

SUPPLEMENTARY
DESPATCHES AND MEMORANDA
OF
FIELD MARSHAL
ARTHUR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

INDIA,
1797—1805.

EDITED BY HIS SON,
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

VOLUME THE FOURTH.

[FEB. 15, 1803—MARCH, 1805; AND A FEW LETTERS OF A SUBSEQUENT DATE.]

LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

MDCCLXIX.

V2, L: 8.110

A858.4

179

SUPPLEMENTARY DESPACHES.

MEMORANDUM UPON THE DRAUGHT BULLOCKS WITH THE [1495.]
ARMY.

15th Feb., 1803.

It appears by the accompanying paper that the number of bullocks which will be required to draw the carriages which I know will be with the army in the field when assembled at Hurryhur (exclusive of the guns with the cavalry, which will be drawn by horses) will amount to 2780.

To this number, however, ought to be added one spare carriage for an 18-pounder, 30; one spare carriage for a 12-pounder, 10; a tumbril for the papers of the Commander-in-Chief; one for the papers of the commissary of provisions, and one for those of the paymaster, which it is almost certain have accompanied the troops from the Carnatic, making the whole number 2856. Besides these it is probable both that the 18-pounders and 3-inch and 5½-inch howitzers have more tumbrils than I have allotted to them, and that there are some store tumbrils in the park, coming from the Carnatic. It is also possible that there may be an additional tumbril for each brigade of 6-pounders coming from the Carnatic and the Ceded Districts as well as for those equipped in Mysore, and that there are Company's platform and arrack carts with the army.

The treasure also, it is reasonable to suppose, is carried in tumbrils: however, I shall calculate the demand for draught-bullocks only at 2854, as I think it probable that if there should be the additional carriages with the army above supposed to be with it, it will be possible to dispense with them.

The number of the Company's draught-bullocks with the army, including 300 gone to Sera with 70 platform carts, and 382 to Chittledroog to move from thence the guns and tumbrils prepared at that station, is 2289. To this number are to be added 300 expected from the Ceded Districts, making the whole number applicable to the service 2589.

Of this number there are 260 calves, which ought not with propriety, and indeed cannot be worked every day. They might be worked, however, one day in three, or 100 of them might be expected for work on every day. This will bring the account as follows:—

Total number of cattle	2589
Deduct calves	260
Remain	2329
Add 100 calves for work	100
Total cattle daily for work	2429
<hr/>	
The demand as above stated is	2854
The number of cattle for work is	2429
Deficiency	425

Great advantage would be the result of being able to draw all the wheel-carriages by means of the Company's draught cattle, both in a military and a political point of view. The carriages drawn by the hired cattle will not be able to move with those drawn by the Company's bullocks, and if there should be only a few of this description in the line, as they must be waited for, they will create as much delay as if there were many. Indeed if any of the carriages are to be drawn by them, the advantage of the state of condition of the Company's cattle will be in a great measure of no avail; and by the delays which the hired cattle will occasion, and by keeping the line long on its march and consequently the good cattle from their food, they will soon reduce these to the same level with themselves.

On the other hand the only mode by which we can inspire either our allies or our enemies with respect for our operations will be to show them that the army can move with ease and celerity at all times and in all situations.

To obtain these objects, viz., an equal power of moving in all parts of the equipment, and to produce a conviction on the minds of the Mahrattas that the British army can move with celerity, the equipments ought to be reduced as low as is possible consistently with the great object in view in assembling the army at all; and particularly those parts of it ought to be dispensed with respecting the utility or efficiency of which there

are doubts, or which might be brought forward upon carriage cattle.

The six brass 12-pounders are of the former description. I have experience of their inefficiency, and officers with whom I have conversed upon the subject (particularly Colonel Carlisle and Captain Scott) are of opinion that they are entirely useless. The carriages on which those guns are which are moving from Seringapatam, although sent new from Madras, are very much shaken, and it is probable will not travel far.

By sending these away from the army a gain would be made of 84 bullocks employed in drawing them, of 144 employed in drawing their tumbrils with shot, and 72 in drawing their tumbrils with shells; besides 10 which I suppose will be employed in drawing their spare carriage; making the total number which will be saved by sending away the 12-pounders, 310.

The stores carried in the additional tumbril with each brigade of guns prepared in Mysore being 10 in number, might be carried on carriage bullocks; the equipment would not be rendered less efficient, and the number of bullocks that would be saved by this arrangement would be 120; making the total number that would be saved by the two arrangements 430.

The deficiency of cattle as above pointed out is 431, for which these arrangements will provide.

With this establishment of cattle, however, and in the expected campaign, this will not be sufficient. In order that the carriages may move with ease, and the marches may be made with the necessary celerity without injury to the cattle, it will be necessary that the whole number set down in the annexed paper should be in the yoke; in which number are included the spare cattle according to the regulations of the Military Board. Some provision ought to be made, therefore, for sick, tired, and lame cattle, and for casualties that may be expected; recollecting always that these cattle are the property of the Company, and that when they are gone there are no other means of moving the wheel-carriages. The number of spare which would answer these ends would be about 400.

The mode in which these might be procured would be as follows:—

There must be some hired cattle with the army better than the rest; the best of all these ought to be selected and bought, and added to the number of the Company's draught cattle to

Of this number there are 260 calves, which ought not with propriety, and indeed cannot be worked every day. They might be worked, however, one day in three, or 100 of them might be expected for work on every day. This will bring the account as follows:—

Total number of cattle	2589
Deduct calves	260
Remain	2329
Add 100 calves for work	100
Total cattle daily for work	2429
<hr/>	
The demand as above stated is	2854
The number of cattle for work is	2429
Deficiency	425

Great advantage would be the result of being able to draw all the wheel-carriages by means of the Company's draught cattle, both in a military and a political point of view. The carriages drawn by the hired cattle will not be able to move with those drawn by the Company's bullocks, and if there should be only a few of this description in the line, as they must be waited for, they will create as much delay as if there were many. Indeed if any of the carriages are to be drawn by them, the advantage of the state of condition of the Company's cattle will be in a great measure of no avail; and by the delays which the hired cattle will occasion, and by keeping the line long on its march and consequently the good cattle from their food, they will soon reduce these to the same level with themselves.

On the other hand the only mode by which we can inspire either our allies or our enemies with respect for our operations will be to show them that the army can move with ease and celerity at all times and in all situations.

To obtain these objects, viz., an equal power of moving in all parts of the equipment, and to produce a conviction on the minds of the Mahrattas that the British army can move with celerity, the equipments ought to be reduced as low as is possible consistently with the great object in view in assembling the army at all; and particularly those parts of it ought to be dispensed with respecting the utility or efficiency of which there

are doubts, or which might be brought forward upon carriage cattle.

The six brass 12-pounders are of the former description. I have experience of their inefficiency, and officers with whom I have conversed upon the subject (particularly Colonel Carlisle and Captain Scott) are of opinion that they are entirely useless. The carriages on which those guns are which are moving from Seringapatam, although sent new from Madras, are very much shaken, and it is probable will not travel far.

By sending these away from the army a gain would be made of 84 bullocks employed in drawing them, of 144 employed in drawing their tumbrils with shot, and 72 in drawing their tumbrils with shells; besides 10 which I suppose will be employed in drawing their spare carriage; making the total number which will be saved by sending away the 12-pounders, 310.

The stores carried in the additional tumbril with each brigade of guns prepared in Mysore being 10 in number, might be carried on carriage bullocks; the equipment would not be rendered less efficient, and the number of bullocks that would be saved by this arrangement would be 120; making the total number that would be saved by the two arrangements 430.

The deficiency of cattle as above pointed out is 431, for which these arrangements will provide.

With this establishment of cattle, however, and in the expected campaign, this will not be sufficient. In order that the carriages may move with ease, and the marches may be made with the necessary celerity without injury to the cattle, it will be necessary that the whole number set down in the annexed paper should be in the yoke; in which number are included the spare cattle according to the regulations of the Military Board. Some provision ought to be made, therefore, for sick, tired, and lame cattle, and for casualties that may be expected; recollecting always that these cattle are the property of the Company, and that when they are gone there are no other means of moving the wheel-carriages. The number of spare which would answer these ends would be about 400.

The mode in which these might be procured would be as follows:—

There must be some hired cattle with the army better than the rest; the best of all these ought to be selected and bought, and added to the number of the Company's draught cattle to

complete the karkhanas in camp. By the food which they would get, the care of Captain Mackay's drivers, and his superintendence, it might be expected that they would soon regain their condition, so as to be put occasionally to work, particularly as there would exist no necessity for working them immediately. By these means the army would be placed with ease, and at a trifling expense, in a most efficient state in respect to its draught cattle. If this plan should be adopted, it would be necessary to delay to purchase the cattle till Captain Mackay will be in camp in readiness to take charge of the cattle that will be bought.

In the former part of this memorandum I stated that if there should be any additional carriages with the army above the number I have supposed to be with it in the annexed paper, I thought it possible to dispense with them; and I now proceed to consider that proposition.

The carriages which there may be are, 1st, additional tumbrils for the 18-pounders and the howitzers, and the 6-pounders. These may certainly be dispensed with, as the additional stores they contain may be carried upon carriage bullocks; the army will be equally efficient, and there will be no additional trouble to anybody excepting those of the store department.

2ndly, store tumbrils in the park. Of these there are already 4 provided for in the annexed paper; which probably will be found sufficient for the whole army. There are also 40 platform carts loaded with stores which could not be carried upon bullocks moving to the frontier with the equipment from Seringapatam, and included in the 115.

3rdly, Arrack and platform carts. Supposing the number of 4 store tumbrils and 40 store platform carts to be sufficient for the store department, there are to carry arrack in the provision department, provided for in the annexed paper, 80 platform and 30 arrack carts.

Supposing that these should carry each upon an average 60 gallons of arrack, the quantity carried will be 6600 gallons. This quantity will last 3000 Europeans 46 days at full allowance. But it is to be recollected that it will be replenished at Darwar, and that an addition will be made to it of as much more arrack as may be deemed proper to be carried on bullocks. Besides these 80 platform carts in the provision department and 40 in the store department, 6 more platform carts are provided

for in the annexed paper, which may be required in some of the departments for purposes of which I am not now aware.

4thly, money tumbrils. I have already provided for tumbrils to carry the papers of those gentlemen to whom a large number of papers necessarily belong; but I don't see any necessity for tumbrils to carry the money.

I bring with me from Seringapatam 13 spare elephants. Some of them have been sent to bring forward with speed the treasure which it was expected might come from the Barahmahal, others are carrying the treasure which is in camp, and others the new furniture for the elephants which are moving to the frontier with the European troops. These elephants are lately come from Ceylon, and are not in good condition; but three of them will carry the 2 lacs and 30,000 pagodas which I am bringing in gold, and the remainder can carry the treasure coming with the Commander-in-Chief. It can be packed in ammunition-boxes, and will move with more ease and safety on their backs than in tumbrils; and they are not wanted for any other service. Besides animals there are 9 hircarrahs camels which may not be wanted, and possibly cannot be used, in that capacity when the army will enter the enemy's country. These also might be used to carry the treasure.

It is also to be observed that in case of the sickness or lameness of any of the elephants or camels, or the necessity of using the latter to carry the hircarrahs, the treasure in boxes might be placed with security on the platform-carts used in carrying the arrack, two or three of which will be emptied daily.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Ordinance to accompany the Troops in the Field according to a Letter from Lieutenant-General Stuart of the 26th November, and Bullocks required to draw them.

ORDNANCE CARRIAGES.	Number of Bullocks in each Carriage.	Total Bullocks.	Grand Total.
4 brass 18-pounders	35	140	
2 8-inch howitzers	28	56	
2 5½-inch howitzers	14	28	
4 iron 12-pounders	47	188	
6 brass 12-pounders	14	84	
36 brass 6-pounders	10	360	
Carry forward	—	—	856

TUMBRILS.	Number of Bullocks in each Carriage.	Total Bullocks.	Grand Total.
Brought forward	856
4 18-pounders, 4 each = 16 ..	12	192	
2 8-inch howitzers, 2 each = 4 ..	12	48	
2 5½ inch howitzers, 2 each = 4 ..	12	48	
4 iron 12-pounders, 1 each = 4 ..	12	48	
6 brass 12-pounders, 2 each = 12 ..	12	144	
Ditto with shells, 1 each = 6 ..	12	72	
36 brass 6-pounders, 1 each = 36 ..	12	432	
Spare in Mysore for 6-pounders 10 ..	12	120	
Store in Mysore	4 ..	12	48
For 4 gallopers, 6-pounders .. 2 ..	12	24	
		<hr/>	1176
SPARE CARRIAGES.			
1 5½-inch howitzer	10	10	
1 8-inch howitzer	20	20	
5 6-pounders	6	30	
		<hr/>	60
CARTS.			
30 arrack carts	4	120	120
7 medical carts	4	28	28
1 pioneer's cart	4	4	4
115 platform carts	4	460	460
10 platform carts at Chittledroog ..	4	40	40
TREASURE TUMBRILS.			
The resident's, 1	12	12	
The bullock agent's, 1	12	12	
		<hr/>	24
1 artificer's cart	12	12	
		<hr/>	12
			<hr/>
			2780

[1496.] G. A. O.

Camp near Kerah-sinta-samoodrum,
Wednesday, 16th Feb., 1803.

The people who are sent to the villages for straw must take with them the sum of money which will be sufficient to pay for what they want. They are not to require change from the people of the villages: they have it not to give to them.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Montresor.

[1497.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp at Jingej Jalaub, 17th Feb., 1803.

I received your letter of the 10th last night. I forwarded to be laid before the Commander-in-Chief the order regarding the appointment of an acting-adjutant to the detachment of the 77th at the time I received it, and I will now forward that which you have enclosed in your letter of the 10th. The subject must have escaped his recollection. I don't know whether Major M'Pherson will draw the superior batta for commanding a division of the troops: that must depend upon the regulations on that subject, which your orders or mine cannot alter.

I understood that Lieutenant — was dead, otherwise I should before now have ordered a court martial upon him; but I will send orders upon that subject and a Native general court martial forthwith. You must fix upon the officers who are to compose these courts, and the time and place of their meeting, according to your ideas of the convenience of the service.

You do right to go into Wynaad and give the finishing stroke there. My public and private letters will have apprised you of what has been done respecting the march of the 2nd of the 1st: I think that corps will be in Wynaad soon after you will receive this letter.

I have intended and still intend to write you a long letter upon various subjects before I quit this country; but I have not yet had time. I have only now to remind you that in case you should have occasion to make any indents upon the stores at Seringapatam for the use of your troops, you must either send them to me to camp or to the Military Board at Fort St. George to be countersigned.

I get on well, but we are sadly distressed for want of water. I believe that General Stuart marched from Sera this morning.

If he continues to march at the rate he has hitherto, I shall join him on the Toombuddra on the 26th.

There is nothing new on the frontier; everything is quiet.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1498.]

To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

SIR, Camp at Jingej Jalaub, 17th Feb., 1803.

I had the honour of receiving your letter of the 14th last night. It does not occur to me that any steps could be taken previously to the advance of the army to obtain possession of Darwar for Ball Kishen Gungurdhur. Bappojee Scindiah will not give up that place till he becomes certain that a superior force is approaching it; and unless he is more obedient than the Mahrattas generally are, he is not likely, under present circumstances, to pay much attention to the Peshwah's orders, even if Ball Kishen Gungurdhur should be at hand to take possession of the fort, unless he has at his disposal a large force.

It would be difficult to understand the Peshwah's object in changing the killadar of this fort at this moment, which must embarrass in some degree the transfer of it to the British Commander-in-Chief, without adverting to the fact that there is a territory attached to the killadary of the value of about 100,000 rupees yearly, which is intended for the support of the garrison. It is probable that the Peshwah wishes that Ball Kishen Gungurdhur should have the advantage of enjoying this revenue during the time that the British troops will be in the possession of the place.

The country through which I have marched has suffered much from a want of rain in the last season, a want which has been general in all the countries bordering on the Western Ghauts, and has been most severely felt to the northward. I understand that the crops have failed entirely in the neighbourhood of Hurryhur, that the country is quite burnt up, and forage for your army will be exceedingly scarce. Under these circumstances I have again taken into consideration the proposition which I heretofore made to you to collect your army at that place.

If immediately upon your arrival in its neighbourhood it is your intention to enter the Mahratta territory, and to advance on your march as soon as your arrangements are made, the best thing to do would be to cross the river Toombuddra at once, and encamp within the Mahratta boundary. You will then have both sides to forage in, whereas if you remain on this side you will procure nothing from the other. I have likewise to observe that the country on the other side of the river is likely to afford

FEB., 1803.

THE ARMY AT HURRYHUR.

you the greatest quantity of forage, as its produce is jowarry, of which the crop is earlier than raggey, and the country is in general more fertile than that on this side. Besides, none of it will have been consumed, whereas there must have been a great consumption of the forage on this side by the cattle which have been in that neighbourhood for the purposes of the formation of the depôt, and belonging to the brinjarries.

If you should be desirous not to advance into the Mahratta territory till you should receive further advices, either from the Governor-General or the Resident at Poonah, as a want of forage for any number of days must be fatal to the cattle and exceedingly detrimental to your ulterior operations, it is my opinion that it would be best not to approach Hurryhur, and not to collect the army in one body till you will have determined to commence your march forward; in that case General Campbell might remain at Harponelly and forage as far as the Toombuddra to the northward; this division either opposite Hoonelly, upon the Toombuddra, or upon the Soolakairy Lake, and the main body of the army in the neighbourhood of Mayaconda. The whole would thus subsist with ease, and two days' easy march would join them at Hurryhur. The distance between each of the divisions would not be more than between twenty and thirty miles; you could communicate your orders to them with expedition, and the arrangements for the transfer of cattle, &c., would be made with a facility almost equal to that with which they would be made if the whole were in the same camp.

I have had frequent conferences with the Dewan upon this subject, with a view to pitching upon some place which I might venture to recommend to you as convenient for the collection of your army, supposing that your march forward might be delayed for some days for further advices; but I have not been able to find out any which does not hold out the most miserable prospect of starvation for the cattle. Having been disappointed in finding no water in many tanks and nullahs in which I have seen much water on my former marches upon this road, I have thought it proper to send a trusty person to examine the roads beyond the rivers as far as Darwar, and I will report to you the information he will give as soon as he returns.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

All remains quiet on the frontier, and no account of an enemy on this side of the Kistna.

[1499.]

To Colonel Carlisle.

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp at Jingej Jalaub, 17th Feb., 1803.

I received last night your letter of the 15th. I have forwarded to the Military Board the proceedings of the committee on the howitzer carriages, by which I observe that one member differs in opinion from the two others. It is probable that the Military Board will call upon that member for the detail of his opinion upon the subject.

As soon as the bullocks, of which the muster commenced on the 14th, are in readiness to leave Seringapatam, they must move towards the frontier, by a route which is enclosed, under charge of an European officer, one havildar, one naig, and twelve sepoys. This detachment will be relieved at Hooly Honore by one from the garrison of Nuggur. Mr. Gordon will send with the bullocks the proper servants to deliver them over to the bullock-agent in camp. I write to Bajee Rao to give Lieutenant Knox an order upon the villages for forage for these bullocks for purchase. Let me know when they set out from Seringapatam.

I had written you a letter to the same purport as this; but Barclay (in his sleep I suppose) gave it to a camel hircarra, instead of one addressed to General Stuart, and it is gone to head quarters open. It will probably reach you as well as this.

Present my best respects to Mrs. Carlisle and Miss Bell.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1500.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Brunton.

SIR,

Camp at Jingej Jalaub, 17th Feb., 1803.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 12th instant, and am very sensible of your kindness in the adoption of that mode to communicate to me your sentiments upon the subject of the table-allowance which I have drawn.

It appears by the letter of government, by which this allowance was granted, that it was given to the officer commanding the subsidiary force with the Rajah of Mysore in addition to every other emolument he might have; and the Court of Directors, when they struck off a part of the allowance, were pleased to confirm the remainder to the officer commanding the subsidiary force with the Rajah of Mysore, whose situation they considered as similar, and were desirous to place it on the same establishment with that of the officer commanding the subsidiary force with the Nizam.

The question is, whether, as a General officer on the staff, I can hold the office of commanding officer of the subsidiary force with the Rajah of Mysore. If I can, of which I believe there is no doubt, I conceive myself entitled to the allowance; but if, after considering the subject and reading the letters to which I have above alluded, copies of which I will transmit to you as soon as I can receive them from Seringapatam, and comparing this allowance with others received by Major-Generals on the staff in Bengal and on this establishment for special services in addition to their staff allowance, you are of opinion that I ought not to draw it, I have to request that you will be so kind as to refer the question to government; and as I am going to the field, and may possibly not have an opportunity of communicating with you, I have the fullest confidence that you will make such a candid statement of my case as will bring the whole question before them.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BRUNTON.

The General officers commanding divisions of the army (Major-Generals not excepted) will draw a proportion of the bazaar allowance granted by the orders of the 22nd September, 1802.

The General officers commanding at Cawnpore and Futtyghur draw each an additional allowance of * in consequence of their situation in the Vizier's dominions.

If the allowance had remained 600 pagodas, as first settled by government (and as the question is under reference to the Court of Directors, it may be granted again), by the adoption of the principle that Major-General

* Blank in manuscript.

Wellesley is not entitled to it as a Major-General on the staff, his situation would have become worse by his promotion to the amount of nearly 100 pagodas *per mensem*. This cannot have been intended.

I believe that Major-General MacDowall, who is only a Major-General on the staff, receives an additional allowance.

The commanding officer of the subsidiary force in Mysore has various duties to perform not immediately connected with the Company's army, for the performance of which it is probable this allowance was granted.

[1501.]

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Camp at Beroor, 18th Feb., 1803.

I enclose you a letter which I received some days ago from Macleod, to which I wish you to pay attention. He desponds, and represents matters as worse than they are. Bad as they are at present, they are certainly in a better situation than they ever were during the administration of the Commissioners; and loud as are the complaints of and animadversions on his style of administration, those who make them will not deny that they foretold a renewal of the rebellion in Malabar whenever the body of troops stationed in the province should be weakened, particularly if those in Mysore should be employed, and that they have repeatedly stated their opinion that this was probable as long as the Pyche Rajah should be in existence and at large.

My opinion is that the Court of Circuit ought to be sent back to Bombay. If government, for certain reasons, does not approve of that measure, and it should not be possible to provide situations for the members in another part of India, they ought to be directed to remove forthwith to the province of Canara, to reside at Cundapoor, and to confine their jurisdiction entirely to that province and Soonda.

Malabar is not fit to receive this court at present, and you see the effect it has had and still has. A people in rebellion can be tried only by military and summary process; government have authorised the military commanding officer to try criminals in this mode, which indeed of itself puts an end to the jurisdiction of the Court of Circuit. Besides, I doubt whether the judges could venture to go a circuit in Malabar.

I have got on well, am this day at the point of the Baba Booden hills, and shall be on the day after tomorrow upon the Toom at Benkypoor.

I have not yet had time to mention to Purneah what you desired me respecting Malcolm; but I will do so to-morrow. The country is sadly distressed for want of water; in other respects we have been well supplied with everything.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Macleod.

[1]

MY DEAR MACLEOD,

Camp at Beroor, 18th Feb., 1803.

I ought before now to have answered your letter of the 2nd; but it arrived at the moment when I was marching from Seringapatam, and I have been so much occupied ever since that I have not had time to write to you.

It gives me pain to observe that you feel so strongly the various disagreeable circumstances attending your situation in Malabar. I cannot deny that they are of a nature to distress you to the greatest degree; but I urge you most earnestly to bear up against them. You are certain of the approbation and support of the government, and of the good wishes of every honest and unprejudiced man concerned in the administration of the affairs of Malabar, or interested in them, or who may turn his attention to that subject. You have also to reflect that, however bad the situation of affairs in that province may be at present, however general the disturbances, and however disaffected the people, the general situation of the province is mended even in those respects since you took upon yourself the administration of its affairs, and that this must be allowed by every man who knows anything of the subject, and is not unwilling to give a fair and candid opinion.

I cannot forget that in the year 1800 I was obliged to go in secret to Cotaparamba to view the roads then making by my directions from that place forward towards Montana and Canote; that with this view I left my staff behind me, and went with Captain Moncrieff alone; at the same time no gentleman either in the civil or the military service could move 100 yards from his station unattended by sepoy or armed police, even although that station was upon the sea coast; and as for the interior of the country, we saw it, and knew it existed, but no

man had ever ventured into it. In the southern districts, supposed to be the most civilized and those in which our government was best established, the civil and military servants were shot at in that very year more than once; they and their escorts were attacked and were driven by the rebels, nearly in the same manner that these have since been driven by us. At that time the force in Malabar was much stronger than it is now.

Disaffection, disturbance, and rebellion exist in Malabar now in some parts; but I should like to know whether the country is not upon the whole more civilized, more quiet, and more submissive to government than it was in March, 1800, previously to the last rebellion of the Pyche Rajah? I beg also to ask those who are most loud in their animadversions upon the administration of civil affairs, whether they have not foreseen, at least have not repeatedly foretold, that the rebellion could not be considered at an end so long as the Pyche Rajah was alive and at large, that it would be renewed as soon as the force in Malabar should be weakened, and particularly so if there should be employment for the troops in the Mysore country?

Without blaming the executive government in Malabar, those about me know well that this has always been my opinion, as I believe it has that of every well-judging man; and I have given proofs that I held this opinion upon the occasion of every proposition that has been made for the reduction of the force in Malabar.

All these considerations must be gratifying to you, and should induce you to bear up against an adverse turn in the state of affairs, which, after all, can be but momentary.

It is true that you have a formidable party against you; but when you are to adopt any measure of consequence, when that occupies your attention, allow me to advise you never to take into consideration what that party may think, say, or do upon the occasion; do not allow yourself to think that they exist, and do your duty as you would if they were where they ought to be, and I dare say will be hereafter. It is impossible, and not perhaps very proper, that you should be ignorant of what they are doing against you; but I recommend you not to allow any man in Malabar to know that you even suspect it; and if government does not deliver you from this intolerable grievance, for which end I am about to exert myself, you may depend upon

FEB., 1803.

HALT AT MAYACONDA.

15

it that the party will not long hold together. Let me hear from you.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Doolan.

[1503.]

SIR,

Camp at Jingey Jalaub, 19th Feb., 1803.

I have the honour to enclose indents made by the officer commanding at Hullihall, and passed by the Military Board, on the stores at Seringapatam. I have taken upon me to address these indents to the acting deputy commissary at Hullihall, as the stores at that station can now afford to supply the articles indented for, and as it might be inconvenient for them now to travel to Hullihall from Seringapatam by the road which leads along the frontier.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

[1504.]

SIR,

Camp at Turrikerra, 20th Feb., 1803.

I had the honour of receiving yesterday your letter of the 17th, and in the night that of the 18th. I have this morning informed Purneah of your intention to halt at Mayaconda for a short time, and he has written directions to the aumildars of that district to prepare for your reception.

I shall be at Hoonelly on the 24th, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will give me permission to go over to Mayaconda to pay my respects to you. The Dewan also has proposed to take the earliest opportunity of going to Mayaconda to pay his respects to you, and will accompany me, if you should have no objection.

I send at the same time with this letter all the camel hircarrahs, excepting two, which I detain in case I should have any intelligence to communicate to you, and one whose camel is sick. You may find them useful in circulating your orders to the different divisions of the army until tappalls can be laid to each, which last is the most certain mode of communication. I should have sent the hircarrahs to you before now, only that their camels

have been employed in carrying the furniture of some of the elephants coming up with the European troops; but all the Ceylon elephants returned this day from Seringapatam, and will carry it on.

I have no very interesting accounts from the frontier. An aumildar, on the part of Amrut Rao, had come into the districts of Darwar and Savanore to take possession of them and establish therein the government of his master; but he was unattended by troops. He had communicated with Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, who had referred him to Goklah. I have not heard the result of his communication with Goklah. The troops under the command of that chief have marched from Savanore towards Nargoond: this is the place at which he keeps his family. There is no appearance of an enemy near the Kistna, although Colonel Close, in a letter of the 4th, informs me that Meer Khan was about to leave Poonah with 10,000 or 12,000 horse and 4000 infantry and guns, to force money from the Putwurdun (or the Bhow's family, who are seated upon the Kistna). There are no rumours in the country of his march.

I received a letter from Mr. Sydenham yesterday, by which I learn that Lord Wellesley certainly does not intend to come to Madras.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1505.] *An Estimate of the Quantity of Rice in the Nuggur Country when it will be beaten out from Paddy.**

20th Feb., 1803.

Kurbah Nuggur (bags), 1000; Anantpoor, 1000; Munde-guddy, 500; Cowleydroog, 1500; Shikarpoor, 300; Mail-bungarry, 500; Dauwas, 1500; Ondagunny, 1000; Surb Tawanundy, 500; Anawooty, 400; Coomprey, 500; Simoga, 500; Hooly Honore, 500; Turrikerra, 500: Total 10,500.

The brinjaries are filling in these districts, and there may be less in them than is above estimated. No rice in the Chittledroog districts. About 2500 loads of gram there.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

* Colonel Wellesley called for a similar estimate from Purneah for the whole of Mysore, and the return gave 106,300 bags.

To Lieut.-Colonel Brunton.

[1506.]

DEAR SIR,

Camp at Benkypoor, 21st Feb., 1803.

I now enclose copies of all the orders which I have received from government and the Court of Directors upon the subject of the extra table allowance of the commanding officer of the subsidiary force with the Rajah of Mysore. In my opinion these papers and the custom in Bengal, on this establishment and in Ceylon, confirm my right to continue to receive it. If you should be of a different opinion, and government should alter the tenor of their orders upon this subject, all that I can say is, that I shall hold the most expensive and the most extensive command in the country, that in the exercise of which there is most trouble, most trust, and most responsibility, upon smaller allowances than are received by any other General officer upon the staff in India, and smaller by 100 pagodas per month than those I received for the exercise of the same command nearly four years ago.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

[1507.]

SIR,

Camp at Benkypoor, 21st Feb., 1803.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 19th. I shall see the Dewan this evening, and will take an opportunity of speaking to him upon the subject of supplies of rice for your army. In regard to cattle for carriage or draught, the Dewan never has supplied, and will not be able to supply any. These are supplied by a particular class of people attached peculiarly to the British armies, and the Natives have not the power of commanding one of them. I have no doubt, however, but that Mr. Gordon will supply as many bullocks as you can require.

The brinjarries will certainly complain if they are detained much longer, and their loads are not bought from them, and indeed will suffer some distress. On the other hand I am much afraid that their presence can be insured at the moment at which their services will be required in no other manner than by keeping their loads full.

My opinion has always been that the whole of your army would not be able to subsist upon the produce of this country without having recourse to brinjarries, or the magazines, or your stores in the grain department in camp, if you should remain any length of time within the frontier; and this opinion has been further confirmed by finding that the bazaar attached to the main body is not attended by a large number of cattle. Without these it is not possible to expect to reap much benefit from the resources even of the most plentiful country. Under these circumstances I think it probable that you will be obliged immediately to use the contents of the loads of the brinjarries for the supply of the daily consumption of your camp while stationary in the neighbourhood of Mayaconda.

It was partly with a view to this consumption that I proposed the formation of the depôt at Hurryhur. Accordingly I would recommend that in case you should find it necessary to consume the present loads on the brinjarries, you should begin by giving them orders upon Chittledroog for rice at a price which may be settled with them hereafter (I imagine that there may be there about 1000 loads beaten out from paddy); afterwards that you should give them orders upon Hurryhur: at that place there are at present 9485 loads, including 2000 loads belonging to the grain department in camp; probably more, as I have not received a return from thence for some days; and I have with me on the bullocks coming up from Seringapatam, for the use of your army, 2400 loads, which I propose likewise to throw into Hurryhur; making the total quantity applicable to your consumption (exclusive of the 2000 loads to be carried forward) nearly 10,000 loads.

I have no idea what your consumption is, but I should imagine this quantity ought to last you two months. I think I may venture to say that this division will not want any of it; and if Major Munro can keep General Campbell supplied in the neighbourhood of Harponelly without using the loads on the brinjarries belonging to the Ceded Districts, you will have the whole of the bags belonging to this class of people full at the end of that period of time.

I recommend that if you should be in want of rice, you should rather take it from the brinjarries, and give them orders upon Chittledroog or Hurryhur for fresh loads, than that you should send thither the public cattle, or bring to your camp the 2400

loads which I have got in my camp, because by using their grain you give them the means of living for the moment, and keep them in good humour.

Besides this mode of keeping full the brinjarry bags, I propose to procure from Purneah an account of the places within twenty or thirty miles of any of the camps at which rice can be procured, and orders upon those places for the quantity which each can afford. This will be a resource in case of necessity. But I don't recommend that it should be adopted, because I know that the brinjarries, when their bags are empty, always prefer to go for fresh loads to the countries in which they are accustomed to purchase them, in which they expect to get what they want at a cheaper rate, and will see their families.

Besides rice, gram must be a great article of consumption in your camp. I recommend that the bags of the cavalry should be kept full by drawing upon Chittledroog as long as the stores at that place will hold out, and then upon Hurryhur, where there are above 4000 loads.

It is probable that your bazaar will not be distressed for gram, because that is the general produce of the country in which your camp will be stationed: if it should be, it must be taken from the brinjarries, but these people ought not to be encouraged to take fresh loads of gram.

In respect to forage, I have adopted a system of foraging in this division of the army by which forage has been procured with the greatest facility to the troops and their followers, and without inconvenience to the people. I have thrown the whole into the quartermaster's department; but I will hereafter have the honour of laying before you the details of this system, and will procure all the necessary documents for its execution in the neighbourhood of Mayaconda, if you should think proper to order it to be adopted. I have very little doubt but that by proper management the necessary quantity of forage for your army can be procured in that neighbourhood for a considerable length of time.

I will submit a memorandum to you upon this subject in the course of this day, if I can draw it out.

In respect to the store at Bellary, the question whether it ought to be removed from thence or not will depend entirely upon the nature of your defensive system. I will give you my

sentiments upon that subject when I shall have the honour of seeing you; and I need not assure you that you may depend upon every exertion I can make, either mental or personal, to carry into execution all your arrangements.

I shall be to-morrow at Hooly Honore, next day between that place and Hoonelly, and at Hoonelly the 24th. If I should have your permission, I shall be at Mayaconda on the 26th.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM UPON FORAGE.

The first object to be attained is, that this necessary article should be got for the troops; the next, that the inhabitants should receive a fair value for it. Indeed the first depends much upon the last; as it is certain that unless the value is given for any article that is required for the armies, it will not long be obtained without the use of force and more trouble than it is worth.

With a view to the first object, the Rajah's government have been prevailed upon to give orders in all parts of the country through which the troops were to pass, that straw might be sold to whoever should require it. There is a portion of the straw, however, which the inhabitants will never sell, viz., that which they require for the food of their own cattle during a certain period of the year. Nothing will tempt them to part with this portion; and when they have but little more than this, they become unwilling to sell any. When the troops arrive at any camp, all their followers commonly go to the nearest village for forage; the people find difficulty in supplying all the demands with the necessary celerity, they become frightened, they fear that if they supply all the demands they will not have the quantity necessary for themselves, and they end in refusing to sell any, if they are protected by a safeguard, which it is impossible to refuse them.

It is apparent, therefore, that in order that the troops may get a sufficiency of forage, it is necessary that the villagers should not have reason to fear that they will be deprived of that which is absolutely requisite for the subsistence of their own cattle, and that with this view measures should be taken to prevent them from foraging all in the same village.

In order to effect this the Sircar has been called upon to furnish an account of the number of villages in the neighbourhood of each ground of encampment, the distance and bearing of each from the place which gives the name to the camp, and the number of bullock loads of forage which each can afford to sell. This return is translated and, put into a form a copy of which accompanies this memorandum, is given to the quartermaster's department the day before the march, who allots to the corps and departments the different villages for forage according to their several wants.

The corps, &c., are then ordered in the General Orders to forage in certain villages by name, of which the direction from the place which gives the name of the camp is inserted. My orders of this day will show the mode in which this is arranged.

The quartermaster ascertains the wants of each corps or department called for from heads of corps or departments, and from individuals attached to head-quarters, of the number of cattle belonging to all descriptions of people attached to each. He then calculates the number of bullock loads of straw required by each corps, &c., at the rate of one bullock load for fifteen bullocks for one day. This is a large proportion; but as the people are obliged to pay for what they get, they will not take more than they want, and by this calculation there can be no disappointment.

The regiments of cavalry are not allowed to have straw for their horses, excepting for the number for which there are no grass-cutters. No country can afford to supply forage for our armies if the means allowed by the Company to supply the regiments of cavalry with green forage are not faithfully applied to that purpose. They get straw, however, for all the bullocks attached to them, of which there are considerable numbers, and for the horses for which there are no grass-cutters. The place which gives the name to the camp is never allotted to any corps, as the Sircar have always prepared and allotted the straw at that place to the Company's gun bullocks.

According to this mode above 20,000 head of cattle have been foraged in this division plentifully and without trouble; besides Purneah's army, in which there are doubtless 5000 more, and above 1500 horse, all of which get straw.

When a camp is likely to remain in one place for a few days, the foraging can easily be managed by an extension of the same system. It is only to allot to corps, &c. villages at the distance of four and five coss instead of under one. Accordingly a detail will be forwarded to head-quarters of the quantity of straw in every village as far as five and six coss from Mayaconda.

In regard to the second object, it was some years ago settled that the price of straw in Mysore should be one bullock load for three silver fanams, if sent for to a village; if brought to the camp, the price of this article, like every other, ought to be allowed to find its own level; and accordingly in this camp there are people who go out to the villages, where they buy it at the regulated price, and bring it into the bazaar, where they sell it to the bazaar people whose bullocks may be more profitably employed, or to others at an advance.

This settled price, I am informed by the Dewan, is a fair equivalent for the straw. Measures ought to be taken to insure its payment. When the straw is in the neighbourhood of the camp, it is probable that nobody will venture to plunder it; but when the forage is brought from a distance, some faults of this kind may be expected. It is to be observed, however, that every village will be allotted to a particular corps; and if the criminal should escape from the villagers, it will not be difficult to find out to whom he belonged. If any one is caught, he ought to be severely punished, and one or two examples will stop this crime entirely.

[1508.]

The Deputy Adjutant-General to Lieutenant-Colonel Chalmers.

Benkypoor, 21st Feb., 1803.

In walking through the camp this morning, Major-General Wellesley was surrounded by a number of bullock men belonging to your battalion, who represented that they had all been flogged because the tents were not up soon enough to-day. The General therefore desires me to call to your recollection that these men, natives of this country, have as yet been but little acquainted with Europeans, and consequently are more apt to take the alarm at any appearance of what may be only requiring their duty from them than the natives of the Carnatic are; and if they should desert you now, the corps may be distressed in its present situation. Besides, the road was so bad to-day that most people's baggage was late getting in; and these men might not have been able to get on their bullocks as quickly as usual.

[1509.]

To Colonel Montresor.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp at Hooly Honore, 22nd Feb., 1803.

I have this morning received your letter of the 16th, and the duplicate of that of the 15th, with other papers. In regard to what you say respecting your allowances, I will mention the subject to the Commander-in-Chief, and will strongly urge him to recommend an increase for you. Without his recommendation nothing can be done. I am concerned to observe the increase of disaffection in Malabar: however, you are taking the best methods to get the better of it. I approve much of arming some of the inhabitants: at least it gives us some security that they will not be on the other side, and they may be of some service.

I get on well. I can march with as much celerity as ever, and with equal, if not with greater ease. I wish I could say as much for General Stuart: but he had bad cattle originally, he has lost many, and those which remain are very weak. We halt in three divisions for further orders; General Stuart at Mayaonda, General Campbell at Harponelly, and myself at Hoonelly. I must still delay my intended long letter. I

hope that you will have received all my letters written since the 6th.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. A. O.

22nd Feb., 1803. [1510.]

Complaints having been made that the people sent to purchase straw do not go to the places appointed for them in orders, commanding officers of corps and heads of departments are requested to explain fully the places allotted for their followers to forage, as any people found deviating from the orders will be punished. Straw is not to be required at any time in the village which gives its name to the camp (unless particularly ordered), because the forage collected there is reserved for the Company's draught bullocks.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Chalmers.

[1511.]

SIR,

Camp near Aneywary, 23rd Feb., 1803.

I have taken into consideration the subject of the letter from Captain Boardman, enclosed with yours of yesterday to Captain Barclay, together with what you have written therein.

These letters relate, first, to the transfer of the tents of the 2nd of the 18th from Captain Boardman to yourself; secondly, to the transfer of the carriage of the sick of that corps.

Government have pointed out the mode according to which tents in use with a corps are to be valued when transferred from one commanding officer to another, viz., by a committee to be assembled for that purpose. The order of government, it is true, does not point out by whom this committee is to be assembled; but it stands to reason that, if possible, its members ought not to be selected by either of the parties concerned in its decision. Under these circumstances, when Captain Boardman objected to particular officers by name as members of this committee, the most regular mode of obtaining its assembly would have been to apply to the commanding officer on the spot, who could regularly assemble a committee whose decision, if made upon the

grounds pointed out in the orders of government, must have been final.

While making my observations upon this subject, it is proper that I should advert to another striking irregularity in the constitution of the committee of whose decision Captain Boardman complains: it is, that Lieutenant Harris, an officer of the 1st of the 8th, was a member of it.

I have to observe to you that you could have named the members of this committee only as commanding officer of the 2nd of the 18th: in any other capacity Captain Boardman had full as good a claim as you to name them; and, as commanding officer of the 2nd of the 18th, you had no right to call upon an officer of the 1st of the 8th to perform any duty whatever.

Under these circumstances therefore, and as Captain Boardman has stated substantial objections to the decision of this committee in regard to the value of the tents, I have given orders that one should be assembled composed of persons to whom there can be no objection on either side, and whose decision will be final.

In regard to the carriage of the sick of the 2nd of the 18th, I have to observe that the orders of government do not point out in what manner this shall be transferred from one commanding officer to another, although it is very obvious that the principles of the mode laid down for the transfer of the tents are fully applicable to the transfer of the carriage of the sick.

Whatever may be the mode, however, in which the carriage of the sick of this corps is to be transferred to you, I have to observe that the property must either be considered in the same light with the camp equipage, as public and regimental or as private. If it is to be considered as public and regimental, as you appear to have considered it, in my opinion it ought to pass entirely from the hands of one commanding officer to those of another upon a fair valuation, but the receiver ought to take it all. If it is to be considered as private property, the receiver need certainly take no more of it than he may think proper or necessary; but in that case he ought to pay for it, as he would for any other species of private property, that price which the seller may fix upon it as its value.

Accordingly, in my opinion, you ought either to take the whole of the carriage which Captain Boardman has provided for the sick of the 2nd of the 18th at a valuation, or, if you choose

to take only a part of it, you ought to pay Captain Boardman for that part whatever he may choose to ask.

Upon this subject I have to remark that, although you say that you have carriage for the sick and you do not want that which Captain Boardman has provided, you have applied for public assistance to enable you to carry your sick, viz., yesterday for five doolies and this day for three, and you obtained them.

I beg that this letter may be communicated to Captain Boardman.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Camp at Aneywary, Wednesday, 23rd Feb., 1803. [1512.]

An outlying piquet to mount in future, to consist of 1 subaltern officer and a detail of 50 Native troops, with a puckalie from each corps of Native infantry in camp; the whole to be commanded by a captain, to be furnished by roster from the infantry. The piquet will parade on halting days in front of the 33rd regiment at half past six in the morning; and on marching days on the marching flank of the infantry a quarter of an hour before assembly beating. The details to parade in the order in which their corps are encamped in line.

An adjutant of the day from the infantry will mount daily, who will receive the details and parade the piquet, and will attend the captain of the piquet, until it takes up its new ground, when he will return to camp, and deliver any report which the captain of the piquet may have to send; after which his tour of duty will be over.

Till further orders it will not be necessary that the captain of the piquet should remain out with it; but he must march with it, post it, and visit it frequently during the day and night, and must always be in readiness, and report when he comes off duty.

It is possible that this division of the army may remain upon the ground in the neighbourhood of Davara Hoonelly for some days. Major-General Wellesley therefore requests commanding officers of corps, heads of departments, and individuals, to be very particular in sending their followers to forage in the places allotted to them. It is obvious that the difficulty in foraging the cattle of this division of the army will become every day greater in proportion to the time that it shall remain on one

ground. Major-General Wellesley therefore again presses the officers of the army to save the dry forage as much as possible by the use of green forage: much can certainly be procured on the banks of the Toombuddra, in quantities nearly sufficient for the use of the cattle, if the officers will force their followers to do their duty and bring it in. There is certainly a great consumption and waste of forage in this division of the army, which it is the duty and the interest of every individual to prevent as much as possible. It is reported that some has even been burnt; and Major-General Wellesley declares his determination to punish any person who may be guilty of so wanton a disobedience of orders in future.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1513.] MEMORANDUM ON BRINJARRIES AND BULLOCKS IN THE CEDED DISTRICTS AND BARAHMAHAL.

24th Feb., 1803.

29th January.—Major Munro estimated the brinjarries thus :

Near Bellary, and contracted for	8,000
At Canote, and had offered to engage	5,000
In small tandahs; might come in	3,000
Would load in the districts	5,000
	21,000, or 22,000

22nd February.—Reported :

Loaded up to that day	4,000
25th. Loaded at the depôt	1,000
Ditto in the villages and passed	1,000
	6,000

Several letters mention small parties of those loaded in the villages having gone on, but no numbers specified.

24th February.—Wiridy bullocks despatched, 3400.

I forward several letters from Major Munro on the subject of the Wiridy bullocks and guards detached from Captain Crane, which I cannot answer.

Mr. Cockburn's last letter (not at hand just now) stated 7000 bullock men ready, and 7000 loading. I think it was dated 7th February. No other account of them, but they were despatched with small guards.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Camp near Davara Hoonelly, 24th Feb., 1803.

Statement of Carriage Bullocks carrying Grain and Provisions with the Army under the command of the Hon. Major-General Wellesley, and the Carriage Bullocks at and in the neighbourhood of Hurryhur, specifying the Number carried, Grain and Provisions, &c. &c.

ARMY.

Grain Department.

	No. of Carriage Bullocks.	Total in Dec.	Grand Total.
2280 bags of rice	2280		
Spare	330		
	2660		

Provision Department.

65 loads of beef	65		
10 ditto of salt	10		
Spare	12		
	87		

Bullocks left Seringapatam, and expected to join the army very soon :

Grain Department.

153 bags of rice	153		
Bullocks without loads, waiting for a few carrying some twine	237		
	440*		
5 loads of beef	5		
	3192		

HURRYHUR AND ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD.

Grain Department.

2000 bags of rice	2000		
Spare	333		
Tarpaulins	6		
	2339		

Provision Department.

230 loads of beef kegs	230		
253 ditto of biscuits	253		
Spare	80		
	563		
		2902	

Total 6094

N.B.—150 maunds of biscuits sent to Hurryhur from Chittledroog is included for carriage in this statement.

* These bullocks arrived in camp since the above list has been written.

[1514.] MEMORANDUM CONCERNING PURCHASING THE BRINJARRY RICE
AND RELOADING IT AT HURRYHUR.

25th Feb., 1803.

When an order may be given to expend any of the brinjarry rice, an order should be given to load as much at Chittledroog or Hurryhur, that the bags may at all times be kept as full as possible, and to avoid any hurry afterwards.

Mickin Lalle will settle the prices, reasonably, for both parties.

Nundah Naig, lately arrived, has 3000 bullocks unloaded in the Nuggur country, and cannot get grain to load with. Ram-Rao promised this morning to give orders for rice: if he don't give them to-day, Mickin Lalle will mention these bullocks, in hope of getting an order from Purneah or on Hurryhur.

Several articles have been prepared as presents for the Naigues. Mickin Lalle proposes to keep them till the whole arrive from Bellary, the Barahmahal, and the Ceded Districts.

In case it should be necessary to press people at any time for the public service, the brinjarries should be exempt, as being contrary to their habits; but Mickin Lalle will at any time take charge of as much public stores as he may have bullocks for, empty: he will keep them at the Golah, and return them when required. The hire of the cattle must be paid. He cannot carry firelocks or things liable to break.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1515.]

To Captain Baynes.

SIR,

Camp at Mayaconda, 26th Feb., 1803.

I have to request that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will send to Chittledroog 834 carriage bullocks, with the proportion of spare of those in the Company's service now grazing in the neighbourhood of Hurryhur. You will send with them a naig's guard, and the naig is to report his arrival to Lieutenant Francke, the commissary of stores at Chittledroog, from whom he will receive further orders regarding the disposal of the bullocks.

Having sent off these bullocks to Chittledroog, you will send

to the Commander-in-Chief's camp, in the neighbourhood of Mayaconda, the remainder of the bullocks now grazing near Hurryhur. The total number of bullocks in the Company's service now at Hurryhur ought to be 2902: the number which you will send to Chittledroog, including spare, will be 973; the number therefore to be sent to this camp will be 1929.

The bullocks which will come to this camp must be directed to Major Symons.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

No. 1.

[1516.]

*Ordnance Stores to be transferred from the Seringapatam Division,
according to Memorandum.**

4 brass 12-pounders.
8 tumbrils, with 12-pounder ammunition.
4 tumbrils, with 4½-inch shells.
400 12-pounder shot, 40 bullock load.
200 4½-inch shells fixed to bottoms, 19 bullock load.
1 spare carriage for 5½-inch howitzer.

In the Seringapatam Division, according to Memorandum.

450 rounds of powder and shot for iron 12-pounders, on 340 carriage bullocks.

No. 2.

Provisions for 1500 European Troops for Two Months.

Arrack .. 4,575 gallons; will require 76 carts,
Sheep .. 11,629.
Salt 703 mercalls.
Rice 469 ditto.†

Besides 30,000 pounds of salt beef, and 30,000 pounds of biscuit, lodged at Hurryhur and prepared at Seringapatam.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, letter to Lieutenant-General Stuart, 3rd March, 1803.

† This rice is for five days; the remainder will be procured from the bazaars or brinjaries.

No. 3.

*Required from the Grand Army for the Equipment of the Detachment
in the Provision Department, according to Memorandum.*

Arrack	4575 gallons.
Sheep	11,629.
Carts for the arrack	46.
Salt	703 mercalls.
Rice	469 ditto.

No. 4.

*Draught Bullocks required for the Equipment of an advanced Detachment,
according to Memorandum.*

	Each.	Draught Bullocks.
4 iron 12-pounders	50	200
2 brass 12-pounders	14	28
16 6-pounders	10	160
		<hr/> 388
Tumbrils :		
4 for iron 12-pounders	12	48
6 for brass 12-pounders	12	72
24 for brass 6-pounders	12	288
4 for stores	12	48
2 for galloper 6-pounders	12	24
2 spare carriages for 6-pounders	6	12
Carts :		
1 artificer's	14	14
45 platform, with stores	4	180
76 arrack	4	304
		<hr/> 990
		1378

No. 5.

*Number of Draught Bullocks according to Captain Mackay's last Return,
and including 300 expected with General Campbell.*

Number of cattle	2589
Deduct, required for advanced detachment	1378
	<hr/>
Remain	1211

No. 6.

*Number of Carriage Bullocks that will be required for advanced Detachment,
according to Memorandum and Nos. 1, 2, and 3.*

For stores	1524
Spare	254
Carried forward	<hr/> 1778

Brought forward	1778	
Deduct according to No. 1 :		
12-pounder shot	40	
4½-inch shells	19	
Spare	10	
		69*
Remain	1709	
Add ammunition for iron 12-pounders	340	
Spare	56	
Total for stores	2105	
Grain in grain department	2000	
Spare	333	
		2333
Provision department :		
Salt beef	300	
Biscuit	300	
Spare	100	
Rice for 5 days	83	
Salt	117	
Spare	33	
		933
		5371

No. 7.

Carriage Bullocks to be transferred from the Seringapatam Division, according to Memorandum and No. 6.

For 12-pounder shot	40
For 4-inch shells	19
Spare	10
	69
Required from grand army :	
For powder and shot for iron 12-pounders ..	340†
Spare	56†
Rice in provision department	83
Salt in ditto	117
Spare	33
	629

No. 8.

Wheel Carriages in Major-General Wellesley's Camp, and Number of Draught Bullocks required for each.

	Each.	Draught Bullocks.
6 12-pounders	14	84
16 6-pounders	10	160
Carried forward		244

* These equipments are of 4 brass 12-pounders, which will be transferred from Seringapatam division to the army.

† The bullocks were provided at Seringapatam, and moved these articles from Chittledroog.

	Each.	Draught Bullocks.
Brought forward		244
4 galloper 6-pounders	10	40
Spare howitzer carriage	10	10
*52 tumbrils	12	624
Artificer's cart	14	14
7 medical carts	4	28
1 pioneer's cart	4	4
45 store platform carts	4	180
30 arrack carts	4	120
Resident's tumbril	12	12
Agent's tumbril	12	12
2 galloper tumbrils	12	24
7 treasure tumbrils	12	84
In the Commander-in-Chief's camp		682
In General Campbell's, computed		300
Remain in Major-General Wellesley's camp, spare		207†
		<hr/> 2585

* Detail of 52 Tumbrils.

18 12-pounder ammunition and $4\frac{1}{2}$ -inch shells.
 24 6-pounder ammunition.
 4 store.
 2 ammunition for galloper 6-pounders.
 4 fixed ammunition for iron 12-pounders.

52

† Of this number there are 4 which had the small-pox so badly that it was necessary to leave them on the road, and there are 23 sick of the same disorder in camp; the number, therefore, that can now be sent to the Commander-in-Chief's camp is 180.

The total number of bullocks applicable to the service was on	
the 13th of February	2589
Lost, which the drivers are to make good	4
	<hr/> 2585
Employed in Major-General Wellesley's camp	1396
In the Commander-in-Chief's	682
In General Campbell's, computed at	300
	<hr/> 2378
Remain spare	207

[1517.]

To Captain Scott.

DEAR SCOTT,

Camp at Hoonelly, 3rd March, 1803.

I was not able to answer your letters of the 24th, 25th, 26th, and 28th February, regularly as I received them, as I was at

General Stuart's camp, where my hands were full of business and the whole of my time taken up. Your carriages are arrived in this camp. The woodwork of them appears excellent, and they are well put together; the fault is in the iron entirely, which cannot be trusted. The neck of one of the swivels is broken, two of the rings of the transom are so likewise, and all the others are bent. I don't know what we shall do with the neck of the swivel; I don't understand these things much, and it is probable that this fracture may be owing to the bad quality of the iron; but it appears that the neck of the swivel is small in proportion to the weight it has to bear, and that it is not of a size or strength in proportion to the hook on the limber, although the weight it bears must be equal.

The diameter of the whole swivel is one inch; suppose the neck to be one-half that size, it will be half an inch, which may not be sufficient; but it is probable that the ring of the swivel is one-third of an inch thick, and if that be the case, there remains but one-third of an inch for the thickness of the neck.

I may be mistaken in this; but I mention it because I am convinced that you are desirous that everybody's notions should be considered.

Brown has some difficulties in repairing the rings, because he cannot take off the transom plates to weld new ones in the swivels, and he fears to attempt it without taking off the transom plates. I have, therefore, recommended to him to weld good esses of great strength, by which the gun can be limbered. Brown will probably enter more into detail upon the subject than I can, and will inform you that there is a fault in the mode of fixing the chains to the limbers. These chains have likewise come out, and the guns have been limbered, in fact, by the chains not fastened as you sent them, but to the pin in the limber, or to the limber axle-tree.

I am anxious to have 12-pounder tumbrils, and wish you to send them. Desire Mr. Gordon to hire bullocks for them.

In answer to your letter of the 28th, I have to inform you that I took the Commander-in-Chief's opinion upon the subject of your hiring bullocks to send for timber, and he was clearly of opinion that if you had a sufficiency of timber to keep you at work till the month of December next, you ought not to incur any expense on that account. Obedience to the orders of the Military Board must on this subject be suspended for the present.

Don't make yourself uneasy about your carriages. I'll put myself in the front of the battle, and I dare say that they will yet do you credit. We must have European iron, however, in all the parts on which there is a strain.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1518.]

To Lieut.-Colonel Montresor.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp at Hurryhur, 7th March, 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 22nd February, which has been detained so long on the road, I imagine, on account of the interruptions of the tappall between Sangaloo and Cancancottah. I shall, however, send a duplicate of this through Koorg.

I am surprised at Major Innes's march by Paulgautcherry, although I have had no correspondence with him upon the subject: first, because it was some time after I heard that he was to go into Wynaad and Malabar that I was acquainted with your wishes respecting his route; secondly, because the order which government sent him was to march up the Gudjelhatty Pass, and by that route into Wynaad. Accordingly, I wrote him a letter to meet him at the head of that pass on his entrance into the Mysore territories, in which I pointed out where he would find his provisions, which have been waiting for him since the 24th of last month, and the route by which he was to march into Wynaad by Edatera. If he has gone by Paulgautcherry, he has disobeyed the orders of government and disappointed us all; but as they are not very quick in their motions at Trichinopoly, I am in hopes that he will have received your letter before he will have got his arms, and that he will still come by Gudjelhatty. If he should not do so, I will request you to write to Mr. Gordon to withdraw the provisions stationed at Ardanelly for him, and to give notice to the Rajah's government that the preparations made for supplying him there and on his march to Wynaad are no longer necessary.

Captain Skelton, of the 5th, has sent an indent upon Seringapatam for 500 stands of arms and 1000 sets of accoutrements, &c. &c., which I have ordered to be complied with, and the articles to be sent to Cancancottah under a guard from that garrison. It will be necessary that you should communicate with

Colonel Carlisle upon this subject, and make arrangements for receiving these stores at Cancancottah and for escorting them to the station of Captain Skelton's battalion. I have written to Seringapatam to desire that they will arrange this matter with you.

I wish that you could desire the officers in Malabar not to send indents upon any stores that are not countersigned by you; and the indents upon the stores in this country must likewise be countersigned either by me or by the Military Board. Indents for arms also ought not to be made upon the stores at Seringapatam, because there are none, at least very few indeed.

The government of Bombay have promised to send to Cannanore 2500 stands, which, with those that the corps have got of good arms and those which the stores of Seringapatam can supply, will probably complete you. But I beg you not to allow the officers to indent for arms which they have not soldiers to carry. Captain Skelton, it appears, will have 1000 stands of serviceable arms; but I doubt much whether he has in his battalion 1000 sepoy.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

(Private and confidential.)

The state of affairs here is as follows: I am going forward with a strong detachment, consisting of four regiments of cavalry, two regiments of Europeans, and six battalions of sepoy, and a number of guns; the remainder are to be encamped upon the frontier in the Ceded Districts, under the Commander-in-Chief, to see the result of my movements, &c. I am to join with Colonel Stevenson, coming with two regiments of cavalry and six battalions of sepoy from Hyderabad. The 80th join the army upon the frontier. All this will be out probably in a day or two. Dallas goes in command of my cavalry; Harness and Wallace of brigades of infantry. I wish that I had you with me.

G. M. O.

Camp near Hurryhur, Monday, 7th March, 1803. [1518.]

Corps and detachments will forage to-day as follows.
Written orders on the villages are sent round for specific quantities.

tities to each corps, &c., and a person to show the villages. Should the quantity allotted to any corps or department not be sufficient, they may send across the river to purchase more; but in that case a careful non-commissioned officer from corps, and a maistry from departments, must accompany the followers of each, to see they pay for the forage and commit no outrage.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1520.]

To Captain Baynes.

SIR,

Camp opposite Arnee, 8th March, 1803.

I expect that the following brinjarries, destined for the detachment of troops under my command, with the number of bullocks set opposite the name of each, will reach Hurryhur on the 11th and 12th instant. You will halt with the detachment under your command till the 12th, on which day you will march with all the brinjarry bullocks that may be collected to join me near Havery, or upon the river Werdah.

Expected at Hurryhur on the 11th, Buggoo Moorih with 1000 bullocks, Bunda Nanjee with 1000 bullocks, Buggoo Narajaout with 600 bullocks, Bidgenney Isser with 1000 bullocks.

I write to Mr. Piele to request that the Rajah's horse, 2000 in number, may march at the same time, and you will be so kind as to communicate with him upon this subject.

Besides these brinjarries, I expect others to arrive at Hurryhur on the 13th, 15th, and 16th instant, to look for whom I have requested you this day to detach guards. These are as follows, viz. : on the 13th, Soocroo Naig with 1500 bullocks; on the 15th or 16th, Bidgenney Isser with 2000 bullocks; Mada Narajaout with 3000 bullocks; Kerah Kolah with 1400 bullocks; Kurchewars with 500 bullocks. I have also requested Mr. Piele to arrange that fifty of the Rajah's horse may remain at Hurryhur to come on with these brinjarries and with the small guards from your corps when they will arrive, and fifty to come on with an officer expected.

The bearer hereof, Namick Ram, gomastah of brinjarries, will make known to you these brinjarries as they will come up, and you will be so kind as to keep up a constant communication with them, and take care that they march with you. You will leave

him at Hurryhur to collect the other brinjarries expected to arrive before the 16th.

Between this day and the 12th I may have occasion to send back brinjarries or other grain dealers to receive loads at Hurryhur, and you will be so kind as to take care that all such come on again with you.

You will march by the road of Rannee Bednore to Havery.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Doolan.

[1521.]

SIR,

Camp at Gubgherry, 9th March, 1803.

I have the honour to inform you that I am upon my march towards the Mahratta territories with a detachment of troops, and that I shall in a short time pass in the neighbourhood of Hullihall, from which place I shall have occasion to draw certain supplies lodged there. You are, therefore, to make preparation as follows hereafter, in order that the cattle and carriages which I shall send to Hullihall for the purpose of moving these supplies may not be delayed.

1. You will be so kind as to have the road from Misserycott to Hullihall, and from Hullihall towards the Malpoorba near Doodwar, examined. You will report to me their state, whether they are practicable for wheel carriages; and if they should not be so, you will urge the aumildar of Hullihall to repair them as far as the territories of the Company extend.

2. The articles which I shall want principally from Hullihall are rice, arrack, and salt provisions. There is only one gate to the fort of Hullihall, which will be the cause of great delay if the cattle are obliged to go into the fort to be loaded. Upon the receipt of this letter, therefore, you will be so kind as to have 2000 bags of the rice carried out of the fort, and lodged in the choultry close to the fort gate. You will also have in readiness all the measuring men and sewers that the place can afford; and you will send me as soon as possible by a careful hircarrah a sample of the kind of rice which will be thus lodged for delivery in the choultry. He will find me somewhere near Savanore.

3. There are 400 kegs at Hullihall which have been sent from

Bombay, each of which contains four gallons of arrack. These are immediately to be put in the best possible state of repair and filled with arrack. A straw rope must be bound round each keg, and two kegs must be placed in each bullock gunny bag. They must be sewed into these bags, so that they will not move about in the carriage. The rice bags will answer for this purpose, and you have my permission and orders to empty out some of the rice in order that the arrack kegs may be prepared as above directed. When the arrack kegs are thus prepared, you will lodge them either in the choultry above mentioned, or in any other building outside of the fort which you can procure.

4. You will be so kind as to have the kegs containing the salt provisions examined and filled up with the brine sent up for that purpose from Bombay, if the liquor should have leaked out. These kegs are also to be prepared in every respect as I have above directed the arrack kegs to be prepared, and to be moved out of the fort.

5. I shall send casks on carriages to be filled with arrack, and possibly kegs. Coopers must be prepared to give them the necessary repairs; and there should be some arrack either in leaguers or in kegs of a larger size outside of the fort, in order that these casks and kegs likewise may be filled from them with convenience and celerity.

You will inform the amildar that a large number of cattle from this detachment will march to Hullihall from Misserycotta, and that it is necessary that forage should be in readiness for them upon the road at Hullihall and on their march towards the Malpoorba. Captain Johnson of the engineers, and Captain Fisher of the Bombay artillery, are to join this detachment upon the Malpoorba, and will be prepared to march with the convoy when it will leave Hullihall.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

You have my permission and orders to employ the Native troops under your command on working parties, in these preparations, and afterwards in carrying out the orders which I shall send you to forward the supplies to this detachment of the army.

Camp near Gubgherry Droog, Wednesday, [1522.]
9th March, 1803.

G. O.

The captains of the piquets of infantry will to-morrow, and till further orders, remain out with them.

A field officer of the day to mount in future, to be taken from the line of infantry to the exclusion of the officers commanding brigades, who will be in charge of the piquets, will command them on the march, and post them, and will also frequently visit them during the day and night.

Whenever it may be necessary to make use of drag ropes to the guns and tumbrils in the line, the officer commanding the brigade which may happen to march in the rear will be so kind as to leave a company of Native infantry at such place, in order to assist the wheel carriages in the park and provision department. This assistance is particularly required in descents.

Major-General Wellesley observes that there are many wheel carriages on the line of march, carrying private baggage, and drawn by bullocks. The Commander-in-Chief has given most positive orders upon this subject, as Major-General Wellesley imagines, to the whole army, which he is determined to carry into execution in this detachment. He has experience of the inconvenience of private carts in the movements of light detachments, and that, in all cases of difficulty, they fall upon the rear guard, the troops composing which are obliged to bring them on. He therefore gives notice, that wheel carriages drawn by bullocks, carrying private baggage, will not be allowed to pass the frontier. This order does not, however, apply to wheel carriages drawn by horses or mules.

As Major-General Wellesley is with a detachment in advance of the army, and the communication between the Commander-in-Chief and the officers commanding corps and stations in Mysore and Soonda, and the officers commanding in the provinces of Malabar and Canara, may be more speedy than if it were made through the medium of Major-General Wellesley, he has obtained the permission of the Commander-in-Chief to order that, upon all occasions of urgency, which require the immediate attention of the Commander-in-Chief, or his immediate decision, the officers above enumerated are to report or apply direct to head quarters in the field, sending a copy of such report or application to Major-General Wellesley, as well as

copies of the Commander-in-Chief's orders upon such reports or applications, or upon any other subject. In all cases, however, not of urgency, and not requiring the immediate decision of the Commander-in-Chief, officers are to report to Major-General Wellesley as usual; and at all events to send their monthly and other returns in the manner heretofore ordered.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1523.] G. O.

Camp at Oollull, Thursday, 10th March, 1803.

Major-General Wellesley has received from head quarters new standards for the 4th, 5th, and 7th regiments of cavalry, and new colours for the 1st battalion 8th regiment, which the Commander-in-Chief has ordered him to deliver to those corps.

The corps will be formed in a line to-morrow morning at sunrise, upon the right of the camp of the cavalry, with their rear to the flank, the left of the 1st battalion 8th regiment being within 70 paces of the river.

Upon the arrival of Major-General Wellesley in the front and centre of the line, the right half squadron of each of the regiments of cavalry, and the 1st grenadier company of the 1st battalion 8th regiment, will move out to the front, together with the commanding officers of the corps, and the officers who are to receive the standards and colours respectively. These officers must have with them the old standards and colours.

When Major-General Wellesley shall deliver the new standards and colours to the commanding officers, the cavalry are to carry swords, and the 1st battalion 8th regiment to present arms. Officers to salute, and trumpets and drums to sound and beat a march. The half squadrons and company advanced in front to receive the standards and colours are also to carry their swords, present arms, and officers to salute, &c.

After the standards and colours shall have been received, the half squadrons and company are to move off towards their respective corps. Upon their arrival at the right of their corps, they are to file off from the left of half squadrons and company, and to march down the line of their regiments. The front rank is to march between the line of officers and the front rank of the regiment or battalion, and the rear rank between the

front and rear ranks. The officers with the standards and colours in front of the line of officers.

When arrived upon the left of the regiments and battalion, the front and rear ranks are to wheel to their left, and to return along the line of their regiment or battalion, the front rank between the front and rear ranks of the line, and the rear rank in the rear of the line, to their places in the line. The officers with the standards and colours are to return along the front of the line to their places in squadrons and battalions.

The cavalry to carry swords, and infantry to present arms, officers to salute, and trumpets and drums to sound and beat a march, when the half squadrons and company shall arrive upon the right; the cavalry to slope swords, and infantry to shoulder arms, as soon as the officers with the standards and colours shall have taken their places in squadron and battalion; the corps are then to break into an open column, right in front, and march past the General in squadrons, and by companies, to their lines.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp at Oollull, Friday, 11th March, 1803. [1524.]

The troops will enter the Mahratta territory to-morrow morning, but they are not to consider it as an enemy's country. The strictest order and discipline must be observed, and every thing that is required from the country must be paid for. Major-General Wellesley will certainly punish any person who may be found guilty of a breach of this order.

The officers commanding corps and the heads of departments are requested to make the followers bring in forage for the cattle. Small guards are to be sent with the foragers, and they are to see that they get what may be required, and that what is taken is paid for. The excuse that the inhabitants will not sell their forage will not be allowed: they have been informed that they must sell what is required, and, if the forage be refused, it must be taken, and the price of it laid down.

Commanding officers of corps and heads of departments will receive from the Deputy Adjutant-General a copy of Major-General Wellesley's proclamation to the inhabitants of the country, which may as well be sent out daily with the foragers.

The Deputy Adjutant-General will point out to the corps

which have lately joined certain orders issued in this detachment since it left Seringapatam, which, with others issued since they joined, are to be considered as standing orders; and the officers commanding brigades will direct those corps to copy them from such others in the brigades as may have them. If they are not at length in the orderly books of any of the corps of cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Dallas will be furnished with a copy by the Deputy Adjutant-General.

Officers commanding brigades, or their quartermasters, will indent on the commissary of stores for their distinguishing flags and staffs, and on the paymaster for the puckalies and artificers allowed; and as the commissary of stores cannot furnish lascars for carrying the flagstuffs, the officers are authorized to entertain lascars for that purpose themselves, agreeably to the regulations.

Major-General Wellesley requests that commanding officers will not countersign chitty for extra quantities of arrack, as it cannot be allowed under present circumstances.

Captain Mackay having represented that there is no green forage to be procured in the neighbourhood of camp, and that the elephants with this detachment, being principally new elephants from Ceylon, will not eat the dry Junnaloo straw in quantities sufficient to support them, he is authorized to purchase sugar cane for them until other green forage can be procured from the river or jungles.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1525.] G. O.

Camp near Reitlie, Saturday, 12th March, 1803.

Two active and intelligent sepoys to be selected in each corps of infantry, and sent as orderlies to Major-General Wellesley. They are to be relieved on the 1st day of every month.

When there may be any considerable breach in the line, or any accident may have happened likely to occasion one, which obliges a corps to halt, the officer commanding the corps in front of which the breach is, or which may be obliged to halt, will order a drummer to beat the long roll, which is to be repeated by all corps in front of that in which there may be a breach, but not by those in the rear. The officer commanding the corps which may have beaten the long roll will acquaint the

officer commanding the brigade to which he belongs of the cause ; when the long roll shall be beaten, all the corps in front of that which shall have beaten it will halt.

When a corps in front of which there may have been a breach in the column shall be at the distance of 200 yards from that which precedes it in column, a drummer is to pass the taps, which are to be repeated by all the corps in front in the column, and the whole are to move forward immediately.

As, however, the cattle with this detachment are good, and it is possible without hurrying either them or the troops (a practice which is again positively forbidden) to close up any small interval which may occur without a general halt of the column, Major-General Wellesley requests that officers commanding corps will not pass the long roll, unless it should be absolutely necessary that the men should halt, to enable their corps to regain their situation.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. A. O.

12th March, 1803. [1526.]

In consequence of complaints of the rioting of soldiers in the bazaar, and this day in the villages, in the neighbourhood of the camp, which may be attended by the worst consequences to the detachment, and to the service in general, and the impossibility of knowing who those soldiers are, and to what regiment they belong, if the practice be continued of allowing them to go about not dressed as soldiers, Major-General Wellesley desires :

1st. That no soldier be allowed to leave his lines unless dressed as a soldier ought to be, with his side arms, excepting to go to bathe, to play at long bullets, or any other game, in front of the lines. Commanding officers of regiments are requested to give orders to their regimental sentries upon this subject ; and the guards in camp will, in general, have orders to stop all soldiers found out of their lines not properly dressed, who shall be punished for disobedience of orders.

2nd. No soldiers are to be allowed to go into the villages excepting the dragoons with their foragers, but those dragoons must be dressed in their uniform when on this duty. Guards of Native infantry are sent to each of the regiments of European

infantry, to go out with their foragers, purposely that the Europeans may not be sent into the villages on that service.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1527.]

To the Secretary of Government, Revenue Department.

SIR,

Camp at Deogherry, upon the Werdah,
14th March, 1803.

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council was pleased some time ago to grant to Mickin Lalle a jaghire in the neighbourhood of Conjeveram, the sunnud for which states that it is to contain 203 cannies of land. The ground made over to him accordingly by Mr. Greenhill, the collector, was that in the neighbourhood of Dionnuddy, and included that village. At the time there was no water in the village of Dionnuddy, and Mickin Lalle having mentioned that inconvenience to Mr. Greenhill, and having expressed a wish to have another piece of ground better watered, Mr. Greenhill informed him that the large tank at Cauverypauk had been accustomed to supply those lands with water, and that he should take care that they should be supplied in future according to the custom. Mickin Lalle thereupon accepted the village and lands in question, collected ryots upon them, and commenced digging a tank, which was to be supplied with water from the tank of Cauverypauk for their better improvement. Since that time, however, the collector in the Company's jaghire has been changed, and the water in the Cauverypauk tank is not allowed to run to Mickin Lalle's lands according to the former custom. The lands in the neighbourhood also of those which have been granted to him have been lately sold to a Mussulman. Those granted to him were never measured, and the consequence is that disputes regarding boundaries have commenced between him and his neighbour the Mussulman.

This same man has likewise made a claim upon Mickin Lalle as proprietor of Dionnuddy for a sum of money under the name of caliore, formerly paid to the polygar, and another for a sum as meerah for the pagoda of Buddaswamy in Conjeveram. The two claims amounted to 5½ pagodas, and he has lately increased them to 9 pagodas. It does not appear by the

sunnud by which the grant was made to Mickin Lalle, that any such sums are due from his lands, and accordingly he is unwilling to pay them.

I applied to government for a reward for Mickin Lalle of this description in consequence of his services with the British armies at different times, and I have been induced to listen to his complaints upon this subject, and to adopt this mode of drawing to them the attention of the Right Hon. the Governor in Council, because Mickin Lalle has exerted himself much in the same line in the preparations which have been made for the supply of the army now in the field, and because it is absolutely necessary for the troops in this country that those exertions should be zealously continued.

I shall, therefore, be much obliged to you if you will lay this subject before the Right Hon. the Governor in Council, and request his Lordship to give such orders upon it as he may think proper.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Camp at Deogherry, Tuesday, 15th March, 1803. [1523.]

The detachment to march to-morrow morning by the left; baggage on the left.

The *general* to beat at a quarter past four o'clock, and the assembly at a quarter past five.

The cavalry to form the advance, and to cross the river by a ford on their left; they are to be followed by the details of infantry coming on piquet, under the field officer of the day, which will cross the river by the ford on the left of the infantry. 50 pioneers to march with the advance, 100 at the head of the column of infantry, and the remainder of the corps not attached to departments with the park. The park and the wheel carriages in the provision department to follow the line of infantry. The piquets now on duty to form the rear guard.

The quartermasters, &c., to meet the Acting Deputy Quartermaster-General at the head of the line on the march.

In future the soldiers are to receive their two drams at two different times in the day. They will receive the first dram on marching days upon their arrival at the new ground of encamp-

ment, and on halting days at daylight in the morning, at the flag of the commissary of provisions, as at present. At the same time the second dram for each man will be delivered to the charge of the quartermasters, who will send the quartermaster serjeants, or other trusty persons, to receive it.

The commissary of provisions will issue kegs to the quartermasters of regiments in which the arrack is to be kept in the regimental lines, under such a guard as the commanding officers of regiments may think proper to appoint; and the second drams are to be issued to the soldiers in their lines at the hours which the commanding officers of regiments may think most proper. The commissary of provisions will arrange that a sufficient number of bullocks attached to his department may attend the quartermasters of the 19th light dragoons, the artillery, the 74th, and Scotch brigade, to carry the kegs on the line of march, and to move them to and from the flag at the commissary of provisions when necessary.

The quartermasters will be so kind as to take care that the kegs which will be delivered to them are filled with water as soon as emptied of arrack, in order to prevent their becoming leaky. The arrack is to be delivered to the 19th light dragoons near the rear of the lines of that regiment by a conicopoly, who will be sent there for that purpose; and Captain Mackay will take care that draught bullocks attend at the flag of the commissary of provisions to remove this arrack on halting days before daylight, and on marching days at the moment the arrack shall reach the new ground of encampment.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1529.]

To Lieut.-Colonel Montresor.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp at Kandegy, 16th March, 1803.

I received yesterday your letter of the 5th. Notwithstanding that my attention is much occupied by other objects, I have for some time been turning over in my mind the state of our affairs in Malabar; the subject is not new to me, and I am fully prepared to give you an opinion upon it. It appears now that, notwithstanding the reinforcements which have been sent into Malabar (and which have consisted of all the troops that could possibly be spared), and the exertions of yourself and the officers

under your command, the rebellion has continued to increase, and there is every appearance of its becoming general throughout the province. The European settlements upon the coast have been threatened, and the efforts of the troops will be required in a great measure to keep them in safety during the monsoon. The utmost length of the season which now remains for operations is two months from this time; and supposing the earliest and most favourable termination of the operations which have brought a great portion of the army to the northern frontier, or even if a part of that army could be spared immediately for the service in Malabar, it would not be possible for it to arrive in the disturbed districts so as to effect any benefit before the commencement of the rainy season.

We must, therefore, immediately turn our thoughts to the adoption of such measures as will secure to us some essential points, in case the state of the Company's affairs in general should allow of the employment of a large force for the suppression of the rebellion in Malabar at the opening of the next season. To do anything else will be useless, and to attempt it may prevent you from providing effectually for the security of those points which, in this view of the case, will be necessary to us hereafter. With this view, you ought, in my opinion, first to provide for the safety of Cannanore, Tellicherry, Mahé, and Calicut, and, as far as possible, for the communication along the coast; secondly, you ought to have posts at Ercoor and Cotaparamba, and, if the southern districts should be disturbed, at Angarypur; thirdly, you ought to occupy Manundwaddy in Wynaad, and the heads of the Ghauts; and, fourthly, the posts at Montana, and Canote, and Pereweil, in Cotiote, if possible. I am not so anxious respecting those, however, mentioned in the fourth instance, although they are of importance in respect to Cotiote, because I know that, even if we hold them, we must still cut our way through that district, which never can be subdued or kept in tranquillity excepting by a commanding force in Wynaad above the Ghauts. That is the outline of the disposition of the troops which I would recommend to you for the monsoon. Your nearer view of the subject may enable you to form a better, but this embraces all the great points of our situation in Malabar, and provides some resting-places for us at the opening of the next fair season.

I recommend that of the posts mentioned in the third in-

stance, you should make those at the heads of the passes the strongest, in order that they may be enabled to detach to the rear of the rebels defending the pass when the troops from below will have to attack it in front.

After you will have determined the number of troops you will have in each post, I recommend you to throw into each post eight months' provisions for them. I need not give *you* the caution which I gave to one of your predecessors under similar circumstances three years ago, for want of attention to which we lost many men.

Your whole efforts ought now to be directed to supplying the posts with provisions, ammunition, and medicines; to putting them in a state of decent repair; to destroying the posts which you will not occupy; and to removing or destroying the stores they contain. Let the sea coast, Cotaparamba, Ercoor, and Angarypur be the last provided for, as they are nearer the source of supply, and the communication with them will never be very difficult. While you are making these arrangements in your posts preparatory to the monsoon, you might keep a corps in motion in the lower country, in order to prevent the rebels from meditating anything against the settlements upon the coast before you have made your arrangements for their safety during the monsoon. But the former is the chief object, for the attainment of which every effort ought to be made.

I am getting on as well as I could expect. I wish that the task you have in Malabar was not attended with more difficulties than I have yet met with.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1530.] MEMORANDUM IN ANSWER TO THE DETAILED MEMORANDUM FROM A VAKEEL OF THE SIRDARS OF THE PUTWURDUN FAMILY.

1. It is not possible to give any answer to the 1st article. It is reasonable to suppose that Sree Munt Bajee Rao will either pay the debts of the state, or deliver possession of the countries mortgaged for their payment.

2. The demands regarding the Kolapoor man are answered,

as far as they can be answered at present, in the 3rd article of the annexed memorandum.

3. The demands made in the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th articles are fully answered by the four articles of the annexed memorandum. It is impossible for Major-General Wellesley to give detailed answers or to enter into engagements upon points which concern the government of Sree Munt Bajee Rao only. All that he can engage to do is to procure the recommendation of the English government in the strongest manner for those Sirdars who now come forward to assist Sree Munt; and he has no doubt but that Sree Munt will pay due attention to such strong claims to his favour recommended in this manner.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Translation of a Memorandum delivered by Ball Kishen Bhow the 23rd March, 1803.

1. The Savanore talooks were mortgaged for a debt; they to remain in our possession until the whole of that debt has been realised.
2. Points to be settled with the Kolapoor man :—
 1. The Kolapoor Rajah to be punished to our satisfaction.
 2. Our talooks, forts, mortgaged talooks and towns and villages to be restored to us.
3. In the year * it was determined to give us countries worth three lacs. Those to be given.
4. The enaum villages and lands which were formerly given to the pagodas, to us, and to our dependents, to be now given.
5. The towns of Yecsimbee and Boje in our jaghires, which have been taken possession of, to be restored.
6. Our friend's jaghiredars reside on the borders of the Kolapoor country. He is oppressed; his towns and lands have been seized. They to be restored, and he to be no longer molested :—
 1. Ichilkirziekir.
 2. Neril-lickir.
 3. Kaapsiekir. Goreporie.
 4. Sreeneewass Rao.
3. Our three jaghires, Amani talooks, enaum towns and lands, to be continued to us as they have been by the Sircar.
4. The jaghires, pay, and enaums granted by the Sircar to the Sirdars depending on us, to be continued to them.
5. Besides our ancient jaghires, the deceased Sree Munt Madhoo Rao Pundit Purdhaun agreed, by a memorandum, to give more jaghires. *The Sircar to grant jaghires accordingly.

* Blank in manuscript.

6. Sree Munt Bajee Rao Pundit Purdhann gave us a sunnud for the fort of Darwar. Let the fort be given accordingly.

7. Sree Munt has ordered us to join the Company's forces with our quotas of troops to punish the rebellious. It is necessary, therefore, to equip a large force; the expenses requisite for this purpose to be obtained from the Sircar.

8. The town of Bitkoonkie and others were granted by the Sircar to Chintoo Ramchunder Letchme in jaghire and for pay. They to be continued to him.

9. Hirbajee Narsimwah Daigoorey formerly enjoyed three villages from the Sircar. Let him have them again.

10. Let our friends and relations continue in the enjoyment of their pay and enaum towns and lands, as they now have them from the Sircar.

11. Let us have the enaum towns, jaghires, lands, and compensation choute for the kindinny, &c., in the Kittoor country, as formerly.

12. Our favoured jaghiredars not to be molested, but protected, viz. :—

1. Ramdroog Kir.
2. Nargoond Kir.
3. Gujundergur Kir.

13. Some Sirdars of the Sircar are with us. Let them be protected, and their jaghires be continued to them :—

1. Rastia.
2. Pansay.
3. Nursing Cundy Rao. Chinchoor Kir.
4. Beenee Wallah.
5. Prittee Niddee.

14. Let such mahals and villages included in our jaghires as have been lost be restored to whomsoever of us three they belonged.

Translation of a Memorandum delivered by Ball Kishen Bhow on the 23rd March, 1803.

Detail of the talooks taken from us by the Kolapoor Walah :—

- 1 Hook-kery and Raibaug talook.
- 1 Booderghur, fort and talook together.

—
2

Mortgaged villages :—

1 Seeralee-kerah	8 villages
1 Uckie-waat	1 "
1 Bistwirr	1 "
1 Sawagawah, &c.	10 "
1 Manowly: Murgoor	1 "
1 Sargaum	1 "
1 The detail of the 3 lac country given in the year *	is separate.

—
7

* Blank in manuscript.

MARCH, 1803. MEMORANDUM OF PUTWURDUN SIRDARS. 51

Enaam towns :—

- 1 Kotillie, belonging to Sree-ginpittee Deo.
- 1 Kircole and its dependencies in Toorgul.
 - Lickiekittey, &c. villages, granted by Hirrekar Baghie rittee Bhye Bhoonslah.
- Rampoor, granted by Seenaputtee Kapreekir.
- 1 Wagolie, granted by Sunt-amaat Bavere-kir.
- 1 Naandnie chamilla, granted by Ichill-kirzie-kir.
- 1 80 begahs of land in the village of Danwilly, enjoyed by Ramchunder Sree Dur-Kalie.
- 1 60 begahs of land, enjoyed by Chintoo Ramchunder.
- 2 Villages, Barey and Rana Dall, enjoyed by Gunput Rao.
- 1 Village, Hatirwit, enjoyed by Jinnar Dinna Megasam.
- 1 300 rupees' worth of land, enjoyed by Kishen Rao Chintomeny.

—
10

Jaghires :—

- 1 Boje and Yecksimbee.

Enaam villages, belonging to Trimbick Rao Appah Koorindawad-kir :—

- 1 Koorindawad
- 1 Hirroolie
- 1 Hirrillghee
- 1 Managaum

—
4

MEMORANDUM IN ANSWER TO ONE PRESENTED ON THE 23RD [1531.]
MARCH, 1803, BY A VAKEEL OF THE PUTWURDUN FAMILY.

1st. It is needless to mention the ancient friendship which has subsisted between the servants of the Company and the Sirdars of the Putwurdun family. This has been manifested by many acts of kindness on both sides, and the Company's government are fully satisfied of the zeal of the Sirdars of the Putwurdun in every affair in which the interests of the Company have been joined with those of Pundit Purdhaun. Major-General Wellesley, therefore, has no scruple in declaring that the Company's government will recommend the Sirdars of the Putwurdun family to Sree Munt Bajee Rao, as he has no doubt whatever that the services of these Sirdars will be of the nature and extent to warrant a recommendation of the strongest kind.

2ndly. The object of the Company's army in this country is

to assist Sree Munt Bajee Rao; and Major-General Wellesley has no hesitation in promising that the Company's friendship shall remain inviolate towards those Sirdars who assist its armies in His Highness's cause.

3rdly. It must be obvious to every well-judging man that in the present crisis of Mahratta affairs the first object must be to restore Bajee Rao to the exercise of his legal power; till that is effected everything else must be postponed, and to attempt to effect any other object would be to throw away time which is precious, and probably to risk the attainment of the main object of the Company and of the Putwurdun family.

After that will be effected, it will not be difficult to satisfy the Sirdars of the Putwurdun family; and there can be no doubt but that Sree Munt Bajee Rao, to whom the cause of these Sirdars will be recommended in the strong manner to which Major-General Wellesley is convinced their services will entitle them, will satisfy their claims and reward their services.

4thly. Major-General Wellesley has no orders and no intention to seize upon the jaghires, enaums, &c., of anybody, and he certainly will not seize upon those belonging to such good friends of the Company and Sree Munt as the Sirdars of the Putwurdun family and their adherents. The best mode of preventing their being seized by Sree Munt will be for the Sirdars to serve His Highness in this crisis of his affairs with zeal and fidelity.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Translation of a Memorandum delivered by Ball Kishen Bhow on the 23rd March, 1803.

1. There is friendship between this Sircar and the Company; therefore the Company to speak in favour of this Sircar to Sree Munt (Bajee Rao), so as all the affairs may be settled, and to obtain the favour of Sree Munt to this Sircar.

2. The friendship between the Company and us to remain inviolate. This to be promised.

3. The Kolapoor man to be punished to our entire satisfaction, and our talooks, mahals, kerahs, and enaum villages which he has seized upon, to be recovered and delivered back to us.

4. The mahals for the support of the armies, or the jaghires belonging to us three, and our enaum villages, and the jaghires of the Sirdars under us, and their enaum villages and lands, not to be sequestrated or seized upon by the Sircar or the Company. They to remain with whoever has possession of them.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR LIEUTENANT CHRISTIE.

[1532.]

24th March, 1803.

The objects in stationing the company under your command at Sungoly are firstly, to give confidence to the brinjarries, bazaar people, &c., who are following the detachment under my command; secondly, to provide a guard for those articles of provisions and stores which it may be found convenient to leave behind the détachment; thirdly, to provide a guard for the boats which it may be necessary eventually to place on the river Kistna; and fourthly, to provide a guard for the hospital stationed here.

You will keep these objects in your view. You will immediately remove your provisions and ammunition into the gurry, of which I have arranged with the Rajah of Kittoor that you are to have possession, which you will consider as your post. You may remain encamped on the river, as you may find it convenient, but you must always have a guard in the gurry. You will preserve the most strict discipline among the troops, &c., and will do everything in your power to conciliate the people of the country to the British interests.

A tappall writer will be placed at Sungoly, and, together with the number of peons necessary to keep up the common communication with Mysore, an additional number to carry my letters to Hullihall. Tappall peons will be placed at Goorgherry, with whom you will communicate occasionally, and see that they go off regularly. A muttaseddee will be placed here, who will be directed to report himself to you. I shall be obliged to you if you will take care that they go off regularly, and that those letters sent for me from Hullihall are sent on by the regular tappall.

You will receive this afternoon an account of everything that will be left at Sungoly.

Hereafter I will send you instructions for your guidance in case I should find it necessary to place boats upon the river Malpoorba. Orders will be given to your commanding officer to provide for the pay of the detachment under your command.

[1533.] G. M. O.

Camp near Ankola, Sunday, 27th March, 1803.

The orderly trumpeters and drummers with the majors of brigade are to be always in readiness, at those officers' tents, to take up the rounds and beats from the Deputy Adjutant-General's orderly-drummers, which the majors of brigade must take care are repeated by their orderlies, until taken up by corps and passed along their brigades.

Whenever an orderly trumpeter or drummer hears a signal from trumpet or drum, he is not to consider from whence it comes, but is to repeat it instantly.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1534.]

To Major Doolan.

Camp, 27th March, 1803.

SIR,

It is possible that the detachment of the army under my command in this country may remain in it till after the rains shall have commenced, and the rivers which rise in the Western Ghauts shall have filled; and it is necessary to provide for this possibility. The sooner we begin to make boats, to keep up our communication, the better; and I look to the station of Hullihall, and to the province of Soonda, for a large supply. The number which I shall require from thence, to be placed on the rivers which I shall mention hereafter, is forty basket boats.

Immediately upon the receipt of this letter, you will be so kind as to communicate with the aumildar at Hullihall upon this subject, and apprise him of this call upon the resources of the districts under his management. You will also send a copy of this letter to Mr. Read, with my request to that gentleman that he will give directions to the aumildar to exert himself in furnishing these boats, which may prove to be important to the existence of this detachment.

I enclose a memorandum which will point out the size of which these boats ought to be, and the mode in which they ought to be made. The first thing to which you ought to direct the attention of the aumildar is to procure a sufficient number of well cured skins. I imagine that it will not be difficult to find them in Soonda, at Darwar, or at Goa. The province of Soonda abounds in the other materials required for

the construction of the boats ; and I should imagine that the amildar will not find it difficult to procure the basket makers. The boats will be wanted in the beginning of June, and the amildar will take his own measures to have them ready at that time. I shall also be much obliged to you if you will inquire, and let me know, what number of boat people the province of Soonda can supply for these boats. The pay allowed is very liberal, viz. one gold fanam *per diem* for every day they do not work, and two gold fanams for every day they do work. According to the information which you will give me upon this point, I shall regulate the call which I shall make upon the province of Soonda for this species of assistance.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING BASKET BOATS.

Camp, 27th March, 1803.

1. The size best calculated for strength and use is 10 feet diameter in the clear, and 2 feet 3 inches high.

2. It is indispensable that the covering of leather should come over the gunwale of the boat, to be lashed to the framework within : most accidents that happen to this kind of boats arise from a neglect of this precaution. There ought to be a double covering of leather, to add to their security and strength ; but this is of less importance than that any part of the gunwale should be left uncovered. It may be useful to notice that the hides should be sewed with leather.

3. The materials that are required for basket boats are bamboo lath ; jungle wood (the best is called souri, a tough thorn) ; country rope ; leather.

4. A framework should be made of three of these laths together, and worked with others, about 4 inches apart, in a succession of triangles, until it allows the diameter required, 10 feet. In this state it is fixed in uprights driven in a circle of 10 feet diameter, the ends bent upwards and worked close with single lath for 2 feet 3 inches, which forms the sides of the boat ; the remaining ends are then twisted in with the small parts of souri, or pliable jungle wood, and this forms the gunwale, which should be well lashed with country rope. This is the mode of

making the boats, with which the Natives are as well acquainted as we are.

5. In this state it is taken from the uprights, and the centre of the boat fixed in a little mound of earth (say 6 inches), when it is lined with the toughest jungle wood that can be procured, and lashed to the frame within it; these should cross each other, so that the pressure may be equal on every part of the boat. Eight pieces are sufficient, about the thickness of $2\frac{1}{2}$ or 3 inch rope, made long enough, with the ends pointed, to run into the bottom of the gunwale, and secured with country rope.

6. It is absolutely necessary that a frame to fit, made exactly as the bottom of the boat, should be then fixed within it, the smooth part of the bamboo uppermost. This is laid over the lining of the jungle, to which it is lashed by the same wood within to the sides of the boat.

7. This is the general mode of making boats: the great error is in preparing the lath too thick, whereas it can scarcely be made too thin. The strength of the boat depends upon the goodness of the jungle wood for lining, and its being equally crossed, in order that it may sustain an equal pressure in all its parts.

8. It is desirable that there should be a second frame, worked close in a circular manner, and lashed within; for, on the transporting of baggage, it prevents a pressure on the leather from bamboos, feet of cots, and tables, that pass through the triangle bamboo work of the boat. It preserves the leather, and adds but little to the weight.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1535.] G. O.

Padshahgaum, Friday, 8th April, 1803.

* As the detachment is now approaching districts which have been for some time past the stations of large bodies of cavalry, and which have been frequently plundered, it is probable that the supply of dry forage which they can afford will be but small, and very difficult to be procured.

Major-General Wellesley therefore requests the heads of corps and departments, and the officers of the detachment in general, to urge their followers to cut the roots of the grass upon which alone the existence of the cattle depends. In order to enable them to procure this species of forage, Major-General

Wellesley will allow tools to be issued from the stores in such proportions as may be required ; but care must be taken of them, and they must be returned when wanted for other services.

The forage guards are not intended to be placed over forage in villages in order to secure it for any particular corps or individual. They are intended to go out with the foragers to purchase forage, to see that they commit no disorder, and pay for what they receive, and to oblige the people of the country to deliver what is wanted for payment. This practice of placing guards over forage to secure it for particular corps, or individuals, is therefore forbidden, excepting to the following heads of departments, viz., the agent for draught cattle, that of the commissary of provisions, and that of the grain agent general.

It is to be understood by all these heads of departments that, if there should be any dry forage in, or in the neighbourhood of, the camp, the agent for draught cattle must have it, and the other guards must be withdrawn when his shall go to a village. Captain Mackay, however, and all those heads of departments, are not to place their guards over more forage than their cattle can consume. The remainder is always to be at the disposal of the villagers, to be sold to whoever goes for it, and all the former orders respecting forage are still in force.

Captain Heitland will give orders that an officer of pioneers sees that there is a clear road out of camp to the distance of at least one mile. Whenever, in consequence of the neglect to make a good passage over a ravine or nullah, or to remove any impediment, the wheel carriages shall be delayed within the camp, or in the distance of one mile from it, Major-General Wellesley will consider the officer of pioneers responsible, whose duty it will have been to see that there is a good road.

The corps in the 5th brigade to send each two carpenters, two smiths, two hammermen, and two bellows boys, with their tools, to the park immediately, to repair the carts in the medical department.

The abstracts of the 1st battalion 8th regiment Native infantry having been examined, the pay of that corps is to be received this afternoon.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1536.]

To Captain Scott.

DEAR SCOTT, Camp at Aklooss, upon the Neera, 15th April, 1803.

I have received your letters of the 6th and 7th. If you are in want of timber, you must have it brought by means of hired cattle, but I recommend that this expense should be avoided if possible. Indeed the orders of the Commander-in-Chief upon this point are positive. Every removal of the timber costs money, and very probably the removal and piling which you propose on this side of the river would be as expensive as to bring the timber to Seringapatam. Under the authority given you in the preceding paragraph, there does not appear any probability that you will want timber to keep your people at work till the return of the fair season.

If you can make up carts for the use of the manufactory, without interfering with other work, and with materials which would be otherwise of no use, I beg that you will make them.

You must make the best bargain you can for charcoal. The account of the Darogah, however, is rather extraordinary. I believe that I have marched more than he has since I had last the pleasure of seeing him, and only one gun bullock has died, and that by accident.

Be so kind as to use the Malabar guns and mortars in any way you may think proper.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1537.]

*To Lieut.-Colonel Collins.**Camp at Somergaum, at the junction of the rivers
Neera and Kurrah, 17th April, 1803.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

After so much time has elapsed since I have had any communication with you, it gives me the most sincere pleasure to commence one by the expression of the great gratification which I received in the perusal of your despatch to the Governor-General of the 25th ultimo, a copy of which reached me yesterday from Colonel Close. In the important conference of which you therein give the details, it appears to me that you have dis-

* British Resident at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

played the moderation, the candour, and the dignified firmness which ought to be the characteristics of the diplomatic agents of the British nation in India; you spoke as a man ought who is sensible of the justice of the cause which he is urging, and who is certain of being supported; and notwithstanding the chicane of his ministers, you drew from the Prince with whom you were sent to negotiate a declaration which must be considered as formal, and to which must be attributed the future peace of India, if he should act in conformity to his declaration.

You will have heard from Colonel Close that I am advancing towards Poonah with a detachment of the army, which is so well equipped and composed, that I should not be apprehensive of the consequences if it were opposed by all the forces of Hindustan. I am now within a few marches of Poonah, where I expect to arrive on the 22nd or 23rd. Colonel Stevenson, with the subsidiary force in the service of the Nizam, reinforced by me by one European regiment, together with His Highness's contingent, is on his march up the Beemah; towards Gardoon; he will leave there, within the Nizam's frontier, all His Highness's troops, and will take a position with those of the Company upon the Beemah, between Poonah and Gardoon.

I had determined upon this disposition of part of the troops under my orders before I had seen your letter to the Governor-General, in which you mention the desire of Scindiah that the Nizam's troops should not be brought to Poonah, because it holds out a probability that all the troops will thereby procure some forage; but I inform you of it that you may make such use of the information as you may think proper.

I at the same time tell you that I do not propose to bring the Nizam's troops within the Mahratta territory, unless it should be absolutely necessary.

My first object after I shall reach Poonah will be to bring up the Peshwah from Bassein, for which I have arranged a plan, and have communicated it to Colonel Close. According to this plan he ought to arrive at Poonah at the end of this month. But I cannot answer for the movement of His Highness's person, and therefore cannot say when he will reach that city.

I shall afterwards take such a position as will appear most likely to enable the troops to subsist with facility in an exhausted country, and to form a junction if that measure should

be necessary, in which I shall wait the result of the pending negotiations.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1538.]

To Major Kirkpatrick.

SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 20th April, 1803.

Having had reason to believe that it was Amrut Rao's intention to destroy by fire the town of Poonah as soon as the British troops should arrive in the neighbourhood, I made a forced march of above forty miles, last night, with the cavalry and a battalion, and the troops under some of the southern jaghiredars, and arrived here this day at two o'clock, in order to prevent the execution of this design. I was detained above six hours in the Bhore Ghaut, about twenty miles from hence : in consequence of which I imagine that Amrut Rao heard of this movement, and he marched off this morning, leaving the town untouched.

My infantry will move here on the day after to-morrow.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1539.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq., Governor of Bombay.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 23rd April, 1803.

Upon an examination of the state of my carriage cattle, I find it impossible to send them to Panwell with any prospect of having their services hereafter ; and as the future efficiency of this body of troops depends in a great measure upon them, I am obliged to avail myself of the present moment of leisure to give them some rest. The brinjarries, however, will go down to Panwell to receive the loads respecting which I wrote to your secretary some days ago.

Under these circumstances I am under the necessity of requesting that you will be so kind as to give orders that all the arrack for which Captain Moor may have prepared kegs may be sent up to Poonah on coolies with the detachment under the command of Colonel Murray. This detachment, I understand,

will be at Panwell about the 26th or 27th. If the sheep contracted for should arrive, I am not immediately in want of anything else, and I shall delay to avail myself of your depôt till my cattle recover. If the sheep, however, should not be sent, it will be necessary that as many casks of salt provisions as can be prepared should be sent likewise.

I have also to request that you will be so kind as to send me three lacs and a half of rupees by the same opportunity. If, however, it is intended by you that Colonel Murray's detachment should be paid and fed by the departments in this army, it will be necessary that you should send me five lacs of rupees. The larger the proportion of this sum in gold coin the better.

I shall want another buggy and horse-harness for one of my friends here.

I am very anxious to hear respecting the wheels for gun-carriages and tumbrils, and the bridge of boats.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Dallas.

[1540.]

SIR,

Camp near Poonah, 24th April, 1803.

In answer to your letter of the 23rd, I have to inform you that I am perfectly aware of the necessity that the public should pay for the forage which the horses received on the 20th and 21st instant. It was necessary for the service that the cavalry should make an extraordinary forced march, on which it was not possible for their grass-cutters to follow them or to join them till late on the next day. On their arrival at Poonah forage was to be procured only by purchase; and as there is no regulated allowance for providing it, it must be an extraordinary charge of this detachment. I shall accordingly direct that this expense may be defrayed.

In respect to the expense incurred on the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th, I have to observe that it stands on grounds entirely different. The grass-cutters were then arrived, and the question is whether the want of grass has been such as that they have not been able to do their duty, and that it became necessary to incur

an additional expense for the horses. The object of all the regulations of government for years past has been to bring all expenses under certain heads, and to preclude the necessity of incurring extra expenses by the means of officers of the junior ranks of the army. This object is one of great importance, not only to the public, but to the officers, as every additional expense of this nature must increase their responsibility, and render them more liable to the checks of the auditor's office. Under these circumstances it is proper that I should proceed with caution in sanctioning or recommending even a momentary deviation from the established practice.

I observe that in the returns forwarded by you, the officers commanding regiments have not stated the quantity of grass brought in by the grass-cutters, excepting the officer commanding the 4th regiment; nor has any one of them declared that upon an examination of the banks of the rivers and nullahs in the neighbourhood of this camp the grass usually brought in by the grass-cutters cannot be mowed. I have reason to believe that it can.

I have also to inform you that, since I had a conversation with you upon this subject, I have made inquiries regarding it, and I find that the whole expense of forage for the horses of the country cavalry, which their chiefs also pay for, does not amount to more than about a quarter of a rupee for each horse. The average expense of forage for our troops amounts to more than that sum, even with the addition of the assistance of the grass-cutters. Upon the whole, particularly as I propose to march towards the hills on the day after to-morrow, in which plenty of grass will be procured, I am desirous to avoid introducing into the service a deviation from the established practice, which may be attended by many public and private inconveniences; but if the officers commanding regiments should be desirous that the question should be referred to the Commander-in-Chief, I will with pleasure transmit all the papers to be laid before him.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp at Panowullah, 27th April, 1803. [1541.]

As this detachment depends principally upon the dry grass to be found among the hills for forage for the cattle of all descriptions, Major-General Wellesley requests that the officers commanding corps, heads of departments, and individuals, will caution their followers, in the most particular manner, against setting fire to the grass among the hills. He prohibits all persons whatever from dressing victuals among the grass, smoking cheroots, or having any fire with them at all.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1542.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Panowullah, 29th April, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 27th, and Captain Moor's of the 26th.

My principal wants at present are arrack, sheep, and wheels. If 100 kegs of the first could be sent up immediately, it would be a great object gained; the remainder might follow hereafter. I have not a wheel in the army that is worth one pin. I therefore am anxious that as many as are ready should be sent up first. The transmission of the medicines, &c., may be deferred till the coolies return.

The bullocks also might be sent up at different times in proportion as they are procured; and each of them might bring up a load of arrack or of beef. My pioneers are now at work upon the Ghaut, and I'll answer for its being very practicable for carriage cattle in a few days.

Supposing that Captain Moor has 1000 coolies, let him send half with arrack and half with wheels. We are not sick now, and our medicines can be postponed.

In respect to money, I prefer gold because it is easiest carried. All our coins pass at our own rate of exchange without much difficulty. However, when the Peshwah comes we may experience more difficulty in this respect.

I enclose a memorandum on the size of a union flag (new pattern) which I shall be obliged to you if you will send me.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1543.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Panowullah, 30th April, 1803.

After considering the proposition that I should take up money from the sôucars at Poonah for bills upon Bengal, and making inquiries upon that subject, I rather believe that after a short time I shall be able to find money in that manner. At present the confidence in the Peshwah's government is so small, that, even if there should be money in the place, no man is willing to allow that he has it. But there is scarcely a doubt that there is much money at Poonah, and it is to be hoped that people will not hereafter be afraid to avow their riches.

If I should be able to procure any money in this manner I will let you know it, and I will request you to send me bills upon the government of Bengal for the sums which I shall receive. In the mean time it would be convenient to have three or four lacs of rupees soon. I highly approve of Captain Moor's proposal to send us our supplies by means of the bullocks to be hired in the Konkan. Those which we now want principally are arrack and salt provisions, as I cannot place much dependence upon supplies of sheep in the rainy season. I will send back the kegs in proportion as I may empty them, so that there will always be plenty at Bombay. I have now more rice than I have bullocks to carry it, and I get gram, &c., in the country. Therefore what I want now principally is arrack, wheels, salt beef, medicines. The rest of our supply, excepting the rice, for which the brinjaries are gone, may remain at Bombay for a short time.

The traders of this camp have taken 100 bullocks down to Panwell for a corresponding number of loads of ghee. I shall be much obliged to you if you will direct that some arrangement may be made so that they may be supplied through the traders in that article at Bombay.

Yours faithfully,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1544.]

To the Adjutant-General.

SIR,

Camp at Panowullah, near Poonah, 1st May, 1803.

I have the honour to enclose copies of the orders issued by me which require the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief.

The company ordered from Hullihall in Soonda to Goa on the 2nd of March was intended to enable Sir William Clarke to provide for the security of the packets from government or the Commander-in-Chief which might be sent from that port to Bombay by sea.

The company ordered from Nuggur on the 10th March was to be posted at Hooley Honore, to keep up the communication between the army and Seringapatam.

The companies ordered from Hullihall to join this detachment on the * and 24th March were to be posted on the banks of the Malpoorba, Gutpurba, and Kistna.

It appeared to me to be of importance that there should be a good survey of the road by which this detachment should march, and as the best mode of obtaining that object, I appointed Captain Johnson to be surveyor.

The allowance ordered on the 27th March for Mr. Gilmour is the same as that drawn by the surgeon with the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.

The company for which rice is ordered on the 28th March was to remain upon the Gutpurba till the companies ordered from Hullihall should arrive.

Captain Baynes was appointed on the 3rd April to superintend the brinjãrries, because, after a most minute inquiry into certain complaints from this class of people, it appeared clearly that the Native agents who had been employed with them were not worthy of the trust which had been reposed in them. In order to prevent the clandestine sale of rice, it was necessary that some person should reside in the golah, and Captain Baynes appeared to be well qualified for this duty.

The order of the 19th April regarding horses for the guides was issued in consequence of the difficulty of procuring information regarding roads, water, &c. &c., from the people of the country, who seldom venture beyond the bounds of their own villages, and the consequent necessity of sending forward the guides to view the roads and watering-places before a march could be attempted. They have generally been escorted by parties of Mysore horse; but I could not allow them to advance more than one march in front of the detachment, and even then not to remain in front. The consequence was, that the guides

* Blank in manuscript.

have frequently gone thirty miles on foot in a day, besides the day's march, a labour to which the number with this detachment were not equal; and I therefore thought it proper to order seven horses to be purchased and kept for them.

On the 24th of April I issued an order to entertain eight new private guides. There were only eleven with this detachment, which is a small number for the duties required from them; and as not one of them can speak the language of this country, it was necessary to have in that department some persons that could.

I have likewise the honour to enclose certain letters, written by my directions, which contain orders which require the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief.

I likewise enclose a report which I received from the superintendent of supplies, in consequence of which I authorized the purchase from the brinjarries of 49 garce 232 mercalls of rice.

I likewise enclose an account of the expenses attending this expedition, for which no provision is made by the regulations, with the vouchers thereof up to the end of April.

The account No. 13 requires some explanation. Soobah Rao Mooty is a man who was dismissed from the service of the Rajah of Mysore in the month of October or November last, at the suggestion of the Resident with the Peshwah, in consequence of his supposed improper communications with Jeswunt Rao Holkar. He was then at Poonah. On my march through the Darwar district, I received a message from him to say that he had something of importance to communicate, provided he could come into camp in safety, of which I gave him assurances. On his arrival he produced sunnuds for the possession of the districts of Darwar, Savanore, &c., bordering on the Toombuddra, drawn in the name of Bajee Rao Berwy; and he was on his road to collect troops and take possession of those districts, for which purpose he asked for my countenance and assistance. As I knew that part of these districts were ceded to the Company, and that, at all events, the attempt of Soobah Rao Mooty to take possession of them would occasion a contest in my rear, from which the detachment under my command was likely to suffer, I prevailed upon him to remain in camp, and he accompanied me to Poonah. On his road he was distressed for money, and I gave him the sum entered in the account No. 13.

The sums entered in the accounts Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 were paid on account of forage for the horses of the cavalry on the 20th and 21st of April, and on the 22nd of April for the gun bullocks.

The forage at Poonah is hay, made and tied up in small bundles at the beginning of the season, and brought into Poonah from the hills at the distance of twenty or thirty miles, in proportion as it is required. It is obvious that as this forage is cut and brought in with great labour, it must be expensive; and as care is taken to keep it scarce, there must be many persons willing to pay a large price for it when an army is assembled in the neighbourhood of the city. When the cavalry arrived there they had made a long forced march, and it was not possible that their grasscutters could join them till the 22nd. As there are no means of procuring forage in the cavalry excepting by means of their grasscutters, I desired the Resident's servant to issue forage to the different regiments from the Resident's store, for which No. 14 is his bill; and Nos. 15, 16, 17, 18 are the bills from the different regiments for the forage purchased by their commanding officers on the 21st. No. 14 also contains a charge for forage purchased from the Resident's servant for the gun bullocks on the 22nd of April, the day on which they arrived at Poonah with the infantry. I desired that this forage might be purchased for them, lest there should be a scarcity on the arrival of the troops. No. 21 is also a bill for straw for the gun bullocks, for which I contracted before the troops arrived at Poonah.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp at Panowullah, 1st May, 1803. [1545.]

Major-General Wellesley requests that commanding officers of corps will take advantage of the present halt to exercise their corps. This measure will be beneficial to them in other respects, as well as in their discipline.

It is very necessary that means should be adopted to prevent the troops or followers from carrying off forage from the villages, or from the inhabitants bringing it to camp, without paying for it; and Major-General Wellesley requests that commanding

officers of corps will endeavour to prevent this practice. Not a day passes that many complaints are not made upon this subject ; and in future any person who shall be found to have disobeyed the orders relating to it will be punished.

A troop of Native cavalry to parade at head quarters at five o'clock to-morrow morning to escort Major-General Wellesley to Poonah. It will return in the evening.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1546.]

To Lieut.-Colonel Collins.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Poonah, 2nd May, 1803.

I received yesterday your letter of the 25th April, for which I am much obliged to you. It is very satisfactory to see that, notwithstanding all the reports in this quarter of a supposed confederacy between Holkar and Scindiah for the purpose of an attack upon us, no steps have yet been taken by those parties which give reason to believe that an accommodation of their differences has taken place, or is likely in a short space of time. You will be surprised to learn that the Peshwah has not yet arrived here ; nay, that he reaches Panwell only on this day. He will probably arrive about the 10th, so that I shall have been here twenty days previous to His Highness's arrival. If the Mahrattas who conquered Hindustan were now in being, they would not have failed to take advantage of a delay which might be so fatal ; but as it is, I hope that no evil will result from it excepting a little trouble to counteract the consequences of intrigues among our friends, for which so much more time has been given.

I heard of Holkar's movements upon the Nizam's frontier, and I have altered the disposition of my forces in order to check them. Notwithstanding the Peshwah's delays, there is nothing in this quarter to impede his advance to Poonah ; and therefore I have sent Colonel Stevenson with the Nizam's army and the subsidiary force towards Aurungabad. I have written to Holkar to desire him to desist from the plunder of the Nizam, and to apprise him of this movement of the troops under Colonel Stevenson.

My own division is encamped about ten miles from hence towards the Bhoré Ghaut. There is a battalion in this city, and

a body of friendly Mahrattas in the neighbourhood, and the Rajah of Mysore's light cavalry at the Bhoze Ghaut.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain Scott.

[1547.]

DEAR SCOTT,

Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 21st April. If it should appear probable that you will want timber to keep any part of your people at work between this time and the return of the season in which you can bring in the timber from the jungles, it will be necessary that you should avail yourself of the permission, which I understand you have from the Military Board, to incur expense to transport the timber to Seringapatam immediately. From the information which you will obtain you will be the best judge whether it will cost least money to do this by hired carts the whole of the distance, or to float the timber down the river to the place mentioned by you, and remove it thence by hired carts. I believe the former mode will be cheaper, as the timber must be moved to the river and from it again by men, and their labour is always the most expensive. In your decision upon this point, also, you must be guided in some degree by the season; I am afraid it is now nearly too far advanced to do much by carts. The iron you wanted from Bombay is gone to Mangalore. I had written so far when I received your letter of the 23rd, to which the above is a complete answer.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1548.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803.

I have taken into consideration Captain Moor's plan for supplying me with money, upon which I have to make the following remarks:—In the present state of our affairs it is in my

opinion an essential object that the detachment should be independent of every thing, particularly of Poonah and its neighbourhood. One of the consequences of Captain Moor's plan is, that in order to procure this money at all I must remain near Poonah; and even if I should remain here, circumstances might so turn out as that I should not find it very easy to get this money. Under these circumstances, although the channel found out by Captain Moor is a very good one, and it will be very proper to use it as long as I may find it convenient, I take the liberty of suggesting to you, 1st. That you should send me some money immediately; 2nd. That you should allow me to draw upon your Presidency in favour of any person from whom I may be able to procure money; and 3rd. That you should allow me to take up money here upon receipts, which receipts are to be replaced by bills drawn by your government upon Bengal. If you should approve of these plans, I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that a letter may be written to me upon the subject.

By letters from the Military Board and the commissary of stores to the commissary of stores with me, I find that little progress has yet been made in my wheels. I have made some myself, and I shall be obliged to you if you will have some iron for tires sent to me immediately. This iron will answer if tumbril wheels cannot be sent; at all events it is necessary to me.

I hope that the boat concern is getting on. I rely upon having the bridge in the middle of June, if we are to have a monsoon campaign.

Yours faithfully,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1549.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 7th May, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 3rd. I imagine that the 400 kegs of arrack are above the Ghauts, and will be here in a day or two. They have been brought upon 200 bullocks hired by Colonel Murray. I want nothing by coolies excepting arrack, iron, wheels, beef, medicines, and the few little articles required for presents. The re-

mainder of my requisition I shall send for as occasion may require. I shall send back the 200 hired bullocks with the empty arrack kegs immediately after they will have arrived. I don't draw upon Bengal myself, because I have no authority from government for doing so, but I have applied for such an authority.

I have not a horseman that I could send you, and at all events if I could spare any, they could not march to the districts which you propose to defend by their means, unless I escorted them thither. The only risk you run in my opinion is between this time and that when the rivers will fill; after that your districts will be safe from the inroads of horse, and can be defended by your infantry, who must keep the field, if necessary, during the rains, and press upon the horse between the rivers, and bang them wherever they may find them. After the rains, if we should not have settled our matters with the supposed confederated Mahrattas, you ought to hire some horse to defend your open countries to the northward, and probably Kulhery Khan would be as proper a man to hire as any other, and he will certainly enter your service. You ought not to pay him more than 25 rupees a month for each horseman. I am sorry to hear of the probable disappointment respecting the boats, but if the other articles required are in a state of preparation, we may still get the boats from Goa, as those of a smaller size may answer.

The Peshwah arrived yesterday at Tallygaum, and is now between this camp and Poonah.

Yours faithfully,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1550.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Panowullah, 7th May, 1803.

I find that it is necessary to get possession by force of the fort of Carnallah, and heavy guns may be required for that purpose. I understand that there are two 12-pounders with their stores already embarked at Tannah, for the use of Colonel Murray's detachment. If that should be the case, I shall be much obliged to you if, upon the receipt of this letter, you will order them over to Panwell; if not, I request you to order two

other iron 12-pounders and their stores to Panwell from Bombay or Tannah. It is necessary that this should be done as soon as may be possible.

Yours faithfully,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1551.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 8th May, 1803.

The soucar is arrived with the dollars, and I have presented the bill to him. He says that he will commence the discharge of it in eight days by instalments of 10,000 rupees a day. This is contrary to agreement both with regard to the original 50,000 rupees and to the other sums which the soucar was to have paid. I fear that this man will fail in paying more than the original 50,000 rupees, and that only at a late period of time. Allow me to suggest that if you have any more dollars or gold coins, it would be best to send them here to me, and I will either have them recoined, or will purchase rupees with them. At all events I shall be certain of having all that you will send. Under the present arrangement the soucar gets a clear profit of 6½ per cent., and an advantage upon the dollars, and he is paid the money in advance; for all of which he does nothing. I much fear that we shall be distressed for money after all.

Yours faithfully,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1552.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 9th May, 1803.

I have received a letter from the Governor-General, in which he desires me to write to the Secretary of State and President of the Board of Control an account of my proceedings to this date by the overland despatch. In case his letters should have arrived at Bombay, I shall be obliged to you if you will detain the packet for these despatches for one day. I will send them to you to-morrow if I can.

We have no sheep yet from your quarter. I get them, how-

ever, at a cheap rate here, viz., about a rupee and three quarters each; but I cannot procure such a stock as to enable me to march, and therefore I wish that those for which Captain Moor has contracted may arrive soon.

I am also very anxious for the arrival of the coolies with arrack, iron, medicines, salt provisions, &c.

Yours faithfully,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut.-Colonel Collins.

[1553.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, 9th May, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 1st instant, and Colonel Close has communicated to me your despatch of the 2nd. It appears that matters are taking a serious turn in your quarter; and although I should be happy to see you at Poonah, I should be much more pleased if I should hear that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had prevailed upon you to remain at his court.

The confederacy against which, according to appearances, we may have to contend, is composed of persons and powers among whom there can be no common interest excepting that of plunder, and there are many sources of jealousy and enmity. They will soon find that they have everything to lose by hostilities with the English government, and such is the state of our military preparations in this quarter that they have but little hope of gain. Some of them, also (please God), may come in for harder blows than they expect, and upon the whole we may reasonably look for the speedy dissolution of this confederacy.

But there are two modes of pressing upon it, or rather the one must be the immediate consequence of the other: I mean, negotiation and arms. By the position of our forces in this quarter we must deprive our enemies of the only hope for the attainment of which they have formed this confederacy, viz. the plunder of the Nizam's country. By the operations of those in Bengal we must show them that they have something to lose; and we must press these points upon their minds by means of the ability and diligence of our diplomatic agents.

The Prince at whose court you have resided is one of the principal members of the confederacy; he has most to lose and

active as they ought to be, must keep the country quiet. Are your villages in Guzerat surrounded by walls?

I think that the best thing to do would be to send me the dollars: they will be of more use to me in that shape, and I can either coin them in my own camp or get them coined at Poonah, or sell them in the bazaar there. In consequence of your letter of this day's date I intend to apply to General Stuart for a supply of money, but still it would be very desirable that I should have the authority which you propose to give me to draw upon Bengal.

I have the honour, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1557.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 13th May, 1803.

As we have so many objects of importance in hand at Bombay, it has occurred to me that all would be much forwarded if I were to go down there. Accordingly I think of leaving this place on the 15th in the evening, and I shall be at Panwell on the 16th in the morning; and I shall be obliged to you if you will send there a boat to convey me to Bombay.

By all means send me the dollars; they will be something in hand. The black people cannot be depended upon to supply money or any thing else to a day. Captain Moor's sheep contractor has brought up the Ghauts 1700 sheep, and he purposes to purchase the remainder in and about Poonah. I told you that my commissary of provisions gets them for 1½ rupees each; the contractor will get them for the same sum, and will receive 5 rupees for them. If he had brought 15,000 sheep up the Ghauts, or would now produce me 15,000 sheep to set my mind at ease upon the subject of that great article of our European consumption, he would have deserved 5 rupees a sheep; but if we are to go on receiving them at a thousand or two thousand at a time, this contractor does us no good whatever, excepting that he is one purchaser added to the number before employed by the commissary of provisions. No iron come yet. I enclose an extract of a letter which has been received by a gentleman upon my staff from a friend lately

returned from the Mauritius, which contains intelligence of a curious and possibly an interesting nature.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Adjutant-General of the Army.

[1558.]

SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 14th May, 1803.

I have the pleasure to inform you that His Highness the Peshwah arrived in his capital yesterday. He had been in the village of Chinsura, about eight miles from hence, since the 7th instant.

The detachment of the Bombay army under Colonel Murray, which had been with His Highness the Peshwah at Bassein, has been employed in getting possession of the fort of Carnallah in the Konkan since His Highness has ascended the Ghauts. The killadar gave up the fort on the 10th instant, which was immediately given over to the Peshwah's officer appointed by His Highness to receive it; and Colonel Murray has ascended the Bhore Ghaut, and is now on his march to Poonah. As soon as he will arrive here I propose to move towards the Nizam's frontier, leaving at Poonah such a detachment as may be deemed sufficient for the protection of His Highness's person during the absence of the greater part of the troops.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar has made an irruption into the territories of the Nizam, and has levied a contribution upon the city of Aurungabad. As soon as I heard of this movement I ordered Colonel Stevenson to move to the northward with the troops under his command, and I apprised Jeswunt Rao Holkar of Colonel Stevenson's march with a view to the protection of the Nizam's territories, from which I requested that chief to withdraw. In answer to my letter he has informed me that the soubahdar of Aurungabad had collected for five years the revenues of two villages belonging to his jaghire, and that he had entered the Nizam's territories to receive from him that money; that he had done the country no injury; that he had received some of the money he required, and was about to depart. It is true that he has two villages in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, and I understand that he has not done any injury to the

least to gain in the contest, because, whatever may be the success of this plundering expedition, his troops are not of that description to partake of its benefits in proportion to their numbers and importance, and his territories are most exposed to our invasions. His mind also appears to be adverse to the course of measures which his ministers have adopted; he is of a disposition to take sudden measures in consequence of the failure of the military operations, against those who advised them; and it appears that he has a great respect and regard for you. Under all these circumstances I anxiously hope that he may have endeavoured to prevail upon you to remain with him, and that you may have stayed.

You will have heard that the Peshwah is now in a village about nine miles from Poonah, where I imagine he will remain till a lucky day for entering that city will arrive. Colonel Stevenson is gone into the Nizam's territories, and he will take up a position that will make these gentry fear to attempt the plunder of any place within a hundred miles of him, and will induce the persons in charge of the Nizam's cities to hold back their money rather longer than the person did who was in charge of Aurungabad.

I shall move towards the Nizam's frontier also as soon as I shall hear of Scindiah's march, and this government will have become settled in some degree.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1554.]

To Lieut.-Colonel Collins.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

10th May, 1803.

Colonel Close has just communicated to me the copy of your despatch to the Governor-General of the 4th instant, and I rejoice to find that you remain with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

It occurs to me that the Governor-General cannot now intend that Scindiah should come to Poonah; at all events, his advance to this place will destroy all the arrangements for settling the Peshwah's government, and may lead to a contest which will be very unpleasant. Colonel Close, therefore, intends to urge the Peshwah to desire Scindiah not to come to Poonah, and to ground that desire upon the fact that he has recovered his

power, and that the presence of the Maharajah's troops can create only confusion and distress.

If the Peshwah should write to Scindiah, I intend also to write him a civil letter to the same purport.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Malcolm.

[1555.]

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp, 10th May, 1803, 6 P.M.

News is come in from Holkar's camp of the 14th Mohurram, or the 6th May: he was then near Aurungabad, but not at the place. Stevenson was upon the Seenah on the 7th, and was rather inclined to halt, for which I am not sorry, as we are thereby secure of Hyderabad. We can suffer no more at Aurungabad than we have already.

A despatch is come from Collins of the 4th. Scindiah had asked him to stay, and said that he intended to march upon Poonah by Badowly, in company with the Rajah of Berar. Scindiah marched on the 4th, and Collins was to follow him on the 5th. The Peshwah is to be desired to tell Scindiah not to come to Poonah, and I am to write to him to the same purport.

Madhoo Rao Rastia's vakeel has been here to beg pardon for not coming, and to promise good behaviour in future. No other news.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1556.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 11th May, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your two letters of the 9th. I am sorry that Captain Moor should be baited by any body, and I am convinced that he has exerted himself as much as has been in his power; but there has been some mistake in our affairs at Bombay, of which I cannot comprehend the reason. I wrote first in January to require that a large depôt might be prepared at Bombay, which was calculated for an army of the

numbers that were then to be assembled upon the Toombuddra under the orders of General Stuart, from the notion that they would be distressed by their march, and would find nothing on their arrival at Poonah. This letter contained memoranda upon buildings, and indeed upon whatever it was supposed such an establishment would require. But it was thought at Bombay that it was best to have the depôt in that place, and to supply the occasional wants of the army by means of boats, which were to carry the articles wanted to Panwell, when they should be called for.

