessantly remind it of a power superior to its own; lastly, festivals, in which homage is paid to those who have made the nearest approach to what is good, noble, or great; in short, temples, ceremonies, and saints. There were now temples to Reason, Marat, and Lepelletier. The people were assembled, they adored a mysterious power, they celebrated those two men. All their desires were satisfied, and they gave themselves up to their passion on this occasion, in no other manner than as they always have done.

If, then, we survey the state of France at this period, we shall see that never were more restraints imposed at once on that inert and patient part of the population on which political experiments are usually made. People dared no longer express any opinion. They were afraid to visit their friends, for fear lest they might be compromised with them, and forfeit their liberty, or even their life. A hundred thousand arrests, and some hundreds of condemnations, rendered imprisonment and the scaffold ever present to the minds of twenty-five millions of French people. They had to bear heavy taxes. If, according to an entirely arbitrary classification, they were classified with the wealthy, they lost for that year a portion of their income. Sometimes, at the requisition of a representative, or of some agent or other, they were obliged to surrender their crops, or their most valuable effects in gold and silver. They durst no longer display any luxury, or indulge in noisy pleasures. They were no longer permitted to use metallic money, but obliged to take and give a depreciated paper, with which it was difficult to procure such things as they needed. If they were shopkeepers, they were compelled to sell at a fictitious price; if they were purchasers, to put up with the worst commodities, because the best eluded the *maximum* and the assignats; sometimes, indeed, they had to do without either, because good and bad commodities were alike withdrawn. They had but one sort of black bread, common to the rich as to the poor, for which they were obliged to contend at the doors of the bakers, by waiting their turn several hours at a time. The names of the weights and measures, the names of the months and days, were changed; there were but three Sundays instead of four; and, lastly, women and aged men found themselves deprived of those religious ceremonies which they had been accustomed to attend all their lives.

Never had power overthrown with greater violence the habits of a people. To threaten every body's life, to decimate every body's fortune, to fix compulsorily the course of exchange, to apply new names to every thing, to abolish the performance of religious worship, this was indisputably the most atrocious of tyrannies; but we must take into consideration the perilous condition of the state, the inevitable crisis of commerce, and the spirit of system inseparable from the spirit of innovation.

CHAPTER XVI.

DANTON'S RETURN—DIVISION IN THE MOUNTAIN, DANTONISTS AND HÉBERTISTS—POLICY OF ROBESPIERRE AND THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC WELFARE—DANTON ACCUSED BY THE JACOBINS, JUSTIFIES HIMSELF; HE IS DEFENDED BY ROBESPIERRE.—ABOLITION OF THE WORSHIP OF REASON—RECENT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY DICTATORIAL GOVERNMENT—ENERGY OF THE COMMITTEE AS EXERTED AGAINST ALL THE PARTIES—ARREST OF ROUSIN, VINCENT, OF THE FOUR DEPUTIES WHO UTTERED THE FORGED DECREE, AND OF THE PRESUMED AGENTS OF FOREIGN POWERS.

EVER since the fall of the Girondists, the *Mountaineer* party, left alone and victorious, had begun to be disunited. The daily increasing excesses of the revolution tended to complete this division, and an absolute rupture was near at hand. Many deputies had been moved by the fate of the Girondists, of Bailly, of Brunet, and of Houchard. Others censured the violence committed in regard to religion, and considered them as in the highest degree impolitic and dangerous. They said that

new superstitions would start up in the place of those which people were anxious to annihilate; that the pretended worship of reason was nothing else than atheism; that atheism could never be suitable for any nation; and that these extravagances were the consequence of foreign pay. On the contrary, that party which held sway at the Cordeliers and at the commune, which had Hébert for its writer, Ronsin and Vincent for its leaders, Chaumette and Clootz for its apostles, insisted that its adversaries meant to resuscitate a moderatist faction, and to bring round a fresh division in the republic.

Danton had returned from his absence. He did not utter his sentiments, but the leader of a party would in vain attempt to conceal them. They pass from man to man, and are soon made known to the public. It was well known that he would fain have prevented the execution of the Girondins, and that their tragic end had visibly affected him. It was well known that though a partisan and an inventor of revolutionary measures, he began to condemn their blind and ferocious application; in his opinion there was no necessity for continuing violent measures a moment after the danger that had suggested them was over, and that at the close of the present campaign, and the entire expulsion of the enemy, he desired that a spirit of mild and equitable legislation should prevail. No one in the tribunes of the clubs had yet ventured to attack him. Hébert dared not insult him in his paper of *Père Duchêne*, but the most insidious rumours were orally circulated; insinuations were thrown out against his integrity; allusion was made, and that in the most perfidious manner, to the disturbances in Belgium, which in some measure were imputed to his connivance; indeed they had even gone so far as to assert, that during his seclusion at Arcis-sur-Aube, he had emigrated and carried his wealth along with him. With him were associated, as no better than himself, his friend Camille-Desmoulins, who with him had felt sympathy for the Girondists, and had defended Dillon as well as Philippeaux, who had just returned from La Vendée, enraged against the disorganizers, and quite ready to denounce Ronsin and Rossignol. In his party were likewise classed all those who had in any way displeased the fervid revolutionists, and their number began to be very considerable.

Julien of Toulouse, who had already incurred suspicion on account of his connexion with d'Espagnac and the contractors, had completely committed himself by a report on the federalist administrations, in which he strove to palliate the improprieties committed by the greater part of them. No sooner was this report delivered, than the indignant Cordeliers and Jacobins, thoroughly roused, obliged him to withdraw it. They made inquiries concerning his private life; they discovered that he had consorted with stock-jobbers, that his mistress was a *ci-devant* countess; and they declared him to be both a dissolute character and a moderatist. Fabre d'Eglantine had recently exhibited a great alteration in his circumstances, and lived in an expensive style, perfectly inconsistent with former appearances. Chabot, the capuchin Chabot, who, on espousing the cause of the revolution, had nothing but his ecclesiastical pension, had also lately begun to display expensive furniture, and married the young sister of the two Freys, with a marriage portion of two hundred thousand livres. This sudden change of fortune excited suspicions against these recently enriched deputies, and it was not long before a proposition which they made to the convention completed their ruin. Osselin, a deputy, had just been arrested, for having, as 'twas said, concealed a female emigrant. Fabre, Chabot, Julien, and Delaunay, who were not easy on their own account, as well as Bazire and Thuriot, who had nothing wherewith to reproach themselves, but who perceived with alarm that even members of the convention were not spared, proposed a decree, purporting that no deputy could be arrested till he had been first heard at the bar. This decree was adopted; but all the clubs and the Jacobins rose up against it, and alleged that it was an attempt to renew the *inviolability*. They caused a report to be made upon it, and commenced the strictest inquiry concerning those who had proposed it, their conduct, and the origin of their sudden wealth. Julien, Fabre, Chabot, Delaunay, Bazire, and Thuriot, stripped of their popularity in a few days, were classed among the party of equivocal and moderate men. Hébert loaded them with the grossest abuse in his paper, and thus handed them over to the mob.

Four or five other persons shared the same fate, though hitherto considered excellent patriots. These were Proli, Pereyra, Gusman, Dubuisson, and Desfieux. Natives, almost all of them, of foreign countries, they had come hither, like the two Freys, as well as Clootz, and identified themselves with the French revolution out of sheer enthusiasm, and probably, also, from a desire to make their fortune. Nobody cared who or what they were, so long as they appeared to be strongly attached to the revolution. Proli, who was a native of Brussels, had been sent with Pereyra and Desfieux to Dumouriez, to discover his intentions. They drew from him an explanation of them, and then went, as we have related, and denounced him to the convention and to the Jacobins. So far all was right; but they had also been employed by Lebrun, because, being foreigners and well-informed men, they were capable of being made serviceable in respect of foreign affairs. In their intercourse with Lebrun, they had learned to esteem him, and latterly they had defended him. Proli had been well acquainted with Dumouriez, and notwithstanding the defection of that general, he had persisted in extolling his talents, and asserting that he might yet have been preserved for the republic. Lastly, almost all of them, possessing a better knowledge of the neighbouring countries, had censured the application of the Jacobinical system to Belgium, and to the provinces united with France. Their expressions were treasured up; and when a general distrust led to the notion of the secret interference of a foreign faction, people began to suspect them, and reflected upon the tenor of their previous language. It was known that Proli was a natural son of Kaunitz; he was supposed to be the principal conspirator, and they were all metamorphosed into spies of Pitt and Cobourg. The public rage soon knew no bounds, and the very exaggeration of their patriotism, which they thought was the best mode of disarming suspicion, only served to

render them still more obnoxious to suspicion. They were confounded with the party of the equivocal men and the moderates. Thus, whenever Danton or his friends had any remark to make on the faults of the ministerial agents, or on the violence offered to religion, the party of Hébert, Vincent, and Ronsin replied by crying out against moderation, corruption, and the foreign faction.

As usual, the moderates flung back this accusation on their adversaries, saying, "It is you who are the accomplices of these foreigners; your connexion with them is proved as well by the common violence of your language, as by the determination to overturn every thing, and to carry matters to extremities. Look," added they, "at that commune which arrogates to itself a legislative authority, and passes laws under the modest title of resolutions (*arrêtés*); which regulates every thing —the police, the markets, and public worship; which at its own good pleasure substitutes one religion for another, supersedes ancient superstitions, and introduces new, preaches up atheism, and causes its example to be followed by all the municipalities of the republic. Look at those offices of the war department whence issue a multitude of agents, who spread themselves over the provinces, to vie with the representatives in practising the greatest oppressions, and to decry the revolution by their conduct; look at that commune, at those offices!—what is it they want but to usurp the legislative and executive authority, to dispossess the convention and the committees, and to dissolve the government? Who can possibly be goading them on, except it be the foreign enemy?"

Amidst these agitations and these quarrels, the supreme authority was necessarily compelled to take a very active part. Robespierre thought, with the whole committee, that these counter accusations were extremely dangerous. His policy, as we have already seen, had consisted, ever since the 31st of May, in preventing a new revolutionary outbreak, in rallying opinion around the convention, and the convention around the committee, so as to create an energetic power, and to effect this he had made use of the Jacobins, who were then all powerful in public estimation. These new charges against accredited patriots, such as Danton and Camille Desmoulins, appeared to him very dangerous. He was afraid that no reputation would be able to stand against the unrestrained popular feeling; he was apprehensive lest the violence offered to religion might alienate part of France, and cause the revolution to be regarded as atheistical; lastly, he fancied that he beheld the hand of the foreign enemy in this vast confusion. It was not long before Hébert afforded him an opportunity, of which he readily availed himself, to explain his sentiments on this head to the Jacobins.

The intentions of Robespierre had got abroad. It was secretly rumoured that he was going to make one of his furious attacks upon Pache, Hébert, Chaumette, and Clootz, the originators of the movement against religion. Proli, Desfieux, and Pereyra, already compromised and threatened, resolved to identify their cause with that of Pache, Chaumette, and Hébert. They went to these latter and told them that there was a conspiracy against the best patriots; that they were all equally in danger, that they ought to support and reciprocally defend each other. Hébert then went to the Jacobins on the 1st of Brumaire (November 21, 1793), and complained of a plan of disunion tending to divide the patriots. "Wherever I go," said he, "I meet with people who congratulate me on not having been yet arrested. It is reported that Robespierre intends to denounce myself, Chaumette, and Pache.—As for myself, who put myself forward every day for the interest of the country, and speak freely on every subject that occurs to my mind, the rumour may have some foundation; but as to Pache!——I know the high esteem which Robespierre entertains for him, and I utterly reject such a notion. It has been said, too, that Danton has emigrated—that he has gone to Switzerland laden with the spoils of the people.—I met him this morning in the Tuileries, and since he is in Paris, he ought to come and explain himself fraternally at the Jacobins. It is a duty which all the patriots owe to themselves to contradict the injurious reports which are circulated respecting them." Hébert then stated that some portion of these reports came from Dubuisson, who wished to impart to him the information he had received, of a conspiracy against the patriots; and according to the usual custom of throwing all the blame upon the vanquished, he added, that the cause of the troubles was to be traced to those accomplices of Brissot who were still alive, and to the Bourbons who still remained in the temple. Robespierre immediately mounted the tribune—"Is it true," said he, "that our most dangerous enemies are the impure remnants of the race of our tyrants? I vote from my heart that the race of tyrants disappear from the face of the earth; but can I shut my eyes to the state of my country so completely as to believe that this event would suffice to extinguish the secret flame of those conspiracies which are rending us? whom shall we persuade by any thing we can say, that the punishment of the despicable sister of Capet would awe our enemies, more than that of Capet himself and of his guilty partner?

"Is it true that another cause of our calamities is fanaticism? Fanaticism! it is expiring; nay, I may say, it is already dead. In directing, for some days past, all our energy against it, are not we diverting our attention from the real dangers which infest us? You are afraid of the priests, and they are eagerly abdicating their titles, and exchanging them for those of municipals, of administrators, and even of presidents of popular societies. Not long ago they were strongly attached to their ministry, when it produced them an income of seventy thousand livres; they cast it off when it yielded them no more than six thousand.——Yes; fear not their fanaticism, but rather their ambition; not the dress which they did wear, but the new skin in which they now appear. Fear not the old superstition, but the new and false superstition, which men simulate in order to effect our destruction!"

Grappling at once the question of religious observances, Robespierre thus proceeded. "Let citizens, animated by a pure zeal, deposit upon the altar of the country the useless and pompous monuments of superstition, so as to render them available for the triumphs of liberty; the country and reason graciously smile upon these offerings; but what right have aristocracy and hypocrisy to mingle their im-

fluence with that of civism? What right have men, hitherto unknown in the career of the revolution, to seek amidst all these events the means of usurping a false popularity, of inveigling the very patriots into false measures, and of throwing disturbance and discord among us? What right have they to violate the liberty of religion in the name of liberty, and to attack fanaticism with a new fanaticism? What right have they to make the solemn homage paid to pure truth, degenerate into wearisome and ridiculous farces?

"It has been supposed, that in accepting the civic offerings, the convention has proscribed the Catholic worship. No, the convention has taken no such step, and never will take it. Its intention is to uphold that universal toleration of all religions which it has proclaimed, and to repress at the same time all those who shall abuse it, and thus disturb the public peace. The convention will not allow the peaceful ministers of the different religions to be persecuted, and she will punish them severely, whenever they shall dare to avail themselves of their functions to mislead the citizens, and to arm either prejudice or royalism against the republic.

"There are men who would fain go further; who, upon pretext of destroying superstition, would rather make or carve a species of religion out of atheism itself. Every philosopher, every individual, is at liberty to adopt on that subject what opinion he pleases; whoever would make a crime of this is a madman, but the public man and the legislator would be a hundred times more insane who should adopt such a system. The national convention abhors it. The convention is not a maker of books and of systems; it is a political and popular body. Atheism is *aristocratic*. The idea of a great Being, who watches over oppressed innocence, and who punishes triumphant guilt, is perfectly in accordance with popular notions. The people and the unfortunate applaud me. If I meet with censures, it will be amongst the rich and amongst the guilty. I have been, ever since I left college, a very indifferent Catholic; but I have never been a cold friend, or an unfaithful defender of humanity. I am on that account only the more attached to the moral and political ideas which I have just been demonstrating to you. *If a God did not exist, it would behove man to invent one.*"

Robespierre, after making this confession of faith, imputed to the foreign foe the persecutions exercised against religion, and the calumnies circulated against the best patriots. Robespierre, who was extremely distrustful, and who had supposed the Girondists to be royalists, was a firm believer in a foreign faction, which, as we have observed, had no other representatives than a few spies sent to the armies, and some few bankers, who were the agents of stock-jobbers, and correspondents of the emigrants. "The foreigners," said he, "have two sorts of armies: the one on our frontiers is powerless and nearly ruined; the other, the more dangerous of the two, is in the midst of us. It is an army of spies, of hireling knaves, who introduce themselves every where, even into the bosom of the popular societies. It is this faction which has persuaded Hébert that I meant to cause Pache, Chaumette, Hébert, nay, the whole commune, to be arrested. Could I persecute Pache, whose simple and retiring worth I have always admired and defended!—I, who have fought for him against a Brissot and his accomplices!" Robespierre lauded Pache, but took no notice whatever of Hébert. He contented himself by saying, that he had not forgotten the services of the commune in the days when liberty was in danger. Then, launching out against what he called the foreign faction, he hurled the bolts of the Jacobins at Proli, Dubuisson, Pereyra, and Desfieux. He related their history; he depicted them as the agents of Lebrun and of the foreign powers, employed to embitter animosities, to divide the patriots, and to inflame them against one another. From the manner in which he expressed himself, it was obvious that the hatred which he felt for the old friends of Lebrun, had no small share in causing his distrust. At length he caused all four of them to be expelled from the society, amidst the roar of the most tumultuous applause, and he proposed that a purifying scrutiny of all the Jacobins should immediately take place.

Thus Robespierre had hinted an anathema at the new worship, given a severe lesson to all the firebrands, said nothing very consolatory to Hébert, not committed himself so far as to praise that disgusting writer, and directed the whole fury of the storm upon those foreigners, who had the misfortune to be friends of Lebrun, to admire Dumouriez, and to censure our political system in the conquered countries. Lastly, he had arrogated to himself the remodelling of the society, by obtaining the adoption of his motion for a purifying scrutiny.

During the succeeding days, Robespierre followed up his system, and read letters to the Jacobins, some anonymous, others intercepted, tending to prove that the foreign enemy, if he did not produce, at least rejoiced at, the extravagances in regard to religion, and the calumnies cast upon the best patriots. Danton had received from Hébert a sort of challenge to explain himself. He would not do so at first, lest it should appear as though he were obeying a summons; but fifteen days afterwards, he seized a favourable occasion for addressing the assembly. A proposition had been brought forward, that all the popular societies should be furnished with a place for meeting at the expense of the state. On this subject he offered various observations, and then took the opportunity of saying that, even assuming that the constitution ought to be passive, while the people were levelling their blows and terrifying their enemies by means of their revolutionary operations, it was nevertheless right to have an eye to those who wanted to urge that same people beyond the prescribed bounds of the revolution. Coupé, of the Oise, replied to Danton, and, while he addressed himself against his ideas, gave them a false construction. Danton immediately re-ascended the tribune, and experienced some tokens of dissatisfaction. He then challenged those who had any thing to allege against him, to bring forward their charges against him in a distinct form, so that he might reply to them publicly. He complained of the disapprobation which was expressed in his presence. "Have I then lost," he exclaimed, "those features which characterize the face of a free man?" As he uttered these words, he shook that head which had been so often seen, so often encountered, amid the storms of the revolution,

and which had always encouraged the audacity of the republicans, and struck terror into the aristocrats. "Am I no longer," he continued, "the same man who was at your side in every critical moment? Am I no longer that man so persecuted, so well known to you, that man whom you have so often embraced as your friend, and with whom you have sworn to die in our mutual dangers?" He then reminded the assembly that he was the defender of Marat, and was thus obliged to cover himself as it were with the shade of that being whom he had formerly protected and disdained. "You will be surprised," said he, "when I shall make you acquainted with my private conduct, to see that the colossal fortune which my enemies and yours have attributed to me, is dwindled down to the very small portion of property which I have always possessed. I defy the malignants to furnish any proof against me. Their utmost efforts will not be able to shake me. I will take my stand in face of the people. You shall judge me in their presence. I will no more obliterate the page of my history, than you will obliterate yours." In conclusion, Danton demanded a commission to investigate the accusations preferred against him. Robespierre then rushed with the greatest eagerness to the tribune. "Danton," he exclaimed, "demands of you a commission to investigate his conduct. I consent to it, if he thinks that this measure will prove serviceable to him. He wishes the crimes with which he is charged to be specified. Well, I will specify them: Danton, thou art accused of having emigrated. It has been said that thou hast gone to Switzerland; that thy indisposition was feigned, to disguise thy flight from the people: it has been said that it was thy ambition to be regent under Louis XVII; that every thing was prepared for proclaiming, at a fixed time, this scion of the Capets; that thou wert at the head of the conspiracy; that neither Pitt, or Cobourg, or England, or Austria, or Prussia, were our real enemy, but thyself alone; that the Mountain was composed of thy accomplices; that there existed no necessity for bestowing a thought upon agents sent by the foreign powers; that their conspiracies were old wives' tales, worthy only of contempt; in short, that it was thou who oughtest to be put to death,—thou alone!" Universal applause drowned the voice of Robespierre. He resumed: "Knowest thou not, Danton, that the more courage and patriotism a man possesses, the more intent are the enemies of the public weal upon his destruction? Knowest thou not, and know not all of you, ye citizens, that this method is infallible? Ah! if the defender of liberty were not slandered, this alone would be a proof that we had no more nobles or priests to encounter." Then alluding to Hébert's newspaper, in which he, Robespierre, was highly praised, he added, "The enemies of the country seem to overwhelm me exclusively with praises. But I repudiate them. Is it to be supposed that in those very praises which are repeated in certain papers, I do not perceive the weapon with which they would fain massacre the country? The cause of the patriots is like that of the tyrants. They are all bound for one another, body for body. I may, perhaps, be mistaken respecting Danton, but, considered in his domestic relations, he deserves nothing but praise. In his political relations I have watched him; a difference of opinion led me to study him with attention, frequently with anger; he was reluctant, I must admit, to suspect Dumouriez; he did not hate Brissot and his accomplices quite enough; but if he was not always of the same sentiments as myself, am I thence to conclude that he would have betrayed the country? No, I always saw him serve it with zeal. Danton wishes to be tried. He is right. Let me be tried too! Let them produce men more patriotic than both of us are. I would wager that they are nobles, privileged persons,—priests. You will there find a marquis, and you will have the exact measure of the patriotism of the gentry who accuse us."

Robespierre then called upon all those who had any thing to allege against Danton to come forward and state it; but no one ventured to do so. Momoro, himself a friend of Hébert's, was the first to remark that as no person came forward, this was a proof that there was nothing to be alleged against Danton. A member then proposed that the president should give him the fraternal embrace. It was agreed to, and Danton, stepping up to the bureau, received the embrace amidst universal applause.

The conduct of Robespierre on this occasion was generous and well managed. That danger, common to all the old patriots, that ingratitude with which Danton's services were then about to be repaid, and lastly, a decided superiority, had made Robespierre depart from his habitual egotism; and on this occasion, actuated by laudable motives, he was more eloquent than ordinary. But the service which he rendered Danton was of greater utility to the cause of the government, and of the old patriots who composed it, than to Danton himself, whose popularity was gone. Extinct enthusiasm cannot be rekindled; and there was no room to afford the presumption that the public would be again exposed to dangers imminent enough to afford Danton, by his courage, the opportunity of retrieving his influence.

Robespierre, prosecuting his work, did not fail to attend every sitting while the purifying process was in progress. Clootz's turn came: he was accused of being connected with the foreign banker, Vandenyver. He attempted to justify himself, but Robespierre addressed the society. He reminded them of Clootz's connexion with the Girondists, his rupture with them, owing to a pamphlet entitled "*Neither Roland nor Marat*," ("*Ni Roland ni Marat*,") a pamphlet in which he attacked the Mountain as strongly as the Girondé; his extravagant exaggerations, his perseverance in talking of a universal republic, his exciting a rage for conquests, and thus compromising France with all Europe. "And how," continued Robespierre, "could M. Clootz interest himself in the welfare of France, when he took so deep an interest in the welfare of Persia and Monomatapa. There is a recent crisis, indeed, of which he may boast. I allude to the movement against the established worship—a movement which, conducted rationally and deliberately, might have produced excellent effects, but the violence of which was liable to do the greatest mischief.——M. Clootz had a conference one night with Bishop Gobel. Gobel passed his word for the next day, and suddenly changing language and dress, he came to resign his letters of or-

dination——. M. Clootz imagined that we should be the dupes of these masquerades. No, no; the Jacobins will never regard as a friend of the people this pretended *sans-culotte*, who is a Prussian and a baron, who possesses an income of one hundred thousand livres, who dines with conspirator bankers, and who is not the orator of the French people, but of the human race."

Clootz was immediately excluded from the society; and on the motion of Robespierre, it was decided that all nobles, priests, bankers, and foreigners, without distinction, should be excluded.

At the next sitting, it came to the turn of Camille-Desmoulins. His letter to Dillon, expressing a sympathy for the Girondists, was laid to his charge. "I thought Dillon a brave and a clever man," said Camille, "and I defended him. As for the Girondists, I was peculiarly situated in regard to them. I have always loved and served the republic, but I have frequently been wrong in my notions of those who served it. That I have adored Mirabeau, I loved Barnave, and the Lameths, I admit; but I sacrificed my friendship and my admiration for them so soon as I knew that they had ceased to be Jacobins. A most extraordinary fatality has decreed that, out of sixty revolutionists who signed my marriage-contract, only two friends, Danton and Robespierre, are now left to me. All the others have emigrated or been guillotined. Of this number were seven of the twenty-two. An emotion of sympathy was therefore very pardonable on this occasion. I have certainly said," added Desmoulins, "that they died as republicans, but my meaning was as federalist republicans; for I assure you that I do not believe there was any royalist among them."

Camille Desmoulins was beloved for his easy disposition and his natural and original turn of mind. "Camille has made a bad choice of his friends," said a Jacobin; "let us prove to him that we know better how to choose ours by receiving him with open arms." Robespierre, ever the protector of his old colleagues, but assuming at the same time a tone of superiority, defended Camille Desmoulins. "He is weak," said he, "and confiding, but he has always been a republican. He loved Mirabeau, Lameth, and Dillon, but he has broken his idols as soon as he was undeceived. Let him pursue his career, and be more cautious in future." After this exhortation, Camille was admitted amidst applause. Danton was then admitted without any observation, as well as Fabre d'Eglantine in his turn, but he had to submit to some questions concerning his fortune, which he was allowed to attribute to his literary talents. This purification was continued, and occupied a long time. It was begun in November, 1793, and lasted several months.

The policy of Robespierre and the government was well known. The energy with which this policy had been demonstrated intimidated the firebrands and restless promoters of the new worship, and they begun to think of retracting, and of retracing their steps. Chaumette, who had the eloquence of a club or a commune orator, but who had neither ambition or courage enough to qualify him for a party leader, did not by any means pretend to put himself in competition with the convention, and to set himself up as the inventor of a new worship. He was eager, therefore, to seize the opportunity for making amends for his error. He resolved to obtain an interpretation of the resolution which shut up all the places of worship, and proposed to the commune to declare that it had no intention to interfere with religious toleration, and by no means prohibited the professors to meet in places paid for by them, and maintained at their own expense. "Let it not be supposed," said he, "that I am actuated by weakness or selfish policy. I am equally incapable of the one or the other. It is the conviction that our enemies would fain abuse our zeal, by urging us beyond its proper limits, and by engaging us in erroneous measures; the conviction exists, that if we prevent the Catholics from exercising their worship in public, and with the sanction of the law, a set of atrabilious wretches will go and induce them to entertain extravagant notions, or cause them to conspire in cellars. It is this conviction alone that presses upon me, and induces me to speak." The resolution, proposed by Chaumette, and strongly seconded by the mayor Pache, was at length adopted with some murmurs soon drowned in the general applause. On her part, the convention declared that she had never intended by her decree to fetter religious toleration, and it forbade the plate still remaining in the churches to be touched, since the treasury had no further need of that kind of aid. From that day the indecent farces performed by the people were no longer repeated in Paris, and the ceremonies of the worship of reason, which had caused so much diversion, were abolished.

Amidst this great confusion, the committee of public welfare felt more keenly every day the necessity of rendering the supreme authority more vigorous, more prompt, and more readily obeyed. Every day the experience he derived from various impediments rendered it more expert, and it was constantly making fresh accessions to that revolutionary machine created for the duration of the war. It had already prevented the transfer of power to new and inexperienced hands, by proroguing the convention, and by declaring the government revolutionary till the peace. At the same time, it had concentrated this power in itself by making the revolutionary tribunal, the police, the military operations, and the very distribution of the articles of consumption, subordinate to itself. Two months' experience had made it acquainted with the obstacles by which the local authorities, either from excessive or defective zeal, clogged the action of the superior authority. The transmission of the decrees was frequently interrupted or delayed, and their promulgation neglected in certain departments. There still remained many of those federalist administrations, which had risen in rebellion, and the power of coalescing had not yet been forbidden them. If, on the one hand, the departmental administrations exhibited some tendency to federalism, the communes, on the other, acting in a contrary spirit, exercised, after the example of that of Paris, an oppressive authority, issued laws, and imposed taxes; the revolutionary committees displayed towards individuals an arbitrary and inquisitorial power, revolutionary armies, stationed in different localities, fortified these local, tyrannical, petty governments, divided among themselves, and

embarrassing the superior government. Lastly, the authority of the representatives, added to all the others, increased the confusion of the sovereign powers; for they imposed taxes, and issued penal laws, in precisely the same manner as the communes, or even the convention itself.

Billaud-Varennes, in a carelessly written but yet able report, detailed these inconveniences, and caused the decree of the 14th of Frimaire, (year II., Dec. 4,) to be a model for a provisional, energetic, and absolute government. Anarchy, said the reporter, threatens republics at their birth and in their old age. Let us endeavour to secure ourselves against it. This decree instituted the *Bulletin des Lois*, an admirable and new invention, the idea of which had never been made public; for the laws, sent by the assembly to the ministers, and by the ministers to the local authorities, without the date when they were to take effect, and without minutes to guaranty their transmission or their arrival, were frequently issued a long time before they were either promulgated or known. According to the new decree, a commission, a printing-office, and a particular kind of paper, were exclusively devoted to the printing and publication of the laws. The commission, composed of four persons, independent of all authority, and discharged of all other labours, received the law, caused it to be printed, and sent it by post within fixed and invariable terms. The transmission and the delivery were ascertained by the ordinary means of the post; and these movements, thus reduced to a regular system, became infallible. The convention was afterwards declared to be the central point, from whence the government received its impulsive motion (*centre d'impulsion du gouvernement*): under these words was impliedly included the sovereignty of the committees, which did every thing for the convention. The departimental authorities were in some measure abolished; they were deprived of all their political functions, and the only duties left for their performance, as in the case of the department of Paris, on the event of the 10th of August, were the assessment of taxes, the maintenance of the roads, and the superintendence of purely local interests. Thus these intermediate and too powerful agents between the people and the supreme authority were suppressed. None but the district and communal administrations were suffered to exist with all their privileges. Every local administration was forbidden to consolidate itself with others; to transfer itself to a new place; to send out agents; to issue ordinances extending or limiting the effect of decrees, or to levy taxes on men. All the revolutionary armies established in the departments were disbanded, and there was to be left only the single revolutionary army established at Paris for the service of the whole republic. The revolutionary committees were obliged to correspond with the districts charged to watch them, as well as with the committee of general safety. Those of Paris were allowed to correspond only with the committee of general safety, and not with the commune. Representatives were forbidden to levy taxes unless they were specially authorized by the convention; they were also forbidden to issue penal regulations.

Thus all the authorities were brought back to their proper sphere, and conflict or coalition between them was rendered impracticable. They received the laws by an unerring process. They could neither modify them or defer their execution. The two committees still retained their command. The committee of public welfare, besides its supremacy over the committee of general safety, continued to retain the diplomatic and the war department, and the universal superintendence of all affairs. This committee from henceforward was the only committee allowed to retain that style, for no committee in the communes could assume that title.

This new decree concerning the institution of the revolutionary government, although restrictive of the authority of the communes, and even directed against their abuse of power, was received in the commune of Paris with great demonstrations of obedience. Chaumette, who affected docility as well as patriotism, made a long speech in praise of the decree. By his awkward haste to enter into the system of the supreme authority, he even incurred a reprimand; and found that he possessed the faculty of being disobedient by striving to be more obedient than necessary. The decree placed the revolutionary committees of Paris in direct and exclusive communication with the committee of general safety. In their fiery zeal they had allowed arrests of every description to be made; they were accused of having imprisoned a host of patriots, and were also said to be filled with that class of persons now beginning to be termed *ultra-revolutionists*. Chaumette complained to the council general of their conduct, and proposed to summon them before the commune to receive a severe admonition. Chaumette's motion was carried, but this man with his ostentatious obedience had forgotten that according to the new decree the revolutionary committees of Paris were to correspond with the committee of general safety, and with no other. The committee of public welfare, who made no distinction between an exaggerated obedience and practical disobedience, and, above all, in no disposition to permit the commune to presume to give lessons, even were they good, to committees placed under the superior authority, caused Chaumette's resolution to be quashed, and prohibited the committees from meeting at the commune. Chaumette received this rebuke with perfect humility. "Every man," said he to the commune, "is liable to error. I candidly confess that I was wrong. The convention has annulled my requisition and the resolution adopted on my motion; it has done justice upon the fault which I committed; she is our general mother; let us unite ourselves with her."

It was only by demonstrating such energy as this, that the committee was likely to succeed in putting a stop to all the disorderly movements either of zeal or opposition, and to produce the greatest possible precision in the action of the government. The *ultra-revolutionists*, compromised and repressed since the movement against religion, received another check, more severe than any of those that preceded it. Rossin had returned from Lyons, whither he had accompanied Collot-d'Herbois, with a detachment of the revolutionary army. He had arrived in Paris at the moment when the report of the sanguinary executions committed in Lyons had excited sympathy. Rossin had caused a bill to be placarded at which the convention were

highly indignant. He therein stated, that out of the one hundred and forty thousand inhabitants of Lyons, fifteen hundred only were not implicated in the rebellion; that before the end of Frimaire, all the guilty would have perished, and that their bodies would have rolled down the Rhone to Toulon. Other atrocious expressions of his were mentioned; there were also great complaints of the despotism of Vincent in the war offices, and of the conduct of his ministerial agents in the provinces, and their putting themselves in competition with the representatives. Various expressions which escaped some of them, and serving to indicate a design to cause the executive power to be constitutionally organized, were repeated. The energy which Robespierre and the committee had recently displayed, was an encouragement for them to set their faces against these agitators. In the sitting of the 27th of Frimaire (17th December) they began by making complaints against certain revolutionary committees. Lecointre denounced the arrest of a courier of the committee of public welfare by one of the ministerial agents. Boursault said, that in passing through Longjumeau, he had been stopped by the commune; that he had informed them that he was a deputy, but that the commune nevertheless insisted that his passport should be confirmed by the agent of the executive council then on the spot. Fabre d'Eglantine denounced Maillard, the leader of the murderers of September, who had been sent to Bordeaux by the executive council, and who was charged with a mission, when in fact he ought to have been scouted from society; he denounced Ronsin and his placard, which had caused an universal shudder; lastly, he denounced Vincent, who had centered in his own person all the authorities of the war-offices, and declared that he would blow the convention into the air, or else compel it to organize the executive power, as he was determined not to be the valet of the committees. The convention immediately arrested Vincent, secretary-general at war, Ronsin, general of the revolutionary army, Maillard, on commission at Bordeaux, three agents of the executive power, who had made themselves notorious by their oppressive behaviour at Saint-Girons, and lastly, one Mazuel, an adjutant in the revolutionary army, who had said that the convention was concocting a conspiracy, and that he would spit in the faces of the deputies. The convention then decreed the penalty of death against those officers of the revolutionary armies who, being members of illegal associations in the provinces, should not instantly dissolve; and lastly, the convention ordered that the executive council should come the following day and explain its conduct.

This act of energy caused severe mortification at the Cordeliers, and provoked explanations at the Jacobins. The latter had not yet declared themselves in regard to Vincent and Ronsin, but they required that an inquiry should be made to ascertain the nature of the charges against them. The executive council justified itself with all humility to the convention. It declared that it never intended to compete with the national representation, and that the arrest of the courier, and the difficulties experienced by Boursault, the deputy, were occasioned solely by an order of the committee of public welfare itself, an order which directed all passports and all despatches to be verified. Immediately after Vincent and Ronsin had been committed to prison as *ultra-revolutionists*, the committee at the same time pursued severe measures against the equivocals (*équivoques*) and the stock-jobbers. It arrested Proli, Dubuisson, Desfieux, and Pereyra, who were accused of being agents of the foreign powers, and accomplices of all the parties. Lastly, it caused the arrest at midnight of the four deputies, Bazire, Chabot, Delaunay of Angers, and Julien of Toulouse, who were accused of being moderatists, and of having made rapid fortunes.

We have already related the narrative of the joint fraud of these representatives, and of the forgery which it had induced them to commit. We have seen that Chabot, whose self-possession was lost, was in the mood to denounce his colleagues, and to throw the whole blame upon them. The reports circulated respecting his marriage, and the denunciation which Hébert was daily repeating, completely intimidated him, and he hastened to reveal the whole affair to Robespierre. He pretended that he had entered into the plot with no other intention than that of participating in it and then informing against it; he imputed this plot to the agency of foreign powers, which, he said, strove to corrupt the deputies in order to bring the national representation into contempt, and that the foreign powers were then employing Hébert and his accomplices to publish their infamy after they had been so corrupted by them. Thus there were, according to him, two distinct parts of the conspiracy, the corruptionary part and the defamatory part, both of which had the same object in view, and this was to scandalize and to cause the dissolution of the convention. The participation of the foreign bankers in this intrigue, the designs of Julien and Delaunay, as evidenced by their language, for they said that the convention would soon come to an end by devouring its own members, and that it was right to make a fortune as speedily as possible, and some intercourse between Hébert's wife and the mistresses of Julien and Delaunay, furnished Chabot with materials to prop up the tale of this double conspiracy, in which the corrupters and scandalizers were secretly leagued for the attainment of the same object. Chabot had, however, some scruples left, and justified Bazire. As he himself had corrupted Fabre, and should have incurred a denunciation from the latter had he accused him, he pretended that his overtures had been rejected, and that the hundred thousand francs in assignats, hung up in the waterclosets, were the hundred thousand francs intended for Fabre and refused by him. These tales of Chabot had no semblance of truth; for it would have been much more natural, if he had really entered into the conspiracy for the purpose of divulging it, for him to have divulged it to some of the members of one or the other committee, and to have deposited the money in their hands. Robespierre sent Chabot to the committee of general welfare, who gave orders in the night for the arrest of the deputies already mentioned. Julien contrived to escape. Bazire, Delaunay, and Chabot only were apprehended *.

The discovery of this disgraceful conspiracy

* 27th Brumaire, (17th November.)

caused a great sensation, and confirmed all the calumnies which the parties levelled at each other. Greater credit than ever now attached to the report of the existence of a foreign faction that had for its object the corrupting the patriots, by exciting them to obstruct the march of the revolution: some by an unseasonable moderation, others by an intemperate exaggeration, by incessant scandals, and by an odious profession of atheism. And yet, what reality was there in all these suppositions? On the one hand, there were men less fanatic, more inclined to pity the vanquished, and for that very reason more ready to yield to the allurements of pleasure and corruption; on the other hand, there were men more violent and more blind, calling the dregs of the people to their assistance, persecuting with their reproaches those who did not share in their fanatical insensibility, and profaning the ancient rites of religion without consideration or decency. Between these two parties there were bankers taking advantage of every crisis to carry on their stock-jobbing speculations; four deputies out of seven hundred and fifty yielding to the influence of corruption, and becoming the accomplices of this jobbing; lastly, a few sincere revolutionists, but foreigners, and suspected on that ground, compromising themselves by that very exaggeration, under colour of which they hoped to cause their origin to be forgotten. This was the only substantive part of the case that had any existence, and in this we observe nothing but what was very ordinary, indeed nothing that justified the supposition of a deep laid scheme.

The committee of public welfare, anxious to make itself independent of parties, resolved to strike and to brand them all; and to effect this, its point was to show that they were all accomplices of the foreign enemy. Robespierre had already denounced a foreign faction, in the existence of which his mistrustful disposition led him to believe. The turbulent faction, thwarting the supreme authority and scandalizing the revolution, was immediately accused of being the accomplice of the foreign faction, but it made no such charge against the moderate faction; nay, it even defended the latter, as we have seen in the case of Danton. If it still spared it, this was because it had thus far done nothing that could obstruct the progress of the revolution, as it did not form a numerous and obstinate party, like the old Girondists, and because it consisted only of a few individuals who condemned the *ultra-revolutionary* extravagance.

Such was the state of parties and the policy of the committee of public welfare in regard to them, in Frimaire, year II (December, 1793). During the period that this committee exercised its authority with such vigour, and achieved the labour of completing the interior of the machine of revolutionary power, it displayed equal energy abroad, and ensured the prosperity of the revolution by a series of glorious victories.

CHAPTER XVII.

TERMINATION OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793—MANŒUVRES OF HOCHE IN THE VOSGES—RETREAT OF THE AUSTRIANS AND PRUSSIANS—THE BLOCKADE OF LANDAU RAISED—OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF ITALY—SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF TOULON BY THE REPUBLICAN ARMY—THE LAST ENGAGEMENTS AND DEFEATS AT THE PYRENEES—EXCURSION OF THE VENDEANS BEYOND THE LOIRE, AND THEIR UTTER DESTRUCTION AT SAVENAY—GENERAL REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793.

THE campaign of 1793 terminated upon all the frontiers, in the most brilliant and successful manner. In Belgium it had been at length deemed preferable to go into winter quarters, in despite of the plan of the committee of public welfare, who were desirous of pursuing the advantages derived from the victory of Watignies, to enclose the enemy between the Scheldt and the Sambre. Thus, at this point, the aspect of affairs had not changed, and the advantages of Watignies were still retained by us.

On the Rhine, the campaign had been greatly protracted by the loss of the lines of Weissenburg on the 13th of October (22nd of Vendémiaire). The committee of public welfare determined to recover them at any cost, and to raise the blockade of Landau, as it had opened the blockades of Dunkirk and Maubeuge. The state of our departments of the Rhine was an additional reason for losing no time in removing the enemy from that quarter. The Vosges were singularly imbued with the spirit of feudality; the priests and the nobles had there retained a powerful influence; the French language being not much spoken, the new revolutionary ideas had scarcely penetrated thither; in a great number of communes, the decrees of the convention were unknown, many of them were without revolutionary committees, and in every one of them the emigrants went to and fro with impunity. A host of nobles of Alsace had followed the army of Wurmser, and were spread over the country from Weissenburg to the environs of Strasburg. In this latter town a plot had been formed for delivering it up to Wurmser. The committee of public welfare immediately sent Lebas and Saint-Just thither, to exercise the ordinary dictatorship of commissioners of the convention. The committee appointed young Hoche, who had so eminently distinguished himself at the siege of Dunkirk, to the command of the army of the Moselle; it detached a strong division from the unemployed army of the Ardennes, and this detachment was divided between the two armies of the Moselle and the Rhine; lastly, it caused levies *en masse* to be raised in all the contiguous departments, and appointed

them for Besançon. These new levies occupied the fortresses, and the garrisons were transferred to the line. At Strasburg, Saint-Just displayed his utmost energy and intelligence. He struck terror into the malignants; those who were suspected of the design to betray Strasburg, he handed over to a commission, and thus brought them to the scaffold. He imparted a renewed vigour to the generals and soldiers. He insisted on daily attacks along the whole line, in order to exercise our raw conscripts. Equally brave and merciless, he exposed himself to the fire, and shared all the dangers of warfare. An extraordinary enthusiasm seized the army; and the cry of the soldiers, who were inflamed with the hope of recovering the lost ground, was, "Landau or death!"

The most accurate manœuvre to execute on this part of the frontiers would still have consisted in constantly keeping the two armies of the Rhine and of the Moselle together, so as to operate *en masse* on one of the slopes of the Vosges. For this purpose, it would have been necessary to regain possession of the passes which bisected the line of the mountains, and which we had lost ever since Brunswick advanced to the centre of the Vosges, and Wurmser to the walls of Strasburg. The plan of the committee was formed: its orders were, that we should possess ourselves of the chain itself, with a view to cut off the Austrians from the Prussians. Young Hoche, then in the plenitude of ardour and talent, was commissioned with the execution of this plan, and his first movements at the head of the army of the Moselle induced a hope of the most decided results.

The Prussians, to give security to their position, had attempted to take by surprise the castle of Bitche, situated in the very heart of the Vosges. The attempt was thwarted by the vigilance of the garri on, which appeared in time upon the ramparts; and Brunswick, whether he was disconcerted by this failure, whether he dreaded the activity and energy of Hoche, or whether he was dissatisfied with Wurmser—with whom he was not on good terms—retired first to Bisingen, on the line of the Erbach, and then to Kayserslautern, in the centre of the Vosges. He had not given Wurmser notice of this retrograde movement; and while the latter was engaged upon the eastern slope near the eminence of Strasburg, Brunswick, on the western slope, found himself in the rear of Weissenburg and not far from the height of Landau. Hoche had followed Brunswick very closely in his retrograde movement; and after he had in vain attempted to surround him at Bisingen, and even to reach Kayserslautern before him, he formed the plan of attacking him at Kayserslautern itself in spite of the difficulties of the locality. Hoche had about thirteen thousand men. He fought on the 28th, 29th, and 30th of November, but the country was imperfectly known and scarcely practicable. On the first day general Ambert, who commanded the left, was engaged, while Hoche, with the centre, was seeking his way; the next, Hoche was by himself face to face with the enemy, while Ambert had lost his way in the mountains. Owing to the difficulties of the locality, his own strength, and to his advantageous position, Brunswick was completely successful. He did not lose more than a dozen men. Hoche was obliged to retire with the loss of about three thousand; but he was not discouraged, and proceeded to rally his troops at Pirmasens, Hornbach, and Deux-Ponts. Hoche, though unfortunate, had nevertheless displayed a boldness and a resolution which made a great impression upon the representatives and the army. The committee of public welfare, who, since Carnot had entered into office, were sufficiently intelligent to be just, and who were only severe in cases of lukewarm zeal, wrote him the most encouraging letters, and for the first time bestowed praise upon a defeated general. Hoche, without being for a moment daunted by his defeat, immediately formed the resolution of joining the army of the Rhine, with a view to overwhelm Wurmser. The latter, who had remained in Alsace while Brunswick had retired to Kayserslautern, had his right flank uncovered. Hoche sent general Taponnier with twelve thousand men to Werdt to break through the line of the Vosges, and to throw himself on the flank of Wurmser, while the army of the Rhine should make a general attack upon his front.

Owing to the presence of Saint-Just incessant fighting had taken place at the end of November and the beginning of December between the army of the Rhine and the Austrians. By standing fire every day this army began to be familiarized with war. Pichegru commanded this army. The detachment sent by Hoche into the Vosges had to surmount numerous difficulties before it could get thither, but it at length succeeded and seriously harassed Wurmser's right wing. On the 22nd of December (2 Nivose), Hoche marched his army across the mountains, and appeared at Werdt on the eastern slope. He overwhelmed Wurmser's right, took from him a vast quantity of cannon and a great number of prisoners. The Austrians were then obliged to quit the line of the Motter and to move, first to Suitz, and afterwards, on the 24th, to Weissenburg, on the very lines of the Lauter. Their retreat was effected with disorder and confusion. The emigrants and the Alsacian nobles who had flocked to join Wurmser fled with the utmost precipitation. The roads were covered by whole families seeking to escape. The two armies, Prussian and Austrian, became dissatisfied with one another, and rendered but little assistance to each other against a foe so fervid and enthusiastic.

A junction had been effected between the two armies of the Rhine and the Moselle. The representatives gave the command in chief to Hoche, and he immediately made his preparations for retaking Weissenburg. The Prussians and the Austrians concentrated by their retrograde movement, were better able to support one another. They resolved, therefore, on the 26th of December, (6 Nivose,) to take the offensive, the very day on which the French general was preparing to rush upon them. The Prussians were in the Vosges and around Weissenburg. The Austrians were extended in advance of the Lauter, from Weissenburg to the Rhine. Certain it is, that had they not been determined themselves to begin, they would not have received the attack in advance of the lines, and having the Lauter at their back; but they had resolved to be the first to attack; and the French, in advancing upon them, found their ad-

vanced guards in march. General Dessaix, who commanded the right of the army of the Rhine, marched to Lauterburg; General Michaud was ordered to Schleithal; the centre attacked the Austrians, drawn up on the Geisberg; and the left penetrated into the Vosges to turn the Prussians. Dessaix carried Lauterburg; Michaud occupied Schleithal; and the centre, driving back the Austrians, made them retire from the Geisberg, even up to Weissenburg itself. The occupation of Weissenburg was likely to prove disastrous to the allies, and it was in imminent danger; but Brunswick, who was at Pigeonnier, hastened to this point, and repressed the motions of the French with great firmness. The retreat of the Austrians was then effected with less disorder; but next day the French occupied the lines of Weissenburg. The Austrians fell back upon Gemersheim, the Prussians upon Bergzabern. The French soldiers incessantly advanced shouting, "Landau or death!" The Austrians hastened to recross the Rhine, without attempting to remain another day on the left bank, and without giving the Prussians time to arrive from Mentz. The blockade of Landau was raised, and the French took up their winter quarters in the Palatinate. Immediately afterwards, the two allied generals attacked one another in contradictory statements, and Brunswick sent in his resignation to Frederic-William. Thus, on this part of the theatre of the war, we had gloriously recovered our frontiers, in spite of the united forces of Prussia and Austria.

The army of Italy had undertaken nothing of importance, and since its defeat in the month of June, it had remained upon the defensive. In the month of September, the Piedmontese seeing Toulon attacked by the English, thought at length of profiting by this circumstance, which might occasion the loss of the French army. The king of Sardinia repaired in person to the theatre of war, and a general attack of the French camp was resolved upon for the 8th of September. The surest way of operating against the French would have been to occupy the line of the Var, which separated Nice from their territory. In so doing, the enemy would have mastered every one of the positions which they had taken beyond the Var, and they would have been compelled to evacuate the comté of Nice, and perhaps even to lay down their arms. They rather preferred an immediate attack of their camp. This attack, executed by single detachments through several valleys at once, was a failure; and the king of Sardinia, dissatisfied with the result, immediately retired to his own dominions. Nearly about the same time, the Austrian general, Dewins, at length thought of moving upon the Var; but he executed his movement with no more than three or four thousand men, advanced no further than Isola, and suddenly stopped by a slight check, he again ascended the Upper Alps, without following up this attempt. Such had been the insignificant operations of the army of Italy.

A more serious interest recalled universal attention to Toulon. That place, occupied by the English and the Spanish, seemed to give them a footing in the South, and a point from which an invasion might be attempted. It therefore behoved France to recover Toulon as speedily as possible. The committee had issued the most urgent orders in this respect, but there was an utter deficiency of the appliances for a siege. Carteaux, after reducing Marseilles, had debouched with seven or eight thousand men by the gorges of Ollioules, had made himself master of them after a slight action, and had established himself at the very outlet of these gorges, in sight of Toulon. General Lapoype, detached from the army of Italy with about four thousand men, had placed himself on the opposite side to that on which Carteaux was, towards Solliès and Savalette. These two French divisions thus posted, the one on the west, the other on the east, were so far apart that they could scarcely perceive one another, and were unable to afford the slightest assistance to each other. The besieged, with a little more activity, might have attacked them singly, and overwhelmed them one after the other. Luckily for us, they thought of nothing but fortifying the place, and manning it with troops. They landed eight thousand Spaniards, Neapolitans, and Piedmontese, and two English regiments from Gibraltar, and thus raised the force of the garrison to fourteen or fifteen thousand men. They strengthened all the defences, and armed all the forts, especially those on the coast, which protected the road where their squadrons lay at anchor. They were particularly solicitous to render Fort Eguilette, situated at the extremity of that promontory which encloses the inner road, or little road, inaccessible. So difficult was its approach made, that it was called in the army *Little Gibraltar*. The Marseillais, and all the people of Provence, who had taken refuge in Toulon, laboured themselves at the works, and manifested the greatest zeal. However, this unity of sentiment could not be of long duration in the interior of the town, for the reaction against the Mountain had caused the revival of all sorts of factions. In that place were to be found republicans and royalists of all shades. Even the allies themselves were not upon the very best terms.

The Spaniards were offended at the superiority affected by the English, and harboured a distrust of their intentions. Admiral Hood taking advantage of this disunion, said that since they could not agree, it would be best for the time being not to proclaim any supreme authority. He even prevented the departure of a deputation which the inhabitants wished to send to the Count de Provence, to induce that prince to come to their city in the capacity of regent. From that moment the motives of the English could be guessed at, and it became apparent how blind and how culpable those had been, who had delivered Toulon to the most cruel enemies of the French navy.

The republicans could not hope, with such means as they then possessed, to recapture Toulon. The representatives even recommended that the army should fall back beyond the Duranee, and wait for the following season. The reduction of Lyons, however, having placed fresh forces at their disposal, troops and materials were sent off to Toulon. General Doppet, to whom the credit of the capture of Lyons had been attributed, was appointed to supersede Carteaux. Doppet himself was soon displaced, and succeeded by Dugommier, a very brave officer, and possessing far greater experience. Twenty-eight or thirty thousand men were collected, and orders were given to terminate the siege before the conclusion of the campaign.

Early history of Bonaparte, who first attracted notice at the siege of Toulon, by a suggestion he then made.

The French began by closely hemming in the place, and erecting batteries against the forts. General Lapoype, detached from the army of Italy, was still to the East, and Dugommier the commander-in-chief, to the West, in advance of Ollioules. The latter was ordered to make the principal attack. The committee of public welfare had caused a regular plan of attack to be drawn up by the committee of fortification. The general summoned a council of war to discuss the plan sent from Paris. This plan was ably conceived, but another was also laid before them, better adapted to the circumstances, and which could not fail to produce more speedy results.

In the council of war there was a young man who commanded the artillery in the absence of the superior officer appointed to that service. His name was Bonaparte, a native of Corsica. Attached to France, the country in which he had been educated, he fought in Corsica for the cause of the convention against Paoli and the English; he had then joined the army of Italy, and now served before Toulon. He displayed extraordinary intelligence and extreme activity, and slept by the side of his guns. This young officer, on surveying the place, was struck with an idea, which he communicated to the council of war. Fort Eguillette, called *Little Gibraltar*, closed the road where the allied squadrons lay at anchor. This fort taken, the squadrons could no longer lie in the road, without running the risk of being burned on the spot; they could do nothing else than abandon it and leave in it a garrison of fifteen thousand men, without communication, without succour, without any other prospect than that of being obliged, sooner or later, to lay down their arms: there was, therefore, every reason to presume that if Fort Eguillette were once in the possession of the republicans, the squadrons and the garrison would both evacuate Toulon. Thus the key of the place was Fort Eguillette, but this fort was almost impregnable. Young Bonaparte strongly supported this idea as best adapted to circumstances, and at length caused it to be adopted.

The French began by hemming in the place. Bonaparte, sheltered from observation by a few olive-trees which masked his artillerymen, placed a battery very near Fort Malbosquet, one of the most important of those surrounding Toulon. One morning, this battery suddenly opened and surprised the besieged, who did not conceive it possible to place guns so near to the fort. The English general, O'Hara, who commanded the garrison, resolved to make a sortie for the purpose of destroying the battery and spiking the guns. On the 30th of November (10 Frimaire) he sallied forth at the head of six thousand men, forced a passage through the republican posts, gained possession of the battery, and immediately began to spike the guns. Fortunately, young Bonaparte was not far off with a battalion; a trench led to the battery, Bonaparte threw himself into it with his battalion, advanced with noiseless steps into the midst of the English, then all at once gave the order to fire, and threw them, by his sudden appearance, into the greatest surprise. General O'Hara, in astonishment, imagined that it was his own soldiers who were firing in mistake upon one another. He then advanced towards the republicans to ascertain the fact, but was wounded in the hand, and taken in the trench itself by a sergeant. At the same moment, Dugommier, who had ordered the *générale* to be beaten in the camp, brought up his soldiers to the attack, and pushed on between the battery and the city. The English, finding themselves in danger of being cut off, then retired, after losing their general, and without being able to rid themselves of this dangerous battery.

This success remarkably encouraged the besiegers, and in a proportionate degree dispirited the besieged. So great were the apprehensions of the latter, that they said that General O'Hara had purposely suffered himself to be taken, to sell Toulon to the republicans. Meanwhile the republicans, who were determined to conquer the place, and who had not the means of purchasing it, prepared for the extremely perilous attack of the Eguillette. They had thrown into it a great number of bombs, and strove to demolish its defences with twenty-four pounders. On the 18th of December (28th Frimaire), it was resolved to make the assault at midnight. A simultaneous attack was to be made by General Lapoype on Fort Faron. At midnight, and in a tremendous storm, the republicans put themselves in motion. The soldiers who guarded the fort kept themselves chiefly in the back ground, in order to shelter themselves from the bombs and balls. The French hoped to reach it unperceived, but at the foot of the height they found some of the enemy's riflemen: an action commenced. On hearing the report of the musketry, the garrison of the fort ran to the ramparts and fired upon the assailants, who alternately fell back and advanced. A young captain of artillery, named Muiron, taking advantage of the inequalities of the ground, had succeeded in climbing the height without losing many of his men. On reaching the base of the fort he got in through an embrasure, the soldiers followed him, forced their way into the battery, made themselves masters of the guns, and in a short time of the fort itself.

In this action, General Dugommier, the representatives Salicetti and Robespierre the younger, and Bonaparte, the commandant of artillery, had been present in the fire, and had imparted the greatest courage to the troops. On the part of General Lapoype the attack had not been so successful, though one of the redoubts of Fort Faron had been carried.

As soon as Fort Eguillette was occupied, the republicans lost no time in disposing the guns so as to play upon the shipping. But the English did not wait till they had completed their preparations. They immediately resolved to evacuate the place, that they might no longer run the risk of a difficult and perilous defence. Before they withdrew, they determined to burn the arsenal, the dockyards, and all the ships that they could not take away. On the 18th and 19th, without apprising the Spanish admiral, without forewarning the compromised inhabitants that they were about to be delivered up to the victorious Mountaineers, orders were given for the evacuation of the place. Every English ship came in its turn to supply itself from the arsenal. The forts were then all evacuated, excepting Fort Lamalgue, which was the last to be abandoned. This evacuation was effected with such dispatch, that the Spaniards, apprised of it too late,

were left outside the walls, and escaped almost by a miracle. Lastly, orders were given to set fire to the arsenal. Twenty ships of the line and frigates suddenly appeared in flames in the middle of the road, and caused despair in the unfortunate inhabitants, and excited the indignation of the republicans, who saw the squadron burning, without having the power to save it. Immediately afterwards, more than twenty thousand persons, men, women, and children, carrying their most valuable effects, poured upon the quays, extending their hands towards the squadrons, and imploring an asylum to shelter them from the victorious army. These were all the Provençal families who were involved in the sectionary movement at Aix, Marseilles, and Toulon. Not a single boat put off from the ships to the succour of these imprudent French, who had entrusted themselves to the care of foreigners, and had delivered to them the principal seaport of their country. However, Admiral Langara, with more humanity, ordered his boats to put off and take on board the Spanish squadron as many fugitives as the ships could receive. Lord Hood dared not resist the example, amid the imprecations that were vented against him. He issued orders, in his turn, but in no great haste, that the Toulonnais should be taken care of. Those unfortunate creatures rushed into the boats. In this confusion, some fell into the sea, others got separated from their families. Mothers might be seen looking for their children; wives and daughters seeking their husbands or their fathers, and wandering upon the quays by the light of the conflagration. At this dreadful moment, robbers, taking every advantage of the confusion to plunder, rushed among the unhappy wretches crowded together upon the quays, and fired upon them, shouting, *Here are the republicans!* The terrified crowd hurried away in the most desperate haste, leaving their property to the robbers who had contrived this surprise.

The republicans at last got into the town, and found it half deserted, and greater part of the naval stores destroyed. Fortunately, the galley-slaves had extinguished the fire, and prevented it from spreading. Out of fifty-six ships and frigates, no more than seven ships and eleven frigates were left. The others had been taken or burned by the English. To the horrors of the siege and those accompanying the evacuation, those of revolutionary vengeance were soon to have place. We shall have to relate elsewhere the sequel of the disasters of this guilty and miserable city. The capture of Toulon caused great rejoicing, and made quite as strong an impression as the victories of Watignies, the reduction of Lyons, and the raising of the blockade of Landau. After this, there was no room to apprehend that the English would again make use of Toulon to cause devastation and rebellion in the south.

The campaign did not terminate quite so successfully at the Pyrenees. However, in spite of the numerous reverses we experienced, and the great deficiency in point of ability in our generals, we had lost nothing but the line of the Tech, and still retained that of the Tet. After the unfortunate action at Truillas, which took place on the 22nd of September (1st Vendémiaire), directed against the Spanish camp, wherein Dagobert had displayed so much coolness and intrepidity, Ricardos, instead of marching forward, had, on the contrary, fallen back upon the Tech. The recapture of Villefranche, and a reinforcement of fifteen thousand men received by the republicans, had made him decide upon this retrograde movement. After he had raised the blockade of Colliours and Port-Vendre, he proceeded to the camp of Boulom, between Céret and Ville-Longue, and kept a sharp look out as to his communications, by securing the highroad to Bellegarde. The representatives, Fabre and Gaston, in the plenitude of their ardour, determined upon attacking the camp of the Spaniards, so as to drive them beyond the Pyrenees; but the attack produced no result, and only terminated in an useless effusion of blood.

The representative Fabre, from a strong desire to make some effectual effort, had long meditated a march to the other side of the Pyrenees, in order to compel the Spaniards to retreat. He had been persuaded that the fort of Roses could be carried by a sudden and off-hand attack. In conformity with his desire, but in direct opposition to the advice of the generals, three columns were sent off beyond the Pyrenees, with orders to join each other at Espola. But, being very ineffective, and too far apart, they were unable to fall in with one another, were beaten, and driven back upon the great chain with considerable loss. This happened in October. In November, thunder-storms, unusual at that season, swelled the torrents, interrupted the communications of the different Spanish camps with one another, and placed them in the greatest danger.

Now was the opportunity afforded us for revenging upon the Spaniards the reverses which we had experienced. The only way they had left them for recrossing the Tech was the bridge of Céret, and there they remained drenched and famished, on the left bank of that river, at the mercy of the French. But nothing that ought to have been done was done. General Dagobert had been succeeded by General Turreau, and he, in his turn, by General Doppet. The army was disorganised. It made but a poor stand in the environs of Céret, and it even lost the camp of Saint-Ferréol, and Ricardos thus delivered himself from the dangers of his position. It was not long before he revenged himself much more ably for the dangerous situation in which he had been placed, and on the 7th of November (17th Brumaire), he fell fiercely with his forces upon a French column, which was cooped up at Ville-Longue, on the right bank of the Tech, between the river, the sea, and the Pyrenees. He defeated this column, which was ten thousand strong, and threw it into such confusion, that it could not rally before it reached Argeles. Immediately afterwards, Ricardos ordered an attack upon Delattre's division at Collioure, and seized upon Collioure, Port-Vendre, and Saint-Elme, and drove us completely beyond the Tech. Thus the campaign was at an end by the latter end of December. The Spaniards took up their winter-quarters on the banks of the Tech; the French encamped in the neighbourhood of Perpignan and on the banks of the Tet. We had lost some ground, but less than might have been apprehended, after so many disasters. It was,

after all, the only frontier on which the campaign had not terminated gloriously for the arms of the republic. At the western Pyrenees, a mutual defensive had been maintained. However, in La Vendée, strange and terrible battles had been fought, in which the republic gained the upper hand, but not without inflicting great injury upon France, who on both sides beheld Frenchmen slaughtering one another.

The Vendeans, after their defeat at Cholet on the 17th of October (26th Vendémiaire), had rushed to the banks of the Loire, to the number of eighty thousand persons, men, women, children, and old men, not daring to return to their country, then in the possession of the republicans; and unable to keep the field any longer before an army flushed with victory, thought of repairing to Brittany, in order to carry out the suggestions of Bonchamps, since that young hero was now dead, and could no longer direct them in their melancholy situation. We have seen that, the day before the battle of Cholet, he sent a detachment to occupy the post of Varade on the Loire. That post, negligently guarded by the republicans, was taken in the night between the 16th and 17th. The battle being lost, the Vendeans were then able to cross the river unmolested, by means of some boats left on the bank, and out of reach of the republican cannon. The danger having been hitherto on the left bank, the government had not thought of defending the right bank. All the towns in Brittany were unprotected; some few detachments of the national guard, dispersed here and there, were incapable of checking the progress of the Vendeans, and could only retreat on their approach. The latter advanced, therefore, without any thing to impede their progress, and successively passed through Candé, Château-Gonthier, and Laval, without encountering any opposition.

In the meantime, the republican army had no intelligence of their whereabouts, their number, or their intentions; nay, for a moment, they believed that the Vendeans were destroyed, and so the representatives had written to the convention. Kléber alone, who had always commanded the army in the name of Léchelle, was by no means of that opinion, and did his utmost to keep this false security within bounds. It was not long, in fact, before intelligence was received that the Vendeans were far from exterminated, inasmuch as in the fugitive column there were still left thirty to forty thousand armed men, and in order for fighting. A council of war was immediately held; and as it was not known whether the fugitives intended to proceed towards Angers or Nantes, or whether they were for marching to Brittany, or were going by the Lower Loire to join Charette, it was settled that the army should form two detachments; that one detachment should hold Charette in check, and recapture Noirmoutiers; that the other detachment, under Kléber, should occupy the camp of Saint-George, near Nantes; and that the rest should remain at Angers, to cover that town, and to keep an eye upon the enemy's march. There is no doubt that had they been better informed, they would not have been behindhand in recollecting that the best course they could take was to remain altogether *en masse*, and march without delay in pursuit of the Vendeans. In the state of disorder and dismay in which they would have found them, it would have been easy to disperse and entirely destroy them; they knew not whither they had gone, and while they possessed no certain information on this point the course pursued was after all the wisest. However, it was not long before they received better intelligence, and they were informed that the Vendeans had marched to Candé, Château-Gonthier, and Laval. They then resolved to pursue them immediately, and to overtake them before they could agitate Brittany, and make themselves masters of any great town or seaport. Generals Vimeux and Haxo stayed behind at Nantes and in Lower Vendée, the remaining portion of the army proceeded towards Candé and Château-Gonthier. Westermann and Beaupuy formed the advanced guard; Chalbos, Kléber, and Canuel, each commanded a single division; and Léchelle, at a distance from the field of battle, left it to Kléber to direct the necessary movements, as he enjoyed the confidence and respect of the army.

In the evening of the 25th of October (4th Brumaire), the republican advanced guard arrived at Château-Gonthier; the main body was a day's march behind. Westermann, although his troops were extremely fatigued, although it was almost dark, and he was yet six leagues from Laval, determined to march thither at once. Beaupuy, who was quite as brave, but who possessed more discretion than Westermann, strove in vain to convince him of the danger attendant upon attacking the Vendean mass in the middle of the night, already far in advance of the main body of the army, and with troops harassed by fatigue. Beaupuy was compelled to yield to the opinion of his senior in command. The republicans commenced their march without delay, and got to Laval at midnight, from whence Westermann despatched an officer to reconnoitre the enemy: the latter, hurried away by his ardour, made a charge instead of an examination, and quickly drove back the outposts. The alarm was given in Laval, the tocsin rang, the whole mass of the enemy immediately turned out, and came to make head against the republicans. Beaupuy, behaving with his usual firmness, courageously sustained the attack of the Vendeans. Westermann displayed all his intrepidity. The battle was most obstinately contested, and the darkness of the night made it indeed very bloody. The republican advanced guard, although much inferior in number, would nevertheless have kept its ground to the last, had not Westermann's cavalry, which was not always as brave as its commander, suddenly dispersed, and obliged him to retreat. It was entirely owing to the efforts of Beaupuy that they were able to retreat to Château-Gonthier in tolerable order. The main body arrived there on the following day. Thus the whole army was again collected on the 26th; the advanced guard exhausted by a useless and destructive action, and the main body fatigued by a long march, performed without provisions, without shoes, and through the slough of autumn. Westermann and the representatives were still for moving forward. Kléber strongly maintained a contrary opinion, and it was settled that they should advance beyond Villiers, half way between Château-Gonthier and Laval.

The next point was to form a plan for the attack

Skirmishes and numerous battles between the republicans and the Vendeans, in which the republicans are worsted.

of Laval. This town is seated on the Mayenne. To have marched directly by the left bank, which the army occupied, would have been highly imprudent, as was judiciously observed by a highly distinguished officer, Savary, who was perfectly acquainted with the locality. The Vendeans could easily occupy the bridge of Laval, and so maintain themselves there against all attacks. They might then, while the republican army was uselessly crowded together on the left bank, march along the right bank, cross the Mayenne in the rear of the republican army, and suddenly overwhelm it. Savary's advice, therefore, was to divide the attack, and to place one part of the army upon the right bank. On this side there would be no bridge to cross, and no serious impediment would present itself to the army's seizing Laval. This plan, approved as it was by the generals, was adopted by Léchelle; next day, however, Léchelle, who sometimes divested himself of his passive authority to commit blunders, issued an order the most stupid and the most inconsistent with the course agreed upon the day before. He directed that the army should march, according to his favourite expression, *majestically* and *en masse* upon Laval, by marching along the left bank. Kléber and the other generals were highly indignant; nevertheless, they were obliged to obey. Beaupuy advanced first, Kléber immediately followed. The entire Vendean army was extended over the heights of Entrames. Beaupuy commenced the engagement, while Kléber deployed on the right and the left of the road, so as to extend his line as much as possible; however, becoming sensible of the disadvantage of this position, he sent to desire Léchelle to bring Chalboe's division to bear upon the enemy's flank, a movement which would have thrown him into disorder. But this column, composed of those battalions formed at Orleans and at Niort, who had so often shown their backs, dispersed themselves before they were put in order to march. Léchelle was the first to run off at full gallop. The greater part of the army, which was not engaged, fled with the utmost precipitation, with Léchelle at its head, and ran to Château-Gonthier, and from Château-Gonthier to Angers. The brave Mayençais, who had never exhibited want of courage, for the first time dispersed themselves. The rout then became general; Beaupuy, Kléber, Marceau, and the representatives Merlin and Terrean, made incredible but useless efforts to stop the fugitives. Beaupuy received a ball in the middle of the chest; on being carried into a hut, he cried out, "Leave me here and show my bloody shirt to my soldiers:" the gallant Bloss, who commanded the grenadiers, and was conspicuous for an extraordinary intrepidity, fell at the head of his regiment. At length one part of the army halted at Lyon-d'Angers; the other part fled as far as Angers itself. General indignation was excited by the cowardly example set by Léchelle in being the first to fly. The soldiers murmured loudly. On the following day during the review, the small number of brave men who had stuck to their colours, and these were some of the Mayençais, shouted "Down with Léchelle! Kléber and Dubayet for ever! *Give us back Dubayet!*" Léchelle, who heard these shouts, conceived a greater ill-will than ever for the Mentz army, and against those generals whose bravery had put him to shame. The representatives, seeing that the soldiers would no longer have any thing to do with Léchelle, resolved to suspend him, and offered the command to Kléber. The latter refused it, because he had an objection to the situation of a commander-in-chief, as being a constant mark for the representatives, the ministers, and the committee of public welfare, and consented merely to take the conduct of the army in the name of another. The command, therefore, was given to Chalboe, who was one of the oldest generals in the army. Léchelle anticipating the resolution of the representatives, demanded his leave to retire, on the ground of ill-health, and withdrew himself to Nantes, were he died some time afterwards.

Kléber, seeing the army in a pitiable state, dispersed partly at Angers, and partly at Lyon-d'Angers, proposed to collect the whole of it at Angers, then to allow it a few days' rest, to supply it with shoes and clothes, and to reorganize it in a complete manner. This suggestion was adopted, and all the troops were collected at Angers. Léchelle, when he resigned, did not fail to denounce the army of Mentz, and attributed to brave men a rout originating solely in his own cowardice. For a considerable time a species of jealousy had existed in respect of that army, on account of its *esprit de corps*, its attachment to its generals, and its opposition to the staff of Saumur. The recent shouts of "Dubayet for ever! Down with Léchelle!" completely compromised it in the opinion of the government. Accordingly, the committee of public welfare soon issued an ordinance commanding that it should be disbanded, and incorporated with other corps. Kléber was to have the management of this latter operation. Although this measure was pointed against himself and his companions in arms, he cheerfully lent himself to it, for he was fully sensible of the dangerous consequences of the spirit of rivalry and animosity which subsisted between the garrison of Mentz and the remainder of the troops, and he felt moreover, that there was a great advantage in forming good advance guards of columns, which, if skilfully distributed, might communicate their own firmness to the entire army.

During these transactions at Angers, the Vendeans, who were freed at Laval from the republicans, and seeing nothing to oppose their march, knew not what course to take, or what was to be the future theatre of the war. Two courses, each possessing the like advantages, presented themselves: they had to choose between the extremity of Brittany and that of Normandy. The remotest part of Brittany had been completely fanaticised by the priests and nobles; the population would hail them with delight, and the country, extremely intersected and mountainous, would furnish them with very simple means of defence; lastly, they would be on the sea coast and in communication with the English. The extremity of Normandy, or peninsula of Cotentin, was rather more remote but much easier to protect; for by making themselves masters of Port Bail and Saint-Cosme, they could completely prevent all access of the enemy. They would there find the important town of Cherbourg, easily accessible to them on the land side, abounding in supplies of every kind, and above all, well adapted for communication with the

English. These two plans then each presented great advantages, and but few impediments intervened to prevent their being fully carried out. The road to Brittany was guarded only by the army of Brest, under the command of Rossignol, consisting at most of five or six thousand men badly disciplined. The road to Normandy was defended by the army of Cherbourg, composed of levies *en masse*, ready to disperse at the first musket shot, and of a few thousand men solely belonging to the regular troops that had not yet quitted Caen. Thus it was that neither of these two armies was to be much dreaded by the Vendean mass. Nay, with a little celerity they might even avoid meeting them. But the Vendeans were ignorant of the nature of the localities. They had not a single officer with them who could give them any information respecting Brittany and Normandy, what military advantages, and what fortresses they possessed. They believed, for instance, that Cherbourg had been fortified on the side next the land; they were therefore incapable of expediting their movements, of gaining information during their march, or indeed of executing any thing with any degree of vigour and precision.

Although numerous, their army was in a distressing state. All the principal leaders were either dead or wounded. Bonchamps had expired on the left bank of the Loire, d'Elbée had been conveyed in a wounded state to Noirmoutiers; Lescure, struck by a ball on the forehead, was drawn dying in the train of the army. Larochejacquelein alone remained, and he had been called to the chief command. Stofflet commanded under him. The army, now compelled to put itself in motion, and to abandon its own country, ought to have been organized; but it marched confusedly (*pêle mêle*), like a horde, having the women, the children, and the waggons in the centre. In a regular army, the brave, the weak, and the cowardly, interlaced the one with the other, must perforce hold together, and mutually support one another. A few courageous men are quite sufficient to impart their energy to the entire mass. Here, on the contrary, no rank was kept, nor was any division into companies or into battalions observed, but every one marched where he pleased; the bravest men had ranged themselves together, and formed a corps of five or six thousand, always ready to be the first to advance. Next to these came a troop, not so much to be relied upon, and whose only efficiency might be displayed in deciding a struggle by throwing themselves upon the flanks of an enemy already in confusion. In the wake of these two bands, the mass, ever ready to turn their backs upon the first musket-shot, confusedly drew itself along.

Thus the thirty or forty thousand armed men reduced themselves to a few thousand brave fellows, who were from mere temperament always disposed to fight. The absence of all sub-divisions prevented their forming detachments, their directing a corps to bear on this or that point, or making any kind of settled arrangement whatever. Some followed Larochejacquelein, others Stofflet, and were followers of them only. It was impossible to issue general orders; all that could be done with them, was to get them to follow at a given signal. Stofflet had merely a few trusty peasants, who went to communicate his directions to their comrades. They had scarcely two hundred wretched horse soldiers, and about thirty pieces of cannon, ill served and ill kept. The baggage encumbered the march; the women and the old men strove, for the sake of greater safety, to stick themselves in the midst of the most courageous troop, and by thus overcharging their ranks, embarrassed their movements. A certain distrust began to gain ground on the part of the soldiers with respect to the officers. They said, that all that the latter were anxious about, was to get to the coast, so that they might embark and abandon the unfortunate peasants whom they had torn from their homes. The council, whose authority had become absolutely illusory, was divided; the priests were dissatisfied with the military leaders; nothing, in short, would have been easier than to have destroyed such an army, if the utmost confusion in regard to command had not prevailed among the republicans.

The Vendeans were, therefore, incapable alike of conceiving and executing any plan whatever. It was twenty-six days since they quitted the Loire, and in so long a space of time they had done nothing whatever. After so much indecision, they at last came to a determination. On the one hand, they were told that Rennes and Saint-Malo were protected by a considerable number of troops; on the other, that Cherbourg was strongly defended on the side next the land; they resolved, therefore, to besiege Granville, seated on the coast between the boundary line of Brittany and Normandy. This plan in particular possessed the advantage of bringing them near to Normandy, which had been described to them as extremely fertile, and abounding in provisions. They marched, in consequence, upon Fougères. There had been raised upon the very road the Vendeans were taking fifteen or sixteen thousand men of the levy *en masse*, who dispersed without striking a blow. They reached Dol on the 10th November, and arrived at Avranches on the 12th.

On the 14th of November (24th Brumaire) they bent their steps towards Granville, leaving half their men and all their baggage at Avranches. The garrison having attempted to make a sortie, they repulsed it, and in driving it back they made their way into the suburb. The garrison had time to enter and close the gates; but the suburb remained in their possession, and they thus possessed great facilities for the attack. They advanced from the suburb up to the palisades which had been recently erected; without caring to destroy them, they confined themselves to keeping up a fire of musketry against the ramparts, until they were in turn replied to by grape-shot and cannon-balls. At the same time, they placed some pieces on the surrounding heights, and fired to no purpose against the tops of the walls, and on the houses of the town. At night they dispersed, and abandoned the suburb, where the fire of the place allowed them no rest. They went beyond the range of the cannon to seek lodging, provisions, and above all, fuel, for the weather began to be extremely cold. The leaders could with difficulty retain a few hundred men in the suburb, to keep up the fire of musketry from that quarter.

On the following day, their inability to take a walled town was still more clearly demonstrated; they still made another trial of their batteries, but

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without success. They again opened a fire of musketry along the palisades, but were soon completely disheartened. One of them all at once conceived the idea of taking advantage of the ebb tide to cross a low beach, and to attack the town on the side next to the harbour. They were preparing for this new attempt, when the suburb was set on fire by the representatives shut up in Granville. The Vendeans were then obliged to evacuate it, and take measures for effectuating a retreat. The attempt on the side next the harbour was entirely relinquished, and on the following day they all returned to Avranches to rejoin the rest of their force and the baggage. From this moment their discouragement was extreme. They complained more bitterly than ever of the leaders who had torn them from their country, and now wanted to abandon them, and insisted, with great outcries, on returning to the Loire. In vain did Larochejacquelein, at the head of the bravest of their force, make a new attempt to lead them into Normandy; in vain did he march to Ville-Dieu, of which he made himself master, he was followed by scarcely a thousand men. The remaining portion of the column regained the road to Brittany by marching to Pontorson, by which it had come. This column gained possession of the bridge at Beaux, which, as being thrown over the Selune, was absolutely necessary to enable them to reach Pontorson.

While these occurrences were taking place at Granville, the republican army had been re-organized at Angers. Scarcely had the time necessary for giving it a little rest, and restoring it to order elapsed, when it was conveyed to Rennes, to be there incorporated with six or seven thousand men of the Brest army, under the command of Rossignol, and it was there that in a council of war, measures had been resolved upon in order to follow up the pursuit of the Vendean column. Chalbos, being ill, had obtained permission to retire upon the rear, to recruit his health; and Rossignol had been invested by the representatives with the chief command of the army of the West and that of Brest, now making in all twenty or twenty-one thousand men. It had been settled that these two armies should proceed forthwith to Antrain; that General Tribout, who was at Dol with three or four thousand men, should repair to Pontorson; and that General Sepher, who had six thousand soldiers of the army of Cherbourg, should follow at the rear of the Vendean column. Thus, placed between the sea, the post of Pontorson, the army of Antrain and Sepher, who had got to Avranches, this column could not fail to be pent up and destroyed.

All these arrangements came into operation at the very moment when the Vendeans were leaving Avranches, and were taking possession of the bridge at Beaux, in order to get to Pontorson. This was on the 18th of November (28th Brumaire). General Tribout, a mere declaimer without any practical knowledge of war, had, in order to protect Pontorson, merely to occupy a narrow pass across a marsh, which covered the town, and round which they could not get. With such an advantageous position as this was, he could have prevented the Vendeans from stirring a single step. But the moment he saw the enemy, he abandoned the defile and moved forward. The Vendeans, encouraged by the taking of the bridge at Beaux, charged him vigorously, obliged him to fall back; and profiting by the disorder of his retreat, rushed after him into the pass that crosses the marsh, and thus made themselves masters of Pontorson, which they ought not to have been suffered to approach.

Owing to this unpardonable blunder, an unexpected passage was opened for the Vendeans. They could now march to Dol; but from Dol they would be obliged to go to Antrain, and to encounter the main republican army. However, they evacuated Pontorson, and advanced to Dol, and Westermann lost no time in pursuing them.

Impetuous as ever, he hurried Marigny and his grenadiers along with him, and had the hardihood to follow the Vendeans as far as Dol with a mere advanced guard. In fact he came up with them, and drove them confusedly into the town; but they soon recovered themselves, and sallied forth from Dol, and by that destructive mode of firing which they managed so expertly, they compelled the republican advanced guard to retire to a great distance.

Kléber, who still governed the army by his counsels, although another was the commander-in-chief, proposed that in order to complete the destruction of the Vendean column it should be pent up, and thus made to perish by famine, disease, and misery. Desertions were so frequent among the republican troops, that an attack by main force might be attended with dangerous risks. On the contrary, by fortifying Antrain, Pontorson, and Dinan, they would enclose the Vendeans between the sea and three intrenched points; and by harassing them every day with the troops under Westermann and Marigny, they could not fail to destroy them. The representatives approved of this plan; and the necessary orders were issued. But all at once, there came an officer from Westermann, who said that if the intention were to support his general, and attack Dol on the Antrain side, while he was to make the attack from the Pontorson side, it would be all over with the Catholic army, and that it would be utterly destroyed. The representatives took fire at this proposal. Prieur of La Marne, quite as impetuous as Westermann, caused the plan at first adopted to be changed, and it was decided that Marceau at the head of a column, should march to Dol simultaneously with Westermann.

On the morning of the 21st, Westermann moved forwards to Dol. In his impatience he never thought of ascertaining whether Marceau's column, which was to come up from Antrain, had already reached the field of battle, and he began the attack off-hand. The enemy answered his assault by their effective mode of firing. Westermann extended the line of his infantry and gained ground; but cartridges now began to fail; he was thereupon obliged to make a retrograde movement, and managed to make good his position upon a level eminence in his rear. The Vendeans made the most of this, for they fell upon his column and dispersed it. In the meantime, Marceau at length came in sight of Dol; the victorious Vendeans came in a body upon him; he defended himself with heroic firmness for a whole day, and succeeded in keeping his ground on the field of battle. But his position was ex-

tremely perilous; he sent to Kléber to afford him advice and assistance. Kléber hastened to him, and advised him to assume a retrograde, but, for all that, a very strong position in the environs of Trans. While some hesitation was being felt as to following Kléber's advice, the Vendean riflemen made their appearance, and made the troops fall back. They were at first thrown into disorder, but soon rallied upon the position pointed out by Kléber. That general then resorted to the first plan which he had proposed, and which consisted in fortifying Antrain. It was adhered to; but the army was not to return to Antrain, but remain at Trans, and fortify itself there, in order to be nearer to Dol. All of a sudden, with that fickleness which characterized all our resolutions, this plan was once more changed, and it was again resolved to take the offensive, notwithstanding the experience afforded by the preceding day. A reinforcement was sent to Westermann, with orders to make the assault on his side, at the same time that the main army should attack on the side next to Trans.

It was to no purpose that Kléber objected that Westermann's troops, completely out of spirits from the event of the preceding day, would not stand their ground. The representatives insisted, and the following day was appointed for the attack. In point of fact, the movement was made the following day. Westermann and Marigny were anticipated, and attacked by the enemy. Their troops, though supported by a reinforcement, dispersed. They made unheard-of exertions to keep them together; it was to no purpose that they rallied around them a few brave men, who were soon hurried along by the rest. The victorious Vendeans abandoned that point, and moved upon their right towards the army which was advancing from Trans.

They had hardly obtained this advantage, and were preparing themselves to gain a second, when the report of the artillery struck terror into the town of Dol, as well as into those who had not as yet gone out to battle, women, aged men, children, and cowardly folks ran off on all sides, and fled in the direction of Dinan and towards the sea. Their priests, with crucifixes in their hands, made useless efforts to bring them back. Stofflet and Larochejacquelein ran from rank to rank to stop them and bring them back into action. At length they contrived to rally them, and get them into the road to Trans, in the train of the brave fellows who went foremost.

Not less confusion prevailed in the principal camp of the republicans. Rossignol and the representatives, commanding all at once, could neither agree together nor act. Kléber and Marceau, suffering under the most intense vexation, had gone forward to reconnoitre the ground, and to interpose themselves to the assault of the Vendeans. When he had come up and faced the enemy, Kléber desired to extend the line of the advanced guard of the army of Brest, but it deserted at the first discharge. He then ordered Canuel's brigade, chiefly composed of Mentz battalions, to advance; and these latter adhering to their wonted bravery, made a good stand during the whole day, and were left alone on the field of battle, abandoned by the rest of the troops. But that Vendean band that had beaten Westermann, took them in flank, and compelled them to retreat. The Vendeans made the best of this, and pursued them even to Antrain. At length their quitting Antrain could no longer be delayed, and the entire republican army retired to Rennes.

Now it was that the prudence of Kléber's advice became to be fully appreciated. Rossignol, under the influence of one of those generous impulses of which he was capable, notwithstanding his prejudice against the generals of the Mentz army, appeared at the council of war with a paper containing his resignation. "I am not qualified," said he, "to command an army. Let me have a battalion and I will do my duty; but I am not competent to undertake command-in-chief. Here, then, is my resignation, and they who refuse it are enemies to the republic." "Away with resignation!" cried Prieur. of La Marne, "thou art the eldest child of the committee of public welfare. We will give thee generals who shall advise thee, and shall be responsible in thy stead for the events of the war." Nevertheless, Kléber, who was extremely vexed at witnessing so misconducted an army, proposed the only plan that could recover the state of things, but which was far from being in accordance with the arrangements made by the representatives. "You ought," said he to them, "assuming that you allow Rossignol to retain the generalship, to appoint a commander-in-chief of the infantry, a commander of the cavalry, and a commander of the artillery." This suggestion was adopted. He then had the boldness to propose Marceau as commander-in-chief of the infantry, Westermann of the cavalry, and Debilly of the artillery, all three of them suspected as members of the Mentz faction. A momentary dispute took place in discussing the qualifications of the individuals; but they afterwards gave in to the ascendancy of that able and generous officer, who was vehemently attached to the republic, not from an extravagant imagination but from principle, who served with admirable sincerity and disinterestedness, who possessed an attachment for, and had a genius peculiarly adapted to his profession in a very rare degree. Kléber had caused the nomination of Marceau, because he possessed great influence over that brave young soldier, and because he could rely upon his absolute devotion to him. He felt assured, that if Rossignol's authority remained in abeyance, he could then manage every thing himself, and so bring the war to a successful termination.

The Cherbourg division, which had come from Normandy, and was incorporated with the armies of Brest and the West, now quitted Rennes, in order to proceed to Angers, where the Vendeans intended to cross the Loire. The latter, after securing the means of return by their twofold victory on the road to Pontorson and on that of Antrain, thought of retiring to their own country. They passed, without striking a blow, through Fougères and Laval, and designed to make themselves masters of Angers, so as to pass the Loire at the bridge of Cé. The last experiment which they had made at Granville had not wholly convinced them of their inability to take walled towns. On the 3rd of December, they rushed into the suburbs of Angers, and began to fire upon the front of the town. They remained there all the

following day; but anxious as they were to open for themselves a passage to their own country, from which they were separated only by the Loire, they soon saw the impracticability of its performance. The advanced guard of Westermann coming up on this same day, the 4th, completely disheartened them, and caused them to abandon their enterprise. They then put themselves in marching order, going up the Loire, and not knowing at what point they should be able to cross it. Some considered that they should go as high as Saumur, others to Blois; but while they were in the act of deliberation, Kléber came up with his division along the causeway of Saumur, and forced them to retreat once more into Brittany. Thus these unfortunate creatures, destitute of provisions, of shoes, of vehicles to convey their families, afflicted by an epidemic disease, were again wandering in Brittany, without finding either an asylum or outlet whereby to escape. The roads were strewed with their remains; and at the bivouac before Angers were found women and children who had died of hunger and cold. They already began to imagine that the convention only wanted their leaders, and many of them threw away their arms, in order to conceal their flight across the country. At length the reports made to them concerning Mans, the plenty they should find there, and the inclinations of the inhabitants, induced them to proceed thither. They passed through La Fleche, of which they made themselves masters, and entered Mans after a slight skirmish.

The republican army followed them. Fresh disputes had taken place amongst the generals. Kléber had intimidated the brawlers by his firmness, and compelled the representatives to send back Rossignol to Rennes with his division of the Brest army. An ordinance of the committee of public welfare then conferred on Marceau the title of commander-in-chief, and discharged all the Mentz generals, but allowed Marceau to avail himself temporarily of Kléber's services. Marceau declared that he would not command, unless Kléber were at his side to order every thing. "In accepting the dignity," said Marceau to Kléber, "I am personally subject to the annoyance and responsibility, and I shall relinquish for thee the actual command and the means of saving the army." "Hold thy peace, my friend," said Kléber, "we will fight together, and we will be guillotined together."

The army marched immediately, and from that moment every thing was conducted with unanimity and vigour. Westermann's advanced guard arrived on the 12th at Mans, and instantly charged the Vendeans. They were soon routed, but some few thousand brave men, headed by Larochejaquelein, formed before the town, and forced Westermann to fall back upon Marceau, who was coming up with a division. Kléber was still behind with the rest of the army. Westermann was for losing no time in making the assault, although it was night. Marceau, impelled by his constitutional impetuosity, but yet fearing to be censured by Kléber, whose cool and tranquil energy never suffered itself to be hurried away, at first hesitated; but at last subdued by the importunities of Westermann, he decided in accordance with him, and attacked Mans. The tocsin was rung, and dismay pervaded the town. Westermann and Marceau dashed forward in the dark, carrying all before them; and in spite of a destructive fire from the houses, they contrived to drive a great number of the Vendeans into the great square of the town. Marceau cut them off from the streets running into this square on his right and left, and thus pent up the Vendeans. After all, his position was by no means without danger; for having ventured into a town in the middle of the night, the enemy might easily get at his rear, and surround him. He therefore sent a dispatch to Kléber, urging him to come up as speedily as possible with his division. The latter arrived at daybreak. The greater part of the Vendeans had fled; the bravest of them only remained to cover the retreat: they were charged with the bayonet, broken, and dispersed, and a horrible carnage began in every part of the town.

Never had the flight of a defeated enemy been accompanied with greater horrors. A considerable number of women, left behind, were made prisoners. Marceau saved a young female who had lost her relatives, and who, in her despair, begged to be put to death. She was modest and beautiful. Marceau, full of kindness and delicacy, took her into his carriage, treated her with respect, and caused her to be conveyed to a place of safety. The country was covered far and wide with the relics of this defeat. The indefatigable Westermann harassed the fugitives, and strewed the roads with dead bodies. The unhappy Vendeans, not knowing whither to flee, entered Laval for the third time, and left it again immediately, to transport themselves once more to the Loire. Their intention was to cross at Ancenis. Larochejaquelein and Stofflet conveyed themselves to the other side, with the intention, it was said, of procuring boats, and bringing them to the right bank. They did not come back. Indeed, it is asserted that their return was impracticable. The passage over could not be effected. The Vendean column, deprived of the presence and support of its two leaders, continued to descend the Loire, still pursued, and still vainly seeking a passage across. At length, reduced to despair, not knowing which way to turn, it resolved to flee to the extremity of Brittany, to the Morbihan. The column proceeded to Blain, where it once more obtained an advantage by its rear-guard; and from Blain to Savenay, from whence it hoped to be able to effect a passage into the Morbihan.

The republicans had followed the Vendean column without intermission, and they arrived at Savenay on the evening of the very day that it had entered that place. Savenay had the Loire on the left, marshes on the right, and a wood in front. Kléber felt the importance of occupying the wood the same day, and of making himself master of all the heights, so that he should not fail to crush the Vendeans on the following day in Savenay, before they had time to quit the place. In point of fact, his advanced guard fell impetuously upon them; and he himself, seizing the moment when the Vendeans were debouching from the wood, to repulse this advanced guard, boldly threw himself into the wood with a corps of infantry, and completely cleared it of them. They therefore fled to Savenay, and shut themselves up there, keeping up,

however, a continual fire during the whole of the night. Westermann and the representatives proposed to make the assault without further delay, and to destroy the Vendeans that very night. Kléber, however, who was by no means desirous that any miscarriage of his should deprive him of a certain victory, declared positively that he would not make the assault, and then shrouding himself under an air of imperturbable indifference, he suffered them to say what they pleased, without replying to any provocation. He thus effectually prevented any operation being conducted without his concurrence.

Next morning, December the 23rd, before it was light, he was on horseback with Marceau, passing along his line, when the Vendeans, driven to desperation, and determined not to survive that battle, rushed first upon the republicans. Marceau marched with the centre, Canuel with the right, Kléber with the left. They all three fell upon, and drove the Vendeans back into the town. Marceau and Kléber effected a junction of each other's forces in the town, made prisoners of all the cavalry they could find, and dashed forth in pursuit of the enemy. The Loire and the marshes prevented these unfortunates from making any retreat. A great number perished by the bayonet; others were made prisoners; and scarcely any of them found means to escape. On that day the column was utterly destroyed, and the great war of La Vendée might then be said to have been actually brought to a close.

Thus this unfortunate people, conveyed from their own country through the imprudence of their leaders, and reduced to the necessity of seeking a seaport as a place of refuge in the direction of England, had in vain dipped their foot in the water of the ocean. Not having been able to capture Granville, they had been brought back to the Loire, and being unable to cross that river, they had been a second time driven into Brittany, and from Brittany again to the Loire. At length, finding it impossible to pass that fatal barrier, they came at last to perish in a body between Savenay, the Loire, and the marshes. Westermann was despatched with his cavalry to pursue the fugitive remnant of La Vendée. Kléber and Marceau returned to Nantes —received on the 24th by the people of that city, they obtained a sort of triumph, and the Jacobin club complimented them with a civic crown.

If we consider this memorable campaign of 1793, with respect to its general results, we cannot regard it in any other light than as the greatest effort ever made by a nation threatened on every side. In the year 1792, the league of the allied powers, which was then far from being perfect, had acted without unity and without vigour. The Prussians had attempted a ridiculous invasion in Champagne; the Austrians had done no more in the Netherlands than bombard the town of Lille. The French, in their first transports of enthusiasm, had repulsed the Prussians beyond the Rhine, and the Austrians beyond the Meuse, they had conquered the Netherlands, Mentz, Savoy, and the Comté of Nice. The great year 1793, opened in a far different manner. The League was strengthened by three powers, who up to that time had remained neutral. Spain, provoked beyond endurance by the event of the 21st of January, had at length sent fifty thousand men to the Pyrenees; France had obliged Pitt to declare himself; and England and Holland had entered at once into the League, now doubly fortified, and which, better informed of the means of the enemy with which it had to cope, augmented its forces, and prepared for a decisive effort. Thus, as in the time of Louis XIV. France had to make a stand against the attack of all Europe; and in the present instance she had not drawn down upon herself this combination of enemies by her ambition, but by exhibiting the just indignation which the interference of the powers in regard of her domestic relations had called forth.

So early as the month of March, Dumouriez commenced by engaging in a rash enterprise, and purposed the invasion of Holland by hastily crossing over in boats. In the meantime, Cobourg surprised the lieutenants of that general, drove them beyond the Meuse, and even obliged him to return and put himself at the head of his army. Dumouriez was compelled to fight the battle of Neerwinden. That terrible battle was won, when the left wing gave way and recrossed the Gette; it became necessary to beat a retreat, and we lost the Netherlands in a few days. Our reverses at that time embittered the public mind; Dumouriez broke with his government, and went over to the Austrians. At the same time, Custine, beaten at Frankfort, brought back to the Rhine, and cut off from Mentz, gave the Prussians an opportunity to blockade and commence the siege of that famous fortress; the Piedmontese repulsed us at Saorgio; the Spaniards effected a passage over the Pyrenees; and lastly, the provinces of the west, already deprived of their priests, and excited beyond all endurance by the levy of the three hundred thousand men, began to rise in open rebellion in the name of the throne and of the altar. It was at this time that the Mountain party, exasperated by the defection of Dumouriez, the defeats experienced in the Netherlands, on the Rhine, at the Alps, and above all, by the insurrection of the west, no longer restrained themselves, but tore the Girondists by force from the body of the convention, and thus got rid of all those who still had the power to have talked to it of moderation. This new excess created it new enemies. Sixty-seven departments, out of eighty-three, rose against the government, which had then to struggle with Europe, royalist La Vendée, and three-fourths of federalized France. It was at this period that we lost the camp of Famars and the brave Dampierre, that the blockade of Valenciennes was completed, that Mentz was closely pressed, that the Spaniards crossed the Tech and threatened Perpignan, that the Vendeans took Saumur and laid siege to Nantes, and that the federalists made preparations for proceeding from Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Caen to fall upon Paris.

From all these points, the experiment of a bold march to the capital might well have been attempted, the revolution itself might have been terminated in a few days, and European civilization suspended for a long period. Fortunately for us, the insurgents laid siege to the fortified towns. The reader will recollect with what firmness the convention recalled the departments to their duty, by simply exhibiting her authority, and by dispersing the misconducted people who had advanced as far

as Vernon; with what success the Vendeans were repulsed from Nantes, and how the march of their victorious career was checked; but while the convention gained a triumph over the federalists, her other enemies were making alarming progress. Valenciennes and Mentz were taken after memorable sieges; the war of federalism brought in its train two most unfortunate events, the siege of Lyons and the treasonable practices at Toulon; lastly, La Vendée itself, surrounded by the enclosure of the Loire, the sea, and Poitou, had, by the successful defence of Nantes, recently driven back the columns of Westermann and Labarolière, who had attempted to force a passage into the heart of the country. Never were circumstances more critical. The allies were no longer detained in the north and on the Rhine by besieging towns; Lyons and Toulon presented effective support to the Piedmontese; La Vendée appeared invincible, and presented a footing for the English. It was then that the convention summoned to Paris the deputies of the primary assemblies, gave them the constitution of the year III. to swear to and defend, and decided with them that the entire of France, men and things, were at the disposal of the government. Then it was that the levy *en masse* was decreed generation by generation, together with the power of requiring whatever was needful for the war. Then was it that the Great Book was instituted, as well as the forced loan from the rich, so as to withdraw part of the assignats from circulation, and to effect compulsory investment in the national property. Then were two large armies despatched to La Vendée; the garrison of Mentz was conveyed thither by post; it was resolved that this unfortunate country should be laid waste, and that its population should be transported elsewhere. Lastly, Carnot became a member of the committee of public welfare, and began to introduce order and unity into our military operations.

We had lost Cæsar's camp, but Kilmaine had, by a lucky retreat, saved the remains of the army of the North. The English advanced to Dunkirk, and laid siege to that town, while the Austrians attacked Le Quesnoy. A mass was rapidly moved from Lilly upon the rear of the duke of York. If Houchard, who on this occasion commanded sixty thousand French, had comprehended Carnot's plan, and had proceeded to Furnes, not an Englishman would have escaped. Instead of placing himself between the army of observation and the besieging army, he pursued a direct course, and at least caused the rising of the siege, by fighting the successful battle of Houdtscheote. This was our first victory: it saved Dunkirk, deprived the English of all the fruits of this war, and joy and hope were ours once more.

Fresh reverses soon converted this rejoicing into new alarms. Le Quesnoy was taken by the Austrians; Houchard's army was seized with a panic terror at Menin, and dispersed; the Prussians and the Austrians, whose progress nothing could stop after the reduction of Mentz, advanced upon the two slopes of the Vosges, threatened the lives of Weissenburg, and beat us in several encounters. The Lyonnese made a vigorous defence; the Piedmontese had recovered Savoy, and had descended towards Lyons, so as to place our army between cross fires; Ricardos had crossed the Tet, and had advanced beyond Perpignan; lastly, the division of the troops in the West into two armies, that of La Rochelle and that of Brest, had prevented the success of the plan of campaign as settled at Saumur on the 2nd of September. Canclaux, inefficiently assisted by Rossignol, had found himself alone, in advance, in the heart of La Vendée, and had fallen back upon Nantes. New efforts were then demonstrated. The dictatorship was completed and proclaimed by the institution of the revolutionary government; the power of the committee of public welfare was proportioned to the danger; the levies were effected, and the armies augmented by a multitude of recruits; the new recruits filled the garrisons, and took the place of the organised troops, who were transferred to the line; lastly, the convention ordered the armies to conquer within a specified time.

The means which she had brought into action produced their natural effects. The armies of the north, being reinforced, concentrated themselves at Lille and at Guise. The allies had proceeded to Maubeuge, which they purposed to capture before the end of the campaign. Jourdan, marching from Guise, fought the Austrians at Watignies, and forced them to raise the siege of Maubeuge, in precisely the same manner that Houchard had obliged the English to raise that of Dunkirk. The Piedmontese were driven back beyond the Saint-Bernard by Kellermann. Lyons, inundated by the levies *en masse*, was carried by assault; Ricardos was driven beyond the Tet; lastly, the two armies of La Rochelle and Brest, incorporated under one commander, Léchelle, who permitted Kléber to act for him, crushed the Vendeans at Cholet, and obliged them to cross the Loire in confusion.

One single reverse detracted from the exultation such events must naturally have produced. The lines of Weissenburg were lost. But the committee of public welfare resolved not to terminate the campaign before they were retaken. Young Hoche, general of the army of the Moselle, unsuccessful yet brave at Kaiserslautern, met with encouragement, although defeated. Unable to break the lines of Brunswick, he threw himself on the flank of Wurmser. From that moment, the united armies of the Rhine and the Moselle drove the Austrians beyond Weissenburg, compelled Brunswick to concur in this retrograde movement, raised the blockade of Landau, and encamped in the Palatinate. Toulon was retaken, in consequence of a felicitous suggestion, and by a prodigy of boldness. Lastly, the Vendeans, whom every body supposed were destroyed, but who, in their desperation, had, to the number of eighty thousand, conveyed themselves beyond the Loire, and sought a seaport, so that they might throw themselves into the arms of the English,—these Vendeans were driven back, alike from the sea-coasts as from the banks of the Loire, and thus were crushed between these two barriers, which they could by no possibility pass. At the Pyrenees alone our arms had not met with success; but yet we had lost no more than the line of the Tech, and we were still encamped before Perpignan.

Thus this grand and awful year exhibits to our eyes Europe bearing down the revolution with its whole weight, making it atone for its first successes

in 1792, driving back its armies, and penetrating into France by all the frontiers at the same time; and a portion of France rising in rebellion, and adding its efforts to those of the hostile powers. The revolution then became incensed. Her wrath was kindled on the 31st of May; she created new enemies by the events of that day, and almost appeared on the point of again succumbing to Europe and the three-fourths of her revolted provinces. But she soon recalled her domestic enemies to their duty, raised a million of men at once, beat the English at Hondtschoote, was beaten in her turn, but immediately increasing her exertions, gained a victory at Watignies, recovered the lines of Weissenburg, drove the Piedmontese beyond the Alps, took Lyons and Toulon, and on two occasions crushed the Vendeans, the first time in La Vendée, and finally in Brittany. Never was there exhibited a more elevated object of attention, or one more worthy to be held forth to the admiration and the imitation of nations. France had recovered all that she had lost excepting Condé, Valenciennes, and some fortresses in Roussillon; on the contrary, the powers of Europe, who had all of them contended against an individual nation, had gained nothing, were accusing one another, and reproached each other with having occasioned the disgraceful failure of the campaign. France had accomplished the organisation of her means, and must necessarily appear still more formidable in the ensuing year.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE EVENT OF THE CONTEST BETWEEN THE HÉBERTISTS AND DANTONISTS.—CAMILLE-DESMOULINS PUBLISHES "THE OLD CORDELIER."—THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC WELFARE IS PLACED BETWEEN THE TWO DOMINANT PARTIES, AND FIRST STRIVES TO SUPPRESS THE HÉBERTISTS.—DEARTH IN PARIS.—IMPORTANT REPORTS OF ROBESPIERRE AND SAINT-JUST.—MOVEMENT ATTEMPTED BY THE HÉBERTISTS.—ARREST AND DEATH OF RONSIN, VINCENT, HÉBERT, CHAUMETTE, MOMORO, ETC.—THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC WELFARE NEXT SUBJECTS THE DANTONISTS TO THE SAME FATE.—ARREST, TRIAL, AND EXECUTION OF DANTON, CAMILLE-DESMOULINS, PHILIPPEAU, LACROIX, HÉRAULT-SÉCHELLES, FABRE-D'EGLANTINE, CHABOT, ETC.

The convention had begun to exercise some severities against the turbulent faction of the Cordeliers, and against the ministerial agents. Ronsin and Vincent were in prison. Their partisans outside were bestirring themselves. Momoro at the Cordeliers, and Hébert at the Jacobins, were striving to excite the interest of the fervid revolutionists in favour of their friends. The Cordeliers presented a petition, and asked, in a tone far from respectful, whether it was intended to punish Vincent and Ronsin for having courageously prosecuted Dumouriez, Custine, and Brissot; they declared that they considered those two citizens as excellent patriots, and that they should still retain them as members of their club. The Jacobins presented a petition framed in more cautious terms, and merely prayed that the report concerning Vincent and Ronsin should be speeded, in order that they might be punished if guilty, or restored to liberty if they were innocent.

The committee of public welfare still preserved silence. Collot-d'Herbois alone, though a member of the committee and a compulsory partisan of the government, displayed the warmest zeal in behalf of Ronsin. The motive of this was natural enough. The cause of Vincent did not affect him, but that of Ronsin, who was sent with him to Lyons, and who moreover carried his sanguinary ordinances into execution, touched him very nearly. Collot-d'Herbois had, with Ronsin, maintained that not more than a hundredth part of the Lyonnese were patriots; that it was necessary to transport or sacrifice the rest, to commit their dead bodies to the Rhône, so as to dismay the entire south by this spectacle, and to strike terror into the rebellious city of Toulon. Ronsin was in prison for having repeated these horrible expressions in a placard. Collot-d'Herbois now summoned to render an account of his mission, was deeply interested in justifying the conduct of Ronsin, that he might secure the approval of his own. At this very time there came a petition signed by some Lyonnese citizens, who presented a most heart-rending picture of the calamities inflicted upon their city. They represented the fact of the discharges of grape shot succeeding the executions by the guillotine, an entire population threatened with extermination, and a wealthy manufacturing city demolished, not with the pickaxe but by mining explosions. This petition, which four citizens had possessed resolution enough to sign, produced a most painful impression upon the convention. Collot-d'Herbois lost no time in making his report, and in the drunkenness of his revolutionary guilt, he exhibited those awful executions precisely as they appeared to his imagination, that is, as indispensable, and as perfectly a matter of course. "The Lyonnese," according to the purport of what he said, "were conquered, but they loudly declared that they would soon have their revenge. It was necessary to strike terror into those yet unsubdued rebels, and not them only, but into all those who were disposed to imitate their examples: a prompt and terrible example was required. The ordinary instrument of death did not work with sufficient despatch; the pickaxe demolished but slowly. Grape shot has destroyed the men. Mining explosions have destroyed the buildings. Those who are now dead had all of them imbrued their hands in the blood of the patriots. A popular commission selected them with prompt and discerning eye from among the multitude of prisoners; and there was no reason to regret any of those who had been stricken." Collot-d'Herbois obliged the amazed convention to approve of what appeared to him so much a matter

of course affair; he then proceeded to the Jacobins to complain to them of the difficulty he had experienced in justifying his conduct, and of the compassion which the Lyonnese had excited. "This morning," said he, "I was forced to employ circumlocutions in order to cause the death of traitors to be approved of. They wept; they wished to know *whether they were killed by the first blow!* the first blow—indeed—the counter-revolutionists! and was Chalier killed by the first blow?* Yes, pray inquire, said I to the convention, how those men died who were covered with the blood of our brethren! If they were not dead you would not be deliberating here! Well, they could hardly comprehend this language; they could not bear to hear mention made of dead men; they knew not how to defend themselves from shadows." Then adverting to Ronsin, Collot-d'Herbois added, that this general had shared every danger with the patriots in the south, that he had there braved with him the daggers of the aristocrats, and displayed the greatest firmness in making the authority of the republic respected; that at this very moment all the aristocrats were rejoicing at his arrest, as they regarded this occurrence as a source of hope for themselves. "What then has Ronsin done to be arrested!" exclaimed Collot, "I have asked every body this question, but none could tell me." On the day after this sitting, the 3rd Nivose, Collot returning to the charge, communicated the death of Gaillard the patriot, who seeing that the convention seemed to disapprove of the energy displayed at Lyons, had died by his own hand. "Was I wrong," exclaimed Collot, "when I told you that the patriots would be driven to despair, if the public spirit were to fall to so low an ebb as this!"

Thus, while the two leaders of the ultra-revolutionists were imprisoned, their partisans were bestirring themselves in their behalf. The clubs and the convention were annoyed by appeals in their favour, and even a member of the committee of public welfare, involved in their sanguinary system, defended them in order to justify himself. Their adversaries began, on their part, to infuse the greatest energy into their attacks. Philippeau, returned from La Vendée, in the plenitude of his indignation against the staff of Saumur, desired that the committee of public welfare, identifying itself with his anger, should prosecute Rossignol, Ronsin, and others, and imagined that he saw a treasonable intention in the failure of the plan of the campaign of the 2nd of September. We have already seen what a jumble there was of mutual reproaches, misconceptions, and incompatibilities of character, in the conduct of that war. Rossignol and the staff of Saumur had been actuated by ill-temper, but had not committed treason. The committee, in expressing disapproval of their conduct, could not visit them with a condemnation which would have been neither just or polite. Robespierre recommended an amicable explanation; but Philippeau, in the irritability of his temper, published a virulent pamphlet, in which he gave a narrative of the whole war, in which were numerous errors, mixed up with no small share of truth. This publication could not fail of producing the most lively sensation, for it attacked the most decided revolutionists, and charged them with the most odious treasons. "What has Ronsin done!" said Philippeau. "He has been party to many an intrigue; he has committed many a robbery, and uttered many a falsehood. His only expedition is that of the 18th of September, when he overwhelmed forty-five thousand patriots by three thousand brigands. It is that fatal battle of Coron, when, after placing our artillery in a narrow pass at the head of a column having a flank of six leagues, he hid himself in a stable, like a cowardly rascal, two leagues from the field of battle, where our unfortunate comrades were mowed down by their own guns." In this pamphlet, Philippeau, it is very evident, was not very delicate in his expressions. Unfortunately for him, the committee of public welfare, whom he ought to have engaged in his interests, was not treated with very great consideration. Philippeau, dissatisfied at not seeing his own indignation responded to by the public, seemed to impute to the committee some of those faults with which he reproached Ronsin, and even made use of this offensive expression: *If ye have been no more than mistaken.*

This pamphlet, as we have just observed, produced a great sensation. Camille-Desmoulins was not acquainted with Philippeau; but pleased to find that in La Vendée the ultra-revolutionists had been quite as much abused as in Paris, and not suspecting that anger had so blinded Philippeau as to make him convert faults into treason, he read his pamphlet with avidity, admired his courage, and, in his natural but pointed manner, he said to every body, "Have you read Philippeau? you must read Philippeau." Every body, in his opinion, ought to have read that publication, which demonstrated the perils to which the republic had been subjected at the hands of the revolutionary exaggeratists.

Camille had a great regard for Danton, and Danton for him. Both of them conceived that, as the republic was saved by the late victories, it was time to put an end to cruelties no longer necessary; that these barbarities, if persevered in, would certainly compromise the revolution, and that no one, save the foreign foe, could desire or promote their continuation. Camille conceived the idea of publishing a new journal, which he entitled *The Old Cordelier*; for he and Danton were the elders of that celebrated club. His paper was directed against all the new revolutionists who wished to overthrow and go beyond the oldest and most tried revolutionists. Never had this writer, the most remarkable the revolution produced, and one of the most natural and witty in our language, displayed such grace, originality, and even eloquence. His first number (15th Frimaire) commenced thus: "O Pitt! I pay homage to thy genius! What new arrivals from France into England have given thee such excellent advice, and furnished thee with such sure means of ruining my country! Thou hast seen that thou shouldst unceasingly fail of succeeding against her, if thou didst not do thy very utmost to ruin in the public opinion those who for these five years have been thwarting all thy projects. Thou hast been brought to understand that it is those who have already

* This *Mountaineer*, who was condemned by the Lyonnese Federalists, had been clumsily executed by the executioner, who was compelled to give three blows before he could sever his head from his body.

conquered thee that it would behove thee to conquer; that it would behove thee to accuse of corruption those very persons whom thou hast never been able to corrupt, and of lukewarmness those whom thou never couldst render lukewarm. I have opened my eyes," added Desmoulins; "I have seen the number of our enemies; their multitude tears me from the Hôtel des Invalides, and hurries me back to the fight. I am forced to write; I must throw aside the slow pencil of the history of the revolution, which I was tracing by the fireside, to take up the rapid and panting pen of the journalist, and to follow at full gallop the revolutionary torrent. A consulting deputy, whom nobody has consulted since the 3rd of June, I sally forth from my closet and my arm-chair, where I have had abundant leisure to follow even into the minutest details the new system adopted by our enemies."

Camille extolled Robespierre to the skies for his conduct at the Jacobins, and for the generous services which he had rendered to the old patriots; and he expressed himself as follows relative to religion and the proscriptions.

"The human mind diseased," said he, "finds relief from the bed haunted by the dreams of superstition; and when one sees the festivals and the processions that are ordained, the altars and the shrines that are raised, it seems as if it were only the bed of the sick person that is changed,—it is merely taking the pillow of the hope of another life from under him. For my part, I said the same thing on the very day that I saw Gobel come to the bar, with his crucifix and his crosier, which were borne in triumph before the philosopher Anaxagoras*. If it were not a crime of *lese-mountain* to suspect a president of the Jacobins and a procurator of the commune, such as Clootz and Chaumette, I should be tempted to believe that, when intelligence was received from Barrère, *La Vendée is no more!* the king of Prussia exclaimed with sorrow, *All our efforts, then, will fail against the republic, since that nucleus, La Vendée, is destroyed!* and that the crafty Lucchesini, in order to console him, made this reply: *Invincible hero, I have hit upon an expedient. Let me do it. I will pay some priests to confess themselves impostors. I will inflame the patriotism of others to make a similar declaration. There are in Paris two famous patriots, who will be well adapted, by their talents, their exaggeration, and by their notorious opinions of religion, to second us and to receive our impressions. Doubtless all we have to do is to make our friends in France act in concert with the two great philosophers, Anacharsis and Anaxagoras; to stir up their bile, and to dazzle their civism by the rich spoil of the sacristies.* (I hope that Chaumette will not complain of this number; the Marquis de Lucchesini could not speak of him in more distinguished terms.) *Anacharsis* and *Anaxagoras* will imagine that they are putting their shoulders to the wheel of the chariot of reason, whereas it will be to that of counter-revolution; and presently, instead of leaving popery ready to draw its last breath, to expire in France of old age and inanition, I pledge myself, by the aid of persecution and intolerance against those who are determined to mass and to be massed, to send off abundance of recruits to Lescure and Larochejaquelein."

Camille then relating what occurred in the time of the Roman emperors, and pretending to give nothing else than a translation of Tacitus, made a terrific allusion to the law of the suspected. "In old time," said he, "there was at Rome, according to Tacitus, a law declaratory of those crimes of state and of lese-majesty that were capital. These crimes of lese-majesty, under the republic, can be classed under four denominations. Where an army had been abandoned in an enemy's country; where seditions had been excited; where the members of the constituted bodies misconducted the public administration or the public money; or where the majesty of the Roman people had been brought into contempt. The emperors needed but a few additional articles to this law to involve the citizens, nay, whole cities, in a proscription. Augustus was the first to stretch this law of lese majesty, by including therein publications which he termed counter-revolutionary. These forced interpretations soon became illimitable. So soon as words had become state offences, there was but one step more to convert mere looks, sorrow, compassion, sighs, even silence itself, into criminal acts.

"Soon afterwards it was considered a crime of lese-majesty, or of counter-revolution, in the city of Nursia to have erected a monument to those inhabitants who had fallen during the siege of Modena; a crime of counter-revolution in Libo Drusus to have asked the fortune-tellers whether he should not some day possess great wealth; a crime of counter-revolution in Cremutius Cordus, the journalist, for having called Brutus and Cassius the last of the Romans; a crime of counter-revolution in one of the descendants of Cassius to have in his house a statue of his ancestor; a crime of counter-revolution in Marcus Scaurus, to have written a tragedy containing a certain verse to which a double sense might be applied; a crime of counter-revolution in Torquatus Silanus to live in an expensive style; a crime of counter-revolution in Petreius to have dreamt of Claudius; a crime of counter-revolution in Pomponius, because a friend of Sejanus had sought an asylum in one of his villas; a crime of counter-revolution to complain of the calamities of the time, for that was bringing the government in question; a crime of counter-revolution not to invoke the Divine Spirit of Caligula. For having failed in the observance of these articles, a great number of citizens had their flesh torn with rods, were condemned to the mines, or exposed to wild beasts, and some even were sawed asunder; lastly, it was a crime of counter-revolution in the mother of Fusius Germinus, the consul, to have wept for the melancholy death of her son.

"It was absolutely necessary to manifest joy at the death of a friend, or a relative, unless one wished to be exposed to the same fate.

"Every thing gave umbrage to the tyrant. If a citizen possessed popularity, he was a rival of the prince, and might stir up civil war: *studia civium in se certerent, et si multi idem audeant, bellum esse.* SUSPECTED.

"If, on the contrary, any one shunned popularity, and kept to his chimney corner; this secluded life has made you remarkable. It has given you consideration. *Quanto minus occultior, tanto plus famâ adepius.* SUSPECTED.

* The name that Chaumette had adopted.

"Were you rich, there was imminent danger that the people might be corrupted by your largesses. *Auri sim atque opes Pluti, principi infensus.* SUSPECTED.

"Were you poor; how then! invincible emperor! That man must be the more closely watched. No one is so enterprising as he that hath nothing to lose: *Syllam inopem, unde præcipuam audaciam.* SUSPECTED.

"Were you of a gloomy, melancholy disposition, or carelessly dressed; the cause of your distress was because public affairs went well. *Hominem publicis bonis mœstum.* SUSPECTED."

Camille-Desmoulins thus pursued this masterly enumeration of suspected persons, and sketched a terrific picture of what was doing at Paris, by what had been done in Rome. If the letter of Philippeau had excited a strong sensation, the journal of Camille-Desmoulins produced a much greater. Fifty thousand copies of each of his numbers were sold in a few days. The provinces took large quantities of them. The prisoners procured them by stealth, and read with delight, and perhaps with some feeling of hope, the writings of that revolutionist who had formerly been so hateful in their eyes. Camille, without desiring that the prisons should be thrown open, or the revolution be stayed in its progress, called for the institution of a committee, to be called the committee of *clemency*, who should review the cause of detention of every prisoner, and should set at liberty those citizens who were confined without sufficient cause shown, and should stop the further effusion of blood in that quarter where it had flowed too freely already.

The publications of Philippeau and Desmoulins irritated the zealous revolutionists in the highest degree, and were disapproved of by the Jacobins. Hébert denounced them there with the utmost rage; he even moved that the names of their authors should be struck off the list of the club. Moreover, he named Bourdon of the Oise, and Fabre d'Eglantine, as the accomplices of Camille-Desmoulins, and Philippeau. We have already observed, that Bourdon had attempted, in concert with Goupilleau, to displace Rossignol: he was involved in a quarrel with the staff of Saumur, and had never ceased, when in the convention, to accuse Rossin's party. It was this that caused him to be associated with Philippeau. Fabre was accused of being art and part in the affair of the fabricated decree, and people were disposed to believe this, though he had been justified by Chabot. Being fully sensible of his perilous situation, and having every thing to fear from the over-severe system that prevailed, he had spoken twice or thrice, advocated a more indulgent system, had broken off with the ultra-revolutionists, and been treated as an intriguer by the Père Duchesne newspaper. The Jacobins, without adopting the violent motion of Hébert, resolved that Philippeau, Camille-Desmoulins, Bourdon of the Oise, and Fabre d'Eglantine, should appear at the bar of the club, to explain themselves in regard to their publications, as well as their speeches in the convention.

The sitting at which they were to appear drew an immense concourse of people. Seats were violently contended for, and some seats were even sold as high as twenty-five francs. Philippeau, though he was not a member of the society, did not refuse to appear at its bar, and repeated the charges which he had already publicly avowed, whether it were in his correspondence with the committee of public welfare, or in his pamphlet. He was no more sparing of individuals on the present occasion than he had been before, and on two or three occasions he deliberately and provokingly gave Hébert the lie. These bold personalities of Philippeau began to agitate the society, and the sitting was becoming stormy, when Danton observed that it required the closest attention and the greatest composure to judge of so serious a question; that he himself had not formed any opinion concerning Philippeau and the truth of his accusations; that he had already said to him himself, "Thou must either prove thy charges, or lay thy head down on the scaffold;" that perhaps there was nothing in fault here but the events themselves; but that, at any rate, it was right that every one should be heard, and above all, be listened to.

Robespierre, speaking after Danton, said that he had not read Philippeau's pamphlet, indeed all he knew was, that in that pamphlet the committee were made responsible for the loss of twenty thousand men; that the committee had no time to answer libels and to engage in a paper war; that he nevertheless did not conceive Philippeau to be guilty of any bad intentions, but was hurried away by his passions. "I do not pretend," said Robespierre, "to impose silence on the conscience of my colleague; but let him commune with himself, and judge whether he hath not in himself vanity or some other petty passion. I dare say he is hurried along as much by patriotism as by passion; but let him reflect! let him consider the conflict in which he is about to engage! He will see that the moderatists will take up his defence; that the aristocrats will range themselves on his side; that the convention itself will be divided; that there will perhaps arise an opposition party, (in itself a most disastrous circumstance,) who will again embroil the fray from which it has sprung, and give new life to the conspiracies which it has cost us so much trouble to put down." He therefore exhorted Philippeau to examine his secret motives, and the Jacobins to listen to him in silence.

Nothing could be more reasonable and more appropriate than Robespierre's observations, with the exception of the tone, which was always emphatic and magisterial, particularly ever since he had borne sway at the Jacobins. Philippeau again resumed his declaration, renewed the same personalities, and caused the same confusion. Danton, who had lost all patience, exclaimed that the best way would be to cut short such quarrels, and to appoint a commission to examine into the particulars of the allegations. Couthon said that even before resorting to that measure, it would be worth while to ascertain whether the question was worth that trouble, and whether it might not be merely a question between man and man; and he moved that Philippeau should be interrogated whether in his soul and conscience he believed that there had been treason. He then addressed Philippeau. "Dost thou believe," said he, "in thy soul and conscience that treason has been committed." "Yes," imprudently replied Philippeau. "In that case," rejoined Couthon, "there is but one

course left. A commission ought to be appointed to hear both the accused and the accusers, and to make its report to the society." The motion was carried, and the commission appointed to examine not only into the charges made by Philippeau, but also into the conduct of Bourdon of the Oise, of Fabre d'Eglantine, and of Camille-Desmoulins.

This was the 3rd of Nivose (23rd of December). In the interval of the time employed by the commission in drawing up its report, the paper war and the recriminations continued without interruption. The Cordeliers expelled Camille-Desmoulins from their society. They prepared fresh petitions on behalf of Ronsin and Vincent, and laid them before the Jacobins, for the purpose of inducing the latter to support them in the convention. That host of adventurers and vile characters with which the revolutionary army abounded, now presented themselves every where, in the public walks, the taverns, the coffee-houses, and places of public amusement, with woollen epaulettes, and moustaches, and made a great noise in favour of Ronsin, their general, and Vincent, their minister. They were nick-named the *épauletiers*, and were much dreaded in Paris. Ever since the passing of that enactment which forbade the sections to meet more than twice a week, they were converted into very turbulent popular societies. There were even two of these societies to a section, and it was to them that all the parties who had any interest in stirring up a popular commotion sent their agents. The *épauletiers* had not been deficient in their attendance on them, and the tumult that prevailed in almost all these assemblies was solely attributable to their presence.

Robespierre, who on every occasion retained his strong position at the Jacobins, caused the petition of the Cordeliers to be rejected, and what was more, caused the affiliation of all the popular societies formed since the 31st of May to be withdrawn. These were acts proceeding from a discreet and laudable energy. However, it was highly expedient that the committee, at the same time that it was making the greatest exertions to repress the turbulent faction, should cautiously abstain from holding out the slightest appearance of weakness and moderation. In order that it should retain its popularity and its strength, it was necessary that it should display the like severity against the contrary faction. This was the reason that on the 5th Nivose (25th December), Robespierre was commissioned to make a new report upon the principles of the revolutionary government, and to propose measures of severity against certain illustrious prisoners. As he was invariably induced, as well from political feeling as from misinformation, to cast [the blame of] all disorders upon the supposed foreign faction, so on this occasion he imputed it to the faults both of the moderatists and the exaggeratists. "The foreign courts," said he, "have vomited upon France the clever scoundrels whom they keep in their pay. They deliberate in our administrations, they introduce themselves into our sectional assemblies and our clubs; they have even sat in the national representation: they direct and for ever will direct the counter-revolution upon the same plan. They continually haunt us, they make themselves masters of our secrets, they flatter our passions, nay, they even seek to direct our very opinions." Robespierre, pursuing this train of ideas, exhibited them as alternately urging the people either to exaggeration or folly, as exciting a persecution against divine worship in Paris, and in La Vendée a rebellious fanaticism; as sacrificing Lepelletier and Marat, and then mingling in every company to decree divine honours to them, for the very purpose of exposing them to ridicule and odium; as alternately giving to or withholding bread from the people; causing specie to appear or disappear; and in short, taking advantage of every incident, with a view to apply them against the revolution and France. After having thus summed up all our calamities, Robespierre, who did not wish that they should seem the natural consequence of the state of things, imputed them to the foreign foe, who no doubt had reason to congratulate himself in that respect, but who in insuring their appearance, availed himself of the vicious propensities of human nature, and could not have attained the same object by mere conspiracies. Robespierre, regarding all the illustrious prisoners still in confinement as coadjutors of the allied powers, proposed to send them immediately before the revolutionary tribunal. Thus Dietrich, mayor of Strasburg, Custine's son, Biron, and all the officers who were either friends of Dumouriez, Custine, or Houchard, were to be brought to trial without further delay. Most assuredly there was little need for a decree of the convention to ensure the sacrifice of these victims by the revolutionary tribunal; but this solicitude to hasten their execution was a proof that the government was not growing weaker. Robespierre proposed moreover to increase, by one third, the rewards in land promised to the defenders of the country.

After this report, Barrère was directed to prepare a further report upon the arrests, which, as it was said, every day were becoming more and more numerous, and to propose means for adjudicating upon the causes of these arrests. The object of this report was to reply, but without appearing so to do, to the "Old Cordelier" of Camille-Desmoulins, and to his proposal for a committee of clemency. Barrère animadverted with great severity upon *translators of the orators of old*, but nevertheless suggested the appointment of a commission to adjudicate upon the causes of the arrests; which very nearly resembled the committee of clemency devised by Camille. However, upon the observations of some of the members, the convention deemed it right to adhere to its previous decrees, which required the revolutionary committees to furnish the committee of general welfare with the causes of the arrests, and allowed prisoners to make their petitions to this latter committee.

The government thus steered its course between the two parties that were now forming, secretly inclining to the moderate party, but constantly apprehensive lest this tendency should be too perceptible. In the meantime, Camille published a number still more severe than the former, and which was addressed to the Jacobins. It was intituled, "My Defence;" and it was the boldest and most terrible recrimination against his adversaries.

On the subject of the erasure of his name from

the Cordeliers, he said, "Pardon, brethren and friends, if I still venture to take the title of Old Cordelier, after the resolution of the club, which forbids me to deck myself with that name. But in truth it is a piece of insolence so unheard of, that of a grand-child revolting against its grandsire, and forbidding him to use his own name, that I must plead this cause against those ungrateful sons. I should like to know to whom the name ought to belong, whether to the grand-papa or to the children whom he has begotten, not a tenth part of whom he has ever acknowledged, or even known, but who assume to drive him from the paternal home?"

He then enters into an explanation of his opinions. "The vessel of the republic is being navigated between two sunken rocks, the rock of exaggeratism, and the sandbank of moderatism. Seeing that *Père Duchêne* and almost all the patriotic sentinels were on deck, glass in hand, solely occupied on the look out, and shouting, There! avast! you are running aground-upon moderatism! it suited well with my position as an old Cordelier and elder of the Jacobins, that I should take upon myself to keep a careful watch, and which none of the younger men would undertake, lest they should injure their popularity, that of crying out, There! avast! you will strike upon exaggeratism! and this is the obligation which all my colleagues in the convention ought to feel that they owe me, that of having risked my popularity itself, in order to save the ship in which my cargo was not greater than their own."

He then justified himself for this expression, with which he had been so frequently reproached: *Vincent Pitt governs George Bouchotte*, "I certainly did," said he, "in 1787 call Louis XVI. 'my fat booby of a king,' without being bastilled (*embastillé*) for it. Could Bouchotte be a more important personage?"

He then reviewed his adversaries; to Collot-d'Herbois he said, that if he, Desmoulins, had his Dillon, he, Collot, had his Brunet and his Proli, both of whom he had defended. He said to Barrère, "People no longer know one another at the Mountain; if it had been an old Cordelier, like myself, an upright (*rectiligne*) patriot, Billaud-Varennes for example, who had scolded me so severely, *austissimus atique*; I would have said, it is the box on the ear given by the impetuous St. Paul to the good St. Peter, who has transgressed. But thou, my dear Barrère, thou, the happy guardian of Pamela*! thou, the president of the Feuillans! thou who hast proposed the committee of twelve! thou who, on the 2nd of June, didst in the committee of public welfare, move the question whether Danton should be arrested! thou, many more of whose faults I could reveal, if I were to rummage the old sack, (*le vieux sac*†,) that thou shouldst all at once shout out *Robespierre! Robespierre!* and that I should be so hardly apostrophized by thee?"

"All this is but a domestic squabble," adds Camille, "between my friends, the patriots Collot and Barrère, but I shall in my turn put myself into a thundering passion (*bougrement en colère*)*, with *Père Duchêne*, who styles me a paltry vile intriguer, a scoundrel who would bring one to the guillotine, a conspirator who wishes the prisons to be opened in order to make a new Vendée of them, a spy in the pay of Pitt, a long-eared jack-ass: WAIT FOR ME, HEBERT, AND I WILL BE WITH THEE IN A MOMENT. Here it is not with coarse abuse and mere words that I shall attack thee, it is with facts."

Camille, who had been accused by Hébert of having married a wealthy woman, and of dining with aristocrats, then narrated the circumstances of his marriage, which had brought him an income of four thousand livres, and he drew a picture of his simple, retired, and easy life. Then, recurring again to Hébert, he called to mind his former occupation of check-taker, and his thefts, which had driven him from the theatre, his sudden and well-known source of wealth, and covered him with the most deserved opprobrium. He narrated and showed how Bouchotte had paid Hébert out of the funds of the war department, first one hundred and twenty thousand francs, then ten, then sixty thousand, for the copies of *Père Duchêne* distributed among the armies; that these same copies were not worth more than sixteen thousand francs, and that consequently the nation had been defrauded of the surplus.

"Two hundred thousand francs!" exclaimed Camille, "to that poor sans-culotte Hébert, for supporting the motions of Proli and of Clootz! two hundred thousand francs for calumniating Danton, Lindet, Cambon, Thuriot, Lacroix, Philippeau, Bourdon of the Oise, Barras, Fréron, d'Eglantine, Legendre, Camille-Desmoulins, and almost all the commissioners of the Convention! for inundating France with his writings, so well adapted to form the mind and the heart! two hundred thousand francs from Bouchotte! Can any body, after this, be surprised at Hébert's filial exclamation at the sitting of the Jacobins: *To dare to attack Bouchotte! —Bouchotte, who has placed sans-culotte generals at the head of the armies!—Bouchotte, so pure a patriot!* All I am astonished at is, that in the transports of his gratitude, *Père Duchêne* did not exclaim: Bouchotte, who has given me two hundred thousand livres since the month of June."

"Thou talkest to me," proceeds Camille, "of my associations; but does not every body know that it is with Kock the banker, the intimate friend of Dumouriez, and with the wife of Rochechouart, the agent for the emigrants, that Hébert, this patriot of note, after having slandered in his paper the purest men of the republic, goes, to his great delight, both himself and his Jacqueline, to spend the most pleasant part of summer in the country, to drink Pitt's wine, and to drink bumpers to the ruin of the reputation of the founders of liberty?"

Camille next reproaches Hébert with the style of his paper. "Knowest thou not, Hébert, that when the tyrants of Europe wish to make their slaves believe that France is covered with the

* Alluding to the piece of *Pamela*, the performance of which had been prohibited.

† Barrère in the time of his nobility described himself as *le vieux sac*

* An expression used by the newsheakers, who when they sold the sheets of the *Père Duchêne* newspaper, cried through the streets: *Il est bougrement en colère le Père Duchêne.*

darkness of the barbarous ages, that Paris, that town so celebrated for its attic wit and its taste, is peopled with Vandals; knowest thou not, wretch, that it is but cuttings from thy papers that they insert in their gazettes? as if the people were as ignorant as thou wouldst make Mr. Pitt believe, or as if they could not be addressed except in language so gross; as if that were the dialect of the convention and of the committee of public welfare; or as if thy obscenities were identified with the nation; or as if a sewer of Paris were the Seine."

Camille then accuses him of having advocated, through the numbers of his publication, the horrible scandal of the worship of reason, and afterwards exclaims: "Is it, then, this base sycophant, who has for his wages two hundred thousand livres, that shall reproach me with my wife's income of four thousand livres? Is it this intimate friend of the Kocks, the Rochechouarts, and a score of other rascals, that shall reproach me with my associations? Is it this insensate or perfidious scribbler that shall reproach me with my aristocratic writings?—he, too, whose papers I will prove to be the delight of Coblentz and the only hope of Pitt! Shall that man, struck out of the list of the servants of the theatre for his robberies, cause to be struck off the list of the Jacobins, for mere matter of opinion, those deputies who are the immortal founders of the republic? Is this writer for the shambles to be the arbiter of opinion—the mentor of the French people?

"Let them despair," adds Camille-Desmoulins, "of ever intimidating me by the terrors and the rumours of my arrest, which they are disseminating around me! We know that there were villains who conspired on the 31st of May against the most energetic members of the Mountain! O my colleagues, I shall say to you, as Brutus did to Cicero: *We have too great a fear of death, exile, and poverty. Nimium timemus mortem et exilium et paupertatem.* What! when twelve hundred thousand Frenchmen are every day boldly storming redoubts bristling with the most murderous artillery, and fly from victory to victory, shall we deputies to the convention—we who can never fall like the soldier, in the obscurity of night, shot in the dark, and without a witness of his bravery—we, whose death in the cause of liberty cannot be other than glorious and solemn, as suffered in the face of the whole nation, of Europe, and of posterity—shall we be more cowardly than our soldiers? shall we be afraid to look Bouchotte in the face? shall we not dare to brave the fierce wrath of *Père Duchêne*, so that we should also obtain that victory which the people expect from us, the victory over the ultra-revolutionists as well as over the counter-revolutionists; the victory over all the intriguers, all the rogues, all the ambitious, and over every one of the enemies of the common weal.

"Does any one believe that even upon the scaffold, supported by that intensity of feeling with which I have passionately loved my country and the republic, and that crowned with the esteem and the regret of all true republicans, I would put my fate in comparison with the fortune of that miserable wretch Hébert, who in his paper is urging twenty classes of citizens to revolt and to despair; who in order to escape from his remorse and his slanders, must fly to some intoxication greater than wine can induce, and be incessantly licking the blood at the foot of the guillotine? What is then the scaffold for a patriot any thing else than the pedestal of the Sidneys and the John de Witts? What is it in this time of war, wherein I have had my two brothers cut to pieces in the cause of liberty—what else is the guillotine more than the stroke of a sabre, and the most glorious of all for a deputy, the victim of his courage and of his republicanism?"

These pages will convey an idea of the manners of the time. The roughness, the sternness, the eloquence of Rome and Athens had re-appeared among us together with democratic liberty.

This new number of Camille-Desmoulins' paper caused a still greater ferment than its predecessors. Hébert did not cease to denounce him at the Jacobins, and to call for the report of the commission. At length, on the 16th Nivose, Collot d'Herbois addressed the Assembly upon that report. The concourse was as great as on the day when the discussion was first opened, and seats were sold at quite as high a price. Collot showed more impartiality than one could have expected from a friend of Ronsin. He reprimanded Philippeau for implicating the committee of public welfare in his accusations; for evincing the most favourable inclinations towards suspected persons; for speaking of Biron in an eulogistic manner, while he assailed Rossignol with abuse; and lastly, for exhibiting precisely the same preferences as the aristocrats. He brought forward another charge against him, which, under the circumstances, had some weight; and this was, that in his last publication, he had withdrawn the accusations pointed against General Fabre-Fond, the brother of Fabre d'Eglantine. Philippeau, who in point of fact had no acquaintance with either Fabre or Camille, had denounced the brother of the former, whom he conceived he had found deficient in his duty in La Vendée. Once brought into contact with Fabre by his position, and accused with him, he had, from a very natural regard, suppressed the allegations relative to his brother. This alone would prove that they had been led separately, and without knowing one another, to act as they had done, and that they formed no substantive faction. But party spirit came to a different conclusion; and Collot insinuated that there existed a secret intrigue, and a communication between the persons accused of moderatism. He ransacked the past, and reproached Philippeau with his votes upon Louis XVI. and upon Marat. As for Camille, he treated him much more favourably. He represented him as a good patriot, led astray by evil associations, whom they ought to forgive, provided he at the same time promised not to indulge in any such exuberance of wit for the future. He therefore proposed the expulsion of Philippeau, and the simple and mere reprimand of Camille.

At this moment Camille, who was present at the sitting, caused a letter to be handed to the president, declaring that his defence was contained in his last number, and requesting that the society would permit the contents to be read. On this proposition, Hébert, who dreaded the reading of that number, wherein the shameful actions of his past life were publicly stated, addressed the society,

and said that there was an evident intention to confuse the discussion by calumniating himself, and that to divert attention, it had been alleged that he had robbed the treasury, which was an atrocious falsehood. "I have the evidences in my hands," exclaimed Camille. These words caused a great disturbance. Robespierre the younger then said, that all personal discussions should be excluded; that the society had not met to enter into matters that merely concerned private character, and that if Hébert had been a thief, the society could not notice that fact; that those who had reason to reproach themselves, ought not to interrupt the general discussion. At these expressions, which were far from satisfactory, Hébert exclaimed, "I have nothing to reproach myself with!" "The disturbances in the departments," resumed Robespierre the younger, "are thy work; it is thou who hast contributed to excite them by impugning religious toleration." To this charge Hébert made no reply. Robespierre the elder then spoke, and keeping himself more within bounds than his brother, but without being a whit more favourable to Hébert, said that Collot had put the question in its proper point of view; that an unfortunate incident had disturbed the dignity of the discussion; that every one was to blame, not only Hébert, but all those who had replied to him. "What I am about to say," added he, "is not pointed against any one individual. He who is himself a calumniator, comes with a very bad grace to make his complaint against those who calumniate him. Those, therefore, who have condemned others in haste and with precipitation and rage ought not to complain of injustice. Let every one tax his own conscience, and apply these reflections to himself. I had wished to prevent the present discussion. It was also my desire, that in private interviews, and in friendly conferences, each one should explain himself, and confess his errors. Then folks can understand one another, and scandal can be dispensed with. But there is nothing of the sort here. Pamphlets have been issued the day after, with the express purpose of creating a sensation. Now, all that concerns us in all these personal quarrels, is not to know whether angry feelings and injustice have not been exhibited on all sides; but whether the charges preferred by Philippeau against the men to whom the most important of our wars are confided are well founded. This is what ought to be ascertained, for the benefit, not of the individuals, but of the republic."

Robespierre, in fact, thought that there was no object in discussing the charges of Camille against Hébert, for everybody knew how capable they were of proof; moreover, they contained nothing that the republic had an interest in verifying; but that, on the contrary, it was of great importance to throw some light upon the conduct of the generals in La Vendée. In point of fact, the debate relative to Philippeau was continued. The sitting was entirely devoted to the examination of a great number of eye-witnesses; but amidst their contradictory affirmations, Danton and Robespierre declared that they did not see their way; and that they did not know what to think of the matter. The discussion, which was already very protracted, was adjourned to the next sitting.

On the 18th the sitting was resumed. Philippeau was absent. As every body was jaded with the discussion concerning him, and which disclosed nothing; the society next went upon the affair of Camille-Desmoulins. He was called upon to explain himself as to the praises he had bestowed on Philippeau, and his connexion with him. Camille professed that he was utterly unacquainted with him; Camille had been at first induced to believe from facts adduced to him by Goupilleau and Bourdon, that Philippeau had stated nothing but what was true, and these facts had raised his indignation, but on the present occasion, when he saw upon discussing the matter, that Philippeau had distorted the truth, (an impression which universally obtained,) he retracted his approbation, and declared that he had no longer any opinion on this subject.

Robespierre, again speaking upon the question as concerned Camille, repeated what he had already said concerning him, that although he bore a high character, yet that this generally approved character did not justify him in writing against the patriots; that in fact, his publications were, as it were, devoured by the aristocrats, who were delighted with them, and consequently they had a great sale in every one of the departments; that he had translated Tacitus without understanding him; that he ought to be treated like a thoughtless child playing with edge tools and making bad use of them; that he must undertake to quit the aristocrats and the bad company that had seduced him; and that, although they forgave him, they ought at least to burn his publications. Camille, throwing aside those terms of conventional respect which he ought in prudence to have kept towards the haughty Robespierre, then cried out from his place: "Burning is not answering." — "Well then," resumed the irritated Robespierre, "we won't burn, but we'll answer. Let Camille's publications be immediately read, more especially as he will have it so; let him be covered with ignominy; let not the society restrain its indignation, since he persists in maintaining his diatribes and his dangerous principles. The man who so pertinaciously adheres to his perfidious writings is perhaps more than misled. Had he meant well, if he had written in the simplicity of his heart, he would not have ventured to stand up any longer in favour of works condemned by the patriots, and sought after by the counter-revolutionists. His is but an assumed courage; it reveals the anonymous persons under whose dictation Camille has written his newspaper; it demonstrates that he is the organ of a villainous faction, that has borrowed his pen to circulate its poison with greater boldness and certainty." Camille in vain begged to be allowed to speak, that he might pacify Robespierre; but they refused to hear him, and immediately began to read his papers. Whatever conventional forms of good breeding individuals observe towards one another in political squabbles, it is not long before self-esteem is involved. With the susceptibility of Robespierre, and the simple unreflecting disposition of Camille, the division of opinions was not long before it became a conflict between self-esteem and hatred. Robespierre despised Hébert and his partisans too much to ever embroil himself with them; but he was well enough inclined to contend with a writer

so celebrated in the revolution as Camille-Desmoulins; and the latter did manage matters so adroitly as to prevent an open rupture.

The reading of Camille's numbers took up two entire sittings. They next proceeded to deal with Fabre. They interrogated him, and called upon him to say what part he had had in the new publications recently circulated. He replied, not one single stroke, and that so far as concerned Philippeau and Bourdon of the Oise, he could safely say he knew them not. At length they desired to declare themselves with respect to the four denounced individuals. Robespierre, although no longer disposed to deal gently with Camille, moved that the debate should not be further proceeded with, and that the society should next consider a far more important matter, a subject more worthy of its attention, and of greater service to the public feeling, namely, the vices and crimes of the English government. "That atrocious government," said he, "conceals, under some appearance of liberty, the principles of despotism and an atrocious Machiavelism; we ought to denounce it to its own subjects, and to reply to its calumnies by demonstrating its faulty organization and its misdeeds." This subject was completely according to the taste of the Jacobins, as it opened so vast a field to their accusing imagination; but some of them had rather that the names of Philippeau, Camille, Bourdon, and Fabre, were first struck off the list. One voice even accused Robespierre of arrogating to himself a sort of dictatorship. "My dictatorship," he exclaimed, "is that of Marat and Lepelletier; it consists in being exposed every day to the daggers of the tyrants. But I am weary of the dissonance daily exhibited in the body of the society, and which can produce no beneficial result. Our real enemies are the foreign powers; they are the parties we ought to pursue, and whose plots it behoves us to unveil." Robespierre consequently renewed his motion, and thereupon it was amidst applauses carried, that the society, setting aside the disputes which had arisen between individuals, should devote the succeeding sittings, without interruption, to the discussion of the vices of the English government.

This was indeed most seasonably turning the restless imagination of the Jacobins from their purpose, and directing their attention to a subject that was likely to occupy them for a considerable period. Philippeau had already gone away, without troubling himself about their decision. Camille and Bourdon were neither excluded or confirmed, their names were no longer mentioned, and they contented themselves by withdrawing themselves from the club. As for Fabre d'Eglantine, notwithstanding Chabot had justified him, the facts which daily came to the knowledge of the committee of general welfare, left no doubt whatever of his guilty knowledge. The committee was therefore obliged to issue a warrant for his arrest, and to include him with Chabot, Bazire, Delaunay, and Julien of Toulouse.

All these discussions created an injurious impression against the new moderatists. There was not the slightest intelligence between them. Philippeau, at one time almost a Girondist, was not acquainted with either Camille, Fabre, or Bourdon; Camille was the only one who was upon an intimate footing with Fabre; as for Bourdon, he was an utter stranger to the other three. But an idea began now to gain ground, that there was a secret faction, of which these persons were either the accessaries or the dupes. The happy disposition and the epicurean habits of Camille, and the circumstance of his twice or thrice dining with some of the wealthy financiers of the time, the evident participation of Fabre with the tricksy stock-jobbers, and his recent wealth, caused it to be supposed that they were connected with the so-called corrupting faction. People durst not yet designate Danton as being its leader; but if he was not accused in a public manner, if Hébert in his paper, and the Cordeliers in their tribune, dealt gently with this powerful revolutionist, they said freely to one another what they dared not openly publish.

The person most injurious to the party was Lacroix, whose malversations in Belgium were so evident, that any one might well impute them to him without being deemed a libeller, and without his daring to reply. Common report associated him with the moderatists on account of his former connexion with Danton, and he was the cause of their being involved in his disgrace.

The Cordeliers, who were dissatisfied that the Jacobins had discharged the order of the day with respect to the denounced persons, resolved, 1, that Philippeau was a libeller; 2, that Bourdon, the pertinacious accuser of Ronsin, Vincent, and of the war-offices, no longer possessed their confidence, and in their eyes was none other than an accomplice of Philippeau; 3, that Fabre, who identified himself with the sentiments of Bourdon and Philippeau, was no more than an astute intriguer; 4, that Camille, already struck off their list, no longer possessed their confidence, although he had in former times rendered essential services to the revolution.

After Ronsin and Vincent had been for some time detained in prison, they were set at liberty, as they could not be committed for trial upon any distinct charge. There was no possibility of prosecuting Ronsin for his conduct in La Vendée, for the events of that war were covered by a thick veil; or for what he had done at Lyons, for that would raise a dangerous question, and at the same time accuse Collot d'Herbois, and the entire system of government as it then existed. It was quite as impossible to prosecute Vincent for certain despotic proceedings in the war offices. There was no bringing either of them to any other than a political trial, and the time had not arrived for their being subjected to such a procedure. They were therefore enlarged*, to the great joy of the Cordeliers, and of all the *épauletiers* of the revolutionary army.

Vincent was a young man of twenty and some odd years, a sort of madman, whose illusions were of a morbid character, and in whom insanity, or rather personal ambition, was predominant. One day when his wife, who was visiting him in his confinement, told him the news respecting himself, being highly irritated at what she told him, he pounced upon a piece of raw meat, and said while he devoured it, "I would in this way devour all

* The 14th Pluviose (2nd February).

Conduct of Ronsin and Vincent upon being released, and their ultra-revolutionary schemes.

those wretches!" Ronsin, who had been at different times a second-rate pamphleteer, a contractor, and general, combined with considerable intelligence, remarkable courage and great activity. Naturally disposed to amplify every thing, he was the most distinguished of those adventurers who had offered themselves as instruments of the new government. As commander of the revolutionary army, he considered how to make the best of his situation, either as offering advantages to himself, his friends, or in aid of the triumph of that state of things to which he belonged. He and Vincent, when in prison together, had always talked with an air of superiority; they were always saying that they should triumph over intrigue; that they should be released by the aid of their partisans; that they, themselves, should go and enlarge the imprisoned patriots, and should send all the other prisoners to the guillotine. They had caused great uneasiness to those unfortunates who were then fellow prisoners, and left them in utter consternation.

They had scarcely been set at liberty, when they loudly declared that they would be revenged, and that they would demand satisfaction of their enemies. The committee of public welfare could scarcely have done otherwise than release them; but the committee was soon made aware that they had let loose two furies, and that they must be put out of the power of committing mischief. There now remained at Paris four thousand men belonging to the revolutionary army. Among these were to be found adventurers, thieves, and *Septembriseurs**, who assumed the mask of patriotism, and who had much rather stay at home and commit spoliations in the interior, than go to the frontiers to lead a life of privation, hardship, and danger. These petty tyrants, with their moustaches and their enormous sabres, practised the most intolerable arrogance in places of public resort. Being provided with artillery, ammunition, and an enterprising commander, they were in a situation to become dangerous. With these were associated the brawlers who filled the offices in Vincent's department. The latter was their civil, as Ronsin was their military commander. There was a constant intercourse maintained between them and the commune through Hébert, and the deputy Chaumette, as well as Pache the mayor, who was ever ready to pay his court to every party, and to fawn upon those he dreaded. Momoro, one of the presidents of the Cordeliers, was their faithful partisan and advocate at the Jacobins. Thus Ronsin, Vincent, Hébert, Chaumette, and Momoro, all went together; and Pache and Bouchotte were added to the list, as time-serving adherents, who permitted them to usurp the two great authorities.

Already had these men shown their inability to express themselves in limited terms against those representatives who, as they said, designed to keep the supreme power for ever in their hands, and to spare the aristocrats. One day, when they were dining at Pache's, they there met with Legendre, a friend of Danton, formerly the imitator of his vehemence, and who now affected his reserve, and became the victim of following his example in that respect, for he became the object of the attacks which no one ventured to point at Danton himself. Ronsin and Vincent addressed offensive expressions to him. Vincent, who had been under obligations to him, embraced him, saying that he embraced the old, and not the new Legendre; that the new Legendre had become a moderatist, and merited no man's approbation. Vincent then asked him ironically, whether, when upon his missions, he had worn the costume of a deputy. Legendre having answered him by saying that he had worn it when with the armies, Vincent added that this dress was very pompous, but unworthy of genuine republicans; that he should dress up a lay-figure in that very costume, and call the people together, and should say to them: "These are the representatives you have chosen; they talk to you of equality, and yet cover themselves with gold and feathers." He said that he should then burn the lay-figure. Legendre then reprimanded him for his folly and sedition. They were near upon coming to blows, to the great alarm of Pache. Legendre having expressed a desire to address himself to Ronsin, who showed less temper, and having called upon him to restrain Vincent, Ronsin answered that Vincent was indeed rather warm, but that his character was adapted to circumstances, and that such men were necessary in the times in which they lived. "You have," added Ronsin, "a faction in the bosom of the assembly; if you do not cast it out we shall call you to account." Legendre left the place in high dudgeon, and repeated all that he had seen and heard at the entertainment. The conversation became generally known, and furnished a new proof of the audacity and frenzy of the two men who had been released from confinement.

There was expressed a very great respect for Pache and for his virtues, as the Jacobins had formerly done when Pache was minister. Pache somehow or other contrived to soothe all violent men by his mildness and complaisance. They were delighted to see their passions recognised by a man who had every appearance of wisdom. The new revolutionists intended, as they said, to make him an influential personage in their government; for without having any methodized intention, without even having matured the plan of, or yet possessing sufficient courage for an insurrection, they were incessantly talking, as all those plotters do who begin by trying their strength and venting their impatience in words. They publicly said, other institutions were now required. The only thing that satisfied them in the present organization of the government was the revolutionary tribunal and army. They had therefore devised a constitution, consisting of a supreme tribunal, over whom a chief judge was to preside, and a military council, under the direction of a commander-in-chief. Under this form of government, every thing was to be made the subject of a military-judicial administration. The commander-in-chief of the armies and the chief judge were to be the greatest personages. There was to be attached to the tribunal a high ex-officio accuser, who was to possess the title of censor, from whom all prosecutions were to emanate. Thus, in this scheme, conceived in a moment of revolutionary delirium, the two essential, nay, the only practical duties to be performed by government were those of condemna-

* For an explanation of this revolutionary term, see ante, p. 97, col. 1. note.

tion and war. It is not worth while inquiring whether this plan originated in the reveries of an individual, or whether it were the concoction of many; whether it existed otherwise than as a mere theoretical conversation, or whether it had been committed to writing; but this much is certain, that its model was to be traced in the revolutionary commissions established at Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, Bordeaux, Nantes, and that, with their imaginations fully occupied with what they had done in those great cities, these terrible executioners proposed to govern all France on the same plan, and to make the violence of a day the model of a permanent government. As yet they had only designated one of the persons designed for filling the highest situations. Pache was wonderfully fitted for the place of a chief judge; the conspirators therefore said that he ought to be the chief judge, and that he should be so. Without knowing what was the nature of the design, or what this place of chief judge meant, many persons repeated as a piece of news, "Pache is to be appointed chief judge." This report went its round without being either explained or understood. As for the dignity of a commander-in-chief, although Ronsin was general of the revolutionary army, he durst not make any pretensions to it, and his partisans did not venture to propose him, as a much more distinguished name was required for such a dignity. Chaumette was also hinted at by some as likely to be censor; but his name had not been very frequently uttered in connection with this report. Indeed, amongst these various rumours, only one could be said to be generally diffused, and that was, *Pache is to be the chief judge.*

Throughout the whole revolution, when the long excited passions of a party were ready to explode, it was always a defeat, a treason, a dearth, in short, some public calamity or other, that served as a pretext for the explosion. It was precisely the same in the present instance. The second law of the *maximum*, which, going further back than the retail shops, estimated the value of commodities at the very place of their manufacture, settled the price of carriage, regulated the profits of the wholesale dealer, as well as the retail dealer, had been passed; but commerce yet contrived to escape the despotism of the law in a thousand ways, and evaded it chiefly in a most mischievous way, namely, by suspending its operations. The restriction on the sale of goods was quite as great as before, and although they were no longer to be refused in exchange for the assignat, yet they were concealed, or no longer changed hands, nor were they sent to the places where there was a demand for them. The dearth was therefore very great, owing to this general stagnation of commerce. However, the extraordinary efforts of the government, and the labours of the commission for provisions, had partially succeeded in diminishing the scarcity of corn, and above all, in lessening the apprehensions of scarcity, a matter quite as formidable as the dearth itself, by reason of the disorder and confusion which it inflicts upon commercial relations. But a new calamity was beginning to be perceptibly felt, namely, the want of meat. The numerous herds that La Vendée had been used to send to the neighbouring provinces, no longer found their way to Paris, after the rebellion had commenced. The departments of the Rhine had also ceased to send cattle ever since they had been the seat of war; there was consequently a substantial diminution in the quantity. Besides all this, the butchers who bought cattle at a high price, and who were compellable to sell them at the *maximum* price, endeavoured to evade the law. The best meat was reserved for the rich, or for the citizen in easy circumstances, who could afford to pay well for it. A great number of close markets were established, especially in the environs of Paris, and in the country; and nothing but the offal was left for the lower classes, or for the purchaser who went to the shops and bargained for the *maximum* price. Thus the butchers indemnified themselves by the inferior quality for the low price at which they were obliged to sell. The people complained bitterly of the weight, the quality, the *réjouissances* *, and the close markets established in the neighbourhood of Paris. As there was a scarcity of beasts, it had been found necessary to kill cows in calf. The populace then immediately said that the aristocrat butchers intended to destroy the species, and demanded the penalty of death against those who should kill cows in calf, and ewes in lamb. But this was not all. Vegetables, fruit, eggs, butter, and fish, were no longer brought to market. A cabbage cost twenty sous. People forestalled the waggons on the road, surrounded them, and bought their load at any price. Few of these waggons reached Paris, where the populace awaited them in vain. Wherever a thing is to be done, there are always plenty of persons ready enough to undertake it. People set about scouring the country, in order to forestall the farmers by the way as they brought vegetables to market. A multitude of men and women undertook this calling, and bought up provisions on account of the rich, by paying for them more than the *maximum* price. Were there a market better supplied than the others, these agents hurried thither and bore off the commodities at a higher rate than the fixed price. The populace were violently excited against those who followed this business. It was said, that among the number were many unfortunate women of the town, who had been deprived, by the measures adopted at the instigation of Chaumette, of their deplorable means of subsistence, and who, in order to earn a livelihood, had followed this new calling.

To remedy all those inconveniences, the commune had, on the reiterated solicitations of the sections, ordered that the butchers should no longer forestall the cattle, or go beyond the ordinary markets; that they should not kill anywhere, but in the authorized slaughter-houses (*abattoirs*); that meat should be sold only in the shambles; that no person should any longer be permitted to forestall farmers by the way; that those who came in should be under the direction of the police, and should be equally distributed among the different markets; that people should go and take their stand at the butchers' doors before six o'clock, for it fre-

* *Réjouissance*, means that portion of inferior meat, which the buyer is compelled to take with the prime parts, and at the same price; this term is only used amongst butchers. *Trans.*

quently happened that they rose at three for this purpose.

These multiplied regulations could not save the people from the evils which they were enduring. The ultra-revolutionists tortured their own imaginations to devise expedients. The last idea that had occurred to them, was, that the pleasure-grounds abounding in the suburbs of Paris, and particularly in the fauxbourg St. Germain, might be brought into cultivation. Thereupon the commune, who never refused them any thing, had immediately ordered that an account should be taken of these pleasure-grounds, and decided, that so soon as the list was made out, they should be planted with potatoes and culinary vegetables. They conceived, moreover, that as vegetables, milk, and poultry, were no longer brought to town, the cause of this was to be imputed to the aristocrats who had retired to their seats around Paris. In point of fact, a great number of persons who had taken the alarm, were concealed in their country houses. The sections came and proposed to the commune to pass a resolution, or to demand a law, compelling them to return. However, Chaumette feeling that this would be too odious a violation of personal liberty, contented himself with making a threatening speech against the aristocrats who had gone to reside in the neighbourhood of Paris. He merely exhorted them to return to town, and directed the village municipalities to keep an eye upon their motions.

In the meantime, the evil was at its height, and there was no restraining the irritation it produced. The confusion in the markets increased. Disturbances were raised there every moment. People waited their turn in the butchers' shops, and in spite of the prohibition to go thither before a certain hour, there was precisely the same anxiety exhibited to get before one another. They had there introduced a practice which had first been used at the doors of the bakers, and this was to fasten a cord that each one might lay hold of, and so secure his turn; but here, as it was at the bakers' shops, mischievous persons, or those who could not get a good place, cut the cord; in that case, a general confusion arose among the waiting crowd, and they were ready to come to blows.

After this, there was no knowing who was to blame. They could not, as before the 31st of May, complain that the convention refused a law of *maximum*, the thing of all most desired, for the convention did all that was required. In their inability to devise any thing, they no longer asked for anything; but still they could not help complaining. The *épauletiers*, Bouchotte's clerks, and the Cordeliers, alleged that the cause of the dearth lay with the moderatist faction in the convention; that Camille-Desmoulins, Philippeau, Bourdon of the Oise, and their friends, were the originators of the prevailing evils; that they could go on no longer, and that extraordinary means must be resorted to; and they added the old catch-word of all the insurrections, *we want a leader*. They then mysteriously whispered to one another : *Pache is to be chief judge.*

However, though the new party had very considerable means at its disposal, though it could take advantage of the revolutionary army and a dearth, it had neither the government or public opinion in its favour, for the Jacobins were averse to it. Ronsin, Vincent. and Hébert, were obliged t fess an apparent respect for the lawfully cons authorities, to keep their designs secret, and in the dark. At the period of the 10th of A and the 31st of May, the conspirators being ters of the commune, of the Cordeliers, of tl cobins, and all the clubs, and having nun and energetic partisans in the national asse and in the committees, when they ventured t spire openly, could publicly draw the po along in their train, and avail themselves of r for the execution of their plots. But this w from being the case with the party of the *revolutionists.*

The reigning authority did not reject an of the extraordinary means of defence or ev vengeance; treasonable practices now no l impeached its vigilance; on the contrary, vic on all the frontiers attested its power, its abi and its zeal. Consequently, those who att this authority, and at the same time held out of qualifications or energy superior to what i sessed, were intriguers who were evidently moting some irregular or ambitious schemes. was the public conviction, and the conspi could not flatter themselves that they could the people in their train. Thus, however fo able they might become if they were permitt proceed, they were far from being of importa their career was seasonably checked

The committee kept its eye upon them; a continued by a series of reports to make the opposite parties of less importance. In the *revolutionists*, it considered that these were spirators who were to be annihilated; and o contrary, in regard to the moderatists, it si recognised old friends, who held the same opi with itself, and of whose patriotism there w suspicion. But that it should not appear defi in the article of strength to smite the *ultra-re tionists*, it was obliged to condemn the modera and to unceasingly appeal to the influence of te The latter were anxious to be heard. Ca published fresh numbers; Danton and his fri in their private conversation, argued against reasons of the committee, and a paper and w war was the consequence. A rancorous s supervened, and Saint-Just, Robespierre, Bar and Billaud, who at first had only repelled moderatists from policy and to fortify themse against the ultra-revolutionists, now began to secute them from personal ill feeling and hat Camille had already, as we have noticed, attac Collot and Barrère. In his letter to Dillon, had addressed the dogmatic fanaticism of Sa Just and the monkish austerity of Billaud i tone of raillery which had deeply wounded th He had at last irritated Robespierre at the J bins; and though he had highly commended h he had concluded by entirely alienating him from him. Danton was far from being agree to them all, by reason of his high reputation; at this time, now that he had retired from conduct of public affairs, he remained in reti ment, censuring the government, and appearing excite Camille's caustic and babbling* pen, could not fail to become more odious to th

* *Babillarde*, an expression adopted by Camille him

every day, and it was hardly to be supposed that Robespierre would again expose himself by defending him.

Robespierre and Saint-Just, who were accustomed to draw up in the name of the committee the declarations of their principles, and were in some measure charged with the moral department of the government, while Barrère, Carnot, Billaud, and others, took the management of the material and administrative department,—Robespierre and Saint-Just made two reports, the one *upon the moral principles which ought to guide the revolutionary government*, the other on the imprisonments of which Camille had complained in *The Old Cordelier*. We must now see in what way these two gloomy minds conceived the form of the revolutionary government, and of the means of regenerating a state.

"The principle of democratic government is virtue," said Robespierre*, "and its mode of operation whilst it is gaining a firm footing is terror. We desire to substitute in this our country, morality for selfishness, probity for honour, principles for usages, duties for conventionalities, the empire of reason for the tyranny of fashion, the contempt of vice for the contempt of misfortune, honest pride for insolence, greatness of soul for vanity, the love of glory for the love of money, worthy persons for good company, merit for intrigue, true genius for pretended wit, sterling truth for outward show, the charm of contented happiness for the languor induced by pleasure, the greatness of man for the littleness of the great, a magnanimous, powerful, and happy people for a giddy, frivolous, and wretched people; that is to say, all the virtues and all the miracles of the republic, for all the vices and all the follies of the monarchy. To attain this end, there was need of a rigorous and energetic government, which should surmount every obstacle whatever. There was, on the one hand, a brutal ignorance, together with a gross cupidity, which looked for nought else in the republic than convulsions; on the other hand, there existed a grovelling and abased corruption, anxious to enjoy all the gratifications of the former luxury, and which could never resolve itself into the energetic virtues of the democracy. Hence two factions: one who desired to carry every thing beyond reason, who pushed every thing to extremity, and in assailing superstition, sought to set aside God himself, and to spill torrents of blood, under the pretext of avenging the republic; the other, who, being weak and vicious, did not consider itself sufficiently *virtuous in order to become so terrible*, and basely deplored all the necessary sacrifices which the establishment of virtue demanded. One of these factions, said Saint-Just†, would CONVERT LIBERTY INTO A BACCHANAL, THE OTHER INTO A PROSTITUTE."

Robespierre and Saint-Just recapitulated the follies of some of the agents of the revolutionary government, and of two or three procurators of communes, who had assumed to renew the energy of Marat, and in so doing they alluded to all the extravagances of Hébert and his creatures. They then dwelt upon all the charges of weakness, acquiescence, and sensibility imputed to the new moderatists. They reproached them for sympathising with the widows of generals, the intriguing females belonging to the old nobility, and the aristocrats; in short, for continually alluding to the severities of the republic, far inferior to the cruelties of monarchies. "You have," said Saint-Just, "one hundred thousand prisoners, and the revolutionary tribunal has already condemned three hundred guilty persons. But under the monarchy you had four hundred thousand prisoners; fifteen hundred smugglers were annually hanged, three thousand were broken on the wheel; and at this very day there are in Europe four millions of prisoners, to whose cries you pay no attention, while your parricidal moderation is allowing the enemies of your government to triumph! We are now heaping reproaches on ourselves, while kings a thousand-fold more cruel than ourselves slumber amidst their crimes."

Robespierre and Saint-Just, in conformity with the system agreed on, added that these two factions, although apparently conflicting, had but one common point on which they relied, and that was the foreign enemy, who set them in action, so as to ruin the republic.

We here see what a compound of enthusiasm, policy, and malice was identified with the system of the committee. Camille and his friends found that they were attacked by allusions, and even by expressions pointedly directed against them. In his *Vieux Cordelier* he advanced the system of virtue against that of worldly happiness. He said that he was attached to the republic because it must necessarily add to the general felicity; because commerce, industry, and civilization were more strikingly developed at Athens, Venice, and Florence, than in any monarchy whatever; because the republic could alone realize that deceitful wish of monarchy, the fowl in the pot (*la poule au pot*). "What will it matter to Pitt," exclaimed Camille, "that France were free, if her liberty served only to carry us back to the ignorance of the ancient Gauls, to their *sayes*, to their *brayes* *, to their misletoe, and to their houses, which were but hovels of clay? So far from mourning over it, I dare say Pitt would give a great many guineas that such a liberty were established here. But that which would make the English government furious is, if it could be said of France, what Dicearchus said of Attica. *Nowhere in the world can one live more agreeably than at Athens, whether one has money or not. Those who are in easy circumstances, either by commerce or by their handiwork, can there procure all imaginable gratifications; and as for those who are striving to do so, there are so many workshops where they may earn wherewithal to amuse themselves at their* ANTHESTHERIA†, *and to lay by something besides, that they cannot possibly complain of their poverty,*

* Sitting of the 17th Pluviose, year II. (5th of February.)

† Report of 8th Ventose. (26th of February.)

* The *say* or *sagum* was a short garment, not lower than the knees, which the Persians, Romans, and Gauls wore in war; not dissimilar to what is now called a *frock* or *blouse*. *Brayes* are *brogues* or short trowsers. *Trans.*

† Anthestheria, was the name given to a three days' festival dedicated to Bacchus, which took place in the eighth month of the attic year, corresponding to our January and February; the time of the year when Camille-Desmoulins published his present observations. *Trans.*

unless indeed they have to reproach themselves with idleness.

"I think, then, that liberty does not exist in an equality of privations, and that the highest eulogium upon the convention would be, if it could bear this witness to itself, I found the nation without breeches, (*sans culottes*) and I leave it breeched (*culottée*).

"An admirable democracy," adds Camille, "was that of Athens! Solon did not pass there for a coxcomb (*muscadin* *), he was not a whit the less considered the model of legislators, and proclaimed by the oracle the first of the seven sages, although he made no difficulty in confessing his inclinations for wine, women, and music; and he obtains so firm a reputation for wisdom, that at this day his name is never pronounced in the convention and at the Jacobins but as that of the greatest of legislators. But how many are there among us who have the character of aristocrats and Sardanapaii, who have not uttered such a similar confession of faith!

"And that divine creature, Socrates, one day meeting Alcibiades gloomy and thoughtful, apparently for no other reason than that he was annoyed at a letter from Aspasia, 'What is the matter with you,?' said this most grave of Mentors, 'Have you lost your shield in battle? have you been vanquished in the camp, in the race, or at the fencing school? Has any one been singing or playing upon the lyre at the table of the general better than yourself?' This trait delineates manners. What delightful republicans!"

Camille then complained of this, that no desire seemed to exist for engrafting the habits and manners of Athens upon the liberty of speech which prevailed in that republic. Aristophanes there represented on the stage the generals, the orators, the philosophers, and the people themselves; and the people of Athens, sometimes personated by an old man, at others by a young one, instead of being irritated, proclaimed Aristophanes the champion of the games, and encouraged him by plaudits and crowns. Many of those comedies were directed against the *ultra-revolutionists* of that day. The sarcasms in them were most cutting; "and if at this day," added Camille, "one were to translate any of those pieces performed four hundred and thirty years before Christ, when Sthenocles was archon, Hébert would maintain at the Cordeliers that it was a piece of yesterday, an invention of Fabre-d'Eglantine against himself and Ronsin, and that no one but the translator was the cause of the dearth.

"However, I am deceiving myself," proceeded Camille, in sober sadness, "when I say that men are changed; they have always been the same; liberty of speech enjoyed no more impunity in the ancient than in the modern republics. Socrates, accused of having maligned the gods, drank the hemlock. Cicero, for having attacked Antony, was proscribed†."

Thus this unfortunate young man seemed to predict that liberty of speech would no more be forgiven in him than in others. Those railleries, and the eloquence with which it was accompanied, irritated the committee, and while it was keeping a watchful eye upon Ronsin, Hébert, Vincent, and every one of the agitators, it conceived a violent hatred against that amiable writer who derided its systems, against Danton, who was supposed to prompt that writer, and, in short, against all those who were regarded as friends or partisans of those two leaders.

In order not to deviate from the straight course it had adopted, the committee presented two decrees, immediately after the reports of Robespierre and Saint-Just, tending, it declared, to confer happiness upon the people at the expense of their enemies. By the tenor of these decrees, the committee of general welfare was alone invested with the power of investigating the complaints of detained persons, and releasing them if they were acknowledged patriots. On the other hand, all those who should be recognised as enemies of the revolution were to be kept in confinement till the peace, and should then be for ever exiled. Their property, which was to be provisionally sequestered, was to be divided among the indigent patriots, a list of whom was to be prepared by the communes *. This, we can clearly see, was an application of the agrarian law against suspected persons for the benefit of the patriots. These decrees, emanating from Saint-Just, were intended to act as a reply to the ultra-revolutionists, and enable the committee to preserve its reputation for energy.

Meanwhile the conspirators were bestirring themselves with more violence than ever. There is nothing to shew that their plans were methodized, or that they had engaged Pache and the commune in their plot. But they conducted themselves in the same manner as before the 31st of May: they excited the popular societies, the Cordeliers, and the sections; they diffused alarming reports, and sought to take advantage of the disturbances occasioned by the dearth, which every day increased and became more severely felt.

All at once there appeared in the markets and sale-rooms placards and pamphlets, declaring that the convention was the cause of all the sufferings of the people, and that it was high time to rend from it that dangerous faction which wanted to revive the Brissotins and their mischievous system. Some of these publications even went so far as to say that the whole convention ought to be renewed; that a leader should be chosen, and that the executive power should be organised, &c. In a word,

* In the sense in which this word was then and afterwards used, and as a revolutionary term, *petit-maître, macaroni*, or *dandy*, would perhaps convey the identical meaning. *Trans.*

† There could not be a more pointed rebuke uttered against the then leaders of the revolution, than this allusion to Socrates, which reminded those to whom it was addressed that the *free* city of Athens could less endure Socrates than the thirty tyrants, and had even put *him* to death whom those tyrants had spared—Numquid potes invenire urbem miseriorem quam Athenienses fuit cum illam triginta tyranni divellerent? Mille trecentos cives, optimum quemque occiderant—Socrates tamen in medio erat—Et insultari volentibus, magnum circumferebat exemplar, cum inter triginta dominos liber incederet. *Hunc* tamen Athenae ipsae in carcere occiderunt: et qui tuto insultaverat agmini tyrannorum, ejus Libertatem *libera civitas* non tulit.—Seneca de Tranquil. Anim. *Trans.*

* Decrees of the 8th and 13th Ventose, year II.

every one of the ideas which Vincent, Ronsin, and Hébert had been turning over in their minds filled these publications, and seemed to betray their originators. At the same time, the *épaulétiers*, more blustering and fierce than ever, were observed loudly threatening to go and slaughter in the prisons those enemies whom the corrupted convention was so pertinacious in sparing. They said that many patriots were to be found unjustly confounded in the prisons with aristocrats, but that they should go and select those patriots, and that they should give them liberty and arms at one and the same time. Ronsin, in full uniform as general of the revolutionary army, with a tri-coloured sash, and red plume, and accompanied by some of his officers, went through the prisons, ordered the gaol-books to be shown him, and extracted lists.

It was the 15th Ventôse. The section of Marat, presided over by Momoro, now assembled, and being indignant, as it said, at the machinations of the enemies of the people, it declared *en masse*, that it had turned out, that it would place a curtain before the declaration of rights, and that it should remain in that state until food and liberty had been secured to the people, and until its enemies were punished. The same evening, the Cordeliers tumultuously assembled. There it was that the sufferings endured by the public were vividly depictured; there it was that a recital was made of the persecutions recently undergone by the two renowned patriots, Vincent and Ronsin, who, it was said, had been lying ill at the Luxembourg, unable to procure the attendance of a surgeon to bleed them. Consequently, they declared that the country was in danger, and a curtain was suspended before the declaration of the rights of man. It was precisely in this way that all the insurrections had begun, namely, by a declaration that the laws were in suspension, and that the people had resumed the exercise of its sovereignty.

On the following day, the 16th, the section of Marat and the Cordeliers introduced themselves to the commune to acquaint it with their resolutions, and to engage it in the same measures. Pache studiously avoided being present. One Lubin presided at the general council. He replied to the deputation with visible embarrassment; he said that at the very time when the convention was taking such energetic measures against the enemies of the revolution, and for the relief of the indigent patriots, it was a matter of surprise that a signal of distress should be made, and that the declaration of rights should be veiled. Then, affecting to justify the general council, as though it had been accused, Lubin added that the council had used its utmost exertions to ensure supplies of provisions, and to regulate their distribution. Chaumette spoke in quite as uncertain a manner. He recommended peace, required the report on the cultivation of the pleasure-grounds, and on the supply of the capital, which in pursuance of the decrees was to be provisioned as a fortified town.

Thus it was that the heads of the commune faltered; and the movement, although tumultuous, was not strong enough to drag them along with it, and inspire them with sufficient hardihood and courage to betray the committee and the convention. The disturbance, however, was great. The insurrection began in the same manner as all those which had already gained their ends, and was equally calculated to excite similar apprehensions. By an unfortunate coincidence, the committee of public welfare was at this time deprived of its most influential members: Billaud-Varennes, and Jean-Bon Saint-André, were absent on official business; Couthon and Robespierre were ill, and the latter was unable to come and keep his faithful Jacobins in order. There only remained Saint-Just and Collot-d'Herbois to grapple with this commotion. They both of them repaired to the convention, whither the deputies had got together in a confused state, and were trembling with fear. At their suggestion, Fouquier-Tinville was immediately summoned; he was directed to make immediate search for the utterers of the incendiary publications distributed in the markets, for the agitators who were exciting the popular societies, in short, for all the conspirators who were threatening the public tranquillity. He was enjoined by a decree to apprehend them immediately, and in three days to make his report to the convention.

There was no great point attained by getting a decree of the convention, for that had never been withheld when called for against disturbers of the public tranquillity; indeed even the Girondists had not been suffered to ask twice for this remedy against the insurgent commune; but in order to ensure the execution of these decrees, public opinion had to be conciliated. Collot, who possessed great popularity at the Jacobins and at the Cordeliers, by his club eloquence, and still more by the well-known energy of his revolutionary sentiments, was commissioned to see that duty performed, and lost no time in getting to the Jacobins. They had scarcely met together, when he pictured to them the factions which threatened liberty, and the conspiracies they were contemplating. "A new campaign is about to open," said he; "the measures of the committee, which so happily terminated the last campaign, have been the means of ensuring new victories to the republic. Relying upon your confidence and your approbation, which it has always been its object to deserve, it devoted itself entirely to its labours; but all at once our enemies have endeavoured to embarrass its progress, they have raised the patriots around it for the purpose of placing them in opposition to it, and causing them to slaughter one another. They want to make us soldiers of Cadmus; they desire to make us fall by the hands of each other. But no! we will not be soldiers of Cadmus! thanks to your excellent feelings, we will continue friends, we will be soldiers of liberty alone! Supported by you, the committee will be enabled to make an energetic defence, to suppress the agitators, to expel them from the ranks of the patriots, and after this indispensable sacrifice, to prosecute its labours and your victories. The position in which you have placed us is perilous, adds Collot, but no one of us ever trembles in the presence of danger. The committee of general safety accepts its arduous office of keeping a strict eye upon prosecuting all the enemies who are secretly plotting against liberty; the committee of public welfare omits nothing that can assist the performance of its immense task; but both of them need your support. In these days of danger we are but few. Billaud and Jean-Bon are away; our friends Couthon and Robespierre are ill. Our

number is too small to enable us to combat the enemies of the public weal; you must therefore support us, or we must retire." "No, no!" cried the Jacobins. "Do not retire; we will support you." Numerous plaudits accompanied these encouraging words. Collot proceeded, and then related what had taken place at the Cordeliers. "There are men," said he, "who have not had the courage to be patient during a few days of confinement, men who have undergone nothing during the revolution, men whose defence we undertook when we deemed them oppressed, and who have attempted to excite an insurrection in Paris, because they had been imprisoned for a very short period. An insurrection, merely because two men have suffered, and because they had not a doctor, or been bled when they were ill! Cursed be those who want an insurrection!" "Yes, yes, curse them!" exclaimed the Jacobins all together. "Marat was a Cordelier," resumed Collot; "Marat was a Jacobin: well then, he also was persecuted, and certainly in a greater degree than these men of a day; he was dragged before that tribunal where none save aristocrats ought to appear: did he excite an insurrection? No. That hallowed insurrection, that insurrection which is charged with the liberation of the human race from all those who oppress it, takes root in more generous sensibilities than the grovelling notion into which an attempt is now making to draw us; but we will not fall into it. The committee of public welfare will not give way to intriguers. It is taking strong and vigorous measures; and were it to perish, it will not shrink from the performance of so glorious a task."

No sooner had Collot finished, than Momoro desired to address the club, in order to justify the section of Marat and the Cordeliers. He admitted that a curtain had been drawn over the declaration of rights, but disclaimed all knowledge of the other facts. He denied the design of insurrection, and maintained that the section of Marat and the Cordeliers were actuated by more worthy motives. Conspirators who justify themselves are lost. So soon as they are unable to openly avow the insurrection, and the mere announcement of the object does not call forth a burst of opinion in their favour, they can effect nothing more. Momoro was heard with marked disapprobation; and Collot was commissioned to go, in the name of the Jacobins, and fraternize with the Cordeliers, and to bring back those brethren, led astray by perfidious suggestions, to a sense of duty.

The night was now far advanced. Collot could not repair to the Cordeliers till the following day, the 17th; but the danger, though at first alarming, was now no longer formidable. It became evident that public opinion was not favourably disposed towards the conspirators, if that term may be applied to them. The commune had drawn back; the Jacobins had adhered to the committee and to Robespierre, although he was absent and ill. The Cordeliers, impetuous but badly advised, and, above all, deserted by the commune and the Jacobins, could not fail to yield to the eloquence of Collot d'Herbois, and to the honour of seeing among them so celebrated a member of the government. Vincent with his violent fury, Hébert with his disgusting newspaper, the numbers of which he circulated more and more, and Momoro with his resolutions of the section of Marat, could not produce a decisive movement. Ronsin alone, with his *épaulatiers* and considerable stores of ammunition, might have made a bold stroke, for he possessed audacity enough; but whether it were that his friends were not possessed with the same spirit of hardihood, or whether he could not entirely depend on his troops, he made no stir; and from the 16th to the 17th, nothing beyond disturbances and threatening movements took place. The *épaulatiers*, dispersed among the popular societies, occasioned a great tumult among them, but they durst not have recourse to arms.

In the evening of the 17th, Collot repaired to the Cordeliers, where he was received with great applause. He stated that secret enemies of the revolution were striving to mislead their patriotism; that they had desired to declare the republic in a state of distress, whereas at that very time it was royalty and aristocracy alone that were at the last extremity; that they had sought to divide the Cordeliers and the Jacobins, who ought, on the contrary, to form but one family, united in principles and intentions; that this insurrectionary design, this curtain drawn over the declaration of rights, was a source of the highest satisfaction to the aristocrats, who on the preceding night had all followed this example, and had in their withdrawing-rooms covered the declaration of rights; and that therefore, in order not to render the satisfaction of the common enemy complete, they ought to lose no time in removing the veil from the sacred code of nature. The Cordeliers were not able to refuse their assent, though there were among them a great number of Bouchotte's clerks. They lost no time in testifying their repentance; they removed the crape thrown over the declaration of rights, and handed it to Collot, charging him to assure the Jacobins that they would always follow their steps.

Collot d'Herbois hurried away to the Jacobins to proclaim their victory over the Cordeliers and over the *ultra-revolutionists*. The conspirators were thus abandoned in every quarter. They had no other resources left than making a bold stroke, which, as we have observed, was almost impossible. The committee of public welfare resolved to anticipate any movement on their part by causing the principal leaders to be apprehended, and by instantly sending them before the revolutionary tribunal. The committee enjoined Fouquier to set an inquiry on foot for the facts that would constitute treason, and to prepare forthwith an act of accusation. Saint-Just was directed at the same time to make a report to the convention against the united factions which threatened the tranquillity of the state.

On the 23rd Ventose (13th March), Saint-Just presented his report. Following the generally adopted mode of thinking, he still represented the foreign powers as setting two factions to work; the one composed of seditious men, incendiaries, spoliators, libellers, and atheists, who were anxious to bring about the overthrow of the republic by extravagant impulses; the other consisting of corrupt men, stock-jobbers, and embezzlers of the public money, who having suffered themselves to be seduced by the snares of luxurious living, wanted to enervate

the republic and thus dishonour it. He asserted that one of these factions had taken the initiative, that it had attempted to raise the standard of rebellion; but that its prospects had very recently been arrested, that he consequently now came to demand a decree of death against all those in general who had meditated the subversion of the supreme power, devised the corruption of the public mind and of republican manners, obstructed the arrival of provisions, and had in any way contributed to the plans framed by the foreign foe. Saint-Just added, that it behoved the convention from that moment to MAKE JUSTICE, PROBITY, AND ALL THE REPUBLICAN VIRTUES THE ORDER OF THE DAY.

This report, evidently dictated by a violent zeal, was equally directed against every one of the factions; but the only persons explicitly devoted to the vengence of the revolutionary tribunal, were the ultra-revolutionist conspirators, such as Ronsin, Vincent, Hébert, &c., and the corrupt members, Chabot, Bazire, Fabre, and Julien, the fabricators of the forged decree. An ominous silence was observed respecting those whom Saint-Just termed the *indulgents* and the *moderatists*.

In the evening of the same day, Robespierre repaired to the Jacobins with Couthon, and both were received with applause. The members surrounded them, congratulated them upon their restoration to health, and promised an unbounded attachment to Robespierre. He required an extraordinary sitting to be appointed for the following day, in order to elucidate the mystery of the recently discovered conspiracy. The sitting was accorded. The subservience of the commune was equally great. Upon the motion of Chaumette himself, an application was made for the report which Saint-Just had made to the convention, and they sent to the printing-office of the republic for a copy in order to read it. Every body submitted cheerfully to the triumphant authority of the committee of public welfare. It was on this night between the 23rd and 24th, that Fouquier-Tinville arrested Hébert, Vincent, Ronsin, Momoro, Mazuel one of Ronsin's officers, and lastly, Kock, the foreign banker, a stock-jobber and ultra-revolutionist, at whose house, Hébert, Ronsin, and Vincent frequently dined and there concocted their plans. It was in this way that the committee laid hold of two foreign bankers, to persuade the world that the two factions were set in motion by the allied powers. Baron de Batz was the medium of proof of this fact against Chabot, Julien, Fabre, and all the corruptionists and moderatists; while Kock was to afford the same proof against Vincent, Ronsin, Hébert, and the ultra-revolutionists.

The denounced parties suffered themselves to be arrested without resistance, and were sent on the following day to the Luxembourg. The prisoners with joy hastened to witness the arrival of those furious men, who had alarmed them so much by their threats of inflicting upon them another September. Ronsin displayed great firmness and indifference; the cowardly Hébert was downcast and dejected; Momoro was in evident consternation, and Vincent repeatedly fainted. The report of these arrests flew quickly throughout Paris, and caused universal satisfaction. Unfortunately, report added that this was not all, and that a blow was to be struck against all those who identified themselves with any one of the factions. The same was repeated in the extraordinary sitting of the Jacobins. After every one had related what he knew of the conspiracy, of its authors, and their designs, it was further stated that all their plots would be discovered, and that a report would have to be made against other persons, besides those who were actually under prosecution.

The war office, the revolutionary army, and the Cordeliers, had received a blow in the persons of Vincent, Ronsin, Hébert, Mazuel, Momoro, and their associates. A desire was expressed to proceed also against the commune. Nothing was talked of but the dignity of chief judge reserved for Pache; but it was well known how incapable he was of joining in a conspiracy, always obedient as he was to the superior authority, and respected by the people; and the committee did not wish to be too severe by associating him with the others. The commune therefore preferred issuing an order for the arrest of Chaumette, who was not a whit more audacious or a more dangerous character than Pache, but who from vanity and extravagant prejudices, had been the originator of the most imprudent resolutions of the commune, as also one of the most zealous apostles of the worship of reason. The unfortunate Chaumette was therefore apprehended and sent to the Luxembourg with the bishop Gobel, the most prominent character in the grand abjuration scene, and accompanied by Anacharsis Clootz, who had been already expelled from the Jacobins and the convention, on account of his foreign origin, his noble birth, his fortune, his scheme of an universal republic, and his atheism.

When Chaumette arrived at the Luxembourg, the suspected persons ran to meet him, and overwhelmed him with sarcastic remarks. This unhappy man, with a great fondness for declamation, possessed none of the boldness of Ronsin, or the fury of Vincent. His smooth hair and his timid look gave him the appearance of a missionary; and such he had actually been of the new worship. He was reminded of his proclamations against prostitutes, against the aristocrats, against the famine, and against the suspected persons. One prisoner said to him, with a low bow, "Philosopher Anaxagoras, I am *suspected*, thou art *suspected*, we are *suspected*," (je suis *suspect*, tu es *suspect*, nous sommes *suspects*.) Chaumette justified himself in an abject and tremulous tone; but from that moment he did not venture to leave his cell, or appear in the prisoners' court-yard.

The committee, after having apprehended these unfortunate persons, drew up, by the assistance of the committee of general safety, the act of accusation against Chabot, Bazire, Delaunay, Julien of Toulouse, and Fabre. All five were put upon their trial, and taken before the revolutionary tribunal. At this time, also, information was obtained that a female emigrant, under prosecution by a revolutionary committee, had found an asylum at the house of Hérault-Séchelles. Already had this celebrated deputy, who poessessed the advantages of a large fortune, with high birth, with a handsome person, and a cultivated and elegant mind, the friend of Danton, Camille Desmoulins, and Proli, and who often shuddered to find himself associated with those terrible revolutionists,

become suspected: indeed, it was quite forgotten that he had been the principal author of the constitution. The committee lost no time in ordering him to be arrested; in the first place because it disliked him, and in the next to prove that it would, without distinction or respect of person, punish those moderatists who were detected in any breach of obedience, and that it would not be more indulgent to them than to other culprits. Thus the blows of this formidable committee were directed at one and the same time against individuals of all ranks, of all opinions, and of every qualification.

On the 1st of Germinal (20th of March), the proceedings against one portion of the conspirators commenced. In the same indictment were included Ronsin, Vincent, Hébert, Momoro, Mazuel, Kock the banker, the young Lyonnese Leclerc, who had been a chief clerk in Bouchotte's office, Ancar and Ducroquet, commissaries of the victualling department, and some other members of the revolutionary army and of the war-office. In order to keep on foot the notion of a connivance between the ultra-revolutionary faction and the foreign faction, Proli, Dubuisson, Pereyra, and Desfieux were included in the same indictment, although they had never had any connexion with the other accused persons. Chaumette was kept back, to figure at a future time with Gobel and the other authors of the scenes of the worship of reason; and lastly, if Clootz, who ought to have been associated with these latter, was joined with Proli, it was in his quality of foreigner. The accused were nineteen in number. Ronsin and Clootz exhibited the greatest firmness of demeanour. "This," said Ronsin to his co-accused, "is a political process; of what use are all your papers, and your preparations for justifying yourselves? you will be condemned. When you should have bestirred yourself, you talked; you must now learn to die. For my part, I swear that you shall not see me quail. Strive to do the same." The wretched Hébert and Momoro bewailed their fate, and said that liberty was undone. "Liberty undone!" exclaimed Ronsin, "because a few wretched individuals are about to perish! Liberty is immortal. Our enemies will fall in their turn, and liberty will survive them all." As they accused one another, Clootz exhorted them not to aggravate their misfortunes by mutual reproaches, and he recited the celebrated apologue:

"Je rêvais cette nuit, que de mal consumé,
Côte à côte d'un gueux on m'avait inhumé," &c.

[I dreamt one night that I returned to clay,
And close beside a beggar's corpse I lay.]

This recitation had the desired effect, and they no longer reproached one another with their misfortunes. Clootz, still full of his philosophical opinions to the very scaffold, confirmed his arguments against what little of deism still remained in them, and incessantly discoursed upon nature and reason with an animated fervour, and exhibiting an inconceivable contempt for death. They were carried to the tribunal amidst an immense concourse of spectators. We have seen, in the account of their conduct, in what their conspiracy consisted. Clubbists of the lowest class, intriguers belonging to public offices, cut-throats enlisted in the revolutionary army, they had the self-sufficiency of inferior officials, mere bearers of orders, who always exceed their office. Thus it was that they had desired to drive the revolutionary government so far as to convert it into a mere military commission, the abolition of superstitious practices into a persecution of religion, republican manners into grossness, liberty of speech into the most disgusting vulgarity, and lastly, democratic jealousy and severity with regard to individuals to the most atrocious scandal against them. Their conspiracies consisted merely in abusive expressions against the convention and the committee, mere conversations as to a plan of government, motions at the Cordeliers and at the sections, disgusting pamphlets, and a single visit by Ronsin to the prisons to see whether patriots were not confined in them, as he had just been, and lastly, a few vague threats, with an attempt at commotion upon pretext of the dearth. In all this there was nothing observable beyond the folly and the depravity of loose characters. But a conspiracy deeply laid and correspondence with foreign powers was far above these unhappy men. It was nothing else than a perfidious suggestion of the committee, which the infamous Fouquier-Tinville was charged to demonstrate to the tribunal, and which the tribunal had orders to adopt.

The offensive language which Vincent and Ronsin had applied to Legendre, when dining with him at Pache's, their reiterated proposals for organising the executive power, were alleged as evidencing the design of annulling the national representation and the committee of public welfare. Their dinners with Kock the banker were held out as proof of their correspondence with foreign powers. To this proof was added another. Letters sent from Paris to London, and inserted in the English newspapers, intimated that, from the agitation which prevailed, popular disturbances might be expected. These letters, said they to the accused, demonstrate that foreigners were in your confidence, since they calculated as to the effect of your plots beforehand. The dearth, the blame of which they had made a subject of reproach to the government, in order to excite the people, was imputed to them alone; and Fouquier-Tinville, returning scandal for scandal, maintained that they were the cause of that dearth, by causing the roadside pillage of the market-carts laden with vegetables and fruit. The military stores collected at Paris for the revolutionary army were charged to their account, as preparations for a conspiracy. Ronsin's visit to the prisons was adduced as a proof of a design to arm the suspected persons, and to let them loose upon Paris. Lastly, the papers and publications distributed in the markets, and the curtain thrown over the declaration of rights, were considered as a commencement of the execution of their conspiracy. Hébert was put to open shame. They hardly cared to charge him with his political acts and his newspaper; they contented themselves with proving that he was guilty of stealing shirts and handkerchiefs.

But let us quit these disgraceful discussions between these base accused, and the base accuser, of which a terrific government sought to avail itself, in order to accomplish the sacrifices it had ordained. Retired within its elevated sphere, this

government pointed out the unfortunate creatures who were obnoxious to it, and left Fouquier, as its attorney-general, to satisfy the forms of law with falsehoods. If in this mean herd of victims, sacrificed to the public tranquillity, some few deserved to be set apart, they were those unfortunate foreigners, Proli and Anacharsis Clootz, condemned as agents of the allied powers. Proli, as we have already observed, being well acquainted with Belgium, his native country, had censured the ignorant violence of the Jacobins in that country. He had admired the talents of Dumouriez, and this he admitted to the tribunal. His acquaintance with foreign courts had on two or three occasions rendered him serviceable to Lebrun, and this he still avowed. "Thou hast blamed," said they to him, "the revolutionary system in Belgium; thou hast admired Dumouriez; thou hast been a friend of Lebrun; thou art, therefore, an agent of the foreign powers;" no other fact was alleged against him. As for Clootz, his system of an universal republic, his doctrine of reason, his income of one hundred thousand livres, and some exertions he had made to save a female emigrant, were sufficient to ensure his conviction. The proceedings of the third day had hardly commenced when the jury declared that they had made up their minds without distinction, and condemned (*pêle mêle*) these intriguers, agitators, and unfortunate foreigners, to suffer death. One only was acquitted, a man named Labourseau, who in this affair had been made use of as a spy for the committee of public welfare. On the 4th Germinal, at four in the afternoon, the condemned were conveyed to the place of execution. The concourse was quite as great as on any preceding occasion. Standings on carts, on tables, were to be let near the scaffold. Neither Ronsin or Clootz ever winced (*broncharent*) to use their own terrible expressions. Hébert, overcome with shame, and disheartened by contumely, took no pains to collect himself. He fell fainting every moment, and the populace, vile as himself, followed the fatal cart, repeating the cry of the hawkers of his own newspaper. *Il est b——t en colère le Père Duchêne**.

Thus these wretched men were sacrificed to the indispensable necessity of establishing a firm and vigorous government; and here the necessity of order and obedience was not one of those sophistries to which governments sacrifice their victims. All Europe threatened France, agitators of every degree wanted to grasp the supreme authority; and were endangering the safety of the commonwealth by their contentions. It became indispensable that some men more energetic than others should possess themselves of this disputed authority, should keep it to the exclusion of all others, and should thus be enabled to use it for the purpose of making a stand against all Europe. If we could experience any sympathy, it would be when we see falsehood arrayed against these wretches, to discern amongst them a man of firm courage in Ronsin, an inoffensive maniac in Clootz, and perhaps an intriguer, but not a conspirator, and certainly a foreigner of superior merit in the unfortunate Proli.

The Hébertists had scarcely suffered, before the *indulgents* manifested great joy, and said that they were not wrong in denouncing Hébert, Ronsin, and Vincent, since the committee of public welfare and the revolutionary tribunal had just sent them to the scaffold. Of what, then, do they accuse us? said they. All that we have done was to charge those factious men with a design to overthrow the republic, to destroy the national convention, to supplant the committee of public welfare, to unite the peril of religious with that of civil wars, and to bring about general confusion. This is precisely what Saint-Just and Fouquier-Tinville have laid to their charge in sending them to the scaffold. In what then can we be deemed conspirators, or enemies of the republic?

Nothing could be more just than these reflections, and the committee was of precisely the same opinion with Danton, Camille-Desmoulins, Philippeau, and Fabre, respecting the danger of that anarchical turbulence. The proof of this is, that Robespierre had, since the 31st of May, never ceased to defend Danton and Camille, and to accuse the anarchists. But, as we have already observed, in striking the blow at the latter, the committee exposed itself to being considered as favouring the modèratists, and it was therefore necessary that it should display the greatest severity against the other party, so that the revolutionary reputation should not be compromised. Therefore it followed as a consequence, that although it was entirely of the same opinion with Danton and Camille, it should nevertheless censure their notions, condemn them in its promulgations, and appear not to favour them a whit more than the Hébertists themselves. In the report against the two factions, Saint-Just had threatened one as much as the other, and preserved an ominous silence with respect to the *indulgents*. At the Jacobins, Collot had said that all was not yet over, and that a report was in preparation against other persons than those who were arrested. These threats were accompanied by the apprehension of Hérault-Séchelles, a friend of Danton, and one of the most respected men of that time. Such facts indicated no intention of giving over, and yet it was still said in all quarters that the committee was about to retrace its steps, that it was about softening the severity of the revolutionary system, and to severely punish murderers of every degree. Those who were anxious for this return to a more humane policy, the prisoners, their families, in short, all the peaceful citizens persecuted under the name of *indifferents*, indulged themselves in hopes not likely to be realized, and loudly asserted that the system of the laws of blood was about to have an end. This soon became the general opinion; it obtained in every one of the departments, and especially in that of the Rhône, where such terrible vengeance had for some months past been inflicted, and where Ronsin had caused such dreadful consternation. People breathed more freely for a moment at Lyons, and ventured to look their oppressors in the face, and seemed to predict to them that their cruelties were approaching their termination. But the patriots were highly indignant on hearing these reports, and being made acquainted with these hopes of the middle and peaceful classes. The Jacobins of Lyons wrote to those of Paris, that aristocracy had raised its head again, that they should not be able to hold out against them much longer, and that unless they afforded them force and countenance, they

* *Ante*, p. 400, col. 2, and *note ibid.*

should be reduced to the necessity of putting a period to their own existence, as the patriot Gaillard had done, who on receiving intelligence of the first arrest of Ronsin had stabbed himself.

"I have seen," said Robespierre to the Jacobins, "letters from some of the Lyonnese patriots. They are all expressive of the same despair, and if the most speedy remedy be not applied to their complaints, they will not find relief from any recipe but that of Cato and Gaillard. That perfidious faction which, affecting a perfidious patriotism, wanted to sacrifice the patriots, has been exterminated; but the foreign foe cares little, for that there is one more still left. Had Hébert triumphed, the convention would have been overthrown, the republic would have resolved itself into chaos, and tyranny would have gained its ends; but with respect to the moderatists, the convention is relaxing her energy, the crimes of the aristocracy pass unpunished, and the tyrants triumph. The foreign enemy has therefore as much hope with one as with the other of these factions, and he must keep them all in pay without attaching any of them to himself. What does it matter to him, that Hébert expired on the scaffold, so long as he has traitors of another kind left, to enable him to accomplish his projects? You have done nothing, then, if there is still left a faction for you to destroy; and the convention is resolved to immolate all, even to the very last of them."

Thus it was that the committee had felt the necessity of freeing itself from the imputation of moderation by a new sacrifice. Robespierre had defended Danton, when a daring faction was about to strike by his side one of the most renowned of the patriots. Then it was that policy, a danger to which they were both exposed, in fact everything induced him to defend his old colleague; but now this bold faction was no more. Were he to continue to defend this depopularised colleague, he might probably compromise himself. Besides, the conduct of Danton could not fail to awaken many reflections in his jealous mind. What could Danton be doing so far away from the committee? Associating with Philippeau and Camille-Desmoulins, he appeared to be the chief promoter and the leader of that new association, which was assailing the government with censures and bitter satire. For some time past, seated opposite to that tribune where the members of the committee took their places, Danton had somewhat of a threatening, and at the same time a contemptuous air. His gesture and his expressions, repeated by every one, and his connexions, every thing in fact showed that he had detached himself from the government, he had made himself its censor, and that he kept himself aloof, as if for the purpose of obstructing it by his extended renown. This was not all. Although depopularised, Danton still possessed a reputation for boldness, and for an extraordinary political genius. If Danton were sacrificed, there would not be left out of the committee a single influential name; and in the committee there would remain only men of second-rate reputations, such as Saint-Just, Couthon, and Collot d'Herbois. By consenting to this sacrifice, Robespierre would at the same stroke destroy a rival, restore to the government its reputation for energy, and above all, heighten his reputation for integrity, by striking down a man accused of having been hot in the pursuit of riches and pleasure. He was, moreover, called upon to make this sacrifice by all his colleagues, who were still more jealous of Danton than he himself was, Couthon and Collot d'Herbois were by no means ignorant that they were the subject of contempt to that celebrated tribune. Billaud, cold, vulgar, and sanguinary, found in him something grand and overwhelming. Saint-Just, dogmatic, austere, and proud, felt an antipathy to an active, generous, and good-natured revolutionist, and he plainly saw that if Danton were dead, he should become the second personage in the republic. Lastly, all of them knew that Danton, in his plan for remodelling the committee, did not intend that any one save Robespierre should be retained. They therefore beset the latter, and had no very great exertions to make before they could wring from him a determination so flattering to his pride. It is not known what explanations led to this resolution, or on what day it was taken; but all at once they became lowering and mysterious. Nothing more was said as to their designs. In the convention, and at the Jacobins, they preserved an absolute silence. But sinister reports secretly got wind. It was said that Danton, Camille, Philippeau, and Lacroix, were about to be sacrificed to the power of their colleagues. The mutual friends of Danton and Robespierre, alarmed at these reports, and seeing that after such an act, no man's head could be safe, that Robespierre himself could not expect to be in certainty, wanted to bring Robespierre and Danton together again, and requested them to explain themselves. Robespierre, intrenching himself in an obstinate silence, refused to reply to these overtures, and maintained a cold reserve. When allusion was made to the friendship he had formerly testified for Danton, he hypocritically replied that he could not do any thing either for or against his colleague; that justice was there to defend innocence; that for his part, his whole life had been a continual sacrifice of his affections to his country; and that if his friend were guilty, he should sacrifice him, certainly with regret, but he still should sacrifice him as he had done all the others to the republic.

It was plainly perceptible that his mind was made up, and that this hypocritical rival would not take any decided part against Danton, and that he reserved to himself the liberty of delivering him up to his colleagues. In fact, the rumours of the approaching arrests became more confirmed. Danton's friends visited him more than ever, and urged him to rouse himself from this kind of lethargy; to shake off his indolence, and to show once more that revolutionary front which he had never yet shown in vain amidst the storm. "I am aware," said Danton, "that they want to arrest me. But no," he added, "they will not dare." Besides, what could he do? To fly was impossible. What country would have given an asylum to this formidable revolutionist? Was it for him to justify by his flight all the calumnies of his enemies? And more than that, he loved his country. "Does a man," he exclaimed, "carry away his country on the soles of his shoes?" On the other hand, remaining in France, he would have but slender means at his disposal. The *Cordeliers* belonged to the *ultra-revolutionists*, the *Jacobins* to Robespierre. The convention was any thing but

firm. On what support could he rely? This then is what has not been sufficiently considered by those who, having seen this mighty man fulminating against the throne on the 10th of August, and stirring the people against foreign allies, have not yet been able to conceive how he should have fallen without defending himself. Revolutionary genius does not consist in reviving a lost popularity, in creating forces which do not exist, but in boldly directing the affections of the people, when once they have been gained. The generosity of Danton, and his secession from public affairs, had almost alienated him from popular favour, or at least had not left him sufficient to enable him to overthrow the reigning authority.

In this conviction of his own incompetence, he lingered on, and repeated to himself, *They will not dare.* He indeed might be permitted to assume, that before so great a name and such great services his adversaries would pause. He then relapsed into his indolence, and into that thoughtlessness so characteristic of powerful men, who await the danger without taking much pains to withdraw themselves from it.

The committee still continued to preserve the utmost taciturnity, and sinister rumours were continually gaining ground. Six days had elapsed since the death of Hébert. It was the 9th Germinal. All at once, those peaceable men who had conceived ill-founded hopes from the fall of the furious party, were saying that they should soon be delivered from the two Saints Marat and Chalier, and that there had been quite enough discovered in their lives to metamorphose them, quite as expeditiously as Hébert was, from great patriots into mere scoundrels. This report, which clung to the idea of a retrograde movement, spread with extraordinary rapidity, and it was every where asserted that the busts of Marat and Chalier were about to be broken to pieces. The blundering Legendre denounced this language in the convention and at the Jacobins, as it were to protest, in the name of his friends, the moderatists, against such a scheme. "Be quiet," exclaimed Collot at the Jacobins, "these stories will be contradicted. We have hurled the thunderbolts at the infamous wretches who deluded the people; we have torn the mask from their faces, but they are not the only ones! We will tear off every mask that can be assumed. Let not the *indulgents* for a moment imagine that it is for them we have here held glorious sittings. We shall soon undeceive them."

Accordingly, on the following day, the 10th Germinal, the committee of public welfare called to its assistance the committee of general safety, and, to give greater weight to its measures, even the committee of legislation itself. As soon as all the members had assembled, Saint-Just addressed them, and in one of those violent and perfidious reports which he so well knew how to prepare he denounced Danton, Philippeau, Desmoulins, and Lacroix, and moved that they be taken into custody. The members of the two other committees, struck with consternation and trembling, durst not resist, and conceived that they were removing the danger from themselves by conferring their joint assent. The greatest secresy was enjoined, and in the night between the 10th and the 11th Germinal, Danton, Lacroix, Philippeau, and Camille-Desmoulins were unexpectedly arrested and conveyed to the Luxembourg.

The next morning the news was all over Paris, and produced there a kind of stupor. The members of the convention met and preserved a silence, in which terror had a great share. The committee, which always kept the convention waiting, and already possessed all the insolence of power, had not yet arrived. Legendre, who was not of sufficient importance to have been arrested with his friends, was anxious to address the assembly. "Citizens," said he, "four members of this assembly were last night arrested. I know that Danton is one of them, the names of the others I know not; but whosoever they be, I ask that they be heard at the bar. Citizens, I declare my belief that Danton is as pure as myself, and I do not believe that there is any thing that can be laid to my charge. I shall not attack any member of the committee of public welfare and of general safety, but I am justified in being apprehensive lest personal animosities and individual passions should deprive those men of liberty who have rendered her the greatest and the most essential services. The man who in September '92 saved France by his energy, deserves at least to be heard, and ought to be allowed to explain himself, since he is now accused of having betrayed the country."

To obtain Danton the liberty of addressing the convention, was the surest way to save him and to unmask his adversaries. Many members, in fact, considered that he ought to be heard, but at this moment Robespierre, who had got there before the committee came in, in the midst of the discussion ascended the tribune, and in an angry and threatening tone spoke in these terms: "From the disturbance, for a long time unknown, which prevails in this assembly, from the agitation produced by the preceding speaker, it is plainly evident that the question here is one of great interest, for it is to settle whether a few men shall this day get the upperhand of the country. But how can you so far forget your principles as to wish to grant this day to certain individuals what you have previously refused to Chabot, Delaunay, and Fabre-d'Eglantine? Why this difference in favour of some men? What care I for the praise that people bestow on themselves and their friends? long and tried experience has taught us to distrust such praise. The question is not whether a man has performed this or that patriotic act, but what has been his whole career.

"Legendre seems to be ignorant of the names of the persons arrested. The whole convention is acquainted with them. His friend Lacroix is one of them. Why does Legendre feign ignorance of this? Because he knows that he cannot in candour defend Lacroix. He has named Danton, because he conceives, no doubt, that to his name is attached a privilege.—No, we want no privileges here; we will have no idols!"

At these last words there was a burst of applause; and the poltroons, trembling at the same time before one idol, nevertheless applauded the overthrow of another, now no longer to be worshipped. Robespierre continued. "In what respect is Danton superior to Lafayette, to Dumouriez, to Brissot, to Fabre, to Chabot, or to Hébert? What can be said of him that cannot equally apply

to them? Nevertheless, you have borne with them. Men talk to you of the despotism of the committee, as if the confidence with which the people have entrusted you, and which you have assigned to these committees, were not a sure guarantee for their patrotism. They affect to have their fears; but I tell you, whosoever trembles at this moment is guilty, for innocence never dreads the public eye."

Here again were fresh applauses from the same poltroons, who trembled themselves at the very time they were anxious to show that they were not afraid. "And for myself also," added Robespierre, "they have wanted to excite alarm in me. They have wished to make me believe, that in advancing against Danton, the danger might extend to myself. They have written to me, the friends of Danton have sent me letters, have beset me with their speeches, they have got it into their heads that the association of an old acquaintance, that a former reliance on feigned virtues, would induce me to slacken my zeal and my passion for liberty. Well, I declare that if Danton's dangers were even to become my own, that consideration would not stop me for a moment. It is here that we all ought to demonstrate some courage and some greatness of soul. Vulgar minds, or guilty men, are always afraid to see their fellows fall, because having no longer a barrier of culprits to shelter them, they are left exposed to the light of truth; but although there may be some vulgar minds, there is no deficiency of heroic spirits in this assembly, and they well know how to brave all false terrors. Besides, the number of the guilty is not so great; crime has found but few advocates among us, and by striking off a few heads, the country will be delivered."

Robespierre had acquired the assurance and the address to say exactly what it was he wanted, and never was he known to have exercised more adroitness, or exhibited more perfidy. To talk of the sacrifice he was making by abandoning Danton, to make a merit of it, to share the danger if there were any, and to comfort the poltroons by alluding to the small number of the guilty, was the height of hypocrisy and adroitness. Thus all his colleagues unanimously decided that the four deputies arrested the previous night should not be heard by the convention. At this moment Saint-Just arrived, and read his report. It was he who was now let loose against the victims, because he combined an extraordinary pointed and vigorous style, with that subtle reasoning so indispensable when facts are to be distorted, and a false construction put upon them. Never had he been more terrifically eloquent or more studiously false; for let his personal hatred have been as great as it may, it could not have persuaded him of the truth of all that he advanced. Having at considerable length calumniated Philippeau, Camille-Desmoulins, and Herault-Séchelles, and accused Lacroix, he came at last to Danton, and either devised the falsest charges, or distorted most atrociously the plainest facts. According to him, Danton was a covetous, indolent, false, and even a cowardly person, who had sold himself to Mirabeau, and afterwards to the Lametha, and had in consequence, with Brissot, prepared the petition which led to the firing on the people in the Champ de Mars, not for the purpose of exploding royalty, but merely as a pretence for shooting good citizens. He then went with impunity to take his recreation and to wallow at Arcis-sur-Aube in the produce of his perfidies. He kept out of the way till the 10th of August, and then only made his appearance to be created a minister: he then connected himself with the Orleans party, and got Orleans and Fabre elected deputies. In league with Dumouriez, and bearing only a simulated hatred to the Girondists, but still knowing how to be on good terms with them, he entirely disapproved of the events of the 31st of May, and had desired to have Henriot arrested. When Dumouriez, Orleans, and the Girondists had been punished, he treated with the party who wanted to restore Louis XVII. Taking money from wherever it came, from Orleans, from the Bourbons, from the foreign powers, dining with the bankers and aristocrats, mingling in every intrigue, holding out hopes to all parties, in short, a very Catiline*, rapacious, debauched, indolent, and a corrupter of public morals, he went and secluded himself once more at Arcis-sur-Aube, to gloat over his spoils. At last he came back, and has recently been in correspondence with all the enemies of the state, with Hébert and his coadjutors, relying upon the common dependence on the foreign enemy to attack the committee, and those men whom the convention had invested with its confidence.

After hearing this iniquitous report read, the convention decreed the accusation of Danton, Camille-Desmoulins, Philippeau, Hérault-Sechelles, and Lacroix.

These unfortunate men had been conveyed to the Luxembourg. "Arrest Us!—Us!" said Lacroix to Danton, "I never never even thought of such a thing!" "Not have even thought of such a thing!" replied Danton; "I knew it; I had been warned of it." "Didst thou know this, and yet hast not bestirred thyself!" exclaimed Lacroix: "this is the effect of thine usual indolence; it has undone us." "I did not believe," replied Danton, "that they would ever have dared to execute their design."

All the prisoners crowded to the gate, to look upon the celebrated Danton, and the interesting Camille, who had thrown a ray of hope into the prisons. Danton was, as usual, calm, haughty, and very jovial; Camille, astounded and melancholy; Philippeau, excited and elevated by the danger. Hérault-Séchelles, who had preceded them at the Luxembourg by a few days, ran out to meet his friends, and cheerfully embraced them. "When men commit follies," said Danton, "they should learn to laugh at them." Then perceiving Thomas Paine, he said to him, "That which thou hast done for the happiness and the liberty of thy country, I have in vain attempted to do for mine. I have been less fortunate, but am not a whit more to blame. They are sending me to the scaffold: well, my friends, we must go to it gaily."

On the next day, the 12th, the copy of the act of accusation was sent to the Luxembourg, and the accused were transferred to the Conciergerie, from whence they were to go before the revolutionary tribunal. On reading this act, full of contemptible falsehoods, Camille became furious. However, he soon composed himself, and he said in a tone of distress, "I am going to the scaffold for having shed a few tears over the fall of so many unfortu-

* Alieni appetens, sui profusus. Sallust, Bell. Catil. *Trans.*

nates. My only regret in dying is that I could not have assisted them." All the prisoners, of whatever grade or opinion, felt a deep interest for him, and poured forth heartfelt prayers for him. Philippeau said a few words about his wife, and remained calm and serene. Hérault-Séchelles retained that grace of mind and manners which distinguished him even among persons of his own rank; he embraced his faithful servant, who had accompanied him to the Luxembourg, but who was not allowed to follow him to the Conciergerie, at the same time using words of consolation and encouragement. At the same time Fabre, Chabot, Bazire, and Delaunay were transferred to the Conciergerie, for these were to be tried together with Danton, in order to make the proceedings against him more degrading, by suggesting that he was an accessory with the forgers. Fabre was ill and almost dying. Chabot, who from his prison had never ceased writing to Robespierre to implore his good offices, and to lavish on him the basest flatteries, but without moving him, saw that his death was inevitable, and that the detection of his infamy was quite as certain as the scaffold. He therefore resolved to poison himself. He swallowed corrosive sublimate; but the pain he suffered having extorted from him some groans, he confessed what he had done, accepted medical aid, and was conveyed, quite as ill as Fabre, to the Conciergerie. A somewhat more generous feeling seemed to actuate him even amidst his torments, namely, a deep regret for having compromised his friend Bazire, who had no hand in the crime. "Bazire," he exclaimed, "my poor Bazire, what hast *thou* done!"

At the Conciergerie, the accused excited the same curiosity as at the Luxembourg. They occupied the place where the Girondists had been confined. Danton spoke with the same energy. "It was on this very day," said he, "that I caused the revolutionary tribunal to be instituted. I beg pardon for it of God and of man. My object was to prevent another September, and not to let loose a scourge upon mankind." Then, giving way to contempt for his colleagues who were murdering him, "These brother Cains," said he, "know nothing about government. I leave every thing in frightful disorder." He then adopted, in order to characterize the impotence of the paralytic Couthon and the cowardly Robespierre, some obscene but original expressions, which indicated an extraordinary gaiety of mind. For a single moment he exhibited a transient regret at having taken part in the revolution, saying, "It would be much better to be a poor fisherman than to have to govern men." This was the only expression of the kind that he uttered.

Lacroix appeared astonished, on looking into the cells, at the number and wretched state of the prisoners. "What!" said they to him, "did not cartloads of victims teach you what was passing in Paris!" The astonishment of Lacroix was not feigned; and it affords a lesson for men, who in pursuing a political object do not sufficiently consider the individual sufferings of the victims, and seem not to believe they exist, because they do not witness them.

On the following day, 13th Germinal, the accused, to the number of fifteen, were arraigned before the tribunal. The committee had included in one indictment the five moderatist leaders, Danton, Hérault-Séchelles, Camille, Philippeau, and Lacroix, the four persons accused of forgery, Chabot, Bazire, Delaunay, and Fabre d'Eglantine; Chabot's two brothers-in-law, Julius and Emanuel Frey, the contractor d'Espagnac, the unfortunate Westermann charged with having participated in the corruption and plots of Danton, and lastly, two foreigners, friends of the accused, Gusman the Spaniard, and Diederichs the Dane. The object of the committee in making this misjoinder, was to confound the moderatists with the corruptionists and with foreigners, by way of proving that moderatism proceeded at once from a deficiency of republican virtue, and from the seduction of foreign gold. The crowd collected to see the accused was immense. A spark of that interest which Danton had once excited, was rekindled at his presence. Fouquier-Tinville, the judges, and the jurors, all subaltern revolutionists, raised from their original nothingness by his mighty hand, felt embarrassed in his presence: his assurance, his haughtiness, aided them, and he appeared rather to be the accuser than the accused. Herman, the president, and Fouquier-Tinville, instead of balloting the jurors, as the law required, packed them, and took such as they called solid men (*les solides*). The accused were then interrogated. When Danton was asked the usual questions as to his age and his place of abode, he proudly replied that he was thirty-four years old, and that his name would soon be in the Pantheon, and himself in nothingness. Camille answered that he was thirty-three, the age of the *sans-culotte Jesus Christ when he died*. Bazire was twenty-nine; Hérault-Séchelles and Philippeau were thirty-four. Thus talents, courage, patriotism, and youth, were all again included in this new holocaust, as in that of the Girondists.

Danton, Camille, Hérault-Séchelles, and the others, complained that their cause was confounded with that of several forgers. Nevertheless they proceeded. They first went into the charge preferred against Chabot, Bazire, Delaunay, and d'Eglantine. Chabot kept to his old story, and argued that if he could be said to have taken part in the conspiracy of the stock-jobbers, it was merely for the purpose of exposing it. He convinced nobody; for it was very strange, that when he engaged in it, he did not privately apprise some member of the committees of the fact, that he should have disclosed at so late a period, and that he should have kept the funds in his own hands. Delaunay was convicted; Fabre, notwithstanding his clever defence, in which he alleged, that in making the erasures and interlineations in the copy of the decree, he conceived that he was only altering the draught of the Bill (*projet*) which they had before them, was contradicted by the evidence of Cambon, whose open and disinterested deposition was overwhelming. He, in fact, convinced Fabre that the draughts (*projets*) of decrees were never signed, that the copy which he had erased was signed by all the members of the commission of five, and that consequently he could not have supposed that he was altering a mere *projet*.

Bazire, who was an accessory, because he had not informed against it, was scarcely heard in his defence, and was put upon the same footing as the

others by the tribunal. The tribunal next went into the charge against d'Espagnac, who was accused of having bribed Julien of Toulouse to get his contracts allowed, and of having had a share in the intrigue of the East India Company. In this case, letters proved the facts, and all d'Espagnac's astuteness could not assist him against this mode of proof. Hérault-Séchelles was then examined. Bazire was declared guilty as a friend of Chabot; Hérault for having been a friend of Bazire; for having had some knowledge through him of the intrigue of the stock-jobbers; for having taken an interest in a female emigrant; for having been a friend of the moderatists; and for having caused it to be supposed by his mildness, his elegance, his fortune, his ill-disguised sympathies, that he himself was a moderatist. After Hérault, came Danton's turn. The utmost stillness pervaded the assembly when he rose to speak. "Danton," said the president to him, "the convention accuses you of having conspired with Mirabeau, with Dumouriez, with Orleans, with the Girondins, with the foreign enemy, and with that faction which seeks the restoration of Louis XVII." "My voice," replied Danton with his powerful organs of speech, "My voice, which has so often made itself heard in the cause of the people, will have no difficulty to repel that calumny. Let the cowards who accuse me show their faces, and I will cover them with shame. Let the committees come here; I will not answer but in their presence; I call for them as accusers, I have need of them as witnesses. Let them appear; for the rest, I care little for you and your judgment—I have already told you that nothingness will be soon my asylum. Life is a burden; take it from me—I long to be delivered from it." In giving utterance to these words, Danton was moved to the highest pitch of indignation, his heart felt a repugnance to make answer to such men. His demand that the committees should appear, and his declared determination not to reply but in their presence, had intimidated the tribunal, and caused great agitation. Such a confronting would in fact have been cruel for them, they would have been covered with confusion, and condemnation would perhaps have been rendered impossible. "Danton," said the president, "audacity is the attendant of guilt, calmness of innocence." At this expression, Danton exclaimed, "Individual audacity ought, no doubt, to be repressed; but that national audacity of which I have so often set the example, which I have so often shown in the cause of liberty, is the most meritorious of all the virtues. That audacity is mine; it is that which I have employed for the republic against the poltroons who accuse me. When I find that I am so basely calumniated, how can I contain myself! It is not from such a revolutionist as I that you must expect a cool defence. Men of my constitution are inappreciable in revolutions—it is upon their brow that the spirit of liberty is impressed." As he uttered these words, Danton shook his head and defied the tribunal. His gestures, so formidable in their import, made a deep impression. The crowd, who are always affected by a forcible address, could not restrain a murmur of approbation. "That I," continued Danton, "I should have been accused of having conspired with Mirabeau, with Dumouriez, with Orleans, of having crawled at the feet of vile despots! Is it myself that am summoned to make answer to *inevitable inflexible justice* *? And thou, cowardly Saint-Just, wilt have to answer to posterity for thy accusation against the firmest supporter of liberty! In going through this catalogue of horrors," added Danton, holding up the act of accusation, "I feel my whole frame shudder." The president again exhorted him to be calm, and reminded him of the example of Marat, who replied respectfully to the tribunal. Danton resumed, and said that since it was desired, he would relate the history of his life. He then related what difficulty he had had in attaining to the municipal functions, the efforts made by the constituents to prevent him, the resistance which he offered to the designs of Mirabeau, and above all, what he did on that famous day, when, surrounding the royal carriage with an immense concourse of people, he prevented the journey to Saint-Cloud. He then referred to his conduct when he led the people to the Champ de Mars to sign a petition against royalty, and the motive of that celebrated petition; to the boldness with which he first proposed the overthrow of the throne in 92; to the courage with which he proclaimed the insurrection on the evening of the 9th of August; and to the firmness which he displayed during the twelve hours of that insurrection. At this point he was almost suffocated with indignation at the thought of the imputation that he had hid himself on the 10th of August: "Where," he exclaimed, "are the men who had occasion to urge Danton to show himself on that day! Where are the privileged beings from whom he borrowed energy! Let my accusers appear!—I am in my sober senses when I call for them.—I will expose the three senseless knaves who have surrounded and ruined Robespierre.—Why don't they show themselves here, that I may plunge them into that nothingness from which they ought never to have emerged——." The president would have again interrupted him, and rang his bell. Danton drowned the sound of it with his terrible voice. "Is it that you do not hear me?" asked the president. "The voice of a man who is defending his honour and his life," replied Danton, "ought to overpower the sound of thy bell." Wearied however from indignation, his voice began to falter; the president then prevailed upon him to rest himself, that he might resume his defence with more calmness and tranquillity.

Danton spoke no more. The tribunal went on to Camille, whose *Vieux Cordelier* was read, and who remonstrated in vain against the construction that was imputed to his writings. Lacroix next occupied their attention, whose conduct in Belgium was referred to with severe censure, and who, after the example of Danton, demanded the appearance of several members of the convention, and frequently urged his being allowed that advantage.

This first sitting had excited a general sensation. The concourse of people surrounding the palace of justice and extending to the bridges, had manifested extraordinary emotion. The judges were frightened. Vadier, Vouland, and Amar, the most malignant members of the committee of general safety, had been present during the pro-

* Expressions that occurred in the indictment.

ceedings, but were concealed from public observation in the printing office adjoining the hall of the tribunal, and communicating with it by means of a small opening. From thence they had witnessed with alarm the boldness of Danton, and the manifestations of the public towards him. They began to doubt whether condemnation were possible. Herman and Fouquier had repaired, as soon as the hearing was over, to the committee of public welfare, and informed them of the application of the accused, who required several members of the convention to come forward. The committee began to hesitate; Robespierre had gone home, Billaud and Saint-Just alone were present. They prohibited Fouquier from answering the application, enjoined him to prolong the proceedings, to let the three days elapse without coming to any explanation, and then cause the jurors to declare that they had sufficient evidence to enable them to come to a conclusion.

While this was taking place at the tribunal, at the committee, and in Paris, there was not less emotion called forth in the prisons, where a deep interest was felt for the accused parties, and where no hopes could be entertained for any one if such revolutionists were sacrificed. At the Luxembourg was to be found the unfortunate Dillon, the friend of Desmoulins, and defended by him; he had learned from Chaumette, who, involved in the same danger, made common cause with the moderatists, what had taken place at the tribunal. Chaumette had heard it from his wife. Dillon, a hot-headed man, and who as an old soldier, sometimes sought in wine a transient forgetfulness of his miseries, talked inconsiderately to a man named Laflotte, confined in the same prison; he said that it was high time for the good republicans to raise their heads against vile oppressors; that the people seemed to be awakening; that Danton insisted on making his defence in the presence of the committees; that his condemnation was far from being a settled affair; that the wife of Camille-Desmoulins might raise the people by distributing assignats; and that if he himself should contrive to escape, he would collect resolute men enough to save the republicans who were on the point of being sacrificed by the tribunal. This was nought else but idle discourse, uttered in the spirit of drunkenness and grief. There appears, however, to have been also a suggestion of sending a thousand crowns and a letter to Camille's wife. The base Laflotte, thinking to obtain his life and liberty by denouncing a conspiracy, hastened to make a declaration to the keeper of the Luxembourg, in which he expressed his belief that a conspiracy was ready to break out within and without the prisons, for the purpose of liberating the accused, and assassinating the members of the two committees. We shall presently see what use was made of this fatal deposition.

On the following day, the concourse at the tribunal was just the same. Danton and his colleagues, equally resolute and obstinate, still required the personal appearance of several members of the convention and of the two committees. Fouquier, urged to make answer, said that he raised no impediment to the calling of necessary witnesses. But it was not merely sufficient, added the accused, that he threw no obstacle in the way, he ought to do more, in fact, should summon them himself. To this Fouquier replied, that he would summon all who should be named, the members of the convention excepted, as it belonged to that assembly to decide whether its members could be personally cited to appear. The accused again cried out against him, that they were refused the means of defending themselves. The tumult was at its height. The president went on examining some of the accused, namely, Westermann, the two Freys, and Gusman, and hastened to put an end to the sitting.

Fouquier immediately wrote to the committee, to apprise them of what had taken place, and to inquire what measure could be devised to enable him to answer the application of the accused. It was a nice point, and every one began to hesitate. Robespierre affected not to offer his opinion. Saint-Just alone, more bold and more decided, thought that they ought not to recede; that they ought to stop the mouths of the accused, and send them to death. At this moment he just received the deposition of the prisoner Laflotte, addressed to the police by the keeper of the Luxembourg. Saint-Just looked upon it as the germ of a conspiracy concocted by the accused, and as a good ground for a decree that should put an end to the struggle between them and the tribunal. In point of fact, on the following morning, he presented himself before the convention, and informed them that a great danger threatened the country, but that it was the last, and, if boldly met, it would soon be surmounted. "The accused," said he, "now before the revolutionary tribunal are in open revolt; they menace the tribunal itself; they carry their insolence so far as to throw balls made of crumbs of bread in the faces of the judges; they excite the people and may even lead them astray. But this is not all; they have contrived a conspiracy in the prisons. Camille's wife has been furnished with money to excite an insurrection; General Dillon is to sally forth from the Luxembourg, to put himself at the head of a number of conspirators, to murder the two committees, and to liberate the culprits." At this hypocritical and false statement, the acquiescent portion of the assembly cried out that it was horrible, and the convention unanimously voted the decree proposed by Saint-Just. By virtue of this decree, the tribunal was to continue, without adjournment, the trial of Danton and his accomplices; and it was authorized to deprive such of the accused as should show any disrespect to the court, or who endeavoured to excite disturbance, of the benefit of their arguments. A copy of the decree was immediately dispatched, Vouland and Vadier carried it to the tribunal, just as the third sitting had begun, and where the increased boldness of the accused was placing Fouquier in the most awkward situation.

On the third day, in fact, the accused had resolved to renew their applications. They all rose at once, and urged Fouquier to compel the appearance of the witnesses they required. They even demanded more; they wanted the convention to appoint a commission to receive the denunciations which they had to make against the scheme of dictatorship which manifested itself in the committees. Fouquier, perplexed, knew not what answer to give. At that moment, an officer of the court came to call him out. He stepped into the adjoining

room, and there found Vadier and Vouland, who still quite out of breath said to him, "We have the villains fast. Here is what will relieve you from your awkward situation;" with these words, they handed him a decree which Saint-Just had just got passed. Fouquier seized it with joy, returned to the hearing, required to speak, and then read this infamous decree. Danton indignant, then rose to speak. "I call this audience to witness," said he, "that we have not insulted the tribunal." "That is true," said several voices in the hall. All the hearers were astonished, nay even indignant, at the denial of justice to the accused. The excitement became general. The tribunal was intimidated. "The truth," added Danton, "will one day be known. I foresee great calamities are about to light upon France. There is the dictatorship. It exhibits itself to the eye, and without disguise." Camille on hearing what was said concerning the Luxembourg, Dillon, and his wife, exclaimed in despair, "The wretches! not content with murdering me, they are determined to murder my wife!" Danton perceived at the farther end of the hall, and in the corridor, Vadier and Vouland, who had placed themselves there out of public observation to witness the effect produced by the decree. He shook his fist at them. "Look," said he, "at those cowardly assassins, they follow us up; they will never leave us till we are dead!" Vadier and Vouland disappeared in evident alarm. The tribunal, instead of answering the applications of the accused, put an end to the sitting.

The next was the fourth day, and the jury had the power of closing the arguments on both sides, by declaring that sufficient evidence had been laid before them to enable them to come to a conclusion. Consequently, without giving the accused time to defend themselves, the jury demanded the closing of the proceedings. Camille was furious, declared to the jury that they were assassins, and called the people to bear witness to this iniquity. He and his companions in misfortune were then hurried out of the hall. He resisted, and was carried off by main force. Meanwhile, Vadier and Vouland talked warmly to the jurors, who, however, did not require any stirring up. The president, Hermans, and also Fouquier followed them into their hall. Hermann had the impudence to tell them that a letter addressed to the foreign enemy had been intercepted, which evidenced the identification of Danton with the allied powers. No more than three or four of the jurors ventured to speak up for the accused, but the majority carried it. Trinchard, the foreman of the jury, returned exhibiting a ferocious satisfaction, and with the air of a madman pronounced the iniquitous verdict of guilty.

The tribunal would not expose itself to a fresh explosion of the condemned, by bringing them back from the prison to the hall of the tribunal to hear their sentence; a registrar, therefore, went down to read it to them. They sent him away without suffering him to finish, desiring to be led to death immediately. When the sentence was once passed, Danton, who till then was boiling with indignation, became calm, and displayed all his former contempt for his adversaries. Camille, soon appeased, shed a few tears for his wife, and in his happy improvidence, never conceived that she too was threatened with death, an idea that would have rendered his last moments insupportable. Hérault was gay as usual. All the accused were firm, and Westermann showed himself worthy of the character he had acquired for intrepidity.

They were executed on the 16th Germinal (6th of April). The infamous rabble, paid to insult the victims, followed the carts. At this sight Camille, impelled by his feelings of indignation, addressed the multitude, and poured forth the most vehement imprecations against the cowardly and hypocritical Robespierre. The wretches employed to insult him replied by gross abuse. In the violence of his action he had torn his shirt, so that his shoulders were bare. Danton, casting a calm and contemptuous look on the mob, said to Camille, "Be quiet, take no notice of this vile rabble." On reaching the foot of the scaffold, Danton was going to embrace Hérault-Séchelles, who extended his arms towards him; the executioner preventing him, he uttered with a smile these terrible expressions; "What, canst thou then be more cruel than death! Be it so, thou canst not prevent our heads from embracing presently at the bottom of the basket."

Such was the end of Danton, who had shed so great a lustre upon the revolution, and had done so much in its cause. Bold, ardent, greedy of excitement and pleasure, he had thrown himself into the arena of disturbances, and was particularly calculated to make himself remarkable in the days of terror. Prompt and decisive, never losing his presence of mind, either from the difficulty or by the novelty of an extraordinary situation, he well knew how to apply the necessary means, and that without fear or scruple of any description. He conceived that it had become indispensably necessary to put an end to the contest between the monarchy and the revolution, and he effected it on the 10th of August. In the face of the Prussians, he deemed it necessary to keep France within certain bounds, and to engage her in the system of the revolution. He, therefore, it is said, brought about the horrible days of September, and in so doing saved a great number of victims. At the beginning of the great year 1793, when the convention was alarmed at the sight of all Europe in arms, he uttered these remarkable words, with an entire conviction of the deep reflection they conveyed; "a nation in revolution is more likely to conquer its neighbours than to be conquered by them." He considered that the twenty-five millions of men, they dared to set in motion, would have nothing to fear from the few hundred thousand armed by individual crowned heads. He proposed to make a rising of the entire population, and to make the rich pay; he in fact it was who devised all those revolutionary measures which left such terrible recollections, but which have saved France. This man, so powerful in action, relapsed during the space that intervened between dangerous emergencies into indolence, and the gratification of those enjoyments to which he had always been attached. He even indulged in the most innocent pleasures, such delights as the country, an adored wife, and friends afforded. Then it was that he forgot the vanquished, ceased to hate them, he could even do them justice, sympathize with and

defend them. But it was during these intervals of repose, indispensable for his fervid imagination, that his rivals won from him step by step and by sheer perseverance the renown and influence he had acquired in the day of peril. The fanatics reproached him with his mildness and his good nature, and forgot that, in point of political cruelty, he had equalled them all in the days of September. While he was trusting to his renown, while he was indolently deferring the time, and was meditating grand designs for effecting a milder system of legislation, for confining the reign of violence to the days of peril, for distinguishing the exterminators irrevocably associated with blood from the men who had only yielded to circumstances, for organizing France and reconciling her with Europe, he was surprised by those of his colleagues to whom he had left the government. The latter, in striking a blow at the ultra-revolutionists, deemed it incumbent on them, that they might not appear to retrograde, to level another at the moderatists. Policy demanded victims; envy selected them, and sacrificed the most celebrated and the most formidable man of the time. Danton fell, notwithstanding his reputation and his services, before that fearful government he had contributed to organize; but at least, by his boldness, he made it for a short period appear doubtful whether he was to fall or not.

Danton's mind was uncultivated, but it was noble, contemplative, and, above all, possessed simplicity and firmness. He never availed himself of his mental resources, save for his own purposes, and never for the purpose of making a shew; he likewise spoke but little, and disdained to write. According to a contemporary, he made no pretension, not even that of guessing what he was ignorant of, a pretension so common to men of his cast. He listened to Fabre d'Eglantine, and was never tired of hearing his young and interesting friend, Camille Desmoulins, in whose wit he delighted, and whom he had the misfortune to involve in his own destruction. He died with his wonted fortitude, and imparted the same to his young companion. Like Mirabeau, he expired proud of himself, and like him considered that his faults and his life were sufficiently atoned for by his great services and his latest intentions.

The leaders of the two parties had now been sacrificed. The relics of these parties were soon associated with their leaders; and men most irreconcileable with each other were confusedly tried together, for the purpose of giving greater weight to the opinion that they were all privy to one and the same conspiracy. Chaumette and Gobel appeared by the side of Arthur Dillon and Simon. The Grammonts, father and son, the Lapallus, and other members of the revolutionary army, figured by the side of General Beysser; lastly, Hébert's wife, formerly a nun, appeared beside the young wife of Camille Desmoulins, scarcely twenty-three years of age, resplendent with beauty, grace, and youth. Chaumette, whose passive obedience and submission we have already observed, was accused of having conspired at the commune against the government, of having famished the people, and endeavoured to urge them to rebellion by his extravagant motions. Gobel was considered as the accomplice of Anacharsis Clootz and of Chaumette. Arthur Dillon had wanted, it was said, to open the prisons of Paris, and then to slaughter the convention and the tribunal, in order to rescue his friends. The members of the revolutionary army were condemned as agents of Ronsin. General Beysser, who had so powerfully contributed to save Nantes jointly with Canclaux, and who was suspected of federalism, was considered to be an accomplice of the ultra-revolutionists. Every one can see what approximation was likely to exist between the staff of Nantes and that of Saumur. Hébert's wife was condemned as an accomplice of her husband. Seated on the same bench with the wife of Camille, she said to the latter, "You at least are fortunate; there is no charge got up against you; you will be saved." In fact, all that could be alleged against this young woman was, that of being passionately attached to her husband, and of constantly wandering with her children about the prison to see their father and to point him out to them. Both were nevertheless condemned, and the wives of Hébert and Camille perished as guilty participators in the same conspiracy. The unfortunate Desmoulins died with a courage worthy of her husband and of her own virtue. No victim since Charlotte Corday and Madame Roland had excited greater interest or more heartfelt sympathy.

CHAPTER XIX.

RESULTS OF THE RECENT EXECUTIONS AGAINST THE PARTIES OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT.—DECREE AGAINST THE EX-NOBLES.—THE MINISTRIES ARE ABOLISHED AND REPLACED BY COMMISSIONS.—EFFORTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC WELFARE TO CONCENTRATE ALL THE AUTHORITIES IN ITS OWN HAND.—ABOLITION OF THE POPULAR SOCIETIES, THE JACOBINS EXCEPTED.—THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AND THE ADMINISTRATION, BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE.—THE CONVENTION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REPORT OF ROBESPIERRE, ACKNOWLEDGES IN THE NAME OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE, THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME BEING AS WELL AS THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

The government had now sacrificed two parties at one blow. The first, that of the ultra-revolutionists, was really formidable, or likely to become so; the second, that of the new moderates, was not so. Its destruction, therefore, was not necessary, but it might be serviceable, in order to throw off all appearance of moderatism. The committee attacked it without conviction, from mere hypocrisy and envy. This latter was a difficult blow to strike. The whole committee were seen to hesitate, and

Robespierre retired to his house, as he was wont to do on days of peril. But Saint-Just, supported by his courage and by his jealous hatred, remained firm at his post, encouraged Hermann and Fouquier, terrified the convention, wrung from it the decree of death, and perfected the sacrifice. The last effort that any authority has to make in order to become absolute is always the most difficult; it requires its utmost strength to overcome the last obstruction; but this resistance once overcome, every thing else gives way, every thing falls prostrate before it; it has then but to reign undisputed master of all. Then it is that it displays its power, commits excesses, and destroys itself. While every mouth is closed, while outward submission appears in every face, hatred lurks in the recesses of the heart, and the act of accusation of the conquerors is being prepared during the height of their exaltation.

The committee of public welfare, having successfully sacrificed these two classes of men, so little identified with each other, who had presumed to thwart or merely to animadvert upon its power, had now become irresistible. The winter was over. The campaign of 1794 (Germinal, year II.) was about to open with the spring. Formidable armies were to extend themselves all along the frontiers, and to cause that terrible power to excite that same sensation from without which was so cruelly experienced within. Whosoever had appeared to have opposed the committee, or had been supposed to feel any sympathy with those who had been put to death, had no time to lose in tendering their submission. Legendre, who had exerted himself on the day that Danton, Lacroix, and Camille Desmoulins were arrested, and who had endeavoured to influence the convention in their favour, Legendre considered that he ought to lose no time in atoning for his imprudence, and divesting himself of his sympathy for the recent victims. Many persons had written him anonymous letters, wherein he was exhorted to strike the tyrants, who, they said, had just thrown off the mask. Legendre repaired to the Jacobins on the 21st of Germinal (April 10), denounced the anonymous letters sent to him, and complained that people took him for a *Séide**, whom they could arm with a dagger. "Well, then," said he, "since I am driven to it, I declare to the people, who have always heard me tell the truth, that I now consider it as openly demonstrated that the conspiracy, the leaders of which are now no more, really existed, and that I was the cat's-paw of the traitors. I have found proofs of this in various papers deposited with the committee of public welfare, especially in the criminal conduct of the accused before the national justice, and in the machinations of their accomplices, who wanted to arm an honest man with the dagger of the murderer. I was, before this plot was discovered, the intimate friend of Danton. I would have answered with my head for his principles and his conduct; but now I feel convinced of his guilt; I am persuaded that he wished to plunge the people into a very great error. Perhaps I should have fallen into it myself, had I not been timely enlightened. I declare to the anonymous scribblers who want to persuade me to stab Robespierre, and to make me the instrument of their machinations, that I was bred amongst the people, that I glory in remaining with them, and that I will die rather than abandon their rights. They will not write me a single letter that I shall not carry to the committee of public welfare."

The submission of Legendre soon became universal. From all parts of France there came a host of addresses, wherein congratulations were offered to the convention and the committee of public welfare on their assumption of energy. The number of these addresses was incalculable. They were couched in every possible kind of style, and under the most burlesque forms; every one of them exhibited the strongest desire to adhere to the acts of the government, and to acknowledge their propriety. Rhodez dispatched the following address: "Worthy representatives of a free people, it is then in vain that the sons of the Titans have lifted their proud heads; the thunderbolt has overthrown them all!—What, citizens! would ye for base lucre sell your liberty. The constitution which ye have given us, has caused every throne to totter, and has struck terror into kings. Liberty advancing with giant steps, despotism crushed, superstition annihilated, the republic recovering its unity, the conspirators exposed and punished, representatives faithless to their trust and base and perfidious public functionaries falling under the axe of the law, and breaking of the fetters of the slaves in the new world: such are your trophies! If intrigues still exist, let them tremble! let the death of the conspirators attest your triumph! As for you, representatives, live happy under the wise laws which you have made for the welfare of all nations, and receive the tribute of our affection*."

It was not from any horror of sanguinary measures that the committee had stricken the ultra-revolutionists, but simply to confirm their authority, and to crush the opposition that impeded its action. Accordingly, it was afterwards seen constantly tending to a two-fold end; and to render itself still more formidable, and to still further concentrate power in its own hands. Collot, who had become the organ of government at the Jacobins, explained in the most energetic manner the policy of the committee. In a violent speech, wherein he pointed out to all the authorities the new track which they ought to pursue, and the zeal they ought to display in their functions, he said, "The tyrants have lost their strength; their armies tremble before ours, already are some of the despots seeking to withdraw from the coalition. In this state, they have but one source from whence they can derive hope, and that is internal conspiracies. We must not the less cease therefore to keep a vigilant watch over the traitors. Like our brethren, victorious on the frontiers, let us all make ready, present, and fire at once. While our external enemies fall beneath the strokes of our soldiers, let our internal enemies fall beneath the blows of the people. Our cause, defended by jus-

* In allusion to a character of that name in Voltaire's 'Mahomet.' A *séide* is the term adopted to express a fanatic capable of committing any crime in his zeal for his religion. Trans.

* Sitting of the 26 Germinal, No. 209 of the *Moniteur* of the year II. (April, 1794.)

tice and energy, shall be triumphant. Nature does every thing this year for the republicans, she promises them a double harvest. The leaves bursting from their buds proclaim the fall of the tyrants. I repeat to you, citizens, let us keep close watch within, while our warriors are fighting from without; let the functionaries charged with the superintendance of the public concerns redouble their attention and zeal; let them be made thoroughly sensible of this reflection, that there is perhaps not a street, not a cross-path where there is not a traitor meditating a new laid plot. Let this traitor meet with death, ay, and the most speedy death! If the administrators, if the public functionaries wish to create a place for themselves in history, now is there a favourable opportunity for so doing. The revolutionary tribunal has already secured for itself a distinguished place there. Let all the administrations imitate its zeal and its inexorable energy; let the revolutionary committees, in particular, redouble their vigilance and their activity; and let them know how to withstand the importunities with which they are beleaguered, and which would hurry them into an indulgence fatal to the cause of liberty."

Saint-Just presented to the convention a formidable report upon the general police of the republic. He therein repeated the fabulous history of all the conspiracies; he exhibited them as the rising of the vices against the austere system of the republic; he said that the government, so far from slackening its energy, ought to strike without ceasing, until it should have sacrificed all the wretches whose corruption caused an impediment to the establishment of virtue. He pronounced the accustomed eulogy on severity, and sought in his usual style, by every description of language to prove that great institutions should originate in terror. "What," said he, "would have become of an indulgent republic? We have set sword against sword, and the republic is founded. It has issued from amidst the storm; this origin it has in common with the world arising out of chaos, and man weeping as he comes into the world." As a consequence of these maxims, Saint-Just proposed a general measure against the ex-nobles. It was the first of the kind that was enacted. In the preceding year, Danton had, in a moment of impetuosity, caused all the aristocrats to be outlawed. This decree being impracticable on account of the magnitude of its operation, had been changed for another, which condemned all suspected persons to provisional detention. But no specific enactment against the ex-nobles had yet been passed. Saint-Just demonstrated them to be the irreconcileable enemies of the revolution. "Do what you will," said he, "you will never be able to satisfy the enemies of the people, unless you re-establish tyranny. Let them go elsewhere in search of slavery and kings. They cannot make peace with you; you do not speak the same language; you do not understand one another. Then drive them away. The world is not inhospitable, and with us the public welfare is the supreme law." Saint-Just proposed a decree banishing all the ex-nobles, and all foreigners, from Paris, the fortresses, and the seaports, and which excluded from all benefit of the law those who should not have obeyed the decree within the space of ten days. Other ordinances contained in this draught made it the duty of all the authorities to redouble their zeal and activity. The convention approved of the proposition, as it always did, and voted it by acclamation. Collot-d'Herbois, the reporter of the decree to the Jacobins, added his figures of speech to those of Saint-Just. "We must," said he, "make the body politic throw out the foul sweat of aristocracy. The more copiously it shall have perspired, the better health it will enjoy."

We have seen what the committee did to manifest the energy of its policy; now let us see what further it did towards the still greater concentration of power. In the first place, it ordered the disbanding of the revolutionary army. That army, devised by Danton, had at first been made of use in carrying out the orders of the convention, while any remains of federalism were in existence; but now become the central rallying point of all the agitators and all the adventurers, and as it had been made serviceable as a point of support to the late demagogues, it was necessary to dissolve it. Besides, the government, being implicitly obeyed, had no need of these satellites to enforce the execution of its orders. Consequently, it was disbanded by decree. The committee next proposed the abolition of the different ministries. Ministries were powers which still possessed too great importance when placed in competition with the members of the committee of public welfare. Either they left every thing to be done by the committee, and in this case they were useless; or they would rather do things themselves, and then they were very troublesome competitors. The example of Bouchotte, who, under the direction of Vincent, had caused the committee so much trouble, was pregnant with instruction. The ministries were in consequence abolished, and in their stead the twelve following commissions were instituted:

1. Commission of civil administrations, the police and tribunals.
2. Commission of public instruction.
3. Commission of agriculture and the arts.
4. Commission of commerce and articles of consumption.
5. Commission of public works.
6. Commission of public relief.
7. Commission of conveyance, posts, and public vehicles.
8. Commission of finances.
9. Commission of organization and direction of the land forces.
10. Commission of the navy and the colonies.
11. Commission of arms, gunpowder, and the working of mines.
12. Commission of foreign relations.

These commissions, dependent upon the committee of public welfare, were neither more or less than twelve offices, (*bureaux*), among which they had distributed the practical part of the administration. Hermann, who was president of the revolutionary tribunal at the time of Danton's trial, was rewarded for his zeal by his being appointed chief of one of these commissions. They gave him the most important, that of civil administrations, the police, and tribunals.

Other measures were adopted for still further augmenting the centralization of power. According

to the institution of the revolutionary committees, there was to be one for each commune or section of a commune. The rural communes being very numerous and far from populous, the number of committees was too great, and their functions were almost nullified. The mode of their formation presented a great inconvenience. The peasants being mostly determined revolutionists, but yet illiterate, the municipal functions had in most cases devolved upon landholders who had retired to their estates, and were by no means disposed to apply their influence in favour of the government; hence it arose that a bad look out was kept upon the country, and especially upon the mansions. To remedy this inconvenient state of things, the revolutionary committees of the communes were abolished, and none but the district committees were retained. By these means the police, in becoming more concentrated, became more active, and passed into the hands of the tradesmen of the districts, who were almost all staunch Jacobins, and very jealous of the old nobility.

The Jacobins were the principal club, indeed the only one recognized by the government. This club had invariably adopted the principles and the interests of the government, and had likewise taken a decided part against the Hébertists and Dantonists. The committee of public welfare was desirous that it should consolidate almost all the others in its own body, and that the entire force of public opinion should be concentrated there, in the same manner as the committee had concentrated in itself the entire power of the government. The expression of this desire flattered the ambition of the Jacobins in an extraordinary degree, and they made the greatest exertions to accomplish this suggestion. Ever since the meetings of the sections had been reduced to two a-week, so as to ensure the attendance of the people, who were there to effect the ascendancy of revolutionary motions, the sections had formed themselves into popular societies. The number of these societies in Paris was very great, indeed there were two or three of them to each section. We have already mentioned the complaints to which they became exposed. It was said that the aristocrats, that is to say, the commercial clerks and the lawyers' clerks, dissatisfied with the requisition, the old servants of the nobility, in short, all those who had any motive for offering opposition to the revolutionary system, met at these societies, and there demonstrated that opposition which they durst not manifest at the Jacobins or in the sections. The number of these secondary societies prevented their being kept under control, and persons sometimes uttered opinions at these societies which they would never have dared to broach in any other place. Their abolition had been already suggested. The Jacobins had no right to take this matter up, nor could the government have done so without appearing to check the privilege of meeting and deliberating in common, a privilege so highly lauded at that time, and considered as being unrestrained. On the motion of Collot, the Jacobins decided that they should no longer receive any deputation from societies formed in Paris since the 10th of August, and that the correspondence with them should no longer be continued. As to those formed in Paris before the 10th of August, and which had the privilege of corresponding, it was decided that a report should be made upon each, to inquire whether they ought to retain that advantage. This measure particularly concerned the Cordeliers, already stricken in the persons of their leaders, Ronsin, Vincent, and Hébert, and latterly considered as suspected. Thus all the sectionary societies were placed in a questionable position by this declaration, and the Cordeliers were to undergo the ordeal of a report.

It was not long before this measure produced the intended effect. All the sectionary societies, intimidated or forewarned, came one after another to the convention and to the Jacobins, to declare their voluntary dissolution. All congratulated alike the convention and the Jacobins, and declared that, having assembled for the public service, they voluntarily separated themselves, since their meetings had been deemed prejudicial to that cause they desired to serve. From that time there no longer remained in Paris any other than the parent society of the Jacobins, and in the provinces the affiliated [or corresponding] societies. That of the Cordeliers, indeed, still subsisted beside its rival. Instituted formerly by Danton, ungrateful towards its founder, and since wholly devoted to Hébert, Ronsin, and Vincent, it had given a momentary uneasiness to the government, and had put itself in competition with the Jacobins. It still comprehended the remnant of the officers of Vincent and the revolutionary army. They could not dissolve it; but the report concerning it was presented. It was by this report remarked, that for some time past it corresponded but very seldom and very negligently with the Jacobins, and that consequently it might be said there was no object attainable in continuing the correspondence. It was on this occasion proposed that an inquiry should take place as to whether there was any necessity for more than one popular society in Paris. Some even ventured to assert that a single central point of opinion should be established, and that it should be placed at the Jacobins. The society passed to the order of the day upon all these propositions, and did not even decide whether the privilege of correspondence should still be accorded to the Cordeliers. But this club, formerly so celebrated, had terminated its existence; entirely deserted, it was no longer of any importance, and the Jacobins, with their train of affiliated societies, remained sole masters and regulators of public opinion.

After centralizing, if we may be allowed the term, public opinion, the next thing thought of was to regulate the method in which its manifestation was to be allowed, so as to render it less tumultuous and less annoying to the government. The continual censure and the denunciation of the public functionaries, magistrates, deputies, generals, and administrators, had hitherto constituted the principal occupation of the Jacobins. This rage for incessantly attacking and persecuting the agents of authority had its inconveniences as well as its advantages, so long as their zeal and their opinions were questionable. But at this day, when the committee had vigorously seized upon the supreme power, when it exercised a vigilant control over its agents, and selected them in the most revolutionary spirit, the Jacobins could not have been any longer permitted to indulge their wonted suspicions, and

to harass functionaries who for the most part were under efficient control, as well as judiciously selected. It would even have been dangerous for the state to have permitted it. It was on the occasion of Generals Charbonnier and Dagobert being both calumniated, while one was gaining advantages over the Austrians, and the other was dying in the Cerdagne, suffering from age and wounds, that Collot d'Herbois had complained at the Jacobins of this indiscreet manner of persecuting generals and functionaries of every degree. According to the habit of throwing all blame upon the dead, he imputed this rage for denunciation to the remnant of Hébert's faction, and persuaded the Jacobins to no longer tolerate these public denunciations, which, he said, wasted the valuable time of the society, and lowered the agents selected by the government in the public esteem. He therefore proposed, and in fact caused a vote to be made, that the society should appoint a committee from members chosen from its own body, whose duty should be to receive denunciations, and to transmit them secretly to the committee of public welfare. In this manner denunciations produced less inconvenience and became less tumultuous, and the regularity of administrative forms began to succeed to the confusions induced by popular faction.

Thus it was that the first concern of the committee, and the earliest fruit of the victory it had obtained over the factions, was to declare itself in a more energetic manner than ever against all the opponents of the revolution, and to centralize the administration, police, and public opinion. Ambition doubtless had begun to influence its determinations much more than in the first moment of its existence, but not in so great a degree as one might be led to suppose from the great mass of power which it had acquired. Instituted at the commencement of 1793, and under the pressure of extraordinary perils, it owed its existence to necessity alone. Once established, it had gradually assumed a greater share of power, in the same degree that the service of the state required it, and it had thus arrived at the dictatorship itself. Its position amidst that universal dissolution of all the authorities had been such, that it could not reorganize itself without gaining power, or yet so well without indulging ambition. The last measures which it had adopted were no doubt advantageous, but they were in themselves prudent and useful. Most of them had even been suggested to the committee; for in a society which is reorganizing itself, every thing seems to present itself and submit itself to the creative authority. But the moment was at hand when ambition was to reign paramount, and when the interest of its own power was to supersede that of the state. Such is man: he cannot long remain disinterested, and he soon identifies himself with the object he is pursuing.

The committee of public welfare had still one more concern to attend to, that which always demands primary attention from the founders of a new society, namely, religion. Hitherto they had confined themselves to moral ideas, by making *integrity, justice, and all the virtues, the order of the day;* they had now to direct their attention to religious ideas.

Let us here remark the singular progress of their systems among these sectaries. When they found it necessary to destroy the Girondists, they considered them as moderatists, and as inefficient republicans, they talked of patriotic energy and of *the public welfare,* and sacrificed them to these notions. When two new parties were formed, the one brutal, extravagant, and striving to overthrow and profane every thing; the other indulgent, easy, disposed to placidity of habit and voluptuousness, their next transition from ideas of patriotic energy was to those of order and virtue; they saw nothing else than fatal moderatism enervating the vigour of the revolution, they beheld all the vices arrayed at once against the severity of the republican system; on the one hand, anarchy rejecting every notion of civil order; and on the other hand, effeminacy and corruption rejecting every conception of morals, a delirium of the mind rejecting all thought of God; then it was that the republic in their own minds became an impersonation of virtue assailed by all the bad passions at once. The word *virtue* was every where; they made justice and integrity the order of the day. It yet remained for them to proclaim the belief in God, the immortality of the soul, all the moral convictions; it yet remained for them to make a solemn confession of faith; in a word, to declare the religion of the state. They resolved, therefore, to pass a decree on this subject. In this manner they should oppose order against the anarchists, faith in God against the atheists, and morals against the profligate. Their system of virtue would be complete. In particular, they considered it a most essential matter to wash away those reproaches of impiety with which the republic had been assailed throughout all Europe; they were desirous of saying what is always said to priests when they accuse you of impiety because you do not put faith in their doctrines: WE BELIEVE IN GOD.

They had also other motives for adopting a decisive measure in regard to religion. The ceremonies of reason had been abolished; festivals (*fêtes*) were required for the decades (*jours de decade*), and it was of importance, when attending to the moral and religious wants of the people, to consider how they should also satisfy their imagination, and present them with an object for publicly meeting together. Besides, there could not be a more favourable opportunity than the present. The republic, victorious at the conclusion of the last campaign, began to be still more so at the commencement of the present. Instead of the great destitution of means in which it found itself the preceding year, it was, through the attention of its government, provided with powerful military resources. From the fear of being conquered, the transition was now to the expectation of victory; instead of alarming insurrections, submission prevailed everywhere. Lastly, if owing to the assignats and the *maximum*, there was still some restriction upon the internal distribution of produce, nature seemed to have been desirous of freely imparting her bounties to France, by granting her the most abundant crops. From all the provinces tidings arrived that the harvest would be unusually full, and would be ripe a month before the usual time. This was therefore the time when this liberated, victorious, and bountifully-supplied republic should throw herself at the feet of the Almighty. The occasion was solemn and affecting for those who were believers. It was seasonable

for those who merely complied with political notions.

Let us notice one remarkable circumstance. Sectaries, for whom there no longer existed any compact that was to be regarded, who, from their extraordinary contempt of all other nations, and the self-esteem in which they were absorbed, were proof against all opinion, and yet feared not wounding general belief; who, in matters of government had reduced every thing to nothing but what was absolutely necessary; who had admitted no other authority than that of a few citizens temporarily elected; who had thrown off all hierarchy of classified conditions of men, who had not hesitated to abolish that which of all is most ancient and of deepest root, sectaries such as these, paused before two ideas, morality and a God. After rejecting all those from which they thought they could deliver man, they remained under the sway of these two latter, and sacrificed a party to each of them. If all did not believe, still all felt the necessity of establishing order among men, and to support this human order, they necessarily recurred to the idea of distinguishing in the structure of the universe a generally and beautifully formed order. This is the first time in the history of the world that the dissolution of all authority left society a prey to the government of purely systematic minds (for the English believed in the traditions of Christianity), and those minds which had outstripped all adopted and generally recognized ideas, retained the ideas of morality and of a God. This example is unparalleled in the history of the world; it is singular, it is grand, it is beautiful; history should pause, that the observation should have its due weight.

Robespierre was the person who had to make the report on this solemn occasion; and to him alone this duty belonged, according to the distribution of the parts which had been made among the members of the committee. Prieur, Robert Lindet, and Carnot, were quietly occupied with the administrative and the war departments. Barrère made most of the reports, particularly those which related to the operations of the armies, and all those in general which had to be verbally delivered. Collot-d'Herbois, the declaimer, was despatched to the clubs and the popular meetings, as the bearer of the messages of the committee. Couthon, although paralytic, likewise went everywhere, spoke at the convention, at the Jacobins, and to the people, and possessed the art of exciting interest by his infirmities, and by the paternal tone he assumed in enunciating the most violent propositions. Billaud, not quite so active in his disposition, attended to the correspondence, and sometimes handled matters of general policy. Saint-Just, young, daring, and active, went to and fro between the fields of battle and the committee; and when he had impressed terror and energy on the armies, he returned to make murderous reports against the parties who were to be put to death. Lastly, Robespierre, their great leader, who was consulted on all matters, never spoke but upon great occasions. It was he who discussed high questions of morals and politics. These elevated subjects were reserved for him, as being more appropriate to his abilities and virtue. The duty of reporter on the question which was about to be discussed, thus of right belonged to him. None had so decidedly declared himself against atheism; no one was so venerated, no one had so high a reputation for purity and virtue; no one in short was so well qualified by his ascendancy and his dogmatism for this sort of pontificate as he was.

Never had so fair an occasion offered for his imitating Rousseau, whose opinions he professed, and whose style he made his continual study. The talent of Robespierre developed itself in a remarkable manner, during the protracted struggles of the revolution. That cold and prosy being began to speak in good extempore; and when he wrote it was with purity, brilliancy, and energy. In his style was to be found somewhat of the bitter and gloomy temper of Rousseau, but he had not been able to borrow either the grand ideas, or the generous and impassioned soul of the author of Émile.

It was on the 18th of Floréal, (May 7, 1794,) that he appeared in the tribune, with a speech most laboriously prepared. Profound attention was paid to him. "Citizens," said he, in his exordium, "it is in prosperity that nations, like individuals, should, as I may say, commune with themselves, and when the passions are still, hearken to the voice of wisdom." He then developed at considerable length the system adopted. The republic, according to him, was virtue; and all the adversaries which she had encountered were but vicious inclinations of every description, excited against her, and in the pay of kings. The anarchists, the corruptionists, and the atheists, were nothing else than the agents of Pitt. "The tyrants," added he, "satisfied with the hardihood of their emissaries, had been anxious to parade before their subjects the extravagancies which they had purchased; and affecting to believe that they in fact were a just representation of the whole French nation, seemed to say to their subjects, 'What will you gain by shaking off our yoke? *The republicans, you see, are not a whit better than ourselves!*'" Brissot, Danton, and Hébert, figured by turns in Robespierre's speech; but while he was launching out into declarations of hatred against the pretended enemies of virtue, declamations already threadbare, he excited but little enthusiasm. But he quickly abandoned that portion of the subject, and rose to ideas truly grand and moral, and expressed with talent. He then obtained universal acclamations. He observed, and with reason, that the representatives of the nation were not to discountenance atheism and to proclaim deism, in the character of originators of systems, but in the character of legislators endeavouring to ascertain what principles are most suitable to man in a state of society. "What signify to you, O legislators!" he exclaimed, "what signify to you the various hypotheses by which certain philosophers explain the phenomena of nature? you can leave all these subjects to their everlasting disquisitions; it is not either as metaphysicians or as theologians that you ought to view them; in the eyes of the legislator, all that is beneficial to the world and good in practice is truth. The idea of the Supreme Being and of the immortality of the soul is a continual appeal to justice, it is therefore social and republican"—"Who therefore," exclaims Robespierre, "hath given thee the mission to proclaim to the people that the Deity hath no existence? O thou who art in love with this unfruitful doctrine, and wast never in love

as a means for discountenancing their previous Atheism, which had disgusted Europe.

with thy country! what advantage dost thou find in persuading man that an undistinguishing power presides over his destinies and strikes at random guilt and virtue? That his spirit is but a slight breath which is extinguished at the threshold of the tomb? Will the idea of his annihilation inspire purer and more exalted sentiments than the confidence of his immortality? Will it inspire him with more respect for his fellow-creatures and for himself, more devotedness to his country, more courage to defy tyranny, more contempt of death and voluptuousness? Ye, who mourn a virtuous friend, you cherish the thought that the bett erpart of him has escaped death. Ye who weep over the coffin of a son, or of a wife, are ye consoled by him who tells you that nothing remains of them but vile dust? Unfortunate ye who expire from the assassin's stroke, your last sigh is an appeal to eternal justice! Innocence on the scaffold makes the tyrant turn pale in his car of triumph. Would it possess this ascendancy, if the grave put the oppressor and the oppressed upon equal terms?"

Robespierre, still confining himself to the political aids of the question, adds these remarkable observations. "Let us," said he, "here take a lesson from history; let us remark, I beseech you, how the men who have exercised an influence on the destinies of states have been led into one or the other of two opposite systems by their personal character, and by the very nature of their political views. Recollect with what profound art Cæsar, pleading in the Roman senate for the accomplices of Catiline, wanders into a digression against the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, so well calculated did these ideas appear to him to extinguish in the hearts of the judges the energy of virtue, so closely does the principle (*cause*) of crime appear to him to be linked with the principle of atheism! Cicero, on the contrary, invoked the sword of the law and the thunderbolts of the gods against the traitors. The dying Socrates discoursed with his friends upon the immortality of the soul. Leonidas, at Thermopylæ, supping with his companions in arms, the moment before executing the most heroic design that human virtue ever conceived, invited them for the next day to another banquet in a new life. Cato did not hesitate between Epicurus and Zeno. Brutus, and the illustrious conspirators who shared his dangers and his glory, belonged also to that sublime sect of the Stoics, which entertained such lofty ideas of the dignity of man, which carried the enthusiasm of virtue to such a height, and whose notions were extravagant solely in respect of heroism. Stoicism brought forth rivals of Brutus and of Cato, even in those frightful ages which succeeded the loss of Roman liberty; Stoicism saved the honour of human nature, degraded by the vices of the successors of Cæsar, and still more so by the patience of the people."

Upon the subject of atheism, Robespierre expresses himself in a singular manner concerning the Encyclopedists*; "in political matters," said he, "that sect were always perfectly indifferent to the rights of the people; in point of morality, they went far beyond the destruction of religious prejudices; the most distinguished leaders sometimes declaimed against despotism, and they were pensioned by despots; sometimes they wrote books against the court, at other times dedications to kings, speeches for courtiers, and madrigals for courtezans; they expressed themselves with haughtiness in their works, and were cringing in the antechambers. This sect propagated with great zeal the opinion of materialism, which prevailed among the great and among the wits; we are partly indebted to it for that kind of practical philosophy, which reducing selfishness to a system, considers human society as a warfare of deceit, success as the standard of right and wrong, integrity as a matter of taste or decorum, and the world as the patrimony of clever scoundrels.

"Among those who, at the time of which I am speaking, distinguished themselves in the career of letters and philosophy, one man [Rousseau], by the moral elevation of his soul and the loftiness of his character, proved himself worthy of the office of preceptor of mankind; he attacked tyranny with all his soul; he spoke with enthusiasm of the Deity; his masculine and single-hearted eloquence described in words that burn the charms of virtue; and defended those doctrines of consolation that reason affords as something on which the heart of man can rely. The purity of his doctrine, drawn from nature and from a deep hatred of vice, as well as his invincible contempt for the intriguing sophists who usurped the name of philosophers, drew upon him the enmity and the persecution of his rivals and of his false friends. Ah! if he had been a witness of this revolution, of which he was the precursor, who can doubt that his generous soul would have embraced with transport the cause of liberty and equality!"

Robespierre then strove to counteract the idea, that in proclaiming the doctrine of the Supreme Being, the government was labouring for the priests. "What have the priests in common with God? The priests are to morality what quacks are to medicine. How different is the God of nature from the God of the priests! I know nothing that so nearly resembles atheism as the religions which they have invented. By grossly misrepresenting the Supreme Being, they have annihilated him as far as lay in their power: they made him out at one time to be a ball of fire, at another an ox, sometimes a tree, sometimes a man, sometimes a king. The priests have created a God after their own image; they have made him jealous, capricious, greedy, cruel, and implacable; they have treated him as the mayors of the palace formerly treated the descendants of Clovis, in order to reign in his name, and to put themselves in his place; they have banished him to heaven as to a palace, and have called him to earth in order to demand in his name for their own interest, tithes, wealth, honours, voluptuousness, and power. The real temple of the Supreme Being is the universe; his worship virtue; his feasts the joy of a great nation, assembled before him to knit closer the bonds of universal fraternity, and to pay him the homage of sensible and pure hearts."

Robespierre then said that the people must have festivals (*fêtes*). "Man," said he, "is the grandest object that can exist in nature, and the most mag-

* This term applies particularly to those who wrote for the Cyclopædia of Diderot and Alembert: their opinions are well known. *Trans.*

The convention, upon the report of Robespierre, declare their belief of a Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul. (18 Floréal.)

nificent of all sights is that of a great people assembled together." In consequence, he proposed schemes for a public meeting every decade. His report was closed amidst the warmest applause. At last he proposed the following decree, which was adopted by acclamation.

"Art. 1. The French people acknowledge the existence of the Supreme Being, and the immortality of the soul.

"Art. 2. They acknowledge that the worship most worthy of the Supreme Being is the practice of the duties of man."

Other articles declared that festivals (*fêtes*) should be instituted, in order to recall the mind of man to the contemplation of the Deity and of the dignity of his own being. These *fêtes* were to take their names from the events of the revolution, or from the virtues most beneficial to man. Besides the *fêtes* of the 14th of July, the 10th of August, the 21st of January, and the 31st of May, the republic was to celebrate upon every Decadi the following *fêtes*—to the Supreme Being—the human race—the French people—the benefactors of mankind—the martyrs of liberty—liberty and equality—the republic—the liberty of the world—the love of one's country—hatred of tyrants and traitors—truth—justice—modesty—glory—friendship—frugality—courage—good faith—heroism—disinterestedness—stoicism—love—conjugal fidelity—paternal affection—filial piety—infancy—youth—manhood—old age—misfortune—agriculture—industry—our ancestors—posterity—happiness.

A solemn festival was ordained for the 20th Prairial, [8th June], and its management was committed to David. It ought to be added, that in this decree religious toleration was proclaimed anew.

No sooner was this report finished, than it was sent to the printers. On the same day the commune and the Jacobins requesting that it should be read, showered down applauses upon it, and consulted as to their going in a body to the convention to testify their gratitude for the *sublime* decree it had just been passing. It had been observed that the Jacobins had made but few speeches after the sacrifice of the two parties, and had not gone to congratulate the committee and the convention. A member had remarked upon this, and said that an occasion now presented itself for evidencing the union of the Jacobins with a government that displayed such admirable conduct. An address was in fact prepared, and presented to the convention by a deputation of the Jacobins. That address concluded in these terms: "The Jacobins come this day to thank you for the solemn decree that you have passed; they will come and join themselves with you in the celebration of that great day when the *fête* of the Supreme Being shall summon together the virtuous citizens from all parts of France, to chant the hymn of virtue." The president made a pompous reply to the deputation. "It is worthy," said he, "of a society that fills the world with its renown, that enjoys so great an influence over public opinion, that has at all times identified itself with every thing that is most courageous in the defenders of the rights of man, to enter the temple of the laws to pay homage to the Supreme Being."

The president proceeded, and after a very long harangue on the same subject, allowed Couthon to speak. This man made a violent speech against the atheists and corruptionists, and passed a pompous eulogy upon the society. He proposed on that solemn day of joy and gratitude to perform an act of justice towards the Jacobins, which had long been due to them, namely, to declare that ever since the commencement of the revolution, they had constantly deserved well of the country. This proposal was adopted amidst the most uproarious applause. They broke up in a transport of joy, and in a sort of joyous intoxication.

Although the convention had received numerous addresses after the death of the Hébertists and the Dantonists, it received indeed many more after the decree which promulgated the belief in the Supreme Being. The communication of ideas and words spreads with extraordinary rapidity among the French. Among a prompt and communicative people, the idea that engages some few minds soon becomes the notion that absorbs the public opinion; the word that is in the mouths of some is soon in the mouths of every body. Addresses poured in from all parts, congratulating the convention on its sublime decrees, and thanking it for having established virtue, proclaimed the worship of the Supreme Being, and restored hope to man. All the sections came, one after another, to express the same sentiments. The section of Marat, presenting itself at the bar, and addressing the Mountain, spoke to it in these words: "O beneficent Mountain! our protecting Sinai! accept also our expressions of acknowledgment and congratulations for all the sublime decrees thou dost daily send forth for the happiness of the human race. From thy fiercely agitated bosom has issued the salutary thunderbolt, which in crushing atheism has imparted to all true republicans the consolatory idea of being free agents in the sight of the Supreme Being, and in expectation of the immortality of the soul. *Long live the convention! long live the republic! long live the Mountain!*" All the addresses besought the convention anew to retain the supreme power. One of the addresses even called upon it to sit till the reign of virtue should be established in the republic upon imperishable foundations.

From that day the words *virtue* and *Supreme Being* were in every body's mouth. Upon the principal facings of the temples, where had been inscribed, To Reason (*A la Raison*), there was now inscribed, To the Supreme Being. The remains of Rousseau were transferred to the Pantheon. His widow was presented to the convention, and received a pension.

Thus the committee of public welfare, triumphant over all the different parties, invested with all the authorities, placed at the head of an enthusiastic and victorious nation, who were proclaiming the reign of virtue and the doctrine of the Supreme Being, had arrived at the height of its authority, and to the furthermost extension of its systems.

CHAPTER XX.

STATE OF EUROPE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR 1794 (YEAR II.)—UNIVERSAL PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.—PITT'S POLICY.—PLANS OF THE ALLIES AND THE FRENCH.—THE STATE OF OUR ARMIES ON LAND AND AT SEA. ACTIVITY AND ENERGY OF THE GOVERNMENT IN OBTAINING AND BRINGING HER RESOURCES INTO ACTION—OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN; OCCUPATION OF THE PYRENEES AND THE ALPS.—OPERATIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS—BATTLES ON THE SAMBRE AND THE LYS—VICTORY OF TURCOING—TERMINATION OF THE WAR IN LA VENDÉE—COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR OF THE CHOUANS—EVENTS IN THE COLONIES—UNFORTUNATE OCCURRENCE IN SAINT-DOMINGO—LOSS OF MARTINIQUE—A NAVAL ACTION.

Both in Europe and in France the winter had been employed in making preparations for a new campaign. England was still the soul of the coalition, and urged the continental powers to advance and to destroy on the banks of the Seine a revolution that alarmed her, as also a rival that was most hateful to her. The implacable son of Chatham had this year made immense efforts to crush France. It was, however, not without opposition that he had obtained from the English Parliament means proportionate to his vast projects. Lord Stanhope in the upper house, Fox and Sheridan in the lower, were continually opposed to the conduct of the war. They denied all sacrifices demanded by the ministers; they were for granting no more than what was actually necessary for the defence of the coast, and above all, they would not allow this war to be termed *just and necessary*, as it was, in their opinion, unjust, ruinous, and punished with deserved want of success. The motives inferred from the opening of the Scheldt, the dangers of Holland, and the necessity of defending the British Constitution, had no real foundation. Holland had not been put in jeopardy by the opening of the Scheldt, and the British Constitution was not endangered. The object of the ministers was to destroy a people who had determined to be free, and to continually augment their own personal influence and authority, under the pretence of defending themselves from the machinations of the French Jacobins. This struggle had been kept up by unfair means. They had fomented civil war and wholesale murder; but a brave and generous nation had frustrated the attempts of its adversaries by unexampled courage and exertions. Stanhope, Fox, and Sheridan concluded that such a contest was discreditable and ruinous to England. They were mistaken on one point. The English opposition may frequently reproach ministers with waging unjust, but never disadvantageous wars. If the war carried on against France was not founded in justice, it possessed excellent motives of policy, as we shall presently see; and the opposition, misled by liberal notions, forgot the advantages that England was about to derive from this war.

Pitt affected alarm at the threats of invasion uttered in the tribune of the convention. He pretended that the labourers of Kent had said, "See, the French are coming to bring us the rights of man." He made these words (paid for, it is said, by himself,) an authority for assuming that the constitution was in danger; he had denounced the corresponding societies in England, which had become somewhat more active, following the example of the clubs of France; and he insisted that, under pretence of a parliamentary reform, their design was to establish a convention. In consequence of this, he called for the suspension of the *habeas corpus*, the seizure of the papers of these societies, and the prosecution of a few of their members. Moreover, he called for the power of enlisting volunteers, and of maintaining them by means of private donations or subscriptions, of increasing the land forces and the navy, and of raising a mercenary troop of forty thousand foreigners, French emigrants and others. The opposition made a spirited resistance; it contended that there was nothing that could warrant the suspension of the most valuable of the liberties of Englishmen; that the prosecuted societies deliberated in public; that their opinions, openly expressed, could not be deemed conspiracies; that these notions were common to all England, since they confined themselves to a parliamentary reform; that the immoderate increase of the land forces was inconsistent with the freedom of the English people; that if the volunteers could be armed and accoutred by private subscription, it would become allowable for the minister to raise armies without the authority of Parliament; that the pay of so great a number of foreigners would be ruinous, and that it had no other object than to pay those Frenchmen who were traitors to their country. In spite of the remonstrances of the opposition, which had never been either more eloquent or less numerous, for it could not reckon on more than thirty or forty votes, Pitt obtained all that he desired, and caused all the bills he had brought in to be passed.

As soon as these demands were accorded, he caused the militia to be doubled; he raised the land forces to sixty thousand men, and the marines to eighty thousand; he organized fresh corps of emigrants, and brought to trial several members of the corresponding societies. An English jury, a more solid guarantee than the parliament, acquitted the accused; but this mattered little to Pitt, who at this time had in his hands all the means of repressing the slightest political movement, and of displaying a colossal power before Europe.

This was the moment to take advantage of this universal war, so as to crush France, to ruin her navy for ever, and to take her colonies from her—a much more sure and desirable result in the eyes of Pitt, than the suppression of certain political and religious doctrines. He had succeeded in the preceding year in arming against France the two

maritime powers which should always have continued in alliance with her, Spain and Holland; he was doing his utmost to support them in their political error, and to turn it to the best account against the French navy. England was able to send out of her ports at least one hundred sail of the line, Spain forty, and Holland twenty, without taking a multitude of frigates into the account. How was France, with the fifty or sixty ships left her after the conflagration at Toulon, able to defend herself against such a force? Thus, although no naval action had yet been fought, the English flag had the sovereignty in the Mediterranean, in the Atlantic Ocean, and in the Indian Seas. In the Mediterranean, the English squadrons threatened the Italian powers, who desired to preserve their neutrality, blockaded Corsica, in order to wrest it from us, and was only waiting for a favourable opportunity to land troops and ammunition in La Vendée. In America they surrounded our Antilles, and sought to make their account by the terrible dissensions prevailing between the whites, the mulattoes, and the blacks, in order to gain possession of them all. In the Indian Seas they perfected the establishment of British power and the ruin of Pondicherry. One campaign more, and our commerce would be destroyed, whatever might be the fate of our arms on the continent. Thus nothing could be more politic than the war waged by Pitt with France, and the opposition was evidently in the wrong to argue against it on the score of advantage. The opposition would have argued justly on only one point, but that point has never yet occurred; if the English national debt, continually increasing, and now become enormous, does really exceed the wealth of the country, and must some day ruin her, England will have exceeded her means, and will have done wrong in struggling for an empire at the expense of her own resources. But this is a mystery of the future.

Pitt never stopped at any injustice to augment his resources and to aggravate the calamities of France. The Americans, happy under Washington, freely traversed the seas, and began to engage in that vast freighting business which has enriched them during the long wars of the continent. The British squadrons stopped American ships, and pressed their seamen. More than five hundred vessels had already been subjected to this injustice, and it became the subject of warm and hitherto useless remonstrances on the part of the American government. This was by no means all: under cover of the neutrality, the Americans, the Danes, and the Swedes, frequented our ports, and imported thither relief in corn, which the dearth rendered extremely valuable, and many articles necessary for the navy; and exported in exchange the wines and other produce that the soil of France affords the world. Owing to this intermediate agency of neutrals, commerce was not entirely suspended, and provision was thus made for some of the necessary articles of consumption. England considering France as a besieged place, which should be famished and reduced to extremity, was desirous of infringing these rights of neutrals, and addressed notes full of sophistry to the northern courts, in order to induce a violation of the law of nations.

While England was making use of these means in every possible way, she had still forty thousand men in the Netherlands, under the command of the Duke of York; Lord Moira, who had been unable to reach Granville in time, was lying at Jersey with his squadron and ten thousand marines; lastly, the English treasury held funds at the disposal of all the belligerent powers.

On the continent, the enthusiasm had somewhat cooled. The powers who had not the same stake in the war as England, and who only carried it on in support of doubtful principles, did not prosecute the war with the same ardour or with the same activity. England endeavoured to stir them all up. She still held Holland under her yoke by means of the prince of Orange, and compelled her to furnish her quota to the allied army of the north. Thus that unhappy nation had its ships and its regiments in the service of its most formidable enemy, and against its most stedfast ally. Prussia, in spite of the mysticism of her king, had in a great measure shaken off the illusory notions in which she had been instructed for upwards of two years. The retreat of Champagne, in 1792, and that of the Vosges in 1793, afforded her no great encouragement. Frederic-William, who had been recently exhausting his treasury, and weakening his army, in a war which could not produce any favourable result to his kingdom, and which could at best serve the house of Austria, would have renounced it altogether. Besides this, a subject of far greater interest for him called him to the north; namely, Poland, who had put herself in motion, and whose dissevered members were inclined to re-unite. England, taking advantage of him in the midst of his indecision, prevailed upon him to continue the war by the all-powerful means of her gold. She concluded at the Hague in the name of herself and of Holland, a treaty by which Prussia engaged to furnish sixty-two thousand four hundred men for the service of the allies. This army was to have a Prussian for its commander, and its future conquests were to be in common with the two maritime powers, England and Holland. In return, those two powers undertook to furnish [the king of] Prussia with fifty thousand pounds sterling per month for the maintenance of his troops, and to pay him besides for bread and forage. Over and above this sum, they granted three hundred thousand pounds for the first expenses of taking the field, and one hundred thousand pounds for the expenses of his return to the Prussian states. It was at this price that Prussia continued the impolitic war which she had begun.

The house of Austria had no further cause for interference with France, since the queen, the wife Louis XVI. had expired on the scaffold. Austria had far less to dread the contagious principles of the revolution than any other country, since the political discussions of the last thirty years have not yet awakened the public mind in that kingdom. Her only motive then for making war upon us was pure revenge; her engagements, therefore, with the allies, and a desire of acquiring some few fortresses in the Netherlands, perhaps idle and vague expectations of acquiring a portion of our provinces, might have operated as an additional motive. She not only infused greater ardour in her operations than Prussia, but also a greater

share of real activity; for all she had to do was to make up and re-organize her regiments without increasing their number. A great part of her troops was in Poland, for she had, like Prussia, a powerful motive for looking behind her, and turning her thoughts in the direction of the Vistula, quite as much as to the Rhine. Gallicia occupied her attention not less than the Netherlands and Alsatia.

Sweden and Denmark maintained a discreet neutrality, and replied to the sophistries of England, that the law of nations was immutable, that there was no reason that it should be violated in respect of France, in fact, nor that the laws of blockade should be applied to an entire country, such laws being in their nature applicable only to a besieged fortress; that Danish and Swedish vessels were well received in France; that they did not find there any barbarians, as they were termed, but a government that honourably discharged the claims of stranger merchants, and who conserved all the relations due to those nations with whom it was at peace; that therefore there was no reason for breaking off such an advantageous intercourse. In consequence of this, although Catharine, in every way favourable to the designs of the English, seemed to declare herself against the rights of neutral nations, Sweden and Denmark persisted in their resolutions, preserved a prudent and firm neutrality, and concluded a treaty by which both of the two countries engaged to maintain the rights of neutrals, and to enforce the observance of a clause in the treaty of 1780, which closed the Baltic against the armed vessels of such powers as had no port in that sea. France, therefore, had reasonable expectation of importing corn from the north, as also the timber and hemp requisite for her navy.

Russia, always affecting great indignation against the French revolution, and holding out great hopes to the emigrants, thought of nothing but Poland, and was not so wrapped up in the policy of the English, but as a means of obtaining the adhesion of the English to the policy of the Russians. This accounts for the silence of England, in respect of an event of no less importance than the disappearance of a kingdom from the theatre of politics. At this moment of general spoliation, when England was acquiring so great a share of superiority in the south of Europe as well as at sea, it would hardly have been in good taste for her to have addressed the language of justice to the partitioners of Poland. Thus those allies who accused France of having fallen into barbarism, were committing in the north the most barefaced plunder (*brigandage*) that policy ever tolerated, and at the same time were contemplating a similar act against France, and were lending their mutual assistance to destroy for ever the liberty of the seas.

The German princes followed the movement of the house of Austria. Switzerland, protected by her mountains and exempted by her institutions from engaging in a crusade on behalf of monarchies, persisted in not espousing either party, and covered by her neutrality the eastern provinces, the most unprotected of all. She performed the same part upon the continent that the Americans, the Swedes, and the Danes, did at sea; she rendered the same services to French commerce, and reaped the same benefit therefrom. She supplied us with the horses necessary for our armies, and with cattle, of which we had been deficient ever since the war had ravaged the Vosges and La Vendée; she exported the produce of our manufactures, and thus became the intermediate agent of a most advantageous commerce. Piedmont continued the war, doubtless with regret, but she could not consent to lay down her arms, after having lost two provinces, Savoy and Nice, at this sanguinary and awkwardly played game. The Italian powers wished to be neuter, but in keeping to that intention they suffered great annoyance. The republic of Genoa had witnessed the English commit a disgraceful act, in fact a substantive breach of the law of nations. They had seized upon a French frigate that had cast anchor there under shelter of the Genoese neutrality, and had slaughtered the crew. Tuscany had been obliged to dismiss the French resident. Naples, who had recognized the republic when the French squadrons threatened her coasts, made great demonstrations against her now that the English flag was displayed in the Mediterranean, and promised to send eighteen thousand men for the relief of Piedmont. Rome, fortunately powerless, cursed us, and had allowed the French agent, Basseville, to be murdered within her walls. Lastly, Venice, though somewhat flattered by the democratical language of France, would not on any account engage herself in a war, and hoped under advantage of her remote situation to preserve her neutrality. Corsica was on the point of slipping out of our hands, since Paoli had declared for the English; all that we now possessed in that island were Bastia and Calvi.

Spain, the least guilty of our enemies, continued an impolitic war, and persisted in committing the same indiscretion as Holland. The pretended obligations of thrones, the victories of Ricardos, together with English influence, decided her to try one more campaign, though she was greatly exhausted, in want of soldiers, and still more in want of money. The celebrated Alcudia caused d'Aranda to be disgraced for having advised peace.

Politics, therefore, had suffered but little change since the preceding year. Interests, errors, indiscretions, and crimes, were the same in 1794 as in 1793. England alone had increased her forces. The allies still had in the Netherlands one hundred and fifty thousand men, Austrians, Germans, Dutch, and English. Twenty-five or thirty thousand Austrians were at Luxembourg; sixty-five thousand Prussians and Saxons in the environs of Mentz. Fifty thousand Austrians, intermixed with some emigrants, lined the Rhine from Manheim to Bâle. The Piedmontese army still consisted of forty thousand men and seven or eight thousand Austrian auxiliaries. Spain had made some levies to recruit her battalions, and demanded some pecuniary aid of her clergy, but her army was not more considerable than in the preceding year, and never exceeded about sixty thousand men, distributed between the eastern and western Pyrenees.

It was in the north that the allies intended to direct their most decisive attacks against us, by supporting themselves upon Condé, Valenciennes, and Le Quesnoy. The celebrated Mack had prepared at London a plan from which great results were expected. On the present occasion, the

German tactician, demonstrating a little more boldness, had caused a march to Paris to form part of his scheme of the war. Unluckily it was now too late for the display of any such foolhardiness, for the French could no longer be taken by surprise, and their forces were immense. The plan consisted in taking one more fortress, that of Landrecies, collecting in force at that point, bringing the Prussians from the Vosges towards the Sambre, and in marching forward, leaving two divisions on the wings, one in Flanders, the other on the Sambre. At the same time Lord Moira was to land his troops in La Vendée, and aggravate our own danger by a forced march upon Paris.

To take Landrecies, after they had got Valenciennes, Condé, and Le Quesnoy, was a puerile idea; to cover the communications towards the Sambre was most judicious; but to station a division to protect Flanders was very useless, when the intention was to form a powerful invading mass; to bring the Prussians upon the Sambre was very questionable, as we shall presently see; lastly, a diversion in La Vendée had been for upwards of a year impracticable, for the entire Vendée had perished. We shall soon perceive, from the comparison of the design with the event, the folly of all these plans of campaign dictated at London*.

The allies had not, we say, brought great resources into action. There were at this moment no more than three really active powers in Europe, England, Russia, and France. The reason is simple enough; England wanted exclusive possession of the seas, Russia to secure Poland, and France to save her existence and her liberty. There were no adequate motives beyond these three great interests: the only moral elevation existed on the part of France; and in furtherance of this interest she called into action the greatest exertions that history has ever recorded.

The permanent requisition, decreed in the month of August in the preceding year, had already procured reinforcements for the armies, and contributed to those successes which terminated the campaign; but this important measure could not possibly produce its full effect till the ensuing campaign. Owing to this extraordinary movement, twelve hundred thousand men had left their homes, and covered the frontiers, or filled the depôts of the interior. The formation of these fresh troops into brigades had already begun. One battalion of the line was incorporated with two battalions of the new levy, and excellent regiments were thus formed. On this plan they had organized seven hundred thousand men, who were immediately sent off to the frontiers and distributed among the fortresses. There were, including the garrisons, two hundred and fifty thousand in the north; forty thousand in the Ardennes; two hundred thousand on the Rhine and the Moselle; one hundred thousand at the Alps; one hundred and twenty thousand at the Pyrenees; and eighty thousand from Cherbourg up to La Rochelle. The means adopted for the equipment of these forces had been neither less prompt or less extraordinary than the mode of getting them together. The manufactures of arms established in Paris and in the provinces, had soon attained that degree of activity which it had been intended they should have, and produced amazing quantities of cannons, swords, and muskets.

The committee of public welfare adroitly availing itself of the French character, had contrived to bring into use the manufacture of saltpetre. Already had the committee, in the preceding year, ordered a visitation to be made of all the cellars, for the purpose of extracting from them the mould impregnated with saltpetre. It soon did more; it drew up directions, a model of simplicity and clearness, so as to inform the citizens how to lixiviate the mould of the cellars. The committee, moreover, paid some operative chemists to instruct them in the preparation. The practice soon became generally introduced; people handed to one another the instructions which they had received, and each house furnished some pounds of this valuable salt. Some of the quarters of Paris assembled for the purpose of carrying with pomp to the convention the saltpetre they had manufactured. A *fête* was appointed, on which every one was to come and deposit his offering on the altar of the country. Emblematic forms were given to the salt; all sorts of epithets were lavished upon it; they called it the *avenging salt, the liberating salt* (*sel vengeur, sel libérateur*). The people amused themselves with it, but they also produced considerable quantities of it; and the government had attained its object. Some slight confusion naturally occurred amongst all this. The cellars were dug out, and the mould, after it had been lixiviated, lay in the streets, which it obstructed and spoiled. An ordinance of the committee of public welfare put an end to this nuisance, and the lixiviated earth was replaced in the cellars. There was a deficiency of saline substances; the committee ordered that all herbs not used either as food for cattle, or for domestic or rural purposes, should be immediately burned, in order to be employed in the making of saltpetre, or converted into saline substances.

Government possessed the tact of introducing another fashion that was not less serviceable. It was easier to raise men and to manufacture arms than to find horses, of which both the artillery and the cavalry were very much in want. The war had rendered them scarce, and the demand and the general rise in the prices of all commodities had increased their value. It became necessary to recur to the grand expedient of requisitions, that is to say, to take by force what an indispensable necessity required. In each canton, one horse out of twenty-five was taken, and paid for at the rate of nine hundred francs. But however mighty force may be, good will is much more effective. The committee suggested that an offering should be made to it of a horse soldier fully equipped. The example was then universally followed. Communes, clubs, sections, were eager to offer to the republic what were called Jacobin cavaliers, completely mounted and equipped.

They had soldiers, but officers were wanting. The committee acted in this respect with its accustomed promptitude. "The revolution," said Barrère, "must accelerate all things for the supply of

* Those who are desirous of reading the most able political and military discussion upon this subject; have only to refer to the critical memoir written by general Jomini upon this campaign, and annexed to his great History of the Wars of the Revolution.

its necessities. The revolution is to the human mind what the sun of Africa is to vegetation." The school of Mars was re-established; young men, selected from every province, repaired on foot, and in military order, to Paris. Encamped in tents on the plain of Sablons, they repaired thither to acquire rapid instruction in every department of the art of war, and were then to distribute themselves throughout the armies.

Efforts equally energetic were made to refit our navy. It consisted in 1789 of fifty men of war and as many frigates. The disorders of the revolution, and the misfortunes at Toulon, had reduced it to about fifty vessels, of which not more than thirty at the utmost were in a fit state to put to sea. The chief deficiency was in men and officers. The navy required experienced men, and all the experienced men were opposed to the revolution. The reform effected in the staffs of the land forces thus became still more necessary in the staffs of the naval forces, and could not fail to cause a much greater disorganization therein. The two ministers, Monge and d'Albarade, had yielded to the pressure of these difficulties, and had been dismissed. The committee resolved, in this instance also, to have recourse to extraordinary measures. Jean-Bon-Saint-André and Prieur (of La Marne), were sent to Brest with the usual powers of commissioners of the convention. The Brest squadron, after having arduously cruised for four months off the west coast to prevent communication between the Vendeans and the English, had mutinied in consequence of its protracted neglect. No sooner had it come home, than Admiral Morard de Gales was arrested by the representatives, and rendered responsible for the disorderly conduct of the squadron. The crews were entirely remodelled and reorganized in the usual prompt and violent manner of the Jacobins. Peasants, who had never been sailors, were put on board the ships of the republic to manœuvre against veteran English sailors. Inferior officers were raised to the highest ranks, and Villaret-Joyeuse, the captain of a man of war, was promoted to the command of the squadron. In a month's time, a fleet of thirty men of warwas ready to set sail; the fleet left the port full of enthusiasm, and amidst the acclamations of the people of Brest; not indeed to defy the formidable squadrons of England, Holland, and Spain, but to protect a convoy of two hundred sail, bringing a considerable quantity of corn from America, and ready to fight to the last extremity if the safety of the convoy required it. Meanwhile, Toulon was the theatre of not less rapid alterations. The ships that had escaped the flames were repaired, and new ones built. The expenses were levied upon the property of those Toulonnais who had assisted in surrendering their port to the enemy. To make up for the large ships which were under repair, a multitude of privateers covered the sea, and made valuable prizes. A bold and courageous nation, that is deficient in the means of carrying on war upon a large scale, can always resort to a system of petty warfare, and therein display its intelligence and its valour; by land, it carries on war by light or irregular troops, and at sea by means of privateers. According to the report of Lord Stanhope, we had taken from 1793 to 1794, four hundred and ten ships, whereas the English had taken from us no more than three hundred and sixteen. The government then did not shrink from the task of re-establishing even the naval portion of our forces.

Such prodigious exertions could not fail to produce their consequences, and we were about to reap in 1794 the benefit of the exertions of 1793.

The campaign first opened on the Pyrenees and on the Alps. Far from being active on the western, it was destined to be much more so on the eastern Pyrenees, where the Spaniards had gained the line of the Tech, and still occupied the famous camp of Boulou. Ricardos was dead, and that famous general had been succeeded by one of his lieutenants, the Count de la Union, an excellent soldier, but an indifferent commander. Not having yet received the fresh reinforcements which he expected, La Union thought of nothing further than keeping Boulou. The French were commanded by the brave Dugommier, the conqueror of Toulon. Part of the ordnance and the troops employed in that service had been sent before Perpignan, while the new levies were training in the rear. Dugommier was enabled to bring thirty-five thousand men into line, and to make the most of the wretched state in which the Spaniards then were. Dagobert, still remarkably active notwithstanding his age, proposed a scheme of invasion by the Cerdagne, which, carrying the French beyond the Pyrenees and upon the rear of the Spanish army, would have obliged the latter to retrograde. It was deemed preferable to attempt, in the first instance, an attack on the camp of Boulou; and Dagobert, who was with his division in the Cerdagne, was directed to await the result of that attack. The camp of Boulou, situated on the banks of the Tech, and sheltered by the Pyrenees, had for its outlet the causeway of Bellegarde, which forms the high road between France and Spain. Dugommier, instead of approaching in front of the enemy's positions, which were extremely well fortified, considered how he might by some means or other push forward between Boulou and the causeway of Bellegarde, so as to reduce the Spanish camp. Every thing succeeded to a miracle. La Union had got the bulk of his forces to Céret, and had left the heights of Saint-Christophe, which command the Boulou, insufficiently protected. Dugommier crossed the Tech, dispatched part of his troops in the direction of Saint-Christopher, and attacked with the rest the front of the Spanish positions, and after a brisk action, remained master of the heights. From that moment the camp became no longer tenable. The enemy was obliged to retreat by the causeway of Bellegarde; but Dugommier made himself master of it, and left the Spaniards no more than a narrow and difficult road across the pass of Porteil. Their retreat soon became a rout. Being charged at the proper time and with briskness, they fled in confusion, leaving us fifteen hundred prisoners, one hundred and forty pieces of cannon, eight hundred mules laden with their baggage, and camp effects for twenty thousand men. This victory, gained in the middle of Floréal (the beginning of May), made us masters of the Tech, and took us beyond the Pyrenees. Dugommier immediately blockaded Collioure, Port Vendre, and Saint-Elme, with the intention of retaking them from the Spaniards. At the time of this important victory, the brave Dagobert, suffering from a fever,

closed his long and glorious career. This noble veteran, aged seventy-six years, carried with him the regret and the admiration of the army.

Nothing could be more brilliant than the opening of the campaign at the eastern Pyrenees. In the quarter of the western Pyrenees, we took the valley of Bastan; and these triumphs over the Spaniards, whom we had never yet conquered, excited universal satisfaction.

In the quarter of the Alps we had yet to establish our line of defence upon the great chain. Towards Savoy, we had, in the preceding year, driven back the Piedmontese into the valleys of Piedmont, but we had yet to take the posts of the Little Saint-Bernard and of Mont Cenis. In the quarter of Nice, the army of Italy was still encamped before Saorgio, without being able to force the formidable camp of the Fourches. General Dugommier had been succeeded by old Dumerbion, a brave officer, but almost always ill with the gout. Fortunately, he suffered himself to be entirely directed by young Bonaparte, who in the preceding year had decided the reduction of Toulon, by recommending the attack of *Little Gibraltar*. This service had gained Bonaparte the rank of a brigadier-general, and had given him great weight with the army. After having observed the enemy's positions, and ascertained the impossibility of carrying the camp of the Fourches, he was struck with an idea hardly less felicitous than that which in the preceding year had restored Toulon to the republic. Saorgio is situated in the valley of the Roya. Parallel with this valley is that of Oneglia, through which flows the Taggia. Bonaparte conceived the idea of throwing a division of fifteen thousand men into the valley of Oneglia, making this division ascend to the rise of the Tanaro, and then to push this division forward to Mount Tanarello, which is on the outside line of the upper Roya, and thus to intercept the causeway of Saorgio, between the camp of the Fourches and the pass of Tenda. The camp of the Fourches, cut off by these means from the high Alps, must necessarily be reduced. There was but one objection that could be made to this plan, and that was, it would compel the army to encroach on the territory of Genoa. But there was no necessity for the republic to make any scruple of this, for in the preceding year two thousand Piedmontese had passed through the Genoese territory, on their way to embark at Oneglia for Toulon; besides, the outrage committed by the English on the Modeste frigate, in the very port of Genoa, was the most signal violation of a neutral country. There was, moreover, an important advantage in extending the right of the army of Italy to Oneglia; they were able by this point to cover a part of the gulf of Liguria, in which Genoa is situated (*Riviera de Gênes*)*, by driving the privateers from the little port of Oneglia, whither they were accustomed to fly for shelter, and thus to secure the trade of Genoa with the south of France. This trade, which was carried on by coasting-vessels, was exceedingly impeded by English privateers and squadrons, and it was important to protect it, because it contributed to supply the south with corn. There could, therefore, be no hesitation in adopting the plan of Bonaparte. The representatives applied to the committe of public welfare for the necessary authority, and the execution of this plan was immediately ordered.

On the 17th Germinal (April 6) a division of fourteen thousand men, divided into five brigades, crossed the Roya. General Massena bore towards mount Tanardo, and Bonaparte with three brigades marched to Oneglia, drove out an Austrian division, and made good his entrance thither. He found in Oneglia twelve pieces of cannon, and cleared the port of all the privateers which infested those parts. While Massena was ascending the Tanardo to Tanarello, Bonaparte continued his movement, and proceeded from Oneglia to Ormèa in the valley of the Tanaro. He entered it on the 15th of April (28th Germinal), and there found some muskets, twenty pieces of cannon, and magazines full of cloth for the clothing of the troops. As soon as the French brigades had effected a junction in the valley of the Tanaro, they bore off in the direction of the upper Roya, to execute the prescribed movement on the left of the Piedmontese. General Dumerbion attacked the front of the Piedmontese, while Massena fell upon their flanks and upon their rear. After several very brisk actions, the Piedmontese abandoned Saorgio, and fell back on the pass of Tenda, and ultimately abandoned the pass of Tenda itself, in order to retreat for safety to Limona beyond the grand chain. During these occurrences in the valley of the Roya, the valleys of the Tinéa and the Vésubia were swept by the left of the army of Italy, and soon afterwards the army of the high Alps, piqued with emulation, took by main force the Saint-Bernard and Mont Cenis. Thus, from the middle of Floréal (the beginning of May) we were victorious over the whole chain of the Alps, and we occupied them from the first hillocks of the Apennines to Mont Blanc. Our right, supported by Ormèa, extended almost to the gates of Genoa, covered great part of that side of the Gulf of Liguria [or Genoa] called the Riviera di Ponenta, and thus protected their trade from the privateers. We had taken three or four thousand prisoners, fifty or sixty pieces of cannon, a great quantity of military equipments, and two fortresses. Our opening, therefore, was as fortunate at the Alps as at the Pyrenees, since on both those points we obtained a frontier and some portion of the enemy's resources. The campaign opened rather later on the great theatre of the war, that is, at the North. There five hundred thousand men were about coming into collision between the Vosges and the sea. The French still had their principal force about Lille, Guise, and Maubeuge. Pichegru had become their general. As commanding the army of the Rhine in the preceding year, he had contrived to appropriate to himself the honour of raising the blockade of Landau, which in reality belonged to young Hoche. He had insinuated himself into the confidence of Saint-Just, while Hoche was thrown into prison, and had obtained the command of the army of the North. Jourdan, esteemed as a prudent general, had not been considered as sufficiently energetic to

* The Riviera of Genoa comprehends those two sides of the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, or the Gulf of Genoa (Liguria), between which Genoa is situated. The side next the east is called *Riviera di Levanti*, and the other is called *Riviera di Ponenti*. *Trans.*

retain the chief command of the army of the North, and had succeeded Hoche at the army of the Moselle. Michaud also succeeded Pichegru at the army of the Rhine. Carnot still presided over the military operations, and directed them by means of his department. Saint-Just and Lebas had been sent to Guise, to rouse the energy of the army.

The nature of the localities required a very simple plan of operations, and one which could have very speedy and very extensive results; and that was to bring the great mass of the French forces to bear upon the Meuse, in the direction of Namur, and thus threatening the communications of the Austrians. This was then the key of the theatre of the war, and such it always will be, so long as war shall be carried on in the Netherlands against Austrians in their progress from the Rhine. Any diversion in Flanders was an indiscretion, for if the wing thrown into Flanders found itself strong enough to make head against the allies, it could do no more than assist in repelling them in front without affecting their retreat; and, if this wing were not considerable enough to obtain decisive results, the allies would only have occasion to let it advance into West Flanders, and might then enclose and drive it back without a chance of an outlet to the sea. Although Pichegru possessed acquirements, intelligence, and abundance of resolution, he was, after all, but moderately endued with military genius; he formed an erroneous judgment of the position; while Carnot, prepossessed with his plan of the preceding year, persisted in attacking the enemy directly in the centre, and in harassing him on both his wings; of course the principal mass was to act from Guise upon the centre of the allies, while two strong divisions, the one operating upon the Lys, the other upon the Sambre, were to make a double diversion. Such was the plan opposed to the offensive plan of Mack.

Cobourg was still commander-in-chief of the allies. The emperor of Germany had gone in person to the Netherlands to excite his army, and above all to make his presence a means of putting an end to the dissensions which were every moment arising among the allied generals. Cobourg collected a mass of about one hundred thousand men in the plains of the Cateau, to blockade Landrecies. This was the first act with which the allies meant to open the campaign, and until they could procure the Prussians to march from the Moselle to the Sambre.

It was towards the end of Germinal (March) that the movements commenced. The enemy's mass, after having repelled the French divisions which lay scattered before it, fixed itself in the neighbourhood of Landrecies. The duke of York was placed in observation near Cambray, and Cobourg in the direction of Guise. By the movement which the allies had just made, the French divisions of the centre, driven backwards, found themselves separated from the divisions of Maubeuge, which formed the right wing. On the 2nd Floréal (April 21) they attempted to join with these Maubeuge divisions. A sanguinary engagement took place on the Helpe. Our columns, still too much divided, were repulsed at all points, and brought back to the positions from which they had set out.

They now resolved upon making not only a renewed, but a general attack on the centre and on both wings. Desjardin's division, which was towards Maubeuge, was to make a movement in order to join Charbonnier's division, which was coming from the Ardennes. In the centre, seven columns were to act at once, and concentrically on the whole hostile mass grouped around Landrecies. Lastly, on the left, Souham and Moreau, starting from Lille with two divisions, forming a total of fifty thousand men, were ordered to advance into Flanders and to take Menin and Courtrai under the very eyes of Clerfait. The left of the French army operated without impediment, for prince Kaunitz, with the division which he had on the Sambre, could not prevent the junction of Charbonnier and Desjardins. The columns of the centre put themselves in motion upon the 7th Floréal (April 26), and marched from seven different points, against the Austrian army. This system of simultaneous and disjointed attacks, which had succeeded so ill with us last year, was not more successful on this occasion. These columns, too far apart from each other, could not support themselves, and gained no decisive advantage upon any one point. One of them, indeed, that of general Chappuis, was entirely defeated. This general, who had marched from Cambray, found himself opposed to the duke of York, who, as we have stated, was covering Landrecies on that side. He scattered his troops in different directions, and camp up before the entrenched positions of Trois-Ville with an inadequate force. Overwhelmed by the fire of the English, charged in flank by the cavalry, he was put to the rout, and his dispersed division returned confusedly (*pêle mêle*) to Cambray. These checks were less attributable to the troops than to the injudicious manner in which the operations were directed. Our young soldiers, sometimes staggered by a fire to which they were not yet accustomed, were, nevertheless, easy to lead and to be brought up to the attack, and they frequently displayed extraordinary ardour and enthusiasm.

While this unavailing attempt against the centre was being made, the diversion which was being effected in Flanders against Clerfait had perfectly succeeded. Souham and Moreau had started from Lille, and had got to Menin and Courtrai on the 7th Floréal (April 26). It is well known that those latter two fortresses are situated on a line with each other upon Lys, the other on its banks. Moreau invested the first, Souham seized upon the second. Clerfait, mistaken as to the march of the French, sought them where they were not to be found. However, he soon became apprised of the investment of Menin and the capture of Courtrai, and then tried to make us fall back by threatening our communications with Lille. In point of fact, on the 9th Floréal (April 28), he proceeded to Mouscrôen with eighteen thousand men, and was imprudently exposing himself to the attack of fifty thousand French troops, who might have crushed him in his retreat. Moreau and Souham, bringing up immediately a part of their forces towards their exposed communications, marched to Mouscrôen, and resolved to engage with Clerfait. He was intrenched in a position accessible only by five narrow defiles, defended by a formidable artillery On the 10th Floréal (April 29th), orders were

given for making the attack. Our young soldiers, most of whom saw fire for the first time, did not at first keep their ground; but the generals and officers exposed themselves exceedingly in endeavouring to rally them; they succeeded, and the positions were carried. Clerfait lost twelve hundred prisoners, eighty-four of whom were officers, thirty-three pieces of cannon, four pair of colours, and five hundred muskets. This was our first victory in the north, and it raised the courage of the army in an extraordinary degree. Menin was taken immediately afterwards. A division of emigrants who found themselves surrounded in the place, escaped by gallantly cutting their way through sword in hand.

The success of the left wing, and the defeat of the centre, determined Pichegru and Carnot to abandon the centre entirely, and to direct their attention exclusively to the wings. Pichegru despatched General Bonnaud with twenty thousand men to Sanglicen near Lille, in order to secure the communications with Moreau and Souham. He left at Guise no more than twenty thousand men under General Ferrand, and detached the rest in the direction of Maubeuge, to join the divisions of Desjardin and Charbonnier. These united forces made the right wing, destined to act upon the Sambre, amount to fifty-six thousand men. Carnot, forming a much more correct judgment than Pichegru as to the state of things, issued an order which decided the result of the campaign. Beginning to be made sensible that the point from which an attack upon the allies might be directed was the Sambre and the Meuse; that if beaten on that line, they would be separated from their main support; he ordered Jourdan to get together fifteen thousand men from the army of the Rhine, to leave upon the western slope of the Vosges the troops absolutely necessary for covering that frontier, then to quit the Moselle with forty-five thousand men, and proceed to the Sambre by forced marches. Jourdan's army, united to the army of Maubeuge, was to form a mass of ninety or a hundred thousand men, and to effect the inevitable defeat of the allies upon the decisive point. This order, the most brilliant of the whole campaign, and that to which the entire results are to be attributed, was issued on the 11th Floréal (April 30th), from the office of the committee of public welfare.

In the meantime Cobourg had taken Landrecies. Not attaching by any means sufficient importance to the defeat of Clerfait, he contented himself by detaching the duke of York towards Lamain, between Tournay and Lille.

Clerfait had proceeded into West Flanders, between the advanced left of the French and the sea. In this manner he became farther than ever removed from the grand army and from the relief which the duke of York was bringing him. The French, so disposed, that one division should support and replace the others (*échelonnés*) at Lille. Menin and Courtray formed an advanced column in Flanders. Clerfait, having got to Thielt, was between the sea and this column; and the duke of York, posted at Lamain, before Tournay, was between this column and the grand allied mass. Clerfait was desirous of making an attempt upon Courtrai, and proceeded to attack it on the 21st Floréal (May 10). Souham was at this moment in rear of Courtrai; he promptly made his arrangements, returned to the fortress to relieve Vandamme, and, while he made ready for a sortie, he detached Macdonald and Malbranck to Menin, with orders to cross the Lys at that place, and to get in the rear of Clerfait. The engagement took place on the 22nd (May 11). Clerfait had took the best situation he could on the causeway of Bruges and in the suburbs, but our young recruits boldly braved the fire from the houses and the batteries, and after a violent rencontre, obliged Clerfait to retreat. Four thousand men belonging to both sides covered the field of battle; and if instead of getting on the enemy's rear on the side next to Menin, they had got at his rear on the opposite side, they could have cut off his retreat towards Flanders.

This was the second time that Clerfait had been beaten by our victorious left wing. Our right wing, on the Sambre, was not so fortunate. Commanded by several generals, who held a council of war with the representatives, Saint-Just and Lebas, it was not so judiciously directed as the two divisions commanded by Souham and Moreau. Kléber and Marceau, who had been removed thither from La Vendée, might have led it on to victory, but their opinions were not much heeded. The movement prescribed to this right wing was to pass the Sambre, so as to march in the direction of Mons: a first passage was attempted on the 20th Floréal (May 9), but the necessary arrangements not having been made on the other bank, the army could not maintain its ground there, and was obliged to recross the Sambre in confusion. On the 22nd, Saint-Just resolved to try a second passage, notwithstanding the failure of the first. It would have been much better to have awaited the arrival of Jourdan, who, with his forty-five thousand men, must have rendered the success of the right wing infallible. But Saint-Just would not admit of hesitation or delay; and the generals were forced to obey this terrible proconsul. The new passage was not more lucky than the first. The French army crossed the Sambre a second time; but again attacked on the other bank before it had gained a firm position there, it would have been lost but for the intrepidity of Marceau and the firmness of Kléber.

Thus for a month past the contending parties had been fighting from Maubeuge to the sea with incredible resolution, and without any decisive successes. Successful on the left, we were unfortunate on the right; but our troops got into order, and the bold and skilful movement prescribed to Jourdan led the way to important results.

Mack's plan had become impracticable. The Prussian general Moellendorf refused to repair to the Sambre, observing that he had no orders to that effect from his court. The English diplomatists were about compelling the Prussian cabinet to make an explanation relative to the treaty of the Hague, and in the mean time, Cobourg, exposed to an attack on one of his wings, had been obliged to disband his centre, after the example of Pichegru. He had reinforced Kaunitz towards the Sambre, and had moved the main body of his army towards Flanders, to the environs of Tournay. A decisive action was, therefore, about to take place on the left, for the moment was fast approaching when mighty masses were about to come into collision and fight with one another.

There was at that time a plan conceived at the Austrian staff, a plan which was called the *destructive* plan; the scope of this plan was to cut off the French army from Lille, to surround it, and then to annihilate it. Such an operation was practicable, for the allies could bring nearly one hundred thousand men into action against seventy thousand; but they made rather singular arrangements for attaining this object. The French were still distributed in the following manner. Souham and Moreau at Menin and Courtray with fifty thousand men, and Bonnaud in the environs of Lille with twenty thousand. The allies were still divided upon the two flanks of this advanced line; Clerfait's division on the left in West Flanders, and the mass of the allies on the right, in the direction of Tournay. The allies resolved to make a concentric effort on Turcoing, which separates Menin and Courtray from Lille. Clerfait was to march thither from West Flanders, passing through Werwick and Luicelles. Generals de Busch, Otto, and the duke of York, received orders to march from the opposite side, that is, from Tournay. De Busch was to proceed to Moucrôen, Otto to Turcoing itself, and the duke of York, advancing to Roubaix and Mouvaux, was to form a junction with Clerfait. By this latter junction, Souham and Moreau would be cut off from Lille. General Kinsky and the archduke Charles, were directed, with two strong columns, to drive Bonnaud back into Lille. These arrangements, in order to have succeeded, would have required a combination of movements impossible to effect. The greater part of these corps had to proceed from extremely distant points, and Clerfait had to march through the French army.

These movements were to be executed on the 28th Floréal (May 17). Pichegru at that time had gone to the left wing of the Sambre, to repair the checks which that wing had just experienced. Souham and Moreau took the command of the army in the absence of Pichegru. The first demonstration of the designs of the allies was given them by the march of Clerfait to Werwick: they instantly moved from that quarter; but, on learning that the main army of the enemy was approaching on the opposite side and threatening their communications, they formed a prompt and judicious resolution, namely, to make an attempt on Turcoing, with a view to possess themselves of this decisive position between Menin and Lille. Moreau remained with Vandamme's division before Clerfait, in order to retard his march, and Souham marched upon Turcoing with forty-five thousand men. The communications with Lille not being yet interrupted, the French general could therefore send orders to Bonnaud to advance on his side to Turcoing, and to make a powerful effort to preserve the communication with that position and Lille. The arrangements of the French generals had the most complete success. Clerfait could advance but slowly; delayed at Werwick, he could not reach Luicelles on the prescribed day. General de Busch had at first possessed himself of Moucrôen, but had afterwards received a slight check, and Otto, having subdivided his troops in order to render him assistance, was not left sufficiently strong in his forces at Turcoing; lastly, the duke of York had advanced to Roubaix and Mouvaux, without seeing anything of Clerfait. or being able to effect a junction with him; Kinsky and the archduke Charles had not arrived towards Lille till very late in the day of the 28th (May 17). Next morning, the 29th (May 18), Souham marched briskly upon Turcoing, carrying all before him, and made himself master of that important position. Bonnaud, on his part, marching from Lille upon the duke of York, who was to put himself between Turcoing and Lille, found him with his troops in subdivided portions upon an extended line. The English, though taken unawares, attempted to make a stand, but our young recruits, marching with ardour, compelled them to give way, and to throw down their arms, and fly. The rout was so complete, that the duke of York, riding off at full gallop, was indebted solely to the swiftness of his horse for his escape. From that moment the confusion among the allies became general; and from the heights of Templeuve the emperor of Austria witnessed the flight of his whole army. Meanwhile, the archduke Charles, ill supplied with intelligence, and disadvantageously posted, was remaining inactive below Lille, and Clerfait, stopped towards the Lys, was compelled to retreat; such was the fate of this "destructive" plan (*plan de destruction*). It gave us several thousand prisoners, a great quantity of ordnance, and the glory of a great victory, obtained by seventy thousand men over nearly one hundred thousand.

Pichegru arrived when the battle was won. All the allied corps fell back upon Tournay; and Clerfait, getting back to Flanders, resumed his position at Thielt. Pichegru did not make the best use of this important victory. The allies were grouped near Tournay, having their right supported on the Scheldt. The French general was desirous of intercepting a quantity of forage coming up the Scheldt, and he made his whole army fight for this puerile object. Drawing near the Scheldt, he closely surrounded the allies in their semicircular position of Tournay. Presently every one of his regiments were successively engaged upon this semicircle. The action was hottest at Pont-a-Chin, by the side of the Scheldt. For twelve hours there was a most frightful carnage, and without any possible result. From seven to eight thousand men perished on both sides. The French army fell back, after burning some boats, and losing in part that superiority which the battle of Turcoing had secured for it.

We might nevertheless consider ourselves as victorious in Flanders; and the necessity to which Cobourg was reduced of sending for reinforcements elsewhere, soon rendered our superiority there more decided. On the Sambre, Saint-Just had desired to effect a third passage, and to invest Charleroi; but Kaunitz being reinforced, had caused the siege to be raised at the moment when, by great good fortune, Jourdan arrived with the whole army of the Moselle. From that time, ninety thousand men were about to act on the true line of operations, and terminate the fluctuations of victory. On the Rhine nothing of importance had occurred, except that General Müllendorff, taking advantage of the diminution of our forces in that quarter, had taken from us the post of Kayserslautern, but he relapsed into inactivity immediately after his gaining this advantage. Thus, from the month of Prairial (the end of May), and along the

whole line of the North, we had not only withstood the league of the allied powers, but had also triumphed over this league in several engagements. We had gained one great victory, and we were advancing on the two wings of their army in Flanders and on the Sambre. The loss of Landrecies was nothing by the side of these advantages, as also of those of which our present situation guaranteed the possession.

The war of La Vendée was not entirely concluded after the rout of Savenay. Three of the leaders were out of danger: Larochejacquelein, Stofflet, and Marigny. Besides these three chiefs, Charette, who, instead of crossing the Loire, had taken the island of Noirmoutiers, remained in Lower Vendée. This war was, however, confined to simple skirmishing, and was not of a nature to give the republic any uneasiness. General Turreau had been appointed to the command of the west. He had divided the available army into moveable columns, which scoured the country, directing their course concentrically to one and the same point. They fought with the fugitive bands when they fell in with them; and when they had none to fight with, they executed the decree of the convention; that is to say, they burned the forests and the villages, and carried away the inhabitants, in order to transport them elsewhere. Several actions had taken place, but they had not been productive of any important results. Haxo, after having recaptured the isles of Noirmoutiers and Bouin from Charette, had several times been in the expectation of capturing him also; but this daring party-leader had always escaped, and shortly afterwards made his appearance upon the field of battle with a constancy not less admirable than his adroitness. This unhappy war was thenceforward nothing else than a war of devastation. General Turreau had been constrained to adopt a cruel measure, namely, to order the inhabitants of the villages to quit the country, upon pain of being treated as enemies if they remained there any longer. This measure compelled them either to quit the soil from which they drew their means of existence, or else to submit to military executions. Such are the inevitable miseries of civil wars.

Brittany had become the theatre of a novel kind of war, the war of the Chouans. That province had already shown some disposition to imitate La Vendée; but the tendency to rise in rebellion was not so general, some individuals only, taking advantage of particular localities, had engaged in unconnected acts of spoliation. The remains of the Vendean column, which had passed into Brittany, soon increased the number of these followers of the Vendean party. Their principal station was in the forest of Perche, and they scoured the country in bands of forty or fifty, sometimes attacking the gendarmerie, levying contributions on small communes, and committing these disorders in the name of the royal and catholic cause. But the substantive war was at an end, and all that remained was to lament the particular calamities which afflicted these unhappy provinces.

In the colonies and at sea, the war was not less active than on the continent. The wealthy settlement of Saint-Domingo had been the theatre of the greatest horrors of which history makes mention. The whites had embraced with enthusiasm the cause of the revolution, which they thought would necessarily lead to their independence of the mother country. The mulattoes had not embraced the cause less cordially than the whites; but they looked for something more than the political independence of the colony, and aspired to the rights of citizenship, which had always been refused them. The constituent assembly had recognised the rights of the mulattoes; but the whites, who wanted to keep the revolution to themselves, had then revolted, and a civil war had commenced between the old race of free men, and those who had been just enfranchised. Taking advantage of this war, the blacks in their turn had appeared upon the stage, and had introduced themselves thither by fire and blood. They had murdered their masters and burned their property. From this moment the colony was abandoned to the most horrible confusion; both parties reproached the other with the new enemy that had newly presented himself, and accused each other of having supplied him with arms. The blacks, without yet ranging themselves on one side or the other, ravaged the country. However, it was not long before that, being excited by the Spanish party, they pretended to espouse the royal cause. To add still further to the confusion, the English had interfered. One part of the whites had applied to them at a period of danger, and had ceded to them the very important fort of Saint-Nicholas. The commissioner, Santhonax, assisted principally by the mulattoes and part of the whites, opposed the invasion of the English, and was only able at last to find one expedient for repelling it, and that was, to recognise the freedom of the blacks who should declare themselves in favour of the republic. The convention had confirmed this measure, and by a decree proclaimed all the negroes free. From that time, a portion of them who had espoused the royal cause went over to the party of the republicans; and the English, intrenched in fort Saint-Nicholas, had no longer any hopes of securing that rich settlement, which, after being long under spoliation, was destined at last to become independent of any foreign power. Guadaloupe, after having been captured and recaptured, still continued in our possession; but Martinique was absolutely lost to us for ever.

Such were the disorders in the colonies. At sea, an important event had occurred, namely, the arrival of that convoy from America, so impatiently expected in our ports. The Brest squadron, to the number of thirty vessels, had issued from that port, as we have already observed, with orders to cruise, but by no means to fight, unless the safety of the convoy imperatively required it. We have already stated that Jean-Bon-Saint-André was on board the admiral's ship; that Villaret-Joyeuse had been promoted from captain to commander of the squadron; that peasants who had never seen the sea had been placed among the crews; and that these sailors, officers, and admirals of a day, were sent forth to fight the veteran English navy. Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse set sail on the 1st Prairial (May 29), and made sail for the isles of Coves and Flores, to wait for convoy. He took by the way a great number of English merchantmen, the captains of which said to him, "*You are taking us by retail, but Lord Howe will soon take you by wholesale.*" In point of fact, that admiral was actually cruising

off the coasts of Brittany and Normandy with thirty-three vessels and twelve frigates. On the 9th Prairial (May 28th), the French squadron descried a fleet. The impatient crews watched those black specks on the horizon growing gradually larger and larger; and when they ascertained them to be the English, they set up shouts of enthusiasm, and insisted on fighting, with that ardent patriotism which has always distinguished the inhabitants of our coasts. Though the instructions given to the admiral did not allow him to fight unless to save the convoy, yet Jean-Bon-Saint-André, himself hurried away by the universal enthusiasm, consented to fight, and caused orders to be issued to prepare for action. Towards evening a ship of the rear division, *Le Révolutionnaire*, that had shortened sail, was brought to action by the English, made an obstinate resistance, lost her captain, and was obliged to be towed into Rochefort. Night prevented the action from becoming general.

Next day, the 10th (May 29), the two squadrons were opposite to one another. The English manœuvred against our rear-guard. The movement which we made to protect it brought on a general engagement. The French not managing so expertly two of their ships, *L'Indomptable* and *Le Tyrannicide*, found themselves opposed to a very superior force, and fought with determined courage. Villaret-Joyeuse ordered some of his squadron to go to the relief of the ships engaged; but his orders being neither clearly understood or properly executed, he advanced alone at the risk of not being followed. However, this was done soon afterwards; our whole squadron bore down upon that of the enemy, and obliged it to sheer off. Unfortunately, we had lost the weather-gauge. We kept up a terrible fire upon the English, but were unable to pursue them. However, we retained our two ships and the field of battle.

On the 11th and 12th (May 30 and 31), a thick fog enveloped the two fleets. The French endeavoured to lead the English to the north and to the west of the track which the convoy was to pursue. On the 13th the fog dispersed, and a bright sun shone upon both the fleets. The French had no more than twenty-six sail, while their adversaries had thirty-six. They again insisted on fighting, and it was agreed to indulge their ardour, for the purpose of occupying the English, and drawing them from the track of the convoy which was to pass over the scene of the battle of the 10th.

This action, one of the most memorable that ocean ever witnessed, began about nine in the morning. Lord Howe bore down to cut our line. A false tack of our ship, *La Montagne*, allowed him to break our line, to cut off our left wing, and to overwhelm it with all his force. Our right and our van were left separated. The admiral would have rallied them around him, with the intention of bearing down upon the English squadron, but he had lost the advantage of the wind, and it was five hours before he was able to approach the field of battle. Meanwhile the ships engaged fought with extraordinary heroism. The English, superior in manœuvring, lost their advantage when the ships lay to by each other's side, and had to encounter a tremendous fire and formidable boardings. It was in the heat of this obstinate action that the vessel *Le Vengeur*, dismasted, half destroyed, and ready to founder, refused to strike her colours at the peril of foundering in the sea. The English were the first to cease firing, and retired astounded at the defence we had offered. They had taken six of our ships. Next day, Villaret-Joyeuse, having collected his van and his right, was for bearing down upon them, and wresting from them their prey. The English, who had suffered greatly, might then perhaps have yielded the victory to us. Jean-Bon-Saint-André was against engaging with the enemy afresh, notwithstanding the enthusiasm of the crews. The English could therefore regain their ports unmolested; they returned to them, indeed, dismayed even with their victory, and filled with admiration at the intrepidity of our young seamen. But the essential object of this terrible conflict was accomplished. Admiral Venstabel had on that same day, the 13th, sailed over the scene of the battle of the 10th, which he found covered with wrecks, and had entered without accident the ports of France.

Thus victorious at the Pyrenees and at the Alps, formidable in the Netherlands, heroic at sea, and strong enough to dispute a naval victory most dearly bought by the English, we commenced the year 1794 in the most brilliant and glorious manner.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE STATE OF AFFAIRS AT HOME AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 1794—ADMINISTRATIVE LABOURS OF THE COMMITTEE—LAW OF THE FINANCES.—THE FUNDING OF LIFE ANNUITIES—STATE OF THE PRISONS—POLITICAL PERSECUTIONS—NUMEROUS EXECUTIONS—ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE ROBESPIERRE AND COLLOT D'HERBOIS—ABSOLUTE ASCENDANCY OF ROBESPIERRE—THE SECT OF "MÈRE DE DIEU"—DISSENSIONS EXHIBIT THEMSELVES IN THE COMMITTEES—"FÊTE" TO THE SUPREME BEING—LAW OF THE 22 PRAIRIAL REORGANISING THE REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL—EXTREME TERROR—GREAT EXECUTIONS AT PARIS—MISSION OF LEBON, CARRIER, AND MAIGNET; ATROCIOUS CRUELTIES PRACTISED BY THEM—"NOYADES" IN THE LOIRE—RUPTURE BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC WELFARE; ROBESPIERRE RETIRES FROM THE COMMITTEE.

WHILE the republic was victorious abroad, its internal state had been incessantly in a state of conflict. Its afflictions were still the same. These were the assignats, the *maximum*, the scarcity of the necessaries of life, the law against suspected persons, and the revolutionary tribunals.

The embarrassments resulting from the necessity for regulating all the motions of commerce could not but increase. They had been compelled to be constantly qualifying the law of the maximum; they were obliged to except from its operation, at one time, spun thread, and to allow it ten

per cent. above the tariff; at another time, pins, cambrics, linen, muslins, gauzes, laces of thread and silk, silks and silken goods. But while there existed a necessity for excepting from the operation of the *maximum* a great number of commodities, there were others which it was expedient should be subjected thereto. Thus, the value of horses having become extraordinarily high, they could not avoid determining their value according to height and quality. From these means the same inconvenience invariably arose. Commerce stood still and closed its markets, or opened clandestine ones; and here it was that authority became powerless. If by means of the assignats it had been enabled to realize the value of the national domains, and if by the *maximum* it had been enabled to place assignats on a par with merchandize, there was no way of preventing merchandize from being withdrawn and concealed from purchasers. So there was no end to the complaints raised against tradesmen who withdrew from business or who shut up their shops.

However, the state of articles of consumption caused less anxiety this year. The convoys arrived from America, and an abundant harvest had furnished a sufficient quantity of corn for the consumption of France. The committee, regulating every thing with the same vigour, had ordered a general statement of the harvest to be drawn up by the commission for provisioning, and that a portion of the corn should be immediately thrashed for the supply of the markets. There had been some apprehension that the itinerant reapers who leave their homes and go to the corn countries would demand extraordinary wages; the committee, therefore, declared that persons of both sexes, who were accustomed to do harvest-work, were under compulsory requisition, and that their wages should be determined by the local authorities. It was not long before, the journeymen butchers and bakers having turned out, the committee adopted a more general measure, and put in requisition mechanics of all kinds who were employed in the preparation, the carriage, and the sale of articles forming the necessaries of life.

The supplies of meat were far more difficult to regulate, and caused greater anxiety. This deficiency was more than ever felt at Paris; and, from the moment that the Hébertists attempted to make this scarcity a pretext for exciting commotion, the evil had rather increased. It had been found necessary to confine the city of Paris to a daily ration of meat. The commission for provisioning had settled the daily consumption at seventy-five oxen, one hundred and fifty quintals* weight of veal and mutton, and two hundred hogs. The commission procured the requisite cattle, and sent them to the *Hospice de l'Humanité*, which was appointed as the common and only authorized slaughter house. The butchers nominated by each section came thither, and took away the meat which was set out for them, and received a quantity in proportion to the population which they had to supply. Every five days they were to distribute to each family at the rate of half a pound of meat for each individual. On this occasion reference was to be made to the tickets delivered by the revolutionary committees for the distribution of bread, stating the number of individuals of which each family was composed. To prevent disturbance and long waiting, an order was issued prohibiting every one from going before six in the morning to the doors of the butchers.

The insufficiency of these regulations soon became apparent; already, as we have before observed, a set of surreptitious traders had established themselves in business as butchers. Their number daily increased. The cattle had not time to reach the markets of Neubourg, Poissy, and Sceaux; the country butchers forestalled them, and came to buy them even in the fields. Taking advantage of the less vigilant execution of the laws in the rural communes, these butchers sold above the *maximum*, and supplied all the inhabitants of the great communes, and particularly those of Paris, who were not content with the allowance of half a pound every five days. In this manner the country butchers absorbed the entire trade of the town butchers, who had scarcely anything to do since they were confined to the distribution of the rations. Several of them even applied for a law authorizing them to determine the leases of their shops. It then became necessary to make new regulations to prevent the diverting of cattle from the markets; and the occupiers of pasture grounds were subjected to declarations and to extremely annoying formalities. They were obliged to descend to still more minute details; as wood and charcoal no longer came to town on account of the *maximum*, under circumstances which suggested suspicions of a monopoly, no one was allowed to have more than four loads of wood, nor more than two loads of charcoal.

The new government addressed itself with a singular activity to surmount all the difficulties of the career that was set before it. While the government was issuing these multiplied regulations, it was engaged in reforming agriculture, altering the law of agricultural tenancy so as to effect an allotment of land in tillage, introducing a new system of cropping, an improved laying down of meadows, and the rearing of cattle; it decreed the institution of botanical gardens in all the capital towns of the departments, for the purpose of naturalizing exotic plants, forming nurseries of trees of all kinds, and opening courses of popular lectures on agriculture, adapted to the comprehension of agriculturists. Measures were taken for the general drainage of marshes, upon a comprehensive and well-conceived plan; it was settled that the state should advance the funds for this great undertaking, and that the owners whose lands should be drained and rendered wholesome should be subjected to a charge, or that they should sell their lands at a certain price. Lastly, the government invited all the architects to furnish plans for rebuilding the villages or demolishing the mansions. Improvements were ordered to be made, so as to render the garden of the Tuileries more commodious for the public; and artists were called upon to furnish a design for changing the Opera House into a covered arena, where the people might assemble in winter.

Thus it executed, or at least attempted, almost every thing at once; so true is it, that the more one has to do, the more one is capable of doing! The department of the finances was not the least difficult or the least perplexing of all. We have

* A Quintal weighs one hundred pounds. *Trans.*

already witnessed what resources were devised in the month of August 1793, to make the assignats current money, by withdrawing part of them from circulation. The one thousand millions withdrawn by the forced loan, and the victories which terminated the campaign of 1793, raised them, and, as we have elsewhere stated, they rose almost to par, owing to the terrible laws which rendered the possession of coin so dangerous. However, this apparent prosperity was of no long duration; the assignats very soon fell, and the quantity of issues rapidly depreciated them. Part of them, indeed, were called in as a consequence of the sales of the national property, but these receipts did not effect the remainder in circulation. That the government possessions should be sold above the estimate was not surprising, for the estimate had been made in money, and payment was made in assignats. Hence it arose that the consideration money was actually much below the true value, although it appeared to be above the estimated value. Moreover, this absorption of the assignats could be but slow, while the issue was necessarily immense and rapid. Twelve hundred thousand men to arm and to pay, with ammunition to provide, a navy to fit out, with a depreciated paper, required enormous quantities of that paper. This having become the only resource, and, besides, the capital of the assignats increasing daily by confiscations, the government made up its mind to employ them so long as occasion required. It abolished the distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary fund, the one arising from the produce of the taxes, the other from the creation of assignats. These two sorts of resources were consolidated, and, whenever occasion required, the revenue was supplied by fresh issues. At the beginning of 1794 (year II.), the sum total of the issues was doubled. Nearly four thousand millions had been added to the sum which previously existed, and had raised it to about eight thousand millions. Deducting the amounts which had been called in and burned, and those which had not yet been expended, there remained in present circulation five thousand five hundred and thirty-six millions. In Messidor, year II. (June, 1794), the creation of a new thousand millions of assignats was decreed, of all sums, from one thousand francs to fifteen sous. The committee of the finances again had recourse to a forced loan from the rich. The tax rolls of the preceding year were made use of, and upon those who were entered in those rolls was imposed an extraordinary war tax of one-tenth of the forced loan, that is to say, of ten millions. This sum was not levied upon them as a loan to be repaid, but as a tax which was to be paid by them without return.

In order to complete the establishment of the Great Book, and the plan of giving uniformity to the public debt, all that remained was to fund (*capitaliser*) the life annuities, and to convert them into so much stock (*inscription*). These annuities, of all descriptions and of every possible form, became the object of the most complicated stock-jobbing; like the old loan contracts they were subject to the same inconvenience, that of being founded upon a royal title, and obtaining a marked preference to republican securities; for it was commonly said, that if the republic should consent to pay the debts of the monarchy, the monarchy would never consent to pay those of the republic. Cambon, therefore, completed his grand work of the reformation of the debt, by moving for and carrying a law which funded the life annuities; the titles were to be delivered up by the notaries and burned as the contracts had been. The capital originally furnished, by the annuitant was converted into an *inscription*, and bore a perpetual interest at five per cent. instead of a life interest. At the same time, out of consideration for aged persons and annuitants of limited means, who desired to augment their resources by sinking them in life annuities, small annuities were preserved, and bore a proportion to the age of the individuals. From forty to fifty, every annuity from fifteen hundred to two thousand francs was suffered to stand; from fifty to sixty, every annuity of three to four thousand; and so on to the age of one hundred, and up to the sum of ten thousand five hundred francs. If the annuitant who came within the cases hereafter mentioned possessed an annuity exceeding the fixed standard, the surplus was funded. Certainly, greater consideration could not well be shown for moderate incomes and for old age; and yet no law ever gave rise to more remonstrances and complaints, and the convention incurred more censure for a discreet and humanely-conducted measure, than for those terrible measures which daily marked its dictatorship. The stock-jobbers were greatly thwarted, because the law, in order to recognize the credits, required certificates of the parties being alive. The holders of titles of emigrants could not easily procure these certificates; hence the jobbers, who were sufferers by this condition, complained loudly in the name of the aged and the infirm; they persuaded the annuitants that they should not be paid, because the mode of doing business, and the formalities which it required, would be attended with endless delays; however, it turned out otherwise. Cambon caused some clauses of the decree to be qualified; and by constantly watching its operation at the treasury, he carried its provisions into effect with the greatest promptitude. The annuitants who did not job in the titles of others, but lived upon their own income, were speedily paid; and as Barrère said, instead of waiting their turn of payment in uncovered courts, exposed to the inclemency of the weather, they waited in the warm and comfortable rooms of the treasury.

By the side of these beneficial reforms, cruelties continued to run their course. The law which expelled the ex-nobles from Paris, the fortresses, and the sea-ports, gave rise to a multitude of vexations. To distinguish true nobility, now that to be noble was a misfortune, was not at this time more easy than when it had been a distinction. Females originally belonging to the commonalty, who had married nobles, and become widows, the purchasers of offices who had taken the title of "esquire," claimed to be exempted from a distinction which formerly they had so eagerly coveted. This law then opened a new career to arbitrary power and to the most tyrannical vexations.

