


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


HISTORY
OF THE
POLITICAL AND MILITARY TRANSACTIONS
IN INDIA.

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Marquess of Hastings. K. G. G. C. B.
&c. &c. &c.

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HISTORY
OF THE
POLITICAL AND MILITARY
TRANSACTIONS IN INDIA
DURING THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE
MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
1813—1823.

BY HENRY T. PRINSEP,
OF THE BENGAL CIVIL SERVICE.

ENLARGED FROM THE NARRATIVE PUBLISHED IN 1830.

Res poscere videtur,—ut non modo casus eventusque rerum, qui plerique fortuiti sunt, sed ratio etiam causasque noscantur. TACITUS.

IN TWO VOLUMES.—VOL. I.

LONDON:
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PREFACE.

THE work published in quarto in 1820, under the title of a Narrative of the Political and Military Transactions in British India, under the administration of the Marquess of Hastings, has formed the basis of the present volumes. The introduction of a particular account of the Nipál War, and the completion of the details of that with the Mahrattas to the taking of Aseergurh, together with the addition of a new and fuller summary of the political and financial result of these operations, have led to the adoption of the more ambitious title now prefixed. In other respects, the present work is only a revised edition of the Narrative.

In the preface to the quarto volume, the Author sufficiently explained the motives which had induced him to publish. A connected state-

ment of the events which had then recently occurred, seemed to him to be a desideratum, which, being opportunely placed for information, it was in a manner his duty, failing any one more able, to endeavour to supply. The compilation was, however, made at a time and under circumstances that obliged him to conclude it prematurely, and to give the results in anticipation from mere estimate or conjecture. This defect it was the Author's intention to have remedied by an early second edition, and even before the published volume reached him in India, some progress had been made in the collection of materials for this purpose. The design was, however, abandoned, partly from the pressure of official avocations, and partly because a succession of similar publications threatened to exhaust the public interest by pressing the subject too much upon attention. When, therefore, the Author came to England, in the course of the past year, he had no fixed intention of republishing; indeed, with exception to the chapters on the Nipâl War, which had been compiled in the first instance,

he brought with him no materials but a few loose notes, taken hastily in the course of business, and hence for the most part irrelative, or incomplete. Moreover, an accident which separated him from his baggage, books, and papers during the voyage home, and led to the loss of several of the latter, must further have defeated such a purpose, had the design been seriously entertained.

Nevertheless, it seemed to the Author, before he had been long in England, that many circumstances combined to revive the public interest in Indian affairs. He found also that his work was in demand, though long out of print; its utility as an authentic exposé of the events of the period not having been superseded by any of the publications which had since appeared. The time, therefore, appearing favourable, the Author was encouraged to undertake the superintendence of a new edition through the press, and hence it became necessary for him to complete the narrative from such materials as he could command, and more especially to endeavour to

bring down the results to the latest period, according to the original design. From what has been stated, however, it will be evident that this part of the work has been executed under great comparative disadvantages.

The author has no longer had the same means of ready reference to official and private correspondence under which it was his boast to have compiled the original narrative. He is sensible, also, that much of the favour, and still more of the credit and authenticity with which his first publication was viewed, were owing to the official situation he then filled, and the intimate relation with the head of the Indian government, in which, from that circumstance, he was supposed to be placed. This certainly is an advantage he cannot claim for any thing new in the present edition; moreover, the distance from his friends, amongst the actors and parties concerned in the events recorded, has deprived him of the power of reference to their judgment and superior intelligence, an advantage of which he before largely availed himself. In the present instance, therefore, the public have the fruit of the Au-

thor's unaided labours; and for any errors or imperfections, or incorrect opinions which may be found, the responsibility is entirely his own.

With respect to the form of publication, it has been the author's aim to place the work as extensively as possible within the reach of those connected with India here or abroad, and to make it as useful as a regard to their convenience and its scope and design have allowed. To have annexed copies of the treaties, and copious notes and references in support of the text, would have had the effect of needlessly swelling the size of the volumes; for the few who require these minute details, can have no difficulty in procuring the entire correspondence as published at the India House, while the abstract contained in the body of the narrative, will suffice for every purpose of general information.

The plans and views introduced into the quarto volume, in illustration of the events of the Mahratta War, have, with exception to the general map of the seat of operations, been omitted in this edition, several of them having

been found to be more or less incorrect, and all greatly inferior to the topographical delineations in the works of Colonel Blacker and Lieutenant Lake, to which any one needing such illustrations may refer. The few, however, having relation to the events of the Nipál War, are retained, as necessary to show the nature of that country, and its positions, and not to be found elsewhere; one or two additional maps of the seat of operations against that nation, have further been inserted for the same reasons.

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Sketch
MAP OF INDIA,
 SHEWING THE
Principal Subdivisions,
etc. with the
capitals of independent or protected
STATES.
and the chief Towns of Provinces, &c.

British Miles



HISTORY, &c.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY MATTERS.

State of India on Lord Moira's arrival—Relations of the British with Native Powers—Alliances, subsidiary protective—disposition towards British—of States subject to their influence—Nizam—Peshwa—other subsidiary Allies—of protected Allies—Independent Powers—Holkur—Sindheea—Nature of their power and administration since 1805—military force—how employed—disposition towards British—Bhoosla—Disposition—General View—Military adventurers not checked or suppressed—Pindarees in 1814—their history—settlement on Nerbudda—mode of warfare—successes—rise of Kureem Khan—his power in 1806—and fall—Cheetoo—Dost Mahommed—Kureem's redemption—second rise—designs, and fall—Durras in 1814—Patans—their power—locality—Relations with Mahrattas and Rajpoots—Ameer Khan—his force in 1814.

THE Earl of Moira, now Marquess of Hastings, arrived in India, and assumed the government-general in October 1813. The seven years of his predecessor, Lord Minto's government, had

been employed first in preparing the States of the West to resist the passage of the French, who then were thought to meditate an invasion overland; afterwards in composing the discontents of the Madras army; and latterly, in wresting from the dominion of France, and the Continental Powers under her influence, their remaining insular possessions in the Indian Ocean and Archipelago. Hence this administration produced very little change in the political relations established with the several native powers, during the second government of Lord Cornwallis, and that of Sir George Barlow. Some additional chiefs of Bundelkhund had indeed been admitted to the benefit of a protective alliance; and in 1809 the system of our relations was extended to the Sutlej by the reception of certain Seikh chieftains also under protection, as a barrier to the rising ambition of Runjeet Singh. Moreover, in 1812 measures of compulsion were undertaken against the Rewa principality, in consequence of this Raja's having aided an incursion of Pindarees into the rich provinces of Mirzapoor and South Bihar. These were, however, still in progress on the arrival of Lord Hastings, and the tract was only finally subjected to our influence by his Lordship. In like manner an attempt made by Lord Minto, in 1808-9, to bring about a subsi

diary alliance with the Bhoosla Raja, proved at the time abortive; and though the hope of eventually accomplishing this object was not finally extinguished, the measure was one remaining for the new Governor-General.

With the slight modifications above adverted to, the relations of the British with the native powers of India were precisely in the condition in which they were placed at the close of the Mahratta war, in 1805-6; but the course of events had in this interval produced many important changes, as well in the relative position of the several powers towards one another, as in their temper towards ourselves. It will be useful, by way of introduction to the proposed Narrative of the principal Political and Military Transactions of Lord Hastings's administration, to give a brief sketch of their actual condition at the time of his Lordship's arrival.

The States of India, that is, of Hindoostan and the Dukhun, for external powers, as those bordering on Persia to the west, and the Burmese and others to the east, are necessarily excluded from the review, may be classed at this period under four heads. First, those with whom the British nation had formed subsidiary alliances. Secondly, those enjoying its protection, without any subsidiary contract, and consisting for the most part of small principalities, scarcely meriting the name

been employed first in preparing the States of the West to resist the passage of the French, who then were thought to meditate an invasion overland; afterwards in composing the discontents of the Madras army; and latterly, in wresting from the dominion of France, and the Continental Powers under her influence, their remaining insular possessions in the Indian Ocean and Archipelago. Hence this administration produced very little change in the political relations established with the several native powers, during the second government of Lord Cornwallis, and that of Sir George Barlow. Some additional chiefs of Bundelkhand had indeed been admitted to the benefit of a protective alliance; and in 1809 the system of our relations was extended to the Sutlej, by the reception of certain Seikh chieftains also under protection, as a barrier to the rising ambition of Runjeet Singh. Moreover, in 1812, measures of compulsion were undertaken against the Rewa principality, in consequence of this Raja's having aided an incursion of Pindarees into the rich provinces of Mirzapoor and South Buhar. These were, however, still in progress on the arrival of Lord Hastings, and the tract was only finally subjected to our influence by his Lordship. In like manner an attempt made by Lord Minto, in 1808-9, to bring about a subsi-

diary alliance with the Bhoosla Raja, proved at the time abortive; and though the hope of eventually accomplishing this object was not finally extinguished, the measure was one remaining for the new Governor-General.

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of substantive powers. Thirdly, acknowledged princes with whom the British government was at peace, and connected by the mutual obligation of treaties ; but with whom it had no closer intercourse, or recognized means of influence, except in so far as the residence of a British representative at the court was sometimes matter of stipulation. Fourthly, independent chieftains and associations never yet acknowledged as substantive states, and to which the British nation was bound by no engagements whatsoever.

The states connected with the British by subsidiary alliances were, the Nizam, whose court was at Hyderabad in the Dukhun ; the Peshwa, residing at Poona ; the Gykwar, whose capital was Brodera, or Baroda, and who held at one time the greater part of Goozerat ; and the Rajas of Mysoor and Travankoor. The Nuwab of Oudh ought, perhaps, in strictness, to be added to these ; but the cessions exacted of him by Lord Wellesley, in commutation for the stipulated subsidy, had so circumscribed his territory and contracted his means, that although independent in the management of his remaining possessions, and consequently far superior to the pageant courts of Dehlee, Moorshedabad, and Arcot, (Urkât,) he was nevertheless in too great dependence on the British government, to be regarded as one of the political states of India.

All the subsidiary alliances had been formed upon the same principles. The British nation stipulated to furnish a specific force for the protection of the country, and maintenance of the sovereign's legitimate authority. This force was not ordinarily to be employed in the duties of civil administration, nor in the collection of the revenues; and the British government generally agreed not to interfere in such matters. A subsidy, equivalent to the payment of the force, was furnished by the protected state either in periodical money payments, or by territorial cession; more frequently the latter. A certain native contingent, as it was called, was also to be maintained in readiness to act with the British troops, and for the efficiency of this, the protected state was answerable. But the most material provision of the treaties was, that the states accepting them, engaged to discontinue all political negotiation with the other powers of India, except in concert with the British government; and to submit all claims and disputes with others to its arbitration and adjustment. This article, though an indispensable correlative of the stipulation for protection, gave to the British a controlling power in all matters of external relation; while the obligation to maintain the protected prince's just authority, implied the right of interfering, with advice at least, in matters of internal policy likely to bring it in

question. Hence all the subsidizing states were more or less in dependence,—a reference to the British government being always necessary either to prevent or punish the aggression of neighbours; to quell insurrections, or enforce the submission of powerful vassals, and guarantee their just treatment; or finally, to regulate the succession on a sovereign's demise.

The engagements for the simple protection of chieftainships and principalities had the same controlling character, nor did they differ materially in substance from the subsidiary treaties, except inasmuch as there was seldom any consideration exacted for the protection to be afforded, and never any obligation on the British government to maintain a specific force for the purpose. The principal members of this class were—the Rajas of Bhurtpoor, of Dholpoor Barea, of Alwa or Macheree, and various other chiefs round Dehlee and Agra, with whom arrangements had been made on the close of the Mahratta war in 1805-6. The Rajas of Oorcha and Tehre, of Duttea, of Punna, and others of the Bundeela race,* together with the Mahratta chiefs of Jaloun and Jhansce, and one or two more taken under protection on the conquest of Bundelkhand, or subsequently; also the Raja of Rewa, in Boghilkhand, and the

* See the nomenclature annexed to this edition.

Seikh chieftains between the Jumna and Sutlej, to whom allusion has before been made, as added to the list in the time of Lord Minto. The Moosulmân Nuwabs of Rampoor and Kalpee in Hindoostan, of Kurnol and Ellichpoor in the Dukhun, and numberless others, whom it would be tedious to recapitulate, belong also to this class. The two Rajpoot states of Jypoor and Joudhpoor had been included in this system by Lord Wellesley; but in the settlement of 1805-6 they were left without the pale of our relations, from an apprehension that these were already too extensive. The Raja of Jypoor was considered, by his conduct in the war with Holkur, to have forfeited all claim to our further protection; while the Raja of Joudhpoor had refused to ratify the treaty concluded with Lord Lake, by his representative; so that no impediment arose out of any existing engagements with either state, to counteract the desire then felt by the British government to withdraw from the connexion.

When mention is made of the extent of the British influence, in estimating the national power and resources in India, it is in allusion to the states and principalities whose relation with us is of one or other of the above two descriptions. These must by no means be overlooked in such an estimate, for it is one most striking feature of the connexion, generally indeed an express stipulation,

that in case of exigency the whole resources of our ally shall be at the command and under the direction of the British government. It must not, however, be supposed that of the states thus subject to our influence, all were equally well contented with their lot, or ready to afford the aid of their resources with the same zeal and alacrity. Their sentiment towards us was almost as various as the circumstances in which they found themselves placed. Sometimes the connexion originated in motives of ambition or interest, or present necessity; and upon gaining the temporary object sought from the alliance, the restraints it imposed on all schemes of further aggrandizement would render the prince who formed it restless and discontented. Sometimes the British government would, from motives of policy, be compelled to pursue ulterior objects, and urge their acceptance with an importunity very irksome and disagreeable to the ally. Sometimes the personal character of the prince or his minister, and as often that of the British representative at his court, would lead to irritating disputes and mutual alienation. But a more general source of discontent necessarily existed in the checks imposed, both directly and indirectly, on the gratification of private revenge, capricious cruelty, and other bad passions. Hence it was but seldom that a prince's gratitude and sincere attachment could be depended upon, unless

he owed to us his elevation to power, or came to the Musnud after the establishment of our influence, with moderate views and chastened ambition, satisfied with the undisturbed enjoyment of what he possessed, and well convinced that, but for the alliance, he would not be able to maintain himself in that.

Of the subsidizing states, the Nizam was our most useful ally, and the connexion with him had, from various circumstances, assumed an anomalous character. Nizam Ulee Khan formed the alliance in his old age, not long after he had received a severe defeat from the Mahratta forces at Kurdla, and when the power and ambition of Tippoo was also a subject of constant apprehension to him. There were at the time two parties at his court; one devoted to the French interest, and placing its reliance on the troops officered chiefly by that nation, who, since the convention of Kurdla, had been greatly strengthened; the other attached to the English, and headed by Azim ool Oomra, the prime minister. Nizam Ulee, sensible of his own weakness and increasing infirmities, desired only repose and security for the future. He was readily led to conceive a suspicion of the French party, from seeing the same interest predominant at the court of his rival Tippoo, as well as in most of the Mahratta durbars, and hence fell naturally into the views of his minister; whose anxiety for a

connexion with the British was not, it must be confessed, wholly disinterested. Having brought about the alliance of 1798, the same influence effected the more close connexion of 1800, which secured to us the aid of the Nizam's resources in the approaching contest with the Mahrattas; but this latter measure was rather yielded to the paramount influence of the minister, than adopted by Nizam Ulee from personal conviction of its benefit to his own interests; and, indeed, during the last years of the reign of this prince, the ascendancy of Azim ool Omra was so complete as to enable him to assume the entire direction of affairs at Hyderabad. Upon the death of Nizam Ulee, in 1803, his eldest son, Meer Ukbur Ulee, who in his father's lifetime had the title of Sekundurjah, succeeded to the musnud without opposition. For this advantage, and for the subsequent acquisition of Berar on the close of the Mahratta war, this prince felt indebted to the course of measures adopted by the ministers of his predecessor, and particularly to the connexion subsisting with the British. Being of an indolent habit, and unambitious character, he was well content to leave the conduct of affairs in the hands he found them. The ascendancy of Azim ool Omra therefore continued till this minister's death in 1804. He was succeeded by his relation, Meer Alum, who found his advantage in drawing closer the ties subsisting

with the British government; for it was to its influence mainly that he owed his appointment, and he continually needed its support against the intrigues of his rivals. Meer Alum died in 1808, when the reigning Nizam made a feeble effort to exercise the rights of sovereignty, by the selection of a minister from amongst his personal favourites. The competitors for the vacant office were three: Mooneer ool Moolk, Meer Alum's son-in-law, and a connexion of the Nizam's favourite wife; Shums ool Oomra, commander of the household troops, and a large jageerdar; and Chundoo Lal, a shrewd Hindoo, long employed under the two former ministers, and by far the most capable person about the court. The British government espoused the cause of the last mentioned, and assumed openly, on this occasion, the right of dictating that the minister should be a person in its confidence. After much discussion, the matter was compromised, by leaving to the Nizam the appointment of a nominal premier, on the condition that Chundoo Lal should be the deputy, and the principal never interfere with his administration. After wavering a little, the choice of Ukbur Ulee fell upon Mooneer ool Moolk, the least fit; and in setting aside the other competitor, he is said to have been influenced principally by the discovery that of the two we should have preferred him for the station of nominal chief. The arrangement

here described took effect in 1810; since when, Chundoo Lal has managed all the affairs of this state, while Mooneer ool Moolk passes his time in consulting astrologers, and the Nizam, partly from ill-humour, and partly from indolence and imbecility, refrains wholly from intermeddling. As the necessary result of such a system, the British influence assumed from this time forward a more confirmed character: the efficient minister was wholly dependent on its aid for the enforcement of his daily measures and orders; and through him the resources and means of the state took whatever direction was pointed out by our representative at the court. Chundoo Lal was naturally distrustful of the military establishment of the Nizam, and of the chiefs, who wasted the revenues of the state under the system of assignments for its maintenance. Hence he readily adopted a suggestion, which the inefficient state of the contingent gave us the excuse for offering, and consented, as a means of reforming this force, to raise battalions, to be officered and disciplined like British sepoy regiments. In 1814 there were two brigades of this description, whose services, when not required in the field as a contingent, were most useful in collecting the revenues, and aiding the civil administration; and whose existence gave to the Nizam's government a strength independent of the British subsidiary force, thus

saving our ally from the humiliating necessity of applying on all occasions for its aid. But while the brigades thus effectually answered this avowed purpose, they were yet more useful to the minister's personal views, as they enabled him to set at defiance, and ultimately to break down, all the military vassals and retainers of the court, whose rivalry and intrigues had heretofore been the cause of so much distraction. Being, however, officered entirely by British subjects, and chiefly by transfer from the Company's military service, the selection being with the resident, under the approval of the supreme government, the system rivetted for ever the dependence of the country. In case of disputes with the British, it was plain that the troops must follow the party of their officers; but this was a contingency that Chundoo Lal needed not to provide against, for he felt himself essentially a British minister.

While circumstances had thus reduced the state of Hyderabad to a condition little different from that of a British province, Bajee Rao Peshwa was pursuing a very opposite policy in the adjoining Mahratta territory of Poona. He was a prince of considerable ability, and needed no minister to relieve him from the toils of government. With consummate art he availed himself of his connexion with the British to recover and improve his own resources; but, instead

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of implicitly trusting to this aid, he evinced at all times the greatest jealousy of any attempt to cement a closer union. It had been distinctly foreseen by Lord Wellesley, that this prince only entered into the defensive alliance from conviction that "he had no other way of recovering any part of his just authority, or of maintaining tranquillity in his empire;"* and that on "his affairs taking a favourable turn, he would, supported by the sentiments of the different branches of the Mahratta empire, be desirous of annulling the engagements he had made with the British government." Fourteen years had now passed since the conclusion of the first subsidiary alliance with the Peshwa at Bassein, and ten since the connexion was matured by the arrangements consequent on the successful issue of the first Mahratta war. If, during this period, Bajce Rao had maintained the character of a good ally, it was because the interval was necessary—first, to consolidate his own power, and then to court the general sentiment of the Mahratta nation, which had been so prophetically designated as the foundation of a future rupture. He was just reaching this elevation when Lord Hastings assumed the government; and the prominent part he thenceforward

* Vide Pol. Despatch to the Court of Directors, September 1804.

acted in the political drama, affords the best development of his policy and actual disposition at the time.

At the courts of the three remaining powers with whom subsidiary alliances had been formed, the ascendancy of the British influence was fixed even more firmly than at Hyderabad. The territory and resources were, it is to be observed, in each case, much less considerable, whence the conviction felt of the greatness of our power, and of the utter hopelessness of any attempt to thwart our views caused them all to give at once into the policy of sparing no effort to secure our favour, on which rested all their hopes of prosperity. With the Gykwar, the same cause which operated at Hyderabad, viz. the prince's imbecility, had contributed to establish a state* of things in some respects similar; but here the right of the British government to interfere in the internal administration of the country, was matter of express stipulation by treaty. The Mysoor

* Soon after the subsidiary alliance, the utter incapacity of Anund Rao, the reigning Gykwar, and the confusion introduced into his affairs by Arab mercenaries and bankers, to whom the state was indebted, induced the leading men to solicit the Bombay government to take on itself the Bhundaree, or guarantee of the public debt, and to give its support to Secta Ram, son of Raojee Apajee, as Dewan or prime minister, with full powers. This arrangement failing to re-

Raja was the same Kishenraj Oodiavèr; who, on the fall of Seringapatam, was placed on the Guddee as an infant, by Lord Wellesley. Poornea, his famous minister, died in 1810; and the young Raja was now just beginning to take an interest in public affairs. His disposition gave early promise of an habitual reliance on the British government; and the circumstances of his elevation were a sufficient guarantee of the sincerity of his attachment. The Travankoor Raja was in 1814 an infant, recently born to one of the sisters of the prince who abetted the attack on Colonel Macaulay in 1808, and who died after the subjugation of his country in 1810. The state has not, since then, been entitled to much consideration in the scale of native powers; and for some time the country was governed, in the name of the regent Toombratee,* by Colonel John Munro, who succeeded Colonel Macaulay as resident, and on whom the office of premier,

retrieve the affairs of the state, from Seeta Ram's want of ability, he was deprived of power, and the administration placed in the hands of a commission, whereof the British resident was a member. Subsequently Anund Rao's brother, Futeh Singh Gykwar, was vested with the sole direction of affairs under the resident's advice; and this was the state of things at Baroda on Lord Hastings' arrival.

* The royal family of Travankoor are Nairs, amongst whom the sister's son has the prior claim to the inheritance. Toombratee is the title of the royal sisterhood.

with the title of Dewan, was conferred by the regent.

The disposition of the second class, viz. of Protected States, varied even more than that of the subsidizing powers; which was owing, perhaps, to their being left more to themselves, as few were of sufficient importance to require a political agent, whose sole business it should be to watch over their actions and influence their conduct.

The Raja of Bhurtpoor's object in accepting protection, in 1805-6, was to recover, without other equivalent than the nominal sacrifice of unrestrained latitude of political action, the fortress of Deeg and the greater part of his territory, then in our hands. The successful defence of his capital against the army of Lord Lake had raised this chief to a dangerous pre-eminence; and in all his subsequent dealings with the British he displayed the most arrogant haughtiness, not exempt from suspicion, distrust, and fear. Feeling that he had become a rallying point of disaffection, he seemed rather to court than avoid the character, and took the attitude of one ready again to try his fortune against us. But while he openly thwarted and irritated us to the full extent of our forbearance, he betrayed his real apprehensions, by conceding immediately when he found he could safely risk no further provocation.

The other protected chiefs on the same frontier,

were, for the most part, well contented; and on comparing their condition with that of their neighbours beyond the pale of the British influence, they had good reason to congratulate themselves on the connexion. They were all under the general superintendence of the British resident at Dehlee, who interfered with them as little as possible; so that they experienced all the benefits, with few of the disadvantages, of the unequal alliance. An example of the conduct which occasionally called for an authoritative interposition may, however, be stated, as it occurred about the time of the arrival of Lord Hastings. The Raja of Macherree, finding himself in the vicinity of the distracted state of Jypoor, thought the occasion a good one for aggrandizing himself at its expense. He accordingly seized some forts and villages to which his family had an obsolete claim; but the British government compelled him to make restitution, mulcting him likewise for delaying instant obedience to the orders for their evacuation.

The eastern Seikhs,* whom the terror of the British name alone saved from the arms of Runjeet Singh; and the Bundeelas, who felt in

* The management of the British relations with the Seikh chieftains was vested in Colonel Ochterlony, who commanded likewise a division of the army stationed at Loodheena. The Bundeelas and Bogheelas were under the political charge

debted to it for a similar protection from Sindheas officer's, and the marauders of the Nerbudda, were, in every respect, well satisfied with their lot, and evinced on all occasions the most zealous attachment and obedience. But this was far from being the case with the Raja of Rewa, who yielded only on compulsion, and sighed again for independence. Our limit forbids a more minute explanation of the views and feelings of the various individuals of this class; nor indeed is it necessary, for in the dealings of the British government with them, advertance was seldom had to the minuter shades of difference which marked their respective situations. All were treated on the same broad and liberal principles; and when any one offended, it was ever the wish to find an excuse or palliative for his conduct, rather than make it a ground of serious quarrel. Independently of the circumstances attending the contraction of the alliance in each case, great allowance was always made for personal character, and for the capricious views which native princes are so apt to entertain of what is best for their present interest. It would have been unreasonable indeed to expect the disposition of such various allies to be uniformly favourable. The framers of a civil superintendent, who was, at the same time, head judicial officer of the British district of Bundelkhund. Mr. J. Wauchope filled this double situation in 1814.

of the scheme of these extensive relations always contemplated that, for a long time, several of the confederates would prove disaffected, many lukewarm, and few zealous for the maintenance of the system of general regulation introduced. The greatest forbearance towards all these different sentiments, and extreme moderation and consistency in our dealings, were essential to the successful management of the stupendous machine thus organized, particularly when a further eventual extension of the system was not an impossible contingency.

The states and powers of the third class, that is to say, those not directly under our influence, and with whom our connexion was that of mutual amity alone, were the Seikh chieftain Runjeet Singh, the Goorkha nation which ruled Nipâl, and the three Mahratta governments of Central India, namely, the Sindheea, Bhoosla, and Holkur families. We shall for the present confine the review to the Mahratta courts, and exclude the two first mentioned powers as not immediately connected with the purpose in hand. British residents were established at the head-quarters of the Sindheea and Bhoosla families, but none had ever been stationed at the Holkur durbar. Indeed, since the derangement of Juswunt Rao's intellect, and more especially since his death, which occurred in 1811, the power which had been reared and main-

tained by his personal ability, was fast falling to decay; while Ameer Khan, Mohummed Shah Khan, and others of the retainers of this family, were raising themselves to consequence and independence on the ruins of its fortune. Juswunt Rao's son and successor, Mulhar Rao, was a minor; and the intrigues of the women and their adherents, superadded to the frequent mutiny of the troops for pay, and the gradual desertion of the different commanders to seek their fortune in a life of predatory adventure, were the only occurrences to be found in the reports of the news-writers* stationed at this court.

Sindheea, since the peace concluded with him in 1805, had steadily pursued the object of breaking the force and reducing the garrisons of the chiefs between the Chumbul and the Nerbudda; so as to establish and consolidate his own power in that quarter. A person little conversant in the affairs of India, and observing on the map the uniform colouring of a given space, described as forming the dominions of a Mahratta chief, would

* The news-writer is a recognised functionary of Indian diplomacy, and though possessing no representative character, is respected and made frequently a channel of intercourse by the native princes, when there is no vakeel resident at the court. Almost all the communications with Runjeet Singh were made through the news-writer, a channel this chief preferred to the more formal mode of representation by letter.

be led to suppose, that his authority was peaceably established over the whole of that space, in like manner as the British authority is established within the districts marked as its immediate possessions. This, however, is quite inconsistent with the character of Mahratta conquest. Instead of commencing with the removal of the existing government, and the general assumption of the whole authority to himself, a Mahratta chieftain begins, by appearing at the season of harvest, and demanding a consideration for his forbearance in withholding the mischief he has it in his power to inflict. The visit is annually repeated, and the demand proportionally enhanced. Whatever is thus exacted is called the *Chout*, and the process of exaction a *Moolkgeeree* (country-taking) expedition. When the same chieftain has been in the habit of continuing his annual exactions from a certain district for a number of successive years, he considers the practice of making them a matter of right and property, and resents the interference of a stranger as an invasion of his possessions. In process of time, perhaps, he has a cantonment, or reduces a fort and establishes himself in the neighbourhood; his exactions swell to the full amount of the revenue; and, in the end, the authorities that may heretofore have retained the local administration by paying these exactions, will either be superseded and reduced to mere

cyphers, or be subdued and expelled by open force. The interval between the occurrence of this last act, and submission to the first exaction, will have been short or long, according as the opportunity may have been favourable for encroachment; or as the party, upon whom it has been attempted, happened to possess the sagacity to perceive, and the means to resist, the obvious tendency of such a system.

At the epoch of the settlement with Sindheea and Holkur in 1805, when the British government engaged not to interfere with the dependencies of those chieftains lying within certain limits; that is to say, in Malwa, Mewar, and Marwar (including Kota, Joudhpoor, and Oodeepoor); the dominions of both families exhibited every variety of the intermediate state above described. The towns and villages, of which they had complete occupation, were comparatively few, and were moreover scattered about in different directions, disconnected and intermingled one with another: except in these few, the army of either chief was the whole machinery of his government, and was at all times kept in motion for the purpose of enforcing contributions from reluctant tributaries, who regularly resisted, and often successfully. Under these circumstances, the effect of the peace concluded with the British was, merely to restrict the theatre of such warfare to their own assumed

dominions, and to allow the employment of the whole military power of each with greater activity against his respective dependents and nominal subjects. Thus, the confusion in that quarter of India, to which their operations were thenceforth confined, was necessarily increased, rather than diminished, by the peace; and one cannot wonder at the rapid rise of predatory hordes to power and consequence, under favour of such a state of affairs. Lord Wellesley's plan for the suppression of this system was, to extend his subsidiary alliances, which he expected would have the effect of inducing the native princes to discard their military establishments, as an useless expenditure and needless incumbrance. This plan was, however, abandoned by Sir George Barlow, so far as Sindheea and Holkur were concerned; indeed, their governments were so essentially military, that it could scarcely have succeeded with them under any circumstances; unless, in progress of time, they should assume a more regular form.

In 1805, and for some years after, Dowlut Rao Sindheea apparently took but little personal interest in the administration of his affairs. Until 1809, his government was, indeed, one of continual shifts and momentary expedients; and his durbar a mere arena for the factions of a selfish aristocracy, whereon to bring to issue their struggles for wealth and pre-eminence. The natural

death of Ambajee Inglia, the too powerful Sooba of Gwalior, and the violent one of Surjee Râo, the father-in-law of Sindheea, both which occurred in 1809, enabled this prince to introduce a ministry more dependent on himself. Since that year, the control of affairs had been in the hands of a banker of the name of Gokul-paruk, recommended to office by his financial ability, and held in check by the counteracting influence and rivalry of personal favourites. By skilfully managing this balance, Dowlut Râo had asserted and exercised a more direct personal control over the affairs of his principality, during the latter period.