I acquiesced in this proposal, because I was informed that large boats could at all times get to Panwell, and that stores could be delivered from them with facility; and according to that arrangement I wrote to the Secretary of Government, and sent a list of the articles which I might first want. When I wrote that letter I imagined that I should have had it in my power to send the cattle for the articles immediately; but upon their arrival at Poonah I found them so much reduced in condition and numbers, that I could not possibly carry away by my own means all the stores which I had requested you to send, and a very small proportion of my bullocks went down the Ghaut. Still there would have been no inconvenience from this failure of my cattle, if no greater proportion of stores had been sent over to Panwell than that for which I made a requisition in my letter to the Secretary of Government; but instead of that I understand that the place is now crowded with stores, and that, instead of keeping them in the boats, and landing them as they may be wanted, according to the plan amended at Bombay, they are reverting to the original plan without attending to all its arrangements, and are throwing the stores into small houses, with small doors, and to which there is a difficult access. Let us adhere to one plan; either the boat plan or that originally given; but if the latter be adopted, let it be with all its arrangements, and let proper store-rooms be constructed with proper people to take care of them; and there is no occasion for putting more into them than I shall call for from time to time. Captain Moor, in his answer to my first letter upon the subject of the depôt, said that we could get as many as 4000 coolies at Bombay if we required them. In consequence of this information, and because both my carriage

cattle and wheel carriages were worse for the march, I called for assistance in coolies to bring up the following articles: arrack, ordnance carriage wheels (which by the bye could come in no other manner), iron, and medicines. It is scarcely to be believed that not one public cooly has arrived yet, excepting some with the durbar presents. The arrack is carried by 200 (not 400 as they say) hired by Colonel Murray, but we are still in want of that article. I have inquired into the causes of this failure, and they are, that a fellow has got a contract (which it seems is deemed a monopoly) for procuring coolies for this service; and instead of procuring them at Bombay, where they are to be got, he has come over to Panwell to procure them there. He does not pay the people any thing like the price which he receives from the public, and can get no coolies; but Captain Young, who is there, says that he can get them at two-thirds of the price allowed by government, but he cannot interfere with this fellow's monopoly.

I understand that the wheels for which I asked will not be ready till the middle of June, and yet I suppose that all India cannot produce people so expert in making wheels, and so many of them, as Bombay. Will it be believed that although the wheels I have asked for will not be prepared there till the middle of June, I have made forty wheels since I arrived at Poonah, and I could march to-morrow if I could get the iron which I required from Bombay? The iron also, which it is to be supposed is not a scarce article in a place like that, and which ought to have been sent over as soon as we had got possession of Panwell, is not yet come, and very probably is not even at Panwell. I mention all these circumstances to you, my dear Sir, because I know you to be very anxious regarding them; but I have made it a rule that I never will allow abuses to interfere with the service. There must be an abuse in the cooly contract, and there must be both abuse and neglect in the department of the commissary of stores, otherwise he must have been able to make wheels at least as soon as my departments, and to send the iron required.

You will receive from Colonel Close an answer upon the subject of Colonel Murray's corps. You will see that under present appearances we cannot spare you any troops. But it appears by your returns that you have 4000 men in Guzerat, besides the garrison of Surat, which number, if they are as

active as they ought to be, must keep the country quiet. Are your villages in Guzerat surrounded by walls?

I think that the best thing to do would be to send me the dollars: they will be of more use to me in that shape, and I can either coin them in my own camp or get them coined at Poonah, or sell them in the bazaar there. In consequence of your letter of this day's date I intend to apply to General Stuart for a supply of money, but still it would be very desirable that I should have the authority which you propose to give me to draw upon Bengal.

I have the honour, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1557.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 13th May, 1803.

As we have so many objects of importance in hand at Bombay, it has occurred to me that all would be much forwarded if I were to go down there. Accordingly I think of leaving this place on the 15th in the evening, and I shall be at Panwell on the 16th in the morning; and I shall be obliged to you if you will send there a boat to convey me to Bombay.

By all means send me the dollars; they will be something in hand. The black people cannot be depended upon to supply money or any thing else to a day. Captain Moor's sheep contractor has brought up the Ghauts 1700 sheep, and he purposes to purchase the remainder in and about Poonah. I told you that my commissary of provisions gets them for 1½ rupees each; the contractor will get them for the same sum, and will receive 5 rupees for them. If he had brought 15,000 sheep up the Ghauts, or would now produce me 15,000 sheep to set my mind at ease upon the subject of that great article of our European consumption, he would have deserved 5 rupees a sheep; but if we are to go on receiving them at a thousand or two thousand at a time, this contractor does us no good whatever, excepting that he is one purchaser added to the number before employed by the commissary of provisions. No iron come yet. I enclose an extract of a letter which has been received by a gentleman upon my staff from a friend lately

returned from the Mauritius, which contains intelligence of a curious and possibly an interesting nature.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Adjutant-General of the Army.

[1558.]

SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 14th May, 1803.

I have the pleasure to inform you that His Highness the Peshwah arrived in his capital yesterday. He had been in the village of Chinsura, about eight miles from hence, since the 7th instant.

The detachment of the Bombay army under Colonel Murray, which had been with His Highness the Peshwah at Bassein, has been employed in getting possession of the fort of Carnallah in the Konkan since His Highness has ascended the Ghauts. The killadar gave up the fort on the 10th instant, which was immediately given over to the Peshwah's officer appointed by His Highness to receive it; and Colonel Murray has ascended the Bhoze Ghaut, and is now on his march to Poonah. As soon as he will arrive here I propose to move towards the Nizam's frontier, leaving at Poonah such a detachment as may be deemed sufficient for the protection of His Highness's person during the absence of the greater part of the troops.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar has made an irruption into the territories of the Nizam, and has levied a contribution upon the city of Aurungabad. As soon as I heard of this movement I ordered Colonel Stevenson to move to the northward with the troops under his command, and I apprised Jeswunt Rao Holkar of Colonel Stevenson's march with a view to the protection of the Nizam's territories, from which I requested that chief to withdraw. In answer to my letter he has informed me that the soubahdar of Aurungabad had collected for five years the revenues of two villages belonging to his jaghire, and that he had entered the Nizam's territories to receive from him that money; that he had done the country no injury; that he had received some of the money he required, and was about to depart. It is true that he has two villages in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, and I understand that he has not done any injury to the

active as they ought to be, must keep the country quiet. Are your villages in Guzerat surrounded by walls?

I think that the best thing to do would be to send me the dollars: they will be of more use to me in that shape, and I can either coin them in my own camp or get them coined at Poonah, or sell them in the bazaar there. In consequence of your letter of this day's date I intend to apply to General Stuart for a supply of money, but still it would be very desirable that I should have the authority which you propose to give me to draw upon Bengal.

I have the honour, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1557.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 13th May, 1803.

As we have so many objects of importance in hand at Bombay, it has occurred to me that all would be much forwarded if I were to go down there. Accordingly I think of leaving this place on the 15th in the evening, and I shall be at Panwell on the 16th in the morning; and I shall be obliged to you if you will send there a boat to convey me to Bombay.

By all means send me the dollars; they will be something in hand. The black people cannot be depended upon to supply money or any thing else to a day. Captain Moor's sheep contractor has brought up the Ghauts 1700 sheep, and he purposes to purchase the remainder in and about Poonah. I told you that my commissary of provisions gets them for 1½ rupees each; the contractor will get them for the same sum, and will receive 5 rupees for them. If he had brought 15,000 sheep up the Ghauts, -or would now produce me 15,000 sheep to set my mind at ease upon the subject of that great article of our European consumption, he would have deserved 5 rupees a sheep; but if we are to go on receiving them at a thousand or two thousand at a time, this contractor does us no good whatever, excepting that he is one purchaser added to the number before employed by the commissary of provisions. No iron come yet. I enclose an extract of a letter which has been received by a gentleman upon my staff from a friend lately

returned from the Mauritius, which contains intelligence of a curious and possibly an interesting nature.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Adjutant-General of the Army.

[1558.]

SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 14th May, 1803.

I have the pleasure to inform you that His Highness the Peshwah arrived in his capital yesterday. He had been in the village of Chinsura, about eight miles from hence, since the 7th instant.

The detachment of the Bombay army under Colonel Murray, which had been with His Highness the Peshwah at Bassein, has been employed in getting possession of the fort of Carnallah in the Konkan since His Highness has ascended the Ghauts. The killadar gave up the fort on the 10th instant, which was immediately given over to the Peshwah's officer appointed by His Highness to receive it; and Colonel Murray has ascended the Bhore Ghaut, and is now on his march to Poonah. As soon as he will arrive here I propose to move towards the Nizam's frontier, leaving at Poonah such a detachment as may be deemed sufficient for the protection of His Highness's person during the absence of the greater part of the troops.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar has made an irruption into the territories of the Nizam, and has levied a contribution upon the city of Aurungabad. As soon as I heard of this movement I ordered Colonel Stevenson to move to the northward with the troops under his command, and I apprised Jeswunt Rao Holkar of Colonel Stevenson's march with a view to the protection of the Nizam's territories, from which I requested that chief to withdraw. In answer to my letter he has informed me that the soubahdar of Aurungabad had collected for five years the revenues of two villages belonging to his jaghire, and that he had entered the Nizam's territories to receive from him that money; that he had done the country no injury; that he had received some of the money he required, and was about to depart. It is true that he has two villages in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, and I understand that he has not done any injury to the

country. By a letter which I received from Colonel Stevenson last night I learn also that Jeswunt Rao has withdrawn from Aurungabad.

Colonel Stevenson is about sixty miles to the northward of Gardoon, nearly on the high road between Aurungabad and Hyderabad; and if Jeswunt Rao Holkar should really have retired from Aurungabad, the Colonel will not advance farther to the northward.

This advance of Colonel Stevenson's division for the protection of the Nizam's frontier, and the march of Dowlut Rao Scindiah from Burhampoor, render it absolutely necessary that I should move from hence in order that the two detachments may be so near as to be able to act in co-operation or join.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1559.]

To Major-General Nicholls.

DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 14th May, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 11th, and I now enclose the copy of one from Sir William Clarke of the 8th instant, by which it appears that we have but a small chance of getting the tonies, and we must therefore depend upon the pontoons which you propose to have made.

The tonies or pontoons will not answer unless they have all an equal capability of bearing weight. If one be larger than another, it is obvious that it will bear a weight which will sink a smaller one. The consequence would be that the bridge would be unsteady, and probably impassable by heavy bodies, such as iron guns. It might also happen that by the sinking of these smaller boats the beams and wood work might be destroyed. For all these reasons you will observe that a large and a small canoe or tony alternately will not answer; and that they must be all nearly of the same dimensions and capability of sustaining weight.

But it appears by your letter and Sir William Clarke's that tonies of the most approved dimensions cannot be procured, and those which can be procured at Goa and at Bombay are small and of different sizes. It may happen that upon trial

you may find that the small boats will bear a greater weight than we imagine they will; and if that should be the case, it may still be practicable to get at Bombay the number required of nearly equal sizes and capable of being used for a bridge. But if you should not be of opinion that the small boats will bear the necessary weight, and if you should not be able to get a sufficient number of nearly the same dimensions, I see no remedy excepting that the pontoons should be made at Bombay as soon as possible. I should imagine that the eighteen feet pontoon would answer perfectly, and, as it is broader, it is probable that it would support an equally great weight with the other. I preferred the longer canoe or tony, because I knew that the deficiency in these boats would be of breadth.

I wrote the memorandum upon the subject of the bridge of boats early in April, as soon as I saw a probability of a campaign in this country, and it is unlucky that it did not reach you at an earlier period. The rivers will fill between the 14th and 20th of June, and at that time we ought to have the bridge in order to be able to carry on the war in any style. Indeed, unless we have it, the Nizam's territories to the northward of the Godavery and those of the Peshwah must be much exposed, and, with all the expense incurred, nothing decisive can be done during the rains.

I should think that if all the hands in the marine yard were applied to this object only for the next fortnight or three weeks (and they cannot have a more important one), it might still be possible to supply the pontoons in good time. They ought to leave Panwell with all their equipments in three weeks at latest.

I intend, if possible, to go to Bombay to-morrow night, but I write to you at present lest anything should happen to detain me here, and I beg you to communicate this letter and its enclosure to Mr. Duncan.

I will keep you apprised of everything material that occurs; but as it frequently happens that I have not time to write, I must occasionally refer you to my letters to Mr. Duncan. If, however, we have no bridge, you may depend upon it that I shall have nothing to tell you excepting of the plunder of the Peshwah's and Nizam's countries.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*

[1560.] MEMORANDUM OF SUBJECTS ON WHICH THE PESHWAH IS TO BE PRESSED IN GENERAL WELLESLEY'S CONFERENCE WITH HIM.

14th May, 1803.

1. *Goklah.*

1st. Two or three lacs of rupees to be given immediately to Goklah to prevent his troops from disbanding.

2nd. Serinjaumy lands to be allotted and made over to him for the number of men that he may have, or the Peshwah may intend that he should keep.

3rd. That Noolgoond, which he at present holds under a sunnud from Pursheram Bhow, may be part of those lands.

2. *Putwurduns.*

1st. That these chiefs may be satisfied upon the different points stated in the memorandums received from them, and which have been forwarded to Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

2nd. That Major-General Wellesley may be authorized by the Peshwah to tell them that they may approach his person without fear, and that they may hope for his favour if they serve him with zeal and fidelity.

3. *Bappojee Vittel.*

1st. The pay of his party to be provided for.

4. *Appah Dessaye.*

1st. Serinjaumy lands to be allotted to this man for the pay of his party.

2nd. That he may be repaid sums of money which he has advanced to Bappojee Vittel, Eshwunt Rao Patukin, Rubram Chowdry, and Goklah, for the payment of their troops.

3rd. That he may be allowed to keep and may have a sunnud for the fort of Manowly and the lands belonging thereto, which were made over to him by Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*

5. *Vinchoor Kir.*

1st. That two or three lacs of rupees may be given to this

* This man was the first who joined, and he has always conducted himself well.

man, in order to pay the arrears of his troops and prevent them from disbanding.

2nd. That compensation should be given to this man in lands which are now productive for those parts of his jaghire, or serinjaum, which have been ceded to the Company under the late treaty.

3rd. Some of his connexions have been forced to join Holkar, as he says: a list of them will be produced, and he asks pardon for them.

6. *Kittoor Kir.*

1st. That the demands of the state upon this man should be clearly stated and definitively determined.

2nd. To whom he is to pay them, and at what periods.

3rd. That his claims and those of the killadar of Darwar upon the districts of Turkoor and others in dispute should be determined.*

7. *Richmajee Scindiah, son of Bappojee Scindiah, Killadar of Darwar.*

This young man came to Poonah as a security for his father's behaviour, and his party of horse are to be considered more in the light of a guard of honour than anything else.

1st. I promised that he should be allowed to return to his father as soon as the present service was concluded.

2nd. That Bappojee Scindiah's accounts may be examined and settled.

3rd. That he may be pardoned and left in command of the fort. That the lands allotted for the support of the garrison may be clearly ascertained.

8. *Madhoo Rao Rastia.*

1st. That this chief may be favourably received.

2nd. That compensation may be given to him for districts of which he was deprived, which are now held by Appah Dessaye near the Kistna, and by Ballojee Putwurdun near Loghur.

9. *Ball Kishen (Letchme or) Bhow.*

1st. That he may be employed as aumildar in the districts

* This man is very useful to us, and keeps the whole country quiet from the fort of Darwar and Hallihall in Soonda to the river Gutpurba.

which may belong to the Peshwah in the Darwar or Savanore countries, or in the Konkan.

2nd. That he may have an enaum from the government.

3rd. That he may have a serinjaum for 100 horse, which he has got.*

10. *Lingum Pundit.*

1st. That this man may have an enaum from the Sircar.†

11. *The Nabob of Savanore.*

1st. That his enaum of 50,000 rupees a year, which has been granted by the Peshwah, should be laid upon ascertained vil-lages, with which nobody but himself is to interfere.‡

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1561.]

To Major-General Nicholls.

DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 15th May, 1803.

Since I wrote to you yesterday, it has occurred to me that the dimensions for a pontoon, which you have taken from a French work, are in French measures, which are much larger than ours; and if the pontoon be made according to these dimensions in our measures, it will be considerably smaller than the author of the work could have intended.

I take the liberty of suggesting, therefore, that, after the pontoon of the French dimensions will have been made, it should be tried in respect to the weight it will bear in a strong tide way.

I find that it is impossible for me to go to Bombay as I intended; but I am convinced that you will see the importance of the bridge to our future operations, and that you will do everything in your power to forward it. If the people in the

* This man has been most useful and steady to our interests. He belongs to the Putwurdun family, and is their agent with General Wellesley, and has kept them in the right road.

† This man is Goklah's vakeel, and has kept him right. He is a clever, meddling fellow, and it would be highly useful to attach him to us. For this reason, Major-General Wellesley prevailed upon the Putwurdun to give him an enaum in Savanore in the year 1800, which, however, he lost in the subsequent troubles.

‡ It may be a question whether, as the Savanore country will fall to the English, the Nabob ought not to be provided for by us.

marine yard work hard, it ought to be ready by the time it will be wanted.

I have the honour, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1562.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 15th May, 1803.

I am sorry to tell you that I find I cannot go to Bombay as I intended. Business presses upon me so much here that it is impossible to move.

I have written fully to General Nicholls yesterday and this day regarding the bridge; that part of our equipment, and the iron and the wheels, I am exceedingly anxious about. If, besides these, I could get a little arrack, I should be satisfied; but they send me medicines and salt and gram, instead of the above-mentioned, which I have written are most necessary. If I want rice, salt, gram, or any thing else excepting iron, ordnance wheels, arrack, and salt provisions, and last of all medicines, I will send for them.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1563.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 16th May, 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 14th, and I am concerned you should have so much trouble and anxiety on account of my concerns. I am glad, however, that I mentioned to you what I heard, as although much may be untrue, and much exaggerated, it is certain that there has been a failure somewhere. You will be surprised to learn that the iron is not yet arrived, nor one public cooly, excepting with medicines.

Indeed Captain Young wrote on the 11th to the commissary of stores that he *would* send off the iron. Neither have any bullocks arrived excepting a few with gram and salt, which I did not want. I shall in future, in conformity to your wishes, confine my correspondence on the subject of the depôt to your-

self. I have heretofore written to some of the gentlemen concerned in the management of it in order to save you trouble. I see that a great mistake has occurred in the management of the depôt, in consequence of Colonel Close's letter to Captain Moor; but that is rectified now, and all will go on smoothly. I wish to have nothing more at Panwell than what was contained in my letter to the Secretary of Government of the 18th April, excepting kegs of spirits and of salt meat, ordnance wheels, and iron. I wish the two former to be increased as far as the commissary may have kegs, and that the latter may be sent to the full amount of my demand. I should be glad if the kegs of spirits and of salt meat, the iron and the wheels, may be sent up to me by means furnished at Bombay: if I want any of the other articles I will indent for them, and send carriages down according to my letter to the Secretary of Government.

I conclude that when you will have sent the treasure to Panwell you will have sent coolies to move it to this place. If you should not have done so, part of those 300 whom you mention to have been hired by Mr. Halliday may as well be employed in bringing it up; the remainder may bring up, half of them iron, and half of them kegs of spirits. Will you do me the favour to inform Captain Moor that the 1200 bullocks hired by Colonel Murray have taken back the 400 kegs filled with water, which they brought up filled with spirits?

When I first called for the wheels and the iron and timber, I sent Colonel Close the dimensions of each kind I wanted.

If I want any more medicines, I will indent or write for them, and they can then be sent by means furnished by Bombay.

In the fifth paragraph of Captain Moor's memorandum he mentions that he has sent 300 bullocks to Panwell, besides those intended for Colonel Murray's corps, and that people employed by him have purchased and hired some. If he has purchased those 300 first mentioned, in addition to those purchased at Panwell, I wish him to send them to me at this place. They ought to have packs and drivers according to my letter to you of January last, and they may bring up loads of arrack or salt meat, if these should be in readiness for them at Panwell; if not, they may bring up loads of rice.

It is extraordinary that, notwithstanding the number of

bullocks employed by Captain Young, viz., 1000, the only bullocks that have yet arrived are those hired by Colonel Murray, loaded with arrack, and 217 loaded with gram and salt: 202 coolies have come loaded with medicines.

My reason for inquiring whether your villages in Guzerat were surrounded with walls was, that I am certain if they were, the Mahratta horse would not be able to live in the country a week if your detachment of infantry were active.

I depend upon your 500 draught bullocks to draw the carriages of the pontoons at the end of the month: 100 coolies have come in loaded with salt provisions.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

[1564.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, Poonah, 18th May, 1803.

I have not written to you for some days past, as I could not give you any intimation of my intentions either military or political. I have received a letter from Captain Shawe, in which he informs me that the Governor-General intends to send me instructions: I have paused till I shall receive them. I conceive, however, that at the present moment it would be very useful to point out to Scindiah and to the Rajah of Berar, particularly to the latter, our military situation in this country.

The Peshwah has not yet written the letter to Scindiah of which I announced the intention in my letter to you of the 10th; but I believe that the draft of it is made, and will be shown to Colonel Close this evening. I rather doubt whether I shall write to that chief, although convinced of the propriety of the measure, till I shall receive the Governor-General's instructions, lest any steps should be taken not in conformity with his plan. At all events, I propose to move towards the Nizam's frontier immediately.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1565.]

To Major-General Nicholls.

DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 19th May, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 17th, and I am glad to see that you have commenced upon the pontoons. I have no doubt but that they will be furnished in time.

I observe in the memorandum or report which you have sent me of the trial of the tonies, that the baulks are only twelve feet long and four inches square. Those mentioned in my memorandum were to be twenty-two feet eight inches long, one foot wide, and four inches thick. Probably those of which you made the trial are not intended for the service hereafter; but I mention the subject at present lest there should have been any mistake.

Colonel Murray's detachment arrived this morning, and appears in very high order and well equipped.

I have the honour, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1566.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Dallas.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp at Poonah, 19th May, 1803.

I had not leisure to write to you yesterday as I intended, but I think it probable that this letter will reach you before you will have recovered your strength sufficiently to be able to give yourself any trouble on the subjects to which it relates.

The concerns which I have at Bombay at present are principally tumbril wheels and the bridge of boats. In respect to the former, I believe that if they are made as those are which are in use with Colonel Murray's corps, they will answer well. The naves will be unbored, and we shall have to bore them and fix them in the brass boxes to fit our iron axletrees.

In respect to the bridge of boats, there are several points to which I wish to draw your attention. It has been determined that we shall have pontoons, and these are now making in the dockyard at Bombay, and all the hands, I am informed, are employed upon them. The mode in which these pontoons will be fixed in the river will be from the head to a rope stretched

across it, having anchors or graplins carried out ahead of the rope; and by the stern to another rope stretched likewise across the river parallel to the first. It will be very necessary that the rings by which the heads and sterns of the pontoons will be fastened to the ropes should be strongly fixed in the woodwork; and I beg you to give a hint upon that subject, which may be the more necessary as the pontoons will be made in a hurry.

In regard to the carriage, you know that it is to be one on the principle of Roebuck's: It will be made from the axletrees and wheels of 6-pounder or 12-pounder carriages, connected by a perch. On each axletree there will be a bed on which the boat will lie with all its stores. It is obvious that the boat must be fastened on the beds on the axletrees by ropes, which will go from rings which must be in the gunwale of the pontoon (to fasten the bearers on when the bridge is laid) to others in the beds on the axletree. These must be substantial, well fixed, and there must be many of them.

I request you to ascertain the weight which each pontoon will be on its carriage, including all its stores; and let me know your opinion respecting the number of bullocks which will be required to draw each carriage. I have provided for only twelve to each carriage, but I can give more if they should be wanted.

I need say nothing respecting the construction of the carriages; you know better than I do how they ought to be made, and I request you to give such hints as you may think necessary regarding them.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp at Poonah, 21st May, 1803. [1567.]

Major-General Wellesley was in hopes that after Captain _____ had been released from his arrest, and admonished by order of the Commander-in-Chief in respect to his conduct towards his commanding officer, Colonel Chalmers, he would have cautiously avoided to offend him in future. It appears, however, in the instance recorded in the proceedings of the general court martial published herewith, that Captain _____ has forgotten, not only the respect which is due to his

immediate superior, but likewise the admonition and orders of the Commander-in-Chief of this army. He is hereby reprimanded.

Captain ——— is positively forbidden to write to his commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Chalmers, excepting on a subject which must be laid before the superior authorities of the army, and upon which a letter must be written according to the regulations.

Lieutenant-Colonel Chalmers is also requested not to receive any note or letter from Captain ———, excepting one upon such a subject as is above described. He is also requested to avoid writing to Captain ———. The communication between these officers ought to be verbal; and it is recommended generally to commanding officers of corps, brigades, &c., to adopt this mode of communication with the officers under their command, in preference to that by letter.

His Highness the Peshwah is to see the troops in line tomorrow morning. The whole will be under arms at a quarter before five o'clock, and prepared to move to the ground which they will have to take up, according to orders which Colonel Murray and the officers commanding brigades of cavalry and infantry will receive. Major-General Wellesley requests that they will be at his tent at that hour in the morning to receive those orders.

Colonel Murray will put his corps in motion before he quits his camp. They are to move from their left by the road which goes by the left of the 19th dragoons towards head quarters. The guns are to accompany the corps, and those in the park to be in the centre of the line of infantry. Colonel Murray's park is to be in its usual situation in his line. His tumbrils to be left in the camp.

The corps to parade as strong as possible. The piquets to join; but the quarter guards to stand fast. The tents of the piquet are to be struck in the morning at daylight and sent off the ground.

When His Highness the Peshwah shall approach the right of the line, a salute of nineteen guns is to be fired from the park of Major-General Wellesley's division. The corps are to present their arms. Officers to drop their swords by corps, and the regimental colour to be dropped, as His Highness shall pass each.

The music, trumpets, and drums to sound, and beat a march, when corps present arms.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Poonah, 23rd May, 1803. [1563.]

Major-General Wellesley requests the commanding officers of the regiments of cavalry to peruse the following memoranda, and to communicate them to their adjutants and such other officers as they may think proper.

1. When corps of cavalry act together, one corps is generally appointed the leading corps, and all are to conform to the movements of that corps, unless otherwise ordered. The leading corps may be altered, and all corps are to attend and follow the movements of that newly ordered as the leading corps. The rule applies equally whether they are in line or otherwise formed; but it is not intended that when a line is to be formed from column, or to change its front, all corps are to perform that operation in the same mode; each is to perform it in that mode in which it can be done with the greatest celerity combined with the greatest accuracy.

2. When a number of regiments are in column, either with the right or left in front, the formation into line may be either to the front or rear of the column, to its proper or reverse flank, or oblique to the line of march.

3. If the column be one with the right in front, and its formation is to be made to the front, each corps disengages from the general column as soon as the nature of the ground will admit, and goes to the left of the leading corps; the same mode is practised if the line is to be formed oblique to the line of march: in both these cases the adjutants of different regiments move out quickly as soon as they learn that the line is to be formed, and mark the ground on which the left of their corps is to stand; *vice versa* if the column be one with the left in front.

4. If the formation from a column with the right in front is to be made to the rear, all the corps in rear of that in which the line is to be formed are to lead out from the general column to their right; all the corps in front of that in which the line is to be formed are to lead out from the general column to their left. The adjutants of the corps in the rear are to take up the ground

on which their left is to stand ; those of corps in front are to take up the ground on which their right is to stand ; *vice versâ* if the column has its left in front.

5. If the line is to be formed from an open column with the right in front to the reverse flank, the corps follow their leaders, each wheeling up successively as it reaches its ground, and the adjutants are to mark the ground on which their left is to stand : *vice versâ* if the column is with the left in front.

6. When a column is marching upon an alignement, an object is generally given in front, on which the column is to march ; the adjutants of corps are to assist in keeping the column in its true direction, by placing themselves in the line and each waiting there, till the corps to which he belongs shall have passed him. The officers leading divisions in an open column, marching on an alignement on which the line is to be formed, are to go close to the horse's head of the adjutant who is marking the ground : a regiment is not to deviate partially from the alignement marked by its adjutant because the rear division of that in front of it may have done so.

7. When the line is to change its front and a new formation is to be made, all corps are to break towards that on which the new formation is to be made : if the corps be on the right, all the corps on the left break into an open column, with the right in front, and the adjutants are to mark the ground on which the left is to stand in the new line ; if the corps be on the left, all the corps on the right are to break into a column with the left in front, and the adjutant is to mark the ground on which the right is to stand.

8. The general rule is, that the corps, whether in forming line from column or in changing front from line, are to enter on the new line at the point marked for them by their adjutants, which is always where their rear will stand ; but as that is the mode of forming which takes most time, the practice is for each corps to enter the new line, either where its head is to stand, or in a central spot. The commanding officers must, in that case, take care to send forward a person to mark a true point in the line, at which he will enter, and to bring up the head of his regiment square to the proposed formation.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1569.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 24th May, 1803.

I enclose a return of more iron which will be wanted, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give orders that it may be sent.

In one respect it would certainly be convenient that the pontoons should have sharp prows, as they would make less opposition to the force of the water. But, on the other hand, boats of that construction do not bear so large a weight. Upon the whole, therefore, considering that they have been commenced according to the common plan, I think it will be best to continue them on it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

[1570.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp at Poonah, 24th May, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letters. Before this time you will have received the Governor-General's instructions of the 5th instant; the consequences of which will be either that Scindiah will not come to Poonah, or that if he should move this way we shall know what line we are to follow.

You have a fine field open for you; and if you should succeed, firstly, in drawing from Scindiah a declaration of his peaceable intentions, and secondly, in prevailing upon him to recross the Nerbudda as a proof of the reality of those intentions, you will deserve the thanks of your country.

I beg that you will tell Jeswunt Rao Holkar that I have no objection to his sending here a news writer. I will take care of the person he will send.

I have called upon Colonel Stevenson for an answer to the representation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah regarding the plunder of Chumargoonda, and I will send it to Colonel Close as soon as it will arrive.

Colonel Stevenson is now up at Puttun. I march in that direction in the course of a few days. I have been detained here for materials to repair some of my carriages; but these

are now arrived from Bombay, and I shall march in three or four days.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1571.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 25th May, 1803.

We have received from the shroff 56,000 rupees, that is to say 6000 on account of the second draft on him, and I have no doubt but that he will pay the whole amount. I don't know how he will get on hereafter, but I suspect that some time will elapse before confidence in the government at Poonah will be so far re-established as to induce the moneyed people to come forward with their cash.

The dollars also arrived last night, and the four boxes addressed to Colonel Murray have been delivered to his paymaster. It is necessary, however, that I should inform you that notwithstanding that by your accounts and Captain Moor's 300 coolies sent from Bombay, as well as others hired at Panwell, were employed in carrying these boxes of treasure, I was obliged to send out from camp my pioneers to meet the escort, as the officer complained of want of carriage; and after all, the treasure was brought in on the Peshwah's camels and on pressed carts. Besides this, I know that the servants and followers in the service of officers under my command were pressed to carry the treasure, having been met going down to Panwell for supplies for their masters; and I have in consequence been obliged to desire that Captain Young may send up the supplies for these officers.

I mention these circumstances because I observe that we suffer great disappointments, and great delays are the consequence of the failure of the coolies and others hired for the public service to do their duty; and I beg leave to recommend that, if these coolies who were employed in carrying the treasure in particular have given security for the performance of the service for which they have been paid, the amount of the security should be recovered from them, and that they may be punished.

In fact till some measure is adopted to secure the performance of the work for which hire is paid, either by coolies or cattle with their drivers, a vast expense will be incurred, nothing will be done, and you will be disappointed, notwithstanding all the trouble you take.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major-General Nickols.

[1572.]

DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 25th May, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 22nd, with its enclosure. The trial made at Bombay of the weight which a pontoon would bear must be decisive respecting the dimensions adopted by Captain Blackall, and I can have no objection to them. The baulks, also, must answer. But as the number of chesses, according to Captain Blackall's plan, will give a bridge of only 480 feet, and the principal river to be crossed in this country, viz. the Beemah, is 200 yards wide, I think that we ought to have two more chesses for each boat.

The baulks of seventeen feet long will probably allow of placing this additional number of chesses.

If the weight of the whole pontoon with its stores should be greater than the carriages can bear, we must of course have other carriages; but as the pontoon weighs only 800 pounds, and its anchor and graplin 100, I should hope that we may still be able to place everything on the same carriage. The gentlemen at Bombay must be the best judges of the practicability of this.

I am concerned to hear that you are not in good health, but I hope that the cool weather, which we may soon expect, will re-establish it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

[1573.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp at Poonah, 26th May, 1803.

It gives me great pleasure to have it in my power to send you an extract from a letter from Colonel Stevenson in answer

are now arrived from Bombay, and I shall march in three or four days

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1571.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 25th May, 1803.

We have received from the shroff 56,000 rupees, that is to say 6000 on account of the second draft on him, and I have no doubt but that he will pay the whole amount. I don't know how he will get on hereafter, but I suspect that some time will elapse before confidence in the government at Poonah will be so far re-established as to induce the moneyed people to come forward with their cash.

The dollars also arrived last night, and the four boxes addressed to Colonel Murray have been delivered to his paymaster. It is necessary, however, that I should inform you that notwithstanding that by your accounts and Captain Moor's 300 coolies sent from Bombay, as well as others hired at Panwell, were employed in carrying these boxes of treasure, I was obliged to send out from camp my pioneers to meet the escort, as the officer complained of want of carriage; and after all, the treasure was brought in on the Peshwah's camels and on pressed carts. Besides this, I know that the servants and followers in the service of officers under my command were pressed to carry the treasure, having been met going down to Panwell for supplies for their masters; and I have in consequence been obliged to desire that Captain Young may send up the supplies for these officers.

I mention these circumstances because I observe that we suffer great disappointments, and great delays are the consequence of the failure of the coolies and others hired for the public service to do their duty; and I beg leave to recommend that, if these coolies who were employed in carrying the treasure in particular have given security for the performance of the service for which they have been paid, the amount of the security should be recovered from them, and that they may be punished.

In fact till some measure is adopted to secure the performance of the work for which hire is paid, either by coolies or cattle with their drivers, a vast expense will be incurred, nothing will be done, and you will be disappointed, notwithstanding all the trouble you take.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major-General Nicholls.

[1572.]

DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 25th May, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 22nd, with its enclosure. The trial made at Bombay of the weight which a pontoon would bear must be decisive respecting the dimensions adopted by Captain Blackall, and I can have no objection to them. The baulks, also, must answer. But as the number of chesses, according to Captain Blackall's plan, will give a bridge of only 480 feet, and the principal river to be crossed in this country, viz. the Beemah, is 200 yards wide, I think that we ought to have two more chesses for each boat.

The baulks of seventeen feet long will probably allow of placing this additional number of chesses.

If the weight of the whole pontoon with its stores should be greater than the carriages can bear, we must of course have other carriages; but as the pontoon weighs only 800 pounds, and its anchor and graplin 100, I should hope that we may still be able to place everything on the same carriage. The gentlemen at Bombay must be the best judges of the practicability of this.

I am concerned to hear that you are not in good health, but I hope that the cool weather, which we may soon expect, will re-establish it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

[1573.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp at Poonah, 26th May, 1803.

It gives me great pleasure to have it in my power to send you an extract from a letter from Colonel Stevenson in answer

to one which I wrote him upon the subject of the reports in the *Northern Akbar* that his troops had burnt and plundered Chumargoonda, by which it appears clearly that that place was destroyed, not by his troops, but by some of Scindiah's new allies. I have not yet got Colonel Stevenson's official answer to my letter upon this subject, but in the mean time you may make use of the information contained in the enclosed paper.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1574.]

To the Adjutant-General, Bombay.

SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 26th May, 1803.

I have the honour to inform you that in consequence of the disturbances in Malabar, and of the very inefficient state of the corps of Native infantry in that province, and having had reason to believe that the surgeons were not so correct as they ought to be in granting certificates of sickness to officers requiring to absent themselves from their corps, and knowing that notwithstanding repeated orders from the Commander-in-Chief and the government of Bombay, officers did not return to their duty in Malabar at as early a period as they ought, I gave orders in the month of November last that no officer should have leave of absence from Malabar, even on account of sickness, excepting in very special cases, till the disturbances in that province should be quelled. Notwithstanding these orders Lieutenant _____ of the 2nd battalion 5th regiment has ventured to absent himself from the province of Malabar without leave, and he is now at Bombay. I beg that you will inform the Commander-in-Chief of these circumstances, and that you will lay before him my request that he will take such steps as he may think proper to bring Lieutenant _____ to a proper sense of his duty.

Lieutenant _____ transmitted to Colonel Montresor some time ago a certificate, stating that a voyage to sea was essentially necessary for his recovery. Colonel Montresor granted him permission to go to sea, on the express condition that he should not go to Bombay. The first newspaper, however,

brought the Colonel an account that Lieutenant _____ had arrived at Bombay, and he has obtained permission to go to Europe. It is possible that his health rendered it necessary that he should go to Bombay, and afterwards that he should go to Europe; but he ought to have apprised his commanding officer of this departure from the orders he had received, and the engagement into which he had entered. In case his health should be re-established I hope that the Commander-in-Chief will do me the favour to prevent his voyage to Europe, and that he will order him to join his corps forthwith.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To General Lake.

27th May, 1803.

[1575.]

SIR,

I send this letter only because it is referable to Lieutenant Sale.

The account you give of the state of Holkar's army is very satisfactory. I have served a good deal in this part of India against this description of freebooter, and I think that the best mode of operating upon such a one is to press him with one or more corps capable of moving with tolerable celerity, and of such strength as to render the result of an action by no means doubtful, if he should venture to risk one. There is but little hope, it is true, that he will risk an action, or that any one of these corps will come up with him. The effect produced by this mode of operation is to oblige him to move constantly and with great celerity. When reduced to this necessity, he cannot venture to stop to plunder the country, and he does comparatively but little mischief, at all events; the subsistence of his army becomes difficult and precarious; the horsemen become dissatisfied; they perceive that their situation is hopeless, and they desert in numbers daily; and the freebooter ends by having with him only a few adherents, and he is reduced to such a state as to be liable to be taken by any small body of country horse, which are the fittest troops to be then employed against him.

In proportion as the body of our troops to be employed against a freebooter of this description have the power of moving with celerity, will such freebooter be distressed. When even the

largest and most formidable bodies of them are hard pressed by our troops, the village people attack them, annoy their rear and their flanks, cut off stragglers, and won't allow a man to enter their villages; because their villages being in some degree fortified, they know well that the freebooters dare not wait the time which would be necessary to reduce them. When this is the case, all their means of subsistence vanish; no resource remains excepting to separate; and even this resource is attended by risk, as the village people cut them off on their way to their homes.

You will have been informed by Mr. Webbe that Colonel Murray has moved before this time.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I have great hopes that I shall be able to move and to make the siege of Chandore in the course of the month of June. Everything is ready. The troops have been clothed and equipped, and I wait only for a fall of rain to move thither.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1576.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 28th May, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 26th. From Captain Moor's memorandum on the subject of the road from Panwell to the foot of the Ghaut, and from thence on to Poonah, and from other accounts, I have been induced to form an opinion that the only difficulty during the monsoon would be the rivers at Choke and Kolapoor below the Ghaut, and the Indoorowny at Carnallah above the Ghaut, and the common difficulty of rainy weather. I have provided boats for the rivers, and as to the rain I have only to observe that it will create delay, and we must not attempt to travel the cattle when it rains very violently.

I am afraid to attempt the establishment of a dépôt on the top of the Ghaut. We should make no progress either in constructing the necessary buildings or in transporting thither the stores before the rains will commence; and the consequence of attempting it will be, that we should have fresh confusion and embarrassment. I therefore think it best to depend upon

Panwell; and although the rain and swelled rivers may occasion delay, we shall still get something.

I hope that Captain Moor is getting on with our draught and carriage bullocks. I depend upon the former to draw up the bridge.

We do all we can with the Peshwah, but he is very slow and undecided, and has but little authority over his people.

There is a report that Holkar is going to take a gallop into the Guzerat country. I doubt it however, as in the first place he is going without guns, and in the next, I have intelligence that he is going into Hindustan.

The idea of the confederacy appears to have gone by, and Scindiah and Holkar have certainly not made peace; and the meeting between Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had not taken place on the 22nd.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1577.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 29th May, 1803.

I have been talking to Colonel Close upon the subject of the boats to be placed on the rivers at Choke and Kolapoor, and he is of opinion, in which I agree, that it would be best to send the boats from Bombay, and to have an establishment on those rivers belonging to the government of Bombay. I have therefore to request that you will be so kind as to give orders that four boats may be placed on each of these rivers, with the requisite number of boatmen, &c., in order to keep up the communication with Panwell during the rains. It is unnecessary to point out to you all the requisites for these establishments, but it is desirable that they should be formed before the rains set in (the 14th of June), and that a shed for the boatmen should be constructed on each river.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.,

[1578.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

30th May, 1803, 4 P.M.

Appah Dessaye has just sent to me to say that he wishes to call here to-morrow, and to take his leave; that they are doing nothing for him, &c. &c. Will you do me the favour to mention this to Ragonaut Rao? He is really one of the most deserving men I brought here: he was the first that joined; and, if something be not done for him, I cannot pretend to stop him.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1579.]

MEMORANDUM ON AHMEDNUGGUR FORT.

June, 1803.

The pettah of Ahmednuggur has forty bastions, or round towers: eight of them are large, with two guns in each; the remainder have only loopholes.

1000 Arabs are in this pettah; and 1000 sepoy in white jackets, with five brass guns, smaller than our 6-pounders, commanded by three French officers, a little dark-coloured, and who wear blue clothes, are encamped on the south side of the town. They have twelve one-pole tents, and the rest of their tentage are only palls.

There are twelve gates, without any detached works for defence. The walls are of mud, about 10 feet high, and no ditch.

The fort is a gun-shot to the eastward of the pettah. It appears to be round, with twenty-four bastions, one large gate, and three small sally ports. It has a glacis, no covered way; a ditch, revetted with stone on both sides, about 18 feet wide, with 9 feet water all round, which only reaches within 6 or 7 feet of the top of the scarp; long reeds grow in it all round. The berm is only about one yard wide. The rampart is of black hewn stone; the parapet of brick in chunam, and both together appeared from the crest of the glacis to be only as high as the pole of a field-officer's tent. The bastions are all about $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet higher; they are round. One of them mounts eight guns en barbet: it points to the eastward; all the rest have jingies, four in each. Two guns are visible now in each bastion, and 200

are said to be ready in the fort to be mounted, with abundance of powder and ball.

The gate fronts the pettah, and is defended by a small half-circular work, with one traverse and several little towers for men. There is a wooden bridge over the ditch, which may be taken away in time of war, but has not the machinery of a drawbridge. A man of the pettah gave information of an iron trough as large as the bridge, which they place upon it, or on the supporters of it, and fill with charcoal or other combustibles, to which they set fire when an enemy approaches.

There are 3000 men in the fort, some with matchlocks, called carnatickee; the rest have firelocks. The men are of all castes and countries in India, Mussulmans and Hindoos; but none of them are Arabs.

500 horse are encamped at Nuggur, along with the sepoy, and 1500 near the fort, principally round the gate. There are two large stacks of forage near the horse, and two more on the other side.

A small river comes from the northward, round the west side of the pettah, and passes to the southward of the fort. A nullah also passes from the northward, between the fort and a town called Bingar, about a gun-shot to the eastward, and joins the river. There is a little hill or rising ground close to and east of Bingar, from which shot may reach the fort.

Two mills or covered aqueducts come from the hills, a mile or more to the northward, pass through and supply the pettah of Nuggur and town of Bingar, and then go into the fort, either under or through the ditch, into which the waste water afterwards falls.

There are no passages across the ditch from the sally ports, and no part of the aqueducts appears above the ditch. The nullah above mentioned passes within 60 yards of the fort; the aqueduct from Bingar passes under it. Its banks are a little steep; and there is no particular road over it between the fort and Bingar.

There are many small pagodas and mosques round Nuggur and the fort, but none exactly between, or between the fort and Bingar, or nearer to the fort than those towns.

[1580.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 2nd June, 1803.

I am very anxious respecting the movement of the bridge from Panwell, upon which subject I have yet heard nothing. Colonel Dallas informed me that Lieutenant Goodfellow was to make trial upon the island of Bombay of the number of bullocks which would be required to draw one carriage, but I have seen no report of this trial.

I intended that the 500 draught bullocks which I requested you to order for me should be employed on this service, and as you intimated that they would be ready by the end of May, I conclude that they will be forthcoming at Panwell on the 8th of June. Besides this number I intend to send down from hence all the draught cattle attached to Colonel Murray's corps. The whole number will draw the bridge in great style. These bullocks will be at Panwell by the 8th.

I march from hence on the 4th. Since my arrival here I have made 150 new wheels, and they have had their tires put on since the iron arrived from Bombay.

I have drawn upon your government this day for 10,000 rupees in favour of a soucar at Poonah, who promises to supply one lac of rupees in every month. However, from the Peshwah down to the lowest cooly in the bazaar at Poonah, there is not a Mahratta on whom it is possible to rely that he will perform any engagement into which he enters, unless urged to the performance by his fears. I doubt, therefore, this soucar. But it is proper that I should inform you that it is rumoured in the bazaar that you don't pay in specie the bills drawn upon you, but that you give treasury notes. This is one cause of the great backwardness which we have experienced on the part of the Poonah soucars; and if they should find the report to be well founded, we shall get no money at all from them.

Could you give me an authority to draw upon Benares?

It is reported that Holkar is going to levy four rupees upon Guzerat.* If you have all your troops in that quarter in the field, and they are well supplied with tents and provisions, well equipped, and have all the necessary means of moving, and they

* *Four* is a cant term among the Mahrattas, used to signify an indefinite number. "Four rupees" is a common expression. See *Kaye's Malcolm*, vol. i. p. 183.

are well commanded, and show a determined countenance, Holkar will not dare to go into that country; but I will give him a hint upon the subject.

I think that the boasted confederacy is now subsiding into a plan to bully the Peshwah out of his lands in Guzerat; but that plan won't answer.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1581.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 3rd June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 1st, with its enclosures, and I am glad to find that the pontoons are getting on so well. I wish that I could receive Lieutenant Goodfellow's opinion regarding the number of bullocks that will be required to draw the bridge. But it appears that those I have sent down (280 trained bullocks belonging to Colonel Murray's corps), and those procured by Captain Moor, and of which he has a prospect, will answer well.

Captain Moor is mistaken regarding the rivers in the Konkan. Those I have mentioned to you are impassable for four months during the rains.

There is no harm in having halting places on the road between Poonah and Panwell, but there ought not to be a permanent depôt.

I conclude that you have written to Colonel Close respecting the impediments you meet with on the part of the Peshwah's servants, and I therefore have said nothing to him on the subject.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp at Poonah, 3rd June, 1803. [1582.]

The detachment to march to-morrow by the left, baggage on the left; the *general* to beat at four, and the assembly at five o'clock; the cavalry to form the advance, followed by the new piquets; the park and the wheel carriages, and the provision

department, to follow the line; the piquets now on duty to form the rear guard. The 78th regiment is to be in the 4th brigade.

While rice continues at the high price which it bears at present in the bazaar at Poonah, Colonel Murray is authorised to issue to each Native officer, non-commissioned officer, drummer, fifer, and rank and file, one half of a pucca seer, *per diem, gratis*, and in this allowance gun lascars are included, but not store lascars. When rice shall fall in price, Colonel Murray is ordered to apprise Major-General Wellesley thereof, and he shall then receive further orders.

In consequence of the representation made to the Commander-in-Chief of the great scarcity of green grass, and the dearth of dry hay upon the arrival of the troops at Poonah, his Excellency has been pleased to give his consent to a charge being made, upon honour, for the extra forage purchased for the troop horses, when the corps were under those circumstances of difficulty, which is not to exceed a fanam and a half for each horse daily.

The forage purchased on the 20th and 21st April has been already paid for; that purchased from the 22nd to the 28th April, inclusive, shall now be paid for according to the principle above stated. After the 28th, as the followers of the army generally procure forage without difficulty, the grass cutters of the army ought to have provided what may be requisite for the horses. Officers commanding troops to make out an account, to be countersigned by commanding officers of regiments, and it is then to be paid by the general agent of cavalry supplies.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1583.] G. O.

Camp at Charowly, 4th June, 1803.

On marching days the bheesties and puckalies are to be warned to be ready on the reverse flank of their companies when the regiments fall in. The doolies are to march at the same time with the regiments, and at such a distance as to be within call.

Detail for piquets of the different corps of infantry consists of 1 subaltern, 2 serjeants, 1 drummer, and 40 rank and file: the subaltern officer marches his piquet from the flank from which the line marches at the beating of the *general*, and is posted by the adjutant of the day.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

[1584.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp near Charowly, 4th June, 1803.

I marched from Poonah this morning, and I shall continue my marches towards the river Godavery. Colonel Stevenson has crossed that river at Puttun.

I have just received your letter of the 30th of May, and Colonel Close has sent me that which you have transmitted to him of the same date. I am concerned that Scindiah should not have given you at once the answer which I think he will give you in the end.

I observe that in the 16th paragraph of the note of instructions to you, the Governor-General requires that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should instantly explain himself without reserve; but instead of making this explanation, he tells you that when he will meet the Rajah of Berar he will let you know whether it is to be peace or war. That very answer might justify an immediate attack upon Scindiah's possessions; but when it is connected with the probable delay of the arrival of the Rajah of Berar, and of the proposed meeting (which, after all, I believe will never take place), it appears to be absolutely necessary that there should be some farther explanation, or that, at all events, Dowlut Rao Scindiah should be called upon to fix the time at which he will give the asked for explanation. You will observe that I am directed to regulate my conduct in conformity to the instructions to you and to Colonel Close; but it is obvious that unless I am to consider Dowlut Rao Scindiah's delay to explain himself as a refusal, I cannot act; and unless he is called upon to fix the time when he will give his explanation, we shall be obliged to remain in the situation which we ought particularly to endeavour to avoid, viz. with armies in the field incurring all the expense and inconvenience of war, without any of its honours or advantages.

You will observe that the object of all the Governor-General's instructions is to bring the question to a speedy decision, and to break up the army in this quarter. The necessity of this becomes more evident when we reflect upon the intelligence of the 11th of March received from Europe last night, from which it appears that there is a probability of the renewal of the war with France.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1585.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Bardoly, north of the Beemah,
5th June, 1803.

I marched from Poonah yesterday, and shall continue my marches towards the Godavery.

I am very anxious to have the carriage bullocks respecting which I wrote to you, or as many of them as are ready; but the first object must be of course to complete the number of draught cattle required for the bridge. I shall be obliged to you if you will give a warning to Captain Moor to send people with the cattle who will take care to feed them.

I have just received your letter of the 3rd. It is not probable that Holkar, or any body of cavalry, will venture into the Konkan during the rains. I have heard a report of this design upon the lower country, but I give no credit to it.

I have no objection to basket boats upon the rivers, but I proposed common boats because I know you have them at Bombay, and people who can work them. You will have to make the baskets, and when made they are difficult to work. We could make the baskets at Poonah, but we can get no people there to carry them down the Ghauts.

Mr. Anderson is mistaken regarding the capacity of these boats; they ought not to be larger than ten feet diameter, and of course will not hold fifty people; and as common boats are upon almost all the rivers, I conclude that they could be worked with advantage upon those in the Konkan.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1586.] G. O.

Camp at Bardoly, 5th June, 1803.

As the rainy weather may be expected, the officer commanding the 74th regiment will indent for a captain's tent for the use of the hospital of that corps; and the officer commanding the 78th regiment will indent for a field officer's tent for the same use. These officers will also indent for lascars, bamboo coolies, and carriage bullocks for those tents.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Malcolm.

[1587.]

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp, 6th June, 1803.

I return your letters, and I am much obliged to you for the perusal of them. I am glad to see that our conduct in this quarter is approved of.

It is very desirable that you should bring on the chiefs, and I hope that you will succeed in your negotiations: but prevail upon them to hasten a little, as otherwise the Beemah will fill, and they will find it difficult and tedious to cross that river.

I have no forage yet; but I have hopes that I shall find some forward. We make very short marches, and our weather is delightful. If I could get a little food for the cattle, I should be easy.

My news from Holkar's camp is that he is in the greatest distress for forage and grain; that he feeds his horses upon the leaves of mango trees, and has lost several. The hircarrah who brought this intelligence left the camp on the 1st, and said that he had met an hircarrah on the road, who was bringing an account of the death of the Rajah of Berar. I told the man that this story was not known in Scindiah's camp on the 30th May, but he insisted upon its truth.

Tell the Colonel that I am very anxious to receive the translations of the news given by his Malabar news writer.

I enclose a paper from the soubahdar of Aurungabad. Look over it, and see whether it is deserving the trouble of giving it a translation.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1588.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp north of the Goor River, 9th June, 1803.

I have received your letter, and I am much obliged to you for the details it contains. I imagine that you have been misinformed respecting the number of bullocks required for the boats. Lieutenant Goodfellow writes that they will require many more than the 500.

I am very anxious to have the 2000 carriage bullocks for which I asked you.

Unless we should have a general Mahratta war, I don't apprehend that Guzerat is in any danger, particularly when the rains will set in. I shall pay as much attention as I can to the interests and safety of Guzerat, but you know that defensive war does not answer, particularly in this country. Offensive operations may draw me away from that province, and it may be liable to be plundered by the enemy.

I heard that the 65th had marched from Surat, and their destination appears well calculated to cover your new acquisitions. But I am told that this corps have no tents, and are otherwise badly equipped. If this be true, that corps will in a short time be worse than useless in the position allotted to them, or indeed in any other. They are a new corps, and it is unfortunate that the committee at Surat did not send out either the 75th, or the part of the 84th stationed in that city, particularly if they could not afford tents for them.

I advert to this circumstance because I know that the European troops cannot be long fit for service if they go without tents or their proper provisions. It is better by far that their march should be delayed till they can have their necessary equipments than that they should go without them. I enclose an indent for more iron wanted.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1589.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

Camp north of the Goor River,
9th June, 1803.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

I have received your letter of the 4th, for which I am much obliged to you. I was about to write to you to suggest that you should have a communication with the Rajah of Berar, and I am happy to observe that you have determined to adopt this measure. I have seen a copy of the letter from the Governor-General to the Rajah, which I think very strong, and well calculated to make an impression in our favour. However, that which is best calculated to make an impression in our favour is our strength in all quarters combined with our moderation. It is true that Mahrattas in general will not give credit to professions of moderation from those who have strength to

be otherwise; but our forbearance for many years past ought to convince them that this quality does really exist in the British nation.

I don't think it possible for the combined Mahrattas now to make any impression upon the Company or their allies, excepting, perhaps, on those of the Nizam's territories which are on the other side of the Godavery. But Colonel Stevenson has crossed that river, and has my directions to secure Aurungabad with a good garrison and a faithful killadar; and I think that neither Scindiah nor the Rajah of Berar will like to venture into His Highness's territories to meet Colonel Stevenson.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1590.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 10th June, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 7th. I hope that Captain Blackall is mistaken in his calculation of the number of bullocks that will be required to draw a pontoon carriage. He makes his calculation upon the datum of an iron 12-pounder, which he calculates to be of the weight of 33 cwt. Those which I have in camp are of 32 cwt., and are drawn by forty bullocks.

I understand that the pontoon, with its equipment, weighs about one ton, upon which weight the calculation of the number of cattle required ought to be made.

If the weight of the carriage of the pontoon be thrown into the calculation, it is obvious that the weight of the carriage of the 12-pounders ought to be so likewise, otherwise the datum for the calculation of the number of bullocks required to draw a pontoon will not be a fair one. But at all events calculations of the number of cattle required to draw a certain weight on a particular carriage, founded upon the number required to draw another weight upon another carriage, are in general very erroneous. Experiment is the only mode of ascertaining the number required, and for this reason I requested Colonel Dallas to urge Lieutenant Goodfellow to place a pontoon on its carriage with all its equipments, and to see what number of

ordinary bullocks would move it with ease. He told me he had done so.

Upon the idea that the whole weight of the pontoon, &c., would be 12 cwt., I imagined that twelve bullocks would draw each carriage; but it has amounted to more than one ton, and I should think that at least twenty bullocks will be required for each carriage. However, I can say nothing positive: experiment alone can ascertain the number required.

If 20 bullocks are required for each carriage, 800 bullocks will be required for the whole, and there ought to be besides about 100 spare. I have sent down 280 of Colonel Murray's, which, with 500 you have provided, will make 780. But I observe that Captain Moor expected to have many more draught bullocks, and therefore there will be no difficulty in procuring the additional number which will be necessary, on the notion of 20 being requisite for each carriage, or even if more should be necessary.

I am very anxious to hear something respecting the carriage cattle for which I asked you, viz., 2000. I take this opportunity, however, of requesting you to give orders to the gentlemen in charge of this department, under the Bombay government, to take effectual measures to have the cattle fed and attended to on their march to join me. You will scarcely believe that, notwithstanding the expensive and liberal establishment on which your cattle are at Bombay, I was not able to choose 1000 fit for service out of all the carriage bullocks that Colonel Murray had with him, although he had been in a country abounding with forage, and the cattle have an allowance of grain. He marched about 70 miles to Poonah, and I marched 600, and really I did not suffer a greater loss of cattle in proportion.

I have to observe that the Madras system of carriage cattle is miserable to an extreme; the cattle are hired at five rupees a month a head, and are generally half starved before they march, and are never frightened with the sight of grain. This, compared with your liberal system, is terrible; and I must say that the gentlemen in charge of the cattle are highly to blame, if you have not all the advantage of the service of good and efficient cattle in your military operations after having adopted it.

If means be not taken to secure the cattle receiving the food

allowed, the forage bought for them, and the attendance paid for, all the expense of the purchase and subsequent feed and attendance of the cattle is entirely thrown away, and it would be much better to do nothing.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1591.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 11th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 8th.

I do not understand what business the Military-Board can have with your appointment of Captain Moor to supply the articles required by General Stuart and me. That Board are subordinate to government, under whose directions they are obliged to act in every possible case. The Military Board are so far from being officers of supply, that they are, and ought to be, the checks employed by government on the officers of supply, and the quantity and quality of the supplies they furnish under the orders of government.

I cannot give an opinion whether any other mode of supplying the articles I wrote for would have answered better; but I am perfectly satisfied with the supplies which have been furnished by Captain Moor: they could not have been of a better quality, and they have been far more ample in quantity than under circumstances I required or could carry away. Besides, I know that they have been procured at a period when Bombay laboured under great distress and many consequent disadvantages, and therefore I conclude that Captain Moor must have used extraordinary exertions to procure all that he has got. I have complained to you occasionally of delay, but not in Captain Moor's department. I rather believe that the delays of which I complained originated in a department with which Captain Moor had no concern whatever.

So far in answer to your letter of the 8th.

As, however, I am in the habit of taking the liberty of writing you my opinions upon all subjects, I am going to do it again upon one connected with that upon which you have written to me.

I am not acquainted with your Commander-in-Chief, or with his character; but it appears to me that he has been very ill treated by the government at home, and that he has been sent to conduct the duties of a very arduous situation, which has been clipped of its honours and of its substantial power (to say nothing of its emoluments). There is no man in the army who is not aware of this, and it is not possible that, under such circumstances, General Nicholls can command either their respect or their ready obedience.

It is my opinion that an officer who is sent to command troops in this country, particularly the Bombay army, ought to be in the very highest situation under the government, and at all events ought to be known to possess their full confidence in all matters relating to his own profession. If the gentlemen at home do not feel this truth, or, feeling it, do not act accordingly merely to save a little money, that is no reason for which you should not, as far as depends upon you, remedy their errors.

You can do this by placing the fullest confidence in the Commander-in-Chief of your troops (supposing him always to deserve it); and by upholding his authority and opinion upon all occasions.

With this view I would recommend it to you, whenever you have determined upon the political expediency of any military measure, to acquaint your Commander-in-Chief with your sentiments forthwith, and call upon him to give his opinion in detail regarding the force which will be required, the mode of collecting that force, and its operations, in order to carry your object into execution. He ought also to acquaint you with the nature and extent of the equipments, provisions, supplies, &c., of different kinds which the troops will want upon the proposed service. After having done this it will remain with you to give your own orders regarding the different objects suggested by him, recollecting always that he or any other military man has no right, such as the Military Board now claims, to make contracts for furnishing supplies independent of the power of government. I mention this subject not from any desire to push forward General Nicholls, with whom I have no acquaintance, or any desire but the good of the service.

It is easy to foresee that with your territory and your connections to the northward, and with the establishment of the

subsidiary force at Poonah, your military operations will increase vastly. I don't like the mode in which they go on now. Every thing appears to be a scramble for money, nobody is responsible, and the Commander-in-Chief is indifferent.

It is not possible that you can have a knowledge of all the details into which it is necessary to enter to equip a body of troops properly for the field in this country, or that, having that knowledge, you should have time to enter into them. What is the consequence? Your troops take the field without the common necessaries for the service, they become sickly, a vast expense is incurred, and nothing is done. Introduce your Commander-in-Chief into your military affairs, make him give his opinion, throw the details into his hands, and make him responsible for them, and if your military operations do not go on as they ought, you know who to blame.

On the other hand, if your officers of supply do not do their duty, for his own sake he will apprise you of their neglect. By these means not only your military operations will be effectual, but you will raise to his proper situation the gentleman who is at the head of your army, and you will relieve yourself from a detail of business which must embarrass you.

You see that I have written my opinion with great freedom. I hope that you will attribute it to my real motive, a wish that the service may go on well, and that you will excuse it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

13th June, 1803. [1592.]

The detachment will halt to-morrow. The field officer of the day will be pleased to post men of the companies of Native infantry on piquet in the rear of the encampment every evening. The companies will encamp on the principal roads or commanding grounds, and detach small guards, so as to cover the whole rear: they are to prevent any person or persons from coming into or going out of camp during the night, without the parole and countersign, unless they may be known to belong to camp, or are bringing letters.

The advance piquet to cover the front, and the standard and

quarter guards of corps on the right and left of the flanks of the encampment in the same manner.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1593.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Angah, 14th June, 1803.

I received last night your letter of the 9th. The return of the cattle procured which you have sent me is rather unfavourable, and it is unlucky that I should be disappointed in the expectations which, from your letters, I entertained of having 2000 carriage cattle as well as the 500 draught at the end of May. It appears that there will not be even the 500 necessary to move the bridge, much less the number which from Captain Moor's report there was reason to expect.

I reported to you the state of Colonel Murray's cattle on his arrival at Poonah. His corps could not even have marched back to Bombay if that measure had been necessary.

I have made all my arrangements in this quarter in such manner as that the accounts of all stores, &c. &c., received from you will be referable to the government of Bombay, and will be passed by the officers and boards under that government. In a day or two I shall send you the orders which I have issued upon these subjects for your approbation.

My reason for adopting these arrangements is, that I am aware that many expenses attend the formation of these depôts and the transport of stores on this side of India which are not known on the eastern coast; and the officers under your government would be exposed to a very troublesome and useless investigation and defence of their accounts in the offices at Madras. Of course the expense of the expedition to Poonah may stand upon the accounts of any government as may be thought expedient, but I recommend that in the first instance all expenses incurred by the officers of your government should be passed in your offices, and that afterwards the amount of the whole expense should be transferred. In this mode the settlement of the accounts will be very simple and easy.

I have no doubt whatever of the disaffection of the soubahdar

of Aurungabad, that he brought Holkar there, and that he might have defended and saved the place if he had thought proper. The whole of the family of that soubahdar is likewise suspected of disaffection to the Nizam's government. But it is no business of mine to inquire whether they are guilty or not; it is sufficient that the Nizam's government have expressed a wish that they should be removed from the situation of trust which they hold, and I must use the force which I have to gratify those wishes if circumstances should permit it.

I have seen your letter of the 10th and its enclosures to Colonel Close. He has told you what is the fact, that without my bridge or cattle my marching to the Attavesy is a joke. Before now you must know whether Holkar has really entered those districts or not. I suspect he has not, for the following reasons:—Firstly: because Scindiah's officer would not have given up Parchole and Bulsaur on the day that Holkar descended the Ghaut. Supposing that Scindiah and Holkar have not made peace, as it is stated they have, that officer must have known that Holkar's arrival must create confusion, during the existence of which he would still hold his districts. Secondly: it is very improbable that Holkar's troops would not have ill-treated the officer of the 86th; and supposing that twelve horsemen were prevented from hurting him by the sight of five soldiers, it is still more improbable that they should say they belonged to Holkar if they really did. Thirdly: it is far more probable that they belonged to Scindiah, and were of the very party which had that day given up Bulsaur; and very probably they were posted on the road for the express purpose of impeding the communication between Mr. Inglis and Surat. Fourthly: there is every reason to believe that if Holkar descended the Ghaut on the 5th with his army, the Native who wrote on the 5th that he was gone off towards Dhar could not have been so far deceived. Fifthly: if he had come down the Ghaut on the 5th, the gentlemen of Surat would surely have known of his approach; at all events they must have known of his actual descent on the morning of the 6th; and as an officer who left Surat on that morning reached Mr. Inglis on that evening, they might have conveyed the intelligence to that gentleman, if not to Bombay.

I know also that Holkar had not quitted the neighbourhood

of Chandore on the 2nd. Upon the whole, therefore, I have strong hopes that this intelligence is at least premature.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1594.]

To Major Malcolm.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp, 15th June, 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 14th, regarding our taking possession of the districts ceded to us to the southward. My opinion is that we have been premature in taking possession of those in Guzerat, and we shall be so if we now take possession of those in Savanore.

You have stated one reason for forbearing to take possession of them, and have proved that it no longer exists; but you have not considered another, viz. the want of force. It is agreed that General Stuart's army ought not to be broken, and that he ought to remain in strength in his position at Moodgul; but unless that force is broken up, or these troops march back, where are the forces to take possession of Savanore? I object positively to any diversion of our force to any object whatever till we know what is to become of the supposed confederacy to the northward. When we know how that stands, I don't care what becomes of the troops: they may be employed in any manner that may be thought proper.

You desire me to call upon the Putwurduns and Goklah for orders to their troops to evacuate the districts. In the first place, I did not know that those chiefs had left Poonah; and in the next, you and Colonel Close have not fixed what districts the Company are to have. The first question upon this point is, what districts are in Savanore and Bancapoor, and what not? and the next is, which of the districts in those two talooks the Company are to have.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

17th June, 1803. [1595.]

If the day continue fair, officers commanding corps will be so good as to order the tents to be struck for an hour, in order that the ground may dry before the men go to sleep upon it.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1596.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 18th June, 1803.

I have received your letters of the 12th and 13th.

I have reason to believe that Holkar, with the main body of his army, has crossed the river Taptee. Some Pindarries may be in Guzerat, south of that river, but I think it not probable that they belong to this chief. There are various reports of his intentions: some that he intends to invade Guzerat north of the Taptee, others that he is going to join Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; others that he is going to the Holkar territory north of the Nerbudda. I suspect that the last is his plan. I think that the worst of the confederacy is, that it will encourage rebels and freebooters to rise in all parts of the territories of the Company and their allies, particularly in Guzerat and in the Nizam's territories, if His Highness should now die.

You may depend upon it that you will have Mulhar Rao on your shoulders, as well as other pretenders, after the rains, if our present threats and negotiations do not keep matters smooth. The Guickwar government ought therefore to be prepared for their defence, and you should have a light corps to the southward of the Nerbudda to watch the enemy's motions in the upper country.

You say very truly that our allies lay on us the labouring oar. Indeed, I judge from their conduct that they think that when once they have put the seal to a treaty with us, they have nothing to do but to amuse themselves and sleep. Not one of them, excepting the Rajah of Mysore, has given us the smallest assistance in the present undertaking: on the contrary, the weakness of their governments is what now weighs heaviest upon us.

I observe by the summary of the proceedings regarding the 65th regiment, that they were sent off from Surat in a hurry,

and it is probable the information I sent you regarding their having taken the field without tents was well founded. Indeed there was a letter from one of the officers giving that information.

I enclose you an extract of a letter from Captain Young to Colonel Murray on the subject of the draught bullocks.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1597.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp near Angah, 18th June, 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 9th, and I am much concerned that my letter of the 4th should have given you any uneasiness. It appeared to be probable, at the moment I wrote it, that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar would never meet; and under that notion, which I see was erroneous, I suggested to you the propriety of urging Scindiah to name a day on which he should give his answer to your inquiries. I am of opinion that you pressed him as hard as was possible, and that a Mahratta durbar only could have withheld an answer at that time. I hope that before now the wished-for private meeting will have taken place, and that you will have had an opportunity of pressing Scindiah for an explanation. It is very desirable that we should know at an early period how we stand.

I enclose a letter for General Lake which has been sent to me, and I shall be obliged to you if you will forward it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1598.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 22nd June, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letters of the 14th, 15th, and 18th. I have nothing further to say upon the subject of the situation of the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay. I heard what I wrote to you from good authority, I might say the very best that the nature of the case would admit of; and

as I had been in the habit of communicating with you for the benefit of the service without reserve, I apprised you of my sentiments upon this subject.

Before I had received your letter of the 15th Fucker u Deen's brother had been dismissed from his situation at Aurungabad; and he is, by desire of the Nizam, to be sent to Hyderabad. The knowledge of this circumstance, in which it was not possible for the British government to interfere, may decide Fucker u Deen towards our cause. Indeed he also is to be dismissed from his situation at Perinda.

We have no ground of quarrel whatever with Holkar that I know of, excepting the plunder of Aurungabad, in which I have no doubt that Sudder u Deen participated. Holkar has certainly passed the Taptee, and we don't know that he has joined the confederacy. On no other ground than that can he be considered as our enemy. It does not appear, therefore, that we require any peace maker to go between us. However, I am of opinion that one great fault of which we have been guilty in the negotiations to prevent the confederacy, has been that we have omitted to keep up a communication and intercourse with Holkar, whom I consider as the most formidable of the three supposed confederates. I endeavoured to remedy this fault as soon as I arrived at Poonah, and proposed to Holkar to send him a gentleman; but he was at that time on his plundering plan in the Nizam's territories, and in his answer he pretended not to understand the meaning of my proposition. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the sooner we remedy this fault the better; and I should not object much to any channel by which we might obtain so desirable an object. But I don't like the communications through third persons: they never lead to any thing but inaction on our part, and give room for every kind of intrigues. If Fucker u Deen has any proposition to make of a mode by which the peace between Holkar and the Honourable Company can be preserved, he is an old servant of the Company's, and in constant communication with you, and he ought to come forward and make it, and to state his authority and his reasons for believing that the mode which he proposes will have the desired effect. On the ground of such a communication some steps can be taken, the business can be put in some kind of shape, we can see what prospect there is of getting it forward, and its future progress; but these second

and third hand communications are always intrigues, and lead to disasters.

I have no complaint to make of Captain Spens; on the contrary, I believe him to have paid every attention to the cattle. There is, however, a fault somewhere. I inspected the remains of the chosen thousand of the Bombay bullocks this morning, and I declare that I never saw such spectres. There never were such cattle with troops.

I have not yet drawn upon Bengal for any money.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1599.]

To Major Malcolm.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp, 22nd June, 1803.

I enclose the letter I received from the Secretary of Government at Fort William regarding the remuneration to the Rajah of Koorg, which contains, I believe, the instructions to the government of Fort St. George on this subject. Let the papers be copied which you require, and return the packet.

I am sorry to find the Putwurdun so backward. It is strange that, in proportion as the sirdars of the Mahratta state demonstrate a disinclination to come forward on the present service, they advance in the Peshwah's favour. I see by the ackbars that Chintomeny Rao, in particular, is now the constant companion of the Peshwah and his brother; and he appears to be the most backward of the family. I should like to know why Bappojee Vittel is not sent out.

The alleged want of bullocks at Poonah is too ridiculous. I make no doubt but that, in the town of Poonah alone, there are not a smaller number than 50,000 bullocks at this moment.

I have not written to the Governor-General for a length of time. I don't like to communicate to him my sentiments of the Peshwah, nor do I wish to deceive him. I agree with you that strong measures are necessary, but how are they to be carried into execution?

Holkar has made one march from the Taptee. It is reported in his camp that the expedition to Guzerat is deferred for two months. He is now supposed to be going to Chooley Myhissur

on the Nerbudda. This place appears to be not far from Ougein and Indore. It is very clear that the confederacy is not firm yet.

You'll see, by my letter to Colonel Close of this day, that the brinjarries have been playing their old tricks to a very large amount, and that we are likely to meet with some distress. Is it not possible to make the Peshwah's government do something?

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

24th June, 1803. [1600.]

Major-General Wellesley having been disappointed in his expectation of procuring additional supplies of rice from Poona, he is under the necessity, for the present, of substituting wheat flour for part of that issued to the Native troops. Accordingly, when rice shall be issued to the Native troops, wheat flour will be issued to them for a similar number of days, at the rate of one seer per day to each man *gratis*.

It would, however, be inconvenient to the troops to receive large quantities of wheat flour at a time; and the commissary of grain will accordingly issue only one, or at most two, days' allowance of wheat flour to any corps at one time; and he will apprise the corps of the periods at which he will issue what is due upon their indents, and the troops will attend to receive it at his requisition.

According to this arrangement, commanding officers will indent this day for two seers of rice and three seers of wheat flour per man *gratis*; which, at half a seer of rice and a seer of wheat flour per day, will subsist them from the 24th to the 30th instant inclusive. The rice to be issued immediately, and the wheat flour according to the mode above pointed out.

The European troops, for the same reasons, are to receive alternately biscuit and rice with their allowance of provisions; the biscuit at the rate of one pound *per diem* for each man.

A committee to assemble at the provision flag at two o'clock this afternoon, to see the above rice issued to the troops, and to ascertain the wastage since the last committee for that purpose.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1601.]

To Colonel Montresor.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, 28th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 11th. I am concerned that you should have been put to so much inconvenience by the necessity of forwarding stores for the use of the gun-carriage manufactory at Seringapatam. Knowing that there would be this difficulty in removing them from Cannanore, I wrote to Mr. Duncan in the month of March to request that they might be sent to Mangalore. But I conclude that there was some mistake.

I am very sorry that you have lost Lieutenant Williams. I approve of Lieutenant Dickenson, if you think him capable of being as useful as Lieutenant Williams was, and I think that you will do well to recommend him to the Commander-in-Chief for the situation which you propose that he should hold.

As you have a judge-advocate in Malabar, I don't think that General Stuart will like the appointment of a person to act as such at a Native general court-martial, as that will create an expense which may be supposed unnecessary. However, as the European court-martial may take more time than I expect it will, and as it is absolutely necessary to close the Native court-martial before the fair season will return, I have desired Barclay to send you a blank warrant for the office of judge advocate, which you will fill with the name of any officer you may think qualified, in case it should be absolutely necessary that both courts-martial should sit at the same time in order that both may finish their proceedings before the return of the fair season.

I suspect that General Stuart will refer your letter on the subject of the police at Cannanore to government.

Matters remain in this country nearly in the state in which they were when I wrote to you before. The northern Mahratta chiefs threaten us with a confederacy, but are evidently afraid to come to blows with us, and wish to delay the decision whether there shall be peace or war. They are badly prepared, and so jealous of each other that they dare not meet in the same camp; and I doubt whether Scindiah and Holkar have yet made peace, notwithstanding that each boasts of the strength of their union. We are pressing them for a decision upon this point, and to cross the Nerbudda if they wish for peace; and Colonel Collins

threatens to leave Scindiah's camp if he does not comply. This situation of affairs cannot last long, and it must soon be determined if we are to have peace or war. I think peace probable, and in that case I shall be back in Mysore.

If I should not be able to return with the troops, however, I don't think it possible that an attempt can be made to provision the posts in Wynaad from the Seringapatam side.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

[1602.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, 29th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 22nd. Yours of the 15th also, which you sent to Aurungabad, reached me only two days ago. I have not written to you lately, because I have had nothing to communicate of any moment, excepting my own distresses on account of the great losses of cattle in my camp occasioned by the heavy rains. The animals were so much weakened by the length of their march from the Mysore country, by the want of forage at Poonah, and the bad quality of that which they got, that they were unable to bear the rain.

Malcolm has communicated to me your letter to him of the 22nd, and I proceed to give you my opinion on the present state of our affairs. I think it is much altered in many respects since the Governor-General wrote the instructions under which you have been acting lately. You will perceive by late letters from Lieutenant-Colonel Close, that it is probable that the treaty of Bassein will not work as was expected even in the Peshwah's durbar; and, on the other hand, the intelligence received from England in the beginning of June gives great reason to believe that the war with the French may have been renewed. Every circumstance, therefore, points out the necessity that, if possible, the war with the northern Mahratta chiefs should be avoided.

The question is, in what manner is this desirable object to be attained? I have long been accustomed to view these different Mahratta governments as powers not guided by any rational system of policy, or any notion of national honour,

but solely by their momentary fears of loss or hope of gain. Since the fall of Tippoo there is no doubt but that they have viewed the British power with jealousy and apprehension, and various endeavours have been made to unite their discordant politics in one object, that of attacking and lessening it; but these endeavours have constantly failed, not because each chief was not sensible of the greatness of the British power, but because each wanted confidence in his neighbour, each felt that he had more to apprehend immediately from him than he had from the British government, and that he ran less risk of loss from a contest with his own neighbour than he did from one with the British government.

Upon this view of our situation in respect to the Mahrattas the treaty of Bassein* was concluded. This treaty does not deprive any of the northern chiefs of anything excepting of two objects of ambition: one, the power of the government of Poonah; the other, the benefit resulting from the claims of that government upon the Nizam, which would be naturally in the hands of that chief who should have the power of the government of Poonah. Under every other point of view the treaty of Bassein is beneficial to each of the northern chiefs. It secures to each, under the guarantee of British faith, not only the possessions which have long belonged to his family, but likewise those which he may have usurped from the weakness of the Peshwah's government during the last six years of troubles, occasioned by the contests of these very chiefs for the power of His Highness's government. They could not have this security under any other possible establishment of the Peshwah's power. If it should be established by means of any one of them, the others know well that they would lose their possessions; and if it should be established by means independent either of any of them or of us (of which I see no probability), the possessions of these chiefs, at least those which they have usurped from the weakness of the government, would be lost.

The motive for war, therefore, with these chiefs at the present moment cannot be the fear of the immediate, or even remote, consequences of the establishment of our power in the government of Poonah, but it must be a desire to regain that

* See *Wellesley Despatches*, vol. iii. p. 627.

object of ambition for themselves. Here I might enter into an argument upon the improbability that these chiefs would ever unite for the purpose of regaining that power for any one of them ; but these topics have been already adverted to in some degree, and are, besides, well known to every body. But I should wish to know, is it true that they have united? Are there any signs that Scindiah and Holkar have made peace? Is there any confidence between these chieftains? Or dare either of them trust himself in the camp of the other, or in an operation in which their mutual safety depends upon their mutual assistance? * Whatever each of them may hold forth, therefore, I contend for it that they are not united, and that their fear of danger is not from us, but from each other.

It may be asked, if they are not united, why should they declare they are, and risk a war with the power of the British government? In answer, I say that they know our moderation, and that as long as they refrain from hostility, they do not risk a war. They are not unacquainted with our fears of a war with a Mahratta confederacy, and they hope by their threats to frighten us or our allies, and to induce us to abandon our situation at Poonah.

Upon the whole, then, I am convinced not only that the confederacy is not, but that it will not be formed.

But the question whether there will be peace or war does not, in my opinion, depend upon the fact whether the confederacy is formed or not, or upon any political question, excepting upon the hope of advantage or the fear of loss entertained by the chiefs in the camp with you. To withdraw from the alliance with the Peshwah, if it were practicable after what has passed, would affect this question only in this manner: it would give reason to our enemies to suppose that we wanted confidence in ourselves, and that their menaces had had their effect; and their hope of advantage from the war would be increased.

In my opinion, therefore, our course of action at this moment ought to be calculated in such manner as to increase their sense of danger, and decrease their hope of gain from the war, as the

* As an instance of the treacherous and suspicious character of the Mahrattas, Todd describes the one-eyed Holkar discussing political arrangements with the wily old regent of Kotah, Zalim Sing (also one-eyed), each in his own boat in the middle of the Chumbul, that being the only safe place of meeting.—*Annals of Rajast'han*, vol. ii.

best means of preserving the peace. There is no doubt but that at this moment Scindiah's territories on this side of the Godavery and at Baroach are exposed to certain loss; and that those of the Rajah of Berar bordering upon the sea coast are in the same situation. On the other hand, there is no hope of immediate gain. Holkar has passed the Taptee, and cannot return in time to assist the other two, supposing them to be united; and the Nizam's army in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad is fully equal to defend His Highness's territory north of the Godavery till I shall be enabled to cross that river. This, therefore, appears to me to be the time best calculated for bringing these chiefs to a decision on the question of peace or war.

On this ground I would immediately send a memorial to Scindiah stating the earnest desire of the British government to remain at peace. I would explain the defensive and innocent nature of the treaty of Bassein, the security it affords to the territories of each of the chiefs, and the provision it makes for the peace of India. I would point out the right which the Peshwah had to conclude that treaty independently of Scindiah.

I would repeat his declared approbation of the measure in his letters to Colonel Close. I would advert to the fact that neither he nor his ministers have ever made any detailed objection to any part of the treaty, I would recall to his recollection his friendly declaration to yourself, and I would contrast that declaration with his recent declared doubt whether there should be peace or war.

I would call upon him to perform his engagement to explain that doubt in three days from the delivery of that paper, and I would announce my intention of departing on that day if I should not then receive his explanation; at the same time I should call upon him to act in conformity with his declarations, and if he were inclined for peace that he should withdraw his army from the Nizam's frontier into its usual stations, and allow us also to withdraw our troops to our own territories.

If Scindiah should not give the explanation which you require, and should not act in conformity to his declaration, you cannot stay in his camp one moment after the time fixed by yourself for your departure.

You will observe that my object is the preservation of peace.

If I saw the smallest prospect of avoiding the war by any political negotiation, I should recommend you to enter upon it; but under present circumstances nothing can be done till the Rajah of Berar and Scindiah will have withdrawn from the Nizam's frontier.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1603.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 2nd July, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letters of the 25th and 27th June. It is impossible to give an opinion regarding the best mode of procuring bullocks with celerity, because the mode which will have been found to answer in one country will not answer in another. In general the bullocks are a property connected with the soil which produces revenue, and when this is the case it is not possible to purchase the bullocks without the permission of the person at the head of the revenue in that country, and very probably not without his assistance. It may therefore be best to employ the collectors of the revenue to purchase the cattle required for the public service. In situations in which there are large cities where there is some trade, or, at all events, a large population which must be fed from distant countries, large numbers of bullocks may be procurable without interfering with the revenue. In such cases any person may be employed to purchase cattle, or any other commodity; and he that is most active, and has most money at command, will be most successful. But the purchase of the cattle is only the first step; provision must be made for their immediate and constant care from the moment they become the property of the Company, for their equipment with saddles, &c., and for their being in some degree trained.

I am really concerned that any thing should have been done to annoy Fukker u Deen; but you know well the nature of our connection with the Nizam; and when His Highness desired that Sudder u Deen should be deprived of the fort of Aurungabad, it was not possible to refuse compliance with his request. I am clearly of opinion that Sudder u Deen did not do all he could to defend his post, and that he has aggravated rather

than endeavoured to diminish the sufferings of the inhabitants of Aurungabad consequent on Holkar's attack.

The truth is I believe, that the Nizam's government, nay, the Nizam himself, encouraged Holkar and Amrut Rao to invade the Peshwah's territories, and the object was either to make of Holkar a permanent balance against Scindiah, or to give the latter a temporary employment, and thus divert his views from the Nizam's country. Nizam Nawaz Jung and his brothers and relations were, I imagine, the medium of the communications between the Nizam's government, and Holkar and Amrut Rao.

There is no doubt of the bias of the Nizam's government in favour of that party in the Mahratta empire, and it appears clearly from the recommendation sent by the Azim ul Omrah to the Governor-General, soon after Holkar's success in the neighbourhood of Poonah. I know also from other quarters that the Nizam's government did give Holkar great encouragement. But it frequently happens that when a particular scheme of politics has been adopted by a government, and fails from any cause, all the instruments who have been employed in carrying that scheme into effect are sacrificed. This is particularly the case in India, where the governments are all weak, and their instruments generally comparatively powerful; and these are commonly more interested in the success of the scheme, and persevere longer than suits the views of their principals. I imagine what I have above stated to be nearly the outline of the history of the disgrace of the family of Nizam Nawaz Jung; and I am farther convinced that I am right, because the Nizam's government, as far as I know, have never fully explained the ground of their complaint against that family, and most probably never could explain it without implicating the Nizam.

I think still that we shall have no war. But we have not altered our system. Indeed no system will answer with people who have seated themselves upon the Nizam's frontier, except that of determined opposition till they remove from their position.

I shall be glad to know if you can send me any more money, and whether in rupees or in what coin.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor.

[1604.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, 3rd July, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 16th June, and I have issued an order regarding Lieutenant Thatcher which I hope will be satisfactory to you.

I entirely agree in opinion with you respecting the practice which prevails among subaltern officers of putting each other in arrest. It originates in an indifference regarding the necessity of appearing before a court martial which prevails in all parts of the country; indeed this feeling ought not to be called indifference, because I rather imagine that the majority of the army would prefer to appear before a court martial, as they deem it a stage on which they can show their abilities. In my opinion it will be proper to issue a General Order to prohibit the practice of which you disapprove, and to desire that when an officer has cause to complain of the conduct of another, he shall complain to their mutual superior, if there should be one within reach, and that he shall not proceed to put another officer in arrest excepting in a case of absolute necessity, of which the proof will be required of him.

I have no news for you. We are exactly in the same situation of doubt in which we were when I wrote to you last.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Adjutant-General, Bombay.

[1605.]

SIR,

Camp, 6th July, 1803.

I have the honour to enclose you copies of orders which I have issued which require the confirmation of the government of Bombay, and I request you to lay them before the Commander-in-Chief, in order that he may consider them, and if he should approve of them, that he should recommend government to confirm them.

The establishments of public followers attached to regiments in the field under the government of Bombay are entirely different from those attached to regiments in a similar situation under the government of Fort St. George.

When the necessities of the service required that I should employ a corps and departments belonging to the government of Bombay with a division of the army of Fort St. George, and

a battalion belonging to the latter with a detachment belonging to the former, it was necessary that I should determine either to remove the corps from the establishment to which they had belonged, or to make the arrangement set forth in the orders of the 25th May. If I had removed the 78th regiment from the Bombay establishment, the public followers attached to that corps must have been discharged, and none of that description of people could be procured at Poonah at the rates of pay established under the government of Fort St. George. On the other hand, if I had authorised the regiment to take into their service the same followers at the rates of pay allowed by the government of Bombay, which are much higher than those allowed by the government of Fort St. George, great discontent would have been occasioned among persons of a similar, or even a better description, who have followed and served the troops since they quitted Mysore and the Carnatic, and some of whom have come even from the neighbourhood of Cape Comorin.

The same reasoning is applicable, in a still greater degree, to the bullock department, of which I was under the necessity of availing myself, but not to the extent sanctioned in the order of the 25th of May, as only 1000 bullocks were fit for any service.

The drivers of the Company's bullocks, under the government of Fort St. George, receive but little more than one-half the pay of those employed by the government of Bombay; and the consequence of my taking them upon the establishment of the former government would have been that I must have lowered their pay, which would have caused desertion; or I must have kept them upon a high rate of pay, and those who had come from Mysore at a lower rate, both being the servants of the same government, which would have caused the desertion of the latter; or I must have raised the pay of the drivers from the Mysore country to an equality with that of the drivers from Bombay, which would have established a bad precedent.

Upon the whole, therefore, I have thought it best to keep the establishments distinct, although circumstances have obliged me to use the means supplied at the expense of one government with the troops in the employment of the other.

The order of the 28th May was issued to enable Major Spens to take charge of a depôt formed at Poonah. This depôt is applicable principally to the service of the division of the army belonging to the government of Fort St. George under my command; but as it has been formed by officers

acting under the authority of the Governor in Council at Bombay, and the expense has been paid by that government, I have thought it best that the whole expense should be incurred under the same authority.

While writing upon this subject it may be expected that I should give my opinion regarding the mode of settling the accounts for the different supplies which have been prepared and furnished by the government of Bombay, at the request of the Commander-in-Chief and myself, for the division of the army of the government of Fort St. George under my command, although possibly it may happen that as the expenses are ultimately to be paid by the Company; it is not material on account of what government they are defrayed.

The articles which have been prepared and received have been so under the orders of the government of Bombay; they have been supplied by the officers serving under the authority of that government, and these have in general incurred the expenses attending their removal to the depôts at Panwell and Poonah, and subsequently to the troops in the field. The prices of all articles at Bombay vary from those in the territories under the government of Fort St. George, the wages of labour are different, as well as the modes of conveyance necessary to be adopted in order to form the depôts required for the troops. The rules by which the military service and expenditure are regulated under each government must be adapted to the peculiar circumstances of their situation, and consequently it happens that customs and expenditure, which would be entirely unnecessary under the one, and are not allowed by its regulations, are very necessary and allowed by the other.

That being the case, the government of Bombay and the officers of check acting under its authority, must be the best judges of the propriety of any charge made for supplies furnished, and of the necessity of incurring any particular expense for the formation of these depôts. It is therefore my opinion that the whole expense ought to be passed by the government of Bombay; and that afterwards it may appear in the accounts of either government as may be thought proper.

I enclose copies of letters written by my orders, which have occasioned expenses, and which require the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief and of government.

That of the 23rd May will, I hope, meet with the approbation of the Commander-in-Chief. It appeared to me to be reason-

able that, as Colonel Orrock was to march from Poonah immediately, and consequently his servants could not have time to go again to Panwell for his supplies, the public should pay the expense of the removal of the supplies to Poonah, as these were still at Panwell in consequence of the public having had the advantage of the labour of the Colonel's servants.

The letters to Captain Mackay of the 7th and 11th of June regarding the purchase of camels for the use of the 78th regiment explain the causes for which that expense was incurred.

The orders contained in the letter to Captain Mackay of the 10th of June were given for reasons which operated to induce me to issue the orders of the 25th May, which reasons are explained in the first part of this letter.

When I replaced or increased the establishment of the Company's carriage bullocks, it was impossible to replace or hire the drivers at rates of pay lower than those given to the Bombay drivers; and if I had placed them on the establishment of the government of Fort St. George, it would have created discontent among the drivers of the Company's draught cattle belonging to that establishment. Besides, according to the mode I have above suggested, there will be no difficulty in settling this account between the two governments.

I have likewise the honour to enclose the copy of a letter which I wrote to Colonel Murray on the 3rd June, containing orders regarding the management of the dépôt at Poonah.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1606.]

To Colonel Carlisle.

MY DEAR COLONEL;

Camp, 7th July, 1803.

I have received a letter from Mr. Knot, in which he informs me that he has had some difficulties in carrying on the duties of the police which have been imposed upon him, in consequence of the interference of officers and others to screen their servants from the powers of his Cutchery, and of the non-attendance of sepoys, lascars, &c., when required either as witnesses or prisoners; that lately the shroffs had left the fort because they had found that the police had not strength to protect them, and particularly in one instance had not been able to punish a man who had beaten one of them.

The police of the fort and island of Seringapatam is, by the judicial regulation of government relative to that place, submitted to the commanding officer in the Mysore country. I have not by me at present the regulation of government, but I desire Lieutenant Knot by this post, to give you the copy to read, which must be in Major Symons's possession, and among the papers in his office.

You will perceive from a perusal of that paper that, although for obvious reasons the police is placed under a military officer, its jurisdiction is strictly civil, and it must be considered in every respect in the same light as the police of Madras, or that of any other town in the Company's territories which may be under the direction of the Company's civil servants.

The objects of criminal police are principally the prevention of crimes, but they refer also to the punishment of them, particularly those of a trifling nature, such as are likely to occur daily in a bazaar. But no police can possibly answer any end for which it may have been established if any set of inhabitants can hold themselves superior to its regulations and its power, or can be screened from punishment when their conduct deserves it, or even from inquiry. Much less can it answer if the persons claiming these privileges are above all others the most likely and the most accustomed to commit the crimes which it must be the object of the police to prevent if possible, and to punish the criminals if the crimes cannot be prevented, viz. the followers of officers and soldiers, and the sepoys, artificers, and lascars of the garrison.

Accordingly, with every wish to indulge the military, and to protect them as far as may have been in my power, I have thought it proper upon all occasions to support the power of the police and of the civil magistrate. I have given directions that any person who may be seen in the act of committing a crime, shall be liable to be arrested by the servants of the police; that if such person should be a military man, of course the police officer must give notice of this arrest to the commanding officer of the garrison; that all persons residing in the fort or on the island of Seringapatam may be obliged to attend the Cutchery when their attendance may be required either as witnesses or to answer any charge that may be made against them; but that if the person whose attendance is required should be a military man, the police officer must write to the commanding officer of the garrison to request that his attendance may be

ordered. Under these rules the police has been kept up as well as local circumstances would permit; at least I have had the satisfaction of seeing the place prosper, and become the most populous and most useful town in the Mysore country.

I most anxiously therefore request from you an adherence to this same system, and the support of the gentleman upon whom the duties of the police have been imposed, much against his inclination, and by no means to his advantage.

I write to him to desire that he will give orders to his officers to arrest any person who may be guilty of crimes or irregularities, giving notice to the commanding officer of the garrison if such person should be military, and to enforce the attendance of all those whose presence may be required either as witnesses or to answer to charges brought against them, excepting military persons, for whose attendance he must make application to the commanding officer.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1607.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, 9th July, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 24th June. My former letters will have pointed out to you the state of our affairs here, and the probability that we should be able to draw back our troops. Matters remain nearly in the state in which they were when I wrote to you last: I think it more probable, however, that we shall have peace.

Whether we have peace with the northern Mahrattas or not, I think it very doubtful that there will be in Mysore in September and October next a force of such magnitude and description as will be required in order to convoy the provisions and stores which will be wanted by the posts you mention in Wynaad. General Stuart's army will certainly be sent to the Carnatic, and this body of troops will be devoted to Poonah and the Ceded Districts.

I observe also that you have been directed to make arrangements to send a force to protect Goa from the French grasp. This will occasion a still greater diminution of your means of performing the service in Wynaad for which you have called for assistance, but it does not increase our means of giving it to you. In my opinion the best measure to be adopted will be, to

diminish the number of your men in each post, particularly in Wynaad, as much as you possibly can; thereby you will increase the means of subsistence of those who will remain, and you will afford us more time to take measures to give you the assistance which you require. I will recommend to the government of Bombay the havildar you mentioned.

I think it will be best to ask the Commander-in-Chief respecting the sepoy boys. The establishments of the corps belonging to the Bombay army are fixed by the government of Bombay, although that of Fort St. George has upon one occasion altered them, viz., when they were lately reduced; but the corps serving in Malabar are liable to be sent up to Bombay; they have already contrived to get a few of them by borrowing them for a particular service, and never repaying; and as I see that the government of Bombay are increasing their territories, and of course the demand upon themselves for military service to an enormous extent, and not at all their means of affording military assistance, I expect that a few more of the Bombay corps will shortly be taken away, and, in the end, that the whole will go. Therefore we should be cautious to avoid allowing the commanding officers to introduce an establishment into the service not admitted by the government of Bombay, and for which we have not the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

The invalids of the Bombay troops serving in Malabar and Canara are referable to the government of Bombay, and therefore the proceedings of the committees regarding those invalids, &c., must be conducted according to the regulations of that government.

In respect to the soldiers in the King's regiments, I believe that the mode in which they ought to be invalided is as follows: they must be seen by a surgeon, who must certify their incapacity for service in this country; they are then sent under orders from the King's Deputy Adjutant General to Poona-mallee, and kept upon the strength as invalids in India till they go home; and afterwards they are kept upon the strength as invalids in Europe till a board of officers in England decide whether they are fit for garrison duty in Europe.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Since writing the above I have spoken to Barclay regarding the invalids in Malabar. He says, that when invaliding com-

mittees were ordered in the different divisions of the army they were likewise ordered in Malabar and at Goa for the Bombay troops, and were conducted according to the regulations of Fort St. George. The proceedings were then sent to Bombay, and the invalids and pensioners were referable to that government. You will do well to delay taking any steps regarding your invalids till the General Order regarding invalids will be issued.

[1608.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, 11th July, 1803.

As I have not received an answer to the letter which I wrote you on the 29th June, I much fear that it may have missed you, and I send you a duplicate of it.

I have seen your letter to the Governor-General of the 6th. It occurs to me that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar may be inclined to withdraw to their own capitals, if they should be assured that we would withdraw likewise. I certainly propose to repass the Beemah myself, and to order Colonel Stevenson to repass the Godavery, as soon as I find that those chiefs commence their march towards their own territories; and I shall break up the army in this quarter as soon as I shall be convinced that they no longer threaten the territories of the Peshwah or the Nizam, and are settled, the one to the northward of the Nerbudda, the other at Nagpoor.

I communicate to you these intentions, in order that you may make such use of them as you may think proper.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1609.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 13th July, 1803.

I have received your letters of the 8th.

In my opinion Fukker u Deen would never disclose the circumstances of the intrigue which I mentioned to you, because, in the first place, it ought never to have existed, and in the next, if it did exist, and came to his knowledge, it was peculiarly his duty as a British agent to give notice of it to his employer. He cannot now disclose it without acknowledging that there

was an intercourse between his family and Holkar, which it is his object to deny, and without at the same time acknowledging a breach of trust in himself.

I have the very best authority for saying that Holkar and Amrut Rao were encouraged by the Nizam's government, and that this family were the medium of the communication. I agree entirely in opinion with you, that inquiry ought to precede punishment; but it must be recollected that the punishment in this instance does not come from us, but from the Nizam's government, and if we were to interfere so far in the interior government of His Highness as to inquire for what reason he thought proper to dismiss one of his servants, still more if we were to desire that that inquiry should be entered into before English gentlemen, we should go a step farther than is allowed by our treaties with His Highness. This state of affairs as affecting this family is to be regretted, but cannot be remedied.

I think that the Military Board are mistaken in the mode which they have recommended of purchasing cattle. Indeed they do not appear to expect success from it themselves, and therefore, in my opinion, their proposal ought to be rejected. There is no use in proving that they are wrong by the actual failure of the system which they have recommended, which failure may go to endangering the existence of the troops in the field. It might be deemed sufficient that the Board themselves don't even hope for success. Besides, I observe that the plan is that owners of cattle are to bring them in for sale to certain stations, where they are to be examined by a committee. We cannot be ignorant how very unwilling the Natives are to incur any risk on an occasion of this kind, particularly in the sale of a bullock, to which they are uniformly averse, and they will be equally so to the delays which must occur in assembling these committees of inspection, and the expense which they must consequently incur in the maintenance of the cattle till they are bought.

I am sorry to hear of your distresses for money, as I expected that we should have got plenty of that necessary for war from Bombay. However, I have got some money coming from General Stuart's army. It would be a great relief to me if you could send cash from Bombay to pay Colonel Murray's corps at Poonah; for if his expenses were thus provided for, I should

be enabled to prevent his paymaster from drawing, and thus get for my bills all the money that is floating at that place. I draw upon Bengal whenever I can, but, notwithstanding your poverty, a bill upon Bombay is preferred. Will you be so kind as to let me know if you can contrive to send cash from Bombay to Colonel Murray's corps?

I will speak to Amrut Rao's vakeel on the subject of Noojee Gouru Patel: but I acknowledge that unless there is reason to believe that this man is employed in intrigues for Canojee, I would rather take no notice of him. I am for the principle of amnesty, as referable to all inferior agents; I have recommended it strongly to the Peshwah's durbar, and I am convinced that if it had been adopted at an early period, the critical circumstances of the present moment would not exist. It is the principle upon which we have settled Mysore and the Ceded Districts, and that upon which we have made our way to this place. Eternal enmity against every petty agent concerned against us or our allies will never answer, and in my opinion we ought rather to rejoice when we see one of them employed in the service of a friend: it is then at least possible that he may not be serving our enemy.

The Peshwah's prime minister is the famous intriguer against us at the court of Hyderabad, who created so much alarm about two years ago.

It is very extraordinary that I have no accounts of this movement of Shahamut Khan's, but your intelligence must be correct.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1610.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, 16th July, 1803.

Although the Governor-General mentioned in one of his despatches that the treaty of Bassein ought to be communicated to Holkar, no orders have been sent stating by whom; and I have not observed in any of the correspondence that it has been communicated to that chief. I have long thought that it would be very desirable to open a communication with Holkar, and particularly to make known to him the treaty of Bassein. I

have therefore taken the opportunity of the departure from this camp of a vakeel from Amrut Rao to show Holkar the treaty; and I have written him a letter, of which I enclose a translation, which I send to him by a Native officer.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

[1611.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, 17th July, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 13th instant, in which you communicate the wishes of Dowlut Rao Scindiah that a news-writer on his part should be permitted to reside in this camp, and that a dawk should be allowed to run from thence to him.

Provided Dowlut Rao Scindiah is determined to preserve the relations of amity, and to remain at peace with the Company, and if he withdraw his troops from the frontiers of His Highness the Nizam, and proceed with them towards his own territories, which is the only proof I desire, or can admit, of his amicable intentions, I have no objection to his sending here a news-writer, or to his communicating with him in any manner that he may think proper. On the contrary, I wish him to be made fully acquainted with all that passes here, as I am certain that the more his people see of us the more convinced they will be that the British government have no intention to injure them.

But if Dowlut Rao Scindiah perseveres in retaining his hostile position upon the Nizam's frontier, and does not withdraw to his own territories, I must consider him in a state of hostility with the Company. I can allow of no communication between my camp and his by the means of news-writers, and it will be useless for him to send a person of that description to this camp.

I have perused a copy of Lieutenant-Colonel Close's letter to you of the 15th. The only difference between the letter which I wrote to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and that which Colonel Close proposed I should write is, that I have not fixed a day on which Dowlut Rao Scindiah shall depart. My reasons for preferring the mode which I have adopted are, that it leaves me the choice of the day on which to commence my operations, supposing

them to be necessary; it renders greater the probability that I shall strike the first blow; and it leaves matters open so far as that, if the Governor-General should alter his plan, I can alter my proceedings. On the other hand, to fix a day for his departure has an appearance of harshness and hostility which is entirely inconsistent with the spirit of the Governor-General's instructions.

I mention these circumstances lest you should suppose that there is any difference of opinion between Lieutenant-Colonel Close and me upon the main point.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1612.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles, President of a General Court Martial.*

SIR,

Camp, 18th July, 1803.

I have received and perused the proceedings of the general court martial of which you are president, on the trial of Lieutenant ———, of the 1st battalion 2nd Bombay regiment; and as I cannot agree in opinion with the court martial that that officer ought to be honourably acquitted of the charge brought against him, it is proper that I should communicate to you the reasons for which I differ from them, and that I should request you to urge the court martial to take these reasons into their consideration, and to revise their sentence.

Lieutenant ——— was accused of ungentlemanlike behaviour by two officers of the corps to which he belonged, of which behaviour, according to the Articles of War, three instances were specified:

The first, that he appeared in a state of intoxication at Mr. Torin's house on the 1st January, 1802.

The second, that he made use of gross and ungentlemanlike language to Mr. Torin at that time.

The third, that he was turned out of Mr. Torin's house in a disgraceful manner.

I imagine that it will be allowed that if any one of those instances be proved, Lieutenant ——— was guilty of ungentlemanlike behaviour; and therefore the question of guilt or innocence turns upon the proof of these instances.

The first proofs produced were letters from Lieutenant ———,

in which he declares that he was the officer who went to Mr. Torin's on the 1st of January, 1802, with money on the part of Captain Gibson. Mr. Torin did not know again the officer who had called upon him at that time, but he swore positively that the officer who called upon him at that time was intoxicated; and it appears by the letters admitted in proof that this officer was Lieutenant —.

In respect to the second instance of ungentlemanlike behaviour charged, it appears by the evidence of Mr. Torin that in consequence of the behaviour of Lieutenant —, he ordered his servant to show him the way out of the house. This evidence is confirmed by the letter from Lieutenant — to Lieutenant-Colonel Boles, admitted in proof of the charge, from which it appears that the conduct and language of Lieutenant — towards Mr. Torin were not "altogether becoming," even in his own opinion, and certainly cannot be considered otherwise than gross and ungentlemanlike by any assembly of officers, although not occurring in the presence of Mrs. Torin.

The third instance of ungentlemanlike behaviour charged against Lieutenant —, that of having been turned out of Mr. Torin's house, is supported by the oath of Mr. Torin. The probability of its truth is also corroborated by the facts before sworn to by that gentleman, viz. that Lieutenant — was intoxicated, and that he made use of gross and ungentlemanlike language to him, and by the account of the language used given by Lieutenant — himself in his letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Boles, admitted in proof.

Upon this view of the evidence which appeared before the court martial, I cannot but consider the facts proved on which the charge of scandalous and infamous behaviour was grounded, and I cannot, therefore, confirm the sentence of the court martial. But I observe that, notwithstanding this evidence, which stands uncontradicted, the court have passed a sentence of honourable acquittal. They may have thought that there is a defect in the evidence, in consequence of which the guilt of Lieutenant — is not sufficiently substantiated to induce them to find him guilty; but it cannot be possible that his innocence is so clear as to entitle him to a sentence of honourable acquittal.

A sentence of honourable acquittal by a general court martial may justly be deemed by an officer to be the very best testimonial of character that it is possible for him to receive in

relation to the subject which has been the object of their inquiry ; but in proportion as this sentence is prized by the officers of the army ought those whose duty it may be to be members of a court martial to be cautious not to pass it excepting in cases in which the innocence of the accused may be clear to the whole world. If sentences of honourable acquittal are passed merely where there is a defect of the proof of guilt, it is obvious that they must lose their force in the eyes of the world, an officer on whom such a one may be passed will still be an object of suspicion, and such sentences will lose their value.

Upon the whole, therefore, I request the court martial to revise their sentence.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1613.]

To the Chief Secretary of Government.

SIR,

Camp, 19th July, 1803.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 5th instant, enclosing the copy of a letter to the Resident at Hyderabad.

The only place at which I can expect to get any money for bills is Poonah ; but many of the soucars had removed their treasures from that city during the absence of the Peshwah, and some had concealed them. The treasures had not been brought back when I quitted Poonah, and the sums which I procured for bills were but small. Since that time the detachment of the Bombay army stationed at Poonah have been subsisted entirely by the cash which they have been able to procure there for their bills upon Bombay ; which circumstance, as it increases the demand for cash, renders it more difficult to insure it. I have requested the Governor of Bombay to endeavour to supply the Bombay detachment with coin from that settlement, and thus to leave for the use of this division any sums that may be in the market at Poonah. If he should be able to adopt this suggestion, I may expect to procure for bills about one lac of rupees *per mensem*. The soucars at Poonah in general prefer to have bills upon Bombay : indeed I have drawn only one bill upon Benares, and none upon any of the other places mentioned in the letter which I received upon this

subject from the Supreme government. When the money will be brought back to Poonah, it is possible that I may be able to get some for bills upon some of those places.

In case I should not be able to get money for bills upon Hyderabad, I will arrange measures with Major Kirkpatrick for sending me the lac of pagodas which has been transmitted to him from Masulipatam.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Adjutant-General.

[1614.]

SIR,

Camp, 21st July, 1803.

A report reached me that Captain Brown, late of the 78th regiment, was shot in a duel; which report was confirmed by a letter addressed to me found among his papers, which I enclose. I therefore thought it proper to order a court of inquiry to assemble, consisting of Lieutenant-Colonel Harness, Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, and Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, to ascertain the causes of Captain Brown's death; and I have the honour to enclose the report which this Court has made upon the subject referred to them.*

I beg you to lay these papers before the Commander-in-Chief, and request his orders respecting the manner of proceeding to be adopted in regard to Captain Grant, and any other gentlemen who may have been concerned in this duel.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

[1615.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, 21st July, 1803.

I have just perused the copy of your despatch to the Governor-General, enclosed in your letter of the 18th to Colonel Close, the contents of which have given me the greatest satisfaction. If there be any truth in a Mahratta durbar, we shall now have peace.

I consider my letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah a complete

* This duel was fought on trifling grounds connected with the respective companies of Captains Brown and Grant.

answer to that which he wrote to the Governor-General; and when he will have been informed that the Governor-General has trusted to me extraordinary powers to settle all these questions, he will probably be of the same opinion, and will be satisfied with it. I now enclose one to the Rajah of Berar to a similar purport, which I request you to deliver to that chief; and I beg you to apprise him at the same time of the powers given to me by the Governor-General, and that I cannot wait to commence my operations for any further letters or orders from his Excellency.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1616.]

To Colonel Curtise.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, 23rd July, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 12th instant. The Brahmins, like others, have found us very indulgent towards them, and they wish now to impose upon us.

The choultry was a part of Tippoo's karkhana, and they, or some other Brahmins, might as well lay claim to the arsenal, in support of which I don't doubt but that they would be able to produce writings of a very ancient date. But that will not answer. The public must have the convenience of all buildings which were of the description of public buildings in Tippoo's time, excepting such as have been given over to the Brahmins as being of no use. The Brahmins, therefore, must not interrupt Captain Scott in his arrangements for hutting his people in the yard in which that choultry stands.

The other choultry near the tank has been given to the Brahmins, and that they may keep.

We are nearly in the state in which we have been for the last two months, excepting that we have friendly declarations and that all parties declare themselves satisfied, so that I shall think it very extraordinary if we have not a peace, and if we are not delivered from a state of suspense in a few days.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1617.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 25th July, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 20th.

In respect to the dollars, I coined at Poonah 120,549½ dollars which you sent me into 273,000 Chandoorie rupees, which comes to about 226½ Chandoorie rupees for 100 dollars.

The Chandoorie rupees are issued to the troops as one pice better than the Bombay rupees, or about two per cent. better, making, in the whole, about 231 Bombay rupees for 100 dollars. Colonel Murray can certainly make the same agreement, and coin the dollars to the same advantage. Supposing, on the other hand, that you should coin the dollars into rupees, and he should draw upon you for 226½ Chandoorie rupees, he will give a draft upon you for 242½ Bombay rupees; and thus by coining the dollars at Bombay, instead of sending them to Poonah, you will lose nearly 5 per cent. From this loss is to be subtracted the expense of transporting the dollars to Poonah. I certainly recommend that you should send the dollars to Colonel Murray, and if you should do so they shall be applicable entirely to the payment of his detachment. My object in this arrangement is, that only one of us should draw upon Bombay, from which I expect that we shall get the money at a better rate of exchange. However, Colonel Murray's corps must have money as well as mine, and if you should not send the dollars, of course he must continue to draw upon Bombay. If you should coin the dollars into Bombay rupees and send them to Colonel Murray, you will gain one rupee upon every 100 dollars; but as Bombay rupees are not so convenient at Poonah as the Chandoorie, and as they would fall still more in their value if a number of them were thrown into circulation, you might probably find it necessary to issue your own rupees at a depreciated rate to your own troops, and thus lose more than you could possibly expect to gain. Upon the whole I recommend that the dollars should be sent to Poonah to be recoined.

Although I have strong hopes of peace, I feel a little anxious about Surat, which place certainly must tempt strongly the cupidity of every Mahratta chief. I don't know whether the Governor-General intended that the troops in your districts

south of the Nerbudda should be under my command ; but as I understood that you had appointed General Jones to the command at Surat, and have since learned from yourself that you have done so, I thought it proper in my public letter to you of the 18th to suppose that the Governor-General intended that I should have the command only in the Guickwar's districts. However, I cannot divest myself of all anxiety about Surat.

I don't think that Holkar or any other of the Native powers, or all of them put together, will venture to attack that place against the garrison which you have in it ; but it is possible that they may seat themselves down in the neighbourhood and stop all supplies, and thus force a contribution from the wealthy inhabitants. This is what I should do if I were in Holkar's situation, and I fancy he knows what to do as well as I or any other man.

I beg leave to suggest to you, therefore, to give a hint upon this point to General Jones. It will not be possible, I suppose, to form very large stores at Surat immediately, but the inhabitants might as well be encouraged to provide for themselves in case of such an operation as I have supposed possible.

I don't know exactly the situation of Surat, but I believe it lies some miles up the Taptee, which is of course navigable to the town. Is the river so broad as that vessels or boats can go up to Surat with supplies without the risk of being fired at from the banks? If it be not, it is evident that the town cannot be supplied from the sea, and it becomes more necessary to provide against the mode of distressing it which I have supposed will be practised.

It is very probable that any of these armies which may sit down near Surat will not be able to occupy both banks of the Taptee in strength, and supplies may still come into Surat from one side of that river, but it is as well to be prepared for the contrary.

I am much obliged to you for your recollection of Captain Stuart. I have desired him to go to Bombay, and have sent him a letter of introduction to you.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. A. O.

28th July, 1803. [1618.]

An armourer and bellows boy, from each corps of infantry on the Madras establishment, are to be sent to the park at six o'clock to-morrow morning, with their tools complete, to assist in repairing some arms belonging to the 78th regiment, which the officer commanding that corps will be pleased to send over to the park at that hour: he will also give directions for their being taken away in the evening.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY,

To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor.

[1619.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, 30th July, 1803.

I received yesterday evening your letter of the 14th.

I had long ago received the intelligence of the plan to assemble a detachment at Tenim for the security of Goa, and to draw that detachment from Malabar and Canara; and I have represented my opinion fully as well upon the faults of that position as upon the inconveniences which will be felt in Malabar in consequence of the absence of the troops. The troops cannot live at Tenim at all events till the month of October, and the situation will at all seasons be unwholesome; but Sir William Clarke has recommended it, and General Stuart has adopted it.

I have this day written to General Stuart again to point out the inconveniences of the road which Sir William Clarke has recommended to the Tenim Ghaut. The troops ought to have been sent into Mysore either by the Soobramany Ghaut or by the Kurdacull Ghaut. They ought to have passed the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, and to have proceeded thence through the Savanore and Darwar countries to Hullihall in Soonda. But as they must by this time have passed Mangalore, I have recommended that they should be sent into the Nuggur country either by the Hyderghur or by the Bilghy Ghaut. If by the former, they will go by Shikarpoor, Massoor, and the Dooab of the Toombuddra and Werdah to Deogherry on the Werdah, and thence by Savanore, &c., to Hullihall; if by the latter, which I believe is the best, they might go by Chandergooty and Bonawassi to Hangul in Bancapoor, and thence through the Savanore country to Hullihall. By any one of these roads they will

avoid much rain and many rivers, they will pass through rich and fertile countries, and will be able to ascend the Ghauts ; but I don't think it possible to ascend any of the passes to the northward of Bilghy with guns.

You will readily believe that I feel for your situation, but I see no remedy for it. In my opinion you must withdraw the troops from the posts in Wynaad, if you cannot diminish their numbers ; and if you should determine upon withdrawing them, I recommend that you should destroy the ordnance and stores, and not think of bringing them away.

I shall forward to head-quarters the papers regarding Captain —— with my remarks upon them. I wish that you would give a hint to Major —— that there is no occasion for so much correspondence among officers in the same cantonment, and that I desire that he will communicate verbally with those under his command instead of in writing, excepting on occasions in which writing is absolutely necessary. These disputes in that corps would not have occurred if the art of writing had never been invented, and Captain —— and the doctor had not imagined that they possessed it.

You ought to put Captain —— in arrest. You ordered him upon the duty of the general court martial, and it is proper that you should put him in arrest. If you don't think so, you may put him in arrest by my orders. At all events, the general court martial have no power over him.

I shall leave Captain ——'s head to be dressed by the Adjutant-General for his conduct in respect to the doctor, giving him a few hints of my sentiments upon the subject.

We shall have peace here in my opinion. I have full powers for peace or war from government, and I am pushing the negotiation to a decision as fast as I can. The confederates promise fairly, but nothing will answer for me excepting their retiring to their own territories, and I attack them if they don't. Scindiah and Holkar have not made peace positively, and the ministers of the former now allow it. They have also declared that, if they are to decide between retiring and war, they must take the former, as they cannot risk the latter. I have ordered Colonel Collins to come away if they don't retire. Between ourselves that is the state of the case at present.

Stevenson has 23,000 men north of the Godavery, and I propose to take Ahmednuggur before I cross that river ; by that

operation I shall secure everything in my rear, and risk nothing in advancing.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1620.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 31st July, 1803.

I wrote you a public letter this day upon two subjects of great importance in my opinion, and I now proceed to advert to two points mentioned in your private letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

One is the proposal to have a sunnud from the Peshwah for Baroach. That will never answer. We must take that place by force of arms, and I hope that there will be no negotiation going on in order to obtain its delivery. I propose to send directions that the officer should summon the commander of the place to surrender it, and that he should attack it immediately if he refuse, and to allow no negotiation to impede or divert him from his operations.

Another is your proposal respecting Bappoo Rao Angria. This man is placed immediately upon our communication between Poonah and Panwell, the existence of which depends upon his neutrality; and between ourselves this army depends upon the existence of that communication. It is my opinion that if Bappoo Rao Angria has no reason to believe that we intend to injure him, he will be neutral, at least till he sees which party is likely to be successful in the contest, and his neutrality will continue as long as our success does; but if he should suspect that we have designs upon his countries, of course he will do all in his power to injure us, and I have above shown you that he has this materially in his power. Allow me, therefore, to entreat you to conciliate this man rather than irritate him either by bringing forward claims for his country, or by urging him too closely for the payment of sums justly due for his piratical depredations.

If, however, troops can be equipped either to keep up the communication between Poonah and Bombay, or to take possession of Angria's territories, supposing the Peshwah should cede them, I can have no objection to the measure.

150 PROPOSITION OF ENEMY UNSATISFACTORY. Aug., 1803.

I shall write to you fully to-morrow upon the defence of Guzerat.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1621.] G. O.

Camp at Walkee, 2nd Aug., 1803.

Major-General Wellesley requests that the officers will not ride out much beyond the piquets in the direction of Ahmednuggur; as their going near the fort or pettah may be disagreeable to the killadar, and they may meet with interruption from his men stationed in the intermediate villages.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1622.]

To Sir William Clarke.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 6th Aug., 1803.

I have many apologies to make to you for having omitted to write to you for so great a length of time; but the fact is that I had nothing new to tell you.

Since I marched from Poonah, on the 4th of June, matters have remained in this quarter exactly in the same state. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have been encamped with large armies in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier. Holkar has been with his troops across the Taptee, and is lately gone to the Nerbudda. Colonel Stevenson has been in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad. I have been threatening Ahmednuggur. Colonel Collins has been negotiating with the northern chiefs to endeavour to prevail upon them to retire to their usual stations in their own territories; and at last, this day, I have received the answers to letters which I wrote to them upon the subject, in which they propose to me to depart, and that they should take up a position at Burhampoor, from which they will have it in their power to attack the Nizam's territories whenever they please. I therefore propose to delay no longer to commence hostilities. Colonel Collins has come away from Scindiah's camp, and I shall march to Ahmednuggur, which is only eight miles from hence, as soon as the weather will hold up.

You will have heard that I have been joined by but a small number of the southern jaghiredars. Appah Saheb is still at Poonah, although Chintomeny Rao is gone back towards Meritch. I believe, however, that these chiefs will be neutral; and this disposition will be favoured in some degree by the position of the corps intended for the protection of Goa, and by that of a corps of observation under General Campbell, at Moodgul, in the Dooab of the Kistna and Nerbudda.

The Rajah of Kolapoor's vakeel promises faithfully that his master will be neutral; indeed the Rajah's interest leads him to adopt that line of conduct, for he must be well aware that nothing can save him if we should ever join Appah Saheb against him; and he must expect a continuance of our neutrality in that dispute, now that Appah Saheb remains neutral in our dispute with the northern chiefs. I shall be obliged to you if you will watch the movements of all these chiefs, and let me hear from you occasionally.

I don't mind much that collection of horse by Succaram Ghautky. I don't believe that it is intended to injure us.

I will write to you when I have anything interesting to tell you. In the mean time,

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 12th Aug., 1803. [1623.]

A troop of Native cavalry to be sent immediately to drive all the camp followers who are down near the fort of Ahmednuggur back into camp, and to prevent any more of them from going towards the fort. The troop above ordered is to cut down any follower who does not instantly retire to camp. The 78th regiment, and 1st battalion 2nd regiment, with their guns, to parade immediately with sixty-rounds of ammunition.

Major-General Wellesley congratulates the troops upon the result of the operations carried on against the fort of Ahmednuggur. His thanks are particularly due to the troops who made the brisk and gallant attack upon the city on the 8th instant; to Lieutenant-Colonels Harness, Wallace, and Maxwell, commanding brigades, Captain Beauman of the artillery,

Captain Johnson of the engineers, and Captain Heitland of the pioneers.

A Royal salute to be fired immediately upon the occasion of taking possession of the fort of Ahmednuggur; and, upon the receipt of this order, in all the garrisons and detachments of troops under the command of Major-General Wellesley in the territories of the Company, the Rajah of Mysore, His Highness the Nizam, and the Mahrattas.

(A committee of three artillery officers ordered to survey and fix a valuation on all the ordnance and military stores in the fort and city.)

(Another to survey and value the grain and provisions.)

(The engineers to survey and report upon the buildings.)

One of the terms on which the killadar capitulated was, that he and his garrison should have their private property. Major-General Wellesley is convinced that there is no good soldier in this detachment who would infringe this capitulation, and he is determined that it shall not be infringed, and he will punish with the utmost severity any person who may be found plundering in the fort of Ahmednuggur.

The brigadier of the day to be discontinued.

(The detachment ordered to move ground next day.)

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1624.]

To Major Malcolm.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp, 16th Aug., 1803.

I enclose a letter from General Stuart. Your money is arrived here, and I wish to know from you whether you wish to have it sent to you, or whether I shall give you a bill for it upon Bombay. It would be convenient to me to have it at present, as it would enable me to make advances to Goklah, as well as to Appah Dessaye, before I march. Send your answer back by the bearer, so that I may receive it to-morrow evening. I hope to be able to march on the next morning, if all the rice should have arrived.

Goklah was here this morning. I showed him the fort, and he was well pleased, and promised to march forward when I

should. There is no news, excepting a report from Stevenson that a party of cavalry had come up the Adjuttee Ghaut.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marquess Wellesley.

[1625.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Camp at Ahmednuggur, 17th Aug., 1803.

Nothing particular has occurred since I wrote to you on the 13th.

The cavalry marched on the 14th, and arrived yesterday upon the Godavery. The infantry follow to-morrow, and I expect to arrive there by the time that the cavalry will have crossed. I shall then move forward immediately.

I have been detained here till this day by the necessity of making various arrangements for the garrison and taking possession of the country; these are now settled, and I shall report them all in the course of a day or two.

You will have heard from Malcolm that he has been obliged to go away on account of sickness. He has been so unwell for some time past as to have been unable to do any business, and is at last obliged to go to Bombay. Before he went we settled an agreement with Amrut Rao's vakeel, by which we have engaged that that chief shall have a revenue of seven lacs of rupees, including what he has already, amounting to four lacs. I hope that we shall be able to prevail upon the Peshwah to give him the remainder; if not, he must have it for the present out of Ahmednuggur.

I enclose a translation of this treaty, and I will report upon it regularly, as soon as I learn Colonel Close's opinion regarding the extent of the communication which ought to be made to the Peshwah upon this occasion.

The news from Scindiah's camp is that they have sent their guns and baggage to Burhampoor, and that they are coming across the Adjuttee hills with a light army of horse only. I have repeatedly desired Colonel Stevenson to attack, with his cavalry, whatever body may enter the Nizam's country. If he should fortunately succeed in cutting up one good party, or if

he should even drive them off, we shall have gained the upper hand in the light warfare, and you may depend upon it the campaign will be our own. I shall be among them in a few days, and I shall follow this plan.

I have not yet been able to ascertain the quantity of stores in Ahmednuggur, but the place is well provided. The lists of them shall be sent to you as soon as they can be made out. Besides the stores and grain there were some trifling articles in the fort belonging to Scindiah, such as looking-glasses, bawdy pictures, swords, dirks, fowling-pieces, and pistols. I have directed that an account may be taken of all these; and as we want the buildings in which they are contained, I have desired that they may be disposed of, and the amount paid into the public treasury.

I am very anxious that the amount of these articles as well as the value of the military stores and grain should be given to the troops as prize money. I don't suppose that the expense will amount to a lac of pagodas, and never did troops better deserve the favour of government for their conduct, or in consideration of the importance of the conquest they have made. But exclusive of these considerations, which I think will weigh with you, I have to inform you, that owing to the length of the march which the corps composing my division have made, some of them from Ganjam, others from Madras, and others from Cape Comorin, and none less than between 700 and 800 miles, to their having been stationed so long at Poonah and its neighbourhood in exhausted countries, and to the severity of the weather to which the cattle have been exposed, the officers have lost their equipments, some of them as often as four times, and I know that they are all in extreme distress. If they had not captured Ahmednuggur and had not some claims for prize, I should have been obliged to recommend to government that their situation might be taken into consideration, and that some relief might be afforded to them.

I enclose the copy of a paper which I have received from Captain Marriott, and a memorandum in answer to it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION OBTAINED OF THE WORKS [1626.]
OF GAWILGHUR.

Gawilghur is a fort situated in the midst of a range of mountains between the sources of the rivers Poorna and Taptee.