The representatives on mission exercised their authority with the utmost rigour, and some of them indulged in extravagant and monstrous cruelties. In Paris the prisons daily became more and more crowded. The committee of general safety had

instituted a police which spread terror every where. At the head of it was a man named Heron, who had under his direction a host of agents, all worthy of him. They were what were called the messengers (*porteurs d'ordre*) of the committees. Some tampered with espionage, others were furnished with secret and even not unfrequently with blank orders, and went to make arrests either in Paris or in the provinces. A sum of money was allowed them for each of their expeditions; they extorted more from the prisoners, and thus added rapine to cruelty. All the adventurers who had been disbanded with the revolutionary army, or dismissed from Bouchotte's office, had taken up this new trade, and become much more formidable in their new vocation. They were every where, in the promenades, the coffee-houses, and places of public amusement; every body was continually apprehensive of being watched and overheard by one of these inquisitors. Owing to their assiduity, the number of the suspected had increased in Paris alone to seven or eight thousand. The prisons no longer exhibited the spectacle which they had at first presented; the rich were no longer seen there contributing to the support of the poor, and men of all opinions, of all ranks, leading at the common charge a tolerably agreeable life, and consoling themselves by the pleasures of the arts for the hardships of captivity. This system had appeared too indulgent for those who were termed aristocrats; an outcry was raised that luxury and plenty were the lot of the suspected, while the people outside were reduced to rations; that the wealthy prisoners amused themselves by recklessly wasting those provisions which might have served to support the indigent citizens; and it had been decided that some other order should be taken with the prisons. Accordingly refectories and common tables had been established; the prisoners were supplied at fixed hours and in large halls with an unpalatable and unwholesome food, for which they were obliged to pay very dear. They were no longer allowed to purchase food in place of that which they could not eat. They were visited by officials, and stripped of their assignats, and thus it was that they deprived them of every means of procuring themselves comforts. They were no longer allowed the same liberty of seeing one another, and living in common; and to the torments of solitary confinement were superadded the terrors of death, who every day was bestirring himself more and more. The revolutionary tribunal began, after the trial of the Hébertists and the Dantonists, to sacrifice victims in troops of twenty at a time. It had condemned the family of the Malesherbes and their relatives to the number of fifteen or twenty persons. The venerable head of that house had met death with the serenity and the cheerfulness of a sage. Stumbling as he was walking to the scaffold, "This false step," said he, "is a bad omen: a Roman would have gone back to his home." To the family of Malesherbes had been added twenty-two members of the parliament [of Paris]. The parliament of Toulouse had been almost entirely sacrificed. Lastly, the farmers of the taxes were brought to trial on account of their former contracts with the revenue. It was proved that these contracts had contained conditions burdensome to the state, and the revolutionary tribunal sent them to the scaffold for exactions on tobacco, salt, &c. Among them was that illustrious votary of science, Lavoisier the chemist, who was in vain solicited a respite of a few days, that he might commit to paper a discovery he had made.

The impulsion was given; the government officiated, fought, and slaughtered with a horrible consistency. The committees placed in the centre of the state governed with the same vigour. The convention, still keeping silence, decreed pensions to the widows or the children of the soldiers who had died for their country, reviewed the judgments of tribunals, interpreted decrees, regulated the exchange of certain government domains; in short, occupied themselves with the most trivial and the most subordinate affairs. Barrère attended the convention every day, to read his reports of victories to the members; these reports he called *carmagnoles*. At the end of every month he acquainted them, as a matter of form, that the powers of the committees were expired, and that they must renew them. He then received for answer, amidst cheering, that the committees had but to prosecute their labours. Sometimes he even forgot this formality, and the committees nevertheless continued to exercise their functions.

It is in these moments of absolute submission that exasperated spirits burst forth, and that the point of the dagger is more to be dreaded than despotic authorities. At that time there was a man employed as a doorkeeper in the national lottery office who had formerly been in the service of several great families, and who felt a deadly hate against the prevailing system. This man was about fifty years of age, and his name was Ladmiral. He had formed the design to assassinate one of the influential members of the committee of public welfare, either Robespierre or Collot d'Herbois. For some time past he had lodged in the same house with Collot d'Herbois, in the Rue Favart, and he was undecided as to whom it should be, Collot or Robespierre. Having on the 3d of Prairial (22d May) resolved upon dispatching the latter, he had gone to the committee of public welfare, and there waited for him the whole day, in the gallery adjoining the hall where the committee sat. Not meeting with him there, he had returned home, and posted himself on the staircase, with the intention of dispatching Collot d'Herbois. About midnight Collot came in and went up stairs, when Ladmiral snapped a pistol at him with the muzzle to his head. The pistol missed fire. Ladmiral pointed it again, but again the weapon refused its office. He snapped the pistol the third time, and this time it went off, but he hit only the wall. A scuffle then ensued. Collot d'Herbois cried "Murder." Luckily for him, a patrole was passing along the street, and hastened up on hearing the noise. Ladmiral then ran up stairs to his room, where he fastened himself in. He was followed by the patrole, who threatened to break open the door. He declared that he was armed, and that he would fire upon any one who should dare to come near him. This threat did not intimidate the patrole. The door was forced. A locksmith named Geffroy advanced first, and received a musket-shot, which almost wounded him mortally. Ladmiral was immediately secured and taken to prison. When examined by Fouquier Tinville, he related the circumstances of his life,

d'Herbois, which is absurdly attributed to the English ministry, and coupled with a coincidence in respect of Robespierre, excites a popular sympathy

his schemes, and the attempts he had made to dispatch Robespierre before he thought of Collot d'Herbois. He was asked who had instigated him to commit this crime. He replied with firmness, that it was no crime at all, that it was a service he had desired to render to his country; that he alone had conceived this design, without any suggestion from another; and that his only regret was that it had not succeeded.

The intelligence of this attempt spread with rapidity, and, as is usual in these cases, it increased the power of those against whom it was directed. Barrère went the very next day, the 4th Prairial, to the convention, to read his report of this new machination of Pitt's. "The factions of the interior," said he, "are unceasingly in correspondence with that coalition-mongering, assassin-hiring government that persecutes liberty as its greatest enemy. While we place justice and virtue on the order of the day, the allies make crime and assassination the order of the day. Every where you will find the baleful spirit of the Englishman: in our markets, in our contracts, on our seas, on the continents, in the thronelings of Europe as well as in our cities. It is the same head that directs the hands that assassinated Basseville at Rome, the French sailors in the harbour of Genoa, the faithful French in Corsica; it is the same head that directs the steel against Lepelletier and Marat, the guillotine against Chalier, and the pistol against Collot d'Herbois." Barrère then produced letters from London and Holland, which had been intercepted, and which stated that the plots of Pitt were levelled against the committees, and particularly against Robespierre. One of these letters in substance said, "We much fear Robespierre's influence. The more concentrated the French republican government becomes, the more strength it will acquire, and the more difficult it will be to overturn."

The like mode of exhibiting facts was well calculated to excite a strong interest in favour of the committees, and especially of Robespierre, and to identify their existence with that of the republic. Barrère then related the fact, with all its circumstances; spoke of *the tender solicitude* which the constituted authorities had manifested for protecting the national representation, and described in high-flown terms the conduct of citizen Geffroy, who had received a severe wound in seizing the assassin. The convention received Barrère's report with applause; she gave directions for investigation, so as to ascertain whether Ladmiral had any accomplices; she passed a vote of thanks to citizen Geffroy, and resolved that, to compensate him, the bulletin of the state of his wound should be read every day at the tribune. Couthon then made a thundering speech, to propose that Barrère's report should be translated into all languages, and diffused throughout every country. "Pitt! Cobourg!" he exclaimed, "and all of you, cowardly and petty tyrants, who consider the world as your heritage, and who, in the last moments of your agony, struggle with such fury, whet, whet your daggers; we despise you too much to fear you, and you well know that we are too great to imitate you!" The hall rang with applause. "But," continued Couthon, "the law whose reign affrights you has her sword uplifted over you. She will strike every one of you. The human race requires this example, and the heaven that you outrage has so ordained it."

Collot d'Herbois then entered, as if to receive the congratulations of the assembly. He was hailed with redoubled acclamations, and had difficulty in making himself heard. Robespierre exhibited greater tact in staying away, and affecting to withdraw himself from the homage that awaited him.

On this same day, the 4th, a young female named Cécile Renault, called at Robespierre's door with a parcel under her arm. She asked to see him, and urgently insisted on being introduced to him. She said that a public functionary ought to be always ready to receive those who have occasion to speak to him, and at last began to abuse Robespierre's landlord's family, the Duploix, who refused to admit her. From the pressing solicitations of this young female, and from her strange appearance, suspicions were entertained; they seized her, and handed her over to the police. On opening her parcel, it was found to contain some clothes and two knives. They immediately imagined that she intended to assassinate Robespierre: on being interrogated, she answered with the same assurance as Ladmiral. She was asked what was her business with Robespierre. She replied that it was only to see what sort of man a tyrant was. She was still further asked what was meant by the clothes and the knives. She replied that she had not intended to make any particular use of the knives; that as for the clothes, she had provided herself with them because she expected to be carried to prison, and from prison to the guillotine. She added, that she was a royalist, because she preferred one king to fifty thousand. They pressed her further, but she refused to make answer, and desired to be conducted to the scaffold.

These indicia were deemed quite sufficient to warrant the conclusion that young Renault was one of the assassins armed against Robespierre. To this last circumstance was presently added another. On the following day, at Choisy-sur-Seine, a citizen was relating in a coffee-house the attempt to murder Collot d'Herbois, and was congratulating himself that it had not succeeded. A monk named Saintanax, who was listening to the account, replied, that it was unfortunate that those wretches belonging to the committee had escaped, but he hoped that, sooner or later, they would be despatched. The unfortunate man was immediately secured, and they conveyed him the very same night to Paris. This was more than enough to induce conjectures of vast ramifications; they were persuaded that a band of assassins had been got ready; people eagerly thronged around the members of the committee, begging them to be cautious, and to take care of those lives that were so valuable to the country. The sections assembled and sent fresh deputations and addresses to the convention. They said that, among the miracles which Providence had wrought in favour of the republic, the mode in which Robespierre and Collot d'Herbois had just escaped the blow of the assassins was not the least. One of them even proposed to furnish a guard of twenty-five men to protect the lives of the members of the committee.

The next day but one was the day for the Jaco-

with the committee of public welfare.—The insignia of supreme power offered to the committee, who judiciously decline.

bins to meet. Robespierre and Collot d'Herbois repaired thither, and were received with the utmost enthusiasm. When power has discovered the method of ensuring a general submission, it has merely to allow baser minds to act, and these soon complete the structure of its omnipotence, and add thereto divine worship and honours. Robespierre and Collot d'Herbois were gazed at with eager curiosity. "Look," it was said, "at those valuable men! The God of free men has saved them. He has thrown his ægis over them, and has preserved them for the republic. It is but right that they should share the honours which France has decreed to the martyrs of liberty; she will thus have the satisfaction of honouring them without having to weep over their funeral urn*." Collot first spoke with his usual vehemence, and said, that the emotion that he experienced at that moment, demonstrated to him how delightful it was to serve the country, even at the price of the greatest perils. "He gathered from it," he said, "this truth, that he who has incurred any danger for his country, receives new strength from the fraternal interest which he excites. Those kind plaudits create a new pact of union between all men of strong minds. The tyrants kept at bay, and feeling their end approaching, would in vain have recourse to daggers, to poison, to stratagems; the republicans will not alarm themselves. Do not the tyrants know, that when one patriot expires under their blows, that it is upon his tomb that all the patriots who survive him swear to take vengeance for the crime, and to eternize liberty?"

Collot finished amidst applause. Bentabolle required that the president should give Collot and Robespierre the fraternal embrace in the name of the whole society. Legendre, with the anxious demonstration of a man who had been the friend of Danton, and who was compelled to submit to more than one meanness to cause that friendship to be forgotten, said, that the hand of guilt had been raised to strike virtue, but that the God of nature had prevented the consummation of the crime. He exhorted all the citizens to form a guard around the members of the committee, and he himself offered to be the first to protect their invaluable lives. At this moment some sections solicited admittance into the hall: enthusiasm was extreme, but the concourse was so great that they were obliged to remain at the door.

The insignia of supreme power were offered to the committee, and this was the fit moment to repel such an offer. It was quite sufficient for leaders of sufficient tact to cause such insignia to be tendered, and then they might make a merit of refusing them. The members of the committee who were present opposed with affected indignation the proposal that guards should be assigned them. Couthon immediately addressed the assembly. He was astonished, he said, at the proposal which had just been made to the Jacobins, and which had already been before the convention. He was willing, indeed, to attribute it to pure intentions, but none but despots surrounded themselves with guards, and the members of the committee did not desire to assimilate themselves with despots. They wanted no guards to defend them. It was virtue, the confidence of the people, and Providence who watched over their lives; they needed no other guarantees for their safety. Besides, they would always be ready to die at their post and in the cause of liberty.

Legendre lost no time in explaining his motion. He said that he did not mean to give precisely an organized guard to the members of the committee, but to induce the good citizens to watch over their safety. At any rate, if he was at all in the wrong, he withdrew his motion, and his intention had been well meant. Robespierre succeeded him in the tribune. It was the first time that he had risen to speak. A loud and prolonged cheering burst forth on all sides; silence was at length obtained, and he was allowed to begin. "I am one of those," said he, "whom the events that have just occurred ought least of all to interest. Still I cannot refrain from making a few reflections. That the defenders of liberty should be exposed to the daggers of tyranny, is no more than what might be expected. I have already said, if we fight the enemy, if we thwart the factions, we shall be assassinated. That which I have foreseen is now come to pass. The soldiers of tyranny have bitten the dust, the traitors have perished on the scaffold, and daggers have been sharpened against us. I know not what impression these events make upon you, but that which they have produced upon me is this: I have felt that it was easier to assassinate us than to conquer our principles or to subdue our armies. I said to myself, that the more uncertain and precarious the lives of the defenders of the people are, the more anxious ought they to be to fulfil their last days in actions promoting the cause of liberty. I, who do not consider that no one need live, were it not to live for virtue and for Providence, I find myself placed in a state in which certainly the assassins did not wish to place me. I feel more independence than ever of the wickedness of men. The crimes of tyrants and the steel of the assassins have rendered me more free and more formidable to all the enemies of the people; my soul is more disposed than ever to unveil the traitors, and to tear from them the mask with which they presume to cover themselves. Frenchmen! friends of equality, leave to us the duty of employing the short remainder of life that Providence may grant, in combating the enemies that surround you!" The acclamation increased, and transports of enthusiasm burst from all parts of the hall. Robespierre, after having enjoyed this enthusiasm for a few moments, again addressed the club against a certain member of the society, who had moved that civic honours should be paid to Geffroy. Considering this as an approximation to that motion which was for assigning guards to the members of the committees, he maintained that these motions could answer no other end than that of exciting envy and obloquy against the government, by burdening it with superfluous honours. He accordingly moved and carried the vote of expulsion against that member who had required civic honours for Geffroy.

Considering the degree of power the committee had attained, it had to cautiously divest itself of the semblance of sovereign power. In point of fact, the committee exercised an absolute dictatorship, but there was no necessity for letting this too

* See the sitting of the Jacobins of the 8th Prairial.

prominently appear; and all the externals, all the parade of power, could but compromise it to no purpose. An ambitious soldier, who obtains the mastery by his sword, and who aspires to a throne, loses no time in impressing a character upon the authority he assumes, especially by blending the energies of power with power itself; but the leaders of a party, who govern that party solely by their influence, and who desire to retain the superiority, are obliged to be continually caressing that party, and be constantly ascribing to it the very power they enjoy, and, while they control its motions, appear to be subservient to it.

It would have been, therefore, bad policy for the members of the committee of public welfare, and the leaders of the Mountain party, to separate themselves from the Mountain and the convention; on the contrary, their policy was to reject whatever might seem to raise them too high above their colleagues. A change in public opinion was already taking place, and the extent of their power forcibly struck even persons of their own party. They were already regarded as dictators, and it was Robespierre in particular whose high influence began to dazzle all eyes. The saying was no longer, *The committee will have it so*, but *Robespierre will have it so*.

Fouquier-Tinville said to an individual whom he threatened with the revolutionary tribunal, "*If Robespierre requires it, thou shalt go thither.*" The agents of the executive power constantly alluded to Robespierre in their operations, and seemed to refer every thing to him as to the cause from which every thing emanated. The victims were not behindhand in imputing their sufferings to him, and the inmates of the prisons recognized but one oppressor—*Robespierre*. Foreigners themselves, in their proclamations, styled the French soldiers *Robespierre's soldiers*. This expression occurred in one of the duke of York's proclamations. Feeling deeply sensible how dangerous a use was made of his name, Robespierre was very anxious to deliver a speech to the convention, for the purpose of repelling what he termed perfidious insinuations, the object of which was to ruin him; he repeated it at the Jacobins, and there drew down that applause which was usually bestowed on all his harangues. The *Journal de la Montagne* and the *Moniteur* having given, on the following day, a report of this speech, and having styled it a masterpiece not susceptible of analysis, because *every word had the point of a sentence*, and *every sentence a page*, he became exceedingly enraged, and complained next day at the Jacobins of the nauseous flattery of the members of the committee emitted by the journals, who pursued this course for the purpose of causing their downfall, by investing them with the semblance of absolute power. The two journals were obliged to retract what they had said, and to apologize for having praised Robespierre, by the assurance that their intentions were pure.

Robespierre had vanity, but was not sufficiently great to be ambitious. Covetous of flattery and respect, he feasted upon them, and justified himself for receiving them by declaring that he had no wish to be all-powerful. He was surrounded by a kind of court, composed of a few men, but chiefly of a great number of women, who paid him the most refined attentions. Constantly resorting to his residence, they manifested the most unceasing solicitude for his welfare; they were continually praising amongst themselves his virtue, his eloquence, his genius; they called him a divine creature, and quite exalted above our human nature. A superannuated marchioness was the principal of those females who waited, like real devotees, upon this proud and bloodthirsty pontiff. Nothing is so certain a demonstration of the public infatuation as the gross admiration of the women. It is they also who, by their active attentions, their language, and their restless affectation, make it appear ridiculous.

With the women who adored Robespierre, was associated a ridiculous and extravagant sect that had been recently formed. When religious worship has been abolished, then it is that sects abound, because the absolute necessity for believing in something seeks to indulge itself with other illusions in lieu of those which have been destroyed. One old woman, named Catharine Théot, whose brain was turned in the prisons of the Bastille, called herself the mother of God, and proclaimed the speedy coming of a new Messiah. He was, according to her, to make his appearance amidst universal disorder, and the time when he was to appear was to be the commencement of an eternal existence to the elect. These elect were to propagate their faith by all means whatever, and to exterminate the enemies of the true God. Dom Gerle, the Carthusian who had figured under the constituent assembly, and whose weak imagination had been led astray by mystic reveries, was one of their two prophets. Robespierre was the other. Deism had doubtless obtained him this distinction. Catharine Théot called him her beloved son; the initiated treated him with reverence, and regarded him as a supernatural being, called to fulfil sublime and mysterious destinies. He was probably apprized of their follies, and, without being their accomplice, he profited by their error. Certain it is, that he had patronised Dom Gerle, that he received frequent visits from him, and that he had given him a certificate of civism, signed by his own hand, to deliver him from the prosecutions of a revolutionary committee. This sect was widely spread; it had its form of worship and its practices, which contributed not a little to its propagation; it held its meetings at Catharine Théot's, in a remote quarter of Paris, near the Pantheon. Here the reception of new members took place, in the presence of the mother of God, Dom Gerle, and the principal elect. This sect began to be known; and it was also vaguely known that Robespierre was looked upon by this sect as a prophet. Thus every thing contributed to exalt him and to compromise him.

It was more particularly among his colleagues that jealousies began to arise. Divisions already manifested themselves, and this was natural; for the power of the committee being established, the time for rivalries had arrived. The committee was split into several distinct groups. The twelve members who composed it were reduced to eleven by the death of Hérault-Sechelles. Jean-Bon-Saint-André and Prieur (of La Marne) had been always absent on missions. Carnot was exclusively occupied with the war department, Prieur (of the

Cote d'Or) with the army supplies, Robert Luidet with provisions. These were called the "lookers into things" (les gens *d'examen*). They took no part either in politics or mutual pretensions. Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon, were linked together. A sort of superiority of mind and manners, the high opinion which they seemed to have of themselves, and the contempt which they appeared to feel for their other colleagues, had induced them to stand apart; they were called the men of the high hand (les gens de *la hautemain*). Barrère was, in their estimation, nothing else than a weak and pusillanimous creature, possessing suppleness enough to be at every body's service; Collot d'Herbois a club declaimer; Billaud-Varennes a man of moderate capacity, gloomy, and envious. These last three could not forgive the secret disdain of their colleagues. Barrère durst not take a decided part, but Collot d'Herbois, and particularly Billaud, whose temper was indomitable, could not conceal the hatred that began to excite them. They sought to make use of their colleagues called "les gens *d'examen*," and to gain them to their side. They had also reason to hope for support from the committee of general safety, who began to feel annoyed at the supremacy of the committee of public welfare. The committee of general safety could ill brook this dependence, confined particularly as it was to the police, and frequently superintended or controlled in its operations by the committee of public welfare. Amar, Vadier, Vouland, Jagot, Louis (of the Bas Rhin), the most cruel of its members, were at the same time the most disposed to shake off the yoke. Two of their colleagues, who were called the *listeners* (*les écouteurs*), watched them for Robespierre, and this kind of espionage at last became insupportable. The malcontents in both committees might therefore coalesce and become dangerous to Robespierre, Couthon, and Saint-Just. We must particularly observe that it was the rivalry of pride and power which commenced the dissension, and not a mere difference of political opinion; for Billaud-Varennes, Collot d'Herbois, Vadier, Vouland, Amar, Jagot, and Louis, were revolutionists not less formidable than the three adversaries whom they sought to overthrow.

A particular circumstance tended to alienate the committee of general safety from these dominants in the committee of public welfare. Great complaints were made of the arrests, which daily became more numerous, and which were often unjust, as they were directed against a great number of individuals known to be excellent patriots; complaint was also made of the rapine and vexations of the numerous agents to whom the committee of general welfare had delegated its inquisitorial powers. Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon, not daring to obtain either the abolition or the renewal of this committee, devised a scheme for establishing an office of police, as part and parcel of the committee of public welfare. This was, without annihilating the committee of general safety, to encroach upon and despoil it of its functions. Saint-Just was to have had the conduct of this office, but having been sent to the army, he had not been able to perform that duty, and Robespierre had undertaken it in his stead. The office of police began to set at liberty those who had been apprehended by order of the committee of general safety; and the latter committee acted in the same manner towards the other. This usurpation of functions led to an open rupture. It soon got wind; and, notwithstanding the secresy which shrouded the government, it soon began to be no secret, that its members were by no means on good terms with one another.

Other causes of mutual dissatisfaction, not less serious, arose in the convention; its bearing was still very submissive, but some of its members, who had conceived fears on their own account, acquired somewhat more boldness from the danger. These were old friends of Danton's, who had compromised themselves by their connexion with him, and who were sometimes threatened as the relics of the party of the *corruptionists and indulgents*. Some had been guilty of malversation in their functions, and dreaded the application *of the system of virtue*; others showed themselves openly opposed to any further display of the daily increasing severities. The most compromised among them was Tallien. It was said that he had been guilty of malversation at the commune at the time he was a member, and afterwards at Bordeaux when on mission there. It was added that, while in the latter city, he had suffered himself to be melted and subdued by a young and beautiful female, who had accompanied him to Paris, and just been thrown into prison. Next to Tallien was mentioned Bourdon (of the Oise), who was compromised by his contest with the Saumur party, and who had been expelled from the Jacobins jointly with Fabre, Camille, and Philippeau; Thuriot's name was also mentioned as having been excluded by the Jacobins; Legendre, who, notwithstanding his daily submissions, could never obtain forgiveness for his former connexion with Danton; and, lastly, Freron, Barras, Lecointre, Rovère, Monestier, Panis, &c., all of them either friends of Danton, or disapprovers of the system followed by the government. These personal inquietudes were on the increase; the number of the discontented were daily increasing, and they were ready to join those members of one or the other committee who would hold out their hand to them.

The 20th Prairial (June 8) was at hand; this was the day appointed for the *fête in honour of the Supreme Being*. On the 16th [Prairial] they were to name a president; the convention unanimously appointed Robespierre to take the presidency. This was conferring on him the principal part on the 20th. His colleagues, we see, still strove to flatter and to soothe him by dint of honours. Preparations had been made on a very large scale, according to the plan conceived by David. The *fête* was expected to be magnificent. On the morning of the 20th the sun shone forth in all its brightness. The multitude, ever ready to attend the sights afforded them by public authority, had collected. Robespierre kept them waiting a considerable time. At length he appeared amidst the convention. He was dressed with extraordinary care. His head was covered with feathers, and in his hand he held, as did every one of the representatives, a bunch of flowers, fruit, and ears of corn. On his countenance, usually so gloomy, was manifested a cheerfulness that was very uncommon with him. An amphitheatre was erected in the centre of the garden of the Tuileries.

This was occupied by the convention; and on the right and left were several groups of boys, men, aged persons, and females. The boys wore wreaths of violets, the youths wreaths of myrtle, the men wreaths of oak, and the aged people wreaths of ivy and olive. The women held their daughters by the hand, and carried baskets of flowers. On the other side of the amphitheatre were figures representing Atheism, Discord, and Egotism. These were to be burned. As soon as the convention had taken its place, the ceremony commenced with music. The president then delivered an introductory discourse upon the object of the festival. "Republican Frenchmen!" said he, "At length has arrived that ever-to-be-remembered day of happiness, which the French people consecrate to the Supreme Being. Never did the world, which he created, exhibit a spectacle so worthy of his attention. He has beholden tyranny, crime, and imposture reigning upon earth. He beholds at this moment an individual nation at war with all the oppressors of mankind, suspending the course of its heroic labours, to lift its thoughts and its prayers towards the Supreme Being, who gave it the mission to undertake and the courage to execute them."

After having spoken for a few minutes, the president descended from the amphitheatre, and, seizing a torch, set fire to the figures of Atheism, Discord, and Egotism. From amidst the ashes arose the statue of Wisdom; but it was remarked that it was smoked by the flames from whence it had to make its appearance. Robespierre returned to his place, and delivered a second speech upon the extirpation of the vices leagued against the republic. After this ceremony, the assembly set out in procession for the Champ de Mars. The self-sufficiency of Robespierre seemed extraordinarily increased, and he affected to walk considerably in advance of his colleagues. But some of them, feeling indignant, kept up with him, and lavished on him the keenest sarcasms. Some laughed at the new pontiff, and said, in allusion to the smoky statue of Wisdom, that his wisdom was obscured. Others uttered the word "tyrant," and exclaimed that there were *still some Brutuses left*. Bourdon (of the Oise) addressed to him these prophetic words: "*The Tarpeian rock is hard by the capitol.*"

The procession at length reached the Champ de Mars. There, instead of the former altar of the country, was to be observed a lofty mountain. At the top of this mountain was a tree, beneath the boughs of which the convention seated itself. On each side of the mountain were placed different groups of boys, old men, and women. A symphony commenced; the groups then chanted a *chorus*, alternately responsive to each other. At length, on a given signal, the youths drew their swords, and swore between the hands* of the old men to defend the country; the matrons lifted their infants in their arms; all present raised their hands towards heaven, and the oath to conquer was mingled with the homage paid to the Supreme Being. They then returned to the garden of the Tuileries, and the *fête* concluded with public diversions.

Such was the famous *fête* celebrated in honour of the Supreme Being. Robespierre had on that day attained the summit of honours, but he had only gained this pinnacle to be hurled from it. Everybody had been wounded by his pride. The sarcasms had reached his ear, and he had observed in some of his colleagues a boldness that was unusual in them. Next day he went to the committee of public welfare, and expressed his indignation against the deputies who had insulted him on the preceding day. He complained of those friends of Danton's, those impure relics of the *indulgent corruptionist* party, and demanded the sacrifice of them. Billaud-Varennes and Collot d'Herbois, who were not less wounded than their colleagues at the part which Robespierre had performed the day before, appeared extremely cold, and by no means over-anxious to avenge him. They did not indeed justify the deputies of whom Robespierre complained, but, recurring to the *fête* itself, they expressed apprehensions concerning its effects. It had, they said, alienated many minds. Besides, those ideas of the Supreme Being, of the immortality of the soul, those pompous ceremonies, looked like a return to the superstitions of old, and were likely to impart a retrograde impulse to the revolution. Robespierre was irritated by these remarks. He maintained that it never was his intent that the revolution should retrograde; that, on the contrary, he had done every thing to accelerate its course. In proof of this, he introduced the draught of a bill which he had just drawn up with Couthon, and which would tend to make the revolutionary tribunal still more sanguinary. Now let us see what this bill meant.

For two months past it had been contemplated to annex some qualifications in the constitution of the revolutionary tribunal. The defence made by Danton, Camille, Fabre, and Lacroix, had shown the inconvenience of the formalities that had been suffered to remain. Every day it had to hear witnesses and advocates; and how brief soever the examination of witnesses, howsoever restricted the defence of the advocates, still they occasioned a great loss of time, and always occasioned a certain scandal. The heads of this government, who wished every thing to be done promptly and without noise, were desirous of suppressing these inconvenient formalities. Having brought themselves to consider that the revolution had a right to annihilate all its opponents, and that they could be distinguished by the mere inspection of party, they thought that the revolutionary proceedings could not be rendered too expeditious. Robespierre, to whom this tribunal was specially committed, had prepared this law with no one else than Couthon, for Saint-Just was away. He had not deigned to consult his other colleagues of the committee of public welfare, and he merely came to read the bill to them before he brought it in. Although Barrère and Collot d'Herbois were quite as well disposed as himself to allow its sanguinary tendencies, they could not but receive it coldly, because it was drawn and settled without their concurrence. It was, however, arranged that it should be brought in on the following day, and that Couthon should report upon it; but no satisfaction was given to Robespierre for the affronts which he had received on the preceding day.

The committee of general safety was no more consulted upon this law than the committee of

* The ancient form of making a solemn declaration or oath before another. *Tacitus.*

public welfare had been. That committee knew that a law was in preparation, but was not invited to take any part in it. It desired, at least, that out of fifty jurors who should be nominated, it should name twenty; but Robespierre rejected them all, and chose none but his own creatures. The motion for bringing in the bill was made on the 22nd Prairial. Couthon had reported upon it. After the usual declamations as to the inflexibility and promptitude which ought to be the characteristics of revolutionary justice, he read the draught bill, which was couched in terrific language. The tribunal was to divide itself into four sections, composed of a president, three judges, and nine jurors. Twelve judges and fifty jurors were appointed, who were to succeed one another in the exercise of their functions, so that the tribunal might sit every day. The only punishment awarded was to be death. The tribunal (so said the bill) was to be instituted for the purpose of punishing the enemies of the people, according to a most vague and comprehensive definition of what was meant by the enemies of the people. In this description were to be included dishonest contractors, and the alarmists who circulated bad news. The power of bringing citizens before the revolutionary tribunal was assigned to the two committees, to the convention, to the representatives on mission, and to Fouquier-Tinville, the public accuser. If there existed proofs, were they substantive facts or moral inferences, no witnesses were to be examined. Lastly, there was a clause to this effect:—*The law grants patriot jurors as defenders to unjustly accused patriots, but it does not accord the same indulgence to conspirators.*

A law that annihilated all the ordinary safeguards, that confined all the necessary formalities to a bare expression of opinion, and which, when it invested the two committees with the power of handing the citizens over to the revolutionary tribunal, thus gave them power over life and death, such a law could not but excite real alarm, especially in those members of the convention who were already uneasy on their own account. It was not stated in the bill whether the committees were to have the power of bringing the representatives before the tribunal without applying for a previous impeachment; for if so, the committees from that time would possess the power of sending their colleagues to death, without any further trouble than that of pointing them out to Fouquier-Tinville. Thus the remains of the faction of the *indulgents* were roused, and for the first time during a considerable period an opposition was manifested in the body of the assembly. Ruamps moved that the bill should be printed and the report adjourned, saying, that if this law were carried without adjournment, all they would have to do would be to blow out their brains. Lecointre of Versailles seconded the motion of adjournment. Robespierre immediately came forward to combat this unexpected resistance. "There are," said he, "two modes of thinking as old as our revolution; one which tends to punish conspirators in a prompt and inevitable manner; the other which tends to acquit the guilty: this latter has never ceased to show itself anew upon all occasions. It again manifests itself to-day, and is come to put it down. For these two months, the tribunal has been complaining of the shackles which obstruct its progress; it complains of the difficulty of procuring jurors; a law therefore is required. Amidst the victories of the republic, the conspirators are more active and more ardent than ever; we must smite them. This unexpected opposition which now manifests itself is not natural. You wish to divide the convention; you wish to intimidate it."—"No, no"—cried several voices. "Nobody shall divide us." "It is us," added Robespierre, "who have always defended the convention, it is not us that it will have occasion to fear. At any rate we have now arrived at the point where they may kill us, but where they shall not prevent us from saving the country."

Robespierre never missed a single opportunity of talking of daggers and assassins, as if he were always exposed to assassination. Bourdon of the Oise replied to him, and said that if the tribunal were in need of jurors, it had but to adopt immediately the proposed list, for nobody had any wish to clog the march of justice, but that the further consideration of the bill ought to be adjourned. Robespierre again ascended the tribunal, and said that the law was neither more complicated or more obscure than a great many others which had been passed without discussion, and that at a moment when the defenders of liberty were threatened with the dagger, no one should strive to relax in their exertions to suppress the conspirators. He concluded with proposing to discuss the whole law, article by article, and to sit till midnight, if it were necessary, that it might be passed that very day. The overwhelming power of Robespierre once more prevailed over all other considerations. The bill was read and carried in a few minutes.

However, Bourdon, Tallien, and all the members who entertained personal apprehensions, were exceedingly alarmed at such a law as this. The committees being thus empowered to hand over citizens to the revolutionary tribunal, not even the members of the national representation being excepted, they trembled lest they themselves should be carried off some night, and delivered over to Fouquier, without the convention knowing any thing about the matter. On the following day, the 23rd of Prairial, Bourdon required to be heard. "When the power was given," said he, "to the committees of public welfare and of general safety of handing over the citizens to the revolutionary tribunal, it certainly never could have been intended by the convention that the power of the committees should include its members without a previous impeachment." "No, no," was shouted from various quarters. "I was expecting these marks of dissatisfaction," continued Bourdon; "they prove to me that liberty is imperishable." This remark caused a deep sensation. Bourdon moved that it should be declared, that members of the convention could not be delivered up to the tribunal without a previous impeachment. The committees were absent; Bourdon's motion was favourably received. Merlin moved the previous question; whereat there were evident symptoms of discontent; but he explained himself, and moved the previous question with a preamble to this effect: that the convention could not divest itself of the right of claiming sole cognizance of its own members. The preamble was adopted to the general satisfaction.

A scene which occurred in the evening gave still

greater point to this novel opposition. Tallien and Bourdon were walking in the Tuileries; the spies of the committee of public welfare followed them very closely. At length Tallien indignantly turned round, provoked them, called them base spies of the committee, and bade them go and tell their masters what they had seen and heard. This scene caused a great sensation. Couthon and Robespierre were highly indignant. Next day they went to the convention, resolved to complain bitterly of the opposition they experienced. Delacroix and Mallarmé afforded them the opportunity. Delacroix required, that those whom the law termed "corrupters of morals" should be defined more precisely. Mallarmé also inquired what was meant by these words: *the law grants unjustly accused patriots no other defender than the conscience of patriot jurors.* Couthon then ascended the tribune, complained of the amendments adopted on the preceding day, and of those which were then proposed. "It was a libel on the committee of public welfare," said he, "to even imagine the possibility that it wished to have the power of sending members of the convention to the scaffold. That the tyrants should scandalize the committee was natural; but that the convention itself should give ear to the scandal, such an injustice was insupportable, and he could not help complaining of it. Yesterday a member prided himself on a fortunate by-word, which proved that liberty was imperishable, as if liberty had been threatened. They had availed themselves of the moment when the members of the committee were absent for making this attack. Such conduct," added Couthon, "is unworthy, and I propose that the amendments made yesterday be annulled, as well as those which have just been moved to-day." Bourdon replied, that to demand explanations concerning a law was not a crime; that if he piqued himself on a by-word, it was because he was gratified to find himself of the same opinion with the convention; and that, if the same acrimony were to be shown on both sides, discussion would be impossible. "I am accused," said he, "of talking like Pitt and Cobourg. Were I to reply in the same spirit, where should we be? I respect Couthon, I respect the committees, I respect the *mountain*, which has saved liberty." These explanations of Bourdon's were applauded; but these explanations after all were but excuses, and the authority of the dictators was still too strong to be openly defied. Robespierre then addressed the convention, and made a prolix speech, full of pride and bitterness. "Mountaineers," said he, "ye will always be the bulwark of the public liberty, for ye have nothing in common with the intriguers and the perverse, whosoever they be. If they strive to thrust themselves into your ranks, they are not the less strangers to your principles. Suffer not a few intriguers, more despicable than others, because more hypocritical, to attempt to misguide a portion of you, and to set themselves up as leaders of a party." Bourdon, (of the Oise,) here interrupted Robespierre, saying that he had never attempted to set himself up for the leader of a party. Robespierre took no notice of him, but proceeded thus: "It would be the height of opprobrium, if calumniators, deluding our colleagues—" Bourdon again interrupted him. "I call upon him," said he, "to prove what he is advancing; he has just been saying, in plain terms, that I am a villain." "I have not mentioned Bourdon," replied Robespierre; "if the cap fits him, let him wear it*! Yes, the mountain is pure, she is undefiled; intriguers belong not to the mountain." Robespierre then dwelt at considerable length upon the efforts which had been made to frighten the members of the convention, and to persuade them that they were in danger. He said that it was the guilty only who were afraid, and it was they who wanted to make others afraid. He then related what had occurred the preceding evening between Tallien and the spies, whom he called the *messengers* (*couriers*) *of the committee.* This relation drew very warm explanations from Tallien, and brought upon the latter abundance of abuse. At length, all these discussions terminated in the adoption of the motions made by Couthon and Robespierre. The amendments of the preceding day were annulled, those of that day rejected, and the frightful enactment of the 22d remained in its original state.

The leaders of the committee were once more victorious. Their adversaries were trembling; Tallien, Bourdon, Ruamps, Delacroix, Mallarmé, and all those who had made objections to the law, gave themselves up for lost, and expected every moment to be arrested. Though a previous decree of the convention was still necessary for impeaching a member, it was still in such a state of intimidation, that she was likely to grant whatever should be asked at her hands. She had passed a decree against Danton; it was to be presumed that she would not hesitate to pass another against such of his friends as survived him. A report was soon circulated that the list was drawn up; the number of the victims was stated to amount to twelve, and afterwards to eighteen. Their names were mentioned. The alarm soon spread, and more than sixty members of the convention ceased to sleep at their own homes.

However, there was one impediment against their lives being disposed of quite so easily as they themselves apprehended. The chiefs of the government were divided. It has already been noticed that Billaud-Varennes, Collot, and Barrère, had replied coldly to the first complaints of Robespierre against his colleagues. The members of the committee of general safety were more opposed to him than ever; for they were to be kept aloof from all co-operation in the law of the 22d [Prairial], and it even appears that some of them were threatened. Robespierre and Couthon carried their demands to a great length. They would have sacrificed a great number of deputies; they talked of Tallien, Bourdon (of the Oise), Thuriot, Rovère, Lecointre, Panis, Monestier, Legendre, Fréron, and Barras; they even called for Cambon, whose financial reputation annoyed them, and who had seemed adverse to their cruelties; lastly, they would have extended their vengeance to several of the most decided members of the mountain, as Duval, Audouin, and Leonard Bourdon†. The members of the committee of public welfare, Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, as well as all those of the committee of general safety, refused their assent. The

* Malheur à qui se nomme lui-même!

† See the list furnished by Vilatte in his memoirs.

Robespierre's quarrel with the committee of public welfare and his secession.—The extreme terror that pervaded France in

danger, by extending to so great a number of lives, might very soon finish by threatening themselves.

They were thus demonstrating these hostile tendencies, with not the slightest inclination of making a further sacrifice, when one concluding circumstance produced a definitive rupture. The committee of general safety had discovered the meetings that were held at the house of Catharine Théot. They had learned that this extravagant sect had turned Robespierre into a prophet, and that the latter had given a certificate of civism to Dom Gerle. Thereupon Vadier, Vouland, Jagot, and Amar, immediately resolved to avenge themselves, by representing this sect as an assemblage of dangerous conspirators, by denouncing it to the convention, and by thus making Robespierre come in for a share of the ridicule and odium which necessarily attach thereto. They sent an agent, named Sénart, who, under the pretence of becoming a member of the society, was admitted to one of its meetings. In the midst of the ceremony he stepped to a window, gave a signal to an armed force, and apprehended almost the entire sect. Dom Gerle and Catharine Théot were apprehended. Upon Dom Gerle was found the certificate of civism given him by Robespierre; and even in the bed of the mother of God they discovered a letter written by her to her beloved son, to the chief prophet, in short, to Robespierre. When Robespierre received intelligence that the sect was about to undergo a prosecution, he was against it, and caused a discussion on this subject in the committee of public welfare. We have already seen that Billaud and Collot were not very favourable to deism, and that they viewed with umbrage the political use which Robespierre wished to make of that creed. They were for the prosecution. Robespierre insisting that these prosecutions should be stopped, the discussion grew extremely warm; he experienced the most abusive language, failed to carry his point, and retired weeping with rage. The quarrel had been so vehement, that, lest they should be overheard by persons passing through the galleries, the members of the committee resolved to adjourn their sitting to the floor above. The report upon the sect of Catharine Théot was presented to the convention. Barrère, in order to revenge himself in his own way on Robespierre, had secretly drawn up the report, which Vouland was to read. The sect was therein represented as equally ridiculous and atrocious. The convention, alternately indignant and amused with the picture drawn by Barrère, decreed the accusation of the principal leaders of the sect, and sent them before the revolutionary tribunal.

Robespierre, indignant at the opposition he had experienced, and the abusive language he had received, discontinued his attendance at the committee, and resolved to take no further part in its deliberations. He withdrew himself towards the end of Prairial (the middle of June). This secession proves of what description his ambition was. An ambitious man never betrays ill-humour; he is only the more excited by obstacles; he seizes the supreme power, and crushes those who have affronted him. A weak and vain declaimer is petulantly spiteful, and yields the contest when he finds a cessation of flattery or respect. Danton retired from indolence and disgust; Robespierre from wounded pride. This secession proved as fatal to him as it did to Danton. Couthon was left alone against Billaud-Varennes, Collot d'Herbois, and Barrère, and these latter were about to take every thing into their own hands.

These dissensions were not yet publicly known; all that got wind was, that the committees of public welfare and of general safety were not on good terms with each other: the public were delighted at this misunderstanding, and hoped that it would prevent fresh proscriptions. Those who were threatened courted the committee of general safety, and flattered it, and supplicated its protection, nay, had even received the most cheering assurances from some of its members. Elie Lacoste, Moses Bayle, Lavicomterie, and Dubarran, the best of the members of the committee of general safety, had promised to refuse their signature to any new list of proscription.

Amidst these contentions, the Jacobins were still devoted to Robespierre. They made as yet no distinction between the different members of the committee, between Couthon, Robespierre, and Saint-Just, on the one hand, and Billaud-Varennes, Collot, and Barrère, on the other; all they looked at was the revolutionary government on the one side, and on the other some remains of the *indulgents*, and some friends of Danton's, who, when the law of the 22d Prairial [8th June] was brought in, had recently set themselves in opposition to that wholesome form of government. Robespierre, who in supporting this law had defended that government, was still in their estimation the first and the greatest citizen of the republic; all the others were but so many intriguers, whose destruction must be accomplished. Accordingly, they did not fail to exclude Tallien from their committee of correspondence, because he had not replied to the accusations preferred against him on the sitting of the 24th [Prairial]. From that day, Collot and Billaud-Varennes, being fully sensible of Robespierre's influence, abstained from appearing at the Jacobins'. What could they have said! They could not have exposed their mere personal grievances, and made the public an arbiter between their pride and that of Robespierre. All they could do was to be silent and bide their time. Robespierre and Couthon had therefore an open field. The rumour of a new proscription having produced a dangerous effect, Couthon hastened to disavow, in the presence of the society, the designs which they were supposed to entertain against twenty-four, nay, even sixty members of the convention. "The shades of Danton, Hébert, and Chaumette still haunt us," said he; "they still seek to perpetuate trouble and dissension. What passed in the sitting of the 24th is a striking instance of this; there exists a desire to divide the government, to vilify its members, by describing them as Syllas and Neros; they deliberate in secret, they meet, they form pretended lists of proscription, they alarm the citizens, in order to set them against the public authority. A few days ago, it was reported that the committees intended to order the arrest of eighteen members of the convention; nay, even their names were given. Distrust these perfidious insinuations. Those who circulate such rumours are accomplices of Hébert's, and of Danton's; they dread the punishment of their guilty conduct; their object is to connect

themselves with singleminded men, in the hope that, whilst concealed by them, they may easily escape the eye of justice. But be of good cheer; the number of the guilty is happily very small; it amounts to no more than four, or perhaps six; and they shall be smitten, for the time is come for delivering the republic from the few remaining enemies that are conspiring against it. Commit the charge of her salvation to the energy and the justice of the committees."

The reducing the number of the proscribed persons whom Robespierre wished to smite to a very few persons, exhibited considerable tact. The Jacobins applauded, as usual, the speech of Couthon; but that speech by no means tranquillized the threatened victims, and those who considered themselves in danger still continued to sleep away from home. Never had the terror been greater, not only in the convention, but in the prisons, and throughout France.

Those cruel agents of Robespierre, Fouquier-Tinville the accuser, and Dumas the president, were putting in force the law of the 22d of Prairial, and were preparing to avail themselves of it for the purpose of desolating the prisons. Very soon, said Fouquier, there shall be put upon their doors this writing, *This house to let*. The intent was to get rid of the greater part of the suspected persons. The public had long been accustomed to consider these latter as irreconcileable enemies, whom they ought to destroy for the welfare of the republic. To sacrifice thousands of individuals, whose only fault was to have a certain bias of opinion, and whose opinions frequently coincided with their persecutors, seemed quite in the regular course of things, from the habit which people had acquired of destroying one another. The readiness with which they put others to death, or encountered death themselves, had become extraordinary. In the fields of battle, and upon the scaffold, thousands daily perished, and it no longer caused remark. The first murders committed in 1793 proceeded from a substantive irritation produced by the apprehension of danger. At this day the danger was passed; the republic was victorious; people were no longer murdered from angry motives, but from the fatal habitude of murder they had contracted. That formidable machine, which they had been obliged to construct in order to withstand enemies of every kind, was no longer necessary; but once set in action they knew not how to stop it. Every government must arrive at its excess, and does not perish till it has attained that excess. The revolutionary government was not able to cease on the very day that all the enemies of the republic were sufficiently terrified; it must needs go beyond that point, and it had to keep itself in motion until it raised a general indignation by its very atrocity. Human affairs have no other tendency. How was it that terrible circumstances had called for the creation of a government of death, which could neither reign or conquer except by death!

That which is still more frightful is, that when the signal is given, when the idea has taken root, that lives must be sacrificed, every thing concurs to carry out this horrid purpose with an extraordinary aptitude. Every one acts without remorse, without repugnance; one gets accustomed to it, just as the judge condemns criminals to death, like the surgeon who sees beings suffering under his instrument, like the general who orders the sacrifice of twenty thousand soldiers. A horrid jargon obtains in reference to these new operations; the people contrive to render it the object of facetious remarks; they invent pointed phrases to express sanguinary ideas. Every one, as drawn along with the current, and as stunned, keeps pace with the mass; and we see men who were yesterday engaged in the peaceful occupations of the arts and commerce, to-day applying themselves with the same facility to the work of death and destruction.

The committee had given the signal by the law of the 22d. Dumas and Fouquier had but too well understood it. However, some colourable pretence was requisite for immolating so many victims. What crime could be imputed to them, when most of them were peaceful unknown citizens, and whose existence was unknown to the state? It was conceived, that being confined in the prisons, they would take measures to liberate themselves; that their number would necessarily suggest an idea of their strength, and present the notion of making it available for their rescue. The pretended conspiracy of Dillon was the germ of this idea, which was illustrated in an atrocious manner. They made use of some miserable wretches, who being also prisoners, consented to act the infamous part of informers. They pointed out in the Luxembourg one hundred and sixty prisoners who, they said, had been concerned in Dillon's plot. Some of these listmakers were procured in all the other prison-houses, and in each prison-house they denounced one or two hundred persons as accomplices in the prison conspiracy. An attempt at escape made at La Force served but to give weight to this infamous invention, and immediately they began to send hundreds of these unfortunates before the revolutionary tribunal. They committed them from the various prisons to the Conciergerie, to go from thence before the tribunal, and then to the scaffold. In the night between the 18th and 19th of Messidor (July 6), the one hundred and sixty persons denounced at the Luxembourg were transferred. They trembled on hearing themselves called; they knew not what was laid to their charge; but what they considered most probable was the death reserved for them. The odious Fouquier, since he had been furnished with the law of the 22nd, had made great changes in the hall of the tribunal. Instead of the seats for the advocates and the bench of the accused, capable of holding eighteen or twenty persons, he had caused an amphitheatre to be built capable of containing one hundred, or one hundred and fifty accused at a time. This he called his little seats (*ses petits gradins*). Pushing his zeal to a kind of extravagance, he had even caused a scaffold to be erected in the very hall of the tribunal, and he proposed to have the one hundred and sixty accused in the Luxembourg tried at one and the same sitting.

The committee of public welfare, when informed of the kind of delirium which had possessed the mind of its public accuser, sent for him, and ordered him to remove the scaffold from the hall in which it was set up, and forbade him to send for more than sixty persons at once. *Dost thou wish, then*, said Collot d'Herbois, in a violent passion, *to demo-*

ralize punishment? It should, however, be remarked, that Fouquier has asserted the contrary, and maintained, that it was himself who demanded the trial of the one hundred and sixty in three divisions. Be that as it may, every thing proves that it was the committee who was less extravagant than their minister, and repressed his revolutionary delirium. The committee were obliged to send a second order to Fouquier-Tinville to remove the guillotine from the hall of the tribunal.

The one hundred and sixty were divided into three companies, and tried and executed in three days. The mode of procedure was quite as expeditious and quite as frightful as that adopted at the wicket of the Abbaye on the nights of the 2nd and 3rd of September. Carts ordered for every day were waiting from the morning in the court-yard of the Palace of Justice, and the accused could see them as they went up stairs to the tribunal. Dumas, the president, sitting like a maniac, had a pair of pistols on the table. He simply asked the accused their names, and added thereto some very general question. In the examination of the one hundred and sixty, the president said to one of them, "Dorival, do you know any thing of the conspiracy?"—"No."—"I expected that you would give that answer; but that will not do. The next." He thus addressed one Champigny: "Are you not an ex-noble?"—"Yes."—"The next." To Guédreville: "Are you a priest?"—"Yes; but I have taken the oath."—"You have no right to speak. The next." To one Ménil: "Were you not servant to the ex-constituent, Menou?"—"Yes."—"The next." To one Vély: "Were you not architect to Madame?"—"Yes; but I was dismissed in 1788."—"The next." To Goudrecourt: "Had you not your father-in-law at the Luxembourg?"—"Yes."—"The next." To Durfort: "Were you not in the life-guards?"—"Yes; but I was disbanded in 1789."—"The next."

Such was the mode in which the trial of these unfortunates was conducted. The law required that the testimony of witnesses was not to be dispensed with, except when they had substantive or moral evidence; nevertheless, no witnesses were called, as it was pretended that there were proofs of this kind existing in every case. The jurors did not even take the trouble to retire to the consultation room. They returned their verdict before the audience, and sentence was immediately pronounced. The accused had scarcely time to rise and to utter their names. One day there was a person whose name was not upon the list of the accused, and who said to the court, "I am not accused; my name is not in your list." "What signifies that?" said Fouquier; "give it directly." He gave it, and was sent to death like the others. The utmost carelessness prevailed in this kind of barbarous administration. They frequently omitted, by reason of their indecent hurry, to deliver the act of accusation to the accused, and they were given them even in court. The most extraordinary mistakes were committed. A worthy old man, Loizerolles, heard along with his own surname the Christian names of his son called over: he forbore to remonstrate, and was sent to the scaffold. Some time afterwards the son was brought to trial in his turn; it was found that he ought not to be alive, since a person answering to all his names had been executed: it was his father. However, for all that he suffered. More than once, victims were called long after they had been executed. There were hundreds of acts of accusation quite ready, to which there was nothing to add but the designation of the individuals. The same course was taken with the judgments. The printing-office was by the side of the very hall of the tribunal: the forms were kept standing; the title, the matters of inducement, were ready composed; there was nothing but the names to be added. These were handed through a small loophole to the corrector of the press. Thousands of copies were immediately worked, and plunged families into mourning, and struck terror into the prisons. The hawkers came to sell the calendar of the tribunal under the prisoners' windows, crying, *Here are the names of those who have gained prizes in the lottery of Saint Guillotine.* The accused were executed at the rising of the court, or at latest on the morrow, if the day was too far advanced.

Ever since the passing of the law of the 22d of Prairial, fifty or sixty heads a day fell under the guillotine. *That goes well*, said Fouquier-Tinville: *heads fall like slates.* And he added, *It must go still better next decade; I must have four hundred and fifty at least* *. For this purpose there were given what were called *orders* to the *sheep* (*moutons*†), who undertook the office of being spies upon the suspected. These wretches had become the terror of the prisons; being confined as suspected persons, it could not exactly be known which of them it was who undertook to point out the victims; but it was guessed, from their insolence, from the preference shown them by the gaolers, from the orgies which they held in the lodges with the agents of the police. They frequently gave intimations of their importance, in order to traffic with it. They were caressed and implored by the trembling prisoners; they even received sums of money not to put names upon their lists. They made their selection at random; they said of one that he had used aristocratic language; of another, that he had been drinking on a certain day when a defeat of the armies was announced; and their mere pointing out was equivalent to a death-warrant. The names they furnished were inserted in so many acts of accusation; and in the evening they came to deliver these acts to the prisoners, and convey them to the Conciergerie. This was called, in the language of the gaolers, the *Evening Journal.* When those unhappy persons heard the rolling of the tumbrels which came to fetch them, they suffered quite as much in their mind as if they had been summoned to death. They ran to the gates, clung to the bars to listen to the list, and trembled lest they should hear their name pronounced by the mouth of the officer. When they were named, they embraced their companions in misfortune, and received their final farewell from them. Most distressing separations were frequently witnessed: that of a father parted from his children, a husband from his wife. Those who

* For the minute relation of these facts, the reader is referred to the long trial of Fouquier-Tinville.

† *Moutons*—a cant name applied to those spies who, as is related in the text, were made to appear as fellow-prisoners with those against whom they informed. *Trans.*

survived were quite as wretched as those who were conducted to the den of Fouquier-Tinville; they went back expecting soon to rejoin their relatives. When this fatal call of names was over, the prisoners breathed more freely, but only till the following day. Their anguish was then renewed, and the fatal rolling of the carts brought fresh terror along with it.

However, public sympathy began to be expressed in a way that gave some uneasiness to the exterminators. The shopkeepers in the Rue Saint Honorè, through which the carts passed every day, shut up their shops. To deprive the victims of these signs of grief, the scaffold was removed to the Barriere du Trone, but not less pity was demonstrated in this quarter of the labouring people than in the best inhabited streets in Paris. The people, in a moment of irritation, may have no feeling for the victims whom they slaughter themselves, but the sight of the death of fifty or sixty unfortunate persons, against whom they are not excited by blind rage, is a spectacle which soon operates upon their sympathy. However, this sympathy was still silent and timid. All the most distinguished persons confined in the prisons had fallen: the unfortunate sister of Louis XVI. had been sacrificed in her turn; and from the upper classes of society a descent was now being made to the lower classes. We find at this period, on the list of the revolutionary tribunal, tailors, shoemakers, hairdressers, butchers, husbandmen, lemonade sellers, nay, even labouring men, condemned for sentiments and language deemed counter-revolutionary. To convey, in short, an idea of the number of executions at this period, suffice it to say, that between the month of March, 1793, the period of the tribunal entering upon its functions, and the month of June, 1794 (22 Prairial, year II.), it had condemned five hundred and seventy-seven persons; and that from the 10th of June (22 Prairial) to the (9 Thermidor) 27th of July, it condemned one thousand two hundred and eighty-five; so that the total number of victims up to the 9th Thermidor amounts to one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two.

However, these executioners were by no means well at ease. Dumas was troubled in his mind, and Fouquier durst not go out at night; he beheld the relatives of his victims ever ready to despatch him. On one occasion, passing with Sénart through the wickets of the Louvre, he felt alarmed at a slight noise; it was caused by a person passing close to him. "If I had been alone," said he, "something would have befallen me."

In the principal cities of France, the terror was not less than at Paris. Carrier had been sent out to Nantes, there to punish La Vendée. Carrier, still a young man, was one of those vulgar and violent minds who, in the excitement of civil wars, become monsters of cruelty and extravagance. He began by saying, on his arrival at Nantes, that all should be put to death, and that, notwithstanding the promise of pardon made to those Vendeans who should lay down their arms, no quarter ought to be given to them. The constituted authorities having spoken upon the subject of keeping faith with the rebels, "You are j— f—," said Carrier to them, "you don't know your business; I'll send you all to the guillotine;" and he began by firing upon and destroying with grape shot, in companies of one hundred or two hundred at a time, the unhappy persons who had surrendered themselves. He made his appearance at the popular society, sword in hand, uttering abusive language, and always threatening the guillotine. This society not suiting him, he caused it to be dissolved. He intimidated the authorities to such a degree, that they durst no longer appear before him. One day, when they came to consult him on the subject of provisions, he replied to the municipal officers, that it was no business of his: that the first b—— who talked to him about provisions, should have his head struck off, and that he had no time to attend to their nonsense. This madman imagined that the sole object of his mission was to slaughter.

He resolved to punish at one and the same time the Vendean rebels, and the federalists of Nantes, who had attempted a movement in favour of the Girondins, after the siege of their city. Every day the unfortunates who had escaped the massacres of Mans and Savenay, were coming in in crowds, as they were driven by the armies which pressed them closely on all sides. Carrier ordered them to be confined in the prisons of Nantes, and had thus collected there nearly ten thousand. He had next formed a band of murderers, who scoured the adjacent country, arrested the Nantese families, and added rapine to cruelty. Carrier had at first instituted a revolutionary commission for trying the Vendeans and the Nantese. He caused the Vendeans to be shot, and the Nantese, suspected of federalism of royalism, to be guillotined. He soon found this formality too tedious, and the execution by shooting attended with inconveniences. This mode of execution was slow; it was troublesome to bury the bodies: they were frequently left on the scene of carnage, and infected the air to such a degree, as to produce an epidemic disease in the town. The Loire, which runs through Nantes, suggested a frightful idea to Carrier, namely, to rid himself of the prisoners by drowning them in that river. He made a previous experiment, and loaded a barge with ninety priests, under the pretence of transporting them elsewhere, and caused it to be sunk when at some distance from the city. This expedient having been found to answer, he resolved to employ it on a large scale. He no longer used the mock formality of passing the prisoners before a commission; he caused them to be taken in the night out of the prisons in parties of one and two hundred, and put into boats. From these boats they were conveyed to small vessels prepared for this horrible purpose. The miserable wretches were thrown into the hold; the port-holes were nailed down; the passages to the deck were closed with planks; the executioners then got into the boats, and carpenters placed in wherries opened the sides of the vessels with hatchets, and made them sink. In this frightful manner four or five thousand persons perished. Carrier congratulated himself at having discovered a more expeditious and more sanitary mode of delivering the republic from its enemies. He drowned not only men, but also a great number of women and children. When the Vendean families were dispersed, after the route of Savenay, a great number of Nantese had taken care of the children, with the intention of

bringing them up. "They are wolf whelps," said Carrier; and he ordered them to be restored to the republic. These unfortunate children were for the most part drowned.

The Loire was covered with dead bodies. Ships, in weighing anchor, sometimes raised boats filled with drowned persons. Birds of prey covered the banks of the river, and gorged themselves with human flesh *. The fish were thus fed upon a substance which rendered them unfit to be eaten, and were forbidden by the municipality to be taken. To these horrors were added those of a contagious disease and dearth. In the midst of this dreadful situation, Carrier, still boiling with rage, forbade the slightest emotion of pity, seized by the collar and threatened with his sword those who came to speak to him, and caused notices to be posted, stating that whosoever should come to solicit on behalf of any person in confinement should be thrown into prison. Fortunately, he was superseded by the committee of public welfare, for although the committee desired extermination, it did not require this extraordinary violence. The number of Carrier's victims is computed at four or five thousand. The greater part of them were Vendeans.

Bordeaux, Marseilles, Toulon, expiated their federalism. At Toulon, Fréron and Barras, the representatives, had caused two hundred of the inhabitants to be killed with grape shot, and had punished them for a crime, the real authors of which had escaped in the English squadron. In the department of Vaucluse, Maignet exercised a dictatorship as terrific as the other delegates of the convention. He had ordered the borough of Bédouin to be burned for rebellion; and at his suggestion, the committee of public welfare had instituted at Orange a revolutionary tribunal, the jurisdiction of which extended to the whole of the South. This tribunal was framed after the very model of the revolutionary tribunal of Paris, with this difference, that there were no jurors, and that five judges condemned, upon what they termed *moral proofs*, all the unfortunate persons whom Maignet collected in his circuits. At Lyons, the sanguinary executions ordered by Collot d'Herbois had altogether ceased. The revolutionary commission had just given an account of its proceedings, and furnished the number of the acquitted and of the condemned. One thousand six hundred and eighty-four persons had been either guillotined or destroyed by grape shot. One thousand six hundred and eighty-two had been set at liberty by *the justice of the commission*.

The North also was not without its pro-consul, Joseph Lebon. He had been a priest, and confessed that, in his youth, he should have carried religious fanaticism to such a length, as even to kill his father and mother, had he been enjoined so to do. He was a real lunatic, less ferocious perhaps than Carrier, but more decidedly divested of reasoning capacity. From his language, and from his conduct, it was evident that his mind was deranged. He had fixed his principal residence at Arras. He had established a tribunal with the approbation of the committee of public welfare, and travelled through the departments of the North, attended by his judges and a guillotine. He had visited Saint Pol, Saint Omer, Béthune, Bapeaume, Aire, &c., and had every where left the bloody traces of his progress. The Austrians having approached Cambray, and Saint-Just imagining that he perceived that the aristocrats of that town were in secret correspondence with the enemy, summoned thither Lebon, who, in a few days, sent to the scaffold a multitude of unfortunate persons, and pretended that he had saved Cambray by his firmness. When Lebon had finished his excursions, he returned to Arras. There he indulged in the most disgusting orgies, with his judges and various members of the clubs. The executioner was admitted to his table, and was there treated with every possible mark of respect. Lebon attended the executions, which he witnessed from a balcony; from this balcony he was accustomed to harangue the people, and caused the "*ça ira*" to be played while the blood was actually flowing. One day, immediately after he had received intelligence of a victory, he hastened to his balcony, and ordered the execution to be suspended, that the sufferers who were about to die might be made acquainted with the successes of the republic.

Lebon's conduct had been so strongly marked by mental alienation, that he became subject to accusation even before the committee of public welfare. Some inhabitants of Arras had sought refuge in Paris, and took great pains to gain access to their fellow-citizen, Robespierre, for the purpose of submitting their complaints to him. Some of them had known, and even conferred obligations on him in his younger days, but yet they could not gain access to him. Guffroy, the deputy, who was at Arras, and who possessed great courage, exerted himself extremely at the committees so as to call their attention to the conduct of Lebon. He had nobly ventured to make an express denunciation to the convention. The committee of public welfare took cognizance of it, and could not help calling Lebon before them. However, as the committee was not willing either to disavow its agents, or to afford the slightest ground for presuming that one could be too severe towards the aristocrats, they sent Lebon back to Arras, and, in writing to him, made use of the following expressions:—"Continue to do good, and pursue your course with that discretion and dignity which cannot afford an handle for the calumnies of the aristocracy." The complaints preferred in the convention by Guffroy against Lebon required a report from the committee. Barrere was commissioned to prepare it. "All complaints against representatives," said he, "ought to be referred to the committee, in order to spare those debates which would perturb the government and the convention. This is what has been done upon the present occasion in regard to Lebon; we have inquired into the motives of his conduct. Are these motives pure? Is the result useful to the revolution? Is it serviceable to liberty? Are the complaints merely recriminatory, or are they only the vindictive outcries of the aristocracy? This is what the committee has kept in view in this affair. Forms somewhat harsh have been employed; but these forms have destroyed the snares of the aristocracy. The committee certainly has reason to disapprove of them; but Lebon has completely defeated the aristocrats, and

* Deposition of the master of a vessel on Carrier's trial.

saved Cambray. Besides, what is there that ought not to be forgiven in the hatred of a republican against the aristocracy! However acrimonious a patriot may be in his prosecution of the enemies of the people, yet how many generous sentiments does he not possess to extenuate his faults! The revolution should not be mentioned but with respect, nor revolutionary measures but with consideration. *Liberty is a virgin, and to raise her veil is a crime.*"

All this ended in Lebon's being authorized to proceed, and in Guffroy's being classed among the troublesome censors of the revolutionary government, and as such was exposed to the same dangers. It was now evident enough that the entire committee was in favour of the system of terror. Robespierre, Couthon, Billaud, Collot d'Herbois, Vadier, Vouland, and Amar, might differ amongst themselves as to their prerogatives, and as to the number and selection of the colleagues they were to sacrifice; but they were every one quite agreed as to the system of exterminating all those who interposed obstacles to the revolution. They did not wish this system to be applied without any limit by the Lebons and the Carriers; but they were anxious to be delivered after the way in which things were done at Paris, that is, with promptitude, certainty, and with as little disturbance as possible, from the enemies whom they supposed to have conspired against the republic. While they could not but censure certain insane cruelties, they possessed that self-esteem of power which is always reluctant to disavow its agents. They condemned what had been done at Arras and at Nantes; but in appearance they approved of it in order that they might not have to acknowledge that their government was to blame. Hurried along into this horrible career, they blindly advanced, not knowing where it would terminate. Such is the unhappy condition of the man engaged in evil, he has not the power to stop. So soon as he begins to conceive a doubt as to the nature of his actions, so soon as he has a glimmering notion that he has strayed from the right path, instead of retreating he rushes forward as if to hide the true state of things from himself, or as if to escape from the transient gleams that annoy him. Before he can arrest his progress he must be calm, he must commune with himself, he must pass a severe judgment upon himself, which no man has courage to do.

There was nothing short of a general rising that could stop the authors of this terrible system. It was requisite that in this rising there should engage, the members of the committees jealous of the supreme power, as well as the threatened Mountaineers, the indignant convention, and every heart disgusted by this horrid effusion of blood. But in order to arrive at this association of jealousy, fear, and indignation, it was requisite that jealousy should make its way in the committees, that the fear should become extreme in the Mountain, and that indignation should restore courage to the convention and to the public. It was further requisite that a suitable opportunity should cause all these sentiments to burst forth simultaneously, and that the oppressors should strike the first blows, so that the oppressed might dare to return them.

Public opinion had received its impression, and the moment had arrived when a movement in behalf of humanity against revolutionary violence was possible. The republic being victorious, and its opponents terrified, the transition from fear and fury to confidence and pity was natural enough. It was the first time during the revolution that such a circumstance could have taken place. When the Girondists and the Dantonists perished, it was not yet time to invoke humanity. The revolutionary government had neither been divested of its utility or its consideration.

Up to this period both parties attentively watched each other, and treasured up the deepest resentment in their hearts. Robespierre had entirely ceased his attendance at the committee of public welfare. He hoped to vilify the government of his colleagues by taking no further part in it; he never showed himself but at the Jacobins, where Billaud and Collot durst no longer appear, and where he was every day more and more adored. He began to throw out observations there upon the intestine dissensions of the committee. "Formerly," said he, (13 Messidor) "the hollow faction which has been formed out of the remains of Danton and Camille Desmoulins was attacking the committees en masse; now it prefers attacking certain members in particular, in order to succeed in breaking the fasces. Formerly, it durst not attack the national justice; now it deems itself strong enough to calumniate the revolutionary tribunal as well as the decree concerning its organization: it attributes to a single individual that which belongs to the entire government; it ventures to assert that the revolutionary tribunal has been instituted for the purpose of slaughtering the national convention, and unfortunately it has obtained but too much credence. Its scandals have gained credence; they have been assiduously circulated: a dictator has been talked of; his name even has been mentioned; it is myself they have alluded to, and you would shudder *were I to tell you in what place.* Truth is my only refuge against crime. These calumnies will most assuredly not discourage me, but they leave me undecided as to my future conduct. Until I am able to say more on this subject, I appeal to the virtues of the convention, the virtues of the committee, the virtues of all good citizens, and, lastly, your virtues, which have so often proved serviceable to the country."

We see by what perfidious insinuations Robespierre began to denounce the committees, and to attach the Jacobins exclusively to himself. For these tokens of confidence he was repaid with unbounded adulation. The revolutionary system being solely attributed to him, it became natural that all the revolutionary authorities should be attached to him, and should warmly espouse his cause. With the Jacobins were of course associated the commune, always united in principle and conduct with the Jacobins, as well as all the judges and jurors of the revolutionary tribunal. This association formed a very considerable force, and, with more resolution and energy, Robespierre might have made himself extremely formidable. By means of the Jacobins he had the direction of a turbulent mass, whom he had hitherto represented, and whose opinion he swayed; through the commune he controlled the local authority, which had taken the lead in all the insurrections; and what was of

still more consequence, the armed force of Paris. Pache, the mayor, and Henriot, the commandant, whom he had saved when they were about to be identified with Chaumette, were wholly devoted to him. Billaud and Collot had taken advantage, it is true, of his absence to imprison Pache; but Fleuriot, the new mayor, and Payan, the national agent, were just as much attached to him; and the committee had not dared to take Henriot from him. Add to these persons, Dumas, the president of the tribunal, Coffinhal, the vice-president, and all the other judges and jurors, and we shall have some idea of the faculties Robespierre possessed in Paris. If the committees and the convention did not obey him, he had only to complain to the Jacobins, to excite a movement in that quarter, to communicate this movement to the commune, to compel the municipal authority to declare that the people resumed its sovereign powers, to set the sections in motion, and to send Henriot to demand of the convention sixty or seventy deputies. Dumas, Coffinhal, and the whole tribunal, would then be at his command, to put to death the deputies whom Henriot should have obtained by main force. In short, all the expedients of such a day as the 31st of May, more prompt and more certain in their execution than the former, were in his hands.

Accordingly, his partisans and his hireling assassins came around him, urging him to give the signal. Henriot again offered the assistance of his columns, and promised to be more energetic than he was on the 2nd of June. Robespierre, who preferred doing every thing by word of mouth, and who imagined that he could still perform a great deal through that medium, resolved to wait. He hoped to make the committees unpopular by his secession, as well as by his speeches at the Jacobins, and he then proposed to seize a favourable moment for attacking them openly in the convention. He continued, notwithstanding his seeming abdication, to direct the tribunal, and to conduct an active police by means of an office which he had established. By his police-office he was keeping strict watch over his adversaries, and informed himself of all their movements. He now allowed himself somewhat more relaxation than formerly. He was observed to repair to a very handsome country-seat, belonging to a family that was devoted to him, at Maisons-Alfort, three leagues from Paris. Thither all his partisans accompanied him; thither, also, came Dumas, Coffinhal, Payan, and Fleuriot. Henriot, also, frequently went thither with all his aides-de-camp; they traversed the roads five a-breast, and at full gallop, overthrowing all the persons they met with, and by their presence spreading terror through the country. The hosts, and the friends of Robespierre, caused him, by their indiscretion, to be suspected of many more plans than he ever contemplated, or had the courage to methodize. In Paris, he was always surrounded by the same persons, and he was followed at certain distances by Jacobins or jurors of the tribunal, men devoted to him, armed with sticks and secret weapons, and ready to hasten to his assistance on the first alarm. They were called his body-guards.

Billaud-Varennes, Collot d'Herbois, and Barrère, on their part, intruded themselves in the conduct of all affairs, and, in the absence of their rival, attached to themselves Carnot, Robert Lindet, and Prieur (of the Côte-d'Or). A community of interest induced an association between them and the committee of general safety; in other respects, they maintained the most profound silence. They strove to effect a gradual diminution of the power of their adversary, by reducing the armed force of Paris. There were forty-eight companies of artillery belonging to the forty-eight sections, well disciplined, and who had invariably demonstrated the most revolutionary spirit. They had constantly sided with the insurrectionary party ever since the 10th of August to the 31st of May. A decree directed that at least the half of them should remain in Paris, but permitted the other part to be shifted to some other place. Billaud and Collot had ordered the chairman of the commission for superintending the movements of the armies, to send them off successively to the frontiers, and this order had already begun to be carried into effect. In all their operations they concealed themselves as much as possible from Couthon, who, not having seceded like Robespierre, watched them attentively, and stood very much in their way. While these things were going on, Billaud, gloomy and splenetic, seldom quitted Paris; but the witty and voluptuous Barrère went to Passy, in company with the principal members of the committee of general safety, with old Vadier, Vouland, and Amar. They met at the house of Dupin, formerly a farmer-general, famous under the late government for his kitchen, and, during the Revolution, for the report which sent the farmers-general to their death. There it was that they enjoyed themselves with fine women; and Barrère pointed his wit against the pontiff of the Supreme Being, the chief prophet, the beloved Son of the Mother of God. After having sufficiently diverted themselves, they quitted the arms of their courtezans, to return to Paris into the midst of blood and party animosities.

On their part the old members of the Mountain, who found themselves threatened, met in secret, and earnestly sought to come to a mutual understanding. The devoted woman who, at Bordeaux, had attached herself to Tallien, and snatched a multitude of victims from his grasp, urged him from the recesses of her prison to strike the tyrant. To Tallien, Lecointre, Bourdon (of the Oise), Thuriot, Panis, Barras, Fréron, Monestier, were associated Guffroy, the antagonist of Lebon; Dubois-Cranté, compromised at the siege of Lyons, and detested by Couthon; Fouché (of Nantes), who had embroiled himself with Robespierre, and who lay under the imputation of not having conducted himself in a perfectly patriotic manner at Lyons. Tallien and Lecointre were the most daring and the most impatient. Fouché was particularly dreaded, on account of his skill in contriving and conducting an intrigue, and it was against him that the triumvirs were most exasperated.

On occasion of a petition from the Jacobins of Lyons, in which they complained to the Jacobins of Paris of their existing situation, the whole circumstances of that unfortunate city came again to be noticed. Couthon denounced Dubois-Cranté, as he had done some months before, and accused him of having allowed Précy to escape, and caused his name to be struck out of the list of Jacobins. Robespierre accused Fouché, and imputed to him the intrigues which had caused Gaillard, the patriot,

to lay violent hands on himself. It was settled that Fouché should be summoned before the society to explain his conduct. It was not so much the intrigues of Fouché at Lyons as his intrigues in Paris, that Robespierre dreaded, and was desirous of punishing. Fouché, aware of the danger, addressed an evasive letter to the Jacobins, and besought them to suspend their judgment, till the committee, to whom he had just submitted his conduct, and whom he had furnished with all the documents in its support, should have pronounced its decision. "It is astonishing," said Robespierre, "that Fouché should to-day implore the aid of the convention against the Jacobins. Is he afraid of the eyes and the ears of the people? Is he afraid lest his agitated countenance should betray his crime? Is he afraid lest the looks of six thousand persons fixed upon him should discover his soul in his eyes, and read his thoughts there in despite of nature who has concealed them? The conduct of Fouché is that of a guilty wretch; you cannot any longer retain him as a member of your body; he must be expelled." Fouché was accordingly expelled, as Dubois-Crancé had been. Thus the storm roared daily more and more vehemently against the threatened Mountaineers, and the horizon on all sides became more overcast with clouds.

Amidst this general agitation, the members of the committees, who feared Robespierre, would rather have courted an explanation and conciliated his ambition, than have engaged in a perilous conflict. Robespierre had sent for his young colleague, Saint-Just, and the latter had immediately returned from the army. It was proposed that a meeting should take place for the purpose of attempting to come to a mutual understanding. Robespierre had to be extremely pressed before he would consent to an interview; he did at last consent thereto, and the two committees gave each other the meeting; mutual reproaches were exchanged with great bitterness on both sides. Robespierre spoke of himself with his usual offensive pride, denounced secret meetings, talked of conspirator deputies to be punished, censured all the operations of the government, and condemned every thing, administration, war, and finances.

Saint-Just supported Robespierre, pronounced a magnificent panegyric upon him, and said that the only hope that was left for the foreign foe was to produce dissension in the government. He related what had been said by an officer who had been made prisoner before Maubeuge. They were waiting, to use the words of that officer, till a more moderate party should overturn the revolutionary government, and cause other principles to get the upper hand. Saint-Just relied upon this fact for making them duly consider the necessity of reconciling their present differences, and going hand in hand with each other. The antagonists of Robespierre were also of the same opinion, and they were willing to come to a good understanding, so that they might remain masters of the state; but in order to effect a mutual understanding, they must consent to all that Robespierre desired, and such conditions could not suit them. The members of the committee of general safety made great complaints of having been stripped of their functions. Elie Lacoste carried his hardihood so far as to assert that Couthon, Saint-Just, and Robespierre, formed a committee in the committees, nay, even dared to utter the word triumvirate. However, some mutual concessions were settled. Robespierre consented to confine his office of general police to the superintendence of the agents of the committee of public welfare; and his adversaries, in return, consented to direct that Saint-Just should make a report to the convention in respect of the interview that had taken place. In this report, as may well be conceived, no mention was to be made of the dissensions that had prevailed between the committees; but the report was to make mention of the commotions which public opinion had of late experienced, and to fix the course which the government purposed to pursue. Billaud and Collot insinuated that the less that was said in it about the Supreme Being the better it would be; for they still had Robespierre's pontificate before their eyes. However, Billaud, with his gloomy and sinister aspect, told Robespierre that he had never been his enemy; and the parties separated without being really reconciled, but apparently somewhat less divided than before. There could be no sincerity in such a reconciliation as this, for their ambitious desires remained the same; it resembled those attempts at negotiation which all parties make before they come to blows; it was a true *kiss and make it up* (*baiser lamourette*); it bore a strong likeness to all the reconciliations proposed between the constituents and the Girondists, between the Girondists and the Jacobins, and between Danton and Robespierre.

However, if it failed to restore harmony among the members of the committees, yet it greatly alarmed the Mountaineers. They concluded that their destruction was to be the pledge of peace, and they strove to ascertain what were the conditions of the treaty. The members of the committee of general safety were anxious to dispel their fears. Elie Lacoste, Dubarran, and Moses Bayle, the better constituted members of the committee, pacified them, and told them that no sacrifice had been agreed upon. This was true enough; and it was one of the reasons which prevented the reconciliation from being complete. Nevertheless, Barrère, who was particularly desirous that they should be on good terms, did not fail to repeat in his daily reports that the members of the government were perfectly united, that they had been unjustly accused of being at variance, and that they were exerting their joint efforts to render the republic every where victorious. He affected to sum up all the imputations raised against the triumvirs; and he repelled those imputations as so many criminal scandals, and pointed equally against both the committees. "Amid the shouts of victory," said he, "vague rumours are heard, obscure calumnies are circulated, subtle poisons are infused into the journals, fatal conspiracies are being contrived, factitious discontents are preparing, and the government is perpetually annoyed, impeded in its operations, thwarted in its movements, scandalized in its intentions, and threatened in those who compose it. Yet what has it done?" Here Barrère added the usual enumeration of the labours and services of the government.

CHAPTER XXII.

OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE NORTH TOWARDS THE MIDDLE OF 1794. THE CAPTURE OF YPRES. FORMATION OF THE ARMY OF THE SAMBRE-AND-MEUSE—BATTLE OF FLEURUS. OCCUPATION OF BRUSSELS—THE LATTER DAYS OF TERROR; STRUGGLE BY ROBESPIERRE AND THE TRIGNVIRS AGAINST THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEES. EVENTS OF THE 8 AND 9 THERMIDOR; ARREST AND EXECUTION OF ROBESPIERRE AND SAINT-JUST—MARCH OF THE REVOLUTION FROM '89 TO 9 THERMIDOR.

WHILE Barrère was doing his best to conceal the discord of the committee, Saint-Just, notwithstanding the report which he had to make, had returned to the army, where important events were taking place. The movements commenced by the two wings had continued. Pichegru had prosecuted his operations on the Lys and the Scheldt; Jourdan had commenced his on the Sambre. Taking advantage of the defensive attitude which Cobourg had assumed at Tournay since the battles of Turcoing and Pont-a-chin, Pichegru designed to beat Clerfait separately. However, he durst not advance as far as Thielt, and he resolved to commence the siege of Ypres, with the twofold object of drawing Clerfait towards him and taking that place, which would consolidate the establishment of the French in West Flanders. Clerfait was waiting for reinforcements, and made no movement. Pichegru then pushed the siege of Ypres so vigorously, that Cobourg and Clerfait deemed it incumbent on them to quit their respective positions, and to go to the relief of the threatened fortress. Pichegru, in order to prevent Cobourg from prosecuting this movement, caused troops to issue from Lille, and to make so serious a demonstration on Orchies, that Cobourg was detained at Tournay. At the same time he moved forward and hastened to Clerfait, who was advancing towards Rousselaer and Hooglède. His prompt and well-conceived movements afforded him an occasion of still fighting Clerfait separately. Unfortunately one division had mistaken its way; Clerfait had time to return to his camp at Thielt, after a slight loss. But, three days afterwards, 25 Prairial, (13 June,) Clerfait, reinforced by the detachment he expected, deployed unawares in face of our columns with thirty thousand men. Our soldiers quickly ran to arms, but the right division being attacked with great impetuosity, was thrown into confusion, and the left remained uncovered on the high level ground of Hooglède. Macdonald commanded this left division, and found means to maintain it against the repeated attacks in front and flank to which it was long exposed. By this courageous defence he gave Devinthier's brigade time to rejoin him, and then obliged Clerfait to retire with considerable loss. This was the fifth time that Clerfait, inefficiently seconded, was beaten by our army of the north. This action, so honourable for Macdonald's division, decided the surrender of the besieged fortress. Four days afterwards, on the 29th Prairial (June 17), Ypres opened its gates, and a garrison of seven thousand men laid down their arms. Cobourg was going to the relief of Ypres and Clerfait, when he learned that it was too late. The events which were taking place on the Sambre then obliged him to move towards the opposite side of the theatre of war. He left the duke of York on the Scheldt, and Clerfait at Thielt, and marched with all the Austrian troops in the direction of Charleroi. It was in fact an absolute separation between the principal powers, England and Austria, who were on very bad terms, and whose different interests were here most distinctly manifested. The English remained in Flanders near the maritime provinces, and the Austrians lost no time in getting to their exposed lines of communication. This separation increased not a little their misunderstanding. The emperor of Austria had retired to Vienna, disgusted with this unsuccessful warfare; and Mack, seeing his plans frustrated, had once more quitted the Austrian staff.

We have observed Jourdan came from the Moselle to Charleroi at the moment when the French, repulsed for the third time, were crossing the Sambre in disorder. After a few days' rest had been given to the troops, some of whom were dispirited by their defeats, and others by their rapid march, some change was made in their organization. The divisions of Desjardins and Charbonnier, as well as the divisions which had arrived from the Moselle, were formed into a single army, called the army of Sambre-and-Meuse; this army amounted to about sixty-six thousand men, and was placed under the command of Jourdan. A division of fifteen thousand men, commanded by Scherer, was left to guard the Sambre from Theuin to Maubeuge.

Jourdan resolved immediately to recross the Sambre and to invest Charleroi. Hatry's division was ordered to attack the place, and the bulk of the army was disposed all round to cover the siege. Charleroi is seated on the Sambre. Beyond it are a series of positions forming a semicircle, the extremities of which are supported by the Sambre. These positions are of no great importance, inasmuch as the semicircle they describe is ten leagues in extent, because they do not sufficiently communicate with each other, and have a river at their back. Kléber, with the left, drew himself out in line from the Sambre to Orchies and Traségnies, and protected the rivulet of Piéton, which ran through the field of battle and fell into the Sambre. At the centre, Marlot guarded Gosselies; Championnet advanced between Hépignies and Wagné; Lefevre occupied Wagné, Fleurus, and Lambusart. Lastly, on the right, Marceau drew himself out in advance of the wood of Campinaire, and connected our line with the Sambre. Jourdan, sensible of the disadvantage of these positions, had no desire to remain there, and advised that, in order to leave them, we should open

the attack on the morning of the 28th Prairial (June 16). At this time Cobourg had not yet moved towards that point; he was at Tournay, being present at the defeat of Clerfait and the capture of Ypres. The prince of Orange, dispatched towards Charleroi, commanded the army of the allies. He resolved, on his part, to anticipate the attack with which he was threatened; and on the morning of the 28th, his troops being deployed, compelled the French to sustain the attack on the ground they occupied. Four columns, directed against our right and our centre, had already made their way into the wood of Campinaire, where Marceau was, had taken Fleurus from Lefèvre, Hépignies from Championnet, and were driving Morlot from Pont-a-Migneloup to Gosselies, when Jourdan, seasonably arriving with a reserve of cavalry, stopped the progress of the fourth column by a successful charge, brought Morlot's troops back to their positions, and revived the conflict at the centre. On the left, Wartensleben had made a similar progress towards Traséguies. But Kléber, by making the most ready and efficient arrangements, retook Traséguies; and then, seizing the favourable moment, got to the rear of Wartensleben, drove him beyond the Piéton, and pursued him with two columns. The conflict had been maintained with advantage, nay, victory was about to declare for the French, when the prince of Orange, effecting a junction between his first two columns in the direction of Lambusart, on the point which connected the extreme right of the French with the Sambre, threatened their line of communications. The right and the centre were then obliged to fall back. Kléber, relinquishing his victorious career, covered the retreat with his troops, which was effected in good order. Such was the first affair of the 28th (June 16). This was the fourth time that the French had been forced to recross the Sambre; but on the present occasion, it was in a manner much more honourable to their military character. Jourdan was by no means out of spirits. He once more crossed the Sambre a few days afterwards, regained the positions he had occupied on the 16th, again invested Charleroi, and caused the bombardment to be maintained with the utmost vigour.

Cobourg, apprised of Jourdan's new operations, at length approached the Sambre. It was of importance to the French that they should take Charleroi before the reinforcements expected by the Austrian army should come up. Marescot, the engineer, pushed the operations so briskly, that in a week the guns of the fortress were silenced, and every preparation was made for the assault. On the 7th Messidor (June 25) the commandant sent an officer with a letter to treat. Saint-Just, who still held supreme sway in our camp, refused to open the letter, and sent back the officer, saying, *This is but a bit of paper; it is the fortress we must have.* The garrison marched out of the fortress the same evening, at the very moment that Cobourg was coming in sight of the French lines. The enemy remained ignorant of the surrender of Charleroi. The possession of the place rendered our position more secure, and that battle in which we were about to engage, with a river at our backs, less disadvantageous. Hatry's division being left at liberty, was marched to Ransart, to reinforce the centre, and everything was made ready for a decisive engagement on the following day, the 8th Messidor (June 26).

Our positions were the same as on the 28th Prairial (June 16). Kléber commanded on the left, commencing from the Sambre to Traséguies. Morlot, Championnet, Lefèvre, and Marceau, formed the centre and the right, and extended their line from Gosselies to the Sambre. Intrenchments had been made at Hépignies, to secure our centre. Cobourg caused us to be attacked along the whole of this semicircle, instead of directing a concentric effort upon one of our extremities, at our right for instance, and taking from us all the passages of the Sambre.

The attack commenced on the morning of the 8th Messidor. The prince of Orange and General Latour, who fronted Kléber on the left, beat back our columns, and drove them through the wood of Monceaux to Marchienne-au-Pont, up to the banks of the Sambre. Kléber, who was fortunately placed on the left for the purpose of taking charge of all the divisions in that quarter, immediately hastened to the threatened point, brought batteries to bear upon the heights, surrounded the Austrians in the wood of Monceaux, and attacked them on all sides. The latter having perceived, as they approached the Sambre, that Charleroi was in possession of the French, began to flinch. Kléber taking advantage of this state of things, made a vigorous charge, and compelled them to get off from Marchienne-au-Pont. While Kléber was thus protecting one of our extremities, Jourdan was doing no less for the centre and the right. Morlot, who was in advance of Gosselies, had been long time fighting with General Kwasdanowich, and attempted several manœuvres for the purpose of getting round to his rear; but it ended by having the same manœuvre practised upon himself. He had himself fallen back upon Gosselies, after making the most honourable exertions. Championnet, supported by the redoubt of Hépignies, made quite as vigorous a defence, but the corps of Kaunitz had advanced to get behind the redoubt at the very moment when a false report announced the retreat of Lefèvre at the right. Championnet, deceived by this report, was retiring, and had already abandoned the redoubt, when Jourdan perceiving the danger, brought part of Hatry's division, placed in reserve, to bear upon that point, retook Hépignies, and sent forth his cavalry into the plain upon the troops of Kaunitz. While both sides were charging with great fury, a still fiercer contest was raging near the Sambre at Wagné and Lambusart. Beaulieu, marching up both banks of the Sambre at once, for the purpose of attacking our extremity to the right, had repulsed Marceau's division. That division fled in all haste through the woods bordering the Sambre, and even crossed the river in disorder. Marceau then got together some battalions, and, regardless of the rest of the fugitive division, threw himself into Lambusart, resolving to perish there rather than abandon that post contiguous to the Sambre, and an indispensable support of our extremity at the right. Lefèvre, who was stationed at Wagné, Hépignies, and Lambusart, drew back his advanced posts from Fleurus upon Wagné, and threw his troops into Lambusart to support Marceau's operations. This spot now became the de-

cisive point of the battle; Beaulieu perceiving this, sent a third column thither. Jourdan, fully apprized of the danger, also brought thither the rest of his reserve. The engagement was kept up around the village of Lambusart with extraordinary obstinacy. So brisk was the firing, that the volleys could no longer be distinguished. The corn and the huts of the camp took fire, and the combatants were soon fighting amidst a conflagration. The republicans at last remained masters of Lambusart.

At this moment, the French at first repulsed, had succeeded in renewing the battle at every point: Kléber had covered the Sambre and the left; Morlot having fallen back to Gosselies, kept his ground there; Championnet had retaken Hépignies; and a furious conflict at Lambusart had ensured us that position. It was now nightfall. Beaulieu had just learned, upon the Sambre, what the prince of Orange had already been apprised of, that Charleroi was in the possession of the French; after that, Cobourg not venturing to proceed, ordered a general retreat.

Such was this decisive engagement, which was one of the most sanguinary in the campaign, and which was fought over a semicircle of ten leagues, between two armies of nearly eighty thousand men each. It was called the battle of Fleurus, though that village acted but a secondary part, because the duke of Luxemburg had already shed a lustre on that name under Louis XIV. Though its results on the spot were inconsiderable, and it was confined to a defensive attack, it decided the retreat of the Austrians, and thereby produced immense results*. The Austrians could not fight a second battle. They must have effected a junction either with the duke of York or with Clerfait, and these two generals were occupied in the north by Pichegru. Besides, exposed as they were upon the Meuse, it was expedient for them to fall back, lest they should endanger their line of communications. From that moment, the retreat of the allies became general, and they resolved to concentrate themselves towards Brussels, in order to protect that city.

The campaign was now evidently decided; but an error of the committee of public welfare prevented us from obtaining results so prompt and so decisive as there had been reason to expect. Pichegru had formed a plan, which was the best of all his military schemes. The duke of York was on the Scheldt, above Tournay; Clerfait at a great distance from thence, at Thielt, in Flanders. Pichegru, still holding to his plan of destroying Clerfait separately, desired to cross the Scheldt at Oudenarde, thus to cut off Clerfait from the duke of York, and to fight him once more singly. His intention next was, that while the duke of York, left alone, should think of joining Cobourg, to fight him in his turn, then to take Cobourg in the rear, or to form a junction with Jourdan. This plan, which was attended not only with the advantage of attacking Clerfait and the duke of York separately, but also with that of collecting all our forces on the Meuse, was thwarted by a very stupid notion of the committee of public welfare. Carnot had been persuaded to despatch admiral Venstabel with marines to the island of Walcheren, so as to cause a rising in Holland. For the purpose of assisting this plan, Carnot directed Pichegru's army to march along the coast, and to take possession of all the ports of West Flanders; he further ordered Jourdan to detach sixteen thousand men from his army, and to send them towards the sea. This latter order, in particular, was one of the most injudicious and the most dangerous that could be. The generals demonstrated its absurdity to Saint-Just, and it was not executed; but Pichegru was nevertheless obliged to move towards the sea, to take Bruges and Ostend, while Moreau was in the occupation of Nieuport.

The movements still progressed by the two wings. Pichegru left Moreau, with one part of the army, to lay siege to Nieuport and Sluys, and with the other took possession of Bruges, Ostend, and Ghent. He then advanced towards Brussels. Jourdan, on his side, was also marching thither. We now had only rear-guard battles to fight, and at length, on the 22nd Messidor (July 10), our advanced guard entered the capital of the Netherlands. A few days afterwards, the two armies of the north and of the Sambre-and-Meuse, effected a junction at that place. Nothing could be of greater importance than this event; one hundred and fifty thousand French, collected in the capital of the Netherlands, could pour down from that point upon the armies of Europe, who, beaten on all sides, were seeking, some to regain the sea, others to regain the Rhine. The fortresses of Condé, Landrecies, Valenciennes, and Le Quesnoy, which the allies had taken from us, were immediately invested; and the convention, upon the assumption that the possession of the territory conferred absolute right, decreed that, if the garrison did not immediately surrender, they should be put to the sword. The convention had also passed another decree, enacting that no more English should in future be made prisoners, by way of punishing all the bold offences of Pitt against France. Our soldiers would not carry out this decree. A sergeant having taken some English, brought them to an officer. "Why hast thou taken them?" asked the officer. "Because we shall have to receive so many shots the less," replied the sergeant. "True," replied the officer, "but the representatives will oblige us to shoot them." "It will not be us," retorted the sergeant, "who will shoot them. Send them to the representatives, and if they are cannibals, why then let them e'en kill and eat them, if they like."

Thus our armies, acting at first upon the enemy's centre, and finding it too strong for them, had divided themselves into two wings, which had marched, the one along the Lys, the other along the Sambre. Pichegru had first beaten Clerfait at Meouröen and at Courtray, then Cobourg and the duke of York at Turcoing, and, lastly, had defeated Clerfait again at Hooglede. After several fruitless passages across the Sambre, Jourdan, brought to the Sambre by a happy idea of Carnot's, had decided the success of our right wing at Fleurus. From that moment the allies, approached by both

* It is wrong to attribute to the influence of a faction the great sensation that the battle of Fleurus produced upon public opinion. The Robespierre faction, on the contrary, had the greatest interest in derogating at the moment from the effect of those victories, as we shall shortly perceive. The battle of Fleurus gave us an entrance into Brussels and Belgium, and it is from that circumstance it derives its estimation.

wings, had abandoned the Netherlands to us. Such was the result of the campaign. Our astounding successes were everywhere extolled. The victory of Fleurus, the occupation of Charleroi, Ypres, Tournay, Oudenarde, Ostend, Bruges, Ghent, and Brussels, and lastly, the junction of our armies in that capital, were looked upon as prodigies. These successes did not gratify Robespierre, who saw that the credit of the committee, especially of Carnot, was on the increase, to whom, it must be confessed, the success of the campaign was not in so great a degree to be attributed. All the good done by the committees, and all the glory gained by them in the absence of Robespierre, could not but rise up against him, and constitute his condemnation. On the other hand, one defeat would have revived the revolutionary fury in his favour, have given him license to accuse the committees of want of energy or treason, have justified his secession for the last four decades, have presented an extraordinary idea of his foresight, and raised his influence to the highest pitch. He had, therefore, placed himself in the most melancholy position; that of wishing for reverses; and every circumstance proved that he did wish for them. It did not become him either to give utterance to this wish or to suffer it to be perceived; but it was made perceptible, in spite of himself, in his speeches; he strove, in his addresses to the Jacobins, to diminish the enthusiasm that the successes of the republic inspired; he insinuated that the allies were retiring before us as they had done before Dumouriez, only to return the sooner; that in temporarily quitting our frontiers, they meant only to deliver us to the dominion of those passions prosperity is apt to call forth. He added, moreover, that "victory over the enemy's armies was not that to which they ought most exclusively to aspire. The genuine victory," said he, "is that which the friends of liberty gain over factions; it is this victory that restores to nations peace, justice, and prosperity. A nation does not acquire glory by overthrowing tyrants or subjugating other nations. That had been the lot of the Romans, and of some other people: our destiny, far more sublime, is to found upon earth the empire of wisdom, justice, and virtue *."

Robespierre had absented himself from the committee ever since the latter end of Prairial. It was now early in Thermidor. It was nearly forty days since he had seceded from his colleagues; it was time to adopt some resolution. His sworn friends declared openly that another 31st of May was desirable; the Dumas, the Henriots, and the Payans, urged him to give the signal for it. He did not possess the same taste for violent measures as themselves, and could not identify himself with their brutal impatience. Accustomed to carry every thing by words, and having greater respect for the law, he much preferred trying the experiment of a speech, in which he should denounce the committees and call for their remodelling. If he should succeed by this quiet method, he would become absolute master, without incurring any danger, and without an insurrection. Should he not succeed, these fair means would not exclude violent measures; on the contrary, he ought to anticipate them. The 31st of May had been preceded by repeated harangues, by respectful applications, and it was not till after asking without having, that it ended by their being peremptorily demanded. He resolved, therefore, to employ the same means as on the 31st of May, to cause in the first place a petition to be presented by the Jacobins, in the next place to deliver a grand speech, and lastly to make Saint-Just come forward with a report. If all these means proved insufficient, he had with him the Jacobins, the commune, and the armed force of Paris. But he hoped after all not to have occasion to renew the scene of the 2nd of June. He had not audacity enough for this, and he still entertained too high a respect for the convention to desire it.

For some time he had been labouring upon a voluminous speech, in which he exerted himself to expose the abuses of the government, and to throw all the evils which were imputed to it upon his colleagues. He wrote to Saint-Just to come back from the army. He detained his brother, who ought to have set out for the frontiers of Italy; he attended daily at the Jacobins, and made every arrangement for the attack. As it always happens in extreme situations, various incidents concur in increasing the general agitation. A person named Magenthies presented a ridiculous petition, praying that the punishment of death should be inflicted upon all who should use oaths in which the name of God was introduced. At last a revolutionary committee ordered some labouring men who had got drunk to be imprisoned as suspected persons. These two facts gave rise to numerous observations against Robespierre; it was said that his Supreme Being was likely to prove a greater oppressor than Christ, and we should shortly see the Inquisition re-established to maintain deism! Sensible of the danger of such accusations, he lost no time in denouncing Magenthies at the Jacobins as an aristocrat paid by foreigners to throw discredit upon the creeds adopted by the convention; he even caused him to be handed over to the revolutionary tribunal. Still further availing himself of his office of police, he had every one of the members of the revolutionary committee of indivisibility apprehended.

The crisis approached, and it appears that the members of the committee of public welfare, and Barrère in particular, would have been glad to have made peace with their formidable colleague; but he had become so overbearing, that it was impossible to come to any understanding with him. Barrère, returning home one evening with one of his confidents, threw himself into a chair, saying, "This Robespierre is insatiable. Let him demand Tallien, Bourdon (of the Oise), Thuriot, Guffroy, Rovère, Lecointre, Panis, Barras, Fréron, Legendre, Monestier, Dubois-Crancé, Fouché, Cambon, and the *whole Dantonist-train*, well and good: but Duval and Audouin, Leonard, Bourdon, Vadier, and Vouland, it is impossible to consent to that." We see that Robespierre required even the sacrifice of some members of the committee of general safety, and consequently there was no longer any possibility of a treaty. All that could be done was, to break with him at once, and stand the chances of the contest. However, not one of Robespierre's adversaries would have dared to begin; the mem-

* Sitting of the Jacobins of 21 Messidor, 9th July.

bers of the committees expected to be denounced; the proscribed Mountaineers waited till their heads should be demanded; all meant to suffer themselves to be attacked before they defended themselves, and they acted wisely. It was much better to let Robespierre commence the engagement, and compromise himself in the eyes of the convention, by the demand of new proscriptions. They would then occupy the position of men defending their lives, and even those of others; for there was no foreseeing the extent of these immolations, if even one more were permitted.

Every thing was ready, and the first movement commenced on the 3rd Thermidor at the Jacobins. Among the sworn friends of Robespierre was one named Sijas, a sub-commissioner of the army-movements. There was a strong dislike against this commission for having ordered the successive departure of a great number of companies of artillery, and for having thus diminished the armed force of Paris. Still no one had ventured to prefer any direct charge against him. Sijas began by complaining of the secrecy in which Pyle the chief commissioner was wrapt; and all the imputations which no one dared to impute either to Carnot or to the committee of public welfare were levelled at this chief commissioner. Sijas pretended that there was but one course left, namely, to address themselves to the convention, and to denounce Pyle there. Another Jacobin denounced one of the agents of the committee of general safety. Couthon then spoke, and said that it was necessary to go still further, and to present to the national convention an address in respect of all the machinations which again threatened liberty. "I invite you," said he, "to submit your reflections to her consideration. She is pure, she will not suffer herself to be under the dominion of four or five villains. As for myself, I declare that they shall never control me." Couthon's suggestion was forthwith adopted. The petition was prepared; it was approved on the 5th Thermidor, and on the 7th it was presented to the convention.

The style of this petition was, as usual, respectful in its style and language, but in point of fact imperious. It stated that the Jacobins came *to make the bosom of the convention the depository of the solicitudes of the people*: this petition repeated the accustomed declamations against foreigners and their accomplices, against the system of indulgence, against the alarm that had been diffused for the sole purpose of creating a division in the national representation, against the efforts that were made to render the worship of God ridiculous, etc. It tended to no precise conclusion, but stated, in a general manner, "You will make traitors, villains, and intriguers, tremble; you will encourage the worthy member of society; you will maintain that union in which your strength consists, you will preserve in all its purity that sublime religion of which every citizen is the minister, and of which virtue is the early practice; and the people trusting in you, will consider that their duty and glory will consist in obeying and defending their representatives even unto death." This was as much as to say in plain terms, you must do what Robespierre dictates, or you will no longer be either obeyed or defended. The reading of this petition was hearkened to amidst a grave silence. No answer was given to it. It had hardly been read before Dubois-Crancé ascended the tribune, and, without alluding to the petition or to the Jacobins, complained of the mortifications to which, for the last six months, he had been subjected, of the injustice he had met with in return for his services, and required that the committee of public welfare might be directed to report upon his conduct, though he said there were in that committee two of his accusers. He required that such report should be presented within three days. His demand was assented to without a single observation, the assembly preserving the same silence as before. Barrère succeeded him in the tribune. He came to submit an important report on the comparative state of France, in July 1793, and in July 1794. It is certain that the difference was very great, and that, were a comparison instituted between France, rended at one and the same time by the royalists, the federalists, and the foreign enemy, and between France, victorious on all the frontiers, and mistress of the Netherlands, they could not refrain from rendering special thanks to that government which had effected such a change in one year. These eulogies bestowed upon the committee was the only way in which Barrère durst indirectly attack Robespierre; nay, he even bepraised him expressly in his report. With reference to the hollow agitations which prevailed, and the misguided outcries of certain disturbers of the peace, who were calling for another 31st of May, he said that "a representative who enjoyed a patriotic reputation, earned by five years of toil, and by his unshaken principles of independence and liberty, had warmly refused this counter revolutionary language." The convention listened attentively to this report, and every one went his way in the expectation of some important event. Each regarded his fellow in silence, and durst neither question or explain.

On the next day, the 8th Thermidor, Robespierre settled upon delivering his famous speech. All his agents had their ease, and Saint-Just arrived in the course of the day. The convention, seeing him in that tribune where he appeared so seldom, were in expectation of a decisive scene. "Citizens," said he, "let others draw flattering pictures for you; I come to tell you useful truths. I come not to realize the ridiculous terrors diffused by perfidy; but I wish to extinguish, if possible, the torch of discord by the mere force of truth. I come to defend before you your outraged authority and violated liberty. I shall defend myself: you will not be surprised at that; you are not like the tyrants with whom you are in conflict. The cries of outraged innocence do not importune your ears, and you cannot but be sensible that this cause nearly concerns you." Robespierre then depictured the agitations which had prevailed for some time, the apprehensions that had been circulated, the designs imputed to the committee and to himself against the convention. "We," exclaimed he, "attack the convention. And what are we without her? Who is it that has defended her at the peril of his life? Who is it that has devoted himself to rescue it from the hands of the factious?" Robespierre replied, that it was himself; and he called his having dragged from the convention Brissot, Vergniaud, Gensonné, Pétion, Barbaroux, Danton, Camille-Desmoulins, &c., defending the convention

against factions. After the proofs of devotedness which he had demonstrated, he expressed his astonishment that sinister reports should have been circulated. "Is it true," said he, "that odious lists have been hawked about, wherein a certain number of members of the convention have been pointed out as victims, and that these lists were first said to have emanated from the committee of public welfare, and then said to have been my work? Is it true that some have dared to suppose meetings of the committee, rigorous resolutions that never had existence, and arrests not less chimerical? Is it true that some persons have taken the pains to persuade a certain number of irreproachable representatives that their destruction was resolved upon; and to persuade all those who, by some error, had paid an inevitable tribute to the fatality of circumstances and to human imperfection, that they were doomed to the fate of conspirators? Is it true that imposture has been propagated with such art and audacity, that a great number of members ceased to sleep at their own homes? Yes, the facts are certain, and the proofs of them are before the committee of public welfare!"

He then complained that the accusation preferred *en masse* against the committees terminated at length in being levelled at him alone. He explained that his name had been identified with whatever misconduct had occurred in the government; that if patriots were imprisoned instead of aristocrats, it was said, *It is Robespierre who desires it*; that if some patriots had fallen, it was said, *It is Robespierre who ordered it*; that if numerous agents of the committee of general safety set no limits to their extortion and their rapine, it was said, *It is Robespierre who sends them*; that if some new law pressed heavily on the fundholders, it was said, *It is Robespierre who ruins them*. He then said that he was represented as the author of every species of mischief for the purpose of ruining him; that he had been called a tyrant, and that, on the *fêts* in honour of the Supreme Being—that day when the convention had stricken atheism and priestly despotism with one blow, when she had attached all generous hearts to the Revolution—that day, in short, of happiness and pure enthusiasm, the president of the national convention, while addressing the assembled people, had been insulted by guilty creatures, and that these men were representatives! They had called him tyrant! and why? because he had acquired some influence by speaking the language of truth. "And what is it ye want," he exclaimed, "ye who wish truth to be powerless in the mouths of the representatives of the French people? Truth assuredly has her power; she is subject to anger; she also is despotic; she also utters her touching and terrible accents which forcibly vibrate in pure hearts as well as in guilty consciences, and which falsehood has not the power of imitating any more than to Salmoneus was given the faculty of imitating the thunder of the gods. But blame the nation for all this, blame the people, who are affected by truth, and have a strong regard for her. Who am I, myself who am accused? a slave of liberty, a living martyr of the republic, the victim as much as the enemy of crime. Every whipster abuses me. The most indifferent, the most legitimate actions on the part of others are crimes in me. A man is slandered as soon as it is known that he is acquainted with me: others are forgiven their open offences; as for myself, my zeal is made a crime. Take from me my conscience, and I am the most miserable of men; I do not even enjoy the rights of a citizen; nay, I am not even allowed to fulfil the duties of a representative of the people."

Robespierre thus defended himself by subtle and diffuse remonstrances, and for the first time he found the convention grave, taciturn, and as it were weary of the length of his speech. At last he came to the pith of the question: he began to be the accuser. Taking a cursory survey of all the departments of the government, he first censured with iniquitous malice the financial system. Originator of the law of the 22nd prairial, he dwelt with a great show of sympathy upon the law concerning the life annuities; there was nothing even to the *maximum*, against which he did not seem to rise in judgment, saying that intriguers had hurried the convention into violent measures. "In whose hands are the finances?" he exclaimed. "In the hands of Fouillans, of notorious rogues, of the Cambons, the Mailarmés, and the Ramels." He then passed to the war department, spoke with disdain of those victories which had just been ascribed with *an academic flippancy* (*légèreté académique*), as though they had not cost either blood or toil. "Keep an attentive watch," cried he; "keep an attentive watch on victory; keep an attentive watch upon Belgium. Your enemies are retiring and leaving you to your intestine divisions; look to the end of the campaign. They have some dissensions among the generals; the military aristocracy is protected; the trusty generals are persecuted; the military administration wraps itself up in a suspicious authority. These truths are epigrammatic." He spoke no further upon Carnot and Barrère; he left to Saint-Just the task of condemning the plans of Carnot. We see that this wretched man flung over every thing the bitterness of that gall in which he was absorbed. He next enlarged upon the committee of general safety, on the multitude of its agents, on their cruelties, their rapine; he denounced Amar and Jagot as having seized upon the police, and doing every thing to vilify the revolutionary government. He complained of the sarcasms uttered in the tribune with respect to Catharine Théot, and asserted that men encouraged the belief of feigned conspiracies in order to conceal real ones. He described the two committees as addicted to intrigues, and engaged, in some degree, in the schemes of the anti-national faction. In the whole existing system he found nothing good but the *revolutionary government*, and in that solely the principle, not the mode in which it was carried out. The principle was his; it was he who caused that government to be instituted, but it was his adversaries who corrupted it.

Such is the substance of Robespierre's voluminous declamations. At length he concluded with this summary: "We assert that there exists a conspiracy against the public liberty; that it derives its strength from a criminal combination, carrying on its intrigues in the very body of the convention; that this combination has accomplices in the committee of general safety, and in the offices of that

committee which they govern; that the enemies of the republic have set this committee in opposition to the committee of public welfare, and thus constituted two adverse governments; that members of the committee of public welfare are engaged in this conspiracy; that the coalition thus formed is striving to ruin the patriots and the country. What is the remedy for this evil? To punish the traitors, to remodel the offices of the committee of general safety, to purify the committee itself, and to render it subordinate to the committee of public welfare, to purify even the committee of public welfare, to constitute the government under the supreme authority of the national convention, which is the centre and the judge, and thus crush all the factions by the weight of the national authority, in order to raise upon their ruins the omnipotence of justice and liberty. Such are the principles. If it is impossible to assert them without passing for an ambitious man, I shall conclude that the principles are proscribed, and that tyranny reigns among us; but not that I should on that account be silent on the subject; for what can be objected to a man who is in the right, and who is ready to die for his country? I am made to enter into a conflict with crime—not to govern it. The time is not yet arrived when worthy persons can serve their country with impunity."

Robespierre had commenced his speech in silence, and in silence he concluded it. In every part of the hall all continued mute, while they attentively surveyed him. Those deputies, once so anxious to cheer him, were frigid as ice; they uttered nothing, and seemed to have the courage to exhibit a chill reserve, now that the tyrants, divided among themselves, looked to them as judges. The faces of all had become impenetrable. A faint kind of hollow murmur gradually arose in the assembly, but no one durst rise to speak. Lecointre (of Versailles), one of the most energetic of Robespierre's enemies, was the first to present himself at the tribune, but it was to move that the speech be printed,—such was still the hesitation, even of the boldest, to enter upon the attack. Bourdon (of the Oise) ventured to state his opinion against the printing of the speech, saying that it involved questions too serious, and he required a reference to the two committees. Barrère, always prudent, supported the motion for printing, and at the same time remarked, that in a free country every thing ought to be printed. Couthon rushed to the tribune, indignant at witnessing a wrangling instead of a burst of enthusiasm, and not only urgently called for the printing of the speech, but that it be sent to every one of the communes, as well as to the armies. He was compelled, he said, to pour forth the feelings of his wounded heart, since, for some time past, the deputies most faithful to the cause of the people had been subjected to the most scandalous treatment; they were accused of shedding blood, and of desiring to shed more; and yet, if he could believe that he had contributed to the destruction of a single innocent person, he should kill himself with grief. The speech of Couthon called into action what little submission there remained in the assembly, and the vote passed, that the speech be printed and sent to all the municipalities.

The adversaries of Robespierre were about to labour under a disadvantage; but Vadier, Cambon, Billaud-Varennes, Panis, and Amar, desired to be heard in reply to the accusations of Robespierre. Their courage received fresh vigour from the danger, and the conflict commenced. All wanted to speak at once. The turn of each was settled. Vadier was first allowed to explain himself. He justified the committee of general safety, and maintained that the report in respect of Catharine Théot had for its object to reveal a substantive and a deep-laid conspiracy; and he added, in a significant tone, that he possessed documents proving its importance and its danger. Cambon justified his financial laws and his integrity, which was universally known and admired, in a post where the temptations were so great. He spoke with his usual impetuosity; he proved that none but the stock-jobbers could be hurt by his financial measures, and then throwing off the reserve which had been kept up thus far, "It is high time," he exclaimed, "to tell the whole truth. Is it I who ought to be accused for having made myself master in any one thing? The man who has made himself master of every thing, the man who has paralysed your will, is the man who has just spoken,—that man is Robespierre!" This vehemence disconcerted Robespierre. As if he had been accused of playing the tyrant in financial matters, he declared that he had never meddled with finances; that of course he could never restrain the freedom of the convention in this matter, and that, at any rate, in attacking Cambon's plans, he meant not to attack his intentions. He had, for all that, called him a rogue. Billaud-Varennes, a no less formidable antagonist, said that it was high time to put the whole facts in evidence; he spoke of the secession of Robespierre from the committees, of the removal of the companies of artillery, of which no more than fifteen had been sent out, although the law allowed twenty-four to be sent out. He added, that he was determined to throw off all disguise; and he had rather that his dead body should serve for a footstool to an ambitious man, than countenance his proceedings by his silence. He called for the report upon the decree which ordered the printing of the speech. Panis complained of the continual calumnies of Robespierre, who had wanted to make him pass for the author of the September murders; he wanted that Robespierre and Couthon should explain their motives as to the five or six deputies, the sacrifice of whom they had been for a month past incessantly demanding at the Jacobins. Immediately the same thing was called for on all sides. Robespierre replied with hesitation, that he had merely come to expose abuses, and that he was not bound to justify or accuse this or that person. "Name them; name the individuals!" was the cry. Robespierre evaded the question, and said, that "since he had possessed the courage to communicate to the convention intelligence which he deemed useful, he did not think——" He was again interrupted. "You who pretend to be endued with the courage of virtue," cried Charlier, "pray exemplify the virtue of truth. Name them; name the individuals!" The confusion increased. The question of printing was resumed. Amar insisted on referring the speech to the committee. Barrère perceiving the advantage of de-

claring for those who were for a reference to the committees, made a sort of apology for having made a contrary motion. At last the convention revoked its decision, and declared that Robespierre's speech, instead of being printed, should be referred to the consideration of the two committees.

This sitting was a truly extraordinary event. All the deputies, habitually so submissive, had again taken heart. As for Robespierre, who never exhibited anything else than superciliousness without an atom of audacity, he was taken by surprise, rebuffed, and dejected. He had need to compose himself; he hurried to his trusty Jacobins, to regain his friends, and to borrow courage from them. They were already apprized of the event, and were anxiously awaiting his arrival. No sooner did he appear, than he was greeted with applause. Couthon followed him, and shared the acclamations. He was requested to read the speech. Robespierre occupied them two long hours in repeating it to them. Every moment he was interrupted by shouts and frenzied cheering. He had hardly concluded, before he added a few words of lamentation and grief. "This speech which you have just been hearing," said he, "is my last will and testament. I have seen this to-day; the bonds of the wicked are so strong, that I cannot hope to escape them. I fall without regret; I leave you my memory; it will be dear to you, and you will protect it from insult." At these words they cried out that now was not the time to give way to despondency and despair; that, on the contrary, they would avenge the father of the country upon the congregation of the wicked. Henriot, Dumas, Coffinhal, and Payan, surrounded him, and declared that they were quite ready to act. Henriot said, that he had not forgotten the way to the convention. "Separate the wicked from the weak-minded," said Robespierre to them; "deliver the convention from the villains who oppress it; render it the service that it expects of you, as on the 31st of May and the 2nd of June. March, and once more save liberty! If, in spite of all these efforts, we must fall, why then, my friends, you shall see me drink the hemlock with tranquillity." "Robespierre," exclaimed a deputy, "I will drink it with thee!"

Couthon proposed to the society a new purificatory scrutiny, and desired the instant expulsion of those deputies who had voted against Robespierre; he had a list of them on his person, which he immediately furnished. His motion was carried amidst a frightful uproar. Collot d'Herbois came forward to offer some observations, but was overwhelmed with yells. He spoke of his services, of his dangers, and of Ladmiral's two shots at him. He was sneered at, abused, and driven from the tribune. All the deputies present, and pointed out by Couthon, were expelled, some of them even were beaten. Collot escaped from amidst the knives pointed against him. The society was reinforced on that day by all the fighting men, who, in times of agitation, gained admission either with false tickets, or even without any. They added violence to words, and they were even quite ready to add murder. Payan, the national agent, who was a man of execution, proposed a bold scheme. He was for going at once and seizing every one of the conspirators; which could very easily be done, for they were all of them at that moment assembled in those committees to which they belonged as members. This struggle might have been thus terminated, without a conflict, by an off-hand attack. Robespierre set himself against this; he disliked such decisive modes of action; he thought that it would be better to pursue the precedent of the 31st of May. A solemn petition had already been made; he had made a speech; Saint-Just, who had lately arrived from the army, was to make a report the next morning; he, Robespierre, would again speak, and if they were unsuccessful, the magistrates of the people, meanwhile assembled at the commune, and supported by the armed force of the sections, were to declare that the people had resumed their sovereignty, and would proceed to deliver the convention from the villains who led them astray. The plan was thus settled according to precedents. The meeting broke up, pledging themselves for the next day, namely, Robespierre to be at the convention, the Jacobins in their hall, the municipal magistrates at the commune, and Henriot at the head of the sections. They reckoned, moreover, upon the young men in the school of Mars, whose commandant, Labretèche, was devoted to the cause of the commune.

Such were the events of the day of the 8th Thermidor, the last of the sanguinary tyranny which had afflicted France; nevertheless, on that very day the horrible revolutionary machine did not cease its work. The tribunal had been sitting, and victims had been conveyed to the scaffold. In their number were two eminent poets, Roucher, author of the "Mois," and André Chenier, who left admirable indications of genius, and whom France will have to regret as much as any other of the young men of genius, orators, writers, and generals, devoured by the scaffold and by the war. These two sons of the muses cheered one another when in the fatal cart by reciting verses of Racine's. Young André, on mounting the scaffold, uttered the cry of genius stopped short in its career: "To die so young!" he exclaimed, striking his forehead, "there was something there*!"

During the night which followed, there was agitation going forward in all the parties, and each party thought of concentrating its own strength. The two committees had met, and were deliberating on the important events of the day and on those of the morrow. What had just passed at the Jacobins proved that the mayor and Henriot

* He is represented by D'Israeli as waiting for his turn to be dragged to the guillotine, when he *commenced* this poem.

"Comme un dernier rayon, comme un dernier zéphyr,
Anime la fin d'un beau jour;
Au pied de l'échafaud j'essaie encore ma lyre,
Peut-être est-ce bientôt mon tour!

"Peut-être avant que l'heure en cercle promenée
Ait posé sur l'émail brillant,
Dans les soixante pas où sa route est bornée,
Son pied sonore et vigilant,

Le sommeil du tombeau pressera ma paupière"

Curiosities of Lit., vol. i. (Poetical and Grammatical Deaths.) *Trans.*

would declare for the triumvirs, and that on the next day they should have to struggle against the entire force of the communes. To cause these two principal leaders to be apprehended would have been the most prudent course, but the committees still hesitated; they would and they would not; they seemed to feel a sort of regret in having begun the struggle. The committees plainly saw, that if the convention were strong enough to vanquish Robespierre, she would resume all her powers, and that they would be snatched from the blows of their rival, but dispossessed of the dictatorship. It would no doubt have been much better to have come to terms with him; but it was now too late. Robespierre had taken good care not to go among them, after the sitting at the Jacobins. Saint-Just, who had just arrived from the army a few hours previously, was watching them. He was silent; they asked him for the report with which he had been entrusted at the time of his last being present; the committees wished to hear it read. He replied that he had it not with him, but had given it to one of his colleagues to read. He was requested to state its conclusions; he refused that also. At this moment Collot entered, incensed at the treatment which he had experienced at the Jacobins. "What are they doing at the Jacobins!" said Saint-Just to him. "Dost thou ask!" replied Collot angrily; "art thou not the accomplice of Robespierre? Have you not concerted your plans together? I see it plain enough, you have formed an infamous triumvirate, and that you want to assassinate us; but if we fall, you will not long enjoy the fruit of your crimes." Then going up to Saint-Just with vehemence, "Thou dost intend," said he, "to denounce us tomorrow morning; thou hast thy pocket full of notes against us; show them ——." Saint-Just emptied his pockets, and assured Collot that he had nothing of the kind. Collot was appeased, and Saint-Just was ordered to come at eleven the next morning to communicate his report before reading it to the assembly. The committees, before they separated, agreed to ask the convention to discharge Henriot, and to summon the mayor and the national agent to the bar.

Saint-Just hastened away to prepare his report, which was not yet written; and denounced, with much more brevity and force than Robespierre had done, the conduct of the committees towards their colleagues, their usurpation of affairs in general, the imperiousness of Billaud-Varennes, and the false manœuvres of Carnot, who had conveyed Pichegru's army to the coasts of Flanders, and had meant to tear away sixteen thousand men from Jourdan. This report was as perfidious, and in another way quite as able, as that of Robespierre. Saint-Just resolved to read it to the convention without showing it to the committees.

While the conspirators were concerting together, the Mountaineers, who had hitherto contented themselves with communicating their apprehensions to one another, and had formed no plot, now hurried to the houses of each other, and agreed to attack Robespierre in a more formal manner on the following day, and to get him impeached, if it were possible. To bring this about, they would require the concurrence of the deputies of the *Plain*, whom they had frequently threatened, and whom Robespierre, affecting the character of moderator, had formerly defended. They had therefore but slight claims to their favour. However they sought out Boissy d'Anglas, Durand-Maillane and Palasne-Champeaux, all three of them constituents, and whose example was likely to decide the others. They told them that they would be accountable for all the blood that Robespierre might yet spill, if they did not agree to vote against him. Repulsed at first, they returned three times to the charge, and at length obtained the desired promise. They bestirred themselves vigorously the whole of the morning of the 9th; Tallien promised to make the first attack, and only desired that others would venture to follow him.

Every one hastened to his post. Fleuriot, the mayor, and Payan, the national agent, were at the commune. Henriot was on horseback with his aides-de-camp, and was riding through the streets of Paris. The Jacobins had commenced a permanent sitting. The deputies, who had turned out early in the morning, had repaired to the convention before the usual hour. They paced the lobbies tumultuously, and the Mountaineers conversed with them in an animated manner, so as to decide them in their favour. It was half-past eleven o'clock. Tallien was speaking to some of his colleagues at one of the doors of the hall, when he saw Saint-Just enter, who ascended the tribune. "Now is the time!" he exclaimed; "we'll go in." They followed him; the benches filled; and the assembly awaited in silence the opening of that scene, one of the grandest in our stormy revolution.

Saint-Just, who had broken his word with his colleagues, and who had not gone to read his report to them, was in the tribune. The two Robespierres, Lebas, and Couthon, were seated beside one another. Collot d'Herbois was in the chair. Saint-Just said that he was commissioned by the committees to make a report, and then was allowed to speak. He set out with asserting that he belonged to no faction, and that he belonged only to truth; that the tribune might prove the Tarpeian rock to him as to many others, but that he should nevertheless give his opinion without reserve upon the dissensions which had broken out. Tallien scarcely let him finish these preliminary sentences, before he asked leave to speak on a call to order, and obtained it. "The republic," said he, "is in the most unfortunate condition, and no good citizen can help shedding tears over her. Yesterday a member of the government separated himself and denounced his colleagues; another is doing the same to-day. This is only aggravating our calamities. I desire that at length the veil may be entirely thrown aside." Scarcely were these words uttered, when cheers burst forth. It was prolonged and renewed for the third time. This was the signal, the harbinger of the fall of the triumvirs. Billaud-Varennes, who took possession of the tribune after Tallien, said that the Jacobins had the preceding evening held a seditious sitting, which was attended by ambushed assassins, who have avowed a design of slaughtering the convention. General indignation was manifested. "I see," added Billaud-Varennes, "I see in the galleries one of the men who yesterday threatened the trusty deputies. Let him be secured." He was immediately seized

and given into the custody of the gendarmes. Billaud then maintained that Saint-Just had no right to speak in the name of the committees, inasmuch as he had not communicated his report to them; that this was the moment for the assembly to be firm, for perish she must if she exhibited any weakness. "No, no," cried the deputies, waving their hats; "she will not be weak, she shall not perish." Lebas claimed to be heard before Billaud had gone from the tribune; he agitated himself, and made a great noise to get possession of the tribune. At the desire of all the deputies, he was called to order. He renewed his demand to be heard. "To the Abbaye with the seditious fellow!" cried several voices of the Mountain. Billaud continued, and throwing aside all delicacy, said that Robespierre had always sought to rule the committees; that he had seceded, when they were opposed to his law of the 22d Prairial, and the use which he purposed to make of it; that he was for retaining the noble Lavalette, a conspirator at Lille, in the national guard; that he had prevented the arrest of Henriot, an accomplice of Hébert's, in order to make him his creature; that he moreover opposed the apprehension of a secretary of the committee, who had stolen one hundred and fourteen thousand francs; that he had caused the best revolutionary committee of Paris to be closed by means of his office of police; that he always had done just what he pleased, and wanted to make himself absolute master. Billaud added, that he could adduce many other facts, but it would suffice to say, that, on the preceding day, Robespierre's agents at the Jacobins, the Dumases and the Coffinhals, had settled amongst each other to decimate the national convention. While Billaud was enumerating these grievances, bursts of indignation every now and then escaped the assembly. Robespierre, livid with rage, had left his seat, and was endeavouring to ascend the steps of the tribune. Standing behind Billaud, he demanded of the president with extreme violence permission to speak. He seized the moment when Billaud was about concluding, to renew his demand with still greater vehemence. "Down with the tyrant! down with the tyrant!" was shouted in all parts of the hall. Twice was this accusing cry raised, and it proclaimed that the assembly dared at length to give him the name which he deserved. While he was still endeavouring to gain a hearing, Tallien, who had darted to the tribune, claimed permission to speak, and obtained it before him. "It was but this moment," said he, "that I desired that the veil might be entirely torn off; I now perceive that it soon will be. The conspirators are unmasked. I knew that my head was in danger, and hitherto I have kept silence; but yesterday I attended the sitting of the Jacobins, I witnessed the formation of the army of the new Cromwell formed; I shuddered for my country, and I armed myself with a dagger, resolved to plunge it into his bosom, if the convention had not the courage to pass a decree of impeachment." As he finished these words, Tallien exhibited his dagger*, and they showered their plaudits upon him. He then moved for the arrest of the chief of the conspirators, Henriot. Billaud proposed to add that of Dumas, the president, and of a man named Boulanger, who had been the day before one of the most violent agitators at the Jacobins. They immediately decreed the apprehension of those three culprits.

At this moment Barrère entered, to submit to the assembly the propositions upon which the committee had deliberated the previous night before it broke up. Robespierre, who had not quitted the tribune, took advantage of this interval again to demand leave to speak. His adversaries were determined to refuse it, fearful lest any remains of fear or servility should be awakened by his voice. Placed, all of them, at the top of the Mountain, they raised fresh clamours, and, while Robespierre was turning first to the president, then to the assembly, shouted with voices of thunder, "Down! down with the tyrant!" Barrère again obtained leave to speak before Robespierre. It is said that this man, who, out of vanity, was desirous of playing a part, and now trembled from weakness at having taken upon himself to perform one, had two speeches in his pocket, one for Robespierre, the other for the committees; he developed the proposition settled the previous night, which was, to abolish the post of commandant-general, to establish that old law of the legislative assembly, by which each commander of a legion commanded in turn the armed force of Paris, and lastly, to summon to the bar the mayor and the national agent, to answer there for the tranquillity of the capital. This decree was forthwith passed, and an officer of the assembly went to communicate it to the commune in the greatest possible peril.

When the decree proposed by Barrère had been adopted, the enumeration of the wrongs that Robespierre had committed was resumed. Every one came in turn to make his charge. Vadier, who fancied that he had discovered an important conspiracy in seizing Catherine Théot, stated what he had omitted to say the preceding day, that Dom Gerle had a certificate of civism signed by Robespierre, and that in Catharine's mattrass had been found a letter, in which she called Robespierre her beloved son. He then enlarged upon the espionage with which the committees were surrounded, with the prolixity of an old man, and a tardiness by no means suited to the agitation of the moment. Tallien, getting impatient, reascended the tribune, and again addressed the assembly, saying, that the question ought to be brought back to its question, really to be settled. They had in fact *decreed* Henriot, Dumas, and Boulanger, and they had called Robespierre a tyrant, but yet they had taken no decisive resolution. Tallien observed, that it was not upon a few circumstances in the life of that man, called a tyrant, on which they were to form a judgment, but that they were to consider the whole tenor of his life. He then commenced an energetic picture of the conduct of that cowardly, supercilious, and blood-thirsty orator. Robespierre, choked with rage, interrupted him with cries of fury. Louchet said: "This must be put an end to." "A warrant of arrest against Robespierre!" — "The accusation against thy grand accuser!" added Loseau. "The accusation! The accusation!" shouted a great number of deputies. Louchet rose, and, looking around him, asked if any one seconded him. "Yes, yes," replied a hundred voices. Robespierre, the

* The reader will remember Mr. Burke's attempted parallel of this scene. *Trans.*

younger, said from his place: "I shared the crimes of my brother; let me be joined with him." Scarcely any attention was paid to this act of devotedness. "The arrest! the arrest!" was still the cry. At this moment Robespierre, who was incessantly pacing from his place to the bureau, and from the bureau to his place, again went up to the president and demanded leave to speak. But Thuriot, who had succeeded Collot d'Herbois in the chair, answered him only by ringing the bell. Robespierre then turned towards the Mountain, where he observed only cold friends or furious enemies. He next turned his eyes towards the plain. "It is to you," said he, "pure and virtuous men, that I address myself, and not to brigands." They either turned away their heads or threatened him. Once more he addressed the president. "For the last time," he exclaimed, "president of assassins, I desire to be heard." He uttered the concluding words in a faint and stifled voice. "The blood of Danton suffocates thee!" said Garnier (of the Aube). Impatient of this struggle, Duval rose and said, "President, is this man any longer to be master of the convention?" "Ah," added Fréron, "how hard a tyrant is to be beaten down." "To the vote! to the vote!" cried Loseau. The arrest so generally called for was put to the vote, and decreed amidst tremendous uproar. No sooner was the decree passed, than on every side of the hall the members rose and shouted, "Liberty for ever! Long live the republic! The tyrants are no more!"

A great number of members rose and said, that they had intended to vote for the arrest of Robespierre's accomplices, Saint-Just and Couthon. They were immediately included in the decree. Lebas desired to be associated with them; his desire was granted, as well as that of the younger Robespierre. These men still excited such apprehension, that the officers of the hall had not dared to come forward to take them to the bar. On seeing them retain their seats, some of the members asked why they did not go down to the place of the accused. The president replied, that the officers had not been able to carry the order into execution. The shout of, "To the bar! to the bar!" now became general. The five accused went down thither. Robespierre furious, Saint-Just calm and contemptuous, and the others thunderstruck at this humiliation so new to them. They were at length at that place whither they had sent Vergniaud, Brissot, Pétion, Camille Desmoulins, Danton, and so many others of their colleagues, so remarkable for their virtue, genius, or courage.

It was now five o'clock. The assembly had declared its sitting permanent. But at that moment, worn out with fatigue, it took the dangerous resolution to suspend the sitting till seven, for obtaining a slight refreshment. The deputies then separated, and left it to the commune, if it had possessed any boldness, the opportunity of closing the place of its sittings, and possessing themselves of absolute power in Paris. The five accused were conducted to the committee of general safety, and interrogated by their colleagues before they were conveyed to prison.

While these important events were occurring in the convention, the commune had remained in suspense. Courtol, the officer of the convention, had gone to give it notice of the decree which placed Henriot under arrest, and summoned the mayor and the national agent to the bar. He had been very rudely received. He asked for a receipt, but the mayor replied, *On such a day as this we give no receipts. Go to the convention; go and tell it that we shall find means to maintain it; and tell Robespierre not to be afraid, for we are here.* The mayor had afterwards expressed himself, before the general council, in the most mysterious manner as to the object of the meeting; he confined himself to the decree which ordered the commune to watch over the tranquillity of Paris; he called to their mind those periods when that commune had displayed great courage, and had alluded very plainly to the 31st of May. The national agent, Payan, speaking after the mayor, had proposed sending two members of the council to the Place de la Commune, where an immense crowd had assembled, to harangue the people, and to invite them to *join with the magistrates in saving the country.* An address had then been prepared, in which it was said that a set of miscreants were oppressing *Robespierre, that virtuous citizen, who caused the decreed of that consolatory worship of the Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul; Saint-Just, that apostle of virtue, who had extinguished treason at the Rhine and in the north; Couthon, that virtuous citizen, who had no more than the body and head of a living man, but those were burning with patriotism.* Immediately afterwards, it was resolved that the sections should be convoked; and that the presidents and the commandants of the armed force should be summoned to the commune to receive its orders. A deputation had been despatched to the Jacobins, that they should come and fraternize with the commune, and send to the general council the most energetic of their members, and a good number of *citizens and citizenesses of the galleries.* Without directly naming insurrection, the commune took all the requisite steps, and evidently proceeded with that object in view. The commune was still in ignorance of the arrest of the five deputies, and on this account it still maintained some reserve.

Meanwhile Henriot had mounted his horse, and was riding through the streets of Paris. Hearing, by the way, of the arrest of five representatives, he therefore strove to excite the people, crying out that villains were oppressing the trusty deputies, and that they had arrested Couthon, Saint-Just, and Robespierre. This wretch was half drunk; he sate unsteady upon his horse, and flourished his sword like a maniac. He first proceeded to the faubourg Saint Antoine, to raise the working classes, who scarcely comprehended what he meant to say, and who had besides begun to relent when they every day witnessed new victims passing to the scaffold. By a fatal mischance Henriot met the carts. When the arrest of Robespierre was known, the people had surrounded them, and as Robespierre was considered as the author of all the murders, it was conceived that he being arrested, the executions would cease. They would have made them turn short back with the condemned, but Henriot, who came up at the moment, opposed this intention, and caused this last execution to be consummated. He then returned, still at full gallop, to the Luxembourg, and ordered the

gendarmerie to assemble in the *place* before the communal house. He took a detachment in his train, and then went down along the quays, so as to get to the Place du Carrousel, and there deliver the prisoners, who were to be found at the committee of general safety. As he was galloping upon the quays with his aides-de-camp, he threw down several persons. A man who had his wife on his arm, turned towards the gendarmes and cried, "Gendarmes, arrest that ruffian! he is no longer your general." An aide-de-camp replied by a cut with his sword. Henriot continued in his course, and dashed through the Rue Saint Honoré. When he got to the place of the Palais-Egalite (Palais-Royal), he perceived Merlin of Thionville, and made up to him shouting, "Arrest that rascal! he is one of those who persecute the trusty representatives." Merlin was immediately seized, maltreated, and taken to the nearest guard-house. When at the courtyard of the *Palais National*, Henriot made his companions alight, and endeavoured to push his way into the *Palais*. The grenadiers refused him admittance, and crossed their bayonets. At this moment, an officer of the convention advanced and said, "Gendarmes, arrest that rebel; a decree of the convention orders you to do so." Immediately hereupon Henriot was surrounded and disarmed, together with several of his aides-de-camp; they were pinioned and conducted to the hall of the committee of general safety, along with Robespierre, Couthon, Saint-Just, and Lebas.

Hitherto all went on well for the convention. Her decrees, boldly passed, were successfully executed; but the commune and the Jacobins, who had not yet openly proclaimed the insurrection, were now ready to break out, and realise their scheme of another 2nd of June. Fortunately, while the convention imprudently suspended its sitting, the commune did the same, and thus the time was lost on all sides.

The council did not meet again till six o'clock. At this resumption of the sitting, the arrest of the five deputies and of Henriot was known. The council, on receipt of this intelligence, could not contain itself, and declared itself in a state of insurrection against the oppressors of the people, who desired the destruction of its defenders. The commune also ordered the tocsin to be rung at the Hotel de Ville and in all the sections. It deputed one of its members to each of the sections, to goad them to insurrection, and to decide them to send their battalions to the commune. It despatched gendarmes to close the barriers, and ordered all the keepers of the prisons not to receive the prisoners who should be committed thither. Lastly, the commune appointed an executive commission of twelve members, among whom were to be found Payan and Coffinhal, to take the conduct of the insurrection, and to exercise all the sovereign powers of the people. At this moment, there were already mustered upon the Place de la Commune some few battalions of the sections, several companies of artillery, and great part of the gendarmerie had already been collected in the Place de la Commune. They then began to administer the oath to the commandants of the battalions there assembled. They next ordered Coffinhal to repair with a few hundred men to the convention, to liberate the prisoners.

Already had the elder Robespierre been conveyed to the Luxembourg, the younger Robespierre to the Maison-Lazare, Couthon to Port-Libre, Saint-Just to the Ecossais, and Lebas to the common gaol (*maison de justice*) of the department. The order issued by the commune to the keepers of the prisons had been executed, and they refused to receive the prisoners. The administrators of police had taken charge of them, and conveyed them in a coach to the Mairie. When Robespierre appeared people embraced him, loaded him with demonstrations of attachment, and swore to die in his defence and that of the trusty deputies. Meanwhile Henriot was left alone at the committee of general safety. Coffinhal, the vice-president of the Jacobins, arrived there sword in hand with some companies of the sections, took possession of the rooms of the committee, expelled the members, and released Hehriot and his aides-de-camp. Henriot, now set at liberty, hastened to the Place du Carrousel, where he still found his horses, leaped upon one of them, and with great presence of mind stated to the companies of the sections and the artillery about him, that the committee had just declared him innocent, and reinstated him in the command. The men rallied around him, and, followed by a considerable force, he began to give orders against the convention, and to prepare for besieging the hall.

It was now seven o'clock in the evening. The convention had already re-assembled; and during the interval the commune had gained great advantages. It had, as we have seen, proclaimed the insurrection, collected around it many companies of artillery and gendarmes, and released the prisoners. It might with boldness march promptly upon the convention, and force it to revoke its decrees. It reckoned, moreover, upon the school of Mars, the commandant of which, Labretèche, was wholly devoted to it.

The deputies assembled tumultuously, and communicated to each other with consternation the news of the evening. The members of the committee, alarmed and undecided, had met in a room by the side of the president's bureau. There they were deliberating, without knowing for what party they were to declare themselves. Several deputies succeeded one another in the tribune, and related what was passing in Paris. It was reported that the prisoners were enlarged, that the commune had met at the Jacobins, that it had already a considerable force at its disposal, and that the convention would soon be besieged. Bourdon proposed to go out in a body and show themselves to the people, in order to bring them over. Legendre made an effort to infuse confidence into the assembly by saying, that go where it would, it would find none but pure and faithful mountaineers ready to defend it; and in this hour of peril he displayed a courage which he had not possessed against Robespierre. Billaud ascended the tribune, and announced the fact that Henriot was in the Place du Carrousel, that he had gained over the artillery, that he had pointed the guns against the hall of the convention, and was about to commence the attack. Collot d'Herbois then went up to the chair, which, from the internal arrangement of the hall, must have received the first balls, and said, as he seated himself in it, "Representatives! now is the mo-

ment for dying at our post. Villains have invaded the national palace." At these words all the deputies, some of whom were standing, others strolling about in the hall, took their places, and remained seated in majestic silence. All the citizens in the galleries fled with a tremendous uproar, leaving nothing behind them but a cloud of dust. The convention remained abandoned to itself, and although under the conviction that the members were about to be murdered, yet resolved to perish rather than endure a Cromwell. Let us here admire the influence of circumstances upon courage! These same men, so long submissive to the orator who harangued them, now braved the cannon which he had caused to be pointed against them with a sublime resignation. The members of the assembly went in and out and brought intelligence of what was going on at the Carrousel. Henriot was still giving orders there. "Outlaw him! outlaw the brigand!" was the cry in the hall. A decree of outlawry was immediately passed, and some of the deputies went to proclaim it in front of the national palace.

At this moment Henriot, who had seduced the cannoniers, and had made them point their guns against the hall, wanted to bring them to fire; but these latter hesitated. Some of the deputies cried out, "Cannoniers! will you disgrace yourselves! that brigand is outlawed." The gunners then positively refused to obey Henriot. Abandoned by his men, he had but time to turn his bridle and to seek refuge at the commune.

This first danger over, the convention outlawed the deputies who had withdrawn themselves from its decrees, as well as all those members of the commune who were engaged in rebellion. However, this was not enough. Although Henriot was no longer in the Place du Carrousel, yet the insurgents were still at the commune with all their forces, and they still might resort to the expedient of an off-hand attack. Such a great danger must necessarily be obviated. The convention deliberate without doing any thing. In the small apartment situated behind the bureau, whither the committees and many had gone, it was proposed that a commandant of the armed force should be chosen from the body of the assembly. "Who!" was the question. "Barras," replied a voice, "and he will have the courage to accept the appointment." Thereupon Vouland immediately hurried to the tribune and proposed that Barras, the representative, should be appointed to take the conduct of the armed force. The suggestion was adopted; Barras was appointed, and associated with him seven other deputies to command under his orders: namely, Fréron, Ferrand, Rovère, Delmas, Boleti, Leonard Bourdon, and Bourdon (of the Oise). To this proposal a member of the assembly added another which was not less important, namely, to appoint representatives to go and shew the true state of things to the sections, and require the assistance of their battalions. This last measure was the most necessary of all, for it was more than ever pressing to decide the wavering or misguided sections.

Barras hastened to the battalions already assembled, to acquaint them with his powers, and to post them around the convention. The deputies despatched to the sections repaired thither to harangue them. At this moment the greater part of them were undecided; very few were for holding with the commune and with Robespierre. Every one had a horror of that atrocious system commonly imputed to Robespierre, and longed for an event that should deliver France from such thraldom. Nevertheless, fear still paralyzed the citizens. They durst not make up their minds. The commune, whom the sections had been long accustomed to obey, had summoned them, and some, not daring to resist, had sent in commissaries, not for the purpose of adhering to the scheme of the insurrection, but to obtain intelligence of the passing events. Paris was in a state of uncertainty and anxiety. The relatives of the prisoners, their friends, and all who were suffering from that cruel system, sallied from their houses, drew nearer street by street in the direction of the places where the uproar prevailed, and strove to gain some intelligence. The unfortunate prisoners, having from their barred windows perceived a great commotion, and heard a great noise, suspected that something was the matter, but trembled lest this new event should only aggravate their lot. However, the dejection of the gaolers, words whispered to the list makers, and the consternation which succeeded, had in some measure dissipated their apprehensions. It was soon known, from some loose expressions, that Robespierre was in jeopardy. The relations of the prisoners came to take their station under the windows of the prisons, and to indicate by signs what was passing; and thereupon the prisoners collected, and placed no restraint upon their rejoicings. The base informers, tremblingly, had taken apart some of the suspected, and were compelled to justify themselves, and to persuade them that they were not the authors of the lists of proscription. Some of them, admitting the fact, said that they had nevertheless excluded many names. One had returned no more than forty names instead of two hundred, which were required of him; another had destroyed entire lists. In their fright, these wretches reciprocally accused each other, and cast the infamy of their proceedings from one to the other.

The deputies distributed among the sections had no great difficulty in prevailing against the obscure emissaries of the commune. Those sections who had sent off their battalions to the Hotel de Ville recalled them; the others directed theirs towards the *Palais National*. Already was the Palais sufficiently protected. Barras went and informed the assembly, and next hastened to the plain of Sablons to supersede Labretèche, who was dismissed, and to bring the school of Mars to the relief of the convention.

The national representation now found itself sheltered from any off-hand attack that might be made. In point of fact, now was the time for taking hostile measures against the commune, and opening the attack, which it had hitherto neglected to do. It was immediately resolved to march to the Hotel de Ville. Leonard Bourdon, who was at the head of a great number of battalions, put himself in order to march. When he announced that he was now going to meet the rebels, "Go," said Tallien, who occupied the president's chair, "and let the rising sun witness no living conspirators." Leonard Bourdon filed

off by the quays, and arrived at the place of the Hotel de Ville. A great number of gendarmes, cannoniers, and armed citizens of the sections, were still to be found there. An agent of the committee of public welfare, named Dulac, had the courage to slide into their ranks, and to read to them the decree of the convention which outlawed the commune. The respect which people had contracted for that assembly, in whose name every thing had been done for two years past, respect for the words law and republic, prevailed over every other consideration. The battalions disbanded: some returned to their own homes, others joined Leonard Bourdon, and the *Place de la Commune* was deserted. Those who guarded, and those who came to attack it, drew up in the neighbouring streets, in order to close all the outlets.

People had such an idea of the resolution of the conspirators, and were so astonished to find them almost motionless in the Hotel de Ville, that they were fearful of approaching. Leonard Bourdon began to fear that they had undermined the Hotel de Ville, but this was not the case. They were confusedly deliberating, and proposing to write to the armies and to the provinces; but they knew not in whose name they should write, and durst not take any decisive course. Had Robespierre ventured, like a man of decision, to have shown himself, and have marched to the convention, she would in good sooth have been placed at the utmost peril. But he was a mere orator; and, besides, he became sensible, and all his partisans became also sensible with him, that public opinion had abandoned them. The end of that frightful system had arrived; the convention was every where obeyed, and the outlawries produced a magical effect. Even had Robespierre been endued with greater energy, he must have been discouraged by these circumstances, superior to any individual force. The decree of outlawry completely astounded every one, when from the *Place de la Commune* it came down to the Hotel de Ville. Payan, who received it, read it aloud, and, with great presence of mind, added to the list of the persons outlawed, *the people of the galleries*, which was not in the decree. Contrary to his expectation, the people of the galleries made their way out in alarm, to avoid sharing in the anathema launched against them by the convention. Then it was that the conspirators were seized with the utmost dismay. Henriot went down to the *Place* to harangue the gunners, but he found not a single man. "What," cried he, swearing, "do those rascals of cannoniers who saved me a few hours since desert me now!" He then went up-stairs in a rage, to announce this new intelligence to the council. The conspirators were overwhelmed with despair: they found themselves abandoned by their own troops, and hemmed in on all sides by those of the convention; they mutually accused each other, as well as reproached themselves with their misfortune. Coffinhal, an energetic man, who had been ill supported, enraged against Henriot, said to him, "It is thy cowardice, villain, that has lost us!" He rushed upon him, and seizing him round the waist, he threw him out of a window. The wretched Henriot fell upon a dungheap, which broke the fall, and prevented it from proving mortal. Lebas shot himself with a pistol; the younger Robespierre threw himself out of a window; Saint-Just continued calm and immoveable, holding a weapon in his hand, but without attempting to use it against himself; Robespierre at length decided to terminate his career, and found in this extremity the courage to inflict death upon himself, and shot himself with a pistol, but entering above the lip, the ball merely pierced his cheek, and inflicted a wound that was by no means dangerous.

At this moment a few bold men, one Dulac, and Meda a gendarme, and several others, leaving Bourdon with his battalions in the *Place de la Commune*, went up, armed with swords and pistols, and entered the hall of the council, at the very instant when the two reports of fire-arms were heard. The municipal officers were going to take off their scarfs, but Dulac threatened to sabre the first who should attempt to take it from him. Everybody remained still: they seized upon all the municipal officers, the Payans, the Fleuriots, the Dumas's, the Coffinhals, &c.: the wounded were carried away on shutters, and were brought in triumph to the convention. It was now three o'clock in the morning—shouts of victory rang around the hall, and made the roof echo. Shouts of "Liberty for ever! The constitution for ever! Down with the tyrants!" arose on all sides. The president uttered these words: "Representatives! Robespierre and his accomplices are at the door of your hall; will you have them brought before you?" "No, no," was replied from all sides; "to execution with the conspirators!"

Robespierre was conveyed with his friends to the hall of the committee of public welfare. He was laid upon a table, and some pieces of pasteboard were placed under his head. He had retained his presence of mind, and appeared composed. He wore a blue coat, the same that he wore at the festival of the Supreme Being, nankeen breeches, and white stockings, which amidst the tumult he had let fall over his shoes. The blood flowed from his wound, and he was wiping it away with a pistol-bag. From time to time persons about him gave him bits of paper, which he used to wipe his face. In this state he remained several hours exposed to the curiosity, and abuse of a crowd of people. When the surgeon came to dress his wound, he raised himself up, got down from the table, and seated himself in an arm-chair. He underwent a painful dressing without a murmur. With the insensibility and sullenness of humbled pride, he made no reply to any observation. He was then conveyed, along with Saint-Just, Couthon, and the others, to the Conciergerie. His brother and Henriot had been picked up, half dead, in the streets adjoining the Hotel de Ville.

The outlawry dispensed with the formalities of a trial; all that was necessary was to prove the identity. On the morning of the following day, the 10th Thermidor, (28th July,) the culprits, to the number of twenty-one, appeared before that tribunal whither they had sent so many victims. Fouquier-Tinville produced evidence of identity, and at four in the afternoon, he caused them to be conveyed to execution. The populace, who had long forbore to attend the executions, hastened thither on that day with great eagerness. The scaffold had been erected in the *Place de la Révolution*. An immense

crowd filled the Rue Saint Honoré, the Tuileries, and the *Grande Place*. Numerous relatives of the victims followed the carts, pouring forth imprecations upon them; many went up to them desiring to see Robespierre; the gendarmes pointed him out to them with their swords; when the culprits had reached the scaffold, the executioners showed Robespierre to the populace; they took off the bandage fastened round his jaw, and wrung from him the first cry of pain he up to that time uttered. He suffered with the same phlegmatic composure he had displayed for the last twenty-four hours. Saint-Just died with the courage which he had always exhibited. Couthon was dejected; Henriot and the younger Robespierre were nearly dead from the effects of their wounds. Shouts of applause accompanied every descent of the fatal knife, and the multitude manifested extraordinary joy. The rejoicing was universal throughout Paris. In the prisons loud singing was heard, people embraced one another in a species of intoxication, and paid as much as thirty francs for the newspapers reporting the recent events. Although the convention had not declared that it abolished the system of terror, and although the victors themselves were either the originators or the apostles of that system, it was considered as terminated with Robespierre; to such a degree had he identified himself with all its horrors.

Such was that happy event, which terminated the ascending movement of the Revolution, so that it now commenced its retrograde movement. The revolution had, on the 14th of July, 1789, overthrown the ancient feudal constitution; she had on the 5th and 6th of October dragged the king from his court to ensure the possession of his person; she had then framed a constitution for herself, and had committed it to his keeping in 1791, as an experiment. Soon having to be dissatisfied with this trial, and despairing of ever reconciling the court to liberty, she had stormed the Tuileries on the 10th of August, and thrown Louis XVI. into prison. When Austria and Prussia were advancing to destroy her, she threw down, to use her own awful language, she threw down, as the gauntlet of defiance, the head of a king, and the lives of six thousand prisoners; she entered in a most uncompromising manner into that struggle, and repelled the allies by her early exertions. Her wrath augmented the number of her enemies; the increase of her enemies and of her danger redoubled her wrath and converted it into rage. She violently tore those sincere republicans from the sanctuary of the laws, who, not comprehending these extremities, sought to moderate them. Then she had to fight one-half of France, La Vendée, and Europe. By the effect of this continual action and reaction of impediments upon her will, and of her will upon obstacles, she mounted at last to the highest degree of danger and exasperation. She erected scaffolds, and sent a million of men to the frontiers. Then, sublime and atrocious at the same time, she was observed to destroy with a blind fury, and to direct the national energies with surprising promptness and with the profoundest views of prudence. Converted again, by the necessity for energetic action, from a turbulent democracy to an absolute dictatorship, she became well regulated, silent, and formidable. During the entire of the latter part of 1793 till the beginning of 1794, she progressed onward, reconciled by the imminence of the danger which surrounded her. But when victory had crowned her efforts, at the end of 1793, a discord would then arise, for generous and mighty hearts, tranquillized by success, cried, "Mercy to the vanquished!" But all hearts were not yet tranquillized; the salvation of the revolution was not evident to the minds of all; the pity of some excited the fury of others, and there were extravagant spirits who wished, instead of a regular government, a tribunal of death. The dictatorship struck down the two new parties which impeded its march. Hébert, Ronsin, and Vincent, perished with Danton and Camille-Desmoulins. The revolution thus continued its career, covered itself with glory from the commencement of 1794, vanquished all Europe, and overwhelmed it with confusion. This was the period when pity was to gain the ascendancy over rage. But then it happened what always will come to pass: out of the incident of a day they desired to complete a system. The heads of the government had systematized violence and cruelty, and when the dangers and excitements were past, they still wished to murder more and more; but the public indignation was everywhere roused. To this opposition they would have replied by the accustomed expedient—death! Then it was that one and the same cry issued from their rivals in power and from the threatened colleagues, and this cry was the signal for a general insurrection. It required a few moments to shake off the numbness of fear; the effort soon proved successful, and the system of terror was overthrown.

It may be asked, what would have happened if Robespierre had gained the ascendancy! The state of desertion in which he found himself, proves that this could never have taken place. But even had he been conqueror, he must either have yielded to the general feeling, or have ultimately fallen. Like all usurpers, he would have been compelled to substitute for the horrors of faction a calm and mild system. But besides this, the disposition of such an usurper did not belong to him. Our revolution had too great a range to permit that the same man, who was deputy to the constituent assembly in 1789, should be proclaimed emperor or protector in 1804, in the church of Notre-Dame. In a country less advanced and of less extent, as England then was, where the same person might still be tribune and general, and combine the two functions, a Cromwell might be both a party man at the beginning, and a usurping soldier at the conclusion. But in a revolution so extended as ours, in which the war had been so terrible and so overpowering, wherein the same individual could not occupy at one and the same time the tribune and the camp, party men first devoured one another; after them came the military men, and a soldier finally remained the ultimate master.

Robespierre, then, could not act with us the part of a usurper. How came it that he was permitted to survive all those famous revolutionists, so far his superiors in genius and in might? Danton, for example? Robespierre was a man who was incorruptible, and a good reputation is requisite for captivating the crowd. He was without sympathy, and pity in revolutions destroys its pos-

sessor. He was possessed by an obstinate and pertinacious pride, and this is the only means of keeping oneself constantly present to people's minds. With these qualifications he necessarily survived all his rivals. But he was of the worst species of men. A devotee without passions, without the vices to which passions are exposed, but yet without the courage, the greatness, and the sensibility which ordinarily accompany them; a devotee living for nothing else than to satisfy his pride and his creed, hiding himself in the hour of danger, coming forth to attract adoration after the victory had been gained by others, is one of the most odious beings that could have bore absolute rule over men, and one would also say the most vile, if he had not possessed a strong conviction and acknowledged incorruptibility.

CHAPTER XXIII.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE 9 THERMIDOR—MODIFICATIONS APPLIED TO THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT—REORGANIZATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEES—REVOCATION OF THE LAW OF THE 22d PRAIRIAL; DECREES OF ARREST AGAINST FOUQUIER-TINVILLE, LEBON, ROSSIGNOL, AND OTHER AGENTS OF THE DICTATORSHIP; SUSPENSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL; ENLARGEMENT OF THE SUSPECTED PERSONS.—TWO PARTIES ARE FORMED, THE MOUNTAINEERS AND THE THERMIDORIANS—REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT COMMITTEES—MODIFICATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES—STATE OF FINANCES, OF COMMERCE, AND OF AGRICULTURE AFTER THE TERROR—ACCUSATION BROUGHT AGAINST THE MEMBERS OF THE FORMER COMMITTEES, WHICH IS DECLARED VEXATIOUS BY THE CONVENTION—EXPLOSION OF THE GUNPOWDER MILL AT GRENELLE—MUTUAL EXASPERATION OF THE PARTIES—REPORT MADE TO THE CONVENTION UPON THE STATE OF FRANCE—NUMEROUS AND IMPORTANT DECREES UPON ALL PARTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION—THE REMAINS OF MARAT ARE CONVEYED TO THE PANTHEON, AND DEPOSITED BESIDE THOSE OF MIRABEAU.

THE events of the 9th and 10th Thermidor had occasioned rejoicings that even the lapse of several days could not tranquillize. The excitement was general. A great number of persons who had left their province to conceal themselves in Paris hurried to the public vehicles, to carry to their homes the tidings of the general deliverance. They were every where stopped upon the road to detail the particulars. On receiving intelligence of these happy events, some returned to their dwellings which they had long since quitted; others, buried in subterraneous retreats, ventured to appear again in the light of day. The prisoners detained in the numerous prisons in France began to hope for liberty, or at least they ceased to dread the scaffold.

No explanation was as yet tendered as to the nature of the revolution which had just taken place; nobody as yet came to inquire how far the surviving members of the committee of public welfare were disposed to continue the revolutionary system, or how far the convention was disposed to enter into their views; all they saw, all they comprehended, was but one thing, the death of Robespierre. It was he who had been the head of the government; it was to him were imputed the imprisonments, the executions, in short, all the acts of the late tyranny. Robespierre being dead, it seemed that everything must be changed and resume a different appearance.

After the termination of any great event, the public expectation eagerly demands to be satisfied as to its results. After two days dedicated to the receipt of congratulations, in listening to addresses, in all of which were repeated the same words, *Catilina is no more, the republic is saved*; in rewarding acts of courage; in voting monuments to perpetuate the memory of the great event of the 9th [Thermidor]; the convention at length became occupied with those measures her situation demanded.

The popular commissions instituted for the trial of the prisoners, the revolutionary tribunal composed by Robespierre, and the bar of Fouquier-Tinville, were still in operation, and needed but a sign of encouragement to continue their terrible functions. In the very sitting of the 11th Thermidor (29th July) the purification of the popular commissions was proposed and decreed. Élie Lacoste directed attention to the revolutionary tribunal, and proposed its suspension until it should be reorganized upon different principles, and composed of other men. The motion of Élie Lacoste was adopted, and, in order not to delay the trial of Robespierre's accomplices, it was agreed to appoint, during that very sitting, a provisional commission to supersede the revolutionary tribunal *. In the evening sitting, Barrère, who continued his office of reporter, came for the purpose of announcing a victory, the entrance of the French into Liege; and he subsequently addressed the assembly upon the state of the committees which had from time to time been retrenched, and reduced by the scaffold or by missions to a small number of members. Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon, had expired on the preceding day [28th July]. Hérault-Sechelles had died with Danton. Jean-Bon-Saint-André and Prieur (of La Marne) were [absent]

* There was more than one tribunal erected for revolutionary purposes. There was first, the tribunal of the 17th of August, which was instituted at Paris on the 17th of August, 1792, for the trial of those who were accused of having been the first to fire in the affair of the Tuilleries of the 10th of August. Then there was the revolutionary tribunal established by the national convention at the suggestion of Danton, the 23th of March, 1793. The style of this tribunal was *tribunal criminal extraordinaire révolutionnaire*, and it was composed of nine members; its judgments were without appeal, and involved the confiscation of the estates of those whom it condemned. And lastly, the present tribunal mentioned in the text, which was suppressed the 31st of May, 1795. *Trans.*

on mission. All that remained were Carnot, who was solely occupied with the war department; Prieur (of the Côte d'Or), commissioned with the furnishing arms and ammunition; and Robert Lindet, who had to controul the supplies of provision and trade; Billaud-Varennes and Collot d'Herbois, charged with the correspondence and the administrative bodies; and lastly, Barrère with the reports. Out of twelve, therefore, there remained but six. The committee of general safety was more complete, and was perfectly adequate to its functions. Barrère proposed to replace the three members who had expired on the preceding day upon the scaffold, by three new members in the interval, and until the general remodelling of the committees, which was fixed for the 20th of every month, but which had been discontinued ever since the tacit consent given to the dictatorship. This was commencing the discussion of great questions: were they going to discharge all those men who had sided with the late government? Were they going to change not only men but things, to alter the form of the committees, to take precautions against their too great influence, to limit their powers,—in a word, to effect a complete revolution in the administration? Such were the questions raised by Barrère's proposition. In the first place, opposition was exhibited against that hasty and dictatorial mode of proceeding which consisted in proposing and appointing the members of the committees at one and the same sitting. A motion was made that the list should be printed, and the nomination adjourned. Dubois-Crancé went still further, and complained against the prolonged absence of the members of the committees. "If they had," as he said, "appointed a successor to Hérault-Sechelles, and had not still suffered Prieur (of La Marne) and Jean-Bon-Saint-André to be continually absent on mission, they would have been more certain of having a majority, and not have hesitated so long as to attacking the triumvirs." He then argued that men exhausted themselves by the exercise of power, and that it made them contract dangerous tendencies. Consequently he proposed that it should be decreed from thenceforward no member of the committees should be authorized to go on mission, and that every committee should be renewed as to a fourth part of its members once in every month. Cambon, carrying the discussion still further, said that the entire government ought to be reorganized. The committee of public welfare had, according to him, usurped everything; and the result was, that its members, were they even to labour night and day, could not perform their task, and that the committees of finance, of legislation, and of general safety, were reduced to a perfect nullity. Consequently there was a necessity for creating a new distribution of powers, so as to prevent the committee of public welfare from being overloaded, and the others from being annulled.

The discussion being thus excited, they were about to lay hands on all the departments of the revolutionary government. Bourdon (of the Oise), whose opposition to Robespierre's system was well known, since he was to have been one of its first victims, checked this inconsiderate movement. He said that up to that time they had possessed an able and vigorous government; that they were indebted to it for the salvation of France and for glorious victories; that they ought to pause before they carelessly laid hands upon its organization; that all the hopes of the aristocrats were about reviving; and that, in protecting themselves from a new tyranny, they ought to modify, but with caution, an institution to which they owed such important results. However, Tallien, the hero of the 9th [Thermidor], was desirous that certain questions at least should be entered into, and he saw no impropriety in settling them at once. Why not, for example, decree at once that the committees should be renewed by the fourth part every month? This proposition of Dubois-Crancé's, submitted in another form by Tallien, was received with enthusiasm, and adopted amidst shouts of *Vive la république!* To this measure, the deputy Delmas was desirous of adding one other. "You have just been drying up the well-spring of ambition," said he to the assembly: "to render your decree perfect in all points, I propose that you decide that no member shall be able to return to a committee for one month after he shall have gone out." The motion of Delmas was received as the preceding, and was forthwith carried. These principles being admitted, it was settled on all hands that a commission should present a new plan for the organization of the committees of government.

On the following day, six members were chosen to replace the dead or absent members of the committee of public welfare. On this occasion, the presentation made by Barrère was not confirmed. They nominated Tallien, to reward him for his courage, Bréard, Thuriot, and Treilhard, members of the first committee of public welfare; lastly, the two deputies Laloi and Echassériaux senior, this last-named individual being well-versed in matters of finance and political economy. The committee of general safety also underwent changes. There was a great clamour on all sides against David, who was said to be devoted to Robespierre, and also against Jagot and Laviconterie, who were accused of having been horrible inquisitors. A great number of voices called for their removal: it was decreed. In order to fill their places and to complete the committee of general safety, they appointed several of those militants of the 9th to succeed them, namely, Legendre, Merlin (of Thionville), Goupilleau (of Fontenay), André Dumont, Jean Debry, and Bernard (of Saintes). Next they unanimously repealed the law of the 22nd Prairial. Great indignation was expressed against the decree which allowed the imprisonment of a deputy before he had been previously heard by the convention,—a fatal decree which had consigned to death illustrious victims, associated with the recollection of all then present, Danton, Camille-Desmoulins, Hérault-Sechelles, &c. The decree was repealed. It was not enough that things were to be changed: there were men whom the public resentment could not pardon. "All Paris," exclaimed Legendre, "demands at your hands the justly merited punishment of Fouquier-Tinville." This motion was instantly decreed, and Fouquier-Tinville was placed under accusation. "No one can sit any longer by the side of Lebon," cried another voice; and all eyes were fixed on the proconsul who had dabbled the city of Arras with blood, and whose

excesses had provoked remonstrances even under Robespierre. Lebon was immediately *decreted* with arrest. They returned to the case of David, whom they first contented themselves with excluding from the committee of general safety, and he also was placed under arrest. The same measure was taken against Heron, the principal of the agents of that police instituted by Robespierre; against General Rossignol, already a well-known character; and against Hermann, president of the revolutionary tribunal under Dumas, and who had become, through Robespierre's influence, the chief of the commission of the tribunals.

Thus the revolutionary tribunal was suspended, the law of the 22nd Prairial repealed, the committees of public welfare and general safety in part recomposed, and the principal agents of the late dictatorship arrested and prosecuted. The character of the late revolution was plainly enough declared; every body gave the rein to their hopes, to complaints of every description. The persons under confinement, who filled the prisons, and their families, said to one another with joy, that they were at length about to enjoy the results of the event of the 9th. Before that happy moment, the relations of the suspected durst not appeal even for the purpose of urging the most legitimate reasons, whether it were for fear of awakening the attention of Fouquier-Tinville, or from the apprehension of being imprisoned themselves for having solicited in behalf of aristocrats. The reign of terror had passed by. The meetings of the sections were again resumed; formerly abandoned to sans-culottes, who were paid forty sous per day, they were immediately filled by persons who had just revisited the light of day, by relatives of the prisoners, by the fathers, brothers, or sons of the victims sacrificed by the revolutionary tribunal. A desire to deliver their kinsfolk animated some, revenge actuated others. They made demands at all the sections for the liberation of the prisoners, and they repaired to the convention to obtain this boon. These demands were referred to the committee of general safety, which was charged with the review of the application of the law of suspected persons. Although the committee still comprehended the greater number of those individuals who had signed the orders of arrest, yet the force of circumstances and the association of new members could not fail to incline it to clemency. It began, in fact, by adjudicating a multitude of liberations. Some of its members, Legendre, Merlin, and others, went through the prisons, to hear petitions, and diffused joy there by their presence and their words; others sitting night and day, received the petitions of relatives, who thronged to apply for discharges. The committee was directed to enquire whether the alleged suspected persons had been imprisoned as coming within the description of the law of the 17th of September, and if those causes were specified in the warrants of arrest. This was simply nothing more than recurring to a more precise execution of the law of the 17th of September; still it was sufficient to empty the prisons almost entirely. The indecent haste of the revolutionary agents had in fact been so great, that they had frequently made arrests without stating distinctly the causes of arrest, and without giving the required notice of them to the prisoners. These were released, as they had been confined, that is, *en masse*. Joy, less turbulent, then became more heartfelt: it was diffused among families, which recovered a father, a brother, or a son, of whom they had long been deprived, and whom they had even looked upon as doomed to the scaffold. They even set at liberty those men whose lukewarmness or whose connexions had rendered them suspected by a jealous authority, as also those whose patriotism, although well-attested, could not save them from the consequences of their opposition. That youthful general, who, by uniting on one of the slopes of the Vosges the two armies of the Moselle and the Rhine, had raised the blockade of Landau by a movement worthy of the greatest commanders, Hoche, imprisoned for his opposition to the committee of public welfare, was liberated and restored to his family, and to those armies he was destined to lead again to victory. Kilmaine, who saved the army of the north by retreating from Cæsar's camp in August 1793, and was thrown into prison for that admirable retreat, was also set at liberty. That young and beautiful female, who had acquired such empire over Tallien, and who, from the recesses of her prison, had never ceased to stimulate his courage, was delivered by him, and became his wife. The discharges every day increased, without the petitions which overwhelmed the committee becoming less numerous. "Victory," said Barrère, "has just determined a period when the country can be indulgent without danger to itself, and can consider faults of incivism as atoned for by a temporary imprisonment. The committees are constantly adjudicating upon the discharges petitioned for; they are incessantly employed in repairing individual errors or acts of injustice. Very soon all traces of private revenge will disappear from the soil of the republic; but the concourse of persons of both sexes about the doors of the committee of general safety only serves to retard labours so beneficial to the citizens. We make due allowance for the very natural anxiety of families; but why retard, by solicitations reflecting upon the legislators, and by too numerous assemblages, the rapid march which national justice ought to take at this period?"

The committee of general safety was, in fact, beset with solicitations of every description. The women, in particular, exerted their influence to obtain acts of clemency; even on behalf of known enemies of the revolution more than one deception was practised upon the committee: the dukes of Aumont and Valentinois were liberated under fictitious names, and a great many others saved themselves by means of the same subterfuge. There was no great harm in that; for, as Barrère had observed, victory had marked the epoch when the republic could become mild and indulgent. But the report that got wind, that the committee were setting at liberty a great number of aristocrats, was likely to awaken the revolutionary mistrusts, and to destroy the kind unanimity with which measures of clemency and peace were welcomed.

The sections were agitated, and became tumultuous. It was not possible, in fact, that the relatives of prisoners or of victims, that the suspected persons recently liberated, that all those, in short, to whom freedom of speech was restored, should confine themselves to seeking reparation for former severities, without also demanding vengeance.

Almost all were furious against the revolutionary committees, and complained loudly against them. They were for remodelling, nay, even for suppressing them entirely, and these discussions produced some disturbances in Paris. The section of Montreuil came to denounce the arbitrary acts of its revolutionary committee; the section of the French Pantheon declared that its committee had lost its confidence; that of the Social Contract likewise took severe measures in regard to its committee, and appointed a commission to examine its registers.

This was only a natural reaction of the moderate class, long reduced to silence and to terror by the inquisitors of the revolutionary committees. These movements could not fail of striking the attention of the Mountain.

That terrible Mountain had not perished with Robespierre, and had survived him. Some of its members had remained convinced of the uprightness, of the integrity of Robespierre's intentions, and did not believe that he ever meant to usurp. They looked upon him as the victim of Danton's friends, and of the corrupt party whose remains he had not been able to destroy; but it was a very small number who held this opinion. The great majority of the mountaineers, staunch republicans, enthusiasts, regarding with horror every scheme of usurpation, had lent their assistance to the 9th Thermidor, not so much with a view to overthrow a sanguinary system, as to strike a rising Cromwell. Without doubt they found such revolutionary justice as Robespierre, Saint-Just, Couthon, Fouquier, and Dumas had administered, iniquitous, but they had no intention to diminish one jot the energy of the government, or give any quarter to those who were termed the aristocrats. The greater part were pure and rigid men, who had no concern in the dictatorship and its acts, and in no wise felt interested in supporting it; but at the same time, jealous revolutionists, who were by no means desirous the 9th Thermidor should be converted into a reaction, and be made available for the purposes of a party. Among those of their colleagues who had united to overthrow the dictatorship, they saw with distrust men who had the character of rogues, men of profuse expenditure, friends of Chabot and Fabre d'Eglantine; in short, members of the peculating, stock-jobbing, and corrupt party. They had supported them against Robespierre; but they were ready to fight with them, if they perceived any tendency in them either to refrigerate the revolutionary energy, or to turn the late events to the advantage of any faction whatever. They had accused Danton of corruption, of federalism, or Orleanism, and of royalism; it is not surprising that suspicions of the like nature should rise up against his victorious friends. Besides, no attack had been yet directed; but the numerous releases, and the general feeling against the revolutionary system, began to revive serious apprehensions.

The real authors of the 9th Thermidor, to the number of fifteen or twenty, and of whom the principal were Legendre, Fréron, Tallien, Merlin (of Thionville), Barras, Thuriot, Bourdon (of the Oise), Dubois Crancé, and Lecointre (of Versailles), were not more favourably disposed than their colleagues to royalism and to counter-revolution; but, excited by the danger and by the conflict, they were more decidedly declared against the revolutionary laws. They had, moreover, much of that tendency to leniency which had ruined their friends, Danton and Desmoulins. Surrounded, applauded, and solicited, they were hurried away more than their colleagues of the Mountain into the system of clemency. It was even probable that many of them had made some sacrifices to their novel position. To render services to distressed families, to receive testimonials of the warmest gratitude, to efface the remembrance of former severities, was a part which presented its temptations. Already those who distrusted their complaisance, as well as those who confided in it, gave them a distinctive appellation: they called them the *Thermidorians*.

Warm discussions frequently took place on the subject of the enlargements. Thus, for example, upon the recommendation of a deputy, who said that he knew one of them as belonging to his department, the committee ordered him to be set at liberty, immediately on this another deputy of the same department made a grievance of this release, and declared that an aristocrat had been enlarged. These wranglings, coupled with the new appearance of a multitude of well-known enemies of the revolution, who showed themselves overjoyed, provoked a measure which was adopted, without its being at first considered of any importance. It was settled that there should be printed a list of every person released by order of the committee of general safety, and that beside the name of the discharged individual, there should be inscribed the name of the person who had petitioned in his behalf, and who had made himself responsible for his principles.

This measure produced a most unpleasant sensation. Writhing under the recent oppression which they had undergone, many citizens were afraid to see their names entered into a list which might be made available for the exercise of fresh severities, should the system of terror ever be again established. Many of those who had already solicited and obtained discharges were sorry for it, and many others would not apply for more. Bitter complaints were made in the sections of this return to measures which disturbed confidence and the public rejoicing, and the revocation of such measures was earnestly called for.

On the 26th Thermidor some remarks were made in the assembly in regard to the agitation prevailing in the sections of Paris. The section of Montreuil had come to denounce its revolutionary committee. The answer returned was, that it ought to address itself to the committee of general safety. Duhem, deputy of Lille, who although totally unconcerned in the acts of the late dictatorship, was a friend of Billaud, and concurred in all his opinions, and convinced that it was not expedient that the revolutionary authority should relax its severity, declaimed violently against aristocracy and moderatism, which, as he said, already lifted their audacious heads, and imagined that the 9th Thermidor had taken place merely for their advantage. Baudot and Taillefer, who had shown a courageous opposition under the rule of Robespierre, but who were quite as staunch Mountaineers as Duhem, and Vadier, a distinguished member of the old committee of general

safety, asserted also that the aristocracy was about to make a movement, and that although the government ought certainly to be just, it ought at the same time to be inflexible. Granet, deputy of Marseilles, who sat with the Mountain, made a proposition which further increased the agitation of the assembly. He insisted that the prisoners already released, if the persons who answered for them did not come forward to give their names, should be immediately re-incarcerated. This proposition excited a great tumult. Bourdon, Lecointre, and Merlin (of Thionville) opposed it with all their might. The discussion, as it almost always happens on such occasions, travelled out of the lists to the political state of the country, and each party briskly attacked the other upon the intentions they were supposed to harbour. "It is time, indeed," exclaimed Merlin (of Thionville), "that all the factions should no longer progress in the steps that led to the throne of Robespierre. Nothing should be done by halves, and it must be confessed that in the affair of the 9th Thermidor, the convention has done a great deal too much by halves. If she has left tyrants here, they ought at least to be silent." Great cheering succeeded these words of Merlin, addressed particularly to Vadier, one of those who had spoken against the movements of the sections. Legendre spoke after Merlin. "The committee," said he, "is well aware that it has been taken by surprize in the release of some aristocrats; but their number is not great, and they will soon again be imprisoned. Why accuse one another? why look upon each other as enemies, when our intentions are, bating some slight differences, the same? Let us restrain our passions, if we would ensure and accelerate the success of the Revolution. Citizens, I demand of you the repeal of the law of the 23d, which orders the printing of the lists of the citizens who have been set at liberty. That law has dispelled the public joy, and frozen all hearts." Tallien followed Legendre; he was heard with the greatest attention, as the principal of the Thermidorians. "For some days past," said he, "all good citizens have observed with pain, that some one is endeavouring to sow dissension among you, and to revive those animosities which ought to be buried in the grave of Robespierre. On entering this place a note was put into my hands, which informs me that several members were to be attacked in this sitting. No doubt it is by the enemies of the republic that such rumours gain credit; let us beware of supporting them by our dissensions." Cheers interrupted Tallien; he resumed, "Continuators of Robespierre's history," he exclaimed, "hope not for success; the convention is determined to perish, rather than endure a new tyranny. The convention wills an inflexible but a just government. It is possible that some patriots have been deceived in regard of certain prisoners; we are no believers in the infallibility of men. But only denounce those persons irregularly discharged, and they shall be again incarcerated. For my own part, I can make the sincere avowal, that I had much rather see twenty aristocrats at liberty to-day, who may again be apprehended to-morrow, than a single patriot remaining in fetters. What! can the republic, with its twelve hundred thousand armed citizens, be afraid of a few aristocrats! No; she is too mighty, she will find means to discover and to chastise her enemies!"

Tallien, although frequently interrupted by cheers, experienced thunders of applause when he concluded his speech. After these general explanations, they returned to the consideration of the law of the 23d; and to the new declaration which Granet wanted to add thereto. The partizans of the law maintained that no one ought to be afraid of declaring himself while performing a patriotic act, such as that of petitioning for a citizen unjustly detained. The opponents of the law replied, that nothing can be more dangerous than the lists; that those of the twenty thousand and of the eight thousand had been the cause of continual disturbance; that those whose names were inscribed therein had lived in dread; and that were there any further tyranny to be apprehended, the persons included in the new lists would never be at rest. At length a mutual explanation took place. Bourdon proposed to print the names of the discharged prisoners, without adding the names of those who answered for them; and solicited their liberation. His motion was favourably received, and it was settled that they should print no more than the names of the persons discharged. Tallien, who was not satisfied with this middle course, immediately reascended the tribune. "Since you have decreed," said he, "to print the list of the citizens restored to liberty, you cannot refuse to publish the list of those citizens who caused them to be imprisoned. It is but just that one should be made acquainted with those who have denounced and caused good patriots to be incarcerated." The assembly, taken by surprize by Tallien's motion, at first deemed the proposition just, and forthwith decreed it. Scarcely had the vote been made, before several members of the assembly changed their opinion. "Here is a list," said one, "which will be inconsistent with the previous one; *this is civil war.*" This expression was soon repeated throughout the hall, and several voices exclaimed: *This is civil war!* "Yes," rejoined Tallien, who had again mounted the tribune, "Yes, *this is civil war.* I am of your opinion. Your two decrees will cause two classes of men to set their faces against each other, who never can be reconciled to each other. But it was my object in submitting to you the second decree, to make you sensible of the inconveniences of the first. Now I propose to you to repeal both of them." There was a cry from all quarters of "Yes, yes, the repeal of the two decrees!" Amar himself called for it, and the two decrees were repealed. The idea of printing any list was therefore thrown aside, owing to the clever and bold artifice Tallien had just practised upon the assembly.

This sitting restored a feeling of security to a great number of persons who began to lose it; but it proved that the passions of all were by no means allayed, and that all contests were not yet terminated. The parties had all been stricken in their turn, and had lost their most illustrious members: the royalists at several periods; the Girondists on the 31st of May; the Dantonists in Germinal; the extravagant Mountaineers on the 9th Thermidor. But if the most illustrious leaders had perished, their parties survived; for parties are not extinguished by a single blow, and those

that remain bestir themselves long afterwards. These parties were now about to dispute amongst themselves alternately for the control of the revolution, and to recommence an arduous and blood-stained career. In fact, it came to this, that those minds who by the excitement of the danger had mounted to the highest degree of exasperation, should return progressively to the point from which they had started. During this reaction, power would necessarily be shifted from hand to hand, and the same conflicts of passions, systems, and authority, would again be witnessed.

After having bestowed these preliminary attentions on the ameliorating of many severities, the convention considered as to the organization of the committees and of the provisional government, which was, as we know, to rule France until the general peace. A preliminary discussion had arisen, as we have just observed, upon the committee of public welfare, and the question had been referred to a commission commissioned with the preparation of a new plan. It became a matter of pressing necessity that this should be attended to; and this was what in fact the assembly did in the early part of Fructidor (August). The convention was placed between two opposite systems and perils: the fear of damnifying that authority on which the salvation of the revolution depended, and the apprehension of reviving tyranny. It is a property of human nature, to fear dangers that are past, and to take precautions against what cannot occur again. The tyranny of the late committee of public welfare had proceeded from the necessity for duly performing an extraordinary task amidst obstacles of every description. A few men had offered themselves to do what an assembly knew not how to, nay, durst not perform itself; and amidst the unheard-of toils for fifteen months, they had not been able either to declare the objects of their operations, or to render an account of them to the assembly, other than in a very general manner; they had not even the time to deliberate amongst themselves, but every one applied himself, as absolute master, to the duty that had devolved upon him. They had thus become so many compulsory dictators, whom circumstances, rather than ambition, had rendered all-powerful. Now that the task was nearly achieved, and the extreme dangers were past, a similar power could no longer create itself, the occasion not requiring it. It was puerile to take such precautions against a danger which could have no existence; nay, in this prudence there existed a grave inconvenience, that of enervating authority and of divesting it of all its energy. Twelve hundred thousand men had been raised, fed, armed, and conveyed to the frontiers; but it was necessary to provide for their maintenance, for their direction, and this was again a task that required great application, extraordinary capacity, and very extensive powers.

The principle of renewal of the committees by one-fourth every month had been already decreed; and it had been moreover decided that the members going out could not obtain re-admission before the expiration of a month. These two restrictions, while they prevented a new dictatorship, also stood in the way of every beneficial mode of administration. It was impossible that there could be any continuity, any constant application, any secrecy in a ministry thus continually renewed. In this organization no sooner had a member made himself acquainted with the course of business than he was forced to leave it; and if an aptitude was manifested, like that of Carnot, for war, of Prieur (of the Côte d'Or) and Robert Lindet for administration, and of Cambon for the finances, it was lost to the state at the appointed term; for the absence of a month, required by law, rendered the advantages of the ulterior re-election almost nugatory.

But a reaction necessarily took place. An extreme centralization of power was to be succeeded by a minute subdivision to the other extreme, and quite as dangerous, though perhaps in a different way. The former committee of public welfare, who took supreme cognizance in regard to what concerned the welfare of the state, had a right to summon the other committees and to make them report upon their operations; it had thus possessed itself of all that practically concerned the duties of each of them. To prevent in future such usurpations, the new organization distinguished the functions of the committees and rendered them independent of one another. Sixteen committees [or boards] were thus established:—

1. The committee of public welfare.
2. The committee of general safety.
3. The committee of finances.
4. The committee of legislation.
5. The committee of public instruction.
6. The committee of agriculture and the arts.
7. The committee of trade and provisions.
8. The committee of public works.
9. The committee of conveyance by post.
10. The military committee.
11. The committee of the navy and the colonies.
12. The committee of public relief.
13. The committee of division.
14. The committee of minutes and archives.
15. The committee of petitions, correspondence, and despatches.
16. The committee of the inspectors of the national palace.

The committee of public welfare was composed of twelve members; it still retained the direction of the military and diplomatic operations; it was charged with the levy and equipment of the armies, the selection of generals, the plans of campaign, &c.; but these were the extent of its duties. The committee of general safety, composed of sixteen members, took charge of the police. The committee of the finances, composed of forty-eight members, had the superintendence of the revenue, the treasury, the mint, the assignats, &c. The committees were enabled to assemble together for the consideration of such matters as concerned them generally. Thus the absolute authority of the former committee of public welfare was divided among a number of rival authorities, subject to embarrassment and inconvenience in their progress. Such was the new organization of the government. In the mean time other reforms hardly deemed less urgent than the preceding were effected. The revolutionary committees established in the smallest boroughs, and empowered to exercise inquisition there, were the most vexatious and the most abhorred of the institutions attributed to Robespierre's party. To render their action less extensive and less annoying, their number was re-

duced to a single one for each district. There was, however, to be one in every commune of eight thousand souls, whether it were the chief town of a district or not. In Paris, the number was reduced from forty-eight to twelve. These committees were to be composed of twelve members; the signature of at least three members was required to a summon to appear, and the signature of seven for a warrant of arrest. Like the committees of government, they were subject to renewal by one-fourth every month. In addition to all these arrangements the convention added others not less important, by deciding that the meetings of the sections should not in future take place but once in each decade, and that on every decadi, and that the citizens who attended should no longer be paid forty sous for the sitting. To render the popular assemblies less frequent, and above all to cease paying the lower classes for attending them, was confining the demagogic spirit within narrower limits. It was also cutting off an abuse which had been carried to excess in Paris. Payment was made by the section as for twelve hundred members present, although there were scarcely three hundred who actually attended. The present answered for the absent, and they alternately rendered each other this service. Thus this mechanic militia, so devoted to Robespierre, were dismissed, and sent back to their labour.

The most important measure adopted by the convention was the purification of the individuals composing all the local authorities, revolutionary committees, municipalities, &c. It was there that, as we have observed, the most fervid revolutionists were to be found; they had become in each petty locality what Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon had been in Paris, and they had exercised their powers with all the grossness of inferior authorities. The decree of the revolutionary government, in suspending the constitution till the peace, had prohibited elections of all kinds, in order to obviate disturbances and to centralize authority in the same hands. The convention, from absolutely similar motives, namely, to prevent conflicts between the Jacobins and the aristocrats, supported the provisions of the decree, and committed to the representatives on mission the burden of purifying the institutions throughout all France. This was the only way to assure itself of the choice and the direction of the local authorities, and to prevent mutual collisions between the two factions. Lastly, the revolutionary tribunal, recently suspended, was restored to its functions. The judges and juries were not yet all appointed: those who had already met were to enter on their office immediately, and to try agreeably to the laws existing before those of the 22d Prairial. These laws were still very dreadful; but the persons selected to administer them, and the docility with which extraordinary jurisdictions follow the direction of that government which creates them, were considered a guarantee against fresh cruelties.

All these reforms were carried into effect between the 1st and the 15th Fructidor (the end of August). One more important institution still remained to be re-established, namely, the liberty of the press. No law at present prescribed its limits; it was even sanctioned in an unlimited manner in the declaration of rights; nevertheless, it had in point of fact been proscribed under the system of terror. A single imprudent word being at that time sufficient to compromise the lives of citizens, how could they have dared to write! The fate of the unfortunate Camille-Desmoulins had clearly proved the state of the press at that period. Durand-Maillane, an ex-constituent, and one of those timid spirits who had become mere ciphers during the storms of the convention, desired that the liberty of the press should be formally guaranteed anew. "We have never been able," said that excellent man to his colleagues, "to make ourselves heard in this place, without being exposed to abusive language and threats. If you care for our opinion in the discussions that shall in future arise; if you are desirous that we should contribute, by our intelligence, to the common cause, you must give new securities to those who may feel disposed either to speak or to write."

Some few days afterwards, Fréron, who had been the friend and colleague of Barras in his mission to Toulon, the also intimate friend of Danton and Camille-Desmoulins, and since their death, the most vehement enemy of the committee of public welfare, Fréron added his opinion to that of Durand-Maillane, and called for the unbounded liberty of the press. Opinions, however, were divided on this subject. Those who had lived under constraint during the late dictatorship, and who now wished to give their opinions on all subjects with freedom, as well as those who felt disposed to cause a reaction energetically against the Revolution, demanded a formal declaration to guarantee the liberty of speech and writing. The Mountaineers, who anticipated the use that was intended to be made of this liberty, who saw a torrent of accusations in preparation against those men who had exercised any functions during the reign of terror, many others, also, without entertaining any personal apprehension, appreciated the dangerous instrument with which the counter-revolutionists, already swarming from every quarter, were to be furnished, were opposed to an express declaration. They assigned as a reason, that the declaration of rights sanctioned the liberty of the press; that to sanction it anew was superfluous, since it was no more than a declaration of an already recognized right, and that to entertain an idea of rendering it unbounded, was committing a grand imprudence. "You are going, then," said Bourdon (of the Oise) and Cambon, "to permit royalism to lift its head, and to print whatever it pleases against the institution of the republic." All these propositions were referred to the competent committees, to examine if it were expedient to make a new declaration upon this subject.

Thus the provisional government destined to direct the Revolution till the peace was entirely modified, agreeably to the new tendencies towards clemency and liberality which manifested themselves since the 9th Thermidor. The government committees, the revolutionary tribunal, and local administrations, were recognized and purified; the liberty of the press was declared, and every thing announced the commencement of a new career.

The effect which these reforms could not fail to produce were not long in being felt. Hitherto, the party of the fervid revolutionists were to be found in the government itself; the committees were

composed of this party, and it ruled the convention; it predominated at the Jacobins; it filled the municipal institutions and the revolutionary committees with which all France was covered; now being dispossessed, it was about to find itself out of the government, and about to form a hostile party against it.

The Jacobins had been suspended on the night between the 9th and 10th Thermidor. Legendre had locked up their hall, and laid the keys of it on the bureau of the convention. The keys were restored, and the society was permitted to re-assemble on condition of purifying itself. Fifteen of the oldest members were chosen to investigate the conduct of all the clubists during the night between the 9th and 10th. They were to admit such only as on that memorable night had been at their posts as citizens, instead of repairing to the commune to conspire against the convention. While this purification was going on, the old members were admitted into the hall as provisional members. The purification commenced. An inquiry concerning each of them would have been difficult, they contented themselves with administering interrogatories to them, and they were tried by their answers. It is easy to conceive that such a scrutiny must have been made with great lenity, since it was the Jacobins sitting in judgment on themselves. In a few days, more than six hundred members were reinstalled, upon their simple declaration, that during that memorable night they had been at the post assigned to them by their duties. The society was soon recomposed on its previous footing, and was filled by all those individuals who, as having formerly been devoted to Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon, grieved for them as martyrs of liberty and as victims of the counter-revolution. In conjunction with the parent society, there still existed that notorious electoral club, to which those retired who had to make motions that could not be entertained at the Jacobins, and where all the great events of the revolution were planned. It sat daily at the Evêché, and was composed of old Cordeliers, the most determined Jacobins, and men most compromised during the reign of terror. The Jacobins and this club naturally became the asylum of those agents whom the new purification was about to drive from their posts; and this did not fail to come to pass. The judges and juries of the revolutionary tribunal, the members of the forty-eight revolutionary committees of Paris, amounting to about four hundred, the agents of the secret police of Saint-Just and Robespierre, the messengers (*porteurs d'ordre*) of the committees, who formed the band of the notorious Héron, the clerks of the different administrations, in short, agents of every description, now excluded from their offices, joined the Jacobins and the electoral club, either as being already members of them, or as upon a new introduction. There it was that they vented their complaints and their resentment. They were alarmed for their safety, and dreaded the vengeance of those whom they had persecuted; they regretted, moreover, those lucrative offices which they had lost, and especially those who, as being members of the revolutionary committees, had been able to add peculations of every description to their official income. The association of such men composed a violent and an obstinate party, to whose natural impetuosity of opinion was now added the irritation of injured interest. What was passing in Paris was occurring throughout all France. The members of the municipalities, of the revolutionary committees, and of the directories of districts, held their assemblies in the societies in correspondence with the parent society, and there vented in common their apprehensions and their animosities. They had on their side the low populace, also divested of its employment, inasmuch as they were no longer paid forty sous for attending the meetings of the sections.

Out of hatred to this party, and for the purpose of opposing it, another was formed, which in fact was no other than a revival. It comprehended all those who had suffered or kept silence during the rule of terror, and who thought that the moment had arrived for rousing themselves and for directing in their turn the progress of the revolution. We have seen, while we were upon the subject of the discharges, that the relatives of the prisoners or of the victims again made their appearance in the sections, and there bestirred themselves either to cause the prisons to be thrown open, or to denounce and punish the revolutionary committees. The new progress of the convention, those reforms already begun, increased the hopes and the courage of these first opponents. They belonged to all those classes that had been sufferers, whatever were their rank, but particularly to the trading classes, to the bourgeoisie, to that industrious, opulent, and moderate *tiers-état*, which, as having been monarchical and constitutional with the constituents, and republican with the Girondists, were absolutely lost sight of since the 31st of May, and had been exposed to persecutions of every description. In its ranks were concealed the now very rare relics of a nobility, who dared not as yet complain of their abasement, but which complained of the rights of humanity violated in their order, and also some partisans of royalty, creatures or agents of the old court, who had not ceased to raise obstacles to the revolution, by throwing themselves among all the rising oppositions, whatever might be their system and character. It was, as usual, the young men of these different classes who declared themselves with the greatest warmth and energy, for youth is always the first to rise against an oppressive sway. They filled the sections, the Palais Royal, and all places of public resort, and expressed their opinion against whom they termed the Terrorists in the most energetic manner. They professed the noblest motives of action. Some of them had seen their families persecuted, others were afraid lest they should some day see their own persecuted, if the reign of terror were re-established, and they swore to oppose it with all their might. But the secret of the opposition of many of them lay in the military requisition; some had escaped it by concealing themselves; others had left the armies on hearing of the 9th Thermidor, to these were to be added the writers, who had been latterly persecuted, and were always as ready as the young to join in any opposition; they were already filling newspapers and pamphlets with violent diatribes against the system of terror.

The two parties declared themselves in the warmest and most hostile manner, upon the modifications applied by the convention to the revolutionary

system. The Jacobins and the Clubbists cried out against the aristocracy. They complained of the committee of general safety, which discharged the counter-revolutionists, and of the press, of which a cruel use was already made against those who had saved France. The measure which wounded them most was the general purification of all the authorities. They did not venture precisely to find fault with the renewal of the individuals, for that would have been to avow motives of too personal a description, but they inveighed against the mode of re-election. They asserted, that the right of the people to choose their magistrates should be restored; that the appointment of the members of the municipalities, of the districts, of the revolutionary committees, by the deputies on mission, was an undue arrogation of power; that to reduce the sections to one sitting the decade, was in fact to violate the right of the citizens to assemble for the purpose of deliberating on public affairs. These complaints were inconsistent with the principle of the revolutionary government, which forbade any elections till the peace; but parties do not care much about inconsistencies when their interest is at stake; the revolutionists knew that a popular election would have brought them back to their posts.

The tradesmen in the sections, the young men at the Palais Royal and in places of public resort, and the writers in the newspapers, loudly demanded the unlimited freedom of the press, made complaints that they still observed, in the existing committees, and in the administration, too many agents of the late dictatorship; they already ventured to present petitions against the representatives who had fulfilled certain missions; they vilified all the services which had been rendered, and began to abuse the convention itself. Tallien, who, in his quality of principal Thermidorian, considered himself as peculiarly responsible for the new impression that had been given to affairs, would have wished that the turn things had taken were steady, without wavering in one sense or the other. In a speech full of subtle distinctions between the rule of terror and the revolutionary government, from which it was to be collected, that without resorting to systematic cruelty, it was, nevertheless, necessary to retain sufficient energy, Tallien proposed to declare, that the revolutionary government was confirmed; that, consequently, the primary assemblies ought not to be convoked for the purpose of new elections; he also proposed to declare, that all the means of terror were prescribed, and that proceedings directed against such writers as had freely expressed their opinions should be considered as means of terror.

These propositions, which presented no precise measure, and which were merely a confession of faith of the Thermidorians who wanted to place themselves between the two parties without favouring either, were referred to the three committees of public welfare, general safety, and legislation, to which every thing that related to those questions was referred.

These means, however, had not for their object the tranquillizing of party feeling. They continued to utter invectives against one another with the same violence; and what peculiarly contributed to increase the general uneasiness, and to multiply the subjects of complaint and accusation, was the financial situation of France, which was more deplorable perhaps than it had ever yet been at the most calamitous epochs of the Revolution.

Notwithstanding the victories of the republic, the assignats had experienced a rapid fall, and in trade did not count at more than a sixth or an eighth of their nominal value; it was this that produced a frightful confusion in every description of exchange, and rendered the *maximum* more impracticable and more vexatious than ever. It evidently was no longer the want of confidence that depreciated the assignats, for no one could now entertain any fear for the existence of the republic; but it was their excessive regularly increasing issue in exact proportion to their fall. The taxes, collected with difficulty, and paid in paper, furnished scarcely a fourth or a fifth of what the republic required monthly for the extraordinary expenses of the war, which the government was obliged to supply by fresh issues. So, since the preceding year, the quantity of assignats in circulation, which it had hoped to reduce by the means of various combinations to the extent of two thousand millions, had, on the contrary, risen to four thousand six hundred millions.

To this excessive accumulation of paper-money, and the depreciation which ensued thereon, were added all the calamities resulting either from the war, or from the unheard-of measures which it had called into operation. It will be recollected, that in order to establish a forced relation between the nominal value of the assignats and merchandize, the public had desired the law of the *maximum*, which regulated the prices of all commodities, and did not allow the dealers to raise them in direct proportion to the depreciation of the paper; it will also be recollected, that to these measures had been added the system of *requisitions*, which gave to the representatives or to the agents of the administration power to forcibly purvey all the commodities necessary for the armies and the great communes, paying for them in assignats at the rate fixed by the *maximum*. These measures had certainly saved France, but they had also introduced extraordinary derangement into commercial relations and the current circulation.

We have already seen what were the principal inconveniences of the *maximum*; the establishment of two markets, the one public, in which the dealers exposed only their inferior goods and in the least possible quantity; the other clandestine, in which they sold all their best commodities for money and at an unrestricted price; a general hoarding of produce, which the farmers contrived to withdraw from the utmost vigilance that could be exerted by the agents authorized to make the requisitions; lastly, derangement and stagnation in manufactures, because the makers could not receive back, by the price at which their manufactures were assessed, the bare prime cost. All these inconveniences of a twofold system of trade, the hoarding of articles of ordinary consumption, and the check upon manufactures, had kept constantly increasing. There were in every place two systems of commerce established, the one public and insufficient, the other secret and usurious. There were two qualities of bread, two qualities of meat, two qualities of every thing; one for the rich, who could pay in money, or

exceed the *maximum*; the other for the poor man, the mechanic and the pensioner, who could not pay more than the nominal value of the assignat. The farmers became every day more astute in withdrawing their produce; they made false declarations; they did not thresh their corn, and pretended that hands were scarce,—a want that was really felt, for the war had absorbed more than fifteen hundred thousand men; they excused themselves upon the score of the bad weather, which in point of fact had not turned out so favorable as had been expected in the early part of the year, when at the *fête* of the Supreme Being, thanks had been offered up to heaven for the victories of the republic and the abundance of the crops. As for the manufacturers, they had entirely stopped work. We have seen, that in the preceding year, the law, in order that it should not press hard upon the shopkeepers, had been obliged to recur to the original manufacturers, and to fix the prices of goods at the very place of manufacture, with the mere addition of the cost of carriage; but this law in its turn had become harsh in its operations. The raw material and workmanship having, like every thing else, universally risen in price, the manufacturers could no longer secure the return of the prime cost, and had stopped work. It was the same with the merchants. The freight of India goods, for example, had risen from 150 to 400 francs per ton; insurances from 5 and 6 per cent, to 50 and 60. The great merchants could no longer dispose of produce when imported at the price fixed by the *maximum*, and they also declined to export. As we have elsewhere remarked, in forcing one price, all must have been forced; but that was impossible.

Time had disclosed other inconveniences peculiar to the *maximum*. The price of corn had been fixed in an uniform manner throughout all France. But as the production of corn varied both in respect of its cost and its abundance in various provinces, the legal rate did not regard the relative value in each locality. The power left to the municipalities to fix the prices of all commodities, brought about another kind of confusion. When commodities were scarce in one commune, the authorities raised their price; goods were then brought thither to the prejudice of the neighbouring communes; so that there was sometimes a glut in one place and scarcity in another, just as the regulators of the tariff pleased; and the operations of commerce, instead of being regular and natural, were capricious, unequal, and convulsive.

The results of the forced requisitions were still more mischievous. Requisitions were resorted to for serving the armies with provisions, for furnishing the great manufactories of arms and the arsenals with what they needed, for provisioning the great communes, and sometimes for supplying manufacturers with such materials as they required. It was the representatives, the commissioners with the armies, and the agents of the commission of trade and provisions, who were empowered to make forced requisitions. In the pressing moment of danger, requisitions were made with hurry and confusion. It frequently occurred that they crossed one another in their subject of forced purveyance, and that the party served with the requisition, knew not whom he was to furnish. The requisitions were almost always unlimited. Sometimes the whole of a commodity in a commune or a department was laid under requisition. Then the farmers or the dealers could no longer sell, except to the agents of the republic. Trade became interrupted, the subject of the requisition lay for a long time without being taken away or paid for, and its facility of disposal was stopped. In the confusion resulting from the emergency, the distances were not taken into consideration, and that department which might be the most remote from the commune or the army which it was meant to supply, was laid under requisition; it was in this that the means of transit had extraordinarily increased. Many rivers and canals were deprived of water by an extraordinary drought. Wheel-carriage was all that was left, and agriculture was deprived of its horses to draw the wains. This extraordinary demand, coupled with a forced levy of forty-four thousand horses for the army, had made them very scarce, and almost exhausted the means of carriage. In consequence of these ill calculated and frequently useless movements, enormous quantities of articles of subsistence or other commodities were accumulated in the public magazines, heaped together without care, and exposed to all sorts of peculation. The cattle obtained by the republic were badly fed; they arrived in a lean state at the slaughter houses, and hence arose a scarcity of fatty substances, suet, tallow, &c. To insufficient means of transit were therefore added waste, and frequently the most mischievous frauds. Corrupt factors secretly sold at the highest rate commodities which they had obtained at the *maximum* by means of requisitions. This fraud was also practised by dealers and manufacturers, who having solicited an order of requisition for the purpose of supplying themselves, subsequently sold at the current price what they had obtained at the *maximum*.

These different causes, coupled with the effects of the continental and maritime war, had reduced commerce to a deplorable state. There was no longer any communication with the colonies, which were rendered nearly inaccessible by the English cruisers, and almost all of them ravaged by war. The principal of our colonies, Saint-Domingo, was subjected to fire and sword by the different parties who disputed its possession. This combination of circumstances already rendered external communications almost impracticable. Another revolutionary measure had also lent its aid in bringing about this state of isolation; this was the sequestration directed against the property of foreigners with whose nation France was at war. The reader will call to mind that the convention, in ordering this sequestration, had intended to put a stop to the jobbing in foreign paper, and to prevent capitalists from shunning the assignats and investing their capital on bills of exchange on Frankfort, Amsterdam, London, and other places. The seizure of the securities that the Spaniards, German, Dutch, and English, held against France, had provoked a similar measure on the part of the European powers, and all circulation of negotiable securities between France and Europe had ceased. There no longer existed any relations with the neutral countries, the Levant, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, and the United States; but the commission of trade

and provisions had availed itself of them, for the purpose of procuring corn, iron, and various articles necessary for the navy. For this purpose the commission had put all the paper under requisition, and had given the French bankers the amount in assignats, and made use of it in Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and America, to pay for the corn and the other commodities which it purchased.

The entire trade of France was therefore confined to the supplies which the government obtained in foreign countries by means of the securities forcibly taken by the requisition from the French bankers. Scarcely any commodities brought by free trade reached the French ports; and when they did, they were immediately laid under requisition, which, as we have just shown, utterly discouraged the merchants, who had paid enormously for freight and insurance, and were obliged to sell at the *maximum*. The only commodities that were at all plentiful in the ports were those derivable from prizes from the enemy. But some were withdrawn from circulation by requisitions, others by the prohibitions issued against the produce of hostile nations. Nantes and Bordeaux, already ravaged by civil war, were reduced by this falling off of trade to absolute stagnation and to extreme distress. Marseilles, which formerly subsisted by its intercourse with the Levant, saw its port blockaded by the English, its principal merchants dispersed by the system of terror, its soap-manufacture destroyed or transferred to Italy; so that all its trade now consisted in a few disadvantageous exchanges with the Genoese. The towns in the interior were not in a less deplorable state. Nîmes had ceased to furnish her silks, which she formerly exported to the amount of twenty millions. The opulent city of Lyons, demolished by bombs and mining explosions, now lay in ruins, and no longer manufactured those rich tissued stuffs with which it formerly supplied commerce to the amount of more than sixty millions. A decree, which had intercepted the goods intended for the rebel communes, had detained a considerable quantity in the neighbourhood of Lyons, of which one portion must necessarily have remained in that city, and the other have passed through it on its way to the numerous points to which the southern road leads. The towns of Châlons, Mâcon, and Valence, had availed themselves of this decree to intercept the goods travelling along that much frequented road. The manufacture of Sedan had been obliged to temporarily abandon the manufacture of fine cloths, so as to be solely occupied in the manufacture of cloth for the troops; and the principal manufacturers were moreover prosecuted as accomplices of the movement planned by Lafayette after the 10th of August. The departments of the North, the Pas-de-Calais, the Somme, and the Aisne, deriving their opulence from the cultivation of flax and hemp, had been entirely ravaged by the war. Towards the west, in the unfortunate La Vendée, more than six hundred square leagues had been wholly laid waste by fire and sword. The lands were partly forsaken, and numbers of cattle roved about at random, without pasture, and without shelter. Lastly, wherever particular misfortune had not aggravated the general calamities, the war had exceedingly thinned the number of hands, and terror with some and a political bias, in regard to others, had either withdrawn from, or rendered a considerable number of laborious citizens disgusted with labour. Many indeed preferred the clubs, the municipal councils, the sections, where they received forty sous for making a stir and exciting themselves, instead of attending to their workshops and fields.

Hence arose confusion in the markets; scarcity of the necessaries of life; interruption in manufactures as the effect of the *maximum*; injudicious removals, useless accumulations, and waste of commodities; exhaustion of the means of conveyance, owing to the requisitions; interruption of communication with all the neighbouring nations, in consequence of the war; maritime blockade, and the sequestration of foreigners' effects; devastation of manufacturing towns and of several agricultural districts by civil war; want of hands, occasioned by the requisition; idleness induced by the predilection contracted for political life:—such is the picture presented by France, saved from the sword of the foreign enemy, but exhausted for a moment by the unprecedented efforts that had been required of her.

Let the reader figure to himself two parties fighting with each other after the 9th Thermidor, whereof one was attaching itself to revolutionary means, as indispensable, and as desirous of prolonging for an indefinite period a state of things purely transitory; and the other irritated at the inevitable evils of an extraordinary organization, forgetting the services rendered by that organization, and desiring its abolition as being atrocious; let him figure to himself two parties of this nature contending with each other, and he will readily conceive how many subjects of reciprocal accusation they would find in the state of France. The Jacobins complained of the relaxation of the laws, of the violation of the *maximum* by the farmers, the shopkeepers, and the rich traders, of the inefficient execution of the laws against stockjobbing, and of the depreciation of the assignats; they consequently renewed the outcry of the Hébertists against the rich, the monopolizers, and the stockjobbers. Their adversaries, on the contrary, venturing for the first time to attack the revolutionary measures, raised an outcry against the excessive issue of the assignats, against the iniquities of the *maximum*, against the tyranny of the requisitions, against the calamities inflicted upon Lyons, Sedan, Nantes, and Bourdeaux, and lastly, against the prohibitions and impediments of every description which paralyzed and ruined commerce. These were, together with the liberty of the press and the mode of nomination of the public functionaries, the usual topics of the petitions of the clubs or of the sections. All remonstrances in respect hereof were referred to the committees of public welfare, of finances, and of commerce, in order to report thereupon and impart their views.

Two parties were thus arrayed against each other, seeking and finding in what had been done, and in what was yet doing, continual subjects of attack and recrimination. All that had taken place, were it good or evil, was imputed to the members of the old committees, who were made the butt of every attack by the authors of the reaction. Although they had contributed to overthrow Robespierre, it was alleged that they had quar-

An accusation made against the former committees is declared scandalous by the convention.

relled to satisfy their own ambition, and for a share in the system of tyranny, but that at bottom they were of the same opinions, that they possessed the same principles, and meant to continue the same system for their own advantage. Among the Thermidorians was Lecointre (of Versailles), a man of violent and indiscreet habits, who expressed himself with an imprudence by no means approved of by his colleagues. He had formed the design of denouncing Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, members of the old committee of public welfare, as also David, Vadier, Amar, and Vouland, of the committee of general safety, as accomplices and *continuators* of Robespierre's system. He could not, and durst not, prefer the same charge against Carnot, Prieur (of the Côte-d'Or), and Robert Lindet, whom public opinion entirely distinguished from their colleagues, and who had the reputation of being exclusively occupied in those matters to which the salvation of France had been attributed. He did not venture to attack further than this the members of the committee of general safety, because they were not all alike condemned by public opinion. He communicated his design to Tallien and Legendre, who endeavoured to dissuade him from it. He nevertheless persisted in its execution, and at the sitting of the 12th Fructidor (August 29th), he presented twenty-six articles of accusation against the members of the former committees. These twenty-six articles were, in point of fact, nothing more than vague imputations of their having been accomplices in the system of terror with which Robespierre had oppressed the convention and France; of having contributed to the arbitrary acts of the two committees; of having signed the orders of proscription; of having turned a deaf ear to all the remonstrances of citizens unjustly prosecuted; of having greatly contributed to the death of Danton; of having defended the law of the 22nd Prairial; of having knowingly permitted the convention to remain in ignorance that this law was not the work of the committee; of not having denounced Robespierre when he seceded from the committee of public welfare; lastly, of not having done any thing on the 8th, 9th, and 10th Thermidor, to protect the convention from the designs of the conspirators.

As soon as Lecointre had finished reading these twenty-six articles, Goujon, deputy of the Ain, a young, sincere, and fervent republican, and also a disinterested *Mountaineer*, for he had taken no part in those acts for which the late government was reproached, Goujon rose and addressed the assembly with every demonstration of intense mortification. "I am deeply afflicted," said he, "when I see how coolly and gingerly folks come hither to sow the seeds of dissension, and to propose the ruin of the country. Sometimes they come to solicit you to brand, by the appellation of the system of terror, all that has been done for a year past; at others they propose that you should accuse men who have rendered great services to the revolution. They may be guilty, for aught I know. I was with the armies, and therefore can give no opinion; but if I had possessed documents criminating members of the convention, I would not have produced them or have brought them here without great pain. But, on the contrary, pray observe how very coolly some can plunge the dagger into the bosom of men valuable to the country for their important services! Observe, also, that the charges preferred are directed also against the convention herself. Yes, it is the convention that is accused. It is the French people who are brought to trial, since both submitted to the tyranny of the infamous Robespierre. J. Debry told you just now that it is the aristocrats who bring forward or suggest all these propositions."—"And the robbers," added some voices.—"I move," resumed Goujon, "that the discussion instantly cease." Many deputies opposed this motion. Billaud-Varennes darted forward to the tribune, and urgently solicited that the discussion should be continued. "Most assuredly," said he, "if the facts alleged be proved, we are great culprits, and our heads ought to fall. But we defy Lecointre to prove them. Ever since the fall of the tyrant, we are made the butt of every intriguer, and we declare that life is of no value to us, if they are to carry every thing their own way." Billaud proceeded, and stated that he and his colleagues had for a long time contemplated the 9th Thermidor; that, if they deferred it, it was because circumstances compelled them so to do; that they had been the first to denounce Robespierre, and to tear from him the mask with which he concealed himself; that, if they made the death of Danton a crime, he would charge himself first and foremost with the guilt of it; that Danton was an accomplice of Robespierre's, that he was the rallying point of all the counter-revolutionists, and, if he had lived, liberty would have been undone. "For some time past," exclaimed Billaud, "we have seen intriguers bestirring themselves, robbers..." "The word is uttered," cried Bourdon, interrupting him; "it must be proved."—"I undertake to prove it for one," said Duhem. "We will prove it for others," added several voices of the Mountain. This was the charge which the Mountaineers were always ready to prefer against the friends of Danton, almost all of whom had become Thermidorians. Billaud, who, amidst this tumult and these interruptions had not quitted the tribune, demanded the institution of proceedings, that the guilty might be known. Cambon succeeded him, and said that the snare laid for the convention should be avoided; that the aristocrats wanted to force her to dishonour herself by bringing some of her members into disrepute; that if the committees were guilty, she was also guilty; "and the whole nation along with her," added Bourdon (of the Oise). Amidst this tumult, Vadier appeared in the tribune with a pistol in his hand, saying that he would not survive the calumny, if they did not allow him to exculpate himself. Several members surrounded him, and obliged him to descend. Thuriot, the president, declared that he would break up the sitting if the tumult did not abate. Duhem and Amar desired the discussion to be continued, as a duty they owed to the inculpated members. Thuriot, one of the warmest Thermidorians, but who for all that was a zealous Mountaineer, saw with concern that such questions were agitated. He addressed the assembly from his chair, and said, "On one hand the public interest requires that such a discussion as this should instantly cease; on the other, the interest of the inculpated persons requires that it should continue; let us reconcile both one and the other by passing

to the order of the day on Lecointre's proposition, and declaring that the assembly has received this proposal with the deepest indignation." The assembly eagerly adopted the suggestion of Thuriot, and passed to the order of the day, by thus condemning Lecointre's motion.

All those who were sincerely attached to their country had witnessed this discussion with the deepest concern. How, in fact, was it possible to revert to the past, to distinguish the evil from the good, and to discern to whom was to be imputed the tyranny they had undergone? How ascertain the part of Robespierre and of the committees who had divided between themselves the supreme power, that of the convention who had patiently endured them, and lastly, that of the nation, who had tolerated alike the convention, and the committees, and Robespierre? Besides all this, how was that tyranny to be tried? Was it a crime of ambition, or the energetic and unreflecting action of men desirous of saving their cause at any price, and hoodwinking themselves as to the means they adopted? How distinguish, in this confused action, the exact proportion of cruelty, ambition, mistaken zeal, and sincere and energetic patriotism? To distinguish between so many obscurities, to judge the innermost thoughts of so many men, was impossible. It was necessary to forget the past, to receive from the hands of those who had just been excluded from power, France as saved, to regulate disorderly movements, to soften too cruel laws, and to consider that in politics it is far better to repair evils than to avenge them.

Such were the sentiments of discreet men. The enemies of the revolution manifested the highest satisfaction in the course Lecointre had taken; and on perceiving that the discussion was closed, they gave out that the convention was afraid, and had not dared to grapple with questions too perilous for her consideration. On the contrary, the Jacobins and the Mountaineers, still fully possessed with their fanaticism, and in no wise disposed to disavow the system of terror, did not shrink from the discussion, and were enraged at its termination. The next day, the 13th Fructidor (30th August), a great number of the Mountaineers got up, saying that the president had on the preceding day taken the assembly by surprise in inducing it to close the discussion; that he had expressed his sentiments without quitting the chair; that as president he had no opinion to give; that the closing of the discussion was an injustice; that it was a duty owing to the inculpated members, to the convention itself, and to the revolution, to freely enter into a discussion which the patriots had no reason to dread. To no purpose did the Thermidorians, Legendre, Tallien, and others, who were accused of having prompted Lecointre, move that the discussion should be stopped. The assembly, who had not lost the habit of paying deference and giving way to the Mountain, consented to annul its vote of the preceding day and opened the lists. Lecointre was called to the tribune to read his twenty-six articles, and to support them by documentary evidence.

Lecointre had not been able to collect the documents in support of this singular procedure, for it would have been necessary to procure evidence of what had passed in the privacy of the committees, so as to enable any one to judge in how great a degree the accused members had participated in what was called the tyranny of Robespierre. On each article Lecointre could only appeal to public notoriety, such speeches delivered at the Jacobins or in the assembly, or the originals of some orders of arrest, which of themselves proved nothing. At every new grievance alleged, the furious Mountaineers cried, *The documents! the documents!* and they would not let him speak without producing written proofs. Lecointre, in most cases being utterly incapable of furnishing any, appealed to the recollection of the assembly, asking if it had not always deemed Billaud, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, to have acted in perfect unison with Robespierre. But this proof, the only possible one, showed the absurdity of such a mode of trial. With such proofs it would have been demonstrated that the convention was an accomplice of the committee, and France of the convention. The Mountaineers would not suffer Lecointre to finish. "Thou art a calumniator," said they, and they compelled him to proceed to another alleged grievance. Scarcely had he read the next before they again roared out, *The documents! the documents!* and as Lecointre had none to produce, they went on shouting, *Go on with the next!* In this manner he went on to the twenty-sixth article, without being able to prove what he advanced. He had but one reason to urge, namely, that the trial was a political one, and did not admit of the ordinary form of discussion, to which it might fairly have been replied, that it was highly impolitic to institute such an investigation. After a long and stormy sitting, the convention declared his accusation scandalous and vexatious, and thus restored the former committees to public estimation. This scene had imparted to the Mountain all its previous energy, and to the convention some of its former deference for the Mountain. Billaud-Varennes, and Collot-d'Herbois, however, gave in their resignations as members of the committee of public welfare. Barrère went out by way of rotation. Tallien, on his part, voluntarily resigned; and the four were succeeded by Delmas, Merlin, (of Douai), Cochon, and Fourcroy. Thus all that were left of the old members of the great committee of public welfare were Carnot, Prieur (of the Côte-d'Or), and Robert Lindet. At the committee of general safety, the operation of renewal by a fourth part also took place. Elie Lacoste, Vouland, Vadier, and Moses Bayle went out. They were deficient in their full number, as David, Jagot, and Laviecomterie, had been previously excluded by a decision of the assembly; these seven members were succeeded by Bourdon (of the Oise), Colombelle, Meaulle, Clauzel, Mathieu, Mon-Mayan, and Lesage-Senault.

An unforeseen and purely accidental event increased the agitation which prevailed. The powder mills of Grenelle took fire and blew up. This sudden and frightful explosion filled Paris with consternation, and it was believed to be the effect of a new conspiracy. The aristocrats were immediately accused, and the aristocrats in their turn accused the Jacobins. New attacks took place in the tribune between the two parties, without bringing any thing to light. To this event succeeded another. In the evening of the 23rd Fructidor (September the 9th), Tallien was returning home when a man

wrapped up in a great coat rushed upon him, saying, "I was waiting for thee—thou shalt not escape me." At the same moment, being close to him, fired a pistol and wounded him in the shoulder. Next day there was a fresh uproar in Paris; it was said that people could no longer hope for quiet; that two parties, inveterately hostile to each other, had sworn perpetually to disturb the republic. Some attributed the attempt on the life of Tallien to the Jacobins, others to the aristocrats, while others again went so far as to say that Tallien, imitating the example of Grange-Neuve before the 10th of August, had procured himself to be wounded in the shoulder to furnish matter of accusation against the Jacobins, and thus have an opportunity of calling for their dissolution. Legendre, Merlin (of Thionville), and other friends of Tallien rushed with vehemence to the tribune, and maintained that the crime of the preceding night was the work of the Jacobins. "Tallien," said they, "has not deserted the cause of the revolution; nevertheless some madmen allege that he has gone over to the moderatists and the aristocrats. It cannot therefore be the latter who could have been possessed with the idea of assassinating him, it can be none else than those madmen who accuse him, that is to say the Jacobins. Merlin denounced their last sitting, and repeated this expression of Duhem: "*The toads of the fen* (*marais*) *are raising their head; so much the better, it will be the easier to cut off.* Merlin, with his accustomed boldness, called for the dissolution of that celebrated club, who had rendered, he said, the greatest services, who had powerfully contributed to overturn the throne, but who, no longer having any throne to overturn, now wanted to overturn the convention itself. Merlin's conclusions were not acquiesced in, but as usual, the facts were referred to the competent committees for them to report upon. References of this kind had already been made upon all those questions which divided the two parties. Reports had been called for upon the question of the press, upon the assignats, upon the *maximum*, upon the requisitions, upon commercial restrictions, and in short, upon every thing that had become a subject of controversy and division. It was then desired that all these reports should be consolidated, and the committee of public welfare was directed to present a general report on the present state of the republic. The preparation of this report was committed to Robert Lindet, the member that possessed the greatest intelligence in respect of the actual state of things, because he belonged to the old committees, and was the most disinterested in those questions, because he had been exclusively engaged in serving his country by undertaking the laborious department of supplies and conveyance. The day for hearing this report read was appointed for the fourth *sans-culottide* * of the year II. (20th of Sept. 1794.)

This report and the decrees which were to be grounded thereupon were impatiently looked for, and considerable agitation prevailed during this interval. It was at the garden of the Palais Royal that the young men of Paris in league against the Jacobins were accustomed to meet. There it was that they read the newspapers and pamphlets that appeared in great number against the late revolutionary system, sold by the booksellers in the galleries. They frequently formed themselves in small companies there, and from thence they went to disturb the sitting of the Jacobins. On the second *sans-culottide*, one of these small companies had formed; it was composed of those young men who, to distinguish themselves from the Jacobins, dressed well, wore high cravats, and were on that account called *Muscadins* †. It was in one of these groups that a party present said that if any thing happened, they ought to meet together at the convention, and that the Jacobins were intriguers and villains. A Jacobin would have replied. A quarrel ensued; one party shouted, *The convention for ever! Down with the Jacobins! Down with Robespierre's tail!* the other party cried, *Down with the aristocrats and the Muscadins! The convention and the Jacobins for ever!* The tumult soon increased. The Jacobin who had spoken, and the small number of those who supported him, were severely handled; the guard hastened to the spot, dispersed the assemblage, which was already very considerable, and prevented a general engagement.

On the next day but one, being that fixed for the presentation of the report of the three committees of public welfare, legislation, and general safety, Robert Lindet was at length heard. He had to draw a sad description of France. Having traced the successive career of the factions and the progress of Robespierre's power to his fall, he demonstrated the existence of two parties, the one composed of ardent patriots, who had their fears for the revolution and for themselves; and the other of weeping families, whose relations had been sacrificed or were still suffering in prison. "Perturbed spirits," said Lindet, "imagine that the government is likely to be deficient in energy; they employ all possible means to propagate their opinion and their apprehensions. They send deputations and addresses to the convention. These fears are chimerical. In your hands the government will retain all its strength. Can the patriots, can the public functionaries ever suppose that the services that they have rendered can be effaced from memory! What courage must they not have demonstrated in accepting and discharging perilous duties! But now France recalls them to their occupations and their professions, which they have too long forsaken. They know that their functions were temporary; that power retained too long by the same hands becomes a subject of uneasiness; and they ought not to be afraid that France will ever abandon them to resentment and malice."

Lindet next proceeding to consider the situation of the party of those who had suffered, continued by saying, "Restore those to their liberty whom hatred, malice, and the misdirection of public functionaries, and the fury of the late conspirators, have caused to be thrown *en masse* into the lock-up houses; at once discharge from custody the labourers, the mercantile men, the relatives of the young heroes who are defending the country. The arts have been persecuted; yet it is by them that you have been taught to forge the thunderbolt; it is by them that the art of the Mongolfiers has served

* *Ante*, p. 378, col. 2.

* For an explanation of this term. Vide *ante*, p. 466, col. 1, note. *Trans.*

to discover the march of the armies; it is by them that metals are prepared and purified, that hides are tanned and rendered fit for use in a week. Protect them, and relieve them. Many serviceable men are still inmates of prisons."

Robert Lindet then drew a picture of the agricultural and commercial state of France. He demonstrated the calamities resulting from the assignats, the *maximum*, the requisitions, the interruption of the communications with foreign countries. "Labour," said he, "has lost much of its activity, in the first place, because fifteen hundred thousand men have been sent off to the frontiers, while a multitude of others have devoted themselves to civil war; and in the next place, because the minds of men distracted by political passions, have been diverted from their habitual occupations. There are new lands brought into cultivation, but many also are neglected. The corn is not thrashed, the wool is not spun, the growers neither steep their flax, or peel and beat their hemp. Let us endeavour to repair evils so numerous and so diversified. Let us restore peace to the great maritime and manufacturing cities. Put an end to the demolition of Lyons. With peace, discretion, and oblivion of what is past, the Nantese, the Bordelais, the Marseillais and the Lyonnese will resume their occupations. Let us repeal the laws so inimical to commerce; let us restore to merchandise its course of traffic; let us permit exportation, that we may be able to import what we want. Let the towns and the departments cease to complain of the government, who they say has exhausted their resources in articles of subsistence, who has not observed equitable arrangements, but has imposed the burden of requisitions in an unequal manner. O that those who thus complain could cast their eyes on the vivid relations, the declarations and the addresses of their fellow citizens of other districts. They would there see the same complaints, the same remonstrances, the same energy inspired by the feeling of the same wants. Let us recall peace of mind and labour to the country; let us bring back the artisans to their workshops, the agriculturists to their fields. But above all, added Lindet, let us strive to bring back union and confidence among us. Let us cease to reproach one another with our calamities and our faults. Have we always been, could we always be, what in fact we wished to be? We have all started in the same career; some have fought with courage and with judgment; others have dashed themselves, in their boiling ardour, against those very obstacles they purposed to destroy and overthrow. Who would think of questioning us, and calling us to account for those movements it is impossible to foresee and to direct! The revolution is accomplished! It is the work of all! Show me the generals, the soldiers, that have barely done no more in war than what they ought to have done, and have known how to stop at that point where cool and calm reason would have suggested that they should stop! Were we not in a state of war with numerous and most dreadful enemies! Have not some reverses inflamed our courage and roused our indignation! What has happened to us is nothing else but what happens to all men thrown to an infinite distance out of the ordinary course of life."

This report, so judicious, so impartial, and so perfect, was received with applause. Every one approved of the sentiments which it contained, and it had been much to be desired that all had been capable of sharing them. Lindet then proposed a series of decrees, which were not less favourably received than his report, and immediatdly adopted.

By the first decree, the committee of general safety and the representatives on mission were empowered to examine the petitions of traders, labourers, artists, fathers and mothers of citizens then in the armies, who were either themselves or had relatives in prison. By a second decree, the municipalities and the committees of sections were bound to declare the grounds of their refusal, when they withheld certificates of civism. This was an act of justice rendered to those who were incessantly complaining of the system of terror, and dreading its revival. A third decree directed the preparation of a moral instruction, tending to restore a love of industry and the laws, to enlighten the citizens with respect to the principal events of the revolution, and appointed to be read to the people on the *fêtes* of the decadis. A fourth decree ordered the plan of a normal school for training young professors, with a view to the diffusion of education and knowledge throughout France.

To these decrees were added several others, enjoining the committees of finances and of commerce with the least possible delay to investigate,—

1. The advantages of the free exportation of articles of luxury, on condition of causing the importation into France of the same amount in merchandise of every description.

2. The advantages or disadvantages of the free exportation of the surplus necessaries of life, upon the condition of a return and of various formalities.

3. The most advantageous means of throwing into commerce the commodities appropriated from communes in rebellion, and retained under the government seal.

4. Lastly, the claims of the merchants who, by virtue of the law of sequestration, were obliged to deposit in the district chests the sums which they owed to the foreigners with whom France was at war.

We see that these decrees were intended to give satisfaction to those who complained of having been persecuted, and that they comprehended some of the measures capable of ameliorating the state of commerce. The Jacobin party alone had no decree peculiar to itself, but none was required. It had not been either prosecuted or imprisoned; it had merely been deprived of power; it therefore had no reparation to ask for. All that could be done was to assure it with regard to the intentions of government, and Lindet's report was framed and written with this object in view. Accordingly, the effect of this report and of the decrees which accompanied it acted favourably with respect to the prevailing parties.

The public mind appeared to be somewhat tranquillized. On the following day, the last of the year, and the fifth sans-culottide of the year II. (September 21, 1794), the *fête* which had long been settled for placing Marat in the Pantheon and excluding Mirabeau therefrom, was celebrated. It was at this time no longer in consistence with

the state of public opinion and feeling. Marat was no longer so much a saint, or was Mirabeau so great a sinner, as that so many honours should be awarded to the sanguinary apostle of terror, and so much ignominy inflicted on the greatest orator of the revolution; but in order not to alarm the Mountain, and to avoid the appearance of too speedy a reaction, the *fête* was not countermanded. On the appointed day, the remains of Marat were conveyed with pomp to the Pantheon, and those of Mirabeau were ignominiously withdrawn by a side door.

Thus the supreme power, in its ebb from the Jacobins and the Mountaineers, was now possessed by the partisans of Danton and of Camille-Desmoulins; in short, by the *indulgents*, who now constituted the Thermidorians. These latter, however, while they strove to repair the evils produced by the revolution, while they released the suspected, and endeavoured to restore some liberty and some security to commerce, still kept on terms of respect and attention with the Mountain, whom they had ousted, at the very time they were awarding to Marat the place they had so unceremoniously taken from Mirabeau.

CHAPTER XXIV.

CONTINUATION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS—SURRENDER OF CONDÉ, VALENCIENNES, LANDRECIES, AND LE QUESNOY—THE ALLIES DISCOURAGED—BATTLE OF THE OURTHE AND LA ROER.—PASSAGE OF THE MEUSE—OCCUPATION OF THE ENTIRE LINE OF THE RHINE—SITUATION OF THE ARMIES AT THE ALPS AND AT THE PYRENEES.—SUCCESS OF THE FRENCH AT ALL THESE POINTS.—STATE OF LA VENDÉE AND BRITTANY; WAR OF THE CHOUANS. PUISAYE, PRINCIPAL ROYALIST AGENT IN BRITTANY—RELATIONS OF THE ROYALIST PARTY WITH THE FRENCH PRINCES AND THE FOREIGN POWERS.—INTRIGUES IN THE INTERIOR; THE PART PLAYED BY THE EMIGRANT PRINCES.

MILITARY operations were by no means so vigorously carried on towards the end of the season. Our two great armies of the North as also the Sambre and Meuse, which had entered Brussels in Thermidor (July), and then proceeded, the one to Antwerp, the other to the Meuse, had remained a long time inactive, waiting for the reduction of the fortresses of Landrecies, Le Quesnoi, Valenciennes, and Condé, which had been lost during the preceding campaign. On the Rhine, General Michaud was employed in remodelling his army, in order to repair the check of Kaiserslautern, and awaited a reinforcement of fifteen thousand men drawn from La Vendée. The armies of the Alps and Italy having made themselves masters of the great chain, encamped on the heights of the Alps, while waiting for the approval of a plan of the invasion, proposed, it was said, by that same young officer who had decided the taking of Toulon and of the lines of Saorgio. At the eastern Pyrenees, Dugommier, after his success at Boulou, had stopped for a considerable time to reduce Collioure, and now was blockading Bellegarde. The army of the western Pyrenees was still organizing itself. This protracted inaction which marked the middle of the campaign, and which must be imputed to the important events in the interior, and to faulty combinations, might have seriously detracted from our successes, had the enemy known how to have seized the opportunity. But so much confusion prevailed among the allies, that they never thought of taking advantage of our error, which had no other effect than to retard for some short period the extraordinary run of our successes.

Nothing could demonstrate worse management than our inactivity in Belgium, in the neighbourhood of Antwerp, and on the banks of the Meuse. The surest means of accelerating the capture of the four last fortresses, would have been to drive further and further from them those large armies which could have relieved them. By taking advantage of the disorder into which the victory of Fleurus and the retreat consequent upon it, had thrown the allies, it would have been easy to have soon reached the Rhine. Unfortunately, a great ignorance yet prevailed as to the art of making the most of victory, an art the most important and the rarest of all, because it regards victory as being not so much the consequence of one successful attack, as the result of vast combinations. To accelerate the surrender of the four fortresses, the convention had issued a formidable decree, much the same as all those which followed one another from Prairial to Thermidor. Standing upon the reason that the allies occupied four French fortresses, and that every thing is allowable in order to get rid of an enemy, she decreed that if the enemy's garrisons did not surrender within twenty-four hours after they were summoned, they should be put to the sword. The garrison of Landrecies alone surrendered. The commandant of Condé returned this admirable answer, *that one nation has not a right to decree the dishonouring of another.* Le Quesnoi and Valenciennes continued to defend themselves. The committee, sensible of the injustice of such a decree, resorted to a subtlety for the purpose of evading its execution, and at the same time of sparing the convention the necessity of repealing it. It assumed that the decree, not having been notified to the commandants of the three fortresses, was as yet unknown to them. Before notifying it to them, the committee ordered general Scherer to push the works with sufficient activity, so as to make the summons more impressive, and to afford the hostile garrisons a good reason for capitulating. Valenciennes accordingly surrendered on the 12th Fructidor (August 29th); Condé and Le Quesnoi a few days afterwards. These fortresses, which had cost the allies so much during the preceding campaign, were thus recovered by us without any great exertions, and the enemy retained not a single point of our territory in the Netherlands. On the other hand, we were masters of all Belgium as far as Antwerp and the Meuse.

Moreau had just taken Sluys and returned into line; Schérer had sent Osten's brigade to Pichegru, and rejoined Jourdan with his division. Owing to this junction, the army of the north, under Pichegru, amounted to more than seventy thousand men actually under arms, and that of the Meuse, under Jourdan, to one hundred and sixteen thousand. The administration, exhausted by the efforts which it had made for the sudden equipment of these armies, was able to provide but very imperfectly for their supply. The deficiency was supplied by requisitions, conducted with as much consideration as possible, and in accordance with the utmost military forbearance. The soldiers contrived to dispense with the most necessary articles. They no longer encamped under tents, but bivouacked under the branches of trees. The officers, without appointments or paid with assignats, lived like the common soldier, ate the same bread, marched on foot like him, and with the knapsack at their back. Republican enthusiasm and victory supported these armies, the best conducted and the bravest that France ever possessed.

The allies were in a singular state of confusion. The Dutch, ill-supported by the English, and doubting their good faith, were dismayed. They formed a *cordon* before their fortresses, so as to gain time for putting them in a state of defence, an operation which ought to have been long before finished. The duke of York, as presumptuous as he was ignorant, knew not how to avail himself of his English troops, and took no decisive step. He retired towards the lower Meuse and the Rhine, extending his wings sometimes towards the Dutch, at others in the direction of the Imperialists. However by being in junction with the Dutch, he might have still had fifty thousand men at his disposal, and have attempted, on the flanks of one or the other of the armies of the north or the Meuse, one of those bold movements which General Clerfait, in the following year, and the archduke Charles, in 1796, knew so well how to execute seasonably and with such propriety, and of which a great captain has since given so many memorable examples. The Austrians, entrenched along the Meuse, from the mouth of the Röer to that of the Ourthe, were disheartened by their reverses, and in want of necessary supplies. The prince of Cobourg, whose reputation was entirely tarnished by his last campaign, had given up his command to Clerfait, of all the Austrian generals the most worthy to retain it. It was not yet too late to draw near to the duke of York, and to act *en masse* against one of the two French armies; but the Austrians thought of nothing else than protecting the Meuse. The cabinet of London, alarmed at the course events were taking, had sent envoy after envoy to excite the zeal of Prussia, to claim from her on her part the execution of the treaty of the Hague, and to induce Austria, by promises of relief, to defend with vigour the line which her troops yet occupied. A meeting of English, Dutch, and Austrian ministers and generals took place at Maestricht, and it was settled that the banks of the Meuse should be protected.

At length in the middle of Fructidor (very early in September), the French armies were again put in motion. Pichegru advanced from Antwerp towards the mouth of the rivers. The Dutch committed the oversight of separating themselves from the English. They ranged themselves to the number of twenty thousand men along Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, and Gertruydenberg, with their backs to the sea, in a position that no longer allowed them to produce any effect for the fortresses they meant to cover. The duke of York, with his English and Hanoverians, retired upon Bois-le-Duc, effecting a junction with the Dutch by a chain of posts, which the French army could take the moment it made its appearance. At Baxtel, on the bank of the Dommel, Pichegru overtook the rear-guard of the duke of York, surrounded two battalions, and cut them off. Next day, on the banks of the Aa, he fell in with general Abercromby, took some prisoners from him also, and contrived to press upon the duke of York, who hastened to cross the Meuse at Grave, under the guns of the place. In this march Pichegru had taken, by this mode of proceeding, fifteen hundred prisoners; he arrived on the banks of the Meuse on the second *sans-culottide* (the 18th September).

Meanwhile, Jourdan was advancing on his part, and put himself in readiness to cross the Meuse. The Meuse has two principal rivers which fall into it, the Ourthe, which joins it near Liege, and the Röer, which falls into it near Ruremonde. These tributary streams form two lines, dividing the country between the Meuse and the Rhine, and which must be successively carried before the latter river can be attained. The French, masters of Liege, had crossed the Meuse, and had recently disposed themselves in front of the Ourthe; they lined the Meuse from Liege to Maestricht, and the Ourthe from Liege to Comblaine-en-Pont, thus forming an angle of which Liege was the apex. Clerfait had ranged his left, in rear of the Ourthe, upon the heights of Sprimont. These heights are bordered on one side by the Ourthe, and on the other by the Ayvaille, which falls into the Ourthe. General Latour commanded the Austrians at that place. Jourdan ordered Schérer to attack the position of Sprimont on the Ayvaille side, while general Bonnet was to march thither, after crossing the Ourthe. On the second *sans-culottide* (September 18th), Schérer divided his corps into three columns, commanded by generals Marceau, Mayer, and Hacquin, and proceeded to the banks of the Ayvaille, which flows in a deep bed between two steep banks. The generals themselves set the example, plunged into the water and led their soldiers to the opposite bank, in spite of a formidable firing of artillery. Latour had continued motionless on the heights of Sprimont, preparing to fall upon the French columns as soon as they should have crossed the river. But no sooner had they climbed the steep bank, than they fell upon the position without giving Latour time to prevent them. They attacked him briskly, while general Hacquin was advancing upon his left flank, and while general Bonnet, who had crossed the Ourthe, was marching upon his rear. Latour was then obliged to decamp, and to fall back upon the imperial army.

This attack, well conceived and executed with spirit, was as honourable for the commander-in-chief as for his army. This conflict gained us thirty-six pieces of cannon, and one hundred baggage

waggons; it caused a loss to the enemy of fifteen hundred men, killed as well as wounded, and decided Clerfait to abandon the line of the Ourthe. That general, on seeing his left beaten, was in fact apprehensive lest his retreat upon Cologne should be cut off. Consequently he quitted the banks of the Meuse and the Ourthe, and fell back upon Aix-la-Chapelle.

All that was left to the Austrians was the line of the Röer. They occupied that river from Dueren and Juliers all the way from its falling into the Meuse, that is, to Ruremonde. They had ceded all that part of the course of the Meuse which is comprised between the Ourthe and the Röer, between Liege and Ruremonde; all they had left for them was no more than that which lay between Ruremonde and Grave, the point by which they connected themselves with the duke of York.

The Röer was the line which it behoved them to defend stoutly, so that they should not lose the left bank of the Rhine. Clerfait concentrated all his forces on the banks of the Röer, between Dueren, Juliers, and Linnich. He had for some time previous constructed considerable works to secure his line, he had placed his advanced corps beyond the Röer, upon the elevated plain of Aldenhoven, protected by intrenchments; he next occupied the line of the Röer and its steep banks, and was encamped behind this line with his army and a formidable train of artillery.

On the 10th Vendémiaire, year III. (October 1, 1794), Jourdan found himself facing the enemy with all his forces. He ordered general Schérer, commanding the right wing, to bear upon Dueren, crossing the Röer at all the fordable points; general Hatry was to cross nearly in the centre of the position at Altorp; also Championnet's and Marlot's divisions, supported by cavalry, were to take the elevated plain of Aldenhoven, situated in advance of the Röer, to scour the plain, to cross the water, and to mask Juliers, in order to prevent the Austrians debouching thence; General Lefèvre had orders to make himself master of Linnich, and to cross at every one of the fords to be found in that neighbourhood; lastly, Kléber, who was near the mouth of the Röer, received orders to proceed up the river to Ratem, and to cross over at that ill-defended point, for the purpose of covering the battle on the side towards Ruremonde.

Next day, the 11th Vendémiaire, the French put themselves in motion along the whole line.

One hundred thousand young republicans marched at once with an order and a precision worthy of more experienced troops. They had never yet exhibited in so great a number on the same field of battle. They advanced towards the Röer, the object of their exertions. Unfortunately, they were still remote from that place, and it was not till near mid-day that they reached it. The general, in the opinion of military men, had committed but one oversight, that of taking a point of departure too distant from the point of attack, and in not taking the whole day to approach nearer to the enemy's line. General Schérer, commanding the right, directed his brigades upon the different points of the Röer, and ordered general Hacquin to cross considerably above, at the fort of Winden, with a view to get round at the rear of the enemy's left flank. It was eleven o'clock when he made these arrangements. It took Hacquin a long time to travel the circuit marked out for him. Schérer waited for him to arrive at the point assigned before he dashed with his division into the Röer, and he thus gave Clerfait time to prepare all his means along the heights of the opposite bank. It was three o'clock; at length Schérer, who would not wait any longer, put his divisions in motion. Marceau plunged into the water with his troops, and crossed at the ford of Mirveiller; Lorges did the same, bore towards Dueren, and drove the enemy from that place after a sanguinary conflict. The Austrians abandoned Dueren for a moment; but after falling back, they returned in more considerable force. Marceau immediately threw himself into Dueren, to support Lorges's brigade at that place. Mayer, who had crossed the Röer a little above at Niederau, and had been received by a murderous fire of artillery fell back also upon Dueren. It was at that place that the action was hottest. The enemy, who as yet brought only his advanced guard into action, was formed in rear upon the heights, with sixty pieces of cannon. He lost no time in using them, and poured a shower of grape shot and balls upon the French. Our young soldiers, encouraged by the generals, stood firm. Unfortunately Hacquin did not yet make his appearance on the left flank of the enemy, a manœuvre upon which the fate of the battle was expected to depend.

At the same moment there was fighting at the centre, on the advanced elevated plain (*plateau*) of Aldenhoven. The French had got thither by using the bayonet. Their cavalry was deployed there, and received and withstood several charges. The Austrians, seeing that the Röer had been crossed above and below Aldenhoven, had abandoned that *plateau* and retired to Juliers, on the other side of the river. Championnet, who had pursued them to the very glacis, cannonaded, and was in return cannonaded by the artillery of the place. At Linnich Lefèvre had repulsed the Austrians, and joined the Röer, but having found the bridge burnt, he occupied himself in rebuilding it. At Ratem, Kléber had encountered sweeping batteries, and answered them by a heavy fire of artillery.

The main action, therefore, was on the right in the direction of Dueren, where Marceau, Lorges, and Mayer were crowded together, who were all of them awaiting Hacquin's movement. Jourdan had ordered Hatry to fall back upon Dueren, instead of making good his passage across the river at Altorp; but the passage across the water was too lengthy for this column to be of any service at the decisive point. At last, at five in the evening, Hacquin appeared at Latour's left flank. Thereupon the Austrians, seeing themselves exposed on their left to Hacquin, and that they had Lorges, Marceau, and Mayer in front of them, decided upon retreating, and drew back their left wing, the same that had been engaged at Sprimont. On their extreme right, Kléber threatened them by a bold movement. The bridge which he wanted to throw across being too short, the soldiers had demanded permission to dash through the river. Kléber, to keep up their ardour, collected all his artillery, and played upon the enemy on the opposite bank. The Imperialists were then obliged to retire at this point,

and it was not long before they quitted all the others. They abandoned the Röer, leaving eight hundred prisoners, and three thousand men wounded.

Next day, the French found Juliers evacuated, and they were able to pass the Röer at all points. Such was the important battle that won us the definitive conquest of the left bank of the Rhine. It is one of those by which general Jourdan best merited the gratitude of his country and the esteem of military men. Nevertheless the critics have censured him for not having taken a point of departure nearer to the point of attack, and for not having brought the bulk of his force to bear upon Mirveiller and Dueren.

Clerfait took the high road to Cologne; Jourdan followed him, and took possession of that town on the 15th Vendémiaire (October 6); he seized Bonne on the 29th (October 20th), Kléber accompanied Marescot to besiege Maestricht.

While Jourdan was so valiantly performing his task, and taking possession of the important line of the Rhine, Pichegru on his part was preparing to cross the Meuse, so as next to reach the Wahl, a principal branch of the Rhine, near the mouth of that river. According to what we have been just now relating, the duke of York had crossed the Meuse at Grave, leaving Bois-le-Duc to its own forces. Pichegru, before he attempted the passage of the Meuse, was to have made himself master of Bois-le-Duc. This was no easy task at this time of year, and with an insufficiency of artillery for a siege. However, the audacity of the French and the discouragement of the enemy rendered every thing possible. Fort Crèvecœur, near the Meuse, exposed to a battery seasonably directed upon a point where the enemy had believed a battery could not have been thrown up, surrendered. The artillery found there served to forward the siege of Bois-le-Duc. Five consecutive attacks daunted the governor, who surrendered the place on the 19th Vendémiaire (10th October). This unhoped-for success gave the French a firm footing, and furnished them with considerable ammunition for pushing their operations beyond the Meuse and to the bank of the Wahl.

Moreau, who formed the right, had since the victories of the Ourthe and the Röer advanced as far as Venloo. The duke of York, alarmed at this movement, had withdrawn all his troops to the other side of the Wahl, and abandoned the entire space between the Meuse and the Wahl or the Rhine. Nevertheless, perceiving that Grave (on the Meuse) would soon be left without communications and without support, he recrossed the Wahl, and undertook to defend the space comprised between those two streams. The ground, as is always the case near the mouths of great rivers, was lower than the bed of the streams; it presented extensive pastures, intersected by canals and causeways, and inundated in certain parts. General Hammerstein, stationed intermediately between the Meuse and the Wahl, had increased the difficulty of access by cutting off the roads, by covering the dykes with artillery, and throwing bridges over the canals which his army was to destroy as it retired. The duke of York, whose advanced guard he formed, was placed in the rear, on the banks of the Wahl, in the camp of Nimeguen.

On the days of the 27th and 28th Vendémiaire (October 18 and 19), Pichegru made two of his divisions cross the Meuse by a bridge of boats. The English, who were under the cannon of Nimeguen, and Hammerstein's advanced guard along the canals and dykes, were too far off to prevent this passage. The rest of the army landed on the other side, under the protection of these two divisions. On the 28th, Pichegru decided upon attacking the works that covered the intermediate space between the Meuse and the Wahl. He launched four columns, forming a mass superior to the enemy, into those pastures overflowed and intersected by canals. The French defied with extraordinary courage the fire of the artillery; they next threw themselves into the ditches up to their shoulders in water, while the sharpshooters, from the margins of the ditches, fired over their heads. The enemy retired in alarm, without thinking of any thing but saving his artillery. He sought refuge in the camp of Nimeguen, on the banks of the Wahl, whither the French were soon to follow him and daily defy him.

Thus towards Holland, as well as towards Luxemburg, the French had at length been able to attain that formidable line of the Rhine, which nature seems to have assigned as a boundary to their fine country, and which the French have always been ambitious of acquiring as a frontier. Pichegru, it is true, being stayed in his progress by Nimeguen, was not yet master of the course of the Wahl; and if he should think of conquering Holland, he saw before him numerous streams, fortified places, inundations, and a frightful season; but he now almost touched the so-much-desired line, and with one more bold exploit he might be able to enter Nimeguen on the isle of Bommel, and effect a firm position upon the Wahl. Moreau, styled the general of sieges, had by an act of boldness just entered Venloo; and Jourdan occupied a strong position on the Rhine. Along the Moselle and Alsace, the armies had likewise just reached that great river.

Since the check of Kayserslautern, the armies of the Moselle and of the Upper Rhine, commanded by Michaud, had spent their time in reinforcing themselves by detachments drawn from the Alps and La Vendée. On the 14th Messidor (July 2), an attack had been attempted along the whole line from the Rhine to the Moselle, on the two slopes of the Vosges. This attack, too divided in its operation, did not meet with success. A second attempt, founded on better principles, had been made on the 25th Messidor (July 13). The greatest exertions had been brought to bear upon the centre of the Vosges, with a view to gain possession of the passes, and had caused, as it always did, a general retreat of the allied armies beyond Frankenthal. The committee had then ordered a diversion upon Trèves, of which the French took possession, to punish the elector. By this movement, a principal regiment was placed *en flèche* between the imperial armies of the Lower Rhine and the Prussian army of the Vosges, without their ever thinking to take advantage of this situation. However, the Prussians, at length taking advantage of a diminution of our forces towards Kayserslautern, had again attacked us unawares, and brought us back in rear of Kayserslautern.

Fortunately, Jourdan had just been victorious on the Röer; and Clerfait had just then recrossed the Rhine at Cologne. The allies had not then the courage to remain in the Vosges; they retired, abandoning the whole Palatinate to us, and throwing a strong garrison into Mentz. All that remained to them were Luxemburg and Mentz on the left bank. The committee immediately gave orders for their blockade. Kléber was called from Belgium to Mentz, to direct the siege of that place, which he had assisted to defend in 1793, and where he had commenced his distinguished career. Thus our conquests were extended on all points, and every where carried us up to the Rhine.

At the Alps, the same cessation from action continued, and the great chain still remained ours. The plan of invasion, ably devised by general Bonaparte, and communicated to the committee by the younger Robespierre, who was on a mission to the army of Italy, had been adopted. It consisted in forming a junction between the two armies of the Alps and of Italy in the valley of Stura, so as to overrun Piedmont. Orders had been given for marching when news of the events of the 9th Thermidor arrived; the execution of the plan was then suspended. The commanders of the fortresses, who had been obliged to give up part of their garrisons, the representatives, the municipalities, and all the partisans of reaction, alleged that this plan had for its object to ruin the army, by throwing it into Piedmont, to open Toulon again to the English, and to serve the secret designs of Robespierre; Jean-Bon-Saint-André, who had been sent to Toulon to superintend the repairs of the ships of war there, and who entertained schemes relative to the Mediterranean, proved himself one of the greatest opponents to this plan. Young Bonaparte was even accused of being an accomplice of the Robespierres, on account of the confidence with which his talents and his designs had inspired the younger of the two brothers. The army was brought back in disorder to the great chain, where it resumed its positions. The campaign concluded with a brilliant advantage. The Austrians, conjointly with the English, determined to make an attempt on Savona, so as to cut off the communication with Genoa, which by its neutrality rendered great service to the provision trade. general Colloredo advanced with a regiment of from eight to ten thousand men, but made no great haste in his march, and gave the French time to prepare themselves. Fallen upon amid the mountains by the French, whose movements were directed by general Bonaparte, he lost eight hundred men, and retreated disgracefully, reproaching the English, who in their turn accused him. The communication with Genoa was put on its old footing, and the army was confirmed in all its positions.

At the Pyrenees our successes were again renewing their career. Dugommier was still besieging Bellegarde, with the intention of making himself master of that place before descending into Catalonia. La Union had desired by means of a general attack on the French line to come to the relief of the besieged; but repelled at every point, he had recently withdrawn himself, and the fortress, more discouraged than ever by this rout of the Spanish army, had surrendered on the 6th Vendémiaire (27th September). Dugommier, feeling quite secure on his rear, put himself in readiness to advance into Catalonia. At the western Pyrenees, the French, shaking off their inaction, had recently overrun the valley of Bastan, taken Fontarabia, and Saint-Sebastian, and favoured by the climate of those countries, made their preparations as they did at the eastern Pyrenees, to make the most of their successes in spite of the approach of winter.

In La Vendée the war had continued. It was not brisk and dangerous, but slow and devastating. Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Charette had at length shared the command among them. Since the death of Larochejacquelein, Stofflet had succeeded him in Anjou and Upper Poitou; Sapinaud had still retained the small division of the centre; Charette, who had distinguished himself by the campaign of the last winter, when, with almost an annihilated force he had yet contrived to elude the pursuit of the republicans, took the command in Lower Vendée; but he aspired to the general command. They had met at Jallais, and had entered into articles dictated by the abbé Bernier, the curé of Saint-Laud, the councillor and friend of Stofflet, and vicegerent in his name. This abbé was quite as ambitious as Charette, and desired such a combination as should furnish him with the means of exercising over all the chiefs the influence he possessed over Stofflet. They agreed to form a supreme council, under whose orders every thing for the future was to be done. Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Charette reciprocally confirmed to each other their respective commands of Anjou, the Centre and Lower Vendée. M. de Marigny, who had survived the great Vendean expedition to Granville, having infringed one of the orders of this council, was seized. Stofflet had the cruelty to order him to be shot upon a report of Charette. This act of severity was attributed to jealousy, and it produced a most unfavourable impression on all the royalists.

The war, without any possible result, became nothing else than a war of devastation. The republicans had established fourteen intrenched camps, which inclosed the whole insurgent country. From these camps issued incendiary columns, who, under the chief command of general Turreau, executed the formidable decree of the convention. They burned the woods, the hedges, the brushwood, frequently the villages themselves, seized the harvest and the cattle, and, acting pursuant to the decree which ordered every inhabitant who had not taken part in the rebellion to retire to the distance of twenty leagues from the insurgent country, treated as enemies every one they met with. The Vendeans, who in order to maintain themselves, had not ceased to cultivate their lands amidst these horrid scenes, defended themselves against this kind of warfare in such a way as to render it endless. On a signal from their leaders, they formed sudden assemblages, fell upon the rear of the camps, and took them by storm, or, allowing the columns to advance, they rushed upon them when they had got into the heart of the country; and if they succeeded in breaking the column, they killed them all to the very last man. They then seized upon the arms and ammunition, which they were extremely desirous of possessing; and without having done any thing to make an

impression upon a very superior enemy, they did no more than procure the means of continuing this atrocious warfare.

Such was the state of things on the left bank of the Loire. On the right bank, in that part of Brittany which is comprehended between the Loire and the Vilaine, a new gathering had been formed, chiefly formed out of the remains of that Vendean column destroyed at Savenay, and of the peasants inhabiting those plains. M. de Scépeaux was its leader. This corps was nearly of the same strength as that of M. de Sapinaud, and connected La Vendée with Brittany.

Brittany had become the theatre of a war in every respect different from that of La Vendée, and not the less deplorable. The Chouans, to whom we have already alluded, were smugglers, whom the discontinuance of the barriers had left without occupation; young men who had refused to comply with the requisition; and some Vendeans, who, like those of M. de Scépeaux, had escaped from the rout of Savenay. They abandoned themselves to the pursuit of plunder among the rocks and spacious woods of Brittany, particularly in the great forest of Pertre. They did not form, like the Vendeans, numerous bodies capable of keeping the field; they marched in bands of from thirty to fifty; stopped couriers and the public conveyances; and murdered the justices of the peace (*juges de paix*), the mayors, the republican functionaries, and, above all, the purchasers of the national property. As for those who were not purchasers but farmers of such property, they called on them, and compelled payment of the farm-rent to them. They generally undertook the destruction of bridges, the breaking up of roads, the cutting off the shafts of carts, the prevention of the conveyance of consumable goods to the towns. They made terrible threats to those who carried their produce to the markets, and they executed those threats by plundering and burning their property. Not being able to occupy the country in military fashion, their object evidently was to subvert it by preventing the citizens from accepting any office under the republic, by punishing the acquisition of national property, and by starving the towns. Less united and less strong than the Vendeans, they were nevertheless more formidable, and truly deserved the appellation of *brigands*.

They had a secret leader, whom we have already mentioned, M. de Puisaye, a member of the constituent assembly. He had retired after the 10th of August to Normandy, had engaged heart and hand, as we have already observed, in the federalist insurrection, and after the defeat of Vernon, had fled to Brittany, to conceal himself, and there gather together the remains of the conspiracy of La Rouarie. To great intelligence and extraordinary skill in uniting the elements of a party, were joined extreme activity of body and mind, with an overweening ambition. Puisaye, struck by the peninsular position of Brittany, with the great extent of its coast, with the peculiar disposition and appearance of its soil, covered with forests, mountains, and impenetrable retreats; struck above all by the rudeness of its inhabitants, speaking a foreign language, and consequently deprived of all communication with the other inhabitants of France, entirely subjected to the influence of the priests, and three or four times as numerous as the Vendeans,—Puisaye conceived that he should be able to excite in Brittany an insurrection much more formidable than that which had the Cathelineaus, the d'Elbées, the Bonchamps, and the Lescures for leaders. Above all, the vicinity of England, and the convenient intermediate situation of the islands of Guernsey and Jersey, had inspired him with the plan of inducing the cabinet of London to concur in his designs. He was therefore by no means desirous that the energy of the country should be wasted in useless pillage, and he laboured to organize it in such a manner, as that he might be able to hold it entirely under his own hand. With the assistance of the priests, he had caused all the men capable of bearing arms to be enrolled in registers opened in the parishes. Each parish formed a company, every canton a division; the united divisions formed four principal divisions, those of Morbihan, Finistère, Côtes-du-Nord, and Ille-et-Vilaine, all four of them depending upon a central committee which represented the supreme authority of the country. Puisaye presided in the central committee, in the capacity of commander-in-chief; by means of these correspondences he made his orders known throughout the whole province. He recommended to his followers, until his vast projects could be put in execution, to commit as few hostilities as possible, that they might not draw too many troops after them into Brittany, and to content themselves with providing ammunition, and preventing the carriage of provisions to the towns. But the Chouans, by no means adapted for the kind of general war which he was contemplating, abandoned themselves individually to robbery, which was more profitable to them, and more to their taste. Puisaye therefore hastened to put the finishing stroke to his work, and purposed, as soon as he should have completed the organization of his party, to go to London, in order to open a negotiation with the English cabinet and the French princes.

As we have already seen, in the account of the preceding campaign, the Vendeans had not yet put themselves in communication with foreign powers. They had sent to them M. de Tinténiac, to inquire who they were, and what number they were, and what was their object, and to offer them arms and assistance if they would make themselves masters of any one port on the coast. It was this that had induced them to march to Granville, and to make that attempt, with the disastrous conclusion of which we are already acquainted. The squadron of Lord Moira, after having cruised to no purpose off our coasts, had carried to Holland the relief intended for La Vendée. Puisaye hoped to call forth a similar expedition, and to come to some understanding with the princes, who had not yet expressed any gratitude, or given any encouragement to the insurgent royalists of the interior.

The princes, on their side, having no great expectation as to support from foreign powers, began to cast back their eyes on their partisans in the interior of France. But none about them were disposed to turn to account the devotedness of the brave men who were ready to sacrifice themselves in their cause. Some aged lords, some old friends, had followed Monsieur, who had become regent, and fixed his residence at Verona, since the coun-

try in the neighbourhood of the Rhine was no longer habitable except for military men. The prince of Condé, a brave but inefficient man, continued collecting Upon the upper Rhine all those who were desirous of making their fortune by their sword. A number of young nobility followed the count d'Artois in his travels, and had accompanied him as far as Saint Petersburg. Catharine had given the prince a magnificent reception; she had presented him with a frigate, a million of money, a sword, and the brave count de Vauban, to induce him to make good use of it. She had, moreover, promised the most effectual assistance the moment the prince should have landed in La Vendée. This descent, however, never took place; and the count d'Artois had returned to Holland, to the head-quarters of the duke of York.

The situation of the three French princes was neither brilliant or prosperous. Austria, Prussia, and England had refused to recognize the regent; for to recognize any other sovereign of France than the sovereign *de facto*, was to interfere with domestic affairs, which no foreign power desired to have the appearance of doing. At this time in particular, when they were beaten, all of them affected to say that they had taken up arms merely on behalf of their own security. To recognize the regent brought another inconvenience along with it: it would have been pledging themselves not to make peace till after the destruction of the republic, an event on which they did not further reckon. In the mean time the powers did not discard the agents of the princes, but did not admit them to possess any public character. The duke d'Harcourt at London, the duke d'Havre at Madrid, and the duke de Polignac at Vienna, transmitted notes little read and hardly attended to, and were rather the second-hand dispensers of the very scanty relief granted to the emigrants, than the organs of an acknowledged power. Hence the highest dissatisfaction at the conduct of the foreign powers prevailed in the three emigrant courts. They began to discover that this admirable zeal of the allied powers in the cause of royalty concealed the most violent enmity against France. Austria, by displaying her flag at Valenciennes and Condé, had, in the notion of the emigrants, called forth an outburst of French patriotism. Prussia, of whose pacific intentions they had already some glimmerings, had, they said, failed in all her engagements. Pitt, who of all the allied powers, was the most positive and the most supercilious towards them, was also the most hateful to them. He was never styled otherwise than as the perfidious Englishman, and they said that they ought to take his money and cheat him afterwards, if they could. They pretended that on Spain alone any reliance could be placed; Spain alone was a faithful cousin, and a sincere ally; and it was only upon her that all their expectations should be founded.

The three petty fugitive courts, at present so little in unison with the allied powers, did not live on the best terms with one another. The court of Verona, indisposed to take an active part, giving to the emigrants orders that were ill-obeyed, making communications to the cabinets that were little heeded, by agents who were not recognized, was filled with distrust of the two others, became jealous of the active part performed by the prince of Condé upon the Rhine, and of the nature of the consideration which his unenlightened but energetic courage gained him the cabinets, and envied even the travels of M. the count d'Artois in Europe. The prince of Condé, on his part, quite as destitute of intelligence as he was brave, would not enter on any settled design, and did not exhibit any great anxiety in respect of the two courts that would not fight. Lastly, the little court collected at Arnheim, disliked both the mode of life it was forced to lead at the Rhine, as well as the superior authority to which it was obliged to submit at Verona, and therefore kept close to the English head-quarters, under the pretext of various designs upon the coast of France.

Cruel experience having taught the French princes that they could not depend upon the enemies of their country for the restoration of their throne, they were fond of observing that they must thenceforward rely solely on their partisans in the interior and on La Vendée. Ever since terror had ceased to reign in France, the violent agitators had unfortunately begun to breathe, as well as honest men. The correspondence of the emigrants with the interior had been recently revived. The court of Verona, by the agency of count d'Entraigues, corresponded with one Lemaitre, an intriguer, who had been successively an advocate, secretary to the council, pamphleteer, and prisoner in the Bastille, and who finished by being the agent of the princes. With him were associated a man named Laville-Heurnois, formerly master of the requests, and a creature of Calonne, and one Brothier, preceptor of the nephews of the abbé Maury. Applications were made to these intriguers for particulars concerning the situation of France, the state of parties, and their political tendencies, and plans of conspiracy. In return they sent intelligence very often the falsest possible; they made empty boasts of their pretended intercourse with the heads of the government, and strove with all their might to persuade the French princes that every thing was to be expected from a movement in the interior. They were directed to correspond with La Vendée, and especially with Charette, who from his protracted defence, became the hero of the royalists, but with whom they had not yet been able to open any negotiation.

Such was then the situation of the royalist party in France, both abroad and at home. It was carrying on in La Vendée a war, less alarming from its dangers than afflicting by its ravages; this party was forming in Brittany extensive, but as yet distant projects, subject moreover to a very difficult condition, the union and the co-operation of a multitude of individuals; out of France this party was dismissed, held in little consideration, and met with little support; at length, being disabused as to the efficacy of relief from the foreign powers, it entertained a puerile correspondence with the royalists of the interior.

The republic therefore had not much to fear from the efforts of Europe and royalty. Apart from the painful contemplation of the ravages in La Vendée, the republic had cause to congratulate herself upon her splendid triumphs. Having been saved from invasion in the preceding year, she had

amply revenged herself by her conquests in this; she had acquired Belgium, Dutch Brabant, the countries of Luxemburg, Liége, and Juliers, the electorate of Trèves, the Palatinate, Savoy, Nice, a fortress in Catalonia, and the Valley of Bastan, and thus maintained a threatening aspect towards Holland, Piedmont, and Spain at one and the same time. Such were the results of the great efforts of the celebrated committee of public welfare.

CHAPTER XXV.

WINTER OF THE YEAR III. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN ALL THE PROVINCES.—CHANGE IN SOCIAL MANNERS, THE THERMIDORIAN PARTY; THE "JEUNESSE DORÉE." THE WITHDRAWING ROOMS OF PARIS.—CONTEST OF THE TWO DOMINANT PARTIES IN THE SECTIONS; STORMY DEBATES AND TUMULTUOUS SCENES.—VIOLENCES COMMITTED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AT THE JACOBINS AND AT THE ELECTORAL CLUB.—DECREES CONCERNING THE POPULAR SOCIETIES.—DECREES IN RESPECT OF THE FINANCES. MODIFICATIONS IN THE "MAXIMUM" AND IN THE REQUISITIONS.—TRIAL OF CARRIER.—AGITATIONS IN PARIS AND THE INCREASING EXASPERATION OF THE TWO PARTIES.—ATTACK UPON THE HALL OF THE JACOBINS BY THE "JEUNESSE DORÉE."—THE JACOBIN CLUB CLOSED.—RETURN OF THE SEVENTY-THREE DEPUTIES IMPRISONED AFTER THE THIRTY-FIRST OF MAY TO THE ASSEMBLY.—CONDEMNATION AND EXECUTION OF CARRIER.—PROSECUTIONS COMMENCED AGAINST BILLAUD-VARENNES, COLLOT-D'HERBOIS, AND BARRÈRE.

WHILE the events we have been relating were occurring on the frontiers, the convention continued its reforms. The representatives commissioned to remodel the administrations traversed France, in every place reducing the number of the revolutionary committees, composing them of other individuals, causing to be arrested as accessories of Robespierre's system those whose notorious excesses would not permit them to be left unpunished, changing municipal functionaries, reorganizing the popular societies, and purifying them of the most violent and most dangerous men. This operation was not always carried into effect without opposition. At Dijon, for instance, the revolutionary organization was found more compact than any where else. The same persons, members at one and the same time of the revolutionary committee, of the municipality, and of the popular society, made every body there tremble. They imprisoned arbitrarily both travellers and inhabitants, inscribed upon the list of emigrants all those whom they were pleased to place there, and prevented their obtaining certificates of residence by intimidating the sections. They had incorporated themselves into regiments under the character of a revolutionary army, and compelled the commune to allow them pay. They followed no calling, but attended the meetings of the club, they and their wives, and dissipated at orgies, where nothing but goblets were used, the double produce of their appointments and their rapacities. They corresponded with the Jacobins of Lyons and Marseilles, and made use of them as go-betweens of communication with those of Paris. The representative Casal had the greatest difficulty in dissolving this combination; he dismissed every one of the revolutionary authorities, selected twenty or thirty of the most moderate members of the club, and delegated to them the task of purifying the remainder.

When they were expelled from the municipalities in the provinces, the revolutionists did there as they did in Paris; they usually retired to the Jacobin Club. If the club had been purified, they either obtruded themselves into it again after the departure of the representatives, or formed another. There it was that they made more violent speeches than ever, and indulged in all the frenzy of rage and fear, for they beheld vengeance every where. The Jacobins of Dijon dispatched an inflammatory address to those of Paris. At Lyons they exhibited a no less dangerous body; and as the city was still under the weight of the terrible decrees of the convention, the representatives had great trouble to keep their fury within bounds. At Marseilles they were more audacious; adding the excitement of their party to the warmth of local character, they formed a considerable body, beleaguered a room where the two representatives, Anguis and Serres, were at table, and sent delegates to them who, sword and pistol in hand, came to demand the release of the imprisoned patriots. The two representatives displayed the greatest firmness; but being ill supported by the gendarmerie, who had invariably seconded the cruelties of the late system, and who had gone so far as to consider themselves accessories of and responsible for it, they narrowly escaped being strangled and murdered. However, several Parisian battalions, which were at that moment at Marseilles, came to the rescue of the two representatives, and dispersed the mob. At Toulouse, also, the Jacobins excited commotions. They had there four individuals: a director of the posts, a secretary for the district, and two comedians, who had made themselves leaders of the revolutionary party. They had formed a committee of superintendence for the whole of the south, and extended their tyranny far beyond Toulouse. They were opposed to the reforms and the imprisonments ordered by the representatives d'Artigoyte and Chaudron-Rousseau, they roused the popular society, and had the audacity to declare through that medium that those two representatives had forfeited the confidence of the people. Overmastered, however, they were clapped in prison with their principal accomplices.

These scenes were repeated every where, with more or less violence, according to the character of the inhabitants of the provinces. Nevertheless the Jacobins were in every place suppressed. Those of Paris, the leaders of the combination,

were in the greatest alarm. They perceived the capital violently opposed to their doctrines; they learned that in the departments public opinion, less prompt to manifest itself than in Paris, was not the less decided against them. They knew that they were every where called cannibals, partisans, accomplices, and *continuators* of Robespierre. They found themselves supported, it is true, by the mob of dismissed officials, by the electoral club, by a violent and frequently victorious minority in the sections, and by a portion of the members of the convention, some of whom still sat in their club; but they were not the less alarmed at the direction public feeling had taken, and pretended that a plot had been concocted for dissolving the popular societies, and after them, the republic.

They prepared an address to the corresponding societies, as a reply to the attacks to which they were subjected. "They are seeking," said they, "to destroy our fraternal union; they are contriving how to break a fasces so formidable to the enemies of equality and of liberty. They accuse us, they pursue us with the darkest imputations. Aristocracy and moderatism are raising their audacious heads. The fatal reaction occasioned by the fall of the triumvirs is perpetuated, and from amidst the storms raised by the enemies of the people a new faction has sprung up, which tends to the dissolution of every one of the popular societies. This faction harasses and strives to excite the public opinion; it carries its audacity to such a height, as to hold us forth as a rival power to the national representation,—us who, always fighting and identifying ourselves with the public opinion throughout all the perils to which the country has been exposed. It accuses us of being the *continuators* of Robespierre's system, and we have in our registers the names of those only who, in the night between the 9th and 10th Thermidor, occupied the post which the danger of the country assigned to them. But we will reply to these vile calumniators by constantly fighting against them. We will answer them by the purity of our principles and of our actions, and by an unshaken attachment to the cause of the people which they have betrayed, to the national representation which they aim at dishonouring, and to that equality which they detest."

They affected, as we see, a high respect for the national representation. They had even, in one of their sittings, given up to the committee of general safety one of their members, for having said that the principal conspirators against liberty were in the body of the convention itself. They circulated their address in all the departments, and particularly in the sections of Paris.

The party which was opposed to them became daily bolder. It had already adopted colours, distinguishing manners, places, and watchwords. This party, especially in its origin, as we have already observed, consisted of young men, either belonging to persecuted families, or who had evaded the requisition. The women had joined them; they had passed the last winter in fearful anxiety; they resolved upon spending the present in festivities and amusements. Frimaire (November and December) was at hand. They were eager to relinquish the appearances of indigence, of simplicity, nay, even that wretchedness which had long been affected during the reign of terror, for brilliant dresses, elegant manners and entertainments. They bound themselves in one common cause with the young enemies of a ferocious democracy; they excited their zeal, they made politeness and attention to dress a law with them. Fashion resumed again its sway. It required the hair to be plaited in tresses, and fastened at the back of the head with a comb. This practice was borrowed from the soldiers, who arranged their hair in that manner to protect themselves from sword cuts; and it was intended to intimate that the wearers had recently borne a part in the victories of our armies. Large cravats, black or green collars were worn, according to the custom of the Chouans, and above all, crape round the arm, as being the relative of a victim of the revolutionary tribunal. We see what a singular medley of ideas, recollections, and opinions presided over these fashions of the *golden age of youth* (*jeunesse dorée*), for that was the name which was given to it at the time. In the evening, in the withdrawing rooms, which now again opened, brilliant compliments rewarded those young men who had displayed their courage in the sections, at the Palais Royal, in the garden of the Tuileries, as also those writers who, in the thousand pamphlets and publications of the day, had launched the keenest sarcasms against the *revolutionary canaille*. Fréron had become the most distinguished of the journalists. He was the editor of the *Orateur du Peuple*, which soon acquired celebrity. This was the journal read by the *golden age of youth*, and in which it sought its instruction of the day.

The theatres were not yet opened; the actors of the *comedie Françaiss* were still in prison. For want of this place of resort, people went to show themselves at concerts given at the Feydeau theatre, where was to be heard a melodious voice which began to charm the Parisians, that of Garat. There assembled what might be called the aristocracy of the time; some nobles who had not quitted France, opulent men who had ventured to show themselves again, and contractors who no longer dreaded the terrible severity of the committee of public welfare. The women appeared there in a costume which, according to the practice of the time, was meant to be antique, and was copied from David. They had long relinquished powder and hoops; they wore fillets round their hair; the form of their gowns approached as near as possible to the simple tunic of the Greek women; instead of high-heeled shoes, they wore that covering for the foot which we see in ancient statues, a light sandal, fastened by ribbons crossing one another round the leg. The young men, with hair turned up and black collar, filled the pit of the Feydeau, and sometimes applauded the elegant and singularly-dressed females who came to cast a lustre on those assemblies.

Madame Tallien was the most beautiful and the most admired of those ladies who introduced the new taste. Her drawing room was the most brilliant and the most frequented. Being the daughter of Cabarus the Spanish banker, the wife of a president at Bordeaux, and recently married to Tallien, she was connected with the men both of the old and of the new regime. She was indignant against the system of terror, as well from resentment as from natural kindness; she had sympa-

thized with all the unfortunate, and, whether at Bordeaux or at Paris, she had not ceased for a moment to act the part of petitioner in their behalf, a part which she performed we are told with irresistible grace. It was she who had softened the proconsular rigour exhibited by her husband in the Gironde, and who had brought him back to more humane sentiments. Her desire was that his part should be that of a mediator, and that he should heal those disorders the revolution had occasioned; she drew around her all those who had contributed with Tallien to the events of the 9th Thermidor, and sought to gain them over by complimenting and holding out hopes to them that the public would acknowledge their services, and grant that oblivion of the past which so many of them needed, as also that power which now seemed to be promised to the adversaries, rather than to the advocates of terror. She was surrounded by amiable women, who contributed to this plan of such a pardonable seduction. Among them the widow of an unfortunate general, Alexandre Beauharnais, a young creolian, fascinating not so much on account of her beauty, as for her extreme gracefulness, was most conspicuous. To these parties were invited simple and enthusiastic men, who led a life of austerity and turmoil. They were caressed, sometimes rallied on their dress, on their manners, and on the severity of their principles. They were placed at table by men whom they would lately have persecuted as aristocrats, as newly-enriched speculators, and plunderers of the public property; they were thus forced to feel their own inferiority beside models of the ancient politeness and good society. Many of them, being in contracted circumstances, lost their dignity together with their rudeness; others who, from the strength of their understanding, knew how to maintain their rank, and to gain those advantages of the drawing room so frivolous and so soon acquired, were nevertheless not proof against delicate flattery. Many a member of a committee, adroitly solicited at a dinner party, rendered a service, or suffered his vote to be influenced.

Thus a woman, sprung from a financier, married to a magistrate, and who had become, as one of the relics of the old state of society, the wife of an ardent revolutionist, undertook to reconcile simple, sometimes coarse, and almost always fanatical men, with elegance, taste, pleasures, ease of manners, and indifference as to opinions. The revolution, brought back from that extreme point of fanaticism and grossness (which was certainly a great point), advanced nevertheless too rapidly towards the oblivion of republican manners, principles, and we may almost say, resentments. The Thermidorians were reproached with this change. They were accused of giving way to it, of producing it, of accelerating its motion, and the reproach was just.

The revolutionists kept aloof from these drawing rooms and from these concerts. If some few of them ventured to appear there, they left them only to go to their tribunes to inveigh against the Cabarus's, the aristocrats, the intriguers, and the contractors, whom Madame Tallien drew along in her train. They, for their part, had no other meetings than their clubs and their assemblies of sections, to which they resorted, not to seek pleasure, but to give vent to their passions. Their wives, who were called the *furies of the guillotine*, because they had frequently formed a circle round the scaffold, appeared in popular costume in the tribunes of the clubs, to applaud the most violent motions. Several members of the convention still attended the sittings of the Jacobins; some carried thither their celebrity, but they were silent and gloomy; such were Collot d'Herbois, Billaud-Varennes, and Carrier. Others, as Duhem, Crassous, and Lanot, went thither from attachment to the cause, but without the personal reason of defending their revolutionary conduct.

It was at the Palais-Royal, in the circle of the convention, in the tribunes, and in the sections, that these two parties came into collision. In the sections in particular, where they had to deliberate and to discuss, extremely violent quarrels took place. The address of the Jacobins to the corresponding societies was about that very time hawked from one to another, and some insisted on having it read there. A decree also enjoined the reading of the report of Robert Lindet on the state of France, a report which presented so faithful a picture of it, and expressed so precisely the sentiments with which the convention and all honest men were animated. The reading of these documents furnished occasion every decadi for the warmest disputes. The revolutionists called loudly for the address of the Jacobins, and their adversaries for Lindet's report. A frightful uproar was the consequence. The members of the old revolutionary committees took down the names of all those who mounted the tribune to oppose them, and, as they wrote them, they exclaimed, "We will exterminate them." The habits which they had contracted during the reign of terror had made the words to kill, to guillotine, so familiar to them, that they had them constantly in their mouths. They thus gave occasion for its being said that they were making new lists of proscription, and intended to revive the system of Robespierre. Fights frequently took place in the sections; sometimes victory was undecided, and by ten o'clock there was no possibility of reading any thing. The revolutionists, who did not scruple to exceed the lawful hour, would then wait till their adversaries, who affected to obey the law, had withdrawn, and then they read what they pleased, and deliberated on any subjects they wished to discuss.

Scenes such as these were daily reported to the convention, and complaints were made against the old members of the revolutionary committees, who were, it was said, the authors of all these disturbances. The electoral club, more noisy of itself than all the sections put together, had just urged the patience of the assembly to the utmost, by an address of the most dangerous kind. It was, as we have said, in this club that the men most compromised always met, and that the most daring schemes were conceived. A deputation from this club came to demand that the election of the municipal magistrates should be restored to the people; that the municipality of Paris, which had not been re-established since the 9th Thermidor, should be re-constituted; and lastly, that instead of a single meeting a decade, each section should be allowed to hold two. On this last petition a

meetings, and the violences committed by the old revolutionist party at the Jacobins and the electoral club.—Decrees against the popular societies. (Vendémiaire.)

great number of deputies rose, made the most vehement complaints, and demanded measures against the members of the old revolutionary committees, to whom they attributed all the disturbances. Legendre, though he had disapproved Lecointre's first attack upon Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, said that it was necessary to go further back, that the source of the evil lay in the members of the former committees of government, that they abused the indulgence which the assembly had shown them, and that it was high time to punish their ancient tyranny, in order to prevent a new one.

This discussion excited a fresh tumult, more violent than the first. After long and deplorable recriminations, the assembly, encountering nothing else than questions too excitable to be discussed, or otherwise impracticable, passed a second time to the order of the day. Various modes of repressing the extravagancies of the popular societies and the abuse of the right of petition were over and over again discussed. It was moved to annex to Lindet's report an address to the French people, expressing in a still more precise and energetic manner the sentiments of the assembly and the new course which it intended to pursue. This idea was adopted. Richard, who had just returned from the army, insisted that this was not enough; that it was necessary to govern vigorously; that addresses signified nothing, because all the petitionmakers would not fail to reply to them; and that people ought not to be suffered to use at the bar such language as in the streets would cause those who dared to utter it to be apprehended. "It is high time," said Bourdon (of the Oise), "that some important truths should be addressed to you. Do you know why your armies are constantly victorious!—because they observe strict discipline. Have a good police in the state, and you will have a good government. Do you know whence proceed the everlasting attacks directed against yours!—from the abuse by your enemies of all that is democratic in your institutions. They take delight in reporting that you will never have a government, that you will be for ever involved in anarchy. It may then be possible that a nation constantly victorious should not know how to govern itself. And would the convention, knowing that this alone prevents the completion of the revolution, neglect to provide for it! No, no; let us undeceive our enemies. It is by the abuse of the popular societies and of the right of petition that they aim at destroying us. It is this abuse that must be repressed."

Various expedients were submitted for suppressing the abuse of popular societies without destroying them. Pelet, in order to deprive the Jacobins of the support of several mountaineer deputies who belonged to their society, and especially Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and other dangerous leaders, proposed to forbid members of the convention from becoming members of any popular society whatever. This suggestion was adopted. But a great number of remonstrances arose from the Mountain. It was urged that the right of meeting, for the purpose of enlightening themselves on the subject of the public interests, was a right belonging to all the citizens, and of which a deputy could no more be deprived than any other member of the state; that consequently the decree adopted was a violation of an absolute and inviolable right. The decree was rescinded. Dubois-Crancé made another motion. Explaining the manner in which the Jacobins had purified themselves, he showed that this society contained within its body the very same persons who had so misguided it under Robespierre. He maintained that the convention possessed the right of purifying it anew, precisely in the same manner as it did by her commissioners in respect of the societies in the departments; and he proposed to refer the question to the competent committees, that they might devise a suitable mode of purifying, and the means of rendering the popular societies useful. This new motion was also carried.

This decree made a great noise at the Jacobins. They cried out that Dubois-Crancé had deceived the convention; that the purifying ordained after the 9th Thermidor had been strictly executed; that there was no pretext for its repetition; that all of them were worthy to sit in that illustrious society, which had rendered such services to the country; that, in fact, they had nothing to fear from the severest examination, and that they were ready to submit themselves to the judgment of the convention. Consequently they settled that a list of all their members should be printed, and carried to the bar by a deputation. On the following day, the 13th Vendémiaire (4th October), they were less tractable; they said that the decision adopted the preceding evening was injudicious; that to deliver a list of the members of the society to the assembly was to recognize in them the right of purification, which belonged to no one; that as all citizens had a right to meet unarmed, to confer together on questions of public interest, no individual could be declared unworthy of becoming a member of a club; that by consequence, purification was contrary to all law, and that they ought not to carry the list to the bar. "The popular societies," exclaimed Giot, a furious Jacobin, and one of those agents retained at the armies, "the popular societies belong exclusively to themselves. Were it otherwise, the infamous court party would have purified that of the Jacobins, and you would have seen these benches, which ought to be occupied by virtue, sullied by the presence of the Jancourts and the Feuillants. Well! the court itself, which was no respecter of persons, durst not attack you; and shall that which the court dared not attempt be undertaken at the very moment when the Jacobins have sworn to overthrow all tyrants, be they who they may, and to be ever submissive to the convention! I have just come from the departments; I can assure you that the existence of the popular societies is in extreme jeopardy; I have been treated as a villain, because the designation of Jacobin appeared on the face of my commission. I was told that I belonged to a society composed entirely of *brigands*. There are secret intrigues to cut you off from the other societies of the republic; I have been so fortunate as to prevent the separation, and to knit more closely the bonds of fraternity between you and the society of Bayonne, which Robespierre had calumniated in the midst of you. What I have just been saying of one commune equally applies to all. Be discreet, continue to adhere to principles and to the

convention, and, above all, do not recognize any authority that assumes the right of purifying you." The Jacobins applauded this speech, and settled that they would not carry this list to the convention, but await its decrees.

The electoral club was much more tumultuous. Since its last petition it had been expelled from the Evêché, and had taken refuge in a room of the Museum; close by the convention. There, in a night sitting, amid the furious shouts of those who attended it, and the stamping of the women who filled the galleries, it declared that the convention had gone beyond the duration of her powers; that she had been commissioned to try the late king and to frame a constitution; that she had performed both; and that, consequently, her task was performed and her powers determined.

These scenes at the Jacobins and at the electoral club were again denounced to the convention, who referred the whole to the committee commissioned to submit to her the draught of a decree relative to the abuses of the popular societies. She had voted an address to the French people, in conformity with a motion already made, and had despatched it to the sections and to all the communes of the republic. This address, couched in firm yet discreet language, repeated, in a more positive as well as in a more precise manner, the sentiments expressed in Lindet's report. This address became the subject of fresh contentions in the sections. The revolutionists wanted to prevent its being read, and set themselves against what was voted in reply to the addresses of approval. On the contrary, they contrived to cause the adoption of addresses to the Jacobins, in order to express to them the interest they felt in their cause. It frequently happened, after they had carried a vote, that an accession of strength came to their adversaries' relief, and then they were expelled, and the section, thus renewed, came to a contrary decision. Thus also were to be seen several sections who presented two inconsistent addresses, one to the Jacobins, the other to the convention. In the first were extolled the services of the popular societies, with the strongest expressions in favour of their retention; in the other, they said that the section, delivered from the yoke of anarchists and terrorists, came at length to express without restraint its desires to the convention, to offer her its arms and its life, so as to put down at once the *continuators* of the system of Robespierre and the agents of royalism. The convention was present at these debates while the bill relative to the police of the popular societies was in agitation.

This bill was brought in on the 25th Vendemiaire (16th October). Its principal object was to break down the combination that all the Jacobin clubs were forming in France. Affiliated with the parent society, and corresponding regularly with her, and obeying her orders, they constituted a most extensive party, ably organized, which had one centre and one rule of action; and it was this that the present decree wanted to destroy. The decree prohibited "*all affiliations and federations, as well as all correspondence in a corporate (collectif) name between popular societies.*" It purported, moreover, that no petitions or addresses could be made in a corporate name, in order to put a stop to these imperious manifestoes, which the delegates of the Jacobins or the electoral club brought and read at the bar, and which, in many instances, had been acted upon as so many orders to the assembly. Every address or petition was to be individually signed. Thus the means of prosecuting the authors of dangerous propositions would thus be provided, and it was expected that the necessity of signing would more readily disunite them. A list of the members of every society was to be immediately prepared, and to be placarded in the place of meeting. No sooner was this decree read to the assembly than a multitude of voices were raised to oppose it. "They want," said the Mountaineers, "to destroy the popular societies; they forget that they have saved the revolution and liberty; they forget that they are the most powerful means of bringing the citizens together and preserving their energy and patriotism; by prohibiting their correspondence, they attack the inherent right of citizens of every degree to correspond with each other, a right quite as inviolable as that of meeting peaceably to confer on questions of public interest.

Lejeune, Duhem, and Crassous, all of them Jacobins, and deeply interested in setting aside this decree, were not the only persons who thus expressed themselves. The deputy Thibaudeau, a settled republican, unconnected with either Mountaineers or Thermidorians, appeared himself to be alarmed at the consequences of this decree, and moved its adjournment, apprehensive lest it might strike at the very existence of the popular societies. There is no desire to annihilate them, replied the Thermidorians, the originators of this decree, we only want to subject them to a salutary control. Amidst this conflict, Merlin (of Thionville) exclaimed, "President, call the opposers to order. They allege that we want to extinguish the popular societies, when the present subject-matter is the regulating their present constitution." Rewbell, Bentabolle, and Thuriot demonstrated that the question did not concern suppression. "Are they to be prevented," said they, "from assembling peaceably and unarmed to confer on the public interests? Assuredly not; that right is inviolate. They are only prevented from forming affiliations and federations, and no more is done with respect to them than has been already done in regard to the departimental authorities. These latter, according to the decree of the 14th Frimaire, which constitutes the revolutionary government, can neither correspond or effect any mutual combination. Can it be permitted that the popular societies should be allowed to do what has been forbidden to the departimental authorities? They are forbidden to correspond in a corporate name, and no one right is thereby violated: every citizen can assuredly correspond from one end of France to the other; but do citizens correspond through a president and secretary? It is this official correspondence between powerful and constituted bodies that it is desired, and with good reason, to prevent, in order to destroy a federalism more monstrous and more dangerous than that of the departments. It is by these affiliations, and by this correspondence, that the Jacobins have contrived to exercise a substantive influence over the government, and to assume a part in the direction of affairs, which ought to belong to the national representation itself."

Bourdon (of the Oise), one of the principal members of the committee of general safety, and, as we have seen, a Thermidorian, frequently in opposition to his friends, exclaimed, "The popular societies are not the people. I only see the people in the primary assemblies. The popular societies are a collection of men, who have chosen themselves, like monks, and who have at last completed an exclusive and permanent aristocracy, styling itself the people, and which now is about to station itself beside the national representation, to suggest, to modify, or to oppose, its resolutions. By the side of the convention I see another representation springing up, and that representation has its seat at the Jacobins." Great cheering here interrupted Bourdon; he proceeded in the following terms: "So little excitement do I carry into this contest, that, in order to secure unity and peace, I would cheerfully say to the people, 'Choose between the men whom ye have appointed to represent you, and those who have sprung up by the side of them; what signifies it, so that ye have an uniformity of representation;'" fresh cheering interrupted Bourdon; he resumed: "Yes," he exclaimed, "let the people choose between yourselves and the men who have wanted to proscribe the representatives entrusted with the national confidence, between yourselves and the men who, in connexion with the municipality of Paris, wanted a few months since to assassinate liberty. Citizens, would ye make a glorious peace! would ye attain the ancient boundaries of Gaul? Offer the Belgians, the people bordering on the Rhine, a pacific revolution, a republic without a conflict of representation, a republic without revolutionary committees stained with the blood of citizens. Say to the Belgians, to the people of the Rhine: 'Ye want an imperfect liberty, we give it to you entire, only sparing you the dreadful calamities which preceded its introduction, by sparing you the sanguinary ordeal through which we have ourselves passed.' Think on this, citizens, that in order to deter the neighbouring nations from uniting with you, a statement has gone forth that you have no settled government, and that treating with you, they know not whether to address themselves to the convention or to the Jacobins. Impart, on the other hand, unity and community to your government, and you will perceive that no nation is alienated from yourselves and your principles; you will see that there is no nation that hates liberty."

Duhem, Crassous, and Clausel proposed at least the adjournment of the decree, saying that it was too important to be passed so suddenly; they all of them at once desired to be heard; Merlin (of Thionville) required leave to move against them, with that fervid spirit which he brought to the tribune, and displayed in the field of battle. The president allowed them to be heard in succession, Dubarran, Lavasseur, and Romme were also heard against the decree, and Thuriot for it. At length Merlin a second time rushed to the tribune, "Citizens," said he, "when the question was as to whether the republic should be founded, you decreed for it without reference to a committee and without report; to-day the question is hardly any thing less than to found the republic the second time, by saving her from the popular societies which have put themselves in combination against her. Citizens, we must not be afraid to enter this cavern in spite of the blood and the carcases which obstruct the entrance; have the courage to advance fearlessly into it, expel the villains and the murderers, and leave none else therein save the good citizens who will calmly balance the great interests of the country. I exhort you to pass this decree, which saves the republic, as you did that which created her, that is, without reference to a committee or report."

Merlin was applauded, and the decree was forthwith voted article by article. This was the first blow given to that celebrated society, which up to that day had made the convention herself tremble, and served to impress her with a revolutionary aspect. It was not so much the provisions of the decree, in many respects easily evaded, as the courage to pass it, that were of importance on this occasion, and these provisions could not but forewarn the Jacobins of their approaching dissolution. Upon meeting that evening in their hall, they made their comments upon the decree and the way in which it had been passed. The deputy Lejeune, who in the morning had opposed its adoption with all his might, complained that he had not been seconded; he said that few members of the assembly had taken part in the debate to defend that society of which they were members: "There are," said he, "members of the convention, celebrated for their revolutionary and patriotic energy, who this day have preserved a reprehensible silence. Either those members are guilty of tyranny of which they are accused, or they have laboured for the public welfare. In the first instance, they are guilty, and ought to be punished; in the second, their task is not yet finished. After having made way by their toils for the successes of the defenders of the country, they ought to defend the principles and the rights of the people which are attacked. Two months ago, you were incessantly speaking in this tribune about the rights of the people, you, Collot and Billand; why have ye now ceased to defend them? Why are ye silent, now that a multitude of objects claim the exercise of your courage and your intelligence?"

Billand and Collot ever since the accusation which had been preferred against them, had observed a gloomy silence. Being thus called upon by their colleague Lejeune to explain, and charged with not having stood up for the society, they spoke out and declared, that if they kept silence it was from prudential motives, and not from want of moral courage; that they were fearful of injuring by their support the cause taken up by the patriots, that for some time past, the apprehension of obstructing the discussions had been the only cause of their reserve; that moreover, being accused of lording it over the convention, they had rather desired that their keeping themselves in the background should afford a sufficient reply to their accusers; that they were in raptures to find themselves called upon by their colleagues to emerge from this voluntary obscurity, and in some measure authorized to devote themselves again to the cause of liberty and of the republic.

Satisfied with this explanation, the Jacobins cheered them, and returned to the consideration of the law passed in the morning: they consoled themselves with saying that they would correspond

with all France by means of the tribune. Goujon called upon them to respect the law just enacted. They promised to do so, but one Terrasson laid before them an expedient as a substitute for their correspondence, while they professed obedience to the law, namely, that a circular letter should be prepared, not written in the name of the Jacobins and addressed to other Jacobins, *but signed by all the free men assembled in the hall of the Jacobins, and addressed to all the freemen in France meeting in popular societies.* This scheme was adopted with great exultation, and the draught of a circular of this kind was resolved upon.

We see how much the Jacobins cared about the threats of the convention, and how little they were inclined to profit by the lesson that it had just given them. While waiting till new facts should provoke further measures in regard to them, the convention set about prosecuting the task that Robert Lindet had allotted her in his report, and to discuss the questions he had proposed. The question was how the mischievous effects of a violent system, as applied to agriculture, commerce, and finances, could be repaired, and in what manner all classes of society could be restored to security, and the tendency to order and industry revived. But here there was as much conflict as ever upon difference of system, and every one seemed as much disposed to lose his temper on this as well as on every other subject.

The requisitions, the *maximum*, the assignats, the sequestration of the property of foreigners, provoked not less violent attacks upon the old government, than the imprisonments and the executions. The Thermidorians, extremely inexperienced in matters of public economy, earnestly applied themselves, from a spirit of reaction, to censure in bitter and abusive terms all that had been done in that way; and yet if, in the general administration of the state during the preceding year, there was any thing that could not be blamed, and was completely justified by necessity, it was the administration of the finances, provisions and supplies. Cambon, the most influential member of the committee of finances, had brought the revenue into the most excellent order: he certainly had caused a great quantity of assignats to be issued, but this was the only resource; and he had his bickerings with Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon for not allowing sundry revolutionary expenses. As for Lindet, who took charge of the transport and requisition service, he had laboured with admirable zeal to draw from abroad, to make requisitions in France, and to convey the necessary supplies either to the armies or to the great communes. The method of requisitions was violent, but it was acknowledged to be the only practicable mode, and Lindet had done his best to avail himself of it with the greatest consideration. Besides all this, he could not answer for the correctness of every one of his agents, or for the conduct of all those who had a right to make requisitions, such as the municipal functionaries, the representatives, and the commissioners at the armies.

The Thermidorians, and Tallien in particular, made the most foolish and the most unjust attacks upon the general system of these revolutionary ways and means, and against the mode of employing them. According to them, the primary cause of all the evils was the too abundant issue of assignats; it was that disproportionate issue that had depreciated them, and they now bore no corresponding proportion with the necessaries of life and commodities in general. Thus it was that the *maximum* had become so oppressive and so calamitous, because it compelled the seller or the satisfied creditor to accept a nominal value, which was daily becoming more and more illusory. There was not in all these objections any thing new, nor did they contain any useful hint; in particular, no remedy was suggested, and every body knew the fact as well as themselves; but Tallien and his friends laid the excessive issue of assignats to the charge of Cambon, and seemed thus to lay all the calamities of the state at his door. They likewise reproached him with the sequestration of the property of foreigners, a measure which, having provoked reprisals against the French, had interrupted the negotiation of paper securities, had destroyed every kind of credit, and had utterly ruined trade. So far as concerned the commission of supplies, the same censors accused it of having harassed France by requisitions, of having disbursed enormous sums to foreigners in the purchase of corn, and of leaving Paris in a state of destitution at the approach of a severe winter. They therefore proposed to call him to a severe account.

Cambon's integrity was acknowledged by all parties. To an ardent zeal for the due administration of the finances, he united an impetuous temper, so that an unjust reproach made him lose all self-control. He had sent word to Tallien and his friends, that he would not attack them so long as they did not annoy him; but that upon the first aspersion cast upon him, he would pursue them in the most determined manner. Tallien had the imprudence to add newspaper articles to his attacks from the tribune. Cambon no longer contained himself, and in one of the numerous sittings dedicated to the discussion of these matters, he rushed to the tribune, and thus apostrophized Tallien: "Ah! dost thou then attack me? wouldst thou cast a slur upon my integrity? Well, then, I will prove that thou art a robber and a murderer. Thou hast not rendered thy accounts as secretary of the commune, and I have proof of this at the committee of the finances; thou hast authorized an expenditure of fifteen hundred thousand francs for an object which will cover thee with infamy; thou hast not rendered thy accounts for thy mission to Bordeaux, and what is more, I have evidence of all this at the committee. Thou wilt ever be suspected of being accessory to the crimes of September, and I shall shortly prove to thee by thine own words that participation therein which must for ever make thee hold thy peace." Cambon was interrupted: he was told that these personalities were foreign to the discussion, that nobody had impeached his integrity, that the only question was as to his financial system. Tallien stammered out a few faltering words, and said that he would not answer personalities against himself, but only go to what touched upon the general question. Cambon then demonstrated that the assignats had been the only resource of the revolution; that the expenditure had amounted to three hundred millions per month; that amidst the disorder which prevailed,

the receipts had furnished scarcely one-fourth of that sum; that it had been necessary to make up the deficiency every month with assignats; that there was no mystery as to the quantity in circulation, and that it amounted to six thousand four hundred millions; that on the other hand, the national property represented twelve thousand millions, and afforded ample means for redeeming the republic; that he had, at the peril of his life, saved five hundred millions that Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon had proposed to appropriate for certain expenses; that he had long opposed the *maximum* and the foreign sequestration; and that as for the board of trade being obliged to pay for corn abroad at the rate of twenty-one francs per quintal, and to part with it in France for fourteen, it was not to be wondered at that this commission should have incurred an enormous expense.

These wranglings, so imprudent on the part of the Thermidorians, who, whether right or wrong, did not enjoy the most immaculate reputation, and who thus fell upon a highly honourable, well informed, though very violent man, caused the assembly a great waste of time. Although these attacks had ceased on the part of the Thermidorians, Cambon would not let the matter rest, but daily repeated in the tribune, "Accuse me! vile rabble! Come, then, examine my accounts, and judge of my conduct." "Pray be quiet," cried one or the other to him, "nobody denies your integrity;" but he reverted to the subject every day. Amidst this conflict of personalities, the assembly took, as far as she could, the measures best adapted to repair or to mitigate the evil.

The convention ordered a general statement of the finances, exhibiting the receipts and the expenditure, and a special report upon the means of withdrawing a portion of the assignats from circulation, but however without having recourse to divesting them of their monetary character, and so as not to render them worthless. On the motion of Cambon, she disclaimed the use of a paltry financial resource, which gave rise to many extortions, and was in conflict with the prejudices of many of the provinces, that of melting down the church plate. This plate had been at first estimated at one thousand millions. In reality it did not amount to more than thirty millions. It was settled that it should no longer be allowed to be touched, and that it should remain in the custody of the communes. The convention then strove to correct the most serious inconveniences of the maximum. Some voices already cried out for its abolition; but the fear of a disproportionate rise of prices prevented the assembly from yielding to this impulse of the reactionists. All that was considered was, how the law could be modified. The maximum had contributed to the destruction of trade, because while they conformed to the tariff, the merchants could not get a return, either of the premiums of freight or insurance. In consequence all colonial produce, all the necessaries of life, all raw materials brought by foreigners into our ports, were released from the maximum and from requisitions, and might be sold unrestrictedly to any person whomsoever. The same exemption was granted to merchandise taken in prizes, for such lay in the ports without being disposed of to purchasers. The uniform maximum of corn was attended with an extremely serious inconvenience. The growth of corn being more expensive and less abundant in certain provinces, the prices received by the farmers in those provinces did not even repay their outlay. It was decided that the prices of corn should vary in every department, according to the prices of 1790, and that they should be advanced two-thirds more. By thus causing a rise in the price of provisions, the intention was to raise the yearly pay, the salaries and the income of small annuitants; but this idea, proposed in good faith by Cambon, was vehemently opposed as insidious by Tallien, and postponed.

They were next occupied with the subject of the requisitions. That these might no longer be general, unlimited, or confused, and that they might no longer exhaust the means of conveyance, it was settled that the commission of supplies should alone have authority to make requisitions; that it should not have the power to lay under requisition, either the entire bulk of any article, or the whole of the productions of any department, but that it should specify the subject, its nature, and its quantity, the time of delivery and of payment; that requisitions should be made in exact proportion to the necessity, and in the district nearest to that which required victualling. The representatives with the armies were the only persons empowered, on an emergent case, either from a want of provisions or a rapid movement, to compel the necessary requisitions off-hand.

The question of the sequestration of foreign securities was warmly agitated. Some argued that the subjects of a government ought not to be personally identified with its wars; that every government should allow its subjects to peaceably continue their mutual intercourse and their exchange, and confine their attacks to the armies; that the French had seized no more than twenty-five millions, whereas of theirs one hundred millions had been seized; the twenty-five millions ought to be restored to enable us to return the one hundred; that the sequestration was ruin to our bankers, for they were obliged to deposit at the treasury what they were indebted to foreigners, while they did not receive what foreigners owed them, foreign governments constantly seizing it by way of reprisals; that the continuance of this measure rendered French commerce suspected even by neutrals; lastly, that the circulation of negotiable securities having ceased, it was necessary to pay in money for part of the supplies procured from the neighbouring countries. Others replied to these arguments, that if a distinction were to be made in war in favour of the subjects of a government, in future bullets and cannon balls were to be projected against the heads of the kings only, and not against their soldiers; that we should restore to English trade the vessels taken by our privateers, and only retain the ships of war; that if we were to restore the sequestered twenty-five millions, the example would not be followed by the hostile governments, and the hundred millions of French property would still be impounded; and that to restore the circulation of paper securities, would in fact be furnishing the emigrants with the means of receiving funds.

The convention durst not settle the question, and merely decided that the sequestration should

be taken off with regard to the Belgians, whom conquest had in some degree restored to a state of peace with France, as also in respect of the merchants of Hamburg, who were guiltless of the war declared by the empire, and whose bills represented corn supplied to France.

To all these measures of restitution adopted for the benefit of agriculture and commerce, the convention added all those that were likely to restore security and to renew confidence among merchants. A decree of some standing outlawed all who had withdrawn themselves either from trial, or from being subject to a particular law; this decree was repealed, and those who had been condemned by the revolutionary commissions, as also the suspected persons who had concealed themselves, could return home. To those suspected persons who were still detained in confinement, the control of their property was restored. Lyons was declared to be no longer in a state of rebellion; her name was restored; the demolition of houses ceased; restitution was made to her of the merchandize which had been sequestrated by the surrounding communes; her merchants no longer needed certificates of civism to qualify them to import or export merchandize; and all restrictions were removed from off that unfortunate city. The members of the popular commission of Bordeaux and their adherents, that is to say, almost all the Bordeaux merchants of that place had been outlawed: the decree outlawing them was repealed. A column to perpetuate infamy was to be erected at Caen in memory of their federalism; it was settled that it should not be erected. Sedan was allowed to manufacture cloths of every description. The departments of the north, the Pas-de-Calais, the Aisne, and the Somme, were relieved from the land-tax for four years, on condition of their re-establishing the cultivation of flax and hemp. Lastly, some notice was taken of unhappy La Vendée. Hentz and Francastel the representatives, general Turreau, and several others, who had executed the formidable decrees of terror, were recalled. It was affirmed, naturally enough, that they were the accomplices of Robespierre and of the committee of public welfare, who, by cruel usage, had wanted to make the war in La Vendée last for ever. Nobody knows why the committee should have entertained such an intention; but parties return one absurdity for another. Vimeux was appointed to take the command in La Vendée, and young Hoche in Brittany. New representatives were despatched to those countries, on a mission to ascertain whether it were possible to induce the acceptance of an amnesty, and thus to bring about a pacification.

We see how rapid and how general was the return to different sentiments. Naturally enough, when the assembly came to survey the whole extent of the calamity, and to consider the cases of proscribed persons, that she should also take into consideration the case of her own members. For upwards of a year, seventy-three of them had been imprisoned at the Port-Libre, for having signed a protest against the 31st of May. They had written a letter demanding a trial. All that was left of the right side, being some of the members of what was called the *Belly* (*Ventre* *), rose upon a question which concerned the freedom of voting, and demanded the restoration of their colleagues. Then arose one of those stormy and interminable discussions which always take place when the past is ripped up. "Do you mean, then, to condemn the 31st of May?" exclaimed the Mountaineers; "Do you mean to stigmatize an event which up to this moment you have proclaimed glorious and salutary? Do you want to raise a faction, which by its opposition had nearly undone the republic? Do you want to revive federalism!!!" The Thermidorians, originators or approvers of the events of the 31st of May, were embarrassed; and, to postpone the decision, a report upon the seventy-three was ordered.

It is in the nature of reactions not only to endeavour to repair the evil committed, but also to seek revenge. The trial of Lebon and Fouquier-Tinville was every day demanded; the trial of Billaud, Collot, Barrère, Vadier, Vouland, and David, members of the old committees, had already been called for. The time was continually bringing propositions of this kind. The drownings (*noyades*) of Nantes, which had long remained a secret, were at length brought to light. One hundred and thirty-three inhabitants of Nantes, sent to Paris, to be tried by the revolutionary tribunal, did not arrive till after the 9th Thermidor; they had been acquitted, and a ready ear was afforded them in all the disclosures they made respecting the calamities of their city. Such was the public indignation, that it was found necessary to summon the revolutionary committee of Nantes to Paris. The depositions against them disclosed all the ordinary atrocities of civil war. In Paris, and at a distance from the theatre of the war, no one ever conceived that ferocity had been carried to such lengths. The accused had but one plea, which they made in defence to all the charges preferred against them: La Vendée at their gates, and the orders of Carrier the representative. Seeing that the preliminary proceedings were drawing to a close, they every day exclaimed more violently against Carrier, insisting that he should share their fate, and should himself be called to account for the acts which he had ordered. The public in general demanded the apprehension of Carrier, and his trial before the revolutionary tribunal. The convention was obliged to take some notice of this. The Mountaineers asked if, after having already imprisoned Lebon and David, and several times accused Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, it was not intended to prosecute every one of the deputies who had gone out on mission. To dispel their fears, they set about devising a decree regulating the formalities to be employed in prosecutions instituted against a member of the national representation. This decree hung long in debate, and was discussed with the greatest animosity on one side and the other. The Mountaineers, in order to prevent a new decimation, were for rendering the formalities long and difficult. Those who were called *reactionists* wished, on the contrary, to simplify them, in order to render summary and more certain the punishment of certain deputies, who were styled "proconsuls." It was at length decreed that every denunciation should be referred to the three committees of public welfare, general safety, and legislation, for them to decide whether there was

* *Ante*, p. 75, col. 1.

ground for inquiry; that in case of an affirmative decision, a sort of commission of twenty-one members should be formed to make a report; that, after this report and the exculpatory defence of the accused deputy, the convention were to decide whether there was ground for the accusation, and should send the deputy before the competent tribunal.

As soon as the decree was passed, the three committees declared that there was ground for further inquiry against Carrier; a commission of twenty-one members was formed, which took possession of the documents, caused Carrier to appear before it, and took the depositions. After what had passed before the revolutionary tribunal, and the knowledge which every body had acquired of the facts, the fate of Carrier could not be doubtful. The Mountaineers, although they concurred in condemning the crimes of Carrier, affirmed that if he were prosecuted it was not to punish his crimes, but to commence a long series of persecutions against the men whose energy had saved France. Their adversaries, on the contrary, hearing the members of the revolutionary committee daily demand the appearance of Carrier, and observing the procrastination of the commission of twenty-one, cried out that they wanted to save him. The committee of general safety, apprehensive lest he should take flight, had surrounded him with police agents, who never lost sight of him. Carrier, however, had no thought of flight. Some revolutionists had secretly advised him to make his escape, but he had not resolution to effect it; he appeared to be overwhelmed, and, as it were, paralyzed by the public horror. One day, perceiving that he was followed, he went up to one of the agents, asked why he followed him, and pointed a pistol at him; a scuffle ensued, the armed force interfered, and Carrier was seized and conducted to his abode. This scene excited a general disturbance in the assembly, and violent complaints at the Jacobins.

It was said that the national representation had been violated in the person of Carrier, and explanations were demanded from the committee of general safety. That committee explained how the circumstances occurred, and though severely censured, it had at least an opportunity of showing that it never had any intention of favouring the escape of Carrier. At length the commission of twenty-one made its report, and decided that there was sufficient ground for accusation before the revolutionary tribunal. Carrier made but a poor defence; he threw the blame of all the cruelties on the exasperation produced by the civil war, on the necessity of striking terror into La Vendée, still threatening; lastly, on the impulse communicated by the committee of public welfare, to which he durst not impute the drownings, but to which he attributed that inspiration of ferocious energy which had hurried away several of the commissioners of the convention. Here it was that dangerous questions, which had already been several times agitated, were again revived; the convention saw that she was again exposed to a dissension as to the part each had taken in the violent scenes of the revolution; the commissioners might fling them back upon the committees, the committees might retort them on the convention, and the convention might impute to France that inspiration which had produced such frightful but such great results, which affected every one, and were in particular induced by a situation without parallel. "Every body and every thing," said Carrier in a moment of despair, "is guilty here, even to the president's bell." The tale of the atrocities committed at Nantes had, however, excited such indignation, that not one member durst defend Carrier, or even thought of justifying him on the score of general considerations. He was unanimously decreed to be under accusation, and was sent to the revolutionary tribunal.

Thus the reaction was making rapid strides. The blows which its authors had not yet dared to strike at the members of the old committees of government, were now levelled at Carrier. All the members of the revolutionary committees, all those of the convention who had served on missions, in short, all the men who had been invested with rigorous functions, began to tremble for themselves.

The Jacobins, already stricken by a decree which forbade their affiliation and correspondence in a corporate name, had need of prudence; but since the late events it was not probable that they knew how to contain themselves, and to avoid a struggle with the convention and the Thermidorians. What had passed in regard to Carrier led in fact to a stormy meeting of their club. Crassous, a deputy and a Jacobin, depictured the means employed by the aristocracy to ruin the patriots. "The trial now going forward before the revolutionary tribunal," said he, "is its principal resource, and that on which it places the greatest reliance. The accused are hardly allowed a hearing before that tribunal; the witnesses are almost all of them persons interested in making a great noise about this affair; some of them have passports signed by Chouans; the journalists and the pamphleteers have combined in exaggerating the most trifling facts, to control public opinion, and to keep out of sight the cruel circumstances which have brought about and which explain the misfortunes that happened not at Nantes only, but throughout all France. If the convention does not take care, she will find herself dishonoured by these aristocrats, who make such a noise about this trial, in order that the entire odium should recoil upon the assembly. It is no longer the Jacobins who are to be accused of wanting to dissolve the convention, but those men who have combined to compromise and to degrade her in the eyes of France. Let, therefore, all good patriots beware; the attack against them has already commenced; let them close their ranks, and be ready to defend themselves with energy."

Several Jacobins spoke after Crassous, and repeated nearly the same sentiments. "People talk," said they, "of shootings and drownings (*fusillades et noyades*), but they do not recollect that the individuals for whom they feel pity had given assistance to the *brigands*. They do not recollect the cruelties perpetrated on our volunteers, who were hanged upon trees and shot in files. If vengeance is demanded on behalf of the *brigands*, let the families of two hundred thousand republicans, mercilessly slaughtered, come also to demand retribution." The highest excitement then took place;

the sitting became a scene of absolute disorder, when Billaud-Varennes, whom the Jacobins reproached for his sullen silence, took his turn to speak. "The course of the counter-revolutionists," said he, "is known. When, in the time of the constituent assembly, they desired to bring the revolution to trial, they called the Jacobins disorganizers, and shot them in the Champ de Mars. After the 2d of September, when they wanted to prevent the establishment of the republic, they called them blood-drinkers (*buveurs de sang*), and loaded them with atrocious calumnies. They are now recommencing the same machinations; but do not let them suppose that they are to triumph. The patriots have been able to keep silence for a moment; but the lion is not dead when he slumbers, and when he awakens he exterminates all his enemies. The trench is opened, the patriots are about to rouse themselves, and to resume all their energy: we have already risked our lives a thousand times; if the scaffold yet awaits us, let us recollect that it was the scaffold that covered the immortal Sidney with glory."

This speech had an electric effect. Billaud-Varennes was cheered; the members gathered round him, vowing to make common cause with the threatened patriots, and to defend themselves to the last extremity.

In the state in which parties then were, a sitting like this could hardly fail of exciting great attention. These words of Billaud-Varennes, who had hitherto restrained himself from showing himself in either of the two tribunes, were an outright declaration of war. The Thermidorians actually regarded them as such. The next day, Bentabolle snatched up the *Mountain Journal*, wherein was a report of the sitting of the Jacobins, and denounced these expressions of Billaud-Varennes: *The lion is not dead when he slumbers, and when he awakens he exterminates all his enemies.* Scarcely had Bentabolle finished reading this sentence, when the Mountaineers took fire, loaded him with abuse, and told him that he was one of those who had caused the aristocrats to be enlarged. Duhem called him a rogue. Tallien was for hearing Bentabolle, who, alarmed at the tumult, would have descended from the tribune. He was, however, persuaded to stay there, and he then proposed that Billaud-Varennes should be called upon to explain what he meant by the *awakening* of the lion. Billaud spoke a few words from his place. "To the tribune!" was shouted from all quarters. He refused, but at length was obliged to ascend and address the assembly. "I shall not disavow," said he, "the opinion that I expressed at the Jacobins; so long as I conceived that the question concerned only private quarrels, I held my peace; but I could no longer hold my tongue when I saw the aristocracy rise up more threatening than ever." At the last words there was a burst of laughter in one of the galleries, and some disturbance occurred in the other. "Turn out the Chouans!" was shouted from the Mountain. Billaud continued amidst the applause of some and the murmurs of others. He said, in a faltering voice, that they had released well-known royalists, and had imprisoned the purest patriots; he cited the instance of Madame de Tourzel, governess of the royal children of France, who had just been liberated, and who might of herself form a nucleus of counter-revolution. At this last expression there was a fresh burst of laughter. He added, that the secret conduct of the committees belied the public language of the addresses of the convention; that, in such a state of things, he had good reason to speak of the necessary awakening of the patriots, for it is the sleeping of men upon the subject of their rights that leads them on to slavery.

Some cheering from the Mountain was heard in favour of Billaud; but a certain portion of the galleries and of the assembly burst forth into greater peals of laughter, and seemed only to demonstrate that insulting pity that prostrate power is apt to call forth while it is stammering forth empty words in its justification. Tallien hastened to succeed Billaud, and to repel the charges against him. "It is high time," said he, "to reply to those men who would fain turn the hands of the people against the convention." "Nobody desires that," cried some voices in the hall. "Yes, yes," rejoined others, "there are those who wish to turn the hands of the people against the convention." "It is those men," continued Tallien, "who are alarmed at seeing the sword suspended over the heads of the guilty, at seeing light thrown upon all the departments of the administration, the vengeance of the law ready to light upon assassins; it is those men who are now bestirring themselves, who pretend that the people ought to awaken, who strive to mislead the patriots by persuading them that they are all compromised; and finally, who hope, by favour of a general commotion, to prevent the prosecution of those who approve of or else abet Carrier." Universal applause interrupted Tallien. Billaud, who was by no means anxious to be deemed an accessory of Carrier, cried out from his place, "I declare that I have never approved the conduct of Carrier." No attention was paid to this protest of Billaud's. Tallien was applauded, and thus resumed: "It is impossible to suffer two rival authorities to exist any longer, or to permit members who are silent here to go away immediately, and to denounce elsewhere all that you have done." "No, no," cried several voices, "let us have no rival authorities to the convention." "It must not," proceeded Tallien, "be allowed that any one should go to any place whatever to pour forth ignominy upon the convention, and upon those of its members to whom it has committed the government. I shall not sum up," added he, "any conclusion at this moment. It is sufficient that this tribune has replied to what has been said in another; it is sufficient that the unanimity of the convention be strongly expressed against the men of blood."

Reiterated cheering showed Tallien plainly enough that the assembly had made up their minds to second any measures that might be proposed against the Jacobins. Bourdon (of the Oise) supported the sentiments of the last speaker, although in many points he differed from his friends, the Thermidorians. Legendre also raised his energetic voice. "Who are they," said he, "that blame our operations?—a handful of men of prey. Look them in the face, you will see that their countenance is covered with a varnish composed of the gall of tyrants." These expressions, which were pointed against the gloomy and atra-bilious counte-

nance of Billaud-Varennes, were loudly applauded. "What have you to complain of," continued Legendre, "you who are incessantly accusing us! Is it because citizens are no longer sent to prison by hundreds! because fifty, sixty, or eighty persons are no longer guillotined every day! Ah! I must confess, in this our pleasure differs from yours, and that our mode of sweeping the prisons is not the same. We have gone over them ourselves; we have made, as far as we could, the distinction between the aristocrats and the patriots; if we have deceived ourselves, our heads are here to answer for it. But while we make reparation for crimes, while we are striving to make you forget that those crimes are your own, why go to a notorious society to denounce us, and to mislead the people, who, fortunately in no great number, betake themselves thither! I move," added Legendre, as he concluded, "that the convention take measures for preventing its members from going and preaching up rebellion at the Jacobins." The convention adopted the motion, and directed the committees to lay those measures before him.

The convention and the Jacobins were thus arrayed against each other; and in this state, when words were exhausted, there was nothing left but to strike a blow. The intention to destroy that celebrated society began to be no longer doubtful; all that was wanting was, that the committees should have the courage to make that proposition. The Jacobins were sensible of this, and complained in all their sittings that there was an evident determination to dissolve them. They likened the existing government to Leopold, to Brunswick, and to Cobourg, who had likewise required their dissolution. One expression in particular, uttered in the tribune, had furnished them with a fertile text for representing themselves as calumniated and attacked. It had been said, that in the intercepted letters a discovery had been made, that the committee of emigrants in Switzerland were on very good terms with the Jacobins of Paris. Had nothing more been said than that the emigrants wished for commotions which should disturb the progress of the government, they would have had good reason for saying so. A letter seized upon the person of an emigrant, stated in fact that it was foolish to expect that the revolution would be overcome by dint of arms, but that its destruction was to be looked for as the effect of its own disorders. But if, on the contrary, people went so far as to suppose that the Jacobins and the emigrants were correspondents, and in combination to attain the same object, they said a thing that was equally absurd and ridiculous, and the Jacobins desired nothing better than to see themselves accused in this fashion. Accordingly, they never ceased, for several days, to declare themselves calumniated; and Duhem, on these several occasions, required that those pretended letters should be read from the tribune.

The agitation in Paris was extreme. Numerous parties, some starting from the Palais Royal, and composed of young men with long tresses and black neckcloths, others from the faubourg Saint-Antoine, and the Rues Saint-Denis and Saint-Martin, and from all the quarters where the Jacobins predominated, met at the Carrousel, in the garden of the Tuileries, on the *Place de la Révolution*. Some shouted, *The convention for ever! Down with the Terrorists and Robespierre's tail!* others replied with cries of *The convention for ever! The Jacobins for ever! Down with the aristocrats!* They had their peculiar songs. The *golden age of youth* had adopted an air which was called the *Réveil du Peuple*; the partisans of the Jacobins sang that old air of the revolution rendered famous by so many victories: *Allons, enfans de la patrie!* They met; they sang their appropriate songs; then set up hostile shouts, and frequently attacked one another with stones and sticks; blood was spilt, and prisoners were taken and delivered by both parties to the committee of general safety. The Jacobins declared that this committee, composed entirely of Thermidorians, released the young men who were handed over to it, and detained none but the patriots.

These scenes lasted for several days together, and at length became so alarming that the committees of government took measures to preserve the public peace, and doubled the guard at all the posts. On the 19th Brumaire (November 9, 1794), the crowds were still more numerous and more considerable than on the preceding days. A party, setting out from the Palais-Royal, and going along the Rue Saint-Honoré, had got to the hall of the Jacobins and surrounded it. The crowd kept continually increasing, all the avenues were choked up, and the Jacobins, who were just then sitting, might fairly consider themselves besieged. Some parties that were favorable to them had shouted, *The convention for ever! The Jacobins for ever!* which had been replied to by opposite cries. A battle ensued, and as the young men were the stronger, they soon succeeded in dispersing all the hostile parties there assembled. They then surrounded the hall of the club, and broke the windows with stones. Flints of enormous size had already fallen amidst the assembled Jacobins. The latter, enraged, cried out that they wanted to murder them; and taking advantage of the presence of some members of the convention, they declared that the national representation was going to be murdered. The women, who filled their galleries, and who were called the *Furies of the Guillotine*, wanted to leave, in order to escape the danger; but the young men, who were waiting for them, seized those who endeavoured to make their escape, subjected them to the most indecent treatment, and even cruelly beat some of them. Several had gone back into the hall in a wretched plight, with dishevelled hair, saying that they wanted to murder them. Stones were still showered upon the assembly. The Jacobins then resolved to sally forth and fall upon the assailants. The energetic Duhem, armed with a stick, put himself at the head of one of these sallies, and the result was a tremendous fray in the Rue Saint-Honoré. If on one side or the other their weapons had been destructive, a massacre would certainly have ensued. The Jacobins returned with some prisoners whom they had taken; the young men remaining outside, were threatening that if their comrades were not liberated, they would force themselves into the hall, and take the most signal vengeance upon their adversaries.

This scene had lasted several hours before the government committees had assembled and could give orders. Several messengers sent from the Jacobins had brought word to the committee of general safety that persons were going to murder

the deputies who were sitting in that club. The four committees, namely, of public welfare, general safety, legislation, and war, met and resolved to send the night patrole immediately to extricate their colleagues who were compromised in this scene, still more scandalous than perilous.

The night patrole set out, with a member of each committee, for the scene of the conflict. It was then eight o'clock. The members of the committees who were at the head of the patrole did not make them charge the assailants, as the Jacobins desired; neither would they enter the hall, as their colleagues there begged of them to do; they remained outside, exhorting the young men to disperse, and promising to give up their comrades. By degrees they succeeded in dispersing the parties who had congregated there; they next cleared the Jacobins' hall, and sent every body home.

Tranquillity being restored, they returned to their colleagues, and the four committees passed the night in deliberating upon what was next to be done. Some were for suspending the Jacobins, others opposed that measure. Thuriot, in particular, though one of those who had attacked Robespierre on the 9th Thermidor, began to be alarmed at the reaction, and seemed to have a hankering for the Jacobins. The committees separated without settling what was to be done.

In the morning (Brumaire 20) one of the most violent scenes took place in the assembly. Duhem was the first, as it may well be supposed, to maintain that on the preceding evening the patriots had been murdered, and that the committee of general safety had not done its duty. The galleries taking part in the discussion, made a frightful noise, and seemed on the one hand to affirm, and on the other to contest the facts. The disturbers were turned out, and immediately afterwards a multitude of members demanded permission to speak; Bourdon (of the Oise), Rewbell, and Clausel, in support of the committee; Duhem, Duroy, and Bentabolle, in opposition. Each spoke in his turn, gave his own colouring to the facts, and was interrupted by the contradictions of those who had viewed them in a different light. Some had only perceived congregations of people maltreating the patriots; others had only met with similar parties maltreating the young men, and abusing the convention and the committees. Duhem, who could scarcely contain himself in discussions of this nature, cried out that the blows had been directed by the aristocrats who were dining at the house of Cabarus, and who were going a hunting at Raincy. His leave to speak was withheld; and all that remained in evidence after this conflict of contrary assertions was, that the committees, notwithstanding their readiness to meet and to call out the armed force, had not been able to send it to the spot till very late; that when the patroles were at last sent towards the Rue Saint-Honoré, they were not disposed to extricate the Jacobins by force, but had contented themselves by causing the concourse to gradually disperse; in short, had shown a very natural indulgence for those parties who shouted *The convention for ever!* and in which nobody said that the government was delivered over to the counter-revolutionists. In fact, one could hardly ask more at their hands. To prevent the maltreatment of their enemies, was their duty; but to insist that they should charge with the bayonet on their own friends, that is to say, those young men who daily came in crowds to support them against the revolutionists, was requiring too much. The committees declared to the convention that they had passed the night in discussing the question whether they ought or ought not to suspend the Jacobins. They were asked if they had yet settled any plan; and on their reply that they were not yet agreed, the whole was referred to them, that they might come to some decision, and afterwards submit the same to the assembly.

This day of the 20th was somewhat more tranquil, because there was no meeting at the Jacobins; but on the 21st, the day for their meeting, the crowds reassembled. On both sides they seemed prepared, and it was very evident that they would come to blows in the evening. The four committees immediately met, suspended by an ordinance the sittings of the Jacobins, and ordered the keys of the hall to be brought forthwith to the secretary's office of the committee of general safety.

The order was obeyed, the hall locked up, and the keys carried to the secretary's office. This measure prevented the tumult that was apprehended; the crowds dispersed, and the night was perfectly quiet. Next day, Laignelot came in the name of the four committees, to acquaint the convention with the resolution they had adopted. "We never had any intention to attack the popular societies," said he, "but we have a right to close the doors of those places where factions are predominant, and where civil war is preached up." The convention repeatedly cheered him. A call of the assembly was demanded, and the ordinance was sanctioned almost unanimously, amidst acclamations and shouts of *Long live the republic! The convention for ever!*

Such was the end of that society whose name had continued to be so celebrated and so odious, and who, like all the assemblies, like all the men who figured one after the other on the stage, nay, like the revolution itself, had the merit and the failings attendant on extreme energy. Placed independent of the convention, open to all new comers, it was the lists whither the young revolutionists who had not yet figured, and who were impatient to show themselves, repaired to try their strength, and to urge on the usually slower progress of those revolutionists who had already attained power. So long as there was need of fresh subjects, fresh talents, fresh lives ready to be sacrificed, the society of the Jacobins had its utility, and furnished such men as the revolution wanted in that terrible and sanguinary struggle. But when the revolution, having arrived at its final term, began to retrograde, it was to the Jacobin club that those ardent spirits to whom it had given birth, and who had survived its violent action, were driven back. This society then became troublesome by its restlessness, and even dangerous by the alarm it diffused. It was then sacrificed by the men who sought to bring back the revolution from the extreme length to which it had been urged, to a just medium of reason, equity, and liberty; and these men, as indeed are most of those who spend their resources in action, blinded by their expectations, conceived that they could retain in that desirable

The Jacobins associate with the Quinze-vingts.—Reinstatement of the seventy-three deputies imprisoned after the 31st of May.

state of mediocrity. They certainly acted reasonably in desiring to return to moderation, and the Jacobins were right in telling them that they were running into counter-revolution. Revolutions being similar to a pendulum violently agitated, and running into opposite extremes, always afford ground for predicating their excess; but it is fortunate that political societies, after violently oscillating in contrary directions, subside at length into an equable and justly limited movement. But before they arrive at that happy determination, what a length of time has to elapse! what calamities! what bloodshed necessarily occur! Our precursors, the English, had to undergo Cromwell and the two Stuarts.

The dispersed Jacobins were not the men to play the part of recluses, and to renounce political agitation. Some sheltered themselves at the electoral club, which, driven from the Evêché by the committees, held its meetings in one of the halls of the Museum. Others went to the popular society of the section of the Quinze-Vingts in the faubourg Saint-Antoine. There the most prominent and the most decided men of the Faubourg met. Thither the Jacobins repaired in a body on the 24th Brumaire, saying, "Brave citizens of the faubourg Antoine! you who are the only supporters of the people, you see the unfortunate Jacobins under persecution. We apply to be admitted into your society. We have said to one another, Let us go to the faubourg Antoine, no one can attack us there; united we shall strike surer blows, to preserve the people and the convention from slavery." They were all indiscriminately admitted, and allowed themselves the utterance of the most violent and the most dangerous language, and several times read this article of the declaration of rights: *When the government violates the rights of the people, insurrection is the most sacred of the rights, and one of the most indispensable duties of the people.*

The committees, who had tried their strength, and felt themselves in perfect vigour, did not consider it necessary to pursue the Jacobins into their asylum, but took no notice of their blustering language, holding themselves in readiness to act at the first signal, should their acts appear commensurate with their words.

The greater part of the sections of Paris took courage, and expelled from their body the Terrorists, as they were called, who then retired to the quarter of the Temple, and in the direction of the Faubourgs Saint-Antoine and Saint-Marceau. Delivered from this opposition, they prepared numerous addresses for the purpose of congratulating the convention on the energy which it had recently displayed against the *accomplices of Robespierre.* Similar addresses came in from almost every town; and the convention, thus borne along in the direction which it had lately taken, engaged in it still further. The seventy-three, over and over again called for, were more than ever demanded with great outcries every day by the members of the centre and of the right side, who were anxious to reinforce themselves with seventy-three voices, and, above all, to insure the freedom of the vote by recalling their colleagues. The seventy-three were at length released and re-instated; the convention, without explaining its sentiments concerning the events of the 31st of May, declared that it was very possible to have thought otherwise than the majority in respect of that subject, without being guilty on that account. They entered in a body, with old Dussaulx at their head. He acted as their prolocutor, and declared that in resuming their seats by their colleagues, they laid aside all resentment, and were solely possessed with the desire of promoting the commonweal. This step taken, it was too late to stop. Louvet, Lanjuinais, Henri Larivière, Doulcet, and Isnard, together with all the Girondists who had escaped the proscription, as also many of them concealed in cellars, wrote and demanded their re-instatement. On this subject a scene of violence took place. The Thermidorians, alarmed at the rapidity of the re-action, stopped short and restrained the right side, who, conceiving that it needed their assistance, durst not displease them, and ceased to persevere. It was decreed that the outlawed deputies should not be further prosecuted, but that they should not return into the body of the assembly.

The same spirit which caused the absolution of some, necessarily induced the condemnation of others. An old deputy, named Raffron, exclaimed that it was high time to prosecute every guilty person, and to show France that the convention took no part with murderers; he moved that Lebon and David should be immediately brought to trial, they being both of them in custody. What had occurred in the south, and especially at Bedouin (Vaucluse), having become known, a report and an act of accusation were called for against Maignet. A multitude of voices insisted on the trial of Fouquier-Tinville, and that depositions should be taken against the former minister at war, Bouchotte, the man who had made the war offices so accessible to the Jacobins. The same motion was made against the ex-mayor, Pache,—an accomplice, it was alleged, of the Hebertists, and saved by Robespierre. Amidst this torrent of attacks upon the revolutionary leaders, the three principal leaders, who had been long defended, could not but at last yield to their fate. Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, being again accused, and in a formal manner by Legendre, could not evade the common lot. The committees could not dispense receiving the denunciation, and stating their opinion. Lecointre, who, when he made his former accusation, was declared a calumniator, now gave notice that he had printed the documents with which he was not provided on the former occasion; they were referred to the committees. The latter, hurried along by the force of opinion, durst not resist, and declared that there was ground for investigation in the case of Collot, Billaud, and Barrère, but not against Vadier, Vouland, Amar, and David.

The process against Carrier, which moved slowly in the eyes of a public that ill-disguised the spirit of re-action by which it was influenced, closed at last on the 26th Frimaire (16th December). Carrier and two members of the revolutionary committee of Nantes, Pinel and Grande-Maison, were condemned to death as agents and accomplices of the system of terror; the others were acquitted; their participations in the drownings (*noyades*) being excused on the ground of obedience to their superiors. Carrier, who persisted in asserting that the entire revolution, as well as those who had

effected, permitted, and directed it, were quite as guilty as himself, was drawn to the scaffold; he exhibited resignation at the fatal moment, and met his death with composure and courage. In proof of the blind excitement of civil wars, many traits of character were cited of Carrier, which demonstrated that previous to his mission to Nantes, he was by no means of a blood-thirsty disposition. The revolutionists at the very time that they condemned his conduct, were alarmed at his fate; they could not conceal from themselves that this execution was the commencement of those bloody reprisals that the counter-revolution had in store for them. Besides the prosecutions directed against the representatives, as members of the old committees, or as sent on mission, other laws lately passed proved that vengeance was about to descend lower, and that the inferiority of the part they played would not save them. A decree required all those who had filled any office whatever, or had dealt with the public money, to pass an account of their administration. Now, as all the members of the revolutionary committees and of the municipalities, had instituted chests with the produce of the assessed taxes, the church plate, and the revolutionary taxes, for the purpose of organizing the first battalions of volunteers, paying the revolutionary armies, defraying the expenses of conveyance, management of the police—in short, for meeting a thousand expenses of the same nature, it was evident that every individual functionary during the terror, was about to be rendered amenable to prosecution.

To these well founded apprehensions were added very alarming reports. Peace with Holland, Prussia, the Empire, Spain, and even La Vendée was talked of; and it was confidently asserted that the terms of this peace would be ruinous to the revolutionary party.

CHAPTER XXVI.

CONTINUATION OF THE WAR UPON THE RHINE, CAPTURE OF NIMEGUEN BY THE FRENCH.—FOREIGN POLICY OF FRANCE, NUMEROUS FOREIGN POWERS REQUIRE A TREATY — DECREE OF AMNESTY WITH REGARD TO LA VENDÉE.—THE CONQUEST OF HOLLAND BY PICHEGRU, CAPTURE OF UTRECHT, AMSTERDAM, AND CAPITAL TOWNS; OCCUPATION OF THE SEVEN UNITED PROVINCES. NEW POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF HOLLAND.—VICTORIES AT THE PYRENEES—TERMINATION OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1794.—PRUSSIA AND SEVERAL OTHER OF THE ALLIED POWERS REQUIRE A PEACE. PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS—STATE OF LA VENDÉE AND BRITTANY. PUISATE IN ENGLAND. THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY HOCHE FOR THE PACIFICATION OF LA VENDÉE. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE VENDEAN LEADERS.

The French armies, masters of the whole left bank of the Rhine, and ready to debouch on the right bank, were threatening Holland and Germany. Were they to advance or to go into cantonments? Such was the question that presented itself.

Notwithstanding their triumphs, and their abode in Belgium, so wealthy a place, they were in a state of the greatest destitution. The country which they occupied, overrun for three years past by innumerable legions, was completely exhausted. To the evils of war were added those of the French administration, which had introduced in its train the assignats, the *maximum*, and the requisitions. Provisional municipalities, eight subordinate administrations, and a central administration established at Brussels, governed the country till its ultimate disposal was decided. Twenty-five millions had been wrung from the clergy, the abbeys, the nobles, and the corporate bodies. The assignats had been put into forced circulation; the prices at Lille had served to settle the *maximum* throughout all Belgium. Articles of consumption and commodities serviceable for the armies had been laid under requisition. These measures had not put an end to the dearth. The merchants and farmers concealed all they possessed; and the officer, like the common soldier, was in want of every thing.

Being levied *en masse* in the preceding year, and hastily conveyed to Hondtschoote, Watignies, and Landau, the entire army had received nothing from the administration save powder and shot. For a long time the army had not encamped under tents, but bivouacked under trees, notwithstanding the commencement of an already severe winter. Many of the soldiers, in want of shoes, fastened wisps of straw about their feet, or wrapped themselves in mats instead of great-coats. The officers, paid in assignats, found their appointments reduced sometimes to eight or ten practicable francs a month; those who received any assistance from their families could hardly avail themselves of it, as every thing was purveyed beforehand by the French administration. They were placed precisely upon the same footing as the common soldier, marching on foot, carrying the knapsack at their back, eating the ammunition bread, and living by the chances of war.

The administration appeared to be exhausted by the efforts which it had made to raise and arm twelve hundred thousand men. The new organization of the supreme power, inefficient and divided, was not calculated to restore it to the requisite nerve and activity. Thus every thing required that the army should go into winter quarters, and there receive the reward of its victories and its military virtues in rest and plentiful accommodation.

Meanwhile, we were before the fortress of Nimeguen, which, seated on the Wahl (the name given to the Rhine near its mouth), commanded both sides, and might serve as a *tête-du-pont* for the enemy to debouch from the next campaign on the left bank. It was therefore important to gain possession of that place before wintering, but to attack it was a very difficult affair. The English army, ranged on the right bank, was encamped there to the number of thirty-eight thousand men;

a bridge of boats enabled the army to communicate with the fortress and to re-victual it. Besides its fortifications, Nimeguen had before it an entrenched camp well manned. To render, therefore, the investment complete, it would have been necessary to have promptly brought upon the right bank an army that would have had to run the risks of the passage and of a battle, and which in case of defeat would have no means of retreat left for it. There was no alternative but to act on the left bank, and they would be obliged to attack the intrenched camp, without any great hope of success.

Notwithstanding all this, the French generals were determined to try the effect of one of those brisk and bold attacks which had in so short a time opened to them the gates of Maestricht and Venloo. The allies, aware of the importance of Nimeguen, had met at Arnheim to decide upon the means of defending the place. It had been settled that an Austrian regiment under general Wernek should be taken into English pay, and should form the left of the duke of York for the defence of Holland, while the duke, with his English and Hanoverians, was to remain on the right bank in front of the bridge of Nimeguen, and thus recruit the forces of the place; general Wernek was to attempt, on the side of Wesel, a considerable distance above Nimeguen, a singular movement, which experienced officers have deemed one of the most absurd that the allied powers ever devised during all these campaigns. This regiment, taking advantage of an island formed by the Rhine, near Buderich, was to cross to the right bank, and to attack a point between the army of the Sambre and Meuse and that of the North. Thus twenty thousand men were to be hurried across a great river, between two victorious armies, each eighty or one hundred thousand strong, to see what effect would be produced upon them: reinforcements were to be made as circumstances might require. It may well be conceived that this movement, executed with the united armies of the allies, might have been grand and decisive; but effected with twenty thousand men, it would be but a puerile attempt, and probably a disastrous one to the regiment that had to undertake it.

Nevertheless, imagining that they could save Nimeguen by these means, the allies on one hand made Wernek's regiment advance towards Buderich, and on the other caused sallies to be made by the garrison of Nimeguen. The French repelled the sallies, and, as at Maestricht and Venloo, opened the trenches much closer to the fortress than was ever yet experienced in war. A fortunate incident accelerated their operations. The two extremities of the semicircle which they described about Nimeguen terminated at the Wahl; they attempted to fire from these extremities at the bridge. Some of their projectiles reached several pontoons, and endangered the communications of the garrison with the English army. The English who were in the fortress, surprised at this unforeseen event, replaced the pontoons, and hastened to rejoin the main body of their army on the other bank, leaving the garrison composed of three thousand Dutch to itself. No sooner were the republicans aware of the evacuation than they increased their fire. The governor, in alarm, acquainted the Prince of Orange with his situation, and obtained permission to retire so soon as he should deem the occasion sufficiently emergent. He had hardly received this authority before he crossed over himself. The garrison got confused. One party laid down their arms; another party, attempting to save themselves by a flying bridge, were stopped by the French, who cut the cables, and they were stranded upon an island, where the latter party were made prisoners.

On the 18th Brumaire (November 8) the French entered Nimeguen, and found themselves masters of that important fortress, solely on account of their temerity, and the terror inspired by their arms. Meanwhile the Austrians, commanded by Wernek, had attempted to debouch from Wesel; but the impetuous Vandamme, rushing upon them at the very moment they set foot on the other side of the Rhine, had driven them on the right bank. And it was fortunate for them that they had not proceeded, for they would have run the risk of being destroyed had they advanced further.