Up to 1810, Sindheea generally was in motion the whole of the favourable season, with the greater part of his army, employed either in punishing his own refractory officers, or in *Moolkgeeree* expeditions in Malwa, Bhopâl, or Rajpootana. Oojein was his nominal capital; but, after the forcible resumption of the Soobadaree of Gwalior from the family of his deceased vassal Ambajee, he pitched his camp a short distance to the south-west of that city and fortress; and as his court has never been moved from the spot, except for occasional pilgrimages, a second city has arisen on the site of his encampment, rivalling the old one in population at least, if not in the appearance and structure of its edifices.

The great body of his troops continued to be

distributed over the surface of the country, enforcing tribute in the usual way, and taking every opportunity, by the capture of fortresses, and the seizure or expulsion of the petty Rajas and chieftains in actual possession, to consolidate his power, and acquire a firmer hold of what had hitherto been more nominally than really under his dominion. The principal and most efficient of Sindheea's commanders employed on this service was Colonel Jean Baptiste Filoze, a man of ambiguous parentage on the father's side, his mother having been a common woman of a camp bazar attached to one of the French battalions. He had, however, been brought up, if not acknowledged, by the French officer whose name he bears; and the wreck of the infantry trained by the officers of that nation was placed under his command, on their desertion in the course of the war. A considerable portion of Sindheea's artillery was also attached to this force: and, in the interval between the settlement of 1805 and Lord Hastings' arrival as Governor-General, the forts and territories of Bahadur-gurh, Gurra-kota, Chanderee, Sheepoor, with several others, had been wrested from their petty feudal lords by this commander. There were three other divisions of Sindheea's troops employed in the same manner, and commanded respectively by Bapoo Sindheea, Juswunt Râo, Bhão (successor to Juggoo Bapoo deceased), and

Ambajee Punt. A fifth corps was stationed about his person, at Gwalior, under command of one Jacob, a Portuguese half-cast, Arratoon, an Armenian, and some other officers. The strength of each of these corps was from seven or eight to ten thousand men of all arms; but it fluctuated according to the personal views and interests of the respective commanders; who were individually answerable to their troops for pay,—the greater part of Sindheea's territories being parcelled out amongst them, and assigned in lots for the subsistence of the several divisions, by the discretionary levy of exactions and contributions by each within the specified limits. Under such a system, the Gwalior Durbar could not be expected to exercise a very active control over any of the chiefs so employed; indeed, the intercourse of each with the court was an uniform series of mutual deception and jealousy.

The disposition of the prince towards the British government must, on the whole, be considered to have been rather favourable than otherwise. He found us punctual paymasters of the annual stipend of seven lack of rupees, agreed in November 1805 to be paid to him and his chiefs, in lieu of the Jageers they held in Hindoostan. Nor had we, on any one occasion, interfered with the prosecution of his system of exaction upon the petty feudatories within the circle of his influence. Even

when he sometimes trespassed beyond those limits, which, by the treaty of 1805, the British nation had engaged to consider as his legitimate prey, we had uniformly manifested the same indifference; and, though free to have checked his aggressions, and to have secured the advantage for ourselves, we had never, except perhaps in the instance of the Bundeela chiefs, whom we received under protection, stepped forward to thwart his views. Thus he had felt, that so long as he abstained from the territories of our actual allies, he might fearlessly pursue his own schemes in any direction; and as there was still abundant scope for his ambition, as well as of employment for his military dependents, within the limits from which we had withdrawn, he had scarcely been sensible of any restraint from our neighbourhood and superior power. This disposition resulted from his experience of our past conduct; but as he could have no security for our continuing to act on the same system, and as events seemed fast verging to that state which must force on us the adoption of one that could not but interfere with his plans and interests, it was natural that he should entertain a jealousy of our views, proportionate to the sense of his own comparative inferiority.

The disposition of Holkur's court was similar in this respect; and its Sirdars seemed to consider it their policy to avoid giving offence to the British

government, even when they affected personal independence.

The resources of Ragoojee Bhoosla had been so reduced by the effects of the war of 1803, which deprived him at once of Berar and Cuttack (Kutuk), that he was scarcely strong enough to defend his own dominions from the aggression of the predatory bands, which had collected along the Nerbudda. The military establishments of this prince, with the exception of some corps of Arabs kept near the Raja's person, were undoubtedly more defective than those of any native potentate. While fewer European improvements had been grafted on the old Mahratta system, the latter had lost all those qualities, that ever had made it formidable. Indeed, so despicable was the character of his troops, that, in 1809-10, Ameer Khan, a Patan officer in Holkar's service, and one of those who was aspiring at independence, planned an attack on Nâgpoor in combination with the Pindarees, and would assuredly have annihilated the power of Ragoojee, had not the British gratuitously aided him in this extremity. A simultaneous movement from Hindoostan and the Dukhun induced Ameer Khan to abandon the design.*

* It was on this occasion, that a Madras and a Bengal force first met on the north of the Nerbudda; Colonel Sir Barry Close having advanced to Séronj, one of Ameer Khan's principal possessions, where he met Colonel Martindell from Bundelkhand,

But Ragoojee's disposition towards us was far from friendly, notwithstanding the service thus rendered him : his resentment for the loss of Berar and Cuttack overpowered any feeling of gratitude for subsequent benefits. Yet fear dictated to him the necessity of keeping on the best terms with the British government: for the idea of his ability to call in its aid, was his main security, at this time, against the ambitious designs of the adventurers in his neighbourhood. Under this conviction, he was nevertheless jealous in the extreme of his political independence, and very averse to the formation of a specific defensive alliance of the same nature as those subsisting with the Nizam and Pêshwa; conceiving it a sacrifice of his dignity and reputation among the states of India, to assume the character of dependence on a British subsidiary force.

Such being the feeling and disposition of the several Mahratta powers, there seemed little in their condition or motions calculated to excite any present alarm. As far as they were individually concerned, the object of the settlement of 1805-6 appeared to have been attained; their weakness afforded a security against any one of them meditating a separate hostile enterprise; at the same time, that the balance then established remained unaltered, and the mutual jealousies relied upon as the guarantee against a second

coalition were yet unextinguished. Nevertheless, there was an unsoundness in this system of our relations, which had been predicted by many, at the moment of their establishment on this basis. Its defects had begun to be apparent some time before 1814, and it could no longer be disguised, that the settlement of 1805 was, after all, but an incomplete arrangement, which must ere long be entirely remodelled. It had become manifest that this settlement, or rather the state resulting from it, instead of having a tendency to wean the population of India from habits of military adventure, in which so large a portion of it had theretofore been bred, rather multiplied the inducements to engage in that course of life. The class addicted to such habits was evidently fast increasing. At the time of the settlement, though there were certainly some bands of marauders and brigands associated under different leaders for purposes of general depredation, their number was not sufficient to attract notice; and it was thought that they must soon either be dissolved through want of effectual bonds of union, or be incorporated with the troops of the regular powers, or at any rate, that these latter, as soon as they were relieved from foreign wars and expeditions, would have the means, and see the advantage, of restraining bodies of men, who professedly subsisted on the plunder of their neighbours. Instead

of this result, however, either from weakness and indifference, or from some erroneous notion of the policy of favouring the lodgment, in their neighbourhood, of a military force, available as an addition to their own strength in the hour of need, without the charge of any regular pay or establishment, Sindheea and Holkur, if not active abettors of the growth of these freebooters, were, at least, very lukewarm in their efforts for their suppression. Their only solicitude was directed towards preventing aggression on themselves, and establishing a sort of nominal authority over as large a portion of the class as could be induced to acknowledge their supremacy. They even made liberal assignments of land to effect this object; and if a leader of a *durra* of Pindarees, so the associations were called, happened to make himself obnoxious, his ruin was attempted by turning against him the arms of a rival leader; without reflecting that such a policy must, in its consequences, rather perpetuate than suppress the evil: the ruin of one chief serving but to consolidate the equally dangerous power of another. It is by no means improbable, that the Mahratta states viewed the increase of the Pindarees with an eye to eventual service from their arms; for they avowedly attributed the disasters of the operations of 1803 to their having imitated the European mode of warfare, and affected to believe,

that, had they adhered to the Parthian method of their ancestors, the results of the contest would have been very different. The predatory hordes still pursued the old method; and the wonderful impunity and success with which they engaged in the most distant expeditions, passing the most formidable barriers of nature and of military art, and baffling every attempt to intercept their return, howsoever well concerted, gave a colour of probability to this opinion; indeed, their calculation was erroneous in one particular only, viz. that there were no strong-holds in India which could hope to baffle our military skill, in case we should adopt the plan of pursuing the depredators to their haunts. They were ignorant of the degree in which our means were superior to those of Aurung-Zeeb; and recollecting that he, after having driven them into their fastnesses, could effect no more, readily gave into the belief, that the British power, now in its zenith, was only to be combated by the arms and arts with which Sevajee had foiled the Moghul in times of yore.

It is immaterial, however, whether accident or design had permitted the predatory hordes to gain the strength they had attained in 1814. Their actual condition at that period entitled them to be regarded as a distinct political interest of the day, requiring an equal exertion of vigilance and circumspection, as Hyder in

the height of his power and inveterate animosity. The actual military force at the disposal of these associations amounted to 40,000 horse, inclusive of the Patans; who, though more orderly and better disciplined than the Pindarees of the Nerbudda, possessed the same character, and were similarly circumstanced in every respect, supporting themselves entirely by depredation wherever they could practise it. This number would be doubled, were we to add the remainder of Holkur's troops of the irregular kind, which were daily deserting the service of a falling house, in order to engage in the more profitable career of predatory enterprise; and the loose cavalry establishments of Sindheea and the Bhoosla, which were bound by no ties, but those of present entertainment, and were always in great arrear of pay. These materials formed the groundwork of an interest formidable at least to our repose, if not to our safety: and its central situation in India, nearly equi-distant from the dominions of the three presidencies, imposed the necessity of the most extensive annual precautions of defence, in spite of which the territories of our allies were continually overrun. On two occasions, once when they entered Guzerat in 1808-9, and again in 1812, when the Bengal provinces of Mirzapoor and Shahabad were devastated, they penetrated into our immediate territories, which for years before

had been exempt from such a calamity. The spirit of enterprise evinced on these occasions had much advanced the reputation of these associations; and although they were not now united under any single head, there had grown up among them a principle of concert in prosecution of common objects, such as a man of superior energy and abilities, had such an one chanced to arise among them, might model into the same description of force that Tymoor and Chunguez Khan had directed to the devastation of the eastern world. The rise of Sevajee and of Hyder, both rapid and both formidable, was a proof that such things could take place in India as well as in other countries; and the whole of the unsettled spirits of Central India were exactly in the condition to engender such another conqueror. They resembled the bands of Companions that swarmed all over Europe in the fourteenth century; and wanted but a leader, whose standard they could rally round with confidence. The lawless and independent character of the Pindarees, and the mode of their association, which rendered the chiefs responsible to nobody for their acts, and made it impossible to hold any of the regular powers legitimately answerable for their dangerous existence, were the circumstances that made it necessary to watch their motions with especial caution, in order to anticipate the effects of any

sudden combination. With this view, the British power had interposed at once, when Ameer Khan had attempted to collect a large body together, in prosecution of his design upon the dominions of the Bhoosla Raja; it being our uniform and avowed object, to preserve things on their actual footing, and to prevent any of those fluctuations of power, which generally end in erecting a vigorous and ambitious domination on the ruins of a weak superannuated government. It was evidently not for our interest that either the Pindarees or the Patans should build up such an edifice on the site of any of the regular states with which we were at that time connected; and it was certainly incumbent on our policy to make some effort to prevent it.

A short sketch of the origin of the predatory hordes, passing under the general denomination of Pindarees, and of the chiefs under whom their numbers were arrayed in 1814, will lead to a more distinct view of their actual condition at that time. The name of Pindara is coeval with the earliest invasions of Hindoostan by the Mah-rattas; but the actual derivation of the word is unknown, notwithstanding the researches of several etymologists. The designation was applied to a sort of roving cavalry, that accompanied the Pêshwa's armies in their expeditions, rendering them much the same service as the Cos-

sacks * perform for the armies of Russia. When the Pêshwas ceased to interfere personally in the affairs of Hindoostan, leaving that part of the Mahratta empire to the Sindheea and the Holkur chieftains, the Pindarees were thenceforth ranged in two parties, assuming respectively the appellation of Sindheea-shahee, or of Holkur-shahee, accordingly as they attached themselves to the fortunes of either family. They still preserved, however, all the peculiarities of their own mode of association; and the several leaders went over with their bands to one chief or the other, as best suited their private interests, or those of their followers. In 1794, the principal leaders first obtained assignments of land from Sindheea, in the valley of the Nerbudda, and amongst the hills which skirt it on the north. From that time till about 1800, there were two principal chiefs, the brothers Heeroo and Burun, whose standards were annually raised in that valley at the season of the Dussera, (an annual festival that takes place at the end of October or the beginning of November,) as a rallying point for all loose spirits and unemployed military adventurers. Here they consulted upon the best means of providing for the necessities of the year, by the exercise of

* Pindara seems to have the same reference to Pandour that Kuzák, قزاق has to Cossack. The latter word is of Turkish origin, but is commonly used to express a mounted robber in Hindoostan.

rapine, accompanied by every enormity of fire and sword, upon the peaceful subjects of the regular governments. Until the close of the rains and the fall of the rivers, their horses were carefully trained, to prepare them for long marches and hard work. The rivers generally became fordable by the close of the Dussera. The horses were then shod, and a leader of tried courage and conduct having been chosen as *Luhbureea*, all that were so inclined set forth on a foray or *luhbur*, as it was called in the Pindaree nomenclature. These parties latterly consisted sometimes of several thousands. All were mounted, though not equally well; out of a thousand, the proportion of good cavalry might be 400: the favourite weapon was a bamboo spear, from twelve to eighteen feet long; but, as fire-arms were sometimes indispensable for the attack of villages, it was a rule that every fifteenth or twentieth man of the fighting Pindarees should be armed with a matchlock. Of the remaining 600, 400 were usually common *looteas*, indifferently mounted, and armed with every variety of weapon; and the rest slaves, attendants, and camp followers, mounted on tattoos or wild ponies, and keeping up with the *luhbur* in the best manner they could. It is not surprising that a body so constituted, and moving without camp-equipment of any kind, should traverse the

whole of India in defiance of the most active pursuit by regular troops along the same line of march: indeed, the rapidity with which they spread their devastations to the southern extremity of the Pêshwa's and of the Nizam's territories, over an extent of not less than seven degrees of latitude from the Nerbudda, baffled every attempt to interrupt or overtake them. The cruelties they perpetrated were beyond belief. As it was impossible for them to remain more than a few hours on the same spot, the utmost despatch was necessary in rifling any towns or villages into which they could force an entrance; every one whose appearance indicated the probability of his possessing money, was immediately put to the most horrid torture *, till he either pointed out his hoard, or died under the infliction. Nothing was safe from the pursuit of Pindaree lust or avarice; it was their common practice to burn and destroy what could not be carried away; and, in the wantonness of barbarity,

* A favourite mode of compulsion with them was, to put hot ashes into a bag, which they tied over the mouth and nostrils of their victim, whom they then thumped on the back till he inhaled the ashes. The effect on the lungs of the sufferer was such, that few long survived the operation. Another common mode was, to throw the victim on his back, and place a plank or beam across his chest, on which two people pressed with their whole weight.

to ravish and murder women and children, under the eyes of their husbands and parents.

In the infancy of the establishment of the Pindarees on the banks of the Nerbudda, their devastations were not carried to so great a distance as afterwards, when they began to feel their strength, and when the desolation of the immediate neighbourhood, or its submission to the levy of contributions on the condition of exemption, made it requisite to push their expeditions to a distance, in order to make them sufficiently productive. With the fruits of these expeditions, the chiefs were, from the first, enabled to keep together a large military force without much territorial revenue; and to offer the occasional services of a part of their strength to Sindheea, Holkur, and other neighbouring chieftains, at a cheaper rate than the same amount of assistance was elsewhere procurable. By means of further assignments obtained in recompense for such services, and of conquests made by the bands thus kept together upon the Grassea (aboriginal) Rajas, in the mountains bordering the Nerbudda, who had never yet submitted to the Mahrattas, the Pindaree chiefs gradually extended their influence; while, at the same time, the reputation of these successes brought additional swarms of adventurers to their standard.

About the year 1800, the two chiefs Heeroo

and Burun died, either in the course of nature, or by violent means, the one at Nâgpoor, and the other at Aseergurh. Both left sons; the former, Dost Mohummed and Wâsil Mohummed; the latter, the two Rajuns; but it was not till after some time that these individuals succeeded to any part of their fathers' influence: the pre-eminence devolved, in the first instance, upon other Sirdars, according to their reputation and ability as leaders. Kureem Khan, a Holkur-shahee Pindara, was the first who rose to consequence after the death of the brothers; indeed, he was not altogether free from suspicion of having procured the death of Burun at Aseergurh. Kureem was an active, bold, and ambitious adventurer, sufficiently devoid of principle to profit by the politics of the time. He commenced his career by joining the rising fortunes of Jeswunt Rao Holkur, with a considerable party of followers, pledged to consider their own and their leader's interest as inseparable. His services proved valuable to Holkur, and were suitably rewarded. A short time after, he was bought over by Sindheea, who gave him the title of Nuwab, and several assignments of land in the valley, and above the ghâts of the Nerbudda: thenceforth he called himself a Sindheea-shahee Pindara, though he was frequently found in arms against the adherents of his nominal superior. He enlarged his

possessions by interfering in the internal affairs of Bhopâl, and in the contests of this state with the Bhoosla. After worsting the latter, he excited a civil war in Bhopâl; and giving his support to one party, was very near establishing his authority over the whole principality; but the state was saved by the personal courage and conduct of Wuzeer Mohummed, with the assistance of Dost Mohummed, the son of Heeroo, who began about that time to rise into notice as a rival of Kureem. During the prosecution of this ambitious course of self-aggrandisement, there was never any intermission of the systematic predatory expeditions, that still formed one of the main resources by which the chieftains maintained their military power. Sindheea himself, the Bhoosla Raja, and the Hindoo chiefs of Bundelkhund, were the principal sufferers by their depredations at this period*.

During the troubles of the Mahratta empire consequent upon the war with the British, Kureem Khan availed himself of the opportunity to seize on some possessions of Sindheea and of the Peshwa's jagerdars in Malwa; insomuch, that after

* The tolerance of this practice may, in part, be accounted for by the recollection, that a predatory inroad is not considered derogatory to the dignity of a Mahratta government, which avowedly regards rapine as a legitimate resource of the state.

the conclusion of hostilities in the year 1806, he was in the occupation of a territory of not less than eleven pergunnas, whereof the principal were Bairsea, Ashta, Shujawulpoor, Sarungpoor, Ichawur, and Sehoree, above the ghâts of the Nerbud-da, together with Sutwas, Chipaneer, and other places within the valley. His annual land-revenue from this territory exceeded fifteen lack of rupees, besides compensations for immunity from plunder, which he levied on most of the neighbouring rajas and chiefs. He had also built himself a fort in the part of his territory acquired from Bhopâl, which was called, after him, Kureemgurb. His power was now at the height; for though there were several Pindaree leaders who had never joined his standard, and who even affected a rivalry for the supremacy he had arrogated; still there were none whose means or influence at all approximated to those of Kureem. Though himself independent in every respect, and even an usurper upon Sindheea on more occasions than one, he still affected to be attached to that chief's interest, and to call himself a Sindheea-shahee Pindara, for the obvious purpose of retaining some claim to protection in case of exigency. His power, however, excited that prince's jealousy; and in 1806, very soon after the settlement with the English, Sindheea, by the proffer of his aid in the reduction of a fort (that, for want of artillery,

had long baffled the attacks of Kureem), inveigled the Pindara to an interview, at which he seized his person, making a simultaneous attack on his camp, which was completely plundered.* Kureem's possessions were then quickly recovered; and, for five years, he was himself detained a close prisoner in the dungeons of Gwalior. His durra, in the mean time, was not broken up, though reduced to no more than two or three thousand horse, by the defection of the greater part of the sirdars of inferior note; who had been tempted, in the full tide of his success, to unite their interest with his. The fall of this chief, however, strengthened the durras of other leaders, particularly of Cheetoo or Seetoo, a chief under whom the two Rajuns, sons of Burun, held a subordinate rank, and who had always been the avowed rival of Kureem, though hitherto the power of the latter had greatly preponderated. The party of Dost Mohummed also acquired a great accession of strength by the ruin of Kureem, whose durra had now little else than plunder to subsist upon. The search of this, however, it prosecuted with considerable success under Kureem's deputies, and especially one Namdar Khan; who made Sindheea's territories the principal theatre of his depredations, in revenge for the trea-

* For an account of this, vide Broughton's *Mahratta Camp*. This officer was present, and witnessed the whole scene.

chery employed against his leader. In 1811, Kureem purchased his release from Sindheea for six lack of rupees, which were punctually paid through Zalim Singh of Kota. Returning to the scene of his former power, he immediately raised fresh levies of infantry, and invited the Pindaree chiefs, who had before followed his fortunes, to rally again round his standard. In a very short time he recovered the greater part of the territory he had formerly possessed, and laid his plans to effect a general combination of all the Pindarees, preparatory to an expedition of more than ordinary moment. Even his rival Cheetoo was induced to unite with his durra; and the Dussera of 1811 was celebrated by an assemblage of not less than 25,000 cavalry of all descriptions, besides several battalions of infantry newly raised for the purpose. Kureem proposed to lead this force immediately against Nâgpoor, the weakness of which was notorious to all the Pindarees, whose detached parties had, a short time before, succeeded in carrying off a considerable booty from a suburb of the city itself. The Bhoosla state had fortunately won over Cheetoo by the recent grant of considerable jageers on the Nerbudda. He accordingly opposed the project, and retired with his durra in discontent.

This division proved the ruin of Kureem; for having a second time awakened Sindheea's jea-

lousy, Juggoo Bapoo, one of Sindheea's principal officers, was sent against him with as large a force as could be collected, and with a reinforcement of some battalions of Holkur. There is reason to believe that this enterprise was invited by Cheetoo, who feared the consequences of having thwarted the designs of Kureem in respect to Nâgpoor; at all events, he was the main instrument of its success, and the person who derived the greatest advantages; the major part of his late rival's possessions being allotted by Sindheea as his share of the spoil. Kureem, expecting from Cheetoo at least neutrality and indifference to his fate, advanced boldly to encounter Juggoo Bapoo. His rival, however, took an active part against him, so that he was completely defeated near Munohur-Thana, and obliged to fly, with a few adherents, and seek refuge in the camp of Ameer Khan, beyond the Chumbul. The strong representations of Sindheea and Holkur obliged the Patan chief to place him in a kind of restraint, in which he remained until the end of 1816. His durra again declined to a secondary condition in comparison with that of Cheetoo, at whose cantonment of Nemawur, on the Nerbudda, not less than 15,000 horse now annually assembled at the Dussera festival, to issue forth under a leader of his nomination, in whatever direction he might prescribe.

In 1814, the following was supposed to be the

relative strength of the Pindaree durras : Cheetoo 5000 good horse ; total of all descriptions about 10,000, exclusive of the Holkur-shahee Pindarees, mustering from 4 to 5000 more, who latterly attached themselves chiefly to his standard. The remains of Kureem's durra amounted to 2000 good horse ; total of every description, at least 4000. Under Dost Mohummed 6000, with the usual proportion of the best quality ; this chief held considerable jageers above the ghâts of the Nerbudda, and usually cantoned in the Bhopâl territory. There were, moreover, at least 6 or 8000 horse under independent leaders of inferior note, who joined one or other of the superior chiefs, as occasion suited. The party that penetrated into the district of Mirzapoor through Rewa was of the durra of Dost Mohummed, who planned the expedition a short time before the second fall of Kureem. It was led by Fazil Khan ; and, turning east as soon as it reached the Mirzapoor frontier, advanced to the neighbourhood of Gya, and then disappeared up the course of the Soane, on its way back to Malwa by the Chandya Ghât, before a single soldier from any British cantonment could come up with its track. Such was the anomalous and undefinable power that had grown up into consequence out of the political arrangements of 1805-6. Its leading feature was hostility to all regular governments, and of course most particu-

larly to ourselves and our allies, whose territories offered the richest booty. The existence of these hordes imposed the necessity of constant vigilance along the whole extent of the south-west frontier of the Bengal presidency; while, for the security of the Dukhun, the subsidiary forces of the Nizam and Pêshwa were annually obliged to move to the northern frontier of their respective territories; notwithstanding which precautions, the dominions of those states were continually penetrated and overrun.

Ameer Khan and Mohummed-shah Khan, the two Patan chiefs, who were rising into a similar and equally formidable pre-eminence, commanded forces of a very different description from those of the Pindaree chiefs, though actuated by the same predatory spirit: each of them, besides horse, had large bodies of infantry and several guns. Mohummed-shah Khan's infantry were the old battalions of Tukojee Holkur, undoubtedly the best in India not under the actual command of European officers. Ameer Khan's were scarcely inferior. The cavalry were besides paid by the month, instead of living avowedly on plunder alone, like the Pindarees. Indeed, the grand difference between the two classes was, that the Patans were banded together for the purpose of preying on governments and powerful chiefs: to this end, their force moved about with the materials of re-

gular battles and sieges, so as to work on the fears of princes and men in power, extorting contributions and other advantages from them, by such intimidation as an efficient army only could impress. The object of the Pindarees, on the contrary, was general rapine; they preyed upon the population at large, without arrogating an ability to cope with the governments; their form and constitution, therefore, were framed with a view to this exclusive purpose.

Rajpootana was the principal field for the exhibition of the species of depredation practised by the Patan leaders. The nature of the principalities of that tract, each of which was a petty feudal government, at war with its neighbours and with its own vassals, seemed to mark it out as their destined prey. Nor was it a new game that they were playing in that quarter; they merely followed up what Sindheea and Holkur had long been habitually pursuing. Indeed, although the objects of the Patan chiefs were wholly personal, and prosecuted with perfect independence of each other, still they represented the Holkur interest in the country, and had introduced their forces under sanction of that name. The very means they possessed, viz. the artillery and regular battalions, had belonged to the Holkur family, though now employed in supporting and establishing an interest virtually distinct.

Notwithstanding this virtual independence of the Patans, Sindheea did not leave them in the undisputed enjoyment of the contributions and other advantages to be extorted from Rajpootana. A division of his army, under Bapoo Sindheea lay at Ajmeer, acting precisely on the principles of the Patans, and living on the plunder it could exact from Jypoor and Joudhpoor. Another force was stationed in the Oodeepoor territory, encroaching on the power and possessions of the Raja there, and devastating the country. The Rajpoots, however, were considerably more jealous of Sindheea's apparently consolidated power than of the Patan chiefs; whose very loose connexion with the Holkur family gave them the character of mercenaries, that, for objects of private interest, might be hired and discharged at pleasure. Thus in 1809, when Sindheea seemed to meditate an invasion of the Joudhpoor territory with a very considerable force, the Raja called in Mohummed-Shah Khan, and took his army into pay for the purpose of repelling the attack.

This facility of transferring their services according to their personal views, gave the Patan chiefs the further advantage over Sindheea and his commanders, of a pretext and power to interfere in the passing intrigues amongst the Rajpoots themselves, and to become partisans of the several actions, from each of which they took care to


reap some personal advantage. So long as they had the prospect of such recompense, they were not over scrupulous of the means of earning it. Ameer Khan twice sold his services for the treacherous assassination of obnoxious persons, and accomplished his purpose, on both occasions, at conferences held under the most solemn guarantees. This chief was the acknowledged head of the Patan interest. His views of ambition were, however, not confined to Rajpootana until 1814; when, finding from the activity of our preparations, whenever he seemed to be meditating an enterprize against the Bhoosla, that we were resolved to prevent his aggrandisement in that quarter, he moved from Malwa across the Chumbul towards Rajpootana; and having strengthened his interest at the durbar of Holkur (then held at Rampoora-Bhanpoora), took upon himself the supreme management of the Patan forces and interests. Mohummed-Shah Khan, Jumsheed Khan, and the other sirdars, agreed to act in subordination to him. The former of these dying about the end of 1814, the troops he had commanded became incorporated with those under the personal command of Ameer Khan. This military adventurer was thus placed at the head of a force of at least 30,000 horse and foot, furnished with an artillery well manned and served; yet he had no claim to be recognised as a substantive power;

though, on the other hand, no one of the regular governments could fairly be held responsible for his acts. The field of his operations lay, it is to be observed, in a quarter where there was every likelihood of his coming ere long into contact with the British government, or with those under its protection.


Against this power, as well as the Pindarees, we were obliged to be continually armed, and on the alert. The want of any determinate territory or home, or of any other stake to be hazarded by the first act of hostility, left us entirely without security for their peaceable demeanour; there was nothing to restrain them but mere motives of convenience, and the sense that the calculation of the chances of success was against them. This, however, was the result of continual and most expensive preparation,—the necessity of which was a part of the evil that required a remedy.

Such was the state of Central India at the beginning of the year 1814. The events which led to the final catastrophe of the year 1817-18 will be traced through the intermediate period, with as much conciseness as may be found consistent with the object of exhibiting a distinct view of the origin of those occurrences, and the share which the conduct of the British government may have had in producing them.

Before, however, entering on this narrative, it will be necessary to detain the reader with an account of the origin and progress of the war forced upon us by the Goorkha government of Nipâl, with which negotiations had been some time pending when Lord Hastings arrived in India.



Upper Hindoostan & the Hill Country.
Himalayas of the Ganges
Himalayas
Against the Nipalese in 1814 & 1815/16.



Published as the act of the Surveying, Printing & Stationery Office, London, 1815.

From page 55 of Vol. 1.

It is foreign to our design to attempt any consistent relation of the means and gradations by which the Goorkhas had risen to power, in the mountainous tract stretching between the plains of Hindoostan and the high lands of Tartary and Tibet. Suffice it to say, that when Lord Hastings took charge of the supreme government, he found their dominion to extend as far as the river Teesta to the east, and westward to the Sutlej; so that this nation was then in actual possession of the whole of the strong country which skirts the northern frontier of Hindoostan.

This extent of dominion had been acquired entirely during the last fifty years, by the systematic prosecution of a policy likened by the Goorkhas themselves, and not inaptly so, to that which had gained for us the empire of Hindoostan. The hill Rajas, whom they had successively conquered and displaced, were mere ignorant, selfish tyrants, on bad terms with their subjects and neighbours, but most of all, with their own relations. Thus, while there was amongst them no principle of combination for mutual defence against a common enemy, not one of the petty principalities was sufficiently strong or united within itself to be capable of substantial resistance.