It consists of a citadel, and outer fort or rooney. The citadel is placed at the western extremity of the fortification, and it does not appear that the rooney or outer fort wall surrounds it entirely.

The rooney, which is reported to be of the extent of six or seven coss, forms the southern, eastern, and northern sides of the fort.

On the eastern side of the citadel the wall is high, and the rock has been scarpd. It has also been scarpd in some places in the whole circumference of the fort, particularly near the roadways.

The wall of the rooney or outer fort is built with stone, and does not appear to be of very great height; it has many towers, and a rampart from which guns can be fired. It has no ditch, unless the scarpd rock can be called one.

The walls of the citadel which stand within the rooney or outer fort are built with stone, are very high, but have no ditch or other defence. There are many guns in the citadel.

The communication between the rooney and the citadel is through a gate in the eastern wall of the latter; and it does not appear that there is any mode of communicating with the citadel excepting through the rooney and that gate.

There are three gates to the rooney: one called the Delhi Gate, one called the Muchy Gate, and one called the Peerputty Gate.

The two former are in the north face; the first nearest to the citadel, and of course to the westward, the other to the eastward.

The Peerputty Gate is in the southern face, also near the citadel.*

The great communication with the fort of Gawilghur is

* Note on MS., not in the handwriting of A. W.—“Peerputty Gate 3 coss from Waughdo, and Maunka Gate 2 coss from the same.”

through the Muchy Gate; and it is said that the road to it is sufficiently broad for 100 men to march abreast, and sufficiently good to be practicable for loaded cattle.

The village immediately at the bottom of this road is Labada, at which there is a nullah, supposed to have water; but, at all events, there are wells in this village.

I have not got an account of the road to the Delhi Gate; that to the Peerputty Gate is narrow, admitting no more than two men abreast, and so difficult as to be impracticable for cattle.

The village at the bottom of the hill with which this road communicates is Bagdow, at which there is a nullah with water.

The great difficulty in attacking Gawilghur is to approach it at all. From Bagdow the distance to the fort is 6 coss, over the hills and through the jungle, in which it is not certain that there is water.

From Bagdow the nearest village on the south side to Labada at the foot of the road leading to the Muchy Gate is 10 coss, likewise over the mountains and through the jungle, and it is not certain that there is water.

The road by which the communication is kept up between the fort and Nagpoor passes by Damengaum or Donegaum, which is 6 coss from Ellichpoor.

At Damengaum there is water.

From Damengaum to Labada is * coss over the mountain, and the road of course is bad; and there is no certainty of water.

The best mode of communicating with Labada, supposing that place to be the best point of attack, is either from Burhampoor and Asseerghur, along the Taptee, or from Mauckly, the seat of a hill rajah who is an enemy of the Rajah of Berar.

Not far from the Peerputty Gate to the southward and eastward is a hill from which it is supposed that the place can be battered, but this is not certain.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

* Blank in manuscript.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1627.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 17th Aug., 1803.

I have received your private letter of the 12th, in answer to which I have to express my concern that General Nicholls should have relinquished the superintendence over the troops to the northward. I consider the Governor-General's orders to have placed the troops under my command only that there might be one uniform system of operations adopted with regard to political events in all parts of the Deccan; but he can never have intended that the troops belonging to the Bombay government to the northward should not be under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, and liable to all the regulations of the Bombay government. It might as well be supposed that the troops in this camp, and the Nizam's subsidiary force, were not under the general superintendence of Lieutenant-General Stuart, or liable to the regulations of the government of Fort St. George. But the case of the troops to the northward is even still stronger. It is not possible at present for me to convey a single order to Surat or to Brodera without its passing through Bombay; those which I have sent hitherto have gone to you, and this practice must continue for some time longer; but even when it will cease, it is very easy to advise Colonel Murray to report to Major-General Nicholls any orders that he may receive from me.

I shall be quite concerned if Major-General Nicholls should relinquish his superintendence of the troops to the northward, because, whatever may be the real state of the case, people will believe that he does not think the arrangement which has been adopted the best for the public service, and that he is of opinion that another would be preferable.

In regard to the arrangement proposed in my letter of the 2nd to you, it is entirely distinct from the question of General Nicholls' superintendence. I proposed the plan contained in my letter because it appeared to me to be the only one by which the troops could be organized and brought to act together on one point: if, however, General Nicholls should think that any other plan would answer better, I am not so wedded to my own ideas and systems as to reject any proposition that is inconsistent with them. Provided the troops are organised upon one military principle, and we can command

through the Muchy Gate ; and it is said that the road to it is sufficiently broad for 100 men to march abreast, and sufficiently good to be practicable for loaded cattle.

The village immediately at the bottom of this road is Labada, at which there is a nullah, supposed to have water ; but, at all events, there are wells in this village.

I have not got an account of the road to the Delhi Gate ; that to the Peerputty Gate is narrow, admitting no more than two men abreast, and so difficult as to be impracticable for cattle.

The village at the bottom of the hill with which this road communicates is Bagdow, at which there is a nullah with water.

The great difficulty in attacking Gawilghur is to approach it at all. From Bagdow the distance to the fort is 6 coss, over the hills and through the jungle, in which it is not certain that there is water.

From Bagdow the nearest village on the south side to Labada at the foot of the road leading to the Muchy Gate is 10 coss, likewise over the mountains and through the jungle, and it is not certain that there is water.

The road by which the communication is kept up between the fort and Nagpoor passes by Damengaum or Donegaum, which is 6 coss from Ellichpoor.

At Damengaum there is water.

From Damengaum to Labada is * coss over the mountain, and the road of course is bad ; and there is no certainty of water.

The best mode of communicating with Labada, supposing that place to be the best point of attack, is either from Burhampoor and Asseerghur, along the Taptee, or from Mauckly, the seat of a hill rajah who is an enemy of the Rajah of Berar.

Not far from the Peerputty Gate to the southward and eastward is a hill from which it is supposed that the place can be battered, but this is not certain.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

* Blank in manuscript.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1627.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 17th Aug., 1803.

I have received your private letter of the 12th, in answer to which I have to express my concern that General Nicholls should have relinquished the superintendence over the troops to the northward. I consider the Governor-General's orders to have placed the troops under my command only that there might be one uniform system of operations adopted with regard to political events in all parts of the Deccan; but he can never have intended that the troops belonging to the Bombay government to the northward should not be under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, and liable to all the regulations of the Bombay government. It might as well be supposed that the troops in this camp, and the Nizam's subsidiary force, were not under the general superintendence of Lieutenant-General Stuart, or liable to the regulations of the government of Fort St. George. But the case of the troops to the northward is even still stronger. It is not possible at present for me to convey a single order to Surat or to Brodera without its passing through Bombay; those which I have sent hitherto have gone to you, and this practice must continue for some time longer; but even when it will cease, it is very easy to advise Colonel Murray to report to Major-General Nicholls any orders that he may receive from me.

I shall be quite concerned if Major-General Nicholls should relinquish his superintendence of the troops to the northward, because, whatever may be the real state of the case, people will believe that he does not think the arrangement which has been adopted the best for the public service, and that he is of opinion that another would be preferable.

In regard to the arrangement proposed in my letter of the 2nd to you, it is entirely distinct from the question of General Nicholls' superintendence. I proposed the plan contained in my letter because it appeared to me to be the only one by which the troops could be organized and brought to act together on one point: if, however, General Nicholls should think that any other plan would answer better, I am not so wedded to my own ideas and systems as to reject any proposition that is inconsistent with them. Provided the troops are organised upon one military principle, and we can command

their services with certainty on any point that may be threatened, I shall be satisfied.

I shall be obliged to you if you will take an opportunity of conveying these my sentiments to Major-General Nicholls.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1623.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

Camp North of the Nimderah Ghaut,
18th Aug., 1803.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

I have received your letter of the 16th. I am sincerely desirous of peace, and will certainly conclude one when I can; but we must proceed with caution, because I am afraid that we shall miss our object if we should appear too desirous to attain it. If any overtures should be made to you, let them know that you will communicate them to me, but that you are convinced that mere pacific professions, unaccompanied by facts, will not persuade me that their intentions are sincere.

If any such overtures should be made to you, favour me with your opinion regarding them at the time you will communicate them.

You see the advantage which we derive from the commencement of hostilities during the season in which the rivers are full. We have got possession of Scindiah's only hold in the Deccan; he cannot receive assistance from Holkar, supposing that chief to be inclined to assist him; and he is confined by the Godavery in the execution of his plan of predatory war, supposing him capable of carrying it into execution. In the mean time I shall fill Ahmednuggur with provisions; and when that is completed, all the Mahrattas in India would not be able to drive me from my position. I believe also that although Colonel Stevenson in particular has suffered much in his equipments lately, and we have all suffered more or less from the severity of the weather, it has done more harm in Scindiah's army, and he is more crippled by it, than any of us.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

[1629.]

MY DEAR COLMAN,

Camp North of the Ninderrah Ghaut,
18th Aug., 1803.

I have an hospital at Erroor on the Kistna, which has long given me considerable uneasiness, and which I am very anxious to remove to Poonah. It consists of 53 Natives and 12 Europeans, and might be removed with the assistance of 12 doolies and 20 bullocks.

I wish that you would turn over in your mind the means of removing it, and I suggest what follows:

1st. That you should send 12 doolies, or more if you can spare them, belonging to the 84th regiment.

2nd. That you should send 20 of your carriage bullocks, if you should have any capable of going so far.

3rd. That you should send arrack, salt provisions, and biscuit for 12 Europeans for 20 days, which it may be expected they will be on the road.

4th. That you should send about 10 bullock loads of rice for the sepoy, at half a seer per day.

5th. That you should send six bullocks to carry the tents which the sick now have at Erroor, as I suspect that their cattle have died.

6th. An officer and 20 sepoy to take charge of those articles to Erroor, and to escort back the sick.

7th. A little money with the officer.

I have written to Lieutenant-Colonel Close to request he will try if he can get 100 horse to go with the party, and come back with the sick.

If you should be able to arrange all this, I request you to write by my southern tappall to the officer commanding at Erroor on the Kistna, to let him know that you have sent for the sick, and to desire that Mr. Scott may be prepared to set off with them. But if you can send only half the provisions now, it would be better to do that, and bring the sick away, and send the remaining half to meet them on the road as they will come up. Enclosed I send you the route by which the party is to march.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1630.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

MY DEAR COLMAN,

Camp at Hunhull, 19th Aug., 1803.

I have received your letter of the 17th. I hope that, notwithstanding the number of coolies you have sent off to Panwell, you will have a sufficient number to send off to Ahmednuggur with the 600 bullock loads of rice which I requested might be sent there in my letter of the 16th instant. This is important, as I have left at Ahmednuggur bullocks to bring away the supply of 600 bullock loads first ordered for the garrison, and which I conclude left Poonah on the 16th or 17th.

I wish that whenever a supply goes off to the garrison of Ahmednuggur, you would desire your staff officer to give notice thereof to the commanding officer there, and desire the officer commanding the post on the Beemah to give notice to the officer commanding the post on the Goor and the officer commanding at Ahmednuggur when it commences to pass the Goor. By these means we shall have the supplies in view from the time they quit Poonah till they arrive at Ahmednuggur.

The post hitherto has not carried letters very regularly to the officers on the Goor and the Beemah, which is owing to there being no conicopolies at those stations; but I have ordered that one may be sent to each, which will insure the delivery of the letters.

I know the position which Colonel Close has proposed to you to occupy, of which I entirely approve. By the bye you must apply to Bombay for two 12-pounders as well as two howitzers, as my artillery officers have insisted on bringing on those which Colonel Murray sent me. Employ Lieutenant Goodfellow as you may think proper. Send your paymaster to Bombay when you please. I have ordered Captain Campbell back to Poonah; he has been very useful to me hitherto.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1631.]

To Major Malcolm.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp at Carwondy, 20th Aug., 1803.

I enclose two letters received from Kawder Nawaz Khan, one of which contains a curious piece of intelligence respecting

Gopal Bhow. If, upon my arrival at the river, which will be to-morrow, I should find that he is still on it, I shall endeavour to beat him up. It is extraordinary that the old woman gave us intelligence of Gopal Bhow's coming, during the siege of Ahmednuggur, and desired us to make haste to finish it before he should arrive.

You will see all my late letters to Colonel Close, in which I have discussed various subjects.

The cavalry are across the river, and I shall be there to-morrow. Scindiah had not moved on the 16th; the 17th was a great feast; so that it was supposed that the 18th would be the day on which he would move. I send with this two letters which I have opened. I don't recollect the memorandum of the 4th, and I wish you to send me a copy of it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp, left bank of the Godavery, 24th Aug., 1803. [1032.]

Lieutenant Monin to superintend the boats from daylight to-morrow morning till noon, when Lieutenant Campbell will relieve him.

Major-General Wellesley has observed several instances of a delay, and in some cases an entire omission, to obey orders, from their not being communicated to those whom they concern. In future the following regulations are to be attended to :

1st. All the orders given out are to be entered in the regimental orderly books; and the commanding officer of every regiment, battalion, or detachment is responsible that they are made known to the officers and men under his command.

2nd. When a pass order is sent round, the receipt of it is to be signed by the brigade major on the back of the order. It is to be communicated immediately by the brigade majors to those concerned, who are to sign a receipt for it, and afterwards, as soon as possible, to all the corps in the brigade. The adjutants, when they receive it, are likewise to sign receipts for it.

3rd. There must be in each brigade an adjutant of the day, and when the brigade major has occasion to quit his tent he must leave there an orderly to take all orders, reports, &c., to the adjutant of the day of the brigade, whose duty it will be to

sign receipts for the orders; and to circulate them as above directed.

4th. In like manner the orderly officer in each corps must do the duty of the adjutant when he may be absent from his lines. When an order is received, there must be no delay in obeying it, and for this the commanding officers of corps are responsible.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1633.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

SIR,

Camp, north of the Godavery, 26th Aug., 1803.

1. I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 19th August, and I am happy to find that the Military Board at Bombay have agreed in opinion with me upon the subject of the inexpediency of allowing the quartermaster of the 75th regiment to contract for the provisions for that corps while posted at Songhur, a measure which I observe was sanctioned and recommended by the military authority at Surat.

2. I possess powers to try officers and soldiers by a general court martial; and I shall give orders that one may be assembled for the trial of Captain — as soon as I shall receive the papers which you propose to send me, on which the charge against that officer is to be founded.

3. In respect to the expression used in my letter of the 13th, "that the service could not be carried on in this manner," which is the subject of the fifth paragraph of your letter of the 19th, I have to observe that I did not intend to allude to anything excepting the conduct of those concerned in the transaction of the public business at Surat. When a corps was assembled for field service in the Attavesy, and the cause of the assembling of that corps was the probability that the Attavesy would be invaded by the enemy, and that enemy had an army of horse, whose object would be, and whose operations would be directed to cut off the communication between the corps in the field and the city of Surat, it was natural to expect that the corps in the field would be equipped in such a manner as to be independent at least for a short time of the city of Surat. On the perusal of the papers upon the subject of Captain —'s conduct, it appeared to me that this corps was not so equipped, and that in fact that officer

depended for the existence of his troops, even for two or three days, entirely upon his communication with Surat; and it was upon this ground that I stated "that the service could not be carried on in this manner."

4. I have every reason to believe that the greatest proportion of the army of Jeswunt Rao Holkar has passed the Nerbudda, and that that chief himself has gone to Indore. Major Walker's hircarrahs have exaggerated the strength of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's army, and I have every reason to believe that the army of that chief was in the neighbourhood of Myhissur on the day that they reported that they were with the army in the neighbourhood of the river Taptee.

At all events, as my troops have now crossed the Godavery, and as I shall move forward immediately, there does not appear any probability that an army can invade Guzerat by the route of Songhur; and everything points out the expediency of collecting the troops north of the river Nerbudda.

5. I am happy to find that Colonel Murray was prepared to depart to assume his command.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

[1634.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp at Julgong, 28th Aug., 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 27th. I received intelligence yesterday morning that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had ascended the Adjuntee Ghaut on the 24th; this was confirmed in the evening by two men who returned from Holkar's army, which they say was on its march from Myhissur to join Scindiah: they left Holkar's army on the 18th, one march beyond the Dhaukote Ghaut, on the road to Burhampoor. The intelligence that Scindiah is above the Ghaut is further confirmed by your letter; but the account of Holkar's movement does not agree with accounts which I have received from Amrut Rao's camp, which state that Holkar had crossed the Nerbudda and gone to Indore. But I have little doubt that a part at least of his army is on its march to the northward.

I am obliged to you for the trouble you have taken with Rajah Mohiput Ram to induce him to supply grain for the use

of my troops. I will give the lac of rupees required with pleasure, provided he will point out the places at which I can get the grain. I have some bullocks coming through the districts of Bheer and Perinda, which might bring some of it up. I hope, however, that though I should not bring it up immediately, Mohiput Ram's fears have exaggerated the chance of its being seized by the Mahratta armies. I shall be at Aurungabad to-morrow, where I hope to shake hands with you.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P.S. Have there been any accounts of Colonel Stevenson lately? The last letter I received from him was of the 23rd, in which he informed me that a patrol of his which had gone below the Badowly Ghaut had seized some horses and bullocks belonging to Scindiah, loaded with grain; and that he was going that night upon an expedition against a party of horse detached by the Rajah of Berar under the command of his nephew.

[1635.] G. O.

Bulgaum, 30th Aug., 1803.

It may be necessary for Major-General Wellesley to order the cavalry, and the 2nd battalion 12th regiment of Native infantry, and 100 pioneers, in advance; and, therefore, till further orders, the following arrangements are to be made daily for the march:

1st. Each of the troopers of the Native cavalry, and each dragoon, will carry with him one day's feed of chinna or jowarry.

2nd. The gram agent general, or the quartermasters of regiments, will have as many bullocks laden with half loads of chinna and jowarry as may be empty.

3rd. Two arrack carts, each drawn by six of the best bullocks, are to follow the cavalry.

4th. The tents of the dragoons are to be carried on the camels attached to the 78th regiment, two on each camel; those of the 78th regiment on the elephants and on bullocks.

5th. Major-General Wellesley's hircarrah camels are to be laden, each with four casks of salt provisions for the use of the dragoons, and Captain Young will prepare twenty bullocks with half loads of rice. A conicopoly must attend this provision.

6th. The officers of the cavalry, and those of the 2nd battalion 12th regiment, are to make their arrangements to move out from the line as lightly equipped as possible, in case Major-General Wellesley should find an opportunity of ordering it with advantage. In such an event, only one half of the tents of the dragoons, all the doolies excepting such as contain sick men, the provision and arrack above ordered, grain in half loads, the guns and tumbrils of the 2nd battalion 12th regiment, and spare ammunition, will be the only public stores to accompany the detachment.

7th. Accordingly, the public stores above mentioned, and such a proportion of tents for the Native troops as commanding officers of corps may think proper, and such private baggage as the officers of the cavalry, and of the 2nd battalion 12th regiment, may choose to take with them (and which it is very desirable should be as little as possible), and the horsekeepers and grasscutters of the cavalry, and such parts of the regimental bazaars of the cavalry as commanding officers may think will be useful, will move in advance with the baggage flag of the cavalry, which is blue.

8th. Officers and heads of departments will be very particular in giving orders that the other baggage may keep with the baggage flag of either of the brigades of infantry.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp near Unterwarry, 1st Sept., 1803. [1636.]

The detachment, with the exception of the 2nd battalion 11th regiment, with its guns, and the details hereafter specified, to march to-morrow morning by the right (the remainder as usual).

Lieutenant-Colonel Chalmers will take up a position on this ground of encampment to-morrow morning, which Captain Johnson will point out to him, with the 2nd battalion 18th regiment, 100 pioneers, a proportion of ordnance and artillery, respecting which Captain Beauman will receive instructions; the military stores and store department, respecting which Captain Noble will receive instructions; a proportion of the grain and provision department, respecting which Captain Young will receive instructions; a proportion of the grain department, respecting

which Lieutenant Monteath will receive instructions; and all the baggage, followers, and bazaars.

Half the number of tents usually allowed to European troops will accompany the detachment on the march, and one tent per troop or company for each Native corps.

The remainder of the tents to be left here, in charge of the convalescents of the corps to which they belong.

Captain Mackay (agent for public cattle) will take care to arrange that there may be a carriage left behind for the tents belonging to the European troops. The sick, convalescents, and weakly men are to be left behind, and doolies for those men who require them to be moved, and a surgeon from each brigade to take care of the sick; the remainder of the doolies to accompany the troops.

Officers are requested to take with them as little baggage and as few tents as possible.

A quartermaster serjeant from each brigade, and a non-commissioned officer, to remain in charge of the baggage of each corps. The line serjeant to remain in charge of the camp equipage and baggage of head quarters.

Those quartermaster serjeants and non-commissioned officers must have a note from their commanding officers to Lieutenant-Colonel Chalmers, to point them out to that officer, whose orders they must obey in every particular.

Carriage must be left for every thing that stays behind, as it is possible the baggage may be ordered to march, and that the troops may not return to it.

Each man who marches to have about him sixty rounds of musket ammunition, for the deficiency of which officers commanding corps will send indents this day. They are to be complied with, without waiting for Major-General Wellesley's signature.

The forage guard for European corps, and for the park and provision departments, are struck off.

The 2nd battalion 18th regiment must send a havildar's guard to the park, one naig and four sepoys to the grain agent, and one naig and four sepoys to the provost, at *general* beating to-morrow morning, to relieve the guards with those departments, which will immediately join their corps, and Lieutenant-Colonel Chalmers will allot such guards for them afterwards as he may think necessary.

Captain Noble is authorised to increase his establishment, as assistant commissary of stores, to the proportion allowed for forty pieces of ordnance.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

[1637.]

MY DEAR COLMAN,

Camp at Goondy, 5th Sept., 1803.

I had not time to write to you to tell you that Colonel Boyé having transmitted a certificate that he had recovered his health, and having informed me that he was coming to join his corps, I sent him an order to join that part of it stationed at Panwell, as I could not with justice to the public service take out of your hands the conduct of affairs at Poonah. You will have heard that the enemy have entered the Nizam's country with their horse. The Godavery is fordable everywhere at present, and it is probable they may pass that river, and penetrate very far. I shall be obliged to attend to their movements; and I propose in that case to reinforce Poonah with three battalions, giving you at that place four battalions and five companies of Europeans. This, in an intrenched camp, will secure Poonah against all accidents. A party of your Europeans ought to be taught the great-gun exercise. I conclude that your depôt is kept complete to 4000 bags. Hereafter, if you should find that the enemy is actually advancing upon Poonah, you might stop part of the supply intended for Ahmednuggur, so as to make Poonah about 6000 bags. I recommend also that you should have in store a few thousand bags of dry grain, such as chinna, jowarry, and wheat. Considering the situation of Poonah, near the hills, and the fort of Seevagur, I should doubt whether it would be possible for any army of horse, however numerous, to cut you off entirely from forage. However, it would be as well to be prepared for such an event; and accordingly I would recommend you to make a contract for a store of from 15,000 to 20,000 bullock loads of hay. You might make this contract immediately if the new hay is coming in, and it is probable that you will get it at a cheap rate. But if you should be of opinion that the contract for the hay will stop or retard the supply of Ahmednuggur, or the depôt of grain at Poonah, it will be best to delay

for a time at least to enter into it. As I above observed, I doubt whether it will be possible to cut you off entirely from the forage on the hills; and even if the enemy should succeed in that object, there must now be green grass about Poonah which will feed your cattle: therefore we may consider the forage as the last point to be attended to. I hope that you have made a requisition on Bombay for ordnance and ammunition.

I have no reason to apprehend that Poonah will be attacked, but it is as well to be prepared for every event; and I fancy that very little exertion will put you in a state fit for this if it should occur.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1638.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

MY DEAR COLMAN,

Camp, 6th Sept., 1803.

My letter of yesterday will have shown you that I am not unmindful of your possible wants, and is nearly an answer to that which I received from you this day. Get up as soon as you can the howitzer and the brass 12-pounders, respecting which I wrote to you some days ago. Never mind the pontoons at present. I shall be obliged to give Colonel Stevenson my iron 12-pounders to take with him upon an expedition into Berar. Unless you can get up two iron 18-pounders upon field carriages, with their equipments, viz., 1000 rounds of powder and shot for each gun, and lodge them if possible in Ahmednuggur, I may be distressed for the want of heavy ordnance in the course of the campaign. Remember the shot must have gunny bags to carry them on the backs of bullocks, and the powder must be in barrels and gunny bags. Although I am anxious that this equipment should be set forward soon, I am more anxious that you should have the ordnance for your defence.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp at Kurka, 6th Sept., 1803. [1639.]

Major-General Wellesley requests that gentlemen will refrain from shooting on the line of march, or in the neighbourhood of the camp, till further orders.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. A. O.

Camp at Kurka, 6th Sept., 1803. [1640.]

It may be necessary to march with a part of the troops during the night, in which case a long roll will be beat at the Deputy Adjutant-General's tent (without any previous taps), which must be passed by the orderly drummers of the brigade majors and adjutants. In one hour afterwards another long roll will beat, which must be passed as above, when all the corps will be paraded, and must wait the orders to move.

The camp is to be struck, and the baggage, &c., laden between the drums, and to be ready to move to a place which will be occupied by two battalions for its defence.

Corps are to move without tents, and no baggage, excepting what each soldier carries for himself, and four casks of arrack and biscuit for the Europeans, sent on by the commissary. Cavalry to carry one day's feed of grain.

Each corps will have its proportion of guns, tumbrils, and spare ammunition; and Captain Noble will send 100 bullock loads of spare ammunition on the best bullocks in the camp. Doolies, except such as are occupied by sick men, to accompany corps.

Two corps will be named on the parade for the protection of the camp, &c. Their details now on piquet will join them. The details of the other corps will form a rear guard. The new piquets and pioneers will parade in front of the park immediately after the first long roll, whence the details which march will be sent to the marching flank.

One half of the pioneers will remain behind to fortify the camp to-morrow.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp at Kurka, 8th Sept., 1803. [1641.]

As it may be necessary at times to move at a very short notice, and as, at all events, it is necessary to prevent the enemy from having intelligence of the intended marches of this division, the following arrangements are to be made :

1. The intention, whether to march or to halt, will never be announced in the orders of the day.

2. The piquets of the infantry are at all times to parade at *réveillé* beating in front of the park.

3. All departments which require any preparations to be made, previous to the beating of the *general*, on a marching day are to make them every morning at such hour as they may think necessary: in case of a halt, notice will be sent to such departments.

4. If there should be a march, the *general* will be beat at half past four, and the assembly at half past five. The piquets will, in that case, parade as soon as possible in front of the park. Notice will be sent to them, and to the officers commanding brigades of cavalry and infantry, to inform them by which flank the troops will march.

5. If there should be a halt, early notice will be given thereof in a pass order.

6. It may at times be necessary to march suddenly, either in the day or night, without baggage; and it may not be possible, or may be improper, to give notice thereof to the troops, &c. In such a case the long roll will be beat, when preparations are to be made as ordered for the march on the night of the 6th instant; and in an hour and a half afterwards another long roll, when the troops are to be prepared to march off.

The following orders to be observed by the inlying piquets whenever there is an alarm in camp:

1. The inlying piquets, as well of cavalry as of infantry, are to turn out.

2. When the inlying piquets are turned out upon the occasion of an alarm, the remainder of the troops are to commence getting ready, viz.: the cavalry to saddle their horses, the infantry to put on their clothes and accoutrements, and the whole to be in readiness to fall into their ranks at a moment's notice.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1642.]

To the Adjutant-General.

SIR,

Camp at Kurka, 8th Sept., 1803.

I have received a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Woodington, commanding the troops in the territories of the Rajah

Anund Rao Guickwar, stating that the fort of Baroach was taken by storm, by the troops under his command on the 29th August. I have not received the detailed account of the attack upon Baroach, but Lieutenant-Colonel Woodington mentions that the troops behaved with great gallantry. Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar entered the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, by the Ghaut of Adjunttee, on the 24th August, when Colonel Stevenson was gone towards that of Badowly to the eastward; they passed with a body of horse only between his corps and Aurungabad to Jalnapoor, a fort situated about forty miles east of Aurungabad, and the capital of a district of the same name. I arrived at Aurungabad on the 29th; the enemy moved farther to the southward and eastward as soon as they heard of my arrival, and it was generally reported that they intended to march upon Hyderabad. I marched on the following days to Rackisbaum on the Godavery, and since to the eastward along the left bank of that river. The river has for some days been fordable everywhere, a circumstance never before known at this season of the year; but by these movements I have checked the enemy's operations to the southward, and they have returned again to the northward of Jalnapoor; and by the position which I occupy at present I give protection to the convoys under Lieutenant Griffiths and Major Hill, still on their march from the Kistna. Colonel Stevenson took Jalnapoor on the 2nd September; he is at present between that place and Aurungabad.

The brigade of infantry in the service of Begum Sumroo has ascended the Adjunttee Ghaut, and it is supposed that under the command of Colonel Pohlman has followed it: neither of them had found the enemy's head-quarters on the night of the 6th. The junction of these troops will retard the enemy's movements, and it may be possible to bring them to an action; but I imagine that I must carry on an offensive operation against the territories of the Rajah of Berar before I can remove them from the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan. The enemy's Pindarries have not done any material injury to the country. In many instances the villages have been defended by the inhabitants and the peons appointed to guard them, and the Pindarries have been beaten off: grain has consequently sold at a very high price in their camp.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar was encamped on the 2nd instant in a

situation between the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda. It does not appear to be certain that he will join the enemy.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1643.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

MY DEAR COLMAN,

Camp, 9th Sept., 1803.

The result of my examination into the state of Colonel Stevenson's and my ordnance is, that I don't send him my iron 12-pounders, but I do send him all my ammunition.

The stores at Ahmednuggur were in great confusion, and we had not been able when I came away to find any 12-pounder shot. A certain number have been found since, and it is possible that as many may have been found as I shall require to equip these pieces of ordnance again. I write to the officer in charge of the stores there to prepare to send me on as many as I require; but it may happen that he may not have found a sufficient quantity, and in that case I have desired him to let you know the deficiency.

I shall be obliged to you if you will desire an officer of artillery to look at the Peshwah's stores and see if they contain any 12-pounder shot; if they do, Colonel Close will assist you in getting the quantity which I shall require. If they do not, or if there should be any difficulty in getting them, I will request you to apply for the quantity required at Bombay, and forward it on to Ahmednuggur.

I have not ordered the colours of the 1st of the 3rd to Panwell.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1644.]

To Major Malcolm.

* MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp, 9th Sept., 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 3rd. I agree in every syllable of your letters to Mr. Duncan. You cannot say more than I feel of respect towards him, or of a desire to conduct my public duties, connected with his government, according to his

wishes ; but I have now done with Guzerat, so that there will be an end to all contention, or rather difference of opinion, between us.

Colonel Stevenson beat up a Pindarry camp on the night of the 6th ; but, from private accounts from his camp, I suspect that the Soubah's cavalry are very bad and very useless. What do you think of the piquets having been obliged to defend themselves with cannon during the whole of the 6th? I believe the same thing happened yesterday, as one of my hircarrahs has reported that he saw an action between our infantry and the enemy's cavalry yesterday morning, in which there was much firing of cannon, and the latter were driven off ; but Colonel Stevenson, from whom I have just received a letter of the 8th, does not mention it.

The enemy are far distant to the northward. The sirdars of the silladar are much discontented, and swear that they will not serve unless the campoos are brought forward. It is said that Scindiah is going to Burhampoor. Not a horseman has been near me yet : indeed, they will not allow me to get within forty miles of them.

Every hircarrah who comes in brings accounts of reports of the *Filtâr* of the Nizam's sirdars, particularly of Sookroodoor.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. A. O.

Heedgaum, 12th Sept., 1803. [1645.]

Until further orders, a company of Native infantry under an European officer to go out every day with the public elephants and camels for forage. When the drum has beat, indicating a halt, the company to proceed to the elephant karkhana at daylight ; and on marching days it is to proceed thither one hour after coming to the new ground. A sepoy with his musket is to be mounted on every elephant. When the agent for public cattle finds that he can forage within the camp, he will send notice in writing to the corps detailed to furnish the company, which, on such occasions, need not proceed to the karkhana.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1646.]

To Major Malcolm.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp, 12th Sept., 1803.

I have received your letter of the 7th, and return Shawe's to you. I am perfectly satisfied with the instructions to Colonel Murray. I don't want to knock up the Resident at Baroda: all I want is an efficient military authority, one that will and can be made responsible for its military actions, in Guzerat and the Attavesy, for the purposes of the war. That is provided for, and I am satisfied.

I am glad to find that you are so much better, but you must restrain your pen.

Stevenson attacked the enemy again on the night of the 9th, and did great damage, as the hircarrahs come from their camp; not much in his opinion. They have some Pindarries in my neighbourhood now, who have done us little mischief themselves, but they have set the village people a-going, and these have attacked our supplies; a gallows or two will, however, remedy that evil. The main body keep away from me, and remain to the northward, about fifty miles from hence, and not far from the passes.

I enclose you a curious letter which I got last night. I made the movement therein suggested yesterday morning, and accordingly they went off. But this letter, however contradictory, has annoyed me considerably, as it gives room for doubt whether the plan I had in contemplation for the campaign is practicable. If the doubts contained in the last paragraph are founded, it certainly is not.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1647.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, 13th Sept., 1803.

I received this morning your letters of the 12th, and I regret exceedingly the circumstances which occasion your desire to return to Calcutta. If you wish it, I will take upon me to give you leave to return immediately, but I should wish that Captain Bradshaw should join me. A detachment, under Captain Baynes, goes to Rackisbaum in the morning, and he might return with it.

You mentioned in our conversation at Auringabad that you had had a secret communication with one of Scindiah's moonshees. It would be very desirable to renew this communication, and to keep it up, if possible, during the war. I shall be obliged to you if you will make known your ideas upon this subject to Captain Bradshaw, or if you will write them to me.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P. S. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar are gone to the northward.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

[1648.]

MY DEAR COLMAN,

Camp, 14th Sept., 1803.

I have received your letter of the 11th.

I want nothing at Panwell except one company of the 1st of the 3rd. The orders upon that subject are sufficiently distinct: however, I issue another this day. I cannot now understand the advantage of having the colours of the battalion in one place or the other, although Colonel Boyé says it would be an honour and an advantage to him to have them at Panwell, and you appear desirous to keep them at Poonah. However, as Poonah must not be weakened even of the recruits, the staff and colours and recruits shall remain there; but the latter must be drilled quickly.

As for covering Poonah with your intrenchment, it cannot be done, and must not be attempted. Your grain and provisions must also be in your camp. If you should want cover for them, you must remove the old or set up fresh Arcot roofs. If you have your grain and provisions on the opposite side of the river, you must fortify the place, have a communication with it, &c. &c., all of which cost immense labour, will require many men for its guard, and will be weak after all. Let Mr. Goodfellow, send me an estimate of the expense of the works he proposes to erect, and I shall authorise it. I anxiously recommend that they should not be too extensive, as they will require all your force to guard them, whereas you ought to be able to send out a large proportion of it. I don't know yet what force I shall be able to send you, but when you require four battalions

[1646.]

To Major Malcolm.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp, 12th Sept., 1803.

I have received your letter of the 7th, and return Shawe's to you. I am perfectly satisfied with the instructions to Colonel Murray. I don't want to knock up the Resident at Baroda: all I want is an efficient military authority, one that will and can be made responsible for its military actions, in Guzerat and the Attavesy, for the purposes of the war. That is provided for, and I am satisfied.

I am glad to find that you are so much better, but you must restrain your pen.

Stevenson attacked the enemy again on the night of the 9th, and did great damage, as the hircarrahs come from their camp; not much in his opinion. They have some Pindarries in my neighbourhood now, who have done us little mischief themselves, but they have set the village people a-going, and these have attacked our supplies; a gallows or two will, however, remedy that evil. The main body keep away from me, and remain to the northward, about fifty miles from hence, and not far from the passes.

I enclose you a curious letter which I got last night. I made the movement therein suggested yesterday morning, and accordingly they went off. But this letter, however contradictory, has annoyed me considerably, as it gives room for doubt whether the plan I had in contemplation for the campaign is practicable. If the doubts contained in the last paragraph are founded, it certainly is not.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1647.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, 13th Sept., 1803.

I received this morning your letters of the 12th, and I regret exceedingly the circumstances which occasion your desire to return to Calcutta. If you wish it, I will take upon me to give you leave to return immediately, but I should wish that Captain Bradshaw should join me. A detachment, under Captain Baynes, goes to Rackisbaum in the morning, and he might return with it.

You mentioned in our conversation at Auringabad that you had had a secret communication with one of Scindiah's moonshees. It would be very desirable to renew this communication, and to keep it up, if possible, during the war. I shall be obliged to you if you will make known your ideas upon this subject to Captain Bradshaw, or if you will write them to me.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P. S. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar are gone to the northward.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

[1648.]

MY DEAR COLMAN,

Camp, 14th Sept., 1803.

I have received your letter of the 11th.

I want nothing at Panwell except one company of the 1st of the 3rd. The orders upon that subject are sufficiently distinct: however, I issue another this day. I cannot now understand the advantage of having the colours of the battalion in one place or the other, although Colonel Boyé says it would be an honour and an advantage to him to have them at Panwell, and you appear desirous to keep them at Poonah. However, as Poonah must not be weakened even of the recruits, the staff and colours and recruits shall remain there; but the latter must be drilled quickly.

As for covering Poonah with your intrenchment, it cannot be done, and must not be attempted. Your grain and provisions must also be in your camp. If you should want cover for them, you must remove the old or set up fresh Arcot roofs. If you have your grain and provisions on the opposite side of the river, you must fortify the place, have a communication with it, &c. &c., all of which cost immense labour, will require many men for its guard, and will be weak after all. Let Mr. Goodfellow, send me an estimate of the expense of the works he proposes to erect, and I shall authorise it. I anxiously recommend that they should not be too extensive, as they will require all your force to guard them, whereas you ought to be able to send out a large proportion of it. I don't know yet what force I shall be able to send you, but when you require four battalions

and five companies of Europeans to secure your position at Poonah, you are not aware that I secure my baggage, in a camp which I intrench in a day, with one battalion, and that in order to give you those four battalions I must keep the field opposed to all the confederates with only four battalions.

I have also to tell you that at Hyderabad they have only two battalions.

I don't know how you made out the return of the Panwell detachment, but according to our returns here it does not amount to any thing like the number of men stated therein.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1649.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

MY DEAR COLMAN,

Camp, 16th Sept., 1803.

I have received your letter of the 13th. I approve your order regarding the appointment of Major Spens to purchase the cattle.

I should be glad to know from you what authority there is from the government of Bombay for charging a gratuity of four rupees for every bullock purchased for the service.

This very allowance, which appears to be the bone of contention between the two gentlemen, is the reason for which I approve of the appointment of Major Spens. If the officer who had charge of the cattle were to receive the allowance for purchasing them (as it is probable that every casualty would be replaced), he would in fact receive a gratuity for every bullock he should lose, and this, in my opinion, would be a premium for omitting to do his duty. I am always glad to avoid doing any thing so preposterous, and therefore approve highly of your order upon public grounds.

I am obliged to you for the trouble you have taken about my shot. I will write to you hereafter about Lieutenant Good-fellow.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Adjutant-General.

[1650.]

SIR,

Camp, 17th Sept., 1803.

I have the honour to enclose copies of orders issued by me in the months of July and August last, which require the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief.

The artificers for whom the allowance is made by the order of the 4th August were levied at Bombay upon the arrival of this division of the army at Poonah. The wheel-carriages were at that time in a very defective state, and had been kept together only by the constant labour of the artificers attached to corps. Those in the store department only complete the number allowed by the regulations of government. Those levied for the provision department have been found absolutely necessary to keep the carriages in repair. The rate of wages of all descriptions of persons hired at Bombay is higher than that given to similar descriptions in the territories under the government of Fort St. George; and the artificers required could not be procured at lower rates.

The order of the 14th August regarding medical supplies was issued because I found that the corps were likely to be in want of medicines, and I had no reason to believe that any provision had been made at Fort St. George to supply them. These medical supplies are now on the road to Ahmednuggur.

I have, however, this day seen a letter from the medical store-keeper at Fort St. George, dated the 3rd instant, to the medical staff-surgeon with this division, stating that by order of the Commander-in-Chief he was about to despatch medical supplies for the troops under my command to Masulipatam, from whence they would proceed by Hyderabad to join the troops. It is not probable that these supplies will be within reach till the end of November, and in the beginning of January another supply will become due: I therefore propose that the supplies expected from Bombay shall be used in the quarter commencing in October, and that those which the medical storekeeper at Madras will have despatched in the beginning of this month shall be used in the quarter commencing in January. As soon as I find that the latter will approach Hyderabad I will make arrangements for bringing them forward to a situation from which they can be brought in safety to the troops.

As I have above mentioned, the wheel-carriages with this

division of the army were in a very unserviceable state when they arrived at Poonah; they were old carriages which had been originally brought to Mysore in the year 1799; they had been much used since that period, frequently repaired; and nothing but the urgency of the occasion, and the general want of wheel-carriages on the establishment, could have induced me to send them out. On my arrival at Poonah I determined to make new wheels for them all, and accordingly during the month which I was there considerable progress was made in the work, under the superintendence of Captain Noble, the assistant commissary of stores. Much, however, still remained to be done, and I appointed Captain Lieutenant Browne to superintend the work when Captain Noble marched with the troops from Poonah. I issued the order of the 21st August with a view to reward his services, and in consideration of the trust reposed in him.

I have the pleasure to inform you that on the 26th August new wheels for all the field-carriages were completed, including the light guns attached to the cavalry, and since that time Captain Browne has been employed in constructing garrison-carriage for the service of the garrison of Ahmednuggur.

The accounts of the expenses of these repairs, exclusive of the salary to Captain Browne, will appear in the accounts of the commissary of supply. I likewise enclose copies of letters authorising expenses, which require the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief, and accounts of expenses incurred in the months of July and August, for the payment of which no provision is made by the regulations of government.

The sum of money paid to Soubahdar Kawder Nawaz Khan was given when that person was sent on a mission to Jeawunt Rao Holkar.

The sum of money paid to Mr. Read was for expenses incurred in forwarding supplies to this division of the army from Hullihall in Soonda, when it was on its march to Poonah, for constructing boats, &c.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P.S. I enclose a letter from Captain Barclay relative to the payment of wages of muttaseddees, gomastahs, &c., employed in collecting and bringing forward the brinjaries in the Barahmahal and Ceded Districts which were allotted to the ser-

vice of the grand army, and these expenses have not therefore appeared in my account.

To Major Malcolm.

[1651.]

MY DEAR MALCOLM, Camp at Golah Pangree, 20th Sept., 1803.

I marched this morning, and shall continue to push at the enemy. I sent yesterday two battalions to Poonah, one of them the 1st of the 3rd. I had long been bored by Captain ——'s growling, and at last he came one morning to grumble because the sepoy's were paid in star pagodas. I told him that a star pagoda was the Company's coin, and, if it did not exchange for the number of Chandoorie rupees that might be wished, I could not help it, and could not give a man three star pagodas whose pay was only two. He was not satisfied, but said that he would put down his complaint in writing. Upon this I told him that I was going to reinforce Poonah, and, as I had not leisure to attend to his grumbling, his should be the corps to go there. I know that you are interested about this corps, and therefore I mention the facts particularly. I have kept with me your relation, Little, till you come back.

When you come, you should come from Poonah to Ahmednuggur, thence to Rackisbaum on the Godavery, from Rackisbaum to Goondy, ten miles lower down the river, where we have a company. You will there fall in with a detachment which I have formed to go backwards and forwards between the Bheer and Dharore districts and the army, to secure our supplies; and you may join with it. Captain Baynes commands it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

24th Sept., 1803. [1652.]

Major-General Wellesley returns his thanks to the troops for their conduct in the action of yesterday, the result of which is so honourable to them, and likely to be so advantageous to the public interest. He requests Lieutenant-Colonel Harness and Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, in particular, to accept his acknowledgments for the manner in which they conducted their respective brigades.

Major-General Wellesley has also every reason to applaud the conduct of the cavalry, particularly that of the 19th dragoons, and to express the deep regret he feels at the loss of Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, who led them.

A Royal salute to be fired in camp this afternoon upon the occasion of the victory gained over the enemy's army yesterday; and a Royal salute to be fired on the same occasion, on the receipt of this order, in each of the detachments, and in each of the garrisons under the command of Major-General Wellesley, in the territories of the Company, of the Soubah of the Deccan, of the Peshwah, and of the Rajah Anund Rao Guickwar.

The whole of the 1st battalion of the 2nd regiment, with a proportion of European and Native officers, to parade as a working party in front of the park at six o'clock to-morrow morning, to be employed under Captain Beauman's directions in bringing the captured guns into the lines.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1653.] G. A. O.

24th Sept., 1803.

The field officer of the day will order such details of the Native inlying piquets to occupy parts in rear of the camp this evening as he may think proper, in lieu of the companies of the outlying piquets usually detached on that duty.

MEM.

Fifty bags of rice to be issued at the moodee khana to-night, at 5 seers per rupee, which will be divided as follows: 2½ bags to each regimental bazaar, and the remainder to the head quarter bazaar; the 74th cutwahl receives for that regiment and the 78th: this rice must be retailed at 4½ seers per rupee.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1654.]

To Major Malcolm.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp, 26th Sept., 1803.

Colonel Close will have informed you of our victory on the 23rd. Our loss has been very severe; but we have got more than 90 guns, 70 of which are the finest brass ordnance I have ever seen. The enemy, in great consternation, are gone down the Ghauts; Stevenson follows them to-morrow. I am obliged

to halt, to move my wounded to Dowlutabad. It is reported that Jadoon Rao is missing. They say that Scindiah and Ragojee are stupified by their defeat. They don't know what to do, and reproach each other. Their baggage was plundered by their own people, and many of their troops are gone off.

I return your letter. I send Mr. Duncan this day a copy of my letter to the Governor-General, in which you will see a detail of the action.

The bay horse was shot under me, and Diomed was piked, so that I am not now sufficiently mounted. Will you let me have the grey Arab? I must also request you to get for me two good saddles and bridles.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

[1655.]

MY DEAR COLMAN,

Camp at Assye, 26th Sept., 1803.

We shall go on very well, but it will be better when you have a fit of the bile to keep it to yourself, and not give it me in a letter.

The camp which you have occupied will answer well for the present force, and appears to have been judiciously fortified; but I examined the ground on that side of the river particularly when I was at Poonah, and I observed that it was all commanded. In my opinion, therefore, as soon as you will be joined by the reinforcement on its march to you, you will do well to occupy the high ground on the other side, on which I originally intended that Colonel Murray should encamp.

As I have beaten Scindiah's army, and taken all his guns, I doubt much whether any body of infantry with guns will venture into this part of the country. Two battalions with the 84th will, therefore, give you tolerable security at Poonah; and as I have suffered a very great loss in the action of the 23rd, I have ordered back one of the battalions which was going to you.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1656.] G. O.

Camp at Assye, 27th Sept., 1803.

1. Officers commanding corps will prepare, as soon as circumstances will permit them, returns of their wounded men whom it is desirable to send to a field hospital.

2. How many of that number require dooly carriage, how many can go in carts, how many upon elephants, how many upon horses or bullocks, and how many can walk.

3. Numbers of wounded men who may be kept with the army, without detriment to them.

Major-General Wellesley wishes to have this return as soon as possible, in order that no time may be lost in making arrangements to send off the wounded men; and he requests that officers commanding Native corps will let Mr. Gilmour (superintending surgeon) have a note of the carriages they have got, so that it may be seen what quantity is available for the service.

The following alterations will take place to-morrow in the details for the infantry piquets, and continue until further orders. The 74th regiment is to be struck off the roster; the adjutant of the day to be furnished by a roster of corps, and the adjutant of the day in the brigade to be discontinued; three subaltern officers to mount piquet, to be furnished by a general roster; and the inlying piquets of each brigade to be under a subaltern officer of the brigade furnished by a roster.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1657.] G. M. O.

Camp at Assye, 30th Sept., 1803.

The carpenters, smiths, and bellows boys, belonging to the corps of infantry in camp, to be sent to the park immediately with their tools, to be employed in making yokes and repairing them, &c., for the captured guns.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1658.] G. O.

30th Sept., 1803.

The 1st battalion 10th regiment and 2nd battalion 12th regiment are to furnish each a dresser for the field hospital.

The staff surgeon is to furnish servants, European medicines, wine, and clothing, as far as the state of his stores will admit:

he is also authorised to purchase ten dozens of Madeira wine at the public expense: twenty pioneers to be employed under the surgeon with the field hospital.

The Native troops who will be sent to the field hospital are to continue to receive half a seer of rice *per diem* each man, in the same manner as those in the field. The commissary of grain is to send down to Adjuttee 200 bags of rice for this purpose; he is also to send 200 bags of rice, 1600 sheep, 300 measures of salt, 400 gallons of arrack, into Adjuttee, to be handed over to the surgeon in charge for the use of the European sick. The men who are to set out for the field hospital to-morrow, under the orders of yesterday, are to march at daylight under an escort of five companies of the 2nd battalion 11th regiment with their guns. Each corps is to send tents for its sick into the field hospital, in the proportion of one tent for every ten men. Officers commanding European corps will take care to give notice to the agent for public cattle of the number of elephants and camels they will require for this purpose.

The captured guns will be moved to-morrow, according to instructions which the commanding officer of artillery and commissary of stores have received. The commissary of stores will communicate with the agent for public cattle respecting the number of bullocks required to move them. Two companies 2nd battalion 11th regiment will march to-morrow morning, according to instructions which the commanding officer will receive. Two parties, of fifty pioneers each, to be in readiness to march to-morrow with the captured guns.

A guard of one Native commissioned officer and a detail of forty Native infantry to accompany the cattle when they go to graze daily until further orders, when an order is beat indicating a halt: the guard to proceed to the karkhana at daybreak; and on marching days it is to proceed thither an hour after coming to the new ground.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

[1659.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, 2nd Oct., 1803.

I have been obliged to order three companies from the garrison of Ahmednuggur to escort some of the captured guns from Goondy, on the Godavery, to that place; and when this

detachment will come in, it will be necessary to send out another to escort the captured guns which are still on the frontier. The garrison of Ahmednuggur will be much weakened when this detachment will be out; and from the imprudence of the gentlemen therein in having employed the sepoy upon light troop services, for which they are entirely unfit, and from the consequent retreat which a body of them has made before a party of peons, a spirit of opposition has arisen throughout that country which is very dangerous: moreover, as I understand, on the 29th a company on its march to General Campbell's camp with non-commissioned drafts for every corps in the army was plundered and shut up in a house by a parcel of peons, and Captain Lucas was obliged to march with the greater part of the garrison to their relief. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should keep Ahmednuggur in strength. Accordingly I request that if the 2nd of the 18th should have arrived, you will, on receipt of this letter, send off three companies of that corps to Ahmednuggur, commanded by an officer junior in rank to Captain Lucas; if they should not have arrived, I beg you to send orders to meet Colonel Griffin, to make the detachment immediately on receipt of your order.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1660.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, 3rd Oct., 1803.

I have not written to you since the action of the 23rd September,* because I have had much to do, and I thought it

* *Extract from a letter by Lieutenant (afterwards Sir Colin) Campbell relative to the Battle of Assye, written at the time of the transaction.*

"The detachment waited for several days near the Godavery for supplies, which joined us on the 19th September. On the 21st we marched, and encamped near Colonel Stevenson at Budnapoor, where General Wellesley had a conference with that officer, and it was agreed that the two detachments were to march by different routes upon the enemy, whom they expected to come up with on the 24th. There was a range of hills between us and the enemy. Colonel Stevenson marched by the western pass and General Wellesley by the eastern on the 22nd, and encamped about eight coss asunder at the two extremities of the range of hills. On the 23rd we again marched, and came to our ground about 11 o'clock (and supposed that the

probable that some time would elapse before you would arrive at Hyderabad, and that my letter would not reach you upon the road. I attacked the united armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah

enemy were about ten or twelve miles off by the information from our *hir-carrab*). The General was with the advance; and some dragoons, who were covering the Quartermaster-General, brought in some *brinjarry* men with bullocks, who said that the combined armies were encamped about two *coos* off; that part of their cavalry had marched that morning, and that their infantry was to follow; that if the General would go to the rising ground in front, he would have a view of their camp.

"The General immediately formed his plan. As he thought there was not a moment to be lost, and was suspicious that the enemy would make off and not stand an action, he wrote a note, or the first intimation he had of the enemy, to Colonel Stevenson, who, he expected, could not be far distant. He ordered on the cavalry, followed by the infantry *piquets* under the command of Colonel Orrock, and reinforced the rear-guard with a battalion under Colonel Chalmers, to protect our stores, camp-equipage, &c. At the village where we had intended to encamp we came in sight of the enemy's camp about one o'clock; our cavalry drew up near a large body of the enemy, who had come out to reconnoitre us. The General, on seeing their camp, immediately determined to attack their left, where their *campos* with their guns were. Their position seemed very strong: a deep rocky nullah in their front and another in their rear, which nullahs joined a little below the village of Assye and protected their flank. They appeared to be in three different encampments: Scindiah, with all his cavalry, on the right; the Berar Rajah in the centre; *campos* on the left of them; the two nullahs ran along all their front and rear, and their camp extended from five to seven miles.

"We moved forward to the attack with the 74th and 78th regiments and four battalions of *sepoys*. The *piquets* led, and our cavalry brought up the rear to protect us from their horse (our whole force brought into action did not amount to 5000 men). They fired at us when at a considerable distance, and did some execution; but by the time we came to the first nullah they had got our range completely, and opened a most tremendous fire on us, which galled us much. We were detained by our guns for a little time at the nullah, and when we crossed we were obliged to bring up our right shoulders to attack their left flank. The enemy, upon this, were obliged to change their front, which they did with the greatest regularity and precision. We were now getting very near them. They advanced with their guns upon us. The line was ordered to form. Colonel Harness's brigade at this time were only across the nullah, and the 74th regiment, of the 5th brigade, which brigade was ordered to form a second line, and the 74th regiment to support the *piquets* on our right, and to keep two or three hundred paces in their rear; the cavalry formed a third line. During these formations we lost numbers of officers and men, as the enemy fired mostly grape and chain-shot. The village of Assye was on our right; the *piquets* were ordered not to go too near it, as there appeared to be some infantry in it, and, in advancing, on no account to incline towards it. The line was ordered to advance. The *piquets* at this period had nearly lost a third of their number, and most of the gun-bullocks were killed; some of the corps, I think, waited too long, wishing to bring forward their guns, which could be of no service. The line moved forward rapidly (I may say without firing two rounds) and took pos-

and the Rajah of Berar on that day, and gained a complete victory, having taken ninety-eight pieces of cannon, all their ammunition, &c. &c. My division alone was engaged. The

session of the first line of guns, where many of the enemy were killed. They then moved on in equally good order and resolution to the second line of guns, from which they very soon drove the enemy; but many of the artillery, who pretended to be dead when we passed on to the second line of guns, turned the guns we had taken upon us, which obliged us to return and again to drive them from them. Things at this period did not go on so well on our right, owing to some mistake of the piquets in having, when ordered to advance, inclined to their right, which brought the 74th regiment into the first line. Major Swinton went to the piquets, and asked them why they did not move on? On his return to his regiment he found that numbers of his officers and men had fallen. He immediately moved forward. At this period the cannonade was truly tremendous. A milk-hedge in their front, which they had to pass to come at the enemy's guns, threw them into a little confusion; but they still pushed forward and had taken possession of many of their guns, when the second line, which opened on them, obliged them to retire from what they had so dearly purchased. The numbers of the 74th regiment remaining at this period were small; on their returning some of the enemy's cavalry came forward and cut up many of the wounded officers and men. It was at this critical moment that the 19th charged, and saved the remains of the 74th regiment. General Wellesley at the same time threw the 78th regiment forward on their right, to move down on the enemy, who still kept their position at Assye. This movement and the charge of the 19th light dragoons made the enemy retire from all their guns precipitately, and they fled across the nullah to our right at the village of Assye, where numbers of them were cut up by the cavalry. It was in this business that Colonel Maxwell fell. It was unfortunate that the cavalry were obliged to be introduced into the action, as it rendered them unfit for pursuing the enemy. We began to advance a little after three, and the action was not entirely over till near six o'clock. We were all greatly fatigued, having marched by the perambulator that day twenty-four miles to the first nullah.

"The General was in the thick of the action the whole time, and had a horse killed under him. No man could have shown a better example to the troops than he did. I never saw a man so cool and collected as he was the whole time, though I can assure you, till our troops got orders to advance, the fate of the day seemed doubtful; and if the numerous cavalry of the enemy had done their duty, I hardly think it possible that we could have succeeded. From the European officers who have since surrendered, it appears they had about twelve thousand infantry, and their cavalry is supposed to have been at least twenty thousand, though many make it more. We have now in our possession one hundred and two guns, and all their tumbrils. The remains of the enemy's infantry deserted after the action.

"Your dear son was killed near the milk-hedge; I cannot yet for certain ascertain whether when advancing or returning, but I think the former, as he was shot in the breast by a grape; he had no other wound. Major Swinton talks of him in the highest terms for his conduct on that day. He informs me that he was the last officer of the regiment killed. The last time I saw him was when forming in rear of the piquets; he was obliged to dismount, as his horse became unruly. He was then, poor fellow, in high spirits, and we had a short conversation. He had a biscuit, which he divided with

battle was the most severe that, I believe, ever was fought in India, and my loss was very great. Scindiah's infantry behaved well: they were driven from their guns only by the bayonet, and

me. Poor M'Leod was at this period killed. Lorn* was twice wounded in the legs, but persisted in going on; he at last, poor fellow! I believe, fainted, and was left behind when the troops were retiring, and cut up by the cavalry. These are all the particulars I have been able to gather of these gallant youths.

"We remained by our arms that night in the field, and in the morning our baggage came up.

"Colonel Stevenson, with part of his detachment, joined us in the night of the 24th. He had been led astray by the guides or hircarrahs, and if we had deferred the action a day he would not have been with us. The enemy that night retired twelve miles in the greatest confusion, and on the 24th descended the Ghauts. Colonel Stevenson pursued them on the 26th, and found some of their guns, &c., on the road. He has since taken Burhampoor and Asseerghur, with the loss of only five or six men, and is now following Scindiah into Berar.

"(Signed) COLIN CAMPBELL,
"Brigade Major to General Wellesley."

Marquess Wellesley to Major-Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Fort William, 27th Oct., 1803.

You will conceive the pride and delight with which I received the details of your most splendid victory of the 23rd September; you will also feel my disappointment at not having received them from yourself; the interruption of the dawk through Cuttack induced the collector to embark all your despatches down to the 3rd of this month, and not a syllable from yourself has yet reached me of any date between the 12th of September, and the 3rd of October.

But from various quarters the particulars of your glory have reached me, although not in a form which can yet admit of a Public Order, (beyond the honours of a salute,) yet in substance sufficiently solid to found the basis of hopes as auspicious, as your fame must be durable, and, in India, unrivalled. With much solicitude for the success of your operations on public grounds, and with every additional anxiety, which affection could inspire, I have fixed my attention on your progress, from the hour of your departure from General Stuart's camp, to the moment of your action of the 23rd of September; and I declare to you most sincerely, that you have infinitely surpassed all that I could have required from you in my public capacity; and have soared beyond the highest point, to which all my affection and all the pride of my blood could have aspired, in the most ardent expectations which could be suggested by my sentiments of respect and love for a brother, who has always held the highest place in my heart and in my judgment.

Your battle of the 23rd (of which I have seen plans) is equal in skill and fortitude to any of which the account exists in history. Your loss certainly was dreadful (if not exaggerated to me)—the result must I think reduce the enemy either to peace, or to the condition of mere freebooters; accompanied as your success is by such a crowd of victories, as, I believe, never before were condensed in so small a space of time. You may be assured, that your reputation is of the first lustre and magnitude; and splendid, matchless.

* The brother of the writer of this account.

some of the corps retreated in great order and formed again. The campoos engaged were Pohlman's, Begum Sumroo's, and another which has been called by the hircarrahs Monkely's,

as was your victory on the 23rd, it was not more than was expected from you; nor in my judgment does it excel the honour you have acquired in conducting your army from Mysore to Assye, and in accomplishing all the great objects, which were finally secured on the 23rd of September.

I am in hourly expectation of your despatches, and therefore I shall not write more at present; you will be glad to receive this short note, and when you reflect on the troubles by which I have been surrounded, you will pardon my long omission of private letters.

I enclose two notes; one containing the general outline of the reports of your victory as they have reached me; another some hints respecting peace. God protect you my dear Arthur, and preserve you for your country, and for your most affectionate brother,

WELLESLEY.

TERMS OF PEACE.

We must *now* positively retain—

From Scindiah :

The Doab of the Jumna and Ganges.

Delhi.

Agra, and the whole line of the right bank of the Jumna to the junction at Allahabad.

The King,

The Mahrattas must be expelled from the northern parts of Hindostan altogether—the boundary to be formed by the petty states, Rajpoots, Jauts, &c.

From the Berar man :

Cuttack with a good frontier.

A crore or two of rupees if he possess so much.

The frontier of Bundelcund.

On the western side of India :

Scindiah's maritime possessions and his possessions in Guzerat.

Ahmednuggur for the Peshwah.

All intermixed territories and forts for the Nizam (from Scindiah and Berar).

Exemption of choute for the Nizam.

W.

NOTE RESPECTING THE VICTORY AT ASSYE.

95 or 101 pieces of cannon taken from the enemy.

Great part of their camp-equipage.

Many bullocks and cattle.

Their loss in killed not above 1200.

Their army entirely routed and dispersed.

Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar's troops *only* engaged (not Holkar's).

Colonel Stevenson pursuing on the 28th.

The enemy flying in all directions.

Our loss about 600 Europeans killed and wounded.

Total Native and European 1500 killed and wounded.

Many officers included, and almost the whole 74th regiment.

W.

Macquire's, and the Maharajah's. I rather believe, however, that, as Mr. Grant was the brigade-major of one of the campoos engaged, the one of which I have not ascertained the name is Dodernaigue's.*

I enclose a list of officers belonging to the campoo of which Mr. Grant was brigade-major, which has been made up by taking from a few leaves of an old orderly book the names of officers ordered for duty. From a perusal of this list you will probably be able to form an opinion what this brigade was; and as every thing relating to this action is a matter of curiosity, I shall be glad to hear from you upon the subject.

I have some reason to complain of Scindiah's English officers, and I shall bring the subject forward publicly as soon as I can ascertain the matter more completely. My soldiers say that after they were knocked down by cannon or grape shot, they were cut and piked by the horse belonging to the campoos, which indeed is perfectly true, and that horse was cut to pieces by the British cavalry. But they say besides that they heard one English officer with a battalion say to another, "You understand the language better than I do: desire the jemidar of that body of horse to go and cut up those wounded European soldiers." The other did as he was desired, and the horse obeyed the orders they received.

It is bad enough that these gentlemen should serve the enemies of their country, particularly after the British government had offered them a provision; but it is too bad that they should make themselves the instruments, or rather that they should excite the savage ferocity of the Natives against their brave and wounded countrymen.

As soon as the soldiers are sufficiently recovered from their wounds, I shall have them examined particularly respecting this report; and if I find it is substantiated, I intend to make a public report on the subject to government, with which I shall send a list of the names of the officers engaged in this battle, and I will request that the whole may be made public, that they may be held up to the execration of their country and the world.

It is reported, and I believe it to be true, that Jadoon Rao has died of wounds that he received in the action of the 23rd.

* It was subsequently ascertained that Colonel Dupont commanded the brigade in question. See p. 207.

I have taken advantage of the passage through this camp of a vakeel from the Rajah of Kolapoor to Scindiah, to urge upon his ministers the impropriety of detaining Lieutenant Simpson; and I have desired this person to say that it would be very agreeable to me to hear that he had been released. Mr. Simpson is, I hear, in camp, and well.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

List of Europeans serving with the enemy.

* Brigade-Major R. Grant.	Ensign Mars.
Captain-Lieut. Mercier.	* Lieut. Stuart.
Ensign Wroughton.	Captain-Lieut. Honoré.
* Ensign M'Culloch.	Ensign Cameron.
Captain Gautier.	John Beckett, Aide-de-camp to the
Cadet Songstar.	Commander-in-Chief.
Ensign Perrin.	Brigade-Major d'Orton, a different
Ensign Brown.	Brigade.

* These officers were not present in the action, as afterwards explained. See p. 206.

[1661.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles, President of a General Court Martial.*

SIR,

Camp, 5th Oct., 1803.

I had yesterday the honour of receiving the duplicate proceedings of the general court martial on the trial of Lieutenant

There does not appear to be the smallest doubt that that officer applied to Mr. Drummond for his interference as a magistrate, and that he wrote him the letter No. 3 in the proceedings because the result of that magisterial interference was not such as he wished it to be. It is not even denied by Lieutenant ——— that that letter is a very improper one, and, as expressed in the charge, it is certainly "couched in intemperate and indecorous terms." Lieutenant ———, therefore, is guilty of having written that letter to Mr. Drummond in consequence of his act as a magistrate.

It is immaterial whether the letter is private or public; indeed, it is difficult to draw the distinction between them. If

the letter were intended to be the ground of a private quarrel and its consequences, it is still more reprehensible than if it were intended as a public offence to a public officer, as it is well known that no public officer whatever can do his duty, particularly one in a judicial capacity, if he be not protected from the insults of those who may apply to him for redress, as Lieutenant —— did in this instance, or who may be brought before him.

I beg that the members of the general court martial will individually and collectively consider their own situation, and whether it is consistent with propriety or the common rules of justice that those who are employed to sit in judgment on the conduct of others should be liable to insult (the intention of which is in this instance avowed) for their acts; and after that I beg them to decide whether a private reprimand, which, at all events, is an improper punishment, is adequate to the offence of which Lieutenant —— has been guilty.

I request that the sentence of this court martial may be revised.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Malcolm.

[1662.]

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp, 5th Oct., 1803.

I enclose a letter for Henry, which I wish you to send by the first opportunity. If a ship should sail immediately, let the letter go by her, and let me know when the overland despatch will go, that I may write by that opportunity.

A kind of proposal has come to negotiate. Ballojee Koonger and a Krooman have written to desire that Captain Johnson and Rajah Mohiput Ram may be sent to Scindiah's camp to re-establish the old relations of peace. I have answered that I have nothing to propose to Scindiah, and therefore that it is not necessary that I should send an officer to him; but that, if he has any thing to propose to me, he may send a sirdar here, who will be received and treated well.

I hope to have the papers ready copied to send to Mr. Duncan to-morrow, when you will see them.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1663.]

To Sir William Clarke.

SIR,

Camp, 5th Oct., 1803.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 22nd September, and I feel much concern that my letter of the 1st September to the government of Bombay should have given you the smallest uneasiness.

The Governor of Bombay thought proper to refer to my opinion a demand which he had received from you to be reinforced by a large body of European troops; and when I came to consider the question whether you should be reinforced or not, it was necessary that I should advert not only to your wants, but to the wants in other posts, and to the probable or possible additional means in your reach, or in the reach of other commanding officers, and the possibility that you or they should be attacked, and the means of defence which you would have in case of such an event.

You will observe accordingly that I viewed the question in a general light, and not as applying solely to Goa; I decided it on that ground, and I believe that I decided it correctly.

It never was my intention, and in my opinion it was not proper, that the government of Bombay should communicate my letter to you: the opinion which I had given to them was sufficient, if they thought proper to abide by it, and they might have communicated to you their decision. It was impossible that you could enter into the general views which I had taken of the question, because you could not have the requisite information; and the only consequence of communicating to you my detailed opinion has been to give you uneasiness, and to occasion a long correspondence, for which neither of us can spare time, upon a subject on which it was not necessary to write another line.

Your situation at Goa is precisely the same as that of every other commanding officer in India. You have not the number of troops you would wish to have to defend your post. But comparing your situation with that of others, and considering the possibility that you will be attacked, and the additional means that may be brought to your defence, I am decidedly of opinion that you ought not to be reinforced, particularly from this part of India.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Doolan.

[1664.]

SIR,

Camp, 6th Oct., 1803.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 26th September, and it is with concern that I observe the existence of fresh disputes and divisions in the 1st battalion 5th Bombay regiment, under your command. I was in hopes that, after what passed upon a former similar occasion, the officers of that corps would have stifled their animosities; and, at all events, I expected that they would have been suspended in a time of war, and that their attention would have been directed to the security of the important post under their charge. Instead of that, instead of receiving from them or from you reports of their observations on the situation and designs of the Mahrattas in their neighbourhood, my attention is claimed at this interesting moment by paltry disputes about nothing, the only effect of which must be to prove the entire absence and annihilation of discipline and subordination in the 1st battalion 5th Bombay regiment. So trifling are these disputes, that I would not even take the trouble of writing upon the subject, did I not observe from them that the adjutant is at the head of a party in the corps formed against you, and that the influence of the European officers has been exerted in order to introduce the Native officers into the party.

This appears in the clearest manner from the sentence of the garrison court martial on the writer, John Rodriguez. The slightest knowledge of the Native character, particularly of that of the Native officers of the army, will make it clear that those who tried John Rodriguez would not have acquitted him when such evidence appeared against him, and particularly would not have used offensive terms in their sentence of acquittal when the commanding officer of their battalion and of the garrison was his prosecutor, if they had not been abetted and encouraged by the adjutant and the European officers.

This conduct is highly dangerous to the public interests, as well as to the European officers in question. They are mistaken if they suppose that they can uphold discipline and subordination among the Native troops under their command (which, in a moment of difficulty, may be essential to the safety not only of the important post of which they have charge, but

I have taken advantage of the passage through this camp of a vakeel from the Rajah of Kolapoor to Scindiah, to urge upon his ministers the impropriety of detaining Lieutenant Simpson; and I have desired this person to say that it would be very agreeable to me to hear that he had been released. Mr. Simpson is, I hear, in camp, and well.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

List of Europeans serving with the enemy.

*Brigade-Major R. Grant.	Ensign Mars.
Captain-Lieut. Mercier.	*Lieut. Stuart.
Ensign Wroughton.	Captain-Lieut. Honoré.
*Ensign M'Culloch.	Ensign Cameron.
Captain Gautier.	John Beckett, Aide-de-camp to the
Cadet Songstar.	Commander-in-Chief.
Ensign Perrin.	Brigade-Major d'Orton, a different
Ensign Brown.	Brigade.

* These officers were not present in the action, as afterwards explained. See p. 206.

[1661.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles, President of a General Court Martial.*

SIR,

Camp, 5th Oct., 1803.

I had yesterday the honour of receiving the duplicate proceedings of the general court martial on the trial of Lieutenant _____.

There does not appear to be the smallest doubt that that officer applied to Mr. Drummond for his interference as a magistrate, and that he wrote him the letter No. 3 in the proceedings because the result of that magisterial interference was not such as he wished it to be. It is not even denied by Lieutenant _____ that that letter is a very improper one, and, as expressed in the charge, it is certainly "couched in intemperate and indecorous terms." Lieutenant _____, therefore, is guilty of having written that letter to Mr. Drummond in consequence of his act as a magistrate.

It is immaterial whether the letter is private or public; indeed, it is difficult to draw the distinction between them. If

the letter were intended to be the ground of a private quarrel and its consequences, it is still more reprehensible than if it were intended as a public offence to a public officer, as it is well known that no public officer whatever can do his duty, particularly one in a judicial capacity, if he be not protected from the insults of those who may apply to him for redress, as Lieutenant —— did in this instance, or who may be brought before him.

I beg that the members of the general court martial will individually and collectively consider their own situation, and whether it is consistent with propriety or the common rules of justice that those who are employed to sit in judgment on the conduct of others should be liable to insult (the intention of which is in this instance avowed) for their acts; and after that I beg them to decide whether a private reprimand, which, at all events, is an improper punishment, is adequate to the offence of which Lieutenant —— has been guilty.

I request that the sentence of this court martial may be revised.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Malcolm.

[1662.]

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp, 5th Oct., 1803.

I enclose a letter for Henry, which I wish you to send by the first opportunity. If a ship should sail immediately, let the letter go by her, and let me know when the overland despatch will go, that I may write by that opportunity.

A kind of proposal has come to negotiate. Ballojee Koonger and a Krooman have written to desire that Captain Johnson and Rajah Mohiput Ram may be sent to Scindiah's camp to re-establish the old relations of peace. I have answered that I have nothing to propose to Scindiah, and therefore that it is not necessary that I should send an officer to him; but that, if he has any thing to propose to me, he may send a sirdar here, who will be received and treated well.

I hope to have the papers ready copied to send to Mr. Duncan to-morrow, when you will see them.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

of their own persons), if they don't support the authority of, and oblige the Native officers to respect, their commanding officer.

It is the duty of the adjutant of the battalion to make up the morning report book daily, and it is the duty of the commanding officer to see that the morning report book is made up. If the adjutant should be sick, it is the duty of the officer of the day to make up the morning report book ; and of course he must have the assistance of the writer allowed to the adjutant by the regulations of government.

I desire that you will understand that it is my order that the morning report book of the 1st battalion 5th regiment may be made up daily, and that if this duty be neglected you will put in arrest the adjutant, or the officer of the day whose duty it may be ; and you will clearly understand that the officer of the day is to have the assistance of the writer allowed by the regulations of government to the adjutant.

It is my intention to submit the papers which I have received from you to the government of Bombay, as well as to the Commander-in-Chief at Fort St. George ; and I intend to recommend that Lieutenant —— may be dismissed from his situation of adjutant of the 1st battalion 5th regiment. You will accordingly be so kind as to recommend another officer to be appointed adjutant.

In respect to Lieutenant ——'s charges against you, some of them are of a serious nature, and others are frivolous, and are to be attributed to the dispute respecting the writer, in which Lieutenant —— was wrong. It is probable also that those of a serious nature, and which alone concern the public, viz., the 3rd and 5th charges, would not have been brought forward if it had not been for the existence of this dispute ; and the whole, therefore, may be referred to private motives.

At any time I should hesitate before I should put an officer in arrest and upon his trial for the gratification of private revenge ; but at the present moment, when the exertions and attention of every officer ought to be turned to the defence and protection of the rights and interests of his country, I shall certainly neither deprive your country of your services by putting you in arrest, nor take up the time and attention of other officers in trying you upon these charges.

I beg that this letter may be entered in the regimental book

of the 1st battalion 5th Bombay regiment, and that you will assemble the officers under your command and read it to them ; and at the same time communicate to them my anxious desire that their animosities may be buried in oblivion, and that they will direct their attention to the discipline and subordination of the troops under their command, and to the security of the important post of which they have charge.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. M. O.

Camp, Adjuttee, 8th Oct., 1803. [1665.]

Fifty pioneers to be sent into the fort, immediately, in order to clean it out : twenty pioneers to be this day attached to the hospital, according to the orders of the 30th ult. The remainder of the pioneers will be employed at work which the engineer will point out.

Major-General Wellesley requests that officers, excepting those commanding corps, and those whose duty it may be, will not go into the hospital, as the crowds that go there only tend to disturb the wounded men. Orders have been given at the gates that no soldiers or sepoys may be admitted into the hospital, excepting those of the latter sent in to work, and such men as may have passes from the commanding officer.

Commanding officers will therefore give passes to such men as may be desirous of seeing their relations, or as they may wish to send into the hospital.

The wounded men are much distressed by the sun in the buildings which they occupy ; and Major-General Wellesley will be much obliged to commanding officers of corps if they will order as many shades as possible to be made by the men of their corps with the boughs of trees, &c. &c. ; they should be of the size of twelve feet square. Officers commanding Native corps will send into the hospital one careful non-commissioned officer, or steady man, and under his command, each corps of infantry twelve, each corps of cavalry six, sepoy boys. They are to assist the Native troops in drawing the provisions of the wounded, &c., and otherwise in attending to and taking care of them.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1666.] G. M. O.

10th Oct., 1803.

As there is plenty of other forage on the ground, Major-General Wellesley requests that none of the straw which is stacked, or cut and laid on the ground, may be taken; and commanding officers are requested to post sentries over such grain as may be in or near their lines.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1667.] G. O.

Binkenholey, 10th Oct., 1803.

Major-General Wellesley has received a report from Captain O'Donnell, of the 1st regiment of cavalry, from which it appears that, being on his march from Ahmednuggur to join the division of the army under the command of Major-General Campbell, with a company of the 1st battalion 12th regiment, under Lieutenant Morgan and the supernumerary non-commissioned officers heretofore belonging to the corps in camp, and lately drafted into the extra battalions, he was attacked by a body of horse and of peons, of such numbers as to induce Captain O'Donnell to think it necessary to take post in the village of Korget Coraygaum. Here the attack was renewed upon this party with additional violence, and Captain O'Donnell finding that his post was a bad one, and at all events too large for his party, barricaded and otherwise strengthened such parts of it as he was of opinion he could defend. He there remained with his small party without throwing away his ammunition, excepting when he could do it with effect in judicious sallies, in three of which he killed a number of the enemy far exceeding that of his party, which remained in security till it was relieved from Ahmednuggur, at the distance of about forty miles.

Major-General Wellesley returns his thanks to Captain O'Donnell and Lieutenant Bryant of the 1st regiment of cavalry, and to Lieutenant Morgan and the company of the 1st battalion 12th regiment under his command, for their conduct upon this occasion. He has been particular in detailing the circumstances of this affair in General Orders, that all officers may know the advantage which, with a small party of men, they may take even of the most ruinous village, to protect themselves and the parties of troops under their command.

To the division of the army under his command, it was

scarcely necessary for Major-General Wellesley to point out, that a small body of infantry which keeps its order, and reserves its fire, has but little to fear from cavalry. But in case any officer in charge of a party should be obliged from circumstances to take post, he may see, in the example set by Captain O'Donnell, the advantages he can take of the numerous fortified villages in this country, the credit he can gain, and the service he can render, by thus defending himself.

Major-General Wellesley will not fail to report to the Commander-in-Chief his sense of the conduct of Captain O'Donnell, and of the party under his command.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Camp at Phoolmurry, 11th Oct., 1803. [1668.]

It is to be considered as a standing order, that no corn which has been cut down is to be taken by the troops for forage, unless in cases of necessity, which are to be first reported; and guards are to be placed over what may be in or near the camp, by the nearest corps, immediately on coming to the ground.

Lieutenant-Colonel ——— having failed to perform his part of the contract for the carriage of the sick of the battalions which have been under his command since this division of the army marched from Seringapatam in February last, the allowance granted by government for the carriage of the sick of the 2nd battalion 18th regiment, at present commanded by that officer, is to cease from the day on which that corps arrived at Poonah.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

[1669.]

MY DEAR COLMAN,

Camp, 11th Oct., 1803.

I think that your store at Poonah need not be of more than 6000 bullock gunny bags of rice. The remainder you may send on as you before proposed. I write to Mr. Duncan respecting keeping up our supplies of provisions. I have been led into a scrape by that old blockhead Colonel ———. When I sent him away I ordered him to make no unnecessary delay upon the road. He was ten days marching sixty miles by way of obeying that order. However, as he made no excuse for the delay, I concluded that the distance was much greater than I at first imagined, but instead of that it turns out to be less. Under

my erroneous notion of the distance between the river and Ahmednuggur, I concluded that Captain Vesey would not be there till the 12th. Instead of that, he will have arrived there much sooner without having received my orders altering the direction of his route, and he is now wandering the Lord knows where. I beg that you will in my name call upon Colonel _____ for an account how he came to be from the 20th to the 29th September, both days inclusive, on his march from my camp at Heedgaum to Ahmednuggur. Desire him to let me have an account of his stages, the number of days he halted, &c. &c. I enclose an account of the articles which he ought to have under the camp equipage contract. I desire that you will have his camp equipage musters regularly, and see that he has really all that he ought to have. There is a mistake respecting the doolies. I did not want them immediately. I only requested that they might be prepared at Bombay, and ready to be sent off as soon as my disabled men should be well enough to go down. I'll write to Bombay on the subject.

You have done perfectly right respecting the proclamations. Of course you must attend to every thing that Colonel Close says. I should be glad to know what object it is to you to have at Poonah Colonel Boyé's colours, because I promised him that they should be sent to Panwell, and I don't like to break my word to any man. Surely the absence of the colours won't weaken you if adjutant, officers, recruits, &c., remain at Poonah, which they shall.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1670.]

To the Adjutant-General.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 18 miles north of Aurungabad,
12th Oct., 1803.

SIR,

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Captain O'Donnell, of the 1st regiment of cavalry, in which he gives a detailed account of an action of no very great importance; but in which he and the detachment of troops under his command appear to have conducted themselves in an exemplary manner.

The party which attacked Captain O'Donnell are a banditti which infest the frontiers of His Highness the Soubah of the

Deccan and that of His Highness the Peshwah, and are formidable from their numbers and boldness. It does not appear that they belong to any particular chief, although it is said that they belong to the late killadar of Ahmednuggur; but I have reason to believe that this person discharged all his troops, and that he joined Dowlut Rao Scindiah in camp.

As there is no established authority, or even an acknowledged boundary, on any part of the frontier, and the killadars and other officers on both sides have been in the habit of carrying on private wars against each other, I am induced to believe that they have encouraged this banditti for the purposes of their own wars. While I was on the frontier, of course their operations ceased; but they have now recommenced them, and I suspect that they are too strong for their former employers.

After the battle at Assye the enemy fled down the Adjuntee Ghaut. They were followed by Colonel Stevenson; but as I was obliged to call his division to my neighbourhood, in order that I might have the assistance of the medical men belonging to the division under his command to dress my wounded soldiers, and of the carriage of his sick to remove them to the hospital, and as it was necessary that I should have repeated conferences with the sirdars in the service of the Soubah of the Deccan before I could fix upon any place to receive the wounded, some days elapsed before Colonel Stevenson descended the Ghaut. The enemy again fled towards Burhampoor, where they left the remains of their defeated infantry, and brought out from thence a fresh body of infantry of no very great number with some guns, which joined the main body of their cavalry.

With these Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar made two or three marches to the westward; they then proceeded from the Taptee in a southerly direction towards the Casserbarry Ghaut, through which they declared it was their intention to pass to the southward.

There are many weak points in the territories of the Peshwah and the Nizam, which it was very important not to expose to risk. The countrys to the northward are also entirely exhausted, and we depend for our supplies in a great measure upon those south of the Godavery. Upon the whole, therefore, I thought it best to proceed with my division towards Aurungabad, by which movement I hoped, if not to prevent the enemy from passing the Casserbarry Ghaut, at least to prevent them from doing any mischief, or from executing any enterprise of importance.

I arrived here yesterday, and I find that they have not passed the Ghaut, although they are still on the road towards it.

Colonel Stevenson is gone with his division towards Burham-poor, where he will prevent the reequipment of the defeated infantry, and he will possibly drive them into Hindustan.

If I should find that the cavalry return towards him, I shall march back to Adjuttee and descend the Ghaut.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1671.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

MY DEAR COLMAN,

Camp, 13th Oct., 1803.

You did quite right respecting Mr. Scott. I only hope now that your express will not overtake him.

There is a mistake at Bombay respecting the doolies, which must have arisen from want of common attention in the perusal of my letter. I first required a supply of fifty doolies to replace old and broken doolies in camp. These are coming with Mr. Guild.

After the action of the 23rd I wrote to Mr. Duncan to request that one hundred doolies might be prepared, boys hired for them, and every thing ready to set off when I should write for them, in order to remove from the hospital to Bombay some of the wounded men, who having lost limbs were disabled for the service, and whom I proposed to send away as soon as they should be well enough to be moved. Instead of making this arrangement, and waiting till I call for the doolies, which must be attended by escorts, medical men, and ten thousand other arrangements, for the food and care of the men upon the road, General Nicholls first orders you to send your doolies from Poonah, then sends thirty more from Bombay, and tells me that Mr. Guild has taken with him some more, which I suppose he conceives can carry themselves, as they have no bearers, are now carried by coolies, and it was particularly explained that these doolies were to supply the place of others broken and worn out. The consequence of all this will be, that if the doolies for the removal of the wounded ever arrive, which, in my opinion, is very doubtful, it will be necessary to detain them for a month or six weeks at the hospital. The boys will starve and run away, and the wounded will never be removed. My plan went to

not keeping them at the hospital one day, by which means I should have insured the removal of the wounded. That is knocked up, and the whole arrangement is so disjointed at present that I don't know how it can be remedied. I believe, however, that the best thing to do will be for you to keep all the doolies and boys at Poonah, where they will have some chance of being fed till I shall call for them, and then you may send them on.

Accordingly I request you to stop your own doolies, and those coming from Bombay, till you will hear from me.

I enclose you an extract of my letter to Mr. Duncan upon this subject, in which you will see my arrangement, and you will yourself judge how well it has been carried into execution.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1672.]

SIR,

Camp, 15th Oct., 1803.

I have the honour to enclose the answer* which I have written to Mr. North's letter, in which he desired that I would raise Arab troops for the service of his government, and the copy of the paper containing the table of pay which he proposed should be given to those troops.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

TABLE of PAY and BATTÀ to the Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Privates of the Malay Regiment in Rix Dollars and Bombay Rupees, calculated at the rate of 125 Rix Dollars per Bombay Rupees 100.

	Net Pay per Month.						Batta per Day when in the Field.					
	R. Ds.	F.	P.	By.	Ra.	A. P.	R. Ds.	F.	P.	By.	Ra.	A. P.
Captain	45	0	0	36	0	0	0	6	0	0	6	1
Lieutenant	26	3	0	21	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	0½
Ensign	18	9	0	15	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	0½
Serjeant	11	3	0	9	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0½
Corporal	9	4	2	7	8	0	0	1	0	0	1	0½
Private	7	6	0	6	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0½
Drummer and Fifer	9	4	2	7	8	0	0	1	1½	0	1	1
Boys	3	9	0	3	0	0
Puckaly	11	6	0½	9	3	0	0	2	0	0	2	0½

* See 1st Edition, Vol. ii. p. 416.

[1673.] G. O.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 15th Oct., 1803.

The sentences passed on Mahomed Isack and Sheek David, sepoy in the 1st battalion 10th regiment, and Mahomed Reza, sepoy in the 1st battalion 2nd regiment, published in the orders of yesterday, are to be carried into execution this afternoon.

The line to be under arms at half past five o'clock ; the cavalry mounted, and formed on the right of the infantry. A guard of a subaltern officer and twenty men from each corps of infantry in camp (except the 74th), under a captain, will parade at the tent where the prisoners are confined at four o'clock, when the provost will deliver them over to the guard, and the captain of it will march them from the right of the cavalry to the left of the infantry in slow time, and back again to the place appointed for the execution of Sheek David, in front of the 1st battalion 10th regiment. The music and drummers and fifers of corps will play the dead march as the prisoners pass.

The provost-serjeant will accompany the prisoners with his guard. An execution party, consisting of one havildar, one naig, and four sepoy of the 1st battalion 10th regiment, and two sepoy from each of the other Native corps in camp, to parade at the place of execution at four o'clock this afternoon.

As soon as the prisoners shall arrive at the place of execution, a gun will be fired from the park as a signal for the time when commanding officers of corps will give orders that the extract from General Orders containing the sentences awarded to the prisoners, and this order, may be read to their corps.

A second gun will be fired when the captain of the guard will deliver the prisoner Sheek David over to the serjeant, and he will carry the sentence awarded to him into execution, according to orders which he will receive through the Deputy Adjutant-General. During the execution of Sheek David, the prisoners Mahomed Isack and Mahomed Reza are to remain in charge of the captain of the guard ; they are afterwards to be sent to their respective corps in charge of the details from them composing a part of that guard ; when the commanding officers of those corps will cause the sentences passed upon them to be put into execution. Upon firing a third gun, all the other corps, and the captain's guard, will be dismissed.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

[1674.]

MY DEAR COLMAN,

Camp, 16th Oct., 1803.

I have received your letter of the 11th. You may as well hire two or three thousand bullocks and send on to Ahmednuggur that number of loads of rice. I will send orders to Ahmednuggur to have them forwarded. Let the bullocks be hired by the month, and to carry the grain wherever I may order it.

In respect to the 18-pounders and their equipments (by which I understand 1000 rounds of powder and shot for each gun), I should certainly wish to see them lodged at Ahmednuggur. But as I have no siege in view immediately, and as Colonel Stevenson has two 18-pounders, and as you want your cattle for other purposes, you need not send them till your cattle have more leisure. You ought to be able to move with two 6-pounders for each corps, two 12-pounders, and two howitzers in your park. You ought to have carriage cattle to carry rice for your fighting men for thirty days, at half a seer a day for each man, and thirty days' rice, arrack, and salt for your Europeans. Thus, by loading the men with five seer when you would march, you would have rice for ten days. You ought to have three sacks of musket ammunition, besides the compliment with corps. If you want draught bullocks, I have 1000 very fine ones which I took from Scindiah. I have sent 300 with the guns to Ahmednuggur, and 600 more went off for that place this morning to graze. I will give orders that as many as you may require may be made over to your bullock agent.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Military Paymaster-General, Fort St. George.

[1675.]

SIR,

20th Oct., 1803.

I have been furnished, from the pay office at Seringapatam, with copies of your letters to the paymaster of that place, under date the 1st and 3rd October; by which I observe that you have disallowed his taking up certain bills drawn upon you by the paymaster of this division of the army in favour of people in

camp, who have their families or their commercial agents residing at Seringapatam.

This division of the army was originally fitted out at Seringapatam, and many merchants of property were induced to accompany it. It became necessary for them to make remittances to their agents there for new purchases of supplies, which were of the greatest importance to the troops. They had no correspondents in Madras, and, if they had, could not have got their money remitted from thence to Seringapatam till after a considerable lapse of time, and probably at much expense. I therefore authorised Mr. Gordon to take up the bills drawn upon you, as stated in the letters of the 14th April and 26th May, of which copies have been sent you.

Mr. Gordon wrote for answer, that he would take up all bills of that kind that might be presented, without requiring a special order for each; and accordingly money to a considerable amount has been paid into the treasury here by the Mysore dealers, and by some military men, for bills on your office, which Mr. Gordon has taken up regularly; and has thereby not only filled our treasury, and brought forward fresh supplies to the army for the time past, but has also established such a confidence among the dealers as promises to insure a continuance of their exertions in bringing forward supplies, which increase daily in importance to the troops, in proportion to the difficulties in bringing them forward.

I conceive that carrying your orders to the paymaster of Seringapatam into execution at present, would be attended with seriously bad consequences to this division of the army, and I am hopeful that you will be induced to suspend them; but if the rules of your office are too strict to allow of your doing so, I beg that you will, as soon as may be convenient, submit the subject to the Right Hon. the Governor in Council.

I am so anxious that no interruption of the payment of these bills may become known, that I have written to Captain Quin to take them all up on my private credit.

I endeavoured to avoid any infringement upon the regulations of government for the conduct of the public officers in this respect, by requesting the Resident in Mysore to lodge a sum of money with the paymaster at Seringapatam, to the amount whereof the paymaster in camp might draw upon him; but the Resident found it inconvenient to do this.

I have been very solicitous to avoid infringing any of the established regulations of government in the conduct of the service established here; although it is very obvious that they could not have been framed with a view for service in these distant countries, particularly the regulations for the conduct of the pay department. As a proof of this solicitude, I have to mention that I have orders and authority from the Governor-General to draw bills upon every station in India, which I have not exercised in respect to Seringapatam because I was unwilling to depart from the established regulations, in a case for which I understood from Mr. Gordon that the regulations had provided.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Malcolm.

[1676.]

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp, 22nd Oct., 1803.

I enclose a long letter for your brother. It contains my real opinion, and is, I think, that which any well judging man must entertain on the subject. Seal the letter, and send it to him.

I had no fever yesterday or last night, but I am still very weak. I have no news for you. The enemy appear to be in the utmost distress and confusion, and not to know what step to take. It is said that they have quarrelled, and that Scindiah is gone by one road and Ragojee by another, both towards Berar. Nothing can be more fortunate than this, if it be true.

I agree entirely in opinion with you regarding the pensions to Gholam Ali's son and his family; but as the expense of all the pensions is defrayed by the Rajah of Mysore, ought not the proposition from you and government to be, that you should be permitted to recommend to the Rajah's government to give a pension of that amount to the family of the late Gholam Ali? The pensions were thrown upon the Rajah as so many incumbrances upon the revenues of Mysore, which were evidently occasioned by the settlement of the government in his family; but I think it may have an awkward appearance, and may be a bad precedent, for the Company's government to make any addition to these incumbrances, although the British Resident may, with great propriety, and ought in this instance to

recommend that one should be made. Thank you for the Army List.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1677.]

To the Adjutant-General, Fort St. George.

SIR,

Camp at Ferdapoor, 23rd Oct., 1803.

I have the honour to transmit the proceedings of the Native general court martial, assembled by my order in this division of the army, and to inform you that I confirmed the sentences passed on Sheek David, private of the 1st of the 10th, agreeably to particular authority from the Commander-in-Chief, and all the other sentences, in terms of my warrant. I caused those passed upon Mahomed Isack and Sheek David, privates in the 1st of the 10th, and Mahomed Reza, private in the 2nd of the 12th, to be carried into execution on the 12th inst.; and I have sent orders to Colonel Colman, commanding at Poonah, to see the sentence passed on Sheek Hussein, private in the 2nd of the 18th, who had marched with his corps, carried into execution there.

It was my intention to have pardoned all these prisoners, but some recent desertions in this camp obliged me to cause the sentences passed upon them to be put in force.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1678.]*

To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp at Ferdapoor, 23rd Oct., 1803.

I received in due course your letter of the 6th, and this day your letter of * , for which I am much obliged to you. Mr. Grant and Mr. Stuart were not in the action of the 23rd September. The latter is arrived at Poonah, and says that he and Mr. Grant, and Mr. M'Culloch, quitted Scindiah's camp on the * , and went to Burhampoor: from thence Mr. Stuart went to Poonah, but he does not say in his report what became of the other gentlemen.

He says that they had not heard of the Governor-General's

* Blank in manuscript.

proclamation of the 29th August, and regrets that they had not, as he is convinced that many Natives would have come away with him. The motives with these gentlemen for coming away were their reluctance to serve against their country, and the fact that the English officers in Hindustan had gone to the British settlements, of which Colonel Pohlman received intelligence from General Perron on the 12th September. The brigades engaged were Pohlman's, Dupont's, and Begum Sumroo's; in the whole sixteen battalions. Wahed Beg, if that be the man to whom the proclamations have been sent, has deceived you, and I suspect him of playing tricks in another instance very lately; indeed I know that he has played them. He had been sent from Scindiah's camp with letters for me in answer to those I wrote on the subject of the first propositions for peace: he showed the directions of the letters to Colonel Lang, who met him on his march to this place to receive a convoy. He afterwards went on to Colonel Stevenson, swore that he had no letter for any body, and pretended that he was come only to supplicate for peace. His object with Colonel Stevenson, I see clearly, was to try if he could not prevail upon him to write a letter to Scindiah upon the subject of peace different from that which I had written him; but it happened that I had sent the Colonel a translation of my letter, and if the Colonel has written at all, it is in corresponding terms. However, whatever his object was, he has deceived Colonel Stevenson, as letters directed to me were positively seen in his hand.

The enemy appear to be much distracted and distressed. Colonel Stevenson took possession of Burhampoor on the 16th without opposition, and he was going on the next day to look at Asseerghur. I am come here to watch their movements, either to interrupt the siege of Asseerghur, or into the countries south of the Ghauts. It is said that Scindiah and Ragojee have quarrelled and separated. I believe there is no doubt of the latter. Ragojee appears to have gone to Chandore, with what view or object I cannot guess, and Scindiah has moved to the Taptee. Colonel Stevenson is employed in striking now, and I shall stay where I am till I see more decidedly what their plans are. I have had no letters from Bengal since the 16th, and none from Colonel Harcourt since he took the pagoda of Juggernaut.

Holkar plundered Ougein of three lacs of rupees, and then marched off to Boondy and Kotah. It is said that Scindiah intends to do Ragojee a similar favour in respect to Nagpoor.

This conduct puts me in mind of the young noblemen in Gil Blas, who agreed that they would settle accounts each with the steward of the other.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P. S. Who is the Nabob Mohamed Meer Khan, Moieen ool Dowlah, who interests himself so much in the affair of the peace? He says he is a great friend of yours, and has forwarded all your objects.

[1679.]

To the Adjutant-General.

SIR,

Camp at Ferdapoor, 24th Oct., 1803.

I have the pleasure to inform you that Colonel Stevenson took possession of the city of Burhampoor without opposition on the 15th instant. He marched to Asseerghur on the 17th, took the pettah on the 18th, opened a battery against the fort on the 20th, and got possession of the fort on the 21st.

I have not received from Colonel Stevenson a detailed report of this service, or a return of the loss he sustained in the attack of the pettah, or in his subsequent operations against this fort.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah marched to the northward with a view to impede Colonel Stevenson's operations, but he halted at Ahoonah, on the Taptee, as soon as he found that I had descended the Ghaut, and he was still there yesterday. The Rajah of Berar has separated from him, and, it is said, is gone towards Chandore; and as Colonel Stevenson has got possession of Asseerghur, and the defeated infantry which were near Burhampoor have retired towards the Nerbudda, and at all events are so completely destroyed as to render it impossible that they can ever be formed into corps again, or be useful to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I propose to reascend the Ghaut.

As soon as Colonel Stevenson will have made his arrangements for the security of Asseerghur, he will move into the territories of the Rajah of Berar.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

26th Oct., 1803. [1680.]

Major-General Wellesley has received information from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the Right Hon. the Governor in Council of Fort St. George has been pleased, on his Excellency's recommendation, to order, till the conclusion of the war with the Mahratta confederates, the continuance of the payments on family certificates to the families of the Native officers, non-commissioned officers, and sepoy who have gloriously fallen or may hereafter fall in battle, or who have died or may hereafter die of their wounds. Rolls of the names and rank of those Native officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates who have fallen in battle or died of their wounds are to be made out forthwith, signed by the adjutant, and countersigned by the commanding officers, and to be sent to the Adjutant-General's office with the monthly returns, and in duplicate to the office of the military secretary of the Governor of Fort St. George.

Major-General Wellesley requests that officers commanding corps will explain this order particularly to the troops under their command, and that they will take this opportunity of again pointing out to the Native troops the anxious concern of the government which they are serving, and of their superiors, to adopt every measure which can alleviate the distress of their families.

In order to insure the early advantage of this attention on the part of government to the objects of it, Major-General Wellesley desires that officers commanding troops of Native cavalry, companies of Native infantry, gun lascars, and pioneers, and officers in charge of hospitals, will, on this day, send to paymasters to whom such officers may have given notice of casualties such as are described in the first paragraph, a copy of this order certified by themselves, together with a list of the names of the officers or men of their troops or companies, or under their charge, who were killed in action or died of their wounds, having opposite the name of each the name of the person to whom the payment is to be continued, under the orders of the Right Hon. the Governor in Council,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1681.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Munro.

MY DEAR MUNRO,

Camp at Cheesekair, 1st Nov., 1803.

As you are a judge of a military operation, and as I am desirous of having your opinion on my side, I am about to give you an account of the battle of Assye, in answer to your letter of the 19th October, in which I think I shall solve all the doubts which must naturally occur to any man who looks at that transaction without a sufficient knowledge of the facts.

Before you will receive this, you will most probably have seen my public letter to the Governor-General regarding the action, a copy of which was sent to General Campbell. That letter will give you a general outline of the facts. Your principal objection to the action is, that I detached Colonel Stevenson. The fact is, I did not detach Colonel Stevenson. His was a separate corps, equally strong, if not stronger than mine. We were desirous to engage the enemy at the same time, and settled a plan accordingly for an attack on the morning of the 24th September. We separated on the 22nd, he to march by the western, I by the eastern road, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jaulna: and I have to observe, that this separation was necessary; first, because both corps could not pass through the same defiles in one day; secondly, because it was to be apprehended that, if we left open one of the roads through these hills, the enemy might have passed to the southward while we were going to the northward, and then the action would have been delayed, or, probably, avoided altogether. Colonel Stevenson and I were never more than twelve miles distant from each other; and when I moved forward to the action of the 23rd, we were not much more than eight miles apart.

As usual, we depended for our intelligence of the enemy's position on the common hircarrahs of the country. Their horse were so numerous that, without an army, their position could not be reconnoitred by an European officer; and even the hircarrahs in our own service, who are accustomed to examine and report positions, cannot be employed here, as, being natives of the Carnatic, they are as well known as an European.

The hircarrahs reported the enemy to be at Bokerdun. Their right was at Bokerdun, which was the principal place in their position, and gave the name to the district in which they were encamped; but their left, in which was their infantry, which I

was to attack, was at Assye, about six or eight miles from Bokerdun.

I directed my march so as to be within twelve or fourteen miles of their army at Bokerdun, as I thought, on the 23rd. But when I arrived at the ground of encampment, I found that I was not more than five or six miles from it. I was then informed that the cavalry had marched, and the infantry were about to follow, but were still on the ground : at all events, it was necessary to ascertain these points ; and I could not venture to reconnoitre without my whole force. But I believed the report to be true, and I determined to attack the infantry, if they remained still upon the ground. I apprised Colonel Stevenson of this determination, and desired him to move forward. Upon marching on, I found not only their infantry, but their cavalry, encamped in a most formidable position, which, by the by, it would have been impossible for me to attack, if, when the infantry changed their front, they had taken care to occupy the only passage there was across the Kaitna.

When I found their whole army, and contemplated their position, of course I considered whether I should attack immediately or should delay till the following morning. I determined upon the immediate attack, because I saw clearly, that, if I attempted to return to my camp at Naulniah, I should have been followed thither by the whole of the enemy's cavalry, and I might have suffered some loss ; instead of attacking, I might have been attacked there in the morning ; and, at all events, I should have found it very difficult to secure my baggage, as I did, in any place so near the enemy's camp in which they should know it was : I therefore determined upon the attack immediately. It was certainly a most desperate one, but our guns were not silenced. Our bullocks, and the people who were employed to draw the guns, were shot, and they could not all be drawn on ; but some were, and all continued to fire as long as the fire could be of any use.

Desperate as the action was, our loss would not have exceeded one half of its actual amount if it had not been for a mistake in the officer who led the piquets which were on the right of the first line. When the enemy changed their position, they threw their left to Assye, in which village they had some infantry, and it was surrounded by cannon. As soon as I saw that, I directed the officer commanding the piquets to keep out

of shot from that village: instead of that, he led directly upon it: the 74th, which were on the right of the first line, followed the piquets, and the great loss we sustained was in these two bodies.

Another evil which resulted from this mistake was the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the cannonade and the action long before it was time; by which the corps which I intended to bring forward in a close pursuit at the heel of the day, lost many men, and its union and efficiency. But it was necessary to bring forward the cavalry to save the remains of the 74th, and the piquets, which would otherwise have been destroyed. Another evil resulting from it was, that we had then no reserve left, and a parcel of stragglers cut up our wounded; and straggling infantry, who had pretended to be dead, turned their guns upon our backs.

After all, notwithstanding this attack upon Assye by our right and the cavalry, no impression was made upon the corps collected there till I made a movement upon it with some troops taken from our left, after the enemy's right had been defeated; and it would have been as well to have left it alone entirely till that movement was made. However, I do not wish to cast any reflection upon the officer who led the piquets. I lament the consequences of his mistake, but I must acknowledge that it was not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the piquets on that day against Assye.

After the action there was no pursuit, because our cavalry was not then in a state to pursue. It was near dark when the action was over, and we passed the night on the field of battle.

Colonel Stevenson marched with part of his troops as soon as he heard that I was about to move forward, and he also moved upon Bokerdun. He did not receive my letter till evening. He got entangled in a nullah in the night, and arrived at Bokerdun, about eight miles from me to the westward, at eight in the morning of the 24th.

The enemy passed the night of the 23rd at about twelve miles from the field of battle, twelve from the Adjuntee Ghaut, and eight from Bokerdun. As soon as they heard that Colonel Stevenson was advancing to the latter place, they set off, and never stopped till they got down the Ghaut, where they arrived in the course of the night of the 24th. After his difficulties of the night of the 23rd, Colonel Stevenson was in no state to follow them,

and did not do so until the 26th. The reason for which he was detained till that day was, that I might have the benefit of the assistance of his surgeons to dress my wounded soldiers, many of whom, after all, were not dressed for nearly a week, for want of the necessary number of medical men.

I had also a long and difficult negotiation with the Nizam's sirdars, to induce them to admit my wounded into any of the Nizam's forts; and I could not allow them to depart until I had settled that point. Besides, I knew that the enemy had passed the Ghaut, and that to pursue them a day sooner, or a day later, could make no difference.

Since the battle, Stevenson has taken Burhampoor and Asseerghur. I have defended the Nizam's territories. They first threatened them through the Casserbarry Ghaut, and I moved to the southward, to the neighbourhood of Aungabad: I then saw clearly that they intended to attempt to raise the siege of Asseerghur, and I moved up to the northward, descended the Adjuntee Ghaut, and stopped Scindiah.

Stevenson took Asseerghur on the 21st October; I heard the intelligence on the 24th, and that the Rajah of Berar had come to the south with an army.

I ascended the Ghaut on the 25th, and have marched 120 miles since, in eight days, by which I have saved all our convoys and the Nizam's territories. I have been near the Rajah of Berar two days, in the course of which he has marched five times; and I suspect that he is now off to his own country, finding that he can do nothing in this. If this be the case, I shall soon begin an offensive operation there. But these exertions, I fear, cannot last; and yet, if they are relaxed, such is the total absence of all government and means of defence in this country, that it must fall. It makes me sick to have any thing to do with them; and it is impossible to describe their state. Pray exert yourself for Bistnapah Pundit.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp at Cheesekair, 2nd Nov., 1803. [1682.]

Major-General Wellesley requests Captain Baynes to accept his thanks for the able disposition which he made of the troops

under his command to defend the convoy of which he had charge, when it was attacked by vastly superior numbers of the enemy on the 31st October; and that Captain Baynes will communicate to the officers and troops under his command Major-General Wellesley's thanks for their steadiness upon that occasion.

This is another instance of what infantry, who preserve their order and reserve their fire, can do against numerous bodies of cavalry; and Major-General Wellesley will not fail to report to the Commander-in-Chief and to government his sense of the conduct of Captain Baynes and of the officers and troops under his command in this action.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1683.]

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

SIR,

Camp at Cheesekair, 4th Nov., 1803.

1. I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 24th October, in which you express the desire of the Hon. the Governor in Council that I should give my opinion regarding the best mode of supplying bullocks for the armies employed on this side of India.

2. This question depends entirely upon another, viz. which is the best mode of procuring men to take care of the cattle? Money will purchase cattle at any time; but, unless men are provided to take care of them and to drive them, the money is thrown away, and the service must come to a stand.

3. A bullock that goes one day without his regular food loses a part of his strength: if he does not get it on the second day, he may not lose the appearance of being fit for service, but he is entirely unable to work; and after these animals have once lost their strength and condition, so much time elapses before they recover, that they become a burthen upon the army, and the whole expense of their original purchase and their subsequent food is lost.

4. I am, therefore, decidedly of opinion that the best mode of having good bullocks (and without good bullocks the troops can perform no service) is to have men to take care of them the moment that they are purchased.

5. In respect to the men, I do not conceive that Bombay, or indeed any other place in India, will afford them at the moment

they are required ; but those hired for the service at Bombay in particular are the worst that I have seen : first ; because they are entirely unaccustomed to the care of cattle : secondly ; because my experience teaches me that, of ten of this description of persons hired at Bombay, nine of them desert. Supposing the army to be well equipped with bullocks and with drivers in the first instance, the ignorance of the drivers of their duty, and their desertion, must occasion the destruction of the bullocks, and would reduce the army to distress.

6. There remains but one mode of having bullock drivers, and consequently bullocks, when their services are required ; and that is, to have in the service at all times a corps of bullock drivers, regularly trained and managed.

7. This measure will create a large and permanent expense ; and before I proceed to detail my ideas of the extent of these corps, it may probably be necessary to consider whether there are not other modes of providing bullocks, at the time they might be required, which would answer equally well.

8. I have already considered the mode at present in practice at Bombay, than which nothing can be worse ; not from any deficiency of expense, or regulation, or any assistance that can be given by government, but because the people hired as drivers will not do their duty, but desert. As a proof of its inefficiency and its expense, I mention that I took from Poonah 1000, that were the only serviceable of nearly 3000 carriage bullocks, which had marched less than 100 miles from the coast with Colonel Murray. These have been completed and reinforced repeatedly, at an enormous expense, and the utmost care and attention have been paid to them by the head of the department : but such is the nature of the people employed as drivers, and so great their desertion, notwithstanding that they receive double the pay of the bullock drivers who came from Mysore, that I have, at last, been obliged to give orders that the establishment might not be recruited, and that it might be allowed to die off.

9. On the other hand, the Mysore establishment of draught cattle which have marched since the month of February last, and have been exposed to all the hardships of want of food, rainy weather, &c., has been kept up, and I do not believe that they have lost 100 bullocks.

10. In respect to the proposal that bullocks should be hired for the service, I have to observe that the system of hiring cattle

has long been tried upon the coast of Coromandel ; and I believe it is now the opinion of those most experienced in the service, among others of his Excellency General Stuart, that the system will not answer, and that, as long as it exists, the public interests are exposed to risk. The whole of the carriage of this army depends now upon hired cattle ; but it is my decided opinion that the system is bad, and ought to be abolished ; and I should not rely upon it for a moment if I had it in my power at present to alter it.

11. But if it is found to be so bad upon the coast of Coromandel, where it has been practised so long, where the bullock owners are the Company's subjects, are men well known, and have had long experience by having served in many wars, how will it answer on this side of India, in a concern of the first magnitude, not only to the operations, but to the very existenee, of the armies? The government will have to depend upon the Mahratta brinjarries, from whom the cattle will be hired, who, of all the Mahrattas that I have yet had dealings with, are the most faithless.

12. Whenever a difficulty would occur, which is always accompanied by a want of forage, which want is ruinous to the owners of the cattle, those people would leave the army immediately. But the fact is, that they will not serve us at all : they will not submit to the regularity of the service, without which it could not stand a single day ; and even if they could be brought to it, they would quit it in disgust upon the first opportunity, and occasion the greatest difficulties and disasters.

13. The result then is, that the Company ought to have an establishment of bullock drivers always in its service ; and if the bullocks can be purchased as speedily as the other preparations for taking the field can be made, they should be purchased when required. If they cannot, or if, as is the case on the eastern coast and in Mysore, the bullocks can graze upon the island of Salsette, or Bombay, or on the continent to the northward, (and the expense of their food in time of peace will be trifling,) it would be desirable for many reasons that they should be in the service, as well as the drivers, at all times. The food of the bullocks in Mysore does not cost much more than half a rupee a month each, and that is for gram.

14. The extent of the establishment ought to be calculated according to the strength of the body of troops disposable for

field service on the Bombay establishment. The establishment ought to be calculated to supply bullocks to draw all the guns and tumbrils, and wheel carriages, that these troops would require, and to carry their stores. It ought also to be calculated to carry one month's provisions for them: not that I consider one month's provisions sufficient for any service on which the troops may be sent, but that quantity would be sufficient to be carried by this superior mode of carriage, and the remainder, which might be required, might be carried either by the hired brinjaries, or according to the present system.

15. The common proportion of drivers to bullocks is one driver to every two bullocks in draught, and one driver to every three bullocks that carry; and that proportion is fully sufficient.

16. I have the honour to enclose an account of the establishment of the Mysore bullocks, which is the same that Tippoo Sultaun had, from which it will appear that there is only one driver for three draught bullocks, and this establishment has certainly been proved to be efficient.

17. In respect to the mode of purchasing bullocks, that must depend upon local circumstances, with which I cannot be acquainted, excepting in the neighbourhood of Madras and Seringapatam, and some of the large cantonments or garrisons in the Carnatic, where there is a constant demand for bullocks, and of course people prepared to supply it. The inhabitants of the countries in which I have served have always been unwilling to part with their cattle; and influence, and frequently force, have been required to procure them for the service. If this should be the case at Bombay, it is obvious that the mode of advertising for bullocks, as proposed by the Military Board, will not answer; for if no man wishes to sell his bullock, none will be brought for sale. From the difficulty of procuring them, and the great price which they cost, which is nearly treble the price which they cost in other parts of India, I conclude it is the case; and therefore the best mode of procuring the bullocks would either be to employ agents to buy them, as at present, or contractors, or both.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1684.] G. A. O.

6th Nov., 1803.

The 1st battalion 2nd regiment with its guns, and a brigade of brass 12-pounders with their proportion of artillerymen and ammunition, including shells, to be held in readiness to march at the shortest notice. The details of the 1st battalion 2nd regiment on the outlying and inlying piquets to join the corps, and the camp guards and orderlies furnished by the battalion to be relieved by the 5th brigade immediately.

Fifty pioneers, with scaling ladders, &c., to accompany the detachment, which will rendezvous at such time and place as Lieutenant-Colonel Chalmers will appoint.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1685.] G. O.

7th Nov., 1803.

Major-General Wellesley has received from Colonel Stevenson the detailed reports of his operations against Asseerghur, which terminated in the surrender of that important fortress.

Major-General Wellesley requests Colonel Stevenson to accept his thanks, and to convey them to the troops under his command, for their conduct upon that occasion. At the same time Major-General Wellesley requests Colonel Stevenson to accept his acknowledgments for the cordial and zealous assistance which he has received from him upon all emergencies of the service since the commencement of the campaign. He has not failed to report to government, and to the Commander-in-Chief, his sense of the conduct of Colonel Stevenson, and of the troops under his command.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1686.] G. A. O.

Monday, 7th Nov., 1803.

As the European soldiers have taken to plundering the neighbouring villages, and more irregularities have been proved against one man of the artillery, one of the 74th regiment, and one of the 78th regiment, Major-General Wellesley directs that the rolls may be called in those corps every hour. Four drummers of the 78th regiment to attend immediately with their cats at the provost serjeant's tent to inflict 200 lashes on

—, of the 4th company 78th regiment, with whom one of the plundered cattle has been found. Major-General Wellesley gives notice that he will punish with death any man found guilty, hereafter, of plundering.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Sir William Clarke.

[1687.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 7th Nov., 1803.

I have received your letter, for which I am much obliged to you.

An hircarrah of yours has created terrible confusion in all our posts on the road to Mysore by circulating a report that they were to be attacked by Succaram Ghautky. There is no ground whatever for such a report. That person, however inimical to us, is at Poonah, and has no men, I believe, to do us any injury.

Allow me to assure you, my dear Sir, that these hircarrahs are not to be believed: they never bring any intelligence that is worth hearing, and when they circulate their false reports they do infinite mischief to our cause.

I shall be obliged to you if you will be so kind as to desire your hircarrahs to confine their reports to yourself.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp at Chitchooly, Tuesday, 8th Nov., 1803. [1688.]

A squadron of Native cavalry of the inlying piquets to parade at Major-General Wellesley's tent, this afternoon at four o'clock, to proceed with him to meet Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, vakeel from Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

A flank company of European infantry from the 4th brigade to parade at Major-General Wellesley's tent at half past four o'clock this afternoon: on the vakeel advancing to the tent, the company will receive him with presented arms and drums beating. A salute of thirteen guns to be fired this afternoon on the vakeel's alighting at Major-General Wellesley's tent. The commanding officer of artillery will place sentries to ascertain the time and pass the signals.

Major-General Wellesley will be glad to see any officers who are off duty, and may be inclined to accompany him when he goes out to meet Jeswunt Rao Goorparah.

MEM.

Four o'clock is an unlucky hour; the squadron of cavalry to be at head quarters at five, and the company of Europeans at half past five o'clock.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1689.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

MY DEAR COLMAN,

Camp, 9th Nov., 1803.

I have received your letter of the 6th.

The agreement you have made with the bullock owners must hold good now, as it cannot be altered; but it is very extravagant; the price is much higher than the former price at Poonah, to which it is our duty to lower it, or, if not, to make the bullocks carry a load proportionable to the increased hire paid for them.

Malcolm will leave Poonah soon. I wish that you would send the horses with him in charge of an officer, assisted by a trooper or two of Colonel Close's guard. I will send troopers to meet them. There will be a large body of troops of different kinds with Malcolm, and that will be the best time to send the horses.

I wrote you some time ago upon the subject of sending his colours to Colonel Boyé, to which letters you have given no answers. I wish to know what disadvantage or detriment it can be to you or the force under your command to send the colours of the corps to Panwell, keeping at Poonah the adjutant, the staff, and the recruits. I conceive that it can be none; and that being the case, I desire that the colours may be sent, as I promised Colonel Boyé that he should have them at Panwell, and I cannot break my word with him without having some good public grounds for leaving the colours at Poonah.

I recommend that you should write again to Mr. Duncan to say that you don't want bullocks, and that those sent are entirely unserviceable.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM OF THE CONFERENCES WITH JESWUNT RAO [1690.]
GOORPARAH AND NAROO PUNT NANA, VAKEELS ON THE
PART OF DOWLUT RAO SCINDIAH.*

10th Nov., 1803.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah desired to have a meeting with Major-General Wellesley on this day, and came in the evening. After a short time, he expressed a wish to speak in private; and the two vakeels, Appah Dessaye,† Mr. Elphinstone, Major-General Wellesley, and Govind Rao, went into Major-General Wellesley's tent.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah began by lamenting that any difference should have occurred between the government of the Company and that of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and declared that the Maharajah felt the greatest concern upon the subject. He then said that it was to be attributed entirely to the violence and precipitation of Colonel Collins, who had been entreated to wait only a few days till an answer could be received to letters which had been addressed to Major-General Wellesley by Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, which he had refused, and had gone off without taking leave. He said that he and Naroo Punt were present at the conference which had been held in Ragojee Bhoonslah's tent, and knew all that had passed.

In answer, Major-General Wellesley observed that this was the first time he had heard of Colonel Collins's violence; that if it had really existed, it would have been easy for the Maharajah's ministers to apprise him of it, as he was at no very great distance, and a remedy would immediately have been applied.

Upon the subject of the letters from Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, Major-General Wellesley recalled to the recollection of the vakeels (if they had been present at the conference in Ragojee Bhoonslah's tent), that a proposal had been made to Colonel Collins that letters should be written to Major-General Wellesley, stating that the Chiefs were willing to withdraw from the Nizam's frontier, and that they would arrive with their armies at Burhampoor when Major-General Wellesley and the British troops should arrive at Madras, Bombay, and Serin-

* This memorandum, and the subsequent memoranda, relative to the treaties with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, are in the handwriting of Major-General Wellesley. They were written immediately after each conference.—Ed.

† The Commander of the forces of the Peshwah serving with the British army.

gapatam ; which proposal Colonel Collins absolutely rejected, and declared that he would depart if letters conformable to it were written ; that afterwards another proposal was made, that letters should be written, stating that the Chiefs would immediately separate, and that each should move towards his own country, and make marches in proportion as the British troops should make them, and that the army of each chief should arrive at their usual stations at the time that the British troops should arrive at the stations they usually occupied. Colonel Collins agreed to this proposal, and said that he would wait till answers should be received to the letters which should be written conformable thereto. Instead of writing letters conformable to their last proposal, in which Colonel Collins had acquiesced, the Chiefs wrote letters conformable to their first, to which they knew that Colonel Collins would not agree, and after he had positively told them that he must depart if such letters were written. Colonel Collins accordingly quitted the camp.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt agreed that what Major-General Wellesley had stated was strictly true ; but they contended that the propositions which had been made in the conference alluded to were verbal, and could not be considered as binding. Major-General Wellesley answered that he never could admit that principle ; and that if it ever were to be admitted, the consequence would be that all public transactions must be in writing.

He then observed that in fact the letters written by Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar were only an additional provocation ; and that Colonel Collins, instead of having hurried away, stayed much longer than he was authorized to stay. Those Chiefs had been guilty of a gross breach of the amity existing between them and the Company by assembling their armies upon the Nizam's frontier, which armies they refused to withdraw, notwithstanding the entreaties of Colonel Collins, not for one day, but for two months, and Major-General Wellesley's letter to them, in which he pointed out in the clearest manner the consequences of their refusal to withdraw their armies, which they had assembled on the Nizam's frontier avowedly for the purposes of hostility.

Appah Dessaye then remarked that it was immaterial in what manner the dispute began. The present object was to make peace, and Jeswunt Rao Goorparah said that the most anxious wish

he had was to see a friendly meeting between Major-General Wellesley and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in which everything should be forgotten.

Major-General Wellesley observed that he had no personal enmity to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and he did not believe that the Maharajah had any reason to entertain a personal enmity against him. But the Major-General said that he must consider himself as charged with the interests of a great state, and the Maharajah as the head of another state, with which the British government is at war. That in this view of their relative situations he must lay aside all personal considerations, and must in everything act as the interests confided to him should require.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah explained that he meant that the meeting should be subsequent to the pacification between the two governments, which he was ready to endeavour to bring about.

Major-General Wellesley replied that he was ready to hear what he had to say upon that subject; but that in the first place it was necessary that he should know what powers Jeswunt Rao Goorparah had from the Maharajah. The Major-General said he had full powers from the British government, and he concluded that Jeswunt Rao had something of the same kind from the Maharajah.

In reply, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah said that it was not usual for a man of great rank to carry a letter; and that besides, the Maharajah had some objections to writing a letter, because the last which he had written to Major-General Wellesley upon the subject of his march to Burhampoor had never been answered.

A long conversation then ensued upon the subject of this letter, in which Major-General Wellesley declared that he had written an answer to the Maharajah, which Colonel Collins had forwarded from Adjuttee, and that Meer Mohamed Khan had adverted to it in a late letter received from him; the vakeels declared that the Maharajah had not received it. Major-General Wellesley then said that there would be no difficulty upon the subject of the loss of the letter sent; and as no personal rudeness was ever intended to the Maharajah, another copy should be sent. Upon the subject of the credentials, Major-General Wellesley said that the common practice throughout the world, but particularly in the Mahratta empire,

was that no common karkoon was ever sent on the most trifling business who did not bring a paper from his employer, and that in the greater concerns of states it was indispensable.

Major-General Wellesley, after pointing out the inconvenience which would result from a departure from the common rule, said that he had no doubt whatever that Jeswunt Rao Goorparah was sent to him by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, as he said he was, and that he was a man of such rank and character that he would not deceive him upon that point, neither would Dowlut Rao Scindiah venture to cast a shade upon his character by denying that he had employed Jeswunt Rao as a vakeel. On this ground, and as Appah Dessaye had a letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, stating that these persons were his vakeels, Major-General Wellesley said he was willing to hear what Jeswunt Rao Goorparah had to say; but he insisted upon it, that as soon as an hircarrah should be able to return, the regular credentials should be produced.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt then retired, and Appah Dessaye remained behind. He said that he had a letter from the Maharajah, saying that these persons were his vakeels, which might be deemed sufficient; and repeated that the reason for which the Maharajah had not written to Major-General Wellesley was, that his former letter had not been answered, upon which subject he was much hurt.

A long conversation ensued upon this subject. At last Appah Dessaye said that it was usual, and the Maharajah would consider it as a compliment, if Major-General Wellesley were to write to him to inform him that Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana had arrived.

Major-General Wellesley agreed that he would write such a letter, which is to be done.

Here the conference ended.

Nov. 11.—Appah Dessaye* sent a message to inform Major-General Wellesley that he was desirous of having a conference with him, and came in the evening.

* This person was formerly in the service, and much in the confidence, of Scindiah, who is married to his niece. He is now in the service of the Peshwah; but like all the other servants of that prince, and indeed every Mahratta, he looks up to Scindiah. The object of this conference was undoubtedly not to discover the instructions of Scindiah's vakeel, but to find out Major-General Wellesley's intentions.—(Note by Major-Gen. Wellesley.)

The General withdrew to his tent with Appah Dessaye, Mr. Elphinstone, and Govind Rao.

Appah Dessaye said that he had discovered the propositions for peace which Jeswunt Rao Goorparah was to make to Major-General Wellesley, and that they were as follows:—

That Scindiah would consent to acknowledge the treaty of Bassein. That he would engage not to assemble his troops on the frontier of the Nizam, or to molest His Highness. That the Company should arbitrate certain claims which he had upon the Nizam.

Upon these conditions being complied with, Scindiah would meet the Peshwah as heretofore, and co-operate with the English government to advance his service.

Major-General Wellesley expressed himself much obliged to Appah Dessaye for having apprised him of the nature of Scindiah's plan for a peace, but said that he should reserve his opinion on that plan, and indeed upon every point relating to it, until full and sufficient powers arrived here for the Sirdar employed by Dowlut Rao Scindiah to negotiate for him.

Appah Dessaye then began a long discourse on the subject of the union between Dowlut Rao Scindiah, Ragojee Bhoonslah, and Jeswunt Rao Holkar; he said that Scindiah had always been accustomed heretofore to negotiate for the interests of the two latter, and that he would settle the terms of the peace for them again with Major-General Wellesley; and that if they did not agree to them, he would join Major-General Wellesley in forcing them to agree to what should be arranged for them.

Major-General Wellesley replied that he did not know that Jeswunt Rao Holkar was the enemy of the British government; that he believed he was a better friend to the British government than he was to the confederates; and that there did not appear any occasion for the interference of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to settle the terms of a peace, where war had never existed. The General then pointed out the absurdity of settling with one power the terms of the peace which should be made with another power entirely independent of it, as Ragojee Bhoonslah was of Scindiah; and observed that if Scindiah had powers to arrange a peace for Ragojee Bhoonslah, it became still more necessary for Major-General Wellesley to proceed with caution, and to see the powers of his minister, before he should make known his sentiments on any plan for a peace.