The time for going into cantonments had at last arrived, since we were now masters of all the important points on the Rhine. Certain it is that to conquer Holland, to secure in this manner the navigation of three great rivers, the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Rhine, to deprive England of her most powerful naval ally, to threaten Germany on her flanks, to interrupt the communications of our enemies on the continent with those at sea, or at least to oblige them to make the long circuit by Hamburg; in short, to open for ourselves the richest country in the world, and the most desirable for us in the state our commerce then was, was indeed a termination worthy of exciting the ambition of our government and our armies; but how dare to attempt the conquest of Holland, almost impossible at any time, but particularly impracticable in the rainy season! Situated at the mouths of several rivers, Holland consists of some strips of land thrown up between the currents of those rivers and the sea. Its soil, every where lower than the bed of the waters, is unceasingly threatened by the ocean, the Rhine, the Meuse, the Scheldt, and is intersected moreover by small detached arms of rivers, and by a multitude of artificial canals. These lowlands, thus exposed, are covered with gardens, manufacturing towns, and arsenals. At every step that an army wishes to make there, it finds either broad streams, whose banks are so many dikes bristling with cannon, or arms of rivers or canals, every one of them defended by the art of fortification, or fortresses which are the strongest in Europe. Those grand manœuvres, which frequently set at nought methodical defence by rendering sieges useless, are therefore impracticable in a country intersected and defended by innumerable lines. Should, however, an army contrive to overcome so many obstacles and to advance into Holland, its inhabitants, by an act of heroism of which they furnished an example in the time of Louis XIV., have but to cut their dikes, in order to swallow up, together with their country, the army that has been so rash to push its way thither. They can still have recourse to their shipping, with which they can, like the Athenians of old, fly with their most valuable property, and wait for better times, or go

to India, and there inhabit the vast empire which belongs to them. All these difficulties are greatly increased during the season of inundations, and a maritime alliance, such as that of England, renders these obstacles insurmountable.

It is true that the spirit of independence which possessed the Dutch at this period, their hatred of the stadtholdership, their aversion to England and Prussia, the knowledge they had acquired of their true interests, their resentment on account of the revolution so unfortunately stifled in 1787, gave the French armies the certainty of being ardently desired. It was to be assumed that the Dutch would not permit that the dikes should be cut and the country ruined for a cause which they detested. But the army of the prince of Orange and that of the duke of York still kept them under, and these being in junction, were sufficient to prevent the passage of the numberless lines which it would be necessary to carry against them. If then a surprise was rash in the time of Dumouriez, it was almost insane at the end of 1794.

Nevertheless, the committee of public welfare, instigated by the Dutch refugees, thought seriously of pushing a point beyond the Wahl. Pichegru, almost as badly off as his soldiers, who were covered with itch and vermin, had gone to Brussels to get cured of a cutaneous disease. Moreau and Regnier had succeeded him; both of them were in favour of rest and winter quarters. General Daendels, a Dutch refugee and a gallant officer, earnestly recommended a preliminary attempt on the isle of Bommel, but we were not to persevere if the attack should fail. The Meuse and the Wahl, running parallel with the sea, unite for a short space just below Nimeguen, again separate, and once more unite at Wondrichem, a little above Gorcum. The tract comprehended between their two arms constitutes what is called the isle of Bommel. Contrary to the opinion of Moreau and Regnier, an attack was attempted upon that island at three different points; it was not successful, and was immediately abandoned with the utmost alacrity, especially on the part of Daendels, who cheerfully acknowledged the impossibility so soon as he discovered it.

Then, that is about the middle of Frimaire (the beginning of December), winter quarters were assigned to the army of which it had so much need; a party of cantonments were stationed around Breda for the purpose of formally blockading it. This fortress, as well as the fortress of Grave, still held out; but the interruption of the communications during the winter would certainly compel them to surrender.

It was in this position that the army expected to await the termination of the season; and certainly the army had done enough to be proud of her glory and her services. But an almost miraculous incident had new prospects in store for her; the frost, already very severe, soon increased to such a degree as to encourage a hope, that in all probability the great rivers would be frozen over. Pichegru left Brussels without perfecting his cure, that he might be ready to seize the first opportunity for new conquests, should the season afford him the opportunity. In point of fact, the winter became more and more severe, and was the most rigorous that had been recently known. The Meuse and the Wahl were already covered with floating ice, and the ice along their banks was set. On the 3rd Nivôse (December 23), the Meuse was entirely frozen, and hard enough to bear cannon. General Walmoden, to whom the duke of York had left the command on leaving for England, and whom he had thus condemned to meet with nought else than disasters, found himself in the most difficult position. The Meuse being frozen over, his front would be exposed; and the Wahl being covered with the floating ice, actually threatening to carry away all the bridges, his retreat was endangered. He soon learned that the bridge of Arnheim had been recently swept away; he then lost no time in filing off his baggage and his heavy cavalry to the rear, and he himself retreated upon Deventer, towards the banks of the Yssel. Pichegru, taking advantage of the opportunity that fortune presented him, to surmount obstacles under ordinary circumstances invincible, prepared to cross the Meuse on the ice. He made arrangements for his passage at three points and for seizing the isle of Bommel, while the division that was blockading Breda should attack the lines which surrounded that place. Those brave Frenchmen, exposed almost without clothes to the severest winter known for a century previous, marching in shoes of which nothing but the upper-leather remained, immediately quitted their quarters, and cheerfully renounced that rest which they had begun to enjoy. On the 8th Nivôse (December 28), in a frost of 17°, they showed themselves at three points, at Crèvecœur, Empel, and fort Saint-Andre; they crossed the ice with their artillery, surprised the Dutch, almost torpid with cold, and completely defeated them. While they were making themselves masters of the isle of Bommel, that particular division which was besieging Breda attacked its lines and carried them. The Dutch, assailed on all points, retired in confusion, some towards the head-quarters of the prince of Orange, who kept still at Gorcum, the others to Thiel. In the confusion of their retreat they never thought of defending the pass of the Wahl, which was not quite frozen over. Pichegru, master of the isle of Bommel, into which he had made his way by passing over the frozen Meuse, crossed the Wahl at different points, but durst not venture beyond the river, the ice not being strong enough to bear the cannon. In this situation, the state of Holland would be desperate if the frost were to continue, and every thing seemed to point to its continuance. The prince of Orange with his Dutchmen out of spirits at Gorcum, and Walmoden with his English in full retreat upon Deventer, could not make head against a formidable conqueror, who was far superior to them in strength, and who had so recently broken the centre of their line. Their political was not less alarming than their military situation. The Dutch, full of hope and joy on seeing the French approach, began to agitate. The Orange party was by far too weak to control the republican party. In every quarter, the enemies of the stadtholder's authority reproached it with having annihilated the liberties of the country, of having imprisoned or banished the best and the most generous patriots, and above all, with having sacrificed Holland to England, by dragging her into an alliance inconsistent with all her interests commercial and naval.

They secretly assembled in revolutionary committees, ready to rise at the first signal, to displace the authorities and appoint others. The province of Friesland, whose states were assembled, ventured to declare that she was desirous of separating herself from the stadtholder; the citizens of Amsterdam presented a petition to the authorities of the province, in which they declared that they were ready to oppose any preparation for defence, and that they would not at any rate suffer the dikes to be cut. In this desperate situation the stadtholder thought of negotiating, and sent envoys to Pichegru's head-quarters to demand a truce, and to offer, as conditions of peace, neutrality and an indemnification for the expenses of the war. The French general and the representatives refused the truce; and so far as concerned the offers of peace, they referred them immediately to the committee of public welfare. Already had Spain, threatened by Dugommier, whom we left descending from the Pyrenees, and by Moncey, who, master of Guipuscoa, was advancing upon Pampeluna, made proposals of accommodation. The representatives sent into La Vendée, to ascertain whether a pacification were possible, had replied affirmatively, and recommended a decree of amnesty. How close soever a government may be, negotiations of this nature are always sure to transpire: they get wind even when the ministers are absolute and irremoveable; how then should they continue private with committees renewable by one fourth every month? It was publicly known that Holland and Spain had offered terms; it was added that Prussia, recovered from her delusions, and acknowledging the fault she had committed in allying herself with the house of Austria, demanded a treaty; it was known through every newspaper in Europe that at the diet of Ratisbon several states of the empire, weary of a war that concerned them but little, had insisted on the opening of a negotiation: every thing therefore predisposed people's minds to peace, and in the same manner as they had come back from the ideas of revolutionary terror to sentiments of mercy, they exhibited a transition from ideas of war to those of a general reconciliation with Europe. They drew inferences from the most unimportant facts, in order to found conjectures upon them. The unfortunate children of Louis XVI., deprived of all their relatives, and separated from one another in the prison of the Temple, had seen their situation somewhat ameliorated since the 9th Thermidor. The shoemaker Simon, to whose care the young prince was committed, had perished as an accomplice of Robespierre. Three keepers were appointed in his stead, each of whom took his turn for a day, and who treated the young prince with greater humanity. From these changes made at the Temple important inferences were drawn. The plan under consideration for withdrawing the assignats also gave occasion for abundance of conjectures. The royalists, who began already to show themselves, and whose number was increased by those irresolute persons who always run from a party that begins to lose its importance, spitefully asserted that they were going to make peace. No longer having it in their power to say to the republicans, "Your armies will be beaten," which had been too often repeated without its being verified, and which would now have appeared too silly; they said, "They are going to stop them in the midst of their victories; peace is signed, what then? They will no longer have the Rhine; the condition of peace will be the restoration of Louis XVII. to the throne, the return of the emigrants, the abolition of assignats, and the restitution of the national property." It is easy to conceive how such rumours must have irritated the patriots. Already terrified at the prosecutions directed against them, they witnessed with despair the object which they had been pursuing with such toil compromised by the government. "What do you mean to do with young Capet?" said they. "What are you going to do with the assignats? Have our armies shed so much of their blood that they are now to be stopped in the midst of their victories? Shall they not enjoy the satisfaction of giving to their country the line of the Rhine and the Alps? Europe has desired the dismemberment of France; the just reprisals of victorious France upon Europe ought to be, to subdue those provinces that render her territory perfect. What are they going to do for La Vendée? Are they going to pardon rebels when they sacrifice patriots?" "It were much better," exclaimed a deputy to the Mountain, in a transport of indignation, "to be Charette than a member of the convention!"

One may conceive how much these subjects of division, added to those which domestic policy had hitherto afforded, must have agitated men's minds. The committee of public welfare, finding itself pressed between the two parties, felt itself called upon to explain. The committee declared, therefore, on two different occasions, first through the medium of Carnot, secondly by the agency of Merlin (of Douai), that the armies had received orders to prosecute their triumphs, and were not to listen to any proposals of peace till they were in the heart of the enemy's capitals.

In point of fact, the negotiations of Holland appeared to the committee to have been too long withheld to be now accepted, and the committee did not think it proper to consent to negotiate when on the point of becoming master of the country. To overthrow the power of the stadtholder, and to restore the Dutch republic, seemed to the committee an act worthy of the French republic. The republic certainly exposed herself to the chance of seeing all the colonies of Holland, and even part of her navy, fall a prey to the English, who would declare that they took possession of them in the name of the stadtholder; but political considerations of course had the greatest weight. France could not avoid overthrowing the stadtholdership; this conquest of Holland would marvellously add to her victories, would intimidate Europe still more, and in particular would jeopardise the flanks of Prussia, compel that power to treat immediately, and, above all, impart confidence to the French patriots. In consequence, Pichegru received orders not to stop. Prussia and the empire had not yet made any overture, so there was no answer to give them. As for Spain, who promised to acknowledge the republic and to satisfy its indemnities, on condition of its erecting a little state near the Pyrenees for Louis XVII., she was listened to with scorn and indignation, and orders were issued to the two French generals to advance without delay. As for La Vendée, a decree of amnesty

was passed. Its effect was, that all the rebels, without distinction of rank, who should lay down their arms within the space of one month, should not be prosecuted for their treasonable practices.

General Canclaux, removed on account of his moderation, was replaced at the head of the army of the West, which comprised La Vendée. Young Hoche, who had already the command of the army of the coasts of Brest, had the additional appointment of the army of the coasts of Cherbourg. No persons were better able than these two generals to pacify the country by tempering prudence with energy.

Pichegru, who had received orders to prosecute his victorious career, waited till the surface of the Wahl should be entirely set. Our army proceeded along the river, being extended upon its banks towards Millingen, Nimeguen, and all along the isle of Bommel, of which we were now masters. Walmoden, observing that Pichegru had left but a few advanced posts on the right bank towards Bommel, drove them back, and commenced a movement on the offensive. He proposed to the prince of Orange to join him, in order to form with their united armies an imposing mass, that could by means of a battle arrest the progress of an enemy who could no longer be restrained by the line of the rivers. The prince of Orange could not be prevailed upon to quit Gorcum, lest the road to Amsterdam should be left exposed. Walmoden then resolved to put himself on his line of retreat, which he had traced beforehand from the Wahl to the Linge, from the Linge to the Leck, and from the Leck to the Yssel, through Thiel, Arnheim, and Deventer.

While the republicans were waiting with the most lively impatience for the freezing of the river, the fortress of Grave, defended with heroic courage by Debous, the commandant, surrendered when nearly laid in ashes. This was the principal of the fortresses which the Dutch possessed beyond the Meuse, and the only one that had not yielded to the ascendancy of our arms. The French entered it on the 9th Nivôse (December 29). At length, on the 19th Nivôse (January 8, 1795), the Wahl was frozen into a firm mass. Souham's division crossed it in the direction of Bommel; Dewinter's brigade, a detachment from Macdonald's regiment, crossed near Thiel. At Nimeguen and above, the passage was not so easy, because the Wahl was not quite frozen over. Nevertheless, on the 21st Nivôse (January 10), the right of the French crossed it above Nimeguen, and Macdonald, supported thereby, passed over at Nimeguen itself in boats. On perceiving this general movement, Walmoden's army retired. Nothing but a battle could have saved his army; but in the state of division and discouragement that prevailed among the allies, a battle perhaps could only have led to some unfortunate termination. Walmoden shifted from front to rear, proceeding upon the line of the Yssel, so as to reach Hanover by the provinces of the main land. In conformity with the plan of retreat which he had laid down for himself, he thus abandoned the provinces of Utrecht and Gueldres to the French. The prince of Orange remained near the sea, namely, at Gorcum. Having no longer any hope, he left his army, repaired to the states assembled at the Hague, declared to them that he had done all in his power for the defence of the country, and that nothing more remained for him to perform. He exhorted the representatives not to make any further resistance to the conqueror, lest that might be the harbinger of still greater evils.

From that moment, the victorious French had only to overrun like a torrent all Holland. On the 28th Nivôse (January 17), Salm's brigade entered Utrecht, as did general Vandamme at Arnheim. The states of Holland decided that no further defence should be offered against the French, and that commissioners should be sent to open for them such places as they deemed necessary for their security. On every side, the secret committees which had been formed manifested their existence, drove out the established authorities, and spontaneously appointed new ones. The French were received with open arms and as liberators, and the Dutch brought them such provisions and clothing as they needed. At Amsterdam, where they had not yet made an entry, but where they were impatiently expected, the greatest ferment prevailed. The citizens, exasperated against the Orange party, wanted the garrison to leave the city, the regency to resign its authority, and the restoration of their arms to the citizens. Pichegru, who was approaching, sent an aid-de-camp to exhort the municipal authorities to preserve peace and prevent disorder. On the 1st Pluviôse (January 20) Pichegru, accompanied by the representatives Lacote, Bellegarde, and Joubert, made his entry into Amsterdam. The inhabitants hastened forth to meet him, carrying in triumph the persecuted patriots, and shouting, *The French republic for ever! Pichegru for ever! Liberty for ever!* They admired those brave men, who, half naked, had defied such a winter and gained such victories. The French soldiers furnished on this occasion the highest example of order and discipline. Destitute of provisions and clothing, exposed to frost and snow, in the heart of one of the wealthiest capitals of Europe, they waited for several hours around their piled arms, till the magistrates had provided for their wants and given them their billets. As the republicans entered on one side, the Orange party and French emigrants fled on the other. The sea was covered with vessels, laden with fugitives and with property of every description.

On the same day, the 1st Pluviôse, Bonnaud's division, which had the day before taken possession of Gertruydenberg, crossed the frozen Biesbos, and entered the town of Dordrecht, where there were found six hundred pieces of cannon, ten thousand muskets, and magazines of provisions and ammunition for an army of thirty thousand men. This division then passed through Rotterdam, on its way to the Hague, where the states were sitting. Thus the right towards the Yssel, the centre towards Amsterdam, and the left towards the Hague, successively took possession of all the provinces. The marvellous itself came to assist this operation of the war, in itself so extremely wondrous. Part of the Dutch fleet was at anchor near the Texel. Pichegru, who did not intend to give it time to get clear of the ice and to set sail for England, sent some divisions of cavalry, and several batteries of light artillery, towards north Holland. The Zuider-Zee was frozen; our squadrons galloped across those plains of ice, and our hussars and horse-artil-

lery summoned the ships, immoveably fixed, as they would have done a fortress, to surrender. The Dutch ships surrendered to these assailants of a nature so new to them.

On the left there was nothing else to do than to gain possession of the province of Zealand, which is composed of the islands situated at the mouths of the Scheldt and the Meuse; and on the right the provinces of Overyssel, Drenthe, Friesland, and Groningen, which connect Holland with Hanover. The province of Zealand, strong in her inaccessible position, proposed terms of capitulation in rather a high style, and in these it stipulated not to receive garrisons into her principal fortresses, to be exempt from the levy of contributions, not to receive assignats in payment, to retain her shipping and her property public and private, in a word, for her exemption from all the inconveniences of war. She also required that the French emigrants should be allowed to retire safe and sound. The representatives acquiesced in some of the articles of the capitulation, but entered into no engagement respecting others, saying they must refer them to the committee of public welfare, and without further explanation they entered upon the province, well enough satisfied that they had avoided the dangers of an attack by main force, and to have preserved the squadron, which in all probability might have been delivered up to England. During these things taking place on the left, the right crossing the Yssel drove the English before it, and forced them to retreat beyond the Ems. The provinces of Friesland, Drenthe, and Groningen found themselves thus overmastered, as the seven united provinces were by the victorious arms of the republic.

This conquest, much rather attributable to the season, to the admirable perseverance of our soldiers, and to their happy disposition for withstanding all hardships, than to the abilities of our generals, excited an astonishment in Europe mingled with terror, and in France unbounded enthusiasm. Carnot, having directed the operations of the armies during the campaign of the Netherlands, was the first and the true originator of this success. Pichegru, and still more Jourdan, had effectively seconded his plans during that sanguinary series of engagements. But from the time that the army had passed from Belgium into Holland, every thing was due to the soldiers and the weather. Nevertheless Pichegru, as commander-in-chief of that army, reaped all the glory of that wonderful conquest; and his name, borne on the wings of renown, circulated throughout all Europe as that of the greatest general of France. It was not sufficient to have conquered Holland; the French had still to conduct themselves there with prudence and policy. In the first place, it was of importance that they should not trample upon the country, lest they should alienate the inhabitants. After taking care of that, they had next to impart a political bias to Holland, and on this point they soon found themselves between two contrary opinions. Some were desirous that this conquest should be rendered available to the cause of liberty by revolutionizing Holland; others desired that too strong a spirit of proselytism should not be developed, lest it should again alarm Europe, now on the point of reconciling herself with France.

The first care of the representatives was to publish a proclamation, in which they declared that all private property should be inviolate, excepting, however, that of the stadtholder; that the latter being the only enemy of the French republic, his property belonged to the conquerors as an indemnification for the expenses of the war; that the French entered as friends of the Batavian nation, not to impose upon it any religion or any form of government whatever, but to deliver it from its oppressors, and to confer on it the means of expressing its desires. This proclamation, followed up by corresponding acts, produced a most favourable impression. The authorities were every where renewed under the French influence. An exclusion took place in respect of several members, who had been introduced into the states by the stadtholder's influence alone, and they elected as president, the patriot Peter Paulus, minister of the navy before the overthrow of the republican party in 1787, a distinguished man, and strongly attached to his country. This assembly abolished the stadtholdership for ever, and proclaimed the sovereignty of the people. She waited on the representatives to acquaint them with what she had done, and to pay them homage, as it were, by thus communicating her resolution. She then undertook the formation of a constitution, and committed the affairs of the country to a provisional administration. Out of the eighty or ninety ships of war composing the military marine of Holland, fifty were left in the ports and preserved for the Batavian republic; the others had been seized by the English. The Dutch army, disbanded from the time of the departure of the prince of Orange, was to be placed upon a new footing, and under the command of general Daendels. As for the famous bank of Amsterdam, the mystery of its chest was at length laid open. Had this bank continued to be a bank of deposit, or had it become a discount or loan bank, either to the East India Company, or to the government, or to the provinces? Such was the question which had long been asked, and which exceedingly diminished the credit of that celebrated bank. It was ascertained that it had lent to the amount of eight or ten millions of florins on bonds of the East India company, the chamber of loans, the province of Friesland, and the city of Amsterdam. This was a violation of the terms of its constitution. It was alleged, however, that there was no deficit, because these obligations represented certain securities. But it was requisite that the company, the chamber of loans, and the government, should be able to pay, in order that the obligations due by the bank should not cause a deficit.

While the Dutch were considering as to the regulation of the state of their country, it was necessary to provide for the wants of the French army, entirely destitute. The representatives made a requisition to the provincial government for cloth, shoes, clothing of all kinds, provisions, and ammunition, which it undertook to supply. This requisition, without being excessive, was sufficient to equip and subsist the army. The Dutch government invited each town to take their part in the supply of this requisition, telling them, and with good reason, that they ought to lose no time in satisfying a generous conqueror, who asked for,

instead of taking what he wanted, and who demanded no more than what his necessities absolutely required. The towns exhibited the utmost willingness to comply, and the articles laid under requisition were punctually supplied. An arrangement was then made for the circulation of assignats. The soldiers receiving their pay only in paper, it was requisite that this paper should have the currency of money, so as they should be able to pay it in return for what they wanted. The Dutch government came to a full understanding on this head. The shopkeepers and the petty dealers were obliged to take the assignats of the French soldiers at the rate of nine sous per franc; they were not to sell to the amount of more than ten francs to any one soldier; they were then, at the end of every week, to appear before the municipalities, who would cancel the assignats at the rate at which they had been taken. Owing to these different arrangements, the army, which had been so long enduring privations, found itself at length in abundance, and began to taste the fruits of its victories.

Our triumphs, so surprising in Holland, were not less brilliant in Spain. There, thanks to the climate, the operations had been continued without difficulty. Dugommier, quitting the high Pyrenees, had advanced in face of the enemy's line, and had attacked on three points the long chain of positions taken by general La Union. The brave Dugommier had been killed by a cannon ball in the attack of the centre. The left had not been successful, but the right, owing to the intrepidity and energy of Augereau, had been completely victorious. The command had been given to Perignon, who had recommended the attack on the 30th Brumaire (November 20th), and gained a signal victory. The enemy had fled in disorder, and left us the entrenched camp of Figueras. The Spaniards being seized with panic terror, the commandant of Figueras had opened the gates to us on the 9th Frimaire, and we had thus entered one of the strongest fortresses in Europe. Such was our position in Catalonia. Towards the western Pyrenees, we had taken Fontarabia, Saint-Sebastian, and Tolosa, and we occupied the whole province of Guipuscoa. Moncey, who had succeeded general Muller, had crossed the mountains and had advanced up to the gates of Pampeluna. However, considering his position much too hazardous, he had retraced his steps, and supported by stronger positions, he awaited the return of the fine weather for pushing his way into Castille.

The winter, therefore, had not been able to impede the progress of that memorable campaign, and it had now closed in the middle of the season of frost and snow, in Pluviôse, that is, in January and February. If the glorious campaign of 1793 had saved us from invasion by the un-blockading of Dunkirk, Maubeuge, and Landau, the campaign of 1794 had recently opened a career of conquest by giving us Belgium, Holland, the country comprised between the Meuse and the Rhine, the Palatinate, the line of the Upper Alps, the line of the Pyrenees, and several fortresses in Catalonia and Biscay. Yet a little, and we shall presently see still greater wonders; but these two campaigns will remain in history as the most national, the most legitimate, and the most honourable for France.

The allied powers could not withstand so frequent and such rude shocks. The English cabinet, who by the blunders of the duke of York had lost no more than the alliance of the states, and who had recently gained forty or fifty ships of war, upon pretext of restoring them to the stadtholder, and who under the same pretence was about to seize upon the Dutch colonies; the English cabinet was by no means in haste to terminate the war; on the contrary, she was fearful lest it should die a natural death by the dissolution of the alliance; but Prussia, who now perceived the French on the banks of the Rhine and the Ems, and saw the torrent ready to burst upon her, no longer hesitated. She immediately sent a commissioner to Pichegru's headquarters to stipulate for a truce, and to promise to open immediately negotiations for peace. The place chosen for these negotiations was Bâle, where the French government had an agent, who had attracted great respect from the Swiss by his intelligence and his moderation. The reason alleged for selecting this place was, that they might there treat with more secrecy and quiet than in Paris itself, where too many passions were still in agitation, and where a multitude of foreign intrigues interlaced one another; but that was not the true motive. While making overtures of peace to that very republic whom they had fully expected to annihilate by a single military movement, Prussia wanted to gloss over the acknowledgment of her defeat, and much rather preferred going in quest of peace to a neutral country than in the heart of Paris. The committee of public welfare, less haughty than its predecessor, and being sensible of the necessity there was for detaching Prussia from the allied powers, consented to invest its agent at Bâle with sufficient powers for treating. Prussia despatched Baron Goltz, and the powers were exchanged at Bâle on the 3d Pluviôse, year III. (January 22, 1795.)

The empire was quite as much anxious to withdraw from the coalition as Prussia. The greater part of its members, incapable of furnishing the quintuple contingent and the subsidies voted under the influence of Austria, had suffered themselves to be urged to no purpose, during the whole campaign, to keep their engagements. With the exception of those who had their states compromised beyond the Rhine, and who clearly saw that the republic would not restore them unless upon compulsion, all were desirous of peace. Bavaria, Denmark, Sweden for the duchy of Holstein, the elector of Mentz, and several states, had declared that it was high time to put an end *by an acceptable peace to a ruinous war;* that the Germanic empire had never had any other object in view than the maintenance of the stipulations of 1648; and had taken up arms only in behalf of such of her states as adjoined Alsace and Lorraine; that she looked to her own preservation, not her aggrandizement; *that her intention never had been or ever could be to meddle with the internal government of France;* that this pacific declaration must be made sooner or later, to put an end to the evils which afflicted humanity; and that Sweden, the guarantee of the stipulations of 1648, and who had happily remained neutral amidst this general war, could take upon herself the office of mediatrix. The majority of the votes had acceded to this proposal. The elector of

Trèves, stripped of his dominions, and the imperial envoy for Bohemia and Austria, were the only persons who declared that it was certainly right to seek for peace, but that such an object was scarcely practicable when the country was without government. At length, on the 25th December, the diet had provisionally published a *conclusum* inclining to peace, leaving it to be afterwards settled by whom the proposition should be made. The substance of the *conclusum* was, that, while making preparation for a new campaign, the states ought not the less to make overtures for peace; that doubtless France, touched by the sufferings of humanity, and convinced that there was no intention of interfering in her internal affairs, would consent to conditions honourable to both parties.

Thus, whoever had committed faults thought of repairing them, if it were yet time. Austria, although exhausted by her exertions, had lost too much in losing the Netherlands to think of laying down her arms. Spain had been inclined to withdraw from the contest; but again involved in English intrigues, and engaged by a feeling of false shame to the cause of the French emigration, she durst not yet demand peace.

The same discouragement that possessed the external enemies of the republic also gained ground among her internal enemies. The Vendeans, divided and exhausted, would not have held themselves aloof from conciliation; to have caused them to decide for a peace, they had only to make a discreet proposal, and to make them believe it were sincere. The forces of Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Charette were extremely reduced. It was only by compulsion that they could now make their peasants march. These latter, sick of the carnage, and above all ruined by devastations, would willingly have abandoned this horrible war. Those that remained entirely devoted to the leaders, were some few men of an absolutely military turn, smugglers, deserters, and poachers, who had contracted a desire for fighting and plunder, and who would be disgusted with agricultural labours. But these latter were by no means numerous. These formed the picked regiment which kept constantly together, but was totally incapable of withstanding the republicans. It was not without the greatest difficulty that on days of active service, the peasants could be taken from their fields. Thus the three Vendean leaders had scarcely any forces. Unfortunately for them, they were not even united. We have seen that Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Charette had entered into articles at Jalais, which were nothing else than a postponement of their mutual rivalries. It was not long before Stofflet, at the instigation of the ambitious Abbé Bernier, would have organized his army separately, and have procured it a settled revenue and an administration, in short, every thing that constitutes a properly constituted authority; and with this object in view, he purposed also to make paper money. Charette, jealous of Stofflet, was vehemently opposed to his designs. Seconded by Sapinaud, with whom he had great influence, he called upon Stofflet to relinquish his design, and to appear before the general council instituted by the articles of Jalais. Stofflet had refused to answer. Upon his refusal, Charette declared the articles of Jalais annulled. This was in some measure to strip him of his command, for it was at Jalais that they had reciprocally acknowledged their titles. The rupture was therefore complete, and did not permit them to recover their exhausted state by being on good terms with one another. Although the royalist agents of Paris were commissioned to open a correspondence with Charette, and to send him letters of regency, nothing of the sort had hitherto reached this leader.

Scépeaux's division, between the Loire and the Vilaine, afforded the same spectacle. In Brittany, it is true, energy was less relaxed; a protracted war had not exhausted the inhabitants. Chouannerie was in itself a lucrative mode of robbery, which did not weary those who abandoned themselves to this pursuit; and besides, a single leader, a man of unequalled perseverance, was there to rekindle the nearly expiring fervour. But this leader, whom we have seen as only delaying his journey till he had completed the organization of Brittany, had lately repaired to London, for the purpose of entering into communication with the English cabinet and the French princes. Puisaye had left, to supply his place at the central committee as major-general, one Sieur Desotteux, styling himself Baron de Cormatin. The emigrants, so numerous in the courts of Europe, were very scarce in La Vendée, in Brittany, and wherever this painful civil war had place. They affected supreme contempt for this kind of service, which they termed chouanning (*chouanner*). For this reason there was a want of officers, and M. de Puisaye had taken this adventurer, who had recently decorated himself with the title of Baron de Cormatin, because his wife had inherited a petty barony of that name in Burgundy. He had been by turns a red hot revolutionist, then an officer of Bouillé's, afterwards a *knight of the dagger* (*chevalier du poignard* *), and lastly he had emigrated, in quest of some employment or other. He was like one possessed with a devil, talking and gesticulating with great vivacity, and liable to the most sudden changes. Such was the man whom Puisaye, without knowing him well enough, had left in Brittany.

Puisaye had been at the pains of instituting a method of corresponding through the islands of Jersey; but his absence was protracted, and oftentimes his letters did not come to hand; Cormatin was in no wise capable of supplying his place and reviving public spirit; the leaders became impatient or disheartened, for they saw the old animosities, lulled by the clemency of the convention, subsiding around them, and the elements of civil war dissolving. The presence of such a general as Hoche was not likely to encourage them; for Brittany, although less exhausted than La Vendée, was quite as well disposed to accept a peace proposed in an apt or delicate manner.

Canclaux and Hoche were both very capable of successfully managing this. We have already observed how Canclaux behaved in the first war in La Vendée; he had left behind him in that country a high character for moderation and ability. The army placed under his command was considerably weakened by the continual reinforcements sent to the Pyrenees and to the Rhine, and moreover, entirely disorganized by its long stay in the same

* *Ante*, p. 62, col. 2.

places. From the disorder incident to civil wars, insubordination had gained ground, and this led to pillage, debauchery, drunkenness, and disease. This was the second relapse of that army since the commencement of this fatal war. Out of forty-six thousand men of whom it was composed, fifteen or eighteen thousand were in the hospitals; the remaining thirty thousand were badly armed, and half of them were protecting the fortresses; thus all that were effective amounted at most to fifteen thousand. Canclaux asked him for twenty thousand men; whereof fourteen thousand were taken from the Brest army, and six from that of Cherbourg. With this reinforcement he doubled all the posts, recovered the camp of Sorinières near Nantes, recently taken by Charette, and bore down in full force in the direction of the Layon, which formed Stofflet's defensive line in Upper Anjou. After he had taken this commanding position, he circulated plentifully the decrees and the proclamation of the convention, and sent emissaries all over the country.

Hoche, habituated to war upon a large scale, and endued with superior qualities for conducting it, found himself, to his extreme mortification, condemned to a civil war, conducted without liberal feelings, military combinations, and without the means of acquiring repute. He had at first solicited his dismissal; but he soon became resigned to serve his country in so disagreeable a post and so beneath his abilities. He was now going to be rewarded for this forbearance, by finding on the very stage he had desired to quit, occasion for displaying the qualities of a statesman as well as those of a general. His army was utterly weakened by the reinforcements sent to Canclaux. He had scarcely forty thousand ill-organized men to protect an intersected, mountainous, and woody country, together with more than three hundred and fifty leagues of coast from Cherbourg to Brest. He was promised twelve thousand men, which were to be drawn from the north. He more particularly required well-disciplined men, and he immediately set about correcting in his own troops the habits contracted in the civil war. "We ought," said he, "to put at the head of our columns none but disciplined men, who can show as much good conduct as bravery, and be mediators as well as soldiers." He had trained them in a great number of small camps, and he recommended to them to go about in troops of forty or fifty, to endeavour to acquire a knowledge of the locality, and to accustom themselves to this war of surprises, to compete with the Chouans in stratagems, to converse with the peasants, to make acquaintance with them, to gain their confidence, their friendship, nay even their assistance. "Never lose sight of this," he thus wrote to his officers, "that policy ought to have a great share in this war. Let us employ by turns humanity, virtue, integrity, energy, stratagem, and never lose sight of that dignity which beseems republicans." In a short time, he had given to that army a different aspect and another position; the discipline so indispensable for pacificatory measures was restored. It was he who, mingling indulgence with severity towards his soldiers, used these judicious expressions in writing to one of his lieutenants, who complained too bitterly of some drunken excesses; "Why, my friend, if soldiers were philosophers, they would not fight. Let us, however, punish drunkards, if drunkenness induces a neglect of their duty." He had conceived the most judicious ideas respecting the country, and in regard to the mode of pacifying it. "These peasants," he wrote, "must have priests; let them therefore have them if they desire it. Many have suffered, and are sighing to return to an agricultural life; let us afford them some assistance to repair their farms. As for those who have contracted the habit of war, it would be impossible to throw them back upon their country; they would only disturb it by their indolence and their restlessness. We form them into legions, and enrol them in the armies of the republic. They will make excellent soldiers for the advanced guard; and their hatred of the allies who have not relieved them, will be a guarantee for their fidelity to us. Besides, what signifies the cause?—it is war that they want. Recollect," he added, "the bands of Duguesclin going to dethrone Peter the Cruel, and the regiment raised by Villars in the Cevennes." Such was the young general who was called in to restore peace to those unfortunate countries.

The decrees of the convention, profusely circulated in La Vendée and in Brittany, the release of the suspected persons, both at Nantes and at Rennes, the pardon granted to Madame de Bonchamps, who had been saved from the decree of death issued against her, the reversing of all unexecuted sentences, the universal toleration that had been granted, the prohibition against injuring churches, the liberation of the priests, the punishment of Carrier and his accomplices, began to produce the desired effect in both countries, and created a general tendency to make the most of the general amnesty, held out to the leaders as well as soldiers. Animosities were appeased, and opposition also declined in the same ratio. The representatives on mission at Nantes had interviews with the sister of Charette, and made him acquainted, through her agency, with the decree of the convention. He was at that moment reduced to extremity. Though endowed with unparalleled perseverance, he could not subsist without hope, and not a single ray of hope appeared. The court of Verona, where he excited such admiration, as we have already seen, nevertheless did nothing for him. The regent had, indeed, recently written him a letter, in which he appointed him lieutenant-general, and styled him the second founder of the monarchy. But this letter, which might at least have ministered to his vanity, had been intrusted to the agents in Paris, and had not yet reached him. He had for the first time solicited relief from England, and sent his young aid-de camp La Roberie to London; but he had received no tidings from him. Thus he had not a word of reward or encouragement, either from the princes to whom he was devoting himself, or from the powers whose policy he was seconding. He consented therefore to an interview with Canclaux and the representatives of the people.

At Rennes also the desired return to confidence was brought about by the sister of one of the leaders. One Botidoux, a principal Chouan of the Morbihan, had been informed that his sister, who was at Rennes, had been imprisoned on his account. He was prevailed upon to repair thither, in order

to obtain her release. The representative Boursault gave him up his sister, paid him all sorts of attentions, satisfied him respecting the intentions of the government, and contrived to convince him of the sincerity of the decree of amnesty. Botidoux undertook to write to one Bois-Hardi, an intrepid young Chouan, who commanded the division of the Côtes-du-Nord, and was reputed to be the most formidable of the insurgents. "What hopes," he wrote to him, "can you entertain? The republican armies are masters of the Rhine. Prussia is soliciting peace. You cannot rely on the promises of England; you cannot rely upon the leaders who write to you only from beyond sea, or who have forsaken you upon pretext of seeking assistance for you; henceforth you can but wage a war of assassination." Bois-Hardi, perplexed by this letter, and unable to leave the Côtes-du-Nord, where as yet active hostilities required his presence, got the central committee to repair to him, in order to furnish an answer to Botidoux. The committee, at the head of which was Cormatin, as Puisaye's major-general, went to Bois-Hardi. There was in the republican army a young general, bold, brave, possessing great natural talent, and especially that cunning peculiar to the calling he had formerly followed, that of a jockey (*maquignon*): this man was general Humbert. "He was one of those," said Puisaye, "who had altogether proved that a year's practical experience in war completely outdoes all the apprenticeships of the parade." He wrote a letter, the style and orthography whereof were denounced to the committee of public welfare, but which nevertheless deeply affected Bois-Hardi and Cormatin. An interview took place. Bois-Hardi showed the self-possession of a young and brave soldier, devoid of personal feeling, a soldier from temperament rather than from fanaticism; however, he made no promises, and left Cormatin to act. The latter, with his habitual inconsistency, highly flattered at being called to treat with the generals of the mighty French republic, acceded to all Humbert's overtures, and begged to be put in communication with the generals, Hoche and Canclaux, and the representatives. Interviews were assented to; the day and the place were appointed. The central committee found fault with Cormatin for having gone too far. The latter, adding duplicity to inconsistency, assured the committee that he would not betray their cause; that in accepting an interview, he wished to form his opinion of the common enemy on a closer inspection, and to judge of his forces and intentions. He gave two reasons, and, according to him, they were important: in the first place, he had never seen Charette, and he had never yet acted with him; by desiring to see him, under the statement that La Vendée as well as Brittany was to be included in the negotiation, he might converse with him upon Puisaye's plans, and obtain his concurrence therein. Secondly, Puisaye, the boyhood acquaintance of Canclaux, had written him a letter likely to affect him, and containing the most splendid offers to gain him over to the monarchy. Upon the pretext of an interview, Cormatin would deliver the letter to him, and thus effectuate Puisaye's plan. Affecting thus the part of a skilful diplomatist with his colleagues, Cormatin obtained their assent to his commencing a feigned negotiation with the republicans, in order to lay his plans with Charette and to gain over Canclaux. In this spirit he wrote to Puisaye, and set out with his head full of the most contrary ideas; at one time proud of deceiving the republicans, of plotting before their faces, and depriving them of a general; at another time, vain at being made the mediator of the insurgents with the representatives of the republic, and ready, in this confused medley of ideas, to become a dupe while intending to make dupes. He saw Hoche; he at first demanded a provisional truce, and then required permission to visit all the Chouan chiefs, one after another, for the purpose of suggesting pacific views, to see Canclaux, and especially Charette, in order to lay his plans before the latter, saying that the Bretons could not separate themselves from the Vendeans. Hoche and the representatives accorded with his request; but they assigned Humbert to accompany him, and to attend at all the interviews. Cormatin, now at the summit of his wishes, wrote to the central committee and to Puisaye, stating that his artifices had succeeded, that the republicans were his dupes, that he was going to confirm the Chouans, to talk with Charette, to engage him merely to temporize till the grand expedition, and lastly, to gain over Canclaux. He accordingly set about making a hasty survey of Brittany, introducing himself to all the leaders, and astonishing them by the promises of peace, and by this singular truce. Not one of them comprehended his subtleties, and they relaxed their exertions. The cessation of hostilities induced a desire for rest and peace, and, without being aware of it, Cormatin promoted the pacification. He himself began to be inclined that way; and while he meant to dupe the republicans, it was the republicans who, without meaning to do so, deceived him. Meanwhile, an appointment had been made with Charette for the time and place of the interview. It was near Nantes. Cormatin was to repair thither, and at that place the negotiations were to commence. Cormatin, more and more embarrassed every day by the engagements which he was contracting with the republicans, began to write less frequently to the central committee; and the committee, seeing the turn which things were about taking, wrote to Puisaye in Nivôse. "Make haste and come back. The courage of our men is shaken; the republicans are seducing the leaders. You must come, but not unless it were with twelve thousand men, money, priests, and emigrants. Be here before the end of January (Pluviôse)." Thus, while the emigrants and the foreign powers were building so many expectations upon Charette and Brittany, a negotiation was about to make a pacification between the two countries. In Pluviôse (January and February) the republic was, therefore, treating at Bâle with one of the principal powers, and at Nantes with the royalists, who had up to this time opposed and misconceived her intentions.

CHAPTER XXVII.

RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF FASHIONABLE LIFE; RE-OPENING OF THE THEATRE AND LEARNED SOCIETIES; ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIMARY AS OF NORMAL SCHOOLS OF LAW AND MEDICINE; DECREES CONCERNING COMMERCE, TRADE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, AND RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES—SCARCITY OF THE NECESSARIES OF LIFE DURING THE WINTER OF THE YEAR III.—THE BUSTS OF MARAT DESTROYED—ABOLITION OF THE "MAXIMUM" AND THE REQUISITIONS—THE DIFFERENT METHODS PROPOSED FOR CALLING IN THE ASSIGNATS—INCREASE OF THE SCARCITY AT PARIS—RE-INSTATEMENT OF THE GIRONDIST DEPUTIES—TUMULTUOUS SCENES OCCASIONED BY THE DEARTH; AGITATION OF THE REVOLUTIONISTS; INSURRECTION OF THE 12TH GERMINAL; THE EVENTS OF THAT DAY DESCRIBED—BANISHMENT OF BARRÈRE, BILLAUD-VARENNES, AND COLLOT D'HERBOIS—ARREST OF VARIOUS MOUNTAINEER DEPUTIES—DISTURBANCES IN THE CAPITAL TOWNS—THE PATRIOTS DISARMED.

THE Jacobins were dispersed, the principal agents or chiefs of the revolutionary government were under prosecution, Carrier executed, and several other deputies were called to account for their missions; lastly, Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, Barrère, and Vadier, had notice that they were to be placed under accusation, and were appointed to be handed over to the tribunal of their colleagues. But while France was thus seeking to revenge herself on the men who had extorted from her such agonized throes, and condemned her to a system so terrible, she returned with intensity of feeling to pleasurable enjoyments, and to the refinements of the arts and of civilization, of which those men had for a moment deprived her. We have already observed with what fervency preparations were made for the enjoyment of this winter, with what new and singular taste the women had sought to array themselves; how much the concerts in the Rue Feydeau were frequented. In the mean time, all the theatres were again opened. The actors of the Comédie Française were released from prison; Larive, Saint-Prix, Molé, Dazincourt, Saint-Phal, and Mesdemoiselles Coutat and Devienne, had again appeared on the stage. The theatres became quite the rage. There it was that every passage that could bear any allusion to the reign of terror was applauded; there it was that the air of the *Reveil du Peuple* was sung; and there it was that the *Marseillaise* was proscribed. In the boxes appeared the beauties of the day, either wives or friends of the Thermidorians; in the front of the pit, the *jeunesse dorée* of Fréron seemed to deride by their pleasures, their dress, and their taste, those gross sanguinary Terrorists who it was said had wanted to drive away all ideas of civilization. The public balls were attended with the same frequency. There was one at which no one was present who had not lost relatives during the revolution. It was called the *victims'* ball. The public places devoted to the arts were also opened. The convention, who with all its passions retained magnificent ideas, had ordered the formation of a museum, whither those pictures France already possessed, as well as those which we acquired by conquest, were to be collected. They had already conveyed thither those pictures of the Flemish school taken in Belgium. The Lyceum, where Laharpe had very recently been uttering his eulogies upon philosophy and liberty in a red cap; the Lyceum, closed during the reign of terror, had just before been restored to the public, owing to the bounty of the convention, who had taken upon itself part of the expense of the establishment, and had distributed some hundreds of tickets among the young men of each section. There Laharpe was heard declaiming against anarchy, the system of terror, the corruption of the language, *philosophism*, in fact against all that he had formerly extolled; before this same liberty he had eulogized had upon a very short acquaintance scared his weak mind. The convention had granted pensions to almost all men of letters and science, without reference to opinions. She had recently decreed the establishment of the primary schools, where the people were to learn the elements of the language, both as spoken and written, the rules of arithmetic, the principles of surveying, and some practical ideas concerning the principal phenomena of nature; central schools were also appropriated for the higher classes, where youth were to be taught the mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry, natural history, the preservation of health, arts and mechanics, the arts of design, the belles lettres, the ancient languages, the living languages most appropriate to peculiar localities, general grammar, logic and analysis, history, political economy, and the elements of legislation, all in the order best adapted to the development of the understanding; the normal schools, where, under the most eminent professors and men of science, young students were to be trained, who were afterwards to diffuse throughout all France the instruction derived from the centre of intelligence; lastly, the particular schools of medicine, law, and the veterinary art. Besides this vast system of education, destined to diffuse and to propagate that civilization which the revolution was so unjustly accused of having banished, the convention voted encouragements of every description. The establishment of various manufactures had just been ordered. There was given to the Swiss who had left their country on account of disturbances there, the national domains at Besançon, in order that they might transfer to that place the manufacture of clocks and watches. The convention had, moreover, required from her committees designs for canals, plans for the formation of a bank, and a system of advances to certain provinces ruined by the war. The convention had also mitigated several laws likely to prejudice agriculture and commerce. A great number of farmers and labourers had quitted Alsace when it was evacuated by Wurmser, the same with regard to Lyons during the siege, and also the same with respect to the entire south after the severities exercised against federalism. The convention made a distinction

between these claimants and the emigrants, and enacted a law by which labourers and artisans, who had left France since the 1st of May, 1793, and who were disposed to return before the 1st Germinal, should not be considered as emigrants. The law relative to suspected persons, the repeal of which had been called for, was retained; but it was no longer formidable to any other than the patriots, who had in their turn become the suspected of the day. The revolutionary tribunal had been entirely remodelled, and restored to the form of the ordinary criminal tribunals; it had judges, juries, and counsel for the accused. Judgment could no longer be given upon written documents, or without the examination of witnesses. The law which allowed the tribunal to dispense with oral pleadings, and which had been passed against Danton, was repealed. The district administrations were to be no longer permanent, except in cities of more than fifty thousand souls. Lastly, the important interests of religious observance were regulated by a new law. The preamble of this law recited, that by virtue of the declaration of rights, all religions were tolerated; but it declared that the state would no longer pay for the support of any particular religion, and would no longer permit its being publicly celebrated. Each sect was at liberty to erect or to rent buildings, and to practise the observances of its religion in those edifices. Lastly, in order to create a substitute for the ancient ceremonies of the Catholic religion and those of *reason*, the convention formed a plan of decadary *fêtes*. The convention had combined dancing, music, and moral exhortations, so as to render the diversions of the people advantageous, and to impart to their minds impressions at once useful and agreeable. Thus relieved from the urgent necessity for defending herself, the revolution divested herself of her violent procedures, and returned to the true object of her mission, that of promoting the arts, industry, intelligence, and civilization.

But, while cruel laws were seen to disappear, while the upper classes were tranquillizing themselves, and indulging in pleasure, the lower classes were suffering from a terrible dearth, and from a season so severe as to be almost unparalleled in our climate. This winter of the year III., which enabled us to cross dry-shod over the rivers and arms of the sea in Holland, made us pay dearly for that conquest, by exposing the people in the towns and in the country to grievous hardships. It was beyond dispute the severest winter of the century; it surpassed even that which preceded the opening of the states-general in 1789. The necessaries of life were deficient from various causes. The principal was the insufficiency of the harvest. Although it had been proclaimed as likely to be very fine, yet the drought, and after that the blights, had deceived every body's expectation. The corn-thrashing had been neglected, as in the preceding year, either from want of hands, or the ill-will of the farmers. The assignats were every day falling lower, and had recently fallen to one-tenth of their value; the maximum had become more than ever oppressive, and the repugnance to obey it, and the efforts to evade it, were so much the greater. The farmers every where made false declarations, and were assisted in their falsities by the municipalities, which, as we have seen, had lately been renewed. Being composed almost all of them of moderate men, they willingly connived at disobedience to the revolutionary laws; in short, all the springs of authority were relaxed; and the government having ceased to operate by fear, the requisitions for the supply of the armies and the great communes were no longer obeyed. Thus the extraordinary system of supplies, that was intended to supply the deficiencies of commerce, was disorganized long before commerce had regained its natural movement. The dearth was, of course, more severely felt in the great communes, always more difficult to supply. Paris was threatened with a famine more distressing than any of those which had caused it alarm during the whole course of the revolution. With causes of a general nature were combined some causes of a particular kind. By the suppression of the conspirator commune of the 9th Thermidor, the charge of supplying Paris had been transferred from the commune to the commission of trade and supplies; from this change an interruption in the services had resulted. The orders had either been given very late, or else with a dangerous precipitation. The means of conveyance failed; all the horses, as we have seen, had died, and besides the difficulty of collecting sufficient quantities of corn, there was to be added to that the difficulty of conveying them to Paris. The dilatoriness, pillage by the way, and all the usual accidents of a scarcity, thwarted the exertions of the commission. With the scarcity of provisions was combined the scarcity of wood for fuel and charcoal. The canal of Briare had been dried up during the summer. Supplies of pitcoal had not yet arrived, and the forges had consumed all the charcoal. The felling of timber had been slowly taking place, and those who rafted it on the rivers, harassed by the local authorities, had been completely discouraged. Charcoal and wood were therefore both scarce, and in that terrible winter the scarcity of fuel was almost as severely felt as that of corn.

Thus the dreadful sufferings of the lower classes contrasted with the new enjoyments in which the higher classes indulged. The revolutionists, irritated against the government, followed the example of all defeated parties, and availed themselves of the public calamities as so many arguments against the present rulers of the state. They even contributed to aggravate those calamities by thwarting the orders of the administration. "Do not send your corn to Paris," said they to the farmers, "the government is counter-revolutionary; it is bringing back the emigrants; it will not put the constitution in force; it leaves the corn to rot in the warehouses of the commission of trade; it means to famish the people in order to compel them to throw themselves into the arms of royalty." Thus they prevailed on the owners of the corn to keep it on hand. The revolutionists left their communes and repaired to the great towns, where they were unknown, and out of the reach of those whom they had persecuted. There they caused universal vexation. At Marseilles they had just been committing some fresh violences upon the representatives, whom they forced to suspend the proceedings instituted against those who were styled the accomplices of terror. It had

been necessary to put the city in a state of siege. It was particularly at Paris, where they assembled in great numbers and became more turbulent. They were constantly harping upon the same point, the sufferings of the people, and compared them with the luxury of those who had now gained an ascendancy in the convention. Madame Tallien was the woman of the day whom they chiefly accused, for at all periods there had been some one person whom they accused; this was the perfidious enchantress at whom they levelled reproaches, just as Madame Roland formerly, and before her, Marie Antoinette had been blamed for all the evils the people suffered. Her name mentioned in the convention did not appear to affect Tallien. At last, he one day obtained leave to speak in order to clear her from so much abuse; he represented her as a model of self devotion and courage, as one of the victims whom Robespierre had destined for the scaffold, and he declared that she had become his wife. Barras, Legendre, and Fréron, joined him, they exclaimed that it was now time to explain; they then bandied abuse with the Mountain, and the convention found itself obliged, as usual, to put an end to the discussion by proceeding to the order of the day. On another occasion, Duhem told Clausel, the deputy, a member of the committee of general safety, that he would murder him. The disturbance became tremendous, and the order of the day at last came to put an end to this novel scene.

The indefatigable Duhem discovered a publication intituled, *The Spectator of the Revolution*, containing a dialogue on the two governments, monarchical and republican. This dialogue demonstrated an evident preference to the monarchical government, and even exhorted plainly enough the French people to re-adopt it. Duhem denounced this work with indignation, as one of the symptoms of the royalist conspiracy. The convention, acknowledging the justice of this complaint, sent the author before the revolutionary tribunal; but Duhem, having allowed himself to say that royalism and aristocracy were triumphant, the convention committed him for three days to the Abbaye, as having insulted the assembly. These scenes had set all Paris in commotion. In the sections they wanted to present addresses on what had just taken place, and squabbles ensued as to the language in which they should be prepared, every one desiring that these addresses should be written with a view to his own notions. Never had the revolution exhibited so tempestuous a scene. Formerly, the all-powerful Jacobins had met with sufficient opposition to call forth a substantive contest. They had driven all before them, and were left masters of the field, noisy and furious, but yet absolute. At this day a powerful party had just risen up; and though it was less violent, it made up by number what it wanted in violence, and could fight upon equal terms. Addresses were made in every variety of language. Some Jacobins, who met in the coffee-houses near the populous quarters of Saint-Denis, the Temple, and Saint-Antoine, held the same language they had been accustomed to do. They threatened to go and attack the new conspirators at the Palais-Royal, in the theatres, nay, in the convention itself. The young men, on their side, made a terrific noise in the pit of the theatres. They settled among themselves to commit an outrage pointed against the Jacobins. The bust of Marat was in all places of public resort, and particularly in the theatres. At the Theatre Feydeau some young men climbed up to the balcony, and mounting upon one another's shoulders, threw down the bust of the saint, dashed it to pieces, and immediately replaced it by the bust of Rousseau. The police made vain efforts to prevent this disturbance. General cheering accompanied this act of the young men. Wreaths were thrown upon the stage to crown the bust of Rousseau; verses, written for the occasion, were handed about; and there were shouts of "*Down with the Terrorists! down with Marat! down with the sanguinary monster who demanded three hundred thousand heads! The author of Emile, of the 'Contrat Social,' of the 'New Héloise,' for ever!*" This scene was repeated on the following day at the other theatres, and at all the places of public resort. People rushed to the covered markets, smeared the bust of Marat with blood, and then threw it into the mud. A number of children in the quarter of Montmartre, made up a procession, and after carrying a bust of Marat to the brink of a sewer, threw it in. Public opinion was expressed with extreme violence; a hatred and disgust of Marat was in every body's heart, not even excepting the greater part of the Mountaineers; for none of them could follow in his eccentricities the ideas of this audacious maniac. But the name of Marat being consecrated, the dagger of Corday having gained him a kind of worship, people were as much afraid of attacking his altars as they would those of liberty itself. We have seen that during the last *sans-culottides*, that is to say, four months previous, he had been introduced into the Pantheon in the place of Mirabeau. The committees were anxious to take this hint, and proposed to the convention to decree that no individual should be deposited in the Pantheon until twenty years had intervened, and that neither the bust or the portrait of any citizen should be set up in places of public resort. It added that every decree to the contrary was repealed. The consequence was that Marat, who had been brought into the Pantheon, was turned out again at the end of four months. Such is the instability of revolutions! Immortality is decreed or withheld, and unpopularity threatens party leaders even after death! From that moment commenced the long infamy which has pursued Marat, and which he has shared with Robespierre. Both, formerly worshipped as divinities by fanaticism, but now tried by affliction, were devoted to long-continued execration.

The Jacobins, incensed at this outrage offered to one of the most renowned revolutionists, assembled at the faubourg Saint-Antoine, and swore to avenge the memory of Marat. They took his bust, carried it about in triumph in all the quarters where they predominated, and being armed to the teeth, threatened to murder any one who should attempt to disturb this sinister celebration. The young men had a great mind to fall upon this procession; they encouraged one another to attack it, and a battle would infallibly have ensued, if the committees had not ordered the club of the Quinze-Vingts to be closed, prohibited processions of this

kind, and dispersed the mob. At the sitting of the 20th Nivôse, (9th January) the busts of Marat and Lepelletier were removed from the hall of the convention, as well as the two fine paintings in which David had represented them dying. The galleries, which were divided, made great outcries against each other; some applauded, while others groaned in a frightful manner. Among the latter were many of those women who were called *the furies of the guillotine;* they were turned out. The assembly cheered, and the Mountain, sullen and silent, on seeing those celebrated pictures taken down, fancied that they witnessed the annihilation of the revolution and the republic.

The convention had just now taken away from both parties all excuse for coming to close quarters; but the struggle was only postponed for a few days. Mutual enmities were so exasperated, and the sufferings of the people so great, that every body was looking for one of those violent scenes which had stained the revolution with blood. Amidst the uncertainty as to what was going to take place, all the questions to which the commercial and financial situation of the country gave rise were discussed; unhappy questions which were agitated and resumed every moment, so as to be considered and resolved in opposite ways, and according to the changes which opinions had undergone.

Two months before the *maximum* had been modified, by varying the price of corn in regard to localities; the requisitions had been qualified by making them special, limited, and regular; and the questions relative to the sequestration money and the assignats were adjourned. At this day all respect for the revolutionary creations had disappeared. It was no longer a mere modification that was demanded, it was the abolition itself of the system of compulsion established during the terror. The opponents of this system addnced excellent reasons. Every thing, said they, not being the object of a *maximum*, the *maximum* was absurd and unjust. The farmer paying 30 francs for a coulter, for which he formerly paid 50 sous, 700 francs to a servant for wages, whom he formerly paid 100, and 10 francs to a day labourer, whom he formerly paid 50 sous, could not afford his produce at the same price as formerly. As raw materials imported from abroad had recently been exempted from the *maximum*, in order to restore some activity to trade, it was absurd to subject them to it when manufactured; for eight or ten times less would then be paid for them than in their natural state. These instances were not the only ones: a thousand more of the same kind might be cited. The *maximum* thus exposing the shopkeeper, the manufacturer, and the farmer, to inevitable losses, they would never submit to it; the former would leave their shops or their factories; the latter would hide his corn or consume it in the farm-yards, for he would find it turn to better account to sell his fattened poultry and pigs; at any rate, if it were desired that the markets should be supplied, it was requisite that the prices should be free; for nobody would care to work at a loss. Moreover, added the opponents of the revolutionary system, the *maximum* had never been carried into execution; those who wanted to buy made up their minds to pay according to the real price, and not according to the legal price. The whole question, therefore, was comprised in these words: pay dear or have nothing. In vain could they attempt to supply the want of voluntary activity of manufactures and commerce by requisitions, that is to say, by the action of the government. A trading government was a ridiculous monstrosity. As to this commission of supplies, which had made such a fuss about its operations, was it known whether it had imported foreign corn into France? From what quarter was France to be fed during five days? It was necessary, therefore, to return to individual activity, that is, to free trade, and to rely solely on that. When the *maximum* should be abolished, and the merchant could recover his premium for price of freight and insurance, the interest of his capital, and his fair profit, he would import produce from all parts of the globe. The great communes, in particular, which were not, like Paris, victualled at the cost of the state, could not have recourse to any thing but commerce, and would be famished unless their free trade was restored.

In principle, this mode of reasoning was just; it was not the less true that the transition from a forced trade to a free trade was liable to prove dangerous at the moment of so great a crisis as the present. Until unrestricted prices should have called forth individual industry, and supplied the markets, every thing would be extraordinarily dear. It would occasion a very transient pressure on all commodities not being necessaries of life; it was but the interruption for a moment, until that period when competition would reduce the prices; but for articles of consumption, which did not admit of interruption, how was the transition to be effected? Until the means of selling corn at an unrestricted price should have caused vessels to be despatched to the Crimea, to Poland, to Africa, and to America, and by the competition have obliged the farmers to part with their grain, how were the people in the cities to subsist without a *maximum* and without requisitions? Would not bad bread, produced by the laborious efforts of the administration, with incredible pains and anxiety, be better than absolute famine? Most certainly it would; the forced system must be got rid of as soon as possible, but with great caution and without misjudged precipitation.

As for the imputations of M. Boissy d'Anglas to the commission of supplies, they were not less unjust than ridiculous. Its importations, he said, could not have fed France more than five days. At first the accuracy of the calculation was denied; but that was of little consequence. A country never wants but a little, otherwise it would be impossible to supply it; but was it not an immense service to have provided that little? Let one conceive the unutterable distress of a country without bread for five days! Again, had this privation been equally distributed, it would not have been mortal, but while the country would have been glutted with corn, one would have seen the great towns, and the capital in particular, destitute of it not for five days only, but for ten, twenty, fifty, and then universal disorder would have ensued. Moreover, the commission of commerce and supplies, under the direction of Lindet, did not confine itself to merely import produce

from abroad, but it had actually conveyed the corn, forage, and merchandise which were in France, from the country to the frontiers, or to the great communes; and commerce, scared away by the war and political horrors, would never have done that of her own accord. It had been found necessary to supply this defect by the intentions of the government, and those energetic and extraordinary intentions merited the gratitude and the admiration of France, notwithstanding the outcry of those petty men, who during the dangers of the country, could do nothing else than hide themselves.

The question was carried by assault as it were. They abolished the *maximum*, and the requisitions of draught conveyance were abolished, much in the same way as the seventy-three had been recalled, and much in the same manner as they had impeached Billaud, Collot, and Barrère. Nevertheless some few remains of the system of requisitions were suffered to exist. Those requisitions which had for their object the victualling of the great communes, were to be in full force for one month longer. Government retained the right of preemption, that is, the right to take articles of consumption by authority on payment of the market price. The famous commission suffered a diminution in its style; it was no longer called the commission of trade and supplies, but merely the commission of supplies. Its five directors were reduced to three; its ten thousand agents to a few hundred. The system of contracts was judiciously substituted for that of administrative management; and by the way, an outcry was raised against Pache for his appointment of the committee of markets. The expense of carriage was allowed to contractors. The manufacture of arms in Paris, which had rendered costly but great services, was discontinued, as it could be without inconvenience dispensed with. The manufacture of arms was again made the subject of contract. The workmen, who clearly saw that they should have less pay, uttered some complaints; indeed instigated by the Jacobins, they even threatened a commotion; but they were repressed and sent back to their communes.

The question of the sequestration, previously adjourned, because it was apprehended, lest in re-establishing the circulation of securities it should aid the cause of emigration, and cause the revival of jobbing in foreign paper to be renewed, this question was again resumed, and was this time determined in favour of free trade. The sequestration was taken off; restitution was made of the sequestered securities to the foreign merchants, at the risk of not obtaining a similar restitution in favour of the French. Lastly, the free currency of money was restored, after a warm debate. A prohibition had previously existed in order to prevent emigrants from carrying money out of France; this was again permitted, from the consideration that, as we had not the means of return, Lyons being no longer able to furnish sixty millions' worth of manufactured goods, Nimes twenty, and Sedan ten, trade could no longer be carried on, unless it were allowed to make payment in gold or silver for the purchases made abroad. Moreover, a supposition existed that specie was hoarded, and as it would not issue again into currency by reason of the paper money, the means it afforded of paying foreigners for articles of importation would induce it to show itself, and would again make it move, Beyond all this, very puerile precautions were taken to prevent its being made available for the emigrants. Every person who sent abroad any metallic currency, was bound to import its equivalent in merchandise. Lastly, the difficult point of the assignats was taken up. There were nearly seven thousand five or six hundred millions in actual circulation; in the treasury there remained five or six hundred millions; the total sum created amounted therefore to eight thousand millions. The pledge remaining in hand of the first and second issue consisted of woods, lands, villas, mansions, houses, and moveables, amounting to more than fifteen thousand millions, according to the actual valuation in assignats. The pledge was therefore amply sufficient. Notwithstanding this, the assignat lost nine-tenths or eleven-twelfths of its value, according to the nature of the subject-matter against which it was exchanged. Thus the state, which received the assessed taxes in assignats, the fundholder, the public functionary, the owner of houses or of lands, the capitalist, all those in short who received their salaries, income, or debts due to them in paper, sustained losses that became every day greater and greater; and the confusion that ensued in consequence was daily increasing. Cambon proposed to augment the salaries of the public functionaries and the income of the fundholders. After this suggestion had been opposed, it was found necessary to adopt it in regard to the public functionaries, who could no longer subsist. But it was but a very slight palliative for such an immense evil; in fact, to relieve one class out of a thousand. To relieve them all, a just estimate of the public securities should be restored; but how could this be effected?

People still harped upon the day dreams of the preceding year; they investigated the cause of the depreciation of the assignats, and the means of raising them. In the first place, in admitting that their great quantity was one cause of their depreciation, they set about demonstrating that this was not one of the main causes, in order to justify themselves for their excessive issue. To prove this, they alleged that at the time of the defection of Dumouriez, of the insurrection in La Vendée, and of the taking of Valenciennes, the assignats, circulating in much smaller quantity than after the raising of the blockade of Dunkirk, Maubeuge, and Landau, were nevertheless much lower; this was true enough, and it proved that defeats and victories had an influence upon the currency of paper money, a truth that was certainly incontrovertible. But at the present time, Ventôse, in the year III. (March, 1795), victory was complete on all points, confidence in the sales was established, the national property had become the object of a species of jobbing, a great number of speculators bought to make a profit by resale or division; and yet the depreciation of the assignats was four or five times as great as in the preceding year. The quantity of the issues was therefore the real cause of the depreciation of the paper, and to call it in was the only mode by which its price could be raised.

The only mode of calling in the paper money was to sell the national possessions; but how was their disposal to be effected?—a question con-

stantly arising, which was brought forward every year. The cause which had obstructed the purchase of the national property in the preceding years was the dislike, prejudice, and, above all, the want of confidence in respect of the title of the property. Now at this time another objection started up. Let us figure to ourselves how immovable property is acquired in the ordinary course of things. The merchant, manufacturer, farmer and capitalist, with goods or income long accumulated, purchase land of the man who has impoverished himself, or who wishes to exchange one kind of property for another. Thus an estate is exchanged either for another, or for a moveable capital accumulated by labour. The purchaser of the estate comes to enjoy repose in its possession; the seller goes elsewhere to employ the moveable capital which he receives in payment, and to succeed to the laborious part of him who obtained it. Such is the insensible devolution of immovable property. But let us figure to ourselves an entire third of the domains, consisting of expensive and mostly undivided estates, parks, villas, and mansions, put up for sale all at once, at the very moment too when the landholders, merchants, and wealthiest capitalists are dispersed, and we shall be able to comprehend whether payment could be made for them. It was not a few tradesmen or farmers who had escaped the proscriptions that could make such purchases, and certainly not pay for them. We shall no doubt be told that the mass of assignats in circulation was sufficient to pay for the domains; but this mass was illusory, if every holder of assignats were obliged to expend eight or ten times the quantity to procure the same things as he was before.

The difficulty consisted, therefore, in purchasers not being so well inclined to buy as unable to pay; consequently, all the means proposed were founded on a false basis, for they all presupposed the existence of that ability. Those means were either forced or voluntary. The former consisted in divesting the assignat of its monetary character, and in the forced loan. This divestment turned paper-money into a mere incumbrance upon property. It was tyrannical; for when it reached the assignat in the hands of the labouring man, or the individual who had but just wherewithal to live, it converted the morsel of bread into earth, and starved the holder of that assignat. The mere rumour, in fact, that a certain portion of the paper was to be divested of the character of money had caused a rapid fall, so much so that they were compelled to decree that this divestment of the monetary character of the assignat should not take place. The forced loan also was not a whit less tyrannical; for it also consisted in forcibly converting the money assignat into a mere charge upon the lands. The only difference was that the forced loan bore upon the upper and wealthy classes, and that its transmutation into property operated for their benefit alone; but they had suffered so severely, that it was scarcely possible to compel them to buy landed property, without throwing them into cruel embarrassment. Besides, ever since the reaction, they began to set their faces against any return to revolutionary measures.

There was of course nothing left but the voluntary system. Every expedient was proposed. Cambon devised a scheme for a lottery: it was to consist of four millions of prize tickets at one thousand francs each, which made a fund of four thousand millions to be provided by the public. The state was to add three hundred and ninety-one millions, which were to make the great prizes, so that there should be four prizes of five hundred thousand francs, thirty-six of two hundred and fifty thousand, and three hundred and sixty of one hundred thousand. The less fortunate were to get back their original tickets of one thousand francs; but the one and the other, instead of being paid in assignats, were to receive a bond upon the national property bearing three per cent. interest. Thus it was supposed that the attraction of a considerable prize would create an interest in this kind of investment in bonds on the national property, and that four thousand millions of assignats would thus lose the character of money, in order to assume that of charges upon lands, minus a premium of three hundred and ninety-one millions. This was assuming that this investment could always be made. Tinurion proposed another plan, that of a tontine. But this method, very appropriate as an investment of savings for some few survivors, was far too slow and too inadequate in regard to the enormous mass of the assignats. Johannot proposed a kind of territorial bank, where assignats might be paid in, and bonds bearing three per cent interest obtained in their stead, bonds that might be exchanged at pleasure for assignats. This was still the same plan of changing the paper money into simple charges upon lands. Here the only difference consisted in allowing these securities the power of reassuming the character of current money. It was evident that the substantive difficulty was not got over. All the means devised for calling in and raising the price of the paper were therefore illusory; the end of it would have been the going on for a long time in the same track, issuing assignats, which would fall more and more every day: when they were become payable, there would have been a forced payment. Unfortunately, people can never foresee the necessary sacrifices, and diminish their extent by making them at once. Nations have always been deficient in this sort of foresight and courage at a financial crisis.

To these proposed means of calling in the assignats were associated others, fortunately more practicable but very insufficient. The moveable property of the emigrants, easily saleable, amounted to two hundred millions. Private contracts for the shares of emigrants in the trading companies might produce one hundred millions; the share in their heritable property five hundred millions. But in the first case capital would be withdrawn from commerce, in the second, a portion of the amount must be received by charges upon lands. It was intended to offer a premium to those who should complete their payments for the property already purchased, and it was hoped that eight hundred millions might thus be called in. Lastly, it was intended to put the great saleé houses, situated in Paris, into a lottery, this made a thousand millions more. Assuming that this scheme worked thoroughly well, all that we have been enumerating might have caused the calling in of two thousand six hundred millions; nevertheless it would have been very fortunate could one thousand five

hundred millions out of the total have been called in; besides this sum was to be reissued in another way. A very judicious and humane measure had been recently decreed, the payment of the creditors of the emigrants. It had been intended to make a separate payment in respect of each emigrant. As many of them were insolvent, the republic would not have paid their debts until their credits had been got in. But this individual liquidation would have been attended with endless delay. It would have been necessary to open an account for each emigrant, to bring into such account his real as well as personal property, and to balance the whole with his debts; and his unfortunate creditors, almost all of them servants, mechanics, or shopkeepers, would have had to wait for payment twenty or thirty years. Cambon settled that the creditors of the emigrants should become creditors of the state, and should be immediately paid, excepting those whose debtors were notoriously insolvent. The republic might thus lose a few millions, but it would relieve very great distress and confer an immense boon. Cambon the revolutionist, was the originator of this very humane idea.

But while they were discussing these unfortunate questions, the attention of government was unceasingly distracted by more pressing concerns, —the supply of Paris, now almost entirely destitute. We were now at the end of Ventôse (the middle of March), the abolition of the *maximum* had not yet had the effect of reviving commerce, and corn was not imported. A number of deputies were distributed in the neighbourhood of Paris, and made requisitions which were not obeyed. Although these requisitions were still in force for the supply of the great communes, and they were to pay the market price, the farmers alleged that they were abolished, and refused to comply with them; but this was not the greatest obstacle. The rivers and canals were entirely frozen. Not a boat could come up. The roads, covered with ice, were impassable; to render wheel-carriage practicable the roads must have been gravelled for twenty leagues round. The carts were plundered by the famished people on the road, whom the Jacobins goaded to madness, saying that the government was counter-revolutionary, that it suffered corn to rot in Paris, and that it intended to restore royalty. While the arrivals diminished, the consumption increased, as always happens in such cases. The fear of running short induced every one to lay in provisions for several days. Bread was delivered as formerly on the presentation of tickets; but every one magnified his necessities. To favour their milk-women, their laundresses, or the country people, who brought them vegetables and poultry, the inhabitants of Paris gave them bread, which was preferred to money, on account of the dearth which afflicted the environs as much as Paris itself. The bakers even sold dough to the country people, and from fifteen hundred sacks the consumption had thus risen to nineteen hundred. The abolition of the *maximum* had caused a rise in the price of all kinds of eatables; to reduce the price, the government had deposited meat and goods with the pork-butchers, the grocers, and the shopkeepers, to be sold at a low price. But these depositaries abused their trust, and sold at a higher rate than had been agreed upon.

The committees were every day in the greatest alarm, and waited with extreme anxiety for the nineteen hundred sacks of flour which had become indispensable. Boissy-d'Anglas, charged with the superintendance of the supply of articles of consumption, came continually to make new reports, in order to tranquillize the public mind, and to endeavour to impart that confidence which the government itself did not possess. In this situation the same abuse was lavished as heretofore. "See," said the Mountain, "the effect of the abolition of the *maximum*!" "See," replied the right side, "the inevitable effect of your revolutionary measures!" Each of them held out the accomplishment of the wishes of his own party as the only remedy, and called for measures frequently the most alien to the painful and all-absorbing subject. "Punish all the guilty!" said the right side, "repair all injustice, revise all tyrannical laws, repeal all the laws against the suspected." —"No," answered the Mountaineers; "renew your committees of government; restore to them their revolutionary energy; cease to persecute the best patriots, and to raise up the aristocracy," such were the means proposed for the relief of the public distress.

It is always such moments as these that parties fix upon for coming to blows, and for carrying their schemes with a high hand. The report so long expected concerning Billaud-Varennes, Collot d'Herbois, Barrère, and Vadier, was presented to the assembly. The commission of twenty-one decided upon accusation, and required the provisional arrest; the arrest was immediately voted by an immense majority. It was decreed that the four inculpated members should be heard by the assembly, and that a solemn debate should be had upon the motion for placing them under accusation. This decision had scarcely been promulgated, when it was proposed to reinstate in the presence of the assembly the proscribed deputies, who two months before had been discharged from all prosecution, but whose return among their colleagues had been prohibited. Sieyès, who had kept silence for five years, who from the first months of the constituent assembly, had concealed himself in the centre, that his reputation and his genius might be forgotten, and whom the dictatorship had overlooked as an unsociable character, incapable of conspiring, and no longer dangerous when he ceased to use his pen, Sieyès emerged from his long abstractedness, and said that, since the sovereignty of the laws seemed to be restored, he should resume the right of speaking. So long as the outrage committed upon the national representation was not atoned for, the sovereignty of the laws, according to him, was not re-established. "Your whole history," said he to the convention, "is divided into two periods; from the 21st of September, the day of your meeting, to the 31st of May, the oppression of the convention by the misguided people; from the 31st of May up to the present time, the oppression of the people by the convention, herself tyrannized. From this day you will show to the world that you are become free by recalling your colleagues. Such a measure cannot even be discussed; it is one of absolute right." The Mountaineers uplifted their voices against this

The inhabitants of Paris put upon rations. Tumultuous occurrences in consequence, and agitation by the old revolutionists.

mode of reasoning. "All that you have done then is null!" exclaimed Cambon. These extended labours, that multitude of laws, all the decrees that constitute the present government, are then null! and the salvation of France, effected by your courage and your efforts, all this is null!" Sieyès said that he was not rightly understood. The assembly, nevertheless, ordered the reinstatement of those deputies who had escaped the scaffold. Those famous proscripts, Isnard, Henri Larivière, Louvet, Larévilliere-Lepaux, Doulcet de Pontecoulant, entered amidst cheering. "Why," exclaimed Chenier, "was there not a cavern deep enough to save from the executioners the eloquence of Vergniaud and the genius of Condorcet!"

The Mountaineers were indignant; many Thermidorians even, alarmed at seeing the leaders of a faction who had opposed so dangerous a resistance to the revolutionary system re-enter the assembly, went over once more to the Mountain. Thuriot, that Thermidorian so inimical to Robespierre, who had by a miracle escaped the fate of Philippeau; Lesage-Senault, a man of sound discretion, but a declared enemy to all counter-revolution; lastly, Lecointre, the resolute adversary of Billaud, Collot, and Barrère,—Lecointre, who had five months before been declared a calumniator for denouncing the seven remaining members of the old committees, again went over to the left side. "You know not what you are doing," said Thuriot to his colleagues; "those men will never forgive you." Lecointre proposed that some distinction should be made; "Recall the proscribed deputies," said he, "but inquire which of them took arms against the country by exciting the departments to insurrection, and these latter do not again call among you." All of them had in fact taken arms. Louvet hesitated not to confess this, and proposed to declare that the departments which had risen in June 1793 had deserved well of the country. Here Tallien got up, and alarmed at the boldness of the Girondins, opposed the two motions of Lecointre and Louvet. Both were refused. While the assembly were recalling the proscribed Girondins, Pache, Bouchotte, and Garat were referred to the examination of the committee of general safety.

Resolutions such as these were not calculated to tranquillize the public mind. The increasing scarcity at length made the assembly adopt a measure which had been postponed for several days, and which could not fail to increase the irritation to the highest pitch,—namely, to put the inhabitants of Paris to a certain allowance of food. Boissy d'Anglas appeared before the assembly of the 25th Ventôse (March 16th) and proposed, in order to prevent waste and to ensure to each a sufficient share of provisions, to limit every individual to a certain quantity of bread. The number of persons composing each family was to be stated on the ticket, and no more than one pound of bread per day was to be allowed for each person. This regulation being adhered to, the commission of supplies could pledge themselves that the city would not want food. The Mountaineer, Romme, proposed to raise the allowance of working men to a pound and a half. The upper classes, he said, possessed the means of procuring butchers' meat, rice, or vegetables; but the common people being unable to buy any thing but bread, ought to have more of it. Romme's proposition was adopted, and the Thermidorians regretted that they had not themselves proposed it, so as they should have ensured the support of the lower classes, and thus have alienated them from the Mountain.

No sooner was this decree passed, than it excited an extreme ferment in the populous quarters of Paris. The revolutionists did all they could to aggravate its effect, and never called Boissy d'Anglas any other than *Boissy Famine*. The next day but one, the 27th Ventôse (March 18), when the decree was for the first time carried into execution, a great tumult arose in the faubourgs Saint-Antoine and Saint-Marceau. There had been distributed among six hundred and thirty-six thousand inhabitants, eighteen hundred and ninety-seven sacks of flour. Three hundred and twenty-four thousand citizens had received the additional half pound allowed to labourers supporting themselves by manual labour. Nevertheless, it appeared so new to the people of the faubourgs to be reduced to a settled allowance, that they made great complaints. Some women, who were constantly attending the clubs, and who were always ready to create a riot, made a disturbance in the section of the Observatoire. The usual agitators of the section joined these women. They wanted to present a petition to the convention; but for this purpose it was requisite that there should be a meeting of the whole section, and it was not lawful to meet on any other day than on the Decadi. They nevertheless beleaguered the civil committee, and demanded at their hands with threatening language the keys of the hall where the sittings were held, and on refusal of the committee, the mob demanded that the committee should send one of its members to accompany the assemblage to the convention. The committee complied, and appointed them one of its members to regulate the movement, and to prevent disturbance. A similar scene was taking place at the same moment in the section of Finisterre. A concourse had collected there, and was about joining itself to the section of the Observatoire. Both of them fell in together, and proceeded together towards the convention. One of the ringleaders undertook to be prolocutor, and was conducted with some few of the petitioners to the bar. The rest of the mob remained outside making a frightful noise. "We are in want of bread!" said the orator of the deputation. "We can almost lament all the sacrifices that we have made for the revolution." At these words the assembly, highly indignant, abruptly stopped him, and several members rose to repress such unbecoming language. "Bread! bread!" shouted the petitioners, thumping on the bar. Upon this insolent conduct, the assembly desired them to be turned out of the hall. Tranquillity however was restored; the speaker finished his harangue and said, that, till the wants of the people were supplied, they would do nothing but shout *The republic for ever!* The president, Thibaudeau replied with firmness to this seditious speech, and without inviting the petitioners to the honours of the sitting, sent them about their business. The committee of general safety, which had already collected some battalions of the sections, cleared the doors of the assembly, and dispersed the mob.

This scene produced a strong impression on the

public mind. The daily threats of the Jacobins diffused through the sections of the faubourgs; their inflammatory placards, wherein they gave notice that an insurrection would take place within eight days, if the patriots were not discharged from every prosecution whatever, and if the constitution of 1793 were not enforced; their assemblies almost publicly holden in the coffee-houses of the faubourgs; lastly, this recent attempt at riot, disclosed to the convention the scheme of a new 31st of May. The right side, the reinstated Girondists, and the Thermidorians, all of them equally exposed to threats, considered as to taking measures to prevent any new attack upon the national representation. Sieyès, who had recently reappeared upon the stage, and become a member of the committee of public welfare, proposed to the united committees a sort of martial law, intended to prevent any new violence being committed against the convention. This bill declared as seditious every concourse of people wherein the proposal or intent of attacking public or private property, of restoring royalty, of overthrowing the republic and the constitution of 1793, or of meeting at the Temple, to the convention, &c., should be entertained. Every member of such an assemblage was to be liable to transportation. If after three warnings from the magistrates the concourse did not disperse, force was to be employed; and while waiting for the junction of the public force, all the adjoining sections were to send their own battalions. An insult offered to a representative of the people was to be punished by transportation; outrage, attended with violence, by death. One bell only was to remain in Paris, and to be placed in the *Tower of L'Unité*. If any mob or concourse of people should be marching towards the convention, this bell was to sound the alarm (*tocsin*) immediately. At this signal all the sections were bound to assemble, and to march to the relief of the national representation. If the convention should be dissolved or its freedom constrained, directions were given to all those members who could escape, to leave Paris immediately, and to repair to Chalons-sur-Marne, and all the deputies absent on leave or on mission were to be ordered to join them. The generals were also to send them troops from the frontiers, and the new convention formed at Chalons, the only depositary of the legitimate authority, was to march to Paris, to set at liberty the endangered portion of the national representation, and punish the authors of the treasonable attempt.

The committee received this bill with great cordiality. Sieyès was commissioned to make the report upon it, and to present it as speedily as possible to the assembly. The revolutionists, on their part, emboldened by the late movement, finding in the dearth a most favourable opportunity, perceiving that the danger was increasing in regard to their party, and that the fatal moment for Billaud, Collot, Barrère, and Vadier, was approaching, bestirred themselves with greater violence, and thought seriously of getting up a sedition. The electoral club and the popular society of the Quinze-Vingts had been dissolved. The revolutionists, deprived of this place of refuge, had distributed themselves among the sectional assemblies, which were held every Decadi: they occupied the faubourgs Saint-Antoine and Saint-Marceau, and the quarters of the Temple and of the *Cité*. They were to be seen in the *cafés* situated in the centre of these different quarters; they projected a commotion, but without having either any settled plan or acknowledged leaders. Among them were to be found several men compromised either in the revolutionary committees or in different official capacities, who possessed considerable influence over the multitude; but none of these had a decided superiority. They measured their strength one against the other, were by no means on very good terms with each other, and had, moreover, no communication whatever with the deputies of the Mountain.

The old popular leaders, always allied with Danton or with Robespierre, or else with the heads of the government, had served as intermediate agents to give the watchword to the populace. But both one and the other had perished. The new leaders were perfect strangers to the new leaders of the Mountain: they had nothing in common with them but their danger and their attachment to the same cause. Besides, the Mountaineer deputies being left in the minority in the assembly and accused of conspiring in order to recover power, the fate of every defeated party, they were under the necessity of justifying themselves every day, and obliged to protest that they were not conspiring. The usual result of such a position is to suggest a wish that others should conspire, and a repugnance to conspire oneself. So the Mountaineers said every day, *The people will rise, the people must rise;* but they would not have dared to enter into any combination with the people with a view of inducing that insurrection. There were cited several imprudent expressions used by Duhem and Maribon-Montaud in a *café*; the one as well as the other exhibited very little reserve or discretion in having uttered them. The declamations made by Leonard Bourdon to the sectionary society of the Rue du Vert-Bois were also repeated: they were likely enough to have taken place on his part, but neither of them corresponded with the patriots. As for Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, who were more interested than any other persons in a commotion, they were afraid that by taking part therein, they should augment the evils of their own position, already very dangerous.

The patriots, therefore, proceeded alone, without much unity of purpose, as is almost always the case when there are no longer any prominent leaders. They ran from one to the other, gave the watchword from street to street and from quarter to quarter, and gave intelligence that this or that section was going to present a petition, or to attempt a movement. At the commencement of a revolution, when a party makes its first appearance, when it gets its leaders, when success and novelty hurry the mass along in its train, when it disconcerts its adversaries by the boldness of its attacks, the absence of unity and method are compensated by the common excitement; on the contrary, when it is once forced to defend itself, when it is deprived of its impulsive movement, and known to its adversaries, it has more need than ever of good conduct and order. But that good conduct and order, almost always impossible to preserve, becomes absolutely so when the influential leaders have disappeared. Such was the posi-

tion of the patriot party in Ventôse, year III. (end of March): it was no longer the torrent of the 14th of July, of the 5th and 6th of October, of the 10th of August, or of the 31st of May. It was the association of a few men, inured by long discord to hostility, seriously compromised, full of energy and obstinacy, it is true, but more able to fight desperately than to conquer.

According to the old custom of preceding every movement by an imperious and yet measured petition, the sections of Montreuil and the Quinze-Vingts, included in the faubourg Saint-Antoine, drew up one perfectly analogous with all those that had been made previous to the great insurrections. It was agreed that it should be presented on the 1st Germinal (March 21). This was the very day that the committees had resolved to propose the law of grand police devised by Sieyès. Besides the deputation who was to present the petition, an assemblage of patriots took care to proceed towards the Tuileries; thither they all ran in crowds, and in the old fashion they formed numerous parties, whose cry was: *The convention for ever! The Jacobins for ever! down with the aristocrats!* The young men, with hair turned back and black neckcloths, had gone over from the Palais Royal to the Tuileries, and formed opposing parties, shouting: *The convention for ever! down with the Terrorists!* The petitioners were conducted to the bar. The language of their petition was extremely moderate; they called to mind the distress of the people, but without acrimony; they denied the justice of the charges levelled against the patriots, but without recriminating against their adversaries. They simply made the remark, that in these charges there was a misconception both of the past services of the patriots, and the position in which they now were placed; they admitted, moreover, that excesses had been committed, but added, that the parties, whoever they were, were composed of men and not of gods. "The sections of the Quinze-Vingts and of Montreuil," said they, "are not come, therefore, to demand of you as general measures, either banishment or the spilling of blood against this or that party, measures which confound mere error with crime; they only see in Frenchmen so many brethren, differently organized, it is true, but all members of the same family. They come to solicit you to use an instrument which is in your hands, and which is the only efficacious one for terminating our political tempests; that is the constitution of 1793. Organize from this day forth that popular constitution which the French people have accepted and sworn to defend. That constitution will reconcile all interests, tranquillize the public mind, and conduct you to the termination of your labours."

This insidious proposition comprised all that the revolutionists desired at the moment. In point of fact, they thought that the constitution, in expelling the convention, would bring back to the legislature, to the executive power, and to the municipal administrations, their leaders as well as themselves. This was a grave error; but they clung to that hope, and thought that, without expressing dangerous suggestions, such as the release of the patriots, the suspension of all proceedings against them, and the formation of a new commune at Paris, they should find its accomplishment by merely putting the constitution in force. If the convention rejected their request, if she did not explain herself precisely, and did not fix an early period, she would avow that she had no desire for the constitution of 1793. The president, Thibaudeau, made them a very firm reply, which concluded with these words, as severe as they were plain spoken: "The convention has never considered that the sturdy and faithful defenders of liberty of the faubourg Antoine, are the originators of the insidious petitions which have been made." No sooner had the president finished, than the deputy Chasles hastened to mount the tribune, to demand that the declaration of rights should be exposed to view in the hall of the convention, as one of the articles of the constitution required. Tallien succeeded him in the tribune. "I ask those men," said he, "who now show themselves such ardent defenders of the constitution, those who seem to have adopted the rallying cry of a sect which sprang up at the conclusion of the constituent assembly, *The constitution and nothing but the constitution*,—I ask them if it was not they who shut it up in a box!" Cheers from one quarter, and groans and shouts from another, interrupted Tallien; he resumed his speech amid the disturbance: "Nothing," he continued, "shall prevent me from speaking my opinion when I am among the representatives of the people. We are all for a constitution with a firm government, and with that government which it prescribes; and it is not right that certain members should make the people believe that there are in this assembly persons not well affected to the constitution. We must now take measures to prevent them from slandering the pure and respectable majority of the convention." "Yes, yes," was the general cry from all sides. "That constitution," proceeded Tallien, "which they followed up, not by laws calculated to perfect it and to render its execution practicable, but by the revolutionary government—that constitution we must put in action, and we must impart life to it. But we shall not be so imprudent as to desire to carry it into effect without organic laws, so as to expose it imperfect and defenceless to all the enemies of the republic. For this reason, I move that a report be prepared without delay as to the means of putting the constitution in force, and that it be decreed that from henceforth there shall be no intermediate agency between the present government and the government that is to be settled." Tallien descended from the tribune amidst universal demonstrations of the satisfaction of the assembly, whom his reply had relieved from some embarrassment. The preparation of organic laws was a happy pretext for deferring the promulgation of the constitution, and furnishing the means of modifying it. It presented an opportunity for a new revision, like that to which the constitution of 1791 was subjected. The deputy Mianlle, a moderate Mountaineer, approved Tallien's proposal, and admitted, with him, that they ought not to be too precipitate in carrying the constitution into effect: but he maintained that there could not be any inconvenience in giving it publicity; and he moved that it should be engraved on marble tablets and set up in all places of public resort. Thibaudeau, alarmed at the idea of such publicity being given to a constitution framed in a

moment of democratic frenzy, gave up the chair to Clausel, and ascended the tribune. "Legislators," said he, "we ought not to assimilate ourselves to those priests of antiquity who had two ways of expressing themselves, the one secret, the other ostensible. We must have the courage to say what we think of this constitution; and were it even to strike me dead, as it last year struck those who presumed to make observations against it, still would I speak." After a long interruption occasioned by cheering, Thibaudeau boldly asserted that there would be danger in publishing a constitution which certainly was not known to those who so highly extolled it. "A democratic constitution," said he, "is not one in which the people themselves exercise all the powers:" "No! no!" exclaimed a multitude of voices." "It is," resumed Thibaudeau, "that under which, by a wise distribution of all the powers, the people enjoy liberty, equality, and peace. Now I do not perceive this in a constitution that would place an usurping commune or factious Jacobins by the side of the national representation; which would not give to the national representation the direction of the armed force in the place where it is sitting, and would thus deprive it of the means of defending itself and of maintaining its dignity; which would grant to a fraction of the people the right of partial insurrection and the faculty of overthrowing the state. To no purpose are we told that an organic law will correct all these inconveniences. A simple law may be altered by the legislature; but arrangements so important as those which will be comprehended in these organic laws must be as immutable as the constitution itself. Moreover, organic laws are not framed in a fortnight, or even in a month; and in the meantime, I propose that no publicity be given to the constitution; that great vigour be imparted to the government, and that even, if it be requisite, new powers be given to the committee of public welfare." Thibaudeau descended from the tribune amidst applause bestowed on the boldness of his declaration. It was then proposed to close the discussion immediately. The president put the question as to closing the debate, to the vote, and almost the whole assembly rose to support it. The irritated Mountaineers complained that they had not had time to hear what the president said, and that they knew not what had been proposed: they were not attended to, and the assembly passed on to other business. Legendre then moved the appointment of a commission of eleven members, whose sole duty it would be to consider the organic laws with which the constitution was to be accompanied. This suggestion was forthwith adopted. The committees at that moment announced that they had an important report to make, and Sieyès ascended the tribune to submit his law of grand police.

While these different scenes were passing in the interior of the assembly, the greatest disturbance prevailed without. The patriots of the faubourg, who had not been able to get into the hall, had dispersed themselves at the Carrousel and in the gardens of the Tuileries; they were waiting there with impatience, and uttering their accustomed clamour, till the result of their scheme with respect to the convention should be known. Some of them had come down from the galleries to report to the others what had passed; and giving them a false account, they had told them that the petitioners had been maltreated. Then it was that the disturbance among them increased; some ran off to the faubourgs to say that their delegates were ill used at the convention; others scoured the garden, driving before them all the young men they met; they had even seized three of them and thrown them into the great basin of the Tuileries. The committee of general safety, observing these disorders, had directed the drums to beat, for the purpose of calling together the neighbouring sections. Meanwhile the danger was urgent; and it required time for the sections to be called together and to assemble. The committee was surrounded by a crowd of young men, who had collected to the number of a thousand or twelve hundred, armed with walking canes, and well enough inclined to fall upon the groups of patriots, who had not yet encountered any opposition. The committee accepted their proffered assistance, and authorized them to perform the part of police in the garden. They then rushed upon the parties who were shouting *The Jacobins for ever!* (*Vive les Jacobins*) dispersed them after a long scuffle, and drove back part of them towards the hall of the convention. Some of the patriots again went up into the galleries, and there caused a sort of confusion by their sudden entry. At this moment, Sieyès was concluding his report on the law of grand police. An adjournment was demanded; from the Mountain shouts were heard of "*It is a bloody law! It is martial law! They want to make the convention to leave Paris!*" With these cries was mingled the noise of the fugitives from the garden. Great agitation ensued. A voice exclaimed, "*The royalists are assassinating the patriots!*" A disturbance was heard at the doors; the president put on his hat. A great majority of the assembly said that the danger provided against by Sieyès's law had already occurred, that it ought to be voted immediately. "To the vote! to the vote!" was the general cry. The law was put to the vote, and carried by an immense majority, amidst the loudest cheering. The members of the left extremity refused to take any part in the deliberation. At length, quiet was gradually restored, and the speakers began at last to be heard. "The convention has been imposed upon," cried Duhem. Clausel, who then came in, said he came to bid the convention be of good cheer. "We don't want to be told to be of good cheer," replied several voices. Clausel continued, and reported that the good citizens had come to make a rampart of their bodies for the national representation. He was cheered. "It is thou," cried Ruamps, "who hast instigated these mobs, in order to cause the passing of an atrocious law." Clausel would have replied, but he could not make himself heard. The law voted with such precipitation was then attacked. "The law has been passed," said the president, "we must not re-open the debate." "There is a conspiracy with those outside," said Tallien; "no matter, we must resume afresh the discussion of the bill, and prove that the convention can deliberate even amidst murderers." Tallien's proposal was adopted, and the bill of Sieyès was anew taken into consideration. The discussion was then conducted with greater tranquillity, and

while they were deliberating within the hall, order was restored without. The young men, victorious over the Jacobins, requested leave to present themselves to the assembly; they were introduced by a deputation, and protested their patriotic intentions and their devotedness to the national representation. They withdrew after having been loudly cheered. The convention persisted in discussing the law of police before they quitted the place, voted it clause by clause, and at length broke up at ten at night.

This day left both parties convinced of the approach of some great event. The patriots, repulsed by the closing of the debate in the convention, and beaten with walking canes in the gardens of the Tuileries, went to the faubourgs, there to vent their rage, and to excite the mob to riot. The assembly plainly saw that she was about to be attacked, and considered how she should avail herself of the tutelary law that had just been passed.

The morrow was likely to bring as grave a discussion as that of the present day. In fact, Billaud, Collot, Barrère, and Vadier, were to be heard before the convention. A crowd of patriots and women had thronged very early to occupy the galleries. The young men, more prompt, had got there before them, and prevented the women from entering. They had turned them away rather roughly, and some scuffles had ensued around the hall. In the meantime numerous patrols, on duty in the environs, had maintained the public peace; the galleries had filled without much disturbance, and from eight in the morning till noon the time had been spent in singing patriotic airs. On one side was sung the *Reveil du Peuple*, on the other, the *Marseillaise*, while the deputies were taking their places. The president at length took the chair amidst shouts of *Long live the convention! Long live the republic!* The accused had entered and seated themselves at the bar, and the discussion was awaited in profound silence.

Robert Lindet immediately required to speak on a motion of order. It was surmised that this irreproachable man, whom none had dared to accuse along with the other members of the committee of public safety, was going to defend his old colleagues. It was liberal in him to do this, for he had still less to do than Carnot and Prieur (of the Côte-d'Or), with the political measures of the late committee of public welfare. He had not accepted the department of supplies and conveyance, without making it to be expressly understood that he should be disconnected with the operations of his colleagues, that he should never deliberate with them, nay, that he should even have his office in another place. He had refused to incur the joint responsibility before the danger; the danger appeared, and he generously came forward to bear his part. It was the settled opinion that Carnot and Prieur (of the Côte-d'Or) would follow this example; accordingly, several voices on the right were raised at once to oppose Robert Lindet's being heard.—"The accused are entitled to have the first word," was the cry; "they must begin before either their accusers or their defenders."—"Yesterday," said Bourdon (of the Oise), "a plot was hatched to save the accused, the good citizens have thwarted it. To-day recourse is had to other means, scruples are awakened in honest men, whom the accusation has distinguished from their colleagues; they now come forward to associate themselves with the guilty, in order to retard justice by new impediments." Robert Lindet replied that the intention was to try the entire government, that he had been a member of it, that in consequence, he ought not to consent that a distinction should be made between him and his colleagues, and that he claimed his share of the responsibility. One could hardly resist such an act of generosity and courage; Robert Lindet obtained permission to speak. He depictured at great length the immense labours of the committee of public welfare; he demonstrated its activity, its foresight, and its eminent services; and made every body sensible that the excitement of zeal produced by the struggle had alone caused the excesses with which certain members of that government were charged. This speech, which lasted six hours, was not heard without many interruptions. The ingrates, already forgetting the services of the accused, considered this enumeration of the obligations owing to them rather tedious; and some members even had the indecency to say that this speech ought to be printed at Lindet's expence, because it would cost the republic too much. The Girondists were ruffled on hearing the federalist insurrection alluded to, and the calamities it had caused. Every party found something to complain of. At length, the assembly adjourned to the following day, making up its mind not to allow any more of those long depositions in favour of the accused. Carnot and Prieur (of the Côte-d'Or) desired, however, to be heard in their turn; they were anxious, like Lindet, to generously afford assistance to their colleagues, and at the same time to justify themselves against a great cloud of accusations, which could not be urged against Billaud, Collot, and Barrere, without involving them also. The signatures of Carnot and Prieur (of the Côte-d'Or), were in point of fact found on those orders which contained the gravest accusations. Carnot, whose reputation was very great, of whom it was said in France and throughout Europe, that he organized the means of obtaining victory, and whose courageous contests with Saint-Just and Robespierre were well known, Carnot could not be heard with indifference and without a sort of respect. He obtained leave to speak. "It belongs to myself," said he, "to justify the committee of public welfare; it belongs to myself, who first dared to openly attack Robespierre and Saint-Just;" and he might have added, to myself, who dared attack them while you obeyed their slightest orders, and decreed at their pleasure all the executions they required at your hands. He first explained how his signature and that of his colleagues, who had no concern whatever in the political acts of the committee, nevertheless appeared at the foot of the most sanguinary orders. "Overwhelmed," said he, by the immense pressure of business, having three or four hundred matters to settle every day, and very often no time for meals, we had agreed to lend our signatures to one another; we signed a multitude of documents without reading them; I signed orders for placing persons under accusation, and my colleagues signed orders for military movements and plans of attack, without either one or the other having time to enter into any explanation concerning them.

The necessity for this immense labour had required that individual dictatorship, which each one had reciprocally granted to the other. Without this, the business never could have been got through. The order to arrest one of the most useful of my employés in the war department, an order for which I attacked Saint-Just and Robespierre and denounced them as usurpers, that very order I had signed without knowing it. Thus our signature proves nothing, and it cannot be adduced in evidence of our participation in the acts laid to the charge of the late government." Carnot then endeavoured to justify his accused colleagues. Though admitting, without expressly saying so, that they had formed part of the passionate and violent men of the committee, he declared that they had been the first to rise up against the triumvirate, and that the indomitable character of Billaud-Varennes had been the greatest obstacle that Robespierre had encountered in his progress. Prieur (of the Côte-d'Or), who in the manufacture of the arms and ammunition, had rendered quite as great services as Carnot, and who had given the same signatures and in precisely the same manner, repeated Carnot's declaration, and insisted, like him and Lindet, on sharing the responsibility which pressed upon the accused.

Here the convention found itself plunged again into the perplexities of a discussion which had been several times opened, and which had never terminated in anything else than a frightful confusion. Was not this example, afforded by three men enjoying universal consideration and voluntarily declaring themselves jointly responsible for the late government, a warning for the convention? was it of no consequence that every body had more or less been an accomplice of the old committees, and that the convention herself ought to come forward and seek to be put in irons, as did Lindet, Carnot, and Prieur? In point of fact, the convention had not attacked tyranny till after the three men whom she now wished to punish as her accomplices; and as for their passions, she had identified herself with them all; she was even more culpable than they, if she had not participated in their feelings, for she had sanctioned all their excesses.

Thus, during the 4th, 5th, and 6th Germinal (24th, 25th, and 26th of March), the discussion became a frightful squabble. Every moment the name of a fresh member was brought in question, that member demanded permission to justify himself, he recriminated in his turn; and on one side and the other digressions equally long and dangerous took place. It was then decreed that the accused and the members of the commission should alone have the privilege of speaking, for the purpose of discussing the facts, article by article, and every deputy was forbidden to attempt to justify himself even if his name were mentioned. It was no good passing this decree; every moment the discussion again became general, and there was not an act but was flung back from one to the other with fearful violence. The commotion which existed on the preceding days kept still increasing; there was but one pass word in the faubourgs. We must go to the convention, to demand bread, the constitution of 1793, and the release of the patriots. Unfortunately, the quantity of flour necessary for furnishing the eighteen hundred sacks not having arrived in Paris on the 6th, there could not be distributed on the morning of the 7th more than a half ration, with a promise of the other half in the evening. The women of the section of the Gravilliers, in the quarter of the Temple, refused the half ration offered them, and assembled tumultuously in the Rue du Vert Bois. Some of them, who had their cue, strove to form a mob, and taking with them all the women whom they met, bent their steps towards the convention. While they were on their road thither, the leaders ran to the house of the president of the section, forcibly seized his bell and the keys of the hall of meeting, and set about forming an illegal assembly. They appointed a president, and a secretary, and read several times that article of the declaration of rights which proclaimed insurrection to be a right and a duty. The women had meanwhile pursued their way to the convention, and were making a great noise at the doors. They desired to be introduced *en masse;* but no more than twenty were let in. One of them boldly spoke in their name, and complained that they had received only half a pound of bread. The president having attempted to reply, they shouted, "Bread! bread!" They interrupted by the same cry the explanation which Boissy-d'Anglas would have given respecting the distribution of the morning. At last they were made to withdraw, and the discussion relative to the accused was resumed. The committee of general safety caused these women to be brought back by patrols, and sent one of its members to dissolve the assembly illegally formed in the section of the Gravilliers. Those who composed it refused at first to comply with the exhortations of the representative sent to them; but on seeing the armed force they dispersed. In the night, the principal instigators were apprehended and conveyed to prison.

This was the third attempt to raise a commotion; on the 27th Ventôse, people had rioted on account of the allowance system; on the 1st Germinal, on account of the petition of the Quinze-Vingts; and on the 7th on account of the insufficient distribution of bread. A general movement it was feared would take place on the Decadi, a day of idleness and appropriated to the meetings of the sections. To prevent the dangers of meeting at night, it was decided that the sectional assemblies should be held between the hours of one and four. This was but a very petty measure, and one which could not possibly prevent the conflict. Every body felt that the principal cause of these uprisings was the accusation preferred against the late members of the committee of public welfare, and the incarceration of the patriots. Many deputies would willingly have abandoned prosecutions which, were they just, were certainly dangerous. Rouzet devised a plan which would dispense with the passing of sentence on the accused, and which at the same time would save their lives; this was banishment by ostracism. When a citizen should have made his name a subject of discord, he proposed to banish him for a time. His suggestion was not listened to. Merlin (of Thionville), a warm Thermidorian and an intrepid citizen, began, nevertheless, to think that it would be better to avoid the struggle. He proposed, therefore, to convoke the primary assemblies, to immediately

put the constitution in force, and to refer the trial of the accused to the future legislature. Merlin (of Douai) strongly supported this advice. Guyton-Morveau suggested a more decided course. "The procedure we are now instituting," said he, "is a public scandal; where should we stop, were we to prosecute all those who have made more sanguinary motions than those with which the accused are charged? In good sooth, no one knows whether we are concluding or recommencing our revolution." Every one, as might be expected, was startled at the idea of committing at such a moment the supreme authority to a new assembly; neither was it disposed to give France a constitution so absurd as that of 1793. It was therefore declared that there were no grounds for discussing the propositions of the two Merlins. As for the procedure already commenced, too many private motives of revenge were gratified by its being continued, to admit of its being abandoned; and it was merely decided that the assembly, in order that it might be able to attend to its other business, should only devote every alternate day to the hearing of the accused.

Such a decision was not calculated to quiet the patriots. The Decadi (10th Germinal) was spent in mutual reciprocations of anger. The sectional assemblies were very tumultuous; nevertheless, the so much dreaded commotion did not take place. In the section of the Quinze-Vingts a new petition was drawn up; it was bolder than the first, and was to be presented on the following day. It was, in fact, read at the bar of the convention. "Why," it asked, "is Paris without a municipality? Why are the popular societies shut up? What has become of the harvest crops? Why are assignats falling every day? Why are the young men of the Palais Royal alone allowed to congregate? How is it that none but the patriots are in prison? The people at last desire to be free. They know that when they are oppressed, insurrection is the first of their duties." The petition was read amid the murmurs of a large portion of the assembly and the applause of the Mountain. The president Pelet (of the Lozère) received the petitioners rather sternly and dismissed them. The only satisfaction granted was to send to the sections the list of the imprisoned patriots, that they might be enabled to judge whether there were any who deserved to be specially protected.

The rest of the 11th Germinal (March 31) was spent in agitations in the faubourgs. People every where said that they must go the next day to the convention, to demand once more all that they had not yet been able to obtain from her. This intelligence circulated from mouth to mouth, in all the quarters occupied by the patriots. The leaders of each section, without having any settled object, wished to excite a general rising, and to propel the entire mass of the populace upon the convention. Next day, the 12th Germinal (April 1) men, women, and boys actually made a general uprising in the section of the *Cité*, and assembled round the bakers' doors, preventing those whom they found there from accepting the ration, and endeavouring to draw every body in the direction of the Tuileries. The ringleaders at the same time set on foot all sorts of rumours; they said that the convention was on the point of departing to Chalons, and leaving the people of Paris to their fate; that they had disarmed the section of the Gravilliers in the night; that the young men had assembled, to the number of thirty thousand, in the Champ de Mars, and that with their aid they were going to disarm all the patriot sections. They forced the authorities of the section of the *Cité* to give up their drums; they took them away, and began to beat the generale through the streets. The flame spread with rapidity; the population of the Temple and the faubourg Saint-Antoine turned out, and proceeding along the quays and the boulevard, directed its course toward the Tuileries. This formidable assemblage consisted of women, boys, and drunken men, the latter armed with bludgeons, and having this inscription on their hats, *Bread and the constitution of* 1793.

At this moment the convention was hearing Boissy d'Anglas reading a report on the various systems adopted in regard to provisions. The convention had but her ordinary guard around her; the mob had reached her doors, and filled the Carousel and the Tuileries, and obstructed all the avenues, so that the numerous patrols scattered through Paris could not come to the aid of the national representation. The mob entered the hall of Liberty, which was before you came to the hall where the assembly held her sittings, and prepared to force its way into the latter. The officers and the guard strove to stop them: men, armed with bludgeons, dashed forward, dispersed all who attempted to resist, rushed against the doors, burst them open, and at last came like a torrent amidst the assembly, hallooing, waving their hats, and raising a cloud of dust. *Bread! bread! the constitution of* 1793! Such was the vociferous outcry of this blinded rabble. The deputies did not leave their seats, and displayed a commanding firmness. Of a sudden one of them rose, and cried, *The republic for ever!* All followed his example, and the mob also set up the same cry, but also added, *Bread! the constitution of* 1793! The members of the left, alone uttered a few bursts of cheering, and did not seem sorry to see the populace among them. That multitude, for which no plan had been designed, and whom its leaders desired to use for no other purpose than to intimidate the convention, introduced itself among the deputies, and sat down beside them, but without daring to offer them any kind of violence. Legendre began to speak. "If ever," said he, "malice——" He was not suffered to proceed. "Down! down!" cried the rabble; "we have no bread!" Merlin (of Thionville), still as courageous as at Mentz or in La Vendée, left his seat, went down amidst the populace, spoke to several of those men, embraced and was embraced by them, and exhorted them to pay due respect to the convention. "To thy place!" cried some of the Mountaineers. "My place," replied Merlin, "is among the people. These men have just assured me that they have no bad intentions; that they have no wish to intimidate the convention by their number; that on the contrary, they are ready to defend the convention, and that they have come hither merely to make the convention acquainted with their necessities." "Yes, yes," still shouted the crowd, "we want bread!"

At these words, shouts were heard in the hall of

Liberty; another popular billow had rolled on after the first; there was a second irruption of men, women, and boys, shouting all at once, "Bread! bread!" Legendre would have recommenced what he was going to say; they interrupted him again by shouting out, "Down!"

The Mountaineers were perfectly sensible that in this state the convention, oppressed, degraded, and gagged, could neither listen, speak, or deliberate, and that the very object of the insurrection was a failure, since the desired decrees could not be passed. Gaston and Duroi, both sitting on the left, rose and complained of the state to which the assembly was reduced. Gaston went up to the people. "My friends," said he, "you want bread, the release of the patriots, and the constitution; but to effect this we must deliberate, and that we cannot do if you remain here." The noise prevented Gaston from being heard. André Dumont, who had succeeded the president in the chair, in vain attempted to give the same reasons to the mob; he was not heard. The Mountaineer, Huguet, was the only one who contrived to make a few words understood. "The people who are here," said he, "are not in insurrection; they are come to make a just demand; namely, the release of the patriots. People, relinquish not your rights!" At this moment, a man came up to the bar, passing through the crowd which opened before him; it was one Vanec, who commanded the section of the *Cité* at the time of the 31st of May. "Representatives," said he, "you see before you the men of the 14th of July, of the 10th of August, and what is more, of the 31st of May." Here the galleries, the populace, and the Mountain cheered most vehemently. "These men," continued Vanec, "have sworn to live in freedom or to die. Your divisions rend the country; it ought not to suffer further from your animosities. Set the patriots at liberty, and give bread to the people. Do us justice upon Fréron's army, and upon those gentlemen of the bludgeon. And as for thee, sacred Mountain," proceeded the speaker, turning towards the benches of the left, "for thee, who hast fought so hard for the republic, the men of the 14th of July, of the 10th of August, and of the 31st of May, acknowledge thee as their own in this critical moment; thou wilt find them ever ready to support thee, ever ready to pour forth their blood for the country." Shouts and cheers accompanied the concluding words of Vanec. One voice in the assembly seemed to be raised against him, but it could hardly be distinguished. They called upon him who had any thing to say against Vanec to speak up. "Yes, yes," exclaimed Duhem, "let him speak out." The orators of several sections succeeded one another at the bar, and in more measured terms, made precisely the same demands as did the section of the *Cité*. The president, Dumont, replied with firmness that the convention would devote her attention to the wishes and wants of the people, so soon as she could resume her labours. "Let her do so immediately," replied several voices; "we are in want of bread." The tumult lasted thus for several hours. The president was exposed to remarks of all kinds. "Royalism is in the chair," said Choudieu to him. "Our enemies are raising the storm," replied Dumont; "they know not that the thunderbolt will fall upon their own heads." "Yes," rejoined Ruamps, "the thunderbolt is your youth of the Palais Royal." "Bread! bread!" shouted the women in their fury.

Meanwhile, the sound of the tocsin was heard from the Tower of *L'Unité*. The committees, in point of fact, were, in accordance with the law of the grand police, calling the sections together. Several of them had taken arms, and were on their road to the convention. The Mountaineers were perfectly sensible that they ought to make haste in order to transmute the wishes of the patriots into decrees; but for this purpose it was necessary to extricate the assembly as far as it could be done, and to give them room to breathe. "President," cried Duhem, "exhort the good citizens to go forth, in order that we may be able to deliberate." He then addressed the people. "The tocsin has been ringing," said he, "the generals has beaten in the sections; if you will not let us deliberate, the country is undone." Choudieu would have taken a woman by the arm to turn her out. "We are at home," replied she angrily. Choudieu called upon the president, and told him that if he did not know how to perform his duty, and cause the hall to be cleared, he had only to give up the chair to another. He again addressed the people. "A snare is laid for you," said he; "retire that we may fulfil your wishes." The people, observing signs of impatience exhibited by the whole Mountain, began to withdraw. The example once set was gradually followed. The immense crowd began to thin in the interior of the hall, and began to sensibly diminish outside. The parties of young men would not have been able this day to have done any thing against this immense multitude; but the numerous battalions of the sections, obedient to the convention, were already coming in from all quarters, and the mob retired before them. Towards evening, the hall was entirely cleared both within and without, and the convention became perfectly quiet again.

The assembly had scarcely been delivered from this inconvenience, than the continuation of the report of Boissy d'Anglas was called for, which had been interrupted by the irruption of the populace. The assembly was by no means perfectly at ease, and wanted to prove that, when unrestrained, her earliest attention was occupied with the affording provision to the people. At the conclusion of his report, Boissy proposed to select from the sections of Paris an armed force to protect in the environs the arrival of the corn by the boats. The decree was passed. Prieur (of the Marne) proposed that the distribution of bread with the labouring people should begin with the labourers. This suggestion was likewise adopted. The evening was already far advanced. A considerable force was assembled about the convention. A few factious men, who still held out, had assembled, some at the section of the Quinze-Vingts, the others in the section of the *Cité*. These latter had taken possession of the church of Notre-Dame, and, as it were, had entrenched themselves therein. However, no further apprehension was entertained, and the assembly was fully capable of punishing the illegalities of the day.

Isabeau presented himself in the name of the committees, and made a report on the events of the day, the manner in which the assemblages had

been formed, the direction which they had received, and the measures the committees had taken for their dispersion in conformity with the law of 1st Germinal. He reported that Auguis the deputy, who had been commissioned to go round to the different quarters of Paris, had been stopped by the factions and had been wounded, and that Penière, who was sent to rescue him, had also been shot at and wounded. At this statement cries of indignation burst forth, and vengeance was demanded. Isabeau proposed, 1. to declare that on this day the privilege of the sittings of the convention had been violated; 2. to authorize the committees to make inquiries as to the authors of that outrage. On hearing this proposition, the Mountaineers, seeing what an advantage was going to be derived against them from the failure of an attempt, uttered groans. Three-fourths of the assembly rose, requiring that it should be put to the vote. It was on all sides said that this was enacting a 20th of June against the national representation, that this day the hall of the assembly had been invaded in precisely the same manner as they had on the 20th of June stormed the king's palace; and that if the convention did not inflict punishment, a 10th of August would soon be prepared for her. Sergent, a deputy of the Mountain, would have laid this movement to the charge of the Feuillans, the Lametha, and the Duports, who, from London, strove, he said, to urge the patriots to imprudent excesses. He was told that he was digressing. Thibandeau, who during this scene had withdrawn from the assembly, indignant at the outrage committed upon her, rushed to the tribune. "It is there," he exclaimed, pointing to the left side, "there you will find the minority that is conspiring! I declare that I absented myself for four hours, because I no longer saw the national representation here. However, I now return, and I support the project of the decree. The time of weakness is past. It is the weakness of the national representation that has always compromised it, and has given encouragement to a criminal faction. The salvation of the country is this day in your hands; you will lose it if you are weak." The decree was passed with great cheering; and those fits of rage and vengeance, which rouse themselves at the recollection of the dangers that have been incurred, now began to burst forth on all sides. André Dumont, who had filled the chair in the midst of that stormy scene, rushed to the tribune. He complained of the threats and insults of which he had been the object; he called to mind that Chasles and Choudieu, at the time they were pointing him out to the people, said that royalism was in the chair; that Fousseduoire had proposed the preceding day, standing in the midst of a party, to disarm the national guard. Fousseduoire gave him the lie; but a great number of deputies nevertheless asserted that they heard him. "Besides," resumed Dumont, "I despise all those enemies who would have pointed their daggers against me; it is the leaders who ought to be stricken. They have this day wanted to save the Billands, the Collots, the Barrères; I shall not propose to you to send them to death, for they are not yet tried, and the time of assassinations is past, but I propose to banish them from the territory they infect and agitate by their seditions. I propose to you, the transportation this very night of the four accused, whose cause you have for some days past been agitating." This proposal was received with lively applause. The members of the Mountain demanded the call by name of the members, and several of them went to the table to sign the demand for it. "'Tis the last effort," said Bourdon, "of a minority whose treason is confounded; I propose to you, in addition, the arrest of Choudieu, Chasles, and Fousseduoire." These two motions were then decreed. Thus terminated in transportation the long proceedings against Billaud, Collot, Barrère, and Vadier; Choudieu, Chasles, and Fousseduoire were put under arrest. But the convention did not stop there; it was recollected that Huguet had made a speech during the invasion of the hall, and had exclaimed, "*People, be not unmindful of your rights!*" that Leonard Bourdon had presided at the popular meeting in the Rue du Vert-Bois, and that he had incited that section to revolt by his incessant declamations; that Duhem openly encouraged the rioters during the irruption of the rabble; that on the preceding days, he was seen at the Payen coffee-house, in the section of the Invalides, drinking with the principal leaders of the Terrorists, and inciting them to insurrection. A decree of arrest was consequently passed against Huguet, Leonard Bourdon, and Duhem. Many others were denounced; among these was Amar, the most abhorred member of the old committee of general safety, and reputed to be the most dangerous of the Mountaineers. The convention caused this latter to be arrested. In order to remove from Paris these self-named leaders of the conspiracy, it was moved that they should be confined in the castle of Ham. The motion was carried, and it was moreover settled that they should be transferred thither immediately. It was next proposed to declare Paris in a state of siege till the danger should be entirely over. General Pichegru was at this moment in Paris, and in the full lustre of his glory. He was appointed commander of the armed force so long as the danger should last; with him were joined Barras and Merlin (of Thionville). It was six o'clock in the morning of the 13th Germinal (2d of April), when the assembly, exhausted with fatigue, broke up, fully confiding in the measures she had adopted.

The committees took the necessary steps to carry into execution without delay the decrees that had just been passed. The very same morning, the four transports were put into carriages, although one of them, Barrere, was extremely ill, and they were sent by the Orleans road for Brest. The same promptitude was exhibited in the departure of the seven deputies who were to be confined in the castle of Ham. The carriages had to pass through the Champs *Elysées*; the patriots knew this, and a crowd had collected on their way to stop them. When the carriages came up, preceded by the gendarmerie, a great crowd gathered round them. Some said that it was the convention withdrawing to Chalons, and carrying off the money in the treasury; others, on the contrary, said that it was the patriot deputies, unjustly borne away from the presence of the convention, and whom no one had a right to forcibly remove from their functions. They dispersed the gendarmerie, and took

the carriages to the civil committee of the section of the Champs-Elysées. At the same moment, another mob fell upon the post stationed at the *barrière de L'Etoile*, seized the cannon, and turned them upon the avenue. The officer commanding the gendarmerie attempted in vain to parley with the insurgents; he was assaulted, and compelled to take to flight. He made the best of his way to Gros-Caillou, to demand assistance; but the cannoneers of the section threatened to fire upon him if he did not retreat. At this moment there came up several battalions of the sections and several hundred young men under the command of Pichegru, proud of being commanded by so celebrated a general. The insurgents fired two cannon-shot, and kept up a brisk fire of musquetry. Raffet, who on that day commanded the sections, received a musket-shot close to the muzzle; Pichegru himself ran the greatest risks, and was twice aimed at. However, his presence, and the confidence he imparted to those under his command, decided the day. The insurgents were put to flight, and the carriages set off without further impediment. They still had to disperse the meeting of the section of the Quinze-Vingts, joined by that formed at the church of Nôtre Dame. There it was that the factions had erected themselves into a permanent assembly, and were designing a new insurrection. Pichegru repaired thither, cleared the hall of the section, and completely restored public order.

On the following day, he introduced himself to the convention, and informed her that the decrees had been carried into execution. Unanimous cheers received the conqueror of Holland, who, by his presence in Paris had just rendered a fresh service to the state. "The conqueror of tyrants," replied the president, "could not fail to triumph over the factions." He received the fraternal embrace and the honours of the sitting; and remained several hours open to the observation of the assembly and of the public, every eye being fixed on him alone. No one took the pains to inquire as to the cause of his conquests, or to distinguish as to those which were the effect of fortunate coincidences; they judged according to the event, and were lost in the admiration of so brilliant a career.

This audacious attempt of the Jacobins, which we cannot better characterize than by terming it a 20th of June, excited an increased irritation against them, and called for fresh repressive measures against them. A rigid inquiry was directed, for the discovery of all the clues of the conspiracy, which was erroneously attributed to the members of the Mountain. These latter had no communication with the popular agitators, and their intercourse with them was confined to a few accidental coffee-house meetings, and to some encouragement in words; nevertheless, the committee of general safety was commissioned to make a general report.

The conspiracy was supposed to be the more extensive, because there had been commotions in all the provinces washed by the Rhone and the Mediterranean, at Lyons, Avignon, Marseilles, and Toulon. Already had the patriots been denounced as quitting the communes, where they had signalized themselves by excesses, and by armed assemblies in the principal towns, either to escape the observation of their fellow-citizens, or to join their fellows there, and to identify themselves with them. It was commonly said that they were wandering about the country bordering on the Rhone, that they were passing to and fro in numerous bands in the environs of Avignon, Nimes, and Arles, and in the plains of La Cran, and were committing depredations upon those inhabitants reputed royalists. To their charge was laid the death of a wealthy individual, a magistrate of Avignon, who had been robbed and murdered. At Marseilles they were hardly restrained by the presence of the representatives, and by the measures which had been taken to place the city in a state of siege. At Toulon they had met in great number, and formed a concourse of several thousand persons, much in the same way as the federalists had done at General Carteaux's arrival. They lorded it over the town by their establishing meetings with the officials of the dockyard and navy, who had almost all of them been appointed by the younger Robespierre after the recapture of the place. They had numerous partisans among the workmen in the arsenal, whose number was upwards of twelve thousand; and all these men, when collected together, had the means of committing the greatest excesses. At this moment the squadron, completely repaired, was ready to sail. The representative Letourneur was on board the admiral's ship; the marines had gone on board the fleet, and the expedition was said to be destined for Corsica. The revolutionists, taking advantage of the moment when there was left only an inefficient garrison, on which no great reliance could be placed, and among whom they could count many adherents, contrived a riot, and under the special protection of the three representatives, Mariette, Ritter, and Chambon, murdered seven prisoners accused of emigration. At the latter end of Ventôse (March) they repeated the same outrages. Twenty prisoners taken in an enemy's frigate were in one of the forts; they insisted that they were emigrants, and that the government intended to pardon them. They roused the twelve thousand workmen belonging to the arsenal, beleaguered the representatives, who narrowly escaped being murdered, but were fortunately repressed by a battalion set on shore by the equadron.

These facts, coinciding with those in Paris, increased the alarm of the government, and augmented its severity. It had already enjoined all the members of the municipal administrations, and the revolutionary committees, as well as of the popular and military commissions, and all officials dismissed since the 9th of Thermidor, to quit the towns to which they had repaired, and to return to their respective communes. A still more severe decree was enacted against them. They had obtained possession of arms distributed in times of danger; it was decreed that all those who were known in France as having contributed to that portentous tyranny abolished on the 9th Thermidor should be disarmed. It was the peculiar province of each municipal assembly, or each sectional assembly, to indicate the accomplices of that tyranny, and to them was committed the charge of disarming them. It is easy to conceive to what dangerous proceedings this decree was about to expose them,

at a time when they had been exciting so fearful a sensation against them.

These measures did not stop there. They desired to take from the Jacobins the ostensible leaders they possessed on the benches of the Mountain. Although the three principal had been condemned to transportation, although seven men more, Choudieu, Chasles, Foussedoire, Leonard Bourdon, Huguet, Duhem, and Amar, had been sent to the castle of Ham, still it was thought that others quite as formidable were left. Cambon, the dictator of the finances, and the inexorable adversary of the Thermidorians, whom he never pardoned for having ventured to cast a slur upon his integrity, appeared at least to stand in their way; nay more, he was even considered a dangerous man. It was asserted that on the morning of the 12th, he had said to the clerks of the treasury, "There are three hundred of you here, and in case of danger you will be able to make a stand,"—words which he was likely enough to have uttered, and which would prove his conformity of sentiments, but not his absolute participation with the Jacobins. Thuriot, formerly a Thermidorian, but since the reinstatement of the seventy-three, and the twenty-two members, converted into a Mountaineer, a deputy possessing great influence, was also considered as a leader of the faction. In the same category was placed Crassous, who had become one of the most energetic supporters of the Jacobins; Lesage-Senault, who had contributed to cause their club to be shut up, but who had since taken alarm at the reaction; Lecointre (of Versailles), the declared adversary of Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, and who since the return of the Girondins had gone back to the Mountain; Maignet, the incendiary of the south; Hentz, the terrible proconsul of La Vendée; Levasseur (of La Sarthe), one of those who had contributed to the death of Philippeau and Granet (of Marseilles), accused of being the instigator of the revolutionists of the south. It was Tallien who pointed them out, and who, after selecting them at the very tribune of the assembly, called for their being arrested like their seven colleagues, and sent with them to Ham. Tallien's desire was complied with, and they were condemned to undergo this imprisonment.

Thus this movement of the patriots caused them to be prosecuted and disarmed throughout all France, and sent back to their respective communes, and also caused the loss of a score of Mountaineers, of whom some were transported and others imprisoned: every movement of a party that is not strong enough to carry all before it, serves but to hasten its destruction.

The Thermidorians, after they had dealt their blows against the persons, next attacked the things. The commission of seven, commissioned to report upon the organic laws of the constitution, declared without any reservation that the constitution was so loosely worded that it must be reconstructed. A commission of eleven was then appointed to present a new plan. Unfortunately, the victories of their adversaries, so far from reducing the revolutionists to order, only tended to excite them still further, and to stir up on their part unheard-of and perilous exertions.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE NEGOTIATIONS AT BÂLE CONTINUED.—TREATY OF PEACE WITH HOLLAND—CONDITIONS OF THIS TREATY—ANOTHER TREATY OF PEACE WITH PRUSSIA—POLICY ADOPTED BY AUSTRIA AND THE OTHER STATES OF THE EMPIRE—PEACE WITH TUSCANY—NEGOTIATIONS WITH LA VENDÉE AND BRITTANY—SUBMISSION OF CHARETTE AND THE OTHER LEADERS.—STOFFLET CONTINUES THE WAR.—POLICY OF HOCHE IN RESPECT OF THE PACIFICATION OF THE WEST.—INTRIGUES OF THE ROYALIST AGENTS—THE SIMULATED PEACE OF THE INSURGENT LEADERS IN BRITTANY.—STATE OF AUSTRIA AND ENGLAND; PLANS OF PITT, DISCUSSIONS IN THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT.—PREPARATIONS MADE BY THE ALLIED POWERS FOR A NEW CAMPAIGN.

DURING these melancholy events, the negotiations at Bâle had been temporarily interrupted by the death of Baron Goltz. The most disagreeable reports were immediately diffused. One day it was said, the powers will never treat with a republic constantly threatened by factions; they will leave her by herself to perish in the convulsions of anarchy, without fighting and without acknowledging it. Another day, some folks asserted the very contrary: peace, said they, is concluded with Spain; the French armies will go no further: treaties are pending with England and with Russia, but at the expense of Sweden and Denmark, who are about to be sacrificed to the ambition of Pitt and Catharine, and who will receive their reward for being in friendship with France. We see that malice, differing in its reports, always imagined the very contrary to that which best suited the republic; it was this ill-feeling that alleged ruptures where peace was desired, and peace where victories were desired. At another time, the report got ground that any peace was utterly impracticable, and that on this subject a protest had been placed in the hands of the committee of public welfare by a majority of the members of the convention. It was a new movement of Duhem that had given rise to this rumour. He assumed that it was a deceit to treat with a single power, and that peace ought not to be accorded to any, until they should all together come to require it. He had left a note on this subject with the committee of public welfare, and it was this that had originated the idea of this alleged protest.

The patriots, on their part, circulated reports not less annoying. They alleged that Prussia was unduly protracting the negotiations, for the purpose of getting Holland included in one common treaty with herself, in order to keep her under her influence, and to preserve the stadtholdership.

They complained that the fate of that republic remained so long unsettled, that the French there enjoyed none of the advantages of conquest; that the assignats were there taken at not more than half their value, and from the soldiers only; that the Dutch merchants had written to the Belgian and French merchants, that they were ready to deal with them, but only on condition of being paid in advance and in a metallic currency; that the Dutch had allowed the stadtholder to go off, and to take with him whatever he pleased, and had sent to London, by the East India Company's ships, a great portion of their wealth. Many difficulties had, in fact, arisen in Holland, either on account of the conditions of the peace, or owing to the vehement enthusiasm of the patriotic party. The committee of public welfare had sent thither two of its members, of sufficient influence to have terminated all the differences which had arisen. To forward the success of the negotiation, the committee had requested the convention to allow them to abstain from indicating either their names or the object of their mission. The assembly had consented thereto, and they had set out immediately.

It was natural that such important events and such high interests should excite hopes and fears, and such contradictory reports. But, in spite of all these rumours, the conferences were continued with success; Count Hardenberg had succeeded Baron de Goltz at Bâle, and the conditions were nearly settled on one side and the other.

Scarcely had these negotiations been opened, when the exigency of the circumstances began to be sensibly felt, and required modifications in the powers of the committee of public welfare. A perfectly open government, which could not conceal anything, could not decide anything of itself, and could do nothing without a public deliberation, would be incapable of negotiating a treaty with any power, even the most independent. In order to effectuate treaties, it becomes necessary to sign suspensions of hostilities, and neutralize other countries; secrecy is most especially necessary, for a power sometimes negotiates long before it is deemed expedient to avow it. This is not all: there are frequently articles which must remain unknown. If a power promises, for example, to unite his forces with those of another, if he stipulates either for the junction of an army or of a squadron, or for any co-operation whatever of measures, this secret becomes of the utmost importance. How could the committee of public welfare, renewed in the proportion of one-fourth every month, obliged to render an account of every thing, and not possessing the energy or the boldness of the old committee, who was capable of taking every thing upon itself,—how could it have negotiated, especially with powers ashamed of their blunders, not admitting that they were defeated without the greatest reluctance, and insisting upon either leaving secret conditions, or not publishing their treaty until it should be signed? The necessity which required the committee to send two of its members to Holland, without making known either their names or their mission, was a remarkable proof how essential an ingredient secrecy is in diplomatic operations. The committee consequently presented a decree which conferred on it the powers indispensably necessary to effect a treaty, and this gave rise to fresh rumours.

A curious spectacle for the theory of governments is that of a democracy, surmounting its indiscreet curiosity, its distrust of power, and, overpowered by necessity, granting to a few individuals the faculty of even stipulating for secret conditions. This is what the national convention did. She conferred on the committee of public welfare the power even of stipulating for armistices, neutralising territories, negotiating treaties, settling their conditions, drawing them up, and even signing them, without reserving to herself any more than what, in fact, most indisputably belonged to her,—that is to say, the ratification. She did more. She authorized the committee to sign secret articles, on the sole condition that these articles should contain nothing derogatory to the open articles, and should be made public so soon as the motive of secrecy ceased to exist. Fortified with these powers, the committee prosecuted and concluded the negotiations opened with different states.

The peace with Holland was at length signed under the influence of Rewbell, and especially of Sieyès, who were the two members of the committee recently sent into Holland. The Dutch patriots gave a brilliant reception to the celebrated originator of the first declaration of rights, and paid him a deference which put an end to many difficulties. The conditions of peace, signed at the Hague on the 27th Floreal, year III. (May 16, 1795), were the following: The French republic acknowledged the republic of the United Provinces as a free and independent power, and guaranteed its independence and the abolition of the stadtholdership. There was to be an alliance, offensive and defensive, between the two republics, for the entire duration of the present war. This offensive and defensive alliance was to be perpetual between the two republics in every case of war against England. The republic of the United Provinces placed at that time at the disposal of France twelve ships of the line and eighteen frigates, to be employed principally in the German Ocean, the North Sea, and the Baltic Sea. This republic, moreover, gave in aid of France half her land army, which, in good sooth, was reduced to almost nothing, and required to be entirely reorganized. As to the demarcations of territory, they were fixed as follows: France was to keep all Dutch Flanders, in such a manner as to fill up the measure of her territory towards the sea, and to extend it to the mouths of the rivers. In the quarter of the Meuse and Rhine, she was to have possession of Venloo and Maestricht, and all the countries comprehended to the south of Venloo, on both sides of the Meuse. Thus the republic relinquished the idea of extending herself on this point to the Rhine, which was reasonable enough. In this quarter, in fact, the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt flow together in such a manner that there is no longer any clear boundary. Which of these arms of rivers ought to be considered as the Rhine? No one knows, and on this point all is matter of settled understanding. Besides, in this quarter, France is not exposed to any other hostility than that of Holland, an hostility by no means formidable, and not requiring the protection of a marked boundary.

Lastly, as the territory assigned by nature to Holland, consists of tracts formed by alluvial soil borne down to the mouths of the rivers, France, in order to extend herself so far as to any one of the principal beds of the stream, must have seized three-fourths at least of those grounds, and nearly annihilated that republic which she had been so recently liberating. The Rhine does not become a boundary for France in respect of Germany till near Wesel, and the possession of the two banks of the Meuse to the south of Venloo left that question untouched. The French republic, moreover, reserved to itself the power, in case of war in the quarter of the Rhine or Zealand, of putting garrisons into the fortresses of Grave, Bois-le-Duc, and Bergen-op-Zoom. The port of Flushing was to remain as common to both. Thus all precautions were taken. The navigation of the Rhine, the Meuse, the Scheldt, the Hondt, and all their branches, was for ever declared free. Besides these advantages, an indemnity of one hundred millions of florins was paid by Holland. To indemnify the latter for these sacrifices, France promised, at the general pacification, indemnities of territory taken from the conquered countries, and in a situation most suitable for the clear demarcation of the mutual boundaries.

This treaty rested on the most reasonable basis; the conqueror showed himself therein equally generous and intelligent. It has been foolishly observed, that in attaching Holland to her alliance, France exposed her to the loss of half her vessels detained in the ports of England, and especially her colonies, left defenceless to the ambition of Pitt; Holland, left neutral, would neither have recovered her shipping or preserved her colonies, and Pitt would still have found a pretext for seizing them on behalf of the stadtholder. The mere preservation of the stadtholdership, without saving in a certain manner the ships, or the Dutch colonies, would have at least taken away every possible pretext from English ambition; but was the upholding of the stadtholdership, with the political principles of France, with the promises made to the Batavian patriots, in conformity with the spirit which animated them, or with the hopes conceived by them when they opened their gates to us, either practicable, consistent, or even honourable?

The conditions with Prussia were more easy to settle. Bischoffverder had recently been imprisoned. The king of Prussia, delivered from mystical refinements, had conceived a perfectly new ambition. He no longer talked of preserving the principles of general order; he rather desired to make himself the mediator of universal pacification. The treaty with him was signed at Bâle on the 16th Germinal. (April 5, 1795.) In the first place, it was agreed that there should be peace, amity, and good understanding between his majesty the king of Prussia and the French republic; that the troops of the latter should evacuate that part of the Prussian states they were occupying on the right bank of the Rhine; that they should continue to occupy the Prussian provinces on the left bank, and that the definitive state of those provinces should not be settled till the general pacification. According to this last condition it was very evident that the republic, without as yet explaining herself positively, thought of appropriating to herself the boundary of the Rhine; but that until new victories over the states of the Empire and Austria, she postponed the solution of the difficulties to which this important determination must have given rise. Then only would she be able either to dispossess the one, or to give indemnities to the others. The French republic engaged to avail herself of the mediation of the king of Prussia for the purpose of effecting her reconciliation with the princes and states of the Germanic empire; she even engaged, for the space of three months, not to treat as enemies such of the princes of the right bank, in whose favour his Prussian majesty might interest himself. This was a sure way to bring the whole empire to solicit peace through the mediation of Prussia.

Accordingly, this treaty was no sooner signed, than the cabinet of Berlin caused its determination, and the motives which had influenced it, to be solemnly announced to the empire. The cabinet of Berlin declared to the diet that it tendered its good offices to the empire if it were desirous of peace; and if the majority of the states refused peace, to such of them as should be obliged to treat separately for their individual safety. Austria, on her part, addressed some very severe remarks to the diet; she said that she desired peace as much as any one, but that she believed it to be impossible; that she would choose the proper time for treating thereupon, and that the states of the empire would find it much more to their advantage to rely upon the long and well known faith of Austria, than upon perjured powers who had violated every one of their engagements. The diet, so as to assume the appearance of preparing for war, at the same time that it solicited peace, decreed the quintuple contingent for this campaign, and stipulated that the states who could not furnish soldiers, might dispense therewith by the payment of two hundred and forty florins a man. At the same time, it decided that Austria, having just connected herself with England, with a view to the continuance of the war, could not be the mediatrix of peace, and resolved to confide that mediation to Prussia. There was nothing more to settle than the form and the manner in which the deputation was to be formed.

Notwithstanding this strong desire to treat, the empire could hardly do so collectively, for it must have required, on behalf of its members stripped of their territories, restitutions which France could not make without renouncing the line of the Rhine. But it was evident, that in this inability to treat collectively, each prince would throw himself into the arms of Prussia, and would make by this mediator his separate peace.

Thus the republic began to disarm its enemies and to force them on to peace. None were firmly resolved upon war but those who had sustained great losses, and who had no hopes of recovering by negotiation what they had lost by arms. Such necessarily were the tendencies of the princes of the left bank of the Rhine who were despoiled of their territories, of Austria deprived of the Netherlands, and of Piedmont turned out from Savoy and Nice. Those, on the contrary, who had had the good sense to keep to the neutrality, congratulated themselves every day on their prudence, and the advantages derivable therefrom. Sweden

and Denmark were about to send ambassadors to the convention. Switzerland, now become the depository of the trade of the continent, persisted in its wise intentions, and addressed, through the medium of M. Ochs, these sensible observations to Barthélemy, the envoy; "Switzerland cannot do without France, or France without Switzerland. In fact, it may not unreasonably be supposed, that but for the Helvetic confederation, the wrecks of the ancient kingdoms of Lorraine, Burgundy, and Arles, would have been united with the French dominions; and one can scarcely help believing that, but for the powerful diversion and decided interference of France, Helvetic liberty would have been strangled in her cradle." The neutrality of Switzerland had in fact recently rendered an eminent service to France, and had materially assisted in saving her. To these observations M. Ochs added others not less elevated. "Some day or other," said he, "the world will admire this sentiment of natural justice, which making us abhor all foreign influence in the choice of our own forms of government, forbids us for that very reason to set ourselves up for judges of the mode of public administration chosen by our neighbours. Our forefathers did not censure the great feudatories of the German empire for having swallowed up the imperial power, nor yet the royal authority of France for having curbed the great feudatories. They have successively witnessed the French nation represented by the states-general; the Richelieus and the Mazarins seize upon absolute power; Louis XIV. centre in himself the entire power of the nation; and the parliaments aspire to share the public authority in the name of the people; but never were they heard inconsiderately assuming the right to recall the French government to this or that period of its history. The happiness of France was their wish, her unity their hope, and the entirety of her territory their support."

These principles, so elevated and so just, were a pointed censure on the policy of Europe, and the results which Switzerland reaped from them were a very striking demonstration of their wisdom. Austria, jealous of her commerce, strove to cramp it by a *cordon*; but Switzerland appealed to Wurtemburg and the neighbouring states, and obtained justice.

The Italian powers wished for peace, at least those whose imprudence was likely to expose them some day or other to future inconveniences. Piedmont, though exhausted, had lost quite enough to desire to have recourse once more to arms. But Tuscany, inveigled in spite of herself to cease her neutrality by the English ambassador, who, threatening her with a squadron, had allowed her but twelve hours to decide, was impatient to return to her former part on the political stage, especially since the French were at the gates of Genoa. The grand duke had consequently opened a negotiation, which terminated in a treaty, the easiest to conclude of any. Good understanding and friendship between the two states were restored, and the grand duke made restitution to the republic of the corn taken from the French in his ports, at the moment of the declaration of war. This restitution he had made at his own suggestion, even before the negotiation. This treaty, beneficial to France for the trade of the south, and especially for the trade in corn, was concluded on the 21st Pluviôse (February 9).

Venice, who had recalled her envoy from France, intimated that she was about to appoint another, and to dispatch him to Paris. The pope on his part expressed regret for the outrage committed on the French. The court of Naples, led astray by the passions of an insensate Queen and the intrigues of England, was far from thinking of negotiating, and made ridiculous promises of assistance to the coalition.

Spain still had need of peace, and seemed to be only waiting to be forced into it by new reverses.

A negotiation, not less important perhaps with regard to the moral effect it was likely to produce, was that now opened at Nantes with the insurgent provinces. We have observed that the leaders of La Vendée, divided among themselves, almost deserted by their peasants, accompanied only by a few determined warriors, pressed on all sides by the republican generals, reduced to a compulsory election between an amnesty or extermination, had been induced to treat for peace; we have observed that Charette had agreed to an interview near Nantes; how the pretended Baron de Cormatin, Puisaye's major-general, had introduced himself as the mediator of Brittany; how he travelled about with Humbert, undecided between the desire of deceiving the republicans, of concerting his own plans with Charette, of seducing Canclaux, and the ambition of being the pacificator of those celebrated provinces. The common place of meeting was at Nantes. The conferences were to begin at the castle of La Jaunaye, one league from that city, on the 24th Pluviôse (February 12).

Cormatin, on his arrival at Nantes, would have wished to have got Puisaye's letter into the hands of Canclaux; but this man, who wanted to deceive the republicans, did not know how to suppress from them the knowledge of this most dangerous letter. It was discovered and published, and he was obliged to declare that the letter was spurious, that he was not the bearer of it, and that he had come in all sincerity to negotiate a peace. By this course he found himself more embarrassed than ever. This character of a skilful diplomatist duping the republicans, concerting with Charette, and seducing Canclaux, he was now completely unable to sustain, and all he could now do was to play the part of a pacificator. He saw Charette, and found him compelled by his position to treat for the moment with the enemy. From that instant, Cormatin no longer hesitated to labour for peace. It was settled between themselves that this peace should be simulated, and that while they were waiting for England to fulfil her promises, they should appear to submit themselves to the republic. They intended to obtain for the moment the best conditions possible. As soon as the conferences were opened, Cormatin and Charette delivered a note in which they demanded religious toleration, pensions for the support of all the ecclesiastics of La Vendée, exemption from military service and assessed taxes for ten years in order to repair the calamities of the war, indemnities for all devastations, the discharge of the engagements contracted by the generals for the supply of their armies, the re-establishment of the old territorial divisions of the country, and its

former mode of administration, the formation of local militia under the command of the existing commanding generals, the withdrawal of all the republican armies, the exclusion of all the inhabitants of La Vendée who had left the country as patriots, and of whose property the royalists had taken possession, and lastly, an amnesty which should include emigrants as well as the Vendeans. Such demands were absurd, and could not be admitted. The representatives allowed religious toleration, indemnities for those whose cottages had been destroyed, exemption from service on behalf of the young men from the present requisition, in order to repeople the country; the formation of local militia under the direction of the administrations to the number of two thousand men and no more; and the payment of the bonds signed by the generals to the amount of two millions. But they refused the re-establishment of the former territorial divisions and the old administrations, the exemption from taxes for ten years, the withdrawal of the republican armies, and the amnesty for the emigrants; and they required the restoration of their property to the Vendean patriots. They stipulated moreover, that all these concessions should be reduced not into a treaty, but into ordinances (*arrêtés*) made by the representatives on mission, and that on their part, the Vendean generals should sign a declaration, wherein they should recognise the republic, and should promise to pay obedience to her laws. A final conference was fixed for the 29 Pluviôse (February 17), for the truce would terminate on the 30th.

It was requested that before peace was concluded, Stofflet should be invited to these conferences. Several royalist officers desired this, because they thought that they ought not to treat without him; the representatives also desired it, because they had wanted to include all La Vendée in the same composition. Stofflet was at this time directed by the ambitious Bernier, who was far from being favourably inclined towards a peace that must deprive him of all his influence. Besides, Stofflet disliked playing a second-rate part, and he witnessed, with considerable loss of temper, this whole negotiation begun, continued, and ended without him. Nevertheless, he consented to repair to the conferences, and he came to La Jannaye with a great number of his officers.

The disturbance was great. The advocates of peace and those who were for war, were in a high chafe with one another. The former attached themselves to Charette; they said that those who wished to continue the war were the very men who never went into action; that the country was ruined and reduced to the last extremity; that the foreign powers had done nothing for them, nor was it likely they ever would. They also whispered to one another, that all they could do would be to wait and gain time by a feigned peace, and that if England ever performed her promises, they would be quite ready to rise. The advocates of war said, on the contrary, that a peace was only held out for the purpose of disarming them, and then they would break all their promises, and sacrifice them with impunity; that to lay down their arms for a moment, was to enervate their courage, and render any insurrection impracticable for the future; that the circumstance of the republic negotiating was a proof that she herself was also reduced to extremity; that all they had to do was to wait awhile and exhibit somewhat more firmness, till they saw the time arrive when they would be enabled to attempt great things with the assistance of the foreign powers; that it was unworthy of French gentlemen to sign a treaty with the mental reservation of not fulfilling it; and that, moreover, they had no right to recognise the republic, for that would be to disavow the rights of those princes for whom they had so long been fighting. Several very animated conferences took place, at which considerable irritation was manifested on both sides. For a moment, indeed, violent threats were exchanged by the partisans of Charette against those of Stofflet, and they were all but coming to blows. Cormatin was not the least ardent of the advocates of peace. His fluency of speech, his restlessness of body and mind, his situation as representative of the army of Brittany, had attracted general attention. Unfortunately for him, he had about him a person named Solilhac, whom the central committee of Brittany had directed to accompany him. Solilhac, astonished to see Cormatin play so different a part from what he had been instructed, and which he had promised to fulfil, observed to him that he was departing from his instructions, and that he had not been sent thither to treat for peace. Cormatin was extremely embarrassed; Stofflet and the advocates of war triumphed when they learned that Brittany was thinking rather of contriving a delay and of concerting schemes with La Vendée than of submitting herself; they declared that they never would lay down their arms, since Brittany had determined to support them.

On the morning of the 29th Pluviôse (February 17), the council of the army of Anjou met in a separate room in the castle of La Jannaye, to adopt a definitive determination. The leaders of Stofflet's division drew their swords, and swore to cut the throat of the first who should talk of peace; and amongst themselves they decided for war. Charette, Sapinaud, and their officers, in another room, agreed upon peace. At noon they were both to meet the representatives of the people in a tent pitched in the plain. Stofflet, not daring to declare to their faces the determination which he had adopted, sent to them to say that he should not accede to their proposals. At noon the meeting was to take place. The representatives left the detachment which accompanied them at an appointed distance, and repaired to the tent. Charette left his Vendeans at the same distance, and came unaccompanied by any other than his principal officers to the place of meeting. In the meantime, Stofflet was seen mounting his horse, with some furious partisans who accompanied him, and going off at full gallop, waving his hat and shouting *Vive le Roi!* In the tent where Charette and Sapinaud were conferring with the representatives, there was nothing more to discuss, for the ultimatum of the representatives had been accepted beforehand. The declarations agreed upon were mutually signed. Charette, Sapinaud, Cormatin, and the other officers, signed their submission to the laws of the republic; the representatives delivered the ordinances containing the conditions agreed on, to the Vendean chiefs. The greatest urbanity pre-

vailed on both sides, and every thing seemed to look forward to a sincere reconciliation.

The representatives, with a view to shed greater lustre upon the submission of Charette, prepared a magnificent reception for him at Nantes. The most lively joy prevailed in that most patriot city. Every one flattered themselves that the destructive civil war was at length approaching its conclusion. They rejoiced in seeing a man so distinguished as Charette return into the bosom of the republic, perhaps to devote his sword to her services. On the day appointed for his solemn entry, the national guard and the army of the west were under arms. All the inhabitants, full of joy and curiosity, thronged to see and to do honour to the celebrated leader. He was received with shouts of *Long live the republic! Charette for ever!* He wore his uniform of Vendean general and the tri-coloured cockade. Charette was harsh, distrustful, artful, and intrepid; all this was perceptible in his features and in his person. A middle stature, a small bright eye, a nose turned up like a Tartar, and a large mouth, gave him an expression the most singular and the most accordant with his character. All who ran to see him strove to guess his sentiments. The royalists fancied that they could read embarrassment and remorse in his face. The republicans thought him overjoyed and almost intoxicated with his triumph. Indeed, he might well be so, in spite of the embarrassment of his position; for his enemies procured him the fairest and earliest recompense he had ever yet received in return for his exploits.

No sooner was this peace signed, than preparations were made for reducing Stofflet, and for making the Chouans accept the conditions granted to Charette. The latter appeared to be sincere in his declarations; he circulated proclamations in the country to bring every body back to their duty. The natives were overjoyed at this peace. The men entirely devoted to war were formed into territorial guards, and the command of them was left to Charette, to form the police of the district. This was the idea of Hoche, which had been altered in its form to satisfy the Vendean chiefs, who, entertaining at the time misgivings and mistrusts, wished to keep the men most inured to war under their own orders. Charette even promised his aid against Stofflet, if the latter, pressed in Upper Vendée, should fall back upon the Marais.

General Canclaux was immediately despatched in pursuit of Stofflet. Leaving nothing but a corps of observation around Charette's country, he conveyed the greater part of his troops to Layon. Stofflet, desiring to create a sensation by a bold stroke, made an attempt on Chalonne, which was vigorously repulsed, and fell back upon Saint-Florent. He proclaimed Charette a traitor to the cause of royalty, and pronounced sentence of death upon him. The representatives, who knew that such a war was to be terminated not merely by the employment of arms, but by indemnifying the ambitious for the loss of their expectations in assisting men destitute of resources, had also distributed money. The committee of public welfare had opened a credit in their favour on its secret service funds. They gave sixty thousand francs in current coin, and three hundred and sixty-five thousand francs in assignats to many of Stofflet's officers. His major-general, Trotouin, received one hundred thousand francs, half in money, half in assignats, and separated from him. He wrote a letter addressed to the army of Anjou, exhorting them to peace, by urging the reasons most likely to shake their resolution.

While they made use of such means in respect of the army of Anjou, the representatives who had been engaged in the pacification of La Vendée, repaired to Brittany to induce the Chouans to enter into a similar composition. Cormatin had followed them; he was now in every respect attached to the system of peace, and his ambition was to make a triumphal entry into Rennes, as Charette had done at Nantes. Notwithstanding the truce, many acts of spoliation had been committed by the Chouans. These latter being for the most part little better than mere robbers, without attachment to any cause, and concerning themselves but little in the political views which had induced their chiefs to sign a suspension of arms, took no pains to observe it, and looked to nothing else than making booty. Some of the representatives, observing the conduct of the Bretons, began to distrust their intentions, and were already of opinion that they must give up all idea of peace. In this notion Boursault was the most decided. On the other hand, the representative Bollet, a zealous peacemaker, conceived that, notwithstanding some acts of hostility, an accommodation was practicable, and that none but mild means should be used. Hoche, hurrying from cantonments to cantonments, eighty leagues apart, never having a moment's quiet, placed between those representatives who were in favour of war, and those who desired peace, between the Jacobins of the towns, who accused him of incompetence and treason, and the royalists, who charged him with barbarity, Hoche was absolutely disgusted, although his zeal was by no means cooled. "You wish me another campaign of the Vosges," he wrote to one of his friends; "how would you like to make a similar campaign against the Chouans, and almost without an army!" This young captain saw his talents wasted on a thankless war, while generals in every respect his inferiors, were immortalizing themselves in Holland and on the Rhine, at the head of the finest armies of the republic. He nevertheless prosecuted his task with ardour, and with a profound knowledge of men and a consciousness of his own situation. We have seen that he had already given the most judicious advice, for instance, for the indemnifying those insurgents who had remained peasants, and to enlist such as the war had made soldiers. A better acquaintance with the country had enabled him to discover the true means of appeasing the inhabitants, and of again attaching them to the republic. "We must continue," said he, "to treat with the Chouan chiefs. Their good faith is very doubtful, but we must keep our words with them. We shall thus gain by confidence those who only require to have their minds set at rest. We must gain over by promotions those who are ambitious; by money those who are necessitous; we shall thus divide them among themselves; and we should confide the police to those of whom we are sure, by trusting them with the command of the local militia, to the institution of which they have recently sub-

mitted. Moreover, we should distribute twenty-five thousand men in several camps to superintend the whole country; station along the coasts a number of gun-boats, which must be kept in continual motion; and transfer the arsenals, the arms, and the ammunition, from the open towns to the forts and fortified places. As for the inhabitants, we must avail ourselves of the priests with them, and grant some relief to the most indigent. If we could contrive to succeed in diffusing confidence by means of the priests, *Chouannerie* would immediately be at an end. Circulate," he thus wrote to his general officers on the 27th Ventôse, "plentifully distribute that salutary law which the convention has just passed respecting freedom of religious worship; and do yourselves preach up religious toleration. The priests, certain that no one will disturb them in the exercise of their ministry, will become your friends, were it only that they might be quiet. Their character inclines them to peace; see them, and tell them that the continuance of the war will expose them to numerous vexations, not from the republicans, who respect religious opinions, but from the Chouans, who acknowledge neither God or law, and who want to domineer and plunder without end. Amongst them are some in necessitous circumstances, and in general they are very selfish; do not neglect to offer them some relief, but without ostentation, and with all the delicacy of which you are capable. Through them you will learn all the manœuvres of their party, and you will obtain from them that they should keep their peasants in their fields, and prevent their fighting. You must be aware, that to attain this end, mildness, amenity, and frankness of behaviour are necessary. Get some of the officers and soldiers to attend respectfully some of their ceremonies, taking care never to disturb them. The country expects of you the greatest devotedness; her service justifies the means so long as they are in accordance with the laws and with republican honour and dignity." To this advice, Hoche added the recommendation, not to take any thing from the country for the supply of the armies for some time at least. As for the designs of the English, he desired that in order to anticipate them, they should make themselves masters of Jersey and Guernsey, and raise a *Chouannerie* in England, to keep them employed. He was also thinking of Ireland; but he wrote that he would explain himself personally with the committee of public welfare on this head.

These means, chosen with great good sense, and employed in more than one place with great address, had already perfectly succeeded. Brittany was completely divided; all the Chouans who had appeared at Rennes were caressed, paid, satisfied, and persuaded to lay down their arms. The others, more obstinate, reckoning upon Stofflet and Puisaye, were for persisting in making war. Cormatin continued to run from one to the other, with a view to bring them together at La Prevalaye, and to persuade them to enter into a negotiation for a treaty. Notwithstanding the ardour which this adventurer exhibited in pacifying the country, Hoche, who had discerned his character and his vanity, distrusted him, and began to fear that he would break his word with the republicans, just as he had done with the royalists. He observed him very closely, to ascertain whether he laboured sincerely and without any secret intention in the work of reconciliation.

Intrigues of a remarkable character were combining with all these circumstances, in bringing about the pacification so earnestly desired by the republicans. We have formerly seen Puisaye in London, striving to prevail on the English cabinet to concur in his projects; we have seen the three French princes on the continent, one waiting at Arnheim for a port to enact, another fighting on the Rhine, the third in his quality of regent, corresponding from Verona with every one of the cabinets, and keeping up a secret agency in Paris. Puisaye had conducted his plans with the character of a man as active as he was skilful. Without introducing himself through the old duke of Harcourt, the useless ambassador of the regent in London, he addressed himself directly to the British minister. Pitt, who ordinarily was inaccessible to those emigrants who swarmed in the streets of London and beleagured him with plans and applications for relief, welcomed at once the organizer of Brittany, and put him in communication with Wyndham the minister at war, who was zealously attached to monarchy, and desired to support or restore it every where. The plans of Puisaye, maturely investigated, were entirely adopted. England promised an army, a squadron, money, arms, and immense supplies of ammunition, in order to effect a descent upon the coast of France; but Puisaye was required to keep the matter secret from his countrymen, and especially from the old duke of Harcourt, the envoy of the regent. Puisaye wanted nothing more than to do every thing by himself, and was impenetrable to the duke of Harcourt, to the other agents of the princes in London, and above all to the Paris agents, who corresponded with the very secretary of the duke of Harcourt. Puisaye did no more than write to the count d'Artois, applying for extraordinary powers, and making him the offer of coming and putting himself at the head of the expedition. The prince sent the powers, and promised to come and command in person. The plans of Puisaye were soon suspected, in spite of his endeavours to conceal them. All the emigrants, repulsed by Pitt, and kept in the back ground by Puisaye, were unanimous; according to them, Puisaye was an intriguer, sold to the perfidious Pitt, and was meditating most questionable designs. This opinion, disseminated in London, soon established itself at Verona with the advisers of the regent. Already in that little court there existed a great distrust of England ever since the affair of Toulon, and particular uneasiness was felt as soon as she proposed to make use of one of the princes. On this occasion every body enquired with a certain degree of anxiety what she meant to do with M. le Comte d'Artois, why the name of Monsieur was not included in her schemes, and whether she conceived that she was able to do without him, &c. The agents at Paris, who held their commission from the regent, and identified themselves with his sentiments concerning England, not having been able to obtain any communication from Puisaye, used the same language respecting the enterprise which was preparing in London. Another motive made them particularly disapprove of it. The regent

thought of having recourse to Spain, and wanted to betake himself thither, that he might be nearer to La Vendée, and to Charette who was his hero. The Paris agents, on their part, had put themselves in communication with an emissary of Spain, who had urged them to make use of that power, and promised that it would do for Monsieur and for Charette, what England intended to do for the count d'Artois and for Puisaye. But it was necessary to wait till Monsieur could be conveyed from the Alps to the Pyrenees by the Mediterranean, and to get up an expedition of some importance. The intriguers of Paris were therefore entirely biassed in favour of Spain. They pretended that the French were less frightened at Spain than at the English, because she had interests less opposed to Spain; that besides all this, she had already gained over Tallien, through his wife, the daughter of Cabarrus, the Spanish banker; they even dared to assert that they were sure of Hoche, so readily did they utter a falsehood to give an air of importance to their schemes! But Spain, her ships and her troops, were, according to them, nothing when compared with the intrigues they pretended to weave in the interior. Placed in the heart of the capital, they saw a movement of indignation manifest itself against the revolutionary system. We must stir up this movement, said they, and if possible turn it to the account of royalism: but for this purpose the royalists ought to show themselves as little formidable as possible, for the Mountain was gaining influence from every apprehension that counter-revolution inspired. All that was wanting was one victory won by Charette, one landing of the emigrants in Brittany, in order to restore to the revolutionary party the influence it had lost, and to render unpopular the Thermidorians whose assistance the royalists wanted. Charette had just made peace; but it was requisite that he should hold himself in readiness to resume his arms; it was necessary also that Anjou and Brittany should appear to be submissive for a time; that during this time, the heads of the government and the generals should be gained over, that the armies should be suffered to pass the Rhine and make an inroad into Germany; and then that they should suddenly fall upon the lulled convention, thus taken by surprise, and proclaim royalty in La Vendée, in Brittany, and in Paris itself. An expedition from Spain, bringing over the regent, and concurring with these simultaneous movements, might then decide the victory in favour of royalty. As for England, all they had to do was to ask her for money, (for these gentlemen were much in want of that,) and to deceive her afterwards. Thus each of the thousand agents employed for the counter-revolution indulged in his own particular day-dream, devising means according to his own station, and desired to be the principal restorer of monarchy. Lies and intrigues were the sole resources of most of them, and money was the principal object they had in view.

With such ideas, the Paris agency, similar to what Puisaye was preparing in London, ought to have done its utmost to throw aside for the moment any expedition of the kind, to have temporized with the insurgent provinces, and to have caused a feigned peace to be signed. Under cover of the truce granted to the Chouans, Lemaitre, Brottier, and Laville-Heurnois, had just opened communications with the insurgent provinces. The regent had directed them to transmit letters to Charette; they intrusted them to an old naval officer, Duverne de Presle, deprived of his commission, and seeking employ. They instructed him, at the same time, to promote the pacification, by advising the insurgents to temporize, to wait for relief from Spain and for a movement in the interior. This emissary repaired to Rennes, from whence he forwarded the regent's letters to Charette, and then recommended to every one a temporary submission. Others were charged with a similar errand by the Paris agents; and very soon, the notions of peace, already generally circulated in Bretagne, were still further diffused. It was every where said that they must lay down their arms, that England was deceiving the royalists, that they had every thing to expect from the convention, that she herself was about to re-establish monarchy, and that in the treaty signed with Charette there were secret articles, expressly stipulating that the young orphan in the Temple, Louis XVII. was soon to be acknowledged as king. Cormatin, whose position had become extremely perplexing, and who had failed in obedience to the orders of Puisaye and of the central committee, found in the system of the Paris agents an excuse and an encouragement for the conduct which he pursued. It even appears that they led him to expect the command of Brittany in the place of Puisaye. By dint of extreme attention he at length succeeded in bringing together the principal Chouans at La Prevalaye, and the conferences were opened.

In this interval, Messrs de Tinténiac and de la Roberie had just been sent from London by Puisaye, the former to bring the Chouans gunpowder, money, and intelligence of a speedy expedition; the latter to communicate to his uncle Charette an invitation to hold himself in readiness to assist the descent in Brittany, and in short for both of them to cause the negotiations to be broken off. They attempted to land with a few emigrants near the Côtes-du-Nord; the Chouans, apprised of their coming, having hurried to meet them, were beaten in an action with the republicans; Messrs. de la Roberie and de Tinténiac were saved by a miracle; but the truce was compromised, and Hoche, who began to distrust the Chouans, and suspected the sincerity of Cormatin, was desirous of having him apprehended. Cormatin protested his sincerity to the representatives, and prevailed with them not to break the truce. The conference at La Prevalaye continued. An agent of Stofflet's came to take part with them. Stofflet, beaten, pursued, reduced to extremity, stripped of all his resources by the discovery of the little arsenal which he had in a wood, had at length begged to be permitted to treat, and had just despatched a representative to La Prevalaye. This was general Beauvais. The conferences were extremely animated, as they had been at La Jaunaye. General Beauvais still advocated the system of war, in spite of the distressed situation of the leader who sent him; and alleged that Cormatin, having signed the peace of La Jaunaye and acknowledged the republic, had lost the command with which Puisaye had invested him, and therefore could no longer take a part in the conference. M. de Tinténiac, who in spite of every danger had reached the place where the confer-

ences were held, wanted in Puisaye's name to break them off, and to return immediately to London; but Cormatin and the advocates of peace prevented him. Cormatin at length disposed the majority to agree to a composition, by representing that they should gain time by an apparent submission, and would lull the vigilance of the republicans. The conditions were the same as those granted to Charette: religious toleration, indemnities for those whose property had been laid waste, exemptions from the requisition, and the institution of a local militia. There was an additional condition in the present treaty, namely, a million and a half for the principal chiefs, whereof Cormatin was to have a portion. According to general Beauvais, Cormatin, as if he must needs act on every occasion against good faith, at the moment of signing, laid the sword upon his hand, and swore to take up arms again on the first occasion, and recommended every one to maintain, until further orders, the established organization and the respect due to all the leaders.

The royalist chiefs then transferred themselves to La Mabilaye, a league from Rennes, to sign the treaty at a formal meeting with the representatives. Many of them had rather not have gone, but Cormatin prevailed upon them to be present. The meeting took place with the same formalities as at La Jaunaye. The Chouans had requested that Hoche might not be present, on account of his extreme distrust; this was agreed to. On the 1st Floréal (April 20), the representatives issued the same ordinances as at La Jaunaye, and the Chouans signed a declaration by which they recognized the republic and submitted to its laws.

On the following day, Cormatin made his entry into Rennes, as Charette had done at Nantes. The bustle in which he had kept himself, and the importance which he arrogated, caused him to be considered as the chief of the Breton royalists. He obtained the credit of every thing, both the exploits of that band of unknown Chouans who had mysteriously traversed Brittany, as well as that peace which had been so long desired. He received a kind of triumph. Applauded by the inhabitants, caressed by the women, supplied with a good round sum in assignats, he reaped all the profit and all the honour of the war, just as if he had been for a long time the main support of the war. His only purpose in landing in Brittany was to play this singular part. Nevertheless, he dared no longer write to Puisaye; he could not venture to leave Rennes or trust himself in the country, for fear of being shot by the malcontents. The principal leaders returned to their divisions, wrote to Puisaye that they had been deceived, that he had only to come, and they would rise at the first signal and fly to meet him. A few days afterwards, Stofflet, finding himself deserted, signed a peace at Saint-Florent upon the same terms.

While the two Vendées and Brittany were submitting themselves, Charette, for the first time, received the regent's letter; it was dated the first of February. This prince called him the second founder of the monarchy, spoke of his gratitude, of his admiration, of his desire to join him, and appointed him lieutenant-general. These manifestations of esteem arrived too late. Charette, deeply affected, replied immediately that the letter with which he had just been honoured filled his soul with a transport of joy; that his attachment and his fidelity would still be the same; that necessity alone had obliged him to yield, but that his submission was only apparent; that *when the parts should be more firmly united*, he would again take up arms, and be ready to die under the eyes of his prince and in the most glorious of causes.

Such was the first pacification of the insurgent provinces. As Hoche had foretold, it was but apparent; but yet, as he had also foreseen, it might be made fatal to the Vendean chiefs, by habituating the country to repose and to the laws of the republic, and by tranquillizing or diverting into another channel that combativeness which distinguishes some men. Notwithstanding the assurance of Charette to the regent, and of the Chouans to Puisaye, all fervid feeling was likely to be extinguished in their hearts after a few months' tranquillity. These underplots were but so many acts of insincerity, excusable no doubt in the unreflecting passion of civil wars, but which take away from those who entertain them all right to complain of the severities of their adversaries. The representatives and the republican generals were most scrupulous in fulfilling the terms agreed upon. It is assuredly superfluous to demonstrate the absurdity of the rumour then circulated and even repeated since, that the treaties which had been signed contained secret articles, to the effect of a promise to place Louis XVII. on the throne; as if the representatives could have been so mad as to enter into such engagements! as if it had been possible that they could consent to sacrifice to a few partisans, a republic which they persisted in maintaining against all Europe! Besides, none of the chiefs in their letters to the princes or to the different royalist agents, had ever ventured to advance such an absurdity. Charette, subsequently tried for having violated the conditions made with him, dared not avail himself of this powerful excuse for the non-execution, of secret stipulation. Puisaye, in his memoirs, has deemed the assertion as frivolous as it was false; and it would not have been noticed in this place, if it had not been retailed in a great number of memoirs.

The result of this peace was not solely the disarming of the country; coinciding as it did with the peace of Prussia, Holland, and Tuscany, and with the intentions manifested by several other states, it possessed the ulterior advantage of producing a very great moral effect. The republic was now observed to be recognized at one and the same time by its enemies at home and abroad, by the allied powers, and by the royalist party itself.

Of the declared enemies of France, there were, only left Austria and England. Russia was too remote to be dangerous; the empire was on the point of being dismembered, and was incapable of supporting the war; Piedmont was exhausted; Spain, identifying herself in an inferior degree with the chimerical hopes of the intriguing royalists, sighed for peace; and the anger of the court of Naples was as impotent as ridiculous. Pitt, in spite of the unparalleled triumphs of the republic, notwithstanding a campaign unexampled in the annals of war, was not shaken; and his strong good sense had come to the conclusion that so many

victories, in themselves ruinous to the continent, were in no respect detrimental to England. The stadtholder, the princes of Germany, Austria, Piedmont, and Spain, had lost in this war a portion of their territory; but England had acquired an incontestable superiority at sea; she was mistress of the Mediterranean and of the ocean; she had seized half the Dutch fleet, she forced the navy of Spain to spend her strength against France; she strove to possess herself of our colonies; she had already taken all those of the Dutch, and secured for ever her Indian empire. For this purpose she still required some time of war and of political aberrations on the part of the continental powers. It was therefore to her interest to excite hostilities by affording assistance to Austria, by awakening the zeal of Spain, and by preparing fresh commotions in the southern provinces of France. So much the worse for the belligerent powers if they were beaten in a new campaign; but England had nothing to fear; she would pursue her course on the seas, in India, and in America. If on the other hand, the powers were victorious, she would be a gainer by restoring to Austria the Netherlands, which she particularly dreaded to see in the hands of France. Such were the sanguinary but profound calculations of the English minister.

Notwithstanding the losses which England had experienced, either by prizes, or by the defeats of the duke of York, or by the enormous expenses which she had incurred, and the sums which she had given to Prussia and Piedmont, she still possessed resources far more great than the English or even Pitt himself dreamt of. England, it is true, complained bitterly of the numerous captures, of the scarcity, and of the high price of all articles of consumption. The English merchant vessels, having alone continued to traverse the sea, had naturally run much greater risk of being taken by privateers than those of other nations. The insurances, in which a great deal of business was done, rendered them almost foolhardy, and very often they would not wait for a convoy. This it was that gave so many advantages to our privateers. As for the scarcity, it was general throughout Europe. On the Rhine, about Frankfort, a bushel of rye cost fifteen florins. The enormous consumption of the armies, the multitude of hands taken from agriculture, the troubles in unhappy Poland, who had this year sent out scarcely any corn, had occasioned this extraordinary dearth. Besides, to ship corn from the Baltic to England was rendered almost impossible since the French were masters of Holland. It was to the New World that Europe had been obliged to resort for provisions; she lived at this moment on the surplus produce of those new lands which the North Americans had just brought into cultivation. But freight was high, and bread had risen in England to an enormous price. The price of meat was much the same. Spanish wool was not imported after the French had occupied the ports of Biscay, and the manufacture of cloth was likely to be interrupted. Thus England, while in labour with her future greatness, suffered severely. The operatives struck for wages in all the manufacturing towns; the people called aloud for peace, and petitions were presented to parliament, subscribed by thousands of signatures, imploring them to put an end to this disastrous war. Ireland, agitated on account of concessions which had been recently withdrawn, was about to add fresh embarrassments to those in which the government was already involved.

Through all these adverse combinations, Pitt discovered adequate motives and means for continuing the war. In the first place, the war flattered the passions of his court: it flattered even those of the English nation, which cherished a deep-seated animosity against France, that could always be revived amidst the severest privations; in the next place, notwithstanding her commercial losses, losses which proved, however, that the English alone had continued to frequent the seas, he saw English commerce augmented during the last two years by the exclusive possession of all the outlets of India and America. He had ascertained that the exports had amazingly increased since the commencement of the war, and he already had a glimpse of the future prosperity of his nation. He found in loans an expedient, at the fruitfulness of which he himself was astonished. The funds had not fallen; the loss of Holland had but little affected them, because the event being foreseen, an enormous quantity of capital had been transferred from Amsterdam to London. The Dutch merchants, although patriots, had nevertheless no confidence in events, and had sought to place their wealth in safety by transporting it to England. Pitt had talked of a new loan to a considerable amount, and in spite of the war he observed that the tenders for it increased. Experience has since proved that war, in prohibiting commercial speculations, and not admitting of any speculations save those in the public funds, so far from presenting difficulties to loans facilitates them. This must happen still more naturally in a country which, being without frontiers, never considers war as involving a question of existence, but merely as a question of trade and disposal of produce. Pitt resolved, therefore, by means of the abundant capital of his nation, to supply Austria with funds, to strengthen his navy, to reorganize his land forces, for the purpose of conveying them to India or America, and to give considerable assistance to the French insurgents. He concluded a subsidiary treaty with Austria, similar in effect to the one he had made in the preceding year with Prussia. That power possessed an army, and promised to keep on foot at least two hundred thousand effective men, but was in want of money; Prussia could no longer open loans either in Switzerland, in Frankfort, or in Holland. England did not undertake to furnish the funds, but to guarantee the loan which she proposed to open in London. To guarantee the debts of a power like Austria is much the same as becoming gage for their payment; but the operation in this form was much more easy to justify before parliament. The loan was for four millions six hundred thousand sterling, (one hundred and fifteen millions of francs) at five per cent. interest. Pitt opened at the same time a loan of eighteen millions sterling on account of England at four per cent. The eagerness of capitalists was extreme; and as the Austrian loan was guaranteed by the English government, and bore a higher interest, they required that for two-thirds taken in the English loan they should

Pitt's policy tending to carrying on what he termed "a just and necessary war."—Answer of the English opposition to Pitt's

have one-third given them in the Austrian loan. Pitt having thus made sure of Austria, strove to rouse the zeal of Spain, but he found it extinguished. He took into his pay the emigrant regiments of Condé, and he told Puisaye that as the pacification of La Vendée diminished the confidence inspired by the insurgent provinces, he would give him a squadron, the necessaries for an army, and emigrants to fill his regiments, but no English soldiers; and that if, as he had written him from Brittany, the dispositions of the royalists were not changed, and if the expedition proved successful, he would endeavour to render it decisive by sending an army thither. He then resolved to raise the navy from eighty to one hundred thousand seamen. For this purpose he devised a species of conscription [called pressing of seamen]. Every merchant vessel was obliged to furnish one seaman for every seven of her crew; this was a due which it was but fair that commerce should discharge for the protection it derived from the navy. Agriculture and manufactures were likewise under obligations to the navy, which ensured the means of disposing of their produce; consequently, each parish was obliged to furnish one seaman. Pitt thus ensured the means of imparting to the English navy an extraordinary development of action. The English men-of-war were very inferior in construction to the French ships; but their immense superiority in point of numbers, the excellence of the crews, and the naval skill of the officers, rendered competition utterly impracticable.

With all these means combined, Pitt presented himself before parliament. The opposition had this year increased by about twenty members. The advocates of peace and of the French revolution were more animated than ever, and they had stubborn facts to oppose to the minister. The language which Pitt dictated to the crown, and which he himself held during this session, one of the most memorable of the English parliament, on account of the importance of the questions and the eloquence of Fox and Sheridan, was extremely dexterous. He admitted that France had obtained unexampled triumphs, but these triumphs, so far from discouraging her enemies, ought on the contrary, he said, to impart to them more firmness and perseverance. It was still England against whom France bore ill-will; it was her constitution, and her prosperity, that she was striving to destroy; at the present time it was any thing but prudent or honourable to acknowledge any inferiority before such a formidable animosity. To lay down her arms, particularly at that crisis, would, as he observed, be a most fatal act of weakness. France having no other enemies than Austria and the empire to combat, would overwhelm them; she would then return, freed from her continental enemies, and fall upon England, who thenceforth single-handed would have to sustain a tremendous shock. It was right, therefore, to take advantage of the moment, when several powers were yet contesting with each other, to join in the attack upon the common enemy, to compel France to retire within her own limits, to wrest from her the Netherlands and Holland, to drive her armies, her commerce, and her mischievous principles back into her own country. Then it would only call for one more effort to completely overwhelm her. She had conquered, it was true, but only by exhausting herself, by employing barbarous means, which had diminished themselves by their very violence. The *maximum*, the *requisitions*, the *assignats*, and terror, had lost their effect in the hands of the leaders of France. All these chiefs had fallen by striving to obtain victory at such a price. One more campaign, then, said Pitt, and Europe and England will be avenged, and preserved from a sanguinary revolution. Even if one did not respond to these reasons, based as they were upon honour, safety, and public policy, and yet desired to effect a peace, such a peace could not be effected. The French demagogues would repel it with that ferocious pride which they had exhibited even before they were victorious. And as to treating with them, where were they to be found? Where look for a government amid those blood-thirsty factions, urging each other on to power, and disappearing as soon as they had got thither? How hope for solid conditions in negotiating with such transient depositaries of a still disputed authority? It was, therefore, dishonourable, it was imprudent, it was impracticable to negotiate. England still possessed immense resources; her exports had wonderfully increased; her commerce experienced losses which proved her boldness and her activity; her navy had become formidable; and her vast pecuniary resources were spontaneously made available, and that without stint, for the service of the government, in order to carry on this *just and necessary* war.

This then was the epithet Pitt had applied to this war from the outset, and which he affected to retain. We see plainly enough, that amongst these hackneyed parliamentary reasons he could not assign the real motives; he would not state plainly through what Machiavelian paths he desired to conduct England to the highest pinnacle of power. No one will avow such an ambition as this in the face of the world.

To this the opposition victoriously replied. All that was asked at the end of last session, said Fox and Sheridan, was no more than a single campaign; that the allies had already several fortresses, from which they were to sally forth in the spring to annihilate France. But look to what has actually taken place! The French have conquered Flanders, Holland, the whole left bank of the Rhine, excepting Mentz, part of Piedmont, the greater part of Catalonia, and the whole of Navarre. Where shall we find such a campaign in the annals of Europe? It is admitted that they have captured some few fortresses; show us then a war in which so many fortified places have been reduced in a single campaign? If the French, struggling against all Europe, have had such success, what advantages are they not likely to gain in a conflict with Austria and England, left almost single-handed; for the other powers are either no longer able to second us, or are about negotiating. It is said that the French are exhausted, that the assignats, their sole resource, have lost all their value; that their present government has ceased to possess its former energy. But the Americans saw their paper-money fall ninety per cent. below par, and yet they have not yielded. But this government, when it is energetic, they told us was barbarous; now that it is become humane and moderate, it is found to be inefficient. People

may talk of our resources, of our great wealth; but the people are perishing of want, and cannot pay for either bread or meat; they are loudly demanding peace. That wonderful wealth, which seems to have been created by magic, is it substantial? Do people coin money out of paper? All those systems of finance conceal some frightful error, some immense abyss, which will suddenly appear. We go on giving our wealth to the powers of Europe; we have already lavished it on Piedmont and on Prussia; we are again going to throw it away upon Austria. Who is it can warrant us that this power will be more faithful to her engagements than Prussia? Who will undertake that she will not break her promises, and sell us after taking our gold? We are exciting an infamous civil war; we are arming the French against their native country, and yet, to our shame be it spoken, these French, acknowledging their error and the wisdom of their new government, have just laid down their arms. Shall we go and fan the expiring embers of La Vendée, for the purpose of producing a tremendous conflagration there? People talk to us of the barbarous principles of France. Is there in those principles any thing more anti-social than our conduct in respect of the insurgent provinces? All the means of the war are, therefore, equivocal or culpable. Peace, we are assured, is impossible. France hates England. But when did the violence of the French against us declare itself? Was it not when we manifested the guilty intention of wresting their liberty from them, of interfering in the choice of their government, of exciting civil war among them? Peace, we are told, would diffuse the contagion of their principles. But Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, the United States, are at peace with them; is their constitution destroyed? Peace, it is dinned into us, is impracticable with a government that is tottering and constantly changing. But Prussia and Tuscany have found some one to treat with; Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and the United States, know with whom to communicate in their relations with France; and yet we cannot negotiate with her! We might as well have been told, on commencing the war, that we should not make peace before a certain form of government had been re-established among our enemies; before the republic had been abolished among them; before they had submitted to the institutions which it pleased us to give them.

Amidst this clash of reasons and of eloquence, Pitt pursuing his course, and without ever communicating his real motives, obtained every thing he desired; loans, pressing of seamen, and the suspension of the *habeas corpus*. With his treasures, his navy, the two hundred thousand Austrian soldiers, and the desperate courage of the French insurgents, he resolved to make a new campaign this year, certain at any rate to prevail at sea, if victory on the continent should adhere to the enthusiastic nation with whom he was contending.

These negotiations, these conflicts of opinion in Europe, these preparations for war, prove of what importance our country then was in the world. At this juncture, ambassadors were seen to arrive all at once from Sweden, from Denmark, Holland, Prussia, Tuscany, Venice, and from America. On their arrival in Paris they called upon the president of the convention, whom they found lodging sometimes in a second or third floor, and whose simple and polite reception had succeeded the ancient introductions at court. They were subsequently introduced to that famous hall, where, on bare benches, and in the simplest costume, sat that assembly which, from the might and the grandeur of its passions, appeared no longer ridiculous, but terrible. An arm-chair was allotted them opposite to that of the president; they spoke being seated; the president replied in the same manner, addressing them by the styles specified in their credentials. He then gave them the fraternal embrace, and proclaimed them representatives of the power from whom they brought despatches. They were able, in a box set apart for their use, to witness those stormy discussions, which excited in strangers as much curiosity as terror. Such was the ceremonial observed in regard to the ambassadors of foreign powers. Its simplicity was consistent with a republic, receiving without ceremony, but with decency and respect, the envoys of the monarchs she had vanquished. The name of Frenchman was then a name of which to be proud, it was ennobled by famous victories, and by the purest of all, those victories which a people have gained in defending their political existence and their liberty.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE INCREASED EXASPERATION AND VIOLENCE OF THE DOMINANT PARTIES AFTER THE 12 GERMINAL.—FRESH CONSPIRACY OF THE PATRIOTS.—MASSACRE IN THE PRISONS AT LYONS BY THE REACTIONISTS.—NEW DECREES CONCERNING THE EMIGRANTS AND IN RESPECT OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP. MODIFICATION IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEES—FINANCIAL QUESTIONS. INCREASING DEPRECIATION OF PAPER CURRENCY. STOCK JOBBING. DIFFERENT SCHEMES AND PLANS FOR THE DIMINUTION OF THE ASSIGNATS. IMPORTANT MEASURE DECREED FOR FACILITATING THE SALE OF THE NATIONAL PROPERTY—INSURRECTION OF THE REVOLUTIONISTS OF THE FIRST PRAIRIAL, YEAR III. FORCIBLE ENTRY OF THE PEOPLE AT THE CONVENTION. THE MURDER OF THE REPRESENTATIVE FÉRAUD. PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THIS AND THE FOLLOWING DAYS. CONTINUATION OF THE EVENTS OF PRAIRIAL. ARREST OF VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE FORMER COMMITTEES. CONDEMNATION AND EXECUTION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES ROMME, GOUJON, DUQUESNOY, DUROI, SOUBRANY, BOURSOTTE, AND OTHERS COMPROMISED BY THE INSURRECTION. DISARMING OF THE PATRIOTS AND DESTRUCTION OF THAT PARTY.—NEW DISCUSSIONS RESPECTING THE SALE OF THE NATIONAL PROPERTY.—SCALE OF DIMINUTION ADOPTED FOR THE ASSIGNATS.

THE events of Germinal had produced the usual consequence of an uncertain action for the two parties which divided France; those two parties had become still more violent and the more intent on destroying one another. Throughout the south, and particularly at Avignon, Marseilles, and Toulon, the revolutionists, more menacing, and more audacious than ever, evading all the efforts that were made to disarm them or to bring them back to their communes, continued to demand the enlargement of the patriots, the death of all returned emigrants, and the constitution of 1793. They corresponded with the partisans whom they had throughout the provinces; they invited them, and induced them to meet together at two principal points, Toulon for the south, Paris for the north. When they should be strong enough at Toulon, they would, as they said, raise the departments, and advance to join their brethren in the north. This was exactly the scheme of the federalists in 1793.

Their adversaries, whether royalists or Girondists, had become bolder ever since the government, attacked in Germinal, had given the signal for persecutions. Masters of the administrations, they used to terrible purpose the decrees passed against the patriots. They imprisoned them, as accomplices of Robespierre's, or as having dealt with the public money without rendering any account of it; they disarmed them, as having participated in the tyranny abolished on the 9th Thermidor; or lastly, they hunted them down from place to place, as having quitted their communes. It was more particularly in the south that these hostilities against the unfortunate patriots were most active; for violence always provokes equal violence in return. In the department of the Rhône, a terrible reaction was about to take place. The royalists, obliged to flee from the cruel violence of 1793, returned through Switzerland, crossed the frontier, entered Lyons with false passports, talked there of the king, of religion, of past prosperity, and availed themselves of the recollection of the grape-shot massacres (*mitrailades*) to bring back to monarchy a city completely republican. Thus the royalists placed their reliance upon Lyons as the patriots did upon Toulon. It was said that Précy had returned and lay concealed in that city, whose calamities had been brought down upon it by his valour. A multitude of emigrants, collecting at Bâle, at Berne, and at Lausanne, showed themselves more presumptuously than ever. They talked of their speedy return; they said that their friends were in power; that they would soon seat the son of Louis XVI. on the throne, get themselves recalled, and their property restored to them; and that with the exception of some terrorists and some military officers who must needs be punished, every body would anxiously lend their aid to this restoration. At Lausanne, where all the youth were enthusiastic admirers of the French revolution, they annoyed the emigrants, and forced them to hold their peace. In other places they were suffered to have their say; their idle boastings, to which every body was pretty well accustomed for six years past, were despised; but a distrust was excited in respect of some of them, who were paid by the Austrian police to closely observe at the time the unguarded language of travellers. It was also in this quarter, that is in the direction of Lyons, that companies were formed, who, styling themselves *companies of the Sun* and *companies of Jesus*, were to traverse the country or find their way into the towns, and murder the patriots retired to their estates or confined in the prisons. The transported priests also returned by this frontier, and had already spread themselves throughout the eastern provinces; they declared all that had been done by the conformist priests to be null; they rebaptized children, remarried couples, and inspired the people with a hatred and contempt of the government. They took care to keep near the frontier, in order to recross it at the first hint of danger. Those who had not suffered transportation, and who enjoyed in France a pension for their support and the free exercise of their religion, did not abuse the tolerance of the government a whit less than the transported priests. Dissatisfied at having to say mass in houses either hired or lent, they stirred up the people, and instigated them to seize the churches, which had become the property of the communes. A great number of unhappy scenes had been exhibited in respect of this subject, and forces had been put in operation to compel submission to the decrees. In Paris, the journalists in the pay of royalism, stimulated by Lemaitre, wrote with more boldness than ever against the revolution, and almost openly preached up monarchy. Lacroix, the author of the *Specta-*

teur, had been acquitted of the charges preferred against him; and since then, the petty tribe of libellers were no longer afraid of the revolutionary tribunal.

Thus the two parties were arrayed against each other, and quite ready for a decisive engagement. The revolutionists, resolved to strike the blow of which the 12th Germinal had been no more than the threat, conspired openly. They devised underhand plots in every quarter, since they had lost their principal chiefs, who by themselves meditated schemes on behalf of the entire party. An association was formed at the house of a man named Lagrelet, in the Rue de Bretagne: it was at that place that a scheme was agitated of setting in motion several mobs, at the head of whom Cambon, Maribon-Montant, and Thuriot, were to be placed; of despatching some of them to the prisons to set the patriots free, others to the committees to carry them there, and others again to the convention to extort decrees from it. Once masters of the convention, the conspirators purposed to compel it to re-instate the imprisoned deputies, to annul the sentence passed upon Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère; to exclude the seventy-three, and immediately to proclaim the constitution of 1793. Everything was prepared, even to the crowbars for breaking open the prisons, the pass-tickets for recognising the conspirators, and a piece of stuff to hang out at the window of the house whence all the orders were to issue. A letter, concealed in a loaf and addressed to a prisoner, was intercepted. In this letter he was informed as follows: "On the day that you will receive some eggs half white and half red, you will hold yourself in readiness." The day fixed was the 1st Floréal. One of the conspirators betrayed the secret, and handed over the particulars of the scheme to the committee of general safety. That committee immediately caused all the leaders who were pointed out to be apprehended; but this unfortunately did not derange the plans of the patriots; for every one was a leader with them, and conspiracies existed in a thousand places at once. Rovère, formerly worthy of the name of a terrorist under the old committee of public welfare, and now a violent reactionist, came to make a report on this plot to the convention, and made heavy imputations against the deputies who were to be put at the head of the assemblies of people. Those deputies had no connexion whatever with the plot, and their names had been used without their knowledge, because the conspirators wanted them, and reckoned upon their inclinations. Already condemned by a decree to be confined at Ham, they had not obeyed, but withdrawn themselves from their sentence. Rovère caused it to be decided by the assembly, that if they did not surrender themselves as prisoners immediately, they should be transported for the simple fact of their disobedience. This abortive procedure sufficiently indicated an approaching event.

As soon as the journals had made known this new plot of the patriots, a great agitation was manifested at Lyons, and the rage against them was very much increased. There was on his trial at this period at Lyons a noted Terrorist denouncer, prosecuted by virtue of the decree passed against the accomplices of Robespierre. The newspapers came to hand, and communicated the report of Rovère respecting the plot of the 29th Germinal. The Lyonnese began to bestir themselves; most of them had to lament either the ruin of their fortune or the death of their relatives. They beleagured the hall of the tribunal. The representative Boisset mounted his horse; they surrounded him, and each began to enumerate his charges against the man upon his trial. The promoters of disturbance, the companies of the Sun and of Jesus, availing themselves of this popular movement, fomented the disturbance, betook themselves to the prisons, forcibly entered them, and murdered seventy or eighty prisoners, reputed Terrorists, and cast their bodies into the Rhone. The national guard made some efforts to prevent this massacre, but exhibited perhaps less zeal than it would have displayed had they been actuated by less resentment against the victims of that day.

Thus scarcely was the Jacobin plot of the 29th Germinal made known, than the counter-revolutionists replied to it by the massacre of the 5th Floréal (24th April) at Lyons. The sincere republicans, while at the same time they blamed the intentions of the Terrorists, were nevertheless alarmed at those of the Counter-revolutionists. Hitherto they had been wholly occupied in preventing a new terror, and were by no means frightened at royalism: royalism, in fact, appeared very remote after the executions of the revolutionary tribunal and the victories of our armies; but when they beheld it, driven as it were from La Vendée, returning by Lyons, forming companies of murderers, impelling seditious priests into the heart of France, and dictating in Paris itself publications entirely filled with the violence of the emigrants, they changed their opinion, and thought that, in addition to the rigorous measures adopted against the tools of terror, others should be taken against the partisans of royalty. In the first place, to leave without pretext those who had suffered from excesses committed, and who thereupon demanded redress, they caused the tribunals to be enjoined to infuse more activity in the prosecution of persons charged with peculation, abuse of authority, and acts of oppression. They then set about considering how the royalists could best be repressed. Chénier, known for his literary talents and his openly-avowed republican opinions, was commissioned to report on this subject. He drew an energetic picture of France, of the two parties that disputed the dominion over her, and especially of the artful practices of the emigrants and the clergy, and he proposed that every returned emigrant should be immediately handed over to the tribunals, to be dealt with according to law; to consider as an emigrant every banished person who, having re-entered France, should be still there at the end of one month; to punish with six months imprisonment all who should violate the law in respect of religious worship, and who should attempt to take forcible possession of the churches; to condemn to banishment every writer who should bring the national representation into contempt, or advocate the restoration of royalty; lastly, to oblige all the authorities charged with the disarming the Terrorists to assign the motives for each seizure of their arms.

All these measures were adopted, excepting two

which occasioned some observations. Thibaudeau considered it inexpedient to punish with six months imprisonment the violators of the laws respecting religious worship; he justly remarked that the churches were fit for one purpose only, that of religious ceremonies; that those people who are so devout to attend mass at private meetings, would not see themselves deprived of those edifices wherein it had been celebrated of yore without pain; that in declaring the government exempted for ever from the expense of all religious worship, it should have restored the churches to the Catholics, to avoid complaints, commotions, and perhaps a general Vendée. Thibaudeau's observations were not approved of; for in restoring the Catholics to their churches, even at their own charge, the convention feared lest they should thereby restore to the old clergy those pompous ceremonies in which a portion of its influence consisted. Tallien, who had become a journalist with Fréron, and who, either from this reason or from an affectation of justice, was induced to protect the independence of the press, was opposed to the infliction of banishment upon writers. He maintained that this demonstrated an arbitrary tendency, and left too great latitude for severities against the press. He was right; but in that state of open war with royalism, it was perhaps of importance that the convention should declare herself strongly against those libellers who strove to bring back France so soon to monarchical ideas. Louvet, that fiery Girondist, whose distrusts had done so much injury to his party, but who was one of the most single-hearted men in the assembly, hastened to reply to Tallien, and conjured all the friends of the republic to forget their dissensions and their mutual wrongs, and to unite against their oldest enemy, the only real one they ever had —namely, royalty. The testimony of Louvet in favour of violent measures was least suspicious of all, for he had braved the most cruel proscription to oppose the system of revolutionary means. The whole assembly applauded his frank and noble declaration, voted the printing of his speech, and its being sent to every place in France, and adopted the article to the great confusion of Tallien, who had so badly chosen his time for maintaining a just and true axiom.

Thus, while the convention had ordered the prosecution and the disarming of the patriots, and their return to their communes, she proceeded at the same time to renew the laws against the emigrants and the banished priests, and to inflict penalties against the opening of the churches as well as against royalist pamphlets; but penal laws are inefficient protections against parties ready to rush one against the other. The deputy Thibaudeau was of opinion that the organization of the committees of government since the 9th Thermidor was too inefficient and too relaxed. This organization, established at the moment when the dictatorship had been very recently overthrown, would not have been devised but under the apprehension of a new tyranny. Thus an excessive tension of all the springs had succeeded to an extreme relaxation. There had been restored to each committee its peculiar jurisdiction, in order to destroy the too predominant influence of the committee of public welfare; and irregularities and delays, and a complete enfeebling of the government, had been the result of this state of things. In fact, if a disturbance occurred in a department, the constitutional course was, that it should be first communicated in writing to the committee of general safety; this committee called to its assistance the committee of public welfare, and in certain cases the committee of legislation; it was necessary to wait till these committees were complete before they could assemble, and then that they should have time to confer together. Thus their meetings were rendered almost impracticable, and too numerous to be of essential service. Were it necessary merely to send twenty men by way of guard, the committee of general safety, charged with the police, was obliged to address itself to the military committee. Now it began to be felt how little reason there was that people should frighten themselves with the idea of the tyranny of the old committee of public welfare, and to take such precautions against a danger thenceforth chimerical. A government thus organized could but very feebly resist the factions conspiring against one another, and could only oppose a powerless authority against them. The deputy, Thibaudeau, therefore proposed a simplification of the government; he moved that the jurisdiction of all the committees should be confined to the mere declaration of the laws, and that executive measures should exclusively rest with the committee of public welfare; that the latter should associate the police with its other functions, and that consequently the committee of general safety should be abolished; and that, lastly, the committee of public welfare, thus entrusted with the entire government, should be increased to twenty-four members, so as to be adequate to the extent of its new duties. The cowards in the assembly, always ready to arm themselves against impossible dangers, cried out against this plan, and said that it was a renewal of the old dictatorship. The lists being opened for discussion, each made his own motion. Those who had the mania for reverting to constitutional means, or to the division of powers, proposed to create an executive power independent of the assembly, in order to separate the execution from the creation of the law; others conceived the idea of taking the members who were to constitute this power from the assembly itself, but were for taking from them, so long as they held their office, their legislative vote. After long digressions, the assembly became sensible, that having but two or three months longer to exist, that is to say, scarcely the time requisite for completely forming a constitution, it was ridiculous to waste its time in framing a provisional constitution, and especially to renounce its dictatorship at a moment when it had more need of strength than ever. In consequence, every one of the propositions tending to a division of the powers was rejected; but they were too much afraid of Thibaudeau's plan to adopt it: the assembly contented herself therefore with merely disengaging the committees a little further from their embarrassments. It was decided that they should be confined to the mere declaration of laws; that the committee of public welfare should alone be entrusted with executive measures, but that the police should remain with the committee of general safety; that the meetings of committees should take place only by the deputation of commissioners; and lastly, in order to be the more constantly protected

against that formidable committee of public welfare who caused so much dread, it was settled that it should be deprived of taking the initiative of the laws, and never more be empowered to make motions tending to proceedings against any deputy.

While these means were being taken to restore a little energy to the government, the assembly continued to occupy itself with those financial questions, the discussion of which had been interrupted by the events of the month of Germinal. The abolition of the *maximum*, of the requisitions, of the sequestration, of all the instruments to effect compulsory means, by restoring things to their natural movement, had rendered the fall of the assignats more rapid than ever. Sales being no longer forced, and prices having again become free, goods had risen in an extraordinary manner, and consequently the assignat had fallen in proportion. The communications with foreign countries being re-established, the assignat had again been placed in comparison with foreign securities, and its inferiority had been rapidly manifested by the continually increasing fall of the exchange. Thus the fall of the paper money was complete in every respect; and, agreeably to the ordinary law of velocities, the rapidity of this fall was increased by its very rapidity. All very abrupt changes in securities induce hazardous speculations, that is, stock-jobbing; and as such changes never take place but from the effect of some political or financial derangement, and as what the soil or industry of a country produces consequently suffers, so are manufactures and commerce impeded; this kind of speculation therefore is almost the only one that remains; and then, instead of manufacturing or importing new commodities, there arises a desire to speculate upon the variations in price of those that already exist. Instead of producing, they gamble with what is produced. Stock-jobbing, which had risen to such a pitch in the months of April, May, and June, 1793, when the defection of Dumouriez, the insurrection of La Vendée, and the federalist coalition, had occasioned so considerable a fall in the assignats, again appeared with greater violence than ever in Germinal, Floréal, and Prairial, year III. (April and May, 1795.) Thus to the horrors of scarcity there was associated the scandal of an unprincipled gambling, which again contributed to increase the high price of commodities and the depreciation of paper. The conduct of the gamblers was precisely the same as in 1793, the same that it always is. They purchased goods, which, rising in relation to the assignat with singular rapidity, increased in value in their hands, and procured them in a few moments a considerable profit. All their desires, all their exertions, tended to the fall of paper. There were articles which were sold and resold thousands of times without ever being removed. People even speculated, as usual, with what they did not possess. They bought a commodity of a seller, who actually had it not, but who engaged to deliver it at a specified time; when that time arrived, the seller could not deliver it, but he paid the difference between the price of purchase and the price of the day, if the commodity had risen; and he received that difference if the commodity had fallen. It was at the Palais Royal, already so obnoxious to the people as the haunt of the [illegible] *dorée*, that the jobbers met. One could not pass through it without being followed by dealers carrying in their hands stuffs, gold snuff-boxes, silver plate, rich hardware. It was at the Chartres *café* that all the speculators in the metallic substances assembled. Although gold and silver were no longer considered as merchandise, and that since 1793 they were forbidden upon very severe penalties to be sold against assignats, the traffic in them was nevertheless carried on in almost an open manner. The louis was sold for one hundred and sixty livres in paper, and in an hour the price was made to fluctuate from one hundred and sixty to two hundred and even two hundred and ten livres.

Thus there was a frightful dearth of bread, an absolute scarcity of fuel, from a frost that was still severe in the middle of spring, an excessive rise in the prices of all commodities, the impossibility of procuring them with a paper that was sinking from day to day; amidst all these evils an unprincipled jobbing was accelerating the depreciation of the assignats by its speculations, and affording a spectacle of the most scandalous gambling, and sometimes of sudden fortunes by the side of the general distress; such was the interminable subject of grievances presented to the patriots for exciting the people to rise. It was a matter of the utmost consequence, as well for the relief of the public distresses, as for preventing a commotion, that these grievances should be removed; but that was the unceasing difficulty.

The only expedient deemed absolutely necessary was, as we have seen, to raise the assignats by calling them in and cancelling them; but in order to call them in, it was necessary to sell the property, and no one would open his eyes to the real difficulty, that of providing purchasers with the means of paying for one-third of the territory. The assembly had rejected compulsory measures, that is to say, the divesting the assignat of its monetary character and the forced loan; and she was undecided between the two voluntary means, namely, a lottery and a bank. The proscription of Cambon decided the preference in favour of the plan of Johannot, who had proposed the latter. But till this chimerical expedient could be made to succeed,—an expedient which even if it did succeed, never could bring back the assignats to a par with money,—the greatest evil, that of a difference between the nominal value and the real value, still existed. Thus the creditor of the state, or of individuals, took the assignat at par, and could only make use of it again for one-tenth at the utmost. Proprietors who had let their lands received but one-tenth of the rent. Instances were known of farmers who paid their rent with a sack of corn, a fatted pig, or a horse. The treasury, in particular, sustained a loss which contributed to the ruin of the finances, and consequently of the paper itself. It received from the tax-payer the assignat at its nominal value, and got about fifty millions a month, which were at most only worth five. To supply this deficit, and to cover the extraordinary expenses of the war, it was obliged to issue assignats to the amount of not less than eight hundred millions a month, on account of their great depreciation. The first thing to be done, while measures were being devised for withdraw-

rise, together with the debates and plans for bringing down the assignat to a certain standard, and thereby facilitating the sale of the national property.

ing and raising them, was to re-establish the relation between their nominal value and their real value, so that the republic, the creditor of the state, the landowner, the capitalist, in short, all persons paid in paper, might not be ruined. Johannot proposed a return to metals as the measure of value. The price of the assignats, in reference to gold and silver, was to be ascertained every day, and they were no longer to be received but at that rate. He to whom one thousand francs were due was to be paid ten thousand in assignats, if the assignats were worth only one-tenth of the metals. The assessed taxes, rents, income of all kinds, the purchase-money of the national property, were to be paid in specie or in assignats, according to the course of exchange. An objection was made to this adoption of specie as the general standard of all property, in the first place, from an old dislike against metals, which were accused of having ruined paper, and in the next, because the English, having a great quantity of it, could, it was said, make it vary at pleasure, and would thus be masters of the credit of the assignats. These were sorry reasons; but they determined the convention to reject metals as the standard of worth. Jean-Bon-Saint-André then proposed to adopt corn, which among all nations was the essential standard of value, to which all others must have relation. Therefore, a calculation was to be made of the quantity of corn which could produce the sum required at the time when the transaction took place, and then there was to be paid in assignats so much in value as would be required to purchase at the moment the same quantity of corn. Thus he who owed rent, or a farm-rent, or taxes, to the amount of one thousand francs, at a time when one thousand francs represented one hundred quintals of corn, was to pay the present value of one hundred quintals of corn in assignats. But to this an objection was raised. The calamities of the war and the losses of agriculture had considerably enhanced the price of corn in proportion to all other articles of consumption or merchandise, and it was worth four times as much. According to the existing currency of the assignats, it ought to have cost more than ten times as much as the price of 1790, namely, one hundred francs the quintal; and nevertheless it cost four hundred. He who owed one thousand francs in 1790, would owe at that moment ten thousand francs if he paid according to the standard rate of silver, and forty thousand if he had to pay according to the standard price of corn; so that he would have to give a value four times as great. There was therefore no knowing what measure was to be adopted in reference to value. The deputy Raffron moved that from the 30th of the month assignats should fall one per cent. every day. An immediate outcry was raised that this would be a bankruptcy, as if it were not the same thing as reducing the assignats to the standard of specie or of corn, that is, to saddle them at once with a loss of ninety per cent. Bourdon, who talked continually of financial matters without understanding them, caused it to be decreed that any motion tending to bankruptcy would not be heard. Nevertheless, the reduction of the assignat to the course of exchange must have been attended with a most serious inconvenience. If in all payments, either for taxes, rents, debts due, or for national property, the assignat was to be taken no longer but at the rate to which it was daily sinking, the fall would have no end, for nothing could stop it. In the present state of things, in fact, the assignat, being still capable of serving, from its nominal value, for the payment of taxes, of rents, of all sums due, had a use which still gave a certain substantiality to its value; but if it was nowhere to be received but at the price of the day, it must sink indefinitely and without limit. The assignat issued to-day for one thousand francs might to-morrow not be worth more than one hundred francs, one franc, or one centime; it would, indeed, no longer ruin any one, either individuals or the state, for nobody would take it but for what it was worth; but its value being in no case compulsory, would instantly sink to nothing. There was no reason why a nominal thousand millions should not fall to one real franc, and then the resource of paper-money, still indispensable to the government, would entirely fail.

Dubois-Crancé, finding all these plans dangerous, opposed the reduction of the assignats to the course of exchange, and, regardless of the sufferings of those who were ruined by payment in paper, merely proposed to levy the land-tax in kind. The state might thus secure the means of maintaining the armies and the great communes, and avoid the issue of three or four thousand millions in paper, which it expended in procuring supplies. This plan, which at first appeared attractive, was afterwards thrown aside after a full investigation; it became necessary to seek some other.

But in the interval the evil was daily increasing: riots broke out in all parts on account of the deficiency of food, provisions, and fuel; bread was seen to be sold at the Palais Royal at twenty-two francs a pound; and the boatmen, at one of the ferries of the Seine, asked forty thousand francs for a service for which they formerly paid one hundred. A kind of despair seized every one; people cried out that an end must be put to this state of things, and that measures of some sort must absolutely be devised. In this distressing situation, Bourdon (of the Oise), a very ignorant financier, who talked upon all these questions like one possessed, discovered, doubtless accidentally, the only suitable expedient for getting out of the dilemma. It would have been difficult, as we have seen, to reduce the assignats to the course of exchange, for no one could know whether silver or corn ought to be taken for a standard; and besides, it would have been stripping them immediately of all their value, and exposing them to an unlimited depreciation. To raise the value of the assignats by sinking them would have been quite as difficult, for that would have required the sale of the property, and to find purchasers for so great a quantity of immoveable property would have been almost impossible.

There was, however, one way of selling the property, and that was, to put it within the reach of purchasers, by requiring only such a value as they could give for it in the existing state of the public fortune. The property was then sold by auction; the result was, that offers were proportioned to the depreciation of paper, and that it was necessary to give in assignats five or six times the

price of 1790. This was nothing else, it is true, than paying half the value of land at that period; but it was far too much for the present time; for land was not in reality worth half, nor a fourth, of what it was worth in 1790. There is no such thing as a value independent of relative circumstances. In America, in extensive continents, lands are of little value, because their mass is far superior to that of moveable capital. Such, one may say, was the case in France in 1795. It was requisite therefore to insist no longer on the fictitious value of 1790, but to that which could be gotten in 1795; for the real value of a thing is just so much as can be paid for it.

In consequence, Bourdon (of the Oise) suggested that the property should be disposed of without sale and by simple contract, to any one who should offer three times the value of 1790 in assignats. In case of competition the preference was to be given to the first bidder. Thus property valued at one hundred thousand francs in 1790, was to be paid for by three hundred thousand francs in assignats. Assignats having fallen to one-fifteenth of their value, three hundred thousand francs represented in reality but twenty thousand effective francs; a purchaser, therefore, paid twenty thousand francs for a property which in 1790 was worth one hundred thousand. This was not losing the other four-fifths, since it became impossible to get more. Besides, had the sacrifice been real, there was no need of hesitation, for the advantages were immense.

In the first place, it obviated the inconvenience of the reduction to the course of exchange, which would have destroyed the paper. We have seen, in fact, that the assignat reduced to the course of exchange in making payment for every thing, even of the national property, would cease to have any fixed value whatever, and that it would fall to nothing. But in reserving it the power of being taken in payment for national property, it possessed a fixed value, for it would represent a certain quantity of land; being always capable of procuring that, it would always preserve the value of land, and no more perish than the land itself. Thus the annihilation of the paper was avoided. But there was something more; it was certain, and what took place two months afterwards proved it, that all the national property might have been sold immediately, on condition of paying for it thrice its value in 1790. All, or nearly all, the assignats might thus have been called in; those which should remain outstanding would have recovered their value; the state would then have issued more and made fresh use of this resource. It is true that in demanding only thrice the value of 1790, the state would be obliged to give much more land in order to withdraw the circulating mass of paper; but they would still have enough left to suffice for fresh extraordinary calls. Moreover, the assessed taxes, now reduced to nothing, because they were paid in depreciated assignats, would recover their value if the assignat were either withdrawn or raised. The national property, consigned at once to individual industry, would begin to be productive both for the owners and for the treasury; in short, the most frightful catastrophe was averted, for the just relation of value was re-established.

The plan of Bourdon (of the Oise) was adopted, and preparations were immediately made for carrying it into execution; but the storm which had been so long gathering, and of which the 12th Germinal had been but the harbinger, had become more threatening than ever; it had overspread the horizon, and was ready to burst. The two contending parties acted each after their own fashion. The counter-revolutionists, predominating in certain sections, got up petitions against the measures in favour of which Chénier had reported, and particularly against that article which punished with banishment the abuse of the press by the royalists. The patriots, on their part, at the last extremity, were contemplating a desperate project. The execution of Fouquier-Tinville, condemned with several jurymen of the revolutionary tribunal for the manner in which he had performed his functions, had pushed their irritation to the highest pitch. Though discovered in their plan of the 29th Germinal, and recently thwarted in a second attempt to make all the sections permanent upon pretext of the dearth, they did not the less conspire in various populous quarters. They concluded by forming a central committee of insurrection, whose station was in the Rue Mauconseil between the quarters of Saint Denis and Montmartre. It was composed of old members of the revolutionary committees and divers individuals of the same character, almost all unknown out of their own quarter. The plan of insurrection was sufficiently pointed out by all the events of the same nature; to put the women in front, to cause them to be followed by an immense mob, to surround the convention by so great a crowd that no one could come to her assistance, to force her to turn out the seventy-three, to recall Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, to release the deputies confined at Ham, as well as the imprisoned patriots, to put in force the constitution of 1793, and thus give a new commune to Paris, to recur anew to all the revolutionary measures, the *maximum*, requisitions, &c.; such was the plan entertained by all the patriots. They reduced it into the form of a manifesto, consisting of eleven articles, and published *in the name of the sovereign people who had resumed their rights.* They caused it to be printed on the evening of the 30th Floréal (May 19th), and caused it to be circulated throughout Paris. The inhabitants of Paris were therein exhorted to repair to the convention, with these words on their hats:—*Bread, and the constitution of '93!* The whole night between the 30th Floréal and the 1st Prairial (May 20) was passed in uproar, shouts, and threats. The women ran about the streets, declaring that they must next day go to the convention, that the convention had put Robespierre to death merely to seat herself in his place; that she was starving the people, protecting the shopkeepers who were sucking the blood of the poor, and put all the patriots to death. They encouraged one another to march in the front, because, they said, the armed force would not dare fire upon women.

Next morning, (1st Prairial, year III. Wednesday, May 20,) at day-break, there was a general tumult in the faubourgs Saint-Antoine and Saint-Marceau, in the quarter of the Temple, in the Rues Saint-Denis and Saint-Martin, and more particularly in the *cité*. The patriots caused all the bells which they could get at to be rung; they beat the generale, and fired cannon. At the same moment,

1st Prairial, May 20, 1795. The irruption of the mob into the hall of the convention, the murder of one of the represen- 1795. May 20. (1 Prairial.)

the tocsin was rung in the Tower of L'Unite, by order of the committee of general safety, and the sections assembled; but those who were in the plot had assembled very early, and were already marching in arms long before the others received the intelligence. The mob constantly increasing, gradually advanced in the direction of the Tuileries. A disorderly crowd of women mixed with drunken men, shouting, *Bread, and the constitution of '93!* bands of ruffians armed with pikes, sabres, and all sorts of weapons, a torrent of the lowest rabble, lastly, some battalions of the sections regularly armed, composed this concourse, and marched without order towards the object pointed out to all, the convention. Near ten o'clock they reached the Tuileries, besieged the hall of the assembly, and closed all the outlets.

The deputies, hastily assembled, were at their post. The members of the Mountain, who had no communication with that obscure committee of insurrection, had not been informed of this movement, and, like their colleagues, knew nothing of the commotion except by the shouts of the populace and the jangling of the tocsin. They even mistrusted, lest the committee of general safety had laid a snare for the patriots, and had caused them to commit an outbreak for the purpose of wreaking its vengeance upon them. The assembly had scarcely met, when the deputy Isabeau read the manifesto of the insurrection. The galleries, occupied from an early hour in the morning by the patriots, immediately rang with boisterous applause. On seeing the convention thus surrounded, a deputy exclaimed, that she would know how to die at her post. "Yes! yes!" cried all the deputies, rising immediately. One of the galleries, better occupied than the others, applauded this declaration. At this moment they heard the uproar increase on the outside; the waves of that animated tide, the populace, were heard to roar; the deputies, meanwhile, succeeded each other in the tribune, offering various observations. All at once, a swarm of women poured into the galleries, trampling over those who occupied them, and shouting, *Bread! bread!* Vernier, the president, put on his hat and commanded silence, but they still continued to cry out, *Bread! bread!* Some shook their fists at the assembly, others jeered at its confusion. A great number of members rose for the purpose of speaking, they could not make themselves heard. They desired the president to enforce respect for the convention; but the president was not able to do this. André Dumont, who had presided with firmness on the 12th Germinal, succeeded Vernier in the chair. The uproar continued; the shouts of *Bread! bread!* were repeated by the women who had rushed into the galleries. André Dumont declared that he would have them turned out; he was answered by yells on the one side, and greeted with applause on the other. At this moment were heard the noise of violent blows against that door which is on the left of the clerks' table, as also the confused noise of a multitude striving to break it open. The hinges of the door creaked, and pieces of plaster began to fall. In this perilous situation the president addressed a general, who had appeared at the bar with a company of young men, to present a very proper petition in the name of the section of Bon-Conseil. "General," said he, "I charge you to protect the national representation, and I appoint you provisional commandant of the armed forces." The assembly confirmed this appointment by their cheers. The general declared that he would die at his post, and withdrew to repair to the scene of the conflict. At this moment the noise that was made at one of the doors ceased, and a slight degree of tranquillity was restored. André Dumont, addressing the galleries, charged all the good citizens who occupied them to withdraw, declaring that force would be immediately employed to clear them. Many citizens went out, but the women remained, still shouting the same words. A few moments afterwards, the general, charged by the president to protect the convention, returned with an escort of fusiliers and a number of young men, who had provided themselves with postillions' whips. They scaled the galleries, and turned the women out by using the whips. The women fled, screaming dreadfully, amidst the loud applause of part of the spectators.

The galleries had been scarcely cleared, than the noise at the left-hand door increased. The mob had returned to the charge; it made a fresh attack on the door, which, yielding to the violence used, was burst open and broken. The members of the convention retired to the upper benches; the gendarmerie forming a line around them for their protection. The armed citizens of the sections immediately entered the hall by the right-hand door to drive out the populace. They turned back at first and seized some women; but they were soon driven back in their turn by the victorious populace. Fortunately, the section of Grenelle, the first to run to the assistance of the convention, at this moment came up and furnished a useful reinforcement. The deputy Auguis was at its head, sabre in hand. "Forward!" he cried. His men closed, advanced, crossed bayonets, and drove back, without wounding, the multitude of the assailants, who gave way at the sight of cold steel. One of the rioters was seized by the collar, dragged to the foot of the clerks' table, searched, and his pockets were found full of bread. It was now two o'clock. Quiet being somewhat restored in the assembly, it was declared that the section of Grenelle had deserved well of the country. All the foreign ambassadors had repaired to the box reserved for them, as if to share, in some measure, the dangers of the convention, and they witnessed this scene. It was decreed that mention should be made in the printed vote of the day of their courageous devotedness.

Meanwhile the crowd around the hall kept increasing. Scarcely had two or three sections time to come up and to throw themselves into the national palace; but they could not withstand the constantly increasing host of the assailants. Others were coming up, but they could not make their way into the interior. They were without any communication with the committees, they had received no orders, they knew not what use to make of their arms. At this moment the mob made a fresh attempt on the hall of liberty, and got as far as the broken door. Shouts of *Aux armes!* were renewed, and the armed force within the hall hastened to the door that was exposed; the president put on his hat; the assembly continued calm. The parties closed with one another, and a battle

took place before the door itself. The defenders of the convention crossed bayonets. The assailants on their part fired, and the balls struck the walls of the hall. The deputies rose, crying, *The republic for ever!* Fresh detachments arrived, crossed over from the right to the left, and assisted to repel the attack. The firing increased; they charged, they intermingled, and fought hand to hand with swords. But an immense crowd in the rear of the assailants propelled and pushed them in spite of themselves upon the bayonets, overthrowing all the obstacles that opposed it, and rushed violently into the assembly. A young deputy, inspired by courage and self-devotion, Férand, who had recently returned from the army of the Rhine, and had been for a fortnight running about in the vicinity of Paris to hasten the arrival of supplies, flew to meet the rioters, and besought them not to advance further. "Kill me," cried he, baring his bosom; "you must pass over my body before you shall enter." Accordingly he threw himself on the ground to endeavour to stop them; but these furious wretches, without heeding him, passed over his body and rushed towards the clerks' table. Three o'clock came. Drunken women, men armed with sabres, pikes, and muskets, having on their hats the words, *Bread, and the constitution of* '93! filled the hall. Some seated themselves on the lower benches which the deputies had left on retiring to the upper ones; others covered the floor, placed themselves before the bureau, or ascended the small flight of steps leading to the president's chair. A young officer of the sections, namely Mally, who was standing on the steps of the clerks' table, snatched from one of these men the inscription which was on his hat. He was instantly fired at, and fell wounded in several places. At this moment all the pikes and all the bayonets were turned towards the president. A fence of iron was placed around his head. It was Boissy-d'Anglas who had succeeded André Dumont; he remained calm and immoveable. Féraud, who had got up from the floor, hastened to the foot of the tribune, tore his hair, beat his breast for very vexation; and on perceiving the danger of the president, rushed towards him for the purpose of covering him with his own body. One of the pikemen would have pulled him back by the coat; an officer, with a view to release Féraud, struck with his fist the man who held him; the latter returned the blow by firing a pistol-shot, which wounded Féraud in the shoulder. The unfortunate young man fell; he was dragged away, trampled upon, carried out of the hall, and his dead body handed over to the populace.

Boissy-d'Anglas continued calm and unshaken during this frightful scene; bayonets and pikes still surrounded his head. At this moment commenced a scene of confusion which baffles description. Every one attempted to speak, and shouted to no purpose to make himself heard. The drums beat to restore silence; but the mob, enjoying the confusion, bawled, kicked, and stamped with delight, on seeing the state to which that supreme assembly was reduced. It was not so done on the 31st of May, when the revolutionary party, headed by the commune, the staff of the sections, and a great number of deputies to receive and give the password, surrounded the convention with a mute and armed multitude, and besieging without rushing in upon her, obliged her to pass, with an apparent dignity, the decrees it wanted to obtain. Here there was no mutual communication, or any means whatever adopted for extorting at least the apparent sanction of the wishes of the patriots. A cannoneer surrounded by fusiliers ascended the tribune, for the purpose of reading the plan of insurrection. His reading was every moment interrupted by shouts, by abuse, and by the rolling of the drums. One man wanted to speak and to address the multitude. "My friends," said he, "we are all here for the same cause. The danger presses, we want decrees; allow your representatives to pass them." Shouts of "down! down!" were the only reply. The deputy, Rhul, a venerable-looking old man, and a zealous Mountaineer, would have spoken a few words from his place, with a view to obtain silence, but he was interrupted by renewed bawlings. Romme, an austere man, disconnected with the insurrection, as was the whole Mountain, but who was desirous that the measures demanded by the people might be adopted, and saw with pain that this tremendous confusion would be unproductive of result, like that of the 12th Germinal; Romme asked leave to speak: Duroi also asked it, for the same purpose, but neither the one or the other could obtain the permission. The tumult commenced anew and lasted for more than an hour. During this scene, a head was brought in on the point of a bayonet. The deputies fixed their eyes on it with horror, but could not recognise it. Some said it was the head of Fréron, others that it was Féraud's. It was in fact the head of Féraud, which some ruffians had cut off and put upon the point of a bayonet. They paraded it in the hall, amidst the yells of the rabble. The rage against the president, Boissy-d'Anglas, was again exhibited; again he was in danger, his head was encompassed with bayonets; he was pointed at from all sides, he was exposed to a thousand deaths.

It was now seven in the evening. The assembly trembled, fearing lest this mob, among whom were to be found some most dreadful ruffians, should proceed to the last extremities, and murder the representatives of the people amidst the darkness of night. Several members of the centre persuaded certain Mountaineers to speak and to exhort the multitude to disperse. Vernier did his best to hint to the rioters that it was late, that they ought to think of retiring, and that they were likely to expose the people to the want of bread by disturbing the expected arrivals. "It is a mere put-off," replied the mob; "you told us that three months ago." Several voices were then successively raised from amidst the crowd. One demanded the release of the patriots and of the arrested deputies; another the constitution of '93; a third, the apprehension of all the emigrants; a multitude of others, the permanence of the sections, the re-establishment of the commune, the appointment of a commander of the armed Parisian force, domiciliary visits to search for hidden articles of consumption; assignats at par, &c. One of these men, who contrived in making himself heard for a few moments, desired the immediate appointment of a commander of the Parisian armed force, and that Soubrany should be chosen. Lastly, one man more, not knowing what to ask,

cried out, *The arrest of the rogues and the cowards!* and for half an hour he kept repeating from time to time, *The arrest of the rogues and the cowards!*

One of the ringleaders, at length aware of the necessity of settling something, proposed to make the deputies descend from the upper benches on which they had seated themselves, in order to collect them in the middle of the hall, and make them deliberate. The suggestion was instantly adopted. They were pushed from their seats, forced to descend, and driven like a flock of sheep into the space which divides the tribune from the lower benches. Here they were surrounded by men who hedged them in with a row of pikes. Vernier now took the chair, instead of Boissy-d'-Anglas, who was exhausted with fatigue after so perilous a presidency of six hours. It was now nine o'clock. A sort of deliberation was now organized; it was settled that the people should remain covered, and that the deputies alone should take off their hats in token of approbation or disapprobation. The Mountaineers began to hope that the decrees might be passed, and prepared to speak. Romme, who had already spoken once, demanded that a decree should be passed for the release of the patriots. Duroi said that ever since the 9th Thermidor, the enemies of the country had exercised a baneful reaction; that the deputies arrested on the 12th Germinal had been illegally arrested, and that their recall ought to be pronounced. The president was compelled to put these various propositions to the vote; hats were taken off, they shouted *adopted! adopted!* amidst a tremendous uproar, without any body being able to distinguish whether the deputies had really given their votes or not. Goujon succeeded Romme and Duroi, and said that it was necessary to insure the execution of the decrees; that the committees did not make their appearance, that it was right to inquire what they were about; that they ought to be summoned to give an account of their operations, and be replaced by an extraordinary commission. It was that, in point of fact, in which the peril of the day consisted. Had the committees continued free agents, they could have come and delivered the convention from its oppressors. Albitte, the elder, observed that the deliberation was not carried on with sufficient order, that there was no one at the clerks' table, and that the *bureau* should be formed. The *bureau* was immediately arranged. Bourbotte demanded the arrest of the journalists. An unknown voice made itself heard, and said, that in order to show that the patriots were not cannibals, the punishment of death ought to be abolished. "Yes, yes," cried another, "except for the emigrants and the forgers of assignats." This proposition was adopted in the same form as the preceding. Duquesnoi reverted to Goujon's proposition, and renewed the demand for the suspension of the committees, and the appointment of an extraordinary commission of four members. Bourbotte, Prieur (of La Marne), Duroi, and Duquesnoi were immediately nominated. These four deputies accepted the functions committed to their charge. Were they ever so perilous, they would learn, they said, to fulfil them, or to die at their post. They withdrew for the purpose of repairing to the committees, and possessing themselves of all the powers. That was the difficulty, and the events of the day depended entirely on the results of the operation.

It was nine o'clock. Neither the insurrectional committee or the government committees appear to have acted during this long and awful day. All that the insurrectional committee had been able to do was to set the populace upon the convention; but, as we have already observed, obscure leaders, such as are left at the fag-end of a party, having at their disposal neither the commune, or the staff of the sections, or a commandant of the armed force, or deputies, had not been able to direct the insurrection with the prudence and the vigour which would have insured its success. They had set on a pack of furious wretches, who had perpetrated atrocious outrages, but who had not done any one thing they ought to have done. No detachment had been sent to suspend and neutralize the committees, to open the prisons, and to deliver the energetic men whose assistance would have been so precious. They had merely possessed themselves of the arsenal, which the gendarmerie of the tribunals, composed entirely of Fouquier-Tinville's militia, had given up to the first comers. In the mean time the committees of the government, surrounded and defended by the *jeunesse dorée*, had been exerting all their efforts to assemble the sections. This was no easy task, with the tumult that prevailed, with the consternation that had seized many of them, and the ill-will that was even manifested by some of them. They had at the outset collected two or three, whose efforts, as we have seen, had been repelled by the assailants. They had subsequently contrived to collect a greater number, thanks to the zeal of the section Lepelletier, formerly called Filles-Saint-Thomas, and they were preparing towards night to seize the moment when the people, completely wearied out, should be thinning, to fall upon the rioters and to deliver the convention. Foreseeing clearly that in this long period of durance the mob would have wrung from the assembly the decrees she had no desire to pass, they had adopted a resolution declaring that they should not consider as legal the decrees issued on that day. These arrangements being made, Legendre, Auguis, Chénier, Delecloi, Bergoeng, and Kervélégan had repaired at the head of strong detachments to the convention. Having got thither, it was arranged that the doors should be left open, so that the mob, pressed on one side, might be able to go out on the other. The next thing was for Legendre and Delecloi to make their way into the hall, to mount the tribune in spite of every danger, and to call upon the rioters to withdraw. "If they do not obey," said those deputies to their colleagues, "charge, and don't concern yourselves about us. Keep pushing on, even though we should perish in the fray."

Legendre and Delecloi actually did get into the hall, at the moment when the four deputies appointed to form the extraordinary commission were leaving. Legendre ascended the tribune in the midst of insults and blows, and began to speak, although hooted at. "I exhort the assembly to remain firm," said he, "and the citizens who are here to withdraw." "Down! down!" was the cry. Legendre and Delecloi were compelled to retire. Duquesnoi then addressed his colleagues

hall of the convention, the murder of one of the representatives, and the events of that and the succeeding days.

of the extraordinary commission, and desired them to follow him, in order to suspend the committees, who, as they saw, were adverse to the operations of the assembly. Soubrany urged them to lose no time. As all four of them were going out, they met the detachment headed by the representatives Legendre, Kervélégan and Auguis, as also by Raffet, the commandant of the national guard. Prieur (of La Marne) asked Raffet if he had obtained the president's order for entering. "I am not accountable to you," replied Raffet, and he advanced. He then ordered the mob to withdraw, and the president also exhorted it to do so in the name of the law. The mob replied by hissing and hooting. The bayonets were immediately lowered; the detachment entered; the unarmed rabble gave way, but the armed men mingled with the crowd resisted for a moment; they were driven back, and fled, shouting, "Help, sans-culottes!" A part of the patriots returned at this cry, and charged with fury the detachment that had got in. They obtained a momentary advantage: Kervélégan was wounded in the hand; the Mountaineers, Bourbotte, Peyssard, and Gaston, shouted, "Victory!" But the charge-step was heard in the outer hall; a considerable reinforcement had arrived, who fell again upon the insurgents, drove them back, and pursued them with swords and bayonets. They fled, either crowding to the doors, or clambering up to the galleries, or made their escape by the windows. The hall was at length cleared: it was now midnight.

The convention, delivered from the assailants who had carried violence and death into its presence, took a few minutes to recover itself. Order was at length restored. "It is then true," exclaimed a member, "that this assembly, the cradle of the republic, had once more nearly been its grave. Fortunately, the crime of the conspirators is rendered abortive. But, representatives, you would not be worthy of the nation, if you were not to avenge it in a signal manner." Applause burst from all sides, and, as on the 12th Germinal, the night was spent in punishing the illegalities of the day; but acts quite as important, although differing in their character, called for measures of another kind of severity. The first thing done was to repeal the decrees proposed and passed by the rioters. "Repeal (*rapporter*) is not the proper word," it was observed to Legendre, who had made this motion. "The convention has not voted, nay, could not vote, while one of its members was being murdered. All that has been done concerns her not, but rather the *brigands* who oppressed her, and some guilty representatives who made themselves their accomplices." All that had been done was then declared null and void. The secretaries burned the minutes of the decrees passed by the rioters. They now sought for those deputies who had spoken during that terrible sitting; they were pointed out with the finger; they were called upon with vehemence. "There is no longer," said Thibaudeau, "any hope of reconciliation between ourselves and a factious minority. Since the sword is drawn, we must fight that minority, and avail ourselves of circumstances for restoring peace and security for ever to this assembly. I move that you decree forthwith the arrest of those deputies who, betraying their duty, have endeavoured to realize the wishes of rebellion, and framed them into laws. I propose that the committees immediately submit to you the severest measures against those representatives who have shown themselves so regardless of their country and their oaths." They were then named: there were Rhul, Romme, and Duroi, who had commanded silence for the purpose of opening the deliberation; Albitte, who had proposed the appointment of a *bureau;* Goujon and Duquesnoi, who demanded the suspension of the committees, and the formation of an extraordinary commission of four members; Bourbotte and Prieur (of La Marne), who with Duroi and Duquesnoi had consented to be members of that commission; Soubrany, whom the rebels had nominated commandant of the Parisian army; and Peyssard, who shouted victory during the fight. Duroi and Goujon desired to speak: they were prevented; they were treated as murderers; a decree was instantly passed against them, and it was begged that they should not be suffered to escape, like most of those against whom a decree had been passed on the 12th Germinal. The president directed the gendarmerie to take charge of them and bring them to the bar. Romme, who delayed coming forward, was sought for; Bourdon pointed him out with his finger, and he was dragged to the bar with his colleagues. Retributory vengeance did not stop there; the feeling was for its being extended to all those Mountaineers who had rendered themselves conspicuous by extraordinary missions in the departments. "I demand," cried one voice, "the arrest of Lecarpentier, the executioner of La Manche." "Of Pinet the elder," cried another, "the executioner of the people of Biscay." "Of Borie," cried a third, "the devastator of the south, and of Fayau, one of the exterminators of La Vendée." These propositions were decreed, with shouts of *The convention for ever! the republic for ever!* "Let us have no more half measures," said Tallien. "The object of this day's movement was to re-establish the Jacobins, and particularly the commune: we must destroy what remains of them; Pache and Bouchotte ought to be arrested. This is only the prelude to the measures which the committee will submit to you. Vengeance, citizens, vengeance against the murderers of their colleagues and of the national representation. Let us take every advantage of the unskilfulness of these men, who fancy themselves the equals of those who overthrew the throne, and strive to compete with them; of these men, who wish to create revolutions, but can only concoct riots. Let us take every advantage of their unskilfulness; let us lose no time in punishing them, and thus put an end to the revolution." The proposition of Tallien was applauded and adopted. In this paroxysm of vengeance there were voices which denounced Robert Lindet, whose virtues and whose services had hitherto protected him from the fury of the reaction. Lehardi demanded the arrest of *that monster;* but so many voices were raised to extol Lindet's humanity, to attest that he had saved communes and whole departments, that they passed on to the order of the day. After these measures, the disarming of the Terrorists was again ordered. It was decreed that on the following Quintidi (Sunday, May 24), the sections should assemble, and proceed immediately *to the*

Second attempt of the patriots or Jacobins after the 1st Prairial, who are besieged in the faubourg Saint-Antoine, and eventually disarmed. 1795. May 28. (4 Prairial.)

disarming of the murderers, the blood-drinkers, the robbers, and the agents of the tyranny which preceded the 9th Thermidor; they were even authorized to cause all those to be apprehended whom they were of opinion should be brought before the tribunals. It was decided at the same time, that, till further order, women should not be admitted into the tribunes. It was now three in the morning. The committees sent word that all was quiet in Paris, and the sitting was adjourned to ten o'clock.

Such was the insurrection of the 1st of Prairial. No event of the revolution had exhibited so fearful a spectacle. If on the 31st of May and the 9th Thermidor, cannon had been pointed at the convention, still the place of its sittings had not been invaded, stained with blood spilt in a conflict, traversed by musket-balls, or sullied by the murder of a representative of the people. The revolutionists had this time acted with the awkwardness and violence of a party long beaten, without accomplices in the government from which it is excluded, deprived of its leaders, and directed by obscure, compromised, and desperate men. Without knowing how to make use of the Mountain, without even apprising it of the movement, they had jeopardized and exposed to the scaffold upright deputies, no parties to the excesses of the terror, attached to the patriots by the fear of reaction, and who had spoken merely to prevent greater calamities, and to accomplish some aspirations with which they were identified.

The rioters, however, seeing the fate that awaited them all, habituated moreover to revolutionary conflicts, were not the men to disperse all at once. They assembled on the following day at the commune, proclaimed themselves in permanent insurrection, and endeavoured to rally around them the sections most devoted to their cause. However, conceiving that the commune was not a good post, though it was situated between the quarter of the Temple and the *cité*, they preferred establishing the centre of the insurrection in the faubourg Saint-Antoine. Thither they transferred themselves in the middle of the day, and put themselves in order, to renew the attempt of the preceding day. On this occasion they strove to act with more order and caution. They despatched three battalions, completely armed and disciplined; they were those of the sections of the Quinze-Vingts, of Montreuil, and of Popincourt, all three composed of stout working men, and under the command of fearless leaders. These battalions advanced alone, without the concourse of people which accompanied them on the preceding day, met some of the sections that adhered to the convention, but who were not strong enough to stop them, and came in the afternoon to draw up with their cannon before the national palace. The sections of Lepelletier, of the Butte-des-Moulins, and others, immediately stationed themselves opposite to protect the convention. It was, nevertheless, doubtful in case a battle should ensue, whether victory would remain with the defenders of the national representation. By an unfortunate coincidence, the cannoneers, who in all the sections were mechanics and hot revolutionists, abandoned the sections drawn up before the palace, and went with their cannon to join those of Popincourt, Montreuil, and the Quinze-Vingts. Shouts of "To arms!" were heard. The muskets were loaded on both sides, and every thing seemed to be ready for a bloody conflict. The dull rolling of the guns was heard in the assembly. Many of the members rose to speak. "Representatives!" exclaimed Legendre, "be calm, and remain at your post. Nature has decreed that we must all die; whether a little sooner or a little later is of no consequence. Good citizens are ready to defend you. Meanwhile, the most becoming motion is to keep silence." The whole assembly again seated itself, and showed the same impressive calmness as it had displayed on the 9th Thermidor, and on so many occasions in the course of this stormy session. During this time the adverse forces were face to face in the most threatening attitude. Before they came to blows, some individuals exclaimed that it was a frightful thing for good citizens to slaughter one another, that they ought at least to explain themselves, and endeavour to understand one another. They left their ranks and stated their grievances. Members of the committees, who were present, introduced themselves among the battalions of the hostile sections, talked to them, and finding that much might be effected by conciliatory means, they required of the assembly twelve of her members to come and fraternize. The assembly, who considered this step as a kind of weakness, was by no means disposed to assent to it; still, as she was informed that the committees deemed it serviceable for preventing the effusion of blood, the twelve members were sent, and introduced themselves to the three sections. The ranks were soon broken on both sides, and became intermixed. The uncultivated man of a lower class is always sensible of the amicable demonstrations of the man who is placed above him by dress, language, and manners. The soldiers of the three adverse battalions were affected, and declared that they would neither spill the blood of their fellow-citizens, or be deficient in the respect due to the national convention. The ringleaders, nevertheless, insisted on having their petition heard. General Dubois, commanding the cavalry of the sections, and the twelve representatives deputed to fraternize, consented to introduce at the bar a deputation of the three battalions.

In fact they did present it, and requested that the petitioners should be heard. Some of the deputies were for refusing them; at last, however, it was granted. "We are commissioned to demand at your bands," said the spokesman of the troop, "the constitution of 1793, and the release of the patriots." At these words the galleries began to hoot and shout, "Down with the Jacobins!" The president imposed silence on these interruptors. The speaker continued, and said that the citizens assembled before the convention were ready to retire into the bosom of their families, but that they would die rather than forsake their post, if the claims of the people were not hearkened to. The president replied with firmness to the petitioners, that the convention had just passed a decree relative to articles of consumption, and he would read it to them. He actually did read it, and then added, that the assembly would examine their proposals, and judge in its wisdom what it ought to decide upon. He next invited them to the honours of the sitting.

Meanwhile, the three hostile sections were still mingled with the others. They were told that

their petitioners had been just then received, that their propositions would be inquired into, and that they must await the decision of the convention. It was eleven o'clock. The three battalions found themselves surrounded by the immense majority of the citizens of the capital; the day, moreover, was far advanced, especially for mechanics, and they resolved upon retiring to their faubourgs.

This second attempt had not been more successful than the former for the patriots. They nevertheless remained assembled in the faubourgs, preserving their hostile appearance, and not yet desisting from the demands they had made. Since the morning of the 3rd, the convention had passed several decrees which the state of things required. To impart more unity and energy to the employment of these means, she gave the direction of the armed force to the representatives, Gilet, Aubry, and Delmas, and authorized them to resort to arms for the purpose of insuring the public tranquillity; she punished with six months imprisonment any one who should beat the drum without order, and with death whosoever should beat the generale without being authorized so to do by the representatives of the people. She ordered the formation of a military commission for the immediate trial and execution of all the prisoners taken from the rebels of the 1st Prairial. She converted into a decree of accusation the decree of arrest issued against Duquesnoi, Durol, Bouchotte, Prieur (of La Marne), Romme, Soubrany, Goujon, Albitte the elder, Peyssard, Lecarpentier (of La Manche), Pinet the elder, Borie, and Fayau. The convention made the same adjudication respecting the deputies arrested on the 12th and 16th Germinal, and enjoined her committees to present a report respecting the tribunal that was to try both the one and the other.

The three representatives lost no time in collecting in Paris the troops dispersed in the environs to protect the arrivals of corn; they made the sections attached to the convention remain under arms, and surrounded themselves with a great number of the young men who had never quitted the committee during the whole insurrection. The military commission entered upon office the very same day: the first person whom it tried was the murderer of Féraud, who had been apprehended the preceding day; the commission condemned him to death, and directed that his execution should take place in the afternoon of the same day, the 3rd. The culprit was actually conveyed to the scaffold; but the patriots being apprised of the circumstance, some of the most determined of them assembled round the place of execution, rushed upon the scaffold, dispersed the gendarmerie, rescued the condemned man and took him to the faubourg. That very night they called to their aid all the patriots who were in Paris, and made their preparations for entrenching themselves in the faubourg Saint-Antoine. They put themselves under arms, pointed their cannon upon the Place de la Bastille, and thus awaited the consequences of this audacious deed.

As soon as this event was known to the convention, it decreed that the faubourg Saint-Antoine should be summoned to give up the condemned, and to surrender its arms and its cannon, and that, in case of refusal, it should be immediately bombarded. In fact, at this moment, the forces collected justified the convention in using more imperative language. The three representatives had found means to bring together three or four thousand men, troops of the line; they had more than twenty thousand men of the armed sections, to whom the fear of seeing the reign of terror re-established imparted great courage, and lastly, the devoted troop of the young men. They immediately invested general Menou with the command of this collective force, and prepared to march against the faubourg. On that same day, 4th Prairial (23rd May), while they were advancing, the *jeunesse dorée* had intended to make a bravado, and were first to reach the Rue Saint-Antoine. A thousand or twelve hundred individuals composed this adventurous troop. The patriots suffered them to engage without offering any resistance, and then surrounded them on all sides. These youths soon saw in their rear the formidable battalions of the faubourg; they perceived at the windows a multitude of incensed women, ready to hurl upon them a shower of stones; and they concluded that they were about to pay very dear for their imprudent bravado. Fortunately for them, the armed force was approaching; besides, the inhabitants of the faubourg had no intention to murder them; and they permitted them to leave their quarter after giving some of them a severe drubbing. At this moment, general Menou came up with twenty thousand men; he caused all the outlets of the faubourg to be occupied, and especially those which communicated with the patriot sections. He ordered the cannon to be pointed, and the insurgents to be summoned. A deputation appeared, and came to receive his ultimatum, which consisted in requiring the delivery of the arms, and of the murderer of Féraud. The manufacturers and all the peaceable and wealthy people of the faubourg, dreading a bombardment, lost no time in using their influence over the population, and decided the three sections to surrender their arms. In point of fact, those of Popincourt, the Quinze-Vingts, and of Montreuil, accordingly delivered up their cannon, and promised to search for the convict who had been carried off. General Menou returned in triumph with the cannon of the faubourg, and from that moment the convention had nothing to fear from the patriot party. Overthrown for ever, from that time this party only appears as experiencing retributive vengeance.

The military commission immediately began to try all the prisoners that could be taken. It condemned to death some gendarmes who had sided with the rebels, some mechanics and shopkeepers, members of revolutionary committees, and taken *flagrante delicto* on the 1st Prairial. In all the sections the disarming of the patriots and the apprehension of the most notorious individuals commenced; and as one day was not sufficient for this operation, the sections were to continue their sittings till they had concluded.

But it was not only in Paris that the desperation of the patriots produced an explosion. It burst forth in the south by events quite as distressing. We have seen them, to the number of from seven to eight thousand, taking refuge in Toulon, surrounding the representatives several times, rescuing

from them prisoners accused of emigration, and striving to involve the workmen of the arsenal, the garrison, and the crews of the ships, in their revolt. The squadron was ready to sail; and they wanted to prevent it. The crews of the ships arrived from Brest, and united with the Toulon division for the expedition which was then contemplated, were entirely opposed to them; but they could rely on the sailors belonging to the port of Toulon. They selected nearly the same time as the patriots of Paris for putting themselves in action. The representative Charbonnier, who had asked for leave of absence, was accused of being their secret director. They rose on the 25th Floréal (14th May), marched to the commune of Souliès, seized fifteen emigrant prisoners, returned in triumph to Toulon, and nevertheless consented to give them up to the representatives. But a few days afterwards, they assembled riotously, roused the workmen in the arsenal, secured the arms which it contained, and beleaguered the representative, Brunel, to make him issue an order for the release of the patriots. Nion the representative, who was on board the fleet, hastened ashore; but the sedition was victorious. The two representatives were forced to sign the order for release. Brunel, extremely mortified at having given way, blew out his brains; Nion sought refuge on board the fleet. The insurgents then thought of marching for Marseilles, to excite a rising, they said, of the whole south. But the representatives on mission at Marseilles stationed a company of artillery on the road, and took every precaution to prevent the execution of their designs. On the 1st Prairial, they were masters of Toulon, without the power, it is true, of extending themselves further, and were striving to gain over the crews of the squadron, one part of whom made resistance, while the other, composed entirely of Provençal seamen, appeared to have made up their mind to join them.

A report was made of these events to the convention on the 8th Prairial. It could not fail to cause renewed hatred against the Mountaineers and the patriots. It was said that the events in Toulon and Paris were the result of concerted acts; the Mountaineer deputies were accused of being the secret organizers thereof, and every one abandoned himself to the bitterest feeling against them. The arrest of Charbonnier, Escudier, Ricord, and Salicetti, all four accused of agitating the south, was immediately ordered. The deputies placed under accusation on the 1st Prairial, and whose judges were not yet appointed, were exposed to further and aggravated severity. Without any respect for their quality of representatives of the people, they were transferred to the military commission constituted for trying the abettors and accomplices of the insurrection of the 1st Prairial. The only exception was old Rhul, whose discretion and virtues were attested by several members. There were sent to the tribunal of the Eure and Loire, the ex-mayor Pache, his son-in-law Audouin, Bouchotte, formerly minister at war, and his adjuncts, Daubigny and Hassenfratz; and lastly, the principal agents of Robespierre's police, Héron, Marchand, and Clemence. It seemed that the sentence of transportation pronounced against Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, had acquired the force of a final judgment; no such thing. In these days of severity the punishment was deemed too mild; it was settled that they should be tried anew, and sent before the tribunal of the Lower Charente, to suffer that death appointed for all the leaders of the revolution. Up to this time, the remaining members of the old committees appeared to be pardoned; the signal services of Carnot, Robert Lindet, and Prieur (of the Côte-d'Or), had seemed to protect them from their enemies; they were now denounced with terrific violence by the Girondist, Henri Larivière. Robert Lindet, although defended by a multitude of members acquainted both with his merits and with his services, was nevertheless arrested. "Carnot has *organized victory*," cried a great number of voices; the furious re-actionists durst not pass a decree against the conqueror of the allied powers. Nothing was said respecting Prieur (of the Côte-d'Or). So far as concerned those members of the old committee of general safety, who had not before been arrested, they were all of them arrested on the present occasion. David, whose genius had caused his acquittal, was arrested with Jagot, Elie Lacoste, Lavicomterie, Dubarran, and Bernard (of Saintes). The only exception made was in favour of Louis (of the Lower Rhine), whose humanity was too well known. Lastly, the report already ordered against all those who had executed missions, and who were called proconsuls, was demanded immediately. Proceedings were commenced against Artigoyte, Mallarmé, Javognes, Sergent, Monestier, Lejeune, Allard, Lacoste, and Baudot. Preparations were made for reviewing the conduct of all those who had been appointed to any mission whatever. Thus none of the heads of that government that had saved France was pardoned; members of committees, and deputies on mission, all were subjected to the general law. Carnot alone was spared, because the regard of the armies commanded forbearance towards him: but Lindet was stricken, a citizen quite as useful and more generous; for victories did not protect him against the cowardice of the re-actionists.

There was assuredly no need of such sacrifices as these to appease the manes of young Férand; the affecting marks of respect paid to his memory ought to have sufficed. The convention decreed a funereal sitting in his honour. The hall was hung with black; all the representatives went in full dress and in mourning. Soft and mournful music opened the sitting; Louvet then delivered a panegyric on the young representative, so devoted, so courageous, so soon torn away from his country. A monument was voted to immortalize his heroism. Advantage was taken of the present opportunity to order a commemorative *fête* in memory of the Girondists. Nothing was more reasonable: victims so illustrious as they were, even though they would have compromised their country, deserved marks of respect; but it would have been sufficient to scatter flowers on their tombs; there was no necessity to sprinkle them with blood. Nevertheless, it was spilt in torrents; for no party, not even that which takes humanity for its device, is wise in its vengeance. It seemed, in fact, as if, not content with her losses, the convention herself desired to add to them. The accused deputies, confined at first in the castle of Taureau, to prevent any attempt on their behalf, were brought to Paris, and the preliminary proceedings against them were

commenced with the greatest activity. The aged Rhul, who had alone been excepted from the decree of accusation, did not care for this pardon; he considered liberty as undone, and terminated his existence by stabbing himself. Affected by so many melancholy scenes, Louvet, Legendre, and Fréron moved that the deputies delivered up to the commission should be sent before their ordinary judges; but Rovère, formerly a Terrorist, and now a fiery royalist, and Bourdon (of the Oise), implacable like a man who has been alarmed, urged the decree, and caused it to be confirmed.

The deputies were brought before the commission on the 29th Prairial. In spite of the most careful inquiries, there was no fact which could prove their secret connivance with the insurgents. In point of fact, it would have been difficult to detect any such; for they knew nothing of the movement; they did not even know any thing of one another: Bourbotte alone was acquainted with Goujon, from having met him during a mission to the armies. All that was proved was, that the insurrection being accomplished, they had been desirous of legalizing some of the aspirations of the people. They were nevertheless condemned; for a military commission, to whom a government sends accused persons of importance, never knows how to return them acquitted. The only person the commission acquitted was Forestier. He had been coupled with the condemned, although he had not made a single motion during that remarkable sitting. Peyssard, who had merely uttered one cry during the conflict, was sentenced to transportation. Romme, Goujon, Duquesnoi, Duroi, Bourbotte, and Soubrany, were condemned to death. Romme was a simple and austere man; Goujon was young, handsome, and endowed with excellent qualities; Bourbotte, as young as Goujon, combined extraordinary courage with the most polished education; Soubrany had formerly been a noble, but was sincerely devoted to the cause of the revolution. At the moment when their sentence was pronounced, they delivered to the registrar letters, packets, and portraits, to be retained for their families. They were made to withdraw, for the purpose of putting them into a room, before being conducted to the scaffold. They had promised themselves that they never should go thither. All that they had left among them was one knife and one pair of scissors, which they had concealed in the lining of their clothes. In going down stairs, Romme was the first who stabbed himself; and fearing that he had failed in his object, he stabbed himself several times in the breast, the throat, and the face. He handed the knife to Goujon, who, with steady hand, gave himself a mortal blow, and fell lifeless. From the hand of Goujon, the instrument of liberation passed to those of Duquesnoi, Duroi, Bourbotte, and Soubrany. Unfortunately Duroi, Bourbotte, and Soubrany did not succeed in inflicting mortal wounds upon themselves; they were dragged, all bleeding as they were, to the scaffold. Soubrany, weltering in his blood, nevertheless retained, in spite of his sufferings, the composure and dignified bearing for which he had always been distinguished. Duroi was exceedingly mortified at having failed. "Enjoy," he exclaimed, "enjoy your triumph, messieurs royalists!" Bourbotte retained all the serenity of youth, and spoke with imperturbable calmness to the people. At the moment when he was about to receive the fatal stroke, it was perceived that the blade had not been drawn up; it was necessary to put the instrument to rights: he availed himself of this interval to utter some few words. He declared that none could die more devoted to his country, and more anxious for her prosperity and liberty. There were but few spectators at this execution: the period of political fanaticism had passed; they no longer murdered with that fury which formerly rendered people insensible. All hearts revolted on learning the particulars of this execution, and it caused the Thermidorians merited disgrace. Thus, in that long succession of conflicting ideas, all had their victims. The very ideas of clemency, humanity, reconciliation, had their holocausts; for in revolutions no one idea can remain guiltless of human blood.

The Mountaineer party thus found itself entirely destroyed. The patriots had just been conquered at Toulon. After a very bloody battle, fought on the road to Marseilles, they had been obliged to give up their arms, and to surrender that place on which they placed their chief reliance for raising all France in rebellion. They were, therefore, no longer an impediment; and, as usual, their fall occasioned that of several revolutionary institutions. That celebrated tribunal, which had been almost reduced, since the law of the 8th Nivôse, to an ordinary tribunal, was definitively abolished. All the accused were transferred to the criminal tribunals, who were to adjudicate according to the procedure of 1791; conspirators alone were to be tried according to the procedure of the 8th Nivôse, and without appeal. The word 'revolutionary,' as applied to institutions and establishments, was suppressed. The national guards were re-organized upon the old footing; labourers, domestic servants, citizens in narrow circumstances, in short, the populace, were excluded from them; and thus the duty of watching over the public tranquillity was confided anew to that class which had the greatest interest in maintaining it. At Paris, the national guard, organized by battalions, by brigades, and commanded alternately by each brigadier-general, was placed under the direction of the military committee. Lastly, that concession most of all desired by the Catholics, the restitution of the churches, was granted them; they were restored to them on condition of maintaining them at their own cost. This measure, although it had been the result of the re-action, was at the same time supported by the wisest heads. It was deemed proper to tranquillize the Catholics, who would never believe that they had recovered the freedom of worship so long as they had not their ancient edifices wherein to celebrate its ceremonies.

The financial discussions interrupted by the events of Prairial were still the most urgent and the most arduous. The assembly had resumed them as soon as tranquillity had been restored. She had revived the decree that there should be but one sort of bread, to deprive the people of an occasion to censure the luxury of the wealthy; she had also ordered accounts of the quantity of corn in the country, to secure the surplus of each department for the supply of the armies and great communes; lastly, she had repealed the decree permitting the

free trading in gold and silver. Thus the pressure of circumstances had brought her back to some of those revolutionary measures against which every body had been so violently inveterate. Jobbing had been carried to the highest pitch of mania. There were no longer bakers, butchers, and grocers, duly licensed; everybody bought and sold bread, meat, groceries, oils, &c. The garrets and cellars were filled with goods and eatables, in which every one speculated. At the Palais Royal, white bread was sold at the rate of twenty-five or thirty francs per pound. The regraters and forestallers rushed into the markets and bought up all the fruit and vegetables brought in by the country people, for the purpose of selling them again immediately at a higher price. People went and bought beforehand unripe fruit and corn, or herds of cattle, in order to speculate afterwards upon a rise in the price. The convention forbade regraters and forestallers to appear in the markets before a certain hour. She was obliged to decree that the licensed butchers should alone buy cattle; and that corn could not be bought before harvest-time. Thus every thing was turned upside down; all persons, even the most unacquainted with commercial speculations, were on the look out for every turn of the assignat, in order to make the loss fall upon another, and to obtain for themselves a higher value for an article of consumption or any other commodity.

We have seen that between the two schemes, either for reducing the assignat to the course of exchange, or for collecting the taxes in kind, the convention had preferred that of selling the national property, not by auction, but at three times the price of 1790. This was, as we have observed, the only mode of selling it; for sale by auction invariably raised the price of the property in proportion to the fall of the assignat, that is, to a price beyond what the public could afford. So soon therefore as the law was passed, the number of offers was extraordinary. When it was known that the first offer qualified the party to pay no more for national property than thrice the value of 1790 in assignats, people thronged from all parts. For some properties there were several hundred offers; at Charenton there were three hundred and sixty for one estate which had formerly belonged to the Fathers of Mercy; and so many as five hundred were made for another. The town-halls were crowded. Mere agents, men of no property, but who happened at the moment to have sums in assignats in their hands, hastened away to make offers for property. As they were obliged to pay down no more than one-sixth, and the remainder in several months, they bought with small sums very considerable estates, with a view to sell them again at a profit to those who had made less haste. Owing to this eagerness, estates which were not known by the administrations to have become national property, were pointed out as such. The plan of Bourdon (of the Oise) was therefore completely successful, and there was reason to hope that soon great portions of the property would be sold, and that the assignats would be either cancelled or raised in value. It is true, that by these sales the republic sustained losses which, calculated in figures, were considerable. The valuation of 1790, founded on the apparent revenue, was frequently inaccurate; for the possessions of the clergy and all those of the order of Malta were let very low; the farmers paid the surplus of the amount by way of presents, which were frequently equal to four times the rent reserved. A farm, ostensibly farmed at one thousand francs, produced in reality four thousand; according to the estimate of 1790 this estate amounted to twenty-five thousand francs in value; it might therefore be bought for seventy-five thousand in assignats, which were worth in reality no more than seven thousand five hundred francs. At Honfleur, some salt-warehouses, the building of which had cost more than four hundred thousand livres, were going to be sold in reality for twenty-two thousand five hundred livres. According to this calculation the loss was great; but there was no help for it, except by making it less by demanding four or five times the value of 1790, instead of no more than three.

Rewbell and a great number of deputies could not comprehend this; they only looked at the apparent loss. They alleged that the treasures of the republic were wasted, and this was how she was crippled in her resources. A great outcry was raised on all sides: those who did not understand the question, and those who saw with pain the property of the emigrants disappearing, leagued together to obtain a suspension of the decree. Ballaud and Bourdon (of the Oise) warmly defended it; they were unable to assign the essential reason, namely, that it was useless to ask more for property than the buyers could afford to give; but they said, what was true enough, that the numerical loss was not so great as it appeared to be; that seventy-five thousand francs in assignats were worth no more than seven thousand five hundred in monies numbered; but that money was worth thrice as much as formerly, and that seven thousand five hundred francs certainly represented fifteen thousand or twenty thousand francs in 1790; they said also that the actual loss was counterbalanced by the advantage that was gained by instantly putting an end to that financial catastrophe, by the cancelling or raising the assignats, by putting a stop to jobbing in merchandise, by attracting paper to land, by giving up forthwith the mass of the national property to individual industry, and lastly by taking away all hope from the emigrants.

The decree was nevertheless suspended. The administrations were ordered to continue to receive offers, so that all the national possessions might thus be discovered from private motives, and that a more accurate statement of them might be drawn up. A few days afterwards, the decree was repealed altogether, and it was decided that the national property should continue to be sold by auction.

Thus, after having had a glimpse of the means of putting an end to the crisis, it was abandoned, and the public relapsed into the frightful distress from which it might have extricated itself. In the mean time, as nothing was done to raise the assignats, it could not persist in the cruel fallacy of their nominal value, which was ruining the republic and the individuals paid in paper. It was absolutely necessary to return to the proposition already made of reducing the assignats. The proposal to reduce them to the currency of money was rejected, because the English, it was said, abounding in money,

and the sliding scale adopted for this purpose. — Reflections on the financial schemes of the republican government.

would govern the course of exchange; neither would the government consent to reduce them to the standard of corn, because the price of corn had considerably increased; the government had refused to take this opportunity to create a standard, and to reduce paper a certain amount every month, because that would be, as was said, divesting paper of its monetary character, and avowing a national bankruptcy. All these reasons were frivolous, whether they chose money, corn, or time, to determine the reduction of the paper. The bankruptcy did not consist in reducing the value of the assignat between private individuals, for the reduction, in fact, had already taken place, and to recognise it was only to prevent frauds; the bankruptcy rather consisted in re-establishing the sale of the national property by auction. What the republic had promised, indeed, was not that the assignats should be worth this or that sum between private individuals (for this did not depend upon her), but that they should procure a certain quantity of national property: now in establishing the sale by auction the assignat would no longer procure a certain quantity of property; it became ineffective in regard to property as in respect of articles of consumption; it experienced the same fall from the effect of competition.

The government wanted to discover some other rule than money, corn, or time, for reducing the assignat; they chose the quantity of issues. It is true in principle that the increase of money in circulation proportionally augments the prices of all commodities. Now, if an article was worth one franc when there were two thousand millions of money in circulation, it must be worth two when there were four, three when there were six, four when there were eight, five when there were ten. Supposing the present circulation of assignats amounted to ten thousand millions, there must at this time be paid five times more for any thing than when there were only two thousand millions. A sliding scale was established, to commence from the period when there were but two thousand millions of assignats in circulation, and it was decided that in all payments made in assignats one-fourth more should be added for every five hundred millions added to the circulation. Thus for a sum of two thousand francs, promised to be paid when there were two thousand millions in circulation, there should be paid when there were two thousand five hundred millions, two thousand five hundred francs; when there were three thousand millions, there should be paid three thousand francs; and lastly, at the present moment, when there were ten thousand millions there were to be paid ten thousand francs.

Those who considered the divesting the assignat of its monetary character (*démonétisation*) as a bankruptcy, were not likely to be satisfied with this measure; for instead of *demonetising* in the proportion of money, corn, or time, it *demonetised* in proportion to the issues; which amounted to the same thing, with the exception of one inconvenience, which was greater in the present instance. By means of the new scale, each issue would diminish the value of the assignat by a fixed and known quantity. In issuing five hundred millions, the state would take from the holder of the assignat a fourth, a fifth, a sixth, and so on, of what he possessed.

Although this scale, which had its inconveniences like all the other reductions to the current price of bullion or corn, ought at least to have been applied to every other transaction, yet the government did not venture upon this; it was first applied to the taxes and their arrears. A promise was given that it should be applied to the public officials when their number should have been reduced, and to the creditors of the state when the first receipts of the taxes after the new scale should admit of their being paid on the same footing. They did not dare permit creditors, of whatever kind they might be, owners of houses in town or country, or proprietors of factories, &c. to take advantage of the scale. The only favoured persons were the great landowners. The farmers making exorbitant profits upon the articles of consumption, and paying by means of the assignats only a tenth or a twelfth of the amount of their rent, were obliged to pay it according to the new scale. They were to furnish a quantity of assignats proportionate to the quantity issued since the time when their rent became due.

Such were the measures by which the government endeavoured to repress jobbing, and to put an end to the fluctuation in the value of all things. They consisted, as we have seen, in forbidding speculators to forestal the consumer in the purchase of eatables and articles of consumption, and by settling a proportion between the amount that might be paid in assignats and the quantity of paper in circulation.

The closing of the Jacobins in Brumaire was the commencement of the ruin of the patriots; the event of the 12th Germinal had advanced it, but the event of Prairial perfected it. The mass of the citizens, who were hostile to them, not from royalism but from the dread of a new terror, were more inveterate against them than ever, and pursued them with the utmost rigour. They imprisoned or disarmed all those men who had ardently followed up the revolution. They exercised in respect to them acts quite as arbitrary as those against the old suspected persons. The prisons were crowded, as before the 9th Thermidor, but they were crowded with revolutionists. The number of the prisoners amounted not as then to nearly one hundred thousand persons, but to twenty or twenty-five thousand. The royalists triumphed. The disarming or imprisonment of the patriots, the execution of the Mountaineer deputies, the proceedings commenced against a great number of others, the suppression of the revolutionary tribunal, the restitution of the churches to the catholic religion, and the remodelling of the national guard, were all measures that filled them with joy and hope. They flattered themselves that they should soon compel the revolution to destroy itself, and that they should see the republic imprison or put to death all those who had founded it. To accelerate this movement, they intrigued in the sections, they excited them against the revolutionists, and instigated them to the greatest excesses. A vast number of emigrants returned, either with false passports or upon pretext of soliciting their erasure from the lists. The local administrations, renewed since the 9th Thermidor, and filled with men either weak in themselves or hostile to the republic, lent themselves to all the official falsehoods

required of them: whatever had a tendency to mitigate the lot of those who were styled the victims of terror seemed permissible in their eyes, and they thus furnished a multitude of the enemies of their country with the means of returning to tear it in pieces. At Lyons, and in the whole of the South, the royalist agents continued to make their appearance again secretly. The companies of Jesus and of the Sun had committed fresh murders. Ten thousand muskets, appointed for the army of the Alps, had been distributed to no purpose among the national guard of Lyons; the national guard had not effected any one thing, and had suffered a great number of patriots to be slaughtered on the 25th Prairial (13th June). Human bodies had again rolled down the Saône and the Rhône. At Nimes, Avignon, and Marseilles, similar massacres had taken place. In the last city, the mob had gone to Fort Saint-Jean, and there renewed the horrors of September against the prisoners.

The dominant party in the convention, composed of Thermidorians and Girondists, while defending itself against the revolutionists, kept an eye on the royalists, and felt the necessity of repressing them. This party immediately obtained a decree that the city of Lyons should be disarmed by a detachment of the army of the Alps, and that the authorities who had suffered the patriots to be murdered should be removed. At the same time, the civil committees of the sections were enjoined to revise the lists of detention, and to order the release of those who were confined without sufficient cause. Forthwith the sections, excited by intriguing royalists, roused themselves; they went and addressed threatening petitions to the convention, complaining that the committee of general safety was enlarging the Terrorists, and was restoring them their arms. The sections of Lepelletier and of the Théâtre Français (Odéon), always the most fervid against the revolutionists, wanted to know if the assembly meant again to raise up the overthrown faction, and whether it was to cause Terrorism to be forgotten, that folks began to talk about royalism to France.

To these petitions, often far from respectful, persons interested in disorder added such rumours as were most likely to agitate the public mind. It was either that Toulon had been delivered up to the English, or that the prince of Condé and the Austrians were about to enter by Franche-Comté, while the English were to make their way into France by the west; that Pichegru was dead; that articles of consumption would soon be very scarce, because the free trade in them was about to be restored; lastly, that there had been a general meeting of the committees, who, alarmed at the public dangers, had deliberated on the re-establishment of the system of Terror. The journals devoted to royalism excited and circulated all these reports; and amidst this general agitation it might truly be said that the reign of anarchy was come. The Thermidorians and the Counter-revolutionists deceived themselves when they called by the name of anarchy that system which had preceded the 9th Thermidor: that system, indeed, had been a frightful dictatorship; but anarchy had commenced from the time that two factions, nearly equal in strength, were fighting one another, while the government was not strong enough to overcome them both.

CHAPTER XXX.

SITUATION OF THE ARMIES AT THE NORTH AND ON THE RHINE, AT THE ALPS AND THE PYRENEES, TOWARDS THE MIDDLE OF THE YEAR III.—THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE TREASONABLE PRACTICES OF PICHEGRU.—STATE OF LA VENDÉE AND BRITTANY.—INTRIGUES AND SCHEMES OF THE ROYALISTS—RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES UPON SOME POINTS OF THE PACIFIED COUNTRIES.—THE QUIBERON EXPEDITION.—DESTRUCTION OF THE ROYALIST ARMY BY HOCHE.—THE REASON WHY THIS ATTEMPT PROVED SO UNSUCCESSFUL.—PEACE WITH SPAIN—PASSAGE OF THE RHINE BY THE FRENCH ARMIES.

The situation of the armies was but little changed, and though half the summer weather was gone, no important event had occurred. Moreau had been appointed to the command of the army of the North, encamped in Holland; Jourdan to that of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, stationed upon the Rhine, in the direction of Cologne; Pichegru to that of the army of the Rhine, cantoned from Mentz to Strasburg. The troops were in a state of privation, which had been greatly increased by the relaxation of all the springs of the government, and by the utter depreciation of the paper-money. Jourdan had no materials for making a bridge, so as to cross the Rhine, nor a single horse to draw his artillery and baggage. Kléber, before Mentz, had not a fourth of the artillery necessary for besieging that place. The soldiers all deserted to the interior. Most of them thought that they had done enough for the republic, in carrying her victorious colours to the Rhine. The government knew not how to maintain them; neither did it know how to satisfy and rekindle their ardour by grand operations. It durst not bring back by force those who deserted their colours. It was well known that the young men of the first requisition, who had returned into the interior, were neither sought after or punished; nay, in Paris they were in favour with the committees, whose volunteer militia they formed. The number of desertions was likewise considerable; the armies had lost a fourth of their effective strength, and there ensued that general relaxation which detaches the soldier from the service, renders the officers discontented, and puts their fidelity in jeopardy. The deputy Aubry, charged as a member of the committee of public welfare with the recruiting of the army, had effected an absolute re-action against all the patriot officers, in favour of

those who had not served in the two glorious years 1793 and 1794.

If the Austrians had not been so demoralized, this had been the moment for them to recover their losses; but they were slowly reorganizing themselves the other side the Rhine, and durst not do any thing towards hindering the only two operations undertaken by the French army—the siege of Luxembourg, and that of Mentz. Those two fortresses were the only points the allied powers had preserved on the left bank of the Rhine. The reduction of Luxembourg would complete the conquest of the Netherlands, and render it decisive; that of Mentz would deprive the imperialists of a *tête-de-pont*, which always permitted them to cross the Rhine in safety. Luxembourg, blockaded during the whole winter and spring, surrendered on account of famine on the 6th Messidor (June 24). Mentz could not be reduced without a siege, but artillery was wanting; it was necessary to invest the place on both banks, and for this purpose either Jourdan or Pichegru must cross the Rhine, a difficult operation in the face of the Austrians, and impracticable without materials for constructing a bridge. Thus our armies, although victorious, were stopped by the Rhine, which they could not cross for want of the means; and like every other department of the government, they felt the effects of the weakness of the present administration.

On the frontier of the Alps our situation was still less satisfactory. On the Rhine we had at least made the important conquest of Luxembourg, while on the Italian frontier we had retreated. Kellermann commanded the armies of the Alps; they were in the same state of privation as all the others; and besides the desertion, they had been weakened by various detachments being made. The government had devised an absurd sort of bold stroke upon Rome. Desirous of avenging the murder of Basseville, it had put ten thousand men on board the Toulon squadron, completely repaired under the superintendence of the old committee of public welfare; it was intended to send them to the mouth of the Tiber, for the purpose of levying a contribution on the papal city, and of then returning with all speed to their ships. Fortunately, an action with Lord Hotham, after which both squadrons left each other equally damaged, had prevented the execution of this plan. There was restored to the army of Italy the division detached from it; but it had been found necessary to despatch a division to Toulon, to fight the Terrorists, and another to Lyons, to disarm the national guard, who had suffered the patriots to be murdered. In this manner the two armies of the Alps had been deprived of part of their force, in the face of the Piedmontese and the Austrians, reinforced by ten thousand men from the Tyrol. General Devins, taking advantage of the moment when Kellermann had very recently detached one of his divisions for Toulon, had actually attacked his right towards Genoa. Kellermann, unable to resist a superior force, had been obliged to fall back. Still occupying with his centre the pass of the Tende, on the Alps, he no longer extended himself by his right to Genoa, and had taken a position in the rear of the line of Borghetto. We had to apprehend that we should not be able to communicate any longer with Genoa; for our trade with Genoa would have to encounter great difficulties as soon as the Riviera di Ponente * should be occupied by the enemy.

In Spain nothing conclusive had been done. Our army of the eastern Pyrenees still occupied Catalonia as far as the banks of the Fluvia. Several battles had been fought on the banks of that river, without producing any result, and without enabling the French to take a position beyond it. At the western Pyrenees, Moncey was organizing an army thinned by disease, with the intention of entering Guipuscoa, and advancing into Navarre.

Although our armies had lost nothing except in Italy, although they had even reduced one of the strongest fortresses in Europe, they were, as we observed, badly attended to, inefficiently managed, and affected by the general anarchy which pervaded every department of the administration.

This was then a favourable opportunity, not for conquering them, for the danger would have rekindled their energy, but for making attempts on their fidelity, and trying plans of counter-revolution. We have observed the royalists and the foreign cabinets concerting various designs upon the insurgent provinces; we have seen Puisaye and England preparing a scheme of making a descent upon Brittany; and the agents of Paris and Spain contemplating an expedition into La Vendée. The emigrants in the mean time were considering how they could push their way into France by another point. They wanted to attack us on the east, while the expeditions attempted by Spain and England were to be directed against the west. The prince of Condé had his headquarters on the Rhine, where he commanded an army of two thousand five hundred foot and one thousand five hundred horse. All the emigrants dispersed over the continent were to be ordered to join him, upon pain of being no longer suffered by the powers to remain in their territories; his army would thus be augmented by all the emigrants who had hitherto remained useless; and leaving the Austrians occupied on the Rhine to keep the republican armies in check, he was to endeavour to penetrate by Franche-Comté and to march to Paris, while the count d'Artois, with the insurgents of the west, should advance towards it on that side. If they should not succeed, they had at least hopes of obtaining a capitulation like that of the Vendeans; they had the same reasons for asking it. "We are," might have said the emigrants assisting in this expedition, "Frenchmen who have had recourse to civil war, but in France, and without admitting foreigners into our ranks." This was, as said the advocates of this plan, the only way for the emigrants to re-enter France, were it either by counter-revolution or by an amnesty.

The English government, who had taken the army of Condé into its pay, and earnestly desired a diversion towards the eastern frontier, while it should be operating on the west, insisted that the prince of Condé should make some attempt, no matter what. It had promised him through Wickham, its ambassador in Switzerland, assistance in money, and the means necessary for forming new

* *Ante*, p. 434, col. 1, note.

regiments. The brave prince desired nothing better than to have some enterprise to attempt; he was utterly incapable of directing either a matter of business or a battle, but he was ready to rush headlong upon danger the moment it was shown to him.

The English government suggested to him the idea of making an attempt to seduce Pichegru, who commanded the army of the Rhine. The terrible committee of public welfare no longer awed the generals, no longer kept the watchful eye and the uplifted hand over them; the republic, paying its officers in assignats, scarcely gave them wherewithal to satisfy their most pressing necessities; the disorders which had arisen in the body of the republic, made her existence even questionable, and alarmed the ambitious, who were afraid of losing by her fall the high dignities they had attained. It was notorious that Pichegru was addicted to women and debauchery; that the four thousand francs which he received per month in assignats, worth scarcely two hundred on the frontiers, could not be enough for him, and that he was disgusted in serving a tottering government. It was recollected that in Germinal he had employed main force against the patriots in the Champs Elysées. All these circumstances suggested the idea that Pichegru might probably be accessible to splendid offers. In consequence, the prince had recourse for the execution of this scheme to M. de Montgaillard, and the latter to M. Fauche-Borel, a bookseller of Neufchatel, who, the subject of a wise and happy republic, was going to make himself the obscure servant of a dynasty under which he was not born. This M. Fauche-Borel repaired to Altkirch, where Pichegru's head-quarters were. After he had followed him in several reviews, he at length attracted his notice by dogging his steps so closely, and ventured to accost him in a corridor; he opened by talking of a manuscript which he was desirous of dedicating to him; and Pichegru having in some measure encouraged his communications, he concluded by explaining himself. Pichegru required a letter from the prince of Condé himself, that he might know with whom he was dealing. Fauche-Borel returned to M. de Montgaillard, and the latter to the prince. A whole night was spent in getting the prince to write a letter of eight lines. At one time he would not style Pichegru general, for he was anxious not to recognise the republic; at another time he objected to seal the envelope with his arms. At last the letter being written, Fauche-Borel returned to Pichegru, who, on seeing the handwriting of the prince, immediately entered into conference. He was offered for himself the rank of marshal, the government of Alsatia, a million in money, the château and park of Chambord, as an inheritance, with twelve pieces of cannon taken from the Austrians, and a pension of two hundred thousand francs income, with the reversion to his wife and children. For his army he was offered the confirmation of all ranks, a pension for the commandants of fortresses who should give them up, and exemption from assessed taxes for fifteen years for such towns as should open their gates. But it was required that Pichegru should hoist the white flag, that he should deliver up the fortress of Huningen to the prince of Condé, and that he should march with him to Paris. Pichegru was too cunning to accede to such demands. He would neither surrender Huningen nor hoist the white flag in his army; that would have been going a great deal too far, and committing himself. He requested to be allowed to cross the Rhine with a body of picked men; there he promised to hoist the white flag, to take with him the corps of Condé, and then to march upon Paris. One does not see what his design could have been improved by this; for it would have been as difficult to seduce the army beyond as it would have been on this side of the Rhine; but he would not have run the risk of surrendering up a fortress, of being surprised when surrendering it, and of having no excuse to assign for his treason. On the contrary, in crossing to the other side of the Rhine, he was still at liberty not to consummate the treason, if he could not come to a good understanding with the prince and the Austrians; or if he were discovered too soon, he might avail himself of the passage obtained, to execute the operations commanded by his government, and say that he had listened to the enemy's overtures merely to turn them to advantage against him. In either case he reserved to himself the means of betraying either the republic or the prince with whom he was treating. Fauche-Borel returned to those who had sent him, but they sent him back again to insist on the same proposition. He went several times to and fro, without being able to accommodate the difference, which consisted always in this, that the prince wanted to obtain Huningen, and Pichegru the passage of the Rhine. Neither one or the other would make the first advances in respect of so great a concession. The motive which prevented the prince, in particular, from acceding to the demand made upon him, was the necessity of having recourse to the Austrians for authority to open the passage; he wished to act without their concurrence, and to secure for himself alone the honour of the counter-revolution. It appears, however, that he was obliged to refer the matter to the Aulic council; and during this interval, Pichegru, closely watched by the representatives, was obliged to suspend his correspondence and his treason.

While these matters were taking place at the army, the agents in the interior, Lemaitre, Brottier, Despomelles, Laville-Heurnois, Duverne de Presle, and others, continued their intrigues. The young prince, son of Louis XVI., had died of a tumour in his knee, originating in a scrofulous habit of body. The royalist agents asserted that he had been poisoned; and they had eagerly sought for information relative to the ceremonial of the consecration, for the purpose of sending it to Verona. The regent had become king according to their notions, and was called Louis XVIII. The count d'Artois had become Monsieur.

The pacification in the insurgent countries had been only apparent. The inhabitants, who began to enjoy a little tranquillity and security, were, it is true, disposed to remain in peace; but the leaders, and the men habituated to war who surrounded them, only waited for an occasion to take up arms again. Charette, having under his command those provincial guards, with whom were incorporated all those who exhibited a decided predilection for war, thought of nothing else, under the pretext of attending to the police of the country, but pre-

paring the nucleus of an army, so as to take the field again. He kept to his camp at Belleville, and was continually receiving there the royalist emissaries. The Paris agents had forwarded to him a letter from Verona, in reply to that in which he sought to excuse the pacification. The pretender dispensed with his making excuses, and retained him in his confidence and favour, appointed him lieutenant-general, and announced to him speedy assistance from Spain. The Paris agents, enlarging upon the expressions of the prince, flattered Charette's ambition with the most magnificent prospects; they promised him the command of all the royalist country, and a considerable expedition, which was to sail from the Spanish ports with assistance for the French princes. As for that which was preparing in England, they appeared to put no faith in it. The English, they said, had always promised and always deceived; it was right, nevertheless, to make use of their means, if possible, but to make use of them in a very different way from that for which they were intended; the relief appropriated for Brittany must first be landed in La Vendée, and that country must be under the control of Charette, who alone enjoyed the confidence of the present king. Such ideas could not fail to minister at once to the ambition of Charette, his hatred of Stofflet, his jealousy of the recent importance of Puisaye, and his resentment against England, whom he accused of never having done any thing for him.

As for Stofflet, he was much less inclined to resume hostilities than Charette, although he had shown much greater reluctance to abandon them. His country became more sensible than the others of the advantages of peace, and manifested a great reluctance to war. He was himself deeply hurt at the preference shown for Charette. He was quite as deserving of the rank of lieutenant-general, which was conferred on his rival, and he was much disgusted by the injustice of which he considered himself the subject. Brittany, organized as before, was quite ripe for insurrection. The leaders of the Chouans had obtained, like the Vendean chiefs, the organization of their best soldiers into regular companies, under pretext of enforcing the police of the country. Each of these leaders had appropriated for himself a select company of light infantry (*chasseurs*), wearing a green coat and pantaloons, with a red waistcoat, and composed of the bravest Chouans. Cormatin, in sustaining his part, had assumed a ridiculous air of importance. He had established what he called his head-quarters at La Prevalaye; he issued publicly orders to all the Chouan chiefs, dated from those head-quarters; he went from one division to another, to discipline the companies of chasseurs; he affected to repress infractions of the truce when any had been committed, and seemed to have become in reality the governor of Brittany. He frequently went to Rennes in his Chouan uniform, which had been brought into fashion; in the companies there, he received tokens of the consideration of the inhabitants, and the caresses of the women, who thought they beheld in him an important personage and the chief of the royalist party.

In secret he continued to incline the Chouans to war, and to correspond with the royalist agents. His part, in regard to Puisaye, was embarrassing. He had disobeyed him, he had betrayed his confidence, and thenceforward he had had no other resource than to throw himself into the arms of the Paris agents, who had held out hopes to him of his being made commander of Brittany, and had included him in their designs with Spain. That power had promised one million five hundred thousand francs per month, on condition that the royalists should act without England. Nothing could be more suitable to Cormatin than a plan which would enable him to break with England and Puisaye. Two other officers whom Puisaye had sent from London to Brittany, MM. de Vieuville and Dandigné, had also entered into the system of the Paris agents, and persuaded themselves also that England meant to deceive us as at Toulon, and to make use of the royalists in order to get a seaport, to make Frenchmen fight against Frenchmen, but not to afford any substantive assistance effective enough to advance the party of the princes and secure their triumph. While one part of the Breton chiefs were wrapped up in these ideas, those of Morbihan, Finisterre, and the Côtes-du-Nord, long connected with Puisaye, and accustomed to serve under him, organized by his efforts, and unconnected with the Paris intriguers, had remained attached to him, called Cormatin a traitor, and wrote to London that they were again ready to take up arms. They made preparations, purchased ammunition and stuff for making black collars, seduced the republican soldiers, and prevailed on them to desert. They were very successful in this, because, being masters of the country, they had abundance of provisions; and the republican soldiers, badly fed, and having nothing but assignats to make up for their rations, were obliged to desert their colours in order to exist. Besides, the republicans had been so imprudent as to leave many Bretons in the regiments serving against the royalist countries, and it was but natural that they should transfer themselves to the ranks of their countrymen.

Hoche, ever vigilant, was attentively observing the state of the country; he saw how the patriots were persecuted under pretext of the law for depriving them of their arms, the royalists full of exultation, articles of consumption kept back by the farmers, the roads very unsafe; the public vehicles obliged to travel in convoys so as to get an escort, the Chouans forming secret meetings, and the frequent communications kept up with the Jersey islands; and he had written to the committee and to the representatives that the pacification was a notable deception, that the republic was cheated, and that every thing indicated the speedy resumption of arms. He had employed his time in forming moveable columns, and in distributing them throughout the country, so as to insure tranquillity, and to be ready to fall upon the first gathering that should be formed. But the number of his troops was inadequate to the surface of the country and the immense line of coast. Every moment, the fear of a rising in some part of the country, or of the appearance of the English fleet on the coast, required the presence of his columns, and they were worn out by incessant running to and fro. To render such a service as this effective, there was called for, on his and his army's part, a resignation a hundred times more noble than that

courage which defies death. Unfortunately, his soldiers compensated themselves for their fatigues by excesses: this deeply afflicted him, and he had as much trouble to keep his own army in due bounds as to watch the enemy.

He soon had occasion to take Cormatin in the very act. Despatches sent by him to several Chouans chiefs were intercepted, and thus a substantial proof of his secret plottings was obtained. Having learned that he was to be on a fair day at Rennes with a number of disguised Chouans, and fearing lest he might be induced to make an attempt on the arsenal, Hoche caused him to be apprehended on the evening of the 6th Prairial, and thus put an end to the part he was playing. The different leaders immediately raised a great outcry, and complained that the truce was violated. Hoche printed Cormatin's letters, and sent him with his accomplices to the prison of Cherbourg; at the same time he kept all his columns in readiness to pour down upon the first rebels who should show themselves. In the Morbihan, chevalier Desilz having risen, was immediately attacked by general Josnet, who killed three hundred of his men and completely routed him: the leader himself perished in the action. In the Côtes-du-Noir, Bois Hardi also rose; his little army was dispersed, and he was himself taken and put to death. The soldiers, enraged at the bad faith of this young leader, who was the most formidable in the whole country, cut off his head and carried it on the point of a bayonet. Hoche, indignant at this grossness towards a fallen enemy, addressed a truly noble letter to his soldiers, and ordered search to be made for the culprits, that they might be punished. This sudden destruction of the two chiefs who had made an attempt at insurrection, made a deep impression upon the others. They remained perfectly still, awaiting with impatience the arrival of that expedition which had been so long announced. Their cry was: *The King, England, and Bonchamps for ever!*

At this moment great preparations were going forward in London. Puisaye was on the best understanding possible with the English ministers. They had not granted him all that they had at first promised, because the pacification had diminished their confidence; but they gave him the emigrant regiments and a considerable train of artillery to attempt a landing; they promised him moreover all the resources of the monarchy, if the expedition showed a promise of success. The interest of England alone ought to have induced him to put faith in these promises; for, driven from the continent ever since the conquest of Holland, she would recover a field of battle, she would transfer this field of battle to the very heart of France, and take Frenchmen into her armies. The means the English afforded Puisaye were these. The emigrant regiments of the continent had been, ever since the opening of the present campaign, taken into the service of England; those which formed the division of Condé were, as we have seen, to remain on the Rhine; the others, which were a mere wreck, were to embark at the mouth of the Elbe and to be transferred to Brittany. Besides these old regiments, which wore the black cockade, and were deeply disgusted with the unprofitable and destructive service in which they had been employed by the powers, England had agreed to form nine new regiments, which should be in her pay, but which should wear the white cockade, so that their appointment might appear to be more than ever French. The difficulty consisted in recruiting them; for if, in the first moment of fervour, the emigrants had consented to serve as soldiers, they would not do so now. It was considered best to pick up on the continent French deserters or prisoners. As for deserters, none were to be found, for the conqueror never deserts to the conquered; they then resorted to the French prisoners. Count d'Hervilly having met in London with some Toulonnese refugees who had formed a regiment, enlisted them in his own, and thus raised it to eleven or twelve hundred men, that is, to more than two-thirds of the complement. Count d'Hector composed his of seamen who had emigrated, and made it as high as six hundred men. Count du Dresnay found in the prisons a number of Bretons, enlisted against their will at the time of the first requisition, and made prisoners during the war; he selected four or five hundred from them. But these were all the French that could be got together to serve in those regiments with the white cockade. Thus, out of the nine no more than three were formed, one having only two-thirds of its complement, and two that had no more than one-third of theirs. There was still in London lieutenant-colonel Rothalier, who commanded four hundred Toulonnese cannoneers. With these was formed a regiment of artillery; to which were added some French engineers, with whom a corps of engineers was composed. As for the crowd of emigrants who would not serve unless in their former rank, and who did not find soldiers to compose regiments for themselves, it was resolved to form with them some small companies which should be filled up in Brittany with insurgents. In that country there was no want of men, and experienced officers being seldom to be met with, they would find their proper level. They sent them to Jersey to be thoroughly drilled, and to be in readiness to follow the descent upon France. In the mean time, while he was making up his forces, Puisaye looked out for pecuniary assistance. England at first promised him sufficient money, but he desired to supply himself with assignats. To this end he obtained from the French princes an authority to forge assignats to the amount of three thousand millions, and in this operation he employed idle ecclesiastics who were unfit to wield the sword. The bishop of Lyons, judging of this measure very differently from Puisaye and the princes, forbade ecclesiastics to have any thing to do with it. Puisaye then had recourse to other agents, and forged the sum which he had resolved to carry with him. He also desired a bishop to fill the part of a pope's legate to the Catholic districts. He recollected that an adventurer, the pretended bishop of Agra, by assuming that usurped character in the first war with Vendée, had exercised an extraordinary influence over the minds of the peasantry; he therefore took with him the bishop of Dol, who had a commission from Rome. He then procured from the count d'Artois the powers necessary for commanding the expedition, and appointing officers of all ranks until his arrival thither. The English ministry on its part conferred on him the direction of the expedition; but having some misgivings on account of his teme-

rity and his extreme ardour to land, it invested count d'Hervilly with the command of the emigrant regiments till the moment that the descent should be carried into effect.

All these arrangements being made, they shipped on board a squadron, d'Hervilly's regiment, the two regiments of Hector and du Dresnoy, all wearing the white cockade, the four hundred Toulonese artillerymen commanded by Rothalier, and an emigrant regiment of old formation, that of La Châtre, known by the name of Loyal Emigrants, and reduced by the war on the continent to four hundred men. This last valorous relic was reserved for decisive actions. On board this squadron were stowed provisions for an army of six thousand men for three months, one hundred saddle and draught horses, seventeen thousand complete infantry uniforms, four thousand cavalry uniforms, twenty-seven thousand muskets, ten field-pieces, and six hundred barrels of powder. They gave Puisaye ten thousand louis in gold, and letters of credit on England, so as to add to his forged assignats more assured means of finance. The squadron which carried this expedition consisted of three ships of the line of seventy-four guns each, two frigates of forty-four, four vessels of thirty to thirty-six, and several gun-boats and transports. The command was taken by commodore Warren, one of the most gallant and distinguished officers in the British navy. This was the first division. It was agreed, that immediately after its departure another naval division should go to Jersey to take up the emigrants organized in small companies; that it should cruise for some time off Saint-Malo, where Puisaye had been working his intelligence, and which place some traitors had promised to surrender to him; and after this cruise, if Saint Malo were not delivered up, the squadron was to rejoin Puisaye, and convey the small companies to him. At the same time transports were to proceed to the mouth of the Elbe, to fetch the emigrant regiments with the black cockade, and convey them to join Puisaye. It was calculated that these different detachments would arrive nearly about the same time as himself. If all that he had said were realized, if the landing could be effected without difficulty, if a part of Brittany came forth to meet him, if he could secure a strong position on the coast of France, either by the delivery into his hands of Saint-Malo, L'Orient, Port Louis, or any seaport whatever, then a new expedition, carrying an English army, further supplies of artillery, and count d'Artois, were to set sail immediately. Lord Moira had actually gone to the continent to fetch the prince.

There was but one fault to be found with these arrangements, that is, that the expedition was divided into several detachments, and especially that the French prince was not put at the head of the first.

The expedition sailed towards the end of Prairial (the middle of June); Puisaye took with him the bishop of Dol, a numerous clergy, and forty gentlemen, all bearing illustrious names, and serving as simple volunteers. The point of landing was a secret, except to Puisaye, commodore Warren, and MM. de Tinténiac and d'Allegre, whom Puisaye had despatched to announce his coming.

After long deliberation, the south of Brittany had been preferred to the north, and they settled upon the bay of Quiberon, one of the best and safest of the continent, and the English were surprisingly well acquainted with it, because they had long been accustomed to anchor there. While the expedition was under sail, Sidney Smith and lord Cornwallis made demonstrations on all the coasts, to mislead the republican armies as to the point of landing; and lord Bridport, with the squadron stationed off the Isle of Ushant, protected the convoy. The French naval force in the ports of the Atlantic had not been very formidable since the unfortunate cruise of the preceding winter, during which the Brest fleet had suffered dreadfully from the weather. However, Villaret-Joyeuse had received orders to sail with the nine ships of the line anchored in Brest, and to go and collect a division blockaded at Belle-Isle. He sailed accordingly, and after being joined by that division, and given chace to some English ships, he was returning to Brest, when he was overtaken by a gale, which for a moment dispersed his squadron. He lost some time in collecting it again, and during this interval, he fell in with the expedition destined for the coast of France. He was superior in number, and might have taken the whole of it; but commodore Warren, perceiving the danger, hoisted all sail, and placed his convoy at a distance, so as to give it the appearance of a second line; at the same time he despatched two cutters in quest of the strong squadron under lord Bridport. Villaret, conceiving that he could not fight with advantage, pursued his course towards Brest, according to the instructions he had received. At that moment lord Bridport came up, and immediately attacked the republican fleet. It was the 5th Messidor (June 23). Villaret, keeping pace with the *Alexandre*, which was a bad sailor, lost time that could not be recovered in effecting his manœuvres. The line fell into confusion; he lost three ships, the *Alexandre*, the *Formidable*, and the *Tigre*, and unable to regain Brest, he was obliged to put into L'Orient.

The expedition having thus distinguished its outset, made sail for the bay of Quiberon. A division of the squadron went and summoned the garrison of Belle-Isle, in the name of the king of France; but it received from general Boucret nothing but an energetic answer and a cannonade. The convoy came to an anchor in the bay of Quiberon on the 7th Messidor (June 25). Puisaye, according to the information he had procured, knew that there were very few troops on the coast. He wanted, in his ardour, to land immediately. Count d'Hervilly, a brave man, capable of cleverly drilling a regiment, but incapable of directing an operation with any degree of talent, and extremely punctilious withal in matters of authority and duty, said that he was commander of the troops, that he was responsible to the English government for their safety, and that he should not hazard them upon a hostile and unknown coast till he had made his observations. He lost a whole day in examining the coast with a telescope, and though he could not see a single soldier, he nevertheless refused to put the troops on shore. Puisaye and commodore Warren having determined on the landing, d'Hervilly at last assented;

and on the 9th Messidor (June 27), those imprudent and stultified Frenchmen landed full of joy in a country to which they brought civil war, and where they were destined to meet with such a deplorable fate.

The bay in which they landed is formed on the one hand by the coast of Brittany, on the other by a peninsula nearly a league in breadth and two in length: this is the well-known peninsula of Quiberon. It is joined to the mainland by a narrow strip of sand, a league in length, called the Falaise. Fort Penthièvre, situated between the peninsula and the Falaise, defends it from approach on the land side. In this fort there was a garrison of seven hundred men. The bay formed by this peninsula and the coast presents one of the safest and most sheltered roads of the continent for shipping.

The expedition had disembarked at the bottom of the bay, at the village of Carnac. At the moment of its arrival, several leaders, Dubois Berthelot, d'Allegre, George Cadoudal, and Mercier, apprized by Tinténiac, hastened up with their troops, dispersed some detachments which were guarding the coast, drove them back into the interior, and proceeded to the shore. They brought with them four or five thousand men inured to war, but ill armed, ill clothed, not marching in ranks, and looking more like plunderers than soldiers. These Chouans had been joined by peasants of the neighbouring country, shouting *Vive le Roi!* and bringing eggs, poultry, and provisions of all kinds to this liberating army, which came to restore to them their prince and their religion. Overjoyed at this sight, Puisaye felt confident that all Brittany was ready to rise. The emigrants who accompanied him experienced far different impressions. Having lived in courts, or served in the finest armies of Europe, they looked with disgust and very little confidence at those soldiers who were about to be placed under their command. Contemptuous expressions and complaints already began to make their round. Chests of muskets and uniforms were brought; the Chouans fell upon them; the sergeants of d'Hervilly's regiment endeavoured to maintain order; a quarrel ensued, and but for Puisaye it might have had fatal consequences. These opening occurrences were not at all likely to establish confidence between the insurgents and the regular troops, which, coming from England, and belonging to that power, were as such rather suspected by the Chouans. Meanwhile the bands were armed as they arrived. Their numbers amounted in two days to ten thousand. Red coats and muskets were afforded them, and Puisaye's next care was to give them officers. He was in want of officers, for the forty gentlemen volunteers were quite inadequate; he had not yet the small companies of gentlemen at his disposal, for they had orders to cruise off Saint Malo; he purposed, therefore, to take a few officers from the regiments, in which they were very numerous, to distribute them among the Chouans, then to march rapidly upon Vannes and Rennes, so as not to give the republicans time to find them out, to raise the whole country, and then to advance and take a position behind the important line of the Mayenne. There, masters of forty leagues of country, and having raised the whole population, Puisaye conceived that it would be time to organize the irregular troops. D'Hervilly, a brave man, but standing on trifles, a stickler for rules, and despising the irregular Chouans, would not sanction the appointment of those officers. Instead of giving them to the Chouans, he proposed to select from among the latter men to complete the regiments, and then to advance, making observations and selecting positions. This was not Puisaye's plan. He threatened to use his authority; d'Hervilly denied it, saying that the regular troops belonged to him, that he was responsible for their safety to the English government, and that he ought not to jeopardise them. Puisaye represented to him that he held this command during the voyage only; that on landing in Bretagne he, Puisaye, was to be commander-in-chief, and to direct the operations. He immediately despatched a cutter to London, to obtain an explanation concerning their respective powers; and meanwhile he implored d'Hervilly not to cause the miscarriage of the enterprise by fatal divisions. D'Hervilly was a brave and perfectly sincere man, but he was unfit for a civil war, and he felt a downright dislike to those ragged insurgents. All the emigrants thought with him that they were not made to play the *Chouans*; that Puisaye compromised them by bringing them into Brittany; that it was in Vendée they ought to have made their descent, and that there they would have found the illustrious Charette, and without doubt a different sort of soldiers.

Several days had been spent in squabbles of this kind. The Chouans were divided into three regiments, for the purpose of taking advanced positions, so as to occupy the roads from L'Orient to Hennebon and Auray. Tinténiac, with a regiment of two thousand five hundred Chouans, was placed on the left at Landevant; Dubois-Berthelot, on the right towards Aurai, with nearly an equal force. Count de Vauban, one of the gentlemen volunteers who had accompanied Puisaye, and one of those whose reputation and merit placed them in the first rank, was directed to occupy a central position at Mendon, with four thousand Chouans, so as to be able to assist Tinténiac or Dubois-Berthelot. He had the command of this whole line, defended by nine or ten thousand men, and advanced four or five leagues into the interior. The Chouans, finding themselves placed there, immediately asked why troops of the line were not put along with them; they relied more upon those troops than upon themselves; that they had come to range themselves around them, to follow them, to support them, but they counted upon their advancing first, to receive the formidable shock of the republicans. Vauban applied for only four hundred men, either to withstand a first attack, in case of need, or to impart confidence to his Chouans, to set them an example, and to prove that there was no intention of exposing them alone to danger. D'Hervilly at first refused, then delayed, and at last sent this detachment.

They had already been on land five days, and they had not got further than a few leagues. Puisaye was extremely dissatisfied; but he contained himself, hoping to overcome the delays and obstacles thrown in his way by his companions in arms. Conceiving that at all events he ought to secure a point of support, he proposed to d'Her-

villy to gain possession of the peninsula by surprising fort Penthièvre. Once masters of this fort, which was the key to the Peninsula on the land side, supported on both sides by the English squadron, they would have an impregnable position; and that peninsula, a league broad, and two long, would then afford a footing quite as secure and more convenient than that of Saint Malo, Brest, or L'Orient. The English might there land all the men and stores they had promised. This measure of safety was of such a nature as to please d'Hervilly; he assented to it, but was for a regular attack on fort Penthièvre. Puisaye would not listen to him, and arranged a plan to take it by storm, and commodore Warren, in the plenitude of his zeal, offered to second him with all the guns of his squadron. They began to cannonade on the 1st of July (13th Messidor), and fixed the decisive attack for the 3rd. (15th Messidor.) While preparations were making, Puisaye sent out emissaries over all Brittany, to rouse Scépeaux, Charette, Stofflet, and all the leaders of the insurgent provinces.

The news of the landing spread with extraordinary rapidity. In two days, it was known over all Brittany, and in a few more throughout all France. The royalists rejoiced; the revolutionists enraged, already believed they saw the emigrants in Paris. The convention immediately sent two extraordinary commissioners to Hoche; she selected Blad and Tallien. The presence of the latter at the threatened point was intended to prove that the Thermidorians were as opposed to royalism as to terror. Hoche, cool and resolute, wrote forthwith to the committee of public welfare, to dispel its apprehensions. "Coolness," said he, "activity, provisions, of which we are in want, and the twelve thousand men you promised me so long ago." He immediately gave orders to the chief of his staff; he directed general Chabot to be stationed between Brest and L'Orient, with a body of four thousand men, that he might fly to the assistance of either of those ports which should be threatened. "Keep your eye more particularly upon Brest," said he; "in case of need, shut yourselves up in the place, and defend yourselves even to death." He wrote to Aubert Dubayet, who commanded the coasts of Cherbourg, to send off troops for the north of Brittany, in order to protect Saint-Malo and the coast. To secure the south, he begged Canclaux, who was still watching Charette and Stofflet, to send general Lemoine with reinforcements to him by Nantes and Vannes. He then collected all his troops about Rennes, Plédermel, and Vannes, and moved them *en échelon* upon those three points, so as to guard his rear; lastly, he himself advanced to Aurai, with all the force he could get together. On the 14th Messidor (July 2nd), he was already in person at Aurai, with three or four thousand men.

The entire of Brittany was thus protected. The illusions which the first insurrection of La Vendée had generated were about to be dispelled; merely because in 1793 the peasants of La Vendée, encountering only national guards, composed of tradesmen who knew not how to handle a musket, had made themselves masters of all Poitou and Anjou, and then formed in their ravines and on their heaths an establishment which it was difficult to destroy, it was imagined that Brittany would rise at the first signal from England. But the Bretons were far from possessing the ardour of the first Vendeans; a few banditti only, under the name of Chouans, were bent upon war, or, to speak more correctly, on pillage; and what was more, a young commander, whose activity was equal to his genius, having experienced troops at his disposal, repressed an entire population with a firm and steady hand. Could Brittany rise under such circumstances, unless the army that came to support it advanced rapidly, instead of groping about on the sea-shore?

This was not all: a party of the Chouans, who were under the influence of the royalist agents in Paris, were waiting for a prince to appear along with Puisaye before they would join him. The cry of the agents and of all those who were in their intrigues was, that the expedition was inadequate and fallacious, and that England had come to Brittany to re-enact the events of Toulon. They no longer said that she meant to give the crown to the count d'Artois, since he was not there, but to the duke of York; they wrote, stating that there was no necessity for forwarding the expedition, but rather to compel it to put to sea and to make a descent near Charette. This was exactly what the latter desired. To the solicitations of Puisaye's agents he replied, that he had sent M. de Scépeaux to Paris, to claim the execution of one of the articles of the treaty; that he must therefore wait the return of that officer, and not expose him to the danger of being arrested by resuming arms. As for Stofflet, who was much more favourably disposed toward Puisaye, he sent word that, if the rank of lieutenant-general were conferred on him, he would march immediately and make a diversion on the rear of the republicans.

Thus every thing combined against Puisaye; his views were opposed to those of the royalists in the interior, jealousies supervened among the Vendean chiefs, and lastly, a skilful adversary had at his disposal forces sufficiently qualified to repress any royalist zeal that existed among the Bretons.

It was on the 15th Messidor (July 3), that Puisaye had resolved to attack fort Penthièvre. The soldiers who defended it had been without bread for three days. Exposed to a storming, cannonaded by the ships, and badly commanded, they surrendered and delivered up the fort to Puisaye. But at this very moment, Hoche, posted at Aurai, caused all the advanced posts of the Chouans to be attacked, in order to restore the communication of Aurai with Hennebon and L'Orient. He had ordered a simultaneous attack on Landevant and in the direction of the post of Aurai. Tinténiac's Chouans, vigorously assailed by the republicans, could not keep their ground against troops of the line. Vauban, who was intermediately posted at Mendon, hastened with part of his reserve to the assistance of Tinténiac, but he found the band of the latter dispersed, and the one he brought with him dispersed on witnessing the defeat. He was obliged to flee, and even to swim across two arms of the sea before he could get back to the remainder of his Chouans at Mendon. On his right, Dubois-Berthelot had been repulsed; he thus saw the republicans advancing on his right and on his left, and it was likely that he would

soon find himself *en flèche* between them. At this moment, the four hundred men of the line he had asked for would have been of great service for supporting his Chouans and bringing them back to the fight; but d'Hervilly had just recalled them for the attack of the fort. However, Dubois-Berthelot infused some courage into his soldiers, and decided them to take advantage of the opportunity by falling upon the rear of the republicans, who had advanced very far in pursuit of the fugitives. He then threw himself upon their left, and rushed upon a village which the republicans had just entered at the heels of the Chouans. They had not expected this brisk attack, and were obliged to retreat. Vauban then returned to his position at Mendon; but there he was left alone. All around him had fled, and he too was obliged to fall back, but in good order, and after an act of vigour which had checked the rapid progress of the enemy.

The Chouans were indignant at having been exposed alone to the attack of the republicans. They complained bitterly that the four hundred men of the line had been taken from them. Puisaye found fault with d'Hervilly, the latter replied that he had recalled them for the attack of the fort. These mutual complaints did not mend matters, and each party continued to be greatly irritated with each other. However, they were masters of fort Penthièvre. Puisaye had caused all the stores sent by the English to be landed on the peninsula, where he fixed his head quarters; there he collected all his troops, and there he resolved to maintain a firm position. He ordered the engineers to perfect the defences of the fort, and to add thereto some advanced works. The white flag was there hoisted beside the English colours, in token of alliance between the kings of France and England. Lastly, it was settled that each regiment should contribute to the garrison a detachment proportionate to its strength. D'Hervilly, who was very anxious to complete his own, and to make it complete with good troops, offered the republicans who had been taken prisoners to enter his service, and to form a third battalion in his regiment. Money and food, of which they were in want, a dislike to remain prisoners, and the hope of being able soon to go over again to Hoche, decided them, and they were enlisted in d'Hervilly's corps.

Puisaye, whose thoughts were always for marching onward, and who had only stopped to take the peninsula in order to secure a position on the coast, spoke sharply to d'Hervilly, gave him the best reasons to induce him to second his views, and even threatened to demand his removal if he refused to comply. D'Hervilly appeared for a moment to coincide with his plans. The Chouans, according to Puisaye, only required support to make them display their bravery, that troops of the line ought to be distributed in their front and rear, to be thus placed in the middle, and with twelve or thirteen thousand men, nearly three thousand of whom were of the line, they might excel the army of Hoche, who had at that time scarcely five or six thousand. D'Hervilly assented to this plan. At this instant Vauban, finding his position extremely perilous, having lost the position he had at first occupied, asked for directions and assistance. D'Hervilly sent him an order, worded in the most pedantic manner, in which he directed him to fall back upon Carnac, and prescribed such movements as could only have been executed by the most expert troops in Europe.

The 3rd of July (15th Messidor) Puisaye left the Peninsula to review the Chouans, and d'Hervilly also quitted it with his regiment, to prepare for the execution of the plans formed the preceding day, of marching forward. Puisaye found nothing but dejection, discouragement, and ill humour, among those men who a few days before were full of enthusiasm. They said that there was an evident intention to expose them unprotected, and to sacrifice them to the troops of the line. Puisaye pacified them as much as he could, and endeavoured to revive their spirits. D'Hervilly, on his part, seeing those soldiers clothed in red, who wore the uniform and carried their bayonets so awkwardly, said that nothing was to be done with such troops, and brought his regiment home again. Puisaye met him at the moment, and asked if that was the way to execute the plan agreed upon. D'Hervilly replied that he never would risk himself by marching with such soldiers; that all they could do was to embark again, or to shut themselves up in the peninsula, to await fresh orders from London, which, according to his notions, meant orders to make a descent on La Vendée.

Next day, July 6th (18th Messidor), Vauban received private intelligence that he should be attacked along his whole line by the republicans. He found himself in a most dangerous situation. His left was supported upon a post called Saint-Barbe, which communicated with the peninsula; but his centre and his right extended along the coast of Carnac, and had no other retreat than the sea. Thus, if he were briskly attacked, his right and his centre might be driven into the sea; his left alone being able to retreat by Saint-Barbe to Quiberon. His Chouans, quite out of spirits, were incapable of standing their ground; he had therefore but one course to pursue, namely, to make his centre and his right fall back upon his left, and file off by the beach to the peninsula. But they would then be shutting themselves up on this strip of land without being able to leave it; for the post of Saint-Barbe, which would thus be abandoned, was, although defenceless on the land side, impregnable towards the side of Falaise, which it entirely commanded. Thus the scheme of a retreat would be equivalent to the determination to shut themselves up in the peninsula of Quiberon. Vauban, therefore, applied for assistance, that he might not be obliged to retire. D'Hervilly sent him a fresh order, worded in all the affectation of military style, enjoining him to keep his ground at Carnac to the last extremity. Puisaye immediately desired d'Hervilly to send some troops, which he promised to do.

On the following day, July 7th (19th Messidor), at daybreak, the republicans advanced in deep columns, and attacked the ten thousand Chouans along the whole line. The latter looked towards the Falaise, but no regular troops were coming. They then became enraged against the emigrants, who did not come to their relief. Young George Cadoudal, whose men refused to fight, begged them

not to disperse; but they would not listen to him. George, enraged in his turn, cried out that those rascally English and emigrants had only come to ruin Brittany, and he wished the sea had swallowed them up before it had brought them to that coast. Vauban then ordered his right and his centre to fall back on his left, that they might retire by the Falaise to the peninsula. The Chouans rushed thither indiscriminately, most of them followed by their families, who fled from the vengeance of the republicans. Women, children, and old men, carrying the wreck of their property, and intermixed with several thousand Chouans in red uniform, covered that long, narrow strip of land, washed on both sides by the sea, and already exposed to bullets and cannon-balls. Vauban then, getting all the officers round him, endeavoured to collect the bravest of the men, exhorted them not to bring ruin upon themselves by a precipitate flight, and conjured them, for their safety and their honour, to make an orderly retreat. They would make, he said, those troops of the line, who left them alone exposed to all the danger, blush for themselves. By degrees he roused their courage, and prevailed upon them to face the enemy, to stand fire, and to return. Then, owing to the good conduct of the officers, the retreat began to be effected with regularity; the ground was disputed foot by foot. Still Vauban was not sure that he should be able to withstand a vigorous charge, and not be driven into the sea; but, fortunately, the brave commodore Warren laying to with his ships and gun-boats, began to thunder from both sides of the Falaise upon the republicans, and prevented them, for that day at least, from pushing their advantages any further.

The fugitives pressed on to the entrance of the fort, but admittance was for a short time denied them; they then fell upon the palisades, tore them up, and rushed *pêle-mêle* into the peninsula. At this instant d'Hervilly came up with his regiment; Vauban met him, and in a fit of passion told him that he should call him to account for his conduct before a council of war. The Chouans spread themselves over the whole peninsula, in which were several villages and hamlets. All the lodgings were occupied by the regiments, and quarrels took place; at last the Chouans lay down on the ground; half rations of rice were given to them, which they ate raw, having no means of cooking it.

Thus this expedition, which was so speedily to carry the standard of the Bourbons and the English to the banks of the Mayenne, was confined to a peninsula two leagues in length. There were now twelve or fifteen thousand more mouths to feed, and it was impossible to furnish them either with lodging, fuel, or utensils for cooking their food. That peninsula, defended by a fort at its extremity, lined on either side by the English squadron, was capable of opposing an invincible resistance; but it became at once extremely weak from the want of provisions. In point of fact, no more provisions had been brought than were sufficient to feed six thousand men for three months, and there were now eighteen or twenty thousand to subsist. To get out of this position by a sudden attack on Saint-Barbe was scarcely possible; for the republicans, full of ardour, were intrenching that post in such a manner as to render it impregnable on the side towards the peninsula. While confusion, animosity, and dejection, pervaded the confused mass of Chouans and emigrants—in Hoche's camp, on the contrary, men and officers laboured assiduously in throwing up the intrenchments. "I saw," says Puisaye, "officers themselves stripped to their shirts, and distinguished only by their stock, handling the spade, and urging on the labours of their soldiers."

Puisaye, however, determined upon a sortie for that very night, in order to interrupt those operations; but the darkness and the cannon of the enemy produced confusion in his ranks, and he was obliged to return. The Chouans, driven to despair, complained that they had been deceived. They longed for their old mode of warfare, and asked to be taken back to their woods. They were dying of hunger. D'Hervilly, with the intention of forcing them to enlist in the regiments, had ordered that only a half ration should be distributed among the irregular troops. They revolted. Puisaye, without whose knowledge this order had been issued, revoked it, and the whole ration was allowed.

That which distinguished Puisaye beyond his intelligence was his unconquerable perseverance; he was not discouraged. He conceived the idea of taking the *élite* of the Chouans; landing them in two divisions for the purpose of scouring the country in the rear of Hoche, rousing the leaders of whom he had yet no tidings, and bringing them to bear *en masse* upon the camp of Saint-Barbe, so as to take it in rear, while the troops of the peninsula should attack it in front. He should thus relieve himself from six or eight thousand mouths, employ them to some purpose, rekindle the nearly extinguished zeal of the Breton leaders, and prepare an attack on the rear of the camp of Saint-Barbe. This plan being adopted, he made the best selection of his Chouans, gave four thousand of them to Tinténiac, with three intrepid leaders, George, Mercier, and d'Allegre, and three thousand to MM. Jean-Jean and Lantivy. Tinténiac was to be put on shore at Sarzean, near the mouth of the Vilaine, and Jean-Jean and Lantivy near Quimper. Both these divisions, after making a considerable circuit, were to form a junction at Band, on the 14th of July (26th Messidor), and to march on the morning of the 16th upon the rear of the camp of Saint-Barbe. At the moment when they were about to set out, the leaders of the Chouans went to Puisaye, and besought their old leader to accompany them, saying that these English traitors were going to ruin him: it was not possible that Puisaye could comply. They set out, and were landed without accident. Puisaye immediately wrote to London, that every thing might be repaired, but that they must send over to him provisions, ammunition, troops, and the French prince without delay.

While these things were taking place in the peninsula, Hoche had already collected from eight to ten thousand men at Saint-Barbe. Aubert-Dubayet had sent him from the coast of Cherbourg troops to protect the north of Brittany; Canclaux had despatched from Nantes a considerable reinforcement under the command of general Lemoine. The representatives had put a stop to all the intrigues which had for their object the surrender of

L'Orient and Saint-Malo. The affairs of the republic were therefore improving every day. Meanwhile, Lemartre and Brothier were, by their intrigues, still combining with all their might to thwart the expedition. They had immediately written to Brittany in disapproval of it. The expedition, according to them, had a dangerous object, since the French prince was not there, and no one ought to promote it. In consequence, agents had spread themselves over the country, and given orders, in the name of the king, not to attempt any movement; and they had required Charette to persist in his inaction. According to their old system of taking advantage of the assistance of England and then deceiving her, they had suddenly devised a plan on the very spot. Mixed up with the intrigue which was to deliver Saint-Malo to Puisaye, they wanted to summon thither the emigrant companies (*cadres*) cruising on board the English fleet, and to take possession of the port in the name of Louis XVIII., while Puisaye was acting at Quiberon, perhaps, said they, for the duke of York. The intrigue at Saint-Malo having failed, they retreated to Saint-Brieuc, kept off that coast the squadron which had the companies of emigrants on board, and immediately sent emissaries to Tinténiac and Lantivy, whom they knew had landed, to desire them to proceed to Saint-Brieuc. Their aim was to form a counter-expedition in the north of Brittany, more sure, according to them, than that of Puisaye in the south.

Tinténiac had landed safely, and, after taking several republican posts, had arrived at Elven. There he found the injunction, issued in the king's name, to proceed to Coetlogon, where he was to receive fresh orders. It was to no purpose that he objected the commission of Puisaye, and the necessity of not marring his plan by removing himself from the appointed place. However, he acquiesced, hoping that by means of a forced march he might yet be in the rear of Saint-Barbe on the 16th. Jean-Jean and Lantivy, who likewise landed without accident, prepared to march towards Band, when they found orders addressed to them to proceed to Saint-Brieuc.

Meanwhile Hoche, uneasy with respect to his rear, was obliged to send off fresh detachments to stop the bands, of whose march he was apprized; but he left in Saint-Barbe a force sufficient to resist any attack by storm. He was much distressed by the English gun-boats, which fired upon his troops the moment they appeared on the beach, and he reckoned upon scarcely any thing short of famine for reducing the emigrants.

Puisaye, on his part, put himself in order for the 16th (28th Messidor). On the 15th a fresh squadron arrived in the bay; it was that which had been to the mouth of the Elbe to bring away the emigrant regiments that had been taken into the pay of England, and were known by the name of regiments with the black cockade. This squadron brought the legions of Salm, Damas, Beon, and Perigord, reduced altogether to eleven hundred men by the losses of the campaign, and commanded by a distinguished officer, M. de Sombreuil. This squadron brought also fresh supplies of provisions and ammunition; it also brought the intelligence that three thousand English were being brought by Lord Graham, as well as of the speedy arrival of the count d'Artois with a still more considerable force. A letter from the English ministry informed Puisaye that the emigrant companies were detained on the north coast by the royalist agents in the interior, who intended, they said, to deliver up a sea-port to them. Another despatch, which arrived at the same time, terminated the dispute that had arisen between d'Hervilly and Puisaye, gave to the latter the absolute command of the expedition, and, what was more, conferred on him the rank of lieutenant-general in the service of England.

Puisaye, now free to command, made all requisite preparations for the following day. He would willingly have deferred the projected attack, in order to give Sombreuil's division time to land; but all being fixed for the 16th, and that being the day mentioned to Tinténiac, he could not delay it. On the evening of the 15th, he ordered Vauban to land at Carnac with twelve hundred Chouans, for the purpose of making a diversion on the extremity of the camp of Saint-Barbe, and to effect a junction with the Chouans, who were to attack it in the rear. The boats were got ready at a late hour, and Vauban could not embark before midnight. He had orders to fire a fusee if he succeeded in landing, and a second if he failed to keep his ground on the shore.

On the 16th of July (28th Messidor), at daybreak, Puisaye left the peninsula with all the troops he had. He marched in columns. The brave loyal emigrant regiment was at the head, with Rothalier's artillery; on the right advanced the royal marine and Dresnay's regiments, with six hundred Chouans, commanded by the duke de Levis. D'Hervilly's regiment, and a thousand Chouans under the chevalier de Saint Pierre occupied the left. These regiments formed altogether nearly four thousand men. While they were advancing upon the Falaise, they perceived a first fusee fired by the count de Vauban. They saw no second, and concluded that Vauban had succeeded. They continued their march, and soon heard something like the distant sound of musketry. "It is Tinténiac!" exclaimed Puisaye; "forward!" A charge was then sounded, and they marched upon the intrenchments of the republicans. Hoche's advanced guard, commanded by Humbert, was placed before the heights of Saint-Barbe. On the approach of the enemy, it fell back and returned within the lines. The assailants advanced in high spirits. All at once a division of cavalry, which had remained drawn out, made a movement, and unmasked formidable batteries. The emigrants were received with a fire of musketry and artillery: grape, balls, and shells were showered upon them. On the right the royal marine and Dresnay's regiments lost whole ranks without flinching; the duke de Levis was severely wounded at the head of his Chouans; on the left d'Hervilly's regiment advanced gallantly amidst the fire. Meanwhile the report of musketry, which the assailants thought they had heard on the rear and on the flanks, had ceased. Neither Tinténiac nor Vauban had therefore attacked, and there was no hope of storming the camp. At this moment the republican army, infantry and cavalry, sallied from its intrenchments: Puisaye, seeing nothing before him but certain death, advised d'Hervilly to order the

royalist army by Hoche.—The entire destruction of the royalist army assisted by the English under commodore Warren, by the republicans under Hoche.

right to retreat, while he would himself cause the same to be done on the left. At that very moment d'Hervilly, who braved the fire with the greatest courage, received an iron ball in the middle of the chest. He directed an aid-de-camp to carry the order for retreat; the aid-de-camp was taken off by a cannon-ball. As they received no orders, d'Hervilly's regiment and the thousand Chouans under the chevalier de Saint-Pierre continued to advance amidst this tremendous fire. While a retreat was sounded on the left, a charge was sounded on the right. The confusion and carnage were horrible. The republican cavalry then fell upon the emigrant army, and drove it back in disorder to the Falaise. Rothalier's cannon, being deep in the sand, were taken. After performing prodigies of valour, the whole army fled towards Fort Penthièvre; the republicans closely pursued them thither, and were on the point of entering the fort with them, but an unexpected assistance saved it from the further pursuit of the conquerors: Vauban, who ought to have been at Carnac, was at the extremity of the Falaise with his Chouans, and commodore Warren with him. Both of them from the gun-boats kept up such a brisk fire upon the beach as to stop the republicans, and once more save the unfortunate army of Quiberon.

Thus Tinténiac had not made his appearance; Vauban, having landed too late, had not been able to surprise the republicans, had been ill-seconded by his Chouans, who dipped their muskets in water that they might not fight, and had retreated near to the fort; his second fusee, kindled in broad daylight, had not been perceived, and thus it was that Puisaye, thwarted in all his combinations, had experienced this disastrous defeat. All the regiments had sustained frightful losses. That of the royal marine alone had lost fifty-three officers out of seventy-two, and the others had suffered in proportion.

It must be confessed that Puisaye had been too precipitate in attacking the camp. Four thousand men, going to attack ten thousand solidly intrenched, ought to have assured themselves in the most certain manner that all the attacks planned on the rear and flanks were ready to take effect. It was not sufficient to have appointed a rendezvous for regiments that had so many obstacles to overcome, in order to conclude that they would have come up at the point and the hour specified; some signal should have been agreed upon, or some other means should have been settled, for insuring the execution of the design. In this particular, Puisaye, though deceived by the sound of distant musketry, had not acted with sufficient precaution. At any rate, he had paid in his own person, and had a good answer for those who pretended to suspect his courage because they could not deny his abilities.

It is easy to comprehend why Tinténiac had not made his appearance. He had found at Elven the order to proceed to Coetlogon; he had complied with that strange order, in hopes of regaining the lost time by a forced march. At Coetlogon he had found women commissioned to deliver to him an order to march to Saint-Brieuc. This came from the agents opposed to Puisaye, who, using the name of the king, in whose name they always spoke, wanted to make the division detached by Puisaye concur in the counter-expedition they contemplated against Saint-Malo or Saint-Brieuc. While a conference was taking place upon this order, the castle of Coetlogon was attacked by the detachments Hoche had sent forth in pursuit of Tinténiac; the latter hastened thither, and fell struck dead by a ball in the forehead. His successor in the command had consented to go against Saint-Brieuc. On their part MM. de Lantivy and Jean-Jean, who had landed near Quimper, had found similar orders; the leaders were disagreed, and observing this conflict of orders and plans, their soldiers, already discontented, had dispersed. This is why not one of the divisions sent by Puisaye to make a diversion had arrived at the place appointed. The Paris agency with its schemes had likewise deprived Puisaye of the companies detained by these agents on the northern coast, of the two detachments they had prevented meeting at Baud on the 14th, and lastly of the aid of all the leaders, to whom these agents had given orders not to make any movement.

Shut up in Quiberon, Puisaye had therefore no hope of leaving it and marching forward; all that was left for him was to re-embark before he was forced to do so by famine, and to attempt a more successful descent on some other part of the coast, namely, in Vendée. This was every thing that the greater part of the emigrants desired; the name of Charette induced them to look forward to Vendée for a great general at the head of a fine army. They were delighted, moreover, to see the counter-revolution effected by any other than Puisaye.

In the mean time, Hoche was examining this peninsula, and seeking how to make his way into it. At the entrance it was defended by fort Penthièvre, and on both sides by the English squadrons. To think of landing thither in boats was out of the question; to take the fort by means of a regular siege was equally impossible, for they could only get to it by the Falaise, which was incessantly swept by the fire of the gun-boats. The republicans, in fact, could not make their observations without being exposed to showers of grape-shot. There was nothing but a surprise by night or famine that could give the peninsula to Hoche. One circumstance induced him to attempt a surprise, dangerous as it was. The prisoners, who had been reluctantly enlisted in the emigrant regiments, could at most have been retained in their service by success; but their pressing necessity, and their want of patriotism, induced them to pass over to the side of a victorious enemy, who was going to treat them as deserters if he were to take them in arms. They repaired to Hoche's camp in great numbers during the night, saying that they had enlisted merely to get out of prison or to escape being sent thither; and they pointed out to him a way of gaining an entrance into the peninsula. On the left of fort Penthièvre there was a rock; by wading into the water up to the breast, a man might get round this rock, and then he would find a path which led to the summit of the fort. The deserters declared, on behalf of their comrades composing the garrison, that they would assist in throwing open the gates.

Hoche never hesitated in spite of the danger of such an attempt. He formed his plan upon the

information he had obtained, and resolved to make himself master of the peninsula, and thus capture the whole expedition before it had time to re-embark. On the night of the 20th of July (2nd Thermidor) the sky was overcast, Puisaye and Vauban had set a watch to secure themselves against a nocturnal attack. "In such a night," said they to the officers, "make the enemy's sentinels fire their muskets at you." Every thing appeared quiet, and they retired to bed in full security.

The preparations were made in the republican camp. About midnight, Hoche put himself with his army in motion. The sky was very cloudy; and an extremely violent wind raised the waves, and drowned with their roar the noise of arms and of soldiers. Hoche formed his troops into columns on the Falaise; he next gave three hundred grenadiers to adjutant-general Menage, a young republican of heroic courage. He ordered him to file off on his right, to wade into the water with his grenadiers, to get round the rock on which the walls were built, to ascend by the path, and to endeavour to make his way into the fort. These arrangements made, they marched in the greatest silence; the night-watch, to whom had been given the red uniforms taken from the slain in the action of the 16th, having the pass-word, deceived the advanced sentinels. They approached without being discovered. Menage entered the water with his three hundred grenadiers, the wind drowning the noise they made in wading through it. Some fell and rose again, others were ingulfed in the abyss. Thus they followed their intrepid leader from rock to rock, and managed to reach the path that led to the fort. Hoche had meanwhile arrived under the walls with his columns. But all at once the sentinels recognised one of the false watch; they perceived amid the darkness a tall moving shadow; they instantly fired; the alarm was given. The Toulonnese gunners ran to their pieces, and poured a shower of grape on Hoche's troops; a confusion took place, they were thrown into disorder, and were on the point of running away. But at this moment Menage got to the summit of the fortress; the soldiers in league with the assailants ran to the battlements, held the butt-ends of their muskets to the republicans, and got them in. They then rushed all together upon the rest of the garrison, slaughtered all who made a resistance, and instantly hoisted the tricoloured flag. Hoche in the midst of the disorder into which the enemy's batteries had thrown his columns, did not flinch for a moment; he ran up to every officer, brought him back to his post, made the men return to their ranks, and rallied his army under this tremendous fire. It began to be not quite so dark. He perceived the republican flag flying on the top of the fort. "What!" said he to his men, "would you run away now that your comrades have hoisted their flag upon the enemy's wall!" He led them on to the advanced works, where part of the Chouans were encamped: they rushed upon the intrenchments, made their way into them at every point, and at length made themselves masters of the fort.

At this moment Vauban and Puisaye, roused by the firing, had hurried to the scene of the disaster; but it was too late. They found the Chouans running away *pêle-mêle*, the officers deserted by their soldiers, and the remnant of the garrison continuing true. Hoche did not stop at the taking of the fort: he rallied part of his columns, and pushed on into the peninsula, before the army of the expedition could re-embark. Puisaye, Vauban, and all the officers, retired towards the interior, where the regiment of d'Hervilly, the wrecks of the regiments of Dresnay, the royal marine, and the loyal emigrant regiments, and Sombreuil's legion, landed two days before, and eleven hundred strong yet remained. By taking a good position, and there were more than one in the peninsula, and occupying it with the three thousand regular troops which they still had, they might give the squadron time to collect the unfortunate emigrants. The fire of the gun-boats would have protected the embarkation; but disorder everywhere prevailed; the Chouans threw themselves into the sea with their families, to get on board some fishing-boats which lay near the shore, and to put off in them to the squadron, which the rough weather had caused to stand more out at sea. The troops, scattered in the peninsula, ran hither and thither, not knowing where to rally. D'Hervilly, capable of defending a position with vigour, and well acquainted with the localities, was mortally wounded; Sombreuil, who had succeeded him, was not acquainted with the ground, knew not where to support himself, or whither to retire, and, though brave, appeared on this occasion to have lost the necessary presence of mind. Puisaye, on coming to Sombreuil, informed him what position to occupy. Sombreuil inquired if he had sent word to the squadron to heave to; Puisaye replied that he had sent a skilful and zealous pilot; but the weather was rough, and the pilot did not arrive quick enough to satisfy the unfortunate men who were exposed to be driven into the sea. The republican columns were approaching. Sombreuil again urged the question, "Is the squadron informed?" he asked Puisaye. Puisaye then offered to fly on board himself, to hasten the approach of the commodore—a commission more proper for him to have given to another, as he should have been the last to withdraw from the danger. One reason decided him—the necessity of saving his correspondence, which would have compromised all Brittany if it had fallen into the hands of the republicans. He was no doubt as anxious to save that, as to save the army itself; but Puisaye might have got it sent on board without going in person. He put off, and got on board the Commodore at the same time as the pilot whom he had despatched. The distance, the darkness, the bad weather, had prevented the disaster from being observed on board the squadron. The brave admiral Warren, who during the expedition had seconded the emigrants with all his means, made all sail, and at length arrived with his ships within the range of his cannon, at the moment when Hoche, at the head of seven hundred grenadiers, was closely pressing Sombreuil's legion, and the latter was on the point of giving way. What a spectacle did this unhappy coast at that moment present! The roughness of the sea scarcely permitted any boats to go near the shore; a multitude of Chouans and fugitive soldiers plunged into the water to their necks to meet them, and drowned themselves in their efforts to get to them sooner; a

thousand unfortunate emigrants, placed between the sea and the bayonets of the republicans, were reduced to the necessity of throwing themselves either into the waves or upon the enemy's steel, and suffered as much from the fire of the English squadron as the republicans themselves. Some boats had come in, but to a different point. On this side there was but a single brig, which kept up a tremendous fire, and which had checked for a moment the advance of the republicans. Some of the grenadiers, it is said, cried out to the emigrants, "Surrender; nothing shall be done to you." This saying passed from rank to rank. Sombreuil would have approached to parley with general Humbert, but the fire prevented him from advancing. An emigrant officer immediately swam off to cause the firing to cease. Hoche would not admit of a capitulation; he was too well aware of the laws against emigrants to dare to make any engagement, and he was incapable of promising what he was unable to perform. He has declared, in a letter published throughout all Europe, that he heard none of the promises attributed to general Humbert, and that he would not have authorised them. Some of his soldiers might have shouted "*Surrender!*" but he offered nothing, promised nothing. He advanced, and the emigrants having no other resource than to surrender or be killed, hoping that they might perhaps be treated like the Vendeans, they laid down their arms. No capitulation whatever, not even a verbal one, took place with Hoche. Vauban, who was present, admitted that no articles or agreement were made, and he even advised Sombreuil not to surrender on the vague hope suggested by the cries of a few private soldiers.

Many of the emigrants stabbed themselves with their swords; others threw themselves into the sea to get to the boats. Commodore Warren made all the efforts in his power to overcome the obstacles presented by the sea, for the purpose of saving as many as possible of those unfortunates. There were vast numbers of them, who on seeing the boats approaching, had gone into the water up to the neck; the enemy on the shore fired at their heads. Sometimes they scrambled into boats already full, and those who were in them, fearing lest they should be sunk, cut their hands with their swords.

But let us quit these scenes of horror, where dreadful misfortunes were visited on great imprudences. More than one cause had contributed to prevent the success of this expedition. In the first place, too great reliance was placed on Brittany. People really disposed to insurrection will break out, as did the Vendeans in 1793, leaders are sought for, implored, nay forced to put themselves at their head, but they do not wait to be organized, do not endure two years of oppression, and then rise when that oppression is past. However favourably its tendencies might have been demonstrated, a superintendent like Hoche would have prevented their manifestation. Puisaye was, therefore, exceedingly mistaken. Much might nevertheless have been done with the people of Brittany, and many men disposed to fight might have been found among them, if an expedition of any magnitude had made its way to Rennes, and had driven before it the army that kept the country in subjection. However, to do this, the leaders of the insurgents should have acted in unison with Puisaye, and Puisaye with the Paris agents; instructions the most contrary should not have been sent to the Chouan chiefs; some should not have received orders to remain stationary, and others should not have been despatched in directions opposite to those that Puisaye had pointed out; the emigrants should have understood better the nature of the war they were about to undertake; they should have felt less contempt for those peasants who devoted themselves to their cause; the English also should have harboured less distrust of Puisaye, and not have associated another leader with him; they should have given him at once all the means they intended he should have, and have attempted this expedition with their whole united force; above all, there ought to have been a great prince at the head of this expedition: it was not absolutely necessary that he should be great, but he ought to have been the first to set foot on the shore. On seeing him, all obstacles would have vanished. That dissension of the Vendean leaders among themselves, between the Vendean leaders and the Breton leaders, between the Breton leaders and the Paris agents, between the Chouans and the emigrants, and between Spain and England, that separation of all the elements of the enterprise would instantly have ceased. At seeing the prince, all the enthusiasm of the country would have been called into action. Everybody would have obeyed his orders and assisted in the enterprise. Hoche might then have been surrounded; and in spite of his talents and his activity, he would have been compelled to retreat before an influence all-powerful in those parts. There would, it is true, still have been behind him those valiant armies which had conquered Europe; but Austria might have occupied them on the Rhine, and prevented them from sending him any sufficient detachments; the government had no longer the vigour of the old committee, and the revolution would have run great risks. Displaced twenty years earlier, her benefits would not have had time to consolidate themselves; unparalleled efforts, immortal victories, torrents of blood, would all have proved fruitless to France; or if at any rate it had not been permitted that a handful of fugitives should subject a brave nation to their yoke, they would have endangered its regeneration; and as for themselves, they would not have lost their cause without defending it, and they would have done honour to their pretensions by their energy.

Every thing was imputed to Puisaye and England by the hot-headed spirits who composed the royalist party. Puisaye was, in their ideas, a traitor, who had sold himself to Pitt, for the purpose of renewing the scenes of Toulon. It was nevertheless certain that Puisaye had done all that lay in his power. It was absurd to suppose that England did not wish to succeed; her own precautions in regard to Puisaye, the selection she herself made of d'Hervilly for the purpose of preventing the emigrant army from being too much compromised; and lastly, the zeal with which commodore Warren strove to save the unfortunate survivors in the peninsula, prove that, notwithstanding her temporizing inclinations, she had not contemplated the hideous and base crime imputed to her. Justice is due to all, even to the implacable enemies of our revolution and of our country.

Commodore Warren went to put the miserable wreck of the expedition on shore in the isle of Houat, and there waited for fresh ordêrs from London, as also for the arrival of count d'Artois, who was on board the *Lord Moira*, to know what he was to do. There was nought else but despair in that little island; the emigrants and the Chouans, in the greatest misery, and attacked by a contagious disease, abandoned themselves to recriminations, and bitterly accused Puisaye. Still greater was the desperation at Aurai and at Vannes, whither the thousand emigrants taken in arms had been conveyed. Hoche, after conquering them, had withdrawn himself from this melancholy spectacle, to follow up the pursuit of Tinténiac's band, called the red army. The fate of the prisoners no longer concerned him; what could he do for them! The laws existed; he could not annul them. He referred it to the committee of public welfare and to Tallien. Tallien set out immediately, and arrived in Paris on the day preceding the anniversary of the 9th Thermidor. On the morrow was to be held, according to the new fashion adopted, in the very presence of the assembly, a *fête* to commemorate the fall of Robespierre. All the representatives sat in costume; a numerous band played patriotic airs, vocal performers chanted the hymns of Chénier. Courtois read a report of the events of the 9th Thermidor. Tallien then read the report of the affair at Quiberon. They noticed his evident desire to procure for himself a double triumph; nevertheless they loudly applauded his services of that day twelvemonth, and those which he had so recently rendered. In point of fact, his presence had not been without its advantages to Hoche. On the same day there was a banquet at Tallien's, at which the principal Girondists met the Thermidorians. Louvet and Lanjuinais were present. Lanjuinais gave for a toast, "The 9th Thermidor, and the courageous deputies who overthrew tyranny." Tallien gave for a second, "The seventy-three, the twenty-two, the deputies, victims of terror;" Louvet added these words: "*And their intimate connection with the men of the 9th Thermidor.*"

Indeed, there was every reason for their uniting and opposing by their joint efforts the multifarious enemies that had risen against the republic. Great was their joy, especially in considering the danger they might have incurred, if the expedition in the west could have acted in concert with that which the prince of Condé had prepared in the east.

It was necessary to decide upon the fate of the prisoners. Many solicitations were addressed to the committees; but in the present state of things to save them was impossible. The republicans asserted that the government intended to recall the emigrants, restore their property, and consequently restore royalty; the royalists, always presumptuous, maintained the same thing; they said that their friends governed, and they became more audacious the more they hoped. To have shown the least indulgence on this occasion would have been to justify the apprehensions of the one, and the fond hopes of the others. It would have been making the republicans desperate, and encouraging the royalists to the most daring attempts. The committee of public welfare ordered the laws to be put in force, and assuredly there were now no Mountaineers among the committee; but it felt the impossibility of doing otherwise. A commission, which met at Vannes, was directed to distinguish the prisoners enlisted against their will from those that were essentially emigrants. The latter were shot. The soldiers allowed as many of them to escape as they could. Many brave men perished; but they had no right to be astonished at their fate, after they had carried war into their own country and been taken in arms. Had she been less threatened by foes of every description, and especially by their own accomplices, the republic might have pardoned them; under existing circumstances, she could not do so. M. de Sombreuil, though a brave officer, gave way at the moment of death to an impulse unworthy of his courageous bearing. He wrote a letter to commodore Warren, in which he accused Puisaye with all the vehemence of despair. He begged Hoche to send it to the commodore. Although this letter contained a false assertion, Hoche, complying with the requests of a dying man, sent it to the commodore; but replied in a letter contradicting Sombreuil's assertion. "I was," said he, "at the head of Humbert's seven hundred grenadiers, and I declare that no capitulation was ever made." All his contemporaries, to whom the character of the young general was known, have deemed him incapable of falsehood. Eye-witnesses, moreover, confirm his assertion. Sombreuil's letter did the emigrants much mischief as well as Puisaye, and it was judged so far from honourable to the memory of the writer, that it has been asserted that the republicans forged it, an assertion every way worthy of the pitiful stories invented by the emigrants.

While the royalist party had recently experienced so severe a check at Quiberon, another was being prepared for it in Spain. Moncey had once more entered Biscay, taken Bilboa and Vittoria, and was closely pressing Pampeluna. The favourite who governed the court, after having refused at first to entertain an overture for peace made by the French government, at the commencement of the campaign, because he had not been made the agent, decided on negotiating himself, and sent the chevalier d'Yriarte to Bâle. The peace was signed at Bâle with Barthélemy, the envoy of the republic, on the 24th Messidor (July 12), at the very moment of the disasters at Quiberon. The conditions were, the restitution of all conquests France had taken from Spain, and as an equivalent the cession of the Spanish part of Saint Domingo to ourselves. France made great concessions for a mere illusory advantage, for Saint Domingo no longer belonged to any body; but these concessions were dictated by the wisest policy. France could not want any thing the other side of the Pyrenees; she had no interest in weakening Spain; she ought, on the contrary, had it been possible, to have restored to that power the strength she had lost in a conflict so detrimental to the interests of the two nations.

The peace was hailed with the most lively joy by every one who wished well to France and the republic. There was now one more power detached from the coalition, a Bourbon who acknowledged the republic; and there were two disposable armies to send to the Alps, to the west, and to the Rhine. The royalists were in despair. The

Paris agents in particular, were apprehensive lest their intrigues should be divulged; they dreaded a communication of their letters sent to Spain. England would then have seen all that they had said of her; and though that power was loudly blamed for the affair of Quiberon, yet she was now the only one that could afford money; it was necessary therefore to keep on good terms with her, with the intention of cheating her, if it were possible*.

Another not less important success was that gained by the armies of Jourdan and Pichegru. After many delays, it was at length settled that they should cross the Rhine. The French and the Austrian armies came up face to face with one another on the two banks of the river, from Bâle as far as Dusseldorf. The defensive position of the Austrians upon the Rhine was most judiciously chosen. The fortresses of Dusseldorf and Ehrenbreitstein covered their right; Mentz, Manheim, and Philipsburg covered their centre and their left; the Necker and the Main, rising not far from the Danube and running in nearly a parallel direction towards the Rhine, formed two important lines of communication with the hereditary states, brought abundance of supplies, and covered the two flanks of the army that intended to act concentrically towards Mentz. The plan to be followed upon this field of battle was the same for the Austrians as for the French, the one and the other (in the opinion of a great captain and a celebrated critic) should have been inclined to act concentrically between the Main and the Necker. The French armies of Jourdan and Pichegru ought to have attempted to pass the Rhine towards Mentz, no great distance from one another, then to join in the valley of the Main, to separate Clerfait from Wurmser; and to ascend between the Necker and the Main, striving to beat in their turn the two Austrian generals. In like manner, the two Austrian generals ought to have endeavoured to concentrate themselves, in order to debouch by Mentz upon the left bank and to fall upon Jourdan or Pichegru. If they had been anticipated, if the Rhine had been crossed at one point, they should have concentrated themselves between the Necker and the Main, to have prevented the junction of the two French armies, and to have taken some favourable opportunity to fall upon one or the other. The Austrian generals had every opportunity for taking the initiative, for they were in possession of Mentz, and could debouch on the left bank whenever they pleased.