The Goorkha chiefs were at all times as ready to apply the influence of intrigue as open force, and could well combine both for the pro-

ecution of their ends. They had a regular army, obedient to its officers, and the whole in proper subordination to the state. This was always available to the weaker party upon conditions, and the frequent internal dissensions of the Rajas, which successively came to form the Goorkha frontier, never failed to produce the invitation.

Prithee Nurayun Sah has the merit of establishing the system which raised this nation to power. Taught by the example of our early victories in Bengal, he armed and disciplined a body of troops after the English fashion; and after a struggle of more than ten years, finally subjugated the valley of Nipál by their means in 1768. The Moorshedabad Nuwab (Kasim Ulee Khan) attempted to interfere in 1762-3, but sustained a signal defeat under the walls of Mukwanpoor; and the British government was not more successful in an effort made some years after to succour the last of the Sooruj Bunsee dynasty, who reigned at Katmandoo.*

* The expedition was undertaken at the recommendation of Mr. Golding, the commercial agent at Betia, who feared that the success of the Goorkhas would ruin the trade he before carried on with Nipál: it had been interrupted for three or four years in consequence of the subjugation of Mukwanpoor. Major Kinloch commanded the party destined for the relief of the Nipál Raja. He was a good officer; but advanced into the hills a month at least too early (in October 1767), and had not

Prithee Nurayun dying in 1771, his son Singh Purtap, and, in 1775, his grandson Run Buhadur came successively to the throne; the latter, however, being an infant, Buhadur Sah, another son of Prithee Nurayun, struggled long with his brother's widow for the regency. Her death at last gave him the ascendancy, which he kept till 1795; when Run Buhadur came of age, and forcibly assumed the sceptre to the destruction of his uncle.

Run Buhadur, proving a tyrant, was expelled in 1800, and took refuge for a time at Bunarus. In the interval of his exile, the Bengal government established a commercial treaty with the ruling faction; and Captain Knox was sent resident to Katmandoo in 1802. Colonel Kirkpatrick had before been employed on a mission to that capital by Lord Cornwallis, but was obliged to return without effecting any thing; and the same jealousy of the object with which the connexion was sought by us being still alive,

strength enough to establish a chain of depôts to secure his communication with the plains; consequently, having penetrated to Hureehurpoor, he was detained there by a nulla, not fordable, and the bridge and raft he constructed were carried away after a fall of rain, which swelled the torrent unnaturally. The delay thus experienced exhausted his supplies, and produced sickness; so that, finally, he was obliged to return early in December,—the time when, properly, he should have set out.

Captain Knox was recalled, and the connexion broken off in 1804.

Run Buhadur left Bunarus, and was received again with open arms by his subjects of Katmandoo, soon after Captain Knox's recall; but his disposition proved to be incorrigibly tyrannical: his bad propensities had been exasperated rather than chastened by adversity, and by the restraints of a residence within the British frontier. The principal people of the court therefore, who found themselves the objects of a revengeful persecution, a second time formed a conspiracy against the Raja, which was brought to a desperate issue prematurely. The conspirators, having some reason to apprehend that they were betrayed, suddenly resolved to sell their lives as dearly as possible; and one of them, the Raja's half brother, rushed forward and cut Run Buhadur down nearly to the middle by a blow of his koka,* as he sat in full durbar in 1805. A barbarous affray followed, in which the brother was himself slain with most of the chief men of the state, and the royal family was nearly extinguished. An infant son of Run Buhadur's was, however, with difficulty secreted in the women's apartments, and thus saved from the massacre by Bheem Sein Thapa, who proclaimed him a few days after, by

* The koka is a short but heavy sword, the edge of which is on the inner side, like that of a scythe.

the name of Kurman Jodh Bikrum Sah, and who, by his influence with the regent-mother, succeeded in introducing himself to a large share in the government. The Raja was still in his minority when the war broke out with the British; and the power of the state was in the hands of an aristocracy, composed of the highest military officers, with whom were associated some of the Raja's distant relations, and some Brahmins. The Panres, or Pandeas, were at the head of the faction which had expelled Run Buhadur, in 1800, but on that chief's return, they were for the most part cut off or expatriated; and since then the Thapas had acquired the paramount authority. Bheem Sein Thapa, who assumed and still uses the English title of General, had the principal conduct of affairs at the capital. He was the son of a chief named Kajee Umur Singh Thapa, governor of Palpa on the Gourukhpoor frontier, and who died in October 1814.

All the territory held by the Goorkhas west of the Gogra had been acquired within the last fifteen years, by the arms of another Umur Singh Thapa; who, having been for many years at the head of a successful army, had clothed himself with a power, which the nationality of his troops and his own patriotism alone prevented him from making independent. The terms on which he stood towards those who conducted affairs at Katmandoo,

and the politics of the court, generally, will be better understood from what we shall presently have to relate: we shall first state briefly the nature and origin of the disputes which ultimately brought on the war.

The whole range of hills is skirted along its southern base by a magnificent forest, chiefly of Sál trees, (*Shorea robusta*). The timber is useful in ship-building, though far inferior to the teak of Malabar, and of the Burman empire. The boats, however, which navigate the upper Ganges, and the beams and rafters for building throughout Hindoostan, even down to Calcutta, are almost exclusively made of it. The forest therefore is valuable* ; it abounds in elephants, which are chiefly prized for their teeth, the animals being less fit for carriage, and in other respects greatly inferior to what are caught at Chittagong, Ceylon, and in the countries nearer the Line. Beyond the forest, towards Hindoostan, is an open plain, called the Turæe or Terecana, which is chiefly valuable on account of the fine pasture it yields during the months of April and May, when the periodical hot winds entirely destroy the herbage of the more southern regions. The bunjaree bullocks from Malwa, and even from the northern parts of the

* It is a saying of the Goorkhas, that every tree is a mine of gold.

Dukhun, come here to graze in those months; and the Kahchuraee, or pasturage-rate, levied by the border Zemindars, is a very productive branch of their revenue.

The soil of the Turaee is for the most part extremely rich; and though the number of wild elephants, rhinoceroses, and buffaloes that find shelter in the adjoining forest, makes it very uncertain whether the husbandman will reap the fruits of his tillage, cultivation has nevertheless made rapid advances there. The insalubrity of the climate during a great portion of the year, prevents the establishment of any considerable towns in the tract. The population is, indeed, for the most part migratory; the several classes retiring either into the hills, or to a distance in the plains, when the unhealthy season commences. There are ruins, however, at Sumroun, and in other parts of the Turaee, which would seem to indicate that, at some former period, the capital of an extensive province was situated there, and that the tract therefore was not always so unhealthy as it is now deemed; but nothing satisfactory on this head has yet been ascertained.

From time immemorial, the country within the hills and on the borders has been divided amongst petty Hindoo Rajas, and the forest and Turaee have naturally been a perpetual bone of contention to them; a chieftain pos-

sessing fastnesses in the hills could always enforce contributions, by issuing thence and carrying off booty from those who hesitated to comply. Hence every hill Raja had a sweep of the forest and low country attached to his estate, and this he was continually endeavouring to extend, either by intrigue, or by violence, or by any means that presented. The superior wealth and greater number of followers at the command of some of the Rajas of the plains, enabled them occasionally to penetrate and reduce to subjection a hill neighbour; but ordinarily, such enterprizes were beyond their skill or resources; and the border-war was handed down from father to son, in their respective families.

Neither Ukbur nor any of his descendants on the throne of Dehlee made any attempt to add the tract of hills to the Moghul empire; its revenue was not an object of cupidity, nor was its population sufficiently formidable to make the subjugation of the country necessary as an act of political precaution. The Rajas of the plains, on the other hand, though compelled to submit to the Moosulman yoke, retained their territories, and became tributaries of the empire; which did not prevent their prosecuting their hereditary feuds with their neighbours in the hills, in the same manner as heretofore. The Moghul officers, not sorry to see a powerful vassal weakened, would

sometimes foment these disputes, and make grants of their tributary's lands in the plains, for the aggrandizement of a hill Raja ; whose name would thus be added to the list of subjects. Ordinarily, however, the Soobas did not interfere in the management of the affairs of this remote tract. The Rajas, therefore, were at perfect liberty to pursue their old system ; and such continued to be the state of this frontier, until the low countries fell under the British dominion, and the hills were gradually overrun by the Nipalese, and consolidated by them into one sovereignty.

The British government, assimilating its conduct to that of its predecessors, did not interfere with the possessions of the Rajas in the plains ; but contented itself with a money-tribute, or at least with a composition for the rights asserted by the Moghuls, which becoming fixed in amount at the perpetual settlement, may be so described.

The Goorkhas, on the other hand, as each Raja in the hills successively fell before them, exterminated the family ; and, becoming heir to all its possessions, took up likewise the old Raja's claims and contests with his neighbours. This brought them into contact with our Zemindars, who were, of course, unable to maintain themselves against such an enemy, and generally therefore had to resign the object in dispute ; for,

unless when the encroachment was gross and easy of proof, it was vain to hope to interest the British government in their favour. That government was, in the first place, no loser by the usurpation, for the public revenue was fully secured by the perpetual settlement, and by the increased value of the entire estate against any loss from a partial aggression. Moreover, it was, on principle, distrustful of the pretensions of its own subjects, which were generally exaggerated; while it regarded the Goorkha nation as a well-disposed neighbour, whom it was desirable to conciliate; hence an injured Raja of the plains would seldom succeed in procuring any powerful support to his cause, unless, as above observed, the case were very flagrant, when the Goorkhas would on remonstrance make reparation.

It will be proper to illustrate this view by an appeal to facts; and the disputes on the Sarun frontier, one of the main causes of the war, afford a case strongly in point.

The Raja of Chumparun, who resides at Betia, was perpetually at war with the Raja of Mukwanpoor within the hills, for different portions of the Turae; and amongst other sources of dispute, each of them had pretensions to sovereignty over part of a Perguna called Sumroun, the same in which the ruins before alluded to are situated. We shall endeavour to explain the circumstances

of this dispute with some minuteness, at the risk of appearing tedious.

The Mukwanpoor family granted Roteehut and Puchroutee, two tuppas (sub-divisions) of the above Perguna, in Jageer to Ubdoollah Beg, a Moosulman, who had influence enough with the Moorshedabad family to get there a confirmation of the tenure by the Nazim. The Betia Raja, who had claims on the tract, and was, there is reason to believe, then in possession, at first resisted; but in the end, gave likewise to Ubdoollah a sunud* for the same lands. Thus was the Moosulman's tenure secured, to whichever party the right belonged; but as the Mukwanpoor grant was the oldest in date, and had been acknowledged at Moorshedabad, this Raja's title to resume eventually acquired a kind of preference. In 1763, Prithee Nurayun, having subdued the Mukwanpoor Raja, claimed to be feudal superior over Ubdoollah; and resolved, as soon as he had secured his conquest, to resume the Jageer. Accordingly, after a year or two, he seized not only Ubdoollah's lands, but twenty-two villages more, which he claimed to be part of Roteehut, though not in the Jageerdar's possession.

Ubdoollah fled to the English authorities; who took up his cause, and made his injuries one pretext for the declaration of war issued prior to the

* Sunud, a deed of gift.

advance of Major Kinloch in 1767. This officer, having failed in penetrating into the hills, was desired to occupy the whole Turæe, as a means of remunerating the British government for the expense incurred. Ubdoollah then claimed his Jageer, and Roteehut and Puchroutee were in consequence given up to him. When peace was restored with the Nipálese, they sent an agent named Deenanath to claim the territory given up to Ubdoollah Beg as part of Mukwanpoor. This was opposed by the Betia Raja, and a long investigation ensued ; when, upon the strength of the first deed of grant to Ubdoollah, which was on copper, and of a date falling in 1743, Mr. Hastings finally decided, in 1781, that Roteehut and Puchroutee belonged to Mukwanpoor, and were not parcel of Betia or Chumparun. While this contest was undetermined, the Goorkhas courted Ubdoollah, and promised to maintain him, for without his help their title could not have been established. After it was decided, however, they resumed his Jageer, and occupied it for themselves. The twenty-two villages seized, on the first invasion of the Goorkhas, on pretence of their belonging to Roteehut, had never been given up either to Ubdoollah, or to the Nipálese ; and no demand was ever made for them. On the contrary, from the time of Major Kinloch's occupation, in January 1768, the revenue of them was uniformly collected as parcel of the Tuppa of

Nunnor, or Noor; belonging equally with Roteehut to the Perguna of Sumroun, but falling in that portion of it which was annexed to Chumparun. At the perpetual settlement concluded by the British government in 1790, Nunnor formed part of the lands for which the Raja of Betia engaged: and thus the matter stood on this frontier till 1810: the twenty-two villages continuing all the while in this Raja's possession.

From the above statement it will be seen that Roteehut, which appears to have originally belonged to the Raja of the plains, was finally dismembered from his territory, and annexed to the hills, by the effect of the intrigue of the hill Raja with Ubdoollah Beg. It was even more common, however, for a hill Raja to become possessed of an estate by usurpation, and then to have his title acknowledged by being permitted to engage for the revenue. The offer of an advance in the yearly rate, or a present payment in cash, was always sufficient to effect such an arrangement with a temporary Amil: and after once procuring possession, with an acknowledged title, all future payments were of course dependent on circumstances, and the interest of the moment.

Of the confusion incident to this conduct in native Amils, more than one instance was brought to light upon our occupying the territory ceded by the Nuwab Vizeer in 1801. The most notable

was that of the Raja of the independent hill territory of Palpa, who had contrived to possess himself of Bootwul, lying for the most part in the plains; for the revenue of which he accounted to the Nuwab Vizeer's government. In like manner the Goorkhas themselves had usurped Sheeoraj on the same frontier; and they further held two Talooks, called Tilpoor and Bunaekpoor, by the same sufferance; professing to be accountable for the revenue, though they paid or not, according to circumstances.

The Bootwul case requires particular mention. On our first occupying Gourukpoor, the Raja of Palpa's family had been recently driven out of the further hills, and obliged to take refuge in Bootwul, which is situated in the mouth of the first pass. At the settlement of the district in 1801-2, the Raja's manager engaged to us, as he had heretofore done to the Oudh government, for the lands of Bootwul, at a juma, or annual assessment, of 32,000 rupees. The Raja himself was then at Katmandoo, negotiating about his territory in the hills. He came, however, to the plains shortly after, and confirmed the engagement with the British Collector, which had been entered into by his manager.

The Goorkhas subsequently induced him to return to Katmandoo, where he was committed to prison, and in the end put to death. The family

upon this, fearing the continued enmity of the Goorkhas if they resided on the frontier, obtained permission to give up Bootwul to the Company's Khas, or special management, and took up their residence at the station of Gourukpoor, upon a pension being assigned to them in lieu of their profit from the management of the estate.

The Goorkhas in 1804, on the ground of having subdued the Palpa Raja, claimed Bootwul as part of his territory. They immediately, therefore, began sending people to collect the rents, instead of allowing them to be received by the company's manager. By November 1805, they had established their influence over two-thirds of the Perguna; but the circumstance having been brought to Sir G. Barlow's notice, when he was at Allahabad in that year, he addressed a letter to the court at Katmandoo, calling upon them to evacuate Bootwul; and giving them to understand that the company's right to the sovereignty of Sheeraj also was undoubted,—the Talook being included by name amongst the Oudh cessions, and the Goorkhas having no title but that of usurpation. Since, however, the date of the seizure of this place was anterior to our possession of Gourukpoor, Sir George professed a willingness to give up his claim to Sheeraj, on the condition of the instant evacuation of Bootwul. The Goorkhas answered this by an offer to farm Bootwul as

dering and making collections in eight others of them, stating that they belonged to Roteehut. The Raja of Betia's people resisted this aggression, and an affray followed, in which Luchungeer was killed. This occurred on the 19th of June, 1811. The British government, on first hearing of the circumstance, directed the Assistant to the Magistrate of Sarun to proceed to the frontier, in order to inquire into the particulars of the affray; but, before he arrived there, a reinforcement had been sent down from Katmandoo, which immediately seized on the whole of the twenty-two villages. Mr. Young's proceedings were, therefore, confined to the ascertainment of this fact, and of the circumstances of Luchungeer's death; both which being established, he submitted his report, and returned to Sarun. In this stage, the case was referred for the investigation of the Commissioner, whom it had already been resolved to send to Gourukpoor, and the instructions as to the further measures to be adopted were addressed to him.

Major Paris Bradshaw, first Assistant to the Resident at Lukhnou, was the person nominated by Lord Minto to settle these frontier disputes; and in the season 1812-13 he met the Goorkha Commissioners in the Gourukpoor part of the Turæe, and proceeded first to investigate the title they preferred to Bootwul and Sheeoraj.

The inquiry was extended to both estates, in consequence of the court at Katmandoo not having closed with either of our offers to resign the latter conditionally.

The result of the investigation established the facts above related, in regard to Bootwul, beyond the possibility of doubt. Sheeoraj was proved to have been seized by the Goorkhas sixteen years before the cession of Gourukpoor to us; and great importance was attached by them to some perwanas, or written orders, addressed by British commanders to the Goorkha Sooba, at the time of Vizeer Ulee's flight from Bunarus to the Turrae, after the murder of Mr. Cherry, in 1798. They argued that the demand then made of aid for that delinquent's apprehension, implied an acknowledgment of right to the territory within which the exertion was called for. The documents were certainly evidence to the power and possession of the Goorkhas; two points which were not denied; but for ten of the sixteen years they had held Sheeoraj, the revenue had been accounted for to the Amils of the Nuwab Vizeer's government, while the origin of the Goorkha title was clearly traced to open usurpation.

The investigation having been brought to this issue, Major Bradshaw was instructed to demand the evacuation both of Bootwul and Sheeoraj. The Goorkha Commissioners declared

a Zemindaree, on the terms agreed to by the Raja and his manager at the first settlement: this, however, was refused, and instant evacuation ordered. But Sir G. Barlow, having shortly afterwards gone as governor to Madras, and Lord Minto's attention being occupied with other things, the matter remained for some years without further notice; and, in the mean time, the Goorkhas occupied the whole of Bootwul.

Emboldened by the indifference thus manifested, in 1810-11, they crossed the small river that forms the boundary of Bootwul, and began to occupy some villages of the adjoining Perguna of Palee. They also advanced from Sheeoraj, till at last their encroachments in this quarter again attracted the attention of government; and in the beginning of 1812, after remonstrating against the aggressions, Lord Minto repeated Sir G. Barlow's offer, to resign his right to Sheeoraj, on condition of the immediate evacuation of Bootwul and all subsequent occupations. Bheem Sein's father, Umur Singh, who was now the Goorkha governor of Palpa, answered the proposition on this occasion by asserting a distinct right to all he had taken, and even to more. This circumstance, combined with what occurred simultaneously on the Sarun frontier, induced the British government to nominate a Commissioner, and to invite the Goorkhas to send others to meet

him, in order to settle finally the boundary line of the respective territories. Considering that the peremptory demand made by Sir G. Barlow in 1805 for the evacuation of Bootwul, had been answered by an offer to farm it, which was a distinct admission of our right, the nomination of a Commission to investigate the matter now, before enforcing the evacuation, was an act of most exemplary and undeserved moderation.

What had passed, however, on the Sarun frontier remains to be told. The lands forming the Jageer of Ubdoollah remained, as resigned by Mr. Hastings, in the hands of the Nipâlese, without aggression on the Betia territory, till the end of 1810, as has been before-mentioned. In 1811, one Luchungeer, the Goorkha Sooba (governor) of Roteehut, crossed the frontier with a party of armed men; and having seized and stockaded Kewya, one of the twenty-two* villages occupied in Prithee Nurayun's time, began plun-

* As these twenty-two villages are continually recurring, it may be useful to give their names, and to state that they all lie to the South of the ruins of Sumroun:—1. Bijbunee; 2. Atmoha; 3. Gora Suhun; 4. Sree Nugur, a Tola; 5. Kewya, or Byrajputee; 6. Poornyha; 7. Korya; 8. Sumunpoor; 9. Busuntpoor; 10. Bejaee; 11. Bhulooa; 12. Kudumooa; 13. Bunkutwa; 14. Nemya; 15. Pukureea; 16. Kurwa; 17. Ambooa, a Tola; 18. Jujhoora; 19. Gogawa; 20. Simree; 21. Khujuaree; 22. Chynpoor, a Tola of Kurwa, No. 16.

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themselves not satisfied, and begged to refer the matter to Katmandoo. The Major accordingly submitted his proceedings for the orders of his government, while he himself went on to the Sarun frontier.

Here it was in his instructions that he should insist on the restitution of the twenty-two villages occupied in 1811, as a preliminary to any investigation of the claim set up by the Goorkhas. After much evasion, he procured this; but when he proposed opening the inquiry, the Nipâlese Commissioners, affecting to have taken some personal offence against the Major, refused to have more discussion with him, and suddenly returned to Katmandoo, leaving him alone on the frontier.

This occurred in March 1814, and was evidently a result of the determination formed by the Goorkha government upon the Gourukpoor cases, which had previously been brought to issue.

Lord Minto, being perfectly satisfied with the proceedings forwarded by Major Bradshaw, addressed a letter to the Raja, in June, 1813, demanding the immediate evacuation both of Bootwul and Sheeoraj. The answer to this did not arrive till December: it was replete with fulsome professions of respect and attachment; but declared the right of the Goorkhas to both Bootwul and Sheeoraj to have been clearly established by the result of the investigation. No reasons were assigned, and as far as concerned Bootwul at least,

the assertion seemed to be in the face of all the evidence. Lord Hastings, who had in the interval assumed charge of the government, as soon as he had examined the voluminous proceedings and papers, and made himself master of the case, addressed to the Raja of Nipál a peremptory requisition to evacuate the two districts; and he sent the letter through the Magistrate of Gourukpoor, giving that officer authority to order the advance of a body of troops to occupy the contested lands, in case the Raja's order for their evacuation should not arrive within twenty-five days from the date of his forwarding the letter. The Goorkha government was further informed that the Magistrate had these orders.

It was the receipt of this letter that had produced the sensation at Katmandoo, which occasioned the sudden recall of the Commissioners from Sarun, and ended in the resolution to abide the issue of war. In April 1814, a council was held, at which the Goorkha Commissioners from the frontier, and two and twenty others of the principal people of the court, were present, and the question of war or peace was fairly debated, in a sitting which lasted from nine o'clock in the morning till eight at night.

There were some in the council who had apprehensions of the result; but an overweening confidence in their own power and resources, and the

opinion of their entire invulnerability in the hills prevailed.* The advocates of war, indeed, argued that by remaining in their native fastnesses, and issuing thence on predatory excursions into the plains, a state of war could be made even more profitable and advantageous, than peace would be with the loss of the power of encroaching with impunity.

The Goorkhas, as before stated, came to this resolution in April; they gave, however, no intimation of their hostile intentions, and answered the Governor-General's letter on the subject of Bootwul and Sheeoraj, by mere common-place assurances of respect, and of a desire to keep on a good understanding with the British, omitting all mention of the specific subject in discussion.

In the mean time, Sir Roger Martin, the Gou-rukpoor Magistrate, receiving no orders from Katmandoo for the evacuation of the disputed districts, addressed the commanding officer at the station; and on the expiration of the period, three companies marched to occupy the lands. The Goorkha officers retired before them, without making the slightest opposition. For nearly a month, too, that the troops remained in the Turæe, they attempted nothing; but suffered the

* Vide in the Appendix a curious report of the opinions of some of the chiefs, as forwarded to the Palpa governor, with instructions to prepare for war.

magistrate to establish three police Thanas in Bootwul, at Chitwa, Bisourea, and Sourah, and one with two subordinate outposts at Sheeoraj, without even making a remonstrance against the manner of occupation. The above arrangement was made merely with a view to the ordinary administration of the districts, upon the retirement of the troops, and wholly without anticipation of attack or hostility of any kind on the part of the Goorkhas.

Early on the morning of the 29th May, 1814, before the regular troops had reached Gourukpoor on their return, the three thanas of Bootwul were surrounded simultaneously, and the people attacked without warning. At the three stations eighteen men were killed and four wounded; the daroga, or chief officer of the thana of Chitwa, was murdered in cold blood, after he had surrendered, and in the presence of Munraj, the late Goorkha governor of Bootwul, who was the leader of this enterprise. As the season was too far advanced for our troops to take the field, the magistrate ordered his thanas in Sheeoraj to concentrate and retire on Bansee; thus relinquishing for the present all he had occupied. One of the outposts was, however, surprised at Rourah on the 3d of June, when four men more were killed and two wounded by the Nipâlese.

While hostilities were thus commencing in


Gourukpoor, the disputes on the Sarun frontier were fast coming to the same issue. The Marquess of Hastings, on first hearing of the conduct of the Nipâlese Commissioners, ordered the permanent annexation to the British territories of the twenty-two villages, and the other disputed tracts of that frontier; and he sent a force of a few companies, which remained in the Turæe during the rains, to secure this quarter. The formal declaration of war was purposely delayed till the close of the rains, in order to allow time for persons engaged in trade with Nipâl to withdraw their capital, as well as to give the Nipâlese the opportunity of disavowing the act of Munraj, and punishing the perpetrators, if so inclined. They showed no disposition to do so; but, on the contrary, made the most active military preparations along the whole extent of their frontier. The declaration of war was accordingly at length issued by his Lordship from Lukhnou, on the 1st November, 1814.

The aggressions on the Sarun and Gourukpoor frontiers are the only ones that have been related at length, and were doubtless the most important; but there were innumerable others equally unwarranted, along the whole Turæe. The magistrate of Tirhoot reported, that between 1787 and 1813 upwards of two hundred villages had been seized on one or other unjustifiable pretext. On the Purneah frontier, the Goorkha governor of Morung had,

in 1808, seized the whole Zemindaree of Bheem-nugur; but this case being particularly flagrant, was taken up immediately, and in June 1809, a detachment under an officer was sent to the frontier, when the Nipâlese, yielding to the threat of an immediate appeal to the sword, evacuated the lands in the course of 1810. Towards Rohilkhund the Goorkhas had seized five of eight Talooks, composing the Perguna of Khyreegurh: three of which were taken before and two after the cession to us in 1801. They also advanced a claim to Kasheepoor, and other lands of Moradabad; but were deterred from seizing them. In the Seikh' country, beyond the Jumna, Umur Singh, the Goorkha commander, was engaged in hostilities with Sunsar-Chund, of Kankra, and with other hill Rajas, who held likewise lands in the plains; to which, as each successively fell before him, he advanced a claim. In 1813 he came down and seized some villages on this plea; but on receiving a vigorous remonstrance from Major-General, then Colonel, Ochterlony, who commanded at Loodheena, he retired. It appeared, indeed, that both his situation and general views of policy made him averse to pushing things to extremity with the British; and he early expressed a decided opinion against the measures adopted in Bootwul and Sheeraj, which he declared to have originated in the selfish views of persons, who scrupled

not to involve the nation in war to gratify their personal avarice.* The insinuation was levelled at Bheem Sein, whose father had made the usurpation, and whose family derived most of the advantages. The revenue of the usurped lands, it is to be observed, could not have been less than a lack of rupees a year to the Goorkhas, taken altogether, in the manner they collected it : the retention of this income was therefore an object of no small importance to the ambitious views of Bheem Sein, and to the preservation of the influence he had contrived to establish for his family.

* Vide Umur Singh's opinion in reply to the question submitted by the Raja, Appendix A.; also his intercepted letter, B.



Map of the
WESTERN HILLS,
 illustrative of the operations of the
 (NIPAL WAR.)
 1814-15.



CHAPTER III.

NIPÁL WAR.—FIRST CAMPAIGN.

1814.;

Governor General leaves the Presidency—Plan of operations—General Gillespie's division takes the field—his failure before Nalapanee—and death—Second assault—unsuccessful—Evacuation of the fort, and pursuit of the garrison—Change of plan—General Martindell takes the command—Operations against Jythuk—Defeat of Major Ludlow's detachment—Major Richards retires with loss—General Ochterlony's division—Capture of Nalagurh—Umur Singh's position at Ramgurh—Skirmish before it—Operations to turn its flank—Affair at Deboo ka Tibia—New position of Umur Singh—General Ochterlony's movement on Belaspoor—Occupation of Maloun ridge by Umur Singh—Gourukpoor division—General J. S. Wood's unsuccessful attack of Bootwul—Defensive proceedings—Sarun frontier—Attempt of Chundur Seekur Opadheea to negotiate—Defeat of Purseram Thapa by Major Bradshaw—General Marley's arrival—Posts of Captains Blackney and Sibley cut off by the Nipálese—Indecision of the General—his departure from camp—Sikhim Raja gained by Major Latter—Repulse of the enemy at one of his outposts.

THE Marquess of Hastings, very soon after his arrival in India, determined to make a tour of inspection to the western provinces. Accordingly,

in prosecution of this intention, he embarked at Calcutta in June 1814, and reached Cawnpoor (Kan,hpoor) by the end of September, after a tedious navigation up the Ganges. The discussion with the Nipâlese had been brought to issue by the murder of the police-officers in Gourukpoor, a short time before his Lordship left the presidency. The interval of the journey, therefore, was employed in preparation for the vigorous prosecution of the war in the hills, and in defensive arrangements against the probability of another violation of our frontier by the Pindarees. The leaders of those associations might, it was thought, be tempted to seize the opportunity to annoy us that would be afforded by the employment of our troops in the opposite direction. The nature, however, of the defensive arrangements resolved upon will be explained hereafter. First, we shall relate the occurrences of the campaign in the hills, and it will be convenient to pursue them without interruption from their commencement in October 1814, to the close of the campaign in April of the following year.

The frontier which was to be the scene of war stretched a distance of about six hundred miles; and the enemy had the command of all the passes of the forest, as well as the hills. This, and the general suspiciousness of the Goorkha character, rendered it extremely difficult for Lord Hastings to

collect intelligence for the arrangement of his plan of operations. He, nevertheless, resolved to act offensively against the enemy along the whole line of frontier, from the Sutlej to the Koosee; and the following was the allotment ultimately made of this space to the several divisions that were brought into the field.

It was assigned to Colonel Ochterlony,* who commanded the post established at Loodheeana in 1808-9, to operate in the hilly country lying near the Sutlej. The force under this officer's command was exclusively native infantry and artillery, and amounted to about six thousand men; it had a train of two 18-pounders, ten 6-pounders, and four mortars and howitzers.

From Meeruth in the Doob, Major-general Gillespie, whose conduct at Vellore and in Java had given his name a high celebrity, was to proceed first against the Dehra Doon (a rich valley stretching between the Ganges and Jumna, within the first range of hills), and as soon as this should be reduced, which it was expected would not be an operation of much time or difficulty, the force was to divide; and while a detachment attacked Gurhwal and Sirinugur, under the snowy range, the main body was to proceed against Nahn, to

* This officer's commission of Major-general arrived soon after the opening of the campaign; we shall therefore henceforth designate him as of that rank.

the west of the Jumna, in aid of the operations of Major-general Ochterlony against Umur Singh. General Gillespie's force originally consisted of his Majesty's 53d, which, with artillery and a few dismounted dragoons, made up about one thousand Europeans, and two thousand five hundred native infantry. This division, and that under General Ochterlony, were ordered to take the field towards the end of October; the unhealthy season of the rains being generally over to the north-west by the beginning or middle of this month. Kumaon, and Almora, its capital, were to be attacked from Rohilkhund; but, according to the original plan, this movement was to follow the occupation of Gurhwal to the north of the province; and the operations undertaken here in December and January were an after-thought, suggested by the peculiar circumstances that attended the commencement of the war.