Major-General Wellesley then said that the first object for Scindiah and his minister was to make peace for himself, and afterwards for his supposed friend; and the General said that he should negotiate a peace for Ragojee Bhoonslah, either with Scindiah, or with Ragojee himself hereafter, according as he should find it most advantageous for the interests of the Company and their allies.

Nov. 20.—Major-General Wellesley sent for Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, who came in the evening, accompanied by Naroo Punt Nana and Appah Dessaye.

After a short time they retired to the General's tent, in which were present Major-General Wellesley, Govind Rao, and Mr. Elphinstone.

Major-General Wellesley said that he wished that Jeswunt Rao Goorparah would state candidly by whose order, and with what view, he had come to his camp; as he informed Jeswunt Rao that he had that day received a letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in which the Maharajah desired him not to pay any attention to what should be said to him by any chief who did not produce the regular papers empowering him to act on behalf of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Major-General Wellesley likewise informed Jeswunt Rao Goorparah that he had received other letters from the durbar of the Maharajah, stating that he (Jeswunt Rao) had not been sent here by Dowlut Rao Scindiah as a vakeel; but that he had had leave to return to his jaghire, and had come here to pass himself upon Major-General Wellesley as a vakeel.

In answer Jeswunt Rao Goorparah said that what Dowlut Rao Scindiah had written was perfectly proper, viz. that Major-General Wellesley ought not to trust any person who did not possess the regular papers. He declared that although, for reasons he had already stated, he had not brought those papers with him, he had been appointed by Dowlut Rao Scindiah to be his vakeel in this camp; and in proof of this declaration he offered to produce Scindiah's letter to Appah Dessaye, and he produced a letter written to himself by another vakeel from Scindiah in the camp of Ragojee Bhoonslah, in which that person pointedly alludes to the object of his mission in this camp, and says that he had been apprised of the nature of it by Dowlut Rao Scindiah himself. He then related the manner in which he

had accepted the mission from Dowlut Rao Scindiah ; and said that if he had been desirous of becoming acquainted with Major-General Wellesley, it was not necessary that he should pretend that he was sent on a mission by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and that he believes he would have been well received if he had offered his services. He said that, supposing circumstances were against him, and that it should be believed that he had not been sent, and that he was going to his jaghire, how would they account for his being accompanied by Naroo Punt Nana, and by the huzzories and camel hircarrahs belonging to Scindiah ?

In answer, Major-General Wellesley said that he had no doubt but that Jeswunt Rao Goorparah had been sent, as he had said he was. He said that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had certainly a right to change his servants as often as he pleased, and that as long as he did not appoint a vakeel to come here to whom there was a personal objection, Major-General Wellesley should not object to his changing his vakeels, although he admitted that these changes did not give him great cause to rely on the sincerity of the Maharajah in his wishes for peace. He observed that this case was one entirely different from that of a mere change of persons employed in an office.

The Maharajah in his letter to Major-General Wellesley virtually denied that he had ever employed Jeswunt Rao Goorparah as his vakeel, and some of the persons of the durbar had written that Jeswunt Rao Goorparah was actually an impostor. He then pointed out the dangerous situation in which Jeswunt Rao Goorparah had been placed. Under the letters received that day from Scindiah's camp, Major-General Wellesley said that he would have been justified in seizing the persons of Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and all his attendants, and in punishing them as impostors and spies ; and that his omitting to adopt this mode of vindicating the honour of the British government must be attributed entirely to his moderation, and to his belief that Jeswunt Rao Goorparah had been sent as a vakeel as he had stated, and that the letters which he had that day received were the result of an intrigue in the durbar.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah admitted the justice of what Major-General Wellesley had said, and declared that he considered himself entirely at his mercy. He wished, however, that before any further steps were taken, Major-General Wellesley would wait till the answers should be received to the letters which he

had despatched on the day after his conference with Major-General Wellesley.

In answer, Major-General Wellesley said that he had no objection to his remaining in camp till those answers should be received, or to his obeying the orders which they should convey; and if they were to depart, as was to be expected, he should allow him to go off. Major-General Wellesley, however, desired him to recollect what had passed in this conversation, and to report it faithfully to the durbar; and to let the Maharajah's ministers know that if ever they ventured to play such tricks again, not only would their instrument suffer for them, but that it would become impossible to hold any intercourse whatever with the durbar of the Maharajah.

Nov. 21.—Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana came to Major-General Wellesley's tent in the evening, letters having been received from Dowlut Rao Scindiah which gave them and Appah Dessaye the regular appointment of vakeels. Appah Dessaye did not come, because Major-General Wellesley had intimated to him, through the medium of Mr. Elphinstone, in the morning, that he did not conceive that it was regular that one of the Peshwah's sirdars should have and exercise the appointment of a vakeel from Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and that Major-General Wellesley conceived that if he did exercise it, the Company would no longer consider him in the service of the Peshwah. On the other hand, Mr. Elphinstone informed him that Major-General Wellesley would not consent to his being present at the conferences between him and Jeswunt Rao Goorparah unless he appeared there in the character of an authorised vakeel from one of the parties concerned in the war.

There were present at the meeting this day Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, Naroo Punt Nana, Mr. Elphinstone, Govind Rao, and Major-General Wellesley.

Major-General Wellesley said that, now that the Maharajah had written that they were persons in whom he confided, and had employed to confer with him, he was desirous that they should lose no time, but would inform him what the object of their mission was.

Jeswunt Rao answered that they were instructed to state the wish of Dowlut Rao Scindiah that there should be peace between the two governments, to ascertain Major-General Wellesley's

wishes upon this subject, and to return to camp, bringing with them an officer having full powers from Major-General Wellesley to conclude a treaty.

Major-General Wellesley, in reply, said that he had hoped that they would have brought forward some plan for a treaty of peace, which he might have considered, and upon which he might have given his opinion; but that as they had not done so, he would open his mind regarding a peace. Major-General Wellesley then related all the principal transactions which had taken place between the British government and the Maharajah, from the period of Holkar's victory near Poonah to that of the breaking out of the war; and he pointed out that the war was one of aggression on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and that the British government had done everything that was consistent with honour to avoid it. He particularly noticed the conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in first calling upon the British government to come forward to assist the Peshwah against Holkar, and afterwards his making peace with Holkar, and sacrificing to him the vast territories which he had conquered from the Holkar family, only to induce him to become a party in the war against the British government.

In this war, Major-General Wellesley said, thus begun in consequence of the aggressions and unjustifiable conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in assembling his troops on the frontier of our ally, the operations of the British troops had been most successful, the Maharajah had lost nearly the whole of his territories, and his government hung only by a thread. The Maharajah now wishes for peace, but Major-General Wellesley said it must be recollected that he began the war, and had been the occasion of vast expenses incurred by the British government, of the loss of many brave officers and men of the British army, and of great damage done to the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan.* Under these circumstances, and considering the successes of the British troops, Major-General Wellesley said that the Maharajah must not expect peace, and the British government would not make it, unless the Maharajah's government should give compensation for what had passed, and security that the Allies would not be liable to such unjust attacks in future.

In respect to sending a sirdar to the camp of the Maharajah,

* The Nizam.

Major-General Wellesley said that he had no objection to adopt that measure, if it were necessary; but he did not see what end it was to answer. The Company had in their hands the possessions of the Maharajah by means of which the peace was to be made. The British government had nothing to ask from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, although he had much to ask from the British government; and, therefore, it appeared that this camp was the proper place to negotiate the terms on which peace should be made.

In reply to this discourse Jeswunt Rao Goorparah recapitulated the various expenses, injuries, and losses which the British government and their Allies had sustained by the war, and said that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had sustained them equally. He said that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had been obliged to assemble large armies; that he had lost them with all his artillery; that his country, instead of being overrun, had been taken from him; that he had lost Holkar's territories by the war; and he particularly expatiated on the loss of power and profit which his government had sustained by the establishment of the British influence at Poonah. He said that the Peshwah's power had been in his hands, and now it was in the hands of the British government. He said that for all these losses surely Dowlut Rao Scindiah ought to have some compensation.

Major-General Wellesley observed in reply, that if all these losses had not been brought on the Maharajah by his own act, his violent aggression, and his hostility towards the British government, there might be some claim for compensation for losses; at least justice would be on his side. But the case was entirely different; his losses were occasioned by his own act, while those the British government had sustained were in defending itself and its Allies. Major-General Wellesley added that, in respect to the claim of compensation brought forward for the loss of the Holkar territories, the fact was that those territories had been sacrificed in order to increase the number of the enemies of the British government; and it would be a curious arrangement to set off against the claim of the British government to compensation for an aggression, the loss of those very territories by the power which had sacrificed them in order to increase the number of our enemies, and, if possible, to insure the success of the confederates united in a war of aggression.

In respect to the Peshwah, Major-General Wellesley denied that his power was identified with that of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or that the latter was anything but the subject of the former; and in respect to the alliance between the British government and the Peshwah, Major-General Wellesley said that he would not allow it to be brought forward at all as a grievance which occasioned the war, as the Maharajah and Ragojee Bhoonslah had both written to the Governor-General, and had expressed their acquiescence in the justice and propriety of the treaty of Bassein before the war broke out.

Major-General Wellesley then said that having, as he thought, established the right of the Company and their Allies to have compensation for the injuries they had received, and security against such wanton attacks in future, he wished to know whether Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana were prepared and authorised to admit that principle as the basis of the terms of the peace. A long conversation then ensued, in which the vakeels declared that the Maharajah was desirous to renew the old friendship upon the old footing, and to owe the re-establishment of his state, which they avowed was gone, to the British government.

Major-General Wellesley replied that the re-establishment of the state of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the old footing was out of the question. That supposing the British government and their Allies were willing to forego the advantages which their successes in the war had given them a right to expect, engagements had been entered into with different chiefs, by which they had been taken under the protection of the Company, and had promised that they would assist the Company against their enemies; that these treaties would never be departed from.

Major-General Wellesley said that the British government had no desire to destroy the state of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; on the contrary, it was their wish to preserve it. But from what he had already said, the Major-General observed that the vakeels must see clearly that unless Dowlut Rao Scindiah soon made peace with the British government, he would have no state left.

The vakeels pressed to know the extent of the compensation which Major-General Wellesley would require.

Major-General Wellesley said that he could not enter into details till he knew whether they were authorised to grant com-

pensation, and he repeated his question upon that subject. In answer, they said they were not.

Major-General Wellesley then said that they must apply for further powers, and that in the mean time the negotiation must stand still; and they might report to Dowlut Rao Scindiah all that he had said.

The vakeels then expressed a desire that hostilities should be suspended, and showed different letters both from Scindiah and his ministers, in which the greatest anxiety is expressed upon this subject. The principal reason which the ministers assigned for making this request was, that the communication might be more quick and easy by both armies being stationary. Major-General Wellesley replied that the proposition to make his army stationary included that of suspending hostilities against Ragojee Bhoonslah, to which he was determined not to agree till he had made peace with that chief. He said that if they had any proposition to make regarding a suspension of hostilities with Scindiah only, he was ready to listen to it.

After some conversation, in which the vakeels repeated frequently that Ragojee Bhoonslah depended entirely on Scindiah, they proposed that Major-General Wellesley should suspend hostilities with Scindiah only, and they showed the secret instruction of Eetul Pundit on this subject, from which it appeared that Dowlut Rao Scindiah was exceedingly alarmed at the corps posted at Dohud in Guzerat, and at the prospect of being engaged with Colonel Stevenson's corps, and that he wished to take up his station at Burhampoor during the negotiations for peace.

In answer, Major-General Wellesley said that he had no objections to a suspension of hostilities with Dowlut Rao Scindiah only, which should be applicable only to the troops in the Deccan and to those in Guzerat; but that he could not consent to the Maharajah's taking up his position at Burhampoor, as that place then belonged to the Soubah of the Deccan; that as the operations of the British troops would still be continued against Ragojee Bhoonslah, it would be necessary for Dowlut Rao Scindiah to remove to a distance; and that the situation which he, Major-General Wellesley, would most approve of for him would be in the Berar country, at any place he thought proper, not less than twenty coss from Ellichpoor.

The vakeels pressed that the suspension of hostilities should extend to the troops in Hindustan. Major-General Wellesley replied that those troops were not under his orders, but under those of the Commander-in-Chief, and that he could not suspend their operations. At all events, he observed that it would take six weeks to communicate with the Commander-in-Chief, and long before that time it was to be hoped that a treaty of peace would be concluded; or if it were not, hostilities must be renewed every where.

The vakeels then agreed to the proposition made by Major-General Wellesley regarding Dowlut Rao Scindiah's position, and they strongly urged that a treaty to that purport should be immediately drawn out, and signed by Major-General Wellesley and by them.

Major-General Wellesley said that it was then late, and that he wished to consider the details of the arrangement till the next day, when the treaty should be drawn out.

The vakeels then asked whether a vakeel from Ragojee Bhoonslah would be received in camp. Major-General Wellesley said that, after what had already happened, he could not receive any person from Ragojee Bhoonslah who did not first communicate the business on which he was sent; but, with that reservation, he would receive a vakeel from Ragojee Bhoonslah, if he had anything to communicate to him.

Nov. 22.—Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana came in the evening. Mr. Elphinstone, Govind Rao, and Major-General Wellesley were present at the conference which followed.

The Persian and Mahratta letters to Dowlut Rao Scindiah of this date were read and explained to them, with which they were perfectly satisfied. The terms of the agreement for the suspension of hostilities were then canvassed. The vakeels expressed a wish that Dowlut Rao Scindiah might be allowed to choose a station twenty coss from Ellichpoor, to the westward of that city, if he should think proper.

To this Major-General Wellesley objected that the neighbourhood of Burhampoor belonged to the Soubah of the Deccan, and he could not consent to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's remaining in any part of His Highness's territories.

The agreement was at length settled as follows :—

Major-General Wellesley on the part of the Honourable Company and their Allies, and Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana on the part of the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, having each communicated to the other their full powers, have made the following agreement :

“ Camp, Nov. 23, 1803.”

1. There shall be a cessation of hostilities between the troops commanded by Major-General Wellesley in the Deccan and in Guzerat, and those in the service of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

2. In order to prevent accidents, and to insure the execution of the first article, it is agreed that there shall be an interval of twenty coss between the different British and Allied armies and that of the Maharajah ; and the Maharajah will march with his army, and take up a position twenty coss to the eastward of Ellichpoor, and he will forage still farther to the eastward.

3. In case the operations of the British and Allied armies against the other enemies of the British government should draw either of them nearer than twenty coss to the position which the Maharajah will have occupied, according to the second article, previous notice of such operation will be given, in order that the Maharajah may take timely measures always to preserve an interval of twenty coss between his army and the British and Allied troops.

4. In Guzerat the British troops shall not advance beyond Dohud. Those of the Maharajah on the side of Guzerat shall not approach nearer to Dohud than twenty coss.

5. Notice must be given in case either of the parties should be desirous to put an end to this agreement.

6. This agreement is to be ratified by the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and his ratification is to be given to Major-General Wellesley in the space of ten days from this time.

After having settled this agreement, Major-General Wellesley said that he wished to know whether the person who was carrying on the predatory operations on the borders of the Ahmednuggur district, and those belonging to the Soubah of

the Deccan in that quarter, was or was not in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. If he were, Major-General Wellesley said that his operations must be stopped; if he were not, Major-General Wellesley said that he should give orders that a reward might be offered for his apprehension, in order that he might be taken and hanged as a freebooter.

The vakeels replied that they would inquire about that person, and in case he should prove not to be in the service of the Maharajah, or if, being in his service, he did not stop his operations when ordered, they wished he might be punished as a freebooter.

A conversation then ensued about some people taken at Jalnapoor and detained, and Major-General Wellesley took that opportunity of animadverting upon the conduct of the confederates in seizing the persons of the inhabitants of the country when they found that they could make no impression on the forts or strongholds. Major-General Wellesley said that in consequence of this conduct he had been obliged to give orders that the persons of those attached to the confederated Chiefs and their adherents should also be seized by way of retaliation. The vakeels denied that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had ever seized any body, and declared that he had taken during the war only Mr. Simpson, who was living in camp.

Major-General Wellesley said that he had cautiously avoided mentioning the name of that gentleman, and even inquiring after him, because the seizure of his person was a gross violation of the laws of nations, and a disgrace to the government of the Maharajah. He was attached to Colonel Collins's mission, and it would have been equally proper to have seized and detained the person of Colonel Collins himself. Major-General Wellesley said that he hoped the Maharajah was unacquainted with that circumstance; and now that he had acquainted the vakeels with it, that they would immediately apprise the Maharajah of it, and that Mr. Simpson would be sent to camp. They said he should.

The vakeels then said that in the conference of the day before Major-General Wellesley had said that the British government must have compensation and security in order to induce them to make peace; and at the same time Major-General Wellesley had said that it was not the wish of the British government to destroy the state of the Maharajah, and

that this compensation could be taken without destroying his government. They wished to know how this could be done.

In answer Major-General Wellesley said that he had the day before stated the reasons for which he thought the British government entitled to compensation, which reasons were unanswerable. He certainly conceived that it was possible to give compensation to the British government and their Allies, and still to preserve the state of the Maharajah, which it was the wish of the British government should stand; but he said that he could not state his ideas in detail upon that subject till he should learn from the vakeels that the Maharajah was willing to adopt the principle of giving compensation to the British government as the basis of the negotiations for peace.

The vakeels said that the existence of the state of Dowlut Rao Scindiah was in the hands of the British government, and that in future, in whatever situation he might be left at the peace, he must depend upon the British government for support; and that after Major-General Wellesley had settled the terms of the peace, and put an end to the war, it would be necessary that he should settle the government of the Maharajah.

In answer Major-General Wellesley said that the first thing to do was to make peace, and that after that was done it would be time enough to talk of other matters.

Here the conversation ended.

Nov. 28.—Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana came to Major-General Wellesley's tent, and there were present Major-General Wellesley, Mr. Elphinstone, and Govind Rao.

The vakeels produced a letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in which that Chief stated that he had not ratified the agreement for suspending hostilities; and his reasons for this omission: they were principally that Ragojee Bhoonslah was not admitted as a party to it, and that he had not sent the letter which had been given to him addressed to Colonel Stevenson, as he feared that it contained an order to that officer to attack Ragojee Bhoonslah's troops.

Major-General Wellesley replied that the Maharajah was at liberty to ratify or not to ratify the agreement, which had been made with his vakeels by his particular desire, at their urgent request; but as he had not ratified it, and had not carried into execution any of its conditions, Major-General

Wellesley desired to have back his letters addressed to Colonel Stevenson and Colonel Murray, containing orders to suspend hostilities.

Major-General Wellesley observed that the letter to Colonel Murray was not mentioned in the letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and he desired to know whether that letter had been sent. If it had, Major-General Wellesley said that the Maharajah had been guilty of a gross fraud, which would render it impossible ever to trust him again.

The vakeels said they had every reason to believe that the letter had not been sent, but they promised to give an immediate answer upon that subject. They then produced a letter from Vencajee Bhoonslah,* by which they pretended they were empowered to act for Ragojee Bhoonslah, and they desired Major-General Wellesley to agree to a suspension of hostilities with that chief.

Major-General Wellesley said that Vencajee Bhoonslah was not Ragojee Bhoonslah; that it did not appear that he had any power to bind Ragojee Bhoonslah, who was his sovereign; and therefore he should have nothing to do with vakeels appointed by him. A long argument ensued upon the subject of the powers which Vencajee Bhoonslah had; and Major-General Wellesley declared that till he saw some formal instrument signed by Ragojee conveying them, he should not consider that he had any, and should not negotiate regarding Ragojee's interests with vakeels appointed by Vencajee.

The vakeels asked on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah whether Ragojee Bhoonslah would be admitted to the suspension of hostilities if he should send to Major-General Wellesley a vakeel regularly appointed with full powers.

Major-General Wellesley replied that he should reserve to himself the terms which he should grant to Ragojee Bhoonslah till a vakeel appointed by that chief should arrive in this camp; that Scindiah had no right whatever to ask a question upon the subject; and that at all events, supposing he had, it would be rather a curious proceeding to specify the terms of an arrangement which should be made with any chief, provided such chief would do Major-General Wellesley the favour to send a vakeel to his camp to accept them.

The vakeels said that Scindiah and Manoo Bappoo were

* Or Manoo Bappoo, brother to Ragojee Bhoonslah, Rajah of Berar.

encamped at no great distance from each other, and that the latter had thrown himself under the protection of the former; that Colonel Stevenson was at the distance of only six coss from Manoo Bappoo, and that there was every reason to believe that his troops would soon come to an engagement with those under Manoo Bappoo. They were therefore very desirous that Colonel Stevenson should be desired to halt, and that Major-General Wellesley also should halt, as they said that Scindiah would be involved in great difficulties, and would not know how to act in such a case.

Major-General Wellesley replied that if Scindiah should adhere to the agreement for suspending hostilities, and should act in conformity thereto, there would be no difficulty.

Manoo Bappoo might be attacked, and Scindiah would not be near enough either to give him assistance, or to suffer disgrace for not assisting him. If he should not act in conformity with his agreement, Major-General Wellesley said he would be still the Company's enemy, and would be treated as such wherever he was found out of the position which it had been agreed that he should take up.

The vakeels urged this point again, and requested that Colonel Stevenson might be desired to fall back, or at least to halt one day; and they said that supposing Manoo Bappoo should follow Scindiah, and should fly to him for an asylum, what was to be done then?

Major-General Wellesley replied that Colonel Stevenson should not go back, and that he should not halt even for an hour. In respect to Manoo Bappoo's following Scindiah, Major-General Wellesley said that if Scindiah should go to the position pointed out for him, the agreement provided for such an event, and notice would accordingly be given to Scindiah if an intention should be formed of attacking Manoo Bappoo, in order that Scindiah might move out of the way; but that if Manoo Bappoo should join him, and he should not be in the position which it had been agreed that he should take up, of course he was to run his chance in the same manner as any other enemy of the British government.

The vakeels mentioned their surprise at the use of the word enemy, and repeated their request regarding the attack of Manoo Bappoo. Major-General Wellesley gave the same answer, and added that Manoo Bappoo and Scindiah would

certainly be attacked on the next day, the 29th, if they did not retire, and Scindiah did not take up the position which had been agreed upon.

In respect of the word enemy, Major-General Wellesley said that Scindiah was still the enemy of the British government; that so far from being at peace with that government, his vakeels had not spoken so much as even one word upon that subject; and that their whole object appeared to be to save the Rajah of Berar from the just punishment which awaited him.

He then asked whether any answer had been received to the question respecting the peace which had been put to them, viz. whether Scindiah was willing to give compensation to the Company and their Allies for the injury which had been done them by his unjust aggression.

In reply the vakeels said they had received his orders upon that subject; but as it was late, and they were desirous of writing to their master that night, they wished to defer to deliver his sentiments upon that subject till the next day.

Dec. 1.—Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana came to Major-General Wellesley and had a conference with him, at which were present Major-General Wellesley, Mr. Elphinstone, and Govind Rao.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah said that he had brought the agreement for suspending hostilities ratified by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and which he presented to Major-General Wellesley.

Major-General Wellesley said that the treaty must be considered as void unless the Maharajah complied with all its stipulations.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah said that he had, and was then marching towards Ellichpoor, and presented letters to Bappojee Scindiah and the Sirdar commanding the troops in the Nuggur district, conveying to them orders to suspend hostilities.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah then presented a letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, by which Major-General Wellesley was again referred to Jeswunt Rao Goorparah for further verbal communications.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah then said that Major-General Wellesley had required that the Company should have compensation at the peace; and he wished to know what Major-General Wellesley would require.

Major-General Wellesley replied that he had required that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should consent to make compensation to the Company the basis of the negotiation for peace; instead of doing that, he had only required that Major-General Wellesley should inform him what compensation the Company would demand. Major-General Wellesley desired to be informed first whether Dowlut Rao Scindiah would or would not give compensation, and next to see the vakeels' instructions upon that point.

The vakeels confounded the distinction between the demand and grant of compensation generally, and the demand and grant of particular countries as compensation; and said it was impossible for them to say that the latter should be granted till they knew which they were.

The distinction was repeatedly explained to them, and Major-General Wellesley required either that they should sign a paper stating that they were authorized to admit the right of the Company to compensation as the principle of the negotiation, or that they should show their instructions; as he observed that there was so much duplicity and want of steadiness in Dowlut Rao Scindiah's durbar, that it was necessary that he should have such a document before he should go any farther.

After a long argument upon this point the vakeels produced their instructions, from a perusal of which it appeared that they were only instructed to find out in what manner it was proposed to take compensation by the Company without destroying Dowlut Rao Scindiah's state.

The vakeels contended that this paper included every thing that was required, and Major-General Wellesley observed that if it did in their opinion, they could have no difficulty in giving the paper which had been required.

At last, however, they agreed that it did not, and they proposed to make a reference to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to give an answer on the next day but one.

Major-General Wellesley took this opportunity of observing upon the manner in which all the papers were drawn up which had reached him from Scindiah's durbar. He said that the paper which had just been produced might be construed either one way or the other, as might be thought most convenient; that those which had reached him previous to the war had been drawn up in the same manner, and that this want of sincerity and candour had partly been the cause of it.

He then said that if on the next day but one the vakeels did not produce a paper clearly drawn out, admitting the right of the Company to compensation as the principle of the negotiations for peace, he should request the vakeels to quit his camp, and should leave Dowlut Rao Scindiah to his fate.

December 8.—Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana came to Major-General Wellesley's tent in the evening; the Major-General, Mr. Elphinstone, and Govind Rao were present.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah said that he had received a letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, dated seven days ago, in answer to that which he had written communicating Major-General Wellesley's desire that the British government should have compensation for the injuries and aggression it had received from the Maharajah and his confederates. After some conversation this letter was produced, and it alluded to a memorandum which accompanied a treaty which Dowlut Rao Scindiah proposed should be signed by Major-General Wellesley, in two articles.

The first article stated that the British troops, having taken forts, guns, stores, property of all kinds, from the Maharajah, a part of these were to be restored to him.

The second article stated that, in consideration of the first being agreed to, Dowlut Rao Scindiah would agree to give to the British government compensation for the expenses which they had incurred during the war. It then recited the necessity to which he was reduced, and expressed a hope that the demand upon him would not be heavy.

Major-General Wellesley said that he did not see any necessity for signing that paper. He had always said that he had no intention to retain all the conquests which the British troops had made: he certainly should restore a part of them, and that part which he should restore would be in a condition as perfect as on the day that the treaty should be ratified.

The vakeels hinted a wish that some of the guns taken in battle might be given back. To this Major-General Wellesley replied that he never would or could consent to such a proposal; that the troops and the British government considered those guns as honourable trophies of their victories, and that it would be considered a disgrace to stipulate for their restoration in any

manner. The vakeels pressed this point, and Major-General Wellesley positively refused it.

The vakeels said that the guns were absolutely necessary to Dowlut Rao Scindiah to enable him to defend himself. Major-General Wellesley replied that he knew that he had some at Ougein; at all events he could cast them; but that even if he had none, and could not procure any, it would be impossible for him to restore the guns taken in battle.

Major-General Wellesley then said that as it appeared the Maharajah was inclined to grant compensation to the Company and their Allies for the injuries they had received, he would proceed to state what he should demand. He began with the Rajpoot and Jaut Chiefs and states, and said that the Company had concluded treaties with them, which could not be departed from, and that these Chiefs must be declared to be independent of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Major-General Wellesley mentioned that there were several of these Chiefs and states with which treaties had been concluded, and said that he would hereafter produce a list of them. In the mean time he said that the Maharajah must acknowledge their independence.

Major-General Wellesley next went to the Nizam. He said that for him he should require a distinct frontier, and that his territories should be freed from all interference and mixture with those of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Also, that the Maharajah should renounce all claims of choute and other claims upon the Nizam, respecting which Major-General Wellesley observed that Scindiah had no right whatever either in his own person or on behalf of the Peshwah, who had submitted his claims to the arbitration of the British government, and had repeatedly declared that he had not authorised Dowlut Rao Scindiah to enforce them. The vakeels replied to this observation that they desired to refer to the treaties between the Maharajah and the Nizam's government, and to the sunnuds from the Peshwah, to ascertain these claims.

Major-General Wellesley said that he had no objection to examine the treaties, and would do so, but not to allow the claim of choute, the renunciation of which he declared was absolutely necessary to obtain peace, whether the claim was founded upon treaty or upon a sunnud from the Peshwah, or, as he apprehended, upon the right of the sword. He explained to the vakeels that when Dowlut Rao Scindiah went to war he

broke all treaties, and there was an end of them; and, unless renewed, they must be considered in the same light as if they had never been made.

Major-General Wellesley also explained the necessity of the renunciation of choute in order to have any peace or prosperity in the country. In respect to the Peshwah's government, he said that it would be necessary to appoint commissioners, whose decision should be final, to ascertain what districts belonged to His Highness, and what to Dowlut Rao Scindiah; otherwise, Major-General Wellesley observed, disputes would be perpetual, and, in the end, there would be another war.

Major-General Wellesley next adverted to the cessions of territory which would be required from Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

He told the vakeels that the Company would require from Scindiah all his territories lying to the northward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and of the Ranah of Gohud, the fort and territory of Baroach, the fort and territory of Ahmednuggur, and the districts near the Godavery, which would be necessary to exclude him from the Nizam's territories.

Major-General Wellesley said that the fort and territory of Baroach were necessary for the preservation of the Company's interests in Guzerat; the fort of Ahmednuggur was necessary to the independence of the Peshwah; and the territories to the northward to the security of the Company, to afford compensation to the allies, and to provide for the King [of Delhi] and other Chiefs who during the war had joined the Company.

Major-General Wellesley here observed that he could not consider the state of Dowlut Rao Scindiah as much diminished by these cessions, as in fact he had not possessed the territories to the northward; they had been in the hands of M. Perron, who had never given him the revenue, had frequently refused to serve him, and was in fact independent of him.

The vakeels, who had been silent nearly till this moment, exclaimed that the Maharajah's state must fall if he should lose his influence over the King, and if those territories which M. Perron had were not restored to him. They said that M. Perron had served, and they instanced the battle of Kurdlah;* and that the Maharajah had always had some of the camoops with him.

* Between Nizam Ali and the Mahrattas, in 1795. The corps of Mons. Perron, on the side of the Mahrattas, and of Mons. Raymond, in the service of the Nizam, were engaged.

Major-General Wellesley said that M. Perron might have served formerly, but that he knew that latterly he had refused to send his troops into the Deccan; and that after having been one of the principal instigators of Scindiah to go to war with the British government, he had basely abandoned him.

In respect to the King, Major-General Wellesley said that Scindiah had given him over to the Frenchmen, who had treated him in the most barbarous manner, and that it would be entirely inconsistent with the humanity of the British government, and the rules of good faith, if His Majesty were to be given up to the Mahrattas again.

In reply the vakeels said that it was true that M. Perron and his Frenchmen had basely deserted Scindiah, but the native establishments of the campoos still remained, and they declared his incapacity to support them unless these territories were restored to him.

Major-General Wellesley replied that Scindiah had other territories from which they might be supported, and stated the intention to restore Burhampoor, Asseerghur, and the territories bordering on Guzerat. The conversation continued some time upon this point, and at length the vakeels desired Major-General Wellesley to continue.

Major-General Wellesley said that one of the principal causes of the present war was to be attributed to the instigations and intrigues of Frenchmen in Scindiah's durbar. He said that wherever there was a Frenchman there was a decided and restless enemy of the British government. The events of the war had shown that these officers in Scindiah's service could not be depended on, and at all events could render him no service; and Major-General Wellesley observed that he could prove to Scindiah in the clearest manner that an alliance with the French nation could, under present circumstances, be of no use to him, excepting to involve him in farther difficulties. Major-General Wellesley said that on these grounds it was necessary that the British government should demand that Scindiah should consent never to take a Frenchman into his service, or any European or American subject whose government should be at war with the English; and it could not be inconvenient to Scindiah to grant this article.

The vakeels declared, in reply, that they would grant it with

pleasure ; that Scindiah had not the smallest wish ever to see a Frenchman again.

A long conversation then ensued upon the cession of the territories to the northward, in which what had passed before was recapitulated, particularly that the infantry establishment was necessary, that it was intended to keep it up, and that it could not be kept up unless those territories were restored.

Major-General Wellesley then said that there was another subject that he had omitted to mention, and that was, that the British government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah should each have a minister residing with the other.

The vakeels assented to this proposition, and Jeswunt Rao Goorparah in particular said that he should be happy to be the person employed by the Maharajah upon this occasion.

Major-General Wellesley took this opportunity of expressing his satisfaction with Jeswunt's conduct, and his hopes that it might be possible to arrange a peace upon the basis which he had stated.

In the course of the conversation which followed, and indeed frequently during this day's conference, the vakeels declared that Dowlut Rao Scindiah was absolutely reduced by necessity to make any peace the British government chose. This declaration appears also in his own letters.

The vakeels then desired to have in writing what Major-General Wellesley had stated, which was promised on the following day.

They urged again the demand for the Rajah of Berar, and said that Scindiah was very desirous that the Rajah should believe that he had assisted to obtain peace for him, and asked whether Major-General Wellesley would admit the Rajah's vakeel to the conferences for peace.

Major-General Wellesley replied that he should not admit the Rajah's vakeel to the conferences with them unless he had powers from Dowlut Rao to treat for him ; nor, on the other hand, should he admit them to the conferences with the Rajah's vakeel. Major-General Wellesley said that he had no objection to make peace with the Rajah ; that, on the contrary, for his own personal convenience he wished to put an end to the war, although to the government it must be indifferent how long it should last, as by the successful exertions of the British troops

territories had been taken possession of, the revenues of which would pay its expenses.

Dec. 11.—Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana came to Major-General Wellesley's tent, and a conference ensued, at which were present Major-General Wellesley, Mr. Elphinstone, and Govind Rao.

They came, they said, to talk over with Major-General Wellesley the articles on which he had proposed on the former day to frame the peace. They expressed a wish to know what territories Major-General Wellesley desired to have in Hindustan, and where the Company's boundary was to be.

Major-General Wellesley replied that the territories which it was necessary that Scindiah should cede were all those to the northward of the states of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and Gohud. In respect to the Company's boundary, Major-General Wellesley said that there was no intention of carrying the Company's territories farther than the Jumna, and to those places on the right bank which would secure the navigation of that river and the Company's frontier; that the remainder of the territories ceded would be applicable to the support of the King and of other Sirdars who had rendered services to the Company during the war, and whose services merited reward. Major-General Wellesley observed that he did not admit the right of the vakeels to ask any questions regarding the disposal of the territory which Scindiah should cede, nor did he pledge the Company's faith that it would be disposed as he had stated; but Major-General Wellesley said that this disposal of the territory was a proof of the generosity of the British government, and he had therefore no desire to conceal it.

The vakeels then pressed most anxiously that the territory to be given to the King and others might be allowed to remain in the hands of Scindiah; that the amount of the subsistence to be given to the King might be fixed by the Company, and that Scindiah should pay it to him; and that the same arrangement should be made for the other persons for whom the Company's government were desirous to provide. They particularly asked what was to become of Scindiah's office of vizier? They said that hitherto the countries in Hindustan, particularly Perron's jaghire, had always been managed in the name of the King; that Scindiah

appointed and dismissed amildars and others in His Majesty's name; and that he also in His Majesty's name distributed the revenues of the districts (excepting, as was understood, Perron's jaghire) in their three shares, to his own government, that of the Peshwah, and that of Holkar. The vakeels asked how this was to be in future? and they wished Major-General Wellesley to specify particularly the names of the talooks which he required, as two-thirds of all to the northward of the states of Jeypoor, &c. belonged to the Peshwah and Holkar.

Major-General Wellesley replied that the British government would never consent to leave in the hands of Scindiah or any other person the provision to be made for the King, or for those who had supported them in the war, and whom they had taken under their protection; that the demand upon that point would never be complied with.

In respect to Scindiah's office of vizier, Major-General Wellesley said that he supposed His Majesty had the power of dismissing him from it, now that he was no longer held in a degraded subjection by M. Perron's troops, and that he was in alliance with the Company. That when he was dismissed from that office, which after all was but nominal, and the authority belonging to which depended upon the existence of Scindiah's military power, there could be no question respecting the exercise of its duties.

In respect to the names of the districts which he should require, Major-General Wellesley said that he would endeavour to procure them. In the mean time, however, he demanded from Scindiah that he should cede all his rights and territories to the northward of Jeypoor, &c. In this cession Major-General Wellesley said that of course the rights of the Peshwah and those of Holkar were not included, as Major-General Wellesley had more than once told the vakeels they had no right to cede or demand on the part of any body excepting their own master; moreover, the British government were bound to protect and support the rights of the Peshwah; and as for Holkar, he was able to protect his own, and certainly the Company had no intention to interfere with him as long as he refrained from hostilities against them.

A long conversation ensued upon this point, in which everything that had been said before was repeated more than once. The vakeels expressed their astonishment that the Company's

government should make such demands for other persons; and they said that there would be no objection to the cession of Perron's jaghire. They expressed themselves strongly upon the hardships which Scindiah must suffer, while those who had brought him into the scrape and who had not assisted him, viz. the Peshwah and Holkar, were, the former supported and protected, and the latter unmolested.

Major-General Wellesley said that it might accelerate matters, and throw some light upon this point in the negotiations, if they would give him a memorandum upon the subject of Hindustan, in which they should state particularly in what manner the revenue was collected and the business conducted. The vakeels then went to the demands for the Nizam. They said that Jalnapoor belonged to the Peshwah, and had been granted by the Peshwah to Scindiah.

Major-General Wellesley replied that the same answer might be given to every demand made. He asked for that district on the part of the British government and their allies; and Scindiah must cede it, if he wished for peace. The British government would find no difficulty in settling the question between the Peshwah and the Nizam. The vakeels then adverted to the demand of Baroach, and said that that place had been given to Madhajee Scindiah * by the British government; that it was the only sea port they had, and hoped they might be allowed to keep it.

Major-General Wellesley replied that it was unfortunate that Scindiah had not recollected that the British government had given him Baroach at the time he exposed it to risk; that in respect to the place, it was important to the Company's interests in Guzerat, and by no means so to Scindiah's, excepting to disturb them; and, in respect to the want of a sea port by Scindiah, Major-General Wellesley observed that it was notorious that the Company's sea ports were managed on the most liberal principles, and that all persons who conducted themselves peaceably, and conformed to the laws of the place, had the use of them. The vakeels then adverted to the demand of Ahmednuggur. They gave up the fort without much difficulty; but they insisted upon keeping the territories depending upon it, or rather those territories of which the British government had

* Uncle and predecessor to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

taken possession. They said that these were the ancient family lands of Scindiah, and that he never could consent to give them up.

Major-General Wellesley, in reply, stated his reasons for demanding them. He said that they were mixed with the lands of the Peshwah, and that one of the consequences of that system of mixing territories was, that the country enjoyed no peace, and could not prosper.

The vakeels said that these lands were not jaghire, but were enaum; that Scindiah kept no troops in them, and there could consequently be no disputes or plunder such as Major-General Wellesley apprehended. They said that these lands were the family estate of Scindiah, and he never could consent to part with them.

Major-General Wellesley said that he would take this demand into further consideration, and that he would not press it if he should find that it would be very inconvenient to the Peshwah not to have these lands.

The vakeels said there would be no difficulty respecting the demand about Europeans in Scindiah's service.

They desired to know who the Chiefs were with whom treaties had been made, which Scindiah was called upon to confirm.

Major-General Wellesley said that when a great confederacy had been formed against the British government, it was necessary that it should secure its own interests as far as might be practicable, and that accordingly officers employed in different parts of India had been authorised to enter into engagements with any Chiefs who chose to adhere to the cause of the Company.

Major-General Wellesley said that, owing to Scindiah's delays, the war still continued, and the number of the Company's partisans was daily increasing in proportion to the success of their arms. The benefit of these engagements had been amply experienced, and it was determined to continue to enter into them till Scindiah should make peace. But as some of the officers authorised to make them were at a great distance, and it was difficult to communicate with them, Major-General Wellesley did not know at that time the extent of their engagements, and therefore could not mention names, much less could he mention the names of all the Chiefs with whom engagements might be made before the officers authorised to make them

would hear of the peace. Notwithstanding this difficulty, Major-General Wellesley said that the honour of the British government required that all these engagements should be kept. He therefore proposed to draw an article which should provide generally for these engagements, and to specify a time at which the names of the Chiefs with whom they had been made should be communicated to Scindiah.

Major-General Wellesley observed that he had repeatedly informed the vakeels of these circumstances, and had pointed out the inconveniences of further delays, particularly in this instance; and he then said that if Scindiah did not take care, he would have no state and no army left.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah observed that, by agreeing to this demand, the Maharajah might, without knowing it, cede away half his remaining territories, as these treaties might contain stipulations to grant territory to the south of the line which the Company had demanded as a boundary.

Major-General Wellesley replied that this was true; but he said that he did not believe that hitherto any treaty had been made by which territory was granted south of the line mentioned, although claims and peshcush certainly were, or that it was intended to deprive Scindiah of any territory but what General Wellesley had claimed. The Sirdars with whom treaties had been made hitherto were provided for within the boundary, and not without.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah then said that, in fact, Scindiah's state must in future depend upon the Company. He hinted that as soon as this war should be concluded, that with Holkar would be renewed, and that Scindiah had no means of defending himself excepting such as the Company would afford him. He particularly specified battalions and money.

Major-General Wellesley replied that under no circumstances whatever would the Company support Scindiah in a war of aggression against Holkar or any other power. He said generally that the Company would not view with satisfaction the destruction of Scindiah's government by Holkar, particularly if that Chief were to be the aggressor; and that he did not doubt but that when peace should be made, it might be possible to come to some arrangement upon this point.

Jeswunt Rao said that he had a request to make, which he would make hereafter, and which he hoped would not be refused.

Major-General Wellesley replied that he could not say whether he should refuse or not till he should hear what the request was.

Dec. 24.—Scindiah's vakeels came to Major-General Wellesley's tent, and a conference ensued, at which were present Eitul Punt, Moonshee Kavel Nyn, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, and Naroo Punt Nana, Major-General Wellesley, Major Malcolm, Mr. Elphinstone, and Govind Rao. Eitul Punt began to explain that the Maharajah had always been desirous to preserve peace with the Company, and that it was not his fault that the war had commenced, which he had done every thing in his power to avoid.

Major-General Wellesley interrupted him, and said that it was useless to re-commence this discussion, which had been already well canvassed; that it was impossible for Eitul Punt to say more upon that subject than Goorparah had said already, every word of which had been answered; and that it would be better to break up the meeting, and for the vakeels to retire with Goorparah, and learn from him what had passed on this subject, than to take up Major-General Wellesley's time by renewing the discussion. The Major-General said that the Company's right to compensation had been admitted as a principle of the negotiation, and he had made certain demands which had been referred to the Maharajah. He understood that these new ministers had brought the answers to those demands, and certain propositions which the Maharajah wished to make, and the Major-General said that it would save time if they would at once enter upon the object of their mission.

After a long preamble upon the subject of the ancient alliance between the Company and Madhajée Scindiah, Eitul Punt at length said that the Maharajah was desirous of connecting himself more closely with the Company, and of establishing an alliance which should be lasting and highly advantageous to both parties, and should occasion the jealousy of all the other powers in Hindustan.

He was pressed in answer to specify what he meant, and was told that it was impossible to conclude any arrangement in such general terms. He then said that the Maharajah wished that the friends and enemies of one state should be the friends and enemies of the other; that there should be no difference between

them, and that the aggrandisement of the one should be proportionate to the aggrandisement of the other.

In reply, Major-General Wellesley said that he understood his meaning to be a general guarantee by both states of their mutual territories, and an engagement that they should defend each other.

Eitul Punt assented to this.

Major-General Wellesley said that the Company's government was bound by such engagements with other states in India, and that he did not know that to make engagements in a similar manner with Scindiah would be inconsistent with its interests. But there were some points of which it was desirable that the vakeels should be first apprised before they should make these engagements.

In the first place, the Company's government could not make a war of aggression consistently either with the laws of Great Britain or the rules of their own policy.

Secondly, they could not make an offensive alliance with any power to attack another power with which their government might be at peace, and which did not demonstrate any intention to attack them or their allies.

Thirdly, the alliance which they could make, therefore, would be only defensive, and confined entirely to the defence of the rights and territories of their own government and those of their allies.

From these facts it followed that when the British government entered into an alliance with any power in India, not perhaps so strictly bound by laws and principles of policy, it was necessary that it should take care in the very treaty of alliance to provide that it should not run the risk of being engaged in a war of aggression, or on futile or insufficient grounds; and, therefore, if the Maharajah should make this proposed treaty with the Company, it would be necessary that he should bind himself to make the Company's government acquainted with all his relations with foreign powers, and attend to the advice of the Company's government in all his foreign concerns.

Major-General Wellesley observed that he might do this without any risk to his honour; that what had occurred lately was a sufficient proof of the attention of the British government to the interest of its allies, and that the war in which they were then engaged was in defence of the Nizam's government.

Major-General Wellesley then said that if the Maharajah

wished to ally himself with the British government for the support and in defence of the just rights and interests of both governments, such an arrangement might be made; but if his object were offensive war against any power, it could not.

The vakeels replied that what Major-General Wellesley had said appeared very just and proper; but Kavel Nyn observed that the government of Scindiah had always been one of violence, that he had raised and maintained himself by force and usurpation, and if he were to be made to give up all that he had ever taken in that manner, his power and state would be much diminished indeed.

Major-General Wellesley said that he did not mean to inquire into the Maharajah's title to all his territories. By the treaty of peace it would be provided that he should have nothing to do with the Nizam, and that there should be an equitable mode of settling what countries in Scindiah's possession belonged to the Peshwah: that he would be obliged to give up these. He must also give up all claims upon the rajahs and others with whom the Company may have made treaties; and he must not press upon others unauthorized demands.

Major-General Wellesley also said that he understood the Maharajah had formerly seized the whole of the Holkar territory, and that he had lately made a treaty with Jeswunt Rao Holkar to restore it. This treaty with Holkar, whatever it might be, must be carried into execution. The Company's government could never support the Maharajah in any war caused by a breach of it by him.

The vakeels paid particular attention to this part of Major-General Wellesley's discourse, and asked many questions to draw explanations in respect to Jeswunt Rao Holkar. They complained bitterly of his conduct towards the Maharajah; declared that he had been the cause of the war, of the misfortunes of the Peshwah's government, and of those of Scindiah, and that he had contrived to keep himself out of the scrape. They also said that he had lately plundered Scindiah to the amount of twenty lacs of rupees.

They asked what it was intended to do respecting Holkar.

Major-General Wellesley replied that he did not think it necessary to disclose his intentions in answer to such a question. That if Holkar attacked either the Company, the Peshwah, the Nizam, or Anund Rao Guickwar, he must be considered an

enemy, and be destroyed; otherwise there was no ground for attacking him.

Major-General Wellesley said that before this proposed treaty should be made, it would be necessary to furnish the British government with a copy of the treaty with Holkar.

The vakeels then said that when this treaty should be concluded there would be no difference between the Company and Scindiah, and it was supposed that he might go to Poonah.

Major-General Wellesley replied that, in respect to Scindiah's going to Poonah, he should not allow him to go there with an army: that he did not see any objection to his going to pay his respects to the Peshwah without one, provided His Highness made no objection: but Major-General Wellesley observed that he thought it would be more advantageous to him to go to Ougein and settle the affairs of his own government.

The vakeels said that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make this arrangement without the consent of the Peshwah, as Scindiah was His Highness's servant.

Major-General Wellesley replied that he would answer for the Peshwah's consent; but he observed that he had hitherto talked to them under the notion that Scindiah was the head of a state; if, instead of being considered in that light, he wished to be considered as the Peshwah's servant, the case was so much altered as to render a different system necessary; and he hinted that in that case the Maharajah was now in rebellion.

The vakeels gave up this point.

A conversation followed upon the suspension of hostilities, which Major-General Wellesley said the Maharajah had broken.

In answer, the vakeels said that everything that was possible had been done to restrain the Pindarries.

Major-General Wellesley desired that the Maharajah would move into Hindustan.

Dec. 26.—Scindiah's vakeels came to Major-General Wellesley's tent, and a conference ensued at which were present Major-General Wellesley, Major Malcolm, Eitel Punt, Moonshée Kavel Nyn, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, Naroo Punt Nana, and Govind Rao.

Major-General Wellesley said that when conversing with Goorparah on a former occasion upon the subject of the terms of the peace, Goorparah had expressed the great desire of the

Maharajah to retain certain districts and villages in Ahmednuggur, to which Major-General Wellesley had objected. He wished now to know whether the Maharajah was determined upon this point. In reply the vakeels explained that these lands were in fact the enaum lands or family estate of the Maharajah, and that he was very desirous to retain them.

Major-General Wellesley explained the principle upon which he was desirous that they should be given up, namely, that as long as the Maharajah had claims in those parts of the country, it was in vain to hope that the Peshwah would be able to settle his country. That his object in this peace was that it should leave no farther ground for war; and that this could not be the case as long as the different powers engaged had their territories intermixed, and concurrent claims in many instances to the same village. In reply the vakeels urged that these were enaum lands, respecting which there never had been, and never could be any question; and they said they were willing to leave the decision of the point to the ministers of the Nizam or of the Peshwah.

Major-General Wellesley said that he knew these lands were enaum; but the fact was that the Mahrattas were in the habit of urging and establishing their claims to benefits of this description at the head of large armies, which were thus introduced into the heart of the territories of the Company's allies. Major-General Wellesley said that at all events he must insist upon it that no armed force should ever be introduced into these territories on any pretence whatever.

After a long dispute upon this point, in the course of which the vakeels repeatedly declared their readiness to appeal to the Peshwah's or the Nizam's ministers, and the fear of the Maharajah that he should be degraded by this cession, Major-General Wellesley at last agreed that they should have Chumargoonda, &c., &c., provided that no armed men were ever to be introduced in these parts, whether with a view to the collection of the revenue or under any pretence whatever.

Major-General Wellesley said that upon a former occasion he had been told that the Peshwah and Holkar had claims to the territories in Hindustan which he had demanded, and he wished to have an account what those claims were.

In answer Eitul Punt said that the old arrangement among the Mahrattas was that of every conquest, the Peshwah, Holkar,

Scindiah, and the Powar family,* should each have a fourth, provided each party co-operated equally in the conquest, and paid an equal share of the expense. That in the conquest of Hindustan the Peshwah and Powar had done nothing, and had contributed no part of the expense, and that Holkar not only had not assisted, but had opposed Madhajee Scindiah. That under these circumstances Madhajee Scindiah had referred his claims to the Peshwah; had represented the expenses he had incurred, and the losses (of his whole family) which he had sustained in this conquest; and that in consideration of them Nana Furnavees had informed him by the Peshwah's desire that His Highness consented to his holding those territories free from the claims of the other parties. That notwithstanding this, Madhajee Scindiah had admitted the claim of Tuckojee Holkar to a share, and had delivered to his aumildars territories of the value of ten lacs annually.

Major-General Wellesley asked whether the Holkar family were at this moment in possession of these territories.

The vakeel answered No.

Major-General Wellesley said that he understood that the Maharajah had lately made a treaty with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and he wished to know whether any thing was granted to the Holkar family by that treaty.

In answer Eitul Punt said that Holkar's right to a share in Hindustan was admitted by that treaty, but that he had not performed its conditions, and that he therefore could derive no rights from it. Goorparah said the conditions may as well be acknowledged; they were that he should join in the attack of the British government; which he has never done. Eitul Punt said that Ragojee Bhoonslah mediated the treaty and was the guarantee, and that he had it at that moment in his possession.

Major-General Wellesley asked what might be the share allotted to the Holkar family by the treaty in question. The vakeels said, one fourth of the revenues, after payment of the expenses of the King and of the Peshwah's government and certain other expenses.

The vakeels then delivered in an account of the revenues in

* The Powar family formed one of the original members of the Mahratta confederacy. The capital of their territories was established at Dhar, a place in Malwa, about forty miles distant south-west from Ougein. In course of time, the possessions of this family have been seized by the more powerful chieftains, and are now principally included in the territories of Scindiah.

Hindustan, formerly in the hands of M. Perron, as managed by other aumildars, or serinjaumy to Sirdars in Scindiah's service, or jaghires.

Major-General Wellesley said that he had taken into consideration the Maharajah's wish to be allied more closely with the Company, and all the circumstances attending the situation of the ladies of Madhaje Scindiah's family, and the Sirdars in his service who had lands in those parts.

The Major-General then informed the vakeels that he was willing to make the following arrangement, viz.,

That provided all the territories north of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and Gohud were ceded,

First. That the Maharajah should not be called upon to incur any further expense in consequence of the treaty of defensive alliance, but that all such expense should be defrayed by the Honourable Company.

Secondly. That the ladies and others who held jaghires should keep them.

Thirdly. That jaghires should be granted to other of Scindiah's Sirdars, provided that the whole amount granted, including the jaghires of the ladies, &c., should not exceed fifteen lacs of rupees per annum.

The vakeels asked whether the lands would be granted.

Major-General Wellesley replied that that point would remain at the option of the Honourable Company.

The vakeels said that the Maharajah possessed three districts also to the northward of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and Gohud, which had been given in enaum to his family by the kings of Hindustan, and were not included in the Dufters; their names were Dholpoor, Baree, and Rajah-Kerrah.

Major-General Wellesley replied that those also should remain to him in enaum under the Company's protection, on the same conditions as the enaum lands about Ahmednuggur.

Major-General Wellesley then said that there remained only one point for discussion, and that related to the treaties negotiated by other officers empowered by his Excellency the Governor-General; and he repeated what he had explained on a former occasion on this subject.

In reply Kavel Nyn said that it was very proper those treaties should be confirmed, provided the parties with whom they had been made performed all their conditions.

Major-General Wellesley said that this was a point for the British government to decide, and not the Maharajah. He was called upon to confirm the treaties; if those with whom they had been made should have broken them, the British government would have no difficulty in finding a mode of settling that point.

The vakeels said that after having ceded such extensive territories they hoped that they would not be called upon to cede more by these treaties, and that no treaty would have been made with any rajah by which those parts of the Maharajah's territory which remained would be ceded.

Goorparah said that in talking upon this subject before, Major-General Wellesley had explained to him that the treaties would go only to deprive the Maharajah of peshcush and other payments by rajahs; that the treaties with Sirdars would not dispose of territory; and that if any territory were disposed of, it would be within the Company's bounds.

Major-General Wellesley observed that he perfectly recollected what he had said. That he had not intended to apply it to rajahs, but only to Sirdars; and he added that it was not intended to ask the Maharajah for territory for any of them beyond what had been already granted; but he had no objection to go still farther, and to say that none of the Maharajah's remaining territories (such as were really his) should be granted away by any treaty made with any rajah or other person.

The article of the treaty regarding the future defensive alliance was then explained to the vakeels, particularly that this article was inserted in order to leave it at the option of the Maharajah to form the alliance with the Company or not, as he might think proper, and to prove to him that there was no desire to force him to enter into it.

The vakeels listened to it with great attention, and asked where the force proposed was to be stationed.

Major-General Wellesley replied that that was a point which the future treaty would settle according to the convenience and benefit of the contracting parties.

Dec. 28.—Scindiah's vakeels came to Major-General Wellesley's tent. Present, Major-General Wellesley, Major Malcolm, Govind Rao, Eitul Punt, Moonshee Kavel Nyn, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, and Naroo Hurry (Naroo Punt Nana).

The treaty of peace drawn out according to the terms agreed

upon at the last meeting was first read over, and afterwards read article by article in order that the vakeels might have an opportunity of making their objections to any article of which they did not approve.

They objected to the introduction of the territories of Joudpoor as the boundary in the second article. They said that the Maharajah had territories to the north of Joudpoor which they had not intended to cede, and that by the article as then drawn they should give up their claims upon Jeypoor and Gohud.

Major-General Wellesley contended against this assertion, and called upon the vakeels to name the districts which they supposed they should lose. He then produced the map, and sketched the relative situation of Gohud, Jeypoor, and Joudpoor for their examination, and pointed out that the possessions of the two former were not at all affected by having the latter as the boundary of the Company's territories.

The vakeels in reply said that Ajmeer was between Joudpoor and Jeypoor, and would still belong to Scindiah, and they repeated their fear that they would lose Jeypoor and Gohud by this article. They then proposed that the Chumbul river should be the boundary; that every thing to the northward should belong to the Company, and every thing to the southward to Scindiah.

Major-General Wellesley replied that they certainly would not lose Jeypoor and Gohud by the second article of the treaty, although they might by another; and he positively refused to insert any thing in the treaty which should tend to defeat the arrangements which might have been made by General Lake with the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Gohud, or with others.

The ministers repeated their old fears and objections, and pretended that they did not understand the article, or the boundary which was intended. At last, after much argument, they were satisfied with the addition to the article of the following words:—

“Such countries formerly in the possession of the Maharajah, as are situated between Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and to the southward of the former, are to belong to the Maharajah.”

In the course of this dispute they were repeatedly called upon to state what were their remaining territories, in order to discover whether they had claims to any countries approaching the right bank of the Jumna south of Gohud.

They particularly said that Bundelcund belonged to Ali Bahauder,* and Jansi and Calpee to the Peshwah.

Upon the perusal of the third article they repeated what Goorparah had said before upon the subject of the cession of Baroach, and said that as the Company had given that place to Madhajee Scindiah, the Maharajah had expected that it would have been restored to him. Major-General Wellesley replied that it was unfortunate that the Maharajah had ever risked the loss of Baroach by forgetting the friendship for Madhajee Scindiah which had occasioned the gift. As it was now, the Company must have the place. The vakeels desired to know what territory was to be given with Baroach?

Major-General Wellesley replied all the territory, and produced a list of 174 villages which he said he must have.

Upon the perusal of the fourth article Goorparah said that there was a village called Sindkeir between the hills and Jalna-poor, which had been an old gift to Madhajee Scindiah, which the Maharajah was desirous to retain.

Major-General Wellesley replied that that village was too near the frontier to be given up in that manner. At all events he said that as well as he recollected, instead of being held in enaam, it was at that moment the harbour of a noted band of thieves, and he positively should not consent to Scindiah's keeping it.

Upon the perusal of the fifth article the vakeels said that Scindiah had claims upon the Peshwah to the amount of crores of rupees, and other claims upon Anund Rao Guickowar.

Major-General Wellesley called upon the vakeels to state particularly the nature of those claims. He observed, however, that by the eleventh article of the treaty of peace a mode of settling the Peshwah's claims was provided, and he proposed that the question of Scindiah's claims upon the Peshwah should be deferred till that article should be discussed; that then that article should be new modelled if the vakeels should wish it, and an exception should be added to the fifth article of the claims then stated to exist upon the Peshwah and the Guickowar. Agreed to.

Upon the perusal of the seventh article the vakeels begged

* Ali Bahauder, son of Shumshere Bahauder, the natural son of Bajee Rao, the first Peshwah; he conquered a great part of Bundelcund under a commission from the Peshwah.

that as the cession of territory was so very large, the amount given in jaghires or pensions might be larger.

Major-General Wellesley replied that he had taken the subject fully into consideration, and he showed that after striking out Begum Sumroo and the Rajah of Bhurtpore from the list of jaghiredars, the amount he had consented to give in pensions was nearly equal to that given in jaghires by the Maharajah. He said that after such a war such a gift was unexampled, and he had hoped that the vakeels would have been satisfied.

The vakeels then begged to have fifteen lacs besides the landed jaghires.

At last Major-General Wellesley agreed to make the grant of seventeen lacs, including the landed jaghires.

The vakeels then objected to the clause restricting Scindiah from having armed men in Dholpoor, and said that the revenue could not be collected without such assistance.

Major-General Wellesley replied that he never would consent to the introduction of a single Mahratta soldier to the northward of the line laid down in the second article as the Company's boundary.

Upon the perusal of the eighth article, the vakeels said that there were other villages which had belonged to Scindiah which they were desirous to possess, the names of which and of the pergunnahs in which they were situated they had forgotten.

Major-General Wellesley said that there was no intention to deprive Scindiah of his personal property; but that it was impossible to enter in a treaty anything so indefinite as the claim just stated. He said, however, that he had no objection to write them a letter, in which he should engage to them that they should have the villages in question, provided they were really Scindiah's private property, and provided all the stipulations of the eighth article were carried into execution respecting them, as well as respecting the villages named in the treaty.

The ninth article was examined very closely; but the objections to it were not repeated.

When the eleventh article was read, Major-General Wellesley proposed that the vakeels should say what claims they had upon the Peshwah and upon the Guickowar, and he proposed to re-

model the article and have a general arbitration of rights and claims on both sides.

The vakeels said that the claims upon the Peshwah and Guickowar were of no consequence, and not worth detailing, but they feared that this article respecting Malwa would destroy the treaty. They said the Peshwah had no rights in Malwa.

Major-General Wellesley explained it, and pointed out that the article did not assert that the Peshwah had any rights in Malwa; but only that his rights, whatever they were, should stand as heretofore. He observed, however, that if the Peshwah had no rights, his servants had, and mentioned particularly the right of Nursing Cundy Rao to a district which Scindiah had seized.

The vakeels replied that the whole of Malwa had been seized by the Peshwah's order, and that district among others.

Major-General Wellesley replied that if they could produce that order, it would be sufficient; but he said that he never would suffer the Peshwah's rights to be seized without further inquiry.

Major-General Wellesley offered to remodel the article if the vakeels thought it would create any alarm in Scindiah's mind; but he said that the substance of it must be retained.

Upon the perusal of the twelfth article, the vakeels asked what was to become of Scindiah's office of vakeel mutulluck?

Major-General Wellesley replied that he must resign it, or His Majesty must appoint another person to it; but that Scindiah must have nothing to do with His Majesty's affairs.

The vakeels said that Scindiah held that office, the Peshwah that of buckshee, Saadut Ali (Nawab of Oude) that of vizier, &c.

Major-General Wellesley replied, all that did not affect the question. These appeared to be nominal offices only; but none of the persons holding them must interfere in His Majesty's business.

No objection was made to any other articles, excepting to the time of delivering up the forts. Major-General Wellesley said that this was the customary mode of delivering back conquests, and he must insist upon adopting it.

Eitul Punt then desired that Major-General Wellesley would give him an order for the immediate delivery of Burhampoor, which was refused till the treaty should be ratified by Scindiah.

Moonshee Kavel Nyn said that the Maharajah was very desirous to preserve some property in the neighbourhood of Muttra in the same manner as Dholpoor, the revenues of which property he stated were applied to religious purposes.

Major-General Wellesley said that the best mode of obtaining this property would be for the Maharajah to apply to the Governor-General: he would find his Excellency well disposed to oblige him. That at present the treaty was drawn out, and it would not answer to alter it.

Moonshee Kavel Nyn then said that there were some guns and stores in three forts not yet taken in Hindustan, which Scindiah was desirous to have.

Major-General Wellesley said that it was usual to give over forts with all their equipments of stores, &c. &c. However, that in the course of this war the Company's troops had taken vast numbers of guns from the Maharajah, and he might be distressed for the means of defending himself unless he should get the guns and stores in question. Major-General Wellesley promised therefore to write upon the subject to the Commander-in-Chief, and to request that Scindiah might have the guns in these forts, provided they should not have been taken possession of before the Commander-in-Chief should receive the treaty and Major-General Wellesley's letter.

Dec. 29.—The treaty having been copied, the vakeels came to Major-General Wellesley's tent at night. Present, Major-General Wellesley, Captain Barclay, Govind Rao, Eitul Punt, Moonshee Kavel Nyn, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, and Naroo Hurry.

The copies of the treaty and of the schedules were read and compared, and they were signed at about one in the morning of the 30th December.

Naroo Hurry said that Bappojee Scindiah had a village in Baroach which they wished that he should keep under the British government.

Major-General Wellesley replied that they would always find the British government disposed to attend to their wishes, and he did not doubt but that upon an application to his Excellency the Governor-General this wish would be attended to.

TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP WITH DOWLUT RAO
SCINDIAH.

Treaty of Peace between the HONOURABLE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY and their ALLIES on the one part, and the MAHARAJAH ALI JAH DOWLUT RAO SCINDIAH on the other; settled by MAJOR-GENERAL THE HONOURABLE ARTHUR WELLESLEY on the part of the HONOURABLE COMPANY and their ALLIES, and by EITUL MAHADEO, Moonshes KAVEL NYN, JESWUNT RAO GOORPARAH AMEER-UL-OMRAH, and NAROO HURRY, on the part of the MAHARAJAH DOWLUT RAO SCINDIAH, who have each communicated to the other their full Powers.

ART. I.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable Company and their Allies on the one part, and the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the other.

ART. II.—The Maharajah cedes to the Honourable Company and their Allies, in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories, and rights in the Dooab, or country situated between the Jumna and Ganges; and all his forts, territories, rights, and interests in the countries which are to the northward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and of the Ranah of Gohud; of which territories, &c., a detailed list is given in the accompanying schedule. Such countries formerly in the possession of the Maharajah, situated between Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and to the southward of the former, are to belong to the Maharajah.

ART. III.—The Maharajah likewise cedes to the Honourable Company and their Allies in perpetual sovereignty the fort of Baroach and territory depending thereon, and the fort of Ahmednuggur and territory depending thereon, excepting those lands which it is agreed by the Eighth Article of this Treaty that the Maharajah is to retain.

ART. IV.—The Maharajah likewise cedes to the Honourable Company and their Allies all the territories which belonged to him previous to the breaking out of the war which are situated to the southward of the hills called the Adjuntee Hills, including the fort and district of Jalnapoor, the town and district of Gandapoor, and all other districts between that range of hills and the river Godavery.

ART. V.—The Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for himself, his heirs and successors, hereby renounces all claim to the forts, territories, rights, and interests ceded by the Second, Third, and Fourth Articles; and all claims of every description upon the British government and their Allies, the Subahdar of the Deccan, the Peshwah, and Anund Rao Guickowar.

ART. VI.—The fort of Asseerghur, the city of Burbampoor, the forts of Powanghur and Dohud, and the territories in Candeish and Guzerat depending on these forts shall be restored to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

ART. VII.—Whereas the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah has represented that his family have long held in enaam, as a gift from the Kings of Hindustan, the districts of Dholpoor, Baree, and Rajah-Kerrah, which

are situated to the northward of the countries of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and of the Ranah of Gohud, and that lands in Hindustan ceded by the Second Article of this Treaty to the Honourable Company and their Allies are held in jaghire by persons of the family of the late Madhaje Scindiah, and others by principal Sirdars in his service, all of whom would suffer distress if deprived of the advantages they enjoy in those countries: It is agreed that the Maharajah shall continue to hold and enjoy in enaum the lands of Dholpoor, Baree, and Rajah-Kerrah; and that Bala Baye Sahib and Munsoor Sahib, Moonshee Kavel Nyn, Boogajee Jamdah, Amraje Jadhoo, and Wirdah Charie, shall continue to hold their lands in jaghire under the protection of the Honourable Company: And further, in order that no individual may incur loss or suffer distress in consequence of this arrangement, it is agreed that the Honourable Company shall either pay pensions, or grant lands in jaghire, according to the option of the British government, to certain other Sirdars and others to be named by the Maharajah, provided that the total amount of the sums paid, or jaghires granted or held, does not exceed 17 lacs of rupees per annum, including the annual value of the lands which it is agreed by this Article that Bala Baye Sahib, Munsoor Sahib, Moonshee Kavel Nyn, Boogajee Jamdah, Amraje Jadhoo, and Wirdah Charie are to continue to hold; and provided that no troops in the service of the Maharajah are to be introduced into Dholpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah, or the other lands held in jaghire, under the pretence of collecting the revenue, or any other pretence whatever.

ART. VIII.—Whereas the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah has represented that his family have long held in enaum certain lands, villages, &c., in the territories of Rao Pundit Purdhaun, viz. :—

Chumargoonda Pergunnah.

Jamgaum.

Ranjingaum.

Half of Seo Gaum Pergunnah.

Six villages in Umber Pergunnah.

Five villages in Puttun Pergunnah.

Five villages in Niwaz Pergunnah.

Five villages in Kuria Pergunnah.

Six villages in Poonah Pergunnah.

Two villages in Wahy Pergunnah.

Six villages in Patutood Pergunnah.

Five villages in Pandipeergaum Pergunnah.

Five villages in Pagood Pergunnah.

Two villages in Parnyra Pergunnah, which have lately been taken possession of by the British government and their Allies; it is agreed that those lands and villages shall be restored to him, provided that no troops shall ever be introduced into those lands and villages under pretence of collecting the revenues, or any other pretence whatever.

ART. IX.—Certain treaties have been made by the British government with Rajahs and others heretofore feudatories of the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah. These treaties are to be confirmed, and the Maharajah hereby renounces all claims upon the persons with whom such treaties have been made, and declares them to be independent of his

government and authority, provided that none of the territories belonging to the Maharajah, situated to the southward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and the Ranah of Gohud, of which the revenues have been collected by him or his amildars, or have been applicable as serinjaumy to the payment of his troops, are granted away by such treaties. Lists of the persons with whom such treaties have been made will be given to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah when this treaty will be ratified by His Excellency the Governor-General.

ART. X.—No person whatever is hereafter to be molested on account of the part which he may have taken in the present war.

ART. XI.—It is agreed that the rights of His Highness the Peshwah to certain lands in Malwa and elsewhere shall be established as heretofore; and in case any difference should arise respecting those rights, it is agreed that the Honourable Company shall mediate, arbitrate, and decide, according to the principles of justice, between His Highness and the Maharajah, and whatever shall be thus decided will be agreed to by both parties, and will be carried into execution.

ART. XII.—The Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah hereby renounces all claims upon His Majesty Shah Alum, and engages on his part to interfere no further in the affairs of His Majesty.

ART. XIII.—The Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah engages never to take or retain in his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power, the government of which may be at war with the British government; or any British subject, whether European or native of India, without the consent of the British government.

ART. XIV.—In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the governments, it is agreed that accredited ministers from each shall reside at the court of the other.

ART. XV.—The Honourable Company being bound by treaties of general defensive alliance with His Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun, to which the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah is desirous of acceding, he is to be admitted to the benefits thereof; and the Honourable Company, with a view to the future security of the Maharajah's territories, engage, in the event of his agreeing to the treaty above-mentioned, in two months to furnish him with a force consisting of six battalions of infantry, with their complement of ordnance and artillery, and usual equipments of military stores, &c., and the expense of this force is to be defrayed out of the revenues of the lands ceded by the Second, Third, and Fourth Articles. But it is agreed that in case it should suit the interests of the Maharajah's government to decline to enter into the treaty above-mentioned, such refusal shall not affect any of the other stipulations of this treaty of peace, which are in every respect to be binding on the contracting parties, their heirs and successors.

ART. XVI.—This treaty is to be ratified by the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah in eight days from this time, and the ratification is to be delivered to Major-General Wellesley.

Major-General Wellesley engages that it shall be ratified by His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, and the ratification shall be delivered to the Maharajah in three months, or sooner if possible.

The orders for the cessions of the territories shall be delivered to Major-

General Wellesley at the same time with the ratification of the treaty of peace, but the forts of Asseerghur, Powanghur, and Dohud are not to be delivered up till accounts will have been received that the territories ceded have been evacuated by the Maharajah's officers and troops.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
 EITUL MAHADEO.
 KAVEL NYN.
 JESWUNT RAO GOORPARAH.
 NAROO HURRY.

Done in Camp at Surjee Anjengaum, this 30th of December, 1803,
 answering to the 15th Ramzaun 1213 Fuzalee.

Jan. 5, 1804.—After delivering the treaty of peace ratified by Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Major-General Wellesley, Eitul Punt said that he was desirous of speaking to the General, who retired with him to his tent, accompanied by Major Malcolm and Govind Rao.

Eitul Punt began by asking what were the Company's intentions respecting Holkar. He said that Scindiah was then at peace with the British government, and it was natural that he should be anxious upon this subject.

In reply Major-General Wellesley said that Holkar had not attacked the Company or their allies; that, on the contrary, he had cautiously refrained from approaching them; and that of course as long as he continued in that line of conduct the Company would not interfere with him.

Eitul Punt then said, "But do you mean to allow him to destroy us? Since the commencement of the war, of which he was the cause, he has plundered Scindiah of above twenty lacs of rupees; he is now employed in the attack of Ajmeer, a part of the Maharajah's territories, and there is no doubt but that the Maharajah must defend himself."

Major-General Wellesley replied that after this peace should have been established there was every reason to hope that it would last, and that the unfortunate inhabitants would be allowed some repose; that the Company's government would certainly view with displeasure any fresh war, and could not consider as a friend the person who should commence it. That in particular they would view with the greatest dissatisfaction the destruction of Scindiah's government, or any injury done to it. But Major-General Wellesley said he could say no more.

Major-General Wellesley then observed that Scindiah's government had been much weakened by the war; that his army was scattered and in disorder; and that supposing a renewal of the contest with Holkar to be necessary, it appeared to him to be advisable to delay it till he should have regained some strength, and ascertained the real state of his government and resources.

Eitul Punt replied that Major-General Wellesley's last observation was very correct, but that Holkar was not a man likely to lose an opportunity. That he knew the state of Scindiah's affairs, and he was likely to attack him at this moment, because the flower of his army was destroyed, and the troops he had left dispersed and disorganised. Eitul Punt then said that the only chance Scindiah had was the support of the Company, which he hoped would be given to him.

Major-General Wellesley replied that the Company could not support Scindiah in a war of aggression in any case whatever. He said that by the treaty of peace the Maharajah had an option of becoming a party to the treaty of general defensive alliance* with the Company, the Peshwah, and the Soubah of the Deccan, and, if he should accept that offer, it would follow that he would be entitled to participate in all the benefits resulting from it to all the parties. That one of these benefits would certainly be security against the invasions of Holkar. That even in this case, however, the Company would not enter at once into a war with Holkar to revenge the injuries the Maharajah might have received in the course of the war. That in every case it would be necessary first to proceed by the way of amicable remonstrance and negotiation, and if that should fail, then to have recourse to arms.

Eitul Punt said in case the Maharajah should agree to the proposed treaty, and the consequence should be a war between the Company and Holkar, and the Company's arms should be attended with their usual success, what share of the conquests would fall to Scindiah's lot?

Major-General Wellesley replied that that was a point which might easily be settled in the negotiation of the treaty, and referred Scindiah to Major Malcolm upon it.

* Accomplished by the treaty of Hyderabad, 12th Oct., 1800, and that of Bassein, 31st Dec., 1802.

In the course of this conversation, which Eitul Punt intended should be between Major-General Wellesley and him, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah first came in, and at last Moonshee Kavel Nyn and Naroo Hurry, and then Eitul Punt broke it off and turned to the articles of a memorandum from Scindiah which he had in his hand ; a translation of a copy of which paper received since from Naroo Hurry is annexed to this memorandum.

The first article relates to demands of money from the Guickowar government.

Major-General Wellesley said that one of the articles of the treaty provided that all claims whatever of every description upon the Guickowar government should be given up. However, that it was not intended to apply this article to debts bonâ fide due by the Guickowar government to Scindiah, which Major-General Wellesley said that he understood that the government of Bombay had allowed to be just ; and therefore he wished that Scindiah would state the amount of the demands to Major Malcolm, who would forward them to Major Walker,* and thus put the matter in a train of being adjusted.

Upon the second and third articles, relating to claims upon General Perron and Colonel Hessing, Major-General Wellesley said that the first point for consideration would be the nature of the arrangements made with General Perron and Colonel Hessing by the Commander-in-Chief when those officers delivered themselves up, and the degree of protection which the British government might think it proper to give them ; the second point for consideration was the degree of power which the British government might think it proper to exercise over the property of those gentlemen ; and here Major-General Wellesley observed that the British government never interfered with private property. Moonshee Kavel Nyn said that, supposing there had been no agreement made with General Perron, all that was wished was that the courts of justice should be open to Scindiah as well as to other persons. Major-General Wellesley replied that the best thing to do would be to refer this point to the Governor-General through Major Malcolm.

Upon the fourth article, relative to the attack of the Seiks, Major-General Wellesley said that the British government

* British Resident at the court of the Guickowar.

never would attack the Seiks unless the Seiks should attack them or their allies.

The vakeels asked whether there would be any objection to Scindiah's levying tribute from them.

Major-General Wellesley replied that that would depend upon the fact whether they were in alliance with the Company or not. But this point ought also to be referred to the Governor-General.

The fifth article in the annexed memorandum regarding money was not mentioned in the conference.

Upon the desire in the sixth article that Scindiah should have Hurdwar and Jalnapoor, Major-General Wellesley referred the vakeels to future negotiations with Major Malcolm.

Upon the seventh article in the memorandum, viz., Holkar's and the Peshwah's claims in Hindustan, Major-General Wellesley observed that he had repeatedly told the vakeels that they had no right to negotiate for Holkar, or any other power or state, excepting their own master; and that of course Holkar had nothing to say to their master. That if Holkar had any claims in Hindustan, the Company would give him an answer.

In talking upon this article of the memorandum, the vakeels said that the Peshwah, Holkar, and all the Mahrattas would be highly displeased with Scindiah for having made this peace. As to Ragojee Bhoonslah, they said he had no reason to complain, as he had been the first to make peace; but he attributed the necessity under which he laboured to make the peace to Scindiah's having sent vakeels.

Upon this speech, Major-General Wellesley observed that nobody had any right to find fault with the peace who had taken no part in the war; and that as to the Peshwah, he was a party against Scindiah, and was not likely to cavil at this peace.

The eighth article in the memorandum was not alluded to in the conference.

Upon the subject of the ninth article, viz., that no assistance or asylum should be given to criminals, Major-General Wellesley observed that what was proposed was reasonable; he referred the subject to Major Malcolm, to be laid before the Governor-General.

Major-General Wellesley said that he would take care that

the persons mentioned in the tenth and eleventh articles should retain their jaghires, &c., and enaums.

Major-General Wellesley gave an answer in the affirmative to the twelfth article.

Major-General Wellesley referred the persons mentioned in the thirteenth article to the Adawlut at Benares. In the mean time he said that Major Malcolm would address a letter regarding them to the person in authority in that city.

The fourteenth article was not alluded to in this conference.

Upon the fifteenth Major-General Wellesley said that the British government were known never to be behindhand in acts of charity, and that Scindiah's recommendation of the persons in question would certainly be attended to.

It is believed that the paper received from Naroo Hurry is not a copy of that from which the vakeels read the memorandum in this conference.

Besides the points above mentioned, the vakeels likewise again claimed Sindkeir as a part of Scindiah's family property, and Pectuly and Dumauly in Dewal Ghaut, and Bheer, Puttun, and other districts in the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan.

Major-General Wellesley repeated the objections he had made to restore Sindkeir, and declared that he positively would not give up that district.

In respect to the Pectuly, Dumauly, &c., Major-General Wellesley said that these trifling claims gave constant cause of quarrel, and that they must be relinquished, according to the treaty.

During this conference an account came that the Pindarries had attacked Mulkapour, which Major-General Wellesley showed to the vakeels. He then declared that there must be either peace or war: that if Scindiah chose the former, every man must be withdrawn from the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan; but that if they were not, he (Major-General Wellesley) should choose the latter; and he declared that if Scindiah did not keep the treaty, he would march the army to Boorhanpoor, and would not cease the pursuit of him as long as he had two men together.

Eitul Punt begged that Major-General Wellesley would allow only four days' time to draw off the Pindarries. He de-

clared that they were a description of troops entirely unmanageable, and that now that he was out of camp, and nobody to settle with them, they were worse than ever they had been before.

Major-General Wellesley then adverted to the conduct of Mulwa Dada* in the Nizam's territories, and explained that in the orders he had given to the person in charge of Chumargoonda, &c., to deliver those places to the Maharajah, he had particularly desired that none of the places might be delivered up till Mulwa Dada should have quitted the country with his banditti. The vakeels then denied that Mulwa Dada belonged to Scindiah. In answer, Major-General Wellesley said that they formerly said he did, and recalled to their recollection the orders which Jeswunt Rao Goorparah had delivered to the Major-General from Scindiah, addressed to Mulwa Dada, to cease hostilities, and the request they had made that he might not be treated as a common thief.

The vakeels then said that they would send huzzoories to Mulwa Dada to order him out of the country; and to tell him, in the face of all his followers, that if he disobeyed they would all be treated as thieves. After that they must leave the punishment of him to Major-General Wellesley.

MEMORANDUM FROM DOWLUT RAO SCINDIAH.

1. The Peshwah has given Scindiah drafts upon the Guickowar government for certain sums of money on account of expenses at the feast of the Dussarah, on account of which drafts money is still due, which Scindiah is desirous to have.

2. General Perron owes Scindiah money on account of Nuzzeranah and his Jaidad lands, and of peshcush received, and other sums on account of other claims of Scindiah upon him. It is wished that inquiry might be made into these claims, and an adjustment made.

3. Colonel George Hessing had lands for the payment of his troops, the annual value of which was greater than the sum required for their payment, and the surplus was paid to Scindiah. It is desired that this matter should be arranged.

* A predatory chief whose band of robbers was subsequently destroyed by Major-General Wellesley near Pareinda.

4. Scindiah had claims upon the Seiks and the *Hoonsy Harary*;* the Company's territories are now between Scindiah and these people. It is proposed that the armies of Scindiah and the Company should join to levy tribute from these people, and that each government should have a share of what should be levied.

5. It is settled by the treaty that Scindiah is to have seventeen lacs of rupees in Hindustan, or money in lieu thereof. Some time will elapse before this point can be adjusted; in the mean time it is requested that something may be given on account, as Scindiah is in great distress.

6. Hurdwar and Jalnapoor are places of Hindu religious worship, and Scindiah is desirous to be allowed to retain them.

7. Scindiah has consented to all the arrangements proposed for the treaty of peace in respect to Hindustan, and he is desirous that he should not be answerable to the Peshwah or Holkar for what he has ceded by the treaty.

8. It is written in the treaty that Scindiah is to have no claims upon the Peshwah: Scindiah desires also that the Peshwah may make no claims upon him.

9. The boundaries of the territories of the Company and of Scindiah will join; and each will be supreme in their own territories. It is desirable that the Company should give no assistance or asylum to any person who may be guilty of crimes in Scindiah's territories who may fly to those of the Company.

10. Saloo Baye Scindiah, Aliah Baye Goorparah, Ramjee Jadoo, Canojee Jadoo, are persons belonging to Scindiah, who have had jaghires in the territories of the Peshwah, to which, in consequence of the war, some injury has been done. It is requested that they may retain their jaghires without being molested.

11. Sree Saheb (Manoor Saheb) has some villages as charitable donations or enaums in Bheer, which it is requested that he may be allowed to keep.

12. Is Scindiah to send vakeels to the Nizam and the Peshwah?

13. Hurry Ambajee Chittavees and Aberdan Seevaran have houses and property in Benares, to which it is requested that no injury may be done.

* The *Hoonsy Harary* were not mentioned in the conference.—(Note by Major-General Wellesley.)

14. Some inhabitants of Puttun, viz. Dyvanaut Naig, are in confinement at Hyderabad. It is requested that the Nawab (of the Deccan) may be applied to, to release these people.

15. Money was given in charity to Fakirs and Brahmins in Hindustan, which it is hoped will be continued.

[1691.] MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCES BETWEEN MAJOR-GENERAL
WELLESLEY AND THE VAKEEL OF THE RAJAH OF BERAR.

Nov. 30.—Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder brought a letter from the Rajah of Berar, and desired to have a meeting with Major-General Wellesley. He came in the evening and had a conference with Major-General Wellesley, at which were present Govind Rao and Mr. Elphinstone.

He began by saying that the Rajah of Berar was the ancient ally of the Company, and he went through a long history of his arrival at Scindiah's camp, of his conversations with Colonel Collins, and of Colonel Collins's departure from the camp because the Rajah would not *obey* his order to return to his old country. Jeswunt Rao then said that Ahmednuggur and Baroach were taken, the war commenced, and he was sent here to endeavour to put an end to it.

Major-General Wellesley replied that it certainly was material to the cause of the Rajah of Berar that it should be proved that he had not been the aggressor in the war, as if he should prove that, however successful the British troops had been, the justice of the cause would be on the side of the Rajah, and he certainly would be entitled to some consideration. But Major-General Wellesley observed, the justice of the British cause had been as clear, as the valour of the British troops had been conspicuous, and their exertions successful.

He then related the facts as they had occurred from the time the Rajah marched from Nagpoor to the period of the breaking out of the war; he alluded particularly to the letter written by the Rajah to Azim ul Omrah,* and to the notoriety of the reports that the Mahratta chieftains were confederated to attack the British government; and he concluded by asserting the right of the British government to call for explanations of their inten-

* Prime Minister to the Nizam.

tions in assembling their armies upon the frontier of the Nizam, to disperse them if those explanations were not satisfactory, and to go to war if they refused to disperse the formidable armaments for the assembling of which no cause could be assigned excepting the intention to attack the British government.

Major-General Wellesley denied that Colonel Collins had quitted Scindiah's camp because his orders were not obeyed; but he quitted it because no satisfactory explanation was given of the intentions of the Chiefs in assembling their armies, and they refused to separate them.

The vakeel replied that the country in which the armies had been assembled belonged to the Rajah of Berar; that he had gone there for the purpose of meeting Scindiah and of settling a dispute between him and Holkar; that the Peshwah had made a treaty with the English, and contrary to the custom of the Mahratta empire had not previously communicated with the other Mahratta Chiefs; that the letter which had been written to Azim ul Omrah alluded only to that treaty, and that he had no intention of making war when he wrote that letter.

Major-General Wellesley asked what business the Rajah of Berar had to interfere between Scindiah and Holkar, and if he did interfere, why he should bring his army to that particular part of his territories.

In reply the vakeel said that the Rajah interfered between Scindiah and Holkar because those Chiefs had for many years been at war and had plundered each other, and had destroyed the whole of Hindustan; and that lately the English had obliged Holkar to quit Poonah, and that the Rajah had been desirous to make peace between them, as if he did not, they would have fallen upon his country. He said that these Chiefs were great men with large armies, and that it was impossible to mediate between them without having an army.

Major-General Wellesley replied that he believed the vakeel had stated the true cause of the mediation, which was to save the Rajah's country, and to form a confederacy which should cause an invasion of that of the Nizam; but the Major-General observed that it was a curious mode of conducting a mediation for a prince to go with a smaller army and seat himself in the camp of one with a more powerful one; that if he had mediated with an army at Nagpoor, the excuse might be admitted, otherwise it could not.

The vakeel then said that the reason for which he had joined Scindiah was, that Holkar was strong and Scindiah was weak, and would have been overpowered without the Rajah's assistance.

In reply Major-General Wellesley observed that the contrary was the fact; that Scindiah had driven Holkar out of Hindustan, and had seized all the possessions of his family; but that supposing the fact to be as the vakeel had represented it, a curious mode had been adopted of strengthening Scindiah and weakening Holkar, viz. by transferring to the latter all the territories of his family. He concluded by observing that these futile arguments and misrepresentations of facts would certainly do no good to the Rajah's cause, and only tended to prove more clearly the fact that the Rajah had been the original cause of the war.

In respect to the treaty of Bassein, Major-General Wellesley observed that the Rajah had stated that he had no objection to that treaty, and he should not allow that ever to be brought forward as the cause of the war, or of assembling the armies. At all events the Major-General said he denied the right of the Mahratta Chiefs to be consulted by the Peshwah before he should make a treaty by which His Highness's government alone was to be bound.

A long argument then ensued upon the subject of the letters written by Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah to Major-General Wellesley immediately previous to the war, which was to the same purport as in the conference with Scindiah's vakeels, and the facts were equally misrepresented.

Major-General Wellesley replied to this argument by relating what passed in the Rajah's tent, as stated in Colonel Collins's despatch.

The vakeel then said that the Rajah was now desirous of peace, whatever might have been the cause of the war.

Major-General Wellesley asked what powers he had, and in what manner he proposed that peace should be brought about.

In reply the vakeel said that he had been ordered by the Rajah to learn Major-General Wellesley's wishes upon that subject, and to act in conformity thereto.

In reply, Major-General Wellesley recapitulated the astonishing and rapid success of the Company in the war, and at the same time the losses sustained and expenses incurred, for all

which the Major-General said that compensation would be required as the price of peace, and he asked the vakeel whether he was empowered to treat on that basis.

In reply the vakeel said he was not, and used the old arguments regarding the injuries the Rajah had received, which were overturned in the same manner as before.

Major-General Wellesley said that if the vakeel had no powers, it was necessary that he should apply for sufficient powers, and that in the mean time he might remain in some of the towns in the neighbourhood of the camp.

The vakeel then expressed an anxious desire that hostilities should be suspended, and that he should be allowed to remain in camp.

In reply Major-General Wellesley positively refused to suspend hostilities till peace should be concluded; and as to his remaining, Major-General Wellesley observed that it could answer no purpose, and that it was very inconvenient to him to have anybody in his camp belonging to the enemy who did not possess full powers to settle a peace. He therefore recommended that the vakeel should go to Ellichpoor, or any other place he might choose in the neighbourhood.

Dec. 9.—Ragojee Bhoonslah's vakeel, Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, came to Major-General Wellesley's tent, and held a conference, at which were present Major-General Wellesley, Mr. Elphinstone, and Govind Rao. After some conversation, Jeswunt Rao produced two letters from Ragojee Bhoonslah, in both of which that Chief expressed his consent to give compensation to the Company in a peace for the injuries they had received, and he wished that Major-General Wellesley would state what would be required.

Major-General Wellesley answered that he should require for the Nizam that his boundary should be extended to the hills on which are Gawilghur and Nernulla to the northward, and to the Wurda river to the eastward. That, besides this, Ragojee Bhoonslah should renounce all claims of every description on all the Nizam's territories within his new boundary.

For the Company Major-General Wellesley said that he should require the province of Cuttack, the port of Balasore, &c., to be connected by a convenient frontier with the Company's other territories.

Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder said in reply that Major-General Wellesley was master of the country, and might take what he pleased, but that, if the Rajah lost all that had been demanded, nothing would remain. He added that there was no occasion to take so much for the Nizam's government, and he wished that less were taken for them and more for the Company.

Major-General Wellesley replied that the Rajah was a great politician, and ought to have calculated rather better his chances of success before he commenced the war; but that, having commenced it, it was proper that he should suffer before he should get out of the scrape.

In respect to the Nizam, Major-General Wellesley said that he was the ancient ally of the Company, and the British government would never give him up; and it was peculiarly necessary to provide compensation for him, to be taken from Ragojee Bhoonslah, because the Rajah had plundered his country in the most barbarous manner. Major-General Wellesley added that indeed the Rajah had adopted that mode only of carrying on the war; and it was perfectly consistent with justice that at the peace he should make sacrifices correspondent to the injuries he had done.

Jeswunt Rao then said that he hoped that the demands were confined to Cuttack and the countries west of the Wurda, and that the Company would not interfere between the Rajah and the Peshwah in Gurry Mundela.

Major-General Wellesley replied that all that he should require for the Peshwah would be a fair and just mode of settling the joint claims of His Highness and Ragojee Bhoonslah to any territory, the revenues of which they might collect jointly.

Major-General Wellesley said that another demand he had to make was, that treaties made with dependents of Ragojee's should be confirmed.

Jeswunt Rao asked what treaties, and with what Chiefs?

Major-General Wellesley replied that he should be informed in due time.

Major-General Wellesley said that another demand he had to make was, that Ragojee Bhoonslah should never take any Frenchman into his service, or any European the subject of a government which should be at war with the British government, or any British subject, whether European or native of India, without the consent of the British government.

Jeswunt Rao answered that he had no objection to this article; the Rajah had no Europeans in his service, and never intended to have any.

Major-General Wellesley said that another demand he should make would be that each government should have at the court of the other an authorised envoy.

To this Jeswunt Rao replied that that was a natural consequence of the peace.

A conversation then ensued upon the demands, which Jeswunt Rao canvassed particularly, and, among other things, declared that if Major-General Wellesley took those territories from the Rajah and the fort of Gawilghur, nothing would remain of his former estate. He then said that the Rajah had old claims for grass and grain upon certain territories of the Nizam, and asked whether those were to be relinquished.

In reply, Major-General Wellesley said every claim of every description must be entirely relinquished. He said that these trifling claims were the cause of constant quarrels, and the enforcing them had been the source of all the evils which the Nizam's government had suffered, and that till they were entirely relinquished there could be no peace.

Jeswunt Rao then desired that Major-General Wellesley would consent to a cessation of hostilities.

Major-General Wellesley replied that he could not. He recommended Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, if he were authorised to do so, to sign the peace immediately, and to send it off to the Rajah to be ratified.

Major-General Wellesley said that he did not wish to do the Rajah more injury than he had done him already, and hinted that delays were dangerous. He said that four days must elapse before the Rajah's sentiments upon the proposed peace could be known; and, supposing that he should desire his minister to sign it, four days more must elapse before the treaty could be ratified.

Jeswunt Rao said that three or four days could not possibly make any difference, and he wished to refer the subject to the Rajah.

Major-General Wellesley in reply begged that Jeswunt Rao would recollect what he had said to him upon this point.

A long conversation ensued upon the subject of the suspension of hostilities, in the course of which Jeswunt Rao begged

that Major-General Wellesley would fix a place where the Rajah should remain if he would not agree to stop hostilities.

This Major-General Wellesley declined, as he said that by doing that he should virtually engage to cease hostilities, which he was determined not to do till the Rajah should have signed the peace, and the ratification should have been given into his hands.

When Jeswunt Rao was going away, Major-General Wellesley said that the peace which he was about to make with the Rajah must be really a sincere one; that it had long been a favourite object with the Rajah to form a confederacy against the British government; and that he thought he had succeeded lately; that it was true that the confederacy had failed to produce any one of the objects for which it had been formed, and that he knew it no longer existed, but that it was necessary that the Rajah should formally declare that he no longer adhered to it: and as the war with some of the other confederates might still continue, notwithstanding the peace with the Rajah, Major-General Wellesley said that he should require that a hostage should reside with him as a security for the performance of this engagement until peace should be concluded with the other confederates. Major-General Wellesley particularly explained that the person who should be sent as an hostage must be informed for what purpose he is sent. Jeswunt Rao made no objection to this demand.

Dec. 12.—Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder came to Major-General Wellesley's tent and held a conference, at which were present Major-General Wellesley, Mr. Elphinstone, and Govind Rao. He presented a letter from the Rajah of Berar.

He then intreated Major-General Wellesley to moderate his demand for the Soubah of the Deccan. He quoted many instances in which the two states had been at war, and sometimes the Rajah and sometimes the Nizam had had the advantage; but that they had never made demands of territory. He then said that it would be better that Major-General Wellesley should allow the Rajah to settle his peace with the Soubah, and that he was convinced he would not make such a demand.

Major-General Wellesley replied that he had made that demand on the behalf of the allies; and he did not deny that he intended that territory for the Soubah of the Deccan as a

small compensation for the great losses he had sustained by the war, in consequence of the plunder of the Rajah. That he should not relinquish that demand; and that he must insist upon the country being delivered over to the government of the allies. Afterwards if the Rajah could prevail by fair means on the Soubah to restore it, that would be another consideration, in which Major-General Wellesley said he did not see at that moment that the British government would have any concern.

A long conversation followed, in which the same arguments were repeated, and the vakeel denied that the Rajah had plundered the Nizam's territories.

Major-General Wellesley replied that he knew that the Rajah had marched from the Taptee for the purpose of plundering those territories; and that he knew that he had done as he intended, for that it had fallen to his lot to follow him and drive him out, and that he had been a witness of his conduct.

Dec. 16.—Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder came to Major-General Wellesley's tent and held a conference, at which were present Major-General Wellesley, Major Malcolm, Mr. Elphinstone, and Govind Rao.

Major-General Wellesley asked whether any answer had been received from the Rajah to the letter written containing the terms on which Major-General Wellesley thought it possible to conclude the peace.

The vakeel replied that an answer had been received; and he would give it in detail on each particular demand. He then said that the Rajah had no objection to giving the compensation required to the Company; but that he hoped they would not ask for more than half the province of Cuttack. That Jaggernaut was his own pagoda, and he was desirous to retain it. That his honour was involved in this point, and he was hopeful it would not be insisted on.

Major-General Wellesley replied that the whole province of Cuttack was absolutely necessary. That the Company had long been desirous to obtain this province, in order that there might not be a break in the communication between Calcutta and Madras, and that to take only half of it, or to allow the Rajah to retain that part in which was situated the pagoda, would entirely defeat that great object. That in respect to the pagoda it was well known that no power in India paid so much attention

to buildings of that description as the British government; that every body had access to them as they pleased, in the utmost safety for the purposes of religion, and that nothing would prevent the Rajah from using that pagoda hereafter as he had done heretofore.

After some conversation this point was given up.

The vakeel then said that the Rajah had but two possessions, Cuttack and Berar. That he had granted the former, and he could not consent to cede the latter. That he would give compensation to the Soubah of the Deccan in money.

Major-General Wellesley replied that money would not compensate for the injuries the Soubah had received and the risks he had incurred; that territory was absolutely necessary, and territory must be given if the Rajah wanted peace.

The vakeel repeated his objection, and said that the whole of Berar to the Wurda could not be given without a sacrifice of the Rajah's state.

Major-General Wellesley replied that it was not wished to destroy the Rajah's state, and he asked what portion of the country the Rajah was willing to give. The answer was, one-quarter of those revenues which he enjoyed, which might amount to five lacs annually.

Major-General Wellesley replied that that would not answer; that he was not desirous to ruin the Rajah, but that the Soubah of the Deccan must have at least thirty lacs of rupees annually from the Rajah; or if the whole of the country claimed were not equal to that, the Wurda river for a boundary.

This point was at last ceded, and it was agreed that the Soubah should have the Wurda for a boundary.

In defining the northern boundary Major-General Wellesley said that the Rajah should have back the forts of Gawilghur and Nernulla.

The vakeel asked for country to support the garrisons of Nernulla and Gawilghur, and Major-General Wellesley agreed that the Rajah should have districts contiguous to the forts, which he would have hereafter to the amount of four lacs of rupees annually.

The vakeel then demanded that the Rajah should retain the claims of Sirdeshmooky, which he said he held by a grant from the Peshwah, and grass and other trifling claims and privileges in the countries ceded.

Major-General Wellesley replied that all claims of every description on these and all the territories of the allies must be entirely renounced. That in respect to the Peshwah's claim of Sirdeshmooky, that would easily be settled by the British government between His Highness and the Soubah of the Deccan.

The vakeel then said that having ceded these extensive countries he hoped the Rajah would be free from all claims of the Peshwah and Nizam on his territories, and that all the sunnuds and treaties of the Peshwah would be held good.

After much argument upon this point it was agreed that the British government should mediate and arbitrate according to the principles of justice between its allies on the one hand and the Rajah on the other.

The vakeel said that the Rajah must depend upon the justice and generosity of the Company, otherwise the Peshwah would lay claim to all his remaining territories.

The vakeel said that the Rajah had no objection to the demand respecting Europeans in his service, or to that respecting vakeels, but he did not understand that demand respecting treaties made with other Chiefs.

Major-General Wellesley in reply stated the reasons for which officers in different situations had been authorised to make treaties with the subjects and feudatories of the confederated Mahratta Chiefs, those reasons for which it was absolutely necessary to adhere to the engagements, and those for which it was impossible to state the names of feudatories alluded to, at the present moment. He said the demand was indispensable, and must be complied with; at the same time he declared that there was no intention to injure the Rajah's state, and that he might rely with security on the honour of the British government that no engagement would be entered into after it should be known that the peace had been concluded.

The vakeel said the Rajah had no objection to renounce the confederacy, and that he would give no assistance to the Company's enemies. In respect to an hostage, which it was explained to him it was necessary to give for his sincerity till the war should be concluded, the vakeel said that excepting the Rajah, his brother, his son, and his nephew, any other sirdar in the state that might be demanded should be sent.

In reply Major-General Wellesley said that as this treaty

appeared to be made in the spirit of friendship and a desire of peace, he should not insist on having any hostage, but should rely on the Rajah's honour and his sense of his own interest in adhering to it.

The vakeel then desired that the treaty should be put into writing, which was done immediately.

Major-General Wellesley left the tent, and in the evening returned to it again with Major Malcolm to sign the treaty.

The vakeel proposed that an article should be inserted providing for the Rajah's rights under grants from the Peshwah, and said that he feared that the British government would be induced to attend to the importunities of the Peshwah to assist in depriving him of them.

Major-General Wellesley replied that he would not agree to guarantee rights, the nature and extent of which he did not know, and that it appeared to him that the Rajah could have no better security than the justice of the British government. He pointed out particularly that to attend to importunities was not to decide according to the rules of justice.

The vakeel was satisfied with this explanation.

He then said that he wished a clause should be added to the eighth article, providing that the British government should not give countenance or protection to the enemies of the Rajah's state; to which Major-General Wellesley consented, and it was added to the treaty.

The vakeel then complained of the tenth article, and said that in fact it laid the whole of the Rajah's state at the feet of the British government. That his whole territory had been conquered from zemindars and others, and that if treaties had been made with these he had nothing left.

Major-General Wellesley replied that the article was indispensable, and must stand as it was. He said it never was intended to destroy the Rajah's state or to increase the acquisitions of the allies by means of that article. That if he had had such a wish, he would have made the demand at once without further ceremony.

Major-General Wellesley also observed that if there had been a wish to destroy the Rajah's state, he would not have made peace with him; but that at all events he promised him that the article should be as little injurious to him as possible, and that so far from increasing the numbers of those who should be the

objects of it, Major-General Wellesley promised that as far as it could be done consistently with the honour and good faith of the British government it should have no operation at all.

The vakeel declared that he was satisfied with this declaration, which Major-General Wellesley desired him to communicate to the Rajah.

The treaty could not be prepared this night.

In the course of this day's conference the vakeel frequently expressed a wish to draw more closely the ties between the Rajah and the Company, and said that by these means the Rajah hoped that his territories would be again increased.

He received encouraging answers, and was told that whatever propositions he had to make on that subject would be communicated to the Governor General, who would probably receive them favourably.

Dec. 17.—The treaties having been prepared during the night, were signed in the morning by Major-General Wellesley and Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP WITH THE RAJAH OF
-BERAR.

Treaty of Peace between the HONOURABLE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY and their ALLIES on the one part, and SENAH -SAHEB SOUBAH RAGOJEE BHOONSLAH on the other, settled by MAJOR-GENERAL THE HONOURABLE ARTHUR WELLESLEY on the part of the HONOURABLE COMPANY and their ALLIES, and by JESWUNT RAO RAMCHUNDER on the part of SENAH SAHEB SOUBAH RAGOJEE BHOONSLAH; who have each communicated to the other their full powers.

ART. I.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable Company and their Allies on the one part, and Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah on the other.

ART. II.—Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah cedes to the Honourable Company and their Allies, in perpetual sovereignty, the province of Cuttack, including the port and district of Balasore.

ART. III.—He likewise cedes to the Honourable Company and their Allies, in perpetual sovereignty, all the territories of which he has collected the revenues in participation with the Soubah of the Deccan, and those of which he may have possession which are to the westward of the river Wurda.

ART. IV.—It is agreed that the frontier of Senah Saheb Soubah, towards the territories of His Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, shall be formed, to the west, by the river Wurda, from its issue from the Injardy Hills to its junction with the Godavery. The hills on which are the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur are to be in the possession of Senah Saheb Soubah, and everything south of those hills, and to the west of the river Wurda, is to belong to the British government and their Allies.

ART. V.—Districts amounting to four lacs of rupees per annum contiguous to, and to the south of, the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur are to be given over to Senah Saheb Soubah. Those districts are to be fixed upon by Major-General Wellesley, and delivered over to Senah Saheb Soubah at the same time with the forts.

ART. VI.—Senah Saheb Soubah, for himself, his heirs and successors, entirely renounces all claims of every description on the territories of the British government and their Allies ceded by the Second, Third, and Fourth Articles, and on all the territories of His Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

ART. VII.—The Honourable Company engage that they will mediate and arbitrate according to the principles of justice any disputes or differences that may now exist, or may hereafter arise, between the Honourable Company's Allies, Secunder Jah Behaudur, his heirs and successors, and Rao Pundit Pordhaun, his heirs and successors respectively, and Senah Saheb Soubah.

ART. VIII.—Senah Saheb Soubah engages never to take or retain in his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power, the government of which may be at war with the British government; or any British subject, whether European or Indian, without the consent of the British government. The Honourable Company engage on their part that they will not give aid or countenance to any discontented relations, rajahs, zemindars, or other subjects of Senah Saheb Soubah, who may fly from, or rebel against, his authority.

ART. IX.—In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the governments, it is agreed that accredited ministers from each shall reside at the court of the other.

ART. X.—Certain treaties have been made by the British government with feudatories of Senah Saheb Soubah. These treaties are to be confirmed. Lists of the persons with whom such treaties have been made will be given to Senah Saheb Soubah when this treaty will be ratified by His Excellency the Governor-General in Council.

ART. XI.—Senah Saheb Soubah hereby renounces, for himself, his heirs and successors, all adherence to the confederacy formed by him and Dowlut Rao Scindiah and other Mahratta Chiefs to attack the Honourable Company and their Allies. He engages not to assist those Chiefs if the war with them should still continue.

ART. XII.—This treaty of peace is to be ratified by Senah Saheb Soubah within eight days from this time, and the ratification is to be delivered to Major-General Wellesley; at which time the orders for the cession of the ceded territories are to be delivered, and the troops are to withdraw. Major-General Wellesley engages that the treaty shall be ratified by His

Nov., 1803. RAGOJEE BHOONSLAH, RAJAH OF BERAR. 287

Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, and that the ratification shall be delivered in two months from this date.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY, Major-General.

JESWUNT RAO RAMCHUNDER
on the part of
SENAR SAHEB SOUBAH.

Done in Camp at Deogaum, this 17th December, 1803,
answering to the 2nd Ramzaun 1213 Fuzalee.

G. O.

Camp at Jaum, Friday, 11th Nov., 1803. [1692.]

On publishing the sentence of the general court martial on the trial of Captain ——, Major-General Wellesley thinks it proper to explain to the troops that there is much difference in the situations and cases in which an officer is permitted to exercise his discretion.

It may frequently happen that an order may be given to an officer, which, from circumstances not known to the person who gave it at the time he issued it, would be impossible to execute, or the difficulty or risk of the execution of it would be so great as to amount to a moral impossibility.

In a case of this kind, Major-General Wellesley is by no means disposed to check officers detached in the exercise of their discretion, but Captain ——'s case is not of this description: he could have, and had, no information which the officer had not who gave him orders, and it was his duty to obey.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew.

[1693.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp, 14th Nov., 1803.

I have the pleasure to inform you that your relation is quite recovered. During his illness I made frequent inquiries about him, and I should undoubtedly have urged him to go to one of the hospitals, or even to the coast, if the medical gentlemen had been of opinion that that was necessary to insure his recovery. I agree entirely in opinion with you, that it is better for an officer to go away to recover when he is sick, than to linger on

in camp a burthen to himself and everybody else; but as these distant operations are neither pleasant nor profitable, and as there are a vast number of persons whose business or whose connexions induce them to wish to be elsewhere, and as I have found the medical gentlemen not very backward in giving certificates of sickness, I have been obliged to be cautious in giving leave of absence on account of ill health, and to confine the patient to the nearest of the hospitals if living in a house and rest should be required, or to Bombay and the coast to the northward if the sea air should be necessary to insure a recovery. However, I do Agnew but justice in assuring you that he is not one of those who have other objects besides their profession: on the contrary, he appears to me to pay the utmost attention to his duty, and he has conducted himself upon all occasions, since he has been with me, much to my satisfaction.

I wrote to you some time ago about clothing for the Native corps, and I am afraid you did not receive my letter, as you have not noticed it. I therefore now send you a duplicate of it. If the subject to which it relates should not be in your province, I shall be obliged to you if you will refer it to whom it may belong, or mention it to General Stuart.

I think that we shall all be in Berar in a few days.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1694.] G. O.

Camp at Ooswud, Thursday, 17th Nov., 1803.

As Major-General Wellesley has the satisfaction to observe that desertion is by no means common among the European soldiers under his command, and as the cases of ——— and ——— are attended by favourable circumstances, he is happy to be able to pardon them consistently with the duty which he owes to the service. He trusts, however, that the dreadful sentence passed on ——— will be a warning to him, and all other soldiers, in future to avoid this crime, by which they become liable to it.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley.

[1695.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON,

Camp, 18th Nov., 1803.

I am much gratified by the approbation which you have expressed in your letter of the 27th October, which I have just received, upon the subject of our action of the 23rd September. It was certainly as severe a contest as any in which the British troops have ever been engaged in this country, and its consequences in this quarter have been much greater than I at first expected they would be.

I am very sorry that you did not receive my despatches, and I should have sent duplicates, only that I knew that the dawk had passed in safety through the countries north of the Godavery, in which alone I suspected there might be risk. I now send, however, a duplicate of the despatch which I wrote you on the 24th September, and I shall send duplicates of those written since the 12th September as soon as they can be made out, according to directions which I have received this day from Mr. Edmonstone.

You will have observed, by my letter of the 11th, that my plan for a peace with Scindiah is nearly the same as that contained in your notes. The only difference is in the demand respecting Guzerat, upon which I intended to have amended my plan before I received the memorandum with your remarks from Major Shawe, enclosed in his letter of the 26th. I write fully to Major Shawe upon that subject this day.

I think that I shall make peace with Scindiah according to the plan contained in my letter of the 11th, amended by the addition of the territories in Guzerat; but I have had no farther conferences with Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, as he has not yet received his powers. This delay is to be attributed to Scindiah's having marched up the valley of the Poonah to the eastward, and to my having marched also towards the Pæen Gunga.

Believe me, my dear Mornington,

Ever yours most affectionately,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1696.] G. O.

Camp at Waukode, Saturday, 19th Nov., 1803.

The General has lately observed many sepoys straggling from their corps, some driving bullocks, others in charge of officers' baggage, and several under the pretence of guarding ammunition, to attend which a sufficient number of lascars is allowed. Officers commanding corps will be pleased not to permit in future of any sepoys marching out of their lines on any of those pretexts.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1697.] G. O.

Camp at Nowly, Monday, 21st Nov., 1803.

Repeated orders having been given to the agent for cavalry supplies to cause payment to be made on the spot for grain taken by his servants in the villages, and complaints having been made to-day that grain so taken has not been paid for, Major-General Wellesley is pleased to publish in General Orders a general regulation, that grain taken or bargained for, in the villages, by any department belonging to the army, shall be paid for on the spot before the grain is removed; and he warns all persons concerned that any deviations from this rule will be submitted to a public inquiry.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1698.] G. M. O.

Camp near the plains of Argaum,
Wednesday, 30th Nov., 1803.

The 1st battalion 3rd regiment and 2nd battalion 11th regiment are to encamp at the entrance into the gardens where the action ended last night, and are to protect the captured guns and ammunition. The quartermasters of brigades to which those corps belong will see that their camp equipage, baggage, and bazaars are sent down to them.

Major-General Wellesley congratulates the troops upon the success of yesterday, which he has every reason to hope was effected without very great loss. The Major-General's thanks are due, upon this occasion, to all the troops for the perseverance with which they went through the fatigues of the day, and for

the steadiness they displayed during the action, but in particular the 74th and 78th regiments.

To Colonel Stevenson for the advice and assistance he received from him; to the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Sentleger for the manner in which he led the British cavalry; to Lieutenant-Colonel Pogson, Major Middleton, Lieutenant-Colonels Wallace and Adams (who commanded Lieutenant-Colonel Harness' brigade during his absence on account of severe indisposition), Haliburton and Maclean, commanding brigades of cavalry and infantry; and to the officers of the staff belonging to Major-General Wellesley's division, and the subsidiary force. Major-General Wellesley had also particular satisfaction in observing the order and steadiness with which the 94th regiment, commanded by Major Campbell, advanced to the attack. The artillery of both divisions was well served and brought up; and Major-General Wellesley's thanks upon this occasion are due in a particular manner to Captain Beauman, commanding the artillery in the division under his immediate command, and to Captain Burke, commanding the artillery with the subsidiary force.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp near Argaum, 30th Nov., 1803. [1699.]

Major-General Wellesley publishes to the troops under his command the copy of an agreement, dated 23rd Nov., 1803, into which he had entered with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for the purpose of suspending hostilities between the troops under his command and those in the service of that chief.

Major-General Wellesley on the part of the Hon. Company and their allies, and Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana on the part of the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, having each communicated to the other their full powers, have made the following agreement, dated Camp, 23rd November, 1803:

1. There shall be a cessation of hostilities between the troops commanded by Major-General Wellesley in the Deccan and in Guzerat and those in the service of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

2. To prevent accidents, and in order to insure the execution of the 1st article, it is agreed that there shall be an interval of 20 coss between the different British and allied armies and that of the Maharajah; and the Maharajah will march with his army and take up a position 20 coss to the eastward of Ellichpoor, and he will forage still farther to the eastward.

3. In case the operations of the British and allied armies against the other enemies of the British government should draw either of them nearer than 20 coss to the position which the Maharajah will have occupied according to the 2nd article, previous notice of such operation will be given, in order that the Maharajah may take timely measures always to preserve an interval of 20 coss between his army and the British and allied troops.

4. In Guzerat the British troops shall not advance beyond Dohud; those of the Maharajah on the side of Guzerat shall not approach nearer than 20 coss to Dohud.

5. Notice must be given in case either of the parties should be desirous of putting an end to this agreement.

6. This agreement is to be ratified by the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and his ratification is to be given to Major-General Wellesley in the space of ten days from this time.

The condition of this suspension was, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should go with his army to a position to the neighbourhood of which it was not probable that the operations of the British troops would carry them for some time. This condition remained unexecuted on his part, and he was repeatedly informed that until it was executed he was liable to be attacked, as well as any other enemy of the British government, wherever he should be found. As this transaction, connected with the action of yesterday, may possibly become a matter of general conversation, Major-General Wellesley adopts this mode of making the real facts public, that all persons may form their own judgment upon it.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1700.]

To Sir William Clarke.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Akote, 2nd Dec., 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letters of the 16th and 17th. My authority for saying that your hircarrahs had

spread the reports respecting which I wrote to you was the officer in command of my posts on the Kistna. But although I wrote you that your hircarrahs had spread those reports, which created much mischief, and were likely to create more, I did not write that you had spread them; I only requested that you would desire your hircarrahs in future not to tell their tales at my posts.

The fact is, that an hircarrah can know nothing but what he sees, and he generally exaggerates that; and in that part of the country there is so little to be seen that it is not worth while to employ them.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I gained a complete victory over the united armies of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar on the 29th of November, and took from them all their cannon, ammunition, baggage, &c. &c., and destroyed vast numbers. My loss upon this occasion has not been very great. No officer was killed.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp at Ellichpoor, Tuesday, 6th Dec., 1803. [1701.]

Captain Young will send into Ellichpoor one month's allowance of arrack, salt, and rice, and eight days' allowance of sheep, for 150 Europeans.

In consequence of the great labour of the dooly bearers in the public service, and the important services they have performed in removing the wounded men to the hospitals after the late battles of Assye, and in the plains of Argaum, Major-General Wellesley desires that a donation of two star pagoda may be given to each maistry, and one star pagoda to each dooly bearer, in the public service on the Madras establishment. This donation is to be drawn for in a separate abstract, and paid as soon as possible by the persons in charge of the public dooly bearers in the divisions under the command of Major-General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1702.]

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Camp before Gawilghur, 9th Dec., 1803.

My letter of the 1st November, which you have not received, did not contain any thing of importance that I recollect. I have long intended to write to Piele about the depredations of Ghopal Bhow. In my opinion the question respecting the mode of treating this vagabond depends entirely upon Purneah's means. If he should have the power of destroying him completely, which I should imagine he must have with his 500 horse, I should recommend that Ghopal Bhow might be attacked and pursued till he is destroyed, let him go where he will. If Purneah should not be strong enough for that, let him adhere to our old system in Mysore of only driving out people of this description when they have come in, without pursuing them any farther than merely to the boundary. In either case I would recommend to Purneah to advertise a reward for his apprehension; and I think it very probable that his own people will seize him, if Purneah should not, in a very few days. If he should be apprehended, he ought to be hanged. Goklah complains of him as much as we do, and has more than once asked me to apply to Purneah to send a force to seize him. So that you see it would not answer to make Goklah responsible for the conduct of this man; and indeed it is best to punish him ourselves.

In respect to General Campbell's advance, I have frequently considered that subject; and notwithstanding all my difficulties on account of the want of a reserve on the Godavery to keep the enemy in my front, I have always decided that General Campbell's corps could never be so well posted as in the spot originally pointed out for him. The foundation of all our success here, the destruction of the enemy's views, and our hopes of peace, depend upon the continuation of tranquillity in the Company's territories and in Mysore. That tranquillity might continue if those troops were ordered forward, but I am not certain that it would. I am certain it will as long as they remain in their position, because they are superior to all that can be brought against them, and they threaten the safety of all the strongholds of the southern chiefs, if these

should presume to declare themselves the enemies of the Company. This was the case before our last success, and my present operations, which go to Ragojee Bhoonslah's existence, had brought that chief out of the Nizam's territories.

But now that friends and enemies and neutrals are all in Berar, I don't want a reserve on the Godavery; the removal of General Campbell's corps would be useless, and all the chances of its being prejudicial to us still exist.

I was the person who first suggested the position at Moodgul to General Stuart; every day's experience shows the benefit which we have derived from occupying it; and I have contended for keeping it against my own inclinations, and my sense of my own ease and advantage, with Close, Malcolm, and every body who has considered the question at all. In fact, whenever the troops are withdrawn from thence, as they were when General Stuart crossed the Toombuddra, and lately when General Campbell made a march to Raichore, the first knowledge I had of their march was the account of a disturbance in the countries situated among the rivers, which has regularly ceased when the troops have returned. After considering all this, I think you will agree in opinion with me that, till we have peace, General Campbell ought to remain where he is.

This fort has a great name, and has a formidable appearance; it stands on a range and in the midst of hills. The difficulty of attacking it consists in that of encamping near it, on account of the want of water. However, I have seized a post within 700 yards of one gate to the southward, which is tolerably covered and supported; and I have sent Stevenson over the hills to the northward. We have got him nearly over with great difficulty and labour, but he tells me that he will overlook the fort on that side: so that there is every probability that we shall have the fort in a few days. In the mean time the negotiations, or rather the conversations about peace, are going on.*

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

* See description of Gawilghur at p. 155.

[1703.] G. O.

Camp at Deogaum, 11th Dec., 1803.

When working parties of troops receive tools from the commissary of stores, or engineer, the officer commanding such parties must grant receipts to the issuing officer for such tools, and will be held answerable that they are neither lost, nor unnecessarily injured, unless he specifies, in the certificate for working money, the corps or individuals by whom they may have been lost or so injured. The commissary of stores or engineer must have people ready to receive the tools back from the working party when their tour of duty is over.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1704.]

MEMORANDUM.

Camp at Deogaum, 14th Dec., 1803.

Colonel Stevenson's division are to storm the northern face of the fort of Gawilghur to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock, and the following arrangements are to be made to facilitate and support that operation :

1. Colonel Wallace, with the 74th regiment, five companies of the 78th, and the 1st battalion 8th regiment, will place himself under cover in the hill under the Peerputty gate before daylight in the morning. If possible, without giving alarm, he will push on a detachment in front of the 12 pounder battery and as far as the uppermost towers before daylight.

2. About 10 in the morning Colonel Wallace will begin to show his force, so as to draw the attention of the enemy to this side of the fort. He will reinforce his party in his front, and push on as many men as he can, without unnecessarily risking them, to the uppermost tower; and will do everything in his power to draw the attention of the enemy to his side.

3. Colonel Stevenson has been desired to make detachments from his storming party to the Peerputty and Delhi gates, in order to open them and communicate with and admit the troops from his side. As soon as Colonel Wallace shall observe this detachment, he will send a detachment to the top of the hill to assist in opening the gates, and he will be prepared to follow with the whole detachment under his orders.

4. Five companies of the 78th regiment and the 1st of the 10th, with a 6 pounder attached to the 1st of the 8th, are to be under the orders of Colonel Chalmers.

5. These troops are also to alarm the enemy and draw his attention towards the Delhi gate.

6. Colonel Chalmers will be the best judge of the place at which it will be most proper to assemble these troops before daylight, so that they may be sufficiently near, at about 10 o'clock, to draw the enemy's attention towards, and alarm him for the safety of, the Delhi gate, and he will post them accordingly.

7. At about 10 o'clock, Colonel Chalmers will show himself towards the Delhi gate, and he will push forward a party with the gun and endeavour to blow it open. He will of course cover the advance of this party and support it, and keep down the fire of the enemy by a fire of musketry on the defences.

8. As soon as Colonel Chalmers will have entered the fort, whether by blowing open the gate or by its being opened for him, he is immediately to communicate and co-operate with the troops of Colonel Stevenson's division.

9. A company of the 1st of the 8th is to be left in the 12 pounder battery, Barry, &c., for the security of all the stores, &c. A company of the 1st of the 10th to be left in the camp for the security of everything there.

10. A party of pioneers with crow's, pickaxes, and hatchets, and a saw, to accompany each detachment.

11. Major-General Wellesley desires that the officers commanding these detachments will give particular orders that the soldiers and sepoys may not be allowed to quit their ranks and go in search of plunder, as is but too commonly the practice. No man is to quit his ranks without the special permission of Major-General Wellesley or Colonel Stevenson, both of whom will most probably be in the fort; and the officers are made responsible for a due obedience to this order. Major-General Wellesley authorises the commanding officers of these detachments to take most effectual measures to prevent the followers from entering with them merely for the purpose of plunder.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1705.] G. M. O.

Camp at Deogaum, Thursday, 15th Dec., 1803.

The breach having been reported practicable, the troops will advance to the attack at 10 o'clock.

Storming party to be commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Kenny, and to be formed as follows :

The advance to consist of a serjeant and twelve volunteers of His Majesty's 94th regiment.

First party, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Kenny, to be composed of one flank and two battalion companies of the 94th regiment, and the flank companies of the 2nd brigade. Second party, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Desse, to consist of one flank and two battalion companies of His Majesty's 94th regiment and the flank companies of the 1st brigade. Third party, the remainder of His Majesty's 94th regiment, under Major Campbell. The 2nd brigade, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton, will follow the storming party, advancing from the right.

The first party, after entering the breach, will turn to the right, and the second party to the left, to drive the enemy from the ramparts, while the 94th regiment and the 2nd brigade will advance and gain possession of the heights and of the enemy's guns. A detail of artillery to accompany each party, to take possession of the guns, and turn them upon the enemy.

The 1st brigade will form the reserve, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Maclean : it is to advance by the right and follow the 2nd brigade, and will enter the breach, if found necessary. The whole of the troops will march down and form in situations which will be pointed out. One company of each Native corps is to remain in camp for the protection of the lines.

Pioneers and scaling ladders will be allotted to each party.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1706.] G. A. O.

Camp at Deogaum, Thursday, 15th Dec., 1803.

Major-General Wellesley has great satisfaction in congratulating the troops under his command upon the brilliant success of this day.

In the course of this short but active and laborious siege, Major-General Wellesley has, with pleasure, observed in all a most anxious and zealous desire to forward the service, the most steady perseverance in the performance of laborious services, which would be thought impracticable by other troops, and that gallantry when opposed to the enemy which they have shown so frequently during the campaign, and which has carried them with honour through so many difficulties.

The most laborious and brilliant part of the siege of Gawilghur fell to the lot of the subsidiary force, serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, under the command of Colonel Stevenson; and Major-General Wellesley adopts this mode of declaring that he never witnessed such laborious and persevering exertions as were made by this corps to bring their ordnance and stores to the point of attack.

The gallantry with which the attack was made by the detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Kenny has never been surpassed.

Major-General Wellesley returns his thanks to all the officers and troops employed on this occasion, particularly to Colonel Stevenson, for the manner in which he conducted the service intrusted to him, from the moment of his march from Ellich-poor to that of the capture of Gawilghur; to Lieutenant-Colonel Kenny, who led the troops to the storm; to Captain Campbell of the 94th, who led the light infantry of the 94th to the escalade of the inner fort, by which the capture was finally insured; to Major Campbell of the 94th regiment; and to Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton, who supported the attack with his brigade.

Major-General Wellesley's thanks are also due to Captain Burke, commanding the artillery with the subsidiary force; to Captain Heitland, of the pioneers; and to Captain Johnson, of the Bombay engineers. Major-General Wellesley takes this opportunity of bearing public testimony to the services rendered by Captain Johnson, in the course of this campaign, in the important department under his charge.

Although the brilliant part of the service did not fall to the lot of the division under his immediate command, Major-General Wellesley observed with satisfaction the exertions they made in the part allotted to them, and his thanks are particularly due

to Captain Beauman, commanding the artillery, and to Lieutenant-Colonels Wallace and Chalmers, for the manner in which they conducted the attacks respectively intrusted to their commands.

Major-General Wellesley desires that the officers who have taken charge, and an account, of the property captured at Ahmednuggur and Asseerghur, and upon different occasions during the campaign, will lose no time in taking charge, and an account, of that captured in Gawilghur, and forwarding all the accounts to Major-General Wellesley, in order that he may lay them before his Excellency the Governor-General, and request his orders for their distribution. A Royal salute, &c. &c.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1707.] G. O.

Camp at Ellichpoor, Saturday, 17th Dec., 1803.

When Major-General Wellesley issued his orders to the troops on the 15th inst., he was not aware that Lieutenant-Colonels Desse and Lang had had such opportunities of personal distinction, of which they availed themselves, as appears from the report of Colonel Stevenson. Major-General Wellesley has more than once in the course of this campaign observed the zeal of those officers in the service on which they have been employed, and he requests them to accept his best thanks for their services in the storm of Gawilghur.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1708.] G. A. O.