The French took the initiative. After considerable delays, the Dutch barks at last got up as high as Dusseldorf, and Jourdan prepared to cross the Rhine. On the 20th Fructidor (September 6), he crossed over at Eichelcamp, Dusseldorf, and Neuwied, by a very bold manœuvre; he advanced by the road from Dusseldorf to Frankfort, between the line of the Prussian neutrality and the Rhine, and arrived near the Lahn on the fourth complementary day* (September 20). At the same moment, Pichegru had orders to attempt the passage on the Upper Rhine, and to summon Manheim to surrender. That flourishing city, threatened with a bombardment, surrendered, contrary to all expectation, on the fourth complementary day (September 20). From that moment the French had all the advantage. Pichegru therefore being established at Manheim, had to draw his whole army thither, and to effect a junction with Jourdan in the valley of the Main. They would then be able to cut off the two Austrian generals, and to act concentrically between the Main and the Neckar. It was of extreme importance to draw Jourdan from his position between the line of neutrality and the Rhine, for his army not having the means of sufficient conveyance for its provisions, and not being able to treat the country as that of an enemy, his army would in all probability soon be in want of actual necessaries if he did not march in advance.

Thus at this moment every thing went well with the republic. Peace with Spain, the destruction of the expedition fitted out by England for the coast of Brittany, the passage of the Rhine, and the successful attacks in Germany. The republic possessed all these advantages at once. It was for her generals and her government to take advantage of so many propitious events.

* The 5th volume of Puisaye proves this.

* These days were at first termed *sans-culottides*, a term the reader will perceive obviously distasteful at this period. *Ante*, p. 370, col. 2. *Trans.*

CHAPTER XXXI.

INTRIGUES OF THE ROYALIST PARTY IN THE SECTIONS.—RETURN OF THE EMIGRANTS. PERSECUTION OF THE PATRIOT PARTY.—THE DIRECTORIAL CONSTITUTION, CALLED OF THE YEAR III., AND THE DECREES OF THE 5TH AND 13TH FRUCTIDOR.—THE CONSTITUTION AND DECREES ACCEPTED BY THE PRIMARY ASSEMBLIES OF FRANCE —THE SECTIONS OF PARIS REBEL AGAINST THE DECREES OF FRUCTIDOR AND AGAINST THE CONVENTION. THE EVENTS OF 13 VENDÉMIAIRE, AND DEFEAT OF THE INSURGENT SECTIONS.—THE NATIONAL CONVENTION CLOSED ITS SITTINGS.

Beaten on the frontiers, and abandoned by the court of Spain, on whom it placed the greatest reliance, the royalist party was reduced to intrigue at home; and it must be confessed that at this moment, Paris offered a wide field for their intrigues. The work of the constitution was advancing; the time when the convention was to resign her powers, when France should meet to elect fresh representatives, when a new assembly should supply the place of that which had so long reigned, was more favourable than any other for secret counter-revolutionary designs.

The most active passions were fermenting in the sections of Paris. There were no royalists there,

but the sections served the cause of royalty without intending it. They had made a point of opposing the Terrorists; they had animated themselves by the conflict; they also wanted to persecute, and they were embittered against the convention, who would not allow the persecution to be pushed to great lengths. They were always ready to remember that terror had issued from her body; they required at her hands a constitution and laws, and the termination of the long dictatorship she had exercised. Most of those who called for this cared nought whatever for the Bourbons. These men were the wealthy *tiers-état* of 1789; these were the merchants, shopkeepers, landowners, advocates, and writers, who wished at length for the establishment of the laws and the enjoyment of their rights; there were also the young men, who were sincerely republican, but blinded by their zeal against the revolutionary system; there were also many ambitious men, newspaper writers, or speakers in the sections, who, to ensure a place for themselves, wanted that the convention should retire before them: behind this mass the royalists concealed themselves. Among these were to be found some few emigrants, some few returned priests, some few creatures of the old court who had lost their places, and many time-serving and cowardly persons, who dreaded a troublous time of liberty. These last did not frequent the sections, but the former attended them regularly, and employed all possible means to agitate them. The instructions given by the royalist agents to their creatures was to adopt the language of the sectionists, to demand the same things, to insist like them on the punishment of the Terrorists, the completion of the constitution, the trial of the Mountaineer deputies, but yet to call for all these things with greater violence than necessary, so as to compromise the sections with the convention, and to provoke new commotions, for every commotion was a chance for them, and would at any rate raise a disgust against so tumultuous a republic.

Fortunately such proceedings were not practicable except at Paris, for that is always the most agitated city in France; that is the place where public concerns are discussed with most warmth, there it is that people have the desire and the pretension of influencing the government, and that is the place where opposition always emanates. Except at Lyons, Marseilles, and Toulon, where men were slaughtering one another, the rest of France took infinitely less share in these political agitations than the sections of Paris.

To all that they said, or caused to be said, in the sections, the intriguers in the service of royalism added pamphlets and articles in the newspapers. According to their usual mode, they uttered falsehoods, assumed an importance they did not possess, and wrote abroad, stating that they had seduced the principal leaders of the government. It was from the utterance of these falsehoods that they procured money, and that was how they had recently obtained some thousand pounds sterling from England. It is nevertheless certain that if they had not gained either Tallien or Hoche, as they alleged, they had at least gained over some convention folks, perhaps two or three. Rovère and Saladin were mentioned as two fiery revolutionists, who had now become violent reactionists. It is also believed that they had influenced by more delicate means some few of those deputies holding middle opinions, who possessed some inclination towards a representative monarchy, that is, towards a Bourbon professedly bound by laws after the English notion. To Pichegru had been offered a mansion, money, and cannon; to some few legislators or members of the committees, it may have been said, "France is too extensive to be a republic; she would be much happier with a king, responsible ministers, hereditary peers, and deputies." This idea, without being suggested, would naturally occur to more than one person, especially to those who were qualified to become deputies or hereditary peers. MM. Lanjuinais and Boissy d'Anglas, Henri Larivière and Lesage (of Eure and Loire), were then looked upon as royalists at heart.

We thus see that the means of the agents were not very powerful; but they were quite sufficient to disturb the public tranquillity, to unsettle opinions, and especially to recal to the memory of the French those Bourbons, the only enemies the republic still had, and whom its arms had not been able to conquer, because recollections are not to be destroyed with bayonets.

Among the seventy-three there was more than one monarchist; but in general they were republicans. The Girondists were all or nearly all of them the same. Nevertheless the counter-revolutionary journals praised them with great warmth, and had thus succeeded in rendering them suspected with the Thermidorians. To protect themselves against these eulogies, the seventy-three and the twenty-two protested their attachment to the republic; for at that time nobody durst speak with apathy of the republic. What a frightful contradiction would it have been, in fact, if people had not wished it well, to have sacrificed so much blood and treasure for its establishment, to have immolated thousands of Frenchmen either in civil or in foreign war! It was therefore a matter of expedience to wish the republic well, or at least to say so. However, notwithstanding these protestations, the Thermidorians were distrustful; they reckoned only upon M. Daunou, whose integrity and strict principles were well known, and on Louvet, whose ardent mind had continued to be republican. The latter, indeed, after losing so many illustrious friends, and running so many risks, did not comprehend that all this could be in vain; he had no idea that so many valuable lives had been sacrificed to bring about royalty; he had cordially joined the Thermidorians. The Thermidorians united themselves from day to day with the Mountaineers, with that mass of unshaken republicans, a very great number of whom they had sacrificed.

They desired, in the first place, that some course should be taken against the return of the emigrants, who continued to make their appearance in shoals, some with false passports and by fictitious names, others under the pretext of coming to solicit their erasure from the lists. Almost every one of them produced false certificates of residence, said that they had not been out of France, and had merely concealed themselves, or that they had been proceeded against only on account of the events of the 31st of May. Under the pretence of memorializing the committee of general safety, they filled Paris, and

some of them contributed to the agitations of the sections. Among the most distinguished personages who had returned to Paris was Madame de Stäel, who had recently made her appearance in France in company with her husband, the ambassador of Sweden. She had thrown open her withdrawing room, where she indulged her natural ability to display her brilliant talents. A republic was far from unacceptable to the firmness of her character, but she would not have been reconciled to it unless she had seen her proscribed friends take a shining part therein, and never more see those revolutionists who doubtless passed for energetic men, but who were gross men and deficient in intellect. Everybody was willing enough to receive at their hands the salvation of the republic, but at the same time desirous to repel them at once from taking any share in the debates or the government. Foreigners of distinction, all the ambassadors, the men of letters most celebrated for their wit, met at the house of Madame de Stäel. It was no longer Madame Tallien's withdrawing room, but Madame de Stäel's that now attracted everybody's regard, and this fact of itself demonstrated the change that French society had undergone during the last six months. It was said that Madame de Stäel interceded for the emigrants; it was asserted that she wanted the recall of Narbonne, Jaucourt, and several others. Legendre denounced her from the tribune in form. Complaints were made in the newspapers of the influence which exclusive societies, nestling around the foreign ambassadors, wanted to exercise, and in short the suspension of the erasures from the lists was demanded. The Thermidorians, moreover, caused it to be further decreed, that every emigrant, returned for the purpose of soliciting the erasure of his name from the lists, was bound to repair to his commune, and there await the decision of the committee of general safety *. They expected by this measure to rid the capital of a multitude of intriguers, who contributed to the general agitation.

The Thermidorians wished at the same time to put a stop to the persecutions against the patriots; they had, through the committee of general safety, liberated Pache, Bouchotte, and the notorious Héron, and many others. It must be admitted, that they might have made a better selection than this last for the purpose of doing justice to the patriots. The sections had, as we have seen, already presented petitions on the subject of these discharges; they now petitioned again. The committees replied, that the patriots who were in confinement ought to be brought at once to trial, and not be detained any longer if they were innocent. To propose their trial was, in fact, to propose their discharge, for their offences were generally those political offences indefinable in their very nature. With the exception of some members of the revolutionary committees, rendered notorious by atrocious excesses, the greater number could not legally be condemned. Several sections came to desire that a few days' longer sitting should be granted them, that they might collect evidence to justify the apprehension and the disarming of those whom they had confined; they stated that, at the first moment they had not been able either to inquire for proofs or to assign causes; but they declared their readiness to furnish them. No attention was paid to these propositions, which cloaked the desire to assemble together, and to obtain the further sittings; and the draught of a decree for bringing to trial the imprisoned patriots was demanded from the committees.

A violent dispute arose concerning this draught decree. Some were for sending the patriots before the departimental tribunals; others suspecting local influences, were opposed to this mode of trial, and proposed that a commission of twelve members should be chosen from among the convention, to be the triers of the imprisoned persons, to release those against whom the charges preferred were insufficient, and to send the others before the criminal tribunal. They alleged that this commission, disconnected with the animosities that agitated the departments, would do more substantial justice, and would not confound the patriots compromised by the ardour of their zeal with the guilty men who had participated in the cruelties of the decemviral tyranny. All the determined enemies of the patriots rose up against the idea of this commission, which was about to act just in the same way as the committee of general safety renewed after the 9th Thermidor had done, namely, to discharge them *en masse*. They asked how it was possible that a commission of twelve members could try twenty or twenty-five thousand cases. The only answer made to this was, that they would follow the example of the committee of general safety, who had tried eighty or one hundred thousand when the prisons were opened. But this was the very mode of trial that was found fault with. After a debate which lasted several days, intermingled with petitions, every succeeding one bolder than the previous, it was at length settled that the patriots should be tried by the tribunals of the departments, and the decree was sent back to the committees to qualify some of its secondary arrangements. It was found necessary also to consent to the continuation of the report concerning the deputies compromised in regard to their missions. The assembly decreed the arrest * of Lequinio, Lanot, Lefiot, Dupin, Bô, Piorey, Maxieu, Chaudon-Rousseau, Laplanche, and Fouché; proceedings were also commenced against Lebon. At this moment the convention had as many of its members in prison as in the time of terror. Thus the advocates of clemency had nothing to regret, and had returned evil for evil.

The constitution had been presented by the commission of eleven. It was discussed during the three months of Messidor, Thermidor, and Fructidor, year III., and was decreed article by article with very little alteration. Its authors were Lesage, Daunou, Boissy d'Anglas, Creuzé-Latouche, Berlier, Louvet, Larévellière-Lépeaux, Lanjuinais, Durand-Maillane, Baudin (of the Ardennes), and Thibaudeau. Sieyès did not desire to become a member of that commission; for in regard to his notions as to what a constitution ought to be, he was more dogmatic on that point than on any thing else. Constitutions were the sole topic of reflexions that had occupied his whole life. They were his peculiar study. He had one ready made

* Decree of the 16th August.

* Decrees of the 8th and 9th August, 1795.

in his head, and he was not a man to sacrifice it. He came, therefore, to propose it in his own name, and apart from the commission. The assembly, out of respect for his genius, were willing enough to hear him, but did not adopt his draught of a constitution. We shall see it brought forward on a subsequent occasion, and it will then be time to make the reader acquainted with that conception, an event in the history of the human understanding. That which was adopted kept pace with the progress the public mind had made. In 1791, men were yet such novices, and so good-natured withal, that they could not conceive the existence of an aristocratic body controlling the will of the national representation, and they had nevertheless admitted and retained with respect, nay, almost with affection, the royal power. On reflexion, however, they would have seen that an aristocratic body belongs to all countries, and that it is more particularly adapted to republics; that a great state may do very well without a king, but never without a senate. In 1795 they had just witnessed the disorders to which a single assembly is exposed, and they consented to the establishment of a legislative body divided into two assemblies; they were then less irritated against aristocracy than against royalty, because, in fact, they dreaded the latter still more. Accordingly they took greater care to protect themselves against it in the formation of an executive power. There was in the commission a monarchical party, consisting of Lesage, Lanjuinais, Durand-Maillane, and Boissy d'Anglas. This party proposed a president; it was refused. "Some day, perhaps," said Louvet, "they will appoint a Bourbon." Baudin (of the Ardennes) and Daunou proposed two consuls; others wanted three. The preference was given to five directors, deciding by a majority. There was not imparted to this executive power any one of the essential prerogatives of royalty, such as inviolability, the sanction of the laws, the judicial power, or the right of peace and war. It possessed the mere inviolability of the deputies, the promulgation and the execution of the laws, the conduct but not the voting of war, and the negotiation and not the ratification of treaties.

Such was the basis on which the directorial constitution was founded. The assembly in consequence decreed:

A council called *the Five Hundred*, composed of five hundred members, of at least thirty years of age, having solely the right of proposing laws, renewing itself as to one-third of its members every year;

A council called *the Ancients*, composed of two hundred and fifty members, of at least forty years of age, all either widowers or married, having the power to give the final assent (*sanction*) to laws, renewing itself also by one-third;

Lastly, An executive Directory, composed of five members, deciding by a majority, renewing itself annually by one-fifth, possessing responsible ministers, promulgating the laws and enforcing their execution, having the disposal of the land and naval forces, the foreign affairs, the authority of repelling the first hostilities, but not the power to make war without the consent of the legislative body, negotiating treaties and submitting them to the ratification of the legislative body, excepting secret articles, which it should have the authority to stipulate, provided they were not inconsistent with or repugnant to the open articles.

All these powers were appointed in the manner following:

All citizens of the age of twenty-one years were to meet as of right in primary assembly on every first day of the month of Prairial and nominate electoral assemblies. These electoral assemblies were to meet every 20th Prairial, and nominate the two councils; and the two councils to nominate the directory. It was considered that the executive power, being nominated by the legislative power, would be more dependent upon it; it was thus settled by a reason deduced from circumstances. The republic being not as yet identified with the ordinary feelings of France, and being rather an opinion of men who had gained experience, or else persons compromised in the revolution, than a general sentiment, it was not considered expedient to entrust the formation of the executive power to the masses. It was considered therefore, that in the first years especially, the authors of the revolution, who would naturally predominate in the legislative body, would choose directors well fitted for the defence of their own production.

The judicial authority was committed to elective judges. Justices of the peace were instituted. A civil tribunal was established in each department, trying as a court of the first instance the causes of the department, and in appeal those of the contiguous departments. There was added a criminal court, composed of five judges and a jury.

There were to be no communal assemblies, but municipal and departmental administrations, composed of three, five, or more members, according to the population: they were to be formed by way of election. Experience caused the adoption of minor and also more important arrangements. Thus the legislative body itself designated its seat, and might transfer it to the commune it chose to select. No law could be discussed without three previous readings, unless it were considered to be an emergent measure, and acknowledged as such by the council of the ancients. This was a method of preventing those very sudden resolutions, so speedily rescinded, which the convention had so frequently taken. Lastly, every society calling itself popular, holding its sittings in public, with secretary, tribunes, and corresponding societies in connection with it, was prohibited. The press was entirely free; the emigrants were banished for ever from the territory of the republic; the national domains were irrevocably secured to the purchasers; all religions were declared tolerated, although not recognized or paid by the state.

Such was the constitution by which it was hoped to maintain France as a republic. One important question presented itself: the constituent assembly, from an ostentation of disinterestedness, had excluded itself from the new legislative body, who became its substitute; would the convention do the same? It must be admitted that such a determination would have been a great miscarriage. Among a fickle people, who, after living fourteen centuries under monarchy, had overthrown it in a moment of enthusiasm, the republic was not so identified with their habits that its establishment could be left to the mere course of things. The

revolution could not be well defended except by its originators. The convention was chiefly composed of constituents and members of the legislative assembly: she comprehended the men who had abolished the ancient feudal constitution on the 14th of July and the 4th of August, 1789, who had overturned the throne on the 10th of August, who had on the 21st of January sacrificed the head of the Bourbon dynasty, and who had for three years been making unparalleled efforts against all Europe to maintain their institution; they alone were capable of effectually defending the revolution, now rendered durable in the directorial constitution. Thus, without ostentatiously priding themselves upon a vain disinterestedness, they decreed on the 5th Fructidor (August 22nd), that the new legislative body should be composed of two-thirds of the convention, and that no more than a new third should be elected. The question was to ascertain whether the convention should herself designate the two-thirds to be retained, or whether she would permit that duty to devolve upon the electoral assemblies. After a tremendous dispute, it was agreed on the 13th Fructidor (August 30th), that the electoral assemblies should undertake this selection. It was settled that the primary assemblies should meet on the 20th Fructidor (September 6), to accept the constitution as well as the two decrees of the 5th and the 13th Fructidor. Moreover, it was decreed, that after having given their votes upon the constitution and the decrees, the primary assemblies should again meet and should at once make, that is to say in the year III. (1795) the elections for the 1st Prairial in the following year. The convention by this announced her intention of resigning the dictatorship, and of putting the constitution into operation. She decreed also that the armies, although ordinarily deprived of the right of deliberating, should nevertheless assemble on the field of battle they should then occupy, for the purpose of voting the constitution. It was but proper, it was said, that those who had to defend the constitution should also be allowed to assent thereto. This was giving the armies an interest in the revolution by their very vote.

These resolutions had been hardly adopted before the enemies of the convention, so numerous and so diverse, discovered how deeply they were mortified by them. The greatest part of them cared but little about the constitution. Any constitution whatever would have suited them, provided it allowed a general renewal of all the members of the government. The royalists wished for this renewal, to produce disturbance, to bring together the greatest possible number of persons of their choice, and to make the republic herself subservient to the cause of royalty: they wished for this renewal, more especially in order to get rid of the conventionalists, so deeply interested in opposing counter-revolution, and to bring forward new men, inexperienced, not compromised, and more easy to be led. Many literary characters, writers, unknown persons eager to start upon the career of politics, not from a spirit of counter-revolution, but from personal ambition, were also desirous of this complete renewal, so as to have a greater number of places open for them to occupy. Both the one and the other dispersed themselves among the sections, and excited them against the decrees. The convention, they said, wanted to keep herself for ever in power; she talked of the rights of the people, and yet postponed the exercise of them for an indefinite period; she arbitrarily settled their election, and would not permit them to prefer the men who had remained unspotted from crime; she wanted to retain by force a majority composed of men who had covered France with scaffolds. Thus, added they, the new legislature would not be freed from the terrorists; thus it was that France would not be perfectly assured in respect of her future state, and could not rest in the assurance of never witnessing the revival of a horrible system. These declamations had their effect upon the minds of the many: the entire of the trading community of the sections, who were content with the new institutions such as they were given to them, but who had an excessive dread of the return of terror; sincere but unreflecting men, who dreamt of a faultless republic, and who desired to place a new and spotless generation in power; young men enamoured of the same chimeras, the imaginations of many captivated with novelty, saw with the most lively regret the convention thus keep itself on foot for two or three years. The tribe of newspaper writers was in commotion. A great number of men who possessed some consideration in literature, and who had figured in the former assemblies, appeared in the tribunes of the sections. MM. Suard, Morellet, Lacretelle junior, Fiévée, Vaublanc, Pastoret, Dupont de Nemours, Quatremère de Quincy, Delalot, the fiery convert Laharpe, general Miranda, who had escaped from the prisons in which he had been confined for his conduct at Neerwinden, the Spaniard Marchenna, withdrawn from the proscription of his friends the Girondists, and Lemaitre, the head of the royalist agency, distinguished themselves by pamphlets or by vehement speeches in the sections: the dissatisfaction was universal.

The plan to be pursued was quite simple; it was merely to accept the constitution, and reject the decrees. This was what was proposed to be done in Paris, and what all the sections in France were exhorted to do also. But the intriguers who agitated the sections, and who wished to urge opposition forward to insurrection, desired a more complicated plan. Their object was that the primary assemblies, after they had accepted the constitution, and rejected the decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor, should make themselves permanent; that they should declare the powers of the convention expired, and the electoral assemblies free to choose their deputies from wheresoever they pleased; lastly, that they should not consent to separate till after the installation of the new legislative body. The agents of Lemaitre acquainted the environs of Paris with this plan; they wrote to Normandy, where there was great intriguing in favour of the constitution of 1791, to Brittany, to the Gironde, and to every quarter with which they had correspondences. One of their letters was seized and made public from the tribune. The convention saw without alarm the preparations making against her, and awaited with calmness the decision of the primary assemblies of all France, certain that the majority would declare itself in her favour. Nevertheless, suspecting the intention of a new conflict, she ordered some troops to

advance, and collected them in the camp of Sablons, near Paris.

The section of Lepelletier, formerly Saint-Thomas, could not fail to distinguish itself on this occasion: this section came with those of the Mail, the Butte-des-Moulins, the Champs-Elysées, and the Theatre-Français (the Odéon), to address petitions to the assembly. They all concurred in asking whether the Parisians had done any thing to cause a forfeiture of her regard, or whether she had her misgivings concerning them to induce them to call in the military; they complained of the alleged violence committed against their election, and made use of these insolent expressions: "Make yourself worthy of our choice, and do not control it." The convention replied in a firm manner to all these addresses, and merely said that she awaited with respect the manifestation of the national will, that she would submit thereto so soon as it should be known, and that she would also compel every one else to submit themselves to the same authority.

What the people most desired was, to establish a central point for communicating with all the sections, so as to impart to them one common impulsive movement, and thus to organize the insurrection. They had sufficient precedents before their eyes to know that this was the first thing to be considered. The section of Lepelletier constituted itself the centre; it had a right to this honour, for it had always been the most ardent. This section commenced by publishing an act of indemnity, as ill-judged as it was worthless. The powers of the constituent body, it said, ceased their action when the sovereign people were present; the primary assemblies represented the sovereign people; the primary assemblies had a right to express any opinion whatever concerning the constitution and the decrees; they were under the safeguard of each other; and they owed to one another the reciprocal guarantee of their independence. Nobody could deny this, saving one qualification which it was necessary to add to these maxims; namely, that the constituent body retained its powers till the decision of the majority was known. Moreover, these idle expressions, which really had nothing to do with the subject, were but a means for arriving at some other conclusion. The section of Lepelletier proposed to the forty-eight sections of Paris to nominate each of them a commissioner, to express the sentiments of the citizens of the capital upon the constitution and the decrees. Here commenced the infraction of the laws; for the primary assemblies were forbidden to communicate with, and to send commissioners or addresses to one another. The convention quashed the resolution, and declared that it should consider its execution as an attempt upon the public safety.

The sections being not yet sufficiently emboldened gave way, and set about collecting the votes on the constitution and the decrees. They began by expelling, without any legal form, the patriots who came to vote as one of their body. In some, they were merely put outside the hall-door; in others, it was notified to them by placards that they had better stay at home, for if they made their appearance at the section, they would be ignominiously expelled. The individuals thus deprived of the exercise of their rights were very numerous; they thronged to the convention to appeal against the violence that was done them. The convention disapproved of the conduct of the sections, but refused to interfere, that she might not appear to canvass for votes, and that the very abuse might prove the freedom of the deliberation. The patriots, driven from their sections, had sought refuge in the galleries of the convention; they occupied them in great numbers, and daily solicited the committees to restore their arms, declaring that they were ready to use them in defence of the republic.

All the sections of Paris, excepting the Quinze-Vingts, accepted the constitution and rejected the decrees. It was by no means the same in the rest of France. The opposition, as it always happens, was less violent in the provinces than in the capital. The royalists, the intriguers, and the ambitious men who had an interest in pressing for the renewal of the legislative body and the government, possessed no numerical strength save at Paris; accordingly, in the provinces, the assemblies were orderly, although perfectly free; they adopted the constitution almost unanimously, and the decrees by a great majority. As for the armies, they received the constitution with enthusiasm in Brittany and La Vendée, at the Alps, and on the Rhine. They were filled with men devoted to the revolution, and attached to her by the very sacrifices which they had made on her account. The inveterate hatred that was manifested in Paris against the revolutionary government was wholly unknown in the armies. The requisitionists of 1793, of whom they were chiefly composed, cherished the glorious memory of that famous committee, who had maintained and subsisted them so far better than the new government. Separated from private life, accustomed to defy hardships and death, supported by glory and the bubble reputation, they still possessed that enthusiasm which in the interior of France had begun to disperse; they were proud of calling themselves the soldiers of a republic whom they had defended against all the kings of Europe, and who was, in some measure, their production. The army of the Sambre and Meuse, commanded by Jourdan, shared the noble sentiments of its brave chief. It was this army who had been conqueror at Watignies, and raised the blockade of Maubeuge; this was the army who had conquered at Fleurus, and given Belgium to France; in short, it was this army who, by the victories of the Ourthe and the Roer, had just given to France the line of the Rhine. This army who deserved so well of the republic, was also the most attached to her. This army, after recently crossing the Rhine, halted on the field of battle, and sixty thousand men were seen accepting at once the new republican constitution.

These tidings arriving in due course at Paris, rejoiced the convention, and deeply mortified the sectionists. Every day they came to present addresses, wherein they declared the vote of their assembly, and announced with insulting joy that the constitution was accepted, and the decrees were rejected. The patriots, closely packed in the galleries, groaned; but presently the reports sent by the departments were read, almost all announced the acceptance of the constitution and of the decrees. The patriots then launched forth into most vocife-

rous applause, and by their peals of gladness nettled the petitioners of the sections seated at the bar. The latter end of Fructidor was spent in scenes of this nature. At length, on the first Vendémiaire, year IV. (September 23, 1795,) the general result of the votes was proclaimed.

The constitution was accepted by the almost unanimous assent of the votes, and the decrees by an immense majority. Some thousands of votes, however, had been given against the decrees, and here and there some few had ventured to demand a king: this was of itself a sufficient proof that the utmost freedom had prevailed in the primary assemblies. On the same day, the convention solemnly declared that the constitution and the decrees were laws of the state. This declaration was followed by prolonged cheering. The convention next decreed that the primary assemblies who had not yet named their electors should finish their nomination before the 10th Vendémiaire (October 2); that the electoral assemblies should meet on the 20th, and conclude their operations at latest by the 29th (October 21); and lastly, that the new legislative body should meet on the 15th Brumaire (November 6.)

The sectionists were thunder-struck at this intelligence. They had hopes up to the last moment that France would give a vote similar to that of Paris, and that they should be delivered from what they called the two thirds; but the last decree deprived them entirely of hope. Affecting to believe that there had not been a correct casting up of the votes, they sent commissioners to the committee of decrees to verify the returns. This insolent application was not unfavourably received. The committee consented to show them the returns, and to allow them to cast up the votes; they found them correct. After they had no longer this unlucky objection of a mistake in casting up, or a wilful error, they had nothing left for it but insurrection. But this was a violent determination, and could not readily be resolved upon. The ambitious parties who wanted the removal of the men of the revolution, that they might take their place in the republican government; the young men, who were anxious to display their courage, and who most of them had served in the army; and lastly, the royalists, who had no other resource than an attack by main force, could cheerfully expose themselves to the chance of a battle; but that mass of peaceable individuals, drawn in to figure in the sections from fear of the terrorists rather than from political courage, felt considerable difficulty in making up their minds. In the first place, the insurrection was not in accordance with their principles. How, in fact, could the enemies of anarchy attack the established and recognized authority? The parties, it is true, did not trouble themselves much as to inconsistencies: but how could tradesmen, who had never been out of their shops or their counting-houses, dare to attack troops of the line, provided with cannon? However, the intriguing royalists and the ambitious thrust themselves into the sections, talked of public benefit and honour, said that there was no safety in being governed any longer by conventionalists, that they should be always exposed to terrorism; that, besides, it was disgraceful to give in, and to suffer themselves to be trampled upon. They appealed to their self-conceit. The young men who had come back from the armies blustered a great deal, hurried the timid along, and prevented them from openly expressing their apprehensions; and every preparation was made for a decisive stroke. Groups of young men paraded the streets, shouting, *Down with the two thirds!* When the soldiers of the convention attempted to disperse them, and to prevent them from uttering seditious cries, they replied with a volley of musketry. There were different riots, and considerable firing even in the middle of the Palais Royal.

Lemaitre and his colleagues, perceiving the success of their plans, had brought several Chouan chiefs and a certain number of emigrants to Paris; they kept them concealed, and were only waiting for the first signal to make them appear. They had succeeded in exciting commotions at Orleans, Chartres, Dreux, Verneuil, and Nonancourt. At Chartres, a representative, Letellier, being unable to quell a riot, had blown out his brains. Although these disturbances had been repressed, any advantage obtained in Paris might induce a general movement. Nothing was omitted that had such a tendency, and very shortly the success of the conspirators appeared complete.

The plan of the insurrection had not been yet determined upon; but the honest tradesmen of Paris suffered themselves by degrees to be led away by the young men and the intriguers. Proceeding from bravado to bravado, they soon found themselves inextricably involved. The section of Lepelletier was always the most agitated. The first thing to be done, before consulting as to any attempt, was, as we have observed, to establish a central management. They had long been considering how this could be done. It was thought that the assembly of the electors, chosen by all the primary assemblies of Paris, might become the central authority; but, according to the late decree, this assembly was not to meet before the 20th, and they had no inclination to wait so long. The section of Lepelletier then devised a resolution, based on a very extraordinary reason. The constitution, it said, interposed no greater an interval than twenty days between the meeting of the primary assemblies and that of the electoral assemblies. The primary assemblies had met on this one occasion on the 20th Fructidor, the electoral assemblies therefore ought to meet on the 10th Vendémiaire. Now the convention had fixed this meeting for the 20th; but that was evidently done for the purpose of still longer postponing the carrying of the constitution into effect, and the distribution of power among the new third. Consequently, and in order to protect the rights of the citizens, the section of Lepelletier passed a resolution that the electors already nominated should meet forthwith; the section communicated this resolution to the other sections, in order to obtain their approval. It was approved by several of them. The meeting was fixed for the 11th, at the Théâtre-Français (the Odéon).

On the 11th Vendémiaire (October 3), a party of the electors met in the theatre, under the protection of some battalions of the national guard. A multitude of inquisitive persons collected in the Place de L'Odéon, and soon formed a considerable

concourse. The committees of general safety and public welfare, and the three representatives, who, since the 4th Prairial, had retained the direction of the armed force, always met together upon important occasions. They hastened to the convention to give information respecting this first step, which evidently denoted some insurrectional design. The convention had met to hold a funeral solemnity in the hall of session in honour of the unfortunate Girondists. A motion was made to postpone the ceremony; Tallien opposed it; he said that it would be unworthy of the assembly to permit an interruption, and that the assembly ought to attend to its accustomed duties amidst all dangers. A decree was issued purporting to be an order for the dispersion of any meeting of electors formed illegally, or before the lawful time, or for a purpose foreign to its electoral functions. To encourage those who might feel disposed to withdraw, it was added to the decree, that all those who had been drawn into illegal proceedings, and who should return immediately to their duty, should be saved from prosecution. Instantly some police officers, escorted by no more than six dragoons, were despatched to the Place de L'Odéon to proclaim the decree. The committees were anxious to avoid as much as possible strong measures. The crowd had increased at the Odeon, particularly towards night. The interior of the theatre was badly lighted: a multitude of sectionists filled the boxes; those who took an active part in the incidents were walking about on the stage in an agitated manner. They durst neither discuss or settle a single thing. On learning the arrival of the officers ordered to read the decree, all ran out to the Place de L'Odéon. The mob already surrounded them; it rushed upon them, extinguished the torches they bore, and compelled the dragoons to run away. They then went back into the theatre, congratulating themselves on this advantage; they made speeches; they took an oath to defend themselves against tyranny, but no measure was taken in support of the decisive step they had just then taken. The night advanced, many of those who were attracted by curiosity and the sectionists withdrew: the theatre got gradually thinner, and ended by being entirely abandoned on the approach of the armed force that soon came up. In point of fact, the committees had ordered general Menou, appointed since the 4th Prairial commander-in-chief of the army of the interior, to cause a column from the camp of Sablons to advance. This column came up with two pieces of cannon, and found not a soul either on the place or in the theatre of the Odéon.

This scene, though without result, had nevertheless produced a great sensation. The sectionists had been trying their strength, and had mustered some courage, as is always the case after a first extravagance. The convention and her partisans had beheld with dismay the occurrences of that day, and more ready to give credit to their adversaries for designs, than their adversaries were to form them, they had no longer any doubt of the insurrection. The patriots, dissatisfied with the convention, who had treated them so roughly, but who in the plenitude of their ardour felt that they ought to sacrifice their resentments to their cause, that very same night ran in crowds to the committees to offer their services and to apply for arms. Some had been let out of the prisons only on the preceding day, others had just been excluded from the primary assemblies: all of them had the strongest reason for their zeal. To these were joined a great number of officers struck out of the army list by Aubry, the reactionist. The Thermidorians constantly predominating in the committees, and entirely reconciled with the Mountain, did not hesitate to accept the offers of the patriots. Their opinion was supported by more than one Girondist. Louvet, at one of the meetings that had taken place at the house of a common friend of the Girondist and the Thermidorians, had already proposed to arm the faubourgs again, and even to let loose the Jacobins once more; but yet to imprison them again, should such a course become necessary. They no longer hesitated to deliver arms to all the citizens who applied for them; and they gave them for their officers those who were at the moment in Paris unattached; the old and brave general Berruyer was appointed to command them. This arming took place on the same morning of the 12th. The news of this spread immediately through all the quarters of Paris. This was an excellent pretext for the agitators of the sections, whose object was to compromise the peaceful citizens of Paris. The convention meant, they said, to renew the reign of terror, she had just been arming the terrorists again; she was about to let them loose upon quiet peaceable folks; property and person were no longer safe; they must have resort to arms to defend themselves. In fact, the sections of Lepelletier, the Butte-des-Moulins, the Contrat-Social, the Theatre-Français, the Luxembourg, the Rue Poissonnière, Brutus, and the Temple, declared themselves in rebellion, beat the generale in their quarters, and enjoined all the citizens of the national guard to join their battalions and to maintain the public safety, threatened by the terrorists. The section of Lepelletier made its sittings permanent, and became the centre of all the counter-revolutionary intrigues. The drums and the speech-makers of the sections dispersed themselves throughout Paris with singular audacity, and gave the signal for a general rising. The citizens, thus excited by the reports that were circulated, repaired in arms to their sections, ready to comply with all the suggestions of an imprudent youth and perfidious faction.

The convention immediately declared her sittings permanent, and enjoined her committees to watch over the public safety and provide for the execution of her decrees. She repealed the law that enjoined the disarming of the patriots, and thus legalized the measures adopted by her committees; but at the same time she issued a proclamation to tranquillize the inhabitants of Paris, and to give them confidence in her intentions, and in the patriotism of the men to whom she had just restored their arms.

The committees, seeing that the section of Lepelletier was becoming the focus of all intrigues, and that it would probably soon be the headquarters of the rebels, determined that this section should be surrounded and disarmed that very day. Menou again received orders to leave Sablons with a regiment of troops and cannon. This general Menou, a good officer, a kind-hearted and

moderate citizen, had experienced a very troubled and laborious life during the revolution. Ordered to fight in La Vendée, he had been made the butt of all the annoyances of the Ronsin party. Taken to Paris, and threatened with a trial, nothing but the events of the 9th Thermidor saved his life. Appointed general of the army of the interior the 4th Prairial, and ordered to march to the faubourgs, he had then had to fight men who were his natural enemies, who were moreover condemned by public opinion, who in fact, by their energy troubled themselves too little about sacrificing the lives of others for any one to be very scrupulous about sacrificing theirs; but on this occasion it was the flower of the capital, it was the youth of the best families, it was in short the class that dictates public opinion, that he had to fire upon with grape shot, if it would persist in its imprudent course. He was therefore in a cruel perplexity, as the weak man almost always is, who knows not either to resign his place, or make up his mind to execute his orders. He set his columns in motion very late; he let the sections proclaim whatever they liked during the whole day of the 12th; he then began secretly to parley with some of their leaders instead of doing his duty; he even declared to the three representatives to whom the direction of the armed force was confided, that he would not have the battalion of the patriots under his command. The representatives replied that this battalion was under the exclusive command of general Berruyer. They urged him to put himself in motion, without yet reporting his delay and want of firmness to the two committees. They observed, moreover, the like repugnance in more than one officer, and among others in the two generals of brigade, Despierre and Debar, who pretending illness, were not at their posts. At length, towards night, Menou advanced, with Laporte, the representative, upon the section of Lepelletier. It was sitting at the convent of the Filles-Saint-Thomas, which has since given place to the handsome edifice of the exchange. Menou repaired thither by the Rue Vivienne. He packed his infantry, his cavalry, and his artillery, all together in that street, and placed himself in a position, where he could have hardly fought at all, encompassed by the multitude of the sectionists, who closed all the outlets, and who filled the windows of the houses. Menou drew his cannon before the door of the convent, and entered with Laporte and a battalion into the very hall of the section. The members of the section, instead of forming a deliberative assembly, were armed and ranged in line, having their president at their head; this was M. Delalot. The general and the representative summoned them to surrender their arms; which they refused to do. The president Delalot, observing the hesitation with which this summons was made, replied thereto with warmth, addressed Menou's soldiers with some neatness and great presence of mind, and declared that before they should deprive the section of their arms they must proceed to the last extremities. To fight in so narrow a space, or to retire for the purpose of battering the hall with cannon, was a most painful alternative. However, had Menou spoken with firmness and pointed his guns, it is doubtful whether the resolution of the sectionists would have held out so long. Menou and Laporte would rather have had a capitulation; they promised to withdraw the troops of the convention, on condition that the section would immediately disperse. The section either promised, or pretended to promise; a party from the battalion filed off as if for the purpose of retiring. Menou, on his part, went away with his troops, and suddenly withdrew his columns, who had great difficulty to pass through the crowd that choked the neighbouring wards. While he had the weakness to retreat before the firmness of the section of Lepelletier, the latter had returned to the place of its meetings, and, proud of its resistance, was still further confirmed in its rebellion. A report instantly gained ground that the decrees were not executed, that the insurrection remained victorious, that the troops were returning without asserting the supremacy of the convention. A multitude of the witnesses of this scene hastened to the tribune of the assembly, whose sittings were then permanent, and gave intelligence to the deputies, when on all sides was heard, *We are betrayed! we are betrayed! call general Menou to the bar!* The committees were directed to attend and explain how matters really were.

At this moment, the committees, informed of what had just taken place, were in the greatest agitation. They were for arresting Menou and trying him immediately. That, however, would not have helped the matter; what was wanted was to make up for what he had omitted to do; but forty members, discussing what was best to be done, were not the likeliest persons to be all of them of the same opinion, and to act with the necessary vigour and precision. Neither were the three representatives commissioned to manage and conduct the armed force a sufficiently energetic authority. They considered as to the appointment of a chief, as on all decisive occasions; and at that moment, which was associated in their minds with all the dangers of Thermidor, the assembly turned its attention to the deputy Barras, who, as general of brigade, had been invested with the command of that famous day, and had acquitted himself with all the energy that could be desired. The deputy Barras was of a tall stature, and strong voice, was incapable of long speeches, but was excellent in the ready application of a few energetic and vehement expressions, conveying the idea of a resolute and devoted man. He was appointed general of the army of the interior, and they gave him as adjuncts the three representatives who had before his appointment been commissioned with the management and direction of the armed force. A single circumstance rendered this selection a most fortunate one. Barras had about him an officer very capable of taking a command, and he was not subject to that narrowness of mind which would throw into the shade a man more able than himself. All the deputies sent on mission to the army of Italy were acquainted with the young officer of artillery who had determined the reduction of Toulon, and had conquered Saorgo, and the lines of the Roya. This young officer, now become a general of brigade, had been discharged by Aubry, and he was in Paris without employment, and reduced almost to indigence. He had been introduced to Madame Tallien, who had received him with her wonted kindness, and even used her

interest in his behalf. His person was attenuated, and by no means tall, and his cheeks were hollow and livid; but his fine features, his fixed and piercing eyes, and his firm and original language, attracted notice. Often did he speak of a decisive theatre of war, where the republic would obtain victories and peace: that was Italy. He was constantly harping on this. Then it was, when the lines of the Apennines were lost under Kellermann, that the committee sent for him to ask his opinion. From that time he was employed in writing dispatches, and remained attached to the official management of the military operations. Barras thought of him in the night of the 12th Vendémiaire; he called for him to be second in command, and this was accorded. The two selections submitted the same night to the convention were instantly approved of. Barras confided the charge of the military arrangements to the young general, who immediately took them all upon himself, and set about giving orders with extreme activity.

The generals had continued to beat in all the quarters of Paris. Emissaries had gone about on all sides, bragging of the defence and the success of the section of Lepelletier, magnifying its dangers, persuading every body that these dangers were common to all the sections and affected their honour, and stirring them up to make themselves equal with the grenadiers of the quarter of Saint-Thomas. There had been a vast concourse from all parts, and a central and military committee had at length formed itself in the section of Lepelletier, under the presidency of the newspaper editor, Richer-Seiry. The plan of an insurrection was settled, the battalions were formed, all irresolute persons were drawn in beyond receding, and the entire *bourgeoisie* of Paris, misled by a false point of honour, was about to play a part but little suited to its habits and its interests.

It was now too late to think of marching upon the section of Lepelletier, in order to strangle the insurrection in its birth. The convention had about five thousand troops of the line; had all the sections displayed the same zeal, they could have assembled forty thousand men, well armed and in good order; and it was not with five thousand men that the convention could cope with forty thousand, in the streets of a great capital. The utmost that could be expected, was to defend the convention, and to convert it into a camp well intrenched. This was what general Bonaparte intended. The sections were without cannon; they had given them all up since the 4th Prairial, and the most ardent of the present day had been the first to afford this example, to ensure the disarming of the faubourg Saint-Antoine. This was a great advantage for the convention. The entire park of artillery was at the camp of Sablons. Bonaparte immediately ordered Murat, a cavalry officer, to go and secure it at the head of three hundred horse. That officer arrived at the very time when a battalion of the section of Lepelletier was on its road to seize the park; he got thither before that battalion, put horses to the guns, and brought them to the Tuileries. Bonaparte next turned his attention to the defence of all the avenues. He had five thousand soldiers of the line, a troop of patriots, who, since the preceding day amounted to about fifteen hundred, some gendarmes of the tribunals disarmed in Prairial and again armed on the present occasion, and lastly the police legion with some invalids, making altogether near eight thousand men. He distributed his artillery and his troops in the streets Cul de Sac, Dauphine, L'Echelle, Rohan, Saint-Nicaise, on the Pont Neuf, Pont Royal, Pont Louis XVI., and in the Places Louis XV. and Vendome, in short, at all the points where the convention was exposed. He placed his regiment of cavalry and part of his infantry in reserve at the Carrousel, and in the garden of the Tuileries. He ordered all the provisions in Paris to be brought to the Tuileries, and a *depôt* of ammunition and a temporary hospital for the wounded to be established there; he dispatched a detachment to secure the depôt of Meudon, and to occupy the heights of that place, so as to secure a retreat thither with the convention in case of defeat; he blocked up the road to Saint-Germain, to prevent cannon from being brought to the insurgents; and conveyed chests of arms to the faubourg Saint-Antoine, to arm the section of the Quinze-Vingts, who had been the only one to vote for the decrees, and whose zeal *Fréron* had been sent to awaken. These arrangements were completed on the morning of the 13th. Orders were given to the republican troops to await the aggressive attack, and by no means to provoke it.

During this interval, the committee of insurrection established in the section of Lepelletier had likewise made its own arrangements. The section had outlawed the committees of government, and created a kind of tribunal for trying those who should deny the sovereignty of the sections. Several generals had come to offer their services. A Vendean, known by the name of count de Maulevrier, and a young emigrant, called *Lafond*, had issued from their hiding places to conduct the movement. Generals Duboux and Damican, who had commanded the republican armies in La Vendée, were associated with them. Damican was a restless spirit, more capable of being a club orator than of commanding an army; he had been a friend of Hoche, who was frequently calling him to account for his inconsistencies. Being out of employ, he was in Paris, extremely dissatisfied with the government, and ready to enter upon the most mischievous designs; he was appointed commander-in-chief of the sections. A fight being resolved upon, and all the citizens being involved in spite of themselves, a sort of plan was formed. The sections of the faubourg Saint-Germain, under the command of count de Maulevrier, were to start from the Odéon, for the purpose of attacking the Tuileries by the bridges; the section of the right bank were to make the attack by the Rue Saint-Honoré, and by all the cross streets communicating between the Rue Saint-Honoré to the Tuileries. A detachment under the command of young Lafond was to secure the Pont-Neuf, so as to put the two divisions of the sectionist army in communication with each other. The young men who had served in the armies, and were most capable of standing fire, were placed at the head of the columns. Out of the forty thousand men of the national guard, twenty or twenty-seven thousand at most were present under arms. There was a much safer manœuvre than that of

presenting themselves in deep columns to the fire of the batteries; this was to barricade the streets, and thus to confine the assembly and its troops to the Tuileries, to occupy the houses in the immediate neighbourhood, and from them keep up a destructive fire, to kill one by one the defenders of the convention, and thus soon reduce them by famine and musket balls. But the sectionists never looked to any thing else than a sudden and off-hand attack, and thought that by a single charge they should get to the palace and make it open the gates.

Early the same morning, the Poissonnière section stopped the artillery horses and the arms on their way to the section of the Quinze-Vingts; the section of Mont Blanc carried off the provisions intended for the Tuileries; and a detachment of the section of Lepelletier made itself master of the treasury. Young Lafond, at the head of several companies, bore off in the direction of the Pont Neuf, while other battalions were coming by the Rue Dauphine. General Carteaux was directed to protect this bridge with four hundred men and four pieces of cannon. As he was by no means willing to come to an engagement, he withdrew to the quay of the Louvre. The battalions of the sections were coming in from all sides, to draw up within a few paces of the posts of the convention, and near enough to converse with the sentinels.

The troops of the convention would have had a great advantage in taking the initiative, and by making a brisk attack they would probably have thrown the assailants into disorder; but the generals had been recommended to wait for an aggressive attack. In consequence, notwithstanding the acts of hostility already committed, notwithstanding the capture of the artillery horses, notwithstanding the seizure of the provisions intended for the convention, as also of the arms sent to the Quinze-Vingts, and notwithstanding the death of an orderly hussar, killed in the Rue Saint-Honoré, they still kept to their instructions of not being the first to begin the attack.

The morning had been spent in preparations on the part of the sections, and in suspense on the part of the conventional army, when Danican, before he began the combat, thought it right to send a flag of truce to the committees to offer them terms. Barras and Bonaparte were visiting the posts, when the messenger was brought to them blindfolded, as if in a fortress. They caused him to be taken before the committees. The messenger expressed himself in a threatening tone, and offered peace on condition of disarming the patriots, and repealing the decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor. Such terms could not be accepted, and besides, none whatever could be listened to. Nevertheless, the committees, although they had made up their minds not to answer, resolved to appoint twenty-four deputies to go and fraternize with the sections, an expedient that had frequently succeeded, for discourse has considerable influence when one is ready to come to blows, and every one readily concurs in an arrangement that spares the effusion of blood. In the mean time Danican, not receiving any answer, gave orders for the attack. A firing was heard, Bonaparte directed eight hundred muskets and cartouch boxes to be brought into one of the halls of the convention, for the purpose of arming the representatives themselves, who were to serve, in case of emergency, as a corps of reserve. This precaution made every one sensible of the whole extent of the danger. Each deputy hastened to take his place, and according to custom in time of peril, the assembly waited in the most profound silence the result of this combat, the first regular battle that she had yet fought with the rebellious factions.

It was now half-past four o'clock; Bonaparte, accompanied by Barras, mounted a horse in the court of the Tuileries, and hastened to the post of the cul-de-sac Dauphine, facing the church of Saint-Roch. The sectionist battalions filled the Rue Saint-Honoré, and were now close to the entrance of the cul-de-sac. One of their best battalions had posted itself on the steps of the church of Saint-Roch, and there it was placed in an advantageous manner for firing upon the gunners of the convention. Bonaparte, who was capable of appreciating the advantage of the first blow, immediately directed his artillery to advance, and ordered a first discharge. The sectionists replied by a very sharp fire of musketry; but Bonaparte, showering down grape-shot upon them, obliged them to fall back upon the steps of Saint-Roch; he then immediately debouched in the Rue Saint-Honoré, and let loose upon the church itself a band of patriots who were fighting at his side with the greatest valour, and who had cruel wrongs to revenge. The sectionists, after a stout defence, were dislodged. Bonaparte, then turning his guns right and left, made them sweep the whole length of the Rue Saint-Honoré. The assailants instantly fled on all sides, and retired in the greatest disorder. Bonaparte then committed to an officer the duty of keeping up the firing and making the defeat certain; he next went up to the Carrousel, and hastened to the other posts. Every where he caused grape-shot to be fired, and every where he witnessed these unfortunate sectionists, imprudently exposed in deep columns to the effect of the artillery, take to flight. The sectionists, though they had very brave men at the head of their columns, fled with the utmost precipitation towards the head-quarters of the Filles-Saint-Thomas. Danican and the officers then discovered the blunder they had committed in marching upon the guns, instead of barricading the streets and planting themselves in the houses adjoining the Tuileries. Still they were not discouraged, and they resolved upon a fresh attack. They conceived the idea of joining with the columns coming from the faubourg Saint-Germain to make a general attack upon the bridges. Accordingly, they rallied a column of from six to eight thousand men, directed them towards the Pont Neuf, where Lafond was posted with his regiment, and fell in with the battalions coming from the Rue Dauphine, under the command of the count de Maulevrier. All advanced together in close column from the Pont Neuf to the Pont Royal along the Quai Voltaire. Bonaparte, present wherever danger required him, lost no time in getting to these places. He placed several batteries on the quay of the Tuileries, which is parallel with the Quai Voltaire, and advanced the cannon placed at the head of the Pont Royal, and caused them to be pointed in such a manner as to enfilade the quay by which the assailants were coming. Having taken these precautions, he suffered the

sectionists to approach; then all at once he gave orders to fire. A shower of grape from the bridge met the sectionists in front, another from the quay of the Tuileries took them obliquely, and carried terror and destruction into their ranks. Young Lafond, in the height of his bravery, rallied around him the steadiest of his men, and again marched upon the bridge in order to take the guns. An increased fire drove back his column. He endeavoured in vain to bring it up a third time; it fled, and was dispersed under the fire of a well-directed artillery.

At six o'clock, the battle that had begun at half-past four was won. Then Bonaparte, who had displayed a merciless energy in the action, and had fired upon the population of the capital, just as he would have done upon Austrian battalions, gave orders to charge the guns with powder, to still further drive the insurgents from before him. Some few sectionists had intrenched themselves in the Place Vendôme, in the church of Saint-Roch, and in the Palais Royal; he made his troops debouch by all the avenues of the Rue Saint-Honoré, and detached a corps which proceeding from the Place Louis XV., crossed through the Rue Royale and along by the boulevards. He thus swept the Place Vendôme, cleared the church of Saint-Roch, invested the Palais Royal, and blockaded it to avoid a battle in the night.

Next morning a few musket shots were quite sufficient to cause the evacuation of the Palais Royal and the section of Lepelletier, where the rebels had designed to entrench themselves. Bonaparte caused some barricades formed near the Barrière des Sergens to be removed, and a detachment bringing cannon from Saint-Germain to the sectionists to be stopped. Tranquillity was completely restored on the 14th. The dead were immediately carried away, in order to remove all traces of this combat. There had been on one side and the other from three to four hundred killed and wounded.

This victory gave great joy to all the sincere friends of the republic, who could not help recognizing in this movement the influence of royalism. This victory restored to the jeopardized convention, that is, to the revolution and its originators, the authority they needed for the settlement of the new institutions. Nevertheless, the general feeling was, that the advantages of this victory should not be too severely pressed. Every one was ready enough to accuse the convention of one thing, and that was, that it had fought only in behalf of terrorism, and with the intention of re-establishing it. It was of great consequence that the imputation of a desire to shed blood should be done away with. In other respects the sectionists on their part proved themselves very inexpert conspirators, and that they were far from possessing the energy of the patriots; they had lost no time in returning to their homes, satisfied at having got off so cheap, and proud of having defied for a moment those guns which had so often broken the lines of Brunswick and Coburg. Provided they were allowed to extol their courage among themselves, they were no longer dangerous. Consequently the convention contented herself with discharging the staff of the national guard, disbanding the companies of grenadiers and light infantry, which were far better disciplined, and contained almost all the young men with double queues, putting the national guard for the future under the direction of the general commanding the army of the interior, ordering the sections of Lepelletier and the Théâtre François to be disarmed, and with issuing three commissions for trying the leaders of the rebellion, who, however, had almost all of them disappeared.

The companies of grenadiers and light infantry suffered themselves to be disbanded; the two sections of Lepelletier and Théâtre Français delivered up their arms without resistance: all, in short, submitted. The committees, adopting these views of forbearance, either connived at the escape of the guilty, or allowed them to remain in Paris, where they could scarcely keep themselves concealed. The commissioners pronounced no sentences, except for contumacy. No more than one of the rebel leaders was apprehended, and this was young Lafond. He had excited some interest by his courage: there was a wish to save him, but he persisted in declaring himself an emigrant and in avowing his rebellion, so that it was impossible to pardon him. The forbearance exhibited was so great, that one of the members of the commission formed in the section of Lepelletier, M. de Castellane, meeting at night a patrole, who cried, "Who goes there?" replied, "Castellane, condemned for contumacy!" The consequences of the 13th Vendémiaire were therefore not sanguinary, and the capital in no degree shocked by them. The guilty kept themselves quiet, or walked about unmolested, and the withdrawing-rooms were exclusively occupied with the accounts of exploits which they ventured to avow. Without punishing those who had attacked her, the convention contented herself with rewarding those who had defended her; she declared that they had deserved well of their country; she voted them gratuities; and gave a brilliant reception to Barras and Bonaparte. Barras, already celebrated since the 9th Thermidor, became much more so by the conflicts of Vendémiaire; to him was attributed the salvation of the convention. However, he was not behindhand in allowing his young lieutenant a due share of the honour of the day. "It is General Bonaparte," said he, "whose prompt and skilful arrangements have saved all here." These words were applauded. Barras was confirmed in the command of the army in the interior, and Bonaparte made second in command.

The intriguing royalists felt themselves sadly out of their reckoning in witnessing the issue of the insurrection of the 13th. They lost no time in writing to Verona, that they had been deceived by every body; that money had been wanting; that *where gold was necessary, they scarcely had old rags*; that *the monarchist deputies, those who had given them promises, had forfeited them, and played an infamous game*; that *it was a Jacobinical race*, in whom no confidence should be placed; that unfortunately those who wished to serve the cause were not sufficiently *compromised* and *involved*; that *the royalists of Paris, with green collars, black collars, and double queues, who ostentatiously displayed their bravadoes in the pit of the theatres, ran away at the first shot, and hid themselves under the beds of the women who kept them.*

Lemaitre, their leader, had just been apprehended, together with the different instigators of the section of Lepelletier. There had been seized at his house a vast number of papers; the royalists were in apprehension that these papers would betray the secret of the plot, and above all, lest he should speak himself. Nevertheless, they were not discouraged; their creatures continued to act along with the sectionists. The kind of impunity which the latter enjoyed had emboldened them. Inasmuch as the convention, although victorious, did not venture to strike a blow at them, she thereby recognized that public opinion was in their favour; she consequently was not morally convinced of the justice of her cause, since she hesitated. Although vanquished, they were more proud, and possessed greater moral elevation than herself; and they again made their appearance in the electoral assemblies, to promote elections in conformity with their aspirations. The assemblies were to constitute themselves on the 20th Vendémiaire, and to continue until the 30th; the new legislative body was to meet on the 5th Brumaire. At Paris the royalist agents procured the election of Saladin the conventionalist, whom they had already gained. In some of the departments they provoked quarrels, and some of the electoral assemblies were seen splitting and dividing themselves into two distinct parties.

These underhand contrivances, this recovered assurance, contributed greatly to exasperate the patriots, who had witnessed in the events of the 13th the verification of all their prognostics; they were proud both of having guessed rightly, and of having overcome by their courage the danger they had so correctly foreseen. They desired that the victory might not prove useless to themselves, that it should induce acts of severity against their adversaries, and indemnity for their friends confined in the prisons. They presented petitions, in which they prayed for the release of the detained patriots, the dismissal of the officers appointed by Aubry, the restoration to their official rank of those who had been dismissed, the trial of the imprisoned deputies, and their reinstatement in the electoral lists, if they were innocent. The Mountain, supported by the galleries, crowded with patriots, highly approved of these demands, and energetically claimed their adoption. Tallien, who had connected himself with the Mountain, and who was the civil chief of the ruling party, in the same way as Barras was its military chief,—Tallien strove to keep the Mountain within bounds; he caused the last demand relative to the reinstatement of the imprisoned deputies in the lists to be withdrawn, as contrary to the decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor. Those decrees, in fact, declared the deputies who were then suspended from their functions ineligible. Nevertheless, the Mountain was not easier to govern than the sectionists; and the last days of that assembly, which had but one decade more to sit, seemed as if they could not elapse without a storm.

The intelligence from the frontiers also contributed to increase the agitation, by exciting the misgivings of the patriots and the inextinguishable hopes of the royalists. We have observed that Jourdan had crossed the Rhine at Dusseldorf, and advanced upon the Sieg; that Pichegru had entered Manheim, and had rapidly despatched a division beyond the Rhine. Events so auspicious as these had not suggested any grand idea to that Pichegru who was so highly extolled, and herein he had demonstrated either his perfidy or his incapacity. In ordinary reasoning his omissions should be imputed to his incapacity; for even with the desire to betray, no one ever rejects the opportunity of obtaining great victories; they always serve to enhance his price. Nevertheless, highly credible contemporaries have considered that Pichegru's false manœuvres should be ascribed to treason: he is, therefore, the only general known in history who ever voluntarily caused himself to be defeated. It was not simply a regiment that he should have pushed on beyond Manheim, but his whole army, so as to have taken possession of Heidelberg, which is the most important point where the roads running from the Upper Rhine into the valleys of the Neckar and the Maine cross one another. This would have been gaining the point by which Wurmser could have joined Clerfait; this would have been completely cutting off those two generals from each other; this would have been securing the point by which it was practicable to effect a junction with Jourdan, and to form with him a mass that would have successfully overwhelmed Clerfait and Wurmser. Clerfait, aware of the danger, quitted the banks of the Maine, and made the best of his way to Heidelberg; but his lieutenant, Kwasdanovich, assisted by Wurmser, had contrived to dislodge from Heidelberg the division that Pichegru had left there. Pichegru was shut up in Manheim; and Clerfait, relieved from all fear for his communications with Wurmser, had immediately marched upon Jourdan. The latter, cooped up between the Rhine and the line of neutrality, could not live there as in an enemy's country, and having no organized service for drawing his resources from the Netherlands, found himself, when he could neither march forward or join Pichegru, in one of the most critical positions possible. Moreover, Clerfait, disregarding the neutrality, had placed himself in such a manner as to turn his left, and to throw him back upon the Rhine. Jourdan, therefore, could not keep his ground there; it was therefore resolved by the representatives, with the assent of all the generals, that he should fall back on Mentz, and blockade it on the right bank. But this position would not be more advantageous than the preceding; it would leave him in the same want of necessaries; it would expose him to the attacks of Clerfait in a disadvantageous situation, and would expose him to the chance of missing his road towards Dusseldorf: it was consequently decided that he should beat a retreat, for the purpose of regaining the Lower Rhine, which he did in good order, and without being annoyed by Clerfait, who, contemplating a grand design, returned to the Maine, so as to bring himself near to Mentz.

To this intelligence of the retrograde march of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, were added alarming reports in respect of the army of Italy. Schérer had arrived there with two fine divisions of the eastern Pyrenees, now rendered available by the peace with Spain; it was nevertheless said that this general did not feel sure of his position, and that he demanded more assistance than could be

afforded him in ordnance and supplies, which if he did not have he threatened to make a retrograde movement. Lastly, there was a report of a second English expedition, which was to bring count D'Artois with a body of marines.

These news, which certainly contained nothing that could cause apprehensions so far as the existence of the republic was concerned, who being still mistress of the course of the Rhine, who had two more armies to send, the one to Italy, the other to La Vendée, and who recently had been enabled by the affair of Quiberon to fully appreciate the talents of Hoche, and not to fear the expeditions of the emigrants; these intelligences, nevertheless, did not a little contribute to rouse the royalists, terrified by Vendémiaire, and to exasperate the patriots, by no means satisfied with the use that had been made of the victory. The discovery of the correspondence of Lemaitre, in particular, produced the most vexatious effects. Every one discovered in it the whole of that plot which had been so long suspected; they were in possession of the fact that a secret agency had been established in Paris in communication with Verona, La Vendée, and every province in France, exciting counter-revolutionary movements there, and having correspondences with several members of the convention and the committees. The very boasting of these paltry agents, who flattered themselves with having at one time gained over generals, at another time deputies, and who said they had connexions with monarchists and Thermidorians, contributed to excite still stronger suspicions, and to make them hover over the heads of the deputies of the right side.

The names of Rovère and Saladin had been already mentioned, and against them satisfactory evidence had been obtained. The latter had published a pamphlet against the decrees of the 5th and the 13th Fructidor, and had just been rewarded for it by the suffrages of the Parisian electors. Lesage (of Eure and Loire), La Rivière, Boissy-d'Anglas, and Lanjuinais, were also pointed out as secret accomplices of the royalist agency. Their silence on the 11th, 12th, and 13th Vendémiaire had greatly compromised them. The counter-revolutionary journals, by the affected terms in which they lauded these men, had sided in compromising them still more. These same papers, which so highly extolled the seventy-three, loaded the Thermidorians with abuse. It was scarcely possible that a rupture should not ensue. The seventy-three and the Thermidorians still continued to meet at the house of a mutual friend, but ill-temper and mistrust prevailed among them. Towards the latter end of the session, there was a conversation at this meeting concerning the recent elections, of the intrigues of royalism to influence them, and of the silence of Boissy, Lanjuinais, La Riviere, and Lesage, during the scenes of Vendémiaire. Legendre, with his usual petulance, censured the silence of four deputies who were present. The latter strove to justify themselves. Lanjuinais dropped the very strange expression of *Massacre of the 13th Vendémiaire*, and thus demonstrated either extraordinary confusion of ideas, or sentiments any thing but republican. At this expression, Tallien flew into a violent passion, and would have gone away, saying that he could stay no longer with royalists, and that he would go and denounce them to the convention. The others surrounded and pacified him, and endeavoured to palliate the expression of Lanjuinais. The party nevertheless broke up on bad terms with each other.

Meanwhile the agitation went on increasing in Paris. Mutual distrusts every where gained ground, and suspicions of royalism attached upon every one. Tallien moved that the convention should form herself into a secret committee, and he formally denounced Lesage, La Rivière, Boissy-d'Anglas, and Lanjuinais. His proofs were not sufficient; they rested only upon mere matters of inducement, more or less probable, and the accusation was not supported. Louvet, although attached to the Thermidorians, did not support the charge against the four deputies, who were his friends; but he accused Rovère and Saladin, and painted their conduct in strong colours. He described their changes from the most outrageous terrorism to the most outrageous royalism, and caused a decree to be passed for their arrest. The convention likewise arrested L'Homond, involved with Lemaitre, and Aubry, the author of the military reaction.

The adversaries of Tallien, by way of reprisal, called for the publication of a letter from the pretender to the duke of Harcourt, in which, speaking of what reached him from Paris, he said, *I cannot bring myself to think that Tallien is a royalist of the right sort.* It should be recollected, that the Paris agents flattered themselves that they had gained over Tallien and Hoche. Their habitual boasting, and their calumnies with respect to Hoche, were sufficient to justify Tallien. This letter produced but little effect, for Tallien, since the affair of Quiberon, and since his conduct in Vendémiaire, so far from passing for a royalist, was considered as a sanguinary terrorist. Thus, men who ought to have assisted heart and hand in protecting by their joint efforts a revolution which was their own work, mistrusted each other, and suffered themselves to be compromised, if not gained over by royalism. Thanks to the asperesions of the royalists, the last days of this illustrious assembly ended, as they had begun, in trouble and agitation.

Tallien lastly moved the appointment of a commission of five members, commissioned to propose efficacious measures for preserving the revolution during the transition from one government to another. The convention nominated Tallien, Dubois-Cranté, Florent Guyot, Roux (of La Marne), and Pons (of Verdun). The object of this commission was to anticipate the manœuvres of the royalists in the elections, and to impart confidence to the republicans in regard to the formation of the new government. The Mountain, in its usual fervour, conceiving that this commission was about to realize all its aspirations, for a moment believed and spread the report, that the assembly was going to annul all the elections, and temporarily suspend the putting the constitution in force. The Mountain had in fact persuaded itself that the time had not arrived for leaving the republic to herself, that the royalists were not sufficiently weakened, and that there was a necessity for continuing the revolutionary government for some time longer, in order to completely reduce them. The counter-revolutionists affected to circulate the same reports. The deputy, Thibaudeau, who thus far had

not gone along either with the Mountain or with the Thermidorians, or with the Monarchists, but who had nevertheless shown himself a sincere republican, and on whom thirty-two departments had just fixed their choice, because in electing him, they had the advantage of not declaring for any party, the deputy, Thibaudeau, could not be expected to distrust the state of public opinion so much as the Thermidorians. He thought that Tallien and his party calumniated the nation, in wanting to adopt so many precautions against the nation; he even supposed that Tallien harboured personal designs, and that he meant to place himself at the head of the Mountain, and to confer a dictatorship on himself under the semblance of preserving the republic from the royalists. He denounced in a virulent and bitter style this supposed design of dictatorship, and uttered an unexpected retort upon Tallien, at which the republicans were much surprised, because they could not comprehend its motive. This sally even compromised Thibaudeau in the opinion of the most mistrustful, and caused intentions that he never entertained to be ascribed to him. Although he reminded the assembly that he was a regicide, it was well known from the intercepted letters* that the death of Louis XVI. might be redeemed by important services rendered to his heirs, so that even this title of regicide no longer appeared to be a perfect guarantee for his conduct. Thus, notwithstanding he was a staunch republican, this sally against Tallien injured him in the estimation of the patriots, and gained him extraordinary praises from the royalists. They called him *Barre-de-fer*.†

The convention passed to the order of the day, and awaited the report of Tallien in the name of the commission of five. The result of the labours of this commission was the draught of a decree comprehending the following measures:—

The exclusion of all emigrants and relatives of emigrants from all functions, civil, municipal, legislative, judicial, and military, till the general peace; permission for all those who were not inclined to live under the laws of the republic to quit France and take their property with them; the dismissal of all officers who had not served during the revolutionary system, that is since the 10th of August, and who had been replaced since the 15th Germinal, that is since the operations of Aubry.

These arrangements were adopted. The convention then decreed in a solemn manner the union of Belgium with France, and its division into departments. At length, on the 4th Brumaire, at the moment of breaking up, she determined to finish her long and stormy career by a signal act of clemency. She decreed that the punishment of death should be abolished in the French republic, to commence from the time of the general peace; she changed the name of the Place de la *Révolution* into the Place de la *Concorde*; and lastly, she declared an amnesty for all acts connected with the revolution, excepting the revolt of the 13th Vendémiaire. This was the setting at liberty men of all parties, Lemaitre excepted, who was the only one of the conspirators of Vendémiaire against whom sufficient evidence had been obtained. The sentence of transportation pronounced against Billaud-Varennes, Collot d'Herbois, and Barrère, which had been revoked for the purpose of trying them anew, that is, to cause them to be condemned to death, was confirmed. Barrère, who alone had not yet been put on board, was to be sent off. All the prisons were to be thrown open. At half-past two o'clock on the 4th Brumaire, year IV. (October 26th, 1795), the president of the convention uttered these words: "The National Convention declares that her mission is accomplished, and that her session is closed." Shouts, a thousand times repeated, of *Vive la République!* accompanied these closing words.

Thus terminated the long and memorable session of the national convention. The constituent assembly had the ancient feudal organization to destroy, and to lay the foundation of a new establishment; the legislative assembly had the testing of that establishment, in the face of the king who was allowed to remain as part of the convention. After a trial of some months, she discovered and declared the incompatibility of the king with the new institutions, and his identification with Europe as leagued against the assembly; she suspended the king and the constitution, and then resigned. The convention, therefore, found a dethroned king, an annulled constitution, war declared with Europe, and their sole resources consisting in an administration entirely destroyed, a paper money of no value, old thinned regiments worn out and empty. Thus it was not liberty that she had to proclaim in the presence of an enfeebled and despised throne, it was liberty she had to defend against all Europe; and this task was quite another affair. Without being for a moment intimidated, she proclaimed the republic in the face of the hostile armies; she then sacrificed the king, to cut herself off from all retreat; she next took all the powers into her own hands, and constituted herself a dictatorship. When voices were raised in her presence who spoke of humanity at a time when she desired to hear nought spoken of but energy, she suppressed them. Soon it happened that this dictatorship she had assumed over France for the public good, twelve of her members arrogated to themselves for the same reason and for the same purpose. From the Alps to the sea, from the Pyrenees to the Rhine, these twelve dictators seized upon all, both men and things, and commenced the greatest and the most awful struggle with the nations of Europe that history has ever recorded. In order that they might remain supreme directors of this immense work, they sacrificed all parties by turns; and in accordance with the feelings of our nature, their qualifications were abused. These qualifications were strength and energy; their abuse was cruelty. They spilt torrents of blood, so much so, that conquest having rendered them no longer useful, and becoming hateful by the abuse of strength, they fell. The convention then resumed the dictatorship, and began by degrees to relax the springs of that terrible administration. Secure in her conquests, she listened to humanity, and indulged her spirit of regeneration. For one year she inquired and sought for all that was good and

* *Moniteur* of the year IV., p. 150, letter of Entraigues to Lemaitre, dated the 10th October, 1795.

† A proverbial expression; viz. such a one is an "iron bar" (*barre-de-fer*), meaning that he is inflexible, unshaken, incorruptible. *Trans.*

great; but the parties crushed under a merciless power, revived under a kindly authority. Two factions, in which were blended, under an infinite variety of shades, the friends and the foes of the revolution, attacked it by turns. She vanquished the former in Germinal and Prairial, the others in Vendémiaire, and up to the last day showed her heroism amidst perils. Lastly, she framed a republican constitution, and after a struggle of three years with Europe, with the factions, and with herself, mutilated and bleeding, she resigned, and consigned France to the directory.

The remembrance of the revolution is coupled with awful associations; but in her defence there is but one fact to be stated, a single fact only, and all reproaches must sink before this great truth: she saved us from foreign invasion! The preceding assemblies had bequeathed to her France in peril; she bequeathed to the directory and the empire France saved. If in 1793 the emigrants had returned to France, there would have been left no vestige of the works of the constituent assembly, and of the beneficial effects of the revolution. Instead of those admirable civil institutions, those magnificent exploits, which distinguished the constituent assembly, the convention, the directory, the consulate, and the empire, we should have had the base and sanguinary anarchy which we behold at this day the other side the Pyrenees. In repelling the invasion of the kings leagued against our republic, the convention has ensured to the revolution an uninterrupted action of thirty years on the soil of France, and has given her works time to become firm and settled, and to acquire that strength which enables them to defy the impotent wrath of the enemies of the human race.

To the men who proudly style themselves the patriots of 1789 the convention will always be able to say: "You have courted the battle, it is I who have maintained it and brought it to a termination."

THE DIRECTORY.

CHAPTER I.

APPOINTMENT OF FIVE DIRECTORS—INSTALLATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY AND THE DIRECTORY.—DIFFICULT SITUATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT. FINANCIAL DISTRESS; DEPRECIATION OF PAPER MONEY—THE FIRST ACTS OF THE DIRECTORY—LOSS OF THE LINES OF MENTZ—RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES IN BRITTANY AND VENDÉE. ANOTHER ENGLISH SQUADRON IS SEEN APPROACHING OUR WESTERN COASTS.—FINANCE SCHEME PROPOSED BY THE DIRECTORY; A NEW FORCED LOAN—SENTENCE PASSED ON SOME ROYALIST AGENTS—THE DAUGHTER OF LOUIS XVI. IS GIVEN IN EXCHANGE FOR THE REPRESENTATIVES DELIVERED TO THE AUSTRIANS BY DUMOURIEZ—STATE OF PARTIES AT THE END OF 1795.—ARMISTICE CONCLUDED ON THE RHINE.—OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF ITALY, BATTLE OF LOANO—EXPEDITION OF ISLE-DIEU. THE ENGLISH SQUADRON LEAVES US. THE LAST EFFORTS OF CHARETTE; MEASURES ADOPTED BY GENERAL HOCHE TO CARRY OUT THE PACIFICATION OF LA VENDÉE—RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1795.

THE 5th Brumaire, year IV. (October 27, 1795), was the day appointed for putting in force the directorial constitution. On that day, the two-thirds of the convention retained in the legislative body were to be joined by the third recently elected by the electoral assemblies, to divide themselves into two councils, to constitute themselves, and then to proceed to the nomination of the five directors entrusted with the executive power. During this preliminary interval, devoted to the organization of the legislative body and the directory, the former committees of government were to remain in office, and be the depositaries of all the powers. The members of the convention, despatched either to the armies or to the departments, were to continue their mission until the installation of the directory should be notified to them.

A great agitation pervaded the public mind. The moderate patriots as well as the enthusiastic patriots evinced the same irritation against the party that had attacked the convention on the 13th Vendémiaire; they were full of apprehensions; they encouraged one another to stand by each other more closely than ever, to defend themselves against royalism; they loudly said that no other men than such as were irrevocably engaged in the cause of the revolution should be called to the directory, and to fill public situations; they had great misgivings as to the deputies of the new third, and anxiously made inquiries respecting their names, their previous conduct, and their known or presumed opinions.

The sectionists, exposed to grape-shot on the 13th Vendémiaire, but treated with the utmost forbearance after the victory, had again grown insolent. Proud of having for a moment stood the fire, they seemed to imagine that the convention, in sparing them, had been influenced by their strength, and had tacitly acknowledged the justice of their cause. They showed themselves every where, boasted of their great deeds, constantly repeating in private assemblies the like impertinences against the great assembly that had just relinquished power, and affected to count much upon the deputies of the new third.

These deputies, who were to take their seats amidst the veterans of the revolution, and to represent there the new opinion that had formed itself in France after a long series of storms, were far from justifying all the distrust of the republicans and all the hopes of the counter-revolutionists. Among them were to be numbered some members of the old assemblies, as Vaublanc, Pastoret, Dumas, Dupont (of Nemours), and the honest and learned Tronchet, who had rendered such great services to our legislation. Next were

seen many new men, not those extraordinary men who shine at the first appearance of revolutions, but some of them possessing those substantial qualifications which, in the career of politics, as in that of the arts, supply the absence of genius; for instance, lawyers and men of office, such as Portalis, Simeon, Barbe-Marbois, and Tronçon-Ducoudray. In general these newly elected, with the exception of some notorious counter-revolutionists, belonged to that class of moderate men, who having taken no part whatever in events, and consequently having had no opportunity either to do wrong or to deceive themselves, alleged that they had a strong attachment for the revolution, but at the same time, made a distinction between her and what they termed her crimes. In the due course of things, they ought to be well enough inclined to censure the past; but they were already somewhat reconciled with the convention and the republic by their election; for every one willingly allows an order of things wherein he has found a place. Besides all this, strangers to Paris and to politics, timid as yet upon this new stage, they conversed with and visited the most distinguished members of the national convention.

Such was the tendency of public opinion on the 5th Brumaire, year IV. The re-elected members of the convention coalesced, and strove to influence the nominations that were yet to be made, so as to remain masters of the government. By virtue of the celebrated decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor, the number of the new conventionalists in the new legislative body was to be five hundred. If this number should not be filled up by the re-elections, the members present on the 5th Brumaire were to form themselves into an electoral body for the purpose of completing it. A draught list was drawn up at the committee of public welfare, and in this list were entered the names of many decided Mountaineers. This list was not entirely approved of. However, none but known patriots were placed in it. On the 5th, all the deputies present met together in single assembly, and constituted themselves an electoral body. In the first place, they completed the two-thirds of conventionalists who were to sit in the legislative body; then they prepared a list of all the deputies married, and aged more than forty years; and from this list they took by lot two hundred and fifty to compose the council of the ancients.

On the following day, the council of the five hundred assembled at the Ride, in the old hall of the constituent assembly, chose Daunou for president, and Rewbell, Chénier, Cambacérès, and Thibaudeau for secretaries. The council of the ancients met in the former hall of the convention, called Larévellière-Lépeaux to the chair, and Baudin, Lanjuinais, Breard, and Charles Lacroix, to the clerks' table (bureau). These selections were suitable, and demonstrated that in both councils the majority belonged to the republican cause. The councils declared that they were constituted, notified this to each other by messages, provisionally confirmed the powers of the deputies, and deferred their verification until after the government had been settled.

The most important of all the elections yet remained to be made,—namely, that of the five magistrates to be invested with the executive power. On this choice depended at once the fate of the republic, and the fortune of individuals. The five directors, in fact, having the nomination of all the public functionaries, could form the government just as they chose, and admit men attached to or hostile to the republic. They would, moreover, have a control over the prospects of individuals; they could either admit them, or exclude them from the career of public office, and reward or discourage men of capacity faithful to the cause of the revolution. The influence which they must necessarily exercise, would therefore be immense. In like manner, all were deeply concerned in the selection that was about to be made.

The conventionalists met to settle among themselves this selection. All agreed that they ought to choose regicides, in order to seat themselves more firmly in power. Public opinion after being for some time unsettled, at last declared in favour of Barras, Rewbell, Sieyès, Larévellière-Lépeaux, and Letourneur. Barras had rendered important services in Thermidor, Prairial, and Vendémiaire; he had been, in some measure, the legislator-general, opposed to all the factions; the last battle, of the 13th Vendémiaire, had in particular given him great consequence, although the military arrangements of that day belonged to young Bonaparte. Rewbell, who had been shut up in Mentz during the siege, and frequently called into the committees since the 9th Thermidor, had adopted the opinion of the Thermidorians, shown talent and diligence in business, together with a certain decision of character. Sieyès was regarded as the first speculative genius of the time. Larévellière-Lépeaux had voluntarily associated himself with the Girondists on the day of their proscription, had returned to his colleagues on the 9th Thermidor, and had opposed with all his might the two factions that had alternately attacked the convention. A mild and humane patriot, he was the only Girondist whom the Mountain did not suspect, and the only patriot whose virtues the counter-revolutionists durst not deny. He had but one disadvantage, in the opinion of certain persons; namely, the deformity of his person; it was said the directorial mantle would not set well upon him. Lastly, Letourneur, known for a patriot, and esteemed for his character, had formerly been an officer of engineers, and had latterly succeeded to Carnot in the committee of public welfare, but was far from possessing his talents. Some of the conventionalists would have wished to place among the five directors some one of the generals who had most distinguished themselves at the head of the armies, as Kléber, Moreau, Pichegru, or Hoche; but they were afraid to give too much influence to the military men, and would not invite any one of them to the supreme power. To render the elections certain, the conventionalists agreed among themselves to resort to an expedient which, without being illegal, had very much the appearance of a juggle. According to the constitution, the council of the five hundred was to present a list of ten candidates for each directorship to the council of the ancients. The latter, out of ten candidates was to elect one. Therefore, for the five directors it was necessary to offer fifty candidates. The conventionalists, who had the majority in the five hundred, agreed to place Barras, Rewbell, Sieyès, Larévellière-Lépeaux, and Letourneur at the head

of the list, and then to add thereto forty-five unknown names, upon which it would be impossible to fix. In this manner there was a compulsory preference for the five candidates whom the conventionalists were desirous of calling to the directory.

This plan was strictly followed; there was only wanting one name out of the forty-five, Cambacérès was added, who had rendered himself agreeable to the new third and all the moderatists. When the list was presented to the ancients, they appeared to be extremely dissatisfied at this manner of forcing their choice. Dupont of Nemours, who had already figured in the preceding assemblies, and who was a declared adversary, if not of the republic, at least of the convention. Dupont (of Nemours) called for an adjournment. "The forty-five persons who compose this list," said he, "are doubtless not unworthy of your choice, for otherwise it would appear that some one has desired to compel your selection of five personages. No doubt these names which are quite new to you belong to men of modest merit, and who are also worthy of representing a great republic; but it requires time to become acquainted with them. Their very modesty, which has kept them concealed, compels us to make inquiries, so that we may appreciate their merit, and authorizes us to demand an adjournment." The ancients, although dissatisfied with this procedure, shared the sentiments of the majority of the five hundred, and confirmed the choice of the five who had been forced upon them. Out of two hundred and eighteen voters, Larevellière-Lépeaux obtained two hundred and sixteen votes, such was the unanimity of esteem for that worthy man. Letourneur obtained one hundred and eighty-nine; Rewbell one hundred and seventy-six; Sieyès one hundred and fifty-six; and Barras one hundred and twenty-nine. This last, who was more of a party man than the others, it was to be expected should excite greater differences of opinion and collect fewer votes.

These five elections caused the greatest satisfaction to the revolutionists, who thus saw themselves assured of the government. They had yet to know whether the five directors would accept the nomination. There was no doubt respecting three of them, but there were two who were known to have no very great taste for power. Larévelliere-Lépaux, a simple, retiring man, but little qualified for the management of affairs and men, sought and found no pleasure but in the Jardin des Plantes with the brothers Thouin. It was doubtful whether he would make up his mind to accept the functions of director. Sieyès, with a mighty mind, capable of conceiving every thing, a matter of business as well as a principle, was nevertheless unfitted by disposition for the duties of government. Perhaps also full of spleen against a republic which was not constituted to his pleasure, he might appear not very much disposed to accept the direction of it. As to Larévelliere-Lépeaux, the highest consideration was set upon his single-heartedness; they told him that his association with the magistrates who were to rule the republic was advantageous and indispensable. He assented. In fact, among these five individuals, men of business or action, it was highly necessary that one should be of pure and unquestionable disinterestedness; and this was obtained by the acceptance of Larévellière-Lépeaux. As for Sieyès, his repugnance was not to be overcome; he refused, affirming that he considered himself unfit to govern.

Some one was wanted to fill his place. There was a man who possessed immense reputation in Europe, this was Carnot. His military services, although substantial, were magnified; to him were attributed all our victories; and though he had been a member of the great committee of public welfare, the colleague of Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon, it was known that he had opposed them with great energy. In him was to be observed the union of a great military genius with a stoic character. His reputation and that of Sieyes were the two greatest of the time. Nothing better could be done in order to obtain respect for the directory than to supply the place of one of these two reputations by the other. Carnot was accordingly put upon the new list along with the men who rendered his nomination compulsory. Cambacérès was also added to the list, which contained only eight unknown persons. The ancients, however, had no hesitation in preferring Carnot; he obtained one hundred and seventeen votes out of two hundred and thirteen, and became one of the five directors.

Thus Barras, Rewbell, Larévellière-Lépeaux, Letourneur, and Carnot, became the five magistrates intrusted with the government of the republic. Among these five persons there was not a man of genius, or even any man of exceeding reputation, excepting Carnot. But what was to be done at the termination of a sanguinary revolution, which in a few years had devoured several generations of men of genius, and of every description! In the assemblies there was not left a single orator of note; in diplomacy there remained not one celebrated negotiator. Barthélemy alone, by his treaties with Prussia and Spain, had attracted some kind of consideration, but he inspired the patriots with no confidence. The armies had already produced great generals, and still greater were qualifying themselves; but as yet no decided superiority had been manifested; and besides, people had their misgivings of the military. Therefore, as we have just now observed, there were but two men of great reputation, Sieyes and Carnot. In the impracticability of having the one, they got the other. Barras possessed activity, Rewbell and Letourneur were industrious men of business; Larévelliere-Lépeaux was a man of discretion and probity. It would have been difficult at the moment to have composed the supreme magistracy in any other way.

The state of things when these five magistrates assumed their power was deplorable; and it required great courage and virtue in some, and great ambition in others, to accept the task that was imposed upon them. It was the day after a battle, in which it had been found necessary to call in one faction to oppose another. The patriots who had so recently spilt their blood were exorbitant in their demands; the sectionists had not ceased to be daring. In short, the affair of the 13th Vendémiaire had not been one of those victories followed by terror, which, in subjecting the government entirely to the yoke of the victorious faction, at least rescue it from the vanquished fac-

tion. The patriots had again started up; the sectionists had not submitted themselves. Paris was full of intriguers of all parties, agitated by the immoderate expectations of the many, and abandoned to the most frightful misery.

At this time as in Prairial, there was a scarcity of the necessaries of life in every one of the great communes; the paper money engendered confusion in business, and left the government without resources. The convention, not willing to assent to the disposal of the national domains for thrice their value in 1790 in paper, the sales had been suspended; the paper, which could only come back by means of the sales, had remained in circulation, and its depreciation had made alarming progress. In vain had a sliding-scale been invented for diminishing the loss of those who received the assignats; that scale reduced them no more than one-fifth, whereas they had not even the one hundred and fiftieth of their original denomination. The state, receiving nothing but paper for the assessed taxes, was ruined as well as private individuals. It levied, it is true, one-half of the land-tax in kind, and this furnished some provision for the consumption of the armies; but oftentimes the means of conveying it to them failed, and those provisions rotted in the stores. To add to its expenditure, the state was obliged, as already stated, to feed Paris. It provided a ration for a specific sum in assignats, which scarcely covered the hundredth part of the cost. This expedient, however, was the only practicable one for supplying at least with bread the annuitants and the public functionaries, who were paid in assignats; but this pressing exigency had raised the expenditure to an enormous amount. Having nothing but paper to meet it, the state had made an unlimited issue of assignats, and had increased the issue in a few months from twelve thousand millions to twenty-nine thousand. By former receipts and those remaining in the treasury, the actual amount in circulation amounted to nineteen thousand million, which went beyond the highest figures ever known in finances. That the issues should not be further multiplied, the commission of five, instituted during the last days of the convention for devising extraordinary means of police and finance, had induced the assembly to decree in principle an extraordinary war-tax of twenty times the land-tax, and ten times the tax on trade licenses, which might produce about six or seven thousand million in paper. But this tax was only enacted in principle; and in the mean time, inscriptions of annuities (*rentes*) were given to the contractors, which they received at a ruinous rate. Five francs annuity was received for ten francs capital. Besides all this, they tried a voluntary loan at three per cent., which was ruinous in its system, and had but few subscribers.

In this dreadful distress, the public placemen, being unable to live upon their salaries, gave in their resignation; the soldiers left the armies, which had lost one-third of their effective force, and returned to the towns, where the inefficiency of the government allowed them to remain unmolested. Thus to maintain five armies, and supply an immense capital, by the simple power of issuing valueless assignats; to recruit those armies; to remodel the entire government in the midst of the two hostile factions,—such was the task of the five magistrates who had just been called to the supreme administration of the republic.

The instinctive feeling of order is so great in human associations, that they themselves consent to its establishment, and wonderfully assist those who undertake the duty of reforming them: it would be impossible to reform them, if themselves did not concur therein; but one ought not the less to acknowledge the courage and the efforts of those who venture upon such undertakings. The five directors, on repairing to the Luxembourg, found not a single article of furniture there. The porter lent them a rickety table, a sheet of letter-paper, and an inkstand, for the purpose of writing the first message, which was to notify to the two councils that the directory was formed. In the treasury there was not a single sou in money. They printed over night the assignats necessary for the service of the following day, and they were issued quite wet from the press of the republic. The greatest uncertainty respecting the supply of provisions prevailed; and for several days there had been nothing but a few ounces of bread or rice to distribute among the people.

The first demand made was a call for funds. According to the new constitution, it was requisite that every expense should be preceded by a demand for the ways and means, with an allowance for each ministry. The two councils allowed the demand, and then the treasury, which had been rendered independent of the directory, took account of sums granted by the decree of the two councils. The directory demanded at first three thousand million in assignats, which was allowed, and which would have to be exchanged immediately for money. Was it the duty of the treasury or of the directory to negotiate for the money? That was the first difficulty. The treasury, in contracting by itself, would overstep the limits of a simple superintendence. That difficulty was got rid of by conferring upon the treasury the power of negotiating with the paper. The three thousand million could produce at most twenty or twenty-five million of crowns. Thus the utmost that could be effected was to satisfy the necessities of the present time. They set themselves to work without loss of time upon a scheme of finance, and the directory intimated to the two councils that the scheme would be laid before them in the course of a few days. In the mean time Paris, which was utterly destitute, had to be fed. There was no longer any methodized system of requisitions; the directory demanded the faculty of requiring, by way of summons, in the departments contiguous to that of the Seine, the quantity of two hundred and fifty thousand quintals of corn, on account of the land-tax payable in kind. The next thing the directory did was to call for a vast number of laws for the repression of all kinds of disorders, and especially of desertion, which was daily diminishing the strength of the armies. At the same time, it set about selecting the persons who were to compose the administration. Merlin (of Douai) was called to the ministry of justice; Aubert-Dubayet was removed from the army of the coasts of Cherbourg, in order that he should receive the portfolio of war; Charles Lacroix was placed at the head of foreign affairs; Faypoult, over the finances; and Benezech, an enlightened

official over the interior. The directory then looked about carefully among the multitude of applicants by whom it was besieged, for the men best qualified to fill public offices. It could hardly be expected but that in this extreme haste it made some very injudicious appointments. The directory retained, in particular, a great number of patriots, who had rendered themselves too notorious to be either impartial or discreet. The 13th Vendémiaire had rendered them necessary, and caused the alarm which they had inspired to be forgotten. The entire government, directors, ministers, and agents of all sorts, was thus formed from an utter abhorrence of the 13th Vendémiaire, and the party which had brought about that conflict. The conventional deputies themselves were not yet recalled from their missions; and to do this the directory had only to forbear sending them a notification of its installation; it thus intended to allow them time to finish their work. Fréron, sent to the south, to repress the counter-revolutionary disturbances in that quarter, was consequently enabled to continue his circuit through those unhappy districts. The five directors laboured without intermission, and displayed, in these first moments, the same zeal that had been seen exhibited by the members of the great committee of public welfare, in the ever memorable days of September and October, 1793.

Unfortunately, the difficulties of this task were aggravated by defeats. The retreat which the army of the Sambre and Meuse had been forced to make gave rise to the most alarming rumours. Owing to the most ill-arranged of all plans, and the treason of Pichegru, the projected invasion of Germany had not altogether succeeded, as we have already seen. The intention was to cross the Rhine at two points, and to occupy the right bank with two armies. Jourdan, who had gone from Dusseldorf after having crossed the river without accident, had found himself upon the Lahn, cooped up between the Prussian line and the Rhine, and destitute of every thing, in a neutral country, where he could not live by forced supplies. This distress, however, could not have lasted longer than a few days, if he could have advanced into the enemy's country and joined Pichegru, who had found by the occupation of Manheim so easy and so unexpected a passage over the Rhine. Jourdan would have repaired by this junction the faulty conception of the plan of campaign prescribed to him; but Pichegru, who was still discussing the conditions of his defection with the agents of the prince of Condé, had stationed but an inefficient division beyond the Rhine. He had pertinaciously made up his mind against crossing the river with the bulk of his army, and left Jourdan alone *en flèche* in the midst of Germany. This position could not be of long duration. All who had the least notion of war trembled for Jourdan. Hoche, who, while commanding in Brittany, interested himself in the operations of the other armies, communicated his ideas accordingly to all his correspondents. Jourdan was therefore compelled to retreat, and to recross the Rhine; and in so doing he acted very judiciously, and deserved esteem for the manner in which he conducted his retreat.

The enemies of the republic were rejoiced at this retrograde movement, and spread the most alarming reports. Their malicious predictions came to pass at the very moment when the directory was installed. The fault of the plan adopted by the committee of public welfare consisted in dividing its forces, and thus leaving to the enemy who occupied Mentz the advantage of a central position, suggesting to him the idea of collecting his troops, and bringing the entire mass of his army to bear against one or other of our two armies. This situation suggested a felicitous idea to general Clerfait, exemplifying greater genius than he had previously displayed, but which he did not likewise demonstrate by the execution of what had been thus suggested by circumstances. A division of nearly thirty thousand French blockaded Mentz. Clerfait, master of that fortress, could debouch from it, and overwhelm the blockading division, before Jourdan and Pichegru had time to come up. In point of fact, he seized the favourable moment with great address. Jourdan had scarcely retired upon the Lower Rhine by Dusseldorf and Neuwied, than Clerfait, leaving a detachment to observe his motions, proceeded to Mentz, and there concentrated his forces, so as to debouch suddenly upon the blockading division. That division, under the command of general Schaal, extended itself in a semicircle around Mentz, and formed a line of nearly four leagues. Though great care had been taken to fortify it, still its extent did not permit it to be closed in a complete manner. Clerfait, who had made his observations upon it, had discovered more than one point easily accessible. The extremity of the semicircular line, which was to support itself on the upper course of the Rhine, left an extensive level between the latter intrenchments and the river. It was upon this point that Clerfait resolved to bring his principal force to bear. On the 7th Brumaire (October 29) he debouched by Mentz with an imposing force, but yet not considerable enough to render the operation decisive. Military men have in fact censured him for having left on the right bank a body which, had it been directed against the left bank, would have inevitably brought destruction upon a part of the French army. Clerfait despatched along the meadow which occupied the space between the line of blockade and the Rhine, a column which advanced with the musket in hand. At the same time, a flotilla of gun-boats went up the river to support the movement of this column. He made the rest of his army march upon the front of the lines, and gave orders for a prompt and vigorous attack. The French division, finding itself at once attacked in front, turned by a corps filing along the river, and cannonaded by a flotilla, whose balls reached its rear, took fright, and fled in confusion. The division of Saint-Cyr, which was stationed next behind the latter, then found itself unprotected, and likely to be closely attacked. Fortunately, the firmness and judgment of its general extricated it from danger. He shifted from front to rear, and executed his retreat in good order, warning the other divisions to do the same. From that moment, the whole semicircle was abandoned; Saint-Cyr's division made its retreating movement to the army of the Upper Rhine; the divisions of Meugand and Renaud, which occupied the other part of the line, finding themselves cut off, fell back

upon the army of the Sambre and Meuse, a division of which, very fortunately, commanded by Marceau, advanced without accident into the Hunds-Ruck. The retreat of these two latter divisions was managed with great difficulty, and would have been impracticable, had Clerfait, comprehending the whole importance of his admirable manœuvre, acted with stronger masses, and with sufficient rapidity. He might, according to the opinion of military men, after having broke through the French line, have rapidly turned the divisions which were descending towards the Lower Rhine, surrounded them, and cooped them up in the elbow which the Rhine makes from Mentz to Ringen.

Clerfait's manœuvre was not the less admirable, and it was considered as the first of the kind performed by the allies. While he was carrying the lines of Mentz, Wurmser by a simultaneous attack upon Pichegru, had taken from him the bridge of the Neckar, and had subsequently driven him within the walls of Manheim. Thus the two French armies, again driven beyond the Rhine, retaining, it is true, Manheim, Neuwied, and Dusseldorf, but cut off from one another by Clerfait, who had driven away the blockaders of Mentz, might run great risks before a bold and enterprising general. The latter event had shaken them considerably; the fugitives had run back into the interior; and an absolute destitution added to the disheartening effects of the defeat. Fortunately, Clerfait was in no hurry to proceed, and took much longer time than was necessary for concentrating all his forces.

This unhappy intelligence arriving at Paris between the 11th and 12th Brumaire, at the very moment of the installation of the directory, in a great degree contributed to augment the difficulties of the new republican organization. Other events, less dangerous in reality, though quite as serious in appearance, were taking place in the west. A fresh descent of emigrants threatened the republic. After the disastrous descent at Quiberon, which, as we have seen, would never have been attempted, if a portion of the forces had not been furnished by the English government, the remains of the expedition had been taken on board the English fleet, and then landed on the little island of Ouat. Thither the unfortunate families of the Morbihan who had hastened to meet the expedition, and the remnant of the emigrant regiments, had been conveyed. An epidemic disease and violent dissensions prevailed on that small rock. After some time, Puisaye, who had been recalled by all the Chouans who had broken the pacification, and who imputed to the English, and not to their former chief, the miscarriage at Quiberon, had returned to Brittany, where he had made every preparation for a renewal of hostilities. During the Quiberon expedition, the leaders of La Vendée had not stirred, because the expedition had no immediate reference to them, and because they were prohibited by the Paris agents from assisting Puisaye; and lastly, because they were waiting for a successful movement before they durst again commit themselves. Charette alone had engaged in an altercation with the republican authorities concerning various disorders committed in his district, and certain military preparations which he was blamed for making, and he had almost come to an open rupture with them. He had just received, by way of Paris, fresh marks of distinction from Verona, and the appointment of commander-in-chief of the Catholic districts, the great object of his desire. This new dignity, while it cooled the zeal of his rivals, had singularly excited his own. He was looking for a new expedition to be sent to his coasts; and commodore Warren having offered him the stores remaining from the Quiberon expedition, he had no longer hesitated; he had made a general attack on the beach, driven back the republican posts, and got some cartridges and muskets. The English had at the same time landed on the coast of the Morbihan the unfortunate families they had dragged in their train, and who were dying from famine and privation in the Isle of Ouat. Thus the pacification was broken, and war again begun.

For a long time, the three republican generals, Aubert-Dubayet, Hoche, and Canclaux, who commanded the three armies known as the armies of Cherbourg, Brest, and the west, had considered the pacification as broken not only in Brittany, but also in Lower Vendée. They had all three met at Nantes, but could not determine upon any thing. They nevertheless put themselves in preparation to hasten individually to the first point that should be threatened. A new landing was talked of; it was said, as was perfectly true, that the Quiberon division was only the first, and that another was to come. Being informed of the new perils to which the coast was exposed, the French government appointed Hoche to the command of the army of the west. The conqueror of Weissenburg and Quiberon, was, in fact, the man on whom at this present juncture the entire national confidence should be reposed. He immediately repaired to Nantes to supersede Canclaux. The three armies appointed to repress the insurgent provinces had been successively reinforced by some detachments arrived from the north, and by several of the divisions which the peace with Spain rendered available. Hoche got leave to draw fresh detachments from the two armies of Brest and Cherbourg, to strengthen that of La Vendée, so that he brought it up to forty-four thousand men. He stationed strongly intrenched posts on the Nantes Sèvre, which runs between the two Vendées, and separates Stofflet's country from that of Charette. His object in this was to cut these two leaders off from one another, and to prevent their combining their operations. Charette had entirely thrown off the mask, and proclaimed war anew. Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Scépeaux, jealous of seeing Charette appointed generalissimo, intimidated also by the preparations of Hoche, and uncertain as to the arrival of the English, did not move from their place. At last, the English squadron made its appearance, at first in the bay of Quiberon, and afterwards in the bay of Isle-Dieu, in front of Lower Vendée. The squadron carried two thousand English infantry, five hundred horse in good order, small companies of emigrant regiments, a great number of officers, arms, ammunition, provisions, clothing for a considerable army, funds in metallic currency, and lastly the long looked-for prince. A still greater force was to follow, provided the expedition opened successfully, and assuming that the prince testified his sincere desire of putting himself at the head of the

royalist party. No sooner was the expedition observed from the coast, than all the royalist chiefs sent emissaries to the prince, to assure him of their devoted attachment, to claim the honour of his confiding himself to them, and to settle how their efforts should be made available. Charette, master of the shore, was best situated for assisting at the landing; and his reputation, as well as the wishes of all the emigrants, attracted the expedition towards his quarter. He also despatched agents to determine upon a plan of future operations.

Hoche was, meanwhile, making his preparations with his wonted activity and resolution. He formed the plan of despatching three columns from Challans, Clisson, and Saint-Hermine, three points situated at the extremities of the country, and carrying Belleville, the head-quarters of Charette. These three columns, twenty or twenty-two thousand strong, ought from their numbers to have overawed the country, destroyed Charette's principal establishment, and thrown him by a brisk and vigorous attack into such disorder, that he should not have been able to protect the landing of the emigrant prince. Hoche accordingly caused these three columns to be sent off, and joined them at Belleville, without meeting with any accident. Charette, whose principal force he hoped to meet with and to fight, was not at Belleville; he had collected nine to ten thousand men, and was on his way in the direction of Luçon, so as to remove the theatre of the war towards the south of the country, and to call the attention of the republicans from the coast. His plan was well conceived, but it failed from the energy opposed to him. While Hoche was entering Belleville with his three columns, Charette was before the post of Saint-Cyr, which protected the road from Luçon to Sables. This post he attacked with all his forces; two hundred republicans intrenched in a church made an heroic resistance, and gave the Luçon division who heard the cannonade time to hasten to their relief. Charette, taken in flank, was completely beaten, and compelled to disperse with his troops, in order to regain the interior of the Marais.

Hoche, not finding the enemy before him, and discovering the real intent of his movement, brought back his column to the points whence they had started, and began to form an intrenched camp at Sauflans near the coast, for the purpose of rushing down upon the first army that should attempt to land. During this interval, the emigrant prince, surrounded by a numerous council and the envoys of all the Breton and Vendean chiefs, continued to consult upon the means of effecting a landing; and allowed Hoche time to dispose of his means of defence. The English sail keeping within sight of the coast, were continually exciting the alarms of the republicans and the hopes of the royalists.

Thus, from the earliest days of the installation of the directory, a defeat before Mentz, and a threatened invasion in La Vendée, were subjects of alarm of which the enemies of the government most traitorously availed themselves to render its settlement more arduous. The government explained or contradicted part of the reports that were circulated concerning the situation of the two frontiers, and gave full information respecting the events that had recently taken place. There was no suppressing the defeat sustained before the lines of Mentz; but the government stated in answer to the speeches of the alarmists, that Dusseldorf and Neuwied were still ours, and had been always in our power; that consequently the army of the Sambre and Mentz possessed two *têtes de pont*, and the army of the Rhine one, for debouching, whenever it should be advisable, beyond the Rhine; that our situation and that of the Austrians were in fact the same, since, if they were enabled by Mentz to carry on operations upon both banks, so were we by Dusseldorf, Neuwied, and Manheim. This reasoning was just; but it remained to be seen whether the Austrians, following up their success, would not soon take Neuwied and Manheim from us, and establish themselves on the left bank between the Vosges and the Moselle. As for La Vendée, the government communicated the vigorous course taken by Hoche, which satisfied reasonable folks, but which could not prevent enthusiastic patriots from conceiving apprehensions, and the counter-revolutionists from diffusing them.

Amidst these dangers, the directory increased its efforts for reorganizing the government, the administration, and particularly the finance department. Three thousand million assignats had been granted it, as we have observed, and had produced at the utmost some twenty millions in crowns. The voluntary loan at three per cent, opened in the latter days of the convention, had just been suspended: for in exchange for a paper capital the state engaged to pay a monied annuity, and made a ruinous bargain. The extraordinary war-tax proposed by the commission of five had not yet been carried into execution, and excited complaints, as a last revolutionary act of the convention with respect to the tax-payers. The public offices were about being closed. Individual placemen, compensated according to the sliding scale, raised such bitter complaints, that the compensations had to be suspended. The post-masters, being paid in assignats, announced their intended resignation, for the insufficient indemnity afforded by the government would not cover their losses. The post-office was soon to close, that is to say, all communications, even in writing, were about to cease in every part of the kingdom. The scheme of the finances, promised in a few days, must therefore be immediately presented. This was the first thing to be looked to, and the first duty of the directory. The scheme was at last communicated to the commission of the finances.

The mass of the assignats in circulation might be computed at about twenty thousand million. Even reckoning the assignats at the one hundredth part of their value, and not at the one hundred and fiftieth, they would not be actually worth more than two hundred million: it is certain that they would not pass for more in the currency, and that those who held them could not get them taken at a higher rate. It might have been possible to have suddenly recurred to their effective value, not to take assignats for more than they were really worth, or admit them unless at the course of exchange, either in dealings between individuals, or in payment of the taxes, or in payment for the national property. If this had been the case, then that prodigious and frightful mass of paper, that enormous debt, would have disappeared. There were remaining nearly seven thousand million crowns

of national property, inclusive of the national property in Belgium and the national forests; therefore there were ample means for calling in those twenty thousand millions reduced to two hundred millions, and for providing against fresh expenses. But this great and bold determination could hardly be adopted; it was rejected both by scrupulous minds, who considered it as a bankruptcy, and by the patriots, who said that people desired the destruction of the assignats.

Both of them seemed to know but little on the subject. This bankruptcy, assuming it were so, was inevitable, and so it ultimately turned out. The only question was how to confine the evil, that is, the confusion, and to establish a system with respect to securities, a mere act of justice that the state owes to every one. At first sight, indeed, it would be a bankruptcy to take at the present time for one franc an assignat which had been issued in 1790 for one hundred francs, and which then contained the promise of the worth of one hundred francs in land. Upon this principle, the twenty thousand million in paper must have been taken for twenty thousand million crowns, and paid in full; but the national property would scarcely have paid a third of that sum. Even assuming that the sum could have been paid in full, the question must be asked, how much the state had received in issuing these twenty thousand million. Four or five thousand million perhaps. They had not been taken for more when received from the hands of the state, and it had already repaid by the sales an equal value in national property. It therefore would have been a cruel injustice with regard to the state, that is to say, towards all tax-payers, to consider the assignats according to their original value. No one therefore could consent to take them but at a reduced value; in fact, this was now beginning to be effected by the introduction of the sliding scale.

Doubtless if there were still persons holders of the first assignats, and who had kept them without once exchanging them, these latter would be exposed to an enormous loss; for having taken them nearly at par, they would have to experience the entire reduction. But this was a fiction in every respect illusory. Nobody had kept assignats by them, for there is no hoarding paper: every one had been in a hurry to pass them away as soon as possible, and every one had borne his proportion of the loss. Every body had borne his share of the loss in this assumed bankruptcy, and from that moment it was no longer a bankruptcy. The bankruptcy of a state consists in making some individuals, namely the creditors, bear the debt which it is not desirable should be borne by all the tax-payers: now if every body had more or less borne his share of the depreciation of the assignats, no one could be said to have become bankrupt. Lastly, a still stronger reason could be given than any of the others. If the assignat had fallen only while in some hands, and had lost its value so far as some individuals were concerned, it had nevertheless passed into the hands of the speculators in paper, and it would have been this class rather than that of the real sufferers who would have reaped the benefit of a most absurd restoration of value. Else would Calonne, in a pamphlet written in London, have observed very sensibly that it was a self deception to suppose that France was overwhelmed with the burden of the assignats, and that this paper money afforded the means of her becoming bankrupt without declaring herself so. He ought, in order to express himself with more propriety, to have said, that by this means the loss by the bankruptcy was universally distributed, which is the same as saying there was no bankruptcy at all.

It was therefore reasonable and just to return to the substantiality of the thing, and to take the assignat for no more than it was absolutely worth. The patriots said that this was effecting the destruction of the assignat that had saved the revolution, and looked upon this idea as a conception issuing from the brain of the royalists. Those who pretended to reason with more enlightened views and a knowledge of what they were talking about, argued that they were going to make paper currency fall all at once, and that the currency could no longer be carried on, for want of the paper which would have been destroyed, and for want of the metallic currency which was either hoarded up or had gone away to foreigners. The event furnished an answer to those who supported this mode of reasoning; but a simple calculation ought to have put them immediately in the way of coming to a more correct conclusion. In reality, the twenty thousand million of assignats represented less than two hundred million; now, according to all calculations, the circulation could not formerly be carried on with less than two thousand million, gold or silver. If therefore at the present time the assignats did not form more than two hundred million in the circulation, how did they manage for the rest in business? It is very evident that the metals must have a considerable currency, and in fact they did have a currency, but it was in the provinces and in the country, far from the eyes of the government. Besides the metals, like all commodities, are always attracted whither their presence is needed; and by repudiating paper, they would have returned, as in point of fact they did return when paper died a natural death.

It was therefore a double illusion, and one that had taken deep root in the public mind, to consider the reduction of the assignat to its real value as a bankruptcy, and as a sudden destruction of the means of circulation. It had only one inconvenience, but it was not for this that it was censured, as we shall presently see. The commission of the finances, bound by the ideas which then prevailed, could only partially adopt the real principles of the matter. After conferring with the directory, it resolved upon the following scheme.

During the intervening period, and until, according to the new plan, the sale of the national property and the collection of the taxes should bring back not fictitious but real sums, it would be necessary still to use assignats. It was proposed to extend the issue to thirty thousand million, but that was to be the extreme limit. On the 30th Nivôse, the plate was to be solemnly broken up. Thus the mind of the public was set at ease respecting the quantity of the new issues. There was set apart to meet the thirty thousand million issued, one thousand million crowns' value of the national property. By consequence the assignat, which in currency was not actually worth more than the one hundred and fiftieth part of its de-

nomination and much less, would be fixed at one-thirtieth, which was a very great advantage given to the holder of paper. Another thousand million crowns' value of national property was further set apart for rewarding the soldiers of the republic, a recompense that had long since been promised them. Therefore there remained five out of the seven undisposed of. In these five were included the national forests, the moveable property of the emigrants and of the crown, the royal residences, and the possessions of the Belgian clergy. There were then five thousand million of crowns still disposable. But the difficulty consisted in disposing of that amount. The assignat had in fact been the means of putting it in circulation before the property was sold. But the assignat being abolished, since there could be no more than ten thousand million added to the existing twenty, a sum which at most represented one hundred million of crowns, how was the value of the property to be realized beforehand, and be made available for the expenses of the war? This was the only objection to be made against fixing the value of the paper and its suppression. A species of debentures (*cédules hypothécaires*) were invented, a measure that had been hinted at in the preceding year. According to this old plan, the government was to borrow and to give to the lenders debentures in the nature of a special pledge upon particular estates. In order to raise this loan, recourse was to be had to financial companies, who were to take these notes on their own hands. In short, instead of a paper at a forced currency, secured as general mortgage on the national property, and which was daily fluctuating in value, by means of the debentures a voluntary paper currency was created specially chargeable as an incumbrance upon some one estate or house, and which could not undergo any other change in value than that of the very object it represented. This was not, correctly speaking, a paper money; it was not liable to fall, because it was not forcibly put into circulation; but, on the other hand, a difficulty might be experienced in disposing of it. In short, the same difficulty as at the outset of the revolution still presented itself in putting the value of the property into circulation, the question was, whether it would be better to force the circulation of that value, or to leave it voluntary. The former expedient being completely exhausted, it was but natural that the other experiment should be tried.

It was therefore settled, that after bringing up the paper up to thirty thousand million, after having appointed one thousand million crowns' worth of property, and after having set apart one thousand million crowns' worth of property for the soldiers of the country, debentures should be made out for a sum proportionate to the public necessities, and that the financial companies were to contract for these notes. The national forests were not to be thus debentured (*cédulées*); they were to be preserved for the state. They formed nearly two out of the five thousand million remaining disposable. Some negotiation was to be opened with the companies as to letting them for a certain number of years.

The consequence of this scheme, founded upon the reduction of the assignats to their real value, was to admit them no longer but at the course of exchange in all business transactions. Until they could be called in by the sale of the thousand million appropriated to them, they were no longer to be taken by individuals or by the state, but at their current value. Thus all confusion in business would be avoided, and all fraudulent payments would become impracticable. The state was about to receive from the assessed taxes the actual value, which would cover at least the ordinary expenses, and would no longer have to pay with the national property any thing else than the extraordinary expenses of the war. The assignat was to be received at par only in the arrears of the taxes, arrears which were considerable, and amounted to thirteen thousand million. Thus the tax-payers, who were in arrear, were furnished with an easy method of discharging themselves, on condition that they should do so forthwith; and the sum of thirty thousand million payable in national property at one-thirtieth, was diminished by so much.

This scheme, adopted by the five hundred, after a long discussion in secret committee, was immediately carried to the ancients. While the ancients were discussing it, new questions were submitted to the five hundred, as to the mode of summoning back to their colours the soldiers who had deserted into the interior, how the judges should be appointed, and as to the nomination of municipal officers, and functionaries of all kinds, whom the electoral assemblies, agitated by the passions of Vendémiaire, had neither time or inclination to nominate. Thus did the directory labour without intermission, and produce fresh subjects for the attention of the two councils.

The scheme of finance referred to the ancients rested on sound principles; it presented resources, for France yet possessed vast resources; unfortunately it did not surmount the real difficulty, for it did not sufficiently reduce those resources into means available at the present time. It is very evident, that with taxes amply sufficient for her annual expenditure when the paper should cease to render the receipts illusory, with seven thousand million for paying off the assignats, and providing for the extraordinary expenses of the war, it is evident enough that France possessed resources. The difficulty consisted in basing a scheme upon sound principles, and in adopting it to the future, to provide particularly for the present.

Now the ancients were not of opinion that the assignats should be so speedily discarded. The faculty of creating a further ten thousand million was capable of producing at most a resource of one hundred million crowns, and this was but little, while waiting for the receipts which the new plan was to procure. Besides, should they find companies treat for the letting of the forests for twenty or thirty years? Should they find any to take the debentures, that is the free assignats? In this uncertainty that existed as to rendering the national property available by the new means, ought they to abandon the former method of expending them, namely, by forced assignats? The council of the ancients, who most rigidly investigated the resolutions of the five hundred, and who had already rejected more than one, put its veto upon the financial scheme, and refused to allow it.

This rejection occasioned considerable anxiety in the public mind, and there was a relapse into the greatest irresolution. The counter-revolutionists, de-

lighted to witness this conflict of notions, alleged that the difficulties of the situation were insuperable, and that the republic would perish for want of finances. The most enlightened men, who are not always the most resolute, feared the same thing. The patriots, irritated to the highest degree on perceiving that an idea had been entertained of abolishing the assignats, cried out that there existed an intention to destroy the last revolutionary device that had saved France; they wanted to know why, without fumbling so long about it, the government did not restore the credit of the assignats by the means of 1793, the *maximum*, *requisitions*, and death. There was a violence and an excitement exhibited, that called to mind the most unquiet periods. To crown our misfortunes, affairs on the Rhine had grown worse; Clerfait, without making the most of his victory, as a great captain would have done, had nevertheless derived from it new advantages. Having obtained La Tour's division, he had marched against Pichegru, attacked him on the Pfirim, and on the canal of Frankendal, and had gradually driven him back to Landau. Jourdan had advanced upon the Nahe, through a difficult country, and was animated by the noblest zeal in carrying on the war in the midst of rocky mountains, in order to extricate the army of the Rhine; but his efforts could do no more than cool the ardour of the enemy, without repairing our losses.

If then the line of the Rhine was left us in the Netherlands, it was lost higher up at the Vosges, and the enemy had taken from us an extensive semicircle around Mentz.

In this state of distress, the directory sent a most urgent despatch to the council of five hundred, and proposed one of those extraordinary resolutions usually adopted on the decisive emergencies of the revolution. This was a forced loan of six hundred million in real value, either in money or in assignats at the current value, distributed among the wealthiest classes. This was making way for a new series of arbitrary acts, like Cambon's forced loan from the rich; but as this new loan was immediately wanted, so that it might call in all the assignats in circulation, and to furnish still further a surplus of three or four hundred million in money, and as it was at length necessary to resort to prompt and energetic resources, it was adopted.

It was settled that the assignats should be received at the rate of one hundred for one: a two hundred million loan would therefore suffice to absorb twenty thousand million of paper. Every assignat that was presented in payment was to be burnt. It was hoped that the paper, being thus almost entirely withdrawn, would rise; and that, were it indispensable, the government could issue more, and avail itself of this resource. There would thus remain to be received out of the six hundred million, four hundred million in money, which would defray the necessities for the first two months, for the expenditure of this year (year IV, 1795, 1796,) was estimated at one thousand five hundred million.

Certain opponents of the directory, who, without troubling themselves very much about the state of the country, and only cared to thwart the new government at any rate, raised the most alarming objections. This loan, said they, was running away with all the money in France; she even had not enough to pay it! as if the state, in taking four hundred million in metal, would not bring them back into the circulation, by purchasing corn, cloth, leather, iron, &c. All that the state was going to burn was paper. The question was, whether France could immediately give four hundred million in articles of consumption and merchandize, and burn two hundred million in paper which was ostentatiously called twenty thousand million. She certainly could. The only inconvenience was in the mode of collection, which might be vexatious, and thereby be rendered less productive; but no one knew how to effect this! To limit the assignats to thirty thousand million, that is to say, not to provide more than one hundred real millions beforehand, then to destroy the plate, and then to let the state depend upon the alienation of the revenue of the forests, and the disposal of the debentures, that is to say, on the issue of a volunteer paper, would have appeared too venturesome a course. In the uncertainty as to what could be done with a free will, the councils thought it best to compel the French to pay more than usual.

By means of the forced loan, it was said a part at least of the paper would be got in; it would be got in with a certain quantity of money; then again there would still be the plate, which would have acquired more value by the absorption of the greater part of the assignats. At all events, other ways and means were not to be discarded solely on this account; it was settled that a part of the national property should be debentured, a lengthy operation, for it was necessary to mention every item of property in the debentures, and then to make a bargain with the financial companies. A decree was passed for putting up to sale the houses situated in towns, of lands under three hundred arpents, and lastly, of the possessions of the Belgian clergy. The late royal residences, Fontainebleau, Versailles, and Compiègne excepted, were also to be disposed of. The moveable property of the emigrants was also to be sold forthwith. All these sales were to be made by auction.

The government durst not yet decree the reduction of assignats to the course of exchange, which would have put an end to the greatest mischief of all, that of ruining all those who received them, private individuals as well as the state. It was apprehended that they would by this simple measure be all at once destroyed; however, it was arranged that in the forced loan they should be received at one hundred for one; that in the payment of arrears of taxes they should be received at their full value, in order to encourage the payment of those arrears, which were to bring in thirteen thousand million; that the repayment of the principal should be still suspended; but that the annuities and interest of all kinds should be paid at the rate of ten for one, which again would be very burdensome upon those who received their income at that rate. The payment of the land-tax and rents of farms was retained upon the old footing, that is to say, half in kind and half in assignats. The customs were to be paid half in assignats and half in money. This exception was made in respect of the customs, because there was plenty of money on the frontiers. There was likewise an exception in regard to Belgium. The assignats had not made their way thither, it was decided that the forced

loan, and the taxes, should there be taken in money.

It was therefore not without some misgivings that the government returned to money, and durst not boldly cut the knot, as is always done in such cases. Thus the forced loan, the sale of national property, the arrears, by getting in considerable quantities of paper, enabled the government to issue more. Moreover, they might fairly reckon upon some receipts in money.

Next to the regulations of finance, the two most important determinations related to desertion, and to the mode of nominating the public officials who had not yet been elected. The one had in view the reformation of the armies, the other to perfect the organization of the communes and tribunals.

Desertion on foreign service, a crime extremely rare, was to be punished with death. A warm discussion took place relative to the penalty to be inflicted on seducing soldiers from their allegiance. Notwithstanding the opposition, it was made punishable precisely as for desertion to the enemy. All furloughs granted to young men of the requisition were to expire in ten days. The prosecution of the young men who had abandoned their colours, which had been entrusted to the municipalities, was lenient and ineffective; this was transferred to the gendarmerie. Desertion on home service was made punishable by imprisonment for the first offence, and with hard labour for the second. The great requisition of August, 1793, the only measure of recruiting that had been adopted, produced men enough to fill the armies; it had sufficed for the last three years to keep them on a respectable footing, and might yet have been sufficient for that purpose, with the aid of a new law to ensure its being carried into execution. The new arrangements were combated by the opposition, which tended naturally to diminish the action of the government, but they were adopted by the majority of the two councils.

A great number of the electoral assemblies, in a state of disturbance by reason of the decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor, had let the time run by, and had not completed the nomination of the individuals who were to compose the local administrations and the tribunals. Such of them as were situated in the provinces of the west had not been able to do so, on account of the civil war. Others had neglected it altogether. The conventionalist majority, to ensure an assimilation of the government, together with an assimilation entirely revolutionary, wished that the directory should have the nominations. It is natural that the government should inherit all those rights that the citizens relinquish, that is, that the action of the government should supply the deficiency of individuals. Thus, in those cases where the assemblies had suffered the constitutional term to elapse, where they had not desired to exercise their rights, it was natural that the directory should be called upon to nominate. The convocation of new assemblies would be repugnant to the constitution, which prohibited such a course; it would be encouraging rebellion against the laws; in short, it would be the commencement of fresh disturbances. Moreover, there were relative analogies in the constitution by which the question would be determined in favour of the directory. Thus the directory was empowered to make the nominations in the colonies, and to reappoint to the places of the public officials who had died or resigned in the interval between one election and another. The opposition did not fail to attack this line of conduct. Dumolard in the council of the five hundred, Portalis, Dupont (of Nemours), and Tronçon-Ducoudray, in the council of the ancients, argued that this was to confer a royal prerogative on the directory. This minority, which had a secret bias in favour of monarchy, rather than the republic, here changed sides with the republican majority, and maintained democratic ideas to an extreme of absurdity. In other respects, an animated and solemn discussion was not disturbed by any violent language. The directory had the nominations, on the sole condition of making its selection from among those who had already been honoured with the suffrages of the people. Principles led to this demonstration; but policy would recommend still further. The directory avoided making new elections at the present moment, and a greater uniformity was imparted to the entire administration, the tribunals, and the government.

The directory had, therefore, the means of procuring funds, of recruiting the army, and of completing the organization of the administration and of justice. The directory possessed a majority in the two councils. A temperate opposition sprung up, it is true, in the five hundred and in the ancients, some few voices of the new third cavilled at its prerogatives; but this opposition was calm and decorous; it seemed to respect the extraordinary situation and the arduous labour of the directory. Without doubt it also respected in this government, elected by the conventionalists and upheld by them, the still all-powerful and highly-irritated revolution. The five directors had each borne their portion of the general task. Barras took the conduct of the public offices, and Carnot the direction of the armies; Rewbell the foreign department; Letourneur and Larévellière-Lépeaux the home department. They nevertheless deliberated in common on all important measures. For a long time their furniture was of the meanest description; but at length they had obtained from the Garde Meuble such things as were necessary for fitting up the Luxembourg, and they began to represent the French republic in a respectable manner. Their ante-chambers were full of applicants, from whom it was not always easy to make a selection. The directory, consistent with its origin and its nature, always selected men of the most decided character. Having taken warning from the insurrection of the 13th Vendémiaire, it had provided itself with a considerable and imposing force to protect Paris and the seat of the government from a fresh *coup-de-main*. Young Bonaparte, who had figured on the 13th Vendémiaire, had been appointed to the command of this army, called the army of the interior. He had entirely reorganized and stationed it at the camp of Grenelle. He had collected into a single regiment, under the title of the "police legion," a party of those patriots who had offered their services on the 13th Vendémiaire. These patriots, for the greatest part, belonged to the old gendarmerie, disbanded after the 9th Thermidor, which was itself formed of none other than old soldiers of the French guards. Bonaparte next organized the constitutional guard of the directory, and that of the

councils. This imposing and well-directed force was capable of overawing everybody, and keeping the parties within due bounds.

Steady in its course, the directory declared itself still more decidedly on a great number of measures of detail. It still abstained from notifying its installation to the conventional deputies on mission in the departments. It enjoined all the managers of theatres not to suffer any other air to be sung than the *Marseillaise*. The *Reveil du Peuple* was prohibited. This measure was deemed puerile: it would certainly have been more dignified to prohibit all songs whatever; but it was desirable to enliven the republican enthusiasm, unfortunately getting lukewarm. The directory caused some royalist journals, which had continued to write with the same violence as in Vendémiaire, to be prosecuted. Although the liberty of the press was unfettered, the law of the convention against writers who should advocate the restoration of royalty, still afforded the means of suppression in very bad cases. Richer-Serizy was prosecuted; depositions were taken against Lemaitre and Brottier, whose correspondence with Verona, London, and La Vendée evidenced their being royalist agents, and demonstrated the operation of their influence in the disturbances of Vendémiaire. Lemaitre was condemned to death as the principal agent; Brottier was acquitted. It was ascertained that two secretaries of the committee of public welfare had handed them over some important papers. The three deputies, Saladin, Lhomond, and Rovère, put under arrest on account of the 13th Vendémiaire, but after their re-election had been declared by the electoral assembly of Paris, were reinstated by the two councils, on the ground that they were already deputies at the time they had been proceeded against, and that the forms prescribed by the constitution in regard to deputies, had not been observed. Cormatin, and the Chouans seized with him, as violators of the pacification, were also brought to trial. Cormatin was transported for having secretly continued to foment civil war; the others were acquitted, to the great displeasure of the patriots, who complained bitterly of the indulgence of the tribunals.

The conduct of the directory with respect to the minister of the court of Florence proved still more strongly the republican rigour of its sentiments. It had been at length arranged with Austria to deliver up to her the daughter of Louis XVI. sole relict of the family that had been confined in the Temple, on condition that the deputies betrayed to Austria by Dumouriez should be given up to the French advanced posts. The princess set out from the Temple on the 28th Frimaire (December the 19th). The minister of the interior went himself to fetch her, and conduct her with the greatest respect to his hotel, whence she set out accompanied by persons of her own selection. An ample provision was made for her journey, and she was thus conveyed towards the frontiers. The royalists were not behindhand to make verses and remarks upon the unfortunate prisoner, at length restored to liberty. Count Carlette, that minister of Florence who had been sent to Paris on account of his known attachment to France and the revolution, applied to the directory for permission to see the princess, in his quality of minister of an allied court. That minister had become suspected, no doubt wrongfully, on account of his violent affectation of republicanism. One can hardly conceive how the minister of an absolute prince, and above all, of an Austrian prince, could entertain such an affectation. The only reply the directory gave him was an order to quit Paris immediately; but it declared at the same time, that this measure had reference to nothing but a personal objection to the envoy, and not to the court of Florence, with whom the French republic continued on terms of friendship.

It was now six weeks at most since the directory was instituted, and already it began to settle itself; the parties were reconciling themselves to the idea of an established government, and having no notion of overturning it, settled among themselves how they should oppose it within the limits marked out by the constitution. The patriots, not renouncing their favourite idea of a club, had assembled at the Pantheon; they sat there already to the amount of more than four thousand, and formed an assembly very much like that of the old Jacobins. Obedient, however, to the letter of the constitution, they had avoided what had been prohibited in respect of these meetings of citizens, namely, the organization of a political assembly. Thus they had no secretary; they had not provided themselves with certificates; the persons present were not divided into spectators and members; there existed neither correspondence or affiliation with other societies of the same nature. With these exceptions, the club possessed all the characteristics of the old parent society, and its passions, grown older, were only the more stubborn on that account.

The sectionists had formed themselves into societies more in accordance with their tastes and manners. At this time, as under the convention, they counted in their ranks some concealed royalists, but they were few in number; the greater part of them were enemies, from fear or complaisance, of the terrorists and the conventionalists whom they affected to confound, and whom they were vexed to find again almost all of them in the new government. They had formed themselves into societies where they read the newspapers, and where they conversed upon political affairs with the politeness and in the style of the withdrawing-rooms, and where reading and conversation was followed by dancing and music. The winter set in, and these gentry indulged in pleasure as an act of opposition to the revolutionary system, a system nobody thought of reviving, for the Saint-Justs, Robespierres, and Couthons were no longer there to bring us back by terror to a state of things that could not be endured.

Both parties had their respective journals. The patriots had *Le Tribun du Peuple*, *L'Ami du Peuple*, *L'Eclaireur du Peuple*, *L'Orateur Plébien*, and *Le Journal des Hommes Libres*; these newspapers were thoroughly Jacobin. *La Quotidienne*, *L'Eclair*, *La Veridique*, *Le Postillon*, *Le Messager*, and *La Feuille du Jour*, passed for royalist papers. The patriots, in their club and their journals, although the government certainly was strongly attached to the revolution, showed themselves highly irritated. Certain it is they were out of temper not so much with the government as with the events themselves. The reverses on the Rhine, the new movements in

La Vendée, the alarming financial crisis, afforded them sufficient ground, as they conceived, for reverting to their favourite ideas. If the armies were beaten, if the assignats fell, it was because the government was indulgent, because it knew not how to recur to great revolutionary expedients. The new financial system, in particular, which discovered a desire to abolish the assignats, and which afforded a glimpse of their speedy abolition, had greatly alienated the patriots.

Their adversaries needed no other cause of complaint than this very irritation. Terror, according to them, was about to be revived. Its advocates were incorrigible; the directory would have enough to do if it did all they desired: they were never satisfied; they were again in agitation; they had reopened the old den of the Jacobins, and there they were constantly preparing every species of atrocity.

Such were the operations of the government, the progress of public opinion, and the state of parties, in Frimaire, year IV. (November and December, 1795.)

The military operations, continued in spite of the season, began to promise more propitious results, and to afford the new administration some compensation for its arduous efforts. The zeal with which Jourdan had advanced into the Hunds-Rück across a frightful country, and without any of the necessaries which could have assuaged the sufferings of his army, had somewhat restored our affairs on the Rhine. The Austrian generals, whose troops were as much worn out as ours, finding themselves exposed to a series of obstinately contested battles in the midst of winter, proposed an armistice, during which the imperial and the French armies should retain the positions they then occupied. The armistice was accepted, upon the condition of determining the same, ten days before the resumption of hostilities. The line which separated the two armies, following the Rhine from Dusseldorf to above Neuwied, left the river there, formed a semicircle from Bingen to Manheim in passing along the base of the Vosges, rejoined the Rhine above Manheim, and did not leave it all the way up to Bâle. Thus we had lost all that semicircle on the left bank. This was, after all, a loss which a simple well-conceived manœuvre might repair. The principal misfortune consisted in having lost for the moment the ascendancy of conquest. The armies, exhausted with fatigue, entered into cantonments, and all the necessary preparations began to be made for putting them in the following spring in a state to open a decisive campaign.

On the frontiers of Italy, the season had not yet wholly excluded military operations. The army of the eastern Pyrenees had been transferred to the Alps. Much time had been occupied in marching from Perpignan to Nice, and the want of provisions and shoes had rendered the march still slower. At length, towards the month of November, Augereau came with a fine division, which had already distinguished itself in the plains of Catalonia. Kellermann, as we have seen, had been compelled to draw back his right wing, and to relinquish the immediate communication with Genoa. He had his left on the high Alps, and his centre at the pass of the Tende. His right was placed behind the line called the line of Borghetto, one of the three which Bonaparte had reconnoitred and marked out in the preceding year, in case of a retreat. Devins, quite proud of his petty success, was staying in the Riviera of Genoa, and making a great show of his plans, without executing one of them. The brave Kellermann was impatiently awaiting the reinforcements from Spain, to resume the offensive and to recover his communication with Genoa. His desire was to terminate the campaign by a brilliant action, which should restore the Riviera to the French, afford them access to the Apennines and to Italy, and detach the king of Sardinia from the allied powers. Our ambassador in Switzerland, Barthélemy, was constantly repeating that a victory towards the maritime Alps would immediately ensure us peace with Piedmont, and the absolute cession of the line of the Alps. The French government agreed with Kellermann upon the necessity of making an attack, but not as to the plan to be adopted, and appointed Schérer to succeed him. Schérer who had gained some credit by his success at the battle of the Ourthe and in Catalonia, came up in the middle of Brumaire, and resolved to attempt a decisive action.

Every body knows that the chain of the Alps, when it takes the name of Apennines, runs very close to the Mediterranean from Albenga to Genoa, and leaves between the sea and the crest of the mountains only narrow and rapid slopes, scarcely three leagues in extent. On the opposite side, that is, towards the plains of the Po, the slopes decline gently over an extent of twenty leagues. The French army, placed on these inclined surfaces towards the sea, was encamped between the mountains and the sea. The Piedmontese army, under Colli, stationed in the intrenched camp below Ceva, on the other side of the Alps, guarded the entrance to Piedmont against the left of the French army. The Austrian army partly on the crest of the Apennines at Rocca-Barbenne, partly on the maritime slope in the basin of Loano, communicated thus with Colli by its right, occupied by its centre the crest of the mountains, and intercepted the line of coast by its left, so as to cut off our communications with Genoa. The observation of this state of things suggested an original thought. The entire force should be brought to bear upon the right and centre of the Austrian army, drive it from the crest of the Apennines, and carry the upper heights. It would thus be cut off from Colli, and the French marching rapidly along these crests, would enclose the left of the Austrian army in the basin of Loano between the mountains and the sea. *Masséna*, one of the generals of division, had first conceived this plan, and it was he who had proposed it to Kellermann. It occurred also to Schérer, and he determined upon carrying it into execution.

Devins, after making some attempts, during August and September, on our line of Borghetto, had given up all idea of making an attack for that year. He was ill, and had procured Wall s to succeed him. The officers thought of nothing else than indulging themselves in the winter at Genoa and its environs. Schérer, after having procured for his army some provisions and twenty-four thousand pairs of shoes, of which it was in absolute want,

fixed his movement for the 2nd Frimaire (November the 23rd). He went with thirty-six thousand men to attack forty-five thousand; but the excellent selection of the point of attack compensated for the inequality of force. He directed Augereau to drive the left of the enemy into the basin of Loano; he ordered Masséna to fall upon their centre at Rocca-Barbenne, and to make himself master of the summit of the Apennines; lastly, Serrurier was to keep Colli in check who formed the right on the opposite slope. Augereau, while pushing the Austrian right into the basin of Loano, had no quick movement to execute; Masséna, on the contrary, was to file rapidly along the crests, and turn the basin of Loano, in order to enclose therein the left of the Austrian army; and Serrurier was to mislead Colli by feint attacks.

On the morning of the 2nd Frimaire (November 23rd, 1795) the French cannon awoke the Austrians, who little expected a battle. The officers hastened from Loano and from Finale to put themselves at the head of their astonished troops. Augereau made his attack with vigour, but without precipitation. He was stopped by the brave Roccavina. This general, stationed on a small eminence in the middle of the basin of Loano, defended it with obstinacy, and suffered himself to be surrounded by Augereau's division, still refusing to surrender. When completely surrounded, he rushed headlong upon the line that held him in, and rejoined the Austrian army, making his way through a French brigade.

Schérer, repressing the ardour of Augereau, obliged him to use his musketry before Loano, that he might not push the Austrians too speedily on their line of retreat. Meanwhile Masséna, to whom the brilliant part of the plan was committed, gained with that vigour and boldness which distinguished him on all occasions, the crests of the Apennines, surprised d'Argenteau, who commanded the right of the Austrians, threw him in extreme disorder, drove him from all positions, and encamped in the evening on the heights of Melogno, which formed the circuit of the basin of Loano, and closed it from behind Serrurier by firm and well-conceived attacks, had kept Colli and the whole right of the enemy in check.

In the evening of the 2nd, the troops encamped, during extremely bad weather, on the positions they had occupied. On the morning of the 3rd, Schérer continued his operations; Serrurier, having been reinforced, began to attack Colli more seriously, in order to cut him off entirely from his allies; Masséna continued to occupy all the crests and outlets of the Apennines; Augereau, no longer restraining himself, vigorously pushed the Austrians, whose rear had been intercepted. From that moment they commenced their retreat, in very bad weather, and by miserable roads. Their right and centre fled in disorder on the other side of the Apennines; their left, shut up between the mountains and the sea, retired with difficulty along the shore by the road of La Corniche. A storm of wind and snow prevented so active a pursuit as might otherwise have taken place; nevertheless, five thousand prisoners, several thousand killed, forty pieces of cannon, and vast stores, were the fruit of this battle, one of the most disastrous the allies had experienced from the commencement of the war, and one of the most best managed on the part of the French in the judgment of military men.

Piedmont was in consternation at the intelligence; Italy gave itself for lost, and was only tranquillized by considering that the season was too far advanced for the French to follow up their operations. The extent of the stores did much towards assuaging the hardships and the privations of the army. A victory so important as this was much wanted to revive hope, and to confirm the new government. This victory was made public, and hailed with delight by all true patriots.

At the same moment, affairs took a no less favourable turn in the provinces of the west. Hoche, having increased the army which kept guard over the two Vendées to forty-four thousand men, having placed intrenched posts on the Nantes Sèvre, so as to cut off Stofflet from Charette, having dispersed the first body of men got together by the latter chief, also watching by means of a camp at Soullans the whole coast of the Marais, was in a condition to oppose a landing. The English squadron, at anchor off the Isle-Dieu, was on the contrary in a very melancholy position. The island on which the expedition had so injudiciously landed, presented nothing but a surface without any shelter, without resources, and less than three quarters of a league in extent. The shore of the island offered no safe anchorage. The ships were there exposed to all the fury of the wind upon a rocky bottom, which cut their cables, and placed them every night in the greatest danger. The opposite coast, on which it was proposed to land, was one vast beach, without any depth of water, where the waves were always breaking; and where boats, taken aback by the breakers, could not reach the shore without running the risk of foundering. Every day increased the dangers of the English squadron and the resources of Hoche. It was now six weeks that the French prince had been at the Isle-Dieu. All the envoys of the Chouans and the Vendéans surrounded him; and mingling with his staff, offered their suggestions all at once, and strove to obtain their adoption. Every one of them was desirous of having the prince in his own power; but they all agreed that he ought to land as soon as possible, no matter to what point the preference was given.

It must be confessed that owing to this stay of six weeks at Isle-Dieu, in sight of the coast, to make a descent had become no easy matter. Neither a landing or the crossing a river ought ever to be subjected to delay or hesitation, for it is these that put the enemy on his guard, and point out to him the intended spot. The determination to land on the coast being once taken, and all the leaders acquainted therewith, the descent should have been effected suddenly, and that upon a point which would have allowed a communication to exist with the English squadron, and on which point the Vendeans and the Chouans could have brought a considerable force to bear. Certainly, if the descent had been made on the coast without threatening it so long, forty thousand royalists of Brittany and La Vendée might have been collected before Hoche could have had time to put his regiments in motion. When we recollect what happened at Quiberon, the facility with which the landing was

this last effort of the emigrants.

Expiring efforts of Charette.—Hoche's plans for reducing the Vendeans.

effected, and the time that it took to assemble the republican troops, we can easily understand how easily the present descent could have been effected, had it not been preceded by a long cruise off the coast. While, in the preceding expedition, the name of Puisaye neutralized all the leaders, the name of the prince in this latter expedition would have rallied them all, and would have roused twenty departments. It is true that the new invaders would afterwards have had severe battles to fight, that they would have had to run the same risks that Stofflet and Charette had encountered for the last three years, that they would have been obliged to disperse perhaps before the enemy, to run away like guerilla troops, to hide themselves in the woods, to reappear, hide again, and, lastly, to run the risk of being taken and shot. Such is the price to be paid for thrones. There was nothing derogatory in playing the Chouan (*chouanner*) in the forests of Brittany, or in the marshes and moors of La Vendée. A prince issuing from those retreats to ascend the throne of his ancestors, would not have been less glorious than Gustavus Vasa, emerging from the mines of Dalecarlia. Moreover, it is probable that the presence of the prince would have excited such zeal in the royalist countries, that a numerous army, continually at his side, would have permitted him to attempt enterprises of importance. It is probable that none of those about him would have had sufficient genius to conquer the young plebeian who commanded the republican army; but at least they might have made a stand before he did conquer them. A defeat is not frequently without its consolations. Francis I. found many consolatory circumstances in the defeat he suffered at Pavia.

Assuming that a landing could have been effected at the instant the squadron arrived, it was no longer practicable after waiting six weeks at the Isle-Dieu. The English seamen declared that it would soon be impossible to keep at sea, and that some determination must be come to; the whole coast of Charette's country was covered with troops; there was no possibility of landing unless beyond the Loire, near the mouth of the Vilaine, or in the country of Scépeaux, or in Brittany, where Puisaye was. But the emigrants and the prince would not land any where but where Charette was, for he was the only person on whom they relied. Now the thing was impracticable on Charette's coast. The prince, according to the assertion of M. de Vauban, solicited the English ministry to recall him. The ministry at first refused, not desiring that the cost of its expédition should have been uselessly incurred. However, it left the prince at liberty to pursue whatever course he thought proper.

From that moment every preparation was made for departure. Long and useless instructions for the royalist chiefs were drawn up. They were told that superior orders prevented for a moment the effecting a descent; that MM. Charette, Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Scépeaux were to settle among themselves to collect a force of twenty-five or thirty thousand men beyond the Loire, which, joined with the Bretons, might form a picked regiment of forty or fifty thousand men, sufficient to protect the landing of the prince; that the point where the descent was to take place should be pointed out so soon as these preliminary measures should have been taken; and that all the resources of the English monarchy would be called into action to second the efforts of the royalist countries. To these instructions were added a few thousand pounds sterling for each chief, some muskets, and a small quantity of powder. These things were landed at night on the coast of Brittany. The provisions with which the English had loaded their squadron were spoiled and thrown into the sea. They were obliged also to cast overboard the five hundred horses belonging to the English cavalry and artillery, for they were almost all diseased from being so long at sea.

The English squadron set sail on the 15th November (Brumaire 26th), and its departure left the royalists in consternation. They were told that it was the English who had obliged the prince to go back; they were indignant, and again gave vent to their utter abhorrence of English perfidy. Charette was the most enraged, and he had some reason to be so, for he was the most compromised. Charette had taken up arms again in the hope of a great expedition, in the hope of immense means, which would counterbalance the inequality of force between him and the republicans; this hope being fallacious, he saw nothing before him but certain and speedy destruction. The threat of a descent had drawn down upon him all the forces of the republicans; and this time he was obliged to give up every hope of reconciling matters; all that he could expect was to be shot without mercy, and without even having any right to complain of an enemy who had already so generously pardoned him on a former occasion.

He resolved to sell his life as dearly as he could, and to employ his last moments in struggling against despair. He fought several actions, in order to get upon the rear of Hoche, break through the line of the Nantes Sevre, throw himself into Stofflet's country, and compel this colleague to resume his hostilities. He was unsuccessful, and was brought back into the Marais by Hoche's columns. Sapinaud, whom he had prevailed upon to résume hostilities, surprised the town of Montaign, and desired to make his way as far as Chatillon; but he was stopped before that place, beaten, and obliged to disperse his men. The line of the Sevre could not be carried. Stofflet, in the rear of that fortified line, was obliged to keep quiet, and besides, he was not disposed to resume hostilities. He beheld with secret pleasure the destruction of a rival who had been loaded with titles, and who had wished to deliver him up to the republicans. Scépeaux, between the Loire and the Vilaine, durst not yet stir. Brittany was disorganized by internal dissension. The division of Morbihan, commanded by George Cadoudal, had revolted against Puisaye at the instigation of the emigrants who surrounded the French prince, and who had retained their old resentment against Puisaye. They wanted to deprive him of the command of Brittany, but it was the division of Morbihan alone that would not acknowledge the authority of the generalissimo.

Such was the state of things when Hoche commenced the great work of pacification. This young general, a skilful politician and soldier, clearly perceived that he must no longer endea-

vour to conquer an enemy with whom it was impossible to grapple, and who was not to be reached by the mere force of arms. He had already despatched several moveable columns in pursuit of Charette; but heavily-armed soldiers, obliged to carry every thing about them, and who did not know the country, could not equal the speed of peasants carrying nothing but their musket, who were always certain of finding provisions wherever they went, who well knew the smallest ravines and the dreariest moors. Consequently he immediately ordered all pursuit to cease, and digested a scheme which, being followed up with firmness and perseverance, could hardly fail in restoring peace to those desolated countries.

The Vendean was at once peasant and soldier. Amidst the horrors of civil war, he had never ceased to cultivate his fields and to attend to his cattle. His musket was at his side, concealed in the ground, or under straw. At the first signal of his leaders, he hastened to them, attacked the republicans, then stole away through the woods, returned to his fields, and again concealed his gun; and the republicans found but an unarmed peasant, in whom they could not by any means recognize an enemy soldier. Thus it was that the Vendeans fought, subsisted, and continued to be almost inaccessible. While they at all times had the means of annoying and of increasing their numbers, the republican armies, whom a ruined administration could no longer support, were in want of every thing, and found themselves in a state of the most awful destitution.

The Vendeans could not be affected by the war, except by devastating the country; an experiment that had been tried during the time of terror, but which had only excited a bitter hatred, without putting an end to the civil war.

Hoche conceived an ingenious mode of reducing the country without laying it waste, by depriving it of its arms, and taking part of its produce for the supply of the republican army. In the first place, he was determined in fixing some intrenched camps, some of which, situated on the Sevre, cut off Charette from Stoffiet, while others protected Nantes, the coast, and Sables. He then formed a circular line, supported by the Sèvre and the Loire, so as to progressively coop in the whole country. This line was composed of very strong posts, communicating with each other by patroles, in such a manner as to leave no free space by which an enemy who was at all numerous could pass. These posts were directed to occupy every township and village, and to disarm the inhabitants. To accomplish this, they were to seize the cattle, which usually grazed in common, and the corn preserved in the barns; they were also to arrest the principal inhabitants, and by no means to restore the cattle and the corn, or release the persons taken as hostages, till the peasants should have voluntarily surrendered their arms. Now as the Vendeans were more attached to their cattle and their corn than to the Bourbons and Charette, it was certain enough that they would surrender their arms. In order not to be deceived by the peasants, who might give up a few bad firelocks and keep the others, the officers charged with the disarming were to make them produce the registers of enrolment kept in every parish, and to call for as many muskets as there were persons enrolled. In default of these registers, they were enjoined to make an estimate of the population, and to require a number of muskets equal to one-fourth of the male portion. After having received the arms, they were faithfully to restore the cattle and the corn, with the exception of a part to be levied in advance by the name of a tax, and to be collected in storehouses formed on the rear of that line. Hoche had directed that the inhabitants should be treated with the utmost mildness, and that the most scrupulous punctuality should be observed in restoring their cattle, their corn, and especially their hostages. He had particularly recommended to the officers to have personal intercourse with them, to treat them well, to send them even sometimes to his head quarters, and to make them presents of corn or other things. He had also enjoined the greatest respect to be paid to the clergymen. The Vendeans, said he, have but one unaffected feeling, that is, attachment to their priests. These latter require nought else than protection and tranquillity; let us ensure both to them; let us even add some kindnesses, and the affections of the country will be our return.

That line, which he called the disarming line, was to encircle Lower Vendée, to advance by degrees, and at length to inclose it entirely. As it advanced, it left behind it the country disarmed, reduced, nay, even reconciled with the republic. It did more; protection was afforded against a return of the insurgent leaders, who usually visited submission to the republic and the surrender of arms by laying waste the country. Two moveable columns preceded this line, to give battle to those leaders and to seize them if possible; and shortly by hemming them in closer and closer, it must inevitably coop them up and secure them. The utmost attention was enjoined to all commandants of posts, so as to keep them constantly in communication by means of patroles, and to prevent the armed bands from breaking through the line, and again transferring the war to the rear. But in spite of all their care, it might so happen that Charette and some of his coadjutors would elude the vigilance of the posts, and pass the disarming line; yet even in this case, which was practicable, they could only pass with a few persons, and they would then find themselves in countries that were disarmed, restored to tranquillity and security, pacified by kind treatment, and intimidated besides by that small-meshed drag-net of troops which encompassed the country. The possibility of a revolt in the rear had been provided against. Hoche had given orders that one of the moveable columns should immediately go back and transfer themselves to the insurgent commune, and that to punish it for not having surrendered all its arms, and for having again made use of them, its cattle and corn should be taken away and the principal inhabitants seized. The effect of these corrections was certain; and as they were administered with justice, they would not excite hatred, but rather a salutary fear.

Hoche's plan was immediately carried into execution in the months of Brumaire and Frimaire (November and December). The disarming line passing through Saint-Gilles, Légé, Montaigu, and Chantonnay, formed a semicircle, the right

extremity of which was supported by the sea and the left by the river Lay, its object being to gradually confine Charette to morasses from whence there was no escape. This was a plan the success of which would particularly depend upon the manner of its execution. Hoche issued his instructions to his officers in a sensible and intelligent manner, and was extremely active in personally attending to all the details. This was not merely a war, it was rather a great military operation, which demanded as much prudence as vigour. The inhabitants soon began to surrender their arms, and to become reconciled with the republican troops. Hoche afforded relief to the indigent from the storehouses of the army; he personally visited the inhabitants detained as hostages, caused them to be kept a few days, and sent them away satisfied. To some he gave cockades, to others police caps, sometimes even corn to such as had none for sowing their fields. He was in correspondence with the clergy, who placed great confidence in him, and acquainted him with all the secrets of the country. He thus began to acquire a great moral influence, a real power, with which he must necessarily terminate such a war. In the mean time, the storehouses formed on the rear of the disarming line were gradually filling with corn; great herds of cattle were collected; and the army began to live in abundance through this simple expedient of levying a tax and mulcts in kind.

Charette had concealed himself in the woods, with a hundred or one hundred and fifty men as desperate as himself. Sapinaud, who at his instigation had again resumed hostilities, begged to lay down his arms this second time, on the mere condition that his life should be spared. Stofflet, cooped up in Anjou with his minister Bernier, received there all the officers who had forsaken Charette and Sapinaud, and did his best to enrich himself with their spoils. He kept at his quarters at Lavoir a sort of court, composed of emigrants and officers. He enlisted men and levied contributions, upon pretext of organizing the local militia. Hoche watched him very attentively, hemmed him in closer and closer by intrenched camps, and threatened him with a speedy disarming, on the first occasion of displeasure. An expedition that Hoche despatched into the Loroux, a district which had a sort of independent existence, not acknowledging obedience either to the republic or any leader, struck terror into Stofflet. Hoche sent this expedition to bring away the wine and the corn, both very abundant in the Loroux, and with which the city of Nantes was completely unprovided. Stofflet was alarmed, and solicited an interview with Hoche. He wanted to make protestation of his adherence to the treaty, to intercede for Sapinaud and the Chouans, and make himself in some measure the mediator of a new pacification, and thus secure himself by a prolongation of his influence. He wished also to discover Hoche's intentions in regard to himself. Hoche told him plainly of what it was the republic had to complain; and intimated that if he afforded shelter to the *brigands*, if he continued to levy men and money, if he wanted to be any thing more than the temporary chief of the police of Anjou, and to play the part of prince, he would carry him off immediately, and then disarm his province. Stofflet promised the utmost obedience, and retired full of apprehensions respecting the future.

Hoche had at that time far greater difficulties to encounter. He had attached to his army a portion of the two armies of Brest and Cherbourg. The imminent danger of a descent on the coast had procured him these reinforcements, which had increased the number of the troops collected in La Vendée to forty-four thousand men. The generals commanding the armies of Brest and Cherbourg were calling for the troops which they had lent, and the directory seemed to countenance their claims. Hoche wrote that the operation which he had commenced, was one of the utmost importance; that if the troops which he had spread like a close drag-net around the Marais were taken from him, the submission of Charette's district, and the destruction of that leader, which would be soon accomplished, would be indefinitely delayed; that it would be better to finish what was so far advanced, before going away elsewhere; that he would then lose no time in returning the troops he had borrowed, and would even send his own to the general commanding in Brittany, so as to apply to that country those measures, the good effects of which had been already experienced in La Vendée. The government, struck with the reasons of Hoche, and reposing the utmost confidence in him, called him to Paris, with the intention of approving all his plans, and giving him the command of the three armies of La Vendée, Brest, and Cherbourg. He was summoned thither at the end of Frimaire, to consult with the directory upon those operations which were to put an end to this the most calamitous warfare of all.

Thus terminated the campaign of 1795. The reduction of Luxembourg, the passage of the Rhine, the victories in the Pyrenees, followed by the peace with Spain, and the destruction of the emigrant army at Quiberon, distinguished the beginning and the middle of this year. The end was not so prosperous. The retura of the armies across the Rhine, the loss of the lines of Mentz, and a portion of ground at the base of the Vosges, momentarily obscured the brilliancy of our triumphs. But the victory of Loano, opening to us an entrance into Italy, reasserted the superiority of our arms; and the operations of Hoche in the west commenced the real pacification of La Vendée, which had been so often and so vainly predicted.

The league of the allied powers confined to England, Austria, and a few princes of Germany and Italy, had reached the limit of its operations, and but for its recent victories on the Rhine would have sought for peace. These gained Clerfait an immense reputation; and it seemed to be the opinion that the next campaign would open in the heart of our provinces on the Rhine.

Pitt, who required supplies, summoned parliament again for autumn, in order to call for fresh impositions. The people of London were quite as anxious as ever for peace. A society called the corresponding society had met in the open air, and had voted the boldest and most threatening addresses against the war system, and urging parliamentary reform. When the king went to open the parliament, his carriage was pelted with stones, the glasses were broken, and it was even believed that he had been shot at from an air-

gun. Pitt, passing through London streets on horseback, was recognized by the populace, pursued to his own house, and covered with mud. Fox and Sheridan, more eloquent than they had ever been, called him severely to account. Holland conquered, the Netherlands incorporated with the French republic, their conquest rendered in some measure absolute by the reduction of Luxembourg, enormous sums spent on La Vendée, and unfortunate Frenchmen exposed to be shot without any, sufficiently adequate motive, were grave accusations against the judgment and policy of the ministry. The expedition to Quiberon, in particular, excited universal indignation. Pitt attempted to excuse himself by saying that no English blood had been spilt. "True," replied Sheridan, with an energy which it is difficult to transfer to another language; "true, English blood has not been spilt, but English honour has oozed from every pore." Pitt, quite as unimpassioned as ever, styled all the events of the year misfortunes, for which those who run the risks of war should always be prepared; but he made the most of the recent victories of Austria on the Rhine; he greatly magnified their importance, and the facilities which they were likely to afford for a treaty with France. According to his custom, he asserted that our republic was fast approaching the limit of its power; that an inevitable bankruptcy was about to plunge it into utter confusion and impotence; that by continuing the war a year longer, the allies had gained a great point, that of reducing the common enemy to extremity. He solemnly promised, that when the new French government should appear to stand on a firmer footing, and to assume a regular form, he would seize the first opportunity for negotiation. He then asked for a new loan of three millions sterling, and for enactments against the press and the political societies, to which he attributed the outrages committed upon the king and himself. The opposition replied that the alleged victories on the Rhine were victories to endure no longer than a few days; that defeats in Italy had in fact just destroyed the effect of the advantages obtained in Germany; that this republic always reduced to the last extremities, recovered itself more vigorously at the opening of each campaign; that the assignats had long been abandoned, that they had performed their office, that the resources of France were elsewhere, and besides, if France were exhausting herself, Great Britain was exhausting herself far more rapidly; that the debt, every day increasing, was overwhelming, and must soon crush the three kingdoms. So far as concerned the enactments against the press and the political societies, Fox, in a transport of indignation, declared that if they were adopted, the English people would have no resource left but resistance, and that he considered resistance no longer as a question of right, but rather as a prudential measure. This holding forth the right of insurrection excited a great tumult, which terminated by the demands of Pitt being voted; he got a new loan as well as his restrictive measures voted, and he promised to open a negotiation as soon as possible. The parliament was prorogued to the 2nd of February, 1796, (13 Pluviôse, year IV.)

Pitt never gave himself a single thought of peace. He merely meant to make a few outward manifestations, and as a sop to public opinion, and to facilitate the obtaining his loan. The possession of the Netherlands by France made the very idea of peace irreconcileable with his ideas. In point of fact, he made up his mind to seize an opportunity for opening a feigned negotiation, and offering conditions that he knew could not be assented to.

Austria, in order to satisfy the empire, which cried out for peace, had caused overtures to be made through Denmark. This power had proposed, on behalf of Austria, to the French government, the formation of an European congress; to which the French government made answer that a congress would render all negotiation impracticable, for there were too many conflicting interests to be reconciled; that if Austria was desirous of peace, she had but to make direct overtures for it: that France desired to treat individually with all her enemies, and to settle matters with them without any mediator. This was a proper answer to make; for a congress would only confound the peace that was made with Austria with the peace between England and the empire, and render it impracticable. Besides all this, Austria required no other answer, for she did not mean to negotiate. She had lost too much, and her recent successes had led her to hope too much, for her to consent to lay down her arms. She strove to infuse courage into the king of Piedmont, who was greatly alarmed at the victory of Loano, and promised him a numerous army and another general for the ensuing campaign. The honours of a triumph were decreed to general Clerfait, on his entry into Vienna; his carriage was drawn by the people; and court favour was added to the demonstrations of popular enthusiasm.

Thus ended for all Europe the fourth campaign of this memorable war.

CHAPTER II.

CONTINUATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS OF THE DIRECTORY—MANIFESTATION OF PARTY FEELING IN THE LEGISLATIVE BODY.—INSTITUTION OF AN ANNIVERSARY FÊTE ON THE 21ST JANUARY.—RETURN OF BRUNNOWVILLE THE EX-MINISTER OF WAR, AND THE REPRESENTATIVES QUINETTE, CAMUS, BANCAL, LAMARQUE, AND DROUET, BETRAYED TO THE ENEMY BY DUMOURIEZ.—DISCONTENT OF THE JACOBINS. BABŒUF'S NEWSPAPER.—APPOINTMENT OF A MINISTER OF POLICE.—ALTERATION IN SOCIAL LIFE.—FINANCIAL EMBARRASSMENTS; CREATION OF MANDATS.—BABŒUF'S CONSPIRACY.—OUR MILITARY POSITION. PLANS OF THE DIRECTORY.—PACIFICATION OF LA VENDÈE; MILITARY EXECUTIONS UPON STOFFLET AND CHARETTE.

THE republican government was encouraged and strengthened by the events that had recently terminated the campaign. The convention, by uniting Belgium with France, and incorporating it with the constitutional territory, had imposed upon her successors the obligation not to treat with the enemy unless they gave us the line of the Rhine. It required renewed exertions and a new campaign, more decisive than the preceding, to compel the house of Austria and England to consent to our aggrandizement. To attain this end, the directory laboured with energy to put the armies in good condition, to put the finances on a better footing, and to suppress the factions.

The directory particularly directed its attention to the putting the laws relative to the young requisitionists in force, and compelled them under the severest penalties to rejoin the armies. No species of exemption was recognized, and in every district a commission of medical men sat to decide upon cases of physical disability. A great number of young men had thrust themselves into the administrations, where they plundered the republic, and showed the most vicious inclinations. The strictest orders were given that none were to be admitted into the public offices but those who belonged to the requisition. The finances, in particular, attracted the attention of the directory; it caused the forced loan of six hundred millions to be raised with extreme promptitude. But it was obliged to wait for the proceeds of that loan, for the alienation of the produce of the national forests, for the sale of the national properties of three hundred acres or more, and for the collection of the arrears of taxes; and in the mean time it was necessary to provide for expenses which unfortunately came all at once, because the installation of the new government was the time to which all payments were deferred, and because the winter was the season appointed for preparations for the next campaign. To anticipate the period of all these returns, the directory had been obliged to avail itself of the resource which the public had taken care it should retain, that of the assignats. But it had already issued in one month from twelve to fifteen thousand millions, in order to procure a few millions in money; and things had come to such a pitch that they could not pass them any where. The directory therefore conceived the idea of issuing a current paper at a short date, which should represent the revenue of the year, as is done in England with Exchequer-bills, and as we are now doing with royal *bons*. It issued bills, termed *rescriptions**, payable to bearer at the treasury, out of the money which was to come in immediately, either from the *forced* loan, which in Belgium was to be paid in money, or from the customs, or from the first engagements with the companies which should undertake the letting of the forests. At first it issued thirty millions of these "rescriptions," and soon raised them to sixty, by securing the assistance of bankers.

Financial companies were no longer prohibited. The directory was now considering how they could be made available in the creation of a bank, so useful to public credit at a time when it was imagined that all the money had gone out of France. The directory formed a company, and proposed to allow it a certain quantity of national property, to serve for the capital of a bank. This bank was to issue notes, which would have lands for their pledge, and would be payable at sight like all bank notes. It was to lend to the state these notes to an amount proportionate to the lands given in pledge. This was, as is plainly perceivable, another mode of drawing upon the value of the national property: it was, in fact, nothing more than the substitution of bank notes for the assignats.

This was by no means a sure scheme, but in its unfortunate situation the government tried every thing, and was right in doing so. Its most meritorious operation was abolishing the rations, and making articles of consumption saleable without restriction. We have seen what trouble it cost the government to bring corn to Paris; and what an expense was entailed upon the treasury, which paid for the corn in hard money, and sold it again to the people of the capital for nominal value. The government was scarcely repaid a two hundredth part of the expense, and thus the republic was not far short from having the entire population of Paris to maintain in food.

The new minister of the interior, Benezech, who had felt the inconvenience of this system, and who conceived that circumstances would allow its abandonment, advised the directory to have the courage so to do. Trade began to be brisk; corn began to be publicly sold; the people insisted on being paid their wages in cash, and thenceforward they could manage to buy bread, which was moderate enough for ready money. Benezech accordingly proposed to the directory that the distribution of rations should be discontinued, as they were only paid in assignats, and to continue them only to the indigent, or to the annuitants and the public functionaries, whose annual income was under a thousand crowns. With the exception of these three classes, every body else was to supply themselves at the bakers by buying bread without restriction.

* Rescription means an order upon another in writing requiring him to make a payment to a third party out of a particular sum or fund. *Trans.*

This was a bold measure, and required real courage. The directory carried it into immediate execution, regardless of the rage which it might excite in the populace, and the means of disturbance it might afford the two factions conspiring against the tranquillity of the republic.

Besides these measures, the directory devised others which could not be less prejudicial to individuals, but which were quite as necessary. That which the armies particularly stood in need of, and which they always want at the end of a long war, was a supply of horses. The directory applied to the two councils for authority to levy all horses kept for pleasure, and to take every thirtieth horse employed in tillage and draught on paying for it. The receipt for the horse was to be taken in payment of taxes. This measure, though harsh, was indispensable, and was adopted.

The two councils seconded the directory, and manifested the same spirit, with the exception of the still moderate opposition of the minority. Some discussions had arisen relative to the verification of the powers upon the law of the 3rd Brumaire, the law of inheritance in respect to emigrants, the priests, and the occurrences in the south, and parties had begun to manifest themselves.

The verification of the powers had been referred to a commission, which had numerous inquiries to make relative to the members whose qualifications could be contested. Its report, therefore, could not be made for a long time, and after more than two months' business had been gone through; it gave rise to many altercations respecting the application of the law of the 3rd Brumaire. This law, we all know, created an oblivion of all offences committed during the revolution, excepting such as related to the 13th Vendémiaire; it excluded from public offices the relatives of emigrants and those persons who, in the electoral assemblies, had set themselves in rebellion against the decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor. This law had been the last energetic act of the conventional party, and was singularly obnoxious to men of moderate sentiments, as well as the counter-revolutionists who concealed themselves behind them. It was necessary to enforce this law with respect to several deputies, and especially to one Job Aymé, deputy of the Drôme, who had raised the electoral assembly of his department, and who was accused of belonging to the companies of Jesus. A member of the five hundred ventured even to demand a repeal of that law. This motion caused all the parties to throw off the reserve they had hitherto maintained. A debate similar to those which had so frequently divided the convention arose in the five hundred. Louvet, always faithful to the revolutionary cause, rushed to the tribune to defend the law. Tallien, who had performed so conspicuous a part since the 9th Thermidor, and whose want of personal influence had prevented his attaining a seat in the directory,—Tallien on this occasion showed himself the unflinching advocate of the revolution, and delivered a speech which made a great impression. The circumstances under which the law of Brumaire had been passed were alluded to; there seemed an attempt to insinuate that it was an abuse of the victory of Vendémiaire in regard to the vanquished; and a great deal had been said concerning the Jacobins and their new audacity. "Let them cease to alarm us," exclaimed Tallien, "by talking of terror, by reminding us of periods totally different from those of the present day, by causing us apprehensions of their return. Times are, indeed, greatly changed. At the periods of which some persons are so fond of reminding us, the royalists did not show their audacious heads; the fanatical priests and the returned emigrants were not protected; the leaders of the Chouans were not acquitted. Why then compare circumstances which have no relation to each other? It is too evident that an intention exists to sit in judgment on the 13th Vendémiaire, the measures which have followed that memorable day, and on the men who, amid these great perils, have saved the republic. Well then, let our enemies ascend this tribune; the friends of the republic will defend us there. The very men who in those disastrous circumstances have pushed before the cannon's mouth a misguided multitude, would now reproach us with the efforts we had to make to repel that multitude; they would fain procure the repeal of the measures which the most imminent danger has forced you to take; but no, they will not succeed. The law of the 3rd Brumaire, the most important of those measures, will be upheld by you, for it is necessary to the constitution, and assuredly you are all of you desirous to maintain the constitution." "Yes, yes, we are," cried a multitude of voices. Tallien then moved the expulsion of Job Aymé. Several members of the new third were desirous of opposing this expulsion. The discussion became extremely warm; the law of the 3rd Brumaire was sanctioned anew; Job Aymé was expelled, and the inquiry was continued in respect of those members of the new third who came within the intent of the same enactments.

A discussion then took place in relation to the emigrants, and their right to future inheritances. A law of the convention had, in order to prevent the emigrants from receiving any assistance, seized their patrimony, and declared that the inheritances to which they had a right were already vested in them for the use of the republic. Consequently a sequestration had been laid upon the property belonging to the relatives of the emigrants. A resolution was proposed in the five hundred for authorizing the partition and the immediate seizure of the portion vested in the emigrants, in order that the sequestration might be taken off. A very warm opposition was demonstrated by the new third. A desire was evinced of impugning this measure, so completely revolutionary, by arguments deducible from the ordinary principles of law; it was alleged that it was committing a violation of the rights of property. Nevertheless this resolution was adopted. With the ancients it fared otherwise. This council, from the age of its members, and its office of supreme examiner, possessed more moderation than the five hundred. It was not so much identified with the conflicting passions of the day; it was less revolutionary than the majority, and much more so than the minority. Like every mediative body, it held the middle course; and it rejected the measure, because it would lead to the execution of a law which it regarded as unjust. The councils afterwards decreed that the directory should be supreme judge of the applications for erasure from

the list of emigrants. They confirmed all the laws against the priests who had not taken the oath, or who had retracted it, and against those whom the authorities of the departments had sentenced to transportation. They decreed that these priests should be treated as returned emigrants, if they appeared again upon the soil of France. They merely consented to put into confinement such of them as were infirm, and could not expatriate themselves.

One subject greatly agitated the councils, and produced an explosion in them. Fréron was still prosecuting his mission in the south, and forming the administrations and the tribunals with fervid revolutionists. The members of the companies of Jesus, the counter-revolutionists of all kinds, who had been committing murders ever since the 9th Thermidor, found themselves in their turn exposed to new reprisals, and made loud outcries. The deputy Siméon had already made temperate remonstrances. The deputy Jourdan, of Aubagne, a man of an ardent mind, and the ex-Girondist Isnard, made great complaints to the five hundred, and occupied several sittings with their declamations. The two parties came to blows. Jourdan and Talot quarrelled in the assembly itself, and almost suffered themselves to commit acts of personal violence. Their colleagues interposed and separated them. A commission was appointed to make a report on the state of the south.

These different scenes caused the parties to declare themselves more than ever. The majority in the councils was great, and entirely devoted to the directory. The minority, although a mere nullity, grew daily bolder, and openly manifested its spirit of reaction. It was nothing else than the continuation of the same spirit which had displayed itself ever since the 9th Thermidor, and which had at first with great justice attacked the excesses of terror, but which, becoming from day to day more severe and more excited, concluded by utterly condemning the revolution. Some of the members of the conventionalist two-thirds voted with the minority, and some of the members of the new third with the majority.

The conventionalists seized the opportunity with which the anniversary of the 21st of January was about to afford them, to subject their colleagues suspected of royalism to a disagreeable test. They proposed a *fête* to celebrate, every 21st of January, the death of the late king; and they caused it to be settled that on this day every member of the two councils and of the directory should take an oath of hatred to royalty. This formality of an oath, so frequently employed by the parties, never could be considered as a guarantee; it has never been any thing else than an unjust infliction of the conquering party, who have wanted to force the conquered to a perjury. The proposal was adopted by the two councils. The conventionalists awaited with impatience the sitting of the 1st Pluviôse, year IV. (January 21st), to see their colleagues of the new third one by one appear before the tribune. Each council sat that day in solemn state. A *fête* was prepared in Paris, and the directory and all the authorities were to attend it. When the oath had to be taken, some of the newly-elected appeared embarrassed. The ex-constituent Dupont, of Nemours, who was a member of the ancients, and retained to an advanced age a great liveliness of temper, and showed the boldest opposition to the existing government,—Dupont, of Nemours, showed some spiteful feeling, and after pronouncing the words, *I swear hatred to royalty*, added, *and to every kind of tyranny*. This was one way of revenging himself, and of swearing hatred to the directory under evasive words. Great disapprobation was manifested, and Dupont was compelled to adhere to the official form. In the five hundred, one André would have had recourse to the same expression as Dupont, but he was in like manner obliged to confine himself to the formula. The president of the directory delivered an energetic speech, and the whole government thus made the most revolutionary confession of faith.

At this juncture the deputies who had been exchanged for the daughter of Louis XVI. arrived. These were Quinette, Bancal, Camus, Lamarque, Drouet, and Bournonville, the ex-minister at war. They made a report of their captivity; it was listened to with profound indignation, and the directory bestowed on them proper marks of its regard; and they took amidst general satisfaction that place which the convention had reserved for them in the councils. It had been decreed, in fact, that they should be members of the legislative body as of right.

Thus did the government and the parties progress during the winter of the year IV. (1795 and 1796).

France, who longed for a government and the re-establishment of the laws, began to be satisfied with the new state of things, and would even have entirely approved it, but for the exertions that were required of her for the salvation of the republic. The rigorous execution of the laws concerning the requisitions, the forced loan, the levy of the thirtieth horse, and the wretched state of the annuitants paid in assignats, were great subjects of complaint: but for these causes, France would have found the new government excellent. It is only the select few of a nation who are affected by glory, liberty, and noble and generous ideas, and who consent to make sacrifices for them. The mass looks for tranquillity, and seeks how to make the fewest sacrifices possible. There are moments when this entire mass is roused, moved by deep and mighty passions: this had been plainly perceptible in 1789, when the mass had been obliged to restrain liberty, and in 1793, when the mass had been compelled to defend her. But exhausted by these efforts, the great majority of France was unwilling to make any more. It required an able and vigorous government to secure at her hands the resources requisite for the salvation of the republic. Fortunately the youth, ever ready for an adventurous life, offered great resources for recruiting the armies. At first they showed great unwillingness to leave their homes; but they yielded after some resistance. Transferred to the camps, they acquired a decided partiality for war, and there performed prodigies of valour. The tax-payers, from whom considerable sacrifices in money were required, were far more difficult to conform to and be reconciled with the government.

The enemies of the revolution took for their text the new sacrifices to which France was subjected, and declaimed in their newspapers against the requisition,

the forced loan, the forced levy of horses, the state of the finances, the distress of the fundholders, and the strict execution of the laws relating to emigrants and priests. They affected to consider the government as being still a revolutionary government, and as retaining all its despotism and violence. According to them, no one could any longer place confidence in it, and be easy in their minds with regard to the future. They inveighed particularly against the intention of a new campaign; they alleged that the government was sacrificing the peace, the property, and the lives of the citizens to the follies of conquest, and appeared to be chagrined that the revolution should have the honour of giving Belgium to France. Besides all this, it was by no means to be wondered at, said they, that the government should entertain such ideas and such designs, since the directory and the councils were full of the members of an assembly that had sullied itself with every crime.

The patriots, who on the score of reproaches and recriminations were never behindhand, found, on the contrary, the government too weak, and showed themselves quite ready to accuse it of complaisance to the counter-revolutionists. According to them, emigrants and priests were suffered to return; they every day acquitted the conspirators of Vendémiaire; there was not sufficient rigour used in enforcing the return of the young men of the requisition to the armies; and the forced loan was not collected with sufficient firmness. They disapproved in particular of the financial system which they seemed inclined to adopt. We have already seen that the idea of abolishing the assignats had exasperated them, and that they had immediately called for the revolutionary means which in 1793 had raised paper to par. The intention of having recourse to the financial companies, and of establishing a bank, revived all their prejudices. The government, they said, was going to surrender itself once more into the hands of the stock-jobbers; it was going, by establishing a bank, to ruin the assignats and to destroy the paper money of the republic, for the purpose of substituting for it a private paper to be created by the jobbers, and the withholding of the rations made them indignant. To remove the restrictions upon the sale of articles of consumption, and no longer afford food to the city of Paris, was an attack upon the revolution: it showed a desire to starve the people, and to drive them to despair. On this point the journals of royalism seemed to agree with those of Jacobinism, and the minister Benezech was overwhelmed with abuse from all parties.

One measure raised the wrath of the patriots against the new government to the highest pitch. The law of the 3d Brumaire, while it pardoned all offences in respect of the revolution, nevertheless excepted particular crimes, such as robbery and murder, which were still subject to be dealt with according to law. Thus the prosecutions commenced during the latter end of the convention against the authors of the September massacres were continued just as ordinary prosecutions for murder would have been. At the same time, the conspirators of Vendémiaire were brought to trial, and almost all of them acquitted. The proceedings against the authors of September were, on the contrary, extremely rigorous. The patriots were choked with rage. One Babœuf, a furious Jacobin, who had been confined in Prairial, and who was now set at liberty by virtue of the act of indemnity and oblivion, had commenced a newspaper in imitation of that of Marat, intitnled the *Tribun du Peuple*. It may easily be conceived what the imitation of such a model must have been. More violent [than Marat's newspaper], Babœuf's was not cynical but low. What extraordinary circumstances had called for was here reduced to a system, and supported with a stupidity and a frenzy hitherto unknown. When ideas which have entirely engrossed the public mind are verging to their termination, they retain their influence in the heads of some individuals, and there produce mania and idiotcy. Babœuf was the head of a sect whose minds were diseased, who maintained that the September massacre had been incomplete, and that it ought to be renewed and rendered general, so that it might be conclusive. They publicly preached up the agrarian law, a thing that even the Hébertists had never ventured to do, and coined a new phrase, *the happiness of all* (*bonheur commun*), to express the object of their system. This phrase alone was sufficient to denote that they went to the utmost limit of popular absolutism. One shudders in reading Babœuf's pages. Well-conducted minds pitied them; the alarmists pretended to believe in the approach of a new terror, and it is but fair to say that the meetings of the society of the Pantheon afforded a specious pretext for their apprehensions. It was in the spacious church of Saint-Geneviève that the Jacobins had revived their club, as we have observed. More numerous than ever, they amounted to nearly four thousand, all of them carrying their clamour far into the night. They had gradually violated the constitution, and had taken to themselves every thing that the constitution had prohibited, namely, a secretary, a president, and tickets; in a word, they had resumed the character of a political assembly. There they declaimed against the emigrants and the priests, the stock-jobbers, the bloodsuckers of the people, against the idea of a bank, the discontinuance of the rations, the abolition of the assignats, and the proceedings instituted against the patriots.

The directory, who found itself every day more and more firmly established, began to seek for the approbation of moderate and well-conducted minds. It felt it to be its duty to visit with severity this outburst of the Jacobin faction. The constitution and the existing laws afforded them the means, and it resolved to put them in action for this purpose. In the first place, it caused several numbers of Babœuf's paper to be seized, as tending to the subversion of the constitution; it then caused the society of the Pantheon to be closed, as also many others formed by the *jeunesse dorée*, and appropriated for dancing and reading newspapers; these latter were situated in the Palais-Royal and the Boulevard des Italiens, and known as the *Société des Echecs*, *Salon des Princes*, and *Salon des Arts*. There was little to fear from them, and they were included in the measure for no other purpose than to show the impartiality of its application. The ordinance was published and executed on the 8th Ventôse (February 27, 1796). A resolution called for by the five hundred added another restriction to those which were already imposed by the con-

stitution upon the popular societies: they were not to be composed of more than sixty members.

The minister Benezech, accused by both parties, tendered his resignation. The directory refused to accept it, and wrote him a letter complimenting him upon his services. The letter was published. The new system of maintaining the public was kept up; the indigent, the fundholders, and the public functionaries, who had not a thousand crowns' income, were alone supplied with rations. Something was likewise done for the unfortunate annuitants, who were always paid in paper. The two councils decreed that they should receive ten for one in assignats; a very insufficient increase, for the assignats were worth no more than the two hundredth part of their nominal value.

The directory added to those measures it had just then taken, that of at last recalling the conventionalist deputies on mission. They were replaced by government commissioners. These commissioners, when with armies or administrations, represented the directory, and superintended the execution of the laws. They no longer possessed, as formerly, unlimited powers in the armies, except in an emergency, or in cases to which the power of the general did not extend; such as a requisition for provisions or troops, they could also adopt resolutions in matters which would not admit of delay, which were in that case carried into execution, subject to the future approbation of the directory. Complaints having been made against numerous functionaries appointed by the directory immediately upon its installation, it enjoined its civil commissioners to keep an eye upon them, to note the complaints that were made against them, and to point out those whom it would be proper to dismiss.

In order to keep a watchful eye upon the factions, who now compelled to conceal themselves, would probably act in the dark, the directory created a special ministry of police.

The police is a subject of importance in troublous times. The three preceding assemblies had appropriated a numerous committee to this office; the directory did not consider that it ought to be left among the subordinate duties of the ministry of the interior, and proposed to the two councils to erect it into a separate branch of the ministry. The opposition urged that it was an inquisitorial institution, which might be very truly said, as also that it was an institution unfortunately inseparable from factious times, and especially where those factions were pertinacious, and obliged to plot in secret. The plan was approved. The deputy Cochon was called upon to fill this new ministry. The directory also would have desired some new laws to regulate the liberty of the press. The constitution declared it to be unlimited, with the exception of those regulations which might become necessary for repressing its excesses. The two councils, after a solemn discussion, rejected every bill for restraining this liberty. In this discussion the scene was reversed. The advocates of the revolution, who should have advocated unlimited liberty, demanded the means of restriction; and the opposition, whose secret sentiments inclined rather to monarchy than to the republic, voted for unlimited liberty; so much are parties governed by their interest! Notwithstanding all this, the decision was a wise one. The press may be unrestricted without danger; truth alone is formidable; falsehood is impotent; the greater it magnifies, the more it exhausts itself. There never yet was a government that was overturned by a lie. What could it matter if a Babœuf did extol the agrarian law, if a *Quotidienne* did vilify the grandeur of the revolution, slander its heroes, and seek to restore banished princes! All the government had to do, was only to let them declaim; eight days' exaggeration and lies wear out all the pens of pamphleteers and libellers. But a government must have time and philosophy before it can recognize these truths. The time perhaps had not arrived for the convention to understand them. It was true that the directory, now more tranquil and more settled, ought to have begun to comprehend and practise these truths.

The last measures of the directory, such as the closing of the society of the Pantheon, the refusal to accept the resignation of Benezech, the recall of the conventionalists on mission, and the change of certain placemen, produced the best effect; they imparted confidence to those who really dreaded the terror; they condemned to silence those who affected to dread it, and they satisfied well-disposed minds who wished the government to make itself independent of all parties. The regularity and activity of the operations of the directory contributed more than any thing else to gain its esteem. People began to look for peace, and to assume the idea of stability from the existing system. The five directors were surrounded by a certain degree of state. Barras, a fashionable man, did the honours of the Luxembourg. He may be said, in some measure, to have acted herein for his colleagues. Social life presented much the same appearance as in the preceding year; it exhibited a singular medley of conditions, great freedom of manners, an unrestrained taste for amusements, and extraordinary luxury. The withdrawing-rooms of the director were frequented by generals, whose education and fortune had been completed in two years; contractors and men of business, who had enriched themselves by speculations and thievery; exiles who had returned and were seeking to connect themselves with the government; men of superior talents, who began to have confidence in the republic, and wished to have a situation under it; and lastly, of intriguers, who were running after favour. Women, of whatever extraction they might be, came to these withdrawing-rooms to display their charms, and exert their influence at a moment when any thing might be demanded and obtained. If sometimes social life was deficient in that decorum and self-control, which is now so strongly insisted upon in France, and which are the fruit of a polished, tranquil, and exclusive society, there prevailed an extreme freedom of mind, and that profusion of correct ideas which the sight and the practice of great things suggests. The men who composed that society were entirely free from antiquated rules; they did not repeat insipid sayings by rote; what they knew, they had learned by their own experience. They had witnessed the greatest events in history. They had taken a part, they were still taking part, in them; and it is easy to figure to oneself what such objects of attention

must have excited in youthful, ambitious, and sanguine minds. There shone in the first rank young Hoche, who from a private in the French guards had become in one campaign general-in-chief, and had bestowed on himself in two years the most finished education. Handsome, of polished manners, renowned as one of the first captains of his time, and scarcely twenty-seven years of age, he was the hope of the republicans, and the idol of those females smitten with beauty, talent, and glory. By his side was already remarked young Bonaparte, who had not yet acquired fame, but whose services at Toulon and on the 13th Vendémiaire were well known, whose character and person excited astonishment by their singularity, and whose understanding made a great impression by its originality and vigour. In this society, where Madame Tallien displayed her charms, and Madame Beauharnais her grace, Madame de Stäel exhibited all the brilliancy of her intellect, elevated as it was by the associations of the time and of liberty.

Those young men called to bear rule in the state, chose their wives, some from among the ladies formerly of rank, who deemed themselves honoured by the selection, others out of the families enriched by the times, who were desirous of ennobling wealth by honourable alliances. Bonaparte had just married the widow of the unfortunate general Beauharnais. Every body looked forward to making his fortune, and thought it would be great. Numerous were the openings now presented. The war upon the continent, the war at sea, the tribune, the magistracy, in short a great republic to defend and govern—these were grand objects of ambition, worthy to inflame every mind! The government had recently made a valuable acquisition; it was that of an ingenious and profound writer, who had devoted his youthful talents to reconcile opinion with the new republic. M. Benjamin Constant had recently published a pamphlet, intituled, *De la Force du Gouvernement*, which had produced a great sensation. He therein demonstrated the necessity of rallying round a government which was the only hope of France and of all the parties.

The regulation of finances was still occupying the attention of government more than any thing else. The measures recently adopted were no more than putting off the evil day. There had been transferred to the present government a certain quantity of national property for sale, the power of letting the great forests, the forced loan, and the copper-plate from which the assignats had been worked off, had been left with it as a last resource. To anticipate the produce of these different resources, it had, as we have seen, created sixty millions of treasury orders, something like Exchequer bills or royal *bons*, payable out of the first money that should come into the public coffers. But these orders it was extremely difficult to make current. The bankers, who met to settle a plan for a national bank, secured on the national property, hung back when they heard the outcries yelled forth by the patriots against jobbers and contractors. The forced loan was levied much more slowly than could have been believed. The assessment rested on extremely arbitrary principles, since the loan was to be raised from the wealthiest classes; every one appealed against the assessment, and each individual portion of the loan occasioned an altercation with the collectors. In two months, scarcely a third of it had been got in. Some millions in money, and some thousand millions in paper had been collected. On the partial failure of this resource, recourse was had once more to the last appliance left to the government for making up for the deficiency of all the others, the copper-plate of the assignats. The issues had amounted during the last two months to the unheard-of sum of forty-five thousand millions. Twenty thousand millions had scarcely provided one hundred millions, for the assignats were not worth more than the two hundredth part of their nominal value. The public absolutely would have nothing to do with them, for they were good for nothing. They could not be made available for the payment of debts which were unsettled; they could not operate as a discharge for more than half the farm rents and taxes, for the other half was payable in kind; they were refused in the markets, or else taken at their reduced value; lastly, they were taken in the sale of the national property for no more than the price they bore in the markets, the sales by auction always causing the offer to rise in proportion to the depreciation of the paper. It was therefore out of the question to use them in any manner that could make them valuable. An issue, of which the extent was not known, made every body look forward to some extraordinary numerical characters which would make the amounts more moderate. Thousands of millions signified at most millions. This fall, which we have already alluded to, when the government refused to prohibit the sale of the national property by auction, was now realized.

Those minds on which the revolution had impressed its prejudices, for all systems and all powers do impress them, were for raising the assignats by setting apart a great quantity of national property as a gage for their redemption, and by using violent measures to effect their currency. But there is nothing which it is so impracticable to re-establish as the credit of paper money: it was therefore found absolutely necessary to renounce the assignats.

One may ask why the paper money was not immediately abolished, by reducing it to its real value, which was about two hundred millions at most, and by requiring payment of the taxes, and for the national domains, either in money or in assignats, according to the course of exchange? Money was in fact again making its appearance, and that somewhat plentifully, especially in the provinces; thus it was a great error to apprehend its scarcity; for the paper reckoned at two hundred millions in the currency: but another reason prevented the abandonment of the paper money. The only resource, it must always be recollected, consisted in the national estates. Their sale seemed neither certain or near at hand. Unable therefore to wait till their value should come spontaneously to the exchequer by sales, it was necessary to represent it by anticipation in paper, and to issue it for the purpose of withdrawing it afterwards; in a word, it was necessary to expend the price before it was received. This necessity of expending before a sale had taken place, turned the attention of the government towards the idea of creating a new species of paper money.

The notes, which were a special incumbrance upon each estate, would induce long delays, because it was requisite that they should bear reference to each estate; moreover, they would depend on the will of the taker, and would not remove the real difficulty. A paper was devised, which, by the name of *mandats* (orders for payment), was to represent a fixed value in land. Every estate was to be delivered without sale by auction, and upon a mere memorandum (*procès-verbal*), for a price in mandats equal to that of 1790 (twenty-two times its annual worth). Mandats, to the amount of two thousand four hundred millions, were to be created, and domains to the like amount, according to the estimate of 1790, were to be immediately appropriated for their payment. Thus these mandats could not undergo any other variation than that of the estates themselves, since they represented a fixed quantity thereof. They assuredly could not be on a par with money, for the domains were not worth so much as in 1790; but at any rate, they must have the same value as the domains.

It was resolved to employ part of these mandats to withdraw the assignats. The plate of the assignats was broken up on the 30th Pluviôse (February 19): forty-five thousand five hundred millions had been issued. By the different returns, whether from loans or arrears, the circulating quantity had been reduced to thirty-six thousand millions, and was soon to be further reduced to twenty-four thousand. These twenty-four thousand millions, in reducing them to one thirtieth, represented eight hundred millions: it was decreed that they should be exchanged against eight hundred millions in mandats, which was fixing the assignat at one thirtieth of its nominal value; four hundred millions more in mandats were to be issued for the public service, and the remaining twelve hundred were to be deposited in the chest with three keys, to be taken out by decree when and as they were wanted.

This creation of mandats was a reimpression of the assignats, with a lower figure, another denomination, and a fixed value with respect to the national property. It was as if there had been created, besides the twenty-four thousand millions that were to be left in circulation, another forty-eight thousand millions, which would have made seventy-two thousand; it was as if it had been settled that these seventy-two thousand millions should be taken in payment for property, for thirty times their value in 1790, which would suppose two thousand four hundred millions' worth of property charged as a pledge for repayment. Thus the figure was reduced, the relation they were to bear to the estates fixed, and the name changed.

The mandats were created on the 26th Ventôse (16th March). The national estates were to be sold immediately, and delivered to the bearer of the mandat on a mere memorandum or minute (*procès-verbal*). Half the price was to be paid in the first decade, the remainder in three months. The national forests were set apart; and the two thousand four hundred millions of national property were taken out of those estates of less than three hundred arpents. Those measures which the adoption of a paper money render necessary were immediately taken. The mandat being the money of the republic, every thing was to be paid for in mandats. Debts payable in money, rents, interest of capital, the assessed taxes, the arrears excepted, the state annuities, the pensions and salaries of the public officers, were all to be paid in mandats. Great discussions took place with respect to the land-tax. Those who foresaw that the mandats might fall, as the assignats, desired that, to ensure to the state a certain return, the land-tax should continue to be paid in kind. They were reminded of the difficulties of the collection, and it was decided that this tax should be paid in mandats, as well as the customs, the registration and stamp duty, posting duties, &c. But the government did not confine itself to that. It was deemed right to accompany the creation of the new paper with the usual severities that attend compulsory values; the government declared that silver and gold should no longer be considered as merchandize, and that paper could thenceforward not be sold against gold and gold against paper. After the experiments that had been made, this was a wretched expedient. Another had been very recently adopted that was scarcely less so, and which injured the directory in the public opinion: this was the closing of the exchange. It ought to have known that the closing of a public market does not prevent a thousand others from being established elsewhere.

In making mandats the new money, and putting them every where in the place of money, the government committed a serious error. Even in keeping up its value, the mandat could never come up to the standard of money. The mandat was worth, if they desired it, as much as the land, but it could not be worth more. Now land was worth no more than half its value in 1790; even a patrimonial estate worth one hundred thousand francs would not have fetched fifty thousand in money. How could one hundred thousand francs in mandats have been worth one hundred thousand in money? This difference then ought at least to have been admitted. The government therefore could not help finding, independently of all the other causes of depreciation, a primary miscalculation, arising from the depreciation of the national estates.

The pressure was so great, that promises of mandats were uttered until the mandats themselves were ready to be issued. These promises instantly went at a value far inferior to their nominal value. Every body was extremely alarmed, and said to themselves that the new paper, which was to do such great things, was about to fall like the assignats, and to leave the republic without any resource. There was, however, a cause for this anticipated fall, and it might very soon have been removed. It was requisite that instructions should be addressed for the use of the local administrations, for their guidance in the extremely complicated cases that must arise from the sale of the national estates upon a mere *procès-verbal*, and this labour consumed much time and delayed the commencement of the sales. During this interval the mandat fell, and it was said that its value would fall with such rapidity, that the state would decline to open the sales, and let the national estates go for nothing at all; that it would be the same with the mandats as it had been with the assignats; that they would be gradually reduced to nothing,

and that then they would be taken in payment for national property, not at the value at which they were issued, but at their reduced value. The malignants suggested that the new paper was but a lure, that the national estates would never be sold at all, and that the republic wanted to keep them for herself, as an apparent and perpetual pledge for whatever paper she chose to issue. The sales, nevertheless, were opened. The subscriptions were numerous. The mandat of one hundred francs had fallen to fifteen. It rose again successively to thirty, forty, and in some places to eighty-eight francs. Hopes therefore were for a moment entertained of the success of the new operation.

It was amidst the factions secretly conspiring against it that the directory entered upon its labours. The agents of royalty had continued their secret plottings. The death of Lemaitre had not dispersed them. Brottier, who was acquitted, had become the chief of the royalist agents. Duverne de Presle, Laville-Heurnois, and Despernelles, had joined him, and secretly formed the royal committee. These wretched agitators had no more influence than in time past; they intrigued, loudly demanded money, wrote a great many letters, and promised wonders. They always acted as the intervening parties between the pretender and La Vendée, where they had numerous agents. They were very pertinacious in their opinions, and observing the insurrection quelled by Hoche, and ready to expire under his attacks, they more than ever kept to the system of doing every thing, even at Paris, by a movement in the interior. They bragged, as in the time of the convention, of being in communication with several deputies of the new third, and they alleged that they ought to temporize, to labour public opinion by the newspapers, to vilify the government, and to make such arrangements that the elections of the next year should bring in a new third of deputies entirely counter-revolutionary. Thus they flattered themselves that they should destroy the republican constitution by means of the constitution itself. This plan was certainly the least chimerical, and it is the one that affords the most favourable idea of their intelligence.

The patriots, on their part, were preparing plots, but they were only dangerous in proportion to the means they had at their disposal. Driven from the Pantheon, absolutely condemned by the government, which had separated itself from them, and had turned many of them out of their places, they had declared against it and become its irreconcilable enemies. Finding themselves closely followed and watched, they had found no other resource than to conspire with the utmost secrecy, and in such a manner that the leaders of the conspiracy should remain absolutely unknown. They had chosen four to form a secret directory of public welfare. Babœuf and Drouet were of the number. The secret directory was to communicate with twelve principal agents, entirely unacquainted with one another, and who were to organize societies of patriots in all the quarters of Paris. These twelve agents, each thus acting by himself, were forbidden to name the four members of the secret directory; they were to speak and to enforce obedience in the name of a mysterious and supreme authority, which was instituted to direct the efforts of the patriots towards what was called the *happiness of all* (*bonheur commun*). In this manner the connecting threads of the conspiracy could scarcely be laid hold of; for supposing one was seized, the others would always remain in obscurity. This organization was constituted in conformity with Babœuf's plan: societies of patriots existed all over Paris, and through the intervention of the twelve principal agents, received the impulse of an unknown authority.

Babœuf and his colleagues were considering what method should be employed to effect what they called *the deliverance*, and in whom the authority should be reposed, when they should have killed the directory, dispersed the councils, and put the people in possession of their sovereignty. They still experienced too many misgivings as to the provinces and public opinion, to run the risk of an election, and to convoke a new assembly. They merely wanted to appoint an assembly composed of chosen Jacobins taken from each department. They were to make this selection themselves, and to complete the assembly by adding to it all the Mountaineers of the old convention who had not been re-elected. Even these Mountaineers did not seem to them to be a sufficient guarantee, for many of them had adhered, in the latter days of the convention, to what they termed liberticide measures, and had even accepted office under the directory. Nevertheless, they had concluded by agreeing to admit into the new assembly sixty-eight of those who were considered the purest. That assembly was to possess itself of all the powers until the *happiness of all* was ensured.

They thought it best to have some understanding with the unelected conventionalists, most of whom were in Paris. Babœuf and Drouet entered into communication with them. They frequently discussed the means by which their measures could be effected. The conventionalists considered those proposed by the insurrectional directory as too extravagant. They wished for the re-establishment of the old convention, with the organization prescribed by the constitution of 1793. At last they came to some conclusion, and the insurrection was fixed for the month of Floréal (April, May). The means which the secret directory purposed to make use of were terrible indeed. In the first place, this secret directory had put itself in correspondence with the principal cities of France, so that the revolution might be simultaneous and consistent throughout France. The patriots were to issue from their quarters, bearing banners whereon were to be inscribed these words: *Liberté, Egalité, Constitution de* 1793, *Bonheur commun*. Whoever should resist the sovereign people was to be put to death. The five directors were to be slain, together with certain members of the five hundred, and the general of the army of the interior; they were then to make themselves masters of the Luxembourg, the treasury, the telegraph, the arsenals, and the depôt of artillery at Meudon. To induce the people to rise, and no longer *pay them with empty promises*, all the inhabitants in easy circumstances were to be forced to lodge and entertain every man who should have taken part in the insurrection. The bakers and the wine dealers were to be required to furnish the people with bread and drink, for which an indemnity was

to be paid them by the republic, upon pain of being hanged at the next lamp in case of refusal. Every soldier who should go over to the side of the insurrection should have his equipments as his own property, be paid a sum of money, and be at liberty to return to his home. The insurgents hoped in this manner to gain all those who disliked the service. As for professed soldiers, who had acquired a taste for war, they were to allow them to plunder the houses of the royalists. To keep up the armies to their complement, and to replace those who should go to their homes, they proposed allowing the soldiers such advantages as would induce the spontaneous enlistment of a multitude of new volunteers.

We see what a hideous and maddened combination of ideas these desperate spirits had conceived. They had appointed Rossignol ex-general of La Vendée, to command the Parisian army of insurrection. They had tampered with that police legion which constituted part of the army of the interior, and was entirely composed of patriots, gendarmes of the tribunals, and old French guards. In fact, this legion did mutiny, but prematurely, and was disbanded by the directory. Cochon, the minister of the police, who was watching the progress of the conspiracy, which had been communicated to him by an officer of the army of the interior whom the insurgents had desired to gain over, suffered it to proceed that he might apprehend all its leading members. On the 20th Floréal (9th May), Babœuf, Drouet, and the other chiefs and agents, were to meet at a cabinet-maker's in the Rue Bleu. Officers of police, stationed in the neighbourhood, apprehended the conspirators, and immediately took them to prison. They also apprehended the ex-conventionalists Laignelot, Vadier, Amar, Ricord, Choudieu, Buonarotti the Piedmontese, Antonelle an ex-member of the legislative assembly, and Pelletier de Saint Fargeau, brother of him who had been assassinated. Application was forthwith made to the two councils to impeach Drouet who was a member of the five hundred; and the whole of the prisoners were sent before the high national court, which was not yet constituted, but which the government immediately set about organizing. Babœuf, whose inordinate conceit was only equalled by his fanaticism, wrote an extraordinary letter to the directory, which showed in a striking manner the diseased state of his mind. "I am a power," he wrote to the five directors; "therefore fear not to treat with me as with an equal. I am the chief of a formidable sect, which you will not destroy by sending me to death, and which, after my execution, will be only more exasperated and more dangerous. You have yet but a single thread of the conspiracy; the apprehension of a few individuals is to no purpose, leaders will always be found. Spare yourselves an useless effusion of blood; you have not as yet made any great noise, make no more, treat with the patriots: they have not forgotten that you were formerly sincere republicans; they will forgive you, if you will but concur with them in the salvation of the republic."

The directory took no notice of this extravagant letter, but ordered the depositions to be taken. These preliminary proceedings were likely to occupy considerable time, for it was resolved that all the forms should be duly observed. This last act of vigour completely confirmed the directory in public opinion. The end of the winter was at hand; the factions were watched, and kept within bounds; the business of the country was conducted with zeal and efficiency; the renewed paper money was the only thing that occasioned uneasiness; the directory had nevertheless provided temporary resources towards making the first preparations for the campaign which was now about to be opened. In fact, the season for military operations had now arrived. The English ministry, always astute in its policy, had behaved towards the French government in the manner public opinion seemed to require from the English government. The English ministers directed Wickham, then agent in Switzerland, to address some insignificant questions to Barthélemy, the minister of France. This overture, made on the 17th Ventôse, (March 8th, 1796,) was evidently to ascertain whether France was disposed for peace, whether she would consent to a congress for discussing its articles, and whether she would intimate beforehand the principal bases on which she was resolved to treat.

Such mode of proceeding by Pitt had nothing else in view beyond appearing to satisfy his own nation, in order that if France refused his overtures he might be justified in calling for more sacrifices. Had Pitt really been sincere, he would not have confided this overture to an agent without giving him commensurate powers; he would not have proposed an European congress, which, from the complicated nature of the questions, would be unable to conclude upon any thing, and which, moreover, France had already refused to Austria, through the intervention of Denmark; lastly, he would not have inquired on what bases the negotiation was likely to be opened, since he knew that, according to the constitution, the Netherlands had become part of the French territory, and that the existing government could not consent to their separation. The directory, unwilling to be treated as simpletons, caused the following answer to be given to Wickham; that neither the form or the object of this procedure were likely to induce a belief of its sincerity; that, nevertheless, in order to demonstrate its own pacific intentions, the directory consented to give a reply to questions which did not deserve any; and declared it was willing to treat, but on no other bases than those fixed by the constitution. This was announcing in a conclusive manner that France would never relinquish Belgium. The letter of the directory, written with temper and firmness, was immediately published together with that of Wickham. This was the first instance of a frank and firm diplomacy, divested of all idle vaunting.

Every one approved of the conduct of the directory, and on both sides preparations were made in Europe for renewing hostilities. Pitt demanded of the English parliament a new loan of seven millions sterling, and he did his utmost to negotiate another of three millions for the emperor. He had done much to persuade the king of Prussia to withdraw from his neutrality, and to engage again in the conflict. He had offered him funds, and had represented to him, that on the termination of the war when all parties would be exhausted, he would possess a decided superiority. The king of Prussia,

not desirous of relapsing into his former errors, would not suffer himself to be misled, and persisted in his neutrality. One part of his army, stationed in Poland, was employed in strengthening his new acquisitions; the other, drawn up along the Rhine, was ready to defend the line of neutrality against any of those powers who should break it, and to take under its protection such of the states of the empire as should claim the Prussian mediation. Russia, always liberal of promises, sent as yet no troops, and was employing herself in organizing the portion of Poland that had fallen to her share.

Austria, puffed up with her successes at the close of the preceding campaign, looked forward to the war with sanguine hopes, and indulged in the most presumptuous expectations. The general to whom she owed this slight return of fortune, had nevertheless been dismissed, in spite of the splendour of his triumphs. Clerfait had displeased the aulic council, and had been succeeded in the command of the army of the Lower Rhine by the young archduke Charles, of whom great hopes were entertained, without his exhibiting any earnest of his future talents. He had displayed in the preceding campaigns the qualities of a good officer. Wurmser still commanded the army of the Upper Rhine. To decide the king of Sardinia to continue the war, a considerable reinforcement had been sent to the imperial army which was fighting in Piedmont, then under the command of general Beaulieu, who had gained great reputation in the Netherlands. Spain, beginning to enjoy peace, closely watched the new struggle that was about to commence, and now, more enlightened respecting her true interests, her inclinations were in favour of France.

The directory, like all new governments, zealous, and anxious withal to render its government illustrious, meditated important projects. It had put its armies into better order, but it had only been able to send them men, without furnishing them with the necessary supplies of provision. All Belgium had been laid under contribution for the maintenance of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, extraordinary exertions had been made to supply the army of the Rhine, in the midst of the Vosges, with provisions. But there no means of conveyance could be obtained; nor had it been practicable to furnish fresh horses for their cavalry. The army of the Alps had lived upon the stores taken from the Austrians after the battle of Loano; but it was destitute of shoes and clothes, and its pay was in arrear. The victory of Loano had thus remained unproductive of results. The armies of the western provinces were, thanks to the attention of Hoche, in a better state than any of the others, without however being provided with all that they needed. But notwithstanding this state of destitution, our armies, accustomed to hardships, to live by expedients, and moreover inured to war by their glorious campaigns, were yet in a state to attempt great things.

The directory was contemplating, we say, the execution of extended designs. It was anxious to finish in the spring the war in La Vendée, and then to take the offensive on every point. Its object was to take the armies of the Rhine into Germany, in order to blockade and besiege Mentz, to complete the subjugation of the princes of the empire, to separate Austria, to transfer the theatre of war to the midst of her hereditary states, and to quarter its troops upon the enemy in the rich valleys of the Maine and the Neckar. With respect to Italy, it entertained still greater designs, as suggested by general Bonaparte. As no advantage had been gained from the victory of Loano; according to that young officer, the French ought to gain a second, make the king of Sardinia determine upon a peace, or else take his states from him, next cross the Po, and then wrest from Austria the fairest ornament of her crown, Lombardy. There would be the theatre of decisive operations, there they might strike the most painful blow against Austria, obtain an equivalent in conquests to pay for the Netherlands, compel a peace, and perhaps bestow liberty upon that fine country Italy. In addition to all this, the most destitute of our armies would be maintained and refreshed in the heart of the most fertile country in the world.

The directory, coinciding with these ideas, made some changes in the command of its armies. Jourdan retained the command he had so well deserved at the head of the army of the Sambre and Meuse. Pichegru, who had betrayed his country, and who was already suspected of the treason, was succeeded by Moreau, who commanded in Holland. Pichegru was offered the embassy to Sweden, which he refused. Beurnonville, who had lately returned from captivity, replaced Moreau in the command of the French army in Holland. Schérer, against whom a dissatisfaction existed because he had not made the most of the victory of Loano, was dismissed. The government wanted a young and enterprising man to exert himself in a bold campaign. Bonaparte, who had already distinguished himself in the army of Italy, and who moreover seemed to be so impressed with the advantages of a march beyond the Alps, appeared to be the most fit person to succeed Schérer. He was therefore promoted from the command of the army of the interior to take the command of the army of Italy. He immediately set out to repair to Nice. In the fulness of his ardour and high spirits, he declared at starting, that in a month he would be either at Milan or at Paris. This ardour savoured of rashness, but in a young man, and in a hazardous enterprise, it was a good omen.

Similar changes had been wrought in the three armies which occupied the insurgent provinces. Hoche, who had been summoned to Paris, to settle with the directory a plan for putting an end to the civil war, had there obtained the most deserved favour, and had received the highest testimonies of esteem. The directory, acknowledging the excellence of his plans, had approved of them all; and that no one might have it in his power to thwart their execution, it had consolidated the three armies of the coast of Cherbourg, the coasts of Brest, and of the west, into one, under the style of the army of the coasts of the ocean, and had invested him with the command in chief. This was the greatest army of the republic, for it amounted to one hundred thousand men, extended over several provinces, and required in the commander a concentration of powers civil as well as military, and altogether extraordinarily special. So great a command was the strongest proof of confidence that a general could experience. Hoche certainly deserved it.

Endued at the age of twenty-seven with numerous great qualities, military as well as civil, and those not unfrequently calculated to endanger liberty; at the same time entertaining a noble ambition, he had not that guilty hardihood which can hurry an illustrious commander to aspire to more than the quality of citizen; he was a sincere republican, and equalled Jourdan in patriotism and integrity. Liberty might applaud him without trembling for his successes, and desire the continuance of his victorious career.

Hoche had scarcely passed a month in Paris, before he returned to the west, that he might complete the pacification of La Vendée by the end of winter or the beginning of spring. His plan of disarming and pacification had been reduced into articles, and embodied in an ordinance of the directory. It was agreed, in conformity with this plan, that a disarming body should surround the insurgent provinces, and scour them one after the other. Until their complete pacification, they were to be subjected to military law. All the towns were declared in a state of siege. It was recognized as a principle that the army was to live at the expense of the insurgent country; consequently Hoche was authorized to levy the taxes and the forced loan, either in kind or in coin as best suited him, and to form stores and chests for the supply of the army. The towns, which it was the object of the neighbouring countries to starve out, were to be provisioned in a military manner by columns attached to the principal among them. Pardon was granted to all those rebels who should lay down their arms. As for the chiefs, such of them as should be taken with arms in their hands were to be shot; those who should submit were to be either confined or kept under surveillance in towns appointed for that purpose, or sent out of France. The directory, approving Hoche's plan, which consisted in first pacifying La Vendée before entering into the consideration of Brittany, authorized him to finish his operations on the left bank of the Loire, before he should bring back his troops to the right bank. So soon as La Vendée should be completely reduced, a disarming line of troops was to inclose Brittany, from Granville to the Loire, and thus advance from one end to the other of the peninsula of Brittany to the extremity of the Finistère. It was for Hoche to regulate the period when these provinces, appearing to him to be reduced, should be relieved from military law, and restored to the constitutional system.

Hoche, on his arrival at Angers, towards the end of Nivôse (the middle of January), found his operations greatly deranged by his absence. The success of his plan depending particularly on the manner in which it should be executed, made his presence indispensable. His place had been ill supplied by general Willot. The line of disarming had made but little way. Charette had crossed it, and had again passed over to his rear. The regular system of victualling had not been well attended to; the army had frequently been in want of necessaries, had relapsed into insubordination, and had committed acts calculated to alienate the inhabitants. Sapinaud, after making, as we have seen, a hostile attempt on Montaigu, had obtained from general Willot an absurd sort of treaty, to which Hoche could not be a consenting party. Lastly, Stofflet still playing the part of prince, and Bernier that of prime minister, were recruiting themselves with the deserters who had left Charette, and were making underhand preparations. The cities of Nantes and Angers were in want of provisions. The patriots who had fled from the surrounding country were crowded together there, and indulged themselves at the clubs in furious declamations worthy of Jacobins. It was further reported that Hoche had been recalled to Paris for no other purpose than to be cashiered. Some said that he had been dismissed as a royalist, others because he was a Jacobin.

His return put a stop to these rumours, and repaired all the evils occasioned by his absence. He recommenced his disarming system, caused the stores to be replenished, and the towns to be victualled; he declared them all in a state of siege; and from that time being authorized to exercise a military dictatorship therein, he closed the Jacobin clubs formed by the refugees, and particularly a society known at Nantes by the appellation of *Chambre ardente*. He refused to ratify the treaty accorded to Sapinaud; he occupied his country, and left it for himself to consider whether he should quit France, or haunt the woods under the penalty of being shot if he were taken. He hemmed in Stofflet more closely than ever, and renewed the pursuit of Charette. He entrusted to adjutant-general Travot, who with great intrepidity exhibited all the activity of a partisan, the task of pursuing Charette with several columns of light infantry and cavalry, so as to leave him neither rest or hope.

Pursued night and day, Charette had now no means of escape left for him. The inhabitants of the Marais, disarmed and closely watched, could no longer help him. They had already delivered up seven thousand muskets, several pieces of cannon, and forty barrels of powder, and they were no longer in a condition to renew hostilities. Even had they been able so to do, they would not willingly have done so, because they felt comfortable in the tranquillity they enjoyed, and because they were afraid to expose themselves to fresh havoc. The peasants came and gave information to the republican officers of the road Charette had gone, and the hiding-places where he was for a moment laying his head; and when they could secure some of those who accompanied him, they brought and delivered them up to the army. Charette, attended by scarcely a hundred devoted servants, and followed by a few women who administered to his pleasures, had nevertheless no thoughts of surrendering. Being extremely mistrustful, he sometimes caused his hosts to be put to death, when he was fearful of their betraying him. It was said that he ordered a curé to be put to death whom he suspected of having betrayed him to the republicans. Travot fell in with him several times, killed about sixty of his men, several of his officers, and among the rest his brother. He had now only about forty or fifty men left.

While Hoche was thus causing Charette to be unceasingly harassed, and was following up his disarming system, Stofflet with consternation found himself surrounded on all sides, and was fully sensible that when Charette and Sapinaud were destroyed, and all the Chouans had made their peace, the sort

of princely state he had arrogated to himself in Upper Anjou would no longer be endured; he considered that it would be too late for him to make up his mind when all the royalists were exterminated. Alleging as an excuse an ordinance made by Hoche, he again raised the standard of revolt and resumed hostilities. Hoche was at this moment on the banks of the Loire, preparing to set out for the Calvados, that he might form a judgment from personal observation of the state of Normandy and Brittany. He immediately deferred his departure, and made his preparations for getting rid of Stofflet, before his rebellion could acquire any importance. Hoche was not after all sorry that Stofflet himself had given him a good reason to break the treaty. This war gave him little trouble, and authorized him to treat Anjou in the same manner as the Marais and Brittany. He despatched his columns from several points at once, from the Loire, the Layon, and the Nantes Sèvre. Stofflet pressed on all sides, could not long keep his ground any where. The peasants of Anjou were still more sensible of the comforts of peace than those of the Marais; they had not responded to the call of their old chief, and had left him to begin the war with the profligates of the country, and the emigrants with whom his camp was filled. Two considerable bodies which he had collected were dispersed, and he found himself obliged to run, like Charette, to the woods. But he had neither the pertinacity or the adroitness of that leader, and his district was not so favourably disposed for concealing a troop of marauders. He was betrayed by his own creatures. Lured to a farmhouse upon pretext of a conference, he was seized, bound, and given up to the republicans. It is generally supposed that his trusty minister, the abbé Bernier, had a hand in this treachery. The capture of this leader was of great importance, on account of the moral effect it would produce in those parts. He was conveyed to Angers; and after undergoing an examination, he was shot, on the 7th Ventôse (26th of February), in the presence of a vast concourse of people.

This news occasioned great rejoicings, and thus evidently pointed to the termination of the civil war in these unhappy countries. Hoche, in the midst of the very arduous duties this kind of warfare demanded, had occasion to be utterly disgusted. The royalists, as a matter of course, called him a villain and a blood-drinker, although he used the most legal measures to destroy them; but the patriots themselves annoyed him by their calumnies. The refugees of La Vendée and Brittany, whose phrenzy he had checked, and whose indolence he discouraged by ceasing to give them food after they were safe in returning to their fields, denounced him to the directory. The authorities of those towns which he had placed in a state of siege, complained of the establishment of the military system, and also denounced him. Communes subjected to amercements, or to the military levy of the taxes, complained in their turn. There was an incessant chorus of complaints and remonstrances. Hoche, whose temper was irritable, was several times driven to despair, and formally tendered his resignation. The directory refused it, and soothed him by renewed demonstrations of confidence and esteem. They made him a national present of two fine horses, a present which was not merely an acknowledgment, but a most serviceable assistance. This young general, who was fond of pleasure, who was at the head of an army of one hundred thousand men, and who disposed of the revenues of several provinces, was frequently in want of common necessaries. His salary, paid in paper, was reduced to nothing. He was in want of horses, saddles, and bridles, and he asked for permission to take, on paying for them, six saddles, six bridles, some horseshoes, a few bottles of rum, and some loaves of sugar, from the stores left by the English at Quiberon: an admirable example of delicacy, which our republican generals frequently demonstrated, but which became less frequent according as our acquisitions became more extended, and as our military habits were becoming corrupted by the effect of conquests and the manners of a court.

Being encouraged by the government, Hoche continued his efforts for bringing his exertions to a conclusion in La Vendée. The complete pacification was entirely dependant upon the capture of Charette. That leader, reduced to extremity, made a request to Hoche for permission to go to England. Hoche consented to this, in conformity with the authority given him by the ordinance of the directory concerning those chiefs who should make their submission. But Charette had made this application merely to gain a short respite, and had no intention of availing himself of the permission. The directory, on its part, had made up its mind not to pardon Charette, because it conceived that this famous leader would always be a bugbear to the country. They wrote to Hoche, desiring him not to grant him any favour. But when Hoche received these new orders, Charette had already declared that his application was nothing more than a feint to obtain a little rest, and that he would not sue for pardon from republicans. He had again gone to the woods.

Charette could not long escape the republicans. Pursued by columns of infantry, watched by troops of disguised soldiers, informed against by the inhabitants, who were anxious to save their country from devastation, tracked in the woods like a wild beast, he fell on the 2nd Germinal (March 23) into an ambuscade laid for him by Travot. Armed to the teeth, and surrounded by some brave followers, who strove to cover him with their own bodies, he defended himself like a lion, and at length fell, after receiving several sabre wounds. He would not deliver his sword to any but the brave Travot, who treated him with all the respect due to such extraordinary courage. He was taken to the republican head-quarters, and received to table by Hédouville, the head of the staff. He conversed with great serenity, and showed no concern about the fate that awaited him. Conveyed first to Angers, he was afterwards removed to Nantes, to end his life in the same place that had witnessed his triumph. He underwent an examination, when he answered with great calmness and propriety. He was questioned concerning the alleged secret articles of the treaty of La Jannaye, and he confessed they never existed. He neither attempted to palliate his conduct or to justify his motives; he acknowledged that he was in the service of royalty, and that he had done his

utmost to overthrow the republic. He exhibited great dignity and unconcern. When led forth to execution, amidst an immense concourse of people, who were not sufficiently generous to forget his having brought upon them the miseries of a civil war, he retained all his assurance. He was covered with blood, had lost three fingers in the last encounter, and carried his arm in a sling. A handkerchief was wrapped round his head. He would neither suffer his eyes to be bandaged, or kneel down. Standing erect, he removed his arm from the sling, and gave the signal. He instantly fell dead. This was on the 9th Germinal (March 29th). Thus died that celebrated man, whose indomitable courage brought so many calamities upon his country, and would have done him honour in a better cause. Compromised by the last attempt at invasion which had been made upon these coasts, he would not give in, and was driven to desperation. He manifested, it is said, the strongest resentment against the princes he had served, and by whom he considered himself as abandoned.

The death of Charette caused as much joy as the greatest victory over the Austrians would have done. His death put an end to the civil war. Hoche, conceiving that there was nothing more to be done in La Vendée, withdrew from it the greater part of his troops, to take them beyond the Loire, and disarm Brittany. Nevertheless, he left forces sufficient to repress the solitary outrages which ordinarily accompany civil wars, as also to effect the complete disarming of the country. Before he passed into Brittany, he had to quell rebellious movements which had burst forth in the vicinity of Anjou, towards Berry. This occupied him for a few days; he then proceeded with twenty thousand men into Brittany, and in conformity with his design, he inclosed it with a vast *cordon* from the Loire to Granville. The wretched Chouans could not withstand so powerful and so well concerted a manœuvre; Scépeaux, between the Vilaine and the Loire, was the first to tender his submission. He delivered up a considerable quantity of arms. In proportion as the Chouans were driven back towards the sea, the more desperate they became. Being without ammunition, they fought hand to hand, with daggers and bayonets. At length they were driven completely up in a corner to the sea. The people of the Morbihan, long since detached from Puisaye, laid down their arms. The other divisions followed this example one after the other. The whole of Brittany was speedily reduced in its turn, and Hoche had nothing to do but to distribute his hundred thousand men into numerous cantonments, that they might watch the country, and victual themselves more readily. All that now remained for him to attend to simply consisted in matters of administration and police. All that he wanted now was a few months' efficient and temperate government to soothe animosities and re-establish tranquillity. Notwithstanding the furious outcry of all the parties, Hoche was feared, beloved, and respected, in the country, and the royalists began to be well disposed towards a republic that was so worthily represented. The clergy, in particular, whose confidence he had managed to gain, were wholly devoted to him, and gave him correct information of all it concerned him to know. Every thing betokened peace and the termination of these horrible calamities. England could no longer reckon upon the provinces of the west for attacking the republic through the medium of internal dissensions. On the contrary, England witnessed in these countries one hundred thousand men, half of whom now became available for active service, and might be employed in some enterprise injurious to her. Hoche, in fact, was contemplating a vast design, which he reserved for the middle of the summer. The government, extremely gratified by the service he had just rendered, and desirous of rewarding him for the repulsive task he had so ably performed, caused it to be declared, both in regard to himself and to the armies who gained such important victories, that the army of the ocean and its commander had deserved well of the country.

Thus La Vendée was in a state of peace by the month of Germinal, before any of the armies had taken the field. The directory could now attend without distraction to its great operations, and even obtain from the districts near the sea efficient reinforcements.

CHAPTER III.

CAMPAIGN OF 1796.—CONQUEST OF PIEDMONT AND LOMBARDY BY GENERAL BONAPARTE. BATTLES OF MONTENOTTE AND MILLESIMO. THE PASSAGE OF THE BRIDGE OF LODI. ESTABLISHMENT AND POLICY OF THE FRENCH IN ITALY.—MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH.—PASSAGE OF THE RHINE BY GENERALS JOURDAN AND MOREAU. BATTLES OF RASTADT AND ETTLINGEN.—THE ARMY OF ITALY TAKES ITS STAND UPON THE ADIGE AND THE ARMY OF GERMANY UPON THE DANUBE.

The fifth campaign of liberty was about to commence. It was to be opened upon the two finest military theatres in Europe—on those most diversified with impediments of art or nature, and lines of defence or attack. These were, on the one hand, the extensive valley of the Rhine, and the two transverse valleys of the Maine and the Neckar; and on the other, the Alps, the Po, and Lombardy. The armies that were now going to fall in line, were the most warlike that had ever been seen under arms; they were sufficiently numerous to cover the ground on which they were to act, but not sufficiently so to render combinations useless, and thus confine the war to a mere invasion. They were commanded by young generals, disengaged from the pedantry of routine, emancipated from obsolete habitudes, but yet well informed, and elevated by great events. Every thing,

therefore, concurred to render the conflict hard-fought, diversified, fertile in combinations, and worthy of public attention.

The plan of the French government was, as we have seen, to invade Germany, so as to quarter its armies upon the enemy's country, to separate the princes from the empire, to invest Mentz, and to threaten the hereditary states. It purposed at the same time to make a bold attempt upon Italy, with a view to quarter its armies there, and to wrest that rich country from Austria.

Two fine armies, of from seventy to eighty thousand men each, were sent to the Rhine under the command of two celebrated generals. About thirty thousand half-starved soldiers were committed to an unknown, but bold young man, to try his fortune beyond the Alps.

Bonaparte arrived at the head-quarters at Nice on the 6th Germinal (March 27). Every thing there was in a deplorable state. The troops were reduced to the last degree of distress. Without clothes, without shoes, without pay, and sometimes without food, they nevertheless endured their privations with extraordinary fortitude. In accordance with that inventive spirit which characterizes the French soldier, they had formed a regular system of plunder, and descended by turns and in bands into the plains of Piedmont to procure provisions. There were no horses whatever to serve the artillery. In order to maintain the cavalry, they had been sent to the rear to the banks of the Rhone. The thirtieth horse and the forced loan had not yet been levied in the south, on account of the troubles. All that Bonaparte had received, which was to serve all his wants, were two thousand louis in money and a million in bills, part of which were protested. In order to supply himself with what was necessary, negotiations were opened with the Genoese government, so as to obtain from it some assistance. No satisfaction for the outrage on the *Modeste* frigate had yet been made, and to satisfy that violation of neutrality, the senate of Genoa was required to consent to a loan, and to deliver up to the French the fortress of Gavi, which commands the road from Genoa to Milan. The recall of the Genoese families banished for their attachment to France was likewise insisted upon. Such was the state of the army when Bonaparte arrived thither.

The army presented quite a different appearance in respect of the men. They were for the most part soldiers who had been hastily sent off to the armies at the time of the levy *en masse*, well informed, young, accustomed to privations, and inured to war by the gigantic conflicts in which they had been engaged amid the Pyrenees and the Alps. The generals were in no wise inferior to the soldiers. The principal were Masséna, a young man of Nice, of uncultivated mind, but collected and intelligent in danger, and of indomitable perseverance; Augereau, formerly a fencing-master, whom great bravery and skill in managing the soldiers had raised to the highest rank; Laharpe, an expatriated Swiss, combining information with courage; Serrurier, formerly a major, methodical and brave; lastly, Berthier, whom his activity, his precision in attending to details, his geographical acquirements, and his capacity for measuring with the eye the extent of a ground or the numerical force of a column, rendered eminently qualified for a useful and convenient head of the staff.

This army had its barracks (*dépôts*) in Provence; it was ranged along the chain of the Alps, connecting itself by its left with Kellermann's army, protecting the pass of the Tende, and stretching towards the Apennines. The effective army amounted at most to thirty-six thousand men. Serrurier's division was at Garessio, beyond the Apennines, to watch the Piedmontese in their intrenched camp of Ceva. The divisions of Augereau, Masséna, and Laharpe, forming a mass of about thirty thousand men, kept on this side the Apennines.

The Piedmontese, to the number of twenty or twenty-two thousand men, and under the command of Colli, were encamped at Ceva, on the back of the mountains. The Austrians, to the number of thirty-six or thirty-eight thousand, were advancing by the roads of Lombardy towards Genoa. Beaulieu, who commanded them, had distinguished himself in the Netherlands. He was an old man who still exhibited the ardour of youth. The enemy had therefore about sixty thousand men to oppose to the thirty thousand whom Bonaparte had to bring into line; but the Austrians and the Piedmontese were far from being on good terms with each other. According to the old plan, Colli wanted to protect Piedmont; and Beaulieu desired to keep himself in communication with Genoa and the English.

Such was the respective force of the two parties. Although Bonaparte had already distinguished himself with the army of Italy, he was considered far too young to command it. Of a short slight figure, without any peculiarity in his appearance beyond Roman features and his steady and piercing eye, there was nothing in his person or past life that seemed remarkable. He was received without any great show of attention. Masséna owed him a grudge for having gained an influence over Dumerbion in 1794. Bonaparte addressed the army in energetic language. "Soldiers," said he, "you are ill-fed and almost naked. The government owes you much, but can do nothing for you. Your patience, your courage, do you honour, but procure you neither benefit nor glory. I am going to lead you into the most fertile plains in the world; you will there find large cities, rich provinces; you will there also obtain honour, glory, and wealth. Soldiers of Italy, would your courage fail you?" The army hailed this language with delight: young generals who all had their fortune to make, poor and adventurous soldiers desired nothing better than to see the beautiful countries thus promised them. Bonaparte made an arrangement with a contractor, and procured for his soldiers a part of their pay which was in arrear. He gave to each of his generals four louis in gold, which shows what was then the state of their fortunes. He next removed his head-quarters to Albenga, and made all the authorities proceed along the coast under the fire of the English gunboats.

The plan to be followed was the same that had suggested itself the year before at the battle of Loano. To penetrate by the lowest pass of the Apennines, and to separate the Piedmontese from the Austrians by bearing strongly on their centre,—

such was the very simple idea that Bonaparte conceived on a survey of the localities. He commenced operations in such good time, that he had hopes of surprising his enemies and throwing them into disorder. However, he was not able to anticipate them. Before he arrived, general Cervoni had been sent forward upon Voltri, quite close to Genoa, to intimidate the senate of that city, and to compel them to consent to the demands of the directory. Beaulieu, apprehensive of the result of this step, lost no time in getting into action, and brought his army to Genoa, partly on one slope of the Apennines, partly on the other. Bonaparte's plan therefore still remained practicable, excepting his intention of surprising the Austrians. Several roads led from the back of the Apennines to their slope towards the sea: in the first place that which runs by the Bocchetta to Genoa, then that of Acqui and Dego which crosses the Apennines at the pass of Montenotte and falls into the basin of Savona. Beaulieu left his right wing at Dego, despatched his centre under d'Argenteau to the pass of Montenotte, and proceeded himself with his left by the Bocchetta and Genoa, upon Voltri, along the sea-side. Thus his position was the same as that of Devins at Loano. Part of the Austrian army was between the Apennines and the sea; the centre under d'Argenteau was on the very summit of the Apennines, at the pass of Montenotte, and was connected with the Piedmontese encamped at Ceva, on the other side the mountains.

The two armies, putting themselves in motion at the same time, met by the way, on the 22nd Germinal (April 11), at the sea-side. Beaulieu fell in with the advanced guard of Laharpe's division, which had been despatched upon Voltri, to alarm Genoa, and repulsed it. D'Argenteau, with the centre, crossed the pass of Montenotte, with the intention of falling at Savona upon the centre of the French army, during its supposed march towards Genoa. At Montenotte he found only colonel Rampon, at the head of twelve hundred men, and obliged him to fall back into the old redoubt of Montelegino, which stopped up the road to Montenotte. The brave colonel, sensible of the importance of this position, retired within the redoubt, and obstinately resisted all the efforts of the Austrians. Thrice was he attacked by the whole of the enemy's infantry, and thrice did he repulse it. Amidst the most galling fire he called upon his soldiers to swear that they would die in the redoubt rather than give it up. The soldiers swore, and remained all night under arms. This act of courage saved the plans of general Bonaparte, and in all probability the future success of the campaign.

Bonaparte was at this moment at Savona. He had not caused the pass of Montenotte to be intrenched, because no one ever intrenches himself when he has made up his mind to take the offensive. He learned what had occurred during the day at Montelegino and Voltri. He immediately became sensible that the moment was come for putting his plan in execution, and took his measures accordingly. That same night he drew back his right, which was formed by Laharpe's division, and at that very time engaged along the sea-side with Beaulieu, and sent it by the road to Montenotte to meet d'Argenteau. He despatched Augereau's division upon the same point, to support the division of Laharpe. Lastly he made Masséna's division march by a by-road to the other side of the Apennines, so as to bring it into the very rear of d'Argenteau's division. On the morning of the 23rd (April 12), all his columns were in motion; himself stationed on an elevated knoll, he saw Laharpe and Augereau marching to join d'Argenteau, while Masséna was making his way upon his rear. The Austrian infantry made a brave resistance; but surrounded on all sides by superior forces, it was put to the rout, and left two thousand prisoners and several hundred dead on the field. It fled in disorder towards Dego, where the rest of the army was.

Thus Bonaparte, whom Beaulieu supposed had intended to file off along the coast to Genoa, had suddenly slipped away, and proceeding by the road which crosses the Apennines, had broken through the enemy's centre, and victoriously debouched beyond the mountains.

In his eyes, no good had been done in overwhelming the centre, unless the Austrians were cut off for ever from the Piedmontese. He proceeded on the same day (23rd) to Carcare, to render his position more central between the two allied armies. He was in the valley of the Bormida, which runs into Italy. Lower down, before him, and at the extremity of the valley, were the Austrians, who had rallied at Dego, guarding the road from Acqui into Lombardy. On his left, he had the narrow passes of Millesimo, which join the valley of Bormida, and in which the Piedmontese were guarding the road to Ceva and Piedmont. It was requisite, therefore, that at one and the same time, his left should force the narrow passes of Millesimo, so as to take possession of the Piedmont road, and that in front he should take Dego, to open for himself the road to Acqui and Lombardy. Then master of both roads, he would have completely cut off the allies from each other, and might at pleasure rush upon them singly or altogether. On the morning of the next day, the 24th (April 13), he put forward his army in advance; Augereau, towards the left, attacked Millesimo, and the divisions of Masséna and Laharpe advanced into the valley towards Dego. The impetuous Augereau dashed with such spirit upon the narrow passes of Millesimo, that he forced them, entered, and reached the extremity before general Provera, who was posted on a height, had time to retreat. The latter was posted in the ruins of the old castle of Cossaria. Finding himself surrounded, he attempted to defend himself there; Augereau surrounded and summoned him to surrender. Provera began to parley, and wanted to treat. It was of importance not to be stopped by this obstacle, and the troops immediately attacked the post. The Piedmontese poured upon them a deluge of stones, and rolled down enormous rocks, which crushed whole lines. The brave Joubert, nevertheless, encouraged his men, and climbed the height at their head. On arriving within a distance, he fell, shot by a cannon-ball. At this sight, the soldiers fell back. They were obliged to encamp in the evening at the foot of the height; here they protected themselves by some felled trees, and kept watch the whole night to prevent Provera's making his escape. On their part, the divisions sent to engage

at the bottom of the valley of the Bormida, had in the mean time marched upon Dego, and made themselves masters of the outworks. The morrow was to be the decisive day.

Accordingly, on the 25th (April 14), the attack again became general on all points. On the left, Augereau, in the narrow pass of Millesimo, repulsed all the efforts made by Colli to extricate Provera, fought him the whole day, and drove Provera to desperation. It ended by the latter laying down his arms at the head of fifteen hundred men. Laharpe and Masséna, on their part, fell upon Dego, where the Austrian army had been reinforced, on the 22nd and 23rd, by regiments from Genoa. The attack was terrible. After several assaults, Dego was taken; the Austrians lost part of their artillery, and left four thousand prisoners, among whom were twenty-four officers.

During this action, Bonaparte had remarked a young officer, named Lannes, who charged with great intrepidity. He made him colonel on the field of battle.

After four days' fighting, the army had need of repose; but scarcely had the soldiers rested from the fatigues of battle before the clangour of arms was again heard. Six thousand grenadiers of the enemy made their way into Dego, and carried against us this post which had cost us so much trouble to get. They were one of the Austrian divisions which had been left on the maritime slope of the Apennines, and were returning across the mountains. So great was the confusion, that this division had made its way into the middle of the French army before the danger was known. The brave Wukassovich, who commanded these six thousand grenadiers, thinking he should save himself by a bold stroke, had carried Dego. We had therefore to begin the battle again, and to renew the efforts of the preceding day. Bonaparte galloped to the spot, rallied his columns, and pushed them forwards upon Dego. Their progress was stopped by the Austrian grenadiers; but they returned to the charge, and at length led on by adjutant-general Lanusse, who put his hat on the point of his sword, they forced their way into Dego, and recovered their conquest, together with some hundreds of prisoners.

Thus Bonaparte was master of the valley of the Bormida; the Austrians fled towards Acqui, upon the road to Milan; the Piedmontese, after they had lost the narrow passes of Millesimo, retired upon Ceva and Mondovi. He was master of all the roads; he had nine thousand prisoners, and spread consternation before him. By skilfully managing the mass of his forces, and bringing them to bear alternately upon Montenotte and upon Millesimo and Dego, he had crushed the enemy in every place by making himself stronger than the enemy on every point. This was the moment for forming a great resolution. Carnot's plan enjoined him not to trouble himself about the Piedmontese, in order that he might dash upon the Austrians. Bonaparte thought the Piedmontese army deserved more consideration, and was not inclined that it should be left in his rear; he was moreover sensible that only one more attack would destroy it; and he deemed it more prudent to complete the destruction of the Piedmontese. He did not therefore enter the valley of the Bormida, and descend towards the Po after the Austrians; he took the left road, forced his way into the narrow passes of Millesimo, and followed the road to Piedmont. Laharpe's division alone was left in the camp of San Benedetto, commanding the course of the Belbo and the Bormida, and keeping watch upon the Austrians. The soldiers were worn out with fatigue; they had fought on the 22nd and 23rd at Montenotte, on the 24th and 25th at Millesimo and Dego; they had lost and retaken Dego on the 26th, had rested only on the 27th, and were again marching on the 28th upon Mondovi. During these rapid marches, there had not been time to distribute the regular allowance, the soldiers were entirely destitute, and they committed acts of spoliation. Bonaparte, indignant, was exceedingly severe upon the marauders, and displayed as much energy in re-establishing discipline as in pursuing the enemy. Bonaparte had gained in a few days the entire confidence of the soldiers. The generals of division yielded to his opinion. They listened with attention, nay with admiration, to the terse and figurative language of the young captain. On the heights of Monte-Zemoto, which had to be crossed to reach Ceva, the army perceived the lovely plains of Piedmont and Italy. The French armies beheld the Tanaro, the Stura, the Po, and all those rivers that run into the Adriatic; they beheld in the back-ground the Upper Alps covered with snow, and were lost in the contemplation of those beautiful plains of *the land of promise**. Bonaparte was at the head of his soldiers; he was affected. "Hannibal," he exclaimed, "crossed the Alps; as for us, we have gone round them." This saying made the object of the campaign intelligible to all. What splendid expectations then opened before our eyes!

Colli defended the intrenched camp of Ceva no longer than was necessary to somewhat delay our march. This excellent officer had contrived to encourage his soldiers, and to keep up their spirits. He had no longer any hope of beating his formidable enemy; but his object was to retreat foot by foot, and to give the Austrians time to come to his relief, in rejoining them by a circuitous march, as they had promised him. He halted behind the Cursaglia, in advance of Mondovi. Serrurier, who on the opening of the campaign had been left at Garessio to watch Colli, had just rejoined the army. Thus one more division was added. Colli was protected by the Cursaglia, a deep and rapid stream, which falls into the Tanaro. On the right, Joubert endeavoured to cross, but he narrowly escaped being drowned in the attempt. In the front, Serrurier attempted to cross the bridge of Saint Michael, in which he succeeded; but Colli, suffering him to make the attack, fell upon him unawares with his best troops, drove him back upon the bridge, and made him pass over the river in confusion. The situation of the army was awkward. On its rear was Beaulieu, who was preparing himself anew; and it was necessary to succeed against Colli as speedily as possible. However, it scarcely seemed practicable to carry the position if it were vigorously defended. Bonaparte ordered a fresh attack to be made on the following day. On the 2nd Floréal (April 21), he marched to

* An expression made use of by Bonaparte.

the Cureaglia, where they found the bridges abandoned. The only object Colli had in making the defence of the preceding day was to delay the retreat. He was surprised in line at Mondovi. Serrurier decided the victory by taking the principal redoubt, that of La Bicoque. Colli left behind him three thousand killed or prisoners, and pursued his retreat. Bonaparte arrived at Cherasco, an ill-defended place, but important from its position at the confluence of the Stura and the Tanaro, and easy to make defensible with the artillery taken from the enemy. In this position, Bonaparte was twenty leagues from Savona his point of departure, ten leagues from Turin, and fifteen from Alexandria.

There was great confusion at the court of Turin. The king, who was very obstinate, would not yield. The ministers of England and Austria beset him with their remonstrances, and persuaded him to shut himself up in Turin, to send his army beyond the Po, and thus to imitate the great examples of his ancestors. They terrified him with the revolutionary influence which the French were likely to exercise in Piedmont; they demanded for Beaulieu the three fortresses of Tortona, Alexandria, and Valenza, that he might shut himself up and defend himself in the Delta they form on the banks of the Po. This was the very thing the king [of Sardinia] chiefly opposed. The idea of giving his three principal fortresses to his ambitious neighbour of Lombardy, was to him insupportable. Cardinal Costa made him decide on throwing himself into the arms of the French. He represented to him the impossibility of resisting so rapid a conqueror, the danger of irritating him by a protracted defence, and thus driving him to revolutionize Piedmont, and all this to minister to a foreign and even inimical ambition, that of Austria. The king yielded, and caused overtures to be made by Colli to Bonaparte. They reached Cherasco on the 4th Floréal (April 23rd); Bonaparte had not power to sign a peace, but he was capable of signing an armistice, and he resolved upon doing so. He had not deviated from the plan of the directory, which had for its object the reduction of the Piedmontese; nevertheless, he had not proceeded so as to effect the conquest of Piedmont, but merely to protect his rear. To conquer Piedmont he must have taken Turin, and he had neither the requisite artillery, or forces sufficient to furnish a blockading corps, and to keep an effective army in reserve. Besides all this, the campaign would then have been confined to a siege. By keeping up a good understanding with Piedmont, with the necessary guarantees, he might securely fall upon the Austrians and drive them out of Italy. Those about him said that he ought not to accede to any terms, that he ought to dethrone a king who was a kinsman of the Bourbons, and diffuse the French revolution in Piedmont. This was the opinion of many soldiers, officers, and generals, in the army, and especially of Augereau, who was born in the faubourg Saint-Antoine, and retained the opinions he had formed there. Young Bonaparte thought otherwise. He felt the difficulty of revolutionizing a monarchy which was the only military one in Italy, and in which old habits and modes of thinking were preserved unchanged; he could have no motive in raising up obstacles in his route; his object was to make a rapid march to the conquest of Italy, which depended on the destruction of the Austrians, and their being driven out beyond the Alps. He would not, therefore, do any thing that might render his situation confused, and delay his march.

Consequently, he assented to an armistice; but he added that, in the relative state of the armies, an armistice would be ruinous to him unless he had certain guarantees for the security of his rear given him; accordingly he required that the three fortresses of Coni, Tortona, and Alexandria, should be given up, together with all the stores they contained, which would be useful to his army, and for which the republic were to account; that the roads of Piedmont should be thrown open to the French, which would considerably shorten the distance between France and the banks of the Po; that a victualling establishment should be prepared on these roads for the troops that should pass that way; and lastly, that the Sardinian army should be distributed among the fortresses, so that the French army might have nothing to fear from it. These conditions were agreed to, and the armistice was signed at Cherasco on the 9th Floréal (April 29th), with colonel Lacoste and count Latour.

It was agreed that plenipotentiaries should set out immediately for Paris to treat for a definitive peace. The three fortresses demanded were given up, with immense magazines. From that moment the army had its line of operation protected by the three strongest places in Piedmont; it had safe and commodious roads, much shorter than those running through the Riviera of Genoa; it had abundance of provisions; it was reinforced by a multitude of soldiers, who at the news of victory quitted the hospitals; it possessed a numerous artillery, taken at Cherasco, and from the different places, and also a great number of horses; in short, it was provided with every thing; and the promises of the general were fulfilled. During the first few days after the entrance of the army into Piedmont it had plundered, because the rapidity of its marches had prevented the distribution of provisions. Hunger being satisfied, order was restored. The count de Saint-Marsan, the Piedmontese minister, visited Bonaparte, and managed to please him; even the king's son was anxious to see the young conqueror, and lavished testimonies of esteem, which deeply affected Bonaparte. Bonaparte replied with great tact to the compliments he received; he dismissed all apprehensions from their minds in regard to the intentions of the directory, and the dangers of revolution. He was sincere in his protestations, for he already entertained an idea, which he adroitly suffered to peep forth in subsequent interviews. Piedmont had marred her interests by allying herself with Austria; it was to France that she ought to ally herself; France was her natural friend, for France separated from Piedmont by the Alps could not desire to possess herself of Piedmont; on the contrary, she was able to defend Piedmont against the ambition of Austria, and even minister to her aggrandizement. Bonaparte could not suppose that the directory would consent to give any part of Lombardy to Piedmont; for it was not yet conquered, and there could exist no desire of making such a conquest, save for the purpose

of making it an equivalent for the Netherlands; but a vague hope of aggrandizement might dispose Piedmont to ally herself with France, which would have procured us a reinforcement of twenty thousand excellent troops. Bonaparte promised nothing, but he managed by a few words to excite the covetousness and the hopes of the cabinet of Turin.

Bonaparte, who with a peremptory disposition combined a vigorous and lofty imagination, and was fond of making an impression, wished to proclaim his successes in a new and striking manner: he sent Murat, his aide-de-camp, to present with great solemnity to the directory twenty-one colours taken from the enemy. He then addressed the following proclamation to his soldiers:

"Soldiers! in a fortnight you have gained six victories, taken twenty-one pair of colours, fifty-five pieces of cannon, several fortresses, and conquered the richest part of Piedmont; you have made fifteen thousand prisoners*, and killed or wounded more than ten thousand men; you had hitherto been fighting for barren rocks, rendered famous by your courage, but of no service to the country; you this day compete by your services with the army of Holland and of the Rhine. Destitute of every thing, you have supplied all your wants. You have gained battles without cannon, crossed rivers without bridges, made forced marches without shoes, bivouacked without brandy, and often without bread. Republican phalanges, the soldiers of liberty alone, could have endured what you have endured. Thanks be to you for it, soldiers! your grateful country will have to thank you for its prosperity; and if when conquerors at Toulon, you predicted the glorious campaign of 1793, your present victories predict one still more glorious. The two armies which so lately attacked you so boldly, are flying affrighted before you; the perverse men who mocked at your distress, and rejoiced in their heart at the triumphs of your enemies, are confounded and trembling. But, soldiers, you have done nothing so long as any thing yet remains to be done. Neither Turin or Milan is yours; the ashes of the conquerors of Tarquin are still trampled upon by the murderers of Basseville! There are said to be among you some whose courage is diminishing, and who would prefer returning to the summits of the Apennines and of the Alps. No; I cannot believe it. The conquerors of Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, and Mondovi, are burning with impatience to bear the glory of the French people to distant climes!"

When these intelligences, these colours, and these proclamations arrived one after the other at Paris, the rejoicing was infinite. On the first day, it was a victory that opened the Apennines, and produced two thousand prisoners; on the second it was a still more decisive victory, that cut off the Piedmontese from the Austrians, and produced six thousand prisoners. The following days brought news of further successes: the destruction of the Piedmontese army at Mondovi, the submission of Piedmont at Cherasco, and the certainty of a speedy peace, which gave room to expect others. The rapidity of these successes, and the number of the prisoners, surpassed every thing that had yet been seen. The language of these proclamations called up the associations of antiquity, and astonished the public mind. Every body was inquiring who this young general was, whose name, known to some appreciators of merit but unknown to France, now for the first time blazed forth. They could not pronounce it correctly at first, and they said with joy, that the republic saw new talents daily springing up to render her illustrious and to defend her. The councils three several times declared that the army of Italy had deserved well of the country, and decreed a *fête* to Victory, for the purpose of celebrating the prosperous commencement of the campaign. The aide-de-camp sent by Bonaparte presented the colours to the directory. The ceremony was impressive. Several foreign ambassadors were on that day received, and the government appeared surrounded by a consideration quite new to it.

Piedmont having submitted, general Bonaparte had nothing to hinder him from marching in pursuit of the Austrians, and hastening to the conquest of Italy. The news of the victories of the French had deeply agitated all the states of that country. He who was about to enter thither should be a profound politician as well as a great captain, in order to conduct himself there with prudence. Every body knows the face of country it exhibits to one emerging from the Apennines. The Alps, the loftiest mountains in our part of Europe, after describing an immense semicircle to the west, in which they include Upper Italy, turn short and run all at once in an oblique line towards the south, thus forming a long peninsula washed by the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Bonaparte coming from the west, and having crossed the chain at the point where it lowers and runs off, by the name of the Apennines, to form the peninsula, had before him the beautiful semicircle of Upper Italy, and on his right that long narrow peninsula which forms Lower Italy. A number of petty states divided that country, which is always sighing for an united government, without which it can have no existence as a great nation.

Bonaparte had passed through the state of Genoa, which is situated on this side of the Apennines, and Piedmont, which is on the other side. Genoa, an ancient republic, founded by Doria, was the only one of all the Italian governments that retained any real energy. Placed for the last four years between the two belligerent armies, it had contrived to maintain its neutrality, and had thus secured all the advantages of commerce. Between its capital and the coast, it numbered nearly one hundred thousand inhabitants; it generally kept from three to four thousand troops; in case of emergency, it could arm all the peasants of the Apennines, and from them obtain an excellent militia; and it was wealthy, from its vast revenues. Two parties divided it; the party adverse to France had gained the ascendency, and expelled several families. The directory had to require the recall of these families, and an indemnity for the outrage committed on the *Modeste* frigate.

On leaving Genoa, and stretching to the right into the peninsula, along the southern slope of the Apennines, fertile Tuscany first meets the eye, situated on the two banks of the Arno, in the

* In fact, scarcely more than ten to twelve thousand.

mildest climate, and in one of the best sheltered parts of Italy. One portion of this tract formed the small republic of Lucca, peopled with one hundred and forty thousand inhabitants; the rest formed the grand duchy of Tuscany, governed recently by the archduke Leopold, and now by the archduke Ferdinand. In this country, the most enlightened and the most polished of Italy, the philosophy of the eighteenth century had kindly germinated. Leopold had there accomplished his admirable legislative reforms, and had tried with success experiments most honourable to humanity. The bishop of Pistoja had also commenced a sort of religious reform by propagating Jansenist doctrines there. Although the revolution had alarmed the weak and timid minds of Tuscany, yet it was there that France had most admirers and friends. The archduke, although an Austrian, had been one of the first princes in Europe to recognise the republic. He had a million of subjects, six thousand troops, and a revenue of fifteen millions. Unfortunately Tuscany was the least able of all the principalities to defend itself.

After Tuscany, came the states of the church. The provinces subject to the Pope, situated on both sides of the Apennines, and extending to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, were the worst governed in Europe. They had only their fine system of agriculture, handed down from remote ages, known to all Italy, an excellent substitute for the opulence of trade, from which she had been long excluded. Excepting in the legations* of Bologna and Ferrara, where a profound contempt for the government of priests prevailed, and at Rome, the ancient abode of science and the arts, where a few nobles had participated in the philosophy of all the great persons of Europe, the minds of men had remained in the most disgraceful barbarism. A superstitious and ferocious populace, together with idle and ignorant monks, composed that population of two million and a half of subjects. The army amounted to four or five thousand men, and every one knows what sort of an army that was. The Pope, a vain, ostentatious prince, jealous of his authority and that of the holy see, entertained an intense hatred for the philosophy of the eighteenth century; he thought he was restoring to the chair of St. Peter part of its influence by the display of great magnificence, and he had also undertaken works serviceable to the arts. Reckoning upon the majesty of his person, and the persuasion of his words, which was great, he had some time since undertaken a journey to Vienna, to bring back Joseph II. to the doctrines of the church, and to counteract the philosophy which seemed to have the sole possession of the mind of that prince. This expedition had not been successful. The pontiff, in the plenitude of his disgust at the French revolution, had launched his anathema against her, and preached a crusade. He had even tolerated the murder of Basseville, the French agent in Rome. Excited by the monks, his subjects shared his hatred against France, and were seized with all the rage fanaticism could induce, when they heard of the success of our arms.

* Legation in this sense signifies a provincial district governed by a Legate, having exclusive jurisdiction, just as we should say the bishopric of Durham, the duchy of Lancaster, &c. *Trans.*

The extremity of the peninsula and Sicily compose the kingdom of Naples, the most powerful state in Italy, bearing the strongest analogy to Rome, both in its ignorance and barbarism, and still worse governed, if possible. A Bourbon reigned there, a mild, imbecile prince, devoted to one pursuit—the amusement of fishing. This occupation entirely absorbed his time; and while he was indulging his favourite amusement, the government of his kingdom was abandoned to his wife, an Austrian princess, sister of the queen of France. This princess, a woman of a capricious disposition and ill-regulated passions, having a favourite who was in the pay of the English, the minister Acton, conducted the affairs of the kingdom in a reckless manner. The English, whose policy it always was to gain a footing on the continent, by domineering over the petty states bordering on its coasts, had endeavoured to acquire the supreme influence at Naples, as well as in Portugal and Holland. They excited the hatred of the queen against France, and with that hatred inspired her with the ambition to rule Italy. The population of the kingdom of Naples consisted of six millions of inhabitants; the army, of sixty thousand; but differing in every respect from the orderly and brave soldiers of Piedmont, the Neapolitan soldiers, nothing else than lazzaroni, without conduct and without discipline, had the usual cowardice of armies totally neglected. Naples had always promised to send thirty thousand men to the army of Devins, and had sent no more than two thousand four hundred cavalry, well mounted and in good condition.

Such were the principal states situated in the peninsula on the right of Bonaparte. Facing him, in the semicircle of Upper Italy, there was first, on the slope of the Apennines, the duchy of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, comprising five hundred thousand inhabitants, keeping three thousand troops, furnishing a revenue of four millions, and governed by a Spanish prince, formerly a pupil of Condillac, but who, in spite of a sound education, had fallen under the yoke of monks and priests. A little further to the right, likewise on the declivity of the Apennines, were the duchies of Modena, Reggio, and Mirandola, peopled with four hundred thousand inhabitants, having six thousand men under arms, and subject to the last descendant of the illustrious house of Este. This distrustful prince had conceived such alarm at the spirit of the age, that by the mere force of his apprehensions he had become a prophet, and had foreseen the revolution. His predictions were cited. In his terror he had taken good care to fortify himself against the slings and arrows of fortune, and had amassed immense wealth by draining his dominions. Avaricious and timid, he was despised by his subjects, the most sharp-witted and the most malicious in Italy, and the most inclined to embrace the new modes of thinking. Further on, beyond the Po, came Lombardy, governed for Austria by an archduke. This beautiful and productive plain, situated between the waters of the Alps which fertilize it, and those of the Adriatic which bring to it the wealth of the east, covered with corn, rice, pastures, herds of cattle, and rich beyond all the provinces in the world, was dissatisfied with its foreign masters. It was Guelph at heart, notwithstanding its long slavery. It contained twelve

hundred thousand inhabitants. Milan was always one of the most enlightened cities in Italy. Less favoured with respect to the arts than Florence or Rome, it was nevertheless more closely allied with the intelligence of the north, and contained a great number of persons who wished for the civil and political regeneration of the people.

The last state in Upper Italy was the ancient republic of Venice. This republic, with its old aristocracy inscribed in the golden book (*Livre d'or*), its state inquisition, its silence, its jealous and wary policy, was no longer a formidable power either to its subjects or its neighbours. With its provinces on the continent, situated at the foot of the Tyrol, and the provinces of Illyria, she numbered nearly three millions of subjects. She could raise so many as fifty thousand Sclavonians, good soldiers, because they were well-disciplined, well kept, and well paid. She was rich in hereditary wealth, but it is well known that for two centuries her commerce had traversed the ocean, and borne her treasures to the islanders of the Atlantic. She hardly possessed a few ships; and the passages of the lagoons were almost choked up. However, she still possessed great revenues. Her policy consisted in amusing her subjects, in lulling them by pleasure and repose, and in observing the strictest neutrality in regard to the neighbouring powers. Yet the nobles of the continent were jealous of the golden book, and bore with impatience the yoke of the nobility intrenched in the lagoons. At Venice itself, the citizens, who were an opulent class, began to think. In 1793, the allied powers had forced the senate to declare against France; they had complied, but had reverted to their neutral policy, so soon as treaties were set on foot with the French republic. As we have previously noticed, Venice had been as anxious as Prussia and Tuscany to send an ambassador to Paris. At this time also, in compliance with the request of the directory, it had just given notice to the head of the house of Bourbon, at that time Louis XVIII., to quit Verona. That prince had accordingly departed, declaring that he should insist on the restitution of some armour given by his ancestor Henry IV. to the senate, and on the obliteration of the name of his family from the pages of the golden book.

Such was Italy at that time. The general spirit of the age had made its way thither, and inflamed many minds. All the inhabitants did not wish for a revolution, particularly those who recollected the frightful scenes that had dyed our revolution in blood; but all wanted, though in different senses, a reform; and there was not a heart that did not experience emotion at the idea of the independence and unity of the Italian father-land. That population of husbandmen, tradesmen, artists, nobles, the priests alone excepted, who know no country but the church, was fired with the hope of seeing all the divisions of the country united into one, under the same government, either republican or monarchical, but Italian. In good sooth, a population of twenty million souls, possessing excellent sea-coasts and soil, great sea-ports and magnificent cities, might well constitute a glorious and powerful state! All it wanted was an army. Piedmont alone, always engaged in the wars of the continent, had brave and well-disciplined troops. Doubtless, nature was far from having denied natural courage to the other parts of Italy; but natural courage is nothing without a strong military organization. Italy had not a single regiment that could stand the sight of the French or Austrian bayonets.

On the approach of the French, the enemies of political reform had been struck with consternation; its advocates had been transported with joy. The entire mass was in anxiety; it had vague, uncertain presentiments; it knew not whether to hope or to fear.

Bonaparte on entering Italy was instructed and his object was to drive out the Austrians. His government being desirous as we have said of procuring peace, intended to conquer Lombardy, for no other purpose than to restore it to Austria, and to force her to cede the Netherlands. Bonaparte could not therefore think of liberating Italy. Besides, with some thirty thousand men, how could he avow a political object? Still, if the Austrians were driven beyond the Alps, and his power firmly established, he might exercise great influence, and in the course of events attempt great things. If, for instance, the Austrians, beaten at all points, on the Po, on the Rhine, and on the Danube, were obliged to cede even Lombardy, if the people in their ardour for freedom were to declare for liberty on the approach of the French armies, then great prospects would open for Italy. But in the mean time Bonaparte had no business to publish any particular object, in order not to irritate the princes whom he left in his rear. His intention, therefore, was not to demonstrate any revolutionary motive, but at the same time not to restrain imagination in its career, and to await the effects of the presence of the French upon the Italian people.

It was on this principle he avoided encouraging the discontented in Piedmont, becase he there saw a country opposed to revolution, a strong government, and an army whose alliance might be serviceable to him.

The armistice of Cherasco had been scarcely signed before he was again upon the road. Many persons in the army disapproved of his marching forwards. What! said they; we are but thirty odd thousand; we have neither revolutionized Piedmont or Genoa; we have in our rear those governments, our covert enemies, and we are going to attempt the passage of a great river, such as the Po, to dash across Lombardy, and perhaps by our presence decide the republic of Venice to throw fifty thousand men into the scale! Bonaparte's orders were to move forward, and he was not a man to hang back with a bold order, but he obeyed it because he approved of it, and he had excellently digested reasons for its approval. Piedmont and Genoa would embarrass us much more, said he, if they were in revolution; thanks to the armistice, we have now a road secured by three fortresses; all the governments of Italy will be reduced if we can but drive the Austrians beyond the Alps; Venice will tremble if we are victorious at her side, the sound of our cannon will even decide her to ally herself with us; we must advance, then, not only beyond the Po, but likewise the Adda and the Mincio, to the line of the Adige; there we will besiege Mantua, and we will make all Italy tremble on our rear. The head of the young general, heated by his march, conceived

even still more gigantic projects than those which he avowed to his army. He wanted, after having destroyed Beaulieu, to make his way into the Tyrol, to cross the Alps a second time, and to dash into the valley of the Danube, for the purpose of joining there the armies which had started from the banks of the Rhine. This colossal and imprudent plan was a tribute which a great and justly reasoning mind could not but pay to the two-fold presumption of youth and success. He wrote to his government, so that he might be empowered to carry it into execution.

He had taken the field on the 20th Germinal (April 11), the reduction of Piedmont had been perfected on the 9th Floréal (April 28) by the armistice of Cherasco; it had occupied him eighteen days. He set out immediately in pursuit of Beaulieu. He had stipulated with Piedmont that Valenza should be delivered up to him, that he might pass the Po at that place; but this condition was a feint,—it was not at Valenza that he wanted to cross the river. Beaulieu receiving intelligence of the armistice, had thought to possess himself by surprise of the three fortresses of Tortona, Valenza, and Alexandria. All he succeeded in doing was to surprise Valenza, into which he threw the Neapolitans; then seeing that Bonaparte was advancing rapidly, he hastened to recross the Po, that he might place that river between himself and the French army. He went and encamped at Valeggio, at the confluence of the Po and the Tésino, near the point of the angle formed by those two rivers. He there threw up some intrenchments, to fortify his position and oppose the passage of the French army.

Bonaparte, on quitting the dominions of the king of Sardinia, and entering those of the duke of Parma, received the envoys of that prince, who came to solicit the forbearance of the conqueror. The duke of Parma was related to Spain; some consideration therefore was to be shown to him, which, after all, was by no means foreign to the intentions of the general. Still he might subject him to some of the rights of war. Bonaparte received his envoys at the passage of the Trebbia. He affected some anger because the duke of Parma had not seized the opportunity of making peace, while Spain, his relative, was treating with the French republic. He then granted an armistice, demanding a tribute of two millions in money, of which the chest of the army was much in need; sixteen hundred horses, for the artillery and the baggage; a great quantity of wheat and oats; leave to pass through the duchy; and the establishment of hospitals for the sick at the expense of the prince. The general did not confine himself to this: he regarded and had a great admiration of the arts as an Italian; he well knew how much they add to the splendour of an empire, and the moral effect they produce on the imagination of men. He demanded twenty pictures, to be chosen by French commissioners and transferred to Paris. The envoys of the duke, too happy in appeasing at this price the anger of the general, consented to every thing, and lost no time in performing the conditions of the armistice. Nevertheless they offered a million to save the picture of Saint-Jerome. Bonaparte said to the army: "This million we should soon spend, and we shall get many more by our conquests. A masterpiece is everlasting; it will be an ornament to our country." The million was refused.

Bonaparte having obtained the advantages of conquest without its troubles, pursued his march. The condition inserted in the armistice of Cherasco, relative to the passage of the Po at Valenza, and the direction of the principal French columns towards that town, induced a belief that Bonaparte would attempt the passage of the river in its neighbourhood. While the main body of his army was already collected at the point where Beaulieu was expecting him to cross, on the 17th Floréal (May 6), he took together with a body of three thousand five hundred grenadiers, his cavalry and twenty-four pieces of cannon, descended along the Po, and arrived on the morning of the 18th at Placentia, after a march of sixteen leagues and of thirty-six hours. The cavalry had seized as it went along all the boats which it found on the banks of the river, and had brought them to Placentia; it had also taken a great quantity of forage, and the medical stores of the Austrian army. A barge carried the advanced guard commanded by colonel Lannes. That officer had no sooner reached the opposite side, than he dashed with his grenadiers upon some Austrian detachments, which were hastily coming up on the left bank of the Po, and dispersed them. The rest of the grenadiers crossed the river in due order, and began to construct a bridge for the passage of the army, which had received orders to descend in its turn to Placentia. Thus by a feint and a bold march, Bonaparte found himself beyond the Po, with the additional advantage of having turned the Tésino. In point of fact, had he crossed higher up, besides the difficulty of doing so in the face of Beaulieu, he would have come upon the Tésino, and have had to effectuate his passage over that also. But at Placentia there was no such inconvenience, for the Tésino at that point is united with the Po.

On the 18th of May, Liptai's division, the first to receive the intelligence, proceeded to Fombio, at a little distance from the Po, on the road to Pizzighitone. Bonaparte, not intending that it should be allowed to establish itself in a position round which the entire Austrian army was going to rally, and where he might be compelled to stand the attack with the river Po at his back, hastened to attack it with all the forces that he had about him. He rushed upon this division, which had intrenched itself; he dislodged it after a sanguinary action, and took from it two thousand prisoners. The rest of the division gained the road to Pizzighitone, and went to shelter itself in that place.

On the evening of the same day, Beaulieu, apprised of the passage of the Po at Placentia, came up to the support of Liptai's division. He knew nothing of the misfortune that division had met with; he fell in with the French advanced posts, was warmly received, and obliged to retreat in the utmost haste. Unfortunately the brave general Laharpe, so useful to the army for his intelligence and his intrepidity, was killed by his own soldiers amidst the darkness of the night. The whole army regretted the loss of this brave Swiss, whom the tyranny of Berne had brought into France.

The Po being crossed, the Tésino turned, and Beaulieu beaten and no longer able to keep the

field, the route to Milan was open. It was natural that a conqueror of twenty-six should be impatient to enter that city. But Bonaparte was desirous, above all, to utterly defeat Beaulieu. To do this, he meant not merely to fight him; he meant to get at his rear, to cut off his retreat, and to oblige him, if possible, to lay down his arms. That he should not fail in his object, he had to anticipate him at the passage of the rivers. A great number of rivers flow from the Alps, and cross Lombardy in their way to the Po and the Adriatic. After the Po and the Tésino come the Adda, the Oglio, the Mincio, the Adige, and a great many more. Bonaparte now had before him the Adda, which he had not been able to turn as he did the Tésino, because he could not have crossed the Po but at Cremona. The passage of the Adda is at Pizzighitone, but the remains of Liptai's division had just thrown themselves into that place. Bonaparte hastened to go up along the Adda, so as to get to the bridge of Lodi. Beaulieu was there some time before him. It was impossible, therefore, for Bonaparte to get before him at the passage of that river. But Beaulieu had not with him at Lodi more than twelve thousand infantry and four thousand horse. Two other divisions, under Colli and Vukassovich, had made a circuit to Milan, to throw a garrison into the citadel, and were then to return to the Adda, to cross it at Cassano, considerably above Lodi. By endeavouring then to cross the Adda at Lodi, notwithstanding the opposition of Beaulieu, Bonaparte might possibly reach the other bank before the two divisions, which were to pass over at Cassano, had perfected their movement. In that case he might have some expectations of being able to cut them off.

Bonaparte came up before Lodi on the 20th Floréal (May 9). That town is situated on the same bank along which the French army had to come. Bonaparte caused it to be suddenly attacked, and got into it in spite of the Austrians. The latter then quitted the town, retired by the bridge, and went to rejoin the main body of their army on the other bank. It was this bridge they had to pass over, on leaving Lodi, in order to cross the Adda. Twelve thousand infantry and four thousand horse were drawn up on the opposite bank; twenty pieces of artillery enfiladed the bridge; a cloud of sharpshooters were posted on the bank. It was not customary in war to brave such difficulties: a bridge defended by sixteen thousand men and twenty pieces of artillery was an obstacle that nobody would have thought of getting over. The entire French army had sheltered itself from the fire behind the walls of Lodi, awaiting the orders of the general. Bonaparte sallied from the town, surveyed the banks of the river, amidst a shower of balls and grape-shot, and, having resolved upon his plan, returned to Lodi to put it in execution. He ordered his cavalry to go up the Adda and to endeavour to ford it above the bridge, he then caused a column of six thousand grenadiers to be formed: he went through the ranks, encouraged them, and communicated extraordinary courage by his presence and his address. He then ordered them to debouch by the gate that opened on the bridge, and to march at a running pace. He had calculated that from the rapidity of the movement the column would not have time to suffer much. This formidable column closed its ranks and debouched by running over the bridge; a tremendous fire was poured upon it, the entire head of the column was thrown down. Nevertheless the column advanced: having reached the middle of the bridge, it hesitated; but the generals encouraged it by their words and by their example. It recovered itself, advanced, rushed upon the guns, and killed the gunners who attempted to defend them. At this moment, the Austrian infantry approached in its turn to support its artillery; but, after what it had just done, the terrible column were no longer afraid of bayonets; it dashed upon the Austrians at the moment when the cavalry, which had found a ford, was threatening their flanks, overthrew them, and took two thousand prisoners.

This most daring exploit struck the Austrians with astonishment; but unfortunately it proved of no avail. Colli and Vukassovich had succeeded in gaining the causeway of Brescia, and could no longer be cut off. If the result had failed, at least the line of the Adda was carried, the courage of the soldiers was elevated to the highest pitch, and their devotion to their general was unbounded. In their gaiety they devised a singular practice, which serves to illustrate the national character. The oldest of the soldiers assembled one day, and seeing that their general was very young, they thought they would make him pass through every grade of promotion; at Lodi they called him corporal, and when he appeared in the camp, they saluted him by the title, since become so famous, of the *little corporal*. We shall find them hereafter conferring others upon him, according as he merited them.

The Austrian army had made good its retreat upon the Tyrol; it would have been useless to follow it. Bonaparte then resolved to turn back upon Lombardy, to take possession of and to organize it. The remains of Liptai's division had intrenched themselves at Pizzighitone, and might convert it into a fortification. He proceeded thither to drive them from the place; he then sent Masséna before him to Milan; Augereau fell back to occupy Pavia. He wished to overawe that great city, celebrated for its university, and to exhibit there one of the finest divisions of the army. Serrurier's and Laharpe's divisions were left at Pizzighitone, Lodi, Cremona, and Cassano, to protect the Adda.

Bonaparte now thought of repairing to Milan. On the approach of the French army, the partisans of Austria, and all those who were terrified at the reputation of our soldiers, who were reported to be as barbarous as they were brave, had fled and covered the roads to Brescia and the Tyrol. The archduke had set out, and had been seen to shed tears on leaving his beautiful capital. The greater part of the Milanese indulged their expectations, and awaited our army with the most favourable inclinations. When they had received the first division commanded by Masséna, and saw that those soldiers, whom report painted in such frightful colours, respected property, conducted themselves quietly with regard to persons, and manifested the kindly feelings natural to their character, they were filled with enthusiasm, and treated them with the utmost kindness. The patriots assembled from all parts of Italy, awaited the young con-

queror, whose exploits were so rapid, and whose Italian name was so soft of pronunciation. They immediately despatched the count de Melzi to meet Bonaparte, and to promise him obedience. A national guard was formed and clothed in the three colours, green, red, and white. The duke de Serbelloni was appointed to command it. A triumphal arch was erected to welcome the French general. On the 26th Floréal (May 15), a month after the opening of the campaign, Bonaparte made his entry into Milan. The whole population of that capital went forth to meet him. The national guard was under arms. The municipality came and delivered to him the keys of the city. Acclamations accompanied him all the way to the Serbelloni palace, where accommodations had been prepared for him. He had now won the hearts of the Italians, as well as of the soldiers, and he was now enabled to act by moral force quite as powerfully as by physical force.

It was not his intention to stay long in Milan, any more than he had done at Cherasco after the submission of Piedmont. He meant to stay there time enough to temporarily organize the province, to extract from it the resources requisite for his army, and to put every thing in order, in regard to the places on his rear. His intention still was to hasten afterwards to the Adige and Mantua, and, if possible, to make his way into the Tyrol and the other side of the Alps.

The Austrians had left two thousand men in the citadel of Milan. Bonaparte caused it to be immediately invested. It was agreed with the commandant of the citadel that he should not fire upon the city, for it was Austrian property, which he had no motive in destroying. The operations of the siege were forthwith commenced.

Bonaparte, without entering into any specific engagement with the Milanese, or promising them an independence which he could not insure to them, nevertheless held out sufficient hopes to excite their patriotism. He spoke to them in energetic language, and said that, to obtain liberty, they must first deserve it by assisting in the utter separation of Italy from Austria. He instituted provisionally a municipal administration; he caused national guards to be everywhere formed, in order to commence the military organization of Lombardy. He next occupied himself with the wants of his army, and was obliged to make the Milanese pay a contribution of twenty millions. This measure appeared to him vexatious, because it must necessarily retard the march of the public mind; but, after all, it was not taken in very bad part, and it was moreover indispensable. Owing to the magazines found in Piedmont, and to the corn furnished by the duke of Parma, the army had abundance of provisions. The soldiers grew fat, they had good bread and good meat to eat, and excellent wine to drink. They were satisfied, and began to observe strict discipline. It only remained to clothe them. Still wearing the old clothes they had in the Alps, they were in rags, and no longer caused an impression, save by their renown, their martial bearing, and their admirable discipline. Bonaparte soon discovered new resources. The duke of Modena, whose states bordered upon the Po, below those of the duke of Parma, despatched envoys to obtain the same terms as the latter. This old avaricious prince, seeing all his predictions verified, had fled to Venice with his treasures, leaving the government of his dominions to a regency. Not wishing however to lose them, he sought a negotiation. Bonaparte could not grant peace, but he was at liberty to grant armistices, which were much the same in effect, and which rendered him master of all the states of Italy. He required ten millions, supplies of all kinds, horses and pictures.

With those resources obtained from the country, he established on the banks of the Po large stores, hospitals furnished with necessaries for the accommodation of fifteen thousand sick, and replenished all the chests of the army. Considering that he himself was rich enough, he even sent off some millions to Genoa for the directory. As he knew, moreover, that the army of the Rhine was in want of funds, and that this state of destitution prevented it from taking the field, he sent by way of Switzerland a million to Moreau. This was an act of good fellowship, that did him both honour and service; for it was of importance that Moreau should take the field, to prevent the Austrians from directing their principal forces against Italy.

Bonaparte was still more confirmed in his plans when he surveyed all these things. It was not necessary, in his opinion, to march against the princes of Italy; all he had to do was to act against the Austrians only. So long as a good defence could be made against the latter, so as to prevent their return into Lombardy, all the Italian states, trembling under the ascendancy of the French army, would be reduced one after the other. The dukes of Parma and Modena had submitted. Rome and Naples would do the same, if he did but continue master of the entrances into Italy. It was at the same time the better policy to hold out expectations to the people, and, without overthrowing governments, to wait till the subjects should rise of themselves. But while he was engaged on these correct ideas and these extensive operations, one of the most vexatious oppositions was about to stop his progress. The directory was enchanted with his services; but Carnot on reading his despatches, written with energy and precision, but in an imaginative style, was alarmed at his gigantic designs. He very properly considered that the desire to traverse the Tyrol and to cross the Alps a second time was too extravagant a scheme, nay even impracticable; but in his turn, and by way of setting the young general right, he conceived another far more dangerous. Lombardy being conquered, Bonaparte ought, according to Carnot, to fall back into the peninsula, to go and punish the Pope and the Bourbons of Naples, and to drive the English from Leghorn, where the duke of Tuscany suffered them to bear rule. To effect this, Carnot, in the name of the directory, ordered the army of Italy to be divided into two; one part to be left under Kellermann in Lombardy; the other was to march upon Rome and Naples under the command of Bonaparte. This unfortunate plan re-enacted the blunder the French have always committed, that of advancing far into the peninsula before they were masters of Upper Italy. It is not with the Pope or with Naples that the possession of Italy has to be disputed, but with the Austrians. Now, the line of operation at that time was not on

the Tiber, but on the Adige. Impatience to effect conquests always urged us on to Rome and Naples, and while we have been overrunning the peninsula, we have always found the road closed in after us. It was natural that republicans should wish to chastise a pope and a Bourbon; but they committed the same blunder as the ancient kings of France.

Bonaparte, in his plan for forcing himself into the valley of the Danube, had considered nobody but the Austrians. This was in Bonaparte the excess of conviction in a sound but inexperienced mind; he could not therefore after such a conviction consent to march into the peninsula; besides, aware of the importance of unity of direction in a conquest which required as much political as military genius, he could not endure the idea of sharing the command with an old general, brave but of moderate abilities, and very conceited. This was in him that proper egotism of genius that is anxious to perform its task alone, because it is conscious that no one but itself is capable of performing it. He behaved here as in the field of battle; he hazarded his future prospects, and tendered his resignation in a letter equally respectful and bold. He knew well that the directory durst not accept it; but it is certain that he much rather preferred resignation, to obedience in this respect, because he could not consent to suffer his own reputation as well as the army to be thrown away in the execution of a vicious plan.

Opposing the most luminous reasoning to the errors of the director Carnot, he said that the French ought to continue to make head against the Austrians, and occupy themselves with nobody else; that a mere division, supported in the rear upon the Po and Ancona, would be sufficient to intimidate the peninsula, and force Rome and Naples to sue for quarter. He prepared immediately to leave Milan, to hasten to the Adige, and to lay siege to Mantua. He there proposed to wait for fresh orders from the directory and for a reply to his despatches.

He published a new proclamation to his soldiers, which could not fail to appeal strongly to their imagination, and which was also calculated to make a powerful impression upon the pope and the king of Naples:

"Soldiers! you have rushed like a torrent from the top of the Apennines; you have overthrown, dispersed every thing that opposed your progress. Piedmont, delivered from Austrian tyranny, has returned to her natural sentiments of peace and friendship for France. Milan is yours, and the republican flag waves throughout all Lombardy. The dukes of Parma and Modena owe their political existence to your generosity alone. The army which proudly threatened you finds no longer any barrier to secure it against your courage; the Po, the Tesino, and the Adda have not stopped you for a single day; those highly-vaunted bulwarks of Italy have proved insufficient; you have passed them as rapidly as the Apennines. These successes have produced joy in the bosom of the country; your representatives have ordered a *fête* dedicated to your victories, celebrated as they are in all the communes of the republic. There your fathers, your mothers, your wives, your sisters, your sweethearts are rejoicing in your achievements, and proudly boast that you belong to them. Yes, soldiers! you have done much, but is there nothing more left for you to do? Shall it be said of us, that we knew how to conquer, but not how to make the most of the victory? Shall posterity reproach you with having found a Capua in Lombardy? But I see you already running to arms. Well! let us go! we have still forced marches to make, enemies to subdue, laurels to gather, injuries to revenge. Let those who have whetted the daggers of civil war in France, who have basely assassinated our ministers, who burned our ships at Toulon—let them tremble! The hour of vengeance has arrived; but let not the people be alarmed; we are friends of the people every where, and more particularly of the descendants of the Brutuses, the Scipios, and the great men whom we have taken for our models. To re-establish the capitol, to set up there with honour the statues of the heroes who rendered it celebrated; to rouse the Roman people, benumbed by centuries of slavery;—such will be the fruit of our victories. They will form an epoch with posterity: you will have the immortal glory of changing the face of the finest portion of Europe. The French people, free, and respected by the whole world, will give to Europe a glorious peace, which will indemnify her for the sacrifices of all kinds that she has been making for the last six years. You will then return to your homes, and your fellow-citizens, pointing to you, will say, *He belonged to the army of Italy.*"

Bonaparte stayed no longer than eight days at Milan; he left it on the 2d Prairial (May 22) to return to Lodi, and to advance towards the Adige.

While Bonaparte was pursuing his march, an unexpected event suddenly recalled him to Milan. The nobles, the monks, the servants of the fugitive families, and a multitude of creatures of the Austrian government, got up a revolt against the French army. They spread a report that Beaulieu, having been reinforced, was at hand with sixty thousand men; that the prince of Condé was coming through Switzerland upon the rear of the republicans, and that they were on the brink of destruction. The priests availing themselves of their influence over some of the peasantry, who had suffered from the transit of the army, excited them to take arms. Bonaparte being no longer in Milan, the moment was deemed propitious for carrying the revolt into execution, and for raising all Lombardy on his rear. The garrison of the citadel of Milan gave the signal by a sortie. The tocsin was immediately rung throughout the whole surrounding country; and armed peasants repaired to Milan, to make themselves masters of the city. But the division which Bonaparte had left to blockade the citadel quickly forced the garrison to fall back within its walls, and drove out the peasants who showed themselves there. In the environs of Pavia the insurgents were more successful. They entered that city, and made themselves masters of it, in spite of the three hundred men whom Bonaparte had left in garrison there. These three hundred men, exhausted or sick, shut themselves up in a fort, to escape being slaughtered. The insurgents surrounded the fort, and summoned it to surrender. A French general passing at that moment through

Pavia, was seized, and obliged, while a dagger was held to his throat, to sign an order commanding the garrison to open its gates. The order was signed and executed.

This revolt might produce disastrous consequences. It might provoke a general insurrection and bring ruin on the French army. The public mind of a nation is always more advanced in the cities than in the country. While the population of the cities of Italy was declaring for us, the peasants, excited by the monks, and suffering severely from the transit of the armies, were most unfavourably inclined towards us. Bonaparte was at Lodi, when, on 4th Prairial (May 24th), he received intelligence of the occurrences at Milan and Pavia; he immediately turned back with three hundred horse, a battalion of grenadiers, and six pieces of cannon. Order was already restored in Milan. He pursued his route to Pavia, sending the archbishop of Milan before him. The insurgents had pushed an advance guard as far as the village of Binasco, which Lannes dispersed. Bonaparte, being sensible that it behoved him to act with promptitude and energy, in order to check the evil in its birth, set this village on fire, that the sight of the flames might strike terror into Pavia. On arriving before that city he halted. It contained thirty thousand inhabitants; it was inclosed within an old wall, and was occupied by seven or eight thousand insurgent peasants. They had closed the gates and manned the walls. To take this city with three hundred horse and one battalion was no easy matter; yet there was no time to lose, for the army was already on the Oglio, and needed the presence of its general. In the night, Bonaparte caused a threatening proclamation to be posted on the gates of Pavia, in which he said that a misguided mob without any effective means of resistance, was defying an army triumphant over kings, and meant to bring destruction on the people of Italy; that, adhering to his intention of not making war upon the people, he would pardon this act of madness, and leave a door open for repentance; but that those who should not instantly lay down their arms, should be treated as rebels, and their villages burned. The flames of Binasco, he added, ought to teach them a lesson. In the morning, the peasants, who were masters of the city, refused to surrender it. Bonaparte ordered the walls to be swept with grape and howitzer shot; he then brought up his grenadiers, who broke open the gates with hatchets. They forced their way into the city, and had to sustain a combat in the streets. The resistance, however, was not long. The peasants fled, and left unfortunate Pavia to the wrath of the conqueror. The soldiers, with loud shouts, demanded leave to pillage. Bonaparte, by way of making a severe example, allowed them three hours' pillage. They were scarcely a thousand men, and they could not do any great mischief in so large a city as Pavia. They fell upon the goldsmiths' shops, and secured a considerable quantity of jewellery. The act most to be condemned was the pillage of the Monts-de-Piété; but fortunately, in Italy, as in every other country where there is a poor and vain aristocracy, the Monts-de-Piété were full of articles belonging to the higher classes of the country. The houses of Spallanzani and Volta were preserved by the officers, who themselves guarded the dwellings of these illustrious scholars; an example doubly honourable to France and to Italy.

Bonaparte then let loose three hundred horse upon the surrounding country, and cut down a great number of the insurgents. This prompt severity produced universal submission, and overawed the party in Italy which was hostile to liberty and to France. It is a sad thing to be reduced to the necessity of employing such means; but Bonaparte was obliged to do it, to save his army and the future prospects of Italy from being sacrificed. The party of the monks trembled; the sufferings of Pavia, passing from mouth to mouth, were magnified; and the French army recovered its formidable renown.

This affair over, Bonaparte lost no time in returning to rejoin the army, which was on the Oglio, and about to enter the Venetian territory.

On the approach of the French army, the question so much agitated in Venice, whether to take part with Austria or France, was discussed anew by the senate. Some of the old oligarchy, who had retained some degree of energy, would have wished the republic to form an immediate alliance with Austria, the natural protector of all the old despotisms; but they apprehended in the future Austrian ambition, and at the moment the cannon of France was most to be dreaded. Besides, they would have themselves to resort to arms, a resolution exceedingly repugnant to an enervated government. Some young members of the oligarchy, equally energetic, but less obstinate than their elders, wished to adopt the most courageous resolves. They proposed to raise a formidable armament, but solely to maintain the neutrality, and with fifty thousand men to intimidate any one of the powers who should violate the Venetian territory. This was a strong resolution, but too strong to be adopted. Some prudent persons, on the contrary, proposed a third course, namely, an alliance with France. Battaglia, the senator, a man of an acute, sagacious, and temperate mind, offered reasons which the course of events has almost made prophetic. In his opinion neutrality, even an armed neutrality, was the worst of all determinations. It was impossible to make themselves respected, whatever force they displayed; and not having attached either of the parties to their cause, they would sooner or later be sacrificed by both. It was absolutely necessary therefore to decide either for Austria or for France. Austria was for the moment driven out of Italy; and even supposing her to possess the means of returning, she could not do so in less than two months, during which time the republic might be destroyed by the French army; moreover, the ambition of Austria was always more to be dreaded by Venice. She had always envied her her provinces in Illyria and Upper Italy, and would seize the first opportunity to take them from her. The only guarantee against this ambition was the power of France, who wanted nothing from Venice, and who would always have an interest in defending her. France, it was true, professed principles which were repugnant to the Venetian nobility; but it was time at last to reconcile themselves with some indispensable sacrifices to the spirit of the age, and to make those concessions to the nobles of the continent

which could alone bring them back to the republic and to the Golden Book. With some slight modifications in the ancient constitution, they might satisfy the ambition of all classes of Venetian subjects, and attach France to them; furthermore, should they take arms for the latter, they might hope, perhaps, to be rewarded for the services which they should have rendered by the spoils of Austria and Lombardy. In every case, repeated Battaglia, neutrality would be the very worst course for all parties.

This opinion, the wisdom of which time has demonstrated, too deeply wounded the pride and the prejudices of the old Venetian aristocracy to be adopted. It must also be observed that sufficient reliance was not placed on the duration of the French power in Italy, to induce Venice to ally herself with France. There was an ancient Italian adage which said that *Italy was the grave of the French*, and they feared lest they should afterwards find themselves exposed, without defence, to the wrath of Austria.

Of these three courses, the most convenient, and that most conformable with the ancient habits and the weakness of this old government, was preferred, namely, an unarmed neutrality. It was decided that the chief officers of state should be sent to meet Bonaparte, to assure him of the neutrality of the republic, and to claim the respect due to the Venetian territory and subjects. There was a great terror of the French, but they were known to be good tempered, and sensible to kind treatment. Orders were issued to all the agents of the government, to receive and to treat them in the best manner possible, and to study the officers and generals in order to gain their good will.

Bonaparte, on his arrival in the Venetian territory, had as much need of prudence as Venice herself. This power, though in the hands of an enfeebled government, was still great. It behoved him not to alienate it to such a degree as to compel it to take up arms; for then Upper Italy would be no longer tenable for the French. But it was also requisite, while observing the neutrality, to compel Venice to suffer us to remain upon her territory, to allow us to fight there, and even to supply ourselves with provisions, if possible. She had allowed the Austrians to pass through her territories; that was the reason to be given for our doing as we chose, and demanding every thing, while she was continuing within the limits of neutrality.

Bonaparte, on entering Brescia, published a proclamation, in which he declared that, in passing through the Venetian territory in pursuit of the imperial army, to which a transit had been allowed, he should respect the territory and the inhabitants of the republic of Venice; that he should make his army observe the strictest discipline; that whatever it should take should be paid for; and that he should not forget the old ties which united the two republics. He was very cordially received by the Venetian *proveditore* of Brescia, and pursued his march. He had crossed the Oglio, which runs next after the Adda; he arrived before the Mincio, which, issuing from the lake of Garda, winds through the plain of the Mantuan, then, after a course of some leagues, forms a new lake, in the midst of which Mantua is situated, and at last falls into the Po. Beaulieu, reinforced by ten thousand men, had posted himself on the line of the Mincio, to defend it. An advanced guard of four thousand foot and two thousand horse was drawn up in advance of the river, at the village of Borghetto. The mass of the army occupied the position of Valeggio, beyond the Mincio; the reserve was a little farther behind at Villa Franca; and detachments guarded the course of the Mincio, above and below Valeggio. The Venetian town of Peschiera is situated on the Mincio, at the very point where it issues from the lake of Garda. Beaulieu, who wished to have that place, in order to more firmly support the right of his line, deceived the Venetians, and upon pretext of obtaining a passage for fifty men, surprised the town, and placed in it a strong garrison. It had a bastioned enclosure and eighty pieces of cannon.

Bonaparte, in advancing upon this line, wholly neglected Mantua, which was on his right, and which he had not yet time to blockade, and supported his left towards Peschiera. His plan was to cross the Mincio at Borghetto and Valeggio. To this end, it was requisite that he should deceive Beaulieu in regard to his intention. On this occasion he had recourse to the same stratagem as at the passage of the Po. He directed one corps upon Peschiera, and another upon Lonato, so as to annoy Beaulieu on the Upper Mincio, and to make him suppose that he designed to cross at Peschiera, or to turn the lake of Garda. At the same time, his most serious attack was pointed against Borghetto. That village, situated in advance of the Mincio, was, as we have stated above, guarded by four thousand foot and two thousand horse. On the 9th Prairial (May 29) Bonaparte commenced the engagement. He had always had great trouble to make his cavalry fight. It was not accustomed to charge, because this movement was not so much in use, and it was besides intimidated by the high reputation of the German cavalry. Bonaparte was determined to make it fight at all events, because he attached great importance to the services that it was capable of rendering. In advancing upon Borghetto, he distributed his grenadiers and his carabiniers on the right and left of his cavalry; he placed the artillery in the rear, and having thus enclosed it, he launched it upon the enemy. Supported on either side, and led on by the impetuous Murat, it performed prodigies, and put to flight the Austrian squadrons. The infantry then attacked the village of Borghetto and took it. The Austrians, retiring from it by the bridge leading from Borghetto to Valeggio, attempted to break it down. In fact they managed to destroy one arch. But some grenadiers, led on by general Gardanne, plunged into the Mincio, which was fordable in some places, and crossed it, holding their muskets above their heads, in defiance of the fire from the opposite heights. The Austrians fancied that they beheld the column of Lodi, and retired without destroying the bridge. The broken arch was repaired, and the army was enabled to cross. Bonaparte instantly started off, to ascend the Mincio with Augereau's division in pursuit of the Austrians; but they declined battle the whole day. Leaving Augereau's division to continue the pursuit, he returned to Valeggio, where he found Masséna's division beginning to

make their soup. All at once the charge sounded, and the Austrian hussars dashed into the middle of the village. Bonaparte had scarcely time to escape. He mounted a horse, and soon ascertained that this was one of the enemy's corps left to guard the Lower Mincio, and which was ascending the river to rejoin Beaulieu in his retreat towards the mountains. Masséna's divisions ran to arms, and gave chase to this division, which however succeeded in rejoining Beaulieu.

The Mincio was thus crossed. Bonaparte had decided for a second time the retreat of the Imperialists, who ultimately were driven into the Tyrol. He had gained an important advantage, that of making his cavalry fight, who now no longer feared the Austrian cavalry. He considered this as a great point gained. Before his time cavalry was not much used, and he had thought that it might be rendered very serviceable by employing it to cover the artillery. He had calculated that the light artillery and the cavalry employed on proper occasions were capable of producing the effect of a mass of infantry ten times stronger. He began already to exhibit a great regard for young Murat, who knew how to make his squadrons fight; a qualification he then considered as very rare among the officers of that army. The surprise which had put his person in jeopardy suggested another idea, namely, to form a corps of picked men, which, under the name of guides, were to accompany him every where. In this case, his personal safety was but a secondary consideration in his own eyes; he perceived the advantage of having always at hand a devoted corps ready for the boldest exploits. We shall in fact observe that he determined great events by sending out twenty-five of these brave fellows. He gave the command of this body to a cavalry officer, possessing great coolness and intrepidity, and afterwards well known by the name of Bessières.

Beaulieu had evacuated Peschiera, to make his retreat to the Tyrol. A battle had taken place with the Austrian rear-guard, and it was not till after a very brisk action that the French army entered the town. The Venetians having been unable to recover it from Beaulieu, it had ceased to be neutral, and the French were authorized to establish themselves there. Bonaparte knew that the Venetians had been deceived by Beaulieu, but he resolved to avail himself of that fact to obtain from them all that he wished. He wanted the line of the Adda, and more particularly the important city of Verona, which commands the river; but above all, he wanted to obtain supplies.

The *proveditore* Foscarelli, an old Venetian oligarch, greatly attached to his prejudices and thoroughly opposed to France, was commissioned to repair to Bonaparte's head-quarters. He had been told that the general was highly enraged at what had happened at Peschiera, and report represented his wrath as a thing to be dreaded. Binasco and Pavia attested his severity; two armies destroyed, and Italy conquered attested his power. The *proveditore* arrived at Peschiera exceedingly alarmed; and on setting out he wrote to his government: *May God be pleased to accept me as a victim!* He was charged with the special mission of preventing the French from entering Verona. That city, which had afforded an asylum to the pretender, was in the most painful anxiety. Young Bonaparte, who was subject to violent fits of passion, and who also knew how to feign them, omitted nothing to increase the terror of the *proveditore*. He inveighed vehemently against the Venetian government which pretended to be neutral, and could not make its neutrality respected, and which, in suffering the Austrians to seize Peschiera, had exposed the army to the loss of a great number of brave fellows before that place. He said that the blood of his companions in arms cried for vengeance, and a signal vengeance they must have. The *proveditore* made every excuse for the Venetian authorities, and then came to the main point, which was Verona. He declared that he had orders to forbid both the belligerent powers the entry into that city. Bonaparte replied that it was then too late; that Masséna had already marched thither; that perhaps at that very moment he was setting fire to it, to punish a city which had had the insolence to consider itself for a moment as the capital of the French empire. The *proveditore* again renewed his solicitations, and Bonaparte, affecting to be somewhat mollified, replied that all he could do, if Masséna had not already carried the place by storm, was to grant a delay of twenty-four hours, after which he would employ bombs and cannon.

The *proveditore* retired in the utmost consternation. He returned to Verona, where he announced the fact that the French must be received. On their approach, the wealthiest inhabitants, conceiving that they should not be forgiven for the residence of the pretender in their city, fled in great numbers to the Tyrol, carrying with them their most valuable effects. The Veronese, however, soon regained confidence, on seeing the French, and convincing themselves with their own eyes that these republicans were not so barbarous as rumour had represented them.

Two other Venetian envoys arrived at Verona to see Bonaparte. Selection had been made of two senators, Erizzo and Battaglia, for this purpose. The latter was the person of whom we have already spoken as desiring an alliance with France, and it was hoped at Venice that these new ambassadors would succeed better than Foscarelli in pacifying the general. He did in fact receive them much more favourably than Foscarelli; and now that he had attained the object of his wishes, he affected to be satisfied, and to consent to listen to reason. What he wanted for the future was provisions, and, if possible, even an alliance between Venice and France. He had to be by turns overbearing and engaging. He was both. "The first law for men," said he, "is to live. I would gladly spare the republic of Venice the burden of feeding us; but since the fortune of war has obliged us to come hither, we are forced to live where we happen to be. Let the republic of Venice furnish my soldiers with what they need; she may afterwards settle with the French republic." It was agreed that a Jew contractor should procure for the army all that it wanted, and that Venice should secretly pay this contractor, that she might not appear to violate the neutrality by supplying the French. Bonaparte then adverted to the subject of an alliance. "I have just occupied the Adige," said he; "I have done so because I must have a line, because that is the best, and because your govern-

ment is incapable of defending it. Let it arm fifty thousand men, let it post them on the Adige, and I will restore to it the towns of Verona and Porto Legnago. For the rest," added he, "you must be pleased to see us here. What France sends me to do in these parts is entirely for the interest of Venice. I am come to drive the Austrians beyond the Alps, perhaps to constitute Lombardy an independent state; can any thing more advantageous be done for your republic? If she would unite with us, no doubt she would be handsomely rewarded for that service. We are not making war upon any government; we are the friends of all those who shall assist us to confine the Austrian power within its proper limits."

The two Venetians retired, struck by the genius of this young man, who, alternately threatening and caressing, imperious and supple, and conversing on all subjects, military and political, with as much profundity as eloquence, demonstrated that the statesman was as precocious in him as the warrior. "*That man,*" they observed, writing to Venice, "*will some day exercise an overweening influence over his country*".*

Bonaparte was at length master of the line of the Adige, to which he attached so much importance. He attributed all the blunders committed in the ancient campaigns of the French in Italy to the injudicious choice of the defensive line. Lines are numerous in Upper Italy, for a multitude of rivers run from the Alps to the sea. The largest and the most celebrated of them, the Po, which traverses all Lombardy, was in his opinion bad, as being too extensive. In his opinion, an army could not guard a stream fifty leagues in length. A feint might always open the passage of a large river. He had himself crossed the Po a few leagues from Beaulieu. The other rivers, such as the Tésino, the Adda, the Oglio, falling into the Po, mingled with it, and had the same inconveniences. The Mincio was fordable, and besides, that river also fell into the Po. The Adige alone, coming from the Tyrol, and running to the sea, covered all Italy. It was deep, and had only one channel of no great extent from the mountains to the sea. It was covered by two fortified places, Verona and Porto Legnago, which were very near each other, and which, without being strong, were capable of withstanding a first attack. Lastly, on leaving Legnago, it traversed impassable morasses, which covered the lower part of its course. The rivers farther on in Upper Italy, such as the Brenta, the Piave, the Tagliamento, were fordable; and besides, were turned by the high road from Tyrol, which debouched behind them. The Adige had the advantage of being placed at the outlet of that road which runs through its own valley.

Such were the reasons that decided Bonaparte in favour of that line, and an immortal campaign has demonstrated the accuracy of his judgment. This line being occupied, he now had to think of commencing the siege of Mantua. This place was situated on the Mincio; it was behind the Adige, and was covered by that river. It was regarded as the bulwark of Italy. Situated amidst a lake formed by the waters of the Mincio, it communicated with the main land by five dikes. Notwithstanding its ancient fame, this fortress had inconveniences which diminished its real strength. Seated in the midst of marshy exhalations, it was subject to fevers; in the next place, the extremities of the raised roads (*têtes de chaussées**) being carried, the besieged would be driven back into the place, and might be blockaded by a corps far inferior to the garrison. Bonaparte calculated upon taking it before a new army could come to the assistance of Italy. On the 15th Prairial (June 3rd), he ordered the *têtes de chaussées*, one of which was formed by the suburb of Saint-George, to be attacked, and carried them. From that moment, Serrurier could with eight thousand men blockade a garrison composed of fourteen thousand, ten of which were under arms and four in the hospitals. Bonaparte caused the operations of the siege to be commenced, and the whole of the Adige to be put in a state of defence. Thus, in less than two months he had conquered Italy. The question now was to keep it. But there the doubt lay, and this was the touchstone by which the young general was to be tried.

The directory had just replied to Bonaparte's letters on the plan for dividing the army and marching into the Peninsula. The ideas of Bonaparte were too correct not to strike Carnot's mind, and his services too brilliant to allow of his resignation being accepted. The directory hastened to write to him, to approve of his plans, to confirm him in the command of all the forces acting in Italy, and to assure him of the entire confidence of the government. If the magistrates of the republic had possessed the gift of prophecy, they would have done well to accept the resignation of this young man, though he was right in the opinion which he supported, and though his retirement would have deprived the republic of Italy and of a great captain; but at the moment they beheld in him nothing but youth, genius, and victory, and they experienced that interest and consideration which all these things were calculated to inspire.

The directory imposed on Bonaparte a single condition, and that was to make Rome and Naples sensible of the power of the republic. All the sincere patriots in France insisted on this. That pope, who had anathematized France, preached up a crusade against her, and suffered her ambassador to be assassinated in his capital, certainly deserved chastisement. Bonaparte, now at liberty to act according to his own interpretation, alleged that all these results could be obtained without quitting the line of the Adige. While one part of the army was guarding that line, and another was besieging Mantua and the citadel of Milan, he wanted with one single division supported by columns in its rear upon the Po, to make the whole Peninsula tremble, and to force the pontiff and the queen of Naples to sue at the throne of republican clemency. News arrived that a strong army, detached from the Rhine, was on its road to dispute the possession of Italy with her conqueror. This army, which

* This prediction was made the 5th June, 1796.

* *Tête* in this sense means that extremity which is nearest the enemy—as *tête de pont*, another military term which frequently occurs in these details of warlike operations, signifies that end or extremity of the bridge which is on the enemy's side. *Trans.*

had to pass through the Black Forest, the Voralberg, and the Tyrol, could not arrive in less than a month. Bonaparte had therefore time to finish every thing in his rear without removing too far from the Adige, and so as to be able by a mere retrograde march to bring himself again in face of the enemy.

It was indeed time that he should consider what was to be done with the rest of Italy. The presence of the French army there called forth opinions with extraordinary rapidity. The Venetian provinces could no longer endure the aristocratic yoke. The city of Brescia manifested a strong inclination to revolt. Throughout all Lombardy, and especially in Milan, public opinion was making rapid progress. The duchies of Modena and Reggio, the Legations of Bologna and Ferrara, would no longer have either their old duke or the pope. In return, the adverse party became more hostile. The Genoese aristocracy was very unfavourably disposed, and were considering how they could execute some adverse movements on our rear. Gerola, the Austrian minister, was the secret instigator of all these designs. The state of Genoa was full of petty fiefs, holden of the empire. The Genoese nobles invested with these fiefs collected deserters, banditti, Austrian prisoners who had contrived to escape, and the Piedmontese soldiers who had been disbanded, and formed irregular troops of light infantry known by the name of *Barbets*. They infested the Apennines at the place where the French army had entered; they stopped the couriers, plundered our convoys, slaughtered the French detachments when they were not numerous enough to defend themselves, and kept the road to France in a disturbed state. In Tuscany, the English had made themselves masters of the port of Leghorn, owing to the protection of the governor, and French commerce was treated as that of an enemy. Lastly, Rome was making hostile preparations; England promised her a few thousand men; and Naples, always agitated by the caprices of a violent queen, promised a formidable armament. The imbecile king, leaving his amusement of fishing for a short time, had publicly implored the aid of Heaven. He had in a solemn ceremonial stripped himself of his royal ornaments, and laid them at the foot of the altar. The whole populace of Naples had applauded this act, and uttered horrible yells, and a multitude of wretches, incapable of handling a musket or facing a French bayonet, demanded arms, and insisted on marching against our army.

Although these movements caused no alarm in Bonaparte, so long as he had means of employing six thousand men, he had no time to lose in repressing them, before the arrival of the new Austrian army, which called for the presence of all his forces on the Adige. Bonaparte began to receive from the army of the Alps some reinforcements, which allowed him to employ fifteen thousand men in the blockade of Mantua and of the citadel of Milan, and twenty thousand in protecting the Adige, and to despatch a division upon the Po, to execute his plans relative to the south of Italy.

He repaired first to Milan, to cause the trenches to be opened around the citadel, and to hasten its surrender. He ordered Angereau, who was on the Mincio, very near the Po, to cross that river at Borgo Forte, and to march upon Bologna; and he directed Vaubois to proceed from Tortona to Modena with four or five thousand men, who had come from the Alps. In this manner he could send eight or nine thousand men into the Legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and threaten the entire Peninsula.

He awaited for some days the subsiding of the inundations on the Lower Po, before he set his columns in motion. But the court of Naples, as imbecile as it was violent, had passed from a state of fury to dejection. On receiving intelligence of the recent victories of the French in Upper Italy, it had sent Prince Belmonte-Pignatelli to make its submission to the conqueror. Bonaparte referred the question of peace to the directory, but he thought it right to grant an armistice. It did not suit him to push on so far as Naples with a few thousand men, and especially while he was in the act of waiting for the arrival of the Austrians.

It was enough for him at that moment to disarm that power, to deprive Rome of its support, and to embroil it with the allied powers. He could not impose levies on it, as he did on the petty princes whom he had entirely in his power, but it engaged to open all her ports to the French, to withdraw from England five sail of the line, and a great number of frigates furnished by her; and lastly, to withdraw from Austria the two thousand four hundred horse who were serving in her ranks. This division of cavalry was to remain sequestered in the power of Bonaparte, who was to have a right to make it prisoner on the first violation of the armistice. Bonaparte knew very well that such terms would not please the government; but at the moment it was of consequence to him that he should not be harassed in his rear, and be demanded no more than he believed would ensure it. The king of Naples having submitted, the pope could not resist; so that at that time the expedition to the right of the Po reduced itself, just as he desired, to an expedition of a few days, and he returned to the Adige.

He signed this armistice, and then set out to cross the Po, and to put himself at the head of the two columns, which he was leading against the states of the Church, Vaubois' column coming from the Alps to reinforce him, as well as Augereau's, which was making a retrograde movement from the Mincio upon the Po. He attached great importance to the situation of Genoa, because it was placed on one of the two roads leading to France, and because its senate had always demonstrated energy. He was aware that he ought to have demanded the expulsion of twenty feudatory families of Austria and Naples to ensure the supremacy of France in that state; but he had no orders on that subject, and he was, moreover, afraid of revolutionizing. He contented himself, therefore, with addressing a letter to the senate, in which he insisted that the governor of Novi, who had protected the banditti, should be punished in an exemplary manner, and that the Austrian minister should be driven from Genoa. He then required an absolute explanation. "Can you," he asked, "or can you not, clear your territory of the murderers who infest it? If you cannot take men-

sures, I will take them for you. I will cause the towns and villages to be burned in which a murder shall be committed; I will cause the houses to be burned that shall afford an asylum to the murderers, and punish in an exemplary manner the magistrates who shall tolerate them. The murder of a Frenchman shall bring woe upon whole communes who have not prevented it." As he was well aware of the delays attending diplomacy, he sent Murat, his aid-de-camp, to carry his letter, and to read it himself to the senate. "There must be," he observed, writing to Faypoult, the minister, "some kind of communication that shall electrify these personages." At the same time he despatched Lannes with twelve hundred men to inflict punishment upon the imperial fiefs. The mansion of Augustin Spinola, the principal instigator of the revolt was burned. The *Barbets* taken in arms were shot without mercy. The senate of Genoa, in consternation, displaced the governor of Novi, dismissed Gerola the minister, and promised to guard the roads by its own troops. The Neapolitan government sent Vincent Spinola to Paris, to come to an arrangement with the Directory in respect of all matters in dispute, the indemnity due for the *Modeste* frigate, the expulsion of the feudatory families, and the recal of the exiled families.

Bonaparte next proceeded to Modena, where he arrived on the 1st Messidor (June 19th), and on the same day Augereau entered Bologna.

The enthusiasm of the Modenese was extreme. They went forth to meet him, and sent a deputation to compliment him. The principal amongst them beset him with solicitations, and implored him to emancipate them from the yoke of their duke, who had carried off the fruits of his exactions to Venice. As the regency left by the duke had faithfully adhered to the terms of the armistice, and Bonaparte had no reason to exercise the rights of conquest on the duchy, he could not satisfy the Modenese; it was, moreover, a question which in policy had better be deferred. He contented himself with holding out hopes, and recommended them to be quiet. He set out for Bologna. The fort of Urbino was on his route; and this was the first fortified town belonging to the pope. He caused it to be summoned; the citadel surrendered. It contained sixty pieces of cannon, of large calibre, and a few hundred men. Bonaparte sent off this heavy artillery for Mantua, to be employed in the siege. He arrived at Bologna, whither Augereau's division had preceded him. The rejoicings of the inhabitants were most animated. Bologna is a city of about fifty thousand souls, magnificently built, celebrated for its artists, its scholars, and its university. Affection for France, and hatred for the Holy See, were there carried to the highest pitch. Bonaparte was not afraid to suffer sentiments of liberty to burst forth at that place; for he was in the possessions of a declared enemy, the pope, and it was in every respect allowable that he should exercise the right of conquest. The two Legations of Ferrara and Bologna beset him with their deputies; and he granted them a provisional independence, promising to get it recognized at the peace.

The Vatican was in alarm, and immediately sent a negotiator to make the best terms he could. D'Azara, the Spanish ambassador, celebrated for his abilities and his partiality for France, and the minister of a friendly power, was selected for this purpose. He had already negotiated for the duke of Parma. He arrived at Bologna to lay the tiara at the feet of the victorious republic. Consistent with his original design, Bonaparte, who would not yet either pull down or build up, required in the first place that the Legations of Bologna and Ferrara should remain independent, that the city of Ancona should receive a French garrison, that the pope should give twenty-one millions in corn and cattle, and one hundred pictures or statues: these terms were accepted. Bonaparte had a long conversation with D'Azara, and left him full of enthusiasm. He wrote a letter, in the name of the republic, to Oriani, the celebrated astronomer, desiring to see him. That modest and erudite man was dumbfounded in the presence of the young conqueror, and evinced his respect by his confusion. Bonaparte neglected no opportunity of showing his respect for Italy, and to awaken her pride and her patriotism. This was not the act of a barbarous conqueror, come to commit spoliations, but a hero of liberty, come to rekindle the torch of genius in the ancient land of civilization. He left Monge, Berthelet, and the brothers Thouin, whom the directory had sent to him, to select the articles destined for the museums of Paris.

On the 8th Messidor (June 26) he crossed the Apennines with Vaubois's division, and entered Tuscany. The duke in alarm sent his minister Manfredini to him. Bonaparte assured him as to his intentions, which he kept secret. Meanwhile his column proceeded by forced marches to Leghorn, entered the city unawares, and took possession of the English factory. Spannochi, the governor, was seized, thrust into a post-chaise, and sent to the grand-duke, with a letter explaining the motives of this act of hostility committed against a friendly power. The grand-duke was informed that his governor had violated every law of neutrality, by injuring French commerce, by affording an asylum to the emigrants and to all the enemies of the republic; and it was added, that out of respect for his authority, he left to him the office of punishing a bad minister. This act of vigour proved to all the neutral states that the French general would take their government into his own hands if they could not manage it themselves. There was no possibility of seizing all the vessels of the English, but their trade was extremely injured. Bonaparte left a garrison at Leghorn, and appointed commissioners to see that every thing belonging to the English, the Austrians, and the Russians, was given up. He then repaired in person to Florence, where the grand-duke gave him a magnificent reception. Having passed three days there, he recrossed the Po, on his return to his head-quarters at Roverbella, near Mantua. Thus twenty days, and one division moving *en échelon* on the right of the Po, was sufficient to overawe the powers of Italy, and insure tranquillity during the renewed contests he had still to maintain against the Austrian power.

While the army of Italy was performing in such a glorious manner the task allotted it in the general plan of the campaign, the armies of Germany

had not yet put themselves in motion. The difficulty of forming stores and procuring horses had kept them hitherto inactive. Austria, on her part, whose interest it was to have opened the campaign in a vigorous manner, was most unaccountably behindhand in her preparations, so that she would not be in a state to commence hostilities before the middle of Prairial (the beginning of June). Her armies were on a formidable footing, and far superior to ours. But our successes in Italy had obliged her to detach Wurmser with thirty thousand of her best troops from the Rhine, to set about collecting and re-organizing the wrecks of Beaulieu's army. The Aulic council, who had resolved to take the offensive, and to make the heart of our provinces the theatre of war, from that time only thought of keeping the defensive, and opposing our invasion. It would even have availed itself of a continuance of the armistice; but it was declared at an end, and hostilities were to commence on the 12th Prairial (May 31).

We have already given an idea of the theatre of war. The Rhine and the Danube issuing, the one from the high Alps, the other from the Alps of Swabia, after nearing each other in the environs of the Lake of Constance, separate, and run, the first of them towards the north, and the second towards the east of Europe. Two transverse and almost parallel valleys, those of the Maine and the Neckar, form as it were two passes through the chain of the Swabian Alps into the valley of the Danube, or from the valley of the Danube into that of the Rhine.

This theatre of war and the plan of operation which it allowed were not then so well known as they now are, thanks to the models they have since afforded. Carnot, who directed our plans, had created a theory from the celebrated campaign of 1794, which had gained him so much glory in Europe. At that period the enemy's centre, intrenched in the forest of Mormale, being impregnable, the French had filed off upon his wings, and by attacking them had obliged him to retreat. This example was deeply engraven on Carnot's memory. Endowed with an innovating but systematic mind, he had created a theory in conformity with that campaign, and was persuaded that it was always requisite to act at once on both wings of an army, and to strive invariably to detach them. Military men have considered this idea as a real advance in military science, and as being far preferable to the system of *cordons*, tending to attack the enemy at all points; but in Carnot's mind it was converted into a settled and dangerous system. The circumstances which here presented themselves held out a still stronger inducement to follow this system. The army of the Sambre and Meuse, and that of the Rhine and Moselle, were both placed upon the Rhine at points very far distant from one another; two valleys ran off at these points, and debouched upon the Danube. These then were adequate motives for Carnot to form the French into two columns; one of which, ascending along the Maine, the other along the Neckar, should thus contrive to fall upon the wings of the imperial army, and to force them to retrograde upon the Danube. He therefore directed generals Jourdan and Moreau to set out, the former from Dusseldorf, the latter from Strasburg, and to advance separately into Germany. As a great captain and a shrewd critic have remarked, and as facts have since proved, to form oneself into two divisions was at once to give the enemy the power as well as the idea of concentrating himself, and of overwhelming with the entire mass of his forces one or other of these two divisions. Clerfait had nearly performed this manœuvre in the late campaign, by first driving Jourdan back upon the Lower Rhine, and then falling upon the lines of Mentz. If even the enemy's general had not been a superior man, we forced him to adopt this plan, and furnished him with an idea his own talent ought to have suggested.

The invasion was therefore settled on this defective arrangement. The means of execution were as badly conceived as the plan itself. The line which separated the armies ran up the Rhine from Dusseldorf to Bingen, then described an arc from Bingen to Manheim, by the base of the Vosges, and followed the Rhine again to Bâle. Carnot's intention was that Jourdan's army, debouching by Dusseldorf and the extremity of the bridge (*tête de pont*) of Neuwied, should cross, to the number of forty thousand men, to the right bank to get at the enemy there; that the remainder of that army, twenty-five thousand strong, setting out from Mayence, under the command of Marceau, should ascend the Rhine, and filing off in the rear of Moreau, should furtively cross the river in the environs of Strasburg. Generals Jourdan and Moreau joined in representing the inconveniences of this plan to the directory. Jourdan, reduced to forty thousand men on the Lower Rhine, might be overwhelmed and destroyed, while the rest of his army would lose incalculable time in ascending from Mentz to Strasburg. It was much more natural that the passage near Strasburg should be effected by the right extremity of Moreau. This mode of proceeding was quite as consistent with secresy as the other, and would not occasion a loss of valuable time to the armies. This modification was admitted. Jourdan, availing himself of the two fortified extremities of the bridge (*deux têtes de pont*) he had at Dusseldorf and Neuwied, was to cross first, to draw the enemy upon him, and thus to divert his attention from the Upper Rhine, where Moreau had to effect a passage by main force.

The plan being thus fixed, preparations were made for putting it into execution. The armies of the two nations were nearly equal in force. Since the departure of Wurmser, the Austrians had on the whole line of the Rhine one hundred and fifty and a few odd thousand men, cantoned from between Bâle up to the environs of Dusseldorf. The French had as many, without reckoning forty thousand appointed to protect Holland, and maintained at their own expence. There was, however, a difference between the two armies. The Austrians had in their one hundred and fifty thousand men, nearly thirty-eight thousand horse, and one hundred and fifteen thousand foot. The French had more than one hundred and thirty thousand foot, but at most only fifteen or eighteen thousand horse. This superiority in cavalry gave the Austrians a great advantage, especially in retreating. The Austrians had another advantage, that of

being commanded by a single general. Since the departure of Wurmser, the two imperial armies had been placed under the supreme command of the young archduke Charles, who had already distinguished himself at Turcoing, and from whose talents much was augured. The French had two excellent generals, but acting separately, at a great distance from one another, and under the direction of a cabinet two hundred leagues from the theatre of the war.

The armistice expired on the 11th Prairial (May 30). Hostilities commenced by a general reconnoitring of the advanced posts. Jourdan's army extended, as we have seen, from the environs of Mentz to Dusseldorf. He had at Dusseldorf a *tête de pont* for debouching on the right bank; he could then ascend between the Prussian line of neutrality and the Rhine, to the banks of the Lahn, with a view to proceed from the Lahn to the Maine. The Austrians had from fifteen to twenty thousand men under the prince of Wirtemberg scattered between Mentz and Dusseldorf. Jourdan caused Kléber to debouch by Dusseldorf with twenty-five thousand men. That general made the Austrians fall back, beat them on the 16th Prairial (June 4) at Altenkirchen, and ascended the right bank between the line of neutrality and the Maine. When he had proceeded to the height of Neuwied, and had covered that debouche, Jourdan, availing himself of the bridge which he had at that point, crossed the river with part of his troops, and rejoined Kléber on the right bank. He thus found himself with nearly forty-five thousand men on the Lahn, on the 17th (June 5). He had left Marceau with thirty thousand men before Mentz. The archduke Charles, who was near Mentz, on learning that the French were repeating the irruption of the preceding year, and were again debouching by Dusseldorf and Neuwied, crossed with part of his forces to the right bank, to oppose their march. Jourdan purposed to attack the corps of the prince of Wirtemberg before he should be reinforced; but being obliged to defer his intention for a day, he lost the opportunity, and was himself attacked at Wetzlar on the 19th (June 7). He proceeded along the Lahn, having his right on the Rhine, and his left on Wetzlar. The archduke, pressing with the mass of his forces on Wetzlar, beat his left extremity, formed by Lefévre's division, and obliged it to retreat. Jourdan, beaten on the left, was obliged to support himself on his right, which was close to the Rhine; and was thus driven toward that river. To avoid being thrown into it, he must attack the archduke. In this event he would be obliged to fight with his back to the Rhine; he might thus, in case of defeat, have to regain with difficulty his bridges at Neuwied and Dusseldorf, and perhaps suffer a fatal defeat. A battle would therefore be dangerous and perhaps useless, since he had accomplished his object by attracting the attention of the enemy, and drawing off the Austrian forces from the Upper to the Lower Rhine. He thought it best therefore to fall back, and gave orders for retreat, which was effected coolly and firmly. He recrossed at Neuwied, and directed Kléber to descend again to Dusseldorf, and there return to the left bank. He recommended to him to march slowly, but not to involve himself in any serious action. Kléber, finding himself too closely pressed at Ukerath, and hurried away by his martial feeling, instantly faced about, and made a vigorous but fruitless attack upon the enemy; after which he regained his intrenched camp at Dusseldorf. Jourdan in advancing for the purpose of afterwards falling back, had performed a thankless task for the benefit of the army of the Rhine. Misinformed persons might in fact consider this manœuvre as a defeat; but the devotedness of that brave general disregarded every consideration, and he waited to resume the offensive, till the army of the Rhine should have derived the required advantage from the diversion that he had just effected.

Moreau, who had displayed a discretion, firmness, and coolness not often perceptible in the operations in which he had been previously engaged in the north, made the necessary arrangements for duly performing his task. He had resolved to cross the Rhine at Strasburg. This large fortress was an excellent point to start from. He could there collect a great number of boats and troops, and a large quantity of provisions. The woody islands which impede the course of the Rhine at this point favoured the passage of the river. The fort of Kehl, situated on the right bank, might be easily surprised: once in our possession, it might be repaired and employed to protect the bridge which was to be thrown across before Strasburg.

Every thing being prepared for this purpose, and the attention of the enemy being directed to the Lower Rhine, Moreau ordered, on the 26th Prairial (June 14), a general attack on the intrenched camp of Manheim. The object of this attack was to fix upon Manheim the attention of general Latour, who commanded the troops of the Upper Rhine under the archduke Charles, and to confine the Austrians within their line. This attack, directed with skill and vigour, was perfectly successful. Immediately afterwards, Moreau despatched part of his troops to Strasburg. It was reported that they were going to Italy, and provisions were bespoken for them all through Franche-Comté, in order to cause the report to be believed. Other troops set out from the environs of Huningen to descend to Strasburg; and these it was asserted were going into garrison at Worms. These movements were so concerted, that the troops should arrive at the destined point on the 5th Messidor (June 23). Accordingly, on that day twenty-eight thousand men were collected, either in the Polygon of Strasburg, or in the environs, under the command of general Desaix. Ten thousand men were to endeavour to cross below Strasburg, in the environs of Gambsheim; and fifteen thousand were to pass from Strasburg to Kehl. On the evening of the 5th (June 23), the gates of Strasburg were shut, that information of the passage might not be given to the enemy. In the night, the troops proceeded in silence towards the river. The boats were taken into the Mabile arm of the river, and from the Mabile into the Rhine. The large island of Ehrlen-Rhine afforded considerable assistance to the passage. The boats landed there two thousand six hundred men. These brave fellows, to avoid giving an alarm by the report of fire-arms, rushed with the bayonet upon the troops distributed over the island, pursued them, and did not allow them time to break down the little bridges

which connected this island with the right bank. They crossed these bridges close upon the enemy; and though neither the artillery or the cavalry could follow them, they ventured to debouch by themselves in the extensive plain which borders the river, and approached Kehl. The Swabian contingent was encamped at some distance at Willstelt. The detachments which came up from that quarter, and especially the cavalry, rendered the situation of the French infantry, that had been so venturesome as to debouch on the right bank, very critical. It hesitated not however to despatch the boats which had brought it, for the purpose of getting assistance, and thus to compromise its retreat. More troops came up; they advanced upon Kehl, attacked the intrenchments with the bayonet, and carried them. The artillery found in the fort was immediately turned upon the enemy's troops coming from Willstelt, and they were repulsed. A bridge was then thrown over from Strasburg to Kehl, and finished the next day, the 7th (June 25th). The whole army now crossed it. The ten thousand men sent to Gambsheim were unable to attempt the passage, on account of the rising of the river. They went up to Strasburg, and crossed there by means of the bridge which had been just before thrown over it.

This operation had been executed with secrecy, precision, and boldness; but the distribution of the Austrian troops from Bâle to Manheim served materially to diminish the difficulty and the merit of it. The prince of Condé was with three thousand eight hundred men in the direction of the Upper Rhine, at Breisach; the Swabian contingent, to the number of seven thousand five hundred, was at Wilstett, at the height of Strasburg; and nearly eight thousand men under Starrai were encamped between Strasburg and Manheim. The enemy's forces, therefore, were not formidable at this point, but this advantage was peculiarly owing to the secrecy of the passage, and that secrecy to the prudence with which it had been prepared.

This situation afforded occasion for the most splendid triumphs. If Moreau had acted with the rapidity of the conqueror of Montenotte, he might have fallen upon the corps scattered along the river, destroyed them one after the other, and even managed to overwhelm Latour, who recrossed from Manheim to the right bank, and who at the moment had at most no more than thirty-six thousand men. He might thus have put the whole army of the Upper Rhine *hors de combat*, before the archduke Charles could return from the banks of the Lahn. History shows us that despatch is all-powerful in war, as in all situations of life. Anticipating the enemy, it destroys in detail; striking blow after blow, it gives him no time to recover himself, destroys his self-control, and deprives him of his presence of mind and courage. But this celerity, of which we have just seen such glorious examples on the Alps and on the Po, pre-supposes something more than mere activity; it presumes a great object, a great mind to conceive it, and great passions to venture upon its accomplishment. No great exploit is to be accomplished without the aid of the passions, and without the ardour and the boldness they impart to reflection and zeal. Moreau, a man of luminous and resolute mind, did not possess that impetuous ardour which in the tribune, in war, and in all situations, hurries men away, and elevates them in spite of themselves to great fortunes.

Moreau was occupied from the 7th to the 10th Messidor (June 25th to the 28th) in getting his divisions together on the right bank of the Rhine. Saint-Cyr's division, which he had left at Manheim, was coming by forced marches. While waiting for that division, he had in his own hands fifty-three thousand men, and he saw some twenty thousand scattered around him. On the 10th (June 28th) he ordered the attack on ten thousand Austrians intrenched on the Renchen, beat them, and took eight hundred prisoners. The wreck of this division fell back on Latour, who was ascending the right bank. On the 12th (June 30th) Saint-Cyr having arrived, the whole army was beyond the river. It presented a mass of seventy-one thousand men, of whom sixty-three thousand were infantry and six thousand were cavalry. Moreau gave the right to Ferino, the centre to Saint-Cyr, the left to Desaix. He stationed himself at the foot of the Black Mountains.

The Swabian Alps form a chain which, as is well known, turns the Danube to the east and the Rhine to the north. It is through these mountains that the Neckar and the Maine make their windings towards the Rhine. These are mountains of moderate height, covered with wood, and intersected by narrow defiles. The valley of the Rhine is separated from that of the Neckar by a chain called the Black Mountains. Moreau, transferred to the right bank, was now at the foot of these Black Mountains. He would have to pass over them before he could debouch in the valley of the Neckar. The Swabian contingent and Condé's regiment were ascending towards Switzerland, to guard the upper passes of the Black Mountains. Latour, with the principal corps, was coming from Manheim for the purpose of securing the lower passes by Radstadt, Ettlingen, and Pforzheim. Moreau might without inconvenience have disregarded the detachments retiring toward Switzerland; and if he had borne down with the entire mass of his forces upon Latour, he must infallibly have overwhelmed him. He might then have debouched as conqueror in the valley of the Neckar, before the archduke Charles. But, as a prudent general, he committed to Ferino the duty of following with his right the detached corps of the Swabians and of Condé; he despatched Saint-Cyr with the centre direct for the mountains, for the purpose of occupying certain heights, and himself skirted the foot of them to descend to Radstadt before Latour. This march was the result both of his own caution and of Carnot's plan. He wished to protect himself at every point, and at the same time to extend his line towards Switzerland, that he might be ready to support by the Alps the army of Italy. Moreau set himself in motion on the 12th (June 30th). He marched between the Rhine and the mountains, over an unequal country thick with woods and intersected by torrents. He advanced with circumspection, and did not arrive at Radstadt till the 18th (July 24). He was still in time to overwhelm Latour, who had not yet been rejoined by the archduke Charles. That prince, after receiving intelligence of the passage, was coming by forced marches with a

reinforcement of twenty-five thousand men. He left thirty-six thousand on the Lahn, and twenty-seven thousand before Mentz, to make head against Jourdan, the whole under the command of general Wartensleben. He made all possible haste, but the heads of his columns were still at a great distance. Latour, after leaving a garrison in Manheim, had at most thirty-six thousand men. He was ranged along the Murg, which falls into the Rhine, having his left at Gernsbach, in the mountains; his centre at their foot, towards Kuppenheim, a little in advance of the Murg; his right in the plain along the woods of Niederbuhl, which extend to the banks of the Rhine; and his reserve at Radstadt. It would have been imprudent in Latour to fight before the arrival of the archduke Charles. But feeling more confident in his position, he was for making a stand, for the purpose of covering the great road which leads from Radstadt to the Neckar.

Moreau had only his left wing with him: his centre, under Saint-Cyr, had stayed behind, to take possession of some posts in the Black Mountains. This circumstance made up for the inequality of the forces. On the 17th (July 5) he attacked Latour. His troops behaved with great intrepidity, carried the position of Gernsbach on the Upper Murg, and penetrated to Kuppenheim, towards the centre of the enemy's position. But in the plain his divisions found it difficult to debouch under the fire of the artillery and in the front of the numerous Austrian cavalry. They nevertheless came up to Niederbuhl and Radstadt, and succeeded in making themselves masters of the Murg at all points. A thousand prisoners were taken.

Moreau halted on the field of battle, without caring to pursue the enemy. The archduke had not yet arrived, and he could still have overwhelmed Latour; but, finding his troops too much fatigued, he deemed it necessary to bring Saint-Cyr to him, that he might act with a greater mass of force; and he waited till the 21st (July 9) before making a new attack. This interval of four days allowed the archduke to arrive with a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand men, and afforded the enemy an equal chance in the conflict.

The relative position of the two armies was nearly the same. They were both in a line perpendicular with the Rhine, with one wing in the mountains, the centre at the foot of them, and the left in the woody and marshy plain which lays along the river. Moreau, who was slow of apprehension, but soon convinced, because he retained that even temper which allowed him to correct his errors, became sensible, when engaged at Radstadt, of the importance of bringing his principal exertions to bear in the mountains. In fact, he who could obtain the possession of them would have the outlets to the valley of the Neckar, the principal object in dispute; he could also fall upon his adversary, and drive him into the Rhine. Moreau had an additional reason for fighting in the mountains; this was his superiority in infantry, and his inferiority in cavalry. The archduke was quite as sensible as himself of the importance of establishing himself there, but he had in his numerous squadrons a strong reason too for keeping in the plain. He corrected the position taken by Latour; he stationed the Saxons in the mountains, to extend his line in front of Moreau; he sent reinforcements to the level eminence (*plateau*) of Rothensol, on which his left had fortified itself; he deployed his centre at the foot of the mountains in advance of Malsch, and his cavalry in the plain. He meant to attack on the 22d (July 10). Moreau anticipated him, and attacked him on the 21st (July 9).

General Saint-Cyr, whom Moreau had brought back to him, and who formed the right, attacked the level eminence of Rothensol. He displayed that precision, and that aptitude of manœuvring, which distinguished him throughout his glorious career. Being unable to dislodge the enemy from a formidable position, he surrounded him with riflemen, and then made the experiment of charging, and feigned a flight, to induce the Austrians to quit their position and to pursue the French. This stratagem was successful; the Austrians, seeing the French advance, and then flee in disorder, dashed after them. General Saint-Cyr, who had troops ready, then launched them upon the Austrians, who had quitted their position, and made himself master of the *plateau*. From that moment he kept advancing, intimidated the Saxons destined to attack our right, and obliged them to fall back. At Malsch, in the centre, Desaix had a brisk action with the Austrians, took and lost that village, and finished the combat by taking possession of the terminating heights that run towards the base of the mountains. In the plain our cavalry had not been engaged, and Moreau had kept on the skirt of the woods.

The battle was therefore indecisive, excepting in the mountains. But that was the important point; for, in following up his successes, Moreau might extend his right wing around the archduke, take from him the avenues to the valley of the Neckar, and drive him into the Rhine. It is true that the archduke, if he lost the mountains which were his chief support, could in his turn deprive Moreau of the Rhine, which was ours; he might renew his effort in the plain, beat Desaix, and, advancing along the Rhine, blow Moreau into the air. On these occasions it is the least bold who is compromised; it is he who fancies that he is cut off who really is so. The archduke deemed it prudent to retire, lest he might by a hazardous movement compromise the Austrian monarchy, which had no other support than its army. This resolution, which led to the retreat of the imperial armies, and exposed Germany to an invasion, has been censured. We may admire those glorious and noble flights of genius which obtain great results at the expense of great dangers; but we must not regulate our actions by their example. Prudence is no more than a duty in the situation in which the archduke was, and we cannot blame him for having retreated, in order to reach the valley of the Neckar before Moreau, and thus protect the hereditary states. Accordingly, he immediately formed the resolution of abandoning Germany, which no line was capable of protecting, and ascending the Maine and the Neckar to the grand line of the hereditary states, that of the Danube. This river, covered by the two fortresses of Ulm and Ratisbon, was the bulwark upon which Austria could most depend. In concentrating his forces there, the archduke was at home, à *cheval* on a large river, with forces equal to those of the enemy,

with the power of commanding operations on both banks, and of overwhelming one of the two invading armies. The enemy, on the contrary, was far from home, at an immense distance from his protecting point, without that superiority of forces which compensates for the danger of remote position, with the disadvantage of a frightful country to traverse for invasion or retreat; and lastly, with the inconvenience of being divided into two divisions and commanded by two generals. Thus the Imperialists would gain in approaching the Danube all that the French would lose. But to insure all these advantages, the archduke should arrive at the Danube without defeat; and after that, it was to retire with firmness, but without exposing himself to the risk of any engagement.

After leaving garrisons at Mentz, Ehrenbreitstein, Cassel, and Manheim, he ordered Wartensleben to retire foot by foot through the valley of the Maine, and to gain the Danube, fighting daily, and sufficient to keep up the confidence of his troops, but not enough to hazard them in a general action. He did the same with his own army; he took it to Pforzheim in the valley of the Neckar, and halted there no longer than was requisite to collect his artillery, and to allow it time for retreat. Wartensleben fell back with thirty thousand foot and fifteen thousand horse; the archduke with forty thousand infantry and eighteen thousand cavalry; amounting, in the whole, to one hundred and three thousand men. The remainder was in fortresses, or had filed off by the Upper Rhine into Switzerland, before general Ferino, who commanded Moreau's right.

No sooner had Moreau influenced the retreat of the Austrians, than Jourdan's army again crossed the Rhine at Dusseldorf and Neuwied, making its movements as it had always done, and proceeded towards the Lahn, so as to subsequently debouch into the valley of the Maine. The French armies advanced therefore in two columns along the Maine and the Neckar, following the two imperial armies, which made a most admirable retreat. The numerous squadrons of the Austrians, hovering in the rear-guard, overawed by their mass, protected their infantry from our assaults, and frustrated all our efforts to break their line. Moreau, who had no fortress to mask on leaving the Rhine, marched with seventy-one thousand men. Jourdan, who had to blockade Mentz, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitstein, and who had been obliged to devote twenty-seven thousand men to these various purposes, marched with only forty-six thousand, and was hardly superior to Wartensleben.

According to Carnot's defective plan, it was still necessary to extend our line beyond the wings of the enemy, that is to say, to depart from the essential object, that of a junction of the two armies. This junction would have enabled the French to bring upon the Danube a mass of one hundred and fifteen or twenty thousand men,—an enormous, an overwhelming mass, which would have thrown out all the calculations of the archduke, foiled all his efforts to concentrate himself, crossed the Danube before his face, taken Ulm, and from that protecting point threatened Vienna, and shaken the imperial throne*

* The reader is referred to the arguments of Napoleon, which he has illustrated by such notable precedents.

In conformity with Carnot's plan, Moreau was to be supported by the Upper Rhine and the Upper Danube, and Jourdan towards Bohemia. Moreau was furnished with an additional reason for supporting himself on this point, namely, the possibility of communicating with the army of Italy by the Tyrol, which presupposed the execution of the gigantic plan of Bonaparte, very properly discountenanced by the directory. As Moreau wished at the same time not to be too far separated from Jourdan, and to extend his left hand to him while he gave the right to the army of Italy, he was seen on the banks of the Neckar occupying a line of fifty leagues. Jourdan, on his part, directed to extend his line in front of Wartensleben, was obliged to separate from Moreau; and as Wartensleben, a mere ordinary general, comprehending nothing of the archduke's plan, instead of approaching the Danube, proceeded towards Bohemia with the intention of protecting it, Jourdan, in order to stretch his line beyond Wartensleben's, was obliged to extend himself more and more. Thus the two hostile armies were both doing contrary to what they ought to have done. There was this difference between Wartensleben and Jourdan, that the former neglected an excellent order, and the latter was obliged to comply with a bad one. Wartensleben's fault was his own, Jourdan's was that of Carnot the director.

Moreau fought a battle at Canstadt for the passage of the Neckar, and then penetrated into the defiles of the Alb, a chain of mountains separating the Neckar from the Danube, as the Black Mountains separate it from the Rhine. He cleared these defiles, and debouched in the valley of the Danube, about the middle of Thermidor (the end of July), after a month's march. Jourdan, after proceeding from the banks of the Lahn to those of the Maine, and fighting a battle at Friedberg, halted before the city of Frankfurt, which he threatened to bombard unless it were given up to him immediately. The Austrians complied only on condition of a suspension of hostilities for two days. This truce would allow them to cross the Maine, and to gain a considerable start; but it would save an interesting city, the resources of which might prove serviceable to the army. Jourdan assented to it. The place was given up on the 28th Messidor (July 16). Jourdan levied contributions on this city, but acted with great moderation, and even displeased his army by the forbearance he exhibited to an enemy's country. The report of the opulence in which the army of Italy lived, had inflamed the imaginations of the army, and excited a wish to live in the same manner in Germany. Jourdan ascended the Maine, made himself master of Wurtzburg on the 7th Thermidor (July 25), and then debouched beyond the mountains of Swabia, on the banks of the Naab, which falls into the Danube. He was nearly on a level with Moreau, and at the same time, that is, about the middle of Thermidor (the beginning of August), Swabia and Saxony had acceded to the neutrality, sent agents to Paris to treat for peace, and consented to the levy of contributions. The Saxon and Swabian troops retired, and thus reduced the Austrian army by about twelve thousand men, in good sooth of little use, and mere fighters without spirit.

Thus, about the middle of summer, our armies,

masters of Italy, the whole of which they controlled, masters of half of Germany, which they had overrun as far as the Danube, threatened Europe. It was two months since La Vendée had been subdued. One hundred thousand men were in the west, and fifty thousand of them might be detached in any direction. The promises held out by the directorial government could not be more gloriously fulfilled.

CHAPTER IV.

INTERNAL STATE OF FRANCE TOWARDS THE MIDDLE OF THE YEAR 1796, (YEAR IV.)—FINANCIAL EMBARRASSMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. FALL OF THE "MANDATS" AND PAPER MONEY.—ATTACK ON THE CAMP AT GRENELLE BY THE JACOBINS.—RENEWAL OF THE FAMILY COMPACT WITH SPAIN, AND INTENTION TO FORM A QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE.—AN EXPEDITION TO IRELAND DESIGNED.—NEGOTIATIONS IN ITALY—HOSTILITIES CONTINUED, ARRIVAL OF WURMSER ON THE ADIGE; VICTORIES OF LONATO AND CASTIGLIONE.—OPERATIONS ON THE DANUBE; BATTLE OF NERESHEIM; MARCH OF THE ARCHDUKE AGAINST JOURDAN.—MARCH OF BONAPARTE TO THE BRENTA; BATTLES OF ROVÉRÉDO BASSANO AND SAINT-GEORGE; RETREAT OF WURMSER INTO MANTUA. RETURN OF JOURDAN TO THE MAINE; BATTLE OF WURTZBURG; MORSAU'S RETREAT.

FRANCE had never appeared greater abroad than during this summer of 1796; but her internal situation was far from corresponding with her external brilliancy. Paris exhibited a singular spectacle; the patriots, furious ever since the apprehension of Babœuf, Drouet, and their other chiefs, execrated the government, and no longer desired the republic should gain victories, since they proved beneficial to the directory. The declared enemies of the revolution stoutly denied them to be victories; the men who were indifferent to her success affected not to believe them. Some recently enriched upstarts, who derived their wealth from jobbing or contractorship, displayed unbounded luxury, and manifested the most ungrateful indifference for that revolution which had made their fortune. This moral state of things was the inevitable result of a general lassitude in the nation, of inveterate passions in the parties, and of cupidity excited by a financial crisis. But still there were republican and enthusiastic Frenchmen, who retained their old sentiments, whose hearts were rejoiced by our victories, who so far from denying them, on the contrary hailed the tidings of them with delight, and pronounced with affection and admiration the names of Hoche, Jourdan, Moreau, and Bonaparte. These were desirous that fresh efforts should be made, and that the malignants and indifferents should be obliged to contribute with all their means to the glory and the greatness of the republic.

In order to tarnish the brilliancy of our triumphs, the parties set about vilifying the generals. They were particularly inveterate against the youngest and the most talented, Bonaparte, whose name had in two months become so glorious. He had, on the 13th Vendémiaire, struck great terror into the royalists, and they did not spare him in their newspapers. It was known that he had manifested a very imperious disposition in Italy; people were struck by the manner in which he treated the states of that country, granting or refusing at pleasure armistices which decided peace or war; they knew that, without making the treasury the means of distribution, he had transmitted funds to the army of the Rhine. They therefore took delight in maliciously reporting that he was intractable, and that he was about to be removed. There would have been a great general lost to the republic, and a renown that became displeasing, cut short in its outset. Accordingly, the malignants assiduously diffused the most absurd reports. They went so far as to allege that Hoche, who was then in Paris, was going off to arrest Bonaparte in the midst of his army. The government wrote a letter to Bonaparte, contradicting these rumours, wherein it repeated the assurance of its entire confidence. The government caused this letter to be published in all the papers. The brave Hoche, incapable of any mean jealousy of a rival who in two months had raised himself far above the greatest generals of the republic, wrote to disavow the part that had been ascribed to him. It may not be amiss to quote this letter, so honourable to the two young heroes. It was addressed to the minister of police, and was made public.

"Citizen minister,—Men who either concealed or unknown during the first years of the foundation of the republic, now think only of seeking the means of destroying it, and speak of it merely to slander its firmest supporters, have for some days past been spreading reports most injurious to the armies, and to one of the general officers who commanded them. Can they then no longer attain their object by corresponding openly with the hordes of conspirators resident at Hamburg? Must they, in order to gain the patronage of the masters whom they are desirous of giving to France, vilify the leaders of the armies? Do they imagine that these, as weak as in times past, will suffer themselves to be calumniated without daring to reply, and to be accused without defending themselves? Why is Bonaparte then the object of the wrath of these gentry? Is it because he has beaten their friends and themselves in Vendémiaire? Is it because he is annihilating the armies of kings, and furnishing the republic with the means of bringing this honourable war to a glorious conclusion? Ah! brave young man, where is the republican soldier whose heart does not burn with the desire to imitate thee? Courage, Bonaparte! lest our victorious armies to Naples, to Vienna; reply to thy personal enemies by humbling kings, by shedding fresh lustre over our armies, and leave to us the task of upholding thy glory!

"I have smiled with pity on hearing a man, in other respects of very shrewd understanding, ex-

press an alarm which he does not feel, respecting the powers conferred on the French generals. You are acquainted with almost all of them, citizen minister. Which of them is it, supposing him even to possess sufficient authority over his army to induce it to march against the government—which of them is it, I ask, who would ever attempt to do so, without being immediately crushed by his comrades? The generals are scarcely acquainted, scarcely correspond with one another. Their number ought to make people easy respecting the designs which are gratuitously ascribed to one of them. Who is ignorant how powerfully envy, ambition, and hatred influence men? and I believe I may add love of country and honour. Cheer up, then, ye modern republicans!

"Some journalists have carried their absurdities so far as to state that I am going to Italy to arrest a man whom I esteem, and with whom the government has the greatest reason to be satisfied. It may be asserted that in the time in which we live, few general officers would undertake the duty of gendarmes, though many may be disposed to combat the factious and the factions.

"During my stay in Paris I have seen men of all opinions. I have been enabled to appreciate some of them at their just value. Some there are who think that the government cannot proceed without them. They raise an outcry, that they may obtain places; others, though nobody cares about them, imagine that their destruction has been sworn. They cry out, to render themselves interesting. I have seen emigrants, more Frenchmen than royalists, weep with joy at the recital of our victories; I have seen Parisians throw doubts upon them. It has appeared to me that one party, daring but without means, was desirous of overthrowing the present government, in order to introduce anarchy in its stead; that a second, more dangerous, more adroit, and which numbers friends every where, was aiming at the destruction of the republic, in order to give back to France the rickety constitution of 1791, and a thirty years' civil war; and lastly, a third, if it is capable of despising the other two, and assuming over them that empire which is conferred on it by the laws, will conquer them, because it is composed of genuine, laborious, and upright republicans, whose means are talents and virtues, because it numbers among its partisans every good citizen and the armies, who assuredly have not been conquering for these five years merely to suffer the country to be enslaved."