From Bunarus and Gourukpoor a force was collected, and placed under the command of Major-general John Sullivan Wood, and his instructions were to penetrate by Bootwul into Palpa. This division consisted of his Majesty's 17th foot, nine hundred and fifty strong, and about three thousand native infantry; it had a train of seven 6 and 3-pounders, and four mortars and howitzers. The 15th of November was fixed upon as the day on which this force was to take the field at Gourukpoor.

Further east from Patna and Moorshedabad, another force of a strength of near eight thousand men, including his Majesty's 24th foot, nine hundred and seven strong, was collected for the main attack, which was intended to be made direct upon the capital of Katmandoo by the passes between the Gunduk and Bagmuttee. Major-general Marley was intrusted with the command of this army, and there was a train attached to it of four 18-pounders, eight 6 and 3-pounders, and fourteen mortars and howitzers. The Ganges was to be crossed by the troops from Patna on the 15th of November; and a further brigade was formed, from troops at more distant stations, to follow the army and secure its depôts and rear, as it advanced into the hills.

Beyond the Koossee eastward, Major Latter was furnished with two thousand men, including his district battalion, for the defence of the Poornea frontier. This officer was desired to open a communication with the petty Raja of Sikhim, and to give him every assistance and encouragement to expel the Goorkhas from the eastern hills, short of an actual advance of troops for the purpose. The Raja's minister had invited the common enemy, who thus had acquired a footing at Nagree and in the pass of Nagurkôt; but little advance had yet been made by the Nipálese in

the subjugation of the country, and the struggle with the Raja's adherents was still actively going on when the declaration of war issued. Sikkim is tributary to Lassa and the Chinese : the frontier towards the plains is small, being bounded by the Teesta to the east, and by the Michee to the west ; but the territory extends northward to the snowy range, and was found to afford a more ready communication with Lassa and China than that through Bootan, by which route Messrs. Bogle and Turner penetrated in Mr. Hastings' time.

Such were the dispositions made for the campaign. Major-general Gillespie was the first to penetrate the enemy's frontier. On the 22nd of October he seized the Keree pass leading into the Doon, and thence proceeded to Dehra, the principal town in the valley, without meeting any opposition. The whole of the hill country, west of the Ganges, was still under Umur Singh ; who had allotted a force of about six hundred men under the command of Captain * Bulbhudur Singh,

* The use of English terms for their grades of command was general in the Goorkha army, but the powers of the different ranks did not correspond with those of our system. The title of General was assumed by Bheem Sein, as Commander-in-chief, and enjoyed by himself alone ; of Colonels, there were three or four only ; all principal officers of the court, commanding more than one battalion. The title of

for the defence of the Doon. About five miles from Dehra was a hill five or six hundred feet high, surmounted with a fort of no great size or strength, called Nalapanee. Here Bulbhudur resolved to make his stand: and employed himself in strengthening and adding to the works, which were still in an unfinished state, when General Gillespie appeared in the neighbourhood,

Misled, in some degree, by his information as to the strength of the place, which had been collected before Bulbhudur had put in hand his recent additions, the Major-general first sent on Colonel Mawbey, with a detachment, to expel the garrison, intending to march immediately with his main body on Nahn. Colonel Mawbey, however, seeing the nature of the works, was deterred from attempting any thing, and solicited fresh instructions. Upon this, the General himself advanced with his whole army; and, after a rapid reconnoissance, resolved on carrying Nalapanee by assault. On the 30th of October he seized, with a part of his force, one end of the table-land, or rather ridge, which, being more than half a mile

Major was held by the adjutant of a battalion or independent company; and Captain was the next grade to colonel, implying the command of a corps. *Luftun*, or Lieutenant, was the style of the officers commanding companies under the Captain; and then followed the subaltern ranks of *Soobadar*, *Jemadar*, and *Havildar*, without any Ensigns.

in length, was not fully occupied by the fort. Here he formed a hasty battery at six hundred yards for his light guns, intending to try the assault next day. In the course of the night he disposed his division in four parties, which, upon a given signal, were to move simultaneously from the battery and surrounding valleys, with ladders, to escalate the walls. Unfortunately, the signal to be given was the firing of guns in a particular manner from the battery; a method of communication at all times open to accident, and particularly uncertain in a rugged country like that in which Nalapanee was situated, where the columns were necessarily out of sight of the battery; and some of them so far off, that the report could not be heard distinctly. The Major-general also gave the officers commanding each column reason to expect the signal after ten o'clock in the day; but having early in the morning fired for some time on the walls, without producing so much effect as he expected, the impetuosity of his temper led him to give the signal an hour before the time. Hence it was only obeyed, when given, by two of the four columns, those led by Colonel Carpenter, and Major Ludlow; the former six hundred and eleven strong, and the latter, nine hundred and thirty-nine; officers included. Captain Bulbhadur had made the best possible preparations for defence; besides manning the walls, he opened the wicket

gate, which jutted out so as to enfilade a great part of the wall, then barring the entrance with cross beams, he planted a gun through the embrasure thus formed, and loaded it with grape.

The columns approached steadily under a heavy fire of musquetry from the walls, but ignorant of this arrangement to take them in flank. Lieutenant Ellis led his pioneers close under the wall, where they planted the ladders. He was, however, killed immediately after, by the fire of the gun before mentioned; and the greater part of the pioneers, and of the head of the column, were swept down with him.

An attempt was then made to gain the wicket, but without effect; whereupon the troops, finding it impossible to enter the place, fell back to the shelter of some huts, at a little distance outside the walls. The Major-general had stayed this while in the battery; but immediately he saw the troops retire, he hastened forward with three fresh companies of the 53d, determined to carry the fort or perish. General Gillespie attempted to lead the columns again to the ramparts; but as the men saw no practicable means of surmounting the wall, he was not so readily followed as he wished. He pushed forward, however, with about a hundred dismounted men of the 8th dragoons; a regiment he had once commanded, and which was much attached to him:

These he led on to within a few yards of the wicket, where, as he was waving his hat, close under the wall, he was shot through the heart, and fell dead. His aidecamp, Major O'Hara, was killed by his side; Captain Byers, his brigademajor, was wounded; and of the men of the 8th dragoons, four were killed, and fifty wounded. The fall of the General was the signal for retreat; and the total loss suffered on this occasion was, besides the General, four officers, and twenty-seven men killed, and fifteen officers and two hundred and thirteen men wounded*.

General Gillespie's death gave the command to Colonel Mawbey of his Majesty's 53d, the senior officer present. His first act was to retire

* *Killed*.—Lieut. and Adjut. O'Hara, 6th Native Infantry; Lieut. and Adjut. Gosling, Light Battalion; Ensign Fothergill, 17th Native Infantry; Ensign Ellis, Pioneers.

Wounded.—Lieut.-Col. Westenra, slightly; Capt. Bruton, severely; Lieut. Heyman, slightly; Lieut. Taylor, severely; Cornet Macdonald, severely, 8th Light Dragoons.—Lieut. Young and Lieut. Anstice, severely, his Majesty's 53d.—Ensign Davidson, slightly, 7th Native Infantry.—Lieut. Broughton, dangerously, 19th Native Infantry.—Major Wilson, and Lieut. Thackeray, severely; Lieut. Monteath, slightly, Light Battalion.—Lieut. Elliott, Pioneers, severely; Lieut. Blane, Engineers, slightly; Capt. Byers, Aidecamp, severely. Mr. William Fraser, of the Civil Service, the Political Agent with this division, was also wounded on this occasion, by an arrow, in his throat.

to Dehra, until a train of heavy guns could arrive from Dehlee, the nearest depôt. This occupied till the 24th of November; and on the 25th, the army recommenced operations. A battery of 18-pounders was now constructed, within three hundred yards; and by noon of the 27th of November, a large part of the wall was brought down. A sally was attempted from the fort, but the enemy were driven back by grape from the battery; and the breach appearing to be practicable, an assault was ordered the same day. On approaching the breach, some few of the grenadiers of the 53d mounted it; but, being immediately shot from within, the rest of the troops hung back, and remained at a short distance, in perfect self-possession, firing at the garrison; but exposed, in return, to the showers of grape, musquetry, arrows, and even stones, which the enemy poured incessantly from behind their defences. The British officers exerted every effort to induce a second attempt to mount the breach, but without effect. Lieutenant Harrington of the 53d advanced personally, to prove to the men how easily it was to be ascended; but, being unsupported, he fell a victim to his zeal and gallantry. The British commander, seeing from the battery what was passing, thought it would be of good effect to send up one of his light guns, which,

being fired into the breach, might, he conceived, clear it of the enemy, and allow the men to mount in the smoke. Lieutenant Luxford, of the horse-artillery, undertook this perilous service; but he had no sooner carried up his gun, and executed what was proposed, than he received a mortal wound. The minds of the soldiers were impressed with so superstitious a conviction of the impracticability of the breach, that they would not advance, even with the advantage of the smoke of the gun. The retreat was, therefore, at last sounded, after two hours had been spent by the assailants in the exposed situation above described, at an immense sacrifice of valuable lives. Four officers, Captain Campbell, 6th N. I.; and Lieutenants Harrington, his Majesty's 53d, Cunningham, 13th N. I., and Luxford, horse-artillery, were killed, with fifteen Europeans and eighteen Natives; while seven officers*, two hundred and fifteen Europeans, and two hundred and twenty-one Natives, were wounded on this occasion. Thus, including the loss incurred in the first attack, this petty fortress had already cost us considerably more than the entire number of its garrison.

* Major Ingleby, Captain Stone, Lieutenants Horsely, Green, and Brodie, and Ensign Aufrere, of his Majesty's 53d; and Captain Blake of the 13th Native Infantry.

It was now determined to shell the place, in the hope that from the want of bomb-proofs, or other protection from this arm, it might be made untenable. The efforts of the besiegers were also directed against the water, which there was reason to believe was got from without the walls. After three days the wisdom of this plan was shown by the evacuation of the fort; which was left by the remnant of its garrison on the night of the 30th of November. It is truly mortifying to reflect, that the same plan, if adopted at the commencement, must have secured the fall of the place with the same facility; and would thus have saved to the nation all the blood that was spilt, besides the loss of two months of the favourable season, and the disrepute of two disastrous failures. Bulbhüdur carried off seventy survivors, all that remained unhurt of his garrison of near six hundred. With these he secretly passed the line of posts established round the fort, and joined a party of about three hundred, which had been sent from Nahn to reinforce the place. They had been seen for some days hovering about the neighbouring hills, but it had not been thought necessary to send a detachment after them. Colonel Mawbey, disappointed that the garrison should escape after all, resolved on an effort to surprise Bulbhüdur. He proposed the enterprise to Major Ludlow, who undertook it with alacrity. Having marched the greater part of

the night of the 1st of December, the Major came by surprise upon the Goorkha bivouack ; it dispersed so quickly that only the advance party were in sight of the enemy ; but a number were cut up, and the pursuit was continued for some distance. Captain Bucke, who commanded the advance, and Ensign Richmond, his adjutant, were wounded, with about fifteen of the Sepoys.

Nalapanee, when occupied by Colonel Mawbey, was found in a shocking state, full of the mangled remains of men and women killed by the shot and shells of our batteries ; a number of wounded were likewise lying about, and the stench was intolerable. Upwards of ninety bodies were collected and burnt ; and the wounded were sent to our hospitals ; after which the fort was razed, and Colonel Mawbey proceeded to execute the further operations assigned to the division.

Experience having shown the determined bravery with which we must expect to be opposed, Lord Hastings so far varied his plan of operations as to forego the detachment of a part of this division to occupy Gurhwal. He accordingly instructed Colonel Mawbey to leave a few men in a strong position for the occupation of the Doon, and to carry his undivided army against Umur Singh's son, Colonel Runjoor Singh Thapa, who was, with about two thousand three hundred elite of the Goorkha army, at Nahn. It was further intended to reinforce the division considerably ; and Colonel

Mawbey was informed that the command had been conferred on Major-general Martindell. This officer was at a distance, and did not join till the 20th of December. In the mean time Colonel Mawbey had led back the division through the Keree pass, leaving Colonel Carpenter posted at Kalsee, at the north-western extremity of the Doon. This station commanded the passes of the Jumna, on the main line of communication between the western and eastern portions of the Goorkha territory, and thus was well chosen for procuring intelligence. The letters to and from Umur Singh and his officers, which developed every secret motive of the Goorkha policy, were chiefly intercepted at this point; and after a short time, the disaffection of the inhabitants, and want of supplies, obliged the Goorkhas to abandon Burat, an elevated and strong position north-east of Kalsee; which, being likewise occupied by Colonel Carpenter, entirely cut off Umur Singh's communication with Kumaon and Katmandoo, except by the very difficult routes close under the snowy range.

The division left the Doon on the 5th of December, and taking the route of the plains, entered the valley below Nahn, by the pass of Kolapanee, and encamped at Moganund on the 19th. Nahn was only seven miles distant, and though upon a hill two thousand feet high, was not deemed by the enemy to be of sufficient strength for their main stand. Accordingly Runjoor Singh had received Umur

Singh's orders to retire to a position north of the town, and to occupy the surrounding heights and the fort of Jythuk, situated at a point where two spurs of mountainous ridges meet, and the peak at the intersection rises to a height of three thousand six hundred feet above the level of the plains of Hindoostan.

General Martindell having ascertained the evacuation of Nahn, caused it to be occupied by Major Ludlow on the 24th of December; and following with his whole force on the 25th, planned an offensive movement against Jythuk, after a cursory examination of the position as it towered to the skies, and exhibited its several peaks to the view from Nahn.

Two detachments were formed to occupy different arms of the ridges above described. Major Richards, of the 13th N. I. was intrusted with one of a strength of seven hundred and thirty-eight men,* which was to make a detour, and establish itself on a height to the north of Jythuk, subsequently called Peacock-hill. Major Ludlow, of the 6th N. I. was intrusted with the command of the other, which was to occupy the southern and nearest arm to Nahn: its strength was a thousand fighting

* Major Richards:—light company of his Majesty's 53d; three and a half light companies of Native Infantry; the battalion companies of the 1st Battalion, 13th Native Infantry, and 50 Pioneers.

A. Strong Ramparts.
 B. Towers in ruins, &
 Remains of British Forts.

C. Ravine Hill.
 D. Remains of British Forts.

E. Guntilias Cannon.
 G. Advanced Battery British Forts.

F. Hydrant.
 H. First Battery British Forts.

British Encampment



STOCKADED POSITION of the GOORKHAS at JYTHUK.

men.* Mountain-guns, on elephants, were attached to each detachment, but the ground was too rugged to allow of their keeping up on the march. The roads, indeed, were mere mountain pathways, difficult of ascent for a single person, without arms, or accoutrements; and scarcely in any part admitting a march of troops otherwise than by single files.

Major Richards, having farthest to go, set off an hour earlier; but Major Ludlow, who moved at midnight, came first upon the enemy. He fell in with Runjoor Singh's outer picquet at three in the morning, at about a mile's distance from the point to be occupied. The party retired, and the Major's advance-guard pushed up the hill in pursuit, exposed to its irregular fire. At the top of the hill was the village and temple of Jumpta in ruins, where was a second post of the Nipålese which similarly retired.

Major Ludlow pushed on immediately with the grenadier company of the 53d, in order to seize the point assigned to him; and on reaching it called a halt, until the rest of his detachment should come up and enable him to secure himself. There was, however, a stockade a little further on, and the grenadiers, mistaking for pusillanimity in the

* Major Ludlow: grenadier company of his Majesty's 53d, three and a half light companies Native Infantry, nine companies of the 1st bat. 6th Native Infantry, and fifty pioneers.

enemy the easy acquisition they had made of several defensible points, thought to redeem the credit that had been lost before Nalapanee, and crowding round the Major entreated to be allowed to storm the post. The impulse of the troops was in unison with the natural ardour of the commander, and he gave way at the sacrifice of his better judgment. He saw, indeed, that the stockade itself was of no great strength, and he thought it might be carried by a coup-de-main before the Nipålese should have time to reinforce its garrison. The occurrences at Nalapanee ought to have suggested greater caution.

Juspao Thapa, Runjoor Singh's best officer, was the Goorkha commandant here; and the greater part of the force at Jythuk had, on the first alarm, been collected within or behind the stockade out of sight of the assailants. Juspao allowed the British to come close under the stockade, and then from either side, a little down the ridge, he pushed out parties round both flanks, who opened a fire on the grenadiers from all quarters at once. Not having expected such a reception, the men were confounded, and drew back; whereupon the Goorkhas, seizing the opportunity, charged them sword in hand from the stockade, and, in the end, drove the detachment from all the ground it had gained, in spite of three efforts of Major Ludlow to rally his men. On coming to the Jumpta temple, the Major found his

main body of native infantry still unformed, and standing confusedly, in a state to afford no support. Indeed, the Sepahees, on seeing the Europeans giving way before the enemy, were panic-struck, and could be brought to no order by the few officers that remained with them. The retreat to Nahn after this was a perfect flight, in which we suffered severely; and so quickly did it pass, that the detachment had returned to camp by ten o'clock in the day; having lost thirty-one Europeans and about one hundred and twenty natives killed and wounded. Lieutenant Munt, 1st N. I. was amongst the former, and there were three officers* in the latter return.

Major Richards had a detour of sixteen miles to make before he could reach the post assigned to him, to the north. It was eight in the morning, therefore, before he came to the foot of the ridge on which he was to establish himself. Finding water, he halted till ten, to allow the men to refresh themselves after the march; then continuing his advance, he came on the enemy's first piquet at about a mile from Jythuk, and, following as it retired, took possession of all the ridge to Peacock-hill, within eight hundred yards of the fort. The water of the position was three hundred yards below in a hollow to the left, which rendered a separate post

* Lieutenant Scott, 5th; Lieutenant Donnelly, 27th; Lieutenant Sayer, 6th N. I.

there necessary. The defensive arrangements were complete by noon; but the troops were astonished to hear nothing in the direction of Major Ludlow's post; where, indeed, every thing was over some time before Major Richards arrived at his ground.

While the troops were speculating on this subject, Runjoor Singh's drums beat to arms; and at about one o'clock he paraded his whole force under the walls of Jythuk, preparatory to an attack. The mountaineers advanced boldly at first, but not being able to face a steady volley, they separated; and availing themselves with wonderful dexterity of every jutting rock or the like that afforded cover, kept up a continued irregular fire, charging every now and then when there was any advantage to gain. The ground was, for the most part, too rugged to allow of a charge to dislodge these isolated parties, consequently, during the whole day, our troops had to abide this method of attack without having any cover to shelter them.

At four P. M. Major Richards, fearing that his ammunition would not last, for the bullocks and hill-porters* with the spare rounds had not come up, wrote to Major-general Martindell to solicit a

* These were under an escort of the rear-guard, which had separated from the column in the dark of the night, and, losing its way, was observed and cut off by a party from one of Runjoor Singh's stockades.

reinforcement. At the same time, as the Goorkhas were beginning to be more bold and troublesome, he concentrated his force, and gave up the post at the watering-place. By sunset nine charges had been made by the enemy, and repulsed each time by a volley; but as it became necessary to husband the ammunition, the pioneers were employed in collecting stones, which the position was steep enough to render an effectual weapon of defence.

Thus was the post maintained till half-past seven, two hours after sunset, when a positive order arrived from the Major-general to retire. Major Richards had not by this time lost more than twenty or thirty men; but having now no hope of a reinforcement, or of fresh ammunition, he had no choice but to obey. He made, therefore, the best dispositions for retreat that his circumstances would admit; but as there was only a single narrow pathway for the troops to file down, and that skirted sometimes the most tremendous precipices, so as to require careful footing, confusion and loss would have been inevitable, had it been broad day: by night it was, of course, much worse.

The important duty of covering the retreat was undertaken by Lieutenant Thackeray, with his light company belonging to the 26th N. I. This officer's self-devotion contributed mainly to save the detachment from being entirely cut off; for while the troops were filing down the

pathway, his company kept the whole Goorkha force in check, charging them several times in different directions. Its situation, of course, grew every instant more desperate, still not a man of the company thought of his individual safety while the Lieutenant lived to command. After more than half of his men had fallen, he was himself at last killed; and Ensign Wilson, who served under him, fell nearly at the same time. The covering party was then overpowered, and it was supposed at first that the company had been cut off to a man; but it was found afterwards that Runjoor Singh had given quarter to about forty men and a soobadar, whom he treated well, and, having vainly tempted to enlist in his ranks, dismissed a few days after on parole not to serve again during the war. Every thing was in confusion in the rear after Lieutenant Thackeray's fall; but most of the troops had filed down the pathway while he was engaged, so that the loss, on the whole, after the stragglers had come in, was three officers killed,* five wounded; and of the men, seventy-eight under the former, and about two hundred and twenty under the latter return. The number of missing, whose fate was for some days uncertain, greatly swelled the first returns; and six officers were amongst

* Killed.—Lieutenant Thackeray, 2-26th Native Infantry; Ensign Wilson, 2-26th Native Infantry; Ensign Stalkart, 1-13th Native Infantry.

these; but the last, Lieutenant Turner, came in on the 1st January, three days after, having had several hair-breadth escapes.

The disasters of this day were owing solely to the irretrievable error of Major Ludlow, in allowing himself to attempt the stockade before he had formed his men, and established the post he was ordered to occupy. Had he first secured his footing on the ridge, those who were driven back would have found a point to rally upon, and the attempt at a coup-de-main, whether successful or not, would have been of no consequence. It must, at the same time, be acknowledged that had the native troops been sufficiently officered, it would have been easy to have made head at the Jumpta temple; and it was natural for Major Ludlow to conclude that he would have found his main body ready formed there to support him; but the fault of the system, and the casualties of the war, had unfortunately so thinned the ranks of officers,* that the nine companies of the 1st bat. 6th N. I. had no more than three on duty, and this deficiency was the principal cause of the disastrous event on this side.

The prudence and good conduct of Major Richards in the occupation and defence of his po-

* Thirty officers had been killed and wounded in the operations before Nalapanee alone.

sion, produced one most advantageous result, as it fully convinced the troops of this division of their great superiority over the enemy in a fair combat. Every man of the detachment felt that had the post been reinforced, or even furnished with fresh ammunition, it might easily have been maintained. Hence the loss was attributed to its proper cause, and the effect of the day's struggle was not diminished by the subsequent retreat. Still, however, something more decisive was wanting to restore complete confidence; and many circumstances contributed at this particular juncture to lead to an exaggerated estimate of the military character of the Goorkha nation.

Thus closed the year 1814 upon this division. No active enterprize was for some time afterwards attempted by Major-general Martindell; but, before relating the operations in which the rest of the season was consumed by him, it may be as well to show what was passing in other quarters, which had similarly become the scene of war.

General Ochterlony, who took the field at the same time with Gillespie, and was opposed to Umur Singh in person, formed from the first a just estimate of the character of his enemy, and of the difficulties he would have to encounter. He resolved, therefore, to proceed with the utmost caution. On the 31st of October, the day of Gillespie's fall, he reached Plaseea, situated in a valley within

the hills, which he entered from the Sutlej, by a pass less difficult than most of those further east. Umur Singh was at this time at Urkee, considerably within the hills. They run here in broken ridges, stretching N.N.W.; and each ridge affords, of course, a series of positions. The outermost ridge was surmounted by the fort of Nalagurh, which, with an outpost at Taragurh, commanded the principal route into the hills. On the next range stood Ramgurh, Joorjooree, Chamba, and a second Taragurh; above this again, towered the heights of Maloun; behind which, lay Urkee on one side, and on the other the capital of Umur Singh's staunch ally the Raja of Belaspoor. Between, was a comparatively fruitful valley, whence Umur Singh could draw his supplies in case of his occupying any of the above ridges.

Having thrown garrisons into the forts of the Nalagurh and Ramgurh hills, and reckoning, apparently, that General Ochterlony would be occupied some time before them, Umur Singh was in no hurry to leave his position at Urkee. The British General, resolving to put nothing to hazard, made a road with great labour, and sat himself down, with his heavy guns, before Nalagurh on the 1st of November. Having breached the wall, the garrison surrendered on the 5th, capitulating also for the stockade on the same ridge, called Taragurh. Umur Singh came down, and took position

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on the Ramgurh range the same day, leaving small garrisons at Urkee and Sabathoo behind him.

Having established depôts at the captured forts, Major-general Ochterlony proceeded, on the 13th of November, against the Ramgurh positions, sending on Colonel Thompson with a brigade one day's march in advance. The position of Ramgurh was so steep on the side towards the plains, that the Major-general determined to turn it if possible, and operate on its rear. These ridges, it must be observed, are all so many steps to the Heemachul; each, therefore, as it approximates to that stupendous range, towers over that before it, and as you look from the plains, the steeper side is always opposed to you.

Ramgurh stood nearly in the middle of the ridge, and formed Umur Singh's right. Major-general Ochterlony, in advancing from Nalagurh, turned his left; and in the course of November had seized a point from which he hoped to be able to batter one of the stockades of that wing. By the 26th of November, after immense labour in making roads and dragging up the guns, a battery was constructed for 6-pounders; but when it began to play, the stockade was found to be so distant, and so much the higher of the two, that the shot had little effect. Lieutenant Lawtie, the engineer, seeing this, advanced with a small party

to reconnoitre another point a little further on. The Goorkhas, however, sallied out to prevent this, and obliged him to seek the shelter of an old wall that stood near. His critical situation being observed, Lieutenant Williams was sent with two companies from the battery to support the reconnoissance; but a much stronger body came down to the Goorkhas and surrounded the whole party; who thus found themselves under the necessity of cutting their way through the enemy, to secure their retreat*. The manoeuvre was successfully executed; but with the loss of Lieutenant Williams, who was killed, besides seventy-five Sepoys killed and wounded. This affair was of no manner of consequence, except as it afforded to the enemy an occasion of triumph. Next day the Goorkhas gave permission to remove and bury the dead,—a

* The author of the Military Sketches of the Goorka War gives a different account of this affair.

He says that Lieutenant Lawtie, in the course of his reconnoissance, came suddenly on a post, which he deemed it safer to attack than to retreat from. He carried it; but the Goorkhas being reinforced turned upon him; and his Sepoys, after firing away the upper layer of their cartridges, abandoned the post and fled. Lieutenant Williams, who was moving to the support, was, he states, similarly abandoned by his men, who were panic-struck, and fled without exerting themselves. The account given in the text was prepared from official records, before the work here cited was published. The latter will be better authority.

courtesy they never refused during the war, and not the only one we experienced at their hands. General Ochterlony was busily employed all this while in surveying and improving the roads, and reconnoitering Umur Singh's position on every side. By the 2d of December he was enabled to form a plan of attack, the object of which was to make a lodgment on a point within the position. The advance was to be made from the battery above mentioned, and was extremely hazardous; inasmuch as there was but one road to the point, and that led under fire of one of Umur Singh's principal stockades, which the advancing column would have to receive on its flank, and perhaps to abide a sally from the garrison as it passed. However, seeing no other way of seriously annoying the enemy, the Major-general submitted the plan to his two Brigadiers, Colonels Arnold and Thompson, in order to learn their opinion of it. The propriety of making the attack was still under deliberation, when news arrived of the second failure before Nalapanee; and General Ochterlony also heard of a reinforcement being on its way, to his own army, by order of Lord Hastings, which determined him to abandon the plan, and thenceforth to put nothing to hazard. The Major-general had at this time serious doubts of our ultimate success in the struggle, and he feared that our native army, with all its discipline, would be found

ill adapted to warfare in a country too rugged to admit of its superior tactics being brought to play. These apprehensions were, however, expressed to none but his Commander-in-Chief; nor could his most familiar associates detect in his demeanour the slightest interruption of that cheerful flow of spirits by which Sir D. Ochterlony has been characterized through life.