Camp at Dewalwarra, Tuesday, 20th Dec., 1803.

The Parsee merchant has represented that Native servants come to his shop and take away goods without paying for them or giving a receipt, and sometimes without leaving their master's name, by which conduct he is in danger of being ruined. As the credit of the army, as well as its future convenience, is interested in preventing this, Major-General Wellesley requests that, when gentlemen send their servants to the Parsee's shop for goods, they will send ready money to pay for what they want, as the man has resolved not to allow any thing to be carried away by servants until paid for.

The 5th brigade to furnish a havildar's guard immediately, for the care of the Parsee merchant's property. It is to be relieved daily.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G: O. Camp at Dewalwarra, Thursday, 22nd Dec., 1803. [1709.]

The line to be under arms to-morrow morning at 7 o'clock, and prepared to move in columns of brigades from their left, according to the orders which officers commanding brigades will receive. Major-General Wellesley requests that they will be at his tent with their staff at 7 o'clock to receive their orders. The guns, but not tumbrils, to accompany corps; corps to parade as strong as possible; all piquets to join, but the quarter and rear guards to stand fast.

When Amrut Rao approaches the right of the line, a salute of nineteen guns is to be fired from the guns which Captain Beauman will appoint. Corps of cavalry to carry their swords, and infantry to present their arms, and officers to drop their swords by corps, as Amrut Rao shall pass each. The music, trumpets, and drums to sound and beat a march as the corps carry swords and present arms.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. M. O. Camp at Dewalwarra, Friday, 23rd Dec., 1803. [1710.]

The ratification of a treaty of peace concluded with Ragojee Bhoonslah, Rajah of Berar, is to be delivered to Major-General Wellesley at 12 o'clock to-day.

A Royal salute to be held in readiness in the park, to be fired on the delivery of the treaty.

A European flank company from the 4th brigade, and the band of His Majesty's 78th regiment, to parade at head quarters a quarter of an hour before 12 o'clock.

A troop of Native cavalry to parade at head quarters a quarter before 2 this afternoon.

Major-General Wellesley intends riding out to meet Vittel Punt, the dewan of Dowlut Rao Scindiah: he will be glad to see any officers off duty who may wish to be present at the delivery of the treaty, or to ride with him to meet the dewan.

An extra dram to be issued to the Europeans to-day, on the occasion of the peace with the Rajah of Berar.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1711.] G. O.

23rd Dec., 1803.

A troop of the inlying piquet of Native cavalry to parade at head quarters at a quarter before 5 o'clock this afternoon, to attend Major-General Wellesley to the tent of Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, vakeel of the Rajah of Berar. Major-General Wellesley will be glad to see any officers who may be inclined to ride with him on the above occasion.

Amrut Rao has requested Major-General Wellesley to allow the troops to accept of a zeafet from him to-day, as a testimony of the satisfaction he derived from their military appearance and performance this morning. The majors of brigade, adjutant of artillery, and commandant of pioneers, will accordingly receive 300 rupees for each corps as a zeafet from Amrut Rao, and will distribute the money immediately.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1712.]

To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.

SIR,

24th Dec., 1803.

Peace having been concluded with the Rajah of Berar, I have appointed you to go to the camp of that chief, and act as Resident till the arrival of Mr. Webbe. You will, accordingly, commence your march as soon as will be convenient to you, attended by the troops appointed in this day's orders as your escort.

A principal object of your attention, on your arrival in the camp of the Rajah of Berar, should be to endeavour to convince him of the sincere desire of the British government to consolidate the peace. You will omit no opportunity of assuring him that the British government is desirous that he should continue a respectable power in India; and that, if he should fulfil the articles of the peace, and perform the common duties of friendship, the British government will never break with him. If he

should make any propositions, such as you have heard his vakeel make, in the conferences during the negotiations, to draw more closely the alliance between the two governments, you will encourage him to speak plainly upon that subject. Inform him that it is probable his Excellency the Governor-General will be inclined to attend to his wishes, provided you are enabled to state them to him distinctly; at the same time apprise him that all governments must consider their own interests in such a case, and unless bound by previous engagements, it might be possible that to give him assistance in the moment of danger might be inconsistent with the interests of the British government. On this ground, you will urge to the Rajah the necessity of providing, by previous engagements, for the support and assistance of the British government, and of his stating his wishes upon this point in the most distinct manner.

Another object which I recommend to your attention is to see that the articles of the peace are carried into execution.

It is not impossible but that the Rajah's aumildars and sirdars in the province of Berar will be unwilling to withdraw; and that the person appointed to take charge of it will complain to you of their delays, and of the irregularities of their troops, and of those of the Rajah upon the borders. In every such case you will remonstrate, in the strongest manner, in the name of the British government. You will require the Rajah to give into your hands written orders addressed to the persons complained of, and messengers of his to carry them; and you will apprise him of my determination to retaliate, in the manner which I may think most efficacious, any injury done to the territories ceded by the treaty.

I think there is every reason to believe that the Rajah is sincere in his desire for peace with the British government, and that he will adhere to his treaty, even if the war should continue with Scindiah. But his treachery is notorious, and the sacrifices which he has made are very great; and he might be induced to renew the war in hopes to regain part of what he has lost. For this reason it is necessary that you should do every thing in your power to be accurately informed of all that passes in his durbar, particularly with the emissaries of Scindiah and Holkar, and the southern chiefs.

Endeavour to obtain an accurate account of the numbers,

description, and disposition of the Rajah's armies. Observe the movements of each corps, and endeavour to trace the causes of them; and if you should find the movements of the troops to correspond with the intelligence you may receive of the intrigues carrying on in the durbar with the emissaries of Scindiah and Holkar, you must remonstrate without loss of time, and point out to the Rajah the certain loss of his government, which must be the consequence of a renewal of the war.

An accurate knowledge of the numbers, description, and disposition of the troops will enable you to judge not only of the truth of any reports you may receive of the existence of intrigues between Ragojee Bhoonslah, Scindiah, and Holkar, and of Ragojee's intention to renew the war; but also of the fact whether he does or does not impede the Soubah's officers in the settlement of the countries ceded by the treaty of peace.

It is very desirable also that you should endeavour to ascertain the extent of the Rajah's resources, the amount of his revenue, from what source it is derived, and how collected; and the nature of his tenure of the different portions of territory still remaining in his possession. It is obvious, however, that much information upon these last mentioned extensive and intricate subjects cannot be acquired for a great length of time; and, indeed, it does not appear to be an object of such consequence at this moment, as to obtain information regarding the communications with Scindiah and Holkar, and of the strength and position of the troops. In regard to the modes of acquiring this intelligence, I have but little to say. You must employ those which your own experience and discretion will suggest; and as I know that no intelligence can be gained without expense, I beg you to incur such as you may think absolutely necessary to obtain that which is required.

I beg leave also to recommend to you, as much as possible, a constant personal intercourse with the ministers of Ragojee Bhoonslah's durbar, instead of communicating by means of any Native servants. The establishment of this mode of communicating at an early period, if it does not immediately lay open to you sources of information which would otherwise be wanted, will, at least, give the government the advantage of them hereafter.

It is vain to hope that any Native, in the situation of a

minister at a durbar, will ever trust another in the situation of servant to the British Resident; and it is equally so to hope that the British Resident will ever be able to gain any useful intelligence from the ministers at any durbar, if his intercourse with them is to be a matter of state or parade, or any thing but a daily occurrence for the transaction of the daily business. I therefore most earnestly recommend you to establish this intercourse with the durbar of Ragojee Bhoonslah without loss of time, as a measure from which may be derived, immediately, all the information which can be required; and, at all events, from which the best consequences may be expected hereafter.

I request you to make me acquainted with all that occurs, and you will make your reports regularly to his Excellency the Governor-General.

It is desirable that, if possible, you should establish a dawk from Nagpoor to Cuttack, and another from Nagpoor to Hyderabad. The latter will not be a matter of much difficulty, as the road, for the greatest part, runs through the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan. You will press these points upon the Rajah's ministers, and urge them particularly, as being the consequence of the 9th article of the treaty of peace; but if they should refuse to allow of these establishments, or should secretly defeat their objects, which is not improbable, you might run a dawk from Hyderabad to Oomrawootty, or any other principal place nearer Nagpoor on the frontier, and communicate with such place by means of daily cossids.

In pressing these points, and, indeed, every other detailed in this letter, on the Rajah's ministers, it is scarcely necessary that I should urge you to adopt the most conciliatory language and manners.

Those qualifications which have induced me to send you upon this important mission, and to recommend you to his Excellency the Governor-General, give me full confidence that every thing in your power will be done to conciliate the Rajah to the British government, and to diminish the acuteness of his feelings upon the occasion of his late misfortunes and losses by the war.

Enclosed, you have Persian, Mahratta, and English copies of the treaty of peace. As soon as it can be copied, I will send

you a copy of the memorandum of the conferences with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1713.] G. O.

Camp at Surjee Anjengaum, Friday, 30th Dec., 1803.

Colonel Stevenson, being unable, on account of severe indisposition, to remain longer in the field, has permission to return to Hyderabad, and eventually to Fort St. George, for the recovery of his health, without prejudice to his situation as commanding the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, or his allowances. (The head surgeon ordered to attend the Colonel.) Major-General Wellesley is much concerned that Colonel Stevenson's state of health should oblige him to quit the field, and he accordingly hopes that it will soon be so far reestablished as to give the public the advantage of his services.

Major-General Wellesley has for some years had the assistance of Colonel Stevenson in the various services in which both have been employed by the government of Fort St. George; and in the course of that time he has derived the greatest advantage from his great experience, his advice and opinions on all occasions, as well as a zealous and active discharge of all the duties of an officer in his situation in the field, particularly in this last campaign. Under these circumstances, every public feeling for the benefit and advancement of the public service, and every private feeling for an officer with whom Major-General Wellesley has been in the habit of friendly intercourse for some years, and from whom he has received the greatest assistance, unite to induce him to regret the want of Colonel Stevenson's services at this moment, the distressing disorder which occasions it, and to express his most anxious wishes for his speedy and perfect recovery.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton.

[1714.]

SIR,

Camp at Paunchgaum, 2nd Jan., 1804.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a paper which I received from Colonel Stevenson immediately previous to his departure from the army.

It is very desirable that I should have at an early period the means in my power of forwarding an account of the property captured in the war, to be laid before his Excellency the Governor-General, as the first step to obtaining his Excellency's orders for the disposal of that property, and accordingly I request you to urge the gentlemen who have charge of it to lose no time in sending me the accounts in question.

I also wish to receive from them an account of the sums due and the sums received on account of the sales in the subsidiary force, and of the sums lodged in the hands of the paymaster according to the enclosed orders given out by Colonel Stevenson. It is essentially necessary for the general benefit of the army and the convenience of individuals who have made the purchases on the terms of payment stipulated, that those terms should be strictly adhered to. Accordingly I request you to desire the officers in charge of the captured property to give in their accounts to the paymaster without loss of time against each individual, in order that the deduction of one-fifth may be made from the pay of such individual, which is due upon his abstract for the month of December.

It will also be necessary that in future the gentlemen in charge of captured property should at the end of every month give in accounts of the purchases made by each individual during such month, in order that the paymaster may commence immediately to make the necessary deductions from the pay to be issued.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.

[1715.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp on the Poorna, 4th Jan., 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 1st, and I rejoice to find that your reception by the Rajah has been satisfactory to you.

[1716.]

STATE of the Troops belonging to His Majesty and the Honourable Company serving in the Field; including the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, the Troops at Poonah, at Major-General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley (agreeable to the Returns of

ABSTRACT.	EUROPEAN																
	COMMISSIONED.							STAFF.									
	Colonels.	Lieutenant-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain-Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Cornets or Ensigns.	Aides-de-Camp.	Persian Interpreters.	Secretaries.	Brigade-Majors.	Quartermasters of Brigade.	Deputy Adjutant-Generals.	Deputy Quartermaster-Generals.	Deputy Judge-Advocates.	Bullock Agents.	Barrack Masters.
The troops serving in Mysore ..	2	7	7	28	9	69	3	1
" " Malabar ..	1	8	7	27	5	82	6	1
" " Canara	1	1	3	1	12	1	1
The Staff of Malabar and Canara	1	1	1	1
The British troops at Goa	2	5	5	19	2	54	15	..	1	1
The troops composing a division of the army in the field, under the personal command of the Hon. Major-General Wellesley)	3	15	15	51	13	147	27	1	1	..	1	..	1	1	..	1	..
The Hyderabad Subsidiary Force	2	10	9	33	9	100	9	1	1	..	3	2	1	1	1	1	1
The troops at Poonah	1	4	3	10	2	36	4	1	1	..	1
" at Hyderabad	2	2	7	1	22	2
" in Guzerat, &c.	1	5	8	39	6	104	20	..	1	2	1	1
" in Cuttack	2	9	4	24	4	81	9	..	1	1	1
Total	15	66	61	241	52	707	96	2	2	4	10	4	2	4	2	2	4

UNDER THE COMMAND OF MAJOR-GENERAL WELLESLEY, &c. 309

Mysore, in the Provinces of Malabar and Canara, at Goa, and of a Division of the Army Hyderabad, and those serving in Guzerat, Surat, Cuttack, &c., under the Command of Corps, &c., dated 1st January, 1804).

OFFICERS.														Native Commissioned Officers.		Non-commissioned Officers, Drummers, Rank and File.				Grand Total, including Officers.		Puckallees and other public followers attached to Corps, &c.
STAFF.														European Non-commissioned Staff.								
Town Majors.	Fort Adjutants.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Superintending Surgeons.	Head-Surgeons.	Staff Surgeons.	Surgeons.	Assistant-Surgeons.	Veterinary Surgeons.	Commissaries.	Deputy Commissaries.	Conductors of Ordnance.	European Non-commissioned Staff.	Subsidiars or Syraung.	Jemidars or 1st Tindals.	Serjeants, Havildars, or 2nd Tindals.	Trumpeters or Drummers.	Rank and File.	Gun Leasers.	Grand Total, including Officers.	Puckallees and other public followers attached to Corps, &c.	
1	2	6	2	1	3	7	..	1	1	7	21	50	67	302	114	5,037	771	6,521	538	
..	2	7	1	..	1	..	5	7	..	1	..	4	23	50	65	332	134	5,098	260	6,128	243	
..	..	1	1	..	1	1	1	4	10	10	50	20	763	..	882	25	
..	4	..	
..	..	4	1	2	4	1	1	6	30	30	195	81	3,321	32	3,812	114	
..	..	10	13	1	6	16	1	1	1	3	29	101	136	655	222	10,200	405	12,079	2,982	
..	..	9	3	1	8	4	..	1	..	1	7	76	91	481	152	8,631	277	9,925	1,983	
..	..	2	1	1	1	..	2	..	1	2	14	19	108	43	1,737	169	2,163	117	
..	..	2	3	1	2	15	18	98	39	2,170	41	2,425	241	
..	2	6	4	..	1	..	5	11	..	3	2	3	8	57	62	446	168	7,336	366	8,668	278	
..	1	6	4	2	6	1	..	9	54	57	301	117	5,025	156	5,876	425	
1	7	53	29	1	3	2	33	60	1	9	6	22	111	457	555	2,968	1,090	49,318	2,477	58,483	6,946	

R. BARCLAY, Deputy Adjutant-General in Mysore,

I did not receive your letter about the complaints of the people of Aotilee (I believe it is); but you did right to mention those complaints to the Rajah. In respect to the Nizam's territories east of the Wurda, I suspect that His Highness has many claims in those parts which we don't intend to support. For instance, some upon the city of Nagpoor. All these Rajah Mohiput Ram will be eager to bring forward to show his zeal in the service of his master; but I think that we ought to be cautious in urging them to the Rajah of Berar.

I know that the Nizam has two districts east of the Wurda, with which I dare say that the Rajah of Berar will not interfere; and at all events we must not allow him to interfere with them; but I doubt whether the Nizam has any other districts or claims in any other districts which it is proper for us to urge. I will, however, inquire particularly into this matter, and let you know the result.

We have not yet given up Gawilghur, because I have been so busy with Scindiah's vakeels as to have been unable to settle with Ramchunder the particular districts to be ceded to the Rajah with the fort; and you carried away with you the Persian account of the revenues of Berar, and I have not yet been able to procure another copy from Rajah Mohiput Ram. But I hope to get one this day, and I shall then immediately make all the necessary arrangements.

You may mention these circumstances to the Rajah or his ministers, if you should have an opportunity.

We concluded a treaty of peace with Scindiah's ministers on the 30th, and I learn that he has ratified it. I expect to receive the ratification to-morrow, and I will send you a copy of the treaty as soon as it can be made out.

I have marched to the westward, and intend, when I receive Scindiah's ratification of the treaty, to pass through the Adjunttee hills, by the Dewal Ghaut.

We have had no letters for some days.

Malcolm will go to Scindiah as soon as I shall have received the treaty.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.

[1717.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Manusgaum, 5th Jan., 1804.

I have this day received your letters of the 30th December and 30th January.

You must lose no time in remonstrating with firmness, but moderation, on the subject of the Rajah's troops still remaining in the country. Tell him that we must either be at peace or at war; and if at peace, the people of the country must enjoy all the advantages of peace, and must not be liable to military violence; and if at war, the government must suffer. I wrote to you yesterday about the Nizam's territories beyond the Wurda. If you should find that Ahier really is in them, remonstrate immediately, and require the orders from the Rajah, according to your instructions.

I suspect that these people cannot manage their troops. This plunder is either to be attributed to that circumstance, or it is a Mahratta trick to carry on the war in this manner without incurring any risk. I should wish to have your opinion upon this point, and whether you think the Rajah inclined to put a stop to the plunder. I know that I am determined to put a stop to it, even at the expense of the renewal of the war.

Your despatch to the Governor-General shall be forwarded.

I will send you the cowle for the Rajah's banker; and I beg that you will take this opportunity of observing to the Rajah's ministers that I am inclined to do everything in my power to oblige him, but the ryots of the countries must have the advantages of the peace, or the government must suffer from the renewal of the war. They must choose.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. M. O.

Camp at Manusgaum, Thursday, 5th Jan., 1804. [1718.]

The ratification of a treaty of peace, concluded with the vakeel of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, is to be delivered to Major-General Wellesley at 10 o'clock this forenoon.

A Royal salute to be held in readiness in the park to be fired on the delivery of the treaty.

Two European flank companies from the 5th brigade and the

band of His Majesty's 78th regiment to parade at head quarters a quarter before 10 o'clock. On the delivery of the treaty, these flank companies will present arms and beat a march, which is to be the signal for firing the salute. The music to play at the same time.

Major-General Wellesley will be glad to see any officers off duty, who may wish to be present at the delivery of the treaty.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1719.] MEM.

5th Jan., 1804.

Major-General Wellesley is very desirous of having some dogs, which were found in Asseerghur, and also some of the fowling pieces taken there; and he will be much obliged to any gentlemen who may be in possession of those dogs or fowling pieces, if they will send them in to him. The full value shall be returned.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1720.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 7th Jan., 1804.

It is long since I have addressed you a private letter, which I am concerned to learn from Major Malcolm has been the cause of some uneasiness to you; but the fact was that I found it impossible to carry on that private correspondence upon public subjects without making what passed in it the subject of reference in my public and official letters, which I could not consider to be correct.

In the course of the correspondence which I have had with your government during the war, I observe that there are some subjects upon which my opinion is different from yours. But I assure you that nothing could ever alter the sentiments of respect which I have always entertained for you, or of gratitude for the kindness which I have always received from you.

I don't know whether I ought to regret the disposition which I feel to consider nothing impossible, to suppose that everything can be effected by adequate exertions, and to feel deeply and to complain of the disappointments which must be met with in carrying on such a service as I have had in hand. But I really

believe that I may sometimes have complained without much cause, and you will see by my public letter of this day that I can do justice to the persons acting under your orders at Bombay.

I have to allude to one subject only, upon which I fear that I have been misunderstood; that is Colonel ———. I recommended that officer to you because I knew that you formerly esteemed him, and I thought that he was still agreeable to you. Nothing else could have induced me to do so. You know my sentiments on the subject of his late correspondence with your government; and I now repeat confidentially that it is my opinion that you ought to vindicate your authority by dismissing him if he should not withdraw his offensive letter to Major-General Nicholls.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1721.]

SIR,

Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 7th Jan., 1804.

I have the honour to enclose copies of the treaties of peace which I have concluded with the vakeels of the Rajah of Berar and of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which have been ratified by those chiefs.

As soon as they can be made, I will send you copies of my letters to his Excellency the Governor-General upon the subject of these treaties, which will make you acquainted with the principles on which they were regulated and concluded.

Upon offering you my respectful congratulations on the restoration of peace in Hindustan and the Deccan, on terms which I hope I may call honourable to the British government and its allies, I take the liberty of adverting to the great assistance which I have received from Bombay since the troops under my command have been in this part of India.

I should do injustice to the officers under your government if I did not report to you that I have had occasion to observe in them the most anxious and zealous desire to forward the service the conduct of which has been intrusted to me, and to obey the orders they received from you. In the course of operations of such extent and difficulty, and in the transaction of business so

novel at Bombay as the equipment and supply of an army so numerous as this is, I must at times have been disappointed in my hopes of assistance, and I may have acquainted you with my disappointment; but I must say that I have ever had reason to be satisfied with the exertions of the officers under your government acting under your orders.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1722.]

To Major Malcolm.

MY DEAR MALCOLM, Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 7th Jan., 1804.

I enclose you a memorandum upon certain subjects to which I wish to draw your attention during your residence at Scindiah's durbar. The topics in this memorandum have been the subject of many discussions between you and me; but I have put them in this form in order to recall them to your recollection, and that I might lay my sentiments before the Governor-General, to whom I shall send a copy of this memorandum. I send your letters with this; likewise two letters to me from Bengal, which I beg you to return to me. Nothing else that is new.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1723.] G. O.

Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, Sunday,
8th Jan., 1804.

A company of Native infantry from the piquets to be posted every evening at sunset in the rear of the bazaars, with orders to patrol frequently and take up all thieves.

The detachment will march to-morrow morning by the left.

The officer commanding at Seringapatam will be pleased to give orders that the sepoy's belonging to the corps on duty in that garrison, and the artificers and others belonging to the public departments, may inhabit, the former the cantonments allotted for them, and the latter such places as may have been appointed for them by the gentleman in charge of the police.

It is positively forbid to allow any sepoy to inhabit Sheher

Ganjam, or any part of the island or fort, excepting the cantonment allotted to the corps to which he belongs.

The following rules are to be observed in the conduct of the police at Seringapatam:

When a sepoy or other person belonging to the military profession is seen in the act of rioting or transgressing the rules laid down for the preservation of good order and cleanliness, or any others which come immediately under the superintendence of the gentleman in charge of the police, such person is to be taken by the police peons, and carried before the magistrate; and the magistrate will give notice of this arrest to the commanding officer, in order that the military authorities may be regularly apprised of the transaction.

When the magistrate shall require the presence of a sepoy or other military person, either to answer to a charge brought against him, or to give evidence in any cause, or for any other purpose, he will apply to the commanding officer to give orders that such sepoy, &c., may be directed to attend him, and the commanding officer will comply with his request. In case the magistrate should find it necessary to detain such sepoy or other military person beyond the day, he will give notice thereof to the commanding officer.

A large police establishment is kept at Seringapatam, by order of government, for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of the inhabitants, an object which, from the situation of the place, must be difficult completely to attain. The gentleman in charge of the police has been desired to send patrols of his police peons into all parts of the fort and island, to take up all persons out of their houses and quarters at unseasonable hours. The military patrols are to assist, and not to impede the execution of the duties required from the police peons. No soldier or sepoy ought to be out of his quarters at unseasonable hours, according to the orders of the garrison of Seringapatam; and no soldier or sepoy is to be allowed to quit his guard. The military patrols ought to have orders to stop soldiers or sepoy dis-obeying these orders.

Major-General Wellesley has experienced during the late war the greatest benefits from the protection which he has uniformly given to the inhabitants of Seringapatam, and he is determined to continue it. He requests, therefore, from the commanding officer at Seringapatam the support of, and co-operation with,

the civil magistrate in the exercise of the duties of his office, as the foundation of the system, at that place, from which such extensive and important public benefits have been derived.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1724.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

SIR,

Camp at Jeypoor, 9th Jan., 1804.

There is a great want of assistants with the gentlemen sent to act as Residents at the durbars of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and I will be very much obliged to you if you will allow Mr. Bouchier, of the civil service on the Bombay establishment, to join me, in order that he may be employed at one of the durbars above mentioned.

If Mr. Bouchier will proceed by Poonah or Ahmednuggur, he will hear at what place he will be able to join the army.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1725.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp at Jeypoor, 9th Jan., 1804.

The bearer hereof is the person fixed upon by Dowlut Rao Scindiah to be his vakeel at the Peshwah's durbar, and Jeswunt Rao Goorparah has desired me to recommend him to you. I therefore take this mode of making him known to you, and request for him such attentions and assistance as you may be able to afford him.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1726.] G. O.

Camp at Turrora, 10th Jan., 1804.

The two brigades of infantry, with the park and provision department, head quarters, bazaars, Amrut Rao's cavalry, and the guns belonging to the other allies, to march to-morrow morning by the left.

The brigade of cavalry, except one squadron of Native

cavalry, the department of general agent for cavalry supplies, and the cavalry belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, to Appah Dessaye, and to Goklah, to halt to-morrow.

The piquets of infantry will form the advance; each corps will hand its own guns and tumbrils up the Ghaut; and the officer commanding the 4th brigade will order such working parties as may be necessary for the park, provision and store carts, and also the guns belonging to the allies, up the Ghaut. A squadron of Native cavalry will guard the baggage as usual. The old piquets of infantry will send a company of infantry up the Ghaut to take post at the hills at the top, and the remaining companies will wait below the Ghaut, till the whole of the departments directed to march and Amrut Rao's cavalry have passed up.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp at So-gaum, Wednesday, 11th Jan., 1804. [1727.]

Major-General Wellesley thinks it necessary to remind the officers that there is a large forage guard sent out daily, with which they may send their camels; and he has further to observe to them that, the peace having occasioned the dismissal of a great many people from regular service with the Native powers, the number of thieves has been thereby increased, and it becomes more necessary for the officers to send their cattle out under the protection of the guard.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Shawe.

[1728.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 16th Jan., 1804.

1. I enclose a copy of the Governor-General's different projects, with remarks, &c. [See p. 318-323.] Upon the whole I hope that he will approve of the treaty. The only doubt I have is about Ambajee.

2. It has also occurred to me that he may not approve of the cessions being made to the allies generally. The fact is, that if I had begun to draw up the treaty by stating the cessions to be made to each of the different powers, the vakeels would have begun intriguing with the Nizam's and the Peshwah's

THREE PLANS for a TREATY of PEACE with DOWLUT RAO SCINDIAH, transmitted
 stances of each

A.	B.
<p>First. The terms of peace with Scindiah which would be most desirable if he should not accept a subsidiary alliance.</p>	<p>Secondly. The terms of peace which must ultimately be required from Scindiah, even at the hazard of continuing the war, if Scindiah should decline a subsidiary alliance.</p>
<p>ART. I.—There shall be peace and friendship between the British government and all its allies and dependents, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>All territories, rights, and pretensions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, situated to the northward of the territories of Oudipoor, Joudpoor, and Jyenagur, to be ceded to the Company.</p>	
<p>ART. II.—The Rajahs of Oudipoor, Joudpoor, and Jyenagur to be independent of Scindiah, and to be included in the treaty of peace as allies of the British government.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. III.—Scindiah's claims on the Ranah of Gohud to be renounced. The Ranah of Gohud to be independent of Scindiah, and included in the treaty of peace as an ally of the British government.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. IV.—All territories now held by Ambajee to be ceded to the British government. Ambajee to be independent of Scindiah, and to be included in the treaty of peace as an ally of the British government.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. V.—Scindiah to renounce all intercourse and connexion with the chiefs and territories of Natcherry, of Bhunnutpoor, of Calpee, and Jansi; with the chiefs or territories situated between the right bank of the Jumna and the river Sutledje; and also with the chiefs and territories of Bundelcund and Bogilcund, and with any chief or territory situated to the northward of the province of Malwa; and all claims whatever on all those chiefs and territories.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. VI.—Scindiah to renounce all claims upon the Seik chiefs or territories.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. VII.—All chiefs and states who may have assisted the British government during the war to be protected from injury, although their territory may be ceded to Scindiah by the treaty of peace.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>

by his Excellency the GOVERNOR-GENERAL, modified according to the circum-
respective Case.

<p style="text-align: center;">C.</p> <p>Thirdly. The terms of peace to be con- cluded with Scindiah upon the basis of a subsidiary alliance.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">REMARKS.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. I.—Provided for by Art. II. of the treaty of peace.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. II.—Provided for by Art. IX. of the treaty of peace, provided the Rajahs mentioned have made treaties with the Company.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. III.—The same.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. IV.—The same in part. I doubt, how- ever, whether part of Ambajee's possessions are not ceded; but the whole are not, I observe, very considerable.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. V.—The same. Scindiah has no claims on Jansi, Calpea, and Bundelcund.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. VI.—The same. Besides, he knows that he cannot reach these chiefs excepting through the British territories.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. VII.—Provided for by Art. X. of the treaty of peace.</p>

PLANS for a TREATY of PEACE with

A.	B.
<p>First. The terms of peace with Scindiah which would be most desirable if he should not accept a subsidiary alliance.</p>	<p>Secondly. The terms of peace which must ultimately be required from Scindiah, even at the hazard of continuing the war, if Scindiah should decline a subsidiary alliance.</p>
<p>ART. VIII.—All treaties concluded by General Lake, or Major-General Wellesley, or by the British government, with any chiefs or states from a line drawn south of the province of Gohud to the eastward and southeastward of Jyenagur, and to the northward of Jyenagur and Joudpoor, to be acknowledged and confirmed by the treaty of peace; and all alliances formed by the British government during the war to be acknowledged and confirmed by the treaty of peace.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. IX.—His Majesty Shah Alum and the royal family to be under the protection of the British government, and Scindiah to renounce all concern in His Majesty's affairs.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. X.—The fortress and city of Baroach, with the whole territory dependent thereon, to be retained by the Company.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. XI.—The fortress of Powanghur and the fort and district of Champonier to be retained by the Company.</p>	<p>ART. XI.—The fortress of Powanghur and the fort and district of Champonier to be restored to Scindiah.</p>
<p>ART. XII.—All other districts in Guzerat belonging to Scindiah, within * distance of the sea, to be ceded to the Company.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. XIII.—The fortress of Ahmednuggur, with the territory dependent thereon, to be ceded to the Peshwah.</p>	<p>ART. XIII.—The fort of Ahmednuggur, and a territory depending thereon, amounting to * to be retained by the Peshwah. The remaining territory of Ahmednuggur to be restored to Scindiah, under an engagement that Scindiah shall never maintain in that district a military force beyond the amount of * or beyond the amount necessary for the collection of the revenue and the maintenance of the police of the country.</p>
<p>ART. XIV.—All territories belonging to Scindiah situated to the southward and eastward of the Adjutee hills, including the fort and district of Jalnapoor, and all districts in which Scindiah may have exercised a joint right with the Soubahdar of the Deccan to collect the revenues, to be ceded to the Soubahdar of the Deccan.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>

* Blank in manuscript.

DOWLUT RAO SCINDIAH—*continued.*

<p style="text-align: center;">C.</p> <p>Thirdly. The terms of peace to be concluded with Scindiah upon the basis of a subsidiary alliance.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">REMARKS,</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. VIII.—Provided for by Art. IX. of the treaty of peace.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. IX.—Provided for by Art. XII. of the treaty of peace.</p>
<p>ART. X.—To be modified according to your proposition, retaining only the fortress and city of Baroach, with an adequate territory.</p>	<p>ART. X.—Provided for by Art. III. of the treaty of peace, as in Projet A.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. XI.—Provided for in the treaty of peace by Art. VI.</p>
<p>ART. XII.—To be omitted.</p>	<p>ART. XII.—No districts in Guzerat south of Baroda, excepting those ceded with Baroach.</p>
<p>ART. XIII.—The fortress only of Ahmednuggur, with a sufficient territory, to be retained.</p>	<p>ART. XIII.—Provided for by Art. III. of the treaty of peace, according to Projet B. nearly.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. XIV.—Provided for by Art. IV. of the treaty of peace.</p>

PLANS for a TREATY of PEACE with

A.	B.
<p>First. The terms of peace with Scindiah which would be most desirable if he should not accept a subsidiary alliance.</p>	<p>Secondly. The terms of peace which must ultimately be required from Scindiah, even at the hazard of continuing the war, if Scindiah should decline a subsidiary alliance.</p>
<p>ART. XV.—Scindiah to renounce all claims of choute, of whatever denomination, on the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and on all allies of the British government.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. XVI.—Scindiah to renounce all claims, of whatever denomination, upon the Nizam, the Peshwah, the Guickwar, and all allies of the Company.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. XVII.—Scindiah to dismiss from his service all Europeans now entertained therein, and never to entertain any European in his service without the express consent of the British government.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. XVIII.—Scindiah never to entertain in his service any native subject of the British government without the express permission of the British government.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. XIX.—The British government and Scindiah constantly to maintain resident envoys at their respective durbars, for the preservation of mutual good understanding.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. XX.—The fort of Asseerghur and the city of Burhampoor, with all the territories dependent thereon in Candeish, to be restored to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. XXI.—The district of Godra to be restored to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. XXII.—All territories and possessions conquered from Dowlut Rao Scindiah in Malwa and Candeish to the northward of the Taptee to be restored to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.</p>	<p>.. ..</p>
<p>ART. XXIII.—All territories and possessions belonging to the Peshwah in Malwa or Candeish to the northward of the Taptee to be ceded to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.</p>	<p>ART. XXIII.—This article may probably be omitted, if the restitutions stated in the preceding articles be made to Scindiah. This article, however, might perhaps be received by Scindiah as a compensation for the retention of the territory in the vicinity of Baroach and on the sea coast, as specified in Arts. X. and XII. of this plan.</p>

DOWLUT RAO SCINDIAH—*continued.*

<p style="text-align: center;">C.</p> <p>Thirdly. The terms of peace to be concluded with Scindiah upon the basis of a subsidiary alliance.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">REMARKS.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. XV.—Provided for by Art. V. of the treaty of peace.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. XVI.—The same.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. XVII.—Provided for partly by Art. XIII. of the treaty of peace.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. XVIII.—Provided for by Art. XIII. of the treaty of peace.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. XIX.—Provided for by Art. XIV. of the treaty of peace.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. XX.—Provided for.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. XXI.—Provided for.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">.. ..</p>	<p>ART. XXII.—None conquered.</p>
<p>ART. XXIII.—It would be desirable to effect an exchange of the Peshwah's territories in Malwa and Candeish, northward of the Taptee, for the districts of Ahmednuggur; and if those territories in Malwa and Candeish should not prove an adequate compensation to Scindiah, an endeavour must be made to compensate him by some further arrangement.</p>	<p>ART. XXIII.—By Art. XI. of the treaty of peace, the Peshwah's rights are reserved in Malwa everywhere under the arbitration of the British government. N.B.—This article includes his rights at Calpee and in Bundelcund.</p>

Peshwah's servants in camp respecting the cessions demanded for them, and I should never have got through the business. I might have entered in the treaty every cession as made to the British government, but this would have had the same consequences.

I have received the account of the captured property, which I propose to forward to the Governor-General to-morrow. It is not much, I am sorry to say.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1729.]

To Captain Johnson.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 16th Jan., 1804.

As I have no Persian translator with me, I must take this mode of answering Mohiput Ram's letters, and I beg that you will communicate this to Colonel Haliburton.

I shall certainly avoid giving Salabut Khan's jaghire, or any part of it, to the Rajah of Berar; but I must give him country to the value of four lacs of rupees near the forts, and I am the person who according to the treaty is to fix upon the country which he is to have. That treaty must be performed. The Rajah's proposal to give country beyond the river cannot be admitted; the Rajah of Berar has already declined the offer, and the treaty says that he is to have districts near the hills. But I have no objection to making an arrangement that shall be conformable to the treaty, that will be satisfactory and advantageous to the Nizam. In order to this, however, I ought either to see Mohiput Ram, or some person on his part who has a thorough knowledge of the country and its value, and who could point out the districts near the hills which the Rajah should have, or Rajah Mohiput Ram should send me a list of those districts.

In his usual shuffling style the last list he sent me was of districts, some near the Ghauts, others near the Wurda, and others forty and fifty miles distant from the hills, and therefore I was obliged myself to fix upon those which are near to them. This is always the consequence of shuffling; and I beg that if he sends me a paper, it may be a true one; or if a person, it may be one who will speak the truth, that I may finally arrange this business.

In respect to Ghazy Khan, I have written to him to say that I have nothing further to say to him, and Rajah Mohiput Ram may do with him as he pleases.

But I can give him no assistance. The Soubah of the Deccan must keep up troops for himself, and I am now obliged to go south of the Godavery to quell disturbances there, which are becoming very serious.

If Colonel Haliburton sees no objection, it may be well to let Rajah Mohiput Ram and his troops and 18-pounders go into Ellichpoor. In a day or two I hope to be able to send orders to Colonel Haliburton to come away with the Company's troops, excepting those under Colonel Lang. Communicate all letters and messages from Mohiput Ram to Colonel Haliburton. When he writes me a letter, be so kind as to translate it, and send me the translation, as Lieutenant Knox is not yet arrived. Tell Mohiput Ram that I am surprised that he has not sent me the orders to Colonel Clementi and * to evacuate Burhampoor. That he would be very much annoyed if the consequence of this breach of treaty were that Scindiah was to invade the Nizam's territories; and yet if he were to do so, I don't think I ought to interfere in their defence, as it would be obvious that the Soubah would be in the wrong. That I have ordered Captain Vernon and Major Malcolm's escort to assist in the attack of Colonel Clementi in Burhampoor, if the Colonel does not evacuate instantly on receiving my orders.

Tell Mohiput also that it would be necessary that I should have some person of consequence on his part in my camp. Tell him also that my letters which I gave him have not arrived at Hyderabad.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain Johnson.

[1730.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Jalnapoor, 19th Jan., 1804.

Much of your time and mine is unnecessarily taken up in correspondence to oblige Rajah Mohiput Ram to conform to the

* Illegible in manuscript.

stipulations of the treaty of peace, but we don't appear to have made much progress in that object yet.

Gunga Ram Pundit, the aumil of Ellichpoor, has sent a force to seize the village of Proslee, in the pergunnah of Waroor, which has belonged to the Rajah of Berar for sixty years. What is the meaning of that? Is Proslee on this or the other side of the Wurda? If Rajah Mohiput Ram would send a person here who could give an answer on these points, as I have requested fifty times, it would save me much trouble.

I enclose a memorandum of those villages which the Rajah of Berar is desirous that his head hircarrah, Mahajee Naig, may continue to enjoy, and I beg that he may keep them in enaam. Settle this point with Rajah Mohiput Ram, and send me the papers.

Major Malcolm writes that the aumil of Mulcapoor has in confinement a zemidar of Edilebud, by name Soomrunt. I desire that he and all prisoners and other persons in confinement belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah may be released forthwith. The Rajah and his master, the Soubah of the Deccan, call out freely if Scindiah should not perform his treaty, but yet they are the first not to perform theirs.

Rajah Mohiput Ram has refused to give up to Scindiah's officers the districts of Pushire, in Candeish. What is the meaning of this shuffling conduct?

Once more I desire that Rajah Mohiput Ram will forthwith send to me or to Major Malcolm orders to his officers to withdraw from every town, district, &c. &c., to the northward of the Adjuttee Ghaut, of which he has taken possession since the commencement of the war.

The Soubah's claims to these districts, previous to the war, do not affect the question at all; the treaty of peace says they must be delivered up; and if I am obliged to go into Candeish myself to put Scindiah in possession of them, he shall have them.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.

[1731.]

SIR,

Camp at Jahnepoor, 19th Jan., 1804.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the (without date), in which you have enclosed your despatch to his Excellency the Governor-General, of the 11th inst. The letter of the 10th inst., a copy of which forms part of the despatch to the Governor-General, has not yet reached me.

As the Rajah of Berar has relinquished the unjust claim he made to the rights of the Soubah of the Deccan, on the left bank of the river Wurda, and has withdrawn his troops from the countries on the right bank, I have given orders to the officer commanding at Gawilghur to evacuate that fort, and deliver it to the person who will be sent to take charge of it on the part of the Rajah of Berar. The fort will be delivered over in the state in which it was on the day the peace was made, with its guns, stores, &c., &c. ; and the swords, armour, &c., belonging to the Rajah of Berar, which still remained in the fort when I was apprised of his wish to have those articles, will be given to his officer there, and a separate receipt will be demanded for them. Some of the arms and armour which had been removed to camp have already been delivered to Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, and I believe that a quantity of these articles have been removed to Ellichpoor, and are still there. If this should be the case, or if there should be any more in camp, they will be given to Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder ; and I beg that you will tell the Rajah's ministers that I am happy to have this opportunity of conforming to the wish and anticipating the orders of the Governor-General, by doing that which is agreeable to the Rajah of Berar.

I have had one conference with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder on the subject of the lands to be delivered over to the Rajah of Berar, contiguous to the hills on which are situated the forts of Gawilghur and Nernulla. We should have settled what districts should be delivered to him in that conference, if I had received true accounts of their value from Rajah Mohiput Ram. But this person takes advantage of my desire to forward the interests of his master consistently with the stipulations of the treaty of peace, and to do justice to others, to deceive me in every instance ; and I have been obliged to adjourn the decision upon this point till I shall receive more correct accounts. In the

mean time, I have told Rajah Mohiput Ram that if he does not give me correct accounts, I must take those I shall receive from Ramchunder, consider them as correct, and decide this question accordingly; so that I hope I shall soon receive the accounts I have required.

I beg that you will explain the cause of the delay in the settlement of this business to the Rajah's ministers, and that it can be no loss to the Rajah, as I will give orders that he shall collect the revenue from the day on which the peace was made.

Tell Sereedur Pundit that I have settled the question respecting the villages, &c., belonging to him and the Rajah's other servants in Berar, to his satisfaction; and I have sent the papers regarding them to Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder.

I propose, also, to settle with Rajah Mohiput Ram respecting the villages for Mahajee Naig.

I will write to Rajah Mohiput Ram respecting the village of Proslee. It occurs to me that the village of Proslee is on this side of the Wurda, and is probably held in enaum by the Rajah. If that be the case, this complaint is made merely to try that point, and whether we are likely to yield it; and if we yield in this instance, every village or district held in enaum will be claimed in like manner. It will be well, therefore, to tell Sereedur Pundit that, if Proslee is on the right bank of the Wurda, Gunga Ram has done right to attack it, and that the Rajah of Berar has behaved improperly in attempting to retain it contrary to the treaty. If the village should be on the left of the Wurda, the Rajah must have it.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1732.]

To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 21st Jan., 1804.

In answer to your letter of the 6th, I beg that you will do whatever you think necessary to procure intelligence. If you think that Jye Kishen Ram will procure it for you, or give it to you, promise to recommend him to the Governor-General, and write to his Excellency upon the subject.

I think it appears from your letter of the 8th that the Rajah

is serious in the peace. He would not discharge his troops if he intended to recommence the war, particularly as by their discharge he is exposed to the risk of mutiny.

I have also received your letter of the 14th. The Governor-General will have heard of the peace about the 6th of January. The treaty reached Hyderabad on the 27th of December, so that there is every reason to believe that all hostilities will have been stopped long ago.

Your dawk is by some means or other very irregular. I received your letter to the Governor-General of the 10th, and that to me of the 14th, on the same day; then that of the 6th, and then that of the 8th yesterday.

There is no news. Everything satisfactory at Scindiah's durbar. A storm, however, is brewing at Hyderabad, in which the minister will fall. Colonel Close has had a bad fever for some days.

I am going across the Godavery on a plan of cutting up the banditti on the Nizam's frontier. I intend to endeavour to surprise them with the cavalry, but God knows whether I shall succeed.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.

[1733.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 26th Jan., 1804.

I have but little to add to my public letter. I have no intelligence of Holkar upon which I can depend. The last account I had was that he was engaged in hostilities with the Rajah of Oudipoor.

Gopal Bhugwunt is the ancient aumildar of Neemgaum, the Rajah's possession in this quarter. He is concerned with a gang of plunderers who obey nobody, and who must be cut up. I propose, however, to give Neemgaum to the Rajah.

Baba Phurkia has a vakeel in this camp, whose business is to request my intercession with the Peshwah to pardon him, and restore to him his ancient serinjaumy.

As usual, the Peshwah has refused, and there the matter stands.

Phurkia, it is said, has been defeated by the Soubah's troops,

and has now nobody with him; but I cannot ascertain whether this story is true or not.

Strachey has not yet joined me. Colonel Close is very ill, and has been obliged to go to the coast. No other news. Nothing from Malcolm excepting that Scindiah has surrounded his pindarries with an intention to plunder them.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1734.]

To Captain Johnson.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 27th Jan., 1804.

I find so much difference in the account of the revenues of Berar received from Rajah Mohiput Ram and that received from the Rajah of Berar, that I am obliged to send the vakeel over to Rajah Mohiput Ram to settle which districts the Rajah is to receive according to the treaty of peace.

I wish you would go with them and mediate between these gentlemen, and see that the business is settled according to the treaty, and that the countries are handed over to the persons appointed by the Rajah of Berar to receive them.

I enclose the draft of a letter which I wish you to write to Rajah Mohiput Ram in my name, in which I point out clearly the mode in which I wish this business to be settled; and I beg you to see that the business is arranged according to the mode pointed out in that letter. You will observe that the account of the value of the country to be delivered over must be taken at that of the revenue actually collected in the best of the last twelve years, and not according to the Jumma-Bundy. I am giving you much trouble upon this business, but there is no other mode of bringing it to a conclusion.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1735.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 28th Jan., 1804.

I have passed through the hills south of the Godavery, and am now about thirty miles north of Kurdlah, towards which place and Perinda I fear that I shall be obliged to proceed in

pursuit of the rebels who have for some time disturbed these districts, and have nearly created a famine at Poonah.

It will be necessary that your corps should remain for a short time to the northward. The best place for forage that I have seen since I ascended the Badowly Ghaut is immediately in the neighbourhood of the hills. You will get some little forage between that and Jaffierabad, and there is good grass and some straw along the nullah, on the right of the road coming to the southward between Jaffierabad and Donegaum.

After passing Donegaum there is not a blade till you get one or two marches to the southward of the Godavery.

I have gone into this detail in order to point out to you the necessity of staying near the hills as long as you can, as when once you are obliged to leave them you will not be able to stop above one or two days in any place till you come to Donegaum, and from thence you must get to the southward of the Godavery as fast as you can.

While you are near the hills I wish that you would drive out from Sindkeir and Sailgaum the banditti who are in possession of those villages, and give them to the Soubah's people.

The banditti quitted them when I passed down, but I had nobody to take possession of them, and I fancy that they have retaken them.

I also wish you to take measures to remove from Ellichpoor our captured guns; they are twenty-six in number, and will require 260 bullocks to draw them. The way in which I recommend that you should arrange to supply bullocks for them is to throw into the fort of Dewal Ghaut, under a small guard, the two iron 12-pounders, two howitzers, and any tumbrils or carts that you may have that are not immediately required. Indeed you may go as far as to throw into Dewal Ghaut one tumbril from each gun in the line. Send the bullocks off under the guard of two or three companies, and you may as well allow some artificers, &c., to accompany them to return with the guns. When the guns will come into your camp, let them go on by Aurungabad to Toka, on the Godavery. They shall be met at Aurungabad if possible, if not at Toka, by bullocks belonging to this division, which will draw them to Ahmednuggur. In the mean time my bullocks will be employed in drawing to Ahmednuggur the guns captured at Assye, which are still at Adjuntee.

In case any of the sick at Ellichpoor should have recovered, let them come with the guns; likewise a guard from one of the corps of this division which has particular charge of all the yokes, traces, &c. &c. You may as well send an artillery officer to bring in these guns.

Upon inquiry I find that the guard left in charge of the yokes, &c., was withdrawn when I marched from the neighbourhood of Ellichpoor. It is most probable, therefore, that the yokes will have been burnt; and I have to request that you will send the yokes, traces, &c. &c., belonging to the carriages which you will throw into Dewal Ghaut.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1736.]

To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 30th Jan., 1804.

Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder went away yesterday morning, and I gave him an elephant, horse, &c., for the Rajah of Berar, and letters for him, Sereedur Pundit, and Gungdeer Rao.

I was not able to settle the cession of the districts bordering on the hills, because Rajah Mohiput Ram had neglected to send the accounts of the revenue; but I have referred the settlement of this matter to Rajah Mohiput Ram, and I have desired Captain Johnson to act as mediator between him and Ramchunder, and to see that the arrangement is completed according to the stipulations of the treaty.

I have also desired Rajah Mohiput Ram to give the Rajah the revenues of the districts to be ceded to him from the 17th December, the day on which I signed the treaty.

Before Ramchunder went away he offered his services. I recommend him to you. He appears a shrewd fellow, and he has certainly been employed by the Rajah in his most important negotiations. I have recommended him to the Governor-General for a pension of 6000 rupees a year. I think that he will give you useful intelligence.

I enclose the copy of a paper which I received this day from Poonah relative to the landing of three Frenchmen on the coast of the Konkan. I have taken measures to stop them on their road to the northward, which will certainly succeed if they

should go that way, or if they should not have passed already. I think it advisable that you should watch the communications of these gentry with the durbar.

Your friend Strachey is here, and goes on to Burhampoor tomorrow.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Edward Strachey, Esq.

[1737.]

SIR,

Camp, 30th Jan., 1804.

I request you to go to the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, near Burhampoor, and to act with the Residency at the durbar of that chief till you will receive further orders from his Excellency the Governor-General. Major Malcolm, who is there at present, is so much indisposed that I imagine he will be obliged to come away, in which case you will take charge of the Residency, and act upon the instructions which Major Malcolm has received and will communicate to you.

If Major Malcolm should be able to remain at Scindiah's durbar, it is probable that he will have occasion to send you to Holkar's camp. You will in that case obey such instructions as you may receive from him.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Malcolm.

[1738.]

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp, 30th Jan., 1804.

Since writing this morning I have received the enclosed, which has relieved my mind from great anxiety; also a copy of the treaty with Ambajee Ingliia, which I send you.

We shall lose Gwalior, I am afraid; but Scindiah has taken us in about Dhoolpoor, Rajah Kerrah, and Baree, which, it appears by the enclosed, were in Ambajee's hands.

Holkar has had a correspondence with General Lake, but there is nothing in it of any consequence. The General writes with confidence of the impossibility that Holkar should penetrate that way, and he says his army is in a state of mutiny.

I have another letter from Lord Wellesley, in which he mentions that the Court of Directors treat him ill, and that the

ministers have informed Henry that they cannot support him against the Court. He approves of your going to Scindiah, and says that Webbe must go to Berar; but he may alter this notion when he shall receive my subsequent letters. Return Lord Wellesley's letter.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1739.]

To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR MORNINGTON,

Camp, 31st Jan., 1804.

I received last night the duplicate of your letter of the 6th, and your letter of the 9th instant, and I am rejoiced to find that you approve of the treaty with the Rajah of Berar.

I have considered Henry's letter of the 31st August with all the attention which the subject deserves, and I shall now give you my unreserved opinion upon it. It appears that the King's Ministers say that they are fully aware of the magnitude of your services in this country, and are sensible of the necessity that Great Britain should continue to enjoy the advantage of them; but they are not sufficiently strong, or they do not choose to incur the risk of supporting you against the attacks of the Court of Directors: that is to say, in other words, "we enjoy a great benefit, and we wish to continue to enjoy it, but we won't pay the price which it must cost us; a price which, by the by, common justice to a man whom we have placed, and upon whom we have prevailed to remain, in an arduous situation, ought to induce us to pay at any rate." In addition to this, the Prime Minister, the man who ought to be most anxious to secure these services for the nation, says that, as your private friend, he cannot advise you to remain in India beyond the last year; and he says this almost in the same breath with a declaration of the magnitude and importance of the continuance of your services, and a dissertation upon certain circumstances respecting your successor, which render him not so fit a person for the office of Governor-General as might be wished.

The first observation that occurs upon this subject is, that the Ministers are guilty of a breach of faith. They promised you their support, and now they refuse to give it. Another observation is, that they are not so sensible of the magnitude and importance of your services as they tell you and your friends

they are; and that in fact they are indifferent whether the nation continues to have the benefit of them, and that they prefer losing them to taking the trouble of giving you the support which is necessary in order that you may continue in your office; in other words, the vote of Mr. Tierney or of Mr. Fonblanque is of greater importance than the continuance of your services as Governor-General.

On this ground I have not the smallest hesitation in saying that you should not delay your departure from India one moment beyond that on which you will have completely executed all the measures which are in course at this moment. When I say completely executed, I don't mean that you should stay till all your views and plans for the peace and prosperity of India will have been carried into effect, because that may yet take time, possibly more than the Court of Directors or the King's Ministers will allow you to hold your office. But I would recommend that you should fix a time in which you might possibly complete every thing, and on no account whatever ought you to stay beyond that time.

There is no doubt that you cannot go in March. It is probable that you will not have received the treaty of peace with Scindiah till late in this month, and one month will not be sufficient for executing all the arrangements connected with and depending on that treaty; but the beginning of October is a good season for sailing to England, particularly from Bengal, and in my opinion you ought to go then, whatever may be the state of our affairs.

You ought to take the earliest opportunity of apprising the Court of Directors of this your determination; and if the King's Ministers should make you acquainted with this new intention not to support you, or if you should think the report made by Henry of his conversation with Mr. Addington sufficient authority, you ought to inform the Ministers of the reasons for which you had come to this determination, and that you would have departed at an earlier period if the season had permitted it.

It may be said that there is but little difference between the beginning of October and the month of December, and that you will have more time for your business, and a better season for your voyage, if you should sail in December: in fact there is but little difference; but in my opinion there is great danger of your being dismissed from your office, and I need not point out the bad effects which that will have in this country. It is

probable that the Ministers might be induced to resist this measure, if they saw that you had determined to go home upon the first opportunity that the season would afford; but they would not do so if they should find that you delayed your departure beyond the first opportunity after you received the intimation of their determination not to give you the support which you have required.

I therefore most anxiously recommend you to fix the 1st of October for the period of your departure, and to take the earliest opportunity of informing the Court of Directors thereof.

You will observe that the opinion I have given you answers your four questions. I am convinced that you will receive orders to resign the government to Sir George Barlow, if you don't announce your determination to go away when the season will permit. These orders will, in my opinion, be more fatal to the public interests in this country, to your character, and to the power which you now possess of forwarding the interests of this empire in England, than the failure of all the plans which you have in contemplation for the public benefit by your leaving the execution of them to Sir George Barlow, even supposing that failure to be certain.

But much time remains between this and the month of October, and much may be done; and it is more than probable that Sir George Barlow will be inclined to adhere to your principles, and to carry your plans strictly into execution. I declare that, if the war still existed, I should have recommended you to go away in March, for the same reason that I now recommend you to go in October. You could not foresee the conclusion of the war, and you would have every reason to expect a recall, which would be more fatal to the public interests than the failure of all your plans for carrying on the war, or for the re-establishment of peace. Besides, in that case your remaining in India after being informed that you were not to receive the support which you had always declared to be necessary to induce you to remain, would have appeared like an adhesion to the office.

Under present circumstances you remain for a certain time, in order, as far as is possible in that time, to conclude certain arrangements, the issue of which is not so uncertain as the operations of a war must be, and at the expiration of that time you announce your determination to go, whether those arrangements are concluded or not.

I will go to Calcutta with great pleasure, and do everything

in my power to forward your views. I have already mentioned to Major Shawe that I thought it was advisable that I should soon quit this country, and I am still of this opinion. I think of going to Bombay, and from thence down the coast to Mangalore, thence to Seringapatam, and from thence by Madras post to Calcutta. It is impossible to say, however, when I shall arrive at Calcutta, as it is impossible to say when I shall be able to quit this country.

In respect to the Residencies, you know already that Malcolm's health will not permit him to remain, I believe, in India. I fancy that he has some symptoms of apoplexy, although he has never said anything to me upon the subject. Scindiah's durbar is by far more important than Ragojee Bhoonslah's; in fact, Ragojee Bhoonslah's can scarcely now be considered a great power in India. I have already informed Major Shawe that I intended endeavouring to prevail on Webbe to go to Scindiah's durbar, and I hope that you may have removed him to it. I have sent Mr. Strachey there from Poonah, either to act as secretary, or to be sent forward to Holkar, or to take charge of the Residency, if Malcolm's health should oblige him to come away before arrangements can be made for filling the office of Resident in the manner you may wish. I recommend that Webbe may be appointed Resident with Scindiah, and Elphinstone with Ragojee Bhoonslah. You will have observed from the despatches of the latter that he has gone on very well, and I have to mention that the Rajah's vakeel in this camp has told me that the Rajah and all his ministers were much pleased with him, and were very anxious that he should remain with them in charge of the Residency.

I have already written to Major Shawe respecting the Residency in Mysore. It might be useful, particularly at the present moment, to send Malcolm to England from Bombay; and a gentleman ought to be sent from Bengal to be Resident in Mysore.

Mr. Strachey will of course be desirous to resume his situation at Poonah, or to be promoted in Bengal, if circumstances should not admit of his being at the head of one of the Residencies.

It is difficult to say what line Holkar will take, or what ought to be done with him. He is evidently only a freebooter, and to crush him cannot be called a war in the present state of

the Company's power; but whatever may be done hereafter, I think it will be advisable not to touch him, unless he should attack the Company or their allies, till the alliance with Scindiah will be concluded. If Scindiah sees us attack Holkar, he will most probably not enter into the defensive alliance; he will attack Holkar at the same time, in order to get what he can.

Ever, my dear Mornington,

Yours most affectionately,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1740.]

To Major Malcolm.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp, 31st Jan., 1804.

I received yesterday your letter of the 25th, after I had closed my despatches, not having been able to get the treaty with the Rajah of Jeypoor copied in time. I now send it to you. If he have written to Scindiah, you see he has deceived him, or is deceiving us.

If the news writer of whom you speak be Mirza Wahed Beg, I recommend you to have nothing to do with him. I shall recollect what you say about Kawder Nawaz Khan.

If Scindiah push you on the subject of money, you might possibly get Dholpoor, Rajah Kerrah, and Baree in a mortgage. Upon considering the subject of the pensions, I think that fourteen or fifteen lacs of rupees may be more than it will be necessary to lay out in that manner; and we might give a part to Scindiah himself, possibly a third; as I rather believe that some of the persons in the list, who have lost their serinjaumy lands, have joined us already. However, do you arrange this matter as you think best. It will not be a bad plan to bribe the prince, as well as his ministers.

I have discharged Amrut Rao's horse. He goes to Bingar. I thus get rid of a very large expense in camp. Webbe was to leave Hurryhur about the 27th. Strachey went away this morning.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Malcolm.

[1741.]

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp, 31st Jan., 1804.

The Governor-General has received a letter from Henry, in which Henry informs him that he had had a long conversation with Mr. Addington on the subject of the support which the Governor-General was to expect from ministers hereafter, in which Mr. Addington said plainly that they could not support the Governor-General against the Court of Directors. Mr. Addington talked in strong terms of the services of the Governor-General, but, almost in the same breath, he told Henry that, as his private friend, he could not advise him to stay beyond the year 1803. The Governor-General has asked my opinion what he ought to do, and writes of staying till December. I have told him that it is obvious that ministers are not more desirous than the Court of Directors that he should remain in office; and that, if he remain one moment beyond the first opportunity that will offer for his going home, allowing a reasonable time to wind up his government, and the affairs at the end of the war, he will be ordered to resign the government to Sir G. Barlow; and that in this manner greater injury will be done to his character, and to the public cause, than could result from the failure of all his plans, supposing that to be certain. I have, therefore, recommended him to fix the 1st of October for the period of his departure, and to apprise the ministers that he would go at an earlier period if the season should permit. He referred to my opinion upon several points connected with the Residencies. I have recommended him to send you home; to appoint Webbe to Scindiah's durbar (which, by the bye, he desired me to offer to you), and Elphinstone to Nagpoor; and to make the arrangement for Mysore which we agreed was the best, supposing that you were not able to go back. I expect a duplicate of the Governor-General's letter, which I shall send you. I have not time to copy that which I have written to him; but this letter contains the outline of it, and I will show you, when we meet, the copy which I have taken in the press. I have recommended the Governor-General to send you to England from Bombay.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1742.]

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Camp, 1st Feb., 1804.

I have received your letter of the 25th January, and I shall be very sorry if you hurry yourself or otherwise put yourself to any inconvenience to meet me at Poonah at an earlier period than that at which you originally intended to arrive there. I have come to the southward to destroy the banditti who have been on the frontier. Since I have crossed the Godavery they have begun to disperse, and have gone to such a distance that for the last three or four days I have halted to rest the troops and cattle a little, which have been marching without more than one halt since the beginning of October. If I find that they disperse entirely, which I think they are about to do, I shall fix the subsidiary force, break up the army, and then go to Poonah.

I think that you will do well to see the Putwurdun sirdars. In my late letters I have just told them that the Company wished them well, and that as long as they should continue the faithful servants of the Peshwah, the Company would not interfere with them. Since our successes they have made shabby excuses for not having cooperated with us in the war, and have expressed a wish that we should interfere in their favour with the Rajah of Kolapoor. This will not answer.

I have given them to understand that General Campbell was retained in his position on the Kistna to destroy them if they had moved, and that I attribute to their dubious conduct the continuance of the war for the last two months.

I don't know whether to rejoice at or to regret the prospect of your going into Council. I rejoice at it for Madras and its dependencies; I regret it on account of affairs in this quarter. I forget whether I informed you that I intended to propose to you to go to Scindiah's durbar; that is by far the most important station in India, and Malcolm is so unwell that he cannot remain there. I question whether he will be able to conclude the subsidiary alliance within the time specified in the treaty of peace. Nothing has been done in it yet. However, we shall have plenty of opportunities to talk over all these matters when you will reach Poonah. At present I can only tell you that I conceive Scindiah's durbar a far more important object than Ragojee Bhoonslah's, and that if you are to remain only a short time at

either (which must be the case if you are to go into Council at Madras), you can render most service at the former.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Adjutant-General.

[1743.]

SIR,

Camp, 2nd Feb., 1804.

I have the honour to enclose the proceedings of a general court martial on the trial of William Clarke, private in His Majesty's 74th regiment, for the murder of a native, the sentence of which has been read to the prisoner in open court.

As I had received the authority of the Commander-in-Chief to pardon William Clarke, if I should find him worthy of his Excellency's mercy, I have inquired into the character of the prisoner, and I find that he is a notorious thief, that he would have been tried by a regimental court martial for theft if he had not been brought to trial before a general court martial for murder, and that he was in every respect a man of infamous character. It was, however, desirable not to punish with death a soldier of the 74th regiment, and I have, therefore, proposed to William Clarke that he should be transported to Botany Bay for life as the condition on which the mercy of the Commander-in-Chief is to be extended to him, to which proposal he has consented.

I request to receive the orders of the Commander-in-Chief respecting him. I believe that it will be proper to send him to Bombay.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp at Munkaiseer, Monday, 6th Feb., 1804. [1744.]

Major-General Wellesley thanks the troops for the persevering activity with which they underwent the fatigues of the march on the 4th and 5th inst.

When the cavalry was formed, they advanced in great order; but Major-General Wellesley has occasion now to point out the necessity of their preserving their order at all times. To lose it is easy, but to regain it after it is lost is difficult, if not im-

possible, in front of an enemy. The discipline of the troops when singly opposed to large bodies of the enemy is of no advantage to them; the greatest number must have the advantage: but when disciplined troops preserve their order, and attend to the commands of their officers, and act together, the inequality of numbers is of no avail, and the disciplined troops must succeed. The advance of the infantry under Major Swinton was very proper, and in the best order.

The detachment will halt to-morrow.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1745.]

To Major Malcolm.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Camp at Munkaiseer, 7th Feb., 1804.

I have destroyed Sirjee Rao Ghautky, Gopal Bhugwunt, Nimbajee Bhoonslah, and others. Mulwa Dada was in Solapoor. I enclose a copy of my letter to the Governor-General upon this subject.

The exertion made by the troops is the greatest I ever witnessed. Every thing was over by 12 o'clock on the 5th; and I think that by that time the infantry must have marched 60 miles from 6 in the morning on the 4th. We halted from 12 in the day till 10 at night on the 4th, so that we marched 60 miles with infantry in 20 hours. That rascal, Appah Dessaye, gave notice to Ghautky: I have everything but the most positive proof of it. However, as it is, the destruction of the band is complete, but I wished to hang some of their chiefs, *pour encourager les autres*. I enclose you the letter from Lord Wellesley.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1746.]

To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 9th Feb., 1804.

Upon examining the papers received from Bengal and the Commissioners at Cuttack, I find that I cannot give you any instructions respecting your communication with the Rajah of

Berar regarding the 2nd and 10th Articles of the treaty of peace. I enclose you the copies of the despatches received from Bengal and Cuttack on this subject, and of one I wrote to the Governor-General, which will explain the difficulties under which I labour, and the difference between the Governor-General's instructions and the information received from Cuttack.

The only point that remains is to give you my opinion respecting what you are to say to the Rajah on the subject of this delay in complying with the stipulation of the 10th Article of the treaty of peace. You will do best to state the fact, viz., that I had received the Governor-General's instructions upon the subject, and a letter from the Commissioners of Cuttack, but that, not deeming the information sufficiently complete to give the Rajah a correct idea of the extent of the negotiations with his feudatories, I had thought it best to defer making any communication till I should have more information. In the mean time you may inform him that all negotiations, &c., were stopped at the moment that the accounts of the peace were received.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

[1747.]

DEAR COLMAN,

Camp, 12th Feb., 1804.

I have received your letter of the 7th.

I beg that upon receipt of this letter you will send to Ahmednuggur, under charge of a company of Native infantry, commanded by a European officer, all the doolies and bearers with corps at Poonah, and 2 soubahdars, 10 ms., 238 bearers, returned as sent for the 78th regiment, with as many doolies as they ought to carry, under the regulations of government. The party will be relieved at Ahmednuggur, but the doolies, when joined by a part of the provision department of the army and bullocks to carry the tents, will proceed on to Adjutee to remove from thence the hospital.

Be so kind as to inform Colonel Wallace when the doolies will leave Poonah, in order that arrangements may be made not to delay them unnecessarily at Ahmednuggur, and let him know the number that you will send.

To Major Symons.

[1749.]

MY DEAR SYMONS,

Camp, 16th Feb., 1804.

I have received your letters of the 2nd. No. 1 has been sent to the Secretary of Government in the Judicial department; I have some difficulty in deciding upon No. 2.

There is no doubt whatever of Lieutenant ——'s fraud; but the question is, in what manner is it to be remedied? I conclude that you know that Lieutenant —— and Major Kennett are dead.

If Major Kennett have left the house, as I believe he has, to a Native woman, or if it be in the possession of a Native, Mr. Reddy might prosecute such Native in your court, and would regain possession of his house; but if the house be in the possession of a European, I don't know how I can interfere to regain possession for Mr. Reddy, excepting by remonstrance.

The best thing that he can do in that case is to prosecute his suit in the courts at Madras, where he will certainly succeed, with costs.

I will try what I can do with the commanding officer of the 2nd of the 3rd, who probably has taken charge of the property.

I forget whether a register of the purchase of a house at Seringapatam is necessary. If it be, we might attack Major Kennett's representative upon that ground in your court, even though he should be a European. Let me hear from you on this subject.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

[1750.]

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Camp, 17th Feb., 1804.

I have received your letter of the 7th, and I think it probable that you will arrive at Poonah about the 20th. I cannot be there before the 24th, but I shall on that day or on the 25th or 26th.

Mr. Frissell will show you the letters which I have written to him, and will communicate to you all the circumstances of the Peshwah's conduct regarding the Frenchmen lately landed at Jyegur. You will observe that our situation at Poonah is rather

critical, and that Colonel Close's sickness is most unfortunate. I have proposed to him to remain at Bombay, and that you and I should go down there to meet him; which plan we will carry into execution if you should have no objection to it.

You will have heard of what I have been doing since the beginning of the month. I believe that everything is now quiet.

I shall say nothing about your going into council till we meet, excepting that I think it a fortunate circumstance for the affairs of Fort St. George. I agree with General Stuart about the probability of Chamier's departure. We must not be certain of it till he is over the surf.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1751.]

To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp, 20th Feb., 1804.

I return the papers enclosed in your letter of the 7th, as you will have observed, by one which I sent you some time ago, that I had received the Governor-General's despatch.

I can give you no instructions about the list of Rajahs with whom treaties have been made. You will have observed that I have referred the subject to the consideration of the Governor-General, and we must wait for his orders.

I have written to him upon the subject since I despatched the letter of which I sent you the copy, and have pointed out the inconsistency of the conduct of Colonel Harcourt and Mr. Melville with the spirit and letter of the treaty, with my promises, and with his own principles; which conduct I have attributed to the desire of those gentlemen to increase as much as possible the limits of their districts, as the means of increasing and insuring the happiness of the subjects under their government. But I have pointed out that this object of theirs, although very desirable, is secondary to that of preserving inviolate the national faith. I think that the Governor-General will give up all these objects. The treaty with one of the Rajahs was concluded ten days after Colonel Harcourt had received the notification of the conclusion of the treaty of peace.

The Governor-General apparently intends to give up Sumchalpoor. I wrote to Gungaram Pundit about Merar Pundit.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P.S. We have got the Frenchmen who I heretofore informed you were landed in the Konkan.

To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley.

[1752.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON,

Camp, 24th Feb., 1804.

I wrote to you on the 31st of January in answer to your letter of the 6th, in which you enclosed one from Henry of the 31st August. I observe by the returns from the post-office at Hyderabad that the dawd of that day from my camp had not arrived there on the 16th of February, and therefore I proceed again to give you my opinion on the subject of Henry's letter.

I think that the King's Ministers are guilty of a breach of faith towards you: they promised you their support, and they made that promise in order to induce you to hold your situation in India. Having succeeded in that object, they now tell you that they withdraw their support, and they leave you to manage the matter with the Directors as well as you can. They do this with their eyes open, and a knowledge that the Court of Directors are inimical towards you; and Henry tells you that the Ministers are either unable or unwilling to support you, and that Mr. Addington would do anything for a vote; in other words, he will consent to sacrifice you, or the British government in India, in order to secure the vote of Mr. Tierney or Mr. Fonblanque.

I conclude, from this statement, that you are at the mercy of the Court of Directors, and there is nothing so bad that you may not expect it from that body: I will even go so far as dismissal from your office.

I certainly think that, in the present state of the public mind in England respecting Indian affairs, your dismissal from your office will be a great public misfortune. People do not appear to me now to take much trouble in inquiring what passes in this country, and the public in general will see nothing in the dismissal but an act of power in the Directors exercised upon an

officer who was obnoxious to them. It will deprive you of much of the power which you have now of serving this country in England. All your efforts upon Indian subjects will be deemed acts of revenge for this act of the Directors, and when considered in that light, they will not meet with the attention from the public which they will deserve. Your stay in this country also, which might be necessary after you would be dismissed, would be probably the most irksome moments of your life, and your departure from India would be by no means consistent with the triumph of every other part of your administration.

In my opinion nothing can prevent this circumstance, which, in a public as well as a private view, I must consider a great misfortune, but the certainty in England that you will return home as soon as you will hear that the King's Ministers have determined not to support you. The knowledge of your return by the first practicable opportunity must prevent it, if the Ministers have a spark of honour, or the slightest regard for your character.

On this ground I should recommend you to go home directly if the war still existed. No man can foresee the conclusion of any war, and to have waited for the conclusion of the late war might have prolonged your government for many years.

But the war is now concluded, and some important arrangements, depending upon the political and military operations of the war, and upon the treaties of peace, are in the course of execution, which it is necessary that you should superintend. As you had not received the treaty of peace with Scindiah on the 7th of this month, it could not be expected that everything would be concluded by the first week in March, the last period of the present season for sailing to England; and you certainly ought not, and it cannot be expected that you should go to England in a season not favourable for the voyage; but you ought to fix for your departure the first week in October. This is the first opportunity that will offer after the first week in March; it will afford you much time for your business, and, in fact, the business which cannot be concluded in the next six months might with advantage be left to your successor.

It may be said that to stay till December will afford you more leisure for your business, and that the difference between going in October and in December is not great. It is not so

in point of time, but it is everything in principle. My opinion is, that your dismissal from office will be a greater public misfortune to this country than the failure of all your plans, supposing that failure to be certain, by leaving the execution of them to Sir G. Barlow; that you will certainly be dismissed if the King's Ministers are not able to oppose to the wish of the Court of Directors to dismiss you, the fact that you will leave India upon the first opportunity, and that therefore you ought to determine to go in October, as being the first opportunity, and to announce that determination to the Court of Directors and the King's Ministers at an early period, grounding it in your communication to the latter on your knowledge that you were not to have the benefit of their support.

I believe I have above given an answer to your four questions, nearly to the same purport as in my letter of the 31st January. I will go to Calcutta with pleasure; I must leave this country soon, and must go to Seringapatam, but I think that I shall be at Calcutta in the beginning of May.

Since I wrote on the 31st of January I have heard that Webbe is to be called into council at Madras, and Malcolm's health I hear has mended. I am now on my way to Poonah to meet Webbe, and he will probably receive your answer to the reference which he has made to you regarding his going to Madras. As I think it probable that you will wish that he should return to Madras, I have already endeavoured to prevail on Malcolm to remain at Scindiah's durbar, and I will make him stay there till the Resident is fixed upon, if I should find that you have desired Webbe to go to Madras. Mr. Elphinstone will make a good Resident at Nagpoor. The Rajah's vakeel in this camp has more than once expressed the Rajah's satisfaction in communicating with Mr. Elphinstone, and his wish that he should be appointed permanently to his durbar.

Mr. Strachey is gone to Scindiah's durbar, where he will act as secretary, and will take charge of the Residency if Malcolm should be obliged to come away, unless an opportunity should offer of sending him on a mission to Holkar. I have desired Malcolm to take advantage of such an opportunity if it should offer. Of course Mr. Strachey will wish to return to his station at Poonah, or to be provided for in Bengal, if he should not have charge of one of the other Residencies.

I have no person here whom I could employ in this line, and

don't know who to recommend. Would it not be advisable to appoint Sydenham to one of the Mahratta Residencies? He is the only man that I know of that is master of Mahratta politics.

I have received Major Shawe's letter of the 7th, to which I will write an answer in a day or two. It is very extraordinary that you should not have received a copy of the treaty of peace. I sent no less than four copies by Hyderabad, and two through Hindostan, to General Lake, in the beginning of January.

-Ever, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1753.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 29th Feb., 1804.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 22nd instant, to which I have given all the consideration which the extent of the subject deserves.

The first point to be considered is our general political situation, as it affects us in Guzerat. A peace has lately been concluded with Scindiah, and there is every appearance that that chief will adhere to the treaty. But the treaty has not yet been ratified by his Excellency the Governor-General; and the arrangement which is the object of the 15th Article of the treaty had not been carried into execution when Major Malcolm wrote last from Burhampoor.

If that arrangement should be carried into execution, it is very possible that it may be made with a condition that the force to be supplied to Scindiah should be stationed in the Company's territory; and if this condition should be required by Scindiah, I have suggested to Major Malcolm to urge him to cede Powanghur and Dohud, and the subsidiary force will be stationed at the latter. In that case it will be necessary to order the troops in Guzerat again to move forward upon Dohud.

If the arrangement proposed in the 15th Article of the treaty of peace should not be carried into execution, or if it should be carried into execution and Scindiah should consent to admit the subsidiary troops into his territories, I conceive that it will still be necessary to keep the troops stationed in Guzerat north of the Nerbuddah, in such positions as that they may be able to effect a junction without loss of time.

It is necessary that they should be kept in this state if the proposed arrangement should not be made, because we have no information respecting what is to be done with Holkar; it is necessary if the subsidiary force should be admitted into Scindiah's territories, because we don't know what may be the effect upon Holkar's views and conduct of the proposed intimate alliance with Scindiah.

Therefore in every view of the present situation of our affairs I am decidedly of opinion that you cannot venture to detach your troops to any considerable distance without incurring the risk of disabling yourself from having the means of obeying the orders which it is probable that the Governor-General may send you.

Having said thus much, it does not appear that I need enter into a discussion on the other points upon which you have been pleased to ask for my opinion.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Neil Benjamin Edmonstone, Esq.

[1754.]

DEAR SIR,

Poonah, 29th Feb., 1804.

I have received your letter of the 4th instant on the subject of Mr. Simpson. I rather believe that at the time you despatched it no accounts of the peace with Scindiah had been received in Bengal, and it is possible that the Governor-General might not now think it expedient to urge the demand on Scindiah: I think it best, therefore, to ask for further orders upon this subject.

When writing upon it, I wish to mention to you that although in the course of the conferences with Scindiah's vakeels I more than once urged the detention of Lieutenant Simpson as a breach of the laws of nations, I think there are some doubts whether it can be strictly so considered.

The law is, I believe, that no impediment shall be given to the passage of an ambassador, with his suite, &c.; but I imagine that it is intended that the journey of the ambassador shall be made, at least, with a reasonable degree of celerity, and that he shall not remain unnecessarily in a town situated in a country become the seat of the war. At least such is probably the intention.

But Colonel Collins remained above six weeks at Aurungabad, not 100 miles from Scindiah's camp, which he had quitted. In this time he had many opportunities of departing, even if the country had been overrun by the enemy's horse, which it was not; particularly he might have marched from thence with my army when I quitted Aurungabad, and returned to the Godavery on the 30th August. In short, as he stayed there unnecessarily, he might be considered as an advanced post of the army rather than an ambassador on his route.

Nothing can be more unjustifiable than Scindiah's conduct in his treatment of Mr. Simpson; but if abstracted from its being a breach of the laws of nations, it is possible that the Governor-General may not think it proper to force Scindiah to give compensation to Mr. Simpson, although it may be very proper to make him sensible of the impropriety of his conduct in ill-treating a British officer who had had the misfortune to fall into his hands. I confess that if I had thought this a breach of the laws of nations, I should not have taken any one step in the negotiations for the peace till reparation for it had been given; but I do not think it so.

I take this opportunity of returning you my thanks for all your private letters.

I saw the Peshwah this morning, but hitherto have done no business with him or his ministers.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1755.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 29th February with its enclosure from Admiral Rainier. You know as well as I do that the Governor-General wants the 75th regiment, &c., for the garrison of Fort William, which I believe that every man (excepting Sir William Clarke) will allow is fully as important as Goa. Yet the latter has already one regiment of Europeans and three battalions of sepoy, and the former no Europeans and but few sepoy.

The truth of the matter is that Sir William Clarke, although he has more troops in his fort than there are in any other post

in India, and which causes the existence of the rebellion in Malabar, is not satisfied. But the Governor-General, who has been apprised repeatedly of Sir William's fears for the safety of Goa, has given no answer or orders upon the subject, and therefore I conclude that they have made as little impression upon him as they have upon me. I recommend that you should send to Sir William Clarke all the provisions and ordnance stores which he can require, and as to troops refer him to the Governor-General or to me.

There is no harm in keeping Colonel ———; he is of no use in his corps, and he may be necessary as a witness at the general court-martial which I must order for the trial of Captain ———, whose conduct has become too bad.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton.

[1756.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Poonah, 3rd March, 1804.

I enclose the translation of a letter* which contains a complaint against Captain ———, of a very serious nature in my opinion, but from circumstances I am induced to believe that it is not deemed quite so serious by Rajah Mohiput Ram. It is of considerable consequence to the character of the British government, as well as to Colonel Stevenson and me, that

* *Translation of a Letter from Rajah Mohiput Ram to the Hon. Major-General Wellesley.*

Received 28th Jilkand,

(Answering to the 1st March, 1804.)

After compliments—I was heartily rejoiced to hear of your success in punishing the predatory and rebellious chiefs in your late excursion: God grant your success may always continue!

Colonel Stevenson, who is an officer of great respectability, transacted business with us for the space of a year in a friendly and proper manner. Colonel Haliburton at present behaves kindly to us all: he is an officer of great sense and experience. But Captain ——— is unkind; he exposes us by false representations; he demands money from all the Sirdars, and when they refuse him he insults them. Although I should not trouble you with so trifling a subject, I do this from absolute necessity. He does not pay the brinjaries and poor people for their grain, and he commits extraordinary acts of oppression.

Do not believe what he may write to you on this subject, unless he produces proof in support of it. He is continually asking.

Let your commands for me be sent through Colonel Haliburton in future.

no imputation should be unnecessarily thrown upon Captain ———, and therefore I wish you (before you hold any communication with Captain ——— on the subject of this complaint) to see Rajah Mohiput Ram, and inform him that I conceive his complaint to be a most serious one, and that if it be founded it will draw upon Captain ——— the most serious punishment; but that before I take any further steps upon the subject, or venture to go further than merely to acquaint you with the circumstance, I wish him to say whether the complaint is really founded in fact, or only brought forward on account of some trifling dispute which he may have had with Captain ———.

If it should turn out to be of the serious nature stated in the enclosed paper, I will request you to give the enclosed paper, and this letter to Captain ——— for his perusal. If it should be only the effects of a little ill temper occasioned by some dispute with Captain ———, I will request you to destroy this letter and the enclosed paper, and warn Rajah Mohiput Ram of the consequences of allowing his passions to get the better of him so far as to attack in this serious manner the character of an officer who has been employed confidentially by Colonel Stevenson and by me.

If Mohiput Ram should persist in the complaint, you will desire him to be prepared to produce evidence in support of it, and you will desire Captain ——— to send me an answer to the enclosed paper. If Mohiput Ram should withdraw the complaint, I request you to say nothing about it to Captain ——— or any body else.

It is scarcely necessary to hint to you the necessity that in communicating with Rajah Mohiput Ram upon this occasion you must use some channel different from Captain ———, if you are not able to speak to him yourself.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1757.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Poonah, 6th March, 1804.

Mr. Webbe and I leave this place for Bombay to-morrow; and, wind and weather permitting, I hope to dine with you on

the 10th, provided the boats are at Panwell when I shall arrive there.

I have five or six gentlemen with me belonging to the Staff, and you will be the best judge whether you can with convenience receive us all: if you cannot, I will request you to order that a house may be taken for me.

I have with me two vakeels of Scindiah's, and some other persons of that description; and I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that either a house may be hired or tents pitched for their reception.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley.

[1758.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON,

Bombay, 15th March, 1804.

I send you some very interesting despatches just received from Malcolm; among others, one containing the copy of the Treaty of Defensive Alliance agreed to by Scindiah. This completes everything you wished for in this part of India.

It is proper, however, that I should inform you that my opinion is that the duration of the peace with Scindiah depends upon the arrangements consequent to the 9th Article.* We must not depend at all upon the annihilation of his army and resources, or too much upon the influence we have established in his durbar. In respect to his army, the men and horses remain; and the extreme distress to which the men are reduced renders it more necessary to employ them in hostility against the Company's government.

It may appear extraordinary, but it is certainly true, that an

* The 9th Article of the "Treaty of Alliance and mutual Defence" between the East India Company and Scindiah, dated 27th February, 1804, is as follows:—"As the chief object of the present defensive alliance is the security and protection of the dominions of the contracting parties and their allies and dependents from all attack whatsoever, the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah engages never to commit an act of hostility or aggression against any State or Chief in alliance with the Honourable Company, or against any other principal State or Power; and in the event of differences arising, whatever adjustment the Company's government, weighing matters in the scale of truth and justice, may determine, shall meet with his full approbation and acquiescence."

army in the state in which Scindiah's army is described to be by Malcolm is more dangerous in the present state of the Company's power than one well paid, and in a better state of discipline, and under better command. In fact, the existence of the individuals, and of their horses (their only property), depends upon their being led into some rich provinces; and they will join any chief who will profess an intention to lead them to plunder. I have many proofs that pay is not an object to Mahratta horsemen compared with plunder; and, notwithstanding the wretchedness of Scindiah's resources at present, I have no doubt but that if he were desirous to renew the war he would not want the means of carrying his wishes into execution.

The influence established in Scindiah's durbar gives us a better hold of him than the state of his army. But even this must not be too much depended upon. The peace must introduce new modes of acting and of thinking upon every subject. The view from it must be tranquillity, and the hope of personal or national aggrandizement must be laid aside. But much time must elapse before the minds of any description of men can be brought cordially to adopt such a change in their situation, and to relinquish all the prospects to which they have looked forward for years. We must not expect, therefore, that the chiefs of Scindiah's durbar will entirely discourage the proposition to renew hostilities with the Company; founded upon the notion, whether true or false, that Scindiah has not been treated with the generosity which he expected in the arrangements consequent to the 9th Article of the treaty of peace.

We must take care not to come to any conclusion respecting the sentiments of the chiefs of Scindiah's durbar from what we have seen of the sentiments of the persons composing the durbars of the Soubah of the Deccan and the Peshwah. In fact, there are no persons in the durbars of either of those princes who were ever of any consequence, or had any power previously to our connection with those durbars respectively (the Minister at Hyderabad, I believe, excepted); all the persons of the description of Gopal Bhow, and others who appear to be at the head of affairs in Scindiah's durbar, are either living in obscurity, or are intriguing to render themselves independent, or are gone over to the enemy.

I believe Scindiah to be disposed to preserve the peace with the Company, and to have a strong feeling of resentment against

Holkar, and to know that he cannot support his power against that chief unless by the assistance of the Company's government. I believe him to have been much gratified by the manner in which the treaty of peace was negotiated; by which, after he had been humbled to the dust, his pride wounded, and his power destroyed, he was raised to a degree of power greater than that possessed by any other prince in India, notwithstanding the immense acquisitions which we have made; and the prospect of the generosity of the Company was afforded to him.

But if by the arrangements consequent to the 9th Article of the treaty he is to be deprived of a large portion of territory, which he imagined he should hold; if the arrangement is to be one consistent with justice, not generosity, and with good faith as defined by the laws of civilized nations, and not as it is understood by these barbarians, these favourable feelings and dispositions of Scindiah's mind must be effaced by one which operates most strongly upon every native, viz. wounded pride, and the fear and shame of hearing and bearing the insults of his own followers for having sacrificed his power to the British government.

We must not depend on Scindiah's sense of his interests, although we may have found him and his ministers to know them well. None of the native princes are guided by a sense of their permanent interest, even as they understand it themselves, but in every instance by their passions, of which the strongest is pride.

Under these circumstances the arrangement under the 9th Article of the treaty of peace is a matter of great delicacy; and the peace of India in a great measure depends upon its being made in conformity with the negotiations for the treaty.

I have no fear whatever for the result of a recommencement of the war, although possibly we might not enjoy all the advantages in carrying it on which we had even in the last war. I feel confident that we must be successful upon every occasion in which we may employ the troops, and that the result of the war must be honourable to us. But we should have to encounter many difficulties, particularly in this quarter. The countries in which we should act, or through which we should have to pass, are entirely exhausted by having been the seat of the operations of the late war, and by having been plundered for years; and

a scarcity of rain in the last season, combined with these causes, has produced a famine, of which the army must feel the consequences.

Supposing that we should penetrate to Hindostan, matters are there in a worse situation than they are in the Deccan, and we should experience greater difficulties.

I have frequently apprised you of circumstances respecting the Peshwah, which, if they do not prove insincerity, at least show how difficult it would be to bring his government through another war immediately; and in respect to the southern chiefs I have to observe that it is not possible to suppose but that they are aware of the Peshwah's designs against them, and that they would take the opportunity of the renewal of hostilities to force us to adopt their plans for their own independence.

We are mistaken if we suppose that the Soubah of the Deccan will be satisfied with the portion of the conquests allotted to him, or that he will enter cordially into a new war, the cause of which will be the failure of an arrangement in which he will have no concern.

The Rajah of Berar will not remain at peace. He complains loudly of the conduct of the Soubah's servants in Berar, and he would renew hostilities if he should see a favourable opportunity.

Under these circumstances we should be obliged to make the most formidable arrangements both for offensive and defensive operations that have ever yet been made by the British government, far exceeding the scale of those made for the last war, because every point must be defended, and our operations must be most actively offensive.

In relation to the state of affairs at home, I consider the renewal of the war to be the greatest misfortune that could occur. In the eyes of those who are to judge of your conduct, it would efface the glory of the last war and of your whole administration. Believe me that neither the Court of Directors nor the King's Ministers are capable of taking an enlarged view of the present state of affairs in India. Everything has been so much altered within these last five years that I doubt very much whether there is any man in England who understands our present situation. I am certain Lord Castlereagh does not, and, as a proof of it, I enclose the copy of a letter which I have got from Mr. Duncan in confidence.

Since I have learned the real state of the case regarding the support that you are to expect in future from the Ministers, and particularly since I have perused the letter of which the enclosed is a copy, I have rejoiced at the peace as the most fortunate event that could have occurred, and equal at least to any that has occurred during your administration, both for the public interest and your reputation. But what a falling off will it be if the consequence of the peace should be a renewal of the war under circumstances of greater difficulty than have hitherto occurred! You possibly may not feel this part of the subject so strongly as I do; but I acknowledge, that I cannot separate the notion of your great character with the public from the public interests in India.

If all this be true, I think there is no doubt but that any sacrifice ought to be made to preserve the peace, and that everything ought to be done to keep Scindiah's durbar in the temper in which it was left when the peace was signed, which is not absolutely inconsistent with the public faith or the public safety.

In the negotiations of the treaty of peace I was certainly not sufficiently informed respecting the real state of Gohud. I understood that the Ranah of Gohud existed as a state in the same manner as the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor; and Scindiah's ministers encouraged that misunderstanding in order to deceive me. It appears that the Ranah of Gohud has not existed as a state for years; that the territory of Gohud has been in the possession of Scindiah; and that your object was to restore the state of the Jauts, not to preserve a state that existed already. I think there is no doubt but that the argument is on our side; and that, both from the breach of the treaty and the understanding of the persons who made it, Scindiah ought to have nothing to do with Gohud. But he thinks he ought; and his ministers have flattered him with the possession of this country and Gwalior, under the hope that I had been deceived, and that the words of the treaty would give him both; and in my opinion the whole question of the peace of India turns upon this point.

I am fully aware of the benefit to be derived from having forts, but I don't think that the possession of this or any other fort is worth the risk of the renewal of the war. Gwalior would be of use to us for offensive operations with Malwa, and perhaps it is absolutely necessary if we keep possession of Gohud.

But it is of no use for general defensive purposes; and I know of no fort and no line of frontier excepting a navigable river that is of any use against the Mahratta armies for mere defensive purposes. But Gwalior may be of use to secure the navigation of the Jumna, an object which is of the utmost importance, although it is too distant, in my opinion, to affect that navigation in any great degree, unless it has a very large garrison.

An arrangement might be made with Scindiah which would secure the navigation of the Jumna, leaving in his hands the fort of Gwalior. Under the circumstance of his having agreed to the treaty of defensive alliance, this measure cannot be deemed a dangerous one.

I would recommend that Scindiah should be informed that under the treaty of peace he had forfeited all claim to the territory of Gohud and to the fort of Gwalior; that the object in wishing to retain those territories and the fort was to secure the navigation of the Jumna; but that provided he would come into arrangements with a view to that object, and would appoint a person to be killadar who should be agreeable to the British government, and in consideration of the intimate alliance lately established between the two states, the British government would restore to him Gwalior and the territory of Gohud, excepting those parts of it which would be necessary to form a sufficient state for the Ranah. If territory should not be wanted for this purpose, it would be better to give him back the whole.

It is scarcely necessary that I should make any excuse for giving you my opinion upon this subject; I should be unpardonable if I omitted it. It agrees with that of Malcolm, and I think it probable that you will adopt it when you will have before you the real state of the case. If you should not, I will enter upon the new state of things with all the zeal and ardour that is possible; and I have no doubt whatever of success. But however I may be pleased with the prospect of that success as far as I am concerned, I should prefer the continuance of peace for the public and for you.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Gungaram Pundit.

[1759.]

16th March, 1804.

I learn from Mr. Elphinstone that, notwithstanding the treaty of peace, my repeated orders and those of Rajah Mohiput Ram, and, above all, of the Sircar, you have refused to deliver to Senah Saheb Soubah the lands situated under the forts of Gawilghur and Nernulla, which it was settled he was to have; you have seized forts and villages which do not belong to Secundar Jah; and you have refused to adopt the measures necessary to establish an arbitration to decide all differences respecting boundaries, &c., which is the fairest and most reasonable way of proceeding. The consequence of your conduct will be that the country will be ruined, and Secundar Jah will get no revenue from it.

I desire that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will give to the servants of Senah Saheb Soubah the lands which it was settled by Rajah Mohiput Ram that he should have; that you will withdraw your people from all places the right of possession of which is doubtful; and that, when you want to possess any villages or districts, the right to which is doubtful, or the possession likely to be disputed, you will apply to Mr. Elphinstone before you attempt to take possession; and that you will immediately correspond with Mr. Elphinstone, and arrange a plan for establishing an arbitration, under his mediation, to define the boundaries of the lands of the two states, and act in conformity with Mr. Elphinstone's requisitions on this subject.

In this manner we may put an end to those petty disputes before the evil which they occasion will increase to any great degree; but if you should omit to do everything in your power to give tranquillity to the country acquired for the Sircar in the late war, you will be responsible for the loss and disgrace which will be the consequence of the confusion, of which your conduct is the immediate cause.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Bombay, 21st March, 1804. [1760.]

Major-General Wellesley is concerned to have been under the necessity of occupying the public time and attention by the investigation of a subject of such small comparative importance

as is contained in the charge brought by Captain — against Lieutenant — of the — regiment. But it appears by the evidence and sentence of the general court martial that nothing would satisfy Lieutenant — but an apology from his commanding officer, whose orders he had disobeyed, or a trial by a general court martial.

In the course of this trial, and of his defence, Lieutenant — has avowed principles of action upon which it is not possible that any military service can be conducted, and which tend to subvert the discipline and subordination of the army.

The first of them is, that he was directly responsible to the commanding officer of the — regiment for an obedience to the orders of Captain —, his immediate commanding officer, in respect of the duties required from the followers of the detachment of the — regiment under his (Lieutenant —'s) command. The next, that he was not bound to obey the orders of Captain —, acknowledged to be his commanding officer, unless those orders should receive the sanction of the commanding officer of the garrison to which both belonged. The commanding officer of the — regiment had nothing to do with the duties ordered from the followers detached with that part of the — regiment under the command of Lieutenant —; and as for the second principle, there is no officer who will read the reprimand who will not perceive that it is entirely inapplicable to the military service.

Major-General Wellesley has always been most anxious to avoid occupying the public time and attention by the investigation of trivial subjects; and for this reason he has repeatedly ordered the officers acting under his command to endeavour to reconcile the trifling differences which might happen; and it has been Major-General Wellesley's wish to assemble a general court martial only for the trial of serious military offences, such as, he is happy to reflect, have not occurred during the service which he has conducted.

But the same erroneous principles of action which caused the disobedience for which Lieutenant — was put in arrest, accompanied by another equally erroneous, the necessity of abiding by the decision of the officers of a corps who could have no knowledge of the transaction on which they were called to decide, frustrated all Captain —'s endeavours to reconcile the difference between Lieutenant — and Captain —, and he here

stands convicted by a respectable court martial of "disobedience of orders and irregular and improper conduct."

Major-General Wellesley warns Lieutenant — of the danger of those erroneous principles on which he has acted, and of trusting to litigation in points of military service; and he hereby publicly reprimands him.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Montresor.

[1761.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Bombay, 26th March, 1804.

Mr. Duncan has desired me to write to you to request that you would allow thirty or forty European soldiers to go on board each of the ships *Bridgewater* and *Elphinstone*, and remain with them while they are on the coast taking in their loads of pepper. If you can spare the men, I shall be much obliged to you if you can comply with this requisition; but you must be the best judge of the possibility of affording this assistance from your limited force. All that I can say is, that it appears to me to be desirable not to allow these ships to fall into the hands of the enemy's privateer, an event which is not very improbable, as they have been fleeced of their men by the ships of war.

Take care to inform yourself particularly at what places the ships are to take in their cargoes, in order that you may give such directions to the officers commanding the troops about landing as will make it certain that they will not be carried to Bombay. In these days it appears to be considered that all is fair that can produce a few men: this is the reason for which I give you this caution.

It is long since I have heard from you, and I believe still longer since I have written to you; but I have had nothing new to tell you. The subsidiary alliance offered to Scindiah, in the 15th article of the treaty of peace, has been concluded. The knowledge of this event will, I think, prevent the supposed contest with Holkar, which after all, in the present state of the Company's power, could not have been considered more than a Polygar war. But to say the truth, I have always considered Holkar's power to depend upon his avoiding a contest with any of the British armies, and I believe that he has been of the same opinion: there are, therefore, good grounds for thinking

that we shall now have unqualified peace. Supposing that we should not, there are four or five armies ready to move upon him, and we should make a capital finishing of a Mahratta confederacy by destroying the chief who they say planned it, but who cautiously avoided activity in the execution of his own plans after the two other members had been destroyed.

I am in daily expectation of letters from Bengal, which will enable me to break up the army and to go down the coast. I shall not go to Cannanore, as I believe that I should have a worse business to get from thence into Koorg than I have had yet; but I shall land at Mangalore, from whence I will write to you.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1762.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman,

MY DEAR COLMAN,

Bombay, 29th March, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 26th. There is no intention to attack Loghur. I have concluded a treaty with the killadar, by which he is to surrender the fort; and I have ordered out the heavy guns only because I have made it a rule never to trust implicitly to the word of any Mahratta. If he should not deliver the fort on the 2nd of April, according to his agreement, I shall join the army myself to attack the fort, and you may do so likewise.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1763.]

To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.

MY DEAR SIR,

Bombay, 6th April, 1804.

I have received your letters of the 20th, and I enclose the copy of one which I have written to Major Kirkpatrick. I am sorry that Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder is not satisfied. Call to his recollection the fact that I told him that the Company were generally desirous to grant money pensions instead of land. In respect to the amount of his pension, I must say that I think him unreasonable. The amount is very large, and, in fact, much larger than that of the Rajah's vakeel, who has been at

Calcutta for above thirty years. It is impossible to estimate a man's hopes, and therefore the fair mode of proceeding in a case of this kind is to reward a service in the same manner as other services of a similar description have been rewarded. If this reward be considered in this manner, it will be found to be reasonable.

In respect to Ramchunder's being a servant of the Company, I should affront him if I considered him in that light, or if I were to hint that the reward was given because he had for a moment lost sight of his master's interests. On the contrary, I recommended that the reward should be given because he combined honesty and zeal for his master's service, with candour and a desire of peace and conciliation; and by that conduct he not only forwarded the interests of his master, but he facilitated the conclusion of the treaty of peace. Put this matter to him in a proper light, and I dare say that he will be satisfied.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton.

[1764.]

SIR,

Bombay, 8th April, 1804.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your several letters, in answer to my private letter of the 3rd March, in which I communicated to you a complaint of the conduct of Captain ———, which I had received from Rajah Mohiput Ram.

After a full consideration of the subject of that complaint, and of different letters which I have received from Captain ———, I have determined to bring that officer to trial before a court martial. Accordingly I have directed Captain Barclay to frame charges against him, founded upon the complaints of Rajah Mohiput Ram, and I have ordered that a general court martial may be assembled for Captain ———'s trial.

I have not thought it proper to include in the charges against Captain ——— any thing respecting the contribution levied at Burhampoor. First, because Rajah Mohiput Ram did not include that subject in his letter to me, containing his complaints against Captain ———; secondly, I had a conversation with Rajah Mohiput Ram upon the subject of the contri-

bution levied at Burhampoor, when the army was encamped in the neighbourhood of Ellichpoor, and the Rajah never hinted a complaint against Captain ———; thirdly, because I have reason to believe that Colonel Stevenson inquired into the circumstances which occurred at Burhampoor, and had no reason to be dissatisfied with the conduct of Captain ———; and fourthly and principally, because the matter of complaint, viz., that Captain ——— levied on Burhampoor one lac of rupees more than he carried to the public account, does not now admit of proof on either side; and the result of such a charge would be, that it could not be proved for want of evidence, at the same time that the character of Captain ——— would not be cleared by such a verdict of acquittal.

To enter into an inquiry before a court martial of a complaint under such circumstances would be extremely injurious to Captain ———, and prejudicial to his character, whatever may be the result of the other charges.

I recollect that in enumerating the amount levied upon Burhampoor, Rajah Mohiput Ram stated a quantity of grain, amounting, I believe, to the value of 30,000 rupees. I repeated to Colonel Stevenson the purport of the conversation which I had had with Rajah Mohiput Ram upon this subject in the presence of Captain ———; and Captain ———, as well as I recollect, said that the grain, which he allowed had been received, had been given to the brinjarries gratis.

If that should be the case, of course Captain ——— cannot be considered responsible for the value of it, and must not be prosecuted on this account; but, on the other hand, if the brinjarries should have paid for the grain which they received at Burhampoor, and which was levied from the inhabitants of the town, an additional crime must be given in against Captain ——— according to a form which is enclosed. (A.);

The mode of ascertaining this point respecting the grain and others connected with the brinjarries will be detailed in this letter.

I beg that Captain Colebrooke may attend the general court martial to prosecute Captain ———. You will instruct Captain Colebrooke to call upon Rajah Mohiput Ram and any other evidences that may be necessary to prove the charges brought forward against Captain ———; but he is not to allow Rajah Mohiput Ram to bring forward his complaints, of which he has no proof, respecting Captain ———'s conduct at Burhampoor;

and if Rajah Mohiput Ram should mention them to the court martial, Captain Colebrooke will explain to the court my reasons as above specified for desiring that a charge on this complaint might not be framed.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Captain ——, containing a statement of his accounts with the brinjarries, which proves that they are in his debt. At the same time the purport of the letter is, that they have some reason to complain that parts of their accounts have not been settled.

It will be necessary to have an inquiry into the whole of the brinjarry accounts, and I request you to appoint a committee to inquire into them, consisting of a field officer who understands the Native languages as president, and Captain Macintosh and the superintendent of bazaars as members.

Let this committee hear the complaints of the brinjarries, if they should have any, and Captain ——'s answers, and ascertain the real state of the account between them, which account must be closed to the end of this month.

You will observe that Captain —— says in his letter, of which the enclosed is a copy, that he has not paid the brinjarries the full price for certain rice received from them because the authority of government has not been received to make the issue of rice at a price lower than that at which it was received from Rajah Mohiput Ram. There is no occasion for waiting for that authority, and I request that the brinjarries may be paid the sum which it was settled by Colonel Stevenson they should receive for the rice from the commissary of grain and commissary of provisions respectively.

If the brinjarries should have any reason to complain excepting that alluded to in his own letter, for which he has accounted in a satisfactory manner, I beg that an additional crime accordingly may be framed and given in against him by the Deputy Adjutant-General of the subsidiary force.

This same committee of inquiry will ascertain and report whether the brinjarries paid for the grain they received at Burhampoor, which was levied on the inhabitants, or received it gratis, amounting to 3600 pullahs; whether they paid for the grain received at Mulcapoor of the value as stated by Rajah Mohiput Ram of 17,000 rupees, or that received at Hattee Andoorah of the value of 8000 rupees.

If the brinjarries should not have paid for those quantities of

grain respectively, it stands to reason that Captain —— cannot be charged with having withheld the money from Rajah Mohiput Ram ; if the brinjarries should have paid for this grain, the additional crime, marked (B.), must be given in against Captain ——.

During the time that Captain —— will be in arrest, it will be necessary that an officer should be appointed to take temporary charge of his appointment of superintendent of brinjarries. Accordingly I recommend that you should appoint the superintendent of bazaars to that charge.

You will also appoint an officer to take charge of his office of Persian interpreter, and another to take charge of the important departments held by Captain Goldsworthy and now superintended by Captain ——.

In future I recommend that the accounts with the brinjarries should be settled and closed, and the balances, if any be due to them, paid, and their receipts for the money taken regularly, when they will supply grain to the departments. When grain is taken from the Sircar, the Soubah's servants ought to be paid for it immediately, and their receipts taken for the money, and they ought not to depend upon the sale of the grain in the bazaar, or any contingent event.

When grain is received from the Sircar, it ought first to be carried to the Company's account in the grain department ; or if necessary to issue it to the brinjarries for carriage, it ought to be given to them under an order from the commanding officer to the commissary of grain, and an indent from the superintendent of brinjarries.

When this grain is issued to the brinjarries, it ought to stand in their accounts as so much money advanced to them, for which they ought to settle when they sell the grain either to the public departments or in the bazaar.

The superintendent of brinjarries ought then to give credit in his accounts with the public for the money received for this grain, stating in the account the date of the indent for the grain, when and from whom it was received.

In this manner the accounts of all the parties would be clear.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE IN LETTER OF 8TH APRIL, 1804.]

Lieutenant _____ of the 8th regiment N.I., put in arrest by order of the Hon. Major-General Wellesley, on the following charges, founded on complaints made by Rajah Mohiput Ram.

1st. For improper conduct in demanding money or presents from Rajah Mohiput Ram and other Sirdars in the service of His Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

2nd. For insulting those Sirdars when the money or presents have been refused.

3rd. For receiving money from certain Sirdars in the service of His Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.*

4th. For omitting to pay Rajah Mohiput Ram, or other officers of the Soubah of the Deccan, the money in his hands for grain issued for the use of the Company's troops at Pattun, at Dowlatabad, and at Aurungabad.

By order of the Hon. Major-Gen. Wellesley,

(Signed) R. BARCLAY,
Dep. Adj.-Gen. in Mysore, &c.

(A.) Additional charge to be given in against Captain _____ according to the result of the proceedings of a committee of inquiry.

1st. For omitting to carry to the public account or to pay Rajah Mohiput Ram the price of 3600 pullahs of grain levied from the inhabitants of Burhampoor and issued to the brinjarries, for which grain he took credit at the rate of † _____ in his accounts with the brinjarries.

(B.) For omitting to carry to the public account or to pay to Rajah Mohiput Ram the price of grain valued at 17,000 rupees received from Mulcapoor, and of grain valued at 8000 rupees received from Hattee Andoorah, issued to the brinjarries, and for which grain he took credit at the rate of † _____ in his accounts with the brinjarries, making the sum of † _____ for the grain received at Mulcapoor, and the sum of † _____ for the grain received at Hattee Andoorah.

Bombay, 9th April, 1804.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1765.]

SIR,

Bombay, 10th April, 1804.

I have the honour to enclose copies of the treaties concluded by Colonel Murray with the Rajahs of Lunawara and Sounte in Guzerat, and the copy of a letter from Colonel Murray, in which that officer describes particularly the persons who have

* *Third Charge against Lieut. _____*—"For receiving money or presents from Sirdars in the service of His Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, for services pretended to have been rendered to them." This was substituted for the third charge as originally drawn up, on the 1st May, 1804.

† Blank in manuscript.

given him assistance, whose safety and indemnity are provided for by the 10th Article of the treaty of peace. Besides these persons, the same Article provides for the safety of all the subjects of Dowlut Rao Scindiah who may have assisted the British government during the war.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1766.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

MY DEAR COLMAN,

Bombay, 11th April, 1804.

I wish that it were as easy to grant as it is to suggest such an arrangement as that which you have proposed, but unfortunately those who have power in their hands are by the innumerable arrangements of the world responsible for the exercise of it, and cannot authorise the issue of the public money as it suits their own convenience or the wishes of their friends. The expression of a wish that such an arrangement should be made, therefore, always occasions an explanation of their circumstances, or a direct refusal; and I acknowledge that I should be well pleased to be able to avoid either.

The orders which I received from the Governor-General were to establish the subsidiary force and appoint the commanding officer as soon as I should have made the arrangements which should enable me to break up the army. Possibly I have anticipated the time at which I ought to have established the subsidiary force under those orders; at all events I should anticipate them if I were to appoint you to receive the salary of the commanding officer for above a year before that time. That reason for omitting to attend to your wishes will be sufficient; but I have others which, as that is sufficient, it is not necessary to give.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1767.]

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Bombay, 12th April, 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 10th, and I rejoice to find that Colonel Close is so well. I think it probable that he

will be able to work through the season ; but he ought to go to Europe before the return of the next winter.

I don't understand the meaning of Scindiah's recognition of the treaties made with the feudatories. The 9th article of the treaty of peace says that those treaties are to be confirmed, and the persons with whom they have been made are to be independent of Scindiah's authority, and that lists of the persons with whom the treaties have been made are to be delivered to Scindiah. The treaty of peace renders them independent of his government and authority, which is all that we can require. To ask for a recognition of the treaties will only occasion a discussion on the subject, on which none is necessary, and this discussion must do mischief and occasion doubts regarding the meaning of the treaty.

I can easily see, however, for what purpose the recognition is required, viz., to afford a ground for the claim of Scindiah's country.

From the last letters from Hindustan, I judge that a few days will decide the course which Holkar would take. He was at Ajmeer with some cavalry, and the body of his army and his baggage at some distance in his rear. It was supposed that if he should return to join his army, he would have relinquished his plan of invading the countries dependent upon Delhi. I shall break up as soon as I find that to be the case.

I have received a letter from Kirkpatrick, from which I learn that the minister at Hyderabad justifies the conduct of the Soubah's servants in Berar, and demands that the Rajah should not be permitted to keep troops in the countries ceded under the 5th article of the treaty of peace, upon which subject the treaty is silent. The minister is also disinclined to allow the Rajah's ministers and servants to retain their jaghires in Berar, which amount to about 15,000 rupees annually, and respecting which I had made an earnest request. In short, everything proves to me that a man who negotiates a peace in this country ought to have the power to carry it into execution, or that he does more injury than benefit, and loses his character as well as his time.

Affairs appear to be going on very badly indeed at Madras. Matters here are just as usual. We have frequent alarms from Malabar Point,* but no overland despatch.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

* The signal station for ships approaching Bombay harbour.

[1768.]

To the Secretary of the Commander-in-Chief.

SIR,

Bombay, 14th April, 1804.

I have the honour to enclose the accounts of expenses incurred in the months of December, 1803, and January, 1804, for which no provision is made by the regulations of government.

The different heads of expense require no explanation, or are explained in the bills accompanying the abstracts, excepting that of 1500 rupees charged in the account of January as paid to Ghazy Khan.

This person is a freebooter who resides in the mountainous tracts between the river Godavery and the province of Berar; his principal occupation is robbery; he plundered indiscriminately the territories of the Rajah of Berar and the Soubah of the Deccan, but principally the former, and he levied contributions from the inhabitants, under pretence of protecting them from robbers, but in reality as the price of his own forbearance.

When I marched into Berar in November I was obliged to pass through the countries which Ghazy Khan inhabited; and it was very obvious that I should lose my communication with the rear unless I should leave a force in those countries, or I should pay Ghazy Khan to protect my convoys, post runners, &c. &c., who would be obliged to follow me, or, in other words, to refrain from plundering them. I determined upon the latter mode as the most convenient at the time, and the most likely to be effectual; and accordingly, having had an interview with Ghazy Khan, I promised to give him 3000 rupees *per mensem* as long as I should use that road for my communication, provided my people received no injury. I gave him 1500 rupees immediately, which is the sum charged in January; but having found that about one month after I had passed through the country my post runners were driven off and the communication was interrupted, I gave Ghazy Khan notice that I should discontinue the payment of his allowance after the first month, and I desired him to send for the second 1500 rupees due to him. He has never sent for this sum, and the only charge is for the 1500 rupees first advanced.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.

[1769.]

SIR,

Bombay, 17th April, 1804.

I enclose a memorandum which I have received from a man who was very useful to Colonel Stevenson and me at the siege of Gawilghur. I do not think that it will be necessary to communicate this memorandum to the Rajah's ministers; but you will act upon that point as you may think proper: I wish you, however, to hint to them that, having protected the Rajah's servants and adherents in Berar, I expect that he will not injure any persons from whom I may have received services during the war.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

[1770.]

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Bombay, 20th April, 1804.

Malcolm's letter of the 14th is certainly very important; but I by no means think the question of peace or war decided. It will depend upon Holkar's conduct when he will find that General Lake has moved. The General's intention not to quit Hindustan, and not to follow Holkar, will be fatal. He ought to leave a corps in Hindustan for its security, and move with a light body in pursuit of Holkar, whose force will fritter away daily, whether he retreats after fighting or without fighting. If he should not pursue Holkar, the war will immediately become defensive on our part in the most important quarter, and by such operations we must lose.

Colonel Murray's offensive operations must be feeble in comparison with those of the Commander-in-Chief; indeed, I don't think that he can venture far from the Myhie. No progress, then, will be made in the war till I can reach the countries north of Ougein; and supposing it to be safe for me to quit the Deccan with any formidable corps of troops, I am almost certain that I shall not have it in my power to collect a sufficient quantity of provisions to subsist the troops till they would arrive in communication with the stores of Guzerat. At all events, months must elapse before I could reach those countries; and I really think

that if General Lake should push Holkar vigorously, the war ought not to last a fortnight.

If General Lake should not be sufficiently strong to carry on the war in this manner, he ought to delay its commencement till he can be reinforced, or till Scindiah's subsidiary force can be arranged. I return all your letters.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1771.]

To Captain Wilks.

MY DEAR SIR,

Bombay, 21st April, 1804.

I have received your letters of the 10th and 12th of April. I was obliged to draw the troops to the neighbourhood of Poonah for the purpose of inducing the killadar of Loghur to give up his fort; and as forage and grain are dearer at Poonah than in other parts of the country, I desired Bistnapah Pundit to draw off towards the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, where both, although not plentiful, were less dear than at Poonah. The fact is that the country is famished, and Bistnapah can go to no place in which he will find plenty; and he has full authority to go to whatever place will be most likely to supply his wants.

I certainly shall not quit the country till I can break up the army, and when I break up the army Bistnapah shall go to Mysore; but I cannot now send him across the Kistna, as that would be, in fact, to send him to his own country.

I will take care that the Mysore horse shall have their hay, and I will write to Bistnapah about his difficulties. I am rather induced to hope, however, that they do not now exist to the degree in which they did in the end of March, when Bistnapah marched towards Poonah with the army, the complaints of which difficulties at that time induced me to order him to return towards the Nizam's frontier.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1772.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Bombay, 21st April, 1804.

My public letter of the 8th instant will have made you

acquainted with my sentiments regarding the mode to be adopted to settle the brinjarry accounts. If the result of the inquiry should be, or if you are already convinced, that Captain ——— owes the brinjarries the sum stated in your letter of the 11th, you ought to call upon him to pay the money immediately, and to take measures to make him pay it; but if you are not already quite certain that he owes the money, if there is any difference of account between Captain ——— and the brinjarries, and if he has any thing to say upon the subject, it will be necessary that the commission should hear it, and by a full examination into the whole subject throw every light that is possible upon the difference of account, and upon Captain ———'s statement.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1773.]

SIR,

Bombay, 22nd April, 1804.

I have the honour to inform you that a Frenchman, by name Pierre Damois, has arrived here this day with a note to myself, and the enclosed passport from the Resident at Poonah. He has served several of the Mahratta chiefs and states, Prittee Niddee in the last instance; and he has quitted the service of that chief to throw himself under the protection of the British government. He was a lieutenant in the service of Prittee Niddee, and received 300 rupees *per mensem*.

I imagine that he cannot be considered to be entitled to the benefit of the proclamation of his Excellency the Governor-General of the 29th August last; and I therefore beg leave to recommend that you should give orders that he may receive such a provision as is allowed by the regulations of your government to a prisoner of war, till an opportunity shall occur of sending him to Bengal.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1774.]

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

I enclose a letter which I beg you to peruse and forward. I think it very desirable, and entirely consistent with the policy which we have adopted at Scindiah's durbar, to express our disapprobation upon the reduction of the power of the great chiefs, particularly of those who are our pensioners. You might write upon that subject to the Governor-General.

I have always held the same opinion about Cashee Rao Holkar. He is an infamous blackguard, despised by everybody, full of prejudices, hatred, and revenge, and without one adherent or even a follower. By adopting his cause we shall burthen ourselves with the defence and support of another weak and helpless power, we shall disgust Scindiah's government, and we shall not give satisfaction to the followers and adherents of the Holkar family. The act will be abstractedly generous; but considering that Cashee Rao was concerned in the murder of his brother, it will be to support usurpation founded on murder, and, for the reasons I have above mentioned, highly impolitic.

The question ought to be decided at the same time that the Governor-General decides that he will go into the war, and I must, of course, write to him about it; but you ought to write likewise.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1775.]

To Lieutenant-General Lake.

SIR,

Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

It is with great reluctance that, at a time like the present, I trouble you upon a subject relating only to myself; but I hope that the extraordinary circumstances which have induced me to trouble you will be my excuse.

Above a year and a half have now elapsed since my promotion to the rank of Major-General was announced in India, and since Lieutenant-General Stuart, unsolicited by me, in a manner most gratifying to my feelings, recommended to the government of Fort St. George that I should be appointed to the staff of that Presidency. Since that period accounts have reached England

that I had been appointed to the staff in the manner to which I have above alluded, and that I had the command of a body of troops employed in this country. From recent appointments made, I judge that the staff in India must have been under discussion lately, and that my appointment must have drawn the attention of His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, and of His Majesty; but I find that no confirmation has been made or notice taken of this appointment.

Under these circumstances, however flattering in other respects, it has become of an ambiguous nature: there is reason to doubt whether it meets with the approbation of His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief; and it is not impossible but that His Royal Highness may appoint another officer to the situation which I fill; and, at all events, I do not conceive it to be creditable, and I am not desirous, to remain in a military situation in His Majesty's service, my appointment to which has not been approved by His Royal Highness and by His Majesty. I am therefore upon the whole very anxious to return to Europe; and I have to request your Excellency's permission to do so. If I should obtain it, I propose to resign the appointments which I hold under the government of Fort St. George, when an opportunity shall offer for my return.*

Upon the occasion of making this request, I beg to assure your Excellency that, in case you should grant it, I do not intend to avail myself of your leave as long as I can be of the smallest service to your Excellency's operations, or as I can forward the objects of the Governor-General's policy in this country; unless I shall find an officer has actually been appointed to fill the situation which I hold upon the staff.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain ———.

[1776.]

DEAR SIR,

Bombay, 24th April, 1804.

I have received all your letters to that of the 13th instant, in which you complain that I have not acknowledged the receipt of them.

* See Lieut.-Gen. Lake's reply, dated 12th May 1804 (Gurwood, p. 1153).

When Rajah Mohiput Ram made a complaint to me of your conduct, I acted exactly in the manner in which I should wish to be treated had a similar complaint been made of me. I referred the complaint again to Rajah Mohiput Ram for his consideration. I pointed out to him the danger of making unfounded complaints, but I told him that if he should persist in making this complaint, it should be inquired into. I also desired that if Rajah Mohiput Ram should persist in making his complaint, it should be communicated to you with the letter which I had written to Colonel Haliburton on the subject, in order that you might have an opportunity of writing what you had to say to explain the ground of complaint, and thus possibly preclude the necessity of inquiry.

In answer to this reference Rajah Mohiput Ram persisted in making the complaints, and declared that he had laid them before the ministers of the Soubahdar of the Deccan: on the other hand, although I don't mean to draw any conclusions from your explanations, they were certainly not satisfactory; they could not exculpate you in the eyes of the army, and could afford me no grounds for omitting to order that you might be brought to trial. As you have been much employed by Colonel Stevenson, and as I have employed you myself, it is not to be supposed but that the credit of both is much implicated in the event of your trial; but still that trial could not be refused, under all the circumstances of the case, without everlasting disgrace both to you and myself.

In respect to my answering your letters, I have to observe to you in the first place that your letters required no answer; and in the next, my correspondence with you, in the situation in which you were placed by the complaints of Rajah Mohiput Ram, would not have appeared very proper in the eyes of any man, but particularly in the eyes of the natives would have appeared entirely inconsistent with every known principle of justice. To avoid making these impressions even by this letter I send it to Colonel Haliburton, who will deliver it to you.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton.

[1777.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Bombay, 24th April, 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 3rd instant.

My public letter of the 8th instant points out the only practicable mode of settling your brinjarry accounts. It will take time possibly, but that cannot be helped. I don't think it will answer to frame another charge against Captain ———, founded upon the delay in the settlement of the accounts. He will urge that the delay was ordered by Colonel Stevenson, and we have no mode of disproving his assertion.

I do not found my opinion regarding the nature of Captain ———'s transactions with the brinjarries on the fact that their grain was kept under our guards, and that it was sold only under orders from Captain ———. The brinjarries were such notorious rascals that there is no other mode of insuring any supply from them; and after all, that which they afford is not very large. I have 10,000 bags of rice at Ahmednuggur. If you should want any of that grain, send your bullocks for it, and let me know the quantity, that I may order the issue of it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace.

[1778.]

SIR,

Bombay, 29th April, 1804.

Having adverted to the state in which the troops composing the division of the army under my command are for want of clothing, and to the advanced state of the season, which renders it very improbable that their clothing can arrive from Madras before the rainy monsoon will set in, I have determined to adopt immediate measures to provide against the evils which would be the consequence of the want of clothing for the troops at such a season. Accordingly I have indented for the quantities and description of cloth contained in the enclosed return, which is now on its way to the army, and I proceed to give you directions regarding its disposal.

It is supposed that one yard of cloth or two yards of perpet will make a jacket for each man of the description of which a pattern will reach you in a day or two.

The cloth on its arrival in camp must be thrown into the department of the commissary of stores, and must be issued by indents countersigned by you, at the rate of a yard of auroca for each havildar, and a yard of broad cloth or two yards of perpet for each naig and private sepoy. The non-commissioned officers of pioneers and gun lascars must have the same as privates.

After having received the cloth from the stores the commanding officers of corps will be so kind as to have it cut out according to the pattern which will be sent up, and they will employ the most effectual means to have the jackets made up before the rains will set in. The cloth, when cut up, must be issued to the sepoy, who must take care of it, and they might themselves sew it together in the first instance; and the commanding officers might in the course of time employ tailors to sew the jackets in a proper manner. According to this mode of proceeding it may be expected that the troops will be clothed before the rains will set in.

The buttons on the old clothing are to be transferred to the jackets now ordered to be made.

The expense which the commanding officers will incur in making up the jackets will be defrayed, but I must request that they will pay particular attention that it shall be as small as may be possible; and I particularly desire that no alteration whatever may be permitted from the pattern sent up.

The 2nd of the 3rd, and the 2nd of the 18th, are the two corps which are to have the perpet clothing.

You will forward the perpet to them, and the cloth, with directions respecting the manner in which it is to be issued, to the 2nd of the 12th at Poonah.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Abstract of Cloth required.

	Yards.
Blue, coarse, for gun lascars	253
Red, for Native infantry havildars	388
40 bales, 5200 yards, red, coarse, sepoy's	} .. 6621
2842 yards of perpet	
Green, for pioneers	727

To the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

[1779.]

SIR,

Bombay, 7th May, 1804.

You will have received copies of the letters from his Excellency the Governor-General, addressed to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and myself, containing directions that hostilities should be commenced against Jeswunt Rao Holkar. I propose to join the army immediately, and to do everything I can to destroy the power and resources of that chief in the Deccan; and I have the honour to enclose a copy of the instructions which I have sent to Colonel Murray.

I beg you to be so kind as to forward a copy of this paper to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and to give me such information of his Excellency's plans as you may be able to afford.

I beg you also to endeavour to communicate with Colonel Murray, and to prevail upon Scindiah's ministers to send to the Colonel a person who will have full powers to draw forth the resources of the country in proportion as the Colonel may have occasion to call for them, and to take possession of such of Holkar's districts in Malwa as Colonel Murray may think proper to give over to his charge. It will be right, however, that this person should be particularly instructed to avoid interfering with Colonel Murray's arrangements in any districts which the Colonel should not deliver over to his charge.

You will observe, by the enclosed instructions, that I have desired Colonel Murray to endeavour eventually to join Scindiah's army. I do not know of what that army consists, or where it is situated; but although I have no doubt that Holkar's strength will fritter away as soon as he will be pressed by the Commander-in-Chief, I conceive that it would be desirable that Scindiah's army should be reinforced by a body of British troops. It would be most desirable if that body were distinct from that under the command of Colonel Murray, as more numerous means of annoying Holkar would thereby be afforded; but even under present arrangements I think that the war cannot last very long.

I request you to urge the durbar to have in readiness at Ougein four iron guns, 18 or 24-pounders, with 500 rounds of powder and shot for each, in case Colonel Murray should have occasion to call for that assistance.

I beg leave to suggest to you to urge Scindiah's ministers to attack Chooly Myhissur on the Nerbudda, and Indore, without loss of time. I imagine that they will be able to get possession of these places without difficulty. They will observe the liberal manner in which his Excellency the Governor-General proposes to dispose of Holkar's possessions, supposing them to be conquered, and they will, of course, exert themselves to bring the war to a speedy and honourable conclusion.

In communicating with Scindiah's ministers on the subject of the disposal of Holkar's possessions, I beg you to take care not to give them any hopes that Scindiah will have UMBER. This place is situated north of the Godavery, between that river, Aurungabad, and Jalnapoor. It is in the midst of the possessions of the Soubah of the Deccan, by whose father I think that it was ceded to the Mahrattas at the peace of Kurdlah. I imagine that the Governor-General could not have adverted to its situation when he wrote to you on the 16th of April.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1780.] *To the Secretary of Government, Military Department, Fort William.*

SIR,

Bombay, 7th May, 1804.