These two letters silenced all the reports, and compelled the malignants to be silent.

Amidst its glory, the government excited pity by its poverty. The new paper-money had kept its ground but for a very short time, and its fall deprived the directory of an important resource. It will be recollected, that on the 25th Ventôse (March 16th) two thousand four hundred millions of mandats had been created, and chargeable upon a corresponding value in national domains. One part of these mandats had been appropriated to the withdrawing of the twenty-four thousand millions remaining in currency, and the remainder to provide for accruing purposes. It was, in some measure, as we have observed, a new impression of the old paper, with a new title and a new numerical symbol. The twenty-four thousand millions in assignats were withdrawn from circulation by eight hundred millions in mandats; and instead of creating forty-eight thousand millions more in assignats, one thousand six hundred millions in mandats were created. The difference was, therefore, in the title and in the numerical symbol. The same difference also existed as to the funds out of which they were payable; for the assignats, from the effect of the sales by auction, did not represent a determinate value in national property; the mandats, on the contrary, as they were capable of procuring estates on the mere offer of the price in 1790, represented exactly enough the sum of two thousand four hundred millions worth of that property. All this did not prevent their fall, which is attributable to various causes. France would not have any more paper, and would no longer put faith in it. Now, let the guarantees be ever so ample, if nobody cares about them, they are as though they did not exist. Then, the numerical symbol of the paper, although reduced, was not sufficiently so. There was a conversion of twenty-four thousand millions in assignats into eight hundred millions in mandats; the old paper, therefore, was reduced to one thirtieth, and it ought to have been reduced to the two hundred and twentieth to insure its practical reduction, for twenty-four thousand millions were not worth more than one hundred and twenty millions at the most. To throw them back into circulation for eight hundred millions, by converting them into mandats, was an error. It is true that there was appropriated to them a like value in national property; but an estate which in 1790 was worth one hundred thousand francs, would not at this time sell for more than thirty thousand or twenty-five thousand; and consequently the paper bearing this new title and this new symbol, even had it exactly represented national estates, must like them be worth no more than one-third of the money. Now, to attempt to make it circulate at par, as had been done, was again to propound a fallacy. Thus, if there had even been a possibility of restoring confidence to the paper, the exaggerated opinion of its value must still have made it fall; thus, although its currency was forced upon every one, it was not for one moment entertained. The violent measures which could have been enforced in 1793, were at this time powerless. Nobody did business but for money. That money which was supposed to be hoarded or carried abroad, supplied the currency. That which had been concealed now came forth; that which had quitted France returned. The southern provinces were full of piastres, which came from Spain, and were introduced among us from necessity. Gold and silver came, like all commodities, whithersoever the demand attracts them; only their price is higher and keeps up till the quantity is sufficient and the want supplied. Some acts of dishonesty were also committed by paying in mandats, because the laws, giving the forced currency of money to paper, permitted its use in the discharge of written engagements; but scarcely any one ventured to do so, and as for all contracts, they were made for money. In the markets nothing was to be seen but gold and silver, and the wages of the lower classes were paid in no other manner. One would have said that there was no paper in France. The mandats got into the

hands of none but speculators, who received them from the government, and sold them to the purchasers of national domains.

In this manner the financial crisis, although in existence so far as concerned the state, had almost ceased with respect to individuals. Commerce and industry, availing themselves of the first moment of tranquillity, and of some communications reopened with the continent as a consequence of our victories, began to resume some activity.

It is not, as governments have had the vanity to assert, merely necessary to encourage production in order that it may prosper; all it requires is, not to be impeded. It avails itself of the earliest opportunity to display itself with wonderful activity. But if the circumstances of private individuals were rendered more easy, the government, that is to say, its leaders and agents of all kinds, military men, high placemen, or magistrates, and its creditors, were reduced to extreme distress. The mandats which were given to them were of no service in their hands; they could make but one use of them, namely, pass them to speculators in paper, who took one hundred francs for five or six, and afterwards sold these mandats to the purchasers of national property. Thus the annuitants were perishing of hunger; the functionaries were giving up their places, and contrary to all usual usage, instead of soliciting appointments, people were resigning them. The armies of Germany and Italy, quartered upon the enemy, were protected from the general want; but the armies of the interior were in extreme distress. Hoche had nothing wherewithal to maintain his soldiers but the provisions levied in the provinces of the west, and he was obliged to keep up the military system in those provinces, in order to have a right to levy the supplies in kind. As for the officers and himself, they had not wherewithal even to clothe themselves. The victualling service established in France for the troops marching through the country had frequently failed, because the contractors would no longer make advances. The detachments sent from the coasts of the ocean to reinforce the army of Italy had been stopped by the way. Hospitals were even seen shut up, and the unfortunate soldiers who filled them turned out of that asylum which the republic should have provided for their infirmities, because they could no longer be supplied either with medicines or with food. The gendarmerie was entirely disorganized. Being neither clothed or equipped, it had nearly ceased to perform its office. The gendarmes, in order to save their horses, which were not replaced, no longer protected the roads; those *brigands*, who are always so numerous after civil wars, infested them. They broke into farmhouses, and frequently penetrated into the towns, and there committed robbery and murder with unheard-of audacity.

Such was the internal state of France. The particular character of this new crisis was the distress of the government in the midst of the improving circumstances of private individuals. The directory subsisted entirely on the wrecks of the paper, and a few millions which its armies sent to it from abroad. General Bonaparte had already remitted thirty millions, and sent it one hundred fine carriage-horses to contribute somewhat to its state.

The directory now began seriously to think of destroying the whole scheme of paper money. To do this, its currency must no longer be forced, and the taxes must be received in real value. The directory therefore declared on the 28th Messidor (July 16), that every one might bargain in whatsoever money he pleased; that the mandats were in future to be taken only at their actual current value, and that this currency should be daily ascertained and published by the treasury. At length the directory ventured to declare that the taxes should be paid in specie or in mandats at the course of exchange; there was but one exception, and that was the land-tax. When the mandats were created, it was to be collected in paper and no longer in kind. The government now began to be sensible that it would have been better to continue to collect it in kind, because amidst the fluctuations of the paper they would at least have obtained provisions. It was therefore decided, after long discussions and several plans rejected one after the other by the ancients, that in the frontier departments or those contiguous to the armies, the taxes might still be demanded in kind; that in other places they should be paid in mandats, at the current price of corn. Thus corn was valued in 1790 at ten francs the quintal; it was valued at the present time at eighty francs in mandats. Every ten francs of assessment, representing a quintal of corn, would now pay eighty francs in mandats. It would have been much more simple to require payment in money, or in mandats at the current value; but upon this the government durst not yet venture; it began therefore to return, but not without some hesitation, to an actual money system.

The forced loan was not yet entirely got in. The supreme authority had no longer that arbitrary energy which could have insured the prompt execution of such a measure. There remained nearly three hundred millions to be collected. It was settled that in payment of the loan and taxes mandats should be taken at par, and assignats at the rate of one hundred for one, but for a fortnight only; and that after the expiration of this term, paper should be taken only at the current value. This was one way of encouraging those who were in arrear, to make up their payments.

The abolition of the mandats being declared, it was no longer possible to take them as an entire payment for the national domains which were appropriated to them; and the bankruptcy which it had been predicted would befal them as well as the assignats became inevitable. In fact, it was publicly stated, that inasmuch as the mandats issued for two thousand four hundred millions had fallen far below that value, and were not worth more than two hundred or three hundred millions, the state would no longer give the promised value in national property, namely, two thousand four hundred millions. The contrary had been maintained, in the hope that the mandats would keep up to a certain value; but one hundred francs falling to five or six francs, the state could no longer give land, worth one hundred francs in 1790, and thirty or forty francs at that time, for five or six francs. Here again was the same kind of bankruptcy that the assignats had experienced, and the nature of which we have already explained. The

state then did what is done at the present day by a sinking fund, which buys in at the course of the exchange, and which, in case of an extraordinary fall, would buy in perhaps at fifty what might have been purchased at eighty or ninety. In consequence, it was decided on the 8th Thermidor, that the last fourth part of the national domains appropriated by the law of the 26th Ventôse (that which created the mandats) should be paid for in mandats at the current value, and by six equal payments. As it had been contracted for at eight hundred millions, this fourth was of course two hundred millions.

The paper-money system therefore was drawing near to its conclusion. It may be asked for what purpose the government had made this second trial of assignats, which had so short a duration and so little success. We are generally too apt to judge of measures of this description, without duly considering the circumstances which have influenced them. An apprehension that money would be wanting had, no doubt, contributed to the creation of the mandats; and assuming it had no other reason, the government would have been much to blame, for there never can be any want of money; but the fact was, the government had been peculiarly impelled by the imperative necessity of living upon the produce of the national property, and of anticipating their sale. It was necessary to send their value into the currency before it was purchased, and for this purpose to issue it in the form of paper. The resource had indeed not been great, because the mandats had fallen so speedily; but at any rate the government had lived upon it for four or five months. And is this nothing? The mandats must be considered as a new discount of the value of the national domains, and as an expedient till these domains could be sold. We shall see how much distress the government had still to undergo before it could realize their sale for money.

The treasury was not deficient in resources speedily demandable; but it was with these resources as with the national estates—they had to be brought into ready money. The treasury had yet to receive three hundred millions of the forced loan; three hundred millions of the land-tax for the year, that is to say, the whole amount of that tax; twenty-five millions of the tax on moveable property; the whole farm-rent of the national domains, and the arrears of that rent, amounting together to sixty millions; various military levies; the price of the moveable property of the emigrants; sundry arrears; lastly, eighty millions of foreign paper. All these resources, added to the two hundred millions of the last fourth of the purchase-money of the national estates, amounted to one thousand one hundred millions,—an enormous sum, but difficult to realize. To complete its year, that is, to go on till the 1st Vendémiaire, it wanted only four hundred millions; it would be saved if out of the one thousand one hundred it could have immediately realized four hundred. For the following year, it had the ordinary taxes, which it hoped to collect all in money, and which, amounting to some five hundred millions, covered what were called the ordinary expenses. For the war expenses, if a new campaign were necessary, it had the remainder of the one thousand one hundred millions just mentioned, and of which it would not spend this year more than four hundred; lastly, it had the new contracts of the national domains. But the difficulty still was, how were those sums to be got in. Ready money never consists of any thing but the proceeds of the year; now it was difficult to raise them at once by the forced loan, by the tax on land and moveables, and by the sale of the national estates. The government set about collecting the taxes, and gave the directory the extraordinary power of pledging Belgian estates for one hundred million in money. The treasury orders, a kind of royal *bons*, whose object was to discount the proceeds of the year, had shared the fate of all the paper. Being unable to avail himself of this resource, the minister paid the contractors with treasury warrants, which were payable out of the first monies to be got in.

Such was the indigence of this government so glorious abroad. At home the parties were still exciting domestic agitation. The submission of La Vendée had greatly abated the hopes of the royalist faction; but the Paris agents were only more than ever convinced of the merit of their old plan, which consisted in not having recourse to civil war, but in seducing public opinion, and in gaining a gradual influence over the councils and the authorities. This it was they laboured in their journals. As for the patriots, they had arrived at the highest point of indignation. They had favoured the flight of Dronet, who had found means to escape from prison, and they meditated new plots, notwithstanding the discovery of Babœuf's. Many old conventionalists and Thermidorians, formerly connected with the government which they had themselves formed the day after the 13th Vendémiaire, began to be discontented. There was a law passed, as we have observed, that ordered the non-elected ex-conventionalists and all dismissed placemen to quit Paris. The police, by mistake, sent warrants to arrest four conventionalists, members of the legislative body. These warrants were acrimoniously censured in the five hundred. Tallien, who at the time of the discovery of Babœuf's plot had loudly declared his adhesion to the system of the government, exclaimed bitterly against the police of the directory, and against that feeling of distrust so pointedly exhibited against the patriots. His habitual opponent, Thibaudeau, replied to him; and after a very warm discussion and some recriminations, each relapsed into sullen ill-humour. Cochon the minister, his agents, and his police spies, were peculiarly hated by the patriots, who had been the first that experienced his vigilance. Besides all this, the course to be pursued by the government was clearly pointed out; and if it was decidedly hostile to the royalists, it was also quite as unconnected with the patriots, that is, with that portion of the revolutionary party who wanted to return to a more democratic republic, and who considered the present system too mild for the aristocrats. But with the exception of the state of finances, the situation of the directory, who was not identified with the parties, but rather curbing them with a strong hand, and supported by fine armies, was very cheering and splendid.

The patriots had already made two attempts, and been twice foiled, since the installation of the directory. They had endeavoured to re-open the

club of the Jacobins at the Pantheon, and they had seen it shut up by the government. They next hatched a mysterious plot under the direction of Babœuf; they had been discovered by the police, and deprived of their new leaders. Still they continued their agitation, and thought of making one last attempt. The opposition, in again attacking the law of the 3rd Brumaire, excited their rage in an increased degree, and impelled them to a final struggle. They had already endeavoured to corrupt the police legion. That legion had been disbanded, and converted into a regiment, which was the 21st dragoons. They wished to try the fidelity of this regiment, and hoped by gaining it over, to draw with it the whole army of the interior, encamped in the plain of Grenelle. They purposed at the same time to excite a commotion by firing muskets in Paris, by scattering white cockades in the streets, by shouting, *Vive le Roi!* and by thus inducing a belief that the royalists were in arms for the destruction of the republic. Their intention then was to avail themselves of this pretext to run to arms, make themselves masters of the government, and get the camp of Grenelle to declare in their favour.

On the 12th Fructidor (August 29) they carried part of their plan into execution, fired petards, and threw some white cockades about the streets. But the police, who had been prepared for this movement, had taken such precautions, that they found it impossible to excite any commotion. They were not however discouraged; and some few days afterwards, on the 23rd Fructidor (September 9), they resolved to fully accomplish their designs. Thirty of the principal assembled at the *Gros-Caillou*, and resolved that very night to collect a mob in the quarter of Vaugirard. That quarter, near the camp of Grenelle, was full of gardens, and intersected by walls; it afforded lines behind which they could assemble and make a stand, in case they should be attacked. Accordingly, in the evening, they collected to the number of seven or eight hundred, armed with muskets, pistols, swords, and sword-sticks. This assemblage comprehended all the most determined men of the party. There were among them some dismissed officers, who headed this concourse in their uniforms and epaulettes. There were also some ex-conventionalists, in the costume of representatives, and even, it was said, Drouet, who had been concealed in Paris ever since his escape. An officer of the guard of the directory, at the head of ten horse, was patrolling in Paris, when he was informed of the concourse collected at Vaugirard. He hastened thither with his little detachment; but he had hardly come up before he was received with a discharge of musketry, and assailed by two hundred armed men, who made him turn back and gallop off. He went immediately to order the guard of the directory to be put under arms, and sent an officer to the camp of Grenelle to give the alarm. The patriots lost no time, and, the alarm being given, repaired in all haste to the plain of Grenelle, to the number of some hundreds. They bent their steps towards the quarters of the 21st dragoons, formerly the police legion, and endeavoured to gain it over by saying that they had come to fraternize with it. Malo, a *chef d'escadron*, who commanded that regiment, immediately left his tent, mounted his horse half-dressed, rallied around him some officers and the first dragoons whom he met with, and charged with drawn swords those who talked of fraternizing with him. This example decided the soldiers; they ran to their horses, dashed upon the mob, and very soon dispersed it. They killed and wounded a great number of persons, and apprehended one hundred and thirty-two. The uproar of this conflict roused the whole camp, which was instantly under arms, and spread alarm throughout Paris. But every body felt relieved as soon as they understood the result, and the folly of the attempt. The directory immediately ordered the prisoners to be imprisoned, and applied to the two councils for authority to make domiciliary visits, for the purpose of apprehending in certain quarters many of the rioters whose wounds prevented their leaving Paris. As they formed part of an armed mob, they were to be tried by the military tribunals, and were handed over to a commission, which began by ordering a certain number of them to be shot. The organization of the high national court had not yet been completed; and its installation was again pressed, in order that the proceedings against Babœuf might commence.

This sudden outbreak was looked upon in its proper light, that is to say, as one of those imprudent acts which are the distinguishing characteristics of an expiring party. The enemies of the revolution alone affected to attach great importance to it, that they might have a new occasion to raise an outcry against terror, and to spread alarm. Generally speaking, people were not much frightened; and this vain attack proved more distinctly than all the other successes of the directory that its establishment was firmly settled, and that the parties must no longer entertain any hopes of effecting its destruction.

Such were the events that were occurring in the interior.

While fresh battles were about to be fought abroad, important negotiations were preparing in Europe. The French republic was at peace with several powers, but in alliance with none. The detractors, who had asserted that it would never be recognized, now said it would for ever be without allies. By way of replying to these malicious insinuations, the directory thought of renewing the family compact with Spain, and projected the scheme of a quadruple alliance between France, Spain, Venice, and the Porte. By these means, the quadruple alliance, composed of all the powers of the south, against those of the north, would command the Mediterranean and the East, annoy Russia, threaten the rear of Austria, and raise up a new maritime enemy against England. It would moreover procure great advantages for the army of Italy, by insuring it the support of the Venetian squadron, and of thirty thousand Sclavonians.

Spain was the easiest of the three powers to decide. She had grievances against England that dated from the commencement of the war. The principal of these were the conduct of the English at Toulon, and the secrecy observed towards the Spanish admiral, at the time of the expedition against Corsica. Spain had still greater grievances to complain of since the peace with France. The English had insulted her ships, intercepted sup-

plies intended for her, violated her territory, taken up positions that threatened her American possessions, violated the custom-house regulations in her colonies, and openly endeavoured to excite them to revolt. These causes for discontent, added to the splendid offers of the directory, which made her expect some possessions in Italy, and the victories which allowed her to give credit to the accomplishment of these offers, at length decided Spain to sign on the 2nd Fructidor (August 19th) a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with France, on the basis of the family compact. By this treaty, those two powers mutually guarantied to each other all their possessions in Europe and in the Indies; they reciprocally promised one another assistance to the extent of eighteen thousand infantry, and six thousand cavalry, fifteen first-rate ships, fifteen seventy-fours, six frigates, and four cutters. This aid was to be furnished at the first requisition of either of the two powers that should be at war.

Instructions were sent to our ambassadors to represent to the Porte and to Venice the advantages in store for them, in concurring in such an alliance.

The French republic, therefore, was no longer cut off from the rest of the world, and she had raised up a new foe against England. Every thing predicted that a declaration of war by Spain against England would soon follow the treaty of alliance with France.

The directory was preparing for Pitt embarrassments of quite another description. Hoche was at the head of one hundred thousand men, distributed along the coast of the [Atlantic] Ocean. La Vendée and Brittany were reduced: he was burning with impatience to employ these forces in a manner more worthy of himself, and to add new exploits to those of Weissenburg and Landau. He suggested to the government a design he had long contemplated,—that of an expedition to Ireland. Now, said he, that we have driven civil war from the coasts of France, we must transfer that scourge to the shores of England, and, by raising the Catholics in Ireland, repay her the evils she did us in raising the Poitevins and the Bretons. The occasion was favourable; the Irish were more than ever alienated on account of the oppressive conduct of the English government; the people of the three kingdoms were suffering severely from the war; and an invasion, in addition to the other evils they were already enduring, might probably carry them to the last degree of exasperation. Pitt's finances were in a tottering state; and the enterprise under the conduct of Hoche might be productive of the most important consequences. The plan was at once received. Truguet, minister of the marine, a good republican and a talented minister, seconded it by all the means in his power. He collected a squadron in the harbour of Brest, and did every thing the state of the finances allowed him towards fitting it out in a suitable manner. Hoche selected all the best troops from his army, and marched them to Brest, to put them on board. Care was taken to give different accounts of this expedition. At one time it was an expedition to Saint-Domingo; at another it was an expedition to Lisbon, in order to drive the English out of Portugal, acting in concert with Spain.

England, who had her suspicions as to the object of these preparations, became seriously alarmed. The treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between Spain and France foreboded her new dangers; the defeats of Austria caused her to apprehend the loss of this powerful and last ally; her finances were extremely impoverished; the bank had contracted its discounts; capital began to fail; and the loan opened for the emperor had been stopped, to prevent further funds from leaving the country. The ports of Italy were closed against English vessels; the Spanish ports were also about to be closed; and those of the [German] Ocean as far as the Texel already were so. Thus the commerce of Great Britain was specially threatened. To all these difficulties were added those of a general election; for the parliament, now verging on its seventh year, was to be totally re-elected. The elections took place amidst the shouting of curses against Pitt and the war.

The empire had almost entirely abandoned the cause of the allied powers. The states of Baden and Wirtemburg had just signed a definitive peace, allowing the belligerent armies transit through their territories. Austria was alarmed on seeing two French armies on the Danube, and a third on the Adige, which seemed to close Italy against her. She had sent Wurmser with thirty thousand men, to collect several reserves in the Tyrol, to rally and reorganize the wrecks of Beaulieu's army, and to descend into Lombardy with sixty thousand soldiers. She had, as she conceived, less to apprehend from this quarter, and so far felt relieved, but she was exceedingly alarmed for the Danube, and directed all her attention thither. To prevent alarming reports, the Aulic council had forbidden public events to be talked of at Venice; it had organized a levy of volunteers, and laboured with extraordinary activity to fit out and arm fresh troops. Katharine, who always made promises and never performed them, had rendered one service; she had guarantied Galicia to Austria, and this arrangement had enabled the latter to withdraw her troops from that country, in order to convey them towards the Alps and the Danube.

Thus France on every side terrified her enemies, and every body looked with impatience for the result of the fortune of war in the neighbourhood of the Danube and the Adige. On the immense line which extends from Bohemia to the Adriatic, three armies were about to encounter three others, and decide the fate of Europe.

In the mean time a suspension of hostilities had been made the subject of a negotiation in Italy. Peace had been made with Piedmont, and the armistice had been succeeded, two months afterwards, by a treaty. This treaty engaged for the absolute cession of the duchy of Savoy and of the comté of Nice to France; the destruction of the forts of Suza and Brunetta, situated at the outlet of the Alps; the occupation during the war of the fortresses of Coni, Tortona, and Alexandria; a free transit for the French troops through the states of Piedmont; and the supply of what was necessary for these troops during their march. In addition to this, the directory, at the suggestion of Bonaparte, wanted an offensive and defensive alliance with the king of Sardinia, in order to have ten or fifteen thousand men of his army.

But this prince in return asked for Lombardy, which France could not yet dispose of, and which she had always intended should serve as an equivalent for the Netherlands. This concession being refused, the king would not consent to an alliance.

The directory had not yet concluded any thing with Genoa; discussions were still going on relative to the recal of the exiled families, to the expulsion of the families feudatories of Austria and Naples, and to the indemnity for the *Modeste* frigate.

With Tuscany our relations were amicable; but the means employed towards the Leghorn merchants, to obtain a declaration of the merchandise belonging to the enemies of France, had sown the seeds of discontent. Naples and Rome had sent agents to Paris in conformity with the terms of the armistice; but the negotiation of the peace was attended with considerable delay. It was evident that the powers were waiting, before concluding it, to see what turn the war would take. The people of Bologna and Ferrara were still as enthusiastic as ever in favour of that liberty that had been provisionally conferred upon them. The regency of Modena and the duke of Parma were immovable. Lombardy awaited with anxiety the result of the campaign. Urgent applications had been addressed to the senate of Venice, with the double intent of inducing it to concur in the plan of a quadruple alliance, and of obtaining a useful auxiliary to the army of Italy. Besides direct overtures, our ambassadors at Constantinople and Madrid had made indirect proposals, and had strongly insisted upon them with the legations of Venice, for the purpose of demonstrating to them the advantages of the plan; but all these schemes had proved fruitless. Venice detested the French ever since she had seen them in her territory, and their ideas had been diffused amongst her population. She no longer confined herself to an unarmed neutrality. On the contrary, she was actively preparing herself for hostilities. She had given orders to the commandants of the islands to despatch the disposable ships and troops into the lagoons; and she had sent for the Sclavonian regiments from Illyria. The *proveditore* of Bergamo was secretly arming the superstitious but brave peasants of the Bergamasco. Funds were collected by the twofold means of taxes and voluntary donations.

Bonaparte thought that at this juncture his course would be to dissemble with all, to protract the negotiations, to endeavour to prevent things from coming to a conclusion, and to appear ignorant of all hostile proceedings, till fresh battles should have settled the question whether we were to stay or be driven out of Italy. There was no necessity for him to agitate those questions which had to be settled with Genoa, and to persuade her that the French were content with the satisfaction obtained, in order that they might find a friend in her in case of retreat. There was no motive to displease the duke of Tuscany by the conduct that was pursued at Leghorn. Bonaparte could never have been of opinion that a brother of the emperor's ought to be left in that duchy, but he did not wish to alarm him prematurely. Garreau and Salicetti, the commissioners of the directory, having issued an order for the departure of all the French emigrants from the environs of Leghorn, Bonaparte wrote a letter to them, in which, without any regard to their quality, he severely reprimanded them for having overstepped their powers and affronted the duke of Tuscany by usurping the sovereign authority in his dominions. With respect to Venice also, he was desirous of maintaining the *status quo*; though he complained loudly of some murders committed on the high roads, and of the preparations which he saw making around him. His object in keeping the quarrel open was to keep himself well supplied, and to coin a reason for amercing the republic in a few millions, if he should beat the Austrians. "If I am victorious," he wrote, "a mere express will be sufficient to put an end to all the difficulties that are raised up against me."

The citadel of Milan had fallen into his power. The garrison had surrendered; all the artillery had been transferred to Mantua, where he had got together a considerable train of ordnance. He was very desirous to bring the siege of that fortress to a conclusion before the new Austrian army should come up to its relief; but in this he could hardly expect to succeed. He employed in the blockade no more than the number of troops that was indispensably necessary, on account of the fever that raged in the environs. Nevertheless he hemmed in the place very closely, and was preparing to attempt one of those surprises which, according to his own expression, depend *upon a goose or a dog;* but the waters of the lake were so low, that the passage of the boats that were to carry his disguised troops could not be effected. He then renounced for the moment the intention of making himself master of Mantua; besides, Wurmser was coming, and it was requisite to attend to that which was most urgent.

The army, which had entered Italy with some thirty thousand men or thereabouts, had received but small reinforcements to repair its losses. Nine thousand men had come from the Alps. The divisions drafted from Hoche's army had not yet been able to traverse France. Owing to this reinforcement of nine thousand men, and to the sick who had left the military *dépôts* of Provence and the Var, the army had retrieved its losses and was even reinforced. It amounted to nearly forty-five thousand men, distributed upon the Adige and around Mantua, at the moment when Bonaparte returned from his march into the peninsula. The diseases which seized the soldiers before Mantua reduced it to about forty or forty-two thousand men. This was its strength in the middle of Thermidor (the end of July). Bonaparte had left merely military *dépôts* at Milan, Tortona, and Leghorn. He had already driven out of the field two armies, one of Piedmontese and the other of Austrians, and now he had to fight a third army more formidable than the preceding.

Wurmser came up at the head of sixty thousand men. Thirty thousand were drafted from the Rhine, and were composed of troops in fine condition. The remainder was formed of the wreck of Beaulieu's army, and of battalions from the interior of Austria. Upwards of ten thousand men were shut up in Mantua, exclusive of the sick. Thus the whole army comprehended more than seventy thousand men. Bonaparte had nearly ten

thousand around Mantua, and had therefore no more than about thirty thousand to oppose to the sixty who were about to debouch from the Tyrol. With such an inequality of force, it required extraordinary bravery in the soldiers, and a most fertile genius in the general, to restore the balance.

The line of the Adige, to which Bonaparte attached so much importance, was about to become the theatre of the struggle. We have already stated the reasons which induced Bonaparte to prefer it to every other. The Adige was not so long as the Po or those rivers which, falling into the latter, blend their line with that of the Po; after flowing a short distance it ran directly to the sea; it was not fordable, neither could it be turned by the Tyrol, like the Brenta, the Piave, and the rivers higher up towards the extremity of Upper Italy. This river has been the theatre of such glorious events, that we must describe its course with some attention.

The streams of the Tyrol form two lines,—the line of the Mincio, and the line of the Adige,—nearly parallel, and mutually supporting each other. A portion of these streams forms in the mountains an extensive and long lake, called the Lake of Garda. The streams from this lake flow to Peschiera, cross the plain of the Mantuan, become the Mincio, form another lake around Mantua, and, pursuing their course, at length fall into the Lower Po. The Adige, formed by the streams from the upper valleys of the Tyrol, runs beyond the preceding line. It descends through the mountains in a direction parallel to the lake of Garda, debouches into the plain in the environs of Verona, then runs parallel to the Mincio, excavates for itself a wide and deep bed as far as Legnago, and a few leagues beyond that town is no longer confined between steep banks, and can spread itself out into impassable inundations, which obstruct the entire space comprised between that point and the Adriatic. Three routes presented themselves to the enemy. One crossing the Adige as high as Roverdo, before the commencement of the lake of Garda, turned round that lake, and led behind it to Salo, Gavardo, and Brescia. Two other routes, running from Roveredo, followed the two banks of the Adige, in its course along the lake of Garda. The one on the right bank ran between the river and the lake, passed through the mountains, and entered the plain between the Mincio and the Adige. The other, following the left bank, and running outside the Adige, debouched into the plain towards Verona, and thus led to the front of the defensive line. The first of the three routes, that which crosses the Adige before the source of the lake of Garda, afforded the advantage of turning at the same time the two lines of the Mincio and of the Adige, and leading to the rear of the army that was protecting them. But it was not very passable; it was accessible to mountain artillery only, and therefore it might serve for a diversion, but not for an operation upon which every thing was to depend. The second, which descended from the mountains between the lake and the Adige, crossed the river at Rivalta or Dolce, a point where it was scarcely at all defended; but it wound its way in the mountains, through positions easily defended,—those of La Corona and Rivoli. The third running beyond the river to the middle of the plain, debouched outside, and led to the best defended part of its course, that from Verona to Legnago. Thus all three routes presented very great difficulties. The first could be only occupied by a detachment; the second, passing between the lake and the river, came upon the positions of La Corona and Rivoli; the third abutted upon the Adige, which has a wide deep bed from Verona to Legnago, and is defended by two fortresses, eight leagues distant from one another.

Bonaparte had stationed general Sauret, with three thousand men, at Salo, to protect the road which debouches on the rear of the lake of Garda. Masséna, with twelve thousand, intercepted the road which runs between the lake of Garda and the Adige, and occupied the positions of La Corona and Rivoli. Despinois, with five thousand, was in the environs of Verona; Augereau, with eight thousand, at Legnago; Kilmaine, with two thousand horse and light artillery, as a reserve, in a central position at Castel Novo. There it was that Bonaparte had fixed his head-quarters, so as to be at an equal distance from Salo, Rivoli, and Verona. As he attached great importance to Verona, which had three bridges over the Adige, and inasmuch as he had his misgivings as to the intentions of Venice, he resolved to make the Sclavonian regiments quit that place. He pretended that they were in hostility with the French troops; and upon pretext of preventing quarrels, he insisted on their leaving the city. The *proveditore* complied, and the French garrison alone was left in Verona.

Wurmser had transferred his head-quarters to Trent and Roveredo. He detached twenty thousand men under Quasdanovich, to take the road that turns the lake of Garda and debouches upon Salo. He took forty thousand with him, and distributed them upon the two roads that run along the Adige. Some were to attack La Corona and Rivoli, others to debouch upon Verona. He believed that in this manner he could entirely surround the French army, which, being attacked at one and the same time, on the Adige and on the rear of the lake of Garda, would be in danger of being forced on its front, and of being cut off from its line of retreat.

Public report had anticipated the arrival of Wurmser. Throughout all Italy his coming was expected, and the party hostile to the independence of Italy exhibited great joy and presumption. The Venetians manifested a satisfaction they could no longer repress. The places of public resort were covered with Sclavonian soldiers, and they, holding out their hands to the passengers, asked for the price of the French blood they were going to shed. In Rome, the agents of France were insulted; the Pope, grown bolder by the hope of speedy deliverance, ordered the carriages laden with the first instalment of the contribution imposed upon him to turn back; he even despatched his legate to Ferrara and Bologna. Lastly, the court of Naples, still as senseless as ever, trampling upon the conditions of the armistice, sent its troops to march to the frontiers of the Roman states. On the other hand, the most painful anxiety prevailed in all the towns devoted to France and to liberty. Tidings from the Adige were impatiently looked for. The Italian imagination, which magnifies every thing, had exaggerated the disproportion of

the forces. It was said that Wurmser was coming with two armies, one of sixty, the other of eighty thousand men. People asked one another how that handful of French could possibly withstand such a mass of foes; and they repeated the famous proverb, that *Italy was the grave of the French.*

On the 11th Thermidor (July 29) the Austrians came upon our outposts and surprised them all. The corps which had turned the lake of Garda debouched upon Salo, whence it repulsed general Sauret. General Guyeux was left alone there with a few hundred men, and shut himself up in an old building, which he refused to quit, though he had neither bread or water, and scarcely any ammunition. Along the two roads which run by the side of the Adige the Austrians advanced with the same advantage: they forced the important position of La Corona, between the Adige and the lake of Garda; they made a passage in the same manner by the third road, and came to debouch before Verona. Bonaparte, in his head-quarters at Castel Novo, received intelligence of all these things. Couriers succeeded one another without intermission, and on the following day, the 12th Thermidor (July 30), he was apprised that the Austrians were marching from Salo upon Brescia, and that thus his retreat upon Milan was excluded; that the position of Rivoli was forced, as well as that of La Corona; and that the Austrians were about to cross the Adige at all points. In this alarming situation, having lost his defensive line and his line of retreat, he could hardly do any thing than consider how to effect his escape. This was the first time he had experienced adversity. Whether he was affected by the excess of the danger, or was ready to adopt a daring resolution, he was desirous of sharing the responsibility with his generals; for the first time he asked their opinion and called a council of war: all of them were for retreating. Without any point of support before them, having lost one of the two roads to France, there was not one who deemed it prudent to hold out. Augereau alone, to whom these days were the most glorious of his life, strongly insisted on trying the fortune of arms. He was young and sanguine; he had learned in the faubourgs to speak with fluency the language of camps, and he declared that he had good grenadiers who would not retire without fighting. Although he was far from being a judge as to the resources which the situation of the armies and the nature of the ground still presented, he was governed solely by the dictates of his courage, and he warmed by his military ardour the genius of Bonaparte. The latter dismissed his generals, without expressing his own opinion, but his plan was formed. Although the line of the Adige was forced, and the line of the Mincio and the lake of Garda turned, the ground was so favourable that it still presented resources to a resolute man of genius.

The Austrians, divided into two bodies, were descending along the two shores of the lake of Garda; their junction was to be effected at the extremity of the lake, and, on their arrival there, they would have sixty thousand men to overwhelm thirty thousand. But by concentrating himself at the extremity of the lake, Bonaparte might prevent their junction. If then he were to form with sufficient rapidity a principal mass, he might overwhelm the twenty thousand who had turned the lake, and then return to the forty thousand who had filed between the lake and the Adige. But, in order to occupy the extremity of the lake, he must bring back thither all the troops from the Lower Adige and the Lower Mincio; he would have to withdraw Augereau from Legnago, and Serrurier from Mantua, for it was impossible to keep so extended a line. It was a great sacrifice; for he had been besieging Mantua for two months, he had brought thither a great train of ordnance, the place was about to surrender, and, by allowing it to revictual itself, he should lose the fruit of protracted operations, with his prey almost within his grasp. However, Bonaparte did not hesitate, and between two objects knew how to seize the most important, and to sacrifice the other; a simple resolution, which is decisive of not only the great captain, but the great man. It is not only in war, but also in politics and in all situations of life, that men in proposing to themselves two different objects, in their desire to attain one as well as the other, miss both. Bonaparte possessed the natural faculty, so great, and so rarely to be met with, of distinguishing between the choice and the rejection. Had he attempted to keep the whole course of the Mincio, from the point of the lake of Garda to Mantua, the enemy would have broken through his line; and if he had concentrated himself upon Mantua to cover it, he would have had to fight seventy thousand men at once,—sixty thousand in front, and ten thousand in rear. He gave up Mantua, and concentrated his force at the extremity of the lake of Garda. Orders were immediately sent to Augereau to quit Legnago, and to Serrurier to leave Mantua, in order to bring up all their forces towards Valeggio and Peschiera on the Upper Mincio. During the night of the 13th Thermidor (July 31), Serrurier burned his gun-carriages, spiked his cannon, buried his projectiles, and threw his powder into the water, before he started to join the active army.

Bonaparte, without losing a single moment, resolved to march first upon that corps of the enemy which was most forward, and the most exposed to danger from the position it had taken. This was the corps of Quasdanovich, who with twenty thousand men had debouched by Salo, Gavardo, and Brescia, on the rear of the lake of Garda, and threatened the communication with Milan. On that same day that Serrurier left Mantua, the 13th (July 31), Bonaparte made a retrograde movement for the purpose of falling upon Quasdanovich, and recrossed the Mincio at Peschiera with the greater part of his army. Augereau crossed at Borghetto, over the same bridge, the scene of a glorious action at the time of the first conquest. Rear-guards were left to watch the march of the enemy who had passed the Adige. Bonaparte ordered general Sauret to go and relieve general Guyeux, who had shut himself up in an old building with seventeen hundred men, without either bread or water, and who had been fighting most heroically for two days. He himself resolved to march upon Lonato, whither Quasdanovich had just pushed forward a division; and he ordered Augereau to get on to Brescia, to re-open the communication with Milan. Sauret succeeded in extricating general Guyeux, and drove back the Austrians into the mountains, and made some hundred of them prisoners. Bonaparte, with

the German brigade, was not in time to attack the Austrians at Lonato: he was anticipated by them. After a very brisk action, he repulsed the Austrians, entered Lonato, and took six hundred prisoners. Augereau was, meanwhile, marching upon Brescia. He entered it on the 14th (August 1), without striking a blow, released some prisoners who had been taken from us, and forced the Austrians to make their way back to the mountains. Quasdanovich, who thought that he should come upon the rear of the French army and surprise it, was astonished to find imposing masses everywhere, making head against him so vigorously. He had lost only a few men either at Salo or at Lonato; but he thought it right to halt, and not proceed further, until he knew what had become of Wurmser, with the principal Austrian mass. He therefore halted.

Bonaparte likewise halted. Time was precious; on this point there was no motive for pushing an advantage further than necessary. It was enough to have made an impression on Quasdanovich; he had now to turn back to face Wurmser. He made a retrograde movement with Masséna's and Augereau's divisions. On the 15th (August 2), he placed Masséna's division at Pon-San-Marco, and Augereau's division at Monte-Chiaro. The rear-guards which he had left on the Mincio became his advanced guards. It was time that he came up, for Wurmser's forty thousand men had crossed not only the Adige but also the Mincio. The division of Bayalitsch having masked Peschiera by a detachment, and passed the Mincio, was advancing upon the road to Lonato. Liptai's division had crossed the Mincio at Borghetto, and driven general Valette from Castiglione. Wurmser had proceeded with two divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, to raise the blockade of Mantua. On seeing our gun-carriages in ashes, our cannon spiked, and all the signs of extreme precipitation, he did not perceive therein the foresight of genius, but the effect of fear; he was overjoyed, he entered the place in triumph which he came to relieve; this was the 15th (August 2nd).

Bonaparte, returned to Pon-San-Marco and Monte-Chiaro, did not halt for a moment. His troops had been constantly on the march, he had himself been all the time on horseback; he resolved to make them fight the very next morning. He had before him Bayalitsch at Lonato, and Liptai at Castiglione, presenting to both of them a front of twenty-five thousand men. He had to attack them before Wurmser should return from Mantua. Sauret had for the second time abandoned Salo; Bonaparte sent Guyeux again thither to recover the position, and to keep back Quasdanovich. After these precautions on his left and on his rear, he resolved to march forward to Lonato with Masséna, and to throw Augereau upon the heights of Castiglione, which had been abandoned on the preceding day by general Vallette. He broke that general at the head of his army, in order to make his lieutenants do their duty without flinching. On the following day, the 16th (August 3rd), the whole army was in motion; Guyeux re-entered Salo, and this rendered any communication between Quasdanovich and the Austrian army still more impracticable. Bonaparte advanced upon Lonato; but his advanced guard was beaten back, some pieces of cannon were taken, and general Pigeon was made prisoner. Bayalitsch, proud of this success, advanced with confidence, and extended his wings around the French division. He had two objects in performing this manœuvre; in the first place, to surround Bonaparte, and in the second, to extend himself on his right for the purpose of entering into communication with Quasdanovich, whose cannon he heard at Salo. Bonaparte, not alarming himself about his rear, suffered himself to be surrounded with imperturbable coolness; he placed some sharpshooters on his exposed wings, he next took the 18th and 32nd demi-brigades of infantry, ranged them in close column, gave them a regiment of dragoons to support them, and rushed headlong upon the enemy's centre, which was weakened by its extension. With this brave body of infantry he overthrew all before him, and thus broke the line of the Austrians. The latter, divided into two bodies, immediately lost their courage: one part of the division of Bayalitsch fell back in all haste towards the Mincio; but the other, which had extended itself, in order to communicate with Quasdanovich, was driven towards Salo, where Guyeux was at that moment. Bonaparte caused it to be pursued without intermission, that he might place it between two fires. He let loose Junot in pursuit of it, with a regiment of cavalry. Junot dashed off at a gallop, killed six horsemen with his own hand, and fell, having received several sabre wounds. The fugitive division, entrapped between the corps at Salo and that which was pursuing it from Lonato, was broken, routed, and lost at every step thousands of prisoners. During this successful pursuit, Bonaparte proceeded on his right to Castiglione, where Augereau was fighting ever since the morning with admirable bravery. The heights on which Liptai's division had placed itself had now to be carried. After an obstinate combat, several times renewed, he had at length accomplished his object, and Bonaparte on his arrival found the enemy retreating on all sides. Such was the battle called the battle of Lonato, fought on the 16th (August 3rd).

This battle produced considerable results. The French had taken twenty pieces of cannon and three thousand prisoners from the division cut off and driven back upon Salo, and they were still pursuing its scattered remnant in the mountains. They had made a thousand or fifteen hundred prisoners at Castiglione, and killed or wounded three thousand men; they had alarmed Quasdanovich, who finding the French army before him at Salo, and hearing it in the distance at Lonato, thought that it was everywhere. They had thus nearly disorganized the divisions of Bayalitsch and Liptai, which fell back upon Wurmser. That general at this moment came up with fifteen thousand men to rally the two beaten divisions, and began to draw out his lines in the plains of Castiglione. Bonaparte observed him on the morning of the following day, the 17th (August 4th), put himself in line to receive battle. He resolved to attack him again, and to fight one pitched battle with him, which should decide the fate of Italy. But for this purpose it was requisite that he should collect all his disposable troops at Castiglione. He therefore deferred this decisive

battle till the 18th (August 5th). He set off at full gallop for Lonato, to personally expedite the movement of his troops. In a few days he had killed five horses with fatigue. He would not intrust any one with the execution of his orders; he would see every thing done himself, personally inquire into every thing, and infuse spirit into every body by his presence. It is thus that a great mind communicates itself to a great mass, and diffuses its own ardour. He arrived about mid-day at Lonato. His orders were already carried out; part of the troops were marching upon Castiglione, the rest were proceeding towards Salo and Gavardo. There remained at most no more than a thousand men at Lonato. Scarcely had Bonaparte entered the place, when an Austrian flag of truce presented itself; and the bearer summoned him to surrender. The general, surprised, could not comprehend at first how it was possible that he should be close to the Austrians. However, the fact soon explained itself. The division, separated on the preceding day in the battle of Lonato, and driven back upon Salo, had been partly taken; but a body of nearly four thousand men had been wandering all night in the mountains; and seeing Lonato almost abandoned, wanted to enter the place, in order to open for itself an outlet upon the Mincio. Bonaparte had but a thousand men to oppose to it, and, besides, he had no time to fight a battle. He immediately made all the officers about him mount their horses. He ordered the bearer of the flag of truce to be brought before him, and his eyes to be uncovered. The latter was astonished at witnessing this numerous staff. "Unhappy man!" said Bonaparte to him, "you know not then that you are in the presence of the commander-in-chief, and that he is here with his whole army. Go, tell those who have sent you, that I give them five minutes to surrender, or I will put them to the sword, to punish the insult which they have dared to offer me." He immediately ordered his artillery to be drawn up, and threatened to fire upon the advancing columns. The messengers went and carried back his answer, and the four thousand men laid down their arms before one thousand*. Bonaparte, saved by his presence of mind on this occasion, gave his orders for the conflict that was about to ensue. He added fresh troops to those which had already been despatched to Salo. The division of Despinois was united with that of Sauret, and both taking advantage of the ascendancy of victory, were to attack Quasdanovich, and throw him back definitively into the mountains. He led all the rest to Castiglione. He got back the same night, and without allowing himself a moment's repose, mounted a fresh horse, and hastened to the field of battle, to make his final arrangements. That day was to decide the fate of Italy.

It was in the plain of Castiglione that this battle was to take place. A series of heights, formed by the last range of the Alps, extends from Chiesa to the Mincio, by Lonato, Castiglione, and Solferino. At the foot of these heights lies the plain that was to serve for the field of battle. The two armies were close in front of each other, vertically from the line of the heights on which both supported one wing; Bonaparte had his left thereon, and Wurmser his right. Bonaparte had at most twenty-two thousand men, Wurmser thirty thousand. The latter had another advantage; his wing, which was in the plain, was protected by a redoubt placed on the elevation of Medolano. Thus it was supported on both sides. To counterbalance these advantages of number and position, Bonaparte relied upon the ascendancy of victory and his manœuvres. Wurmser would naturally strive to extend himself on his right, which supported himself by the line of the heights, in order to open a communication towards Lonato and Salo. This is what Bayalitsch had done two days before, and this was what Wurmser ought to have done, whose sole attention should have been directed to a junction with his great detachment. Bonaparte resolved to favour this movement, from which he hoped to derive important advantage. He had at his disposal Serrurier's division, which, pursued by Wurmser ever since it had left Mantua, had not yet been able to enter into line. It was coming by way of Guidizzolo. Bonaparte ordered it to debouch in the direction of Cauriana, on Wurmser's rear. He waited for his fire to begin the battle.

Ever since daybreak the two armies entered into action. Wurmser, impatient to attack, moved his right along the heights; Bonaparte, to favour this movement, drew back his left, formed by Masséna's division; he kept his centre immoveable in the plain. He soon heard Serrurier's fire. Then, while he continued to draw back his left, and Wurmser to draw out his right, he ordered the redoubt of Medolano to be attacked. At first he directed twenty pieces of light artillery upon that redoubt, and after briskly cannonading it, he detached general Verdier, with three battalions, to storm it. That brave general advanced, supported by a regiment of cavalry, and took the redoubt. The left flank of the Austrians was thus exposed at the very moment when Serrurier, arriving at Cauriana, excited alarm upon their rear. Wurmser immediately moved part of his second line upon his right, now deprived of support, and placed it *en potence* to front the French, who were debouching from Medolano. He took the remainder of his second line to the rear, to protect Cauriana, and thus continued to make head against the enemy. But Bonaparte, seizing the opportunity with his accustomed promptness, immediately ceased to avoid engaging his left and his centre, and gave Masséna and Augereau the signal which they were impatiently awaiting. Masséna with the left, Augereau with the centre, rushed upon the weakened line of the Austrians, and charged it with impetuosity. Attacked so briskly on its entire front, and threatened on its left and its rear, it began to give ground. The ardour of the French increased. Wurmser seeing his army jeopardized then gave the signal for retreat. He was pursued, and some prisoners were taken. To put him completely to the rout, it would have been necessary to have made much more haste, and to push him while in disorder upon the Mincio. But for six days the troops had been constantly marching and fighting; they were unable to advance further, and slept on the field of battle. Wurmser had on that day lost no more than two thousand men, but he had nevertheless lost Italy.

* This fact has been called in question by one historian, M. Botta; but it is confirmed by others, and I have been assured of its authenticity by M. Aubernon, the paymaster-in-chief of the forces in service, who passed the four thousand prisoners before him in review.

On the following day, Augereau proceeded to the bridge of Borghetto, and Masséna before Peschiera. Augereau commenced a cannonade, which was followed by the retreat of the Austrians; and Masséna fought a rear-guard action with the division that had masked Peschiera. The Mincio was abandoned by Wurmser; he again took the road to Rivoli, between the Adige and the lake of Garda, in order to enter the Tyrol. Masséna followed him to Rivoli and to La Corona, and resumed his old positions. Augereau appeared before Verona. The Venetian *proveditors*, in order to give the Austrians time to evacuate the city, and to save their baggage, demanded a ten hours' law before opening the gates; Bonaparte broke them open with cannon-balls. The Veronese, who were devoted to the cause of Austria, and who had loudly manifested their sentiments when the French retreated, dreaded the wrath of the conquerors; but his behaviour towards them was marked with great forbearance.

In the quarter of Salo and La Chiesa, Quasdanovich was effecting a difficult retreat behind the lake of Garda. He halted, and attempted to defend a defile called La Rocca d'Anfo; but he was beaten, and lost twelve hundred men. The French had soon recovered all their old positions.

This campaign had lasted six days; and in that short space of time some thirty thousand men had put sixty thousand *hors de combat;* Wurmser had lost twenty thousand men,—seven or eight thousand of whom were killed, and twelve or thirteen thousand prisoners. He was driven into the mountains, reduced to a state that rendered it utterly impracticable for him to keep the field. Thus had this formidable expedition vanished before a handful of brave men. These extraordinary results, unexampled in history, were owing to the promptness and vigour of resolution of the young commander. While two formidable armies covered both shores of the lake of Garda, and the courage of all was shaken, he in fact reduced the whole campaign to a single question—the junction of these two armies at the extremity of the lake of Garda. His judgment had guided him in rejecting one of two advantages,—the blockade of Mantua, in order to concentrate his forces at the decisive point; and by alternately inflicting tremendous attacks on each of the enemy's masses at Salo, at Lonato, and at Castiglione, he had successively disorganized them, and driven them back into the mountains from which they had issued.

The Austrians were struck with consternation, the French transported with admiration of their young commander. Their confidence in and devotion to him were at their height. One battalion could put three to flight. The old soldiers, who had made him corporal at Lodi, promoted him to serjeant at Castiglione. In Italy, the greatest sensation had been created. Milan, Bologna, Ferrara, the towns in the duchy of Modena, and all the friends of liberty, were transported with joy. The convents and all the old aristocracies looked very grave. Venice, Rome, and Naples, the governments that had acted so imprudently, were extremely alarmed.

Bonaparte, judging soundly of his position, did not consider the struggle as at an end, though he had deprived Wurmser of twenty thousand men. The old marshal was retiring into the Alps with forty thousand. He was going to refresh, to rally, to recruit them, and it was fairly to be presumed that he would make one more rush upon Italy. Bonaparte had lost a few thousand men, in prisoners, killed, and wounded; he had a great number in the hospitals: he thought it best to continue to temporize, to keep his eyes constantly upon the Tyrol, and his feet upon the Adige, and to content himself with overawing the Italian powers until he should have time to chastise them. He contented himself with apprising the Venetians that he was informed of their armaments, and continued to make them furnish him with supplies at their own cost, still postponing the negotiations for an alliance. He had learned the arrival at Ferrara of a papal legate, who had come to resume possession of the legations. He summoned him to his head-quarters. This legate, who was Cardinal Mattei, fell at his feet, crying, *Pecavi.* Bonaparte put him under constraint in a seminary. He wrote to M. d'Azara, who was his go-between with the courts of Rome and Naples, complained to him of the imbecility and of the bad faith of the papal government, and informed him of his intention to very shortly fall upon its rear, if it compelled him to do so. With regard to the court of Naples, he assumed the most threatening language. "The English," said he to M. d'Azara, "have persuaded the king of Naples that he was something; I will soon prove to him that he is nothing. If he persists, notwithstanding the terms of the armistice, to put himself in battle-array, I solemnly vow before the face of Europe, to march against his pretended seventy thousand men, with six thousand grenadiers, four thousand horse, and forty pieces of cannon."

He wrote a polite but firm letter to the duke of Tuscany, who had suffered the English to occupy Porto Ferrajo, and told him that France had certainly had it in her power to punish him for this negligence by occupying his dominions, but that she forbore to do so for old friendship's sake. He changed the garrison of Leghorn, in order to awe Tuscany by a movement of troops. To Genoa he was silent. He wrote a strong letter to the king of Sardinia, who tolerated the Barbets in his territories, and despatched a column of twelve hundred men, with a roving military commission to seize and shoot all Barbets found on the roads. The people of Milan had shown the most friendly inclinations towards the French. He addressed to them a delicate and noble letter, in order to thank them. His recent victories affording him well-grounded hopes of retaining Italy, he thought that he might favour the Lombards a little more; he granted them arms, and permitted them to raise a legion in their own pay, in which a great number of Italians, and the Poles dispersed over Europe since the last partition, enrolled themselves. Bonaparte testified his satisfaction to the people of Bologna and Ferrara. Those of Modena desired to be liberated from the regency established by their duke; Bonaparte had already some motives for breaking the armistice, for the regency had permitted the transit of supplies to the garrison of Mantua. He resolved, however, to wait a while. He solicited assistance from the directory to repair his losses, and remained at the entrance of the narrow passes of the Tyrol, ready to rush upon Wurmser, and to destroy the remains of his army the moment he should have learned that Moreau had crossed the Danube.

While these great events were taking place in Italy, others were about to take place on the Danube. Moreau had pushed the archduke foot by foot, and had arrived in the middle of Thermidor (the first day of August) on the Danube. Jourdan was on the Naab, which falls into that river. The chain of the Alb, which separates the Neckar from the Danube, is composed of mountains of middling height, terminating in an elevated plain crossed by defiles, quite as narrow as the fissures in rocks. It was by these defiles that Moreau had debouched upon the Danube, in an unequal country, intersected by ravines, and covered with wood.

The archduke, who entertained the design of collecting all his forces at one point on the Danube, and recovering strength on that powerful line, suddenly formed a resolution which had nearly marred his judicious plans. He received intelligence that Wartensleben, instead of falling back upon him as near as possible to Donaeverth, was falling back towards Bohemia, under the foolish idea of giving it some protection. He was apprehensive lest, profiting by this false movement, which left the Danube exposed, the army of the Sambre and Meuse should attempt to cross it. He resolved, therefore, to cross it himself, in order to file rapidly along the other shore, and to go and make head against Jourdan. But the river was obstructed by his stores and ammunition, and it would take him some time to clear them out; besides this, he did not wish to effect the passage under the eyes of Moreau and too much within reach of his attacks, and he conceived the idea of removing him by giving him battle with the Danube at his back,—a faulty conception, for which he has since severely censured himself, for it rendered him liable to be thrown into the river, or at least not to get thither without loss, things that were indispensable to insure the success of his ulterior designs.

On the 24th Thermidor (August 11th), he halted before Moreau's positions, to make a general attack upon him. Moreau was at Neresheim, occupying the positions of Dunstelkinger and Dischingen by his right and his centre, and the position of Nordlingen by his left. The archduke, wishing in the first place to throw him off from the Danube, in the next place to cut him off, if possible, from the mountains by which he had debouched, and lastly, to prevent him from communicating with Jourdan, attacked him, in order to attain all his objects on all these points at once. He succeeded in getting at the rear of Moreau's right, and in dispersing all his flankers; he advanced to Heidenheim, almost close to his rear, and excited such alarm, that all his artillery fell back. At the centre he attempted a vigorous attack, but it was not sufficiently decisive. On the left, towards Nordlingen, he made threatening demonstrations. Moreau was not intimidated either by the demonstrations made upon his left, or by the excursion behind his right; and judging very correctly that the essential point was at the centre, did the reverse of what is done by generals of ordinary capacity, who are always alarmed when the enemy's line threatens to extend beyond their own, he weakened his wings to strengthen his centre. This precaution was judicious, for the archduke increasing his efforts at the centre towards Dunstelkinger was repulsed with loss. Both armies passed the night on the field of battle.

Next day Moreau found himself greatly embarrassed by the retrograde movement of his artillery, which left him without ammunition. He nevertheless conceived that he ought to make amends by daring, and make show of an intended attack. But the archduke, in a hurry to recross the Danube, had no inclination to renew the combat; he effected his retreat with great firmness to the Danube, repassed it unmolested by Moreau, and broke down the bridges as far as Donawerth. There he learned what had passed between the two armies on the Maine. Wartensleben had not thrown himself into Bohemia, as he feared, but had remained on the Naab in front of Jourdan. The young Austrian prince then formed an admirable resolution, as being the consequence of his protracted retreat, and which was calculated to decide the campaign. His aim in falling back upon the Danube had been to bring all his forces to one point there, that he might have it in his power to act upon one or other of the two French armies with a superior mass of forces. The battle of Neresheim might have thwarted this plan, if, instead of being uncertain, it had been positively disastrous. But having retreated without loss to the Danube, he could now take advantage of the separation of the French armies, and fall upon one of the two. He consequently resolved to leave general Latour, with thirty-six thousand men, to keep Moreau in play, and to proceed in his own person with twenty-five thousand towards Wartensleben, in order to overwhelm Jourdan by this juncture of forces. Jourdan's army was the weaker of the two. At so great a distance from his supporting point it did not amount to much more than forty-five thousand men. It was evident that he could make no defence, and that he was even likely to be exposed to great disasters. Jourdan being beaten and driven back to the Rhine, Moreau, on his part, could not remain in Bavaria, and the archduke might even proceed to the Neckar, and anticipate him on his line of retreat. This very correct suggestion has been considered the most judicious of any that can reflect credit upon the Austrian generals during these long wars; like those which at the same moment distinguished the genius of Bonaparte in Italy, it emanated from a young man.

The archduke set out from Ingoldstadt on the 29th Thermidor (August 16), five days after the battle of Neresheim. Jourdan, placed on the Naab, between Naabburg and Schwandorf, was not aware of the storm that was brewing over his head. He had detached general Bernadotte to Neumark, on his right, with a view to put himself in communication with Moreau,—an object that it was impossible to effect, and for which a detached corps was uselessly endangered. It was this detachment that the archduke, on his way from the Danube, must necessarily attack. General Bernadotte, attacked by superior forces, made an honourable resistance, but was obliged rapidly to recross the mountains by which the army had debouched from the valley of the Maine into the valley of the Danube. He retired to Nuremberg. The archduke, having despatched a corps in pursuit of him,

proceeded with the rest of his forces against Jourdan. The latter having received intelligence that a reinforcement was coming, and being apprised of the danger which Bernadotte had incurred, and of the retreat which he was obliged to make upon Nuremberg, resolved to recross the mountains himself. At the moment when he was commencing his march, he was attacked at once by the archduke at Wartensleben; he had a hazardous conflict to sustain at Amberg, and lost his direct route to Nuremberg. Thrown with his artillery, his infantry, and his cavalry into cross-roads, he incurred the greatest dangers, and was eight days in making a most difficult but a most creditable retreat both for the troops and for himself. He found himself once more on the Maine, at Schweinfurt, on the 12th Fructidor (August 29), purposing to proceed to Wurtzburg, to halt there, to rally his corps, and to once more try the fortune of war.

While the archduke was executing this admirable movement upon the army of the Sambre and Meuse, he afforded Moreau occasion to execute a similar one, equally masterly and equally decisive. An enemy never attempts a bold stroke without exposing himself, and without affording favourable chances to his adversary. Moreau having no more than thirty-eight thousand men opposed to him, might easily have overwhelmed them by acting with a little vigour. He could have done more (in the opinion of Napoleon and the archduke Charles), he might have attempted a movement which would have been attended with prodigious results. He should himself have followed the march of the enemy, have fallen upon the archduke, as that prince was himself falling upon Jourdan, and have got unawares upon his rear. The archduke, caught between Jourdan and Moreau, would have incurred incalculable risks. But for this purpose he must have executed a very extensive movement, suddenly changed his line of operation, and thrown himself from the Neckar upon the Maine; he must moreover have disobeyed the instructions of the directory, which ordered him to support himself upon the Tyrol, with a view to turn the enemy's flanks, and to communicate with the army of Italy. The young conqueror of Castiglione would not have hesitated to take this bold step, and to have committed such an act of disobedience, which would have decided the campaign in a victorious manner; but Moreau was incapable of such a determination. He remained several days on the banks of the Danube, ignorant of the departure of the archduke, and leisurely exploring a position that was then but little known. Being at length apprised of the movement which had taken place, he was alarmed for Jourdan; but not daring to take any vigorous determination, he resolved to cross the Danube and to advance into Bavaria, to try to draw the archduke back upon him, while adhering to the plan prescribed by the directory. It was however easy to judge that the archduke would not quit Jourdan till he had put him *hors de combat*, and that he would not suffer himself to be diverted from the execution of a vast plan by an incursion into Bavaria. Moreau nevertheless crossed the Danube after Latour, and approached the Lech. Latour showed an intention to dispute the passage of the Lech; but too much extended to support himself there, he was obliged to abandon it, after being worsted in an action at Friedberg. Moreau then approached Munich; on the 15th Fructidor (September 1) he was at Dachau, Pfaffenhofen, and Geisenfeld.

Thus fortune began to be less favourable to us in Germany, as the consequence of an ill-constructed design, which, separating our armies, rendered them liable to be beaten singly. Other results were about to take place in Italy also. We have seen that Bonaparte, after he had driven back the Austrians into the Tyrol, and resumed his old positions on the Adige, meditated fresh designs against Wurmser. Not content with having destroyed twenty thousand of his men, he wished to utterly ruin his army. This operation was indispensable for the execution of all his plans in Italy. Wurmser destroyed, he could make a push as far as Trieste, ruin that port, so important for Austria, then return to the Adige, give law to Venice, Rome, and Naples, whose ill-will was still as manifest as ever, and at length throw out the signal of liberty in Italy, by constituting Lombardy, the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and perhaps even the duchy of Modena, an independent republic. He resolved then, in order to accomplish these plans, to ascend into the Tyrol, certain of being now supported by the presence of Moreau on the other slope of the Alps.

While the French troops were taking about a score days' rest, Wurmser had reorganized and reinforced his. New detachments from Austria and the Tyrolese militia enabled him to increase his army to nearly fifty thousand men. The aulic council sent him a new head of the staff, general Latter, of the engineers, with fresh instructions respecting the plan to be pursued for taking the line of the Adige. Wurmser was to leave eighteen or twenty thousand men under Davidovich, to guard the Tyrol, and to descend with the rest by the valley of the Brenta, into the plains of the Vincentine and the Paduan. The Brenta rises not far from Trent, recedes from the Adige in the form of an arch, again becomes parallel to that river in the plain, and discharges itself into the Adriatic. A causeway, commencing at Trent, leads into the valley of the Brenta, and running through Bassano, terminates in the plains of the Vincentine and the Paduan. Wurmser would have to pass through this valley, in order to debouch in the plain and to attempt the passage of the Adige between Verona and Legnago. This plan was not better conceived than the preceding; for it was still attended with the inconveniences of dividing him into two bodies, and placing Bonaparte between them.

Wurmser entered into action at the same moment as Bonaparte. The latter, ignorant of Wurmser's designs, but foreseeing with rare sagacity that during his excursion to the extremity of the Tyrol the enemy might possibly be examining the line of the Adige from Verona to Legnago, left general Kilmaine at Verona, with a reserve of nearly three thousand men, and with all the means of resisting for two days at least. General Sahuguet remained, with a division of eight thousand men, before Mantua. Bonaparte set out with twenty-eight thousand, and ascended by all the three roads of the Tyrol,—that which runs behind the lake of Garda, and the two which border the

Adige. On the 17th Fructidor (September 3), Sauret's division, now before Vaubois, after passing behind the lake of Garda, and fighting several actions, arrived at Torbole, near the upper extremity of the lake. On the same day, Masséna's and Augereau's divisions, which at first proceeded along both banks of the Adige, and afterwards formed a junction on one bank by means of the bridge of Golo, arrived before Seravalle. They fought an advanced-guard action, and took some prisoners from the enemy.

The French had now to make their way up a narrow and deep valley. On their left they had the Adige, on their right lofty mountains. In many places the river, running close to the foot of the mountains, left only the breadth of the causeway, and thus formed frightful defiles to pass. In penetrating into the Tyrol, there was more than one of this kind to encounter. But the French, daring and active, were as fit for this kind of warfare as for that which they had just been carrying on in the extensive plains of the Mantuan.

Davidovich had placed two divisions, one in the camp of Mori, on the right bank of the Adige, to make head against Vaubois' division, which was advancing along the causeway from Salo to Roveredo, behind the lake of Garda; the other at San Marco, on the left bank, to guard the defile against Masséna and Augereau. On the 18th Fructidor (September 4) the French and Austrians found themselves in presence of each other. It was Wukassovich's division that defended the defile of San Marco. Bonaparte's mind instantly grasping the nature of the tactics accordant with the locality, formed two corps of light infantry, and distributed them on the right and left on the surrounding heights. Then, after he had harassed the Austrians for some time, he formed the 18th demi-brigade into close column by battalions, and ordered general Victor to force his way with them through the defile. A fierce conflict ensued; the Austrians at first made a stand, but Bonaparte decided the action by directing general Dubois to charge at the head of the hussars. That brave general rushed upon the Austrian infantry, broke it, and fell pierced with three balls. He was borne away, expiring, "Before I die," said he to Bonaparte, "let me know if we are conquerors." The Austrians fled on all sides, and retired to Roveredo, a league distant from Marco. They were pursued at a running pace. Roveredo is situated at some distance from the Adige; Bonaparte despatched Rampon, with the 32nd, towards the space between the river and the town; and Victor, with the 18th, upon the town itself. The latter entered the high street of Roveredo at the charge step, swept the Austrians before him, and reached the other extremity of the town at the very moment Rampon was finishing his external circuit of the town. While the principal army was thus carrying San Marco and Roveredo, Vaubois' division came up along the other bank of the Adige. The Austrian division of Reuss had disputed with it the camp of Mori, but Vaubois had just carried it, and all the divisions were now united about noon on both banks of the river, near Roveredo. But the most difficult task was yet to be performed.

Davidovich had rallied his two divisions upon his reserve, in the defile of Calliano, a perilous defile, and quite as dangerous as that of Marco. At this point the Adige, running close to the mountains, left but the width of the causeway between its bed and their foot. The entrance of the defile was closed by the castle of La Pietra, which connected the mountain with the river, and was surmounted with artillery.

Bonaparte, persisting in his tactics, distributed his light infantry on the right upon the declivities of the mountain; and on the left, upon the banks of the river. His soldiers, born on the banks of the Rhone, the Seine, or the Loire, equalled the hunters of the Alps in boldness and agility. Some, climbing from rock to rock, attained the summit of the mountain, and poured down a vertical fire upon the enemy; others, not less intrepid, glided along the river, venturing wherever they could find a footing, and turned the castle of La Pietra. General Dommartin placed a battery of light artillery in a situation where it produced the best effect: the castle was taken. The army then passed through it, and advanced in close column upon the Austrian army, crowded together in the defile. Artillery, cavalry, and infantry, were intermingled, and fled in frightful disorder. Young Lemarois, aid-de-camp of the general-in-chief, with a view to prevent the flight of the Austrians, dashed away in full gallop at the head of fifty huzzars, passed through the whole length of the Austrian mass, then, suddenly facing about, attempted to stop the van. He was struck from his horse, but he spread terror in the Austrian ranks, and gave the cavalry, which hastened after him, time to pick up several thousand prisoners. Thus ended that series of actions which made the French army masters of the defiles of the Tyrol, the town of Roveredo, the whole of the Austrian artillery, and four thousand prisoners, exclusively of killed and wounded. Bonaparte called this affair the battle of Roveredo.

On the following day, the 16th Fructidor (September 5th), the French entered Trent, the capital of the Italian Tyrol. The bishop had fled. Bonaparte, in order to appease the Tyrolese, who were strongly attached to the house of Austria, addressed to them a proclamation, in which he exhorted them to lay down their arms, and not to commit hostilities against his army; promising that on this condition their property and public establishments should be respected. Wurmser was no longer at Trent. Bonaparte had surprised him at the moment when he was marching to execute his plan. On seeing the French enter the Tyrol, for the purpose of communicating perhaps with Germany, Wurmser was only the more disposed to descend by the Brenta, in order to possess himself of the Adige during their absence. He even hoped, by means of this rapid circuit, which would bring him to Verona, to inclose the French in the upper valley of the Adige, and at once to envelope them and to cut them off from Mantua. He had set out two days before, and must already have reached Bassano. Bonaparte immediately formed one of the boldest of resolutions. He determined to leave Vaubois to guard the Tyrol, and to hasten himself, through the narrow passes of the Brenta, after Wurmser. He could not take with him more than twenty thousand men, and Wurmser had thirty; he might be cooped up in those frightful gorges, if Wurmser should make head against him; he might

also come too late to fall upon the rear of Wurmser, and the latter might have time to force the Adige. All this was possible, but his twenty thousand men were as good as thirty; if Wurmser attempted to oppose him and to shut him up in the gorges, he would cut his way through his army; if he had twenty leagues to go, he would perform that distance in two days, and reach the plain as soon as Wurmser. He would then drive him back, either upon Trieste, or upon the Adige. If he drove him upon Trieste, he would pursue him, and burn that port before his face; if he drove him upon the Adige, he would hem him in between his army and the river, and thus envelope the enemy, who thought to catch him in the narrow passes of the Tyrol.

This young man, whose conceptions and resolutions were quick as lightning itself, ordered Vanbois, on the very day of his arrival at Trent, to proceed to the Lavis, and to take that position from the rear-guard of Davidovich. He made Vanbois execute this order before his face, pointed out to him the position which he was to occupy with his ten thousand men, and then set out with twenty thousand to dash through the gorges of the Brenta.

He set out on the morning of the 20th (September 6th), and lay that night at Levico. Next morning, the 21st (September 7th), he resumed his march, and arrived before another defile, called the defile of Primolano, where Wurmser had placed a division. Bonaparte employed the same manœuvres as before, stationed riflemen upon the heights and upon the bank of the Brenta, and then ordered a column to charge upon the road. The defile was taken. There was a small fort beyond it; this was surrounded and carried. A few intrepid soldiers, running forward along the road, outstripped the fugitives, stopped them, and gave the army time to come up and secure them. Three thousand prisoners were taken. Bonaparte arrived in the evening at Cismona, after marching twenty leagues in two days. He would have advanced further, but the soldiers were unable to proceed; he was himself exhausted with fatigue. He had distanced his head-quarters, and had neither attendants or victuals. He partook of the ammunition-bread of one of the soldiers, and lay down to wait with impatience for the morrow.

This astounding and unexpected march greatly astonished Wurmser. He never imagined how his army could have got into those narrow passes, at the risk of being shut up there; he resolved to avail himself of the position of Bassano which shut them in, and to stop the passage with his entire army. Should he succeed in the attempt, Bonaparte would be taken in the bend of the Brenta. He had already sent the division of Mezaros to survey Verona; but he recalled it, that he might engage here with all his forces; however, it was not likely that the order would arrive in time. The town of Bassano is seated on the left bank of the Brenta. It communicates with the right by a bridge. Wurmser placed the two divisions of Sebottendorff and Quasdanovich on the two banks of the Brenta, in advance of the town. He posted six battalions as an advanced guard in the defiles which precede Bassano and close the valley.

On the morning of the 22nd (September 8th), Bonaparte left Cismona and advanced towards Bassano. Masséna marched on the right bank, Augereau on the left. The defiles were carried, and the French debouched close in front of the enemy's army, drawn up on both banks of the Brenta. Wurmser's soldiers, disconcerted by the extreme boldness of the French, did not defend themselves with the courage which they had shown on so many other occasions; they gave way, were broken, and entered Bassano. Augereau presented himself at the entrance of the town. Masséna, who was on the opposite bank, wanted to force his way by the bridge; he carried it in close column, as he did the bridge of Lodi, and made his entry at the same time with Augereau. Wurmser, whose head-quarters were still there, had scarcely time to save himself, leaving us four thousand prisoners and an immense ordnance. Bonaparte's plan was thus carried into effect; he had debouched into the plain quite as soon as Wurmser, and it was now his business to surround him by driving him back upon the Adige.

Wurmser, in the disorder of so hurried an action, found himself cut off from the remains of Quasdanovich's division. This division had retreated towards the Friule, and he, seeing himself pressed by Masséna's and Augereau's divisions, which closed the road to the Friule against him, and drove him towards the Adige, formed the resolution of forcing a passage across that river and then throwing himself into Mantua. He had been rejoined by the division of Mezaros, which had been making vain efforts to take Verona. He now numbered no more than fourteen thousand men, eight of whom were infantry, and six excellent cavalry. He proceeded along the Adige, seeking a passage every where. Luckily for him, the post which guarded Legnago had been removed to Verona, and a detachment which ought to have come and kept the place had not yet come up. Wurmser, taking advantage of this accident, took possession of Legnago. Certain of being now able to regain Mantua, he gave some rest to his troops, who were spent with fatigue.

Bonaparte followed him closely: he was deeply mortified on learning the negligence that had saved Wurmser; however, he did not despair of still preventing him from reaching Mantua. He transferred Masséna's division to the other bank of the Adige by means of the ferry of Roncо, and despatched it to Sanguinetto, to stop the road to Mantua. He ordered Augereau towards Legnago itself. Masséna's advanced guard outstripping his division, entered Cérea on the 25th (September 11), at the moment when Wurmser was arriving there from Legnago with his entire army. This advanced guard of cavalry and light infantry, commanded by generals Murat and Pigeon, made the most heroic defence, but was completely overthrown: Wurmser forced his way through it, and continued his march. Bonaparte arrived alone at a gallop, at the moment of this action: he narrowly escaped being taken, and rode off in the utmost haste.

Wurmser passed through Sanguinetto; then learning that all the bridges over the Molinella were broken down excepting that of Villimpenta, he proceeded downwards to that bridge, crossed the Molenilla, and marched to Mantua. General Charton attempting to oppose him with three hun-

dred men formed in a square, these brave fellows were all either sabred or taken. Thus Wurmser arrived at Mantua on the 27th (September 13). These slight advantages afforded some alleviation to the disasters of the old and brave marshal. He distributed his army over the environs of Mantua, and for a moment kept the field, owing to his numerous and excellent cavalry.

Bonaparte came up out of breath, and enraged against the negligent officers who had caused him to lose so glorious a prey. Augereau had again got into Legnago, and had made the Austrian garrison, sixteen hundred strong, prisoners. Bonaparte ordered Augereau to proceed to Governolo on the Lower Mincio. He then fought some minor engagements with Wurmser, to draw him out of the place, and in the night between the 28th and 29th (September 14 and 15) he took up a position in the rear, in order to induce Wurmser to show himself in the plain. The old general, allured by his slight successes, actually deployed outside Mantua, between the citadel and the suburb of Saint-George. Bonaparte attacked him on the third complementary day, year IV. (September 19, 1796.) Augereau, coming from Governolo, formed the left; Masséna, starting from Due-Castelli, formed the centre; and Sahuguet, with the blockading corps, formed the right. Wurmser still had twenty-one thousand men in line. He was forced back every where, and driven into the fortifications with the loss of two thousand men. Some days afterwards he was completely enclosed in Mantua. The numerous cavalry which he had brought back were of no service to him whatever, and only increased the number of unprofitable mouths; he therefore ordered the horses to be killed and salted. He had twenty odd thousand men in garrison, several thousand of whom were in the hospitals.

Thus, although Bonaparte had partly lost the fruit of his daring march to the Brenta, and had not made the marshal lay down his arms, he had entirely ruined and dispersed his army. Some thousand men were driven back into the Tyrol under Davidovich; and some thousand were fleeing into the Friule under Quasdanovich, Wurmser, with twelve or fourteen thousand, had confined himself in Mantua. Thirteen or fourteen thousand were prisoners, six or seven thousand killed or wounded. Thus this army had been losing about twenty thousand men, besides ordnance stores to a large amount, in ten days. Bonaparte had lost seven or eight thousand, fifteen hundred of whom were prisoners, and the rest killed, wounded, or sick. Thus to the armies of Colli and Beaulieu, destroyed on entering Italy, was to be added that of Wurmser, destroyed on two occasions, first in the plains of Castiglione, and next on the banks of the Brenta. To the trophies of Montenotte, Lodi, Borghetto, Lonato, and Castiglione, were to be added those of Roveredo, Bassano, and Saint-George. At what period of history had ever such great results been seen, so many enemies slain, so many prisoners, colours, and cannon taken! The intelligence of these victories caused fresh rejoicings in Lombardy, and terror in the more remote parts of the peninsula. France was lost in admiration of the commander of the army of Italy.

Our arms were not so prosperous upon the other theatres of war. Moreau had advanced upon the Lech, as we have seen, in the hope that his progress in Bavaria would bring back the archduke and extricate Jourdan. This expectation was not well founded; for the archduke would have formed but a poor opinion of the importance of his movement, had he been diverted from its execution merely to return to Moreau. The whole campaign depended on what was about to take place on the Maine. Assuming that Jourdan were beaten and driven back upon the Rhine, the progress of Moreau would only involve him still further, and expose him to the risk of losing his line of retreat. The archduke therefore contented himself with despatching general Nauendorf, with ten regiments of cavalry and some battalions, to reinforce Latour, and continued his pursuit of the army of the Sambre and Meuse.

That brave army retired with the deepest regret, and without any abatement of its self-respect. It was this army that had performed the greatest and the most splendid exploits during the first years of the revolution; this was the army that had conquered at Watignies, at Fleurus, and on the banks of the Ourthe and the Roer. It had a warm esteem for its general, and a strong confidence in itself. This retreat had not discouraged it, and it was persuaded that it yielded solely to superior combinations and to the mass of the hostile forces. It desired and looked for an occasion for measuring its strength with the Austrians, and re-establishing the honour of its flag. Jourdan desired it also. The directory wrote to him that he must at any rate maintain his ground in Franconia on the Upper Maine, in order to take up his winter-quarters in Germany, and more particularly not to expose Moreau, who had advanced to the very gates of Munich. Moreau, on his part, had just then informed Jourdan, by a despatch dated the 8th Fructidor (August 25), of his march beyond the Lech, the advantages he had gained there, and the plan he designed of advancing still further, with a view to bring back the archduke. All these reasons induced Jourdan to try the fortune of arms, though he had before him a very superior force. He would have considered it dishonourable to himself had he quitted Franconia without fighting, and deserted his colleague in Bavaria. Besides, being misled by the movement of general Nauendorf, Jourdan imagined that the archduke had recently set out to regain the banks of the Danube. He halted, therefore, at Wurtzburg, a place he deemed it important to preserve, but of which the French had retained no more than the citadel. He there gave some rest to his troops, made some alterations in the arrangement and command of his divisions, and declared his intention to fight. The army displayed the greatest ardour in carrying all the positions that Jourdan deemed it necessary to occupy before he gave battle. He had his right supported by Wurtzburg, and the rest of his line by a series of positions extending along the Maine to Schweinfurth. The Maine separated him from the enemy. No more than one part of the Austrian army had crossed that river, and it was this that confirmed him in the idea that the archduke had gone back to the Danube. He left at the extremity of his line Lefebvre's division at Schweinfurth, to secure his retreat upon the Saale and the Fulda, in case the

result of the battle should deprive him of the road to Frankfort. He thus denied himself the advantage of a second line, and of a *corps de réserve;* but he conceived that he ought to submit to this privation as a means of securing his retreat. He settled upon making the attack on the morning of the 17th Fructidor (September 3rd).

In the night between the 16th and 17th, the archduke, apprised of the plan of his adversary, rapidly conveyed the remainder of his army across the Maine, and displayed before Jourdan's eyes a very superior force. The battle commenced at first very favourably on our side; but our cavalry being fiercely attacked in the plains extending along the Maine by the powerful cavalry of the Austrians, was broken, rallied, was again broken, and were sheltered behind the lines and the steady fire of our infantry. Jourdan, if his reserve had not been at too great a distance from him, might have won the victory; he despatched to Lefebvre officers who could not make their way through the numerous squadrons of the enemy. He hoped, nevertheless, that Lefebvre, seeing that Schweinfurth was not exposed, would march to the place of danger; but he waited in vain, and made his army fall back, in order to withdraw it from the formidable cavalry of the enemy. The retreat was made in good order to Armstein. Jourdan, the victim of the faulty plan of the directory and of his attachment to his colleague, had now to retreat to the Lahn. He continued his march without intermission, ordered Marceau to retire from before Mentz, and arrived behind the Lahn on the 24th Fructidor (September 10th). His army in this arduous march to the very frontiers of Bohemia, had not lost more than five or six thousand men. It sustained a sensible loss in the death of young Marceau, who received a musket-shot from a Tyrolese rifleman, and who could not be carried off from the field of battle. The archduke Charles caused every attention to be paid to him, but he soon expired. The young hero, regretted by the two armies, was buried under a discharge of the artillery of both armies.

During these occurrences on the Maine, Moreau, still beyond the Danube and the Lech, was waiting with impatience for news from Jourdan. None of the officers sent to bring him intelligence had arrived. He proceeded in great uncertainty without venturing to take any decisive step. In the interval his left, under the command of Desaix, had to sustain a most violent attack from the cavalry of Latour, which, united with Nauendorf's, debouched unawares by Langenbruck. Desaix made such judicious and such prompt arrangements, that he repulsed the numerous squadrons of the enemy, and dispersed them in the plains, after inflicting upon them a considerable loss. Moreau, still left in uncertainty, at length decided, after a delay of about three weeks, to attempt a movement in order to discover where the enemy lay. He resolved to approach the Danube, in order to extend his left wing to Nuremberg, and get some intelligence of Jourdan, or else to relieve him. On the 24th Fructidor, he directed his left and his centre to recross the Danube, and left his right by itself on the other side of the river near Zell. The left, under Desaix, advanced as far as Aichstett. In this singular situation, he extended his left towards Jourdan, who at the moment was sixty leagues distant from him; he had his centre on the Danube, and his right beyond that, exposing one of those three divisions to the risk of being destroyed, assuming that Latour had known how to take advantage of their separation. All military men have censured Moreau for this movement, as one of those half measures which have all the danger of great measures, without compensating by their advantages. Moreau, having in fact missed the opportunity of turning short round upon the archduke at the time the latter was turning round upon Jourdan, could not but jeopardize himself by thus placing himself *à cheval* upon the Danube.

At length, after four days' suspense in this singular situation, he became aware of the danger, moved back beyond the Danube, and thought of ascending its course in order to bring himself nearer to the point on which his operation was to be supported. He then received intelligence of the forced retreat of Jourdan on the Lahn; and he had no doubt that the archduke, after forcing back the army of the Sambre and Meuse, would fly to the Neckar, to cut off the retreat of the army of the Rhine. He was likewise informed of an attempt made by the garrison of Manheim upon Kehl, with a view to destroy the bridge by which the French army had debouched into Germany. In this state of things, he no longer hesitated to put himself in marching order for the purpose of regaining France. His position was perilous. Engaged in the heart of Bavaria, having to cross the Black Mountains in his return to the Rhine, having in front Latour with forty thousand men, and exposed to falling in with the archduke Charles with thirty thousand on his rear, he could not help foreseeing incalculable dangers. But if he was deficient in that comprehensive and ardent genius which his rival displayed in Italy, his was a well-regulated mind, and not open to that confusion of ideas with which more animated dispositions are sometimes seized. He had the command of a superb army sixty odd thousand strong, whose self-esteem had not been shaken by any defeat, and which placed extreme confidence in its leader. Appreciating such a resource, he did not alarm himself on account of his position, and resolved quietly to regain his route. Thinking that the archduke, after forcing Jourdan to fall back, would probably return to the Neckar, he was apprehensive lest he should find that river already occupied; he therefore went up along the valley of the Danube, to proceed direct to that of the Rhine by way of the forest towns. These passes being the most remote from the point where the archduke then was, appeared to him to be the safest.

He remained therefore beyond the Danube, and ascended it quietly, supporting one of his wings upon the river. His artillery and his baggage marched before him without confusion; and every day his rear-guard bravely repulsed the enemy's advanced guards. Latour, instead of crossing the Danube, and striving to prevent Moreau from entering the defiles, was content to follow him step by step, but did not venture to make any attempt on his army. On reaching the lake of *Pédemée*, Moreau thought fit to halt. Latour had divided his forces into three divisions; he had given one to Nauendorf, and sent him to Tubingen on the Upper

Neckar, through which Moreau did not want to pass; he was himself with the second at Biberach; and the third was a long way off at Schussenried. Moreau, who was approaching the Hollenthal (Val-d'Enfer), by which he intended to retreat, and who had no desire to be too closely pressed in passing through that defile, who saw Latour before him separated, and who was aware that a victory would certainly impart confidence to his troops during the rest of the retreat, halted on the 11th Vendémiaire, year V (October 2, 1796), in the environs of the lake of Fédersée, not far from Biberach. The country was mountainous, wooded, and intersected by valleys. Latour had drawn his troops on several heights, which could be detached and got at by their rear; and had, moreover, a deep ravine at their back, namely, the Riss. Moreau attacked him at all points, and, cleverly contriving to penetrate through his positions, attacked some in front, and, getting at the rear of others, drove him back to the Riss, threw him into it, and took from him four thousand prisoners. This important victory, taking its name from the town of Biberach, drove back Latour to a great distance, and remarkably increased the confidence of the French army. Moreau resumed his march and approached the defiles. He had already got beyond the roads which run through the valley of the Neckar and lead into the valley of the Rhine. There yet was left for him that road which, passing through Tuttlingen and Rothveil towards the very sources of the Neckar, follows the valley of the Kintzig, and terminates at Kehl; but this Nauendorf had already occupied. The detachments which had come from Manheim had already joined the latter, and the archduke was approaching him. Moreau preferred to ascend a little higher, and to pass through the Hollenthal, which, running through the Black Forest, formed a longer elbow, but led to Breisach, a still greater distance from the archduke. Accordingly, he placed Desaix and Ferino, with the left and the right, towards Tuttlingen and Rothweil, to cover himself on the side next to the outlets where the principal Austrian forces were; and he despatched the centre, under Saint-Cyr, to force the Hollenthal. At the same time, he made his heavy artillery file off for Huningen by way of the forest towns. The Austrians had surrounded him with a multitude of petty divisions, as if they had hoped to surround him, and were not in any one place in a condition to make way against him. Saint-Cyr found scarcely a detachment in the Hollenthal, proceeded without difficulty to Neustadt, and arrived at Freiburg. The two wings immediately followed, and debouched through that frightful defile into the valley of the Rhine, rather exhibiting the appearance of a victorious army than a retreat. Moreau reached the valley of the Rhine on the 21st Vendémiaire (October 12). Instead of recrossing the Rhine at the bridge of Breisach, and ascending along the French bank to Strasburg, he resolved to ascend the right bank to Kehl in the face of the whole hostile army. Whether he was desirous of making a better appearance on his return, or whether it were that he hoped to maintain himself on the right bank, and to cover Kehl by proceeding directly thither, these reasons have been deemed insufficient for risking a battle. By crossing the Rhine at Breisach, on his return he could have gone up without opposition to Strasburg, and then debouched again by Kehl. That *tête de pont* could hold out long enough to give him time to come up. To determine, on the contrary, to march in face of the hostile army, the whole of which was again collected together under the archduke, and thus to expose himself to a general battle, with the Rhine at his back, was an inexcusable oversight, now that he had no longer a motive for either taking the offensive or of covering a retreat. On the 28th Vendémiaire (October 19), both armies were close in front of each other on the banks of the Elz, from Waldkirch to Emmendingen. After a sanguinary and variable conflict, Moreau perceived the impossibility of proceeding to Kehl along the right bank, and resolved to cross over the bridge of Breisach. Nevertheless, considering that he could not pass his whole army over the bridge without the risk of obstruction, and being anxious to send some forces as speedily as possible to Kehl, he ordered Desaix with the left wing to cross again at Breisach, and returned towards Huningen with the centre and the right. This determination has been deemed not less misadvised than that of fighting at Emmendingen; for Moreau, weakened by the separation of one-third of his army, was liable to be endangered. He reckoned, it is true, upon a capital position, that of Schliengen, which covers the debouch of Huningen, and upon which he could halt and fight, in order to render his passage more quiet and safe. Accordingly, he fell back thither, and halted there on the 3rd Brumaire (October 24), and fought an obstinate and drawn battle. Having by this day's fighting afforded time for his baggage to cross, he evacuated the position during the night, passed over to the left bank, and proceeded on his way towards Strasburg.

Thus ended that celebrated campaign, and that still more celebrated retreat. The result sufficiently indicates the imperfection of the plan. If, as Napoleon, the archduke Charles, and general Jomini have demonstrated, the directory, instead of forming two armies, advancing in detached columns, under different generals, with the paltry intention of attacking the enemy's flanks, had formed a single army of one hundred and sixty thousand men,—whereof a detachment fifty thousand strong was to have besieged Mentz, while the other one hundred and ten thousand, consolidated into a single division, should have invaded Germany by the valley of the Rhine, the Hollenthal, and Upper Bavaria,—the imperial armies would have been forced to keep retiring, without being able to bring their collected forces to bear advantageously against a too superior mass. The admirable plan of the young archduke would have been rendered impracticable, and the republican flag would have been carried to Vienna itself. With such a plan as this to go by, Jourdan was a compulsory victim. Thus his campaign, constantly unfortunate, became a matter of self-devotion, quite as much when he first crossed the Rhine to draw the forces of the archduke upon him, as when he advanced into Bohemia and fought at Wurtzburg. Moreau alone, with his fine army, was able to partially repair the imperfection of the plan, either by hastening to crush all that was before him at the moment when he debouched by Kehl, or by

turning short upon the archduke when the latter was following Jourdan. He either dared not, or knew not how to do any thing of the kind; but although he displayed not a spark of genius, and although he preferred a retreat to a decisive and victorious manœuvre, he at least displayed in that retreat a great character and extraordinary resolution. It was certainly not so difficult as it has been represented, but nevertheless it was conducted in the most creditable manner.

The young archduke was indebted to the imperfection of the French plan for a fine conception, which he very ably executed; but, like Moreau, he lacked that ardour and that daring which might have rendered the fault of the French government fatal to its armies. Only conceive what would in all probability have been the case, had there been on either side that impetuous genius which had just destroyed three armies beyond the Alps; if Moreau's sixty thousand men, at the moment when they debouched from Kehl, or if the imperialists, at the moment when they quitted the Danube to turn round upon Jourdan, had been led with the impetuosity displayed in Italy, most assuredly the war would have been terminated at one blow in a disastrous manner for one of the two powers.

This campaign gave the young archduke a high reputation in Europe. In France every one was well satisfied with Moreau, for having brought back safe and sound the army jeopardized in Bavaria. Extreme anxiety had been felt on account of that army, especially from the time when Jourdan having fallen back, the bridge of Kehl being threatened, or a multitude of petty divisions having intercepted the communications through Swabia, nobody knew what had become or what was likely to become of it. But when, after these vivid apprehensions, it was seen debouching into the valley of the Rhine in such excellent condition, they were enraptured with the general who had so happily brought it home. His retreat was extolled as a masterpiece of military science, and immediately associated with the retreat of the ten thousand. No one certainly ventured to bring any thing into comparison with those brilliant triumphs of the army of Italy; but as there are always numbers of persons who take umbrage at superior genius and extraordinary fortune, and are better pleased with mediocre talent, these ranged themselves on Moreau's side, expatiated on his prudence and his consummate ability, and determined themselves in favour of those qualities, rather than the ardent genius of the young Bonaparte. From that day Moreau had in his favour all who prefer second-rate merit to first-rate genius; and it must be confessed that in a republic we would almost forgive those enemies of genius, when we observe in how many respects genius is able to injure that liberty which has called it forth, cherished it, and elevated it to the highest degree of worldly splendour.

CHAPTER V.

THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STATE OF FRANCE AFTER THE RETREAT OF THE ARMIES FROM GERMANY AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR V.—COMBINATIONS OF PITT; OPENING OF A NEGOTIATION WITH THE DIRECTORY; ARRIVAL OF LORD MALMESBURY AT PARIS.—PEACE WITH NAPLES AND WITH GENOA; FRUITLESS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE POPE; THE DUKE OF MODENA DEPOSED; FOUNDATION OF THE CISPADANE REPUBLIC.—THE MISSION OF CLARKE TO VIENNA.—RENEWED EFFORTS OF AUSTRIA IN ITALY; ARRIVAL OF ALVINZY; EXTREME DANGER OF THE FRENCH ARMY; BATTLE OF ARCOLA.

THE turn which the campaign in Germany had taken considerably embarrassed the republic. Her enemies, who persisted in denying her victories, or in predicting severe reverses of fortune, saw their prognostics realized, and openly triumphed in consequence. Those rapid conquests in Germany, said they, had then no solidity. The Danube and the genius of a young prince had soon put an end to them. No doubt, the rash army of Italy, which seemed so firmly established on the Adige, would be torn from it in its turn and flung back upon the Alps, as the armies of Germany had been upon the Rhine. The conquests of general Bonaparte, it is true, seemed to rest upon a somewhat more solid foundation. He had not confined himself to driving Colli and Beaulieu before him; he had destroyed them; he had not contented himself with repelling the new army of Wurmser; he had first thrown it into confusion at Castiglione, and subsequently annihilated it on the Brenta. There was somewhat more hope, therefore, of remaining in Italy than of remaining in Germany; but every one indulged himself in circulating alarming rumours. Numerous forces were on their road, it was said, from Poland and Turkey, to proceed towards the Alps; the imperial armies of the Rhine would now be able to make fresh detachments; and general Bonaparte, having continually new enemies to fight, would, with all his cleverness, have an end put to his successes, setting the exhaustion of his army out of the question. It was natural that in the present state of things such conjectures should be made; for imagination, after enlarging upon successes, will in its turn be unreasonably alarmed at reverses.

The armies of Germany had made good their retreat without any great losses, and occupied the line of the Rhine. There was no great misfortune in this, but the army of Italy was without support, and that was a serious inconvenience. Moreover, our two principal armies, having returned to the French territory, would now have to be maintained out of our finances, which were still in a deplorable state; and this was the worst of all. The *mandats*, no longer possessing a forced currency as money, had fallen to nothing; besides, they had been spent, and there were scarcely any remaining at the disposal of the government. At Paris they had got

into the hands of a few speculators, who sold them to the purchasers of national domains. The arrear of the national debt due was still considerable, but it was not paid off; the arrears of taxes, and the forced loan, were slowly collected; the national domains contracted for were only partially paid for; the instalments still due were not demandable according to law; the contracts for sales that were still taking place were not sufficiently numerous to furnish the treasury. Besides all this, the government lived upon these sale contracts, as well as upon the articles of consumption proceeding from the land-tax, and the promises of payment made by the ministers. The budget of the year V. had just been made up, classed into ordinary and extraordinary expenses. The ordinary expenses amounted to four hundred and fifty millions, the others to five hundred and fifty. The land-tax, the customs, the stamp-duties, and the whole annual proceeds, were expected to answer the ordinary expenditure. The five hundred and fifty millions of the extraordinary would be amply covered by the arrears of the taxes of the year IV. and of the forced loan, and by the instalments yet to be paid for the national property previously sold. The government could also resort to the national property in the hands of the republic unsold; but all this had first to be turned into money, and in this the difficulty always consisted. The contractors, remaining unpaid, refused to continue their advances, and all the public services were suddenly left destitute. The public officials and the annuitants were not paid, and were dying of want.

Thus the insulated state of the army of Italy, and our finances, might afford considerable expectations to our enemies. The plan formed by the directory of a quadruple alliance between France, Spain, the Porte, and Venice, produced nothing but the alliance with Spain. The latter, induced by our offers, and our brilliant fortune in the middle of the summer, had decided, as we have observed, upon renewing the *Family Compact* * with the republic, and she had just published her declaration of war against Great Britain. Venice, in spite of the solicitations of Spain, and the invitations of the Porte, and in spite of Bonaparte's victories in Italy, had refused to ally herself with the republic. It had in vain been represented to her that Russia grudged her her colonies in Greece, and Austria her Illyrian provinces; that her alliance with France and the Porte, who coveted none of her possessions, would secure her against these two ambitious enemies; that the repeated victories of the French on the Adige must secure her from the return of the Austrian armies, as well as the vengeance of the emperor; that the concurrence of her forces, and of her navy, would render that return still more impossible; that neutrality, on the other hand, would not give her any friend, but leave her without protector, and perhaps even expose her to the danger of serving as a medium of accommodation between the belligerent powers. Venice, who deeply hated the French, was providing armaments evidently intended against them, since she consulted the Austrian ministry on the choice of a general, and refused a second time the alliance proposed to her. She clearly perceived the danger from Austrian ambition; but the danger of French principles was greater, more urgent, in her estimation, and she replied that she should persist in the unarmed neutrality, which was an act of dissimulation; for she was arming on all sides. The Porte, shocked by the refusal of Venice, and by the suggestions of Vienna and of England, had not yet acceded to the project of alliance. There therefore remained only France and Spain, whose alliance might certainly assist in wresting the Mediterranean from the English, but might also jeopardize the Spanish colonies. Pitt had, in fact, been considering how he could make them revolt against the mother country, and had already been intriguing in Mexico. The negotiations with Genoa were not concluded; for they were settling with her all at one time, the payment of a sum of money, the expulsion of certain families, and the recall of certain others; they were not more so with Naples, because the directory demanded a contribution; and the queen, who negotiated as a last resource, refused to comply. Peace was not made with Rome, on account of a condition required by the directory; it wanted the holy see to revoke all the pastoral letters *(brefs)* issued against France since the commencement of the revolution, which severely hurt the pride of the aged pontiff. He summoned a council of cardinals, which decided that no such revocation could take place. The negotiations were broken off. They were renewed at Florence; and a congress was opened. The envoys of the Pope having replied on their part that the condition was a *sine quâ non*, they separated after a few minutes' interview. The Pope was the more positive in his refusal, inasmuch as he relied upon assistance from the king of Naples, and from England. He had just sent Cardinal Albani to Vienna, to implore the aid of Austria, and to confer with her on his defending himself against the French.

Such were the relations of France with Europe. Her enemies, on their part, were much exhausted. Austria felt more confidence, it is true, by the retreat of our armies which had advanced to the Danube; but she was very uneasy respecting Italy, and was making fresh preparations to recover it. England was reduced to a sad state: her situation in Corsica was precarious, and she saw herself exposed, in all probability, to the loss of that island. The French were for closing all the ports of Italy against her, and one more victory gained by general Bonaparte was all that was wanting to insure her entire expulsion from that country. War with Spain was about to close the Mediterranean against her, and to threaten Portugal. The whole coast, as far as the Texel, was closed against England. The expedition that Hoche was preparing in Brittany caused great anxiety in respect of Ireland; her finances were in disorder, the bank was shaken, and the people wanted peace; the opposi-

* This was the name of a treaty conceived by the duke de Choiseul, who was at the head of the French ministry in 1761, and was negotiated by him with the court of Madrid for the purpose of cementing an alliance and perpetual union among the different branches of the house of Bourbon, for the purpose of counterbalancing the maritime power of England, which has always given the French uneasiness. See Koch's Revolutions of Europe, in the series of the Popular Library, p. 147. *Trans.*

tion had been made stronger by the recent elections. These were quite sufficient reasons for thinking of peace, and for taking advantage of the late reverses of France to induce her to accept it. But the royal family and the aristocracy felt a great repugnance to treat with France, because according to their notions it was holding terms with the revolution. Pitt, much less attached to aristocratic principles, and intent solely on the interests of the English power, would certainly have been glad of peace, but on one condition, indispensable with him, but to which the republic could never assent—the restitution of the Netherlands to Austria. Pitt, as we have already remarked, was English all over in pride, ambition, and prejudices. The greatest crime of the revolution was, according to his notions, not so much the giving birth to a colossal republic, as the annexation of the Netherlands to France.

The Netherlands were, in fact, an important acquisition for France. That acquisition gave her, in the first place, the possession of the most fertile and wealthy provinces of the continent, and, above all, of manufacturing provinces; it gave her the mouths of the rivers most important to the commerce of the North, the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Rhine; it gave her a considerable increase of coast, and consequently of shipping; it afforded her seaports of great importance, especially Antwerp; and lastly, an extension of our maritime frontier in a quarter the most dangerous to the English frontier, opposite to the defenceless coast of Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk, and Yorkshire. Besides this positive acquisition, the Netherlands conferred on us another advantage; Holland must fall under the immediate influence of France, when no longer separated from her by Austrian provinces. In this case, the French line would extend not only to Antwerp but to the Texel, and the English coast would be environed by a cincture of hostile shores. Add to this a family compact with Spain, then become powerful and well-organized, and we shall easily conceive that Pitt must have felt some uneasiness respecting the maritime power of England. It is, in fact, a principle with every Englishman well brought up in his national ideas, that England ought to bear sway at Naples, Lisbon, and Amsterdam, in order to have a footing on the continent, and to break the long line of coast that may be opposed to her. This principle was as deep-rooted in 1796, as that which caused any injury done to France to be considered as a benefit done to England. In consequence, Pitt, in order to recruit his finances for a moment, would gladly have consented to a temporary peace, but on the condition that the Netherlands should be restored to Austria. He thought, therefore, of opening a negotiation on this basis. He could hardly expect that France would admit such a condition; for the Netherlands were the principal acquisition of the revolution, and the constitution did not even allow the directory to treat for their alienation. But Pitt knew little about the continent. He sincerely believed that France was ruined, and he spoke as he believed the fact to be, when he came regularly every year and proclaimed the exhaustion and the fall of our republic. He thought that if France had ever been disposed to peace, it was at that very moment, whether it were on account of the fall of the mandats, or on account of the retreat of the armies from Germany. At any rate, whether he considered the condition admissible or not, he had a stronger reason for opening a negotiation. This was the necessity of complying with the public opinion, which loudly demanded peace. In fact, before he could obtain the levy of sixty thousand militia and fifteen thousand seamen, he had to show by some striking proof, that he had done his utmost to make a treaty. He had another object in view not less important. In taking the initiative, and opening a solemn negotiation in Paris, he had the advantage of drawing the discussion of all the European interests into one focus, and preventing the opening of any separate negotiation with Austria. This latter power cared less to recover the Netherlands than England did that they should be restored to her. The Netherlands were in the eyes of Austria a remote province, which was detached from the centre of her empire, exposed to continual invasion from France, and deeply imbued with revolutionary ideas; a province she had several times thought of exchanging for other possessions in Germany or Italy, and which she had kept solely because Prussia had always opposed her aggrandizement in Germany, and because opportunities had not offered allowing her increase of influence in Italy. Pitt thought that a solemn negotiation opened in Paris, on behalf of all the allies, would prevent individual combinations and preoccupy any private arrangement relative to the Netherlands. Lastly, he wanted to have an agent in France who could judge of her from close observation, and to obtain authentic information respecting the expedition preparing at Brest. Such were the reasons which, even without any hope of obtaining peace, decided Pitt to make an overture to the directory. He did not confine himself, as in the preceding year, to an insignificant communication from Wickham to Barthelemy. He demanded passports for an envoy invested with the powers of Great Britain. In this public mode of proceeding, adopted by our most implacable foe, there was something glorious for the republic. The English aristocrats were thus reduced to sue for peace at the hands of the regicide republic. The passports were immediately granted. Pitt selected lord Malmesbury, formerly Sir [James] Harris, and son of the author of "Hermes." This personage had not the character of being partial to republics; he had contributed to the oppression of Holland in 1787. He arrived in Paris, with a numerous suite, on the 2nd Brumaire (October 23, 1796).

The directory caused itself to be represented by the minister Delacroix. The two plenipotentiaries met at the foreign office the 3rd Brumaire, year v. (October 24, 1796.) The minister of France exhibited his powers. Lord Malmesbury declared himself to be sent by Great Britain and her allies, in order to treat for a general peace. He then exhibited his powers, which were signed by England alone. The French minister then asked if he was empowered by the allies of Great Britain to treat in their name. Lord Malmesbury replied, that as soon as the negotiation was opened, and the principle on which it could be based was admitted, the king of Great Britain was confident of obtaining the concurrence and the powers of his

allies. His lordship then delivered to Delacroix a note from his court, stating the principle upon which the negotiation was to be based. This principle was that of mutual indemnity in respect of conquests between the powers. England, so said this note, had made conquests in the colonies; France had made conquests on the continent from the allies of England; there was therefore matter of restitution on both sides. But the principle of these compensations must first be defined, before entering into explanations concerning the subjects of mutual indemnity. We observe that the English cabinet forbore to explain itself positively concerning the restitution of the Netherlands, and enunciated a general principle, in order that the negotiation should not be broken off as soon as it was opened. The minister Delacroix replied, that he would go and confer with the directory.

The directory could not give up the Netherlands. In fact it had no authority conferred upon it so to do; if it had been authorized, it ought not to have complied. France had engagements of honour in regard to those provinces, and could not expose them to the vengeance of Austria by restoring them to her. Besides, she had a right to indemnities for the unjust war that had been made upon her; she had a right to compensation for the aggrandizements which Austria, Prussia, and Russia had gained in Poland by the consequences of an immoral act; lastly, her tendencies should be directed towards obtaining her natural extent of territory; and for all these reasons, she ought never to part with the Netherlands, but uphold the arrangements of the constitution. The directory, firmly resolved to perform its duty on this point, had it in its power to break off immediately a negotiation, the evident aim of which was to propose to us the cession of the Netherlands, and to prevent an arrangement with Austria; but thus it would have afforded a pretence for saying that it did not desire peace; it would have satisfied one of the principal intentions of Pitt, and have furnished him with excellent reasons for demanding fresh sacrifices of the English nation. The directory replied the very next day. France, it stated, had already treated separately with most of the powers of the coalition, without their having called for the concurrence of all the allies; to render the negotiation general, was to render it interminable; it was giving room to believe that the present negotiation was not more sincere than the overture made in the preceding year through the medium of Mr. Wickham. Besides, the English minister had not the powers of the allies, whose name he used. Lastly, the principle of mutual indemnity was enunciated in a manner too general and too vague for it to be possible either to admit or to reject it. The application of this principle always depended on the nature of the conquests, and on the strength left to the belligerent powers for retaining them. "Thus," added the directory, "the French government might well spare itself the trouble of replying; but to prove its desire of peace, it declares that it will be ready to listen to all the propositions so soon as lord Malmesbury shall be furnished with the powers of all the other potentates in whose name he alleges he is to treat."

The directory, who in this negotiation had nothing to conceal, and could therefore act with the greatest frankness, resolved to make the negotiation public, and to insert in the newspapers the notes of the English minister and the replies of the French minister. Accordingly it published immediately the memorial of lord Malmesbury, and the answer which he had returned. This mode of proceeding was of such a nature as somewhat to disconcert the tortuous policy of the English cabinet; but it did not depart from the ordinary course of politeness, although it deviated from established forms. Malmesbury replied, that he should refer the matter to his government. A singular plenipotentiary this, who had none other than such insufficient powers, and who at every difficulty was obliged to refer to his court! The directory might have looked upon this as a trick, and as showing an intention to unduly protract, by assuming the air of negotiating; it might even have expressed displeasure at the presence of a foreigner, whose intrigues might be dangerous, and who came to discover the secret of our armaments. However, the directory manifested no dissatisfaction; it permitted lord Malmesbury to wait for the answers of his court, and, while thus waiting, to make his observations upon Paris, the parties, their strength, and that of the government. The directory indeed would rather gain by so doing.

In the mean time our situation was becoming perilous in Italy, notwithstanding the recent triumphs of Roveredo, Bassano, and Saint-George. Austria redoubled her efforts to recover Lombardy. In consequence of the guarantees given by Catharine to the emperor for the security of Galicia, the troops which were in Poland had been marched towards the Alps. Owing also to the hope of maintaining peace with the Porte, the frontiers of Turkey had been stripped, and all the reserves of the Austrian monarchy directed towards Italy. A numerous and devoted population furnished, moreover, powerful means of recruiting the armies. The Austrian administration displayed extraordinary zeal and activity in enlisting fresh men, incorporating them with the old troops, and in arming and fitting them out. A fine army was thus preparing in the Friule, with the wrecks of Wurmser, the troops from Poland and Turkey, the detachments from the Rhine, and the recruits. Marshal Alvinzy was appointed to the command of it. It was hoped that this third army would be more fortunate than the two preceding, and that it would succeed in wresting Italy from the young conqueror.

In this interval, Bonaparte was perpetually demanding reinforcements, and advising negotiations with the Italian powers who were in his rear. He urged the directory to treat with Naples, to renew the negotiations with Rome, to conclude with Genoa, and to negotiate an alliance offensive and defensive with the king of Piedmont, in order to obtain assistance in Italy if none could be sent to him from France. He desired to be permitted to proclaim the independence of Lombardy, and that of the states of the duke of Modena, that he might gain himself partisans and auxiliaries strongly attached to his cause. His views were correct, and the distress of his army justified his urgent entreaties. The rupture of the negotiations with the Pope had stopped a second time the contributions

levied by the armistice of Bologna. No more than one payment of it had been made. The contributions levied upon Parma, Modena, and Milan were exhausted either by the expenses of the army or by the remittances made to the government. Venice was regular in her supply of provisions, but the pay was in arrear. The amounts to be taken from foreign commerce at Leghorn were still in dispute. Amidst the richest countries in the world, the army began to experience privations. But the greatest misfortune was the void in its ranks, thinned by the Austrian cannon. It was not without sustaining great losses that it had destroyed so many enemies. It had been recruited by nine or ten thousand men since the opening of the campaign, which made the number of the French who had entered Italy amount to nearly about fifty thousand; but at this moment it had at most thirty and some odd thousand; fighting and disease had reduced it to this small number. A dozen battalions from La Vendée had just joined, but they were singularly diminished by desertions; the other promised detachments had not arrived. General Willot, who commanded in the south, and who was ordered to send several regiments to the Alps, detained them, to quell the disturbances which his mismanagement and his bad spirit excited in the provinces under his command. Kellermann could not take from his line of troops, for he was still obliged to hold himself in readiness to keep Lyons and its environs in order, where the companies of Jesus were committing murders. Bonaparte asked for the 83rd and the 40th brigades, forming nearly six thousand good troops, and undertook to answer for the result if they should arrive in time.

He complained that he had not been directed to negotiate with Rome, because he should have waited, before signifying his ultimatum, for payment of the contribution. "So long," said he, "as your general shall not be the centre of every thing in Italy, all will go wrong. It would be easy to accuse me of ambition, but the fact is, I am laden with too much honour. I am ill; I can scarcely sit my horse; nothing is left me but courage, and that is insufficient for the post I occupy. They can count us," added he; "the charm of our strength is fast disappearing. Send troops, or Italy is lost!"

The directory, feeling the necessity of depriving Rome of the support of Naples, and of strengthening Bonaparte's rear, at length concluded its treaty with the court of the two Sicilies. It forbore from making any particular demand; and for its own part, that court which our recent victories on the Brenta had intimidated, which saw Spain making common cause with France and was afraid of seeing the English driven from the Mediterranean, acceded to the treaty. Peace was signed on the 19th Vendémiaire (October 10). It was agreed that the king of Naples should withhold every kind of relief from the enemies of France, and that he should shut his ports against the armed vessels of the belligerent powers. The directory then concluded its treaty with Genoa. A particular circumstance led to its conclusion. Nelson had taken a French ship within sight of the Genoese batteries. This violation of the neutrality deeply compromised the republic of Genoa; the French party there became bolder, the party of the coalition more timid; and it was resolved to enter into an alliance with France. The ports of Genoa were closed against the English. Two millions were paid to us as an indemnity for the *Modeste* frigate, and two more were furnished by way of loan. The feudatory families were not exiled; but all the partisans of France formerly expelled from the territory and from the senate were recalled and reinstated. Piedmont was anew solicited to conclude an alliance, offensive and defensive. The king was just dead; his young successor, Charles Emanuel, manifested very favourable inclinations towards France, but he was not content with the advantages offered to him as the price of his alliance. The directory offered to guaranty his dominions, which in that general convulsion, and amidst all the republics that were ready to start up, no other power could guaranty to him. But the new king, like his predecessor, wanted to have Lombardy given to him; this the directory could not promise, having to settle the question of mutual indemnities in order to treat with Austria. The directory then allowed Bonaparte to renew the negotiations with Rome, and gave him full powers for that purpose.

Rome had sent Cardinal Albani to Vienna. She had reckoned upon Naples, and in her excessive eagerness had offended the Spanish legation. Naples failing her, and Spain manifesting her dissatisfaction, she became alarmed, and the moment was favourable for renewing the previous intercourse with her. Bonaparte, in the first place, wanted his money; in the next, though he was not afraid of her temporal power, he dreaded her moral influence over the people. The two Italian parties engendered by the French revolution, and developed by the presence of our armies, became daily more and more exasperated against one another. If Milan, Modena, Reggio, Bologna, Ferrara, were the seat of the patriotic party, Rome was the seat of the monastic and aristocratic party. She had it in her power to excite fanatic fury, and to do us great mischief, especially at a moment when the question with the Austrian armies was not yet resolved. Bonaparte deemed it right to temporize a little longer. As a man of a free and independent mind, he despised all the fanaticisms that clog the human understanding; but as a man of action, he dreaded those powers which are out of the reach of personal constraint, and he chose rather to elude than to combat with them. Besides, though educated in France, he was born amidst Italian superstition. He did not identify himself with that disgust of the Catholic religion, so strong and so common among us at the end of the eighteenth century; and he had not the same repugnance to treat with the holy see as was felt in Paris. He purposed therefore to gain time, to spare himself a retrograde march through the peninsula, to spare himself fanatical denunciations, and, if possible, to regain the sixteen millions carried back to Rome. He directed Cacault the minister to disavow the demands made by the directory in regard to matters of faith, and not to insist on any other than purely material conditions. He selected cardinal Mattei, whom he had confined in a convent, for the purpose of sending him to Rome; he set him at liberty, and commissioned him to go and speak to the Pope. "The court of Rome," he wrote to him, "wants war, and war it shall

have; but first I owe it to my nation and to humanity to make one last effort to bring back the Pope to reason. You are acquainted with the strength of the army which I command. To destroy the temporal power of the Pope, I need but to will it. Go to Rome, see his holiness, enlighten him as to his true interests; tear him away from the intriguers by whom he is surrounded, who wish for his ruin and for that of the court of Rome. The French government permits me still to listen to words of peace. Every thing may yet be settled. War, so cruel for nations, has terrible results for the vanquished. Divert these great calamities from the Pope. You know how anxious I am to finish by peace a struggle which war would terminate for me without glory as without danger."

While he was employing these means to *entrap*, as he said, *the old fox*, and to screen himself from the fury of fanaticism, he was thinking how to excite the spirit of liberty in Upper Italy, in order to oppose patriotism to superstition. All Upper Italy was in a state of the utmost enthusiastic excitement. The Milanese, which had been violently taken from Austria; and the provinces of Modena and Reggio, impatient of the yoke with which their old absentee duke oppressed them, the Legations of Bologna and Ferrara, withdrawn from the Pope, loudly demanded their independence and their organization into republics. Bonaparte could not proclaim the independence of Lombardy, for victory had not yet positively decided its fate; but he still held out to it hopes and encouragement. As for the provinces of Modena and Reggio, they lay close at the rear of his army, and bordered on Mantua. He had to complain of the regency, which had afforded a transit for provisions to the garrison; he had recommended to the directory not to give peace to the duke of Modena, but to confine itself to the armistice, that it might be able to punish him on a future occasion. Circumstances daily becoming more complicated, he decided upon a bold stroke, without giving previous notice of it to the directory. It was ascertained that the regency had again been in fault, and that it had violated the armistice by supplying Wurmser with provisions. He immediately declared the armistice broken, and by virtue of the right of conquest he expelled the regency, declared the duke of Modena deposed, and the provinces of Reggio and Modena free. The enthusiasm of the Reggians and the Modenese was extraordinary. Bonaparte ordered a municipal government to administer the country temporarily till it should be constituted. Bologna and Ferrara had already constituted themselves republics, and began to raise troops. Bonaparte resolved to unite those two Legations with the states of the duke of Modena, and to form with them a single republic, which, situated entirely on this side of the Po, should be called *The Cispadane Republic*. He thought that if it were necessary at the peace to restore the Modenese and the Legations to the duke of Modena and the Pope, that there might thus be erected a republic, the daughter and friend of the French republic, which would remain beyond the Alps the focus of French principles, and the asylum of the compromised patriots, whence liberty might some day be diffused over all Italy. He conceived that the enfranchisement of Italy was not to be accomplished by a single blow; he considered the French government as too much exhausted to effect it at that moment, and he thought that it was requisite to sow at least the seeds of liberty in this first campaign. To this end, it was advisable to unite Bologna and Ferrara with Modena and Reggio. Local interests were adverse to this plan; but he hoped to conquer that opposition by his all-powerful influence. He repaired to those cities, was received with enthusiasm, and decided them to send to Modena one hundred deputies from all parts of their territory, to form a national assembly, which should be charged to constitute the Cispadane republic. This assembly met on the 25th Vendémiaire (October 16th) at Modena. It was composed of lawyers, landholders, and merchants. Restrained by the presence of Bonaparte, and directed by his counsels, it displayed the greatest discretion. It voted the consolidation of the two Legations, and of the duchy of Modena into a single republic; it abolished the feudal system, and decreed civil equality; it appointed a commissioner to organize a legion of four thousand men, and ordained the formation of a second assembly, which was to meet on the 5th Nivôse (December 25), to deliberate upon a constitution. The Reggians displayed the greatest zeal. An Austrian detachment having quitted Mantua, they ran to arms, surrounded it, made it prisoner, and conducted it to Bonaparte. Two Reggians were killed in the action, and became the first martyrs of Italian independence.

Lombardy was jealous and alarmed at the favours conferred on the Cispadane republic, and regarded them as a sinister omen for herself. She conceived that, as the French were constituting the Legations and the duchy, without constituting her, they intended to restore her to Austria. Bonaparte again comforted the Lombards, represented to them the difficulties of his situation, and repeated that they must earn their independence by assisting him in this arduous struggle. They resolved to bring the two Italian and Polish legions up to twelve thousand men, the organization of which they had already commenced.

Bonaparte had thus gained over and got round him governments kindly disposed to his cause, and which were about to exert their utmost efforts to support him. Their troops certainly were no great things; but they would serve to act as a police to the conquered country, and in this manner they rendered the detachments which he employed there serviceable. They would be able, if supported by a few hundred French, to resist a first attempt of the Pope, if he were foolish enough to make one. Bonaparte strove at the same time to gain the confidence of the Duke of Parma, whose states bordered on the new republic, whose friendship might be useful, and whose relationship with Spain commanded attention. He held out to him the possibility of gaining a few towns amidst the dismemberment of territories. He thus availed himself of all the resources of politics to supply the deficiency of the forces with which his government could not furnish him; and in this he performed his duty to France and to Italy, and with the tact and address of a veteran diplomatist.

Through his exertions, Corsica had just been emancipated. He had collected the principal re-

fugees at Leghorn, given them arms and officers, and daringly thrown them upon the island, to second the rebellion of the inhabitants against the English. The expedition had been successful, his native country was delivered from the English yoke, and the Mediterranean was soon likely to be the same. There was reason to expect that the Spanish squadrons, united with the squadrons of France, would in future close the Straits of Gibraltar against the English fleet, and have exclusive dominion throughout the whole of the Mediterranean.

He had, therefore, employed the time which had elapsed since the occurrences of the Brenta, in improving his position in Italy; but if he had rather less to fear from the princes of that country, the danger from Austria was getting greater, and his forces were still insufficient to ward off the blow. The 83rd and the 40th demi-brigades were still detained in the south. He had twelve thousand men in the Tyrol under Vaubois, drawn up in front of Trent, on the bank of the Lavis; about sixteen or seventeen thousand, under Masséna and Augereau, on the Brenta and Adige; lastly, eight or nine thousand before Mantua, which made his army amount to about thirty-six or thirty-eight thousand. Davidovich, who had remained in the Tyrol after Wurmser's disaster, with a few thousand men, had now eighteen thousand. Alvinzy was advancing from the Friule upon the Piave, with about forty thousand. Bonaparte was, therefore, in extreme jeopardy; for, to oppose sixty thousand men, he had only thirty-six thousand, worn out by a triple campaign, and daily thinned by the fevers which they contracted in the rice-grounds of Lombardy. He wrote to the directory, under the influence of extreme mortification, and told them that he was on the point of losing Italy.

The directory, seeing the danger Bonaparte was in, and unable to come soon enough to his assistance, thought of suspending hostilities immediately by means of a negotiation. Malmesbury was in Paris, as we have seen. He was waiting for the answer of his government to the communication of the directory, which insisted that he should have the powers of all the governments, and that he should express himself more clearly on the principle of compensation for conquests. The English ministry, after the lapse of nineteen days, at length answered on the 24th Brumaire (November 14th), that the demands of France were unusual; and that it was the usual practice for one ally to apply to treat in the name of her allies before receiving their formal authority for so doing; that England was confident of obtaining such authority, but it was first requisite that France should explain herself distinctly respecting the principle of the mutual indemnification, the only basis upon which the negotiation could be opened. The English cabinet added, that the reply of the directory was full of very indecorous insinuations respecting the intentions of his Britannic majesty, that it was beneath him to answer them, and he should take no notice of them, that he might not impede the negotiation. On the same day, the directory, wishing to be prompt and categorical, replied to lord Malmesbury, that it admitted the principle of mutual indemnification, but that it expected him to state immediately the objects to which that principle was to be applied.

The directory could give this answer without proceeding too far, since, while refusing to cede Belgium and Luxemburg, it could cede Lombardy and some other small territories. Besides all this, the negotiation was evidently illusory; the directory could not expect to derive any benefit from it, and it resolved to frustrate the subtleties of England by sending direct to Vienna a negotiator commissioned to effect a separate arrangement with the emperor. The first proposal which the negotiator had to make was, that of an armistice in Germany and Italy, which was to last at least six months. The Rhine and the Adige were to separate the armies of the two powers. The sieges of Kehl and Mantua were to be suspended. The provisions requisite for the daily consumption were to be sent every day into Mantua, so that at the conclusion of the armistice the two parties might be in the same situation they were formerly. France would thus gain the retention of Kehl, and Austria that of Mantua. A negotiation was to be opened immediately to treat for peace. The conditions offered by France were the following: Austria was to cede Belgium and Luxemburg to France; France was to restore Lombardy to Austria, and the Palatinate to the empire; she would thus on this latter point relinquish the line of the Rhine, she would consent moreover to indemnify Austria for the loss of the Netherlands by the secularization of several bishoprics of the empire. The emperor was not to interfere in any way in the affairs of France with the pope, and she was to employ her influence in Germany to procure indemnities for the Stadtholder. This was an indispensable condition, to insure the quiet of Holland, and to satisfy the king of Prussia, whose sister was the wife of the stadtholder. These conditions were extremely moderate, and proved the desire of the directory to put an end to the horrors of war, and to the alarm which it had felt for the army of Italy.

The directory appointed general Clarke, who was employed in the war-office under Carnot, to be the bearer of these proposals. His instructions were signed on the 26th Brumaire (November 16). But it took time before he could set out, arrive, be received, and heard; and during this interval events succeeded one another in Italy with extraordinary rapidity.

On the 11th Brumaire (November 1) marshal Alvinzy had thrown bridges over the Piave, and advanced upon the Brenta. The plan of the Austrians this time was to attack at once by the mountains of the Tyrol and by the plain. Davidovich was to drive Vaubois from his positions, and to descend along both banks of the Adige to Verona. Alvinzy, on his part, was to cross the Piave and the Brenta, to advance upon the Adige, to enter Verona with the main body of the army, and there form a junction with Davidovich. The two Austrian armies were to start from this point, and to march in concert to raise the blockade of Mantua, and to relieve Wurmser

Alvinzy, after crossing the Piave, advanced upon the Brenta, where Masséna was posted with his division. The latter, having reconnoitred the enemy's force, fell back. Bonaparte marched to his support with Augereau's division. At the same time he directed Vaubois to coop up Davidovich

in the valley of the Upper Adige, and to take from him, if possible, his position on the Lavis. He himself marched against Alvinzy, resolving, in spite of the disproportion of strength, to attack him impetuously, and to break him at the very outset of this new campaign. On the morning of the 16th Brumaire (November 6), he came in sight of the enemy. The Austrians had taken position in advance of the Brenta, from Carmignano to Bassano; their reserves had remained behind the other side of the Brenta. Bonaparte directed his whole force against them. Masséna attacked Liptai and Provera in front of Carmignano; Augereau attacked Quasdanovich before Bassano. The action was hot and bloody; the troops displayed great bravery; Liptai and Provera were driven beyond the Brenta by Masséna; Quasdanovich was thrown back upon Bassano by Augereau. Bonaparte intended to enter Bassano the same day, but was prevented by the arrival of the Austrian reserves. He was obliged to defer the attack till the following day. Unfortunately he received intelligence in the night that Vaubois had just experienced a reverse on the Upper Adige. That general had gallantly attacked the positions of Davidovich, and had at first obtained some advantages; but a panic had seized his troops, notwithstanding their tried bravery, and they had fled in disorder. He had rallied them in the famous defile of Calliano, where the army had deployed so daringly in the invasion of the Tyrol: he hoped to maintain his ground there, when Davidovich sending a corps to the other bank of the Adige, had fallen upon Calliano and turned the position. Vaubois declared that he was retiring, in order to avoid being divided, and he expressed his fear lest Davidovich should get before him to the important positions of La Corona and Rivoli, which cover the road to the Tyrol, between the Adige and the Lake of Garda.

Bonaparte then became aware of the danger of proceeding further against Alvinzy, while Vaubois, who was with his left in the Tyrol, was liable to lose La Corona, Rivoli, and even Verona, and even to be driven back into the plain. Bonaparte would then have been cut off from his principal wing, and placed with fifteen or sixteen thousand men between Davidovich and Alvinzy. He consequently resolved to fall back immediately. He ordered a trusty officer to fly to Verona, to collect there all the troops he could find, to hasten with them to Rivoli and La Corona, in order to anticipate Davidovich, and to give Vaubois time to retire thither.

The next day, the 17th Brumaire (November 7), he marched back, and passed through the city of Vicenza, which was astonished to see the French army retiring, after the success of the preceding day. He proceeded to Verona, where he left his whole army. He repaired alone to Rivoli and La Corona, where, very fortunately, he found Vaubois' troops rallied, and in some measure able to make head against a new attack of Davidovich. He resolved to give a lesson to the 39th and 85th demi-brigades, which had given way to a panic terror. He ordered the whole division to be assembled, and addressing those two demi-brigades, he reproached them for their want of discipline, and their flight. He then said to the head of the staff, "Let it be inscribed on the colours that the 39th and the 85th no longer form part of the army of Italy." These expressions produced the keenest mortification in the soldiers of those two demi-brigades. They surrounded Bonaparte, told him that they had been fighting one against three, and asked to be sent to his advanced guard, to show whether they had ceased to belong to the army of Italy. Bonaparte made them amends for his severity, by a few kind words, which transported them, and left them in a disposition to avenge their honour by desperate bravery.

Vaubois had only eight thousand men left out of the twelve thousand that he commanded before this rash enterprise. Bonaparte distributed them in the best manner that he could, in the positions of La Corona and Rivoli; and after he had made sure that Vaubois could maintain his ground for a few days, and cover our left and our rear, he returned to Verona, to operate against Alvinzy. The causeway leading from the Brenta to Verona, skirting the foot of the mountains, passes through Vicenza, Monte-Bello, Villa-Nova, and Caldiero. Alvinzy, surprised to see Bonaparte fall back the day after he had gained an advantage, had followed him at a distance, doubting whether the progress of Davidovich could alone have induced him to retire. He hoped that his plan of a junction at Verona was about to be realized. He halted about three leagues from Verona, on the heights of Caldiero, which command the road to that city. These heights presented an excellent position for making head against an army leaving Verona. Alvinzy posted himself there, placed batteries, and omitted nothing to render them impregnable. Bonaparte reconnoitred, and resolved to attack them immediately; for the situation of Vaubois at Rivoli was very precarious, and left him not much time to act against Alvinzy. He marched against him on the evening of the 21st (November 11th), repulsed his advanced guard, and bivouacked with Masséna's and Augereau's divisions at the foot of Caldiero. At day-break, he perceived that Alvinzy, deeply intrenched, was ready for battle. The position was assailable on one side, that which abutted upon the mountains, and which had not been defended with sufficient care by Alvinzy. Bonaparte sent Masséna thither, and directed Augereau to attack the rest of the line. The action was brisk. But the rain fell in torrents, which gave a great advantage to the enemy, whose artillery was placed beforehand in good positions, while ours, obliged to move along roads rendered impassable, could not be brought to suitable points, and wholly failed in effect. Masséna nevertheless succeeded in climbing the heights neglected by Alvinzy. But the rain suddenly changed to a cold sleet, which a violent wind blew in the faces of our soldiers. At the same instant Alvinzy ordered his reserve to march to the position which Masséna had taken from him, and recovered all his advantages. In vain did Bonaparte persist in renewing his efforts. They were attended with no better success. The two armies passed the night fronting each other. The rain never ceased falling, and our soldiers were in a miserable plight. On the next day, the 23rd Brumaire (November 15th), Bonaparte returned to Verona.

The situation of the army now became desperate.

After having to no purpose driven the enemy beyond the Brenta, and lost without benefit a great number of brave men; after having lost on the left the Tyrol and four thousand men, after having fought an unsuccessful battle at Caldiero to drive off Alvinzy from Verona, and again weakened him to no purpose, every resource seemed to fail. The left, now consisting of no more than eight thousand men, was liable every moment to be hurled from La Corona and Rivoli, and then Bonaparte would be surrounded at Verona. The two divisions of Masséna and Augereau, which formed the active army opposed to Alvinzy, were reduced by two battles to fourteen or fifteen thousand men. What were fourteen or fifteen thousand men against nearly forty thousand! The artillery, which had always served to counterbalance the superiority of the enemy, could no longer move along through the mud; there was therefore no hope of fighting with any chance of success. The army was in consternation. Those brave soldiers, tried by so many hardships and dangers, began to murmur. Like all intelligent soldiers, they were subject to fits of murmuring, because they were capable of forming a judgment. "After destroying," said they, "two armies which were opposed to us, we are expected, forsooth, to destroy those too which were opposed to the troops of the Rhine. After Beaulieu came Wurmser, after Wurmser comes Alvinzy. The struggle is renewed every day. We cannot do the work of all. We have no business to fight Alvinzy any more than we had to fight Wurmser. If every one had done his duty as well as we have, the war would be at an end. Well and good," they added, "if they had but sent us assistance proportioned to our dangers! but they abandon us in the uttermost parts of Italy; they leave us by ourselves to contend with overwhelming armies. And when, after having shed our blood in thousands of fights, we shall be brought back to the Alps, we shall return without honour and without glory, like runaways who have not done their duty." Such was the language held by the soldiers in their bivouacs. Bonaparte, who shared their ill-temper and their mortification, wrote on the same day, the 24th Brumaire (November 14), to the directory. "All our superior officers, all our best generals, are *hors de combat*. The army of Italy, reduced to a handful of men, is exhausted. The heroes of Millesimo, of Lodi, of Castiglione, and of Bassano, have died for their country, or are in the hospital. All that is now left to the division is their reputation and their pride. Joubert, Lannes, Lamare, Victor, Murat, Charlot, Dupuis, Rampon, Pigeon, Menard, Chabrand, are wounded. We are deserted in the remotest parts of Italy; the few brave fellows who are still left me see death staring them in the face, amidst dangers so unceasing and with such inferior strength. Perhaps the hour of the brave Augereau, of the intrepid Masséna, is near at hand. Then, again, what will become of these brave fellows? This idea makes me melancholy; I no longer dare to face death, which would be a subject of discouragement to any one exposed to my anxieties. If I had received the 83rd, numbering three thousand five hundred men, known to the army, I would have answered for every thing going on well. Perhaps in a few days forty thousand may not be enough! To-day," added Bonaparte, "rest for the troops; to-morrow, according to the movements of the enemy, we shall act."

While he was addressing these bitter complaints to the government, he affected the greatest self-reliance in the presence of his soldiers; he caused it to be repeated to them by his officers that one more effort must be made, and that this effort would be the last; that if Alvinzy were destroyed, the means of Austria would be exhausted for ever, Italy conquered, peace secured, and the glory of the army immortal. His presence and his address to them roused the courage of the men. The sick wasted by fever, on hearing that the army was in danger, left the hospitals in a body, and hastened to take their places in the ranks. The most heartfelt and the deepest emotion was in every heart. The Austrians had that very day got within sight of Verona, and were showing the ladders which they had prepared to scale the walls. The Veronese gave loose to their joy, at the idea of seeing in a few hours Alvinzy joining with Davidovich in their city, and the French destroyed. Some few among them who were compromised on account of their attachment to our cause, walked pensively up and down, counting the small number of our brave fellows.

The army anxiously awaited the orders of the general, and hoped every moment that he would set them in motion to some purpose. The day of the 24th had nevertheless elapsed, and against all usage the order of the day had not intimated any thing. But Bonaparte had not lost time; and after meditating on the field of battle, he made up his mind to adopt one of those resolutions which despair suggests to genius. Towards night, orders were issued for the whole army to get under arms, the strictest silence was recommended; the command to march was given, but instead of moving forward, the army fell back, recrossed the Adige by the bridges of Verona, and left the city by the gate leading to Milan. The army believed they were retreating, and that there was no further intention of keeping possession of Italy; and a general feeling of melancholy prevailed. However, at some distance from Verona, the army turned to the left; instead of continuing to recede from the Adige, it began to proceed along the river, and to follow its downward course. This line of march was followed for four leagues. At length, after a march of some hours, the army arrived at Roncco, where a bridge of boats had been thrown across by direction of the general; the army recrossed the river, and at day-break was on the other side of the Adige, which it had been believed had been quitted for ever. The plan of the general was extraordinary, he was about to surprise both armies. The Adige, on issuing from Verona, ceases for a short distance to run perpendicularly from the mountains to the sea, and bends obliquely towards the east; in this oblique direction it goes near the road from Verona to the Brenta, on which Alvinzy was encamped. Bonaparte, on reaching Roncco, consequently found himself brought back on the flanks, and nearly on the rear of the Austrians. By means of this bridge, he found himself amidst extensive marshes. These marshes were traversed by two causeways, one of which on the left, running along the upward course of the Adige, through Porcal

and Gombione, was continued to Verona; the other on the right, crossed a small stream called the Alpon, at the village of Arcola, and went in the direction of the Verona road near Villa-Nova, in the rear of Caldiero.

Bonaparte therefore kept possession at Ronco of two causeways, both of them communicating with the high road occupied by the Austrians; the one between Caldiero and Verona, the other between Caldiero and Villa-Nova. Now remark the result of his calculations; amidst these marshes numerical advantage was neutralized; there was no deploying but upon the causeways, and on the causeways the courage of the advanced guards of the columns would decide the event. By the causeway on the left, which communicated with the road between Verona and Caldiero, he could fall upon the Austrians if they attempted to scale Verona. By the causeway on the right, which crossed the Alpon at the bridge of Arcola, and terminated at Villa Nova, he might debouch upon the rear of Alvinzy, take his artillery and baggage, and cut off his retreat. He was therefore impregnable at Ronco, and he stretched his two arms around the enemy. He had caused the gates at Verona to be shut, and had left Kilmaine there, with fifteen hundred men, to stand a first assault. This combination, so daring and so profound, struck the army, who immediately comprehended its object, and inspired them with confidence.

Bonaparte stationed Masséna on the dike at the left, so as to go up to Gombione and Porcil, and take the enemy in the rear, if he should march to Verona. He despatched Augereau to the right, to debouch upon Villa-Nova. It was just day-break. Masséna placed himself in observation at the dike on the left; Augereau, before he could advance along the right-hand dike, had to cross the Alpon by the bridge of Arcola. Some battalions of Croatians had been detached thither to watch the country. They were stationed along the river, and had their cannon pointed at the bridge. They received Augereau's advanced guard with a brisk fire of musketry, and made it fall back. Augereau ran up, and brought his troops once more in advance; but the fire from the bridge and the opposite bank again stopped them. He was obliged to give way to this obstacle, and to make a halt.

In the mean time, Alvinzy, who had his eyes fixed upon Verona, and who imagined that the French army was still there, was surprised to hear a very brisk fire amidst the marshes. He never supposed that general Bonaparte could choose such a field, and he imagined that it was a detached regiment of light troops. But his cavalry soon returned to inform him that the action was serious, and that reports of musketry proceeded from all quarters. Without yet being sensible of his situation, he sent off two divisions; one under Provera followed the line of the left-hand dike, the other, under Mitrowski, followed the right-hand dike, and advanced upon Arcola. Masséna, seeing the Austrians approaching, suffered them to advance upon this narrow dike, and when he considered they had advanced too far to retreat, he dashed upon them at a running pace, drove them back, threw them into the marsh, and killed and drowned a great number of them. Mitrowski's division arrived at Arcola, debouched by the bridge, and followed the line of the dike, as Provera's division had done. Augereau rushed upon [illegible] and threw part of it into the marsh. He [illegible] and attempted to cross the bridge after it, but the bridge was still better protected than in the morning. A numerous artillery defended its approaches, and the entire remnant of the Austrian line was deployed on the bank of the Alpon, firing on the dike, and firing on it from one side to the other. Augereau seized a flag, and carried it upon the bridge; his soldiers followed, but a tremendous fire drove them back. Generals Lannes, Verne, Bon, and Verdier, were severely wounded. The column fell back, and the soldiers descended to the side of the dike, to get themselves sheltered from the fire.

Bonaparte saw from Ronco the whole hostile army set itself in motion, which at length made sensible of its danger, lost no time in leaving Caldiero, that it might not be taken in the rear at Villa-Nova. He perceived with vexation that great results were eluding his grasp. He had, indeed, sent Guyeux with a brigade to endeavour to cross the Alpon above Arcola; but many hours would elapse before this attempt could be carried into execution; and in the mean time, it was of the utmost importance to cross the Arcola immediately, in order to get in due time at the rear of Alvinzy, and obtain a complete triumph; the fate of Italy depended upon it. He no longer hesitated; he set off at full gallop, came near the bridge, threw himself from his horse, went to the soldiers who were crouching down by the borders of the dike, asked them if they were still the conquerors of Lodi, revived their courage by his words, and seizing a flag cried, "Follow your general!" Hearing his voice, a number of soldiers went up to the causeway and followed him; unfortunately, the movement could not be communicated to the whole column, the rest of which remained behind the dike. Bonaparte advanced carrying the flag in his hand, amidst a shower of balls and grape-shot. All his generals surrounded him. Lannes, who had already received two wounds from musket-shots during the battle, was struck by a third. Young Muiron, the general's aid-de-camp, striving to cover him with his body, fell dead at his feet. The column was nevertheless on the point of clearing the bridge, when a last discharge stopped it, and threw it back. The rear abandoned the advance. The soldiers who still remained with the general then laid hold of him, carried him away amidst the fire and smoke, and insisted on his remounting his horse. An Austrian column debouching upon them, threw them in disorder into the marsh. Bonaparte fell in, and sunk up to the waist. As soon as the soldiers perceived his danger, "Forward," cried they, "to save the general." They ran after Belliard and Vignolles to get him out. They pulled him out of the mud, set him upon his horse again, and returned to Ronco.

At this moment, Guyeux had succeeded in making a passage above Arcola, and in taking the village by the other bank. But he was too late. Alvinzy had already made his artillery and his baggage file off; he had deployed in the plain, and in a manner so as to anticipate Bonaparte's designs. So much heroism and genius thus became inoperative. Bonaparte might, indeed, have

avoided the obstacle of Arcola by throwing his bridge over the Adige, a little below Ronco, that is, at Albaredo, the point where the Alpon joins the Adige. But then he would have debouched in the plain, which it was of importance to avoid; and no facilities were afforded him for flying by the left-hand dike to the relief of Verona*. He therefore had good reasons for doing what he had done; and though the success was not perfect, important results had been obtained. Alvinzy had quitted the formidable position of Caldiero; he had descended again into the plain; he no longer threatened Verona; he had lost a great number of men in the marshes. The two dikes had become the only field of battle between the two armies, which gave the advantage to bravery and took it away from numerical strength. Lastly, the French soldiers, animated by the conflict, had recovered all their confidence.

Bonaparte, who had to provide against all dangers at once, had to attend to his left, left at La Corona and Rivoli. As it might every moment be overthrown, he was anxious to possess the means of flying to its assistance. He therefore considered that he ought to fall back from Gombione and Arcola, to recross the Adige at Ronco, and to bivouac on this side of the river, so as to be at hand to succour Vaubois, in case he should in the night receive intelligence of his defeat. Such was this first battle, on the 25th Brumaire (November 15).

The night passed without any bad news. It was known that Vaubois still held out at Rivoli. The exploits of Castiglione protected Bonaparte on that quarter. Davidovich, who commanded a division at the battle of Castiglione, had retained such an impression of that event, that he did not venture to advance without receiving certain intelligence of Alvinzy. Thus the influence of Bonaparte's genius was where he was not personally present. The battle of the 26th (November 16) commenced; the scene of the contest was the two dikes. The French charged with the bayonet, broke through the Austrians, threw a great number of them into the marsh, and made many prisoners. They took colours and cannon. Bonaparte still kept up a fire of musketry on the bank of the Alpon, but he made no decisive attempt to effect a passage. When night came on, he again drew back his columns, took them below the dikes, and collected them on the other bank of the Adige, satisfied with having harassed the enemy the whole day, while waiting for more certain intelligence of Vaubois. The second night was passed in the same manner: the intelligence from Vaubois was encouraging. There was then a third day to be devoted to a decisive conflict with Alvinzy. At length the sun rose for the third time on this frightful theatre of carnage. It was the 27th (November 17). Bonaparte calculated that the enemy could not have lost much less than a third of his army in killed, wounded, drowned, and prisoners. He considered him to be harassed and disheartened, and he saw his own soldiers full of enthusiasm. He then resolved to quit those dikes, and to transfer the field of battle to the plain the other side the Alpon. As on the preceding days, the French, debouching from Ronco, encountered the Austrians on the dikes. Masséna still occupied the left dike; on the dike at the right hand it was general Robert who was directed to attack, while Augereau proceeded to cross the Alpon near its falling into the Adige. Masséna at first experienced an animated defence, but he put his hat on the point of his sword, and marched in that manner at the head of his soldiers. As on the former days, a great number of the enemy were killed, drowned, or taken. On the right-hand dike, general Robert advanced at first with success; but he was killed, and his column repulsed nearly up to the bridge of Ronco.

Bonaparte, who was sensible of the danger, placed the 32nd in a wood of willows which bordered the dike. While the enemy's column, victorious over Robert was advancing, the 32nd suddenly sallied from its ambuscade, took it in flank, and threw it into frightful disorder. These were the three thousand Croatians; the greater part of them were slain or made prisoners. The dikes thus cleared, Bonaparte determined to cross the Alpon. Augereau had passed it on the extremity at the right. Bonaparte brought back Masséna from the left-hand dike to the right-hand dike, despatched him to Arcola, which was evacuated, and thus brought his whole army into the plain in front of Alvinzy's army. Bonaparte, before he gave the word to charge, wanted to cause a panic by means of a stratagem. A marsh, overgrown with reeds, covered the left wing of the Austrians; he ordered Hercule, a *chef de bataillon*, to take with him twenty-five of his guards, to march in single line through the reeds, and to charge unawares with a great blast of trumpets. These twenty-five brave fellows made themselves ready to execute this order. Bonaparte then gave the signal to Masséna and Augereau. These latter vigorously charged the Austrian line, which made a stand; but all at once a great blast of trumpets was heard. The Austrians, conceiving that they were going to be charged by a whole division of cavalry, gave up the field. At that moment the garrison of Legnago, which Bonaparte had ordered to move round upon their rear, showed itself at a distance, and increased their alarm. They then retreated; and after this seventy-two hours' tremendous battle, disheartened and worn out with fatigue, that victory was no longer withheld, so justly due to the heroism of a few thousand brave men, and to the genius of a great commander.

Both armies, exhausted by their exertions, passed the night in the plain. Next morning Bonaparte renewed the pursuit to Vicenza. Arrived at the upper end of the causeway leading from the Brenta to Verona, through Villa-Nova, he left his cavalry alone to pursue the enemy, and thought of returning to Verona, by way of Villa Nova and Caldiero, in order to come up to the relief of Vaubois. Bonaparte received intelligence on the road that Vaubois had been obliged to abandon La Corona and Rivoli, and to fall back to Castel-Novo. He redoubled his speed, and arrived the same evening at Verona, passing over the field of battle which Alvinzy had occupied. He entered the city at the gate opposite to that by which he had left it. When the Veronese saw this handful

* I here report an observation frequently made to Bonaparte with respect to this famous battle, and the answer he has made thereto in his Memoirs.

of men, who had gone forth as fugitives by the Milan gate, re-entering as conquerors by the Venice gate, they were exceedingly surprised. Neither friends or foes could repress their admiration of the general and the soldiers who had so gloriously changed the fortune of the war. From that moment neither party feared or hoped that the French could ever be driven out of Italy. Bonaparte immediately ordered Masséna to march to Castel-Novo, and Augereau upon Dolce, along the left bank of the Adige. Davidovich, attacked on all sides, was quickly driven back into the Tyrol, with the loss of a great number of prisoners. Bonaparte contented himself by causing the positions of La Corona and Rivoli to be again occupied, without caring to go up as far as Trent, or resume possession of the Tyrol. The French army was exceedingly reduced by this last conflict. The Austrian army had lost five thousand prisoners, and eight or ten thousand in killed and wounded; but it still found itself upwards of forty thousand strong, inclusive of Davidovich's division. The Austrian army retreated into the Tyrol and to the Brenta, to there rest itself: it was far from having suffered so severely as the armies of Wurmser and Beaulieu. The French, completely worn out, could only repulse but not destroy it. All idea of a pursuit was necessarily abandoned until the promised reinforcements should arrive. Bonaparte satisfied himself by occupying the Adige from Dolce to the sea.

This new victory was the occasion of extreme rejoicings both in Italy and in France. That persevering genius, which, with fourteen or fifteen thousand men against forty thousand, had never thought of retreating; that inventive and profound genius, which had the sagacity to discover in the dikes of Ronco a field of battle entirely new, and neutralized numerical strength, and transferred the attack to the flanks of the enemy, became the theme of universal admiration. Every one enlarged upon the heroism displayed at the bridge of Arcola, and the young general was every where depictured with the colours in his hand, amidst fire and smoke. The two councils, in declaring, according to usage, that the army of Italy had deserved well of the country, resolved moreover that the flags which the two generals, Bonaparte and Augereau, had borne upon the bridge of Arcola, should be presented to them, to be preserved in their families: an appropriate and a noble reward, worthy of an heroic age, and far more glorious than the diadem decreed at a later period by weakness to all-powerful genius.

CHAPTER VI.

GENERAL CLARKE AT THE HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF ITALY.—THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ENGLISH CABINET ABRUPTLY TERMINATED, LORD MALMESBURY TAKES HIS DEPARTURE.—THE IRISH EXPEDITION.—ADMINISTRATIVE OCCUPATIONS OF THE DIRECTORY DURING THE WINTER OF THE YEAR V. FINANCIAL STATE OF THINGS. RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURE.—CAPITULATION OF KEHL.—THE EXPIRING EFFORTS OF AUSTRIA IN REGARD TO ITALY. VICTORIES OF RIVOLI AND LA FAVORITA. CAPTURE OF MANTUA.—CONCLUSION OF THE MEMORABLE CAMPAIGN OF 1796.

GENERAL CLARKE arrived at the head-quarters of the army of Italy, whence he was to set out for Vienna. His mission was deprived of its essential object, for the battle of Arcola had rendered an armistice of no purpose. Bonaparte, whom general Clarke had orders to consult, totally disapproved of the armistice and its articles. The reasons he gave were excellent. The armistice could have but one object, that of saving the fortress of Kehl on the Rhine, which the archduke Charles was most vigorously besieging; and for this very subordinate object it sacrificed Mantua. All that Kehl presented was a *tête de pont*, which was by no means indispensable for debouching into Germany. The taking of Mantua, on the contrary, would inevitably lead to the absolute conquest of Italy, and would allow us to demand in return, Mentz and the entire line of the Rhine. The armistice evidently jeopardised this conquest; for Mantua, incumbered with sick, and reduced to half rations, could not delay opening its gates longer than a month. The provisions that would be brought thither would restore health and strength to the garrison. Their quantity could not be exactly ascertained, and Wurmser, by economical arrangements, might husband his stores so as to renew his defence, in case of the resumption of hostilities. The effects of the battles fought to protect the blockade of Mantua would thus become inoperative, and it would have to be recommenced by a new outlay. Nor was this all. The Pope could not fail to be included in the armistice by Austria, and then the French would be deprived of the means of punishing him and wringing from him twenty or thirty millions, of which the army had great need, and which could be made available for a new campaign. Lastly, Bonaparte, looking forward into futurity, advised that, so far from suspending hostilities, to prosecute them with vigour, but to transfer the war to its most appropriate theatre, and to send into Italy a reinforcement of thirty thousand men. He undertook, if this was acceded to, to march to Vienna, and in two months to secure peace, the line of the Rhine, and a republic in Italy. Most assuredly this combination would place in his hands all the military and political operations of the war; but putting out of the question the disinterestedness of the request, it was equitable and profound, and the event proved its wisdom.

Nevertheless, in obedience to the directory, letters were addressed to the Austrian generals on the Rhine and the Adige, to propose an armistice and to obtain passports for Clarke. The archduke Charles answered Moreau that he could not hearken to any proposal for an armistice, that his powers

did not permit him so to do, and that he must refer the matter to the Aulic council. Alvinzy made the same answer, and sent off a courier to Vienna. The Austrian minister, secretly devoted to England, had little inclination to listen to the proposals of France. The cabinet of London had acquainted him with the embassy of lord Malmesbury; the English cabinet had done its best to persuade the Austrian minister that the emperor would gain far greater advantages by concurring in the negotiation opened in Paris than by making separate conquests, since the English conquests in the two Indies would be sacrificed to procure for him the restitution of the Netherlands. Besides the insinuations of England, the cabinet of Vienna had other reasons for rejecting the proposals of the directory. It flattered itself that the fortress of Kehl would in a very short time be recaptured; the French, hemmed in along the Rhine, would then no longer be able to cross that river; fresh detachments might then without danger be withdrawn, and sent to the Adige. These detachments, joined to the new levies that were being raised throughout all Austria with wonderful activity, would afford one more attempt upon Italy; and then perhaps that terrible army, which had annihilated so many Austrian battalions, might at last conclude by yielding in its turn to reiterated attacks.

In this instance, therefore, German perseverance was consistent enough, and in spite of so many reverses did not yet abandon its pretensions to fair Italy. It was in consequence resolved not to allow Clarke to come to Vienna. Besides, there was a feeling of apprehension against having a spy in the capital itself, and a direct negotiation was by no means desirable. As for the armistice, the Austrians would have consented to allow it on the Adige, but not on the Rhine. Clarke received for answer, that if he would repair to Vicenza, he would there find the baron de Vincent, with whom he might confer at that place. The conference accordingly took place at Vicenza. The Austrian minister alleged that the emperor could not receive an envoy of the republic, because that would be equivalent to acknowledging it; and as for the armistice, he declared that it was not admissible save in Italy. This proposal was ridiculous, and one cannot conceive how the Austrian minister could make it, for it would save Mantua without saving Kehl, and the French must have been supposed fools indeed to accept it. Nevertheless the Austrian ministry, who wished in case of need to reserve to itself the means of a separate negotiation, caused it to be declared by their envoy, if the French commissioner had proposals to make relative to peace, he had only to go to Turin, and to communicate them to the Austrian ambassador at Piedmont. Thus, owing to the suggestions of England and to the silly hopes of the cabinet of Vienna, the dangerous project of an armistice went off. Clarke went to Turin, in order to avail himself, in case of need, of the means of communication offered to him at the court of Sardinia. But he had another mission, and that was to watch general Bonaparte. The genius of that young man had appeared so extraordinary, his character so peremptory and so energetic, that, without any precise motive, he was supposed to be guilty of ambitious projects. He had wanted to conduct the war just as he pleased, and had tendered his resignation when a plan had been laid down for him that was not his own; he had acted like a sovereign in Italy, granting to princes peace or war under the name of armistices; he had loudly complained because the negotiations with the pope had not been conducted by him alone, and he had insisted that they should be entirely transferred to his control; he had treated the commissioners Garran and Salicetti with great severity when they had taken upon themselves to carry out measures which he disapproved, and had compelled them to leave the head-quarters; he had taken upon himself to transmit funds to the different armies, without being first authorized by the government, and without availing himself of the indispensable medium of the treasury. All these acts indicated a man who liked to do himself that which he thought he alone could properly perform. This at present was nothing more than the impatience of genius, which cannot bear to be thwarted in its operations; but it is by this impatience of control that a despotic will begins to manifest itself. On seeing him excite Upper Italy against its old masters, and create or destroy states, the saying was that he wanted to make himself duke of Milan. They had a glimmering of his ambition, and he himself had a confused idea of his being open to the accusation. He complained of being accused, and then justified himself, before a single word of the directory had given him occasion so to do.

Clarke then had, besides the office of negotiating, that of watching Bonaparte, who, aware of his errand, and acting in this instance with that haughtiness and tact which were peculiar to him, and letting him perceive that he was acquainted with the object of his mission, in a short time won him over by his ascendancy and his winning behaviour, quite as powerful, it is said, as his genius, and made him a convert to his own opinions. Clarke possessed talent, but he had too much vanity to be a clever and supple spy. He remained in Italy, sometimes at Turin, sometimes at head-quarters, and soon belonged more to Bonaparte than the directory.

At Paris the English cabinet did its utmost to protract the negotiation; but the French cabinet, by returning prompt and explicit answers, had at last obliged lord Malmesbury to make himself clearly understood. That minister had, as we have seen, at first assumed the principle of a general negotiation, and that of a mutual indemnity in respect of conquests; the directory, on its own part, had demanded the powers of all the allies, and a clearer explanation upon the principle of mutual indemnities. The English minister had taken nineteen days to reply; he had at length answered that application had been made for the powers; but before they were produced, it was requisite that the French government should positively admit the principle of mutual indemnities. The directory had then required an immediate declaration of the objects to which the principle of mutual indemnities should extend. It was at this point that the negotiation had stopped. Lord Malmesbury again wrote to London, and after a lapse of twelve days, replied, on the 6th Frimaire (November 26), that his court had nothing to add

to what it had already said, and that it could not further explain itself so long as the French government would not formally admit the proposed principle. This was a mere trick; for in demanding a statement of the objects which were to form the subject of indemnity, France had evidently admitted the principle of mutual indemnities. To write to London, and to occupy twelve days more upon this idle distinction, was nothing else than trifling with the directory. The directory replied, as it always did, on the following day, and in a note of four lines stated that its former note necessarily implied the admission of the principle of mutual indemnities, but at any rate it formally admitted that principle, and demanded immediately a specification of the objects to which it was to be applied. The directory further desired to be informed whether, upon every question, lord Malmesbury would be obliged to write to London. Lord Malmesbury vaguely replied, that he should be obliged to write on every occasion that the question required fresh instructions. He again wrote, and remained twenty days before he replied. It was evident this time that he must divest himself of that vagueness in which he had shrouded himself, and at last enter upon the formidable question of the Netherlands. To come to an explanation on that point was to break off the negotiation, and it is generally believed that the English cabinet delayed the rupture as long as possible. At last, on the 28th Frimaire (December 18), lord Malmesbury had an interview with the minister Delacroix, and delivered to him a note in which the claims of the English cabinet were broadly stated. The English cabinet desired that France should restore to the powers of the continent all her conquests, and that she should restore to Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg, and to the empire the German states on the left bank of the Rhine; that she should entirely evacuate Italy, and place it in the *statu quo ante bellum*; that she should restore to Holland certain portions of territory, such as maritime Flanders, for example, in order to render her independent; and lastly, that changes should be made in her present constitution. The English cabinet would not undertake to restore the Dutch colonies, unless the stadtholder were restored; and still it would not give up all: the English meant to keep some as an indemnity for the war; among these was the Cape. For all these sacrifices it proposed to restore two or three islands which we had lost during the war in the West Indies, Martinique, Saint-Lucia, and Tobago, and again upon condition that we should not retain the whole of Saint-Domingo. Thus France, after an iniquitous war, in which she had all the justice on her side, in which she had expended enormous sums, and from which she had come off victorious, France was not to gain a single province, while the northern powers had just divided a kingdom among them*, and England had been recently making immense acquisitions in India! France, who still occupied the line of the Rhine, and who was mistress of Italy, was to evacuate the Rhine and Italy, at the mere summons of England! Such conditions were absurd and inadmissible: the simple proposition of them was offensive, and they could not be hearkened to. Delacroix, nevertheless, did listen to them with a politeness which struck the English minister, and which even made him hope that the negotiation might be continued.

Delacroix gave a reason, which was insufficient, namely, that the Netherlands were declared national territory by the constitution; and the English minister replied by a reason which was not a whit better, that the treaty of Utrecht* adjudged them to Austria. The constitution might be obligatory upon the French nation, but it neither concerned or was binding upon foreign nations. The treaty of Utrecht was, like all other treaties in the world, an arrangement of constraint, which force had the power of altering. The only reason which the French minister ought to have given was, that the annexation of the Netherlands to France was just, that it was founded on every principle of natural and political expediency, and justified by conquest. After a long discussion on all the subordinate points of the negotiation, the two ministers separated. Delacroix went to refer the matter to the directory, who justly incensed, resolved to reply to the English minister as he deserved. The note of the English minister was not signed; it was merely enclosed in a signed letter. The directory that same day required that it should be invested with the necessary forms, and demanded his *ultimatum* within twenty-four hours. Lord Malmesbury, in embarrassment, replied that the note was sufficiently authentic, since it was enclosed in a signed letter, and so far as concerned the *ultimatum*, it was against all usage to demand an *ultimatum* in such an offhand offensive manner. The next day, the 29th Frimaire (December 19th), the directory caused it to be notified to him that it never would hearken to any proposal contrary to the laws and treaties which bound the republic; the directory also added that lord Malmesbury having constantly to refer to his government, and performing a purely passive part in the negotiation, his presence in Paris was of no service; that in consequence he had orders to withdraw himself and his suite within forty-eight hours; moreover, that couriers would suffice for the purposes of negotiation, if the English government adopted the fundamental principles assumed by the French republic.

Thus ended this negotiation, in which the directory, so far from disregarding forms, as hath been represented, set a real example of frankness in its relations with hostile powers. In the present, not a single point of usage was violated. The communications of powers are impressed, like every other relation between individuals, with the character of the time, of the situation, and of the persons who govern. A strong and victorious government speaks in a different tone from that of a weak and vanquished government; and it was more appropriate for a republic, supported by justice and victory, to render its language prompt, distinct, and perfectly open.

During this interval, Hoche's grand design upon Ireland was carried into execution. This was what

* Alluding to the final partition of Poland between Russia, Austria, and Prussia. *Trans.*

* The articles and objects of this treaty, which bore date in April, 1713, are fully explained in "Koch's Revolutions of Europe," forming a part of the series of "The Popular Library of Modern Authors," p. 113. *Trans.*

England dreaded, and which would in fact place her in great jeopardy. Notwithstanding the reports industriously spread of an expedition to Portugal or America, England had correctly understood the object of the preparations making at Brest. Pitt had caused the militia to be called out, and the coasts to be armed, and had given orders to retreat from every place in the interior, if the French should land.

Ireland, whither the expedition was directed, was in such a state as to cause serious anxieties. The partisans of parliamentary reform and the Catholics in that island afforded a mass sufficient to produce an insurrection. They would gladly have adopted a republican form of government under the protection of France, and they had sent secret agents to Paris to have a good understanding with the directory. Thus every thing indicated that an expedition might be the occasion of placing England in serious difficulties, and be the means of compelling her to accept a very different sort of peace from that which she had just been offering. Hoche, who had spent the two best years of his life in La Vendée, and who saw the great theatres of war occupied by Bonaparte, Moreau, and Jourdan, burned with impatience to open one for himself in Ireland. England was quite as noble an adversary as Austria, and the honour of fighting against and overcoming her was quite as great. A new republic had sprung up in Italy, and was about to become the focus of liberty in that quarter. Hoche imagined that it would be a glorious as well as a practicable scheme to erect such another in Ireland, by the side of the English aristocracy. He was closely connected with admiral Truguet, secretary of the admiralty, and a minister of comprehensive views. They both pledged each other to raise the navy into importance, and to do great things; for at that time every body's head was in labour, every body was thinking how he could effect prodigies for the glory and happiness of their country. The offensive and defensive alliance concluded with Spain, at Saint Ildefonso, presented extensive resources, and admitted of vast projects. By joining the Toulon squadron with the Spanish fleet, and bringing their united force in the channel to bear in conjunction with that which France had in the [Atlantic] ocean, a very formidable force might be collected, and an attempt be made to open the seas by a decisive engagement: Ireland at least might be set in flames, and the successes of England in India might suffer interruption. Admiral Truguet, sensible of the importance of sending speedy relief to India, desired that the Brest squadron, without waiting for the junction of the French and Spanish fleets in the channel, should immediately set sail, put Hoche's army ashore in Ireland, keep a few thousand men on board, then sail for the Isle of France, take on board the battalions of negroes in training there, and take this reinforcement to India to assist Tippoo Saib. This grand expedition was so far defective in its arrangement in transferring to Ireland no more than a portion of the army belonging to this expedition, and leaving it exposed to great risks, while till the very precarious junction of admiral Villeneuve's squadron which was to sail from Toulon, of the Spanish squadron which was dispersed in the ports of Spain, and of Richerry's squadron, which was returning from America. This expedition was not carried into effect. It waited for admiral Richerry's arrival from America, and notwithstanding the state of the finances, extraordinary exertions were made to complete the fitting out of the Brest squadron. In Frimaire (December) this squadron was ready to sail. It consisted of fifteen sail of the line, twenty frigates, six luggers, and fifty transports, and could carry twenty-two thousand men. Hoche could not agree with admiral Villaret-Joyeuse, and the latter was succeeded by Morard de Galles. The expedition was to land in Bantry Bay. Each of the captains of the ships of the line was furnished with sealed orders, specifying the direction which he was to follow, and the anchorage he was to resort to in case of accident.

The expedition sailed on the 26th Frimaire (December 16), Hoche and Morard de Galles were both on board one frigate. Owing to a thick fog, the French squadron escaped the English cruisers, and crossed the sea unnoticed. But in the night between the 26th and 27th the squadron was dispersed by a violent storm. One ship foundered. However, rear-admiral Bouvet manœuvred for the purpose of rallying the squadron, and succeeded in two days in getting it together with the exception of one man of war and three frigates. Unfortunately, the frigate which bore Hoche and Morard de Galles was one of the latter. The squadron doubled Cape Clear, and manœuvred there several days, waiting for the two commanders. At length, on the 4th Nivôse (December 25th), the squadron entered Bantry Bay. A council of war decided on landing; but this became impracticable on account of the bad weather; the squadron was again borne away from the coasts of Ireland. Rear-admiral Bouvet, daunted by so many obstacles, apprehensive lest he should run short of provisions, and separated from the two commanders-in-chief, felt it his duty to regain the coast of France. Hoche and Morard de Galles at length arrived in Bantry Bay, and there received information of the return of the French squadron. They got back home amidst unparalleled dangers. Tossed by the sea, and chased by the English, it was little short of a miracle that they reached the French shores. The man-of-war *Les Droits de l'Homme*, captain La Crosse, got separated from the squadron, and performed prodigies: attacked by two English vessels, she destroyed one, and sheered off from the other; but being much damaged, and having lost masts and sails, she could not withstand the violence of the sea. Part of the crew was swallowed up by the waves, the remainder were with difficulty saved.

Thus ended that expedition, which caused great alarm in England, and exposed her weakest point. The directory did not give up all idea of prosecuting this design at a future period, but for the moment turned its whole attention towards the continent, in order to compel, and that without loss of time, Austria to lay down her arms. The troops of the expedition had not suffered much; they were brought on land. A sufficient force was left on the coast to perform the police duty of the country, and the greater part of the army, which had been called the army of the ocean, proceeded towards the Rhine. The two Vendées and Brittany were, at any rate, perfectly tranquillized through the

vigilance and the constant presence of Hoche. An important command was provided for that general, to reward him for his thankless and arduous exertions. The resignation of Jourdan, whom the unsuccessful issue of the campaign had disgusted, and who had been temporarily succeeded by Beurnonville, afforded an opportunity for offering Hoche a compensation which had long been due to his patriotism and his talents.

The winter, already far advanced (it was now Nivôse, January, 1797), had not interrupted this memorable campaign. On the Rhine, the archduke Charles was besieging Kehl and the *tête de pont* of Huningen; on the Adige, Alvinzy was preparing for one concluding effort against Bonaparte. The interior of the republic was tolerably quiet; the parties had their eyes fixed on the different theatres of the war. The credit and the strength of the government increased or diminished according to the chances of the campaign. The late victory of Arcola had shed a great lustre, and had compensated for the bad effect produced by the retreat of the armies of the Rhine. But after all, this effort of desperate bravery had not completely restored general confidence respecting the possession of Italy. It was well known that Alvinzy was reinforcing himself, and that the pope was fitting out troops; the malignants said that the army of Italy was exhausted; that its general, overwhelmed with the labours of a campaign without precedent, and wasted by an extraordinary disease, could no longer sit his horse. Mantua was not yet taken, and there was room for uneasiness as to what the month of Nivôse (January) would bring forth.

The journals of the two parties, taking unbounded advantage of the liberty of the press, continued to launch forth. Those of the counter-revolution, looking forward to spring, the period for the elections, did their best to agitate opinion, and to incline it in their favour. Ever since the disasters of the royalists in La Vendée, it was clear that their last expedient was to destroy liberty by abusing it, and to usurp the republic by controlling the elections. The directory, witnessing their inveteracy, was seized with those movements of impatience, which even the most enlightened government cannot always repress. Although long accustomed to liberty, it was alarmed at the language it uttered in certain journals; it did not yet thoroughly comprehend, that every thing should be spoken out, that falsehood is never to be feared whatever publicity it may gain; that it expends itself by its violence; and that a government perishes by truth alone, and especially by truth repressed. It applied to the two councils for laws respecting the licentiousness of the press. An outcry was raised; it was alleged that, as the elections were at hand, the directory wanted to cramp the freedom of election; the laws which it called for were refused; two articles only were adopted; one relative to the repression of private slander, the other to the hawkers of newspapers in the streets, who, instead of crying them by their titles, announced them by unconnected and frequently very improper expressions. The hawkers of a particular pamphlet for instance, cried about the streets, "*Give us back our myriagrammes, and —— the camp if you cannot make the people happy.*" It was settled that, to obviate this scandal, the journals and other publications should not be cried in future but by their simple title. The directory recommended the establishment of an official journal of the government. The five hundred assented to this; the ancients opposed it. The law of the 3rd Brumaire brought a second time under discussion in Vendémiaire, and made the pretext for the ridiculous attack of the patriots on the camp of Grenelle, had been maintained after a solemn debate. It was, in a certain degree, the post around which the two parties were incessantly running against one another. It was that article in particular, which excluded the relatives of emigrants from public offices, the right side wished to annul, and that which the republicans desired to retain. After a third attack, it was decided that this article should be retained. There was but one alteration made in this law. It excluded from the general oblivion accorded to revolutionary misdemeanors, those offences connected with the 13th Vendémiaire; that event was already of too remote a date not to indemnify the individuals who might have taken part in it, and who, moreover, enjoyed absolute impunity for the act; the act of oblivion therefore was declared to have reference to the offences of Vendémiaire as well as to all the other purely revolutionary acts.

Thus the directory, and all those who were for the directorial republic, retained a majority in the councils, in spite of the outcries of certain foolish hotheaded patriots, and of some intriguers in the pay of the counter-revolution.

The state of the finances produced the usual effect of inflicting privations in social life, and disturbed the domestic union of the directory with the legislative body. The directory complained that its measures were not always favourably received by the councils; the directory addressed to them a message of alarming import, and published it, as if to make the public misfortunes recoil upon them, if they did not readily adopt its conclusions. The message of the 25th Frimaire was couched in these terms. "Every department of the service is distressed. The pay of the troops is in arrear; the defenders of the country are exposed to the horrors of nakedness; their courage is enervated by the painful feeling of their necessities, the disgust which is the consequence of it, leads to desertion. The hospitals are destitute of furniture, fire, and medicines. The charitable institutions experience the same destitution, and repel the poor and the infirm, whose sole resource they were. The creditors of the state, the contractors, who every day contribute to supply the wants of the armies, are scarcely able to wring but small portions of the sums that are due to them; their distress deters men who could perform the same offices with more punctuality or for less salaries from offering their services. The roads are cut up, the communications interrupted. The public functionaries are without salary; from one end of the republic to the other, judges and administrators may be seen reduced to the horrible alternative either of dragging on with their families a miserable existence, or of degrading themselves by receiving pay from the intriguers. Malignancy is every where in active operation; in many places murder is systematically perpetrated, and the police, without activity, without energy,

because it is denuded of pecuniary resources, cannot put a stop to this disorder."

The councils were irritated at the publication of this message, which seemed to throw the blame of the disastrous condition of the state upon them, and sharply censured the indiscretion of the directory. Notwithstanding this, they immediately set about examining its allegations. Money was every where plentiful except in the coffers of the state. The assessed taxes at this time receivable in money or in paper at the current value, came in but slowly. The national property contracted for was paid in part, the payments yet remaining to be made were not yet fallen due. The government lived by expedients. Those who contracted for the treasury warrants received tallies (*borderoaux de liquidation*), a sort of securities, bearing interest, which were taken only for a very inferior value, and which caused a considerable rise in the price of the markets. Here was again the same situation that we have already so frequently illustrated.

Great improvements were introduced into the finances for the year V. The budget was divided, as we have already seen, into two parts; the ordinary expenses of four hundred and fifty millions, and the extraordinary expenses of five hundred and fifty. The land tax, amounting to two hundred and fifty millions, the sumptuary and personal tax at fifty, the customs, the stamp and registration duties, at one hundred and fifty, were to furnish the four hundred and fifty millions for the ordinary expenditure. The extraordinary expenditure was to be covered by the arrears of the assessed taxes and by the produce of the national property. The taxes were now to be levied entirely in specie. There were still left some mandats and some assignats, which were immediately cancelled, and taken at the current value for the payment of arrears. In this manner the paper money confusion was put an end to. The forced loan was finally closed. It had produced scarcely four hundred millions, effective value. The taxes in arrear were to be paid up before the 15th Frimaire (December 5) of the present year. Distraining brokers were appointed in order to accelerate the collection, lists were ordered to be prepared for the purpose of levying immediately one-fourth of the taxes for the year V. It yet remained to be settled how the value of the national property was to be made available, as there was no longer any paper money for putting it beforehand into circulation. The last sixth of the national estates contracted for was still outstanding. It was settled that in order to anticipate this last payment, there should be required of the purchasers bonds payable in money, falling due at the very period the law required for their discharge, and involving in case of protest the forfeiture of the estate sold. This measure was likely to bring in some eighty millions in bonds, with which the contractors declared they would willingly pay themselves. There was no longer any confidence in the state, but there was with regard to private individuals; and the eighty millions of this personal paper had a value which a paper issued and guaranteed by the republic would never have had. It was settled that the property sold in future should be paid for as follows: One-tenth in ready money, five-tenths down in treasury warrants, or in tallies delivered to contractors; and lastly, the other four-tenths in bonds payable at one per year.

Thus having no longer any public credit, the government availed itself of private credit; being no longer able to issue paper money upon security of the national property, it required of the purchasers of those estates a kind of paper which, bearing their signature, possessed an individual value; and lastly, it allowed the contractors to pay themselves for their services out of the estates themselves.

These arrangements gave hopes of a little order and some returns. To supply the urgent wants of the ministry of war, there was immediately assigned for that service for the months of Nivôse, Pluviôse, Ventôse, and Germinal, months devoted to preparations for the new campaign, the sum of one hundred and twenty millions, thirty-three of which were to be taken from the ordinary, and eighty-seven from the extraordinary revenue. The registration, the posts, the customs, the licences, the land tax, were to furnish these thirty-three millions; the eighty-seven of the extraordinary [revenue] were to be composed of the produce of the woods, the arrears of the military levies, and the bonds of the purchasers of national property. These securities were of known value, and they were going to be paid up forthwith. All the public officials were paid in money. It was decided that the life annuitants should be paid in the same manner; but not having money to give them, they were paid by notes to bearer, receivable in payment for national property, much in the same manner as the treasury warrants and the tallies delivered to the contractors.

Such were the administrative operations of the directory during the winter of the year V. (1796, 1797), and the means which it prepared, in order to provide for the ensuing campaign. The present campaign had not yet terminated, and every thing indicated that notwithstanding ten months' hard fighting, and in spite of ice and snow, there would still be fresh battles. The archduke Charles was bent on carrying the *têtes de pont* of Kehl and Huningen, as if, in possessing himself of them, he should for ever prevent the French from returning on the right bank. The directory had an excellent reason for keeping him there, namely, to prevent him from proceeding to Italy. He spent nearly three months before the fortress of Kehl. On both sides the troops distinguished themselves by heroic courage, and the generals of division displayed extraordinary practical talent. Dessaix, in particular, immortalized himself by his intrepidity, his coolness, and his skilful arrangements around that miserably intrenched fort. The conduct of the two commanders-in-chief was far from being so highly approved of as that of their lieutenants. Moreau was accused of not having done the best with his army, and for not having debouched on the right bank to fall upon the besieging army. The archduke was censured for having expended such exertions on a *tête de pont*. Moreau surrendered Kehl on the 20th Nivôse, year V. (January 9, 1797); it was no great loss. Our long defence proved the solidity of the line of the Rhine. The troops had not suffered much, Moreau had employed the time in perfecting their complete discipline; his army appeared in the finest order. The army of the

Sambre and Meuse, transferred to the command of Beurnonville, had not been usefully employed during these latter months; but it had been taking rest, and was reinforced with fresh detachments from La Vendée. This army had now for its leader a celebrated commander, Hoche, who had been at last called to a war worthy of his talents. Thus the directory, although it no longer was master of Mentz and had lost Kehl, might still consider itself as powerful upon the Rhine. The Austrians, for their part, were proud of having taken Kehl, and they now directed all their efforts against the *tête de pont* of Huningen. But the thoughts of the emperor and of his ministers were solely occupied with regard to Italy. The administration had made extraordinary exertions to reinforce Alvinzy's army, and in preparing for a final struggle. The troops had been sent off post-haste. The whole garrison of Vienna had been despatched to the Tyrol. The inhabitants of the capital, in their extreme attachment to the imperial house, had furnished four thousand volunteers, who were formed into regiments under the style of the Vienna volunteers. The empress had presented them with colours, embroidered with her own hands. A new levy had been made in Hungary, and some thousand of the best troops of the empire had been drawn from the Rhine. Owing to this most meritorious activity, Alvinzy's army had been reinforced by about twenty thousand men, and now amounted to upwards of sixty thousand. This army had taken its rest, and been reorganized; and though it contained some recruits, it was chiefly composed of veteran troops. The battalion of Vienna volunteers was formed of young men, to whom, it is true, war was new; but as members of good families, they were animated with noble sentiments, thoroughly devoted to the imperial house, and were ready to display the greatest bravery.

The Austrian ministers were on good terms with the pope, and had prevailed upon him to resist the threats of Bonaparte. They had sent him Colli and some other officers to command his army, and had recommended to him to make it advance as near as possible to Bologna and Mantua. They had apprised Wurmser that he would be speedily relieved, but that he was not to surrender; and should he be reduced to extremity, he was to leave Mantua with all the troops, and especially all the officers, to throw himself across the Bolognese and the Ferrarese into the Roman states, to join the papal army, and to organize and bring it to bear upon the rear of Bonaparte. This plan, so well conceived, might very possibly have succeeded with so brave a general as Wurmser. This old marshal still held out in Mantua with great firmness, though his garrison had nothing to eat but salted horseflesh and polenta.

Bonaparte was awaiting this last struggle, which was to decide for ever the fate of Italy, and made good preparations to meet it. In fact, as reported in Paris by the malignants, who desired the degradation of our armies, he was afflicted with a cutaneous disorder, which had been improperly treated, and contracted at Toulon by charging a cannon with his own hands. This disease, not well understood, joined to the unheard-of fatigues of this campaign, had extremely weakened him. He could scarcely sit his horse; his cheeks were hollow and livid. His personal appearance was attenuated; his eyes alone, still bright and piercing as ever, indicated that the fire of his soul was not extinguished. His physical proportions even exhibited, when put in comparison with his genius and celebrity, a singular and striking contrast, amusing to soldiers, who are at the same time jovial and enthusiastic. Notwithstanding the decline of his strength, his extraordinary energy supported him, and imparted an activity which was applied to all objects at once. He had begun what he called *the war against the thieves*. Intriguers of all kinds had hastened to Italy, for the purpose of introducing themselves into the administration of the armies, and getting what they could out of the superabundance of that fine country. While simplicity and indigence prevailed in the armies of the Rhine, luxury had introduced itself into the army of Italy; the luxury indeed of that army equalled its glorious achievements. The soldiers, well clothed and well fed, were every where cordially received by the handsome Italian women, and lived in pleasures and abundance. The officers and the generals partook of the general profusion, and laid the foundation of their fortunes. As for the contractors, they displayed a scandalous licentiousness, and purchased with the produce of their extortions the favours of the most beautiful actresses of Italy. Bonaparte, who possessed within himself every passion, but who at that moment was entirely absorbed by one passion, that of glory, lived in a simple and austere manner, seeking no pleasure save in the society of his wife, to whom he was tenderly attached, and who had come, at his desire, to his head-quarters. Indignant at the disorders of the administration, he carefully looked into petty details, personally audited the accounts of the companies, detected dishonest administrators, and caused them to be rigidly prosecuted. He reproached them, in particular, with want of courage, and with leaving the army in the hour of danger. He recommended to the directory to select men of tried energy; he proposed the institution of a syndicate, which, trying like a jury, should have power, on its simple [moral] conviction, to punish those offences of which legal proof could not be obtained. He willingly allowed his soldiers and generals enjoyments which were not in their case the indulgences of Capua; but he bore an implacable hatred to all those who enriched themselves at the expense of the army, without administering to its wants by their acts or their diligence. He had applied the same attention and activity with respect to his relations with the Italian powers. Still dissembling with Venice, whose armaments he saw preparing in the lagoons and in the mountains of the Bergamasco, he deferred all explanation till after the surrender of Mantua. He caused his troops to temporarily take possession of the castle of Bergamo, which had a Venetian garrison, and assigned as a reason that he did not think it sufficiently guarded to resist a sudden attack of the Austrians. He thus secured himself against treachery, and overawed the numerous enemies whom he had in Bergamo. In Lombardy and the Cispadane republic he continued to favour the spirit of liberty, repressing the Austrian and papal party, and keeping within bounds the demo-

cratic party, which in every country needs constraint. He maintained friendly relations with the king of Sardinia and the duke of Parma. He went in person to Bologna, to terminate a negotiation with the duke of Tuscany, and to overawe the court of Rome. The duke of Tuscany was annoyed at the presence of the French in Leghorn; questions and warm debates had arisen between the merchants of Leghorn with respect to the merchandise belonging to traders enemies of France. These discussions produced violent animosity; besides, the merchandise, rescued with great difficulty, had been carelessly sold, and that by a company who had recently plundered the army of five or six millions. Bonaparte preferred to make his arrangements with the grand duke. It was agreed that in consideration of two millions, he should evacuate Leghorn. By this means he had the garrison of that city more completely at his own disposal. His intention was to take the two legions formed by the Cispadane republic, to unite them with the garrison of Leghorn, to add to them three thousand of his troops, and to despatch this little army towards the Romagna and the March of Ancona. He meant to take possession of two more provinces of the Roman states, and there lay his hand upon the demesnes of the pope, put a stop upon the taxes there, and thus pay himself for the levy which had not been discharged, take hostages selected from the party inimical to France, and thus establish a natural defence between the states of the church and Mantua. By this he would render the plan of a junction between Wurmser and the papal army impracticable; he could overawe the pope, and oblige him at last to submit to the conditions of the republic. Giving vent to his ill temper against the holy see, he even had thoughts of never being reconciled with her, and wished to make an entirely new division of Italy. He would have restored Lombardy to Austria; he would have formed a powerful republic, by adding Romagna, the March of Ancona, and the Duchy of Parma to the Modenese, the Bolognese, and the Ferrarese: Rome would have been in this case assigned to the duke of Parma, which would have given great pleasure to Spain, and have compromised the most catholic of all the powers. He had already begun to carry his design into execution; and had betaken himself to Bologna with three thousand men, and from thence threatened the holy see, which had already formed the nucleus of an army. But the pope, now certain of a new Austrian expedition, hoping to communicate by the Lower Po with Wurmser, defied the threats of the French general, and even manifested a wish to see him advance still further into his dominions. The holy father, it was said at the Vatican, would, if necessary, quit Rome in order to seek protection at the extremity of his territories. The further Bonaparte should advance, and remove himself from the Adige, the more dangerous would his situation be, and so much the more favourable would be the chances for the holy cause. Bonaparte, who was quite as cautious as the Vatican, took good care not to march to Rome; all he cared to do was to threaten, and he always had his eye upon the Adige, expecting every moment a new attack. On the 19th Nivôse (January 8, 1797) he actually received intelligence that an action had taken place on all his advanced posts; he immediately recrossed the Po with two thousand men, and hastened in person to Verona.

Since the affair of Arcola, his army had received the reinforcements which it ought to have received before that battle. As the winter was over, his sick had left the hospitals; he had about forty-five thousand effective men under arms. Their distribution were still the same. About ten thousand men were blockading Mantua, under Serrurier; thirty thousand were in observation on the Adige. Augereau occupied Legnago; Masséna, Verona; Joubert, who had succeeded Vaubois, kept Rivoli and La Corona. Rey, with a division of reserve, was at Dezenzano, on the border of the lake of Garda. The other four or five thousand men were either in the citadels of Bergamo and Milan, or in the Cispadane republic. The Austrians were advancing with sixty and some odd thousand men, and had twenty thousand in Mantua, at least twelve thousand of whom were under arms. Thus, in this conflict as in the preceeding, the proportion of the enemy was as two to one. The Austrians on the present occasion ventured on a new system. They had tried all the routes for attacking the double line of the Mincio and the Adige. At the time of the battle of Castiglione they had descended along both shores of the lake of Garda, by the two valleys of the Chiese and of the Adige. Subsequently, they had debouched by the valley of the Adige and by that of the Brenta, making their attack by Rivoli and Verona. They had now modified their plan in conformity with their arrangements with the pope. The principal attack was to be made by the Upper Adige, with forty-five thousand men under the command of Alvinzy. A subordinate attack, and independent of the former, was to be made with nearly twenty thousand men, under the command of Provera, by the Lower Adige, with a view to communicate with Mantua, Romagna, and the army of the pope.

Alvinzy's attack was to be the principal one; it was strong enough to hope for success on this point, and it would have to be pushed without any consideration of what might befall Provera. We have already described the three routes which issue from the mountains of the Tyrol. That which turned behind the lake of Garda had been dismissed ever since the affair at Castiglione; the others were to be followed. The one, running between the Adige and the lake of Garda, passed through the mountains which separate the lake from the river, and there came upon the position of Rivoli; the other, running outside the river, debouched on the plain of Verona outside the French line. Alvinzy selected that which passed between the river and the lake, and which went as far as the French line. It was therefore upon Rivoli that his attack was to be pointed. Now let us survey this ever memorable position. The chain of Monte Baldo divides the lake of Garda from the Adige. The high road winds between the Adige and the foot of the mountains, to the extent of some leagues. At Incamale the river washes the very base of the mountains, and leaves no room whatever for proceeding along its bank. The road then leaves the banks of the river, rises by a kind of zig zag direction round the sides of the mountain, and debouches upon an extensive elevated plain (*plateau*), which is that of

Rivoli. It overlooks the Adige on one side, and is encompassed on the other by the amphitheatre of Monte Baldo. An army in position on this *plateau* commands the winding road by which the ascent to it is made, and sweeps by its fire both banks of the Adige to a great distance. It is very difficult to storm this *plateau* in front, since you must clamber up the narrow zigzag road before you can reach it. Therefore no one would attempt to attack it by that single way. Before arriving at Incanale, other roads lead to Monte Baldo, and ascending its long and sloping acclivities terminate at the *plateau* of Rivoli. They are not passable either for cavalry or for artillery, but they afford easy access to foot soldiers, and may be made available for conveying a considerable force in infantry upon the flanks and rear of the body defending the *plateau*. Alvinzy's plan was to attack the position by all the outlets at once.

On the 23rd Nivôse (January 12), Alvinzy attacked Joubert, who kept all the advanced positions, and forced him back upon Rivoli. The same day, Provera pushed two advanced guards, the one upon Verona, the other upon Legnago, by Caldiero and Bevilaqua. Masséna, who was at Verona, sallied forth, overthrew the advanced guard, coming right before him, and made nine hundred prisoners. At that very moment, Bonaparte arrived upon the spot from Bologna. He drew back the entire division to Verona, to keep it in readiness for marching. In the night, he received intelligence that Joubert was attacked and forced at Rivoli, and that Augereau, before Legnago, had observed considerable forces. He could not yet judge upon what point the enemy would direct his principal mass. He still kept Masséna's division ready to march, and ordered Rey's division, which was at Dezenzano, and which had not observed any enemy debouching from behind the lake of Garda, to proceed to Castel-Novo, the most central point between the Upper and the Lower Adige. Next day, the 24th (January 13), couriers came in one after another. Bonaparte was informed that Joubert, attacked by immense forces, was likely to be surrounded, and that it was owing only to the obstinacy and the success of his resistance that he was yet able to preserve the *plateau* of Rivoli: Augereau sent him a message from the Lower Adige that a fire of musketry was kept up along both banks, but that no event of importance had taken place. Bonaparte had not more than about two thousand Austrians before him at Verona. From that moment he guessed what the enemy was at, and he saw clearly that the principal attack was directed against Rivoli. He thought that Augereau would be sufficient to defend the Lower Adige; he reinforced him with a corps of cavalry, detached from Masséna's division. He ordered Serrurier, who was blockading Mantua, to send his reserve to Villa-Franca, that it might be stationed at intervals with reference to each point. He left a regiment of infantry, and one of cavalry, at Verona; and set out in the night between the 24th and 25th (January 13 and 14), with the 18th, 32nd, and 75th demi-brigades of Masséna's division, and two squadrons of cavalry. He sent a message to Rey not to stop at Castel-Novo, but to get with all possible speed up to Rivoli. He got forwards before his divisions, and arrived at Rivoli at two in the morning. The weather, which had been rainy for some days, had now cleared up. The sky was clear, the moon shone brightly, and it was bitter cold. On his arrival, Bonaparte beheld the whole horizon in a blaze with the enemy's fires. He reckoned him to have forty-five thousand men; Joubert had ten thousand at most: it was high time that some assistance should come up. The enemy had divided himself into three bodies. The principal, composed of a strong column of grenadiers, the whole of the cavalry, the whole of the artillery, and the baggage, proceeded under Quasdanovich, along the high road between the river and Monte Baldo, and was to debouch by the zigzag road of Incanale. Three other divisions, under the command of Ocskay, Kobloe, and Liptai, solely composed of infantry, had climbed the steep and long slopes of the mountains, and were to get to the field of battle by descending the steps of the amphitheatre formed by Monte Baldo round the *plateau* of Rivoli. A fourth division, under the command of Lusignan, winding round the side of the *plateau*, was to station itself on the rear of the French army, to cut it off from the road to Verona. Lastly, Alvinzy had detached a sixth division, which, from its position, had no connexion with the operation. It marched on the other side of the Adige, and followed the road running outside along the river through Roveredo, Dolce, and Verona. This division, commanded by Wukassovich, could at most send a few balls upon the field of battle by firing from one bank across to the other.

Bonaparte instantly perceived that he must keep the *plateau* at any rate. He had in front the Austrian infantry descending the amphitheatre, without a single piece of cannon; on his right he had the grenadiers, the artillery, the cavalry, advancing along the road by the river, and ready to debouch by the zigzag road of Incanale on his right flank. On his left, Lusignan was getting to the rear of Rivoli. The balls of Wukassovich, launched from the other side of the river, reached his advanced guard. Posted on the *plateau*, he prevented the junction of the different divisions. He played with his artillery upon the infantry, deprived of its cannon, and drove back the cavalry and artillery, crowded together in a narrow winding road. He did not concern himself as to the exertions Lusignan made to get at his rear, or that Wukassovich was firing some few cannon balls in the direction. Having resolved upon his plan with his accustomed promptness, he commenced his operations before daylight. Joubert had been obliged to keep his men close together, so that he should not occupy a greater space than would suffice for his strength; and it was apprehended that the infantry, descending the steps of Monte Baldo, would not effect its junction with the advanced guard of the column climbing up by Incanale. Bonaparte, long before daylight, ordered Joubert's troops, which, after forty-eight hours' fighting, were taking a little rest, to be roused. He made them attack the advanced posts of the Austrian infantry, drove them back, and extended himself more widely upon the *plateau*.

The action became extremely brisk. The Austrian infantry, having no cannon, retreated before our infantry provided with its formidable artillery, and fell back in a semicircle upon the amphitheatre of

Monte Baldo. But, at this moment, an unfortunate event happened on our left. Liptai's division, which kept the extremity of the enemy's semicircle, fell upon Joubert's left, composed of the 89th and 25th demi-brigades, surprised them, broke them, and compelled them to retire in disorder. The 14th, coming immediately after these two demi-brigades, formed *en crochet* to cover the rest of the line, and made a most admirable stand; the Austrians put forth all their strength against it, and were nearly overwhelming it. In particular, they tried hard to take its cannon, the horses attached to which had been killed. They had already reached the pieces, when an officer exclaimed, "Grenadiers of the 14th, will you let them take your guns!" Fifty men immediately rushed forward after the brave officer, repulsed the Austrians, harnessed themselves to the pieces, and drew them back.

Bonaparte perceiving the danger, left Berthier on the threatened point, and set out at a gallop for Rivoli to procure relief. Masséna's first troops had scarcely come up, after marching all night. Bonaparte took the 32nd, already distinguished by its exploits during the campaign, and brought it to bear upon the left, so as to rally the two demi-brigades which had given way. The intrepid Masséna advanced at its head, rallied behind him the broken troops, and overthrew all before him. He repulsed the Austrians, and placed himself by the side of the 14th, which had not ceased to perform prodigies of valour. The fight was thus kept up on this point, and the army occupied the semicircle of the *plateau*. But the momentary check of the left wing had obliged Joubert to fall back with the right; he gave ground, and already the Austrian infantry was a second time nearing that point which Bonaparte had such an object in compelling him to abandon; in fact, the Austrian infantry was about getting up to the outlet by which the winding road of Incanale led to the *plateau*. At this moment, the column composed of artillery and cavalry, and preceded by several battalions of grenadiers, ascending the winding road, and with incredible efforts of bravery, repulsed the 29th. Wukassovich, from the other bank of the Adige, sent a shower of cannon balls to protect this kind of escalade. Already had the grenadiers climbed the summit of the defile, and the cavalry was debouching in their train upon the *plateau*. This was not all. Lusignan's column, whose fires had been seen at a distance, and who had been perceived on the left, getting to the rear of the position of the French, were now coming up to their rear, in order to cut them off from the road to Verona, and to stop Rey, who was coming from Castel-Novo with the division of reserve. Lusignan's soldiers finding themselves on the rear of the French army, already clapped their hands, and considered it as taken. Thus, on this *plateau*, closely pressed in front by a semicircle of infantry, pressed on the rear on the left by a strong column, sealed on the right by the main body of the Austrian army, and galled by the cannon balls which came from the opposite bank of the Adige in the direction of this *plateau*, Bonaparte was alone with Joubert's and Masséna's divisions in the midst of a cloud of enemies. In fact, he was with sixteen thousand men, surrounded by forty thousand at least.

At this anxious moment, Bonaparte was not shaken; he retained all the fire and all the vivacity of inspiration. On seeing Lusignan's Austrians, he said, "*Those are ours!*" and he allowed them to engage without giving himself any concern about their movement. The soldiers, conjecturing what their general meant, experienced the same confidence, and also repeated to one another, "*They are ours!*"

At this moment Bonaparte did not concern himself with more than what was passing before him. His left was protected by the heroism of the 14th and the 32nd. His right was threatened at once by the infantry which had resumed the *offensive*, and by the column that was scaling the *plateau*. He immediately directed decisive movements to be effected. A battery of light artillery and two squadrons, under two brave officers, Leclerc and Laselle, were ordered to the outlet of which the enemy had taken possession. Joubert, who, with the extreme right, had this outlet at his back, suddenly faced about with a corps of light infantry. All charged at once. The artillery first poured a discharge upon all that had debouched; the cavalry and the light infantry then charged with vigour. Joubert's horse was killed under him; he got up nowise daunted, and rushed upon the enemy with a musket in his hand. All that had debouched, grenadiers, cavalry, artillery, all were hurled *pêle mêle* headlong down the winding road of Incanale. The confusion was awful; some pieces of cannon firing down into the defile, augmented the terror and the confusion. At every step, the French killed and made prisoners. Having cleared the *plateau* of the assailants who had scaled it, Bonaparte again returned to his attacks against the infantry which was ranged in semicircle before him, and set Joubert upon it with the light infantry, and Laselle with two hundred hussars. On this new attack, consternation seized that infantry, now deprived of all hope of effecting a junction with the main body; it fled in confusion. Our whole semicircular line then moved from right to left, drove back the Austrians against the amphitheatre of Monte Baldo, and pursued them as far as possible into the mountains. Bonaparte then returned, and proceeded to realize his prediction upon Lusignan's division. That body, on witnessing the disasters of the Austrian army, soon perceived what would be its own fate. Bonaparte, after firing upon it with grape-shot, ordered the 18th and the 75th demi-brigades to charge. These brave demi-brigades moved onwards, singing the *chant du départ*, and drove Lusignan along the Verona road, by which Rey was coming up with the reserve division. The Austrian corps at first made a stand, then retreated, and came full butt upon the advanced guard of Rey's division. Terrified at this sight, it sought the clemency of the conqueror, and laid down its arms, to the number of four thousand men. Two thousand had been taken in the defile of the Adige.

It was now five o'clock, and it may be said that the Austrian army was annihilated. Lusignan was taken; the infantry that had advanced from the mountains was taking flight over rugged declivities; the principal column was pent up on the bank of the river, while the subordinate division of Wukassovich was an idle spectator of the disaster, sepa-

rated by the Adige from the field of battle. This great victory did not confuse Bonaparte's ideas; he now turned his attention to the Lower Adige, which he had left exposed; he judged that Joubert, with his brave division, and Rey with the reserve division, would be well able to give the finishing blow to the enemy, and to take from him thousands of prisoners. He rallied Masséna's division, which had fought the preceding day at Verona, which had then marched all night, and again fought the whole of the 26th (14th), and he set out with it, to march the whole of the following night, and to hurry away to new battles. These brave soldiers, with joyful faces, and reckoning upon fresh victories, seemed to be incapable of fatigue. They flew, rather than marched, to protect Mantua, from which city they were fourteen leagues distant.

Bonaparte received intelligence by the way of what was passing on the Lower Adige. Provera getting away from Augereau, had thrown a bridge at Anghuiari, a little above Legnago; he had left Hohenzollern beyond the Adige, and marched to Mantua with nine or ten thousand men. Augereau, apprised too late, had nevertheless followed close upon him, taken him in rear, and made two thousand prisoners. But Provera himself, with seven or eight thousand men, was continuing his march towards Mantua, in order to join the garrison. Bonaparte learned these particulars at Castel-Novo. He was fearful lest the garrison, on hearing of them, should sally forth, and co-operate with the division that was coming up, and place the blockade division between two fires. He had marched the whole night between the 25th and 26th (14th and 15th), with Masséna's division; he made it continue its march the entire of the day of the 26th (15th), so that it might arrive in the evening before Mantua. Moreover he directed thither the reserves, which he had left on his road to Villa-Franca, and hastened thither himself to make his arrangements.

That same day, the 26th (15th), Provera had come up before Mantua. He presented himself before the suburb of Saint George, in which Miollis with at most fifteen hundred men had been stationed. Provera summoned him to surrender. The brave Miollis replied by a discharge of his artillery. Provera, repulsed, betook himself to the side nearest the citadel, in the expectation of a sally from Wurmser; but he found Serrurier before him. He halted at the palace of La Favorita, between Saint George and the citadel, and hastily despatched a boat across the lake, to tell Wurmser to debouch from the place on the following morning. Bonaparte arrived in the evening, posted Augereau on the rear of Provera, and Victor and Masséna on his flanks, so as to cut him off from the citadel, by which Wurmser would have to debouch. He posted Serrurier facing Wurmser. Next morning, the 27th Nivôse (January 16th), at daybreak, the battle commenced. Wurmser debouched from the place and attacked Serrurier with fury; the latter made a gallant defence, and kept him back along the lines of circumvallation. Victor, at the head of the 57th, which, on that day, received the name of *the Terrible*, rushed upon Provera, and carried all before him. After an obstinate conflict, Wurmser was driven back into Mantua. Provera, hunted like a deer, surrounded by Victor, Masséna, and Augereau, annoyed by a sally of Miollis, laid down his arms, with six thousand men. The young Vienna volunteers followed their example. After an honourable defence, they surrendered their arms, together with the colours embroidered by the hands of the empress herself.

Such was the last act of that memorable operation, which is considered by military men as one of the best conducted ever recorded in history. It was found that Joubert, in his pursuit of Alvinzy, had also taken from him seven thousand prisoners. Six thousand had been taken on the day of the battle of Rivoli, which made thirteen thousand; Augereau had taken two thousand; Provera had surrendered six thousand; one thousand had been picked up before Verona, and some hundreds elsewhere, which made the total number in three days amount to twenty-two or twenty-three thousand men. Masséna's division had marched and fought without intermission for four days, marching all night and fighting all day. Thus Bonaparte wrote with justifiable pride that his soldiers had surpassed the so much vaunted rapidity of Cæsar's legions. It can be easily understood at a later period why he attached to the name of Masséna that of Rivoli. The action of the 25th (January 14) was called the battle of Rivoli; that of the 27th (16th), before Mantua, the battle of La Favorita.

Thus in three days again, Bonaparte had taken or destroyed half of the enemy's army, and had, as it were, stricken it with a thunderbolt. Austria had made her expiring effort, and now Italy was ours. Wurmser, driven back into Mantua, was without hope; he had eaten all his horses, and the garrison was perishing from the joint effects of disease and famine. To have stood out any longer would have been not only useless, but trifling with human life. The veteran marshal had exhibited a noble courage and an uncommon resolution; he could now think of surrendering himself. He sent one of his officers to Serrurier to treat; this was Klenau. Serrurier referred to the commander-in-chief, who repaired to the conference. Bonaparte, wrapped in his cloak, without making himself known, listened to the conversation between Klenau and Serrurier. The Austrian officer expatiated largely on the resources which his general still had left, and declared that he had yet provisions for three months. Bonaparte, muffled up as before, approached the table at which the conference was held, snatched the paper on which Wurmser's propositions were written, and commenced making certain notes on the margin, without uttering a single word, and to the great astonishment of Klenau, who could not conceive what this unknown person was about. Afterwards rising and throwing off his cloak, Bonaparte stepped up to Klenau. "There," said he, "are the conditions which I grant to your marshal. If he had but a fortnight's provisions and could talk of surrender, he would not deserve an honourable capitulation. As he sends you, it must be that he is reduced to extremity. I respect his age, his intrepidity, and his misfortunes. Take him the conditions which I grant. Whether he leaves the place to-morrow, in a month, or in six months, he shall have neither better nor worse conditions. He can stay as long as may be consistent with his honour."

By this language and this tone Klenau recognized the illustrious commander, and hastened to take Wurmser the terms that had been offered him. The old marshal was very grateful for the generosity which his young adversary exhibited towards him. Bonaparte had given him permission to march freely out of the place with all his staff; he even allowed him two hundred horse, five hundred men, chosen by himself, and six pieces of cannon, to render his departure the less humiliating. The garrison was to be conducted to Trieste, and there exchanged against French prisoners. Wurmser readily accepted these conditions; and to testify his gratitude to the French general, he informed him of a plot hatched in the papal states to poison him. He was to quit Mantua on the 14th Pluviôse (February 2). His consolation was, that on leaving Mantua, he should deliver up his sword to the conqueror himself; but he found only the brave Serrurier, before whom he was obliged to file off with his whole staff. Bonaparte had already set out for Romagna, to chastise the pope and punish the Vatican. His vanity, as gigantic as his genius, did not evince itself in him as it would in ordinary minds; he far preferred being absent than present at the place of triumph.

Mantua having surrendered, Italy was absolutely conquered, and this campaign was terminated.

In generally reviewing the events of this campaign, the imagination is struck by the multitude of the battles, the fertility of ideas, and the immensity of the results. Bonaparte entering Italy with some thirty thousand men, first cuts off the Piedmontese from the Austrians at Montenotte and Millesimo, completes the destruction of the former at Mondovi, then hastens after the latter, crosses the Po at Placentia before their face and the Adda at Lodi, makes himself master of Lombardy, halts there an instant, again marches onward, finds the Austrians reinforced on the Mincio, and puts the finishing stroke to their destruction at the battle of Borghetto. There he seizes at a glance the plan of his future operations. It is on the Adige that he must establish himself to make head against the Austrians. As for the princes on his rear, he would content himself by quieting them with negotiations and threats. A second army is sent against him under Wurmser; he cannot beat it unless by rapidly concentrating his forces, and alternately attacking each of his separate masses; as a resolute man, he sacrifices the blockade of Mantua, crushes Wurmser at Lonato and at Castiglione, and drives him into the Tyrol. Wurmser is again reinforced, as Beaulieu had been. Bonaparte anticipated him in the Tyrol; ascends the Adige, overturns all before him at Roveredo, throws himself across the valley of the Brenta; cuts off Wurmser, who expected to perform the same manœuvre against him, fairly throws him at Bassano, and coops him up at Mantua. This is the second Austrian army destroyed after being reinforced.

Bonaparte, still negotiating and threatening the banks of the Adige, awaits the third army. It is formidable; it arrives before he has received reinforcements; he is obliged to give way before it; he is reduced to despair; he is about to succumb, when he discovers in the midst of an impassable morass, two lines debouching upon the enemy's flanks, and casts himself upon them with incredible audacity. He is again victor at Arcola. But the enemy is only checked—not destroyed; he returns, for the last time, and stronger than at first. On the one hand he descends from the mountains; on the other he advances along the Lower Adige. Bonaparte discovers the only point where the Austrian columns, winding through a mountainous country, can form a junction, dashes upon the celebrated *plateau* of Rivoli, and from that *plateau* confounded the main army of Alvinzy; then resuming his flight towards the Lower Adige, surrounds the whole column that had crossed it. His last operation is the most brilliant, for here good fortune was associated with talent. Thus, in ten months, besides the Piedmontese army, three formidable armies, thrice reinforced, had been destroyed by one, which, only thirty and a few odd thousand strong on taking the field, had received only about twenty thousand to repair its losses. Thus fifty-five thousand French had beaten more than two hundred thousand Austrians, taken more than eighty thousand, killed and wounded more than twenty thousand. They had fought twelve pitched battles, and more than sixty actions, and crossed several rivers, in defiance of the waves and the enemy's fire. When war is a purely mechanical routine, consisting only in driving and slaughtering the enemy you have before you, it is scarcely worth recording as history; but when one of those conflicts occur, where a mass of men are observed to be impelled by one absorbing and vast conception, which displays itself amidst the roar of cannon with as much distinctness as any idea of Newton or Descartes in the solitude of the closet, this is a matter worth the attention of the philosopher, as well as of the statesman and the soldier; and if this identification of the multitude with a single individual, who originates force at its highest impulse, is available for the defence and protection of a noble cause, that of liberty, then the scene becomes as much a subject for reflection as it is elevated.

Bonaparte now hurried on to new designs. He bent his steps towards Rome, to put an end to the shuffling at that court of priests, and to return, not to the Adige, but to Vienna. He had by his successes brought back the war to its appropriate theatre, Italy, from whence he could drop down upon the emperor's hereditary dominions. The government, who understood the motive and object of his achievements, sent him reinforcements to enable him to proceed to Vienna, and to dictate a glorious peace in the name of the French republic. The conclusion of the campaign had realized all the hopes to which its opening had given rise.

The triumphs of Rivoli had raised the joy of the patriots to the highest pitch. These twenty-two thousand prisoners were in every body's mouth, and the certificate of the authorities of Milan, who had reviewed them and certified their number, in order to silence all the doubts of malevolence, were cited in corroboration. The surrender of Mantua next came to fill the measure of public satisfaction. From that moment the conquest of Italy was considered as absolute. The courier who brought these tidings arrived in the evening in Paris. The

garrison was immediately assembled, and the intelligence published by torchlight, to the sound of trumpets and shouts of joy, from every Frenchman attached to his country. Ah! days long to be remembered and ever to be regretted by us! At what period was our country greater and more glorious! The storms of the revolution seemed to be succeeded by a calm; the discontented murmurs of the parties sounded like the expiring gusts of the tempest. These remains of agitation were considered as the very life of a free state. Trade and finance were emerging from a tremendous crisis; the entire soil, restored to industrious hands, was now to be rendered productive. A government composed of citizens, our equals, ruled the republic with moderation; the best were selected to succeed them. The great roads were open. France, at the height of power, was mistress of the soil extending from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, and from the sea to the Alps. Holland and Spain were about to unite their fleets with hers, and unite their efforts against maritime despotism. France was resplendent with immortal glory. Well disciplined armies caused her tricoloured banners to wave in the presence of those kings who intended to annihilate her. Twenty heroes, differing in character and talent, alike only in age and courage, led her soldiers to victory. Hoche, Kléber, Desaix, Moreau, Joubert, Masséna, Bonaparte, and a great number of others were following in their steps. People weighed their different merits; but no eye, piercing soever as it might be, could distinguish amongst this generation of heroes the unfortunate or the guilty; no eye could mark him who was so soon to expire in the flower of his age from the attack of an unknown disease, him who was to fall by the Mussulman dagger, or the fire of the enemy, him who should cramp liberty, or him who should betray his country: all appeared pure, happy, and affording augury of their future fame. This was but for a moment; but there are tides in the affairs of nations, as in the life of individuals. We were about to regain wealth with tranquillity; as for liberty and glory, we already possessed them! "The country," said one of the ancients, "ought to be not only prosperous, but sufficiently glorious." This aspiration was accomplished. Frenchmen, ye who have since seen our liberty extinguished, our country invaded, our heroes shot, or forgetful of their glory—let us never forget those ever memorable days of liberty, greatness, and expectation!

CHAPTER VII.

SITUATION OF THE GOVERNMENT DURING THE WINTER OF THE YEAR V. (1797.)—CHARACTER, OF AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FIVE DIRECTORS, BARRAS, CARNOT, REWBELL, LETOURNEUR, AND LARÉVELLIÈRE-LÉPEAUX.—STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION. THE CLICHY CLUB.—INTRIGUES OF THE ROYALIST FACTION. DISCOVERY OF A PLOT BY BROTTIER, LAVILLE-HEURNOIS, AND DUVERNE DE PRESLE.—ELECTIONS OF THE YEAR V.—REVIEW OF THE SITUATION OF THE FOREIGN POWERS AT THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1797.

THE late victories of Rivoli and La Favorita, and the capture of Mantua, had restored all her superiority to France. The directory, as grossly abused as ever, struck the greatest terror into the foreign powers. "Half Europe," wrote Mallet Dupan[1], "is on its knees before this divan, bargaining for the honour of becoming its tributary." These fifteen months' firm and brilliant reign had not only firmly seated the five directors in the government, but had also developed their passions and their characters. Men cannot live long together without exhibiting either preference or distaste to one another, and without making their associations in conformity with their inclinations. Carnot, Barras, Rewbell, Larévellière-Lépeaux, and Letourneur, had already begun to exclusively associate with each other. Carnot was systematic, headstrong, and proud. He was totally deficient in that habitude which imparts enlarged views and precision to the mind, and aptitude to the character. He was shrewd, and carefully investigated every subject he had to examine; but when once involved in an error, he never extricated himself from it. He was upright, persevering, very attentive to business, but never forgave either a wrong or an affront offered to his self-love; he was witty and original, which is not uncommon with men of great mental resources. He had formerly quarrelled with the members of the committee of public welfare, for it was impossible that his pride should sympathize with that of Robespierre and Saint Just, and that his great courage should quail before their despotism. At this time, the same thing could hardly fail to happen to him with regard to the directory. Independent of the circumstances which made him run against his colleagues while engaged in common with them in a task so difficult as that of government, and which so naturally provokes a diversity of opinions, he nursed up bygone resentments, particularly against Barras. The whole tenor of his conduct, as a strict, upright, laborious man, estranged him from this prodigal, debauched, and indolent colleague; but he was particularly disgusted with him as being the chief of those Thermidorians, friends and avengers of Danton, and persecutors of the old Mountain. Carnot, who was one of the principal authors of Danton's death, and who would shortly have fallen a victim to the persecutions directed against the Mountain, could not forgive the Thermidorians; he therefore cherished a settled dislike against Barras.

Barras had formerly served in India; and had there displayed the courage of a soldier. He was a fit man to put himself on horseback in times of disturbances; and as we have already seen, it was by so doing that he had gained his place in the directory. So, on all troublous occasions did he still talk of getting on horseback, and of cutting

[1] Secret correspondence with the Venetian government.

down the enemies of the republic. In person he was tall and handsome; but in his countenance there was something dark and sinister, that harmonized little with his character, which was rather choleric than wicked. Although he was brought up in a superior station in life, there was nothing in his address that indicated the well-bred man. His address in fact was coarse, bold, and vulgar. He possessed a shrewdness and sharpness of wit that with study and application might have been turned to good account; but indolent and ignorant, he knew at the most no more than what is acquired in an agitated state of existence, and in those matters upon which he was daily called to give his opinion, he suffered sufficient good sense to peep out, to make one regret that his education had not been more attended to. In other respects, profligate and cynical, violent and faithless, as southerns generally are who care to conceal their duplicity under an affected bluntness, republican by sentiment and by position, but an inconsistent man, admitting to his house the most violent revolutionists of the faubourgs, and all the emigrants returned to France, pleasing the one by his trivial vehemence, and making himself agreeable to the other by his spirit of intrigue, he was in reality a warm patriot, and in secret he held out hopes to all parties. He was the representative of the Danton party in every thing save Danton's talent, which had not been transmitted to his successors.

Rewbell, formerly an advocate at Colmar, had acquired at the bar and in our different assemblies great experience in the conduct of affairs. With the most extraordinary shrewdness and discernment, he combined extensive information, a prodigious memory, and a remarkable attention to business. These qualities made him an indispensable personage at the head of the state. He thoroughly sifted matters, though somewhat argumentatively, from an adherence to former professional habits. To a personable appearance he joined easy manners; but he was coarse and affronting by the warmth and keenness of his language. Notwithstanding the false insinuations of the counter-revolutionists and the malignants, he was thoroughly honest. Unfortunately he was not without some tincture of avarice; he was desirous of investing his private fortune in a profitable manner, and it was this that caused him to be resorted to by men of business, and gave some weight to vexatious imputations. He was particularly diligent in attending to foreign affairs, and his attachment to the interests of France was so strong, that he would willingly have acted unjustly towards foreign nations. A warm, steady, and staunch republican, he belonged originally to the moderate part of the convention, and was quite as much estranged from Carnot as he was from Barras, the one as a Mountaineer, the other as a Dantonist. Thus Carnot, Barras, and Rewbell, all three of them coming from adverse parties, hated one another; thus the animosities kindled during a long and terrible struggle were not extinguished under the constitutional system; thus hearts had not reciprocated feelings, as rivers which unite without mingling their streams. Notwithstanding, while these three men cordially hated one another, they repressed their resentments, and laboured heartily in the common cause.

There remained Larévellière-Lépeaux and Letourneur, who bore no animosity to any one. Letourneur, a vain easy creature, but whose conceit was not overbearing and annoyed no one, who was satisfied with the outward insignia of power and the salutes of sentinels, Letourneur possessed a respectful esteem for Carnot. He was ready to offer his opinion, but equally ready to abandon it the moment he found that his notions were erroneous, or when Carnot had spoken. His vote on all occasions was with Carnot.

Larévellière, the most honest and best of men, united with great and varied information a well-regulated and observant mind. He was very attentive in business, and was capable of giving sound advice on all subjects; and in fact, he did give good advice upon important occasions. But he was frequently hurried away by illusory notions, or checked by the scruples of a single-hearted mind. He sometimes desired what was impracticable, and did not venture to call for what was necessary; for it requires a great mind to calculate how much is to be conceded to circumstances without compounding principles. As a good orator and endued with extraordinary firmness, he was highly useful when good suggestions were to be supported, and his personal consideration rendered the directory no small assistance.

His part among colleagues who detested each other was extremely serviceable. Among the four directors, he entertained a decided preference in favour of the most honest and the most talented, namely, Rewbell. Yet he had cautiously avoided any close connexion, which would have been more to his taste, if it would not have alienated him from his other colleagues. He was not without some preference for Barras, and would have been on closer terms with him had he found him less corrupt and less insincere. He possessed a certain ascendancy over his colleague, by reason of his high standing, his shrewdness, and his firmness. Profligates are never behindhand in scoffing at virtue, but they fear her when she combines with that sagacity which exposes them, the moral courage that defies them. Larévelliere exerted his influence over Rewbell and Barras, to keep them in harmony with one another and with Carnot. Owing to this mediator, and owing also to their zeal for the interests of the republic, these directors lived on terms of ordinary politeness together, and prosecuted their task, delivering their opinions on the questions they had to decide much rather in accordance with their real feelings than with reference to their animosities.

With the exception of Barras, the directors resided with their families, each occupying a suite of rooms in the Luxembourg. They lived in an inexpensive style. However, Larévelliere, who was fond of company, and of the arts and sciences, and who deemed it his duty to spend his salary in a manner useful to the state, admitted to his house scientific and literary characters, but he treated them with simplicity and cordiality. He had unfortunately exposed himself to some ridicule, without having in the least deserved it. He adhered in every respect to the philosophy of the eighteenth century, as expressed in the profession of faith of the Savoyard vicar. He wished for the fall of the Catholic religion, and he flattered himself that it

would soon be extinguished, if governments had the prudence to employ against it nothing else than neglect and disregard. He was against all superstitious ceremonies, and all substantive representations of the Deity; but he conceived that public meetings were requisite for men, that there they might discourse together on morality and the greatness of the Deity, as manifested in the creation. These subjects, in fact, ought to be treated of in public assemblies, because men there are more readily moved, and are more accessible to elevated and generous sentiments. He had promulgated these ideas in a written work, wherein he had said that it would be well some day to supersede the ceremonies of the Catholic worship by meetings like those of the Protestants, but more simple and more free from formality. This idea, adopted by some well-meaning minds, was immediately carried into execution. A brother of Haüy, the celebrated geologist, formed a society which he called the *Theophilanthropists*, whose meetings were instituted for the purpose of moral exhortations, philosophical lectures, and pious hymns. More than one society of this kind was formed. They assembled in halls hired at their own expense, and under the superintendence of the police. Although Larévellière considered this institution meritorious, and likely to draw from the Catholic churches many of those tender consciences who yearn for the outpouring of their religious sentiments in common, he took care that neither himself or his family should ever figure there, lest he should be supposed to assume the character of the leader of a sect, and recall the associations created by the pontificate of Robespierre. In spite of Larévellière's caution, malignity seized that pretext to throw some ridicule on a magistrate universally honoured, and who gave no occasion for calumny. Besides, if Theophilanthropism were the subject of some pointless jokes in Barras's parties, or in the royalist journals, it attracted but little notice, and did not in the least diminish the respect which Larévellière-Lépeaux enjoyed.

That director who really injured the respect due to the government, was Barras. His mode of life was not so simple and retired as his colleagues; he displayed a luxury and a prodigality for which his participation in the profits of men of business could alone account. The finances were managed with strict probity by the directorial majority and by the excellent minister Ramel; but they could not prevent Barras from receiving from the contractors, or the bankers whom he supported with his influence, a very considerable share of their bonuses. He had a thousand other ways of supplying his extravagance. France had become the arbitress of so many states, great and small, that many princes were glad to seek her favour, and to pay large sums for the promise of a voice in the directory. We shall soon see what was attempted in this way. The exhibition that Barras displayed might not in itself have been useless, for the leaders of a state ought to mix much with company, in order to study men, to learn their characters, and to select proper objects for their purposes; but he surrounded himself not only with men of business, but with intriguers of all sorts, dissolute women, and persons of bad character. His withdrawing rooms were the scene of the most scandalous licentiousness. Those clandestine connexions which in well-regulated society every body strives to conceal, were publicly avowed. Gros-Bois was the place where these orgies were celebrated, which furnished the enemies of the republic with powerful arguments against the government. Besides, Barras himself did not care to conceal any part of his conduct, and like most debauchees, he boasted of his irregularities. He himself related to his colleagues, who sometimes severely condemned him, his excesses at Gros-Bois and the Luxembourg; he would tell them how he had forced a celebrated contractor of that day to take off his hands a mistress of whom he began to be tired, and whose extravagance he could no longer supply; how he had revenged himself upon the abbé Poncelin, a newspaper writer, for some personal invectives against him; and how, after getting him to come to the Luxembourg, he had made his servants give him a flogging. This aping of an ill-regulated prince, was in a republic extremely prejudicial to the directory, and would have completely lowered it in public estimation, had not the high reputation and the virtues of Carnot and Larévellière compensated for the ill effect of the excesses of Barras.

The directory, instituted on the morrow of the 15th Vendémiaire*, formed in the spirit of hatred to counter-revolution, composed of regicides, and furiously attacked by the royalists, could not but be warmly republican. But each of its members participated more or less in the opinions that divided France. Larévellière and Rewbell possessed that moderate but rigid republicanism, which was as much opposed to the excesses of 1793 as to the royalist frenzies of 1795. To gain them over to the counter-revolution was impossible. The unerring instinct of the parties taught them that from such men nothing was to be obtained either by corruption or by eulogiums in the newspapers. Accordingly, the parties had nothing but the most bitter accusations against those two directors. As for Barras and Carnot, it was otherwise with them. Barras, though he entertained everybody, was in reality an ardent revolutionist. The faubourgs made much of him, and had not forgotten that he had been the general of Vendémiaire, and the conspirators of the camp of Grenelle had considered that they could reckon upon him. Accordingly, the patriots loaded him with praise, and the royalists overwhelmed him with invectives. Some secret agents of royalism, brought in contact with him by a common spirit of intrigue, might indeed, calculating upon his depravity, conceive some hopes; but this was an opinion which they kept to themselves. The great bulk of the party abhorred him, and pursued him with the utmost animosity.

Carnot, ex-mountaineer, formerly member of the committee of public welfare, and in danger after the 9th Thermidor of becoming a victim to the royalist reaction, ought certainly to have been a decided republican, and he really was so. At the first moment of his entrance into the directory, he had strongly supported all the appointments taken from the mountaineer party; but by degrees, in proportion as the terrors of Vendémiaire subsided, his

* Year IV. 4 October, 1795.

Circumstances of the government in the winter of the year V.—The state of public opinion with regard to the directorial mode of government.

inclinations had changed. Carnot, even in the committee of public welfare, had never liked the herd of the turbulent revolutionists, and had powerfully contributed to destroy the Hebertists. On seeing Barras, who wanted to continue king of the mob (*roi de la canaille*), surround himself with the relics of the Jacobin party, he had become hostile to that party; he had displayed great energy in the affair of the camp of Grenelle, and the more so as Barras was somewhat compromised in that rash attempt. Nor is this all; thoughts were Carnot's tormentors. The charge that had been made against him of having signed the most sanguinary acts of the committee of public welfare extremely harassed him. It was not enough for him that he had given very reasonable explanations; he would have wished to prove by every possible means that he was no monster; and he would have made great sacrifices to prove this. Parties know every thing, guess at every thing; they are not nice with respect to persons when they are victorious; but when they are vanquished they draw others into their association in every possible manner, and above all, are careful to pay their court to the commanders of armies. The royalists were soon aware of Carnot's inclinations in regard to Barras and the patriot party. They had discovered his anxiety to reinstate himself in the good opinion of the public; they were aware of his military importance, and they took care to treat him differently from his colleagues, and to speak of him in the manner which they knew to be most likely to affect him. Thus, while the whole tribe of their journals never stopped their current of gross abuse against Barras, Larévellière and Rewbell, they did nothing else than pass eulogiums on the ex-mountaineer and regicide Carnot. Moreover, in gaining over Carnot, they would also have Letourneur, and thus two voices were gained by a common but powerful artifice, like all those which are addressed to vanity. Carnot had the weakness to yield to this kind of seduction; and without ceasing to be governed by his internal convictions, he formed with his friend Letourneur in the body of the directory a kind of opposition, not dissimilar to that which the new third formed in the two councils. On all questions, in fact, on which the directory had to deliberate, he pronounced in favour of the opinion adopted by the opposition. Thus, on all questions relative to peace and war, he voted for peace, after the example of the opposition, which affected continually to demand it. He had strongly recommended that the greatest sacrifices should be made to the emperor, and that peace should be signed with Naples and Rome, without insisting on too rigorous conditions.

No sooner do such differences of opinion break out than they make rapid progress. The party desirous of making the most by them bestows the most extravagant praise on those whom it wishes to gain over, and turns the blame upon the others. This mode of proceeding had met with its usual success. Barras and Rewbell, already inimical to Carnot, had a still greater grudge against him ever since the praise that had been lavished upon him, and laid to his charge the inveterate attacks of which they were the object. Larévellière did all he could, but in vain, to appease these animosities; but dissension nevertheless made baneful progress. The public, apprised of what was going on, distinguished the directory into majority and minority, classing Larévellière, Rewbell, and Barras in the former, and Carnot and Letourneur in the latter.

The ministers were also classified. As the utmost desire was manifested of finding fault with the management of the finances, a clamour was raised against the minister Ramel, an excellent public manager, whom the impoverished state of the exchequer compelled to resort to expedients censurable at any other time, but which could not be avoided in the present state of things. The taxes came in but slowly, owing to the terrible irregularities in the collection. It had been found necessary to reduce the land-tax, and the customs, excise, stamps, and registry duties (*contributions indirectes*) yielded much less than had been expected. There were frequently no funds whatever in the treasury; and in these emergencies, the funds appropriated for the ordinary expenses were applied in discharge of the extraordinary, or perhaps the receipts themselves were anticipated, or else those improvident and usurious contracts were made which always take place on such occasions. A great outcry was being kept up against abuses and peculations, at a time when every assistance should have been rendered to the government. Ramel, who performed the duties of his office with equal integrity and intelligence, was the butt of every attack, and received no quarter from the newspapers. It was the same with Truguet, the minister of the marine, well known as an open-hearted republican, as the friend of Hoche, and as a supporter of all the patriot officers; so it was with Delacroix, the minister for foreign affairs, capable of forming a good manager for the public, but in other respects a bad diplomatist, too pedantic, and too gross in his intercourse with the ministers of foreign powers; the same with Merlin, who in his administration of justice displayed all the fervour of a mountaineer republican. As for Benezech, Petiet, and Cochon, the ministers of the interior, of war, and of the police, they were classed entirely by themselves. Benezech had sustained so many attacks from the Jacobins for having proposed to return to the free-trade system in articles of consumption, and for ceasing to feed Paris at the public expense, that he had gone over to the counter-revolutionary party. An able public manager, but schooled under the old system, which he regretted, he partly deserved the favour of those who praised him. Petiet, minister at war, acquitted himself ably of his functions; but being a creature of Carnot's, he shared precisely the same fate as the latter with the parties. As for Cochon, he was also recommended by his connexion with Carnot; and the discovery he had made of the plots of the Jacobins, and the zeal which he had shown in prosecuting them, had won the favour of the opposite party, who landed him up to the skies.

Notwithstanding these contrarieties of opinion, the government was still sufficiently united to rule with vigour, and to prosecute with glory its operations against the powers of Europe. The opposition was constantly kept down by the conventional majority remaining in the legislative body. The elections, however, were approaching, and the

moment was at hand when a new third, chosen under the influence of the moment, would succeed another conventional third. The opposition flattered itself that it would then acquire the majority, and emerge from the state of submission in which it had existed. Accordingly, its language in the two councils became more loud, and suffered its expectations to manifest themselves. The members of this minority met at Tivoli, there to talk over their plans, and to concert their measures. This meeting of deputies had become a most violent club, known by the name of the *Clichy Club*. The journals participated in this movement. A great number of young men, who under the old system would have composed morsels of poetry, now declaimed through fifty or sixty pages, against the excesses of the revolution and against the convention, to whom they imputed those excesses. They bore no hostility, they said, to the republic, but with those who had stained its cradle with blood. The assemblies of electors were forming beforehand, and every exertion was made to influence their choice. This was in every respect the language, the spirit, and the passions of Vendémiaire; the same simplicity and the same credulity in the mass, the same ambition in certain individuals, the same perfidy in some few conspirators secretly engaged for the purpose of royalty.

The royalist faction, always beaten, but still credulous and intriguing, was interminably kept on foot. Wherever there is a claim supported by some pecuniary assistance, there will always be found intriguers ready to serve it by petty designs. Although Lemaitre had been condemned to death, La Vendée quelled, Pichegru deprived of the command of the army of the Rhine, the plots of the counter-revolution were by no means extinguished; far otherwise, they were prosecuted with extreme activity. The relative positions of the individuals were singularly changed. The pretender, who alternately bore the title of count de Lille and Louis XVIII., had left Venice, as we have seen, to proceed to the army of the Rhine. He had stopped for a moment in the camp of the prince of Condé, where an accident placed his life in jeopardy. Standing at a window, he was fired at and slightly grazed by the ball. This attempt, the author of which remained unknown, could not fail to be attributed to the directory, which was not so short-sighted to pay for a crime that would have done no service to any body but the count d'Artois. The pretender did not stay long with the prince of Condé. His presence in the Austrian army was not agreeable to the cabinet of Vienna, who had shown no desire to recognize him, and was aware that his presence would only serve to inflame the quarrel with France, a quarrel already too sanguinary and too expensive. He was quietly told to go away, and on his refusal, a detachment was sent to compel him. He then retired to Blankenburg, where he continued to be the centre of communication. Condé remained with his regiment upon the Rhine. The count d'Artois, after his vain schemes respecting La Vendée, had retired to Scotland, whence he still corresponded with some intriguers, passing to and fro between La Vendée and England.

Lemaitre being dead, his associates had taken his place, and succeeded him in the confidence of the pretender. These were, as we have already seen, the abbé Brottier, formerly a tutor; Laville Heurnois, formerly the master of requests; a certain chevalier Despomelles, and a naval officer named Duverne de Presle. The old system of these agents, stationed in Paris, was to do every thing through the medium of the intriguers in the capital, while the Vendeans pretended to do every thing by armed insurrection, and the prince of Condé to do every thing by means of Pichegru. La Vendée being subdued, Pichegru doomed to retirement, and an alarming reaction breaking out against the revolution, the Paris agents were the more fully persuaded that every thing was to be expected from a spontaneous movement of the interior. To control the elections, then by the elections to control the councils, by the councils the directory and the public offices, seemed to them a sure way to re-establish royalty with the very means rendered available to them by the constitution of the republic. But to effect this, that contrariety of opinions that had always prevailed in counter-revolutionary designs must first cease. Puisaye, who remained concealed in Brittany, was dreaming there, as formerly, of an insurrection in that province. In Normandy, M. de Frotté was striving to excite a rising similar to that which had taken place in La Vendée, but neither of them would put themselves in communication with the Paris agents. The prince of Condé, duped in his intrigue with Pichegru upon the Rhine, was always desirous of acting individually in this matter, without mixing the Austrians or the pretender up with it, and he was heartily sorry that he had let them into the secret. To impart some consistency to these incoherent projects, and more especially to obtain money, the Paris agents sent one of their number into the western provinces, and into England, Scotland, Germany, and Switzerland. Duverne de Presle was the person thus selected. Being unable to deprive Puisaye of his command, they strove, by the influence of the count d'Artois, to force him to join the system of the Paris agents, and to come to an understanding with them. They obtained from the English the most important thing, some assistance in money. They procured powers from the pretender, which made all the intrigues depend upon the Paris agency. An interview was had with the prince of Condé, who was not to be rendered either intelligent or tractable. An interview was also had with M. de Précy, who was still the secret promoter of the disturbances at Lyons and in the south. At last a general plan was concerted, but it had neither consistency or unity, except upon paper, and it did not prevent every one from doing just as he chose, and in conformity with his personal interests and pretensions.

It was settled that France should be divided into two agencies, one comprising the east and the south, the other the north and the west. M. de Précy was to be at the head of the former, the Paris agents were to direct the latter. These two agencies were to mutually arrange all their operations, and to correspond directly with the pretender, who was to give them his orders. Secret associations were devised on the model of those formed by Babœuf. They were to be entirely unconnected with one another, and were not to know

the names of the leaders, so that the apprehension of one of the parties should not lead to the seizure of all the conspirators. These associations were to be adapted to the state of France. As it had been observed that the greater part of the population, without desiring the return of the Bourbons, wished for peace and quiet, and imputed to the directory the continuance of the revolutionary system, a sort of masonic society was formed, called the *Philanthropists*, who engaged to use their electoral rights, and to exercise them in favour of men opposed to the directory. The Philanthropists were unacquainted with the secret object of these underplots, and all that was held out to them was the mere intention of strengthening the opposition. Another association, more secret, more concentrated, less numerous, and intituled the *Faithful*, was to be composed of those more resolute and devoted men, to whom the secret of the faction might be communicated. The *Faithful* were to be secretly armed, and ready for all sudden attacks. They were to enrol themselves in the national guard, which was not yet organized, and under cover of that uniform to execute the more securely the orders that should be given them. Their special mission was, independent of every plan of insurrection, to watch the elections; and if the parties should come to blows, as had been the case in Vendémiaire, to fly to the assistance of the opposition party. The *Faithful*, moreover, were to aid in concealing emigrants and priests, in forging passports, in persecuting the revolutionists and the purchasers of the national estates. These associations were to be under the direction of military leaders, who were to correspond with the two principal agencies, and to receive orders from them. Such was the new plan of the faction; a chimerical design, which history would disdain to record, did it not make us acquainted with the bitter fancies on which defeated parties chew the cud. Notwithstanding this assumed consistency, the association of the south did nothing else than produce some anonymous companies, acting without direction and without object, and solely governed by the ideas of revenge and plunder. Puisaye, Frotté, and Rochecot, in Brittany and Normandy, laboured apart to get up another Vendée, and disavowed the mixed counter-revolution of the Paris agents. Puisaye even published a manifesto, declaring that Brittany would never second any plans which did not tend to restore by open force an absolute and unrestricted royalty to the family of Bourbon.

The prince of Condé continued on his part to correspond directly with Pichegru, whose singular and strange conduct can only be accounted for by his embarrassing situation. This general, the only commander recorded in history to have voluntarily suffered himself to be beaten, had himself required his dismissal. This conduct must appear surprising, for it was depriving himself of every possible influence, and consequently rendering himself incapable of accomplishing his pretended designs. However, we shall be able to account for it in attentively considering Pichegru's situation: he could not continue general, without at last putting in execution the plans he had engaged to accomplish, and for which he had received considerable sums. Pichegru had before his eyes three examples, all of them different cases, Bouillé, Fayette, and Dumouriez, which proved to him that it was impossible to seduce a whole army. He wished, therefore, to put it out of his power to attempt any such thing; and this explains his requiring his dismissal, which the directory, wholly ignorant of his treason, did not accept without concern. The prince of Condé and his agents were extremely surprised at the conduct of Pichegru, and conceived that he had cheated them out of their money, and that in reality he had never intended to serve them. But he had hardly been discharged before he returned to the banks of the Rhine, upon pretext of selling his carriages, and then proceeded into the Jura, which was his native country. From that place he continued to correspond with the agents of the prince, to whom he represented his resignation as a deep-laid scheme. He should be considered, he said, as a victim of the directory; he was going to connect himself with all the royalists of the interior, and to form an immense party; his army, in the command of which he was to be succeeded by Moreau, would deeply regret him, and on the first reverse that it should sustain, it would not fail to call for its old general, and to revolt in order to obtain his reinstatement. He should take advantage of this moment to throw off the mask, hasten to his army, assume the dictatorship, and proclaim royalty. This ridiculous plan, had it been sincere, would have been baulked by the successes of Moreau, who, even during his famous retreat, always came off victorious. The prince of Condé, the Austrian generals, whom he had been obliged to trust in this matter, and Wickham, the English minister in Switzerland, began to believe that Pichegru had cheated them. They had no desire to continue the correspondence; but at the pressing requests of the intermediate agents, who never liked to be unsuccessfully employed, the correspondence was continued, to see whether any good could come of it. The correspondence came by way of Strasburg, through the medium of some spies, who crossed the Rhine, and met at Klinglin's, the Austrian general; and so on by Bâle, with the English minister, Wickham. Pichegru stayed in the Jura, without refusing or accepting the embassy to Sweden, which had been offered him, but striving to get himself nominated deputy, paying the agents of the prince with the most wretched promises, and continually receiving considerable sums. He held out hopes of the most important results from his nomination to the five hundred; he boasted of an influence which he did not possess; he pretended to be giving the directory perfidious advice, and inducing it to adopt dangerous resolutions; he took honour to himself for the long defence of Kehl, which, he said, he had recommended for the purpose of compromising the army. Very little faith was placed in these pretended services. The count de Bellegarde wrote, "We are in the situation of the gambler who wishes to regain his money, and who is exposing himself to further loss in the hope of recovering what he has lost." The Austrian generals continued, nevertheless, to keep up the correspondence, because, although nothing very great could be done, yet at all events they obtained valuable particulars concerning the state and the movements of the French army. The infamous agents of this correspondence sent to general Klinglin such state-

ments and plans as they could procure. During the siege of Kehl they had been continually marking the points upon which the enemy's fire might be directed with the greatest effect.

Such was then the miserable part performed by Pichegru. With an understanding not above mediocrity, he was cunning and wary, and had sufficient tact and experience to believe any plan of counter-revolution impracticable at the moment. His everlasting delays, and his fables to amuse the credulity of the prince's agents, prove his conviction on this point; and his conduct in important circumstances will go much further. He received, nevertheless, the reward agreed on for designs he would not execute, and had the art to cause it to be offered to him without his asking for it.

After all, this was the way in which all the agents of royalism behaved. They had most impudently boasted of an influence they did not possess, and pretended to have influence over the personages of the greatest importance, to whom they had never spoken a word. Brottier, Duverne de Presle, and Laville-Heurnois, boasted that they could command a great number of the deputies in the two councils, and felt assured they should have many more after the new elections. There was nothing of the kind; they had no communication except with the deputy Lemerer, and one Mersan, who had been excluded from the legislative body by virtue of the law of the 3rd Brumaire against the relatives of emigrants. By means of Lemerer, they pretended to have got all the deputies belonging to the Clichy club. They judged from the speeches and the votes of those deputies that they would probably applaud the restoration of the monarchy, and for that reason they deemed themselves authorized beforehand to make a demonstration of their attachment and even of their repentance to the king of Blankenburg. These wretches imposed on this king, and calumniated the members of the Clichy club. There were among them ambitious men, who were enemies of the conventionalists, because the conventionalists had the entire government in their hands, men exasperated against the revolution, dupes who suffered themselves to be led, but very few men bold enough to turn their thoughts towards royalty, and of sufficient capacity to effectually advance its re-establishment. Yet it was upon such foundations that the agents of royalism built their designs and their assurances.

It was England that furnished all the funds for the presumed counter-revolution. She sent from London to Brittany the assistance required by Puisaye. Wickham, the English minister in Switzerland, was directed to supply the two agencies of Lyons and Paris with money, and to send some direct to Pichegru, who in the terms of the correspondence was "*treasured up for great occasions.*"

The agents of the counter-revolution had intended to take the money of England, and then laugh at her. They had agreed with the pretender to receive her funds, without ever following any of her views, and without ever complying with any of her suggestions, which they alleged it was right to distrust. England was not their dupe, and felt for them all the contempt they deserved. Wickham, Pitt, indeed no one of the English ministers, placed the least reliance on the operations of these gentry, and had no hope whatever of a counter-revolution by their means. They wanted turbulent spirits, who should disturb France, who should give general uneasiness by their designs, and who, without putting the government in any real peril, should cause exaggerated apprehensions. They cheerfully devoted one or perhaps two million a year to this purpose. Thus the agents of the counter-revolution deceived themselves in supposing that they were deceiving the English. With every desire to act the cheat, they were unable to do so; for England never reckoned upon greater results than those which they were capable of producing.

Such were then the designs and the means of the royalist faction. Cochon, minister of the police, was partly acquainted with them; he knew that there were in Paris correspondents of the court of Blankenburg; for throughout our long revolution, during which one plot was constantly succeeded by another, there is not a single instance of a conspiracy having remained unknown. He attentively watched their proceedings, surrounded them with spies, and waited for an overt act on their part, that he might take them with the means of conviction. They soon gave him the opportunity. In conformity with their notable design of gaining over the authorities, they first thought of securing the military authorities of Paris. The principal forces of the capital consisted of the grenadiers of the legislative body, and those in the camp of Sablons. The grenadiers of the legislative body were a picked corps of twelve hundred men, whom the constitution had placed about the two councils as a guard of safety and honour. Their commandant, adjutant-general Ramel, was known for his moderate sentiments, and in the estimation of the silly agents of Louis XVIII. this was a sufficient reason to set him down for a royalist. The armed force assembled at Sablons amounted to nearly twelve thousand men. The commander of this armed force was general Hatry, a brave man, whom they had no hope of gaining over. They turned their eyes to the colonel of the 21st dragoons, named Malo, who had so briskly charged the Jacobins at the time of their ridiculous attempt on the camp of Sablons. They argued respecting him as they did about Ramel, and because he had repulsed the Jacobins it was concluded that he would welcome the royalists. Brottier, Laville-Heurnois, and Duverne de Presle, sounded both of them, and made proposals, which were listened to and immediately denounced to the minister of the police. The latter enjoined Ramel and Malo to continue to lend an ear to the conspirators, in order to get at their whole scheme. Accordingly, they were encouraged to enter into a long explanation of their designs, their means, and their hopes, and another interview was appointed, at which they were to exhibit the powers that they had received from Louis XVIII. Advantage was to be taken of this opportunity for securing them. The interviews took place in the apartments occupied by Malo in the military school. Gendarmes and witnesses were concealed in such a manner as to hear every thing, and to be able to show themselves at a given signal. Accordingly, on the 11th Pluviôse, these wretched dupes attended, bringing with them the powers of Louis XVIII., and again detailed their

plans. The interview over, they were going to part, when they were seized by the agents employed for the purpose, and taken before the minister of the police. Messengers were immediately sent to their residences, and all their papers were secured in their presence. Among them were found letters which furnished sufficient proofs of the conspiracy, and in part discovered the details. It was seen, for example, that those gentry composed an entire government at their pleasure. They meant, for the moment, and till the return of the king from Blankenburg, to suffer part of the existing authorities to remain. Among others, they proposed to retain Benezech in the department of the interior, and Cochon in that of the police; and if the royalists should feel shy of the latter as a regicide, they designed to put M. Siméon or M. Portalis in his place. They meant, moreover, to give the superintendence of the finances to M. Barbe-Marbois, "*who*," they said, "*possesses talents and information, and has the credit of being an honest man.*" They had, to be sure, not consulted MM. Portalis, Siméon, Benezech, Barbé-Marbois, and Cochon, to whom they were totally unknown; but they had disposed of them, as they were accustomed to do, without their knowledge, and on their presumed opinions.

The discovery of this plot produced a very great sensation, and proved that it behoved the republic to be continually upon its guard against its old enemies. It excited a positive astonishment in the members of the opposition, whose acts tended to royalism without their being aware of it, and who were not at all in the secret. This astonishment proved how those wretches boasted when they sent assurances to Blankenburg that they had at their disposal a great number of the members of both councils. The directory proposed to give them up immediately to a military commission. They denied the competency of its authority, asserting that they had not been taken in arms, or making any attempt by violence. Several deputies, united in sentiment to their cause, supported them in the councils; the directory nevertheless persisted in sending them to a military commission for trial, because they had attempted to seduce military officers.

Their system of defence was plausible enough. They admitted their title of agents of Louis XVIII., but declared that they had no other commission than to prepare the public opinion, and to expect from that alone, and not from force, a return to monarchical ideas. They were condemned to death, but their punishment was commuted to that of imprisonment, in consequence of the confessions of Duverne de Presle*. The latter made a long statement to the directory, which was inserted in the secret register, and in which he disclosed all the intrigues of the royalists. The directory abstained from publishing these details, lest it should apprize the conspirators that it was acquainted with their whole plan. Duverne de Presle gave no information concerning Pichegru, whose intrigues, being carried on directly with the prince of Condé, were unknown to the Paris agents; but he declared vaguely from hearsay that attempts had been made to gain partisans in one of the principal armies.

This apprehension of their chief agents might have thwarted the intrigues of the royalists, had they laid a well-combined plan, but as each of them proceeded in his own way, the arrest of Brottier, Laville-Heurnois, and Duverne de Presle, did not prevent M. de Puisaye and M. de Frotté from intriguing in Normandy and in Brittany, M. de Précy at Lyons, and the prince of Condé in the army of the Rhine.

About the same time, Babœuf and his accomplices were brought to trial; they were all acquitted, excepting Babœuf and Darthé, who underwent the punishment of death *.

The most important affair was that of the elections. Out of opposition to the directory, or from a bias in favour of royalism, a great number of persons were taking every measure to influence them. In the Jura, great efforts were made to obtain the nomination of Pichegru; at Lyons, that of M. Imbert-Colomès, one of the agents of Louis XVIII. in the south; and at Versailles, that of M. de Vauvilliers, who was seriously compromised in the recently-discovered plot. In short, exertions were making in every quarter on behalf of persons opposed to the directory. In Paris, the electors of the Seine had met to concert their nominations. They proposed to ask the candidates the following questions: *Hast thou purchased national estates? Hast thou been a newspaper writer? Hast thou written, made thyself conspicuous, or done any thing during the revolution?* Those were not to be nominated who answered these questions in the affirmative. Such preparations showed how violent was the reaction against all those who had taken part in the revolution. A hundred journals declaimed with vehemence, and produced an actual dizziness in the public mind. The directory had no other means to repress them than the law which inflicted capital punishment on writers calling for the restoration of royalty. No judges would ever have consented to give judgment on so cruel a law. The directory, for the third time, applied to the two councils for new legislative enactments, which were again refused. It proposed also to make the electors take an oath of hatred to royalty. A warm discussion took place concerning the efficacy of the oath, and the motion was modified by changing the oath into a mere declaration. Every elector was to declare that he was an enemy to anarchy as well as to royalty. The directory, without descending to any of the disgraceful means so frequently employed by representative governments for influencing elections, contented itself with choosing as commissioners to the assemblies men known for their republican sentiments, and setting Cochon, the minister, to write circulars, in which he recommended to the electors the candidates of its choice. A great outcry was raised against those circulars, which were only an insignificant exhortation, and by no means an injunction; for the number and independence of the electors, especially in a government in which almost all places were elective, placed them above the reach of the influence of the directory.

While every body was busying themselves about the elections, the choice of a new director occupied considerable attention. The question was, which of the five should be fixed upon by lot to go out of

* 19th Germinal (April 18).

* 6th Prairial (May 25).

the directory: whether it should be Barras, Rewbell, or Larévellière-Lépeaux, the opposition made sure, with the assistance of the new third, of having the nomination of a director of its own choice. The opposition hoped that it should then have a majority in the government, on which point it deceived itself, for its follies would not have failed very soon, to alienate Carnot and Letourneur from its cause.

The Clichy club noisily discussed the choice of the new elector. Cochon and Barthélemy were then proposed. Cochon had lost somewhat in the opinion of the counter-revolutionists since the apprehension of Brottier and his accomplices, and especially since his circulars to the electors. They preferred Barthélemy, our ambassador in Sweden, whom they believed to be secretly connected with the emigrants and the prince of Condé.

Amidst this agitation, the most absurd reports were propagated. It was said that the directory intended to commit the newly-elected deputies to prison, and to prevent their assembling; it was even maintained that its intention was to cause them to be assassinated. Its friends, on their part, declared that an act of accusation was preparing against them at Clichy, and that the framers were only waiting for the new third in order to present it to the five hundred.

But while the parties were thus in a state of ferment, in expectation of an event which was to alter the majorities, and to change the direction of the republican government, a new campaign was in preparation, and every thing indicated that it would be the last. The relative situation of the powers stood much the same as in the preceding year. France, allied with Spain and Holland, had to struggle against England and Austria. The sentiments of the court of Spain were not, and could not be, favourable to the French republicans; but its policy, directed by the prince of the peace, was entirely favourable to them. She considered their alliance as the surest means of being protected against their principles, and justly flattered herself that they would not desire to revolutionize her, so long as they should find in her a powerful naval auxiliary. Besides, she had an ancient enmity against Austria, and hoped that the union of all the navies of the continent would furnish her with the means of avenging her injuries. The prince of the peace seeing that his existence depended on this policy, and aware that he must perish along with it, employed all his influence with the queen to secure it the ascendancy over the sentiments of the royal family; and therein he was perfectly successful. It was the constant result of this state of things that the French were individually ill-treated in Spain, while their government got every thing it wanted. Unfortunately, the French legations there did not behave with the respect due to a friendly power, or with the firmness requisite for protecting French subjects. Spain, by allying herself with France, had lost the important colony of Trinidad. She flattered herself that if France should this year free herself from Austria, and bring back all her forces against England, the latter would have to surrender all her acquisitions. The queen, in particular, flattered herself with an advancement in Italy for her son-in-law, the duke of Parma. There was an idea also of an expedition against Portugal, and amidst that vast convulsion of states, the court of Madrid was not without some hope of uniting the whole of the Peninsula under one sovereignty.

As for Holland, her situation was melancholy enough. She was agitated by all the passions that a change of constitution calls forth. The reasonable persons who wished for a government, in which the old federative system should be made consistent with the unity necessary for giving strength to the Batavian republic, had to contend with three parties, all of them equally dangerous; in the first place, the orangists, comprising all the creatures of the stadtholder, the placemen, and the populace; secondly, the federalists, including all the wealthy and powerful families, who were desirous of maintaining the former state of things, with the exception of the stadtholdership, which wounded their pride; lastly, the decided democrats, a turbulent, daring, and implacable party, composed of hot-headed persons and adventurers. These three parties were inveterately hostile to one another, and impeded the establishment of the constitution of the country. Besides these embarrassments, Holland was still in dread of an invasion by Prussia, who was not checked by the successes of France. She found her commerce restricted in the north by the English and the Russians; lastly, she was losing all her colonies, through the treachery of most of her governors. The Cape of Good Hope, Trincomalee, and the Moluccas, were in the hands of the English. The French troops encamped in Holland to protect her against Prussia, observed the strictest and most praiseworthy discipline; but the public departments and the military commanders did not conduct themselves with either propriety or common honesty. The country was, therefore, horribly burdened. Some persons might therefore assume that Holland had done wrong by connecting herself with France, but this would be a hasty conclusion. Holland, placed between the two belligerent masses, could not escape the influence of the conquerors. Under the stadtholder, she was the subject of England, and sacrificed to her interests; she was moreover subject to bondage at home. By allying herself with France, she ran the risks attached to the nature of that continental rather than maritime power, and compromised her colonies; but she might some day, by the union of the three navies of the continent, recover what she had lost; she might hope for a reasonable constitution under French protection. Such is the situation of states: if they are strong, they make their revolutions themselves, but they have to undergo all the calamities attending them, and welter in their own blood; if they are weak, they see their neighbours come to revolutionize them with a strong hand, and undergo all the inconveniences arising from the presence of foreign armies. They do not indeed slay one another, but they pay the soldiers who come to keep them in order. Such was the fate of Holland and her relative situation with us. In this state, she had not been of any great service to the French government. Her army and navy were very slowly putting themselves to rights; the Batavian money orders (*rescriptions*), with which the war indemnity of one hundred millions had been paid, were passing for next to nothing, and the advantages of the alliance were of no effectual service so far as

France was concerned; an estrangement between the two countries was the consequence. The directory blamed the Dutch government for not keeping its engagements, and the Dutch government reproached the directory with putting it out of its power to fulfil them. In spite of these misunderstandings, both states had the same object in view. A squadron and marines attached thereto were getting ready in Holland to assist in the designs of the directory.

So far as concerned Prussia, a great part of Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland, France had always continued in the same relations of strict neutrality. Misunderstandings had arisen between France and America. The United States conducted themselves towards us with as much injustice as ingratitude. Old Washington had suffered himself to be drawn into the party of John Adams and the English, which was desirous of bringing America back to the aristocratic and monarchical state. The injuries suffered from certain privateers, and the conduct of the agents of the committee of public welfare, afforded them a pretext; a very slight pretext indeed, for the wrongs done by the English to the American navy were of a far more serious nature; and the conduct of our agents was noticed at the time, and ought to have been excused. These favourers of the English party alleged that France meant to obtain from Spain the cession of the Floridas and of Louisiana; that, by means of those provinces and of Canada, she would encompass the United States, sow there the seeds of democratic principles, successively dismite all the states from the union, thus dissolve the American federation, and form a vast democracy between the Gulf of Mexico and the five lakes. Nothing of the kind was ever intended; but these falsehoods served to create a ferment, and make enemies to France. A treaty of commerce had just been concluded with England; this treaty contained stipulations which transferred to that power advantages formerly reserved for France alone, and due to the services she had rendered to the American cause. The notion of a violent separation from the United States had its advocates in the French government. Monro, who was ambassador to Paris, gave the directory the most prudent advice with regard to this matter. "War with France," said he, "will force the American government to throw herself into the arms of England, and abandon herself to English influence; aristocracy will gain supreme control in the United States, and liberty will be compromised. On the contrary, by patiently enduring the wrongs of the present president, you will leave him without excuse, you will explain yourselves to the Americans, and cause a contrary nomination at the next election. Reparation will then be made for all the wrongs of which France may have to complain. This wise and provident recommendation prevailed with the directory. Rewbell, Barras, and Larévelliere, had triumphantly opposed the opinion of the systematic Carnot, who, though in general favourably inclined to peace, wanted them to give us Louisiana, and that the experiment of a republic should be tried there.

Such were the relations of France with those powers who were either her allies or simply her friends. England and Austria had concluded in the preceding year a treaty of triple alliance with Russia; but the great and meanly-perfidious Catherine had recently died. Her successor, Paul I., whose mind by no means sound, possessed but a few lucid intervals, as is frequently the case in his family, had paid many marks of respect to the French emigrants, and yet at the same time cared very little as to executing the conditions of the treaty of triple alliance. This prince seemed to be struck by the colossal power of the French republic; and one would have said that he saw the danger of increasing its formidable character by opposition; at least the language he used to a Frenchman, celebrated for his acquirements and his abilities, would induce us to think so. Without violating the treaty, he had turned the state of his army and his treasury to the best account, and advised England and Austria what course the negotiation would take. England had endeavoured to induce the king of Prussia to take a part in this league, but had not succeeded. That prince felt that he could have no interest in affording assistance to his most formidable enemy, the emperor. France promised him an indemnity in Germany for the stadtholder who had married his sister; he had, therefore, nothing to desire for himself. All he cared about was to prevent Austria, beaten and despoiled by France, from indemnifying herself for her losses in Germany; he would even have desired to oppose her receiving indemnities in Italy. So he had in like manner declared that he never would consent that Austria should take Bavaria in exchange for the Netherlands; and at the same time he had made an offer of allying himself with the republic of Venice, offering to indemnify her, in case France and Austria should attempt to accommodate their differences at her expense. This object, therefore, was to prevent the emperor from obtaining equivalents for the losses which he had sustained in the contest with France.

Russia not yet taking a part in the conflict, and Prussia persisting in her neutrality, England and Austria alone remained in the field. England was in a very sad state; she no longer dreaded, at least for the moment, an expedition to Ireland, but her bank was threatened more seriously than ever; she placed no dependance whatever on Austria, whom she saw out of breath, and expected to see France, after conquering the continent, fall upon her with her united forces. Austria, notwithstanding the occupation of the *têtes de pont* of Kehl and Huningen, was fully sensible that she had ruined herself by her obstinacy in persevering to attack two bridges, and in not marching all her forces into Italy. The disasters of Rivoli and La Favorita, and the capture of Mantua, placed her in imminent danger. She was obliged to leave the Rhine exposed, and to reduce herself to an absolute inferiority on that frontier, in order to transfer her forces and her prince Charles to Italy. But during the interval that the troops would take to perform the march from the Upper Rhine to the Piave and the Isonzo, she would be left defenceless to an adversary, who was admirably qualified for seizing advantages the moment they occurred.

All these fears were not without foundation, and France was making preparation for a serious attack, which the opening campaign was not long in rendering effectual.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE STATE OF OUR ARMIES AT THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1797.—BONAPARTE MARCHES AGAINST THE ROMAN STATES.—TREATY OF TOLENTINO WITH THE POPE.—NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE AUSTRIANS.—PASSAGE OF THE TAGLIAMENTO. BATTLE OF TARWIS.—REVOLUTION IN THE CITIES OF BERGAMO, BRESCIA, AND OTHER CITIES IN THE VENETIAN STATES.—PASSAGE OF THE JULIAN ALPS BY BONAPARTE. MARCH TO VIENNA. PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE WITH AUSTRIA SIGNED AT LEOBEN.—PASSAGE OF THE RHINE AT NEUWIED AND DIEDRHEIM.—VENETIAN PERFIDY. MASSACRE OF VERONA. THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE EXTINGUISHED.

THE army of the Sambre and Meuse, reinforced by great part of the army of the Ocean, had been increased to eighty thousand men. Hoche, who had become its commander-in-chief, had stopped a very short time in Paris, on his return from the expedition to Ireland, and had hastened to proceed to his head-quarters. He had employed the winter in organizing his troops and providing them with necessaries. Drawing ample resources from Holland and the provinces between the Meuse and the Rhine, which were treated as conquered countries, he had preserved his army from those privations to which the army of the Rhine was exposed. By adopting a different mode of distributing his troops, he had altogether improved his army, and had brought it into the finest order. He was burning with impatience to march at the head of his eighty thousand men, and saw nothing to prevent him from advancing into the very heart of Germany. Anxious to illustrate his political views, he wished to imitate the examples of the general in Italy, and in his turn to create a republic. The provinces between the Meuse and the Rhine, which had not been, like Belgium, declared constitutional territory, were temporarily under military law. If, at the conclusion of peace with the empire, France were refused them in order that she should be deprived of the line of the Rhine, she might at least consent that they should be constituted into an independent republic, an ally and friend of our own. This republic, by the name of Cisrhenane republic, might have been indissolubly attached to France, and as useful to her as any one of her provinces. Hoche availed himself of the moment to give it a temporary formation, and to prepare it for the republican state. He had formed at Bonn a commission, which was charged with the double task of organizing it and making it available for the purposes of the French troops.

The army of the Upper Rhine, under Moreau, was far from being in so satisfactory a state. In regard to the valour and the discipline of the troops every thing was as it should be, but it was in great want of necessaries; and the want of money, not even allowing the cost of materials for a bridge, delayed its taking the field. Moreau urgently solicited a few hundred thousand francs, with which it was impossible for the treasury to furnish him. In order to obtain them, he had applied to general Bonaparte, but was obliged, to wait till the latter had finished his excursion into the Roman states. This circumstance could not but delay the operations on the Rhine.

The most violent and the most sudden attacks were about to be carried into effect in Italy. Bonaparte, who had nearly destroyed at Rivoli the last Austrian army, had given notice that he should afterwards make an incursion of a few days into the states of the pope, to subject him to the republic, and to wring from him the money of which the army stood in need. He added, that if a reinforcement of thirty thousand men were sent him, he would cross the Julian Alps, and march at once to Vienna. This plan, so vast, would have been in the preceding year deemed chimerical; but as things now were, it had become practicable. The policy alone of the directory might have stood in the way; it might have objected to again transferring the entire operations of the war to this young commander, so peremptory in his determinations. However, the benevolent Larévellière strongly insisted on his being furnished with the means of executing so grand a design, and which would put so speedy an end to the war. It was settled that thirty thousand men should be sent to him from the Rhine. Bernadotte's division was taken from the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and Delmas' division from that of the Upper Rhine, to be marched across the Alps in the depth of winter. Moreau made the utmost efforts to place the division of Delmas on such a footing as to be a worthy representative of the army of the Rhine in Italy; he selected his best troops, and emptied his magazines in fitting them out. It was impossible to be actuated by a more honourable and a more delicate sentiment. Those two divisions, forming twenty and some odd thousand men, passed the Alps in January, before any one was aware of their march. When just ready to cross, a tempest overtook them. The guides advised a halt; a charge was sounded, and they defied the tempest, with drums beating and colours flying. These two divisions were already descending into Piedmont before any one knew of their having left the Rhine.

Bonaparte had hardly signed the capitulation of Mantua when he set out, without waiting for marshal Wurmser to file off before him, and proceeded to Bologna, to give law to the pope. The directory was desirous that he should at length destroy the temporal power of the holy see, but had not made it peremptorily incumbent upon him so to do, and had left him at liberty to act according to circumstances and his own discretion. Bonaparte had no intention of undertaking such an enterprise. While preparations were making in Upper Italy for a march across the Julian Alps, he meant to wrest one or two provinces from the pope, and to impose on him a levy sufficient to defray the expenses of the new campaign. To desire to do more would interfere with his designs against

Austria. It was even requisite that Bonaparte should make great haste, that he might be able to return speedily to Upper Italy; above all, it behoved him to conduct himself in such a manner as to avoid a war of religion, and that he should overawe the court of Naples, which had signed a peace, but did not consider itself at all bound by its treaty. That power felt strongly inclined to interpose in the quarrel, either in the hope of coming in for a share of the spoils of the pope, or as desiring to prevent the establishment of a republic at Rome, and that the revolution should not be brought to its own doors. Bonaparte joined, at Bologna, Victor's division as well as the new Italian troops raised in Lombardy and in the Cispadane, and marched at their head, to execute in person an enterprise which, in order to lead to success, required all his tact and efficiency.

The pope was in the most painful anxiety; the emperor had promised him his alliance, but only on the hardest conditions, that is, at the price of Ferrara and Commachio; but even this alliance could no longer be of service, since Alvinzy's army was no more. The holy see had therefore compromised itself to no purpose. The correspondence of cardinal Busca, secretary of state, and a sworn enemy of France, had been intercepted. The designs against the French army, which it was proposed to attack in the rear, were disclosed; there was no longer any excuse for appealing to the clemency of the conqueror, to whose proposals the Papal government had for a year past refused to listen. When Cacault, the French minister, published the general's manifesto, and applied for leave to retire, there was not the slightest sign made of his being desired to remain; but this arose from a feeling of pride; but the pope was nevertheless suffering the most dreadful anxiety. Soon, nothing was listened to but the counsels of despair. The Austrian general, Colli, who arrived at Rome with some officers, was put at the head of the Papal troops; fanatical sermons were preached throughout the Roman states; heaven was promised to all who should devote themselves for the holy see, and efforts were made to stir up a Vendée around Bonaparte. Urgent entreaties were addressed to the court of Naples for the purpose of awakening all its ambition and religious zeal.

Bonaparte advanced rapidly, that he might not allow the conflagration time to spread. On the 16th Pluviôse, year V. (February 4, 1797), he marched to the Senio. The Papal army was intrenched there. It consisted of seven or eight thousand regular troops, and a great number of peasants armed in haste, and headed by their monks. This army exhibited a most burlesque appearance. A person who came to treat declared, that if the army of Napoleon persisted in advancing, it would be fired upon. It advanced nevertheless towards the bridge over the Senio, which was rather strongly intrenched. Lannes went up the river with a few hundred men, forded it, and drew up in order of battle in the rear of the Papal army. General Lahoz, with the Lombard troops, then marched to the bridge, and soon carried it. The new Italian troops steadily bore the fire, which was for a short time very brisk. Four or five hundred prisoners were taken, and some of the peasants cut down. The Papal army retreated in disorder. It was pursued to Faenza; the gates of the town were broken open, and the French entered to the sound of the tocsin, and amidst the shouts of an infuriated people. The soldiers asked leave to plunder the place; Bonaparte refused it. He assembled the prisoners taken in the battle on the banks of the Senio, and spoke to them in Italian. These unfortunates imagined that they were about to be put to the sword. Bonaparte put their minds at ease, and informed them, to their great astonishment, that he set them at liberty on the condition of their going and setting their fellow countrymen right respecting the intentions of the French, who were not come to destroy either religion or the holy see, but who merely wished to remove the evil councillors by whom the pope was surrounded. He then ordered them to be fed, and discharged them. Bonaparte advanced rapidly from Faenza to Forli, Cesena, Rimini, Pesaro, and Sinigaglia. Colli, who had but about three thousand regular troops left, intrenched them in good position before Ancona. Bonaparte surrounded and took great part of them. He gave them their liberty on the same conditions as before. Colli retired with his officers to Rome. Bonaparte had now only to march to that capital. He proceeded first to Loretto, the treasury of which had been emptied; scarcely a million was found in it. The old wooden image of the virgin was sent to Paris as a curiosity. Leaving the coast, he marched from Loretto by Macerata for the Apennines, intending to cross them, and to debouch upon Rome, if that should be necessary. He arrived at Tolentino on the 26th Pluviôse (February 13), and there halted, to see what effect his rapid march and the liberation of his prisoners would produce. He had sent for the general of the Camaldulenses, an ecclesiastic in whom Pius VI. placed great confidence, and directed him to repair to Rome with offers of peace. Bonaparte was anxious for the pope to submit, and to accept the conditions which he resolved to impose upon him. He did not intend to lose time in exciting a revolution in Rome, which might detain him longer than suited his purposes, which would perhaps have provoked the court of Naples to take up arms, and which, in overthrowing the established government, would for the moment ruin the Roman finances, and prevent him from drawing from the country the twenty or thirty millions for which he had need. He conceived that the holy see, deprived of its finest provinces in favour of the Cispadane republic, and exposed to the vicinity of the new republic, would soon be infected with the revolutionary contagion, and in a very short time be subjugated. This was good policy, and the event proved its correctness. He awaited therefore at Tolentino the effects of his clemency, and the pope's apprehensions.

The prisoners whom he had discharged had, in fact, gone to all parts of the Roman states, and especially to Rome, spreading the most favourable reports of the French army, and appeasing the resentments excited against it. The general of the Camaldulenses arrived at the Vatican at the moment when the pope was about to enter his carriage and to leave Rome. That potentate, comforted by the message brought by that ecclesiastic, relinquished his intention of quitting the capital, dismissed Busca the secretary of state, and de-

spatched cardinal Mattei, the prelate Galeppi, marquis Massimi, and his nephew, the duke of Braschi, to Tolentino, to treat with the French general. They had full powers to treat, provided the general left religious faith untouched. The treaty was thereby rendered perfectly smooth, for with respect to articles of faith the French general was by no means particular. The treaty was concluded in a few days, and signed at Tolentino on the 1st Ventôse (February 19). Its principal conditions were these. The pope revoked all treaties of alliance against France, acknowledged the republic, and declared himself in peace and good understanding with her. He ceded to her all his claims on the Comtat Venaissin*, and gave up definitively to the Cispadane republic the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and likewise the fine province of Romagna. The town and the important citadel of Ancona were to remain in the hands of France until the general peace. The two provinces of the duchy of Urbino and Macerata, which the French army had occupied, were to be restored to the pope on payment of the sum of fifteen millions. A like sum was to be paid, agreeably to the armistice of Bologna, not yet executed. These thirty millions were payable, two-thirds in money, and one-third in diamonds or precious stones. The pope was moreover to furnish eight hundred cavalry horses, and eight hundred draught horses, buffaloes, and other productions of the states of the church. He was to disavow the murder of Basseville, and to pay three hundred thousand francs for the benefit of his heirs and of others who had suffered by the same event. All the works of art and manuscripts ceded to France by the armistice of Bologna, were to be sent off immediately to Paris.

Such was the treaty of Tolentino, which gained for the Cispadane republic not only the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, but also the beautiful province of Romagna, and procured for the army a subsidy of thirty millions, more than enough for the campaign that was about to commence. A fortnight had sufficed for this expedition. While this treaty was negotiating, Bonaparte had contrived to intimidate the court of Naples, and to disengage himself from it. Before quitting Tolentino, he performed a remarkable act, and one which even then showed his personal policy. Italy, and the Papal states in particular, were full of exiled French priests. These unfortunate men, retired in convents, were not always received there with much charity. The ordinances of the directory forbade their stay in countries occupied by our armies; and the Italian monks were not sorry to get rid of them by the approach of our troops. These unfortunates were reduced to despair. Long separated from their country, exposed to every contumely from foreigners, they wept when they saw our soldiers; they even recognized some of them, whose pastors they had been in the villages of France. Bonaparte was easily moved; besides, he was anxious to appear divested of every kind of revolutionary and religious prejudice: he commanded, by an order from head-quarters, that all the convents of the holy see were to receive the French priests, to maintain them, and to give them pay. Thus, so far from driving them away, he improved their condition. He wrote to the directory, explaining the motives which had induced him to commit this breach of its ordinances. "By continually hunting down these unfortunate men," said he, "you force them to return home. It is far better that they should be in Italy than in France; they will be useful to us there. They are less fanatical than the Italian priests; they will set the mind of the people, who are highly excited against us, to rights. Besides," added he, "they weep on seeing us; how is it possible not to have compassion on their misfortunes!" The directory approved of his conduct. This act and this letter were published, and produced a very strong sensation.

He returned immediately to the Adige, to execute the boldest military march known in history. After once crossing the Alps to enter Italy, he was now going to cross them a second time, to throw himself beyond the Drave and the Mur into the valley of the Danube, and to advance upon Vienna. Never had a French army yet appeared in sight of that capital. To execute this vast design, many dangers had to be encountered. He left all Italy upon his rear;—Italy, struck with terror and admiration, but still impressed with the notion that the French could not long retain their acquisition.

The late campaign of Rivoli and the capture of Mantua had appeared to put an end to those doubts; but a march into Germany was about to revive them all. The governments of Genoa, Tuscany, Naples, Rome, Turin, and Venice, indignant at seeing a focus of revolution placed beside them in the Cispadane republic and Lombardy, might seize the opportunity of the first reverse to revolt. In uncertainty as to the result, the Italian patriots watched one another, that they might not compromise themselves. Bonaparte's army was far inferior to what it ought to have been to neutralize all the perils attendant on his design. The divisions of Bernadotte and Delmas, arrived from the Rhine, amounted to no more than twenty thousand men; the old army of Italy did not exceed forty thousand; and these, with the Lombard troops, might make about seventy thousand. But it was necessary to leave at least twenty thousand in Italy, and to guard the Tyrol with fifteen or eighteen thousand, so that there remained but thirty and some odd thousand to march upon Vienna, a most unheard-of rashness. Bonaparte, in order to obviate these difficulties, strove to negotiate an offensive and defensive alliance with Piedmont, which he had long been most anxious to effect. This alliance would procure him ten thousand good troops. The king, [of Sardinia,] who at first was not satisfied with the protection of his dominions as a compensation for the services he was going to afford, was content with it now that he saw the revolution was gaining head in public opinion. He signed the treaty, which was sent to Paris. But this treaty opposed the views of the French government. The directory, approving of Bonaparte's policy in Italy, which consisted in awaiting the very speedy downfall of

* The name of a district of Provence, on the borders of the Dauphiné. Joanna of Naples sold the *Comtat Venaissin* to pope Clement VI., in 1348. The pope kept possession of this territory, although the parliament of Provence, repudiating this sale, caused it to be re-annexed to France in 1663. However, this territory was never actually in the possession of the French till 1791.—*Trans.*

the governments, and in not causing it, so as to have neither the trouble or the odium of revolutions—the directory did not care to attack or afford protection to any potentate. The ratification of the treaty was therefore extremely uncertain, and besides it would take fifteen or twenty days. It would then be required that the Sardinian contingent should set itself in motion, and by that time Bonaparte ought to be beyond the Alps. Bonaparte would, above all, have concluded a similar treaty of alliance with Venice. The government of that republic was fitting out considerable armaments, the object of which could not be misunderstood. The lagoons were full of Sclavonian regiments. Ottolini, podesta of Bergamo, the blind instrument of the state inquisitors, had distributed money and arms among the mountaineers of the Bergamasco, and kept them ready for the first favourable opportunity. That government, equally weak and perfidious, was nevertheless unwilling to compromise itself, and persisted in its pretended neutrality. It had refused the alliance of Austria and of Prussia, but yet it was armed; and if the French, after entering Austria, should sustain reverses, then it had made up its mind to declare itself by slaughtering them in their retreat. Bonaparte, who was as crafty as the Venetian aristocracy, was aware of this danger, and pursued his alliance more for the purpose of protecting himself from its hostile designs than of deriving assistance. On crossing the Adige, he wished to see the *proveditore*, Pezaro, the same he had so terrified the year before at Peschiera; to him he made the most frank and friendly overtures. The entire continent, said he, is impregnated with revolutionary notions; a single word from the French would be sufficient to excite all the provinces to insurrection against Venice; but the French, if Venice were to ally herself with them, would take care not to excite a revolt; they would do their utmost to pacify public opinion; they would guarantee the republic against the ambition of Austria; and without demanding at her hands the sacrifice of her constitution, they would content themselves by advising her, for her own good, to adopt some indispensable reforms. Nothing could be more prudent or more sincere than this advice. It is not true that, at the moment it was given, the directory and Bonaparte were considering how to betray Venice to Austria. The directory had not considered with respect to this; if any thing had entered her mind, it was rather to emancipate Italy than to give up any part of it to Austria. As for Bonaparte, he sincerely wished to make an ally of Venice; and if Venice had listened to him, if she had joined him, and would have reformed her constitution, she might have saved her territory and her ancient laws. Pezaro answered in an evasive manner. Bonaparte finding that he had nothing to hope, then looked to his precautions, and how to compensate for all his deficiencies in his usual manner, that is, by the rapidity and the vehemence of his attacks.

He had sixty and odd thousand men, such as Europe had never yet seen. He resolved to leave ten thousand in Italy; these, joined to the Lombard and Cispadane battalions, would form fifteen or eighteen thousand men, capable of awing the Venetians. He then had left him fifty and some odd thousand, which he was going to dispose of in the following manner. Three roads lead across the Rhætian, Noric, and Julian Alps to Vienna: the first, on the left, crossing the Tyrol by the pass of the Brenner; the second, in the centre, traversing Carinthia by the pass of the Tarwis; the third, on the right, crossing the Tagliamento and the Izonzo, and leading into Carniola. The archduke Charles had the bulk of his forces on the Izonzo, guarding Carniola and protecting Trieste. Two divisions, one at Feltre and Belluno, the other in the Tyrol, occupied the other two causeways. Owing to the blunder Austria had committed in not transferring her forces to Italy till very late, six fine divisions coming from the Rhine had not yet come up. This blunder might have been partly repaired, had the archduke Charles, fixing his head-quarters in the Tyrol, intended to operate upon our left. He would have got the six divisions from the Rhine fifteen days earlier; and then indeed Bonaparte, instead of filing off on the right by Carinthia or Carniola, would have been compelled to fight him, and to finish with him before he ventured himself the other side of the Alps. He would then have found him with his best troops, and would not have got off so easily. But the archduke had orders to protect Trieste, the only sea-port of the monarchy. He therefore posted himself at the outlet from Carniola, and placed only subordinate divisions on the causeway from Carinthia and the Tyrol. Two of the divisions leaving the Rhine were to reinforce general Kerpen in the Tyrol; the four others were to file off behind the Alps, through Carinthia and Carniola, and to proceed to the head-quarters in the Friuli. It was now Ventôse (March). The Alps were covered with snow and ice: how could it be imagined that Bonaparte intended to climb at that moment the summit of the Alps!

Bonaparte conceived that by throwing himself upon the archduke before the arrival of the principal forces from the Rhine, he should more easily carry the passes of the Alps, next make his way through them, beat one after the other, as he had always done, the separate bodies of the Austrians, and if he were supported by a movement of the armies from the Rhine, advance to Vienna.

Consequently he reinforced Joubert, who had at Rivoli proved himself worthy of his entire confidence, with the divisions of Baraguai d'Hilliers and Delmas, and thus gave him a division eighteen thousand strong. He directed him to get up into the Tyrol, to fight generals Laudohn and Kerpen, and to utterly destroy their army, to drive them beyond the Brenner to the other side of the Alps, and then to file off to the right across the Pusterthal, so as to effect a junction with the grand army in Carinthia. Laudohn and Kerpen might doubtless return into the Tyrol, after Joubert should have rejoined the principal army; but they would want time to put themselves in order after a defeat, to obtain reinforcements, and to regain the Tyrol, and in the mean time Bonaparte would be at the gates of Vienna. To quiet the Tyrolese, he recommended to Joubert to show much regard for the priests, to speak well of the emperor and ill of his ministers, to touch none but the imperial wealth, and to make no change in the administration of the country. He directed the intrepid Masséna, with his fine division, ten thousand strong,

to march upon the division which was in the centre towards Feltre and Belluno, to hasten to the narrow passes of the Ponteba, which come before the great pass of the Tarwis, to make himself master of the narrow defiles and the pass of that mountain, and thus to secure the outlet of Carinthia. His intention was himself to march with three divisions, twenty-five thousand strong, upon the Piave and the Tagliamento, to push the archduke before him into Carniola, then to fall down towards the road of Carinthia, to join Masséna at the pass of the Tarwis, to cross the Alps by that pass, to descend into the valley of the Drave and the Muer, take up Joubert, and march for Vienna. He reckoned upon the impetuosity and the audacity of his onset, and upon the impression which his prompt and terrible attacks ordinarily created.

Before he commenced his march, he gave to general Kilmaine the command of Upper Italy. Victor's division, posted *en échelon* in the Papal states, waiting till the thirty millions should be paid, was to return in a few days to the Adige, and there form with the Lombards the corps of observation. An extraordinary ferment prevailed in the Venetian provinces. The peasants and the mountaineers devoted to the priests and the aristocracy, and the cities agitated by the revolutionary spirit, were ready to come to blows. Bonaparte commanded general Kilmaine to observe the strictest neutrality, and set out to execute his vast projects. He issued as usual an energetic proclamation, calculated to increase the enthusiasm of his soldiers, supposing that had been possible. On the 20th Ventôse, year V. (March 10, 1797), the cold being intense, and the snow several feet deep on the mountains, he set his whole line in motion. Masséna commenced his operation upon the centre division, pushed it forwards on Feltre, Belluno, and Cadore, made a thousand prisoners, among whom was again general Lusignan, then descending upon Spilimbergo, he got far into the narrow defiles of the Ponteba, which precede the pass of the Tarwis. Bonaparte advanced with three divisions upon the Piave; Serrurier's division, which had so distinguished itself before Mantua; Augereau's division, now under the command of general Guyeux in the absence of Augereau, who had gone to take the column to Paris, and Bernadotte's division, which had come from the Rhine. This last formed a strong contrast, by its simplicity and its rugged appearance, with the old army of Italy, enriched in the beautiful plains which it had conquered, and composed of brave, fiery, and ill-regulated southerns. The soldiers of Italy, proud of their victories, derided the soldiers of the Rhine, and called them *the contingent*, alluding to the contingents of the circles of Germany, who in the emperor's armies were lazy in their duty. The soldiers of the Rhine, veterans in arms, were impatient to exhibit their courage before their rivals in glory. Some sabre cuts had already been exchanged on account of these railleries, and they were impatient to make a demonstration of their valour in the face of the enemy.

On the 23rd, (March 13,) the three divisions crossed the Piave, and were on the point of losing one man, who was in danger of being drowned, when a female suttler swam after him and saved him. Bonaparte gave the woman a gold necklace. The enemy's advanced guards fell back to protect themselves behind the Tagliamento. All the troops of prince Charles in the Friule were there assembled to dispute the passage. The two young adversaries were about to meet. The one, in saving Germany by a felicitous idea, had in the preceding year acquired high reputation. He was brave, not at all wedded to the German routine, but very uncertain of success, and in great anxiety for his military reputation. The other had astonished Europe by the fertility and the boldness of his combinations; he feared nothing whatever. Although diffident till the battle of Lodi, he now deemed no genius equal to his own, and no soldier equal to the French soldier. On the morning of the 26th Ventôse (March 16), Bonaparte directed his three divisions by Valvasone to the bank of the Tagliamento. That river, the bed of which is badly mapped, descends from the Alps over gravel, and divides into a great number of branches, all fordable. The Austrian army was drawn up on the other bank, covering the level shingle of the river with its cannon balls, and holding its fine cavalry in readiness, deployed on its wings, so as to make it serviceable on these plains so favourable for military evolutions.

Bonaparte left Serrurier's division in reserve at Valvasone, and despatched the two divisions of Guyeux and Bernadotte; the former to the left, facing the village of Gradisca, where the enemy had made a lodgment; the latter to the right, facing Godroïpo. The cannonade opened, and some skirmishes took place with the cavalry on the shingle. Bonaparte, finding the enemy too well prepared, feigned to give some rest to his troops, ordered the firing to cease, and directed them to begin their soup. The enemy thus led into error, imagined that these divisions having marched all night were about to halt and to take some rest. But at noon, Bonaparte all at once ordered them again under arms. Guyeux's division deployed on the left, Bernadotte's on the right. Battalions of grenadiers were formed. At the head of each division was placed the light infantry, ready to disperse as sharpshooters, then the grenadiers, who were to charge, and the dragoons who were to support them. The two divisions were deployed in rear of these two advanced guards. Each demi-brigade had its first battalion deployed in line, and the two others arranged in close column on the wings of the first. The cavalry was appointed to hover about on the wings. The army advanced in this manner towards the banks of the river, in the same order, and with the same self-possession, as if on parade.

General Dammartin on the left, and general Lespinasse on the right, made their artillery draw up. The light infantry dispersed and covered the banks of the Tagliamento with a cloud of riflemen. Bonaparte then gave the signal. The grenadiers of the two divisions entered the water, supported by the squadrons of cavalry, and advanced towards the other bank. "Soldiers of the Rhine!" exclaimed Bernadotte, "the army of Italy has its eyes upon you!" On both sides they dashed on with equal bravery. They rushed upon the enemy's army, and drove it back on every quarter. However, prince Charles had placed some heavy infantry at Gradisca, towards our left, and kept his cavalry

towards our right wing, in order to extend his line beyond ours, and charge us by taking advantage of the plain. General Guyeux, at the head of his division, made a furious attack on Gradisca, and carried it. Bonaparte disposed his reserve cavalry towards our threatened wing, and ordered it to charge, under the command of general Dugua and adjutant-general Kellermann, upon the Austrian cavalry. Our squadrons charged with skill and impetuosity, took prisoner the general of the enemy's cavalry, and put it to the rout. Along the whole line the Tagliamento was cleared, and the enemy put to flight. We made four or five hundred prisoners; the ground, being open, did not give us the chance of making more.

Such was the battle of the 26th Ventôse (March 16), called the battle of Tagliamento. While it was taking place, Masséna, on the centre causeway, attacked Osopo, made himself master of the narrow defiles of the Pontebba, and drove the remains of Lusignan's and Orkscay's division upon Tarwis.

The archduke Charles was fully sensible that, in order to guard the Carniola causeway and to cover Trieste, he must lose the Carinthia causeway, which was the most direct and the shortest, and that which Bonaparte meant to follow in his march to Vienna. The Carniola causeway communicates with that of Carinthia, and with the pass of Tarwis by a cross road, which runs through the valley of the Izonzo. The archduke Charles despatched the division of Bayalitsch by this route towards mount Tarwis, to get before Masséna, if possible. He afterwards retired with the rest of his forces upon the Friule, in order to dispute the passage of the Lower Izonzo.

Bonaparte followed him, and took possession of Palma-Nova, a Venetian fortress, which the archduke had occupied, and which contained immense stores. He then marched to Gradisca, a town situated in advance of the Izonzo. He arrived there on the 29th Ventôse (March 19). Bernadotte's division advanced towards Gradisca, which was badly intrenched, but guarded by three thousand men. In the mean time Bonaparte ordered Serrurier's division, a little below Gradisca, to cross the Izonzo at that place, and to cut off the retreat of the garrison. Bernadotte, without waiting for the result of the manœuvre, summoned the place to surrender. The commandant refused. The soldiers of the Rhine demanded permission to take the place by assault, that they might enter the town before the soldiers of Italy. They rushed upon the intrenchments, but a shower of balls and grape-shot struck down more than five hundred of them. Fortunately, Serrurier's manœuvre put an end to the battle. The three thousand men in Gradisca laid down their arms, and gave up their colours and cannon.

During this time Masséna had at length reached the pass of Tarwis, and after a very brisk action, made himself master of that passage of the Alps. The division of Bayalitsch, proceeding across the sources of the Izonzo to anticipate Masséna at Tarwis, would therefore find the outlet closed. The archduke Charles, foreseeing this result, left the rest of his army on the Friule and Carniola road, with orders to come and rejoin him behind the Alps at Klagenfurt; he then himself made the utmost haste to Villach, where numerous detachments were coming up from the Rhine, to make a fresh attack on Tarwis, to drive Masséna from it, and to re-open the road for Bayalitsch's division. Bonaparte, on his side, left Bernadotte's division to pursue the divisions that were retreating into Carniola, and with Guyeux's and Serrurier's divisions, proceeded to harass the Bayalitsch division in its rear, in its passage through the valley of the Izonzo.

Prince Charles, after rallying behind the Alps the wrecks of Lusignan and Orkscay, who had lost the pass of Tarwis, reinforced them with six thousand grenadiers, the finest and bravest soldiers in the imperial service, and again attacked the pass of Tarwis, where Masséna had left scarcely a detachment. He succeeded in recovering it, and posted himself there with the regiments of Lusignan and Orkscay, and the six thousand grenadiers. Masséna collected his whole division, in order to carry it again. Both generals were sensible of the importance of this point. Tarwis retaken, the French army would be masters of the Alps, and would make prisoners of the whole of Bayalitsch's division. Masséna rushed on headlong with his brave infantry, and suffered as usual in person. Prince Charles was not less chary of himself than the republican general, and several times ran the risk of being taken by the French riflemen. The pass of Tarwis is the loftiest of the Norie Alps. It overlooks Germany and Dalmatia. The battle took place above the clouds, amidst snow, and upon plains of ice. Whole lines of cavalry were thrown down and broken on this frightful field of battle. At length, after having brought forward his last battalion, the archduke Charles abandoned Tarwis to his pertinacious adversary, and found himself compelled to sacrifice Bayalitsch's division. Masséna, left master of Tarwis, fell down upon that division which now came up, attacked it in front, while it was pressed in the rear by the divisions of Guyeux and Serrurier, both under command of Bonaparte. That division had no other resource than to be made prisoners. A great number of soldiers, natives of Carniola and Croatia, escaped across the mountains, after throwing away their arms; but five thousand were left in the hands of the French, together with all the baggage, ammunition, and the artillery of the Austrian army, which had followed this route. Thus Bonaparte had reached in a fortnight the summit of the Alps, and in the place where he assumed the command, had completely realized his object.

In the Tyrol, Joubert justified his confidence by fighting the battles of the giants. The two generals Landohn and Kerpen, occupied the two banks of the Adige. Joubert had attacked and beaten them at Saint Michael, killed two thousand of their men, and taken three thousand. Pursuing them without intermission to Newark and Trentin, and taking from them two thousand more men, he had thrown Landohn to the left of the Adige into the valley of the Meran, and Kerpen to the right, to the foot of the Brenner. Kerpen, reinforced at Clausen by one of the two divisions coming from the Rhine, had been again beaten. He recruited himself anew at Mittenwald, with the second division of the Rhine, had been finally beaten, and ultimately retired beyond the Brenner. Joubert having thus cleared the Tyrol, had turned right about, and was marching through the Pusterthal to rejoin his

commander-in-chief. It was now the 12th Germinal (April 1), and Bonaparte was already master of the heights of the Alps, had taken nearly twenty thousand prisoners; he was going to consolidate Joubert and Masséna with his principal army, and to march with fifty thousand men for Vienna. His adversary, broken, was using his utmost exertions to collect around him the wrecks of his army, and to join them to the troops which were coming up from the Rhine. Such was the result of this rapid and daring march.

But while Bonaparte was obtaining such speedy results, all that he had foreseen and apprehended on his rear was now actually taking place. The Venetian provinces, agitated by the revolutionary spirit, had risen. They had thus furnished the Venetian government with a pretext for calling out considerable forces, and placing itself in a condition to crush the French army in case it suffered a reverse. The provinces on the right bank of the Mincio were most infected with this revolutionary spirit, owing to the vicinity of Lombardy. In the towns of Bergamo, Brescia, Salo, and Crema, were numbers of great families to whom the yoke of the nobility of the golden book was intolerable, and who, supported by a numerous trading population, formed powerful parties. By following the advice of Bonaparte, by opening the pages of the golden book, by introducing some reforms into the ancient constitution, the government of Venice might have disarmed the formidable party which had sprung up in all the continental provinces; but the usual unreflecting spirit of all aristocracies had prevented this settlement, and rendered a revolution inevitable. The part the French took in this revolution can easily be perceived, notwithstanding all the absurdities invented by malice and repeated by stupidity. The army of Italy was composed of southern, in other words, ardent revolutionists. In all their intercourse with the subjects of Venice it could not but happen but the army should bring over the Venetians to their mode of thinking, and excite a revolt against the most odious of European aristocracies; but this was not to be avoided, and neither the government or the French generals could prevent it. As for the intentions of the directory and Bonaparte, they were clear enough. The directory wished for the downfall of all the Italian governments in the common course of things; but it had determined not to take any active part in accelerating the event; and besides, it relied entirely on Bonaparte to conduct the political and military operations in Italy. As for Bonaparte himself, he had too much need of union, tranquillity, and friendly powers in his rear, to think of revolutionizing Venice. An arrangement between the two parties would have suited him much better. This arrangement and our alliance being refused, he purposed to demand on his return what he had not been able to obtain by fair means. But for the moment he meant to do nothing. His intentions on this point were positively expressed to his government, and he had given general Kilmaine the most strict orders not to take any part in political events, and to maintain tranquillity to the utmost of his power.

The towns of Bergamo and Brescia, the most agitated of the terra firma [or continent], were frequently in communication with Milan. Secret revolutionary committees were every where formed, for the purpose of corresponding with the Milanese patriots, and their aid was solicited to shake off the yoke of Venice. The victories of the French left no further doubt of the conclusive expulsion of the Austrians. The protectors of the aristocracy were therefore conquered; and although the French might have affected neutrality, it was clear that they would never have used their arms to bring those people whom they had relieved once more under the yoke. All those, therefore, who rose in insurrection would in all probability continue free. Such was the mode in which the Italians reasoned. The inhabitants of Bergamo, who were more closely connected with Milan, wrote to that city, and secretly inquired of the Milanese leaders whether they could rely upon their support, and upon the assistance of the Lombard legion, commanded by Lahoz. Ottolini, the podesta of Bergamo, the same who, like a trusty agent of the state inquisitors, gave money and arms to the peasants and mountaineers, had spies among the Milanese patriots; he knew what was going on, and obtained the names of the principal inhabitants of Bergamo, agents of the revolt. He lost no time in despatching a courier to Venice, to carry their names to the state inquisitors, and to call for their apprehension. The inhabitants of Bergamo, apprized of the danger, sent messengers after the bearer of the despatch, who overtook and stopped him, and published the names of those amongst them who were compromised. This event determined the outbreak. On the 11th March, at the very time Bonaparte was marching to the Piave, the disturbance began in Bergamo. Ottolini, the podesta, made great threats, to which no one hearkened. The French commandant, whom Bonaparte had placed in the citadel with a garrison to watch the motions of the mountaineers of the Bergamasque, increased his vigilance, and doubled all his posts. His influence and support were appealed to by both parties; his answer was that he could not interfere in the contests of Venetian subjects with their government, and said that the doubling of the posts was only a precaution for the safety of the place committed to his charge. In executing his orders and remaining neutral, he did quite enough for the Bergamasques. The latter assembled on the following day, March 12, formed a provisional municipality, declared the town of Bergamo free, and drove away Ottolini, the podesta, who retired with the Venetian troops. They immediately sent an address to Milan, to obtain the support of the Lombards. The conflagration could not fail to spread rapidly to Brescia and to all the neighbouring cities. The inhabitants of Bergamo, as the first act of their newly-acquired freedom, sent a deputation to Brescia. The presence of these Bergamasques made the Bresciens rise. It was Battaglia, the same Venetian who had given such prudent counsel in the deliberations of the senate, who was podesta of Brescia. He did not believe that he could stem the torrent, and therefore he gave way. The revolution of that city was brought about on the 15th March. The flame continued to spread, proceeding along the foot of the mountains. From Bergamo and Brescia it communicated to Salo, where the revolution was accomplished in like manner by the arrival of

Bergamasques and Bresciana, by the flight of the Venetian authorities, and in the face of the French garrisons, who remained neuter, but whose aspect, silent though they were, filled the revolters with hope. This rising of the patriotic party in the towns could not, but as a matter of course, induce the rising of the opposite party in the mountains and in the country. The mountaineers and the peasants, armed long before by Ottolini, received the signal from the capuchins and the monks, who came to preach in the hamlets; they got ready to go and sack the insurgent towns, and, if they could, murder the French. From that moment the French generals could no longer remain inactive, much as they wished to continue neuter. They were too well acquainted with the intentions of the mountaineers and of the peasants to suffer them to take up arms; and without wishing to give support to either party, they found themselves compelled to interpose, and to repress that party which entertained and declared hostile intentions against themselves. Kilmaine immediately ordered general Lahoz, commander of the Lombard legion, to march towards the mountains to oppose their arming. He had no wish, nor was it his duty, to impede the operations of the Venetian regular troops, if they came to act against the insurgent towns; but he would not suffer a rising, the result of which was incalculable in case of a defeat in Austria. He immediately despatched couriers to Bonaparte, and sent to hasten the march of Victor's division, which was returning from the Papal states.

The government of Venice, as it always happens in every unenlightened government, which will not prevent danger by granting what is indispenseable, was alarmed at these events, just as if they had been unforeseen. The Venetian government immediately put in motion the troops it had long been getting together, and sent them to the towns on the right bank of the Mincio. At the same time, persuaded that the French were the secret influence to whom they should apply, they addressed themselves to Lallemant, the minister of France, inquiring whether, in this extremity of danger, the republic of Venice could rely on the friendship of the directory. Lallemant's reply was simple, and dictated by his position. He declared that he had no instructions from his government to meet this case, which was true; but he added that if the Venetian government would introduce into its constitution such reforms as the time required, he considered that France would cheerfully lend her assistance. Lallemant could not have given any other answer; for if France had proffered her alliance to Venice against the other powers, she had never offered it to her against her own subjects; and she could not offer it to her against them, but on condition that the government should adopt wise and rational principles. The great council of Venice deliberated on Lallemant's answer. It was several centuries since the proposal of a change of constitution had been publicly made. Out of two hundred votes it obtained but five. Some fifty voices were for adopting some energetic determination; but one hundred and eighty declared in favour of a slow and gradual reform, to be referred to less troublous times, in other words, in favour of an evasive determination. It was resolved two deputies should be immediately sent to Bonaparte, to sound his intentions, and to call for his assistance. They made selection of one of the sages of the continent (*sages de terre ferme*), J. B. Cornaro, and the well-known procurator, Pezaro, whom we have already seen so often in the presence of the general.

The couriers from Kilmaine and the Venetian envoys reached Bonaparte at the moment when his bold manœuvres had ensured to him the line of the Alps, and had enabled him to make his way into the hereditary states. He was at Gorice, occupied settling the capitulation of Trieste. He received with unaffected concern intelligence of the events that were taking place on his rear, and one may very well imagine this, when the audacity and the danger of his march upon Vienna is taken into consideration. Besides, his despatches to the directory plainly exhibit the concern he felt; and those who have said that he did not express his real sentiments in those despatches, have not shown great judgment, since he made no scruple of avowing his least creditable artifices against the Italian governments. But what could he do under such circumstances? It would not be generous in him to forcibly repress the party that proclaimed our own principles, the very party that welcomed and received our armies, and ensure the triumph to a party which was ready, in case of a reverse, to annihilate our principles and our armies altogether. He resolved to make the most of this circumstance, so as to obtain from the envoys of Venice the concessions and the relief which he had not yet been able to wring from them. He received the two envoys with politeness, and gave them an audience on the 5th Germinal (March 25). "For me to arm against my friends," said he, "against those who welcome us and are ready to defend us, in favour of my enemies, in favour of those who detest and would slaughter us, is quite out of the question. This base policy is as far from my heart as from my interest. Never will I lend my aid against those principles for which France has achieved her revolution, and to which I owe in part the success of my arms. But I offer you once more my friendship and my advice. Ally yourselves heart and hand with France; embrace her principles; make those reforms that are indispensably necessary to your constitution; then I will answer for every thing, and without using violent measures, to which I never can assent, I will obtain by my influence over the people of Italy, and by the promise of a more rational system, the restoration of order and peace. This result would be quite as much for your advantage as for mine." This language, which was sincere, and the wisdom of which needs no demonstration, was by no means agreeable to the Venetian envoys, and especially to Pezaro. This was not what they wanted: they were desirous that Bonaparte should restore the fortresses he had occupied by way of precaution in Bergamo, Brescia, and Verona; that he should support the armament of the fanatic party against the patriotic party, and that he should thus allow another war like that of Vendée to be raised up against him in his rear. This was not the way to come to a mutual understanding. Bonaparte, whose disposition was peremptory, behaved with rudeness to the two deputies, and reminding them of the proceedings of the Venetians towards the French

army, declared that he well knew their secret inclinations and designs; but that he was a match for them, and that he had an army in Lombardy to look after them. The conference grew warm. They passed from these questions to that of supplies. Hitherto Venice had furnished provisions for the French army, and she had given Bonaparte a good reason for demanding them at her hands by supplying the Austrian army. The Venetians were desirous that Bonaparte, having entered the hereditary states, should no longer have his army kept at their expense. This was by no means his intention, for he did not mean to require any thing of the inhabitants of Austria, so that he might conciliate them. The contractors whom Venice had secretly employed to supply the French army had ceased to send provisions, and the general had been obliged to levy requisitions in the Venetian states. "This is a vicious expedient," said Bonaparte; "it distresses the inhabitant, and affords occasion for abominable peculations; this campaign will cost me a million a month so long as this campaign lasts; it will not be a long one. The French republic will afterwards settle with you, and will be better satisfied with this million than for all the vexation you suffer from the requisitions. Besides, you have been supplying all my enemies, you have afforded them an asylum; you should do the same for me." The two envoys replied that the treasury was impoverished. "If it be so," answered Bonaparte, "take money out of the treasury of the duke of Modena, whom you have harboured to the detriment of my allies, the Modenese; get it from the property of the English, of the Russians, of the Austrians, of any of my enemies you have now in safe keeping." The parties separated in an ill humour. A fresh interview took place on the following day. Bonaparte, who was then in a better temper, renewed all his proposals; but Pezaro did nothing to satisfy him, and merely promised to inform the senate of all his demands. Bonaparte, whose irritation could no longer be concealed, then grasped the arm of Pezaro, and said, "Now I tell you plainly I know what you are about; I know what you are preparing for me; but mark me! If while I shall be engaged in a distant expedition, you murder my sick, if you attack my depôts, if you threaten my retreat, you will have done for yourselves. What I might forgive while in Italy, would be an unpardonable crime while I am engaged in Austria. If you take up arms, you decide either my ruin or your own. Consider this, and do not hazard the infirm lion of Saint Mark against the fortune of an army which would find in its depôts and its hospitals wherewithal to cross your lagoons and to destroy you." This energetic language frightened, without convincing, the Venetian envoys, who wrote off at once the result of this conference. Bonaparte also wrote immediately to Kilmaine, ordering him to increase his vigilance, to punish the French commandants if they overstepped the bounds of neutrality, and to disarm all the mountaineers and peasants.

Things had gone too far to stop. The insurrection of Bergamo had taken place on the 22nd Ventôse (March 12), that of Brescia on the 27th (March 17), that of Salo on the 4th Germinal (March 24). On the 8th Germinal (March 28) the town of Crema effected its revolution, and the French troops were compelled to engage therein. A detachment which preceded Victor's division, returning to Lombardy, presented itself at the gates of Crema. It was in a moment of agitation. The sight of the French troops could not fail to increase the hopes and the boldness of the patriots. The Venetian podesta, who was frightened, at first refused admission to the French; he then introduced forty of them, who made themselves masters of the gates of the town, and opened them to the rest of the French troops that followed. The inhabitants seized the opportunity, rose, and sent off the Venetian podesta. The French had done this merely to open themselves a passage; the patriots took advantage of it to rise. When such inclinations exist every thing helps, and the most involuntary circumstances have results which induce a suspicion of concert where none really exists. Such was the situation of the French, who, there is no doubt, personally desired the revolution, but who officially observed neutrality.

The mountaineers and the peasants, excited by the agents of Venice and by the sermons of the capuchins, overran the country. The Sclavonian regiments, landed from the lagoons upon the continent, advanced towards the insurgent towns. Kilmaine had issued orders, and set in motion the Lombard legion to disarm the peasants. Several skirmishes had already taken place; villages had been burned, and some peasants seized and disarmed. But the latter, on their part, began to sack the towns, and to slaughter the French, whom they distinguished by the name of Jacobins. They had even already murdered, in a horrible manner, all those whom they met with singly. They first effected a counter-revolution at Salo; and thereupon a body of the inhabitants of Bergamo and Brescia, supported by a detachment of the Poles of the Lombard legion, immediately marched upon Salo to drive away the mountaineers. Some persons sent to parley were induced to enter the town, and were slaughtered; the detachment was surrounded and beaten. Two hundred Poles were taken prisoners and sent to Venice. The known partisans of the French were seized at Salo, at Verona, and in all the Venetian towns; they were confined under the leads, and the state inquisitors, emboldened by this petty success, showed themselves inclined to take cruel vengeance. It is asserted that it was forbidden to cleanse the canal of Orfano, which was appropriated, as it is well known, to the horrible purpose of drowning prisoners of state. However, the government of Venice, while it was inclined to exhibit the greatest severities, strove to deceive general Bonaparte by acts of apparent compliance, and granted the million a month which he had demanded. The murder of the French, whenever they could be found, still continued. Their situation became extremely critical, and Kilmaine despatched fresh couriers to Bonaparte. The latter, when apprised of the battle fought by the mountaineers, the events of Salo, where two hundred Poles had been made prisoners, the confinement of all those in the interest of France, and the murders committed upon the French, was exceedingly enraged. He immediately sent an astounding letter to the senate, in which he recapitulated his complaints, and de-

manded the disarming of the mountaineers, and the liberation of the Polish prisoners, and of the Venetian subjects imprisoned under the leads. He charged Junot to carry this letter, and to read it to the senate, and ordered Lallemant, the minister, to quit Venice immediately, at the same time declaring war against it if all the satisfaction demanded were not granted.

In the mean time Bonaparte was descending with gigantic strides from the summit of the Noric Alps into the valley of the Mur. His great expectation in this venturous march, was the armies of the Rhine promptly taking the field, and then speedily reaching the Danube. But he received a despatch from the directory, which told him he had nothing to expect from that quarter. The distress of the treasury was so great that it could not furnish general Moreau with the few hundred thousand francs which he wanted for a moveable bridge and for crossing the Rhine. Hoche's army, which had got two bridges, and was quite ready, wanted to march, but the government did not venture to expose it by itself the other side the Rhine, while Moreau remained on this side of it. Carnot, in his despatch, even magnified the impediments which would delay the armies of Germany taking the field, and gave Bonaparte no hopes of being supported. The latter was extremely disconcerted by this letter; he was of a sanguine temperament; with him the transition from unbounded confidence to extreme distrust was very easy. He fancied either that the directory wished for the destruction of the army of Italy, and of its commander, or that the other generals would not second him. He wrote an angry letter respecting the conduct of the armies of the Rhine. He said that a line of water never was an obstacle, and that his conduct was a proof of this; that when one was determined to cross a river, it could always be done; that those who would never hazard their reputation sometimes lost it; that he had crossed the Alps over snow and ice three foot deep, and that if he had calculated, like his colleagues, he would not have dared to do it; that if the soldiers of the Rhine left the army of Italy exposed by itself in Germany, *they could have no blood in their veins*; that in addition to this, if that brave army were abandoned, it would have to retreat, and Europe would be judge between it and the other armies of the republic. Like all sensitive and proud men, Bonaparte was fond of complaining, and of greatly magnifying the subject of his complaints. Let him say what he would, he never intended to retreat, or even to halt, but rather to strike terror into Austria by a rapid march, and to force her to consent to a peace. Many circumstances favoured this design. There was the greatest alarm at Vienna; the court was inclined to treat: prince Charles strongly advised that course. The ministry alone, devoted to England, still held out. The conditions prescribed by Clarke before the victories of Arcola and Rivoli were so moderate, that it would be easy to obtain the adherence of Austria to those conditions, nay, even to more important cases. Joined by Joubert and Masséna, Bonaparte would have forty-five or fifty thousand men under his command; and with such a force he did not fear a general battle, whatever might be the strength of the enemy. These things being considered, he resolved to make an overture to prince Charles, and if he received no answer, to fall upon him with impetuosity, and to strike so sudden and so violent a blow, that they should no longer be able to refuse his offers. How glorious would it be for him, if alone and unsupported, having made his way into Austria by so extraordinary a route, he should compel the emperor to accept of peace on the terms dictated.

He was at Klagenfurt, the capital of Carinthia, on the 11th Germinal (March 31). Joubert on his left, was completing his movement, and going to join him. Bernadotte, whom he had detached by the causeway of Carniola, had made himself master of Trieste, of the rich mines of Idria, and of the Austrian magazines, and was returning by Laybach and Klagenfurt. On the same day, the 11th (March 31), he wrote a memorable letter to the archduke Charles. "*Monsieur* the commander-in-chief," said he, "brave soldiers make war and desire peace. Has not this war lasted for six years? Have we not slain men enough, and inflicted calamities enough on suffering humanity! It cries out against us on all sides. Europe, which had taken up arms against the French republic, has laid them down. Your nation alone is left, and yet more blood is about to be spilt than ever. This sixth campaign is presaged by sinister omens. Be its issue what it may, we shall kill on either side some thousand men, and indeed, at last we must come to an arrangement, since every thing has an end, even the most intense hatred.

"The executive directory of the French republic has made known to his majesty the emperor its desire to put an end to the war which is grievously afflicting to both nations. The intervention of the court of London is opposed to this. Is there then no hope of our coming to some understanding; and is it to serve the interests and passions of strangers to the calamities of war that we should go on murdering one another? You, monsieur commander-in-chief, who are by birth so close to the throne, and are elevated above all the petty passions which so frequently actuate ministers and governments, have you made up your mind to merit the title of benefactor of all humankind, and be the real saviour of Germany? Do not suppose, monsieur commander-in-chief, that I mean by this that it is not possible to save her by force of arms; but even assuming that the chances of war turn in your favour, Germany will not on that account be the less devastated. As for me, monsieur commander-in-chief, if the overture I have the honour of making to you can save the life of a single man, I shall be more proud of the civic crown I shall find that I have deserved, than that of the melancholy reputation that can result from military successes."

The archduke Charles could not receive this overture, for the aulic council had not yet come to any determination. At Vienna, the valuable effects of the crown and state papers were shipped on the Danube, and the young archdukes and archduchesses were sent to Hungary. The court prepared, in case of extremity, to quit the capital. The archduke replied to general Bonaparte that he wished for peace as much as he could, but that he had no authority to treat, and that he must address himself direct to Vienna. Bonaparte advanced rapidly across the mountains of Carinthia,

and in the morning of the 12th Germinal (April 1) pursued the enemy's rear-guard upon Saint Veith and Freisach, and utterly overthrew it. In the afternoon of the same day, he came full butt upon the archduke, who had taken up his position in advance of the narrow passes of Nieumark, with the remains of his army of Friule, and with four divisions come from the Rhine, those of Kaim, Mercantin, and the prince of Orange, and the reserve of grenadiers. A furious engagement took place in these defiles. Masséna again had all the honour of the day. The soldiers of the Rhine were emulating the veterans of the army of Italy. The question was, which of them should advance the quickest and the farthest. After an obstinately contested action, in which the archduke lost three thousand men on the field of battle and twelve hundred prisoners, every thing was carried at the point of the bayonet, and the defiles taken. On the following day, Bonaparte marched without halting from Neumark to Unzmark. It was between these two points, the cross-road connecting the great causeway of the Tyrol with the great causeway of Carinthia terminated. It was by this route that Kerpen, who was pursued by Joubert, was coming up. The archduke, wishing to gain time to get Kerpen's division about him, proposed a suspension of arms, to take, as he said, into consideration the letter of the 11th (March 31st). Bonaparte replied that they could go on negotiating and fighting, and continued his march. On the following day, the 14th (April 3), another severe engagement took place at Unzmark, where he took fifteen hundred prisoners, entered Knitelfeld, and found nothing to impede him between that place and Léoben. The advanced guard entered that place on the 18th Germinal (April 7). Kerpen had made a long round before he could again join the archduke, and Joubert had assisted the principal army.

On that same day that Bonaparte entered Léoben, lieutenant-general Bellegarde and major-general Meerfeld arrived at the head-quarters in the name of the emperor, whom the rapid march of the French had intimidated, and who desired a suspension of hostilities. He asked for ten days. Bonaparte was fully sensible that a suspension of hostilities for ten days would give the archduke time to get the last reinforcements from the Rhine, to collect all the detached portions of his army, and to take breath. But he himself had great need of the same, and on his side he would have the advantage of effecting a junction between the divisions of Bernadotte and Joubert. Besides, he believed that there was a sincere desire to treat, and he granted a suspension of arms for five days, to allow plenipotentiaries time to arrive, and to sign preliminaries. The convention was signed on the 18th (April 7), and was not to last longer than the 23rd (April 12). He fixed his head-quarters at Léoben, and sent on Masséna's advanced guard to the Limmering, the last height of the Norie Alps, which is twenty-five leagues distant from Vienna, and from whence may be seen the steeples of that capital. The use he made of those five days was to rest and collect his columns. He issued a proclamation to the inhabitants to satisfy them of his intentions, and he added deeds to words, for nothing was taken without being paid for by the army.

Bonaparte awaited the expiration of the five days, ready to strike a fresh blow, and to add to the consternation of the imperial court, if it were not yet sufficiently alarmed. But there was every disposition at Vienna to put an end to this long and cruel struggle, which had lasted five years, and in which torrents of blood had been spilt. The English party in the ministry were entirely thrown out. Thugut was on the point of falling into disgrace. The people of Vienna loudly demanded peace; the archduke Charles himself, the hero of Austria, recommended it, and declared that the empire could no longer be saved by arms. The emperor inclined to this opinion. At length, a determination was taken; and count de Meerfeld, and the marquis de Gallo, ambassador of Naples at Vienna, were immediately despatched to Léoben. The latter was chosen through the influence of the empress, who was the daughter of the queen of Naples, and who interfered much in public affairs. Their instructions were to sign preliminaries which might hereafter serve for a basis in a subsequent treaty for a definitive peace. They arrived on the morning of the 24th Germinal (April 13), at the moment when the truce had expired, and Bonaparte was preparing to attack the advanced posts. They declared that they had full powers to determine the basis of a peace. A garden in the environs of Léoben was declared neutral ground, and the treaty was negotiated in the midst of the bivouacs of the French army. The young general, who had all at once become a negotiator, had not served a diplomatic apprenticeship; but for a year past, he had had to negotiate the most important affairs that could form the subject of a treaty in this world. He had acquired a celebrity which made him the most distinguished character of his times, and the language he used was in every respect as remarkable. He, therefore, most creditably represented the French republic. He had no authority to negotiate. It was Clarke who was invested with the necessary powers for that purpose; and Clarke, whom he had sent for, had not yet arrived at head-quarters. But he might consider the preliminaries of peace as an armistice, and this was within the scope of the general's authority; besides, it was certain that Clarke would sign all that he would have agreed upon, and he therefore entered immediately into negotiation. The chief concern of the emperor and of his envoys was the regulation of the ceremonial. According to ancient usage, the emperor had the honour of taking the initiative before the kings of France; he was always named first in the protocols of treaties; and his ambassadors had precedence of the French ambassadors. He was the only sovereign to whom this honour was conceded by France. The emperor's two envoys immediately consented to acknowledge the French republic, provided the ancient ceremonial was abided by. "The French republic," proudly replied Bonaparte, "does not want to be acknowledged; she is in Europe as the sun above the horizon: so much the worse for those undiscerning persons, who can neither see or take a lesson from this fact." He repudiated the article of acknowledgment. As for ceremonial, he declared that such matters were quite indifferent to the republic; that they might settle that point with the directory, which would probably not be behindhand in sacrificing

such interests to real advantages; that, on the present occasion, they would treat on a footing of equality; and that France and the emperor should alternately take the initiative.

They then proceeded to the consideration of the essential questions. The first and most important article was the cession of the Belgic provinces to France. Austria could no longer think of withholding them. It was first agreed that the emperor should cede to France all the Belgic provinces; that moreover he should consent, as a member of the Germanic empire, that France should extend her frontiers to the Rhine. There was a question as to indemnities, and the emperor had demanded that sufficient indemnities should be given him either in Germany or in Italy. There were two modes of procuring them for him in Germany, either by giving him Bavaria, or by secularizing several ecclesiastical states of the empire. The first idea had more than once engaged the attention of European diplomacy. The second is attributable to Rewbell, who had devised this expedient, as being most accordant and consistent with the spirit of the revolution. In fact, it was no longer a time for bishops to be temporal sovereigns, and Rewbell indeed was astute in making the ecclesiastical power contribute to the augmentation the French republic was about to receive. But the acquisitions of the emperor in Germany would hardly have met with the concurrence of Prussia. Besides, if Bavaria were given to him, indemnities would have to be provided for the prince to whom it belonged. Lastly, the states of Germany being under the immediate influence of the emperor, he would not gain much by acquiring them, and he far preferred aggrandizements in Italy, which really did add new territories to his power. It became therefore necessary to think of seeking indemnities in Italy.

Had the immediate restoration of Lombardy to the emperor been assented to; if an engagement had been entered into for maintaining the republic of Venice in its present state, and not permitting democracy to advance to the frontiers of the Alps; he would instantly have consented to the peace, and acknowledged the Cispadane republic, composed of the duchy of Modena, the two Legations, and Romagna. But to subject Lombardy again to the Austrian yoke, Lombardy who showed so strong an attachment for us, who had made such exertions and such sacrifices for us, and whose principal inhabitants were so deeply compromised, would have been an odious and weak act; for our situation allowed us to demand more. We were therefore bound to ensure the independence of Lombardy, and to look in Italy for such indemnities as would compensate Austria for the twofold loss of Belgium and of Lombardy. There was a very simple arrangement, which had more than once occurred to European diplomatists, and had more than once been a subject of hope to Austria, and of fear to Venice; this was to indemnify Austria with the Venetian states. The Illyrian provinces, Istria, and the whole of Upper Italy, from the Izonzo to the Oglio, formed rich dominions, and could supply ample indemnities to Austria. The manner in which the Venetian aristocracy had conducted itself towards France, its constant refusals to make alliance with her, its secret armaments, the evident object of which was to fall upon the French in case of a reverse, the recent rising of the mountaineers and peasants, and the murder of French subjects, had filled Bonaparte with indignation. Besides, if the emperor, for whom Venice had secretly armed, accepted her spoils, Bonaparte, against whom she had prepared those armaments, could not have any scruple to cede them. After all, there would yet be indemnities left to offer to Venice. There was Lombardy, the duchy of Modena, the Legations of Bologna, and Ferrara, and Romagna, rich and important provinces, part of which formed the Cispadane republic. Venice might be indemnified with some of these provinces. This arrangement appeared the most suitable; and here for the first time was laid down the principle of indemnifying Austria with the continental provinces of Venice without prejudice to compensating Venice with other Italian provinces.

Recourse was had to Vienna, which was scarcely twenty-five leagues distant. This kind of indemnity was agreed upon; the preliminaries of peace were immediately settled and reduced into articles, which were to serve as the basis of a definitive negotiation. The emperor ceded to France all his possessions in the Netherlands, and consented, as a member of the empire, that the republic should acquire the boundary of the Rhine. He further renounced Lombardy. As an indemnification for all these cessions, he was to receive the Venetian continental territories, Illyria, Istria, and Upper Italy as far as the Oglio. Venice remained independent, retaining the Ionian islands, and was to receive compensations taken from the provinces at the disposal of France. The emperor acknowledged the republics which were about to be founded in Italy. The French army was to retire from the Austrian states, and be distributed in cantonments on the frontiers of those states; that is to say, to evacuate Carinthia and Carniola, and to be posted on the Izonzo, and at the outlets of the Tyrol. All the arrangements relative to the Venetian provinces and government were to be made to the mutual satisfaction of Austria and France. Two congresses were to be opened, one at Berne for the separate peace with the emperor, the other in a city of Germany for the peace with the empire. The peace with the emperor was to be concluded in three months, otherwise the preliminaries were to be annulled. Austria had another powerful reason for hastening the conclusion of the definitive treaty, and that was to enter into possession as soon as possible of the Venetian provinces, so that the French might not have time to propagate revolutionary ideas in that quarter.

Bonaparte's design was to dismember the Cispadane republic, composed of the duchy of Modena, the two legations, and Romagna; to unite the duchy of Modena with Lombardy, and to create with them a single republic, having Milan for its capital, under the style of the Cisalpine republic, from its situation with reference to the Alps. He then purposed giving the two Legations and Romagna to Venice, taking care to humble its aristocracy and to reform its constitution. After this fashion there would be in Italy two republics allied with France, owing their existence to her, and inclined to concur in her plans. The Cisalpine would have the Oglio for its frontier, which is

would be easy to fortify. It would not possess Mantua, which, with the Mantuan, would continue to belong to the emperor; but Pizzighitone on the Adda might be made a first-rate fortress; and the walls of Berghamo and Orema might be rebuilt. The republic of Venice with her islands, with the Dogado and the Polesino, which Bonaparte would do his utmost to preserve for her, with the two Legations and Romagna, which were to be given to her with the province of Massa-Carrara, and the Gulf of Spezzia, which was to be added thereto in the Mediterranean, would be a maritime power, opening on two seas.

It may be asked why Bonaparte did not avail himself of his position to drive the Austrians at once from Italy; and why, in particular, he indemnified them at the expense of a neutral power, and by an act similar to the partition of Poland. In the first place, was it possible entirely to emancipate Italy? Should we not have had to turn Europe upside down once more before we could bring it to consent to the overthrow of the pope, of the king of Sardinia, of the grand-duke of Tuscany, of the Bourbons of Naples, and of the duke of Parma? Was the French republic in a state to make those renewed exertions which such an enterprise would have demanded? Was it not a great thing to have sown in this campaign the seeds of liberty, by constituting two republics, whence she could not fail soon to extend herself to the remotest parts of the Peninsula? The partition of the Venetian states did not in any one thing resemble that notorious outrage with which Europe has been so frequently reproached. Poland was partitioned by the very powers which had made her to rise, and had promised her their assistance. Venice, to whom the French had in all sincerity offered their friendship, had refused it, and prepared to betray them, and to surprise them in a moment of danger. If she had cause of complaint, it was against the Austrians, for whose benefit she wished to betray the French. Poland was a state whose limits were distinctly marked on the map of Europe, whose independence, if we may so express ourselves, was dictated by its natural position, and was of consequence, so far as the tranquillity of the west was concerned; whose constitution, though vicious, was liberal; whose citizens, unworthily betrayed, had exhibited a noble courage, and deserved the sympathy of civilized nations. Venice, on the contrary, had no natural territory but her lagoons, for her power had never resided in her continental possessions; she was not destroyed, because some of her provinces were exchanged for others; her constitution was the most corrupt in Europe; her government was abhorred by her subjects; her perfidy and her cowardice gave her no claim to sympathy or to existence. There was nothing then in the partition of the Venetian states that could be compared with the partition of Poland, unless it were the manner in which Austria had acted.

Besides, before we could be exempted from giving such indemnities to the Austrians, we must have expelled them from Italy, and this could only be done by treating in Vienna itself. But to effect this we must have had the concurrence of the armies of the Rhine, and Bonaparte had been written to, that they could not take the field in less than a month. All that he could have done in this situation would have been to fall back, to wait for their taking the field, which would have exposed him to numerous inconveniences; for it would have given time to the archduke to prepare a formidable army against him, and to Hungary to rise *en masse* and fall upon his flanks. Moreover, he would have been obliged to fall back, and almost to acknowledge the imprudent hardihood of his march. In accepting the preliminaries, he had the honour of individually extorting peace; he reaped the fruit of his very daring march; he obtained conditions which, in the situation of Europe, were very splendid, and were, above all, far more advantageous than those which had formed the instructions for Clarke, since they stipulated for the line of the Rhine and the Alps, and for a republic in Italy. Thus, partly for political and military reasons, partly from personal considerations, he made up his mind to sign the preliminaries. Clarke had not yet arrived at head-quarters. With his accustomed boldness, and the confidence suggested by his reputation, his name, and the general desire for peace, Bonaparte overstepped his powers, and signed the preliminaries, just as if it were a question of a mere armistice. The signature was given at Léoben, on the 29th Germinal, year V. (April 18, 1797.)

If at this moment he could have known what was taking place on the Rhine, he would not have been in such a hurry to sign the preliminaries of Léoben; but he knew no more than what had been written to him, and he had been informed that the inactivity of the army would be protracted. He immediately sent off Masséna to carry the preliminaries to Paris. This brave general was the only one who had not been sent to carry the colours to Paris, and receive the honours of the triumph. Bonaparte deemed this a fine opportunity for sending him, and one that was worthy of the important services which he had rendered. He also despatched couriers to the armies of the Rhine and of the Sambre and Meuse, who travelled through Germany, in order to get thither as quickly as possible, and to put an end to all hostilities if they had commenced.

They had in fact commenced at the very time while the signature of the preliminaries was taking place. Hoche, long impatient to enter into action, was incessantly demanding permission to commence hostilities. Moreau had hastened to Paris, to solicit the funds necessary for the purchase of materials for a bridge. It was at last ordered. Hoche, at the head of his fine army, debouched by Neuwied, while Championnet, with the right wing, debouched by Düsseldorf, and marched to Uckerath and Altenkirchen. Hoche attacked the Austrians at Heddersdorf, where they had thrown up considerable intrenchments, killed a great number of them, and took five thousand prisoners. After this brilliant action, he advanced rapidly upon Frankfort, always beating Kray, and striving to cut off his retreat. He was on the point of surrounding him by a skilful manœuvre, and perhaps of taking him, when there came Bonaparte's courier, who announced the signature of the preliminaries. This circumstance stopped Hoche in the midst of his victorious career, and caused him deep mortification, for he once more saw himself stopped short in his career. If the couriers had

but been sent first to Paris, he would have had time to take Kray and all his army, which would have added a glorious exploit to his life, and have had the greatest influence on the subsequent negotiations. While Hoche was advancing thus rapidly upon the Nidda, Dessix, who had been authorized by Moreau to cross the Rhine, attempted one of the boldest actions recorded in the history of the war. He had chosen for crossing the Rhine a point much lower down than Strasburg. After grounding with his troops upon an island of gravel, he had at length got to the opposite shore. There he had remained for twenty-four hours, liable to be thrown into the Rhine, and obliged to contend against the whole Austrian army in order to keep his ground in copses and marshes, till the bridge was thrown across the river. At length the passage was effected; the Austrians had been pursued into the Black mountains, and some part of their baggage seized. Here also the army was stopped amidst its successes by the courier sent from Léoben; and it was much to be regretted that the false statements sent to Bonaparte should have determined him to sign so soon.

The couriers next arrived at Paris, where they gave great joy to those who wished for peace, but not to the directory, who, deeming our situation commanding, was sorry to see that it had not been turned to better account. Larévellière and Rewbell, as philosophers, desired the entire emancipation of Italy; Barras, like a fiery revolutionist, wished that the republic should humble the powers; Carnot, who for some time past affected moderation, and who generally supported the views of the opposition, approved of the peace, and argued that, in order to make it durable, the emperor should not be too much humiliated. Warm discussions on the subject of the preliminaries took place in the directory; nevertheless, in order not to alienate public opinion, and not to appear to be desirous of everlasting war, it was decided that the basis established at Léoben should be approved of.

During these occurrences on the Rhine and in France, important events were bursting forth in Italy. We have already observed that Bonaparte, who had received intelligence of the disturbances which agitated the Venetian states, of the rising of the mountaineers against the towns, of the check of the Brescians before Salo, of the capture of the two hundred Poles, of the murder of a great number of Frenchmen, and of the imprisonment of all their partisans, had written at Léoben a letter expressing the utmost indignation to the Venetian senate. He had ordered Junot, his aid-de-camp, to read it himself to the senate, and then to demand the liberation of all the prisoners, as well as that search should be made for the murderers who were to be delivered over to the French; and he further ordered him to quit Venice immediately, at the same time posting up a declaration of war if complete satisfaction were not granted. Junot was introduced to the senate on the 26th Germinal (April 15). He read the threatening letter of his general, and he conducted himself with all the rudeness of a soldier so peculiar to a soldier of fortune. He was answered, that the armaments that had been prepared had for their object nothing else than the maintenance of subordination in the territories of the republic; that if murders had been committed, it was an accident they could not have prevented, but for which amends should be made. Junot would not be put off with empty words. He threatened to post up the declaration of war unless they instantly released the state-prisoners and the Poles, and unless orders were given for disarming the mountaineers, and for following up all those who had committed the murders. At last they contrived to pacify Junot, and it was settled with him and the French minister, Lallemant, that the senate should write to general Bonaparte, and send two deputies to arrange with him as to the amends he would require to be made. The two deputies appointed were Francis Donat and Leopold Justiniani.

But in the mean time the agitation in the Venetian states continued. The towns were still in hostility with the country and mountaineer population. The agents of the aristocratic and monkish party spread the grossest misrepresentations relative to the fate of the French army in Austria. They asserted that it had been surrounded and destroyed, and they relied upon two facts as supporting their false intelligence. Bonaparte, in drawing closer to him the two corps of Joubert and Bernadotte, which he had ordered to march, the one through the Tyrol, the other through Carniola, had exposed his wings. Joubert had beaten and driven Kerpen beyond the Alps; but he had left Laudohn in a part of the Tyrol, from whence the latter had soon reappeared, raising the whole loyal population of those mountains, and descending the Adige, to proceed to Verona. General Servier left with twelve hundred men to guard the Tyrol, retired foot by foot upon Verona, to seek refuge with the French troops remaining in Upper Italy. At the same time, a division of the same strength, left in Carniola, retired before the Croats, who had risen like the Tyrolese, and fell back upon Palma Nova. These were matters of no great importance, and Lallemant, the French minister, strove to demonstrate their unimportance to the Venetian government, that it might desist from further acts of imprudence; but all these arguments were of no force; and at the very time that Bonaparte was compelling the Austrian plenipotentiaries to come to his head-quarters to treat, it was reported in the Venetian states that he was beaten, surrounded, and must inevitably perish in his hare-brained expedition. The party hostile to the French and to the revolution, at the head of which were several members of the Venetian government, without the government appearing to be identified with it, was in higher spirits than ever. At Verona, the agitation was particularly violent. This, the most important city of the Venetian states, was the first exposed to the revolutionary contagion, for it stood next to Salo upon the line of the insurgent towns. The Venetians were extremely desirous to save it, and to drive the French from it. Every thing seemed to concur favorably for them in this respect, not so much the inclinations of the inhabitants, as the great concourse of the mountaineers, and the approach of general Laudohn. There were already in the city Italian and Sclavonian troops in the service of Venice. More were advancing towards the place, and very soon all the communications with the neighbouring towns were occupied. General Balland, who commanded the French garrison at

Verona, found himself cut off from the other commandants posted in the environs. More than twenty thousand mountaineers overran the country. The French detachments were attacked on the roads; Capuchins preached to the populace in the streets, and a false manifesto of the *podesta* of Verona was circulated, for the purpose of exciting the people to slaughter the French. This manifesto was a forgery, and the name of Bataglia, subscribed thereto, is enough to prove its falsity; but it did not the less fail to add to the general excitement. At length, a communication emanating from the leaders of the party in Verona informed general Landohn that he might approach, and that they were going to deliver the citadel to him. It was on the 26th and 27th Germinal (April 15 and 16) that all this took place. There were no news from Léoben, and the moment in fact appeared most suitably chosen for an outbreak.

General Balland kept upon his guard. He had given his troops orders to retire into the fortifications on the first signal. He complained to the Venetian authorities of the treatment experienced by the French, and particularly of the preparations which he saw making; but he obtained only evasive replies, and no real satisfaction. He wrote to Mantua and to Milan asking for assistance, and held himself ready to retire into the fortifications. On the 28th Germinal (April 17), which was Easter Monday, an extraordinary agitation was exhibited in Verona; bands of peasants entered, shouting, "Death to the Jacobins!" Balland withdrew his troops into the fortifications, left mere detachments at the gates, and gave notice that on the first act of violence he would fire upon the city. But about noon whistlings were heard in the streets: the people fell upon the French; armed bands attacked the detachments left to guard the gates, and butchered those who had not time to regain the forts. A set of ferocious wretches flew upon those Frenchmen whose duties kept them in Verona, stabbed them with daggers, and threw them into the Adige. Even the hospitals were not spared, and they were stained with the blood of some of the patients. In the mean time those who could get away, but had not time to run to the fortifications, fled to the government-house, where the Venetian authorities afforded them an asylum, in order that the massacre might not appear to be their doing. Already more than four hundred unfortunate persons had perished, and the French garrison could not contain itself for rage at seeing the French slaughtered, and their bodies floating at a distance upon the Adige. General Balland immediately gave the order to fire, and showered cannon-balls upon the city. He could have reduced it to ashes. But although the mountaineers who had entered concerned themselves but little about this, the inhabitants and the Venetian magistrates resolved to come to some terms in order to save their city. They sent a flag of truce to general Balland, in order to come to some understanding with him, and to stop further damage. General Balland consented to hear what they had to say, with a view to save the unhappy individuals who had taken refuge in the government-palace, and who were threatened with revenge for all the damage done to the city. Among the number were women and children belonging to the officers of the civil administrations, and patients escaped from the hospitals; and it was of importance to put them out of the reach of danger. Balland insisted that they should be delivered up to him immediately, that they should turn the mountaineers and the Sclavonian regiments out of the town, that they should disarm the populace, and that some of the Venetian magistrates should be given him as hostages and guarantees for the submission of the city. The bearers of the flag of truce desired that an officer should go to the government-palace to treat. The brave brigadier-general (*chef de brigade*) Beaupoil, had the courage to undertake this. Having made his way through the furious populace, who would have torn him in pieces, he came before the Venetian authorities. The whole night was passed in vain discussions with the *proveditore* and the *podesta*, without being able to come to any understanding. They would not disarm, they would not give hostages, they wanted guarantees against the vengeance that general Bonaparte would not fail to take on the rebellious city. But during this parley, the agreement not to fire during these conferences was violated by the ferocious hordes that had taken possession of Verona; they exchanged a fire of musketry with the *forts*, and our troops made occasional sallies. Next morning, the 29th Germinal (April 18), Beaupoil returned to the forts, exposed to the greatest possible dangers, without having gained any thing. It was now learned that the Venetian magistrates, unable to keep the furious multitude within bounds, had disappeared. The firing of musketry against the fort was renewed. General Balland then ordered the firing to be renewed, and kept up a most heavy cannonade-fire upon the city. It was on fire in several places. Some of the principal inhabitants were collected at the government-palace in order to take the government of the city in the absence of the authorities. A fresh parley took place; it was agreed that the firing should cease; but this agreement was not better adhered to by the insurgents than the previous, for the insurgents kept up an incessant fire upon the fortifications. The savage peasants who covered the country fell upon the garrison of the fort of La Chiusa, situated on the Adige, and killed every body there. They treated the French scattered in the villages around Verona in the same manner.

But the moment of vengeance was not long deferred. Couriers had been despatched from all quarters to put general Kilmaine on his guard. Troops were coming in from all quarters. Kilmaine gave orders to general Chabran to march immediately with twelve hundred men; to Lahoz, commander of the Lombard legion, to advance with eight hundred; and to generals Victor and Baraguay d'Hilliers, to march with their divisions. While the troops were executing these movements, general Landohn, receiving intelligence of the signature of the preliminaries, halted upon the Adige. After a sanguinary battle, which general Chabran had to fight with the Venetian troops, the city of Verona was surrounded on all sides, and then the furious wretches who had massacred the French after the most atrocious violence, now exhibited the most abject feeling. They had never ceased to alternately parley and fire from the 1st to the 5th Floréal (April 20—25). The Venetian magis-

trates had again made their appearance; they still wanted guarantees against the vengeance which threatened them; twenty-four hours were given them to decide; they again disappeared. A provisional municipality supplied their place, and on seeing the French troops masters of the city and ready to reduce it to ashes, it surrendered unconditionally. General Kilmaine did what he could to prevent pillage, but he could not save the *Mont de Piété*, which was partly plundered. He ordered some of the known leaders of the insurrection, taken in arms, to be shot; he imposed upon the city a levy of eleven hundred thousand francs, for the pay of the army, and sent out his cavalry upon all the roads to disarm the peasants, and to cut down those who resisted. He then exerted himself to restore order, and immediately despatched a report to the general-in-chief, awaiting his orders with regard to the rebel city. Such were the massacres known by the name of the Veronese Easter (*Pâques Véronaises*).

While this incident was taking place at Verona, an act still more odious, if possible, was committed in Venice itself. There was a regulation which prohibited armed vessels of the belligerent powers to enter the port of Lido. A lugger, commanded by captain Laugier, belonging to the French flotilla in the Adriatic, chased by Austrian frigates, had taken shelter under the batteries of Lido, and had saluted them with nine guns. He was ordered to sheer off, notwithstanding the weather, and the enemy's ships that were in pursuit of him. He was going to obey, when, without giving him time to get off, the batteries fired upon the unfortunate vessel, and riddled her without mercy. Captain Laugier, with a generous self-devotion, made his crew go down into the hold, and went himself upon deck with a speaking-trumpet to make himself heard and repeat that he was getting away, but he fell dead upon the deck with two of his crew. At the same moment the lugger was boarded by some Venetian boats, manned by Sclavonians, who rushed upon deck and murdered the crew, with the exception of two or three unfortunate men, who were carried to Venice. This deplorable event happened on the 4th Floréal (April 23).

At this moment news arrived not only of the massacres at Verona, but of the capture of that city, and of the signature of the preliminaries. The government found itself completely compromised, and could no longer reckon upon the ruin of general Bonaparte, who, so far from being surrounded and beaten, was on the contrary victorious, and had just been dictating a peace to Austria. It was now going to face that all-powerful general, whose alliance it had refused, and whose soldiers it had been murdering. The government, in fact, was completely terrified. That it had officially ordered either the massacres at Verona or the cruelties perpetrated at the port of Lido, was by no means probable; and no one who is acquainted with the usual course pursued by governments under the influence of factions can suppose this to have been the case. Governments so circumstanced have no occasion to give orders for the execution of what they wish; all they have to do is to remove all restraint from that faction in whose sentiments they participate. They surrender their appliances to the faction, and thus make it the instrument of doing what they dare not do themselves. The insurgents of Verona had cannon; they were supported by Venetian regular regiments. Ottolini, podesta of Bergamo, had been supplied wholesale with all that was necessary for arming the peasants; thus, after furnishing the means, the government had only to suffer them to be employed; and this is the way in which it behaved. In the first moment, however, it acted without consideration, by rewarding the commandant of the Lido, for having, as it said, made the laws of Venice to be respected. It could not, therefore, flatter itself with the hope that available excuses could be tendered to general Bonaparte. It sent fresh instructions to the two deputies, Donat and Justiniani, who were at first directed only to reply to the demands made by Junot on the 28th Germinal (April 13). As yet the occurrences at Verona and the Lido were not known; but now the two deputies had a very different task to perform, and very different events to explain. They advanced amidst shouts of joy excited by the news of the peace, and they soon comprehended that they alone had cause to be sad amidst these important events. They learned on the road that Bonaparte, to punish them for the refusal of his alliance, for their severity to his partisans, and for some individual murders committed upon the French, had ceded part of their territories to Austria. What would be done when he should be acquainted with the atrocious circumstances which had since occurred!

Bonaparte was already on his return from Léoben, and, according to the tenour of the preliminaries, retreated with his army towards the Alps and the Izonzo. They found him at Gratz, and were introduced to him on the 6th Floréal (April 25). At this moment he had heard only of the massacres at Verona, which had begun on the 28th Germinal (April 17), and not of the affair of the Lido, which took place on the 4th Floréal (April 23). They had fortified themselves with a letter from a brother of the general's, in order that they might be the more graciously received. They came trembling into the presence of that man "truly extraordinary," as they said, "for the vivacity of his imagination, the promptness of his understanding, and the invincible force of his comprehension".* He received them politely, and, repressing his indignation, permitted them to explain themselves at great length. Then breaking silence, he thus addressed them, "Are my prisoners released? Are the murderers punished? Are the peasants disarmed? I want no empty professions; my soldiers have been massacred; signal vengeance must be taken for this." The two envoys would have reverted to the circumstances which had obliged them to provide against the insurrection, to the disorders inseparable from such events, to the difficulty of discovering the real murderers. "A government so well served by spies as yours," replied Bonaparte sharply, "ought to know the real instigators of those murders. At any rate, I well know that it is as contemptible as it is despicable, and that it cannot now disarm those whom it has set in motion. I will myself disarm them. I have made peace. I have eighty thousand men; I will break up

* Veramente originale, ma forse non più che per vivacità d' immaginazione, robustezza invincibile di sentimento, ed agilità nel ravvisarlo esternamente.

your leads. Venice shall find a second Attila in me. I will have no inquisition, no golden book; those are institutions of the barbarous ages. Your government is too aged by far; it can no longer stand. When I was at Gorice, I offered M. Pezaro my alliance and good counsel. He rejected them. You were waiting for my return to cut off my retreat; well, here I am. I will no longer parley; I am determined to lay down the law. If you have nothing else to tell me, I can only say that you may retire."

These words, uttered with great indignation, prostrated the Venetian envoys. They solicited a second interview, but they could not draw any other expressions from the general, who persisted in his intentions, and whose evident determination it was to give law to Venice, and to destroy by force an aristocracy whom he could not bring to reform itself in pursuance of his advice. But they had soon additional cause for apprehension, when they became acquainted with the particulars of the massacres at Verona, and especially with the detestable cruelty committed in the port of Lido. Not daring to make their appearance before Bonaparte, they ventured to write him a most submissive letter, offering him every explanation he could desire. "I cannot receive you," he replied, "covered all over as you are with French blood; I will hearken to you when you have delivered to me the three state-inquisitors, the commandant of the Lido, and the officer who has the conduct of the Venetian police." However, as they had received a recent courier relative to the event at the Lido, he consented to see them, but refused to listen to any proposal, till they had delivered up to him the persons whom he demanded. The two Venetians, then seeking to avail themselves of a faculty the republic had frequently employed with effect, endeavoured to propose to him a reparation of another kind. "No, no," replied the irritated general; "if you were to cover your beach with gold, all your treasures, all the treasures of Peru, could not pay for the blood of one of my soldiers.

Bonaparte dismissed them. It was the 13th Floréal (May 2). He immediately issued a proclamation of war against Venice. The French constitution did not permit either the directory or the generals to declare war, but it authorized them to repel hostilities already commenced. Bonaparte, supporting himself upon this authority and upon the events at Verona and at the Lido, declared that hostilities had commenced; gave notice to Lallemant, the minister, to quit Venice; took down the lion of Saint Mark in all the continental provinces; caused the towns to be municipalized; proclaimed every where the overthrow of the Venetian government; and in the interval of the march of his troops on their return from Austria, he ordered general Kilmaine to proceed with the divisions of Baraguay-d'Hilliers and Victor to the border of the lagoons. His determinations, as prompt as his anger, were instantly executed. In the twinkling of an eye, the ancient lion of Saint Mark disappeared every where between the banks of the Izonzo and those of the Mincio, and was replaced by the tree of liberty. Military were on their road from all quarters, and the French cannon roared on those shores which for a long time had never heard the cannon of an hostile force.

The ancient city of Venice, seated amidst her lagoons, could still present almost insuperable difficulties even to the general who had just humbled Austria. All her lagoons were protected. She had thirty-seven galleys, and one hundred and sixty-eight gun-boats, carrying seven hundred and fifty guns and eight thousand five hundred seamen or gunners. She had a garrison of three thousand five hundred Italians and eleven thousand Sclavonians, provisions for eight months, fresh water for two, and the means of renewing these supplies. We were not masters of the sea; we had no gunboats for crossing the lagoons; we should be obliged to proceed sounding as we went along those unknown canals and under the fire of innumerable batteries. Brave and daring as the conquerors of Italy were, they might yet be frustrated by such obstacles, and condemned to a siege of several months. And how many events might not a delay of several months bring about! Austria, at present repulsed, might reject the preliminaries, enter the lists again, and give rise to fresh chances.