While waiting the arrival of the promised reinforcement, Major-general Ochterlony exerted himself in winning over the Plaseea Raja,* and having succeeded in this object, he got him to lend his exertions in making a road for artillery from Mukran, by Khundnee, to Nehur, three miles N.N.E. of Ramgurh, where he had for some time fixed his head-quarters. This was preparatory to an attempt to carry some points in Umur Singh's rear. On the 27th of December, the 2nd bat. 7th N. I., with an additional train of light guns, having joined, Colonel Thompson was detached, with fourteen strong companies, two guns, and two howitzers, to attack two stockades which were opposed to General Ochterlony's right, and were situated on a kind of spur from the Ramgurh ridge, projecting north-eastwards in Umur Singh's rear. The stockades were, if possible, to be carried, and a third point, on which there was no stockade, was

* Raja Ram Surwa Sen was at this time Raja of Hindor and Plaseea.

then to be occupied by the detachment. Colonel Thompson set off in the night, and late in the morning came opposite the first stockade; but on reconnoitering, thought it not safe to try a coup-de-main. He passed on, therefore, in order to seize a ridge about seven hundred yards distant from a stone redoubt belonging to the enemy, and which led to within five hundred yards of Deboo-ka Tibia, the second stockade to be attacked. Here he waited for his guns, and on their arrival fired at Deboo till night, in the hope of effecting a breach. The Goorkha defences are generally proof against light artillery; hence, no impression being made, Colonel Thompson was compelled to be satisfied with establishing himself on the ridge. In the course of the night the Goorkhas evacuated Deboo-ka Tibia, which Colonel Thompson discovering, sent a party to occupy. The Goorkhas further employed the night in concentrating their force, preparatory to a strong effort to dislodge the detachment. Just before daybreak they commenced a serious attack from a stockade called Mungoo-ka Dhar, which crowned the heights of the Ramgurh ridge, at the point where it was joined by that on which Deboo was situated. The detachment was well on its guard, and drove back the Goorkhas after a few volleys, with a loss of near one hundred and fifty men, whereof sixty were counted on the ground. We had twelve killed, and fifty-

seven wounded, but no officer was of the number. General Ochterlony, on hearing the firing, sent the 2nd bat. 7th N. I. to reinforce the post; and in the course of the 29th of December, it was stockaded afresh, and otherwise secured. It has been mentioned that Ramgurh formed Umur Singh's right as his position fronted the plains. Colonel Thompson's present post was in the rear of his centre, so as entirely to intercept the supplies he received by the Urkee road, and to incommode the communication with Belaspoor. Seeing this, the Goorkha General shifted his ground, deserted all his stockades to the left of Ramgurh, and keeping that fort still as his right, took up a reversed position on the other side of it, so as to oppose a new front to our army, which had turned his left. Umur Singh likewise strengthened Mungoo-ka Dhar, and made it his head-quarters. It was soon found that the ridge on which Colonel Thompson was lodged did not afford any means of approaching the main stockades of the enemy's new position, the intervening ground being particularly rugged. It hence became necessary to devise a different plan of operations, and on the 16th of January, General Ochterlony, still seeking the means of straitening the enemy's supplies, which, since the occupation of the Urkee and Subathon roads, had been drawn wholly from Belaspoor, put in execution the following masterly movement:—Crossing the

Gumba river from Nehur, north-east of Ramgurh, he went along the Urkee road, till he turned the Maloun ridge, and thence, sending on Colonel Thompson a-head, made a long detour in the direction of Belaspoor. By the 18th of January a party of irregulars, under Captain Ross, occupied the heights of Punalee, commanding Belaspoor, and the valley of the Sutlej, in which it is situated. Colonel Thompson was at the same time a kos beyond Jynugur, on the road to the same place, and General Ochterlony himself about to join him. Thus Belaspoor was open; and the power of operating against the north-east face of Maloun, from the valley of the Gumrora, gained. At the same time that this movement was made, Colonel Arnold was left at Deboo-ka Tibia, to watch Umur Singh; and, as it was expected that he would not quietly wait the result, the Colonel had instructions to be on the look-out for a move; and, if the Goorkha army likewise took the route of Belaspoor, to occupy the stockades that would be abandoned, and follow at its heels by a road that would place the enemy between the two British divisions, each of which was more than a match for his whole force. If the Goorkhas merely retired to Maloun, leaving garrisons in the Ramgurh stockades, Mungoo was to be first proceeded against, in order to maintain the direct communication with the plains and other divisions; and as soon as that

point was gained, the brigadier was to advance to Belaspoor. General Ochterlony left his heavy guns with a battalion at Nehur, to be made available in the reduction of Mungoo, and eventually of the Ramgurh forts likewise, after Colonel Arnold should have proceeded to his ulterior destination. As was expected, Umur Singh no sooner saw the object of the detour made by the head-quarters of the British army, than he moved off with his whole force to take up the stronger position of Maloun, which he feared the British might else preoccupy. Thus Mungoo-ka Dhar was abandoned and occupied by Colonel Arnold on the 18th January; but small Goorkha garrisons were still left in the stone redoubts of Ramgurh, Taragurh, Chamba, and Joorjooree. Against these Colonel Cooper commenced operations, while Colonel Arnold proceeded, according to his instructions, towards Belaspoor. The latter officer marched along the Ramgurh ridge and under the walls of the remaining Goorkha forts, without experiencing any obstruction from the garrisons. The movement, nevertheless, took up several days, which were passed in much anxiety and hardship; for, besides the extreme ruggedness of the pathway, the progress of the division was further delayed by a week's heavy rain and snow. It was not, therefore, till the beginning of February, that the brigadier reached Tulsoora, the point assigned to him, and:

established himself at the extremity of the Maloun range; subsequently he reduced Rutungurh,—a fort disjointed from the ridge, but lying directly between Maloun and Belaspoor.

Some time was consumed in reducing the Ramgurh forts; and, during the interval, General Ochterlony employed himself in bringing over the Raja of Belaspoor, who, after an unsuccessful attempt to dislodge Captain Ross from the Punalee heights, had fled across the Sutlej. This Raja, though connected with Umur Singh's family by a recent marriage, was induced at last, through fear of seeing his capital and country given over to another, to make his terms and submit.

Here we shall leave this division for the present, in order to bring on the operations in the Turaees of Gourukpoor and Buhar. Umur Singh had fully justified the reputation he enjoyed as a soldier, by the manner in which he met, and sometimes defeated, the sagacious plans of the British commander. Nothing decisive, indeed, had yet been done by either army; but, considering that the British had been reinforced to near seven thousand men, while Umur Singh had never more than two thousand eight hundred, or at the most three thousand, this was the best possible proof of the skill with which he had availed himself of the advantage of ground, which was all he had to compensate for his numerical inferiority.

The division assembled at Gourukpoor was ordered to take the field on the 15th November; but, owing to the difficulty of collecting hill-porters for the carriage of the baggage and supplies in sufficient abundance in that thinly-peopled district, it was late in December before Major-general J. S. Wood proceeded into the Turæe. Having waited some time to collect information as to the best mode of penetrating to Palpa, he came at first to the determination of leaving Bootwul to the right, and attacking Nyakot, a post which crowns the hills to the west of the town. Having ascertained, however, that the Goorkhas, under Colonel Wuzeer Singh, a nephew of Bheem Sein's, had taken post at the mouth of the pass, within which Bootwul is situated, and had built there a stockade called Jeetgurh, it was resolved to reconnoitre the works, and carry them, if possible, before proceeding further. On the 3d of January, General Wood marched from his camp at Simra, in the Turæe, with twenty-one companies of infantry to put this plan in execution. He acted on the information of a Brahmin, in the employ of the family of the old Palpa Raja, residing at Gourukpoor, and the Brahmin offered his services as guide. The road ran along the banks of the Tenavee, which here is likewise called Goonghee, and the last seven miles of the way led through the Sâl forest; but General

Wood had been told to expect an open space immediately about the stockade. He was himself, with the advanced guard, still in the thick of the forest, when the road brought them suddenly in front of the stockade, at not more than fifty yards distance. A smart and destructive fire was immediately opened on the advanced party, and the General's Brigade-major, Captain Hiatt, and subsequently his engineer officer, Lieutenant Morrieson, were wounded, the latter mortally. This loss was sustained in attempting to reconnoitre the post, preparatory to the advance of the main column, which was headed by his Majesty's 17th regiment, under Colonel Hardyman. Immediately on its arrival, the colonel formed his men, and advanced against the stockade, driving in the party of the enemy who had sallied out on the advance guard; Captain Croker, who led the grenadiers, followed the enemy up the hill, and succeeded in ascending with his own, and two other companies of the regiment, round the left flank of the enemy's work. Thus a position was gained that commanded it entirely, for it was merely a hollow stockade, running along the declivity. The carrying of the work was therefore certain, indeed the enemy were already retreating from it up the hill behind. General Wood, however, thinking it was not possible to carry the hill also, while, without doing so, the stockade itself seemed to

him to be untenable and of no value, ordered a retreat to be sounded, to the great disappointment of the troops, who were flushed with the prospect of a certain and easy victory. The British loss was twenty-four killed, and one hundred and four wounded; besides the two staff-officers above mentioned, Captain M'Dowell, of the artillery, and Lieutenants Pointz and Pickering, of his Majesty's 17th, were severely wounded. The enemy lost a sirdar, named Sooruj Thapa, and many more men than we did; but the retreat gave to them the triumph of a decided victory.

The result of this action, and the bravery the enemy had displayed, left in the general's mind an impression of the inadequacy of his force to the objects assigned to it, which influenced all his future measures: instead of endeavouring to penetrate the hills, he confined his operations to defensive precautions. At his solicitation, parties of irregular horse were added to the force; and, in the end, the 8th native cavalry was sent to assist in scouring the country, and repelling the enemy's incursions. Report magnified the Goorkha army to twelve thousand men; whereas, their regular troops scarcely reached so many hundred. The major-general, however, giving credence to these exaggerated statements, threw up works at Lotun, and put a garrison there to defend the direct road to Gourukpoor, while he himself moved with his main

body to repel an incursion into Nichloul. These measures contributed to make the enemy bold, and produced a disastrous alarm in our own subjects, which, indeed, was not altogether unfounded: for scarce a day passed without some village being plundered and burnt by the Goorkhas. The same state of things continued during the whole of January, February, and even March; and though reinforced by another native battalion, and with further artillery, General J. S. Wood still considered himself too weak to act offensively.

What had passed simultaneously on the Sarun frontier, and to the eastward, unfortunately tended to confirm this impression; and it is time now to advert to the operations in that quarter.

Major Bradshaw, the negociator, remained, during the rains, in military charge of the frontier, and disputed lands of Sumroun, as has before been mentioned. The posts he established were not molested, nor had he much communication of any kind with the Goorkhas until October. By that time, some alarm began to be entertained, at Katmandoo, at the extent of preparation witnessed; wherefore, though determined to concede nothing, they still thought it worth while to attempt to amuse the British government with further negotiation, so as, if possible, to spin out the season of operations in empty discussion. In the course of November, Chundur Seekur Opadheea came down

to the Turæe, and sent information to Major Bradshaw that he had a letter and presents for the Governor-general; wherefore he desired a passport to enable him to carry them to Calcutta. The letter was one of congratulation, in the form usual on the arrival of a new governor-general, and was written as if there were no matters whatever in dispute between the two governments. Major Bradshaw sent to Chundur Seekur a copy of the proclamation of war, issued the first of the month, and refused to let any one pass, or to receive the Opadheea himself, unless he brought full powers to treat for a pacification. The letter was forwarded to the Governor-general, who confirmed the intimation, and further ordered Chundur Seekur to be desired to return to Katmandoo, or remain on the frontier at his peril.

Notwithstanding this intimation, Chundur Seekur lingered in the Turæe, and attempted to get a passport surreptitiously from the Tirhoot Magistrate, who, he thought, would not be aware of the circumstances. He was still at work on this intrigue, when Major Bradshaw, having heard of General Marley's crossing the Ganges, on his way to the Turæe, resolved to defer active operations no longer, but to attack the Goorkha post of Burhurwa, situated on the right bank of the Bagmuttee, and close on the frontier, preparatory to occupying the whole Turæe for the

British government. Accordingly he concentrated his force on the 24th of November; and early in the morning of the 25th, surprised and carried the post; killing the Goorkha commander, Pursuram Thapa, and making prisoner Chundur Seekur Opadheea, with his attendants. Major Bradshaw by this means obtained possession of the Opadheea's instructions, which entered fully into the points at issue between the two governments, and completely showed the object of the deputation to have been merely to gain time. The Goorkhas were very indignant at the seizure of Chundur Seekur, who, they thought, should have been respected as an ambassador, since he had been deputed as such. They forgot, however, that the reception of the individual, or the sanctioning of his deputation, at least, is the thing that plights the faith of the government to whom an agent is accredited, and that this alone gives a claim to the respect of person enjoyed by the envoy of a hostile power, and distinguishes him from a spy. Lieutenant Boileau, who commanded the Major's escort, was wounded in personal conflict with Pursuram Thapa during the affair; and there were, besides, two Sepoys killed, and fourteen wounded. Of the enemy, seventy-five were killed or wounded, and ten soldiers were made prisoners, besides Chundur Seekur's attendants. The Turæe was imme-

diately evacuated by the Goorkhas, and occupied and annexed, *pro tempore*, by proclamation, to the British possessions. Major Bradshaw then established the following posts for its defence, till General Marley should arrive. Captain Hay, with the head-quarters of the Chumparun light infantry, was posted at Baragurhee; Captain Blackney, with a wing of the 2nd battalion, 22nd native infantry, was at Sumunpoor, to the right; while Captain Sibley was stationed, with about five hundred men, at Pursa, on the high road to Hetounda, very considerably to the left of Baragurhee.

General Marley arrived in the Puchroutee Tuppa, with the main army, on the 12th of December. An outpost of Captain Hay's had been driven in on the 7th; and the Goorkhas, though they kept within the cover of the Sál forest, had shown many symptoms of an actively hostile spirit. Some attempts at poisoning the wells and pools were discovered; and their spies were known to be busy, several having been detected in our camps. General Marley formed his army into three divisions, intending himself to attempt the Bicheekoh and Hetounda pass, with twenty-two hundred men; while Colonel Dick, with about fifteen hundred, took the route of Hureehurpoor, to the eastward; and Major Roughsedge, with one thousand two hundred and eighty

men, moved by the Sukteeduree pass and Joor-jooree, which was between the other two, and in advance of Baragurhee. The remainder of the army was to be prepared to support either division that might need it, and to keep open the communications through the forest, till the arrival of the brigade allotted to this duty, which had not yet assembled.

The month of December was spent in devising this plan, and in collecting information preparatory to its execution. In the mean time, the main army was stationary in the Puchroutee Tuppa; and except that Major Roughsedge was at one time, sent to Janikpoor, to the extreme right, the posts above described remained as before. That of Captain Sibley was twenty miles to the left of the main army, which was encamped behind Baragurhee; Captain Blackney was nearly as far to the right,—both without support; and, notwithstanding the length of time that they had occupied the same ground, no substantial works had been thrown up by either officer. This state of things induced the Goorkhas to plan a simultaneous attack on both points.

The main army of the Nipalese was collected at Mukwanpoor, under Colonel Rundhêr Singh; but the forest was in the possession of different parties, who were always on the alert. Rundhêr, having exact intelligence of the positions occupied

by Captains Sibley and Blackney respectively, ordered them both to be attacked on the morning of the 1st of January. Shumsheer Rana commanded the party sent against Pursa; and Surbjeet Thapa, that which attacked Sumunpoor: both were captains, that is, commandants of independent companies or corps in the Goorkha service, and were of high repute with their nation for bravery and conduct.

Captain Blackney was taken completely by surprise by Surbjèet, who came upon him before day-break of the new year. Himself, and his second in command, Lieutenant Duncan, were killed in the first onset; and, before the action had lasted ten minutes, the sepoy, who had but partially run to their arms on the alarm, broke, and fled in every direction. To increase the confusion, the Goorkhas set fire to the tents, having penetrated to the heart of the camp before resistance was offered. Lieut. Strettell, the only surviving officer, seeing things in this state, and perceiving that the day was quite irrecoverable, himself joined the fugitives, and retreated to Gora Suhun with the remnant of the detachment. The communication with Captain Hay had previously been cut off, so that it was not possible to retire on Baragurhee.

Captain Sibley was better on his guard at Pursa, where many circumstances had led him

to expect an attack. He had, indeed, only recently stated his apprehensions to General Marley, who, on the 31st of December, 1814, sent him a reinforcement under Major Greenstreet. The post was more than twenty miles distant, as before mentioned; and the detachment, having marched in the evening, unfortunately encamped on the road. On the morning of the new year, however, hearing the report of artillery in the direction of Pursa, the Major hastened his march, and got within three miles before the firing had ceased. The coming-in of the fugitives then sufficiently explained how the affair had ended. It seems that Shumsheer Rana came to the attack in three columns; Captain Sibley's advance had been thrown very considerably forward, and the ground of the position lay between two nullas, the windings of which allowed the enemy to penetrate sufficiently on either flank, to cut off the communication between the front and rear. The latter quarter, moreover, was left to the defence of about seventy irregular horse, and was therefore a weak point, especially in a night-affair. The attack commenced in front, where it was checked by the advance-guard, commanded by Lieutenant Smith. Finding himself pressed, however, this officer sent to ask of Captain Sibley the reinforcement of a light gun, (a one-and-a-half pounder of new construction,) which was

with the detachment. The Captain brought it forward himself; but when it came, the cartridges were found too large for it to be turned properly to account; and in the mean time, the firing having begun in rear and on both flanks, Captain Sibley found it necessary to return immediately. While on his way back he was wounded, first in the leg, and soon after, mortally, by a shot through the body, from parties of the enemy who had availed themselves of the winding of the nulla, to come close in upon the line of communication with the advance. Lieutenant Smith, the next in rank, was immediately summoned from the front to take the command; and, as the firing in the rear was heavy, he judged it right to carry in his advance-guard. On reaching the line, he found that Shumsheer Rana, while he had thus kept the detachment in play in front and in both flanks, had made his chief attack from the rear; and, having overpowered the irregulars, had penetrated to the officers' tents, and possessed himself of the magazine and bazar. The six-pounder, with the detachment, had been turned towards the rear by Lieutenant Matheson, the artillery-officer; and on the junction of Lieutenant Smith with the advance-guard, all that could be done was to form a circle, in order to keep the enemy at a distance. They had established themselves at the magazine, where there were

some trees and other cover, from behind which they picked off nearly all the artillery-men. Both Lieutenant Smith and Lieutenant Matheson were sensible that, unless the Goorkhas could be dislodged from this point, the day was lost. On proposing, however, to the sepoy to charge and recover it, they showed a disinclination to the undertaking; and kept on firing, nearly at random, until their ammunition was expended. A retreat was then resolved on; and it was effected by crossing one of the nullas at a place where it was not properly fordable, and at a time when the Goorkhas were intent on the plunder. Thus many were saved; but the two guns, the magazine, and stores of every kind, fell a prey to the enemy. Every European of the artillery, except Lieutenant Matheson himself, was either killed or wounded; and our whole loss amounted to one hundred and twenty-three killed, one hundred and eighty-seven wounded, besides seventy-three missing. The detachment originally consisted of about five hundred fighting men; and the proximity of Major Greenstreet, combined with the enemy's eagerness to secure the booty, was what alone saved the wounded and stragglers.

The activity and enterprise shown in these attacks was so unexpected by General Marley, that he began to entertain some apprehension for his train of heavy artillery, which was at the time

coming up from Betia, in the rear. Having therefore strengthened the post of Baragurhee, by ordering Major Roughsedge there from Janik-poor, the general himself made a westward movement to cover his train; moreover, considering his force to be insufficient, he abandoned all idea of penetrating the hills in the manner indicated in his instructions. The two brigadiers, Colonels Dick and Chamberlain, agreed with him in representing the army not to be sufficiently strong for offensive measures; and, perhaps, in this respect they were not wrong at the time.

The Marquess of Hastings was seriously disappointed at all these untoward occurrences. Every nerve was strained to increase the strength of all the divisions, but particularly of this, from which so much was expected. All the military stations of Bengal and Buhar were drained of troops, in order to furnish reinforcements; but it was not so easy to restore confidence to the mind of the commander.

Major-general Marley, notwithstanding the high state of the equipments of his army, and the daily approach of fresh troops, continued inactive during the whole of January; making indeed some marches in the open Turæe, but without once venturing into the forest. Repeated orders came from head-quarters, enjoining some effort at offensive measures. When, however, the general began

to deliberate upon the plan he was to adopt, he was distracted by the different opinions entertained by those he was in the habit of consulting, and came, in the end, to no resolution. In the mean time, the enemy, whose army was at Amowa, burnt several villages at no great distance from his camp, and threatened even to attack Baragurhee, where there were upwards of a thousand men in garrison. They raised a stockade at Soofee, a short distance from the post; and were inspired with such confidence from past successes, that orders were issued, under the red seal, for the attack; but the Goorkha commander, Bhugut Singh, had better information than the council at the capital, and wisely refrained. The court, however, not satisfied with his reasons, attributed his conduct to cowardice; and summoning him to the capital, to answer for the disobedience, made him appear at the Durbar in woman's attire, as wanting the spirit and courage of a man. They were soon afterwards undeceived; and on the 7th February removed the post they had so impudently established. But to the mortification of the troops, and discredit of the British general, it had continued thus to insult us for near a month with impunity. Major Roughsedge, indeed, a day or two before the evacuation, sent Captain Hay with a party from Baragurhee to reconnoitre, and, if possible, dislodge the enemy; but that officer, finding his approach inter-

cepted by a morass, and seeing that the post was too strong for his detachment to carry by assault, contented himself with firing a few shrapnell shells from a couple of 6-pounders he had with him, and retired again to Baragurhee.

On the 10th February, General Marley, unable longer to endure the irksomeness of his situation, and feeling strongly the impossibility of answering the expectations of his commander-in-chief, took the sudden and extraordinary resolution of leaving the camp, which was then at Bunjaree Pookureea. He set off before daylight in the morning, without publishing any notification of his intention to the troops, and without taking any means of providing for the conduct of the ordinary routine of command during his absence.

The resolution had previously been formed by Lord Hastings of providing another commander for the Sarun army; but the unadvised step into which General Marley was thus betrayed, seemed to him to require his permanent removal from the staff.

Major-general George Wood was ordered up from the presidency to succeed General Marley; and Colonel Dick, the senior brigadier, assumed and continued to exercise the command until his arrival.

We have now brought up the operations of this campaign to the period when the succession of

disasters had reached its crisis. General Ochterlony alone had not been foiled. He was steadily pursuing his plan by slow and secure manœuvres, but had yet gained no brilliant advantage over his equally cautious antagonist. General Martindell's division had failed three several times: twice before Nalapanee, and the third time in the attempt to take up positions before Jythuk. Moreover, the aggregate loss sustained by this division had amounted to a third of the numbers that originally took the field from Meeruth. The army assembled at Gourukpoor had allowed itself to retire before the enemy under circumstances amounting to a repulse; while, as we have seen, the Buhar division, which was thought strong enough to have penetrated to Katmandoo, had lost two detachments of five hundred men each, without an equivalent success of any kind. From the frontier of Oudh to Rungpoor, our armies were completely held in check on the outside of the forest; while our territory was insulted with impunity, and the most extravagant alarms spread through the country. We had lost nothing, indeed, on the Morung frontier; on the contrary, the cooperation of the Sikhim Raja had been gained, the communication having been opened by an overture on his part, and a request for a few military stores. In this quarter, also, an attempt made by the Goorkha commander in Morung to cut off a post of ours

stationed at Moodwanee, had failed; Lieutenant Foord, of the 9th N. I. having repulsed their night attack, after the assailants had succeeded in firing his tents and baggage. We had several killed, and Lieutenant Thomas, of the 9th, was amongst the wounded, in this affair, which was very creditable to the troops and officers; but as the position was next day evacuated, there was little to boast of in the victory. Major Latter, indeed, was led by the vigorous nature of the attack to solicit the aid of some reinforcements, then on their way to the Sarun army; and thus, by withholding them from their destination, yielded the enemy some advantage from the attack, notwithstanding its failure. The alarms of the civil authorities of Tirhoot had produced a similar diversion in that quarter; and it was not until the end of February, or, indeed, the beginning of March, that the division destined for the main attack was augmented to the full strength proposed for it.

CHAPTER IV.

NIPÀL WAR.—FIRST CAMPAIGN.

1815.

Reflections—Successful skirmish on Sarun frontier—General G. Wood takes the command—his inactivity—General J. S. Wood's proceedings in Gourukpoor—Resolution of Governor-general to attack Kumaon—Levies for the purpose—Lieut.-colonel Gardner penetrates by the Kosila—turns the Goorkha position—takes post at Choumou—Major Hearsey penetrates to Chumpawut—Colonel Gardner again turns the Goorkha position, and arrives before Almora—Colonel Nicolls sent by the Governor-general to support these operations—Defeat and capture of Major Hearsey by Hustedul—his death in an affair with Major Patton's detachment—Attack of the Goorkha positions before Almora—Night sally of the Nipàlese defeated—Fall of Almora—Proceedings before Jythuk—Plans of General Martindell—unsatisfactory results—Resolution to cut off the enemy's supplies—Major Richards sent to occupy a post for this purpose—Dislodges the enemy with loss—Jythuk surrendered to General Ochterlony—his further proceedings—Reduction of Ramgurh, &c. by Colonel Cooper—Final operations against Maloun—Lodgment at Ryla and Deothul—Death of Captain Showers—Bhugtee Thapa leads a desperate attack on Deothul—his defeat and death—Goorkha chiefs desert Umur Singh—his surrender—Arrangements for disposal of the conquered territory.

THE uniform success which had hitherto attended the Goorkhas produced, in January 1815,

an effect on the public mind in the independent portion of India which is more easily imagined than described. Although jealous, naturally, of our preponderance, and suspicious to a degree of any relinquishment of the pacific policy, the native powers had so little knowledge of the strength and resources of the Goorkhas, that the war at first excited little sensation. It was regarded as a mere affair with a troublesome Raja of the frontier; and, but for the greater magnitude of our preparations, might have been assimilated to the measures taken in 1812 against the Rewa chief. As one check, however, followed another, speculation grew more active, and the events of the campaign became matter of intenser interest; until, at last, more than one of the native courts began seriously to think it was time to prepare to take advantage of circumstances. Runjeet Singh, the Punjab Seikh, kept an army at Lahore, and seemed to menace us in the extreme north-west; while Ameer Khan collected together his Putan battalions, and made an ambiguous offer of their services, from a point only a few marches from Agra. The tone, moreover, assumed in Sindheea's durbar and at Poona was any thing but conciliatory.

It is not our business in this place to explain at length the attitude assumed by the native powers, in consequence of the altered view of our

position presented by these disasters. Suffice it to say, that the intrigues which were set on foot throughout the whole independent portion of India, and which led to such important results a few years afterwards, date their commencement from this period. In proportion as their existence became manifest, it was of course more necessary that we should persevere and conquer the subsisting difficulties in the hills; for the name and character of the government and of the British nation were felt to be committed on the issue.

The Marquess of Hastings never doubted for an instant of his ultimate success in the campaign; and notwithstanding the unfavourable aspect of things at the commencement of 1815, there were abundant sources of consolation, and of a just confidence, to those who looked beyond the surface. Every check our arms had experienced was clearly traceable to a want of due precaution in those who directed the operation, and this was an error that was sure to be remedied as soon as felt. Thus every encounter, even when unfavourable in its result, brought more strength in the lessons of prudence it inculcated, than was detracted in the physical loss sustained. The soldiers and sepahees of the British army had, for some time, been unused to war; but though somewhat open to the influence of panic from the strangeness of the scene, and

novelty of their situation amidst the forests and mountains of this extraordinary region, and moreover a little disheartened, at first, to find their best efforts thwarted by this semi-barbarous enemy, they yet showed a wonderful buoyancy of spirit in soon recovering their wonted nerve. The Goorkhas, on the other hand, were abundantly satisfied with repulsing an attack or cutting off an outpost. They never pushed their success beyond this; and were indeed too deficient in military science, as well as in physical means, to assume a superiority in the campaign, or act offensively on a large scale, against any one of our divisions. Their tactics were purely defensive; so much so, that howsoever severely their assailant might suffer from the indiscretion of his first attack, they left him ample time to collect fresh courage, and approach them again with more caution.

To the officers of the Bengal army, in particular, were the lessons of this war salutary; precipitancy and want of caution were qualities bred in them, by an uninterrupted course of easy victory. From the days of Clive to those of Lord Lake, they had only to show themselves, and march straight against their enemy, to ensure his precipitate flight. They naturally carried into the hills the same contempt of the foe which their victories in the plains had engendered; and

were taught only by painful experience to make sufficient allowance for the entire change of circumstances in the new field of action. They had, however, to guard against another influence as prejudicial as over confidence; and that was, too great distrust and apprehension after the experience of a check. It is doubtful which extreme was, in its results, most injurious to the British cause: but more than one of the officers in high command afforded an example of the facility with which the mind passes from one to the other, as well as of the obstinacy with which distrust maintains its hold when once it finds admittance.

It must be allowed to the Goorkhas that they were an experienced as well as a brave enemy: they had been continually waging war in the mountains for more than fifty years, and knew well how to turn every thing to the best advantage. Caution and judgment were, therefore, more required against them, than boldness of action or of decision; but most of all, that power of intelligence and discrimination which is never without a resource in circumstances the most unexpected.


It will be perceived that little advance was made in the campaign until we had learnt to turn the same advantages to account against the enemy, by the help of which he foiled us so often at the

commencement; for with all the experience of Indian warfare, combined with the professional science of Europe, our officers found yet something to learn from these Goorkhas. We adopted from them the plan of stockading posts, which the nature of the campaign frequently rendered it necessary to place beyond the limit of prompt support. Had this plan been adopted from the first, the detachments of Captains Sibley and Blackney would have been saved. It was, however, altogether a new thing to the Bengal army; for, from the earliest days, there had never been works thrown up for the defence of an outpost; nor in a war of the plains, could there ever be occasion for such a precaution. Sir David Ochterlony has the merit of having first resorted to this plan,* and of having adopted it, too, as a resource of prudence which occurred to his own mind, not taught to him by the experience of disaster, as was the case with others. Such, however, was the nature of Umur Singh's positions that they could not have been turned or surrounded, so as to cut off his communications without occupying a large circuit, and throwing out detachments for the purpose at considerable distances from one another; many of which, being necessarily much


* The first stockade erected after the Goorkha fashion was at Khundnee, where a battalion was left with some irregulars, while the division turned Umur Singh's left, by marching to Nehur.

exposed, would have been liable to be overwhelmed separately, but for this simple though substantial defence.

The strength of the stockades was originally greatly miscalculated; made up of rough hewn wood and stones, heaped together between an inner and outer palisade, they were in appearance so contemptible as to invite assault without even seeming to require breaching. On the plains, much more formidable-looking places were constantly carried in that way: but appearances were deceitful; and the Goorkhas, having a just confidence in their defences, always stood boldly to them, and made the assailants pay dearly for their temerity. The lighter artillery made little or no impression, and the difficulty of bringing up heavy guns, rendered them, in truth, most formidable defences. The wood and materials for raising them were every where at hand, and the celerity with which they could be prepared in any position formed a main source of the strength of the country. But this was a resource equally available to an invader, and one which placed the issue in the power of continuance, that is, in the length of the purse. By the adoption of this system, the operations of the divisions which penetrated the hills were entirely converted into a war of posts, as will have been already sufficiently manifest from the character of General Ochterlony's proceedings.



Second Stockade.



SECTION
of the
Second Stockade.



Third Stockade.

The same plan was ultimately put in practice at Jythuk, Kumaon, and elsewhere. Its effect will presently be fully shown; but first, it will be proper to mention the result of the efforts made against the more central possessions of the enemy.

The operations of the Sarun and Gourukpoor armies may be dismissed with a very few words. Major-general George Wood was appointed General Marley's successor, and joined the camp on the 20th of February. The very day before his arrival, an event occurred that struck terror into the enemy, and raised the courage of this army to the highest pitch of confidence. Lieutenant Pickersgill, an active officer of the intelligence department, discovered, while out reconnoitering, a party of about five hundred Goorkhas at no great distance from camp. He immediately sent intimation to Colonel Dick, the senior officer, who had assumed the command on General Marley's departure, and himself remained with his personal escort to watch the enemy. Colonel Dick sent a party of irregular horse, under Cornet Hearsey, to strengthen Lieutenant Pickersgill, and himself followed, with all the picquets of the army, in the hope of cutting off this detachment. The Goorkhas, who had taken an advantageous position in a hollow, finding themselves unmolested by Lieutenant Pickersgill, and seeing his small numbers, came to the resolution of attacking him. Just, however, as they debouched

from their position for the purpose, they perceived the cavalry, and the further support that was advancing. Appalled by this, they attempted a precipitate retreat, when Lieutenant Pickersgill, waiting only to be joined by Cornet Hearsey's horse, fell upon them, and cut the whole detachment to pieces. A number of officers of the army had ridden out from camp immediately on its being known that a party of the enemy were in sight, and these joined in the charge, and were mainly instrumental to its success.

The Goorkhas were so intimidated by this result, that they hastily withdrew every position they had established in the forest and Turæe; and when General G. Wood arrived next day, the passage of the forest was free to him,—not a Goorkha being to be seen below the hills.