I have had the honour of receiving your letters of the 12th and 16th of April, and I shall proceed immediately to carry into execution the orders of his Excellency the Governor-General. I am much gratified by the approbation of his Excellency the Governor-General of the measure of levying a contribution upon the city of Burhampoor. I always considered that I was fully justified in using the advantages which the bravery of the troops had put into my hands to increase the resources applicable to the purposes of the war, and to diminish those of the enemy.

To restore the money levied upon the inhabitants of Burhampoor would be a measure of generosity and of good policy, if it were practicable; and as the restoration has been preceded by the approbation of government of the measure of levying the contribution, it would not afford ground for belief among the Natives that the conduct of the officers who authorised and levied it had been disapproved of by his Excellency. But

it is not known from whom the money was taken ; and supposing that any measure could be devised by which it could be restored to the original proprietors, I doubt whether Dowlut Rao Scindiah would not immediately deprive them of it. However, his Excellency the Governor-General must be the best judge upon this subject, and I request to have his orders.

The money levied at Burhampoor has been applied to the payment of the troops.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton.

[1781.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Bombay, 7th May, 1804.

The boats on the Godavery, five or six in number, are, I believe, at Goondy, on that river, below Rackisbaum ; it would be very desirable to have them repaired at an early period, and I request you to speak on the subject to Rajah Mohiput Ram, and tell him that I rely upon him to have this work done.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.

[1782.]

MY DEAR HENRY,

Bombay, 13th May, 1804.

I have been detained here ever since I wrote to you by Houghton, by the want of the Governor-General's answers upon a variety of points which I had referred to him at different times, and by the chance which I saw that the result of General Lake's discussions with Holkar would be the necessity of attacking that chief. Accordingly I have within these few days received the Governor-General's order to attack the possessions of Holkar in the Deccan, while General Lake will attack him in Hindostan ; and I propose to join the army which is now encamped between this place and Poonah in the course of very few days.

There is at present a famine in the Deccan, which, in my

opinion, will destroy half of the inhabitants. It is occasioned in part by the operations of the Mahratta armies for the last ten years, particularly by those of Holkar in the year 1802; in part by the operations of the Mahratta armies in the war, and in part by the want of rain in the last season, and by the want of arrangement and energy in the government of the Peshwah. But whatever may be its cause, I fear that it will prevent me from commencing my operations till a late period in the rainy season, when I may expect that the new grass and new crops of grain will afford some forage. In the mean time it is my opinion that if General Lake attacks Holkar with vigour, and pursues him with activity and perseverance, and above all, if Scindiah should co-operate heartily in the war, it will not last a fortnight. Holkar's power is like that of the band of freebooters whom I destroyed in the month of February last: it cannot stand a defeat of his army; and the pursuit after the defeat will make it crumble away to nothing.

Scindiah's government, although it has concluded the defensive alliance, is not satisfied with us; and the misfortune is that, between ourselves, I think we are in the wrong. The difference relates to the fort of Gwalior, which Scindiah thinks ought to belong to him, and the Governor-General will not give it up. I differ in opinion with the Governor-General both as to the right and policy of keeping this fort: I have delivered my opinion to him regarding the latter, but have said nothing upon the former, as the question turns upon a nice point of the law of nations, which the Governor-General has argued with his usual ingenuity; but I acknowledge I differ from him entirely.

I could not make you understand this subject without writing a volume, and you will probably see the papers upon it very shortly after you will receive this letter. All I can say is, that I am convinced, and so is Malcolm, that we should have renewed the war upon this point if the Governor-General had not determined to give Scindiah the whole of the Holkar possessions; and this concession will probably reconcile Scindiah's mind to the disappointment respecting Gwalior.

If Scindiah should not be satisfied, and should take advantage of the state of our affairs with Holkar to attack us again, the Rajah of Berar, who is equally dissatisfied, will likewise enter into the war. He also is not satisfied with the manner in

which the treaty of peace has been carried into execution. The Nizam's government have pressed upon him most powerfully, and I think that the Governor-General has not treated him with liberality. I promised that the tenth article of the treaty of peace should not be applied in any instance in which it was not necessary for the preservation of the Company's faith; and I reported this promise to the Governor-General in the letter which accompanied the treaty, and in the minute of the conferences in the negotiation. The Rajah has been called upon to confirm, under the tenth article of the treaty of peace, verbal offers (I may call them) which were scarcely accepted, and on which treaties were not concluded till ten days after Colonel Harcourt had received from Calcutta the intelligence of the peace, and nearly twenty days after he had received private intelligence of it from me. After all, the treaties were not concluded with the real feudatories, who were in confinement at Nagpoor, but with their ministers in some instances, and their wives in others. The Governor-General makes an ingenious argument to show that a verbal agreement is equally binding with a treaty, which verbal agreement, by the bye, was never made; but supposing it had been made, let it be recollected that after I had signed a treaty of peace with an authorized vakeel of the Rajah of Berar, I refused to stop the operations: on the contrary, I continued my march towards Nagpoor till the treaty was ratified by this very Rajah of Berar, who is now told that verbal agreements must be considered as binding upon the British government.

From all this statement you will observe that the system of moderation and conciliation by which, whether it be right or wrong, I made the treaties of peace, and which has been so highly approved and extolled, is now given up. Our enemies are much disgusted, and complain loudly of our conduct and want of faith; and in truth I consider the peace to be by no means secure.

However, the Governor-General is sincere in his notions upon these subjects. He considers his decisions to be strictly correct, and he has offered compensation to the Rajah of Berar, and, as I have above told you, has adopted measures which will possibly conciliate Scindiah. But still we are all shaking again: the public interests may again be exposed to the risk of a battle, which we might have avoided by a smaller portion of ingenuity.

In fact, my dear Henry, - we want at Calcutta some person who will speak his mind to the Governor-General. Since you and Malcolm have left him, there is nobody about him with capacity to understand these subjects, who has nerves to discuss them with him, and to oppose his sentiments when he is wrong. There cannot be a stronger proof of this want than the fact that Malcolm, and I, and General Lake, and Mercer, and Webbe, were of opinion that we had lost Gwalior with the treaty of peace.

I wish you to consider all that I have written to you upon this subject as entirely between ourselves. I mention it to you only that you may know the real state of the case if the war should be renewed: however, I now think it possible that it will not.

There is nothing new in India. The Admiral writes to Mr. Duncan that the French and Dutch squadrons, both of which are at Batavia, are superior in strength to his squadron.

In my opinion the Governor-General has no intention of going home in January. I form this opinion from the perusal of a letter which he wrote to the Court of Directors in March, after he had received the letters from Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Addington, and you, dated the 9th of September. I am determined to go as soon as I can; certainly in October, if the war with Holkar should be concluded. Indeed I have already applied for leave.

I have got some prize money, but I don't know yet how much.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1783.]

To Lieutenant-General Nicholls.

SIR,

Bombay, 16th May, 1804.

In the course of the service which I have conducted I have had particular reason to be satisfied with the conduct of Captain Spens and Captain Johnson, both officers of the Bombay establishment, whom I beg leave to recommend to your favour and protection. The former had charge of the depôt formed at Poonah, the intricate business of which he conducted in a most satisfactory manner; the latter had the charge of the guide

department with the army, in which office, as well as in his office as engineer, he gave me such complete satisfaction, that I have repeatedly reported my sense of his conduct to his Excellency the Governor-General, and have appointed him the Deputy Quartermaster-General of the subsidiary force to be stationed at Poonah.

I have already taken the liberty of explaining to you the objects of Captain Spens in the service. Captain Johnson commands the corps of Bombay Pioneers which is stationed in Malabar, and I beg leave to express a hope that he will not be deprived of this situation in consequence of his appointment at Poonah.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1784.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Cundolla, 19th May, 1804.

I return the paper respecting the staff of the Bombay army, and I have no doubt of the subject.

The orders of the Court of Directors, in respect to General Nicholls's appointment to Council, are dated in June, at which time they could not have known that General Nicholson had resigned. Those orders, therefore, ought to be considered in reference to the state of the case which the Court of Directors had before them, *viz.* one major-general on the staff besides Major-General Nicholls; and the meaning affixed to them ought to be that no King's major-general should be appointed to the staff in consequence of General Nicholls's promotion, or no Company's major-general, supposing that there should be no officer of that rank in the King's service in India. But they cannot be supposed to mean that General Nicholls, who has under his command now a larger body of men than General Stuart had before the Mysore war, should have no assistance, or that in time of war the government of Bombay should not have even a peace establishment of major-generals.

In respect to the order of the* March, 1802, about filling up vacancies, you will observe that it is preceded by a positive approval of the conduct of government in appointing General

* Blank in manuscript.

Nicholson to the staff under circumstances nearly similar, excepting that the army of Bombay at that time consisted only of the garrisons of Bombay and Surat, and that at present it is really respectable, and is likely every day to become of more importance.

Exclusive of my desire to be active in assisting General Jones's views, after having been so frequently the passive instrument of doing him an injury, I am really of opinion that there ought to be a major-general under General Nicholls. At present it might possibly be inconvenient to move him to the northward, but he would be highly useful to General Nicholls on the island of Bombay in superintending the discipline of the troops, and in many details and out-of-door duties to which a man in General Nicholls's situation cannot attend.

Supposing that the public grounds to which I have above alluded are not deemed sufficiently strong to induce you to make the appointment, General Jones's private claims are certainly the strongest that I have met with. I object in general to the system of founding public measures on private claims or convenience; but still these, particularly in this country, must have their weight; and I am not quite certain whether, in the eyes of those who are to judge of public measures in India, they do not appear the most justifiable motives for public conduct. General Jones's letters give proofs of great grievances which certainly deserve redress; but when to all these is added the late regulations regarding the off-reckonings, which preclude all hope of his commanding the artillery till General Bellasis will be in his grave, or will have been removed to the retired list, a body of grievance and claim is made out, such as I have seldom seen produced by any one of them.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1785.]

To Major Symons.

MY DEAR SYMONS,

Camp at Panowullah, 22nd May, 1804.

I return herewith the proceedings in your inquiry into the charges against the daroga of the mausoleum.

This person, as well as all those belonging to the mosques in the fort and to the mausoleum, are under the civil authority,

whether of you or me is a matter of little consequence, as in either case I must trouble you to have an eye upon them.

The first thing to provide for is, that all the persons for whom pay is given by the public are actually employed and regularly paid; the next, that they do the duty required from them. I think it very doubtful whether they ought to get a part of the provisions provided at the expense of the public for charity: upon this point you might inquire what was the state of the case in the time of the Sultaun; and if you should find that they got the provisions, they must be continued; if they did not get them, you must decide whether they shall receive them now, adverting, in the consideration which you will give to this question, to the difference in the price which every man can get for his labour at Seringapatam at present, and to the probability that if you strike off the provisions, you will have no attendants at the mausoleum.

In respect to the provisions, I, who made the arrangement, think that the quantity set down was the utmost quantity that it was ever intended should be delivered daily in charity; and the price set against each denomination was not the amount intended to be laid out on each description of provisions daily, but the amount which the quantity of each description would cost in the bazaar at the time the arrangement was made. Under these circumstances the allowance of money ought to be reduced, since the price of provisions has fallen to such a degree at Seringapatam. However, that would be an ungenerous act, particularly as the total expense is so small. I am therefore of opinion that you ought to settle once a month the quantity of each description of provisions to be delivered daily at the mausoleum, according to the general price of provisions in the bazaar, and the allowance received from the paymaster; and the daroga ought to settle his account in the Cutchery of the provisions purchased and issued once a month. I wish you to consider whether it is desirable to increase to any great numbers those fed by this public charity, and whether it would not be desirable at cheap times to lay aside a part of the money, and lodge it in the court, for the purpose of being able to purchase more, and feed a larger number of people in times of scarcity and dearth.

In respect to the feasts, the money allotted for them stands upon precisely the same grounds. It ought to be faithfully

laid out for the purposes intended ; and the provisions ought to be distributed in due proportions to the persons for whom they are provided. I will request you also to inquire into these subjects, and communicate with Mr. Gordon regarding them ; he will show you the papers he received from me, and every thing which can throw light upon them.

I joined the army this day.

Believe me, &c,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1786.]

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Camp at Panowullah, 23rd May, 1804.

I joined the army yesterday, and I have some hopes that I shall be able to move at an early period in the rains. I have clothed, armed, and equipped the troops. The Europeans have new tents, and the carriages are better than ever they were. If I should find that there is any forage upon any road, I will march, and the accounts which I have received give me some hopes ; but still I must wait till the rains for water.

I have no doubt but that Holkar intends to attack Bappojee Scindiah, particularly if General Lake should omit to press him with activity. Bappojee must move towards Colonel Murray, unless he should see a fair opening to join General Lake. In that case he ought to join General Lake, as he has desired it ; if he had not, I should think it a better plan for Bappojee Scindiah to join, or at least to cooperate, with Colonel Murray.

The Colonel received my letter on the 13th, and was likely to move immediately. There were some little embarrassments about money, of the nature of those which are common to everybody ; but I think that they will have been got over in the same manner as they are elsewhere, by shifting the difficulties to some other quarter, by drawing a bill. I have written to Murray three times to draw his attention towards Ougein, and yesterday, in particular, I desired him to move to that quarter.

Let Scindiah purchase the heavy guns ; they will certainly be of some use. There will be no necessity for moving them till Colonel Murray will call for them.

Shawe's letter to Malcolm has distressed me much, but not so much as one I received from Edmonstone, of the 2nd, enclosing

a copy of a letter to you and notes upon Malcolm's letters, dated the 30th April. There is a want of firmness in the arguments in those notes which has quite astonished me, and shows how far a man will go when he has determined to push to extremity a particular object; besides that, they contain insinuations against Malcolm's integrity, which are highly unjustifiable. If he should have seen them, they will distress him beyond measure, and I hope that you will not have shown them to him in the state of health in which he was, although I cannot see the manner in which you can have kept them from him. If he should have seen them, tell him that he is at full liberty to make use of my letter to him of the 18th April, in which I declined to authorize him to give up the forts of Asseerghur, &c., till he should receive notification from General Lake that Hindustan was evacuated.

I am afraid that I have been the means of placing you in a situation in which you will pass but an unpleasant time. It is impossible for you to stop the mouths of Scindiah's ministers: they will discuss public questions, and in their own manner; but that manner gives offence, and will be the constant source of dispute and ill temper. I therefore recommend you to avoid detailing the discussions in your despatches. The general line of reasoning adopted by either party, and the result of a discussion, is all that can be necessary; and to state more, excepting upon a very extraordinary occasion, will only do mischief.

I have received a letter from Scindiah upon the subject of Gohud and Gwalior, to which I have written an answer, which I have given to Goorparah. I enclose the English draft and a copy of the answer. From what Goorparah said, I think that this letter will settle the question. In the argument yesterday, which followed the perusal of the letter, they gave up Gohud and Gwalior, and continued to dispute on the ground of other districts which Ambajee had ceded, and which we had made over to the Ranah. I told them that I could not go into details, as I had no information; that the decision upon every such district depended upon two points: 1st, was it to the southward of the territories of the Ranah; 2nd, had it been Scindiah's, or Serinjaumy? In summing up the result of the discussions I observed to them that they had given up Gohud and Gwalior, and directed their arguments entirely to the possession of other districts; to which they answered in the usual style, that they

had done so because it was my pleasure. But the fact is, that they had nothing to answer.

I pressed them to discontinue their angry discussions, to advise Scindiah from me to bring this question to a close by confirming the treaties, and afterwards to enter into a confidential communication with you on the state of his affairs in general. The Governor-General may write what he pleases at Calcutta; we must conciliate the natives, or we shall not be able to do his business; and all his treaties, without conciliation and an endeavour to convince the Native powers that we have views besides our own interests, are so much waste paper.

Let me hear from you frequently. I have not written to you lately, as I had nothing to tell you. I was feasted out of Bombay, as I was feasted into it. I learn from General Stuart that Sir John Cradock is appointed his successor. He was to leave England in May, and I understand from General Stuart's letter that he was to wait for him.

I will send the Governor-General a copy of my letter to Scindiah.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Open any letters for me that may pass you.

[1787.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Panowullah, 23rd May, 1804.

I received last night your letters of the 20th, and this morning that of the 21st.

In respect to General Bellasis, it is my opinion that General Nicholls has mistaken the question. In the first place the commanding officer of the artillery at each of the Presidencies in India has not only a regimental charge in consequence of this appointment; he is at the head of the Ordnance department; returns of ordnance from all parts are made to him, and he is particularly the superintendent of the great arsenal at the Presidency.

Secondly, this charge, which by-the-bye might be assimilated to that of the Master-General in England, is not deemed unworthy of the attention of a major-general, even although he is not on the staff. General Dease in Bengal commanded the

artillery when he was not on the staff, as did General Sydenham, General Giels, and General Smith at Fort St. George at different times. General Sydenham was specially appointed to the command of the artillery at Madras by a General Order, by which he was removed from the office of auditor-general to enable him to hold and do the duty of this important command.

Thirdly, you have been mistaken at Bombay in supposing that the general rule that general officers should not exercise regimental command applied to general officers of the artillery.

I have above shown the duties of the commanding officer of the artillery, and what is the practice at the other Presidencies; and I enclose an extract from the regulations of 1796, which show that the Court of Directors contemplated the possibility that a general officer not on the staff might command the artillery, and that they provided for that event.

Fourthly, I have to observe that it is a matter of immaterial consequence whether the general officer commanding the artillery, not on the staff, is senior or junior to those who are on the staff. The officer commanding the artillery has special duties to perform under the regulations of government, and no others. As a general officer he exercises, and can exercise, no command whatever. A general officer on the staff is one selected by government to exercise a command, either general or particular, over certain portions of the army; it is not probable that such a one would have anything to say to the duties of the commanding officer of the artillery; and if he should have the rank of general officer as the commanding officer of artillery is nothing, excepting it should be called into action by the special authority of government by an appointment to the staff. The commanding officer of the artillery must obey in this instance, as well as every other officer over whom such officer on the staff will have been directed by government to exercise a command.

These principles are clear; they guide the service under every government, and are frequently applied in Europe in the cases of governors of garrisons being senior officers to those on the staff in the districts in which the garrisons are situated; and there is a famous decision on the subject in the case of the Duke of Richmond, who claimed no rank as a general, or command in a camp in which he was doing duty as a colonel of the Sussex militia.

Fifthly, the late orders from the Court of Directors do not

alter the question at all respecting general officers being colonels of regiments. They leave these officers as they were before; and at all events, supposing that they did alter the situation of those officers, they could not be construed to apply to the commanding officer of the artillery being a general officer, the duties of that officer being, as I observed in the first instance, so important, and the Court having by their orders of 1796, which are unsuspended, provided for the event.

Upon the whole, I am decidedly of opinion that it would not be consistent with justice to deprive General Bellasis of his office; and I should recommend you to take the business upon yourself. But if you should find the General disposed to push it, and you should leave the decision to the Board, and they should agree with him, the best thing to do would be to refer the question to Bengal.

I am obliged to you for the bills which I have received. I return Mr. Forbes's letter. As the soucars have always dawks of their own, I should doubt their deriving any advantage from our daily dawk to Poonah, excepting an economical convenience.

I have mislaid your first letter of the 20th, and do not sufficiently recollect the contents to be able to answer it, excepting in reference to your cotton at Baroach, which I strongly recommend you to sell.

I have always contemplated the necessity of paying for the services of the Guickowar troops, at least of advancing the money.

If I should find your letter of the 20th, I will write to you again in the evening.

I return Mr. Lechmere's letters, which are very satisfactory.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1788.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Panowullah, 24th May, 1804.

The only part of your letter of the 20th which remained unanswered by mine of yesterday related to Mulhar Rao. I think it very desirable that chief should be removed to Bombay, and kept in such a state of restraint as will secure his person. To do more will be useless, and to do less will expose the public

peace and safety to risk. I think it immaterial whether he is kept at Tannah or on the island of Bombay.

As I observe that some of the crew of the *Ann* are safe, I hope that the treasure will have been got out of the ship.

Mr. Manesty's mission is to be confined to the delivery of the letter to the King of Persia ; he is then to return to India.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

[1789.]

SIR,

Camp at Panowullah, 25th May, 1804.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Colonel Murray, which will make you acquainted with Colonel Murray's plan for carrying into execution the orders which I gave him.

From the position of the different corps in the service of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, I judge that that chief purposes to invade Bundelcund. In that case, I doubt the expediency of Colonel Murray's following him, or of his adhering to the plan of operations laid down in my letter of the 7th instant. I therefore propose to write to Colonel Murray fresh instructions applicable to the case of Holkar's having evacuated the province of Malwa, and I shall desire the Colonel, in that event, to commence the destruction of Holkar's power in that province by getting possession of his strongholds.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

[1790.]

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Camp at Panowullah, 26th May, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 19th instant. The state of Holkar's army, as reported by General Lake, is very satisfactory ; and I repeat that if the General would press upon Holkar, the war would not last a fortnight. His forces would disperse, and he would become so weak that Bappojee Scindiah would be able to destroy him. But if General Lake does not press upon him either with his own corps or some other, the affair will end in an

insurrection in his own rear about Delhi, and our situation will become intricate. What could have induced the General to press for the commencement of the war with Holkar, being entirely unprepared to follow him, or to carry the war beyond the Company's frontier?

I am convinced that Holkar is going into Bundelcund. I see that all his detachments are drawing off to that quarter, and I suspect that we are not very strong there. Indeed, when Murray will have reached the frontier of Guzerat, Monson being at Boondy, Holkar can only cross the Nerbudda or go into Bundelcund.

You have said exactly what you ought in the memorandum to Scindiah.

Mr. Mercer may be a sensible man, but he appears to me to be rather inconsistent, and to write a good deal without much consideration. He talks of confining Scindiah to his jaghire at Ougein, at the same time that the General's army is not able to move from the Company's frontier, and never has been so; and they are obliged to call upon me to march above 1000 miles through a desert in order to defeat Holkar alone.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1791.]

To Colonel Montresor.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp at Panowullah, 26th May, 1804.

I have only now received your letter of the 10th April, which you had sent to Mangalore, to be delivered to me on my arrival at that place. The Governor-General having been at last obliged to give orders that Holkar might be attacked, I have joined the army again by his directions, and I intend, if I should have the smallest chance of procuring subsistence, to march to the northward and attack Chandore and Holkar's possessions in the Deccan in the course of a few days. This necessity has prevented my return to the southward, and will, I am afraid, prevent it for some time.

I was much concerned to hear of your indisposition, but I hope that your residence at Mahé will have recovered you. We had very bad accounts of you at Bombay, but I think that they must have been exaggerated. However, we must either give

you some repose in Malabar, or if you must continue to work hard, we must remove you to a climate more favourable to your constitution.

The state of affairs to the northward is as follows :

General Lake is, I believe, in Jeypoor with the army; he has Colonel Monson with his brigade, and a body of country cavalry in advance towards Boondy. They have already taken some trifling places from Holkar, and were likely to give him a severe blow by the capture of Rampoora. Colonel Murray was to move towards Rutlaum, in Malwa, about the 20th of this month. Scindiah's army was to the northward of Ougein, and its commander in great apprehension that he should be attacked by both Holkar and Meer Khan before he could be joined by the British troops. Holkar retreated in front of Monson's detachment, and has lost vast numbers by desertion; and his force is frittering away as such a body always will when it is pressed.

From the position and the movements of Holkar, and the different detachments under Meer Khan, &c., I judge that they are going into Bundelcund, where I apprehend that we are not very strong. In proportion as Monson will move to the southward, and Murray to the northward and eastward, Holkar's situation will become more critical, and he must either fight or go into Bundelcund, or cross the Nerbudda and meet me.

If General Lake would only dash at him with his cavalry, it is my decided opinion that the war would not last a fortnight. As it is, our means are not quite sufficient, and Holkar's final defeat may be delayed for some time. But he cannot hold out very long unless he should gain a victory, as in proportion as he will fly he will lose men, and he will end by being no match for Scindiah's army, which will then destroy him.

I have strengthened Murray much in sepoy, and weakened him in Europeans. He has had four additional battalions since the conclusion of the last war, and he has still two regiments of Europeans, which are as many of that description of troops as he can require. Besides that, the troops in Guzerat are in a collected, disciplined, and effective state, which they were not at this time last year. Murray will take with him into Malwa two regiments and four or five battalions, and 2000 or 3000 horse, leaving behind a reserve in Guzerat of two battalions in the field, besides the garrisons.

My corps is much weakened. I have sent away many of the troops in order to be able to reinforce Murray from Goa; all the battalions and regiments are weak. But I have clothed, armed, and equipped them, and they are of good stuff. Besides that, I shall be joined by the subsidiary corps with the Soubah of the Deccan, which is near Jalnapoor.

You have now all the news from this quarter.-

General Stuart tells me that Sir John Cradock is to be the Commander-in-Chief at Madras. He leaves England in May.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1792.]

To Major Symons.

MY DEAR SYMONS,

Camp at Panowullah, 26th May, 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 4th of May, which had been waiting for me at Mangalore, and one of the 18th, which had come direct from Seringapatam.

I will give an answer hereafter to the petition from the hircarrah.

The rule respecting the court is, that all Natives residing upon the island of Seringapatam are liable to its jurisdiction. The General Orders do not limit its jurisdiction; they only point out the mode of proceeding when military men are arrested. Natives (military men), being liable to the jurisdiction, must of course receive the punishment which the court will sentence when they may be tried.

It is inherent in the constitution of every court in the universe, particularly a British court of justice, that the magistrate shall have the power of punishing disrespect towards himself, and contempt of his authority. This is an essential part of his jurisdiction, or he could not go on for a moment. Of course, those who are liable to the jurisdiction of the court must likewise be amenable to punishment for disrespect and contempt of court; and there is nothing in the Native military character which should induce us to allow them to treat the court with contempt, or to refrain from punishing them if they should be guilty of such a crime.

I acknowledge that it gives me great concern to hear that

the Natives in the service behave in this manner, because it is a clear proof that the officers at Seringapatam are not actuated by that spirit of subordination and good order which formerly pervaded the officers of that garrison. I never shall believe that the Native troops would venture to treat with contempt a court and a respectable magistrate acting under the immediate authority of government and my superintendence, if they did not believe that such misconduct would be agreeable to their immediate European superiors.

In respect to Mr. Anderson's house, he cannot possibly have a right to more than he purchased. The question is, what did he purchase? The proceedings of the committee which valued the quarters, and which are, I believe, in the town major's office, will show that. If the offices in question should have been valued by the committee as part of Mr. Anderson's quarters, he ought to have them, otherwise not.

After having spent large sums of money to lay open the fort, and to have a wide communication all around under the works, it would be a curious proceeding to allow gentlemen to encroach upon that communication by increasing their compounds. I have already decided this question. One of the grounds of Captain Grant's displeasure towards me was, that I would not allow him to increase his compound at the expense of the public convenience. I cannot alter this decision.

As well as I recollect the revenue regulation regarding spirits, and my own sentiments upon the perusal of it, it appeared to me to be likely at Seringapatam to occasion great drunkenness among the troops; and I therefore objected to it. If the Board of Revenue have positively referred you to my opinion upon the subject, I still retain the same opinion; if they have not, you must of course obey their order, and take every precaution against drunkenness.

You have not sent me the particulars of the toddy arrangement, or Captain Wilks's letter. However, I protest against the introduction of the system of the Board of Revenue into the Rajah's territories. It is an old order at Seringapatam that the soldiers are not to quit the island; and as the toddy is made only in the Rajah's country, the sale of it can be checked only by a high duty upon its import, collected through the means of a farmer. This is one reason for the continuance of the spirit farm on its old ground. However, upon the whole of this

subject, you must obey the Board of Revenue, if they have not referred you to me ; and if they have, act as Captain Wilks will wish respecting the toddy, and as we have always acted respecting spirits.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1793.]

To Major Symons.

SIR,

Camp at Panowullah, 26th May, 1804.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 4th instant on the subject of the intended appeal of Gholam Hussein Khan from the decrees of the Court of Cutchery.

The regulation points out clearly the mode in which the appellatant in a case like this is to proceed ; and although in his legislative capacity the Right Hon. the Governor in Council can alter the regulation for the purpose of taking this question into consideration, or can suspend its operation, I am inclined to doubt whether his Lordship, in his judicial capacity, in which he will consider these decrees, can depart from the rules laid down by his own authority for the regulation of this part of the service. The appeal therefore ought to be made to his Lordship according to the forms laid down in the regulation.

The fact that Gholam Hussein Khan is a ward of the court makes no alteration in the state of the case, or in the reasoning upon it. As his guardian, you must have appointed a person to conduct his business for him when the late cause was tried, against the sentence on which he now purposes to appeal ; and you must proceed in the same manner in enabling him to lay his appeal before the Governor in Council, according to the forms pointed out by the regulation.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1794.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Panowullah, 27th May, 1804.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 25th. You have my opinion fully before you regarding the staff of the

Bombay army, and the question about General Bellasis's and General Jones's command of the artillery. There is no difference in the situation of these officers; General Bellasis distinction has none.

You have before you the Governor-General's orders about Holkar's possessions, and you must be aware of the impossibility of entering into an engagement with the Guickowar state, the performance of which must occasion an alteration of these orders. I don't mean to say that it may not happen that the Governor-General will give something to the Guickowar state, or make some arrangement for them even in Cattywar or elsewhere, which will be considered an adequate reward for the service they may render; but I am sure he never will or can depart from the engagement which he has made to Scindiah regarding the Holkar territories, excepting Scindiah should conduct himself in such a manner during the contest with Holkar as would render his own destruction a justifiable measure. Under these circumstances I am of opinion that if the definitive treaty is likely to give hopes to the Guickowar state of a division of the Holkar territories (I have not a copy of it, and don't recollect how far the words will bear such a construction), it would be better to delay concluding it till the end of the war.

I have written to Colonel Murray about the state of his finances, and I enclose a copy of what I wrote to him. His letter to General Nicholls appears to me to contain a dash at the measure of paying the Guickowar troops rather than at that of applying the resources at Surat to the payment of the troops. Colonel Murray conducts the service in a manner that is not very conciliatory, and he finds fault with everything; but I hope that you don't believe that the opinion of the Governor-General can ever be influenced by reports of this description, particularly coming from a man who never writes but to complain.

It is very desirable that you should have the command of large resources to the northward, in order to be able to keep Colonel Murray supplied; but that is no reason for which you should deprive yourself of every resource in order to accomplish that object. If Colonel Murray takes the field with ten lacs of rupees, he has enough to pay him for three or four months, and you may be permitted to breathe, I think, for two or three months. I entreat you not to allow these pettish paragraphs of Colonel Murray's to annoy you.

I have a letter from General Lake, from which I learn that Holkar's army is dispersing already. Holkar is in the greatest distress. Colonel Monson with a British detachment was near Boondy. From the position and movements of the different detachments of Holkar's army, I judge that he means to dash into Bundelcund.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1795.]

To Lieutenant-General Nicholls.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Panowullah, 27th May, 1804.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 25th. It is absolutely necessary that we should have a guard at Panwell, and I have already run myself so hard in order to provide a garrison for Bombay, and to reinforce Colonel Murray, that I have not a man to spare, and I shall be less strong at every point in the Deccan than I ought to be. I am now spread from the frontier of Berar to the Bhore Ghaut. I hope, therefore, that you will find it convenient to allow the detachment of the 7th to remain at Panwell.

In respect to the object of the corps being together, I believe there is no man more desirous than I am of effecting it in every instance, and no man has done more for the army in that way. But where small posts are to be occupied, a rule of this kind must be departed from, however beneficial when viewed generally.

I could not venture to move a man from the coast without the permission of the government of Fort St. George, excepting in a case of necessity, such as that of reinforcing Colonel Murray. When I moved the troops from Goa, I replaced them by those from the army. However, I will try what can be done for Captain Dardell.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1796.]

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Camp at Panowullah, 28th May, 1804.

Your letter of the 21st, which I have just received, has de-

lighted me, and I now hope that we shall be able to manage our affairs at Scindiah's durbar in the spirit of peace.

I feel for Malcolm's situation, more especially as I was the original cause of the difficulty in which he is involved, and I believe that it was in consequence of my opinion that he adopted at Scindiah's durbar the conduct and language of conciliation. I still think that he has not received the worst of the papers from Bengal. If the letters which he has sent me have affected him to such a degree, he must have felt still more the language of the notes which Edmonstone has transmitted to me.

I will send you copies of them, lest those directed to you should have been intercepted, or if they should not have been sent you, that you may see what was intended for Malcolm.

General Lake's private letter to me, which you transmitted, contained his sentiments upon the subject of my situation on the staff. It is very obvious that he thinks as I do upon that subject; but he says that he can give no opinion, as he has received no orders from England. His letter is written in remarkably civil terms. He gives an account of the state of Holkar's army, and says that his people are deserting him in hundreds and coming to his own camp; but he appears to think that it is useless to pursue him. In my answer, which I sent yesterday, I have entered very fully into a consideration of the plan of operations to be adopted against Holkar, and have pointed out the effects which must result from pressing his army with one or more British corps capable of moving with celerity, and each of them so strong as to be able to fight Holkar if he should be disposed to risk an action. I hope that he will adopt the plan which I have proposed to him; if he does, we shall soon have destroyed this fellow.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Mr. Duncan. Sir Benjamin will be delighted, and I expect to hear that he has sailed for Madras.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton.

[1797.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp at Panowullah, 28th May, 1804.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letters of the 16th

2 D 2

and 17th, and at the same time a letter of the 10th from Captain Johnson. It is an extraordinary circumstance how your tappall comes to be so irregular; I receive letters from General Lake, in Hindustan, in as short a time as I do from you. I have a tappall that runs by Jaulna to Ellichpoor, and as our speedy correspondence appears to become a greater object every day, and my tappalls have throughout the war been more regular than yours, I think it desirable that you should communicate direct with this tappall at Jaulna, and place there a writer to receive and forward your letters from and to me. Your runners to my camp, if you have any, may in that case be taken off the road, but your postmaster must take care in forwarding your letters that they go by the proper road.

I enclose a list of the names of the places at which we have runners on the northern road; you may communicate with any one of these you please instead of Jaulna, taking care only to place a writer at whichever of the stages you will communicate with.

In my opinion the best plan will be for you to take off your runners from the road and communicate only with my tappall. This will save expense, your communication will be more speedy with every place, and we shall have no confusion.

However, you must act upon this subject as you may think most expedient. Long before I had received your letter of the 16th instant I had ordered to your camp from Ahmednuggur four lacs of rupees. This money is gone before this time.

I intended to have sent you instructions to attack Umber, and to give possession of that place to the Nizam's officer on the northern frontier, whether Rajah Mohiput Ram or Rajah Sookroodoor.

It is my intention to move to the northward and to attack Chandore as soon as I shall be able to find water upon the road. This will probably be in a few days. I shall require the cooperation of the troops under your command, and I wish you to be prepared to move to the westward and join me north of the Godavery, when I will write to you to that purport. You must bring with you my iron 12-pounders and 5½-inch howitzers, and the Soubah's 18-pounders.

When you will move to the westward, it might be well to bring Lieutenant-Colonel Lang up the Ghauts towards Jaulna.

It would be very convenient to me if you could contrive to

send 400 bullocks to Ahmednuggur to carry away 4000 12-pound shot that are in that fort for the iron 12-pounders. If you cannot perform that service, however, with convenience to yourself, I shall be able to send for the shot, and will do it.

Let me have any account which you may be able to procure of the strength of Chandore.

I have sent to the northward to see if my runners are posted regularly upon the road, and to correct any errors that there may be in the tappall.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

[1798.]

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Camp at Panowullah, 29th May, 1804.

I return the despatch from the Court of Directors, and Lord William's* minute on the affairs in Malabar. I draw from the former the conclusion respecting the sentiments of the Court of Directors and their power, which you have drawn in your letter; at the same time I think that they have contrived to meet Lord Clive's claim to applause for some of the measures of his government in such a manner as to enable the Board of Control to approve of the letter without incurring the risk of offending the Governor-General. In short, the despatch contains a personal invective against Lord Clive, and it does not touch upon public measures excepting in one part, where it conveys a hint that Lord Clive had endeavoured to claim for those measures the applause which properly belonged to the Governor-General.

Whether this is an expedient of the Court of Directors to obtain the sanction of the Board of Control to the despatch, or an expedient of the Board of Control to insure impunity, I cannot tell; but it is my opinion that no notice will be taken of the despatch.

Lord William's minute is like all his other papers that I have ever perused. There never was a man of such prompt decision and firmness. Other men inquire when they are in doubt, and decide after inquiry; but his Lordship doubts everything, ex-

* Lord William Bentinck succeeded Lord Clive in the government of Fort St. George.

cepting that the inhabitants of Malabar are sensible of good treatment and impatient of oppression, and that they have a high respect for courts of judicature, for the rights of landed proprietors, which rights are perfectly defined, and that they are much attached to their old customs. Upon this general nonsense, canvassing everything and deciding no one point, does his Lordship conclude by the adoption of Mr. Rickards's plan.

As for Mr. Rickards's plan, all that I can say for it is that it is a plan; but the revenue system which it proposes to establish, and on which the whole is founded, depends upon inquiries to be conducted hereafter. It is my opinion that if a fair revenue system can be introduced in this manner, a much better judicial system than that proposed may follow it; but I doubt whether the inhabitants of Malabar, till awed by the presence in the province for years of a very superior military force, will allow the investigation which, according to Mr. Rickards's revenue system, is absolutely necessary.

Scindiah's journey to Ougein will be rather inconvenient to you at this season of the year; but, excepting on that ground, I rather approve of it. It shows that he has confidence in his own strength, and, at all events, it will enable you to conduct the operations of the war in Malwa in a better style.

I have a letter from Ogg, in which he tells me that he is married "to a woman of family, fortune, and beauty; and, what is more, that he is not tired of her, does not repent, and hopes he never will." He had not quite recovered. His marriage has improved his style so far as that his letter is more decent than those I received from Lisbon; but, on the other hand, it is not so entertaining.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1799.]

To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

SIB,

Camp at Panowullah, 30th May, 1804.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 17th May. I am very sensible of your favour and kindness in permitting me to recommend to you an officer to be Deputy Quartermaster-General in Mysore, in the room of Captain Cun-

ningham; but as the Deputy Quartermaster-General is an officer with whom, by the nature of his situation, I can have but little confidential communication, and as I have been able to provide for Lieutenant Bellingham, from whom I have received and continue to receive much assistance, and, above all, as you expect Sir John Cradock in a short time, and have many officers for whom you wish to provide, I must request you to appoint whoever you may think proper, and I shall be happy to receive any officer that you will appoint. Besides these reasons for declining to recommend any officer to you upon the present occasion, I have to mention that I don't think that I shall remain long in India after your departure, or the present campaign.

Nothing could have been more flattering or satisfactory to me than the manner in which I was appointed to the staff at Fort St. George by yourself; but as that appointment has not been noticed by His Majesty's government, although it was known in England at as early a period as June last, that I had led a body of troops into the Mahratta territory, and as the staff in India must have been under discussion, I conceive that I have not been very well treated, and I don't feel any very strong inclination to remain in my situation under the government of Fort St. George. In the course of my correspondence with General Lake, I have mentioned this subject; and although, of course, he has given no opinion, it is not difficult to discover that his sentiments upon it are not very different from mine. Under these circumstances I am still less anxious than I should be otherwise respecting the person who may be appointed Deputy Quartermaster-General in Mysore.

In case Captain Barclay should be promoted, which I understand to be probable, and the same rule should apply to his office, I should wish that Captain Baynes might be appointed to succeed to Captain Barclay, as, of course, with the person in Captain Barclay's situation I must have much confidential communication.

I did not require a supply of medicines from Bombay till I joined, and found that the medicines had not been written for to Madras.

I will send you detailed returns of all our probable wants in the course of a few days. The ordnance carriages and carts

might be sent from Seringapatam to Mangalore, and thence by sea to Bombay; but the returns shall be accompanied by a memorandum suggesting the mode by which each article shall be sent.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1800.]

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

SIR,

Camp at Panowullah, 31st May, 1804.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th instant, with which you have transmitted one of the 20th, from the Resident at Baroda.

It is very proper that endeavours should be made to induce Anund Rao Powar to join the corps of British troops under Colonel Murray; and if Anund Rao should join Colonel Murray, he will be entitled to the consideration of the British government. I beg leave to recommend, however, that the gentleman in Guzerat should cautiously avoid contracting any engagement with Anund Rao Powar. The family of Powar was formerly equal with those of Scindiah and Holkar in its rank in the Mahratta empire, and it shared in the conquests made in the same proportion with those families and with the Peshwah: but in the course of time the family of Powar has fallen to decay; and in our recent transactions in the Mahratta empire we found Anund Rao, the head of the family, a chief of no consequence, and serving in Scindiah's army with a small body of horse at the battle of Assye.

It is my opinion that Anund Rao Powar cannot be considered in the light of an independent chief because Scindiah and Holkar are so considered, and because the family of Powar were formerly of the same rank in the empire with those of Scindiah and Holkar. Those chiefs are considered to be independent for a variety of reasons, which it is not necessary at present to detail; but principally, I imagine, because their acts had, for a series of years, been uncontrolled by the Peshwah (the servants of whose government they were formerly) or by any other power; and they were to all intents and purposes, in fact, independent. This reasoning will not apply to Anund Rao Powar; he was formerly, like every other Mahratta chief, a

servant of the Peshwah. We do not know of his independence, and we found him serving in Scindiah's army. Under these circumstances, it is my opinion that we ought to avoid making any engagement with him, the formation of which must be an acknowledgment of his independence.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

June, 1804. [1801.]

Amount of Expenses incurred by Major-General Wellesley above his Staff Allowance, from the period at which he was appointed to command in Chief, and received full powers from His Excellency the Governor-General.

	Star pagodas.
1803 : July	415
August	700
September	830
October	690
November	864
December	900
1804 : January	820
February	900
March	812
April	426
May	924
June	820
	9101

To Sir William Clarke.

[1802.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 1st June, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 22nd May, and wish that it were in my power to gratify your wishes. I cannot but be of opinion, however, that you cannot be spared from Goa; and therefore, though I shall forward to be laid before the Governor-General a copy of your letter, I could not propose to recommend that he should comply with your request.

I really do not believe that the operations of the war against Holkar will be of any consequence, which is another reason for

which you should not be permitted to quit your station in order that you might join in them.

You will see by my public letter of this date that the 2nd battalion 12th regiment has marched towards your quarter.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I have received intelligence that the fort of Rampoora, belonging to Holkar, and situated on the borders of Hindustan, was taken by storm by two battalions of our troops, with but small loss, in the middle of last month.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1803.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 1st June, 1804.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 30th May. As long as I remain to the southward, you need not fear Holkar's troops in Candeish. Besides that they are by no means numerous or powerful, I should think that you might venture to send your treasure by the battalion which is about to march. However, as I have not seen the particulars of the intelligence received from Colonel Anderson, I cannot be so good a judge of the propriety of the measure as those who have.

Your situation is a difficult one if you cannot communicate with Surat with safety either by land or by water. However, I hope there is no real ground for alarm.

The question regarding Shahamut Khan is a very delicate one, and I don't know how to decide it. As an enemy he ought to get nothing, at the same time that he ought to have been paid this demand before he became an enemy; and I think it not impossible but that the payment of this sum may afford the means of drawing off Shahamut Khan from Holkar. I will write you a public letter upon the subject, which may be forwarded as an instruction to Major Walker or Colonel Murray, and will provide for everything.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I have received intelligence from Hindustan stating that Holkar's fort of Rampoora has been taken by our troops by assault, with but small loss on our side. I don't know whether this fort is of any strength,

but it is a convenient post to our operations, and Holkar relied upon it as a means of stopping our march for some days.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1804.]

SIR,

Camp at Poonah, 2nd June, 1804.

Since I have received your private letter on the subject of the money due to Shahamut Khan Patan on account of the ransom for Futtu Sing Guickowar and his mother, I have considered the subject maturely, and I am about to state to you the result and my opinion regarding the measures to be adopted.

Futtu Sing Guickowar and his mother were in the custody of Shahamut Khan, who agreed to liberate them on condition that he should receive a certain ransom amounting to 50,000 rupees. It is not necessary now to inquire whether the detention of the persons of Futtu Sing and his mother was a fair act on the part of Shahamut Khan; it is sufficient that the ransom was promised by those who are able to perform their engagement, and that in consequence of that engagement Futtu Sing and his mother were liberated. The ransom ought to have been paid at the time that this event took place; but in consequence of certain pecuniary difficulties under which the Guickowar government laboured, the payment was deferred, and hostages were given as a security for the payment at a future period.

These hostages have escaped from the camp of Shahamut Khan; and I imagine it is clearly understood that if Shahamut Khan did not now stand in the situation of an enemy to the British government as a servant of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the Resident at Brodera would have made arrangements to pay him the money due for the ransom, notwithstanding the escape of the hostages.

There can be no doubt but that, as an enemy to the government, Shahamut Khan has cancelled all his claims: they might be revived, it is true, in a negotiation for peace, but that is never likely to take place, on account of the character of the enemy with whom we have to deal, and of the manner in which it is intended to carry on the war, and that in which that enemy is likely to be considered and treated at the end of it.

It is desirable, however, for the sake of the credit of the British government that Shahamut Khan should not believe that the government were concerned in the escape of the hostages, or were parties to the measure of defrauding him of the payment of the money due upon the ransom; and in my opinion this beneficial measure can be effected, and may be connected with other objects from which equal benefit will be derived.

I recommend that an early opportunity should be taken of opening a communication with Shahamut Khan, and that he should be informed that the British government and its servants were much surprised and displeased when they heard that the hostages for the payment of the ransom had escaped from his camp, and that Major Walker had immediately taken measures to transmit the money to his camp. That in the mean time Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in relation to whom Shahamut Khan stood as a servant, had rendered it necessary by his hostile conduct that the British government should adopt measures for the defence of the British territories and those of their allies, and that, by the blessing of God, the bravery and activity of the British troops had already been attended by their usual effects, and Holkar had begun to discover that he had adopted a line of conduct which must end in his ruin and destruction.

That in this manner Shahamut Khan stood in the light of an enemy to the British government, and that the invariable customs of the world and sound policy required that the British government should omit to put into the hands of an enemy resources which would be applied against its own security and existence. But that as the debt to Shahamut was due for a valuable consideration, the British government would be glad to find an opportunity of paying it to him, which might be afforded to them by his taking an early occasion of quitting the service of Holkar and returning to his home and remaining there in tranquillity.

That, on the other hand, if he should remain in Holkar's service, Holkar's enmity cancelled all debts, and all engagements to pay them, and he (Shahamut Khan) must take the best measures in his power to recover them.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

[1805.]

SIR,

3rd June, 1804.

I am sorry to tell you that it appears to be impossible for me to move for some time. There is neither forage nor grain in the country; the rains have already destroyed many cattle, and when they become more severe, more bullocks will die. Colonel Haliburton writes me that he is much distressed for want of provisions already, that his supplies come from Berar, and that if he moves farther from that province he must starve.

The result of all this is, that I have determined to send on the battering train at least to Ahmednuggur, and to desire Colonel Haliburton to move, if he can possibly do so, at an early period of the rains, and to attack Chandore. If he can move, I shall join, leaving the greatest part of my corps here.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Montresor.

[1806.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Camp at Chinchore, 4th June, 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 1st, and I now enclose the duplicate of one which I wrote to you a few days ago, in answer to your letter of the 10th April, which I had only then received.

I don't know what to say to your plans. I have certainly no very strong inclination to remain in the country; but I cannot fix the period of my departure: it must depend upon circumstances which I cannot control. Whenever I do go I think it probable that my opinion will have much influence in the choice of my successor in Mysore, and I intend to recommend you. However, I know that Macdowall is much favoured by General Lake, and I cannot pretend to determine how far General Lake's recommendation will influence the Governor-General, supposing that he should choose my successor, or how far Macdowall himself may have arranged his concerns at Madras, supposing that the choice of my successor should rest with Lord William Bentinck. All that I can tell you is, that I will positively recommend that you should be appointed my successor in Mysore both to the Governor-General and the government of Fort St. George, when-

ever circumstances will permit me to communicate with either on the subject of my departure from India.

The question is, whether it will be worth your while to remain in India for such a prospect: this you must determine for yourself. The allowance at Seringapatam is 400 pagodas *per mensem*: it ought to be nearly 500, under the orders of the Court of Directors themselves, who reduced it from 600. God knows what the bazaar fund will be. But the command in Mysore is, in my opinion, the first military situation in India, and leads to every thing for a man who understands the nature of the country, and is determined to do his business and draw well with those with whom he must cooperate. In short, if you choose to stay in India, it is by far the most eligible station that you could fill. If you do stay, I recommend you to return to Malabar; because, besides my recommendation, it lays the ground of a claim for the command in Mysore which nothing could get the better of.

I certainly think that I have done you a disservice in sending you to Malabar. If I had not done so, I should have had no less than three opportunities of placing you in an eligible situation. But who could foresee the events of the last year? Particularly when you were appointed to Malabar (afterwards General Stuart refused to allow you to quit that province), no man could suppose that an army would be fighting battles in Berar, and that I should command the troops in Guzerat.

I wish that you could come up here. I shall not be able to march for some time. There is a famine in the Deccan, and I cannot venture to quit the depôts, at least till there will be some green forage. If you will come up I will post conveyances upon the road, and will furnish you with dry lodging in camp. We have plenty of hunting, reviews, &c. &c., and everybody in good humour, and I think you will like your journey. Bring your palanquin, and I'll post boys; only give me notice of your departure.

I think that if you should determine to stay in India, you ought to go to Madras by sea, and travel to Malabar by land. When at Madras you may possibly discover whether you have any chance of succeeding to Mysore; but as nobody can do more than suspect that I have an inclination to go home, I recommend you to take care not to say that I have such an intention, as there is no person who has so many correspondents as General

Maddowall. He would hear it instantly, and would exert himself to procure the situation for which you wish.

You see that I have written to you with as much freedom and have explained my sentiments as fully as you could desire. This will show you that you need have no scruple in writing to me upon any subject connected with your own interests, and I beg you to consider what I write to you as confidential.

You'll see the state of affairs in the enclosed letter: they have altered but little since it was written. We have taken Ram-poora. Holkar was on the Taptee by the last accounts, and General Lake had some thoughts of making a dart across.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. A. O.

4th June, 1804. [1807.]

1. In order to relieve the distress of the camp for want of grain, and that of the followers on account of its high price, it is intended to supply the bazaars with rice from the stores in the depôt.

2. The mode in which this must be effected is to bring rice from the depôt to the army by means of the grain dealers, and to sell it to the bazaars at a reasonable rate.

3. The commanding officers of corps and heads of departments must take care that the public followers of their corps and departments are supplied by arrangements which they will make; the former with the cutwahls of their regimental bazaars, and the latter with the cutwahl of the grand bazaar.

4. The rice must be drawn from the depôt by an order from the superintendents of the bazaars, specifying the rate at which the rice is to be delivered to the bearer of the order.

5. The superintendent will take care not to give an order for rice to any dealer who cannot give security that he will bring the rice for sale to the camp bazaar. The security must be for a sum double the amount which the quantity of rice ordered would sell for in the bazaar of Poonah, or the country.

6. The superintendent will settle the rate at which the rice is to be delivered at the depôt to the grain dealers upon the basis of the rice being afterwards retailed in the bazaar at the rate of six seers for the rupee.

7. The grain dealers are not to pay for the rice at the depôt, but they will pay for it into the hands of the superintendent of bazaars, when they shall have sold it.

8. The storekeeper of the depôt will, in his accounts of issues of rice to the order of the superintendents of bazaars, state particularly the rate at which it appears by the order that the rice should be paid for, and the date of the order.

9. He will send to the superintendents at the end of every month an account of the quantity of rice issued during the month under his order, specifying to whom issued, and at what rate to be paid for, and the date of the order.

10. The superintendent will at the end of every month pay to the Paymaster, on account of the Hon. Company, the sum which he will have received from the dealers. He will give in an account at the same time, specifying the sum received from each dealer, and for what quantity of grain; and he will support this account by that which he will receive from the grain keeper and the depôt as à voucher.

11. The superintendent will regulate the issue of this rice to the bazaars, in the usual manner, in proportion to the consumption of each corps; and commanding officers of corps must take care, by the exertion of their influence over the regimental cutwahls, that the public followers are supplied in the first instance.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1808.]

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Camp at Chinchore, 5th June, 1804.

I have received your letter enclosing the ackbar of Ougein of the 26th May. I have written repeatedly and fully to Colonel Murray respecting his march to Ougein, which I have pressed upon him in the strongest manner. By the last accounts from him he was to be at Bierpore on the 25th of May, and he was likely to receive my orders to march towards Ougein on the 27th or 29th at furthest. I wrote to him, however, again this day, and desire him to leave Canojee to his fate.

Canojee was marching about the frontiers of Guzerat, and, from Colonel Murray's last letters, I judge that he had no apprehensions from Canojee's operations.

My last letter will have informed you of our state. The rains have commenced, and are pretty severe. Haliburton has been obliged to draw nearer to Buswunt, in Berar, for fear of starving.

We shall do no good with this war with Holkar till the Governor-General sends Scindiah a subsidiary force. I wish that Scindiah would make a requisition for it, and then it must be sent. I have given many hints upon this subject, but people in Bengal appear to have begun to be callous to hints.

Not a word yet about Malcolm.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1809.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Chinchore, 5th June, 1804.

I am sorry to tell you that, in consequence of the distresses in Colonel Haliburton's camp, which, I have received accounts this day, have induced him to fall back towards Berar, I am induced to delay commencing my operations for some time. I have been obliged to feed my camp entirely from the depôts; and I greatly fear that Colonel Haliburton will fall upon us likewise.

Under these circumstances I am anxious that as soon as the first flurry of the monsoon will be over, an opportunity should be taken of sending the 10,000 bags of rice which it was settled I was to have when I was at Bombay. Captain Moor might correspond with Captain Young regarding the period of sending off this rice, so that it would travel during the interval which there may be of fair weather.

From a letter which Captain Barclay has received from Captain Moor, mentioning your wishes, and the fact which I have above mentioned to you relating to Colonel Haliburton, who I suspect will soon fall upon my southern depôts (indeed, he has already in some degree upon Ahmednuggur), I am induced to ask you to let me have 10,000 bags more. This may also be sent at a fair interval in the rainy season; but as I am not in immediate want, I am in no violent hurry about it; nor

will I ask for it at all if it should be inconvenient to you to let me have it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1810.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Halburton.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Chinchore, 5th June, 1804.

I received only this day your letters of the 23rd and 27th May. The irregularity of your tappall is terribly inconvenient, at the present moment, and I sincerely hope that you will have acted according to the instructions I lately sent you, and that our communication carried on by mine will be more regular. I ought to hear from you in three days.

In consequence of your letter of the 24th to Captain Barclay, which reached Poonah on the 3rd, I determined to delay my march to the northward, a determination which has been confirmed by your letter of the 26th, received by Captain Barclay this morning.

Before I enter into a discussion on the plan which we must now follow, I must allude to your distresses for want of money. Since I parted from you I have regularly sent you half of every sum of money that has been sent to me from Hyderabad, and four lacs of rupees have gone to you from Ahmednuggur. This I have done from an apprehension that you might want money, and not from any positive information of the state of your resources; for till I heard that you had nothing to make your payments for April, I did not know that you were even likely to be in want. I wish that you would desire your paymaster to send me a return, when he will have made his payment of a month's pay, stating what balance he has in hand. In this manner I shall be able to keep you supplied regularly.

Besides the four lacs of rupees gone to you from Ahmednuggur, you shall have half of another sum of twelve lacs of pagodas now, I hope, on the road from Hyderabad.

I am much concerned to hear of your difficulties in respect to payments to the troops in gold, particularly as I know of no remedy. As long as the Company coin money of an inferior value, and as their troops serve in foreign countries, they must be exposed to the inconvenience of which you complain.

I beg you to send to Ahmednuggur for any more rice that you may want. I have there about 6000 loads still. Let me know what you may draw from thence.

I write to Hyderabad to have rice sent up to you. I recommend that you should increase the number of bullocks in your grain department. I have gone on always without brinjaries, but I have had 4000 or 5000 bullocks in the grain department; and you ought to increase the number of your bullocks in proportion as you will lose your brinjaries.

The state of your supplies, which has obliged you to draw off towards Buswunt, obliged me to delay the operations against Chandore. However, we must renew them as soon as possible, and this is the plan which I now propose :

I shall send up forthwith the heavy guns and stores to Ahmednuggur, and thence, if the weather should be favourable, to Aurungabad. If you should find that you can advance towards Chandore, I should wish you to do so, and pick up the heavy guns and stores at Aurungabad, as you will pass near that place. If you should be able to advance, let me know it, and I will move immediately either with my whole corps or a detachment. I shall have no difficulty in doing so at any season, as I have a bridge.

I hope that when you will have received the money and your provisions from Buswunt, you will be able to advance towards Chandore immediately. It is most important that we should settle this business at an early period.

I hope to be able to write to you this day about Captain _____'s brinjary accounts. In the mean time it is desirable to ascertain the following facts. Who appointed Madoo Rao chowdry of the brinjaries? Was he an agent of Captain _____, or an agent of the brinjaries? Did the brinjaries know that Madoo Rao received money on their account? Does Madoo Rao acknowledge the receipt of the money which Captain _____ alleges that he paid him?

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1811.]

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Camp at Chinchore, 8th June, 1804.

I have just received your letters of the 30th and 31st May.

I am decidedly of opinion that Bappojee Scindiah ought either to have joined Murray, or to have acted in cooperation with that corps : but it would have been impossible to have altered the disposition made by the Commander-in-Chief, and you have acted quite right to urge Scindiah to allow Bappojee Scindiah to remain in cooperation with Monson. However, I see very clearly that "Bragge"* will bring Bappojee Scindiah towards Ougein as fast as he can, with at least a part of his corps; and as Monson is strong enough, and has some cavalry on which he can depend, and can be reinforced by larger bodies by the Commander-in-Chief, I do not regret this.

By your letter to Colonel Close of the 30th May, I see that the Saperabad question is involved in all the obscurity in which it is possible to place it by Mahratta intrigues. I believe that it will be best to notice the transaction only as an irregularity.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1812.] G. O.

Camp at Chinchore, Friday, 8th June, 1804.

The rice thrown into the bazaars under the orders of the 4th inst. is for the general benefit, and it is not intended to preclude any body from enjoying it, but it is intended principally for the followers of the army, both public and private; and accordingly Major-General Wellesley desires that measures should be taken by commanding officers and heads of departments, in order to secure to the followers what they should require. It appears, however, that the sepoy consider that they have an exclusive right of pre-emption in the bazaars, and that they have already been guilty of acts of riot and outrage, because they found that

* The confidential Minister of Scindiah, whose name was variously spelled — Etul Pundt, Eitul Punt, Eitul Pundit, and Wattel Punt. His face wore always an impenetrable mask, and Sir John Malcolm said he never saw such a countenance for the game of *Brag*. In after years when Sir John inquired of the Duke of Wellington the character of Talleyrand, His Grace replied, that he was a good deal like *Old Brag*, but not so clever.—*Kaye's Life of Malcolm*, vol. i. p. 241.

the orders and arrangements of commanding officers of corps under the particular directions of Major-General Wellesley were found to give a preference to the followers of the army, for whose subsistence, till then, no provision had been made. The sepoys forget that they receive daily an allowance of rice *gratis*, and that at all events they have no right of pre-emption, excepting under an order, and that Major-General Wellesley will not suffer violence, or outrage, or riot, on any account whatever. He now desires that orders may be given to the guards, in the different bazaars, to take up immediately any sepoys or any body that may be found rioting or endeavouring to force the sale of grain and provisions. Any person guilty of such outrages shall be punished, and the allowance of rice to any sepoys who may be found guilty of riot shall be stopped. Major-General Wellesley requests that commanding officers of corps will be very particular in explaining these orders to the sepoys, and particularly the causes for which the arrangements were made which were ordered on the 4th instant.

Major-General Wellesley particularly calls the attention of the adjutants to the regulations for mounting guards. The guards are to be paraded and marched off, according to these regulations; excepting in the inspection of the adjutant of the day, which, as the guards are inspected by the adjutants of corps, and by the officers of the guards to which they belong, is not immediately necessary; and the inspection of so many men by one officer would take up too much time. That inspection, therefore, need not be made in this camp.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Camp at Chinchore, Saturday, 9th June, 1804. [1813.]

Major-General Wellesley takes this opportunity of expressing his satisfaction upon finding the corps of Native infantry in such good order, upon the inspection which he has made of them, and he will not fail to report their state to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

It is by no means Major-General Wellesley's wish that the corps should be harassed and fatigued by drill. After a corps is perfectly drilled in its exercise, but little attention will keep it in a state fit for service, or to be seen by the superior officer.

of the army, whenever it may be called upon. But in order to preserve the corps in the state in which they now are, Major-General Wellesley desires that no corps may ever be dismissed from a parade with arms without performing some one, or more, if circumstances render it necessary, of the manœuvres laid down for the exercise of the troops; and commanding officers of corps will take care that whenever they perform any manœuvre, whether upon the regimental parade or elsewhere, or make any formation, that it be done upon true principles, and in the mode pointed out by the Regulations of the Army. Officers commanding brigades are requested to notice any irregularity, or false movements, or incorrect principles, which they may at any time observe in the exercise or formation of corps upon their regimental parade, or elsewhere.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1814.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Chinchore, 12th June, 1804.

I have had the pleasure of receiving Mr. Grant's letter of the 8th about the military at Surat.

The rule in the territories on the other side of India and at Seringapatam is, that when the magistrate requires the attendance of any military person, either as a prisoner or as a witness, in any cause pending in his court, he calls officially upon the commanding officer of the troops to send such person to attend him. The advantage of this mode of proceeding, which does not extend to officers' servants or the followers of the army, is that it makes the commanding officer of the troops in fact head constable to the magistrate; and the commanding officer of the troops is responsible that every military person offending is brought forward when called for. It saves to the magistrate's peons the difficulty and trouble of searching for and taking up particular persons against whom there may be informations, among many all dressed in the same uniform, and all having the same appearance. It also saves the riots and the unequal contests which are always likely to occur when the magistrate's peons come to seize the persons of sepoys with arms in their hands.

Upon the whole I take the liberty of recommending this arrangement to you; and if you should adopt it, I will issue an

order upon the subject at the same time, which will point out clearly the duty of a commanding officer in every case of this kind which can occur.

It appears that the captain of the *Admiral Aplin* neglected to destroy the packet intrusted to his charge when his vessel was taken; and the Frenchmen have opened and read all the letters, and have published some of them. I have seen some which they have published, particularly one from Lord Grenville, and another from my brother to Lord Wellesley, containing matter certainly not fit for the public eye. The former contained a history of the state of parties in England, particularly in the month of June last, when it was written; and the latter an account of the sentiments and opinions of the ministers and Court of Directors regarding each other, and several points of Indian politics, which I am convinced that Lord Wellesley would not have shown even to his private secretary.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel de Meuron, commanding at Seringapatam. [1815.]

SIR,

Camp at Chinchore, 13th June, 1804.

After the state of public justice at Seringapatam had been considered for some time by those most capable of forming an opinion upon the subject, and after government had availed itself of the advantage of the opinions of the persons who had considered the subject, that judicial establishment was formed over which Major Symons presides under my superintendance as commanding officer in Mysore.

The establishment existed for two years during my residence at Seringapatam, with but short temporary absences on different services; and I am enabled by experience to assert that all the practical benefits were derived from the establishment which those expected of whose opinions government availed itself in framing it. Under these circumstances you may conceive the concern with which I have received various complaints of the conduct of the officers of the garrison of Seringapatam, relating to the judicial establishment, since I marched from thence in February, 1803, particularly a letter from the magistrate, dated the 4th of June, of which I now enclose a copy.

As a British officer I have always considered it to be my duty, nay more, an honourable distinction to the character of a British officer, to support the laws and the authority of the magistrates who administer them. In this country in particular, in which His Majesty's European subjects are not liable to the jurisdiction of the courts of justice established by the laws of our country for the government of the Natives of India, it is more particularly incumbent on those British officers, who have a due sense of the honour of their profession and situation, to support the authority of the magistrates appointed by government to preside in those courts. Under these circumstances it is not a matter of astonishment that the magistrate should applaud the conduct of the corps which were left in Seringapatam in 1802. These corps have since been with me in the field, and have shown in front of the enemy that they possess the true discipline, gallantry, and spirit of British officers and soldiers; a discipline and spirit which I have always observed are not confined to the day of battle, but which regulate the conduct of those who possess them in every transaction of life, and more particularly in their duty in garrison and in their conduct towards a respectable magistrate.

I have, therefore, particular concern in being obliged to animadvert upon the conduct of the officers of the 1st of the 14th, in comparison with the conduct of officers of other corps, in whose praise too much cannot be said for their conduct in every situation in which they have been placed.

In respect to the particular complaints made by the magistrate in his letter of the 4th of June, I have the honour to enclose my answer to him. I desire that you will publish this letter in the garrison orders, and that you will inform the officers of the garrison that they have no business whatever with the decrees or the proceedings of the court of justice of Seringapatam, excepting in cases in which they may themselves think proper to apply to it. In every instance in which an officer may have any thing to say to the magistrate in his official capacity, excepting in a case where such officer may be himself a party, the officer is to apply to you, and the commanding officer of the garrison is to be the only channel of communication with the magistrate.

I observe that the sepoy's of the 1st of the 14th are guilty of great irregularity in appearing in the streets of Seringapatam

not dressed as soldiers, and in rioting about the streets. Both practices are contrary to the standing orders of the garrison established since the year 1799, and the former contrary to the standing orders of the army, and I desire that both may be prevented.

It is with concern that I find myself obliged, in considering this subject, to observe upon the conduct of an officer for whom I have long entertained sentiments of the highest respect and esteem. It appears that the magistrate received and decided upon a complaint made by Sheick Rundugu, sepoy in the 1st battalion 14th regiment, and informed you that he had done so. You afterwards appointed a court of inquiry to consider of that complaint.

I beg leave to observe that whatever might have been the result of the inquiry, you could not have ventured to take any step in consequence of it. By a reference to the orders of government you will see the penalties annexed to the interference of military officers in judicial affairs, and therefore this court of inquiry, however it might have been intended, could have tended only to degrade the authority of the magistrate in the eyes of all the Natives, particularly in those of the sepoys of the 1st battalion 14th regiment, who, I am concerned to observe, appear to require the control of that authority more than any Natives of Seringapatam.

The line of conduct which you ought to have adopted in this instance should have been to refer the sepoy to the magistrate, who ought to have known in what manner to punish his contumely.

It is a matter of regret to me that I have found myself under the necessity of writing you this letter, but neither the principles of my mind nor my sense of duty will allow me to pass unnoticed the circumstances of which Major Symons complains; and it is best that it should be publicly known at once that I am determined to use the power in my hands to bring to trial and punishment any person who may hereafter be guilty of a disobedience of these my orders, and of a flagrant violation of the laws of our country.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

To Major Symons.

SIR,

Camp at Chinchore, 13th June, 1804.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 4th instant on the subject of the interference of the officers of the 1st battalion 14th regiment in the concerns of the court of justice at Seringapatam. Whatever may be the motives for such interference, it is entirely unnecessary and improper; and I proceed to give you, and shall send by this post, directions to the commanding officer at Seringapatam, which I hope will have the effect of preventing such improprieties in future.

In respect to the decree of the Court of Cutchery in the case of Abdul Cawder versus Syed Osman, I entirely approve of it. The regulations of government do not require that I should affix my signature to the proceedings as an evidence of my approval, and confirmation of them and the sentence; otherwise, as both are conformable to the law, and the latter to the evidence, I should have no scruple in signing them.

I am astonished that you should have thought it necessary to hold any communication with Captain —, or with any other officer of the garrison, regarding a decree of your court, with which they have no more to do than they have with the decisions of the Supreme Court at Madras. I am equally surprised to find that when Captain — refused to take cognisance of the debt due by Syed Osman, in consequence of the decree of the court of Cutchery, you did not use the power in your hands for the recovery of that debt. You ought to have required the person of Syed Osman, sepoy in the 1st battalion 14th regiment, from the commanding officer of the garrison, and you ought to have kept him in confinement as a debtor until his debt should be discharged, or security given for its payment.

I desire that you will immediately adopt these measures against Syed Osman; and in future I request you to hold no communication whatever with any officer of the garrison of Seringapatam relating to the business of your office, excepting with the commanding officer, and in cases in which an European officer may be a party.

In the event of the use of improper language or of improper and contemptuous behaviour towards you by any Native officer or soldier, or any Native of any description, you have in your

hands the power of supporting and vindicating your own authority, and I desire that you will use it. It is not to be supposed that any European officer will behave improperly to a magistrate; but if there should be such a one, the principles and inclinations of my mind as a British subject, and my sense of my duty as a British officer, will induce me to take the measures which I have in my power to bring to trial and to punishment the officer who may be guilty of a contempt of the laws or the person of one of the magistrates.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Symons.

[1816.]

MY DEAR SYMONS,

Camp at Chinchore, 13th June, 1804.

I have approved and confirmed the two trials accompanying this letter; but it is my opinion that the interest beyond 12 per cent. ought not to be allowed to the plaintiffs.

The law says the magistrate may lay a fine upon the defendant in certain cases, but that fine goes to the public, and ought not to go into the pocket of the defendant. The fine is a punishment inflicted in the criminal court of Foujdarry, and ought not to be a proceeding in the civil court of Cutchery on the trial of an action of debt.

But you will say the plaintiff is aggrieved by the detention of his money, and ought to have some compensation. In answer, I say give him double or treble costs of suit, but not interest which, according to our law, and, I believe, that of the Hindoo, must be deemed usurious.

Consider of these my sentiments, and if you agree with me in opinion, it would be well to reconsider the sentence, and send it back to me. I have written you publicly about the conduct of the officers of the garrison.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1817.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Chinchore, 14th June, 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 11th, and I have referred it to Mr. Webbe. I have been to Poonah this morning to speak to Major Malcolm on the subject. He is of opinion that the offer to Govind Malmah is intended only to draw him to Scindiah's durbar and to plunder him. If this should be true, we ought not to interfere to induce Govind Malmah to quit Baroda.

Colonel Close has apprised me that one of the shroffs at Poonah has offered him two lacs of rupees at the following rates: 100 Chandore rupees for a bill for 100 sicca rupees on Calcutta, and 100 Chandore rupees for a bill for 102 Bombay rupees on Bombay. These are the same terms at which you got money lately, which shows that our measures to check the imposition of the soucars have already had some effect. Colonel Close will want more money soon, and I probably shall require a little assistance from you to pay the prize-money. I wish to know whether you will send money to Poonah, or whether I shall accept these offers of taking money for bills upon Calcutta. I am still of opinion that it would be best that you only should draw. Excepting to pay the prize-money, I shall not want any money for some time yet. I have money to pay the troops in July, and I expect three lacs of rupees at Ahmednuggur in the course of a few days. This will be followed soon by three lacs of pagodas, which sum I have heard has left Masulipatam for Hyderabad for my use, so that you see that I shall be able to be better than my word, which was, I believe, that I should not have occasion to trouble you till July.

Colonel Close told me this morning that copies of some important despatches to me went to you last night. I have not seen the originals, and I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will send me copies of those you have received.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1818.]

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Camp at Chinchore, 15th June, 1804.

I have a letter from Colonel Murray, dated the 2nd instant, from which I judge that he will have passed the boundary of

JUNE, 1804. COL. MURRAY'S MARCH TOWARDS OUGEIN. 429

Soonte, on his road towards Ougein, on the 4th. He had received my letter of the 22nd May. He complained much of want of water and of the sufferings of the Europeans from the heat of the weather, and he said that there was still a space of forty miles of country to be marched over in which all the tanks were dry; but he expected rain daily.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1819.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Camp at Chinchore, 15th June, 1804.

I enclose a letter from Colonel Murray. You will see there that Colonel Murray, now that he can no longer complain of want of money, complains of want of troops, and wishes to have the 84th. I think the best mode of settling the respective claims of himself and Sir William Clarke to the services of that regiment would be to desire them to toss up for it.

It would be very desirable, however, to reinforce Colonel Murray with artillery, and I should be glad if that could be effected, although I don't see how it could.

His giving Canojee's brother his personal liberty, and his engagement with a Rajah of Cutch, and his engagement with the Rajah tributary to Ahmedabad, and with the Rajahs of Joudpoor and Oudepoor, are each capital in their style, and strictly contrary to my instructions. He will probably bring the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief on his back for interfering with the two latter.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O.

Camp at Chinchore, Saturday, 16th June, 1804.

[1820.]

Major-General Wellesley requests the attention of officers commanding corps of infantry to the following instructions, when several battalions are required to march in line :

1. When the battalion is in line, the post of the commanding officer is in the rear of the centre.
2. When the line is ordered to advance, each battalion is to

march by its own centre, in the same manner as if it were alone. The commanding officer of each battalion is to fix upon an object perpendicular to the centre of his own battalion, upon which the officer who leads the battalion is to march.

3. The havildar or serjeant in the centre of the battalion between the colours is to follow exactly the steps of the officer or non-commissioned officer who leads the battalion.

4. After the battalion shall have advanced a certain distance, the commanding officer will be able to see whether it approaches, or recedes from, the battalion which will have been named as that which leads the line. If he should find that the due distance is not preserved, he is to alter the direction of his march, and point out another object to the officer or non-commissioned officer who shall lead the battalion, to which the leader will gradually alter his direction, and his steps will be strictly followed by the non-commissioned officers placed between the colours.

5. All changes of direction of a battalion marching in line, particularly if they are great changes, are equivalent to a wheel of the battalion on its centre, a movement of a very complicated nature, which requires time and great accuracy.

6. It follows, therefore, that in no case whatever must the pace of the battalion be hurried whilst the alteration of the direction is making; or that, when it becomes necessary to alter the direction to any great degree, it would be best to mark the time till the alteration is completed, and then to bring up the battalion to its place.

7. It must sometimes happen that the alteration of the direction of the march of the other battalions is so great as that it cannot be made by the wheel of the battalion each upon its centre; when the alteration of the direction of a battalion is from any cause of this magnitude, it ought to be made by the *echelon* march of divisions.

8. When the commanding officer of a battalion in line finds it necessary to alter the direction of its march, he should apprise thereof the commanding officer of the next battalion on the flank most distant from the leading battalion.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Symons.

[1821.]

MY DEAR SYMONS,

Camp at Chinchore, 16th June, 1804.

It would be very desirable to stop the manufacture and sale of country arrack, if the measure were not likely to be attended by inconveniences. But none of the lower classes will live in the island if they cannot get arrack, and they are your followers for an army. You must regulate the sale, however, as high as you can, to prevent the soldiers from getting it.

Tell the commanding officer that the Laal Baug Palace must not be pulled down.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton.

[1822.]

SIR,

Camp, 18th June, 1804.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 10th May on the subject of the brinjarry accounts with Captain ———, and I proceed to give my opinion upon it.

The best mode of doing this appears to be to consider the different items of the debt and credit side of the account current, and to communicate my sentiments upon each item.

The first sum with which the brinjarries are charged is 75,000 rupees advanced to them by Major Kirkpatrick. It is impossible to go into a consideration of this charge without adverting to the set-off against it made by the brinjarries of 7500 rupees on account of a stoppage made by Madoo Rao Chowdrey.

There can be no doubt whatever that Major Kirkpatrick paid 75,000 rupees to the brinjarries on account of grain, and that he desired Captain ——— to recover that sum for the public from the brinjarries in proportion as they should sell their grain. It is probable that when Major Kirkpatrick advanced this sum of money he required some security from them, and it is equally probable that the brinjarries were obliged to pay a premium for the security which they produced. Whether this was known to Major Kirkpatrick or was not known to him is a matter of but little importance. The fact is, that the brinjarries must have got the money from him by the security of Madoo Rao Chowdrey, and it is certain that Madoo Rao was

entitled to some advantage and remuneration for the risk he incurred.

I have to observe upon this part of the subject that it throws great light upon the nature of Madoo Rao's employment, and will enable me to trace these accounts in such a manner as will be satisfactory.

The question now is, whether Captain —— ought to have credit for the full sum of 75,000 rupees advanced by Major Kirkpatrick; or whether 7500 rupees, stopped by Madoo Rao, are to be charged to him. There can be no doubt but that Captain —— paid 75,000 rupees to Major Kirkpatrick, and therefore he has a right to take credit for it. If the brinjarries think they ought not to have paid the money to Madoo Rao Chowdrey, that may be a subject for further discussion and inquiry against Madoo Rao, but Captain —— can have nothing to do with the result.

It is my opinion, therefore, that in the account with Captain —— the brinjarries ought to be charged with the full sum of 75,000 rupees, and ought not to have credit for 7500 rupees.

Respecting the 2nd and 3rd sums charged to the brinjarries in account current No. 5 Brinjarry Accounts, it appears that there is no dispute respecting them.

The brinjarries admit they received these sums in No. 3 Brinjarry Accounts, and Lechman Naig admits 42,000 rupees received when the corps was at Aurungabad, to go for rice to Cowlas Ghur.

These two sums, therefore, of 30,000 and 12,000 rupees must be admitted in the accounts in credit of Captain ——.

The 4th sum charged to the brinjarries is an advance of 30,000 rupees for the purchase of grain at Pytun.

Upon this sum there are two questions: one, whether the money was really advanced; the other at what rate the brinjarries ought to have received the grain for which the advance was made. In respect to the second question, it may be laid aside for some time, and the decision of it can affect but little the right of Captain —— to charge the brinjarries with the full sum of 30,000 rupees. It appears by the proceedings of the committee that Lechman Naig says that 30,000 rupees were advanced to Madoo Rao Chowdrey to pay for the grain to be purchased at Mungapytun; but he contends that the grain at Mungapytun ought to have been given according to

a rate settled at Aurungabad. It also appears, by a note made by the committee to Brinjarry Account No. 3, that of the sum of 30,000 rupees, only 28,309 rupees $9\frac{1}{2}$ annas was paid for grain, and that 1690 rupees $6\frac{1}{2}$ annas remain unaccounted for in the hands of Madoo Rao Chowdrey. In respect to this sum unaccounted for, I have to observe that Captain ———, as far as appears at present, has nothing to do with it; Madoo Rao Chowdrey must be called to account for it, and the result of the inquiry into this subject will show whether Captain ——— ought to pay it. The brinjarry Lechman Naig says positively that 30,000 rupees were given to Madoo Rao, and that Madoo Rao had orders to make advances to the brinjarries for their subsistence out of it. These advances, with the sum paid for the grain, may make up the full 30,000 rupees when Madoo Rao will settle his accounts. But in the mean time it appears but fair to allow Captain ——— to take credit for the full sum which everybody acknowledges that he advanced.

In regard to the second question affecting this sum, I shall canvass it presently when I come to consider the credit side of the account.

The 5th sum charged as an advance to the brinjarries is 26,928 rupees paid to Salabut Khan for grain received at Balapoor and Ellichpoor.

It does not appear to be disputed that this sum was paid to Salabut Khan, but the brinjarries claim to receive the grain at the rate agreed upon at Aurungabad. The justice of this claim shall be canvassed hereafter; in the meantime Captain ——— must be permitted to charge 26,928 rupees.

The 6th sum charged to the brinjarries is 8419 rupees 13 annas for grain purchased at Roshengaum and Budnapoor. This stands upon the same ground as the 5th, and must be admitted accordingly.

The 7th sum charged is 2929 rupees 15 annas for grain purchased at Jalnah. It stands upon the same grounds, and must be admitted.

The 8th sum charged is 23,040 rupees 15 annas for grain purchased at Burhampoor.

In considering the nature of this transaction, it will be necessary to separate the consideration of the disposal of the money from that of the charge made to the brinjarries.

In respect to the disposal of the money, Captain ———

avers that the money was paid to the paymaster as part of the contribution levied at Burhampoor. In my letter to you of the

* April, I have explained what I recollected of the conversation I had with Colonel Stevenson and Captain ——— on the subject of this contribution at Burhampoor, which conversation passed, I believe, on the 30th December, but certainly not many days before Colonel Stevenson quitted the army. If Colonel Stevenson altered his intentions regarding the grain in question, it is extraordinary that he did not mention the alteration to me, as there was always the most free and confidential intercourse between the Colonel and me, and he was particularly anxious that I should have a complete knowledge of the whole of this transaction. But the disposal of this grain and money is now a subject of inquiry for the general court-martial, and it is not proper that I should give any further opinion upon it.

I now come to consider the price charged for this grain. Captain ——— says that Colonel Stevenson authorized him to charge the grain delivered to the brinjarries at Burhampoor at a very reduced rate. The rate upon which he fixes certainly cannot be called a reduced rate, considering the price of grain in camp, the bargain which had been made at Aurungabad, the time which had elapsed, the distance which had been marched since the bargain had been made, and the dearness and scarcity of forage and every article of life at that advanced station.

When I am considering whether this rate, which Colonel Stevenson ordered might be a reduced one, was really low, I cannot avoid adverting to the fact that, but very few days before this grain was delivered to the brinjarries, a quantity of rice, amounting to 1000 bags, which had been left by me at Adjuttee for Colonel Stevenson's use, was given to the brinjarries gratis by the Colonel's orders. When the Colonel did this, knowing that the grain which, by Captain ———'s account, he had ordered might be given to the brinjarries at a reduced rate, had been got for nothing, I cannot conceive that he would have considered Captain ———'s conduct to have been exactly consistent with his intentions, if he had found that Captain ——— charged for that grain as high a price as for any that the brinjarries received during the campaign.

The brinjarries claim to receive this grain at the rate fixed

* Blank in manuscript.

by the agreement made at Aurungabad. I certainly think it unfortunate that the accounts with the brinjarries were not settled at shorter intervals of time, and that fresh agreements were not made with them upon every occasion on which they received grain on the Company's account.

But as no fresh agreement was made with them, the brinjarries had reason to believe that, in proportion as the armies advanced, their bargain would not be worse, and I am decidedly of opinion that, upon the whole, it was an advantageous one to the Company. Under these circumstances, I am of opinion that, unless when otherwise settled, the brinjarries ought to receive the grain at the rate of the Aurungabad agreement as it is stated by Rajah Mohiput Ram, viz., rice at 7 seers, and all dry grains at 20 seers for a rupee.

In considering the charges made to the brinjarries for grain delivered to them at Ballapoor, Ellichpoor, Budnapoor, Rosbengaum, and Jalnah, I have allowed the charge of the full price paid for the grain. I have done this to keep the subject clear; but in the course of this letter I shall authorise the difference to be drawn and paid to the brinjarries between the rate at which they ought to have received the grain according to their agreement at Aurungabad and that at which it was purchased and actually delivered to them and charged in their account, as the Aurungabad agreement is equally applicable to all those deliveries of grain.

The charge for grain delivered at Burhampoor, however, stands, in some degree, upon different grounds. Captain ——— ought not to have charged it at a high rate: and, at all events, till the decision of the general court-martial, I must believe the disposal of the money to be at least a matter of doubt. Under these circumstances, I am of opinion that the charge to the brinjarries for grain delivered at Burhampoor ought to be only 18,528 rupees 3 annas, being at the rate agreed at Aurungabad.

The 9th charge in the account current is 14,168 rupees 4 annas for the purchase of grain at Gawilghur. There does not appear to be any difference of opinion respecting this charge, and it must be admitted.

The 10th charge is for 30,000 rupees advanced for the purchase of grain to Madoo Rao Chowdrey.

The brinjarries admit that this sum was received by Madoo

Rao, and, of course, it must stand against their account till it will be seen whose agent Madoo Rao is, and the nature of his employment.

In regard to the sum of 30,000 rupees struck out of the amount as advanced by order of Colonel Haliburton, I have to observe that, if Captain —— advanced the money and it stands against him, he ought to be allowed to charge it in his accounts, as there appears no doubt that the brinjarries received it.

If Colonel Haliburton advanced the money, and it does not stand against Captain ——, of course Captain —— has no right to charge it.

The 10th charge in the account current, therefore, is to stand at 30,000 rupees.

The 11th charge is 20,761 rupees for cash advanced at different times, and appears not to be disputed, and must stand.

The 12th charge is for the purchase of rice at Aurungabad, 16,811 rupees. It appears that this was the price of the rice which the brinjarries admitted that they received, and the charge must stand in the account, upon the same principle as the 5th, 6th, and 7th charges.

The 13th charge of 17,186 rupees 10 annas for dry grain delivered at Aurungabad stands upon the same ground and must be admitted.

The 14th charge of 15,180 rupees for rice delivered at Pytun must also be admitted if the brinjarries received the grain on their own account and sold it in the bazaars or to the commissary of grain. But it appears that there was a dispute respecting some rice to be delivered to the brinjarries at Pytun; the result of which was that they were sent to Pytun to receive the rice on account of the Company, and for this service were to receive 5000 rupees, and did receive 2500 rupees.

If the rice for which this charge is made be that alluded to by Captain —— before the committee, the charge must be struck out of this account of course, and the rice must be charged to the Company; if it be not that rice, the charge must remain against the brinjarries.

The 15th charge is 9600 rupees for the purchase of dry grain at Dowlutabad.

There appears to be no objection to this charge excepting that the money having been charged to the brinjarries has not been

paid to the Nizam's government, or, as far as appears, credited to that of the Company. But in the course of this letter you shall have orders upon this part of the subject.

The 16th charge is for the purchase of grain delivered at Mulcapoor and Nandoorah, 24,922 rupees.

It appears by the proceedings of the committee that this grain has not been paid for, although it is charged to the brinjaries. However, that is a point referred to the court-martial. It is certain that the grain must be paid for to the Nizam's government, and therefore the charge must stand to the brinjarry accounts.

The claim of the brinjaries to receive the grain at the rate of the agreement of Aurungabad stands upon the same grounds as their claim to receive the grain delivered at Budnapoor, &c., at the same rate.

The 17th and 18th charges ought not to have been included in the brinjarry accounts at all, as it appears the brinjaries did not supply the grain. But I conclude it is the custom in the subsidiary force for the commissary of grain to make out his bills for all grain received as if received from the brinjaries; and I conclude that the brinjaries have credit for these two quantities of grain received by the commissary of grain at Aurungabad and Burhampoor. If they have credit in the accounts for this grain which they did not deliver, it is but fair that the price of the grain should be charged to them, and therefore these two charges may stand. According to this division the debtor side of the brinjarry account will stand according to paper marked A.*

I come now to consider the items on the credit side of the account, and in order to render my remarks clear I will number each item as I did those on the debtor side.

To the four first items there do not appear any objections, excepting possibly in adding up the sums, and they must stand in the account.

The 5th item, 11,704 rupees 3 annas for difference in the Aurungabad grain, ought to be struck out of this account and entered into another which I will have made out for the sake of clearness.

The 6th item stands upon the same ground with the 5th, viz. 8338 rupees for difference between the price charged for the grain delivered at Mulcapoor and Nandoorah, and that at

* See page 440.

which the grain ought to have been delivered according to the agreement made at Aurungabad.

The 7th item of 7500 rupees ought to be struck out entirely. In canvassing the 1st item on the charge side I have shown that this is the case.

The 8th item of 1690 rupees 6½ annas for deficiency of the advance made for the purchase at Pytun ought to be struck out for the reasons stated in canvassing the 4th item of the charge side of the account.

The 9th item of the account, viz. 2500 rupees for carriage of rice from Pytun, ought to be included as due to the brinjaries, by Captain ——'s account before the committee.

In regard to the 10th and 11th items of the credit side of the account, the question is whether the brinjaries have credit in statements No. 6, 7, 8, 9 for all the sums received from the commissary of grain for grain purchased, these sums among others. If they have, these items ought to be struck out of the credit side of the account, and 17, 18 ought to remain on the debtor side; if they have not credit for this in the statements above alluded to, the items 17 and 18 ought to be struck out of the debtor side. In either case they ought not to appear on the credit side; as if credit is given for the grain in the statements 6, 7, 8, 9, by including in the account current the items 10 and 11, the brinjaries will have credit twice for the same sums; and if they have not credit for these sums in the statements above alluded to, the items 17 and 18 must be struck out of the debtor side.

According to this division the account between the brinjaries and Captain —— will be as in paper A,* and the balance 90,533 rupees 6½ annas.

But besides the balance which appears by paper A to be due to the brinjaries by Captain ——, it appears they have been charged for the grain delivered to them at Aurungabad, Mungapytun, Budnapoor, Roshengaum, Jalnah, Ballapoor, Ellichpoor, Mulcapoor, and Nandoorah, at the rates paid for the grain received at those places respectively, and not at the rates settled in the agreement made with Colonel Stevenson at Aurungabad in August, 1803.

I have already given my opinion that that agreement ought to be considered binding on both parts till another should be made; and I have the honour to enclose a paper marked B, by which it appears that the amount paid for the grain delivered to the

* See page 440.

brinjarries and charged to them is 146,081 rupees 8½ annas, and the amount at which they ought to have received it is 96,215 rupees 2½ annas; the difference 44,466 rupees 2½ annas. I request you to be so kind as to authorize the superintendent of supplies to draw this sum of difference, and pay it to the brinjarries on account of the Honourable Company; for which disbursements this letter is to be the voucher.

There remain now to be considered only the sums due by Captain —— to the Soubah's government for rice and other grains delivered to the brinjarries.

As by these accounts current Captain —— is allowed to take credit for the full price of the grain received in every instance, it is necessary that he should pay the full price. Accordingly I request you to, call upon Rajah Mohiput Ram, Rajah Sookroodoor, and others to know what has been paid for and what has not; and you will oblige Captain —— to pay the money.

You will particularly inquire whether the grain received at Dowlutabad has been paid for by bill or otherwise; and if it has not, you will take care that it is paid for.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

(ENCLOSURE B.)

ACCOUNT of the difference between the price at which grain was charged to the Brinjarries with the Subsidiary Force, and the rates agreed upon with them at Aurungabad.

Places of delivery of Grain.	Amount charged to the Brinjarries.		Amount at which it ought to have been charged by agreement at Aurungabad.		Difference.	
	Rs.	As.	Rs.	As.	Rs.	As.
Aurungabad	33,998	2	22,950	7	11,047	11
Budnapoor	6,732	3	4,319	12	2,412	7
Roshengaum	1,687	10	1,155	12	531	14
Jalnah	2,929	15	1,857	4	1,072	11
Mungapytun { Rice	15,180	0	12,000	0	3,180	0
Mungapytun { Dry Grain	28,309	9½	21,142	8½	7,167	0½
Muleapoor	16,291	1	11,976	15½	4,314	1½
Nandoorah	8,625	0	6,900	0	1,725	0
Ballapoor	13,854	5	6,229	12½	7,624	8½
Ellichpoor	13,073	11	7,682	14½	5,390	12½
Rupees	1,40,681	8½	96,215	6½	44,466	2½

* Vide Enclosure A, next page.

[ENCLOSURE A.]

THE BRINJARRIES in Account Current with the HON. COMPANY and LIEUT. ———, from the commencement of the Campaign till 31st March, 1804. Cr.

	Rs.	As.		Rs.	As.
1. To Cash paid to Major Kirkpatrick on account of advances made by him to the Brinjarries	75,000	0	1. By Grain delivered as per Statement (Appendix No. 6)	1,13,542	15½
2. To Cash advanced Brinjarries sent to Buswunt	30,000	0	2. By ditto ditto (Appendix No. 7)	1,52,020	7
3. To Cash advanced the party sent with Munnick Chund	12,000	0	3. By ditto ditto (Appendix No. 8)	96,560	0
4. To Cash for the purchase of Grain at Pytun	30,000	0	4. By ditto ditto (Appendix No. 9)	83,114	0
5. To Cash to Salabut Khan for the purchase of Grain as per Statement of Lieut. ———'s (No. 1)	26,928	0	5. By the difference due the Brinjarries for the carriage of the Pytun Rice	2,500	0
6. To Cash for the purchase of Grain at Budnapoor and Rashengaum: vide Lieut. ———'s Statement (No. 2)	8,419	13			
7. To Cash for the purchase of Grain at Jalnah: vide ditto (No. 3)	2,929	15			
8. To Cash for ditto at Burhampoor: vide ditto (No. 4)	18,528	3			
9. To Cash for ditto at Gawilghur: vide ditto (No. 5)	14,168	4			
10. { To Cash advanced for the purchase of grain at Bazaar } Rs. 18,000					
{ To Cash advanced brinjarries sent to Kair } Rs. 42,000					
Total	60,000				
Deduct by order of Lieut.-Colonel Haliburton	30,000	0			
11. To Cash advanced to the Brinjarries at different times	20,761	0			
12. To the purchase of Rice at Aurungabad per Statement (No. 1)	16,811	8			
13. To the purchase of Dry Grain at ditto ditto (No. 2)	17,186	10			
14. To the purchase of Rice at Pytun ditto (No. 3)	15,180	0			
15. To the purchase of Dry Grain at Dowlatabad ditto (No. 4)	9,600	0			
16. To the purchase of ditto at Mulcapoor and Nandoorah ditto (No. 5)	24,922	3			
17. To Cash paid for the purchase of Grain at Aurungabad drawn for in the Commissary of Grain's bill as per Statement (No. 1)	2,724	15			
18. To Cash paid for the issue of Grain at Burhampoor included in the Commissary of Grain's account	2,043	14			
Total	3,57,204	5			
To Balance due to the Brinjarries	90,533	1½			

440

BRINJARRY ACCOUNTS.

JUNE, 1804.

4 47 727 61

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

[1823.]

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Camp at Chinchore, 20th June, 1804.

I have received your letters of the 6th, 8th, and 11th.

You have acted quite right in omitting to report to the Governor-General the renewed conversations about Gwalior and Gohud. They will lead to nothing, and I think it useless to report conversations of this nature, excepting in a very general manner. If they should become serious discussions, you should report them, and advert to the former conversations as not having been reported. This mode of carrying on business is certainly not what it ought to be; but it is the only mode that can answer at present.

Malcolm has informed you of the nature of the letter of instructions received from the Governor-General, and I expect a copy of them this day from Bombay, which shall be sent to you. I have since received a letter from the Governor-General of the 30th May, by which I am authorized to depart from the instructions of the 25th, and the Governor-General has desired me to go to Bengal. Before I had received this last letter I had written to Mr. Duncan to desire him not to recall Murray from Malwa, and I had determined at Malcolm's suggestion, and in consequence of a letter from Shawe, to go to Bengal. In a few days I will send you the detail of my plans and measures for the campaign in the Deccan. We keep upon our legs everywhere, and still we decrease our expenses and relieve some of the troops from the inconveniences which they have been suffering.

I fear that Scindiah will not like my going away; but you must tell him that the Governor-General has ordered me to Bengal, and that I had arranged everything for the campaign before I had gone off.

One of my principal reasons for going to Bengal is to give you some support and confidence. I shall labour hard to keep everything correct. I go by Seringapatam in order to see Purneah, and by Madras to see General Stuart, as I am not quite prepared to speak upon the military affairs of Fort St. George without knowing his opinion.

What is the nature of Monson's success against Jeswunt?

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1824.] G. O.

Camp at Poonah, Sunday, 24th June, 1804.

The following corps, &c., are to compose the subsidiary force serving with His Highness the Peshwah, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace :

5th and 7th regts. Native cavalry.
 Detachments of Madras and Bombay artillery.
 H. M. 74th and 78th regts.
 1st batt. 2nd regt. Madras N. I.
 2nd batt. 3rd do. do.
 1st batt. 6th do. do.
 2nd batt. 18th do. do.

Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton, commanding the subsidiary force serving with the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, commanding the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, will each place themselves under the authority of the Resident at the durbar of the powers in whose service the troops under their command are employed, according to the orders and regulations of government upon this subject. Colonel Murray and the troops in Malwa will receive further orders for their guidance from the authorities at Bombay.

Upon the occasion of quitting the army, in consequence of the orders of the Governor-General, Major-General Wellesley once more returns his thanks to the officers and troops for their uniform good conduct since he has had the honour of commanding them. In the space of little more than a year, those in this quarter in particular, now composing the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and those which are under orders to march to the southward, have been tried in every mode in which it is possible to try troops, and have uniformly manifested that patience under fatigues and severity of climate, that activity and perseverance in labour, and bravery and discipline in action, which are the characteristic qualities of the best soldiers: their success, and the honour which the troops have acquired, are proportionate to the good qualities which they have displayed: on which qualities Major-General Wellesley has always had the fullest reliance in every emergency of the service. He now recommends to them an adherence to the principles which have brought them with honour through so many difficulties, as the certain pledge of future success.

Major-General Wellesley has frequently reported the good

conduct of the troops to the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General, and has recommended them to the notice of their Excellencies. He will not fail to recommend individuals who have had opportunities of distinguishing themselves, whenever an occasion may offer; and he assures all that he shall ever remember and reflect with satisfaction on their conduct and services, and that in every situation in which he may be placed he will be happy to forward their views.

Major-General Wellesley has delayed to give orders for the division of the property captured during the war, according to the instructions of the Governor-General, only till he receives all the prize rolls: he expects those of the 11th regiment from Berar in the course of a few days, when orders will be sent on that subject and regarding the batta for the officers.

Major-General Wellesley takes this opportunity of expressing his approbation of the conduct of the troops serving under the government of Bombay in Guzerat during the late war.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

EXTRACTS FROM A MEMORANDUM GIVEN BY MAJOR-GENERAL [1825.]-
WELLESLEY TO THE BOMBAY GOVERNMENT RELATIVE TO
THE FORMATION OF THE SUBSIDIARY FORCE AT POONAH.

* * * * *

4. The subsidiary force is to consist of 6 battalions, each consisting of 1000 rank and file, 1 company of artillery, and 1 company or 100 pioneers, with their proper complement of ordnance and warlike stores.

* * * * *

10. The next subject for consideration is the equipment of these corps for the field. The commanding officers of Native corps on the establishment of Fort St. George carry the camp equipage and regimental stores for their corps; an arrangement which is certainly convenient to the service, and, as far as I am able to judge, economical. However, it is one which could not be introduced into the establishment of the government of Bombay without reference to the Court of Directors. It will therefore be necessary to continue the present mode of carrying the camp equipage at the expense of the public; but I recom-

mend that the tents should be carried upon camels, instead of upon bullocks. This arrangement will be an economical one eventually, and will be attended by other advantages. A camel will carry three of the tents used by the Bombay army, with their poles, with great facility.

* * * * *

12. The corps on the Bombay establishment are very deficient in regimental establishments to supply the troops with water. It would be a much better arrangement to give the adjutants of corps an allowance of 26 rupees per month, to supply two puckalie men and two bullocks with bags for each company; the watermen, bullock bags, &c., to be mustered once a month at the same time with the corps, and the bullocks to be marked with the number of the corps and the letter W, to distinguish them from all others.

13. There is another establishment also much wanted with the corps of the Bombay army, and that is, one of bullocks to carry spare ammunition and entrenching tools, &c., of which I enclose a list, which the corps ought always to have with it; to carry which, 24 bullocks. It would be proper to give an allowance *per mensem* to the adjutants, or any subaltern officer of corps, to provide bullocks and drivers for this service. These bullocks to be marked with the number of the corps and the letter A, and to be mustered with their drivers once a month with the corps.

14. In respect to carriage for the sick, I am fully aware of the difficulties under which the government of Bombay must always labour in this part of their equipments. I should recommend, therefore, that the establishment of doolies with each Native corps should be only four; but that waggons should be made at Bombay to carry twenty men of each corps, besides those for whom doolies will be provided. General Bellasis will be able to make a pattern waggon: if it could be done with convenience and without great expense, the waggon ought to be upon springs, and at all events covered from the weather. Their wheels and axletrees ought to be strong, and they ought to have a greater capacity of turning than the waggon which General Bellasis lately sent to Poonah. It is not a matter of much consequence what number of men each waggon is made to contain, although possibly six men would be the most convenient number.

15. I enclose a statement of the establishment for each department, formed upon the model of that of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad ; and they appear to me to be necessary. When the Bombay Native infantry shall form the subsidiary force, it will be necessary to add an establishment of armourers to the department of the commissary of stores, as those corps have no battalion armourers, and the repairs to their arms are always performed in the public stores.

16. In case General Stuart should not find it convenient to leave at Poonah the ordnance at present there, the ordnance which should be in the Peshwah's territory for the service of the subsidiary force are ; two iron 18 pounders, two iron 12 pounders, two brass 12 pounders, eighteen brass 6 pounders, two 5½ inch howitzers, with their proportion of tumbrils, and five spare tumbrils for stores, and thirty platform carts, and an artificer's cart, and eleven arrack carts.

17. The commissary of stores at Poonah has a general state of stores which he ought to carry (exclusive of stores for the heavy guns, which can be but seldom required, and must be the subject of a distinct arrangement when required), and these will require 1000 bullocks, including their complement of spare cattle, one to every six bullocks.

* * * * *

19. But supposing that they could be replaced, or that they would stay, it is notorious that the worst mode of procuring bullocks for the public service is to hire them ; and the best is to have an establishment of bullocks and drivers, the property and in the service of the public, provided the persons composing it really know or are taught and are forced to perform their duty.

20. I am therefore induced, by every consideration, to recommend that a bullock establishment should be formed at Bombay, to the extent at least that will be necessary to carry the stores for the subsidiary force.

21. The establishment should be in regular karkhanas. The drivers entertained for these bullocks should be accustomed at an early period to bring in their forage. The bullocks of each karkhana should be picketed in a separate line ; they should receive their grain at the same time, and in the presence of the officer who will have the temporary charge of the department at Bombay. This officer ought also to see the forage which the

drivers bring in for the cattle, and that the bullocks are rubbed down and cleaned every night. The drivers ought to be taught the mode of saddling and of loading and driving cattle, and everything which relates to the duty of a bullock driver. Unless those who have charge of the cattle understand these duties, the cattle are destroyed, and the public are obliged to incur the expense of replacing them.

22. I recommend that the troops of the subsidiary force should be fed whenever they may be on actual service, and, when rice is not sold in the bazaar of the camp at 12 pucca seers (each of 2 lbs.) for a rupee, in the manner in which I fed the troops during the late war. They received their batta in money, and each man besides received half a seer or 1 lb. of rice *gratis* (daily). As rice was seldom at so low a price as a rupee for 6 seers, the public gained by this arrangement in the mere expense of the rice issued to the troops; and the expense of half the carriage which would have been required to carry rice to last the troops for an equal length of time, supposing that a seer of rice had been issued to each man instead of batta; and I had the further advantage of not overburthening the army with cattle. I therefore strongly recommend this system.

23. The number of bullocks which I have attached to the grain department of the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah is 5000, although there are none in the grain department with the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.

24. The reason for which I have departed from the model of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam in this instance is, that there is a famine in the Deccan at present, the effects of which may be felt for some time; and I could not depend upon the Mahratta brinjarries in the same manner as I know that the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam may upon those belonging to His Highness's territories. I have, however, lately suggested to Colonel Close the expediency of giving the Mahratta brinjarries a trial, from which Mr. Duncan will be able to judge whether they can be depended upon.

25. At all events, whether they can or not, I conceive that the quantity of grain for the carriage of which I have above provided is far more than will be necessary upon any future occasion. In ordinary times, when the subsidiary force will not move, it is probable that no establishment of grain bullocks will be necessary; particularly if Colonel Close should find that he can command

the services of the Mahratta brinjaries upon the plan proposed, or upon any other plan. If he should not be able to command their services, a bullock establishment, to carry rice to feed the number of fighting men at the half allowance for thirty days, will be necessary. But as it is possible that the plan proposed in respect to the Mahratta brinjaries will answer, and as at all events, supposing it should not, it is probable that some of the Mysore and Madras bullock owners and maistries attached to the grain department may be prevailed upon to stay, I do not now propose that a bullock establishment should be formed at Bombay for the grain as well as the store department; although, if it should be necessary to keep bullocks permanently to carry grain, in consequence of Colonel Close being unable to depend upon the brinjaries, it will be necessary hereafter to form such an establishment.

26. In that case they ought to be formed regularly at Bombay in the manner recommended for those of the store department.

27. The number of European troops will be so small, that there will be no difficulty at any time in arranging for the carriage of their provisions.

28. The number of draught bullocks which I have allotted for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, as appears by the enclosed papers, is 1250, besides 100 belonging to the Bombay establishment at Poonah, which I placed under the charge of the commissary of grain at Poonah.

29. After making a liberal allowance for all the carriages to be drawn, and allowing the usual number of spare, this number is 350 more than the number of carriages will require.

30. However, the service in the Mahratta country will require great celerity and independence of movement; and it cannot be performed unless the commanding officer have the command of good cattle, in high condition, to draw his carriages. He may be obliged to be in the field during the monsoon: it must be expected that some cattle will die in that season, and yet the military operations must be continued.

Besides the ordnance and store carriages, for which provision has been and must be made, I have recommended that waggons should be constructed for the carriage of the sick: these may require four or six bullocks each, and will increase the demand from 100 to 120 bullocks.

31. It is therefore my opinion that the number of draught bullocks with the subsidiary force ought not to be less than 1300.

32. I know the Mysore people, who attend the draught bullocks now with the subsidiary force, will not stay in the Peshwah's territories after the troops belonging to the government of Fort St. George shall come away; indeed it would be unreasonable to expect that they should stay. Their families live near Seringapatam, and they can purchase food and all the necessaries of life in Mysore at one sixth of the price at which the same articles can ever be procured at Poonah.

33. Supposing, therefore, that it should be convenient to the government of Fort St. George to hand over to the government of Bombay the bullocks now at Poonah, it would be necessary that the government of Bombay should entertain persons, and form an establishment of servants to attend upon the cattle.

34. I proceed now to detail the mode in which I recommend that that plan should be carried into execution, in reference to an establishment of draught bullocks for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah.

35. The number of karkhanas which will be required will be thirteen, to be numbered accordingly. In my opinion, the best place at which to collect the drivers and other servants, and to train them to their business, will be the head quarters of the subsidiary force. There are already a certain number of Mahratta drivers in the Mysore karkhanas, left at Poonah, which might be the foundation of the establishment.

36. An establishment of servants and drivers should be formed for thirteen karkhanas.

37. By degrees they may draft into these karkhanas the Mahratta drivers belonging to the Mysore karkhanas; and when they shall find the drivers, &c., sufficiently trained and steady both in the mode of taking care and of driving the cattle, they may send the Mysore drivers away to Seringapatam, and keep Mahratta servants and drivers only in charge of the bullocks.

38. It will not be possible to hire, in the Mahratta territories or at Bombay, servants and drivers of bullocks at the same rate of wages as those receive who belong to the Company's establishment in Mysore. On the other hand, it is very desirable for the government, as well as for the officers of the army, that the wages of labour prevalent at Bombay should not be paid in the subsidiary force.

I recommend, therefore, that it should be left to the authorities at Poonah to settle the rate of the wages of the different descriptions of servants and drivers who are to form this establishment of draught bullocks. But care must be taken to fix the wages of the drivers of the karkhana of carriage bullocks for the department which must be formed at Bombay at the same rate, otherwise it will be necessary to raise the wages of the attendants and drivers belonging to the draught karkhanas to the Bombay standard.

39. It will be impossible to form the carriage karkhanas in camp; there are no carriage bullocks in camp on that establishment, and there is no model; and as the camp will be moving, it will not be possible to train the servants and drivers so well as they can be trained at Bombay.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton.

[1826.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp at Niggeree, 28th June, 1804.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 10th. I am much concerned to observe that you will not be able to march for some time. However, I trust that you will exert yourself to prevail upon your brinjarries to carry for you the grain you have got from Mohiput Ram, so as to be able to cooperate in the siege of Chandore in the month of August.

It is most desirable that that operation should be undertaken at that period. If the place should not be in our possession before the rivers will fall, Holkar will have it in his power to impede our operations by throwing troops across the Nerbudda and Taptee, and possibly invading the Nizam's territories. If we take Chandore before the rivers will fall, he can do no mischief in the Deccan. You see, therefore, how important it is that you should equip yourself again. I beg you to correspond with Colonel Close or Colonel Wallace upon this subject, and let them know what prospect you have that you will be able to prevail upon the brinjarries to attend you at an early period.

Besides the money gone to you lately, and which you have received, you will in the course of a month from this date receive

450 SCINDIAH'S DESIRE TO DESTROY HOLKAR. JUNE, 1804.

not less than twelve lacs of rupees, so that you will have plenty to pay your brinjaries.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1827.]

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Camp at Rajahpore, 30th June, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 19th instant.

If Scindiah's ministers have detained Holkar's vakeel, they have done so with a design to deceive Holkar. There cannot be a doubt of Scindiah's desire to destroy Holkar, or that his ministers are aware that Holkar's destruction is the only mode by which Scindiah's government can acquire any degree of strength or respectability. I think it possible that they may have detained the vakeel, and the reason for which I think so is, that Holkar did not plunder Ougein when he was in the neighbourhood of that city. He would have done so if he had not been led to believe, either by the detention of the vakeel or by some other mode, that Scindiah would not become a party to the war.

It may be true that Holkar's vakeel is in Burhampore and the ministers may not know it, and may not have any treacherous design in allowing him to remain there. If I recollect correctly, they told either you or Malcolm that this person was attached to Scindiah, more than to Holkar whose service he was desirous to quit, and they may have allowed him to remain in Burhampore as a place of safety. On the other hand, it is certain that all the Mahrattas attach but little importance to the residence of a vakeel with each other during the time of the most violent hostility, and the ministers may have winked at his residence at Burhampore even in his public character on this ground.

I conclude that you will have continued your endeavours to ascertain whether the vakeel is really there or not, and you may possibly have ascertained the fact before you will receive this letter, as well as whether or not he holds any communication with Scindiah's ministers. Whatever may be the result of your inquiries (unless it should be that he is not at Burhampore), I think that you ought to speak to Kavel Nyn upon the subject, and desire that the matter may be explained. You will judge from the explanation whether the subject ought to be noticed in

your despatches to the Governor-General, and in what manner. The fact is, that I could account for the vakeel's remaining at Burhampoor in several different modes, each of which would be conclusive with a Mahratta, and I am convinced that Scindiah and his ministers are serious in their declared intentions to destroy Holkar, and that if they have detained the vakeel with any political view, it is to deceive Holkar, and not us; but the Governor-General will never understand this.

I am sorry that you mentioned to Murray that the Governor-General did not intend that he should quit Guzerat. He will certainly halt, if he does not return; but I conclude that you have written to him again as soon as you learned from Malcolm that I did not intend to carry into execution that part of the Governor-General's instructions.

I have not noticed the instructions to Murray in any manner, and I have urged Mr. Duncan to allow him to proceed according to my instructions of the 7th May.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain Wilks.

[1828.]

SIR,

Camp at Padshahpoo, 4th July, 1804.

I have the honour to inform you that the Rajah's troops will enter Mysore by Hurryhur. I have desired that they may proceed from the Kistna, which river they are now crossing, by detachments, in order that they may be relieved from the distress which they suffer at the earliest possible period; and that they may not delay and consume the forage at the different rivers, from which our troops would be distressed in that article.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Adjutant-General of the Army.

[1829.]

SIR,

Camp at Deogherry, 9th July, 1804.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the orders issued by me in the month of June, which require the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief.

The order of the 4th of June, relative to the issue of rice from the stores to the bazaars to be sold to the followers, was rendered necessary by the famine which existed in the Deccan. It was not possible that the followers of the camp, the majority of whom do not receive more than 7 rupees *per mensem*, and many not so much, could subsist when the most common grains could not be got under a rupee for two seers. The rains also had commenced, and it became more difficult every day to procure grain at any price.

It would possibly have been a more economical arrangement to the public to issue the grain at once from the stores to the followers, at the rate at which it was settled that it should be purchased in the bazaars. But this arrangement would have been attended by the ruin of all the bazaar people, and of the dealers who had attended and fed the camp throughout the war, and upon whom I was to depend for subsistence when the country should be able again to afford any article of consumption, by the transportation and sale of which they could live. I therefore preferred the mode of giving this rice to the bazaars pointed out in the orders of the 4th of June. It has been sold to the dealers at 1 rupee for $7\frac{1}{2}$ seers, and from every account which I have seen, the rice in store at Poonah has been laid in at the rate of a rupee for 10 seers; so that the difference of gain to the Company by the arrangement adopted by me is $1\frac{1}{2}$ seers upon every rupee.

The order of the 9th of June was issued because the reasons which existed for depriving Lieutenant-Colonel Griffin of the contract for the carriage of the sick of the 2nd battalion 18th regiment did not exist in respect to Major Mealey, and I thought it proper to place him on the same establishment with other commanding-officers of corps.

I have likewise the honour to enclose copies of letters, written by my directions, which contain orders which require the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief. In the letter of the 8th of June to Major Mealey, I authorised the issue of rice to the followers of the 2nd battalion 18th regiment, rather than the issue of it to the bazaar, because that corps was stationed at Poonah, and the same reasons did not exist for allowing the bazaar people and dealers to have a profit upon the consumption of the camp as existed in favour of the dealers and bazaar people in the camp under my command.

The letter to Captain Young of the 15th of June, allowing a higher pay to be given to one class of the attendants on the elephants, was written on the same principle which operated in favour of the drivers of the gun-bullocks in June, 1803, and which was approved by the Commander-in-Chief. I have desired Captain Young to reduce the pay of both descriptions of persons to the former level, from the end of the month in which they will enter Mysore.

As Captain Colebrooke incurred some expense in the care and feed of horses which he purchased for the service, from the time at which he purchased them to that at which they were examined by a committee and allotted to corps; and as he lost some, and, upon the whole, performed the service on which he was employed in a satisfactory manner, and purchased really good horses, particularly for the 19th dragoons, at a rate but little higher than that which the Company pay for colts landed upon the Malabar coast, I considered him entitled to some reward, and fixed upon that sum as commission which has been given to agents for purchases in every other instance.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter, and other papers sent with it, to Colonel Haliburton, in which I have given the Colonel orders to authorise the superintendent of supplies with the subsidiary force to draw from the Paymaster a sum amounting to 44,466 rupees 2½ annas, being the difference between the sum which the brinjarries have been charged for grain delivered to them at different places during the campaign, and that at which they ought to have received the grain according to a bargain which they made with Colonel Stevenson at Aurungabad.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1830.]

SIR,

Camp at Mooty Bednore, 10th July, 1804.

I have the honour to enclose you English and Mahratta translations of a treaty which I have proposed to make with the Rajah of Kolapoor, with a view to enable you to raise the blockade of the Rajah's ports on the coast of Malabar.

I did everything in my power to induce the Rajah to pay the

money which he owes to the Company and to the British merchants residing at Bombay on account of former piracies; but I was not able to effect this object, because the Rajah has no means whatever of defraying the expense. But this treaty decides nothing upon those claims; on the contrary, I explained particularly to the Rajah's vakeels that the British government delayed to enforce them only till the Rajah should be able to discharge the debts which were so justly due.

I have requested that the Rajah should send you a copy of the treaty signed by himself, with this letter; and that he should at the same time propose for your approbation the person who is to be the security for the payment of the value of any vessels which may be taken on the coast hereafter. If he should comply with these requests, and you should approve of the security which he will offer, I hope that you will raise the blockade of his ports.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Translation of a proposed arrangement with the Rajah of Kolapoor relative to his Political Affairs.

The Honourable Company being united by a defensive alliance with His Highness the Peshwah, and the Rajah of Kolapoor having claims upon His Highness and upon different sirdars in His Highness's service of various descriptions, all of which it is desirable to bring to an amicable conclusion, it is hereby agreed:

1st. That the Rajah of Kolapoor will refer to the consideration and arbitration of the Honourable Company's government all claims and subjects of dispute which exist between His Highness the Peshwah or any of his servants or subjects, and the Rajah of Kolapoor will agree to whatever the Honourable Company may decide upon those subjects.

2nd. The Honourable Company's government hereby engage to take into consideration and to decide according to the principles of justice and equity the various claims and subjects of dispute existing between His Highness the Peshwah, his subjects or servants, and the Rajah of Kolapoor.

3rd. Till the two first articles can be carried into execution it is agreed that all hostilities shall be suspended, and that each party, viz. the Peshwah and his sirdars or subjects on the one hand, and the Rajah of Kolapoor on the other, shall retain possession of what he has got.

Translation of a proposed arrangement with the Rajah of Kolapoor relative to his Maritime Affairs.

1. The Rajah shall engage that no pirate vessels of any description shall be fitted out at or shall sail from or enter into the ports on the coasts of his country, or shall find there an asylum.

2. The Rajah shall produce a soucar residing at Bombay or at Poonah who shall give security that if any vessel should be plundered or molested at sea or sailing on the coast by any vessel belonging to or which has sailed from or may enter into the ports belonging to the Rajah of Kolapoor, such soucar is to pay to the order of the Governor of Bombay the value of such vessel plundered.

3. The mode in which the value of such vessel shall be ascertained shall be by a committee of the Insurance Society at Bombay, to be appointed by the Governor of Bombay.

4. Upon those articles being agreed to, and upon the Governor of Bombay's acceptance of the security of the soucar as stated in the second article, the blockade of the ports in the Rajah of Kolapoor's territories shall be taken off.

To the Secretary of the Commander-in-Chief.

[1831.]

SIR,

Camp at Akowla, 11th July, 1804.

I have the honour to enclose the accounts of expenses incurred in the month of June, for which no provision is made by the regulations of government.

In the account No. 5 there is a charge of 100 rupees paid to Lalla Ramchund. This was a person employed in my camp by Rajah Mohiput Ram, and, according to the custom, he had no means of subsistence excepting those which I gave him from time to time.

No. 6 is a receipt for 1500 rupees for Ghazi Khan. This is a Reyot chief on the borders of Berar, to whom I promised to pay 3000 rupees *per mensem* when I entered that country in

November, 1803, on condition that he would keep the country in a state of tranquillity for my communication. I paid him half a month in advance, and he soon afterwards failed to perform his engagement; but I conceived that he was entitled to the allowance for one month, and therefore paid him the remainder of one month's allowance.

Sheik Ghazi (No. 7) was his messenger to my camp to receive the money; and was starving.

The enclosed copy of a letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, dated April 29th, 1804, will explain all the circumstances respecting the charge for making up clothing.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1832.]

To Major Symons.

DEAR SYMONS,

Vellore, 21st July, 1804.

I return the trials signed. I think that the sentences of the persons who have been found with one base coin are severe; the accident might happen to any body, to you as well as to me. It would be difficult to know in what place the coin was got, and hard to be punished in an instance in which there could be no criminal intention whatever. I think therefore that there ought to be proof of an intention to defraud before a person is convicted of the crime of uttering base coin.

I will apply at Madras that all the ladies concerned in the late intrigues, and Hyder Hussein and his brother, may be sent to Vellore. In the mean time let a note be written in my name to Hyder Hussein Khan, to apprise him that I am aware of the improper correspondences carried on in his house, probably with his knowledge; and that therefore he must receive two hircarrahs, one of whom is constantly to remain with him, to report all he does, who he sees, and where he lies.

These hircarrahs are to be paid out of his allowance from the Company.

You will fix upon trustworthy persons to perform this duty, and let them report to you daily, and immediately any occurrence of importance.

Let Joseph Enarol be sent to Madras by the first opportunity, and a letter written with him to the town major, stating that I

had before sent him away, but that he had been allowed to return, and there was strong suspicion he had been guilty of improper practices.

Try Sheik Mahomed, Abdul Cawder, Rajah Khan, and Sheik Hussein in the Court of Foujdarry for holding improper communications with the Company's enemies. Let one of the party be evidence against the rest. He who first gave the information ought to be the man.

Let the daroga and havildar be tried by a court-martial, which I will order.

Public justice must be done, whatever may be the consequences; but there is no occasion for entering into the bazaar business, unless the prisoners should do so in their defence.

The Ashur Khanas in Seringapatam were considered as permanent religious establishments, and not as temporary provisions for the fakirs in charge of them.

The paymaster cannot advance money to pay for the mosques without an order from government, and it is not worth while to apply for it. He may, and possibly will, make small advances on account till the savings in hand will be sufficiently large to enable the mosques to get on without an advance. How was this matter arranged before we interfered?

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Send me a copy of this letter.

Rajah Khan is, I believe, one of the Company's pensioners; if so, he ought to be deprived of his pension.

GENERAL ORDERS BY THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL AT MADRAS. [1833.]

28th July, 1804.

The government of Fort St. George have repeatedly had occasion to express their high approbation of the distinguished services performed by Major-General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley.

The conduct of Major-General Wellesley during the campaign against Seringapatam, in the operations against Dhoondiah Waugh, and in the expeditions necessary to establish the tranquillity of Mysore, afforded the most honourable and decisive testimonies of his talents, energy, and zeal;

but a wider field was furnished for the exercise of those eminent qualifications by the subsequent events in the Mahratta empire.

The rapid and judicious movements of Major-General Wellesley which produced the retreat of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, preserved the capital of the Mahratta empire, and restored the Peshwah to the musnud of Poonah; his success in securing the means of subsistence and movement for the army under his command in countries remote from the sources of supply, and exhausted by the depredations of the Mahratta troops; the victories which he achieved at Assye and Argaum over the combined armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; the conquest of the fortresses of Ahmednugur, Asseergur, and Gawilghur; the general conduct of the war, and the conditions of the treaties of peace arranged by him with the confederate Mahratta chiefs, entitle Major-General Wellesley to be classed with the most illustrious British commanders, and to receive the approbation and gratitude of his country.

These services have already been appreciated and acknowledged by the highest authority in India; but the Right Honourable the Governor in Council cannot deny himself the gratification of publishing to this army, on the occasion of Major-General Wellesley's departure for Bengal, the high sense entertained by his Lordship of the extensive ability, military science, and political knowledge manifested by Major-General Wellesley during the period while he commanded in the Deccan, and of the eminent services which he has rendered to the interests of this government, of the empire in India, and the British nation.

[1834.]

To Major Symons.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 28th July, 1804.

I have had the honour of laying before the Right Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George your report on the discovery at Seringapatam of a treasonable correspondence; and his Lordship has been pleased to give directions that the mother of Futteh Ali, and the mother of Hyder Hussein Khan and Saffier Ali Khan, and all the females belonging to the family, and Hyder Hussein Khan and Saffier Ali Khan, may be sent to Vellore without loss of time.

You will accordingly be pleased to make arrangements for sending off those persons. You will ascertain from Hyder Hussein Khan the number and description of females belonging to the family, and you will provide suitable carriage for them. You will indent upon the stores for doolies, and carts, and camp equipage, and whatever else may be required.

As soon as all the preparations for the accommodation of these persons will be completed, you will apply to the commanding officer of Seringapatam for an escort, and you will send

them off, giving notice to the commanding officer at Vellore of the period of their departure.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1835.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Barrackpoor, 20th Aug., 1804.

I have perused the proceedings of your government on the 20th July, which you have transmitted to the Governor-General, and I am much concerned to observe that you entertain some apprehensions respecting the state of Guzerat. It is my opinion that you have no cause for apprehension as long as the rainy season will continue; and you will be surprised when I tell you that, at the moment at which you wrote to the government of Fort St. George to apprise that government of the probability that Guzerat would be attacked, it was actually threatened, and of your opinion that Surat itself was not safe, Holkar was engaged with Colonel Monson in the Rajah of Boondy's country, and was not likely to be able to return towards Guzerat for a considerable length of time. Even if he should return, it must be recollected that before he can reach Surat he must beat Colonel Murray, pass through Guzerat, a country always hitherto deemed impracticable for such an army as his during the rainy season, and cross the rivers Myhie, Nerbudda, and Taptee.

If you should persevere in the plan laid down in my letter to Colonel Murray of the 7th of May, which is entirely consistent with, and, indeed, is a part of the general plan of operations which will be carried into execution, and which must destroy Holkar, all will be right. I hope that General Nicholls will not have recommended any plan to you different from that, and I think that you must have strangely altered your opinion of him and me if you should adopt any such plan. If you should not adopt it, you will only have embarrassed yourself by having called for it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1836.]

To N. B. Edmonstone, Esq.

SIR,

Fort William, 22nd August, 1804.

I beg you to bring under the notice of his Excellency the Governor-General the services rendered by the Honourable Mr. Elphinstone during the late war in the Deccan, and in the negotiations of the treaties of peace.

This gentleman was an assistant to the Secretary of the Resident at Poonah, and he joined me when I required his services, under the authority which I had received from his Excellency the Governor-General. I employed him confidentially in the transaction of the most important business, and I have had every reason to be satisfied with his conduct and services, and I have recommended him to the favourable notice of his Excellency the Governor-General.

I now beg leave to recommend that he may receive an allowance as Secretary from the time he joined me in August, 1803, till he was sent to the durbar of the Rajah of Berar; and that his expenses in the field, which it could never be intended should fall upon a gentleman in the civil service, may be paid.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1837.] *To Lieut.-Colonel Maclean, President of a General Court-Martial.*

SIR,

Fort William, 23th Aug., 1804.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has been pleased to direct the Judge-Advocate-General to forward for my confirmation the proceedings on the trial of Captain —— of a general court-martial which I had ordered to assemble, of which court-martial you are the President.

I am concerned to be under the necessity of requesting that the general court-martial may be reassembled, in order to revise their proceedings and their sentence.

It does not appear on the face of the proceedings that the President and members of the general court-martial, or the officer who first officiated as Judge-Advocate, were ever sworn. It is probable that these persons were sworn, and the omission to enter a memorandum of this fact on the fair copy of the pro-

ceedings is only a clerical error; but if this should be the case, the proceedings must be altered, which can be done only in consequence of a regular revision by the court-martial.

If the President, members, and Judge-Advocate were not sworn, the return to this order that the proceedings may be revised will show that fact, and further orders will be sent upon the subject.