But if the military situation of Venice presented resources, her internal state did not allow an energetic use to be made of them. Like all worn-out bodies, this aristocracy was divided. It had neither the same interests or even the same sentiments. The upper nobility, possessing the public offices and honours, and having great wealth at its disposal, had less ignorance and fewer prejudices and passions than the lower nobility; it had, above all, the ambition of power. The mass of the nobility, excluded from public employments, living as state-pensioners, ignorant and violent, possessed genuine aristocratic prejudices. In conjunction with the priests, it excited the people to whom they belonged, as happens in every state where the middle class is not yet sufficiently powerful to get the nobility to identify itself with that class. The Venetian populace, composed of seamen and artisans, coarse, superstitious, and half-savage, were ready to indulge in every possible excess. The middle class, composed of merchants, tradesmen lawyers, physicians, &c., wished, as in every other place it does, for the establishment of civil equality, rejoiced at the approach of the French, but durst not give vent to its joy, on seeing before its face a populace capable of being stimulated to the greatest excesses before a revolution were effected. Lastly, to all these discordant elements was added another not less dangerous. The Venetian government was served by Sclavonians. This barbarous soldiery, alien to the people of Venice, and frequently in hostility with them, were on the look-out for an opportunity to satisfy their love of pillage, without caring to serve one party or the other.

Such was the internal state of things at Venice. That superannuated body was ready to fall to pieces. The great, in possession of the government, were alarmed at the very idea of contending with such a warrior as Bonaparte; and although Venice could have stood out without any great difficulty, they could not face without consternation the horrors of a siege; the violences to which both parties, highly exasperated, would not fail to abandon themselves; the excesses in which the Sclavonian soldiery might indulge; the dangers to which Venice, with her maritime and commercial esta-

blishments would be exposed: they were, above all, apprehensive lest their possessions, all situated on the continent (*terre ferme*), should be sequestrated by Bonaparte, and threatened with confiscation. They even had fears on account of the pensions upon which the reduced nobility subsisted, and which would be lost, if, pushing the contest to extremity, they exposed themselves to a revolution. They conceived that by negotiating, they might save the ancient institutions of Venice by reforms; retain the power which is always confirmed to those who are accustomed to wield it; save their estates, and the pensions of the reduced nobility; and spare the city of Venice the horrors of sack and pillage. These men, consequently, who neither possessed the energy of their ancestors or the passions of the mass of the nobility, were for treating with the enemy. The principal members of the government assembled at the doge's. These were the six councillors of the doge, the three presidents of the criminal tribunal of forty, the six grand sages, the five grand sages of the *terra ferma*, the five sages of the orders, the eleven sages taken from the council, the three chiefs of the council of ten, and the three avogadors. The object of this meeting, which was of an extraordinary nature, and even against all usage, was to provide for the safety of Venice. Every member of the assembly was in the utmost consternation. The doge, broken by age, his eyes dimmed with tears, said that they were not sure of sleeping the next night quietly in their beds. Each had different measures to suggest. One member was for employing Haller the banker to corrupt Bonaparte. This was judged ridiculous and useless. Besides, the ambassador Quirin had orders to do whatever could be done in Paris, and even to buy votes in the directory, were it practicable. Others proposed that they should defend themselves. This proposal was deemed inapplicable, and as emanating from young and inexperienced minds. At length it was decided to propose to the great council a reform of the constitution, in order by this means to appease Bonaparte. The great council, composed in general of all the nobility, and representing the Venetian nation, was convoked. Six hundred and nineteen members, that is, rather more than half, were present. The proposition was made amidst a mournful silence. This question had already been discussed in consequence of a communication from Lallemant, the minister, to the senate, and it had been voted to refer the reforms to some other time. But on this occasion every one was sensible that it was no longer practicable to have recourse to dilatory measures. The doge's proposition was adopted by five hundred and ninety-eight votes. It purported that two commissaries, to be sent by the senate, should be authorized to negotiate with general Bonaparte, and even to treat of objects within the competence of the great council, that is, of constitutional objects, subject to ratification.

The two commissaries set out immediately, and found Bonaparte on the border of the lagoons, at the bridge of Marghera. He was arranging his troops, and the French artillerymen were already exchanging balls with the Venetian gun-boats. The two commissioners delivered to him the resolution of the great council. For a moment he appeared struck with their determination; then, resuming a rough tone, he said to them, "And are the three state-inquisitors and the commandant of the Lido in confinement? I must have their heads. No treaty till French blood has been avenged. I fear not your lagoons. I find them just what I expected. In fifteen days I shall be at Venice. Your nobles shall not escape death except by going like the French emigrants, and dragging their misery all over the world." The two commissioners did their utmost to gain a few days' respite, in order to obtain the consent of the council to the reparation he desired. He would not grant more than twenty-four hours. He nevertheless consented to grant a suspension of arms for six days, to give the Venetian commissaries time to rejoin him at Mantua, with the adherence of the great council to all the conditions which he imposed.

Bonaparte, satisfied with having struck terror into the Venetians, had no intention of coming to real hostilities, because he was aware of the difficulty of carrying the lagoons, and he foresaw the interference of Austria. One article of the preliminaries purported that every thing which concerned Venice should be the subject of an amicable arrangement between France and Austria. If he entered by main force, complaints of the violation of the preliminaries would be made at Vienna; and in any case it would suit him better to induce them to submit. Satisfied with having terrified them, he set out for Mantua and Milan, not doubting that they would soon follow, to make their full and entire submission.

The assembly of all the members of the government, already formed at the doge's, met afresh to receive the report of the commissaries. There were no longer any means of resisting the demands of the general; they were obliged to consent to them all, for the danger daily became more imminent. It was said that the citizens were conspiring, and intended to murder the nobility; and that the Sclavonians would avail themselves of the occasion to pillage the city. It was agreed to submit a new proposition to the great council, tending to accede to all that general Bonaparte demanded. On the 15th Floréal (May 4) the grand council was again convened. By a majority of seven hundred and four voices to ten, it decided that the commissaries should be authorized to negotiate on the subject of every one of the conditions with general Bonaparte, and that proceedings should be immediately commenced against the three state-inquisitors and the commandant of the Lido.

The commissaries, furnished with new powers, followed Bonaparte to Milan, to lay the proud constitution of Venice at his feet. But six days were not sufficient, and the truce had nearly expired before they could come to an arrangement with the general. During this interval the consternation kept increasing in Venice. At one moment the terror was so great, that the commandant of the lagoons was authorized to capitulate to the French generals, invested with the command in the absence of Bonaparte. The government merely recommended to him the independence of the republic, religion, the protection of persons and of the foreign ambassadors, public and private property, the mint, the bank, the arsenal, and the archives. An extension of the truce was, however, obtained from the French generals, in order

to allow the Venetian envoys time to negotiate with Bonaparte.

The arrest of the three state-inquisitors had disorganized the police of Venice. The most influential persons among the citizens put themselves in motion, and openly manifested an intention of bestirring themselves for the purpose of hastening the fall of the aristocracy. They were constantly with Villetard, the French chargé d'affaires, who had remained at Venice after the departure of the minister Lallemant, and who was an ardent patriot. They sought and hoped to find in him one who would forward their designs. At the same time, the Sclavonians were in a state of insubordination, which afforded reason to apprehend the most horrible excesses. They had come to blows with the Venetian populace, and the citizens seemed even to excite these disturbances, which produced division among the forces of the aristocratic party. The 20th Floréal (May 9) the general alarm reached its highest pitch. Two very influential members of the revolutionary party, by name Spada and Zorzi, entered into communication with some of the members of the extraordinary meeting convened at the doge's. They insinuated that they ought to address themselves to the French chargé d'affaires, and to have some understanding with him as to the means of preserving Venice from the calamities which threatened her. Donat and Bataglia, two patricians, whom we have already observed as appearing before the public, addressed themselves to Villetard on the 9th of May. They asked him what would be, in the present perilous state of things, the most proper course to be taken for saving Venice. The latter replied, that he had no authority whatever from the commander-in-chief to treat, but that, if they asked for his private opinion, he should advise the following measures: the putting on board and sending away the Sclavonians; the institution of a municipal guard; the introduction of four thousand French into Venice, and the occupation by them of all the fortified points; the abolition of the ancient government, and the formation, in its stead, of a municipality of thirty-six members, chosen from among all classes, with the present doge for mayor; and the liberation of all prisoners confined on account of their opinions. Villetard added, that on these terms Bonaparte would, no doubt, pardon the three state-inquisitors and the commandant of the Lido.

These propositions were submitted to the council assembled at the doge's. They were extremely severe, inasmuch as they involved a complete revolution in Venice. But the heads of the government dreaded a revolution stained with blood, through the designs of the reforming party, the popular violence, and the cupidity of the Sclavonians. Two of the council most firmly stood out. Pezaro said that they ought to retire to Switzerland, rather than themselves complete the ruin of the ancient Venetian government. The opposition, however, was diverted, and it was resolved that the proposition should be presented to the great council. The convocation was summoned for the 23d Floréal (May 12). In the mean time they paid off the Sclavonians who were sent on ship-board to be sent back to Dalmatia. A contrary wind, however, prevented them from leaving the harbour, and their presence in the waters of Venice did nothing else than keep up the prevailing agitation and terror.

On the 23rd Floréal (May 12) the great council was solemnly assembled for the purpose of voting the abolition of this ancient aristocracy. An immense concourse of people was collected. On the one hand was perceived the citizen class in high glee at witnessing at length the extinction of the power of their masters; and on the other, the populace, excited by the nobility, were ready to rush upon those whom it considered as the instigators of this revolution. The doge in tears addressed the assembly, and proposed that he should abdicate the sovereignty. They were about to deliberate, when reports of musketry were heard. The nobility conceived themselves threatened with a massacre. "To the vote! To the vote!" was shouted on all sides. Five hundred and twelve voices voted the abolition of the old government. According to the statutes, there should have been six hundred. There were twelve negative votes, and five altogether void. The great council surrendered the sovereignty of the entire Venetian nation; it voted the institution of a municipality, and the establishment of a provisional government, composed of deputies of all the Venetian states; it consolidated the public debt and the pensions granted to the poor nobles, and decreed the admission of French troops into Venice. No sooner were these resolutions adopted, than a flag was hoisted from a window of the palace. On seeing this, the citizens were delighted; but the enraged populace, bearing the image of St. Mark, dispersed themselves over the streets of Venice, and attacked the houses of those inhabitants accused of having wrung this determination from the Venetian nobility. The houses of Spada and Zorzi were pillaged and sacked: the uproar was at its height, and a terrible convulsion was apprehended. Meanwhile, a certain number of the inhabitants, desirous of preserving the public tranquillity, assembled, placed at their head an old Maltese general, named Salembeni, who had been long persecuted by the state-inquisition, and fell upon the rioters. After a conflict on the bridge of the Rialto, they dispersed them, and restored order and tranquillity.

The Sclavonians were at length put on board and sent home, after committing great excesses in the villages of Lido and Malamocco. The new municipality was instituted; and on the 27th Floréal (May 16) the flotilla went to fetch a division of four thousand French, which quietly established itself in Venice.

During these occurrences in Venice, Bonaparte signed at Milan, and on the same day, with the Venetian plenipotentiaries, a treaty conformable in every respect with the revolution which had just taken place. It stipulated the abdication of the aristocracy, the institution of a provisional government, the introduction of a French division by way of protection, and the punishment of the three state-inquisitors, and of the commandant of the Lido. Secret articles stipulated, moreover, exchanges of territory, a levy of three millions in money, and three millions in naval stores, and the delivery to France of three men-of-war ships and two frigates. This treaty was to have been ratified by the government of Venice; but this ratification could not take place, since the abdication had already taken

place; and moreover it would have been to no purpose, as all the articles of the treaty were already executed. The provisional municipality, nevertheless, thought it right to ratify the treaty.

Thus Bonaparte, without compromising himself with Austria, without encumbering his operations with the delay and confusion of a siege, had gained his ends. He had overthrown the absurd aristocracy which had betrayed him; he had placed Venice in the same situation as Lombardy, the Modenese, the Bolognese, and the Ferrarese; he would now, without any confusion, make such arrangements of territory as he should think fit. In ceding to the emperor the whole of the continental possessions (*terre ferme*), extending from the Izonzo to the Oglio, he had the means of indemnifying Venice, by allotting it Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, which at this time formed part of the Cispadane republic. This was not again subjecting these provinces to the yoke, but rather bestowing them upon revolutionized Venice. There would then be left the duchy of Modena and Lombardy, with which it would be easy to compose a second republic, allied with the first. Still better might be done, that is, if it were possible to put an end to provincial rivalries, namely, to unite all the provinces emancipated by the French arms, and to create with Lombardy, the Modenese, the Bolognese, the Ferrarese, the Romagna, the Polesina, Venice, and the Greek islands, a powerful republic, which should bear sway both on the continent and in the seas of Italy.

The secret articles relative to the three millions in naval stores, and to the three men-of-war and two frigates, were a means of controlling the entire Venetian navy. The comprehensive mind of Bonaparte, whose foresight extended to all within its reach, was desirous that it should not be with us in respect of the Venetians as had before happened to us with regard to the Dutch, namely, that the naval officers or the governors of the islands, dissatisfied with the revolution, should deliver up to the English the ships and islands under their command. He laid particular stress upon the important Greek islands belonging to Venice, Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, Santa-Maura, and Cerigo. He immediately ordered them to be occupied. He wrote to Toulon, desiring that a certain number of seamen might be sent to him by land, promising to pay their expenses and to fit them out on their arrival in Venice. He asked the directory for orders that admiral Brueys should immediately put to sea with six ships, in order to collect the whole of the Venetian navy, and to go and take possession of the Greek islands. He sent of his own accord two millions to Toulon, that the commissioner of the navy there might not be stopped for want of funds. In this respect he transgressed the regulations of the treasury, in order that no delay should occur. However, fearing lest Brueys should arrive too late, he joined the little flotilla which he had in the Adriatic with the ships found at Venice, distributed the Venetian crews among the French, put on board two thousand troops, and despatched them immediately to take possession of the islands. He was thus securing the most important posts in the Levant and the Adriatic, and was taking a position which, becoming daily more striking, could not fail to have a powerful influence on the definitive negotiations with Austria.

The revolution was every day making greater progress, since the signature of the preliminaries of Leoben had settled the fate of Italy, and had there confirmed the influence of France. It was now certain that the greater part of Upper Italy would be constituted into a democratic republic. It was a seductive precedent, and one which agitated Piedmont, the duchy of Parma, Tuscany, and the states of the Pope. The French general controlled no one's choice, but seemed ready to welcome those who should throw themselves into his arms. At Genoa, the public mind was violently incensed against the aristocracy, a class by no means so unreasonable and so weak as that of Venice, but, if possible, more obstinate. France, as we have seen, had parleyed with her *for* the purpose of securing her rear, and had limited her demands to two millions for indemnities, two millions in advance, and the recal of the families exiled for their attachment to France. But the patriot party threw off all restraint so soon as Bonaparte had imposed peace upon Austria. This party held its meetings at one Morandi's, and had there formed an extremely violent club. A petition was drawn up and presented to the doge, demanding reforms in the constitution. The doge obtained the appointment of a commission to report how far this were practicable. In the interval, however, the agitation was not quelled. The citizens of Genoa and the hot-headed young men combined together, and held themselves ready to have recourse to arms. On their part the nobility, aided by the priests, excited the common people, and armed the charcoal-dealers and the linkmen. The French minister, a mild and temperate man, rather restrained than excited the patriot party. But, on the 22nd of May, when the occurrences at Venice became known, the *Morandists*, as they were called, appeared in arms, and tried to make themselves masters of the principal posts of the city. A most violent conflict ensued. The patriots, who had to deal with the entire population, were beaten, and were most dreadfully used. The victorious rabble committed the grossest excesses, and did not spare the French families, many of whom were exposed to extreme violence. The only reason why the French minister was spared, was only because the doge had taken care to send him a guard. When Bonaparte heard of these events, he saw that he could no longer defer his interference. He despatched Lavalette, his aid-de-camp, to claim the French who were made prisoners, to demand reparations on their behalf, and, above all, to insist on the apprehension of the three state-inquisitors accused of having put arms into the hands of the populace. The patriot party, supported by this powerful influence, rallied itself, regained the ascendency, and obliged the Genoese aristocracy to abdicate, as that of Venice had done. A provisional government was installed, and a commission sent to Bonaparte, to settle with him as to the constitution it was expedient the republic of Genoa should receive.

Thus, after having in two months brought the pope into subjection, crossed the Julian Alps, dictated the terms of a peace to Austria, once more crossed the Alps, and punished Venice, Bonaparte

was at Milan, exercising supreme authority over all Italy, awaiting, without unnecessarily urging, the course of the revolution, taking in hand the constitution of the emancipated provinces, building himself a navy in the Adriatic, and rendering his situation more and more capable of overawing Austria. The preliminaries of Léoben had been approved in Paris and in Vienna: the exchange of the ratifications had taken place between Bonaparte and M. de Gallo, and the opening of the conferences for a definitive peace was anxiously looked for; Bonaparte in Milan, a mere general of the republic, possessed greater influence than all the potentates in Europe. The continued arrival and departure of couriers declared in very plain terms that it was there that the fate of the world was soon to be centered. The enthusiastic Italians waited for hours at a time to see the general come forth from the Serbelloni palace. Young and beautiful women paid their court to Madame Bonaparte, and formed her brilliant court. Then commenced that extraordinary state of existence which has since dazzled and influenced civilized nations.

CHAPTER IX.

THE EMBARRASSING POSITION OF ENGLAND AFTER THE PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE WITH AUSTRIA; FRESH PROPOSALS FOR PEACE; THE CONFERENCES AT LILLE.—THE ELECTIONS OF THE YEAR V.—THE PROGRESS OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY REACTION.—CONTEST OF THE COUNCILS WITH THE DIRECTORY.—BARTHÉLEMY ELECTED TO THE DIRECTORY IN THE ROOM OF LETOURNEUR, THE DIRECTOR GOING OUT OF OFFICE.—FRESH FINANCIAL PARTICULARS FOR THE YEAR V.—PROPOSED REFORMS IN RESPECT OF THEIR ADMINISTRATION MADE BY THE OPPOSITION.—RETURN OF THE PRIESTS AND EMIGRANTS.—INTRIGUES AND PLOT OF THE ROYALIST FACTION.—HOW PARTIES WERE DIVIDED, AND THEIR RELATIVE STRENGTH.—POLITICAL BIAS DEMONSTRATED BY THE ARMIES.

THE conduct of Bonaparte in regard to Venice was bold, but nevertheless it had not exceeded the limit of the laws. He had founded the manifesto of Palma Nova upon the necessity of repelling hostilities already commenced; and, before hostilities had terminated in a declared war, he had concluded a treaty, which rendered it unnecessary for the directory to submit the declaration of war to the two councils. In this manner the republic of Venice had been attacked, destroyed, and rased from [the map of] Europe, without the general having scarcely consulted the directory, or the directory the councils. Nothing was left to be done but to publish the treaty. Geneva had been revolutionized in the same way, without the government appearing to have been consulted: and all these facts, which were attributed to general Bonaparte in a far greater degree than they really belonged to him, imparted an extraordinary idea of the authority which he assumed in Italy, and of the power which he arrogated to himself. The directory, in fact, considered that general Bonaparte had summarily disposed of a great number of questions; yet it could not reproach him with having materially exceeded his powers. The directory was obliged to acknowledge the utility and the propriety of all his operations; and it durst not condemn the conduct of a victorious general, and one invested with such public influence. M. Quirini, the Venetian ambassador in Paris, had employed all possible means with the directory to gain votes in favour of his country. He made use of a Dalmatian, a cunning intriguer, who was acquainted with Barras, to gain over that director. It appears that the sum of six hundred thousand francs in bills was given, on condition of defending Venice in the directory. But Bonaparte, informed of the intrigue, denounced it. Venice was not saved, and payment of the bills was refused. These facts, laid before the directory, occasioned explanations, and even went so far as the commencement of a prosecution, but it ended by its being silently quashed. The conduct of Bonaparte in Italy was approved of, and the days next ensuing the intelligence of the preliminaries of Léoben were devoted to the most animated public rejoicings. The enemies of the revolution and of the directory, who had so loudly called for peace, so as to obtain a pretext for accusing the government, were in their own hearts very mortified at seeing the preliminaries signed. The republicans were at the height of their exultation. They could have wished, it is true, the entire emancipation of Italy; but they were delighted to see the republic recognized, and in some measure sanctioned, by the emperor. The great mass of the population was glad to see an end put to the horrors of war, and looked for a reduction of the public burdens. The sitting at which the councils received the notification of the preliminaries was a scene of enthusiasm. It was declared that the armies of Italy, of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, had deserved well of the country and of mankind in general, in subjecting peace to their victories. All the parties lavished expressions of the warmest enthusiasm on Bonaparte, and it was proposed to give him the surname of *Italicus (Italique)*, as in Rome that of *Africanus* had been conferred on Scipio.

Together with Austria the continent was in subjection. There was only England now to contend with; and she, reduced to her own resources, was in fact in a critical situation. Hoche, stopped short at Frankfort in the midst of the most glorious triumphs, was impatient to open for himself a new career. Ireland was the continual object of his thoughts, and he had by no means abandoned his designs of the preceding year. He had nearly eighty thousand men between the Rhine and the Nidda; he had left about forty thousand in the environs of Brest; the squadron fitted out in that port was quite ready to sail. A Spanish fleet collected at Cadiz was only waiting for a gale that

should compel the English admiral Jervis to sheer off, in order to sail from the road, and get to the Channel, to combine its efforts with that of the French navy. The Dutch had at length succeeded in getting a squadron together, and re-organizing part of their army. Hoche could therefore have at his disposal powerful appliances to effect a rising in Ireland. He purposed to detach twenty thousand men from the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and to march them off for Brest, to be there again put on board. He had selected his best troops for this important operation, to which his entire attention was bent. He himself repaired to Holland, preserving the strictest incognito, having reported that he was going to pass a few days with his family. There he superintended with his own eyes all the preparations. Seventeen thousand excellent Dutch troops were put on board a squadron, and were only waiting for a signal to sail, and join the expedition fitted out at Brest. If to these appliances those that Spain could furnish were to be joined, England would be exposed, as is plainly perceivable, to dangers of which no one could foresee the event.

Pitt was in the greatest consternation. The defection of Austria, the preparations making in the Texel, the squadron collected in Cadiz, from which the blockading fleet might be blown away by a gale —all these circumstances were alarming. Spain and France were labouring with Portugal to compel her to make peace, and the defection of this ancient ally, too, was to be apprehended. Those events had sensibly affected public credit, and produced a crisis long foreseen and frequently predicted. The English government had always had recourse to the bank, and had drawn from it enormous advances, either by making it purchase stock or discount exchequer bills. These advances the bank could never have made save by an extended issue of notes. The prevalence of the general alarm, and a report being circulated that the bank had lent considerable sums to the government, every one hastened to turn his notes into money. Thus, in the month of March, at the moment when Bonaparte was advancing towards Vienna, the bank was obliged to ask for the privilege of suspending its cash payments. This was complied with, and the bank was discharged from an obligation it could never have performed; but this did not protect the existence or the credit of the bank. A statement of its securities and liabilities was immediately published. The former amounted to £17,597,280 sterling; the latter to £13,770,390 sterling; so that its securities exceeded its liabilities by £3,826,890 sterling. But it was not stated how much of the former consisted in government securities. All that consisted in bullion or bills of exchange was considered very sure; but stocks and exchequer bills, which constituted the greater part of the securities, had lost credit as well as the policy of the government. Bank notes fell immediately more than 15 per cent. The bankers, in their turn, solicited the privilege of paying in notes, otherwise they should be obliged to suspend their payments. It was natural that the same favour should be granted to them as to the bank; nay, it was no more than just that it should, for it was the bank's refusal to fulfil its engagements in cash, that put them in the situation of incapacity to discharge theirs in the same way. But from that time a forced money currency, in regard to notes, was the consequence. To obviate this inconvenience, the principal merchants and traders in London met, and exhibited a remarkable proof of public spirit and intelligence. Being sensible that the refusal to bank notes in payment would produce an inevitable catastrophe, in which everybody would have to bear their share of the calamity, they resolved to prevent it, and unanimously agreed to receive notes in payment. From that very period fell into England the way of a paper currency. It is true that this paper money, instead of being forced, was voluntary; but it had only the solidity of paper, and was eminently dependent on the political conduct of the cabinet. To make it more serviceable for pecuniary purposes, it was divided into small sums. The bank, whose smallest notes had been for £4 sterling, (ninety-eight or one hundred francs,) was empowered to issue notes for twenty and forty shillings. This was one way of making them available for the payment of the labouring classes.

Though the accommodating spirit of English commerce had rendered this catastrophe less mischievous than it might have been, yet the situation was not less perilous; and that it might not become completely fatal, France must be conciliated, and something done to prevent the Spanish, French, and Dutch squadrons from exciting a conflagration in Ireland. The royal family were as little reconciled as ever to the revolution and peace; but Pitt, who had no other view than the interest of England, considered a respite as indispensably necessary at the moment. Whether the peace were or were not definitive, a temporary cessation of hostilities must be obtained. Perfectly agreeing on this point with Lord Grenville, he got the cabinet to set on foot a *bonâ fide* negotiation, which should afford two or three years' relaxation to the overstrained springs of the British power. There could be no longer any question as to the Netherlands, now ceded by Austria; all that had to be settled was as to the colonies, and consequently there were the means as well as the expectation of coming to some mutual understanding. Not only did the state of things suggest the idea of a treaty, but the selection of the negotiator also proved it. Lord Malmesbury was again nominated for the present occasion; and at his age he would not have been employed twice successively upon a useless piece of state ceremonial. Lord Malmesbury, celebrated for his long diplomatic career, and the address he had displayed in his negotiations, was weary of business, and wished to retire from it, but not till he had concluded some memorable and successful negotiation. None could be more capable of effecting an impression than a pacification with France after so obstinate a contest; and if he had not been certain that his cabinet was desirous of peace, he would not have consented to play a mere walking part, which would become ridiculous by the repetition. He had, in fact, received secret instructions, which left him no doubt. The English cabinet applied for passports for its negotiator; and by common consent the place for the conferences was fixed not in Paris but at Lille. The directory preferred receiving the English minister in a provincial town; for there there was less to be apprehended from

the English minister, on his part, had no desire to be brought face to face with a government whose forms had some rudeness, and rather preferred treating through the medium of its negotiators. Lille was therefore selected, and a formal legation was prepared on both sides. Hoche had nevertheless to continue his preparations with vigour, in order to give greater weight to the French negotiators.

Thus France, victorious on all sides, was in negotiation with the two great European powers, and was verging upon a general peace. Events so auspicious and so brilliant should not have left room for any thing but joy in all hearts; but the elections for the year V. had just given a dangerous strength to the opposition. We have seen how the adversaries of the directory bestirred themselves at the approach of the elections. The royalist faction had considerably influenced their result. This faction had lost three of its principal agents by the apprehension of Brottier, Laville-Heurnois, and Duverne de Presle; but there was no great harm in that, for so confused was its state, that the loss of its leaders could hardly add to the confusion. There constantly existed two associations, one of men devoted to and capable of taking up arms; the other of doubtful men, fit only to vote at elections. The Lyons agency was yet intact. Pichegru, conspiring apart, was still corresponding with Wickham, the English minister, and the prince of Condé. The elections, influenced by these intriguers of every description, and especially by the spirit of reaction, had the result which had been foreseen. Almost the whole of the second third was composed, like the first, of men who were enemies to the directory, either from attachment to royalty or hatred of terror. The advocates of royalty were, it is true, very few in number; but they meant to avail themselves, as usual, of the passions of others. Pichegru was elected deputy in the Jura. At Colmar one Chemblé was chosen, a person employed in the correspondence with Wickham; at Lyons, Imbert-Colomés, one of the members of the royalist agency in the south, and Camille-Jordan, a young man of good feelings and a lively imagination, but who displayed a ridiculous enmity against the directory; at Marseilles, general Willot, who had been removed from the army of the Ocean to command in the department of the Bouches-du-Rhone, and who, so far from keeping the parties within bounds, had suffered himself to be gained over, perhaps unconsciously, by the royalist faction; at Versailles, one Vauvilliers, implicated in Brottier's conspiracy, and intended by the agency to be a commissioner for articles of consumption (*administrateur des subsistances*); and at Brest, admiral Villaret-Joyeuse, who had quarrelled with Hoche, and, consequently, with the government, on occasion of the expedition to Ireland. A great many other elections were made, equally significant with the former. General Jourdan, who had resigned the command of the army of the Sambre and Meuse after the unsuccessful termination of the preceding campaign, was elected deputy by his department. He was worthy of representing the army in the legislative body, and of avenging the dishonour which the treason of Pichegru was about to cast upon it. It was a singular circumstance that Barrère was elected by the department of the Hautes-Pyrenees.

The new members hastened to Paris. While waiting for the 1st Prairial, when they were to be installed, they were drawn in to become members of the Clichy club, which daily became more and more violent. The councils themselves no longer manifested their former moderation. The members of the first third, seeing that the moment when they were to be reinforced was approaching, began to throw off the reserve in which for fifteen months past they had wrapped themselves. They had hitherto followed in the wake of the constitutionalists, that is, of those deputies who pretended to be neither friends or enemies of the directory, but affected an attachment to the constitution alone, and to oppose the government only when it deviated from that. This line of conduct had particularly prevailed in the council of the ancients. But as the day of the junction approached, the opposition in the five hundred began to employ a more threatening language. It was said that the ancients had too long led the five hundred, and that it was time for the latter to throw off their dependence. Thus, in the Clichy club, as well as in the legislative body, the party that was about to acquire the majority manifested its joy and its audacity.

The constitutionalists, deceived, like all those who from the commencement of the revolution had suffered themselves to be drawn into the opposition, thought that they were about to become the controllers of the movement, and that the new comers would only be a reinforcement for them. Carnot was at their head. More and more involved in the false course which he had taken, he had never ceased supporting in the directory the opinion of the legislative minority. In the discussion of the preliminaries of Leoben, in particular, he had given vent to an animosity hitherto kept within the bounds of decorum, and supported the concessions made to Austria with a zeal which could not have been expected from his past life. Carnot, blinded by his self-love, conceived that he could lead at pleasure the constitutional party either in the five hundred or in the ancients, and saw in the newly elected only additional partisans. In his zeal to bring together the elements of a party of which he hoped to be the chief, he sought to connect himself with the most distinguished of the new deputies. He had even gone beyond Pichegru, who was far from showing politeness to any of the members of the directory, and called to see him. Pichegru, making a very ill return for his courtesy, had only manifested aversion, and almost disdain. Carnot was connected with many other deputies of the first and second third. His apartments at the Luxembourg had become the rendezvous of all the members of the new opposition; and his colleagues daily saw their most irreconcilable enemies coming to visit him.

The great question was that of the choice of a new director. The lot was to decide who should go out. If the lot fell upon Larévellière-Lépeaux, Rewbell, or Barras, the course of the government would be changed; for the director nominated by the new majority could not fail to vote with Carnot and Letourneur.

It was said that the five directors had agreed among themselves which of them should retire;

that Letourneur had consented to resign his functions, and that the ballot was to be merely a feigned one. This was an absurd surmise, as the surmises hazarded by parties in general are. The five directors, Larévellière alone excepted, clung closely to their places. Moreover, Carnot and Letourneur, hoping to become masters of the government, if the lot should turn out one of their three colleagues, would not consent to abandon their plans voluntarily. One circumstance might have favoured this rumour. The five directors had stipulated among themselves that the member going out should receive from each of his colleagues a compensation of ten thousand francs, in all forty thousand, so that a poor director might not pass all at once from the pomp of power to indigence. This arrangement led to a conjecture that in order to decide Letourneur, his colleagues had agreed to give up to him part of their salaries. This, however, was not the case. It was said also that it had been agreed that he should resign before the 1st Prairial, that the nomination of the new director might take place before the admission of the second third into the councils,—another combination irreconcilable with the presence of Carnot.

The Clichy club was exceedingly busy in preventing the arrangements just mentioned. It contrived to get a proposal submitted to the five hundred, tending to oblige the directors to draw the lots in public. This proposal was unconstitutional, for the constitution did not prescribe the mode of drawing, and depended for its regularity on the interest of each of the directors. It passed nevertheless in the councils. Larévellière-Lépeaux, without ambition but firm, represented to his colleagues that this measure would be an encroachment on their prerogatives, and exhorted them not to acknowledge its legality. The directory replied that it would not carry it into execution, because it was unconstitutional. The councils rejoined that the directory had no right to judge of a decision of the legislative body. The directory was about to insist, and to answer that the constitution was placed by a fundamental article under the safeguard of each of the powers, and that the executive power was bound not to constitute an unconstitutional measure; but Carnot and Letourneur abandoned their colleagues. Barras, who was violent, but by no means firm, prevailed upon Rewbell and Larévellière-Lépeaux to give way, and there was no further dispute about the mode of drawing the lots.

The disorderly meeting at Clichy devised fresh propositions to be submitted to the councils before the 1st Prairial. The most important in its estimation was the repeal of the noted law of the 3rd Brumaire, which excluded the relatives of emigrants from public functions, and closed the doors of the legislative body against several members of the first and second third. The proposition was actually made to the five hundred, a few days before the 1st Prairial, and adopted in a stormy discussion. This unhoped-for success, even before the junction of the second third, proved the influence which the opposition began to exercise over the legislative body, though still composed of two-thirds conventionalists. However, the party calling itself constitutional was stronger in the ancients. It was offended at the wilfulness of the deputies, who had hitherto seemed to submit to its direction, and it refused to repeal the law of the 3rd Brumaire.

The 1st Prairial having arrived, the two hundred and fifty new members repaired to the legislative body, and took the place of two hundred and fifty conventionalists. Out of the seven hundred and fifty members of the two councils, there were left therefore no more than two hundred and fifty, belonging to the great assembly which had consummated and defended the revolution. When Pichegru appeared at the five hundred, the greater part of the assembly, not knowing that it had a traitor in its bosom, and regarding him only as an illustrious general disgraced by the government, rose from an impulse of curiosity. Out of four hundred and forty-four votes, he obtained three hundred and eighty-seven for the presidency. The moderate and constitutional party would have called general Jourdan to the bureau, in order to pave the way for him to the chair, and to raise him to it after Pichegru; but the new majority, proud of its strength, and throwing off already all kind of delicacy, rejected Jourdan. The members of the bureau that were named, were Messrs. Siméon, Vanblanc, Henri La Rivière, and Parisot. The exclusion of Jourdan was unwise, and could not but severely wound the armies. During the sitting, the election for the Hautes-Pyrenées, which had returned Barrère to the legislative body, was annulled. The result of the drawing of lots by the directory was communicated. Singularly enough, the lot had fallen on Letourneur, which still further confirmed the notion that had gone about of a voluntary agreement among the directors*. The choice of a successor was immediately to be considered. The selection was now a matter of much less consequence, since it could not change the directorial majority; but still it was the support of one voice given to Carnot; and besides, as people were not well acquainted with the sentiments of Larévellière-Lépeaux, as he was known to be a moderatist, and one of the persons proscribed in 1793, they flattered themselves that he might in certain cases join Carnot, and change the majority. The constitutionalists, who entertained the wish and the hope to reform the course of the government, without overthrowing it, would fain have nominated a man attached to the existing system but decidedly opposed to the directory and ready to support Carnot. They proposed Cochon, the minister of the police, and a friend of Carnot's. They also thought of Beurnonville; but in the Clichy club there existed an aversion to Cochon, though they had at first shown him great favour on account

* In almost every account it is stated that Letourneur went out by a settled arrangement. The director Larévellière-Lépeaux in his valuable unedited memoirs assures us that this was not the fact. To those who have been acquainted with this virtuous citizen, who was incapable of uttering a falsehood, his assertion will be enough. But all doubt will be dispelled on the perusal of Carnot's memoirs, written after the 18th Fructidor. In this memoir, which is tinctured with gall, and which it is to be lamented for Carnot's reputation that it ever was written, he assures us that the notion of these settled or private arrangements have no foundation whatever. Carnot certainly felt no interest in justifying his colleagues, against whom he entertained the utmost resentment.

of his energy against the Jacobins. They now owed him a grudge for the apprehension of Brottier, Duverne de Presle, and Laville-Heurnois, but especially for his circulars to the electors. They rejected Cochon and even Beurnonville. They proposed Barthélemy, our ambassador in Switzerland, and the negotiator of the treaties of peace with Prussia and Spain. It was certainly not the diplomatic pacificator whom they meant to honour in his person, but the supposed accomplice of the pretender and the emigrants. However, the royalists who hoped, and the republicans who feared, to find a traitor in him, were alike mistaken. Barthélemy was but a weak man, of moderate abilities, loyal to the reigning power, and not even possessing the boldness necessary for betraying it. To decide his election, which met with opposition, it was reported that he would not accept the office, and that his nomination would be a homage paid to the man who had commenced the reconciliation of France with Europe. This contrivance contributed to his success. In the five hundred, he obtained three hundred and nine votes, and Cochon two hundred and thirty. In the list of the candidates presented to the ancients appeared Masséna, supported by one hundred and eighty-seven votes; Kléber by one hundred and seventy-three; Augereau, by one hundred and thirty-nine. There were a number of deputies who wished to call up to the government one of the most distinguished generals of division in the armies.

Barthélemy was elected by the ancients, and in spite of the contrivance devised to gain him votes, he immediately replied that he accepted the functions of director. His introduction into the directory instead of Letourneur produced no change of influence whatever. Barthélemy was not more capable of acting upon his colleagues than Letourneur; he proceeded to vote in the same manner, and to do from the circumstances of his position, what Letourneur had done from attachment to the person of Carnot.

The members of the meeting at Clichy, the *Clichyans*, as they were called, set to work immediately on the 1st Prairial, and proclaimed the most violent intentions. Few of them were in the confidence of the royalist agents. Lemerer, Mersan, Imbert-Colomès, Pichegru, and perhaps Willot, were alone in the secret. Pichegru, at first in correspondence with Condé and Wickham, had just been put in direct communication with the pretender. He received great encouragement, magnificent promises, and fresh funds, which he again accepted, without being more certain than before what use he could make of them. He promised much, and said that before he could come to any determination, he must observe the new course of affairs. Cold and reserved, he affected towards his accomplices and every body, the mystery of a profound mind, and the varied acquirements of a great character. The less he spoke, the greater were supposed to be his combinations and his means. The majority of the Clichyans were unacquainted with his secret mission. The government itself was ignorant of it, for Duverne de Presle was not in the secret, and of course could not communicate it.

Among the Clichyans, some were actuated by ambition, others by a natural leaning towards monarchy, and the greater number by the remembrance of the reign of terror, and by the fear of seeing it renewed. Collected together by various motives, they were led, as is almost always the case with bodies of men, by the most ardent among them. After the 1st Prairial, they formed the most extravagant designs. The first was to place the councils in permanence. They then meant to demand the removal of the troops which were at Paris; they wanted to arrogate to themselves the police of the capital, by interpreting the article of the constitution which gave to the legislative body the police of the place of its sittings, and by construing the word *place* (*lieu*), as the word *town* (*ville*). They also wanted to impeach the directors, to appoint others, to repeal *en masse* the laws termed revolutionary, that is, to utterly repeal by favour of that term the revolution. Thus, Paris lying in their power, the chiefs of the government overthrown, the authority placed in their hands to be disposed of at their pleasure, they could introduce what they chose, even royalty itself. However, these propositions of some hot-headed spirits were not approved of. More cautious individuals seeing that they were tantamount to an attack by main force upon the directory, opposed them, and introduced other resolves. It was agreed that they should fulfil the office of the majority, for the purpose of changing all the commissions, reforming certain laws, and opposing the present conduct of the directory. Legislative tactics were therefore preferred for the moment to attacks by main force.

This plan once settled, it was immediately put in execution. After annulling Barrère's election, they recalled four members of the first third who had been excluded in the preceding year, by virtue of the law of the 3rd Brumaire. The refusal of the ancients to repeal this law was no impediment. The deputies excluded from the legislative body were recalled, as unconstitutionally deprived of their seats. Their names were Ferrand-Vaillant, Gault, Polissart, Job Aymé (of the Drome), and Marean, one of the agents of royalism. They then devised a new method of repealing the law of the 3rd Brumaire. The repeal of that law having been proposed some days before, and rejected by the ancients, could not be again proposed for another year. A new procedure was adopted, and it was decided that the law of the 3rd Brumaire should be repealed, so far as concerned the exclusion from public functions. This was nearly the entire enactment. The ancients adopted the resolution under this form. The members of the new third, excluded as being relatives of emigrants, or as included in the act of oblivion for revolutionary offences, could take their seats. To this resolution M. Imbert-Colomès of Lyons was indebted for the privilege of entering the legislative body. It served Salicettis' turn also, who had been implicated in the events of Prairial, and included in the act of oblivion, with several members of the convention. Being put in nomination in Corsica, his election was confirmed. To preserve an appearance of impartiality, those who had gained an ascendancy of the five hundred obtained the repeal of a law of the 21st Floréal, which removed from Paris the conventionalists not invested with public office. This was done to preserve the appearance of repealing all the revolutionary laws. They proceeded immediately to the verification of the

elections, and, as it might naturally be expected, they declared all that were doubtful, void, whenever the question concerned a republican deputy, and confirmed them when an opponent of the revolution was concerned. They caused all the commissions to be renewed; and pretending that every thing ought to date from the day of their taking their seat in the legislative body, they demanded accounts of the finances up to the 1st Prairial. They then appointed special commissions for examining the laws relative to emigrants, priests, religion, public education, the colonies, &c. The intention of laying hands on every thing was plain enough.

Two exceptions had been made in the laws which banished emigrants for ever: the one in favour of the labourers and husbandmen, whom St. Just and Lebas had driven from the Upper Rhine during their mission in 1793; the other in favour of the persons implicated and obliged to take to flight in consequence of the events of the 31st of May. The refugees from Toulon, who had delivered up that place, and escaped in the English squadron, were alone deprived of the benefit of this second exception. Under colour of these two clauses, a multitude of emigrants had already returned. Some passed themselves off for artisans or farmers of the Upper Rhine, others as having been proscribed on the 31st of May. The Clichyans moved and carried a prorogation of the time allowed to the fugitives of the Upper Rhine, and caused the time to be extended to six months. They even caused it to be declared that the Toulonese fugitives might avail themselves of the exception granted to the persons proscribed on the 31st of May. Although this indulgence was merited by many of the Southerns, who had not fled to Toulon, and from Toulon on board the English squadron, but for the purpose of shielding themselves from the prescription incurred by the federalists, it nevertheless had relation to, and seemed to grant an act of oblivion for the most criminal act of the revolutionary faction, and must have excited the indignation of the patriots. The discussion on the subject of the colonies, and on the conduct of the agents of the directory in Saint Domingo led to a violent scene. The commission to whom this subject was referred, consisting of Tarbe, Villaret-Joyeuse, Vaublanc, and Bourdon (of the Oise), presented a report, in which the convention was treated with the greatest acrimony. The conventionalist Maree was accused therein of not having opposed *tyranny with the energy of virtue*. At these words, which indicated the intention frequently manifested of insulting the members of the convention, all those who had still seats in the five hundred rushed to the tribune, and demanded a report drawn up in a manner more worthy of the legislative body. The scene was one of the most violent that could be imagined. The conventionalists, supported by the moderate deputies, got the report sent back to be reviewed by the commission. Carnot influenced the commission by means of Bourdon (of the Oise), and the clauses of the projected decree were reformed. At first it had been proposed to deprive the directory of the faculty of sending agents to the colonies; that power was left it, but the number of agents was limited to three, and the duration of their mission to eighteen months. Santhonax was recalled. The constitutionalists, seeing that by joining the conventionalists, they had been able to check the impetuosity of the Clichyans, conceived that they were about to become the moderators of the legislative body. But the succeeding sittings were soon to undeceive them.

Among the most important subjects to which the new members purposed to direct their attention, were religion and the laws concerning the priests. The commission to whom this important subject was confided appointed for its reporter young Camille-Jordan, whose imagination had been heated amidst the horrors of the siege of Lyons, and whose sensibility, though sincere, was not without some self-conceit. The reporter made a long and turgid dissertation on the freedom of worship. "It was not sufficient," he said, "to allow to any one the exercise of his religion, but in order that the liberty should be real, nothing should be required of him that was inconsistent with his creed. Thus, for instance, the oath required of the priests, though it were not repugnant to their creed, yet having been unfavourably interpreted by them, and considered as contrary to the doctrines of the Catholic church, ought not to be imposed upon them. It was a tyranny, the result of which was to create a class of proscripts, and of dangerous proscripts, because they greatly influenced opinion; and, being assiduously concealed from the researches of the authorities by the pious zeal of the people, they laboured in secret to excite rebellion. As for the ceremonies of religion, it was not enough to permit them in closed temples. It was right, while forbidding all external shows that could occasion disturbance, to permit certain indispensable usages. Thus, bells were absolutely necessary for calling the Catholics together at certain hours; they were a necessary part of their worship; to prohibit their use was to restrict toleration in this respect. Besides, the people were accustomed to those sounds, they were fond of them, they had not yet consented to do without them, and in the country the law against bells had never been carried into execution. To allow them, therefore, was to satisfy an innocent want, and to put an end to the scandal of a law that had never been put in force. The case was the same in regard to cemeteries. While prohibiting the use of public processions in all religions, it was nevertheless necessary to allow each to have its own enclosed places devoted to burial, and in which liberty should be granted for the placing the symbols peculiar to each form of worship. As a consequence of these principles, Camille-Jordan proposed the abolition of the oaths, the repeal of the oppressive laws which it had introduced, the use of bells, and the appropriation of cemeteries, in which each religion could place such religious symbols as it pleased over the graves. The principles of this report, though deduced with dangerous emphasis, were just. It is true that there is but one way of destroying old superstitions, namely, indifference and famine. By tolerating all religions, and granting salaries to none, governments would amazingly accelerate their extinction. The convention had already restored to the Catholics the buildings which served them for churches. The directory would have done well to allow them bells and crosses in the cemeteries, and to abolish the oath, and the laws against the priests who re-

fused to take it. But were the right forms employed, was the proper moment chosen for bringing forward such claims? If, instead of making them one of the grievances in the grand indictment preferred against the directory, they had waited for a more seasonable moment, and allowed passions time to subside, and the government time to settle itself, they would infallibly have obtained the desired concessions. But because the counter-revolutionists made them a condition, for that very reason the patriots opposed them; for men will always oppose the opinions of their enemies. On hearing the sound of the bells, they would have fancied that they heard the tocsin of counter-revolution. Each party desires that its own feelings should be appreciated and conceded to, but it will neither comprehend or admit those of the contrary party. The party feeling of the patriots was composed of errors, apprehensions, and animosities, which it was likewise necessary to comprehend and put up with. This report produced an extraordinary sensation, for it appealed to the keenest and the deepest resentments. It was the most striking and perhaps the most dangerous act of the Clichyans, though at bottom the most reasonable. The patriots made a bad reply to it, by saying that their adversaries proposed to reward the violation of the laws by the repeal of the violated laws. In point of fact those laws that could not be carried into execution, ought to be repealed.

To all these requisitions the Clichyans added annoyances of all kinds against the directory on the subject of the finances. This was the chief object by means of which they hoped to harass and paralyse the government. We have already shown, in giving a sketch of the financial resources of the year V. (1797), what were the presumed receipts and expenses for that year. There were to meet four hundred and fifty millions [francs] of ordinary expenses, two hundred and fifty millions from the land-tax, fifty millions from the poll-tax, and one hundred and fifty millions from the stamp duty, registration, licenses, posts, and customs. Five hundred and fifty millions were to be provided for by the last fourth of the instalment of the national estates put up to sale in the preceding year, amounting to one hundred millions, and demandable in bills from the purchasers; by the produce of the woods and the rents of national property, by the arrears of the assessed taxes, by the Batavian money orders, by the sale of the national moveable property, by various accessory revenues, and lastly, by the continuing resource of the domains yet remaining to be sold. But all these means were insufficient, and very much below their presumed value. The receipts and expenditure of the year being but temporarily provided for, orders had been issued for the levy on the provisional assessments, of three-fifths of the land-tax and poll-taxes. But the assessments made by the local administrations being imperfect, as we have already stated, on account of the continual variation of the fiscal laws, and crammed with marginal abstracts, gave rise to continual difficulties. The unwillingness of the payers added to these difficulties, and the receipt was very slow. Besides the inconvenience of its coming in but slowly, it was much below what had been expected. No more than two hundred millions could be anticipated from the land-tax instead of two hundred and fifty. The different revenues, such as stamp-duty, registration, licenses, customs, and posts, gave hopes of no more than one hundred millions instead of one hundred and fifty. Such was the deficit in the ordinary revenues appointed to provide for the ordinary expenses. It was not the less so in the extraordinary. The bills given by the purchasers of the national property for the last fourth of the purchase money, had been negotiated under great disadvantages. To avoid suffering the same losses on the Batavian money orders, they had been pledged for a sum very inferior to their value. The estates sold very slowly indeed, consequently extreme distress prevailed. The army of Italy had been supported upon the levies it had enforced; but the armies of the Rhine, of the Sambre and Meuse, of the interior, and the naval forces had suffered most severely. The troops had more than once given demonstrations of a mutinous spirit. The public establishments and the hospitals were in extreme destitution, and the public officials did not receive their salaries.

It had been found necessary to recur to expedients of every description. Thus, as we have already noticed, recourse was had to postponement in the payment of certain obligations. The annuitants were paid no more than one-fourth in cash, and three-fourths in bills, payable in national estates, called three-quarter bills (*bons des trois quarts*). The amount of the consolidated debt, the life debt, and pensions, was two hundred and forty-eight millions; consequently there were only sixty-two millions to pay, and the ordinary expense was thus reduced to one hundred and eighty-six millions. But notwithstanding this reduction, the expenditure exceeded the income. Notwithstanding the distinction made between the ordinary and extraordinary expense, this distinction was not kept in the payments of the treasury. The extraordinary expense was provided for by resources appropriated for the ordinary expense; that is, in default of money to pay the troops, or the contractors who supplied them, it was taken from the sums set apart for the salaries of the public functionaries, the judges, and the administrators of all classes. Not only were the two kinds of funds confusedly mixed, but the receipts were anticipated, and orders given upon this or that receiver, payable out of the first funds that should come to his hands. The contractors had orders given them upon the treasury, the minister of which fixed the order of payment according to the urgency of the wants. This method gave rise sometimes to abuses, but it afforded the means of providing for what was most pressing, and of frequently preventing contractors from being disheartened and relinquishing the service. Lastly, in default of every other resource, bills were given upon the national property—a paper negotiable to purchasers. This was how the sales were anticipated since the destruction of the paper money. From this state of the revenue it turned out that none but the worst kind of contractors, that is, speculative contractors, would have to do with government, and made it to submit to the most disadvantageous bargains. They would not take the paper that was given them but at a very low rate, and they raised the price of articles of consumption in proportion to the chances

or the delay of payment. The government was frequently obliged to make the most singular arrangements, in order to supply particular wants. Thus the minister of the marine bought flour for the fleet, on condition that the contractor, on delivering the flour at Brest, should give part in money, in order to pay the seamen, who were ready to mutiny. The premium for this advance of cash was of course to be obtained from the high price of the flour. All these losses were inevitable, and resulted from the existing state of affairs. It would be an injustice to impute them to the government. Unfortunately, the conduct of one of the directors, who secretly shared in the profits of the contractors, and who took no pains to conceal either his prodigality or the growth of his fortune, furnished a pretext for all sorts of calumnies. It was certainly not the disgraceful profits made by one individual which involved the state in distress, but people took occasion from them to accuse the directory of ruining the finances.

Indeed, this subject alone furnished matter wherein a violent and factious opposition might find ample scope for declamation and for mischievous designs. In fact, an extremely dangerous opposition had been formed. This opposition had secured the nomination of men of its own choice to the finance commission, men who were most unfavourably disposed towards the government. The first thing which this commission did was to present to the five hundred, through the reporter, Gilbert Desmolières, an incorrect statement of the income and expenditure. It exaggerated the one, and greatly diminished the other. Obliged to acknowledge the inadequacy of the ordinary resources, such as the land-tax, the registration, the stamp duty, the patents, the posts, and the customs, it nevertheless refused all the taxes devised for supplying the deficiency. Ever since the commencement of the revolution, it had been found impossible to re-establish the indirect taxes. A tax on salt and tobacco was proposed; the commission alleged that it would frighten the people. A lottery was proposed; that it rejected as immoral. A toll upon the high roads was proposed; this it considered as liable to great difficulties. All this was more or less just; but it was absolutely necessary to seek and to find resources. As the sole resource, the commission intimated that it was about to take into consideration a duty on the registry of judicial acts. As for the deficit of the extraordinary receipts, so far from providing for that, it sought to increase it, by forbidding the directory the use of those expedients, by means of which it had contrived to live from day to day. The course which it pursued was this.

The constitution had separated the treasury from the directory, and made it a distinct establishment, under the control of independent commissioners, appointed by the councils, who had no other duty than to receive the revenue and to make the disbursements. Thus the directory had not the management of the funds of the state: it gave orders upon the treasury, which the latter paid till the credits opened by the councils were exhausted. Nothing could be more vicious than this system, for the management of the funds is a branch of the executive which ought to belong to the government, like the direction of the military operations, and in which the deliberating bodies can no more interfere than in the plan of a campaign. In many cases even it occurs, that by a clever and skilful management a minister contrives to create temporary resources on a pressing emergency. Thus the two councils had, in the preceding year, empowered the treasury to carry out all the negotiations commanded by the directory. The new commission resolved to cut short the expedients which enabled the directory to exist, by depriving it of all power over the treasury. In the first place, it desired that the directory should cease to possess the faculty of ordering the negotiation of securities. When non-circulating securities were to be realized, the commissioners of the treasury were to negotiate them themselves upon their personal responsibility. The new commission then considered how to deprive the directory of the right of regulating the order in which the warrants for payment were to be discharged. It proposed also to prohibit any anticipation of the funds that were to be received by the chests of the departments. It even went so far as to desire that all orders already delivered upon the credit of funds not yet received, should be carried back to the treasury, verified, and paid in their turn, which would interrupt and annul all the operations that had already taken place. It proposed, moreover, to render obligatory the distinction made between the two natures of expenses and receipts, and to require that the ordinary expenses should be paid out of the ordinary receipts, and the extraordinary expenses out of the extraordinary receipts, a mischievous measure at a moment when it was absolutely necessary to supply every urgent want out of the first disposable funds. To all these propositions it added a last, more pernicious than the preceding. We have already stated, that as the national estates sold slowly, the government anticipated their sale, by giving bills receivable in part payment of their value. The contractors were satisfied with these bills, which they afterwards negotiated to purchasers. This paper, it is true, was put in competition with *the three quarters bills* delivered to the stock annuitants, and were deteriorated in value by the competition. Upon pretext of protecting the unfortunate annuitants against the rapacity of the contractors, the commission proposed no longer to allow the national estates to be paid for by the bills given to the contractors.

All these propositions were adopted by the five hundred, the majority of whom, hurried on without reflection, no longer kept within due limits. These propositions were extremely prejudicial, and threatened the interruption of all the public services. The directory, in fact, being no longer allowed to negotiate at pleasure the securities which it had in its hands, having no longer the power to regulate the order of the payments according to the urgency of the services, to anticipate on an emergency funds not yet received, to take from the ordinary for the extraordinary, and lastly, to issue a voluntary paper, payable in national domains, was deprived of all the means which had hitherto enabled it to exist, and was permitted, in the impossibility to provide for all wants, to give the preference to the most urgent. The measures adopted, though well suited to restore order in a time of greater tranquillity, were alarming

in the existing state of the country. The constitutionalists made vain efforts to oppose them in the five hundred. They passed, and the only hope left was in the council of ancients.

The constitutionalists, who were temperately opposed to the directory, saw with the utmost concern the line of conduct pursued by the council of the five hundred. They had hoped that the addition of a new third would have rather done them service than otherwise, that it would have no other effect than that of changing the majority, and that they should become masters of the legislative body. Carnot, their leader, had conceived the same delusive ideas; but they both found they had overshot the mark, and they could perceive, on this as on all other occasions, that behind opposition lurks counter-revolution, with its mischievous designs. They possessed much more influence with the ancients than with the five hundred, and they strove to cause the rejection of the resolutions relative to the finances. Carnot had a devoted friend there in the deputy Lacuée; he was also connected with Dumas, formerly a member of the legislative assembly. He could reckon upon the influence of Portalis, Tronson-Decoudray, Lebrun, and Barbé-Marbois, all rational opponents of the directory, and censuring the extravagance of the Clichyan party. Owing to the united efforts of these deputies, and to the inclinations of the council of ancients, the first proposition of Gilbert Desmolières, which forbade the directory to manage the negotiations of the treasury, to regulate the order of the payments, and to confuse the ordinary with the extraordinary, were rejected. This rejection gave great satisfaction to the constitutionalists, and to all moderate men in general, who dreaded a conflict. Carnot was extremely rejoiced at it. He again hoped that the Clichyans might be kept within bounds, by means of the council of ancients, and that the direction of affairs would remain in his hands and those of his friends.

But this was but a poor palliative. The Clichy club resounded with the most violent declamations against the ancients, and with fresh schemes of accusation against the directory. Gilbert Desmolières resumed his first propositions rejected by the ancients, in order to present them in another form, and thus obtain their adoption upon a second deliberation. Resolutions of all kinds against the government succeeded one another in the five hundred. Deputies were forbidden to accept places for a year before their leaving the legislative body. Imbert-Colomès, who corresponded with the court of Blankenburg, proposed to take from the directory the faculty, which it derived from a special law, of examining letters coming from abroad. Aubry, the same who had brought about a reaction in the army of the 9th Thermidor, and who had displaced Bonaparte in 1795, proposed to deprive the directory of the right of removing officers, which would strip it of one of its most important constitutional prerogatives. He proposed also to add to the twelve hundred grenadiers composing the guard of the legislative body a company of artillery and a squadron of dragoons, and to give the command of the whole of this guard to the inspectors of the hall of the legislative body—a ridiculous proposition, and which seemed to denote preparations for war. Condemnatory remarks were made as to the remittance of a million to the commissioner of the navy at Toulon, sent off by Bonaparte, without availing himself of the medium of the treasury, for the purpose of expediting the departure of the squadron which he wanted in the Adriatic. That million was seized by the treasury and conveyed to Paris. Similar remarks were also made as to remittances made in the same way from the army of Italy to the armies of the Alps, the Rhine, and the Sambre and Meuse. A lengthy report upon our relations with the United States was presented; and although the directory had some reason on its side in the differences which had arisen between it and that power, it was censured with acrimony. At length the rage for impeaching and censuring all the operations of the government, hurried the Clichyans into one final course, which was on their part a fatal indiscretion.

The events at Venice had made a great noise in Europe. Since the manifesto of Palma Nova, that republic had been annihilated, and that of Genoa revolutionized, without the directory communicating a single word on the subject to the councils. This silence is accounted for, as we have seen, by the rapidity of the operations, a rapidity so great that Venice had ceased to exist, before the war could be submitted for deliberation to the legislative body. The treaty since concluded had not yet been laid before it, but was to be discussed in a few days. It was not so much the silence of the directory that excited dissatisfaction, as the fall of the aristocratic governments, and the progress of the revolution in Italy. Dumolard, that irrelevant speaker, who for nearly two years had unceasingly attacked the directory in the council of five hundred, resolved to make a motion relative to the events of Venice and Genoa. The attempt was a bold one, for it was impossible to attack the directory without attacking general Bonaparte. To do this, he had to testify open contempt for an admiration now universal, and an influence which had become colossal since the general had compelled Austria to make peace, and in particular since as negotiator and warrior, he seemed at Milan to be the arbiter of the destinies of Europe. All those Clichyans who still retained a particle of common sense strove to dissuade Dumolard from his intention; but he persisted, and in the sitting of the 5th Messidor (June 23), he made a motion of order with regard to the events of Venice. "Rumour," said he, "whose flight it is impossible to restrain, has every where diffused the report of our conquests over the Venetians, and of the astonishing revolution which has crowned them. Our troops are in their capital; their navy is delivered up to us; the most ancient government in Europe is annihilated; in the twinkling of an eye it again appears under democratic forms; and our soldiers, braving the billows of the Adriatic, are on their way to Corfu to complete the new revolution. Admit those events as certain, and it follows that the directory has in disguised terms made war and peace, and in certain respects a treaty of alliance with Venice, and all without your concurrence. Are we then no longer that nation which has proclaimed in principle, and maintained by force of arms, that no foreign power has a right, upon any pretext, to interfere in the form of government of another

state! Insulted by the Venetians, was it on their political institutions that we had a right to declare war? Victors and conquerors, was it for us to take an active part in their revolution, in appearance unlooked for? I shall not here inquire what is the fate reserved for Venice, and particularly for her continental provinces. I shall not examine whether their invasion, contemplated, perhaps, before the outrages which served to justify it, is not destined to figure in history as a fit parallel to the partition of Poland. I shall waive these reflections, and with the constitutional act in my hand, I ask how the directory can justify the absolute ignorance in which it seeks to leave the legislative body concerning this multitude of extraordinary events." Passing from the affairs of Venice, Dumolard then adverted to the transactions at Genoa, which, he said, exhibited the same character, and justified the supposition of the interference of the French army and its leaders. He spoke also of Switzerland, with which he said they were at variance relative to a right of navigation; and he asked if the government proposed to render democratic all the states in alliance with France. Taking frequent occasion to praise the heroes of Italy, he made mention only once of the commander-in-chief, whose name no lips then omitted an opportunity of pronouncing and eulogizing. Dumolard concluded by proposing a message to the directory, applying for explanations concerning the events of Venice and Genoa, and the relations of France with Switzerland.

This motion caused general astonishment, and showed the boldness of the Clichyans. It was soon to cost them dearly. Until they had to experience its melancholy consequences, their arrogance was excessive. They loudly proclaimed their great expectations, and seemed likely to become in a short time masters of the government. It was in every respect the same self-confidence and indiscretion which distinguished them in Vendémiaire. The emigrants returned in crowds. Great quantities of false passports and false certificates of residence were sent from Paris to all parts of Europe. A traffic was carried on with them at Hamburg. The emigrants introduced themselves into the French territory by way of Holland, Alsatia, Switzerland, and Piedmont. Induced to return by that attachment the French possess towards their fine country, and by the hardships and contumelies endured abroad, and having, besides, nothing to hope from war, since the commencement of negotiations with Austria, having even to apprehend the disbanding of the corps of Condé, they came back to attempt, by means of peace and intrigues at home, that counter-revolution which they had not been able to effect by the united assistance of the European powers. Besides, whatever might be the success of counter-revolution, they wished to see their country once more, and to recover part of their property. Owing in fact to the interest which they every where excited, they had a thousand facilities for redeeming it. The jobbing in the different papers taken in payment for national domains, the facility for obtaining these papers at a low price, the favour of the local administrations towards the old proscribed families, and the complaisance of the bidders, who drew back whenever a former proprietor wished to purchase his estates under a fictitious name, enabled the emigrants to recover possession of their patrimony with very small sums. The priests, in particular, had returned in crowds. They were cordially received by all the devout in France, who lodged them, fed them, fitted up chapels for them in their houses, and supplied them with money which they collected. The old ecclesiastical hierarchy was clandestinely re-established. None of the new limitations of the civil constitution of the clergy was acknowledged. The old dioceses still existed. Bishops and archbishops secretly officiated therein, and corresponded with Rome. Through them and their ministry all the ceremonies of the Catholic church were practised; they confessed, baptized, and married the persons who had remained faithful to the old religion. All the thriftless Chouans hastened to Paris, and joined the emigrants, whose number there was said to exceed five thousand. Seeing the conduct of the five hundred and the perils of the directory, they conceived that it would take but a few days to bring about the long-wished-for catastrophe. These expectations formed the sum of their correspondence with foreign countries. At the prince of Condé's, whose division was retiring to Poland, at the pretender's at Blankenburg, and at count d'Artois's in Scotland, there was the greatest demonstrations of satisfaction. In the midst of this general exhilaration, which had manifested itself at Coblentz, by the emigrants expecting to come back in a fortnight in the train of the king of Prussia, they formed plans for their return. They talked of it, and enjoyed the thoughts of it, as an event that would immediately take place. The towns bordering on the frontiers were full of people waiting with impatience for the moment when they could revisit France. Lastly, to all this must be added the violent language of part of the royalist journals, whose fury increased with the temerity and the hopes of the party.

The directory was informed by its police of all these movements. The conduct of the emigrants, the proceedings of the five hundred, sufficiently corresponded with the declaration of Duverne de Presle to demonstrate the existence of a real plot. Duverne de Presle had denounced, without naming parties, one hundred and eighty deputies as implicated therein. He had accused by name none other than Lemerer and Mersan, and had said that all the others were members of the Clichy club. In this he was mistaken, as we have seen. The greater part of the Clichyans, excepting perhaps five or six, were hurried away by the mere force of opinion, and did not act upon any concerted plan. But the directory, misled by appearances and by the declaration of Duverne de Presle, believed them to be knowingly engaged in the plot, and regarded them as conspirators. A discovery made in Italy by Bonaparte had just disclosed to him an important secret, and increased the alarm of the directory. The count d'Entraigues, an agent of the pretender's, through whom he communicated with the intriguers of France, and the confidant of all the secrets of the emigration, had sought refuge in Venice. When the French entered that city, he was seized and delivered up to Bonaparte. The latter might have sent him to France to be shot as an emigrant and a conspirator; but he suffered him-

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN SOCIETY

self to be moved, and chose rather to make use of him and his indiscretions than to doom him to death. He assigned him the city of Milan for his prison, gave him some assistance in money, and made him relate all the secrets of the pretender. He thus learned the whole history of Pichegru's treason, which had remained unknown to the government, and of which Rewbell alone had entertained some suspicions, to which his colleagues refused to listen. D'Entraigues related to Bonaparte all that he knew, and made him acquainted with all the intrigues of the emigrants. Besides these verbal disclosures, some very curious particulars were obtained by the seizure of the papers found at Venice in the portfolio of d'Entraigues. Among other papers there was one of great importance, containing a long conversation between d'Entraigues and the count de Montgaillard, in which the latter gave an account of the first negotiation opened with Pichegru, and which proved fruitless through the obstinacy of the prince of Condé. D'Entraigues had committed this conversation to writing, which was found among his papers*. Berthier, Clarke, and Bonaparte immediately signed it, for the purpose of attesting its authenticity, and sent it to Paris.

The directory kept it secret, like the declaration of Duverne du Presle, waiting for an occasion to employ it to good purpose. But it had no longer any doubt concerning the part acted by Pichegru in the council of five hundred, which explained his defeats, his absurd conduct, his ill behaviour, his refusal to go to Stockholm, and his influence over the Clichyans. The directory supposed that at the head of one hundred and eighty deputies, his accomplices, he was preparing a counter-revolution.

The five directors were divided since the new direction which Carnot had taken, and which had been followed by Barthélemy. Barras, Rewbell, and Larévellière-Lépeaux, alone continued devoted to the system of the government. These three directors themselves were not very closely united; for Rewbell, a moderate conventionalist, hated Barras as a partisan of Danton, and had, moreover, a great aversion for his manners and character. Larévellière had some acquaintance with Rewbell, but very little intercourse with Barras. The three directors harmonized only in the habitual conformity of their votes. All three were highly irritated, and decidedly hostile to the Clichy faction. Barras, although he received emigrants, in consequence of an habitual complaisance, never ceased to declare that he would mount his horse, and proceed sword in hand, at the head of the faubourgs, to cut in pieces all the counter-revolutionists of the five hundred. Rewbell did not express himself in that manner; he imagined that all was lost; and though resolved to do his duty, he conceived that no other resource would soon be left for him and his two colleagues but flight. Larévellière-Lépeaux, endowed with as much courage as integrity, thought that they ought to make head against the storm, and to strain every nerve to save the republic. With a heart free from hatred, he might serve as the connecting link between Barras and Rewbell, and such he resolved to make himself. He first addressed himself to Rewbell, whose probity and intelligence he highly appreciated, and explaining his intentions, asked him if he would consent to save the revolution. Rewbell received his overtures with warmth, and promised to be entirely devoted to him. The question now was to make sure of Barras, whose energetic language was not sufficient to satisfy his colleagues. Giving him no credit for either integrity or principle, seeing him surrounded by men of all parties, they deemed him just as capable of selling himself to the emigrants, as of putting himself some day at the head of the faubourgs, and attempting some horrible off-hand attack. They were as apprehensive of one of these things as of the other. They wished to save the republic by an act of energy, but not to compromise it by fresh murders. Scared by the manners of Barras, they distrusted him too much. Larévellière undertook to speak to him. Barras, delighted to coalesce with his two colleagues, and to ensure their support, flattered above all by their alliance, acquiesced entirely in their plans, and appeared to fall in with all their views. From that moment they were sure of forming a compact majority, and of completely annulling by their three united votes the influence of Carnot and Barthélemy. It now became a question what means were to be employed to counteract the conspiracy, which was supposed by them to have such extensive ramifications in the two councils. To have recourse to judicial proceedings, to denounce Pichegru and his accomplices, to demand of the five hundred an act of accusation against them, and then to bring them to trial, was altogether impossible. In the first place, they had no names but those of Pichegru, Lemerer, and Mersan; it was believed that the others might be easily recognized by their connexions, their intrigues, their violent propositions in the Clichy club and in the five hundred, but they were no where named. To procure the condemnation of Pichegru and two or three deputies would not be destroying the conspiracy. Besides, they had not the means of ensuring the condemnation of Pichegru, Lemerer, and Mersan; for the proofs obtained against them, though carrying moral conviction, were not sufficient to enable the judges to pronounce a condemnation. The declaration of Duverne du Presle and that of d'Entraigues were insufficient without the aid of oral depositions. But this was not the greatest difficulty. If they had obtained against Pichegru and his accomplices all the evidence which was wanting, it would be requisite to wring the act of accusation from the five hundred; and though the proofs had been as clear as day, still

* M. de Montgaillard in his work, which is filled with slanderous imputations and mistakes, has asserted that this document contained some facts in themselves true, but that it was a forgery, and had been prepared by Bonaparte, Berthier, and Clarke. The contrary is self-evident, and it may easily be conceived how anxious M. de Montgaillard must be to justify his brother in respect of the conversation attributed to him in this document. But one can hardly come at once to the conclusion that three persons of such consideration would dare to utter a forgery. These acts are quite as uncommon in our days as cases of poisoning. Clarke had been dismissed after Fructidor, and he was one of Carnot's party. It is not very probable that he would lend himself to forge documents in support of the events of Fructidor. In the next place, the document does not bear out the statement it was framed to support; and if a forgery had been committed, it would have been made sufficient for its purpose. Every thing therefore tends to show how little reliance can be placed on M. de Montgaillard.

the existing majority would never have confirmed it, for it was nothing else than sending a culprit to be tried by his own accomplices. These reasons were so evident, that Larévellière and Rewbell, notwithstanding their preference of a legal course, were obliged to relinquish all idea of a regular trial, and to make up their minds to a decisive act of violence,—a sad and deplorable resource, but which, in their situation and with their cause for alarm, was the only practicable one. Having determined upon extreme measures, they purposed, nevertheless, not to have recourse to sanguinary measures, and strove to curb the revolutionary propensities of Barras. Without having yet decided upon the mode and the moment of execution, they adopted the idea of apprehending Pichegru and his one hundred and eighty supposed accomplices, impeaching them before the purified legislative body, and demanding from it an extraordinary law, which should decree their banishment without trial. In their extreme distrust, they made a great mistake respecting Carnot. They forgot his past life, his rigid principles, his obstinacy, and looked upon him as almost a traitor. They feared that, united with Barthélemy, he was implicated in Pichegru's plot. The pains which he took to collect the opposition around him, and to make himself its chief, appeared to their prejudiced eyes so many proofs of criminal connivance. Still they were not yet convinced; but having determined upon a bold stroke, they would not do the thing by halves; and they were ready to strike the guilty, even at their sides, and in the very bosom of the directory.

They agreed to prepare every thing for the execution of their plan, and to watch their enemies closely, in order to seize the moment when the blow should be no longer delayed. Disposed to so bold an act, they had need of support. The patriot party, which could alone furnish it, was divided as formerly into two classes: some still furious ever since the 9th Thermidor, had not cooled in the space of three years; they comprehended nothing whatever of the forced march of the revolution, considered the legal system as a concession made to counter-revolutionists, and wanted nought else than vengeance and proscriptions. Though the directory had struck them in the person of Babœuf, they were ready, with their usual self-devotion, to fly to its aid. But they were too dangerous to be employed, and the utmost that could be done was, in the day of extreme danger, to form them into regiments, as on the 13th Vendémiaire, and to reckon upon the sacrifice of their lives. They had sufficiently proved by the side of Bonaparte and on the steps of the church of Saint-Roche, of what they were capable in the hour of danger. Besides these ardent patriots, almost all compromised by their zeal or their active participation in the revolution, there were moderate patriots of a superior class, who, approving more or less the conduct of the directory, desired nevertheless that the republic should derive its support from the laws, and saw the imminent peril to which it was exposed by the reaction. These perfectly answered the intentions of Rewbell and Larévellière, and could lend the aid, if not of force, at least of opinion to the directory. They were to be seen alternately in the withdrawing-rooms of Barras, who kept up a kind of state for his colleagues, or in those of Madame de Staël, who had not quitted Paris, and who, by the charms of her superior mind, collected around her all the most shining characters in France. M. Benjamin Constant occupied the first rank among them, for his talents, and for the works which he had already published in favour of the directory. There too was seen M. de Talleyrand, who, erased from the list of emigrants during the latter times of the convention, had come to Paris, with the desire of again entering upon the career of high diplomatic employments. This assemblage of distinguished men, composing the government society, had resolved to form an association to counterbalance the influence of Clichy, and to discuss political questions in a contrary spirit. It was called the constitutional circle. It soon comprised all the persons whom we have just designated, and the members of the councils who voted with the directory, that is, nearly the whole of the last conventional third. The members of the legislative body, who called themselves constitutionalists, would naturally have been expected to join the new circle, for their opinion was the same; but embroiled from self-love with the directory, and by their discussions in the legislative body, they persisted in keeping distinct between the constitutional circle and Clichy, after the example of Carnot and Barthélemy, the directors, and the deputies Tronçon-Ducoudray, Portalis, Lacuée, Dumas, Doulcet-Pontécoulant, Siméon, and Thibaudeau. M. Benjamin Constant spoke several times in the constitutional circle. M. de Talleyrand also delivered his sentiments there. This example was imitated; and circles of the same kind, composed, it is true, of men of an inferior class, and of less temperate patriots, were formed in all quarters. The constitutional circle was opened on the 1st Messidor, a month after the 1st Prairial. In a few days there were similar associations all over France; the warmest patriots joined them, and from a perfectly natural reaction, the Jacobin party almost seemed to be forming itself anew.

But this was a worn-out implement, and of little use. The clubs had lost their reputation in France, and were deprived by the constitution of the means of again becoming efficacious. The directory had fortunately another support, namely, the armies, in which republican principles seemed to have taken refuge ever since the sufferings of the revolution had produced so violent and so great a reaction in the interior. Every army is attached to the government that organizes, maintains, and keeps it in pay; but the republican soldiers viewed the directory not merely as the heads of the government, but as the heads of a cause for which they had risen en masse in 1793, and for which they had fought and conquered for six years. Nowhere was the attachment to the revolution so strong as in the army of Italy. It was composed of the revolutionists of the south, as impetuous in their opinions as in their bravery. Generals, officers, and soldiers were loaded with honours, rolling in wealth, and revelling in pleasure. They had conceived an extraordinary pride on account of their victories. They were informed of what was going on in the interior from the newspapers, which were given to them to read, and they talked of nothing but recrossing the Alps, to cut down the aristocrats of Paris. The ease they enjoyed ever since the signature of

the preliminaries, contributed by idleness to augment their excitement. Masséna, Joubert, and Augereau, in particular, set them the example of the most ardent republicanism. The troops which had come from the Rhine, without being less republican, were more settled, more moderate, and had contracted under Moreau greater sobriety and discipline. Bernadotte was their commander. He affected a polished education, and strove to distinguish himself from his colleagues by more elegant manners. In his division, the title of *Monsieur* was employed, whereas throughout the entire of the old army of Italy, no other title than that of *citizen* was tolerated. The old soldiers of Italy, licentious, insolent, and quarrelsome as southerns and as spoilt children of victory, were already rivalled in bravery by the soldiers of the Rhine; and now they began to compete with the latter, not in opinion but in manners and habits. They would not be called *Monsieur*, and on this account they had frequent duels with their comrades of the Rhine. Augereau's division, in particular, which was distinguished, like its general, for its revolutionary exaltation, was the most restless. It required an energetic proclamation from its chief to repress it, and to put a stop to duels. The style of citizen was the only one allowed.

General Bonaparte viewed with pleasure the spirit of his army, and encouraged its flights. His first successes had all been gained against the royalist faction, whether before Toulon, or on the 13th Vendémiaire. He was opposed to that faction from the beginning. That faction had since made a point of depreciating his triumphs, because their lustre was reflected upon the revolution.

Its last attack, especially, had filled the general with indignation. He could not contain himself when he read Dumolard's motion, and learnt that the treasury had seized the million sent to Toulon. But besides his particular reason for detesting the royalist faction, he had another more general and more profound; it lay in the glory and the greatness of the part which he was acting. What effect might a king have on his future prospects? To whatever height he might exalt him, that king would still be above him. Under the republic, on the contrary, no head was exalted above his own. Whether he had any presentiment of his wonderful destiny or not, he foresaw, at least, in the republic an audacity and an immensity of enterprise which tallied with the audacity and the immensity of his own genius; with a king, on the contrary, France would have been brought back to an obscure and limited existence. However he might act towards the republic, whether he served or oppressed it, Bonaparte could not be great unless through it and by it, and he could not but cherish that in which his own destiny was involved. That a Pichegru should suffer himself to be allured by a mansion, a title, and a few millions, is not surprising; the ardent imagination of the conqueror of Italy required a different prospect. It required the prospect of a new world, revolutionized by his hands.

He wrote, therefore, to the directory, to say that he and his army were ready to fly to its aid, in order to make the counter-revolutionists return into their former nothingness. He was not afraid to give advice, and he earnestly exhorted the directory to sacrifice a few traitors, and to break up a few newspaper presses.

In the army of the Rhine, every thing was in far less a perturbed state. The army contained some bad officers placed in the ranks by Pichegru. Nevertheless the bulk of the army was republican, but quiet, disciplined, poor, and less intoxicated than that of Italy. An army is always created after the image of the general. His disposition is reflected in his officers, and from his officers it is imparted to his soldiers. The army of the Rhine was modelled after Moreau. Moreau, flattered by the royalist faction, who were for putting his well-conducted retreat above the wonderful exploits in Italy, felt less hatred towards them than Bonaparte. He was, moreover, of an easy, temperate disposition, and phlegmatic, and his taste for politics was no greater than his capacity; therefore he hung back, never caring to declare his opinions. Yet for all this he was a republican and no traitor, as it had been asserted. He possessed at this moment evidence of Pichegru's treason, and could have rendered an immense service to his government. We have already stated that he had taken a baggage waggon belonging to general Klinglin containing a great quantity of papers. These papers included Pichegru's entire correspondence in cypher with Wickham, the prince of Condé, &c. Moreau, therefore, could have furnished proofs of the treason, and rendered judicial proceedings more effectual. But Pichegru had been his commander-in-chief and his friend; he would not betray him; and he worked hard to discover the cypher of this correspondence without giving information to the government. Moreover, it contained the very proof of Moreau's fidelity to the republic. Pichegru, after resigning the command, had only one mode of retaining importance; namely, to say that he could do what he chose with Moreau, and that leaving the conduct of the army to him he was himself going to manage the intrigues of the interior. Now Pichegru was continually repeating to his correspondents that they must not address themselves to Moreau, because he would not admit any overture *. Moreau then was cold, but faithful. His army was one of the finest and bravest that the republic ever possessed.

Every thing was different in the army of the Sambre and Meuse. This was, as we have elsewhere observed, the army of Fleurus, of the Ourthe, and of the Roër, a brave and republican army, like its old general. Its ardour was increased when young Hoche, appointed to command it, had come to diffuse among his soldiers all the energy of his character. This young man, who from sergeant in the French guards had risen in one campaign to be commander-in-chief, regarded the republic as his mother and his benefactress. Even in the dungeons of the committee of public welfare his attachment to her had not become lukewarm; in La Vendée it had been strengthened while contending with the royalists; in Vendémiaire he had been always ready to fly to the aid of the convention, and he had already set twenty thousand men

* If M. de Montgaillard had perused the correspondence of Klinglin, he would not have advanced upon the faith of an assertion of the king, Louis XVIII., that Moreau had been a traitor to France ever since the year 1797.

in motion, when the vigour of Bonaparte in the battle of the 13th rendered it unnecessary for them to advance further. Having in his political capacity a reason for meddling in affairs which Moreau had not, and not being envious of Bonaparte, although impatient to overtake him in the career of glory, he was heartily devoted to the republic, and ready to serve her in every way, on the field of battle, or amidst the storm of politics. We have already had occasion to observe, that with consummate prudence he combined a most extraordinary ardour and restlessness of character. Ready to throw himself into the arena of public events, he offered his arm and his life to the directory. Thus there was no failure of physical force in the government, but it had to be used with discretion, and above all, with due reference to the occasion.

Of all the generals, Hoche was the man whom it best suited the directory to employ. If the glory and the character of Bonaparte could excite umbrage with some, it was not so with Hoche. His victories at Weissenburg in 1793, his admirable pacification of La Vendée, his recent victory at Neuwied, reflected upon him a splendid and a varied glory, in which esteem for the statesman was blended with esteem for the warrior; but there was nothing in his reputation that could militate against liberty. If a general must be made a party to the troubles of the state, it were far better to apply to him than to the giant who was bearing sway in Italy. He was the favourite general of the republicans, and the one upon whom their thoughts reposed without any fear. Besides, his army was nearer to Paris. Twenty thousand men could, were it necessary, in a few marches reach the capital, and second by their presence the vigorous stroke which the directory had resolved to strike.

It was on Hoche, then, that the attention of the three directors, Barras, Rewbell, and Larévelliere was fixed. However, Barras, who was extremely busy and very clever at intrigue, and who was desirous in this new crisis to take upon himself the honour of the execution, Barras, without communicating with his colleagues, wrote to Hoche, with whom he had some acquaintance, and called for his intervention in the events that were preparing. Hoche never hesitated. A most convenient opportunity offered for sending troops to Paris. He was labouring with the greatest assiduity in fitting out his new expedition against Ireland. He had gone to Holland to superintend the preparations making in the Texel. He had resolved to detach twenty thousand men from the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and to send them off for Brest. On their way through the interior, it would be easy to stop them when in the neighbourhood of Paris, and to employ them in the service of the directory. He offered still more; money would be wanted, either for the column on march, or for any sudden occasion; he provided himself very cleverly with this. We have observed that the provinces between the Meuse and the Rhine had but an uncertain existence until peace should be made with the empire. They had not been, like Belgium, divided into departments and incorporated with France; they were governed according to martial law and with great discretion by Hoche, who wished to turn them into republics, and if he could not obtain their express union with France, to form them into a Cisrhenane republic, attached to the French as a daughter to her mother. He had established a commission at Bonn, to whom the government of the country was entrusted, together with the collection of the levies made on this as well as on the other side of the Rhine. Two millions and some hundred thousand francs were in the coffers of this commission. Hoche prohibited their transfer to the chest of the army paymaster, because they would then be under the authority of the treasury, and would perhaps even be withdrawn for purposes foreign to the army. He directed the column which he was about to set in motion to be paid up, and nearly two millions to be kept in reserve, either to be offered to the directory or to be employed for the expedition to Ireland. It was out of political zeal that he committed this breach of the rules of keeping the public accounts, for this young general, who had greater opportunities for enriching himself than any other, was very poor. In doing all this, Hoche conceived that he was executing the orders not of Barras only, but also of Larévelliere-Lépeaux and Rewbell.

Two months had elapsed since the 1st Prairial, that is, since the opening of the new session: it was now the end of Messidor (the middle of July). The propositions settled at Clichy, and carried to the five hundred, had followed one another without intermission. A fresh proposal was in preparation, to which the royalist faction attached great interest. The organization of the national guards was not yet decreed; the principle was merely introduced into the constitution. The Clichyans were desirous of contriving some force to act in opposition to the armies, and to get again under arms that youth which had risen in Vendémiaire against the convention. They had just been nominating a commission in the five hundred, who were to report upon a plan of organization; Pichegru was its president and reporter. Besides this important measure, the commission of finance had again, in an underhand manner, taken up the propositions rejected by the ancients, and sought to present them in a different manner, so as to get them adopted in a new form. These propositions of the five hundred, formidable as they were, alarmed the three directors less than the conspiracy, at the head of which they saw a celebrated general, and which they supposed to have very extensive ramifications in the councils. Determined to act, they meant first to make certain changes in the ministry, which they deemed necessary for giving more consistency to the administration of the state, and more steadiness and decision to the conduct of the government.

The minister of the police, Cochon, though somewhat in disgrace with the royalists, since the prosecution of the three agents of the pretender and the circulars relative to the elections, was not the less entirely devoted to Carnot. The directory with the plans it entertained, could not leave the police in the hands of Cochon. The minister at war, Petiet, stood high in the estimation of the royalists; he was the devoted creature of Carnot. He would have to be excluded also, that there might not be a hostile channel of communication between the armies and the directorial majority. Benezech, minister of the interior, an excellent public functionary, and a complaisant courtier, was not

o be feared by either party; but he was suspected m account of his known partialities and the in-dulgence shown him by the royalist journals. It was proposed to remove him too, were it but to have in his stead one on whom more reliance could be placed. Entire confidence was reposed in Truguet, commissioner of the navy, and Charles Delacroix, minister for foreign affaire; but reasons grounded on the interest of the service induced the directors to desire their dismissal. Truguet was a butt for every attack of the royalist faction, and he partly deserved their attacks on account of his haughty and violent temper. He was a man of integrity and of great resources, but did not behave to individuals with evenness of temper, which is necessary at the head of a great administration. Besides, he might be employed with advantage in the diplomatic career; and he was himself desirous of superseding general Perignon in Spain, in order to obtain the concurrence of that power in his great plans respecting India. As for Delacroix, he had since proved himself capable of conducting the affairs of a department with ability; but he had neither the dignity or the information requisite for representing the republic with the European powers. Besides, the directors had a strong desire to see another person, M. de Talleyrand, at the head of the foreign department. The enthusiastic spirit of Madame de Staël was delighted with the cool, keen, and unfathomable mind of M. de Talleyrand. She had introduced him to M. Benjamin Constant, and Benjamin Constant had been desired to put him in communication with Barras. M. de Talleyrand contrived to gain over Barras, as he would indeed have won over more subtle men. After he had got himself introduced by Madame de Staël to Benjamin Constant, and by Benjamin Constant to Barras, he got Barras to introduce him to Larévellière, and he knew how to gain the honest man just as he had gained the dissolute one. He appeared to all a person greatly to be pitied, odious to the emigrants as a partisan of the revolution, suspected by the patriots as a man of high birth, and the victim at once of his opinions and his birth. It was agreed to appoint him minister for foreign affairs. The vanity of the directors was flattered by attaching to themselves so distinguished a personage; and they were moreover sure that they were committing the foreign affairs to a clever, well-informed man, and one who was personally identified with the entire diplomacy of Europe.

There were left Ramel, minister of the finances, and Merlin (of Douai), minister of justice, who were more hateful to the royalists than all the others together, but who performed the duties of their respective offices with equal zeal and ability. These the three directors would not remove on any account. Thus, out of the seven ministers, they purposed to change Cochon, Pétiet, and Benezech, for the sake of public opinion; Truguet and Delacroix, for the benefit of the service; and to retain only Merlin and Ramel.

In every state whose institutions are representative, whether monarchy or republic, it is by the selection of the ministers that the government declares its spirit and its conduct. It is also for the choice of the ministers that parties are set in motion, and they are desirous of influencing that appointment as much in support of their opinion as of their ambition. But if, among the parties, there is one that wishes for more than a simple reform in the system of the government, and aspires to overthrow the existing order of things, that party, dreading reconciliations, wants something more than a change of ministers, abstains from interfering in it, or interferes in order to prevent it. Pichegru and the Clichyans, who were in the secret of the plot, cared but little about the change of the ministry. They nevertheless associated again with Carnot, to have some conversation with him; but it was rather a pretext to sound him and to discover his secret intentions, than to arrive at a result which was in their eyes very unimportant. Carnot had frankly declared himself to them, personally and in writing, in his replies to the members who had made overtures to him. He had declared that *he would sooner perish than suffer the constitution to be prejudiced, or the powers which it had constituted to be dishonoured* —(the literal expressions of one of his letters). He had, therefore, obliged those who came to sound him to confine their remarks to constitutional projects, such as a change of ministers. As for such of the Clichyans as were not initiated in the secrets of the faction and the constitutionalists, they sincerely desired to obtain a ministerial revolution, and to stop there. The latter, therefore, collected themselves around Carnot. The members of the ancients and of the five hundred, who have already been named, such as Portalis, Tronçon-Ducoudray, Lacuée, Dumas, Thibaudeau, Doulcet-Pontécoulant, Siméon, and Emery, conversed with Carnot and Barthélemy, and discussed the changes to be made in the ministry. The two ministers whom they particularly desired to have changed were Merlin, the minister of justice, and Ramel, minister of the finances. Having especially attacked the financial system, they were more hostile to the minister of the finances than to any other. They wished also for the removal of Truguet and Charles Delacroix. They were desirous of course to retain Cochon, Pétiet, and Benezech. The two directors, Barthélemy and Carnot, were not difficult to persuade. The weak Barthélemy had no personal opinion; Carnot saw all his friends in the ministers retained, all his enemies among the rejected. But to this scheme, so readily formed in the constitutionalist cabals, it was not so easy to gain the assent of the other three directors, who having made up their minds as to the course they would take, wanted fairly enough to dismiss those whom the constitutionalists were anxious to retain.

Carnot, who was unacquainted with the connexion formed between his three colleagues, Rewbell, Larévellière, and Barras, and who knew not that Larévellière was the link that connected the two others, expected that he would be the easiest to disengage. He therefore advised the constitutionalists to address themselves to him, in order to endeavour to bring him over to their views. They accordingly repaired to Larévellière, but found that with all his moderation he was unalterably resolved. Larévellière, unaccustomed, like all the men of his time, to the tactics of representative governments, did not conceive that people could negotiate for the choice of ministers. "Stick to your part," said he, "that is, make laws; leave to us to perform our du-

ties, that of choosing the public officials. It is our duty to give a preference according to our conscience and our opinion of the merit of individuals, and not according to the requisitions of parties." He had then to learn, and at that time no one was aware, that a ministry ought to be composed of influential persons; that these persons ought to be taken from among the existing parties; and that the choice of this or that minister, being a guarantee of the course which is about to be pursued, may fairly become a subject of negotiation. Larévellière had other reasons for rejecting any compromise; he was conscious that he and his friend Rewbell had never wished or voted but for what was right; he was sure that the directorial majority, whatever might be the personal views of the directors, had never voted otherwise; that in its financial arrangements, without being able to prevent all the subaltern malversations, the directorial administration had been upright and as little vicious as possible under the circumstances; that in politics, it had never had any personal ambition, and done nothing to extend its prerogatives; that in the direction of the war it had aspired only to a speedy but honourable and glorious peace. Larévellière could not, therefore, comprehend and admit the reproaches pointed against the directory. His good conscience rendered them unintelligible to him. Henceforward he considered the Clichyans but as so many perfidious conspirators, and the constitutionalists as so many men whose self-conceit had been wounded. He then with every one else had to learn that the temperament of parties, whether well or ill founded, must be conceded to, and that among all other claims must be reckoned even those of wounded self-love. Besides, what the constitutionalists offered, possessed no peculiar attraction. The three directors in coalition wished to give themselves a ministry acting in unison, in order to crush the royalist faction. The constitutionalists, on the contrary, required a ministry totally opposite to that which the directors deemed necessary in the existing danger, and they had nothing to offer in return but their votes, which were by no means numerous, and which moreover they would not pledge on any question. Their alliance, therefore, possessed no such great benefit as to induce the directory to listen to them, and to desist from its designs. Larévellière gave them no satisfaction. In their communications with him, they employed Faujas de Saint Fond, the geologist, with whom he was connected by conformity of tastes and studies. All was to no purpose. He concluded with his reply; "Whenever you attack us, we shall be ready for you. We shall kill you, but it will only be in a political sense. You want our blood, but yours shall not be spilt. You shall merely be deprived of the power to injure us."

This firmness caused them to despair of Larévellière. Carnot advised them to apply to Barras, hardly expecting they would be successful, for he was aware of his dislike. Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse, an ardent oppositionist, and whose fondness for pleasure had frequently brought him into the company of Barras, was commissioned to speak to him. The complaisant Barras, who promised every body, though at bottom his sentiments were sufficiently decided, was apparently less intractable than Larévellière. Out of the four ministers whose removal the constitutionalists demanded, namely, Merlin, Ramel, Truguet, and Delacroix, he was willing to change two. It had been so agreed with Rewbell and Larévellière. He could, therefore, promise for those two latter, and he promised their dismissal. But whether, with his usual facility, he promised more than he intended to perform, whether he meant to deceive Carnot and to induce him to demand himself the change of the ministers, or whether his generally ambiguous language was interpreted too favourably, the constitutionalists went and informed Carnot that Barras consented to every thing, and would vote with him in regard to each of the ministers. The constitutionalists insisted that the change should take place immediately. Carnot and Barthélemy, by no means relying on Barras, hesitated to take the initiative. Barras was urged to take it, and he replied that the newspaper press being at that time very furious, the directory would appear to yield to their violence. Some endeavours were made in order to quiet the newspapers, but meanwhile Rewbell and Larévellière, ignorant of these intrigues, themselves took the initiative. On the 28th Messidor, Rewbell declared in the sitting of the directory, that it was high time to come to some conclusion, that they ought to put an end to the fluctuations of the government, and occupy themselves with the change of ministers. He proposed that they should proceed immediately to the ballot. The ballot was secret. Truguet and Delacroix, whom every body was for turning out, were unanimously excluded. As for Ramel and Merlin, whom the constitutionalists alone would have dismissed, they had only the two votes of Barthélemy and Carnot against them, and they were kept in by the votes of Rewbell, Barras, and Larévellière. Cochon, Pétiet, and Benezech, were turned out by the votes of the same three who had supported Merlin and Ramel. Thus the plan of reform agreed upon by the directorial majority was accomplished. Carnot finding himself baffled, tried to defer at least the appointment of successors, saying that he had not made up his mind on the subject. He was sternly reminded that a director ought always to be prepared, and that he ought not to remove one public officer without first determining as to his successor. He was obliged at once to vote. The five successors were appointed by the same majority. Ramel was retained in the department of the finances, and Merlin in that of justice; M. de Talleyrand was placed at the head of the foreign affairs; and over the navy an old and brave seaman and an excellent administrator, Pléville le Peley; over the interior, Francois (of Neufchatel), a distinguished writer, but more ingenious than practical; over the police, Lenoir-Laroche, a discreet and intelligent man, who had written several good political articles for the *Moniteur*; lastly, over the war-office, the young and illustrious general on whom it had been settled every reliance was to be placed, Hoche. The latter was not of the age required by the constitution, namely, thirty years. Every body knew this, but Larévellière had proposed to his two colleagues, Rewbell and Barras, to appoint him, notwithstanding they would have to find another in his place within two days, in order to attach him to their interests, and as paying a high

compliment to the armies. Hence every one concurred in this change, which became decisive, as we shall presently see. It is common enough to see parties contributing to one and the same event, which they think will turn to their advantage. They all concur in producing it, but the strongest decides the result in his favour.

Even if Carnot had not possessed the most irritable pride, he must have been indignant, and have conceived himself deceived by Barras. The members of the legislative body who were interested in the negotiation hastened to him, recapitulated the proceedings at the sitting of the directory which had just taken place, used extremely violent language against Barras, called him a base wretch, and evinced the warmest indignation. But one particular incident was soon to increase the ebullition, and raise it to the highest pitch. Hoche, on the recommendation of Barras, had put his troops in motion, with the intention of ultimately taking them to Brest, but of making them halt for a few days in the vicinity of the capital. He had chosen the legion of the Franks, commanded by Humbert, Lemoigne's division of infantry, the division of light horse commanded by Richepanse, and a regiment of artillery, in all fourteen or fifteen thousand men. Richepanse's division of light horse had already arrived at La Ferté-Alais, eleven leagues from Paris. This was an indiscreet act, for the constitutional radius was twelve leagues, and in awaiting for the moment of action, the limit fixed by law ought not to have been transgressed. This indiscretion was owing to the error of a commissariat, who had in ignorance violated the law. This unlucky act was not the only one. The troops, seeing whither they were being conducted, and knowing what was passing in the interior, had no doubt that they would be brought to act against the councils. The officers and soldiers said to each other by the way, that they were going to bring the aristocrats of Paris to reason. Hoche had contented himself with apprising the minister at war of a general movement of troops towards Brest, for the expedition against Ireland.

All these circumstances were evident signs to different parties that they were on the eve of some decisive event. The opposition and the enemies of government did their utmost to ward off the stroke that threatened them; and the directory for its own part neglected nothing that could accelerate the execution of its designs and ensure their success; and we see a little further that the directory was most completely successful.

CHAPTER X.

CONCENTRATION OF THE MILITARY AROUND PARIS.—CHANGES IN THE MINISTRY.—PREPARATIONS OF THE OPPOSITION AND THE CLICHYANS AGAINST THE DIRECTORY.—CONTEST OF THE COUNCILS WITH THE DIRECTORY.—INTENDED ENACTMENT RESPECTING THE NATIONAL GUARD.—A LAW PASSED AGAINST POLITICAL SOCIETIES.—FÊTE TO THE ARMY OF ITALY.—MANIFESTATION OF THE GOVERNMENT POLICY.—AUGEREAU TAKES THE COMMAND OF THE PARIS FORCES.—NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE WITH THE EMPEROR.—CONFERENCE AT LILLE WITH ENGLAND.—THE COUNCILS REMONSTRATE AGAINST THE MOVEMENTS OF THE MILITARY.—THE ENERGETIC MESSAGE OF THE DIRECTORY IN REFERENCE TO THIS SUBJECT.—THE OPPOSITION PARTY DIVIDED.—MADAME DE STAEL'S INFLUENCE; UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS AT RECONCILIATION.—THE ANSWER OF THE COUNCILS TO THE MESSAGE OF THE DIRECTORY.—THE DIRECTORY ADOPT A DECISIVE LINE OF CONDUCT AGAINST THE MAJORITY IN THE COUNCILS.—DECISIVE MEASURES OF THE XVIII. FRUCTIDOR.—VIOLENCE OFFERED TO THE TWO COUNCILS BY THE ARMED FORCE.—BANISHMENT OF FIFTY-THREE DEPUTIES, TWO DIRECTORS, AND OTHER CITIZENS.—VARIOUS REVOLUTIONARY LAWS ARE REVIVED.—THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS REVOLUTION.

THE news of the arrival of Richepanse's light horse, the particulars of their march and of their language, reached Pétiet, the minister, on the 28th Messidor. Pétiet communicated them to Carnot; and at the moment when the deputies had crowded to pour forth their resentment against the directorial majority, and to condole with the dismissed ministers, they were informed of the movement of the troops. Carnot said that the directory had not to his knowledge issued any order; that perhaps the three other directors had held a private deliberation, but in that case it ought to be entered in the secret register; that he would ascertain that point, and that it was not right to promulgate the circumstance before he had examined whether there existed any orders. But they were too much annoyed to conduct themselves with temper and moderation.

The dismissal of the ministers, the movement of the troops, and the appointment of Hoche in the place of Pétiet, left no doubt whatever as to the intentions of the directory. It was publicly said that the directory evidently had a design against the inviolability of the councils, to bring about a new 31st May, and to proscribe the deputies who adhered to the constitution. A meeting was held at the house of Tronçon-Ducoudray, who was one of the most influential members of the ancients. The Clichyans, as is usual with violent parties, had with pleasure seen the moderates, that is, the constitutionalists, disappointed in their hopes, and deluded in their scheme for composing a ministry according to their own fashion. They considered them as duped by Barras, and were glad of it. But the danger appeared serious, when they saw the troops advancing. Their two generals, Pichegru and Willot, knowing that every one was running to Tronçon-Ducoudray's to talk over what had taken place, repaired thither, though the meeting was composed of men who did not follow the same line of politics. Pichegru at this time possessed no effective means; his only resource was the angry feelings of the parties, and he had to run thither the moment they blazed forth, either

to watch or animate them. At this meeting were Portalis, Tronçon-Ducoudray, Lacuée, Dumas, Siméon, Doulcet-Pontécoulant, Thibaudeau, Villaret-Joyeuse, Willot, and Pichegru. The excitement was great, as might be expected. They talked of the plans of the directory; they cited the language of Rewbell, Larévellière, and Barras, who declared they had made up their minds, and they concluded from the change of ministry and the march of troops that this determination was some decisive act against the legislative body. The most violent resolutions were proposed, such as to suspend the directory, to impeach its members, or even to outlaw them. But to carry out all these resolutions, some physical force would have been requisite; and Thibaudeau, who did not participate in the general excitement, asked whence it was to be got. The reply to this was, that they had the twelve hundred grenadiers of the legislative body, part of the twenty-first regiment of light horse, commanded by Malo, and the national guard of Paris; that during the reorganization of that guard, they could send into every district of the capital companies of grenadiers to rally around them the citizens who had taken arms in Vendémiaire. There was a great deal of talking, but nothing was settled, as is almost always the case when the effectual means are wanting. Pichegru, cold and reserved as usual, made some observations on the insufficiency and danger of the means proposed, the coolness of which formed a contrast to the general excitement. They separated and returned to Carnot's, and to the dismissed ministers. Carnot disapproved of all the plans proposed against the directory. A second meeting was held at Tronçon-Ducoudray's, but Pichegru and Willot were not there. A great deal of loose conversation again took place, and the members, not daring to recur to violent measures, at length resolved to intrench themselves in constitutional means. They pledged themselves to demand the law relative to the responsibility of ministers, and the immediate organization of the national guard.

The same declamation took place at Clichy as was the case elsewhere, and to no better purpose; for although there was a greater degree of excitement, the means were not a whit more effective. They particularly regretted the police, which had just been taken from Cochon, and reverted to one of the favourite schemes of the faction, that of wresting the police of Paris from the directory, and giving it to the legislative body, by straining the construction of an article of the constitution. It was proposed at the same time to give the direction of this police to Cochon; but the proposition was so startling that no one durst move it. They fixed at last upon the idea of quibbling about the age of Barras, who, they said, was not forty years old at the time of his appointment to the directory, and of demanding the instantaneous organization of the national guard.

Accordingly, on the 30th Messidor (18th July), there was a grand disturbance at the five hundred. Delahaye, the deputy, denounced the movement of the military, and moved that the report on the national guard should be forthwith presented. Severe comments were passed upon the conduct of the directory; the state of Paris was painted in alarming colours, and the arrival of a multitude of known revolutionists, who required that the five hundred should form itself into a committee upon the political societies. It was settled that the report on the national guard should be made the next day but one, and that immediately afterwards the debate on the clubs should take place. The next day but one, the 2nd Thermidor (20th July), further particulars had arrived concerning the movement of the troops and their number, and it was known that there were already four regiments of cavalry at La Ferté-Alais.

Pichegru made the report on the organization of the national guard. His draught of the new bill was framed in the most perfidious manner. Every Frenchman qualified as a citizen was to be inscribed in the list of the national guard; but all were not to compose the effective force of that guard. Those who were to be on duty were to be chosen by the others; that is, to be elected by the mass. In this manner the national guard was to be formed, like the councils, by the electoral assemblies; and the result of the elections showed what kind of guard would be obtained by these means. It was to be composed of one battalion in every ward; in each battalion there was to be a company of grenadiers and light horse, so as to re-establish those select companies, which were always composed of the most violent men, and were usually employed by the parties for the execution of their views. It was proposed to vote the adoption of the plan immediately. The fiery Henri La Rivière declared that every thing announced a 31st of May. "Let us go then! let us go!" cried some voices of the left, interpreting him. "Yes!" he resumed, "but I am cheered when I consider that we are at the 2nd Thermidor, and that we are near the 9th, a day fatal to tyrants." He proposed that the bill should be instantly passed, and that a message should be sent to the ancients, requesting them to remain sitting, that they might also pass it before they separated. Thibaudeau, the leader of the constitutional party, justly remarked that, whatever expedition might be used, the national guard could not be organized in less than a month; that their precipitation to vote an important project would therefore be unavailing to secure the legislative body from the dangers with which it was threatened; that the national representation ought to confine itself to its rights and its dignity, and not look for support in measures that at the present time were utterly unavailable. He proposed a solemn deliberation. An adjournment of twenty-four hours for the consideration of the bill was adopted, but the principle of the reorganization was immediately afterwards decreed. At this moment a message arrived from the directory, giving explanations concerning the march of the troops. This message stated that the troops appointed for a remote station must necessarily take their road near Paris; that owing to the inadvertence of an army commissariat, they had transgressed the constitutional bounds; that the error of the commissariat was the sole cause of this infraction of the laws; and that, moreover, the troops had received orders to fall back immediately. This explanation was not satisfactory; a violent declamation ensued, and a commission was appointed to inquire into this message, and to make a report on the state of Paris, and the movement of the troops. On the following day the discussion

of Pichegru's bill commenced, and four of its articles were passed. The assembly then turned its attention to the clubs, which were springing up on all sides, and seemed to indicate a rally of the Jacobin party. It was proposed to prohibit them absolutely, because the laws which restricted them were always evaded. It was decreed that no political assembly should be permitted for the future. Thus the society of Clichy committed a species of self-extinction, and consented to its own dissolution on condition of destroying the constitutional demarcation as well as the other subordinate clubs which were forming in all quarters. The leaders of the Clichy had, in fact, no need of that tumultuous assemblage for concerting their measures, and they could sacrifice the club without depriving themselves of any great resource. Willot then denounced Barras as not having attained the age required by the constitution at the time when he was appointed director; but an examination of the registers of the war-office proved that this was a mere quibble. Meanwhile other troops had arrived at Rheims; this caused a fresh alarm. The directory having repeated the former explanations, declared them insufficient, and the commission already appointed was directed to investigate and report.

Hoche had arrived in Paris, for he must have gone that way, whether he had to proceed to Brest, or to execute some decisive movement. He presented himself without fear to the directory, certain that, in ordering his divisions to move on, he had obeyed the directorial majority. But Carnot, who was at this moment president of the directory, strove to intimidate him. He asked by virtue of what order he had acted, and threatened him with an impeachment for having passed over the constitutional limits. Unfortunately, Rewbell and Larévellière, who were not informed of the order given to Hoche, could not help him out. Barras, who had given this order, had not the courage to take up the matter, so that Hoche was left exposed to the peremptory questions of Carnot. He replied that he could not go to Brest without troops. Carnot rejoined that there were still forty-three thousand men in Brittany, a number quite sufficient for the expedition. However, Larévellière perceiving the hobble Hoche was in, came at last to his assistance, informed him in the name of the majority of the directory the esteem and confidence which his services had merited, assured him that an impeachment against him was out of the question, and broke up the sitting. Hoche ran to Larévellière to thank him; he there learned that Barras had neither informed Rewbell or Larévellière of the movement of the troops; that he had given the order without their knowledge; and he was indignant against Barras, who, after compromising him, had not the courage to defend him. It was evident that Barras, in acting apart, and without apprising his two colleagues, had wanted to keep in his own hand the means of execution. Hoche, who was indignant, treated Barras with his usual haughtiness, and solemnly transferred his regard to Rewbell and Larévellière. Nothing was yet ready for the execution of the design that the three directors contemplated; and Barras, in summoning Hoche, had compromised him to no purpose. Hoche returned immediately to his head-quarters, which were at Wetzlar, and ordered the troops which he had brought to go into cantonments in the environs of Rheims and Sedan, where they would still be at hand to march for Paris. He was highly disgusted by the conduct of Barras towards him; but he was ready to be at his service again, if Larévellière and Rewbell should give him the signal. He was deeply compromised; some talked of impeaching him; but he awaited with firmness at his head-quarters what the majority of the five hundred, who were perfectly inveterate against him, might attempt. His age not having allowed his acceptance of the ministry at war, Schérer was called to that office in his stead.

The noise that this affair had created, effectually prevented Hoche being employed in the execution of the projects of the directory. Besides, the importance which such a participation must give him might excite the jealousy of the other generals. It was not impossible that Bonaparte might take it ill that any one should be sent to but himself. It was considered more advisable not to make use of any of the commanders-in-chief, but to select one of the most distinguished generals of division. The idea was conceived of asking for Bonaparte one of those generals who had gained such celebrity under his command, which would have the advantage of satisfying him personally, and at the same time avoid wounding the feelings of any of the commanders-in-chief. But, while they were considering as to sending for him, he made himself a party to the quarrel in a manner most annoying to the counter-revolutionists and embarrassing at least to the directory. He chose the anniversary of the 14th of July, corresponding with the 26th Messidor, for giving a *fête* to the armies, and causing addresses to be drawn up relative to the events in preparation. He ordered a pyramid to be erected at Milan, bearing trophies and the names of all the officers and soldiers who had fallen during the campaign in Italy. Around this pyramid the *fête* was held. It was magnificent. Bonaparte attended it in person, and addressed to his soldiers a threatening proclamation.

"Soldiers!" said he, "this day is the anniversary of the 14th of July. You see before you the names of your companions in arms who have died on the field of honour for the liberty of the country. Their example is before you. You are to devote yourselves wholly and entirely to the republic; you are bound to sacrifice yourselves wholly and entirely to the happiness of thirty millions of French; you are to devote yourselves wholly and entirely to the glory of that name which has received fresh lustre from your victories.

"Soldiers! I know that you are deeply affected with the calamities which threaten the country. But the country cannot incur any real dangers. The same men who have caused it to triumph over all Europe in league against us are there. Mountains separate us from France; you will cross them with the rapidity of the eagle, in case of need, to maintain the constitution, to defend liberty, to protect the government and the republicans.

"Soldiers! the government is watching over the laws which are committed to its care. The royalists, the moment they appear, will have ceased to live. Be no longer anxious, but let us swear by the manes of the heroes who have died by our side for liberty, let us swear upon our colours,

implacable war against the enemies of the republic, and of the constitution of the year III !"

There was afterwards an entertainment, at which the most energetic toasts were given by the generals and the officers. The general gave for the first toast the brave Stengel, Laharpe, and Dubois, who had fallen in the field of honour. "May their manes," said he, "watch over us, and protect us from the secret devices of our enemies!" The company then drank to the constitution of the year III., to the directory, to the council of the ancients, to the French murdered in Verona, to the *re-emigration of the emigrants*, to the union of the French republicans, and to the destruction of the Clichy club. At this last toast the trumpets sounded a charge. Similar festivities took place in all the towns where divisions of the army were stationed, and they were celebrated with the same solemnity. Addresses were afterwards drawn up in each division. These were still more significant than the proclamation of the commander-in-chief. He had observed a certain propriety of language; but the Jacobin style of 1793 was displayed in full breadth in the addresses of the different divisions of the army. The divisions of Masséna, Joubert, and Augereau, made themselves quite notorious. The division of Augereau, in particular, exceeded all bounds. "*O conspirators,*" it said, "*tremble! From the Adige and the Rhine to the Seine is but one step! Tremble! the measure of your iniquities is full! and the point of our bayonets is the price you will pay for them!*"

These addresses were subscribed by thousands of signatures and sent to the commander-in-chief. He put them up and transmitted them to the directory with his proclamation, that they might be printed and published in the newspapers. Such a step indicated clearly enough that he was ready to set himself in motion to put down the faction formed in the councils, and to afford his assistance to the execution of some necessary but decisive act. At the same time, knowing the directory to be divided, seeing that the scene was becoming complicated, and wishing to be informed of every thing, he selected one of his aides-de-camp, M. de Lavalette, who enjoyed his entire confidence, and who possessed the sagacity necessary for forming a correct judgment of events; he sent him off to Paris, with orders to observe every thing, and to get all the information he could; at the same time, he made an offer of funds to the directory, in case it should need them, for the purpose of effecting any rigorous measures.

When the directory received these addresses, it was placed in an extremely awkward predicament. These addresses were in some measure not warranted by law, for the armies had not the power of deliberating. To receive them and to publish them, was as much as to authorize the armies to interfere in the government of the state, and to deliver up the republic to the military power. But how was it to extricate itself from this dilemma? In addressing itself to Hoche, in applying to him for troops, and in asking for Bonaparte as a general, had not the government itself suggested this intervening power? Obliged to have recourse to force, to overstep the bounds of legality, how could it apply to any other supporters than the armies? To receive these addresses was but the consequence of what it had done, of what it had been obliged to do. Such was the fate of our unfortunate republic that, to extricate herself from her enemies, she was obliged to place herself in the power of the armies. It was the dread of a counter-revolution which, in 1793, had thrown the republic into the excesses and horrors whose melancholy history we have already related; it was the dread of counter-revolution which now obliged her to throw herself into the arms of the soldiery; in a word, it was always to avoid the same danger that she had recourse on one occasion to party violences, at another to bayonets.

The directory would have been glad to have kept these addresses secret, and not have published them, on account of the bad example they afforded; but it would have grievously offended the general, and perhaps have thrown him back among the enemies of the republic. It was therefore compelled to print and circulate them. They struck terror into the Clichyan party, and made it sensible of the egregious imprudence which it had committed in attacking, by Dumolard's motion, the conduct of general Bonaparte at Venice. They gave rise to fresh complaints in the councils, to invectives against this interference of the armies; it was said that they had no right to deliberate, and they furnished fresh evidence of the designs imputed to the directory.

Bonaparte caused the directory further perplexity by the general of division whom he sent. Augereau excited a kind of agitation in the army by the violence of his opinions, in every respect worthy of the faubourg Saint-Antoine. He was ready to quarrel with any one who was less violent than himself; and Bonaparte was fearful of dissensions existing among his generals. To get rid of him, he sent him to the directory, conceiving that he would be very fit for the purpose for which he was destined, and that he would be better in Paris than at head-quarters, where want of occupation rendered him dangerous. Augereau was delighted; for he was as fond of the agitations of clubs as of fields of battle; and he was not insensible to the attractions of power. He set out immediately, and arrived in Paris in the middle of Thermidor. Bonaparte wrote to his aide-de-camp, Lavalette, that he sent Augereau because he could not keep him any longer in Italy; he recommended him to be on his guard against him, and to continue his observations, in keeping himself constantly aloof from him. He also recommended him to keep on the best terms with Carnot; for, though he distinctly declared himself in favour of the directory against the counter-revolutionary faction, he wished not to enter in the slightest degree into the personal quarrels of the directors.

The directory was by no means pleased at Augereau's arrival. That general was a very suitable person for Barras, who was willing enough to be herding with the Jacobins and patriots of the faubourgs, and who was always talking of putting himself on horseback; but he did not suit Rewbell and Larévellière, who wished for a prudent and temperate general, who could, if things came to the worst, make common cause with them against the schemes of Barras. Augereau could not have been better pleased than to find himself in Paris on such a mission. He was a brave man and an

excellent soldier, with a good heart, but a great braggart, and altogether a very weak man. He went about Paris, receiving entertainments, enjoying the celebrity gained by his exploits, but attributing to himself part of the operations of the army of Italy, willingly allowing it to be supposed that he had suggested to the general-in-chief his most brilliant plans, and repeating on all occasions that he would soon bring the aristocrats to reason. Larévellière and Rewbell, who were concerned at this conduct, resolved to obtain his confidence, and by flattering his vanity, to bring him back to some degree of consistency. Larévellière paid him great attention, and succeeded in taming him, partly by well-placed compliments, partly by the respect he knew how to make him feel. He explained to him that he was not to dishonour himself by a sanguinary affray, but to acquire the title of saviour of the republic by an act distinguished by its energy and discretion, which should disarm the factions without spilling blood. He thus softened Augereau, and at length contrived to make him more reasonable. He was immediately invested with the command of the seventeenth military division, comprehending Paris. This new step sufficiently denoted the intentions which the directory had resolved upon. Hoche's troops were within a few marches; a signal was all that was wanted to bring them to the capital. The directory was only waiting for the funds promised by Bonaparte, as it would not take money from the treasury, lest it should compromise Ramel, the minister, who was so strictly watched by the commission of finance. These funds were partly appropriated for gaining over the grenadiers of the legislative body, who were twelve hundred in number, and who, without being formidable, might by resisting bring on a battle; and this was what it was most desirous to avoid. Barras, ever fertile in intrigues, was entrusted with this part of the business; and this was the motive for deferring the decisive act.

The events in the interior had a most pernicious influence on the highly important negotiations commenced between the republic and the powers of Europe. The implacable faction leagued against the liberty and the repose of France was about to add to its injurious acts that of compromising the peace which had been so long expected. Lord Malmesbury had arrived at Lille, and the Austrian ministers had conferred at Montebello with Bonaparte and Clarke, the two plenipotentiaries appointed to represent France. The preliminaries of Léoben, signed on the 29th Germinal (April 18), purported that two congresses should be opened, the one a general congress at Berne, for peace with the emperor and his allies, the other a special congress at Rastadt, for peace with the empire; that the peace with the emperor should be concluded within three months, otherwise the preliminaries were to be null and void; that nothing should be done in the Venetian states unless in concert with Austria, but that the Venetian provinces should not be occupied by the emperor till after the conclusion of the peace. The occurrences at Venice seemed to be somewhat inconsistent with these conditions, and Austria showed much haste to vary them more formally, on her part, by occupying the Venetian provinces of Istria and Dalmatia. Bonaparte winked at this infraction of the preliminaries, in order to spare recriminations in regard to what he had done at Venice, and what he was about to do in the islands of the Levant. The exchange of the ratifications took place at Montebello, near Milan, on the 5th Prairial (May 24). The marquis de Gallo, the Neapolitan minister at Vienna, was the emperor's envoy. After the exchange of the ratifications, Bonaparte conferred with M. de Gallo, for the purpose of inducing him to forego the idea of a congress at Berne, and to prevail on him to treat separately in Italy, without calling in the other powers. The reasons which he had to assign, tending even to the interest of Austria herself, were excellent. How could Russia and England, if they were called to this congress, allow Austria to indemnify herself at the expense of Venice, whose possessions they coveted themselves? It was impossible, and the very interest of Austria, as well as the necessity of a speedy conclusion, required that they should immediately confer, and that in Italy. M. de Gallo, a sagacious and intelligent man, felt the force of these reasons. In order to decide the matter and to gain the Austrian cabinet, Bonaparte made a concession of etiquette, to which the cabinet of Vienna attached great importance. The emperor still apprehended that the republic would not repudiate the ancient ceremonial of the kings of France, and not insist on the alternative in the protocol of the treaties. The emperor was always solicitous to be named first, and to preserve for his ambassadors their precedency before the ambassadors of France. Bonaparte, who had, at his desire, been authorized by the directory to concede such nothingnesses, assented to the request of M. de Gallo. The satisfaction was so great, that M. de Gallo immediately adopted the principle of a separate negotiation, and wrote to Vienna to obtain powers in consequence. But old Thugut, superannuated and ill-tempered, entirely attached to the English system, and every moment tendering his resignation, since the courts, influenced by the archduke Charles, seemed to be actuated by a contrary system—Thugut had other views. The peace was distasteful to him: the internal disturbances in France gave him hopes in which he indulged, although they had so often proved deceitful. Although it had cost Austria so much money, and she had been led into so many false steps and a disastrous war by giving ear to the emigrants, still Pichegru's new conspiracy suggested to Thugut the idea of deferring the conclusion of the peace. He resolved to oppose wilful delays to the urgency of the French plenipotentiaries. He caused the proceeding of the marquis de Gallo to be disavowed, and another negotiator, major-general count de Meerveldt, to be despatched to Montebello. This negotiator arrived on the 1st Messidor (June 19), and demanded the execution of the preliminaries, that is, the assembling of the congress at Berne. Bonaparte, indignant at this change of system, returned a most animated reply. He repeated all that he had previously said in regard to the impossibility of obtaining the adhesion of England and Russia to arrangements the bases of which had been fixed at Léoben; he added that a congress would involve fresh delays; that two months had already elapsed since the signing of the prelimi-

The cabinet of Vienna desires to protract the negotiations with the hope of assisting the royalists.—Conferences at Lille.

naries of Léoben; that according to those preliminaries, peace ought to be concluded in three months, and that it would be impossible to conclude it in that time, if all the powers were to be summoned. These reasons again left the Austrian plenipotentiaries without reply. The court of Vienna appeared to give way, and fixed the conferences at Udine, in the Venetian states, that the place of negotiation might be nearer to Vienna. They were to recommence on the 13th Messidor (July 1). Bonaparte, whom business of the greatest importance detained at Milan amidst the new republics now being founded, and who, moreover, was anxious to watch the events at Paris as closely as possible, did not wish to suffer himself to be drawn uselessly to Udine, to be there overreached by Thugut. He sent Clarke thither, and declared that he should not repair thither in person until he was convinced, by the nature of the powers given to the new negotiators, and by their conduct in the negotiation, that the court of Vienna was sincere in its professions. In point of fact, he was not mistaken. The cabinet of Vienna, more than ever imposed upon by the wretched agents of the royalist faction, flattered itself that it would be discharged from entering into a treaty with the directory by a revolution, and it caused notes, rather extraordinary in the then state of the negotiation, to be sent. These notes, dated July 18th (30th Messidor), stated that the court of Vienna intended to adhere strictly to the preliminaries, and consequently to treat for a general peace at Berne; that the term of three months fixed for the preliminaries for the conclusion of peace, could only be understood to commence from the meeting of the congress, otherwise it would have been useless to have made this stipulation; that consequently the court of Vienna, insisting on confining herself to the tenor of those preliminaries, demanded a general congress of all the powers. These notes contained likewise bitter complaints on the occurrences at Venice and Genoa; they maintained that these occurrences were a serious infraction of the preliminaries of Léoben, and that France ought to give satisfaction for them.

On receiving these very strange notes, Bonaparte was highly indignant. His first idea was to collect all the divisions of his army immediately, to resume the offensive, to advance once more upon Vienna, and to insist this time on less moderate conditions than at Léoben. But the internal state of France, and the conferences opened at Lille, stopped him, and he conceived that he ought at this important juncture to leave the directory, placed as it was at the centre of all the operations, the responsibility of settling the conduct to be pursued. He contented himself with instructing Clarke to draw up a peremptory note. This note was to the following effect: That it was too late to demand a congress, the impossibility of which had been acknowledged by the Austrian plenipotentiaries, and to which the court had itself acceded, by appointing the conferences at Udine; that at the present time there was no reason for this congress, since the allies of Austria were separating themselves from her, and showing an intention of treating singly, which was proved by the conferences at Lille; that the term of three months could not be otherwise construed than to commence from the day of the signature at Léoben, otherwise by deferring the opening of the congress there would be no end of the delay, the very thing France had desired to prevent by fixing a certain period; that finally the preliminaries had not been violated in the conduct pursued towards Venice and Genoa; that those two countries could not have changed their government unless it had been discovered to be vicious; and finally, that by seizing upon Istria and Dalmatia, in defiance of all the written conventions, Austria had herself broken the preliminaries. After having thus replied in a firm and dignified manner, Bonaparte referred the whole to the directory, and awaited its orders, recommending to it as speedy a decision as possible, because it was of importance that hostilities should be resumed before the bad weather came, if such a resolution should become necessary.

The negotiation opened at Lille, was conducted with greater good faith, which cannot but appear singular, since it was with Pitt that the French negotiators had to deal. But Pitt was really alarmed at the situation of England. He had no further reliance upon Austria; he placed no confidence in the downright lies of the royalist agents, and wished to treat with France, before peace with the emperor should make her stronger and more importunate. If then he had in the last year only wanted to adroitly evade a treaty for the purpose of satisfying the public mind, and preventing an arrangement in regard to the Netherlands, this year he had every wish to negotiate, even though this peace should afford no more than two or three years' tranquillity. This downright Englishman could not, in fact, consent to absolutely relinquish the Netherlands to France.

Every thing showed that he was in earnest, as we have already observed, as well as the selection of lord Malmesbury, as the secret instructions given to that negotiator. According to the practice of English diplomacy, all was so arranged that there should be two negotiations at once; the one official and apparent, the other secret and substantive. Mr. Ellis had been associated with lord Malmesbury, in order to conduct under his direction the secret negotiation, and to correspond directly with Pitt. This practice of English diplomacy is compulsory in a representative government. In the official negotiation nothing more is said than may be repeated in the two houses of Parliament, and what cannot be published is reserved for the secret negotiation. When in particular the ministry is divided on the question of the peace, the secret conferences are communicated to that portion of the ministry which authorizes and directs the negotiation. The English legation arrived at Lille with a numerous retinue, and in great state, on the 16th Messidor (July 4).

The negotiators appointed to represent France were Letourneur, who had recently quitted the directory, Pléville le Peley, who stayed but a few days at Lille on account of his appointment to the commissionership of the navy, and Hugues Maret, since duke of Bassano. Of these three ministers the latter alone was capable of taking a useful part in the negotiation. Young, but early practised in diplomatic experience, he combined with much intelligence manners which had become rare in France since the revolution. He was indebted to

M. de Talleyrand for his introduction to public affairs; and on this occasion he had mutually settled with him that one of the two should have the ministry for foreign affairs, and the other the mission to Lille. M. Maret had been sent twice to London in the early days of the revolution; he had been favourably received by Pitt, and had acquired a perfect knowledge of the English cabinet. He was therefore a very fit person to represent France at Lille. He repaired thither with his two colleagues, and they arrived at the same time as the English legation. It is not ordinarily the case that diplomatic questions are disposed of in public conferences. The English negotiators, who exhibited great tact and dexterity, would have been glad to meet the French negotiators on familiar terms, and had too much good sense to evince any coolness. On the contrary, Letourneur and Pléville le Peley, upright men, but possessing no great experience in diplomacy, had much of the revolutionary coarseness; they considered the two Englishmen as dangerous persons, ready to intrigue and to deceive, against whom it was necessary for them to use the utmost caution. They refused to see them unless officially, and became apprehensive of compromising themselves if they adopted any other mode of communication. This was not the way to bring about a good understanding with each other.

Lord Malmesbury stated his powers, where the conditions of the treaty were left in blank, and required to be informed of the conditions of France. The three French negotiators showed the conditions which, as it may be conceived, were a very high *maximum*. They required that the king of England should renounce the title of king of France, which he continued to assume, according to one of those ridiculous customs retained in England; that he should restore all the ships captured at Toulon; that he should restore to France, Spain, and Holland, all the colonies which he had taken from them. In exchange for all these concessions, France, Spain, and Holland, offered nothing but peace, for they had taken nothing from England. It is true that France was justified by her present importance in requiring a great deal, but to demand every thing for herself and her allies, and to cede nothing, was in fact putting an end to all mutual arrangement. Lord Malmesbury, who wished to arrive at effective results, saw clearly that the official negotiation would lead to nothing, and sought to bring about a more unreserved mode of communication. M. Maret, more familiar than his colleagues with diplomatic usages, readily concurred in this, but he had to negotiate with Letourneur and Pléville le Peley, in order to prevail on them to meet the English envoys at the theatre. The young men of the two embassies were the first to associate together, and they were soon on the most friendly footing. France had so completely broken with the past since the revolution, that it cost great pains to re-establish her in her old relations with the other powers. They had nothing of the same nature to do in the preceding year, because all that time the negotiation not being conducted in good earnest, they had scarcely any thing to do than to make evasions, but this year they had to enter into a conclusive and kindly intercourse. Lord Malmesbury caused M. Maret to be sounded, with a view to engage him in a private negotiation. Maret, before he assented to it, wrote to Paris to obtain authority to do so from the French ministry. It was accorded without difficulty, and he immediately entered into conferences with the English negotiators.

There was no longer any idea of contesting for the Netherlands, or discussing the new position in which Holland was placed with regard to France; but England was desirous of keeping some of the principal colonies she had conquered, either to indemnify herself for the expenses of the war, or as a return for the concessions she should make to us. She consented to restore us all our colonies, she even agreed to renounce all pretensions to Saint Domingo, and even to assist us in re-establishing our government there; but she claimed to indemnify herself at the expense of Holland and Spain. Thus she would not restore Spain the island of Trinidad, of which she had possessed herself, and which was a very valuable colony from its position at the entrance of the Caribbean sea; she desired also, with respect to some of the possessions taken from the Dutch, to keep the Cape of Good Hope, which commands the navigation of the two oceans, and Trincomalee, the principal port of the island of Ceylon; she was willing to exchange the town of Negapatnam, on the Coromandel coast, for the town and fort of Cochin on the coast of Malabar, one of her most valuable settlements. As for disclaiming the title of the king of France, the English negotiators resisted it on account of the royal family, who were by no means disposed to peace, and whose vanity had to be considered. With respect to the ships taken at Toulon, which had been already fitted up and armed in the English fashion, they deemed it too degrading to restore them, and offered an indemnity in money of twelve millions. Lord Malmesbury gave as a reason to Maret, that he durst not return to London if he restored every thing, and did not retain for the English people some of the conquests acquired at the expense of their blood and treasure. In other respects, to prove his sincerity, he showed all the secret instructions sent to Mr. Ellis, which furnished evidence of the desire of Pitt to obtain peace. These conditions deserved consideration.

A circumstance which suddenly occurred gave great advantage to the French negotiators. Besides the junction of the Spanish, Dutch, and French squadrons at Brest, a junction that depended on the first gale which should remove admiral Jervis from Cadiz, England had another danger to apprehend. Portugal, terrified by France and Spain, had just abandoned her ancient ally and entered into a treaty with France. The principal condition was, that she should not admit more than six armed vessels belonging to the belligerent powers at once. England would thus lose her invaluable station in the Tagus. This unexpected treaty placed the English negotiators somewhat at the mercy of M. Maret. They began to discuss the definitive conditions. Trinidad was by no means to be taken from them; as for the Cape of Good Hope, which was the most important object, it was at length agreed that it should be restored to Holland, but on one express condition, that France should never take advantage of her ascendancy over Holland to possess herself of it. This

was what England most dreaded. She was less anxious to hold it herself than to take it from us, and the restitution of that colony was agreed to on condition that we should never have it ourselves. With regard to Trincomalee, which involved the possession of Ceylon, it was to be kept by the English, but still with the appearance of an option. A Dutch garrison was to take turns with an English garrison; but it was agreed that this should be a mere illusory formality, and that this port should actually belong to the English. As to the exchange of Cochin for Negapatnam, the English insisted on this, but without making it a condition *sine quâ non*. The twelve millions were accepted for the ships taken at Toulon. As for the title of king of France, it was agreed that, without a formal abdication, the king of England should cease to assume it.

Such was the point at which the reciprocal claims of the negotiators had stopped. Letourneur, who was left alone with Maret since the departure of Pléville le Peley appointed to the commissionership of the navy, was completely ignorant of the secret negotiation. M. Maret made him amends for his nullity by paying him all external honours, and giving him precedence of which this honest and easy man was very tenacious. M. Maret had communicated all the particulars of the negotiation to the directory, and awaited its decision. Never had France and England been so near a reconciliation. It was evident that the negotiation of Lille was wholly uncomected with that of Udine, and that England was acting independently without caring for any secret intelligence with Austria.

The decision to be adopted on the subject of these negotiations could not fail to agitate the directory more than any other question. The royalist faction furiously demanded peace without wishing for it; the constitutionalists desired it sincerely, even at the price of some sacrifices; the republicans desired it without sacrifices, and they desired above all the glory of the republic. They would have insisted on the entire liberation of Italy, and the restitution of the colonies of our allies, even at the price of a new campaign. The opinions of the five directors were dictated by their position. Carnot and Barthélemy voted for accepting the conditions of Austria and England; the other three directors maintained the contrary opinion. These questions served to create a misunderstanding between the two parties in the directory. Barras bitterly censured Carnot for the preliminaries of Léoben, and spoke of him in no very measured terms. Carnot, on his part, said with reference to these conditions, that *Austria ought not to be hardly used;* which meant that in order to render the peace durable, the conditions ought not to be overstrained. But his colleagues took these expressions in very bad part, and Rewbell asked him whether he was a minister of Austria or a magistrate of the French republic. The three directors, on receiving Bonaparte's despatches, were for breaking off at once and resuming hostilities. But the present state of the republic, the fear of putting another weapon in the hands of the enemies of the government, and of furnishing them with a pretext for saying that the directory never would make peace, induced the directors to temporize for a while. They wrote to Bonaparte, that they must wait till their patience was exhausted, and until they had full proof of the insincerity of Austria, and in such a manner that the resumption of hostilities could be imputed to her alone.

With respect to the conferences at Lille, the question was not less embarrassing. As for France she could easily make up her mind, since every thing was to be restored to her; but so far as concerned Spain, who was to be deprived of Trinidad, and as regarded Holland, who was to lose Trincomalee, the question was a difficult one to resolve. Carnot, whose new position obliged him to be always in favour of peace, voted for the adoption of these conditions, although they did not make any liberal concessions to our allies. As the directors were greatly dissatisfied with Holland and the parties which divided her, Carnot advised that she should be left to herself, and that no further concern should be taken on her behalf; a piece of advice quite as illiberal as that of sacrificing her colonies. Rewbell was exceedingly angry on this question. Possessing the strongest affection for France, even to injustice, he wished that, so far from deserting Holland, the French should make themselves all powerful in that country, and make it a province of the republic; and he particularly opposed with all his might the adoption of the article by which France renounced possession for ever of the Cape of Good Hope. He maintained, on the contrary, that this colony and several others must some day be transferred to us in payment of our services. He defended, as we see, the interest of our allies, much more for our sake than for theirs. Larévelliere, who, from a spirit of equity, was very attentive to their interests, was adverse to the proposed conditions for totally different reasons. He considered it as disgraceful to sacrifice Spain, whom we had drawn into a quarrel, which was in some measure foreign to her, and whom we obliged, as the price of her alliance, to sacrifice an important colony. He regarded it as equally dishonourable to sacrifice Holland, who had been hurried by France into the career of revolutions, of whose interest she had taken charge, and whom she was about to deprive at once of her richest possessions and to consign to a frightful anarchy. If, in fact, France were to withdraw her hand, Holland must fall into the most fatal disturbances. Larévelliere said that the directory should be responsible for all the blood that should be spilt. This policy was liberal; perhaps it was not sufficiently prudent. Our allies were sustaining losses; the point was whether they would not sustain still greater by continuing the war. The event has proved this. But the triumphs of France on the continent then gave room to hope that when she was freed from Austria, she would obtain victories quite as glorious upon the seas. The desertion of our allies appeared disgraceful; a different course was adopted. It was resolved to address Spain and Holland, for the purpose of inquiring their intention. "They were to declare if they wished for peace, at the price of the sacrifice required by England; and in case they should prefer a continuance of the war, they were further to declare what forces they proposed to collect for the defence of the common interests. Despatches were posted to Lille, stating that no answer could

be given to the proposals of England before the allies of France had been consulted.

These discussions completely estranged the directors from each other. The moment of the catastrophe was near at hand. The two parties pursued their course, and daily became more and more exasperated. The commission of finances in the five hundred had amended its measures, in order to induce the ancients to pass them with some qualifications. The arrangements in respect of the treasury had been slightly varied. The directory was still to have nothing to do with the negotiation of securities; and without confirming or abolishing the distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary, it was settled that the expenses relative to the pay of the armies should always have the preference. Anticipations were forbidden, but the anticipations which had already taken place were not revoked. Lastly, the new arrangements relative to the sale of the national estates were again brought forward, with an important amendment it is true; namely, that the treasury warrants and the bonds of the contractors were to be taken in payment for national estates, like the *three-quarter bills*. These measures, thus amended, had been adopted; they were less destructive of the means of the treasury, but still extremely dangerous. All the penal laws against the priests were abolished; the oath was changed into a mere affirmation, by which the priests declared that they submitted to the laws of the republic. Neither the question of the forms of worship or the question of the bells was yet taken into consideration. The heritable rights of the emigrants were no longer vested in the state, but went to the next of kin. The families which had already been obliged to account to the republic for the patrimonial share of an emigrant son or relative were to receive an indemnity out of the national estates. The sale of the parsonage-houses was suspended. Lastly, the most important of all the measures, the institution of the national guard, had been voted in a few days, on the basis already noticed. The composition of this guard was to be effected by way of election. It was on this measure that Pichegru and his partisans placed the greatest reliance for the execution of their designs. Accordingly, they had obtained the addition of an article, according to which the business of this organization was to commence ten days after the publication of the law. They were thus sure to have soon collected the Parisian guard, and with it all the insurgents of Vendémiaire.

The directory, on its part, convinced of the imminence of the danger, and still supposing a conspiracy ready to break out, had assumed the most threatening attitude. Augereau was not alone in Paris. The armies were inactive, and a shoal of generals had flocked thither. Chérin, chief of Hoche's staff; generals Lemoine and Humbert, who commanded the divisions which had marched to Paris; Kléber and Lefebvre, who were away on leave; and lastly Bernadotte, whom Bonaparte had sent to carry the colours that were yet to be presented to the directory, were all in Paris. Besides these superior officers, officers of all ranks, out of commission since the reduction of the companies, and looking out for employment, were very numerous in Paris, and held the most threatening language against the councils. A great number of revolutionists had flocked thither from the provinces, as they always did whenever they expected a commotion. In addition to all these symptoms, the direction and destination of the troops could scarcely leave any doubt; their cantonments were in the neighbourhood of Rheims. It was alleged that if they had been destined solely for the expedition to Ireland, they would have continued their march to Brest, and not have been staying in the departments contiguous to Paris, that Hoche would not have returned to his head-quarters, and, finally, that so large a body of cavalry would not have been collected for a naval expedition. A commission had been appointed, as we have seen, to investigate and to report upon all these circumstances. The directory had given only very vague explanations to this commission. The troops, it was said, had been marched for a remote expedition, by an order from general Hoche, who had received that order from the directory; and if they had transgressed the limits of the constitutional limit, that was through the mistake of an army commissariat. But the councils had replied, through Pichegru, that troops could not be transferred from one army to another upon the mere order of the general in chief; that he ought to derive his orders from a higher authority; that he could not receive them from the directory, unless through the medium of the minister at-war; that Pétiet, the minister at war, had not countersigned that order; that consequently general Hoche had acted without a formal authority; that finally, if the troops had to be marched to a remote place, they ought to pursue their march, and not to collect around Paris. These observations were well founded, and the directory had good reasons for not answering them. The councils decreed, in consequence of these observations, that a circle should be drawn around Paris, with a radius of twelve leagues; that columns should mark on all the roads the circumference of this circle, and that the officers of the troops who should pass it should be considered as guilty of high treason.

But fresh circumstances soon occurred to renew the alarm. Hoche had collected his troops in the departments of the north, around Sedan and Rheims, a few marches from Paris, and he had despatched fresh troops in the same direction. These movements, the language held by the soldiers, the agitation which prevailed in Paris, and the quarrels of the regular officers with the golden age of youth (*jeunesse dorée*), furnished Willot with the opportunity of making a second denunciation. He ascended the tribune, spoke of a new movement of troops, of the spirit which manifested itself in their ranks, of the fury excited in them against the councils; and while on this subject, he inveighed against the addresses of the army of Italy, and against the publicity given them by the directory. In consequence, he proposed that the inspectors of the hall should be directed to collect fresh information, and to make a new report. The deputies called the inspectors of the hall were charged with the police of the councils; and consequently it was their duty to provide for their safety. Willot's proposal was adopted, and on the suggestion of the commission of inspectors, several embarrassing questions were on the 17th Ther-

midor (August 4) addressed to the directory. They reverted to the nature of the orders by virtue of which general Hoche had acted. Could, in short, the nature of those orders be explained? Had means been used to enforce the execution of the constitutional article which forbade the troops to deliberate?

The directory resolved to reply by an energetic message to the new questions which were addressed to it, without, however, giving those explanations which it did not suit it to give. Larévellière drew it up, Carnot and Barthélemy refused to sign it. This message was presented on the 23rd Thermidor (August 10). It contained nothing more concerning the movement of the troops. The generals of division, said the directory, had received orders from general Hoche, and general Hoche from the directory. The channel through which they had been transmitted was not yet mentioned. As to the addresses, the directory said that the signification of the word *deliberate* was too vague for it to be possible to determine whether the armies had done wrong in presenting them; that it admitted the danger of allowing armies to express their opinions, and that it would prevent fresh publications of that nature; but that under all circumstances, before the step which the soldiers of the republic had ventured to take could be imputed to them as a crime, it was necessary to go back to the causes which had occasioned it; that the chief reason was, the general restlessness that had for some months past possessed every one; that the cause lay in the deficiency of the public revenue, which left all the departments of the administration in the most deplorable situation, and frequently deprived of their pay the men who for years had been spilling their blood and spending their strength in the service of the republic; in the persecutions and the murders perpetrated on the purchasers of the national estates, on the public functionaries, and on the defenders of the country; in the impunity of crime and the partiality of certain tribunals; in the insolence of the emigrants and the refractory priests, who, openly recalled and favoured, overran every place, fanned the flame of discord, and excited contempt for the laws; in that multitude of newspapers, which deluged the army and the interior, and preached up nothing but royalty and the overthrow of the republic; in the partiality, always ill dissembled and often boldly manifested, for the glory of Austria and England; in the efforts that were made to depreciate the just renown of our warriors; in the scandals reported against two illustrious generals, who had, the one in the west, the other in Italy, added to their exploits the immortal honour of the most admirable political conduct; finally, in the sinister projects announced by men who possessed more or less influence on the fortunes of the state. The directory added, that at any rate it entertained the firm resolution and the well-founded hope of saving France from the new convulsions with which she was threatened. Thus, so far from explaining and excusing its conduct, the directory, on the contrary, recriminated, and openly manifested an intention to engage in the conflict, and its expectation to come off victorious. This message was considered as an actual manifesto, and created the strongest sensation. The five hundred immediately appointed a commission to examine and to answer the message.

The constitutionalists began to be alarmed at the state of affairs. They saw, on the one hand, the directory ready to rely on support from the armies; on the other, the Clichyans ready to collect the band of Vendémiaire, under pretext of organizing the national guard. Those who were sincerely republicans would rather that the directory should prove victorious, but they would altogether have preferred that there should not have been any contest; and they could not but perceive how pernicious their opposition had been in alarming the directory and encouraging the reactionists. They did not confess their faults, but they lamented the present state of things, imputing it as usual to their adversaries. Those Clichyans who were not in the secret of the counter-revolution, who did not even wish for it, and who were solely actuated by an imprudent hatred against the excesses of the revolution, began to be alarmed, and feared lest by their opposition they had awakened all the revolutionary propensities of the directory. Their ardour was cooled. Those Clichyans who were out and out royalists were in a great hurry to act, and were afraid of being anticipated. They importuned Pichegru, and urged him on with great earnestness. The latter, with his usual phlegm, made promises to the agents of the pretender, and was always temporizing. Besides all this, he possessed no real appliances; for a few emigrants, and some few Chouans in Paris, did not constitute a sufficient force; and until he should have the national guard at his disposal, he could not make any serious attempt. Cool and wary, he took a just view of his situation, and replied to all solicitations that it was requisite to wait. He was told that the directory was about to strike; he replied that the directory durst not. At any rate, as he did not give the directory credit for sufficient boldness, finding his own means yet inadequate, playing a great part, and having plenty of money at his disposal, it was not to be wondered at that he was in no great hurry to be up and be doing.

In this state of things, temperately-disposed persons sincerely desired that a conflict might be avoided. They would have rather wished for a reconciliation, which in bringing the constitutionalists and the moderate Clichyans round to the directory, should restore it the majority it had lost, and relieve it from the necessity of recurring to violent means for safety. Madame de Staël was so circumstanced as to wish for, and to attempt, such an accommodation of differences. She was the centre of that brilliant and enlightened society, which, though it deemed the government and its leaders rather coarse, was attached to the republic, and cleaved to it. Madame de Staël preferred that form of government, as the fairest arena for the human mind. She had already placed one of her friends in an elevated position; she hoped to provide for them all in the same way, and to become their Egeria. She was not insensible of the perils to which this order of things, which had become dear to her, was exposed; she admitted men of all the parties, and paid them attention, and could foresee a speedy collision. She was generous, and active; she could not remain inattentive to events; and it was natural

that she should strive to use her influence in bringing together men whose estrangement did not proceed from any great difference in opinion. She assembled in her drawing-room the republicans, the constitutionalists, and the Clichyans; she endeavoured to allay the violence of the discussions, by interposing herself between their self-love, with the tact of a kind-hearted and superior woman. But she was not a whit more successful than people ordinarily are in effecting party reconciliations; and the men most strongly opposed to one another began to stay away from her house. She strove to obtain an interview with the members of the two commissions appointed to reply to the recent message of the directory. Some were constitutionalists, as Thibaudeau, Emery, Siméon, Tronçon-Ducoudray, and Portalis; through them some impression might be created by the style of the two reports, and these reports were extremely important, for they were the answer to the manifesto of the directory. Madame de Staël bestirred herself personally, and through her friends. The constitutionalists wished to reconcile matters, for they were sensible of the danger; but this accommodation required on their part sacrifices which it was difficult to wring from them. If the directory had committed substantive errors and had taken culpable measures, then a negotiation might have been opened for the revocation of certain of those measures, and a treaty concluded upon the basis of mutual concessions; but excepting the private misconduct of Barras, the majority of the directory had conducted itself with as much zeal and attachment to the constitution as could possibly be desired. No arbitrary act, no usurpation of power, could be imputed to it. The administration of the finances, so severely censured, was the forced result of circumstances. The change of the ministers, the movement of the troops, the addresses of the armies, the appointment of Augereau, were the only facts that could be mentioned as indicating formidable intentions. But these were precautions rendered indispensable by the danger, and the danger could only be made to vanish entirely by ensuring the majority to the directory, so as than to have a right to demand that these precautionary measures be abandoned. The constitutionalists, on the other hand, had supported the newly-elected members in all their attacks, were they unjust or imprudent, and it was for them alone to make concessions. There was nothing therefore to demand at the hands of the directory, but much from the constitutionalists; which rendered reciprocity of concessions impracticable, and their wounded self-conceit irreconcilable.

Madame de Staël took great pains, personally and by her friends, to make it understood that the directory was ready to run all risks, that the constitutionalists would be the victims of their obstinacy, and that the republic would be ruined along with them. But the latter would not abandon their old notions for new, and refused every species of concession, and insisted that the directory should go over to them. Rewbell and Larévellière were spoken to. The latter, without avoiding the argument, entered into a long enumeration of the acts of the directory, asking, at the mention of each of these acts, whether it was censurable. To this no answer was made. As for sending back Augereau, and the revocation of all the measures which indicated a speedy revolution, Larévellière and Rewbell were not to be moved. They would accede to nothing, and proved by their cold firmness that a high resolve had been taken.

Madame de Staël and those who seconded her in her laudable but fruitless undertaking, pressed the members of the two commissions very hard, that they should not propose too violent legislative measures, and in particular, that when they replied to the grievances expressed in the message of the directory, they should not indulge in angry and dangerous recriminations. All this trouble was thrown away; for there is no instance of a party having ever followed advice. In both commissions there were Clichyans, and they in all reason would call for the most violent measures. In the first place, they wanted to give the criminal jury of Paris exclusive cognizance of all offences committed against the safety of the legislative body, and to demand the exclusion of all troops from the constitutional boundaries, they required in particular that the constitutional boundaries should not be included within any military division. The aim of this last measure was to take the command of Paris from Augereau, and to accomplish by a decree what could not be obtained by way of negotiation. These measures were adopted by the two commissions. But Thibaudeau and Tronçon-Ducoudray who had to make the report, the former to the five hundred, the latter to the ancients, refused, with equal prudence and firmness, to submit the last proposition. The idea was then relinquished, and the two former propositions were thought quite sufficient. Tronçon-Ducoudray made his report on the 3rd Fructidor, Thibaudeau on the 4th. They replied indirectly to the reproaches of the directory, and Tronçon-Ducoudray addressing the ancients, exhorted them to interpose their wisdom and their dignity between the vivacity of the young legislators of the five hundred, and the susceptibility of the heads of the executive power. Thibaudeau strove to justify the councils, to prove that they had not intended either to attack the government or to scandalize the armies. He referred to Dumolard's motion relative to Venice. He insisted that nobody meant to attack the heroes of Italy; but maintained that their appointments would not be durable unless they had the sanction of the two councils. The two insignificant measures proposed were adopted, and these two reports, from which so much had been expected, produced no effect whatever. They clearly manifested the impotence to which the constitutionalists were reduced by their equivocal situation between the royalist faction and the directory, in resolving not to conspire with the one or to make concessions to the other.

The Clichyans complained much of the insignificance of these reports, and declaimed against the weakness of the constitutionalists. The most ardent wished for the conflict, and especially for an opportunity of engaging in it, and inquired what the directory was doing towards organizing the national guard. This was precisely what the directory had no wish to do, and in point of fact, it had resolved not to organize it.

Carnot was in a still more singular position than the constitutional party. He had fairly quarrelled

The directory resolve that by a "coup d'état" they should rid themselves of their opponents by banishment, and they use language

with the Clichyans on observing their conduct; he was useless to the constitutionalists, for he had taken no share in their attempts at accommodation, and he was too irritable to reconcile himself with his colleagues. He was alone, without support, amidst the void, with no longer any object in view, for he had fallen short in ministering to the personal vanity he once possessed, and the new majority which he had dreamt of could not be obtained. Nevertheless, from a ridiculous perseverance in supporting the sentiments of the opposition in the directory, he formally demanded the organization of the national guard. His presidency of the directory was about to expire, and he availed himself of this circumstance to bring that subject under discussion. Larévellière then rose with considerable assurance, and having never had any personal quarrel with him, he resolved to address him once more in order to reconcile him to his colleagues. Addressing him at once in a firm but yet mild tone, he put several questions to him. "Carnot," said he, "hast thou ever heard us make any proposition tending to abridge the prerogatives of the councils, to increase our own, or to compromise the constitution of the republic?" "No," replied Carnot, with some confusion. "Hast thou," resumed Larévellière, "ever heard us in a matter of finance, war, or diplomacy, propose a measure that was not conformable with the public interest? As to what is personal to thyself, hast thou ever heard us detract from thy merit, or deny thy services? From the time that thou hast separated thyself from us, canst thou accuse us of any disrespect for thy person? Has thy opinion been the less listened to when it appeared to us useful, and proposed with good intentions? For my own part," added Larévellière, "although thou hast belonged to a faction which has persecuted both myself and my family, have I ever shown the least resentment against thee?" "No, no," replied Carnot to all these questions. "Well, then," added Larévellière, "how canst thou separate from us to attach thyself to a faction which deceives thee, which would make use of thee to ruin the republic, which would ruin thee after making a tool of thee, and which in ruining will also effect thy dishonour?" Larévellière employed the most friendly and the most persuasive terms to convince Carnot of the error and the danger of his conduct. Rewbell and Barras even did violence to their hatred. Rewbell from a sense of duty, and Barras from habitual complaisance talked to him almost as friends. But demonstrations of kindness serve only to stir up a certain sort of pride. Carnot remained unmoved, and after all the pains taken by his colleagues, he again drily pressed his proposal for discussing the organization of the national guard. The directors then broke up the sitting and retired, convinced as men easily are on such occasions, that their colleague was betraying them, and that he was in correspondence with the enemies of the government.

It was resolved that the decisive blow should include him and Barthélemy, as well as the principal members of the councils. The plan definitely adopted was as follows. The three directors still believed that the Clichyan deputies were in the secret of the conspiracy. They had not obtained, either against them or against Pichegru, any fresh evidence that would warrant judicial proceedings. They were therefore obliged to have recourse to some extraordinary and violent measure to save the state. They had in the two councils a decided minority, which would be joined by all those wavering men, whom half measures irritate and estrange, but whom great energy overpowers and brings back. They purposed to close the halls in which the ancients and the five hundred met, to appoint some other place for their sittings, to summon thither all the deputies on whom they could rely, to draw up a list containing the two directors, and one hundred and twenty deputies selected from among the most suspected, and to propose their banishment without judicial discussion, and by an extraordinary legislative procedure. They meditated no person's death, but the forced removal of all the dangerous men. Many have thought that this extraordinary measure had become useless, because the councils, intimidated by the evident resolution of the directory, appeared to relax. But this was a transient impression. To every one acquainted with the course of the parties and their lively imagination, it is evident that the Clichyans, on seeing the directory inactive, would have plucked up their courage. If they had kept themselves under till the new election, they would have increased their ardour on the arrival of the third third (*troisième tiers*), and would then have displayed an irresistible impetuosity. The directory would not even have then found the conventional minority which remained in the councils to support it, and to give a sort of legality to the extraordinary measures of which it intended to avail itself. Lastly, without taking into consideration this inevitable result of a new election, the directory, in remaining quiet, would have been obliged to execute the laws, and to reorganize the national guard; that is, to give the army of Vendémiaire to the counter-revolution, which would have produced a frightful civil war between the national guards and the troops of the line. And in fact, while Pichegru and a few intriguers had no other means than making motions in the five hundred, and some emigrants or Chouans in Paris, their schemes were little to be feared; but supported by the national guard, they would be able to give battle, and to commence the civil war.

In consequence, Rewbell and Larévellière agreed that it was necessary to act without delay, and no longer remain in suspense. Barras alone hung back, and gave some uneasiness to his two colleagues. They were still apprehensive lest he should treat with the royalist party, or join with the Jacobin faction to excite a commotion. They watched him closely, and still strove to win Augereau, by addressing themselves to his vanity, and endeavouring to render him sensible to the esteem of upright men. Still some further preparations were requisite, as well to gain over the grenadiers of the legislative body, as to prepare the troops, and to obtain funds. It was agreed to wait a few days longer. The directors would not apply to Ramel, the minister, for money, lest they should compromise him, and they were expecting that which Bonaparte had offered, but which had not yet arrived.

Bonaparte had, as we have seen, sent his aide-de-camp, Lavalette, to Paris, to give daily accounts of every intrigue. The aspect of Paris had created an unfavourable impression on the mind of M. de

Lavalette, and he had communicated his ideas to Bonaparte. So many personal resentments are mixed up with political animosities, that on a close view of the parties, the sight becomes repulsive. Frequently also, if we suffer ourselves to dwell exclusively on what is personal in political dissensions, we shall be tempted to believe that there is nothing generous, sincere, and patriotic in the motives which divide men. Such was precisely the effect likely to be produced by the struggles of the three directors, Barras, Larévellière, and Rewbell, with Barthélemy and Carnot, and of the conventionalists with the Clichyans; it was a terrible affray, wherein mortified self-conceit and private ends would appear at first sight to act the principal part. The military officers in Paris added their pretensions to all those that were already in agitation; although irritated against the Clichy faction, they were not very well disposed towards the directory. It is usual for men to become importunate and susceptible when they deem themselves necessary. Grouped around the minister Schérer, these officers were disposed to complain, as if the government had not done enough for them. Kléber, the noblest but the most intractable of these characters, and who has been correctly described when it was said that he did not wish to be either the first or the second,—Kléber had told the directory in his original language, *I will fire upon your enemies if they attack you; but in facing them I shall turn my back upon you.* Lefebvre, Bernadotte, and all the others, expressed themselves in the same manner. Struck with this confusion of ideas, M. de Lavalette wrote to Bonaparte in such a way as to induce him to remain independent. Thenceforward the latter, satisfied with having communicated the impulse, would not proceed further, but resolved to await the result. He never wrote more. The directory then addressed itself to the gallant Hoche, who, having alone a right to be dissatisfied, sent fifty thousand francs, forming the greatest part of his wife's portion.

It was the commencement of Fructidor. Larévellière had just succeeded Carnot as president of the directory; he was commissioned to receive Visconti, the envoy of the Cisalpine republic, and general Bernadotte, the bearer of some colours which the army of Italy had not yet sent to the directory. He resolved to declare himself in the boldest manner, and thus to force Barras to come to a decision. He made two vehement speeches, in which he replied to the two reports of Thibaudeau and Tronçon-Ducoudray, but without alluding to either. Speaking of Venice and the recently emancipated people of Italy, Thibaudeau had said that their fate would not be settled until the legislative body of France should have been consulted. Alluding to this expression, Larévellière said to Visconti, that the people of Italy had wished for liberty, that they had a right to take it themselves, and so far wanted nobody's consent. "That liberty," said he, "of which some would deprive both you and us, we will defend together, and take care to preserve." The threatening tone of the two speeches left no doubt of the inclinations of the directory: men who broach such doctrines are reasonably supposed to have the means of supporting them. It was the 10th Fructidor; the Clichyans were in the utmost alarm. In their rage, they returned to their old plan of impeaching the directory. The constitutionalists were apprehensive of such a design, because they felt that it would afford the directory an excuse for an outbreak, and they declared that they would in their turn set about procuring evidence of the treason of certain deputies, and call for their impeachment. This threat stopped the Clichyans, and prevented the preparation of an act of impeachment against the five directors.

The Clichyans had long wished to add Pichegru and Willot to the commission of the inspectors, who were considered as the two generals of the party. But this addition of two new members, increasing the number to seven, was contrary to rule. They awaited, therefore, the renewal of the commission, which took place at the beginning of every month, and appointed Pichegru, Vaublanc, Delarue, Thibaudeau, and Emery. The commission of the inspectors had charge of the police of the hall; it gave orders to the grenadiers of the legislative body, and it was in some measure the executive power of the councils. The ancients possessed a similar establishment: this commission had united itself with that of the five hundred, and both watched together over the common safety. A great number of deputies frequented the commission, without having a right to a seat in it; so that it was transformed into a new Clichy club, in which the most violent and the most idle motions were made. At first, it was proposed to organize a police, in order to gain daily information of the designs of the directory, and one Dossonville was appointed to superintend it. As they had no funds, each contributed his share; but only a small sum was collected. Amply provided as he had been, Pichegru could have contributed a considerable subscription; but it does not appear that he employed on this occasion the funds received from Wickham. These police agents went about gathering false rumours, and then came to the commissions to alarm them.

Every day they said, "To-day, to-night, the directory intends to apprehend two hundred deputies, and have them put to death by the faubourgs." These rumours struck terror into the commissions, and this terror gave rise to the most indiscreet schemes. The directory received through its spies an exaggerated report of all these propositions, and in its turn experienced the most alarming apprehensions. It was then said in the reception-rooms of the directory that it was high time to strike the blow, unless they desired that some one else should be beforehand with them, and threats were thrown out, which, repeated in their turn, communicated one alarm in return for another.

Separated and distinct as the constitutionalists were between the two parties, they every day became more sensible of their faults, and the dangers to which they were exposed. They became a prey to the greatest uneasiness. Carnot, still more disconnected than they, embroiled with the Clichyans, odious to the patriots, suspicious even to the moderate republicans, slandered, and misunderstood, received daily the most alarming intelligence. He was told that he was about to be put to death by order of his colleagues. Barthélemy, threatened and apprized in like manner, was in a state of the utmost perturbation.

At any rate, the same warnings were given to others. Larévellière had been informed, in such a way as to leave no room to doubt the fact, that Chouans had been hired to assassinate him. Finding him the firmest of the three members of the majority, it was he who was fixed upon to be despatched, for the purpose of dissolving it. Certain it is, that his death would have changed every thing, for the new director nominated by the councils would certainly have voted with Carnot and Barthélemy. The purposes which led to the intended commission of this crime and the particulars given to Larévellière, ought to have induced him to be upon his guard. However he affected to disregard these warnings, and continued his evening walks to the Jardin des Plantes. A plan was laid to insult him by means of Malo, a *chef d'escadron* of the 21st dragoons, who had cut down the Jacobins at the camp of Grenelle, and afterwards denounced Brottier and his accomplices. This Malo was the creature of Carnot and Cochon, and he had, without intending it, inspired the Clichyans with hopes which rendered him suspected. Cashiered by the directory, he attributed his dismissal to Larévellière, and went to the Luxembourg to insult him. The intrepid magistrate was not to be daunted by a cavalry officer, and seizing him by the shoulders, pushed him out of his presence.

Rewbell, though strongly attached to the common cause, was more violent but less firm. Some one came to tell him that Barras was treating with an emissary of the pretender's, and was ready to betray the republic. The connexion of Barras with all the parties was liable to excite all sorts of apprehensions. "We are undone," said Rewbell, "Barras is betraying us; we shall be murdered; we have nothing else for it than to run; for it is no longer in our power to save the republic." Larévellière, more calm, told Rewbell in reply, that instead of giving way, they ought to go to Barras, speak peremptorily to him, oblige him to speak out, and overawe him by their firmness. Both of them accordingly went to Barras, questioned him in an authoritative manner, and asked why he still delayed. Barras, engaged in making preparations with Augereau, asked for three or more days more, and promised to delay no longer. This was the 13th or 14th Fructidor; Rewbell was satisfied, and consented to wait.

Barras and Augereau had, in fact, prepared every thing for the execution of the decisive blow which had been so long in contemplation. Hoche's troops were arranged around the constitutional boundaries, ready to cross it and to repair at a few hours' notice to Paris. A great part of the grenadiers of the legislative body had been gained by availing themselves of Blanchard, the second in command, and several other officers who were devoted to the directory. A sufficient number of defections in the ranks of the grenadiers had been made sure of so as to prevent a battle. Ramel, the commander-in-chief, had continued true to the councils, in consequence of his connexion with Cochon and Carnot, but his influence was not much to be feared. As a precautionary measure, orders had been given that the troops of the garrison of Paris, and also the grenadiers of the legislative body, should have a grand firing review. These movements of troops, this din of arms, was one way of concealing the day when this decisive measure was actually to take place.

The event was expected to suddenly develop itself every day; it was looked for on the 15th Fructidor, then on the 16th; but the 16th corresponded with the 2nd of September, and the directory would not have chosen that day of awful memory. However, the terror of the Clichyans was extreme. The police of the inspectors, deceived by false appearances, had persuaded them that the event was fixed for the night between the 15th and 16th. That same evening they assembled tumultuously in the hall of the two commissions. Rovère, the fierce reactionist, one of the members of the commission of the ancients, read a police report, according to which two hundred deputies were to be apprehended in the night. Others came in out of breath, to report that the barriers were closed, that four columns of troops were entering Paris, and that the directing committee was acting in concurrence with the directory. They said also that the hotel of the minister of the police was lighted up. An extraordinary confusion took place. The members of the two commissions, who ought to have been but ten, and who were about fifty, complained that they could not deliberate. At length messengers were sent to the barriers and to the hotel of the police to verify the reports of the agents, and it was ascertained that the greatest tranquillity prevailed every where. It was stated that the police agents could not be paid on the following day for want of funds; each emptied his pockets to furnish the requisite sum. They then broke up. The Clichyans attended Pichegru, to persuade him to act. They proposed in the first place to make the councils permanent, then to collect the emigrants and the Chouans whom they had in Paris, to join with them a number of young men to march with against the directory, and to secure the three directors. Pichegru declared all these plans ridiculous and impracticable, and again repeated that there was nothing yet to do. However, the foolish heads of the party did not the less resolve to open the proceedings of the following day by obtaining a declaration of permanence.

The directory was apprized by its police of the confusion of the Clichyans, and of their desperate plans. Barras, who had in his hands all the means of execution, resolved to employ them that very night. Every thing was so arranged that the troops could pass over the constitutional boundary in a few hours. In the interval it was supposed that the Paris garrison would be sufficient. A grand firing review was appointed for the next day, so that an excuse should not be wanting. Neither the ministers or the two directors, Rewbell and Larévellière, or any other person, were apprized of the moment, so that every body was ignorant of the event which was about to take place. That day, the 17th (3rd September), went off quietly enough; no proposition was made to the councils. Many of the deputies absented themselves, so as not to be present at the catastrophe they had so imprudently provoked. The sitting of the directory was held as usual. The five directors were present. At four in the afternoon, the moment the sitting was over, Barras took Rewbell and

Larévellière aside, and told them that it would be necessary to strike the blow that very night, in order to anticipate the enemy. He had asked them for four days more, but anticipated that period that he should not be surprised. The three directors then repaired to Rewbell's, where they remained. It was agreed to summon all the ministers to Rewbell's, to shut themselves up there till the event was completed, and not to allow any one to go out. They were to have no communication with any person outside excepting Augereau and his aides-de-camp. This resolution taken, the ministers were summoned for the evening. All of them being assembled with the three directors, they began preparing the requisite orders and proclamations. The plan was to surround the palace of the legislative body, to take from the grenadiers the posts which they occupied, to dissolve the commissions of the inspectors, to close the halls of the two councils, to appoint another place of meeting, to summon thither the deputies on whom they could depend, and to cause them to pass a law against those whom the directors wanted to expel. They were certain that such as were enemies to the directory would not venture to repair to the new place of meeting. In consequence, proclamations were drawn up, stating that a great plot had been formed against the republic, that its principal originators were members of the two commissions of inspectors; that it was from these two commissions that the conspirators were to proceed; that to prevent their treason, the directory commanded the halls of the legislative body to be closed, and fixed upon another place for the meeting of the deputies, who remained true to the republic. The five hundred were to meet in the Odéon theatre, and the ancients in the amphitheatre of the School of Medicine. A narrative of the conspiracy, supported by the declaration of Duverne de Presle and the paper found in the portfolio of d'Entraigues, was appended to these proclamations. All this was printed immediately, and was to be posted in the night on the walls of Paris. The ministers and the three directors remained shut up at Rewbell's, and Augereau set out with his aides-de-camp to execute the plan as settled.

Carnot and Barthélemy, having retired to their apartments in the Luxembourg, knew nothing of what was in preparation. The Clichyans, still greatly agitated, thronged the hall of the commissions. But Barthélemy, deceived, sent word that it would not be that night. Pichegru, on his part, had just left Sohérer, and assured him that nothing was yet in preparation. Some movements of troops had been observed, but these, it was said, were occasioned by the firing review, and no one took the slightest alarm at that circumstance. Every one went home quite satisfied. Rovère alone remained in the inspectors' hall, and laid himself on a bed provided for the member whose turn it was to keep watch.

About midnight, Augereau placed all the troops of the garrison about the palace, and brought forward a numerous artillery. The greatest tranquillity pervaded Paris; nothing was heard but the tramp of the soldiers and the rolling of the guns. It became necessary, but without resorting to violence, to deprive the grenadiers of the legislative body of the posts they occupied. About one in the morning, orders were transmitted to Ramel, the commandant, to go to the minister at war. He refused, guessing what was going forward, ran to awaken Rovère, the inspector, who would not yet believe the danger, and then hastened to the barracks of his grenadiers, to get the reserve under arms. Nearly four hundred men occupied the different posts of the Tuileries; the reserve was eight hundred. It was immediately put under arms, and drawn up in battle array in the garden of the Tuileries. The greatest order and the most profound silence prevailed in the ranks.

Nearly ten thousand troops of the line occupied the environs of the palace, and were preparing to force it. The firing of a cannon charged with powder, about three o'clock in the morning, served for a signal. The commandants of the columns presented themselves at the different posts. An officer went in the name of Augereau to order Ramel to give up the post of the Pont Tournant, which communicated between the garden and the Place Louis Quinze; but Ramel refused. Fifteen hundred men having advanced to this post, the grenadiers, most of whom were gained over, surrendered it. The same thing occurred at other posts. All the outlets of the garden and of the Carrousel were given up, and the palace was surrounded on all sides by numerous bodies of infantry and cavalry. Twelve pieces of cannon, with the horses to them, were pointed at the palace. All that remained now was the reserve of the grenadiers, eight hundred strong, drawn up ready for action, and having Ramel at their head. Part of the grenadiers were disposed to do their duty; the others, corrupted by the agents of Barras, were inclined, on the contrary, to join the troops of the directory. Murmurs were heard in the ranks. "We are not Swiss," exclaimed several voices. "I was wounded by the royalists on the 13th Vendémiaire," said an officer; "I won't fight for them on the 18th Fructidor." The spirit of desertion thus gained ground among these troops. Blanchard, second in command, excited them by his words and his presence. Their commander, Ramel, was still determined to do his duty, when he received an order, issued from the hall of the inspectors, forbidding him to fire. At that moment Augereau arrived at the head of a numerous staff. "Commandant Ramel," said he, "do you recognize me as chief of the seventeenth military division?" "Yes," replied Ramel. "Well then, as your superior officer, I order you to consider yourself under arrest." Ramel obeyed; but he was ill-treated by some furious Jacobins mingled among the staff of Augereau. The latter got him away, and sent him to the Temple. The report of the cannon and the investment of the palace had awakened every body. It was five o'clock in the morning. The members of the commissions had flocked to their post, and were met in their hall. They were surrounded, and could no longer doubt as to the extent of the danger. A company of soldiers stationed at their door had orders to allow all who should present themselves with the deputies' medal to enter, but to let no one out. They saw their colleague Dumas coming to his post; but they threw a note to him out of the window, to apprize him of the danger and to exhort him to escape. Augereau ordered the swords

of Pichegru and Willot to be delivered him, and themselves he sent to the Temple, as well as several other deputies, seized in the inspectors' hall.

While this operation was being carried on against the councils, the directory had ordered an officer to put himself at the head of a detachment, and take Carnot and Barthélemy. Carnot, who had received timely warning, got away from his apartments, and contrived to escape by a back door of the garden of the Luxembourg, of which he possessed the key. As for Barthélemy, he was found at home, and arrested. His capture placed the directory in an awkward situation. With the exception of Barras, the directors were delighted that Carnot had made his escape; they sincerely wished that Barthélemy had done as much. They had recommended him to seek safety in flight. Barthélemy answered that he would comply, if they would order him to be openly conveyed, and in his own name, to Hamburg. The directors could not undertake to do this. After purposing to banish several members of the legislative body, they could not show such favour to one of their colleagues. Barthélemy was taken to the Temple; he arrived there at the same time as Pichegru, Willot, and the other deputies, seized at the commission of inspectors.

It was eight o'clock in the morning: numerous deputies, though forewarned, resolved courageously to repair to their post. Siméon, president of the five hundred, and Lafond-Ladebat, president of the ancients, reached their respective halls, which were not yet closed, and were able to take the chair in the presence of some few deputies. But some officers arrived and intimated to them that they were ordered to withdraw. They had only time to declare that the national representation was dissolved. They retired to the residence of one of their number, and the most courageous meditated a new attempt. They resolved to meet a second time, to traverse Paris on foot, and to present themselves, with their president at their head, at the gates of the legislative palace. It was nearly eleven in the forenoon. All Paris was apprised of the event; it had not disturbed the tranquillity of that great city. It was no longer the passions that produced an outbreak. It was a methodical act of authority against some of the representatives. A crowd of persons drawn thither by feelings of curiosity thronged the streets and the public places without saying a word. Some detached groups from the faubourgs alone, composed principally of Jacobins, passed through the streets, shouting, *The republic for ever! Down with the aristocrats!* They found neither response or approbation in the mass of the population. It was in the neighbourhood of the Luxembourg that the groups were most dense. In that quarter they shouted, *The directory for ever!* and some, *Barras for ever!*

The group of deputies passed in silence through the dense crowd in the Carrousel, and presented itself at the gates of the Tuileries. They were refused admittance; they insisted; then it was that a detachment drove them back, and pursued them till they were dispersed—a sad and deplorable spectacle, which betokened the speedy and inevitable domination of the Pretorian guard! Why was it decreed that a perfidious faction should have compelled the revolution to seek the aid of bayonets! The deputies thus pursued retired, some to the residence of Lafond-Ladebat, the president, and others to a neighbouring house. They there confusedly deliberated, and were engaged in drawing up a protest, when an officer came to notify the order for their separation. A certain number of them were apprehended and conveyed to the Temple: these were Lafond-Ladebat, Barbé-Marbois, Tronçon-Ducoudray, Bourdon (of the Oise), Goupil of Préfeln, and some few others. They were carried to the Temple, whither the members of the two commissions had already preceded them.

In the mean time the directorialist deputies had repaired to the new place assigned for the meeting of the legislative body. The five hundred went to the Odéon, the ancients to the School of Medicine. It was nearly noon, and they were still far from numerous; but the number increased every moment, either because the tidings of this extraordinary convocation were communicated by one to another, or because all the waverers, fearful of declaring themselves not agreed, were eager to repair to the new legislative body. The members present were counted at short intervals; and at length, when the ancients amounted to one hundred and twenty-six, and the five hundred to two hundred and fifty-one, being one more than half of both councils, their deliberations commenced. A certain irresolution manifested itself in both assemblies, for the act which they were called upon to legalize was notoriously an act of necessary violence. The first thing done by both councils was to declare themselves permanent, and reciprocally to apprize one another that they were constituted. Poulain-Grandpré, a member of the five hundred, was the first who spoke. "The measures that had been taken," said he, "the building we now occupy, all proclaim that the country has incurred, and is still incurring great dangers. Let us thank the directory; for it is to the directory we owe the salvation of the country. But it is not enough that the directory watches over it: it is our duty also to take effectual measures to ensure the public welfare and the constitution of the year III. To effectuate this I move the formation of a commission of five members."

This motion was adopted, and the commission was composed of deputies devoted to the directorial system. These were Sieyes, Poulain-Grandpré, Villers, Chazal and Boulay (of La Meurthe). It was notified that at six o'clock a message would be sent by the directory to the two councils. This message contained a narrative of the conspiracy, so far as it was known to the directory, the two documents which we have already mentioned, and fragments of letters found among the papers of the royalist agents. These documents contained nothing more than the proofs already in evidence: they proved that Pichegru was in negotiation with the pretender, that Imbert-Colomes corresponded with Blankenburg, that Merman and Lemerer were the depositaries of the conspiracy with the Clichyan deputies; and that a vast royalist connexion existed throughout France. There were no other names in them than those already mentioned. These documents, nevertheless, excited a great sensation. By satisfying a moral conviction, they showed the impossibility of proceeding in a judicial mode, by ren-

son of the insufficiency of direct and positive proof. The commission of five had to express themselves on the subject of this message. The directory, not being entitled to take the initiative in any thing proposed, it lay with the commission of five to begin; but that commission was in the secret of the directory, and meant to propose the legalizing of the stroke of policy so long settled beforehand. Boulay (of La Meurthe), appointed to speak in the name of the commission, gave the reasons with which extraordinary measures are usually accompanied, reasons which, under the circumstances, were unfortunately but too well founded. After observing that they were at that moment on a field of battle; that some prompt and decisive measure must be taken, and that without spilling a drop of blood the conspirators should be incapacitated from doing mischief, he made the propositions previously determined upon. The principal consisted in annulling the electoral operations of forty-eight departments; in thus delivering the legislative body from a set of deputies identified with a faction, and in selecting from their number the most dangerous in order to banish them. The council had scarcely an option in regard to the measures to be taken; the circumstances admitted of no others than those which were proposed to it, and besides, the directory had assumed such an attitude that the assembly would not have dared to refuse them. The wavering and uncertain portion of the members, those over whom in a popular assembly energy always gains an ascendancy, were ranged on the side of the directorialists, and ready to vote whatever they pleased. Chollet, however, asked for a delay of twelve hours, in order to examine the propositions. The cry of *question* silenced him. The assembly confined themselves to striking out a few names from the banishment list, such as Thibaudeau, Doulcet de Pontécoulant, Tarbé, Crécy, Detorey, Normand, Dupont (of Nemours), Remusat, and Bailly, some as being good patriots, notwithstanding their opposition; others as too contemptible to be dangerous. After these erasures the proposed resolutions were immediately voted. The electoral operations of forty-eight departments were annulled. These departments were Ain, Ardèche, Ariége, Aube, Aveyron, Bouches-du-Rhône, Calvados, Charante, Cher, Côte-d'Or, Côtes-du-Nord, Dordogne, Eure, Eure-et-Loire, Gironde, Hérault, Ile-et-Vilaine, Indre-et-Loire, Loiret, Manche, Marne, Mayenne, Mont-Blanc, Morbihan, Moselle, Deux Nèthes, Nord, Oise, Orne, Pas-de-Calais, Puy-de-Dôme, Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin, Rhône, Haute-Saône, Saône-et-Loire, Sarthe, Seine, Seine-Inferieure, Seine-et-Marne, Seine-et-Oise, Somme, Tarn, Var, Vaucluse, and Yonne. The deputies returned by these departments were excluded from the legislative body. All public officials, such as judges or municipal administrators, elected by these departments were also declared disqualified from holding their appointments. The following individuals were condemned to banishment to a place to be chosen by the directory: in the council of five hundred, Aubry, Job Aimé, Bayard, Blain, Boissy-d'Anglas, Borne, Bourdon (of the Oise), Cadroi, Couchery, Delahaye, Delarue, Doumère, Dumolard, Duplantier, Duprat, Gilbert Desmolières, Henri La Rivière, Imbert-Colomès, Camille-Jordan, Jourdan (of the Bouches-du-Rhône), Gau, Lacarrière, Lemarchant-Gomicourt, Lemerer, Mersan, Madier, Maillard, Noailles, André, Mac-Curtain, Pavée, Pastoret, Pichegru, Polissart, Praire-Montaud, Quatremère-Quincy, Saladin, Siméon, Vauvilliers, Vaublanc, Villaret-Joyeuse, and Willot; in the council of the ancients, Barbé-Marbois, Dumas, Ferraut-Vaillant, Lafond-Ladebat, Laumont, Muraire, Murinais, Paradis, Portalis, Rovère, and Tronçon-Ducoudray.

The two directors Carnot and Barthélemy, Cochon the ex-minister of police; Dossonville his clerk; Ramel, commandant of the guard of the legislative body, and the three royalist agents, Brottier, Laville-Heurnoise, and Duverne de Presle, were likewise sentenced to banishment. The directors did not stop there: the journalists had been not less dangerous than the deputies, and there was quite as much difficulty in bringing them within the scope of a judicial procedure. It was resolved to proceed in revolutionary fashion with them, as was done in the case of the members of the legislative body. The proprietors, editors, and publishers of forty-two newspapers were condemned to banishment; for no restrictions being then imposed on the political journals, their number was immense. Among the forty-two figured the *Quotidienne*. To these proceedings against individuals, others were added for strengthening the authority of the directory, and re-establishing the revolutionary laws which the five hundred had abolished or amended. Thus the directory was to have the appointment of all the judges and municipal magistrates, whose election had been annulled in the forty-eight departments. As for the deputies' seats, they remained vacant. The articles of the noted law of the 3rd Brumaire, which had been repealed, were again put in force and even extended. The relatives of emigrants, excluded by this law from public functions until the peace, were excluded by the new law for the space of four years after the peace. They were deprived, moreover, of the electoral franchise. The emigrants who had returned upon the pretext of applying for their erasure [from the lists] were to leave the communes in which they were within twenty-four hours, and the French territory in a fortnight. Such of them as should be taken offending this law were to be convicted within twenty-four hours. The laws which recalled the banished priests, released them from the oath, and imposed no more on them than a mere declaration, were repealed. All the laws relative to the police of religious worship were re-established. The directory was empowered to banish by a mere ordinance such priests as they knew to misconduct themselves. As for the newspapers, it was to have in future the power to suppress such as should appear dangerous. The political societies, that is, the clubs, were put upon their former footing; but the directory was armed with the same power against them as it had been permitted to exercise against the journals. It could close their offices whensoever it pleased. Lastly, and this was a point not less important than any of the others, the organization of the national guard was suspended and deferred to a later period.

None of these enactments were sanguinary, for blood-thirsty times had gone by, but they invested the directory with a power completely of a re-

volutionary character. They were voted in the evening of the 18th Fructidor, year V. (4th September), in the five hundred. No voice was raised against their adoption. Some deputies applauded, but the majority were silent and submissive. The resolution which contained them was then carried to the ancients, who were in permanence, like the five hundred, and waiting to be furnished with a subject for deliberation. The mere reading of the resolution and of the report occupied them till the morning of the 19th. Wearied with too long a sitting, they adjourned for a few hours. The directory, impatient to obtain the sanction of the ancients, and to be enabled to support by a law the blow which it had struck, sent a message to the legislative body. "The directory," it said, "has devoted itself to the salvation of liberty, but it relies on you to support it. It is now the 19th, and yet you have not done any thing to second the directory." The resolution was immediately passed as a law, and was sent to the directory.

No sooner was the directory furnished with this law than it made haste to make it available, being determined to execute its plan with despatch, and immediately afterwards take every thing else in its appropriate order. A great number of those who were condemned to banishment had fled; Carnot had secretly bent his steps in the direction of Switzerland. The directory would have been glad if Barthélemy could have also escaped, but he persisted in his refusal for reasons which have been already stated. Out of the list of persons to be banished, the directory selected fifteen, who were considered as either the most dangerous or the most guilty, and condemned them to a transportation which to some of them was as miserable as death itself. They were sent off the same day in grated carriages for Rochefort, whence they were to be conveyed in a frigate to Guiana. These were Barthélemy, Pichegru, and Willot, who were thus treated either by reason of their importance or their guilt; Rovère, on account of his known correspondence with the royalist faction; Aubry, on account of the part which he had performed in the reaction; Bourdon (of the Oise), Murinais, and Delarue, on account of their conduct in the five hundred; Ramel, on account of his conduct at the head of the grenadiers; Dossonville, by reason of the office he had filled under the commission of inspectors; Tronçon-Ducoudray, Barbé-Marbois, and Lafond-Ladebat, not so much by reason of their guilt, for they were sincerely attached to the republic, but for their importance in the council of the ancients; lastly, Brottier and Laville-Heurnois for their conspiracy. Their accomplice, Duverne de Presle was spared in consequence of the private information he had given. Personal animosity doubtless took its ordinary part in the selection of the victims, for among those fifteen persons, Pichegru was the only person to be feared. The number was increased to sixteen, by the attachment of Letellier, Barthélemy's servant, who insisted on accompanying his master. They were sent off without delay, and exposed, as it always happens in such cases, to the brutality of the inferior officers. The directory, however, having been informed that general Dutertre, who commanded the escort, behaved with brutality towards the prisoners, immediately cashiered him. These exiles on account of royalism were bound for Sinamari, where they would find themselves in the company of Billaud-Varennes and Collot-d'Herbois. The others were banished to the Isle of Oleron.

During these two days, Paris continued in a state of tranquillity. The patriots of the faubourgs deemed the punishment of transportation too mild; they were accustomed to revolutionary measures of another description. Relying upon Barras and Augereau, they expected something more. They formed groups beneath the windows of the directory, and shouted, *The republic for ever! The directory for ever! Barras for ever!* They attributed the measure to Barras, and desired that he might be charged with the suppression of the aristocrats for a few days. These groups, however, which were far from numerous, did not cause the least disturbance in Paris. The sectionists of Vendémiaire, who but for the law of the 19th would soon have been reorganized as national guards, had no longer sufficient energy to voluntarily take up arms. They offered no resistance to this violent but necessary act of state policy. In other respects, public opinion continued unsettled. The sincere republicans clearly perceived that the royalist faction had rendered an energetic measure inevitable, but they deplored the violation of the laws and the interference of the military power. They almost doubted the guilt of the conspirators when they saw such a man as Carnot mixed up with them. They feared that personal animosity had too strongly influenced the determinations of the directory. Lastly, even though considering its determinations as necessary, they felt melancholy, and not without reason; for it became evident that the constitution, on which they had placed all their hope, was not the termination of our troubles and our discord. The mass of the population submitted, and ceased from that day to take any great part in political events. We have observed the people on the 9th Thermidor passing from hatred against the old regime to hatred against the system of terror. Of late they had never evinced any desire to interfere in public affairs, other than for the purpose of creating a reaction against the directory, which it confounded with the convention and the committee of public welfare. Fairly terrified at present by the energy of the directory, the people regarded the 18th Fructidor as a warning not to identify itself with political events. Accordingly, from that day political zeal was observed to be on the wane.

Such were the necessary consequences of this act of state policy of the 18th Fructidor. It has been asserted that it was inoperative from the moment of its execution; that the directory in causing dismay to the royalist faction had already succeeded in overawing it; that by persisting in this violent mode of procedure, the directory had paved the way to military usurpation, by being the first to violate the laws. But as we have observed, the royalist faction was intimidated but for a moment; on the junction of the new third, it would infallibly have overturned every thing, and overpowered the directory. A civil war between the directory and the armies must have been the necessary consequence. The directory, in foreseeing this movement, and timely repressing it, prevented a civil war; and if by that means it placed itself under the

protection of the military, it submitted to a melancholy but inevitable necessity. The assumed legality of the act is chimerical after such a revolution as ours. It was not under the protection of the legal power that all the parties could resort for tranquillity and peace; it required a stronger power to repress them, to unite them, to blend them together, and to protect them all against Europe in arms; and that power was the military power. The directory, therefore, by the 18th Fructidor, prevented civil war, and substituted in its stead an arbitrary but necessary act of power, carried out with energy, but with all the mildness and moderation that revolutionary times would allow.

CHAPTER XI.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 18TH FRUCTIDOR.—THE APPOINTMENT OF MERLIN (OF DOUAI), AND OF FRANÇOIS (OF NEUFCHATEAU), IN THE ROOM OF THE EXILED DIRECTORS.—THE CIRCUMSTANCES BROUGHT AT LAST TO LIGHT AGAINST MORRAU, AND HIS DISGRACE.—THE DECEASE OF HOCHE.—REPAYMENT OF TWO-THIRDS OF THE NATIONAL DEBT.—LAW ENACTED AGAINST THE FORMER NOBILITY.—THE CONFERENCES AT LILLE WITH ENGLAND ABRUPTLY TERMINATED.—CONFERENCES AT UDINE.—BONAPARTE'S OPERATIONS IN ITALY; THE CISALPINE REPUBLIC FOUNDED; ARBITRATION BETWEEN LA VALTELINE AND LES GRISONS; LIGURIAN CONSTITUTION; ESTABLISHMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.—THE TREATY OF CAMPO FORMIO.—BONAPARTE'S RETURN TO PARIS, AND TRIUMPHAL FÊTE.

THE 18th Fructidor struck terror into the ranks of the royalists. The priests and the emigrants, who had already returned in great numbers, quitted Paris and the large towns to regain the frontiers. Those who were ready to come back retired into Germany and Switzerland. The directory had just been rearmed with the entire revolutionary power by the law of the 19th, and there was no one to withstand it. It began by reforming the administrations, a course almost always pursued upon every change of system, and appointed decided patriots to most of the public offices. The directory possessed the right of nominating to all the elective functions in forty-eight departments, and could thus greatly extend its influence and patronage. Its attention was first directed to the appointment of two directors in the place of Carnot and Barthélemy. Rewbell and Larévellière, whose influence was singularly increased by the recent event, were unwilling to furnish a pretext for accusing them of having excluded two of their colleagues, in order that they should remain masters of the government. They therefore demanded that the legislative body should be immediately desired to nominate two new directors. This was not the recommendation of Barras, and still less so of Augereau. That general was delighted with the proceedings of the 18th, and quite proud of having conducted it so adroitly. By mixing himself up with public events, he had acquired a taste for politics and power, and had become ambitious of obtaining a seat in the directory. He was desirous that the directors, without applying to the legislative body for colleagues, should call him up to sit among them. As they would not gratify this pretension, he had no other means left for becoming director than to obtain the majority in the councils. But in this expectation also he was deceived. Merlin (of Douai), and François (of Neufchateau), minister of the interior, obtained a great majority of votes over their opponents. Masséna and Augereau were the candidates who next to them had the greatest number of votes. Masséna had some few more than Augereau. The two new directors were installed with the accustomed ceremonial. They were republicans, rather after the manner of Rewbell and Larévellière than after the manner of Barras; they had besides different habits and different manners. Merlin was a lawyer, François (of Neufchateau) was a man of letters. Both of them lived in a style consistent with their professions, and were on good understanding with Rewbell and Larévellière. It might perhaps have been desirable, for the influence and the consideration of the directory with the armies, that one of our celebrated generals had been called up thither.

The directory appointed two excellent administrators from the provinces to succeed the two ministers thus called up. It thus hoped to compose the government of men less identified with the intrigues of Paris, and less accessible to private interest. Lambrechts was appointed minister of justice, the same who was commissioner to the central administration of the department of the Dyle, that is to say, prefect. He was an upright magistrate. Letourneur was appointed to the interior; he had been commissioner to the central administration of the Loire-Inferieure, an able, active, and honest public functionary, but too great a stranger to the capital and its ways not to appear sometimes ridiculous at the head of a great administration.

The directory had reason to congratulate itself on the manner in which the events had gone off. Its only uneasiness was the silence of general Bonaparte, who had neither written for a long time or sent the promised funds. Lavalette, his aid-de-camp, had not appeared at the Luxembourg during the event, and it was suspected that he had prejudiced his general against the directory, and given him false particulars concerning the state of things. M. de Lavalette had, in fact, never ceased to advise Bonaparte to hold back, to take no part in the meditated blow, and to confine himself to the aid he had afforded to the directory by his proclamations. Barras and Augereau sent for M. de Lavalette, threatened him, and said that he had no doubt deceived Bonaparte, and they declared that, but for the regard due to his general, they would have had him arrested. Lavalette set out immediately for Italy. Augereau lost no time in writing to general Bonaparte, and to his friends in

the army, in order to represent the circumstance in the most favourable colours.

The directory, dissatisfied with Moreau, had resolved to recall him, when it received from him a letter which produced the greatest sensation. Moreau, in crossing the Rhine, had taken the papers of general Klinglin, among which he had found the whole correspondence of Pichegru with the prince of Condé. This correspondence he had kept secret, but on the 18th Fructidor he resolved to communicate it to the government. He asserted that he had decided on this step before he was acquainted with the events of the 18th, and in order to furnish the directory with the necessary proof for confounding enemies of the most dangerous character. But we are assured that Moreau had received by telegraph intelligence of the events of the 18th on the very same day, and that he had then hastened to write, in order to lay an information which would not compromise Pichegru more than he already was, and which would relieve himself from a heavy responsibility. Whatever ground there may be for these different conjectures, it is clear that Moreau had long been the depositary of an important secret, and had not made up his mind to disclose it till the very moment of the finale. Every body said that, not being republican enough to impeach his friend, he had not been so staunch a friend as to keep the secret till all was over. Herein his political character showed itself as it really was, that is to say, weak, vacillating, and uncertain. The directory summoned him to Paris to account for his conduct. On examining this correspondence, it found the confirmation of all that it had heard concerning Pichegru, and could not but regret not being sooner informed of it. In these papers it discovered also evidence of the fidelity of Moreau to the republic; but the directory punished him for his lukewarmness and his silence by taking his command from him, and leaving him out of office in Paris.

Hoche, still at the head of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, had passed a whole month in a state of the most painful suspense. He was at his head-quarters in Wetzlar, having a carriage completely ready to fly with his young wife to Germany, if the party of the five hundred should gain the ascendancy. It was on that occasion that he had thought for the first time of his own interests, and of collecting a sum of money to supply his wants during his absence. We have already observed that he had lent to the directory the greatest part of his wife's portion. The news of the 18th Fructidor filled him with joy, and relieved him from all apprehension on his own account. The directory, to reward his zeal, consolidated the two large armies of the Sambre and Meuse and of the Rhine, by the name of the army of Germany, and gave him the command. It was the most extensive command under the republic. Unfortunately, the health of the young general scarcely allowed him to enjoy the triumph of the patriots, and the testimonies of confidence bestowed by the government. For some time, a dry and frequent cough and nervous convulsions had alarmed his friends and his medical attendants. An unknown disease was consuming this young man, lately in such robust health, and who united with superior talents the advantage of manly beauty and health. Notwithstanding his state, he was occupied with the consolidation of the two armies, with the command of which he had just been invested, and he was still meditating his expedition to Ireland, by means of which the directory hoped to alarm England. But towards the end of Fructidor, his cough became more violent, and he began to suffer excruciating pains. His friends wished him to cease from his labours, but he would not. He sent for his physician. *Give me*, said he, *a cure for fatigue, but let not that cure be rest.* Exhausted by his disease, he took to his bed, on the first complementary day of the year VI., and expired on the following day in great agony. The army was much troubled, for it adored its young general. The tidings spread with rapidity, and deeply afflicted all the republicans, who reckoned upon the talents and patriotism of Hoche. A report immediately got abroad that he was poisoned. People could not believe that a man of such youth, such strength, such health, could have died a natural death. A post-mortem examination was made; the stomach and intestines were examined by the faculty, who found them full of livid spots, and though the medical men did not declare these to be symptoms of poison, they seemed at least to believe them to be so. The poisoning was attributed to the directory, which was absurd, for no one of the directory was capable of that crime so foreign to our manners, and, moreover, there was no motive for the commission of such an act. Hoche was in fact the strongest support of the directory, as well against the royalists as against the ambitious conqueror of Italy. It was conjectured, with much greater probability, that he had been poisoned in the west. His medical attendant recollected, as he thought, that an alteration had taken place in his health ever since his last stay in Brittany, whither he had gone to embark for Ireland. It was supposed, though without any proof, that the young general had been poisoned at an entertainment which he gave to persons of all parties, for the purpose of bringing them together.

The directory ordered a magnificent funeral to be prepared. It took place in the Champ de Mars, and was attended by an immense concourse of people. A considerable army followed the corpse, headed by the aged father of the general, as chief mourner. This solemnity produced a profound impression, and was one of the most interesting of our heroic age.

Thus terminated the life of one of the most glorious and most interesting characters of the revolution. In this instance, at least, it was not by the scaffold. Hoche was twenty-nine years old. A soldier in the French guards, he had educated himself in a few months. With the physical courage of a soldier, he combined an energy of character, a superior understanding, great knowledge of mankind, tact in political events, and lastly, the all-powerful spring of the passions. His were ardent, and they were perhaps the sole cause of his death. A particular circumstance heightened the interest excited by his qualities. His fortune had always been interrupted by unforeseen accidents; conqueror at Weissenburg, and just entering upon the most glorious career, he was all at once consigned to a dungeon; released from confinement, he went to waste his life in La Vendée, he there played a most useful political part, and at the

moment when he was about to execute a grand design against Ireland, he was again stopped short by a storm and misunderstandings; removed to the army of the Sambre and Meuse, he gained a splendid victory, and found his progress suspended by the preliminaries of Léoben; lastly, while at the head of the army of Germany, and as Europe was at that time circumstanced with a grand prospect before him, he was suddenly stricken in the midst of his career, and carried off by an illness of forty-eight hours. At all events, if a glorious memory can reconcile any one to the loss of life, he could receive no better exchange for such an early death. Victories, an important pacification, universality of talents, unimpeachable integrity, the idea entertained by all republicans that he would single-handed have opposed the conqueror of Rivoli and the Pyramids, that his ambition would have continued of a republican character, and would have proved an invincible obstacle to the great ambition that aspired to the throne—in a word, brilliant exploits, expanded ideas, and twenty-nine years, such are the associations which are connected with his memory. It is indeed glorious enough. Let us not lament his premature decease; it will far better serve the memory of Hoche, Kléber, and Desaix, that they did not live to be marshals. They had the honour to die citizens and free men, without being reduced, like Moreau, to seek an asylum in foreign armies.

The government gave the army of Germany to Augereau, and thus got rid of his turbulence, which began to cause inconvenience at Paris.

The directory had made in a few days all the arrangements that circumstances required, but it had yet to direct its attention to the finances. The law of the 19th Fructidor, by delivering it from its most formidable adversaries, by re-establishing the law of the 3rd Brumaire, by furnishing it with new means of severity against the emigrants and the priests, by arming it with the power of suppressing the journals and closing those societies whose politics it censured, by permitting it to appoint to all the vacant places after the annulling of the elections, and by adjourning indefinitely the reorganization of the national guards,—the law of the 19th Fructidor had restored all that the two councils had intended to deprive it of, and had even added thereto a kind of revolutionary omnipotence. But the directory had advantages quite as important to recover in the department of finances; for the councils had been not less desirous to restrict it in that respect than in every other. An extensive scheme had been submitted for the expenditure and the income of the year VI. The first thing to be done was to restore to the directory the powers of which it had been deprived relative to negotiations of the treasury, the order of payments, in short, the management of the funds. All the articles on this subject adopted by the councils before the 18th Fructidor were repealed. It was necessary, in the next place, to consider as to the creation of new taxes, to relieve landed property which was too heavily burdened, and to raise the receipts to a level with the expenditure. The establishment of a lottery was authorized, a duty was imposed upon the roads, and another upon contracts of pledge. The duty on registration was so regulated as to considerably increase its revenue; and the duty on foreign tobacco was raised. Owing to these new sources of income, the land-tax could be reduced to two hundred and twenty-eight millions [francs], and the poll-tax to fifty, and yet the total amount of the revenue for the year VI. raised to six hundred and sixteen millions. In this sum the presumed sales of national domains were estimated at no more than twenty millions [francs].

The receipts being raised to six hundred and sixteen millions by these different means, it became necessary to reduce the expenditure to the same sum. It was supposed that the war would not cost this year more than two hundred and eighty-three millions, even in case of a new campaign. The other general services were estimated at two hundred and forty-seven millions, making a total of five hundred and thirty millions. The purposes of the debt amounted alone to two hundred and fifty-eight millions; and if they had been entirely provided for, the expense would have amounted to a sum far above the means of the republic. It was therefore proposed to pay no more than the third, or eighty-six millions. In this manner the war, the general services, and the debt, would raise the expenditure to no more than six hundred and sixteen millions, the total of the receipts. But in order to confine it within these limits, it would be requisite to take a decisive measure in regard to the debt. Since the abolition of paper money and the return to money, the payment of the interest could not be very strictly kept up. One-fourth had been paid in money, the other three-fourths in bills on the national estates, called *three-quarter bills*. This was in some respects like paying one-fourth in money, and three-fourths in assignats. The debt, therefore, had hitherto only been provided for with resources arising from the national estates, and it became necessary to adopt some measure in this behalf for the benefit of the state and of the creditors. A debt whose annual charge amounted to two hundred and fifty-eight millions [francs] was really enormous for that period. The resources of credit and the power of the sinking fund were not yet known. The revenue was much less considerable than it has since become; for there had not yet been time to reap the blessings of the revolution, and France, which has since been enabled to furnish a thousand millions in general taxes, could then scarcely supply six hundred and sixteen millions. Thus the debt was overwhelming, and the state was in the situation of an individual who was unable to meet his engagements. It was resolved, therefore, to continue to pay a portion of the debt in money, and instead of paying the remainder in bonds upon the national estates, to pay off the capital itself with these estates. It was proposed to retain one-third only; the third retained was to be called the *consolidated third*, and to remain on the Great Book as a perpetual annuity. The other two-thirds were to be paid off at the rate of twenty times the annuity, and in bonds receivable in payment of national estates. It is true that these bonds fell in traffic to less than one-sixth of their value, and that for those who did not wish to purchase lands it was an absolute bankruptcy.

Notwithstanding the quiescence and tractability of the councils since the 18th Fructidor, this measure excited a strong opposition. The opponents

of the paying-off scheme maintained that it was a downright bankruptcy; that the payment of the debt at the commencement of the revolution had been confided to the national honour, and that it was dishonouring the republic to pay off the two-thirds; that the creditors who would not purchase the national estates would lose nine-tenths by negotiating their bonds, inasmuch as the issue of so large a quantity of paper would considerably lower its value; that even without entertaining prejudices against the origin of the national property, most of the creditors of the state were too poor to buy lands; that there was no forming companies to effect their purchase as a joint stock; that consequently an actual loss of nine-tenths of their capital in most cases took place; that the third, assumed to be consolidated and secured from reduction in future, was only promised; that one-third promised was worth less than three-thirds promised; that lastly, if the republic could not at the moment provide for the whole interest of the debt, it would be better for the creditors to wait as they had hitherto done, but to wait in the hope of seeing their lot ameliorated, rather than find themselves all at once stripped of their security. There were even many persons who could have wished that a distinction should be made between the different species of annuities subscribed for in the Great Book, and that those only should be liable to be paid off which had been bought at a low rate. Some of them had actually been sold at the rate of ten and fifteen francs, and those who had bought them would still be considerable gainers by the reduction to one-third.

The advocates of the directorial scheme replied that a state had a right, like a private individual, to give up its property to its creditors, when it could no longer pay them; that the debt far exceeded the means of the republic, and that under these circumstances, it had a right to give up to them the very pledge of this debt, that is, the national estates; that in buying lands they would lose very little; that these lands would rise very rapidly in their hands, till they regained their former value, and that they would recover in this way as much as they had lost; that there would still be left national estates to the amount of one thousand three hundred millions (the thousand millions promised to the armies having been transferred to the creditors of the state); that peace was near at hand; that at the peace, the bonds in which the debt had been paid off would alone be received in payment for national estates; that consequently, the part of the capital paid off, amounting to about three thousand millions, would find wherewith to purchase one thousand three hundred millions worth of national estates, and lose at most two-thirds, instead of nine-tenths; that moreover, the creditors had not hitherto been treated otherwise, that they had always been paid in national property, whether assignats had been given to them or *three-quarter bills*; that the republic was obliged to give them what it had; that they would get nothing by waiting, for it would never be in its power to provide for the whole debt; that in being paid off their condition was fixed; that the payment of the consolidated third would commence immediately, because there existed means of providing for it, and that the republic, on her part, would be relieved from an enormous burden; that she would thereby be enabled to resort to regular means; that she would present herself before Europe with a lightened debt, and that she would thus command more respect, and be better able to obtain peace; that lastly, it was impossible to make a distinction between the different annuities according to the price at which they were bought, and that they must be all treated alike.

This measure was inevitable. The republic did in this instance as she had always done; all engagements beyond her ability of performance she had fulfilled with lands, at the price to which they had fallen. It was in assignats that she had paid the old charges, as well as all the expenses of the revolution, and it was with lands she had paid off the assignats. It was in assignats, that is, with lands, that she had discharged the interest of this debt, and it was with lands that she now finished by discharging the capital itself. In short, she gave what she had. The debt of the United States had been liquidated in the same manner. The creditors had received nothing but the shores of the Mississippi in payment. Measures of this nature inflict, like revolutions, much individual hardship; but they must be put up with when there is no remedy for them.

The measure was adopted. Thus, by means of the new taxes, which raised the revenue to six hundred and sixteen millions, and owing to the reduction of the debt, which allowed the expenditure to be limited to the same sum, some equilibrium was re-established in our finances; and there was room for expectation that there would be less confusion in the year VI. (September, 1797, to September, 1798.)

To all these measures, the results of victory, the republican party wished to add another. It alleged that the republic would always be in danger, while a hostile *caste*, that of the *ci-devant* nobles, should be nurtured in her bosom: it proposed that all the families which had formerly been noble, or who laid claim to nobility, should be banished from France; that the value of their possessions should be given to them in French commodities, and that they should be compelled to transfer their prejudices, their passions, and their persons, to other countries. This plan was warmly supported by Sieyès, Boulay (of La Meurthe), and Chazal, all of them decided republicans, but was strongly opposed by Tallien and the friends of Barras. Barras was a noble; the commander of the army of Italy was a gentleman by descent; many of the friends who participated the pleasures of Barras, and who filled his withdrawing-rooms, were likewise of the old nobility; and though an exception was made in favour of those who had rendered services to the republic, the withdrawing-rooms of the director were highly incensed against the proposed law. Indeed, without adducing reasons of so personal a character, the danger and the severity of that law was easy of demonstration. It was nevertheless submitted to the two councils, and excited a sort of commotion, which obliged it to be withdrawn, for the purposes of amendment. The measure was brought forward in another shape. The *ci-devant* nobles were no longer to be condemned to exile, but to be considered as foreigners, and required, in order to recover the states of citizens, to go through the formalities and undergo

the ordeal of a naturalization. An exception was made in favour of those who had usefully served the republic, either in the armies or in the assemblies. Barras, his friends, and the conqueror of Italy, on whose birth people were constantly making reflections, were thus exempted from the consequences of this measure.

The government had resumed an energy in every respect revolutionary. The opposition, which affected to become clamorous for peace in the directory and the councils, being removed, the government showed itself more firm and more peremptory in the negotiations at Lille and Udine. The government immediately ordered all soldiers having leave of absence to return, put every thing upon the war system, and sent fresh instructions to its negotiators. Maret at Lille had contrived, as we have seen, to reconcile the claims of the maritime powers. Peace was concluded, provided that Spain would sacrifice Trinidad, and Holland Trincomalee, and provided that France would engage never to take the Cape of Good Hope for herself. The only question was to get the consent of Spain and Holland. The directory thought Maret too easy, and resolved to recall him: Bonnier and Treilhard were next sent out to Lille, with fresh instructions. According to these instructions, France required the unconditional restitution not only of her own colonies, but those of her allies. With respect to the negotiations at Udine, the directory was by no means less peremptory and positive. The directory would no longer adhere to the preliminaries of Léoben, which gave Austria the limit of the Oglio in Italy; the directory, however, wanted the liberation of entire Italy as far as the Izonzo, and that Austria should be content to indemnify herself by the disannexation from the Church of various ecclesiastical states in Germany. The directory also recalled Clarke, who had been chosen and sent by Carnot, and who, in his correspondence, had not spoken of those generals of the army of Italy reputed to be the most republican in the mildest terms. Bonaparte remained invested with the powers of the republic for treating with Austria.

The ultimatum that the directory caused to be communicated at Lille by the new negotiators, Bonnier and Treilhard, caused the abrupt termination of the negotiation, now nearly brought to a close. Lord Malmesbury felt extremely annoyed, for he wished for peace, either as a glorious termination to his career, or to procure a momentary respite for his government. He expressed the most lively concern, but it was impossible for England to renounce all her maritime conquests, and get nothing in return. So sincere was lord Malmesbury in his desire to treat, that he desired M. Maret to make inquiry in Paris whether it was not possible to influence the determination of the directory on this point, and he even offered several millions [francs] to purchase the vote of one of the directors. M. Maret refused to undertake any negotiation of this description, and left Lille. Lord Malmesbury and Mr. Ellis set out immediately, and did not return. Although the directory could on this occasion be charged with having rejected a certain and advantageous peace for France, still its motive was honourable. It would have been in very bad faith for us to leave our allies in the lurch, and make them sacrifice their interests in return for their self-devotion to our cause. The directory, flattering itself that it could soon have peace with Austria, or at least that it could dictate a peace upon a movement of our armies, expected to get rid of its continental enemies, and to be able to turn its whole force against England.

The ultimatum notified to Bonaparte displeased him exceedingly, for he had no reasonable expectation of compelling its acceptance. In point of fact, it would be difficult to compel Austria to entirely renounce Italy, and to be content with the disannexation of a few ecclesiastical states in Germany, unless he marched to Vienna. Now Bonaparte could not lay claim to that honour, for he had all the forces of the Austrian monarchy on his hands, and it was the army of Germany who ought to have the advantage of making an inroad on the former, and forcing its way into the hereditary states. This dissatisfaction was not the only one he experienced, when he received intelligence of the suspicions that were conceived of him in Paris. Augereau had sent one of his aids-de-camp with letters for many of the officers and generals of the army of Italy. This aid-de-camp seemed to have something in the nature of a special mission confided to him, and to be employed to correct the opinion of the army concerning the 18th Fructidor. Bonaparte soon perceived that he was mistrusted. He quickly assumed the air of an offended person, and began to complain with the warmth and bitterness of a man who knows himself to be indispensable. He said that the government treated him with horrible ingratitude; that it behaved towards him as it had done towards Pichegru after Vendémiaire; and he requested leave to resign. This man, of so lofty and resolute a disposition, and who could assume such a commanding attitude, here gave way to his petulance, like an unruly and froward child. The directory made no reply to his application for leave to resign, but contented itself by assuring him that the directory had nothing to do with the letters or with the sending of the aid-de-camp. Bonaparte was pacified, but again applied to be reinstated in his functions of negotiator, and in those of organizer of the Italian republics. He repeated incessantly that he was ill, that he could no longer endure the fatigue of riding, and that it would be impossible for him to make another campaign. Still, though he was really ill, and borne down by the overwhelming exertions he had been making for the preceding two years, he had no wish to be superseded in any of his employments; and indeed he was well aware how soon he could bring his mental energies to the assistance of his physical infirmities, in great emergencies.

In point of fact, he resolved to prosecute the negotiation, and to add to the glory of being the first captain of the age, the additional glory of pacificator. The ultimatum of the directory annoyed him; but he was not more decided on this occasion than on many others to implicitly obey his government. His operations at this moment were prodigious. He was organizing the Italian republics, fitting up a navy in the Adriatic, had great schemes on foot with regard to the Mediterranean, and was treating with the plenipotentiaries of Austria.

He had commenced the organization of the provinces he had liberated in Upper Italy as two distinct

states. He had long since erected the duchy of Modena and the Legations of Bologna and Ferrara into the Cispadane republic. His plan was to unite this petty state with revolutionized Venice, and thus to indemnify her for the loss of her continental provinces. He purposed to organize Lombardy separately, under the appellation of the Transpadane republic. But he soon changed his intentions, and preferred that the emancipated provinces should constitute a single state. The spirit of locality, which at first was so opposed to the union of Lombardy with the other provinces, was now, on the contrary, in favour of their being united. Romagna, for instance, objected to be united with the Legations and the duchy of Modena, but consented to be dependent on the central government established in Milan. Bonaparte soon perceived that as each of these states detested its neighbour, it would be easier to subject them all to a central authority. Lastly, there was the difficulty of deciding upon the supremacy between Venice and Milan, and of preferring one of the two and making it the seat of government; now that difficulty no longer existed. He had resolved to sacrifice Venice. He disliked the Venetians; he saw that the change of government had not produced among them a change in opinion. The greater nobility, the lesser nobility, and the populace, were enemies of the French and of the revolution, and still had a hankering for the Austrians. A very small number of wealthy citizens might perhaps approve the new order of things. The democratic municipality manifested the utmost ill-will towards the French. Almost every person in Venice seemed to desire that a turn of fortune would permit Austria to restore the late government. The Venetians moreover were not in a situation to command the respect of Bonaparte in regard to another point, which was important in his eyes, power. Their canals and their harbours were almost choked up; their navy was in a sad state; they were themselves rendered degenerate by luxury, and were entirely destitute of energy. "It is a soft, effeminate, and cowardly race," he wrote, "without land or water, and we can do as we please with it." He therefore thought seriously of ceding Venice to Austria, on condition that Austria, renouncing the boundary of the Oglio, as stipulated in the preliminaries of Léoben, would go back to the Adige. That river, which forms an excellent boundary line, would then separate Austria from the new republic. The important fortress of Mantua, which, according to the preliminaries, was to be restored to Austria, would then remain to the Italian republic, and Milan would of course become the capital. Bonaparte deemed it much better to form a single state, having Milan for its capital, and to give to this state the frontier of the Adige and Mantua, than to keep Venice; and it was for the interest of Italian liberty itself that he should do so. Unless he could be the liberator of entire Italy as far as the Isonzo, it would be rather preferable to sacrifice Venice than the frontier of the Adige and Mantua. Bonaparte had perceived, in conversing with the Austrian negotiators, that the new arrangement could be accepted. In consequence, he comprehended Lombardy, the duchies of Modena and Reggio, the Legations of Bologna and Ferrara, the Bergamasco, the Bresciano, and the Mantuan, in one state extending to the Adige, which possessed excellent fortresses, as Pizzighitone and Mantua, a population of three million six hundred thousand inhabitants, an admirable soil, with rivers, canals, and harbours.

He immediately set about making it into a republic. He would have preferred a different constitution from that given to France. In that constitution he considered the executive power as too weak; and, even without having yet any particular bias for this or that form of government, still his object being the creation of a vigorous state, capable of contesting with the neighbouring aristocracies, he would have desired a more centralized and energetic organization. He desired that Sieyès should be sent to him, that he might consider the subject with him; but the directory did not concur in Bonaparte's notions, and insisted that the French constitution should be given to the new republic. The directory was obeyed, and our constitution was immediately adapted to Italy. The new republic was called the Cisalpine. It was proposed in Paris to call it the Transalpine; but that would have been taking Paris, as it were, for the centre, and the Italians desired to have it at Rome, because all their aspirations pointed to the liberation of their country, its unity, and to the re-establishment of the ancient metropolis. The term Cisalpine was therefore a far more suitable term. It was deemed most prudent that the first formation of their government should not be left to the choice of the Italians. On this first occasion, Bonaparte appointed himself the five directors and the members of the two councils. He took great pains to make the best selection he could, so far, at least, as his situation permitted him. He appointed Serbelloni, one of the highest nobles of Italy, director; he caused national guards to be every where organized, and collected thirty thousand of them at Milan, for the federation of the 14th of July. The presence of the French army in Italy, its great achievements, and its glory, had begun to diffuse a military enthusiasm in that country, too unaccustomed to arms. Bonaparte strove to excite it by all possible means. He could not affect to be ignorant how weak the new republic was in a military point of view. The only Italian army he considered worthy of notice was the Piedmontese, because the court of Piedmont alone had been engaged in war during the course of the century. He wrote to Paris that a single regiment of the king of Sardinia's would overthrow the Cisalpine republic; that warlike habits should be introduced into this republic; that then it would be an important power in Italy; but that this must be a work of time, and that such revolutions were not to be effected in a few days. Nevertheless he made some progress herein, for he possessed in the highest degree the art of communicating to others the strongest of his partialities—a taste for warfare. No one knew better how to employ his glory in order to make military honours peculiarly attractive, and to direct to that point every species of vanity and ambition. From that time a change of manners commenced in Italy. "The long loose coat, which was the fashionable dress for young men, was superseded by the uniform. Instead of passing their lives at the feet of the women, the young Italians frequented the riding-schools, the fencing-rooms, and reviews. The boys no longer

played at chapel: they had tin soldiers, and imitated in their sports the events of war. In broad comedy, and in the street drolls, had been always represented an Italian, a great coward, though witty, and a sort of blustering captain, sometimes French, more frequently German, very strong, very brave, and very brutal, who finished by giving a sound drubbing to the Italian, amidst the applause of the spectators. The people would no longer suffer such allusions: dramatists introduced upon the stage, to the satisfaction of the public, brave Italians, putting foreigners to flight in support of their honour and their rights. A national spirit was forming. Italy had her songs, both patriotic and martial. The women rejected with contempt the homage of men who affected effeminate manners in order to please them*."

The revolution, however, had scarcely commenced. The Cisalpine could not acquire strength without the assistance of France. The plan was to leave there, as in Holland, a portion of the army, who were there to refresh themselves after its toils, to enjoy its glory in quiet, and to animate the whole country with its martial ardour. Bonaparte, with that foresight which comprehended every thing, had formed a vast and magnificent project for the Cisalpine. That republic was to be an advanced post for France: and that our armies should be able to reach it without loss of time, Bonaparte had formed the plan of a road from France to Geneva, and running from Geneva through the Valais, crossing the Simplon, and descending into Lombardy. He was already in treaty with Switzerland on this subject; he had sent engineers to make an estimate of the expense, and he arranged all the details of execution with that precision which he displayed even in apparently the most extensive and chimerical projects. He desired that this high road, the first that should cross the Alps in a direct line, should be broad, safe, and magnificent —a masterpiece of liberty, and a monument of French power.

While he was thus engaged with a republic which owed its existence to him, he also administered justice, and was chosen as arbiter between two states. The Valteline had revolted against the sovereignty of the Grison league. The Valteline consists of three valleys, which belong to Italy, for their rivers flow into the Adda. They were subject to the yoke of the Grisons, a yoke they found insupportable, for there is none so heavy as that which one people presses upon another. There was more than one tyranny of this kind in Switzerland. That of Berne over the Pays de Vaud was notorious. The people of the Valteline rose, and desired to form part of the Cisalpine republic. They appealed to Bonaparte for protection, and supported their claim upon ancient treaties, which placed the Valteline under the protection of the sovereigns of Milan. The Grisons and the people of the Valteline agreed to refer the matter to the arbitrament of Bonaparte. With the permission of the directory, he accepted the mediation. He advised the Grisons to recognize the rights of the people of the Valteline, and to associate them with themselves as a new member of the Grison league. They refused to comply, and wished to plead the cause of their tyranny. Bonaparte fixed a time for their appearance before him. At the appointed time, the Grisons, at the instigation of Austria, refused to appear. Bonaparte, then taking his stand on the submission to arbitration and on ancient treaties, gave judgment against the Grisons in default, declared the people of the Valteline free, and permitted them to unite themselves with the Cisalpine republic. This sentence, founded in law and equity, excited a strong sensation in Europe. It terrified the aristocracy of Berne, delighted the Vaudois, and added to the Cisalpine a wealthy, brave, and numerous population.

Genoa at the same time availed herself of his recommendation in the choice of a constitution. Genoa was not conquered. She had a right to choose her own laws, and in this respect was wholly independent of the directory. The two parties, aristocratic and democratic, had come to blows. A first insurrection had broken out, as we have already observed, in the month of May; there had been a second, more general, in the valley of La Polcevera, which had nearly proved fatal to Genoa. This insurrection was got up by the priests against the new constitution. The French general, Duphot, who was there with some troops, restored order. The Genoese addressed themselves to Bonaparte, who answered them in a severe letter, full of sound advice, and in which he reproved their democratic intemperance. He made alterations in their constitution, instead of five magistrates invested with the executive power, he left only three. The councils were far from numerous; the government was organized in a less popular, but in a stronger manner. Bonaparte conferred greater privileges on the nobles and the priests, in order to reconcile them with the new order of things; and as it had been proposed to exclude them from public functions, he condemned that idea. *You would do*, wrote he to the Genoese, *what they themselves have done.* He had a motive in publishing the letter containing this expression. It was a censure directed against the course pursued in Paris in regard to the nobles. He was delighted with the opportunity of thus indirectly interfering in politics, of uttering an opinion, of giving it against the directory, and above all, of separating himself at once from the victorious party, for he affected to remain independent; not to approve of any thing, to serve none of the factions, to despise them, and to sway them all.

While he was thus the legislator, the arbiter, and the adviser of the people of Italy, he was engaged in other plans not less vast, and which demonstrated a still greater foresight. He had seized the navy of Venice, and summoned admiral Brueys to the Adriatic to take possession of the Greek islands belonging to Venice. He had thus been led to reflect on the Mediterranean, on its importance, and on the part which we might act there. He had thence concluded that if we had to meet with our masters on the Atlantic, we ought not to encounter them in the Mediterranean. Whether Italy should or should not be completely liberated, and whether Venice should or should not be ceded to Austria, he desired that France should keep the Ionian islands, Corfu, Zante, Saint Maura, Cerigo, and Cephalonia. The inhabitants of those islands

* Napoleon's memoirs by count Montholon, vol. iv. p. 106, (Paris ed. *Trans.*)

wanted to become our subjects. Malta, the most important post in the Mediterranean, belonged to an obsolete order, which must soon disappear before the influence of the French revolution. Malta moreover must soon fall into the hands of the English, if France did not take possession of it. Bonaparte had caused the property of the knights in Italy to be seized, with a view to complete their extinction. He had set on foot intrigues in Malta itself, which was guarded only by a few knights and a slender garrison, and his plan was to send thither his little squadron, and to make himself master of it. "From these different positions," he wrote to the directory, "we shall command the Mediterranean, we shall keep an eye upon the Ottoman empire, which is entirely crumbling to pieces, and we shall be at hand to support it, or to secure our share of it. We shall be able to do more," added Bonaparte; "we shall be able to render the sovereignty of the Atlantic almost useless to the English. They have disputed with us at Lille the possession of the Cape of Good Hope. We can do without it. Let us occupy Egypt. We shall be in the direct road for India, and it will be easy for us to found there one of the finest colonies in the world."

Thus it was in Italy, while turning his attention to the Levant, that he conceived the first idea of that celebrated expedition which was put in motion the following year. "It is in Egypt," wrote he, "that we must attack England." (Letter of 16th August, 1797, 29th Thermidor, year V.)

To attain these ends, he had caused admiral Brueys to be sent into the Adriatic, with six sail of the line and some frigates and cutters. He had moreover devised means for capturing the Venetian navy. According to the treaty concluded, he was to be paid three millions in naval stores. Upon this pretext, he took all the hemp, iron, and other materials, which constituted the sole wealth of the Venetian arsenal. After seizing these stores under pretence of the three millions, Bonaparte took possession of the ships, upon the pretext of sending them to occupy the islands on the behalf of democratic Venice. He ordered those which were building to be finished, and thus succeeded in fitting out six sail of the line, six frigates, and several cutters, which he joined to the squadron which admiral Brueys had brought from Toulon. He replaced the million which the treasury had stopped, furnished Brueys with funds for pressing excellent seamen in Albania and on the coast of Greece, and thus created a naval force capable of awing the whole Mediterranean. He fixed its principal station at Corfu, for excellent reasons, and which were approved by the government. From Corfu, this squadron could sail up the Adriatic, and act in unison with the army of Italy, in case of new hostilities; it could go to Malta, overawe the court of Naples, and there would be no difficulty if it were wanted in the Atlantic to make it available for any other service, to fly to the straits more speedily than from Toulon. Lastly, at Corfu the squadron might learn naval tactics and be made more complete than at Toulon, where it generally lay inactive. "You will never have seamen," wrote Bonaparte, "so long as you let them lay in harbour."

Such was the way in which Bonaparte employed his time during the intentional delays which Austria made him experience. He turned his attention also to his military position in regard to that power. Austria had made very great preparations since the signature of the preliminaries of Léoben. She had transferred the greater part of her forces to Carinthia, in order to protect Vienna, and to shelter herself from the fiery assaults of Bonaparte. She had caused a levy *en masse* in Hungary, eighteen thousand Hungarian horse had been in training for three months past on the banks of the Danube. Thus she possessed the means of supporting the negotiations of Udine. Bonaparte had scarcely more than seventy thousand troops, a very small portion of which was cavalry. He applied to the directory for reinforcements that he might be able to face the enemy, and he particularly pressed for the ratification of the treaty of alliance with Piedmont, in order to obtain ten thousand of those Piedmontese soldiers on whom he laid such stress. But the directory would not send him reinforcements, because the removal of the troops would have occasioned numerous desertions. The directory rather preferred accelerating the march of the army of Germany, to extricate the army of Italy than to reinforce it; and the directory still hesitated to sign the alliance with Piedmont, because it would not guarantee a throne, the natural fall of which it looked for and desired. The directory had merely sent a few dismounted cavalry. In Italy there was plenty wherewithal to mount and fit them for service.

Deprived of the resources on which he had relied, Bonaparte saw himself exposed to a storm from the quarter of the Julian Alps. He had endeavoured to supply himself in every possible manner with the means that were refused him. He had armed and fortified Palma Nova with extraordinary activity, and had made it a fortress of the first order, which would of itself require a long siege. This circumstance alone produced a material change in his position. He had caused bridges to be thrown over the Izonzo, and piers constructed, in order to be ready to debouch upon the enemy with his accustomed promptitude. If the rupture should take place before the snowy season, he hoped to surprise the Austrians, to throw them into disorder, and in spite of the superiority of their forces, to be very soon at the gates of Vienna. But if the rupture should not take place till after the snowy season, he could no longer anticipate the Austrians, but be obliged to receive them in the plains of Italy, whereon they could debouch at all times of the year, and then the disadvantage of number would no longer be compensated by his taking the offensive. In this case he considered himself as being in danger.

Bonaparte was therefore desirous that the negotiations should be speedily terminated. After the ridiculous note of the 18th July, wherein the plenipotentiaries had again insisted upon a congress at Berne, and remonstrated against what had been done at Venice, Bonaparte had replied in a vigorous manner, which proved to Austria that he was ready to fall once more upon Vienna. MM. de Gallo, de Meerveldt, and a third negotiator, M. de Degelmann, had arrived on the 31st August (14th Fructidor), and the conferences had immediately begun. But the object evidently was delay; for while accepting a separate negotiation at Udine,

they constantly reserved to themselves the right to revert to a general congress at Berne. They notified that the congress of Rastadt, in respect of the peace with the empire, was about to open immediately; that the negotiations would be conducted there at the same time as those at Udine, which could not fail to singularly confound interests, and to give rise to as many difficulties as a general congress at Berne. Bonaparte observed that there was no negotiating peace with the empire till after peace had been concluded with the emperor; he declared that if the congress were opened, France would not send envoys thereto; and he added that, if on the 1st October peace were not concluded with the emperor, the preliminaries of Léoben should be considered as null.

Things were at this point, when the 18th Fructidor (September 4) frustrated all the false hopes of Austria. M. de Cobentzel immediately hurried from Vienna to Udine. Bonaparte repaired to Passeriano, a fine country mansion at some distance from Udine, and every thing seemed to demonstrate that in treating both parties acted in good faith. The conferences took place alternately at M. de Cobentzel's, at Udine, and at Passeriano, at Bonaparte's. M. de Cobentzel was a man of a shrewd, fertile, but illogical mind: he was haughty and morose. The other three negotiators kept silence. Bonaparte was the sole representative of France since the dismissal of Clarke. He possessed sufficient arrogance, and his language was quite prompt and keen enough for the purpose of replying to the Austrian negotiator. Though it was evident that the intention on the part of M. de Cobentzel to treat was really sincere, he nevertheless set up the most extravagant claims. It was just as if Austria ceded the Netherlands to us, but would not undertake to secure to us the boundary of the Rhine, saying that it was for the empire to make this concession. As an indemnification for the rich and populous provinces of Belgium, Austria required possessions not in Germany but in Italy. The preliminaries of Léoben had assigned to her the Venetian states as far as the Oglio, that is to say, Dalmatia, Istria, the Friule, the Bresciano, the Bergamasco, and the Mantuan, together with the fortress of Mantua; but these provinces would not half indemnify her for what she lost by the cession of the Netherlands and Lombardy. It would not be too much, said M. de Cobentzel, to leave her not only Lombardy, but also give her Venice and the Legations, and reinstate the duke of Modena in his duchy.

To all the eloquence of M. de Cobentzel, Bonaparte only replied by unbroken silence, and to his absurd requirements by pretensions equally extravagant, uttered in a firm and decisive tone. He demanded the line of the Rhine, including Mentz, for France, and the line of the Izonzo for Italy. A medium was to be settled between these opposite claims. Bonaparte, as we have already observed, had a slight notion that, by ceding Venice to Austria (a concession not included in the preliminaries of Léoben, because he had then no thought of destroying that republic), he could prevail upon the emperor to remove his boundary further back from the Oglio to the Adige, so that the Mantuan, the Bergamasco, and the Bresciano, might be given to the Cisalpine, which would thus have the frontier of the Adige and Mantua; and further, that the emperor should guarantee to France the boundary of the Rhine, and even surrender Mentz; and lastly, that he should consent to leave France the Ionian islands. Bonaparte resolved to treat on these conditions: they presented to his mind substantial advantages, and all those that France could obtain at the moment. The emperor, in accepting Venice, would compromise himself in the opinion of Europe, for it was on his account that Venice had betrayed France. By abandoning the Adige and the Mantuan, the emperor would give great consistence to the new republic. By leaving us the Ionian islands, he would pave the way for us to the empire of the Mediterranean; by guaranteeing to us the boundary of the Rhine, he would put it out of the power of the empire to refuse it; by surrendering Mentz to us, he would virtually put us in possession of that boundary, and would again compromise himself with the empire in the most serious manner, by giving up to us a fortress belonging to one of the Germanic princes. It is true that in another campaign, France would certainly have annihilated the Austrian monarchy, or at least have compelled it to renounce Italy. But Bonaparte had more than one personal reason for avoiding a new campaign. It was now the month of October, and too late to advance into Austria. The army of Germany, commanded by Augereau, must have all the advantage, for there was nothing to oppose it. The army of Italy would have all the Austrian forces upon its hands, and it could no longer act the brilliant part it had formerly played when compelled to act on the defensive; and it could no longer be the first at Vienna. Lastly, Bonaparte was jaded. He wished to repose for some short time upon his laurels. One battle more would be no addition to his two wonderful campaigns, and in signing the peace, he would receive an immense accession to his glory. To the reputation he had gained as a warrior would be added that of the politician, and he would be the only general of the republic who had combined both, for not one of them had ever signed a treaty. He would fulfil one of the most ardent aspirations of France, and return to her bosom loaded with every mark of honourable distinction. Certainly it was a practical disobedience to sign a treaty on those principles, for the directory required the entire liberation of Italy; but Bonaparte felt confident that the directory would not dare to decline the ratification of the treaty, as it would then be setting itself in opposition to the public opinion in France. The directory had already given it great offence by breaking off the negotiations at Lille, and certainly would be doing so in a greater degree by abruptly terminating the conferences at Udine; and would justify all the reproaches of the royalist faction, which accused the directory of designing a perpetual war. Bonaparte therefore felt that by signing the treaty, he should be able to hold the directory to its ratification.

He boldly delivered his ultimatum to M. de Cobentzel. This was Venice for Austria, but the Adige and Mantua for the Cisalpine, the Rhine and Mentz for France, with the Ionian islands into the bargain. On the 16th of October (25th Vendémiaire, year VI.), the last conference was held at M. de Cobentzel's at Udine. A declaration was made by both parties that they would no longer

negotiate; and M. de Cobentzel intimated that his carriages were ready. They were seated at an oblong square table; the four Austrian negotiators being on one side, Bonaparte by himself on the other. M. de Cobentzel recapitulated all that he had said, insisted that the emperor, in giving up the keys of Mentz, ought to receive those of Mantua; that he could not do otherwise without breaking his word; that after all, France had never made a more glorious treaty, and certainly she could not desire one more advantageous; that she wished above all things for peace, and would know how to appreciate the conduct of the negotiator who should sacrifice the interest and tranquillity of his country to his military ambition. Bonaparte, who had remained cool and impenetrable during this insulting apostrophe, suffered M. de Cobentzel to finish his speech; then stepping up to a sideboard upon which stood a porcelain tea-service, a present from the great Catharine to M. de Cobentzel, and displayed as an article of peculiar value, he took it up and dashed it upon the floor with these words: "War is declared; but remember, that before three months are over, I will break up your monarchy, just as I break this porcelain." This act and these words struck the Austrian negotiators with astonishment. He made his bow to them, withdrew, and getting immediately into his carriage, ordered an officer to go and acquaint the archduke Charles that hostilities would recommence in twenty-four hours. M. de Cobentzel, alarmed, instantly sent the ultimatum signed to Passeriano. One of the conditions of the treaty was the release of M. de Lafayette, who had for five years heroically endured his imprisonment at Olmütz.

Next day, October the 17th (26th Vendémiaire), the treaty was signed at Passeriano; it was dated from a small village situated between the two armies, to which, however, the negotiators did not repair, because it possessed no suitable place for their reception. This village was *Campo-Formio*. It gave its name to this celebrated treaty, the first concluded between the emperor and the French republic.

It was agreed that the emperor, as sovereign of the Netherlands, and as a member of the empire, should confirm to France the boundary of the Rhine; that he should deliver Mentz to our troops; and that the Ionian islands should remain in our possession. It was further agreed that the Cisalpine republic should have Romagna, the Legations, the duchy of Modena, Lombardy, the Valteline, the Bergamasco, the Bresciano, and the Mantuan, with the Adige and Mantua for its boundary. The emperor subscribed, moreover, to various conditions resulting from this treaty and from anterior treaties which bound the republic. In the first place, he engaged to give the Brisgau to the duke of Modena as a compensation for his duchy. He also engaged to use his influence for the purpose of obtaining for the stadtholder a compensation in Germany for the loss of Holland, and for the king of Prussia a compensation for the loss of the little territory which he had ceded to us on the left bank of the Rhine. By virtue of these engagements, the voice of the emperor was ensured at the congress of Rastadt for the solution of all questions that specially interested France. The emperor received, in return for all that he had granted, the Friuli, Istria, Dalmatia, and the mouths of the Cattaro.

France had never before made so glorious a peace. She had at length obtained her natural confines, and obtained them with the concurrence of her continental neighbours. A great revolution had taken place in Upper Italy. There an ancient state had been destroyed and a new state founded. But the state destroyed was a despotic aristocracy, an irreconcilable enemy of liberty. The state founded was a republic liberally constituted, and which might be the means of communicating liberty to all Italy. It was to be regretted, it is true, that the Austrians had not been driven beyond the Izonzo, that all Upper Italy, and the city of Venice itself, had not been united with the Cisalpine; with another campaign that result would have been obtained. Extraordinary circumstances had prevented the young warrior from making that campaign. Personal interest began to affect the calculations of the great man, and to attach a stain to the first, and perhaps the brightest act of his life.

Bonaparte could scarcely doubt but that the treaty would be confirmed; yet he was not without anxiety, for this treaty was an open contravention of the instructions of the directory. He transmitted this treaty by Berthier, the faithful and complaisant chief of his staff, his intimate friend, and whom he had not yet sent to France to enjoy the congratulations of his fellow-citizens. With his usual tact, with the military officer he associated a scientific man: this was Monge, who had been a member of the commission for the selection of works of art in Italy, and who, notwithstanding his rank demagogue spirit and stiffness of character, had yielded as so many others had done, to the attractions of genius, elegance, and glory.

Monge and Berthier got to Paris in a few days. They arrived there in the middle of the night, and roused Larévellière-Lépeaux, president of the directory, from his bed. Although they came the bearers of a treaty of peace, the two envoys were far from feeling the joy and confidence usual under such circumstances; they were embarrassed, like men who have to commence with a painful avowal; in point of fact, they were compelled to state that the government had been disobeyed. In introducing the tenor of this treaty, and justifying their general, they used the most measured and cautious language. Larévellière received them with all the attention due to two such distinguished individuals, especially as one of them was well known to possess great scientific attainments: but all he said concerning the treaty was that the directory would consider of it. He laid it in the morning before the directory. The news of the peace had already spread throughout Paris; the utmost self-gratulation was every where visible; the terms were not yet published, but, whatever they were, they made sure that they were highly satisfactory. They extolled Bonaparte and his double glory. As he had foreseen, they were delighted at the character of pacificator and the warrior united in him; and a peace which he had only signed from selfish motives, was held forth as an act of military disinterestedness. The young general, it was said, has declined the glory

of a new campaign in order that his country might enjoy the blessings of peace.

The public demonstrations of joy were so decided, that it would have been very difficult for the directory to have nullified them by repudiating the treaty of Campo-Formio. This treaty was the consequence of a decided act of disobedience; the directory, therefore, could have had excellent reasons for refusing its ratification; and it would have done considerable service had a severe lesson been given to the young audacious negotiator who had violated its explicit orders. But how disappoint the general expectation? How venture to refuse peace a second time, after having refused it at Lille? It would thus afford a ground for all the charges made by the victims of Fructidor, and seriously compromise them with the public. There would be another danger equally formidable to encounter. In point of fact, by rejecting the treaty, Bonaparte would tender his resignation, and reverses must inevitably follow the resumption of hostilities in Italy. What a responsibility would not the government take upon itself in this case? Besides, this treaty was exceedingly advantageous; it presented a splendid prospect for the future; it gave us Mentz and Mantua in addition to what we obtained by the treaty of Léoben; lastly, it left all the forces of France unemployed, so that they might be the better able to invade England.

The directory, therefore, approved of the treaty. The general joy now became more animated, and more settled. The directory skilfully sought to avail itself of this event for calling public attention against England. The hero of Italy and his invincible companions were to hurry from one enemy to another, and the very day on which the treaty was published, an ordinance appointed Bonaparte commander-in-chief of the army of England.

Bonaparte made his arrangements for leaving Italy, in order to taste a few moments' repose, and to enjoy a reputation greater than had been ever recognized in modern times. He was appointed plenipotentiary at Rastadt, with Bonnier and Treilhard, to treat for peace with the empire. It was also agreed that he should meet M. de Cobentzel at Rastadt, and exchange with him the ratifications of the treaty of Campo-Formio. At the same time, he was to attend to the execution of the conditions relative to the occupation of Mentz. With his usual foresight, he had taken care to stipulate that the Austrian troops should not enter Palma-Nova, until after his own troops should have entered Mentz.

Before he set out for Rastadt, he resolved to put a finishing hand to the affairs of Italy. He nominated to the appointments that yet remained vacant in the Cisalpine; he settled the conditions of the continuation of the French troops in Italy, and their relations with the new republic. These troops were to be commanded by Berthier, and to form a body of thirty thousand men, to be maintained at the expense of the Cisalpine. They were to remain there till a general peace in Europe. He withdrew the corps which he had at Venice, and delivered up that city to an Austrian corps. The Venetian patriots, on finding themselves transferred to Austria, were indignant. Bonaparte had caused an asylum to be secured for them in the Cisalpine, and had stipulated with the Austrian government for the power to sell their possessions. They were not sensible of these attentions, and poured forth vehement and very natural imprecations against the conqueror by whom they were sacrificed. Villetard, who seemed to have pledged himself with them for the French government on this occasion, wrote to Bonaparte, and was treated by him with extraordinary harshness. But after all, it was not the patriots alone who manifested great concern on this occasion. The nobles and the populace, who so lately preferred Austria to France, because they liked the principles of the one and abhorred those of the other, felt a revival of all their natural sentiments, and showed an attachment to their ancient country, which rendered them worthy of an interest that they had not yet inspired. The despair became general; a noble lady was known to have poisoned herself; and the old doge fell motionless at the feet of the Austrian officer between whose hands he was taking the oath of allegiance.

Bonaparte addressed a proclamation to the Italians, in which he took leave of them, and gave them his parting advice. It breathed that noble, firm, and somewhat rhetorical tone, which he had the art of imparting to his public addresses. "We have given you liberty," said he to the Cisalpines; "take care to preserve it. To be worthy of your destiny, do not merely content yourselves with making discreet and merciful laws; cause them to be executed with energy. Favour the diffusion of knowledge and respect religion. Form your battalions not of disreputable men, but of citizens imbued with the principles of the republic, and closely linked to its prosperity. You have in general need to impress yourselves with the feeling of your strength, and with the dignity which is consistent with the free man. Divided and bowed down for ages by tyranny, you would not have acquired your liberty; but in a few years, were you to be left to yourselves, no power on earth will be strong enough to wrest it from you. Till then the great nation will protect you against the attacks of your neighbours; its political system will be united with yours. I shall leave you in a few days. The orders of my government and an imminent danger to the Cisalpine republic will alone bring me back among you."

This last sentence was a reply to those who asserted that he aimed at making himself king of Lombardy. There was nothing that he preferred to the title and the character of first general of the French republic. One of the Austrian negotiators had offered him, in the name of the emperor, a state in Germany. He replied, that he was determined to owe his fortune to the gratitude of the French people alone. Did he possess a glimmering of what was hereafter to take place? Certainly not; but had he been only the first citizen of the republic, it is easy to conceive that he would have preferred it. The regret of the Italians accompanied him, and they saw with concern the disappearance of this bright apparition. Bonaparte rapidly traversed Piedmont, intending to proceed through Switzerland to Rastadt. Magnificent entertainments, and presents for himself and his wife, awaited him on his route. Princes and common people were anxious to see that celebrated warrior, that arbiter of so many destinies. At Turin the king had caused presents to be prepared,

to testify his acknowledgments for the support he had obtained through Bonaparte with the directory. In Switzerland, the enthusiasm of the Vaudois for the liberator of the Valteline was extreme. Young maidens in tri-coloured dresses presented him with chaplets. Every where this maxim, so dear to the Vaudois, was inscribed: *One people cannot be subject to another people.* Bonaparte desired to see the bone-house of Morat; he there met with a multitude, who were never tired in following his steps. The cannon fired salutes in the towns through which he passed. The government of Berne, who observed with spleen the enthusiasm excited by the liberator of the Valteline, forbade its officers to fire the cannon. The order was not obeyed. On reaching Rastadt, he found all the German princes impatient to see him. He immediately caused the French negotiators to assume the position in accordance with their mission and their station. He refused to receive M. de Fersen, whom Sweden had sent to represent her at the congress of the empire, and whose connexions with the former court of France rendered him an unfit person to treat with the French republic. This refusal produced a strong sensation, and evidenced Bonaparte's constant solicitude to sustain the dignity of the *great nation*, as he called it in all his harangues. Having exchanged the ratifications of the treaty of Campo-Formio, and made the necessary arrangements for the re-delivery of Mentz, he resolved to set out for Paris. He saw nothing of importance to be discussed at Rastadt, and above all, he foresaw interminable delays before all these petty German princes could be brought to agree. Such a part was not to his taste; besides he was fatigued, and some impatience to arrive at Paris and ascend the capitol of modern Rome was very natural.

He left Rastadt, travelled incognito through France, and arrived in Paris on the evening of the 15th Frimaire, year VI. (December 5th, 1797.) He retired to a house of unpretending appearance, which he had caused to be purchased for him in the Rue Chartereine. This man, whose pride was unbounded, had all the address of a female in concealing himself from public view. On the surrender of Mantua, he had hurriedly avoided the honour of seeing Wurmser and the garrison file off before him; and in Paris he determined to retire to the most obscure abode. He affected in his language, his dress, and in all his habits a simplicity which took every one by surprise, and the effect was more deeply impressed on the imagination when the contrast was considered. All Paris, apprized of his arrival, was impatience itself to see him; this was only natural, especially in Frenchmen. M. de Talleyrand, the minister for foreign affairs, for whom, though absent, he had conceived a strong partiality, would have gone and seen him the same evening. Bonaparte apologized for not being able to see him, and went to the minister on the following morning. The reception-room of the foreign-office was filled with distinguished persons, anxious to see the hero. Reserved towards every body, he perceived Bougainville, and went straight up to him, and addressed him in terms which, falling from his lips, could not fail to produce the deepest impressions. He already affected the air of a sovereign towards the useful and celebrated man. M. de Talleyrand introduced him to the directory. Though there were many reasons for dissatisfaction between the general and the directors, yet the interview demonstrated the utmost confidence and cordiality. It was far more suitable for the directory to affect satisfaction, and the general a show of deference. At any rate, his services were so important, and his glory so resplendent, that dissatisfaction was forced to give way to accordance with the general feeling. The directory prepared a triumphant *fête* for the delivery of the treaty of Campo-Formio. This did not take place in the reception-room of the directory, but in the great court of the Luxembourg. Every arrangement was made for rendering this solemnity one of the most impressive of the revolution. The directors were seated on a dais at the further end of the court, at the foot of the altar of the country, and habited in the Roman costume. Around them, the ministers, the ambassadors, the members of the two councils, the magistrates, the chiefs of the administrations, were placed on seats, amphitheatrically arranged. Magnificent trophies, formed of numberless flags taken from the enemy, rose at a little distance from one another all round the court; beautiful tri-coloured hangings adorned the walls. The galleries were filled with the best company of the capital; bands of musicians were placed in the area; and a numerous artillery was drawn up around the palace, to add its thunders to the sounds of the music and the din of acclamations. Chenier had composed one of his finest hymns in honour of that day.

It was the 20th Frimaire, year VI. (December 10, 1797.) The directory, the public functionaries, and the spectators, having taken their places, waited with impatience for the illustrious man, whom few of them had ever seen. He made his appearance, accompanied by M. de Talleyrand, who was commissioned to present him; for it was the negotiator who was now being congratulated. Every one of his contemporaries, struck by that slender figure, that pale Roman visage, that bright eye, even at this time speak of the effect which he produced, and of the indescribable sensation of genius and authority which he impressed upon the imagination. A great sensation was manifested. Unanimous acclamations burst forth at witnessing a person so simple in his appearance, surrounded by such renown. *The republic for ever! Bonaparte for ever!* were echoed from all sides. M. de Talleyrand then addressed the assembly, and in a neat and concise speech, strove to refer the glory of the general, not to himself, but to the revolution, to the armies, and to the *great nation*. He seemed in this anxious to relieve the modesty of Bonaparte, and with his accustomed intelligence, to guess how the hero would like to be spoken of before his face. M. de Talleyrand next spoke of *what might*, he said, *be called his ambition;* but in alluding to his antique taste for simplicity, to his fondness for the abstract sciences, to his favourite reading, to that sublime Ossian, with whom he learned to wean himself from the earth, M. de Talleyrand said that it would perhaps be necessary to solicit him to tear himself some day from his studious retirement. What M. de Talleyrand had been saying was in every body's mouth, and went its round in all the speeches delivered at this great solemnity. Every body de-

clared, and repeated that the young general was without ambition, so fearful were they that he had it. After M. de Talleyrand had finished, Bonaparte spoke, and delivered in a firm tone the following disconnected sentences:

"Citizens,

"The French people, in order to be free, have had to contend with kings.

"Before we could obtain a constitution founded upon reason, we have had the prejudices of eighteen centuries to overcome.

"The constitution of the year III. and yourselves have triumphed over all obstacles.

"Religion, feudalism, royalty, have successively for twenty centuries past governed Europe; but the peace which you have just concluded is the date from which all representative governments will date their era.

"You have succeeded in organizing the great nation, whose vast territory is circumscribed only because nature herself has fixed its limits.

"You have done more. The two finest countries in Europe, formerly so renowned for the arts, the sciences, and the great men whose cradle they were, see with the greatest hopes genius and freedom issuing from the tomb of their ancestors.

"These are two pedestals on which the destinies are about to place two powerful nations.

"I have the honour to deliver to you the treaty signed at Campo-Formio, and ratified by his majesty the emperor.

"Peace ensures the liberty, the prosperity, and the glory of the republic.

"When the happiness of the French people shall be founded on better organic laws, all Europe will become free."

This speech was scarcely concluded before another burst of applause was heard; Barras, the president of the directory, replied to Bonaparte. His address was prolix, rambling, and inconsistent. He highly extolled the modesty and the simplicity of the hero; he cleverly introduced a tribute to the memory of Hoche, the supposed rival of the conqueror of Italy. "Ah! why is not Hoche here," said the president of the directory, "to see and to embrace his friend!" Hoche had in fact in the preceding year defended Bonaparte with generous warmth. In accordance with the new impulse given to the public mind, Barras promised new laurels to the hero, and exhorted him to go and gather them in England. After these three speeches, Chenier's hymn was sung in chorus accompanied by a magnificent orchestra. Two generals then advanced, attended by the minister at war. These were the brave Joubert, the hero of the Tyrol, and Andreossy, one of the most distinguished officers of the artillery. They came forward, bearing a handsome flag. This was the flag which the directory had just given at the conclusion of the campaign to the army of Italy, the new consecrated standard (*oriflamme*) of the republic. Its field was charged with numberless letters in gold, and these letters formed the following inscriptions:

The army of Italy has made one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners, it has taken one hundred and seventy pair of colours, five hundred and fifty pieces of siege artillery, six hundred pieces of field artillery, five portable bridge equipages, nine sail of the line, twelve frigates, twelve cutters, and eighteen gallies.—Hostilities suspended with the kings of Sardinia, Naples, the Pope, the Dukes of Parma and Modena—Preliminaries of Léoben.—Convention of Montebello, with the republic of Genoa.—Treaties of peace of Tolentino and Campo-Formio.—Freedom given to the people of Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, Massa Carrara, La Romagna, Lombardy, Brescia, Bergamo, Mantua, Cremona, part of Veronese, of Chiavenna, of Bormio, and of the Valteline; to the people of Genoa, to the Imperial Fiefs, to the people of the departments of Corcyra, the Egean Sea, and Ithaca. Transferred to Paris the masterpieces of Michael Angelo, Guercino, Titian, Paul Veronese, Coreggio, Albano, the Carracis, Raphael, Leonardo da Vinci, &c. Triumphed in eighteen pitched battles, MONTENOTTE, MILLESIMO, MONDOVI, LODI, BORGHETTO, LONATO, CASTIGLIONE, ROVEREDO, BASSANO, SAINT GEORGE, FONTANA-NIVA, CALDIERO, ARCOLA, RIVOLI, LA FAVORITA, THE TAGLIAMENTO, TARVIS, NEWMARKT,—*fought sixty-seven actions.*

Joubert and Andreossy spoke in their turn, and received a flattering reply from the president of the directory. After all these speeches, the general went to receive the fraternal embrace from the president of the directory. The moment that Bonaparte had received it from Barras, the other four directors threw themselves, as if by an involuntary impulse, into the arms of the general. Unanimous acclamations rent the air; the people who thronged the neighbouring streets joined their shouts, the cannon its thunders. Every one yielded to the intoxicating impulse of the moment. Thus we see has France thrown herself into the arms of an extraordinary man! Let us not censure the weakness of our fathers. That glory comes down to our times but through the clouds of time and adversity, and brings us back to the past! Let us say with Æschylus; "What would it have been had we seen the monster himself."

CHAPTER XII.

GENERAL BONAPARTE AT PARIS; HIS SITUATION WITH THE DIRECTORY.—PROJECTED INVASION OF ENGLAND.—POLITICAL RELATIONS OF FRANCE WITH THE CONTINENT.—THE CONGRESS OF RASTADT. CAUSES THAT IMPEDED THE NEGOTIATIONS.—REVOLUTION IN HOLLAND, AT ROME, AND IN SWITZERLAND.—INTERNAL STATE OF FRANCE; ELECTIONS OF THE YEAR VI.; ELECTORAL SCHISMS. TREILHARD APPOINTED A DIRECTOR.—EXPEDITION IN EGYPT SUBSTITUTED BY BONAPARTE FOR THE INTENDED ENGLISH INVASION; THE PREPARATIONS MADE FOR THAT EXPEDITION.

THE triumphant reception which the directory had prepared for Bonaparte was followed by splendid entertainments given to him individually by the directors, the members of the councils, and the ministers. Each strove to surpass the other in magnificence. The hero of these festivities was struck with the taste displayed on his account by the minister for foreign affairs, and felt a strong inclination for ancient French elegance. Amidst this pomp, he appeared simple and affable, but constrained, almost insensible to pleasure, seeking among the crowd the useful and celebrated man, in order to converse with him on the art or science in which he was known to excel. Men of the highest renown felt honoured at having been distinguished by general Bonaparte.

The acquirements of the young general ranked no higher than those of an officer who had recently quitted the military schools. But, owing to the instinct of genius, he could converse on subjects the most foreign to his profession, and throw out some of those bold, but original ideas, which frequently are nought else than the impertinences of ignorance, but which, coming from superior men, and expressed in their style, create a false notion, and captivate even men who have made those subjects their particular study. Bonaparte's facility of conversing generally upon all subjects excited surprise. The journalists who detailed the most trifling particulars respecting the person of general Bonaparte, who reported with what personage he had dined, how he had looked, whether he was cheerful or melancholy, these journalists stated that in dining with François (of Neufchateau), he had conversed on mathematics with Lagrange and Laplace, on metaphysics with Sieyès, on poetry with Chenier, and on legislation and political economy with Daunou. In general, few persons ventured to ask him many questions when they were in his company, but every one extremely desired to lead him to talk of his campaigns; but whenever that was the case, he never spoke of himself, but of his army, of his soldiers, and of republican bravery; he gave a graphic description of the uproar and confusion that attended battles; made every one understand the value of a decisive moment—how it should be made available; and charmed all who heard him by his clear, striking, and dramatic narratives. If his achievements had proclaimed a great commander, his conversations disclosed an original and cultivated mind, alternately varied and precise, and always seductive when he pleased. He had gained the ascendancy over the mass by his glory; by the powers of his conversation he began to gain over, one by one, the most distinguished men in France. The infatuation, already great, became still greater when they had seen him. There was nothing about him, not even the traces of a foreign extraction, which time had not yet effaced from his person, but contributed to the effect. Singularity always adds to the influence of genius, especially in France, where, with the greatest uniformity of manners, eccentricity is greatly admired. Bonaparte affected to shun the crowd, and to conceal himself from observation. Sometimes he even manifested displeasure as too marked demonstrations of enthusiasm. Madame de Staël, who was, and who had a right to be fond of greatness, genius, and glory, was all impatience to see Bonaparte, and to express her admiration of him. Like an imperious man, who wishes every body to keep his place, he disliked her for sometimes leaving hers; he found her too clever, too enthusiastic, and even felt her independence amidst all her admiration; with regard to her he was cold, harsh, and unjust. She asked him one day, in rather an off-hand manner, who was in his estimation the greatest woman? He drily replied, "She who has borne most children." From this moment commenced that reciprocal antipathy which cost her so much unmerited persecution, and which led him to commit acts of petty and brutal tyranny against her. He went abroad but little; lived in his humble dwelling in the Rue Chartereine, which had changed its name, and which the department of Paris had ordered to be called the *Rue de la Victoire*. He admitted only a few men of science, Monge, Lagrange, Laplace, and Berthelot; a few generals, Desaix, Kléber, and Caffarelli; a few artists, and especially the celebrated actor of whom France was so soon to be deprived, Talma, for whom he already manifested an extraordinary partiality. Whenever he went abroad, it was generally in a very common sort of carriage; he never went to the theatre but in a private box; and he seemed not to participate at all in his wife's fondness for dissipation. For her he showed extreme affection. He was enthralled by that peculiar grace, which either in private life, or upon the throne, never forsook Madame Beauharnais, and which in her supplied the place of beauty.

A place having become vacant in the institute by the banishment of Carnot, it was immediately offered to Bonaparte. He eagerly accepted it. At the meeting held for his reception, he took his seat between Lagrange and Laplace, and thenceforth, in public ceremonies, he assumed the dress of a member of the institute, affecting thus to conceal the warrior under the habit of the man of science.

So much glory could not fail to give umbrage to the heads of the government, who, having on their

side neither priority of rank or personal greatness, were wholly eclipsed by the warrior peacemaker. They nevertheless paid him the highest respect, to which he replied by the utmost demonstrations of deference. The sentiment that most engrosses, is the one that is least in our mouths. The directory was far from giving vent to its apprehensions. It received numerous reports from its spies, who went to the barracks and to the public places to listen to the language used concerning Bonaparte. Bonaparte, it was said, would soon put himself at the head of affairs, overthrow an enfeebled government, and thus save France both from the royalists and the Jacobins. The directory, with a feigned frankness, showed him these reports, and affected to treat them with contempt, as if it had deemed the general incapable of ambition. The general, who was not behindhand in dissembling, acknowledged his gratitude for these testimonials, by assuring the directory that he was worthy of the confidence reposed in him. But on either side there was extreme distrust. If the spies of the police talked to the directory of plans of usurpation, the officers who surrounded the general talked to him of poisoning schemes. The death of Hoche had given rise to absurd suspicions; the general, who, though exempt from puerile apprehensions, was nevertheless prudent, was extremely cautious when he dined with a certain director; he ate little, and only of such dishes as he had seen the director himself eat of, and drank no wine of which he had not seen him drink.

Barras wished to encourage a belief that he was the author of Bonaparte's fortune, and that, being no longer his protector, he had continued to be his friend. He showed in particular an extraordinary devotion for his person; he strove with his usual complaisance to convince him of his attachment. He took every opportunity of exposing his colleagues to him, and affected to hold himself apart. Bonaparte received the professions of this director with coldness, as he placed no reliance on their sincerity, and did not reward his servility by the slightest token of confidence.

Bonaparte was frequently consulted on certain questions. A minister was sent to summon him to the directory; he would go, take his seat beside the directors, and give his opinions with that superiority of tact which distinguished him in matters of administration and government, as well as those of war. He affected in politics a line of ideas depending upon the position which he had assumed. Immediately after the 18th Fructidor, we have seen him, when the impulse was once given and the fall of the royalist faction assured, stop short all at once, with the resolution of affording the government no more than the support absolutely necessary for preventing the restoration of monarchy. This point obtained, he did not wish to appear to attach himself to the directory. He chose to show all parties that he kept aloof from them, without being either connected or embroiled with any. The attitude of a censor was the position which suited his ambition. This part it is very easy to sustain in regard to a government assailed in contrary directions by factions, and constantly in danger of falling; it has its advantages, because it brings about you all the malcontents, that is, all the parties who soon become universally disgusted with the government that attempts to repress, without having strength sufficient to crush them. The proclamations of Bonaparte to the Cisalpines and the Genoese, relative to the laws they had proposed to pass against the nobles, were quite enough to indicate the course his present ideas were about to follow. It was plainly perceptible, and his language rendered it sufficiently obvious, that he censured the conduct pursued by the government subsequently to the 18th Fructidor. It was natural that the patriots should in some measure have resumed the ascendancy since that event. The directory was not controlled, but slightly impelled by them. This was evident in its appointments, in its measures, and in its spirit. Bonaparte, though keeping up considerable reserve, manifested disapprobation at the course the government was pursuing. He appeared to consider it as feeble, incompetent, suffering itself to be beaten by one faction after having been beaten by another. It was obvious, in short, that he would not identify himself with its measures. He even conducted himself in such a manner as to prove that, though determined to oppose the return of royalty, he was by no means willing to undertake for the responsibility of the revolution and its acts. The anniversary of the 21st of January was at hand; it was considered necessary to sound him as to whether he would undertake to appear at the *fête*, which was about to be celebrated for the fifth time. He had arrived in Paris in December, 1797. The year 1798 was commencing (Nivôse and Pluviôse, year VI.). He would not attend the ceremony, as if he had disapproved of the act that was celebrated, or as if he had wished to do something for those whom his proclamations of the 18th Fructidor, and the grape-shot slaughter of the 13th Vendémiaire, had alienated from him. It was intended that he should figure there under all his titles. Lately commander-in-chief of the army of Italy and plenipotentiary of France at Campo-Formio, he was now one of the plenipotentiaries to the congress of Rastadt, and general of the army of England; it was therefore obligatory upon him to be present at the solemnities of his government. He said that those were not distinctions that necessarily involved his figuring there, and that therefore, his presence being voluntary, would look like an assent which he was not prepared to give. The matter was compromised. The institute was to attend the ceremony in a body; he mingled in its ranks, and seemed to perform a duty imposed on him as a member. Among all the titles already heaped upon him, that of member of the institute was certainly the most convenient, and he contrived to make a good use of it.

Rising power is soon discerned. A number of sycophants and flatterers already surrounded Bonaparte; they asked him whether he would always confine himself to the command of armies, and whether he would not at length take that part in the government of affairs which his ascendancy and his political genius entitled him. Without yet being fully aware of what he had the power of doing, and what he ought to be, he saw plainly enough that he was the first man of his time. On observing the influence of Pichegru in the five hundred, and that of Barras in the directory, he might well consider that he could play an import-

ant political part; but at that time he had none to perform. He was too young to be a director; he must be forty years old before he could be a director, and he was not yet thirty. Certainly there was some talk of a dispensation in regard to age, but this was a concession to be obtained which would alarm the republicans, would make them raise a great outcry, and certainly would not compensate for the annoyances that it would bring upon him. To be associated, as a fifth member, in the government, to have nothing but a bare vote in the directory, to wear himself out in contesting with the councils, who were as yet independent, was by no means a part he would be desirous of acting; and it was not for such a purpose worth while to dispense with the law. France had yet a powerful enemy to combat, England; and though Bonaparte was covered with glory, it was better for him to go and gather fresh laurels, and to leave the government to waste its strength still further in its arduous struggle with the various parties.

We have seen that on the very day that the signature of the treaty of Campo-Formio was known in Paris, the directory, with a view to excite the public mind against England, immediately created an army, called *the army of England*, and gave the command to general Bonaparte. The government considered frankly and sincerely of going the shortest way to attack England, and purposed to make an invasion in that country. The hardy mode of thinking at this period caused such an enterprise to be considered as extremely practicable. The expedition already experimented in Ireland showed that it was possible to cross over under cover of a fog or a gale of wind. The general belief was, that with all its patriotic feelings, the English nation, which had not yet got together sufficient land forces for its protection, could not be able to withstand the admirable soldiers of Italy and of the Rhine, and above all, the genius of the conqueror of Castiglione, Arcola, and Rivoli. The government did not intend to leave more than twenty-five thousand men in Italy, all the rest were brought back into the interior. As for the grand army of Germany, composed of the two armies of the Rhine and of the Sambre and Meuse, it meant to reduce that to a force no more than enough for overawing the empire during the congress of Rastadt, and to move off the rest towards the sea-coasts. The same course was to be taken with all the troops remaining undisposed of. The generals of engineers inspected the coasts, to select the best points for making the descent; orders were given to collect considerable flotillas in the ports; and a great spur was imparted to the naval department. Every one was still waiting for a gale that would at length drive off the English squadron, that was blockading the harbour of Cadiz, so that then the Spanish fleet would be able to come out and join that of France. As for the Dutch fleet, which the French government had flattered itself with the prospect of uniting with its own, it had just sustained a severe loss within sight of the Texel, and its wrecks only had returned to the ports of Holland. But the Spanish and French fleet would be sufficient to convoy the passage of a flotilla, and to ensure the transport of sixty or eighty thousand men to England. To second all these preparations, care had been taken to provide additional means of finance. The budget, fixed, as we have seen, at six hundred and sixteen millions for the year VI., was inadequate to an extraordinary armament. It was desirable to obtain the concurrence of commercial men in an enterprise most favourable to their interests, and therefore government proposed a voluntary loan of eighty millions. It was to be secured upon the state. Part of the profits of the expedition were to be converted into premiums, for which lots were to be drawn by the subscribers. The directory, through the medium of the principal merchants, applied to open the loan. The plan was submitted to the legislative body, and from the first it appeared to gain credit. Subscriptions to the amount of fifteen or twenty millions were received. The directory exerted not only all its efforts, but all its severity against England. A law prohibited the introduction of English goods; this law authorized the usage of domiciliary visits to discover them, and caused them to be carried into effect throughout all France on the same day, and at the same hour*.

Bonaparte seemed to forward and approve this great movement, but at bottom he had no great inclination for the design. To march to London, to gain an entrance there, and to get sixty thousand men into England, did not appear to him the most difficult part of the affair. But he was sensible that to conquer the country, and to establish himself there would be impracticable; that all he could do would be to ravage it, despoil it of part of its wealth, retard its improvements, and render it a mere cypher for half a century; but that he must necessarily sacrifice the army he should have brought over, and return almost alone after a sort of barbarian incursion. At a later period, with a more extended power, with greater experience of his means, with a strong personal feeling against England, he thought seriously of engaging her hand to hand, and staking his fortune against hers; but at this time he had different ideas and other designs. One reason in particular diverted him from this enterprise. The preparations that were making would take several months more; the fine weather was approaching, and it would be necessary to wait for the fogs and the storms of the ensuing winter, in order to attempt a landing. Now, he had no desire to remain a year idle in Paris, making no addition to his great exploits, and sinking in public opinion for the sole reason that he was not rising in it. He therefore contemplated a plan of a different kind, a plan quite as gigantic as the invasion of England, but more original, more extensive in its consequences, more in conformity with his imagination, and above all, sooner accomplished. We have seen that in Italy he turned his particular attention to the Mediterranean; that he had created a sort of navy there; that in the partition of the Venetian states, he had taken care to reserve the Ionian islands for France; that he had been forming intrigues in Malta; in the hope of depriving the knights and the English of that island; that finally, he had frequently turned his attention to Egypt, as the intermediate point that France should occupy between Europe and Asia, to ensure herself either

* The 15th Nivôse, year VI. (4th January, 1798.)

the commerce of the Levant or India. This idea had taken possession of his imagination, and wholly engrossed it. There were in the foreign office some valuable documents concerning Egypt, throwing considerable light on its colonial, maritime, and military importance; these were, at his request, sent him by M. de Talleyrand, and he set about reading them as if he would have devoured them. Compelled to make a tour round the sea-coasts for the purposes of the design against England, he filled his carriage with travels in and memoirs concerning Egypt. Thus, while apparently acting in obedience to the commands of the directory, he was contemplating quite a different enterprise; his person was on the level shores and beneath the sky of ancient Batavia, while his imagination was roaming on the shores of the East. He had a glimmering of confused and great forthcoming events. To penetrate into those countries of light and glory, where Alexander and Mahomet had conquered and founded empires, to make them ring with his name, and to have it sent back to France repeated by the echoes of Asia, was for him a most ravishing prospect.

He set about, therefore, his inspection of the coasts, during the months of Pluviôse and Ventôse (January and February, 1798), making valuable notes in respect of the preparations for invasion, but wholly occupied by other thoughts and other designs.

While the republic was turning all her forces against England, she had still important interests to look after on the continent. Her political labours in that quarter were immense. She had to treat with the empire at Rastadt, that is, with feudality itself; she had to train up three republics, her political daughters, in the way they should go, the Batavian, the Cisalpine, and the Ligurian republics. Placed at the head of the democratic system, and confronted with the feudal system, she had to prevent collisions between these systems, that she might not have to recommence the struggle which she had just then so gloriously terminated, but which had cost her such dreadful efforts. Such was her task, and it scarcely presented less difficulties than the attack and destruction of England.

The congress of Rastadt had been assembled for the last two months. Bonnier, a very intelligent man, and Treilhard, an upright but coarse man, were the representatives of France. Bonaparte, in the few days he spent at the congress, had secretly settled with Austria the arrangements necessary for the occupation of Mentz and the *tête de pont* of Manheim. It had been settled that the Austrian troops should retire on the approach of the French troops, and leave the troops of the empire to themselves; the French troops were then to take possession of Mentz, and the *tête de pont* of Manheim, either by intimidating the troops of the empire, when left to themselves, or by a prompt and bold assault. This was accordingly done. The troops of the elector, finding themselves abandoned by those of Austria, surrendered Mentz. Those who were at the *tête de pont* of Manheim made a show of defence, but were obliged to give in. Several hundred men, however, were sacrificed. It was plain enough from these two events, that Austria had, by the secret articles of the treaty of Campo-Formio, recognised the right of the republic to the line of the Rhine, since she consented to guarantee her the two most important points. It was further agreed, that during the negotiations, the French army should quit the right bank of the Rhine, and return to the left bank, from Bâle to Mentz, so that from this point the French army might continue to occupy the right bank, but by keeping along and without crossing the Maine. As for the Austrian armies, they were to retire beyond the Danube, and as far as the Lech, and to evacuate the fortresses of Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg. Their position with respect to the empire would be nearly the same as that of the French armies. The deputation of the empire would thus have to deliberate between a double line of soldiers. Austria did not fairly carry out the secret articles, for, under colour of a deception, she left garrisons in Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingoldstadt. France winked at this infraction of the treaty, for the purpose of not disturbing the good understanding that existed. The next point was, that each party was to send ambassadors. Austria replied, that for the present the two powers might content themselves with corresponding through the ministers whom the powers had at the congress of Rastadt. This was not showing any great anxiety to renew amicable relations with France; but after her defeats and humiliations, this last exhibition of ill temper might be accounted for and passed over.

The first explanations between the deputation of the empire and the ministers of Austria were warm. In fact, the states of the empire complained that Austria had been art and part in stripping them of their possessions by recognising the right of the republic to the line of the Rhine, and perfidiously surrendering Mentz and the *tête de pont* of Manheim. They complained also that Austria, after involving the empire in her quarrel, had left her to shift for herself, and was bartering away her provinces in order to get possessions in Italy in exchange. The ministers of the emperor replied that he had been involved in the war in respect of the interests of the empire, and for the defence of the princes who had possessions in Alsatia; that after taking up arms on their behalf, he had made extraordinary efforts for six consecutive years; that he had found himself successively abandoned by all the states of the confederation; that he had almost single-handed sustained the whole burden of the war; that he had lost in this conflict part of his dominions, and especially the rich provinces of Belgium and Lombardy; that after such efforts, which had cost him so much, he expected gratitude, and not to be subjected to complaints. The truth was, that the emperor had made use of the name of the princes having possessions in Alsatia as a pretext for making war; that he had carried it on for his own ambitious purposes; that he had hurried the Germanic confederation into it against their inclination; and that now he was betraying them, in order to indemnify himself at their expense. After some warm explanations, which came to nothing, they were obliged to proceed, and occupy themselves with settling the basis of the negotiations. The French wanted the left bank of the Rhine, and proposed the expedient of disannexation from the Church, in order to indemnify the princes dispos-

sessed of their dominions. Austria, who, not content with having acquired the greater part of the Venetian territory, wanted to indemnify herself still further with a few bishoprics, and who, moreover, had secret conventions with France; Prussia, who had agreed with France to indemnify herself on the right bank for the duchy of Cleves, which she had lost on the left bank; the dispossessed princes, who desired rather to acquire states on the right bank, protected from the neighbourhood of the French, than to recover their old principalities,—Austria, Prussia, and the dispossessed princes, all voted alike for ceding the line of the Rhine, and for recurring to disannexations from the Church as a means of indemnity. The empire could then scarcely defend itself against such a concurrence of determinations. However, the powers given to the deputation making the entirety of the Germanic empire an express condition, the French plenipotentiaries declared these powers too limited and insufficient, and required others. The deputation required fresh powers from the diet; but although from that time the deputation had the power of ceding the line of the Rhine and renouncing the left bank, it nevertheless persisted in opposing this concession. The deputation alleged many reasons, for reasons can always be found. The Germanic empire, said the deputation, had not been the first to declare war. Long before the diet of Ratisbon had proclaimed war, Custine had surprised Mentz and overrun Franconia. The Germanic empire had therefore done no more than act in self-defence. The loss of part of its territory would overthrow its constitution and compromise its existence, which was a matter that concerned all Europe. The provinces on the left bank, of which it was proposed to deprive the Germanic empire, were of very little consequence to a state that had become so extensive as the French republic. Some other military line, the Moselle, for instance, might be substituted for the line of the Rhine. Lastly, the republic was renouncing, for very paltry advantages, a glory that was so splendid, so pure, and so advantageous for her, the credit of political moderation. Consequently, the deputation proposed to abandon all that the empire had possessed beyond the Moselle, and to take that river for the boundary line. France had a good reply to make to all this. Certain it was that she had taken the offensive, and in point of fact begun the war; but the actual war, the war of intention, of plottings, and of preparations, had been commenced by the empire. It was at Trèves and at Coblentz that the emigrants had been collected and organized; it was from those places that the phalanxes commissioned to humble, to brutalise, to dismember France, were to come. France, instead of being vanquished, came off victorious; she availed herself of her position, not to render evil for all the evil others had intended to do her, but to indemnify herself for the war which had been made upon her for demanding her true natural boundary, the line of the Rhine.

They therefore went on disputing; for concessions, even when they can no longer be withheld, are yet contested. But it was evident that the deputation was about to cede the left bank, and that it made this opposition merely to obtain better terms on other disputed points. Such was the state of the negotiations at Rastadt in the month of Pluviôse, year VI. (February, 1798.)

Augereau, to whom the directory, in order to get rid of him, had given the command of the army of Germany, had surrounded himself with the most outrageous Jacobins. He could not fail to give umbrage to the empire, which particularly dreaded the contagion of the new principles, and complained of the inflammatory publications circulated in Germany. So many heads in Europe were in a ferment, that there was no necessity for assuming French interference to account for the circulation of revolutionary writings. But it was of consequence to the directory to obviate all complaints; besides, it was dissatisfied with the turbulent conduct of Augereau; the directory deprived him of his command, and sent him to Perpignan, upon pretext of collecting there an army intended, so it was said, to be sent against Portugal. That court had, at the instigation of Pitt, not ratified the treaty concluded with the republic, and France threatened to inflict a blow on her as an ally of England. At any rate this was but an empty demonstration, and the commission given to Augereau was a concealed disgrace.

France, in addition to the direct relations which she began to renew with the powers of Europe, had, as we have observed, to regulate the new republics. They were naturally agitated by contrary parties. It was the duty of France to spare them the convulsions by which she had herself been torn. Besides, it was for this that she had been appealed to and paid. She had armies in Holland, in the Cisalpine, and in Liguria, maintained at the expense of those republics. If, in order to avoid the appearance of interfering with their independence, she were to leave them to themselves, there would either be a counter-revolution or an outburst of Jacobinism to be apprehended. In the one case, the republican system would be jeopardised; in the other, the maintenance of the general peace would be hazarded. The Jacobins once having obtained the mastery in Holland, might alienate Prussia and Germany; if they made themselves masters in Liguria and the Cisalpine, they had the power of convulsing Italy and summoning Austria once more to the struggle. It was requisite, therefore, to moderate the course of these republics, but in so doing, the government exposed itself to another inconvenience. Europe complained that France had made the Dutch, the Cisalpines, and the Genoese, subjects rather than allies, and reproached her with having a view to universal dominion. It was expedient, therefore, to choose agents who had precisely the shade of opinion adapted to the country in which they were to reside, and who had tact enough to make the power of France felt without suffering it to be openly perceptible. There were, as we see, all sorts of difficulties to be overcome, in order to keep in existence, and that without collision, the two systems which had of late been arrayed one against the other in Europe. We have seen them at war for six years; we are now about to see them during a year of negotiation, and that year will go to prove, more than the war itself, their natural antipathy.

We have already described the different parties that divided Holland. The moderate and prudent party, that desired an uniform and temperate con-

stitution, had to contend with the Orangists, the creatures of the stadtholder; the federalists, the partisans of the old provincial divisions, aspiring to universal domination in their provinces, and willing to submit to nothing else than a weak federal bond; and lastly, the democrats, or Jacobins, wanting unity and pure democracy. The directory would naturally support the first party, opposed, as it was, to the other three, because it was solicitous, without going into any of the contrary extremes, to reconcile the old federative system with a sufficient centralization of the government. The directory has been frequently accused of wishing to establish every where the republic *one and indivisible*, and people in general have argued very unfairly concerning its system in this particular. The republic *one and indivisible*, conceived in 1793, would have been a subtle idea, if it had not been the offspring of a mighty instinct. A state so consistent in all its parts, and founded on so solid a basis as France, could not admit the federal system. A state so threatened as France, would have been undone by admitting it. It was not adapted either to its geographical position, or to its political situation. To have attempted to introduce unity and indivisibility every where in the same degree as in France, would certainly have been absurd; but the directory, placed at the head of a new system, obliged to create powerful allies for itself, would naturally seek to give strength and consistence to its new allies, and there is no strength or consistence without a certain degree of concentration and unity. Such was the conception, or more correctly speaking the instinct, which directed and could not help directing, almost unknown to themselves, the heads of the French republic.

Holland, with its former federative system, would have been reduced to complete impotence. Its national assembly had not yet been able to give it a constitution. It was still subjected to all the regulations of the ancient states of Holland; federalism there reigned supreme; the advocates of unity and of a limited constitution demanded the abolition of these regulations, and the speedy establishment of a constitution. The envoy Noel was accused of favouring the federalists. France could no longer delay declaring herself; she sent Joubert, one of Bonaparte's lieutenants in Italy, subsequently celebrated for his march into the Tyrol, a modest, disinterested, and brave man, also a warm patriot, to command the army of Holland. Delacroix, formerly minister for foreign affairs, was substituted for Noel; a better choice might certainly have been made. The directory unfortunately was deficient in persons versed in diplomatic knowledge. There were certainly among the members of the past or present assemblies many well-informed and distinguished men, but these men were not conversant with diplomatic forms. They were dogmatic and supercilious; and it was difficult to find among them persons combining firmness of principles with an habitual deference to forms; and this it was absolutely necessary our envoys to foreign countries should possess, the better to enforce respect for our principles, and conciliate the prejudices of antiquated Europe. Delacroix, on his arrival in Holland, attended a banquet given by the diplomatic committee. All the foreign ministers were invited. After having used in their presence the most democratic language, Delacroix, glass in hand, exclaimed, "How is it there is not a Batavian who will dare to despatch the ordinance on the altar of the country?" It is easy to conceive what an effect such sallies as these must produce on foreigners. It was not long, in fact, before the ordinance was despatched. Forty-three deputies had already protested against the operations of the national assembly. They met on the 3rd Pluviôse (January 22nd, 1798), at the hotel of Haarlem, and there, supported by our troops, they adopted the same line of proceeding as had been taken at Paris four months previous, on the 18th Fructidor. They excluded from the national assembly a certain number of suspected deputies, put some of them into confinement, abolished the ordinance, and organized the assembly into a kind of convention. In a few days, a constitution closely resembling that of France was framed and put in force. From a desire to imitate the convention, the new leaders composed the government of the members of the existing assembly, and constituted themselves into a directory and legislative body. The persons who come forward to effect movements of this kind are always the most decided of their party. It was to be feared that the new Batavian government would be strongly impressed with democracy, and that, under the influence of an ambassador like Delacroix, it would overstep the limits which the directory would have wished to have marked out for it. This kind of 18th Fructidor in Holland did not fail to cause the remark to be made by the members of the European diplomacy, and of Prussia in particular, that France governed Holland, and that her influence in fact extended to the Texel.

The Ligurian republic went on very well, although secretly disquieted like all new states, by two equally intemperate parties. As for the Cisalpine, it was a prey to the most vehement passions. The spirit of locality divided the Cisalpines, who belonged to old states successively dismembered by Bonaparte. Besides this spirit of locality, the agents of Austria, the nobles, the priests, and the furious democrats, violently agitated the new republic. But the democrats were the most dangerous, because they had a powerful support in the army of Italy, composed, as we have seen, of the most fiery patriots in France. The directory had as much ado to direct the spirit of these armies in foreign countries as that of its ministers, and in this particular it had as many difficulties to surmount as in every other. As yet there was no minister to the new republic. It was Berthier who, as commander-in-chief, had hitherto represented the French government. It now became necessary to regulate by a treaty of alliance the relations of the new republic with the mother state. This treaty was prepared in Paris, and sent for the ratification of the councils. The two republics formed an alliance offensive and defensive for all cases; and till the Cisalpine should have a military establishment, France was to grant the assistance of twenty-five thousand men on the following conditions. The Cisalpine was to provide buildings for barracks, hospitals, and magazines, and ten millions per annum for the subsistence of the twenty-five thousand men. In case of war, she was to furnish an extraordinary subsidy. France gave up to the Cisalpine great part of the artillery taken from the

enemy to strengthen her fortresses. These conditions were not exorbitant; yet many of the Cisalpine deputies in the council of the ancients, who were unfavourably disposed towards the republican system and France, pretended that this treaty was too burdensome, that undue advantage was taken of the dependence in which the new state was placed, and they rejected the treaty. In this there was evidently a manifestation of bitter feeling. Bonaparte, obliged to select the persons composing the councils and the government, had not been able to ascertain the sentiments of them all, and it became necessary to remodel them. The existing councils, nominated according to martial law by Bonaparte, were remodelled in martial fashion by Berthier. The latter removed some of the most obstinate members, and then submitted the treaty, which was immediately accepted. It was unfortunate that the hand of France was necessarily visible in this, for Austria instantly asserted that, notwithstanding all the promises made at Campo-Formio, the Cisalpine was not an independent republic, but evidently a French province. Austria raised difficulties concerning the admission of Marescalchi, the minister accredited at her court by the Cisalpine.

The territory formed by France and the new republics dovetailed with yet feudal Europe in a most dangerous manner for the peace of both systems. Switzerland, still entirely feudal, though republican, was encircled by France, by Savoy which had become a French province, and by the Cisalpine. Piedmont, with whom France had contracted an alliance, was surrounded by France, Savoy, the Cisalpine, and the Ligurian. The Cisalpine and Ligurian surrounded the Parmesan and Tuscany, and might communicate the contagion of their principles to Rome and Naples. The directory had recommended their agents to adopt the greatest reserve, and had forbidden them to hold out any hopes to the democrats. Guingené in Piedmont, Cacault in Tuscany, Joseph Bonaparte at Rome, and Trouvé at Naples, had express orders to testify the most amicable inclinations towards the princes in whose capitals they resided. They were to assure them that the directory had no intention whatever to propagate revolutionary principles, that it would content itself with maintaining the republican system where it was already established, but that it would take no steps to extend it to powers who kept good faith with France. The intentions of the directory were founded in good faith and discretion. It certainly was desirous that the revolution should progress, but its movements were no longer to be advanced by arms. The directory was determined, in case the revolution should break out in fresh states, that there should be no occasion to reproach France with an active participation therein. Besides, Italy was full of princes, the relations or allies of the great powers, whom it was impossible to injure without running the risk of the most determined hostilities. Austria would not fail to interfere in behalf of Tuscany, of Naples, and perhaps of Piedmont; Spain would certainly interfere on account of the prince of Parma. It was requisite therefore to make a point, if new events should break out, that we should not identify ourselves with them.

Such were the instructions of the directory; but the passions are not to be governed, and especially the passion for liberty. Could France prevent the French, Ligurian, and Cisalpine democrats from corresponding with the Piedmontese, Tuscan, Roman, and Neapolitan democrats, and from communicating to them the warmth of their opinions, their encouragement, and their hopes! They told them that policy forbade the French government to interfere ostensibly in the revolutions which were every where in preparation, but that it would protect them when these revolutions were once effected; that they must have the courage to attempt them, and that relief would immediately be afforded.

Agitation pervaded all the Italian states. Arrests were multiplied there, and our accredited ministers confined themselves to the duty of occasionally claiming the persons unjustly imprisoned. In Piedmont, the apprehensions were numerous, but the intercession of France was frequently successful. In Tuscany, great moderation prevailed. At Naples there was a class of men who identified themselves with the new opinions; but a court equally malicious and senseless combated those opinions by imprisonment and punishments. Our ambassador Trouvé, was overwhelmed with humiliations. He was shunned, like one infected with the plague. The Neapolitans were forbidden to visit him. He had even found great difficulty in procuring a physician for himself. Those who were accused of having had communication with the French legation, and who wore their hair cropped and unpowdered, were thrown into prison. The letters of the French ambassador were seized, opened, and kept by the Neapolitan police for ten or twelve days. Frenchmen had been assassinated. Even when Bonaparte was in Italy, he had great difficulty in restraining the fury of the court of Naples; and now that he was no longer there, it is easy to conceive what it must have been capable of doing. The French government was strong enough to punish it severely for its wrongs; but to avoid disturbing the general tranquillity, it had directed Trouvé, its minister, to observe the utmost moderation, to confine himself to remonstrances, and to strive to bring the Neapolitan court to reason.

The government, whose ruin was nearest at hand, was the Papal government. This was not for want of defending itself; it ordered arrests also; but an aged pope, whose pride was humbled, and aged incompetent cardinals, could scarcely uphold a state tottering on all sides. Already, at the suggestion of the Cisalpines, the March of Ancona had revolted, and formed itself into the Anconitan republic. From this quarter the democrats excited rebellion throughout the whole of the Roman states. They had indeed no great number of partisans there, but they were strongly seconded by the public discontent. The Papal government had lost that splendour which dazzled the eyes of the people, since the levies imposed at Tolentino had obliged it to give up even the valuable movables and the precious stones belonging to the holy see. The new taxes, the creation of paper-money, which had diminished in more than two-thirds of its value, and the alienation of one-fifth of the property of the clergy, had made all classes dissatisfied, including the ecclesiastics themselves. The grandees of Rome, who were not deficient in the intelligence generally diffused throughout Europe during the eighteenth century, uttered loud murmurs against

a feeble, paltering government, and said that it was high time the temporal rule of the Roman states should be transferred from the hands of ignorant, incapable monks, unacquainted with worldly affairs, to those who were true citizens, experienced in the business of life and knowledge of the world. Thus the inclinations of the Roman people were by no means favourable to the pope. However, the democrats were far from numerous; they were obnoxious to great prejudices with respect to religion, to which they were supposed hostile. The French artists at Rome considerably excited the Romans; but Joseph Bonaparte strove to repress them, saying that they were not strong enough to attempt a decisive movement; that they would ruin themselves and compromise France to no purpose; that at any rate she would not support them, but leave them exposed to the consequences of their imprudence.

On the 6th Nivôse (December 26th, 1797), they came to apprise him that a movement would take place. He sent them away, charging them to keep quiet, but they did not believe the French minister meant what he said. The system of all the undertakers of revolutions was to dare every thing, and to enlist France in their cause even against her will. They accordingly assembled on the 8th Nivôse (December 28th), for the purpose of attempting a movement. Dispersed by the pope's dragoons, they sought refuge in the jurisdiction of the French ambassador, and under the piazza of the Corsini palace where he resided. Joseph hurried thither with some French military, and among them general Duphot, a very distinguished young officer of the army of Italy. He wanted to interpose between the Papal troops and the insurgents, in order to prevent a massacre. But the Papal troops, without attending to the ambassador, fired and killed the unfortunate Duphot by his side. This young man was engaged in marriage to a sister-in-law of Joseph. His death produced an extraordinary commotion. Several foreign ambassadors, particularly the Spanish minister, d'Azara, hastened to Joseph's residence. The Roman government alone let fourteen hours pass by without sending to the minister of France, though he had written to him repeatedly during the day. Joseph indignantly demanded passports forthwith; they were given to him, and he set out immediately for Tuscany.

This event produced a great sensation. It was clear enough that the Roman government could have prevented this commotion, of which it had received information two days previous; but that its object was to suffer it to break out, for the purpose of inflicting severe chastisement on the democrats; and that in the tumult it had not taken care to adopt such precautions as to prevent a violation of the law of nations, and an outrage upon the French legation. In the Cisalpine and with all the Italian patriots, great indignation was immediately manifested against the Roman government. The army of Italy loudly shouted their desire for a march to Rome.

The directory was extremely embarrassed; they looked upon the pope as the spiritual head of the party opposed to the revolution. The directory felt strongly tempted to destroy the pontiff of that antiquated and tyrannical Christian religion, in spite of the danger of offending the powers and provoking their interference. But whatsoever might be the inconveniences of a hostile determination, the revolutionary passions triumphed on this occasion, and the directory ordered general Berthier, who commanded in Italy, to march against Rome. The directory hoped that as the pope was neither the kinsman or ally of any one court, his fall would not excite any powerful interference.

All the republicans and advocates of philosophy were in high glee. On the 22nd Pluviôse (February 10th, 1798), Berthier came in sight of the ancient capital of the world, as yet unvisited by the republican armies. Our soldiers paused for a moment to contemplate the old and magnificent city. The Spanish minister, d'Azara, the usual mediator of the Italian powers with France, hastened to the head-quarters to negotiate a convention. The castle of Saint-Angelo was delivered up to the French on the terms ordinarily accorded between civilized nations, to respect religion, the public establishments, persons, and property. The pope was left at the Vatican, and Berthier, introduced at the Porta di Populo, was conducted to the capitol, like the Roman generals of old who triumphed over foreign enemies. The democrats, at the height of their ambition, assembled in the Campo-Vaccino, where they witnessed the remains of the ancient forum, and surrounded by a senseless rabble, ready to applaud all new events, proclaimed the Roman republic. A notary drew up an act by which the populace, who styled itself the Roman people, declared that it resumed its sovereignty and constituted itself a republic. The pope had been left alone at the Vatican. A message was sent to require at his hands the abdication of his temporal sovereignty, for there was no intention of meddling with his spiritual authority. He replied, at any rate, with dignity, that he could not divest himself of an inheritance not his own, but which had been transmitted to him from the apostles, and was only a trust in his hands. This theological course of reasoning had no force with our republican generals. The pope, treated with the respect due to his age, was removed during the night from the Vatican and taken into Tuscany, where he received an asylum in a convent. The Roman people seemed to feel little regret for this sovereign, who had nevertheless reigned more than twenty years.

Unfortunately, a series of excesses not only committed against persons but against property, reflected disgrace on the entry of the French into the ancient capital of the world. There was no longer at the head of the army that severe and inflexible commander, who, less from a feeling of probity than from a horror of disorder, had so severely punished pillagers. None other than Bonaparte could have restrained rapacity in so wealthy a country. Berthier had just left for Paris; Masséna had taken his place. This hero, to whom France will owe everlasting gratitude for having saved her at Zurich from apparently inevitable ruin, was accused of having been the first to set the example. It was soon followed. The palaces, the convents, and the rich collections were soon pillaged. Jews in the train of the army purchased at a low price the magnificent objects placed in their hands by the depredators. The spoliation was revolting. The truth must be told; it was neither the subaltern officers or the soldiers who indulged in these excesses, it was the superior

officers. All the articles they took away, and over which they could exercise rights of conquest, ought to have been collected in a repository, and sold for the benefit of the army, who had not received pay for five months. The army had come from the Cisalpine, the defective financial organization of which had hitherto prevented it from paying the subsidy agreed upon by our treaty. The soldiers and the inferior officers were in the most deplorable state of destitution; they were indignant at seeing their chief clogged with spoils, and compromising the glory of the French name, without imparting the slightest advantage to the army.. A mutiny broke out against Masséna. The officers assembled in a church, and declared that they would no longer obey him. Part of the population, unfavourably disposed towards the French, prepared to seize the moment of this misunderstanding to attempt a movement. Masséna withdrew the army from Rome, leaving a garrison in the castle of Saint-Angelo. The danger put an end to the mutiny, but the officers persisted in keeping together, and demanding the punishment of the plunderers, and the recall of Masséna.

We observe that to the difficulty of rendering the proceedings of the new republics less violent, and of choosing and directing our agents, was added that of keeping the armies in order, and all this at immense distances for means of official communication. The directory recalled Masséna, and sent a commission to Rome composed of four upright men of superior intelligence, to organize the new republic. These were Daunou, Monge, Florent, and Faypoult. The latter, an able and honest public officer, had charge of every thing relating to the finances. The army of Italy was divided in two; that which had just dethroned the pope was called the army of Rome.

The next thing was to explain the causes of the new revolution to the foreign powers. Spain, whose piety might have occasioned some apprehension, but who was under French influence, was perfectly silent. But self-interest is less likely to bear reason than even religious zeal. So the two most discontented courts were those of Vienna and Naples. The court of Vienna saw with concern the spread of French influence in Italy. In order not to aggravate her grievances, it was resolved not to consolidate the new republic with the Cisalpine. It was therefore constituted individually. To have united both of them, would too suddenly have roused the idea of Italian unity, and given credence to the plan for democratising all Italy. Although the emperor had as yet no minister at Paris, Bernadotte was despatched to give him explanations, and to be resident at Vienna. As for the court of Naples, its rage was extreme at witnessing the revolution brought to its doors. Naples demanded nothing less than two or three Roman provinces as the price of appeasing her anger. She particularly wanted the duchy of Benevento and the territory of Ponte-Corvo, which were situated most conveniently at hand. Garat was sent to Naples to come to an understanding with that court; and Trouvé was appointed for the Cisalpine.

The revolution was thus making unrestricted and much more rapid strides than the directory could have wished. We have already named a country whither it threatened to introduce itself, and this was Switzerland. It seems that Switzerland, that ancient abode of liberty and of simple and pastoral manners, had nothing to receive from France, and was the sole state that had no revolution to undergo; yet though the thirteen cantons were governed by republican forms, it was by no means a necessary consequence that equity should prevail in the mutual relations of these petty republics, and especially in their relations with their subjects. Feudalism, which is nothing else than the military hierarchy, existed among these republics, and there were people dependent on other people, as a vassal upon his sovereign lord, and groaning under a yoke of iron. The Aargau and the canton of Vaud were dependent on the aristocracy of Berne; the Lower Valais on the Upper Valais; the Italian bailiwicks, that is, the valleys sloping towards Italy, on various cantons. There were, moreover, a vast number of petty corporations (*communes*) dependent on certain towns. The canton of Saint-Gall was under the feudal domination of a convent. All the subject countries were only become so by force of the conditions contained in charters consigned to oblivion, and which it was forbidden to bring forth to light. The whole extent of country was almost every where holden of the towns as superior lords, and subject to the most odious monopolies; and no where was the tyranny of trade corporations so oppressive. In every department of government, the aristocracy had gradually possessed itself of the entire power. At Berne, the principal of these petty states, a few families had seized the supreme authority, and excluded all others from it for ever; they had their golden book (*livre d'or*), in which the names of all the ruling families were inscribed. Manners frequently temper the severity of the laws, but it was not so here. These aristocracies revenged themselves with a malicious acrimony peculiar to petty states. Berne, Zurich, Geneva, had frequently, and very recently too, exhibited the spectacle of [political] executions. Throughout all Europe there were scattered Swiss, who were either banished, or who had withdrawn themselves by voluntary exile from aristocratic vengeance. At any rate, ill united to one another, the thirteen cantons had lost their importance; they were brought so low as to be unable to defend their liberty. From that feeling of bad brotherhood so common in federative states, almost all of them in their bickerings had recourse to the neighbouring powers, and had particular treaties, some with Austria, others with Piedmont, and others again with France. Switzerland, therefore, was nought else than a glorious association and an admirable soil; in a political point of view, she presented nothing else than a continuity of petty and humiliating tyrannies.

Hence it may well be conceived the effect produced by the example of the French revolution in its bosom. At Zurich, Bâle, and Geneva, the greatest agitation prevailed. In this latter city, in particular, the disturbances had not been unaccompanied with bloodshed. Throughout the whole French part, and especially in the *Pays de Vaud*, revolutionary sentiments had made great progress. The Swiss aristocrats, on their part, had not omitted any bad office they could render to France, and had made it their business to displease her as

much as they could without provoking her omnipotence. The gentry of Berne had welcomed the emigrants, and rendered them all the services that lay in their power. It was in Switzerland that all the plots hatched against the republic were devised. The reader will recollect that it was at Bâle that Wickham, the English agent, guided all the threads of the counter-revolution. The directory therefore had reason to be highly displeased. The directory possessed one mode of revenging itself on Switzerland, and that was easy enough. The Vaudois, persecuted by the gentry of Berne, solicited the interference of France. When the duke of Savoy ceded them to Berne, France had undertaken to guarantee their rights by a treaty, dated in 1565*; that treaty had several times been appealed to and carried into execution by France. There was nothing extraordinary, therefore, in the interference of the directory, claimed on this occasion by the Vaudois. Besides, several of those petty dependent districts had foreign protectors.

We have seen with what enthusiasm the Vaudois received the liberator of the Valteline, when he passed through Switzerland, on his way from Milan to Rastadt. The Vaudois, buoyed up by hope, had sent deputies to Paris, and urgently insisted upon the protection of France. Their countryman, the brave and unfortunate Laharpe, had died for us in Italy, at the head of one of our divisions; they were subjected to the most horrible oppressions, and without any political reason, mere humanity would suffice to induce France to interfere. It was not to be understood how France, with her new principles, could decline the carrying out treaties conservative of the liberty of a neighbouring people, and executed even by the ancient monarchy. There was nothing but policy to prevent her, for it was giving a new alarm to Europe, especially at the very moment when the pontifical throne was crumbling to pieces at Rome. But France, who was endeavouring to avoid giving offence to Germany, Piedmont, Parma, Tuscany, and Naples, did not consider that the same circumspection should be adopted in respect to Switzerland; and was particularly desirous of establishing a government similar to her own in a country which was considered as the military key to all Europe. In this case, as in regard to Rome, the directory was drawn beyond the line of its cautious policy by a more absorbing interest. To get the Alps back into the hands of powers in amicable relation with ourselves, was an object quite as attractive as that of overthrowing the papacy.

Consequently, on the 8th Nivôse (December 28, 1797), the directory declared that it took the Vaudois under its protection, and that the members of the governments of Berne and Friburg should be answerable for the safety of their persons and property. General Menard, at the head of the division that was lately Masséna's, immediately recrossed the Alps, and encamped at Carouge, in sight of the Lake of Geneva. General Schawembburg ascended the Rhine with a division of the army of Germany, and stationed himself at Erguel, in the environs of Bâle. At this signal there was a burst of joy in the Pays de Vaud, in the bishopric of Bâle, and in the country of Zurich. The Vaudois thereupon immediately demanded their ancient states. Berne replied that it would receive individual petitions, but that there should be no assemblies of states, and required the renewal of the oath of allegiance. This was the signal for the Vaudois to rise. The bailiffs, whose tyranny was odious, were expelled, but beyond that received no ill-treatment: trees of liberty were every where planted, and in a few days the Pays de Vaud constituted itself into the *Lemanic republic*. The directory recognised it, and ordered general Menard to occupy it, at the same time notifying to the canton of Berne that its independence was guaranteed by France. In the mean time, a revolution was in progress at Bâle. Ochs, the tribune, a man of superior intelligence, a staunch advocate for revolutionary principles, and in close connexion with the French government, was the principal mover in it. The inhabitants of the country had been admitted with the citizens to form a kind of national convention, for the purpose of framing a constitution. Ochs was its originator: it was, with some trifling difference, not dissimilar to the French constitution, which at that time served as a model for all republican Europe. It was translated into the three languages, French, German, and Italian, and circulated in all the cantons, to excite their zeal. Mengaud, who was the French agent to the cantons, and who resided at Bâle, contributed to the impulsive movement. In Zurich, the rural population had revolted, and demanded their reinstatement to their rights.

In the mean time, the gentry of Berne had collected an army, and convoked a general diet at Aarau, to consider of the state of Switzerland, and to demand the federal contingent from each canton. They caused to be diffused among their German subjects a report that the French part of Switzerland wanted to separate itself from the confederation, and to unite itself with France; that religion was in danger; and that the atheists of Paris wished for her annihilation. Thus it was they caused to descend from the mountains of the Oberland a simple, ignorant, fanatic population, who were fully persuaded that their ancient religion was about to be attacked. They collected nearly twenty thousand men, divided into three divisions, stationed at Friburg, Morat, Buren, and Soleure, guarding the line of the Aar, and watching the French. In the mean time, that is to say, in Pluviôse (February, 1798), the diet assembled at Aarau was embarrassed, and knew not what course to pursue. Its presence did not prevent the inhabitants of Aarau from rising, planting the tree of liberty, and declaring themselves free. The Bernese troops entered Aarau, cut down the tree of liberty, and committed some excesses there. Mengaud, the agent, declared the people of Aarau under the protection of France.

The parties were thus confronting each other without being as yet in open war. France, called upon by the people whom she had promised to protect, covered them with her troops, and threatened to employ force, in case the least violence was offered them. On its own side, the Bernese aristocracy claimed the rights of sovereignty, and declared that she wished to live at peace with France, but to be

* See *Koch's Revolutions of Europe*, forming a portion of the present Series of "Popular Library of Modern Authors," p. 92, col. 1. *Trans.*

restored to her dominions. Unfortunately for her, all the old governments were falling around her, either by their own acts or by violence offered them. Bâle had emancipated, so far as she was concerned, the Italian bailiwicks; the Upper Valais had emancipated the Lower Valais; Friburg, Soleure, and Saint-Gall were in a state of revolution. The Bernese aristocracy, finding itself pressed on all sides, made some concessions with a good grace, and admitted fifty persons from the country to share the privileges hitherto reserved for the ruling families; but it postponed all constitutional reform for a year. This was but an empty concession, which could do no good. A French flag of truce had been sent to the Bernese troops posted on the frontiers of the Pays de Vaud, to tell them that they would be attacked if they advanced. The bearer was assaulted, and two horsemen belonging to his escort were murdered. This circumstance decided the directory for war. Brune, appointed to the command, had some conferences at Paverne, but they came to nothing, and on the 12th Ventôse (March 2) the French troops set themselves in motion. General Schawemburg, with the division which had come from the Rhine and was stationed in the territory of Bâle, made himself master of Soleure and of the course of the Aar. Brune, with the division from Italy, made himself master of Friburg. General Erlach, who commanded the Bernese troops, retired into the strongholds of Fraubrunnen, Guminen, Laupen, and Neueneck. These positions protect Berne on every side, whether the enemy debouch from Soleure or from Friburg. This retreating movement produced among the Bernese troops the usual effect of such a movement upon fanatic and undisciplined bands. They cried out that they were betrayed, and massacred their officers. Part of them dispersed. Erlach, however, had still about him some of those battalions, distinguished in all the armies of Europe by their discipline and their bravery, and a certain number of resolute peasants. On the 15th Ventôse (March 5), Brune, who was on the Friburg road, and Schawemburg on the Soleure road, made a simultaneous attack on the positions of the Swiss army. General Pigeon, who formed Brune's advanced guard, came to close quarters with the position of Neueneck. The Swiss made an heroic resistance, and favoured by the advantage of the ground, stopped the way to our veteran bands of Italy. But at the same moment, Schawemburg, who had come from Solothurn, took from Erlach the position of Fraubrunnen, and the city of Berne found itself left unprotected on one side. The retreat of the Swiss became compulsory, and they fell back in disorder upon Berne. The French found before the city a multitude of fanatic and desperate mountaineers. Women and old men came and threw themselves upon their bayonets. They were compelled to sacrifice with regret these unfortunate wretches, who thus to no purpose sought death. The French entered Berne. The people of the mountains upheld their ancient reputation for valour, but they behaved with the blind ferocity of the Spanish rabble. They again murdered their officers, and among them the unfortunate Erlach. Steiger, the celebrated chief magistrate (*avoyer*) of Berne, the head of the Bernese aristocracy, with difficulty escaped from the fury of the fanatics, and fled across the mountains of the Oberland to the petty cantons and from them into Bavaria.

The capture of Berne decided the submission of all the great Swiss cantons. Brune, called up, as our generals have so often been, to be the founder of a republic, thought of composing with the French part of Switzerland, the Lake of Geneva, the Pays de Vaud, part of the canton of Berne, and the Valais, a republic which should be styled the Rhodanic. But the Swiss patriots would not have required a revolution in their own country, but in the expectation of two great advantages: the abolition of every dependence of one people upon another people as superior lords, and the Helvetic unity. They wanted to see the abolition of all internal tyrannies, and to form themselves into one common power, by the establishment of a central government. They procured the concession that an individual republic should be founded out of all the parts of Switzerland. A meeting was convoked at Aarau, for the purpose of there proposing the constitution framed at Bâle. The directory despatched the ex-conventionalist Lecarlier, to conciliate the views of the Swiss, and to settle with them the establishment of a constitution which should be in accordance with their wishes. Some relics of opposition were getting up in the small mountain cantons of Uri, Glarus, Schwitz, and Zug. The priests and the defeated aristocrats persuaded these unfortunate mountaineers that the French were coming to outrage their religion, and annul their independence. They circulated, among other absurd reports, that as France was in want of soldiers to fight the English, she meant to press the robust youths of Switzerland, to put them on shipboard and send them forthwith to the British coasts.

The French, on entering Berne, seized the coffers of the government, which is the usual and the least contested consequence of the right of war, for all the public property of the vanquished government belongs to the victorious government. All these petty, economical, and avaricious states, possessed accumulated hoards. Berne had a small treasury, which has furnished all the enemies of France with a never-ending theme of reproach. It has been rated as high as thirty millions; it was no more than eight. It has been asserted that the sole object of France in making war was to possess herself of it, and to devote it to the Egyptian expedition, as if she could have supposed that the authorities of Berne would be so improvident as not to remove it, and as if it were possible that she should plunge into a war and defy the consequences of such an invasion, in order to gain eight millions [francs]. These absurdities will not bear the slightest examination*. A levy was imposed on the members of the old aristocracies of Berne, Friburg, Soleure, and Zurich, to supply the troops with pay and provisions.

It was near the end of the winter of 1798 (year VI.). Five months had scarcely elapsed since the treaty of Campo-Formio, and the situation of Europe was already strangely altered; the republican system was daily making fresh invasions: to the three republics previously founded by France were

* They are repeated by Madame de Staël and a whole tribe of authors.

now to be added two new ones, created within two months. Europe every where resounded with the names of *Batavian republic, Helvetic republic, Cisalpine republic, Ligurian republic, and Roman republic.* Instead of three states, France had now the control of five. She was involved in a new complication of business, and had fresh explanations to give to the foreign powers. The directory found itself thus insensibly carried away with the stream. There is nothing more ambitious than a system; it conquers almost always of itself, and frequently even against the will of its originators.

While the directory was obliged to attend to external affairs, the elections afforded it cause for anxiety. Ever since the 18th Fructidor, there had remained in the councils only such deputies as the directory had voluntarily left in them, and on whom it could rely. They consisted of all those who had either desired or had yielded to the violent but necessary measures of that day. Six months of tolerable quiet between the executive power and the councils had elapsed, and the directory had employed them, as we have seen, in negotiations, in maritime projects, and in the creation of new states. Although there had been a great calm, it cannot be said that the union was perfect; two powers having opposite interests cannot long remain in perfect unison with each other.

A new opposition was being formed, composed no longer of royalists but of patriots. The reader must have remarked that, after one party had been conquered, the government found itself compelled to enter into a conflict with the party who had assisted its operations, because the latter became too encroaching, and began in its turn to rebel. Since the 9th Thermidor, the epoch at which the factions become equal in strength, and had begun to be alternately defeated and victorious, the patriots had caused a reaction in Germinal and Prairial, and immediately after them, the royalists in Vendémiaire. Since Vendémiaire and the institution of the directory, the patriots had taken their turn, and had shown themselves the most audacious, till the rash attempt on the camp at Grenelle. Computing from that day the royalists had regained the ascendancy, they had lost it on the 18th Fructidor, and it was now for the patriots to raise their heads. To characterize this state of things, a word was devised, which we have seen make its appearance at a later period, that of *see-saw* (*bascule*). That was denominated a *see saw system*, which consists in alternately elevating either party. The directory was reproached with adopting this system, and thus being by turns the slave of that faction of whose services it availed itself. This reproach was unjust; for unless it take the helm of state with a victorious sword in its hand, no government can destroy all the parties at one blow, and govern without them, and independent of them. At every change of system, changes in the administration have to be made, and those naturally are summoned to its assistance who have manifested opinions in conformity with the system which has triumphed. All the members of the victorious party, giving the rein to their expectations, press forward in a body, beset the government, and are ready to attack it if it does not do all that they desire. All the patriots were stirring, and getting the support of the deputies who had voted with the directory in the councils. The directory had resisted many calls of this nature, but had been obliged to comply with some. Numerous patriots had been appointed commissioners in the departments (prefects). A shoal of others were preparing to seize the opportunity of the elections to gain an entry into the legislative body. The authorities recently nominated gave them a good opportunity for advancing themselves.

Besides the new opposition, composed of all the patriots who wished to make the 18th Fructidor serve their turn, another had formed, which styled itself constitutional. This opposition made its appearance anew; it pretended to have no bias either to the royalists or to the patriots; it affected independence, moderation, and attachment to the written law; it comprehended men who, without being carried down by the stream of party, had personal causes for discontent. Some had not been able to obtain an embassy, a step in promotion, or a contract for a relation; others had missed the place vacant in the directory by a few votes. Nothing is more common than this sort of discontent under a new government, recently established, composed of men who were but the other day in the station of mere citizens. It is said that hereditary office is a curb to ambition, and reasonably so if limited to places of a particular description. Nothing can equal the importunity displayed towards men who were yesterday your equals. You have helped to appoint them, or perhaps you feel that they are above you merely by the accident of a few votes; it seems as if you had a right to ask for and have every thing of them. The directory, without intending it, had made a great number of malcontents among the deputies who were formerly called directorialists, and whom their assistance afforded in Fructidor, had rendered it extremely difficult to satisfy. One of Bonaparte's brothers, Lucien, returned by Corsica to the five hundred, had ranged himself in this constitutional opposition, not that he had any reason for personal discontent, but because he affected to act the same part as his brother, and assumed the part of censor of the government. This was the attitude that seemed most consistent to a family that sought to dwell apart. Lucien was intelligent, and endowed with a remarkable talent for public oratory. He there showed off with great effect, surrounded as he was by the halo of his brother's glory. Joseph had returned to Paris ever since he left Rome; he there maintained great state, and received a great number of generals, deputies, and eminent persons. The two brothers, Joseph and Lucien, could thus do many things, from which good taste and his great reserve excluded the general.

However, if public opinion, which for six months past had been nearly uniform, now began to exhibit various shades, no striking difference was as yet perceptible; cautious behaviour and mutual respect prevailed in the councils, and every measure introduced by the directory was carried by immense majorities.

Every thing indicated that the elections of the year VI. would be in favour of the patriots. They now ruled supreme in France and in all the new republics. The directory had determined to employ all legal means to avoid being overrun with them. Its commissioners issued moderate circulars, which contained exhortations but no threats.

At any rate, the directory had not at its disposal any of those ascendancies or infamous tricks devised in our days for carrying elections as parties in power might please. In the elections of the year V. some assemblies were divided, and to avoid violence, a portion of the electors had gone and voted apart. This example was proposed in the electoral assemblies of this year; political schisms were very prevalent, and in almost every locality the electors in the minority alleged some infraction of the law, or some violence exercised towards them, as a pretext for assembling apart, and making their particular elections. It is right to observe, that in many departments the patriots comported themselves with their accustomed turbulence, and legally justified the withdrawal of their opponents. In some of the assemblies it was the patriots who were in a minority, and who seceded; but almost every where they had a majority, because the mass of the population, who was opposed to them, and who had thronged to the elections of the year V. and of the year VI., now intimidated by the 18th Fructidor, had, as it were, withdrawn from public affairs, and durst no longer take any part therein. In Paris, the agitation was very great; there were two assemblies, one at the Oratoire, composed entirely of patriots, and comprehending at least six hundred electors; the other at the Institute, composed of moderate republicans, and amounting to no more than two hundred and seventy-eight electors. The latter made an excellent selection.

The elections, in general, had been doubled. Already the malcontents, the lovers of novelty, those who, from all sorts of motives, wished to modify the existing order of things, cried, *This will never do; after having got up an 18th Fructidor against the royalists, we shall be obliged to get up another against the patriots.* Already they circulated reports that the constitution was about to be changed; a proposition to that effect was even made to the directory, who peremptorily rejected it.

Different courses had to be taken with regard to the elections. In acting upon strict principles, the councils must sanction the elections made by the majorities; otherwise the consequence would be that the minorities, by seceding, would have power of gaining the day, and carrying the nominations. Riots and illegal proceedings might be a reason for annulling the selection made by the majorities, but not for adopting the choice of the minorities. The patriots in the councils strongly maintained this opinion, because their party having shown a far greater number at almost all the assemblies, they would then have gained their point. But the mass of the two councils were by no means anxious to help them to gain their cause, and two expedients were proposed, either to choose between the nominations made by the seceding assemblies, or to make a new 18th Fructidor. This last measure was not to be thought of; the former was by far the milder and much more natural course. It was adopted. Almost every where the elections of the patriots were annulled, and those of their adversaries confirmed. The elections made in Paris, in the assembly of the Institute, though it contained only two hundred and twenty-eight electors, while that at the Oratoire comprehended six hundred, were approved of. In spite of this system, however, the new third brought an effectual reinforcement to the patriotic party in the two councils. That party was highly incensed at the expedient adopted for excluding the men of its choice, and became somewhat more impatient against the directory.

A new director had to be elected. The ballot designated François (of Neuf-chateau) as the member going out. He was succeeded by Treilhard, one of our plenipotentiaries at Radstadt. Treilhard entertained precisely the same opinions as Larévellière, Rewbell, and Merlin. He introduced no change in the spirit of the directory. He was an honest man, well acquainted with the forms of business. Thus there were in the government four sincere republicans, voting absolutely alike, and combining intelligence with integrity. Treilhard was succeeded at Rastadt by Jean Debry, formerly a member of the legislature and of the national convention.

Since the parties had been obliged, by the establishment of the constitution of the year III. to struggle within the narrow space of a constitution, the scenes in the interior had attracted less notice. Since the 18th Fructidor, in particular, the tribune had lost much of its importance. Every body was intent upon what was doing abroad. The great influence of the republic in Europe, her singular and multiplied relations with foreign powers, her train of republics, the revolutions which she was every where effecting, her designs against England, solely absorbed public attention. How would France address herself to attack her rival, and strike her severe blows as she had already inflicted on Austria? Such was the question that people put to themselves. The public were so familiarized with hardy plans and extraordinary enterprises, that the crossing the channel seemed a mere matter of course. Friends and enemies of England alike conceived her to be in extreme jeopardy. She herself considered that she was seriously exposed, and made extraordinary efforts for defending herself. The whole world had its eyes fixed on the straits of Calais.

Bonaparte, whose thoughts were upon Egypt, in the same way he had two years previously thought of Italy, indeed in the mode in which he thought of every thing, that is, with irresistible impulse, had submitted his plan to the directory, who at this moment was engaged in discussing its practicability. Those great geniuses who have consulted the map of the world, have all turned their thoughts towards Egypt. We may mention three, Albuquerque, Leibnitz, and Bonaparte. Albuquerque had been impressed with the idea that the Portuguese, who had just opened a way to India by the Cape of Good Hope, might be stripped of that important commercial monopoly, if proper use were made of the Nile and the Red Sea. Thus he conceived the gigantic idea of diverting the course of the Nile, and bringing it into the Red Sea, so as to render that way for ever impracticable, and secure the India trade to the Portuguese for ever after. Vain foresight of genius, that would seek to create a perpetuity in a changeful and shifting world! Had Albuquerque's plan been successful, the benefit of his labours would have been reaped by the Dutch, and subsequently by the English. Under Louis XIV., the great Leibnitz, whose mind was most comprehensive, addressed a memorial to the French monarch,

which is one of the most splendid monuments of political reasoning and eloquence. Louis XIV. had resolved, for the sake of earning a few medals, to invade Holland. "Sire," said Leibnitz, "it is not at home that you will be able to conquer those republicans; you will not cross their dikes, and you will have all Europe arrayed on their side. It is in Egypt where you must strike them. There it is that you will find the real track of the commerce of India; you will wrest that commerce from the Dutch, you will secure for ever the dominion of France in the Levant, you will rejoice all Christendom, you will fill the world with astonishment and admiration; and so far from leaguing against you, Europe will applaud your policy."

Such were the vast conceptions, neglected by Louis XIV., that absorbed the attention of the young republican general.

At a still later period, Egypt had been the subject of attention. M. de Choiseul had thought of occupying it when all the American colonies were in danger. It again became an object of consideration, when Joseph II. and Catherine threatened the Ottoman empire. Still more recently, M. Magallon, the French consul at Cairo, a man of superior abilities, and thoroughly acquainted with the state of Egypt and the east, had addressed memorials to the government, either to complain of the extortions practised by the Mamelukes upon French commerce, or to make the government sensible of the advantages that would accrue from the retaliations inflicted upon them. Bonaparte had surrounded himself with all these documents, and had formed his plan from their contents. Egypt was, in his opinion, the real point of correspondence between Europe and India; there was the place where France ought to establish herself in order to ruin England; from thence could a command be ensured over the Mediterranean, make it, to use one of his own expressions, a *French lake*; and either guarantee the existence of the Turkish empire, or take the best share of her spoil. Once established in Egypt, he would have it in his power to do two things; either create a navy in the Red Sea, and proceed to destroy the settlements of the English in the great Indian peninsula, or make Egypt a colony and a magazine. The Indian trade could not fail soon to transfer itself thither, and desert the Cape of Good Hope. All the caravans of Syria, Arabia, and Africa, already crossed each other at Cairo. The trade of those countries alone might prove immense. Egypt was the most fertile country in the world. Besides a great abundance of different kinds of grain, it was capable of furnishing all the productions of America, and forming a complete substitute for them. Thus, whether Egypt were made a point of departure for the purpose of attacking the English settlements, or whether it were made a mere magazine, it was certain to bring an enormous trade back into its true channels, and to make those channels lead to France.

This daring enterprise, in the next place, had in the eyes of Bonaparte the credit of possessing peculiar advantages. According to the luminous reports of the consul, Magallon, this was the very moment for an expedition to Egypt. By hastening the preparations and the voyage, the expedition might arrive there in the early part of the summer. It would then find the harvest finished and got in, and a favourable wind for ascending the Nile. Bonaparte maintained that it would be impossible to make his descent upon England before the winter; that, besides, she was too well forewarned; that the expedition to Egypt being totally unexpected, would meet with no impediments; that a few months would suffice for the French to form a settlement; and that he would himself return in the autumn to carry into execution the invasion of England; that the period would then be favourable; that England would by that time have sent part of her fleet to India, so that they would meet with less impediments on nearing the British shores. Besides all these incitements, Bonaparte had others of a personal nature; the inactive life he was leading in Paris was insupportable to him; there was no new path to be opened in politics; he was afraid of wearing himself out; he looked to still further aggrandizement for himself. "*Great names*," he had observed, "*are only made in the east.*"

The directory, who have been accused of having desired to get rid of Bonaparte by sending him to Egypt, on the contrary, made strong objections against the scheme. Larévellière-Lépeaux in particular, was one who was most obstinately opposed to it. He said that the government would be exposing thirty or forty thousand of the best soldiers of France, consigning them to the risk of a naval engagement, and depriving itself of its best general, of that general whom Austria most dreaded, at a moment when the continent was far from being in a settled state, and at a time when the foundation of the new republics had excited the most bitter resentments; that moreover it might, perhaps, stir up the Porte to engage in hostilities by invading one of his provinces. Bonaparte had an answer to every objection. He said that nothing was easier than to escape the English by keeping them in ignorance of the design; that France with three or four hundred thousand soldiers would not miss thirty or forty thousand; that as for himself he should soon return; that the Porte had long ago lost Egypt through the usurpation of the Mamelukes; that the Porte would be very glad to witness their chastisement by France; that some understanding might be come to with her; and that the continent would not so soon evince its indignation, &c. &c. He also spoke of Malta, which he should take from the knights as he went along, and which he should secure for France. Some warm words took place, and occasioned a scene that has always been incorrectly related. Bonaparte, in one of his impatient moods, uttered the word "resignation." "I am far from desiring that you should tender it," said Larévellière with firmness; "but if you do tender it, I am of opinion that it ought to be accepted*." From that moment Bonaparte never uttered the word resignation again.

Overcome at last by the reasons in reply and the arguments of Bonaparte, the directory assented to the proposed expedition. It was seduced by the grandeur of the enterprise, by its commercial advantages, by the promise that Bonaparte gave to

* This expression has been alternately attributed to Rewbell or to Barras. The discussion has been ascribed to a perfectly different cause than the true one. It was on the occasion of mooting the Egyptian expedition and with Larévellière that this scene took place.

return by the winter, and then to attempt the invasion of England. It was agreed to keep the affair a secret; and that it might be the better kept, the pens of the secretaries were not employed. Merlin, president of the directory, wrote the order with his own hand, and the order itself did not state the nature of the enterprise. It was agreed that Bonaparte should be empowered to take with him thirty-six thousand men of the old army of Italy, a certain number of officers and generals of his own selection, men of science, engineers, geographers, operatives of every description, and the squadron of Brueys, reinforced by some of the ships which had been left at Toulon. Orders were given to the treasury to deliver him a million and a half [francs] every decade. He was allowed to take three out of the eight millions found in the coffers of Berne. It has been asserted that Switzerland was invaded in order to obtain the means of invading Egypt. The reader is now capable of judging what truth there was in that conjecture.

Bonaparte immediately formed a commission, which was directed to repair without loss of time to the ports of the Mediterranean, and to get ready there the means of conveyance for the troops. This commission was styled *the commission for arming the coasts of the Mediterranean.* The commission itself was no better acquainted than other people with the object of the armament. The secret was confined to Bonaparte and the five directors. As great preparations were making in all the ports at the same time, it was supposed that the armament in the Mediterranean was connected with that going forward in the ports of the Atlantic. The army assembled on the coast of the Mediterranean was called the left wing of the army of England.

Bonaparte now set to work with that extraordinary activity which he displayed in the execution of all his plans. Running by turns to the ministers of war, of the marine, and of the finances, and from the ministers to the treasury, making sure with his own eyes that his orders were executed, using his influence to hasten their completion, corresponding with all the ports, with Switzerland, and with Italy, he caused every preparation to be made with incredible rapidity. He appointed four places where the convoys and troops were to meet. The principal convoy was to sail from Toulon, the second from Genoa, the third from Ajaccio, the fourth from Civita Vecchia. He ordered to Toulon and Genoa the detachments of the army of Italy, then on their return to France, and one of the divisions which had been to Rome, to Civita Vecchia. He contracted both in France and Italy with captains of merchant vessels, and thus procured in the ports which were to serve as points of departure four hundred vessels. He collected a numerous artillery; he selected two thousand five hundred of the best cavalry, and had them put on board without horses, because he intended to mount them at the expense of the Arabs. He resolved to take with him nothing but saddles and harness. He ordered no more than three hundred horses to be shipped, that on his arrival he might have a few mounted cavalry and harnessed guns. He gathered together operatives of every description. He took from Rome the Greek and Arabic printing-types of the Propaganda, and a set of printers; he formed a complete collection of philosophical and mathematical instruments. The scientific men, artists, engineers, draughtsmen, and geographers, whom he took with him, amounted to about one hundred persons. The names of the most illustrious persons were associated with his enterprise: Monge, Bertholet, Fourier, and Dolomieux, belonged to the expedition; Desgenettes, Larrey, and Dubois were the same. Every one was eager to attach himself to the fortune of the young general. They knew not where they were to land, but were all ready to accompany him any where. Desaix had gone, during the negotiations at Udine, to visit the fields of battle which had become so celebrated in Italy. From that time he had contracted a friendship with Bonaparte, and he wished to go with him. Kléber was at Chaillot, discontented, as usual, with the government, and not desirous of asking for employment. He frequently called to see the great master of the art to which he was passionately attached. Bonaparte proposed that he should go with him: Kléber joyfully accepted the offer. "But," said he, "will the *lawyers* let me go?" (This was the name he always gave the directors.) Bonaparte undertook to remove all obstacles. "Well," said Kléber, who supposed that they were bound for England, "if you throw a fire-ship into the Thames, put Kléber on board of her, and you shall see what he will do." To these two first-rate generals, Bonaparte added Reynier, Dugua, Vaubois, Bon, Menou, Baraguay-d'Hilliers, Lannes, Murat, Belliard, and Dammartin, who had already so ably seconded him in Italy. The brave and accomplished Caffarelli-Dufalga, who had lost a leg on the Rhine, commanded the engineers. The weak but agreeable Berthier was to be the chief of the staff. Detained by a love affair, he had nearly forsaken the general who had made his fortune; ashamed of his conduct, he made his excuses, and hastened to embark at Toulon. Brueys commanded the squadron; Villeneuve, Blanquet-Duchayla, and Decrès were the rear-admirals. Gantheaume was the chief of the naval staff. Thus all the most illustrious characters that France possessed in war, in science, and in the arts, placing implicit confidence in the young general, went with him to embark for an unknown destination.

France and Europe resounded with the noise of the preparations making in the Mediterranean. Conjectures of all kinds were formed. "Whither is Bonaparte going?" was the general question. "Whither are those brave officers, those scientific men, that army, going?" "They are going," said some, "to the Black Sea, to restore the Crimea to the Porte." "They are going to India, to assist Tippoo Saïb," replied others. Some, who were nearer the mark, maintained that they were going to cut a canal across the isthmus of Suez, or indeed to land on the shore of the isthmus, and to embark again in the Red Sea for India. Others, hitting the mark itself, said that they were going to Egypt. A tract read in the preceding year to the Institute furnished a ground for this conjecture. Lastly, the most experienced suggested a much more profound calculation. In their opinion, all this show of preparation, which seemed to indicate a plan of colonization, was no more than a feint. Bonaparte intended merely to pass with the Medi-

terranean squadron through the strait of Gibraltar, to attack lord Saint-Vincent, who was blockading Cadiz, to drive him off, to release the Spanish squadron, and to take it to Brest, where the so much desired junction of all the continental fleets would take place. This was why the Mediterranean expedition was called the left wing of the army of England.

This last conjecture was exactly the one which was most firmly assumed by the English cabinet, who had been for six months past in a state of alarm, and knew not on what side the storm that had been so long gathering would burst. In this anxiety, the opposition had for a moment coalesced with the ministry, and made common cause with it. Sheridan had directed his eloquence against the ambition, the encroaching turbulence, of the French people, and with the exception of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, he acquiesced in the motions of the minister. Pitt had immediately ordered the outfit of a second squadron. Extraordinary efforts were made to send it to sea, and it was reinforced with ten sail of the line from lord Saint-Vincent's fleet, to enable it to close the straits, for which Bonaparte was expected to steer. Nelson was detached with three sail by lord Saint-Vincent, to cruise in the Mediterranean, and to watch the motions of the French.

Every thing was ready for embarkation. Bonaparte was on the point of setting out for Toulon, when a scene occurred at Vienna, and the intentions manifested by several cabinets, had well-nigh detained him in Europe. The foundation of two new republics had excited to the utmost the apprehension of revolutionary contagion. England, desiring to foment this apprehension, had filled every court with her emissaries. She urged the new king of Prussia to depart from his neutrality, and to preserve Germany from the revolutionary torrent; she endeavoured to work upon the wrong-headed and violent spirit of the emperor Paul; she strove to alarm Austria on account of the occupation of the chain of the Alps by the French, and offered the emperor subsidies in order to cause a renewal of the war; she also called into action the silly passions of the queen of Naples and Acton. This latter court was more irritated than ever. Naples insisted that France should evacuate Rome, or cede to it part of the Roman provinces. Garat, the new ambassador, had displayed to no purpose the greatest evenness of temper. He could no longer put up with the ill-treatment of the Neapolitan cabinet. The state of the continent therefore suggested well-grounded apprehensions, and an unforeseen circumstance served to render them more serious. Bernadotte had been sent to Vienna, to give explanations to the Austrian cabinet, and he was to reside there, although no ambassador had yet been sent to Paris. That general, of a restless and susceptible disposition, was far from being a fit person for the post which he was destined to fill. On the 14th April (25th Germinal), an entertainment was to be given at Vienna in honour of the institution of the Vienna volunteers. The reader will recollect the zeal these volunteers had manifested in the preceding year, and what fate had befallen them at Rivoli and La Favorita. Bernadotte was indiscreet enough to want to oppose this entertainment, alleging that it was an insult to France. The emperor very justly replied that he was master in his own dominions, that France was at liberty to celebrate her victories, but that he too was at liberty to celebrate the devotedness of his subjects. Bernadotte determined to reply to one festivity by another; he gave an entertainment at his hotel commemorative of one of the victories of the army of Italy, of which it was the anniversary, and hoisted before his door the tri-coloured flag, with the words, *Liberty, Equality.* The populace of Vienna, excited it is said by emissaries of the English ambassador, flocked to the hotel of the French ambassador, broke the windows, and committed some disorders. The Austrian ministry hastened to send protection to Bernadotte, and behaved towards him in a far different manner from what the Roman government had done towards Joseph Bonaparte. Bernadotte, whose imprudence had provoked this event, quitted Vienna and repaired to Rastadt.

The cabinet of Vienna was extremely vexed at this occurrence. It was clear that this cabinet, even supposing it to be inclined to resume hostilities, would not have begun by insulting our ambassador, and provoking hostilities to meet which it was unprepared. It is certain, on the contrary, that though highly dissatisfied with France and her recent encroachments, and foreseeing that it should some day have to renew the conflict with her, it was not yet disposed, and deemed its subjects too much exhausted, and its means too feeble, to attack anew the republican colossus. It lost no time in publishing its condemnation of the proceeding, and writing to Bernadotte for the purpose of appeasing him.

The directory considered this occurrence at Vienna as a rupture, and counter-orders were immediately sent to Bonaparte, they even desired him to set out for Rastadt, to overawe the emperor, and to force him either to give satisfaction or to prepare for war. Bonaparte, very much annoyed by this interference with his plans, would not go to Rastadt, and judging of the matter more correctly than the directory, he declared that the circumstance was by no means such a serious affair as it was supposed to be. Austria, in fact, wrote immediately that she was at length about to send a minister to Paris, a M. de Degelmann; she held out the dismissal of the directing minister Thugut; she intimated that M. de Cobentzel would repair to any place fixed by the directory, to enter into explanations with an envoy of France concerning the affair of Vienna, and the changes which had taken place in Europe since the treaty of Campo-Formio. The storm, therefore, seemed to have blown over. Moreover, the negotiations at Rastadt had made an important advance. After disputing the left bank of the Rhine foot by foot, after insisting on retaining the tract comprised between the Moselle and the Rhine, and afterwards a small territory between the Röer and the Rhine, the deputation of the empire had at last conceded the whole of the left bank. The line of the Rhine was at length recognised as our natural boundary. Another principle, of not less importance, had been admitted —that of indemnifying the dispossessed princes by means of disannexations from the church. But points not less difficult yet remained to be settled, the appropriation of the islands in the Rhine,

the conservation of the fortified posts, bridges, and *têtes de pont*, the fate of the monasteries, and of the greater nobility on the left bank, the payment of the debts of the countries ceded to France, and how the laws against emigrants were to be enforced in them, &c. &c. These were questions which it was difficult to resolve, putting German tardiness out of the question.

Such was the state of the continent. The horizon seemed somewhat clearer, and Bonaparte at length obtained permission to set out for Toulon. It was settled that M. de Talleyrand should start immediately afterwards for Constantinople, in order to gain the assent of the Porte to the expedition of Egypt.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE EGYPT EXPEDITION. DEPARTURE FROM TOULON; ARRIVAL OFF MALTA; CONQUEST OF THAT ISLAND; DEPARTURE FOR EGYPT; LANDING AT ALEXANDRIA; CAPTURE OF THAT PLACE. MARCH TO CAIRO; BATTLE OF CHEBREISS.—BATTLE OF THE PYRAMIDS; CAIRO OCCUPIED BY THE FRENCH.—ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS OF BONAPARTE IN EGYPT; A NEW COLONY ESTABLISHED THERE. NAVAL BATTLE OF ABOUKIR; THE FRENCH FLEET DESTROYED BY THE ENGLISH.

BONAPARTE arrived at Toulon on the 20th Floréal, year VI. (May 9th, 1798). His presence cheered the army, which had exhibited some discontent in the apprehension that he would not be at the head of the expedition. This was the old army of Italy. It was well provided for, covered with glory, and one might say of it that *its fortune was made*. Hence its zeal for war was not so great, indeed it required all the zeal with which the general inspired it, to induce it to go on shipboard, and proceed to an unknown destination. Nevertheless, on seeing him at Toulon, it exhibited the utmost enthusiasm. The army had not seen him for eight months. Bonaparte, without acquainting his army of its destination, published the following proclamation :—

"Soldiers!

"You are one of the wings of the army of England, you have gained warlike experience in mountains, in plains, and at sieges; it still remains for you to earn some experience in a naval battle.

"The Roman legions, whom you have sometimes imitated but never yet equalled, combated Carthage by turns on the sea, and on the plains of Zama. Victory never forsook them, because they were constantly brave, patient in enduring fatigue, well disciplined, and in unity with themselves.

"Soldiers, the eyes of Europe are upon you! You have great destinies to fulfil, battles to fight, dangers and hardships to surmount; you will do more than you have yet done for the prosperity of your country, the happiness of mankind, and your own glory.

"Soldiers, seamen, infantry, artillery, cavalry, be unanimous: recollect that on the day of battle you have to rely upon one another.

"Soldiers, seamen, you have hitherto been neglected; now the greatest solicitude of the republic is for you. You will be worthy of the army of which you form a part.

"The genius of liberty, which has made the republic from her birth the arbitress of Europe, decrees that she shall assume this character before the most remote seas and nations."

It was impossible to proclaim a great enterprise in a more distinguished manner, and at the same time leave it in the mystery in which it was intended to be involved.

The squadron of admiral Brueys consisted of thirteen sail of the line, of which one of 120 guns, (this was the *Orient*, which was to carry the admiral and the commander-in-chief), two of 80, and ten of 74. There were besides two Venetian ships of 64 guns, six Venetian and eight French frigates, seventy-two brigs, cutters, luggers, gun-boats, and small vessels of all sorts. The transport ships assembled at Toulon, Genoa, Ajaccio, and Civita Vecchia, amounted to four hundred. There were thus five hundred sail, which were to float at once upon the Mediterranean. Never before had such an armament appeared at sea. The fleet carried about forty thousand men of all arms, and ten thousand seamen. It had water for one month, and provisions for two.

This fleet set sail on the 30th Floréal (May 19th), amid the thunders of the cannon, and the cheers of the whole army. Violent gales did some damage to a frigate on leaving the port. The same gales caused such loss to Nelson, who was cruising with three sail of the line, that he was obliged to bear up for the islands of St. Pierre to refit. He was thus kept at a distance from the French fleet, and did not witness its departure. The Fleet first sailed for Genoa, to join the convoy collected in that port, under the command of general Baraguai-d'Hilliers. It then steered for Corsica, to rejoin the convoy at Ajaccio, commanded by Vaubois, and afterwards proceeded into the Bay of Naples, to join the convoy of Civita Vecchia, under the command of Desaix. Bonaparte's intention was to stop at Malta, and there make by the way a bold attempt, the success of which he had long since endeavoured to secure by secret intrigues. He meant to make himself master of that island, which, commanding the navigation of the Mediterranean, became important to Egypt, and could not fail soon to fall into the hands of the English, unless they were anticipated. The order of the Knights of Malta was like all the institutions of the middle ages. It had lost sight of the origin of its institution, and consequently possessed neither its former dignity or strength. It was nothing else than an abuse of an institution, and profitable only to those who were concerned in it. The knights possessed considerable estates in Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and Germany, conferred on them by the piety of good Catholics, in order to protect the

Christians going on pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Now that there had ceased to be pilgrimages of this kind, the duty of the knights was to protect the Christian nations against the Sallee Rovers, and to destroy the infamous system of piracy that infested the Mediterranean. The property of the order was sufficient to maintain a considerable naval force; but the knights took no pains whatever to form one; they had but two or three old frigates, that never saw the outside of the port, and a few galleys, that went to give and receive entertainments in the ports of Italy. The bailiffs and the commanders, dispersed over all Christendom, consumed in luxury and indolence the revenues of the order. There was not a single knight who had ever fought against the Sallee Rovers. Besides, all feeling of interest for the order was extinct. In France, the knights' possessions had been appropriated by the government, and Bonaparte had also caused them to be seized in Italy, without a single remonstrance being made on their behalf. We have seen that Bonaparte had already taken care to form secret connexions in Malta. He had gained over some of the knights, and he purposed to intimidate them by a bold stroke, and to make them surrender, for he had neither time or means for a regular attack against a fortress reputed to be impregnable. The order, which had for some time forebodings of the dangers to which it was exposed, on seeing the French squadrons scouring the Mediterranean, had placed itself under the protection of the emperor, Paul I.

Bonaparte made great efforts to rejoin the division from Civita Vecchia; but he could only join it at Malta. The five hundred French sail came in sight of the island on the 21st Prairial (June 9), twenty-two days after leaving Toulon. This sight caused great consternation in the city of Malta. Bonaparte, in order to have a pretext for stopping there, and for picking a quarrel, applied to the grand master for leave to take in water. The grand master, Ferdinand de Hompesch, replied by a peremptory refusal, alleging that the rules of the order forbade the entry of more than two ships belonging to belligerent powers. The English had been received in a far different manner when they had made their appearance. Bonaparte said that this was a proof of the most marked ill-will, and immediately ordered a landing to be effected. On the following day, the 22d Prairial (June 10th), the French troops landed on the island, and completely invested La Valetta, which contains a population of nearly thirty thousand souls, and is one of the strongest fortresses in Europe. Bonaparte ordered artillery to be landed, for the purpose of cannonading the forts. The knights returned his fire, but very feebly. They resolved to make a sally, but a great number of them were taken. The confusion extended itself to the inside of the fortress. Several knights, Frenchmen by birth, declared that they could not fight against their countrymen. Some of them were thrown into dungeons. The consternation was general, and the inhabitants were for a surrender. The grand master, who possessed little energy, and recollected the generosity of the conqueror of Rivoli at Mantua, thought only of protecting his own interest from destruction, enlarged one of the French knights whom he had thrown into prison, and sent him to Bonaparte to negotiate. The treaty was soon concluded. The knights surrendered to France the sovereignty of Malta and its dependent islands: in return France promised her interference at the conference of Rastadt to obtain for the grand master a principality in Germany, in default of which she promised him a life annuity of three hundred thousand francs, and a compensation of six hundred thousand francs in ready money. She granted to each knight of French birth a pension of seven hundred francs, and one thousand for those of sixty years of age; she promised her mediation with a view that those of other nations might be put in possession of the estates belonging to the order in their respective countries. Such were the conditions by means of which France gained possession of the best harbour in the Mediterranean, and one of the strongest fortresses in the world. Nothing short of the ascendancy Bonaparte had acquired could have obtained it without fighting; all that was requisite for this purpose was his venturing to lose some days there, with the English close after him. Caffarelli-Dufalga, as witty as he was brave, when he went over the place, the fortifications of which he greatly admired, facetiously said, "*It is fortunate there was somebody in the place to let us in.*"

Bonaparte left Vaubois at Malta with a garrison of three thousand men. He placed Regnault (of Jean-Saint d'Angely) there in quality of civil commissioner. He made all the administrative regulations that were necessary for the establishment of the municipal system in the island, and set sail immediately to steer for the coast of Egypt.

He weighed anchor on the 1st Messidor (June 19), after a stay of ten days. The main thing now was, to escape falling in with the English. Nelson, having refitted at the islands of Saint-Pierre, had obtained from lord Saint-Vincent a reinforcement of ten sail of the line and several frigates, which formed a squadron of thirteen sail of the line and some vessels of lower rate. He had returned on the 13th Prairial (1st June) off Toulon, but the French squadron had been gone twelve days. He had run from Toulon to the roads of Tagliamon, and from the roads of Tagliamon to Naples, where he had arrived on the 2d Messidor (20th June), at the very moment when Bonaparte was leaving Malta. Receiving intelligence that the French had been seen off Malta, he followed with the intention of attacking them, if he could but overtake them.

The French on board the whole squadron were ready for battle. The possibility of the English coming up with them presented itself to every body, but excited no alarm. Bonaparte had distributed in each ship of the line five hundred picked men, who were daily exercised in working the guns, and at the head of whom was one of those generals so accustomed to stand fire under his command. He had made it a principle in maritime tactics, that each ship was to have but one object in view, that of getting close to another, fighting with, and boarding her. Orders were issued in consequence, and he reckoned upon the bravery of the picked men distributed on board the ships. These precautions taken, he calmly steered for Egypt. This man, who, according to absurd detractors, feared the dangers of the sea, coolly exposed himself to

the chances of fortune amidst the English squadrons, and actually had the hardihood to spend some days at Malta to conquer that island. A light-hearted feeling prevailed on board the fleet; none of them precisely knew whither they were going, but the secret began to transpire, and they waited with impatience to get sight of the shores which they were going to conquer. Of an evening, the men of science and the general officers on board the *L'Orient* joined the commander-in-chief, and there commenced the ingenious and learned discussions of the Institute of Egypt. At one moment, the English squadron was only a few leagues distant from the immense French convoy, and neither party was aware of it. Nelson, beginning to suppose that the French were bound for Egypt, set sail for Alexandria, and got thither before them; but not finding them there, he flew to the Dardanelles, to endeavour to meet with them there. By singular good fortune, the French expedition did not come in sight of Alexandria till two days afterwards, the 13th Messidor (July 1st). It was very nearly six weeks since it had set sail from Toulon.