The season was doubtless very far gone for any thing now to be commenced, nevertheless, there remained a month to make some effort to redeem the consequences of his predecessor's inactivity; and the army naturally expected to be led through the forest after the enemy, if not into the passes of the hills. The new General, however, adopted an opinion that the season of the fever had arrived, and that it would be risking the health and efficiency of his fine army, which was now augmented to thirteen thousand four hundred regular troops, were he to attempt to

penetrate the forest. He accordingly contented himself with sweeping its skirt, in a long march eastward to Janikpoor and back again; and thus the season closed, actually without his seeing a single enemy.

In Gourukpoor, Major-general John Sullivan Wood burnt a few of the Goorkha villages in retaliation of their excesses, and marched wherever he heard the enemy were advancing. He was, however, still deceived by false reports, and could not get rid of the impression that his force was too weak to effect any thing against Wuzeer Singh, whom he represented to head-quarters as commanding an army numerically much superior to his own. On the necessity of ascertaining this point, by coming actually into contact with the enemy, being strongly urged by the Commander-in-chief, General Wood was induced at the close of the season, that is, in the month of April, to appear again before Bootwul. He accordingly, on the 17th of that month, drew up his army, and opened a desultory fire against the place for some hours, from his artillery and line. The manœuvre produced no result whatever, though attended with several casualties. The General, however, described it as a reconnoissance calculated to create a diversion by alarming the enemy on this frontier, at the same time that it enabled himself to ascertain that he had not miscalculated the strength of the army.

opposed to him. General Wood immediately after this manœuvre laid waste the Goorkha portion of the Turæe, and then retired to cantonments at Gourukpoor.

It is fortunate for the interest of this narrative that the spirit of enterprize was not every where so wanting as in the leaders of the two central divisions. In proceeding westward, it now becomes our duty to relate a series of operations of a very opposite character.

It was ascertained by Lord Hastings, while on his tour through Rohilkhund, that the province of Kumaon, which skirts the north of it, was nearly destitute of troops; the whole Goorkha force having been drawn off to oppose the British divisions operating to the east or west. It seemed to him that a diversion in this quarter, while it would distract the enemy by multiplying the points of attack, would further be of use in preventing any reinforcements from proceeding westward to Jythuk. If successful, it might lead to very important results, even to the conquest of the province, and entire separation of the eastern from the western territory: if the contrary, the effect would be produced in other quarters without much loss. It is to be observed that the Kumaonese were known to be disaffected to the Goorkhas, who held them in rigorous subjection, frequently seizing and selling into servitude their women and children, in order

to enforce the most arbitrary exactions. The consequent alienation of the population from their masters, was reckoned upon as likely to aid greatly the projected enterprize.

There were no regular troops that could be spared at this juncture (December); for the threatening tone and position of several chiefs and associations of the south and north-west required that a warlike attitude should be maintained on both frontiers; whilst the demands for reinforcements to the divisions already in the hills, were so urgent as to require every disposeable man. In order, therefore, not to lose the opportunity, Lord Hastings resolved to avail himself of the warlike population of Rohilkhund, who are Putâns, of a race trained from infancy to the use of the sword and matchlock, and naturally brave and impetuous, though not easily subjected to discipline. Two officers, used to such troops, were accordingly ordered to make levies of Rohillas, to be employed against Kumaon. The persons selected were Lieutenant-colonel Gardner, and Major, then Captain, Hearsey, neither of them of the regular establishment, but both Mahratta officers of great merit, who had come over under the proclamation of Lord Wellesley, on war breaking out with Sindheea in 1802-3. Lieutenant-colonel Gardner had since been retained in command of a corps of police-horse; Major Hearsey had not been em-

ployed in a military capacity for some years, but was the companion of Mr. Moorcroft's adventurous journey across the snowy range to the lake Manusararwa, and had been detained in Kumaon as a prisoner, along with Mr. Moorcroft, on their return, the very year before the war broke out.

To the former officer it was assigned to penetrate from Kasheepoor in the Moradabad district; while the latter was to operate against Chumpawut, to the east of the province, by the passes near Peeleebheet and Khyreegurh, where the Deoha, or Gogra, forces its way into the plains. Both officers received their instructions late in December, and proceeded at once to organize levies.

On the 11th of February, 1815, Lieutenant-colonel Gardner commenced his march from Kasheepoor, accompanied by a civilian, his relation, the Honourable Edward Gardner, to whom was assigned the function of political agent for the province. On the 15th, the force reached the foot of the first passes, and dislodged a Goorkha picquet from Deklee: from hence they could see distinctly a party of Goorkhas stockaded on the summit of Kat-kee-nao, an elevated post which overlooked the entrance of the pass, by the bed of the Kosila; while another party of the enemy occupied the Gurhee, or fort of Kotha, considerably to the right. Having reconnoitered the two positions, the Lieutenant-colonel determined on an attempt to pene-

trate them, so as, if possible, to get between the garrisons and Almora.

On the 16th, in order to put the above design into execution, the Lieutenant-colonel made a short march up the Kosila to Chookum, and next day halted: that the same hill porters who attended the advance, might return to bring up the rest of the baggage and supplies. Heavy rain commenced on the 18th, which soon filled the river, and otherwise impeded the advance. In the evening, however, a party was sent in the direction of Kotha, as if to threaten that post; and at the same time two hundred Rohillas, and one hundred Mewatees marched up the river, to endeavour to seize a strong pass, called Thangura, where the Kosila rushes through a defile commanded by lofty and precipitous mountains on either side. This party, from some misconduct of the guide, did not secure the pass on both sides of the river; but established itself on the hill overlooking it to the south-east. The detachment sent in the direction of Kotha, fell in with the garrison on a hill called Ronseldeh, between the Thangura pass and Kotha. Lieutenant-colonel Gardner, therefore, deeming it necessary to dislodge the enemy from this post without loss of time, moved next morning with five hundred men for the purpose. The object being effected, he turned towards Thangura, and encamped for the night at Ookul Danga, where his party had esta-

blished themselves, as above mentioned, on the evening before. On the 20th, the Goorkhas evacuated Kat-kee-nao, and retired to Googur Gurh, on the right of the Kosila, near Thangura. Kat-kee-nao was immediately secured by a party of observation sent for the purpose the preceding day; and in the evening, the Lieutenant-colonel in person crossed the river, and dislodged the enemy from Googur; thus securing both sides of the important pass of Thangura. On the 21st, seven hundred Rohilla Putans moved forward to Seethee, where they bivouacked, and were next day pushed on to a point where two roads to Almora meet, at a peepul-tree. The more open route, by the valley and town of Boojan, was found occupied by the Goorkha Surdar (Rungelee), with the concentrated garrisons of Kotha and Kat-kee-nao. After a short halt therefore to refresh, the Lieutenant-colonel marched with all haste to seize the Choumou hill, the first steep ascent on the other road; which, leaving the valley, runs along the ridge to the north or left of the direct line of advance. The whole day was consumed in this arduous march; and at the close of it, there was an ascent of three kos to the summit which it was intended to occupy. The fatigue was so great, that only about forty men of the whole number came to the ground; and these were supplied with water from the snow, which lay there in abun-

dance. Early in the morning of the 22d, the enemy were seen making for the same point: they were led by Ungut Surdar, who had just arrived with a reinforcement from Almora. The party at Choumou were still extremely weak; but they had several standards, of which they made such a display as deterred Ungut from an attack which he seemed to meditate.

It was the 28th of February before all the supplies could be brought up from the rear to Choumou: on that day, however, a further short advance was made to Kampena-ke-danda; whence the enemy were seen in force at Koompoor, a rugged hill in front.

The Lieutenant-colonel, having been obliged to form depôts and establish garrisons at Kat-kee-nao, Kotha, and several other places in his rear, thought it prudent to wait here for further reinforcements; and particularly for one thousand Putans raised at Hâpur in the Meeruth district, and now on their way to join him. Little happened in the interim of this halt, with the exception of two skirmishes, on the 6th and 18th of March; both of which ended in a manner highly creditable to the Rohillas. In the former, the Lieutenant-colonel's advanced-guard succeeded in driving back a party of the enemy who ventured to descend from their stockade into the intervening valley of Tarakot; and in the second

affair, which was rather more serious, between six and seven hundred men being engaged on either side, the Putans made a resolute charge, and put to the rout a body of the enemy of equal strength, who ventured again to the same ground.

The Lieutenant-colonel, while he thus advanced by the Kosila, had kept a party in front of the direct route from Rohilkhund by Bummouree and Bheem Tál; the commandant, however, attempted nothing, and was in the end ordered to join the main body.

Major Hearsey, having completed his levies, at the same time with Colonel Gardner, advanced also, in February, from Peeleebheet, and penetrated by the Kalee, or western Gogra, to Chumpawut, without meeting any opposition. The population showed some disposition to declare in his favour; so, posting half his force to guard the important passes of the Kalee, he began to think of co-operating with Lieutenant-colonel Gardner, by an advance to Almora from the east.

In this view he moved upon Kootulgurh, a very strong fort; but which some information received as to the state of its supplies, induced the Major to think must soon yield to a blockade. The month of March was spent in these operations.

In the mean time, Colonel Gardner being joined by the men from Hâpur, on the 22nd of March, again out-generaled the Goorkha commander, and established himself in his rear, and even within sight of Almora. The same night that the reinforcement joined, a strong detachment under Mohun Singh, a native commandant of known courage and steadiness, was sent, by a circuitous route through the valleys to the right, to seize the southernmost point of a ridge immediately facing Almora, where was a temple called Sheeo-ka Devee. On the morning of the 23d, in order to draw off the enemy's attention from this operation, a demonstration was made of attacking Koompoor in front. The movement was thus so well concerted, that it was not till twelve o'clock in the day that the Goorkhas made the discovery of its object, by seeing the Rohillas taking up their position at the temple behind them. The Lieutenant-colonel, satisfied at the success of the operation, waited till the following day to see its effect on the enemy. Early in the morning he advanced with the intention of attacking, or at least turning, the left flank of the Koompoor position, in order to follow to Sheeo-ka Devee. The Goorkhas, however, moved at the same time; and setting fire to their stockade, hastened by Reonee to Kutarmul, two points on the same ridge with

Sheeo-ka Devec. The Lieutenant-colonel followed by the same route; but the want of porters prevented his reaching Reonee till the 25th, and a halt of a couple of days was then necessary, to bring up the guns and supplies. On the 28th he marched in two columns upon Kutarmul; and as he approached, the Goorkha commander, finding himself between Mohun Singh's detachment and the main body, did not think it prudent to continue on the same ridge, but crossed the Kossila, and posted himself on the declivities between Almora and that river, leaving the Lieutenant-colonel free to occupy the ground on the right bank from Reonee to Sheeo-ka Devec. Thus had Lieutenant-colonel Gardner, by sheer dexterity, and without bloodshed, made an effectual opening to the heart of the province of Kumaon. His conciliatory conduct, and that of the Political Agent, had succeeded in effectually gaining the natives; so much so, that the bazar of his camp seldom failed to be supplied from the villages in the hills; and the intercourse opened and maintained furnished certain intelligence of all the enemy's projects.

In the end of March, Lord Hastings, seeing the state of things here, determined on supporting the Lieutenant-colonel; and following up his successes, by sending a force of regular in-

fantry and artillery, capable of subduing all further opposition. He selected Colonel Jasper Nicolls, at the time Quartermaster-general of the King's troops in India, for this important service; and on the 23rd of March, placed under his command a force of two thousand and twenty-five firelocks, composed of the 1st battalion 4th N. I., under Captain Faithful; the 2d battalion 5th N. I. under Major Patton; and part of a battalion formed of grenadier companies, and then employed in Gurhwal. Ten pieces of artillery of different kinds were added from Moradabad. The state of the operations before Jythuk, combined with the assurance that the tranquillity of Central India would not be disturbed this season, were the circumstances that enabled the Governor-general to devote the troops of his regular army to this service now; though two months earlier he had not deemed it safe to spare them.

On the 5th of April, Colonel Nicolls entered the hills with his advance, and hastened to join Lieutenant-colonel Gardner at Kutarmul. On his way he heard of the entire defeat and capture of Major Hearsey, and of the reduction of all the posts he had established to guard the line of the Kalee or Surjoo; by which names the western branch of the Gogra is here known. It seems that the court of Katmandoo, finding all secure for the

season to the eastward, determined on an effort to succour Almora, and eventually relieve Jythuk. For this purpose they ordered a battalion to cross the Kalee into Kumaon, and gave the command of the force to Hustee-dul, the chief then governing the province of Dotee. Having strengthened himself by collecting all the detachments of his province, this chief crossed the Kalee, on the 31st of March, at Khusmot Ghat. Major Hearsay had attempted the defence of a wider line along this river than his force justified, besides being still engaged on the blockade of Kootulgurh. His men were thus too much detached for his whole force to be made available in the emergency; nevertheless, he hastened to meet the enemy with the few men he had at Chumpawut, and fell in with him on the first day's march. The Rohillas, being raw levies, deserted Major Hearsay after the first fire; and he was wounded, and made prisoner. None of the positions he had garrisoned held out afterwards; but the men hastened back again to the plains with the utmost terror and expedition. Little better was to be expected from new levies, upon the loss of their commander; the defeat was, however, of bad effect in the impression it left on the inhabitants of the province; and had not the support been on its way to Colonel Gardner, its influence on the raw troops of his force might, perhaps, have ren-

dered necessary the relinquishment of all the advantages gained. It may be observed here, that in every action between the Goorkha regulars and Rohilla Nujeebs, or other similar levies, the former were always victorious. Hence the merit of Colonel Gardner's plan, under which, though always advancing to his object, he avoided committing his men, except in skirmishes where he had a decided superiority, or under circumstances in which the enemy did not think it prudent to attack him, is the more conspicuous.

Colonel Nicolls, on being informed of the defeat and capture of Major Hearsey, hastened to effect a junction with Lieutenant-colonel Gardner, and reached him a day or two before Hustee-dul arrived with his prisoner at Almora. The latter event was announced by a salute which was both heard and seen from the British camp. On the 23d of April, Hustee-dul again left the town, with a considerable detachment, upon some expedition, the object of which was not immediately apparent. Colonel Nicolls, seeing the movement, despatched Major Patton, with his battalion, the 2d of the 5th N. I., in the direction of Gunnanath, a station about fifteen miles north of Almora, on which Hustee-dul appeared to be marching. The routes of the two detachments brought them in sight, and close upon one another, before they were well aware. They were both marching up the

same eminence, and it was a contest which should seize it. Hustee-dul first gained the summit; but the British advance-guard, under Lieutenant Webster, of the 5th N. I., attacked him before he had time to make any arrangement for his defence. He was dislodged with considerable loss; and in the action received a ball in his temple, which secured the victory to us. Our loss was only two killed, and twenty-five wounded, including Ensign Blair, severely.

Hustee-dul was an active and brave officer, of high reputation in his nation, and his loss was severely felt in Almora.

Colonel Nicolls determined, on the return of Major Patton, to avail himself of the alarm he judged the late defeat would occasion; and on the 25th, at one P. M., he led the 1st battalion 4th N. I. in person across the Kosila, followed by Lieutenant-colonel Gardner and his irregulars, in order to effect a lodgement on the Seetolee heights, where the enemy were posted. Having reached the height and taken measures to secure the possession of it, he thought he observed symptoms of alarm in the garrison of a stone breast-work before him, and immediately in front of the town of Almora. He was hence tempted to try an assault, without waiting to bring up his guns to breach the walls, which would have occasioned a considerable loss of time. The assault was led by Captain

Faithful in person; and the redoubt was entered first, through an embrasure, by Lieutenant Wight, who fell immediately, severely wounded by a Goorkha chief. Captain Faithful followed at the head of some grenadiers, and saved his brother officer by cutting down the man; when the rest fled, leaving the redoubt in our possession. All the stockades of the ridge were carried or evacuated; and the enemy were pursued into the town of Almora; leaving the Colonel to make his dispositions for the night.

The Nipålese were not, however, disposed to resign the possession of these heights, which communicated directly with the town, without a further struggle; and accordingly, at about eleven in the night, having sent a detachment secretly round, they attacked and carried our most northerly post, though stockaded and defended by a piquet of regulars, under Lieutenant Costly, of the 1st battalion of 4th N. I. A party of the flank battalion, under Lieutenants Brown and Winfield, immediately moved to the support of the post; and with the aid of a ghole of irregulars, under Colonel Gardner in person, the place was recovered, but not without a hard struggle. The firing in this quarter was the signal for a general sortie from the fort; but for this Colonel Nicolls was prepared, and the enemy were driven back with loss; after which they confined themselves to a little de-

tached firing. We lost in this affair an officer, Lieutenant Tapley of the 27th, attached to the grenadier battalion, besides many sepoy and irregulars killed and wounded.* The next day the guns were brought up, and a position taken about seventy yards only from the fort of Almora. Bumsah Chountra, the governor of the province, seeing his situation desperate, proposed in the evening of the following day a suspension of arms, preparatory to a negotiation of the terms of surrender.

The armistice being granted, the Nipâlese wounded officers came boldly into our camp to solicit surgical aid. They further stated, without reserve, their extreme want of supplies, and allowed us to examine the walls and defences of the place ; thus exhibiting a frankness and confidence not a little remarkable in their circumstances. In arranging the terms of capitulation, their main stand was made to obtain an article permitting five hundred men, destined to the service by the government at Katmandoo, to proceed westward, to

* Including the operations in the day-time, the loss in the attack and maintenance of the Seetolee position, was one officer, Lieutenant Tapley, twenty-nine sepoy, and twenty irregulars killed ; two officers (Lieutenants Wight and Purvis, of the 4th native infantry), ninety-eight sepahes, and sixty-one irregulars wounded. Making a total of two hundred and eleven killed and wounded.

reinforce Runjoor Singh at Jythuk. This, of course, was resisted; but they did not give up the point until a renewal of hostilities was threatened, if the surrender were not concluded by a given hour. At last, on the 27th of April, a formal convention was signed by Colonel Nicolls and the Honourable Edward Gardner, on one side, and Chountra Bumsah, Ungut Kajee, and Chamoo Bundaree, on the other.

In this the surrender of the province of Kumaon, with all its fortified places, was stipulated; also the retirement of all troops and officers of the Goorkha government, within ten days, to the east of the Kalee; the British engaging to furnish carriage to aid the transportation of private property. Major Hearsey's unconditional release was further stipulated. These articles were faithfully executed; and Colonel Nicolls, having accompanied the Goorkha troops to the ghats of the Kalee, disposed his force in the best manner for the defence of that line, against any future attempt of the Nipålese to molest our possession of the province.*

Let us now return to the events of the campaign further west. It has been stated that Major-

* During the operations above explained, the Goorkhas made an irruption from Dotee into Khyreegurh, in the plains; but were defeated and driven back by a detachment under Captain Buchanan, sent from Futchgurh by Lord Hastings.

general Martindell, after the failures of December, was so firmly persuaded of the inadequacy of his force to do any thing against the position of Jythuk, that he lay long inactive at Nahn. In the interim, several reinforcements reached him; and the instructions of his Commander-in-chief continually urged the recommencement of active operations. Towards the beginning of February, Major Kelly was detached from Nahn, with a light battalion, to occupy a post on the same ridge that Major Ludlow had moved upon in December. He established himself without opposition at Nounee; and on the 12th of the month, being supported by Major Ludlow and his battalion, he advanced to a point called the Black Hill. This post being within the range of heavy artillery, it was resolved by the Major-general to carry up 18-pounders, and batter the first of the enemy's stockades. The side of the hill was therefore prepared for the purpose, and, by great exertions, guns and stores were dragged up the precipitous part of the ascent. The operation excited the astonishment of the enemy, who came out every where to see the wonder, but made no attempt to prevent it. In the mean time, Runjoor Singh's communications were left quite open; and besides the reinforcement carried to him by Bulbhudur Singh, others were continually joining. On the 17th of February, intelligence reached camp of a party being on its way to

Jythuk, from the Jumna. Lieutenant Young was accordingly detached with a body of irregulars to intercept it. Not finding the enemy at the point expected, he came back on the 19th; but more correct intelligence being then obtained, he again marched with all the irregulars in camp, amounting to upwards of two thousand men, and found the Goorkhas in a place called Chumalgurh. Not thinking it right to trust his raw troops with an immediate attack of the position, and relying on his great superiority of number, he proceeded to post detachments where most they could annoy the enemy, and cut off the communication with Jythuk.

The whole number of the Goorkhas did not amount to two hundred fighting men; but seeing their situation desperate, they called a council, and adopted the resolution to die bravely together*. Having thus prepared themselves, they advanced, and delivering their fire, charged, sword in hand, the nearest post of the irregulars. These unfortunately gave way immediately, and were pursued, in the utmost confusion, to the next post, where the panic quickly spread; until the whole party took to flight without attempting any resistance, in spite of the utmost efforts of Lieutenant Young to induce them to face the enemy.

* Ujumba Punt was the leader of this party.

This unlooked-for result of their intrepidity enabled the Goorkhas to continue their march to Jythuk, without further opposition; and gave them so much confidence, that they never afterwards failed to attack a post of irregulars whenever placed within their reach; and even when stockaded, they generally succeeded.

The 18-pounders, from the Black Hill, were opened against the first stockade on the 17th of March; and on the 20th a battery was erected in a more advanced position. The effect of one day's fire of this last, was to level with the ground the whole stockade; but the Major-general, instead of following up the advantage by an immediate attack, which all the troops were eagerly expecting, came now to the conclusion that his present plan was injudicious; for that, if carried, the post could not be maintained against the force Runjoor Singh could bring up from behind it. It would thus seem, that with an European regiment and a force of at least five thousand of the Company's regular army, the Major-general yet thought it dangerous to take a step that might bring on a general action with an enemy, who had never more than two thousand five hundred men at the utmost. This excess of caution was an unfortunate consequence of the early disasters above related; but it was a feeling that none of the officers or troops of the division participated

with the general, and that, under the circumstances, was quite unwarranted. The vacillation of mind exhibited in the adoption and abandoning of these different plans, was strongly remarked upon by the Commander-in-chief. It seemed to him that the practicability of reducing the stockades by battering them in succession, could as well have been determined upon before bringing up the guns, and wasting so much labour and ammunition; in which case, more than a month would have been saved for the prosecution of any other plan. It is painful, however, to dwell upon the sources of such disappointments.

Upon relinquishing the hope of gaining any useful end by the heavy artillery, the Major-general, on the 26th of March, came to the resolution of surrounding Runjoor by detachments, and thus reducing him by blockade and starvation. General Ochterlony, he perceived, had effected every thing by directing his efforts against the supplies of his antagonist; and there could be little doubt that the same system must be efficacious at Jythuk, though the end of March was rather late in the season to commence on such an operation. In execution of this new plan, Major Richards was sent, on the 1st of April, to seize a post on the eastern ridge, connected with Jythuk. He marched with two battalions, the 1st of the 13th, and 1st of the 15th N. I. and some irregulars. Having made a consi-

derable circuit, to bring his detachment to a place where the ascent could be made with artillery, and without much separation of the files, he advanced cautiously to gain the top of the ridge, which was occupied by the Goorkhas in considerable force. The enemy allowed the Major to come within forty yards before delivering his fire. The post was, however, overpowered without much loss; and Major Richards followed up his advantage along the ridge to a point called Punjab-kateeba, or Punchul; where the Goorkhas seemed disposed to make a more serious stand. The Major halted, to allow time for the rear companies to close up; and then attacked this post in two columns; and carrying it, proceeded immediately to make preparations to stockade it against an effort to recover it, that he expected Runjoor Singh would make with his whole force. The enemy were, however, deterred by the state of preparation they witnessed, and by their past ill-success; and left Major Richards full leisure to establish himself securely.

In the above affair the Goorkha commander, Ujumba Punt*, was taken prisoner; and of thirteen hundred men that composed his force, one hundred and seven were killed, and about two

* This was the same man, who with two hundred, or one hundred and fifty Goorkhas, defeated the irregulars under Lieutenant Young;—*Vide above, page 159.*

hundred and fifty wounded. The British loss was trifling, being only seven killed and twenty-nine wounded, including two officers. On the 16th of April, Captain Wilson marched to occupy a point midway between Major Richards and the headquarters of the Major-general: besides which, several other points had, in the interim, been seized and stockaded in execution of the plan of blockade. Notwithstanding, indeed, the lateness of the period at which it was adopted, there can be but little doubt that the operation would have been effectual in reducing Jythuk, had not its fall been hastened by other means.

The glory of receiving the surrender of Jythuk was reserved for Sir David Ochterlony, whose further successes alone remain to be recorded.

We left this officer in position on the further side of the Maloun ridge, with Colonel Arnold at Rutungurh, between the enemy and Belaspoor, while Colonel Cooper was left to reduce the forts of the Ramgurh range. The first of these attacked was Ramgurh itself, which, after great exertions in dragging up the heavy artillery, was breached at last on the 16th of February. The garrison capitulated for themselves, and for Joorjooree, and were allowed to march out with the honours of war. The two commanders, however, on joining Umur Singh at Maloun, were punished with the loss of their

ears and noses ;—an act of savage discipline not perhaps wholly unmerited by the individuals ; but considering Umur Singh's circumstances, not very judicious. Each of the forts had a garrison of one hundred men ; and Joorjooree would have taken some days to reduce, even admitting that Ramgurh could have held out no longer.

It was the 10th of March before Colonel Cooper could bring a battery to bear on Taragurh, the next place he attacked. The breach was practicable the following day, and the garrison evacuated the fort in the night. Chumba, on the same ridge, was next attacked ; and by the 16th of March, after a day's battering, the garrison hung out the white flag, and surrendered prisoners of war. The chiefs expressed alarm lest their families should suffer from Umur Singh's severity ; to deceive him, therefore, the Colonel ordered the guns to continue firing occasionally with blank cartridges ; while some of the prisoners were released, that they might endeavour to bring away the families from Maloun.

The whole of the strong forts in the rear being thus reduced and occupied, Colonel Cooper followed the main army, to take part in the last operations against Maloun. By the 14th of April all was prepared for a combined movement, the plan of which the General had for some time been maturing.

The immediate object was to effect a lodgment within the series of heights that formed Umur Singh's present position. His line stretched between the stone forts of Maloun and Soorujgurh, presenting to the view a series of connected peaks more or less abrupt, and each crowned with a stockade, excepting two, which had the names of Ryla peak and Deothul. The former was conveniently situated for operations against Soorujgurh, which it would effectually cut off from Maloun; the latter was in the very heart of the Goorkha position, and not one thousand yards from Maloun itself. It was to be expected that the whole force of the Goorkhas would oppose the occupation of Deothul, which was the main object of attack. General Ochterlony reckoned, however, that even if he failed there, the possession of Ryla would still be a great advantage; and that the movement on both points at the same time, would contribute to distract the enemy. To assist the enterprize further, a diversion was planned by other detachments, which were directed to march right upon the enemy's cantonment under the walls of Maloun.

It will be proper to explain this movement more in detail. Five columns altogether were put in motion, besides detachments for the diversion, and the following was the part assigned to each. The first from Pulta, one of the posts opposed to Soorujgurh, on the enemy's extreme right, con-

sisted of two light companies of the 19th N. I. under Lieutenant Fleming, who, attended by a strong party of irregulars, was to make a secret night movement on Ryla, and there show a light as a signal for the movement of the other columns. Immediately on seeing it, Captain Hamilton was to march on the same point, with his own and Lieutenant Lidlie's detachments, assembled for the purpose at Jynugur; while a grenadier battalion from head-quarters, under Major Innes, moved simultaneously in the same direction. This force was destined to support Lieutenant Fleming, and to occupy Ryla; while Major Lawrie, with the 2d battalion of the 7th N. I. from his position at Kalee, to the right, and Lieutenant-colonel Thompson, with the 2d battalion of the 3d N. I. from General Ochterlony's head-quarters, were to lead each separate columns on Deothul, and two field-pieces were attached to the latter, for the defence of the position when occupied.* Two smaller detachments, one led by Captain Bowyer, and the other by Captain Showers, and consisting each of three companies, besides irregulars, were to move from opposite sides direct upon the Goorkha cantonment, in order to create the diversion, above alluded to, in aid of the occupation of Deothul.

* These two columns were to wait for daylight in the bed of the Gumrora, in order that their ascent of the heights might be simultaneous.

Ryla was occupied by Lieutenant Fleming in the course of the night of the 14th ; and at sight of the signal, by which it was preconcerted that notice of this event should be communicated, Captain Hamilton and Major Innes marched on the same point, and in the course of the morning established themselves, without meeting any opposition. The signal being repeated from a conspicuous station behind the General's camp, the two columns under Colonel Thompson and Major Lawrie marched immediately to the Gumrora, and waiting there till daylight, moved from opposite directions on Deothul. They just met at the last ascent, and pushed on together to seize the point, at about ten in the morning; when a contest commenced as severe as any in which our native troops have ever been engaged. As the head of the first column approached the summit of Deothul, a picquet of not more than twenty or thirty Goorkhas charged fearlessly on the advance-guard, and occasioned a check that was near proving fatal to the success of the movement. The exertions of the officers, however, particularly of Major Lawrie, restored the men to a sense of duty, and they advanced boldly and dislodged the enemy as well from Deothul as from other posts in the immediate neighbourhood. The day was spent in desultory fighting about the position ; and every exertion was made in the evening and during the night to throw up defences about Deothul, in the

conviction that the struggle for the post had yet to come.

The Goorkhas had been occupied during the day in opposing and pursuing the detachments of Captains Showers and Bowyer, which had thus completely succeeded in withdrawing their attention from the main object. The former officer marched from Rutungurh, and early in the day found himself within the stockades of the enemy. He was of a peculiarly chivalrous spirit, and thinking he had instilled the same ardour and fearlessness into his men, urged them to trust only to the bayonet, and in this view he commanded them not to load. As the column approached the cantonments, a body of Goorkhas came boldly down upon them; when Captain Showers stepped forward to lead the projected charge: the sepoy, however, not being on ground where they could form readily, proved unequal to the trial, and the Captain was left alone to stand the shock. A personal combat ensued with the Goorkha chief, and he was slain by the Captain, who happened to be an excellent swordsman. This brave officer was, however, shot dead immediately after, which completed the confusion. The detachment fled precipitately as far as Lag Village, and were pursued by the Goorkhas; this spot being, however, open, the men were rallied by Lieutenant Rutledge; and having had time to load, offered a successful oppo-

sition, and again assumed the offensive.* Captain Bowyer, in the mean time, had marched from Kalee at daybreak, and reached the point assigned to him as a post of observation by seven in the morning; there he was attacked, and maintained himself till noon; when perceiving the entire failure of Captain Showers, and thus seeing the impossibility of converting the feint into any thing more beneficial, he commenced a retreat in the face of the enemy. The retreat was executed with field-day precision, one half of the detachment retiring to position, and the other following under cover of its fire. The Goorkhas, who had anticipated confusion, and the destruction of the column, continued engaged in a fruitless pursuit during a great part of the day, but could effect nothing beyond occasioning a few casualties. They were thus effectually drawn away from the more important post at Deothul, which was in the mean time occupied and secured, as we have before mentioned.