I now come to the consideration of the sentence, and I am concerned that I cannot agree in opinion with the general court-martial either on the extent of the guilt of the prisoner, or on the punishment which the court have awarded for that degree of guilt which they have agreed has been proved.

In regard to the first charge, it appears that the court-martial have found Captain ——— guilty of demanding money from Rajah Mohiput Ram, but not for his own use.

The money which it appears on the face of the proceedings that Captain ——— did demand from Rajah Mohiput Ram was a part of the amount of the collection of the arrears of the mukassah; and possibly an explanation of the meaning of the mukassah, and of the manner in which it was collected and under what authority, will induce the court-martial to believe that Captain ——— could have made the demand only for his own use.

In the first place, I have to observe that Rajah Mohiput Ram swears positively that Captain ——— did demand for his own use first 50,000 rupees, and afterwards lowered his demand to 20,000 rupees, collected on account of the mukassah; and Madoo Rao Chowdry, who was present at the time, confirms the evidence of Rajah Mohiput Ram.

The revenues of every district in the province of Berar, the limits of which extend to the neighbourhood of Mulcapoor, were divided between the government of the Soubah of the Deccan and the Rajah of Berar, excepting certain districts which were held solely by the Rajah. The Soubah of the Deccan was the sovereign, and had a right to the revenues, and his amildars and servants managed the civil government and collected the revenue throughout the country. The Rajah of Berar had a right to the mukassah, which is another name for choute, and which having been originally one-fourth of the revenues collected, became, before the late war, in consequence of different arrangements between the government of the Nizam and the Rajahs of Berar, four-fifths of the whole revenue.

When the progress of the British arms in the war brought the British armies into Berar, it is not unreasonable to suppose that arrears of choute or of mukassah were due to the Rajah in different parts of the country; and, indeed, I know that these arrears were due, and Rajah Mohiput Ram was authorized by me to collect them.

Captain —— defends himself from the imputation that he demanded the arrears of the mukassah from Rajah Mohiput Ram by an argument upon the improbability that he should demand a part of the Soubah's revenue which could not be paid to him without the certainty that the circumstances would come to the knowledge of the Soubah of the Deccan; and secondly, by an assertion that the mukassah revenue, which he allows he did demand, was intended to be in payment of the arrears of a contribution which Rajah Mohiput Ram had levied on Burham-poor on account of the British government.

In answer to Captain ——'s reasoning regarding the improbability that he should demand the arrears of the mukassah, as the circumstances must have come to the knowledge of the Soubah's government, I have to oppose the facts regarding the nature of the revenue called mukassah, and that of the right of the Soubah to it which I have above detailed, from which the members of the court-martial will clearly perceive that the Soubah's government could have no means of knowing the amount of those arrears collected by Rajah Mohiput Ram; that their amount must have depended not only upon that which remained uncollected by the Rajah of Berar, but upon the extent of the progress in Berar of the British armies, and upon the success of Rajah Mohiput Ram in inducing the people to pay these arrears; upon all which facts the government at Hyderabad could have had no means of forming a judgment.

Captain ——'s argument, therefore, on the improbability that he should make this demand, founded upon the knowledge that the Soubah must have had of the amount of the arrears collected, falls to the ground, and the evidence of Rajah Mohiput Ram and Madoo Rao Chowdry stands uncontradicted.

But Captain —— allows that he did demand a part of the arrears of the mukassah, but declares that it was in payment of the arrears of a contribution levied at Burham-poor.

It is extraordinary that Captain —— should have fixed upon any particular branch of revenue collected as that which

was to enable Rajah Mohiput Ram to pay a just debt. However, even this assertion will not hold good.

Rajah Mohiput Ram swears that the mukassah money was demanded from him some time previous to the battle of Argaum. I have the honour to inform the court-martial that I did not authorize the demand of the arrear of the contribution collected at Burhampoor till the day after the battle of Argaum, on which day that subject was explained to me by Colonel Stevenson, and I spoke to Rajah Mohiput Ram upon it.

I therefore conclude that there is neither evidence nor reasoning to weigh against the positive evidence of Rajah Mohiput Ram and Madoo Rao Chowdry; therefore, that Captain ——— did demand a part of the arrears of the mukassah money for his own use, and that he ought to have been found guilty of this fact and of improper conduct, as stated in the first charge.

I now come to consider the punishment which the court have awarded to Captain ——— for the degree of guilt which they have agreed has been proved.

The court-martial have found Captain ——— guilty, first of having received a present from a sirdar in payment for services rendered, and other presents from other sirdars. In addition to the infamy which must attach to the character of any officer for accepting payment for services of this nature, which can be considered in no other light than as a bribe, I have to observe that the law of our country forbids the acceptance of any present from a native of this country, and declares that the acceptor shall forfeit double the amount of its value. It likewise declares the acceptance of a present to be extortion and a misdemeanor at law.

The court-martial find the prisoner guilty, in fact, of defrauding the government of the Soubah of the Deccan in the 4th charge, and of defrauding the brinjaries in the 2nd additional charge, and of endeavouring to conceal these frauds by a false account transmitted to me in the 3rd additional charge; and yet for these crimes, which must be repugnant to every honourable mind, which include bribery and extortion and fraud and the fabrication of false accounts, the general court-martial have been satisfied with a sentence that Captain ——— should be reprimanded, and that he should be suspended from the service for six months.

It must be recollected that, at the end of those six months he will return to his station as an officer of the army; and supposing that it were not necessary on public grounds that crimes such as those of which he has been guilty should be punished in the most exemplary manner, surely there is no officer belonging to the Coast army who will not feel disgraced that such a man should remain in the service, and that his character should form a part of the general character of the army.

Upon the whole, therefore, I request that you will lay this letter before the general court-martial, with my desire that they will revise their proceedings and their sentence; and I beg that the proceedings may be sent to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for his confirmation as soon as they will be revised.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1833.]

To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

MY DEAR WEBBE,

Fort William, 11th Sept., 1804.

I have received your letters of the 30th of July and 13th of August. You will rejoice to learn that your conduct has been approved of in every respect.

Your memorandum of the 13th was very acceptable, particularly at the moment it arrived, as the discussion which it contains regarding the temper of Scindiah's durbar and the motives which he had to wish for the war with Holkar is calculated to remove any doubts which might have been entertained here regarding Scindiah's conduct after the success of Holkar against Monson's corps. That success is as great as it well could be; but still I hope that the Commander-in-Chief will be able to alter the state of affairs at a period sufficiently early to keep Scindiah stout to the alliance and the Rajah of Berar faithful to the peace.

I was always of the same opinion with you regarding Scindiah's objects in the war and his probable steady adherence to the alliance, and I had frequently stated my opinion to the Governor-General, to all which your opinion has added great weight. I hope that Scindiah will have the sense to see that Holkar's success has been against a detachment ill-conducted and badly composed, and the patience to wait the result of a

general action between him and General Lake. If he does so, I see a prospect of restoring his government and affairs in general in Malwa and on our frontier to the state in which, in my opinion, they ought to have been left at the peace.

The Governor-General appears determined to leave the Rajahs of Joudpoor, Oudepoor, Kota, and Boondy at Scindiah's mercy, and to have nothing to say to them. It has been reported that the Jeypoor people fired at Monson on his retreat, and suspicions are entertained of the Rajah's designs by Captain Sturrock, who resides with him. The Rajahs of Bhurtpoor and Machery also are supposed to have corresponded and intrigued with Holkar; indeed it is certain that the ministers of the former have done so. If all or any of these persons should have broken their treaty with the Company, the Governor-General is determined to hand them over to Scindiah's government in the same situation as they were previous to the late war. He has found out that this barrier is exceedingly dangerous, and he hopes that he will be able to carry into execution the arrangement to which I have above alluded. He appears also to be inclined to give up Gwalior. All this is between ourselves, of course.

Monson's disasters are really the greatest and the most disgraceful to our military character of any that have ever occurred. The detachment had not two days' provisions; was cut off from its resources by many rivers, on which we had neither bridge nor boat; and all measures to supply with provisions the only fort (Rampoora) to which, in case of emergency, he might have recourse, were omitted. To employ the detachment at all was an error; but the common modes of securing its safety have been omitted.

I shall return immediately to the Deccan and shall bring up reinforcements, which have been already ordered to be in readiness. You may as well mention this circumstance publicly at Scindiah's durbar.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1839.]

To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 12th Sept., 1804.

I enclose an extract of a letter from the Secretary to Government in the Military department, conveying the approbation of the Governor-General to the measure of giving you Captain's prize-money and gratuity. You will accordingly draw the one from the prize-agents, and the other from the paymaster of my division of the army. Write to Bellingham, and he will settle both for you.

I have applied to the Governor-General to give you the allowance of a Secretary to a Residency, and to pay your expenses from the time at which you joined me to that at which I sent you to Nagpoor.

You will have heard of Colonel Monson's retreat, defeats, disgraces, and disasters. He is, however, at last arrived at Agra, he and his detachment woful examples of the risk to be incurred by advancing too far without competent supplies, and of the danger of attempting to retreat before such an army as Holkar's is. He would have done much better to attack Holkar at once, and he would probably have put an end to the war. At all events, he might have made a better retreat. This is between ourselves, as I am very unwilling to circulate my opinion of the late transactions to the northward. I only hope that they will not induce our late enemies to break out again.

I think you will do well to mention Monson's retreat to Ramchunder, apprising him that it was a small detachment which had been pushed too far from support. Tell him that General Lake is now in the field (he marched from Cawnpore on the 3rd), that, for fear of accidents, I am returning to the Deccan immediately, and that the troops on the frontiers of Mysore have actually been put in motion. This may as well be a private communication.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Sir William Clarke.

[1840.]

MY DEAR SIR,

2nd Nov., 1804.

I have perused your despatch to his Excellency the Governor-General; and his Excellency has desired me to communicate to you his observations upon the state of affairs at Goa, and his wishes.

You have received copies of the orders of His Majesty's Ministers respecting the settlement of Goa; and his Excellency the Governor-General has given you instructions which were applicable to the state of affairs at Goa at the period at which they were issued. But it appears now that the Viceroy of Goa is not disposed to allow us to retain that footing in the settlement which we have had hitherto; he has withdrawn the troops which he had placed under your command; it is doubtful what part he would take in the event, however improbable, that the French were to make an open attack upon Goa; and if orders were to arrive from Europe addressed to the Viceroy, and directing him to give up the settlement to the French, it appears certain that the Viceroy would use the Portuguese force under his command in co-operating with any French force which might arrive to carry into execution the orders which he would receive from Portugal.

Under these circumstances our situation at Goa becomes very uncertain and insecure, unless it should be practicable to increase permanently to a great extent the strength of the British corps stationed at Goa, or unless we should drive out the Portuguese troops and establishments, and take absolute possession in His Majesty's name; or unless we should come to an understanding with the Viceroy, and make such an arrangement with him relating to the Portuguese troops as will secure their services at the moment at which they will be required.

In the present state of the establishments of India it is not possible to post permanently at Goa a larger body of British troops, particularly of Europeans, than you have at present. To drive out the Portuguese troops and establishments, however necessary for the eventual security of our frontier, and allowed by the spirit of His Majesty's commands, if there should be actual danger that the French will get possession, is in contradiction to the letter of the orders received, and might occasion difficulties in Europe, which it is the anxious wish of the

Governor-General to avoid.* There remains then only to endeavour to come to an understanding with the Viceroy, and to make such an arrangement of the Portuguese troops as will secure their services in case they should be required.

The Governor-General therefore wishes that you should take an early opportunity of having a conference with the Viceroy, in which you will explain his Excellency's sentiments to the following purport.

You will inform him that his Excellency is determined that the French shall not be put in possession of Goa, whatever may be the nature or extent of the efforts to be made to keep them out of the place, or the consequences of those efforts. That his Excellency thinks it possible that the Prince Regent may be obliged to sacrifice Goa, and to send out orders that that settlement may be ceded to the French in order to avoid the necessity of becoming a party in the war against his old ally the King of Great Britain, or that of ceding other portions of the Portuguese territory, or of making other sacrifices more nearly affecting the interests of the Crown of Portugal.

That the Governor-General is sincerely desirous that the settlement of Goa should continue a possession of Portugal, as he has repeatedly manifested in the course of his administration of the British government in India; and that in order to avoid the loss which will certainly be incurred by the injustice, the violence, and rapacity of the French government, and to exempt the Viceroy from all censure, he proposes to him the following arrangement :

1. It is to be clearly understood that on no account whatever shall the settlement of Goa be given up to the French.

2. The Portuguese troops now forming a part of the garrison of Goa shall co-operate with the British troops in keeping possession of the place; they shall be placed under the orders of Sir William Clarke; their pay shall be made equal to the pay received by the British troops, and the extra expense shall be paid by the British government.

3. After the conclusion of the present war with France the settlement of Goa will be delivered over to the Crown of Portugal, to be held in the same manner as it was held before the war broke out, unless the Crown of Portugal should become a party in the war against His Majesty.

This arrangement may be kept secret from all excepting the

Prince Regent, and those of his ministers in whom His Royal Highness may confide; and you may inform the Viceroy that, in case it should be necessary that there should be the appearance of force in order to prevent him from ceding Goa to the French according to the orders which he may receive from Europe, care will be taken that nothing shall be done injurious to his person or dignity, or more than will be absolutely necessary to exempt him from censure for disobedience of the orders of his Sovereign.

In case you should find it necessary, the Governor-General authorises you to disburse a sum not exceeding one lac to accomplish this arrangement.

I need not point out to you the opportunities which will occur for the exercise and display of your skill in this negotiation. You will point out to the Viceroy particularly the great service which he will render to his country in saving for the Crown of Portugal the valuable settlement of Goa throughout two wars between Great Britain and France, in the course of which France has been in the habit of violating the rights of neutral nations, and of obliging the weaker powers of Europe to make sacrifices in order to preserve their neutrality.

You will also observe to him, that if the arrangement is made and acted upon immediately, he will be less liable to censure for disobedience of orders than if he should delay it till he will expect orders to cede the settlement to the French.

You will also particularly impress upon his mind that it is positively determined that the French shall not have Goa; that by a good understanding with the British government he will certainly secure the possession for the Crown of Portugal; but that otherwise it may be lost entirely.

If you should be of opinion that it is not necessary to enter into this arrangement, or that the Viceroy will decline it, or that to attempt it will be injurious to us, the Governor-General desires you not to commence the negotiation.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1841.]

To Major Shawe.

MY DEAR SHAWE,

Government House, 8th Nov., 1804.

I propose to defer my journey to Barrackpoor till to-morrow. In the mean time I remind you of the following papers which I shall require: an order to Captain Hayes to take me on board, and land me on the coast; an order directing me to take upon myself the command of the troops in the Deccan; a political commission, if that should be thought necessary. The Governor-General said he would writé to Lord William Bentinck respecting the Nabob of Arcot, and a letter to General Lake which he wished me to see.

I hear this morning that the *Belle* packet is arrived at Ked-geree, having left England on the 25th June.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1842.]

*To Major Malcolm.*MY DEAR MALCOLM, On board the *Bombay* frigate, 14th Nov. 1804.

I am just about to sail. I have given Sydenham a letter from the Governor-General, in which I have recommended Kistna, and I have desired him to send you a copy of it. The names of the villages to be granted to Kistna, and the value, are wanting. You must send the necessary information to Shawe or Sydenham, and the blanks will be filled up before the letter will be given to the Governor-General.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1843.]

To the Rev. Mr. Clarke.

DEAR SIR,

Seringsapatam, 8th Dec., 1804.

I have had the honour of receiving and of considering your letter of the 5th instant, and the papers which you sent with it, being copies of letters written by you to Mr. Read on the 5th and 26th August, a copy of a letter from Mr. Read of the 17th

August, and an original letter from that gentleman of the 15th September last.

It is not exactly my province to decide on a question of the kind upon which those letters are written ; however, as you and Mr. Read desire it, and as my decision is likely to prevent farther discussion, I have no objection to consider and decide upon what you have referred to me.

It appears that at the desire of Mr. Read you went into the province of Canara to perform the marriage ceremony for that gentleman ; and it is reasonable that your expenses should be paid for that service, and that you should have your usual fee. Mr. Read conceived that he had fulfilled every expectation which you could have formed upon this subject by presenting you with 250 pagodas ; and possibly if you had not delayed in Canara, Mr. Read's conception would have been correct. However, you were three months absent from your station, instead of half of that time, and the bill for your expenses amounts to 274 star pagodas 38 fanams 20 cash, a larger sum than that which Mr. Read presented to you.

If Mr. Read had not promised you, through Major Grant, that your expenses should be paid liberally, I should at once declare my opinion that he had satisfied all reasonable claims upon him ; but as he made you that promise, I conceive that, in the first place, he ought to discharge the bill for your expenses actually incurred ; and in the next, that he should give you a reasonable fee for the performance of your professional duty.

That fee ought to be, in my opinion, according to the best information I have been able to collect, 100 star pagodas.

According to this opinion your total demand upon Mr. Read is 374 p. 38 f. 20 c., of which sum Mr. Read has already paid you 250 p. ; and 100 p. are at Mr. Gordon's office, to be paid to you on demand. I shall besides desire Mr. Gordon to pay you 24 p. 38 f. 20 c. on account of Mr. Read, which will make up the full sum to which you can possibly be entitled.

I propose to send Mr. Read a copy of this letter ; and I have to desire that no farther correspondence may pass upon this subject.

I have the honour, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1844.]

To Major Campbell.

MY DEAR MAJOR,

Seringsapatam, 8th Dec., 1804.

My friend Captain Quin is going to England, and as I am very desirous to render him a service, I wish much that he should have charge of any men that may be going in the next fleet. Let me know whether you can assist him in obtaining this object, or if you cannot, to whom I shall apply to obtain it.

Captain Quin is an old deputy and friend of Major Young's; he is a most deserving officer, to whom I am under the greatest obligations, and whom I am most anxious to serve.

When I was at Madras I wished to have an opportunity of speaking to you and Major Munro regarding your own situations and objects.

General Stuart was always very kind to me. I had no acquaintance with or claims upon him, excepting those of service; and I owe everything to his confidence, his favourable opinion, and his support. I feel for him an affection and gratitude which I cannot describe; and nothing would give me greater pleasure than to forward the views of any of his friends in this country, particularly of officers so intimately connected with him as you and Major Munro. I therefore trust to you to let me know if you should think that I can render you or Major Munro, or any of General Stuart's friends, the smallest service.

We have sustained a sad loss in poor Webbe. The General will be much afflicted when he hears of it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1845.]

To the Marquess Cornwallis.

MY LORD,

Seringsapatam, 8th Dec., 1804.

I take the liberty of addressing your Lordship to introduce and request your favourable notice of Captain Quin, of the 33rd regiment, who is returning to England.

This officer arrived in India with the regiment as adjutant; when promoted he was made paymaster, and performed the duties of both these situations in a manner highly creditable to

himself, and satisfactory to me and to the other officers who commanded the regiment during my absence.

Shortly after the capture of Seringapatam he was placed on the staff in the pay department of the King's troops, and since that office was abolished he has acted as town major of Seringapatam. In both these situations he has done credit to the corps to which he belongs; I therefore take the liberty of requesting your Lordship's notice of him.

The government of Fort St. George having been pleased to employ me in the command of different divisions and detachments of their troops for two years past, I have not been constantly with the 33rd regiment. I have never ceased to feel, however, the greatest anxiety for its welfare. I have kept up a constant correspondence with the commanding officer of it, and have seen it as often as circumstances would permit. Very lately I have had two opportunities of seeing five companies of it at Vellore, and the other five companies marched with me from Seringapatam, in the beginning of the year 1803, to join the Commander-in-Chief on the frontier. I am happy to say that all were in the highest order, and the men remarkably healthy.

Your Lordship will not expect that I should give you any public news; you must have the best sources of information in England respecting affairs in this country, and any information which I might send you might prove erroneous.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Chief Secretary of Government.

[1846.]

SIR,

Seringapatam, 2nd Jan., 1805.

The acting Resident in Mysore has sent me a copy of a letter which he has received from you, upon the subject of supplies from the Mysore country for the troops serving in Wynaad.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter which was written to Colonel Macleod upon this subject by my directions in answer to a letter in which he informed me that he should require supplies of provisions from this quarter in certain operations which he was about to carry on in Wynaad. I have not since heard from Colonel Macleod.

In respect to supplies of provisions, there are two modes by which they can be furnished from the Mysore country, by the officers of supply at Seringapatam, or by turning into Wynaad for the support of the Company's troops the grain dealers and others who trade and supply the different bazaars in the southern and western parts of the Mysore country.

No difficulty will attend the first mode. Colonel Macleod has only to let me know the quantities and kinds of provisions he will want, or the number of men he has to feed and the length of time which he wishes to feed them, and the officer of supply at Seringapatam will send him immediately all that he can require. It will only be necessary to fix the period of the departure from Seringapatam of each quantity of provisions, so that Colonel Macleod may provide convoy for them upon the frontier of Wynaad.

In respect to the other mode, it requires time and various arrangements, and it may be attended with inconvenience to the country. It will not answer at all, unless Colonel Macleod is certain that the communication between his corps in Wynaad and the Mysore country is secure; as the march of the dealers cannot be regulated in point of time in the same manner as a number of bullocks hired in the Company's service, and either some must be detained for convoy at great expense and inconvenience to themselves, or they must incur the risk of moving through Wynaad without it; and if any of the bullocks or people should be cut off by the enemy, the supply from this resource will fail entirely.

Upon the whole, therefore, I recommend the mode first suggested, and I wish to receive the orders of government respecting it.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1847.]

To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.

MY DEAR SIR,

Seringapatam, 4th Jan., 1805.

I have just received your letter of the 18th of December. You may depend upon it that you have no reason to suspect Prubbaccer Bellall. He is largely paid by the Company, and he is fully aware of the power of the British government, and

of the advantages which he and his employer enjoy under it. I have known him for a great length of time in situations in which he had ample scope for intrigue; and I have watched him more closely than I ever have any Mahratta, and I have never found him to be engaged in any transaction of which I could disapprove.

I hope that you will have allowed Amrut Rao to continue his progress towards Denares.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant Sydenham.

[1848.]

MY DEAR SYDENHAM,

Seringsapatam, 6th Jan., 1805.

I received only yesterday your letter of the 7th December. In respect to yourself I have written fully to Shawe. It is absolutely necessary that you should either go to Scindiah's durbar or relinquish your situation. The public interests cannot be again exposed to such risk as they have been lately by the want of a proper agent at that court. Besides, Colonel Close's health requires that he should have a secretary or some person on the spot to whom he can with propriety deliver charge in case he should be taken ill. I am very sensible of your kindness to myself in the latter part of your letter; but you will see in a letter which I wrote to Shawe two days ago my determination to go to England. The office which Sir John Cradock says is to be proposed to my acceptance has not been offered, nor I conclude will it be.* If it were, I should not accept it. If circumstances should oblige me to stay in India contrary to my inclination, it is desirable that I should have that office, as it would give me more power, and would enable me to interfere more effectually in Bombay affairs than I have hitherto. Otherwise I would not accept it; and as a permanent and honourable situation in India I prefer that which I have here.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

* The command of the forces at Bombay.

[1849.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Seringatam, 8th Jan., 1805.

I am much annoyed, and in some degree apprehensive, of the consequences of Colonel Murray's flight to Kota, particularly as he has left in the hands of the enemy the forts of Purtaubghur and Hinglisghur on his road, and he is aware that Gungaram Cotaree was collecting a corps to operate upon his communication. I don't know whether he has left in Guzerat the corps de réserve which I ordered him to leave in that province, but, whether he has or not, it is certainly now exposed to some risk.

I conceive that there is no danger from Meer Khan, who is in Gurrah Mundelah, or from Scindiah (even supposing that he should be hostile towards us, which I don't think he is), as he is gone Lord knows where to the eastward to cross the Nerbudda. But this Gungaram Cotaree will collect a force of blackguards of all descriptions, who, if they have nothing to oppose them, will do much mischief and be formidable. Besides, your old enemy Canojee Rao Guickowar will again come into play.

If the reserve should be in Guzerat, you ought to collect upon it as many of the Guickowar troops as possible, and make up a respectable field force. If it should not, you ought to endeavour, by drawing troops out of the garrisons, to get together two battalions of the Company's troops, and join to them whatever of the Guickowar forces may remain in Guzerat, so as to make up a respectable corps. This will make all safe in that province.

Although Colonel Murray has left Guzerat to its fate, and appears indifferent to the preservation of his communication with that province, by which alone, as far as I have any knowledge of the subject, he can exist, we must not lose him and his corps by equal indifference as to their fate. I therefore earnestly recommend to your attention the preservation of the communication with Colonel Murray, and the forwarding to him constant supplies.

At this distance from the scene of action, and being in entire ignorance of details, it is impossible for me to suggest to you the means of effecting these objects. If Gungaram Cotaree should invade Guzerat, he will have ample employment for his

troops, and you need not fear much from his operations upon Colonel Murray's communication. In that case, escorts of peons, or other country troops which Major Walker may be able to hire, will effect your purpose. If he should not invade Guzerat, and should confine his operations to the annoyance of Colonel Murray's communication, the reserve will not be required for the defence of that province, and this corps may be usefully employed in escorting provisions, or covering their advance to the frontier of Guzerat, where they may be met by detachments from the army in advance.

These are the general suggestions which I beg leave to make for your consideration, in the difficult case which has occurred in consequence of Colonel Murray's movement to Kota, leaving behind him in the possession of the enemy the forts of Hinglisghur, &c.

I see, by a letter from Poonah, that the Commander-in-Chief has ordered Colonel Murray to remain at Kota; but I have a letter from Bengal, of as late a date as the 12th of December, from which I learn that the Commander-in-Chief has ordered Colonel Murray to move upon Shahabad, a station to the eastward of Kota, and distant, I believe, about eighty miles. This order will remove him still farther, and will render his communication more difficult, at the same time that to preserve it, will be more important.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Macleod.

[1850.]

SIR,

Seringapatam, 9th Jan., 1805.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 5th instant. The Resident in Mysore had already sent me a copy of the letter of the 29th of December last addressed to him by the Chief Secretary of Government; and I had written a letter to the Chief Secretary on this subject of supplies for your corps on the 2nd instant, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy.

In conformity with the principles stated in that letter I have given directions to the paymaster at this station to prepare to send into Wynaad 2000 sheep, 750 gallons of arrack, and

1666 bags of rice for the use of your detachment, and to hire 2000 bullocks to carry those articles of provision.

I have calculated the total of your detachment at 8000 men to be fed, and the quantities above specified will last them, at half a seer each man *per diem*, one month. The sheep and arrack are calculated for 500 Europeans for the same period.

From the accounts which I have received of the state of Wynaad I am induced to be of opinion that you will find supplies in that district for your camp; if you should not, the quantity now sent will place you above want; and you will give orders that the rice may be issued to the bazaars in such proportions as you may think proper. If you should stay longer in Wynaad than one month, and should not be able to find in that district the supplies you should require, I recommend you to lodge the supply which will be sent from hence in a central depôt, and to send the cattle back to Seringapatam for a fresh supply. In this manner you will be well supplied; and as the price of rice in Malabar is at double the rate at which it sells at Seringapatam, and as the rice will probably sell in your bazaar at nearly the same rate at which it sells in Malabar, the difference of price will cover the expense of the hire of the cattle incurred by government.

In regard to the articles dhol, ghee, chillies, and tobacco, they are not generally supplied to the troops, and I cannot venture to order Mr. Gordon to furnish them. They are usually purchased by the sepoy in the bazaars; and I make no doubt but that you will be attended by a bazaar which will be supplied from Malabar with these articles. If, however, you should be desirous of sending your bazaar people into Mysore to purchase them, orders will be given that they may be sold to them.

The bullocks from Seringapatam will go by the road you point out, and I will apprise you hereafter of the period of their departure.

I propose to send to the Chief Secretary of Government a copy of this letter for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. Lord William Bentinck.

[1851.]

MY DEAR LORD,

9th Jan., 1805.

The situation of affairs to the northward, and the pacific intentions which the different Mahratta chiefs have demonstrated, have induced me almost to determine not to go into the Deccan. In this determination I consider myself to be justified, not only by my own view of the inutility of the journey, but by the express desire of the Governor-General in case I should hear of the defeat of Holkar's armies.

This being the case, I consider myself at liberty to comply with your desire that I should meet Sir John Cradock at Madras, which, on private grounds, will give me the greatest pleasure; and I shall be obliged to you if you will permit me to absent myself from my station for this purpose.

In case you should grant your consent to this request, I enclose a memorandum which I beg you to give to Major Thompson to have bearers posted to carry me through the Company's territories. I propose to leave this as soon as I shall hear that Sir John Cradock has landed at Madras; and if you should give Major Thompson the memorandum when Sir John will land, the bearers will be in good time for me.

I take this opportunity of informing you, that in case I should find the Mahratta chiefs confirmed in their pacific intentions, I propose to resign all the appointments which I hold in the Company's service under your government, and to avail myself of the permission which I have from the Commander-in-Chief to go to England. I include in these appointments that of a Major-General on the Staff, which I hold by an order of your government, and not from His Majesty.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Agnew.

[1852.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Seringsapatam, 13th Jan., 1805.

Before you will receive this letter you will have learned from Lord William Bentinck that it is my opinion that it is not necessary to send forward the troops ordered by the Governor-General to Hyderabad.

After Colonel Monson's defeat I acknowledge that I considered the peace with the Mahrattas very precarious; and indeed if the success of Holkar had continued, I consider that we should have had to fight over again not only our battles with the Mahrattas, but those with all the other powers of India, whether considered as our dependants or our allies. I also believe that the Rajah of Berar in particular, and very possibly Scindiah, considered the advantages gained by Holkar to have been much greater than they really were; that they anticipated farther successes, and the former prepared to take advantage of them. There is, however, a wide difference between preparation such as that to which I have referred, and an actual determination to go to war at all events; and I am sorry to observe that my friend Elphinstone was not aware of that difference. Accordingly in his despatches he has almost considered the war as existing, and has created an unnecessary alarm, which will be the cause of an enormous expense. The result of his discussions with the Rajah is, that the Rajah has dismissed his new levies, has cantoned his army in positions pointed out by the British Resident, and has confiscated the jaghire of his brother.

These despatches from Mr. Elphinstone were the cause of the Governor-General's apprehension for Hyderabad, for which no man can now conceive that there is the smallest ground.

As for Scindiah, he has crossed the Nerbudda with his army, and it is said is going to Ougein. The conduct of the Rajah of Berar is not a bad indication of his real intentions. However, supposing them to be doubtful, he can now do no mischief to Hyderabad.

It is my opinion that the place where the reserve is required is on the Company's frontier. As long as that is secure, no mischief can happen to the northward. I have, therefore, recommended that the cavalry should remain at Bellary to the present; and if circumstances should render it necessary to move them to the northward, of which I don't think there is the smallest probability, they can easily be replaced by other troops.

The 18th might be moved into the Ceded districts or remain in Mysore till that movement is made.

The next despatches from Scindiah's durbar will make his plans as clear as the Rajah of Berar's are now. In the mean

time it would be best to leave the troops in the situations in which they are at present.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

[1853.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Seringapatam, 14th Jan., 1805.

I have received your letters of the 4th instant. The capture of Captain Eyles and the other gentlemen is very unpleasant, and will add to the reputation of Gungaram Cotaree, if it should have no other bad effect. However, I anxiously hope soon to hear of General Jones's safe arrival at the army.

I have perused Captain Burr's papers with great attention. I consider papers of this description to be very useful, notwithstanding that they may never be applied to the purpose for which the writer intended them. They ought to be encouraged by government, as they afford information which at times may be useful, and the persons who write them must apply themselves to business, instead of spending their time in idleness. That is all that I can say in favour of Captain Burr's paper.

I have always been of opinion that this warfare with Holkar has shown that there is no such thing in India as a frontier, properly so called, particularly against the Mahrattas. In fact, with their horse they can penetrate anywhere, excepting across a navigable river; and when once they have penetrated with their horse, they have no difficulty in making roads for their guns. I have marched with a British army through one of these impracticable countries at the rate of from sixteen to twenty miles a day.

So far for the natural frontier; but Captain Burr says that the Bheels will defend this frontier, and that by a system of connexion with Oudepoor and different other petty Rajahs, we shall have the service of all these people. This is another error which this warfare with Holkar has exposed. The British government can form no connexion with petty powers of this description in India, excepting that of subjection on their part and government on ours. Indeed, I doubt whether that connexion can be formed; and if I were to choose whether I would connect the Company with them or leave them with the Mahrattas, I would adopt the latter. Of this I am very sure,

that I should be much more certain of their assistance in the day of need by this system than by taking them under the Company.

The conduct of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, on the frontier of the Jumna, is a strong proof of the conduct of these people. This Rajah was made independent, had additions made to his territories, and the whole guaranteed to him in the war with Scindiah, in which he served with the Commander-in-Chief's army. Notwithstanding this, *he* called in Holkar; *he* supported him upon the Jumna; *he* is the cause of the invasion of the Dooab, and of the prolongation of the contest at this moment by the support which he gives to Holkar's defeated troops by his forts on our frontier.

The Rajah of Jyenagur is another instance. His country was considered as one of the bulwarks of Bengal, yet Holkar galloped through it with his cavalry, marched his infantry through it, has communicated ever since with Malwa through it; and the Rajah, although rendered independent by the treaty of peace and called an ally of the Company, has not only never given any assistance, but is strongly suspected of having aided to distress Colonel Monson on his retreat. There are many other instances of the same kind on the frontier of Cuttack. So much for alliances with petty Rajahs.

In respect to the conference which Captain Burr has had with a vakeel from the Ranah of Oudepoor, Colonel Murray was apprised, at the commencement of the war, that the Commander-in-Chief was in communication with the Rajpoot states of Oudepoor, Joudpoor, &c., &c., and that he must have nothing to do with them; and that if they should send to him, he must refer them back to General Lake. This is the best course.

Malcolm sent you a paper the other day, which I received from the Governor-General's Secretary, relative to various points upon which you had written to me, among others, Mr. de Souza's jaghire and the Guickowar cavalry in the former war. I don't think it possible to arrange anything for the Guickowar state in this war, excepting the payment of their expenses, for reasons which I have before given you.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Sir John Cradock.**

[1854.]

MY DEAR CRADOCK,

Serlingapatam, 15th Jan., 1805.

I received last night your letter of the 14th December which you had given to Captain Sydenham, and I assure you that it has gratified me more than I can express. The length of time which has elapsed since I have seen you has by no means abated the warmth of the affection which I have always felt for you, and you will easily believe the pleasure with which I have perused the expression of similar sentiments on your part.

Lord William Bentinck will inform you that I have determined to go to see you upon your arrival at Madras, and I expect in a few days to receive his leave to commence my journey.

I shall go to Madras with every disposition to be of service to you. I will give you all the information that I possess upon every subject upon which you will require it, and I shall be happy if I can be of any use to you in the commencement of your career in this country.

I am very much obliged to you for your sentiments upon my situation and views in this country; but I acknowledge that I don't agree with you. It may be true that I have overrated my chances of employment in Europe, and have not given sufficient weight to the advantages of the situation which you say is to be offered to my acceptance. In respect to the latter, however, I believe that my opinion is not incorrect; and I have determined not to accept it if it should be offered.

Many local considerations, into which it is impossible to enter in a letter, have induced me to come to this determination; and when I shall have an opportunity of explaining them to you, I think that you will be of my opinion.

I shall now observe upon our difference of opinion upon this subject, that you think about my staying in India like a man who has just come out, and I like one who has been here for seven years involved in perpetual troubles. I acknowledge that I am anxious to a degree which I cannot express to see my friends again; and even if I were certain that I should not be employed in England at all, there is no situation in India which would induce me to stay here.

* Lieut.-General Cradock, afterwards Lord Howden, succeeded Lieut.-General Stuart as Commander-in-Chief of the Madras army.

I am not rich in comparison with other people, but very much so in comparison with my former situation, and quite sufficiently so for my own wants. I got a great deal of prize money in the last war; which with what I got before, and a sum of money which the Court of Directors gave me for a service rendered to them in this country, and the accumulation of the interest upon those sums, have rendered me independent of all office or employment.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1855.]

To the Adjutant-General.

SIR,

Seringsapatam, 17th Jan., 1805.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of certain charges on which Lieutenant _____, of the regiment De Meuron, has been put in arrest by his commanding officer Lieutenant-Colonel Lardy; a copy of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Lardy to Lieutenant-Colonel Hill, explanatory of those charges; and the copy of an additional charge against Lieutenant _____, framed by my direction.

An unfortunate party dispute has long prevailed in the regiment De Meuron, which originated in a duel which was fought at Madras some years ago. Notwithstanding that the officer who was principally concerned in that duel was dismissed from the service by the sentence of a general court martial, the party dissensions, of which he was the cause, have continued, and have been kept up principally by the means adverted to in the second charge against Lieutenant _____, and more particularly in the letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Lardy to Lieutenant-Colonel Hill.

As I was desirous to avoid the necessity of assembling a court martial for the trial of Lieutenant _____, and I thought it probable that I should be able to impress the officers of the regiment with a sense of the impropriety and evil consequences of their dissensions, I assembled them at my house, and made such a representation to them as I thought suitable to the circumstances of the case. I particularly urged Lieutenant _____ to apologize for his conduct; but I am concerned to say that I have learned from Lieutenant-Colonel Lardy that what I said produced no effect. I have

also delayed to make this report till this time, in hopes that this unpleasant dispute would have been settled in the corps; but Lieutenant _____ obstinately persists in his refusal to make any apology for his conduct. I am, therefore, under the necessity of assembling a general court martial for the trial of Lieutenant _____ as soon as circumstances will permit; and I have given directions that the additional charge against him may be framed.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To G. Buchan, Esq.

[1856.]

DEAR SIR,

Seringsapatam, 28th Jan., 1805.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 23rd instant, and it will give me the greatest satisfaction to be at all instrumental in forwarding the object of yourself and the gentlemen who agreed with you to testify their sentiments of respect and regard for the memory of Mr. Webbe, by rendering their act as honourable to his public character as it deserved. I propose, therefore, to take an early opportunity of making known their wishes to the Governor-General.

I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate to the gentlemen who were present at the original meeting my anxious desire to be permitted to be one of the number to pay this tribute of respect and regard to a much lamented friend.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Adjutant-General.

[1857.]

SIR,

Seringsapatam, 1st Feb., 1805.

I beg that you will lay my request before Major-General Campbell for permission to absent myself from my station and to visit the Presidency on my private affairs.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1858.]

To the Right Hon. Lord William Bentinck.

MY DEAR LORD,

Seringsapatam, 1st Feb., 1805.

I received last night a letter from Calcutta dated the 10th January, by which I learn that General Cradock was still unwell, and that it was apprehended that he would not be able to sail for Madras with the fleet which was to be despatched on the 17th.

Notwithstanding that he may not arrive, I still intend to go to Madras, with your Lordship's permission; and I have this day forwarded to General Campbell the official application for leave to absent myself from my station. If your Lordship should have no objection to my going, I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Major Thompson to have the boys posted according to the mode pointed out in the memorandum which I took the liberty to enclose in my letter of the 9th January; and I propose to leave this place about the 6th or 7th, and to get a party of the Mysore troops to escort me along the borders of the Pollams.

From the tenor of the letter which I received yesterday it appears that the Governor-General is of opinion that it is not necessary that I should return into the Deccan; and he intends to leave it to my own option to go to England or not, as I may think proper. I shall therefore certainly return to England.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1859.]

To William Harington, Esq.

SIR,

Seringsapatam, 1st Feb., 1805.

Since I wrote to you last upon the subject of my return to Europe, the probability of my being able to do so from the state of public affairs has increased daily, and I am more than ever anxious to carry that intention into execution. I am, however, desirous of conforming to the wishes and objects of the Governor-General, whether for the public interests or his private convenience; and the want of his final decision upon the question is the reason for which I have hitherto omitted to request you to take a passage for me.

From a letter which I received last night from one of his private secretaries, I think it probable that he will consent to my departure; and as the time presses, and it is likely that if I

do not decide to take a passage now, I shall lose the opportunity of the first fleet, I trouble you again upon that subject.

I am not very particular about accommodation, and I would take any rather than lose the opportunity, if circumstances should permit my departure; and I don't care a great deal about the price. I should prefer, however, either half a round house or the starboard side of a great cabin; and I don't much care who the captain is, or what the ship.

You now know as much about my intentions, and the possibility of carrying them into execution, as I do myself, and I leave it to you to act for me as you will think best. As, however, it is possible that the Governor-General may be desirous that I should prolong my stay in India, and if he be so I shall certainly conform to his wishes, I am rather desirous that you should not engage the passage for me unless you should have reason to believe that by delaying to engage it you will lose it entirely. I propose to go to Madras in a few days, and till then I shall be obliged to you if you will not mention my intention of returning to Europe.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Macbean.

[1860.]

SIR,

Seringapatam, 8th Feb., 1805.

I observe that Lieutenant-Colonel Desse is dead, and it becomes, therefore, impossible to assemble a number of members of the general court martial which tried Captain ——— sufficient to revise its proceedings and sentence.

I therefore request that you will do me the favour to return the letter which I wrote to you, and the proceedings of the court martial, in order that I may lay the whole before the Commander-in-Chief, and take his orders upon the subject.

Be so kind as to direct these papers to me at Fort St. George.

I beg that you will consider yourself and intimate to the members of the court martial that they may consider themselves as liable to all duties till they will receive farther orders from the Commander-in-Chief.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1861.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman.

MY DEAR COLMAN,

Seringsapatam, 8th Feb., 1805.

A report has reached me that you have taken under your protection and countenance Captain ——, late Persian interpreter to the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan.

This gentleman was put on his trial and has been tried for crimes of which a man of principle could not be guilty; and although the sentence of the court martial which tried him has, for unavoidable causes, not yet been made public, and the lenity and humanity of the British laws require that we should presume that every man is innocent till he will have been proved guilty, there is a wide difference between such legal presumption and the conduct resulting from it, and the countenance and protection which an officer of your rank and character, and holding your situation, has it in his power to give or to withhold from a person in Captain ——'s situation.

I lived with Captain —— on terms of intimacy, and employed him in many important transactions, in all of which I had reason to believe that he conducted himself as he ought; but since Captain —— has been accused I have ceased to hold any communication with him, excepting such as was required on public affairs. This is the line of conduct which, in my opinion, was required from me, and is equally required from every officer of rank, who is by position influential for the discipline, the subordination, and the character of the army. I therefore most earnestly urge you to cease from intimate communications with Captain —— till you will have the result of his trial.

You will readily believe that I write this from no motive excepting a desire that you should act correctly in every situation. No man will suspect me of enmity or any unworthy feeling towards Captain ——, to whom, if it were necessary, I might refer you for an account of the mode in which I have acted towards him since the first complaint of him was made.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm.

[1862.]

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Fort St. George, 15th Feb., 1805.

I arrived here on the 13th, about four o'clock in the morning, General Cradock having landed, as you will have heard, on the 12th, in the evening. He appears to me to be well disposed to carry on affairs in the manner in which they ought to be conducted, and I hope that every thing will go on well.

I have received no political letters since I saw you, excepting from Bengal, copies of the despatches from Mr. Jenkins; which were written in December, of which I had not received copies before. There is nothing new in them of any importance; and it is my opinion that Mr. Jenkins might have turned the course of the negotiation in such a manner as to insure the destruction of Ghautky, and Scindiah's march to Ougein.

By the last accounts from Bengal, Bhurtpoor had not fallen on the 15th, but it was expected to fall on the 16th or 17th. Meer Khan had crossed the Chumbul at Dhoolpoor, in order to join Holkar; and General Jones had been ordered to follow him, and to fall upon his rear. I think it fortunate that Meer Khan had determined to join Holkar, rather than to fall upon General Jones's rear. I have not yet determined upon my future plans. Every body here has inquired after you.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of the Military Board.

[1863.]

SIR,

Fort St. George, 16th Feb., 1805.

I have received accounts that the Rajah of Koorg has sent me two elephants as a present. I have written to Seringapatam to desire they may be given to the Company's agent for cattle, &c.; and I request that orders may be sent to him to receive them on account of the Company.

I have the honour to inform the Board that I have three

elephants, my own property, of which I wish to dispose ; and I offer them for the Company's service if they should be required.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1864.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 16th Feb., 1805.

I have the honour to inform you that I have received the orders of his Excellency the Governor-General to send to Bombay and Fort St. George respectively all corps, troops, and followers belonging to those Presidencies which may now be in the Deccan beyond the establishments of the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah, and with the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

The first step which it is necessary to adopt in obedience to those orders is to complete the subsidiary force serving with His Highness the Peshwah, with the Native infantry of the Bombay establishment still required for that purpose. Accordingly I have urged the Commander-in-Chief at Fort St. George to order the two Bombay battalions still in Malabar to march to Poonah, and his Excellency proposes to attend to my recommendation upon this subject. They will proceed, I imagine, through the provinces of Canara, and by Hullihall in Soonda ; but you will be apprised from hence of their route.

I have not been informed whether the company of pioneers with the Poonah subsidiary force have been relieved by 100 pioneers from Bombay ; but if those troops have not been relieved, it is desirable that measures should be taken to relieve them as soon as may be convenient by sending 100 Bombay pioneers to from Poonah.

It is also desirable that this same opportunity should be taken to relieve the draught bullock establishment belonging to the government of Fort St. George, still serving with the subsidiary force with the Peshwah. I am not informed whether the bullocks and drivers for this relief have been formed at Bombay, and I request you to give information upon this subject to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief at Fort St. George, in order that if the government of Bombay should not be prepared to relieve

them, he may order the establishments of Fort St. George to remain in the Peshwah's territories some time longer.

Before I left Poonah in June last, orders were given by the late Commander-in-Chief, General Stuart, to prepare at Seringapatam carriages for all the ordnance at Poonah, and those carriages are now ready. When the subsidiary force was subsequently formed and placed under the government of Bombay, I desired that the dimensions of the pieces of ordnance which required carriages might be sent to Bombay, in case that government should be unable to supply ordnance for the troops which should compose the subsidiary force, and should be able to supply carriages. I do not know what determination was made upon this subject, and I request you to inform the Commander-in-Chief at Fort St. George whether the government at Bombay will supply the ordnance required for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, or if that government should not be able to supply the ordnance, whether it will supply the carriages, or whether the carriages which are made shall be sent to Poonah from Seringapatam.

It is my opinion that when the Madras Native infantry will be withdrawn from the Peshwah's territories, the officers of the army of Fort St. George, who are to be removed from the staff of the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, according to the orders of his Excellency the Governor-General, may be relieved from their situations. Accordingly I take the liberty of recommending that Captain Watson may be paymaster and commissary of provisions, and Captain Lewis commissary of grain and of hired bullocks. I also beg leave to recommend that Captain Lewis may be judge advocate to the subsidiary force, and that Captain Powell, of the artillery, may be commissary of stores. I recommend this officer for this situation, because there was no artillery officer in Malabar in charge of an arsenal, and he came up to Poonah in charge of the store department of Colonel Murray's corps, in which situation he conducted himself much to my satisfaction. In case Captain Powell should be deemed an officer of rank superior to that which a commissary of stores ought to have, and that he should be placed in the command of the artillery of the subsidiary force, I beg leave to recommend that Lieutenant Morse may be commissary of stores.

I am not acquainted with the merits of the medical gentlemen

of the Bombay army who have lately been relieved from the provinces of Malabar and Canara, and therefore I cannot take upon me to recommend either of them to your notice as the medical superintendent with the Peshwah's subsidiary force; but if you should deem it proper to select a gentleman from the service at large to be the superintending surgeon at Poonah, the obligations which I have to Mr. Baird for services rendered to the whole army in the charge of the hospital at Ellichpoor induce me to draw your notice to that gentleman.

His Excellency the Governor-General has been pleased to desire that the 84th regiment might be sent to Goa, in which case the 77th regiment will be drawn into the territories of the government of Fort St. George, and probably employed in the relief of some of the European regiments in the Deccan. The present moment appears to be favourable for effecting this arrangement, and if you should be of that opinion, I beg leave to suggest to you to send the 84th regiment to Goa by sea as soon as it may be convenient.

Sir William Clarke proposed some time ago that this regiment should be sent in the ships which should carry to Goa from Bombay the arsenal supplies required for the garrison, which proposition I beg to refer for your consideration.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P.S. Since writing this letter I have received private intimation from you that you have detached to the northward the 2nd battalion 9th regiment from Bombay, and it may possibly be inconvenient to you to detach the 84th regiment to Goa. If this should be the case, I request you to make it known to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief at Fort St. George.

[1865.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Fort St. George, 17th Feb., 1805.

Five ships arrived this morning, which left England on the 4th September. General Lake was made Lord Lake of Delhi and Laswarree, and I a Knight of the Bath, on the 1st September. Henry is gone as plenipotentiary to Madrid.

I determined last night upon going to England. No news from any quarter.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm.

[1866.]

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Fort St. George, 18th Feb., 1805.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Shawe; I have also received one from the Governor-General to the same purport. You may keep the letter, as I have a duplicate of it. The Admiral has offered me a passage in the *Trident*, but I am afraid that I have paid for one in the *Marchioness of Exeter*.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Chief Secretary of Government.

[1867.]

SIR,

Fort St. George, 19th Feb., 1805.

I have the honour to enclose the judicial report of the Island of Seringapatam for the year 1804, which I request you to lay before the Right Hon. the Governor in Council.

This paper affords the most ample testimony of the zeal and diligence of the gentleman* at the head of the judicial department at Seringapatam; but I have the satisfaction to add that his integrity and justice are at least equal to his diligence, and that all ranks and descriptions of persons residing at Seringapatam are satisfied with the manner in which he has conducted the important duties intrusted to his charge.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm.

[1868.]

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Fort St. George, 20th Feb., 1805.

You shall certainly have my picture. Write to Sydenham for a bust, or half-length, or a three-quarters. I enclose

* Major Symons.

duplicates of Jenkins's last letters, which you may keep. Close writes that he was still in Scindiah's camp on the 18th.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1869.]

To the Secretary of the Military Board.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 21st Feb., 1805.

I have the honour to enclose a letter, &c., from Major Lennon of the Engineers, in which he has proposed that the establishment of the engineer at Seringapatam should be increased in consideration of the great work with the execution of which he is charged. It is my opinion that Major Lennon will require the assistance of many overseers; and as the addition to the engineer establishment, as proposed, is of persons of that description, I beg to recommend Major Lennon's application to the favourable consideration of the Military Board.

In regard to the second application of the Major, I must decline to recommend it.

There are no forts in Mysore which belong to the Company excepting Seringapatam; the others are the property of the Rajah. Under the treaty with the Rajah it is settled that those forts shall be garrisoned and repaired as the Company's government may think proper; and that in case of the repair of a fort, the expense shall be defrayed by the two contracting parties.

Under this article of the treaty the fort of Bednore was lately repaired; and by order of government, the officer employed to repair it was one in the service of the Rajah of Mysore; and the repair was executed with economy, and in a satisfactory manner. It may be deemed expedient to resort to similar means of repairing or of reforming the works of other forts in Mysore, and therefore I am desirous to avoid recommending an appointment which might embarrass government in adopting this mode of executing the required works, particularly as such an appointment has never been made in any former instance.

As, however, Major Lennon is to be employed in an important service, and has been removed for the purposes of that service from the southern division of the army, where he received full batta, I beg leave to recommend that he may have full batta

at Seringapatam, notwithstanding that for the reasons which I have above detailed it may not be expedient to appoint him engineer in the Mysore country.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Adjutant-General of the Army, Fort St. George.

[1870.]

SIR,

Fort St. George, 23rd Feb., 1805.

I beg leave to lay before you the case of Burry Khan, late soubahdar in the 1st battalion 8th regiment, now a pensioner; and I request that you will submit the same to the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief, in the hope that his Excellency will see some grounds for recommending that this soubahdar may have as a pension the full pay of his rank and class, instead of the half-pay to which only he is entitled.

It appears by his certificate that he has served the Company forty years, and that he was a soubahdar of the 1st class. He was also a man of good character, and well connected in his corps; and five of his relations, commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the battalion, were killed in the battle of Assye, wherein he also received the wound which has occasioned his being transferred to the non-effective establishment.

The wound is in his right shoulder, and has totally disabled that arm, from which splinters of bone continue to come away, and his only chance of relief is said to be in amputation; but from the situation of the wound, the medical gentlemen have not thought proper to attempt that operation.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm.

[1871.]

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Fort St. George, 26th Feb., 1805.

I spoke to Lord William this morning about Purneah's intention of taking off the duties, if it were wished; he said that he thought it was not necessary, and he promised to write to

you, if it should be deemed so. He also promised to write to Purneah about the behaviour of his troops and peons, as soon as they should be sent back to their own country. I have desired Barclay to send over to you the vakeels of the Mahratta chiefs who are at Seringapatam, and you will do well to communicate with them, and to dismiss them when you have done all the business which you propose to transact through their agency. They cost some money, of which Barclay will give you an account.

I have spoken to Sir J. Cradock frequently about you, and I have told him that you would keep him informed of events as they should come to your knowledge. He said that he should be happy to hear from you, and he begged that you would commence your correspondence without ceremony or further loss of time.

I don't know when we go. I have written to Calcutta about Wilks. Tell him that he has omitted to send me a copy of his report on Mysore. It must positively be sent after me, with all the documents connected with it. Barclay is to remain in his office, and I believe no person will be appointed to Mysore till orders come from Calcutta. I recommended old Chingleput Campbell, or Monypenny; the former rather than the latter.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1872.]

To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR MORNINGTON,

Fort St. George, 27th Feb., 1805.

I enclose copies of letters which I received yesterday in a box containing the insignia of the Order of the Bath. This box was kicking about the *Lord Keith*, which arrived here ten days ago, and was brought on shore by a passenger who went to the ship by accident to look for his own luggage, and he informed me yesterday that he had got it.

It is very unlucky that I did not receive it when the ship came in, as it proves to me that Sir John Cradock had no right to invest me with the Order of the Bath, which he did soon after the account arrived stating that it had been conferred upon me; and I should have been invested by your order in a manner more consistent with the intentions of the Secretary of

State. However, there is no remedy for what has passed; and it now only remains that you should authorise Sir John Cradock to invest me with the Order of the Bath, antedating the authority, and then the proceeding will be regular. If you should not approve of this mode of proceeding, which appears to me to be best, I request you to let me know it by the first overland-despatch, as well as by sea; as in that case I suppose I must go through all the ceremonies in England.

The letters which I send you this day will show you all that I have done to carry into execution your instructions of the 29th January. Everything is quiet, and likely to remain so, in the Deccan; but if there should be serious war, of which I do not think there is any probability, I recommend that you should appoint Colonel Closé to command there, with the political powers which I had.

Lord William Bentinck told me that he should not appoint an officer to succeed me in Mysore, under the notion that you would appoint to that situation. I recommend for it either Colonel Campbell of the 74th, now commanding in the northern division, or Colonel Monypenny of the 73rd. I rather prefer the former, Lord William the latter: both are more fit for the situation than any officer that I know of in India. It is desirable that no time should be lost in settling who shall command in Mysore.

I have left Malcolm in communication with the southern chiefs of the Mahratta empire. I recommend that the settlement with them should be deferred till the season of profound peace; that it should be made upon moderate and conciliating principles, in the presence of the Peshwah's subsidiary force; and a small corps of two or three battalions of infantry and two regiments of cavalry ought to be collected on the Company's frontier while it is under discussion.

We shall sail, I believe, between the 3rd and 5th. I go with the Admiral, having paid forfeit to the captain of the Indiaman from whom I had taken a passage.

Let me know what supporters you would wish me to take out, according to Sir Isaac Heard's letter.

I hope that you will send me all your commands to England; I shall have nothing to do excepting to attend to them, and I will exert myself to forward your views. I am fully aware of

everything relating to the military and political situation of India; but I am not master of the finance, upon which you must send me information if you should wish me to say anything upon it.

I will write to Major Shawe upon other points. With most anxious wishes to see you soon in England,

Believe me ever yours most affectionately,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1873.]

To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort St. George, 27th Feb., 1805.

I have received your letter of the 12th instant, for which I am much obliged to you. I only hope that Colonel Holmes may reach the army in safety.

In my opinion, it is a fortunate event for General Jones that he has joined General Lake and will save his army, for the fate of which I have trembled for some time. It is not best for Guzerat, however, unless Woodington should be able to defend that province.

I wish that you had been able to detain the 2nd battalion 9th regiment, but its departure does not much signify.

Mr. Forbes's sandalwood business will be settled to his satisfaction. Mr. Frissell wrote to me in too strong terms upon the subject, which is the cause of the misunderstanding.

I am going to England immediately with the Admiral, and I beg to take this opportunity of returning you my most grateful thanks for all the favours which I have received from you. If I can do anything for you or your government in England, I beg that you will command my services. A letter addressed to me at my mother's, No. 3, Henrietta Street, Cavendish Square, will always find me.

Having now thanked you for former favours, I am about to ask you for a fresh one: it is to take an opportunity of doing something for Lieutenant Colin Campbell of the 78th. This officer has been my Brigade-Major, and latterly had the charge of my papers, a situation of no small labour and confidence. You are already acquainted with him, and I have only to add to what I have said above that I shall consider any favour you

can confer upon him as the greatest obligation you can confer upon me.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of the Commander-in-Chief.

[1874.]

SIR,

Fort St. George, 28th Feb., 1805.

I have the honour to enclose a letter which I have received from the superintending surgeon in Mysore, and the copy of a letter which I wrote to the late Commander-in-Chief, in which I transmitted a letter from the same officer to a similar purport. Although the late Commander-in-Chief informed me that he should adopt the arrangement recommended by Mr. Anderson, I have not learned that any thing was ever done in the business; and I am led to believe that his Excellency forgot this arrangement in the press of business which he had on his hands previous to his departure from this country.

The objects proposed by Mr. Anderson are two: first, to place at Seringapatam a larger depôt of medical stores than is there at present. He explains fully the reasons for which he recommends this measure; and I have only to add to what he says upon the subject, that every day's experience proves that no dependence can be placed on the sea communication between this place and Cannanore. In fact, the medical stores at Seringapatam already supply the wants of the troops on the Malabar coast; and unless measures are adopted to replenish them, and if the proper number of troops should again be stationed in Mysore, those stores will not be sufficiently ample to answer the demands of the troops, for which they were specially established.

The second object recommended by Mr. Anderson is to augment the salary and establishment of the garrison surgeon and medical storekeeper at Seringapatam. If the medical depôt at Seringapatam should be augmented, there can be no doubt but this measure will be necessary. A reference, however, to Mr. Anderson's letter, in which will be observed a description of the difference between his situation and that of other medical storekeepers, will show that the measure is necessary even at the present moment. The duties of Mr. White

are far greater than those of any other garrison surgeon and medical storekeeper, on account of the clothing and cot establishments for the Native sick, which the climate of Mysore has rendered necessary; on account of the arrack issued to those troops, the accounts of which he keeps; and above all, because he is, in fact, at this moment the medical storekeeper for the troops in Malabar and Canara, and at Goa, although the depôt in his charge is not sufficiently supplied.

In addition to these claims of Mr. White's, I have to say that he performs the extensive and important duties with which he is charged with an ability and zeal which have never been surpassed.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1875.]

To the Magistrate at Seringapatam.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 28th Feb., 1805.

I herewith enclose a bond, No. 2713, of 1804-5, for the amount of one thousand star pagodas.

I wish to place this sum of money in the charge of the Court of Seringapatam for the benefit of Salabut Khan, the son, or the adopted son, of the late Dhoondiah Waugh.

I am desirous that the Court should be his guardian, and should superintend his education, the expense of which will be defrayed out of the interest of this sum, and a sum of two hundred pagodas already in the hands of Lieutenant-Colonel Symons, and allotted by me for his support, which Lieutenant-Colonel Symons has been requested to pay into the Court.

I am desirous that, if not absolutely necessary for his advancement, the principal of one thousand star pagodas should never be given to Salabut Khan; but the interest is to be applied to pay the expense of his education, and to be given to himself when he will arrive at years of discretion, and will be no longer under the guardianship of the Court.

This money is to revert to me in case Salabut Khan should die without heirs.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Gore, 33rd Regiment.

[1876.]

SIR,

Fort St. George, 2nd March, 1805.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 28th February.

Nearly twelve years have elapsed since His Majesty was pleased to appoint me to be Lieutenant-Colonel of the 33rd regiment, and in the whole course of that period, during which I have been either in the exercise of the command of the regiment or in constant communication with the actual commanding officer, I have had every reason to be satisfied with their conduct. It has been my uniform object to maintain the system of discipline, subordination, and interior economy which I found established in the regiment by the Marquess Cornwallis, our Colonel; and by the influence of this system, the foundation of which is vigilance on the part of the officers to prevent the commission of military crimes, and by the support and assistance which I have uniformly received from Colonel Sherbrooke, Lieutenant-Colonel Elliott, and yourself and the officers of the regiment, my duties as Lieutenant-Colonel have always been a pleasing occupation.

It is most gratifying to me to receive the mark of approbation conveyed by your letter from officers with whose conduct I have so much reason to be pleased, and with many of whom I have been so long and intimately acquainted. I beg that you will assure them that I shall never forget their services, and that I shall always be happy to forward their views.

I have only to recommend to them to adhere to the system of discipline, subordination, and interior economy which they have found established in the regiment, and, above all, to cherish and encourage among themselves the spirit of gentlemen and of soldiers.

With the most anxious wishes for the success and prosperity of yourself and of the 33rd regiment,

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Officers of the Garrison of Seringapatam.

[1877.]

GENTLEMEN,

Fort St. George, 2nd March, 1805.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 27th Fe-

bruary, and I am much flattered by the expression of your regret upon the occasion of my departure from this country.

The period which has elapsed since I was appointed to the command of the garrison of Seringapatam has been probably the most eventful of the history of the British nation in India, and that place has always been an important point in the military operations which have been carried on. The discipline and good order of that garrison, and the efficiency of the public departments fixed in it, must always have been an object of most anxious solicitude to my mind; and I am happy to have an opportunity of declaring that the order and regularity of the troops which have been stationed there have been exemplary, and that the efficiency and zeal of the public departments fixed at Seringapatam have been the principal source and foundation of the success which you have noticed.

In whatever situation His Majesty may think proper to employ my services, I shall always be interested in the welfare of officers with whose conduct in their several public capacities I have so much reason to be pleased, and in whose private society I have enjoyed so much satisfaction.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1878.]

To Sir William Clarke, Bart.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 21st of February. The government of Bombay might, I should think, afford to complete your artillery at Goa; but it is certain that the corps of artillery in all parts of India are very weak, and it is not improbable but that the authorities at Bombay may think it more important to preserve their strength entire there than to make you as strong as you wish. I therefore recommend you to have some of your infantry trained to the gun exercise, a practice which, in my opinion, ought to be adopted in all parts of India.

I don't mean to say that I prefer artillery to infantry; on the contrary, my opinion is that the main strength of our armies consists in British infantry. But I think that a soldier cannot know too much, and in a garrison one who understands the duty

of an artilleryman may be so far more useful than one who knows only the duty of an infantry soldier.

The same reasoning applies to the Native infantry, and it is my opinion that some of these ought to be taught the great gun exercise; but care should be taken to select for this purpose those men who are known and distinguished for their attachment to the service.

I think there is a chance that you will have the 84th regiment; but if you should have it, the 77th will come into the territories of Fort St. George. This is between ourselves.

In regard to your private views and objects, I recommend you to apply to the Governor-General to be appointed to the staff, and to command at Goa as soon as you will be made a Major-General, without any increase of allowances. If you should not adopt this plan, the officer next in rank to yourself may claim the command, and bring forward for discussion a question upon which I should find no difficulty in deciding; but it is impossible to say how it might be decided by the government of the day. I do not recommend you to quit Goa, because I really think that in India at present there is not, or will not in a short time, be anything for a military man to do; and you are in a situation as likely to be attacked by the French as any other. You would lose in point of emolument by being removed from it, and, without compliment, it would be very difficult to replace you. I therefore recommend and wish you to stay at Goa as long as you will find it convenient to remain in India.

You will have heard that I am going to England. I sail with the Admiral.

With best wishes for your health and prosperity,

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm.

[1879.]

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Fort St. George, 7th March, 1805.

Grant sent to me your letter of the 3rd yesterday morning. After I had written to you on the 26th I received all Close's letters regarding the outrages at Scindiah's durbar; and I shall send you a copy of my letter to Colonel Close upon this subject, if I can get it copied. The outrage may be attributed to

Ghautky; but the proof affecting him is not clear, and Scindiah certainly had nothing to do with the business. If Scindiah had intended to attack Jenkins, he would not have called him back to his camp by two of his ministers, but would have sent his pin-darries after him, who would have done his business with ease. This, as far as I can judge from a letter received by Lord William from Sydenham, is the Governor-General's opinion. However, who committed the outrage, or how it was committed, is not so much the question at present, as how it is to be repaired, and the peace to be maintained: and upon this point I am really at a loss.

It was reported here yesterday that Bhurtpoor was taken, but I don't believe it to be true. Meer Khan entered the Dooab on the 7th with 12,000 horse, and General Smith was close to him on the 9th with six regiments of cavalry and the horse artillery.

I hope that you will take care to keep me informed in England of all kinds of events. News from this country of every kind will be very interesting, indeed necessary, to me, for some time after I shall arrive in England; and I hope that you will give it to me. I believe that we shall sail on Saturday: and I don't know whether I shall have leisure to write to you to-morrow, so God bless you! Remember me to Wilks, Ingledeu, and Little.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1880.] G. O.

Fort St. George, 9th March, 1805.

Major-General Sir A. Wellesley informs the troops under his command that he has received the permission of his Excellency the Governor-General to resign the political and military powers with which he had been lately intrusted in the Deccan, and the leave of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to proceed to England. He cannot avoid expressing the regret which he feels upon taking leave of officers and troops with whom he has served so long.

In the course of the period of time which has elapsed since Major-General Wellesley was appointed to the command of a division of this army, various services have been performed by the troops, and great difficulties have been surmounted, with a

steadiness and perseverance which have seldom been surpassed. Upon every occasion, whether in garrison or in the field, the Major-General has had reason to be satisfied with their conduct; and he once more returns them his thanks, and assures them that he shall never forget their services, or cease to feel a lively interest in whatever may concern them. He earnestly recommends to the officers of the army never to lose sight of the great principles of the military service, to preserve the discipline of the troops, and to encourage in their respective corps the spirit and sentiments of gentlemen and of soldiers, as the most certain road to the achievement of every thing that is great in their profession.

Upon the occasion of taking leave of the troops who have been so long under his command, Major-General Wellesley cannot avoid noticing and recording the assistance which he has received from officers commanding districts and divisions under his orders, and the officers of the staff appointed to assist him: of the former, some distinguished characters are now no more, and others are gone to Europe, and all are sufficiently known to the troops; but in noticing the assistance he has received from the staff, he must record particularly his obligations to Major Barclay, Captain Bellingham, and Lieutenant Campbell of the 78th regiment.

Orders will be given from head-quarters regarding the mode of conducting the duties and making the reports in Mysore, Malabar, and Canara, as also at Goa. The reports from the corps in the Deccan, under the orders of Colonels Wallace and Haliburton, are to be made according to the orders by Major-General Sir A. Wellesley, of the 24th June, 1804.

The troops belonging to the army in the Deccan, entitled to share in the prize money of the late war, are informed that measures have been taken to insure, at an early period, the division of that part of it not yet divided.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm.

[1881.]

H.M.S. *Trident*, 20th March, 1805,
Lat. 5° N., Long. 84° E.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I understand that the *Albion* and *Sceptre* are going to leave us this day, and I will not allow them to depart without a letter

for you. We have not yet got on very fast, as you will observe by the date of this letter, as we have had light winds and calms; but the ships of the convoy sail better than was expected, and I still hope that we shall have a good passage.

Tell Wilks that I have not seen Mrs. Wilks since we sailed, but I hear that she is well. I conclude that she will write to India by these ships.

In case Purneah should write to me, I wish you would send me a translation of his letter.

I depend upon you for sending me all kinds of intelligence from India. When you shall have an opportunity of sending a letter, look over your correspondence, and make up a general letter of all the intelligence you have received upon all points. Every thing, particularly of a military or a political nature, will be interesting.

Before I went away I omitted to suggest to you some arrangements respecting the Rajah's teakwood forests. From conversations which I have had with the Admiral, I find that these forests are an object of great interest in England: they are so particularly, I know, to Lord Melville; and I should be glad to be able to give him authentic information upon them at an early period through your means. I wish therefore that you could prevail upon Purneah to send some people into the forests to make a general survey of them, and to give some general knowledge of the number and description of trees which they contain. The forests might be divided, and one of his intelligent hircarrahs, or muttaseddees, might be sent to each division, with orders to ascertain, as nearly as circumstances will permit, the number of trees in each, and of what description. In respect to their sizes, the best mode would be to require no more from them than to ascertain the number of trees more than one foot, and the number less than one foot, square. I have long turned over in my mind the situation of these forests, and I am of opinion that the time is now come in which Purneah ought to levy a duty upon the cutting of the trees. As a compliment to the Company, he might excuse their contractor from the payment of this duty; but, on the other hand, Scott must watch the contractor very closely, and take care that he does not avail himself of this compliment to supply the bazaar of Seringapatam with timber duty free, and thus defraud both the Rajah and the Company. This matter may easily be arranged between you and Scott.

As well as I recollect, the price of timber in Seringapatam ought to be 11 rupees for 12 feet, including the expense of the carriage from the forest. Scott gets his timber for 1 faham and 60 cash the square foot, the expense of carriage being nothing, as the Company's carts and bullocks draw it in. In my opinion Purneah might levy a duty of 1 fanam a square foot upon the timber, to be levied at the forest, which you will observe would be a sum nearly equal to the cost of cutting the timber, at the same time that it would increase the price of timber but very little in Seringapatam. The great object of the duty would be that it would place the forest under regulations, and would enable Purneah at all times to ascertain what quantity of timber is taken out, either for his own purposes, for those of the Company, or for the public market.

Turn this subject over in your mind. You see that, although absent, I cannot avoid reflecting upon Mysore affairs. I cannot express to you the concern which I felt at leaving Madras. Indeed I feel it still; but I am convinced that I never took a step with the propriety of which I had so much reason to be satisfied, whether I view it in relation to my private views or to the public interests.

The *Albion* and *Sceptre* do not go this day, and I shall not close this letter until they do.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Earl of Mornington.

[1882.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON,

St. Helena, 3rd July, 1805.

We arrived here on the 20th of last month, having had a most tedious passage from Madras. The weather, however, was finer than we had any reason to expect, and we had gales only for three days off Madagascar, for one day off the Cape, and for two days on this side of the Cape. My health has been much restored by the voyage, and particularly by my residence here; and I am now convinced that if I had not quitted India I should have had a serious fit of illness.

You will easily conceive how much surprised I was to hear of Lord Cornwallis's appointment to the office of Governor-General in India, and how anxious to learn the probable causes

of this appointment. In order to be enabled to form a judgment upon this point, I opened some packets of newspapers which I found here addressed to you, and which you will receive with this letter, but they do not contain one word which can afford ground on which I can form an opinion. I acknowledge, however, that I have my opinions upon this subject, founded upon an acquaintance with events which have preceded this arrangement; and although it was impossible to believe that Lord Cornwallis would be the person, I did expect (before Mr. Pitt came into power) that a successor to you would be sent out.

As this letter may not reach you, I will not enter into an enumeration of the circumstances which lead me to think that the appointment of Lord Cornwallis is intended as a mark of disapprobation. That opinion, however, is weakened in a great degree by a report in general circulation here that you are to be appointed the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on your arrival in England, and that Lord Mulgrave holds the office only during your absence. If this should be the case, the arrangement will prove honourable to your character, and I should imagine that nothing more agreeable to you could be done than to send Lord Cornwallis to succeed you in India under these circumstances.

The *Belle* arrived here on the 28th of June, and sailed on the 29th. I conclude that she had letters and instructions for me, which of course I could not receive; but I have written to Henry to desire that he would receive and peruse them, and act accordingly, and I have apprised him of my opinion that you would quit India as soon as you should hear of Lord Cornwallis's appointment. No inconvenience, therefore, will result from the arrival of the *Belle* in England a short time before I shall arrive there with the fleet.

I don't know how you will manage here. If you should land, I imagine that the Governor will ask you to live with him, as otherwise you could exist in no other manner excepting in a boarding-house with passengers, captains and mates of Indiamen, children, &c. &c. The Governor is a good man, but a quiz, of a description that must have been extinct for nearly two centuries. I never saw anything like his wig or his coat. If you should not stay here long, I would recommend you to remain in your ship. If you should land, you will do well

to go to the Governor's house in the country. The interior of the island is beautiful, and the climate apparently the most healthy that I have ever lived in.

There are two letters here for you, from Lady Wellesley, I believe:

I shall not close this letter till we sail, and I will send a duplicate of it to India.

Believe me, my dear Mornington,

Ever yours most affectionately,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

On board the *Trident*, 9th July.

We embarked last night, and shall sail to-morrow morning.

To Colonel Malcolm.

[1883.]

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

St. Helena, 3rd July, 1805.

We arrived here on the 20th June, having had a most tedious passage from Madras. The weather was uncommonly fine throughout, and we had gales only for three days off Madagascar, for one day off the Cape, and for two days on this side of the Cape. We found here a fleet which sailed from China in January, and we have been joined here by a fleet from Bengal, one from Bombay, and a second fleet from China. The whole amount to about forty sail of Indiamen and ships from China, which will sail for England, I hope, in about a week, under convoy of the *Trident*, and the *Athenian*, a 64 which has come from China, and the *Mediator*, a frigate sent from England.

My health has been much mended by the voyage, and particularly by a short residence upon this island; and I am convinced that, if I had not quitted India, I should have had a serious fit of illness. I was wasting away daily, and latterly, when at Madras, I found my strength failed, which had always before held out. In short, I do not recollect for many years to have been so well as I have felt latterly, and particularly since I have been here. I have scarcely any rheumatism or lumbago. Mrs. Wilks looks better, I think, than she did when she quitted Seringapatam, and far better than when she embarked from

Madras. She is not so comfortably situated here as I could have wished her to be. She is in the country with ——— and ———, who came in the same ship, and I fancy that they find subsistence very difficult. Mrs. ——— is a good woman, and ——— is a very honourable and good man. But he is directly the contrary of *Ho Saheb*; he is not an assenter to propositions; he contradicts everything; and, upon the whole, it appeared to me that Mrs. Wilks would have preferred to live any where else. However, you may tell Wilks, with my best remembrance, that she is well. I have seen her only twice since we landed, as I live in the country likewise, and the distance to their house is no small matter, and the roads and horses very bad.

You will have been astonished to hear of Lord Cornwallis's appointment to succeed Lord Wellesley. There are letters here for the latter from Lady Wellesley, which I believe were despatched from England in November, from which circumstance I judge that he was expected to return before it was determined to appoint Lord Cornwallis. But you know well that I expected that some measure would be adopted to force Lord Wellesley to quit his situation, if he delayed to resign it; and that I informed him of this opinion and the grounds on which I had formed it. Mr. Pitt's appointment to office made some alteration in these grounds, but not a very essential one. I believe that Mr. Pitt has been known to interfere but little in the departments of government, of which he trusts the management to others, and that he refrains particularly from all interference in the affairs of India. If this should be the case, the administration of India is the same now as it was in the time of Mr. Addington; and the only difference in respect to Lord Wellesley is the greater degree of intimacy subsisting between him and Mr. Pitt, and the greater degree of reluctance which ——— would feel in proposing his removal to Mr. Pitt than to Mr. Addington.

I acknowledge that I am of opinion that this arrangement is intended as a mark of disapprobation of Lord Wellesley, which opinion is founded upon a variety of circumstances which came to my knowledge before I quitted India, with which you are well acquainted. I can see nothing in the papers to the end of February to lead my judgment on this subject; and there is, against the opinion that I have formed, a report in circulation here that Lord Wellesley is to be appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs upon his arrival in England, ——— holding the office only during his absence.

The *Belle* packet arrived here on the 28th June, and sailed on the 29th, having sailed from Bengal on the 2nd April. The letters which she probably had for me were in the packet, which could not be opened, and therefore I know nothing excepting what is in the papers to the end of March. The 4th and 5th failures before Bhurtpoor are disastrous events, of which I apprehend the worst consequences. They must have blundered that siege terribly, for it is certain that, with adequate means, every place can be taken; and ——— having been so long before the place, adequate means must have been provided, or in his power. The fault lies therefore in the misapplication of them; or, most probably, in the omission to employ all those which were necessary to accomplish the object in view, either through the ignorance of the engineers, or the impetuosity of ———'s temper, which could not brook the necessary delay.

5th July. I dined with Mrs. Wilks, at ———'s, yesterday. She looked very well, but complained of her cough. We embark on Monday, the 8th, and I believe that we shall sail on Thursday.

I beg that you will remember me most kindly to Purneah and Bistnapah, and all my friends, black, white, and grey, at Seringapatam and elsewhere within your reach.

Did I tell you before I left Madras that I had recommended to Lord W. that Wilks might have a salary for acting as Resident in Mysore; and to Sir J. Cradock, that young ——— (Webbe's friend in the —th regiment) might be appointed Persian interpreter at Seringapatam, *vice* Knox?

All Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, and the captains of all the Indiamen in the world, are here. To do the Bengalese justice, their complaints of the inconveniences of the place are less loud than those of any of the others, with the exception always of some persons who growl at every thing. I hear that, when ——— was here last year with Lord Clive, he swore that he would have preferred to spend his time in a French prison.

I hope that ——— will be in office when you will go to Europe. He is the best of ———, and the greatest of quizzes. I really believe that a man of his description, with such a wig and coat, has not appeared in the world for two centuries. The race has been extinct, I believe; and how it came to be revived in his person is incomprehensible. His family are very good people indeed.

On board H.M.S. *Trident*, 9th July, 1805.

We embarked last night, and sail to-morrow. I have nothing to add to this epistle, already full of nothing. God bless you, my dear Malcolm!

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1884.]

To Major Barclay.

MY DEAR BARCLAY, H.M.S. *Trident*, St. Helena, 9th July, 1805.

I have written to Malcolm and Mrs. Freese a full account of all our adventures, &c., from Madras to this place. We arrived here on the 20th June, and leave this *Shetland the 2nd** to-morrow, with about forty sail of Indiamen and Chinamen. I am in very good health, and have now but little rheumatism.

I wish that you would send me some Trichinopoly chains. Let them be packed in letters directed to me to the care of Messrs. Coutts, bankers, London; and given to private hands. Draw upon me for their value. Campbell gave me some at Madras, which I have lost. I don't recollect that I paid him for them. I wish that you would inquire; and if I did not, pay him, and draw upon me for the amount.

It is said here that Col. Stevenson is dead; and that the Court of Directors have given a pension of 300*l.* a-year to his widow, and one of the same amount to Mrs. Maxwell. 'God bless you, my dear Barclay. Remember me most kindly to Symons, and to all my friends in India.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1885.]

To the Hon. Sir Thomas Strange.†

MY DEAR SIR,

On board the *Trident*, 25th August, 1805.

When I wrote to you a few days ago I did not immediately recollect that you were nearly connected with Lord Melville, and that you would be particularly interested in what concerned

* Major Barclay was a Shetlander.

† Sir Thomas Strange was passenger in the *Cirencester*, one of the ships of the homeward bound fleet.

him. If I had recollected these circumstances, I would have given you the details of his situation as far as they had come to my knowledge, even at the risk of detaining the *Cirencester's* boat during the squall.

It has appeared by the Tenth Report of the Commissioners appointed under a late Act of Parliament to investigate the accounts of the naval expenditure of the last war, that Mr. Trotter, who was the Paymaster of the Navy under the Treasurer, was in the habit of drawing the monies voted for the naval service from the Bank of England and lodging them in the house of Messrs. Coutts and Co. It is contended by the one party that this was contrary to Act of Parliament, which appears to be admitted by the friends of Lord Melville; excepting to a moderate extent, for the purpose of making the common payments of the navy. Mr. Trotter received an advantage from the house of Coutts, and it is contended by the opposition that Lord Melville both knew of, and participated in this illegal advantage. It besides appears that some sums were drawn from the Bank on account of the naval service which were applied to other purposes, particularly one sum of 40,000*l.* lent to the house of Boyd and Benfield, and another of 10,000*l.* given to Lord Melville himself. The report of the Naval Commissioners was referred to a Committee of the House of Commons, whose report I have not seen; but one of the members of the Committee, Mr. Whitbread, moved that Lord Melville should be impeached. His Lordship had previously been dismissed from His Majesty's councils and from his office, and a civil prosecution had been ordered against him; and I judge, from the debates, that these measures had been adopted at the recommendation of Mr. Pitt. His Lordship was admitted into the House of Commons to defend himself on the day on which Mr. Whitbread made his motion, and from his speech I judge that he is entirely free from guilt. The sum of 40,000*l.* was advanced to the house of Boyd by the desire of Mr. Pitt and of the Cabinet of the day, and is justified on the score of the necessity of saving that house from bankruptcy; and this sum has been repaid. Lord Melville acknowledges that he received the sum of 10,000*l.*, of which he declares that he will give no account; but he avers that this sum was spent in secret services in Scotland. The result of Mr. Whitbread's motion was—that it was lost; and it appears that Mr. Pitt opposed it. Another motion was made

by Mr. Bond, that Lord Melville should be prosecuted criminally in the courts below by the Attorney-General, which was also opposed by Mr. Pitt, but supported by the opposition and the party of Mr. Addington. This was carried by a majority of 9. A few days afterwards Mr. Leicester moved that Lord Melville should be impeached rather than prosecuted in the courts below; and this motion was supported by Mr. Pitt and all his Lordship's friends, but opposed by the opposition and Mr. Addington's friends, on the ground of the necessity that Parliament should be consistent in its conduct. This motion was carried, and his Lordship was to be impeached.

It is my firm opinion that there is nothing against Lord Melville excepting possibly his knowledge that Mr. Trotter derived an illegal advantage from the use of the public money. It is difficult to guess, and there is nothing to enable me to form a judgment of the cause for which Mr. Pitt recommended to His Majesty to dismiss Lord Melville from his councils and office, excepting it be this one fact.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1836.]

ON DEARTH IN INDIA.*

I read lately in a Bombay newspaper a statement of a speech made by Sir James Mackintosh, the Recorder of Bombay, to the Grand Jury of that settlement, in the course of which, after having adverted to the charitable disposition manifested by its inhabitants to the famished Natives of the neighbouring continent, and the efforts made by the government of Bombay to provide for the relief of those who had come to that island in search of food, he observes upon the frequent occurrence of dearth in India, and upon the more fatal effects produced by it in that part of the world, in comparison with those produced by the occurrence of a similar calamity in other regions. He particularly points out these two evils as subjects deserving investigation, into which he proposes to inquire, and to which he will draw the attention of his hearers at a future period.

I happened to be in the Deccan in the years 1803 and 1804,

* Written on the voyage home from India.

during the time this dearth existed, and the calamities occurred which have drawn the attention of Sir James Mackintosh, and have excited the charitable feelings of all the inhabitants of Bombay; and as I have had opportunities which few others have, of viewing the Natives of India in their various relations with each other, when concerned with Europeans, as I particularly saw the cause and progress of the evil which every man must lament, and had occasion to advert to the modes which were practicable of alleviating it, I will enter into a consideration of the general subject, which, I hope, will not be deemed entirely useless.

The dearth and consequent famine which occurred in the Deccan in 1803 and 1804 were to be attributed principally to the dry season of 1803. Those who are not acquainted with the systems of government and the customs of the inhabitants of India, or with the nature of the climate, will be of opinion that the recurrence of the dearth might be prevented by a better system of cultivation, or that the pernicious effects of the dearth of the grain in any particular part, viz. famine, and the mortality of its inhabitants, might be prevented by measures of the government.

In order to clear the subject of all difficulty, it is necessary, 1st, to consider generally the different modes of cultivating the land in practice throughout India; and in what manner these modes are affected by a wet or a dry season; 2ndly, to consider in what manner the deficiency produced by the seasons in any particular part could be remedied by the government in that part; and, 3rdly, what are the physical or moral causes which prevent the application of those remedies.

It is well known that the rains in India, which are the great source of all the cultivation, are periodical; and that the whole of the continent does not enjoy the benefit of them at the same time of the year. The western rains, or those which set in in the month of June, with what is called the S.W. monsoon, have by far the greatest influence. They prevail in the whole of Hindustan, including the provinces of Oude, Bahar, Bengal, and Orissa, all along the western coast of the peninsula, from Surat to Cape Comorin, and across the peninsula, as far as the eastern mountains, commonly called the range of Eastern Ghauts. Even the countries to the eastward of this eastern range, the Carnatic and the Northern Circars, are not entirely exempt from their influence, as the rain falls heavily at times in those countries in the months of June, July, and August, the season of the westerly

rains; but not in sufficient quantities, in those parts of India, to induce the inhabitants to take advantage of it for the purposes of cultivation.

The countries on the eastern coast of the peninsula, extending from Ganjam to Cape Comorin, and inland as far as the eastern mountains, have the advantage of the eastern rains for the cultivation of their lands; and these begin generally in October, with the N.E. monsoon, and last till towards the end of December.

The rain which falls at this season reaches the other parts of India, as well as the provinces situated on the Bay of Bengal; but it is very partial, and very much in proportion to their neighbourhood to the eastern mountains; and it does not appear that the inhabitants of any of the countries to the west of those mountains take advantage of the easterly rains for the purposes of cultivation, excepting in Mysore.

It follows, then, from this account, that, although the whole of India may be watered in some degree by rains which fall at two different seasons, in June and in October, the inhabitants of Hindustan, of Oude, Bahar, Bengal, and Orissa; of the coast of Malabar, from Surat to Cape Comorin; and of the whole peninsula of India, from the Western Sea to the Eastern Ghauts, take advantage of the western rains only for the cultivation of their lands; and that the inhabitants of the countries situated on the Bay of Bengal, as far as the eastern range of mountains, take advantage of the eastern rains for the same purposes.

To this statement the Mysore country is an exception. The eastern rains fall heavily, particularly in the eastern parts of that country, and advantage is taken of them in cultivation; and it will appear presently, when I come to consider the different species of cultivation, that the inhabitants of some countries in the Carnatic, through which rivers run which rise in the Western Ghauts, and empty themselves in the Bay of Bengal, have likewise the advantage of the western rains in their cultivation; as the rivers which supply them with water are filled by the western rains.

It is well known that the cultivation in India is either of wet land or of dry. The great produce of what is called wet land is rice, excepting in some very particular spots, on which the produce is occasionally wheat, sugar, or Indian corn. But these three last ought more properly to be termed exceptions from the

general rule, and do not deserve consideration in a discussion respecting the causes or the consequences of dearth.

In the cultivation of rice the land is watered either, 1st, directly by the fall of the rain ; or, 2ndly, by artificial canals made by the embankments of rivers ; or, 3rdly, by tanks filled by the rains, or by the overflow of rivers, or torrents, the water running into them by canals ; or, 4thly, by wells filled by the rain, from which the water is drawn by manual labour or that of cattle.

The greatest part of the cultivation of the wet lands in the province of Bengal, and in the countries on the coast of Malabar, is carried on by the first mode ; and, of course, the produce must depend entirely upon the critical arrival of the rains, and upon the quantity of the rain that falls. This quantity generally overflows the whole country ; and in Bengal, particularly, the crop is reaped in boats.

The fall of the water in many of the rivers in India is very great, so much so as to render the rivers torrents in the season of the rains ; and the banks of some of these are low. In these cases dams are thrown across the rivers ; by which means the water is diverted from the principal channel into others for the purposes of cultivation. It frequently happens that the fall of the principal river is so great, and the dam is so well constructed, as to throw water into the inferior channels for the purposes of cultivation, even at the season in which the river is not full. The produce of the lands through which these rivers run, particularly those from which water can be drawn when the river is not quite full, is far less precarious than of those lands which depend solely upon the rains. Of this description are all the lands upon the river Cauvery, from its rise in the western mountains, in all its progress through Mysore, and the countries of Trichinopoly and Tanjore, till it falls into the sea. Innumerable canals are cut from it ; and these happy countries are certain of a crop, whether the rains are abundant or otherwise. In some instances these canals, after watering a great extent of country, fall again into the river ; in others they are led to great tanks, which afford a constant supply of water for the cultivation of the land in the neighbourhood ; and in every case the cultivation of the country is independent of the rains.

I did not see any river in India of which so much advantage was taken in this way as of the Cauvery ; as none that I saw had such a fall, or banks equally low.

The greatest part of Mysore and nearly the whole of the Carnatic, excepting the countries of Trichinopoly and Tanjore, receive the water for the purposes of the cultivation of their wet lands from tanks. These are filled either by the periodical rains, the water which falls in their neighbourhood running into them and being retained by their banks, or by the overflow of some of the rivers, or rather torrents, which are filled by the eastern rains. Canals are cut from these, which conduct the waters into the tanks.

The beds of these torrents are dry during the whole year excepting in the season of the rains, and in some instances banks have been built across them at different distances to retain the water. In this manner a river will appear to be a chain of tanks. Although the countries watered by these tanks, whether filled by the rains or by the overflow of the torrents, are more certain of a crop than those which depend solely upon the fall of the rain in their field, they are not in so good a situation as those watered by such a river as the Cauvery. I know of no tanks or canals in any part of India excepting in the Company's territories south of the Toombuddra and Kistna, in Mysore and in the Carnatic.

Wells for the purposes of cultivation are filled either by the fall of the rain into them, or by a canal cut from a river. The water is drawn from them by manual labour; but they are little used for the purposes of wet cultivation, excepting in parts of the Northern Circars, and in the Company's territories in Benares and Oude, and generally throughout India, for watering wheat fields, sugar cane, Indian corn, and gardens. I am informed that the whole country of Benares is watered by wells; but those which I have seen in other parts have done little more than afford water to the garden grounds or sugar cane.

A country watered by wells is less dependent for its crop upon the periodical rains than one which receives the water immediately from the heavens into its fields; but such a country is less certain of a sufficient supply of water than one which receives what it requires from tanks or canals.

What I have above written applies solely to the cultivation of wet lands, the produce of which is properly rice. But rice, as the produce of wet lands, is the food of but a very small proportion of the inhabitants of India. This grain is eaten generally in the province of Bengal, along the coasts of India from Orissa

to Cape Comorin, and from Cape Comorin to Surat; but it is not the food of the people of the upper countries, that is of those who inhabit the countries between the eastern and western range of mountains in the peninsula, of the inhabitants of Hindustan, those of Oude, Benares or Bahar. In the greatest part of this immense tract of country the soil is of a black garden mould, which would not produce rice; and in Mysore, parts of which do produce great quantities of that grain, it is not the food of the common people, but is used as an article of commerce with the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar. The inhabitants of all these countries subsist upon what are called dry grains, or the produce of the dry lands; and the nature of the cultivation of these lands of course requires the attention of the person who considers this subject. As the countries which are watered by the eastern rains produce rice, and that is the common food of their people, those who depend upon the produce of the dry lands for their food are the inhabitants of the countries which are watered by the western rains.

They depend for their crop greatly upon the rain which falls on the land which they cultivate; they plough the land and sow the seed with the first rains, and they reap it in the months of December and January. If the rain fails, they lose it entirely.

In some parts of India they have small spots of ground watered by wells, which are ploughed early in the season, and produce an early crop. But these appear to be cultivated principally for fodder for the cattle; and at all events, whatever may be the intention, the produce from these small spots of ground must be so small as to afford subsistence to their cultivators for a very short space of time.

The produce of the land, therefore, and the subsistence of the people throughout India, depend entirely upon the critical arrival and the quantity of the periodical rains; and if these should fail in any particular part of the country, the people of that part must want subsistence.

It does not appear that it would be very possible to improve this system of cultivation either of wet or of dry lands. The rains which fall in the province of Bengal, and in the countries on the coast of Malabar, are generally so heavy, and the countries are so flat and so completely overflowed, as to preclude the possibility of constructing the works, and canals and tanks, which insure the rice crop in parts of Mysore and the Carnatic, and render it less uncertain in others.

The cultivation of dry lands appears equally incapable of improvement. If more wells were dug, the dependence upon the rain would not be quite so absolute; but the number to be dug, in order to produce any effect upon the cultivation and produce of the land, must be very great, and the work would be exceedingly expensive. In a year of famine, the grain produced by the land watered by a well would pay the expense of constructing it; but in the years in which the fall of rain would be plentiful, the well would not be used.

It remains, then, to be considered whether any means can be adopted, either to make the superfluity of one year supply the want of another, or the superfluity of one country provide for the wants of that not so well provided.

[1887.] MEMORANDUM ON THE PLAN PROPOSED OF AN INTERCHANGE OF NATIVE TROOPS OF INDIA AND THE NEGRO CORPS OF THE WEST INDIES. 1805.*

The plan of employing the negro troops in the East Indies, and the sepoy in the West Indies, ought to be considered in

* This memorandum was written at sea on the voyage from St. Helena to England, in consequence of the observations contained in the following letters from Lord Castlereagh to Marquess Wellesley.—Ed.

MY DEAR LORD,

East Sheen, 21st Aug., 1804.

The extreme difficulty of raising men at home for general service has induced His Majesty's Ministers to turn their attention to foreign troops of every description. A considerable number of Europeans has already been procured, and an extensive augmentation of the black corps in the West Indies has been ordered, but still the establishment of the army will remain very far short of what the various and pressing exigencies of our situation require.

Amongst other expedients for augmenting the public force, the possibility of raising sepoy regiments for service extra India has suggested itself for consideration; but as considerable doubts are entertained here of the policy of such a measure as bearing upon the habits and feelings of our Native subjects in that part of the globe, there is a reluctance in His Majesty's servants to lend any countenance to such a plan unless previously fortified by your Lordship's opinion in favour of its expediency and practicability.

It will be a great satisfaction to the King's Ministers to be favoured with your Lordship's sentiments upon this subject in detail, with such suggestions as occur to you with respect to the time for which the men should be enlisted; the best mode of constituting such a force, regard being had to the importance of having a proportion of the officers conversant with the language and habits of the natives of India; and also the probable charge of raising and transporting a regiment of this description to the West Indies, to which

two views : 1st, in a view to its efficiency, supposing it to be practicable ; 2ndly, in a view to its practicability, supposing it to be beneficial.

quarter, with perhaps the addition, under peculiar circumstances, of Gibraltar and Malta, their services must be confined.

The difficulty of raising men in this prosperous country bears so much upon the security of India itself in necessarily limiting our European force, that I am confident, exclusive of the ardour with which your Lordship is naturally disposed to lend yourself to every public object, that the question now submitted to your consideration will, in this view, additionally claim your attention. There may be reasons why in prudence we should not attempt to draw from India a resource which it cannot yield without prejudice or hazard to higher and more important interests ; but if from the immense population now within the limits of our Indian sovereignty (there being no longer any difficulty with respect to the recruiting of our own armies) a small proportion of force could be drawn in aid of our service in other parts of the world, it would certainly facilitate essentially the supplying India with a due proportion of European troops.

I presume if the attempt is to be made at all, it would be prudent to make a very limited experiment in the first instance ; that the nature of the service should be fully explained to the men on entering, and that their return to India, after a given number of years' service, should be assured to them.

Some doubts have been suggested as to the competence of the Indian sepoy in robustness and bodily strength to cope with the European enemy to whom they would generally be opposed in the West Indies : a quality in which it is apprehended they are materially inferior as troops to the African blacks. I should be glad to receive your Lordship's opinion on this part of the subject.

Whilst I am upon the topic of African corps, I may as well mention, though I can well conceive the objections to which such a plan may be liable, an idea which has been thrown out in contemplating the difficulty of feeding India with European force, namely, whether the introduction of some regiments of a description similar to those which have been found so serviceable in the West Indies, but to the extension of which force beyond certain limits in that quarter there are serious objections, might not supply India with a description of force possessing many of the valuable qualities of European troops. I merely mention this, wishing to attract your Lordship's attention to whatever hints may lead you to a minute consideration of this subject.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord,

Your faithful humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

If I recollect right, the sepoys employed to garrison the Moluccas in the last war were absent from the continent of India, many of them for the last five or six years of the war. If so, it may have afforded your Lordship the means of judging how far the men can be reconciled to remote and protracted service without shaking that disposition to embark which happily has been, with good management, progressively increasing, of late years amongst our Native troops, and which for our Indian interests it is essential to cultivate with the utmost care and attention.

MY DEAR LORD,

East Sheen, 25th Aug., 1804.

Having, in my letter No. 25, adverted to the defective supply of recruits at

It is supposed that the negro regiments are to be substituted for European regiments in India. It cannot be intended to substitute them for sepoy battalions; as, supposing the ordinary

home for general service, I think it may be satisfactory to your Lordship to receive a detailed statement of our present military force at home and abroad.

The statement enclosed is for the month of May last, but, as that for July does not exceed it in amount more than 2000 men, it will answer equally well for all the purposes of general information.

The line and militia at present amount, at home and abroad, to 241,217 effective rank and file. The deficiencies on our establishment (almost entirely confined to the line) are not less than 40,000 men. The additional force proposed to be raised under Mr. Pitt's last Bill, exclusive of the gradual conversion of the supplementary militia, as vacancies happen, into an army of reserve, may be taken at 20,000, making a gross deficiency upon our proposed military establishment of about 60,000 men.

Your Lordship will perceive that, independent of volunteers, which in the accompanying returns are stated from the effectives at the monthly inspections, and not from their nominal establishment, the regular force for home-defence is, in Great Britain, including Jersey and Guernsey, 138,000; in Ireland, 50,000 rank and file. It will require full 20,000 men more to place us at home as we wish to stand, and this before we can consider ourselves as having a force disposable for foreign service.

The demands for disposable force are at the same time very pressing, and it is impossible for us to look upon ourselves as in a situation to do justice to the interests of the country in the war in which we are engaged unless we can command the service of a corps of not less than 20,000 men for offensive operations, preserving at the same time our internal defences on that high scale which the preparations of the enemy have rendered indispensable.

Your Lordship will be able to estimate from the above sketch of our military situation the difficulties I have to contend with in attempting to procure for India the European reinforcements which I deem to be essential to our interests in that quarter; so that your Lordship must be satisfied to receive at present limited supplies, being assured that I shall seize the first moment which more exposed interests will admit of placing the British army in India on the most respectable footing; and I shall not cease to importune the Duke of York to allot a number of recruits, beyond the very inadequate proportion the Company have lately received from the recruiting depôt, to restore the artillery corps to its proper strength. In the mean time I trust you will avail yourself of whatever resource can be derived for the support of this most important feature of our army, either from the men volunteering from the King's regiments ordered home, or from the Company's European regiments, which are at present wholly inefficient; notwithstanding which evident truth, and the little prospect of completing them by recruits from Europe, I find either their reduction or their conversion into Native battalions much disrelished by the Court of Directors. Such of the men, however, as are fit for the artillery will, I am sure, be much more usefully employed in that service.

Having apprised your Lordship that His Majesty's Ministers are not yet satisfied with the amount of our force at home, which exceeds both in quality of troops and in numbers what the country has possessed at any former period, I think it necessary to state in explanation that the preparations of the enemy continue with unabated vigour along the whole line of their coast.

and constant expense of both descriptions of troops to be the same, the levy and transport of negroes to India would cost considerable sums, whereas the levy of sepoy costs nothing. The

Great exertions have been used in equipping and even augmenting their regular navy, and they have now, including 8 Dutch, about 45 sail of the line from Toulon to the Texel in a state to put to sea, though certainly, in many respects, little qualified to contend with our ships. But their efforts have been principally directed to the construction, equipment, and discipline, as far as that can be accomplished in their own harbours and under the protection of their batteries, of a lesser marine, which consists of four or five different classes of vessels, descending from prames, which are square-rigged and carry each about thirty heavy guns, to row-boats carrying one gun and capable of receiving about fifty men. The former are good batteries, sail reasonably well with a fair wind, and, from drawing very little water, are well calculated to cover the landing of troops.

From the best information we are in possession of, they have accumulated not less than 2000 vessels of all sorts for the purposes, of descent; of these about 300 are of the class of stout gun-brigs and armed vessels of a higher description; the remainder are transports fitted for the reception of horses and artillery, Dutch schuyts, Greenland boats, and craft of various descriptions. They are now assembled in the ports of Boulogne, Ostend, and Flushing, the former station, with several dependent basins, having been enlarged for the reception of this flotilla, on board of which a large proportion of the army is constantly embarked, partly for the purpose of training and accustoming them to the management of the boats, partly as affording them more convenient accommodation than huts on shore. Making due allowance for the proportion of tonnage which must be employed in transporting artillery, stores, provisions, and horses, the above fleet may be calculated as capable of transporting on an average about sixty men each, or upon the whole 120,000 men; to which is to be added whatever may be embarked from Brest and Rochefort on the one flank, or from the Texel on the other, either on board or under the protection of their fleets.

It has been generally understood that Buonaparte's purpose has been not to attempt the descent with less than 200,000 men. Your Lordship will make your own calculation what proportion of this force is likely to penetrate the succession of defences we happily possess before the enemy can bring the contest to an issue upon land.

There are still sceptics upon the attempt being finally made. Whatever may be the result, we must clearly act as if it were inevitable; and after all that has passed, the nature of the man and the object in view compared with the risk being considered, I cannot bring myself to doubt its being hazarded, the rather as there is nothing in the state of the Continent which is likely, at least for the present year, to give him any alarm for his own security at home whilst he is employed on the expedition.

During the last three months the progress the Volunteers have made in discipline is highly satisfactory, and there prevails amongst that valuable and improving force the best possible spirit. Since encouragement was given by Parliament to their coming out upon permanent duty, there have been in Great Britain alone not less than 180,000 men who have passed from a fortnight to three weeks, at a distance from their own homes, in an uninterrupted improvement of themselves in the use of arms, during which time they have been subject to the Mutiny Act and been superintended and instructed by regular officers.

negroes could not perform the duties of the sepoy's better, or so well, as these have always performed them. It cannot be deemed necessary to send negroes to India to replace sepoy's, who may be withdrawn from thence for the service of the West Indies, as hitherto there has existed no very great difficulty in raising as many sepoy's for the service in India as might be thought necessary.

The plan, therefore, must be considered as substituting negroes in India for English soldiers.

In addition to our preparations in point of numbers, the whole being now brigaded under General officers, a plan is in considerable forwardness for moving with rapidity to the point of attack whatever proportion of the Volunteer force it may be expedient to bring forward in aid of the regular army; and it is hoped that it may be so arranged as to admit of the entire force (if necessary) of England being concentrated for the security of the metropolis on the ninth day, supplying a daily reinforcement of about 25,000 men to the main army advanced in front of London.

I have already said enough to justify myself, I trust, to your Lordship for not having obtained for India, in the course of the past season, a larger proportion of King's troops. The same considerations must also reconcile your Lordship to a disappointment with respect to the naval succours, which, upon consultation with Lord Melville, I felt myself warranted in holding out to your Lordship in my letter of May last. His Lordship desires me to express his regret that the pressing demands at home preclude him at this moment from detaching from hence the two ships then promised, and he is also unable to supply by the fleet now under despatch any number of seamen for the ships which may have been taken up in India in pursuance of the late orders from the Board of Admiralty to Admiral Rainier, there being above thirty light-armed ships, peculiarly adapted for service in the narrow seas, at this moment in the river, completely equipped and only waiting for hands. It will, however, be an early object of his Lordship's solicitude to furnish you with the means of completing the naval armament ordered in India with the least possible delay.

I cannot close this despatch without offering to your Lordship my congratulations on the truly gallant and distinguished conduct of the China fleet. The Court of Directors have liberally distributed about 50,000*l.* amongst the officers and men, which, in addition to the notice the King has taken of their services by conferring on Captain Dance, as Commodore, the honour of knighthood, cannot fail, I trust, to infuse into the Company's marine a confidence in their own strength and a determination hereafter to redeem their character, which had suffered in one or two instances towards the close of the last war. Few events have given greater satisfaction to the nation than Linois' defeat. It is a novel description of glory, and, as such, has produced a more lively impression on the public mind than a repetition of triumphs to which our navy is so well accustomed.

Believe me, my dear Lord, with great truth and respect,

Most faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

It must first be considered for what a substitute is to be found, before it is determined that it is a good one.

The English soldiers are the main foundation of the British power in Asia. They are a body with habits, manners, and qualities peculiar to them in the East Indies.

Bravery is the characteristic of the British army in all quarters of the world; but no other quarter has afforded such striking examples of the existence of this quality in the soldiers as the East Indies. An instance of their misbehaviour in the field has never been known; and particularly those who have been for some time in that country cannot be ordered upon any service, however dangerous or arduous, that they will not effect, not only with bravery, but a degree of skill not often witnessed in persons of their description in other parts of the world.

I attribute these qualities, which are peculiar to them in the East Indies, to the distinctness of their class in that country from all others existing in it. They feel that they are a distinct and superior class to the rest of the world which surrounds them; and their actions correspond with their high notions of their own superiority. Add to these qualities that their bodies are inured to climate, hardship, and fatigue, by long residence, habit, and exercise, to such a degree, that I have seen them for years together in the field without suffering any material sickness; that I have made them march 60 miles in 30 hours, and afterwards engage the enemy; and it will not be surprising that they should be respected, as they are, throughout India. Their weaknesses and vices, however repugnant to the feelings and prejudices of the Natives, are passed over in the contemplation of their excellent qualities as soldiers, of which no nation has hitherto given such extraordinary instances. These qualities are the foundation of the British strength in Asia, and of that opinion by which it is generally supposed that the British empire has been gained and upheld. These qualities show in what manner nations, consisting of millions, are governed by 30,000 strangers.

For this body, endowed with these excellent qualities, are negroes a substitute? It does not appear that the fidelity of the negroes can be depended upon; they are prone to mutiny.

They are brave, undoubtedly; but are they unhesitatingly so as are the English soldiers?

The Native public cannot but know that they have been pur-

chased slaves. There will be no distinction between the negroes and the lower classes of Natives; if any, unfortunately, one to the disparagement of the former, and no respect will be entertained for them.

It is a curious fact, but one that has more than once fallen under my observation, that the Natives of India have no fear or respect for the military qualities of the soldiers of any European nation excepting the English. I had under my command for some years the Swiss regiment De Meuron, which, for good conduct, discipline, and other military qualities, was not surpassed by the English regiments. But the Natives heard that they were foreigners, that they had been bought into the service, and they had no confidence in them. What respect or confidence could be expected from them in a band of purchased negroes?

The introduction of the negro troops in India will bring with it a new evil not hitherto known there. The government will not be able to place implicit reliance on the fidelity of its troops. Certain classes of them must be taken to watch and balance the power and strength of certain other classes, which evil in itself will obviously weaken the whole. Are the few Europeans who must still be in India to be employed to watch the negroes, or is this service to be performed by the faithful sepoy? In either case the power and strength of the government will be lessened; and yet it is well known that the only power in India is military; and that, if Great Britain should lose her military pre-eminence there, her empire will no longer exist.

Will this evil be kept a secret from the Natives? Our own subjects, nay, our sepoy, would be equally ready with our enemies to take advantage of this decided symptom of internal debility.

My opinions upon this subject are so strong, that, if it be true that Great Britain cannot afford to supply the troops found necessary to maintain its empire in Asia, I would prefer to trust the maintenance of it to a smaller and select band of English soldiers, aided by their faithful and brave companions and adherents the Company's sepoy, to the adoption of any such substitute as the negro force of the West Indies.

Let them go to Ceylon, where the establishment is less of the nature of a colony than these are on the continent of India. The climate of that island is said to be more congenial to their

constitutions than it has been found to be to those either of Europeans or Natives of India. Their mutinies or misbehaviour can do no permanent mischief there, as the body required for the service of that island must always be small.

There appear few, if any, difficulties in the execution of this part of the plan, supposing that it should be determined. The negro regiments can be sent from the West Indies to India either in transports or in Indian men of war, in the same manner as other troops in His Majesty's service. They can be recruited by purchases of slaves on His Majesty's account in the West Indies, on the west coast of Africa, or on the east coast of Africa, or in Madagascar, or in small numbers, possibly, in the Portuguese settlements in India. They will be expensive recruits, undoubtedly; but if the plan be necessary on account of the difficulties in supplying English soldiers, the expense of the article must not be considered.

It is supposed that they will receive in India the same pay and provisions as the European troops in the same branch in the West Indies. But they will still be less expensive than the European troops, inasmuch as it will not be necessary that their barracks, their field equipage, their hospitals, their arrack, should be equally good and expensive as those now supplied to the European troops.

If, however, it should be intended to make up for the deficiency in quality of the negro troops, in comparison with the Europeans, by sending increased numbers to India of the former, the expense to the Company of this negro establishment will be heavier than that of the European establishment has ever been; and, as I have before observed, the confidence in their efficiency as soldiers, whether in a view to their fidelity or to their bravery and discipline, and other military virtues, can never be so great.

I come now to consider the other branch of the plan, viz. to send the sepoys to the West Indies. First, I shall consider their probable efficiency, as soldiers, in the West Indies.

The sepoys are to be substituted for the European as well as the negro troops. There is no man who has a higher opinion, or ought to have a higher opinion, of the sepoys than I have. I have tried them on many serious occasions, and they never failed me, and always conducted themselves well. But it must be recollected that in India we never, or scarcely ever undertake

any service with the aid of sepoys only. The operations of war in India are always, or ought to be, offensive, if they can be made so; and it is possible in an offensive operation to have some of the troops who are to perform it, however desperate it may be, of an inferior description. Accordingly, in proportion to the service to be performed, we have seen $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{3}{4}$ of the number of the operating army English soldiers; and it has been held by great authorities that $\frac{1}{4}$ of the whole army in India ought to be of that description.

Since the battle of Cuddalore, in the year 1783, the sepoys have not been engaged in a regular battle with a European enemy. Upon that occasion a very large proportion, I believe half the army, was composed of European troops; and it has always been customary in the wars in India to increase the proportion of the European troops to the Natives as the service should appear more arduous.

The services which will be required from the sepoys in the West Indies will be generally of a defensive nature, against the best troops, excepting the English soldiers, which the world has produced. According to the Indian notion of employing sepoys, I should say that one half at least of the whole number of troops to be employed upon such an occasion ought to be English soldiers; and even upon that ground I should not think that I could save to the mother country half the soldiers required for the defence of the West India colonies. As substitutes, I could not consider less than two sepoys an equivalent for one soldier; and then there must be as many soldiers as sepoys every where. So that the most that the country could gain by this arrangement, supposing it is intended to provide fairly and upon known principles for the defence of the West Indies, would be $\frac{1}{4}$ of the number of soldiers at present employed there. That is, supposing the number of soldiers now required for the West Indies is 15,000, it might be reduced to 10,000; and the deficiency I should consider to be made good by 10,000 sepoys.

In respect to the offensive operations in the West Indies, I mean those against Caribs, refractory negroes, brigands, &c., the sepoys are entirely unfit for them. The light troops are best adapted for these operations; and the sepoys are the worst of all troops for services of this description. The Europeans or the country troops are always employed upon services of this description in India when they occur, which is but seldom, as

the country is one generally of plains, and the sepoys are not trained to them. Another reason why they will never make good light troops is, that the services of light troops naturally depend upon individual talents and exertion, and are carried on out of the sight of the officer. Those acquainted with the sepoys know well that they will do nothing against their enemy excepting led by, and in the sight of, their officers. Add to these defects, that the sepoys are very delicate troops; that their health is affected by unwholesome situations and climate, equally with the Europeans; that the service in hilly and woody countries invariably affects them, and at times sends whole battalions to the hospital; and it will appear that this branch of the plan is not less inefficient than the other, of sending the negroes to India.

The difference between them is, that the West Indies will acquire at least a harmless defence; but not so the East Indies, as I have already shown.

But the difficulties which oppose the execution of this part of the plan are much greater than those which affect the other; and these are of a nature which, supposing it was likely to be efficient, ought in my opinion to induce government to abandon it.

In the first place, the embarkation of sepoys in India has never been otherwise, excepting on the coast of Malabar, than a voluntary service. On the coast of Malabar it has long been the practice to embark the sepoys at Bombay, and to send them to the northern or southern provinces under that government. But in the season in which those voyages are invariably undertaken the weather is always good; the length of the voyage is known to be only a few days; and short trips of that description are not uncommon among the inhabitants of the country.

The Bengal sepoys have never yet embarked in whole battalions. When Native troops are required for foreign service, the practice has been to call for volunteers from the whole army; and the numbers which turn out are formed into battalions, with officers posted to them. Whole battalions have embarked upon the Madras establishment; but it has always been a voluntary offer made by the soldiers.

The same mode of proceeding must be adopted with a view to obtain sepoys for the service in the West Indies, not only at Madras and in Bengal, but on the Bombay establishment; as,

although the sepoys belonging to the latter have been in the habit of embarking for short voyages of a few days' duration, they would be unwilling, and it might create inconvenience to make them embark for service in the West Indies.

To go on the service or not, then, must be left to the choice of the sepoys; and if the length of the voyage, the nature of the country to which they are to be sent, and the length of time they are to be absent, are fairly described to them, I think I may venture to say that very few indeed will voluntarily offer their services.

But I will suppose that they will offer them. They must have with them a certain proportion of their women, and some of their followers. Measures must be taken to feed them, not only on the passage, but in the West Indies, with the description of grain and other food to which each class of them has been accustomed.

Then they must be sent back to India in a reasonable period of time; suppose five years from the period of embarkation.

The European officers from the Company's service must accompany them, with their battalions, if whole battalions should volunteer their services, or taken from the regular regiments, supposing that the volunteers for the West Indies should be taken from the whole army, and formed into separate and extra battalions. In either case the European officers must be assured that they will have in the West Indies the same allowances as in India, or it may be depended upon there will be no Native volunteers for the service. If the Company's officers are to have Indian pay in the West Indies, discontent will be created among the King's officers in the same country. If the volunteers for the West Indies are to be formed into extra battalions, to be furnished with European officers from the regular sepoy regiments, the establishment of officers in India must be increased, as it is already too small for the service.

There are numberless inconveniences of minor importance, for which remedies can be found, such as the rank to be held by the Company's officers in the West Indies, the mode of conducting Native General Courts Martial, and the authority under which they are to be held, and other matters. But those first stated appear of such monstrous expense and difficulty as to render the plan to any extent quite impracticable.

If it should be attempted in this mode, which is the only one

in which it can be effectual, it must be expected that the recruiting for the sepoy regiments in India will receive a very serious blow. The families of the Natives will see with additional disquiet their relatives enlist in a service in which they will know that they are liable to be sent to an unknown country, situated in a different quarter of the globe.

If the plan went only to draw from India a certain proportion of men for service in the island of Jamaica, for instance, where particular prejudices prevail against the negroes, the best mode of proceeding would be to recruit for this number at Chittagong, in the Bay of Bengal, by means of the King's officers.

But, even according to this plan, much inconvenience would be felt by the Indian service, as the recruiting officers must either give bounty or promise additional pay, or they would get no recruits. Bounty for enlisting is unknown in India, excepting where the King's officers enlisted for the Native regiments in Ceylon, and this enlistment might introduce it. An increase of pay to the troops in India would be equally unnecessary and injurious; and yet it might be necessary to promise it in the quarter of the country in which these recruiting officers would have been.

Another plan for procuring soldiers for the West Indies from India would be to recruit from the Malay coast, opposite Prince of Wales's Island. The Malays are a hardy and brave race, and would make better soldiers for the West Indies than the people of India Proper; and to recruit these would not be attended with any of the inconveniences expected from the recruiting in India.

Upon the whole, I do not conceive that this plan would give to India a force which it is suitable to British India to have, or to the West Indies a force which would be efficient for their defence. On the other hand, the difficulties and expense attending the execution of both branches of the plan are such as must tend greatly to overbalance the advantages expected by the more sanguine, but which I am convinced would never be found to exist. Those, in particular, attending the execution of that part of the plan which sends sepoys to the West Indies, must prevent it from being carried to any useful extent, supposing it could be useful at all.

All the arguments upon sending sepoys to the West Indies apply to sending them to the Cape, with the difference only of

distance, which, in such distances as either is from India, the sepoys would be unable to appreciate. But if troops are wanted at the Cape, why not send negroes there, and leave India to its old means, viz. English soldiers and sepoys?

[1888.]

To the Chairman of the Court of Directors.

19th Sept., 1805.

Sir Arthur Wellesley presents his compliments to the Chairman of the Court of Directors. He has had the honour of serving the East India Company for many years, but has never had an opportunity of paying his respects to the Court of Directors; and he will be much obliged to the Chairman if he will make known to the Honourable Court Sir Arthur Wellesley's anxious wish to have the honour of waiting upon them at any time the Court may think proper to appoint.

[1889.]

To the Chairman of the Court of Directors.

SIR,

No. 18, Conduit Street, 24th Sept., 1805.

I had the honour of receiving last night on my return to town your note of the 23rd.* As my only object in expressing a wish to wait upon the Court of Directors was to mark my respect for the East India Company, whom I have served for some years, I beg that you will not communicate it to the Court if you should see any reason for which it should be withheld, until I can have the honour of seeing you.

I propose to wait upon you this day before twelve o'clock; but if it should be inconvenient to you to see me at that hour, I will call upon you at any hour in the course of to-morrow that you may appoint.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

"India House, 23rd Sept., 1805."

* "The Chairman has the honour to acknowledgethe receipt of the note addressed to him by General Wellesley under date the 19th instant, and it is his intention to lay it before the Court of Directors. He would be glad, however, if he could previously be favoured with a short interview with General Wellesley, and regrets he was not so fortunate as to find him at home when he went to pay his respects to him on the morning of the 19th, before he knew of the note in question, as he probably would then have heard of the intention of writing it, and might have made the observation which it is still his wish to offer."

To Colonel Gordon.

[1890.]

SIR,

Cheltenham, 18th Oct., 1805.

I have received a letter from the brother of Lieutenant-Colonel (Major) Elliott of the 33rd regiment, in which he has desired me to lay before His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief my opinion of his brother's conduct, and of his pretensions to be promoted to be Lieutenant-Colonel of a regiment, as he had some hopes that Lieutenant-Colonel Elliott might be recommended to His Royal Highness as the successor to the late Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland of the 75th. Lieutenant-Colonel Elliott was appointed an Ensign in the 33rd regiment shortly after the American war, and he has risen to the rank of Major by the purchase of every step in the same regiment. He was appointed Major in the year 1796. He served with the 33rd regiment on the Continent during the late war, and was wounded; he afterwards went out to India with his regiment, but was obliged to come home on account of his health, and he joined again as soon as he had recovered. During the whole period of his service, in which he has never been absent from his regiment excepting on account of indisposition, he has uniformly done his duty to the satisfaction of his commanding officers, and very much to his own credit; and by the exchange of Lieutenant-Colonel Gore with Major-General Sherbrooke, he stands without any immediate hope of promotion in his regiment, under the command of an officer junior in rank to himself. Under these circumstances I should hope that Lieutenant-Colonel Elliott may be considered by His Royal Highness as deserving his favour and protection.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Earl of Mornington.

[1891.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON,

Deal, 21st Dec., 1805.

I am just about to make a second attempt to reach the river Weser with a body of troops, to which I am attached as a Major-General; but before I depart I wish to make you acquainted with all that has passed between your friends and the ministers and me respecting yourself, as far as I may be able in a letter.

I arrived in England about the 10th of September, and I was received by Lord Castlereagh with great kindness and cordiality. I had several different discussions with him on the subject of recent transactions in India, in all of which he appeared to maintain the opinions given in the "Observations on Mahratta Affairs." He admitted, however, that you had done as you ought in not carrying into execution the orders which had been sent to you founded upon the principles laid down in that paper, as the war and the treaties of peace had entirely altered the circumstances which, it was supposed here, existed, or might exist when those orders should reach India. As I found that Lord Castlereagh still adhered to the notions which he had formed when he wrote the "Observations," which were certainly erroneous, I thought it best to communicate to him the memorandum which I had written upon those Observations, of which you had approved.* After he had read this paper I had another opportunity of discussing the subject with him. His objections to the treaty of Bassein upon that occasion were confined to one specific point, viz. that it had been framed too much in imitation of the subsidiary treaty with the Nizam. To this I answered that it certainly would have been possible to frame a treaty with the Peshwah in different words, which should have bound both parties to the same specific stipulations; but I said that I was entitled by experience to assert that nothing short of the treaty of Bassein would have answered at all. I then recapitulated the arguments upon this part of the subject contained in my memorandum.

Lord Castlereagh in answer said that what he would have wished would have been some middle line between that of leaving the Peshwah entirely at the mercy of the Mahrattas and taking him out of their hands and into ours, from which supposed project I could never drive him. When I pressed him by a detail of the situation of the different parties in the empire, and their different political objects, and urged the impossibility of reconciling those objects either with our interests or any pacific system, he either gave me no answer or flew off to some other part of the subject or to one entirely unconnected with it.

One of these was the great extension of our political system as laid down in your instructions to General Lake and my-

* See *Wellington Despatches*, ed. 1852, vol. ii. p. 1316.

self of June, 1803, which was carried into execution by the treaties of peace; upon which he urged all the topics which have repeatedly been brought forward upon the same subject. In answer I told him that when you found that your system was not likely to meet with the approbation and support at home which you had thought it deserved, and, above all, when you had experience of the treachery of the Rajpoots and others in their conduct towards Monson's detachment, and upon other occasions, you had determined to narrow the system in such a manner as I thought would be satisfactory to him. I then explained the nature of the arrangement which you had proposed to make with a view to the settlement of Scindiah's government, by which I pointed out to him that we should have nothing beyond the Jumna excepting what was absolutely necessary to secure the navigation of that river, and our possessions in Bundelcund.

In all our discussions upon this subject Lord Castlereagh always spoke with the greatest deference and respect for you. He lamented that he had differed in opinion with you, and particularly that you should have imagined, as he supposed you did, that he had altered his opinion of the treaty of Bassein as soon as he found that it was likely to be followed by war. He told me that he had written you a letter upon that subject, which he intended to send to St. Helena to meet you, and which he said he would show me; but I have never seen it.

He lamented in strong terms your differences with the Court of Directors, and entered with some detail upon the causes of them. These were principally the old story, disobedience of their orders, contempt of their authority, neglect to write to them to inform them of the most important events, and declared dislike of their persons; add to all this a confirmed belief in the Court, founded upon the indiscretion of some persons who had returned from India and were attached to you, that it was your fixed resolution to exert all the means in your power to overturn the authority of the Company upon your return to England.

Shortly after my arrival in England I went to Cheltenham, and Lord Castlereagh sent after me a very long despatch, No. 128, which had been sent up from the Court of Directors to the Board of Control. I never saw such a paper in my life. In this the Court entered into a discussion of all the measures of your government since the settlement of Mysore, excepting the

treaty of Arcot, each of which they censured in the grossest and the least candid terms. I wrote to Lord Castlereagh upon the subject of this despatch a letter, of which I enclose you a copy, and the consequence was that he refused to allow the despatch to be sent out to India, as it contained reflections which were unjust and injurious upon the governments abroad; and he ordered that they should write another upon the points which were called constitutional, of which he transmitted them a draft. In this draft he has discussed and disapproved of three practices of the Supreme government in the conduct of the public business: first, the separate correspondence; secondly, the practice of issuing orders in the name and by the authority of the Governor-General alone when he is at Calcutta; and, thirdly, the practice of recording minutes at councils at which the Governor-General does not preside, and at periods subsequent to the arrangement of the transactions to which they relate. This letter does not contain any injurious or disrespectful reflections, but positive orders to discontinue the practices which it decidedly disapproves. You will observe in my letter that I had urged Lord C. not to send any orders upon these subjects to India till he should have seen and conversed with you; and I urged the same again in conversation.

At the same time that this draft was sent down to the Court, another was sent to the Secret Committee, in which the Governor-General is ordered to narrow his system in India nearly according to the plan which you had proposed when you had in contemplation the arrangements for Scindiah's government. It is written in general terms, and contains an approbation of the conduct of the Governor-General in delaying to carry into execution the orders which he received at the same time with the anonymous "Observations."

Lord C. lately took an opportunity of showing the Chairman that paragraph of one of your late letters to him in which you disclaim all plans to overturn the Company's authority. The Chairman said that he was glad to see it, but that you must have altered your mind upon that subject, as he had reason to believe that you had entertained such a project.

Pitt was at Weymouth when I arrived in England, and I did not see him till the day before I left town to go to Cheltenham. I had met Lord Camden at East Sheen a day or two before, and had some conversation with him respecting you. I

told him that you were but little annoyed by the insolence and vulgarity of the Court of Directors, but you felt extremely the neglect of your friends, and that you had had reason to apprehend till very lately that Pitt had not approved of any part of your administration. That the ground of that apprehension was that he had never said a word in parliament upon the subject till upon a late occasion, but that I was convinced you would feel more satisfied when you would hear of the handsome manner in which he had spoken of your administration, when he had defended you from the attacks made upon you by Francis and some of the Directors, than you could be by any event that could occur. In answer, Lord Camden told me that Pitt certainly felt towards you as warmly as ever, and that he was determined to support you. He said that, in fact, no serious attack had ever been made upon your administration, or was likely to be made; but in order to prove to me how much in earnest Pitt was in his determination to give you all the support which he was capable of giving, he mentioned in confidence that upon one occasion, when there was a probability that a serious attack would be made upon you, Pitt had determined to send to Lord Grenville to consult with him regarding the mode in which each should defend you in the Houses of Lords and Commons, although he had not had any communication with Lord Grenville for several months before.