Bonaparte immediately despatched a messenger to find out the French consul. He learned that the English had made their appearance two days before, and supposing them to be close at hand, he resolved not to lose an instant in attempting to gain a landing. There was no gaining an entrance into the harbour of Alexandria, for the place appeared disposed to defend itself: he had therefore to go some way further down on the neighbouring coast, at a creek called the Marabou's. It was blowing hard, and the sea broke with fury over the reefs on the shore. The day was far advanced. Bonaparte gave the signal, and made up his mind to go on shore immediately. He was the first who got into a long boat. The soldiers loudly insisted on accompanying him. The boats were low being let down, but the sea ran so high that they were in danger of being dashed every moment against each other. At length, with great hazards, they got to land. At that moment a sail appeared on the horizon; it was supposed to be an English sail. "*O Fortune*," exclaimed Bonaparte, "*dost thou desert me? Why, I only want five days!*" Fortune had not deserted him, it was but a French frigate about to join them. There was great difficulty experienced in landing four or five thousand men that evening and night. Bonaparte resolved to march forthwith for Alexandria, in order to surprise the place, and not to allow the Turks time to make preparations for defence. Marching orders were given. Not a single horse was yet landed; the staff, Bonaparte, and Caffarelli himself, notwithstanding his wooden leg, had to go four or five leagues over the sands, and came at daybreak within sight of Alexandria.

That ancient city, Alexander's daughter, no longer possessed its magnificent edifices, its innumerable houses, and its immense population. Three-fourths of it were in ruins. The Turks, the wealthy Egyptians, and the European merchants, dwelt in the modern town, which was the only part preserved. A few Arabs lived among the ruins of the ancient city: an old wall, flanked by towers, enclosed the new and the old town, and all around nothing was visible but those sands which in Egypt advance wherever civilization recedes.

The four thousand French led by Bonaparte arrived there at daybreak. Upon this sandy beach they met with no one save a few Arabs, who, after a few musket-shots, sheltered themselves in the desert. Bonaparte divided his men into three columns: Bon, with the first, marched on the right towards the Rosetta gate; Kléber, with the second, marched in the centre towards the Pillar gate; Menou, with the third, advanced on the left towards the Catacombs gate. The Arabs and the Turks, very good soldiers, were behind a wall, and kept up a steady fire, but the French ascended with scaling ladders, and got over the old wall. Kléber was the first who fell, struck by a ball on the forehead. The Arabs were driven from ruin to ruin, up to the new town. The battle was about to be continued from street to street, and to become sanguinary, when a Turkish captain served as a mediator for negotiating an arrangement. Bonaparte declared that he had not come to plunder the country, or to take it from the Grand Signior, but merely to free it from the domination of the Mamelukes, and to revenge the outrages they had committed against France. He promised that the authorities of the country should be upheld, that the ceremonies of religion should continue to be performed as theretofore, that property should be respected, &c. Upon these terms, the resistance ceased: that same day the French were masters of Alexandria. In the mean time, the rest of the army had effected their landing. The next thing to be done was to place the squadron in some place of shelter, either in the harbour or in one of the neighbouring roads; to form at Alexandria an administration adapted to the manners of the country; and to settle upon a plan of invasion for gaining possession of Egypt. At present, the dangers of the sea and meeting with the English were over; the greatest obstacles were surmounted with that success which seems always to accompany the youth of a great man.

Egypt, on which we had just effected our landing, is a country the most peculiar, the best situated, and one of the most fertile in the world. Its [geographical] position every one knows. Africa is connected with Asia by an isthmus a few leagues across, called the Isthmus of Suez, and which, if cut through, would furnish a communication from the Mediterranean to the Indian Sea, and dispense with the necessity of sailors in future doubling by a long voyage and in stormy weather the Cape of Good Hope. Egypt is situated parallel with the Red Sea and the Isthmus of Suez. She is mistress of that isthmus. It was this country through which, in the time of the ancients and in the middle ages, during the prosperity of the Venetians, the commerce of India flowed. Such is its situation between the East and the West. Its physical constitution and form are not less extraordinary. The Nile, one of the largest rivers in the world, takes its rise in the mountains of Abyssinia, runs six hundred leagues through the deserts of Africa, then enters, or rather falls into, Egypt, throwing itself down the cataracts of Syene, and, after a course of two hundred leagues more, falls into the sea. The banks of the Nile form the whole of Egypt. It is a valley two hundred leagues

in length, and five or six in breadth. On either side it is bordered by an expanse of sand. Several chains of mountains, low, dry, and rugged, make a melancholy break to these sands, and throw something of a shadow over their vast extent. Some of these mountains separate the Nile from the Red Sea, others divide this river from the great desert, in which they disappear to the eye. On the left bank of the Nile, at a certain distance in the desert, wind two strips of land capable of cultivation, which form a contrast to the sands, and are covered with some verdure. These are the *oases*, a kind of islands where vegetation exists amidst an expanse of sand. There are two, the great and the little. An effort of man, by diverting thither a branch of the Nile, would convert them into fertile provinces. Fifty leagues from the sea, the Nile divides into two branches, which fall, at the distance of sixty leagues one from the other, into the Mediterranean, the one at Rosetta, the other at Damietta. The Nile was once known to have seven mouths. They are still to be traced, but only two of them are now navigable. The triangle formed by its two great branches and the sea measures sixty leagues at its base and fifty on the sides. It is called the Delta. It is the most fertile part of Egypt, because it is the best watered and most intersected by canals. The country is divided into three parts: the Delta or Lower Egypt, which is called Bahireh; Middle Egypt, called Westanieh; and Upper Egypt, called the Saïd.

The trade winds (*vents étésiens*) constantly blowing from north to south, during the months of May, June, and July, carry with them all the clouds formed at the mouth of the Nile, entirely prevent their making a stay in that ever serene country, and convey them towards the mountains of Abyssinia. There these clouds gather, descend in rain, during the months of July, August, and September, and produce that celebrated phenomenon of the rising of the Nile. Thus this land receives from the overflowings of the river that moisture which is not imparted to it from the heavens. It never rains; and the marshes of the Delta, which would be pestilential beneath the sky of Europe, in Egypt never occasion a single fever. The Nile, after its inundation, leaves a fertile mud, which is the only soil that can be cultivated on its banks, and produces those abundant harvests which of old were appropriated to the subsistence of Rome. The farther the inundation extends, the greater is the extent of the soil fit for cultivation. The owners of this soil, levelled every year by the waters, divide them among themselves every year by measurement. Hence land-surveying is an important art in Egypt. Canals might be made a means of extending the inundation, which would also have the advantage of diminishing the rapidity of the waters, of making them stay a longer time, and of diffusing fertility at the expense of the desert. No where else would the labour of man be productive of more salutary effects; no where else would civilization be more desirable. The Nile and the desert hold divided sway in Egypt, and it is civilization that would furnish the Nile with the means of conquering the desert, and causing it to recede. It is believed that Egypt formerly supported twenty millions of inhabitants, exclusive of the Romans; it could hardly subsist three millions of souls when the French arrived there.

The inundation is over about September. Then it is that field labour commences. In October, November, January, and February, the country in Egypt exhibits a delicious spectacle of fertility and luxuriance. It is then covered with the richest crops, enamelled with flowers, and depasturing immense herds and flocks. In March, the summer heats begin; the earth gapes in such deep clefts, that it is sometimes dangerous to travel on horseback. Agricultural labour at this time terminates. The Egyptians have by that time got in all the productions of the year. Besides corn, Egypt produces the best rice, the finest vegetables, sugar, indigo, senna, cassia, carbonate of soda, flax, hemp, cotton, and all these in marvellous abundance. Egypt produces no oil, but this it obtains on the opposite coasts of Greece; neither does it grow tobacco or coffee, but these it finds by its side in Syria and Arabia. It is also devoid of wood, for vegetation on a larger scale cannot protrude roots a sufficient depth of soil in the annual mud deposited by the Nile upon a sandy substratum. A few sycamores and palms are the only trees of Egypt. For want of fuel, the inhabitants burn cow-dung. Egypt rears immense herds. Poultry of every description swarms there. Egypt possesses those beautiful horses, so celebrated all over the world for their beauty, their spirit, and their familiarity with their masters; and also that useful beast, the camel, able to supply itself at one time with food and drink for several days, whose foot sinks without fatigue in the moving sands, and serves-like a living ship for crossing the sandy sea.

Every year there arrive at Cairo prodigious caravans, who meet like fleets on both sides of the desert. Some come from Syria and Arabia, others from Africa and the coasts of Barbary. They are importers of every production peculiar to the countries of the sun, gold, ivory, feathers, inimitable shawls, perfumes, gums, spices of all kinds, coffee, tobacco, wood, and slaves. Cairo becomes a magnificent emporium of the most exquisite productions of the globe, such as the mighty genius of the people of the west can never imitate, because it is the sun which bestows them, and which their delicate taste will always make them covet. Thus the trade of India is the only one to which the progress of nations will never put an end. There would, therefore, be no necessity for making Egypt a military station, for the purpose of violently putting an end to the English trade with India, all that would be required for this purpose would be the establishment of a grand commercial depository, enjoying personal safety, laws, and European commodities, to draw thither the wealth of the world.

The population of Egypt is, like the towns that cover it, an assemblage of the wrecks of several nations. The Copts, the ancient inhabitants of Egypt, the Arabs, who conquered Egypt from the Copts, and the Turks, the conquerors of the Arabs: such are the races whose degenerate remains lead a wretched life in a land of which they are unworthy. On the arrival of the French, the Copts amounted at most to two hundred thousand. Poor, contemned, and brutalized, they had devoted themselves, like all the proscribed classes, to the most ignoble employments.

The Arabs formed almost the entire mass of the population. They were descendants of the fellow warriors of the prophet. Their condition was infinitely varied; some of high birth, carrying back their pedigree to Mahomet himself, great landed proprietors, possessing some traces of Arabian knowledge, combining with nobility the functions of the priesthood and the magistracy, were, under the title of Sheiks, the real grandees of Egypt. In the Divans, they represented the country, when its tyrants wish to address themselves to it; in the Mosques they formed a sort of universities, in which they taught the religion and the morality of the Koran, and a little philosophy and jurisprudence. The great mosque of Jemil-Azar was the first learned and religious body in the East. Next to these grandees came the smaller land-owners, composing the second and more numerous class of the Arabs; then the lowest orders of the population, who had sunk into the state of absolute Helots. These last were hired peasants, cultivating the land by the name of fellahs, and living in distress and abject poverty. There was a fourth class of Arabs, namely, the Bedouins or wandering Arabs; these would never attach themselves to the soil; they were the children of the desert. Mounted on horses or camels, driving before them numerous herds of cattle, they wandered about seeking pasturage in the Oases, or coming annually to sow the strips of land capable of cultivation, situated on the borders of Egypt. Their occupation was to escort caravans, or to lend their camels for the purposes of conveyance. But like faithless robbers, they frequently plundered the merchants whom they escorted, or to whom they lent their camels. Sometimes, even violating the hospitality granted to them on the borders of the land capable of cultivation, they fell upon the valley of the Nile, which, five leagues in breadth, was easy of access, plundered the villages, and remounting their horses, carried off their booty into the heart of the desert. Turkish negligence left their ravages almost always unpunished, and made no greater struggle against the robbers of the desert, than it would to fight against the sands. These wandering Arabs, divided into tribes on both sides of the valley, amounted to one hundred or one hundred and twenty thousand, and could furnish from twenty to twenty-five thousand horse, brave indeed, but only fit to harass an enemy, not to fight with him.

The third and last race was that of the Turks; but this race was hardly more numerous than the Copts, that is to say, it amounted to about two hundred thousand individuals at the most. This race was divided into Turks and Mamelukes. The Turks, who had come since the last conquest of the sultans of Constantinople, were almost all enrolled in the list of the janizaries; but it is well known that in general they got their names inscribed in those lists merely that they might enjoy the privileges of janizaries, and that a very small number of them were really in the service. Very few of them composed the military force of the pacha. This pacha, sent from Constantinople, was the sultan's representative in Egypt; but escorted only by a few janizaries, he found his authority enfeebled by the very precautions which sultan Selim had formerly taken to preserve it. That sultan, judging that from its remoteness Egypt might be able to escape from the dominion of Constantinople, and that a clever and ambitious pacha might there create an independent empire, had devised a counterpoise by instituting a Mameluke soldiery. But as it is impossible to conquer those physical conditions which render one country dependent or independent of another, instead of the pacha, it was the Mamelukes who had rendered themselves independent of Constantinople and masters of Egypt. The Mamelukes were slaves purchased in Circassia. Selected from among the handsomest children of the Caucasus, carried young to Egypt, brought up in ignorance of their origin, and in the practice of and taste for arms, they became the bravest and most agile horsemen in the world. They considered it an honour to be without family, to have been bought at a high price, and to be handsome and brave. They had twenty-four beys, who were their owners and their chiefs. These beys had each of them five or six hundred Mamelukes. It was a herd of which they had the burden of feeding, and which they bequeathed sometimes to a son, but more frequently to a favourite Mameluke, who became bey in his turn. Every Mameluke was served by two fellahs. The entire band consisted of nearly twelve thousand horse, served by twenty-four thousand Helots. They were the real masters and tyrants of the country. They lived either on the produce of the lands belonging to the beys, or on the revenue arising from the numerous taxes imposed in every possible form. The Copts, whom we have already described as engaged in the most ignoble occupations, were their tax-gatherers, their spies, their men of business; for the brutified part of society is always under the subjection of the strongest. The twenty-four beys, equal by right, were not so in fact. They made war upon one another, and the strongest, subduing the rest, possessed a sovereignty for life. He was entirely independent of the pacha representing the sultan of Constantinople, allowed him at most a sort of nullity at Cairo, and frequently refused him the *miri*, or land tax, which, representing the right of conquest, belonged to the Porte.

Egypt was, therefore, an absolute feudality, like that of Europe in the middle ages. It exhibited at once a conquered people; a conquering soldiery, in rebellion against its sovereign; and lastly, an ancient brutified class, in subjection to, and hired by the stronger.

Two beys, superior to the others, bore sway in Egypt at this moment. The one, Ibrahim Bey, wealthy, crafty, and powerful; the other, Murad-Bey, intrepid, valiant, and impassioned. They had agreed between themselves upon a sort of division of authority, by which Ibrahim Bey enjoyed the civil prerogatives, and Murad Bey the military power. The latter had the conduct of the wars; in these he excelled, and he possessed the affection of the Mamelukes, who were all eager to follow him.

Bonaparte, who with the genius of the captain combined the tact and the address of the founder of governments, and who had, moreover, so frequently regulated the affairs of conquered countries as to have gained peculiar experience therein, immediately apprehended the line of policy he had to follow in Egypt. He must in the first place wrest that country from its real masters, the Mamelukes. It was that class with whom he had to

contend, and to destroy as well by arms as by policy. Besides, he had reasons of great weight against them, for they had unceasingly ill-used the French. As for the Porte, he had to dissemble any attack upon its sovereignty, and on the contrary, to profess a great respect for it. Such was the state to which it was reduced, that this sovereignty became of no moment. The Porte could be treated with, whether it were for the cession of Egypt, whether it were by giving certain advantages elsewhere, or for a partition of authority, in which there would be nothing mortifying; for in leaving the pacha at Cairo in precisely the same condition he had hitherto been, and themselves succeeding to the power of the Mamelukes, would furnish no great cause of disquiet. As for the inhabitants, in order to attach them to us, the real population would have to be gained over, namely, the Arabs. By respecting the Sheiks, by courting their old pride, by increasing their power, by encouraging a secret desire, which it was discovered they possessed, as was the case in Italy, and indeed every where, a desire for the restoration of their ancient country, the country of the Arabs, it was certain they would be entirely under our control, and firmly attached to us. It was also expected that by showing consideration to life and property, with a people accustomed to consider conquest as conferring a right to murder, pillage, and devastation, he should cause a surprise that would operate most advantageous for the French army; and if besides all this, the French were to respect women and the prophet, the conquest of hearts would be as firmly secured as that of the soil.

Bonaparte conducted himself in perfect conformity with these notions, which were equally just and profound. Endowed with an entirely eastern imagination, it was easy for him to assume the solemn and imposing style which was suited to the Arab race. He made proclamations, which were translated into Arabic and circulated throughout the country. To the pacha he wrote, "The French republic has resolved to send a powerful army to Egypt to put an end to the plunder of the beys, as it has been obliged to do several times during this century against the beys of Tunis and Algiers. Thou, that oughtest to be the ruler of the beys, and whom they nevertheless hold at Cairo without authority and without power, thou shouldest witness my arrival with pleasure. Thou art, doubtless, already aware that I am not come to do any thing against the Koran or the sultan. Thou knowest that the French nation is the only ally that the sultan has in Europe. Come then to meet me, and curse with me the impious race of the beys." Speaking to the Egyptians, Bonaparte addressed them in these words: "People of Egypt, you will be told that I am come to overthrow your religion. Believe it not; make answer and say, that I am come to restore you to your rights, to punish the usurpers, and that I respect God, his prophet, and the Koran, more than I do the Mamelukes." Speaking of the tyranny of the Mamelukes, he said, "Is there a richly-cultivated territory? it belongs to the Mamelukes. Is there a beautiful slave, a fine horse, a good house? it belongs to the Mamelukes. If Egypt is their farm, let them produce the lease which God has granted them of it. But God is just and merciful to the people, and he hath ordained that the empire of the Mamelukes shall no longer exist." Speaking of the sentiments of the French, he added, "We, too, are true Mussulmans! Was it not us who destroyed the pope, who said that war must be made upon the Mussulmans? Was it not we who destroyed the knights of Malta, because those bigots believed that God had decreed that they should make war upon the Mussulmans? Thrice happy those who shall side with us. They shall prosper in their fortune and their rank. Happy those who shall be neuter. They will have time to become acquainted with us, and they will range themselves on our side. But woe, threefold woe, to those who shall arm for the Mamelukes, and fight against us! For them there will be no hope; they shall perish."

Bonaparte said to his soldiers, "You are going to undertake a conquest, the effects of which on the civilization and the commerce of the world are incalculable. You will give England a certain home-thrust, which will be but a prelude to your shortly giving her a death-blow."

The people with whom we are going to live are Mahometans. The first article of their faith is this: "*There is but one God, and Mahomet is his prophet.*" Do not contradict them. Act towards them as you have acted towards the Jews, towards the Italians. Demonstrate the same respect to their muftis and to their imans, as you have done to the rabbis and to the bishops. Exhibit the same toleration for the ceremonies prescribed by the Koran and for the Mosques, as you have done for the convents, for the synagogues, for the religion of Moses, and for that of Jesus Christ. The Roman legions protected all religions. You will here find customs differing from those of Europe; you must habituate yourselves to them. The people among whom we are come treat women differently from us. Recollect that in every country he who commits a rape is a coward.

"The first city that we shall come to was built by Alexander. We shall meet at every step with glorious associations, worthy to excite the emulation of Frenchmen."

Bonaparte lost no time in making his arrangements for establishing the French authority at Alexandria, for quitting the Delta, and gaining possession of Cairo, the capital of Egypt. It was in July; the Nile was about to inundate the country. He was anxious to reach Cairo before the rising of the Nile, and to employ the time of its duration in completing his establishment. He ordered that every thing at Alexandria should remain in the same state as before, that the offices of religion should be continued; and that justice should be administered as before by the cadis. His intention was merely to enforce his succession to the rights of the Mamelukes, and to appoint a commissioner to levy the accustomed imposts. He caused a divan, or municipal council to be formed, composed of the Sheiks and principal citizens of Alexandria, so as to be able to consult with them upon all measures that the French authority would have to adopt. He left three thousand men in garrison at Alexandria, and gave the command to Kléber, whose wound was likely for a month or so to keep him from active exertion. He directed a young officer of extraordinary merit, and who gave promise to France of becoming a great engineer, to put Alexandria

in a state of defence, and to construct there all the necessary works. This was colonel Cretin, who at a small charge, and in a short period of time, completed at Alexandria some well-constructed outworks. Bonaparte then issued orders for the fleet to be brought into some safe harbour of shelter. It was a matter of some doubt whether the large ships could enter the port of Alexandria. A commission of naval officers was appointed to sound the harbour and to make a report. In the mean time, the fleet was anchored in the road of Aboukir. Bonaparte ordered Brueys to ascertain the fact, and to repair to Corpe if it should be ascertained that the ships could not enter the harbour of Alexandria.

After he had despatched these affairs, he made his arrangements for marching. A considerable flotilla, laden with provisions, artillery, ammunition, and baggage, was to proceed along the coast to the Rosetta mouth, enter the Nile, and go up the river at the same time with the French army. He then set out with the main body of the army, which, exclusive of the two garrisons in Malta and Alexandria, was about thirty thousand strong. He had ordered his flotilla to proceed to the height of Ramanieh on the banks of the Nile. There he purposed to join it, and to proceed up the Nile parallel with it, in order to quit the Delta and to reach Upper Egypt or Bahireh. To go from Alexandria to Ramanieh there were two roads, one through inhabited countries by the side of the sea-coast and the Nile, the other shorter, and as a bird would fly, but across the desert of *Damankour*. Bonaparte never hesitated, but chose the shorter. It was of consequence for him that he should reach Cairo as speedily as possible. Desaix marched with the advanced guard; the main body followed at a few leagues distance. The army put itself in motion on the 18th Messidor (July 6). When the soldiers found themselves amidst this boundless plain, with a shifting sand beneath their feet, a scorching sun over their head, no water, no shade, with nothing for the eye to rest upon but scanty tufts of palm trees, seeing no living beings save light troops of Arab horsemen, who appeared and disappeared on the horizon, and sometimes concealed themselves behind sandhills to murder those who lagged behind, they were dreadfully dispirited. The desire for rest had already occupied their mind, after the long and obstinate campaign in Italy. They had accompanied their general to a distant country, because they had a blind faith in him, because he had held forth to them the prospect of a land of promise, from which they were to return rich enough to purchase each of them a field of six acres. But when they beheld this desert, discontent was the only feeling exhibited, which almost approached despair. They found all the wells, which at intervals border the road through the desert, destroyed by the Arabs. There were left only a few drops of water quite brackish, and wholly insufficient for quenching their thirst. They had been informed that at Damanhour they should find some relief; they met with nothing there but miserable huts, and could neither procure bread or wine, but only lentils in great abundance, and a little water. They were obliged to push forward again into the desert. Bonaparte saw the brave Lannes and Murat themselves take off their hats, dash them on the sand, and trample them under foot. Nevertheless he overawed all; his presence enforced silence, and sometimes restored cheerfulness. The soldiers would not impute their sufferings to him; they vented their moroseness against those who took pleasure in observing the country. Whenever they observed scientific persons stop to examine the smallest remains of ruins, they said that they were only brought thither for them, and revenged themselves with coarse jokes in their way. Caffarelli, in particular, brave as a grenadier, and inquisitive as a scholar, was considered by them as the man who had deceived the general and drawn him into this remote country. As he had lost a leg on the Rhine, they said, "What does he care for all this: as for him, he has one foot in France." However, after severe hardships, endured at first with impatience, and afterwards with gaiety and fortitude, they reached the Nile on the 22nd Messidor (July 10), after a march of four days. At sight of the Nile and the water, so much longed for, the soldiers rushed into it, and bathing in its waters, forgot all their fatigues. Desaix's division, which from the advanced guard had gone to the rear guard, saw two or three hundred Mamelukes galloping before it, who were dispersed by a few volleys of grapeshot. These were the first that had been seen. They proclaimed the approaching conflict with the hostile army. In fact, the brave Murad Bey, having been put on his guard, was collecting his forces in the neighbourhood of Cairo. Until he could get them together, he was hovering with a thousand horse about our army, so as to keep an eye upon its march.

The army waited at Ramanieh for the arrival of the flotilla, and took rest till the 25th Messidor (July 13), when it set out on the same day for Chebreiss. Murad Bey was there waiting for us with his Mamelukes. The flotilla which had been first to set out, and which had preceded the army, found itself engaged before it could be supported. Murad Bey was also provided with a flotilla, and from the shore he joined his fire to that of his *djerms* (light Egyptian vessels). The French flotilla was severely attacked. Perrée, an officer of marines, who had the command, displayed extraordinary courage; he was supported by the cavalry who had come dismounted to Egypt, and who, until they could serve themselves at the expense of the Mamelukes, were brought thither by water; two gun-boats were retaken from the enemy, and he was repulsed. At that moment the army came up; it was composed of five divisions. It had not yet been in action with its singular opponents. To rapidity of movement, charge of horse, and the use of the sabre, the French had to oppose the fixed position of the foot soldier, his long bayonet, and masses presenting a front on every side. Bonaparte formed his five divisions into five squares, in the centre of which were placed the baggage and the staff. The artillery was placed at the angles. The five divisions flanked one another. Murad Bey set upon these living citadels a thousand or twelve hundred intrepid horse; who rushing onwards with loud shouts and at full gallop, discharging their pistols, and then drawing their formidable scymetars, came and threw themselves upon the front of the squares. Encountering every where a hedge of bayonets and a tremendous fire, they hovered about the French

ranks, fell before them, or got away in the plain at the utmost speed of their horses. Murad, after losing two or three hundred of his bravest horsemen, retired for the purpose of gaining the point of the Delta, and getting on so as to wait for us above Cairo at the head of all his forces.

This battle sufficiently familiarised the army with this new species of opponents, and to suggest to Bonaparte the sort of tactics he should use against them. He went on towards Cairo. The flotilla kept on the Nile above the army, which marched without halting for the following days. The soldiers had to experience further privations, but they kept close to the Nile, and could bathe therein every night. The sight of the enemy had restored all their animation. "I found," said Bonaparte, "that these soldiers, already averse to fatigue, as is always the case when men have got sufficient reputation, stood fire very well. While under marching orders, they frequently vented their spleen, but after their moroseness they exhibited their coarse wit. The scientific men began to command respect by the courage which they displayed. Monge and Berthollet had shown heroic intrepidity at Chebreiss. The soldiers, although they still made them the subject of their mirth, yet regarded them highly. As the capital of Cairo, so highly extolled as one of the wonders of the East, did not yet make its appearance, they declared that it never had existence, or that they should find it, like Damanhour, a collection of wretched huts. They further said that this poor general had been deceived, and that he had suffered himself to be sent away *like a good boy*, himself and his companions in glory. In the evening, when they halted, the soldiers who had read the tales of the Thousand and One Nights, or heard them recited, repeated them to their comrades, and promised themselves gorgeous palaces glittering with gold. They were still without bread, not from the want of corn, but because there was neither mill or oven. They ate lentils, pigeons, and an exquisite water melon, known in southern climates by the name of *pastèque*. The soldiers called it *St. Pastèque*."

Cairo was near at hand, and there the decisive battle was to be fought. Murad Bey had there collected the greatest part of his Mamelukes, nearly ten thousand or thereabouts. They were attended by double the usual number of fellahs, to whom arms were given, and whom they compelled to fight behind the intrenchments. He had also assembled some thousands of janizaries or spahis, dependent on the pacha, who, notwithstanding Bonaparte's letter, had suffered himself to be drawn in to join the side of his oppressors. Murad Bey had made preparations for defence on the banks of the Nile. The great capital, Cairo, is seated on the right bank of that river. It was on the opposite bank, that is to say, on the left, that Murad Bey had pitched his camp, in a long plain that lay between the river and the pyramids of Gizeh, the highest in Egypt. These were his arrangements. A large village, called Embabeh, lay with its back towards the river. Murad Bey had ordered some works to be thrown up there, conceived and executed with true Turkish stupidity. They were nothing else than a mere ditch, which encompassed the village, with fixed batteries, the guns of which, not being placed on field carriages, could not be shifted. Such was Murad's intrenched camp. He had there posted his twenty-four thousand fellahs and janizaries, intending to make his stand there with the accustomed obstinacy of the Turks behind walls. This village, intrenched and supported upon the river, formed his right. His Mamelukes, to the number of ten thousand horse, extended over the plain, between the river and the pyramids. Some thousand Arab horse, who were no farther the auxiliaries of the Mamelukes than as performing the part of plunderers and murderers in case of victory, filled the space between the Mamelukes and the pyramids. Ibrahim, Murad Bey's colleague, less warlike and less brave than Murad, kept on the other side of the Nile, with about a thousand Mamelukes, and with his women, his slaves, and his wealth, ready to leave Cairo and seek refuge in Syria, if the French should prove victorious. A considerable number of *djerms* covered the Nile, and were laden with the valuable effects of the Mamelukes. Such was the order in which the two beys waited for Bonaparte.

On the 3rd Thermidor (July 21), the French army set itself in march before daybreak. Every one was aware that they should soon come in sight of Cairo and encounter the enemy. At break of day, the army at last descried on its left, and on the other side of the river, the lofty minarets of that great capital, and on its right, in the desert, the gigantic pyramids gilded by the beams of the rising sun. The army, on witnessing these monuments of antiquity, halted as if seized with curiosity and admiration. The face of Bonaparte was lighted up with enthusiasm. He began to gallop before the ranks of the soldiers, and pointing to the pyramids, "*Consider*," he exclaimed, "*that from the summits of those pyramids, forty centuries look down upon you*." They advanced at a rapid pace. As they approached, they observed the minarets of Cairo rise up; they saw the pyramids increase in height, they saw the thickening of the multitude that guarded Embabeh, they saw the glistening arms of the ten thousand horsemen resplendent with gold and steel, and forming an immense line. Bonaparte immediately made his arrangements. The army, as at Chebreiss, was divided into five divisions. Those of Desaix and Regnier formed the right, towards the desert; Dugua's division formed the centre; and the divisions of Menou and Bon formed the left, all along the Nile. Bonaparte, who, since the battle at Chebreiss, had well considered the ground and the enemy, made his arrangements accordingly. Each division, as at Chebreiss, formed a square; each square was composed of six ranks. Behind were the grenadier companies in platoons, ready to reinforce the points of attack. The artillery was at the angles. The baggage and the generals were in the centre. These squares were moving. When they were in motion, two sides marched upon the flank. When they were charged, they were to halt, so as to present a front on all sides. Again, when they were to carry a position, the first ranks were to detach themselves and to form columns of attack, and the others were to remain in rear, still forming the square, but only three deep, and ready to support the columns of

attack. Such were the arrangements ordered by Bonaparte. He was afraid lest his impetuous soldiers of Italy, accustomed to advance at the charge step, would find it difficult to resign themselves to that chilling and negative fixity of walls. He had taken pains to prepare them for this. Orders were issued, in particular, not to be in a hurry to fire, to wait coolly for the enemy, and not to fire till he was at the muzzle of the guns.

The army advanced almost within cannon-shot. Bonaparte, who was in the centre square, formed by Dugua's division, examined with a telescope the state of the camp of Embabeh. He saw that the artillery of the camp, not being mounted on field carriages, could not be moved into the plain, and that the enemy would not quit the intrenchments. It was on these views that he based his movements. He resolved to bear with his divisions upon the right, that is, upon the main body of the Mamelukes, moving round out of the range of the cannon of Embabeh. His intention was to cut off the Mamelukes from the intrenched camp, to surround them, to drive them into the Nile, and not to attack Embabeh till he had entirely got rid of them. After he had destroyed the Mamelukes, it would not be difficult for him to settle matters with the multitude which thronged that camp.

He immediately gave the signal. Desaix, who formed the right extremity, was the first to put himself in motion. Next to him came Regnier's square, and then Dugua's, where Bonaparte was. The two others moved round Embabeh, beyond the range of the cannon. Murad Bey, who, though uneducated, was endowed with great natural abilities and great perspicacity, immediately guessed his adversary's object, and resolved to charge during this decisive movement. He left two thousand Mamelukes to support Embabeh, and then rushed with the rest on the two squares upon the right. Desaix's square, having got among some palm-trees, was not yet formed at the time the first horsemen came up to it. But it formed instantaneously, and was ready to receive the charge, an enormous mass must that have been, composed, as it was, of eight thousand horse, galloping all at once in a plain. They rushed with extraordinary impetuosity upon Desaix's division. Our brave soldiers, who had become as cool as they had formerly been fiery, waited for them calmly, and received them at the muzzle of their guns with a tremendous fire of musketry and grape. Checked by this fire, these innumerable horsemen hovered along the ranks, and galloped around the blazing citadel. Some of the bravest threw themselves on the bayonets, then, turning their horses and backing them on our infantry, they succeeded in making a breach, and thirty or forty actually expired in the very centre of the square, at the feet of Desaix. The entire body, facing to the right about, quitted Desaix's square, and turned upon Regnier's, which came next. Being received with the same fire, they then returned to the point from whence they had started; but they found in their rear Dugua's division, which Bonaparte had moved in the direction of the Nile, and was put completely to the rout. The enemy then fled in disorder, one part of the fugitives ran off on our right towards the pyramids, another, passing under Dugua's fire, went to throw itself into Embabeh, carrying confusion along with it. From that moment disorder became visibly perceptible in the intrenched camp. Bonaparte, the moment he observed this, ordered his two divisions on the left to approach Embabeh for the purpose of taking it. Bon and Menou advanced under the fire of the intrenchments, and on coming within a certain distance they halted. The square divided; the foremost ranks formed columns of attack, while the others remained in squares in shape always resembling real citadels. But at the same moment the Mamelukes, as well those whom Murad had left at Embabeh as those who had fled thither, attempted to anticipate us. They rushed upon our columns of attack while yet in march. But the latter, halting immediately and forming into square with wonderful rapidity, received them with firmness, and overthrew a great number of them. Some hastily got into Embabeh, where the utmost confusion prevailed; others flying to the plain between the Nile and our right, were either shot or driven into the river. The columns of attack pressed closely on Embabeh, made themselves masters of the place, and threw the crowd of janizaries and fellahs into the Nile. Many were drowned, but as the Egyptians are excellent swimmers, the greater number somehow or other contrived to escape. All was now over. The Arabs who were near the pyramids, and who were making sure of victory, fled into the desert. Murad, with the wrecks of his cavalry and his face all over blood, retired towards Upper Egypt. Ibrahim, who from the opposite bank had been a witness of this disaster, pushed on in the direction of Belbeys, so as to effect a retreat into Syria. The Mamelukes immediately set fire to the *djerms* which contained their property. This prey escaped us; and our soldiers saw, during the whole night, the flames consuming a rich booty.

Bonaparte took up his head-quarters at Gizeh, on the banks of the Nile, where Murad Bey had a magnificent residence. A great quantity of provisions was found either at Gizeh or Embabeh; and our soldiers were enabled to make themselves amends for their long privations. They found vines laden with magnificent grapes in the gardens of Gizeh, and a short vintage they made of them. But they gained a booty of a different nature on the field of battle, and this consisted of splendid shawls, weapons of fine workmanship, horses, and purses, containing as many as two or three hundred pieces of gold, for the Mamelukes carried all their ready money on their persons. They passed the evening, the night, and the next day, in collecting these spoils. Five or six hundred Mamelukes had been killed. More than a thousand were drowned in the Nile. The soldiers set about dragging for their bodies for the purpose of stripping them, and spent several days in this kind of pursuit.

The battle could scarcely have cost us a hundred killed and wounded; for if defeat be terrible for squares when broken, the loss is insignificant when the squares come off victorious. The Mamelukes had lost their best horsemen by the fire or by the water. Their forces were dispersed, and we were now complete masters of Cairo. This capital was in a state of the most extraordinary agitation. It contained more than three hundred thousand inhabitants, filled with a ferocious and brutal populace, and abandoned to every species of excess, and

desiring to take advantage of the disturbance to pillage the rich palaces of the beys. Unfortunately, the French flotilla had not yet ascended the Nile, and we had no means of crossing to take possession of Cairo. Some French merchants who happened to be there were sent to Bonaparte by the sheiks to settle as to the occupation of the city. He procured a few *djermes*, so as to despatch a detachment that restored tranquillity, and placed life and property beyond the reach of the populace. On the next day but one, Bonaparte entered Cairo, and took possession of the palace of Murad Bey.

He had hardly been settled in Cairo before he hastened to pursue the same policy he had already pursued at Alexandria, and which was to attach the country to his interest. He visited the principal sheiks, paid them compliments, gave them hopes of the re-establishment of the Arab dominion, promised to respect their religion and customs, and completely succeeded in winning their hearts by a well-managed mixture of flattery and high-flown expressions impressed with the grandeur of Oriental diction. The main point was to obtain from the sheiks of the mosque of Jemil-Azar a declaration in favour of the French. This is much the same as a Papal edict among Christians. In this matter Bonaparte called forth his greatest powers of address, and perfectly succeeded in his object. The great sheiks issued the desired declaration, and exhorted the Egyptians to submit to the envoy of God, who reverenced the prophet, and who had come to deliver his children from the tyranny of the Mamelukes. Bonaparte established a divan at Cairo as he had done at Alexandria, composed of the principal sheiks and the most distinguished inhabitants. This divan, or municipal council, was to avail him in gaining over the minds of the Egyptians, by making them party to his counsels, and receiving intelligence from them as to all the details of home administration. It was settled that similar institutions should be established throughout all the provinces, and that these subordinate divans should send deputies to the divan of Cairo, which would thus become the great national divan.

Bonaparte resolved to permit justice be administered by the cadis. In furtherance of his scheme for succeeding to the rights of the Mamelukes, he seized their estates, and caused the duties previously imposed to be continued for the purposes of the French army. To do this, he was obliged to have the Copts under his own control. He omitted nothing to attach them to him, by making them conceive hopes of bettering their present state. He sent out generals with detachments to go again down the Nile to complete the occupation of the Delta, which had been nothing more than traversed. He also despatched other detachments towards the Upper Nile, to take possession of Middle Egypt. Desaix was stationed with a division at the entrance of Upper Egypt, which he had to take from Murad Bey, as soon as the waters of the Nile should subside in autumn. Each of the generals, furnished with detailed instructions, was to re-enact in the country what had been done at Alexandria and at Cairo. They were to influence the sheiks, to win the Copts, and to establish the levy of the taxes, to administer to the wants of the army.

Bonaparte next occupied himself with the well-being and health of his soldiers. Egypt began to be agreeable to them; they there found rest, plenty, and a pure and wholesome climate. The singular manners of the country became familiar to them, and became a never-failing source of mirth. But, guessing with their accustomed sagacity the intention of the general, they assumed a mock reverence for the prophet, and with him laughed at the part which policy obliged them to play. Bonaparte ordered ovens to be built, that they might have bread. He lodged them in the excellent houses of the Mamelukes, and exhorted them, above all things, to respect the women. They had found in Egypt, asses of a very fine breed, in great numbers. It was one of their great amusements to ride about in the environs, and to gallop about upon these animals over the country. Their quick movements caused some accidents among the formal inhabitants of Cairo. It became necessary to prohibit their running about the streets at such speed. The cavalry was mounted on the finest horses in the world, namely, on the Arabian horses taken from the Mamelukes.

Bonaparte, in like manner, did not omit to uphold kindly relations with the neighbouring countries, in order to preserve and appropriate to himself the rich commerce of Egypt. He himself appointed the Emir-Hadgi. This is an officer annually chosen at Cairo, to convey the great caravan from Mecca. He wrote to all the French consuls on the coast of Barbary, to inform the beys that the Emir-Hadgi was appointed, and that the caravans might set out. At his desire the sheiks wrote to the sherif of Mecca, to acquaint him that the pilgrims would be protected, and that the caravans would find safety and protection. The pacha of Cairo had followed Ibrahim Bey to Belbeys. Bonaparte wrote to him, as well as to the several pachas of St. Jean d'Acre and Damascus, to assure them of the kindly inclinations of the French towards the Sublime Porte. These last precautions were unfortunately useless, and the officers of the Porte were hardly to be persuaded that the French, who had just invaded one of the richest provinces belonging to their sovereign, could in fact be his friends.

The Arabs were struck by the character of the conqueror. They could not comprehend how it was that a mortal who wielded the thunderbolt of war, could at the same time be so forbearing. They called him the worthy son of the prophet, the favourite of the great *Allah*; they had even chanted in the great Mosque the following litany.

"The great Allah is no longer angry with us. He hath forgotten our faults, sufficiently atoned for by the long oppression of the Mamelukes! Let us sing the mercies of the great *Allah*.

"Who is he that hath saved from the dangers of the sea and the rage of his enemies *victory's favoured son*? Who is he that hath led safe and unharmed to the banks of the Nile *the brave men of the west*?

"It is the great *Allah*, the great *Allah*, who is no longer angry with us. Let us sing the mercies of the great *Allah*.

"The Mameluke beys had put their trust in their horses. The Mameluke beys had set their infantry in battle array.

"But *the favoured son of victory*, at the head of

the brave men of the west, hath destroyed the footmen and the horsemen of the Mamelukes.

"As the morning dews which rise in the morning from the Nile, are dispersed by the rays of the sun, so hath the army of the Mamelukes been dispersed by *the brave men of the west*, because the great *Allah* is at present angry with the Mamelukes, because *the brave men of the west* are as the apple of the right eye of the great *Allah*."

Bonaparte was desirous, in order to go further into the manners of the Arabs, of being present and taking a part in their festivals. He was present at that of the Nile, which is one of the greatest in Egypt. This river is the benefactor of the country, and therefore is held in great veneration by the inhabitants, and is the subject of a species of worship. During the inundation, the river is introduced into Cairo by a great canal; a dike prevents its issuing into this canal until it has attained a certain height; at that time it is cut, and the day fixed for this operation is a day of rejoicing. A proclamation of the height to which the river has risen is then made, and when there are hopes of a great inundation a public rejoicing takes place, for it is a sign of future plenty. It is on the 18th of August (1st Fructidor) that this sort of fête is celebrated. Bonaparte had issued orders for all his army to be under arms, and had drawn them up on the banks of the canal. An immense concourse had assembled, and witnessed with joy *the brave men of the west* taking a part in their public rejoicings. Bonaparte, at the head of his staff, accompanied the principal authorities of the country. The first thing was for a sheik to proclaim the height to which the Nile had risen: it was twenty-five feet, which occasioned great joy. The next thing was to cut the dike. The whole of the French artillery resounded at once, at the moment when the water of the river poured in. According to custom a great number of boats hastened to the canal, in order to obtain the prize appointed for that which should first get there. Bonaparte himself delivered the prize. A multitude of men and boys plunged into the waters of the Nile, attributing various beneficial effects to this ablution. Women also threw in hair and pieces of stuff. Bonaparte then ordered the city to be illuminated, and the day concluded with entertainments. The feast of the Prophet was celebrated with no less pomp; Bonaparte repaired to the great Mosque, seated himself on cushions, cross-legged like the sheiks, and repeated with them the litanies of the Prophet, slowly moving the upper part of his body to and fro, and shaking his head. He edified the entire holy college by his piety. He then attended the banquet given by the grand sheik elected that day.

It was by such means that the young general, as profound a politician as he was a great captain, contrived to ingratiate himself with the people. While he temporarily indulged their prejudices, he laboured for the diffusion in that quarter of the light of science, by creating the celebrated institute of Egypt. He assembled the scientific men and artists whom he had brought with him, and, associating with them some of the better informed of his officers, composed that institute to which he appropriated revenues and one of the greatest palaces in Cairo. Some were to occupy themselves in making an accurate description, and preparing a finished map of the country; others were to explore its ruins, and afford new light to history; others, again, were to study its natural productions, to make observations useful to natural philosophy, astronomy, and natural history; others were to employ themselves in devising means for introducing improvements in the condition of the inhabitants, by means of machinery, canals, works upon the Nile, and processes adapted to this peculiar soil, so different from that of Europe. If Fortune had some day to deprive us of that beautiful country, at least she could not deprive us of the acquisition science was about to make in that quarter; a monument was in preparation which was to reflect honour on the genius and the perseverance of our men of science, in the same degree that the expedition did credit to the heroism of our soldiers.

Monge was the first who obtained the presidency; Bonaparte was but the second. He proposed the following subjects: To inquire the best mode of building wind and water mills; to find a substitute for the hop, which does not grow in Egypt, for the making of beer; to determine the spots most adapted to the cultivation of the vine; to settle upon the best means for procuring water to the citadel of Cairo; to dig wells in different spots in the desert; to inquire the means of clarifying and cooling the water of the Nile; to devise some useful application of the rubbish with which the city of Cairo, as well as all the ancient towns of Egypt, was encumbered; and to discover materials wherewith to manufacture gunpowder in Egypt. Some judgment may be formed from these inquiries alone of the bent of the general's mind. Instantly were engineers, draughtsmen, and scientific men dispersed throughout all the provinces, to begin describing and making a map of the country. Such were the first objects to which this rising colony turned its attention, and the manner in which the founder directed its operations.

The conquest of the provinces of Lower and Middle Egypt had been effected without difficulty, and had cost only a few skirmishes with the Arabs. A forced march upon Belbeys had been sufficient to drive Ibrahim Bey back into Syria. Desaix was waiting for the autumn, to take Upper Egypt from Murad Bey, who had retired thither with the wreck of his army.

But during this period fortune was preparing for Bonaparte the most direful reverses. On leaving Alexandria he had strongly recommended admiral Brueys to keep his squadron safe from the English, either by getting it within the harbour of Alexandria, or by taking it to Corfu; but above all not to stay in the road of Aboukir, for it was much better to fall in with an enemy when under sail, than to receive him when at anchor. A warm discussion had arisen on the question whether ships of eighty and one hundred and twenty guns could be taken into the harbour of Alexandria. There was no doubt as to the others, but the two eighty gun ships and the one hundred and twenty gun ship would have to be lightened sufficient to enable them to draw three feet less water. For this purpose it would be necessary to take out their guns, or to construct half pontoons. Admiral Brueys would not take his squadron into the harbour on

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such terms. He conceived that if compelled to adopt such precautions for his three largest ships, he never should be able to get out of the harbour when in face of the enemy, and that he might thus be blockaded by a squadron of very inferior force! he therefore made up his mind to proceed to Corfu. But, being strongly attached to general Bonaparte, he would not sail before he had received intelligence of his entry into Cairo, and his establishment in Egypt. The time which he spent, either in sounding the channels of Alexandria, or in waiting for news from Cairo, caused his discomfiture, and occasioned one of the most fatal events of the revolution, and one of those which, at that period, had the greatest influence on the destinies of the world.

Admiral Brueys was moored in the road of Aboukir. That road forms a very regular semicircle. Our thirteen ships formed a semicircle parallel to the shore. The admiral, in order to secure his line of mooring had supported it at one extremity upon a small island called the islet of Aboukir. He never imagined that a ship could pass between that islet and his line to take him in the rear; and in that belief he thought he had done sufficient by placing there a battery of twelve pounders, for the sole purpose of preventing the enemy from landing there. He considered himself so impregnable on this side, that he had placed his worst ships there. He felt more uneasy in respect of the other extremity of his semicircle. On this side he deemed it possible the enemy might pass between the shore and his line of mooring, so he had there placed his strongest and best officered ships. Moreover, he felt secure from an important circumstance, and that was, that this line being to the south, and the wind blowing from the north, an enemy that would attempt to attack on this side would have the wind right against him, and would hardly expose himself to fight under such a disadvantage.

In this situation, protected on his left by an islet, which he deemed strong enough for closing the road, and on his right by his best ships and by the wind, he awaited in security the intelligence that was to settle the time of his departure.

Nelson, after visiting the Archipelago, and having returned to the Adriatic, Naples, and Sicily, had at length obtained certain intelligence of the landing of the French at Alexandria. He immediately steered for that place in order to come up with and to fight their squadron. He sent a frigate to find it out, and observe its position. This frigate, having discovered it in the road of Aboukir, was able to examine our line at her leisure. If the admiral, who had a great number of frigates and light vessels in the harbour of Alexandria, had taken the precaution of having a few of them under sail, he could have kept the English always aloof, have prevented them from observing his line, and have had sufficient notice of their nearing him. Unfortunately, he did nothing of the kind. The English frigate, having made her observations, returned to Nelson, who being informed of all the particulars of our position, immediately steered right in for Aboukir. He arrived there on the 14th Thermidor (August 1st, 1798,) about six in the evening. Admiral Brueys was at dinner; he immediately ordered the signal for battle to be given. But so little was the enemy expected, that the hammocks were not stowed away on board any of the ships, and part of the crews were on shore. The admiral despatched officers to send the seamen on board, and to collect part of those who were in the [illegible]. He never thought that Nelson would dare attack him the same evening, and believed that he had plenty of time to get the reinforcements for which he had applied.

Nelson resolved to make the attack immediately, and to try a daring manœuvre, on which he hoped the victory would depend. He was determined to fall upon our line on the left, that is to say, by the islet of Aboukir, to pass between that islet and our squadron, in spite of the danger of shoals, and thus place himself between the shore and our line of mooring. This manœuvre was a dangerous one, but the intrepid Englishman did not hesitate. The number of ships was equal on both sides, namely, thirteen sail of the line. Nelson attacked about eight in the evening. His manœuvre was not at first quite successful. The *Culloden*, in attempting to pass between Aboukir islet and our line, got on a shoal. The *Goliath*, which followed her, was more fortunate, and went on; but owing to the wind, she drifted past our first ship, and could not bring to till opposite to the third. The English ships, the *Zealous*, the *Audacious*, the *Theseus*, and the *Orion*, followed this movement, and succeeded in placing themselves between our line and the shore. They advanced as far as the *Tonnant*, which was our eighth, and thus engaged the whole of our left and centre. Their other ships advanced outside the line, and placed it between two fires. As the French squadron never expected an attack of this description, the guns on the side next to the shore were not yet cleared, and our first two ships could fire on one side only: the consequence was, that one of them was disabled, and the other dismasted. But in the centre where *L'Orient*, the admiral's ship, was, the firing was terrible. The *Bellerophon*, one of Nelson's best ships, had her rigging shot away, was dismasted, and was obliged to bring to. Other English ships, dreadfully crippled, were also compelled to quit the battle. Admiral Brueys had received no more than part of his complement of seamen; nevertheless he still kept his ground with advantage; he even hoped, in spite of the success of Nelson's manœuvre, to gain the victory, if the orders which he gave at this moment to his right were executed. The English had engaged only the left and the centre; our right, composed of our five best ships, had no enemy before it. Admiral Brueys signalled it to make sail, and to bring itself round outside the line of battle. This manœuvre succeeding, the English ships that attacked us from without would then have been between two fires, but the signals were not perceived. In such a case, a lieutenant ought not to hesitate to run into danger, and to fly to the relief of his commander. Rear-admiral Villeneuve, a brave but irresolute man, continued motionless, still waiting for orders. Our left and our centre remained, therefore, between two fires. Nevertheless, the admiral and his captains performed prodigies of valour, and gloriously sustained the honour of the flag. We had lost two ships; the English also had lost two, one of which was aground and the other dismasted: our fire was greater than theirs. The unfortunate Brueys was wounded; he

would not leave the deck of his ship. "An admiral," said he, "ought to die in the act of giving orders." A cannon-ball killed him on his quarter-deck. About eleven o'clock a fire broke out on board the magnificent ship *L'Orient*. She blew up. This tremendous explosion suspended for a short time this obstinate conflict. Without suffering themselves to be dispirited, our five ships in action, the *Franklin*, the *Tonnant*, the *Peuple Souverain*, the *Spartiate*, and the *Aquilon*, kept up their fire the whole of the night. There still would have been time for our right to weigh anchor, and to come to their assistance. Nelson trembled for the execution of this manœuvre; he was so crippled that he could not have sustained the attack. At length Villeneuve made sail, but it was but to stand out to sea and to save his wing, which he did not think could be exposed with any chance of success against Nelson. Three of his ships threw themselves upon the coast: he escaped with the other two, together with two frigates, and sailed for Malta. The engagement had lasted upwards of fifteen hours. All the crews of the ships attacked had performed prodigies of valour. The brave captain Du Petit-Thouars had two of his limbs shot off. He ordered snuff to be brought him, remained on his quarter-deck, and, like Brueys, waited till a cannon-ball carried him off. The entire of our squadron, excepting the two ships and two frigates carried off by Villeneuve, was destroyed. Nelson was so crippled that he could not pursue the ships that had taken to flight.

Such was the famous naval battle of Aboukir, the most disastrous that the French navy had ever sustained, and one the military consequences of which must necessarily prove the most prejudicial. The fleet which had carried the French to Egypt, which might have either afforded them relief or assistance, which was to second their movements on the coast of Syria, had there been any to execute, which was to overawe the Porte, to force it to put up with false reasoning, and to oblige it to permit the invasion of Egypt, which finally, in case of reverse, was to convey the French back to their country,—that fleet was destroyed. The French ships were burned, but they had not been burned by themselves, a circumstance which was quite another thing so far as the moral effect was concerned. The news of this loss spread rapidly in Egypt, and for a moment filled the army with despair. Bonaparte received the tidings with imperturbable composure. "Well," said he, "we must die in this country, or get out of it as great as the ancients." He wrote to Kléber. "This will oblige us to do greater things than we ever intended. We must keep ourselves ready." The great soul of Kléber was worthy of being thus addressed. "Yes," replied Kléber, "we must do great things. I am preparing myself accordingly." The courage of these great men supported the army, and made it retain its self-respect. Bonaparte strove to divert the thoughts of the soldiers by various expeditions, and soon made them forget this disaster. At the fête given to commemorate the founding of the republic, celebrated on the 1st Vendémiaire, he would yet excite their imagination: he had engraved on Pompey's Pillar the names of the first forty soldiers slain in Egypt. These were the forty who had fallen in the attack of Alexandria. These forty names of men sprung from the villages of France were thus associated with the immortality of Pompey and Alexandria. He addressed this grand and extraordinary harangue to his army, in which was summed up his own remarkable history.

"Soldiers,

"We celebrate the first day of the year VII. of the republic.

"Five years since the independence of the French people was threatened; but you took Toulon: this was a presage of the destruction of your enemies.

"A year afterwards you were fighting with the Austrians at Dego.

"The following year you were on the summits of the Alps.

"Two years since you were in conflict with Mantua, and you gained the famous victory of St. George.

"Last year you were at the sources of the Drave and the Isonzo, on your return from Germany.

"Who would then have said that you would this day be on the banks of the Nile, in the centre of the old continent!

"From the Englishman, celebrated in arts and commerce, down to the hideous and ferocious Bedouin, the world has its eyes fixed upon you.

"Soldiers, you have an extraordinary destiny to fulfil, because you are worthy of what you have done, and of the opinion that is entertained of you. You either will die with honour, like the brave men whose names are inscribed on this pyramid, or else you will return to your country covered with laurels and with the admiration of all nations.

"During the five months that we have been far away from Europe, we have been the object of the unceasing solicitude of our countrymen. On this day, forty millions of citizens are celebrating the era of representative governments: forty millions of citizens are thinking of you; they all say, 'It is to their labours and to their blood, that we are indebted for the general peace, for repose, for the prosperity of commerce, and for the blessings of civil liberty.'"

CHAPTER XIV.

WHAT EFFECT THE EGYPT EXPEDITION PRODUCED IN EUROPE.—DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES OF THE NAVAL BATTLE OF ABOUKIR.—WAR PROCLAIMED BY THE PORTE.—THE EFFORTS MADE BY ENGLAND TO FORM A NEW LEAGUE.—CONFERENCES WITH AUSTRIA AT BELL.—PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OF RASTADT.—RENEWED COMMOTIONS IN HOLLAND, SWITZERLAND, AND THE ITALIAN REPUBLICS.—ALTERATION OF THE CISALPINE CONSTITUTION; THE DIRECTORY GREATLY EMBARRASSED IN REGARD TO THIS MATTER.—OUR SITUATION AT HOME.—A NEW OPPOSITION DECLARES ITSELF IN THE COUNCILS.—A GENERAL INCLINATION DISPLAYED IN FAVOUR OF WAR.—THE CONSCRIPTION ACT.—FINANCES OF THE YEAR VII.—RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES.—THE ROMAN STATES INVADED BY THE NEAPOLITAN ARMY.—CONQUEST OF THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES BY GENERAL CHAMPIONNET.—ABDICATION OF THE KING OF PIEDMONT [SARDINIA].

THE expedition to Egypt remained a mystery in Europe long after the departure of our fleet. The capture of Malta induced more certain conjectures. This place, reputed impregnable, and taken in their way, cast a halo of extraordinary renown around the French argonauts. The landing in Egypt, the occupation of Alexandria, the battle of the Pyramids, electrified all France and Europe. The name of Bonaparte, which had appeared so great when it came from the Alps, produced a still more singular and striking effect when coming from the remote countries of the east. Bonaparte and Egypt were in every body's mouth. The plans already executed were as nothing to the still more gigantic schemes yet in preparation. Bonaparte was going, it was said, to traverse Syria and Arabia, and to make a rush upon Constantinople or India.

The unfortunate battle of Aboukir came, not to destroy the spell of the enterprise, but to revive all the hopes of the enemies of France, and accelerate the success of their plots. England, who was extremely alarmed for her commercial power, and was only waiting for a favourable moment to turn new enemies against us, had filled Constantinople with her intrigues. The Grand Signor was not sorry to see the Mamelukes punished, but he was by no means minded to lose Egypt. M. de Talleyrand, who was to have gone to offer explanations to the divan, had not set out. The agents of England had a clear field. They persuaded the Porte that the ambition of France was insatiable; that after disturbing Europe, she would turn the East upside down, and that in violation of an ancient alliance she had invaded the richest province of the Turkish empire. These suggestions, and money distributed in the divan, would not have been powerful enough to decide it if the fine fleet of Brueys could have come to cannonade the Dardanelles; but the battle of Aboukir deprived the French of all their ascendancy in the Levant, and gave to England a decided preponderance. The Porte solemnly proclaimed war against France *, and, for the sake of a province she had long lost, she quarrelled with her natural friend, and connected herself with her most formidable enemies, Russia and England. The sultan ordered an army to be collected to go and recover Egypt. This circumstance placed the French in an extremely difficult position. Separated from France, and deprived of all relief by the victorious fleets of England, they were, in addition, exposed to the irruption of all the hordes of the east. The French were no more than about thirty thousand to struggle against such a host of perils.

Nelson, now victorious, proceeded to Naples to refit his crippled squadron, and to receive the honours of a triumph. In spite of the treaties which connected the court of Naples with France, and which forbade her to give any relief to our enemies, all the ports and dockyards of Sicily were open to Nelson. He was himself received with extraordinary honours. The king and queen came to meet him on his entering port, and called him the hero and liberator of the Mediterranean. It now began to be the talk that Nelson's triumph ought to be the signal for a general uprising; that the powers ought to take advantage of the moment when the most formidable army of France and her greatest captain were penned up in Egypt, to march against her, and to fling back her soldiers and her principles upon her interior. Such suggestions were diligently offered at every one of the foreign courts. A correspondence was set on foot with Tuscany and Piedmont to rouse their hitherto disguised hatred. Now was the time, it was said, to second the court of Naples, to make league against the common enemy, to rise all at once on the rear of the French, and to slay them from one end of the peninsula to the other. Austria was told that she ought to take advantage of the moment, when the Italian powers should take the French in the rear, so as to attack them in front, and to recover Italy from them. There was no great difficulty in doing this, for Bonaparte and his terrible army were no longer on the Adige. Recourse was had to the empire, despoiled of part of its states, and compelled to cede the left bank of the Rhine; the utmost was done to get Prussia to secede from her neutrality; lastly, such means were used with the emperor Paul as were calculated to act upon his morbid disposition, and to make him decide on furnishing that assistance so long and so vainly promised by Catharine.

These suggestions could not fail to be well received at all the courts; but they were not all of them in a condition to comply therewith. Those nearest to France were the most exasperated, and most disposed to spurn the revolution from them; but from the very circumstance that they stood nearer to the republican colossus, they were obliged to exercise greater reserve and caution before they entered into a contest with it. Russia, the farthest removed from France, and the least

* 18th Fructidor, year VI. (4 September.)

exposed to her vengeance, either from her remote position, or by reason of the moral state of her people, made up her mind more readily. Catharine, whose able policy had always tended to place the West in perplexities, either to afford an opportunity for her interference with its policy, or obtain time for effecting her purposes in Poland,—Catharine had not carried her policy along with her. This policy is inborn in the Russian cabinet; it proceeds from her very position: that cabinet may change its proceedings or its means, just as the sovereign may happen to be crafty or violent; but it constantly points, by an irresistible impulse, to the same end. The intelligent Catharine had contented herself with affording hopes and relief to the emigrants; she had preached the crusade without sending a single soldier. Her successor was about to pursue the same end, but with his peculiar tone of mind. That prince, violent and almost insane, but at any rate sufficiently generous, had at first appeared to disavow Catharine's policy, and refused to execute the treaty of alliance concluded with England and Austria; but after this momentary deviation, he had soon returned to the policy of his cabinet. He was observed to afford an asylum to the pretender, and take emigrants into his pay after the treaty of Campo-Formio. He had been persuaded that it was he who ought to make himself the chief of the European nobility threatened by the demagogues. The step taken by the order of Malta, who constituted him their protector, contributed to unsettle his mind, and he embraced the idea held out to him with all the facility of transition, and with all the ardour characteristic of Russian princes. He made an offer of his protection to the empire, and would tender himself guarantee for its integrity. The capture of Malta filled him with indignation, and he offered the co-operation of his armies against France. England triumphed, therefore, at St. Petersburg as at Constantinople, and was making enemies heretofore irreconcileable go hand in hand with each other.

The same enthusiasm was not manifested every where. Prussia found herself too much benefited by her neutrality and by the exhaustion of Austria, to have any desire to interfere in the struggle of the two systems. She merely watched her frontiers towards Holland and France, in order to prevent the revolutionary infection. She had placed her armies in such a manner as to form a *cordón sanitaire*. The empire, which had learned to its cost to appreciate the power of France, and which was always liable to become the theatre of war, was anxious for peace. Even the dispossessed princes wished for it also, because they were sure of obtaining indemnities on the right bank. The ecclesiastical princes alone, threatened with a disannexation from the Church, wished for war. The Italian powers of Piedmont and Tuscany wanted nothing better than an opportunity, but they trembled under the iron hand of the French republic. They were waiting till Naples or Austria gave them the signal. With respect to Austria, although she might be the best disposed of the courts forming the monarchical league, she yet hesitated with her usual dilatoriness to declare herself, and, above all, had fears on account of her subjects, already much exhausted by the war. France had opposed to Austria two new republics, Switzerland and Rome, one on her flank, the other in Italy, which had greatly exasperated her, and in every respect inclined her to engage in the contest anew; but she would have taken no notice of these fresh encroachments of the republican league, if she had been indemnified by some acquisitions. It was with this view that she had proposed the conferences at Selz. These conferences were to take place in the summer of 1798, not far from the congress of Rastadt, and concurrent in point of time with the congress at that place. On their result would depend the determination of Austria and the success of the efforts made to form a new league.

François (of Neufchâteau) was the envoy chosen by France. This was why the little town of Selz had been selected. It was situated on the bank of the Rhine not far from Rastadt, but on the left bank. This last condition was necessary, because the constitution prohibited a director, on relinquishing office, to leave France till the end of a specified term. M. de Cobentzel was the envoy for Austria. From the first moment the bias of that power was plainly perceptible. Her desire was to be indemnified by an extension of territory for the conquests which the republican system had made in Switzerland and Italy. France was particularly desirous that some understanding should be come to with respect to the events at Vienna, and that some satisfaction should be made for the insult offered to Bernadotte. But Austria carefully avoided to render any explanation on that point, and constantly adjourned that portion of the negotiation. The French negotiator reverted to it incessantly; at any rate he had orders to be content with the slightest satisfaction. France would have wished that Thugot the minister, apparently in disgrace, should be so in reality, and that some excuse, the most insignificant in the world, should be made to Bernadotte in reparation of the insult he had received. M. de Cobentzel contented himself by stating that his court disapproved of what had taken place at Vienna, but he did not accede to the notion of making any satisfaction whatever, and continued to insist on the extension of territory he claimed. It was clear that the concessions sought for wounded pride would not be granted till the demands of ambition had been gratified. Austria alleged that the institution of the two republics, Roman and Helvetic, and the manifest influence exercised over the Cisalpine, Ligurian, and Batavian republics, were violations of the treaty of Campo-Formio, and a dangerous alteration in the state of Europe: she maintained that France, if she desired that her recent usurpations should be forgiven should concede indemnifications; and as such indemnification, the Austrian negotiator demanded new provinces in Italy. He wanted the line of the Adige to be carried further, and that the Austrian possessions should extend to the Adda and the Po, that is to say, that they were to give the emperor the greater half of the Cisalpine republic. M. de Cobentzel proposed to indemnify the Cisalpine republic with a portion of Piedmont; the remainder of the kingdom was to have been given to the grand duke of Tuscany; and the king of Sardinia would have taken the states of the Church as an indemnity. Thus at the price of an augmentation of ter-

ritory for himself in Lombardy, and for his family in Tuscany; the emperor would have sanctioned the institution of the Helvetic republic, the overthrow of the pope, and the dismemberment of the Piedmontese [Sardinian] monarchy. France could not assent to these proposals for a host of reasons. In the first place she could not dismember the Cisalpine, as yet hardly formed, and again place under the Austrian yoke the very provinces she had enfranchised, to whom she had promised, and whom she had made pay for liberty; lastly, she had, in the preceding year, concluded a treaty with the king of Piedmont [Sardinia], by which she guaranteed his dominions to him. This warranty was in particular vouched against Austria. France then could not sacrifice Piedmont; consequently François (of Neufchâteau) could not give his adherence to the proposition of M. de Cobentzel. They parted without having settled any thing. No satisfaction was made for the occurrence at Vienna. M. de Degelmann, who was to have been sent to Paris in the character of ambassador, did not arrive, and it was stated that the two cabinets would continue to correspond through their ministers at the congress of Rastadt. This parting was generally considered as a kind of rupture.

From that time it became evident that Austria had taken her resolutions; but before recommencing hostilities with France, she wished to make herself certain of the concurrence of the principal powers of Europe. M. de Cobentzel set out for Berlin, and was to proceed from Berlin to St. Petersburg. The object of this running to and fro was to assist England in the formation of a new league. The emperor of Russia had sent to Berlin one of the most distinguished personages in his empire, the prince Repnin; M. de Cobentzel was to unite his efforts with those of prince Repnin and the English legation to draw the young king over to their side.

France, on her part, had sent to Berlin one of her most illustrious citizens; this was Sieyès. The reputation of Sieyès had been immense before the reign of the convention. It had vanished under the level of the committee of public welfare. It had suddenly revived when the position of individuals in society could renew their natural advantages; and the name of Sieyès had again become the greatest name in France after Bonaparte; for in France a reputation for profound thinking, next to a high military renown, produces the greatest effect. Sieyès was one of the two great men of the time. Always discontented with, and criticising the government, not like Bonaparte from ambition, but from a feeling of ill-temper against a constitution which he had not framed, he could not be otherwise than a stumbling-block. The idea, therefore, was started of giving him an embassy. This would afford an opportunity of getting rid of him, for making him useful, and above all, for furnishing him with some means of existence. The revolution had taken away all from him, when it abolished ecclesiastical benefices. A dignified embassy would allow their being restored to him. The most important embassy was that of Berlin, for there were no envoys either in Austria, Russia, or England. Berlin was the theatre of all intrigues, and Sieyès, though not the best of all practical men, was nevertheless a keen and a careful observer. Besides, his high reputation peculiarly qualified him to represent France, especially in Germany, for which he was better suited than for any other country.

The king was by no means pleased to see such a celebrated revolutionist as Sieyès arrive in his capital, yet he durst not refuse him. Sieyès conducted himself with propriety and dignity; he was received as others had been, but left entirely to himself. Like all our envoys abroad, he was carefully watched, and as it were removed from society. The Germans were very curious to have an interview with him, but they durst not. He possessed no influence whatever at the court of Berlin. It was a sense of his interests that supported the king of Prussia against the urgent solicitations of England, Austria, and Russia.

While every endeavour was being made in Germany to decide the king of Prussia, the court of Naples, in the plenitude of her inconsiderate rejoicings since Nelson's victory, was making mighty preparations for war, and redoubled her solicitations at the courts of Tuscany and Piedmont. France, by a species of acquiescence, had suffered it to occupy the duchy of Benevento, but this concession did not render Naples more tranquil. This court flattered herself that in the approaching war she should gain half of the papal dominions.

The negotiations at Rastadt went on successfully for France. Treilhard, who had become director, and Bonaparte, who had gone to Egypt, had been succeeded at the congress by Jean Debry and Roberjot. After having obtained the line of the Rhine, a host of military, commercial, and political questions had to be settled. Our deputation had become extremely encroaching, and demanded much more than it had a right to obtain. In the first place, it required all the islands in the Rhine, which was an important article, especially in a military point of view. It next insisted on keeping Kehl and its territory, opposite to Strasburg; and Cassel and its territory, opposite to Mentz. It insisted that the commercial bridge between the two Breisachs should be restored; that fifty acres of land facing the old bridge of Huningen should be granted to us, and that the important fortress of Ehrenbreitstein should be demolished. It next demanded that the navigation of the Rhine, and of all the German rivers falling into the Rhine, should be free; that all the passage tolls should be abolished; that goods should be subject to the same customs on both sides of the river; that the towing-paths should be kept up by the owners of lands adjoining the river. It lastly demanded an ultimate and highly important condition, namely, that the debts of the countries on the left bank ceded to France should be transferred to the countries on the right bank, intended to be given as indemnities.

The deputation of the empire replied with justice, that the line of the Rhine ought to afford an equal security to both nations: that it was the reason of an equal security which had been more particularly alleged in order to cause this line to be granted to France; but that this security would no longer exist for Germany, if France should keep all the offensive points, as well by reserving for herself the islands, as by appropriating Cassel, Kehl, and fifty acres of land opposite to Huningen, &c. The deputation of the empire, therefore,

would not admit the demands of France, and proposed as the real boundary line the *Thalweg*; that is, the middle* of the principal navigable branch. All the islands on the right of this line were to belong to Germany, all those on the left were to belong to France. Thus they placed between the two nations the real obstacle that converts a river into a military line, namely, the principal navigable branch. As a consequence of this principle, the deputation demanded the demolition of Cassel and Kehl, and refused the fifty acres opposite Huningen. The deputation was opposed to France retaining any offensive point, while Germany was to lose them all. With less reason, the deputation refused to concur in the demolition of Ehrenbreitstein, which was inconsistent with the safety of the city of Coblentz. The deputation accorded the free navigation of the Rhine, but demanded it for the whole length of the stream, and wanted France to compel the Batavian republic to recognise this privilege. As for the free navigation of the rivers of the interior of Germany, that article exceeded, said the deputation, its limits of action, and concerned each state individually. The towage-path was ceded. The deputation desired that every thing relative to passage tolls and their abolition should be referred to a treaty of commerce. Lastly, it proposed, with respect to the countries on the left bank ceded to France, that they should continue to bear the charge of their own debts, on the principle that the debt follows its pledge, and that the estates of the greater nobility should be considered as private property, and acknowledged by that title. The deputation demanded as a matter of consequence, that the French troops should evacuate the right bank, and raise the blockade of Ehrenbreitstein, because it reduced the inhabitants to famine.

These contrary claims gave rise to a series of notes and counter-notes during the whole summer. At length, about the month of Vendémiaire, year VI. (August and September, 1798), the *Thalweg* was admitted by the French deputation. The principal navigable branch was taken for the boundary between France and Germany, and the islands were consequently to be divided upon this principle. France consented to the demolition of Cassel and Kehl, but insisted upon having the island of Petersau, which is placed in the Rhine, a little above Mentz, and of great importance for that place. The Germanic empire consented on its part to the demolition of Ehrenbreitstein. The free navigation of the Rhine and the abolition of passage tolls were conceded. Some arrangement had yet to be made concerning the commercial bridges, the possessions of the greater nobility, the administration of the laws of emigration in the ceded countries; and as to the debts of those countries, the secular princes had declared that every concession consistent with the honour and the security of the empire ought to be made, to obtain that peace which was so necessary to Germany. It was evident that most of those princes wished to treat; Prussia induced them so to do. As to Austria, she began to exhibit the very opposite inclinations, and to excite the resentment of the ecclesiastical princes against the tenor of the negotiations. The deputies of the empire, while they declared for peace, behaved with the utmost caution on account of the fear which Austria caused them, and sailed close to the wind on their tack between that power and Russia. As for the French ministers, they exhibited a certain austerity of demeanour; they lived apart, and in a sort of seclusion, as did all our ministers in Europe. Such was the state of the congress at the conclusion of the summer of the year VI. (1798.)

While these occurrences were taking place in the east and in Europe, France, still charged with the direction of the five republics instituted around her, had troubles without end. These consisted of the everlasting difficulties that presented themselves in giving a direction to public opinion, in keeping up an army at home, in maintaining a good understanding between our ambassadors and our generals, and keeping up friendly relations with the neighbouring states.

It had been necessary almost every where to do what had been done in France, that is, after striking a blow at one party, soon afterwards to exterminate another. In Holland, on the 3rd Pluviôse (January 22nd), there had been executed a kind of 18th of *Fructidor*, to throw out the federalists, to abolish the old regulations, and to give a military constitution to the country, somewhat resembling that of France. But this revolution had turned too much in favour of the democrats. These latter had engrossed all the powers. After excluding from the national assembly all the deputies whom they looked upon as suspected characters, they had constituted themselves into a directory and two councils, without having recourse to new elections. They had by this mode of procedure intended to imitate the national convention of France, and its celebrated decrees of the 16th and 18th *Fructidor*. They had since possessed themselves of the entire direction of affairs, and they went beyond the line which the French directory had prescribed to all the republics under its care. General Daendels, one of the most distinguished men of the moderate party, arrived at Paris, came to an understanding with our directors, and returned to Holland, to inflict on the democrats there an extermination similar to that which they had recently experienced in Paris, by excluding them from the legislative body by the separation of parties (*scissions*). Thus, whatever was done in France, had to be repeated immediately afterwards in the states dependent on her. Joubert was ordered to support Daendels. The latter joined the ministers, and, with the aid of the Batavian and French troops, dispersed the directory and the councils, formed a provisional government, and issued orders for new elections. Delacroix, the French minister, who had supported the democrats, was recalled. These scenes produced their ordinary effect. It gave a handle to the assertion that the republican constitutions could not go alone, that they were every moment requiring the support of bayonets, and that the new states found themselves in the most complete dependence on France.

In Switzerland, the establishment of the republic, *one and indivisible*, could not take place without fighting. The small cantons of Schwytz, Zug, and Glarus, excited by the priests and the Swiss aristocrats, had sworn to oppose the adoption of the new system. General Schauenburg, without intend-

* The medium filum aquæ. *Trans.*

ing to reduce them by force, had prohibited all intercourse between the other cantons with the latter. The refractory petty cantons immediately took up arms and invaded Lucerne, where they committed great pillage and spoliation. Schaumburg had marched against them, and, after some obstinate combats, had reduced them to sue for peace. The pledge of that peace had been the acceptance of the new constitution. It had even been necessary to employ fire and sword in quelling the peasants of the Upper Valais, who had made an incursion into the Lower Valais for the purpose of re-establishing their dominion there. Notwithstanding these obstacles, in Prairial (May, 1798), the constitution was every where in force. The Helvetic government had assembled at Aarau, composed of a directory and two councils it began to endeavour to gain experience in the administration of the country. The new French commissioner was Rapinat, the brother-in-law of Rewbell. The Helvetic government was to come to some arrangement with Rapinat respecting the administration of affairs. Circumstances rendered this administration an arduous affair. The priests and the aristocrats, posted in the mountains, were on the look-out for a favourable moment to raise the population afresh. The government had to be on its watch against them, to maintain and to satisfy the French army which was had to oppose them, to organize the administration, and to put itself in a situation to exist soon in an independent manner. This task was no less difficult for the Helvetic government, than for the French commissioner sent thither.

It was natural that France should seize the funds belonging to the ancient aristocrat cantons, to pay the expenses of the war. The money contained in the chests, and the stores in the magazines formed by the late cantons, were indispensable for the support of her army. This was no more than exercising the most ordinary right of conquest; she might, certainly, have renounced this right; but necessity compelled her to avail herself of it at the moment. Rapinat was therefore ordered to put seals upon every one of the chests. A great number of the Swiss, even among those who had wished for the revolution, considered it very wrong that they should lay hold of the hoards and the stores of the old governments. The Swiss are, like all mountaineers, prudent and brave, but extremely avaricious. They heartily desired that liberty should be brought to their doors, and that they should be freed from their oligarchs, but they had no notion of paying the expenses of the war. While Holland and Italy had supported, almost without complaining, the enormous burden of the longest and most devastating campaigns, the Swiss patriots made a great outcry about a few millions, of which they were robbed. The Helvetic directory, on its part, caused fresh seals to be put over those which had just been placed by Rapinat, and thus protested against the regulation that placed the chests at the disposal of France. Rapinat immediately ordered the seals of the Helvetic directory to be taken off, and declared to that directory that its office was confined to merely administrative functions, that it could not do any thing contrary to the authority of France, and that, in future, its laws and decrees should have no force, unless they contained nothing contrary to the ordinances of the commissioner and of the French general. The enemies of the revolution, and more than one had crept into the Helvetic councils, triumphed on witnessing this contest, and cried out against tyranny. They said that their independence was violated, and that the French republic, who had pretended to bring liberty to their doors, had in reality brought them nought else than subjection and misery. The opposition did not solely manifest itself in the councils, it also existed in the directory and in the local authorities. At Lucerne and at Berne old aristocrats occupied the administrations; they raised obstacles of all sorts against the levy of fifteen millions [francs] assessed upon the ancient noble families for the wants of the army. Rapinat took upon himself to purify the Helvetic government and administrations. By a letter of the 28th Prairial (June 16), he required at the hands of the Helvetic government the dismissal of two directors, named Bay and Pfeiffer, and that of the minister for foreign affairs, and the remodelling of the administrative chambers of Lucerne and Berne. This demand, made with the tone of an order, could not be refused. The dismissals were immediately given, but the rudeness with which Rapinat conducted himself caused a fresh outcry to be raised, and cast all the blame on his own side. He compromised his government, in fact, by openly violating forms, in order to effect changes which could easily have been effected by other means. The French directory lost no time in writing to the Helvetic directory to express its disapprobation of Rapinat's conduct, and to give satisfaction for this open violation of order. Rapinat was recalled; nevertheless the dismissed members continued to be excluded. The Helvetic councils nominated, as successors to the two dismissed directors, Ochs, the originator of the constitution, and colonel Laharpe, brother of the general who had fallen in Italy, one of the originators of the revolution in the Canton de Vaud, and one of the most upright and best intentioned citizens of his country.

A treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was concluded between the Helvetic and French republics on the 2nd Fructidor (August 19). According to this treaty, whichever of the two powers that should be at war, had a right to require the intervention of the other, and to call upon it for assistance, the extent of which was to be determined according to circumstances. The querent power was to pay the troops that should be furnished by the other; the free navigation of all the rivers of France and Switzerland was mutually stipulated. Two routes were to be opened, the one from France to the Cisalpine, across the Valais and the Simplon; the other from France into Suabia, taking the upward course of the Rhine, and then following the eastern shore of the lake of Constance. In this system of united republics, France thus secured for herself two military high-roads, to take her to the states of her allies, and enable her to debouch rapidly in Italy or in Germany. It has been said that those two roads transferred the theatre of war to the allied states. It was not the roads, but the alliance of France which rendered these states exposed to the liability of becoming the theatre of war. The roads were nought else than a quicker means of occasional transit and protection for them, whenever they took the offensive in Germany or in Italy.

The city of Geneva was incorporated with France, and so was the town of Mühlhausen. The Italian bailiwicks, which had long wavered between the Cisalpine and the Helvetic republics, declared for the latter, and voted for their incorporation. The Grison leagues, whom the directory would have united with Switzerland, were divided between two rival factions, and hesitated between Austrian and Helvetic domination. The monks and the foreign agents brought about fresh troubles in Unterwalden. They excited the peasants of that valley to rise against the French troops. A most obstinately contested battle took place at Stanz, and it was found necessary to set fire to that unfortunate village before it could be cleared of the fanatics who had there established themselves.

The same difficulties presented themselves on the other side of the Alps. A sort of anarchy prevailed between the subjects of the new states and their governments, between those governments and our armies, and between our ambassadors and our generals. The confusion was frightful. The petty Ligurian republic was inveterate against Piedmont, and determined to introduce the revolution there whatever might be the consequence. A great number of Piedmontese democrats had sought refuge in its interior, and issued therefrom armed and organized, to make incursions into their country, and to attempt to overthrow the royal government. Another band came from the Cisalpine, and had advanced by Domo-d'Ossola. But these attempts had been repulsed, and a crowd of victims uselessly sacrificed. The Ligurian republic had not for all that desisted from harassing the government of Piedmont; it collected and armed a new set of refugees, and intended to make war on its own account. It was with the greatest difficulty that Sotin our minister at Genoa repressed it. Guingené, our minister at Turin, had on his part no less trouble in replying to the continual complaints of Piedmont, and to restrain that court in carrying out its vengeance upon the patriots.

The Cisalpine was in frightful disorder. While Bonaparte was constituting it, he had not had time to make an exact calculation of the relative proportions that ought to have been observed in the divisions of the territory, and in the number of the functionaries; nor yet to organize the municipal and the financial systems. This little state had for itself alone two hundred and forty representatives. The departments were too numerous; it was devoured by a multitude of officials; it had no regular and uniform system of taxation. With considerable wealth, it had no finances, and it could scarcely find means to pay the subsidy agreed upon for the support of our armies. Moreover, in every other branch the confusion could not be greater. Ever since the exclusion of some members of the council as decreed by Berthier, when he would have compelled the acceptance of the treaty of alliance with France, the revolutionists had retained the ascendancy, and the language of the Jacobins predominated in the councils and the clubs. Our army seconded this movement, and supported all its extravagances. Brune, after completing the subjection of Switzerland, had returned to Italy, where he had been invested with the general command of all the French troops, since the departure of Berthier for Egypt. He was at the head of the most vehement patriots. Lahoz, the commandant of the Lombard troops, whose organization had been commenced under Bonaparte, was attached to the same notions and the same sentiments. Besides all this, there existed other causes of disorder in the misconduct of our officers. They conducted themselves in the Cisalpine as though they had been in a conquered country. They maltreated the inhabitants, exacted billets, to which in accordance to the treaties, they were not entitled, despoiled the places where they took up their abode, frequently availed themselves of requisitions as in time of war, extorted money from the local authorities, and dipped into the municipal chests without alleging any kind of reason beyond their good pleasure. The commandants of fortresses, in particular, committed intolerable exactions. The commandant of Mantua, for instance, had taken upon himself to let out for his own private gain the fishing of the lake. The generals proportioned their exactions to their rank, and, independently of all that they exacted, they made scandalous profits with the trading companies. The contracting company that had the charge of supplying of the army of Italy, allowed the staffs a commission of forty per cent; and some opinion may be formed of its profits before it could make such allowances to those who took care of its interests. As a consequence of desertions, there was not in the ranks half the men entered in the lists, so that the republic was paying double what it ought. Notwithstanding all these malversations, the soldiers were ill paid, and the pay of most of them was several months in arrear. Thus the country which we occupied was dreadfully oppressed by exactions, without our soldiers faring a bit the better. The Cisalpine patriots tolerated all these disorders without complaining, because the staff lent them its support.

At Rome, things went on better. There a commission composed of Daunou, Florent, and Faypoult governed the liberated country with wisdom and integrity. These three men had framed a constitution, which had been adopted, and which, with some trifling exceptions, and the appellations which were not the same, was an exact resemblance of the French constitution. The directors were termed consuls; the council of the ancients was called the senate; and the second council the tribunate. But it was not sufficient to give a constitution, it had to be put in force. It was not, as may easily be imagined, the fanaticism of the Romans that obstructed its establishment, but their indolence. There were no malcontents, except in a few peasants of the Apennines, urged on by the monks, and very easy to bring to subjection. But there was in the inhabitants of Rome, who had been called to compose the consulate, the senate, and the tribunate, a careless and extreme inaptitude for business. It had cost considerable pains to induce them to sit every other day, and they absolutely insisted on summer vacations. To this laziness must be added an absolute inexperience and incapacity in point of administration. There was far more zeal in the Cisalpines, but it was zeal without intelligence and without self-restraint, which rendered it quite as detrimental as carelessness. There was reason to apprehend that, on the departure of the French commission, the Roman government would be broken up by

the inaction or retirement of its members. Yet, notwithstanding all this, there was a great desire for public offices at Rome, they were an object of great interest, as is always the case in states devoid of industrious habits.

The commission had put an end to all the corruptions practised at the first moment of our entry into Rome. This commission had taken into its own hands the management of the finances, and directed them with integrity and ability. Faypoult, who was an upright and able functionary, had introduced into the whole Roman state a system of taxation that was well understood. He was thereby enabled to provide for the wants of our army; he had paid up all arrears of pay, not only to the army of Rome, but also to the division that had embarked at Civita-Vecchia. If the finances had been as well conducted in the Cisalpine, the country would not have been so oppressed with exactions, and our soldiers would have wanted for nothing. Military authority was at Rome in every respect subject to the commission. General St. Cyr, who had succeeded Masséna, distinguished himself by strict integrity; but partaking of that fondness for authority now becoming general among his comrades, he appeared dissatisfied at being under the control of the commission. At Milan in particular, considerable dissatisfaction was shown with all that was going on at Rome. The Italian democrats were angry to see the Roman democrats made mere nullities and kept in order by the commission. The French staff on whom the divisions stationed at Rome were dependent, witnessed with vexation a rich portion of the conquered countries evade their grasp, and sighed for the moment when the commission should be divested of its functions.

It would be wrong to charge the French directory with the disorder that prevailed in the allied countries. No power, how strong soever it might be, could have prevented the excesses which distracted them; and as for extortions, the power of Napoleon himself was not sufficient to prevent them in the conquered provinces. What a single individual, in the plenitude of genius and vigour could not effect, a government composed of five members, and placed at immense distance, was still less able of perfecting. Nevertheless, there existed in the majority of our directory the greatest zeal for ensuring the welfare of the new republics, and the most lively indignation against the insolence and exactions of the generals, and against the manifest robberies committed by the companies. With the exception of Barras, who shared in all the profits of the companies, and who was the hope of all the firebrands of Milan, the other four directors denounced with the greatest energy the transactions in Italy. Larévellière in particular, whose strict integrity revolted from such excesses, submitted to the directory a plan which was assented to. His object was, that a commission should continue to direct the Roman government, and keep the military authority within bounds; that an ambassador should be sent to Milan, to represent the government at that place, and to deprive the staff of all influence whatever; that this ambassador should be authorized to make in the Cisalpine constitution necessary alterations, such as reducing the number of the local divisions, the public functionaries, and the members of the councils; that lastly, this ambassador should have for his associate a functionary of sufficient capacity to institute a system of taxation and responsibility. This plan was adopted; Trouvé, late minister of France at Naples, and Faypoult, one of the members of the commission at Rome, were sent to Milan, to carry into execution the measures proposed by Larévellière.

Trouvé was, as soon as he arrived at Milan, to take into his confidence the most intelligent men of the Cisalpine, and to arrange with them as to what alterations it would be necessary to make, either in the constitution or in the officers of the government. When all these changes were resolved upon, he was to get them proposed in the councils of the Cisalpine by deputies under his influence, and in case of need, to support them with the authority of France. At the same time, he was to keep his own power out of sight as far as it was possible.

Trouvé, having repaired from Naples to Milan, acted there in the manner prescribed as his rule of conduct. But it was a difficult matter to conceal the object of his mission. It soon got abroad that he had come to make alterations in the constitution, and especially to reduce the number of offices of every description. The patriots, who were very sensible from the conduct of the ambassador, that the reductions would affect them, became furious. They placed their chief reliance on the staff of the army, which was of itself extremely alienated from the new authority, to which it had to obey, and a scandalous struggle was witnessed between the French legation and the French staff, who were associated with the Italian patriots. Trouvé, and those who visited him, were denounced with extreme violence in the Cisalpine councils. It was alleged that the French minister had come to violate the constitution, and to renew one of those acts of oppression which the directory had exercised upon all the allied republics. Trouvé experienced vexations of every description from the Italian patriots, and of our offices. The latter conducted themselves with the utmost indecency at a ball which he gave, and caused the greatest scandal. These scenes were pitiable, particularly with regard to the effect they produced upon the foreign ministers. Not only was presented to those ministers the spectacle of the most unhappy discussions, but they insulted them at the diplomatic dinners, by drinking before their faces, to the extermination of all kings. The most vehement Jacobinism reigned at Milan. Brune and Lahoy set out for Paris, for the purpose of obtaining the support of Barras. But the directory, previously advised of all circumstances, was not shaken in its resolutions. Lahoy was ordered, at the very moment of his arrival, to leave Paris. As for Brune, he was ordered to return to Milan, and to concur in the changes which Trouvé was about to effect there.

After having accomplished the various necessary amendments in the constitution, Trouvé called together at his own house the most discreet deputies, and laid these amendments before them. They approved of them, but the public feeling was so strong, that they durst not take upon themselves to propose them to the two councils. Trouvé was therefore obliged to display the authority of France, and to exercise ostensibly a power he would

prevent by causing alterations in their constitution.

Opposition in the councils.

have desired to conceal. After all, the mode employed was in point of fact of little consequence. It would have been absurd for France, who had created these new republics, and who kept them on foot by her support, not to make the most of her strength for the establishment of that mode of government she deemed the best. The vexatious part of the affair was, that she had not made it the best that could be made on the very first day and at once, so that she might not have occasion to re-enact these acts of her omnipotence. On the 30th of August (13th Fructidor, year VI.), Trouvé assembled the directory and the two councils of the Cisalpine. He presented them with the new constitution and all the administrative and financial laws, which Faypoult had prepared. The councils were reduced from two hundred and forty to one hundred and twenty members. The individuals to be retained in the councils and the government were nominated. A regular system of taxation was established. There were two species of taxes, the personal and the indirect; a system at that time proposed to be introduced into France, and was highly offensive to the patriots. All these alterations were approved of and adopted. Brune had been obliged to obtain the assistance of the French troops; so the rage of the Cisalpine patriots was impotent, and the revolution was effected without serious obstruction. It was decided, moreover, that a speedy convocation of the primary assemblies should take place, for confirming the alterations made in the constitution.

Trouvé's task was performed; but the French government, on witnessing the uproar that minister had excited, conceived that it would not be possible to leave him at Milan, that some other embassy should be given him, and that some one who was a stranger to the late disagreements should be sent to Milan. Unfortunately, the directory allowed to be thrust upon it a *ci-devant* member of the Jacobins, who had played the part of a base and truckling courtier to Barras, whom he had made his associate in the jobbings of the companies, and put into the way of receiving distinctions. This was Fouché, whose appointment Barras obtained unawares from his colleagues. Fouché set out to succeed Trouvé, and the latter had to repair to Stutgard. But Brune, taking advantage of the opportunity of Trouvé's departure, took the liberty, with an audacity perfectly unaccountable, unless by the military licentiousness that prevailed at that time, to make the most important alterations in the work of the minister of France. He demanded the resignation of three of the directors nominated by Trouvé; he changed several of the ministers, and made various changes in the constitution. One of the three directors, whose resignation he demanded, Sopranzi, having courageously refused to give it, he caused to be forcibly seized by his soldiers and dragged from the palace of government. He then hastened the convocation of the primary assemblies, in order to make them approve of Trouvé's work, amended as it had just been by himself. Fouché, who arrived during this interval, ought to have opposed this convention, and not have allowed alterations that the general had no authority for making; but he let Brune do just as he pleased. Trouvé's amendments, and the more recent amendments of Brune, were approved of by the primary assemblies, who were at once submissive to the military power and the violence of the patriots.

When the French directory obtained information of these particulars, it showed no hesitation. The directory vacated all that Brune had done, displaced him, and left it to Joubert to go and restore matters to the state in which Trouvé had left them. Fouché made objections; he alleged that the new constitution being approved of with the alterations that Brune had introduced, the consequences of recurring to those alterations would be pernicious. He spoke with reason, and he even gained over Joubert to his opinion. But the directory should not have put up with such liberties on the part of its generals, and above all, it did not become the directory to permit them to exercise such authority in the allied states. The directory recalled Fouché himself, (who thus passed no more than a few days in the Cisalpine,) and enjoined the re-establishment of the constitution in every part, such as Trouvé had formed it in the name of France. As for the individuals from whom Brune had wrung their resignation, they were prevailed upon to confirm it, in order to prevent further changes.

The Cisalpine therefore remained constituted as the directory had desired it should be, the few dismissals from office effected by Brune only excepted. But these continual changes, this sharp-shooting, these contests between our civil and military agents, produced the most deplorable effect, depressed the recently-emancipated people, lowered the mother republic in public esteem, and demonstrated the difficulty there was of keeping all these bodies within their proper sphere.

The events in the Cisalpine were urged as matter for severe reproof against the directory: for it is customary to turn every thing into a grievance against a government that is impugned, and to impute to it as subject of blame the very impediments it encounters in carrying out its designs. The double opposition, which began to appear in the councils, attacked in different ways the operations executed in Italy. The patriot opposition had a very simple charge to make: an outrage had been committed, it said, against the independence of an allied republic; nay, even an infraction of the French laws had been committed, for the Cisalpine constitution, which had just been altered, was guaranteed by a treaty of alliance, and that treaty, approved of by the councils, could not be infringed by the directory. As for the constitutional, or moderate opposition, it was natural to reckon upon its approval rather than its reproaches; because the changes made in the Cisalpine were directed against the exclusive patriots. But in this party of the opposition stood Lucien Bonaparte. He was seeking causes of quarrel with the government, and, besides, he considered that he ought to defend the work of his brother, now attacked by the directory. He cried out, like the patriots, that the independence of the allies was attacked, that the treaties were violated, &c.

The two oppositions declared themselves more and more boldly every day. They began to dispute with the directory certain prerogatives with which it was invested by the law of the 19th Fructidor, and which it had occasionally exercised. Thus this law gave it a right to close those clubs

or suppress those newspapers whose acts seemed to have a pernicious tendency. The directory had closed some clubs which had become too violent, and suppressed some newspapers which had published false intelligence, evidently devised with a malicious intent. There was one newspaper, among the rest, which alleged that the directory was going to annex the Pays de Vaud to France: the directory suppressed it. The patriots inveighed against this arbitrary power, and demanded the repeal of several of the clauses of the law of the 19th Fructidor. The councils decided that these clauses should remain in force until a law was enacted regulating the press; and a report was ordered preliminary to the preparation of that law.

The directory in like manner experienced great opposition in respect of financial matters. It was now occupied in closing the budget for the year VI. (1797-1798), and in bringing forwards the budget for the year VII (1798-1799). The budget for the year VI. had been fixed at six hundred and sixteen millions, but out of the six hundred and sixteen millions there was a deficit of sixty-two millions; and, besides this deficiency, a considerable arrear in the receipts. The creditors, notwithstanding the solemn promise to discharge the consolidated third, had not been paid in full. It was settled that they should receive bills (*bons*), which should be taken in payment of taxes. The budget for the year VII. had to be settled immediately, as the year was about to commence. The expenditure was fixed at six hundred millions, assuming there would be no new continental war. Some reduction had to be made in the land tax and the personal tax, which were far too high, and to raise the duties on stamp registration, customs, &c. Additional taxes were decreed for the local expenses, and duties payable (*octrois*) at the gates of towns for the maintenance of the hospitals and other institutions. Notwithstanding this increase, the minister Ramel asserted that the taxes would not produce more at the utmost than three-fourths, to judge from past years, and that it was a gross exaggeration to estimate the effective receipts at four hundred and fifty or five hundred millions. He, therefore, demanded fresh resources to really cover the expenditure of six hundred millions. He proposed a tax on doors and windows, and a tax on salt. With respect to this subject a heated contest ensued. The tax on doors and windows was decreed, and a report on the salt tax was prepared.

There was nothing in these oppositions inherently mischievous, but they afforded the indication of a secret animosity, which only required public calamities to bring it into open action. The directory, very well informed as to the state of Europe, clearly perceived that new dangers were in preparation, and that a revival of hostilities on the continent was about to take place. There was no doubt of this when the movements of the different cabinets were considered.

Cobentzel and Ropnin had not been able to make Prussia renounce her neutrality, and had left that kingdom in extreme dissatisfaction. But Paul I., who had been completely gained over, had stipulated a treaty of alliance with Austria, and it was said that his troops were on the march. Austria was actively arming her population. The court of Naples had ordered the enrolment of the entire population. It would have been the height of imprudence not to make preparations, on observing such movements from the banks of the Vistula to the banks of the Volturno. Our armies were extraordinarily reduced by desertion. The directory resolved to provide for their being reunited by a grand institution, which had yet to be formed. The convention had twice drawn upon the population of France, but in an extraordinary manner, without being able to resort to a permanent law for the annual levy of soldiers. In March, 1793, the convention had ordered a levy of three hundred thousand men; in August, in the same year, she had adopted the great and glorious resolution of the levy *en masse*, generation after generation. Since that, the republic had existed by this measure alone, by compelling those who had taken arms at that period to keep to their flags. But war and disease had destroyed a great number, peace had sent many back to their homes. No more than twelve thousand furloughs had been granted, but there had been ten times as many desertions; and it was hard to be severe against men who had for six years defended their country, and made her triumphant over Europe at the expense of their blood. The squares of the regiments remained, and they were in good condition. It was necessary to fill them up by new levies, and to adopt not so much an extraordinary and temporary expedient, as a general and permanent measure; in short, make a law which should become, in some measure, a component part of the constitution. The conscription was devised.

General Jourdan was the reporter upon this great and useful law, which, like every thing else in this world, has been abused, but which for all that, has saved France, and raised her glory to its greatest elevation. By this law, every Frenchman was declared to be a soldier by right, during a certain period of his life. This period was from the age of twenty to twenty-five. The young men of that age were to be divided into five classes, year by year. The government was to call out these men as they were wanted, beginning with the first class, that is the twenty-year old class, and with the youngest of each class. The government could call out the five classes one after the other, in proportion and to the full extent of its requirements. In time of peace, the conscripts were to be obliged to serve till they were twenty-five years old. Thus the duration of a soldier's service would vary from one year to five, assuming that they were taken from twenty-five to twenty years. In time of war, this duration was to be unlimited; the government had the power of granting furloughs, when it conceived it could be done without inconvenience. There was to be no exemption of any kind, except in favour of those who had married before the passing of the law, or who had already paid their debt in the preceding wars. This law thus provided for ordinary occasions; but on extraordinary occasions when the country should be declared in danger, the government was to have a right, as in 1793, over the entire population, and in that case the levy *en masse* was to be revived.

This law was adopted without opposition, and considered as one of the most important creations of the revolution*. The directory immediately

* It was passed the 19th Fructidor, year VI. (5th September.)

called for its being put in operation, and demanded a levy of two hundred thousand conscripts, to complete the armies and to put them on a respectable footing. This demand was granted by acclamation on the 2nd Vendémiaire, year VII. (September 23rd, 1798.) Even though the two oppositions frequently thwarted the directory, out of ill-temper or jealousy, still they wished that the republic should preserve its ascendancy in the eyes of the powers of Europe. A levy of men requires a levy of money. The directory demanded, over and above the budget, one hundred and twenty-five millions; ninety for the equipment of the two hundred thousand conscripts, and thirty-five to repair the recent naval disaster. The question was, from whence were they to be drawn. The minister, Ramel, proved that the bills (*bons*) for the payment of two-thirds of the debt had almost all of them been called in, and that there were yet left national estates to the amount of four hundred millions which were consequently unincumbered, and might be appropriated to the new wants of the republic. Consequently it was decreed that one hundred and twenty-five millions worth of national domains should be sold. One-twelfth part was to be paid in ready money, the remainder in obligations of the purchasers, negotiable at pleasure, and payable successively in the course of eighteen months. They were to bear interest at five per cent. This paper would be as good as ready money, from the readiness with which it could be taken by the companies. The national property was to be sold at eight times its annual income. This expedient met with no more opposition than the law for recruiting, from which it emanated.

The directory thus placed itself in a position to reply to the menaces of Europe, and sustain the dignity of the republic. Two events of inferior importance had occurred, the one in Ireland, the other at Ostend. Ireland was in a state of rebellion, and the directory had sent thither general Humbert, with fifteen hundred men*. Unfortunately a remittance of money which the treasury was to have made having been delayed, a second division of six thousand men, under the command of general Sarrazin, could not set sail, and Humbert had been left unsupported. He had stood out for a considerable time, and long enough to demonstrate that the arrival of the expected reinforcement would have entirely changed the aspect of things. But after a series of well-conducted attacks, he had been obliged to lay down his arms, with his whole army. A similar kind of check experienced by the English had just required this loss. The English came from time to time, and threw a few bombs into our seaports. They wanted to effect a landing at Ostend for the purpose of destroying the sluices; but vigorously pursued, and cut off from their ships, they were taken to the number of two thousand men.

Although Austria had contracted an alliance with Russia and England, and could now reckon upon a Russian army and an English subsidy, still she hesitated to involve herself in a fresh contest with the French republic. Spain, who beheld with regret the flames of war again kindled upon the continent, and who dreaded in an equal degree the progress of the republican system, as well as its destruction; for in the one case she would be revolutionized, and in the other punished on account of her alliance with France.—Spain had again interposed, in order to pacify the exasperated combatants; but her mediation, by provoking discussions, by suggesting some possibility of arrangement brought about further indecision at Vienna, or at least further delays. At Naples, so frantic was public enthusiasm, that the idea of any delay was spurned, some measure was to be contrived for opening the contest, so as to force Austria to draw the sword. The folly of this petty court was unparalleled. It was the fate of the Bourbons at this period, to be led by their wives into all their misconducts. Three of them had been observed at one time in this same predicament, namely, Louis XVI., Charles IV., and Ferdinand. The fate of the unfortunate Louis XVI. is well enough known. Charles IV. and Ferdinand were dragged along, although by different paths, under the same influence into inevitable destruction. The people of Naples had been made to wear the English cockade. Nelson was treated as a tutelary divinity. Orders had been issued for the levy of one-fifth of the population—a species of extravagance, for one-fiftieth, well armed, would have sufficed to give Naples rank among the powers. Each convent was to furnish a horse-soldier fully equipped; part of the possessions of the clergy had been sold; all the taxes had been doubled; lastly, that framer of unfortunate projects, all whose military plans had been so unsuccessful, and whom fate reserved for reverses of so extraordinary a kind—Mack, had solicited to be placed at the head of the Neapolitan army. They had decreed him a triumph before victory, and had bestowed on him the title of liberator of Italy, the very same that Bonaparte had borne. To all these grand means were added nones (*neuvaines*) to all the saints*, prayers to St. Januarius, and persecutions against those who were suspected of participating in French opinions.

The petty court of Naples continued its intrigues in Piedmont and Tuscany. It was for exciting the Piedmontese to rise in the rear of the army that occupied the Cisalpine, and the Tuscans in the rear of that which protected Rome. The Neapolitans would have taken advantage of the opportunity to attack the army of Rome in front; the Austrians would also have taken the like advantages by attacking the Cisalpine army in front; and from all these combinations they drew the conclusion that not a single Frenchman would escape. The king of Sardinia, a religious prince, felt some scruples on account of the treaty of alliance which bound him to France; but he was told that promises pledged to oppressors were not binding, and that the Piedmontese had a right to kill all to the very last Frenchman. At any rate, scruples on this occasion were not so much the real stumbling-block, as the strict watch kept up by the directory. As for the archduke of Tuscany, he was entirely destitute of means. Naples, in order to decide

* He landed in Ireland the 5th Fructidor (22nd August), and was beaten and taken prisoner the 22nd (8th September), by general Cornwallis.

* The space of nine consecutive days, which were to be spent in performing acts of devotion to one particular saint, whose mediation was exclusively implored with the Almighty. *Trans.*

him, promised to send him an army by Nelson's fleet.

The directory, on its own part, was on its guard, and took its precautions accordingly. The Ligurian republic, always inveterate against the king of Sardinia, had at length declared war against that prince. To a strong dislike of each other's rule of conduct was added the mutual jealousy arising from their juxta-position, and those two petty states were determined, come what might, to fight it out. The directory interfered in the quarrel, signified to the Ligurian republic that it should lay down its arms, and declared to the king of Sardinia that it would take upon itself to maintain tranquillity in his dominions; but that, to effect this, the directory must occupy an important post therein. The directory consequently required of him to allow the occupation by its troops of the citadel of Turin. Such a design could only be justified by the apprehensions which the court of Piedmont excited. There was an antipathy between the old and new states, and they could not trust each other. The king of Sardinia strongly remonstrated; but he had not the means of resisting the demands of the directory. The French occupied the citadel, and immediately set about putting it in a condition of defence. The directory had separated the army of Rome from that of the Cisalpine, and had appointed to its command general Championnet, who had distinguished himself on the Rhine. The army was dispersed over the whole of the Roman states: there were in the Marches of Ancona four or five thousand men, commanded by general Casa Bianca; general Lemoine was, with two or three thousand men, on the opposite slope of the Apennines, towards Terni. Macdonald, with the left, nearly five thousand strong, was distributed over the country along the Tiber. There was a small reserve at Rome. The so-called army of Rome was therefore fifteen or sixteen thousand men at most. The necessity for keeping a close watch over the country, and the difficulty of drawing their subsistence from it, had forced us to scatter our troops; and if an active and well-supported enemy had known how to seize the opportunity, he might have made the French repent their severance from each other.

Great reliance was placed on this fact at Naples. The court flattered itself with the idea of surprising the French, and destroying them one after the other. How glorious would it be to take the initiative, to gain the first success, and at last to force Austria to enter upon the career after having opened it for her! Such reasons as these induced the court of Naples to take the initiative in hostilities. Naples hoped that the French would be easily beaten, and that Austria could no longer hesitate when once the sword should be drawn. M. de Gallo and prince Belmonte-Pignatelli, who knew a little more about Europe and her affairs, were opposed to this notion of taking the initiative; but their experienced counsels were disregarded. In order to decide this poor king, and to drag him from his innocent pursuits, a forged letter, as if from the emperor, was presented to him, as is said, which provoked the commencement of hostilities. Upon this marching orders were issued for the end of November. The whole Neapolitan army was set in motion. The king himself set out, with great pomp, to be present at these operations. There was no declaration of war, but merely a summons to the French, to evacuate the Roman states. They replied to this summons by preparing to fight, notwithstanding the disproportion in point of number.

In the respective situation of the two armies nothing was easier than to overwhelm the French, dispersed as they were in the Roman provinces, on the right and left of the Apennines. To effect this, a march should have been made straight upon their centre, and the mass of the Neapolitan forces brought to bear against the French between Rome and Terni. The left of the French, placed beyond the Apennines to guard the Marches, would have been cut off from their right, placed on this side to guard the banks of the Tiber. The Neapolitans thus would have prevented the French from effecting a junction, and would have been driven back in disorder to Upper Italy. The Peninsula, at least, would have been delivered; Tuscany, the Roman states, and the Marches, would have been placed under the dominion of Naples. The number of the Neapolitan troops would have rendered this plan easier of execution and more certain, but it was impossible that Mack should avail himself of so simple a manœuvre. As in his former plans, he proposed to surround the enemy by a multitude of detached corps. He had nearly sixty thousand men, forty thousand of whom formed the army in actual service, and twenty thousand the garrisons. Instead of directing this mass of forces upon the all-important point of Terni, he divided it into six columns. The first, moving on the back of the Apennines, along the Adriatic, was to proceed by the Ascoli road to the Marches. The second and third, moving on the other side of the Apennines, and keeping themselves in communication with the first, were to march, the one to Terni, the other to Magliano. The fourth, constituting the main body, was to make a movement upon Frascati and Rome. A fifth, proceeding along the coast of the Mediterranean, was to traverse the Pontine marshes, and to rejoin the main body on the via Appiana. The sixth, and last, put on board Nelson's squadron, was bound for Leghorn, to effect a rising in Tuscany, and cut off the retreat of the French. Thus every preparation was made for surrounding and destroying them all, though nothing was done for beating them first.

It was in this order that Mack marched with his forty thousand men. The quantity of his baggage, the want of discipline in his troops, and the bad state of the roads, rendered his movements extremely slow. The Neapolitan army formed a long train, without order and without unity. Championnet, duly apprized of the danger, detached two divisions, to watch the march of the enemy and to protect the separate bodies as they fell back. Having great doubts as to whether he should retain Rome, he resolved to take a position in rear of the city, on the banks of the Tiber, between Civita-Castellana and Civita-Ducale, and there concentrate his forces so as to resume the offensive.

While Championnet was prudently retreating from and evacuating Rome, leaving eight hundred men in the castle of St. Angelo, Mack was vauntingly advancing by all the roads, and seemed as if he was not to meet with opposition. He arrived at the gates of Rome on the 9th Frimaire, year VII. (November

29, 1798), and entered without trouble. A triumphal reception had been prepared for the king. That weak prince, treated as conqueror and liberator, was intoxicated with the kind of military glory which had been got up for him. At any rate he had been advised to make a noble use of his victory, and he invited the pope to come and resume possession of his dominions. Nevertheless his army, less generous than himself, committed atrocious acts of spoliation. The Roman populace, with its usual fickleness, attacked the houses of those who were accused of being revolutionists, and destroyed them. The mortal remains of the unfortunate Duphot were exhumed, and treated with the grossest indignity.

While the Neapolitans were thus amusing themselves at Rome, Championnet was executing with extraordinary activity the able movement he had resolved on making. Aware that the most important point was at the centre, on the Upper Tiber, he made Macdonald take a strong position at Civita-Castellana, and reinforced him with all the troops he could afford. He transferred part of the forces that he had in the Marches to the other side of the Apennines, and left general Casa-Bianca no more than were absolutely necessary to obstruct on this side the march of the enemy in that quarter. He himself hurried to Ancona, to hasten the arrival of his artillery and ammunition. Not alarming himself unnecessarily as to what was in preparation on his rear in Tuscany, he despatched an officer with a small detachment to observe what was going on in that quarter.

The Neapolitans at length fell in with the French on the different roads which they were traversing. They were thrice as numerous, but they had to deal with the famous Italian bands, and they found they had a hard task. In the Marches the column advancing by Ascoli was driven back to a great distance by Casa-Bianca. On the Terni road, a Neapolitan colonel was taken, with his whole division, by general Lemoine. This first taste of war with the French was not calculated to encourage the Neapolitans. Mack nevertheless made his arrangements for carrying the position which he felt to be the most important, that of Civita-Castellana, where Macdonald was to be found with the main body of our troops. Civita-Castellana is the ancient Veii, it is seated on a ravine, in a very strong position. The French held several distant posts, which covered the approaches to it. On the 14th Frimaire (December 4), Mack caused Borghetto, Nepi, and Rignano to be attacked by a considerable force. He despatched an accessory column along the opposite bank of the Tiber, which was to take possession of Rignano. None of these attacks prove successful. One of the columns put to flight, lost all its artillery. A second being surrounded, lost three thousand prisoners. The others, dispirited, confined themselves to mere demonstrations of hostility. In short, no part of the Neapolitan troops could withstand the attack of the French. Mack, somewhat disconcerted, renounced the attempt to take the central position of the Civita-Castellana, and began to discover that it was not on this point he should have endeavoured to force the enemy's line. It was at Terni, a point, much nearer the Apennines, and not so well defended by the French, where he ought to have struck the principal blow. He then began to bethink himself how he could withdraw his troops, and bring them back from Civita-Castellana to Terni. But to conceal that movement it would have required that rapidity of execution impossible to be effected with undisciplined troops. It would have taken several days to get the main body of the army again over the Tiber; and Mack retarded still more by his own fault an operation already too slow. Macdonald, whom he hoped to detain by hostile demonstrations at Civita-Castellana, had already transferred himself from Civita-Castellana to the other side of the Tiber. Lemoine had been reinforced at Terni. Thus the Neapolitans had been anticipated at every one of the points which they purposed to surprise. The first movement of general Metsch, from Calvi on Otricoli, did nothing but harm. On the 19th Frimaire (December 9), that general, driven back from Otricoli upon Calvi, was surrounded and obliged to lay down his arms, with four thousand men before a body of three thousand five hundred. From that moment, Mack thought of nothing else than returning to Rome, and falling back from Rome to the foot of the mountains of Frascati and Albano, with a view to rally his army there, and to reinforce it with fresh battalions. This was but a poor expedient, for it was not the numerical force of his soldiers that required augmentation, but it was their habitude that he ought to have changed; and it was not by retiring a few leagues from the field of battle that he could gain time to endue them with discipline and bravery.

The king of Naples, when apprized of these unhappy events, surreptitiously left Rome, whither he had but a few days previously entered in triumph. The Neapolitans evacuated in disorder, to the great satisfaction of the Romans, who were already much more annoyed by their presence than they had been by that of the French. Championnet re-entered Rome seventeen days after his quitting it. He had truly deserved the honours of a triumph. Skilfully concentrating himself with fifteen or sixteen thousand men, he had managed to take the offensive against forty thousand men, and driven them in disorder before him. Championnet would not confine himself to the mere defence of the Roman States. He conceived the bold design of conquering the kingdom of Naples with his weak army. The enterprize was difficult, not so much on account of the force of the Neapolitan army, as the inclinations of the inhabitants, who might involve us in a long and very dangerous irregular warfare. Championnet nevertheless persisted in advancing. He left Rome to pursue Mack in his retreat. He took from him by the way a great number of prisoners, and put completely to the rout the column that had landed in Tuscany, and of which there escaped no more than a thousand men.

Mack, in complete disorder, retreated rapidly into the kingdom of Naples, and did not stop till he was before Capua, on the line of the Voltarno. He selected his best troops, placed them in front of Capua, and along the whole line of the river, which is very deep, and forms an almost insurmountable barrier. Meanwhile the king had reached Naples, and his sudden return had produced consternation there. The populace, enraged at the defeats sustained by the army, raised the cry of

treason, demanded arms, and threatened to murder the generals, the ministers, and all those to whom they attributed the disasters of the war. That odious court did not hesitate to give arms to the lazzaroni, although it was easy to foresee the use that would be made of them. No sooner had these little better than barbarians received the spoils of the arsenals, than they rose and made themselves masters of Naples. Still shouting treason, they seized a king's messenger and put him to death. Acton, the favourite, on whom the public calamities now began to be imputed, the queen, the king, the whole court, were in the utmost dismay. Naples no longer appeared a safe abode; the idea of taking shelter in Sicily was immediately conceived and adopted. On the 11th Nivôse (December 31), the most valuable moveables of the crown, all the treasures of the palaces of Caserta and Naples, and twenty millions in money, were put on board Nelson's squadron, which sailed for Sicily. Acton, the author of all the public calamities, would not stand the consequences of abiding at Naples, and embarked with the queen. All that could not be carried away was burned. It was amidst a storm, and by the light of the flames of the blazing dockyards, that this cowardly and criminal court abandoned the kingdom it had sacrificed to its fears. It left orders, it is said, to put to death all the upper class of citizens accused of a revolutionary spirit. All were to be sacrificed down to the rank of notary. Prince Pignatelli remained at Naples, invested with the powers of royalty.

Championnet was, in the mean time, advancing towards Naples. He had, in his turn, committed the same fault as Mack. He had divided his force into several columns, which were to effect a general junction before Capua. Their junction, after traversing a difficult country, amidst a fanatic population, excited every where against the alleged enemies of God and St. Januarius, was hardly to be relied upon.

Championnet, having arrived with his most effective division on the banks of the Volturno, resolved to make an attempt on Capua. Repelled by a numerous artillery, he was obliged to relinquish the idea of taking it by an off-hand attack, and consequently to withdraw his troops, and wait for the arrival of the other columns. This attempt took place on the 14th Nivôse (January 3, 1799). The Neapolitan peasantry, who had every where risen, intercepted our couriers and our convoys. Championnet received no intelligence concerning his other columns, and his position might be considered as extremely critical. Mack seized this opportunity to make friendly overtures. Championnet, reckoning upon the fortune of the French, peremptorily rejected Mack's proposals. Fortunately, he was rejoined by his columns, and an armistice was then concluded on the following conditions. Mack was to abandon the line of the Volturno, to cede the city of Capua to the French, to retire behind the line of the Regi-Lagni on the Mediterranean side, and of the Ofanto on the Adriatic side, and thus to cede a great portion of the kingdom of Naples. Besides these concessions of territory, a levy of eight millions in money was stipulated. The armistice was signed on the 22nd Nivôse (January 11).

When the news of the armistice reached Naples, the people abandoned themselves to the dictates of their fury. They cried out more loudly than ever that they were betrayed by the officers of the crown. The appearance of the commissioner appointed to receive the levy of eight millions caused the mob to commit the greatest excesses; open rebellion took place, and prevented the execution of the armistice. The tumult was carried to such a height that prince Pignatelli quitted Naples in a fright. That fine capital was now abandoned to the lazzaroni. There was no longer any recognized authority, and the city was threatened with a terrible outbreak. At length, after three days' disturbance, a chief was chosen, who possessed the confidence of the lazzaroni, and who had some means of repressing their disorders. This was the prince of Moliterno. During this interval, the like fury burst forth in Mack's army. His soldiers, so far from laying their misfortunes to their own cowardice, broke out against their general as the cause, and would have massacred him. The pretended liberator of Italy, who a month before had received the honours of triumph, had no other asylum than the very camp of the French. He solicited permission of Championnet to seek an asylum in his camp. The generous republican, forgetting the undue language of Mack in his correspondence, afforded him an asylum, gave him a place at his table, and allowed him to retain his sword.

Championnet, who now felt authorized by the refusal given at Naples to execute the conditions of the armistice, advanced upon that capital, with the intention of capturing it. The undertaking was not easy of accomplishment, for an immense population, which in the open field a few squadrons of cavalry would have swept away, became extremely formidable behind the walls of a town. To get before the place cost him several battles, and there the lazzaroni displayed more courage than the Neapolitan army. The urgency of the danger had increased their fury. The prince of Moliterno, who strove to bring them to reason, shortly ceased to possess their confidence, and they had chosen for leaders two of their body, by name Paggio and "Mad" Michael. From that moment they abandoned themselves to the utmost excesses, and committed every species of violence against the citizens and nobles accused of Jacobinism. To such a height did these enormities proceed, that all classes concerned in the support of good order and government were anxious for the arrival of the French. The inhabitants wrote to apprise Mack that they would join him for the purpose of giving Naples into his hands. The prince of Moliterno himself promised to seize fort St. Elmo, and to give it up to the French. On the 4th Pluviôse (January 23rd), Championnet made the assault. The lazzaroni defended themselves courageously, but the citizens, having gained possession of fort St. Elmo, and different posts of the city, let in the French. However, the lazzaroni intrenched in the houses, were about to defend themselves, retreating from one street to another, and would perhaps have set fire to the town, but one of their leaders was made prisoner, he was treated with kindness and attention, he was promised St. Januarius should be respected, and at last he was prevailed on to get his followers to lay down their arms.

From that moment Championnet found himself

master of Naples and of the whole kingdom. He lost no time in restoring order, and disarming the lazzaroni. In conformity with the intentions of the French government, he proclaimed the new republic. An ancient name was given to it, that of the Parthenopean republic. Such was the result of the follies and malignities of the court of Naples. Twenty thousand French and two months were sufficient to foil its vast designs, and convert its dominions into a republic. This short campaign of Championnet immediately procured him a brilliant reputation. The army of Rome thenceforth assumed the title of army of Naples, and was separated from the army of Italy. Championnet became independent of Joubert.

While these events were taking place in the Peninsula, the fall of the kingdom of Piedmont was at length consummated. Already, by reason of a precaution amply justified by the circumstances, had Joubert taken possession of the citadel of Turin, and furnished it with artillery taken from the Piedmontese arsenals. But this precaution was ineffective in the present state of affairs. Piedmont was continually in a disturbed state. The republicans were incessantly making new attempts, and they even had recently sustained a loss of six hundred men in trying to surprise Alexandria. A masquerade, sallying from the citadel of Turin, in which the whole court was represented, and which was the joint work of the Piedmontese as also of the French officers, whom the generals could not always keep within bounds, had well-nigh provoked a sanguinary conflict even in Turin. The court of Turin could not maintain amicable relations with us, and the correspondence of the Neapolitan minister with M. de Priocca, the president of the council of Piedmont, sufficiently demonstrated this. Under such circumstances, France, exposed to a new war, could not leave upon her communications with the Alps, two parties in actual war with one another, and a hostile government. France possessed as against the court of Piedmont the right that the defenders of a fortress have over all the buildings which confine it or endanger its defence. It was decided that the king should be compelled to abdicate. The republicans were supported, and they were assisted in gaining possession of Novara, Alexandria, Susa, and Chivasso. It was then intimated to the king that he could no longer reside in dominions in a state of rebellion, and which were soon to become the theatre of war; he was called upon to abdicate the sovereignty of Piedmont, retaining that of Sardinia. The abdication was signed on the 19th Frimaire (December 9, 1798). Thus the two most powerful princes of Italy, those of Naples and Piedmont, had no more of their dominions left them but two islands. Under the circumstances that were in agitation, there was no desire exhibited of taking the trouble to form a new republic; and until the war had produced some settled result, it was decided that Piedmont should be provisionally administered by France. There was nothing more in Italy left as a subject of invasion save Tuscany. A mere notification would have been all that was necessary for taking possession of it, but this notification was deferred, and till it should be made, we had to wait till Austria should have openly declared herself.

CHAPTER XV.

STATE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE ARMIES AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF 1799.—PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.—LEVY OF TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND CONSCRIPTS.—RESOURCES AND PLANS OF THE DIRECTORY AND THE ALLIED POWERS.—DECLARATION OF WAR WITH AUSTRIA.—OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1799.—INVASION BY THE GRISONS.—BATTLE OF STOKACH.—JOURDAN'S RETREAT.—BATTLE OF MAGNANO; SCHERER'S RETREAT.—ASSASSINATION OF THE FRENCH PLENIPOTENTIARIES AT RASTADT.—THE EFFECTS OF OUR FIRST REVERSES.—MULTIPLIED CLAMOURS AGAINST THE DIRECTORY.—ELECTIONS OF THE YEAR VII.—SIEYÈS APPOINTED DIRECTOR IN ROOM OF REWBELL.

SUCH was the state of things at the commencement of the year 1799. War, after the events we have been relating, was no longer doubtful. The intercepted correspondence, the demonstrations of resistance by the court of Naples, who would not have taken the initiative unless they had been sure of a powerful intervention, the immense preparations of Austria, and lastly, the arrival of a Russian division in Moravia, left no doubt whatever. It was now Nivôse (January, 1799), and it was evident that hostilities would commence before the expiration of two months. Thus the antipathy of the two great systems which the revolution had arrayed against each other, was demonstrated by facts. France had begun the year 1798 with three republics by her side, the Batavian, the Cisalpine, and the Ligurian, and by the end of that year there existed six of them in consequence of the creation of the Helvetic, the Roman, and the Parthenopean republics. This extension did not so result from the spirit of conquest, as from the spirit of the system. France had been called upon to assist the oppressed Vaudois. She had been provoked at Rome to avenge the death of the unfortunate Duphot, sacrificed in desiring to separate the two parties: at Naples nothing more had been done than repel an aggression. Thus she had been absolutely forced to renew the struggle. Certain it is that the directory, though it had unbounded confidence in French power, was nevertheless desirous of peace for political and financial reasons; certain it is also, that the emperor desirous as he was of war, wanted to defer it some time longer. Both had, nevertheless, conducted themselves as though they had wished to renew the conflict immediately, so great had been the antipathy of the two systems.

The revolution had imparted to the French

government extraordinary confidence and hardihood. The recent event in Naples, though inconsiderable in itself, had confirmed it in the persuasion, that every thing must give way before French bayonets. Indeed, this was no more than the general opinion of Europe. It required nothing short of the immense means combined against France, to endue her enemies with sufficient courage to attack her. But this confidence of the French government in its strength was overrated, and concealed from it part of the difficulties of its position. The event has proved that its resources were immense, but that at the period of which we are speaking these were not sufficiently strong to ensure victory. The directory, besides France, had to regulate Holland, Switzerland, and all Italy, divided into so many republics. To regulate them through the medium of their own government was, as we have seen, a more difficult task than if they had been under the immediate control of the directory. By reason of a defect in organization, there was no making them available as a resource, generally speaking, either in money or men. Notwithstanding this, they were from that time obliged to defend them, and consequently to fight upon a line extending without interruption from the Texel to the Adriatic, a line which, attacked in front by Russia and Austria, was taken aback by the English fleets, either in Holland or at Naples. The forces which such a military situation required, the directory had to draw from France alone. Now the armies were in a remarkably diminished state; forty thousand soldiers, the best, were in Egypt under our great captain. The armies left in France were reduced one-half by desertions, which is always one of the consequences of peace. The government paid for the same number of soldiers, but it had not perhaps one hundred thousand effective men. The administrations and the staffs made a job of the pay, and it became a profitless surcharge on the finances. These one hundred and fifty thousand effective men formed excellent squares, which might be filled up by the new levy of conscripts; but all this required time, and there had not been time enough since the establishment of the conscription. Lastly, the finances were still in the same sad state of confusion, owing to the vicious mode of their collection. There had been voted a budget of six hundred millions, and an extraordinary subsidy of one hundred and twenty-five millions taken out of the four hundred millions [francs] worth of national property remaining on hand; but the receipts came in slow, and the error in the estimate of certain taxes left a considerable deficit. Lastly, subordination, most necessary in so great a machine, began to disappear. It became extremely difficult to keep the military within bounds. This state of perpetual war made them sensible that there was no doing without them, and they grew imperious and encroaching. Posted in wealthy countries, they determined to make the most of it, and they were participators in every species of corruption. They also enforced assent to their opinions wherever they resided, and could hardly ever be brought to pay obedience to the civil authorities. We have already remarked an instance of this in the quarrel between Brune and Trouvé. Lastly, in the interior, the opposition, which has been observed as reviving since the 18th Fructidor, and assuming two characters, was demonstrating itself more and more. The patriots, suppressed at the last elections, were preparing to gain an ascendancy in the new elections. The moderatists criticised in temperate, but bitter, language, the measures of the government, and as all oppositions ever do, blamed it for the difficulties it had to overcome, and which were most part insurmountable. The government is power (*force*) itself; it ought to gain the ascendancy; so much the worse it fares if it does not. No one will listen to its excuses explaining why it has not succeeded.

Such was the situation of the directory at the moment when war again broke out in Europe. The directory made most energetic efforts to restore order in this great machine. Confusion still prevailed in Italy. The resources of that fine country were squandered, and to no purpose destroyed for the army; a few plunderers monopolized all the benefit derivable therefrom. The commission appointed to constitute and to administer the Roman republic had just performed its office, and thereupon immediately the influence of the staffs had manifested itself. The consuls, who were deemed too moderate, had been changed. The advantageous contracts made for the supply of the army had been repudiated. The commission, in which Faypoult took the management of the finances, had contracted for the subsistence and the payment of the troops stationed in Rome, and for the carriage of all the works of art sent to France. This commission had assigned in payment national property taken from the clergy. The contract, besides being moderate in regard to price, gave an opportunity for disposing of the national property. This contract was repudiated and then given to Baudin and company, who were devouring Italy. This company was patronized by the staffs, to whom they allowed a profit of one per cent. Piedmont, which had been recently occupied, afforded a new prey to be devoured, and the integrity of Joubert, the commander-in-chief of the army of Italy, was no guarantee against the rapacity of the staffs and of the companies of contractors. Naples, in particular, was to be systematically pillaged. There were in the directory four men of probity, namely, Rewbell, Larévellière, Merlin, and Treilhard, who were highly indignant at all these irregularities. Larévellière in particular, the strictest of all, and the most perfectly acquainted with facts from his peculiar relations with Trouve the ambassador, and with the members of the commission of Rome—Larévellière recommended that the greatest energy should be displayed. He proposed and obtained the adoption of a very judicious plan, namely, constituted in all the countries dependent on France, or in which our armies were stationed, commissioners who were to take charge of the civil and financial departments, and wholly independent of the staffs. At Milan, Turin, Rome, and Naples, the civil commissions were to receive the levies stipulated with the countries allied with France, to allow contracts and make all financial arrangements; in a word, to supply the wants of the armies, but not leave the management of any funds to the military commanders. The commissions were, nevertheless, ordered to pay the generals the funds they should require, without being compelled to state the application of such money, being accountable therefore to none other than the government. Thus great respect was

shown to the military authority. The four directors procured the adoption of the measure, and orders were given to Schérer to carry it into immediate execution in the most strict manner. As he manifested some indulgence towards his comrades, it was notified to him that he should be held responsible for all irregularities that were not suppressed.

This measure, however just it might be, could not but give great offence to the staffs. In Italy, especially, they appeared as if they would openly mutiny. They alleged that the precautions that were adopted reflected dishonour on them, that it was making the generals entirely dependent, and depriving them of all authority. Championnet, at Naples, was already playing the legislator, and appointing commissions charged with the regulation of the conquered country. Faypoult was despatched to Naples, to take the management of the entire financial department in that place. He issued the necessary orders for re-establishing the administration in his hands, and revoked certain very injudicious measures adopted by Championnet. The latter, with all the offensive pride of men of his profession, especially when they are victorious, considered himself insulted. He had the hardihood to issue an order, by which he enjoined Faypoult and the other commissioners to quit Naples within twenty-four hours. Such conduct was not to be endured. To disobey the orders of the directory, and to drive from Naples the envoys invested with its powers, was an act which deserved the severest reprehension, unless it were intended to abdicate the supreme authority, and transfer it to the generals. The directory did not falter, and owing to the energy of the incorruptible members, who were determined to put an end to peculations, the directory displayed in this instance all its authority. Championnet was cashiered, and ordered to be tried by a military commission, notwithstanding his recent successes. Unfortunately, the insubordination did not stop there. The gallant Joubert suffered himself to be persuaded, that the honour of the military was affected by the ordinances of the directory; he would not retain the command on the new conditions prescribed to the generals, and tendered his resignation. The directory accepted it. Bernadotte refused to take Joubert's place from the same motives. However, the directory would not give way, and persisted in its ordinances.

The directory then turned its attention to the levy of the conscripts, which was going on but slowly. The first two classes not being able to furnish the two hundred thousand men, the directory authorized their being taken from all classes, till the number required should be complete. To save time, it was settled that the communes should take upon themselves the fitting out of the new recruits, and that this expense should be deducted from the amount of the land tax. These new conscripts, indifferently equipped, were to repair to the frontiers to be there formed into garrison battalions, to replace the old troops in the fortresses and the camps of reserve; and, when they should be sufficiently drilled, to go and join the armies in active service.

The directory had now to attend to the deficiency of revenue, the minister, Ramel, who had always managed our finances with intelligence and probity ever since the establishment of the directory, after he had correctly ascertained the produce of the taxes, certified that the deficiency would amount to sixty-five millions at least, without taking into the account the arrear arising from the delay in the receipts. A violent dispute took place respecting the individual amount of the deficiency. The opponents of the directory did not estimate it at more than fifteen millions. Ramel proved that it would be at least sixty-five, and perhaps even seventy-five. The tax on doors and windows had been devised, but that was not enough. A debate took place on the salt-tax. Then it was that great outcries were raised, the people it was alleged were oppressed; the public burdens bore most heavily upon a single class; however, the salt-tax was renewed. It was Lucien Bonaparte who was one of the speakers who urged these objections with the greatest pertinacity. The supporters of the government replied by asserting the necessity of the case. The tax was rejected by the council of the ancients. In order to make amends, the tax on doors and windows was doubled, and that on carriage-doors was even increased tenfold. The possessions of the protestant clergy were put up to sale, and it was decreed that salaries should be paid to those ministers by way of compensation for their property. The sums recoverable from owners of national property, who still remained indebted to the state, were placed at the disposal of the government.

Unfortunately all these resources were not sufficiently prompt. Besides the difficulty of raising the produce of the taxes as high as six hundred millions, there was another inconvenience in the tardiness of the receipts. The government was reduced in this instance as in the preceding years, to give orders to the contractors upon the produce not yet received. The government anticipants, to whom, since the paying off of the two-thirds, the utmost punctuality had been promised, were even paid with bills (*bons*) receivable in payment of the taxes. Thus the government was again reduced to expedients.

In providing soldiers, and funds for their support, we had by no means done all, we had to distribute them as occasion required, and appoint generals to command them. We had, as is already noticed, to protect Holland, the line of the Rhine, Switzerland, and all Italy, that is, to be actively employed from the gulf of Tarento to the Texel. Holland was protected on one side by the neutrality of Prussia, of which there appeared no doubt; but an Anglo-Russian fleet was to attempt a landing there, and no delay ought to take place in protecting her against that danger. The line of the Rhine was protected by the two fortresses, Mentz and Strasburg, and though it was by no means likely that Austria would endeavour to break through this line, it nevertheless became a matter of prudence to cover it by a corps of observation. Whether we acted on the offensive or defensive, it was in the neighbourhood of the Upper Danube, towards the Lake of Constance or in Switzerland, that we should have to encounter the Austrian armies. We therefore wanted an army in active operation, which, starting from Alsace or Switzerland, should advance into the plains of Bavaria. The next thing was to provide a corps of observation to protect Switzerland; and we had need of a strong army to cover Upper Italy against the Austrians, and Lower Italy against the united Neapolitans and English.

This field of battle was of enormous extent, and it was not known and appreciated as it since has been, after long wars and glorious campaigns. It was then considered that the key to the plain was in the mountains. Switzerland, situated amidst the immense line upon which the hostile armies would have to fight, appeared to be the key to the whole continent. France, in occupying Switzerland, seemed to have a decided advantage. In possessing the sources of the Rhine, the Danube, and the Po, she seemed to command the whole course of those rivers. This was an error. One may conceive that two armies, whose wing is supported immediately upon mountains, as was the case when the Austrians and the French fought in the environs of Verona, or in the environs of Rastadt, should attach importance to the possession of those mountains, because that one of the two which retains their possession can attack the enemy from the heights. But when they are fighting at the distance of fifty or one hundred leagues from mountains, they cease to possess the same importance. While they would be misapplying their forces to obtain possession of the St. Gothard, armies stationed on the Rhine or on the Lower Po would have time to decide the fate of Europe. But the lesser was compared with the greater: that inasmuch as heights are important on a field of battle of a few leagues, the conclusion was come to that the power obtaining possession of the Alps must, as a matter of consequence, be master of the continent. Switzerland has but one real advantage, that of opening direct roads by France to Austria, and by Austria to France. It may consequently be conceived that so far as the tranquillity of the two powers and of Europe were concerned, the closing of these routes is a great service. The more you can anticipate points of contact and means of invasion, the better it is, especially between two states who cannot come into collision without shaking the continent. It is in this sense that the neutrality of Switzerland is of concernment to all Europe, and therefore it is with very good reason, that upon the recognition of this principle the general safety may be said to depend.

France, by invading Switzerland, had gained the advantage of the direct routes to Austria and Italy; and, in this sense, the possession of Switzerland might be considered as important for her. But if a great number of routes is an advantage for the power that has to take the offensive, and which possesses the means of so doing, it becomes an annoyance to the power that is reduced to take the defensive, by reason of the inferiority of its forces. The latter must desire the number of the points of attack to be as limited as possible, so that it may be the better able to concentrate its forces. If it were beneficial for France, sufficiently prepared for the offensive, to be able to debouch in Bavaria by Switzerland, it would embarrass France, when reduced to the defensive, not to be able to rely on the Swiss neutrality; it would embarrass her to have to protect the entire space between Mentz and Genoa, instead of having it in her power, as she did in 1793, to concentrate her forces between Mentz and Strasburg on one side, and between Mont Blanc and Genoa on the other.

Thus the occupation of Switzerland might become pernicious to France, in case she had to act on the defensive. But she was far from anticipating such a contingency. The intention of the government was to take the offensive every where, and to proceed as formerly by blows that confounded the enemy by their force and rapidity. But the distribution of its forces was peculiarly unfortunate. One army of observation was stationed in Holland, and another army of observation on the Rhine. One army on active service was to start from Strasburg, to cross the Black Forest, and to invade Bavaria. Another army on active service was to fight in Switzerland for the possession of the mountains, and thus to support on the one hand that which was to act on the Danube, and on the other, that which was to act in Italy. Another great army was to set out from the Adige, to drive the Austrians completely beyond the Isonzo. Lastly, one more army of observation was to cover Lower Italy and protect Naples. It was intended that the army of Holland should amount to twenty thousand men, that of the Rhine to forty thousand, that of the Danube to eighty thousand, that of Switzerland to forty thousand, that of Italy to eighty thousand, and that of Naples to forty thousand; making a total of three hundred thousand men, exclusively of garrisons. With such forces, this mode of distribution would not have been so defective. But if by the levy of the conscripts our armies could be increased in time to that number, they were far from reaching that total at the present time. Scarcely more than ten thousand men could be left in Holland. On the Rhine no more than a few thousand men could be got together. The troops appointed to compose this army of observation were detained in the interior, either to keep an eye on La Vendée, which was still exposed, or to maintain the public tranquillity during the approaching elections. The army appointed to act on the Danube at the outside consisted of forty, that of Switzerland, thirty, that of Italy, fifty, that of Naples, thirty thousand men. Thus we were scarcely able to count one hundred and sixty, or one hundred and seventy thousand men. To strew them irregularly from the Texel to the Gulf of Tarento was the worst thing that could have been done.

Since the directory, hurried away by revolutionary daring, was determined to take the offensive, it became in that case more necessary than ever to choose the points of attack, to assemble in sufficient mass at those points, and not to scatter its forces for the purpose of fighting on all points at once. Thus in Italy, instead of dispersing its forces from Verona to Naples, it ought, after the example of Bonaparte, to collect the greater part of them on the Adige, and there make the most determined attack. By beating the Austrians on the Adige, it would be plain enough that Rome, Florence, and Naples, could be kept in awe. In the quarter of the Danube, instead of uselessly sacrificing thousands of brave men at the foot of Saint-Gothard, the army of Switzerland and of the Rhine should be diminished; the active army of the Danube augmented; and a decisive battle fought by the latter in Bavaria. It was even practicable to reduce the points of attack still further, to remain in observation on the Adige, not to act offensively save on the Danube, and there strike a more vigorous and decisive blow, by augmenting the

mass that was making the attack. Napoleon and the archduke Charles have proved, the first by great examples, the second by profound reasoning, that between Austria and France the quarrel should be brought to a termination on the Danube. That is the shortest way for attaining such object. A victorious French army in Bavaria neutralises all the successes of a victorious Austrian army in Italy, because it is brought so much nearer to Vienna.

It must be urged as an excuse for the plans of the directory, that no one hitherto had learned to comprehend such extensive fields of battle, and that the only man who could do so was in Egypt. The directory therefore distributed here and there the one hundred and sixty thousand men or thereabouts, actually disposable, upon the immense line which we have described, and in the order we have already pointed out. Ten thousand were to observe Holland, a few thousand the Rhine, forty thousand formed the army of the Danube, thirty thousand that of Switzerland, fifty thousand that of Italy, thirty thousand that of Naples. The conscripts were soon to reinforce these masses, and to bring them up to the number fixed by the plans of the directory.

The appointment of the generals was scarcely more judicious than the conception of the plans. It is true that, since the death of Hoche and the departure of Bonaparte, Dessaix, and Kléber for Egypt, the choice was much more limited. There yet remained one general, whose reputation stood deservedly high; this was Moreau. There possibly might be found men more daring, more enterprising, but not one more firm or more trusty. A state defended by such a man could not perish. Disgraced on account of his conduct in Pichegru's affair, he had modestly consented to become a mere inspector of infantry. He had been proposed to the directory to take the command in Italy. Ever since Bonaparte had drawn so much attention to that fine country, ever since it had been, as it were, the apple of discord between Austria and France, that command seemed to be the most important of any. This was why Moreau was thought of. Barras opposed it with all his might. He argued like a fiery patriot, and represented Moreau as a suspicious person, on account of his conduct on the 18th Fructidor. His colleagues had the weakness to give way to him. Moreau was thrown aside, and remained a mere general of division in that army of which he ought to have been the commander-in-chief. He nobly accepted this subaltern rank, so much beneath his talents. Joubert and Bernadotte had refused the command of the army of Italy, from motives unnecessary to repeat. The directory then thought of Schérer, the minister at war. This general, by his successes in Belgium, and by his admirable battle at Loano, had gained a high reputation. He was a man of great intelligence, but his body was worn out with age and infirmities: he was no longer capable of commanding young men, full of vigour and daring. Besides, he was on bad terms with most of his comrades by desiring to introduce some severity in the repression of the military licentiousness that prevailed. Barras proposed him for general of the army of Italy. It has been said, that this was done for no other purpose than to get him out of the ministry of war, wherein he was beginning to be disliked for his severity. However, the military men who were consulted, and especially Bernadotte and Joubert, having spoken of Schérer's capacity as it existed by common report in the army, that is to say, in terms of high commendation, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the army of Italy. Schérer did all he could to decline this appointment, alleging his age, the state of his health, and, above all, his unpopularity, owing to the office he had held; but it was insisted on, and he was obliged to accept it.

Championnet, who had been tried by a military commission, was succeeded in the command of the army of Naples by Macdonald. The command of the army of Helvetia was entrusted to Masséna. These appointments were very judicious, and the republic could not but highly approve of them. The important army of the Danube was given to general Jourdan. Notwithstanding his ill-success in the campaign of 1798, the services he had rendered in 1793 and 1794 were not forgotten, and it was hoped that he would not fall short of his earlier exploits. Considering that this army had not been given to Moreau, it could not be in better hands. Unfortunately it was so inferior in point of number, that to have commanded it with confidence would have required the daring of the victor of Arcola and Rivoli. Bernadotte had the command of the army of the Rhine; Brune that of Holland.

Austria had made preparations far superior to ours. Not confiding, like us, in her successes, she had employed the two years which had elapsed since the armistice of Léoben, in levying, fitting out, and drilling fresh troops. She had provided them with every thing that was necessary, and had been careful to select the best generals. She could at this moment actually bring into line two hundred and twenty-five thousand effective men, exclusive of the recruits which were still in preparation. Russia was furnishing her with a contingent of sixty thousand men, whose fanatic bravery was extolled throughout all Europe, and who were commanded by the celebrated Suwarrow. Thus the new league was ready to operate on the front of our line with about three hundred thousand men; mention was also made of two other Russian contingents, partly formed of English troops, the one appointed for Holland, the other for Naples.

The plan of campaign adopted by the allied powers was not more judicious than ours. It was a pedantic conception of the Aulic council, strongly disapproved of by the archduke Charles, but thrust upon him and all the generals, without their being allowed to make any alteration in it. This plan, like that of the French, was founded on the principle, that mountains are the key to the plain. Thus considerable forces were accumulated to guard the Tyrol and the Grisons, and to wrest if possible the great chain of the Alps from the French. The second object the Aulic council seemed to have most at heart was Italy. Considerable forces were stationed behind the Adige. The most important theatre of war, that of the Danube, did not appear to be the one with which they most concerned themselves. The best thing that had been done in that quarter was to station the archduke Charles there. The Austrian forces were distributed as follows: The archduke was with fifty-four thousand infantry and twenty-four thousand cavalry in Bavaria. In the Voralberg, all along the Rhine, to

z opening into the Lake of Constance, general Hotze ommanded twenty-four thousand infantry and two housand horse. Bellegarde was in the Tyrol, with orty-six thousand men, two thousand of whom were avalry. Kray had on the Adige sixty-four thouand infantry and eleven thousand horse, forming a otal of seventy-five thousand men. The Russian ody was ordered to join Kray, in order to make a novement in Italy.

We see that Hotze's twenty-six thousand men and Bellegarde's forty-eight thousand were intended to e of service in the mountains. They had to gain the ources of the rivers, while the armies moving in the lain were to endeavour to cross over them. On he part of the French, the army of Helvetia had the ame charge confided to them. Thus, on one side nd the other, a host of brave men were about to estroy one another to no purpose among inaccesible rocks, the possession of which could scarcely e said to exercise any influence whatever over the vent of the war*.

The French generals had not failed to inform the irectory of the general deficiency of their means. 'ourdan, who had been obliged to despatch several attalions into Belgium to suppress some disturbnces in that quarter, as well as a demi-brigade to he army of Helvetia, in substitution of another lemi-brigade despatched to Italy, could not reckon nore than thirty-eight thousand effective men. Such forces were too disproportionate, compared vith those of the archduke, to contend with him vith any chance of success. Jourdan solicited the rompt formation of Bernadotte's army, which nitherto comprised no more than four or five thouand men, and especially the organization of the ew field battalions. He would have desired pernission to have either the army of the Rhine or the rmy of Helvetia joined to his own, in which he was ight. Masséna on his part complained that he had either magazines or the means of transport indisensably necessary to keep his army in barren and almost inaccessible countries.

The directory replied to these observations by aying that the conscripts were about to join and mmediately form into field battalions, that the army of Helvetia should be immediately increased to forty housand men, and that of the Danube to sixty housand, that as soon as the elections were over, the old battalions retained in the interior, should go and form the nucleus of the army of the Rhine. Bernadotte and Masséna had orders to concur in Jourdan's operations, and to conform to his views. The directory still relying on the effect of the offensive, and relying as much as ever in its soldiers, was anxious that the generals, in spite of the disproportion of number, should lose no time in hazarding an attack, and disconcerting the Austrians by an impetuous charge. Orders were therefore issued accordingly.

The Grisons, divided into two factions, had long hesitated between the Austrian sovereignty and the Swiss power. They had at last called the Austrians into their valleys. The directory considering them as Swiss subjects, ordered Masséna to occupy their territory, at the same time giving the Austrians a previous summons to evacuate. In case of refusal, Masséna was immediately to begin the attack. At the same time, as the Russians continued advancing into Austria, the directory dictated two notes on this subject, the one to the congress at Rastadt, the other to the emperor. The directory thereby distinctly stated, that if in the space of eight days the march of the Russians were not counter-ordered, the directory should consider war as declared. Jourdan had orders to pass the Rhine immediately upon the expiration of this term.

The congress of Rastadt had made extraordinary progress in its labours. The questions of the line of the Rhine, the division of the islands, and the construction of bridges, were settled, all that it had to consider was the question of the debts. The greater part of the Germanic princes, the ecclesiastical princes excepted, required nothing else than a good mutual understanding, in order to avoid war; but the greater part being under the control of Austria, durst not declare their sentiments openly. The members of the deputation quitted congress one by one, and they were soon to find that they could no longer deliberate. The congress declared that it could not reply to the note of the directory, and referred its contents to the diet of Ratisbon. The note intended for the emperor was sent to Vienna and remained unanswered. War was *ipso facto* declared. Jourdan had orders to cross the Rhine, and to advance through the Black Forest to the sources of the Danube. He passed the Rhine on the 11th Ventôse, year VII. (March 1.) The archduke Charles crossed the Lech on the 13th Ventôse (March 3). Thus the limits which the two powers had prescribed for themselves were passed, and they were about to come once more to blows. However, while Jourdan was making a hostile march, he received orders to allow the enemy to be the first to fire, while waiting for approval by the legislative body of the proclamation of war.

During this period, Masséna was engaged in the Grisons. On the 16th Ventôse (March 6), he summoned the Austrians to evacuate them. The Grisons form the upper valley of the Rhine, and the upper valley of the Inn or Engadine. Masséna resolved to cross the Rhine near its entrance into the Lake of Constance, and thus to catch all the companies distributed over the upper valleys. Lecourbe, who formed his right wing, and who, from his extraordinary activity and daring, was the most accomplished general for mountain warfare, was to start from the environs of the Saint-Gothard, cross the Rhine near its head, and throw himself into the valley of the Inn. General Dessoles, with a division of the army of Italy, was to second him, by proceeding down the Valteline into the valley of the Upper Adige.

These skilful arrangements were made with great vigour. On the 16th Ventôse (March 6), the Rhine was boldly crossed at all points. The soldiers threw carts into the river, and passed over them as upon a bridge. In two days Masséna was master of the whole stream of the Rhine, from its head to its opening into the Lake of Constance, and had taken fifteen pieces of cannon and five thousand prisoners. Lecourbe, on his part, carried out with equal success the orders of his commander-in-chief. He crossed the Upper Rhine, passed from Dissentis to Tusis in the valley of the Albula, and

* All these assertions are fully justified by the archduke Charles, general Jomini, and Napoleon.

from this valley he boldly threw himself into that of the Inn, by crossing the loftiest mountains in Europe still covered with the snows of winter. A compulsory delay having prevented Dessoles from proceeding from the Valteline towards the Upper Adige, Lecourbe found himself exposed to the attacks of all the Austrian forces cantoned in the Tyrol. While, in fact, he was boldly advancing into the valley of the Inn, and marching upon Martinsbrück, Laudohn rushed with a division upon his rear; but the intrepid Lecourbe, retracing his steps, attacked Laudohn, overthrew him, took a great number of prisoners, and resumed his march into the valley of the Inn.

These brilliant openings seemed to induce a belief that the French were enabled every where, in the Alps as at Naples, to face an enemy superior in number. These successes confirmed the directory in the opinion that it was right to persist in the offensive, and to compensate by hardihood for numerical inferiority.

The directory sent to Jourdan the declaration of war, which it had obtained from the councils*, with orders to enter immediately on the attack. Jourdan had debouched by the defiles of the Black Forest into the country between the Danube and the Lake of Constance. The angle formed by this river and the lake opens more and more as it advances into Germany. Jourdan, who wanted to support his left on the Danube and his right on the Lake of Constance, was therefore obliged as he proceeded to keep extending his line, and consequently to weaken it in a dangerous manner, especially in the face of an enemy very superior in number. He had at first got as far as Mengen on the one hand, and Marckdorf on the other. But, learning that the army of the Rhine would not be organized before the 10th Germinal (March 30), and fearing lest the enemy should get at his rear by the valley of the Necker, he considered he should make a retrograde movement. The orders of his government and the success of Masséna decided him to march forward again. He chose a good position between the Lake of Constance and the Danube. Two swift mountain streams, the Ostrach and the Aach, rising at nearly the same point, and falling, the one into the Danube, and the other into the Lake of Constance, form one and the same right line, behind which Jourdan posted himself. Saint-Cyr, forming his left, was at Mengen; Souham, with the centre, was at Pfüllendorf; Ferino with the right was at Bärendorf. D'Hautpoult was stationed with the reserve. Lefebvre, with the division of the advanced guard, was at Ostrach. This was the most accessible point of the line: situated at the rising of the two streams, it presented marshes which might be crossed by means of a long causeway. It was upon this point that the archduke Charles, who would not suffer himself to be anticipated, resolved to make his greatest effort. He directed two columns to the left and right of the French, against St. Cyr and Férino. But his chief mass, nearly fifty thousand strong, was brought to bear upon the point of Ostrach, where there were nine thousand French at the utmost. The battle commenced in the morning of the 2nd Germinal (March 21), and was most obstinately contested. The French displayed, in this first collision, a bravery and perseverance which excited the admiration of prince Charles himself. Jourdan hurried on to this point, but the extent of his line and the nature of the country did not allow him by a rapid movement to transfer his forces from his wings to his centre. The passage was forced, and after an honourable defence, Jourdan found himself obliged to beat a retreat. He fell back between Singen and Tuttlingen.

A check at the opening of the campaign was provoking, it dissolved that illusion of hardihood and invincibility, by means of which the French were obliged to make up for numerical strength. However, their inferiority of force had rendered that check almost inevitable. Notwithstanding all this, Jourdan did not abandon his intention of taking the offensive. Knowing that Masséna was advancing on the other side of the Rhine, and fully relying upon the co-operation of the army of the Danube, he considered himself obliged to make a final effort to assist his colleague, and to support him by bearing on towards the Lake of Constance. He had another motive for again bringing himself in advance: this was the desire of occupying Stockach, where the roads from Switzerland and Swabia cross each other, a point which he had done wrong in quitting, on his retreat to between Singen and Tuttlingen. He fixed his movement for the 5th Germinal (March 25).

The archduke Charles had not yet decided what direction his movements should take. He knew not whether he ought to direct his march to Switzerland, so as to cut off Jourdan from Masséna, or towards the sources of the Danube, so as to cut off the former from his support of the Rhine. The movement towards Switzerland seemed to him to be more advantageous for both the armies, for the French had as strong an interest in connecting themselves with the army of Helvetia, as the Austrians had in cutting them off from it. But he was ignorant of Jourdan's plans, and resolved to examine the ground to know what they were. He had intended to make this examination on the 5th Germinal (March 25th), the very day on which Jourdan, on his part, intended to attack him.

The nature of the locality rendered the position of the two armies extremely complicated. The grand military point was Stockach, where the roads from Swabia and Switzerland cross each other. It was this point that Jourdan desired to retake, and the archduke wanted to keep. The Stockach, a small river, flows in a meandering stream in front of the town of the same name, and concludes its winding course by falling into the Lake of Constance It was on this river that the archduke had posted himself. He had his left between Nenzingen and Wahlwies, on the heights, and behind one of the windings of the Stockach. His centre was placed on an elevated plain (*plateau*), called the Nellenberg, and in advance of the Stockach; and his right was on the extended space of this elevated plain, along the causeway which runs from Stockach to Liptingen. It was, like the centre, in advance of the Stockach. The extremity of this wing was protected by the thick woods which extend along the road to Liptingen. This position was very unskilfully taken. If the left had the Stockach in front, the centre and

* This declaration of war was made the 22nd Ventôse, year VII. (12 March.)

the right had the river behind, and might be precipitated therein by an effort of the enemy. Besides, all the positions of the army had but one and the same outlet towards the town of Stockach, and in case of a forced retreat, the left, the centre, and the right, would be pressed together on a single road, and might by meeting there occasion a most fatal confusion. But the archduke, in his desire to cover Stockach, could not take any other position; and necessity was his excuse. He had but two real faults to reproach himself with; the one, that of having omitted to throw up some works for the better protection of his centre and his right; and the other, of having carried too many troops to his left, which was sufficiently protected by the river. It was his extreme anxiety to retain the important point of Stockach which had induced him to distribute his troops in this manner. He had, in other respects, the advantage of an immense numerical superiority.

Jourdan was unable to ascertain the arrangements of the archduke, for nothing is more difficult than examining of the ground, especially in a country so varied as that on which the two armies were in motion. He still occupied the opening of the angle formed by the Danube and the Lake of Constance, from Tuttlingen to Steusslingen. This line is of great length, and the nature of the country, which scarcely admitted of a rapid concentration, rendered this inconvenience still more serious. He ordered general Férino, who commanded his right towards Steusslingen, to march to Wahlwies; and Souham who commanded the centre towards Eigeltingen, to march to Nenzingen. These two generals were to combine their efforts to carry the archduke's left and centre, by crossing the Stockach and climbing the Nellenberg. Jourdan purposed then to set in motion his left, his advanced guard, and his reserve upon the point of Liptingen, in order to force a passage through the woods which covered the archduke's right, and to succeed in forcing it. These arrangements had the advantage of directing the greatest mass of forces upon the archduke's right wing, which was most jeopardized. Unfortunately, all the starting points of every column of the army were too remote. In order to act upon Liptingen, the advanced guard and the reserve had to start from Emmingen-ob-Ek, and the right from Tuttlingen, at the distance of a day's march. This complete separation was the more dangerous, because the French army, about thirty-six thousand strong, was inferior by at least one-third to the Austrian army.

On the 5th Germinal (March 25), in the morning, the two armies met. The French army marched to battle, the Austrians to make an examination of the ground (*reconnaissance*). The Austrians, who had put themselves in motion a little before us, surprised our advanced guards, but were soon driven back on all points by the mass of our divisions. Férino on the right, and Souham in the centre, arrived at Wahlwies, Orsingen, and Nenzingen, on the bank of the Stockach at the foot of the Nellenberg, brought the Austrians back to their previous position of the morning, and commenced a serious attack on that position. They had to cross the Stockach and to force the Nellenberg. A long cannonade took place along the whole line.

On our left, the success was more speedy and more complete. The advanced guard, at present commanded by Soult, for Lefebvre was wounded, repulsed the Austrians, who had advanced to Emmingen-ob-Ek, drove them away from Liptingen, put them to the rout in the plain, pursued them with extreme activity, and succeeded in taking the woods from them. These woods were the very same that covered the Austrian right; by following up their movements, the French might possibly throw the Austrian right into the ravine of the Stockach, and cause a fatal loss. But it was clear that this wing had been just reinforced at the expense of the centre and the left, and that a great mass of force would be required to make any effect upon it. It was necessary, therefore, as in the original plan, to make the advanced guard, the reserve, and the left, converge upon this same point. Unfortunately, general Jourdan, too confident upon the too easy success which he had so recently gained, desired the attainment of too remote an object, and, instead of bringing Saint-Cyr to him, he ordered that general to make a long circuit, for the purpose of turning the Austrians and cutting off their retreat. This was being in a hurry to reap the fruits of victory, when the victory itself had not been gained. General Jourdan kept no more at the decisive point than the division of the advanced guard, and the reserve entrusted to d'Hautpoult.

In the mean time the right of the Austrians, seeing the woods which covered them forced by the enemy, faced about, and disputed with extreme firmness the causeway from Liptingen to Stockach, which runs through those woods. They were fighting furiously, when the archduke came up in the utmost haste. Forming at a single glance a correct notion of the danger, he withdrew the grenadiers and the cuirassiers from the centre and the left, and transferred them to his right. Feeling no alarm about the movement of Saint-Cyr on his rear, he felt sensible that if Jourdan were repulsed, Saint-Cyr could but be further jeopardised, and therefore resolved to confine himself to a decisive effort in the direction of the point actually threatened.

The woods were disputed with an extraordinary fury. The French, very inferior in number, made an heroic defence, which the archduke termed admirable; but the prince charged in person with some battalions on the causeway of Liptingen, and made the French loose their hold. The latter lost the woods, and at length found themselves in the open plain of Liptingen, from which they had started. Jourdan sent to demand succours of Saint-Cyr; but it was too late. His reserve remained, and he determined to order a charge of cavalry, with a view to regain the advantages that he had lost. He sent off four regiments of cavalry at once. This charge, met by another charge, which the archduke's cuirassiers made in good time, did not answer its object. A terrible confusion ensued in the plain of Liptingen. The French after performing prodigies of valour dispersed. General Jourdan made heroic efforts to stop the fugitives; he was himself hurried along with them. The Austrians, however, exhausted by this long combat, did not venture to pursue us.

The battle was then over. Férino and Souham had kept their ground, but they had not forced

either the centre or the left of the Austrians. Saint-Cyr was not far behind upon their rear. It could not be said that the battle was lost: the French, inferior in number by one-third, had every where kept the field of battle, and displayed remarkable bravery; but inferior in number, and separated as their different divisions were, not to have conquered was in fact to be beaten. It was necessary immediately to call back Saint-Cyr, who was very much exposed, to rally the advanced guard and the reserve, which had suffered severely, and to bring back the centre and the right. Jourdan immediately issued the necessary orders in consequence, and directed Saint-Cyr to fall back as speedily as possible. The position of the latter had become extremely dangerous, but he effected his retreat with the steadiness that has always distinguished him, and regained the Danube without accident. The loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was much about the same on both sides. It amounted to about four or five thousand men.

After this unfortunate battle the French were unable to keep the field, and it became necessary for them to shelter themselves behind some strong protecting line. Should they retreat to Switzerland or the Rhine? It was evident that in retreating into Switzerland they might combine their efforts with Masséna's army, and be enabled by that junction to resume an imposing attitude. Unhappily, general Jourdan did not consider that he should make this movement; his fears were for the line of the Rhine, on which Bernadotte had not yet collected more than seven or eight thousand men, and he resolved to fall back to the entrance of the defiles of the Black Forest. He there took a position which he conceived to be strong, and leaving the command to Ernould, the chief of his staff, he set out for Paris, to make complaints of the inferior state in which his army had been left. The results spoke much more loudly than all the complaints in the world could have done, and it would have been far better that he should have remained with his army than to go to Paris to make complaints.

Most fortunately, the orders of the Aulic council to the archduke Charles involved a serious error, which partly made amends for ours. If the archduke, pushing his advantages, had closely pursued our vanquished army, he might have thrown it into complete disorder, and perhaps even destroyed it. There would then have been time to return towards Switzerland to attack Masséna, at that time destitute of assistance, reduced to his thirty thousand men, and embarrassed in the upper valleys of the Alps. It would have been by no means impossible to have cut him off from the road to France. But the Aulic council forbade the archduke to push on for the Rhine, before Switzerland was evacuated; this was one of the deductions from the principle, that the key to the theatre of the war was in the mountains.

While these occurrences were taking place in Swabia, the war was being carried on in the Upper Alps. Masséna was making his movements in the direction of the source of the Rhine, Lecourbe towards the sources of the Inn, and Dessoles towards the sources of the Adige, with tolerably even success. There was, on the other side of the Rhine, a little above the point where it falls into the Lake of Constance, a position which it was necessary to carry—that of Feldkirch. Masséna had done all that his energy could suggest to gain that post, but he had lost two thousand men without gaining any thing. Lecourbe at Taussers, and Dessoles at Nauders, had fought brilliant actions which had brought them three or four thousand prisoners, and well made up for the check at Feldkirch. Thus the French, by their spirit and hardihood, kept the upper hand in the Alps.

Operations commenced in Italy the very day after the battle of Stockach. The French had received about thirty thousand conscripts, which brought the mass of their forces in Italy to amount to very nearly one hundred and sixteen thousand men. They were distributed as follows: Thirty thousand old troops under Macdonald guarded Rome and Naples. The thirty thousand young soldiers were in the fortresses. There remained fifty-six thousand men under Schérer. Of these fifty-six thousand men, he had detached five thousand men under general Gauthier to occupy Tuscany, and five thousand under general Dessoles to make a movement in the Valteline. Thus Schérer had forty-six thousand left to fight with upon the Adige, an essential point, whither the whole mass of our forces should have been brought to bear. Besides the disadvantage of the small number of men on this decisive point, there was another which was not less fatal to the French. The general commanded no confidence. He was far too old, as we have observed; he had besides lost all popularity during his ministry. He was himself aware of this, and it was with great reluctance that he had accepted the command. He went about at night to listen to the conversation of the soldiers in their tents, and to collect with his own ears the evidence of his unpopularity. These were most unfavourable circumstances at the opening of a great and difficult campaign.

The Austrians were to be commanded by Mélas and Suwarrow. During the previous interval they were under the command of baron de Kray, one of the emperor's best generals. Even before the arrival of the Russians, they amounted to eighty-five thousand men in Upper Italy. Nearly sixty thousand were already on the Adige. In both armies orders had been given to act on the offensive. The Austrians were to debouch from Verona, to skirt the foot of the mountains, and to advance on the other side of the river, keeping the fortresses out of view. The object of this movement was to support a similar movement of the army of the Tyrol in the mountains.

Schérer had received no other injunction than to cross the Adige. The order was a difficult one to execute, and the Austrians had all the advantage of that line. It ought to have been sufficiently known by the events of 1796. Verona and Legnago, which command it, belonged to the Austrians. The attempt to throw a bridge at any point whatever would have been a dangerous experiment; for the Austrians possessing Verona and Legnago, would have had it in their power to debouch on the flank of the army while occupied in attempting a passage over. The safest course, if the order had not been to act on the offensive, would have been to allow the enemy to debouch beyond Verona, to wait for him on a ground which we should have chosen at our leisure, to give him battle, and to make the most of the victory in order to cross the Adige close behind him.

Schérer, being obliged to begin, hesitated as to the best course to pursue, but at length decided upon an attack towards his left. The reader recollects, no doubt, the position of Rivoli in the mountains, at the entrance of the Tyrol, and very far above Verona. The Austrians had made outworks to protect every approach, and formed a camp at Pastrengo. Schérer resolved, in the first place, to carry this camp, and to throw the Austrians back on this side beyond the Adige. The three divisions of Serrurier, Delmas, and Grenier, had to do this. Moreau, who had become merely a general of division under Schérer, was, with Hatry's and Victor's divisions, to annoy Verona. General Montrichard, with one division, was to make a hostile demonstration upon Legnago. This distribution of force sufficiently demonstrated the hesitation and uncertainty of the commander-in-chief.

The attack took place on the 6th Germinal (March 26), the day after the battle of Stockach. The three divisions directed to assault the camp of Pastrengo on several points, carried it with an intrepidity worthy the old army of Italy, and made themselves masters of Rivoli. They took fifteen hundred prisoners and a considerable quantity of cannon from the Austrians. The latter recrossed the Adige at full speed by a bridge they had thrown across at Polo, and which they had time to destroy. At the centre, near Verona, there was hard fighting for the villages situated in front of that city. Kaim exercised his energies to no purpose in defending and recovering them. The village of San Massimo was seven times taken and retaken. Moreau, not less firm than his antagonist, did not allow him to acquire any advantage, and kept him penned up in Verona. Montrichard, in making an imaginary demonstration on Legnago, ran into real danger. Kray, deceived by false intelligence, conceived that the French would direct their principal effort upon the Lower Adige. He had sent thither great part of his forces, and in debouching from Legnago he placed Montrichard in the most imminent peril. The latter was fortunately protected by the inequality of the ground, and prudently fell back upon Moreau.

The action had been bloody, and the French had the best of it on the left and at the centre. Their loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, might be estimated at four thousand at least. However, in spite of the advantage acquired by the French, they had obtained but very unimportant results: all they had done at Verona was to confine the Austrians; true it is that above Verona they had driven them across the Adige, and had gained the means of passing close after them by repairing the bridge of Polo; but unfortunately it was perfectly unimportant to cross the Adige at that point. It should be recollected that the road which runs outside that river goes through Verona, and that there is no other outlet for debouching into the plain. They were far from doing all they had to do when they crossed the Adige at Polo; after we had crossed it we found ourselves in front of Verona, in the same position as Moreau at the centre, and we should have to take the fortress. If, on the same day, advantage had been taken of the disorder into which the attack on the camp of Pastrengo had thrown the Austrians, and if no time had been lost in restoring the bridge of Polo, perhaps the French might have entered the place close upon the fugitives, especially considering the obstinate battle which Moreau on the other side of the Adige was fighting with general Kaim.

Unfortunately, nothing of the sort was done. However, all this might have been put to rights by making a brisk movement on the following day, and by transferring the mass of the forces before and above Verona towards the bridge of Polo. But Schérer was for three successive days in uncertainty as to what course he should pursue. He made enquiry for a road on the other side of the Adige, which would allow him to avoid Verona. The army was indignant at this hesitation, and loudly complained that the advantages gained in the action of the 6th (March 26) were not followed up. At length, on the 9th Germinal (March 29), a council of war was held, and Schérer decided on making a movement. He formed the singular plan of throwing Serrurier's division across the Adige by the bridge of Polo, and of directing the mass of his army between Verona and Legnago, for the purpose of attempting the passage of the river there. To effect the removal of his forces, he took two divisions from his left to his right, made them pass behind his centre, and exposed them to useless fatigues, upon bad roads, rendered utterly impassable by late rains.

On the 10th Germinal (March 30), the new plan was put in execution. Serrurier, with his division, six thousand strong, crossed the Adige alone at Polo, while the bulk of the army was getting lower down between Verona and Legnago. It was easy to divine what would befall Serrurier's division. Embarrassed, after crossing the Adige, along a road which was closed by Verona, and which thus formed a kind of *cul-de-sac* *, he ran great risks. Kray, who knowing pretty well how Serrurier's army must be circumstanced, despatched against it a mass of forces three times superior, and briskly made it fall back upon the bridge of Polo. The ranks were thrown into utter confusion, and the second passage of the river was not effected without great disorder. Detachments were obliged to cut their way through, and fifteen hundred prisoners remained in the hands of the Austrians. Schérer, when apprised of this check, which could not have been avoided, contented himself with bringing up the beaten division, and getting nearer to the Lower Adige, where he had now concentrated the greater part of his forces.

Several more days were passed by both parties in feeling their way. At length Kray took a determination, and resolved, while Schérer was getting down upon the Lower Adige, to debouch *en masse* from Verona, to bear down upon Schérer's flank, and to drive him into a corner between the Lower Adige and the sea. The notion was good, but fortunately an intercepted order made Moreau acquainted with Kray's design; Moreau immediately communicated it to the commander-in-chief, and pressed him to make his divisions go up the river once more, in order to make head towards Verona, the place where the enemy was about to debouch.

* A way or road, the termination of which presents no outlet. *Trans.*

It was while executing this movement that the two armies met on the 16th Germinal (April 5), in the environs of Magnano. Victor's and Grenier's divisions, forming the right, towards the Adige, were making their way up the river by San Giovanni and Tomba, so as to get to Verona. They overwhelmed Mercantin's division, which was opposed to them, and utterly destroyed Wartensleben's regiment; these two divisions thus arrived nearly opposite to Verona, and were enabled to accomplish their object, which was to cut off from that city all the troops that Kray might have drawn from it. Delmas's division, which was to move to the centre, towards Butta-Preda and Magnano was behindhand, and afforded the Austrian division of Kaim occasion to advance as far as Butta-Preda, and thus to form a salient point towards the middle of our line. But Moreau, on the left, with the divisions of Serrurier, Hatry, and Montrichard, advanced without opposition. He had ordered Montrichard's division to shift its front, in order to face Butta-Preda, towards the point where the enemy had formed a point, and was marching with his two other divisions towards Dazano. Delmas at length arrived at Butta-Preda, covered our centre; and at this moment fortune seemed to declare in our favour, for our right, completely victorious in the quarter of the Adige, was about to cut off the retreat of the Austrians to Verona.

But Kray, considering that the essential point was on our right, and that he ought to abandon all ideas of success on all the other points for the purpose of gaining the victory on that, sent on that quarter the greatest mass of his forces. He had one advantage over Schérer, namely, the proximity of his divisions, which permitted him more readily to shift them. The French divisions, on the contrary, were at a great distance from one another, and fought on ground intersected by numerous enclosures. Kray fell unawares, with his whole reserve, upon Grenier's division. Victor was proceeding to the relief of the latter, when he was himself charged by the Nadasty and Reisky regiments. Kray was not content with this first advantage. He had caused Mercantin's division, beaten in the morning, to be rallied in the rear; he sent it forth again against Grenier's and Victor's divisions, and thus decided their defeat. Those two divisions, notwithstanding they made a warm resistance, were obliged to abandon the field of battle. The right being put to the rout, our centre found itself much exposed. Kray did not fail to press hard against it, but Moreau was there, and he prevented Kray from following up his advantages.

The battle was evidently lost, and it was necessary to think of retreating. The loss had been great on both sides. The Austrians had three thousand killed and wounded, and two thousand of them were prisoners. The French had an equal number killed and wounded, but they had lost four thousand prisoners. It was in this battle that general Pigeon was mortally wounded; the same who, during the first campaign in Italy, had displayed so much talent and daring in the advanced guards.

Moreau recommended the passing the night upon the field of battle, to avoid the confusion of a retreat at night; but Schérer resolved to retreat that same evening. Next day, he retired behind the Molinella, and the next day but one, the 18th Germinal (April 7), to the Mincio. Supported upon Peschiera on the one side, and Mantua on the other, he could make a vigorous resistance, recall Macdonald from the further extremity of the peninsula, and by this concentration of his forces recover the superiority he had lost by the battle of Magnano. But the unfortunate Schérer had entirely lost his presence of mind. He was quite as unpopular with his soldiers as ever. Masters for three years of Italy, they were indignant at seeing that conquest torn from them, and they imputed their reverses to the unskilfulness of their general. It is certain that, so far as they were concerned, they had done their duty as well as in the brightest days of their glory. The censures of his army had affected Schérer quite as much as his defeat. Conceiving that he could not maintain his ground on the Mincio, he retreated to the Oglio, and subsequently to the Adda, which he reached on the 12th of April. No one knew where this retrograde movement was to stop.

The campaign had been opened scarcely six weeks, and already we were on our retreat at every point. Ernould, chief of the staff, whom Jourdan had left with the army of the Danube at the entrance of the defiles of the Black Forest, had become alarmed at receiving intelligence of an incursion of a few light troops on his flanks, and made a disorderly retreat towards the Rhine. Thus, both in Germany and in Italy, our armies, who had shown as much bravery as ever, nevertheless lost their acquisitions, and retreated beaten towards the frontier. Switzerland was the only place where we had retained the superiority. There Masséna kept his ground with all the tenacity of his character, and, with the exception of the fruitless attempt on Feldkirch, had constantly come off victorious. But, stationed on the salient angle that Switzerland forms between Germany and Italy, he was posted between two victorious armies, and he could not do otherwise than retreat. In fact, he had just given such orders to Lecourbe, and fell back into the interior of Switzerland, but in good order, and still retaining the most imposing attitude.

Our military reputation was humbled, and our ministers abroad were now to be sacrificed as victims of the most disgraceful and atrocious outrage. War being declared against the emperor, and not against the Germanic empire, the congress of Rastadt had continued assembled. The last difficulty, that of the debts, had been nearly cleared up; but two-thirds of the states had already recalled their deputies. This was in consequence of the influence exerted by Austria, who did not desire that a peace should be concluded. All who remained at congress were some few deputies of Germany, and the retreat of the army of the Danube having opened the country, the conferences took place in the midst of Austrian troops. The cabinet of Vienna then conceived an infamous plan, which has cast a deep shade of dishonour upon its policy. The cabinet had much to complain of in the haughtiness and energy which our ministers had displayed at Rastadt. It imputed to them a disclosure which had deeply compromised the cabinet in the estimation of the Germanic

body, namely, the secret articles arranged with Bonaparte for the occupation of Mentz. These secret articles proved that, in order to obtain Palma Nova in the Friuli, the Austrian cabinet had ceded Mentz, and betrayed in the most unworthy manner the interests of the empire. That cabinet was highly incensed, and resolved to take vengeance upon our ministers. It wished, moreover, to seize their papers, in order to ascertain those German princes who were at that time treating individually with the French republic. It therefore conceived the criminal idea of securing the persons of our ministers on their return to France, of robbing, ill-using, and perhaps even murdering them. However, it has never been brought to light whether positive orders had been given for their assassination.

Already had our ministers felt some distrust, and without apprehending any outrage upon their persons, they, nevertheless, were alarmed for their correspondence, which was in point of fact interrupted on the 30th Germinal by the removal of the bridge-masters, who were employed to take it across. Our ministers remonstrated; the deputation of the empire also remonstrated, and asked if the congress could consider itself in a state of safety. The Austrian officer, to whom the deputation addressed itself, did not return an answer calculated to set these apprehensions at rest. Our ministers then declared that they would set out in three days, that is to say, on the 9th Floréal (April 29), for Strasburg, and they added, that they should stay in that city, ready to renew the negotiations so soon as any desire for that purpose should be expressed. On the 7th Floréal a courier of the legation was arrested. Fresh remonstrances were made by the whole congress, and it was expressly asked, whether the French ministers might be said to be safe. The Austrian colonel commanding the Szekler hussars, in cantonments near Rastadt, replied that all the French ministers had to do was to set out within twenty-four hours. He was requested to allow them an escort, but he refused it, and gave an assurance that their persons would be respected. Our three ministers, Jean Debry, Bonnier, and Robejeot set out at nine in the evening of the 9th Floréal (April 29). They occupied three carriages with their families. After them came the Ligurian legation and the secretaries of embassy. At first some difficulties were raised as to their being allowed to leave Rastadt; but at length all impediments were removed, and they left the town. They had hardly got fifty paces from Rastadt, when a troop of Szekler hussars rushed upon them with drawn swords, and stopped the carriages. That of Jean Debry was the first. The hussars violently opened the door, and asked, in a semi-barbarous dialect, if he was Jean Debry. On his reply in the affirmative, they seized him by the throat, dragged him out of the carriage, and in presence of his wife and children inflicted upon him several sabre wounds. Believing him to be dead, they went on to the other carriages, and murdered Robejeot and Bonnier, in the arms of their families. The members of the Ligurian legation and the secretaries of embassy had time to escape. The ruffians hired to perform this murderous act next plundered the carriages, and carried off all the papers.

Jean Debry's wounds were not mortal. The cold night air recovered him, and he crawled, covered with blood, to Rastadt. When this outrage was known, it excited the indignation of the inhabitants and of the members of the congress. German faith was shocked at a violation of the law of nations unheard of among civilized people, and which was only conceivable of a semi-barbarian cabinet. The members of the deputation left at the congress, lavished on Jean Debry and the families of the murdered ministers the most marked and assiduous attention. They afterwards assembled, and drew up a declaration, in which they denounced to the whole world the outrage that had just been committed, and repelled all suspicion of being concerned with Austria as participators therein. This crime, which was immediately published throughout all Europe, excited universal indignation. The archduke Charles wrote a letter to Masséna, intimating that he should direct proceedings to be instituted against the colonel of the Szekler hussars; but this cold and constrained letter, which demonstrated how embarrassed the prince felt, was not worthy either of himself or his character. Austria did not, and could not, make any reply to the accusations directed against her.

Thus the war between the two systems that divided the world was implacable. The republican ministers, ill received at first, then insulted during a year of peace, at last came to be most atrociously murdered, and with a degree of ferocity which none but barbarians could have exhibited. The law of nations, held sacred between the most inveterate enemies, was violated only in regard to them.

The very unexpected reverses which marked the opening of the campaign, and the outrage at Rastadt, produced an impression most fatally prejudicial to the directory. From the very moment war was declared, the two parties in opposition began to lose all self-restraint; they no longer contained themselves when they saw our armies beaten, and our ministers assassinated. The patriots excluded by the separations (*scissions*), and whose licentiousness the government had attempted to repress, the royalists, concealing themselves behind the disaffected of different classes, all at once made a handle of the late events for accusing the directory, against whom they made the most unjust and the most multifarious imputations. The armies, they alleged, had been utterly neglected. The directory had suffered their ranks to be thinned by desertion, and had not used any activity in recruiting them by means of the new conscription. The directory had retained in the interior a great number of old battalions, which instead of being sent to the frontiers, were employed in repressing the freedom of the elections; and to armies thus reduced to a force so disproportionate to that of the enemy, the directory had neither supplied stores, provisions, accoutrements, means of transport, or horses to replace those that were lost. The directory, said its accusers, had abandoned them to the rapacity of the administrations, which had consumed a revenue of six hundred millions without showing any thing for it. Lastly, the directory had made the very worst choice of generals to command the armies. Championnet, the conqueror of Naples, was in confinement for having

desired to repress the rapacity of the government agents. Moreau was reduced to the situation of a mere general of division. Joubert, the conqueror of the Tyrol, and Augereau, one of the heroes of Italy, were without command. Schérer, on the contrary, who by his administration had done those acts that contributed to all our defeats, was put in command of the army of Italy, because he was a countryman and friend of Rewbell. But they did not confine themselves to this. There were other persons whose names were injuriously brought forward. The illustrious Bonaparte, his illustrious lieutenants, Kléber and Dessaix, and their forty thousand companions in arms, the conquerors of Austria, where are they?—In Egypt, in a distant land, where they are about to perish from the imprudence of the government, perhaps from its malignity. As to this expedition, lately so much bepraised, it began to be said that the directory had thus contrived to get rid of a celebrated warrior of whom it had conceived a distrust.

They went still further back into the causes of things: the government was blamed in respect of the very war itself; the imputation against the directory was, that it had causelessly provoked the war by its imprudent disregard to the interests of foreign powers. The directory had invaded Switzerland, overthrown the pope and the court of Naples, driven Austria to extremities, and all without being prepared to enter upon the conflict. By invading Egypt, it had decided the Porte in coming to a rupture. By thus deciding the Porte, the directory had freed Russia from all apprehension for her rear, and permitted her to send sixty thousand men into Germany. In short, so great was the popular feeling, that they went so far as to say the directory was the secret author of the murders at Rastadt. It was, they alleged, an expedient for inflaming the public mind against the enemies of France, and demanding fresh resources from the legislative body.

These imputations found their echo in the tribune, in the newspapers, and in places of public resort. Jourdan had hastened to Paris, to complain of the government, and to charge all the reverses he had suffered to its mismanagement. Those generals who had not come had written for the purpose of laying a statement of their grievances. This was an universal explosion, which in itself would be incomprehensible, if we were not acquainted with the violence, and especially the antipathies of the predominant parties.

It required no very close recollection of the facts to enable us to disprove all these imputations. The directory had not suffered the ranks of the armies to be thinned, for it had granted more than twelve thousand leaves of absence; as to preventing desertion in time of peace, that would have been impracticable. There is not a government in the world that could have succeeded in preventing this. The directory would even have laid itself open to the charge of tyranny by taking measures to oblige many soldiers to rejoin the armies. In point of fact, the bringing back to their colours men who had been spilling their blood for the last six years, would have appeared too severe a measure. The conscription had not been settled upon more than six months, and the government had not had the means, in so short a time, to organize that system of recruiting, and above all, to fit and drill the conscripts, to form them into field battalions, and to send them to Holland, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. The directory had retained some old battalions, because they were indispensable in maintaining the public peace during the elections, and because this duty could not be committed to young soldiers, whose tone of feeling was not formed, and whose attachment to the republic was not sufficiently settled. Another important consideration had justified this precaution, namely, La Vendée again excited by foreign emissaries, and Holland threatened by the Anglo-Russian fleets.

So far as concerned the disorders in the administration, the directory was not a whit more to blame. There certainly had been great abuses in the expenditure, but in almost every case the very persons who most loudly complained of them were the parties benefited by them, and this in spite of the most strenuous efforts of the directory. There had been great profusion committed in three particulars, by plundering the conquered countries, by charging the state with the pay of the soldiers who had deserted, and lastly, by making improvident bargains with the companies of contractors. Now, it was the generals and the staffs who had committed and made their market of all these irregularities. It was they who had plundered the conquered countries, made a gainful job of the pay, and shared the profits with the companies of contractors. We have already observed, that the latter sometimes allowed as much as forty per cent. out of their profits, as a means of securing the patronage of the staffs. Schérer, towards the end of his ministry, had embroiled himself with his companions in arms for having attempted to interpose a remedy for these irregularities. The directory had been compelled, in order to put a stop to these abuses, to appoint commissions who were independent of the staffs; and we have seen how Championnet had treated them at Naples. The losing bargains made with the companies arose from another cause, the state of the finances. The contractors received nothing but promises, and these, in their turn, indemnified themselves by the price they charged for the uncertainty of the payment. The credits opened this year amounted to six hundred millions of ordinary, and to one hundred and twenty-five millions of extraordinary. Out of this sum, the minister had already signed the order for four hundred millions for expenses actually absorbed. Not two hundred and ten had yet been received; orders of assignment had been delivered out for the remaining one hundred and ninety.

Thus nothing could be laid to the charge of the directory, so far as recklessness of expenditure was concerned. There was nothing to say against the selection of generals, except in one solitary instance. Championnet, after his conduct towards the commissioners sent to Naples, could not retain the command. Macdonald was at least his equal, and was distinguished by his strict integrity. Joubert and Bernadotte had no desire to accept the command of the army of Italy. They themselves had named Schérer. It was Barras who rejected Moreau; he was the only person who had put Schérer in nomination. As for Augereau, his democratic turbulence was a well-grounded reason

for refusing him a command; and at any rate, notwithstanding his indisputable qualifications, he was far from being able to take the command-in-chief. With respect to the expedition to Egypt, we have seen whether the directory should be blamed for that, and whether it is true that it was anxious to get Bonaparte, Kléber, Dessaix, and their forty thousand companions in arms out of the way. Larévellière-Lépeaux had a disagreement with the hero of Italy, for the firmness with which he opposed the expedition.

The war no more emanated from the acts of the directory than the other miscarriages. It must have been plainly perceptible that the conflict of the passions then raging in Europe, had alone been the cause of the war. In this respect no body was to blame; but, at all events, certainly not the patriots, or military men, who had a right to accuse the directory. What would the patriots have said if the Vaudois had not been suppressed, the Papal government punished, the king of Naples overthrown, and the sovereign of Piedmont compelled to abdicate. Was it not the military men, who in the army of Italy had always been urging the directory to seize upon new countries? They were all delighted to hear news of the wars that were going on. Was it not, moreover, Bernadotte at Vienna, and a brother of Bonaparte at Rome, who had committed imprudences, if any had been committed? It was not the determination of the Porte that had influenced that of Russia; but had the fact been so, it was the originator of the Egypt expedition with whom the blame ought solely to rest. Nothing then could be more absurd than the mass of the accusations heaped upon the directory. It could only be said to lay open to one imputation, that of having participated in the excessive confidence placed by the patriots and the military men in the power of the republic. It had participated in the revolutionary passions, and resigned itself to their influence. The directory had conceived that one hundred and seventy thousand men would be enough for the preliminary purposes of the war; that taking the offensive would decide every thing, &c. As for its plans, they were defective, but not more so than Carnot's in 1796, or worse than those of the Aulic council, and sketched out moreover, in part, on a plan of general Jourdan. There was but one man who could have draughted more perfect designs, as we have already said, and it was no fault of the directory if this man was not in Europe.

At any rate, history should, in common justice, note the injustice of these accusations; but woe to a government when every thing is imputed to it as a crime. One of the most indispensable qualities of a government is to possess that high character that raises it above the bare suspicion of injustice. When it has lost this, and the injuries of others, nay, even those of fortune, are indiscriminately laid to its charge, it has no longer the power to govern, and this impotence calls for its secession. How many governments were worn out since the commencement of the revolution! The action of France against Europe was so violent, that it could not but speedily destroy all its springs of action. The directory was worn out, as the committee of public welfare had already been, and as Napoleon himself has since been. All the accusations of which the directory was made the object were no evidence of its unreasonable conduct, but rather demonstrated its infirmity of age.

However, it is not surprising that five civil magistrates, elected to power, not on account of their hereditary greatness or their personal reputation, but because they had deserved somewhat more esteem than their fellow-citizens, that five magistrates, armed with the sole power of the laws, for the purpose of opposing outrageous factions, reducing to obedience numerous armies and generals covered with glory and with a full sense of their claims on public attention, and finally, for laying down the law to one-half of Europe, it is not surprising that they should soon appear incompetent, amid the terrible struggle now recently revived. It required but a single reverse to show this incompetence in a strong light. The factions alternately destroyed, the military men several times checked, called the directory contemptuously the *lawyers*, and said that France could no longer be governed by them.

From a very strange singularity, but which is not unfrequently observed in the conflict of revolutions, public opinion seemed to favour only that one of the five directors who was least deserving of all. Barras indisputably deserved to have objected against his own person all that could be said against the directory. In the first place, he had never occupied himself with the duties of his office, and had left the burden of public affairs to his colleagues. Excepting in critical periods, when he made his voice, which was stronger than his courage, heard, he paid no attention to business. All he did was to look to the government appointments, which better suited his intriguing disposition. He had shared in all the profits of the companies, and was the only one who defended them from the charge of corrupt expenditure. He had always been the defender of firebrands and rascals; it was he who had upheld Brune, and sent Fouché into Italy. He was the cause of the improper selection that had been made of the generals, for he had opposed the appointment of Moreau, and had strongly insisted on that of Schérer. In spite of all these very serious charges, he alone was exempt from animadversion. In the first place, he was not considered, like his four colleagues, as a *lawyer;* for his indolence, his dissolute habits, his soldier-like manners, his connexion with the Jacobins, and the recollection of the 18th Fructidor, which was attributed exclusively to him, made him look more of a practical man than his colleagues. The patriots found him not dissimilar to themselves in more than one point, and believed that he was devoted to them. The royalists received from him secret hopes. The staffs, whom he flattered, and whom he screened from the just severity of his colleagues, also regarded him highly; the contractors lauded him to the skies; and in this manner he escaped the general discredit. He was even perfidious towards his colleagues; for all the reproaches which he had deserved he had the art to throw solely upon them. Such a part cannot long be successful; it may certainly succeed for the moment: and it did succeed on the present occasion.

We have already adverted to the enmity Barras bore against Rewbell. The latter, a really able functionary, had offended by his ill temper and his

hauteur all those with whom he had to deal. He had been very severe upon the jobbers; upon all those for whom Barras had interested himself, and particularly the military men. Hence he had become an object of universal odium. He was a man of integrity, though somewhat avaricious. Barras had the art amongst his connexions, which were numerous, to subject him to the most odious suspicions. An unlucky circumstance seemed to warrant these suspicions. Rapinat, the agent of the directory in Switzerland, was Rewbell's brother-in-law. He had practised in Switzerland those exactions to which all countries in a state of subjection are exposed, but not in so great a degree as was done elsewhere. But the reiterated complaints of that petty avaricious people had produced an extraordinary sensation. Rapinat had been charged with the unfortunate commission of putting seals upon the coffers and treasures of Berne, and he had treated the Helvetic government with an offensive pride; these circumstances, and his name, which of itself was pregnant with disagreeable associations*, had made him pass for the Verres † of Switzerland, and as the originator of those peculations in which he took no share, for he had even quitted Switzerland before the period of her greatest suffering. Barras' friends made wretched puns upon Rapinat's name, and the entire odium fell on Rewbell, who was his brother-in-law. Thus Rewbell's integrity was assailed by every species of detraction.

Larévellière, by reason of his inflexible severity and his influence in the political affairs of Italy, was not less odious than Rewbell. However, his mode of life was so simple and so retiring, that to impeach his integrity was quite out of the question. Barras' friends ridiculed him. They affected to deride his personal appearance, and his pretensions to a new papacy. They said that he had wanted to be the founder of the religion of Theophilanthropy, of which, by the bye, he was not the originator. Merlin and Treilhard, although more recently installed in their authority, and not such prominent characters as Rewbell and Larévellière, were, nevertheless, involved in the same unpopularity.

While public opinion was in this state, the elections of the year VII. took place, and these were the last. The furious patriots resolved not to be excluded this year, as in the preceding, from the legislative body. They had inveighed against the system of separations (*scissions*), and did all they could to bring it into disrepute beforehand. In this they were so far successful, that there was no venturing to resort to it again. In this state of agitation, when men impute to their adversaries the very designs they most dread, it was said that the directory, availing itself, as on the 18th Fructidor, of extraordinary means, was about to continue for five years the powers of the existing deputies, and to suspend during that interval the exercise of the electoral franchises. They said that some Swiss were going to be brought to Paris, merely because the directory was engaged in organizing the Helvetic contingent. They made a great noise about a circular to the electors, issued by the commissioner of the government (the prefect) in the department of the Sarthe. It was not a circular, as we have since discovered, but an exhortation. The directory was compelled to express its disapproval thereof by a message. The elections which took place under these circumstances, brought a considerable number of patriots into the legislative body. There was no thought taken this year to exclude them from the legislative body, and their election was confirmed. General Jourdan, who had good reason to impute his reverses to the numerical inferiority of his army, but who did not act with his usual discretion in charging the government with an intention to destroy him, was again returned to the legislative body, his heart swelling with resentment. Augereau was also returned with an increased addition to his former ill temper and turbulence.

A new director had now to be chosen. Fortune in this instance did not assist the republic, for instead of Barras, the lot fell upon Rewbell, the ablest of the five directors, who was thus declared the retiring member. This was a grand subject of satisfaction to all the enemies of that director, and furnished them with a new opportunity of slandering him with greater impunity. As, however, he had been elected to the council of the ancients, he took an opportunity of replying to his accusers, which he did in the most triumphant manner.

On Rewbell's going out, the only infraction of the strict rule of right with which the directory can be charged was committed. The first five directors, appointed at the time of the institution of the directory, had made an agreement among themselves, by which they were to take ten thousand francs in advance of their salary, in order to give them to the retiring member. The aim of this noble sacrifice was to better provide the members of the directory for the transition from supreme power to private life, especially with respect to those who had no great income. There was even a lofty feeling displayed in doing thus; for it operated strongly against the respect due to the government, to find in indigence that man who had been seen the day before in the enjoyment of supreme power. This was the chief reason that induced the directors to provide in a more suitable manner for the future situation in life of their colleagues. Their salaries were already so moderate, that an advance of ten thousand francs appeared very disproportionate. They resolved to allow the sum of one hundred thousand francs to each director on retiring. This would be an additional expense to the state of one hundred thousand francs. This sum was to be applied for from the minister of the finances, who might take it out of one of the thousand surplus incomings which it was so easy to make in budgets of six or eight hundred millions. It was moreover settled that each director should retain his carriage and horses. As the legislative body made an annual allowance for furniture, this expense was to be declared, and would thenceforward become an item strictly legitimate. The directors, moreover, agreed that whatever was not disbursed in the article of furniture should be divided among them. This was assuredly a very slight pull upon the public purse, if it could be deemed so; and while generals and companies were making such enormous profits, one hundred thousand francs per annum, devoted to the subsistence of a man who had been recently at

* As apparently derived from *Rapine*. *Trans.*

† A Roman praetor, in Sicily, accused by Cicero, and condemned for his extortions. *Trans.*

the head of the government was no misappropriation at all of the revenue. The reasons and the mode in which the measure was to be carried out in some sort justified it. Larévellière, to whom it was communicated, never would consent to this. He declared to his colleagues that he never would accept his share. Rewbell received his. The one hundred thousand francs given to him were taken from the two millions of secret service money, for which the directory was not obliged to account. Such was the only impropriety with which the directory collectively can be charged. No more than one of its members, out of the twelve who succeeded one another, was accused of having made private gains. Can the same be said of any other government in the world!

Some one was to be found to succeed to Rewbell. A desire was manifested of selecting some person of high reputation, who would reflect some degree of honour upon the directory, and public attention was turned to Sieyès, whose name, next to that of Bonaparte, was the greatest of that period. The embassy to Prussia had added to his reputation. He was already regarded, and very justly, as a deep thinker; but since he had been in Berlin, the continuance of the Prussian neutrality was attributed to him; though it was owing, in fact, much less to his intervention than the situation of that power. Thus he was deemed quite as capable to rule the government, as to devise a constitution. He was chosen director. Many persons conceived that in this selection they discerned the confirmation of a rumour generally gaining ground, that very speedy reforms were about to be made in the constitution. They said that Sieyès was called to the directory for no other purpose than to assist in these reforms. So little did they imagine that the existing state of things could be upheld, that they perceived in all these facts certain indications of a change.

CHAPTER XVI.

CONTINUATION OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1799; MASSÉNA CONSOLIDATES THE COMMANDERSHIP OF THE HELVETIC AND DANUBIAN ARMIES, AND OCCUPIES THE LINE OF THE LIMMAT.—ARRIVAL OF SUWARROW.—SCHÉRER TRANSFERS THE COMMANDERSHIP-IN-CHIEF TO MOREAU.—BATTLE OF CASSANO.—RETREAT OF MOREAU TO THE OTHER SIDE OF THE PO AND THE APENNINES.—THE ENDEAVOUR TO EFFECT A JUNCTION WITH THE ARMY OF NAPLES; BATTLE OF TREBBIA.—ALL THE PARTIES COALESCE IN OPPOSITION TO THE DIRECTORY.—REVOLUTION OF THE 30TH PRAIRIAL.—LARÉVELLIÈRE AND MERLIN RETIRE FROM THE DIRECTORY.

In the interval which was occupied by the reforms in the government we have just related, the directory had been constantly making the greatest exertions to repair the reverses which had so recently marked the opening of the campaign.

Jourdan had lost the command of the army of the Danube, and Masséna had received the commandership-in-chief of all the troops in cantonments between Dusseldorff and the Saint-Gothard. This judicious appointment was of itself sufficient to save France. Schérer, impatient to quit an army whose confidence he had lost, had obtained license to transfer the command to Moreau. Macdonald had received pressing orders to evacuate the kingdom of Naples and the Roman States, and to come and effect his junction with the army of Upper Italy. All the old battalions retained in the interior were on their march for the frontiers; the equipment and the organization of the conscripts had been accelerated, and reinforcements began to come in from all quarters.

No sooner was Masséna appointed commander-in-chief of the armies of the Rhine and Switzerland, than he began to consider respecting the most suitable disposal of the forces committed to his charge. He could not have taken the command under more critical circumstances. He had at most thirty thousand men, dispersed over Switzerland, from the valley of the Inn to Bâle; he had opposed to him thirty thousand men under Bellegarde in the Tyrol, twenty-eight thousand under Hotze in the Vorarlberg, and forty thousand under the archduke Charles, between the Lake of Constance and the Danube. This mass of nearly one hundred thousand men, was capable of surrounding and destroying Masséna's army. If the archduke had not been thwarted by the Aulic council, and incapacitated by illness, and had crossed the Rhine between the Lake of Constance and the Aar, he might have cut off Masséna's retreat into France, surrounded, and destroyed his army. Fortunately, he was not his own master; still more fortunately also, Bellegarde and Hotze had not been placed immediately under his command. Between these three generals there was a continual wrangling, and this prevented their engaging themselves to effect any one decisive operation.

These circumstances favoured Masséna, and enabled him to take a firm position and to distribute the troops placed at his disposal in a suitable manner. Every thing proved that the archduke had no other intention than to observe the line of the Rhine in the neighbourhood of Alsace; and that he purposed to commence his operations in Switzerland, between Schaffhausen and the Aar. Consequently Masséna moved back into Switzerland the greater part of the army of the Danube, and assigned to it the positions it ought to have taken from the first, that is to say, immediately after the battle of Stockach. He had been wrong in leaving Lecombe too long embarrassed in the Engadine. The latter was compelled to make his retreat from that place, after having fought brilliant actions, in which he displayed admirable intrepidity and presence of mind. The Grisons were evacuated. Masséna then distributed his army from the great chain of the Alps to the confluence of the Aar and Rhine, choosing the line that to him seemed the best.

Switzerland presents several lines of water,

which commencing at the High Alps, pass quite through the country in their way towards the Rhine. The most extended and greatest is that of the Rhine itself, which taking its source not far from the Saint-Gothard, first runs northward, then spreads out into a spacious lake *, whence it issues near to Stein, and runs westward towards Bâle, thence it again begins to run northward, and forming the frontier line of Alsace. This line is the most extensive, and takes in all Switzerland. There is a second line, that of Zurich, delineated within the preceding: this is the line of the Linth, which river taking its rise in the smaller cantons, stops and forms the Lake of Zurich, issues from it by the name of the Limmat, and finishes its course in the Aar, not far from the place where this latter river falls into the Rhine. This line, which surrounds no more than a part of Switzerland, is much less extensive than the former. There is lastly a third, the line of the Reuss, also delineated within the second line, which from the bed of the Reuss flows into the Lake of Lucerne, and from the Lucerne runs on and joins the Aar near the point where it falls into the latter. These lines, commencing on the right against prodigious mountains, terminating on the left in great rivers, consisting sometimes of rivers, at other of lakes, present numerous advantages for the defensive. Masséna could not hope to retain the longest, that of the Rhine, and to extend himself from the Saint-Gothard to the mouth of the Aar. He was obliged to fall back upon the line of the Limmat, where he posted himself in the strongest manner. He placed his right wing, formed by the division of Lecourbe, Menard, and Lorge, from the Alps to the Lake of Zurich under the command of Férin. He posted his centre on the Limmat, and composed it of the four divisions of Oudinot, Vandamme, Thureau, and Soult. His left guarded the Rhine towards Bâle and Strasburg.

Before he confined himself in this position, he tried to prevent by battle the junction of the archduke with his lieutenant, Hotze. These two generals, posted on the Rhine, one of them at the place where the river falls into the Lake of Constance, the other of them at the point where the river issues from the lake, had the whole extent of the lake between them. In crossing over this line, so as to gain a firm footing for themselves in front of the line of Zurich and the Limmat where Masséna had posted himself, they would have to start from the two extremities of the lake, in order to effect their junction on the other side. Masséna had the power of fixing upon the moment when Hotze had not yet advanced to fall upon the archduke, to drive him beyond the Rhine, then to turn short round upon Hotze and repulse him in his turn. It has been calculated that he would have had time for executing this divided operation, and for beating separately both the Austrian generals. Unfortunately, he did not think of attacking them until the very moment they were near joining each other, and when they were in a situation to mutually support each other. He fought them on several points on the 5th Prairial (May 24), at Aldenfingen and at Frauenfield, and though he had every where the advantage, owing to that vigour which he infused into all his movements, still he could not prevent the junction, and was obliged to fall back on the line of the Limmat and Zurich, where he made himself ready to give the archduke a warm reception, if the latter should decide upon attacking him.

Things were far from turning out well in Italy. There one disaster followed close on the heels of another. Suwarrow had rejoined the Austrian army, with a division of twenty-eight or thirty thousand Russians. Mélas had assumed the command of the Austrian army. Suwarrow was commander-in-chief of both armies, amounting at the least to ninety thousand men. He was called the *Invincible*. He was celebrated for his campaigns against the Turks, and by his cruelties in Poland. He possessed great energy of character, with an affectation of eccentricity which verged upon madness, but he was destitute of all talent for combination. He was a genuine barbarian, fortunately incapable of duly appreciating the extent of his forces, otherwise the republic might not have been able to resist him. His army closely resembled himself. It possessed a most extraordinary courage that bordered on fanaticism, but without intelligence. The artillery, the cavalry, and the engineers belonging to it, were reduced to mere automata. All in which they could be said to be tolerably expert, was the use of the bayonet, and they used this weapon as the French had done during the revolution. Suwarrow, extremely insolent to his allies, sent Russian officers to the Austrians to teach them the use of the bayonet. He employed the most haughty language: he said, that the *women, the dandies, and the idlers* ought to quit the army; that the babblers who presumed to criticise the imperial service should be treated as egotists and lose their rank; and that every one ought to sacrifice himself to effect the deliverance of Italy from the French and the atheists. Such was the style of his addresses. Fortunately, after causing us much damage, this brutal energy was about to be met by the vigorous exertion of science and skill, and to succumb before it.

Schérer, who had entirely lost his wits, had rapidly retreated to the Adda, amidst indignant outcries from his soldiers. Out of his army of forty-six thousand men, he had lost ten thousand, either slain or prisoners. He was obliged to leave eight thousand more at Peschiera or Mantua, so that there were no more than twenty-eight thousand remaining. Nevertheless, if with this handful of men he had known how to make a few skilful movements, he might have given Macdonald time to join him, and might well have avoided many disasters. But he posted himself on the Adda, in the most unhappy manner. He divided his army into three divisions. Serrurier's division was at Lecco, at the issue of the Adda from the Lake of Lecco. Grenier's division was at Casano, and Victor's division was at Lodi. He had placed Montrichard, with a few light troops, towards the Modenese and the mountains of Genoa, to support the communications with Tuscany, by which Macdonald had to debouch. His twenty-eight thousand men thus spread over a line of twenty-four leagues could not make an effectual resistance at any given point, and could not but be broken wherever the enemy should present himself in any great strength.

* The Lake of Constance.

On the evening of the 8th Floréal (April 27), at the very moment when the line of the Adda was broken through, Schérer transferred the command of the army to Moreau. That brave general had some right to decline the command. He whom they had degraded to the part of a mere subaltern, now, when the campaign was lost, and when nothing but disasters were to be met with, was to have the command given to him. However, with a patriotic devotedness which history cannot too highly commend, he made up his mind to suffer a defeat by accepting the command the very same evening that the Adda was forced. It is from this period that the least extolled but the most glorious portion of his life may be said to commence.

Suwarrow had approached the Adda at several points. When the first Russian regiment appeared in sight of the bridge of Lecco, the carabineers of the brave 18th light infantry quitted the intrenchments, and ran to meet those soldiers who had been depictured as terrible and invincible giants. They rushed upon them with fixed bayonets, and made a great carnage among them. The Russians were repulsed. A glorious excitement had been raised in the bosoms of our brave fellows; they were determined to make these insolent barbarians, who came to meddle with a quarrel in which they had no concern, repent of their expedition. The appointment of Moreau raised their ardour to a higher pitch, and imparted every confidence to the army. Unfortunately, the position was no longer tenable. Suwarrow, repulsed at Lecco, had sent troops across the Adda at two points, at Brivio and at Trezzo, above and below Serrurier's division, which formed the left. That division was thus cut off from the rest of the army. Moreau, with Grenier's division, fought a furious battle at Trezzo, for the purpose of driving the enemy back beyond the Adda, and again putting himself in communication with Serrurier's division. With eight or nine thousand men, he fought with a division of more than twenty thousand. His soldiers, animated by his presence, performed prodigies of valour, but could not drive back the enemy beyond the Adda. Unfortunately, Serrurier, to whom orders could now no longer be despatched, did not conceive the idea of bringing himself back upon this same point of Trezzo, where Moreau was fighting so desperately, in order to place himself again in communication with him. He was obliged to desist, and to leave Serrurier's division to its fate. This division was surrounded by the entire hostile army, and fought with the most determined bravery. Surrounded at length on all sides, it was compelled to lay down its arms. Part of this division, thanks to the hardihood and presence of mind of an officer, got away safe over the mountains to Piedmont. During this terrible action, Victor had luckily retired with his division unhurt. Such was the fatal battle called the battle of Cassano, on the 9th Floréal (April 28), which reduced the army to about twenty-eight thousand men.

It was with this handful of brave fellows that Moreau undertook to retreat. That extraordinary man lost not a moment that presence of mind which naturally belonged to him. Reduced to twenty thousand men, opposed to an army that could have been made to amount to ninety thousand, if it had been brought up in a mass, he was never for a moment shaken. This imperturbability was infinitely more meritorious than that which he displayed when he returned from Germany with an army of sixty thousand victorious men, and yet it has been far less eulogized! So much do the casual influences of popular prejudice affect contemporary opinions.

His first care was to protect Milan, to afford means for sending off the artillery and the baggage, and to allow time to the members of the Cisalpine government, and all the Milanese who were compromised, to retire to the rear. Nothing is more dangerous for an army than these families of fugitives which it is obliged to receive into its ranks. They embarrass its march, retard its movements, and may even sometimes jeopardize its safety. Moreau, after having stayed two days in Milan, took up his march to recross the Po. From the conduct of Suwarrow, he had reason to think that he should have time to take a firm position. He had two objects to attain; namely, to protect his communications with France and also with Tuscany, by which the army of Naples was advancing. To compass this desirable purpose, the best course that suggested itself to him was to occupy the slope of the mountains of Genoa; this was the most favourable point. He marched in two columns, the one escorting the artillery, the baggage, and the whole equipage of the army, took the high road from Milan to Turin; the other took the road in the direction of Alexandria, to occupy the roads to the Riviera of Genoa. He performed this march without being too hard pressed by the enemy. Suwarrow, instead of rushing with his victorious army on our feeble army, and completely destroying it, procured himself to be decreed the honours of triumph at Milan by the priests, the monks, the nobles, and all the creatures of Austria, who had returned in shoals in the train of the allied armies.

Moreau had time to get to Turin, and to send off all the superfluous accompaniments of the war towards France. He fortified the citadel, strove to excite the zeal of the partisans of the republic, and then went to join the column which he had despatched towards Alexandria. He there chose a position which fully proved the correctness of his observation. The Tanaro, as it falls from the Apennines, flows onwards to fall into the Po below Alexandria. Moreau placed himself at the confluence of these two rivers. Protected at the same time by both, he was not afraid of an attack by storm; he guarded at the same time all the roads to Genoa, and was enabled to await the arrival of Macdonald. This position could not have been more advantageously chosen. He occupied Casale, Valenza, and Alexandria; he had a chain of posts on the Po and the Tanaro; and his masses were disposed in such a manner that they could hasten in a few hours to the very first point that might be attacked. There it was that he posted himself with twenty thousand men, and awaited with imperturbable composure the movements of his formidable enemy.

Suwarrow had fortunately allowed himself plenty of time to make further progress. He had required at the hands of the Aulic council that the Austrian corps of Bellegarde, appointed for the Tyrol, should be placed at his disposal. This corps had just then descended into Italy, and increased the

combined army to considerably more than one hundred thousand men. But Suwarrow, having orders to besiege Peschiera, Mantua, and Pizzighitone all at once, wishing at the same time to protect himself on the side towards Switzerland, but after all, unskilled in the art of distributing masses, had not more than forty thousand immediately available, a force at any rate quite adequate to overwhelm Moreau, had Suwarrow known how to make the proper use of it.

Suwarrow followed the course of the Po and Tanaro, so as to post himself opposite to Moreau. He stationed himself at Tortona, and made that place his head-quarters. After a few days of inaction, he at length resolved to make an attempt on Moreau's left wing, that is to say, on the side next to the Po. A little above the confluence of the Po and the Tanaro, opposite to Mugarone, are some woody islands, and under favour of these the Russians resolved to attempt a passage. In the night between the 22nd and the 23rd Floréal (May 11 and 12), they crossed over to the number of nearly two thousand, to one of these islands, and thus found themselves beyond the principal arm of the river. That branch of the river they had yet to pass was inconsiderable, and might even be crossed by a swimmer. They boldly crossed it, and were then on the right bank of the Po. The French, forewarned of the danger, hastened to the point that was threatened. Moreau, who was informed of other demonstrations made in the direction of the Tanaro, waited till the real point of danger should be well determined, so that he might bring his forces to support it: so soon as he became certain of the fact, he marched thither with his reserve, and drove into the Po the Russians who had had the hardihood to cross over. There were two thousand five hundred of them killed, drowned, or made prisoners.

This vigorous act completely secured Moreau's position, in the singular triangle in which he had posted himself. But the inaction of the enemy gave him uneasiness. He was fearful lest Suwarrow had left but a mere detachment before Alexandria, and that he might have ascended the Po with the mass of his forces, with the intention of proceeding to Turin and carrying the position of the French in the rear, or that he might perhaps have marched so as to meet Macdonald. In the uncertainty in which he was left by the inactivity of Suwarrow, he resolved to make a movement himself in order to ascertain the real state of things. He thought of debouching the other side of Alexandria, and making a very careful survey (*reconnoissance*) of the ground. If the enemy should have left nothing save a detached corps in his front, Moreau's plan was to convert this survey of the ground into a serious attack, to overwhelm this detached corps, and then quietly retire by the high road of the Bochetta towards the mountains of Genoa, and there wait for Macdonald. If, on the contrary, he should light upon the principal mass, his plan was to immediately withdraw, and regain in all haste the Riviera of Genoa by all the accessible communications that would be left for him. One reason which particularly induced him to adopt this decisive course was the insurrection in Piedmont on his rear. It was incumbent on him to get as near to his main position as soon as he could.

While Moreau was projecting this extremely cautious measure, Suwarrow was framing another plan, which had not even common sense to recommend it. His position at Tortona was certainly the best he could have taken, since it placed him between the two French armies, those of the Cisalpine and Naples. He ought not to have left Naples upon any consideration whatever. Nevertheless, his notion was, to bring along with him part of his force to the other side of the Po, to follow its course up to Turin, to seize upon that capital, to organize the Piedmontese royalists there, and to make himself master of Moreau's position. Nothing could be worse contrived than such a manœuvre; for to deprive Moreau of his position, he ought to make the attempt by a definite and vigorous attack, but above all, never to have quitted the intermediate position between the two armies, who were anxious to effect their junction.

While Suwarrow, by dividing his forces, was leaving part of them in the environs of Tortona, along the Tanaro, and was proceeding with the other beyond the Po, to march to Turin, Moreau was making his intended survey of the ground. He had sent forward Victor's division, to make a vigorous attack upon the Russian corps that he had before him. He kept himself with his reserve somewhat in the rear, ready to convert this survey of the ground into a serious attack, if he should consider that the Russian corps could be overwhelmed. After a very warm action, in which Victor's troops displayed extraordinary intrepidity, Moreau believed that the whole Russian army was before him: he durst not make an attack outright for fear of having a too superior enemy upon his hands. In consequence, between the two courses which he had purposed to adopt, he preferred the second as the safest. He resolved, therefore, to retire towards the mountains of Genoa. His position was most critical. All Piedmont was in open insurrection on his rear. A body of insurgents had gained possession of Céva, which commands the principal road, the only one that could be approached by artillery. The great convoy for the objects of art collected in Italy, was subjected to the danger of falling into the hands of the enemy. These circumstances were most vexatious. By taking the roads more to the rear, and terminating at the Riviera di Ponente, Moreau feared that he should be too far from the communications with Tuscany, and that he should leave them in the hands of the enemy, whom he supposed to be collected in mass about Tortona. In this perplexity he immediately made up his mind, and made the following arrangements. He detached Victor's division without artillery or baggage, and sent it by byways, passable for none but infantry, towards the mountains of Genoa. This division had to make all haste to occupy every one of the passes of the Apennines, for the purpose of joining the army coming from Naples, and reinforcing it in case it should be attacked by Suwarrow. Moreau, keeping no more than eight thousand men at the utmost, came up with his artillery, cavalry, and all that could not follow the mountain tracts, to gain one of the high roads in rear of Céva, and which terminate at the Riviera di Ponente. In deciding upon this eccentric retreat, he made another calculation, namely, that he should draw upon himself

the enemy's army, and divert it from its pursuit of Victor and falling upon Macdonald.

Victor made a good retreat by Acqui, Spigno, and Dego, and then occupied the crests of the Apennines. Moreau, on his part, retreated with extraordinary celerity upon Asti. The capture of Zéva, which cut off his principal communication, threw him into extreme embarrassment. He sent off the greater part of his artillery by the pass of Fenestrella, and kept no more of the field artillery than what was absolutely necessary, and resolved to open a road for himself across the Apennines, which his own soldiers were to make. After four days spent in incredible exertions, the road was rendered passable for artillery, and Moreau arrived in the Riviera of Genoa without having retrograded to the pass of the Tenda, which would have kept him too far off from Victor's troops detached towards Genoa.

Suwarrow, on receiving intelligence of Moreau's retreat, lost no time in pursuing him; but he knew not how to guess or anticipate his skilful combinations. Thus, owing to his coolness and his dexterity, Moreau had brought off his twenty thousand men without suffering them to be once broken, and on the other hand had kept off the Russians wherever he had met them. He had left a garrison of three thousand men in Alexandria, and was with nearly eighteen thousand in the environs of Genoa. He took up his position on the crest of the Apennines, awaiting the arrival of Macdonald. He had sent Lapoype's division, Montrichard's light corps, and Victor's division, to the Upper Trebbia, to join Macdonald; as for himself, he kept in the environs of Novi, with the remainder of his entire army. His plan of junction was marked by profound caution. He was able to get the army of Naples over to him by the shores of the Mediterranean, collect it at Genoa, and with it effect a debouchment from the Bochetta; or, if he chose, make it debouch from Tuscany into the plains of Placentia and on the banks of the Po. The former course would ensure the junction, because it would be effected under shelter of the Apennines; but it would be necessary to cross the Apennines once more, and to make head against the enemy to carry the plain. On the other hand, by debouching in front of Placentia, the mastery would be obtained of the plain as far as the Po, he could then take up his field of battle on the very banks of that river, and, if victorious, drive the enemy into the river. Moreau was desirous that Macdonald should always keep his left close to the mountains, so as to keep up his communication with Victor, who was at Bobbio. For his own part, he watched Suwarrow, ready to fall upon his flanks the instant he should attempt to march to meet Macdonald. In this situation the junction appeared quite as certain of being effected as if made at the back of the Apennines, and would be on a far preferable ground.

The directory had been getting at this very time together a considerable naval force in the Mediterranean. Bruix, the minister of the naval department, had put himself at the head of the Brest fleet, had raised the blockade of the Spanish fleet, and was cruising with fifty sail in the Mediterranean, with a view to clear it of the English, and to re-open communications with the army of Egypt. This most desirable junction was at length effected, and might enable us to restore our preponderance in the Levant. Bruix was at this moment before Genoa. His presence had singularly excited the courage of the army. It was said that he was bringing provisions, ammunition, and reinforcements. There was nothing of the kind, but Moreau made the most of this rumour, and endeavoured to make it so believed. He caused a report to be circulated, that the fleet had just landed twenty thousand men and considerable supplies. This report encouraged his army, and greatly diminished the confidence of the enemy.

It was now the middle of Prairial (the early part of June), a new event had very recently taken place in Switzerland. We have seen that Masséna had occupied the line of the Limmat or of Zurich, and that the archduke, debouching in two masses from the two extremities of the Lake of Constance, had come and ranged his troops all along, and the full length of this line. He resolved to attack it between Zurich and Brügg, that is, between the Lake of Zurich and the Aar, all along the Limmat. Masséna had taken up his position not on the Limmat itself, but on a series of heights in advance of the Limmat, and which at the same time cover the river as well as the lake. He had intrenched these heights in the most formidable manner, and rendered them almost impregnable. Although this part of our line between Zurich and the Aar was the strongest, the archduke had resolved to attack it, because there would have been considerable danger in making a wide circuit for the purpose of attempting an attack above the lake, along the Linth. Masséna might have taken advantage of this moment to crush the corps left in front of him, and thus to gain a decisive advantage.

The projected attack was executed on the 4th of June (16th Prairial). It took place upon the whole extent of the Limmat, and was every where victoriously repulsed, notwithstanding the obstinate perseverance of the Austrians. Next day the archduke, thinking that such attempts ought to be followed up for the purpose of providing against useless losses, renewed the attack with the same obstinacy as before. Masséna, considering that his line might be broken, and that his retreat would then become difficult, that the line which he should abandon would be next to one still stronger—the chain of the Albis, which takes the rear of the Limmat and the Lake of Zurich, resolved to retire voluntarily. All that he should lose by this retreat, would be the city of Zurich, which he considered as of slight importance. The chain of the Albis mountains, running along the Lake of Zurich and the Limmat to the Aar, presenting, moreover, a continuous steep declivity, was almost unassailable. By occupying this post, all he could lose would be a little ground, for he should fall back no farther than the width of the lake and the Limmat. Consequently, he retired thither voluntarily and without loss, and posted himself there in such a manner as made the archduke extremely disinclined to attack him.

Our position, therefore, was always much about the same in Switzerland: the Aar, the Limmat, the Lake of Zurich, the Linth, and the Reuss, as far as the Saint-Gothard, formed our defensive line against the Austrians.

In the Italian quarter, Macdonald was at last advancing towards Tuscany. In conformity with his instructions, he had left garrisons in fort Saint Elmo, Capua, and Gaëta. This was uselessly exposing troops who were not capable of upholding the republican party, and who left a void in those troops composing the army in actual service. The French army, on withdrawing, had left the city of Naples a victim to a royalist reaction, which equalled the most terrible scenes of our own revolution. Macdonald had rallied at Rome some thousand men of Garnier's division; he had picked up Gauthier's division in Tuscany, and Montrichard's light corps in the Modenese. He had thus formed a body of twenty-eight thousand men. He was at Florence on the 6th Prairial (May 25). His retreat was effected with great rapidity and remarkable order. He unfortunately lost considerable time in Tuscany, and did not debouch beyond the Apennines into the plains of Placentia till towards the end of Prairial (the middle of June).

Had he debouched on the plains of Placentia sooner than he did, he would have surprised the allies so dispersed that he might have overwhelmed them one after the other, and driven them beyond the Po. Suwarrow was at Turin, of which he had recently got possession, and where he had found immense supplies. Bellegarde was watching the outlets from Genoa; Kray was besieging Mantua, the citadel of Milan, and the fortresses. In no single spot were there so many as thirty thousand Austrians or Russians collected together. Macdonald and Moreau debouching with an united force of fifty thousand men, might have altered the whole course of the campaign. But Macdonald thought it right to spend a few days in resting his army, and reorganizing the divisions which he had successively picked up. He thus threw away very valuable time, and afforded Suwarrow the opportunity of repairing his omissions. The Russian general, being informed of the march of Macdonald, lost no time in quitting Turin, and proceeding with a reinforcement of twenty thousand men, for the purpose of posting himself between the two French generals, and resuming the position he ought never to have abandoned. He gave orders to general Ott, who was in observation on the Trebbia in the environs of Placentia, to retreat upon him if he were attacked; he ordered Kray to send to him from Mantua all the troops that he could well spare; he left to Bellegarde the charge of watching Novi, from whence Moreau was to debouch; and he set himself in order, to march into the plains of Placentia, to encounter Macdonald.

These are the only arrangements which, during the whole of this campaign, have earned Suwarrow the approval of military men. The two French generals still occupied the positions we have pointed out. Posted, both of them, on the Apennines, they would have to descend for the purpose of uniting in the plains of Placentia. Moreau was to debouch from Novi, Macdonald from Pontremoli. Moreau had sent on Victor's division to reinforce Macdonald. He had stationed general Lapoype with some battalions at Bobbio on the slope of the mountains to protect the junction; and his scheme was to seize the moment when Suwarrow should march in front against Macdonald to fall upon his flank. But before this could be done, Macdonald should continue to keep himself supported upon the mountains, and not suffer himself to engage too far down in the plain.

Macdonald put himself in motion about the end of Prairial (the middle of June). Hohenzollern's division, posted in the environs of Modena, was guarding the Lower Po; it was overwhelmed by superior forces, lost fifteen hundred men, and was nearly being all taken prisoners. This opening success encouraged Macdonald, and made him hasten his march. Victor's division, which had just joined him, and made his army amount to nearly thirty-two thousand men, formed his advanced guard. The Polish division, commanded by Dombrowsky, marched on the left of Victor's division; Rusca's division supported them both. Although the main body of the army, composed of the divisions under Montrichard, Oliver, and Watrin, was still behind, Macdonald induced by the advantage which he had so recently obtained over Hohenzollern, was for overwhelming Ott, who was in observation on the Tidone, and ordered Victor, Dombrowsky, and Rusca, to march against him without losing a moment's time.

Three rapid streams, running parallel from the Apennines to the Po, formed the field of battle. These were the Nura, the Trebbia, and the Tidone. The main body of the French army was still on the Nura. The divisions of Victor, Dombrowsky, and Rusca, advanced towards the Trebbia, and had orders to cross over and proceed to the Tidone, so as to overwhelm Ott, whom Macdonald believed to be unsupported. They marched on the 29th of Prairial (June 17). They at first repulsed the advanced guard of general Ott from the banks of the Tidone, and compelled it to take a position farther back, in the direction of the village of Sermet. Ott was all but overwhelmed; but at that moment Suwarrow came to his relief with his whole force. He stationed general Bagration in a position to meet Victor, who was marching along the Po; he drew off Ott to the centre, against Dombrowsky, and ordered Mélas to the right upon Rusca's division. Bagration did not at first make much way against Victor, and was forced to make a retrograde movement, but at the centre. Suwarrow ordered Dombrowsky's division to charge with the Russian infantry, threw two regiments of cavalry upon his flank, and broke his division. From this moment Victor, who advanced towards the Po, found himself exposed to a greater front of line than his own, and in jeopardy. Bagration, reinforced by the grenadiers, resumed the offensive. The Russian cavalry, who had broken the Poles in the centre, and had thus attacked Victor, charged him in flank, and obliged him to retire. Rusca on the right was then forced to give ground to Mélas. Our three divisions recrossed the Tidone, and made a retrograde movement to the Trebbia.

This first battle, in which one-third of the army at most had been engaged with the whole of the enemy's army, had not been successful. Macdonald, who did not know that Suwarrow had come up, had been in too great a hurry. He resolved to encamp himself behind the Trebbia, to collect all his divisions at that place, and to revenge himself for the check he had so recently experienced. Unluckily, the divisions commanded by Olivier, Montrichard, and Watrin's, were still behind on the Nura,

and he resolved to wait till the day after the next, that is, till the 1st Messidor (June 19), to give battle.

But Suwarrow did not give him time to get his forces together, and prepared to attack on the very next day, namely, the 30th Prairial (June 18). The two armies were about to join each other, the Trebbia supporting their wings on the Po and the Apennines. Suwarrow, judging wisely that the essential point was in the mountains, by which the two French armies would be able to communicate, took thither his best infantry and his best cavalry. He despatched Bagration's division, which was at first on his left, along the Po to his right against the mountains. He posted them, together with Schweikofsky's division, under the command of Rosenberg, and ordered them both to cross the Trebbia, near Rivalta, in the upper part of its course, in order to get the French away from the mountains. It was near this point that the divisions of Dombrowsky, Rusca, and Victor were posted, to the left of the French line. The divisions commanded by Olivier and Montrichard were to come and place themselves in the centre along the Trebbia. Watrin's division was to occupy the right near the Po and Placentia.

On the morning of the 29th Prairial (June 17), the Russian advanced guards attacked the advanced guards of the French, which were beyond the Trebbia, at Casaliggio and Grignagno, and repulsed them. Macdonald, who did not expect to be attacked, was engaged in bringing his centre divisions into line. Victor, who commanded on our left, immediately took all the French infantry the other side the Trebbia, and for a moment put Suwarrow in peril. But Rosenberg coming up with Schweikofsky's division regained the advantage, and after a furious action, in which the loss was enormous on both sides, compelled the French to return behind the Trebbia. In the mean time the divisions of Olivier and Montrichard came up at the centre, and Watrin's division on the right, and a regular cannonade took place along the whole line. After exchanging some cannon balls they halted on the banks of the Trebbia, which separated the two armies.

Such was the second action. It had consisted in a battle on our left, a terrible battle, but without result; Macdonald after this, putting his entire force in order, was determined that the third conflict should be decisive. His plan was to cross the Trebbia at all points, and to fall upon both wings of the enemy. With this view, Dombrowsky's division was to ascend the river to Rivalta, and to cross it above the Russians. Watrin's division was to cross it nearly at its influx into the Po, and to gain Suwarrow's extreme left. He calculated at the same time that Moreau, whose co-operation he had been expecting for two days past, would come into action on that day at the latest. Such was the plan for the 1st Messidor (June 19). But a tremendous and unexpected encounter occurred in the night. A French detachment having crossed the bed of Trebbia to take its position, the Russians conceived they were attacked, and ran to arms. The French, on their part, did the same. The two armies were intermingled, and a nocturnal conflict ensued, in which both sides were bent on slaughter, without distinguishing friend from foe. After a useless carnage, the generals at length succeeded in bringing back their men to the bivouac. On the following day, the armies were so fatigued by three days' fighting, and by the confusion of the night, that they did not get into action till about ten in the morning.

The battle commenced on our left on the Upper Trebbia. Dombrowsky crossed the Trebbia at Rivalta in spite of the Russians. Suwarrow detached thither prince Bagration. This movement left Rosenberg's flanks uncovered. Victor and Rusca immediately took advantage of this circumstance to fall upon him after crossing the Trebbia. They advanced successfully, and enveloped Schweikofsky's division, where Suwarrow was, on all sides. They placed it in the greatest peril, but it faced about every where, and defended itself valiantly. Bagration, perceiving the danger, turned right about to the threatened point, and obliged Victor and Rusca to desist from their attempt. Had Dombrowsky seized the opportunity to fall, on his part, upon Bagration, the advantage would have remained ours at this point, which was the most important, since it was contiguous to the mountains. Unluckily, he continued inactive, and Victor and Rusca were obliged to fall back to the Trebbia. At the centre Montrichard had crossed the Trebbia near Grinagno, and Olivier in the direction of San Nicolo. Montrichard was marching upon Forster's corps, when the Austrian reserves, for which Suwarrow had applied to Mélas, and which were filing past the rear of the field of battle, fell unawares upon the flanks of his division. It was surprised, and the fifth light infantry, which had performed prodigies in a hundred battles, fled in disorder. Montrichard found himself obliged to recross the Trebbia. Olivier, who had advanced with success towards San Nicolo, and vigorously repulsed Ott and Mélas, found himself exposed by the retreat of Montrichard. Then Mélas sending counter-orders to the Austrian reserves, whose appearance had alarmed Montrichard's division, directed them against Olivier's division, which was likewise forced to cross the Trebbia. Meanwhile, Watrin's division brought to no purpose to the extreme right, where it had nothing to do, was advancing along the Po, without being of any assistance to the army. It was even obliged to recross the Trebbia in order to follow the general retreating army. Suwarrow, still apprehensive of seeing Moreau debouch on his rear, made great efforts during the rest of the day to pass the Trebbia, but without success. The French opposed his progress with unshaken resolution on the whole line, and that stream which had witnessed so obstinate a conflict, still separated for the third time the two hostile armies.

Such was the third act of that sanguinary engagement. The two armies were disorganized. They had each lost about twelve thousand men, most of the generals were wounded, and entire regiments were destroyed. But their relative situation was far different. Suwarrow was daily receiving reinforcements, and could not but gain by the prolongation of the struggle. Macdonald on the other hand had exhausted all his resources, and might, if he persisted in fighting, be driven in disorder into Tuscany. He therefore thought of retreating to the Nura with a view to regain Genoa by the back of the Apennines. He quitted the Trebbia on the morning of the 2nd Messidor (June 20). A de-

spatch, in which he described to Moreau his desperate situation, having fallen into the hands of Suwarrow, the latter was overjoyed, and hastened to pursue him as closely as possible. The retreat, however, was effected in tolerable order to the banks of the Nura. Unfortunately Victor's division, which had been incessantly engaged for four days, was at length broken, and lost many prisoners. Macdonald, nevertheless, had time to collect his army beyond the Apennines, after a loss of fourteen or fifteen thousand men, killed, wounded and prisoners.

Very luckily, Suwarrow, hearing Moreau's cannon on his rear, suffered himself to be diverted from the pursuit of Macdonald. Moreau, whom insurmountable obstacles had prevented from moving before the 30th Prairial (June 18), had at length debouched from Novi, so as to fall upon Bellegarde, put him to the rout, and had taken from him nearly three thousand prisoners. But this too late advantage was of no service, and had no other result than to call off Suwarrow, and to suspend his hot pursuit of Macdonald.

That junction, from which such important results were expected, had thus brought about a bloody defeat; it gave rise also to disputes between the French generals, which have never been well cleared up. Military men have censured Macdonald for taking up his quarters for such a length of time in Tuscany, for having made his divisions march at too great a distance from one another, in such a manner that the divisions commanded by Victor, Rusca, and Dombrowsky, were beaten two successive days, before the divisions of Montrichard, Olivier, and Watrin were in line; for having endeavoured on the day of battle to fall upon the two wings of the enemy, instead of directing his utmost exertions on his left towards the Upper Trebbia; with having kept himself too far off from the mountains, so as not to permit Lapoype, who was at Bobbio, to come to his relief; hastly, for having, above all, been in too great haste to give battle, as if he had wished to have the honour of the victory entirely to himself. Military men, in approving the scientific combinations of Moreau, have censured him for only one thing, namely, for not having put all complaisance towards an old comrade out of the question, for not having taken the immediate command of the two armies, and especially with not having commanded in person at the Trebbia. Whatever may be the justice of these animadversions, thus much is certain, that Moreau's plan, executed according to its conception, would have saved Italy. It was entirely lost by the battle of Trebbia. Luckily Moreau was still there to keep together the wreck of our host, and to prevent Suwarrow from making the most of his immense superiority. The campaign had not been opened more than three months, and excepting in Switzerland, we had experienced nothing but misfortunes. The battle of Stockach made us lose Germany; the battles of Magnano and the Trebbia lost us Italy. Masséna alone, firm as a rock, still occupied Switzerland, along the chain of the Albis. It must not be forgotten, however, that amid these cruel reverses, the courage of our soldiers had been as firm and as admirable as in the most glorious days of our victories; that Moreau had proved himself at once the great citizen and the great captain, and had prevented Suwarrow from destroying our armies in Italy by a single blow.

These last miscarriages afforded the enemies of the directory fresh opportunities, and subjected it to renewed popular censures. The fear of an invasion began to seize upon the public mind. The departments of the south and of the Alps, the first to be exposed to the incursions of the Austro-Russians, were in the utmost excitation. The cities of Chambéry, Grenoble, and Orange, sent to the legislative body addresses which created the greatest sensation. These addresses were an echo of the malevolent censures that had been in every body's mouth for two months past; they alluded to the pillage of the conquered countries, the peculations of the companies, the destitution of the armies, the ministry of Schérer, his conduct as general, the injustice done to Moreau, the arrest of Championnet, &c. "How is it," said they, "that the faithful conscripts have found themselves compelled to return to their homes by the destitution to which they were exposed? How is it that the innumerable peculations that have been committed have remained unpunished? How was it that the incompetent Schérer, whom Hoche declared a traitor, so long remained minister of war? How is it that he has been enabled, in his character of general, finally to accomplish those evils for which he had paved the way as minister? Why have names cherished by victory been superseded by names that are unknown? Why is the conqueror of Rome and Naples under impeachment?"

We have already been enabled to estimate these censures at their true value. The addresses containing them had the honour of being ordered to be printed, were well received, and sent to the directory. This mode of reception sufficiently demonstrated the inclinations of the two councils. They could not be more unfavourable. The constitutional opposition had joined the patriot opposition. The one, composed of ambitious men, who wished for a new government, and vain self-sufficient persons, who complained that their representatives had not been properly received; the other, consisting of patriots excluded by the separation (*scission*) of the legislative body, or reduced to silence by the law of the 19th Fructidor;—both oppositions were equally desirous of the ruin of the existing government. They said that the directory had at one and the same time misgoverned and badly defended France; that the directory had violated the freedom of public opinion, and persecuted the liberty of the press and of the popular societies. The directory was declared to be at once weak and violent; they even went so far as to allude in express terms to the 18th Fructidor, and to say that, not having regarded the laws made on that event, the directory had no right to appeal to them for protection.

The nomination of Sieyès to the directory had been one of the acts which led to these demonstrations. To call to the directorship a man who had never ceased to regard the directorial constitution but as most defective, and who had already for that very reason refused to be a director, was after a manner to publicly express a desire for a revolution. The acceptance of Sieyes, concerning which some distrust existed on account of his previous

refusals, only served to confirm these conjectures.

The discontented of all descriptions who desired a change clustered around Sieyès. Sieyès was by no means an able party leader; he did not possess the accommodating and bold spirit, nor yet the ambition indispensable to such a character; but he rallied about him a great number by his reputation. It was well known that he deemed the constitution and the government entirely defective; and every one pressed round him, as if to invite him to effect an entire change. Barras, who had somehow made the directory overlook his former conduct by his connexions and his intrigues with all the parties, had gained the confidence of Sieyès, and had contrived to attach him to himself, by basely abandoning his colleagues. It was around these two directors that all the enemies of the directory rallied. This party had taken care to provide themselves with the support of a young general, who possessed reputation, and was considered like many others, as a victim of the government. The position of Joubert, on whom great expectations were founded, and who had been unemployed since his dismissal, was the cause of his selection. By his marriage with a Mademoiselle de Montholon, he had recently allied himself with M. de Sémonville. He had gained the confidence of Sieyès; he got appointed general of the 17th military division of Paris, and every thing that could be done was effected to make him the head of the new coalition.

No one as yet thought of making any changes; the first thing was to gain possession of the government, then to save France from invasion; and the consideration of all constitutional projects was postponed till after the danger was over. The first thing to be obtained was the removal of the members of the old directory. Sieyès had been in office no longer than a fortnight. He had entered it on the 1st Prairial as successor to Rewbell. Barras had, as we have seen, sheltered himself from the storm. Public odium was entirely turned against Larévellière, Merlin, and Treilhard, all three of them being wholly guiltless of what was laid to the charge of the government.

They had the majority, because there were three of them, but what was wanted was to render the exercise of authority on their part a matter of impossibility. They had resolved to entertain the utmost respect for Sieyès, and to forgive even his ill-temper, that they might not add to the difficulties of their position those which personal dissensions might still produce. But Sieyès was intractable; he found fault with every thing, and in this he was sincere; but he expressed himself in such a manner, as to prove that he did not care to apply himself in conjunction with his colleagues to remedy the evil; somewhat infatuated with what he had seen in the country from which he had just come, he was constantly saying to them, "This is not the way in which they do these things in Prussia." "Let us know then," replied his colleagues, "how they do manage these things in Prussia: enlighten us with your advice; assist us to do what is right." "You would not understand me," replied Sieyès; "it is useless to talk to you; go on in your old fashion."

While this mutual repugnance between the minority and the majority was demonstrating itself in the interior of the directory, the most animated attacks were constantly being made against it from without by the councils. There had already been an open quarrel upon the subject of finance. The distress had, we have observed, arose from two causes—the tardiness of the receipts, and the deficiency in the estimated revenue. Out of four hundred millions, for which orders had already been given on account of expenses disbursed, two hundred and ten millions had with difficulty been got in. The deficiency in the estimate of the revenue amounted, according to Ramal, to sixty-seven or even to seventy-five millions. As the component parts of the deficiency, as stated by him, were always a matter of dispute, he gave in the *Moniteur* a formal contradiction to the deputy Genissieux, and proved what he advanced. But of what service are proofs at certain times. The minister and the government were not the less subjected to abuse; it was incessantly repeated that they were ruining the state, and continually demanding new funds to form a subject for fresh peculations. Nevertheless, the force of evidence compelled the grant of an additional revenue. The tax on salt had been refused; as a compensation one decime per franc was added to all the taxes, and the tax on doors and windows was doubled. But creating taxes was not doing much, some course was to be taken to ensure them their assessment and collection. These laws were not passed. The minister was urgent for their being discussed, they were continually adjourned, and the answer to his pressing applications were cries of "treason, robbery," &c.

Besides the subject of the finances, another cause of dissension had arisen. Remonstrances had already been made against certain articles of the law of the 19th Fructidor, allowing the directory to close the clubs, and to suppress newspapers by a mere ordinance. A bill (*projet de loi*) relative to the press and the popular societies had been ordered to be brought in for the purpose of amending the law of the 19th Fructidor, and depriving the directory of the arbitrary power with which it was invested; a great outcry had been made against the power which that law conferred on the directory, to banish at pleasure suspected priests, and to erase the names of emigrants from the list. The patriots themselves seemed inclined to deprive it of this dictatorship, fatal as were its operations against their opponents. The debate began with a discussion relative to the press and the popular societies. The bill brought forward was draughted by Berlier. The debate commenced towards the end of Prairial (the middle of June). The partisans of the directory, amongst whom Chénier, Bailleul, Creuzé-Latouche, and Lecointe-Puyraveau, were most prominent, maintained that this dictatorship granted to the directory by the law of the 19th Fructidor, although very formidable in ordinary times, was of the most indispensable necessity in the present state of things. It was not, said they, in such perilous times as these, that the strength of the government ought to be diminished. The dictatorship that had been conferred upon government on the morrow of the 18th Fructidor, had become indispensable, not so much against the royalist faction, as against the faction

of the anarchists which was not less formidable than the other, and in secret alliance with it. The disciples of Baboeuf, they added, were showing themselves again in all parts, and threatening the republic with a new irruption.

The patriots, who swarmed in the five hundred, replied with their usual vehemence to the speeches of the partisans of the directory. It was necessary, they said, to give France a violent shock, and thus impart to her that energy of 1793, which the directory had utterly stifled by subjecting her to overwhelming restrictions. All patriotism would be extinguished unless the clubs were opened and the patriotic papers were allowed freedom of discussion. "It is stuff," they added, "accusing the patriots; it is all folly feigning apprehensions of an attack from them. What have these patriots done who are so grievously accused? For three years past they have been slaughtered, proscribed, and expatriated, from that very republic which they so powerfully assisted to create and have defended. What crimes have you to lay to their charge! Have they reacted against the reactionists? No. They are an exaggerating, turbulent set of men; be it so. But are these crimes? They speak, nay, they shout, if they will; but they are not assassins, although every day they are assassinated. Such was the language of Briot (of the Doubs), of Aréna the Corsican, and a host of others.

The members of the constitutional opposition expressed themselves in a far different manner. They were naturally moderate. They used a measured, but yet bitter and dogmatic, tone. Recourse must be had, said they, to principles little understood, and liberty must be restored to the press and to the popular societies. The perils of Fructidor had certainly made the grant of a temporary dictatorship to the directory necessary, but what use had been made of this dictatorship, created under feeling of confidence! You have only to ask the parties, said Boulay (of La Meurthe). Although they all entertained different views, yet royalists, patriots and constitutionalists, were unanimous in declaring that the directory had made a bad use of its omnipotence. Such unanimity among men so opposed to each other in sentiments and views, could not leave the slightest doubt, and the directory was condemned. Thus the irritated patriots complained of oppression, and the constitutionalists, full of pretensions, complained of misgovernment. All parties coalesced and effected the repeal of the articles of the 19th Fructidor, relative to the journals and the popular societies. This was an important victory, which was to bring about an unrestrained licentiousness of periodical publications, and a gathering of all the Jacobins. The agitation went on increasing towards the end of Prairial. Rumours of the most sinister import were circulated in all quarters. The new coalition resolved to resort to the usual base inventions, which are commonly resorted to by the opposition party in representative governments, to compel a ministry to resign. Embarrassing and oft repeated questions, and threats of impeachment, were employed. These arts are so natural, that even were they not resorted to in representative governments, the instinct of parties is of itself sufficient to discover them.

The commissions of disbursements, of funds, and of war, appointed from the council of five hundred for managing those different subjects, assembled, and proposed the form of a message to be sent to the directory. Boulay (of La Meurthe) was entrusted with the draught of the report, and presented it on the 15th Prairial. On his motion, the council of five hundred addressed a message to the directory, in which it desired to be informed of the causes of the internal and external dangers which threatened the republic, and of the means that existed for providing against them. Applications of this nature produce scarcely any other effect than to extort avowals of distress, and to still further compromise the government from whom they are wrung. A government, we repeat, ought to be able to carry its measures: to compel it to admit that it has not been able so to do, is to force from it the most conclusive of all confessions. To this message were joined a host of special notices of motions, all of them for much the same purpose. They bore upon the questions respecting the right to form popular societies, the liberty of individuals, the responsibility of ministers, and the publicity of accounts, &c.

The directory, on receiving the message in question, resolved to give a specific answer, wherein it should give a full description of all the events that had taken place, and fully detail the means it had employed, and those which it yet purposed to use, in order to disengage France from the crisis in which she then was. An answer of this nature demanded the concurrence of all the ministers, in order that each of them should be enabled to make his report. It would take at least several days to prepare the report, but this did not suit the leaders of the councils. They did not want an accurate and faithful survey of the present state of France, but hasty and embarrassing avowals. Accordingly, after waiting some days, the three commissions who had proposed the message made a new proposition to the council of five hundred, by the deputy Poulain Grand-Pré. This was on the 28th Prairial (16th June). The reporter proposed to the five hundred to declare themselves in permanence till the directory should have replied to the message of the 15th. The motion was carried. This was nothing else than raising a cry of alarm and proclaiming an approaching event. The five hundred communicated their determination to the ancients, by engaging them to follow their example. The example, in point of fact, was followed, and the ancients likewise sat in permanence. The three commissions of disbursements, ways and means, and war being too numerous, were converted into a single commission, composed of eleven members, whose business it was to submit to government such measures as circumstances should require.

The directory replied, on its own part, that it was going to constitute its sitting permanent, in order to hasten the report that was required from it. One may well conceive the ferment that must have resulted from such a determination. As was always the case in these instances, the most alarming reports were sedulously spread abroad. The adversaries of the directory alleged that it was meditating some unheard of and sudden act of violence, and that it meant to dissolve the councils. Its partisans replied, on the contrary, that a coalition had been formed between all the parties, in order that the constitution should be violently destroyed. No-

thing of the sort was contemplated on one side or the other. The coalition of the two oppositions wanted nothing else save the removal of the three former directors. A preliminary expedient was devised for bringing this about. The constitution required that the director entering on office should have quitted the legislature for one whole year. The discovery was made that Treilhard, who had sat for thirteen months in the directory, had quitted the legislature on the 30th Floréal, year V., and that he had been nominated to the directory on the 26th Floréal, year VI. Consequently there wanted four days of the prescribed term. This was nothing else than a mere chicane, for this irregularity was waived from its not being noticed for two sessions; and what was more, Sieyès himself was in the same predicament. The commission of the eleven immediately proposed to annul the nomination of Treilhard. This annulling took place the very same day, the 26th, and was certified to the directory.

Treilhard was a man of blunt and rough demeanour, but did not possess a firmness equal to the harshness of his manners. He was disposed to give way. Larévellière was of a totally different turn of mind. This honest and disinterested man, whose functions were a burden to him, and who had accepted office merely from a sense of duty, and who heartily wished every year that the lot would restore him to privacy, was no longer desirous to surrender his office from the moment the coalesced factions appeared to demand it. He imagined that there could be no other object in expelling the former directors than the abolition of the constitution of the year III.; that Sieyès, Barras, and the Bonaparte family concurred in the same object with different views, but all equally fatal to the republic. Being fully persuaded of this, he was not desirous that the old directors should abandon their post. The consequence was, he lost no time in going to Treilhard, and persuaded him to hold out. "With Merlin and myself," said he, "you will form a majority, and we will refuse to execute this determination of the legislative body, as illegal, seditious, and extorted from it by a faction. Treilhard had not courage sufficient to follow this advice, and immediately sent his resignation to the five hundred.

Larévellière seeing the majority lost, did not for all that the less adhere to his resolution not to resign, if he were required so to do. The managers of the five hundred resolved to appoint a successor to Treilhard forthwith. Sieyès would have been pleased to have obtained the nomination of a man entirely at his service; but Sieyès's influence had no weight in this instance. The person appointed was an advocate of some standing at Rennes, and at that time president of the court of appeal (*cassation*), known to belong rather to the patriotic than to the constitutional opposition. This person was Gohier. He was an upright citizen, and devoted to the republic, but of no great capacity, and unacquainted with men or business. He was nominated on the 29th Prairial, and was to be installed on the very next day.

But matters did not end with excluding Treilhard from the directory. Larévellière and Merlin must also be turned out. The patriots in particular were furious against Larévellière. They recollected that although a regicide, he had never been a mountaineer; that he had frequently stood against their party since the 9th Thermidor, and that in the preceding year, he had encouraged the system of the separations (*sécessions*). They consequently threatened to impeach both him and Merlin, unless they handed in their resignation. Sieyès was commissioned to make a preliminary overture, in order that they might be induced to yield voluntarily to the storm.

On the evening of the 29th, Sieyès proposed a private meeting of the four directors at Merlin's They repaired thither. Barras, as if they considered themselves in danger, went with his sword by his side, and never opened his lips. Sieyès opened the cause of their meeting with considerable embarrassment, made a long digression on the irregularities of the government, and stammered a long time before he came to the real object of the meeting. At length, Larévellière called on him to explain himself; "Your friends," replied Sieyès, "as well as Merlin's, strongly recommend you both to send in your resignation." Larévellière asked who those friends were. Sieyès could not name one who merited the least confidence. Larévellière then spoke with the tone of a man indignant at seeing the directory betrayed by its own members, and delivered up by them to the conspiracies of the factions. He proved that up to the present time his conduct and that of his colleagues had been unimpeachable, and that the censures thrown upon them were nought else than a tissue of calumnies, he next pointedly attacked Sieyès on the subject of his secret designs, and threw him into the greatest confusion by his vehement apostrophes. During all this time, Barras maintained a sullen silence. His position was an awkward one, for he alone had deserved all the reproaches which were heaped upon his colleagues. To demand their resignation for improprieties they had not committed, and which were entirely confined to himself, would have been too bad. He therefore held his peace. They left without doing any thing. Merlin, who durst not follow any course with regard to himself, had declared that he would do whatsoever Larévellière should do.

Barras now thought of employing some go-between, in order to obtain the resignation of his two colleagues. For this purpose he made use of Bergoeng, an old Girondist, whose fondness for pleasure had drawn him into his society. He commissioned him to go and see Larévellière, and get him to resign, Bergoeng accordingly went to him on the night of the 29th and 30th, conjured Larévellière by the longstanding friendship that bound them, and did all he could to move him. He assured him that Barras loved and honoured him, that he considered his removal as iniquitous, but he earnestly entreated him to make the concession, that he might not expose himself to the tempest. Larévellière's resolution could not be shaken. He replied that Barras was the dupe of Sieyès, and Sieyès of Barras, and that both would be duped by the Bonapartes; that the ruin of the republic was the object in view, but that he would stand out to his last gasp.

On the following day, the 30th, Gohier was to be installed. The four directors were assembled. All the ministers were present. The installation was

scarcely over, and the speeches of the president and the new director delivered, when the subject of the meeting of the preceding evening was resumed. Barras desired to speak in private with Larévellière; both of them went into an adjoining room. Barras again applied the same entreaties and the same expressions of friendship with his colleague as before, and found that his mind was as fully made up as ever. He returned much mortified at being foiled, and still apprehensive of any discussion as to the acts of the old directory, which could not redound to his credit. He then began to use violent language, and not daring to attack Larévellière, he launched forth against Merlin, whom he detested, depictured him in the most ridiculous and the falsest colours, and represented him as a bobadil (*fier-à-bras*) meditating, with a band of cut-throats, some sudden act of violence against his colleagues and the councils. Larévellière, coming to Merlin's assistance immediately rejoined, and demonstrated the absurdity of such imputations. There was in point of fact no similarity between Merlin the lawyer, and the character Barras had represented. Larévellière then recapitulated the history of the whole administration of the directory, and entered into particulars for the purpose of enlightening the ministers and the new director. Barras felt himself in a most awkward position; at last he got up saying, "Well, it can't be helped, swords are drawn!"—"Wretch!" replied Larévellière with firmness, "why talkest thou of swords? There is nought in this but knives, and they are pointed against irreproachable men whom you want to murder, as you are unable to intimidate them."

Gohier now was desirous of reconciling matters, but he could not succeed. At this moment, several members of the five hundred and of the ancients having met, came to beseech the two directors to give in with a good grace, promising that no impeachment should be levelled against them. Larévellière replied with scorn that he looked for no favour at their hands, that they might accuse him if they pleased, and he would answer for himself. The deputies to whom this mission had been delegated, returned to the two councils, and caused a fresh disturbance there by reporting what had passed. Boulay (of La Meurthe) denounced Larévellière, admitted his integrity, but very unreasonably attributed to him the scheme of a new religion, and complained bitterly of his opiniated notions, which he said would certainly effect the ruin of the republic. The language of the patriots was more unrestrained than ever, and they said that, inasmuch as they were pertinacious, no favour should be shown the directors.

The agitation was at its height, and the contest having commenced, there was no knowing to what lengths it would be carried. A great number of the moderate members of both councils assembled, and said that to prevent calamities, they ought to go and conjure Larévellière to yield to the storm. They accordingly went to him on the night of the 30th, and implored him, for the sake of the dangers that might befall the republic, to send in his resignation. They told him that they were all of them exposed to the greatest perils, and that if he persisted in refusing, they knew not what extremes the rage of the parties would go. "But do you not see," replied Larévellière, "the far greater dangers that threaten the republic? Do you not see that it is not ourselves who are the object of attack, but the constitution; that in giving way to-day, concessions will have to be made to-morrow, and for ever, and that the republic will be undone by our weakness? My office," he added, "is a burden to me. If I at this time persist in keeping it, it is because I deem it my duty to oppose an insurmountable barrier to the plots of the factions. However, if you consider that my holding out exposes you to dangers, I am ready to yield; but I declare to you that the republic is undone. A single individual cannot save it; I yield then, because I remain alone; and I will send you my resignation."

He gave it that night. He wrote a simple and appropriate letter to enunciate his motives. Merlin begged leave to copy it, and the two resignations were sent together. Thus the old directory was dissolved. All the factions it had endeavoured to reduce, had entered into a combination to overthrow it, and had made common cause against it. It was guilty but of one fault, that of being weaker than the factions; a great fault it is true, and amply sufficient to justify the destruction of a government.

Notwithstanding the general prejudice against him, Larévellière carried with him the esteem of the most respectable citizens. He refused on quitting the directory to accept the one hundred thousand francs which his colleagues had agreed to give to the members going out; he did not even accept the apportionment to which he was entitled of his salary, nor did he take with him the carriage which the director going out was allowed to keep. He retired to a small house which he possessed at Audilly, where he was visited by every person of reputation who was unaffected by the rage of party feeling. Talleyrand the minister was one of those who came to visit him in his retirement.

CHAPTER XVII.

FORMATION OF A NEW DIRECTORY.—MOULINS AND ROGER-DUCOS SUCCEED LARÉVELLIÈRE AND MERLIN.—MINISTERIAL CHANGES.—LEVY FROM EVERY CLASS OF CONSCRIPTS.—FORCED LOAN OF ONE HUNDRED MILLIONS.—LAW CONCERNING HOSTAGES.—NEW MILITARY DESIGNS.—OPERATIONS RESUMED IN ITALY; JOUBERT COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; BATTLE OF NOVI, AND JOUBERT'S DEATH.—THE ANGLO-RUSSIANS MAKE A LANDING IN HOLLAND.—FRESH DISTURBANCES AT HOME; FURIOUS PROCEEDINGS OF THE PATRIOTS; ARREST OF ELEVEN NEWSPAPER EDITORS, BERNADOTTE DISMISSED; PROPOSAL TO DECLARE THE COUNTRY IN DANGER.

TIME wears out popular factions (*les partis*), but many years must elapse before they are utterly exhausted. Strong party prejudices (*les passions*), never expire but with the bosoms that gave them birth. An entire generation must pass away, and then there remains nothing of the claims of such factions but what they may rightfully require, and time can then also effect in regard of such claims a reconciliation of conflicting interests, in perfect conformity with nature and reason; but long before this change can be wrought, popular factions become inaccessible to the warnings of reason: the government that would address itself to them in the language of justice and law soon becomes unendurable, and by how much the more such a government is inclined to temperate measures, so much the more is it holden in contempt as being weak and impotent. Should a government so inclined seek to employ compulsory measures against those who reject its admonitions, it is then accused of tyrannical conduct, and of being malignant in the exact proportion of its weakness. Until the effluxion of time has concurred in effecting these results, nothing short of a most absolute despotism can control popular factions when once highly excited. The directory, then, was this same legal and moderate government, that required the popular factions (*partis*) which the revolution had created, to submit themselves to the law, and which five years of contest and reaction had not yet exhausted. They all combined, as we have just observed, on the 30th Prairial, to effect its downfall. The common enemy being overthrown, they stood face to face one against the other, without any hand to restrain them. We shall see how they conducted themselves.

The constitution, although little else than a mere illusion, was not abolished; an illusion of a different character was now required to replace the fallen directory. Gohier had succeeded Treilhard; successors had to be found for Larévellière and Merlin. Roger-Ducos and Moulins were elected. Roger-Ducos was an old Girondist, an honest man of mean capacity, and entirely devoted to Sieyès. His nomination in the ancients was through the influence of Sieyès. Moulins was an obscure general, formerly employed in La Vendée, a warm and upright republican, nominated, like Gohier, through the influence of the patriot party. Other distinguished persons, either civil or military, had been proposed for filling up the directory, but they had been rejected. It was clear enough from such selections as these, that the parties had no intention to give themselves masters: they had called up to the directory only such mediocre talents as are usually selected to fill up a temporary vacancy.

The present directory, composed, like the councils, from opposite parties, was still weaker and less consistent with itself than the preceding. Sieyès, the only superior man among the five directors, indulged, we have observed, in a day dream of a new political organization. He was the head of the party calling itself moderate or constitutional, all the members of which, nevertheless, wished for a new constitution. He had but one devoted colleague, and he was Roger-Ducos. Moulins and Gohier, both heated patriots, incapable of conceiving any thing but what was before their eyes, were well pleased with the present constitution, but wished to execute and to interpret it in the spirit of the patriots. As for Barras, called naturally to give the casting vote between them, who could rely upon him? He was himself the living emblem of that chaos of inconsistent vices, passions, interests, and ideas, exhibited by the dying republic. The majority depending on his casting vote, would therefore depend upon mere chance.

Sieyès told his new colleagues distinctly enough that they were taking the direction of a government threatened with a speedy extinction, but that they must save the republic if they could not save the constitution. This language was highly displeasing to Gohier and Moulins, and was very unfavourably received by them. Consequently, from the very first day, the sentiments of the directors appeared to be far from unanimous. Sieyès held the same language to Joubert, the general who was sought to be engaged with the reorganizing party. But Joubert, an old soldier of the army of Italy, entertained its sentiments: he was a stanch patriot, and he entertained a distrust of Sieyès' intentions. He secretly imparted his feelings on this subject to Gohier and Moulins, and seemed to attach himself wholly to them. However, these were questions that could not arise as a subject of discussion at a future period. What pressed most was the government and defence of the threatened republic. The tidings of the battle of Trebbia, made public in every quarter, caused a general feeling of alarm. Extraordinary measures must now be adopted for the preservation of the public welfare.

The first thing a government takes upon itself to do is to act precisely contrary to that which preceded it, were it only in obedience with the feelings which have obtained it the ascendancy. Championnet, the so much vaunted hero of Naples, Joubert, and Bernadotte, were now to emerge from imprisonment or

obloquy, in order to fill the highest offices. Championnet was immediately set at large, and appointed commander of a new army, which it was proposed to form along the Upper Alps. The ministry of war was confided to Bernadotte. Joubert was called to the command of the army of Italy. His triumphs in the Tyrol, his youth, and his heroic character, gave rise to the most florid expectations. The reorganizers wished him sufficient success and glory to enable him to support their designs. The selection of Joubert was, to be sure, excellent in itself, but it was an additional act of injustice to Moreau, who had so generously accepted the command of a beaten army, and who had so ably saved it from destruction. But Moreau was rather distasteful to the hot-headed patriots, who at that time were in the ascendancy. The command of an intended army of the Rhine (for it was not then in existence) was conferred on him.

Besides all this, various changes also took place in the ministry. Ramel, minister of the finances, who had rendered such important services since the installation of the directory, and who had been in office during that very difficult transition from paper-money to specie,—Ramel had shared the odium cast upon the old directory. He was so virulently attacked, that the new directors, in spite of the esteem which they entertained for him, were obliged to accept his resignation. A man dear to the patriots and respected by all the parties was appointed his successor, this was Robert Lindet, formerly a member of the committee of public welfare, and so indecently attacked during the reaction. He for a long time excused himself from taking a portfolio. His experience of the injustice of the parties was not likely to induce him to accept office again. However, he at last consented, out of devotion to the republic.

The diplomacy of the directory had not been less censured than its financial administration. It was charged with having again engaged the republic in war with all Europe, but this imputation was very unjust, especially if we consider who were the accusers. These accusers were, in fact, the patriots themselves, whose strong party prejudices had again involved the republic in war. The directory was more particularly censured in regard to the Egypt expedition, not long before so greatly lauded, and it was assumed that this expedition had brought about a rupture with the Porte and Russia. The minister Talleyrand, already disagreeable to the patriots as an old emigrant, had incurred all the responsibility of this diplomacy, and he was so vehemently attacked, that it was necessary to deal with him as with Ramel, and to accept his resignation. The person appointed to succeed him was a native of Wirtemberg, who, under the appearance of German kindness of heart, disguised extraordinary shrewdness, and whom M. de Talleyrand had recommended as best qualified to be his successor. This was M. Reinhard. It had been asserted that this appointment was only a temporary one, and that M. Reinhard merely accepted the post till the moment when M. de Talleyrand could be recalled. The ministry of justice had been taken away from Lambrechts, on account of the state of his health, and given to Cambacérès. Bourguignon, formerly a magistrate, a sincere and honest patriot, was placed at the head of the police department. Fouché, that accommodating and insinuating ex-Jacobin, whom Barras had engaged in the jobbery of the companies, and afterwards provided for by the embassy to Milan,—this Fouché, turned out of office by reason of his conduct in Italy, now passed for a victim of the old directory. He was therefore to participate in the triumph decreed to all the victims; he was appointed to the Hague.

Such were the principal changes introduced with regard to the government and army appointments. The object in view was not merely a change of persons; they had to be supplied with new appliances for performing the task under which their predecessors had succumbed. The patriots reverting, according to their manner, to revolutionary means, maintained that great ills required strong remedies. They proposed the urgent measures of 1793. After having refused every thing to the preceding directory, they were now willing to concede every thing to the new. They wanted to put extraordinary means into its hands, and even to compel it to use them. The commission of eleven, formed of the three commissions of disburse, of ways and means, and of war, and to whom was confided, during the crisis of Prairial, the office of devising measures for saving the republic, conferred with the members of the directory, and settled with them various measures which took their complexion from the bias of the moment. Instead of two hundred thousand men to be taken from the five classes of conscripts, the directory was empowered to call out all the classes. Instead of the taxes proposed by the late directory, and rejected with such strong feeling by the two oppositions, the idea of a new forced loan was once more entertained. In conformity with the patriot system, it was to be progressive; that is, instead of making each individual pay according to the amount of his assessed taxes, which would have made the returns of land-tax and assessed taxes the basis of the assessment, every individual was required to contribute according to his income. Hence, it became necessary to have recourse to a jury of assessment, in plain language, to punish the wealthy by means of a commission. The middle party opposed this plan, and said that it was a re-enactment of the system of terror, and that the difficulty of the assessment would moreover render this measure inefficacious and inoperative, like all the previous forced loans. The patriots replied, that the charges of the war must not be borne by every class of society, but solely by the wealthy. The same party prejudices still used, as we see, the same reasons. The forced and progressive loan was decreed. It was fixed at one hundred millions, and was charged upon the credit of the national estates.

Besides these measures of recruiting and finance, some police measure had to be employed against the renewed outbreak of *chouannerie** in the south and in the west, the theatres of the former civil war. Renewed enormities were committed; purchasers of the national estates, reputed patriots, public functionaries, were murdered; and in particular, the diligences were stopped and robbed. Among the perpetrators of these out-

* The meaning of this term will be explained to the reader by a reference to p. 567, col. 1. *Trans.*

rages were to be found a great number of the Vendeans and Chouans, whom we have before noticed, a great number of the notorious companies of the sun *, as well as many mutinous conscripts. Although these *brigands*, whose presence indicated a sort of social dissolution, had but one object, namely, plunder, it was evident, from the selection of their victims, that they had a political origin. A commission was appointed to devise their extermination. This commission proposed a law which was called the "hostages act," and has ever since been known by that appellation. Inasmuch as most of these atrocities were laid to the charge of the relatives of emigrants, or to *ci-devant* nobles, it was consequently proposed that they should be compelled to give hostages. Whenever a commune was declared to be in a notorious state of disorder, the relatives of emigrants, the *ci-devant* nobles, the heads of families of the individuals known to belong to these associations, were considered as hostages, and as such, being civilly and personally responsible for the outrages committed. The central administrations were to point out the persons selected for hostages, and to imprison them in houses appropriated to that purpose. There they were to live at their own charges, and in what manner they pleased, and to be closely confined while the country was in a disturbed state. When the disturbed state of the country went so far as to produce murder, four of them were to be transported for every murder committed. It is easy to conceive all that could be urged both for and against this law. It was, said its advocates, the only way there was of reaching the originators of those disturbances, and it was a mild and humane mode. Its opponents replied, that it was a new *loi des suspects* †, a revolutionary law, which, utterly inefficient as it was to reach the truly guilty, punished the many for the fault of the few, and committed all the injustice incident to laws of this nature. In one word, all was said *pro* and *con* on this measure that we have seen so often repeated in this history with respect to revolutionary laws. But there was one objection, stronger than all the rest, to be made against this measure: as these brigands proceeded solely from an absolute dissolution of social ties, the only remedy lay in a vigorous reorganization of the state, not in measures in every respect worthless, and which were not capable of restoring any energy to the springs of the government.

The law was passed after a very warm discussion, wherein the popular parties, who had the moment before coalesced in order to overthrow the late directory, now openly took different sides. To these important measures, which were intended to arm the government with revolutionary means, were added some which, in other respects, restricted its might. These accessory measures were the consequence of the imputations made against the former directory. To prevent separations (*scissions*) for the future, it was decided that the choice of any electoral faction should be void; that any agent of the government attempting to influence the elections should be punished as for an outrage committed against the sovereignty of the people; that the directory should no longer have authority to bring troops within the constitutional radius without being expressly empowered so to do; that no military officer should be liable to be deprived of his rank, unless by the decision of a council of war; that the directory should have no longer the power to delegate to agents the right granted to it of issuing warrants of arrest; that no one in service of the government, nor any official whatsoever, should be permitted to be a contractor, or even to be concerned in contracts, for supplies; and that a club could not be closed without a decision of the municipal and central administrations. On the subject of a law for regulating the press, the parties could not agree; but the article of the 19th Fructidor, which gave the directory the right of suppression in regard to the journals, continued nevertheless abolished; so that, until some new plan should be brought forward, the press remained irresponsibly free.

Such were the measures passed, in consequence of the 30th Prairial, either for correcting alleged abuses, or to restore to the government an energy which it did not possess. Those measures which are adopted in critical moments, after a change of system, are devised for the purpose of saving a state, but do rarely come in time to save it, for every thing is frequently settled before such measures can be carried into execution. They furnish, at most, resources for the future. The loan of one hundred millions and the new levies could not be executed for at least some months. However, the effect of a crisis is to give a new impulse to all the springs, and to impart to them a certain degree of energy. Bernadotte lost no time in writing pressing circulars, and in this manner contrived to accelerate the organization of the battalions of conscripts already commenced. Robert Lindet, to whom the forced loan of one hundred millions afforded no present assistance, called together the principal bankers and merchants of the capital, and urged them to assist the state with their credit. They acquiesced in this, and lent their signature to the ministry of the finances. They formed a syndicate, and till the taxes should be collected, signed bills which were to be repaid as fast as the receipts came in. Thus was a sort of temporary bank established to supply the necessity of the moment.

The next thing to be considered was, how were the next campaigns to be conducted. Bernadotte was asked to suggest a draught of a new campaign, and he lost no time in presenting a truly singular scheme, but which, luckily, was not carried out. Nothing could be more subject to multiplied combinations than a field of battle so extensive as that on which operations were to be conducted. It was calculated to impart different ideas to every one who surveyed it; and if every individual could propose his own scheme, and obtain its adoption, there was no reason why the draught of the scheme should not be continually altered. Although a variety of opinions may be useful in discussing a measure, it is a sad thing to have a difference of opinion, when a

* These associations, which were also known as *Compagnies de Jésus*, originated with the royalists in the south of France, who after the 12th Germinal, year III. (1st April, 1795,) made dreadful reprisals upon the patriots in the south of France. *Ante*, p. 548, col. 2. *Trans.*

† The reader will recollect that the *loi des suspects* was passed the 17th of September, 1793. Its operation was the imprisonment of all persons obnoxious to the dominant party of that period. *Ante*, p. 340, col. 2. *Trans.*

measure is to be put in execution. At first, it was conceived that we ought to act at one and the same time on the Danube and in Switzerland. After the battle of Stockach, there was no inclination for further operations other than in Switzerland, and the army of the Danube was disposed of. At this present juncture, Bernadotte was of a different opinion. His argument was, that the cause of the success of the allies lay in the facility with which they could keep up a communication across the Alps between Germany and Italy. To deprive them of these means of communication, he wanted to take from them the Saint-Gothard and the Grisons, at the right wing of the army of Switzerland, and that a fresh army of the Danube should be formed, which should again make Germany the seat of war. In order to form this army of the Danube, he proposed to speedily organize the army of the Rhine, and reinforce it with twenty thousand men taken from Masséna. This would be compromising the latter, who would have to face the whole force of the archduke, and who was liable to be overwhelmed while this turning about was taking place. True it is that it would have been better to again make the Danube the seat of war, but it would have been enough had Masséna been supplied with the means of taking the offensive, so that his army could itself have become the army of the Danube. Then so far from weakening him, every thing ought to have been placed at his disposal. According to Bernadotte's plan, an army was to be formed on the High Alps to protect the frontiers against the Austro-Russians in the quarter of Piedmont. Joubert, collecting the remains of all the armies of Italy, and reinforced by the disposable troops in the interior, was to debouch from the Apennines, and to attack Suwarrow by main force.

This plan, strongly approved of by Moulins, was sent to the generals. Masséna, weary of all these extravagant schemes, tendered his resignation. It was not accepted, and the plan was not carried into execution. Masséna retained the command of all the troops from Basle to the Saint-Gothard. The intention of assembling an army on the Rhine, to cover that line, was persevered in. A nucleus for an army was formed on the Alps under the command of Championnet. This nucleus consisted of about fifteen thousand men. All the disposable reinforcements were sent to Joubert, who was to debouch from the Apennines. It was now the middle of the season, in Messidor (July). The reinforcements were now coming up. A certain number of old battalions, retained in the interior, had repaired to the frontiers. The conscripts were draughted into regiments, and went to take the place of the veteran troops in the garrisons. Lastly, as there were not squares sufficient to receive the great quantity of conscripts, it was resolved to increase the number of battalions in the demi-brigades or regiments, and this would allow new levies to be incorporated with the old divisions.

It was known that a reinforcement of thirty thousand Russians, under the command of general Korsakow, was entering Germany. Masséna was urged to quit his positions, and attack those of the archduke, so as to do his utmost to beat him before his junction with the Russians. The government had been well advised in this respect; for no delay ought now to take place in making an attempt before the junctions of so imposing a mass of forces. Nevertheless Masséna refused to take the offensive; whether it were that he on the present occasion was deficient in his accustomed hardihood, or whether it were that he was waiting for the resumption of offensive operations in Italy. Military men have unanimously censured his inactivity, which, after all, was a fortunate course as things turned out, through the blunders of the enemy, and was redeemed by glorious services. However, to testify his obedience to the pressing solicitations of the government, and in execution of part of Bernadotte's plan, which consisted in preventing the Austro-Russians from keeping up a communication between Germany and Italy, Masséna ordered Lecourbe to draw out his right to the Saint-Gothard, to possess himself of that important point, and to retake the Grisons. By this operation the French would again become masters of the High Alps, and the enemy's armies operating in Germany would find themselves cut off from all communication with those operating in Italy. Lecourbe executed this enterprise with that boldness and intrepidity which distinguished him in mountain warfare, and once more became master of the Saint-Gothard.

In the mean time, a fresh series of events were preparing in Italy. Suwarrow, being obliged by the court of Vienna to finish the siege of all the fortresses before he pushed his advantages, had in no wise pursued the advantages the victory of the Trebbia might have afforded him. He might even in perfect consistency with his instructions, have reserved an adequate force for entirely dispersing the remains of our armies; but he had not sufficient genius for military operations to adopt that course. He therefore wasted his time in his sieges. Peschiera, Pizzighitone, and the citadel of Milan, had fallen. The citadel of Turin had met with the same fate. The two celebrated fortresses of Mantua and Alexandria still held out, and appeared likely to make a long resistance. Kray was besieging Mantua, and Bellegarde Alexandria. Unfortunately, all our fortresses had been consigned to commandants destitute of energy and skill. Their artillery was ill served, because none but worn out divisions had been sent into the fortresses; and the absence of our active armies, who had retreated to the Apennines, was exceedingly discouraging. Mantua, the principal of these fortresses, did not deserve the reputation which Bonaparte's campaigns had afforded it. It was not its strength, but the combination of events, that had prolonged its defence. In fact, Bonaparte, with about ten thousand men, had compelled fourteen thousand men to perish there by fever and famine. General Latour-Foissac was at this time commandant. He was a skilful officer of engineers; but he did not possess the energy necessary for this kind of defence. Discouraged by the irregularity of the place and the bad state of the fortifications, he never considered that deficiencies of fortification might be compensated by boldness of action. Besides all this, his garrison was not strong enough; and after the first assaults he appeared disposed to surrender. General Gardanne commanded at Alexandria. He was a resolute man, but not well educated in his profession. A first assault was vigorously repulsed by him; but he had not the sagacity to

discover in the place the resources that it still presented.

It was now Thermidor (the middle of July), more than a month had elapsed between the revolution of the 30th Prairial, and the appointment of Joubert. Moreau felt the importance of taking the offensive before the fortresses were reduced, and of debouching, with a reorganized and reinforced army, upon the dispersed Austro-Russians. Unfortunately, he was shackled by the orders of the government, which had enjoined him to wait for Joubert. Thus, in this disastrous campaign, there was a series of unseasonable orders that always induced our reverses. A change of ideas and plans, in matters of execution, and more particularly so in war, is always fatal. Had Moreau, to whom the command ought to have been given at the very first, received the command after the battle of Cassano, and had held it independent, all would have been saved; but then associated with Macdonald, and then again with Joubert, he was prevented, for the second and third time, from repairing our misfortunes, and recovering our military credit.

Joubert, whom every effort had been made to attach, by his wife's connexions, and by great marks of attention, to the party that was contemplating a reorganization, lost the whole month of Messidor (June and July) in keeping up his wedding festivities, and thus missed the critical moment. Joubert was not sincerely attached to that party whose support he was thus attempted to be made (for he continued devoted to the patriots), and so they caused him a waste of valuable time. He set out, observing to his young wife, "You will see me again, either dead or victorious." In fact, he had brought his mind to the heroic resolution, to conquer or die. This noble-minded young man, on joining the army in the middle of Thermidor (early in August), testified the greatest possible deference for the consummate master whom he was called upon to succeed. He begged him to remain with him, to give him his advice. Moreau, quite as generous as the young general, very freely consented to be present at his first battle, and to assist him with his counsels: a noble and touching instance of professional friendship, which adorns the virtues of our republican generals, and belongs to a time when patriotic zeal still held greater empire over the hearts of our warriors than even ambition itself.

The French army, composed of the remains of the armies of Upper Italy and Naples, and of reinforcements drawn from the interior, amounted to forty thousand men, well drilled, and impatient to measure themselves against the enemy. Nothing could equal the patriotism of these soldiers, who, always beaten, were never disheartened, and always desired to turn again upon the enemy. No republican army deserved better of France, for none so thoroughly replied to the unjust imputation thrown upon the French, namely, that they are incapable of bearing adverse fortune. It is true, that part of its firmness was owing to the brave and unobtrusive general in whom it had placed its entire confidence, and who was constantly being removed at the very time he was once again leading it to victory.

These forty thousand men were independent of the fifteen thousand who were to serve under Championnet, as forming the nucleus of the army of the High Alps. They had debouched by the Bormida upon Acqui, and by the Bochetta upon Gavi, and were now in battle array in advance of Novi. These forty thousand men debouching in good time, before the junction of the divisions engaged in the sieges, might have obtained decisive advantages. But Alexandria had just opened her gates on the 4th Thermidor (July 22). An indistinct rumour also gained ground, that Mantua had also recently opened her gates. This melancholy intelligence was soon confirmed, and news arrived that the capitulation was signed on the 12th Thermidor (July 30). Kray had just rejoined Suwarrow, with twenty thousand men; the force of the Austro-Russians now in motion amounted at this present time to sixty and some odd thousand. It was therefore no longer possible for Joubert to struggle with any thing like a chance against so superior an enemy. He called a council of war; they were unanimously for returning to the Apennines, and confining themselves to the defensive, while waiting for the arrival of a reinforcement.

Joubert was about to execute his resolution, when he was prevented by Suwarrow, and obliged to accept battle. The French army was formed in a semicircle on the slopes of the Monte Rotondo, which commands the whole plain of Novi. The left, composed of Grouchy's and Lemoine's divisions, extended, in a circular position, in advance of Pasturana. It had at its back the ravine of the Riasco, and this rendered its rear accessible to an enemy who should venture to commence an attack in that ravine. The cavalry reserve, commanded by Richepanse, was in the rear of this wing. In the centre, Laboissière's division covered the heights to the right and left of the city of Novi. Watrin's division, at the right wing, defended the approaches to the Monte Rotondo, in the direction of the road to Tortona. Dombrowsky, with one division, was blockading Serravalle. General Perignon commanded our left wing; Saint-Cyr, our centre and our right. The position was strong, well occupied on every point, and difficult to carry. However, there was no comparison in point of advantage in favour of forty thousand men against more than sixty thousand. Suwarrow resolved to attack the position with his customary violence. He sent Kray towards our left, with the divisions under the command of Ott and Bellegarde. The Russian division under the command of Derfelden, Bagration's advanced guard at its head, was to attack our centre, near Novi. Melas, staying a little behind with the rest of the army, was to assail our right. From a singular combination, or rather from the want of combination, the attacks were to be successive and not simultaneous.

On the 28th Thermidor (August 15, 1799), Kray commenced the attack at five in the morning. Bellegarde attacked Grouchy's division on the extreme left; and Ott, Lemoine's division. These two divisions being not yet formed, suffered a narrow chance of being surprised and broken. The obstinate resistance of one of the demi-brigades obliged Kray to throw himself upon the twentieth light, which he overwhelmed by directing his best exertions against it. His troops had already reached the elevated plain, when Joubert galloped

up to the point of danger. It was too late to think of retreating, and every thing had to be dared for the purpose of driving the enemy from off this elevated plain (*plateau*). Advancing amidst the riflemen to encourage them, he received a ball, which entered near the heart, and stretched him on the earth. At the point of death the young hero cried to his soldiers, "On, my friends, on!" This event might have produced confusion in the army, but, luckily, Moreau had accompanied Joubert to this point. He immediately assumed that command which was accorded to him by the general confidence, rallied the soldiers boiling with resentment, and led them back against the Austrians. The grenadiers of the 34th drove them with the bayonet, and threw them down the hill. Unluckily, the French had not yet their artillery in battery, and the Austrians, on the contrary, were cutting up their ranks by showers of howitzer-shot and balls. During this action Bellegarde used great exertions to turn the extreme left by the ravine of the Riasco, which has already been described as affording access to our rear. He had already pushed some way in, when Perignon, seasonably bringing up against him the reserve commanded by general Clausel, stopped him in his career. Perignon achieved his destruction in the plain, by charging him with Partonneaux's grenadiers and Richepanse's cavalry. This vigorous effort disengaged the left wing.

Owing to the singular combination of Suwarrow, whose design was to make a series of his attacks, our centre had not yet been attacked. Saint-Cyr got time to make his arrangements, and to bring Watrin's division, forming his extreme right near Novi. At the urgent solicitation of Kray, who required to be supported by an attack on the centre, Bagration had at length determined to assail it with his advanced guard. Laboissière's division, which was on the left of Novi, suffering Bagration's Russians to approach within half musket-shot, received them with a tremendous fire of musketry and grape-shot, and covered the plain with dead. Bagration, without evincing any confusion, then directed some batteries to get at the rear of Novi by our right; but being encountered by Watrin's division, which was approaching Novi, they were thrown back into the plain.

Half the day was now spent, and our line was not yet broken. Suwarrow had just come up with the Russian corps of Derfelden. He ordered a new general attack to be made on the whole line. Kray was again to assail the left. Derfelden and Bagration the centre. Mélas was directed to accelerate his pace, in order to overwhelm our right. All being settled, the enemy set himself in motion against our entire line. Kray, who was most inveterate against our left, tried once more to assail it in front by Ott; but Clausel's reserve repulsed Bellegarde's troops, and Lemoine's division threw Ott down the slopes of the hills. In the centre, Suwarrow caused a furious attack to be made to the right and left of Novi. A fresh attempt to get to the rear of the town was foiled, as it had been in the morning, by Watrin's division. Unluckily, our soldiers, hurried away by their ardour, occupied themselves too closely in pursuit of the enemy, ventured into the plain, and were brought back to their position. At one o'clock the fire slackened again, in consequence of the general fatigue; but it soon returned with violence, and for four hours the French, immoveable as walls, resisted with admirable coolness the utmost fury of the Russians. So far they had sustained no very great loss. The Austro-Russians, on the other hand, had been severely handled. The plain was strewed with their dead and wounded. Unfortunately, the rest of the Austro-Russian army, under the command of Mélas, arrived from Rivolta. This fresh irruption was about to be directed against our right. Saint-Cyr, on perceiving this, brought back Watrin's division, which had advanced too far into the plain, and sent it towards an elevated plain to the right of Novi. But while this movement was in operation, Watrin's division found itself surrounded on all sides by the numerous regiments of Mélas.

Horror-stricken on perceiving this, it dispersed in disorder, and reached the elevated plain in confusion. However, towards the rear this division rallied. In the mean time, Suwarrow, increasing his exertions at the centre, near Novi, at length drove the French into the town, and made himself master of the heights which commanded it on the right and left. From that moment, Moreau, seeing that we had nothing left for it but retreat, gave the necessary orders before the further progress of the enemy should cut off the communication with Gavi. On the right, Watrin's division was obliged to cut its way through, in order to regain the road to Gavi, which was already closed. Laboissière's division retired from Novi; Lemoine's and Grouchy's divisions fell back on Pasturana, on experiencing the furious charges of Kray. Unfortunately, a battalion found its way into the ravine of Riasco, which runs behind Pasturana. The fire of this battalion threw our columns into confusion. Artillery and cavalry all were in disorder. Lemoine's division, closely pressed by the enemy, dispersed and threw itself into the ravine. Our soldiers were driven along like dust before the wind. Pérignon and Grouchy rallied a few brave fellows to check the enemy's progress, and to save the artillery; but they were cut to pieces and made prisoners. Pérignon had received seven sabre wounds, and Grouchy six. Brave Colli, the Piedmontese general, who had distinguished himself in the first campaigns against us, and who had afterwards entered into our service, formed himself into a square with some battalions, resisted till it was broken, and fell dreadfully mangled into the hands of the Russians.

After this first moment of confusion, the army rallied in advance of Gavi. The Austro-Russians were too much fatigued to follow the pursuit. Our army could therefore march without being harassed. The loss on both sides was equal; it amounted to about ten thousand men for each army. But the killed and wounded were much more numerous on the Austro-Russian side. The French had lost a far greater number of prisoners. They had lost also their commander-in-chief, four generals of division, thirty-seven pieces of cannon, and four pairs of colours. Never had they displayed greater coolness and intrepidity. They were inferior to the enemy by at least one-third. The Russians had exhibited their fanatic bravery, but their advantage was entirely owing to their number, and not to the manœuvres of the general, who had demonstrated on this occasion the greatest ignorance. He

had, in point of fact, exposed his columns to the risk of being destroyed by grape-shot, one after another, and had not sufficiently supported himself on our right, the point which he ought to have overwhelmed. This wretched battle completely closed Italy against us, and rendered us unable to keep the field any longer. We were obliged to enclose ourselves in the Apennines, considering ourselves fortunate in being still able to retain them. The loss of the battle could not be imputed to Moreau, but to the unlucky circumstance of Kray's junction with Suwarrow. This last disastrous termination was entirely attributable to Joubert's delay.

All our misfortunes were not confined to the battle of Novi. The long announced expedition against Holland was at length executed by the co-operation of the English with the Russians. Paul I. had entered into a treaty with Pitt, whereby he engaged himself to furnish seventeen thousand Russians, who were to receive English pay for service in Holland. After many difficulties had been surmounted, the expedition had been got ready for the beginning of Fructidor (the end of August). Thirty thousand English were to join the seventeen thousand Russians, and if the landing met with no impediment, it might be fairly expected that Holland would be taken from the French. This was a matter of great concern for England; and had she only succeeded in destroying the fleets and arsenals of Holland, she would even then have considered herself well compensated for the expenses of the expedition. A considerable squadron was sent to the Baltic to go and get the Russians. A preliminary squadron set sail under the command of general Abercromby, to secure a landing. All the troops of the expedition, when once got together, were to be under the chief command of the duke of York.

The most advantageous point for landing in Holland was the mouth of the Meuse. Thus the French line of retreat would be exposed, and the English get very near the Hague, where the stadtholder's party was the strongest. A more convenient situation of coast made the English prefer the northern part of Holland. Abercromby steered for the Helder, where he arrived towards the end of August. After surmounting various impediments, he landed near the Helder, in the environs of Groot-Keeten, on the 10th Fructidor (August 27). The enormous preparations this expedition had required, with the presence of all the English squadrons on the coast, had afforded sufficient notice to the French, so as to put them on their guard. Brune took the sole command of both the Batavian and the French army. He could hardly be said to have under his command more than seven thousand French and ten thousand Dutch, commanded by Daendels. He had sent the Batavian division to the environs of the Helder, and posted the French division about the environs of Haarlem. Abercromby, on landing, fell in with the Dutch at Groot-Keeten, repulsed them, and thus contrived to secure the disembarkation of his troops. The Dutch showed no want of bravery on this occasion, but were not commanded with sufficient ability by general Daendels, and were obliged to retreat. Brune got them together again, and made his arrangements for promptly attacking the troops that had landed, before they could obtain a firm position, and could be reinforced by the English and Russian divisions who were to join them.

The Dutch demonstrated the most favourable inclinations. The national guards had offered to garrison the fortresses, and it was this that had enabled Brune to bring these reinforcements into active service. He had summoned to his assistance Dumonceau's division, six thousand strong, and he resolved to attack, very early in September, the camp in which the English had seated themselves. This camp was well fortified; this camp was Zyp, formerly a morass, drained by Dutch industry, forming an extensive territory, intersected by dikes and canals, and covered with dwellings. Seventeen thousand English had there fortified themselves in the best possible manner. Brune had at most but twenty thousand men to storm this intrenchment, a number far from sufficient for this purpose when the nature of the ground was taken into consideration. He made an attack on this camp on the 22nd Fructidor (September 8), and after an obstinate conflict was obliged to beat a retreat, and fall back upon Amsterdam. From that moment he lost all power of preventing the junction of all the Anglo-Russian forces, and was obliged to wait till a French army could be got together to fight them. This advantageous position of the English in the north of Holland induced the event that was most to be apprehended, namely, the defection of the great Dutch fleet. The Texel had not been closed, and the English admiral, Mitchell, was enabled to enter it with his entire fleet. For some considerable time previous, the emissaries of the prince of Orange had been endeavouring to alienate the Dutch seamen. On the first summons of admiral Mitchell, they rose in mutiny, and forced their admiral, Story, to surrender. The whole Dutch navy thus fell into the hands of the English, a circumstance of itself of the greatest possible advantage to them.

As these tidings reached Paris, post after post, they produced the very effect that might naturally be expected from them. They increased the fermentation of the parties, and especially the inveteracy of the patriots, who demanded with greater warmth than ever the adoption of the grand revolutionary measures. The license accorded to the newspapers and the clubs had caused the revival of a great number. The remnant of the Jacobin party had met in the Old Ride, where our earliest assemblies had sate. Although the law prohibited popular societies from assuming the character of deliberative assemblies, the club at the Ride had nevertheless arrogated to itself a president, secretaries, &c., under different titles. Here it was that the ex-minister, Bouchotte, Drouet, Felix Lepelletier, and Aréna, all of them disciples or accomplices of Babœuf, made themselves notorious. Here were invoked the *manes* of Goujon, Soubrany, and the victims of Grenelle. Here were demanded, in the style of 1793, the punishment of all the bloodsuckers of the people, the disarming of the royalists, the levy *en masse*, the establishment of manufactories of arms in places of public resort, the restitution of their cannon and pikes to the national guards, &c. Here also was a demand made for the impeachment of the first set of directors, to whom the recent disasters, as

consequences of their administration, were imputed. When the results of the battle of Novi and the events in Holland became known, the violence of these men overstepped all bounds. The generals were loaded with abuse. Moreau was treated as a stupid old fellow. Joubert himself, notwithstanding his heroic death, was accused of having lost the army by his joining it so late as he did. His young wife, and Messrs. de Semonville, Sainte-Foy, and Talleyrand, to whom his marriage was attributed, were mercilessly insulted. The Dutch government was charged with treason; it was said to be composed of aristocrats, *stathouderieurs*, and enemies to France and liberty. The Freeman's Journal (*Journal des Hommes Libres*), the organ of the party that met at the Ride, repeated all these declamations, and added to the scandal of the words that of their publication.

This unrestrained license of popular fury was the occasion of many persons suffering from a "terror" as it were. People became apprehensive of a return to the scenes of 1793. Those who styled themselves the *moderates*, the *politicians*, and who, like Sieyès, entertained the laudable design, and the somewhat bold pretension of saving France from the fury of the parties, and by giving it a constitution a second time, were indignant at the fury of these new Jacobins. Sieyès in particular had an habitual dread of these persons, and he declared against them with all the vivacity of his temper. At any rate they might be deemed formidable, for besides the "spouters" (*criards*) and firebrands who displayed their energy in the clubs or in the newspapers, they could count upon allies far more brave, more powerful, and consequently more dangerous, in the government itself. In the first place, there were in the councils all the patriots excluded last year by the separations (*scissions*), and entered by force at the elections of this year, who in more measured language repeated pretty nearly what was said in the club at the Ride. These were men who did not want to stand the chance of a new constitution, who, moreover, distrusted those who wished to make a new constitution, and who had their apprehensions that maintenance of the government by employing generals boded no good. They were also for availing themselves of measures similar to those employed by the committee of public welfare, in order to extricate France from her present perilous situation. The ancients, more measured, and by their position more cautious, did not participate to any extent in these notions, but more than two hundred members warmly supported them in the five hundred. These were not all of them hot-headed men, as Angerean, but wise and enlightened men, as Jourdan. These two generals gave the patriotic party a great ascendancy in the five hundred. In the directory this party had two voices; Gohier and Moulins. Barras remained undecided; on the one hand, he distrusted Sieyès, who showed him but little respect, and considered him as a most corrupt individual; on the other hand, he feared the patriots and their extravagance. He hesitated therefore to declare himself. In the ministry the patriots had recently gained a new supporter in Bernadotte. This general was much less decided than most of the generals of the army of Italy; and it will be recollected, that his division, on arriving at the Taglianmento, had a quarrel with Angerean on the subject of the word *Monsieur*, which it had already substituted for that of *Citoyen*. But Bernadotte cherished a restless ambition; his ill temper had been roused by the confidence reposed in Joubert by the reorganizing party; he conceived that Moreau stood best in public estimation since the death of Joubert, and this circumstance rendering him averse to the plans of reorganization, attached him entirely to the patriots. General Marbot, commandant of the citadel of Paris, a violent republican, entertained much the same opinions as Bernadotte.

Thus two hundred deputies in the five hundred whose sentiments were known, at the head of whom were two celebrated generals, the minister at war, the military commandant of Paris, two directors, a great number of newspaper editors and clubs, and a considerable remnant of men who had compromised themselves, and well fitted for a violent and for a decisive movement, were capable of creating serious apprehensions, and though the Mountaineer party could not be revived, the reader may well conceive the alarm it excited with those persons still full of the recollections of 1793.

Some dissatisfaction had been manifested with the mode the magistrate Bourguignon had conducted himself while charged with the police. He was an honest citizen, but very ill advised. Barras proposed to Sieyès, one of his dependents, whom he had recently sent as ambassador to Holland, the accommodating and crafty Fouché, formerly a member of the Jacobins, thoroughly imbued with their spirit and their secret associations, by no means attached to their cause, and only caring how he could, amidst the wreck of parties, save his own fortune—Fouché was eminently qualified to be a spy upon his old friends, and to protect the directory from their schemes. He was accepted by Sieyes and Roger Ducos, and was invested with the ministry of police. This was, under the circumstances, a valuable acquisition. He confirmed Barras in the idea of attaching himself rather to the reorganizing party than to the patriot party, because the latter had nothing to look forward to, and besides, might carry him away too far.

This measure being taken, war against the patriots commenced. Sieyès, who possessed great influence over the ancients, because that council was wholly composed of *moderates* and *politicians*, availed himself of that influence to have the new Jacobin club closed. The Ride as adjoining to the Tuileries, was comprised in the precincts of the palace of the ancients. Each council, retaining the police of its own precincts, the ancients had the power of causing the Ride to be closed. In point of fact, the commission of the inspectors issued an ordinance, and prohibited all meetings whatever in that place. A mere sentinel placed at the door was sufficient to prevent the meeting of the new Jacobins. This plainly showed that although their declamations had not altered their tone, their strength was not what it used to be. The preamble of this ordinance was justified at the council of the ancients by a report of the deputy Cornet. Courtois, the same who drew up the report on the 9th Thermidor, seized the opportunity of making a fresh denunciation against the plots of the Jacobins. His denunciation was followed by a discus-

sion which terminated in a report being ordered on this subject.

The patriots, driven from the Ride, retired to a spacious building in the Rue du Bac, and there recommenced their habitual declamations. As their organization into a deliberative assembly still remained unaltered, the constitution gave the executive power a right of dissolving their society. Sieyès, Roger-Ducos, and Barras, at the instigation of Fouché, made up their minds to close the club. Gohier and Moulins did not agree with them, stating that, in the present critical state of things, the public spirit should be revived by means of clubs; that the new Jacobin club comprised some men of misguided feeling, but no violently seditious persons, since they had retired before a single sentinel when the Ride was closed. Their opinions were not attended to, and the order was made. Its execution was deferred till after the celebration of the anniversary of the 10th of August, which was to be held on the 23rd Thermidor. Sieyès was president of the directory; in that capacity his duty was to make a speech on the occasion. He made a remarkable speech, in which he strove to point out the danger in which the new anarchists involved the republic, and denounced them as dangerous conspirators, indulging in their day-dreams of a new revolutionary dictatorship. The patriots who attended the ceremony took this speech in ill part, and showed their disapprobation in a noisy manner. In the midst of salvos of artillery, Sieyès and Barras imagined that they heard balls whistling about their ears. They returned to the directory in high dudgeon. Distrusting the authorities of Paris, they resolved to take the command of the citadel from Marbot, who was openly accused of being a warm patriot, and of participating in the pretended plots of the Jacobins. Fouché proposed Lefebvre, a brave general, who had no notion of any thing further than the military watchword, and was an utter stranger to the intrigues of the parties as his successor. Marbot was therefore displaced; and on the next day but one after the ordinance prohibiting the meeting of the club in the Rue du Bac was published.

The patriots offered no more resistance at the Rue du Bac than they did at the Ride. They withdrew, and remained definitely separated. But they had still the journals left them, and of these they made a formidable use. That which styled itself The Freeman's Journal (*Journal des Hommes Libres*), declaimed with extreme violence against all the members of the directory who were known to have approved of the measure. Sieyès was sadly abused. That perfidious priest, said the patriotic journals, has sold the republic to Prussia. He has agreed with that power to re-establish monarchy in France, and to give the crown to Brunswick. These charges had no other foundation than the well known opinion of Sieyès upon the constitution and his residence in Prussia. In fact, he was for ever repeating, that the firebrands and the "speechifiers" (*bavards*) marred all good government; that authority must be centralized; that liberty might even consist with monarchy, as was evident from England; but that liberty was incompatible with this successive domination of every popular party. He was even alleged to have advanced this doctrine in conversation, *that the north of Europe was full of wise and moderate princes, who would be well able, with a sound constitution, of ensuring the happiness of France.* Such expressions as these, whether true or false, were quite enough to hold him out as the originator of conspiracies, which had no existence save in the imagination of his enemies. Barras was not a whit better treated than Sieyès. The civilities with which the patriots had long treated him, because he had always flattered them with the hopes of his support, were discontinued. He was now declared by them a traitor, a corrupt man, who was of no service to any party. Fouché, his adviser, an apostate like himself, was hunted down with similar imputations. Roger-Ducos was, according to them, nothing else than an imbecile, blindly adopting the course of two traitors.

The license of the press was unrestrained. The law proposed by Berlier not having been entertained, there was only one mode in which political writers could be punished, and that was by procuring the re-enactment of a law of the convention against those whose acts or writings should tend to the overthrow of the republic. This intention had to be demonstrated by some overt act to bring the offence within the meaning of this law, and then, and in that case the law decreed the punishment of death. It was therefore impossible to resort to this. A new law had been demanded from the legislative body, and it had been settled that the subject should meet with immediate consideration. But in the mean time, the unrestrained fury of the press was continued with the same violence, and the three directors composing the majority declared that it was impossible to conduct the affairs of government. They thought of referring the article 144 of the constitution to this case, which gave the directory a right to issue warrants of arrest against the originators of, or accomplices in, conspiracies formed against the republic. They had therefore to make a tortuous construction of this article, in order to bring the journalists within its meaning. As, however, it was one mode of stopping the outrageous excess of their publications, by seizing their presses and apprehending their persons, the directorial majority, by the advice of Fouché, issued warrants against the authors of eleven journals, and put the seal upon their presses. The ordinance was communicated on the 17th Fructidor (September 3), to the legislative body, and produced strong excitement on the part of the patriots. They cried out against authoritative acts of violence (*coups d'état*), dictatorship, &c.

Such was the state of affairs. In the directory, in the councils, in short, every where, the *moderates* and the *politicians* were in open contest with the patriots. The former had the majority in the directory as in the councils. The patriots were in a minority, but they were sanguine of success, and made noise enough to frighten their adversaries. Fortunately, the means were like the parties, worn out, and on one side as well as the other they were much more likely to cause alarm than do any real mischief. The directory had twice closed the new Jacobin club, and suppressed its journals. The patriots cried out, and made threats, but had neither boldness or numerical force sufficient

to make an attack on the government. In this situation, which had lasted from the 30th of Prairial, that is, for nearly three months, the notion so common on the eve of decisive events—that of a reconciliation, got afloat. Numerous deputies on all sides proposed an interview with the members of the directory, to enable them to explain and come to a good understanding in respect of their mutual grievances. "We are all lovers of liberty," said they, "and are all of us desirous of saving her from the perils to which she is exposed by the defeats of our armies; let us endeavour then to agree together upon the choice of the means, since it is to that selection we impute the only cause of our disunion." The interview took place at the residence of Barras. There is not, and there never can be, any permanent reconciliation between parties, for then they would have to disclaim their object, a thing that never can be effected by a mere conversation. The patriot deputies complained that plots were daily talked of, inasmuch as the president of the directory had himself pointed to a class of dangerous men, and who were meditating the ruin of the republic. They asked to be informed who those men were, in order that they might not be confounded with the patriots. Sieyès, to whom this appeal was addressed, replied by adverting to the conduct of the popular societies and of the journals, and by calling attention to the dangers that would ensue from another anarchy. He was then asked to name the real anarchists, that they might unite against and attack them. "But how can we unite against them," said Sieyès, "when not a day passes but members of the legislative body ascend the tribune to support their doctrines?" "It is us, then, whom you attack," rejoined the deputies, to whom Sieyès had been giving this answer, "When we wish to come to an explanation with you, you abuse and repulse us." They all lost their temper, and left immediately, speaking to one another in much more threatening than conciliatory tones.

Immediately after this interview, Jourdan conceived the idea of an important motion, that of declaring the country in danger. This declaration of course would draw to it the levy *en masse*, and several other grand revolutionary measures. The motion was submitted to the five hundred on the 27th Fructidor (September 13). The moderate party strongly opposed it, alleging that this measure, so far from strengthening, could only weaken the government by exciting exaggerated fears and dangerous agitations. The patriots insisted that some great commotion was required to rouse the public spirit, and save the revolution. This expedient, which was excellent in 1793, could not succeed at the present day, and would have been nothing else than an erroneous application of the past. Lucien Bonaparte, Boulay (of La Meurthe), and Chenier, warmly opposed it, and obtained the adjournment of the question till the following day. The patriots of the clubs had tumultuously surrounded the palace of the five hundred, and insulted several of the deputies. It was reported that Bernadotte, urged on by them, was about to get on horseback, and to put himself at their head, for the purpose of exciting an insurrection. It is certain that several of the firebrands of the party had strongly pressed him to do so. There was reason to fear that he would suffer himself to be drawn into their schemes. Barras and Fouché saw him, and endeavoured to come to an explanation with him. They found him full of resentment against the plans which had been formed, he said, with Joubert. Barras and Fouché assured him that there was nothing of the kind, and got him to keep quiet.

They returned to Sieyès, and agreed to get Bernadotte's resignation from him, so that they should not have to dismiss him themselves! Sieyès in a conversation he had the same day with Bernadotte, induced him to say that he wished soon to return to active service, and that he should consider the command of an army as the most pleasing recompense for his ministry. Instantly interpreting this reply as an application for his removal, Sieyès, Barras, and Roger-Ducos, resolved to write to Bernadotte that his resignation was accepted. They had seized the opportunity while Gohier and Moulins were absent to adopt this determination. On the very next day, the letter to Bernadotte was written. The latter was astounded, and replied to the directory in a very bitter letter, in which he said that they accepted a resignation that he had never sent in, and demanded his superannuation allowance. The intelligence of this falsified resignation reached the five hundred at the moment when that assembly was about to vote on the country being in danger. It caused a very strong sensation. "Some violent state schemes are in preparation," exclaimed the patriots. "Let us swear," said Jourdan, "to die in our curule chairs." "My head shall fall," cried Augereau, "before any outrage shall be committed upon the national representation." At length, after great disturbance, the question was put. Jourdan's motion was negatived by a majority of two hundred and forty-five votes against one hundred and seventy-seven, and the country was not declared in danger.

When the two directors, Gohier and Moulins, were apprized of Bernadotte's dismissal, thus settled without their concurrence, they complained to their colleagues, saying that such a measure ought not to have been adopted without the assent of the five directors. "We formed the majority," replied Sieyès, "and we had a right to do what we have done." Gohier and Moulins immediately paid an official visit to Bernadotte, and they took care to do it in as public a manner as they could.

The administration of the department of the Seine also excited some distrust in the directorial majority, it was changed; Dubois de Crancé succeeded Bernadotte in the war department.

The disorganization of the government was in every respect completed; beaten in their external relations by the allied powers, and nearly turned upside down in their domestic relations by the popular parties, the republic threatened a speedy fall. What was wanted was some controlling power that should arise from some one side or other, either to quell the factions or to withstand the foreign enemy. This controlling and superior power it was in vain to expect from a victorious party, for they were all alike worn out, and in disrepute. Such a power could only derive its birth from the armies, in which absolute power, that power which is silent, regular, and glorious in its operation, truly exists, such indeed as a nation, weary of the agitation of

dissensions and the conflict of opinions may be said to require. Amidst this great dissolution, all eyes were fixed upon those men who had distinguished themselves during the revolution, and seemed to look for some ruling hand; "*We want no more babblers*," Sieyès had once observed, "*we must have a head and a sword*." The head found for it was in the directory. The sword was the thing wanted. Hoche was dead. Joubert, whose youth, excellent disposition, and heroism, recommended him to all the friends of the republic, had just expired at Novi. Moreau, who was deemed the greatest captain among the generals left in Europe, had left on the public mind the impression of a cold indecisive character, without enterprise, and by no means desirous of involving himself in any great responsibility. Masséna, one of our greatest generals, had not yet earned the glory of being our deliverer. Besides, he was looked upon as a soldier and nothing more. Jourdan had just been vanquished. Augereau was a turbulent spirit, Bernadotte of an unsettled disposition, and neither of them had acquired sufficient distinction. There was one very great personage, who exhibited in his own person glory of every description, who to a hundred victories had procured us an advantageous peace, who had raised France to the pinnacle of greatness at Campo-Formio, and who at his departure seemed to have carried his good fortune away with him—this man was Bonaparte; but he was in foreign climes; his name was swelling the echoes of the east. He alone had remained victorious, and caused the banks of the Nile and the Jordan to resound with the war of those thunders with which he had formerly affrighted Europe on the Adige. It was not enough to find him glorious, he must also excite a stronger interest; he was spoken of as exiled by a distrustful and jealous authority. While in the character of an adventurer, he was seeking a career vast as his own imagination, he was considered as an obedient citizen, recompensing by victories the state of exile to which he was condemned. "Where is Bonaparte?" said one to another, "His waning existence is ebbing fast in an unhealthy climate! Ah, were he but among us, the republic would not be threatened with speedy destruction. Europe and the factions would both have to respect it." Indistinct reports gained ground with reference to Bonaparte. Sometimes it was said that victory, faithless to all the French generals, had in her turn abandoned him, in his distant expedition. But no credit attached to such rumours as these. "He is invincible," was the reply; "so far from having experienced reverses, he is marching to the conquest of all the east." Gigantic projects were attributed to him. Some went so far as to assert that he had traversed Syria, and crossed the Euphrates and the Indus; others went so far as to say that he had marched to Constantinople, and that after overthrowing the Ottoman empire, he would turn short round upon Europe. The newspapers were full of these conjectures, which testify how strong a hold this young man had taken on their imagination.

The directory had sent him orders to return, and had got together in the Mediterranean an immense fleet composed of French and Spanish ships to bring the army home*. The general's brothers, who had remained in Paris, and were instructed to convey him intelligence of the state of things, had sent him despatch after despatch to apprise him of the confusion into which the republic had fallen, and to urge his return. But these letters had to cross the seas, and to pass through the English squadrons, and nobody knew whether the hero would be apprised of passing events, and return before the destruction of the republic was effected.

* We must say that this order is a disputed fact. We are aware of a minute of the directory, signed by Treilhard, Barras, and Larévellière, and dated the 7th Prairial, which recalled Bonaparte into Europe. Larévellière, in his memoirs, declares that he possesses no recollection of having given this signature, and treats it as supposititious. Till this is cleared up, the maritime expedition of Bruix will remain unexplained. At any rate, it is certain that the directory at this period were anxious to have Bonaparte, and entertained less apprehensions of his ambition, than of Suwarrow's ferocity. If the order be not authentic, it is in accordance with the fact; and besides all this, it is of no great importance, for Bonaparte was empowered to return whenever he might deem it expedient.

CHAPTER XVIII.

CONTINUATION OF BONAPARTE'S OPERATIONS IN EGYPT.—CONQUEST OF UPPER EGYPT BY DESAIX; BATTLE OF SEDIMAN.—THE SYRIAN EXPEDITION; CAPTURE OF THE FORT OF EL-ARISCH AND JAFFA; BATTLE OF MOUNT TEABOR; SIEGE OF SAINT-JEAN-D'ACRE.—RETURN TO EGYPT; BATTLE OF ABOUKIR.—BONAPARTE LEAVES EGYPT FOR FRANCE.—MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EUROPE.—MARCH OF THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES TO THE RHINE, AND OF SUWARROW INTO SWITZERLAND; MOVEMENT BY MASSÉNA; MEMORABLE VICTORY OF SURICH; SUWARROW'S DANGEROUS SITUATION; HIS DISASTROUS RETREAT; FRANCE SAVED.—EVENTS IN HOLLAND; DEFEAT AND CAPITULATION OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ARMY; HOLLAND EVACUATED.—TERMINATION OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1799.

BONAPARTE, after the battle of the Pyramids, had found himself master of Egypt. He had begun to fortify himself there, and sent his generals into the provinces to complete their conquest. Desaix, placed at the entrance of Upper Egypt, with a division of about three thousand men, was directed to deliver that province from the remains of Murad Bey's forces. It was in Vendémiaire and Brumaire in the preceding year (October, 1798), at the moment the overflowing of the Nile had ceased, that Desaix had set out on his expedition. The enemy had retired before him, and awaited him at Sédiman; it was at that place, on the 16th Vendémiaire, year VII. (October 7, 1798.)

that Dessaix had engaged in an obstinate conflict with the desperate remains of Murad-Bey's army. Not one of the engagements of the French in Egypt was so bloody as this. Two thousand French had to contend with four thousand Mamelukes and eight thousand Fellahs, intrenched in the village of Sédiman. The battle went off in the same way as that of the pyramids, and like all those which were fought in Egypt. The fellahs were behind the walls of the village, and the horse in the plain. Dessaix formed his army in two squares, and had placed on his wings two other small squares, in order to deaden the shock of the enemy's cavalry. For the first time, our infantry was broken, and an opening made in one of the small squares. But by a sudden and admirable instinct, our brave soldiers immediately threw themselves on the ground, that the great squares might be able to fire without hurting them. The Mamelukes, passing over them, charged the great squares with fury for several hours together, and concluded by meeting their death in a state of desperation on our bayonets. As usual, the squares then put themselves in motion to attack the intrenchments, and carried them. During this movement, the Mamelukes, describing an arc of a circle, got at the wounded, whom they killed in cold blood on our rear; but they were soon driven from this field of carnage, and the enraged soldiers put to death a considerable number of them. A greater number of slain had never before strewed a field of battle. The French had lost three hundred men. Dessaix continued his march during the whole winter; and after a series of actions, having reduced Upper Egypt as far as the cataracts, he made himself as terrible by his intrepidity as beloved for his clemency. In Cairo Bonaparte had been called Sultan Kebir, *the Fire Sultan*; in Upper Egypt Dessaix was called *the Just Sultan*.

Bonaparte had, in the meantime, marched to Belbeys, in order to drive Ibrahim Bey back into Syria, and he had picked up by the way the remains of the caravan of Mecca, plundered by the Arabs. Returning to Cairo, he continued to establish there a form of government in every respect French. A revolt, excited in Cairo by the secret agents of Murad Bey, was sternly repressed, and completely disheartened the enemies of the French*. The winter of 1798-1799 thus elapsed, while great events were expected. During this interval, Bonaparte received intelligence of the declaration of war by the Porte, and of the preparations that state was making against him with the assistance of the English. The Porte was providing two armies, one at Rhodes, the other in Syria. These two armies were to be simultaneously brought into action in the spring of 1799, the one by landing at Aboukir, near Alexandria, the other by crossing the desert which separates Syria from Egypt. Bonaparte, instantly sensible of his position, determined, according to his custom, to destroy the enemy's arrangements, and to forestal him by a sudden attack. He could not cross the desert which parts Egypt from Syria in summer, and he resolved to avail himself of the winter for destroying the military gathering forming at Acre, at Damascus, and in the principal towns. The celebrated pacha of Acre, Djezzar, was appointed seraskier of the army collected in Syria. The pacha of Damascus, Abdallah, commanded his advance guard, and had advanced as far as the fortress of El-Arisch, which separates Egypt on that side of Syria. Bonaparte resolved not to delay his operations. He was in communication with the tribes of Lebanon. The Druses*, the Christian tribes, the Mutualis, and the Schismatic Mahometans, offered him assistance, and sincerely welcomed his arrival. By a brisk assault on Jaffa, Acre, and some other badly fortified places, he might in a short time possess himself of Syria, add this fine conquest to that of Egypt, become master of the Euphrates, as he was of the Nile, and thus have under his own control all means of communication with India. His ardent imagination went still farther, and formed some of those schemes of which his admirers in Europe assumed him capable. It was not impossible that by raising the hordes of the Lebanon, he might obtain sixty or eighty thousand auxiliaries, and that with these auxiliaries, supported by twenty-five thousand soldiers, the bravest in the world, he might march against Constantinople, in order to seize upon that city. Were this gigantic project practicable or not, this much is certain, that it formed the sole object of his thoughts; and when it has been seen what, aided by fortune, he actually did perform, no one can venture to pronounce any of his designs the effect of a disordered imagination.

Bonaparte commenced his march in Pluviôse (very early in February), at the head of the divisions under Kléber, Regnier, Lannes, Bon, and Murat, about thirteen thousand strong. Murat's division was composed of cavalry. Bonaparte had raised a regiment of quite a novel description, the dromedary regiment. Two men seated back to back were mounted on each dromedary; and such are the strength and swiftness of those animals, that they can go twenty-five or thirty leagues without stopping. Bonaparte had formed this regiment to give chase to the Arabs who infested the borders of Egypt. This regiment followed the army on the present expedition. Bonaparte had moreover directed rear-admiral Perrée to leave Alexandria with three frigates, and to come to the coast of Syria, for the purpose of conveying thither the siege artillery and ammunition. Bonaparte came up before the fort of El-Arisch on the 29th Pluviôse (February 17). After some slight resistance, the garrison surrendered themselves prisoners, to the number of thirteen hundred men. In this fortress were found considerable stores. Ibrahim Bey, who desired to relieve it, was put to flight; his camp fell into the hands of the French, who found in it an immense booty. The soldiers had to endure severe hardships while crossing the desert; but when they saw their general marching by their side, suffering, in impaired health, the same privations and the same fatigues, they dared not complain. They soon reached Gaza; this fortress was taken before the very eyes of Djezzar-Pacha,

* This event took place the 30th Vendémiaire, year VII. (21st October, 1798.)

* These are a tribe that inhabit the valleys of Mount Lebanon, in Asiatic Turkey; they are governed by their own chief, who is a tributary of the Turkish government. *Trans.*

and they found there, as in the fortress of El-Arisch, a great quantity of ammunition and provisions. From Gaza the army proceeded to Jaffa, the Joppa of antiquity. The army got thither on the 13th Ventôse (March 3). This place was surrounded by a massive wall, flanked by towers. It contained a garrison of four thousand men. Bonaparte caused it to be battered in breach, and then summoned the commandant, whose only answer was cutting off the head of the messenger. The assault was made and the fortress stormed with extraordinary intrepidity, and given up to a thirty hours' pillage and murder. Here also were found a considerable quantity of artillery and provisions of every description. There remained some few thousand prisoners, whom the general could not send off to Egypt, because he had not the ordinary means for escorting them, and whom he was by no means desirous to send back to swell the enemy's ranks. Bonaparte decided upon a terrible measure, and which is the only cruel act of his life. Transported into a barbarous country, he had involuntarily adopted its manners: he put to death in cold blood all the prisoners that remained. The army performed with obedience, but with a sort of horror, the execution that was ordered. It was while staying at Jaffa that our soldiers caught the first infection of the plague.

Bonaparte then advanced upon Saint-Jean-d'Acre, the ancient Ptolemaïs, situated at the foot of Mount Carmel. It was the only place that could now offer a barrier to his progress. Syria was his, if he could carry this fortress. There it was that Djezzar had intrenched himself with all his wealth and a strong garrison. He placed great reliance upon the support of Sidney Smith, who was cruising off that coast, and who furnished him with engineers, artillerymen, and ammunition. Besides, he was shortly to be relieved by the Turkish army collected in Syria, which was advancing from Damascus to cross the Jordan. Bonaparte lost no time in making his attack on this fortress, in order to carry it, as he had done Jaffa, before it was reinforced with fresh troops, and before the English had time to complete its defences. The trenches were immediately opened. Unfortunately, the siege artillery, sent by sea from Alexandria, had been captured by Sidney Smith. All the siege and field-artillery the French possessed consisted of a thirty-two pound carronade, four twelve pounders, eight howitzers, and thirty or so of four pounders. The French had no cannon-balls, but they devised a mode of procuring them. They caused a few horsemen to make an appearance on the beach. Sidney Smith, on observing them, kept up a rolling fire from all the batteries; and the soldiers, to whom five sous were given for each ball, went about and collected them amidst the cannonade and amidst universal laughter.

The trenches had been opened on the 30th Ventôse (March 20). Sanson, general of engineers, in a night survey, thinking he had come to the foot of the rampart, declared that it had neither counterscarp or ditch, and it was therefore conceived that all they had to do was to effect a mere breach, and then proceed to the assault. On the 5th Germinal (March 25), a breach was made, every thing was ready for the assault, but they were stopped by a counterscarp and a ditch. They immediately set about mining. The operation was carried on under the fire of all the ramparts, and of the fine artillery which Sidney Smith had taken from us. He had given Djezzar some excellent English gunners, and Philippeaux, an emigrant engineer officer of distinguished merit. The mine exploded on the 8th Germinal (March 28), and carried away no more than a portion of the counterscarp. Twenty-five grenadiers, headed by young Mailly, went up to the assault. The Turks on seeing that brave officer place a ladder, were frightened; but Mailly fell down dead. The grenadiers were then disheartened; the Turks returned, two battalions which followed were received with a tremendous fire; their commandant, Langier, was killed, and the assault once more became a failure.

Unfortunately for us, the place had just then received a reinforcement of several thousand men, a great number of gunners who practised the European mode of gunnery, and immense supplies of ammunition. This was a heavy siege to be carried on with thirteen thousand men, and almost entirely destitute of artillery. We had to open a new shaft of a mine, and to commence another covered way, before we could blow up the entire counterscarp. It was now the 12th Germinal (April 1). Ten days had we been occupied before the fortress; news arrived of the advance of the grand Turkish army; we had now to carry on our works and to protect the siege, and all with no more than the army allotted to the expedition. The commander-in-chief ordered that we should work without intermission at a fresh mine, and detached Kléber's division towards the Jordan, in order to prevent its being crossed by the army coming from Damascus.

That army, composed of the hordes of the mountains of Naplouse, amounted to about twenty-five thousand men. Its main strength consisted in upwards of twelve thousand horse; it had an immense baggage train, and was commanded by Abdallah Pacha of Damascus. On the 15th Germinal (April 4), it crossed the Jordan at Jacob's bridge. Junot, with Kléber's advanced guard, five hundred strong at most, fell in with the Turkish advanced guards on the road to Nazareth on the 19th (April 8); instead of retreating, he boldly dared the enemy, and formed a square, covered the field of battle with slain, and took five pair of colours. But being obliged to yield to numbers, he fell back upon Kléber's division. The latter was advancing, and was hastening its march to rejoin Junot. Bonaparte apprised of the enemy's force, detached himself with Bon's division to support Kléber, and to fight a decisive battle. Djezzar acting in concert with the army that was coming to raise the siege, would have made a sally, but was so utterly repelled with our fire of grape shot, that he left our works covered with his slain; Bonaparte promptly commenced his march.

Kléber had debouched with his division in the plains that extend at the foot of Mount Tabor, not far from the village of Fouli. He had conceived the idea of surprising the Turkish camp in the night, but had arrived too late to be successful. In the morning of the 27th Germinal (April 16), he found the whole Turkish army in order of battle. Fifteen thousand infantry occupied the village of

Fouli, and more than twelve thousand horse were drawn up in the plain. Kléber had scarcely three thousand infantry in square. The whole of the enemy's cavalry set itself in motion and rushed upon our squares. Never had the French yet seen so many horsemen prancing, charging, and in constant motion. They preserved their accustomed coolness, and receiving them at the muzzle of their guns with a terrible fire, at every charge prostrated a considerable number of their assailants. They had soon formed around themselves a rampart of men and horses, and sheltered by this horrible breastwork, they were enabled to resist for six successive hours the utmost fury of their adversaries. At this moment Bonaparte debouched from Mount Thabor with Bon's division; he saw the plain covered with fire and smoke, and Kléber's brave division defending itself under a line of carcasses. He immediately formed the division which he had brought with him into two squares. These two squares advanced in such a manner as to form an equilateral triangle with Kléber's division, and thus put the enemy between them. They marched on in silence, and without giving any sign of their approach till within a certain distance; Bonaparte then ordered a cannon to be suddenly fired, and immediately made his appearance on the field of battle. A tremendous fire immediately discharged from the three points of this triangle assailed the Mamelukes who were in the midst, made them whirl confusedly round one another, and made them take to flight in a most disorderly manner in every direction. Kléber's division, who gained spirits on witnessing this attack, rushed upon the village of Fouli, carried it at the point of the bayonet, and made a great carnage among the enemy. In a moment the whole multitude vanished, and the plain was left covered with the slain. The Turkish camp, the pacha's three tails, four hundred camels, and an immense booty, became the prey of the French.

Murat, posted on the banks of the Jordan, slew a great number of the fugitives. Bonaparte caused all the villages of the Naplousians to be burned. Six thousand French had destroyed that army which the inhabitants had said could no more be numbered than *the stars in the heavens and the sands on the sea-shore*.

During this interval, there was no end to mining and countermining about the walls of St. Jean d'Acre. A ground turned upside down by the besiegers' art was disputed inch by inch. The French had been six weeks before the place. They had made many assaults, driven back numerous sallies, and killed a great number of the enemy; but, in spite of their constantly maintaining the superiority, they suffered losses in point of time and soldiers that could not be repaired. On the 18th Floréal (May 7), there arrived in the port of Acre a reinforcement of twelve thousand men. Bonaparte, calculating that it would take them at least six hours to land, immediately ordered a twenty-four pounder to play against a considerable portion of wall; this was to the right of the point against which so many exertions had for some time been made. Night came, the breach was mounted, the enemy's works carried and filled up, the guns spiked, and every body in the way slain. The French were at length masters of the place, when the recently landed troops advanced in battle array and exhibited a tremendous mass. Rambaut, who commanded the first grenadiers who mounted to the assault, was killed. Lannes was wounded. At that very moment the enemy made a sally, took the breach in rear, and cut off the retreat of the brave fellows who had made their way inside the fortress; some contrived to make their way back; others, taking a desperate resolution, fled to a mosque, intrenched themselves there, expended their last cartridges, and were prepared to sell their lives as dearly as they could, when Sidney Smith, affected by such bravery, caused a capitulation to be granted them. Meanwhile, the besieging troops marching upon the enemy, drove him back into the place after inflicting on him a frightful carnage, and taking from him eight hundred prisoners. Bonaparte, with a determination of spirit almost amounting to insanity, gave two days' rest to his troops, and on the 21st (May 10), ordered another assault to be made. The men mounted with the same bravery as ever, scaled the breach but could not pass it, the army was there, guarding the place and defending every street. The siege had to be abandoned.

Two months had elapsed while the army had been before Acre; it had sustained considerable losses, and it would have been imprudent to expose it still further. The plague was in that city, and the army had contracted the disorder at Jaffa. The proper time for landing the troops was at hand, and the news came of the arrival of a Turkish army near the mouth of the Nile. If he still persisted in his operations, Bonaparte would so far weaken himself as not to be able to repulse new enemies. The main point of his plan was effected, since he had destroyed the combination of hordes formed in Syria, and had reduced the enemy in that quarter to absolute incapacity. As for the brilliant part of those same plans, as for those vague and illusive hopes of conquests in the east, these he certainly must renounce. He made up his mind at last to raise the siege. But he regretted this so deeply, that notwithstanding his subsequent unparalleled good fortune, he has been frequently heard, when speaking of Sidney Smith, to say; "That man lost me my fortune." The Druses, who during the siege had supplied the army as well as all the tribes hostile to the Porte, received the intelligence of Bonaparte's retreat with despair.

Bonaparte had commenced the siege on the 20th Ventôse (March 20), he raised the siege on the 1st Prairial (May 20th), and it had occupied him for two months. Before quitting Saint-Jean d'Acre, he determined to leave an awful memorial of his expedition; he overwhelmed the town with his fire and left it almost reduced to ashes. He wended his way back by the desert. By the cannonade, hardship, and disease, he had lost nearly one third of his force, that is, about four thousand men. He carried away twelve hundred wounded. He now put himself in marching order once more to traverse the desert. He ravaged the whole country as he went along, and impressed it with the greatest feeling of terror, and arrived at Jaffa, he blew up the fortifications. There was an hospital in that town for the soldiers infected with the plague. To take them with him was impossible:

if they were left behind, they would be exposed to inevitable death, either by the disease, or by famine, or by the cruelty of the enemy. Accordingly Bonaparte told Desgenettes, the physician, that it would be much more humane to give them opium than to continue their existence, to which that physician made this noble reply: "My profession is to cure, not to destroy them." Opium was not administered, and this circumstance served to give rise to an unworthy, but now universally repudiated calumny.

Bonaparte at length reached Egypt after an expedition of nearly three months. It was high time for him to return. The spirit of insurrection had spread throughout the whole Delta. An impostor calling himself the angel El-Mohdhy, who gave out that he was invulnerable, and that he would drive out the French by merely raising a dust, had collected some thousand insurgents. The agents of the Mamelukes gave him their assistance; and he had taken Damanhour and slaughtered the garrison. Bonaparte sent a detachment, which dispersed the insurgents, and killed the invulnerable angel. The disorder had spread to the different provinces of the Delta. His presence produced every where submission and tranquillity. He gave orders for magnificent festivities at Cairo to celebrate his triumphs in Syria. He did not openly allude to that part of his plans which had been foiled, but he boasted, and justly, of the numerous actions fought in Syria, of the glorious battle of Mount Thabor, and of the terrible vengeance that he had wreaked on Djezzar. He issued fresh proclamations to the inhabitants, in which he assured them that he was acquainted with their inmost thoughts, and knew their plans the moment they were formed. They gave implicit belief to these strange assertions of sultan Kebir, and actually believed that he well knew their secret intentions. Bonaparte had to curb not only the inhabitants, but his own generals and the army itself. A deep discontent pervaded it. This discontent proceeded neither from fatigue or from danger, still less from privations, for the army wanted nothing, but from that fondness for his own country which follows the Frenchman go where he will. An entire year had been spent in Egypt, and for nearly six months, they had received no news whatever from France. No ship had been able to reach them; a settled feeling of melancholy preyed upon every heart. There was scarcely a day passed but officers and generals were asking for leave of absence in order to get back to Europe. Bonaparte seldom granted it, or if he did, accompanied it with expressions that were felt as a disgrace. Berthier himself, his faithful Berthier, melancholy from the effect of a long-standing matrimonial engagement, solicited permission to revisit Italy. On the second occasion he was ashamed of his weakness, and declined going. At one time the army had formed the plan of carrying off its colours from Cairo and marching to Alexandria, for the purpose of embarking. But it went no farther than the intention, and durst not oppose its general. Bonaparte's lieutenants, who all set the example of murmuring, were silent in his presence, and submitted themselves to his supremacy. He more than once had high words with Kléber. The ill-temper of the latter was not the consequence of any disheartened feeling, but from his usual peevishness. They were always reconciled, for Bonaparte admired the great soul of Kléber, and Kléber was fully persuaded by the genius of Bonaparte.

It was now Prairial (June). The same ignorance prevailed in the army as to what was going on in Europe, and the unhappiness to which France was subject. All they knew was, that the continent was in a state of real confusion, and that a new war was inevitable. Bonaparte impatiently waited for further particulars, that he might make up his mind as to the course he would pursue, and return, if it were required, to the scene of his early exploits. But before he did so, he wanted to destroy the second Turkish army, collected at Rhodes, the very speedy landing of which was announced.

This army, put on board numerous transports, and convoyed by Sidney Smith's squadron, appeared on the 23rd Messidor (July 11) in sight of Alexandria, and anchored at Aboukir in the same road where our squadron had been destroyed. The place fixed upon by the English for their landing was the peninsula which defends this road, and which bears the same name. This narrow peninsula runs out between the sea and Lake Madieh, and has a fort at its extremity. Bonaparte had ordered Marmont, who commanded at Alexandria, to improve the defences of the fort, and to destroy the village of Aboukir, situated around it. But, instead of destroying the village, they thought it better to keep the place in order to lodge the soldiers there; and it had merely been surrounded by a redoubt to protect it on the land side. But the redoubt not joining on both sides the sea, did not present the appearance of a close work, and put the fort on the same footing as a simple field-work. The Turks, in fact, landed with great boldness, attacked the intrenchments sword in hand, carried them, and made themselves masters of the village of Aboukir, putting the garrison to the sword. The village being taken, the fort could no longer hold out, and it was obliged to surrender. Marmont, who commanded at Alexandria, had issued forth at the head of twelve hundred men to hasten to the assistance of the troops at Aboukir. But learning that the Turks had landed in considerable numbers, he durst not attempt to drive them into the sea by a bold attack. He returned to Alexandria, and left them to quietly take up their position on the peninsula of Aboukir.

The Turks amounted to nearly eighteen thousand infantry. These were not the miserable Fellahs who had composed the infantry of the Mamelukes; these were brave janizaries, carrying a musket without bayonet, slinging it at their back after firing, and rushing pistol and sword in hand upon the enemy. They had a numerous and well-served artillery, and were under the direction of English officers. They had no cavalry, for they had not brought more than three hundred horses; but they expected Murad Bey, who was to leave Upper Egypt, proceed along the desert, cross the oases, and throw himself into Aboukir with two or three thousand Mamelukes.

When Bonaparte was informed of the particulars of the landing, he left Cairo instantly, and made from that city to Alexandria one of those extraordinary marches of which he had given so

many instances in Italy. He took with him the divisions of Lannes, Bon, and Murat. He had ordered Dessix to evacuate Upper Egypt, and Kléber and Régnier, who were in the Delta, to bring themselves nearer Aboukir. He had chosen the point of Birket, midway between Alexandria and Aboukir, in order to concentrate his forces thither, and to manœuvre according to circumstances. He was very fearful lest an English army had landed with the Turks.

Murad Bey, according to the plan settled with Mustapha Pacha, had tried a descent into Lower Egypt; but being met and beaten by Murat, he had been obliged to regain the desert. There was now nothing left but the Turkish army to fight, destitute as it was of cavalry, but yet encamped behind intrenchments, and disposed to stand its ground there with its usual pertinacity. Bonaparte, after inspecting Alexandria and the admirable works executed by colonel Cretin, and after reprimanding Marmont, his lieutenant, who had not dared to attack the Turks at the moment of landing, left Alexandria on the 6th Thermidor (July 24). Next day, the 7th, he was at the entrance of the peninsula. His plan was to enclose the Turkish army by intrenchments, and to await the arrival of all his divisions, for all he had with him were no more than the divisions of Lannes, Bon, and Murat, about six thousand men. But on observing the arrangements made by the Turks, he altered his intentions, and resolved to attack them immediately, hoping to enclose them in the village of Aboukir, and to overwhelm them with bombs and howitzers.

The Turks occupied the furthest end of the peninsula, which is very narrow. They were covered by two lines of intrenchments. Half a league in advance of the village of Aboukir, where their camp was, they had occupied two round sand-hills, supported the one on the sea, the other on Lake Madieh, and thus forming their right and left. In the centre of these two hillocks was a village, which they had likewise kept. They had one thousand men on the hillock to the right, two thousand on the hillock to the left, and three or four thousand men in the village. Such was their first line. The second was at the village of Aboukir itself. It consisted of the redoubt constructed by the French, and was connected with the sea by two trenches. It was there that they had stationed their principal camp and the bulk of their forces.

Bonaparte made his arrangements with his usual promptitude and decision. He ordered general Destaing, with some battalions, to march to the hill on the left, where the one thousand Turks were posted; Lannes to march to that on the right, where the two thousand others were; and Murat, who was at the centre, to make the cavalry file on the rear of the two hillocks. These arrangements were executed with great precision. Destaing marched to the hillock on the left, and boldly climbed it; Murat contrived to get at its rear by a troop of cavalry. The Turks, when they saw this, abandoned their post, fell in with the cavalry, which cut them in pieces, and drove them into the sea, into which they chose rather to throw themselves than to surrender. The same operation was executed on the right. Lannes attacked the two thousand Mamelukes, Murat got at their rear; and they were in like manner cut to pieces and driven into the sea. Destaing and Lannes then moved towards the centre, formed by a village, and attacked it in front. The Turks there defended themselves bravely, relying upon assistance from the second line. A column in fact was detached from the camp of Aboukir; but Murat, who had already filed upon the rear of the village, cut this column in pieces, and drove it back into Aboukir. Destaing's infantry and that of Lannes entered the village at the charge step, driving the Turks out of it, who were driven in all directions, and who obstinately refusing to surrender, had no other retreat than the sea, wherein they were drowned.

Already four to five thousand had perished in this manner. The first line was carried; Bonaparte's object was accomplished, and now, enclosing the Turks in Aboukir, he could bombard them while waiting for the arrival of Kléber and Régnier. But he desired to make the most of his success, and to complete his victory that very moment. After giving his troops a little breathing time, he marched upon the second line. The division under Lanusse, which had been left as a reserve, supported Lannes and Destaing. The redoubt which covered Aboukir was difficult to carry; it had within it nine or ten thousand Turks. On the right, a trench joined it to the sea; on the left, another trench brought it further out; but was not continued quite to Lake Madieh. The open space was occupied by the enemy, and swept by the fire of numerous gunboats. Bonaparte, having accustomed his soldiers to defy the most formidable obstacles, sent them upon the enemy's position. His divisions of infantry marched upon the front and the right of the redoubt. The cavalry, concealed in a wood of palm-trees, had to make the attack on the left, and then to cross, under the fire of the gun-boats, the open space between the redoubt and Lake Madieh. The charge was made; Lannes and Destaing urged forward their brave infantry. The 32nd marched with their pieces on their arms towards the intrenchments, and the 18th got at the rear of the intrenchments on the extreme right. The enemy, without waiting for them, advanced to meet them. They fought hand to hand. The Turkish soldiers, having fired their pieces and their two pistols, drew their flashing sabres. They endeavoured to grasp the bayonets, but received them in their flanks before they could lay hold of them. Thus a great slaughter took place in the intrenchments. The 18th was on the point of getting into the redoubt, when a tremendous fire of artillery repulsed it, and sent it back to the foot of the works. The gallant Letureq fell gloriously, by desiring to be the last to retire; Fugieres lost an arm. Murat on his part had advanced with his cavalry, with a view to clear the space between the fire of the redoubt and Lake Madieh. Several times he had dashed forward, and had turned back the enemy; but taken between the two fires of the redoubt, and that of the gunboats, he had been obliged to fall back on our rear. Some of his horse-soldiers had advanced to the very ditches of the redoubt. The efforts of so many brave fellows appeared likely to be utterly unavailable. Bonaparte looked coolly on this carnage, waiting for a favourable moment to return to

the charge. Fortunately the Turks, as they usually did, quitted the intrenchments for the purpose of cutting off the heads of the slain. Bonaparte seized this opportunity, launched forth two battalions, one of the 22nd, the other of the 69th, which marched upon the intrenchments and carried them. On the right, the 18th also took advantage of this opportunity, and entered the redoubt. Murat, on his side, ordered a fresh charge. One of his divisions of cavalry traversed that most exposed space between the intrenchments and the lake, and made his way into the village of Aboukir. The Turks, affrighted, fled on all sides, and a horrible slaughter of them ensued. They were pressed by the point of the bayonet and driven into the sea. Murat, at the head of his horse, penetrated into the camp of Mustapha Pacha. The latter, in a fit of despair, snatched up a pistol and fired it at Murat, whom he wounded slightly. Murat struck off two of his fingers, and sent him prisoner to Bonaparte. Such of the Turks as were not killed or drowned retired into the fort of Aboukir.

More than twelve thousand corpses were floating in Aboukir bay, which not long ago had been covered by the bodies of our seamen. Two or three thousand had perished by the fire or by the sword. The rest, enclosed by the fort, had nothing to rely upon save the clemency of the conqueror. Such was that extraordinary battle, in which, for the first time perhaps in the history of war, a hostile army was entirely destroyed. It was on this occasion that Kléber, arriving towards the close of the day, clasped Bonaparte round the waist, and exclaimed: "General, you are as great as the world itself!"

Thus, either by the expedition to Syria, or by the battle of Aboukir, Egypt was freed, at least for the time, from the forces of the Porte. The state of the French army might be considered as very encouraging. After all the losses which it had sustained, it still numbered about twenty-five thousand men, the bravest and the best officered in the world. Every day would induce a more cordial feeling between the army and the inhabitants, and would confirm its position. Bonaparte had been there a whole year: arrived in summer before the rising of the Nile, he had employed the first moments in gaining possession of Alexandria and the capital, which he had secured by the battle of the Pyramids. After the rising of the water and in autumn, he had completed the conquest of the Delta, and confided that of Upper Egypt to Desaix. In winter he had undertaken the expedition to Syria, and destroyed Djezzar's Turkish army at Mount Tabor. He had now, in summer, just destroyed the second army of the Porte at Aboukir. Thus the time had been occupied in the best manner possible; and while victory abandoned in Europe the banners of France, she remained faithful to them in Africa and in Asia. The tri-coloured flag waved triumphant over the Nile and the Jordan, even over the places from whence the Christian religion had issued to spread its influence over the world.

Bonaparte as yet knew not what was going on in France. None of the despatches from the directory or from his brothers had ever reached him: he was in a state of the most anxious suspense. With a view to obtain some intelligence, he ordered brigs to cruise about with orders to stop all merchantmen, and to procure from them some information as to the events which were taking place in Europe. He sent to the Turkish fleet an officer to parley, who under the pretext of negociating an exchange of prisoners, was to do his best to procure intelligence of some description or other. Sidney Smith detained this officer, treated him exceedingly well, and perceiving that Bonaparte was ignorant of the calamities that had befallen France, gratified a malicious pleasure by sending him an entire file of newspapers. The messenger returned and delivered the packet to Bonaparte. The latter spent the whole night in devouring the contents of those papers, and informing himself of what was passing in his own country. No sooner did he know than he made up his mind what to do: he resolved to sail secretly for Europe, and to attempt the passage at the risk of being captured on the way by the English cruisers. He sent for rear-admiral Gantheaume, and gave him orders to get the *Muiron* and the *Carrère* frigates ready for sea. He communicated his intentions to no one, and he hastened to Cairo to make all his arrangements, drew up a long set of instructions for Kléber, with whom he purposed to leave the command of the army, and set out on his return to Alexandria without losing an instant.

On the 3rd Fructidor (August 22), taking with him Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Andréossy, Marmont, Berthollet, and Monge, and escorted by some of his guides, he repaired to an open and exposed but retired part of the coast. Some boats had been got ready; they stepped into them, and went on board the *Muiron* and *Carrère* frigates. These were accompanied by *La Revanche* and *La Fortune* xebecs*. They instantly set sail, so that by daylight they might be out of sight of the English cruisers. Unfortunately it fell calm; great anxiety being felt lest they should be surprised, it was proposed to return to Alexandria; Bonaparte would not consent to this. "Be quiet," said he, "we shall give them the go by." Like Cæsar, he relied upon his good fortune†.

This was not, as it has been called, a cowardly flight, for he left a victorious army, to defy dangers of every description; and the most horrible of all, imprisonment in London. It was one of those rash acts by which men of inordinate ambition tempt Heaven, and to which they afterwards owe that unbounded confidence, which alternately elevates and hurls them from their exalted state.

While the fate of such a man as this was thus committed to the chances of the winds or of a meeting with the enemy, victory waited on our banners in Europe, and the republic extricated itself by a sublime effort from the perils to which we have just seen her exposed. Masséna was all the time on the line of the Limmat, deferring the moment of resuming the offensive. The army of Italy, after losing the battle of Novi, had dispersed itself in the Apennines. Fortunately, Suwarrow secured no greater advantages by

* A vessel used on the Mediterranean, pointed at both ends, with three masts, and impelled by sails and oars. *Trans.*

† Cæsarem vehis et fortunam ejus. *Trans.*

the victory of Novi than he did by the battle of the Trebbia, and lost in Piedmont that time of which France was making use in preparing herself. At this moment, the aulic council, as inconstant in its schemes as the directory had been, devised a plan which could not fail to change the aspect of events. The aulic council was jealous of the authority that Suwarrow had wanted to exercise in Italy, and observed with vexation that this general had written to the king of Sardinia, to recall him to his dominions. The aulic council had its own views upon Piedmont, and was on the stretch to detach the old marshal from that country. Besides all this, the Russians and the Austrians were not on the best terms with each other; and all these reasons put together made the aulic council effect a complete change in the distribution of the troops upon the line of operation. The Russians were intermixed with the Austrians on the two theatres of the war. Korsakow was operating in Switzerland with the archduke Charles, and Suwarrow with Mélas in Italy. The aulic council were for transferring the archduke to the Rhine, and Suwarrow to Switzerland. In this manner the two Russian armies would both of them have to conduct their operations in Switzerland. The Austrians would have to act by themselves on the Rhine; and they would also have to solely conduct their operations in Italy, where they were to be soon reinforced by a new army, provided to supply the deficiency left by Suwarrow. The aulic council assigned as a reason for this change, that it was more expedient to let the troops of each nation fight together; that the Russians would find in Switzerland a temperature more analogous to their own climate, and that the movement of the archduke Charles to the Rhine would assist the expedition to Holland. England could not fail to approve of this plan, for she entertained great expectations on this head as well as in respect of the expedition to Holland, and also upon the presence of the archduke on the Rhine, and she was not sorry that the Russians, who had already entered Corfu, with the intent to seize Malta, should be sent off to a distance from Genoa.