The night was one of anxiety to both parties. Bhugtee Thapa, or more properly Bukhtyar Thapa, Umur Singh's best officer, saw from Soorujgurh the serious character of the operation intended; he accordingly left that place, with a chosen band, to

* The author of the Sketches of the Goorkha War states that the flight and pursuit were continued till arrested by the artillery of Ratungurb, which opened on the pursuers.

take part in the struggle which impended. The absolute necessity of dislodging the British from Deothul, was but too apparent to Umur Singh and his council. There were, however, two complete battalions now established there, besides irregulars; and two pieces of field artillery had been brought up and placed in position, to say nothing of the works hastily prepared. The elite of the Goorkha army were in this emergency collected; and two thousand, more than could well operate at once on the broken ground of the ridge, were placed under the personal command of Bhugtee Thapa, for the attack of Deothul next morning.* Umur Singh himself also resolved to appear in the field with his youngest son, the only one with him, in order to encourage and support the attack.

Agreeably to the arrangement thus determined upon, the British position at Deothul was attacked at once on all sides where it was accessible, just at daybreak on the morning of the 16th of April. The Goorkhas came on with furious intrepidity, so much so, that several were bayoneted or cut to pieces within our works. Umur Singh stood all

* This officer assured Umur Singh that he would return victorious, or not at all; and he gave notice to his two wives to prepare for their sutee, as he had little hope of surviving. They both sacrificed themselves on the funeral pile on which his body was burnt the next day.

the while just within musquet range, with the Goorkha colours planted beside him; while Bhugtee was every where exciting the men to further efforts. The Goorkhas particularly aimed at gaining possession of our guns; and directed their fire with so much effect against the artillery men, that at one time three officers, Lieutenant Cartwright, Lieutenant Hutchinson of the engineers, and Lieutenant Armstrong of the pioneers, were, with one artillery man, the only persons remaining to serve them. The British commandant at Ryla, perceiving the desperate nature of the struggle at Deothul, sent a reinforcement, with ammunition, which arrived very opportunely. After a contest of two hours' continuance without intermission, the Goorkhas being observed to slacken their efforts, it was resolved to assume the offensive, and drive them back. Major Lawrie led this charge, and Bhugtee Thapa being killed in it, the enemy was every where put to flight, and the victory decided.

There were two hundred and thirteen killed and wounded on the side of the British*; and the enemy left above five hundred men on the ground about the post of Deothul. In the

* Lieut. Bagot died of his wounds, and Major Lawrie was slightly hurt: Lieutenant Gabb, light battalion, and Ensign Dalgairns, of the 3d N. I. were the other officers wounded in this part of the operations.

course of the day they sent to request permission to seek the body of Bhugtee Thapa ; and it was found, covered with wounds, close to the foot of our defences. General Ochterlony ordered it to be wrapped in shawls, and delivered to Umur Singh, in order to testify the respect his bravery had excited.

The total loss incurred in the operations of the 15th and 16th of April was, two officers, three Soobadars, four Naiks, and fifty-two Sepoys killed ; and five* officers, one sergeant, and two hundred and eighty-seven men wounded.

Taken altogether, this approached more nearly to a general action than any event that occurred in the campaign ; and it was a proud triumph to the officers of the Indian army, to have achieved so complete a victory on ground which gave such great advantages to the enemy, and with numbers so nearly equal,—for not one half of Sir David's army was engaged.

The dispositions for the operation exhibited wonderful skill, and the precision with which the movement of the different detachments was calculated, reflects the greatest credit on those who collected the intelligence, and furnished the materials on which the plan was combined. Lieutenant Lawtie of the engineers was the most

* The only officer not already named, is Lieutenant Spellessy of the 7th N. I. attached to the detachment under Capt. Showers.

valuable instrument of those to whose exertions the General was indebted on the occasion. This young officer had, as field-engineer, directed the operations of the late successful sieges, under Colonel Cooper; and there had not been a movement or enterprize undertaken by the division, since it took the field, that had not benefited by his professional zeal, activity, and penetration. His ardour in examining all the routes by which the Maloun position was to be approached, with a view to provide against every possible contingency or mishap, led him into exertions that produced a fever of which he died in the beginning of May*; but he had the satisfaction of first seeing the completion of the triumph he so essentially contributed to secure.

General Ochterlony, who considered nothing done while any thing remained, set himself immediately to prepare a road for heavy artillery to Deothul; and to straiten Maloun, by closing his positions round it. The Goorkhas likewise concentrated themselves about Maloun, with-

* General Ochterlony published a general order on the occasion of the death of this officer, in which he spoke in high commendation of his services and useful talents. The officers of the division, uniting in esteem of his great merit, went into mourning for him, and further subscribed for the erection of a marble monument to his memory; which now stands in the cathedral church of St. John's at Calcutta:—a proud record to have been earned by so young an officer.

drawing their garrisons from all the positions on the further side of Deothul; and even from Soorujgurh, though a place of some strength. The evacuation of this post gave Lieutenant Murray an opportunity of showing his activity and vigilance, by intercepting and dispersing the garrison as it retired.

By the end of the first week in May, a battery was raised against Maloun; and news of the fall of Almora having reached the Goorkha camp, all the Surdars urged Umur Singh to accept terms for himself, and his son, Runjoor, at Jythuk. The old chief was, however, obstinate in refusing; and endeavoured, with much earnestness, to persuade his men, that if they did but hold out till the approaching rains the British army would be obliged to withdraw.

Seeing the pertinacity of his refusal, the Surdars began to desert with their men, until at last only about two hundred remained faithful to Umur Singh. With these he retired into the fortress of Maloun until the batteries were in readiness to open on its walls. Yielding at last to his fate, this proud chief, on the 15th of May, signed a capitulation; in which it was agreed that the Goorkha nation should retire to the east of the Kalee or Gogra; and resign to the British all the provinces from Kumaon westward. Runjoor Singh was, of course, included in these

terms; and the father and son, after giving orders for the surrender of all the remaining garrisons, were safely conducted, with all who chose to accompany them, to the other side of the Kalee, as stipulated.

Many of the Goorkha soldiers took service with the British; and three battalions were, at the suggestion of Sir David Ochterlony, formed of them, and called Nuseeree battalions. A provincial corps was likewise raised for Kumaon civil duties, in order to allow a further opening for the employment of the military classes.

Thus the campaign, which in January promised nothing but disaster, finished in May by leaving in the possession of the British the whole tract of hills from the Gogra to the Sutlej. A very few words will suffice to explain the nature of the arrangements made for the occupation and management of this tract.

Kumaon was made a province of the British territory, and the Honourable Edward Gardner was appointed commissioner, with full power for the administration of its affairs. The Doon was likewise retained, and annexed ultimately, to the Sheharunpoor district. The remainder of the hill country was restored to the several Rajas and chiefs from whom Umur Singh had conquered it; with exception to Subathoo, Raeengurh, Nahn, and one or two other places, which were made military

posts for the Nuseeree battalions. The principle adopted was, to place all the chiefs in precisely the same condition as they stood with respect to each other before the appearance of the Goorkhas; and to leave them each in the free enjoyment of his own, under the general protection of the British government. The following statement exhibits the names and relative importance of the principal chiefs, whom this arrangement placed in a state of protected dependence. Mr. Fraser, the Political Agent attached to the force of General Martindell, was, in the first instance, invested with the duty of introducing this system; and for that purpose, some time before the surrender of Jythuk, he undertook a journey into Gurhwal, and afterwards made a tour of the principal places in the hills, where he was instrumental in confirming the Rajas and Thakoors in the assurance of their security, and in reconciling them to the new state of things. Ultimately, Gurhwal being restored to its Raja, the superintendence of the affairs of all the western chiefs was vested in Sir David Ochterlony; on whose part a military Assistant was appointed to reside at Subathoo.

NAMES OF THE RAJAS AND THAKOORS,

AS ESTABLISHED AND TAKEN UNDER PROTECTION IN 1815,

WITH AN ESTIMATE OF THEIR REVENUE.

	Rupees, Per Ann.
<i>Kuhlor, or Belaspoor, extending on both sides of the Sutlej, but the eastern part only is guaranteed.</i>	
Raja Mohachund - - - - -	60000

Hindor, or Plaseca.

Raja Ram Surun Sein.—Hill territory 15015; in the plains 30000 rupees - - - - -	45000
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Sirmoor.—Nahn the capital.

Futteh Prokash Singh, infant son of Kurum Pro- kash; who was set aside for profligacy and ty- ranny, and died in 1816. Jounsur and Bhawur, two Pergunnas east of the Tonse, have been re- tained by the British - - - - -	80000
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Busakur.—Capital Rampoor.

Raja Muhindur Singh, a minor son of Oogur Singh, deceased; Teekum Das is the Vizeer or manager. - The Raja pays a tribute of 15000 rupees - - - - -	80000
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Keonthul.

This is the largest of the Bara Thakoraces; Suba- thoo was reserved from it as a British station; and there being no family that had any claim to resto- ration, the territory was given to the Seikh Raja of Puteeala in reward for his services - - - - -	40000
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Bagul.—Capital Urkee.

Rana (name unknown) - - - - -	23247
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
Joobul.

Rana Poorun Chund, with two subordinate chiefs,
 Danjee Vizeer, and Prem Singh Vizeer - 19100
 Besides some minor chiefs, of less than 5000
 rupees per annum.

Gurhwal, west of the Alknundra.

Raja Sheeo Dursun Sah, to whom, with exception
 to the Dehra Doon, and territory east of the Alk-
 nundra, valued altogether at about 60000 rupees,
 the rest of the province was restored. - 40000

Map
Illustrative of the
Second Campaign
of the
NIPAL WAR,
1816.
Jan's 1816 & March.



Published as the act directs by Kingway, Carey & Allen London.

London 1816.

J. Walker Sculp.

CHAPTER V.

NIPÁL.—NEGOTIATIONS.—SECOND CAMPAIGN,
AND PEACE.

1815-16.

Disposition of the Goorkha chiefs—Overture for Peace—Governor-general's terms—Cession of Turace refused, and negotiation broken off by the Goorkhas—Preparations—Fresh overtures—Demand modified—Hesitation of the Goorkhas—Negotiations—Treaty signed—Further concessions meditated—Ratification refused at Katmandoo—Reflections—General Ochterlony takes the field—Plan of operations—Chooreea Ghatee pass turned—The General arrives before Mukwanpoor—Battle of Seekhurkutree—Colonel Kelly's march to Hureehurpoor—Battle there—Submission of the Nipálese—Ratification of the former Treaty—Liberality of the British Government—Sikhimputee Raja received under protection—Objects proposed—Goorkha representations at Pekin—Arrival of a Chinese Minister at Digurchee—his proceedings there, and letter to the Governor-general—The Raja of Nipál dies of the smallpox.

IN hazarding a breach with the British government, the Goorkhas had never speculated on rousing it to such exertions as they witnessed in the

first campaign. Notwithstanding their early successes, therefore, they very soon repented of the rash measures by which they had brought themselves into so hopeless a contest. Even when at the height of their prosperity, the immensity of the preparations, and the perseverance of their enemy, convinced them their cause was desperate; and they would willingly have given up every object in dispute, could they by that means have brought the war to an honourable termination. They were prepared also for some sacrifices, if such should be required. It appears from an intercepted letter,* addressed by Umur Singh to the Raja, on the 2d of March, 1815, that immediately on the fall of Nalapanee he was consulted as to the policy of giving up the Dehra Doon, and the hilly tract west of the Jumna, in addition to the contested lands on the Sarun and Gourukpoor frontiers. That chief's opinion was adverse to any cession of hill territory. Though vested, therefore, with power to negotiate on this footing, if the plan had met his approval,† he never indi-

* Vide this letter Appendix A.

† Some overtures were made to General Ochterlony by Umur Singh, with the view of discovering the extent of the demands of the British. When the latter, however, found that they included the cession of a considerable tract of the hill country, he proudly replied, "That from the Sutlej to the Teesta, the Goorkalces would dispute every inch of the

cated to General Ochterlony any disposition to treat on such a basis.

Upon the conquest of Kumaon, the Goorkhia governor of that province, Bum Sah, a man of some consideration in the state, expressed much desire to be the means of re-establishing the former relations between the two powers; and the occasion was taken of assuring the court of Katmandoo, through him, that the British government entertained a reciprocal anxiety to restore the ancient good understanding.

After the campaign had closed so triumphantly for us, the desire of peace seemed to have increased at the capital of Nipál. Most of the chiefs appeared to have become sensible that their confidence of security in the ruggedness of their mountains, was a vain illusion; and although a considerable faction still maintained their hostile disposition, all parties united in the wish to discover on what terms peace would be granted. Accordingly, in

mountains; and if driven from them, would then retire to the confines of China. This country," he added, "is not rich in men and money, like Bengal and Hindoostan; but it contains a race, of which not a man, while the soul remains in his body, will submit to become like the Rajas of the plains, with all their wealth and luxuries." Umur Singh finally refused to hold further communication with the British general, while he allowed the vakeels of the hill Rajas to remain in attendance.

May 1815, Gooroo Gujraj Misur, the family priest of the Raja, was sent down from Katmandoo with full powers under the red seal, and with instructions to negotiate with Major Bradshaw, the British political agent in that quarter, an entire adjustment of all differences.

This overture was met by an unreserved disclosure of the sacrifices which Lord Hastings conceived himself to be now justified in demanding. They were—1st, The perpetual cession of all the hill country taken in the campaign, viz. from the Kalee westward; 2dly, A like cession of the entire Turæe, from the foot of the outer hills along the whole line of the remaining territory of the Goorkhas; 3dly, The relinquishment by the Goorkhas of the footing they had gained in the territory of the Sikhim Raja, and the surrender to that chief of the stockaded forts of Nagree and Nagurkot; and, finally, The reception of a Resident, with the usual escort and establishment, at Katmandoo, and the customary stipulation not to receive or give service to Europeans without the special sanction of government.

Major P. Bradshaw stated to the Gooroo that he could not negotiate except on this basis; and the Gooroo declaring he had no authority to treat for any cession in the Turæe, excepting the disputed tracts, the overture was broken off, and Gujraj Misur returned to Katmandoo.

From a hope that other negotiators might be more accommodating, the Goorkha court empowered Bum Sah to make a second overture to the Honourable E. Gardner, who was now Civil Commissioner for the management of the province of Kumaon. That officer had been instructed as to the manner in which such an overture was to be received. Accordingly, the reply to Bum Sah being similar in every respect to that made to the Gooroo, the negotiation in that quarter was similarly broken off.

In the mean time, the army, which had been collected on the Sarun frontier, was cantoned to the north of the Ganges, or at Dinapoor, the cantonment of Patna, and was kept in a state of equipment to be ready to take the field immediately the favourable season should return.

The Marquess of Hastings, thinking that a second campaign might be inevitable, determined on so conducting it as to humble the proud spirit of the Goorkha chiefs; or, if that were impossible, to crush this ambitious and aspiring nation for ever. Preparation was made for penetrating with a brigade from Kumaon, where Lieutenant-colonel J. W. Adams, a most excellent and steady officer, had succeeded Colonel Nicolls; while the latter was to operate against the Bootwul and Palpa frontier, with the army of Major-general J. S. Wood, considerably reinforced. Major-general

Ochterlony was at the same time to be summoned from the north-west, to take the command of the Sarun troops, which were destined to penetrate into the valley of Nipál.

Although provision was thus made for pushing the war with vigour, the efforts of the government to reestablish peace were not relaxed; for many powerful considerations made this much the most desirable consummation at the juncture. It was with satisfaction, therefore, government learnt that the negotiation was re-opened by the Gooroo, who came again into the Turæe, in August, for the purpose. The Marquess of Hastings had, in the interim, ascertained that a main objection to the relinquishment of the Turæe was, that most of the principal officers of the Goorkha court had Jageers there. Accordingly, to reconcile them to the cession, and to show that the British government did not desire it from any avaricious motive, his Lordship authorised his negotiator to tender the amount of the estimated revenue in stipends, to be at the distribution of the court of Katmandoo. The annual assignment thus sanctioned amounted to between two and three lacks of rupees, and his Lordship justly considered that a permanent peace was worth this sacrifice.

The Gooroo was made acquainted with the liberal disposition of the government; but, after some consideration, he again broke off the nego-

tiation in September ; declaring that the Goorkha chiefs would never accede to a cession of the whole Turæe, which was the main source of their subsistence ; the hills themselves being comparatively unproductive.

The Marquess of Hastings, having maturely weighed the matter, resolved to proceed a step further for the re-establishment of peace. It seemed evident, from what had passed, that no advantage offered in any other shape would compensate to the Goorkha government for the entire loss of the Turæe and forests under the hills. That court's repugnance to the cession was ascertained to be owing to the high estimate of the pecuniary value of the territory which was entertained by the chiefs, rather than to any feeling of pride or objection to the humiliation of the step. The reception of a resident was the article most offensive to them on this score ; but this had been insisted on as a *sine qua non*, and, finding there was no hope of procuring a change, the Goorkhas had conceded the point. The Turæe was, therefore, the only question remaining for discussion. For the last year that the British authorities had held the greater part of the tract, its management had been found very troublesome and expensive ; and the climate was so noxious as to render the continuance in it of troops, and even of civil officers, impracticable for a large

portion of the year. To us, therefore, the accession of territory promised little advantage, but much trouble and difficulty in the maintenance of the rights and privileges whence the revenue was derived. The demand of the cession, it is to be observed, chiefly originated in a desire, by exclusion of the Nipâlese from any interest in the lowlands, to take away the source of future contention; and, at the same time, to inflict an appropriate punishment for the encroachments, and other acts of violence and insult, which had brought on the war;—the hope of profit in the tract formed no part of the motives which influenced the British government. Balancing the acquisition of the above objects, therefore, against the advantage of a restoration of peace, Lord Hastings finally determined to relax the rigour of the original terms; and a treaty was drafted, which the British negotiator was desired to present openly to the Gooroo, in case of his expected re-appearance, accompanied by a declaration that it contained the British ultimatum. In the draft, the Turæe, from the Kalee, or western Gogra, to the Gunduk, was all that was insisted on; and of the rest, so much only as was in our actual possession. Stipends to the extent of two lacks of rupees were still offered to be placed at the distribution of the court, in compensation for the re-

tained lands, and the draft contained a stipulation to this effect.

As was expected, the Raj Gooroo again sought out Major Bradshaw; and on this occasion Chundur Seekur Opadheea, who, at the close of the campaign, had been allowed to return to Katmandoo, was associated with him. The drafted treaty was shown to them, when both declared that they could not venture to accede to the terms, even as altered, without first submitting the draft to the court. They engaged, however, that a definitive answer should arrive in fifteen days, and forwarded a copy of the proposed treaty to Katmandoo for the purpose. The term expired without their receiving any reply; and the negotiators, being unable to redeem their pledge, begged submissively that the negotiation might not be broken off, until they should themselves go to Katmandoo to ascertain the cause. The Gooroo, at the same time, offered to sign the treaty, if the portion of Turæe in the British occupation, viz. that lying between the Gunduk and Koosa, were substituted for the offered stipends. This was refused, and the negotiators took their leave on the 29th of October, promising to return in twelve days, with the treaty signed.

The supreme government, on hearing of the

continued reluctance of the Nipàlese, called on the authorities in charge of the contiguous districts, to state their opinion as to the value of the several portions of the Turæe, and the means of obtaining a good frontier line, by the retention of part only of what had been occupied; thus preparing itself to make some further gratuitous concessions, either in lieu of the stipends, or in addition to them, in order the better to gratify the Goorkha chiefs, and leave them in a disposition to execute and maintain the treaty when signed.

In the mean time the Raj Gooroo Gujraj Misur came down again from Katmandoo, and signed the treaty according to the original draft. This was done at Segoulee, on the 28th of November, 1815. The supreme government, on being apprised of the event, fired the usual salutes, and ratified the treaty on the 9th of December, with due solemnity. It was determined, notwithstanding, to make the further concessions contemplated; and it was considered fortunate that the execution of the treaty without them, would yet more decidedly mark the act as a gratuitous bounty towards a fallen and suppliant foe. The conciliatory effect of the boon on the Sirdars would likewise, it was conceived, be enhanced by their not feeling themselves indebted for it to

their own obstinacy either in war or negotiation.

In the confidence of its own liberal views towards the Nipålese, the British government never doubted the sincerity of the enemy. The very earnestness of their opposition in the course of the negotiation, seemed to show that the acceptance of the proffered terms was the deliberate act of the court; and though their assent was unwilling and tardy in the extreme, still this seemed to be fully accounted for by being attributed to the reluctance with which they entered into engagements they felt to be inviolable. Adopting this view, the Governor-general reckoned that so soon as his further intentions for the benefit of the nation should be made known, the partial discontent which existed would give place to general satisfaction; and that all parties would be thankful for the restoration of peace. In this impression, the government hesitated not to suspend the preparations which had hitherto been actively making for a second campaign; and the commissariat officers, in their zeal for economy, went beyond the bounds of due discretion, and discharged a great part of the establishments which had been entertained for the transport of stores, selling also much of the grain which had been collected in the frontier depôts.

Of this precipitancy there was soon reason to

repent. It was a stipulation of the treaty that the ratification under the red seal should be delivered to Lieutenant-colonel Bradshaw in fifteen days. The period expired, and no ratification came; moreover, it was ascertained, in the course of the month of December, that after several very animated discussions at the court of Katmandoo, the war faction had again prevailed over that which favoured the Gooroo, and his late negotiations. Hence a renewal of hostilities was all that could be looked for; though it was, of course, expected to be the policy of the Goorkhas to waste as much of the season of action as possible, by amusing us with fresh offers to negotiate.

In order to anticipate such an attempt, and to show the serious light in which the past conduct of the court of Katmandoo was regarded, Sir David Ochterlony was forthwith ordered into the field, and every possible exertion was made to furnish the stores and establishments requisite to give efficiency to his army. A letter was also written to the Raja of Nipâl, complaining of his want of faith, and warning him of the approach of the British army. He was told, however, that the consequences might yet be averted, by sending the treaty, duly ratified, to meet the General in the Turæe.

A word or two may be required, in order to explain the motives which seemed at this time to

influence the Goorkha councils. The non-ratification of the treaty of Segoulee has not, ordinarily, been attributed to any settled plan of deceit practised on the British government; but it must be admitted, that the time of the Raj Gooroo's signing, which was just that at which the army would otherwise have taken the field, is a very suspicious circumstance. There seems reason, however, to believe that the Raj Gooroo was himself sincere, and that the disavowal of his act was the result of a divided sentiment amongst the chiefs; part of whom strenuously advocated the necessity of accepting the terms offered, while others as violently opposed the measure.

The veteran Umur Singh, and his sons, who had recently arrived at the capital, were amongst the warmest partisans of the war. Some notion of the proud spirit which actuated this chief may be formed from the intercepted letter written by him in March 1815, when he himself was closely beset on every side by the army of General Ochterlony, against which he felt he could make no head. As the document is highly characteristic, and shows the hopes which buoyed up the war faction in their determination to persevere, rather than submit to what they deemed the first step to subjection, it may not be out of place to give it at length, though it has already been more than once before the public. The letter will be found, there-

fore, in an Appendix, being too voluminous for the compass of a note.

The points most dwelt upon are the following :

First—That a treaty concluded after defeat could not be trusted to, as the British, knowing the terms to be conceded through fear, would presume upon the weakness of the nation, and seek new causes of quarrel, until its absolute subjugation was effected.

Secondly—That the constitution of the Goorkha power, which held several subordinate Rajas and nations in unwilling subjection, would afford the British numberless occasions of interference; and that they would thus by intrigue, during peace, effectually weaken and undermine the dominion established.

Thirdly—The danger of allowing a Resident to be permanently fixed at Katmandoo, is particularly dwelt upon as likely to lead to the introduction of a subsidiary force, and to prove a preliminary step to absolute subjection.

Fourthly—The advantage of manful resistance, as opposed to concession and submissiveness, is strongly urged, from the prosperity enjoyed by the Bhurtpoor Raja since his successful defence of that fortress, contrasted with the utter ruin by which Tippoo Sooltan was overtaken, after the concessions made by him to effect the peace signed by Lord Cornwallis in 1790.

The remainder of this curious letter contains an exaggerated view of the resources of the nation :— first, in the courage of its troops, and the natural strength of the country ; and secondly, in the support to be expected from the ill-affected allies of the British in Hindoostan, and eventually from the Chinese, to whom an immediate application for assistance in money is strongly recommended.

Assuming this letter to contain a fair statement of the sentiment of those who advocated the continuance of war, it would seem that suspicion of the ulterior views of the British was a main ingredient of their present disposition. It is certain, however, that independently of such a suspicion, the events of the past campaign in the Turace, east of the Gogra, had filled many of the chiefs with the most presumptuous confidence in the strength of the barrier opposed by the forests and hills, which skirted their eastern territories, and that the occurrences to the west had very partially removed this feeling. From the Gogra to the Koosee, on a line of near eight hundred miles, the British armies had been wholly baffled ; and though superior in force to those which achieved the conquests of the west, had not even ventured to cross the forest. Hence, the Goorkhas felt assured that they might persevere in the war with impunity, so long as they kept the passes of the first range guarded ; and, under this impression, they saw no

reason why they should assent to a permanent relinquishment of their independence, by receiving a Resident; or give up the ambitious hope of recovering some part of their lost territory in the hills.

In this state of the public feeling at Katmandoo, the treaty of Segoulee was, as we have before related, finally rejected by the chiefs; and every precaution taken to fortify and render impregnable the passes through the first range of hills. The principal route into the valley of Nipâl is by the Bicheea-Koh pass, which by distinction is called the Chooreea Ghatee, or main pass over the Chooreea hills. Other minor passes have occasionally the same name applied to them, or at least to that part of the route by them which leads over the same range. The grand pass, however, is, as before stated, by Bicheea Koh; and this the Goorkhas defended by three successive fortifications; the last of which was absolutely impregnable; all the other known routes were similarly defended; and in this manner the Goorkhas awaited the arrival of General Sir David Ochterlony, leaving him the passage of the forest altogether free.

The British army was already in motion to the Turæe, when towards the beginning of February, it was met by Gujraj Misur, with a formal intimation of the determination of the Nipâlese to recommence the war. Sir D. Ochterlony had a

force of near twenty thousand effective men, including three European regiments, his Majesty's 24th, 66th, and 87th. He divided this force into four brigades: giving Colonel Kelly, of the 24th, one; Lieutenant-colonel Nicol, of the 66th, another; Lieutenant-colonel Miller, of the 87th, a third; while the fourth was commanded by Colonel Dick, who has before been mentioned.


Colonel Kelly, with his brigade and regiment, were detached to the right by Bhugwanpoor, with orders to penetrate, if possible, by Hureehurpoor; Lieutenant-colonel Nicol was similarly directed on Ramnugur, to the left; while General Ochterlony, with the other two brigades, moved straight through the forest, by Simlabassa, to the foot of the Bicheea Koh pass.

On the 10th of February, 1816, the General established himself at a kind of caravanseray at the outlet of the pass, and at a short distance from the enemy's first stockade. The seray was quickly converted into a depôt; and the opposite works having been reconnoitered, and found unassailable, information was sought with earnestness as to the possibility of turning the pass by some route unknown to the enemy.

After four days thus spent, without interruption of any kind from the Goorkha army, a route was discovered by Captain Pickersgill, of the Quartermaster-general's department; and on the 14th, at

nine at night, Colonel Miller's brigade was led by the General in person through a deep and narrow ravine, called Baleekola, which brought the detachment to a water-course, leading to a steep acclivity, by which the first formidable barrier of hills was to be scaled. The march was continued during the whole night, and by seven in the morning, the Choorea heights, to the west of the enemy's positions, were occupied without resistance. In the course of the 15th, the brigade advanced about five miles to the Chukree Mukree Nulla, and there bivouacked for four days, waiting the arrival of its supplies and tents, for no laden animal had been able to accompany the troops.

For the first two days the men suffered the greatest privations, being for the most part without food. Their hardships were participated, in a great measure, by the General himself, who had no baggage, and slept under cover of a hut, hastily constructed for him by the men of the 87th, of boughs cut from the green trees. All this, however, was submitted to with cheerfulness by both men and officers, in the conviction that the object of the movement was gained. On the morning following that of the General's march, Colonel Dick moved up close to the enemy's outer stockade; and, in the course of the following day, found the triple fortification evacuated by the Goorkhas, in



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consequence of the success of the operation for turning the position.

By the 20th of February, the roads were prepared for a further advance; and the two brigades met again at Etounda, on the banks of the Raptee, which here runs in a valley remarkably picturesque and beautiful. After a halt to establish a second depôt, the Major-general marched again on the 27th, moving up the valley to Mukwanpoor, under which place he encamped in the evening, at a village called Chougurha Munde.

Mukwanpoor is situated on a low ridge, which lay to the north of the encampment, stretching from west to east. The town and fort were to the east opposed to our right, and on the other extremity was a village named Seekhur Kutree, which was also occupied by the enemy on the General's first appearance under the position.

For some unknown reason, the Goorkhas withdrew their men from Seekhur Kutree next morning, which being observed by the British General, he immediately detached four companies and forty Europeans to seize the point. Captain Pickersgill accompanied them, and was proceeding to occupy some other points along the ridge, when he perceived a large force of the enemy ascending the northern side of the hill, so as to cut him off from Seekhur Kutree, which he had just left. He made good his retreat down the southern declivity

into camp, while the Goorkhas advanced against the posts which had been occupied. They had recovered all but the village itself, and the men there had lost their commanding officer, Lieutenant Tirrell,* and were beginning to feel the want of ammunition, when the 25th N. I. which General Ochterlony had kept under arms prepared for any exigency, came opportunely to their relief, accompanied by the flank companies of the 87th. The post was now secured, and dispositions made to maintain it; but the Goorkhas, unwilling to relinquish the advantage, poured a force of two thousand men from the stockade near Mukwanpoor, and showed a determination to recover the village at all hazards. Sir David Ochterlony, seeing that the contest was becoming every instant more serious, detached the 2d battalion of the 12th N. I. with four more companies of the 87th, under the command of Colonel Miller, to support the troops at Seekhur Kutree; and turning out his line, he further ordered the artil-

* This officer was Adjutant of the 1st battalion of the 20th, or Marine Regiment, but was at the time doing duty with the 2d battalion of the 25th, having left his staff situation to seek distinction in the active service of this campaign. He had only joined by Dak a day or two before. The post was maintained after the fall of Lieutenant Tirrell, by Lieutenant Kerr and Ensign Impey, who were publicly thanked in general orders for the service.

lery to play on the different bodies of the enemy as they passed along the ridge to the attack. The Goorkhas seeing this, opened also their guns at Mukwanpoor, turning them at first against the advancing parties, and subsequently on the camp and line where Sir David and his staff were a conspicuous object.* In the mean time, the junction of the reinforcement enabled the force at Seekhur Kutree to advance on the enemy; and the Europeans leading, a charge was made, which drove the Goorkhas beyond a hollow separating this part of the ridge from Mukwanpoor. Detached parties of the enemy, however, still cowered down in the jungul on the ridge, and kept up a very destructive, though desultory fire on our posts; they brought also some guns to the opposite side of the hollow, and thus continued to annoy us during the whole day.† Towards the afternoon, Sir David

* A menial servant of the General's, who carried his pen and ink, was killed by this fire; but, in other respects, it did remarkably little execution.