I desired Lord Camden to tell Pitt what I had said, which I believe he did, as on the next day I received a message from him to desire that I would call upon him. Instead of calling upon him, I rode with him from Wimbledon Common to London. We rode very slowly, and I had a full opportunity of discussing with him and explaining all the points in our late system in India, to which objections had been made, which were likely to make any impression upon him. These were principally the probability of future wars arising out of that system, in which we should be obliged to interfere; the increased demand for European troops; the increased expenses, which would swallow up our increased resources. Upon all these his mind appeared to be satisfied. I explained to him, as I had done to Lord Camden, how much you had felt his silence upon all the events of your administration, and your apprehension that its general tenor had not been approved by him; and I told him that I was convinced that you would receive the

greatest satisfaction when you would read the account of the handsome manner in which he had spoken of you in a late debate. He then spoke of you in the strongest and handsomest terms, and said that till the late opportunity, of which he had availed himself, none had offered in which he could have spoken.

I told him that you were naturally most anxious that a parliamentary decision should be given upon the war; upon which he said that upon his first coming into office he had not been able to turn his mind to the subject as he had wished; that afterwards, when he had been able to read the papers, he had been so much pressed by different questions in parliament that he could not bring it forward, more particularly as he would not conceal from me that many of his friends entertained doubts upon that subject, which it was not very easy to remove. He said, however, that he wished you might arrive before the parliament should meet, in order that he might have an opportunity of talking over with you the whole subject, and of arranging in what manner it should be brought forward. I have seen Pitt several times since; he has always been very civil to me, and has mentioned you in the most affectionate terms.

Lord Grenville has been out of town ever since I arrived in England; but I went to Stowe on my way to Cheltenham, where I underwent a bore for two days. Bucky is very anxious that you should belong to the opposition. He urged every argument to induce me to inflame your mind against Pitt, particularly that he had not given you the Garter. He told me that you might depend upon the cordial and active support of himself, his brothers, his son, and all his friends; that they had stipulated with Fox that they were to give you this support in any question that might arise on your administration; but he expressed a hope that you would not at once throw yourself into the arms of Pitt, forgetting your old friends and connexions. I told him that I was convinced you would follow the wise advice given to you by Lord Grenville, which was to come home and look about you, and settle all the questions relating to your Indian government before you should take any part in politics or belong to any party. He then pointed out the inducements which Pitt would hold out to you, all of them in his opinion

strong; but they were office, power, and the means of revenging the injuries you have received from the Court of Directors, about which body I suppose you will never think after you will arrive in England. On the other hand, he urged that to join the opposition was the best political game of the day; and this notion was founded upon the difference of the age of the King and the Prince of Wales.

I was with Lord Bathurst at Cirencester, and had some conversation with him respecting you. He said that although, of course, he was desirous of renewing his old habits with you, and that you should be with Pitt, it was his opinion that you ought not to take any decided part in party politics immediately upon your arrival, or till your Indian questions should have been settled. Lord Buckinghamshire, with whom also I had a conversation very lately upon the same subject, is of the same opinion.

As for my part, I have no doubt upon the subject; and I strongly recommend it to you to remain neutral for some time, and observe the course of events. The Court of Directors by their conduct have left you in an awkward predicament regarding several acts of your administration; but, excepting the Mahratta war, upon which I am inclined to believe that there must be a parliamentary decision, I rather think that the remainder may as well be left alone. The real truth is that the public mind cannot be brought to attend to an Indian subject. It appears to me that people in general were much prejudiced against the whole system of Mahratta politics, because it was necessary to attack Holkar, because Monson was defeated, and because Lord Lake failed before Bhurtpoor; and you cannot bring their attention to the subject sufficiently to enable them to understand you, and to prove to them that those events which all must lament had nothing to do with the system of Mahratta politics which occasioned the treaty of Bassein.

In the same way the treaty of Oude and other measures are equally misunderstood, and it is equally difficult to make people sufficiently attentive to be able to understand them. For this reason I would stand upon the defensive: keep Pitt well charged with information, and prepared in the House of Commons, and yourself in the House of Lords; and whenever an attack is made, lay forth all your strength upon the particular

point to which it may be directed. Henry and William are both of the same opinion.

In regard to myself, I have to tell you that I have seen the Duke of York but once, upon my arrival in England. He was very civil, and said he should be happy to avail himself of an opportunity to employ me. I rather think that upon the whole they have not treated me very well in not giving me a regiment. Bucky tried to inflame me upon this point; but of course I have said, and shall say, nothing upon the subject.

The Court of Directors invited me to one of their Wednesday dinners, at which they were personally civil to me; and I believe that I stand well with that august body. But upon my arrival I proposed to wait upon them by desire of Lord Castlereagh, and the Chairman recommended that I should withdraw my proposition because it had no precedent. The real reason, however, for which they refused to receive me was, that they were apprehensive lest by any mark of personal attention to me they should afford ground for a belief that they approved of any of the measures in the transaction of which I had been concerned. Lord Castlereagh told me this, but I don't wish that it should be mentioned to him again.

By-the-bye, now that I think of it, I mention that I don't believe that Lord C. knows that it was Pitt's intention to consult with Lord Grenville about the mode of defending you in parliament.

I will not enter into the particulars of our late unfortunate attempt to reach the Weser: you will see it all in the papers; and I only hope the next attempt will be more fortunate, but it does not now promise very well. I will write to you from the Continent when I shall hear of your arrival in England.

I cannot conclude this letter without congratulating you upon the state in which you will find your children. I saw Richard in London before I went to Cheltenham, and I think him one of the finest young men I ever met with. I called upon him afterwards at Oxford upon my return from Cheltenham, but he was with his mother at Brighton; and he afterwards went to Oxford, where he has remained ever since. The two other boys are also very fine fellows, and the girls (particularly the youngest) are very handsome and accomplished. This is some consolation, even if your services should not have been con-

sidered and treated as they deserve. But you have this additional consolation in the reflection that by your firmness and decision you have not only saved but enlarged and secured the invaluable empire intrusted to your government at a time when everything else was a wreck, and the existence even of Great Britain was problematical.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. Robert Dundas.**

[1892.]

MY DEAR DUNDAS,

London, 27th March, 1808.

I have read over, with all the attention which it deserves, the paper which you were so kind as to allow me to peruse respecting the arrangement which I made in the year 1803 with Amrut Rao, upon which I trouble you with the following remarks :

Amrut Rao was the adopted son of the Peshwah's father Ragoba. He was a very able man in the civil and political affairs of the Mahratta empire, and had been deeply concerned in all the intrigues and disturbances which had taken place since the death of the former Peshwah. His reputation for ability was higher than that of any other Mahratta, principally because all the adherents of the late Nana Furnavees, in other words, all the people of business in the country, were attached to him ; and he had uniformly been opposed to the government of the reigning Peshwah. He had been a principal in Holkar's rebellion and short occupation of Poonah ; he had conducted the civil and political affairs of the state while it existed ; and it had been intended by Holkar to place his son on the musnud as Peshwah, if the British government and the allies had not interfered in consequence of the treaty of Bassein. When Holkar was obliged to retire from Poonah in April, 1803, by the advance of the British corps under my command, Amrut Rao was the last who retired from that city, and he was hard pressed by my light troops.

When I arrived at Poonah and had brought back the Peshwah to resume the exercise of his government, the first object of my attention was to give him and his government such strength as to enable him to carry on its ordinary operations without having

* President of the India Board.

recourse to us. It appeared to me and to the Resident that we could not effect this object better than by reconciling Amrut Rao and the Peshwah, for which we had an opening in a negotiation which the former had commenced under the pretence of recovering some property which had been taken from him by my light troops in his retreat from Poonah. This negotiation was carried on much against the inclination of the Peshwah, who feared and detested his brother; but we still considered it so important to secure the neutrality or support of Amrut Rao in the contest, which even at that time we thought a possible event, that we persevered so far as to ascertain his terms, upon which we made a proposition to the Peshwah.

These turned principally upon what he had had previous to the treaty of Bassein, and what he had lost by that arrangement; and we thought it reasonable that we should secure to him, by any settlement which we should make, an income at least equal to that which he had previous to the treaty of Bassein.

By a reference to the whole of the letters from me, quoted in the paper to which I refer, and above all (if you have it) by a reference to my correspondence with the Resident at Poonah, it will be seen that Amrut Rao's jaghire upon the Godavery was worth four lacs of rupees *per annum*; and what he had lost in Savanore (which province was then to have gone to the Company) and near Surat, and what he still had depending upon the fort of Poonadur, near Poonah, was worth more than three lacs in addition to that sum. The demand, then, upon the Peshwah for a jaghire of four lacs for Amrut Rao, on the commencement of the negotiation, which was suspended upon His Highness's unreasonable demand that Amrut Rao should be put in confinement as soon as he should have received this jaghire, must have been and was in addition to the jaghire of four lacs which he still retained upon the Godavery.

The negotiation, thus suspended, was kept on foot, as much by the inclination of Amrut Rao to connect himself with the English, as by ours to attach him to the cause of the Peshwah, till the war broke out in 1803, and then I found it necessary to take decided steps to bring it to a conclusion, which I did, as well as I recollect, on the morning after, I took the fort of Ahmednuggur. The writers of the paper to which I refer give me credit for the necessity which they say might have existed on military grounds, for concluding that negotiation by the treaty

which I signed, at the same time that they dispute the probability that Amrut Rao could have had a force which could give me any apprehension at that time. You will see in my despatches to the Governor-General and the Resident, to which the Court have referred, that they have not taken into consideration the extent of the military inconvenience resulting from the position of Amrut Rao's force, which is stated in the despatches; much less have they adverted to the advantage to be derived from any arrangement with Amrut Rao, which I have detailed in this letter, or to other facts bearing upon this subject which appear in my correspondence with the Resident at Poonah, and with the Governor-General at that time.

Amrut Rao had placed himself, in July and August, 1803, in a position near the hills, towards which I could not approach in that season without risking the loss of the health of my troops. In proportion as I advanced and carried my operations across the Godavery (and by reference to the correspondence it will be seen I was not one moment too soon), he would have been behind me, and would have operated upon my communication with Poonah. Admitting his corps to have been as small as it is stated by the Court, it would have been materially inconvenient and dangerous; but led by a man of the rank and influence of Amrut Rao, by one who it appears by the same correspondence had great influence over the southern jaghiredars, through whose countries I kept up my communication with Mysore, it was most important that, as I could not destroy it, I should have it on my side. Besides these considerations, and those of a political nature to which I have adverted at the commencement of this letter, to induce me to conclude this treaty, I must mention that Amrut Rao performed a service nearly about this time which never ought to be forgotten.

By reference to the records of the day, it will be seen what pains were taken by the confederates to bring Holkar's army into active operation in the Deccan; and if that chief had performed his engagements with Scindiah, I cannot pretend to say that I should have brought the army through its difficulties. Amrut Rao intercepted a letter from Scindiah to the Peshwah, in which Scindiah urged His Highness to break his alliance with the English, and promised that, as soon as we should be defeated, he (Scindiah) would join with the Rajah of Berar and the Peshwah to destroy Holkar. Amrut Rao sent this letter to

Holkar, and the consequence was that Holkar, after he had made two marches to the southward with a view to cooperate with the confederates, returned and crossed the Nerbudda, and, in point of fact, never struck a blow; on the contrary, he was in friendly communication with me throughout the war.

I think I may conclude that I did right in making some arrangement with Amrut Rao, and what I have above stated shows that seven lacs *per annum* was a fair stipend; and I will now consider whether the mode of payment was unreasonable and improper. You will observe that the arrangement was not concluded till the last moment at which it was necessary to conclude it (in point of fact, I recollect to have concluded it in the open air, the camp being struck, the army on its march towards the Godavery, and I got upon my horse the moment after I had signed it). It was obvious that the Peshwah would agree to nothing, and that if I were to make any agreement with Amrut Rao, it must be in terms to secure to him an amount equal to the sum to which I thought him entitled. The Court complain that it is given in money, and not in land; whereas Amrut Rao would have preferred land, and actually proposed to take some of the territories depending upon Ahmednuggur, which I had just captured. It is perfectly true that territory does not always produce the exact amount at which it is estimated; but the possession of territory, in the Mahratta country in particular, is attended by advantages which more than compensate for a small loss of money.

The Court then complain of the first article of the treaty, whereas that article, with the despatches to which they have themselves referred, show the meaning of the whole, viz., that Amrut Rao was to have seven lacs of rupees secured to him by the Company either in land or money, and that the land which he should retain in his hands belonging to the Peshwah should be considered as part of the sum stipulated. By this arrangement I had in view to secure that which afterwards occurred, viz., the tranquil occupation of Amrut Rao's, jaghire on the Godavery by the Peshwah, if His Highness did not choose to consent to allow Amrut Rao to retain it; and thus I should have avoided that which I must ever consider the greatest misfortune which can befall an army, viz., a contest in its rear.

When I came to the settlement of Amrut Rao's accounts in November, 1803, I demanded an account of the revenues of the

jaghire on the Godavery and of that in the country near Poonadur, because I could not otherwise know their exact amount, and I did not carry their revenues to account against Amrut Rao from August to November, when he actually resigned; and I put the Peshwah in possession of the countries because I knew the fact which he stated to be true, viz., that the Peshwah's troops had overrun and plundered them, and that "they had no produce and no revenue."

I think that a perusal of my memorandum to Amrut Rao's vakeel of the 30th September, 1803, would tend to show that I was not very much disposed to yield anything to that chief. On the contrary, I believe that that paper will show that no person in my situation ever contended more strenuously for the interests of those for whom he was employed.

In respect to my opinion, which is quoted, that the British government were at liberty either to adhere to the treaty or not, it is perfectly true, and the opinion is well founded; for Amrut Rao had omitted to join the army, according to treaty, although he had performed the other parts of the treaty. He, like other Mahrattas, conceived that we had but little chance of success, and he did not change his opinion till after the battle of Assye. But although we should have been justified by the laws of nations, as understood by European nations, in taking advantage of his omission to perform his treaty, the natives of India, and particularly those with whom I had even then hopes of making peace, would not have been satisfied with this strict interpretation of a treaty of which our conduct towards Amrut Rao would have been an example.

After this long discussion upon this subject, I hope it is hardly necessary to assure you that I acted in this instance as I have done in every other in which I have been employed, with a sincere desire to forward the views and interests of those who employed me. I may have been mistaken, and this affair, as well as others which I have managed, might possibly have been settled to more advantage; but of this I am very certain, that I did not think so at the time; and although I may have been pressed to decide upon critical occasions, I cannot accuse myself of having involved the Company's affairs unnecessarily, or of having adopted any measure of importance (particularly in this instance) without due deliberation. I only wish that the Court of Directors would consider the questions which arise on determinations

which I have made in reference to the times and seasons in which they were made, and I am convinced that their justice would induce them to refrain from selecting passages out of different letters on which to ground a censure.

As for the other points referred to, viz., the legality of my powers and the measures which have been since taken to give Amrut Rao land instead of money, I have nothing to say to them; but I should think that there can be no difficulty in finding land for Amrut Rao.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1893.] MEMORANDUM * ON MARQUESS WELLESLEY'S GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

In order to understand the merits or demerits of Marquess Wellesley's government in India, it is necessary to review the state of that country when his Lordship assumed its government in May, 1798, and that in which it was left in April, 1806, which was the close of the official year in which Marquess Wellesley resigned the government. This subject is large, and will require a minute detail of many measures, of the causes which led to them, and of their consequences. But this paper shall be made as short as possible; and nothing shall be inserted in it which is not necessary for the elucidation of the subjects on which it is written.

The first intelligence which reached Marquess Wellesley, upon his arrival in India, was that the ancient Native enemy of the Company had formed an alliance with the French at Mauritius, for the purpose of attacking the British nation in India; and that, in consequence of this alliance, a body of Frenchmen had already been landed at the port of Mangalore on the coast of Malabar, and had marched to Seringapatam. Shortly after the receipt of this intelligence, it was known in India that Buonaparte, with a large French army, had landed and taken possession of Egypt, and that the avowed object of this expedition was to invade India by that route.

* Written after the Session of Parliament of 1806. The sums and dates left in blank in the original memorandum, were filled up at the Board of Control and the India House.

The state of warfare which was to be expected in consequence of the intelligence of these measures and movements of the enemies of the British government, rendered necessary a review of its situation in all its branches; and what follows is the result of that review, and of the measures which were adopted to apply a remedy to the inconveniences and evils which were found to exist.

The Company were found to have a revenue of 8,059,880*l.*, a sum less than that which they had been found to have in 1793, at the renewal of their charter, by 165,748*l.* The debt amounted to 10,866,588*l.*, having increased since 1793; and the interest was annually 746,933*l.*, having increased since 1793. The total amount of the charges of the government in India, including the interest of the debt, was 8,178,626*l.*; and the deficiency of the revenues, in comparison with the charges, at a time of profound peace in India, was 322,530*l.* At the same time the Company's credit was at the lowest ebb. Money could not be borrowed in Bengal at 12 *per cent.* interest; the Company's bonds and securities at that rate were circulated at such a discount, as well at that Presidency as at Madras and Bombay, as to amount nearly to a stagnation; and with this great war in expectation, the Company's financial servants in India were entirely at a loss to find the means for supporting and carrying on the ordinary operations of the government in time of peace. The Company's armies, although in a high state of discipline, and maintained, that of Fort William at the expense of 1,996,487*l.*, that of Fort St. George at the expense of 1,868,498*l.*, and that of Bombay at the expense of 641,469*l.*, were not in a state of preparation and efficiency to perform the operations which the crisis of the Company's affairs was likely to require from them. The Commander in Chief and Adjutant General of Fort St. George, reported that six months would be required to prepare for service the army serving under that Presidency, upon which the brunt of the contest was likely to fall; and the government of that Presidency were apprehensive of the consequences of drawing the attention of the enemy by making the smallest preparation for defence against the attack which they well knew he had meditated. The army of Bombay, on which naturally the task would have fallen of co-operating in the contest with that of Fort St. George, was necessarily scattered in the disaffected provinces under the government of Bombay; and

the army of Bengal was stationed principally in the Vizier's territories, with a view to keep them in tranquillity, and to defend them from the expected invasion of the King of Caubul.

Those powers on whom experience of former wars with Tippoo had shown that the Company ought to rely for assistance were the Nizam, the Peshwah, the Nabob of the Carnatic, and the petty rajahs and zemindars on the coast of Malabar. Since the peace of 1792 with Tippoo, which had attained the object of the alliance between the first two and the Company, the situation of these powers had been considerably changed. The Nizam, by the result of an unfortunate state of hostility with the Mahrattas, which ended in battle, and a peace, or rather capitulation, concluded at Kurdlah in the year 1795, had fallen from the state of a great and leading power in Hindustan to that of a tributary to the Mahrattas. His ministers were appointed by the Mahrattas; his army was disbanded; and the only support of his authority was a corps consisting of about 14,000 men, trained, disciplined, and commanded by French officers. These officers had possession of a considerable portion of the Nizam's territories, from the revenues of which they were to pay their troops; and by the power which they acquired by this possession, and by the state of confusion of the government of the Mahrattas at Poonah, the weakness of that of the Nizam, and the supine indifference of that of the Company, they were becoming a French state in the peninsula of India. By their power and violence they overawed the Nizam's councils, and precluded all hope of his co-operation in the war which was expected with Tippoo and his French allies in the year 1798.

The Mahratta government of Poonah, which had afforded such material assistance to the British government in the war which had ended in 1792 by the treaty of Seringapatam, was become equally incapable with the Nizam of affording any aid in that which was expected in 1798. After the peace of Kurdlah in 1795, the Peshwah, Mahdoo Rao Narain, threw himself from a window in his palace at Poonah, and died upon the spot. A contest then ensued for the possession of the power of that government, in which all the principal Mahratta chiefs were engaged, and which, having lasted with various success during the years 1796 and 1797, had ended by placing all the power at Poonah in the hands of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. This chief already possessed the Mahratta territories upon the Jumna and

Ganges bordering upon those of the English and the Nabob of Oude, and the actual sovereignty of all those situated to the northward of the rivers Nerbudda and Taptee. By the gain of the influence over the government of the young Peshwah, Bajee Rao, he extended his power to the northern frontier of Tippoo's dominions in Mysore; thus holding in his own hands all the different Mahratta states.

In 1793 this extended power was but feebly established, and would have been unequal to the exertion to be made in the expected contest with Tippoo, even if it could be supposed that Scindiah's policy would have led him to enter into it. But when that chief became the sole head of the Mahrattas, his policy would have led him to support Tippoo rather than the English in the impending contest, supposing his power to have been in that state to enable him to enter into it. He must have been aware that, with respect to him, the English were the most formidable of the two powers; and that his objects would have been forwarded by their defeat. Besides this, Scindiah's principal force consisted in a body of infantry, raised, disciplined, and commanded by French officers; and although the influence of these officers over the government of Scindiah was by no means of the description of that exercised by those in the service of the Nizam over the government of that prince, it was still sufficiently strong to prevent Scindiah from adopting a measure which was contrary to his obvious policy, as the sole possessor of all the Mahratta power from the Ganges to the Toombuddra.

Thus, then, nothing was to be expected from the two powers which had been the principal allies of the Company in the former war with Tippoo; and as the French were likely to be actively and personally engaged in this expected war, it was to be apprehended that they would derive assistance from the force commanded by Frenchmen in the service of those powers who had formerly been considered as the firm allies of the British government.

Since the peace of 1792 the Nabob Mahomed Ali of the Carnatic had died, and had been succeeded by his son, Omdal ool Omrah. This prince, who was very unpopular in his territories, showed every disposition to impede rather than to forward the operations of the British army. He gave them no assistance; and it was afterwards found at Seringapatam that he was in correspondence with the Company's enemy.

As for the rajahs of Malabar, they (with the exception of the Rajah of Koorg) had been in a state of hostility with the Company from the conclusion of the peace of 1792 till the year 1798, and had kept a considerable proportion of the Bombay army in constant hostile operations against them. No assistance was to be expected from them ; but, on the contrary, every thing which was in their power to annoy and harass the army and to aid the enemy.

Add to this representation of the state of our affairs in India at this period, that a revolution had just been effected in Oude by Lord Teignmouth ; that the government of the reigning Prince Saadut Ali was most unpopular, and by no means firmly established throughout the country ; that his army was mutinous and disaffected ; that an invasion of his country was expected from Zemaun Shah, the King of Caubul, against which it was necessary to provide by the assembly of a large force in Oude under the command of Sir J. Craig ; and that, in this emergency of affairs in Oude, such was the state of mutiny and disaffection of the Nabob's troops, that His Highness could not trust to them the guard of his person, but was obliged to call for British troops to preserve him from the effects of their treachery ; and Sir J. Craig, to whom was intrusted the defence of Oude, considered these troops in the light of an enemy's fortress in his rear.

Another circumstance which embarrassed government in India at all times, and was a considerable source of embarrassment at the period under consideration, was the nature and state of the alliances between the British government and its dependent and tributary states.

These alliances had always been formed in a moment of extreme weakness, and generally after the Native and dependent state had been conquered. The principal stipulation was uniformly protection by the British government, in consideration of subsidy to be paid by the Native state, and in other respects the Native state was declared of was considered to be independent in the management of all its internal concerns.

The Native states having in every instance contracted these alliances in a moment of weakness, in which, of course, all the powers of their governments were paralysed, they have invariably been under the necessity of calling for the assistance of the British protecting government for the support of their authority in the management of their internal concerns.

The system of government in India, the foundations of authority, and the modes of supporting it and of carrying on the operations of the government, are entirely different from the systems and modes adopted in Europe for the same purposes.

The foundation and the instrument of all power there is the sword; and when these alliances have been formed, the sword, or, in other words, the army of the East India Company, became the only support and the only efficient instrument of authority of the protected Native states.

This position of affairs, which was the result of the principle of government long established in the East, and of the weakness of the Native state, was attended by a stipulation in some cases, or an understanding in others, that the Native state should be *independent* in all the operations of its internal government; and at the very moment in which this stipulation was made, the interference of the British government was required, and all the internal concerns of the Native state submitted to its judgment, in order that its agents might see whether the cases in which its interference was called for were of a nature to justify it.

Here, then, the door was necessarily opened to the interference of the British government in every concern; and the result was increased weakness in the Native state, jealousy of this interference, and disunion bordering upon treachery.

These evils had long appeared to require a remedy; and they must have been felt particularly at the moment in which the British government was likely to be involved in a most extensive warfare with the most formidable of the Native powers, assisted by the French.

This having been the state of India at the time Marquess Wellesley assumed the government in the year 1798, the measures adopted to apply a remedy to the evils which existed will form an epitome of the history of his Lordship's administration. I shall detail them in that order which is most likely to make them clear to the understandings of those who will read this paper.

The objects which pressed most upon his Lordship's attention in May and June, 1798, were to place the army of Fort St. George in a situation to resist the expected hostility of the enemy, to relieve the finances from the difficulties under which they laboured, and to bring back the allies of the Company to the state in which they had been left by the peace at Seringapatam in

1792, so that the allies might be able to render the assistance in the war which they were capable of affording.

The measures of finance which were at that time successfully adopted laid the foundation of the system which was subsequently acted upon, and which will be fully considered in another part of this paper.

Effectual measures were immediately adopted to put in a situation to enable them to defend themselves the whole disposable force of Fort St. George, and eventually to perform the service which might be, and was afterwards, required from them.

The army of Fort St. George was reinforced by European troops from Bengal, and preparatory measures were adopted to enable government to reinforce it still further with Native troops, when the most favourable season for transporting them by sea should come round.

But the principal measure of those days, that which gave a turn to the state of the Company's affairs in India, and to the general sentiment of the people of that country respecting the British government, was the negotiation at Hyderabad, which ended by the substitution of a British for a French force at the capital of the Nizam.

The Nizam had long been connected with the British government, and by the treaty of 1789* it had been stipulated that he should have the assistance of two British battalions when he should call for them. This article of the treaty had not been performed till the war broke out with Tippoo, which ended by the peace of 1792, when Lord Cornwallis made a new treaty [1790] with the Nizam, and attached to his army two British battalions, which acted with them during that war. At the same time two British battalions were attached to the Mahratta army under Pursheram Bhow.

The services of these battalions stationed with the Nizam, as will be observed by the treaty,† were to be confined to operations against foreign enemies and domestic rebels; but not to be directed against the Mahrattas, and in particular not against

* "Letter from Earl Cornwallis to the Nizam, deemed equal to a treaty, written 7th July, 1789." [See *Collection of Treaties and Engagements with the Native Princes and States of Asia, concluded on behalf of the East India Company by the British Government in India*, 1 vol. 4to., published in London, 1812, page 123.]

† See ditto, page 126.

certain tributaries of the Nizam stationed upon the Mahratta frontier, who were likewise tributaries of the Peshwah.

After the defeat and capitulation of the Nizam at Kurdlah in 1795, which has been above referred to, the Mahrattas had obliged His Highness to send these battalions back into the Company's territories; but during the disputes at Poonah for the succession to Madhoo Rao, His Highness had taken advantage of the momentary weakness of the Mahratta government, and had recalled these battalions to his capital.

The object of the negotiation which Marquess Wellesley commenced with the Nizam was to prevail upon His Highness to perform the defensive treaty of Hyderabad, 1st Sept. 1798;* and as it appeared that His Highness was unable to perform it on account of the power which the French officers and their faction had over his councils, it was proposed to His Highness that he should dismiss them and their troops from his service for ever; and an offer was made to supply British troops to enable His Highness to accomplish this object, and to remain thereafter at Hyderabad as substitutes for the troops under the command of the French officers.

A treaty was concluded on this basis with the utmost secrecy and despatch, which contained all the restraining articles for the service of the troops which had been in the treaty of 7th May, 1798; and a body of British troops entered the Nizam's territories, and had made some marches towards Hyderabad before the French officers were aware of their fate. This body of troops, having joined those already at Hyderabad, performed the service on which they were sent without bloodshed; and the Nizam was thus restored to the power of performing his defensive engagements with the Company, and one of the great and fruitful sources of the evils impending over us in 1798, which has been already described, was removed by a timely, well contrived, and able exercise of the power of the British government.

This negotiation at Hyderabad was accompanied by another at Poonah, with a view to the same objects. But this failed, for reasons which will be reviewed hereafter. In the course of this negotiation all the circumstances attending that carrying on at Hyderabad were ascribed to the Peshwah, with a view to prevent the jealousy which might otherwise have been expected upon the

* See *Wellesley Despatches*, vol. i. p. 682.

renewal of the ancient alliance between the Company and the Nizam.

After one of the principal allies of the British government had thus been placed in a situation to be enabled to perform his treaty of alliance, a negotiation was opened with Tippoo Sultaan, the object of which was to bring that Prince to an early decision, whether he should be at peace or at war with the Company. It was obvious that the assistance which he had hitherto received from his allies, the French, was small in comparison with that which he might expect from them; and that it was not of an extent and description to be very formidable to the British government, particularly as its alliance with the Nizam had been renewed, and the source of danger in that quarter had been removed. All that was required from Tippoo, therefore, was a renunciation of this offensive alliance, and such an unequivocal proof of it as should be satisfactory to the whole world; and the adoption of arrangements which should facilitate the usual friendly communications between states not in hostility with each other.*

These negotiations were attended by military preparations which were calculated to secure early success and a speedy termination to the war, which it was determined should be the consequence of Tippoo's refusal to give the allies the reasonable satisfaction which they had required. The wisdom of these early preparations was soon proved; for on the very day that Tippoo, after a delay of some weeks beyond the period fixed for his answer to the remonstrance of the British government, despatched his answer, and desired that a British officer might be sent to negotiate with him, he commenced his march to attack the Bombay army, which was assembled in the territories of the Rajah of Koorg.

In this review of the measures of Marquess Wellesley's government, it is not intended to detail the movements or the actions of the different armies. The result of the well prepared and well combined operations of the war against Tippoo was the capture of his capital, with all his arsenals, treasure, &c.; his own death, on the 4th May, 1799; and the subsequent reduction and submission of all his territories to the allied governments.

The army of the Nizam, with the subsidiary force as formed by the late Treaty of 1798, co-operated in this war with the

* See *Wellington Supplementary Despatches*, vol. i. p. 152.

British army; and His Highness's government shared equally with the British government in the advantages arising from its successful termination. The territories of the Company were increased by the addition of those belonging to Tippoo, situated upon the sea coast of Malabar, and those which gave possession of important military positions. The Nizam received an equivalent, contiguous to his frontier; and a portion was reserved for the Peshwah, to be given on the condition that His Highness should become a party to the alliance between the other governments, and should accede to certain stipulations which were proposed to him, and which will be discussed in a subsequent part of this paper. His Highness having refused to accept these conditions, this portion was divided between the Company and the Nizam.

The principal and all the centre part of the territories of Tippoo were given to a descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, in whose person a state was formed under the immediate influence and protection of the British government. This state was connected by a treaty of alliance with the Company, which was bound to defend it on condition of the payment of a stipulated tribute. As alliances of this description, by conferring a nominal independence on the Princes connected by them with the Company, had been found in other instances to be attended with many inconveniences, to render necessary a constant interference by the protecting government in the internal affairs of the Native subordinate state, and to occasion internal weakness, jealousy of the protecting power, and a waste and embarrassment of the resources of the government, it was thought best, in the treaty of alliance with the government of Mysore, to provide for the interference of the British government in all its concerns when such interference might be necessary; and the state in which this government is found to be at this moment, the cordial and intimate union which exists between the government of Mysore and the British authorities, and the important strength and real assistance which it has afforded to the British government in all its recent difficulties, afford the strongest proofs of the wisdom of this stipulation of the treaty.

Thus, then, in less than one year from the period at which the perils which I have above described threatened the existence of the British government in India, our principal ally, the Nizam,

was restored to us, the French state growing in the peninsula of India was destroyed, our formidable Native enemy, Tippoo, the certain ally of the French in India, was subdued, and in his place was established in Mysore a government calculated to afford, and which has afforded, the most substantial assistance to Great Britain in all her difficulties.

The Governor-General having now relieved the peninsula of India from the danger by which it was threatened, and affairs in that quarter having been placed on foundations of strength calculated to afford lasting peace and security, turned his attention to the great and increasing cause of the weakness of the north-west frontier of the Bengal provinces. These provinces were covered in that quarter by the territories of the Nabob Vizier of Oude, who was connected with the Company by a treaty of alliance, by which, in consideration of a subsidy amounting to a sum not exceeding 50 lacs sicca rupees *per annum*, the Company were bound to defend him; and with this view to maintain at all times at least 10,000* men in his territories; and in case this number should for any cause be increased beyond 13,000* men, the Nabob was to pay the actual expense incurred by the Company. This treaty was attended by the usual stipulation of the independence of the Nabob in his internal concerns; which stipulation had been uniformly frustrated by the necessary and uniform interference of the Company in all those concerns for the support of the Nabob's authority, for the preservation of tranquillity in the country, and for the security of the funds from which the Company derived so important a portion of the resources applicable to the payment of their military establishments.

For some years previous to 1798 apprehensions had been entertained that Zemaun Shah, the King of Caubul, would carry

* The treaty of 1798 contains the following Article:—

VII. "The Governor-General, Sir J. Shore, on the part of the East India Company, agrees that the English forces maintained in the country of Oude for its defence shall never consist of less than 10,000 men, including Europeans and Natives, cavalry, infantry, and artillery. And if at any time it should become necessary to augment the troops of the Company in Oude beyond the number of 13,000 men, the Nabob agrees to pay the actual difference occasioned by the excess beyond that number; and, in the same manner, if the troops of the Company shall be less than 8000 men, a deduction shall be made from the annual stipend of 76 lacs, equal to the actual difference of men below the specified number."—*Collection of Treaties, &c.*, p. 178.

into execution an old and favourite plan of the Affghan government to invade Hindustan; and these apprehensions had appeared so well founded in 1798 that the Governor-General, Marquess Wellesley, had found it necessary to assemble a large British army in Oude, under the command of Sir J. Craig, for the protection of the Nabob's territories against this expected invasion, notwithstanding the difficulties under which the government laboured at the same period in the peninsula of India.

At the close of the year 1797 the Nabob, Azof ool Dowlah, died, and was succeeded in his government by his supposed son, Vizier Ali. This usurper had been formally deposed by the authority of the British government under Lord Teignmouth, after a full examination of the justice of his claim; and Saadut Ali had been placed in the government of Oude.

This prince was very unpopular with the army, and was not generally agreeable to his subjects. His disposition was parsimonious, and his habits were not of a nature to conciliate the affections of his turbulent subjects.

When the preparations were making to resist the expected invasion of Zemaun Shah, the Nabob, Saadut Ali, although fully convinced of the necessity of collecting the largest force upon the frontier, called for a detachment of the British troops to attend and guard his person against his own turbulent and disaffected troops. He declared repeatedly that these troops were not to be trusted in the day of battle, or on any service; and after viewing their state of discipline and equipment, and obtaining a knowledge of their principles and attachment to the cause of the allied governments, Sir J. Craig considered these troops as worse than useless, as dangerous, and of the nature of an enemy's fortress in his rear; and he actually left a detachment of British troops to watch them, and the turbulent inhabitants of Rohilcund, the frontier province of Oude to the north-west.

The Governor-General, by his negotiations at the court of Persia, had drawn the attention of the King of Caubul to the defence of his own western frontier; and availed himself of the certain tranquillity which he had obtained on the frontiers of Oude to arrange the affairs of that country on a basis better calculated to give it permanent security and tranquillity, and to increase the strength of the British government on its north-west frontier, which was one of its weakest points.

Towards the close of the year 1799 the Governor-General called upon the Nabob of Oude to dismiss his expensive, useless, and dangerous troops, and to fill their places by increased numbers of the Company's troops. The Nabob had desired the assistance of the Governor-General in the reform of the different establishments of his government; but the British government had a right, under the article of the treaty of 1798, to require that this reform should be made. After some difficulties, arising principally from the defective principle on which the military establishments were formed, paid, and commanded, this great object was effected; and arrangements were made for introducing into the Vizier's territories 3000 additional British troops, at the expense to the Nabob Vizier of 76 lacs of Oude sicca rupees *per annum*.

In order to improve the security of Oude still further, a reform of the civil administration of the government was necessary; and this reform was pressed upon the attention of the Nabob. But while the negotiations for this purpose, and for the final arrangement of the military establishments, were going on, the Nabob bravely declared that he was not able to pay the expense of the troops which had been stationed in his country for its defence at the time of the expected invasion of Zemaun Shah, or the expense of the additional troops which had been necessarily stationed in his country upon the occasion of the reform of his military establishments, although he was bound by treaty to defray the whole of these charges.

A demand was then made upon him to give territorial security, according to the 11th article of the treaty of 1798; and, after a long negotiation, a treaty was concluded on the 10th Nov. 1801,* by which, in commutation for subsidy, and for the perpetual defence of his country, the Nabob ceded to the Company the territory of Rohilcund, the Dooab, and Gorruckpoor; the two former being his frontier provinces towards the Mahrattas, the Seiks, and Affghans, and the latter bordering upon the Company; and he engaged, further, to introduce a better system of management into the territories which remained in his hands.

By the whole of this arrangement the Company gained,

1st. The advantage of getting rid of a useless and dangerous body of troops stationed on the very point of their defence, and ready at all times to join an invading enemy :

* See *Wellesley Despatches*, vol. ii. p. 598.

2ndly. The advantage of acquiring the means of placing upon this weak point additional numbers of the British troops, and thereby increasing its strength, and the general security of the provinces in their rear :

3rdly. Ample territorial security for the regular and perpetual payment of these funds for the support of their military establishments in Bengal :

4thly. By the introduction of their own system of government and management into the countries ceded to them, and the employment of their own servants in the administration, they secured the tranquillity of those hitherto disturbed countries, the loyalty and happiness of their hitherto disaffected and turbulent inhabitants ; and, above all, they acquired the resources of those rich but hitherto neglected provinces for their armies, in case of the recurrence of the necessity for military operations upon that frontier.

These advantages, the full benefit of which, as will be seen hereafter, was felt in a very few years, were gained without incurring any disadvantage whatever ; in particular, that was not incurred which appears most likely to weaken a great continental power, such as the Company is in India, viz., the frontier was not increased. The Company were equally bound to defend, and had actually defended, this same frontier in 1798 and 1799, when the country was governed by the Nabob ; so that all was gain and strength, without the smallest degree of disadvantage or weakness.

But the advantages in this arrangement were not gained by the Company only ; those of the Nabob were at least equal to those of the Company. Whatever increased the security of the Company manifestly increased his security likewise ; and here he acquired a great advantage. But this was not all. It is known that the Nabob of Oude had never collected from the countries ceded, and realised in his treasury, even the sum of 76 lacs of Oude sicca rupees, being the old subsidy paid under the treaty of 1798 ; much less had he realised the increased sum which he was obliged to pay in consequence of the increase of the number of troops stationed in his country. His pecuniary gain was the difference between the annual sum he realised and that which he was bound to pay. Under the new treaty of Nov. 1801, the Company were bound to defend the territories of the Nabob under all circumstances ; and no new demand could be

made upon him on any account, whatever might be the extent of the service, or of the expense incurred in their defence. The Nabob has already felt the full advantage of this stipulation.

Besides these advantages of a pecuniary nature, the Nabob derived others from the arrangement. The cession of the provinces had been preceded by the discharge of a large proportion of his troops; and those which remained in his service scattered over the whole surface of his enlarged territories, were unequal to the performance of the duties required from them. These duties could not, with convenience, be performed by the Company's Native troops, commanded as they are by European officers, as the civil government remained in the hands of the Nabob's Native servants. Both the Company's government and the Nabob suffered inconvenience; the former from the frequent calls of the Nabob for the service of their troops in the detail of the collections of the revenue; and the latter from the want of habit of these troops in duties of this description, and the difficulties of performing them through the agency of European officers directed by Native servants. When the provinces were ceded to the Company, the Nabob had the means and advantage of employing in a reduced territory the troops which had been found insufficient for the conduct of the administration of one of greater extent; and these troops, being more immediately under his inspection, and within the reach of his authority, were kept in better order.

Thus then, upon the whole, this arrangement has been advantageous, and has proved satisfactory, to both the parties to it, whatever may have been the difficulties in settling it; and Marquess Wellesley removed by it all the inconveniences and weakness felt upon the north-west frontier of Bengal, and added considerably to the resources of the British government.

The evil to which Marquess Wellesley next directed his efforts was the nature of the British alliances with its tributary states in general, and particularly with the Nabob of Arcot. The alliance between the Company and the family of this prince had commenced in the infancy of the British power in the peninsula of India, and the terms of it had been altered at different periods. The general purport of them, however, at all times, had been protection of the Carnatic by the Company, on the condition of the regular monthly payment of a stipulated subsidy by the Nabob; that the Nabob should have no political communica-

tion with any foreign power, excepting through the intervention or with the consent of the Company; that the Company should not interfere in the internal concerns of the Nabob's government; and the last treaty of 1792 provided particularly that, in case of failure in the payment of the stipulated subsidy, certain countries should be ceded to the Company.*

One of the great evils in this alliance, as in all those of this description which had been formed in India, was that it provided that the Company should not interfere in the internal concerns of the Nabob's government, at the same time that the interference of the Company in every possible case was absolutely and essentially necessary for the support of the Native government, and was practised on every occasion.

Another evil which affected this, as well as every alliance of the same description, was that the amount of the subsidy to be paid to the Company was to be realised from the country by the Nabob; and that this subsidy necessarily bore so large a proportion to the revenues which the country could afford, that it was scarcely possible to realise it so as to make the regular monthly payments required by the nature of the Company's service and stipulated in the treaty. The consequence was that the Nabob was obliged to borrow money, at large interest, to make his payments at the stipulated periods; and as the Natives were unable or unwilling to come forward to lend their money upon these occasions, the loans were made from the Company's civil and military servants, and the European inhabitants of Fort St. George and its dependencies.

The interest upon these loans was usually 3 *per cent. per mensem*; and the security for the payment of the interest, as well as the principal, was generally a tuncaw, or order, or assignment, from the Nabob, upon the revenues of certain portions of his territories. It is obvious that the tuncawdar, or holder of these orders, could have no interest in the prosperity of the country of which he was thus appointed by the Nabob the temporary collector, excepting to recover from it as he could, and at the earliest possible period, the sums supposed to be due. Here, then, was established a system which tended not only to the oppression of the inhabitants of the country, to the impoverishment of the Nabob, and to the destruction of the revenues of

* See *Collection of Treaties, &c.*, p. 424.

the Carnatic, but it was carried into execution by the Company's civil and military servants, and by British subjects.

In this view of the evil it was of enormous magnitude. The practice of lending money to the Native powers by British subjects had been repeatedly forbidden by the Company, and the continuance of it, therefore, was a breach of their most positive orders; but it was so general, and the profits so large, that no government had been found sufficiently strong entirely to prevent it. But the evil did not consist only in the ruin of the Nabob and his country, and in this breach of order and discipline, but it established at Madras, and in the subordinate territories, a body of men in the service of the Company, or living under its protection, whose interests and objects, as relative to the Nabob of the Carnatic, were different from those of the Company. On all occasions, whether trifling or important, of difference between the Company and the Nabob, the latter was certain of the advice, assistance, and active exertions of this description of men; and he never failed to succeed in his objects. It is not astonishing, therefore, that a Prince whose views were directed to an increase of his political power, and whose vanity was flattered by the services performed and court paid to him by so many Europeans of the first rank and consequence in that country, should have promoted every object which could have a tendency to continue this system, and should have set his face against every measure calculated to restrain it, although it was evidently ruinous to his finances, to the revenues of his country, and to his real interests and independence.

The countries which by the treaty of 1792 had been assigned as security to be assumed by the Company, in case of the failure in the regular payment of the subsidy, were among the richest of all those under the government of the Nabob; and it had been particularly provided by the treaty that tuncaws should not be granted upon these districts. Those who lent His Highness their money, however, had no objection to take these countries as their security; and it was natural that the Nabob should feel a slighter degree of interest in the permanent prosperity of those countries than in that of the other provinces subject to his authority. Accordingly, tuncaws were generally granted, contrary to treaty, upon these provinces assigned by treaty for the Company's security; and in aggravation of the accumulated evils of this system, the Company's governments abroad had the mor-

tification to observe the daily and increasing ruin of the resources of Fort St. George, and the deterioration of the prosperity of the provinces allotted as their security by the means of their own servants and those living under their protection. Not a month elapsed that did not afford matter of speculation whether the Nabob could continue to pay his stipulated subsidy; and not one in which he did not procure the money by loan at a large interest, by means which tended to the destruction of the country.

From the time the operation of the treaty of 1792 was observed, every Governor had endeavoured to prevail upon the Nabob to consent to an alteration of it, by which the Company's resources should be secured, and the evils above described should be prevented. The endeavours, however, of Lord Buckinghamshire, Marquess Wellesley, and Lord Powis, equally failed in prevailing upon the Nabob to consent to a modification of the treaty; and when the war broke out with Tippoo, the country was labouring under all the accumulated disadvantages of the system, its resources were ruined, and its inhabitants, from long oppression, disaffected.

Besides these evils, there was a manifest indifference, or rather disaffection, in the Nabob, Omdal ool Omrah, himself, to the cause of the British government and its allies, the meaning of which was not discovered till Seringapatam was taken, and the papers of Tippoo had fallen into the hands of the British government. Among them were found all the written communications and correspondence which had been carried on between the Nabob Mahomed Ali and the Nabob Omdal ool Omrah, his son, and Hyder Ali and Tippoo Suldaun, without the knowledge of the Company's government.

The fact of the existence of the correspondence alone was a breach of the treaties by which the Nabobs of the Carnatic had been allied to the British government; but in addition to this fact it was found that the correspondence referred to objects under discussion by the different parties to it, and entirely inconsistent with the principle of the connexion between the British government and the Nabobs of the Carnatic, with the terms of the treaties by which that connexion had been formed, or the existence of friendly intercourse between any states in any part of the world.

As soon as Marquess Wellesley had ascertained all the circumstances attending these communications, by an examination of

the persons who had been instrumental in carrying them on, he referred the whole subject to the authorities in England, and stated in detail his sentiments on the conduct of the Nabob, and on the measures which it would be advisable to adopt. These sentiments having been approved, his Lordship proceeded to carry into execution the measures which he had proposed to adopt.

His Lordship's principles on this question were, generally, that the Nabobs, by their communications with Hyder Ali and Tippoo Suldaun, had broken their treaties of alliance with the Company; and that in consequence of this breach of treaty the Company had a right to act in the manner that best suited their own interest. That which best suited their own interest was, to take into their own hands the entire management of the civil and military government of the Carnatic; giving to the Nabob, for the support of himself and his family, such a proportion of the revenues as should be sufficient for those objects, provided His Highness would acquiesce in the arrangements which should be carried into execution. These principles were considered to apply equally to the son, or supposed son, of the Nabob Omdal ool Omrah, as it was obvious that he could claim to inherit the authority of his father in the Carnatic, and the advantages derived from the connexion with the Company, only under the treaties between the Company and his family, all of which had been broken by the correspondence carried on with Hyder Ali and Tippoo Suldaun, by Mahomed Ali and Omdal ool Omrah.

When the orders from Marquess Wellesley upon this subject reached Madras, the Nabob Omdal ool Omrah was in such a state of health as to be incapable of attending to business; and soon afterwards he died. The supposed son was then apprised of the discoveries which had been made at Seringapatam, of the sentiments of the British government in consequence of these discoveries, and of the measures which they proposed to adopt in the Carnatic. But he refused to accept the situation held out to him under the new arrangement. As the claim of this Prince to succeed to his father, supposing that circumstances had allowed of the succession, was by no means clear, and as it was desirable for the peace of the Carnatic that the Nabob's family should adopt the arrangement, Lord Clive (now Earl of Powis) determined to set aside Ali Hussein entirely, and to propose it to Azeem ool Dowlah, the eldest legitimate son of Ameer ool Omrah,

who was the second son of the Nabob Mahomed Ali, and brother of the late Nabob Omdal ool Omrah. This Prince having agreed to the arrangement, a treaty was concluded by which the whole of the civil and military government of the Carnatic was transferred for ever to the Company; and the Nabob Azeem ool Dowlah, and his heirs, were to preserve their title and dignity, and to receive one fifth part of the net revenues of the country.*

Thus was this important arrangement concluded in a peaceable manner, by which a remedy was provided for all the evils which had attended the former connexion between the Company and the Nabobs of the Carnatic; additional security was given to the British government, and an addition of 800,000*l. per annum*, value of 20 lacs of star pagodas, was made to their pecuniary resources. This improvement in their situation was not attended by any extension of their frontier (for the Company was bound before, both by treaty and positive interest, to defend the same line of country), or any circumstance which tended to weaken the British government in the Carnatic.

The arrangement, the nature of which I shall next discuss, is the treaty of 1800, with the Nizam.† It will be recollected that the treaty of 1798,‡ which had been a remedy for some of the inconveniences existing at that time in the connexion between the Company and the Nizam, had been directed principally to the object of enabling His Highness to perform his part of the triple alliance of 1790,§ formed against the power of Tippoo Sultaun, in which object it had completely succeeded. But in reference to the Nizam, there were objects in contemplation also at that moment, which could not be carried into execution; and some inconveniences had grown out of the treaty of 1798 for which it was necessary to provide an early remedy. Between the years 1792 and 1798 the power of the government of the Nizam had fallen under the influence of the Mahrattas. This power had large claims upon His Highness; some founded upon the treaty or capitulation of Kurdlah, which claims had been afterwards modified and given up by other treaties; and others founded

* Unless the revenue exceeded the sum of 25 lacs of star pagodas, in which case the 5th part of the excess was to be applied to purposes of military defence.

† See *Wellesley Despatches*, vol. ii. p. 709.

‡ See *Collection of Treaties, &c.*, p. 182.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

upon the general principle of overbearing extortion of the Mahratta government.

As will appear in a subsequent part of this paper, the Governor-General had endeavoured, in 1798, to prevail upon the Peshwah to become a party to the treaty made that year with the Nizam, and to allow the British government to arbitrate in the Mahratta claims on the Nizam's government, but without success; and the Mahrattas continued to bring forward these vexatious and groundless claims, and at different periods, as well during the war against Tippoo as subsequently, Scindiah, who at that time possessed the power at Poonah, had collected armies upon the Nizam's frontier for the purpose of enforcing them.

Another evil which had existed in 1798 affecting the Nizam's government, and for which the treaty of 1st Sept., 1798, had been no remedy, was the state of the Nizam's government in relation to its tributaries, who were likewise tributaries to the Mahrattas. A considerable proportion of the pecuniary resources of the Nizam was derived from this source; but the Nizam was unable to enforce payment of his just demands, which the tributaries were encouraged by the Mahrattas to withhold from His Highness.

Under the treaty of 1st Sept., 1798, the Nizam was not entitled to the assistance of the British troops stationed in his country, either to defend him against the Mahrattas, or to assist him in overawing those of his tributaries who were likewise tributaries to the Mahrattas; and after the conquest of Mysore the British government, which by that event had become paramount in India, was obliged to determine the precise nature of the relation in which it would stand, as well to the Nizam's as to the Mahratta government, and that in which those powers should stand to each other.

It was obvious that the Mahrattas would continue to make, and would at length enforce, their unjust demands upon the Nizam's government to the length of replacing affairs at Hyderabad in the situation in which they had been left by the treaty of Kurdlah in 1795, when a Mahratta minister had governed the Nizam's territories. But this was not the only danger. The Nizam's government could not proceed unless its tributaries were brought under subjection. This measure was necessary as well on account of the pecuniary relief which it would afford to the Nizam, as because the rebellion of these tributaries was a

dangerous example of insubordination to the governors and collectors of the revenue of the distant provinces of the Nizam's territories. The existence of rebellion and insubordination in any country must always be formidable to its neighbours; but it is particularly so in India: and in the years 1799 and 1800 the existence of these evils was peculiarly inconvenient to the British government, and impeded the settlement of the new government of Mysore and the conquered provinces.

After the peace of Seringapatam, therefore, the British government were compelled to advert to the means of strengthening the government of the Nizam. Those which occurred were first to encourage and aid the Nizam in raising an army, to be disciplined and commanded by European officers. It would have been impossible to provide the number of English officers which His Highness's service would have required, even if all the persons of this description who might have been prevailed upon to go to India could have been depended upon, and if the national policy in respect to India had allowed of the emigration to that country of such a large body of persons. These European officers must therefore have been foreigners, all of whom have been invariably found to be inimical to the British interests, and principally Frenchmen. Here, then, the evil would have been revived, of which the inconvenience and danger had been felt previous to 1798, and for which the treaty of 1798 had been a remedy.

The second mode which occurred was to encourage the Nizam to raise a Native army. From the treachery of the Native chiefs, from their habits of correspondence and communication with the Mahrattas, and the superiority which this nation had acquired over them in a long series of contests, nothing effectual was to be expected from this measure, and it would have led directly to place the Nizam in a state of subjection to the government of Poonah. The Mahrattas would thus have been brought to the Company's frontier in the Northern Circars, the Carnatic, and to the boundaries of the new government of Mysore. The power of the Poonah state was at that time exercised by Scindiah, who was in his own right in possession of all the Mahratta power in Hindustan. Thus one Mahratta would have had in his hands all the power from the Ganges and Indus to the frontiers of the Carnatic and Mysore; touching the Company's frontier on the whole line, and possessing the

means of attacking it where he should think proper. Such a power has never appeared in India, and it is to be hoped never will !

The third mode was to extend the basis of the treaty of 1st Sept., 1798 ; to make it generally defensive against all powers ; and, in fact, to take the Nizam under the protection of the British government.

Adverting to the state of the government of the Nizam ; to the fact that it was incapable from weakness of carrying on its ordinary operations over the countries and people submitted to His Highness's authority, excepting by the assistance of a Gallo-Indian army, by means which would have subjected His Highness to the Mahrattas, or by the assistance of the British government ; and that in either of the former cases it would have fallen into the hands of our rivals or enemies, and would have been exercised to our disadvantage, there is no man who will doubt of the propriety of the arrangement made by the treaty of 1800.

But this treaty was preceded and attended by other circumstances, which, as a political measure, rendered it more necessary. It has already been stated that, since the peace of Kurdlah in 1795, the Mahrattas had never ceased to make vexatious demands upon the Nizam, supported generally by the assembling of armies upon his frontier. The remonstrances and negotiations of the British government had prevented the invasion of His Highness's territories, with a view to enforce the payment of these demands ; and there is no doubt that any symptom of an intention to withdraw from his support would have been followed by their immediate conquest, in the same manner as the omission of the British government to interfere between the two powers in 1795 had been the occasion of the war, and the disasters which were followed by the capitulation of Kurdlah.

Here, then, is a new view of the case—a Mahratta conquest made of the Nizam's territories, in consequence of our moderation at least ; and the conqueror placed upon our frontier.

If there had been no treaty with the Nizam, if the British had no interest in his preservation excepting what related to themselves, they would have been bound to interfere to prevent this evil.

But besides the great views of policy which rendered the alteration of the treaty of 1798 desirable, as far as related to

the employment of the forces, there were other circumstances, of inferior importance certainly, which rendered expedient the other alterations made by the treaty of 1800.*

Under the treaty of 1798 the British government had been bound to furnish the Nizam with a certain force, for the payment of a stipulated sum of money monthly. As was usual in all these cases, this subsidy fell in arrear; and the records of the Presidency are filled with accounts of the complaints made of the existence of these arrears, and of the measures adopted to secure their liquidation. These arrears gave rise to complaints and remonstrances from the British government, which of course must have tended to weaken the good understanding which ought to have existed between the Nizam and them; and they were equally prejudicial to the interests of both powers. The grant of territorial security for the payment of the subsidy removed all these causes of misunderstanding.

The territory which was granted to the Company was that which had been under the government of Tippoo Suldaun, and had been ceded to the Nizam by the treaties of Seringapatam of 1792 and 1799.† The authority of the Nizam had never been firmly established in those countries; and the state of confusion in which they were in 1799-1800 was highly prejudicial to the British interests in Mysore, and in the Company's recently acquired countries. The Nizam's treasury had never received any thing from those countries; and His Highness had supported the Company's subsidiary troops by funds acquired from other parts of his territories. It was hoped that the introduction of a better system of government would have produced order and regularity among this hitherto turbulent people, a hope which has been completely fulfilled; and this territory now yields a revenue of _____, a sum fully equal to pay the expenses of the subsidiary force stationed with the Nizam, and of the administration of government in the provinces which His Highness ceded.

Under this arrangement the Company's frontier is defined by the course of the Toombuddra to its junction with the Kistna; and then by the course of the Kistna to its entry into the province of _____. The provinces acquired under this treaty cover the Mysore country to the northward; and have

* See *Collection of Treaties, &c.*, p. 188.

† *Ibid.*, p. 441.

removed the source of danger to be apprehended to that newly established government, from the neighbourhood and example of a turbulent and disaffected people, paying no revenue or obedience to the government under which it is placed.

From the general view which has been given of this arrangement, it will readily be believed that the Nizam wished to accomplish it much more eagerly than the British government did. In fact, His Highness felt that before this arrangement was made his government was not in a state of security; and it will be observed that the security of His Highness's government was the principal object and motive of this treaty. Other objects were connected with this principal motive, equally interesting and advantageous to both the parties to the treaty; and upon the whole it may be said that it does not contain an article or an arrangement in which both parties were not equally interested.

The next subject to which I shall advert is the arrangement made with the Peshwah by the treaty of Bassein. It will be recollected that the Mahratta government of Poonah had been connected with the British government by a treaty made by Lord Cornwallis on 1st Sept. 1798, commonly called the Treaty of Triple Alliance, against Tippoo Sultaun. Under this treaty His Highness was bound to assist the British government and the Nizam, in case either of these powers were attacked by Tippoo.

After the peace of Seringapatam, in 1792, the Mahrattas attacked the Nizam, and the war ended by a peace or capitulation concluded at Kurdlah, by which the Nizam ceded half his territories, placed the remainder under the influence of the Mahrattas, paid a large sum of money, gave up his minister as a prisoner, and appointed other ministers nominated by the Mahrattas. Shortly after this peace the Peshwah, Mahdoo Rao Narain, died. A contest ensued among the different Mahratta chiefs for the succession to the office of Peshwah, and the possession of the influence and power of the government, which, after various success, ended in the establishment of the present Peshwah, Bajee Rao, and the possession of all the power and influence of the government by Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

This chief already had, by right of succession to his relative Mahdajee Scindiah, all the Mahratta territories in Hindustan, situated between the rivers Nerbudda and Taptee, and the Gan-

ges and Indus. The principal support and instrument of his government was an army disciplined and commanded by French officers, with a formidable train of artillery; and, by his influence at Poonah, he had now acquired that part of the power of the Mahratta government which was not already in his hands.

This was the general state of Mahratta affairs in the year 1798, when Marquess Wellesley assumed the government. But this power of Scindiah's was by no means consolidated. A formidable rebellion prevailed in his territories north of the Nerbudda, which was directed and encouraged by the female relations of his predecessor: and the confusion in the southern parts of the empire which had attended the progress of the contest for the possession of the power at Poonah, had not subsided upon its establishment in the hands of Scindiah.

Besides these causes of disquietude, Scindiah was not uninterested in the invasion of India by Zemaun Shah, at that time expected. The first effects of that invasion would have been felt by Scindiah; and his only hope of safety was in the assistance which he might derive from the British government.

It appears that, from this state of affairs, the Governor-General, Marquess Wellesley, endeavoured to derive additional strength and security to every part of the British empire in India. His first object was to procure the assistance of the Peshwah in the war against Tippoo Sultaun, which was impending, according to the stipulations of the Treaty of Triple Alliance; and with this view he endeavoured first to prevail upon Scindiah to return to Hindustan for the protection of his northern frontier against Zemaun Shah; and secondly, he acquainted the Peshwah with the course of measures he was pursuing for the restoration of the power and activity of the other party to the alliance, the Nizam; and offered to adopt similar measures for the establishment and support of the power of the Peshwah.

With the object of obtaining the assistance of the Mahrattas in the war against Tippoo, was connected another equally important to the permanent interests of Great Britain in India. I have already related the effect which the existence of the Mahratta claims upon the Nizam, and the mode in which they had been enforced, had produced upon the strength of His Highness's government, and upon the general strength and efficiency of the Triple Alliance formed against Tippoo Sultaun, in 1798.

In the view which the British government must have taken of

the probable issue of their discussions with Tippoo in 1798, they naturally considered the continuance of that alliance and the strength of all the parties to it as essential to the preservation of the peace of India; and in any event, even if they could have anticipated that which occurred in May, 1799, they must have considered the security of the Nizam's government to be essential to the peace and security of the British territories in the peninsula of India.

The propositions made to the Peshwah, with a view to obtain his assistance in the war, were accompanied by offers to arbitrate in the Mahratta claims on the Nizam, and were attended by a negotiation with Scindiah, to induce him to return to his territories in Hindustan, for their defence against the invasion of Zemaun Shah.

The influence of Scindiah, however, occasioned the failure of this negotiation, and the war against Tippoo was carried on and concluded without the assistance of the Peshwah.

After this event, which ended in the death of Tippoo, the destruction of his power, and the transfer of it to the British government and the allies, the principal object of the Triple Alliance of course existed no longer. The other objects of the alliance with the Peshwah, viz., the independence of his power in relation to Scindiah, and the arbitration and settlement of the Mahratta claims in his name on the government of the Nizam, still existed. The British government therefore repeated the offers which it had made to the Peshwah, accompanied by others, to allow His Highness to participate in the advantages resulting from the war, which were likewise rejected by the influence of Scindiah.

The negotiation was renewed by the Peshwah at different periods, particularly in the year 1800, when his power and the safety of his person were threatened by Scindiah; but their object was always defeated by the influence and violence of that chief, and by the apprehension of the Peshwah of their effects in the period which must elapse between the moment in which Scindiah might become acquainted with the negotiation and that at which the British troops would be in a position to protect the Peshwah.

At length the confusion which had existed in the northern parts of Scindiah's territories from the period of the death of Mahdajee Scindiah came to a crisis towards the close of the

year 1800, which drew Scindiah's attention, and required his presence in that quarter; and here commenced a new scene in Mahratta affairs, which led immediately to the treaty of Bassein, and the subsequent transactions in which the British government have been engaged.

It has already been noticed that the female relations of the predecessor of Dowlut Rao Scindiah were at the head of a party in Hindustan, who were in rebellion against the authority of Scindiah's government. When the contest had lasted for some time, the Mahratta chief, Tuckajee Holkar, who had been next in rank and power to Scindiah, died in the year 1797; and the sons of that chief came to Poonah to arrange with the Peshwah the succession of one of them to the territories of their father. Scindiah's objects in this arrangement were to procure the succession for Cashee Rao Holkar, the legitimate son most likely to favour the pretensions and objects of Scindiah in the Mahratta Empire. The wishes of the family were for Mulhar Rao Holkar, with whom were connected his illegitimate brothers, Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Vittojee Rao Holkar.

While the negotiations were going on at Poonah between these different branches of the Holkar family and the Peshwah, Scindiah, on the night of the Sept. 1797, attacked the camp of Mulhar Rao Holkar, put him to death, seized his widow, and dispersed all his adherents, including his illegitimate brother. Vittojee Rao Holkar was soon afterwards taken in rebellion against the Peshwah, and was put to death at Poonah. Jeswunt Rao Holkar fled first to Hyderabad, and then to Nagpoor, the capital of the Rajah of Berar, where, by the influence of Scindiah, he was put in confinement; and, after a short time, having made his escape from Nagpoor, he fled into Hindustan, where he joined the army of the rebels against the authority of Scindiah's government, assembled under the influence of the female relations of his predecessor. In a short time Holkar acquired considerable influence in the councils and the army of these females, which he soon turned to his own advantage; and he suddenly attacked and plundered them, and placed himself at the head of their troops. He then increased his forces to the utmost extent that was practicable, and on the 17th and 18th July, 1801, made an attack upon a large detachment of Scindiah's regular infantry stationed at Ougein, the capital of Scindiah's government, which detachment he defeated with great

slaughter, particularly of their European officers; and he plundered the city of Ougein. This event drew Scindiah's serious attention to the situation of affairs in Hindustan; and he removed from Poonah with his army in the month of Dec. 1800. His agents, however, still conducted the operations of the Peshwah's government. His Highness's prime minister had been appointed by Scindiah; and, although His Highness's person and his councils were in some degree relieved from the previous constraint under which they had laboured for some years, no act of the government could be carried into execution without the consent of Scindiah's servants.

When Scindiah arrived in Hindustan with his army the contest between him and Holkar continued with increased violence; and at length Holkar was defeated in a great battle, which was fought at Indore, the capital of the possessions of the Holkar family, on the [14th October, 1801].* After this battle, Holkar was obliged to withdraw from Hindustan into the hilly countries between the Nerbudda and the Taptee, into which Scindiah was unable to carry the war, as his attention was still taken up by the settlement of his government in the north of Hindustan, and his armies were not reunited sufficiently from the loss sustained in the different battles which had been fought. Holkar took advantage of this respite to carry the war across the Taptee into the Peshwah's country. In the course of the year 1802 he had several engagements with the Peshwah's troops in Candesh and on the Godavery, in which he was uniformly successful, and at length, in the month of October, 1802, he approached Poonah. Scindiah had sent a small detachment of his regular infantry and a body of cavalry to join the remnant of the Peshwah's army; and on the 25th October, 1802, a great battle was fought between these armies, almost within sight of the city of Poonah, which ended in the complete defeat of the troops of the Peshwah and Scindiah. After this battle the Peshwah fled from Poonah into the Konkan, or low country on the sea-coast between Bombay and Goa. Having been pursued by Holkar's troops, he embarked at Severndroog, on board a ship which was sent from Bombay for his accommodation, and he arrived at Bassein, opposite to the Island of Salsette, on the 16th December; and Holkar remained in possession of the authority of the government of Poonah.

* See *History of the Mahrattas*, by Grant Duff, vol. iii. p. 201.

During the progress of Holkar in his invasion of the Peshwah's territories, His Highness the Peshwah renewed the negotiations, which had been so frequently broken off, for the assistance of the British government. These negotiations, however, were not brought to a close on the day of the battle near Poonah; and after the result of that day was known, and immediately previous to his flight, His Highness signed a paper, by which he engaged to perform all the material stipulations required by the British government as the conditions on which they would consent to give him the assistance for which he asked. These were, principally, that His Highness would allot a territorial security for the payment of the troops which the Company would detach into his country; that those troops should occupy a position within his territories; that the Company should arbitrate on the differences between him and the Nizam; and that the Peshwah should not enter into any treaty or correspondence with any foreign power excepting with the knowledge and consent of the Company.*

When the Governor-General received this paper from Poonah, it was necessary that he should revise all the proceedings in the negotiations at Poonah, and all the reasonings which had led to and operated upon them; and that he should decide according to the new appearance which affairs had taken in the Mahratta empire since the late revolution.

The principle on which the negotiations at Poonah had turned since the death of Tippoo Sultaun, on the 4th May, 1799, had been, the necessity of introducing the arbitration of the British government in the disputes and claims which existed between the Peshwah and the Nizam. It was obvious that unless the British government should interfere, the Nizam must fall under the power of the Mahrattas; and for this reason the treaty of 1798 with the Nizam had been made generally defensive against all powers whatever by the treaty of October, 1800. When this treaty was concluded there existed a necessity for continuing to urge the Peshwah to admit of the arbitration of the British government in the Mahratta claims; or the British government must have been prepared for, and must have expected, war with the Mahratta nation, whenever these claims should be made, and the Mahrattas should find themselves in a

* See the *Treaty of Bassein*, in *Wellesley Despatches*.

condition to enforce them. The attainment of this political object, therefore, was the only one likely to ensure the peace of the Peninsula of India.

The introduction of the British troops into the Peshwah's territories was a mere military question, and turned exactly upon the chance of being able to support the Peshwah's power, and of giving him sufficient authority in his own government to enable him to perform his treaty with the Company in favour of the Nizam.

The cession of territory for subsidy was the best mode of avoiding the disputes and inconvenience which had invariably attended these subsidiary alliances in other instances; and the article respecting the intercourse of the Peshwah with foreign states was rendered necessary by the nature of the constitution of the two governments, the alliances by which each was bound, and the laws which regulated their intercourse with foreign states. The necessity for this connexion with the head of the Mahratta Empire was rather increased by the successful invasion of the Peshwah's territories, and by the usurpation of His Highness's authority by Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and the circumstances which existed at the close of the year 1802, and in the commencement of 1803, afforded the fairest prospect of effecting this great object without hostilities.

Immediately after the flight of the Peshwah from Poonah, Holkar took upon himself the government of the Peshwah's territories; but finding that this arrangement was not popular, and gave offence to the chiefs in the southern parts of the empire, he appointed the son of Amrut Rao, who was the adopted son of the father of the Peshwah, Bajee Rao, to be the new Peshwah; and Amrut Rao to be his minister, and himself to be the head of his armies. He endeavoured to obtain the consent and acknowledgment of the Nizam and of the British government to this arrangement; and while the negotiations were going on upon this subject, it is well known that he was collecting about his person all the pretenders to authority, and the disaffected subjects of the Company and their allies, that could be found; and he was preparing the documents on which he intended to found the vexatious claims of the Mahratta government on the Nizam, the territories of Mysore and Arcot. He was at the same time urging the British government to acknowledge his new dynasty at Poonah, and to interfere in the settle-

~~news~~ of the Mahratta affairs. Scindiah, who had been informed by the Governor-General of the progress of the Peshwah's negotiations with the British government in the year 1802, and who must have been aware of the engagement which the Peshwah had signed upon his departure from Poonah, earnestly urged the British government to interfere in the Mahratta affairs, as the only mode of settling their actual confusion.

The animosity between Scindiah and Holkar still existed with the greatest violence; and in the operations which must be carried on to relieve the Peshwah and to restore his authority, there was every reason to expect that Holkar would find himself exposed singly to the hostility of all the great powers in India, and that he would withdraw from the Peshwah's territories.

Orders were therefore issued for the conclusion of a treaty with the Peshwah, upon the basis of the paper which had been delivered by His Highness to the Resident at Poonah on the day preceding his flight; and the treaty was concluded accordingly on the 31st Dec. 1802. Scindiah's minister, who, as was before related, was the Peshwah's dewan, was privy to the whole transaction; and he on the part of Scindiah, and on the part of Cashee Rao Holkar, engaged to make good to the Peshwah a part of the expense which he should incur in procuring the interference and assistance of the British government.

The treaty having been concluded on the 31st Dec. 1802, and all the preparatory arrangements made, the British troops marched from the frontiers of Mysore on the 12th March. They were joined on their march by the principal of the Mahratta chiefs and of the Peshwah's officers in the southern parts of the Mahratta empire. The detachments of Holkar's army, which had been upon the Kistna and Godavery, successively fell back; and the British troops formed a junction with the Nizam's army and the subsidiary British troops in His Highness's service on the 15th April, within 100 miles of Poonah. Nearly about the same time Holkar withdrew from Poonah to the northward, and left that city to be occupied by the British army. A communication was immediately opened with the Peshwah, who was at Bassein, under the protection of a detachment of the army of Bombay, and His Highness entered Poonah and took upon himself the government of his country on the 13th May.

In this manner this great arrangement was effected without the loss of a man. By a skilful and ready application of the forces

and resources of the government, and by taking advantage of opportunities, the ally of the Company was restored to his dignity and to the exercise of his authority; the usurpation of a most rapacious freebooter was destroyed; and this dangerous neighbour was removed from the frontier of the Company's allies. At the same time an arrangement was made which was calculated to preserve peace between the Company's allies, and secure the weak government against the unjust claims of the strong; and, by preserving all in the relative situation in which they were at the moment the arrangement was made, to strengthen all the powers of India against the attacks of a foreign invader, and to secure its internal tranquillity.

From the knowledge which the British government possessed that Scindiah was aware of all the circumstances of the negotiations which the Peshwah was carrying on, that he had earnestly desired their interference in the Mahratta affairs, and, above all, because he must have known that they had acquired a most formidable position for their armies in the Peninsula, of which nothing could deprive them excepting great military success, it was confidently expected that this arrangement would not have occasioned any subsequent hostilities.

But these were not the only grounds on which this expectation of the continuance of peace was founded. Scindiah had, in point of fact, no right to interfere in an arrangement between the Company and the Peshwah, particularly in one concluded under all the circumstances which had attended the treaty of Bassein.

The Mahratta empire has at times been considered as an institution, in some degree, of the same description with the Empire of Germany; at others it has been considered as the union of a number of chiefs possessing territory and power, acknowledging the Peshwah as their nominal head; and at others, the Peshwah has been considered as the real head of a government of which Scindiah and others were only the powerful officers. Arguments have been drawn from the supposed existence of all these imaginary forms of government to prove that the Peshwah had no right to enter into the treaty of Bassein without the consent of Scindiah and other chiefs of the Mahratta empire.

Admitting the existence of all, or any, of these forms of government (and excepting the similarity to the Empire of Germany, all have in reality existed at different periods of the Mahratta

history), the fact is, and cannot be denied, that the Peshwah has frequently made treaties, not only to which none of the Mahratta chiefs consented, but to which some of them objected. For instance, the Treaty of Triple Alliance, in 1798, was objected to by Mahdajee Scindiah and Tuckajee Holkar. The treaty of peace in 1792, at Seringapatam, and of partition, was not consented to by any of the Mahratta chiefs. But if it be true that the Peshwah, who is acknowledged by those who reason upon all these different forms of government to be either the real or the nominal head of what is commonly called the Empire, cannot make a treaty without the consent of Scindiah and the other chiefs, it may be presumed that Scindiah and the other chiefs, who are supposed to be of the second rank, cannot make a treaty without the consent of the Peshwah. How is this fact? They make war and peace in their own names against whom they please, when they please, and as they please; and never use the Peshwah's name, or refer to its authority, excepting as a last subterfuge in the discussions which may attend their negotiations. In point of fact, Scindiah, instead of being a powerful subject, and in that light a party to be consulted in an agreement to be entered into by the Peshwah with the British government, was himself the guarantee of the treaty of Salbye between the same parties.

In this very capacity of guarantee of a treaty he must have been considered, and must have been in fact, independent of the two powers contracting it. Before he became a guarantee, the history of those times shows that he was independent of the Peshwah. But this very act of guarantee has always been considered important in India, particularly by the Native politicians, as it afforded complete evidence of the division of the Mahratta power.

The hopes of the continuance of peace, then, were founded as well upon the right of the Peshwah to conclude the treaty of Bassein, as upon the circumstances which attended its negotiation and its execution.

A new party, however, came forward upon this occasion, through whose means and by whose exertions a peace was patched up between Scindiah and Holkar, on which was founded a confederacy against the British government.

The Rajah of Berar had not been engaged in hostilities since the year 1780, when he had marched to the British frontier of

Bengal, and had received a sum of money to desist from his hostilities, excepting during the short campaign of 1795, in which he had co-operated with the other Mahrattas against the Nizam. He was the oldest of the chiefs of the present day, and was renowned among them for his wisdom and political knowledge and skill. He had claims upon the power of the state of Poonah, from his relationship to the Rajahs of Sattarah; and he was known to have entertained serious designs of forming an union of all the Mahratta powers against the British government.

When he perceived the advantage which the British government had taken of the existence of the disputes among the Mahratta chiefs, he saw that he must become the victim of the arrangement. Holkar had been obliged to retire to the northward in front of the British troops; but he could not venture to cross the Taptee, as he would then have been exposed to Scindiah's hostility. Holkar would have been unwilling to discharge his army; he could not remain in the Peshwah's territories, or invade those of the Nizam; and his only resource to provide for their subsistence would have been to enter Berar.

The Rajah, who clearly perceived this consequence (and who has since acknowledged this motive for his conduct), determined to endeavour to organise a confederacy of the Mahrattas against the British government.

Whatever might have been the claim of Scindiah to the possession of the power of the Peshwah's government, and the degree of encouragement he gave to the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, there is no doubt that he lost solid power by the arrangement, which he could not hope to recover. He had nothing to gain by the continuance of hostilities against Holkar; and the sacrifices which he made, and which he intended should be only nominal, were more than compensated by the advantages which he hoped to acquire from the confederacy, in which, from the efficiency and the general state of his power, he must act the principal part. Holkar could hope nothing from the continuance of his hostilities with Scindiah. The latter had driven him from Hindustan; and in the course of the years 1801, 1802, in which he had settled his government in the northern parts of India, he had acquired additional strength which he could apply in his contest with Holkar, if it should continue.

A combination of all the Mahratta chiefs, with their forces,

had long been an object with the Mahratta politicians ; and the plan flattered the national vanity, although it was impracticable, unless attended by great and important military successes at its outset. The Rajah of Berar, therefore, succeeded in patching up a peace between Scindiah and Holkar, none of the important articles of which were performed by either party.

Before I proceed to the relation of the events which followed the treaty of Bassein, it will be proper to discuss the justice and policy of the British government in entering into the treaty of Bassein, on the ground that they must have expected the event which followed it.

I have already pointed out the objects of the treaty, the favourable circumstances under which it was negotiated, and the probability which existed that its arrangements would be carried into execution without a war, and that it would secure the permanent peace of India. But the faithless nature of the Mahratta character, and the habits of the councils of all the chiefs, are so well known, that it may be admitted that the British government ought to have contemplated the chance of a confederacy of the Mahratta chiefs to oppose the arrangement.

Considering the nature of the materials of which that confederacy was to be formed ; that the two most powerful of the chiefs entertained the most rooted and inveterate animosity against each other ; that after they had signed their treaty of peace their hostilities continued, and they could not trust each other so far as to place their armies within reach of attack ; that none of the chiefs trusted the other ; and that the pride of all prevented them from placing the management of the affairs and the command of the armies of the confederacy in the hands of one ; the British government had but little to apprehend from this confederacy, provided vigorous measures were adopted at an early period of time to oppose it effectually, and to prevent it from acquiring strength and consistency by success.

The arrangements which had been made by Lord Wellesley, viz. the treaty with the Nabob of Oude, the treaty with the Guickowar,* the arrangement at Surat, the arrangements in Mysore, the treaty with the Nizam, of October, 1800, and above all, the treaty of Bassein, afforded the most efficient

* Copies of these documents will be found in the *Collection of Treaties*, 1 vol. 4to., published in 1812.

means of opposing the confederacy with success. If the troops did their duty with their usual bravery, its early dissolution became certain; and by the advanced position in which the treaties of Hyderabad and Bassein placed the British troops, the evils of the war would be removed to a distance from the British territories, the seat of the resources of the government.

But it is not clear that the omission to conclude the treaty of Bassein would not have led equally to a war with all the powers of the confederated Mahratta states, under circumstances of increased disadvantage. The removal of Holkar from Poonah was absolutely necessary on every ground of justice, policy, and good faith; and if the treaty of Bassein had not been made, the British government must have aided Scindiah in effecting that object. Holkar's armies would have been defeated, and the power of his rival, Scindiah, would have been established in full vigour at Poonah. He would thus again have been in possession of all the Mahratta power from the Ganges and the Indus to the Toombuddra; and his situation would have been so far more advantageous, as in the course of the years 1801 and 1802 he had overcome the rebellion which had till then prevailed in his northern dominions, and had completely established the authority of his own government in those rich countries. His first demand would have been upon the Nizam; and here at once the Company would have come in contact with a Mahratta confederacy, but under very different circumstances of strength from that with which they were engaged in 1803. In this contest Scindiah would have been really, as well as nominally, at the head of the confederacy; he would have had no rival, or rather actual enemy, in Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and would have been able to direct all his forces against the British government. He would have had on his side, instead of against him, all the strength of the Peshwah, including, what is of no small importance, all the strength of the southern chiefs situated on the frontier of Mysore. The Company, on the other hand, would have been obliged to engage with this more formidable confederacy with diminished means and resources, as they would not have had the Peshwah and the southern chiefs on their side. But their principal loss would have been the position for their armies which the treaty of Bassein gave them. By adopting this position in the Deccan in 1803, the armies were enabled immediately to render offensive the operations of a war which

had been undertaken solely for defence. In the war which must have been expected if the treaty of Bassein had not been concluded, the operations must have been defensive upon a frontier extending above a thousand miles, assailable in all its parts; and the seat of the war would have been either the heart of the territories of the Nizam, or those of the Rajah of Mysore.

Upon the whole, then, I conclude that the treaty of Bassein was a wise, just, and politic measure; that none of the chiefs had any right to interfere in it or question its stipulations; and that it was concluded under circumstances and at a time which promised that it would be followed by lasting tranquillity. If it should be contended that the British government ought to have expected, as a consequence of the treaty, the confederacy and war which happened in 1803, I answer that, with the military and political advantages they acquired by the treaty of Bassein, they had nothing to fear from that confederacy; and that if they had not concluded the treaty of Bassein they would in a few months afterwards have been involved in a war with the same power, much increased in strength and resources, and possessing superior advantages, while those of the Company, in every point of view, would have been diminished.

As soon as the British government was made acquainted with the measures which had been adopted by the Rajah of Berar to arrange a confederacy of the Mahratta chiefs against the Company, the Governor-General directed that measures should be taken to make the Rajah of Berar and Holkar acquainted with the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, and to point out to all the chiefs the innocent and defensive nature of the treaty, and the arrangement contained in the article which provided for the security of all their rights. They were at the same time called upon to declare the nature and object of their negotiations, and their views in marching to join each other in a station at so great a distance from the Nizam's frontier. In answer to these representations, Scindiah declared that he could not say whether there would be peace or war till he should meet the Rajah of Berar. After Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had joined their troops in a position which enabled them in one march to enter the Nizam's territories, letters were presented to them from the Governor-General, in which the nature and objects of the treaty of Bassein were fully discussed and explained. Scindiah and

the Rajah of Berar wrote the following answers to these letters.* In the mean time the peace between Scindiah and Holkar had been signed, although but one article of it had been carried into execution, viz. that which stipulated that Hindoo Rao Holkar, the infant and posthumous son of Mulhar Rao Holkar, should be delivered over by Scindiah to Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The object of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar in writing these answers to the Governor-General's letter was to gain time, to allow the season of the rains to pass over, to conciliate the confidence and receive the co-operation of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to complete their preparations for attack on all parts of the frontier of the Company and the allies. Early measures, however, had been adopted by the British government to resist their hostilities, and their armies were completely prepared in the middle of July, 1803. It was an object of importance to bring the confederates to a decision whether there should be peace or war before the season of the rains should pass over, before they should have time to complete their preparations, and to conciliate the confidence of Holkar. Accordingly the following letter† was written to them by the commanding officer in the Deccan, in answer to their letters to the Governor-General. They refused to comply with the reasonable demand contained in this letter, and the British Resident quitted the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 3rd Aug. and hostilities immediately commenced.

It is useless to follow the operations of the British armies. It is sufficient to state, that owing to the preparations which were made, the positions which they had taken, and the favourable season in which the military operations were commenced, they were uniformly successful; the result was, the early dissolution of the confederacy, in which Holkar never joined, and that in less than two months the confederates sued for peace.

Treaties were concluded with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar in the end of December, 1803, by which the allies gained an acknowledgment of the treaty of Bassein.‡ The Company acquired from the Rajah of Berar the district of Cuttack, &c.,

* See *Wellesley Despatches*, vol. iii. p. 250.

† See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, letter dated 14th July, 1803, vol. i. p. 222.

‡ Copies of treaties are given at pp. 264, 285.

by which they insured the defence of a weak part of the frontier of Bengal, and the continuity of their possessions, and the certainty of a communication at all times between the Presidency of Fort William and Fort St. George. On the north-west frontier they acquired from Scindiah all his possessions on both banks of the Jumna; by which they got that river for a frontier, and secured its navigation, an object of infinite importance to the commerce of that part of the country. They also acquired from Scindiah the town, port, and territory of Baroach, in Guzerat, by which they secured the government of the Guickowar and all the Company's interests in that quarter. Scindiah was also obliged to relinquish the influence which he had exercised over the person and power of the Mogul; and to admit the independence of all the petty states in the north of India, who, during the war, had connected themselves by treaty with the Company. By this arrangement, which affected the Rajpoot state of Jeypoor, and all the petty Rajahs to the northward of that state, the Mahrattas were removed to a distance from the Company's frontier, which was surrounded and guarded by these petty states.

The Nizam acquired by these treaties an exemption from all demands of all descriptions on his territories by the confederates. He also acquired on the side of Scindiah a defined boundary, and all the territories belonging to Scindiah which were within that boundary.

From the Rajah of Berar, the Nizam acquired the province of Berar, with the river Wurda and the hills to the northward as a frontier; by which cession he gained an addition of revenue amounting to 800,000*l.* annually.

The Peshwah acquired from Scindiah the fort and territory of Ahmednuggur, and, by an arrangement made with Amrut Rao at the commencement of the war, he had acquired the jaghire of this chief upon the Godavery. By these arrangements his territories became compact; the city of Poonah was rendered more secure, and the pretext of posting troops in the neighbourhood for the purpose of collecting the revenues of territories in that quarter was annihilated.

Besides these advantages acquired by each of the allies by this war, the British government destroyed entirely the corps in the service of the enemy, which was commanded and officered by Frenchmen, and took from them not less than 823 pieces of

ordnance. The advantages resulting from these military successes will be best understood by reflecting on the difficulties and losses sustained in gaining them, and on the reputation for bravery and other military qualities acquired by our officers and troops.

During this war with the confederacy the conduct of Holkar had been rather favourable than otherwise to the British government. This chief had employed his army in levying contributions in the countries under the government of Scindiah situated north of the Nerbudda, and in endeavours to establish the authority of his infant nephew in the jaghire of the Holkar family. When Scindiah was obliged to collect a body of troops at Ougein, in consequence of the progress made by the army in Guzerat towards that capital, Holkar proceeded to the northward, and began to plunder the Rajpoot states. Shortly afterwards, peace was concluded between the British government and the other members of the confederacy.

[1894.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Hastings, 31st July, 1806.

I have received your letters up to the 14th Jan., for which I return you many thanks. The subjects to which they relate are too large to be discussed in a letter which must go to the post this afternoon, in order to be despatched by the ships which will sail in a few days. I shall therefore satisfy myself by telling you that I consider that you have acted a part entirely consistent with your own character, and in strict conformity with my sentiments, in everything that you have done. The arrangement with Scindiah is precisely that which you and I recommended long before, and which I urged, and, I believe, was ordered when I was in Bengal in 1804. I thought also at that time, and so did you, that the Rajpoots ought to have been subjugated to the control of Scindiah's government, as the only mode of re-establishing it; the state in which it must exist, if it is to exist at all. This object might with care and justice have been effected at that time, if the state of Scindiah's government had permitted it; and I am not sufficiently acquainted with all that has passed between the Rajpoots and our government since the period of Monson's defeat, to be able to decide that we ought not to deliver them over to Scindiah, notwith-

standing the favourable change which has taken place in the state and dispositions of his councils.

I regret that it has been necessary to allow Holkar to exist, and to be at large. I should be induced to suspect that he will never allow us to be at peace; and without peace we cannot reduce the debt, which must be the great object at present. However, if it was necessary to allow him to exist, I see but one amendment which could have been made to the treaty with him; that is, to have kept permanently Umber and Chandore in the Deccan, and some place of similar consequence in Hindustan, either in our own hands or those of our allies, as a perpetual memorial to the whole world that we had defeated him. The powers of India will not now believe that our moderation alone has occasioned the treaty which has been concluded; and I shall not be surprised if it give ground for a belief, the most erroneous, that Holkar's power and his mode of warfare had been more destructive to us than the resources and the efficiency and discipline of the armies of the other Mahrattas.

In respect to the necessity of peace with Holkar, no man can be a judge of it who has not been in this country, who has not sat in the House of Commons, and had means of ascertaining the public opinion at its fountain head. I really believe, that in the opinion of the majority of people in this country, it would have been better to cede the whole of Oude to Holkar than to continue the war with him.

As for myself, I am here in the command of a few troops stationed in this part of the coast, the old landing place of William the Conqueror. You will have seen that I am in Parliament, and a most difficult and unpleasant game I have had to play in the present extraordinary state of parties. I have desired Sydenham to send you a copy of a speech which I made upon the budget.

I have seen your brothers, Pulteney and Charles, both well. The former is in the *Donegal*, off Brest; the other unemployed in London. But Sir Thomas, whom I saw likewise, expects to be able to get a ship for Charles soon. God bless you, my dear Malcolm; don't stay too long in India.

P.S. Pray remember me most kindly to Wilks and all friends in Seringapatam.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1895.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Deal, 10th Dec., 1806.

I hear that the ships will soon sail from Portsmouth, and I will not allow them to go without a few lines, although I have but little to tell you. I know no more of public news than what you will see in the newspapers, which, indeed, in these days contain everything. You will read with horror the accounts of the French successes against the King of Prussia; but will learn with pleasure that, considering the line of policy which that government had adopted for some years, those successes are not likely to do us any material mischief immediately, whatever may be the eventual consequence in relation to our ally the Emperor of Russia. Of the truth of this opinion I am thoroughly convinced, from a personal knowledge of facts, as well as because I know it is entertained by some for whose judgment I entertain the greatest respect.

As for India, I know but little respecting it. If I had been employed in North America, I might be informed and consulted on the measures to be adopted in India; but as it is, that is out of the question. Lord Minto will sail soon, I believe early in next month; and Gen. Hewitt, who is appointed Commander-in-Chief, will go with him, or shortly after him. You will find this to be a sensible and goodnatured gentleman, and well disposed to carry on his business in the manner which experience has proved to be most suitable to the country. I doubt whether his health or his age will permit him to remain long or to be very active in the field.

The last letter which I received from you was dated from Cawnpore, in May, I believe; but I sent it to Lord W., who has kept it. You are already acquainted with my opinion, generally, about your peace with Holkar and your treaty with Scindiah. I only wish that you had kept anything from the former which might have been held out as a perpetual signal and memorandum to all India that he had been defeated by us; for I am apprehensive that the opinion, to which I know all were inclined, that Holkar's system of warfare was the same with the old Mahratta system, that it was the best against us, and that Scindiah was ruined by his adoption of a more regular system, than which nothing can be more erroneous, may occasion another war with a confederacy. I know that we have no danger to apprehend

from this war if we keep up, not so much the strength of our armies as an equipment, and if our troops are commanded by officers who know how to make use of them. But I dread the expense and the effect which the renewal of these wars will have in this country; and I know full well that there are many delicate questions to be settled in the Mahratta empire, the arrangement of which, in peace, will require all the impression from former victories, all the vigour, all the prudence, and all the temper which have brought us through our former difficulties. The fault which I find with the peace with Holkar therefore is that it has strengthened an erroneous opinion which deprives us of the greatest advantage of our victories, viz., their impression, and that in this manner it will increase the chance of war upon the occasion of the arrangement of every question which remains to be settled in the Mahratta empire. The want of this impression renders the exercise of a vigorous administration nearly impracticable, excepting in a state of constant preparation for war, which, after all, is nearly as expensive as war itself; and yet I don't see how the government in India is to be carried on excepting with vigour.

I see no material objection to the treaty with Scindiah, and I believe that I recommended that the treaty of peace should be arranged upon the principles of that treaty; and that a treaty to a similar purport should be concluded with Scindiah when the treaty of peace was arranged differently.

You will have heard with astonishment of ——'s attack upon Lord Wellesley. The impudence of this gent. in setting himself up for Westminster has afforded an opportunity of unveiling him to the public, and his character is now well known. Only think of that fellow standing for Westminster, and having been not far from carrying his election!!! He is not now in Parliament, and I doubt whether he will ever come in; and if he should not be in the House of Commons, it is not quite clear that anybody will undertake the cause which he will have left. But whether there should be such a person or not, I have some reason to believe that the House will not allow the business to be brought forward again, although from the state of parties I am afraid that it will not be got rid of in the manner which would be most agreeable and honourable to Lord W. and his friends. You, who know him well, will be aware of the impression which all that has passed upon this subject, and the state of

the public mind on Indian subjects generally, have made upon him. I shall not pretend to describe it to you in a letter; and I cannot venture to enter into particulars on many subjects on which I should write for your information, considering the danger to which letters are exposed on their passage, and the bad consequences which have resulted, and must always result, from the publication of intercepted correspondence.

Your brother is well, and off Brest in the *Donegal*. Charles has got a ship, and is, I believe, still at Plymouth. I have been endeavouring to do something for ——'s brother, who is to be married to your sister, but hitherto without success. Remember me most kindly to Wilks, Barclay, Symons, and Piele, and all friends at Seringapatam; also to Colonel Close when you write to him.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1896.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

London, 23rd Feb., 1807.

I had intended to write to you by Lord Minto, but he left town very suddenly while I was hunting at Hatfield, and he had sailed before I heard of his departure from London. But I hear that the Indiamen are to sail immediately, and I shall not suffer them to go without a letter.

I shall not pretend to give you an account of the state of public affairs, of which you will be enabled to form a better judgment by a perusal of the newspapers than by anything I could write to you. The minority are certainly very strong in Parliament, and, I think, are getting on a little in the country. But they will never be so popular as Pitt was; and I think that there are symptoms in this country and in Ireland which require the serious attention of every man who wishes for the continuance of the empire and the prosperity of Great Britain. They are coming to their senses greatly about India, and I know that Tierney has some good principles in relation to that country, and that he would govern it well if he had the power. A revolution is also in progress, slowly but very certainly, in the public mind, respecting the former system of government there, and that according to which affairs ought to be administered there in future. The Court of Directors are certainly less hostile than

they were towards Lord Wellesley ; and, as for me, I have the most certain proofs that they are desirous that I should serve them again. All this looks well, and I am sanguine in my expectations that all difficulties upon these subjects will soon have been overcome.

You will have been astonished at the career of ———, ———, your quondam friend and *protégé*. He certainly was nearly being the representative of Westminster, owing partly to the unpopularity of Sheridan ; partly to his own impudence ; and partly to the power which Horne Tooke and Cobbett have acquired over the public mind. I was the first person who discovered that the characteristics of ——— were perseverance, effrontery, and impudence ; and when you conceive such a character, you will not be astonished at all at what he has done, notwithstanding the kicks, cuffs, and buffeting which we gave him last year in Parliament, and all that he still threatens. He is not now in Parliament, and ———, who was one of his supporters last year, has announced his intention of moving a resolution on the transactions in Oude. He brings no charge, however, and he does not mean to criminate Lord Wellesley ; and he has particularly stated that he does not think there is the smallest ground for attributing to Lord Wellesley the waste of the public money. We shall beat him, whatever may be the nature of his resolution. Another gentleman, ———, has given notice of a day for moving again for the printing the Carnatic papers, with a view to the consideration of the transactions in the revolution in that country. We shall beat him likewise. You will readily believe that Lord Wellesley is much annoyed by all this ; but his mind is more composed, and he is more reconciled to his situation than he was last year.

Alas ! my dear Malcolm, what has come over the army of Fort St. George ? What are we to believe ? Is it possible that the Princes at Vellore can have corrupted the detachment at Hyderabad, at the distance of 500 miles ? Surely these Princes in confinement, and possessing but limited pecuniary means, could never have had the power of creating a general interest in their favour throughout the whole of the Native army of Fort St. George, dispersed as it is over thousands of miles !!! I am all anxiety upon this subject, and yet I have not received a line from a soul. Nobody believes the accounts which are received from India upon this subject, notwithstanding the credit and

character of those who have transmitted them ; and the mind of every man is filled with suspicion and alarm. Surely those followers who went through the difficulties and dangers of the Mahratta campaigns cannot have broken their allegiance ! I can never believe it, till I shall see it proved in the clearest manner.

I wish that you were *now* in England ; but I doubt whether it will be of any use to you to come hereafter. Government have some thoughts of sending an embassy to Persia ; —— as the ambassador. I put a spoke in his wheel the other day, I think, in a conversation with ——, and urged him to get Lord Howick to appoint you. God knows whether I have succeeded in the last object, although I made it clear that —— was an improper man, and that you were the only one fit for the station. I do not recommend it to you to be in a hurry to come to England. Expenses here are very heavy, and fortunes very large. Notwithstanding all the taxes and the rise in price of every article in life, there is more luxury than ever, more appearance of riches in the country, and more persons with large fortunes, and fewer with fortunes of a moderate extent, than there were formerly. You could not exist in the way you would like under a much larger fortune than you possess ; and take my word for it, you will lose nothing by staying away from England a little longer. Pray don't forget to remember me to all my friends, particularly to Wilks, Close, Barclay, Symons, Piele, Cole, if he should be with you, Buchan, &c., &c. Tell —— that I have endeavoured to serve him in his difficulties. The Court of Directors are outrageous against him, for no reason whatever ; and I am not sure that I have prevailed with —— to prevent them from venting their rage in paragraphs in a general letter. God bless you.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[1897.]

To the Right Hon. H. Dundas.

MY DEAR DUNDAS,

Dublin Castle, 20th April, 1808.

I have perused with great attention the paper which you enclosed with your letter of the 15th.* My opinion is, that you

* It is affirmed that in 1800 the French government suggested to the Emperor Paul a conjoint French and Russian expedition against British

ought to make an effort to meet the enemy, if possible, upon the Indus; although that opinion is much qualified by a variety of considerations which I shall now suggest to you.

India. France and Russia were each to supply 35,000 men; and the Emperor of Germany was to give a passage to the French troops, and to facilitate their descent by the Danube to the Euxine.

The Russian army to be assembled at Astracan, on the north-west of the Caspian Sea, was to consist of 25,000 regulars and 10,000 Cossacks:—from Astracan it was to embark for Astrabad, on the south-east coast of the Caspian, there to wait the arrival of the French. Astrabad to be the head-quarters, and magazines, &c., to be established there.

Route of the French Army.—Thirty-five thousand men to be detached from the Army of the Rhine, and to descend the Danube to the Euxine:—there to be embarked on Russian transports, and passing the Euxine and Sea of Azof, to disembark under Tajanrog. Then to coast along the Don, ascend the right bank of the river to the Cossack town Piati-Ishianka; there pass the Don, and march to the environs of Tsaritsin on the right bank of the Volga; from thence to re-embark and descend that river to Astracan; there to embark on mercantile vessels, to be found in abundance, for Astrabad.

The French and Russian forces being united at Astrabad, to pass the towns of Herat, Terah, and Candahar, and to march on to the right bank of the Indus.

Time.—Descent of the Danube to its mouth, 20 days; to Tajanrog, 16; to Piati-Ishianka, 20; to Tsaritsin, 4; to Astracan, 5; to Astrabad, 10; to borders of the Indus, 45. Total, 120 days.

The death of the Emperor Paul in 1801 prevented, it is supposed, the attempted invasion, but the project was revived in 1807, and it probably formed one of the secret articles of the Treaty of Tilsit, which the Emperor of Russia refused to communicate to the British Government.—Ed.

Right Hon. Robert Dundas to Major-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley.

MY DEAR SIR ARTHUR,

Downing-street, 15th April, 1808.

I will be much obliged to you to peruse the enclosed, and let me know your sentiments on the subject of it.

Yours sincerely,

ROBERT DUNDAS,

[ENCLOSURE.]

1st Feb., 1808.

It cannot admit of a doubt the possibility of a French army (with the concurrence or co-operation of Russia, and the decided assistance of Persia in furnishing them with the means of transporting their baggage, ammunition, &c., and supplying them with provisions) reaching the banks of the Indus; and it must also be as clear to every one acquainted with the British interests in India, that allowing a French or Russian army to pass that river and possess themselves of the fertile plains of the Punjaub would be attended with the greatest danger to our possessions under Bengal, on which our Indian empire must be understood entirely to depend. It would afford them the most ample means to refresh their army, it would supply them abundantly with the means of further progress, and open an easy road for the disaffected to join them.

The system adopted by the late Governor-General (Lord Wellesley), if his design had been completed, would not only have restrained the Mahratta

1st. The art of crossing rivers is now so well understood, and has been so frequently practised, and so invariably, I believe, with success, in the late wars in Europe, that we cannot hope

chiefs Scindiah and Holkar, and other inferior princes, from adding their force and influence to the invading army, but would have diverted their resources and power in some measure to a confederate operation with the British force to resist the invaders. The abandonment of that grand object has unfortunately left not only Scindiah and Holkar smarting under the blows they have received, but several others, ready to join any party that may hold out to them the means of retaliation, or of gratifying their revenge against the British power.

From the policy of keeping the enemy at the greatest possible distance, and from the reasons I have stated as applicable to Scindiah and Holkar, &c., as well as the advantage it presents to the opposing army having the possession of the eastern banks of the Indus, it must be admitted, I think, that the opposition of the British to the intrusion of the French or Russians should be made at that river. The country in the rear of the English army is favourable for affording them abundant supplies, while the country in the rear of the enemy's army could not afford them the same advantage.

From my knowledge of the country to the westward of the Indus, I conclude that the enemy, if the attempt should be made, will endeavour to enter Hindustan by the easiest road, the one by which former conquerors have entered the country, by Candahar, Caubul, &c., to the banks of the Indus at Attock, or its vicinity. The passage of this river in the face of an army well supplied with heavy artillery would be a very arduous undertaking, and the attempt would probably be rendered abortive if the boats on the river were either destroyed or secured, and the officer in command were an intelligent and able man. The river may be said not to be fordable, although I have understood that at some periods it has been so in some places; but as it seldom occurs, it is not to be reckoned on. The space about Attock free from the impediment of mountains is of no great extent. On the south of Attock the river soon becomes confined by mountains, and to the northward the mountainous face of the country, inhabited by warlike tribes, as was experienced both by Alexander and Nadir Shah, renders the enterprise of crossing the river in the face of a British army, commanded, as it is to be supposed it would be, by an able officer, scarcely practicable. Alexander, it is true, amused Porus while part of his army crossed above, that is to the northward; but this only proves that he was not ably opposed. Neither Timour nor Nadir Shah met with opposition at this barrier to Hindustan. The latter in particular, had he been opposed there by the force of Mahomed Shah, it is reasonable to suppose, from the impression made on the Persian army by Saadut Khan, near Kurnaul, that his passage over the Indus might have been effectually prevented.

From Attock towards the sea the Indus presents a formidable obstacle, and in the rainy season, as with the Nile, the country on each side of its banks is overflowed, and in many places to a very great extent. The approach to its banks from the westward through the country of the Beloches, under Mahmood Khan, is too unfavourable to the operations of an army, from the mountainous and sterile state of the country, to suppose that the French or Russians will ever attempt to penetrate much to the southward of Attock. The insuperable obstacle of the desert of Jaysulmeer, &c., will naturally induce them to confine their attempts to its vicinity. Should they attempt to march

to defend the Indus, as a barrier. It is true that the enemy will not be in possession of the resources and means which they could apply to such an operation on a river in Italy or in

along the westward bank to the southward, the motions of our army must of course keep pace with theirs, and be ready to oppose any attempt to pass the river.

On the subject of the utility of a flotilla in the Indus, hostile as the government of Scinde is to the British interests, I do not see how it could maintain itself unless supported by the presence of the British army; but such an armament would, however, be useful should the operations of the invaders in an attempt to cross the river bring our army towards the sea, and might be prepared and kept ready at all times for actual service in some of the ports in the Gulf of Kutch, or nearer, if possible, to the scene of action.

It is not necessary for me to say anything of the strength of the army which should be destined to occupy the eastern bank of the Indus, as it must depend entirely on the force of the invading army; but it will be necessary that a separate corps of considerable strength should be stationed in the centre of the Punjaub to overawe the country in the rear of our army on the Indus, to secure the safety of supplies to it, as well as for other purposes; and it would be advisable to have a force of equal strength stationed somewhere in the vicinity of Kurnaul or Pattiyalla to prevent any of the Mahratta chieftains, or others, from making their way to join our grand enemy. The army to be stationed in the centre of the Punjaub would be able to co-operate in this measure also, particularly should the attempts of the disaffected be made more to the westward. It would also be ready, should their services be required, to reinforce our grand army, to act in conjunction with it, or separate either to the northward or southward, as the motions of the enemy might render necessary.

As we have no alliances with the Seiks, and as the disposition and force of this race of people are not understood, I shall briefly remark, that they are no longer that united and formidable nation they were when they contended for the religion against the intolerant Mussulmans on the decline of the Mogul power at Delhi. They might be united again, perhaps, were endeavours made to make them renounce their religious principles, but in their present state they are not to be considered as of any great weight as a military power. They are dwindled into petty zemindars; and individual, and not the general, interest guides their actions. I think it would be impolitic to attempt to negotiate with them for a free passage for our army through their countries before it was well advanced towards Lahore, say to the banks of the Beas river: it would then be time enough to send some accredited native with a letter announcing to Leyna Sing, the chief of Lahore, and the man of the greatest consequence in the Punjaub, that our army was marching through their country to meet a foreign foe, and to secure the Punjaub from depredation, pointing out at the same time the necessity there would be for him and the other sirdars to co-operate, as far as circumstances would admit, to keep the country open in the rear of our army on the Indus, and to secure an uninterrupted supply of provisions. I am averse to negotiate first for a passage for our army, from my personal knowledge of the natives of India. It would lead them to estimate themselves too high. We should gain more on them by entering their country as their superiors; and they are not inclined to enter on hostilities unless they are pressed to it. This part of their character was very evident in the irruption that Holkar and Lord Lake made into their territories

Germany; but they will experience no want of such resources as that country will afford; and I have made as good a bridge with the basket boats (which are described in Cæsar, and are

last war. On the invasion of Zemaun Shah they were unable to oppose him by force, and I believe the only loss he sustained from them was the defeat of a small detachment which he left in his rear when he evacuated their country. Their resentment was then at the highest. He was a Mussulman, from whom they had reason to expect the greatest severity, on account of their religion; and he had recently plundered their most sacred temple at Umritsir.

It is necessary to remark that the country in general between the Jhelum and the Indus is still in the hands of Mussulmans, either forming a part of the Caubul territories, or of the Mussulman zemindaries tributary to them. The country on the east bank of the Indus, from Attock to the mouths of that river, is either under the Caubul government or tributary to it. Mooltan has a soubahdar appointed from Caubul, and from the boundary of that government to Sukkur, the eastern side, extending over a great part of the desert, and reaching east almost to the confines of the Soubah of Delhi, belongs to Mussulman zemindars who acknowledge the supremacy of the court of Caubul, and pay occasionally a reluctant tribute. From the western side of the Indus the country in this space is either actually under the government of Caubul or belongs to Mahomed Khan of the Beloch tribe, tributary to the Caubul government. The passage through his country presents great difficulties, being mountainous, thinly inhabited, exposed to excessive heat, and unpropitious to the march of an army from a great scarcity of water. From a little below Sukkur the country under the government of Scinde commences, and occupies the whole of the delta. This country is tributary to the Caubul government. The government of Scinde and the principal inhabitants are afraid of, and are very hostile to the interests of, the English. The desert is on the east, and on the west the country is mountainous and unproductive, unfit for the passage of a large army. Alexander, however, with great difficulty, returned from Scinde towards Persia by the western road through Mekraun: and the first invasion of Hindustan by the Arabs under Assim Khan was from the westward by Tatta, Hyderabad, &c. These circumstances may prompt to the necessity of the army under the Presidency of Bombay being embodied and kept ready for active service either in the northern part of Guzerat or in Kutch; it would be ready in case of the enemy descending the Indus to act offensively against them in conjunction with the flotilla.

I have been particular in noticing that the whole of the country on both sides of the Indus either actually belongs to Caubul or is tributary to its government. Should our army unexpectedly enter this country, it might excite jealousy, or perhaps provoke hostility, unless some communication was made from our government of Bengal to the court of Caubul, previous to the arrival of our army on the Indus, explanatory of our motives and the necessity of the measure, equally beneficial to both parties.

India possesses great resources and a valorous, faithful, and well-disciplined army in the Bengal Native troops, the only part of the British Native troops that would, I conclude, be employed on the Indus and in the Punjab, &c. These resources, however, must be directed by a mind equal to the magnitude of the object, and the commander-in-chief of the army on the Indus should not only be an able tactician, but he should have a knowledge of the politics and motives that are likely to actuate the different Indian states, and should

in use all over India, the materials for which are to be found every where) as I could have made of the best pontoons. I acknowledge, therefore, that although, in this impending war,

be well acquainted with the general disposition and manners of the natives. Possessing fully the necessary abilities for the military part of his duty, the latter part may be supplied by his selection of his confidential staff from among the officers of the Company's army, among whom several may be found, no doubt, in India, fully qualified in point of abilities and information to fill those important situations. For the command of the armies proposed to be in the Punjab and near Kurnaul, or Pattayalla, officers in the Company's service may be selected, and who, from their long experience and local knowledge, may be fitter for such situations than strangers.

On the necessity of assembling an army for the above purposes, it naturally occurs that the place for them to assemble at should be at or near the extremity of our possessions towards the point threatened. Sahaurunpoor, or its vicinity, appears to me the most preferable. The army once assembled and completely equipped, would, by occasionally changing its ground, not only preserve the health of the troops, but would train the different departments of the army for a rapid march towards the Indus whenever it might be necessary.

C. REYNOLDS.

[The following note from Viscount Sidmouth to Sir Arthur Wellesley refers to the subject discussed in the letter to Mr. Dundas of the 20th April, 1808.]

MY DEAR SIR,

3, Gloucester Place, June 9th, 1808.

I am much obliged to you for the papers you have sent me. The extract from Cobbett is very striking. As to the supposed views of France respecting India, it is extreme folly either to imagine that they are not seriously entertained, or that they are impracticable. The difficulties are unquestionably, and happily, very great; but they are diminished by the footing which Buonaparte has acquired at St. Petersburg, Vienna, Constantinople, and Ispahan, and by the known dispositions of Scindiah and Holkar.

Believe me to be, my dear Sir,

Very faithfully yours,

SIDMOUTH.

Frankfort, 14th Jan., 1808.

The wish to humble England animates all minds. The German politicians are particularly employed on the means of attacking her in the Indies, and striking her to the heart. The alliance of Russia, France, and Persia appears to them adapted to accelerate this project. The public papers of Germany are therefore filled with plans relative to this expedition. Among those which have appeared, the following, published in the Journal of Mannheim, has attracted considerable notice.

The author supposes that the expedition will be made not only with the consent of the King of Persia, but that that monarch will furnish the armies that shall pass through his territory with every thing necessary for their subsistence. He chooses Astracan for the place of rendezvous of the French and Russian armies, and he adds, the Russian army will not only be sufficiently provided with artillery and ammunition, but the Russian Generals will take

I should seize Attock at an early period, and should endeavour to make the Indus the seat of its operations; I have no great reliance upon that river as the barrier to India.

2ndly. If it be true that we cannot rely upon the defence of the Indus, although it is desirable to try it, and to carry the war into the countries on its banks, the question is, what preparatory steps ought to be ordered from hence? We must look to the state of the finances, to the fears and jealousies

care to have them in readiness for the French, which, to facilitate its march, will take with it neither cannon, ammunition, nor horses. The Russian army will easily be collected at Astracan, but it will be necessary to shorten and facilitate the march of the French army. It has two points of departure, consequently two routes to follow to arrive at Astracan, one from the Duchy of Warsaw, and the other through Dalmatia.

By the former, the army will proceed in a right line to Zarozun, making a march of about 460 leagues (or 230 German miles). There it will embark on the Volga for Astracan, from which Lazazum is distant about 100 leagues. Thus the French army setting out from Warsaw will have 560 leagues to go to reach Astracan, 100 of which will be by water: a march that will employ two months and a half or three months.

By the second route, that is to say, from Dalmatia, the French army will make a march of about 140 leagues to reach the Danube at a place proper to embark. It will go down the Danube to its mouth on board vessels brought from the Black Sea. When arrived at the Black Sea, it will pursue its route, and passing by the Strait of the Crimea, will land at Tajanrog, on the Sea of Azof. From Tajanrog it will march to the Don, which it will pass near Piati Isbianka, and proceed to the Zarozun, where it will embark for Astracan; it is only about 140 leagues from Tajanrog to Zarozun; it appears that by this route the French army has only about 240 or 250 leagues to march by land, in going from Dalmatia to Astracan.

The time which will be employed by the French in this march may be estimated at about six weeks: that is to say, about half the time of the former. Having joined at Astracan, the two Franco-Russian armies, with their artillery, ammunition, horses, &c., will embark in vessels put in requisition on the Caspian Sea, will traverse that sea, and arrive at Astrabad in Persia, after a passage of ten or twelve days. From Astrabad the two armies, furnished with provisions by the King of Persia, will pursue their route through that kingdom for the Indus, where they will arrive after a march of seven or eight weeks.

It results from this plan that a French army of 30,000 men, setting out from Dalmatia, and a Russian army (which may likewise be joined by a Persian army), may arrive in the East Indies at the end of five months at latest.—*Journal de l'Empire*, 19th Jan.

An article, dated Moscow, Nov. 30th, says, "The negotiations with Persia have taken the most favourable turn. It is believed here that a joint expedition against the English possessions in Hindustan is in contemplation. Some French officers who have served in that quarter, under M. de Busey and other Generals, are expected at Astracan."

which will be excited throughout India by a very large early preparation, to a corresponding preparation by those in whom those fears and jealousies will be excited, to the state of inefficiency and apathy in which an army becomes in that country when long assembled in preparation and does not act.

The measures which I should recommend would be founded, 1st, upon the conviction that the Indus cannot be completely defended, do what you will ; and, 2ndly, upon the considerations above referred to, of the inconvenience and evils resulting from a large early preparation to meet the enemy on that river.

I shall not now enter into a detailed consideration of all the points to which I have above referred. I shall only tell you that experience has convinced me, and, I believe, the late Lord Lake, that active operations are not to be carried on in those countries without the assistance of large bodies of the *country light troops*. In this supposed war they would be absolutely necessary, to enable us to cope at all with the same description of troops which will be brought from the northern parts of Asia by our enemies ; and I leave you to judge of the extent of abuse and expense which will attend the employment of troops of this description before the period of their active operations will arrive.

The measure which I should recommend to you would be to assemble your British army in the cantonments upon the Ganges and the Jumna, and in the neighbourhood of Delhi ; to form your magazines for its support ; to adopt all the preparatory measures for its taking the field at the shortest notice which do not create large expense, and even those which do create a large expense, the completion of which would require much time ; to form arrangements with the chiefs and leaders of the *country light troops* for their junction with the British army, when their services should be called for.

Then I should assemble in the field in front of Delhi a large corps consisting of from 6000 to 10,000 men, including a good proportion of the British cavalry and a body of from 2000 to 3000 of *country light troops*, and provided with a small battering train, the object of which should be to cover the cantonments of the army, and to be in readiness to move with rapidity and seize —, as soon as intelligence should be received of the intended advance of the enemy. The main body of your army would follow and support this corps, and either the defence of

the Indus might be undertaken, or any other measure might be adopted which would appear most advisable at the time.

If the battle is to be fought upon the Indus, it will be absolutely necessary to station reserves upon the Bundelcund frontier, on the Jumna, and one in the country of the Seika. But I do not now propose to enter so much into detail upon this subject as to point out the situation of these reserves. The station for the Bombay troops in Guzerat ought to depend upon the temper and inclinations of Scindiah and Holkar. If all is right in these quarters, the Bombay troops might be assembled at Ahmedabad, from whence they would threaten the enemy's right flank; if not, I am afraid it would be necessary to move them towards Dohud. It is certain, however, that the enemy cannot spread in the direction of Guzerat; and indeed the Bombay troops would not find it an easy matter to move northward, excepting in the winter, from Ahmedabad, on account of the difficulty of the Desert, and of the Ajmeer and Oudepoor countries.

Before I left India I gave in a plan for the positions of the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Nizam, which, however, I am afraid that they have never been able to carry into execution. It went to the establishment of these corps upon the river Godavery, in communication with each other. If this plan had been adopted, no foreigners could enter the Deccan. Even as it is, not a shot has been fired in the Deccan since the year 1803. But if this great attack should be made upon Hindustan, the subsidiary forces must be moved up to the northern frontier, towards the Taptee. If Scindiah should misbehave, one of them should move across the Taptee and Nerbudda, and co-operate with the Bombay troops against him; and this corps ought to be replaced in the Peshwah's territories by the advance of a corps of the same strength from Mysore. Then you ought to have on the frontier of Mysore a reserve in the field.

In respect to the flotilla, the expense of it will be enormous, and the utility very doubtful. The enemy cannot spread to the Lower Indus; if they could, they would then fall in with the pirates, who would stop them, or they must subdue the pirates. If we send a flotilla to the Lower Indus, we must begin by subduing the pirates, and, when we shall have effected that object, as we cannot afford a sufficient army to protect our-

selves there, we shall have deprived ourselves of our best barrier in that quarter, for the enemy would not be able to do more than drive the pirates from their establishments on the continent, considering the naval means which the latter have.

My opinion therefore is, that, instead of forming a large flotilla, we should encourage the pirates in the mouths of the Indus and in the Gulf to defend themselves; and that we should aid them to that end as far as may be in our power. However, I may be mistaken upon this point, for I do not exactly recollect all that bears upon it, and I am writing to you without either paper or a map to refer to.

P.S. I sail to-night, and hope to be in London on Monday.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. Robert Dundas.

[1803.]

MY DEAR DUNDAS,

London, 7th Dec., 1803.

Henry has shown me a letter and a paper which you left with him, in which my name is mentioned; and I wish to trouble you with a short statement of the circumstances which occasioned the grant which has drawn the displeasure of the Court of Directors. I wish that they had sent you with the papers my letter to the Governor-General, and the Governor-General's minute upon this grant, which would have saved me the trouble of writing to you at all.

The fact is, that as you know I commanded a large army in the Deccan from the month of March, 1803, to the month of July, 1804, and during above a year of that time I superintended all the political affairs in the Deccan, having all the political residents under my direction, and I negotiated personally two treaties of peace, by which all the parties to them are bound on this day, and made several other political arrangements. I received nothing for these services but my allowance as a Major-General on the staff, which I should have had if I had been in cantonments, and my expenses very considerably exceeded my income. By referring to the Indian establishments and accounts, you will see that all the political agents employed by the Company are allowed a salary equal at least to my allowances as a

Major-General on the staff, and, besides this salary, they are allowed to charge all their expenses. Officers commanding in chief in the field, also as I was, have various allowances and establishments, none of which I enjoyed. That which the Governor-General gave me, in the 30,000 rupees, was the sum of money I had actually spent in the service of the Company beyond my allowances during the time that I was employed as the Political Superintendent and the Commander-in-Chief of the army in the Deccan, and the account was actually made up by the officer who managed for me my private affairs. So far for this sum; and you will observe that if anybody else had been employed in the same manner, he would have had a right to claim and would have claimed all his expenses, besides his allowances.

Now, in respect to the sum of 8000 rupees for my expenses at Calcutta. After I had settled the treaties of peace, there were many questions depending with different Mahratta chiefs, which could not be settled unless I went to Calcutta. I was, therefore, ordered there in July, 1804, from Poonah, and I went by land across the Peninsula to Madras, and thence to Calcutta. The Governor-General paid my expenses during the time I was at Calcutta, as has been invariably the custom when any officer has been ordered there on the public service. Indeed it could not be otherwise, for at the same time that I was at Calcutta on the public service, I had an establishment at Poonah with the army, and another at Seringapatam; and I should not have been *satisfied* if what had been done for others had not been done for me on this occasion.

The other sum of 12,000 rupees is for bearers laid for me and the officers who accompanied me, on the road from Calcutta to Madras both going and returning, which it was reasonable should be paid by the public, as I went upon the public service.

This is the real state of Lord Wellesley's crime, as stated in this part of the Court's draft. I refer you to my letters and his minute upon the first sum.

Ever, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MARQUESS WELLESLEY'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION. 603

The following documents [in the handwriting of Major- [1899.]
General the Honourable Sir Arthur Wellesley] appear to have
been prepared for the Parliamentary defence of Marquess Wel-
lesley's Indian Administration :—

Financial State of India.

	£.
Amount of debt in India in April, 1805	28,197,498
Deduct in the sinking fund	3,151,064
Net debt in April, 1805	25,046,433
Add calculated deficiency for 1805-6	2,655,957
Total debt in April, 1806	£27,702,390
Interest of debt to April, 1805	1,823,040
Add interest of debt to be incurred in 1806	265,595
Total interest	£2,088,635
<hr/>	
The assets in India, in April, 1805, as stated in page 72	17,252,399
Surplus of debt to assets	10,449,991
Value of houses, &c.	9,994,208
<hr/>	
Debt in 1793	7,367,190
Assets in 1793	8,834,538
Debt in 1798	11,032,645
Assets in 1798	9,922,903
Increase of debt from 1793 to 1798	3,665,455
Increase of assets from 1793 to 1798	1,088,365
Net increase of debt beyond assets	£2,557,090
<hr/>	
Amount of investment sent home, of supplies to China, from 1793 to 1798	9,776,119
Amount of advances to the King's and Company's ships from 1793 to 1798	594,793
Total	10,370,912
Amount of supplies received from Europe in the same time	2,904,931
Balance	7,965,981
Deduct surplus revenue in those five years	4,181,559
Remaining balance	£3,283,422

Amount of investment sent home and supplies to China from	£.
April 1798 to April 1804	11,855,185
Advances to the King's and Company's ships in ditto ..	1,759,701
	<hr/>
Total advanced in India	13,614,886
Amount sent to India in bullion, stores, &c. in the same period	10,036,296
	<hr/>
Balance	3,578,590
Add balance up to 1798	3,283,422
	<hr/>
Total supplied from India in 11 years beyond } surplus revenue and supplies from Europe .. }	£6,862,012

This sum is exclusive of the amount laid out upon the Egyptian and other expeditions for which the East India Company have a claim upon, and have received compensation from, government;

Of the amount of expenses of the government in Ceylon the same;

Of the amount sales of the prize property at the Moluccas and Colombo;

Of the value of cargoes from the Moluccas for which no payment was made.

Causes of the great Expense of Lord Wellesley's Journey—the Number of People he took with him.

(The boats were charged in the Durbar accounts, and came under one view.)

Lord Cornwallis's servants in 1792-93 cost 718*l.* sterling, and in 1793-94 747*l.* sterling.

In 1795-96 the establishment of servants for the Government House was 2667*l.* sterling.

That of Lord Wellesley in 1805, in the new Government House, 2400*l.* per annum.

The largest establishment in his time was 3000*l.* per annum.

Public entertainments allowed by the Directors' practice.

The practice of Lord Wellesley.

The expense of his entertainments at the theatre, 1200*l.*

The cause of the great expense of the entertainments on the peace of Amiens.

The consequences of that expense.

The expense of a public entertainment at Surat.

The actual cost of the last, 713*l.* sterling.

The average expense of all Lord Wellesley's public entertainments about 3900*l.*

Purchase of plate and furniture managed in the most economical manner.

Works at Barrackpoor.

Report of 25th April, 1801, on the state of the bank of the river, by a committee of survey.

Government House.

Nature and state of the old house, and of the Council House.

Estimated expense of repairing each; 9875*l.* for the former, 15,000*l.* for the latter.

MARQUESS WELLESLEY'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION. 605

The expense of repairing even the latter would have been 5405*l*.

Minutes upon this subject : 24th Dec., 1798, 1st April, 1801.

Durbar charges under the superintendence of the private secretary as paymaster.

The accounts submitted to the Governor-General in Council, and afterwards paid by the private secretary as paymaster.

No accounts more regular.

Entered in a separate book by Accountant-General, and transmitted to England with other books of account.

The expenses charged under this head of account are :

Foreign Residencies.

Vakeels with the Governor-General.

Temporary embassies.

Journeys of the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief from Calcutta on the public service.

Servants attached to the Government House, 1615 rupees a-month, 2400*l*. per annum.

Pensioners, 200 rupees a-month, 300*l*. per annum.

Servants at Barrackpore, 379 rupees a-month, 470*l*. a-year.

Durbar office, 1600 rupees a-month, 2400*l*. a-year.

Contingencies, such as

Rent of houses and offices till those of the Government House should be complete, 455 rupees a-month, 700*l*. a-year.

Public entertainments on extraordinary occasions.

Repairs and purchase of plate and furniture.

Temporary works at Barrackpore.

Expense of Residencies.

Increase beyond former times.

Expense of temporary embassies.

Journeys of the Governor-General.

Boat-hire 83,250 rupees, 10,400*l*.

Lord Cornwallis's expenses paid in Mysore to the amount of 14,057*l*.

Lord Teignmouth's in Oude, 3948*l*.

Commander-in-Chief in Oude, 4002*l*.

The estimate of the expense of building the Government House, including iron and marble work, was 66,152 <i>l</i> ., and it was executed for	£.	63,291
A further expense for gateways, iron railing round the area, &c.	15,874
Painting the ceilings and other works inside the house	8,625
Purchase of ground and houses in the neighbourhood of the Government House	71,437
Making two new streets	3,423
Total	£162,660

606 MARQUESS WELLESLEY'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.

From this sum to be deducted the savings actually made, as follows :—

The expense of the rent of the old Government	£.
House	12,661
Rent of Writers' buildings	11,466
Rent of new Court-house	10,600
Rent of Cutcheries and Court-houses	14,485
Materials sold	10,620
Rent for offices for the old public departments	3,150
Rent of the old Stamp Office	1,875

£64,863

To this sum ought to be added :

Saved for rebuilding the Council House	£.	15,000
„ for rebuilding the wharf at the custom-house		14,375

£94,233

Leaving the actual expense of the building of the new Government House about 68,000*l.*

The property acquired by the Company :

New Court House ?

Mr. Church's house ?

132,540*l.* sterling.

The annual saving of expense is 6000*l.*

Body Guard.

The total expense was 6526*l.* per annum.

State boats have always existed, and no addition made to them by Lord Wellesley, excepting one boat for the band.

Lord Cornwallis used them all.

Secret Service Money.

Total amount of secret service money in Lord Wellesley's administration was 15,618*l.* Of this sum, 10,004*l.* were paid in two payments to a native employed on a mission to Persia.

END OF SUPPLEMENTARY INDIAN DESPATCHES.