This shifting and changing, executed before Masséna's eyes, was extremely dangerous, and besides, it transferred the Russians to a theatre of war not so suitable to their habits. These soldiers, accustomed to charge in the plain and with the bayonet, were not expert in the use of the musket, nor, what is particularly desirable in mountain warfare, expert sharpshooters. The aulic council, acting in the very spirit of cabinets, postponed political reasons to military considerations, forbade its generals to urge a single objection, and issued orders for the strict execution of this plan in the middle of Fructidor (the latter end of August).

We have already described the configuration of the theatre of war*, and the mode in which the armies were distributed therein, and the waters issuing from the High Alps, and sometimes running in the form of rivers, and at others collected in the form of lakes, presented different lines one with another, commencing on the right, against a great chain of mountains, and ending on the left in that great river which separates Germany from France. The two principal rivers were those of the Rhine and the Limmat. Masséna, compelled to abandon that of the Rhine, had fallen back upon that of the Limmat. He had even been compelled to retire a little behind the latter, and to support himself upon the Albis. The line of the Limmat did not the less separate the two armies. This line was composed of the Linth, which rises among the High Alps in the canton of Glaris, and then falls into the Lake of Zurich; of the Limmat, which issues from that very lake, and falls into the Aar in the neighbourhood of Brügg. The archduke Charles was behind the Limmat, from Brügg to Zurich. Korsakow was behind the Lake of Zurich, waiting till a position was assigned him. Hotze was keeping the Linth.

According to the plan agreed upon, the position of the archduke, whose appointment had been for the Rhine, was to be taken behind the Limmat by Korsakow. Hotze was to remain upon the Linth, with the Austrian corps of Voralberg, so as to assist Suwarrow on his march from Italy. The question was, what route should Suwarrow take. He had to cross the mountains, and might follow one or the other of the lines which intersect Switzerland. Should he prefer making his way by the valley of the Rhine, he might, by crossing the Splugen, get to Corre to the Upper Rhine, and there form his junction with Hotze. It had been calculated that he might get thither about the 25th of September (3rd Vendémiaire, year VIII.) This movement would possess the advantage of being conducted at a great distance from, and entirely out of the reach of the French, and thus of ensuring its independence of any accident. Suwarrow might with equal propriety take another route, and instead of following the line of the Rhine, enter the valley of the Reuss by the Saint-Gothard, and debouch by Schwytz behind the line of the Linth, occupied by the French. This march had the advantage of bringing him upon the back of the enemy's line; but in that case he would have to cross the Saint-Gothard, occupied by Lecourbe; it would be necessary also to prepare a movement of Hotze beyond the Linth, that he might be able to assist the army coming from the Saint-Gothard; in order to second this movement, there would have to be made an attack upon the Limmat; in one word, a general operation on the whole line, with a harmony and precision so seldom attained, when acting at such great distances and in such numerous detachments. This plan, which the Russians cast upon the Austrians, and the Austrians fling back upon the Russians, was nevertheless preferred. Consequently a general attack on the whole line was ordered for the latter end of September. At the moment when Suwarrow should debouch from the Saint-Gothard into the valley of the Reuss, Korsakow was to make his attack below the Lake of Zurich, that is, along the Limmat, and Hotze above

* With every desire to make myself fully understood, I hardly expect to make the reader comprehend the details I am about to relate, if he does not place before him while reading this, some map, no matter whether it be very finished or not. However, these events are so extraordinary, and have in so absolute a manner been the means of saving France, that I consider them worthy of forming part of the present history. The most imperfect map of Switzerland will be quite sufficient to enable the reader to understand at a glance the scene of the operations.

the lake and along the Linth. Two of Hotze's lieutenants, Linken and Jellachich, were to make their way into the canton of Glaris, as far as Schwytz, and assist Suwarrow. The general junction once effected, the troops assembled in Switzerland would amount to eighty thousand men. Suwarrow was coming up with eighteen thousand; Hotze had twenty-five, Korsakow thirty. This latter had in reserve the division of Condé and some thousand Bavarians. But, before the junction could be effected, thirty thousand under Korsakow, and twenty-five thousand under Hotze, that is to say, fifty-five thousand, would find themselves exposed to the attacks of Masséna's entire army.

In point of fact, the moment when the archduke Charles was quitting the Limmat, and before Suwarrow had yet crossed the Alps, was too favourable for Masséna to let pass, and not shake off the inaction which had cost him so much animadversion. His army had been increased by the reinforcements which it had received to about seventy-five thousand men; but it had to extend itself from Saint-Gothard to Bâle, an immense line to cover. Lecourbe, forming his right, and having Gudin and Molitor under his command, guarded the Saint-Gothard, the valley of the Reuss, and the Upper Linth, with twelve or thirteen thousand men. Soult, with ten thousand, occupied Linth up the point where it flows into the Lake of Zurich. Masséna, with the divisions under the command of Mortier, Klein, Lorge, and Mesnard, forming a total of thirty-seven thousand men, was in front of the Limmat, from Zurich to Brügg. Thureau's division, nine thousand strong, and Chabran's division, of eight thousand, guarded, one the Valais and the other the environs of Bâle.

Masséna, though inferior in force, had the advantage of being able to concentrate his principal mass on the essential point. Thus he had in front of the Limmat thirty-seven thousand men whom he could launch against Korsakow. The latter had recently diminished his strength by four thousand men sent as a reinforcement to Hotze behind the Lake of Zurich, which reduced it to twenty-six thousand. Condé's division and the Bavarians, who were to avail Korsakow as a reserve, were still far behind Schaffhausen. Masséna was therefore in a situation of launching forth thirty-seven thousand men against twenty-six thousand. Korsakow beaten, he could then turn against Hotze, and then putting both to the rout, perhaps destroying them, overwhelm Suwarrow, on his coming into Switzerland with the expectation of finding the enemy in that quarter reduced, or at least confined within its line.

Masséna, apprized of the enemy's plans, arranged his general attack for one day in advance, and fixed it for the 3rd Vendémiaire (September 25, 1799). Ever since he had retired to the Albis, a few paces beyond the Limmat, the course of that river belonged to the enemy; he would have to take it from the enemy by effecting a passage across; this was what he proposed to effect with his thirty-seven thousand men. While he was about conducting his operations below the Lake of Zurich, he directed Soult to operate above it, and to cross the Linth that same day. Military critics have considered Masséna to blame in one instance; he should, they say, have rather drawn Suwarrow into Switzerland, than to have kept him away; if, therefore, instead of leaving Lecourbe to fight in vain at the Saint-Gothard against Suwarrow, Masséna had joined him with Soult, he would have been in a far better condition to overwhelm Hotze and to cross the Linth. At any rate, as the result obtained was as great as could be wished, this animadversion upon Masséna's conduct has been made strictly with regard to rules of art.

The Limmat issues from the Lake of Zurich at Zurich itself, and divides the town into two parts; in conformity with the plan concerted with Hotze and Suwarrow, Korsakow made his arrangements for attacking Masséna, and for this purpose he had transferred the mass of his forces to that part of Zurich which is in advance of the Limmat. He had left no more than three battalions at Kloster-Fahr, to guard a point where the Limmat is more accessible: he had sent off Durasof with a division in the direction of the point where the Limmat flows into the Aar, to watch that quarter, but his main body, at least eighteen thousand strong, was in advance of the river, in a commanding situation.

It was upon this state of things that Masséna founded his plan. He resolved to mask rather than attack the point of Zurich, where Korsakow had collected the mass of his forces; next, with a considerable portion of his troops, to attempt the passage of the Limmat at Kloster-Fahr, a point but weakly defended. The passage effected, he purposed that this division should go up along the Limmat on the opposite bank, so as to station itself on the rear of Zurich. He then intended to attack Korsakow on both banks, and to keep him shut up in Zurich itself. The most important consequences might be the result of these arrangements.

Mortier, with his division, which was eight thousand strong, and occupied the right of this field of battle, was sent off to Zurich. The object was first to keep off and next to attack the Russian mass. Klein, with his division, consisting of ten thousand men, was to be placed at Altstetten, between the point of Zurich and that of Kloster-Fahr, where the passage was to be attempted. This division would be thus able either to proceed before Zurich and assist Mortier against the Russian mass, or hasten to the point of crossing, assuming that support was required. This division comprised four thousand grenadiers and a reserve of superb cavalry. The division under Lorge, with part of the division under Mesnard, were to effect the passage at Kloster-Fahr. This mass comprehended nearly fifteen thousand men. The remainder of Mesnard's division had to make hostile demonstrations on the Lower Limmat, to deceive and detain Durasof.

These arrangements, which have been universally admired by military critics, were carried into execution at five in the morning of the 3rd Vendémiaire year VIII. (September 25, 1799.) The preparations for the passage had been made near the village of Dietikon, with extraordinary caution and secrecy. Boats had been dragged to the spot by hand, and concealed in the woods. Very early in the morning they were afloat, and the troops drawn up in silence on the bank. General Foy, since distinguished as a public speaker, commanded the artillery in this ever memorable battle; he arranged several batteries in such a manner as to protect the pas-

sage. Six hundred men boldly embarked, and reached the opposite bank. They rushed immediately upon the enemy's riflemen and dispersed them. Korsakow had posted three battalions, with cannon, on the elevated plain (*plateau*) of Kloster-Fahr. Our artillery, more skilfully directed, soon silenced the fire of the Russian artillery, and protected the successive passage of our advanced guard. When general Gazan had united a sufficient reinforcement with the six hundred men who had first crossed, he marched upon the three Russian battalions guarding Kloster-Fahr. These had posted themselves in a wood, and made a most gallant defence. Gazan surrounded them, and was obliged to kill them almost to the last man before he could dislodge them. These three battalions being destroyed, a bridge was thrown across. The remainder of Lorge's division and part of Mesnard's passed the Limmat. Fifteen thousand men were now beyond the river. Bontemp's brigade was placed at Regensdorf, to confront against Durasof, if he should attempt to ascend the Lower Limmat. The bulk of the troops, directed by Oudinot, chief of the staff, marched up the Limmat, for the purpose of proceeding to the rear of Zurich.

This part of the operation being accomplished, Masséna returned to the other side of the Limmat, to superintend the movement of his wings. Towards the Lower Limmat, Mesnard had so completely deceived Durasof by his demonstrations, that the latter had posted himself upon the bank and opened all his fire on the right. Mortier had advanced upon Zurich by Wollishofen, but he had fallen in with Korsakow's main body, posted, as we have seen, in the advance of the Limmat, and had been obliged to fall back. Masséna coming up at that moment, despatched Klein's division, which was at Altstetten. Humbert, at the head of his four thousand grenadiers, marched to Zurich and restored the fight. Mortier renewed his attacks, and thus the French succeeded in enclosing the Russians in Zurich.

Meanwhile, Korsakow, mortified at hearing cannon in his rear, transferred several battalions to the other side of the Limmat; but this inefficient relief had proved useless. Oudinot, with his fifteen thousand men, continued to ascend the Limmat. He had taken the little camp placed at Hong; he had also taken the heights which are in the rear of Zurich, and possessed himself of the high road to Winterthur, which affords an outlet into Germany, and was the only one by which the Russians could retreat.

The battle was almost over, and most important results were to be the consequence of the next day's proceedings. The Russians were pent up in Zurich; Masséna had moved fifteen thousand men upon their rear by means of the passage of Kloster-Fahr, and placed eighteen thousand in their front. He could scarcely fail of making them experience a reverse. It had been conceived that, instead of leaving Klein's division before Zurich, he should have sent it by Kloster-Fahr, to the rear of that town, to intercept completely the road to Winterthur. But he was apprehensive lest if Mortier were left with eight thousand men only, Korsakow might rush upon his division and drive him into the Linth. Korsakow, it is true, would have fallen in with Soult and Lecourbe; but he might also have met with Suwarrow coming from Italy, and no one knows what might have resulted from this singular combination.

Korsakow had at last become fully sensible of his position, and had moved his troops into the other part of Zurich behind the Limmat. Durasof, on the Lower Limmat, on hearing of the passage, had stolen away; and avoiding Bontemp's brigade by a circuit, had regained the road to Winterthur. Next day, the 4th Vendémiaire (September 26), the battle would certainly be most obstinately contested, since the Russians were determined to cut their way through, and the French also were desirous of rearing fresh trophies. The battle commenced at an early hour. The unhappy town of Zurich, encumbered with artillery, carriages, and wounded, attacked on all sides, was enveloped, as it were, in fire. On this side of the Limmat, it was attacked and ready to be stormed by Mortier and Klein. On the other, Oudinot pressed it in the rear, and purposed to cut off Korsakow's retreat. This road to Winterthur, the scene of a sanguinary conflict, had been several times taken and retaken. Korsakow, preparing at length to retreat, had placed his infantry in the van, his cavalry in the centre, his artillery and his carriages in the rear. In this manner he advanced, forming a long column. His brave infantry, charging with fury, overthrew all before it, and opened a way for itself; but when it had passed, with part of the cavalry the French returned to the charge, attacked the rest of the cavalry and the baggage, and drove them back to the gates of Zurich. At the same moment, Klein and Mortier entered the town on their side. The distinguished and unfortunate Lavater was struck by a ball at the door of his house, by a drunken Swiss soldier who presented his musket at him to extort money; he fell severely wounded in the thigh, which caused his death some months after.

All who remained in Zurich were obliged to lay down their arms. One hundred pieces of cannon, all the baggage, the public papers, the chest of the army, and five thousand prisoners, fell into the hands of the French. Korsakow had, moreover, eight thousand men put out of fighting order in this obstinate engagement. Eight and five made a loss of thirteen thousand men, that is to say, of half his army. The great battles in Italy had not presented more extraordinary results. The consequences for the rest of the campaign were not likely to be less important than the material results. Korsakow, with thirteen thousand men at most, hastened to regain the Rhine.

In the mean time, Soult, who was sent to cross the Linth above the Lake of Zurich, executed his commission with no less success than the commander-in-chief. He had effected the passage between Bilten and Reichenburg. One hundred and fifty brave fellows, holding their muskets over their heads, swam across the river, reached the opposite bank, cleared it of the riflemen, and protected the landing of the advanced guard. Hotze, who had hastened immediately to the point of danger, was killed on the spot by a ball, and his death had thrown the Austrian ranks into confusion. Petrasch, who succeeded Hotze, endeavoured but in vain to throw the corps that had passed into the Linth; he was obliged to fall back, and made a precipitate retreat to Saint-Gall and the Rhine, leaving three thousand

prisoners and some cannon. Generals Jellachich and Linken, despatched by the Upper Linth to the canton of Glaris, to meet Suwarrow at the outlet of the Saint-Gothard, had on their part retired, when they received intelligence of all these disasters. Thus nearly sixty thousand men were already driven from the line of the Limmat beyond that of the Rhine, after suffering severe losses. Suwarrow, who expected to debouch in Switzerland on the flank of an enemy, attacked on all sides, and to decide the defeat of that enemy by his arrival, was doomed to find, on the contrary, all his lieutenants dispersed, and himself in the midst of an army victorious in every quarter.

Leaving Italy with eighteen thousand men, Soult had reached the foot of the Saint-Gothard on the fifth complementary day of the year VII. (September 21, 1799.) He had been obliged to dismount his cossacks, and to load their horses with his artillery. He sent Rosenberg with six thousand men to get at the back of the Saint-Gothard by Disentis and the Crispalt. Arriving on the 1st Vendémiaire (September 23) at Airolo, at the entrance of the narrow pass of the Saint-Gothard, he there found Gudin with one of the brigade of Lecourbe's divisions. He fought with the most determined obstinacy; but his soldiers, bad marksmen, having no notion of anything but advancing and fighting till they were killed, fell in whole platoons under the fire and stones.

He determined at length to annoy Gudin on his flank, and thus obliged him to yield the pass as far as the hospital. Gudin had, by his resistance, given Lecourbe time to collect his troops. The latter having only six thousand men at hand, was unable to resist Suwarrow, who was coming up with twelve thousand, and Rosenberg who, having already reached Urseren, had six thousand on his rear. He threw his artillery into the Reuss, then gained the opposite shore by climbing almost inaccessible rocks, and penetrated into the valley. Having got beyond Urseren, and having Rosenberg no longer on his rear, he broke down the Devil's bridge, and killed a great number of the Russians before they had cleared the precipice by descending into the bed of the Reuss and ascending the opposite bank. Lecourbe had thus retreated foot by foot, availing himself of all obstacles to harass Suwarrow's soldiers, and to cut them off one by one.

Thus the Russian army arrived at Altorf, at the extremity of the valley of the Reuss, exhausted with fatigue, in want of provisions, and extremely weakened by the losses which it had sustained. At Altorf, the Reuss falls into the Lake of Lucerne. If Hotze, according to the plan agreed upon, had been able to push forward Jellachich and Linken beyond the Linth as far as Schwytz, he would have sent boats to the mouth of the Reuss to receive Suwarrow. But, after the events which had just occurred, Suwarrow found himself without a single boat, and pent up in a frightful valley. It was the 4th Vendémiaire (September 26), a day generally disastrous all along the whole line. He had, therefore, no other resource than to throw himself into the Schachenthal, and to cross tremendous mountains where there was no beaten track, for the purpose of penetrating into the valley of the Muthenthal. He set out on the following day. Only one man could pass at once along the path that he had to pursue. The army took two days to travel the distance of a few leagues. The first man had reached Mutten before the last had yet quitted Altorf. The precipices were covered with carriages, horses, soldiers dying from either famine or fatigue. On reaching the Muthenthal, Suwarrow might debouch by Schwytz, not far from the Lake of Zurich, or yet ascend the valley, and throw himself by the Bragel upon the Linth. But, on the side next to Schwytz, Masséna was coming with Mortier's division, and on the other side of the Bragel was Molitor, who occupied the defile of the Kloenthal, towards the banks of the Linth. After allowing his troops two days' rest, Suwarrow resolved to fall back by the Bragel. On the 8th Vendémiaire (September 30) he commenced his march; Masséna attacked him in rear, while Molitor met him from the other side of the Bragel at the defile of Koenthal. Rosenberg bravely withstood all Masséna's attacks, but Bagration, in the van, made vain efforts to force his way through Molitor. He opened the Glaris road for himself, but could not clear that of Wesen. Suwarrow, after engaging in sanguinary and destructive conflicts, cut off from all the roads, and driven back upon Glaris, had no other resource than to ascend the valley of Engi, and to throw himself into that of the Rhine. But this route was still more frightful than that which he had already traversed. He nevertheless made up his mind to take it, and, after four days of unparalleled efforts and hardships, reached Coire and the Rhine. Out of his eighteen thousand men, he had saved scarcely ten thousand. The Alps were strewed with the bodies of his soldiers. This barbarian, styled invincible, retired overwhelmed with confusion and swelling with rage. In the course of a fortnight, more than twenty thousand Russians and five or six thousand Austrians had fallen. The armies ready to invade us were expelled from Switzerland, and driven into Germany. The alliance was dissolved; for Suwarrow, exasperated against the Austrians, would not serve them any longer. We may say, France was saved.

Perpetual honour to Masséna, who managed to execute one of the most admirable operations whereof the history of the war has made mention, and who had saved us at a more perilous crisis of affairs than even that of Valmi and Fleurus! Battles are entitled to our admiration when they exhibit vastness in either their conception or political result; but those that save a nation are more particularly to be regarded with honour. We owe admiration to the former, gratitude to the latter. Zurich is the brightest gem in Masséna's crown of glory, and there is not a military crown that can exhibit one more brilliant.

While these auspicious events were taking place in Switzerland, victory once more returned to us in Holland. Brune, faintly pressed by the enemy, had found time to concentrate his forces, and after beating the Anglo-Russians at Kastrikum, had pent them up at Zyp, and reduced them to capitulate. The conditions were the evacuation of Holland, the restitution of all that they had taken at the Helder, and the unconditional enlargement of eight thousand prisoners. The restitution of the Dutch fleet would have been very desirable; but this was refused by the English, and fears were entertained of the mischief which they

might do to the country if the capitulation were rejected.

Thus terminated this memorable campaign of 1799. The republic, having hurried too soon into action, and committing the error of taking the offensive before she had concentrated her forces, had been beaten at Stockach and at Magnano, and lost by these two defeats Germany and Italy. Masséna, left alone in Switzerland, formed a dangerous salient angle between two victorious masses. He had fallen back upon the Rhine, then upon the Limmat, and lastly upon the Albis. There he had made himself impregnable for four months. In this interval, the army of Upper Italy had been beaten at the Trebbia. A junction being afterwards effected with that army in the rear of the Apennines, then rallied and reinforced, it had lost its general at Novi, had been again defeated, and had conclusively lost Italy. The Apennines were even invaded by the enemy, and the Var threatened. But this was the terminating point of our disasters. The alliance, shifting its forces, had transferred the archduke Charles to the Rhine, and Suwarrow to Switzerland. *Masséna* seizing this moment, had destroyed Korsakow, thus deprived of the assistance of the archduke, and put to flight Suwarrow, who could no longer be supported by Korsakow. *Masséna* had thus compensated for our misfortunes by a splendid victory. In the East, brilliant triumphs had concluded the campaign. But it must be confessed, that if these great exploits had upheld the republic when ready to fall, if they had shed over her some additional lustre, they had by no means imputed to her either her greatness or her power. France was saved, but no more than saved; she had not yet recovered her rank, and her situation was even perilous on the Var.

CHAPTER XIX.

BONAPARTE'S RETURN; HIS LANDING AT FRÉJUS; THE ENTHUSIASM INSPIRED BY HIS PRESENCE.—THE AGITATION THAT PREVAILED AMONG THE PARTIES ON HIS ARRIVAL.—HE FORMS A COALITION WITH SIEYÈS TO EFFECT THE DESTRUCTION OF THE DIRECTORIAL CONSTITUTION.—EVENTS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE OCCURRENCES OF THE XVIIITH BRUMAIRE.—ABOLITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE YEAR III.; INSTITUTION OF A PROVISIONAL CONSULATE.—THE CONCLUSION OF THE PRESENT HISTORY.

THE intelligence of the battle of Zurich, and of the capitulation of the Anglo-Russians, followed each other in rapid succession, and calmed the perturbed excitement of the public mind. It was the first time that these detestable Russians had been beaten, and so completely beaten were they, that the utmost satisfaction could not but prevail. But yet Italy was for ever lost, the Var threatened, the southern frontier in danger. We had not yet been restored to the grandeur of Campo-Formio. At all events, the greatest perils were not now to be apprehended from without, but from within. A disorganized government, and factious parties, who would not submit to authority, and who, nevertheless, were not strong enough to obtain the upper hand; and every where a kind of social dissolution, and robbery, a sign of that dissolution, infesting the high roads, especially in the provinces formerly rent by civil war,—such was the state of the republic. A respite of a few months being ensured by the victory of Zurich, it was not so much a defender that was needed at this moment as a chief who should seize the reins of government. The entire mass of the population desired above every other consideration, tranquillity, good government, an end of mutual bickerings, and an unity of purpose. The people as a mass dreaded the Jacobins, the emigrants, the Chouans, and all popular parties. This was the witching time for him who should be able to allay all these apprehensions.

The despatches containing the details of the expedition to Syria, and the battles of Mount Tabor and Aboukir, produced an extraordinary effect, and confirmed this idea, that the hero of Castiglione and Rivoli would remain conqueror wherever he made his appearance. His name was again in every body's mouth, and the questions, *What is he doing? when will he come?* were every where repeated. What if he should return! it was said. By a singular and involuntary movement, a report that he had actually arrived twice or thrice got wind. His brothers had written to him, and so had his wife; but it was not known whether these despatches had ever come to his hand. In point of fact, as we have seen, there was no getting them past the English cruisers.

In the mean time, that man who was the object of such extraordinary anxiety, was quietly ploughing the sea in the midst of the English squadrons. The passage was not prosperous, and was prolonged by contrary winds. More than once the English had been seen, and great fear was entertained lest he should become their prey. He alone, pacing the deck of his ship with calm and serene look, confided in his star, taught himself to confide therein, and not vainly alarm himself as to danger that could not be avoided. He read the Bible and the Koran, works of the nations which he had just quitted. Fearing lest, after the recent events, the south of France should be invaded, he had steered, not for the coast of Provence, but for that of Languedoc. He was for landing at Collioure or Port Vendre. A gale had driven him to Corsica. The whole island hurried to welcome their renowned fellow-countryman. He then sailed for Toulon. He had nearly arrived thither, when all at once, about sunset, thirty sail of the enemy were seen to larboard; they were plainly perceptible amidst the rays of the setting sun. It was proposed to put a boat out to sea, and to stealthily come to land. Still, ever confiding in his destiny, Bonaparte said that he would wait awhile. In fact, the enemy disappeared; and on the 17th

Vendémiaire, year VIII. (October, 1799), at daybreak, the frigates *La Muiron*, *La Carrère*, and the xebecs *La Revanche* and *La Fortune*, came to an anchor in the Gulf of Fréjus.

The inhabitants of Provence had, for three successive years, been in constant dread of an invasion by the enemy. Bonaparte had freed them from this apprehension in 1796, but it had recurred more powerfully than ever since the battle of Novi. On learning that Bonaparte had anchored off the coast, they imagined that their deliverer had arrived. All the inhabitants of Fréjus hurried out, and in a moment the sea was covered with boats. A multitude, highly excited by enthusiasm and curiosity, stormed the vessels, and breaking through all the sanatory regulations, communicated with the new comers. All enquired for Bonaparte, all wanted to see him. This was no time for enforcing sanatory regulations. The board of health was obliged to dispense with the general's performing quarantine, for in that case it must have condemned the whole population, which had already communicated with the crews, to the same restraint. Bonaparte immediately went ashore, and resolved to set out the same day for Paris.

The telegraph, speedy as the wind itself, had already spread along the road from Fréjus to Paris the grand news that Bonaparte had arrived. This intelligence had caused a great and confused outburst of joy. The news, proclaimed in all the theatres, had produced an extraordinary impression there. The singing of patriotic hymns had in every instance been substituted for the theatrical representations. The deputy Baudin, (of the Ardennes,) one of the framers of the constitution of the year III., a discreet and staunch republican, passionately attached to the republic, and looking on it as utterly lost if some powerful arm were not stretched forth to save it—Baudin (of the Ardennes) died of joy on receiving intelligence of this event.

Bonaparte had set out that same day, the 17th Vendémiaire (October 9), for Paris. He had passed through Aix, Avignon, Valence, and Lyons. In all these cities the enthusiasm was unbounded. There was ringing of bells in the villages, and at night bonfires on the roads. At Lyons, in particular, the impression produced was more vivid than any where else. On leaving the latter city, Bonaparte, who wished to arrive incognito, took a different route from that which he had mentioned to his couriers. His brothers and his wife, misled by his directions, were travelling to meet him while he was entering Paris. On the 24th Vendémiaire (October 16), he was already in his own house, in the Rue Chantereine, before any one had the least notion of his arrival. Two hours afterwards he repaired to the directory. The guard recognized him, and shouted, on seeing him, *Bonaparte for ever*. He hastened to the president of the directory, who was Gohier. It was settled that he should be presented to the directory on the following day. In fact, he was the next day, the 25th, ushered into the presence of the supreme magistracy. He said that, after confirming the establishment of his armies in Egypt by the victories of Mount Tabor and Aboukir, and confiding it to the care of a general well able to ensure its prosperity, he had set out to fly to the succour of the republic, which he believed to be undone. He had found it saved by the exploits of his brethren in arms, and at this he rejoiced. Never, he added, putting his hand to his sword, never would he draw it but in defence of that republic. The president congratulated him on his triumphs and on his return, and gave him the paternal embrace. The reception was apparently most cordial, but at bottom apprehensions of a serious nature began to arise, and were too strongly justified by circumstances to render his return a matter of congratulation to the five republican magistrates.

Now when men are roused at last from a long insensibility, and attach themselves to any particular object, it is with strong feeling. In that void into which opinions, parties, and all the authorities had fallen, every body had for some time been without having their attention absorbed in any one particular object. An universal disgust was felt for men and things as they then stood. But, on the appearance of that extraordinary individual whom the East had restored to Europe in so unexpected a manner, all feelings of disgust, all uncertainty was at an end. It was on him alone that all eyes, all aspirations, and all hopes, were instantly fixed.

All the generals, employed or not employed, patriots or moderates, all flocked round Bonaparte. This was nothing else than natural, since he was the first member of that most ambitious and most discontented class. In him that class seemed to have found an avenger against the government. All the ministers, all the functionaries who had been dismissed one after the other during the fluctuations of the directory, flocked also round the new comer. In appearance they went to visit the illustrious warrior, but in reality to observe and to flatter that man who seemed to have a control over the future.

Bonaparte had brought with him Lannes, Murat, and Berthier, who never left him. It was not long before Jourdan, Augereau, Macdonald, Beurnonville, Leclerc, Lefebvre, and Marbot, notwithstanding differences of opinion, showed themselves on his side. Moreau himself soon formed part of this assembly. Bonaparte had met him at Gohier's. Sensible that his superiority permitted him to make the first advances, he went up to Moreau, expressed his anxiety to make his acquaintance, and testified a personal respect for him, which deeply affected him. He afterwards presented him with a Damascus sword, enriched with precious stones, and contrived to gain him over entirely to his side. In a few days, Moreau was an attendant at his levee. He also was discontented, and went with all his comrades to visit the reputed avenger. To these illustrious warriors were added men embarked in every career of life. Among these were to be observed Bruix, ex-minister of the navy, who had just been scouring the Mediterranean, at the head of the French and Spanish fleets, a man of acute and subtle mind, quite as capable of conducting a negotiation as of commanding a squadron. There also might be observed M. de Talleyrand, who had reason to fear the displeasure of Bonaparte for not having gone with him to Egypt. But M. de Talleyrand relied upon his talents, his reputation, and his importance, as ensuring him a favourable reception; and he was not disappointed. The tastes

of these two men were too closely allied, and they had too much need of each other's friendship to be otherwise than on good terms with one another. There was also to be seen in the Rue Chantereine, Roederer, formerly *procureur* of the commune, a man full of frankness and intelligence, as well as Regnault de Saint-Jean d'Angely, an old constituent, to whom Bonaparte had attached himself in Italy, and whom he had employed at Malta, a brilliant and a fertile *orator*.

But it was not merely those who were in disgrace and the discontented who repaired to Bonaparte's. The present heads of the government also made their appearance there with the same anxiety to pay him attention. All the directors and all the ministers gave him entertainments, as on his return from Italy. A great number of the members of the two councils procured themselves to be introduced to him. The ministers and the directors paid him far more flattering homage. They came every moment to consult him as to what they had to do. Dubois Crancé, the minister at war, had in some measure transferred his portfolio to Bonaparte. Moulins, that director who particularly occupied himself with the department of war, generally spent part of his morning with him. Gohier and Roger-Ducos went thither also. Cambacérès, minister of justice, an able lawyer, who possessed that inclination for Bonaparte that weak men have towards men of strong minds, and whom Bonaparte affected to caress, to prove that he could appreciate merit in a civilian. Fouché, minister of the police, who wanted to exchange his declining patron Barras for a new and powerful protector; Réal, commissary for the department of the Seine, a warm and generous patriot, and one of the most intelligent men of his time, paid all of them equal court to Bonaparte, and conversed with him on affairs of state. The general had scarcely been eight days in Paris, before the superintendence of affairs was almost involuntarily referred to him. Instead of the expression of his will, which as yet was nothing, he was asked for his opinion. On his part, he affected, with his usual reserve, to withdraw himself from the attentions so assiduously rendered him. He was not accessible to many persons, and he showed himself but little, and went abroad only, as it were, by stealth. His face had become thinner, and his complexion darker. He wore since his return a gray frock coat, and a Turkish sabre, fastened by a silken cord. To those who had been fortunate enough to obtain a sight of it, this was an emblem that called up the associations of the east, the Pyramids, Mount-Tabor, and Aboukir. The officers of the garrison, the forty adjutants of the national guard, and the staff of the place, desired to be presented to him. He delayed from day to day, and seemed to subject himself with reluctance to all this exterior respect. He listened, kept his opinion to himself, and observed every thing closely. This was deep policy. When a man becomes needful, he need not be afraid of having to wait. This excites the impatience of people; they flock about you; and you have nothing to do than to make your own election.

What course will Bonaparte take? was the common question of the day. It proved that there was something to be done that could not be avoided. Two principal parties, and a third, a subdivision of the two others, offered themselves to him, and were disposed to serve him if he adopted their views; these were the patriots, the moderates or politicians, and lastly, the rotten ones (*pourris*), as they were called—the corrupt of every time and every faction.

The patriots certainly mistrusted Bonaparte and his ambition; but with their habitude of distrust, and their heedlessness for the morrow, they would rather have availed themselves of his arm to overturn every thing, without giving themselves much concern for the future. At any rate, these were only the notions of none other than those furious madmen, who, always dissatisfied with things as they are, consider destructiveness as the most important of all affairs. The rest of the patriots, those who might be called the republicans, took umbrage at the renown of the general, wished at most that a place should be given him in the directory, and even saw with pain that for this purpose a dispensation on account of age would have to be granted him, and in particular were above all things desirous that he should go to the frontiers to restore the glory of our arms, and to reinstate the republic in its former splendour.

The *moderatists* or *politicians*, persons who were in fear from the fury of the parties, and especially of the Jacobins, having nothing to hope from a violated and worn-out constitution, wanted a change, and wished that it should be effected under the auspices of some mighty man. "Accept absolute authority, ordain us a wise and mild constitution, and let us have security"—such was the language which they addressed to Bonaparte in private. These persons composed the most numerous party in France. It included even a great number of compromised patriots, who, having their fears for the revolution, were anxious that the commonwealth should be confided to some powerful individual. They possessed the majority in the council of ancients, but were considerably in the minority in the five hundred. They had up to this point attached themselves to the highest civil renown, that of Sieyes, and they more particularly adhered to him ever since he had been abused at the Ride. But at this time they must needs run after Bonaparte with far greater solicitude, for it was power (*force*) that they were looking for; and absolute power existed more essentially in a victorious general than it ever could in a political writer, how illustrious soever he might be.

Lastly, the corruptionists (*pourris*) comprehended the whole crew of those dishonest intriguers who were striving to make their fortune, who had sullied their character in effecting this purpose, and who still contained in the same dirty practices for the same object. These were in the train of Barras and the minister of police, Fouché. There were to be found among them Jacobins, moderatists, and even royalists. They could hardly be said to form a party, but rather a numerous set.

We must not add to this catalogue of parties the advocates of royalty. They were too insignificant since the 18th Fructidor, and besides, they had nothing to expect or hope from Bonaparte. Such a man could only look to himself, and could not accept the supreme power, merely to transfer it to others. They therefore contented themselves with

dding themselves to the opponents of the directory, nd to vilify it in much the same language adopted y all the popular parties.

Among these different parties, Bonaparte had nly one choice to make. The patriots did not uit him at all. Some, well content with the present state of things, distrusted his ambition; others ere wishing for some sudden and great act, and hen what never-ending agitation there would be; nd nothing could be relied upon with regard to he patriots. Besides, they were not in accordance vith the spirit of the time, and were fast expiring. The corruptionists (*pourris*) were nought, they ere nothing, save in the government, into which hey had naturally insinuated themselves, for it is hither their aspirations are always directed. At ny rate, he had nothing to do with them, but ather to let them alone; they would certainly go ver to him who should get most chances in his avour, because they wanted to retain possession of oth places and money. The only party on which Bonaparte could support himself was that which, dentifying itself with the requisitions of the ntire population, was desirous of protecting the epublic from the factions, by imparting to it a olid constitution. In this consisted all hope for he future, and it was on this side that he ought to leclare himself.

His selection could not be long protracted. He ad involuntarily settled it in his own mind beforeand. Bonaparte had a horror of turbulent, and was disgusted with corrupt men. He never could ring himself to regard other than those well-conitituted persons who wished some one to govern 'or them; in other words, the nation itself. But e had yet to wait, to permit himself to be first addressed by the popular parties, and to keep an eye upon their leaders, in order to discover with whom it would be most prudent to form an alliance.

The popular parties were all of them represented in the directory. The patriots had for their representatives, as we have already observed, Moulins and Gohier. The corruptionists (*pourris*) had Barras. The politicians or moderatists had Sieyès and Roger-Ducos.

Gohier and Moulins, staunch and well-intentioned patriots, more moderate than their party, because they were in power, admired Bonaparte; but having no desire to avail themselves of his military services, save to maintain the glory of the constitution of the year III., they were desirous of sending him to the armies. Bonaparte treated them with great respect; he esteemed their honesty, for he always regarded that virtue in others (a natural self-interested inclination in a man born to govern). Besides, the respect he entertained for such persons afforded him the opportunity of demonstrating his esteem for genuine republicans. His wife was intimate with the wife of Gohier. She truly appreciated also her husband's situation, and had observed to Madame Gohier, "My intimacy with you will be a reply to all idle assertions."

Barras, who felt his political end approaching, and who beheld in Bonaparte a man who would certainly take his place, thoroughly detested him. He would have submitted to flatter him as formerly, but he felt that he was more than ever despised by him, and he kept aloof from him. Bonaparte entertained for this ignorant, inflated, corrupt epicurean, an aversion that daily became insurmountable. The name of '*pourris*' (rotten, thoroughly corrupt), which he had given to him and those about him, sufficiently proved his disgust and contempt. He could hardly have ever consented to ally himself with him.

There yet remained that really important person, namely, Sieyès, drawing in his train Roger-Ducos. In calling Sieyès to the directory at the crisis of the 30th Prairial, it would seem as if it had been intended that every thing should be surrendered to him. Bonaparte owed him somewhat of a grudge for having taken the first place in his absence, for having made himself the object of general attention for a moment, and for having raised hopes. He felt a prejudice against him which he never explained. Although they were both very much opposed to each other in talents and inclinations, they nevertheless possessed sufficient elevation of mind to understand one another, and make mutual allowances for each other, but they both possessed too much pride to make mutual concessions. Unfortunately, they had not yet spoken to each other; and two great minds which have not paid each other mutual compliments, instinctively become hostile. They closely observed one another, and each expected that the other would make the first advances. They met at dinner at Gohier's. Bonaparte had felt himself sufficiently Moreau's superior to make the first advances; he thought that he could not do so towards Sieyès, and did not speak to him. The latter exhibited the same reserve. They retired in a rage. "Did you notice that little insolent fellow?" said Sieyès, "he never even saluted the member of a government that ought to have had him shot." "What could have possessed folks," said Bonaparte, "to put that priest into the directory? He is sold to Prussia, and unless you look sharp, he will betray you to her." Thus, in men of the highest qualifications, pride gets the better even of policy. If at any rate it were otherwise, they would no longer possess that elevation which renders them fit to bear rule.

Thus the personage whom it particularly concerned Bonaparte to gain, was the very man for whom he felt the greatest aversion. But their interests were so identical, that they were soon, in spite of themselves, about to be propelled towards one another by their own partisans.

While they were thus measuring each other, and the number of attendants at Bonaparte's levee were constantly multiplying, the latter still uncertain what course he ought to take, had sounded Gohier and Ducos, to ascertain whether they would consent to his being director, notwithstanding he had not attained the requisite age. His object was to make way for himself in the directory by displacing Sieyès. By excluding Sieyès, he should become master of his other colleagues, and be assured of governing in their name. This certainly was far from perfectly succeeding in his object; but it was a means of arriving at supreme power without exactly effecting a revolution; and once having attained supreme power, he should have time to survey his position. Whether he was sincere, or whether he meant to deceive them, as is very possible, and to

persuade them that his ambition was limited to a place in the directory, he sounded them, and found them most peremptory in their objections in reference to age. A dispensation, though given by the councils, appeared to them an infraction of the constitution. He was, therefore, obliged to abandon this idea.

The two directors, Gohier and Moulins, beginning to feel uneasy on account of the strong inclination Bonaparte manifested for political offices, and were thinking how they could get rid of him by giving him the command of an army. Sieyès by no means concurred in this, and said, with his usual moroseness, that so far from affording him occasion to acquire fresh glory, they ought, on the contrary, to forget him, and to cause him to be forgotten. There was some talk of sending him to Italy, when Barras said that he had managed matters so well for himself that he was by no means anxious to return thither. At length it was settled that they should send for him, and invite him to take a command, leaving it to himself to make his election what army he would take.

Bonaparte, being summoned, repaired to the directory. He understood well enough what had been insinuated by Barras. Before the cause of his summons thither had been notified to him, he opened the conversation in a high and threatening tone, alluded to the insinuation of which he had to complain, and looking Barras full in the face said, that if he had made his fortune in Italy, at least it had not been made at the expense of the republic. Barras made no reply. Gohier, the president, replied to Bonaparte, that the government was persuaded that his laurels were the only fortune he had made in Italy. He then told him that the directory invited him to take a command, leaving it to himself to choose the army he would prefer to command. Bonaparte answered coldly, that he had not yet rested sufficiently from his fatigues; that the transition from a dry to a moist climate had severely tried his constitution, and that he needed a little more time to regain his health. He retired without further explaining himself. Such an act as this necessarily apprized the directors of his views, and at the same time gave him intelligence of their distrust.

This was quite enough to induce him to lose no time: his brothers, his intimate advisers, Roederer, Réal, Regnault de Saint-Jean d'Angély, Bruix, and Talleyrand, brought to him every day members of the moderate and political party in the councils. These were, in the five hundred, Boulay (of La Meurthe), Gandin, Chazal, Cabanis, Chénier; in the ancients, Cornudet, Lemercier, Fargues, and Daunou. All were of opinion that he should ally himself with the true party, the reforming party, and coalesce with Sieyès, who had a constitution ready made, and the majority in the council of the ancients. Bonaparte was of just the same opinion, and felt sensible that he had no power of selection; but he must first be reconciled with Sieyes, and this was a difficult matter. However, the interests in question were so great, and so delicate and so expert were the negotiators between his pride and that of Sieyès, that the coalition could not fail of being effected. M. de Talleyrand would have conciliated far more offensive pride than existed in either of these two men. The negotiation was soon opened and concluded. It was agreed that a more powerful constitution should be given to France under the auspices of Sieyès and Bonaparte. Without going fully into the form and nature of that constitution, it was impliedly agreed that it should be republican, but that it should deliver France from what both of them termed the "speechifiers" (*bavards*), and allot to those two master minds, now in close alliance, the greatest preponderance in public in the conduct of affairs.

A systematizer dreaming of the long-deferred accomplishment of his conceptions, an ambitious man seeking to rule the world, were, in the centre of that nothingness of all system and all power, eminently calculated to coalesce. Their mutual antipathy of temper was of little consequence. The adroitness of the negotiators, and the importance of the interests, sufficed to palliate that inconvenience, at least for a moment; and one moment was quite enough for effecting a revolution.

Bonaparte was, therefore, determined to act with Sieyès and Roger-Ducos. He still testified the same aversion for Barras, the same respect for Gohier and Moulins, and preserved the same reserve with all three. But Fouché, who well knew how to worship the rising sun, perceived with the utmost regret the aversion Bonaparte entertained for his patron Barras, and was vexed when he observed that Barras did nothing towards counteracting that aversion. He had entirely made up his mind to go over to the camp of the new Cæsar; but hesitating from a slight remnant of shame to desert his protector, he would rather have drawn him along with him. Paying constant attention to Bonaparte, and not unfavourably received because he held the portfolio of the police, Fouché did his utmost to overcome Bonaparte's repugnance for Barras. He was seconded by Réal, Bruix, and the other advisers of the general. Conceiving that he had succeeded, he got Barras to invite Bonaparte to dinner. Barras sent him an invitation for the 8th Brumaire (October 30th), which Bonaparte accepted. After dinner, a general conversation took place as to politics. Bonaparte and Barras waited till one of them opened the conversation. Barras first entered upon the subject. He began with making some general remarks upon his personal situation. Hoping no doubt that Bonaparte would contradict him, he told him that he was ill, worn out, and compelled to resign all participation in business. Bonaparte still being silent, Barras added, the republic was disorganized, that it was necessary to ensure its salvation, to centralize the supreme power, and to appoint a president; and he then named general Hédouville as a fit person to be chosen. Hédouville was as unknown as he was unfit. Barras wished to conceal his thoughts, and named Hédouville, in order to avoid making mention of himself: "As for you, general," added he, "your intention is to proceed to the army; go, and there acquire further glory, and reinstate France in her proper rank. As for me, I am going to seek that retreat of which I have now so much need." Bonaparte looked hard at Barras, made no reply, and there the conversation dropped. Barras, dumbfounded, added not another word. Bonaparte immediately retired, and before he left the Luxembourg, went to the apartments of Sieyès. He went on purpose to declare to him

directorial constitution.—State of popular feeling at this period, and the circumstances that induced the call of Bonaparte to the consulate, and the abolition of the directorial constitution.

most explicitly that his desire was to act with him alone, and that they had only to settle the means of execution. The alliance was sealed at that interview, and they agreed to prepare every thing for the 18th or the 20th Brumaire.

On his return home, Bonaparte found there Fouché, Réal, and the friends of Barras; "Well," said he to them, "what do you think your friend Barras has proposed to me? why, to appoint a president, who was to be Hédouville, meaning himself all the time; and as for me, I was to pack off to the army. There is nothing to be done with such a man." The friends of Barras were anxious to cure the effects of this awkwardness, and did all they could to excuse him. But Bonaparte did not urge the matter, and diverted the conversation, for he had made up his mind. Fouché immediately called on Barras to call him to account, and to prevail on him to go and counteract the effect of his absurd conduct. The first thing next morning Barras hied away to Bonaparte, to excuse himself for the language of over-night, and tendered his devotions and his co-operation in all that the general might think fit to attempt. Bonaparte did not believe him, replied in general terms, and talked, in his turn, of his fatigues, of his impaired health, and of his being disgusted with men and public business.

Barras saw that he was lost, and felt that he had no further part to play. It was indeed time that he should reap the reward of his double intrigues, and his base turncoat acts. The ardent patriots would have no more to do with him since his conduct towards the club at the Ride; the republicans attached to the constitution of the year III. possessed no other feeling towards him than contempt and distrust. The reformers and the politicians looked upon him in no other light than as a man who had forfeited everybody's esteem, and applied to him the term rotten or thoroughly corrupt (*pourri*), an expression which originated with Bonaparte. All the resources that Barras still had left him were some intrigues with the royalists by means of certain emigrants concealed in his court. These intrigues were of long standing. They had commenced as far back as the 18th Fructidor. He had communicated them to the directory, and got himself authorized to prosecute them, so that he might have in his hands the groundwork of counter-revolution. He had thus adroitly obtained the means of betraying at will either the republic or the pretender. There was a sort of treaty on foot at this moment with this last-named personage as to furnishing a sum of several millions [francs] to assist him in his return. It is very possible, after all, that Barras was not sincere with the pretender, for all his inclinations must certainly have been identified with the republic. But to correctly ascertain what this old corruptionist really preferred would be a hard matter. In all probability he himself scarcely knew what partialities he entertained. Besides, at such a pitch of corruption, a little money will unfortunately prevail against the strongest inclinations of private bias or opinion.

Fouché, in despair to see his patron undone, mortified above all to find himself compromised in his disgrace, renewed his attentions to Bonaparte. The latter, who exceedingly mistrusted such a man, carefully concealed from him all his designs; but Fouché, nothing discouraged, for he saw that Bonaparte was certain of success, resolved to overcome his chilling behaviour by dint of services. He had the police; he conducted it skilfully, and he knew that conspiracies were forming in every quarter. He was cautious not to communicate this fact to the directory, the majority of which, composed of Moulins, Gohier, and Barras, might in consequence of his discoveries have adopted a determination adverse to the conspirators.

It was now about a fortnight that Bonaparte had been at Paris, and almost every thing was already prepared. Berthier, Lannes, and Murat, were daily gaining the officers and the generals. Among these, Bernadotte out of jealousy, Jourdan from attachment to the republic, and Augereau from Jacobinism, had hung back, and had communicated their apprehensions to all the patriots of the five hundred; but the mass of the military men was gained. Moreau, a staunch republican, but suspected by the patriots who were the dominant party, dissatisfied with the directory, which had so ill rewarded his talents, had no other refuge than Bonaparte. Caressed and won by him, and by no means unwilling to bear a superior, he declared that he would second all his projects. He had no wish to be let into the secret, for he had a horror of political intrigues, but he desired to be called in at the moment of execution. There were in Paris the 8th and 9th dragoons, which had formerly served under Bonaparte in Italy, and were devoted to him. The 21st light infantry, organized by him, when he commanded the army of the interior, and which had once reckoned Murat in its ranks, was quite as devoted to his cause. These regiments were constantly soliciting permission to pass in review before him. The officers of the garrison and the adjutants of the national guard were likewise asking to be presented to him, and had not yet received his assent. He postponed this, desiring to make this introduction subservient to his plans. His two brothers, Lucien and Joseph, and the deputies of his party, were daily making fresh acquisitions in the councils.

An interview with Sieyès was fixed for the 15th Brumaire, in order to settle the plan and the means of carrying it into execution. On that same day the councils were to give a banquet to Bonaparte, as had been done on his return from Italy. This was not, as on the former occasion, an entertainment given by the councils in their official character. The thing had been proposed in secret committee; but the five hundred, who, on the first moment of his landing, had chosen Lucien president, with a view to do honour to the general in the person of his brother, were now distrustful, and refused to order a banquet. It was then decided that it should be given by subscription. At any rate, the number of the subscribers was from six to seven hundred. The feast took place in the church of St. Sulpice; every one was cold and silent; all were most circumspect in their behaviour, and maintained the utmost reserve. It was very plain that some great event was expected, and that it would be effected by a part of those who attended the banquet. Bonaparte was silent and abstracted. This was but natural, since he was, on leaving, to go and determine the place and hour of a conspiracy. The dinner was hardly over

before he rose, took a turn with Berthier round the tables, addressed a few words to the deputies, and then precipitately withdrew.

He repaired to Sieyès, to make his final arrangements with him. There it was that they first agreed upon the mode of government to be adopted in the place of the existing government. It was resolved that the councils should be suspended for three months; that the five directors should be superseded by three provisional consuls, who, during these three months, should exercise a kind of dictatorship, and be commissioned to frame a constitution. Bonaparte, Sieyès, and Roger Ducos, were to be the three consuls. The next thing they did was to find the means of carrying this design into execution. Sieyès had a certain majority in the ancients. As there was always a set of floating reports imputing incendiary projects to the Jacobins, the device was to invent an accusation against them of intending to commit an outrage upon the national representation. The commission of the inspectors of the ancients, wholly at the disposal of Sieyès, was to propose to transfer the legislative body to Saint-Cloud. In point of fact, the constitution authorized the council of ancients to do this. That council was, in addition to that measure, to perform another act, which was not authorized by the constitution, and that was to confide the office of protecting this translation of the government to a general of its selection, that is to say, to Bonaparte. The ancients were to invest him at the same time with the command of the 17th military division, and of all the troops cantoned in Paris. With these forces, Bonaparte was to escort the legislative body to Saint-Cloud. There it was expected that they would be able to control the five hundred, and to extort from them the decree of a provisional consulate. Sieyès and Roger Ducos were, on that same day, to hand in their resignation as directors. It was proposed to intimidate Barras, Gohier, and Moulins, into giving in their resignations. Then the directory would thus be disorganized by the dissolution of the majority; they would then go to the five hundred with the statement that there no longer existed a government, and compel them to name the three consuls. This plan was perfect in its conception; for it is always necessary, when a revolution is to be effected, that the illegality of a proceedure should be cloaked as far as is practicable, to make use of constitutional terms to destroy a constitution, and make the members of a government subservient to its abolition.

The 18th Brumaire was fixed for getting up the decree of translation of the government, and the 19th for the decisive sitting at St. Cloud. The task was divided. The decree of translation, and the managing matters so as to obtain it, were confided to Sieyès and his friends. Bonaparte undertook to have the armed force in readiness, and to lead the troops to the Tuileries.

Every thing being resolved upon, they parted. Wherever one went nothing was heard but that a great event was ready to burst forth. This had been the case on previous occasions. No revolutions are successful, save those which can be foreseen. Fouché, moreover, took good care not to forewarn the three directors who had nothing to do with the conspiracy. Dubois-Crancé, notwithstanding his deference for the high intelligence of Bonaparte in matters of war, was a warm patriot; he got scent of the plan, and ran to denounce it to Gohier and Moulins, but he obtained no credence. They believed that some ambitious project might demonstrate itself, but had no idea of a conspiracy ready to break out. Barras plainly perceived a great movement was about to take place; but he was sensible he was undone whichever way things went, and he basely resigned himself to the course of events.

The commission of the ancients, over which the deputy Cornet presided, had directions to prepare every thing in the night between the 17th and 18th for getting the decree of translation passed. The shutters were closed, and the window-curtains drawn, that the public might not be apprized by the lights that the commission were occupied during the night. Care was taken to summon the council of the ancients for seven o'clock, and that of the five hundred for eleven. According to this arrangement, the decree of translation ought to be passed before the five hundred commenced their sitting; and as all debate was prohibited by the constitution at the moment when the decree of translation was promulgated, the tribune of the five hundred would be closed by this promulgation, and all awkward discussions prevented. Another thing was provided for; that was, to delay sending off the letters of summons for certain deputies. This ensured the certainty that those who were distrusted would not arrive till after the vote had been given.

Bonaparte, on his side, had taken every necessary precaution. He had sent for colonel Sebastiani, who commanded the 9th dragoons, to assure himself of the inclinations of the regiment. That regiment was composed of four hundred foot and six hundred horse. It contained many young soldiers, but it derived its character and bearing from the veterans of Arcola and Rivoli. The colonel answered to Bonaparte for the regiment. It was agreed that the colonel, on pretence of a review, should leave his barracks at five o'clock, distribute his men, part in the Place de la Révolution, and part in the garden of the Tuileries, and that he himself, with two hundred horse, should occupy the Rue Mont-Blanc and the Rue Chantereine. Bonaparte then sent word to the colonels of the other regiments of cavalry, that he would review them on the 18th; as an excuse for appointing such a time, he intimated he was about to take a journey. He sent to appoint Moreau and all the generals to be in the Rue Chantereine at the same hour. At midnight, he dispatched an aide-de-camp to Lefebvre, to beg him to call upon him at six in the morning. Lefebvre was entirely devoted to the directory, but Bonaparte felt fully assured that he would not stand out against his ascendancy. He had not given any previous intelligence either to Bernadotte or Angereau. He had taken care, in order to put Gohier completely off his guard, to invite himself to dine with him on this same 18th, with all his family; and at the same time, in order to induce him to send in his resignation, he had, by his wife, requested him to come the next morning at eight o'clock to take breakfast with him in the Rue Chantereine.

On the morning of the 18th, a great stir, totally

unexpected, even by those who were mainly concerned in causing it, was very visible on all sides. A numerous cavalry passed along the Boulevards; all the generals and officers in Paris proceeded in full uniform to the Rue Chantereine, little thinking to meet such a crowd as they would find when they got thither. The deputies of the ancients hurried to their post, astonished at receiving such short summonses. The five hundred were for the most part perfectly unconscious of what was about to be done. Gohier, Moulins, and Barras, knew nothing about the matter; but Sieyès, who had for some time been taking lessons in riding, and Roger Ducos, were already on horseback and on their way to the Tuileries.

As soon as the ancients had met, the chairman of the commission of the inspectors addressed them. The commission appointed to watch over the safety of the legislative body had, he said, received intelligence that some dangerous conspiracies were in agitation; that conspirators were coming in shoals to Paris, were there holding clandestine and secret meetings, and were there designing some outrage upon the freedom of the national representation. The deputy Cornet added, that the council of the ancients had the means of saving the republic entirely in its own power, and that it ought to avail itself of them. These means were nothing else than in translating the legislative body to Saint Cloud, so as to render it less exposed to the attempts of the conspirators, and in the meantime place the public tranquillity under the protection of a general who had the ability of performing this duty, and to select Bonaparte as general for that purpose. The reading of this proposition and of the decree which comprehended it had hardly been completed before a certain movement manifested itself in the council. Some members were determined to oppose this proposition; Cornudet, Lebrun, Fargues, and Regnier, supported it. The name of Bonaparte, on which great stress had been laid, and of whose support they felt assured, decided the majority. At eight o'clock the decree was passed. This decree translated the councils to St. Cloud, and summoned them to meet on the following day at noon. Bonaparte was appointed commander-in-chief of all the troops comprised in the 17th military division, of the guard of the legislative body, of the guard of the directory, of the national guards of Paris and of the environs. Lefebvre, the commandant of the 17th division, was placed under his command. Bonaparte was ordered to appear at the bar to receive the decree, and to take the oath the president was to administer to him. A state messenger was directed to convey the decree to the general without loss of time. The state messenger, who himself was the deputy Cornet, found the Boulevards blocked up by a vast body of cavalry, and the Rue du Mont-Blanc and the Rue Chantereine crowded with officers and generals in full uniform. All of them were making all possible haste to attend general Bonaparte's invitation. As the reception rooms of the latter were too small to receive so great a concourse, he ordered the doors to be thrown open, went out on the balcony, and harangued the officers. He told them that France was in danger, and that he relied upon them to assist him in saving her. The deputy Cornet at this point handing him the decree, he snatched it out of his hand, read it out loud to them, and asked if he could reckon upon their support. The reply was by all of them, putting their hands to their swords, and saying, that they were ready to stand by him. He likewise addressed himself to Lefebvre. The latter, seeing the troops in motion, without orders from him, had asked colonel Sebastiani what all this meant, who, without replying, had told him to go in and enquire of general Bonaparte. Lefebvre went in, somewhat discomposed. "Well, Lefebvre," said Bonaparte to him, "you, one of the main stays of the republic, will you suffer it to perish in the hands of these *lawyers*? (*avocats*.) Unite with me in assisting me to save her. Hold," added Bonaparte, holding out a sword, "there is the sword which I wore at the battle of the Pyramids; I present it to you as a token of my esteem and my confidence." "Yes," replied Lefebvre, with deep emotion, "let us throw the *lawyers* overboard." Joseph had brought round Bernadotte; but the latter seeing what was going on, withdrew to put the patriots on their guard against them. Fouché was not in the secret; but apprized by the event, he had given orders for closing the barriers, and had countermanded the departure of the mail and public conveyances. He then came in all haste to tell Bonaparte, and to tender his declaration of attachment to his cause. Bonaparte, who had hitherto neglected him, did not give him a rebuff on this occasion, but told him that his precautions were useless; that there was no necessity for closing the barriers or causing a suspension of the ordinary course of things; that he was going hand in hand with the nation, and reckoned upon its supporting him. Bonaparte at this moment learnt that Gohier refused to attend his invitation; he exhibited a slight degree of anger on hearing this, and sent him word by a mutual friend, that he would ruin himself in vain by desiring to hold out. He immediately mounted his horse to proceed to the Tuileries, and to take the oath before the council of the ancients. Almost all the republican generals were on horseback by his side. Moreau, Macdonald, Berthier, Lannes, Murat, and Leclerc, rode behind him as his lieutenants. Arrived at the Tuileries, he there found the detachments of the 9th; he harangued them, and having fully excited their enthusiasm, went into the palace.

He presented himself before the ancients, accompanied by this magnificent staff. His presence produced a lively sensation, and proved to the ancients that they had associated themselves with a powerful man, who possessed all the means requisite for ensuring success to a necessary and violent act of state policy (*coup d'état*). He made his appearance at the bar. "Citizens, representatives," said he, "the republic was on the eve of destruction; your decree will be the means of saving her. Woe to those who seek to prevent its being fully carried out! Aided by all my companions in arms here assembled around me, I shall know how to be beforehand with them. In vain can historical parallels be cited to cause you anxiety; there is no historical parallel to the eighteenth century, and nothing that has occurred in the present century bears any resemblance to the acts that attend its close. We are determined to have the republic. We

will have that republic based upon genuine liberty, and upon the representative system. We will have that republic; I swear it in my own name and in the name of my companions in arms." "We all of us swear it," repeated the generals and the officers who were at the bar. The way in which Bonaparte took the oath was very well managed, inasmuch as he had evaded swearing fealty to the constitution. A deputy would have spoken for the purpose of remarking this; but the president refused to hear him, on the ground that the decree of translation prohibited all discussion whatever. The assembly immediately broke up. Bonaparte then went into the garden, mounted his horse, accompanied by all the generals, and reviewed the regiments of the garrison as they each of them came up. He made a short and energetic speech to the soldiers, telling them that he was going to effect a revolution which would restore them to plenty and glory. Shouts of *Long live Bonaparte!* came from the ranks. The weather was very fine for the season, the concourse very great. Everything seemed to lend appliances to that most necessary enterprise, that was now to put an end to the disorder that had prevailed by creating an absolute power.

At this moment the five hundred, apprised of the revolution that was now being got up, had repaired in a disorderly manner to the hall in which they held their session. No sooner had they assembled, when they received a message from the ancients containing the decree of translation. On hearing it read, a multitude of voices burst forth at once; but the president, Lucien Bonaparte, soon put them to silence by virtue of the constitution, which prohibited further discussion. The five hundred broke up immediately; the most fiery of them ran off to each other's houses, and held clandestine meetings to vent their indignation in common, and to devise some means of opposition. The patriots of the faubourgs were in a high state of ferment, and got together as many of their party as they could to rally tumultuously around Santerre.

In the meantime Bonaparte, having finished the review of the troops, had gone back to the Tuileries, and proceeded to the commission of the inspectors of the ancients. The commission of the five hundred had altogether adhered to the new revolution, and concurred in every thing that was in preparation. It was with them that whatever had to be done should be carried out under the pretence of duly carrying the translation into effect, and there it was that Bonaparte held a permanent sitting. Cambacérès, the minister of justice, also repaired thither. Fouché, on his part, also came thither. Sieyès and Roger Ducos also came to give in their resignation. It was a matter of importance to get one more resignation from the directory, for then, and in that case, the majority being dissolved, there would no longer exist an executive power, and there would no longer be any reason for apprehending a closing act of energy on its part. There was no expectation that either Gohier or Moulins would send in their resignation; M. de Talleyrand and admiral Bruix were therefore despatched to Barras, in order to extort from him his resignation.

Bonaparte then made his distribution of the command of the troops. He sent Murat, with a numerous cavalry and a corps of grenadiers, to occupy Saint-Cloud; Serrurier was posted at the *Point-du-jour* with a reserve. Lannes had the command of the troops that guarded the Tuileries confided to him. Bonaparte then gave Moreau a singular commission, and certainly the least honourable of all, in this great event: he charged him to go with five hundred men, and guard the Luxembourg. Moreau's instructions were to cut off every approach to the directors upon pretence of providing for their safety, and to debar them of all communication from without. At the same time Bonaparte caused it to be notified to the commandant of the directorial guard, that he was to obey Bonaparte, that he was to leave the Luxembourg with his troops, and to come and join him at the Tuileries. With the assistance of Fouché, a last and an important precaution was taken. The directory had the power of suspending the municipalities; Fouché, acting in his capacity of minister of the police, and as if he had been authorized by the directory, suspended the twelve municipalities of Paris, and deprived them of all authority whatever. By adopting this measure, there no longer remained any rallying point for the patriots, either in the directory or in the twelve communes that had succeeded to the great commune of heretofore. Fouché then caused bills to be posted recommending the citizens to maintain order and tranquillity, and assuring them that everything that could be done was being at that moment done to save the republic from the perils by which she was surrounded.

These measures were completely successful. The authority of general Bonaparte was everywhere acknowledged, although the council of the ancients had not acted constitutionally in conferring it on him. This council, in point of fact, might lawfully make an advance for the translation, but were not justified in appointing a commander-in-chief of the armed force. Moreau proceeded to the Luxembourg, and closed all the avenues with five hundred men. Jubé, commandant of the directorial guard, immediately obeying the orders he had just received, made his men mount, left the Luxembourg, in order to go to the Tuileries. In the meantime the three directors, Moulins, Gohier, and Barras, were in the most painful state of perplexity. Moulins and Gohier being at last made fully sensible of the conspiracy which had hitherto escaped their notice, went to the apartments of Barras, to ask him if he would stand firm with them, and form the majority. The luxurious director was in the bath, and was with some difficulty made to understand what Bonaparte was doing in Paris. "That fellow," he exclaimed, with a gross expression, "has cheated us all." He promised to unite with his colleagues, for he always promised everybody, and everything, and sent Bottot, his secretary, to the Tuileries, to see what he could learn. But Gohier and Moulins had hardly left him before he fell into the hands of Bruix and M. de Talleyrand. They experienced no great difficulty in making him sensible of the impotence to which he was reduced, and there was no reason to fear that he would fall gloriously in defence of the directorial constitution. They undertook that he should enjoy tranquillity and fortune; and on these terms he consented to give in his resignation. A letter had been prepared for his

signature, to which he put his hand, and M. de Talleyrand and Bruix hurried away with it to Bonaparte. From that moment Gohier and Moulins made vain efforts to gain access to him, but learned that he had resigned. Constrained to rely solely on themselves, having no longer the right to deliberate, they knew not what course to pursue, and yet were anxious to faithfully fulfil their obligations to the constitution of the year III. They resolved, therefore, to repair to the commission of the inspectors, and to ask their colleagues, Sieyès and Ducos, if they would unite with them to reconstitute the majority, and to promulgate at least the decree of translation. This was but a poor shift. It was not possible to collect an armed force, and to raise a standard hostile to Bonaparte's; it was therefore perfectly useless to go to the Tuileries and openly defy Bonaparte in the midst of his camp and all his forces.

They nevertheless did go thither, and no impediment was offered them. They found Bonaparte surrounded by Sieyès, Ducos, a multitude of deputies, and a numerous staff. Bottot, secretary to Barras, had just before met with an ungracious reception. Bonaparte had said to him, raising his voice, "What have they done with that France which I left in such a flourishing condition? I had left behind me peace, I have now found war; I had left her victorious, I have now found her suffering from her losses. I left behind me the riches (*millions*) of Italy, and I have now discovered her reduced by extreme taxation and wretchedness. What is become of the hundred thousand French whom I knew so well, all my companions in glory?—they are dead!" The emissary Bottot retired in confusion; but at this moment the resignation of Barras had come in, and had pacified the general. He told Gohier and Moulins that he was glad to see them; that he relied upon their resignation, because he looked upon them as worthy citizens, too honest to oppose an absolutely necessary and salutary revolution. Gohier replied in a very spirited tone, that he had come with his colleague, Moulins, for no other intent than that of labouring to save the republic. "Yes," replied Bonaparte, "save it; and with what?—with the means of the constitution, which is crumbling to pieces on all sides!" "Who told you so?" replied Gohier. "A set of people who have neither the courage or the will to go hand in hand with her." High words were taking place between Gohier and Bonaparte, when a note was delivered to the general. This letter communicated the intelligence that there was a great commotion in the faubourg Saint-Antoine. "General Moulins," said Bonaparte, "you are a relation of Santerre?" "No," replied Moulins, "I am not his relation, but his friend." "I am informed," added Bonaparte, "that he is stirring up a commotion in the faubourgs. Tell him that on the very first outbreak I will have him shot." Moulins replied very pointedly to Bonaparte, who repeated that he would have Santerre shot. The conversation was continued in the same strain by Gohier. Bonaparte concluded it by saying, "The republic is in danger—it must be saved: *it is my will.* Sieyès and Ducos have given in their resignation. Barras has just given his. You are but two; divested of associates, you are powerless; you can do nothing; I advise you to hold out no longer." Gohier and Moulins replied that they would not desert their post. They returned to the Luxembourg, in which they were from that moment placed under the guard of sentinels, separated from one another, and deprived of all communication by the orders of Bonaparte transmitted to Moreau. Barras had just left Paris for his estate at Gros Bois, his country seat, under the escort of a company of dragoons.

There was now no longer any executive power! Bonaparte had in his own person centralized absolute supremacy. All the ministers resorted to him at the commission of the inspectors. All orders emanated thence, as from the only point where any lawfully-constituted authority existed. The day went off quietly enough. The patriots formed numerous secret associations, and proposed desperate resolutions, but without imagining that they could put them in execution, so much did they dread the ascendancy of Bonaparte over his men.

In the evening, a council was held at the commission of the inspectors. The object of this council was to settle with the principal members of the ancients what was to be done on the morrow at Saint-Cloud. The plan arranged with Sieyès was to propose the adjournment of the councils, with a provisional consulate. This proposition involved certain objections. Many of the members of the ancients, who had rendered them assistance in getting the decree of translation passed into law, were nevertheless extremely alarmed at the domination of the military party. It had never entered their heads that the object had been the formation of a dictatorship in behalf of Bonaparte said his two associates; all they would have desired was that the directory should be differently constituted, and, notwithstanding Bonaparte's age, they would have consented to his being appointed a director. They made a proposal to that effect. But Bonaparte replied in a decided tone that the constitution was no longer able to go alone, that a more centralized authority had become necessary, and especially an adjournment of all those political discussions that caused confusion in the republic. The appointment of three consuls, and the suspension of the councils till the 1st Ventôse were then proposed. After a somewhat lengthened debate these measures were adopted. Bonaparte, Sieyès, and Ducos, were chosen for consuls. The act was drawn up, and was to be moved in the council on the following morning at Saint-Cloud. Sieyès, well acquainted with the revolutionary manœuvres, was for arresting forty of the chief conspirators of the five hundred in the night. Bonaparte did not accord with this counsel, and was afterwards sorry for it.

The night was tolerably quiet. Next morning, the 19th Brumaire (November 10), the road to Saint-Cloud was covered with troops, carriages, and those whom curiosity drew thither. Three halls had been prepared at the castle, the first for the ancients, the second for the five hundred, and the third for the commission of the inspectors, and for Bonaparte. They were to have been fitted up by noon, but they could not be got ready before two o'clock. This delay had nearly proved fatal to the originators of the new revolution. The members of the two councils were walking in the gardens of Saint-Cloud, and were talking together rather loud. The members of the five hundred, annoyed at having been excluded, as it were, by the members of the

ancients, before they could say a word for themselves, naturally asked what it was they wanted, and what they intended to do that day. "The government is dissolved," said they; "be it so; we agree that its parts must be reunited, which is much wanted. Are all of you agreed that instead of incapable and obscure individuals, you are to introduce persons calculated to inspire respect and attention! Will you bring in Bonaparte! Even though he may not be of the requisite age, we still have no objection." These pointed interrogations confused the ancients. They had to admit that something else was wanted, and that the object of the present procedure was a complete abrogation of the constitution. Some among them very plainly hinted that this was the case; but their observations were unfavourably received. The ancients, already intimidated on the preceding day by what had passed at the commission of the inspectors, were utterly aghast on perceiving the opposition that was exhibited in the five hundred. From that moment the intentions of the legislative body seemed unsettled, and this revolutionary design was greatly jeopardized. Bonaparte was on horseback at the head of his troops; Sieyès and Ducos had a post-chaise and six waiting for them at the gate of Saint-Cloud. Many other persons had provided themselves in a similar way, so as to be able, in case the plan miscarried, to save themselves by flight. However, Sieyès displayed throughout this whole scene extraordinary coolness and presence of mind. Apprehensions were entertained lest Jourdan, Augereau, or Bernadotte, should go and make speeches to the military. Orders were given to cut down the first person who should make his appearance for the purpose of haranguing them, no matter were he general or representative.

The sitting of the two councils commenced at two o'clock. In the ancients some remonstrances were made by those members who had not been summoned on the preceding day to attend the discussion on the decree of translation. These remonstrances were not attended to, and the next thing was the consideration of a message to be sent to the five hundred, to inform them that a sufficient number of its members had convened, and were ready to begin business. In the five hundred, the debates opened in a different manner. The deputy Gaudin, who was commissioned by Sieyès and Bonaparte to open the debate, first alluded to the risks to which the republic was exposed, and proposed two things: first, accord a vote of thanks to the ancients for having translated the legislative body to Saint-Cloud; and secondly, to form a commission who should make a report on the perils to which the republic was exposed, and the means of providing against those perils. If this proposition had been adopted, a report had already been got up for the occasion, and a provisional consulship and an adjournment would have been proposed. But Gaudin had hardly finished speaking, before a most tremendous explosion of feeling burst forth in the assembly. The most violent exclamations resounded on all sides, from all parts were heard, "Down with the dictators!"—"No dictatorship!"—"The constitution for ever!"—"The constitution or death!" exclaimed Delbrel. "There is no fear of bayonets; here we are free." These words were followed by more shouting. Some deputies, highly excited, looking steadily at the president, Lucien, repeated, "No dictatorship! down with the dictators!" At these insulting exclamations, Lucien addressed them, "I am too sensible of what is due," said he, "to the dignity of president, to endure any longer the insolent menaces of certain speakers; I call them to order." This reprimand did not allay the excitement, but only rendered them more outrageous. After a protracted scene of disorder, the deputy Grandmaison proposed to take the oath to the constitution of the year III. The motion was instantly agreed to. A call of the assembly was also demanded. This also was agreed to. Each deputy went in his turn to the tribune to take the oath, amidst the shouts and plaudits of all present. Lucien himself was obliged to quit the chair for the purpose of taking that oath, which was entirely to subvert his brother's schemes.

Things were taking a dangerous turn. Instead of appointing a commission to receive proposals for plans of reform, the five hundred took an oath to uphold what existed, and the ancients, already daunted, were on the point of shrinking back. This was a revolution that could not stand its ground. The danger was imminent. Augereau, Jourdan, and the influential patriots were at Saint-Cloud, waiting for the propitious moment for bringing the military round to their side of the question. Bonaparte and Sieyès immediately judged that it was time to be up and be doing, and to gain over the undecided mass to their side. Bonaparte resolved on making his appearance before the two councils at the head of his staff. He came across Augereau, who said to him in an ironical tone, "A pretty pickle you are in!" "Matters were much worse at Arcola," replied Bonaparte, and he repaired to the bar of the ancients. He was unaccustomed to public assemblies. To speak for the first time in public is embarrassing, nay, has its terrors for the most collected minds, and under the most ordinary circumstances. Amidst such events, and to a man who had never appeared at a tribune, it could not fail to be far more disagreeable. Bonaparte, under strong agitation, made his speech, and in broken accents, but in a loud voice, thus addressed the ancients. "Citizens, representatives!" said he, "you are not acting as in the ordinary course of business; but you are at the crater of a volcano. Allow me to explain. You have considered the republic in danger; you have translated the legislative body to Saint-Cloud; you have summoned me to assist in enforcing the execution of your decrees; I have issued from my privacy to perform your behests, and already myself and my brave companions in arms are subjected to every species of misrepresentation and attacks. There is talk of a new Cromwell and a new Cæsar. Citizens! if I had desired to assume such a character, it would have been easy for me to have taken that part on my return from Italy, in the moment of the most glorious triumph, and when the army and the parties invited me to take it. I did not wish for it then, I do not desire to assume the character now. Nought else than the perils of my country have called forth my zeal and yours." Bonaparte then depictured, but constantly with a voice choked with emotion, the dangerous situation of the republic, torn by the popular factions (*les partis*), threatened with a new civil war in the west, and with an invasion in the south. "Let us," he added,

"prevent all these calamities; let us save the two things for which we have made so many sacrifices, liberty and equality." "Speak also in the same manner of the constitution," exclaimed the deputy Linglet. This interruption disconcerted the general for a moment; but he soon recovered his self-possession, and in broken accents he replied, "As for the constitution, you no longer have a constitution! It was you who destroyed it yourselves by committing an outrage upon the national representation on the 18th Fructidor; by annulling on the 22nd Floréal the popular elections, and by attacking, on the 30th Prairial, the independence of the government. That constitution, of which you speak, all the popular factions are doing their utmost to destroy. They have all come to impart their designs to myself, and to beg my assistance. I have not assented. If I am required, I will name the parties and the men." "Name them," cried the opponents, "name them, and call for a secret committee." A protracted confusion succeeded this interruption. Bonaparte at length proceeded, and again describing the state in which France was placed, exhorted the ancients to take such measures as were capable of saving her. "Surrounded," said he, "by my brethren in arms, I am well able to assist you. I call to witness those brave grenadiers, whose bayonets I see, and whom I have so often led against the enemy; I call to witness their courage; we will co-operate with you in saving the country. And if any speaker," added Bonaparte in a threatening tone, "if any speaker, the hireling of foreign courts, should talk of outlawing me, I will then appeal to my brethren in arms. Call to mind, that I march accompanied by the god of fortune and by the god of war."

These audacious expressions told the five hundred what they had to expect. The ancients took them in very good part, and appeared to be gained over by the presence of the general. They accorded him the honours of the sitting.

Bonaparte, after infusing a little of his fervid spirit into the ancients, next made it his business to go to the five hundred, and endeavour to see if he could not overawe them. He made his way thither, with some grenadiers in his train; he entered, but left them behind him at the furthest end of the hall. He had to walk nearly half the length of the hall to reach the bar. He had scarcely got half way up before furious outcries issued from all sides. "What!" cried a multitude of voices, "soldiers here! arms! What does all this mean! Down with the dictator! down with the tyrant!" A great number of deputies dashed into the middle of the hall, surrounded the general, and addressed to him the most pointed remonstrances. "What!" said they, "is it for this that you have conquered! All your laurels are faded. Your glory is changed into infamy. Respect the sanctuary of the laws. Retire! retire!" Bonaparte was confounded amidst the crowd that thronged around him. The grenadiers whom he had left at the door hastened up, pushed back the deputies, and put their arms around him. It is said that in this disturbance some of the grenadiers received dagger wounds, which were intended for him. A grenadier, named Thomé, had his clothes torn. It is very possible that in the confusion his clothes may have been torn, without daggers being drawn. It is likewise possible that daggers might have been found in more than one hand. Republicans, conceiving that they beheld a new Cæsar, might arm themselves with the steel of Brutus, without being assassins. It is very absurd to think of justifying them on this point. Be this as it may, Bonaparte was turned out of the hall. It is said that he was confused, which is not more surprising than the supposition of daggers. He mounted his horse, went off to his troops, told them that the five hundred had wanted to assassinate him, that he went in fear of his life, and was every where received with shouts of *Bonaparte for ever!*

The storm meanwhile raged with greater violence than ever in the assembly, and was pointed against Lucien. The latter displayed extraordinary firmness and courage. "Your brother is a tyrant," said they to him; "in one day he has lost all his glory." Lucien strove in vain to justify him. "You would not hear him," he replied; "he came to explain his conduct, to acquaint you with his mission, and to answer all the questions upon which you have been constantly addressing him ever since you met. His services at least entitled him to be allowed time to defend himself." "No, no, down with the tyrant!" shouted the furious patriots. "Outlaw him!" added they; "outlaw him!" This was a terrific word; it had undone Robespierre. Uttered against Bonaparte, it might perhaps make the military hesitate, and detach them from his cause. Lucien courageously opposed the proposition of outlawry, and insisted that his brother ought first to be heard. He struggled for a long time, amidst a tremendous uproar. At length, taking off his cap and his gown, "Wretches," he exclaimed, "would you have me outlaw my own brother! I leave the chair, and I now go to the bar to defend him who is accused."

At this moment Bonaparte heard outside the scene that was passing in the assembly. He got alarmed for his brother, and sent ten grenadiers to bear him out of the hall. The grenadiers entered, found Lucien encompassed by a group, laid hold of him by the arm, saying that it was by his brother's orders, and drew him out of the hall. Now was the time to do a decisive act. The slightest hesitation, and all would be lost. The assembly being impervious to the strongest oratorical appeal, there was but one alternative, and that was force; one of these daring acts, on the eve of which usurpers are always known to have hesitated, had now to be performed. Cæsar hesitated when he passed the Rubicon, Cromwell when he dissolved the [long] parliament. Bonaparte now made up his mind to let loose his grenadiers against the assembly. He put himself on horseback, accompanied by Lucien, and rode in front of the troops. Lucien harangued them. "The council of the five hundred is dissolved," said he; "it is I that tell you so. Assassins have taken possession of the hall of session, and have done violence to the majority. I now call upon you to march and to clear it of them." Lucien next swore that himself and his brother would be the faithful defenders of liberty. Murat and Leclerc then put themselves in motion with a battalion of grenadiers, and conducted it to the door of the five hundred. They advanced to the entrance of the hall. At the sight of the bayonets, the deputies set up a tremendous outcry, as they had done at the appearance of Bonaparte; but

the rolling of the drums drowned their noise. "*Grenadiers, forward!*" cried the officers. The grenadiers entered the hall, and dispersed the deputies, who fled, some by the passages, others by the windows. In a moment the hall was cleared, and Bonaparte was left master of this deplorable field of battle.

Intelligence of this event soon reached the ancients, and filled them with uneasiness and sorrow. They were far from desiring such an outrageous proceeding. Lucien appeared at their bar, to justify his conduct with regard to the five hundred; his reasons were not gainsayed, for what could be done in such a situation? Matters must now be brought to a conclusion, and the object that had been proposed fulfilled. The council of the ancients could not, of themselves, decree the adjournment of the legislative body and the institution of the consulship. The council of five hundred was dissolved; but there were still left some fifty deputies, who advocated the recent violent but necessary state measure. They were got together and made to pass the decree, the very object of the revolution that had just been effected. The decree was then carried to the ancients, who adopted it about midnight. Bonaparte, Roger-Ducos, and Sieyès, were nominated provisional consuls, and invested with the whole executive power. The councils were adjourned to the 1st Ventôse next ensuing, and were replaced by two commissions of twenty-five members each, selected from the councils, who had it in charge to authorize such legislative measures as the three consuls should find it expedient to take. To the consuls and the commissions was confided the office of framing the draught of a new constitution.

Such was the revolution of the 18th Brumaire, concerning which such opposite opinions are entertained, being considered by some as an outrage which absolutely destroyed our rising liberty, and by others as a daring but necessary act, that terminated a state of anarchy. What may be said of it is this, that the revolution, after having appeared in every character, either as monarchical, republican, or democratic, at length assumed the military character, because amidst that perpetual conflict with Europe, it was requisite that she should constitute herself in a strong and solid manner. The republicans groaned in spirit over so many abortive efforts, so much blood spilt to no purpose, in order to establish liberty in France, and they deplored her immolation by one of the heroes whom she had brought forth. But in this their elevation of feeling tends to mislead them. The revolution, which was to give us liberty, and which has so disposed events that we shall some day enjoy her, was not, neither could it be, liberty. The revolution could not be any other than a great struggle against the old order of things. Having been the conqueror in this conflict in France, the next thing was to obtain the like mastery in Europe. But so violent a struggle was not consistent with the forms or the spirit of liberty. For one brief moment liberty existed under the constituent assembly; but when the popular party became so overbearing as to intimidate public opinion; when that party stormed the Tuileries on the 10th of August; when, on the 2nd of September, that party sacrificed all those who excited its distrust; when, on the 21st of January, that party forced every one to compromise himself with it by dabbling his hands in royal blood; when, in August, 1793, that party obliged all the citizens to go off to the frontiers, or to surrender their fortune; when that same party abdicated its power, and transferred it to that great committee of public welfare, composed of twelve individuals, was there liberty, or could liberty exist? No; there was a violent effort of highly-wrought feeling and heroism; there was the muscular tension of an athlete wrestling with a powerful antagonist. After this moment of danger, after our victories, there was an interval of repose. The last days of the convention and the directory exhibited moments of freedom. But the contest with Europe could not be otherwise than temporarily suspended. This contest soon recommenced; and on experiencing the first reverse, all the popular factions uprose against a too moderate government, and invoked the aid of some more mighty arm. Bonaparte, returning from the east, was hailed as sovereign, and called to the supreme power. It is idle to say that Zurich had saved France. Zurich was a mere accident, a respite; a Marengo and a Hohenlinden would still have been required in order to save her. It required something more than military successes; it required a powerful reorganization at home of all the departments of the government, and it was a political leader rather than a military chief of whom France had need. The 18th and 19th Brumaire could not, under the circumstances we have related, have been avoided. All we can say is, that the 20th is to be condemned, and that the hero turned the service which he had just rendered to a bad account. But it may be replied, that he came to fulfil an inscrutable mission, of which he was made the unconscious instrument by fate, involuntarily fulfilling her mysterious purposes. It was not liberty that he came to maintain, for she could no longer exist. He came to maintain, under monarchical forms, the revolution in the world; he came to maintain the revolution by seating himself, a plebeian, on a throne; by bringing the pontiff to Paris to anoint a plebeian brow with the sacred oil; by creating an aristocracy out of plebeians; by compelling the old aristocracies to associate themselves with his plebeian aristocracy; by making plebeians kings; and finally, by taking to his bed the daughter of the Cæsars, and mingling plebeian blood with the blood of one of the oldest families in Europe; by confounding all nations; by diffusing the French laws in Germany, Italy, and Spain; by dispelling illusions of such ancient date, by shaking so many things to their centre, and confusing them. This was the vast mission he came to fulfil; and in the mean time, the new social order was to be confirmed under the protection of his sword; and Liberty was yet some day to come. She has not yet come; but come she will. I have described the previous crisis that has so disposed matters for her advent in Europe; I have done so without personal resentment, compassionating false opinions, honouring virtue, admiring greatness, striving to comprehend the unfathomable designs of Providence in these mighty events, and attributing to them their due influence so soon as I imagined that I fully attained to their true interpretation.

APPENDIX.

NOTE 1. Page 10, col. 2.

I SHOULD not cite the following passage of the memoirs of Ferrières, if base detractors had not endeavoured to vilify every scene of the French revolution. The passage I am about to extract will enable my readers to form a judgment of the effect which the national solemnities of this period produced on the hearts of those who were the least affected by the general exultation of the people.

"I recal, with pleasure, the impression which this august and touching ceremony made upon me. I shall copy the relation I then wrote, which is full of the sensations it excited; and if this fragment is not historical, it will possess, perhaps, on that account, a more lively interest for some readers.

"The nobility were dressed in black coats, waistcoats, and breeches, richly embroidered with gold, silk cloaks, lace cravats, and hats mounted with feathers à la Henri IV.; the clergy in gowns, large mantles, and cornered hats; the bishops in their purpled robes and surplices; and the third class in black suits, with silk cloaks and cambric cravats. The king was seated in a vehicle in the form of an alcove, richly decorated; Monsieur, the count D'Artois, the princes, the ministers, and the chief officers of the crown, took their place beneath, the queen opposite; and Madame, the countess D'Artois, the princesses, and the ladies of the court, gaily attired, and sparkling with diamonds, formed his brilliant suite. The streets were hung with tapestry; the regiments of the French and Swiss guards formed a line from Notre-Dame to Saint-Louis; immense crowds observed the procession in respectful silence; the balconies were ornamented with the most expensive drapery, the windows filled with spectators of every age and both sexes, particularly with beautiful women, elegantly dressed: every variety of hats, feathers, and apparel was displayed on this occasion; a most amiable emotion was painted on every countenance, and joy sparkled in all eyes. Clapping of hands and expressions of the most cordial interest welcomed us, and followed us after we were out of sight. How vainly do I endeavour to describe this ravishing and enchanting scene. Bands of music, placed at convenient distances, filled the air with melodious sounds; and military marches, the beat of drums, the flourishing of trumpets, and the noble chaunt of the priests, alternately succeeding each other without discord or confusion, animated this triumphant procession."—*Memoirs of the Marquis de Ferrières*, vol. i. p. 18.

NOTE 2. Page 13, col. 1.

The following is an enumeration of those considerations which determined the third class to adopt this first revolutionary measure. As this was the act with which the revolution may be said to commence, and was of great importance in itself, I do not think I can do better than by relating the grounds and motives which governed the decree of the commons: they emanate from the pen of the abbé Sieyès.

"The assembly of the communes, deliberating concerning the overture of reconciliation proposed by the commissioners of the king, have thought it, at the same time, incumbent on them to take into consideration the resolution which the nobility have entered into with respect to that same overture.

"They have observed that the nobility, in spite of their first acquiescence in the proposal of the king, modified it immediately afterwards, which almost entirely nullifies its intention; and that thus their resolution on the subject under consideration can be regarded as nothing less than a positive refusal.

"In consideration of this conduct, and the continued perseverance of the nobility in their preceding determinations, which are opposed to every project of reconciliation, the deputies of the communes think it absolutely useless to occupy themselves any longer in a project which can no longer be called conciliatory, since it has been rejected by one of the parties whose object it was to conciliate.

"In this state of things, which replaces the deputies of the communes in their first position, it appears to them that they can no longer remain in inaction, waiting for the junction of the privileged classes, without rendering themselves culpable towards the nation, which has, without doubt, a right to require a better employment of their time.

"The deputies of the communes therefore deem it the pressing duty of all the representatives of the nation, to whatever class of citizens they may belong, to form themselves, without delay, into an active assembly, capable of commencing and fulfilling the object of their mission.

"They therefore direct the commissioners, who have been the mediators in the several conferences called conciliatory, to draw up the recital of the repeated and wise efforts which they have made to bring to an equitable arrangement the differences which have arisen between them; and direct them also to detail the motives which have forced

them to pass from a state of attendance to one of action; and, finally, resolve that these motives shall be printed at the head of the present deliberation.

"But since it is not possible to form an active assembly without recognising previously those who have a right to compose it, that is to say, those who have the faculty of voting as representatives of the nation, the deputies of the communes believe it their duty to make a last attempt to induce the clergy and nobility, who possess the same powers as themselves, yet have hitherto refused to confirm them, to join them.

"Further, the communes deeming it necessary to gain proof of the refusal of those two classes of deputies to join them, in case they persist in their present determination, judge it their indispensable duty to give them a last invitation, which will be carried to them by deputies ordered to read it in their presence, and to leave them a copy of it, which is herewith subjoined.

"Messieurs, we are ordered by the deputies of the communes of France to inform you that they can no longer defer the fulfilment of the obligation imposed upon all the representatives of the nation. It is assuredly time for all who acknowledge this title to confirm it by a common verification of their powers, and to commence finally to occupy themselves in the consideration of the national interest, which alone, and to the exclusion of all private interests, presents itself as the great object which all the deputies should endeavour to promote by their united efforts. In consequence of this obligation, and the necessity which calls upon the representatives of the nation no longer to remain in inactivity, the deputies of the communes call upon you again, gentlemen, to join them; and their duty obliges them, as much individually as collectively, to give you this last invitation to concur in, and submit yourselves to a common verification of powers. We are at the same time ordered to inform you that the general calling over of all the convoked bailiwicks will take place in an hour, that the verification will then immediately take place, and all absentees will be deemed in default."

Note 3. Page 18, col. 1.

I support nothing by notes or citations but that which is liable to be disputed. This question of whether we possessed a constitution or not, appears to me one of these; and a more respectable and less suspected opinion on this subject cannot be cited than that of Lally-Tolendal. After some preliminary observations, he thus goes on.

"You have not certainly a law which establishes that the states-general are an integral part of sovereignty, for you demand one, and hitherto, sometimes a resolution of the council has forbidden their deliberations, and sometimes the decree of a parliament has annulled their decisions.

"You have not a law which necessitates the periodical assembling of your states-general, for you demand one, and a hundred and seventy-five years have elapsed since they were assembled.

"You have not a law which protects individual liberty from arbitrary arrests, for you demand one, and during the reign of a king, whose justice is acknowledged, and whose probity is respected throughout all Europe, ministers have dragged your magistrates from the sanctuary of the laws by military force.

"You have no law which establishes the liberty of the press, for you demand one.

"You never had, or have no longer, a law which makes your consent necessary to levy taxes, for you demand one, and, for the space of two centuries, you have been loaded with three or four hundred millions of taxes, without having assented to a single one.

"You have not a law which renders the ministers of the executive power responsible, for you demand one.

"Finally, you have no general positive written law, a code at the same time national and royal, a grand charter of a fixed and invariable nature, by which every individual may learn what portion of his liberty and property he must sacrifice for the preservation of the remainder, and which ascertains the nature of civil rights, and defines the nature of civil power.

"I limit myself to these details, for I could extend them to infinitude; but if all these facts are true, if you have none of those laws which you demand, or if in possessing them, (pay attention to this,) or if in possessing them, you have not one which enforces their execution, which ensures their accomplishment, and which maintains their stability, define what you mean by the word constitution, and agree at least that some indulgence should be extended towards those who cannot help entertaining some doubts concerning the existence of ours."

Note 4. Page 18, col. 1.

I deem it necessary to recite in this place the recapitulation of the papers made to the national assembly by M. de Clermont Tonnerre. It furnishes a correct statement with regard to public opinion at this period, through the whole length and breadth of France. In this report, the recapitulation is of extreme importance; and although Paris had been prejudiced upon the digesting of these papers, it is not the less true that the provinces were for the greater part quite as much so.

Report of the Committee of the Constitution, containing a Recapitulation of the Contents of the Papers relative to the formation of a Constitution, read at the National Assembly by the Count de Clermont-Tonnerre, on the 27th of July, 1789.

"Gentlemen, you are called together to regenerate the French empire, and you bring to this great work both your own wisdom and the wisdom of your constituents.

"We have thought it our duty first to collect together and present to your consideration the opinions contained in the greater number of your papers; we shall then state to you the particular views of your committee, and those which it has, or may become acquainted with, from the several plans and observations, which have or may be communicated to it by the members of this august assembly.

"It is of the first part of this task, gentlemen, that we are now about to give an account.

"Our constituents, gentlemen, are all agreed on one point; they all desire the regeneration of the state; but some look for this as the result of a simple reform of abuses, and of the re-establishment of a constitution which has stood for fourteen

centuries, and which appears to them capable of reparation; while others regard the social system at present existing as so perfectly vitiated, that they demand a new constitution, and, with the exception of a monarchical form of government, which is respected, and cherished in the hearts of all Frenchmen, they have given you every power necessary to create one, and to establish on the surest principles the prosperity of the kingdom of France. These persons, gentlemen, think that the first chapter of the constitution ought to contain a declaration of the rights of man, of those imprescriptible rights, the maintenance of which alone can make any system of society a blessing to its members.

"The demand for this declaration of the rights of man, the nature of which has been so constantly mistaken, is the only real difference which exists between those papers which demand a new constitution, and those which merely require the re-establishment of that which they regard the present constitution.

"Both the one and the other equally desire a monarchical government, a legislative body, the national consent for the imposition of taxes, a new organization of all administrative bodies, and the inviolability of the rights of citizens.

"We shall now, gentlemen, recapitulate the particular topics on which our constituents express their sentiments, and distinguish those on which they all agree, from those on which their opinions seem to be divided, by presenting to you the former as decisions, and proposing the latter as questions.

1st. "The monarchical form of government, the inviolability of the sacred person of the king, and the hereditary descent of the crown from male to male, are equally acknowledged by the greatest number of your papers, and not questioned by any.

2nd. "The king is declared the depositary of all the plenitude of the executive power.

3rd. "The responsibility of all the agents of power is generally demanded.

4th. "Some papers acknowledge the legislative power of the king, limited by the constitutional and fundamental laws of the kingdom; others declare that the king, during the interval of the sessions of the states-general, can alone make laws of police or administration, to be afterwards enregistered in the sovereign courts; one bailiwick has maintained that this record should not take place without the consent of two-thirds of the intermediate commissioners of the assemblies of the districts. The majority of the papers acknowledge the necessity of the royal sanction in the promulgation of the laws.

"As to the legislative power, the plurality of the papers acknowledge it as residing in the national representation, authorized by the royal sanction; and it appears that this ancient maxim, *Lex fit consensu populi et constitutione regis*, is almost generally adhered to by your constituents.

"As to the organization of the national representation, the questions on which you have to decide relate to the convocation, the duration, and the composition of this representation, or to the mode of deliberation which your constituents propose.

"As to the convocation, some have declared that the states-general can only be dissolved by themselves; others, that the right of convoking, proroguing, and dissolving, belongs to the king, under the single condition that, in case of dissolution, he must immediately summon a new convocation.

"As to the duration of the states-general, some demanded that it should be periodical, that its periodical re-assembling may depend neither on the will nor interest of authority; others, but a less number, advocate its permanency, that the separation of its members may not bring on the dissolution of the states.

"The question of the periodical return of the states has given rise to another; whether an intermediate commission during the interval of the sessions would not be expedient? But the majority of your constituents regard the establishment of an intermediate commission as a dangerous institution.

"As to the composition of the states, some decidedly favour the distinct existence of the three orders; but with respect to this, the extension of powers which many representatives have already obtained, leaves undoubtedly a much greater latitude for its solution.

"Some bailiwicks have demanded the union of the two first orders in the same chamber; others the suppression of the clergy, and the division of its members between the two other orders; others that the representation of the nobility should be double that of the clergy, and that both together they should be equal in number to the commons.

"One bailiwick, in demanding the union of the two first orders, has required the establishment of a third, under the title of the order of the country. It has been also demanded that every person possessing a place or employment at court should be excluded from becoming a deputy of the states-general. Finally, the inviolability of the persons of the deputies is acknowledged by the majority of the bailiwicks, and is contested by none. As to the mode of deliberation, the question of individual voting, or voting by order, has been decided in favour of the first; some bailiwicks demand two-thirds of the opinions of the whole assembly to form a resolution.

"The necessity of the national consent for the imposition of taxes is generally acknowledged by your constituents, and established by your papers; they all limit the duration of every tax to the term which you may fix, a term never to extend further than from one session to another; and this imperative clause appears to your constituents the surest guarantee for the perpetuity of national assemblies.

"Loans, being but indirect taxes, ought, in the opinion of your constituents, to be subjected to the same regulations.

"Some bailiwicks except those taxes from the foregoing regulations which have for their object the liquidation of the national debt.

"As to administrative bodies, or provincial states, all the papers demand their establishment, and the majority leave their organization to your wisdom.

"Finally, the definition of the rights of citizens, individual liberty, and the security of property, are loudly called for by the whole French nation.

She demands for her members the inviolability of their private possessions, and for herself the inviolability of public property. Individual liberty, in the broadest sense of the word, is claimed: the liberty of the press is also demanded; lettres de cachet are denounced with indignation, as the most infamous invention of despotism."

In this multitude of claims, gentlemen, we have remarked some particular modifications relative to lettres de cachet, and the liberty of the press. You will consider them in your wisdom; you will undoubtedly encourage those sentiments of honour which animate the French nation, and will assuredly find that those who are the first to resist those laws which crush the weak, will be the readiest to yield obedience to those which bind the strong; you will calm the inquietudes of religion, so often outraged by libels in times of persecution; and the clergy, recollecting that licentiousness has long been the companion of slavery, will acknowledge that the first and natural effect of liberty is the return of order, decency, and respect for objects of public veneration.

Such, gentlemen, is the account which your committee have thought it their duty to give you of that part of your papers which treat of the constitution. You will find there, without doubt, all the foundation-stones of the edifice you are appointed to raise to its complete height; but you will look in vain, perhaps, for that order and harmony of combination, without which the social system will always contain numerous defects: all the great objects we have in view are certainly pointed out by our constituents, but are not detailed with sufficient accuracy; the organization of the national representation is not marked out with the necessary precision; the requisites of eligibility are not stated; and it is by your wisdom that all these hints must be matured into efficient measures. The nation wishes to be free, and it is on you that the work of emancipation has devolved. The genius of France has hurried on the march of public spirit. It has acquired by a few hours' experience that which could have hardly been expected from the reflection of many ages. You are empowered, gentlemen, to give a constitution to France; the king and the people demand it; and both have merited it.

Result of the examination of the papers.

AVOWED PRINCIPLES.

Article 1st. The French government is a monarchical government.

2nd. The person of the king is sacred and inviolable.

3rd. His crown is hereditary, descending from male to male.

4th. The king is the sole depositary of the executive power.

5th. Agents of authority are responsible.

6th. The royal sanction is necessary in the promulgation of the laws.

7th. The nation and the royal sanction combined makes the law.

8th. The national consent is necessary for the levying of loans and taxes.

9th. Taxes can only be imposed for the space of from one holding of the states to another.

10th. Property is sacred.

11th. Individual liberty is sacred.

Questions concerning which all the papers are not in agreement.

Article 1st. Does the king possess legislative power, limited by the constitutional laws of the kingdom?

2nd. Can the king make provisionary laws of police and administration during the intervals between the holding of the states?

3rd. Are these laws to be submitted to the free record of the sovereign courts?

4th. Can the states-general only be dissolved by themselves?

5th. Can the king alone convoke, prorogue, and dissolve the states-general?

6th. In case of dissolution, is not the king obliged immediately to convoke a new assembly?

7th. Are the states-general permanent or periodical?

8th. If they are periodical, is an intermediate commission necessary?

9th. Are the two first orders to be united in the same chamber?

10th. Are the two chambers to be formed without distinction of orders?

11th. Are the members of the clerical order to be divided between the two other orders?

12th. The representation of the clergy, the nobility, and the commons, is it to be in the proportion of one, two, and three?

13th. Is a third order to be established under the title of the order of the country?

14th. Can the persons possessing employments or places at court be deputies of the states-general?

15th. Are two-thirds of the votes of the whole assembly requisite to form a resolution?

16th. Are the taxes which have for their object the liquidation of the national debt, to be gathered till its extinction?

17th. Are lettres de cachet to be abolished or modified?

18th. Is the liberty of the press to be indefinite or limited?

NOTE 5. Page 33, col. 1.

At the commencement of the history of the legislative assembly *, the reader will find some opinions concerning the faults imputed to the constitution of '91, which appear to me just. I have only one word to say here concerning the project of establishing in France, at this period, the English constitution. This form of government is a reconciliation between the three interests which divide modern states, royalty, aristocracy, and the people. And this reconciliation cannot possibly be effected before the strength of the contending parties is exhausted, that is to say, before a contest, or a revolution. In England it was in fact brought about by a long struggle, and after the reign of democracy and usurpation. To wish to effect it before a contest, is, in fact, to wish to make peace before war is declared. This is a lamentable truth, but it is incontestable; men never enter into treaties till they have exhausted all their resources. It was not therefore possible to establish the English constitution in France till after the revolution. It was well no doubt to propose it as an example, but this task was clumsily executed; and even if it had been more ably managed, it would not have suc-

* Post, p. 72.

ceeded better. I shall add, to diminish the regret of the partisans of the English constitution, that even had it been fairly written on the tables of our law, it would not have appeased the passions of men; that the ensuing struggle would nevertheless have been engaged in, and the battle been fought in contempt of this preliminary treaty. I repeat, therefore, that war, that is, the revolution, was inevitable. Justice is not to be obtained without fighting for her.

Note 6. Page 34, col. 1.

I am far from blaming the unyielding firmness of the deputy Mounier, for nothing can be more respectable than a man who acts from conviction, but the fact is sufficiently curious to call for proof. The following is a passage extracted from his *report to his constituents*:—

"Many deputies," said he, "had resolved to obtain from me the sacrifice of this principle (*the royal sanction*), and by abandoning it themselves, thought to engage me, from feelings of gratitude, to grant them some compensation; they conducted me to the house of a zealous partisan of liberty, who was desirous that a coalition should take place between them and me, that the cause of liberty might meet with fewer obstacles, and who requested to be present at our conferences, though he declined taking part in our decisions. For the purpose of endeavouring to convince these gentlemen of their errors, or to gain conviction of my own, if I was mistaken in my principles, I accepted this invitation. My opponents declaimed violently against the pretended inconveniences which would accrue from the king having an unlimited power of hindering the passing of any new law, and declared that if this power was acknowledged by the assembly, there would be a civil war. These conferences, twice renewed, had no success; they were resumed afterwards at the house of an American, well known for his talents and his virtues, who possessed at the same time a theoretical and experimental knowledge of those institutions which are adapted to maintain liberty. He decided in favour of my principles; and when my opponents found that all their efforts to make me abandon them were useless, they declared that they considered the question of the *royal sanction* as of little importance, although they had represented it, a few days before, as involving consequences which would lead to a civil war; they offered then to vote for an unlimited *sanction*, and also for the two chambers, but on condition that I would not defend, in favour of the king, the right of dissolving the assembly of representatives; that I would merely require, for the upper chamber, a suspending *veto*, and that I would not oppose a fundamental law which went to establish periodical *national conventions*, to be convoked either by a requisition of the assembly of representatives, or by that of the provinces, for the purpose of revising the constitution, and making those alterations they might judge necessary. By *national conventions* was understood assemblies into which all the rights of the nation were to be transferred; who would unite in themselves all the powers of the state, and consequently would annihilate, by their simple existence, the authority of the monarch and the ordinary legislature; who would have the power of disposing arbitrarily of all kinds of authority, overthrowing, at their will, the constitution, and re-establishing despotism or anarchy. Finally, my opponents wished to commit to one single assembly, which would have borne the name of the national convention, the supreme dictatorship, and thus expose the kingdom to a periodical return of factions and tumult.

"I testified my surprise at my opponents inviting me to enter into treaties with them concerning the interests of the kingdom, as if we alone were its absolute masters; I observed, that in granting merely a suspending *veto* to the upper chamber, if it was to be composed of eligible members, it would be difficult to fill it with persons worthy of the public confidence; since every citizen would prefer being nominated a representative; and that that chamber which was to be judge of the crimes of the state ought to possess great dignity, and that consequently its authority ought not to be less than that of the other chamber. Finally, I added, that when I believed a principle to be true, I was obliged to defend it, and that I could not dispense with this obligation, since truth was the inviolable property of every citizen."

Note 7. Page 36, col. 1.

The particulars of the conduct of Mirabeau are not yet well known, but they soon will be. I have obtained from those who intend to publish them, positive details; I have seen many important papers on this subject, and especially that written in the form of a profession of faith, which formed part of his secret treaty with the court. I cannot at this moment give any of these documents to the public, nor even point out where they are deposited. I can only affirm that of which the truth will be demonstrated when the above-mentioned details are published.

Thus far I can sincerely state, that Mirabeau had never been party to the supposed conspiracies of the duke of Orleans. Mirabeau, when he set out from Provence, had but one single object in view, that of exerting himself against arbitrary power, which in his case had severely injured him, and which his reason as well as his sentiments induced him to consider as detestable. I have said, and I repeat it, he belonged to no party. The duke of Orleans alone has been able to make it appear that he had some connection with him; and the public were willing to believe, that because the duke and Mirabeau were on familiar terms, and both of them ambitious characters, the one as a prince, the other as a man of the people, they must necessarily have been on some footing of political intimacy. The pecuniary distress of Mirabeau and the opulence of the duke might seem an adequate motive for such an association. Nevertheless, Mirabeau, up to the time of his connection with the court, remained poor.

Note 8. Page 38, col. 1.

The letter of the count d'Estaing to the queen is a curious record, which ought always to be consulted in regard to the events of the 5th and 6th of October. This brave sailor, a most faithful and independent spirit (qualities apparently contradictory, but often united in the character of sailors), had been in the habit of stating all he knew to those princes for whom he felt regard. His testimony ought not to be involved in doubt at the time when, in a confidential letter, he acquaints the

queen of the intrigues he had discovered, and which caused him alarm. The reader will observe whether, in point of fact, the court had not some object in view at this period.

The Letter of Count d'Estaing to the Queen.

"My duty and my fidelity exact it, and I must therefore lay at the feet of the queen, the account of a journey I have made to Paris. I have been applauded for sleeping soundly on the eve of an assault or a naval combat. I can assure you that I am not timid. Being brought up with M. le Dauphin, by whose favour I was much distinguished, accustomed to speak the truth at Versailles from my infancy, both a soldier and sailor, and acquainted with the forms of society, I respect them, but suffer them not to deprive me either of my frankness or firmness.

"Alas! I must avow to your majesty that I did not close my eyes the past night. I have been told in good society, in good company, (just heavens, what would be the consequence if it should spread among the people!) it has been repeated to me, that the nobility and clergy have assumed party signatures. Some pretend that the king acts in concert with them; others believe that he is ignorant of the whole matter. I have been assured that a plan is formed; that the king will either flee from Paris, or be carried off by the road to Champagne or Verdun, and will finally go to Metz. M. de Bouillé is named, and by whom? by M. de Lafayette, who told it me in a whisper at the house of M. Junge, at table. I trembled lest a single servant should overhear him; I observed to him that a word of his mouth might become the signal of death. M. de Lafayette is deliberately positive; he told me that at Metz, as elsewhere, the patriots were the strongest party; and that it was better that one should die than that all should be sacrificed.

"M. le baron de Breteuil, who delays his departure, is said to be the chief director of this project. Money is said to be accumulated, and a million of francs per month is to be furnished for the furtherance of the concerted plan. M. the count de Mercy has, unhappily for his reputation, been cited as one of the actors. These are the particulars; if they spread among the people, the mischief that may result from them is incalculable; the project as yet is only whispered. All good men appear to me to be alarmed at the consequences which may result; if a suspicion of its reality transpires, they may be dreadful. I have been to the house of the Spanish ambassador, and certainly I shall not conceal from the queen that my alarm has been redoubled by an interview with him. M. Fernand Nunes conversed with me about the reports I have mentioned, expressed his horror at the supposition that such a plan was possible, which would cause the most disastrous and humiliating of civil wars, which would dreadfully weaken, if not totally overthrow monarchy, become the prey of civil discord, and foreign ambition, and which would bring irreparable misfortunes on the persons the most dear to France. After having spoken of the fugitive court, persecuted and deceived by those who would not support it when they could, and who actually wish to see its dissolution, afflicted by a general bankruptcy, become inevitable, and dreadful to be contemplated . . . , I exclaimed that no other evil consequence could happen from these false reports except their propagation, because in reality they were without any foundation of truth. M. the ambassador of Spain cast down his eyes at this last expression. I became urgent; and he at last declared that a person of very considerable importance, and who was worthy of credit, told him that he had been asked to sign a bond of association. He would not mention his name; but either through inattention, or for the good of the public welfare, he happily did not demand that secresy from me which had not been imposed upon himself. I therefore did not promise to keep this fact secret. It has filled me with more terror than I have ever before experienced; but it is not for myself that I feel it. I supplicate the queen in her wisdom to calculate all the consequences that may happen from such an evil line of conduct: the first false step will cost sufficiently dear. I have seen the queen, in the goodness of her heart, shed tears at the lot of condemned criminals; but in the present instance, rivers of blood vainly shed will be to be regretted. A simple indecision may be remediless. It is only by sailing with the stream, and humouring its waywardness, that she can escape wreck. Nothing is as yet lost. The queen may conquer the kingdom for the king. Nature has given her the means; they are the only possible ones. She may imitate her august mother: if not, I am silent. I supplicate your majesty to grant me an audience for one of the days of the present week."

NOTE 9. Page 41, col. 1.

The province of history is not sufficiently extensive to descend into minute particulars for the justification of individuals, especially in revolutions where even first-rate characters are extremely numerous. Yet as M. Lafayette has been so much calumniated, and as his character is nevertheless so pure, and was so well sustained throughout the arduous contest in which he acted, one note at least must be devoted to his vindication. For this purpose, it will be only necessary to observe, that there is a wide distinction between a general who has long led his soldiers to victory, and so acquired the authority of absolute command, and one whose influence over his troops depends upon his political opinions. In the latter case, all control would cease upon suspicion of change of sentiment in the general. Lafayette, therefore, could not assume the tone of imperative authority, yet he resisted the entreaties of his soldiers for a whole day; and did not at last comply with them till his compliance became a duty of prudence. It is certain that had not the national guard arrived when they did at Versailles, the château would have been taken by assault, and what might have been the fate of the royal family in the midst of a popular insurrection, it is impossible to conjecture. Had it not been for the assistance of the national guard, the garde du corps would have been repulsed; and upon the whole it is evident, nothing but the presence of M. de Lafayette could have insured the safety of the king and his family. But, having arrived at Versailles, he has been bitterly reproached with retiring to rest. It must however be recollected, that he remained up till five o'clock in the morning, during which time he was unceasingly employed in sending out patrolles, and

taking every other precaution to prevent tumult. It was not till every thing appeared calm, that he did what every one in his situation would likewise have done, flung himself on his bed, to take that repose of which he had been deprived for four-and-twenty hours. The testimonies of his contemporaries must also be attended to. Madame de Staël, who certainly was no friend of Lafayette, declares she heard the gardes du corps cry, "Live Lafayette." Mounier, whose testimony is equally free from suspicion, praised his disinterested devotion; and M. de Lally-Tolendal regretted that he had not been invested with a species of dictatorship. The opinions of these two deputies, who were so decidedly hostile to the transactions of the 5th and 6th of October, should be received with confidence.

NOTE 10. Page 42, col. 2.

I have already shown how slender the connexion between Mirabeau and the duke of Orleans really was. The following is an explanation of the famous expression: *that* ——— *does not deserve the trouble that is taken for him!* The restraint imposed by Lafayette on the duke of Orleans displeased the popular party, but more particularly irritated the friends of the prince condemned to exile. These persons, taking advantage of Mirabeau's aversion to Lafayette, thought to make him advocate the cause of the duke against the general. Lauzun, a friend of the former, came to his house one evening to urge him to speak in the assembly the next morning on the subject of the duke's banishment. Mirabeau, who often allowed himself to be persuaded, was about to yield to his solicitations, when his friends, more careful of his reputation than he was himself, pressed him not to interfere in the business. He was then resolved to be silent. The next day, at the opening of the sitting, the departure of the duke of Orleans was reported; and Mirabeau, who was angry at his yielding to Lafayette, calling to mind the useless efforts of his friends, exclaimed: *that* ——— *does not deserve the trouble which is taken for him.*

NOTE 11. Page 43, col. 1.

Mirabeau possessed, as many other great men, much littleness as well as much grandeur of character. It was necessary to feed his ardent imagination with hopes. Although it was impossible to give him the ministry without destroying his influence, ruining his reputation, and enfeebling the assistance which could be derived from him, it was still necessary to hold out this allurement to his imagination. Those, therefore, who mediated between him and the court, counselled the latter to give him at least hopes of the ministry. Nevertheless, the personal interests of Mirabeau were never particularly mentioned in the several communications which took place; neither money nor favours were ever spoken of, and it was difficult to make Mirabeau understand that which the court wished to insinuate. For this purpose a very adroit method was pointed out to the king. Mirabeau had so bad a reputation, that very few persons would associate with him as a colleague. The king, addressing himself to de Laincourt, for whom he entertained a particular friendship, asked him if, for the purpose of being useful to him, he would accept of the ministry with Mons. de Mirabeau. M. de Laincourt replied, that he was ready to do any thing which the interests of his majesty's service required. This conversation was quickly reported to the orator: it gave him great satisfaction, and he doubted no longer that, if circumstances permitted it, he should be nominated to the ministry.

NOTE 12. Page 45, col. 2.

It will not be uninteresting to learn the opinion of Ferrières concerning the manner in which the deputies of his own order conducted themselves in the assembly.

"There were not in the assembly," says Ferrières, "more than three hundred truly upright members, exempt from party spirit, unassociated with both clubs, desiring the public good for its own sake, independent of the interests of any order or body of men, always ready to support the most just and useful propositions, without caring from what quarter they might come, or by whom they were espoused. These men were worthy of the honourable part they were called upon to act, and it is from them that every good law which was established by the assembly proceeded. Adopting every salutary, and rejecting every evil measure, they often gave a majority to motions, which, but for them, would have been discarded by the spirit of faction; and frequently repulsed propositions, which, unopposed by them, would have been adopted through motives of private interest.

"I cannot on this subject help noticing the impolitic conduct of the nobility and bishops. As their only object was to dissolve the assembly, and to throw discredit on its proceedings, far from opposing evil decrees, they manifested an indifference in this respect which it is hardly possible to conceive. They left the chamber the moment the president proposed any question of this nature, and invited the deputies of their party to follow them; or, if they remained, they declared their resolution of not entering into the deliberation. The clubbists, who, by their abandonment of their duty, became the majority of the assembly, carried every thing they wished. The bishops and the nobles, firmly believing that the new order of things could not last, endeavoured with impatience to accelerate the ruin of the throne, and with it their own. To this insensate conduct they added a most insulting indifference both towards the assembly and the people who occupied the galleries. They paid no attention to any question that might be before the chamber, but laughed and conversed in a loud tone of voice among themselves, thus confirming the unfavourable opinion the people entertained of them; and, instead of endeavouring to regain their confidence and esteem, did all in their power to acquire their hatred and contempt."—*Ferrières*, vol. ii. p. 122.

NOTE 13. Page 45, col. 2.

The recal of the gardes-du-corps gave occasion to an anecdote which is worthy of being recorded. The queen complained to M. de Lafayette that the king was not free, and gave as a proof of it, that the service of the château was performed by the national guard, and not by the gardes-du-corps. M. Lafayette immediately asked her if she would wish to see the recal of the latter. The queen at first hesitated, but did not dare to reply otherwise than in the affirmative. The general then commu-

nicated this conversation to the municipality, who, at his instigation, made an official demand to the king for the recal of the gardes-du-corps, offering, at the same time, to divide the service of the château with them. The king and the queen received this demand very unwillingly; they were soon made to feel its consequences, and those who did not wish that they should appear free, made them reply to it by a refusal. Yet to give reasons for this refusal was an embarrassing task, and the queen, who was often employed in difficult dilemmas, was commissioned to tell M. de Lafayette why the proposition of the municipality was not accepted. The motive which she gave was, that the king would not expose the gardes-du-corps to be massacred. M. Lafayette had just met one of them walking in the Palais Royal in full uniform. He related this fact to the queen, who became still more embarrassed, but persisted in the intention she had been commissioned to express.

NOTE 14. Page 46, col. 1.

The address of Monsieur to the Hotel de Ville, contains a passage too important to be passed over.

"As to my personal opinions," said this august personage, "I shall speak with confidence to my fellow-citizens. Since the day when, in the second assembly of the notables, I declared my sentiments concerning that fundamental question which then divided the minds of all men, I have not ceased to believe that a great revolution was in preparation; that the king, by his patriotic intentions, his virtues, and his supreme rank, was eminently fitted to be its chief, since it cannot be advantageous to the nation without being equally so to the monarch; and that finally the royal authority ought to be the rampart of national liberty, and national liberty the basis of royal authority."

NOTE 15. Page 46, col. 2.

The speech pronounced by the king on this occasion is too remarkable not to be cited, with some observations.

This excellent man and unfortunate prince was continually vacillating, but upon particular occasions he saw with great propriety what was due from him, and the unreasonable behaviour of the court. The tone which pervades his speech of the 4th February is sufficient to show that in the present instance the words were not put into his mouth, and that he spoke with truth and sincerity as to his present position.

"Gentlemen," said he, "the vast importance of many events which have lately happened, and the critical situation in which France is now placed, make me feel it my duty to offer you my undisguised opinion on the state of affairs. The progressive advance of disorder and insubordination, the suspension or inactivity of justice, the discontents which have arisen from individual privations, the conflicts and unhappy animosities which are the inevitable result of long dissensions, the precarious situation of the finances, and the uncertainty of the public welfare, and finally, the general agitation of all minds; seem all to unite to increase the anxiety of the true friends of the prosperity and welfare of the kingdom.

"A grand object is presented to your view. But you must endeavour to attain it without increasing the public troubles, and without new convulsions. It was my intention to lead you to this object by tranquil and gentle means when I first formed the design of assembling you, and of uniting in your public deliberations the wisdom and will of the representatives of the nation. My happiness and glory are most intimately allied to the success of your endeavours.

"I have taken care, by continual vigilance, to protect your proceedings from that fatal influence which the calamitous circumstances, in the midst of which you are placed, might have upon them. The horrors of famine, which France had to fear last year, have been dispelled by unremitting exertions to provide for the necessities of the population. The disorders which the impoverished state of the finances, the national discredit, the excessive scarcity of money, and the gradual decrease of the revenue naturally occasioned, have at least been partially suppressed. I have in some measure remedied everywhere, but particularly in the capital, the dangerous consequences which might arise from want of employment for the labouring classes; and notwithstanding the enfeebled state of all authority, I have maintained the kingdom, not, it must be allowed, in perfect calmness, but in a state of sufficient tranquillity to receive the benefit of a moderate and well-organized system of liberty; finally, in spite of the internal agitation of the kingdom, and the political convulsions which disturb other nations, I have preserved peace with foreign states, and kept upon such terms of friendship with the powers of Europe as may render this peace durable.

"After having thus protected you from the many dangers which might have thwarted your proceedings, the moment has at length arrived in which the interests of the nation call upon me to assist, in a more express and decisive manner, in the execution of all you have concerted for the advantage of France. I cannot seize upon a more fitting opportunity for effecting this purpose than that which offers itself to me by my acceptation of those decrees which are destined to establish a new organization of government in the kingdom, and which must have so important and propitious an influence on the happiness of my subjects, and the prosperity of the empire.

"You know, gentlemen, that it is now more than ten years since, and at a period when the sense of the nation had not so fully declared itself in regard to provincial assemblies, that I had commenced the substitution of this species of administration for one which antiquity and long usage had sanctioned. Experience having demonstrated to me that I was not deceived in the opinion I had entertained concerning the utility of these institutions, I have earnestly sought to extend the same benefit to all the other provinces of my kingdom; and in order that the new administrations should enjoy public confidence, it was my desire that the members of which they were to be composed should be freely nominated by the body of the citizens. You have in various ways improved upon these views, and certainly the most essential improvement is that equal and justly conceived subdivision, which by diminishing the ancient separations of province from province, and by establishing an uniformity of system, and a perfect political balance, still further tends to make all parts of the kingdom unite in one

common feeling and the same political interests. This great conception, this beneficial intention, are entirely owing to you; indeed, nothing short of an universal consent on the part of the representatives of the nation, and nothing short of that proper influence they were enabled to exercise over public opinion, could enable them to undertake with confidence the conduct of a reform of so great importance, and to combat by the force of reason the oppositions of those who cling to ancient custom and individual interests."

All that the king states here is perfectly just, and very well conceived. It is true, that he had already upon his own impulse suggested every possible reform, and that he had furnished a rare example to princes, that of anticipating the requisitions of their subjects. The encomiums he bestowed upon the new mode of territorial division appear upon the face of them to have been uttered with the most perfect good faith; for it certainly was serviceable to government by destroying the opposition which local jurisdictions and prejudices had not unfrequently set up against it. Every thing therefore induces the belief that the king on this occasion spoke in the utmost sincerity of his heart. He continued,

"I shall countenance and shall assist, with my utmost ability, the success of this vast organization, on which the safety of France depends; and I consider it incumbent on me to declare, that I am too anxious about the internal situation of the kingdom, and have my eyes too open to the dangers of all kinds with which we are surrounded, not to feel convinced that in the present state of public feeling, considering the situation of public affairs, a new order of things should be established without disturbance or discord, or that the kingdom will be exposed to all the calamities of anarchy.

"Let all those who are true citizens think on this, as I have also done, that by solely fixing their attention on the common weal, they will perceive, even under every difference of opinion, that one great interest ought to cordially unite them at this time. Time will remedy those defects which the legislation of this present assembly may leave for amendment, (*this indirect and well-introduced remark, is a proof of itself that the king would not flatter them, but simply state the truth though in most calm and temperate language;*) but every design that may tend to shake the principles of the constitution itself, every scheme that shall have for its object the subversion or diminution of its benign influence, will do nought else than serve to bring down upon us the frightful calamities attendant upon dissension; and assuming the success of such an attempt upon my people and myself, the result will for ever deprive us of various advantages of which a new order of things has in store for us.

"Let us indulge, then, cordially in the hopes which the present aspect of things may justify us in entertaining, and think only of realizing them by an unanimous accordance in our efforts. Let it be known throughout the kingdom, that the monarch and the representatives of the nation are united by the same interests and the same objects, that the firm belief of this alliance may spread the spirit of peace and mutual benevolence through the provinces, and that all good citizens, and all who can serve the state by their zeal or abilities, may hasten to take part in the different subdivisions of the general administration, whose united exertions will effectually re-establish order and prosperity throughout the kingdom.

"We must not conceal the truth from ourselves; there is much to be done before we can attain this object. Unanimity and a general and common effort are absolutely necessary to obtain effectual success. Persevere therefore in your proceedings without any other object than that of the public good; fix your chief attention on the condition of the people and public liberty; but do not overlook the necessity of destroying all suspicions, and of removing without delay the several causes of fear which have banished from France so great a number of her citizens, the effect of which is strongly contrasted with the laws of safety and liberty you are about to establish. Measures of compulsion can never have a prosperous issue; a general consent is necessary to their beneficial operation. At present we enjoy bright hopes; may these hopes be quickly converted into solid happiness!

"The day, I trust, will shortly arrive, when the advantage of the entire suppression of ranks in society will be acknowledged by all Frenchmen. But at the same time, it must not be forgotten that all which reminds a nation of the antiquity and continued services of an honourable race of men, is a distinction which nothing can destroy, and, as the duty of gratitude is included in it, those who, in all classes of the community, truly aspire to serve their country, and those who have already had the happiness to succeed in such glorious enterprises, have an interest in respecting that transmission of titles or recollections, which is the noblest heritage they can leave to their children.

"Neither can the respect due to the ministers of religion be effaced; and their dignity being closely united to that of those sacred truths which are under the guardianship of order and morality, all upright and enlightened citizens will have an equal interest in maintaining and defending it.

"*Without doubt those who have abandoned their pecuniary privileges, those who will form no longer, as they formerly did, a political order in the state, must submit to sacrifices of which I know all the importance; but I am persuaded that they possess sufficient generosity to seek their requital in the public advantages of which the establishment of national assemblies affords hopes.*"

The king proceeded, as we see, to expound to all parties the benefits proposed by the new laws, and at the same time alluded to the necessity there was to preserve some of the old. His address to the privileged orders on this head demonstrates his real opinion as to the necessity and propriety of the sacrifices to which he had subjected them, and their opposition will be eternally condemned by the expressions contained in this speech. It is no purpose for them to say that the king was not a free agent; the care he took on this occasion to measure his concessions, his advice, and even his censures, show that he spoke with sincerity. He expressed himself in far different language at a later period, when he was desirous of rescuing the state from the bondage in which he believed her to be. His letter to the ambassadors, given lower down, will sufficiently prove that. The vulgar exaggeration that prevails in that letter sufficiently demonstrates the intention, on his part, no longer to appear a free agent. But on this present occasion the measured tone of his language leaves no doubt

whatever, and what follows is so affecting and so beautifully expressed, that it must have been utterly impossible any one not to have felt in accordance with it, especially after having consented to write and to speak it.

"I also should have many losses to reckon up, if I engrossed the great interests of the state. I could stoop to personal considerations; but I have found a compensation which satisfies me, a full and perfect compensation in the increase of the happiness of the nation, and it is from the bottom of my heart that I express this sentiment.

"I therefore pledge myself to maintain and defend the constitutional liberty of the state. *I will do more, and in concert with the queen, who partakes these sentiments with me, I will early prepare the understanding and heart of my son for the new order of things, which circumstances have brought about. I will habituate him from his earliest years, to make his happiness consist in the happiness of France.*

"I doubt not that before you conclude your legislative labours, you will strengthen and establish the executive power on a firm basis; you must perceive, that, without your system derives stability from an active and tutelary authority, its parts cannot long hold together, and that that liberty which we have been so careful to introduce into the public administration, and which we cherish with so fervent an attachment, must degenerate into anarchy, be destroyed by blind violence, and finally give place to the most alarming of all tyrannies.

"Thus, not so much on my own account, gentlemen, who do not lay any particular stress on what is especially due to myself, according to the laws and the institutions which must necessarily regulate the future welfare of the empire, but for the good of our country, for its prosperity and its power, I call upon you to dismiss from your minds all momentary impressions that may divert from considering altogether and without regard to details, what such a kingdom as France demands, as well from her vast extent and great population as from her foreign connexions which are inseparable from her existence.

"I need not remind you, to fix your special attention on that which must be the primary object of all legislators; the morals of a people, distinguished among the nations of Europe for all the social virtues.

"The rights of property also demand your closest attention; these rights, you must be aware, do not derive their sacredness from any privileged orders, nor have they been accidentally acquired, but spring out of the very nature of civil society, are the very preservatives of order in every community, and lie at the foundation of all social harmony.

"From what fatal circumstance has it come to pass, that while tranquillity was restoring, renewed disturbances should have spread over the provinces! How can these continued excesses be accounted for! Concur with myself in repressing them, and let us use our utmost exertions, that criminal outrages do not cast a stain on those days which are the harbingers of national prosperity. You who have in so many ways the power of influencing public confidence, *do you enlighten the people that is led astray with regard to their true interests, my good subjects, so dear to me, and of whose entire affection I am assured, when they express themselves desirous to soothe my cares on their behalf.* Ah! if they did but know how much I feel on receiving the intelligence of the attacks made on property and the violence committed against persons, they would, perhaps, spare me this grievous affliction.

"In speaking of the great interests of the state, I cannot omit urging you to take some speedy and definitive measures for the re-establishment of order in the finances, and for the satisfaction of that innumerable multitude of citizens, whose private interests are involved in that of the national funds.

"Gentlemen, it is time that all the discontents of party should be appeased, it is time that the public credit of the kingdom should be established on a durable foundation. But you cannot do all at once. Reserve, therefore, for a future period, some of the multiplied objects that engross your attention. When you have settled the administration of justice; when you have established a perfect equilibrium between the revenues and expenses of the state; when you shall have completed the constitution, you will have acquired a strong claim upon the public gratitude, and successive assemblies will only have to preserve what you have gained, and improve upon your first principles. May this day, in which your king unites himself to you, in the most frank and intimate manner, be a memorable epoch in the history of the nation! May all dissensions from henceforward cease, and peace and concord prevail among you! May every one sacrifice his private animosities to the public welfare! May all painful recollections be for ever obliterated! *and if my gratitude and affection can be any compensation for such eradication of long cherished hostilities, I pledge myself that such disinterested patriotism shall be amply recompensed.*

"Let us, I say, from this very day profess (and I set you the example) but one single opinion, one sole interest, and one sole spring of action,—attachment to the newly-formed constitution, an heartfelt desire for peace and the happiness and prosperity of France."

NOTE 16. Page 49, col. 1.

I cannot do better than cite the Memoirs of M. Froment himself, in order to impart a correct idea of emigration, and the contrary opinions which prevailed on this subject; in a volume intituled "A Collection of Sundry Documents relative to the Revolution" (*Recueil de divers Écrits relatifs à la Révolution*), M. Froment expresses himself as follows in the fourth and following pages.

Extract from M. Froment's collection of documents, relative to the revolution:—

"I went secretly to Turin, (*January*, 1790,) to the princes of France, to solicit their approbation and support. On my arrival, a council was held. I there maintained, that *if the partisans of the throne and the altar could be brought to act in concert; if the interests of royalty and religion were linked together, both might be preserved.* Although strongly attached to the faith of my fathers, I felt no resentment against those who had separated from the Church of Rome; but those who were the declared enemies both of catholicism and royalty, those who openly maintained that Jesus Christ and the Bourbons had been too long associates together, were the objects of my enmity, whose aim it was to strangle

at the same time both monarchy and religion. The nonconformists to the Church of Rome *who remained faithful to royalty* have ever found in me a kindly-disposed fellow-citizen, the *rebel Catholics* the most implacable enemy.

"The true argument of the revolutionists being force, I conceived that the true answer should be force likewise: then, as now, I was convinced of this grand truth, *that one strong passion could only be stifled by another still stronger, and that religious zeal could alone subdue republican delirium.* The miracles which zeal for religion has since operated in La Vendée and Spain, prove that all the philosophers and revolutionists would never have succeeded in establishing their anti-religious and anti-social system, in a few years, over the greatest part of Europe, if the ministers of Louis XVI. had conceived a project such as mine, or if foreign princes had sincerely adopted and vigorously maintained it.

"But, unfortunately, most of the persons in the confidence of Louis XVI., and the princes of his house, reasoned and acted on philosophical principles. The very mention of the word religion they thought would cover them with ridicule, and they therefore were ashamed to have recourse to the powerful resources it offered them, though the greatest politicians at all times have made use of them with success. They imagined they could lead the people back to the duties of submission and obedience, by exposing the inconsistencies of the new laws, and by depicting the sufferings of the king. But these means were perfectly inadequate to the object they had in view, for the clamours of discontent could never arrest the enterprises of faction. The adoption of my advice would probably have cost me my life. Its disinterestedness, therefore, ought to have given it value. But the titles and riches of the nobility were more weighty, and prevailed."

M. Froment continues his narrative, and moreover describes the characters of the parties into which the exiled court was divided, in the following mode. Page 33.

"These honourable designations and the respect generally expressed towards me at Turin, would have made me forget the past, and conceive the most flattering hopes of the future, provided I could have perceived great appliances on the part of the counsellors of the princes, and a good understanding amongst the most influential persons in our affairs; but I witnessed with regret that the *emigration was divided into two parties*, whereof the one was not desirous of attempting a counter-revolution, except *by the assistance of foreign powers;* and the other, *by the royalists at home.*

"*The first party* asserted, that by ceding certain provinces to foreign powers, those provinces would furnish to the French princes armies sufficiently numerous to effect a complete reduction of the factions; that after some lapse of time the concessions that had been compulsorily made could be revoked; and that the court by not contracting any obligation with any one particular state body, could give law to all France. . . . The courtiers trembled, lest the provincial nobility and the royalists of the *tiers-état* should have the honour of rescuing the tottering monarchy on the throne. They were sensible that they no longer were the dispensers of bounties and favours, and that their reign would terminate the very moment that the provincial nobility had, at the price of her blood, restored the royal authority, and thereby deserved the gratitude and the confidence of her sovereign. The apprehension of this new order of things brought them to unite together, if not to divert the princes from making use of the royalists at home in any wise soever, at least to make them fix their attention upon the European cabinets, and induce them to found their greatest expectations upon foreign assistance. As a consequence of this apprehension, they secretly put in use the most efficacious means to ruin the resources of the interior, and to thwart the plans proposed, some of which might bring about the restoration of order, had they been discreetly directed and substantially upheld. It is this of which I am able to testify: this it is that I shall some day demonstrate by acts and authentic documents; but the moment has not yet arrived. In a conference which took place much about this period, upon the point as to what party could excite the sympathies of the Lyonnese and the Franch-comtois, I laid down, and that without circumlocution, the measures that ought to be employed, and *at the same time* ensure the ascendancy of the royalists of the Gévandau, the Cevennes, the Vivarais, the Comtat-Venaissin, Languedoc, and Provence. During the heat of the discussion, M. the marquis of Autichamp, a field-marshal, *a great advocate for foreign powers*, said to me, 'But will not the oppressed and the relatives of the victims endeavour to revenge themselves!—Well! what does that matter? so long as we obtain our end!—Don't you see,' he cried, 'that I have brought him to confess that vengeance will be wreaked upon individuals!' Extremely surprised at this observation, I said to the marquis de la Rouzière, who stood near me, 'I am not of opinion that a civil war should resemble a mission of capuchin friars!' It was thus that by exciting in the princes a fear of being made odious in the eyes of their most cruel enemies, the courtiers always induced them to use none but half measures, sufficient, no doubt, to call forth the zeal of the royalists at home, but extremely inadequate, after having compromised them for securing them against the fury of the factions. Since then it has occurred to my recollection, that while the army of the princes was making a stay in Champagne, M. de la Porte, an aid-de-camp of the marquis of Autichamp, having taken a republican prisoner, thought that, by following the system adopted by his commander, he should bring the republican to a sense of his duty by a pathetic exhortation, and by restoring him his army and his liberty; but the republican had not gone many paces before he stretched his conqueror on the earth. M. the marquis of Autichamp, then losing sight of the moderation he had exhibited at Turin, burnt numerous villages, in order to avenge the death of his imprudent missionary.

"*The second party* maintained that since the foreign powers had several times taken arms in order to humiliate the Bourbons, and in particular to prevent Louis XIV. from securing the crown of Spain to his grandson, so far from calling them to our assistance, we had much rather revive the zeal of the clergy, the devotion of the nobility, the love of the people for the king, and *to do one's best to hush up a family quarrel*, of which the foreign enemy might perhaps be tempted to take advantage.

"It is to this fatal dissension amongst the leaders of the emigration, and to the indiscretion or perfidy of the ministers of Louis XVI., that the revolutionists owed their first success. I go still further, and I maintain that it was not the National Assembly that created the revolution, but rather the associates of the king and the princes; I maintain that the ministers have delivered Louis XVI. over to the enemies of royalty, as certain empty-headed personages have betrayed the princes and Louis XVIII. to the enemies of France; I maintain that the greater portion of the courtiers who surrounded the kings, Louis XVI., Louis XVIII., and the princes of that house, were and are *quacks, and true political sondescripts*, (*des charlatans, de vrais eunuques politiques*,) that it is to their inertness, their cowardice, or their treason, all the ills France has undergone, and those which now threaten the whole world, are to be imputed. Admitting that I inherit a great name, and have been of the council of the Bourbons, I shall never get rid of the idea that a horde of vile and cowardly miscreants, not one of whom ever exhibited a particle of originality or superior talent, has contrived to tumble down the throne, to establish her supreme ascendancy amongst the most powerful states of Europe, and made the world tremble before them; and since this idea haunts me, I have buried myself in the utmost privacy, to shelter myself from censure, more especially as this same idea has rendered me totally incompetent to stay the progress of the revolution."

I have already cited some passages of the Memoirs of Ferrières relative to the first session of the states-general. As nothing is of greater importance than to state with precision the true feelings which the revolution excited in the minds of men, I consider that I ought to give a description of the federation from this same Ferrières. It will there be made appear whether the enthusiasm was real, whether it communicated its excitement to others, and whether this revolution was, after all, so hideous as some have desired to make it appear.

"In the mean time, the federalists arrived from all parts of the empire. They were lodged in private houses, whose occupiers most cordially furnished them with beds, linen, wood, and every thing that could make their visit to the capital comfortable and convenient. The municipality took precautions to prevent such a confluence of strangers disturbing the public tranquillity. Twelve thousand labourers worked without ceasing at the preparations in the Champ de Mars; yet the work advanced but slowly, and it was feared that it would not be finished by the 14th of July. In this difficulty the districts invited, in the name of the nation, all the citizens of Paris to assist the labourers. This invitation was accepted with great eagerness. Schoolmasters, scholars, sisters of religious orders, and monks grown old in solitude, quitted their cloisters to assemble at the Champ de Mars, with spades at their backs, and carrying banners ornamented with patriotic emblems over their shoulders. The scene which this plain presented was as singular as it was interesting. The most dissimilar characters were associated together with the most perfect equality; a dishevelled courtezan and virtuous matron might be seen working together as fellow-labourers, a capuchin and a chevalier of St. Louis drawing the same dray, a porter and a petit-maître digging at the same piece of ground, a robust fishwoman and an elegant lady of rank filling the same barrow. The rich, the poor, the well-dressed, and the ragged, old men, children, comedians, soldiers, clerks, some at work, some at rest, actors, and spectators, afforded altogether a spectacle full of life and motion. Moving taverns, and portable shops; songs, and exclamations of joy, the sound of drums and military music, the clatter of spades, and the rumble of barrows, and the voice of the labourers calling to one another, and encouraging each other. The soul melted away under the influence of a delicious enchantment, at the sight of an entire nation reverting all at once to the tender feelings of primitive brotherhood. At nine o'clock the groups separate. Each citizen repairs to the spot where his section is appointed, rejoins his family and acquaintances. Parties form themselves in order of march to the sound of the drum, return to Paris preceded by torches, occasionally uttering sarcastic reflexions upon the aristocrats, and singing the famous air of "Ça ira *."

"Finally, the 14th of July, the day of the confederation, arrived. If this grand ceremony had not the serious and august character of a fête, at the same time religious and national, a character which is nearly irreconcileable with the temper of the French people, it presented a delightful and animated picture of joy and enthusiasm a thousand times more touching. The federalists, ranged by departments under eighty-three banners, set out from the Place of the Bastile; the troops of the line, bands of sailors, the Parisian national guard, drums, choirs of music and flags, opened and closed the march.

"The federalists traversed the streets of Saint-Martin, Saint-Denis, and Saint-Honoré, and proceeded to a bridge of boats, built on the river. They were received in their procession by the acclamations of an immense populace, who thronged the windows, the streets, and the quays. The rain, which came down in torrents, neither disturbed or impeded the procession. The federalists, dripping with rain and perspiration, danced in circles hand in hand, shouting, 'Long live our brothers the Parisians.' Wine, hams, and fruit were let down to them from the windows, and the people hailed them with benedictions. The National Assembly joined the procession at the Place of Louis XV., and marched between a battalion of veterans, and of scholars of the military school: a station expressively emblematic, which seemed to intimate that in them the interests of all ages were united.

"The way leading from the Champ de Mars was thronged with people clapping their hands and singing "Ça ira." The *Quai de Chaillot* and the high grounds of Passy exhibited one long amphitheatre, where the elegance of the dress, the charms and the graceful bearing of the women there seated, charmed the eye and deprived it of the faculty of making a preference in favour of one over another. The rain continued to fall; but no one seemed to care about it; the natural gaiety of the French triumphed over bad weather, muddy streets, and the length of the procession.

"M. de Lafayette, seated on a fine horse, and sur-

* "Ça ira" was the refrain of one of the most noted revolutionary ballads of the day. *Trans.*

rounded by his aids-de-camp, exercised his superintendence, and received the homage of the people and the federalists. His face ran down with perspiration. One man, with whom nobody seemed to be acquainted, made his way through the crowd, holding a bottle in one hand, and a drinking-glass in the other. 'My general, you are hot; here, take a drink.' This man raised his bottle, filled a large tumbler, and handed it to M. de Lafayette. M. de Lafayette took the glass, looked steadily at the unknown, and swallowed the wine at a single draught. The people shouted applause. Lafayette cast a smile of affability and kindness on the crowd; and his look seemed to say, 'I shall never entertain any distrust; I shall experience no anxiety for myself whilst I am in the midst of you all.'

"Meanwhile, more than three hundred thousand persons had been assembling from Paris and the environs, at the Champ de Mars, since six o'clock in the morning. They were seated on the grass bank, which formed a circus round the plain, dripping with rain, and splashed with mud, and holding up parasols to keep off the torrents which poured upon them, and, on the slightest symptom of returning sunshine, wiping their faces, adjusting their dresses, and awaiting with smiles the national assembly. As soon as the first federalists arrived, they struck up a hand in hand dance. Those who followed imitated their example. This spectacle of so great an assemblage of men come from all parts of France, banishing all memory of the past, all thought of the present, and all apprehension of the future, and giving unrestrained loose to the gaiety of the moment; and of three hundred thousand spectators of every age, and both sexes, following their motions with their eyes, beating time with their feet, and forgetting the rain, hunger, and the wearisomeness of waiting so many hours, was worthy the contemplation of a philosopher. At last the whole procession entered the Champ de Mars; the dancing ceased, each federalist went to join his own banner. The bishop of Autun proceeded to solemnize the mass at an altar after the antique, placed in the midst of the Champ de Mars. Three hundred priests in white vestments, with broad tricoloured ribands, arranged themselves round the four corners of the altar. The bishop of Autun blessed the consecrated standard and the eighty-three banners: he then opened the chant of the *Te Deum*. Twelve hundred musicians performed this anthem. Lafayette then, at the head of the Parisian militia, and of the naval and military deputies, approached the altar, and swore in the name of the troops and confederates to be faithful to the nation, the law, and the king. The discharge of four pieces of artillery announced to France this solemn adjuration. The president of the national assembly repeated the same oath. The people took it up, and the words *I swear it*, rent the air. The king rose up and proclaimed with a loud voice, 'I, king of France, swear to employ the power with which a constitutional act of the state has invested me, to maintain the constitution decreed by the national assembly, and accepted of by me.' The queen at the same moment taking the dauphin in her arms, and holding him up to the people, exclaimed, 'Behold my son; he joins me in these sentiments.' This unexpected exclamation called forth a thousand shouts of 'Live the King! Live the Queen! Live the Dauphin!' The cannon continued to mingle their roar with the bands of military music, and the acclamations of the people; the weather cleared up; the sun shone forth in all his splendour; it would seem as if the Supreme Being himself desired to be a witness of this mutual contract, and ratify the same by his presence. Yes, He did witness it, He did hear it; and the frightful calamities which from that day have never ceased to desolate France, (O just Providence!) are the due punishment of a broken oath. Thou hast stricken both the monarch and the subjects who have violated their solemn vow!

"The enthusiastic feeling and the *fêtes* were not confined to the day of the federation. There was, during the stay made by the federalists in Paris, a continued succession of feasting, dancing, and amusements. The Champ de Mars was revisited, and drinking, singing, and dancing took place there. M. de Lafayette reviewed a part of the national guard of the departments and the army of the line. The king, the queen, and the dauphin, were present at this review. They were received with acclamations. The queen graciously presented her hand for the federalists to kiss, and held up the dauphin before them. The federalists, before they quitted the capital, went to pay their respects to the king; all of them exhibited the most respectful demeanour and the most perfect attachment to his person. The chief of the Bretons knelt on one knee, and presenting his sword to Louis XVI. said: 'Sire, I hand you the sword of the loyal Bretons, it will never be stained but with the blood of your enemies.' 'This sword cannot be in better hands than in the keeping of my dear Bretons,' replied Louis XVI. while raising the chief of the Bretons, and returning him his sword; 'I never doubted their attachment and loyalty: assure them that I am the father, the brother, the friend of all the French.' The king, agitated by deep emotion, grasped the hand of the Breton chief, and embraced him. A pause, occasioned by the tender emotions of both parties, protracted this affecting scene. The Breton chief was the first to break silence. 'Sire, every Frenchman, if I can judge of the French by ourselves, have maintained and will preserve the utmost attachment towards you, because you are a citizen king.'

"The municipality of Paris were not behindhand in *fêting* the federalists. There were sports on the river, fireworks, illuminations, a ball and collation at the corn-market, and a ball upon the site of the Bastille. As you entered, there was to be seen in large letters, 'Dancing here;' a felicitous association, which bore a striking contrast to the ancient ideas of honour and despair which that hateful prison was calculated to recall. The people went and came from one place to another without confusion. The police, by prohibiting carriages in the streets, had taken care to prevent those accidents so frequently occurring on occasions of public rejoicing, and thus did away with that tumult, hurry, and terror which not unfrequently gives an appearance of a hurried flight from danger to the best regulated and brilliant public rejoicing. Public *fêtes* are exclusively reserved for the people. If the wealthy are desirous to partake in popular rejoicings, let them on that occasion mix with the people; they will obtain impressions previously

unknown to them, and will disturb by their presence the gaiety of their fellow-citizens.

"It was particularly at the Champs Elysées that reflecting imaginations felt the greatest satisfaction at the sight of this charming popular rejoicing. Lamps were suspended from every tree, festoons of small lamps interlaced one another, pyramidical fireworks, placed at certain distances, gave a strong light, affording a strong contrast to the darkness of the trees. The grass-plots and walks were filled with the people. The tradesman, seated with his wife, in the midst of his children, ate, talked, and walked about, and enjoyed himself. Here were to be observed girls and youths, who were dancing to the sound of bands of music in spaces that they had cleared for themselves. A little further on some sailors, in jackets and aprons, surrounded by parties who seemed interested in their proceedings, endeavoured to climb up poles, rubbed with soap, and to win the prize allotted to him who should contrive to carry off a tri-coloured flag fastened at top. No one could fail to observe the bursts of laughter against those who found themselves compelled to abandon the undertaking, and the hearty cheering afforded to those who, more fortunate or more dexterous, appeared likely to carry off the prize. A tempered and deep-seated satisfaction appeared manifest on every face there, and sparkled in every eye, called to mind the peaceful recreations of the happy shades in the Elysian fields, imagined by the ancients. The white apparel of a vast number of women wandering about under the trees of these splendid walks, still further added to the illusion."—*Ferrières*, vol. ii. p. 89.

Note 18. Page 58, col. 2.

M. de Talleyrand predicted in a very remarkable manner the financial consequences of this paper-money. In his address, he first demonstrates the quality of this money, characterises it with great accuracy, and illustrates the reasons of its approaching depreciation. "The national assembly will not surely," said he, "order another emission of two millions of paper-money. It is thought, perhaps, that this second emission will be successful because the first was so; but it must be recollected, that the demands of commerce, so much increased by the revolution, and which gave so rapid a currency to our first conventional money, which demands were so great, that, in my opinion, your paper would have circulated freely and without force, have very much diminished. To build, therefore, your hopes on your first success, which indeed is not complete, since your assignats lose their value in favour of a second and more ample emission, is to expose the state to great danger, for the empire of the law has its limit; this limit is interest, which we must either respect or violate at our peril!

"Without doubt your assignats when issued will have a character of security which no other paper-money ever had; so precious a pledge, secured by so substantial a mortgage, has never before been created: this I am free to confess. The assignat, considered as a bond of debt, has a positive and material value; this value is exactly equivalent to that of the land which it represents; nevertheless it must be granted, that no national paper will ever be able to keep pace with coin; never will the supplementary sign of the first sign representative of riches have the exact value of its model; its title itself proves the want of specie, and want always creates fear and distrust.

"But why, you will ask, must paper-money always be below coin? Because the exact proportion between the mass of your assignats and that of your territorial acquisitions will always be a matter of doubt; and because the period at which your fund of assignats will be exhausted will not be known; coin and paper being put into currency together, both will become a saleable commodity, and the more abundant this commodity, the lower will fall its price; finally, paper-money may be dispensed with, coin cannot; an abundance of the latter would soon stop the circulation of the former."

Further on the orator adds, "Paper-money must be considered merely as a representative of coin. However sure, therefore, or solid it may be, it is only the sign, whether free or forced, not of riches, but of credit. It follows from hence, that to give paper the character of specie, by making it intermediate between all articles of exchange, is to change the standard value of money, and to operate in a moment that which ages will scarcely bring about in the most flourishing commercial states."

After having shown the nature of the new money, M. de Talleyrand predicts, with singular precision, the confusion which has taken place in private transactions.

"But finally, let us follow the march of the assignats, and see what course they will take. The reimbursed creditor must either buy land with his paper, or keep it, or employ it in gaining other acquisitions. If he purchases land, then your object is gained; I shall applaud you for the creation of the assignats, for they will not have been disseminated by circulation, and will have effected that which you desired, by giving the public creditors the ability of paying themselves by the public domains. But if the distrustful creditor prefers neglecting your interests by preserving a dormant claim; or if he converts his assignats into coin to get rid of them, or transports them into foreign countries in exchange for goods; or if these instances are much more numerous than the *former*; if, in a word, the assignats remain a long time in circulation before they are annihilated; if they are forced into and remain in the hands of men obliged to receive them as equal in value to coin, and who, owing nothing, cannot dispose of them but with loss; if they become the occasion of great injustice committed by debtors towards their creditors by forcing them to receive assignats as equal to money, whilst in reality their value is less, since it will be impossible to oblige sellers to receive them at such a value, that is to say, without augmenting the price of their merchandise in proportion to the inferiority of the assignats; then how much will this ingenious operation have deceived the patriotism of those whose sagacity has planned, and who sincerely defend it; and to what inconsolable regrets shall we not be condemned for our precipitate confidence."

It cannot then be said, that the constituent assembly was in utter ignorance of its determination; but to these conjectures we can reply one of those answers which no one ever ventures to make at the particular period, but that which must become decisive, and are so in their consequence: this

answer was, necessity; that is to say, the necessity for providing for the national debt, and dividing the national property.

NOTE 19. Page 59, col. 2.

It is not possible that there should not be a diversity of opinion on a work composed collectively, by a great number of men. Unanimity is rare; every one must have disapproved of that which he voted against. Thus each article of the constitution of 1791 was condemned by individuals of that body which framed it; nevertheless it was their real and incontestable work. The want of unanimity which is here noticed must happen to every deliberative body. Mirabeau's plan, therefore, was nothing but a fraud. It might even be said, that there was but little delicacy in his procedure, but we must excuse that in a great but irregular man, who seemed to think the propriety of the end justified the means, I mean the morality of the object in view, for Mirabeau was a sincere believer in the necessity there was for a reformed constitution; and so far as his ambition and his petty personal rivalries could assist in estranging him from the popular party, he had a great dread of anarchy. Others, far differently constituted than he was, dreaded the court and the aristocracy far more than the people. Thus he had real dangers to apprehend, whatever position he took. Conviction shifts with the point from which the view is made, and morality, that is to say, integrity, may be found in parties the most opposed to each other.

NOTE 20. Page 61, col. 1.

Ferrières, who was an eye-witness of the intrigues of this period, relates those which were employed to prevent the priests from taking the oath. This passage appears to be too characteristic not to be cited.

"The bishops and the revolutionists consult and intrigue together; the one party to force the priests to take the oath, the other to hinder them. Both parties feel the influence which the conduct of the ecclesiastics of the assembly will have in the provinces. The bishops become intimate with their curates; all the devout are in great agitation. All conversations turn upon the oath of the clergy. It appears as if the fate of France, and the destiny of all Frenchmen, depended on the taking or rejection of it. Men the most liberal in their religious opinions, and women the most infamous in their morals, have become, all at once, severe theologians and zealous upholders of the purity and integrity of the Romish faith.

"The *Journal de Fontenay*, *L'Ami du Roi*, and the *Gazette de Durosoir*, employ their ordinary arms, exaggeration, falsehood, and calumny. Numerous papers are circulated by them, in the which the civil constitution of the clergy is treated as schismatical, heretical, and destructive of religion. The bigots carry these papers from house to house; they pray, beg, or make threats, according to the different dispositions or characters they have to deal with. To some are displayed pictures of the clergy triumphant, the assembly dissolved, the prevaricating ecclesiastics deprived of their benefices, and shut up in houses of correction, and those who have remained faithful, rewarded with glory and riches. The pope, according to these representations, is about to launch his thunders against the sacrilegious assembly and apostate priests. The people, deprived of the sacraments, are to rise in insurrection, foreign powers to enter France, and the edifice of iniquity which has been raised by the assembly, is about to crumble on its own foundations."—*Ferrières*, vol. ii. p. 198.

NOTE 21. Page 62, col. 1.

M. Froment relates the following fact in his memoirs already cited:—

"Under these circumstances, the princes conceived the idea of forming regiments in the interior of the kingdom entirely composed of those who remained loyal subjects of the king, to make use of them till the troops of the line were entirely re-organized. Being desirous of being at the head of the royalists whom I had commanded in 1789 and 1790, I wrote to Monsieur the count d'Artois, to beg his royal highness to grant me the brevet rank of colonel commandant, on the condition of my enlisting a sufficient number of citizens to form a regiment, requesting him at the same time to make the same grant to every other royalist. M. the count d'Artois applauded the idea, and received my demand favourably, but the members of the council did not entertain the same sentiments; they found it so strange that a *bourgeois* should pretend to a military brevet, that one of them asked me in a disdainful manner, *why I did not demand a bishopric?* my only answer to this observation was a burst of laughter, which a little disconcerted the gravity of the interrogator. Nevertheless the question was discussed again at the house of M. de Flaschlanden; this council thought that the new corps should be denominated '*legions bourgeoises*.' I observed that under this title they would simply form new bodies of national guards; that the princes could not order them to march wherever they might be required, because their duty would merely be to defend their own homes; that it was to be feared that the factions would embroil them with the troops of the line; that the revolutionists had, under specious titles, armed the people against the public authorities; and that it would be wise to follow their example, and give to the new corps the denomination of the *royal militia*, that * * * *

"The bishop of Arras here interrupting me suddenly, said, 'No, no, sir, the word *bourgeois* must be in your commission;' and the baron de Flaschlanden, who drew it up, accordingly introduced that denomination."—*Collection of Papers relative to the Revolution*, p. 62.

NOTE 22. Page 68, col. 1.

The following are the details of the return from Varennes which madame Campan received from the mouth of the queen herself:—

"On the day of my arrival, the queen called me into her cabinet to tell me that she should have great occasion for me to carry on the communications she had entered into with Messieurs Barnave, Duport, and Alexander Lameth. She informed me that M. J—— was her mediator with these members of the constitutional party, who had good intentions, unhappily too late; and assured me that Barnave was a man worthy of esteem. I was astonished to hear her pronounce the name of Barnave with so much kindness. When I quitted Paris he was spoken of only with abhorrence. I made this

remark to her; she was not astonished at it, but said that he was very much changed; and that he was a young man of genius and noble sentiments, but misled by ambition: 'a sentiment of pride which I cannot very heavily censure in a young man of the *tiers état*,' said the queen, when speaking of Barnave, 'captivated him with all that paved the way to distinction for that class in which he is born; and if ever power return into our hands, the pardon of Barnave is already written in our hearts.' The queen added, 'that it was not the same with respect to the nobles who had thrown themselves into the revolution, for they had obtained all the favours of the court, and often to the detriment of the inferior classes, among whom the greatest talents were found; and finally, that being nobles, they were the natural rampart of monarchy, and were consequently too culpable to be pardoned.' The queen astonished me more and more by the warmth with which she justified the favourable opinion she had conceived of Barnave. She told me that his conduct on the road was that of a perfect gentleman, whilst the republican rudeness of Pétion was disgusting, for that the latter ate and drank in the most uncleanly manner in the carriage, and threw his bones out of the window, at the risk of throwing them into the king's face; and that this conduct was premeditated, since the man had received some education, and that Barnave was perfectly shocked. He, when he was pressed by the queen to take some refreshment, replied, 'Madame, the deputies of the national assembly, on so solemn an occasion as the present, only claim your majesty's attention with regard to their mission, and not with regard to their wants.' All these respectful regards and delicate attentions gained not only the goodwill of the queen, but that of madame Elizabeth.

"The king had begun to talk to Pétion on the situation of France, and the motives of his own conduct, which were founded on the necessity of giving a necessary force to the action of the executive power, for the good of the constitution itself, since France could not become a republic. 'Not yet, in truth,' replied Pétion, 'because the French are not sufficiently ripe for that.' This audacious and cruel reply imposed silence on the king, who spoke no more till his arrival at Paris. Pétion held on his knees the young dauphin; he amused himself by twisting the auburn locks of this interesting child round his fingers, and in the vehemence of speaking pulled his hair so violently as to make him cry. 'Give me my son,' said the queen, 'he has been accustomed to care and attention, which render him ill fit for such familiarities.'

"The chevalier de Dampierre had been killed near the carriage of the king going out of Varennes. A poor curate of a village at some leagues distant from the place where this crime was committed had the imprudence to approach to speak to the king; the infuriate rabble surrounded the carriage and attacked him furiously. 'Tigers,' said Barnave, 'have you ceased to be Frenchmen? Nation of heroes, have you become a race of assassins?' These words alone saved from certain death the curate, who was already thrown to the earth. Barnave, in pronouncing them, sprang nearly out of the door of the carriage, and madame Elizabeth, touched by his noble feelings, held him back by his coat. The queen said, when speaking of this event, that at the most critical moments, ridiculous contrasts always struck her; and, in the present instance, the pious Elizabeth holding Barnave back by his coat, appeared to her a most comic situation. The deputy experienced another kind of astonishment. The discourse of madame Elizabeth on the situation of France, her soft and persuasive eloquence, the noble simplicity with which she conversed with Barnave, without diminishing, in the least degree, her dignity, appeared to him enchanting in this charming princess, and his heart, disposed to receive the noblest sentiments, if it had not been seduced into error, was captivated by the most touching admiration. The conduct of the two deputies displayed to the queen at once the distinction between the republican and constitutional party. At the inns where she stopped she had some private conversations with Barnave. He spoke much of the faults of the royalists during the revolution, and said that he had found the interests of the court so feebly and badly defended, that he had been many times tempted to offer himself as its courageous champion, who knew the spirit of the age and the nation. The queen asked him what were the means the employment of which he would have advised? 'Popularity, madam,' replied he. 'And how could I have any?' answered her majesty. 'Ah, madame,' said Barnave, 'it would be much more easy for you to command it than for me to obtain it.' This assertion has furnished matter for commentary; I confine myself to the narration of this curious conversation."—*Memoirs of Madame Campan*, vol. ii. p. 150.

Note 23. Page 69, col. 1.

The following is the answer itself from the pen of Barnave, a beautiful specimen of argument, address, and dignity.

"I see, gentlemen," said Louis to the commissioners, "I see by the object of your mission that there is no question here of interrogation; so that I myself wish to fulfil the desires of the assembly. I shall never fear to make the motives of my conduct public. The outrages and menaces which were practised against me and my family on the 18th of April, were the cause of my quitting Paris. Many writers had endeavoured to excite the people to violence against my person and family. There appeared to be no more safety or even consideration for me in this city. I never intended to quit the kingdom; I have never entered into any plan for the furtherance of such an object, neither with foreign powers, with any relations, nor with any of the French emigrants. As a proof of my intentions, I can assure you lodgings were prepared for me at Montmédy. I chose this place because, being fortified, my family would be in greater security; and because, being near the frontier, I should have been better prepared to oppose any invasion of France, if any had been attempted. One of my principal motives in quitting Paris was to destroy the argument of my want of freedom, which might have given occasion to disturbances. If I had had the intention of quitting the kingdom, I should not have published my declaration on the very day of my departure; I should have waited till I was beyond the frontiers; but I always retained the desire of returning to Paris. It is in this sense that the last sentence of my declaration should be understood, in which it is said, 'Frenchmen, and you especially, Parisians, with what pleasure shall I

not return again amongst you!' I had only in my carriage three thousand louis in gold, and fifty-six thousand livres in assignats. I only informed Monsieur of my intended departure a very short time before it took place. Monsieur went into a foreign country, because he had agreed with me that we should not take the same road: it was his intention to return to France after me. The passport was necessary to facilitate my journey, and was taken for a foreign country because passports are not given at the foreign-office for the interior of the kingdom. The road to Frankfort was not even followed. I made no protestation except that which I left in my declaration before my departure. This protest does not touch upon, as its contents show, the fundamental principles of the constitution, but the form of the sanctions, that is to say, the little liberty I appeared to enjoy, and on the impossibility of judging of the constitution as a whole, the decrees having been presented to me separately, and not in a body. The principal reproach which is contained in the declaration relates to the difficulties attending the administrative and executive powers. I observed, in my journey, that the public opinion was in favour of the constitution; I could not form an opinion of the public opinion of Paris; but from the remarks I have personally made on my journey, I am convinced how necessary it is, for the support of the constitution, to give strength to the established authorities for the maintenance of public order. Immediately I perceived the general wish of the nation, I hesitated no longer, as I have never hesitated in making a sacrifice of any thing personal to myself. The happiness of the people has always been the object of my desires. I shall forget willingly all the troubles I have experienced, if I can promote the welfare of the nation."

NOTE 24. Page 72, col. 1.

Bouillé possessed an intimate friend in the count de Gouvernet; and although they did not agree upon every point, they had a great regard for each other. Bouillé, who deals but little in constitutionals, expresses himself with the highest respect towards M. Gouvernet, and opens his mind fully on the subject. For the purpose of imparting in his memoirs a notion of what was taking place in the assembly at this period, he cites the following letter, written to himself by the count de Gouvernet, the 26th August, 1791:—

"I have given you hopes which I entertain no longer myself. This fatal constitution, which was to have been revised and ameliorated, will remain unaltered. It will remain, as it is, a code of anarchy, a source of calamities; and our baneful star, at the very moment when the democrats perceived, in some degree, their errors, has caused the aristocrats to refuse their support, and oppose all reparation. To inform you of the present state of affairs, and to clear myself from the imputation of having given you false hopes, I must take a retrospective view, and acquaint you with all that has lately happened, as I have at present an opportunity of writing to you.

"On the first and second day of the departure of the king, the two sides of the assembly remained in an attitude of observation on the respective movements of each other. The popular party was struck with consternation; the royalist party appeared unquiet; the least indication might have awakened the fury of the people. All the members of the right side remained silent, and those of the left, left to their leaders the proposition of those measures which they called measures of security, and which no one opposed. On the second day the jacobins became menacing, and the constitutionalists moderate. The latter were then and are still much more numerous than the jacobins. These spoke of an accommodation, and a deputation to the king. A conference to be held the next day was also proposed to M. Malouet, but the arrest of the king prevented it taking place. Nevertheless the opinions of the constitutionalists were decidedly pronounced by the part they had already taken, and this separated them still more widely from the violent party. Barnave, since his return, has shown a disposition decidedly favourable to the royal sufferers. He, as you know, is the most talented of his party. As a first effort of his newly-acquired zeal, he rallied around him four-fifths of the left side, not only to save the king from the fury of the jacobins, but also to restore to him a portion of his former authority, and enable him in future to defend himself without violating the constitution. With regard to the last part of Barnave's plan, Lameth and Duport were alone in the secret; the revision of the constitution still inspired much apprehension, and the constitutionalists could by no means make sure of a majority without counting the members of the right side; this, however, they thought they might confidently do, and therefore in the approaching revision intended to give a wider latitude to the royal authority.

"Such was the state of things when I wrote to you last. But convinced as I was of the perverse disposition of the aristocrats, and of the continual inconsistencies of their conduct, I did not think they would have gone so far as they have gone.

"As soon as the news of the arrest of the king was known, the right side, in their secret committees, resolved to vote no longer, and to take no part in the deliberations or discussions of the assembly. Malouet did not agree with them in this resolution. He represented to them that whilst the session lasted, and they assisted at it, they were under an obligation to oppose actively every measure destructive of public order, and the fundamental principles of monarchy. All these representations were useless; they persisted in their resolution, and drew up secretly a protest against all the acts of the assembly. Malouet protested in his turn against the adoption of this measure, and made every effort to prevent its being carried into effect. He, however, gained over only from thirty-five to forty members to his opinion, and he told me that he feared greatly that Barnave's plan would fail for want of support.

"The general dispositions of the assembly were so favourable to the king, that whilst he was on his road to Paris, Thouret having ascended the tribune to determine the manner in which he should be guarded, (I was at the sitting,) the most perfect silence prevailed throughout the chamber, and in the galleries. All listened to the fatal decree with an air of consternation; but no one spoke. The president was going to put it to the vote, when, all at once, Malouet rose up, and with an indignant air cried out, 'What are you

about to do, gentlemen? After having arrested your king, do you propose to make him a prisoner? Where will this conduct lead you? Think well of it. Will you order your king to be imprisoned?' '*No! no!*' exclaimed many members of the left side, rising in tumult; '*we do not mean that the king should be a prisoner*;' and the decree was on the point of being almost unanimously rejected, when Thouret hastened to add,—

"'The object of this decree has been wilfully misinterpreted. The imprisonment of the king has never been contemplated, it is only for his safety, and that of his family, that measures are proposed.' It was only after this explanation that the decree passed, although the imprisonment is real, and is shamelessly prolonged even to the present moment.

"Towards the end of July, the constitutionalists, who expected a protest from the right side, yet were not sure of it, gradually pursued their plan of revision. They feared the jacobins and aristocrats more than ever. Malouet attended their committee of revision. He spoke to them first as to men to whom he could teach nothing with respect to the dangers and vices of their constitution; but he found them little disposed to great reforms. They feared the loss of their popularity. Target and Duport warmly defended their work. The next day Chapelier, who had at first disdainfully refused to hear any thing of Barnave's plan, but had afterwards agreed to take part in it, joined this conference. Malouet proposed discussing in the sitting of the 8th, the merits of all the principal articles of the constitution, and severally pointing out its vices. 'You, gentlemen,' said he, 'answer me; overwhelm me with your indignation; defend your work skilfully on the least dangerous articles, and even on the majority of points to which my censures will be directed; and as to those which I shall declare to be anti-monarchical, reply that neither the assembly nor the committee needed my remarks on those questions; that you intended yourself to propose the reform of the articles to which I had alluded, and forthwith propose it.' This plan was agreed to; but the protest of the right side being known, and their obstinate determination to withhold their votes from every discussion, whilst the strenuous opposition of the jacobins was certain, it was given up with deep regret. Malouet, who had no regular communications with the constitutionalists, nevertheless made his attack. He solemnly rejected the constitution as anti-monarchical, and impracticable on many points. His arguments had already begun to make a great impression, when Chapelier, who expected no success from this project, interrupted the orator, declared he had been uttering blasphemies, and requested the president to make him descend the tribune, which he was, in fact, obliged to do. The next day he avowed that he had been to blame; but said that the obstinacy of the right side had deprived himself and his party of all hope, and that they were therefore unwilling to venture an attack which would certainly prove fruitless.

"It was necessary to give you this long history, that you might not lose all confidence in my prognostications. They are gloomy at present; the evil of the state of public affairs is extreme; and I see, neither within nor without, but one remedy, that of adding force to reason."—*Memoirs of Bouillé*, p. 282.

Note 25. Page 74, col. 2.

The minister Bertrand de Molleville has given us so clear an insight into the inclinations of the king and queen at the commencement of the first legislative assembly, that no doubt can remain of their sincerity at that time. The following is an account of his first interview with these august personages:—

"After having answered to some general observations I had made concerning the difficulty of circumstances in which, as minister, I should be placed, and the numerous errors I might commit in a situation, the duties of which I was perfectly unacquainted with, the king continued: 'Well! have you any other objection to make?'—'*No, sire*, the desire to obey and please your majesty is the only sentiment I feel; but to know whether I can flatter myself with the idea of doing this, it will be necessary to give me some notion of your majesty's plan relative to the observance of the constitution, and what is the conduct you would wish your ministers to pursue.'

"'This is just,' replied the king; 'I do not, I must confess, regard the constitution as a *chef-d'œuvre*, and what is more, I believe it has great defects, and that if I had the liberty of addressing some observations to the assembly on the subject, very advantageous reforms might result from them; but the time for doing this has passed by; I have accepted of it, such as it is; I have sworn to put it into execution; it is my duty to do so. I will be strictly faithful to my oath, and more particularly so, because I believe that the most exact execution of the constitution is the surest method of making its defects known to the nation, and of bringing about such reforms as it may require. I have, and can have no other plan than this; I shall never deviate from it myself, and it is my desire that the conduct of my ministers should be conformable to it also.' 'This plan appears to me infinitely wise, sire; I feel myself perfectly disposed to follow it, and I enter into the engagement so to do. I have not sufficiently studied the new constitution, either in its general character, or its details, to have any decided opinion concerning it, and I shall abstain from adopting any, till the execution of it has enabled the nation to appreciate its merits by its effects. But is it permitted me to ask your majesty whether the opinion of the queen is conformable to that of your majesty?' 'Yes, absolutely; she will tell you so herself.'

"I then visited the queen, who after having declared, with extreme graciousness, that she felt herself under the same obligation to me as the king, by my acceptation of the ministry at such a critical period, added these words: 'The king has acquainted you with his intentions relative to the constitution; do you not think that the only plan he should follow, is to be faithful to his oath?' 'Yes, certainly, madame.' 'Well! be assured that no one will make us change it. Courage, M. Bertrand, all is not yet lost; patience, firmness, and time will restore all.'"—*Bertrand de Molleville*, vol. vi. p. 22.

Note 26. Page 77, col. 1.

We learn from madame Campan that the king had a secret correspondence with Coblentz.

"Whilst couriers carried letters from the king to

his brothers, and the foreign princes, the assembly prayed him to write to the princes to persuade them to return to France. The king ordered the abbé de Montesquiou to write such a letter as he would wish to send them. This letter, which was excellently written, in a style touching and simple, suitable to the character of the king, and filled with powerful arguments for rallying round the constitution, was given to me by the king that I might take a copy of it.

"About this time, M. Mor . . . , one of the superintendents of the household of Monsieur, obtained a passport from the assembly to join that prince, on some indispensable domestic affair. The queen chose him for the porter of this letter; she insisted upon giving it him herself, and explaining to him its contents. The choice of this courier astonished me: the queen assured me he was perfectly suitable; that she even reckoned on his indiscretion, for that it was essential that the knowledge of this letter being written from the king to his brother should get abroad. *The princes were, without doubt, warned by the private correspondence of this manœuvre.* Nevertheless, Monsieur manifested some surprise at the receipt of the letter, and the messenger returned more hurt than gratified by a mark of confidence which might have cost him his life during the reign of terror."—*Memoirs of Madame Campan*, vol. ii. p. 172.

NOTE 27. Page 78, col. 2.

Letter of the King to his Brother Louis Stanislaüs Xavier.

"*Paris, 11th Nov.* 1791.

"I wrote to you, my brother, on the 16th of October last, and you ought not to have doubted of the truth of the sentiments I then expressed. I am astonished that my letter did not produce the effect I had a right to expect from it. I have appealed to every motive which ought to influence you, to recall you to your duties. Your absence affords a pretext to evil designers, and a sort of excuse to all those who are misled, and who think they are serving me by keeping France in a state of inquietude and agitation, which is the torment of my life. The revolution is finished, the constitution is established, France has chosen it, and I will maintain it; it is on its stability that the safety of the monarchy at present depends. The constitution has given you rights, but has imposed a condition upon them which you ought to hasten to fulfil. Believe me, my brother, and dismiss those doubts which have been instilled into you, with respect to my liberty. I am about to prove, by a solemn act, and at a most interesting conjuncture, that I can act freely. Prove to me that you are my brother and a Frenchman, by yielding to my entreaties. Your proper place is near me; your interest, and the sentiments of your heart, must equally prompt you to resume it; I invite you, or if I must, I command you to do so.

(*Signed*) "LOUIS."

The Answer of Monsieur to the King.

"*Coblentz, Dec. 3rd*, 1791.

"Sire, my Brother and Lord,—The count de Vergennes has sent me a letter from your majesty, the address of which, although my Christian names are on it, so little resembles mine, that I thought of returning it unopened. Nevertheless, on his positive assurance that it was for me, I opened it, and the name of brother leaving me no doubt of its being intended for me, I read it with the respect which is due to the handwriting and signature of your majesty. The order which it contains for me to return near the person of your majesty, is not the free expression of your majesty's will, and my honour, my duty, and even my affection equally forbid my obedience. If your majesty would wish to have a more detailed explanation of my motives, I pray your majesty to refer to my letter of the 10th of September last. I pray you also graciously to receive the homage of the most tender and respectful sentiments, with which

"I am, Sire, &c. &c. &c."

Letter of the King to his Brother Charles Philip.

"*Paris, 11th Nov.* 1791.

"You have assuredly been informed of the decree which the national assembly have passed with respect to emigrants, to which I have thought it my duty to refuse my consent, as I would wish to persuade myself that gentle means will more effectually accomplish the proposed end, which the interest of the state imperatively calls for. My uniform conduct with respect to you can leave you no doubt as to my intentions or wishes. The public tranquillity and my personal repose are interested in your return. You certainly cannot persist in a conduct which disturbs France and afflicts me, without failing in your most essential duties. Spare me the regret of having recourse to severe measures against you; consult your true interest; allow yourself to be guided by the love which you owe to your country, and yield, finally, to the desires of the nation, and those of your king. This conduct, on your part, will be a proof of your sentiments of attachment to me, and will secure to you the continuance of those I have always entertained for you. (*Signed*) "LOUIS."

Answer of the Count d'Artois to the King.

"*Coblentz, Dec. 3rd*, 1791.

"Sire, my Brother and Lord,—The count de Vergennes sent me yesterday a letter, which he assures me was addressed to me by your majesty. The superscription which gives me a title which I cannot admit of, made me believe that the letter was not destined for me; nevertheless, as I recognised the seal of your majesty, I opened it, and paid due respect to the handwriting and signature of my sovereign; but the total omission of the name of brother, and, more than all, the decisions referred to in the letter, gave me a new proof of the moral and physical captivity in which our enemies dare to retain your majesty. After this discovery, your majesty will not be surprised, if, faithful to my duty, and the laws of honour, I yield not obedience to orders evidently extorted by violence.

"For the rest, the letter I had the honour of writing to your majesty, conjointly with Monsieur, on the 10th of September last, contains those sentiments, principles, and resolutions, from which I shall never deviate; I refer your majesty therefore to that; in it is contained the fundamental principles of my conduct, from which I here again pledge myself never to swerve. I pray your majesty to receive the homage of my most tender and respectful sentiments, with which

"I am, Sire, &c. &c. &c."

NOTE 28. Page 78, col. 2.

The report of Messrs. Gallois and Gensonné is, without contradiction, the best account of the commencement of the disturbances in La Vendée. The beginning of these disturbances is the most interesting part, because it brings us acquainted with their cause. I think it therefore necessary to cite this report. It appears to me to throw light on one of the most curious parts of this fatal history.

Report of Messieurs Gallois and Gensonné, Civil Commissaries, sent into the Departments of La Vendée and the Two Sèvres, by virtue of a decree of the Constituent Assembly, received by the Legislative Assembly, on the 9th of October, 1791.

"Gentlemen,—The national assembly decreed on the 16th of July last, on the report of its committee of inquiry, that civil commissaries should be sent into the department of La Vendée, to gain all the information they could procure on the causes of the late disturbances in that country, and to endeavour to repress them, and, in concert with the legislature, to prevent their recurrence.

"On the 23rd of July we received this mission, and we set out two days after for Fontenay-le-Compte, the chief town of the department.

"After having conferred some days with the administrators of the directory on the situation of things, and the disposition of the public mind; and after having, in conjunction with the administrative bodies, entered into some preliminary measures for the maintenance of public order, we determined to travel into the different districts into which this department is divided, that we might examine whether the complaints which had reached us were true or false, real or exaggerated, and that we might be able to state, with the greatest possible exactness, the situation of this department.

"We have now traversed nearly the whole of its extent, sometimes to gain necessary information; sometimes to maintain peace and prevent disturbances, and at others to ward off acts of violences with which some citizens believed themselves menaced.

"We have received from many district directories communications from all the municipalities of which they are composed; we have listened, with great attention, to all citizens who had either facts to communicate, or views to propose to us; and we have with great care collected all the details which have come to our knowledge; but as our information has been multiplied rather than various, as the facts, complaints, and observations, which have come under our notice have always been of the same description, we think it best to present to you, under one general point of view, and in a concise but exact manner, the general result of such a multitude of particulars.

"We consider it useless to lay before you the details we have procured concerning former disturbances; they do not appear to us to have had any direct influence on the actual situation of the department; besides, the law of amnesty having arrested the progress of those law proceedings to which these troubles had given rise, we could only give you, on those subjects, vague conjectures and uncertain results.

"As the time when the ecclesiastical oath was first enforced, disturbances took place in the department of La Vendée; until then the people had enjoyed the greatest tranquillity. Being far removed from the common centre of activity and tumult, and disposed, by their natural character, to peace and good order, they seemed to enjoy the benefits of the revolution, without partaking of its evils.

"The seclusion of this province, its difficulty of communication with any other, the simplicity of an agricultural life, ignorance of letters, and the seductions of a worship extremely captivating, have rendered the inhabitants of these parts so susceptible of superstitious feelings, and kindled such a fanatical enthusiasm in their minds, that it appears hopeless to endeavour to enlighten their understandings by reason.

"The religion of the Vendeans, that is to say, the view they have taken of religion, has become the strongest, or to speak more properly, the only moral feeling of life; the most essential duty it presents is the worship of images, and the minister of this worship, whom the inhabitants regard as the dispenser of heavenly blessings, who can, say they, by the fervour of his prayers, mitigate the inclemency of the seasons, who, they believe, has power to determine their eternal weal or woe, has acquired absolute control over the most amiable and ardent affections of their souls.

"The constancy of these people in their religious fervour, and the unlimited confidence their priests enjoy, are the principal causes of the disturbances which have taken place, and may still continue to prevail in this department.

"It is easy to conceive with what activity the priests and the factions take advantage of this disposition of the people in their favour; nothing has been neglected to inflame their zeal, to alarm their consciences, to fortify the weak, and inspirit the daring; inquietude and remorse has been instilled into the minds of some; to others hopes of triumph and success have been held out; and the influence of seduction or of fear has been successfully practised upon nearly all.

"Many of the ecclesiastics of these districts act their part with sincerity; they appear to be strongly impressed with the opinions they propagate, and the sentiment they inspire; others are accused of concealing their real designs under the cloak of religion; and the political activity of these latter increases or moderates, according to circumstances.

"A powerful coalition has been formed between the former bishop of Luçon, and a part of the clergy of his diocese; they have resolved upon a plan of opposition to the execution of many decrees about to be carried into effect in several parishes; mandates and inflammatory publications have been addressed to all the curates, to fortify their resolutions of resistance, or to engage them in a confederation which is supposed to be general; a circular letter of M. Beauregard, grand-vicar of M. de Merci, formerly bishop of Luçon, deposited at the registry of the tribunal of Fontenay, and which the ecclesiastic has since acknowledged in his examination, will enable you, gentlemen, to form a pretty correct opinion, both of the secret of this coalition, and of the skilful and combined plan which has been formed for forwarding their designs. It is as follows:—

"*Letter dated Luçon, 31st of May, 1791, addressed under cover to the Curate of Ricorthe.*

"'Sir,—A decree of the national assembly, dated May 7th, grants to those ecclesiastics which it pretends to deprive of the exercise of their functions, on account of their refusal to take the oath, the use of parish churches solely for the purpose of celebrating mass; the same decree authorises Roman Catholics, as also all nonconformists, to assemble for the practice of their religious worship in any place they may choose for that purpose, on condition that in their public exhortations the civil constitution of the clergy be not animadverted on.

"'The liberty granted to the legitimate pastors by the first article of this decree, should be regarded only as a dangerous snare; almost all the churches have been seized upon by false pastors; the faithful may, therefore, be forced to listen to their instructions, and receive the sacrament from schismatics, which the laws of the church forbid. To avoid so great an evil, all curates will feel the necessity of securing at least one place, where they can, by virtue of the second article of the decree, exercise their functions, and assemble their faithful parishioners, whilst their pretended successors occupy their church; without this precaution, many, in the fear of being deprived of the mass, and other divine institutions, might be induced to communicate with false pastors, and thus be exposed to the risk of almost inevitable seduction.

"'In the parishes where there are but few rich proprietors, it will undoubtedly be difficult to find a suitable place, and to procure sacred vases, &c.; in such cases, a simple barn, a portable altar, and earthenware vases, will serve to solemnize the sacred mysteries.

"'This simplicity and poverty, by recalling to our minds the first ages of the church, the cradle of our holy religion, will be a powerful means of exciting the zeal of the ministers, and the fervour of the faithful.

"'The bishop of Luçon, in the instructions he has transmitted to us as a supplement to those of the bishop of Langres, and which will be equally communicated to the other dioceses, urges all the clergy,—

"'1st. To keep a registry in duplicate of all acts of baptism, marriage, or burial, of all the catholics of their respective parishes; one of these registers to remain in their own hands, and the other to be deposited yearly in the hands of some person worthy of confidence.

"'2nd. Besides this register, all curates are also recommended to keep another, with a duplicate, in which to insert all acts of dispensation relative to marriages; these acts to be signed by two credible and faithful witnesses, and to give them the greater validity, the registers in which they are inserted should be approved and examined by the bishop, or in his absence by one of his vicars-general; a duplicate of this document should also be committed to the care of some trustworthy individual.

"'3rd. The clergy will be careful not to retire from their respective churches till the nomination of their successors is specifically notified to them, upon which they will do well to protest against such violation of their rights.

"'4th. They are also commanded to prepare secretly legal statements of the instructions of their successors, of which I subjoin a model; and to give this act all possible validity, it should be signed by the curate, his vicar, and, if there is one, by a neighbouring priest, or by two or three pious and discreet laymen, all precautions nevertheless being observed to keep it secret.

"'5th. Those of the clergy whose functions may be suppressed without the intervention of the legitimate bishops, must regard themselves always as the only legitimate pastors of their parishes, and should it be impossible to remain in those parishes, they should endeavour to procure a lodging in the neighbourhood, so as to be enabled to attend to the spiritual necessities of their parishioners.

"'6th. Should the civil power deny the use of the common burial-ground to the faithful, or should the parents of the deceased manifest any great repugnance to his being interred in any particular spot, though specially consecrated, the legitimate pastor having solemnized the service of the ritual in his house, the body of the defunct may be carried to the door of the church; but should the false pastor interfere, the procession must retire instantly, to avoid contamination.

"'I beg of you, sir, and those of your brethren to whom you may think fit to communicate my letter, to have the goodness to inform us of the moment of your removal, and of the installation of your pretended successor; of the most remarkable circumstances which may attend it; of the dispositions of your parishioners; of the steps you may think it your duty to take for the service of your parishioners; and of your abode, if you should be absolutely forced to quit your present residence. You must be aware that all these details are particularly interesting to us; your troubles and ours are the same, and we ardently desire to lighten your sufferings by bearing our share in all that may befall you.

"'I have the honour to be, with the most respectful and inviolable attachment, your most obedient humble servant.'

"These attempts to excite disturbances have been powerfully seconded by the missionaries established in the town of St. Laurent, in the district of Montaign. It is to their activity and zeal, to their plots and secret exhortations, that we chiefly ascribe the troubled state of the department, and we feel it our duty to call the attention of the assembly to the conduct of these zealots, and to the spirit by which they seem to be actuated.

"This establishment was founded about sixty years ago; it is supported by charity, and the only business of the priests who are the objects of this bounty, is preaching. These missionaries, who have acquired the attachment of the people by distributing indulgences, and such like practices, have lately become sufficiently numerous to found other establishments in several parts of the kingdom. There are now hordes of them to be found in Poitou, Anjou, Bretanny, and Annis; but their principal place of abode is St. Laurent. In this last town, they have built a spacious and beautiful meeting-house, and have acquired, it is said, other territorial property.

"This institution is allied to another, an establishment of sisters of the grey order. These latter

give up their time to the service of the poor, and are constant in their attendance upon hospitals: they afford a medium of general correspondence to the missionaries to all parts of the kingdom, and on some occasions, when the intolerance of their zeal has provoked their expulsion from the hospitals, they have taken refuge in the religious asylum of their brother fanatics, the priests.

"To enable you to form an opinion of the conduct of these zealous missionaries, and of the religious morality which they profess, it will be sufficient, gentlemen, to present you with an abridged summary of the maxims contained in several manuscripts which have been seized in their houses by the national guards of Angers and Cholet.

"These manuscripts, drawn up in the form of instructions for the country people, establish it as a principle, that none can communicate with the constitutional priests, denominated intruders, for the administration of the sacraments, without incurring the guilt of a mortal sin; that those who are married by these intruders are not really married, and that the Divine curse is both upon them and their children, begotten in such unlawful wedlock; that the validity of marriages solemnized by the recusant priests is incontestable; that their children are legitimate, however they may be stigmatized by the faithless; that, on the contrary, the children of those married by false pastors are *really bastards*; that it is forbidden to the faithful to have their relatives buried by the new curates; that if a legitimate pastor cannot perform that service without endangering his life, the parents and friends are permitted to solemnize it secretly and privately themselves.

"Such, gentlemen, are the absurd and seditious instructions which these manuscripts contain, and of which the public voice accuses the missionaries of Saint-Lambert of being the most zealous propagators.

"The tardy removal of the recusant priests from their cures, has greatly contributed to the success of this coalition. M. Rodrigue, the present bishop of the department, was not nominated to that bishopric till the beginning of May. At that time an uniform system of resistance had been planned; an open and active opposition was at work; the grand vicars and curates were closely allied together; the jealousies, rivalries, and quarrels of the ancient hierarchy had had time to subside, and all their interests had become united in one common cause.

"The removal of the recusant clergy has only as yet been partially effected; a great majority of these ecclesiastics still remain in their parishes, invested with their former functions; the last nominations have hardly had any effect, as the new priests, alarmed at the prospect of a dangerous conflict, refuse to officiate.

"This schism among the clergy has also produced disunion among the people; religious feuds destroy the peace of private families; wives daily separate from their husbands, and children abandon their parents.

"The municipalities are also in a state of great disorganization; very few of them concur in the removal of the priests who have not taken the oath.

"A great number of citizens have renounced the service of the national guard, and those who remain in it cannot without danger be employed in any affair in which religion is concerned, because the people would then see in the national guard, not a neutral instrument of the law, but the agents of a party opposed to them.

"In many parts of the department, a public functionary, a judge, or a member of an electoral body have become objects of aversion to the people, from their exertions to enforce the laws relative to the civil constitution of the clergy.

"Nothing is more common, than in a parish of five or six hundred persons, to see only ten or twelve attend the mass of the new priest; the proportion is the same in all the places of the department. On Sundays, or festivals, the whole population of villages and towns may be seen deserting their own church to go one, and sometimes two leagues, to hear mass from their old priests. These habitual migrations have appeared to us the most powerful cause of that fermentation, which sometimes secretly works, and sometimes openly breaks out in nearly all the parishes which are occupied by the new priests: it may easily be conceived with what aversion a multitude of individuals, who believe themselves obliged by their conscience to go so far to seek spiritual aid, must behold, on their return, five or six persons with the priest of their election at their door.

"It is to this general cause, more active perhaps at this moment than the secret exhortations of the recusant priests, that we think the interior discord, which we have observed in most of the parishes occupied by the new priests should be especially attributed.

"Many of these parishes have presented to us, as also to other administrative bodies, petitions begging for permission to hire private houses to be set apart for their religious worship; but as these petitions, which we knew to have been most actively promoted by persons who did not sign them, appeared to us to be part of a more general and secret system, we thought it our duty by no means to encourage a religious separation, which we regarded, considering the situation of the department, as possessing all the characteristic marks of a civil schism between the citizens. We thought, and said publicly, gentlemen, that it was your part to determine precisely how, and by what means a liberty of religious opinions on the present subject, under the actual circumstances of affairs, could be practicable, and compatible with the maintenance of public tranquillity.

"It will undoubtedly excite surprise that the former priests who remain in their parishes, do not take advantage of the liberty which the law gives them of saying mass in the churches occupied by the new curates, and do not avail themselves of this permission, to spare their adherents the loss of time, and the inconveniences of numerous and disagreeable journeys. To explain this conduct, apparently so extraordinary, it is necessary to bear in mind, that one of the instructions most strongly recommended to the recusant priests, is to abstain from all communication with those whom they call intruders or usurpers, lest the people, struck only by external signs, should see no difference between priests who perform the same worship in the same church.

"Unfortunately, this religious division has produced a political separation among the citizens, and

this separation is still widened by the denomination affixed to each party: the small number of persons who frequent the churches of the new priest are called *patriots*; those who adhere to the old ones are called *aristocrats*. Thus, in the estimation of these poor rustics, the love or hatred of their country does not consist in obedience to the laws, and respect to the lawful authorities, but in the frequenting or avoiding the mass of the new priests; ignorance and prejudice have taken, on this subject, such deep root, that we found great difficulty in explaining that the political constitution of the state was not the same as the civil constitution of the clergy; that the law imposed no shackles on conscience; that every one was at liberty to go to that mass which he liked best, and to that priest in whom he placed the most confidence; that all were equal in the eyes of the law, and that it imposed upon them no other obligation than that of living in peace, and mutually tolerating the differences of their religious opinions. We have neglected nothing to efface from the minds, and banish from the discourses of these poor rustics, those absurd denominations, as we clearly perceived all the evil consequences of such distinctions in a department where the pretended *aristocrats* form more than two-thirds of the population.

"Such, gentlemen, are our opinions on the facts which have come to our knowledge in the department of La Vendée, and the reflections to which they have given rise.

"We have taken in regard to this subject all the measures that we were enabled, whether it were to maintain general tranquillity, or whether it were to prevent or repress the outrages against the public peace: as ministers of the law we have caused her voice to be heard. At the same time that we were ensuring the means of preserving public peace and protection, we were engaged in explaining or rendering intelligible to the administrative bodies, the tribunals, or to individuals, the difficulties that arose either in the instructions given by the decrees, or in the mode in which they are to be carried out; we have invited the administrative bodies and the tribunals to increase their vigilance and zeal in the execution of the laws that protect the persons of individuals and the rights of property; in one word, to use with that firmness which constitutes a primary duty the authority the law has delegated to them; we have stationed a part of the public forces which was at our command at places where the most imminent or greatest danger was apprehended; we have ourselves visited all places immediately they were declared in a state of disturbance; we have obtained evidence upon the state of things with the utmost calmness and precision; and after having either by words of conciliation and sympathy, or else by the firm and uncompromising action of the law tranquillized the momentary disturbances of individual misconduct, we consider that the mere presence of legal authority is quite sufficient to repress tumults. It belongs to you, gentlemen, and to you alone, to take those measures that will be assuredly efficacious in regard to an object which from the relation in which it stands with the constitution of the state, exercises at this moment upon this same constitution far greater influence than ordinary or simple notions unacquainted with the existence of facts would induce one to believe.

"We have recently terminated, gentlemen, our mission in the department of the Vendée, inasmuch as the decree of the national assembly of the 8th August, which upon the requisition of the local authorities of the department of the Deux-Sèvres, has authorised our visitation of the Chatillon district, has reached us as well as the directory of this department.

"We had been informed on our arrival at Fontenay-le-Comte that this district was in the same state of disturbance, from religious causes, as the department of the Vendée. Some few days before the receipt of our commission, numerous citizens, electors, and public functionaries of this district, came in order to make a written denunciation in respect of the disturbances which they stated to exist in different parishes; they gave intelligence of an insurrection ready to break out: the most sure and summary plan, and which they urged very strongly upon us, was to drive from the district within three months all nonjuring and ejected curates, as well as all nonjuring rectors or vicars. The directory, after having been long extremely disinclined to adopt a measure that did not appear consistent with the principles of even-handed justice, at last conceived that the public character of the relators was quite sufficient to prove both the absolute existence of the evil, and the urgent necessity for the remedy. Consequently, an ordinance was issued on the 5th of September; and the directory, at the same time that they ordered all the ecclesiastics to leave the district within three days, recommended them to resort within the same period to Niort, the capital town of the department, *assuring them that there they would find personal protection and safety in every respect.*

"The ordinance had been already printed, and was about to be put into execution, when the directory received an official transcript of the commission that it had been soliciting; at that very moment, the directory issued a new ordinance suspending the execution of the former, and left it to our discretion as to whether we should ratify, qualify, or suppress it altogether. Two members of the directory were by the same ordinance named commissioners for the purpose of making us fully acquainted with all that had taken place, to repair to Chatillon, and there take in conjunction with us all those measures we should deem necessary.

"When we got to Chatillon, we caused the fifty-six municipalities, of which the district is composed, to be summoned to meet us; they were all of them, singly, called into the hall of directory. We consulted with each of them as to the state of his parish: all the municipalities were of one mind; those whose curates had been ejected, demanded at our hands the return of those priests; those whose nonjuring curates were still in office, required of us that they should be retained. There is still one more point on which all these country people are agreed; that religious freedom which had been formerly accorded them, and which they desired to enjoy. The same and the following day the surrounding country sent us numerous deputations of the inhabitants, to repeat the same earnest request. 'We seek no other favour,' said they all with perfect unanimity, 'than to have those priests on whom we can rely.' Many of them even attached so much importance to this indulgence, that they assured us that to

obtain it, they would willingly pay a double assessment.

"In that place by far the greater number of the public ecclesiastical functionaries of that district had not taken the oath; and while their churches could hardly contain the crowd of citizens resorting thither, the churches of the conforming clergy were almost deserted. In regard to this, the state of this district seemed to us the same as that of the department of La Vendée; there as elsewhere we found the common term of *patriots* and *aristocrats* completely established with the people, in the same sense, and perhaps even more generally. The inclination of public opinion in favour of nonjuring priests has seemed to us still more openly declared than in the department of La Vendée; the attachment that is demonstrated in their favour, the confidence that is reposed in them, bear every mark of a lively and deep-seated affection; in some few of these parishes the conforming clergy or citizens attached to these priests have been exposed to threats and insulting language, and although there, as in other places, these acts of violence may in some instances have appeared to us highly magnified, we feel assured (and the simple exhibition of public opinion enforces our conviction) that the greater part of these complaints were made with just cause.

"At the very time that we are recommending to the magistrates and local authorities the greatest vigilance upon this matter, we shall omit nothing that can tend to inspire the people with ideas more in conformity with respect to the law and the rights of private individuals.

"We ought further, gentlemen, to state, that these same men who have been represented to us as downright furious, deaf to every kind of reasoning, have left our presence perfectly conciliated on our making them understand that one of the principles of the new constitution was freedom of conscience; they were deeply affected by emotions of repentance and sorrow on account of some improprieties a few of them had been induced to commit; they have promised us with submission to follow the advice we have given them, to live in peace, notwithstanding their religious differences, and to respect the officer appointed by the law. They were heard, as they went along, to congratulate each other on having seen us, to tell one another what we had stated to them, and to fortify each other in their resolutions of peace and mutual good understanding.

"The same day some persons came to inform us that several of these country folks on their return home had posted handbills, by which they gave notice that every one of them was determined to accuse and procure the arrest of the first person who should injure the other, and especially the conforming priests.

"We ought to remark that in this same district, so long disturbed by difference of religious opinions, the taxes in arrear for 1789 and 1790, amounting to seven hundred thousand livres, had been nearly all paid; we were satisfied of this by the director of the district.

"After having attentively observed the state of public feeling and things in general, we were of opinion that the ordinance of the directory ought not to be put in execution, and the commissaries of the department as well as the administrators of the directory of Chatillon were of the same opinion.

"Setting aside all the matters on which we could form a judgment, either from facts or from individuals, we have carefully considered whether the measure adopted by the directory was in the first instance just in itself, and in the next place efficacious in its execution.

"We thought that priests who had been ejected could not be considered as in a state of rebellion against the law, because they continue to dwell in the place where they have performed their duties, and the more so as it is a notorious fact that these priests bind themselves to live as peaceable and charitable individuals, and do not identify themselves with any public or private contentions on religious matters, we thought that in the eye of the law they could not be adjudged to be in a state of rebellion until they committed some overt act of a definite and specific character; lastly, we conceived that acts of disobedience against the laws relating to the clergy, and against all other the laws of the kingdom, ought like all other misdemeanors to be punished according to form of law.

"In the next place, looking at the efficaciousness of this measure, we saw that if faithful Christians do not place reliance on the conforming clergy, it is by no means a reconciling measure to take from them the priests of their own selection.

"Such, gentlemen, is the general result of the facts we have collected, and the observations we have made during the course of the mission which has been confided to us. The most heartfelt reward of our labours will be, to have afforded you the means of confirming the tranquillity of these departments upon the most solid foundations, and to have responded by our zeal to the confidence with which we have been honoured."

Note 29. Page 81, col. 2.

I have already had occasion to refer more than once to the inclinations of Leopold, of Louis XVI. and the emigrants; I am now going to quote various passages, which will give the reader the clearest insight into their feelings. Bouillé who was abroad, and whose reputation and abilities had caused him to be sought for by sovereigns, had better opportunities than any one else of making himself acquainted with the sentiments of foreign courts; and his testimony is beyond all doubt. The reader will observe how he expresses himself in various parts of his memoirs.

"It may be seen by this letter that the king of Sweden was very uncertain concerning the true projects of the emperor and his co-allies, which certainly at this time were not hostile to France. Undoubtedly the empress knew this, but had not yet communicated it to him. I know that at this time she employed all her influence with the emperor and the king of Prussia to engage them to declare war against France. She had even written a very strong letter to the first of these sovereigns, in which she represented to him that the king of Prussia, for a simple act of rudeness offered to his sister, had marched an army into Holland, whilst he himself patiently suffered the insults and affronts which were heaped upon the queen of France, the degradation of her rank and dignity, and the overthrow of the throne of a king, his brother-in-law and ally. The empress urged the same arguments

upon Spain who had also adopted pacific intentions. Nevertheless the emperor, after the acceptance of the constitution by the king, received an ambassador from France, whom he had before forbade appearing at his court. He was even the first to admit the national flag within his ports. The courts of Madrid, Petersburg, and Stockholm alone dismissed the French ambassadors. All circumstances tend to prove that the views of Leopold were pacific, and that these views were the fruit of his correspondence with Louis XVI. and the queen."—*Memoirs of Bouillé*, p. 314.

In another place, Bouillé again says,—

"However several months elapsed before I saw any thing come of the plans the emperor had designed for collecting armies on the frontier, forming a congress, and opening a negotiation with the French government. I presumed that the king had expected that his acceptance of the new constitution would have restored him his personal liberty, and restored peace to his kingdom, that an armed negotiation would have confused matters, and that consequently he had settled with the emperor and the other sovereigns, his allies, not to take any course that might induce hostilities, which he had constantly sought to avoid. I was confirmed in this opinion by the silence of the court of Spain on the proposal to furnish the king of Sweden with the fifteen millions of livres tournois which she had undertaken to give him in aid of the charges of this expedition. That prince had got me to write on his behalf to the Spanish minister, from whom I got nothing but vague replies. I then advised the king of Sweden to open a loan with Holland, or with the free maritime cities of the north upon the security of Spain, whose inclinations however seemed to me to be changed with respect to France.

"I learnt that anarchy was daily making progress in France, which was too truly demonstrated by the shoal of emigrants of all conditions who fled to the foreign frontiers. Arms were given them, they were embodied in regiments on the banks of the Rhine, and they formed in that quarter a little army, which threatened the provinces of Alsatia and Lorraine. These measures revived the popular fury, and assisted the destructive designs of the jacobins and the anarchists. The emigrants had even desired to make an attempt upon Strasburg, where they conceived they possessed certain communications and parties on their side who would have opened them the gates. The king, who was apprised of this, used both commands and even entreaties to stop and prevent them from doing any act of hostility. For this purpose he sent to the princes, his brothers, M. the baron of Viométil, and the chevalier de Cogny, who on his part testified his disapproval of the hostile arming of the French nobility, to which the emperor interposed every possible impediment, but it still continued to take place."—*Ibid.* p. 309.

Lastly, Bouillé relates from the words of Leopold himself his plan for a congress:—

"At last, on the 12th September, the emperor Leopold summoned me to attend him, and to bring with me the scheme of the arrangements which he had previously demanded of me. He took me into his closet, and told me that he had not been able to speak to me sooner upon the subject for which he caused my attendance, because he had waited for answers from Russia, Spain, England, and the principal sovereigns of Italy; that he had received them, that they were conformable to his intentions and his designs, and that he was assured of their assistance in the carrying them into execution, and of their concurrence, with the exception however of the cabinet of St. James, which had declared its intention of preserving the most strict neutrality. He had taken the resolution of assembling a congress, in order to treat with the French government, not only upon the subject of redressing the grievances of the Germanic body, whose rights in Alsatia, and in other portions of the frontier provinces, had been violated, but at the same time to consider upon the means of restoring tranquillity to the kingdom of France, whose anarchy disturbed the peace of all Europe. He further informed me that this negotiation would be seconded by formidable armies with which France would be surrounded, that he hoped that this design would prove successful, and prevent a bloody war, the last resource to which he wished to have recourse. I took the liberty of asking of the emperor if he was informed of the real intentions of the king. He had been made acquainted with them, and he also knew that the prince was strongly averse to the employment of hostile measures. He also stated to me that he was from other sources informed that the charter of the new constitution was to be presented to him in a few days, and that he considered that the king could not but accept it without any restriction, by reason of the risks he would run of his own life, and those of his family, if he should make the least difficulty, or suffered himself to make the slightest remark; but that his sanction, rendered compulsory by the circumstances, could not avail any thing, it being practicable to undo all that had been done, and to confer a good government upon France, such as should satisfy the people, and should yet reserve to the authority of the crown a latitude of power sufficient for the purposes of maintaining tranquillity at home, and to ensure peace abroad. He asked me for the plan of arranging the armies, and at the same time assured me that he would examine it at leisure. He further added, that I might return to Mentz, whither the count de Brown who was to have the command of his troops, and who was then in the Low Countries, would communicate with me as well as with the prince Hohenlohe, who was going into Franconia, in order for a general conference, when occasion should serve.

"I considered that the emperor had not resolved upon this pacific and extremely reasonable scheme since the conference of Pilnitz, without first consulting Louis XVI., whose inclination had always been for an arrangement, and to use the medium of negotiation, rather than have recourse to open hostilities."

NOTE 30. Page 83, col. 2.

The following is a relation of this fact by Bertrand de Molleville:—

"I informed the council on the same day of the visit the duke of Orleans had paid me, and of our conversation. The king determined upon receiving him, and held with him the next day a conversation of more than half an hour's length, with which his majesty appeared to be perfectly satisfied. 'I believe as you do,' said the king to me, 'that his return to his duty is sincere, and that he

will do all which depends upon himself to repair the evil which he has occasioned, and in which it is possible he has not had so much to do as we believed.'

"On the Sunday following the duke attended the levee of the king, where he met with a most humiliating reception from the courtiers, who were ignorant of what had passed, and from the royalists, who were accustomed to visit the château on that day to pay their court to the royal family. Every one crowded about him, elbowed him, pushed him towards the door, and prevented his re-entrance. He then went to the queen's apartment, where the table was laid for dinner; the moment he appeared, the exclamation of *Gentlemen, take care of the dishes!* was heard from all sides, as if he had been suspected of carrying poison in his pockets.

"The insulting murmurs which his presence excited, forced him to retire without having seen the royal family. He was followed to the queen's staircase, and whilst descending, some spat on his head, and others on his coat. Rage and revenge were painted on his countenance, and he left the château, convinced that the king and queen were the instigators of the insults he received, whilst, on the contrary, they were perfectly ignorant of what had happened, and exceedingly grieved when they learned it. He swore at the moment an implacable hatred against them, and has shown himself too faithful to his horrible oath. I was at the château on that day, and witnessed the facts I here relate."—*Bertrand de Molleville*, vol. vi. p. 290.

NOTE 31. Page 87, col. 2.

Madame Campan gives a different account of the conversation of Dumouriez with the queen.

"All parties," says she, "endeavoured either to ruin or to save the king. One day I found the queen extremely agitated; she said that she felt perfectly distracted by the difficulties of her situation; that the chiefs of the jacobins had offered themselves to her through the medium of Dumouriez, or that Dumouriez, abandoning the party of the jacobins, had come voluntarily to offer her his services; that she had given him an audience; and, that being alone with her, he had thrown himself at her feet, and placed as it were the red bonnet on her head, but that she could not consent to become a jacobin; that the revolution had been delivered up into the hands of a rabble of demagogues, who, seeking only pillage, were capable of the most desperate enterprises, and might furnish a formidable army to the assembly, sufficient to overthrow all those remnants of regal authority which were already in a most tottering condition. She added, that whilst speaking with extreme warmth, he had seized her hand, and kissing it, exclaimed with vehemence: '*Suffer yourself to be saved.*' The queen said that she could not believe the protestations of a traitor; that his character was well known, that the wisest conduct was certainly to distrust him; and that, besides, the princes had recommended her to place no confidence in any proposition which came from the interior, *&c.*"—vol. ii. p. 202.

NOTE 32. Page 88, col. 1.

Bouillé, whose memoirs I have already cited, and who was placed in a situation which enabled him to form a correct judgment of the intentions of the foreign powers, did not believe in the zeal or sincerity of Catherine. He expresses himself as follows on this subject:—

"It is very perceivable that this prince (Gustavus) placed great confidence in the zeal of the empress of Russia, and on the active part she would take in the coalition, which has nevertheless been confined to promises. The king of Sweden was deceived; and I doubt whether Catherine would ever have given him the eighteen thousand Russians she promised. I am persuaded besides, that neither the emperor nor the king of Prussia communicated to him their own views. They had both, personally, more than a dislike to him, and did not wish him to take any active part in the affairs of France."—*Bouillé*, p. 319.

NOTE 33. Page 88, col. 2.

Madame Campan informs us in the same passage of the construction of the iron closet, and of the existence of a secret protestation made by the king against the declaration of war. This manifests an extraordinary fear of war on the part of Louis, and accounts for his endeavours to cast the odium of its annunciation on the popular party.

"The king had a prodigious quantity of papers, and unhappily conceived the idea of having a secret hiding-place constructed by his locksmith behind the corridor of his apartment, in which to conceal them. This hiding-place, had it not been for the information of the locksmith, might have remained long unknown. The wall, in the place where it was constructed, was covered with large coloured stones, and its opening was perfectly concealed by the brown grooves which the dark part of these coloured stones formed. But before the locksmith had informed the assembly of this concealment, which has since been called the *iron closet*, the queen gained intelligence that he had spoken of it to some of his friends; and that this man, to whom the king had habitually granted too much confidence, was a jacobin. She imparted to the king this discovery, and persuaded him to fill a large portfolio with all his most important papers, and to give them into my charge. She begged him, in my presence, to leave nothing in the closet, and the king, to tranquilize her, assured her that nothing was left there. The portfolio being then delivered over to me, I attempted to lift it, and carry it into my apartment, but it was too heavy. The king said he would carry it himself; I went before him to open the doors. When he had placed the portfolio in my cabinet, he said to me, 'The queen will tell you what it contains.' When therefore I returned to the queen, I asked her to inform me of its contents, judging from the words of the king that it was necessary I should know it. 'They are,' replied the queen, 'the papers which would be most fatal to the king in case matters went to the extent of a trial. But what is of more importance still, that portfolio contains the proceedings of a state council, in which the king has given his advice against the war, and which, being signed by all the ministers, he hopes to make, in case of extremity, extremely useful to him.' I asked the queen to whom I should confide the portfolio. 'To whom you will,' replied she, 'but you are *alone responsible* for it. Do not take it from the palace, even in your months of retirement, for there are circumstances in which it may be

extremely useful for us to lay our hands on it without any delay.'"—*Madame Campan*, vol. ii. p. 222.

NOTE 34. Page 189, col. 2.

Explanation of the motives of the National Assembly, in decreeing on the formal proposition of the King, that there is a necessity for declaring war against the King of Bohemia and Hungary, by M. Condorcet. (*Sitting of the 22nd of April*, 1792.)

"Being forced by the most imperious necessity to declare war, the national assembly are fully aware that they will be accused of having accelerated or provoked it.

"They clearly perceive that the insidious conduct of the court of Vienna has had no other object than that of giving a semblance of probability to this imputation, foreign powers finding it so necessary to hide from their people the real motives of their unjust attack upon France; and they are aware that this reproach will be repeated by the enemies of our constitution and laws, in the criminal hope of depriving the representatives of the nation of the good opinion of the public.

"A simple exposition of their conduct is their only reply; and they address themselves with equal confidence both to foreigners and Frenchmen, knowing that nature has implanted in the hearts of all men the same sentiments of justice.

"Every nation has, alone in itself, the power of making its laws, and the unalienable right of changing them. This right belongs to it on no occasion, or on all equally. To attack it in one instance is to acknowledge it in none: to wish to destroy it by the interposition of a foreign power is to declare a disregard for it, in that state of which the assailant may be the chief or the citizen; this is to betray our country; this is to proclaim ourselves the enemy of the human race! The French nation were willing to believe that these simple truths were understood by all princes, and that in the eighteenth century none would venture to oppose them by the exploded maxims of tyranny; but their hopes have been deceived; a league has been formed against their independence, and they had no other alternative but that of expostulating with their enemies on the justice of their cause, or of opposing them by force of arms.

"Being informed of the menacing league, the national assembly, in the first instance, demanded the object of the concert of those powers, which had so long been rivals, and were answered that they had no other motive than the maintenance of general tranquillity, the safety and honour of thrones, and the apprehension of the renewal of those disastrous events of which some epochs of the French revolution had furnished such sad examples.

"But how can it be proved that France, who entered into a solemn resolution to undertake no conquest, and to attack the liberty of no nation, did menace the general tranquillity? How did she, who, during the long and sanguinary struggle between the government and the citizens, maintained a strict neutrality, endanger the stability of thrones?

"Without doubt, the French nation has proclaimed aloud, that sovereignty belongs solely to the people, who, limited in the exercise of their supreme will by the rights of posterity, cannot invest any individual with irrevocable authority; without doubt, she has loudly declared, that no custom, no express law, no consent, no convention, can subjugate a society of men to any authority which they have not the right of resuming. But what idea of the legitimacy of their power, or of the justice with which they exercise it, must foreign princes entertain, if they regard the proclamation of these rights as an enterprise against the tranquillity of their states?

"Will they say that this tranquillity can be disturbed by the publications and speeches of Frenchmen? This would be suppressing the liberty of the press, and declaring war against the progress of reason by an armed force; and when it is universally known that the French nation has been insulted with impunity, and that the presses of neighbouring countries have not ceased to inundate our departments with works exciting treason, and counselling revolt; when the instances of protection which their authors have met with are recollected, will it be believed that a sincere love of peace and not a hatred to liberty has dictated these hypocritical accusations?

"The attempts made by the French nation to excite neighbouring nations to break their chains and reclaim their rights have been urged in defence of foreign powers. But their ministers who have repeated these imputations, without venturing to cite a single fact which supports their assertions, know how void they are of all foundation; and even if these attempts had really taken place, those courts who have countenanced conspiratory assemblages of our emigrants, who have given them assistance, who have received their ambassadors, who have publicly admitted them to their conferences, who have not blushed to invite Frenchmen to take part in a civil war, have no right to complain; or it must be confessed that it is allowable to extend servitude, and criminal to propagate liberty, that every undertaking against the people is legitimate, and that kings alone have real rights. Never has the pride of thrones insulted with more audacity the majesty of nations!

"The French people, free to fix the form of their own constitution, could not endanger, by exercising this right, either the safety or honour of foreign thrones. Do the chiefs then of other countries consider it among the number of their prerogatives to oblige the French nation to give a head to their government invested with power equal to that which they exercise themselves? Would they, because they themselves rule over slaves, extirpate freemen from the earth? How is it that they do not perceive that by sanctioning every thing which has for its object what they call the safety of thrones, they declare every enterprise which one people may undertake in favour of the liberties of other nations legitimate?

"If outrages, if crimes have been attendant on some epochs of the French revolution, it belongs alone to the representatives of the nation to punish or bury them in oblivion; no citizen, no magistrate, whatever may be his title, has a right to demand or look for justice from any other source than the laws of his country. Foreign powers, however much their subjects may have suffered from the disastrous events of the French revolution, can have no just motive either to complain of them, or to enter into any hostile measures to prevent their

recurrence. Personal alliances between kings are nothing to nations; whether enslaved or free, common interests unite them: nature has made their happiness to consist in peace, and wills that they should live associated in the bonds of brotherhood: the idea of putting the fate of twenty millions of men, and the caprices or pride of a few individuals in the same balance, is abhorrent to every dictate of humanity. Must we be condemned then again to see the voluntary servitude of nations pile human victims on the altars of the false gods of the earth!

"Thus these pretended motives of the league against France are only new outrages against its independence. The French nation had a right to demand a renunciation of their hostile preparations, and to regard the refusal of it as a declaration of war, and such have been the principles which have directed the conduct of the national assembly. They still continue to desire peace, but think war preferable to an endurance of measures dangerous to liberty; they cannot conceal from themselves that alterations in the constitution, and violations of that equality which lies at its foundation, are the only objects of the enemies of France; and it is, therefore, that the national assembly have bound themselves by an oath, repeated throughout France, to perish rather than suffer the slightest attack to be made on the liberty of their fellow-citizens, the sovereignty of the people, and above all, that equality of rights, without which society can neither obtain justice nor enjoy happiness.

"But the French nation has been reproached with not having sufficiently respected the rights of other countries, in offering only pecuniary indemnities to the pope and to the German princes, who possessed territory in Alsace.

"The sovereignty of France over Alsace has been acknowledged by treaties, and peacefully exercised for more than a century. The rights which these treaties reserve for the German proprietors are merely privileges; the sense of this reservation is, that the possessors of fiefs in Alsace shall retain, with their ancient prerogatives, the several rights of feudality: this reservation signifies, besides, that if these feudal prerogatives should be overwhelmed in one common ruin, the nation shall pay an equivalent to their possessors, in consideration of the real advantages it reaps from their abolition; for this is all that the rights of property can demand, when they are in opposition to the laws of the country, and militate against the public interest. The citizens of Alsace are Frenchmen, and the nation could not, without shameful injustice, suffer them to be deprived of the smallest share of those common rights which are due to all who live under her protection. Will it be said that, to indemnify these princes, a portion of territory should have been given up to them? No; a free and generous nation sells not men, condemns none to slavery, and delivers not over to masters those whom it has once admitted to a share of its liberty.

"The citizens of Alsace were free to give themselves a constitution; they might have declared themselves independent; but they have preferred to remain Frenchmen, and France will never abandon after having adopted them. Even if she had refused to accede to their desires, their country is embosomed in her territory, and she would never have permitted their oppressors to traverse the land of liberty for the purpose of punishing men for having dared to render themselves independent, by resuming their rights. That which the pope possessed in their country was only the salary arising from the exercise of his spiritual authority: the people, in depriving him of some portion of this authority, have merely exercised a power which a long servitude had suspended, but could not destroy; and the indemnity proposed by France was not even demanded by justice.

It has been said that the views of the French people for the maintenance of their equality and independence are those of a faction: but the French nation has a constitution; this constitution has been acknowledged, and adopted by the majority of the citizens; it cannot be changed but by the people, and according to the forms prescribed by itself: whilst it exists, the authorities established by itself have alone the right of expressing the national will, and it is by them that this will has been declared to foreign powers. It is the king who, at the instigation of the national assembly, fulfilling the functions with which the constitution has invested him, has complained of the protection granted to the emigrants, and demanded, in vain, that it should be withdrawn; it is he who has required the dissolution of the league of foreign potentates; and it is surely surprising to hear the solemn expression of the will of the people, publicly declared by their legitimate representative, branded as the clamour of a faction. By what title as respectable as this can those kings support themselves who force deluded nations to fight against their own interests, to arm themselves against rights which they possess in common with us, and to crush under the wrecks of the French constitution, the germs of their own felicity, and the common hopes of the human race!

"But the king of France, say they, is not free —— Alas! is he not free because he is obliged to observe the laws of the country? The liberty of disobeying or opposing them by an armed force, indeed, is not a right, but a crime!

"Thus, rejecting all insidious propositions, and despising all injurious declamations, the national assembly have shown themselves as anxious for peace as they are jealous of the liberty of the people: thus, the continuation of tolerating our emigrants,—the open violation of promises to disperse their assemblages,—the refusing to dissolve a league evidently offensive,—the injurious motives of this refusal, tending to the destruction of the French constitution, are sufficient to authorize, on the part of the French nation, hostile measures, which have never proceeded further than acts of legitimate defence; for it is not an offensive proceeding to deny our enemies time to exhaust our resources by long preparations, to set all their snares—to assemble all their forces—to strengthen their old alliances—to form new ones—to carry on a system of *espionage* in the midst of us, and to multiply conspiracies and plots in our provinces. Does he deserve the name of an aggressor who, menaced and provoked by an unjust and perfidious enemy, takes the advantage of striking the first blow? Thus, far from provoking war, the national assembly have done all in their power to prevent it. In demanding new explanations of intentions which might be doubtful, they have shown that they re-

nounced with grief the hopes of a return to principles of justice on the part of their enemies; for if the pride of kings is prodigal of the blood of their subjects, the humanity of the representatives of a free nation is sparing even of the blood of their foes. Insensible to all provocations, to all injuries, to the contempt of former engagements, the violation of new promises, to the shameful dissemination of secret plots against France, to that perfidious condescension, under the guise of which the aid and encouragement given to Frenchmen who have betrayed their country has been concealed, the assembly would still have accepted peace, if the terms offered had been compatible with the maintenance of the constitution, the independence and sovereignty of the nation, and the security of the state.

"The veil which has long hidden the intentions of our enemy is finally torn away! Citizens! which of you could submit to their degrading propositions? Feudal servitude, and a humiliating inequality, bankruptcy, and taxes to be paid by you alone, tithes, and the inquisition, your properties, bought in the confidence of the public faith, to be restored to their ancient possessors, the re-establishment of the destructive game-laws, your blood to be spilt in the ambitious enterprises of an enemy; these are the conditions of the treaty between the king of Hungary and perfidious Frenchmen!

"Such is the peace which is offered to you! No; you will never accept it! All the pusillanimous of the kingdom have fled to Coblentz, and France contains none now in her bosom but men worthy of liberty!

"The king of Hungary announces in his own name, and the name of his allies, the project of making the French nation abandon its rights, and he gives us clearly to understand that he will demand sacrifices which the fear alone of destruction can make the nation submit to . . . and to these it will never submit! This insolent pride, far from intimidating, will only rouse its courage. Time is necessary to discipline the slaves of despotism; but every man is a soldier when he combats tyranny; gold will issue from its obscure retreats when called for by the country in danger; those ambitious and base men, the slaves of corruption and intrigue; those vile calumniators of the people, from whom our enemies have ventured to hope for shameful assistance, will lose the support of the deluded or pusillanimous citizens whom they have deceived by their hypocritical declamations, and the empire of France, in all its vast extent, will present a front to our enemies animated by one will, that of conquering or perishing with the constitution and the laws!"

NOTE 35. Page 92, col. 1.

Madame Campan explains, in the following manner, the secret of the papers burnt at Sèvres.

"At the commencement of the year 1792, a priest of a very venerable character requested me to grant him a private interview. The existence of a manuscript of a new libel of madame Lamotte's had come to his knowledge. He said, that he had remarked in the persons who brought it from London, to have it printed at Paris, a great desire of gain, and that he doubted not, they would deliver up the manuscript to him for a thousand louis, if he could find any friend of the queen disposed to make that sacrifice for her tranquillity; that he had thought of me on this occasion, and that if his majesty would give him the eighty thousand francs, he would procure the manuscript immediately.

"I communicated this proposition to the queen, but she refused to accede to it, and ordered me to reply, that, at the time when she had power to furnish the authors of these libels, she had judged them to be so atrocious and distant from any shadow of truth, that she had disdained having recourse to any means of impeding their circulation; that if she was weak or imprudent enough to buy a single one, the active inquisitiveness of the jacobins would soon discover it; that the libel in question, even if it was bought, would nevertheless be published, and would only become the more dangerous from her endeavours to keep it from the eye of the public, which they would soon be informed of.

"The baron d'Aubier, one of the gentlemen of the king's household, and my particular friend, possessed the talent of relating, in a concise and clever manner, the substance of the deliberations, debates, and decrees of the national assembly. He used daily to bring me whatever news was stirring, and it was my custom to detail it every day in the queen's apartment, which made the king exclaim, as I entered, 'Here comes the Calais postilion.'

"One day, M. d'Aubier came and said, 'The assembly has been occupied about some information given by the workmen of the manufacture of Sèvres. They have brought to the president a file of papers, calling them the life of Marie-Antoinette. The director of the manufacture has been called to the bar, and has declared that he received orders to burn them in the furnace prepared for the fabrication of porcelain.'

"Whilst I gave this account to the queen, the king blushed, and stooped his head over his plate. The queen said to him, 'Monsieur, have you any knowledge of this affair?' The king made no reply. Madame Elizabeth demanded the signification of his silence, but he still persisted in his taciturnity. I retired immediately. A short time after, the queen came to my apartment, and told me that the king, out of consideration for her, had bought the whole of the printed edition of the libel of which I had formerly spoken to her, proposing to her the same measure, and that M. de Laporte had thought that burning them at Sèvres, in the midst of two hundred workmen, of which eighty were jacobins, was the most mysterious, and least suspicious method of getting rid of them. She added, that she concealed her grief from the king, although she was overwhelmed with consternation, but could not complain, as his tenderness was the cause of this accident."—*Madame Campan*, vol. ii. p. 196.

NOTE 36. Page 96, col. 2.

The mission given by the king to Mallet-du-Pan is a most important fact, and its evidence is rendered unquestionable by the memoirs of Bertrand de Molleville. Being minister at that period, de Molleville must have been perfectly acquainted with this event; and being a counter-revolutionary minister, he would rather have concealed than avowed such a fact. This mission proves the moderation of Louis XVI., but also his communications with foreign powers.

"Far from partaking of this patriotic security, the king saw, with profound grief, France engaged in an unjust and bloody war, which the disorganization of her armies seemed to render her incapable of sustaining, and which exposed her provinces, more than ever, to the danger of an invasion. His majesty feared, besides, every species of civil war, and was convinced it would break out on the news of the first advantage gained by the emigrants, who formed part of the Austrian army, over the French troops. It was, in fact, greatly to be feared that the jacobins and infuriated populace would retort sanguinary vengeance on the priests and nobility who still remained in France. These apprehensions, which the king expressed to me in a daily correspondence which I held with his majesty, made me determine to propose to him to send a person of confidence to the emperor and king of Prussia, for the purpose of obtaining from their majesties, promises not to act on the offensive, except in a case of the last extremity, and to publish a manifesto, before their armies entered into the kingdom, declaring the following sentiments: 'That the emperor and king of Prussia, forced to resort to arms by the unjust aggression which has been made on them, attribute the declaration of war, notified to them, neither to the king nor the nation, but to the criminal faction which oppresses both; that, consequently, far from renouncing the sentiments of friendship which unite them to the king of France, the object of their majesties is merely to deliver him from the yoke of the most criminal tyranny which has ever existed, to aid him in the establishment of his legitimate authority, which has been violently usurped, and to restore order and tranquillity; all which they propose to effect without meddling, in any manner, in the form of the French government; but, on the contrary, for the very purpose of giving the nation the liberty of choosing that which will best suit it; that every idea of conquest is far from the thoughts of their majesties; that the property of individuals will not be less respected than that of the nation; that their majesties take under their special protection all peaceable and faithful citizens; and declare that their only enemies, which are those of France, are the factious, and their adherents, on whom alone they wish to make war.' Mallet-du-Pan, whose character and talents the king highly esteemed, was charged with the execution of this mission. Being never seen at the palace, having no connexion with those attached to the court, and being accustomed to make frequent journeys to Geneva, which prevented the suspicion that would otherwise have been awakened by his taking that road, he was every way adapted to undertake the commission with which he was intrusted."

The king gave Mallet-du-Pan his instructions, written with his own hand, which are thus specified by Bertrand de Molleville.

1st. "The king joins his prayers to his entreaties to persuade the princes, and the French emigrants, not to give to the present war the character of one carried on between foreign powers, by an hostile and offensive conduct on their part.

2nd. "He urgently entreats them to leave to him, and the other courts who have interfered on their behalf, the discussion of the security of their interests, when the time proper to treat of those questions shall have arrived.

3rd. "It is necessary that they should appear parties and not arbitrators in this affair, all arbitration being reserved to his majesty, when he is restored to his freedom, and those foreign powers who have interfered in their behalf.

4th. "Every other conduct will produce a civil war in the interior, expose the life of the king and his family, overthrow the throne, be fatal to the royalists, cause all the revolutionists, who are now divided, and become more so every day, to rally round the jacobins, rekindle the flames of discord now about to expire, and give strength to that resistance, which will yield to the first success, when it shall be perceived that the fate of the revolution is not committed exclusively into the hands of those against whom it was first directed, and who have become its victims.

5th. "It is necessary to represent to the courts of Vienna and Berlin the utility of a manifesto, expressing the common sentiments of themselves, and all the other states in concert with them; this manifesto is important, because it will separate the jacobins from the rest of the nation, give confidence to those who are inclined to return to the paths of duty, or who, disapproving of the present constitution, desire the suppression of abuses, and the enjoyment of a moderated liberty, under a monarch of authority, limited by the restrictions of the law.

6th. "It is requisite also to express in this manifesto that fundamental truth, *viz.* that the war is waged merely against an anti-social faction, and not against the French nation; that it is undertaken in defence of legitimate authority, and the people, against a furious anarchy, destructive of every social bond, and every conventional establishment, under the shade of which, liberty, peace, and security can alone repose; that its object is, not disorganization, or the imposition of laws, but to declare energetically to the assembly, the administrative bodies, the municipalities, and to the ministers, that they are personally and individually responsible for all outrages committed against the sacred person of the king, the queen, and royal family, and the persons and properties of all citizens whatsoever.

7th. "Furthermore, it is necessary to express the wish of the king, that the foreign powers, on entering the kingdom, should declare their readiness to make peace, but that they neither can nor will treat with any but the king; that, consequently, they require that he be restored to perfect liberty; that, then, a congress be assembled, in which the several interests of the nation may be discussed, on the basis already proposed, the emigrants being admitted as a party, and the general plan of indemnities being negotiated under the auspices and guarantee of the combined powers."—*Bertrand de Molleville*, vol. viii. p. 39.

NOTE 37. Page 96, col. 2.

Bertrand de Molleville, from whom I have selected the facts relative to Mallet-du-Pan, mentions the reception he met with, in the following terms:—

"On the 15th and 16th of July, Mallet-du-Pan conferred, at great length, with the ministers of the emperor and the king of Prussia, count Cobentzel, count Haugwitz, and M. Heyman. These ministers first examined his authority, and in-

tened with an extreme attention as he read his instructions and his own memoir, and immediately recognised his views to be perfectly the same as what had been previously signified by his majesty to the courts of Vienna and Berlin. They, consequently, placed great confidence in him, and approved, in every respect, of the manifesto he proposed. They positively declared that they entered into the war with no ambitious motives, that they sought no personal interest or augmentation of their territories, and that their majesties desired nothing but the re-establishment of order throughout France; because, as long as that country remained in a state of anarchy, they were obliged to keep up, at a very great expense, extraordinary bodies of troops, and adopt many precautions to protect the frontiers of their territory from the disorders of their neighbours; and that so far from wishing to impose on the French nation a particular form of government, they would not even interfere in the negotiations with their king on that subject. He was asked to give a detailed account of the state of France, and to speak particularly as to the public opinion relative to the ancient order of things, *viz.* the parliament, and the nobility, &c. They told him, in confidence, that the emigrants had volunteered to form themselves into a body, and enter into the king's service, whom they expected would be shortly released from his present state of confinement. They insinuated, in a humorous manner, their dislike to the royal princes, who, it was supposed, entertained quite opposite opinions to the king's, and were busy in forming a party of their own, and had secret intentions of appointing a regency. (*Mallet-du-Pan could not concur in this supposition for an instant, and observed that it was impossible to judge of the intentions of princes rightly, from the frivolous and extravagant views of their courtiers.*) After a minute discussion of the several demands and propositions which were contained in his memorial, which Mallet-du-Pan was not at liberty to alter, and the subject of his mission was well understood, the three ministers united in acknowledging the wisdom and justice of his instructions, and formally declared their assurance, that their majesties would most zealously co-operate with the French monarch."—*Bertrand de Molleville*, vol. viii. p. 320.

NOTE 38. Page 96, col. 2.

"'The princes' party,' says madame de Campan, 'were very much alarmed when they heard of the negotiations of the constitutionalists on behalf of the queen. Her majesty always apprehended much danger, not only from the strength of the party that declared for the princes, but from the pretensions of the French noblemen who formed it. She justified the count d'Artois, and often repeated that his party would discover their intentions to be quite opposite to his sentiments, which were favourable to the king and her majesty, but that she thought he would be made to participate in the criminality of the conduct of his party by the efforts of Calonne, who exercised an uncontrolled ascendency over the minds of his advisers. She severely reproached count Esterhazy, who had received very considerable favours from her for his attachment to Calonne's party, which ranked him in the number of her enemies.'"—*Memoirs of Madame de Campan*, vol. ii. p. 193.

NOTE 39. Page 97, col. 1.

"The emigrants dreaded the thoughts of a reconciliation between the court and the constitutionalists, which they imagined would be merely nominal, and afford to the government no assistance towards the reparation of their faults. They thought it was more advisable that the king and his family should remain in the hands of the jacobins till such time as they were prepared to rescue them, by which means he would avoid the necessity of acceding to the stipulations they should dictate."—*Madame de Campan's Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 194.

NOTE 40. Page 100, col. 1.

A very curious paper was found among the documentary evidence that was produced on the trial of the authors of the riots of the 20th June. It is the deposition of one Lareynie, and contains a summary of the testimony that was procured from various witnesses; the whole of which proceedings have been published.

"Personally appeared before us, John-Baptiste-Marie-Louis Lareynie, a volunteer in the battalion of the Isle-Saint-Louis, decorated with the military order of the Cross, residing in Paris on the quay Bourbon, No. 1—

"Who, professing sentiments of abhorrence at the excesses which have prevailed throughout the capital, and conceiving himself bound in duty, as a good citizen, to elucidate every circumstance connected with these excesses, and so detect the delinquents and authors of all seditions directed against the public tranquillity, and sapping the foundation of the constitution—

"Declareth, that he was informed by his correspondent, in the faubourg St. Antoine, that the citizens of that faubourg were incited to rebellion by M. Santerre, who commanded the battalion of the Enfans-Trouvés, and by various other persons, of which number was M. Fournier, an American, and who had been an elector of the department of Paris in 1791; that M. Rotondo, an Italian; M. Legendre, a butcher, residing in the rue des Bucheries, in the faubourg St. Germain; M. Cuirette Verrières, residing in the story immediately over the coffee-house of the Rendezvous, in the rue du Théâtre Français, held nightly meetings at M. Santerre's house, and sometimes in the hall of the committee of the section of the Enfans-Trouvés, where they deliberated in the presence of a few individuals belonging to that faubourg, to whom they communicated their sentiments; that M. Rossignol, formerly a journeyman jeweller; M. Nicholas, miner in the above-mentioned battalion of the Enfans-Trouvés; M. Brierre, a wine-merchant; M. Gonor, commonly called Conqueror of the Bastille, and others whom he could cite, proposed various questions to be agitated by the groups frequenting the Tuileries, the Palais Royal, the Place de Grève, and especially the vicinity of the Porte St. Antoine and the Place du Bastille; that they were the authors of the placards that were affixed from time to time in the faubourgs, as also of the petitions that were delivered in by deputations to the patriotic societies of Paris; and that, in fact, they were the authors

of the celebrated petition, and concerted the plot which was carried into execution on the 20th of June. That, on that day, a secret committee was held in the house of Santerre at midnight; in proof of which he could produce witnesses as soon as they returned from the country, whither they had been sent on a mission by Santerre, and by whom he was assured that they saw M. Pétion, the mayor of Paris; Robespierre; Manuel, the solicitor-general; Alexander, commandant of the battalion of St. Michael; and Sillery, ex-deputy of the national assembly, present at such meeting. That on the 20th, Santerre, perceiving that many of his party, and particularly the chiefs, were intimidated by the decree that had been issued by the directory of the department, and in consequence actually refused to attend in arms, on the pretext that they would be fired at, assured them *that no such order would be given to the national guard; and moreover, that Pétion would himself be present.* That at eleven o'clock in the morning of that day, the concourse did not, at most, amount to more than fifteen hundred persons, including many who attended out of curiosity; and that it was only when M. Santerre placed himself at the head of a detachment of invalids, and marched to the passage of the Feuillans that the spectators were excited to join; that not daring to force the post that guarded this passage, he continued his march to the court of the Capuchins, and there planted the may-bush which had been destined for the palace; that he, the witness, himself asked several individuals of the troop that was following the said Santerre, why the may-bush was not reserved for the terrace of the Tuileries, to which they replied, that *they knew very well what they were about, they were aware that several pieces of cannon were placed in the gardens, a snare into which however desirous the Feuillantines might be to plunge them, they knew very well how to avoid.* The declarant also observed that at this time the populace had nearly dispersed, and when the music and drums were heard in the interior of the assembly, several small clusters which were standing about here and there collected together, and joining themselves with all the spectators on the spot, marched into the assembly, and crowded one upon another three deep; he further observed that no outrage was committed as they passed through the Tuileries, and no attempt was made to force the palace. That when they were all assembled and drawn up on the 'Place du Carrousel,' they did not manifest the least hostile intention towards the palace, till the arrival of M. Santerre, who, being in attendance at the national assembly, did join them till it was adjourned. That when M. Santerre arrived in company with several others, among whom the deponent remarked M. St. Huruge, he addressed himself to his troops, who, till then, had observed the greatest tranquillity, and asked, *Why they had not already entered the palace? that they must forthwith proceed thither; that he had brought them for no other purpose!* That he immediately ordered the engineers to follow him with a piece of cannon, and said, if the gates were not opened voluntarily, he would force them. Thus provided, he arrived at the gate, where a slight resistance was offered to him by the 'gendarmerie,' but he met with a steady opposition on the part of the national guard; and so great was the tumult occasioned by this, that the people were, perhaps, on the point of proceeding to violence, when two men, in scarfs of the national colours, one of whom the deponent recognised to be M. Boucher René, and the other who was named, as he learnt from the spectators, M. Sergent, addressed the guards, *and ordered* them, in an imperious, if not insolent tone, *to open the gates*, prostituting the sacred name of the law in support of this demand; adding that *no person had authority to close the gates, and that every citizen had the right to enter the court;* that the gates were, in fact, opened by the national guard, and Santerre and his troop immediately rushed into the court; that M. Santerre, who had ordered a body of his men to follow him to the king's apartments with the piece of cannon to break open the door, should it be necessary, or for the purpose of meeting any resistance that might be offered by the national guard in his progress, was stopped as he was passing the last court to the left, at the foot of the staircase, by a group of citizens, who addressed him with great moderation, and endeavoured to appease his fury; they threatened to render him responsible for every thing that might occur during this fatal day, because, said they, *you are the sole author of this unconstitutional assemblage; you alone have been instrumental in misleading these brave fellows; you are the only one of the number that is actuated by evil intentions.* The manner in which these worthy citizens discoursed, caused a paleness to spread over his countenance. But M. Legendre, the butcher, perceiving the state of Santerre's mind, came to his aid, and re-animated him in a moment; Santerre then, evading all opposite reply to the citizens who had expostulated with him, devised a most hypocritical course of conduct. He addressed himself to his followers in the following words: 'Gentlemen, be witness of my refusal to march into the king's apartments at your head;' that the troops, who were accustomed to divine Santerre's meanings, immediately fell upon the honest citizens, forced a passage, conveyed their cannon into the interior of the palace, and burst into the apartments, breaking open all the doors, and shattering the windows in their passage."

Note 41. Page 113, col. 2.

The terror into which this alarm had thrown the royal family, is thus described by madame de Campan:—

"M. de Laporte, the comptroller of the civil list, was informed by the police, towards the end of the year 1791, that a jacobin of the most violent opinions, who had been heard to say that it would materially assist the cause of the French nation if the days of the king were shortened, and kept a pastry-cook's shop in the Palais Royal, had succeeded to the hereditary situation of an attendant in the king's household, into the duties of which office he was about to enter. His business was to attend to the pastry details. He was closely watched by the superintendents of the kitchen who were devoted to his majesty; but to avoid the danger which they incurred by eating of made-dishes, the royal family were always provided with roast joints. M. Thierry, of Ville d'Avry, superintendent of the apartments, supplied them with bread. The king, who was very fond of pastry, requested me to purchase some, as if for myself, one day at one shop, and another day at another. The sugar I always kept

in my own room. The king and queen, and madame Elizabeth, took their meals together, and always dismissed the servants, each helping himself from a mahogany waiter, which was placed at his side, and when the servants' presence was required, they rang the bell. M. Thierry always brought the bread and wine himself, and I immediately locked it up in a cupboard in the king's cabinet, on the Rez-de-Chaussée, of which I always kept the key. Immediately the king was seated at table, I took out the pastry and bread and concealed it under the table, that it might not be observed by any of the servants. It was not only impolitic, but very disagreeable to the king, to let his attendants see that he suspected them. As he only drank part of a bottle of wine at a meal, and as the princesses only drank water, he poured the contents of the bottle that was supplied him by his butler into his private bottle, which I carried away every day after dinner. Although the king and his family tasted of no other pastry than such as I bought, care was taken to make it appear that what was served at table by the servants was eaten. The lady who was my successor in this office had no occasion to make any alterations in my plan, of which no one but the family were in the secret."—*Madame de Campan's Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 188.

NOTE 42. Page 113, col. 2.

When M. Lafayette was imprisoned at Olmutz, M. de Lally-Tolendal addressed a most eloquent letter to the king of Prussia in his behalf. He enumerated the various instances of the general's devotion to the king, which he produced documents to prove. In them may be discovered the projects and efforts of the constitutionalists at this period.

M. Lally-Tolendal's Letter to the King.

"*Paris, Monday, July* 9, 1792.

"I am requested by M. Lafayette to repeat the proposal made already by himself, and which your majesty did not accept at that time, because your majesty had engaged to appear at a ceremony that was to take place on the 14th, two days after the date when it was to have been carried into effect.

"Your majesty could not have missed seeing M. Lafayette's project, it having been presented to M. Duport, to hand to M. Monhiel, for your majesty's inspection.

"M. Lafayette proposes to be here on the 15th, accompanied by general Luckner, with whom he has entered into the necessary engagements, in which both will co-operate to obtain the proposed end.

"They propose that your majesty quit the capital, escorted by them through the public streets, and that your majesty announce such to be your intention to the national assembly, to whom you should also state that you will not go beyond the constitutional line, and that you have fixed on Compiegne for your retreat.

"It is proposed to convey your majesty and family in one carriage, and a hundred chosen cavalry guards may be easily provided to attend you. Should any attempt be made to oppose your departure, your majesty will be strongly protected by the Swiss, and even by a part of the national guard, should their aid be required. The two generals will remain by your side. At Compiegne a strong detachment will be furnished by that town, a choice guard will there join you from the capital, and a third detached from the army to effect your majesty's escape.

"M. Lafayette will provide ten squadrons of supernumerary troops, and the horse artillery, which may in two days be brought up by forced marches to Compiegne.

"Should your majesty's departure be prevented, in defiance of all this protection, the two generals will march their troops against the capital, and avenge so gross a violation of the laws.

"The object of this project is evident.

"Peace would, in the event of its success, be established throughout Europe, through the mediation of your majesty.

"Your majesty would, in that case, be established in your legitimate powers.

"Your majesty would also have your prerogatives, which are now too limited, enlarged; the nation would be governed by a monarch whose authority would be strongly upheld, and under whose reign the liberty of the people would be maintained inviolate.

"The nation would be duly represented, and your majesty would preside over their representatives, for without you, that body is void of authority.

"An executive power would be established.

"The representatives of the nation would be elected from among the landed proprietors.

"The constitution would be revised, some parts of it abolished, and others improved and secured on a better basis.

"The new legislative body might sit three months in the year; and,

"The privileges of the nobility, such as titles, arms, livery, &c., would be revived.

"I shall not venture an opinion, or make any comment on this plan, but shall content myself with simply performing my duty. My imagination depicts the rage of the jacobins, at the news of a town falling into our hands, in colours too vivid for words to describe. The light in which I view the scene that was exhibited on Saturday, so far from tranquillizing my mind has increased its inquietude. All these kisses remind me of that of Judas.

"I ask to be one of the eighty or hundred cavalry to escort your majesty, and should this my sole request be granted, I dare promise your majesty, that the blow aimed at your majesty's life must take mine first.

"But one more word and I have done. Before the revolution I was intimately acquainted with M. Lafayette. On the 22nd of March, in the second year of the revolution, we ceased to communicate; at that epoch I endeavoured to prevail upon him to follow that line of conduct which he is now pursuing. I appealed to his honour; I urged it on the score of his duty and even his interest. He made promises which he did not perform. His motives for so acting I will not inquire; whether his resolution failed him, or he chose to pursue the contrary course. I declared to him my reasons, and our mutual friends joined me in setting before him the most disagreeable truths. My correspondence with him has been referred to by these mutual friends. The object and style of these letters are

well known to your majesty. I have read his letters, and conversed with him for two hours the evening he departed. He acknowledged his mistakes, and is now devoted to the cause of liberty, but under a monarchical government. If necessity required it, he would sacrifice his life in defence of his country and his king, which are in his mind inseparable. These are his principles. He embraces them with enthusiasm, he is thoroughly convinced of their truth; his heart is engaged in the cause, and he breathes sentiments of fidelity towards your majesty. In his engagements to promote these views, he has entirely lost sight of himself. Of all this I can solemnly assure your majesty upon my conviction as an honest man.

"I had almost forgot to say, that he desires that no communication may be held with any of the officers who may be in the capital at this period. All may suspect that there is some project in agitation, but none can know the real one. It is sufficient if they know the part they are to act the morning previous to its execution, for some may be indiscreet enough to speak of it.

"P.S. May I say that this communication appears to me to merit the consideration of that illustrious individual who heroically overcame an army of assassins in a cause, the memory of which must live for ever, who dictated on the subsequent day a proclamation as sublime as his conduct had been great the evening before.

"M. Lafayette does not admit the idea that your majesty having once quitted the capital, is obliged to pursue any line of conduct not dictated by your own conscience and free will. He thinks that your majesty should first attend to the formation of a body guard; he thinks that his project might be modified in twenty different ways; he prefers a retreat to the north, as he could more conveniently afford the assistance required; and, besides, he is afraid of the factious spirit of the south. In fact, the object which he most sincerely desires, is to see the king enjoy his liberty, and all the factions by which France is agitated, dispersed. After which he hopes, himself, things will go on in their natural course."

Copy of a Letter from M. Lafayette.

"*8th July*, 1792.

"I had disposed of my army, so that the best squadrons, the grenadiers and the horse artillery, were under the orders of M—— of the fourth division; and had my proposition been acceded to, I would have marched up fifteen squadrons, and eight pieces of cannon, in two days to Compiegne, the rest of the army being divided into detachments, and separated the distance of one day's march from each other, and each regiment having orders to proceed in due succession, in case their commanding officers should be engaged.

"I had so completely overcome Luckner as to obtain from him the promise that, if the king's safety required it, he would march with me against the capital. I had the absolute disposal of five squadrons of this army and of that of Languedoc and ——; I had also the exclusive command of the horse artillery; I had determined that these latter troops should also march to Compiegne.

"The king engaged to attend the ceremony of the confederation. I regret that my plan was not adopted.

"The preparations which I have made, supported by many departments and communities, the co-operation of M. Luckner, the confidence my troops and the whole army feel in me, and my popularity throughout the kingdom, which has augmented rather than decreased, although it is very limited in the capital; all these circumstances together have excited the suspicions of the factious, and doubts in the minds of many honest men. I hope that the danger attending the ceremony of the 14th of July will not be so great as is expected. It is my opinion, that were the king accompanied by myself and Luckner, and surrounded with a select battalion of troops, this danger would be entirely obviated.

"We shall, there is no doubt, lose the first battle; but, in return, we shall triumph over this temporary defeat.

"I again repeat that the king must quit Paris. I know that if he was one in whom I could not confide, that I should expose myself to imminent hazard; but the king being an honourable man, I cannot hesitate an instant, nor can I extinguish my desire of seeing him at Compiegne.

"My present project is directed to these two objects: First, if the king has not yet summoned Luckner and myself, he must lose no time in doing so. *We have gained over Luckner!* He will tell you that we are together; I will tell you the rest. Luckner can come to me, and we can both of us be in the capital the same evening. The 13th and 14th may perhaps furnish an occasion for some popular tumults, and your presence, you may be sufficiently confident, will, at least, counteract any violence; and who knows what will be the effect of mine on the national guard!

"We will accompany the king to the altar of the country. The two generals will represent the two armies, whose devotion to them is well known, and this will prevent any indignities that might be otherwise offered to the king. I think I can enforce obedience to my commands, as I formerly used by my presence alone. The terror with which I have always inspired some, ever since they joined the factious party; and, perhaps, some abilities that I may have of turning the channel of events, at the very crisis, may render me useful if it be only in averting dangers. To judge of the interest I have in making this demand, it is sufficient to compare the situation I shall be placed in with the object of the confederation; but I regard it as a sacred duty to accompany the king during this ceremony; and so obstinately am I bent on this, that *I absolutely require* the minister of war to command my attendance, so that this first part of my proposition may be adopted; and I beg of you to announce this proposal by means of some common friends of the king, to the royal family, and their advisers.

"Second. As for my second proposition, I think it equally indispensable, and this is the way in which, I conceive, it can be carried into execution. Many of those who are inclined to be factious would be quieted and silenced, at least for the time, if the king were solemnly to declare that the invasion of the foreign armies was contrary to his wishes, and if we, conjointly with him, were also to take an oath to the same effect. I would then have the king write a note to Luckner and myself in secret, which would meet us on the road on the

evening of the 11th or the next day, to the following effect: *viz.* 'That intending to manifest to foreign powers his sincerity in his oath just taken, for the satisfaction of his people, and thinking a visit to Compiegne the most effectual manner of doing this, he orders us to add some squadrons to the national guard of that place, and the detachment accompanying him from the capital, requesting our attendance to Compiegne, from whence we might rejoin our respective armies, and enjoining us to be careful in selecting such squadrons for this service as are commanded by persons of known attachment to the constitution, the general officer in charge of the whole being an unquestionable constitutionalist.

"Luckner and I will then charge M—— with the command of this expedition; he shall take with him four pieces of horse artillery, eight pieces if requisite, but the king must by no means speak of this, because the odium of that measure ought to fall upon us. On the 15th, at ten o'clock in the morning, the king may proceed to the assembly in company with Luckner and myself, we being followed by a whole battalion, or, at least, fifty horsemen devoted to the king; or, even if only a few friends of mine accompanied us, we should all be free from any danger of arrest.

"Supposing even that we were arrested, Luckner and myself would immediately complain to the assembly, and threaten it with our armies. The king's position, too, would not be more critical, for he, not having infringed upon the constitution, would be justified by all who were not the enemies of that constitution, and Luckner and I could easily bring up some detachments from Compiegne. This manner of proceeding would not compromise the king so much as the plan of conduct which he is now concerting.

"The immense funds that have been lavished by the aristocrats in their wild plans, have left the king but very diminished pecuniary resources at his command. But if it is necessary, some loans must be obtained, to be rendered subservient to our purposes during the three days of the festivity in commemoration of the federation.

"There is only one thing more which I wish to guard you against; should the assembly issue a decree forbidding the presence of the generals in Paris on this occasion, let the king immediately refuse to give it his sanction.

"If, by an inconceivable fatality, the king has already given it his sanction, let him immediately appoint a rendezvous where we may meet at Compiegne, and even though he may fully expect to be arrested in quitting Paris, we will rescue him, and carry him off in triumph. It is useless to observe that when he shall have arrived at Compiegne, in either case, he may there form his body-guard, such as he is allowed by the constitution.

"Really, when I contemplate my situation, surrounded as I daily am by inhabitants of all parts of the country who flock to see me, some coming from ten leagues, or more, for this purpose, and who declare their cordial participation in the sentiments by which I am guided, I cannot consider all as lost; but more especially, when I perceive the firm attachment of the army to my cause, over whom the jacobins have no influence; and reflect upon the numerous testimonies of approbation I receive from all parts of the kingdom, I cannot but think that it is in my power to render myself essentially useful to his majesty."

Note 43. Page 114, col. 1.

Answer in the King's own hand.

The following reply is extracted from the same collection of documents referred to in the preceding note. "I cannot but acknowledge my gratitude towards one who has shown himself so devoted to my service as to venture his life to procure my freedom; but the project of M. Lafayette appears to me impracticable. Although I have no personal fears, I do not think it prudent to hazard all at once. In case of failure, we should be a prey to the demagogue faction. Fontainebleau appears to me too near, and besides its southern situation is objectionable; a northern direction would have the appearance of flying towards the Austrians. The attendance of the generals at the confederation might be useful; they might pretend that they came to Paris for the purpose of conferring with the new minister of war on military affairs. The best advice that I can give M. Lafayette is to continue to be a terror to the factious by fulfilling his duties as a general; the army will thus become more and more attached to him, and he may eventually be enabled essentially to serve the king and constitution by the influence he may, in this manner, obtain."

Note 44. Page 115, col. 2.

A minute relation of the Proceedings of the 10th of August.

(They are taken from a paper signed *Carra*, and entitled, *An Historical and very exact Account of the Origin and Authors of the celebrated Insurrection of the 10th of August, which saved the Republic. The Author assures the public that the Mayor had not the least share in its success; but that it was providentially fortunate to the cause of the Patriots, that he was at that time in office.* This article is extracted from the "*Annales Politiques*," of the 30th of November.)

"Those men," says Jerome Pétion, in his excellent speech on the accusation that was directed against Maximilien Robespierre, who claimed the glory of that day, "are the very men the least deserving of it. The glorious consequences of that insurrection are solely attributable to those persons who prepared the measures for the fit execution of the plan, and to the threatening appearance which the situation of affairs at that time presented; *to the brave confederates and their secret directory, that had for some time concerted the plan of insurrection*; and lastly, to that protecting genius which has presided over the interests of France since the first meeting of its representatives.

"This is the same directory of which I shall speak by and by, and in which Jerome Pétion was an active member. This secret directory was established in the hall where the jacobins carried on their correspondence, in the quarter St. Honoré, and was appointed by the central committee of confederates; it was composed of five members selected from the forty-three who had daily met since the commencement of July. These five members were Vaugeois, chaplain to the bishop of Blois; Debessé, an inhabitant of the department of Drome; Guillaume, professor at Caen; Simon, an editor at

Strasburg; and Galissot, an inhabitant of Langres. I was elected one of the committee, and after some days the number of the members was increased by the addition of Fournier, an American; Westermann; Kienlin, a resident at Strasburg; Santerre; Alexander, commandant of the faubourg St. Marçeau; Lazouski, a captain of engineers in the faubourg St. Marçeau; Antoine, an ex-constituent of the town and department of Metz; Lagrey, and Garin, an elector of 1789.

"These insurrectionists held their first session at a small tavern at the sign of the Golden Sun, rue St. Antoine, near the Bastille, on the night of Thursday, till Friday morning the 26th July, after the fête that was given by the citizens to the confederates on the ruins of the Bastille. The patriot Gorsas attended at this tavern to conduct us at two o'clock in the morning, when our sessions adjourned, to the column of liberty, that had been erected on the ruins of the Bastille, in defence of which we were all determined to die. The American, Fournier, also, at my suggestion, brought us the red flag, upon which I inscribed these words, *the martial law of the sovereign people against the rebellion of the executive power.* It was in this very tavern that I produced five hundred copies of a placard on which were inscribed these words, *whoever fires upon the columns of the people shall be put to death on the spot.* This placard had been printed by the librarian Buisson, and given to Santerre, from whom I obtained it. Our project failed on this attempt, in consequence of the great prudence of the mayor, who probably thought that we were not yet sufficiently prepared: and the second session, in which active measures were to be adopted, was postponed till the 4th of August.

"The same individuals that composed the last session sat also at this, with one additional member, Camille-Desmoulins. It was held at the sign of the 'Cadran bleu,' on the Boulevards; and, at about eight o'clock, it removed to the apartments of the ex-constituent Antoine, in the rue St. Honoré, opposite the 'Assumption,' the very house in which Robespierre resided. The landlady of this house was so alarmed for Robespierre, that she begged of Antoine to let her know whether he desired to see Robespierre murdered. '*If any one is to be murdered, we ought to be the victims,*' said Antoine; '*our deliberations do not concern Robespierre, and all that he has to do is to keep himself out of sight.*'

"At this second session, in which we proceeded to consider what measures were to be adopted, I drew up, myself, the whole plan of the insurrection, and marked out the manner in which the palace was to be attacked. Simon copied out this plan, which was sent to Santerre and Alexander at midnight; but our second attempt also failed, because Alexander and Santerre were not ready, and there were many dissentient voices among the members, who thought it ought to be put off till after the discussion that was to take place at the assembly, on the 10th of August, relative to the suspension of the king.

"The third and last session which this directory held, was on and during all the night of the 9th of August, when it separated into three divisions, which was announced by the sounding of the tocsin. The chiefs of these divisions were posted as follows: Fournier, the American, in the faubourg St. Marçeau; Westermann, Santerre, and some others, in the faubourg St. Antoine; Garon, the editor from Strasburg, and myself, in the barracks of the Marseillois, and in the very apartment of the commander, where we were seen by all the battalion.

"In this account, which agrees exactly with the truth, and the details of which I challenge any one to refute, no mention is made either of Marat, of Robespierre, or of many others, who would claim to themselves the merit of having acted in this affair; but the only persons who really gained the glory of that day, are the members that composed the secret directory, of which I have just spoken."

NOTE 45. Page 120, col. 2.

Copy of a Letter from Guadet, Vergniaud, and Gensonné, to the citizen Boze.

"You ask us, sir, our opinion respecting the present state of France, and what measures we would advise in order to protect the country from the imminent dangers with which it is threatened, which is a continual source of anxiety to all good citizens, and the object which most incessantly occupies their attention.

"Being asked a question of such high importance, we will explain our sentiments most candidly.

"It is too late to conceal the truth that the misconduct of the king is the immediate cause of the evils that afflict France, and of the dangers that environ the throne. Those deceive the king who attempt to persuade him that certain exaggerated opinions, the violent proceedings of the clubs, and the machinations of the factious, gave rise to, and keep up the present disorders in the country, which are daily becoming worse; and what the consequences may be no one can say.

"If the nation had been satisfied with the success of a revolution which cost them so dearly; if the liberty of the people had been securely established; if by his conduct the king had obtained the confidence of the people, the great body of the citizens would think only of enjoying the benefits derived from the constitution; and if any factions should still exist, acting, as they would, without any pretext, or even any object to gain, no danger could be feared.

"But as long as the liberty of the people is at stake, as long as the citizens are kept in a state of alarm by the conduct of the executive power, and that the conspiracies which are continually carrying on both by domestic and foreign enemies shall appear to be more or less encouraged by the king, the peace of the country must necessarily be disturbed. In the most ancient and best constituted states, this is always and must be the seminal principle of a revolution; and the effect of this principle will, in this instance, follow with greater rapidity, inasmuch as the agitations that preceded the former revolution have scarcely subsided, when we are now again threatened with a second.

"It is, then, but too evident that the present state of affairs must produce a crisis, which, as appearances strongly indicate, will be attended with dangerous consequences to royalty. The interests of the king and of the nation are actually considered as two distinct things; the first public functionary of a free nation is become the chief of

a party; and by this crooked policy, the odium of all the evils with which France is afflicted reflects upon him.

"And what success would he reap from the assistance of the foreign powers, should they go so far even as to augment the royal authority, and remodel the form of government? Is it not evident that those men who first proposed this congress have sacrified the interest of the monarch to their personal interests and prejudices? Should their schemes succeed, will not their institutions be considered as an usurpation of the authority of the nation, to which it will never submit by restraint? Is it possible that they did not perceive how requisite it would be, after they had effected this change, to maintain it by a force equivalent to that which it originally employed, in order to succeed, and by that means they would disseminate throughout the kingdom the spirit of civil discord, which the lapse of many centuries would scarcely eradicate.

"Sincerely and steadily attached to the interests of the nation, from which we will not separate those of the king, as long as he allows them to be united, we are of opinion that the king should desist from all such conduct as may create suspicions in the minds of the people, and prove what are his real sentiments, openly and unequivocally; till then, no sufficient measures can be adopted to protect the empire from the evils with which it is threatened, and to re-establish order throughout the kingdom; and till then, the king cannot expect to recover the confidence of his people, on which alone he depends for his power and happiness.

"It is not sufficient to have recourse again to fresh protestations, which, at this period, would be deemed insulting and ironical; and so far from allaying the alarm of the country, would rather increase the imminent danger.

"The only protestation from which any good effect can be expected, would be a solemn declaration on the part of the king, that he will accept of no augmentation of his powers whatsoever, but what may be voluntarily accorded to him by the nation.

"This has been observed to the king; and many of the national assembly know that it was proposed to him, when he declared war with the king of Hungary, but he thought proper to reject it.

"He might, perhaps, regain the confidence of his people by recognising the independence of the French nation, by ordering the coalesced powers to desist from all hostilities, and by insisting upon the removal of their troops from our frontiers.

"It is impossible to convince the nation that the king has not the power of breaking up that coalition; and so long as he endangers the public security, he ought not to flatter himself with the idea of retaining the affections of the people.

"But if the king's means of effecting this dispersion of the enemy are insufficient, he ought, at least, to co-operate with the nation in repulsing their attack, and to prove the groundlessness of the popular suspicions, by the adoption of measures of vigour.

"To see the nation menaced with immediate danger, of which he cannot be ignorant, and to declare that it originates in the crimes of factions, is calculated to excite the most odious suspicions. To complain that the popular passions are extravagant, to abuse the clubs, to attribute the ferment and agitation that exists in the minds of the people to the factious spirit of a few demagogues, only serves to aggravate their miseries, and urge them to violence.

"As long as any efforts are made to prevent the people from obtaining their liberty, resistance, on their part, is inevitable.

"The tranquillity of the state can only be brought about by the previous removal of all dangers; and until this most fortunate period arrives, it is most important to the nation and the king to provide against the continual aggravation of these calamities by an unequivocal conduct on the part of the agents of the executive power.

"1. Why does not the king select his ministry from among those who decidedly favour the revolution? Why is he at the most critical moments surrounded by unknown or suspected characters? If it was the king's object to increase the suspicions of the people, would he proceed otherwise than he has done?

"The choice of the ministry has been at all times one of the most important prerogatives with which the king is invested; it is, as it were, the thermometer according to which the disposition of the court is ascertained; and it is easy to conceive what must now be the effect of such a choice, which at another time would have occasioned the most violent murmurs.

"To select a patriotic ministry would be the most effective measure which the king could adopt to regain the confidence of the people. But he would be strangely deceived if he believed that a single proceeding of this kind would produce this effect. It requires time and continual efforts to efface impressions which have been too deeply engraved to be forgotten in an instant.

"2. At a moment when the country stands so much in need of every means of defence which it can obtain, why has not the king offered the horses and arms belonging to his guard?

"3. Why does he not request the enaction of a law subjecting the expenses of the civil list to a public scrutiny, by which the nation would be assured that it is not converted to an improper use, or otherwise employed?

"4. Another great measure by which the people would be tranquillized, inasmuch as it would evince the predisposition of his majesty, would be to move himself for the enaction of a law regulating the education of the royal prince, then immediately consigning that precious pledge to the care of a person in whose principles the nation could repose confidence.

"5. Another circumstance of which the people complain, is, that the decree enforcing the disbanding of the general staff has never been sanctioned. The reserve which his majesty evinces in according his sanction to decrees of the legislature which are so eagerly desired by the public, with whose anxiety thereupon the king is not unacquainted, cannot fail to provoke the discussions relative to the constitutional question, whether the king has the right of exercising the authority of the *veto* in extraordinary cases, and is not of a nature to quiet the alarms and discontent that prevail.

"6. It is a matter of importance in the public opinion, that the command of the troops should be confided to other hands than those of M. Lafayette.

It is most evident that that officer can no longer be of service to the public.

"We conclude with one general observation: viz., that whatever can allay the suspicions of the people, and promote their confidence in the king, should not be omitted. If the king adopts this resolution, and acts up to it cordially and with perseverance, the constitution is saved."

A copy of Thiérry's Letter to Boze.

"I have been again censured for receiving the letter which you transmitted me, and which in my zeal for the king's interest I was determined to lay before him.

"He has, however, permitted me to reply:

"1. That he never neglected the choice of his ministers.

"2. That the declaration of war was made by the very ministers who called themselves the patriots.

"3. That he had tried his utmost at the proper time to prevent the coalition of foreign powers, but that now they had collected on the frontiers; that he possessed no other means of dispersing them than those which he had already put in force.

"4. That he had ever observed the constitution with the strictest scrupulosity, but that many who accused him had, on the contrary, violated it continually."

NOTE 46. Page 124, col. 1.

The following paper is one of those referred to by M. Lally-Tolendal in his letter to the king of Prussia.

Copy of the Minutes of the Sitting held the 14th of August, 1722, written in the handwriting of Lally-Tolendal.

"*4th August.*

"In the presence of M. Montmorin, formerly minister for foreign affairs; M. Bertrand, minister for maritime affairs; M. de Clermont Tonnere; M. de Lally-Tolendal; M. Malouet; M. de Gouvernet, and M. de Gillera. After three hours' deliberation, we each communicated whatever had come to his knowledge with respect to the impending insurrection. I had received an anonymous letter, in which I was informed, that conferences had been held on this subject at Santerre's house, in which it was agreed that an attack should be made on the Tuileries, the king should be assassinated, the dauphin carried off, to be dealt with afterwards as circumstances might require, or in case the king should not be killed, the whole royal family should be made prisoners. We then unanimously resolved upon his majesty's departure from Paris under an escort of the Swiss, and accompanied by ourselves and our friends, who were very numerous. We reckoned upon M. de Laincourt, who had offered to come up from Rouen to our assistance, and also upon the co-operation of M. de Lafayette. Just as our deliberations concluded, M. de Malsherbes arrived; he came to beg of madame de Montmorin and madame de Beaumont, her daughter, to quit Paris immediately, as he foresaw the approaching storm. M. de Malsherbes gave us further intelligence respecting the insurrection, and we unanimously agreed that M. de Montmorin should go immediately to the palace, to inform the king of the events which had come to our knowledge, and to communicate to him the resolutions we had come to. The king apparently acceded to all our requests that evening. On the following morning we all again assembled at the Tuileries, and I conversed a long time with M. the duke de Choiseul, who perfectly coincided in our opinions, and urged the king at all hazards to fly; but he was astonished to find that the king had altered his determination, and was *resolved rather to expose himself to every danger than commence a civil war.* The decree of dethronement was to be pronounced on the Thursday following. The troops of Lafayette were now the only resource. I immediately sent off a despatch to him, containing a project which I desired him to communicate to the duke of Brunswick, on the first tidings he might receive of the dethronement."

NOTE 47. Page 149, col. 1.

The following contains some valuable information as to the September murders, which exhibits these frightful scenes in their true light. The most important of these disclosures were made at the Jacobins, and were published by the disputes which arose in the Convention.

(*Sitting of Monday, 29 October, 1792.*)

"*Chabot.* This morning Louvet has noticed a fact which it is highly essential should be set right. He has told us that the events of the 2nd of September were not brought about by the same men as those of the 10th of August; but I, from ocular testimony, assert that they were. He has told us that there were not two hundred persons engaged therein, but I, for my part, tell him that I passed under an arch of ten thousand sabres. I appeal to Bazire, Colon, and other deputies who were with me for the truth of what I say: from the court of the monks up to the prison of the Abbaye, it was hardly possible for us to pass. I myself counted among them one hundred and fifty federalists. It is possible that Louvet and his adherents were not present at these popular executions. However, while any one can coolly utter such a speech as Louvet has just done he cannot possess much humanity; for my part, since I have heard his speech I should not like to sleep by the side of him for fear of being assassinated. I call upon Pétion to declare if there were not more than two hundred men at this execution, but it is nothing more than consistent that the intriguers should shirk the recollection of the events of that day of which France has received so little information . . . Their object is to cut off the patriots one by one. They want to impeach Robespierre, Marat, Danton, and Santerre. They will soon have Bazire, Merlin, Chabot, and Montaut, and even Grangeneuve, unless he takes up with them; they will next propose a decree against the entire faubourg Saint-Antoine, against the forty-eight sections, and we shall be . . . in all eight thousand men under accusation; they must, however, entertain some doubt of their strength since they now call for an ostracism."

(*Sitting of Monday, the 5th November.*)

"Fabre d'Eglantine made some observations upon the events of the 2nd September: he positively states that it was the men of the 10th of August who had broken open the prisons of the

Abbaye, Orleans, and Versailles. He said that at this critical period, he had seen the same men come to Danton, and express their satisfaction by rubbing their hands; that one among them desired that Morande should be sacrificed: he adds, that he has seen Roland in the garden of the minister for foreign affairs, pale, downcast, supporting his head against a tree, and calling for the transference of the convention to Tours or to Blois. He also added, that Danton was the only one who showed the greatest energy on that day; that Danton never despaired for the safety of the country; that by stamping on the earth he could cause tens of thousands of its defenders to issue forth, and that he had sufficient moderation not to abuse the species of dictatorship with which the national assembly had invested him, by decreeing that those who thwarted the ministerial operation should suffer death. Fabre next declares that he has received a letter from madame Roland, in which the wife of the minister for the home department begs him to lend his assistance to some contrivance devised for carrying some decrees of the convention. The speaker requires that the society should order the preparation of an address which should contain all the minute historical facts of the events that had taken place from the acquittal of Lafayette up to this very day."

"*Chabot.* These are the facts that are necessary to be known. On the 10th of August the people then being in a state of insurrection wanted to sacrifice the Swiss; at this period the Brissotins did not consider themselves the men of the 10th August, for they came to implore us to have mercy on them: those were the expressions of Lasource. I was a god on that occasion; I saved one hundred and fifty Swiss; I myself at the gate of the Feuillans stopped the people who wished to make their way into the hall to sacrifice these unfortunate Swiss to their vengeance: the Brissotins then were afraid that they would also be included in the massacre. After what I had done on the occasion of the 10th August, I expected that on the 2nd September I should be sent on deputation to the people: well! the extraordinary commission then presided over by Brissot, then supreme, did not elect me! who did they choose? why, Dusaulx, to whom they actually associated Bazire. They did not at that time know what men were fit to influence the people and stop the effusion of blood. I happened to be on my way to the deputation; Bazire asked me to join him, he took me there . . . Had Dusaulx any special instructions? I know not, but what I know is that Dusaulx would not allow any one to speak. In the midst of an assemblage of ten thousand men, among whom were one hundred and fifty Marseillais, Dusaulx got upon a chair; he felt considerably at a loss: he had to address men armed with daggers. When he had at last obtained silence, I promptly spoke to him these words, 'If you can manage things well you will stop the effusion of blood; say to the Parisians that it is for their own interest that there should be an end put to these massacres, in order that the departments should not conceive any apprehension as to the safety of the national convention now about to assemble at Paris . . .' Dusaulx heard what I said: and whether it were bad faith, or the testiness of all age, he did not do as I had told him; and this is the M. Dusaulx who is now held up as the only man worthy of the deputation of Paris . . .! A second fact not less important than the former is, that the massacre of the prisoners at Orleans, has not been committed by the Parisians. This . . . massacre must necessarily appear more detestable, since it was committed at a later period than the 10th August, and by a smaller number of persons. Yet the intriguers have never alluded to it, they have never said a single word on the subject; it is that an opponent of Brissot had perished, the minister of foreign affairs, who had driven away his *protégé* Narbonne . . . As for myself, if I at the gate of the Feuillans have stopped the people who wanted to sacrifice the Swiss, how much more could not the legislative assembly have prevented the effusion of blood. If then it be a crime, it ought to be laid to the charge of the legislative assembly, or rather to Brissot who then devised it."

Note 48. Page 167, col. 2.

The following is a description of the two sides of the Convention, from the pen of the minister Garat *, the only person who has formed a just conclusion upon the characters who figured in this revolution.

(Extracted from Garat's Memoire.)

"Nearly all the men of whom I have just spoken belonged to the right side of the assembly, and I could perceive no other disposition among them than that which they manifested in their private lives. I observed in them a republican spirit, which disdained to obey any man but one who spoke in the name of the *nation* and conformably to *law*, and that republicanism of intellect, much more rare, which decomposes and recomposes the whole organization of a society of men equal in rights as in nature, and which discovers, by a happy art, the profound secret of associating together, in a great republic, things apparently the most unsociable, equality and submission to magistrates; that agitation which keeps the spirit of a people ever active, and a constant and invariable maintenance of order; a government absolute in authority over individuals and the multitude, and always subject to the nation; an executive power effective, imposing in its forms, and ever displaying the majesty of the republic, but banishing the idea of any individual or personal superiority.

"On the same side of the assembly, I observed also those men who best understood the doctrines of political economy, who endeavoured to open and enlarge all the channels of individual and national wealth; to amass a public fund from the properties of the citizens, scrupulously mindful of the proportion each should contribute, according to the extent of his means; to create new sources of riches by making a judicious use of the property which had been thrown into the treasury of the republic; and to protect and maintain the freedom of every species

* I have considered it my duty to add such notes as seemed likely to prove serviceable, either as illustrations of facts little known and not duly appreciated, or as records of a style and language altogether consigned to oblivion, but yet highly characteristic. These scraps are for the most part derived from sources utterly neglected, and particularly from the debates of the Jacobins, a very rare and curious political record.

of industry without partiality or favour; regarding extensive possessions not as stagnant lakes, which receive and absorb the mountain streams, but as necessary reservoirs, destined to spread fertility over spots which would otherwise remain parched and unfruitful. These were admirable doctrines, calculated to give liberty to arts and commerce, even before it was introduced into governments, but particularly adapted to republics, and alone capable of laying a solid foundation of *equality*, not in a system of *frugality*, which is always violated, and which restrains the passions much less effectually than industry, but by producing a general competency, and by encouraging those pursuits and occupations whose ingenious variety, and constant and unfailing renovation, can alone employ, happily for liberty, the turbulent activity of democracies, which, after having long agitated, finally shattered and annihilated all the ancient republics in a volcano of storm and tempest, the atmosphere in which they were always enveloped.

"In the right side were five or six men of a genius sufficiently capacious to grasp the extensive theories of social order and political economy, and several others capable of comprehending and engrafting new branches on these principles; there were also, belonging to this party, many who had formerly been carried away by impetuosity and violence, and who, having run through the whole circle of demagogue extravagances, now desired to counteract those evils they had previously propagated; finally, on these benches sat those gentle and amiable characters who were possessed of competent fortunes and respectable mental acquirements, and were disposed to honour all the virtues of a republic which left them in the undisturbed enjoyment of their repose, their benevolence, and their domestic happiness.

"Turning from my survey of this side, and fixing on the left side, and the *Mountain*, how great was the contrast! There I beheld the aspect of a being agitated by tumultuous passions, livid in complexion, and having the air of one just emerged from the carcase-strewn caverns of the anthropophagi, and breathing the atmosphere of hell; whose convulsive, startled, and frantic gait declared the assassin escaped from the executioner, or the fury bent upon the destruction of the human race, to avoid the terror which the countenance of man inspired in his guilty soul. Under the reign of despotism, which he had not been able to stain with blood as he had done liberty, this man had endeavoured to make a revolution in sciences, and had attacked, by his daring and flimsy systems, the greatest discoveries of modern times, and of the human intellect. Studying the history of centuries back, his attention had been arrested by the lives of those exterminators who had transformed cities into deserts, to repeople these deserts again with beings formed after their own image, that is, of tigers; this is all that struck him in the annals of the human race, and these monsters were the objects of his imitation. By an instinct similar to that of the ferocious beasts of the forest, rather than by any profound perversity of intellect, he observed into how many and great extravaganees and crimes it was possible to seduce a people, whose religious and political chains had been just broken; to bring about these horrors was the object of all his writings, words, and actions. He fell under the dagger of a woman! But more, fifty thousand, agitators, conformed to his own image, soon sprung up from the bosom of the republic!

"By the side of this man were others who were not capable of conceiving similar atrocities, but who, being thrown with him, by an act of extreme audacity, into the midst of events whose precipitous elevation made them giddy, whilst the dangers which surrounded them made them tremble, although disavowing the maxims of this *monster*, which they had nevertheless already acted upon, were not sorry to be considered capable of proceeding to the same lengths. Detesting Marat, they were yet willing to make use of him. They placed him in the midst of them, or even put him in the foreground, and might be said to carry him in their bosom, as the head of Medusa. The repulsion and terror which such a character inspired was universal; his image was ever before all eyes; he was considered as composing the whole *Mountain*, and the whole *Mountain* was thought to be personified in him. Among its chiefs many, indeed, resembled Marat more in the undisguised boldness of their speech, than in any near approximation to his ferocity.

"But of these (and here I differ in opinion with many respectable men) were many who, allied to their party more by events than inclination, regretted their renunciation of wisdom and humanity, and would have displayed many virtues, and have rendered many services to the republic, had they not been looked upon as outcasts. All those who were passionate enthusiasts of liberty, flocked to the *Mountain*, as to a military post, but understood little of its theory; all those who considered equality menaced, or even violated by lofty ideas or elegant language; all those who, educated in cottages or work-shops, could only recognise a republican in the costume which they themselves wore; all those who, entering for the first time into the career of the revolution, sought to signalize themselves by impetuosity and violence, their only road to celebrity; and all those who, in the ardour of youth, and more adapted to serve the state in our armies than in the sanctuary of the laws, seeing that the birth of the republic took place amidst the noise of thunder, believed that its decrees should be promulgated, and its spirit preserved in the same manner. In the left side of the assembly also, many of those deputies sought an asylum rather than a place, who had been educated in the proscribed ranks of the nobility and the priesthood, who, though pure in principle, were always exposed to suspicions, and fled to the height of the *Mountain* to escape from accusation: there too those grave and melancholy beings, who, having too often perceived duplicity united to politeness, recognised virtue only in a habit of gloom, and liberty in a garb of ferocity, thronged together to nourish their suspicions, and to surround themselves with phantoms of their own creation: there sat also some individuals who had attained some knowledge of the sciences, and proud of possessing acquirements immediately applicable to the mechanic arts, disdainfully separated themselves from the men of letters and philosophers, whose attainments were not so directly useful to the common trades of life, and are, consequently, not appreciated till a people become generally enlightened, and, finally, with the *Mountain* all those took their seats,

who were disposed to go beyond, rather than fall short of the energy necessary to propel the career of the revolution.

NOTE 49. Page 173, col. 2.

Address of Collot D'Herbois to Dumouriez after the Campaign of Argonne, extracted from the Journal of the Jacobins.

(*Sitting of Sunday, the 14th of October, the first year of the Republic.*)

"In speaking of our armies, I am happy it is in the presence of the soldier whom you have just heard. I disapprove of the reply of the president: I have already frequently said that no president should answer for the members of a society, but his reply has been addressed to all the soldiers of our army. His speech, however, has given a lively testimony of our satisfaction; Dumouriez will partake of it with all his brothers in arms, for he knows that without them he could not have acquired any glory. We must accustom ourselves to this language. Dumouriez has done his duty, and this is his greatest recompense. It is not because he is a general that I praise him, but because he is a French soldier.

"Is it not true, general, that it is glorious to command a republican army? Have you not found a great difference between this army and one of despotism? Your soldiers have not only the bravery natural to Frenchmen; they are not content with despising death, for who fears death? But those inhabitants of Lille and Thionville, who brave in cold blood the attacks of the enemy, who are unmoved in the midst of the roar of cannon and the destruction of their houses, do they not display all the virtues? Oh! yes; and these virtues are more honourable than all their triumphs. A new manner of making war is now invented, and our enemies will never find it out; tyrants can do nothing when freemen rise up in their own defence.

"A great number of our brethren have fallen in the cause of liberty; they are dead, but their memory is dear to us; they have left us examples which survive in our hearts; but do those live with whom they have contended? No; they have sunk down, and their cohorts are mere animated carcasses, become putrid on the very ground where they fought, and so thoroughly infected, that the sun of liberty would scarcely purify them. This cloud of moving skeletons resembles the skeletons of tyranny, and like it, must soon fall. What have become of their generals of great renown? Their very shadows have vanished before the omnipotent genius of liberty; they fly, and have only dungeons for their retreat; for dungeons will shortly be the palaces of despots; they fly, because the people rise up.

"It is not a king who has appointed you, Dumouriez, but thy fellow-citizens: recollect that the general of a republic should never negotiate with tyrants: recollect that a general like yourself should be the servant only of liberty.—You have heard of Themistocles; he had saved the Greeks by the battle of Salamis; he was calumniated (you have enemies, Dumouriez, you will be calumniated, and it is therefore that I speak to you). Themistocles was calumniated; he was punished unjustly by his citizens; he sought an asylum with tyrants, but was always Themistocles. It was proposed to him to take arms against his country: *My sword shall never serve tyrants*, said he, and plunged it into the heart of the proposer. Recollect also the history of Scipio.—Antiochus endeavoured to seduce this great man, by offering him his son as a hostage. Scipio replied, 'All your riches are insufficient to buy my conscience, and my love of my country is above all bribery.'

"Many people groan in slavery; you will soon deliver them. What a glorious mission! Success is not doubtful: the citizens of those nations wait for you, and those who are here urge you on . . . Yet you must be blamed for an excess of generosity towards your enemies: you have let the king of Prussia off rather too much in the French fashion, that is the ancient French fashion, understand (*applause*). But we hope that Austria will pay double for this lenity; she is deeply in our debt: you cannot make her pay too dearly for the outrages she has committed against the human race.

"Thou art going to Brussels, Dumouriez (*cheers*); thou wilt go through Courtray. At that place the French name has been profaned: a general has abused the expectation of the people; the traitor Jarry has been firing dwelling-houses. I have not hitherto addressed myself to thy courage, I now appeal to thy heart. Bear in your mind those unfortunate inhabitants of Courtray; do not deceive their hopes this time; promise them the nation's justice, the nation will justify thy promises.

"When thou shalt be at Brussels . . . I have nought to observe on thy conduct there . . . if thou shouldest there find an execrable woman, who, under the walls of Lisle, has come to satisfy her ferocity with the spectacle of unsanguined cannon balls; . . . but this woman does not expect thee . . . shouldest thou find her she will be thy prisoner: we have others also of the same family . . . ; thou wilt send her up here . . . ; and cause her to be shaved so close that she shall never more wear a wig.

"At Brussels liberty will revive under thy auspices. A whole nation will be transported with joy; thou wilt restore children to their fathers, husbands to their wives, and wives to their husbands; the sight of their happiness will divert thee after thy toils. Children, citizens, girls, and women shall press around thee; all of them shall embrace thee as their father; . . . What felicity thou art going to enjoy, Dumouriez . . . ! my wife . . . she is a Brussels woman; she will also embrace thee."—This speech was frequently interrupted by loud applause.

NOTE 50. Page 174, col. 2.

Narrative of the Visit that Marat paid to Dumouriez at Mademoiselle Candeillé's, extracted from the French Republican Journal, (Journal de la République Française), *and written by Marat himself in his number of Wednesday, 17th October*, 1792.

Declaration made by the People's Friend.

"Not so much astonished as indignant at witnessing the old servants of the court placed by the course of events at the head of our armies; and since the 10th August, kept in office by influence, intrigue, and folly, carry their audacity to such lengths as to degrade and treat as criminals two patriot battalions under the ridiculous, and most probably the false, pretence that some individuals had massacred

four Prussian deserters, I offered myself at the tribune of the Jacobins to unveil this odious conspiracy, and to ask that two . . . commissaries distinguished by their civism, should accompany me to Dumouriez, and bear witness of his answers to my interrogatories. I repaired to his house with the citizens Bentabole and Manteau, two of my colleagues in the convention. The answer was, that he was at the play, and that he would sup in town.

"We ascertained that he had returned from the *Variétés* [theatre]; we then went to find him out at the club of D. Cypher, where it was said he had an appointment: we missed him by a moment. At last, we learnt that he was engaged to supper in the rue Chantereine at Talma's little box there. A long train of carriages and brilliant illuminations pointed out to us the temple where the son of Thalia was entertaining a child of Mars. We were surprised to find the national guard of Paris inside the house, and also outside. After having passed through an ante-chamber full of servants, mingled with attendants in Hungarian liveries (*heiduques*), we came to a withdrawing room filled with a large company.

"At the door was Santerre, general of the Parisian army, performing the office of a footman to announce the names. He announced my name in a loud voice the moment he noticed me, a piece of indiscretion that exceedingly annoyed me, inasmuch as it enabled some deceitful personages with whom I should have been glad to have been better acquainted, on their guard. Nevertheless, I saw quite enough to trace the course of the intrigues in that quarter. I shall say nothing about ten fairies or so who were to add to the gaiety of the entertainment. Political matters in all probability did not bring them there. Neither shall I say any thing of some national officers who paid their respects to the great general; nor yet of some old servants of the court who accompanied him under the disguise of aide-de-camp. And to conclude, I shall say nothing of the master of the house, who stood in the midst of all, dressed like a common stage-player. But I can't help stating, for the benefit of the conventional operations, and as a piece of intelligence for those who have the dealing out decrees, that in this august assembly were Kersaint, that great man of all-work, Lebrun, and Roland, and Lasource; . . . and Chenier, all of them hirelings of the federalist republic; as well as Dulaure and Gorsas their libellous whipsters (*galopins*). As all was noise and confusion, I could distinguish no more than these conspirators; in all probability they mustered strong; and as it was by no means late, it is highly probable they had not all arrived; for the Vergniauds, the Camusas, the Rabauds, the Lacroixs, the Guadets, the Barbaroux, and other parties to the plot, were no doubt engaged to this entertainment, inasmuch as they belong to the association.

"Before giving an account of our conversation with Dumouriez, I pause for an instant, to make with the judicious reader some few observations by no means pointless in this place. Can any one conceive that this generalissimo of the republic, who has suffered the king of Prussia to escape him at Verdun, and who has capitulated with the enemy, whom he could have stormed in his own camp, and made him lay down his arms instead of allowing his retreat, should choose so critical a moment as this to abandon the armies under his command, to run about to plays, to get homage and attention paid to himself, and to engage in profligate debauches with an actor and with the nymphs of the opera.

"On entering the withdrawing room, where the entertainment was prepared, I saw plainly enough that my presence was a restraint upon the gaiety, which can very easily be conceived when it is considered that I am a scarecrow to the enemies of my country. Dumouriez, in particular, appeared extremely disconcerted; I begged him to walk with us into another room, in order to have a few minutes' conversation with him. I began first, and here is our conversation word for word: 'We are members of the national convention, and we are come, sir, to beg of you to afford us some explanations upon the real facts of the affair of the two battalions, the *Mauconseil* and the *Republican*, accused by you, with having in cold blood murdered four Prussian deserters. We have gone over the papers of the military committee and those of the war department; and we have not therein found the least proof to warrant conviction, and no one can give us better information on the subject than yourself. . . . Gentlemen, I have sent all the papers to the minister . . . We assure you, sir, that we have in our hands a statement made in his offices, and under his name, purporting that there are no facts whatever to warrant a conviction for this pretended offence, and therefore we must address ourselves to you to see if there be any . . . But, gentlemen, I have made my statement to the convention, and I refer you to her . . . Allow us, sir, to observe to you, that the information you have given is not sufficient, inasmuch as the committees of the convention, to whom this affair has been referred, have declared in their report that they were unable to come to any conclusion for want of evidence and proofs of the offence as charged. We therefore beg you to tell us whether you are acquainted with the real facts . . . Certainly. I know them of my own knowledge. . . . And is not that by a private accusation made to you on the word of M. Duchaseau! . . . But, gentlemen, when I say a certain thing, I think I ought to be believed . . . Sir, if we were of the same opinion on that matter with yourself, we should not have taken the course that brings us here. We have great reasons for doubting it; numerous members of the military committee declare to us that these pretended Prussians were four French emigrants . . . Well, gentlemen, when that shall be . . . Sir, that will entirely change the state of the affair, and without being in haste to approve the conduct of these battalions, although they may be perfectly innocent; there are circumstances which have induced this massacre, which it behoves us to know; again, letters from the army declare that these emigrants have been discovered to be spies sent by the enemy, and that they themselves were in mutiny against the national guards. How is this, sir, do you then approve of insubordination by soldiers? . . . No, sir, I by no means approve of insubordination by soldiers; but I abhor the tyranny of commanders: I have strong grounds for believing that this same is a mere machination of Duchaseau against the patriot battalions, and the way in which you have treated them is revolting. Mr. Marat, you are too sharp, and I cannot enter into any explanation with you.' At this

point, Dumouriez finding himself hard pressed, freed himself from his awkward situation by leaving us: my two colleagues however followed him, and in the conversation they had with him, he confined himself to saying that he had sent the papers to the minister. During their interview I perceived myself surrounded by all Dumouriez's aids-de-camp as well as by the officers of the Parisian guard. Santerre did his best to conciliate me; he spoke to me as to the necessity there was that subordination should be maintained in the military. 'I know that as well as you,' I answered; 'but I am quite disgusted at the manner in which the soldiers of the country are treated. I still have at heart the massacres of Nancy and the Champ-de-Mars.' Here some of Dumouriez's aids-de-camp began to declaim against the agitators. 'Cease these idle declamations,' I then cried; 'the only agitators in our armies are the infamous officers, their spies and their perfidious courtesans, that we are so foolish as to leave at the head of our troops.' What I said was pointed at Moreton, Chabrillant, and at Bourdoin, of whom one was an old court servant, and the other a spy of Lafayette's.

"I was indignant at all I had heard, and of every fresh atrocity exhibited in the odious conduct of our generals. Not being able to stay longer, I quitted the party, and saw with astonishment in the neighbouring room, the doors of which were open, a great many liveried servants of Dumouriez with naked swords. I do not know what could have been the object of this ridiculous farce: if it had been done with the idea of intimidating me, it must be admitted that Dumouriez's footmen have great notions of liberty. Have patience, good sirs, we shall teach you what liberty is. In the mean time, believe that your master has a far greater dread of the tip of my pen, than I have for the broad-swords of his German bandits (*chenapans*)."

NOTE 51. Page 203, col. 2.

Amongst the most cool and impartial spirits of the revolution, must be named Pétion. No one has so judiciously commented upon the two parties that divided the convention. His natural love of justice was so well known, that both sides consented to be bound by his decision. The accusations that took place from the opening of the assembly caused great dissensions among the jacobins. Fabre d'Eglantine proposed their being referred to Pétion's judgment. The following is the mode in which he expressed himself.

(*Sitting of the 29th October*, 1792.)

"There is another measure that I consider of use, and which will produce a greater effect: in almost every instance, when a vast intrigue is in concoction, it has wanted the assistance of a greater power; it has therefore to make every exertion to obtain a great personal influence. If there existed a man who had observed every thing, and fairly appreciated the merits of either party, you would never hesitate to declare that this man, friend to truth, ought to make them known. Well, I propose that you invite this man, a member of your own club, to give his judgment upon the crimes that are imputed to the patriots; and charge his virtuous disposition to enunciate his conclusions from all that he has seen: this man, then, is Pétion. Whatever allowance that the man may make for his friends, I venture to say that the intriguers have not corrupted Pétion; he is always pure, he is always sincere; I say it here, I often go to the convention to speak to him at troubled periods, and though he does not tell me that he groans, I see that he groans in spirit; this morning he wanted to ascend the tribune. He could not refuse to write what he thought, and we shall see that in spite of what I get out of him by this means, the intriguers can make him change his mind. Mind this, citizens, that this course will of itself prove that all you want is truth; it is a token of respect that you will pay to the virtue of a good patriot, with this additional motive, that the leaders are so wrapped up in the idea of his integrity as to be something. I require the motion to be put to the vote" (*cheers*).

"*Legendre.* The blow was ready to fall, that is clear enough: the circulation of Brissot's speech, the home secretary's report, the speech of Louvet in his pocket, all shows that he had made up his mind definitively as to what he should do. Brissot's speech upon the *erasure* question, contains all that Louvet has said: Roland's report was only made for the purpose of giving Louvet an opportunity of speaking. I approve of Fabre's motion: the convention will give Robespierre priority of motion on Monday: I ask that the club suspend its opinion till then; it is impossible that virtue should be trampled upon by malice in a free country.

"After this quotation, I think I ought to set before the reader the piece that Pétion wrote, in reference to the dispute between Louvet and Robespierre; this, with the citations from Garat, is one which reflects the greatest light upon the character and behaviour of the men of that day, and are those that history ought to preserve as being the most capable of diffusing correct ideas as to this period.

"Citizens! I had made up my mind to maintain perfect silence with regard to the events that have taken place since the 10th of August; I was induced to adopt this reserved line of conduct from a sense of delicacy, and from a desire to serve the public.

"But it is impossible to remain silent any longer; from all sides my testimony is called for; I am urged by every one to deliver my opinion, and I shall candidly declare all that is come under my knowledge concerning individuals, and what I think of the present state of our affairs.

"I have been a close observer of the scenes of the revolution; I have seen cabals, intrigues, and fearful struggles between tyranny and liberty, between vice and virtue.

"When the passions of men appear without disguise,—when the secret springs which have directed the most important operations are made manifest,—when events are traced clearly to their causes,—when all the perils which liberty has encountered are recollected, and when we look down into that abyss of corruption which threatened every moment to ingulf us, we may well ask ourselves with astonishment, by what train of wonderful circumstances we have made so rapid a progress in the cause in which we engaged.

"Revolutions should be seen from a distance; through the vista of ages their stains are not perceptible; posterity only considers their results; our grandsons will look back upon us as great men: may they be better than we are!

"I shall pass over all events which were anterior to that day ever memorable for the elevation of liberty on the ruins of tyranny, and which converted a monarchy into a republic.

"The men who attribute to themselves the glory of that day, are those to whom it least belongs; it is due to those who prepared the way for it; to the imperative necessity which made it inevitable; to the brave confederates, and those who concerted long before the plan of the insurrection, to the people, and to the tutelary genius which has presided over the destinies of France since the first assembling of its representatives!

"It must, however, be confessed that, at one moment, its success was dubious; and those who are truly informed of the details of this day, know who were the intrepid defenders of their country, who dispossessed the Swiss and other satellites of despotism of the field of battle, and who were those who rallied our citizen phalanxes when they wavered.

"The events of this day would nevertheless have equally taken place without that concourse of the emissaries of several sections, who met together at the house of the commune: the members of the ancient municipality, who had not separated during the night, were in sitting at half past nine o'clock in the morning.

"Yet these emissaries, it must be granted, entered into a bold measure, by investing themselves with all the municipal power, and putting themselves in the place of the council-general, whose corruption and weakness they feared, and thus exposing themselves to the greatest dangers, should the insurrection have proved unsuccessful.

"If the emissaries had had the wisdom to lay down their authority afterwards, and return to the rank of simple citizens after the noble action they had performed, they would have acquired great honour; but they could not resist the attractions of power, and the lust of dominion overpowered them.

"In the first intoxication of conquest, and liberty, and after so violent a commotion, it was impossible that order and tranquillity should be instantly restored; it was unjust to expect it; the reproaches, therefore, which have been addressed to the council-general of the commune were perfectly uncalled for, and sprung from ignorance of their position; but the emissaries then began to merit censure, when they prolonged the insurrection beyond its necessary term.

"The national assembly had pronounced their will; they had acted greatly; they passed decrees which saved the nation; they had suspended the king; they had effaced the line of demarcation which separated the citizens into two classes, and had convoked the convention! The royalist party was down. All should, therefore, have rallied round the assembly,—have fortified it by public opinion, and have imparted confidence to its members; both duty and policy pointed out this line of conduct.

"But the commune preferred setting up as a rival to the assembly; she entered into a struggle which only served to throw disgrace upon all which had happened, and represented the assembly as acting under the imperious yoke of necessity; she obeyed or resisted its decrees, according as they favoured or thwarted her views; she had her representations before the legislature in a domineering and irritating manner; she affected power, and knew neither how to enjoy her triumphs, nor to procure pardon for her usurpations.

"The members of this commune succeeded in persuading some, that whilst the revolution lasted, all power should return to its first source,—that the national assembly was destitute of any decisive character,—that its existence was precarious, and that the assemblies of the commune were alone possessed of potency and legality.

"To others it was insinuated that the leading men in the national assembly harboured perfidious projects, and designed to overthrow liberty, and deliver up the republic into the hands of foreign powers.

"By these persuasions, many members of the council believed themselves in the exercise of a legitimate right when they usurped authority, thought they were resisting oppression when they opposed the law, and considered themselves acting as good republicans when they failed in all the duties of a citizen; yet in the midst of all this anarchy, the commune, from time to time, took salutary measures.

"I had been continued in my office, but it was no more than a vain title; I sought in vain to fulfil its functions; they were divided among many, and every one exercised them at his pleasure.

"I resorted to the council; I was dismayed by the disorder which reigned in this assembly, and especially by the spirit which seemed to prevail there; it was no longer an administrative body deliberating on the affairs of the commune, but a political assembly, invested with full powers, discussing the interests of the state, examining the laws already in existence, and promulgating new ones. Then I heard of conspiracies against the public liberty; citizens were accused, summoned to the bar, heard in their defence, summarily sentenced, acquitted, or retained prisoners; all ordinary regulations were dispensed with; the heat and hurry by which all things were precipitated along rendered every attempt at restraint impossible; all deliberations were carried on with precipitation and enthusiasm; they succeeded each other with terrifying rapidity; day and night, without any intermission, the council were always in sitting.

"I was unwilling that my name should be attached to these multitude of irregular acts, so contrary to my principles.

"I felt that it would be prudent not to approve of them, nor give them my countenance by my presence. Those who feared to see me in the council, those whom my presence displeased, were willing, nevertheless, that the people, whose confidence I preserved, should believe that I presided over their operations, and that nothing was done without my consent; my reserve, therefore, increased their dislike, but they dared not show it too openly, fearing to alienate the people, whose favour they courted.

"I appeared rarely among them, and the conduct I observed in this delicate position, between the ancient municipality, who complained of their dismissal, and the new one who pretended that they were legally instituted, was not unserviceable in restoring public tranquillity; for if I had pro-

nounced an opinion for or against either party, it would have produced a rupture which might have been attended with the most fatal consequences.

"The administration was neglected; the mayor was no longer a centre of unity; every hold of authority slipped from between my fingers, all power was divided among a multitude of competitors; every thing was left without superintendence; and all means of repression failed.

"Robespierre then took the ascendant in the council, and considering the situation of affairs, and the cast of his disposition, it would have been surprising if he had not. I heard him make a speech which saddened my heart: the question referred to the decree by which the barriers were ordered to be opened, and on this subject he declaimed in the most animated manner; he perceived nothing but precipices under his feet, and snares laid on every side for liberty; he pointed out the supposed conspirators; he addressed himself to the populace, heated their imaginations, and wrought profoundly on the passions of those who heard him.

"I replied to this speech, with the intention of tranquillizing those whom he had thrown into agitation, of dissipating his dark suspicions, and bringing back the attention of the assembly to the subject before them.

"Robespierre and his partisans drew the commune into inconsiderate measures, and urged them to extremities.

"But I did not on this account suspect his intentions; I blamed his head more than his heart; but the possible consequences of his gloomy apprehensions gave me great alarm.

"The galleries of the council daily echoed with the most violent propositions; its members could no longer persuade themselves that they were magistrates charged to watch over the execution of the laws and the maintenance of order; they regarded themselves as forming a revolutionary association.

"The assemblies of the sections were actuated by the same influence, and communicated it in their turn to others, so that, in a short time, all Paris was in a state of fermentation.

"The committee of superintendence filled the gaols with prisoners, and it cannot be denied that if many of these imprisonments were just and necessary, some were ordered on very slight grounds. But the blame of this is less to be laid on the leading men of the commune than their agents; the police was badly constituted; one man among others, whose very name makes all peaceable citizens shudder, seemed to direct all its measures; assiduous in all conferences, he mingled in all affairs; he harangued and commanded as a master; I complained loudly of this to the commune, and expressed my opinion in these words; *Marat is either the most insensate or the most wicked of men.* I have never since alluded to him.

"Justice delayed to pronounce the fate of the prisoners, and the prisons became thronged to excess. One section sent a deputation to the council of the commune on the 23rd of August, and declared formally, that the citizens, weary and indignant at the dilatoriness of justice, had determined to force open the gates of the gaols, and sacrifice to their vengeance the criminals who were confined there. This petition, which was drawn up in the most frantic style, received no censure, and was even applauded.

"On the 25th, from a thousand to twelve hundred citizens, in arms, quitted Paris to carry off the state prisoners who were detained at Orleans, and confine them elsewhere.

"On the 27th, the national assembly called upon the department of Paris to furnish thirty thousand men to be despatched instantly to the frontiers; this decree gave rise to a new idea among the people, which concurred with those already excited.

"On the 31st, the acquittal of Montmorin roused the indignation of the populace; the report spread that he had been saved by the perfidy of a messenger of the king's, who had led the jury into error.

"At the same time, the discovery of a plot, revealed by a criminal, was published; this plot had for its object the escape of all the prisoners, who were then to spread through the city, commit every kind of excess, and, finally, carry off the king.

"The public agitation was now at its height. The commune, to excite the zeal of the citizens, had resolved to assemble them together, in military array, at the Champ-de-Mars.

"Finally, the 2nd of September arrived; the alarum guns were fired; the tocsin sounded. Oh, day of mourning! On this signal, the people assembled, rushed into the prisons, and slew and assassinated! Manuel, and many deputies of the national assembly resorted to these scenes of carnage; their efforts were ineffectual; victims were slaughtered, even in their arms! Alas! I was enjoying a false security; I was ignorant of these massacres, for I had not lately mixed much in public business. Finally, I was informed of them, —but how? in a vague, indirect, and partial manner; it was added, at the same time, that all was then over. The most heart-rending details afterwards came to my knowledge; but I was convinced that these horrors would not be again repeated. Nevertheless they continued. I made urgent applications to the commandant; I required him to protect the prisons by an armed force. At first he made me no reply. I applied again. He then told me that he had given orders. These orders did not appear to be executed; the massacres continued. I went to the council of the commune; I hastened to the 'Hôtel de la Force,' with many of my collegues. The citizens, apparently peaceably disposed, obstructed the street which led to this prison; a very weak guard was posted at its gates. I entered. No, never can the spectacle I there witnessed be effaced from my heart; I saw three municipal officers hanging in their scarfs; I saw two men quietly seated at a table, the prison registers open before them, and calling over the names of the prisoners; others interrogated them; others acted as jurymen and judges; about a dozen executioners, their naked arms covered with blood, some with clubs, others with sabres and cutlasses, executed instant sentence on the wretched victims; the citizens waited impatiently without, receiving with mournful silence the sentences of death, and with exclamations of joy those of acquittal.

"Both the judges and executioners seemed to enjoy the same security as if they had been called upon by the law to exercise these functions. They

boasted of their justice, of their attention to distinguish the innocent from the guilty, of the services they had rendered to the republic, and they demanded,—can it be believed!—they demanded payment for their time spent in these butcheries! I was really confounded at their audacity!

"I addressed them in the austere language of the law. I expressed the deep indignation which I felt. I made them go out before me. But scarcely had I departed, when they returned to their work. I again drove them out. But during the night they completed their horrible butcheries.

"Were these assassins commanded or directed by other men? I have had several lists of names in my possession, I have received reports, I have collected some facts, but if I had to pronounce my opinion as a judge, I could not say of any one, Behold the instigator.

"I think, however, that these crimes would not have had such a free course, and that they might have been arrested, if those who possessed the means of putting a stop to them, had beheld them with horror; but, I must say, for it is the truth, that many public men, many defenders of their country, believed these disastrous and dishonouring scenes necessary to free the nation from dangerous characters, and strike terror into the hearts of the conspirators; they believed that crimes odious to morality were necessary to policy.

"This idea relaxed the energies of those to whom the law has confided the maintenance of public order, to whom it has committed the defence of persons and property.

"It is easy to conceive how the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th of September have been connected with the immortal day of the 10th of August, and how the scenes of the former have been represented as the natural consequences of those of the latter; but, for my own part, I cannot confound glory with infamy, nor consent to dishonour the 10th of August by imputing to it the crimes of September.

"The committee of superintendence issued on the 4th, whilst the massacres still continued, an order of arrest against Roland. Danton being informed of it, hastened, with Robespierre, to the mayoralty; he expressed the warmest indignation against this arbitrary act of madness, which would have ruined, not Roland, but those from whom it proceeded. On his representations, it was recalled.

"I had an animated explanation with Robespierre. I reproached him, to his face, in terms which friendship would have softened in his absence; I said to him: 'Robespierre, you are the cause of much evil. Your denunciations, your alarms, your hatreds, and your suspicions, throw the people into a ferment. But explain yourself; have you facts, have you proofs? I myself contend with you; I love only truth; I am only at the establishment of liberty.'

"'You allow yourself to be prejudiced. You allow yourself to be imposed upon,' replied he, 'you are set against me; you see my enemies daily, you see Brissot and his party.'

"'You deceive yourself, Robespierre, no one is more free from prejudices than myself. I judge of men and things with the utmost impartiality.'

"'It is true I see Brissot, but it is rarely; you do not know him, but I have known him from his childhood. I have seen him at moments when he has been perfectly free from reserve, and has discovered his heart to me in all the confidence of friendship. I know his disinterestedness, I know his principles, and I protest to you they are pure. Those who make him the head of a party, have a most incorrect idea of his character; he is enlightened, and talented, but he has neither that reserve, nor that dissimulation, nor that power of captivation, nor that methodical mind which are necessary for the leader of a party, and what will astonish you more is, that, far from being able to lead others, he is very easily led himself.'

"Robespierre insisted on the truth of his suspicions, but confined himself to generalities. 'For Heaven's sake,' said I, 'explain yourself. Tell me frankly all that is upon your heart, all that you know.'

"'Well!' replied he, 'I believe that Brissot belongs to Brunswick!'

"'How deeply you are in error,' cried I; 'this is really madness. How does your imagination mislead you! Would not Brunswick be the first to take his head? Brissot is not senseless enough to doubt it. Which of us can seriously capitulate now? which of us has not our life at stake? Let us banish these groundless suspicions!'

"I return to those events of which I have endeavoured to give a slight sketch. These events, and a few of those which preceded the celebrated day of the 10th of August, and the occurrence of many facts and circumstances, about the same time, have given rise to an opinion that some intriguing characters aimed, by these means, at possessing themselves of the physical force of the people, and of thus seizing on absolute authority; Robespierre has been openly pointed out; his connexions have been scrutinized, his conduct minutely examined; the expressions which have escaped from his friends have been caught up, and it has been concluded that he entertains the insensate ambition of making himself dictator of his country.

"But the character of Robespierre satisfactorily explains all his actions. He breathes in an atmosphere of gloom and suspicion; he perceives, on all sides, plots, treasons, and precipices; his bilious temperament, and splenetic imagination, present every object to him in dark colours; imperious in his opinion, perversely attached to his own ideas, impatient of contradiction, never acknowledging his errors, or pardoning the wounds inflicted on his self-love, accusing others on the slightest grounds, worried by doubts, believing himself the object of universal attention, considering himself persecuted, devoured by egotism, a stranger to all prudential motives, by which he often injures the causes he defends, aiming, above all things, at the favour of the people, courting them incessantly, and valuing, beyond price, their affection and applause; these are the causes which have made him suspected of aspiring to the dictatorial power.

"For my own part, I cannot persuade myself that this imagination has ever entered into his thoughts, has ever been the object of his desires, or the aim of his ambition.

"Nevertheless, it is certain that he is singularly attached to this idea, that he ceases not to call for a dictatorship, which he represents as the only thing

which can save us from the anarchy of which he himself is a prime cause. But for whom does he solicit this tyrannical power? You would never believe it; you know not to what a pitch of extravagance his delirious vanity carries him. He solicits it for Marat; for a being, who, if his folly was not surpassed by his ferocity, would be the most ridiculous object on the earth; but nature seems to have set upon him a seal of reprobation."

NOTE 52. Page 228, col. 1.

Amongst the most curious opinions expressed with regard to Marat and Robespierre, we must not omit that which was uttered by the Jacobin club on the sitting of Sunday, the 23rd December, 1792. I know nothing that can better delineate the spirit and the bias of the moment, than the discussion which arose upon the character of these two personages. The following is an extract:—

"Desfieux reads the correspondence. A letter from one club, whose name has escaped us, gave rise to a great discussion well calculated to cause important reflections. This club declares to the parent society that it is unalterably attached to the principles of the jacobins: it observes that it does not suffer itself to be blinded by the calumnies so profusely uttered against Marat and Robespierre, and that it preserves its entire esteem and veneration for those two incorruptible friends of the people.

"This letter has been loudly applauded, but it has been followed by a discussion, which Brissot and Gorsas, who are assuredly prophets, had announced the preceding day.

"*Robert.* It is very surprising that the names of Marat and Robespierre are always indiscriminately used. How much must the public mind have been corrupted in the departments, since no distinction is made between these two defenders of the people! They both possess rare virtues, 'tis true; Marat is a patriot, he has estimable qualities, I admit, but how different he is from Robespierre. The latter is discreet, moderate in his measures; while Marat is exaggerated, and does not possess that discretion which is so characteristic of Robespierre. It is not enough to be a mere patriot; we must, if we wish to be of real service to the people, be reserved in carrying out our measures, and Robespierre far excels Marat in the mode in which he carries out his designs.

"It is high time, citizens, to pluck away the veil that conceals the truth from the eyes of the departments; it is indeed time that they should be taught to make some distinction between Robespierre and Marat. Let us write to the corresponding societies what we really think of these two citizens; for, I must avow it, I am a great partisan for Robespierre. (*Groans from the galleries, and from a party in the hall*).

"*Bourdon.* We ought long since to have plainly stated to the corresponding societies our opinion of Marat. How could Marat and Robespierre be ever confounded! Robespierre is a man truly virtuous, against whom no censure can be made from the commencement of the revolution; Robespierre is temperate in his measures, whereas Marat is an intemperate writer, who does considerable mischief to the jacobins (murmurs); and moreover, it is quite as well to observe, has done us much harm at the national convention.

"The deputies conceive that we are partisans of Marat; they call us *Maratists;* if they perceive that we know how to appreciate Marat, then you will see the deputies come nearer the *Mountain* where we sit, you will see them come into the body of this society, you will find the corresponding societies return from their wanderings, and rally themselves once more around the cradle of liberty. If Marat be a patriot, he ought to acquiesce in the motion I am about to make. Marat ought to sacrifice himself to the cause of liberty. I require that his name be erased from the list of the members of this club.—This motion called forth some few cheers, violent marks of displeasure from one party in the hall, and a great disturbance in the galleries.

"It will be recollected that eight days previous to this novel scene, Marat had been covered with applause in the club; the people of the galleries who had not lost their memory remembered it well; they could not be brought to believe that such a quick change had taken place in public opinion, and as the moral instinct of the people is invariably correct, they were highly indignant at Bourdon's motion; the people rose in defence of their *virtuous friend;* the people had not believed that in eight days Marat could have forfeited the esteem of the society, for although it has been said that ingratitude was a virtue in republics, it will take some trouble to familiarize the French people with that description of virtue.

"The union of the names of Marat and Robespierre presented no revolting association to the people; their ears had been for some time now accustomed to see them joined in correspondence; and after having several times seen the club indignant when the clubs of other departments requested the erasure of Marat's name, they did not think that they ought on this occasion support Bourdon's motion.

"A citizen belonging to a corresponding club has observed to the present society how practically dangerous it is to join the names of Marat and Robespierre together. 'In the departments,' said he, 'a great distinction is made between Marat and Robespierre, and one is surprised to see the present society silent upon the subject of the differences existing between these two patriots. I propose to the society, after having declared what is to be done with Marat, to discontinue the use of the term affiliation, (this word ought not to be named in a republic,) but to employ the word *fraternization.*'

"*Dufourny.* I oppose the motion to erase Marat's name from the list of this society. (*Loud cheering.*) I shall not wrangle upon the difference that exists between Marat and Robespierre. These two writers, who resemble each other in their patriotism, yet exhibit remarkably different traits of character; they have both of them served the cause of the people, but by very different means. Robespierre has defended the true principles of action with suitable method, firmness, and wisdom; Marat, on the other hand, has not unfrequently overstepped the limits of sound reason and discretion. Nevertheless, in admitting the difference that does exist between Marat and Robespierre, I am by no means in

favour of the motion for erasing his name: one might be just without being ungrateful to Marat. Marat has been highly serviceable to us, he has served the revolution courageously. (*Loud cheering from the club and the galleries.*) It would be an act of ingratitude to erase his name from the list. (*Yes, yes, from all sides.*) Marat has been an indispensable person; in revolutions there must be such strong-minded men, capable of conciliating all sorts and conditions, and Marat is one of those remarkable men who are indispensably necessary to overthrow despotism. I conclude by moving, that the motion of Bourdon be rejected, and that we content ourselves with writing to the corresponding societies, apprising them of the distinction that we make between Marat and Robespierre.

"The society resolves that she will no longer use the term affiliation, considering it as injurious to republican equality; the society, therefore, substitutes the word *fraternization*. The society lastly resolves that the name of Marat shall not be erased from the list of its members, but a circular letter shall be sent to all the societies which enjoy the rights of fraternization, in which shall be expressly defined the points, resemblances, dissimilarities, conformities, and contrarieties which exist between Marat and Robespierre: so that all those who fraternize with the jacobins may be able to declare themselves with precision upon these two defenders of the people, and that they may be at last enabled to disunite two names, that it has been erroneously conceived ought to have eternally associated with each other.

NOTE 53. Page 246, col. 1.

The following is another extract from the *Memoirs of Gorat*, not less curious than the preceding: it is considered the best portrait that has ever been drawn of Robespierre, and the suspicions which were his tormentors. The following is a conversation.

"As soon as Robespierre understood that I was about to speak to him of the quarrels of the convention, he exclaimed, 'All the deputies of the Gironde, Brissot, Louvet, and Barbaroux, are all counter-revolutionists and conspirators!' I could not help laughing at this exclamation, and this laugh hurt him extremely. 'You were always the same,' he replied; 'in the constituent assembly you were disposed to believe that the aristocrats were attached to the revolution; but I have not always been the same. In the constituent assembly I believed there were some nobles who were not aristocrats; I thought so of many, and you yourself still think so of a few. I believed, also, that we might have made some conversions among the real aristocrats, if, of the two means which were at our disposal, reason and force, we had more frequently employed reason, in which we had the exclusive advantage, whereas the tyrants might have used force. Believe me: let us forget those dangers which we have overcome; they have no connexion with those which at present threaten us. War was carried on then between the friends and the enemies of liberty; but, at present, it is waged between the friends of the republic. If an occasion should present itself, I shall tell Louvet that he is entirely mistaken in thinking you a royalist; but I must tell you, also, that Louvet is no more a royalist than yourself. You resemble, in your quarrels, the Mollinists and Jansenists, whose whole dispute turned upon the manner in which divine grace operates in the soul, and who reciprocally accused each other of not believing in God. If they are not royalists, why were they so anxious to save the life of the king? It appears that you, also, are for pardon and clemency . . . What signifies it on what principles the death of the tyrant was just and necessary; your Girondists, your Brissotines, your appealers to the people, opposed it. They wish to leave to tyranny all the means of re-erecting itself. I do not know that the intention of the *appealers to the people* was to spare the life of Capet: an appeal to the people always appeared to me imprudent and dangerous; but I can well conceive how those who voted for it might believe that the life of the prisoner Capet would be more serviceable to the republic than his death: I can well conceive that they thought this appeal would be doing honour to the nation in the eyes of the whole world, by affording it an opportunity of exercising a great act of generosity by an act of sovereignty. This is surely putting fine constructions on a measure you disapproved of in favour of men who are conspiring on all sides. Where then are they conspiring? Every where. In Paris, throughout France, and throughout Europe. In Paris, Gensonné is carrying on conspiracies in the faubourg St. Antoine, going from shop to shop and persuading the tradespeople that we patriots wish to plunder their goods; the Gironde have long since formed a design of separating themselves from France, and uniting themselves to England, and their chiefs themselves are the authors of this project, which they are determined to execute, whatever may be the price; Gensonné does not conceal it; he declares aloud that they are not the representatives of the nation, but the plenipotentiaries of the Gironde. Brissot carries on his conspiracies by means of his journal, which is a tocsin of civil war; it is known that he went to England, and the reason why he went is also known; we are not ignorant of his intimate connexion with the minister for foreign affairs; with that Lebrun, who is the creature of the house of Austria: the most intimate friend of Brissot is Claviere, and Claviere conspires wherever he breathes; Rabaud, a traitor, both as a Protestant and a philosopher, cannot conceal from us his correspondence with that traitor and courtier Montesquiou; for the last six months they have both been endeavouring to open Savoy and France to the Piedmontese; Servan has been nominated general of the army of the Pyrenees to deliver up the keys of France to the Spaniards; and, finally, behold Dumouriez, who no longer menaces Holland, but Paris; and when that quack of a hero was here, *where I wished to have him arrested*, it was not with the *Mountain*, but at the houses of the Girondists that he dined every day: three or four times at my house, for instance. *I am weary of the revolution:* I am ill: the country never was in greater danger, and I doubt how all will end. Well! do you feel inclined to laugh now; do you still believe these Girondists honest men and good republicans? No, I am no longer inclined to laugh, but I can scarcely restrain my tears, when I see the legislators of my country a prey to such unfounded suspicions. I am sure that nothing which you suspect is true; but I am sure, also, that your suspicions

themselves are really and deeply dangerous; nearly all the men whom you have mentioned are your own enemies, but not one, with the exception of Dumouriez, is an enemy to the republic; and if you could stifle your animosities, the country would be no longer in any danger. You are going to propose to me to renew the motion of the bishop Lamourel; no, I have sufficiently profited by the lessons which you have given me, and by my experience in the three national assemblies, to know that the best patriots hate their enemies better than they love their country; but I have one question to put to you,—I beg you to reflect before you answer it; 'Have you no doubt of the truth of all you have said to me?' 'None.' I then quitted him in astonishment, and trembled at what I had just heard.

"Some few days afterwards, as I was leaving the executive council, I chanced to meet Salles, who was quitting the national convention. Circumstances were every day assuming a more threatening aspect. All those who possessed any regard for one another could not see each other without finding themselves urged to converse upon politics.

"Well! said I to Salles, as I lighted upon him, is there no way of putting an end to these horrible disagreements?—Oh! yes, I do hope so; I hope that I shall expose these terrible wretches and their frightful conspiracies to the world. But as for you, I know that you always possess a blind confidence; I know your way is never to believe any thing.—You are in the wrong there; I believe as much as any one else; but I found my credence upon presumptions, and not upon mere suspicions; upon attested facts, and not on imaginary circumstances. Why, then, do you suppose me so incredulous? Is it because in 1789 I would not believe upon your assertion, that Necker was embezzling the public capital, and that mules had been seen laden with gold and silver, which was his mode of transferring millions to Geneva? This hardness of belief, I must confess, is a thing I cannot restrain; for to this day I am persuaded that Necker has left here more millions for himself than ever he carried off with him to Geneva.—Necker was a rascal, but nothing to compare with the rascals by whom we are surrounded, and it is of these latter I wish to speak if you will but hear me. I would have you say all, for I know all; I have unravelled all their plans. All the conspiracies, all the crimes of the *Mountain* have had their commencement with the revolution: it is the duke of Orleans who is at the head of this band of robbers; and it is the author of that detestable romance called *Liaisons dangereuses* who has settled the plan of all the enormities they have been committing for five years past. The traitor Lafayette was their accomplice, and it is he who, by making it appear that he had detected the plot from its birth, sent Orleans to England to arrange every thing with Pitt, the prince of Wales, and the cabinet at Saint-James's. Mirabeau was also there with them: he received the king's money in order to conceal his connexion with the duke of Orleans, but he received a far greater sum of the duke of Orleans to serve him. The great affair for the Orleans party was to get the Jacobins to identify themselves with his designs. They had not dared to undertake this in a direct manner; it was first to the Cordeliers that they paid their court. Now mark, the Cordeliers have always been not only so numerous, but have made less noise than the Jacobins: it is because that they want every body to be their tool, but will not let every body into their secret. The Cordeliers have always been the nursery of conspirators: it is there that Danton, the most dangerous conspirator of all, brings them up, and adapts their minds to impudence and lying, while Marat renders them fit agents for murder and massacre: it is there that they are getting up the part they must next play at the Jacobins; and the Jacobins, who conduct themselves as if they took the lead in France, are themselves led by the Cordeliers without their at all suspecting it. The Cordeliers, who have the appearance of being concealed in some hole and corner in Paris, negotiate with Europe, and have their envoys at every one of those courts that have sworn to effect the destruction of our liberty: the fact is certain; I can prove it. In short, it is the Cordeliers who have plunged the throne in waves of blood, in order that a new throne should issue therefrom. They well know the right side, where all the virtues preside, is also the side where all the true republicans are to be found; and if they accuse us of royalism, it is because they want this pretext for unloosing upon us the fury of the populace: it is because they can find daggers more easily than answer our arguments. In a single conspiracy there are three or four. When the right side shall be altogether butchered, the duke of York will come to seat himself upon the throne, and Orleans, who has promised it him, will then assassinate him, and then Orleans in his turn will be assassinated by Marat, Danton, and Robespierre, who have made him a like promise; and the triumviri will then divide France, covered with ashes and blood, till the man of the greatest ability, and that will be Danton, assassinates the others, and reigns alone; at first, under the style of a dictator, and next, without disguising the term, under the style of king. Now don't you see their plan? don't doubt it: I have considered it so long that I am convinced of it. See how all the circumstances combine and tally with each other: there is not a single fact in the revolution which is not a part and an evidence of these shocking conspiracies. You are astonished, I see it; will you still distrust me?—Indeed, I am astonished; but tell me, are there many amongst you, that is to say of your side, who are entirely of your opinion on this subject?—All, or nearly so. Condorcet once made some objections; Sieyès has but little communication with us; as for Rabant he entertains another scheme, which sometimes is similar, and sometimes is unlike my own: but all the others have no more doubt than I have upon what I have been telling you; they all feel the necessity there is for acting with promptitude, and to lose no time in *putting the irons into the fire*, in order to prevent so much crime and misery, and that we should not lose the fruits of a revolution that has cost us so dear. On the right side, there are members who do not repose sufficient confidence in you; but as for me, I who have been your colleague, who know you for an honest man, and as a friend of liberty, I assure them that you will be on our side, and that you will assist us by every possible means your situation will admit of. Is there any thing that can tinge with the slightest degree of uncertainty what I

have said of these wretches?—I should be certainly unworthy the regard you manifest towards me, if I left you to believe that I entirely accord with your notions as to this plan, which you conceive is your enemies' device. The more you compare facts, things, and men, the more will appear probable to you, and the less so to me. The greater part of the facts, out of which you frame the tissue of this plan, have had an object with which there is no necessity to charge them; they speak for themselves; and you are assigning an object which does not speak for itself, and which must have a reason assigned for it. Now, we must have proofs before we can throw aside a natural inference, and other proofs are next required before an inference, which cannot be supported in a natural way, can be adopted. For instance, every one believes that Lafayette and Orleans are enemies, and that Paris, France, and the national assembly would be quit of great uneasiness, if Orleans could be prevailed upon or compelled by Lafayette to remove himself from France for some time to come. Now, it must be settled, not by assertion, but by proof—1. That they were not enemies; 2. That they were coadjutors; 3. That the journey Orleans took to England was for the express purpose of carrying their conspiracies into execution. I know that by adopting such a strict course of reasoning, one exposes oneself to see crimes and miseries committed before one's eyes, without being able to reach them, and without the means of preventing them by foresight: but I also am aware that by indulging one's own imagination, one creates systems out of past and future events, and one lets slip the means of duly discerning and appreciating the present state of things; and by dreaming of thousands of enormities which no one ever devises, one deprives oneself of the faculty of perceiving with certainty those that threaten us. We force our enemies, who want but little encouragement, to commit acts of which they would have no idea but for our suggesting them. I have no doubt whatever that we have about us a pack of wretches: the unrestrained action of their bad passions produces such men, and the gold of the foreigner keeps them in pay. But believe me, if their schemes are horrible, they are neither so vast, or so great, or so complicated, nor conceived and brought from such a distance. There is in all this much more of the robber and murderer than the deep conspirator. The real conspirators against the republic are the kings of Europe and the bad feelings *(passions)* of the republicans. Our armies are well able to keep off the kings of Europe and their regiments, and more than enough: there is one mode of preventing our party feelings from destroying us, and only one—lose no time in organising a government that has supreme power, and is deserving of confidence. In the state in which your bickerings leave the government, even a democracy of twenty-five millions of angels would soon become a prey to all the furious passions and hates to which offensive pride gives rise: as Jean Jacques has said, there must be twenty-five millions of gods, and no one can ever bring himself to imagine so many. My dear Salles, men and great assemblies are not so constituted that on one side all are gods, and on the other all devils. Wherever you will find men whose interests and opinions are conflicting, even the good are subject to bad feelings, and even those that are bad, if you will take the pains to dive into their hearts, are susceptible of honest and good impressions. I discover in the depths of my own soul an evident and convincing proof of at least one-half of this truth: I am good, and am as much to be relied upon as any one of you; but when instead of combating my opinions with argument and liberality, you repel them with suspicion and contumely, I am ready to throw argument overboard, and see whether my pistols are well loaded. You have on two occasions made me minister, and twice you have rendered me any thing but a service; it is only the perils that environ you and surround myself which can induce me to remain in the post I now occupy. A brave man does not ask for leave of absence on the eve of a battle. The battle I see is not far off; foreseeing that both the two sides will discharge themselves upon me, I am determined to remain. I shall on every occasion tell you what I, in my reason and conscience, consider true or false; but mind and take warning that I shall be guided entirely by my own conscience and reason, and not by the conscience or argument of any other man upon earth. I shall not have laboured thirty years of my life in making myself a lantern, for the purpose of lighting myself on the road by another's lantern.

"Salles and myself parted, and shook hands, and embraced each other, as if we had still been each other's colleagues in the constituent assembly."

NOTE 54. Page 267, col. 2.

The true feelings of Robespierre with regard to the 31st May, are plainly evidenced by the language he used at the Jacobins, where he spoke with greater freedom than at the assembly, and where the work of conspiracy was more overtly conducted. Extracts from his speeches at different important periods will evidence the course of his ideas with regard to the grand catastrophe of the 31st May and 2nd June. His first speech uttered on the occasion of the pillages and spoliation of the month of February, affords us an early indication of his sentiments.

(*Sitting of February* 25, 1793.)

"*Robespierre.* As I have always been a friend to humanity, and have never sought to flatter any one, I shall declare the whole truth without any reserve. A snare has been laid for the patriots. The intriguers wish to ruin them, and the people experience a sentiment of just indignation. I have always maintained, even when in the midst of persecution, and without any support, that the people can never be in the wrong; I dared to proclaim this truth at a time when it was not generally acknowledged, but the course of the revolution has fully developed it.

"The people have so often heard those call out for the law who wished to bring them under their yoke, that they now distrust that language.

"The people suffer; they have not yet reaped the fruit of their labours; they are still persecuted by the rich, and the rich are now, what they ever have been, unpitiable. (*Applause.*) The people observe the insolence of those who have betrayed them; they see wealth accumulate in the hands of these traitors; they feel their own misery, and the necessity of taking decisive measures; and when

they are addressed in the language of reason, they can listen to nothing but invectives against the rich, and allow themselves to be misled by those who only court their favour to abuse it.

"There are two causes for this: the first, a natural disposition to seek the means of solacing their sufferings, by obtaining by their own exertions that protection which the laws do not afford them.

"And the second, the perfidious designs of the enemies of liberty, who were convinced that the only means of delivering us up to foreign powers, is to alarm the people on the subject of subsistence, and make them the victims of those excesses which must naturally arise from their distress. I myself have been a spectator and witness of many popular risings. By the side of honest citizens I have seen foreigners and opulent individuals disguised in the dress of *sans-culottes*. I have heard them thus speak: We were promised abundance after the death of the king, and we have only become more wretched since then. We have heard violent declamations, not against that intriguing and counter-revolutionary portion of the convention, who are seated where the aristocrats of the constituent assembly formerly sat, but against the *Mountain*, against the deputation of Paris, and against the Jacobins.

"I do not say that the people are culpable. I do not say that these commotions are insurrectional; but I ask, when the people rise up, should not the object in view be worthy of a great nation? Should they continually occupy themselves in pitiful trafficking? No advantage has been derived from it, for the sugar-loaves have been gathered up by the hands of the valets of aristocrats; but suppose it had profited, in exchange for this petty advantage, what manifold grievances might have resulted! Our adversaries wish to frighten you away from all moderation and propriety; they wish to persuade you that our system of liberty is subversive of all order and security.

"The people should rise, not to provide themselves with sugar, but to overthrow the robbers. (*Applause.*) Must I recall to your recollection your past dangers? You were on the point of becoming a prey to the Prussians and Austrians; a negotiation was entered into; and those who had before trafficked away your liberty, who had incited you to the commission of outrages and excesses, I proclaim it aloud in the face of the friends of liberty and equality, and in the face of the nation, that in the month of September last, after the affair of the 10th of August, these very men had made every arrangement for the arrival of the Prussians at Paris."

(*Sitting of Wednesday, 8th May*, 1793.)

"*Robespierre.* We have to fight a battle which rages externally and internally. A civil war is maintained by the enemies of the interior. The army of La Vendée, the army of Brittany and the army of Coblentz are turned against Paris, that stronghold of liberty. People of Paris, tyrants arm themselves against you, because you are the most worthy portion of human kind; the great powers of Europe arise against you, all that corruptionists can perform in France seconds their exertions.

"After having conceived this vast scheme of your enemies, you ought not to be at a loss as to the means of defending yourselves. I did not communicate my secret to you; I have disclosed it to the convention.

"I am now going to reveal this secret to you, and were it possible that this duty of the representative of a free people could be considered as a crime, I should know how to brave every peril, in order to confound the tyrants and preserve liberty.

"I have this morning stated at the convention that the light troops of Paris would go and meet the wretches of La Vendée, that they would take along with them in their route all their brethren of the departments, and that they would exterminate all, yes, all the rebels at once.

"I have said that all the patriots at home should rise and utterly incapacitate the aristocrats of La Vendée, and the aristocrats disguised under the mask of patriotism, from doing us further harm.

"I have said that the insurrectionists of La Vendée possessed an army at Paris; I have said that that generous and exalted people, who for five years has borne the weight of the revolution, ought to take the necessary precautions, lest our wives and children should be subjected to the counter-revolutionary knife of those enemies that Paris still retains within her precincts. No one has dared to dispute this principle of action. These massacres are of a most emergent and pressing nature. Patriots! fly to meet the *brigands* of La Vendée.

"They are no more to be dreaded, other than as they have taken the precaution to disarm the people. Paris must send her republican legions; but when we shall cause our enemies at home to tremble, our wives and our children will no longer be exposed to the fury of the aristocrats. I have proposed two measures: the first, that Paris do send two legions sufficient to exterminate all the wretches who have dared to raise the standard of rebellion. I have demanded that all the aristocrats, that all the *feuillans*, and that all the moderatists should be banished from those sections they have contaminated with their impure breath. I have demanded that all suspected citizens should be placed in confinement.

"I have demanded that the appellation of a *suspected citizen* should not be restricted to the title of former nobles, procurators, financiers, and merchants. I have required that all citizens who have given proof of incivism, should be imprisoned until the war be at an end, and that we should assume a commanding attitude before our enemies. I have said that the people must be furnished with some means of meeting in their sections without injuring their means of subsistence, and that for this purpose, the convention should declare that every mechanic living by his daily labour should be paid during all the time that he should be compelled to keep himself under arms for preserving the tranquillity of Paris. I have demanded that some necessary millions should be appropriated for the purpose of making arms and pikes, so as to arm all the *sans-culottes* of Paris.

"I have demanded that workshops and forges should be erected in the places of public resort, so that all the citizens should be witnesses of the fidelity and activity with which these works should be conducted. I have also demanded that

all public officers should be dismissed from their employments by the people.

"I have demanded that the municipality and the department of Paris, which enjoy the confidence of the people, be no longer placed under restraint.

"I have demanded that the factions who are in the convention, should cease to vilify the people of Paris, and that those newspaper editors who prevent public opinion should be silenced. All these measures are necessary, and in resuming my discourse, see the acquittance of the debt I have contracted with the people.

"I have demanded that the people make an extraordinary effort to exterminate the aristocrats who exist every where. *(Applause.)*

"I have demanded that an army should be in the precinct of Paris; an army not like that of Dumouriez, but a popular army, which should be continually under arms to overawe the *feuillans* and the moderatists. This army ought to be composed of paid *sans-culottes;* I demand that there be assigned millions enough to arm the mechanics and all good patriots; I demand that they be stationed at every post, and that their commanding majesty should make every aristocrat turn pale.

"I demand that after to-morrow forges be erected in all places of public resort, where arms shall be made for arming the people. I demand that the executive council have the charge of carrying out these measures on its own responsibility. If any one oppose these measures, if there should be any one who should incline to the enemies of liberty, they should be driven away after to-morrow.

"I demand that the constituted authorities be charged with the superintendence of the execution of these measures, and that they be ever mindful that they are the delegates of a city that is the bulwark of liberty, and whose existence is sufficient to render a counter-revolution impossible.

"In this moment of emergency it becomes the duty of all patriots to save the country, by adopting the sternest expedients; if you will allow the patriots to be butchered one by one, all that is virtuous on earth will be extinguished; it remains for you to see whether you will be the saviours of the human race.

[All the members simultaneously rise with one burst of feeling, and cry out while waving their hats: "*Aye, aye, be it so!*" (*Oui, oui, nous le voulons!*]

"All the vile wretches in the world have concocted their plans, and all the defenders of liberty are marked out for their victims.

"It is because the question concerns your glory and your welfare, and this is the sole motive for which I so earnestly adjure you to keep a watchful eye over the safety of the country. Perhaps you think that you have to cause a rising, and that you must assume the appearance of an insurrection: by no means, it is by the law that we must exterminate our enemies.

"It is a most scandalous piece of impudence that perfidious delegates have wanted to make a distinction between the people of Paris and the departments, that they have desired to make a distinction between the people of Paris and the people of the galleries, as if we were in fault, we who have made every possible sacrifice to open our galleries for the entire population of Paris, and if that population were assembled within these walls, if that population heard me plead its cause against Buzot and Barbaroux, there is no doubt whatever but that it would come over to my side.

"Citizens, the perils are magnified, the foreign armies united with the rebels of the interior are objected against us; what can their efforts avail against millions of valiant *sans-culottes?* And if you follow up this proposition, that one free man is as good as twenty slaves, you ought to calculate that your force is far beyond all the combined powers.

"You possess by the laws themselves the faculty of legally exterminating our enemies. Have you aristocrats in the sections; drive them forth. Have your liberty to be saved; proclaim the rights of liberty, and use all your energy. Have you a vast population of *sans-culottes,* very honest and very sturdy, they must leave their work, get them paid by the wealthy. You have a national convention, it is very possible that the members of this convention are not all alike friendly to the cause of liberty and equality, but the far greater number have made up their minds to maintain the rights of the people and to save the republic. The gangrened portion of the convention will not be able to prevent the people from fighting the aristocrats.

"Do you think then that the *Mountain* of the convention will not be strong enough to repress all the partisans of Dumouriez, of Orleans, and Coburg! In good sooth you cannot entertain the idea.

"Should liberty fall, it will not be so much the fault of the delegates as of the sovereign power. People, do not forget that your destiny is in your own hands; it is your duty to save Paris and the human race; if you do not do this, you are highly to blame.

"The *Mountain* requires the aid of the people; the people rest their support upon the *Mountain.* Every method is taken to cause you alarm; they want to make you believe that the southern departments are opposed to the jacobins. I declared to you that Marseilles is the eternal friend of the *Mountain;* that at Lyons the patriots have gained a complete victory.

"I resume my proposition, and I demand, 1. That the sections raise an army sufficient to form the nucleus of a revolutionary army, which should include all the *sans-culottes* of the departments, in order to exterminate the rebels. 2. That an army of *sans-culottes* be raised at Paris for the purpose of repressing the aristocracy. 3. That dangerous intriguers and all aristocrats be placed under arrest; that the *sans-culottes* be paid out of the public funds which shall be supported by the wealthy, and that this measure be extended to the entire republic.

"I demand that forges be established in all places of public resort.

"I demand that the commune of Paris do, with all its might, administer to the revolutionary zeal of the people of Paris.

"I demand the revolutionary tribunal do its duty; and that it do punish those who, in these latter days, have blasphemed against the republic.

"I demand that this tribunal do, without delay,

THE SERVANTS OF SOCIETY

inflict exemplary punishment upon certain generals taken *flagrante delicto*, and who ought to be condemned.

"I demand that the sections of Paris unite themselves with the commune of Paris, and that they countervail by their influence the perfidious writings of newspaper editors, supported by foreign powers.

"By taking all these measures, without affording any pretence for saying that you have committed a breach of the laws, you will give an impulse to the departments, who will with you unite in endeavouring to save liberty."

(*Sitting of Sunday, May 12th*, 1793.)

"*Robespierre.* It has always appeared to me astonishing that, in critical moments, so many propositions are made tending to endanger the friends of liberty, whilst they themselves are left destitute of all support. Until it shall be proved to me that it is not necessary to arm the *sans-culottes*, nor to pay them for mounting guard, and preserving the tranquillity of Paris; until it shall be proved to me that we should not convert some of our public buildings into workshops for the manufacturing of arms, I shall think, and I shall say to those who reject these measures, that they know not the only way to save their country; for extreme measures should never be resorted to till all others have failed. It is not a single effort of enthusiasm that can save the republic; we have for our enemies men of the most subtle minds, who have all the resources of the state at their disposal.

"The measures that have been proposed cannot produce any decisive result; they have only served to propagate calumny; and have furnished the public journalists with a pretext for representing us in the most odious colours.

"When we neglect the most simple dictates of reason, which always offer themselves first to the mind, we may be sure that we are not on the right road. I shall say no more, but I protest against all those measures whose object may be to injure this society, without promoting, in any way, the public interests. Behold my profession of faith!

"When I perceive many anxious to make enemies for the society, and lending a willing ear to all calumnies against it, I cannot but conclude that these men are either blind, or harbour bad intentions.

"I move that the society passes the measures I have proposed, and I shall regard those men as very culpable who prevent their execution. How can a compliance with these measures be refused? How is it that their necessity is not felt? How can any one hesitate for a moment to support and adopt them? I propose that the society enters into a discussion of the principles of the constitution which has been prepared for France; for it is necessary to scrutinize all the projects of our enemies, and if the society should discover their perfidy and fraud, it will not have lost its time. I demand, therefore, permission to read my observations on the constitution."

(*Sitting of Sunday, 2[illegible] May, 1793.*)

"*Robespierre.* I have told you that the people ought to repose calmly in its strength [illegible] the people is oppressed, when [illegible] is left save itself, that man would be a coward [illegible] call upon it to rise. It is when all laws are violated, when despotism is at its height, it is when good faith and modesty are trampled under foot that the people ought to rise. This moment has now come: our enemies openly oppress the patriots; they want under colour of law to once more plunge the people into a state of misery and slavery. I shall never be the friend of these corrupt men whatever bribes they may offer me. I rather prefer dying with republicans than triumphing with those wretches. (*Loud applause.*)

"I know but of two ways in which a people can exist: either where it governs itself, or where it confides that trust to delegates. We, deputies of the republic, are desirous of establishing the government of the people by its delegates, with responsibility; it is to these principles that we refer our opinions, but the more we do so the less inclination is exhibited to hear us. A sudden signal given by the president, strips us of the right of voting. I consider that the sovereignty of the people is violated, since the delegates of the people give to their creatures the places that belong to the people. In accordance with these principles, I am grievously affected . . . ."

The speaker was interrupted by a deputation being announced. (*Disorder.*) "I am going," shouted Robespierre, "to continue my address, not to those who interrupt me, but to the republicans."

"I exhort every citizen to preserve a respect for his rights; I invite him to rely upon his own strength, and upon that of the nation; I invite the people to put themselves in the national convention in insurrection against all corrupt deputies. (*Applause.*) I declare that having received from the people the right of defending its rights, I regard him who interrupts me, or refuses me any right of speech, as my oppressor; and I declare that I myself now place myself in insurrection against the president and against all those members who sit in the convention. (*Applause.*) When a culpable affectation of contempt is exhibited against the *sans-culotte*, I declare, that I place myself in insurrection against the corrupt deputies. I invite all the Mountain deputies to rally, and to engage hand to hand against aristocracy, and I say that there is but one alternative left for them: either to oppose with all their might and main the efforts of the intriguers, or else to give in their resignation.

"At the same time the French people must be made acquainted with its rights, for faithful deputies cannot act without instructions.

"Should treason call the foreign enemy into the bosom of France; if when our cannoneers hold in their hands the thunder that must exterminate tyrants and their satellites, we see the enemy approaching our walls, then I declare that I myself will punish the traitors, and I promise you that I will look upon every conspirator as my enemy, and treat him as such." (*Applause.*)

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