† In the duty of this day many officers found great advantage in the use of their double-barrelled fowling-pieces, with the skill acquired by practice in the sports of the field. The officer who commanded the light company of the 25th N. I. was particularly distinguished for the certainty with which he anticipated the aim of the Goorkha light troops, who ordinarily lay secure under a rock, presenting nothing except just at the moment of firing. Ensign Shipp, of his

Ochterlony despatched to Colonel Miller a fresh battalion, the 2d of the 8th N. I., to enable him to finish the action, if possible, before sunset. The battalion, upon its arrival, was conducted by Major Nation across the hollow; and advancing, with charged bayonets, captured the nearest of the enemy's guns: after which, the Goorkhas retired within their fort and stockades, leaving their dead and wounded at our mercy.

The Goorkhas were, in this action, led by Shumsheer Rana, the chief who commanded the attack on Captain Sibley's post at Pursa in the previous campaign. Their whole force was engaged in the course of the day, and the defeat was signal; their loss in killed and wounded having, by their own acknowledgment, exceeded eight hundred men. Of the British, forty-five were killed, including eleven men of the 87th; and one hundred and seventy-five wounded, including nineteen Europeans, and Lieutenant and Adjutant P. Young, of the 2d battalion 12th

Majesty's 87th, was noticed for a personal encounter with a Goorkha chief, in the face of both armies. He was a capital swordsman, but his weapon broke early in the conflict, whereupon, he threw it away, and trusting to his activity, closed with the Goorkha, and wrenching his sword from him, laid him lifeless with a back-handed stroke.—Feats of this kind are not the proper duty of officers, but when they occur are very encouraging to the troops; for the union of personal prowess with gallantry and success will always command admiration.

N. I. Lieutenant Tirrell was the only officer killed.

Colonel Nicol, with his brigade, joined the Major-general on the day after the action; having successfully penetrated into the valley of the Rapteree, by a pass to the north of Ramnugur, and having marched thence up the valley without meeting any opposition. The Colonel left a strong detachment of two battalions in position at Ekoor, under Major Lunley, to maintain the communication by this route, and keep the valley free of the enemy.

In the mean time Colonel Kelly, who had orders to penetrate by Hureehurpoor, succeeded likewise in finding a route by which he entered the hills without opposition, and penetrated to that fortress. His march was, however, much impeded by the difficulties of the ground; and it was the 27th of February before he reached Rutunpoor, a village on the left bank of the Bagmuttee, a few miles to the south of the fort. He immediately made from hence a strong reconnoissance; and finding the post to be unsailable from the south, he resolved on crossing the Bagmuttee and advancing to Joorjoor, a village to the west of Hureehurpoor, whence the approach seemed more easy. This movement was effected on the 29th of February. The principal stockade of the enemy was about one

thousand yards to the west of Hureehurpoor, crowning the ridge in a semicircular form, and commanding the valley of the Bagmuttee. On the Colonel's first arrival at Joorjoor, he observed an eminence at about eight hundred yards distance from this stockade, which the enemy had left unoccupied. He, accordingly, next morning, before daybreak, detached his light companies, under Captain (Brevet-major) Hughes, of his Majesty's 24th, supported by seven battalion-companies, under Lieutenant-colonel O'Holloran, to seize the point. This detachment ascended, and quickly established itself, driving off a picquet of the enemy it found there; no sooner, however, was it well in position, than the whole force of the Goorkhas came on to the attack; and Colonel O'Holloran had to sustain an unequal fight from six in the morning until half-past eleven, exposed on every side to the fire of the enemy. At length a strong reinforcement arrived, with two 6-pounders, and two howitzers on elephants. The enemy was then driven back with considerable loss, and the attempt on the position was not repeated*. The Goorkhas, in-

* The British loss consisted of four Europeans and four Natives, killed; five officers,—Captain Lindsay, artillery; Captain (Brevet-major) Hughes, Captain Smith, and Lieutenant O'Leary, of his Majesty's 24th; Lieutenant De Vœux,

deed, although their first attack was vigorous and obstinate, did not evince, on this occasion, quite so much bravery as was expected from the reputation of their commander; who was no other than Runjoor Singh, the defender of Jythuk. He had with him also a choice band of his associates in that defence, whom he had distinguished by crescents on their turbans, and by the pompous title of 'Band of the Moon.' Runjoor was himself one of the first to leave the field; and his conduct in the action, and in subsequently abandoning his post, tarnished his bright name, and brought him into permanent disgrace at the court of Katmandoo. The fort of Hureehurpoor was evacuated in the night after this affair; and Colonel Kelly, having converted it into a depôt, was preparing for a further advance, when he received the General's orders to retrace his steps.

The news of the first defeat at Mukwanpoor, spread consternation at Katmandoo; and without waiting for intelligence of the event at Hureehurpoor, the court immediately resolved on an attempt to deprecate further vengeance by unqualified submission. The red seal was affixed in haste to the treaty of Segoulee; and an envoy sent to the camp of General Ochterlony, to notify

Chumparun Light Infantry; twenty-three Europeans, and twenty-five Natives, wounded.

that it was ready for delivery. The messenger brought a letter from Bukhtawur Singh, the Goorkha commander, requesting permission to send the instrument by Chundur Seekur Opadheea, who was stated to have come to Mukwanpoor for the purpose. The General returned for answer, that the Goorkhas must not expect the same terms now, as before the re-commencement of hostilities; but that he had no objection to receive the Opadheea if he came with full powers. At the same time the approaches were pushed on to within five hundred yards of Mukwanpoor, and a battery was made ready against the place.

Chundur Seekur made his appearance in camp on the 3rd of March, and earnestly entreated the General to accept the ratified treaty. Sir David had been vested with full powers to use his own discretion, in the acceptance of the former terms, or in advancing further demands, according as circumstances and the state of the season might prompt; but he was not to conclude a treaty until the enemy were sufficiently humbled to make it safe to rely on their sincerity.

This period seemed to Sir David to have now arrived; and in order to put their humility to the test, it was explained to Chundur Seekur, that the letter of the treaty would give to the British all the territory in their occupation, and would now, therefore, include the valley of the

Raptee, as well as Hetounda and Hureehurpoor. At the same time the Opadheea was assured that he must no longer expect any concession beyond the letter, and he was called upon to give a specific note in writing, declaratory of his being influenced by no such hopes, and further to engage that the Raja should specifically confirm the declaration in a letter to the Governor-general.

To all this the Goorkha negotiator readily assented; and he agreed, moreover, to present the ratified treaty on his knees at the General's durbar, in the presence of all the Vakeels in camp.

This solemnity having passed, the General concluded the treaty, and despatched Lieutenant Boileau of his staff to act as Resident at Katmandoo, until the Governor-general should nominate a proper officer. He prepared, also, for his own return; but did not finally leave the hills until he received the orders for the surrender of the forts of Nagree and Nagurkot to the Raja of Sikkim, and had ascertained that they would be duly executed.

Lord Hastings was much pleased with the result to which Major-general Ochterlony had thus brought the campaign in so short a space of time; more particularly so, because the late period at which the operations had unavoidably been undertaken, after the interruption to the preparations,

which occurred in November and December, had made him apprehensive of the arrival of the unhealthy season before there would be time effectually to humble the enemy. Sir David himself, too, had discovered that the capture of Mukwanpoor would be the limit of what could be effected this campaign; for he found it would not be safe to keep the troops in that valley after the middle of March; this, therefore, was not the least powerful of the motives which influenced him in granting the terms.

The articles of the treaty were all punctually executed, according to agreement.* The supreme government thought, notwithstanding what had passed, that it would be a politic act of conciliation to give up such of the Turæe as might not be required to form a straight and even frontier, in lieu of the pensions stipulated in the treaty. The Marquess of Hastings, therefore, after every article had been executed, gave notice to the Raja of his intention to send the Honourable E. Gardner to Katmandoo, as Resident, and to empower him to conclude a new arrangement on that basis. This was subsequently effected, after a boundary had been surveyed and marked with pillars of masonry, to prevent the possibility of any future disputes between the Nipålese officers and our Zemindars.

* Vide Treaty, Appendix C.

The part of the Turæe which skirted the Oudh dominions was, however, retained, and with Khyreegurh, a pergunna of Rohilkhund, lying on the Oudh side of the Gogra, was made over to the Nuwab Vizeer, in extinction of the second loan of a crore of rupees obtained from him during the war.

With the Sikhimputeer Raja a treaty was concluded by Major Latter, at Titaleea, on the 10th of February, 1817,* in which, amongst other articles, there is one guaranteeing the possessions of the Raja to himself and his family;—a small stripe of the Turæe also, lying between the Mich,hee and the Teesta, (part of what was retained under the final arrangements concluded with Nipâl), was ceded to this Raja for a line of communication.

The policy of this guarantee cannot be doubted. Its effect has been to shut out the Nipålese from any ambitious views of aggrandizement to the east, and to circumscribe their territory on three sides by the British power, while on the fourth, the stupendous range of the Heemalaya, and the Chinese frontier, present an effectual barrier. Thus, while the British and Chinese empires continue in their present strength, the hope of extending their dominion must be extinguished, and the military spirit, which was fostered by the

* See Appendix D.

series of victories gained over the surrounding
* Rajas, must die away for want of employment.

It only now remains to state the nature of the relations subsisting between the government of Nipál, and the Celestial Empire, and the result of the application made to Peking for assistance, during the campaign of 1814-15.

In the first government of Lord Cornwallis, the Goorkhas having invaded Tibet, and plundered the palace of the Teeshoo Lama, at Jigurchee or Digurchee, a Chinese army was sent to punish them. The Goorkhas retired before it, but contrived to maintain themselves for some time without much loss.

This produced an overture from the Chinese commander, that the British should co-operate in a simultaneous attack on Nipál. The proposition was not favourably received; and the Chinese, having changed their General, gained an important victory in the Tingree desert, and thus succeeded at last in reducing the Goorkhas to submission. From that time Nipál has been considered by the Chinese as a tributary country; and though nothing is demanded beyond some nominal offerings, still a legation proceeds every three years from Katmandoo, to renew the assurances of allegiance and good faith.

On the war breaking out with the British, the Nipálese represented to the court of Peking that

the difference had arisen in consequence of our having demanded the passes through the Heemâchul, which they, as faithful allies, had refused to give. The Chinese attached no credit to the representation, until they received, through their own officers at Lassa, a long manifesto; which the Supreme Government, knowing the relations which existed between Katmandoo and the Celestial Empire, thought it expedient to forward in explanation of the real cause of war.

The Chinese now argued that there might probably be some truth in what the Goorkhas had represented of our ambitious views, as so much pains was taken to disavow, or, as they conceived, to disguise them. Accordingly, it was determined by the Court of Peking that a force should immediately be directed to the quarter menaced; and that one of the most confidential ministers, and a military man, should proceed to ascertain the state of things in Nipál.

So slow were the Chinese in executing their determination, that the war was actually over before their army was heard of at Katmandoo. In September 1816, however, the Governor-general received, through the Sikhim Raja, a letter, written in scarcely intelligible Persian, from a person styling himself Shee Cheeoon Chang, Vizeer, or Prime Minister, with whom were associated the chief authority of Lassa, and another principal

officer of the frontier. The object of the letter was, to ask distinctly what were the views of the British government in that direction,* and to state how they had been misrepresented. In the course of the same month, the Goorkhas, having heard that a Chinese force had arrived at Digurchee, or Jigurchee, in August, applied directly to the Resident to know whether, in case the Chinese demanded any further submission beyond what had already been acceded to, they might depend on the co-operation of the British in resisting them.

In this state of things, the Supreme Government forbade any assurance of support being given to the Nipālese, lest it should encourage them in seeking cause of quarrel with the Chinese. The Governor-general also communicated a statement of all that had occurred, in reply to the letter which had been received through the Sikhim Raja. With this answer the Chinese authorities professed themselves satisfied, in so far as the British were concerned: they demanded, however, that some confidential agents from Nipāl should wait upon them; and the following account of what

* The Bengal government had furnished the Company's officers at Canton with a full explanation of all that passed; but the Chinese cautiously avoided any allusion to the Nipāl war in their official communications with the select committee there.

passed at the interview, was obtained afterwards from a Cashmeerian of the suite.

The first visit was one of pure ceremony; but the Goorkha Vakeels, Dilbunjun Pande and Colonel Runbeer Singh Thapa, waited again on Cheeoon Chang on the following day, when his Excellency commenced by asking, "What had become of the Pandes and Bishnawuths?" (leaders of the expedition into Tibet before alluded to;) and he added, "Who are these Thapas that I never before heard of? You Goorkhās are a mischievous race, and have caused the ruin of many Rajas. Digurchee, too, you plundered without cause or provocation; and now you have thought to act the Digurchee scene with the English, and so murdered their police-officer, after settling the question by negotiation. You have been punished justly;—you wrote us of war, and have since written of peace; yet still ask our aid.—What kind of peace is this?" The Nipālese urged that if not inclined to give assistance to recover what had been lost, the Chinese authorities would, at least, lend their good offices to procure the removal of the Residency from Katmandoo. Cheeoon Chang replied, "You wrote that it was to establish a factory that the English had come; why should I remove merchants?" Dilbunjun, one of the Vakeels, on this said, "They were not merchants,

but soldiers and officers that they desired to be rid of." Cheeoon Chang replied, "The English have written that their object is to cement peace; and it appears you have agreed to receive the Resident. You wrote us that the English had demanded the passes into Koteh China; but we know this is false;—if they desired to come to China, it would not be by that route." Turning to Colonel Runbeer, the other Vakeel, Cheeoon Chang continued in a tone of irony, "You Goorkhas think the hills have no soldiers but yourselves: how many of you may there be? About two lakh, I suppose!—and what is your revenue?" Runbeer replied, "That his Excellency was right in the number of fighting men; and that the revenue of the hill country was very small, not exceeding five lakh of rupees."—"Truly," said Cheeoon Chang, "you are a mighty nation!" and with this he dismissed the Vakeels.

The Chinese were so fully satisfied with the intelligence procured on this occasion, that they immediately withdrew their troops from Digurchee and Lassa. They betrayed, however, a little jealousy at the establishment of a Resident at Katmandoo; and, in reply to the letter of the Governor-general, after stating that they were perfectly satisfied, the Vizier introduced a hint that they should be still better pleased were he withdrawn. It was couched in the following terms.

“ You mention that you have stationed a Vakeel in Nipál. This is a matter of no consequence ; but as the Raja, from his youth and inexperience, and from the novelty of the thing, has imbibed some suspicions, if you would, out of kindness towards us, and in consideration of the ties of friendship, withdraw your Vakeel from thence, it would be better, and we should feel very much obliged to you.”

These minute details are, perhaps, too puerile to be recorded at such length ; but as so little is known of the conduct pursued by the Chinese in their relations with other Asiatic powers, at the same time that there is an interest about every thing that brings us politically into contact with them, it is hoped that this full account of their proceedings at Digurchee will not prove unamusing or out of place.

To the above statement of occurrences after the treaty, it only remains to add, that the young Raja of Nipál died, on the 20th of November 1816, of the small-pox ; and was succeeded by an infant son named Raj Indur Bikrum Sah. This event contributed to fix more firmly the authority of the party of General Bheem Sein, by giving him another lease of uncontrolled dominion, pending a second long minority.

CHAPTER VI.

OUDH.—BHOPAL.

1814-15.

Financial embarrassments—Irritating discussions with Nwab Sadut Ulee—set at rest by Lord Hastings—Nwab's death, and succession of Ghazee-ood-Deen Hydur—Resident's proceedings at Lucknou—Intrigues there—First Oudh Loan—Second ditto—Governor-general's intentions respecting Pindarees—Defensive plans—Reasons for adopting Bhopâl and Sagur alliance—Condition of Bhopâl—Designs of Mahrattas—Chief applies for British protection—Terms offered—Consequent military arrangements—Negotiation—Communication to Sindheea—How received by him—The Bhoosla and Pèshwa—Preparations in the Dukhun and Hindoostan—Augmentation of Bengal army—Effect of these measures in maintaining tranquillity—Conduct of Bhopâl—Vakeel dismissed—Reflections.

IN order to avoid confusion from interrupting the Narrative, the Nipâl war has been related from its origin to its close without mention of the affairs of the rest of India. We shall now supply this omission; and the completion of the war will enable us to pursue consecutively the thread of those affairs, after first noticing one or two matters of general interest connected more or less with the events already described.

When Lord Hastings left the presidency in June 1814, with the Nipál war upon his hands, the finances of the Bengal government were at a very low ebb. Great efforts had been made to furnish to Europe as large a cash remittance as possible; and the treasuries of the western provinces, instead of being in a condition to supply the wants of a campaign, had been drained of their resources to provide funds for this purpose, or to relieve other pressing demands at the presidency. Of these, the foremost were the necessity of supplying from Bengal a considerable deficiency in the resources of Java, and of meeting, besides, a heavy drain from China, where the provision of the tea investment depended on the negotiation of bills on Calcutta. But a new and rather unusual source of embarrassment arose from the state of the exchange with England at this time; for, owing to the great depreciation of the British currency, the sicca rupee, which intrinsically was worth a small fraction more than two shillings and a halfpenny, came to bear a remittance-value of two and eightpence, and even two and tenpence. While this was the case, all the public creditors, who had heretofore availed themselves of the option of receiving their dividends by bills on England, at two shillings and sixpence, demanded cash in India to purchase private bills at the advanced rate; and as a very large proportion of

the entire Indian debt was at this time held by retired servants, and others, resident in Europe, the sudden drain on the Indian treasuries from this cause was inconveniently heavy. The same unfavourable state of the exchanges operated, of course, to prevent the Indian governments from obtaining relief by bills on the Court of Directors, had they been disposed to seek such aid.

In this extremity, the natural resource would have been to open a new loan; but several circumstances precluded a resort to this step. In the first place, the securities of the existing loans, which had then very recently been negotiated with much trouble, and at the expense of much obloquy and dissatisfaction, at six per cent. interest per annum, in substitution for the old debts at eight per cent., bore in the market a discount of nine and ten per cent.; indeed, at one time, the discount was as low as sixteen. This showed the utter impossibility of raising money at the same rate of interest; while the manner of reduction rendered it as impossible, without forfeiting all pretensions to consistency and fair-dealing towards the public creditors, to depart from the principle on which the preceding loans had been made, and open a new one at a higher rate. Moreover, the distress for money was, at this juncture, so great and so general at Calcutta, that the first mercantile houses were giving twelve per

cent. on the security of government obligations. To open a public loan, therefore, at even a higher rate of interest than six per cent. would but add to the general distress, and produce, from the alarm it would occasion, a very great further depreciation of all existing securities, without being in itself productive in a degree to compensate such evils.

Being thus compelled to look abroad for some extraordinary source of supply, Lord Hastings cast his eye upon the Nuwab Vizeer, whose territory had suffered equally with our own from the aggressions of the Nipâlese, and who was known to have accumulated an immense hoard, which lay unemployed in his treasuries. Sadut Ulee Khan, the ruler of Oudh, was a man of considerable ability, and, naturally, not illiberal in disposition; but from dwelling on his own and his brother Asuf ood Doula's misfortunes, all owing, as it seemed to him, to the want of ready money, he had become latterly extremely greedy and parsimonious. His administration, since the forced cessions of 1801, had been conducted systematically on a principle of selfish avarice, which aimed to draw as much as possible from the country, at the smallest possible charge. Every district was, in consequence, farmed out yearly to the person who offered most for it; and no care whatsoever was taken to protect the population

either in property or person.* The farmer was the only government officer employed; and he was absolute in power, and accountable to no authority but the Nuwab himself.

In the treaty concluded with Sadut Ulee by Lord Wellesley, there was a loose engagement on the Nuwab's part to reform his internal administration, and the right of tendering advice to this end was specially reserved to the British government. No result, however, had yet followed from this stipulation, except an interminable and most unsatisfactory discussion between the Nuwab and the Resident. The former, of course, relished no plan of reform that trenched at all on his means of accumulating wealth; while the latter urged the necessity of providing establishments for the suppression of crimes which had become enormously prevalent, and for the administration of civil and criminal justice. After much fruitless negotiation, a plan of reform was devised, upon the principle of assimilating the administration of Oudh to that of the British provinces, and dividing the

* As an example of the character of Sadut Ulee's administration, it may be noticed that one of his first acts after the cession, was to resume all jageers, and rent-free tenures, by whomsoever granted, and for whatsoever purposes. Religious tenures, as well Mohammedan as Hindoo, and all political grants, excepting only those protected by British interference, fell before this general and indiscriminate confiscation.

territory into districts, with revenue, and judicial officers acting, as with us, under separate controlling authorities at the capital. This scheme was referred to government by the Resident at Lukhnou in 1810; and being approved, was then formally submitted to the Nuwab Vizeer, along with a letter from Lord Minto, urging strongly its adoption. The Nuwab met the proposition by declaring his readiness to adopt any scheme that might seem to him practicable; but he denied this to be so. He dwelt upon his utter want of trustworthy public officers of the kind possessed by the British government in its civil and military servants; and contended that the plan was, in other respects also, inapplicable to the state of things in his country, and to the relations which subsisted between himself and the people of his court, who must be his instruments, as well as with his subjects at large. The objection was plausible, and certainly not unfounded; but the truth is, that the Nuwab saw in the scheme, besides the expense of a large establishment, a very great abridgement of his own authority, and most probably, the direct and perpetual interference of the British Resident between himself and the public officers to be employed*. Hence he was extremely apprehensive

* Major Baillie, the Resident, went so far as to assume, in the discussions which took place, a right of seeing that pro-

of the tendency of such a system; and notwithstanding the Resident's most persevering endeavours, backed by occasional remonstrances from the Governor-general himself, nothing could reconcile him to its introduction. Indeed, the dissatisfaction he showed at the manner in which the measure was pressed, threatened to end in a dissolution of the relations of the state.

Several other irritating subjects of discussion contributed to augment the soreness produced by this negotiation. There were in Oudh some families and individuals that, from past services, claimed to be under the special protection of the British government. It was usual for the Resident to receive complaints from these against acts of the Nuwab or his officers affecting their interests, and also to interfere to adjust disputes between different members of the privileged families. It was impossible, in such a state of things, to avoid collision with the Nuwab; but Major Baillie was, besides, far from discreet in his manner of advocating the cause of those to whom he gave this support, and pushed the principle much further than was intended, by including his Moonshees and per-

per persons should be selected to execute the plan; and further, on one occasion, in answer to the Nuwab's objection from the want of instruments, offered to recommend him some,—an interference which threatened, at the very outset, to deprive the Nuwab of all his patronage.

sonal adherents amongst those entitled to the advantage.

Such was the state of things at Lukhnou towards the commencement of 1814. It was an early determination of Lord Hastings to adopt, as far as possible, towards the native princes linked in unequal alliance with us, a course of policy directed to the conciliation of their personal good will. Seeing, therefore, the acrimony and irritation apparent in the communications between the Nuwab Vizeer and Resident, and in the appeals and references to which they gave rise, it was a question with him, very soon after his arrival, whether it might not be expedient to make some exchange of Residents, in order to avert the crisis which seemed to be impending. The measure would have been a strong one, and might, perhaps, have been misinterpreted, so as to weaken our permanent influence at the court of Oudh. For this reason it was not adopted, and his Lordship rested satisfied with enjoining Major Baillie to be more cautious in his interference in future; and as an earnest of his desire to conciliate the Nuwab, he directed the further agitation of the question of reform to be dropped altogether.

Sadut Ulee Khan was naturally grateful for this change of policy, for which he felt himself indebted entirely to the new Governor-general. Lord Hastings, on the other hand, reckoned on

the favourable change of sentiment thus produced, as likely to lead his Excellency to enter readily into his views in case his assistance should be needed for the prosecution of the Nipâl war. With this predisposition to a mutual good understanding, Lord Hastings commenced his journey to the Western Provinces; but before he had proceeded half-way, he was met by intelligence of the death of Sadut Ulee, which occurred on the 11th of July, 1814. Ghazee-ood-Deen Hydur, the deceased Nuwab's eldest son, was at once raised to the musnud in his room, to the prejudice of the interests of the second son Shums-ood-Doula, in whose favour Sadut Ulee had created a party; for having a mean opinion of his eldest son's abilities, he had desired to supersede him. Major Baillie, in reporting these events, added, that the first act of the new Vizeer was to yield an immediate assent to the introduction of the plan of reform, and to give up all the points on which his predecessor had so strenuously resisted. It was impossible for Lord Hastings to approve of so injudicious an exertion of influence; and his displeasure was further excited at finding, on his arrival at Lukhnou, that all the most lucrative appointments, created under the scheme of reform, were filled by the Resident's own moonshees and dependents. It was too evident that Ghazee-ood-Deen had not been a free agent in what had been done. This the

Nuwab himself did not hesitate to declare to those about him, and he even went so far as to give in a paper of complaint on the subject to Lord Hastings ; but his fears afterwards got the better of him, and he retracted when the matter was ordered for investigation. There was so much intrigue and mystery in all these proceedings, that for a considerable time little was known of their real character, and except the extreme folly and timidity of the new Vizeer, which very soon became apparent, all else was mere suspicion and vague rumour. Major Baillie subsequently sent in a full statement of the whole transaction, which led to his immediate removal from the residency, It appeared from this, that the Nuwab's effort to emancipate himself from the state of thralldom in which he was held, was the effect of an intrigue instigated by the confidential advisers of the late Nuwab, aided by some English gentlemen at Lukhnou. The project was defeated by a counter intrigue, wherein the Resident's own moonshee, by holding out the example of Vizeer Ulee's degradation, and representing it as the consequence of his quarrel with the Resident of the time, created such an alarm in the mind of the Nuwab, as led to his recantation of his complaints, and nomination of the person of this party's selection for minister.

The truth was not discovered till after Lord

Hastings had left Lukhnou, consequently Major Baillie, for the time, retained his situation, but with the diminished confidence of the Governor-general, and the expression of some dissatisfaction at his past conduct. Until his removal, indeed, which occurred about a year after, he maintained also, through his moonshee and the new minister, his hold on the fears of the Nuwab; thus, for the time, defeating the declared wish of the Governor-general, for the Vizeer to be left unfettered in the exercise of authority within his own dominions. But after this event, and the disgrace and death of the moonshee in question, his Excellency assumed the reins with a more decided hand, relying with confidence on Lord Hastings' frequent assurances that he might consider himself in reality, as well as in name, independent. This confidence, however, in a timid mind like that of his Excellency, was not the growth of a day, and it was some time, therefore, before the Nuwab was convinced of the sincerity of the assurances he received.

It has been necessary to say thus much of the passing intrigues at the court of Oudh, in order to explain the circumstances under which the two loans were obtained from the Vizeer. The subject has else no immediate connexion with the political history of India, and is far from inviting.

The first loan was procured in October 1814; when the Resident and his party were under some apprehension lest the complaint about to be preferred against him should be successful; and when the Nuwab was anxious to do every thing in his power to secure the favour of the Governor-general, as the only means of securing himself against the designs of Shums-ood-Doula, and eventually of emancipating himself from the state of thralldom in which he was held. Lord Hastings thus found all parties eager to show zeal in promoting any object known to be personally interesting to himself; accordingly, upon the very first hint, through the Resident, that financial assistance was desired, his Excellency readily came forward, and offered a crore of rupees at his next interview. The sum was accepted as a subscription to the last preceding six per cent. loan, and an arrangement was at the same time made, to relieve the Nuwab from the payment of stipends equivalent to the interest payable on it. Most of these having been guaranteed by the British government, or obtained, at its instance, for individuals of the privileged class above described, the necessity which was constantly recurring of interposing to urge punctuality of payment had heretofore proved one of the most fruitful sources of irritation. The Nuwab was fully sensible of the advantage of ridding himself of the annoyance

of such interpositions; so much so, that of his own motion he added eight lakh to the principal sum lent, in order to relieve himself from a further stipend, beyond the amount of interest on the crore of rupees originally tendered.*

The aid so obtained from the Nuwab Vizeer enabled Lord Hastings to fill the western treasuries, and send his armies into the field against Nipâl, in the manner already described. A considerable portion was, at the same time, furnished for the relief of the presidency; but his Lordship could not avoid feeling some disappointment at the use there made of it. There was on the register still one remaining loan, at eight per cent. amounting to about fifty-four lakh and a half (Sicca rupees, 54,56,000). In their anxiety to be rid of this now anomalous species of stock, the officers of finance recommended the whole debt being at once advertised for peremptory payment. Such a measure, they urged, would be of the best effect at this juncture, in restoring public credit, and relieving the mercantile community, who still suffered much distress from the want of money in the market. The step was accordingly taken, without consulting the Governor-general, upon the

* Amongst the provisions thus secured, was a liberal allowance to his Excellency's second brother, Shuma-ood-Doula; who, to quiet all apprehensions from his rivalry and intrigues, was required to fix his residence at Bunarus.

presumption that the Oudh loan would furnish ample means beyond the wants of the campaign ; but in this respect the calculation proved fallacious. Extensive preparations had become indispensable in every quarter, and the call for increased exertions on the side of Nipâl grew every day more urgent. The consequence was, that a deficiency of funds was again experienced before the campaign was half over. In this emergency, a second application to the Nuwab Vizeer was deemed necessary ; the financial officers being unable to devise any other remedy. The request for further aid was accordingly submitted, accompanied with a full and candid explanation of our difficulties. So applied to, his Excellency could not, consistently with his professions of sincere and ardent attachment, refuse the solicited assistance ; but he did not afford it so readily as on the former occasion. He at first offered fifty lakh, but this sum was not accepted, and the offer was assumed to be made from an imperfect acquaintance with the extent of the embarrassment for which we sought relief. Thus urged, his Excellency was, at length, brought to consent to furnish another crore on the same terms as the preceding. It is to be observed, that the mass of treasure accumulated by Sadut Ulee Khan, and made over to Ghazee-ood-Deen on his accession, was estimated to amount, at the lowest compu-

tation, to seven or eight crore,* so that the accommodation solicited was not more than the Nwab could well afford.

Having thus explained the source whence supplies were drawn for the extraordinary exertions made in 1814-15, it is time to relate the measures they gave the means of undertaking in Central India, while the war, already described, was waging to the north.

It had been resolved by the Supreme Government, on the eve of the Governor-general's departure from the presidency, in 1814, to make a strong representation of the formidable and rapidly augmenting power of the predatory associations to the home authorities;† with the view of impressing them with the like conviction of the danger to the British interests, arising from the continuance and progressive increase of bodies so capable of acquiring a mischievous pre-eminence; and of

* Major Baillie stated the amount, in money and jewels, at fourteen crore. In the course of 1816, the death of the Fyzabad Begum, widow of Shooja-ood-Doula, put government in possession of fifty-six lakh more, on the condition of providing annuities equivalent to the interest, at six per cent. This also was a most seasonable relief. The Begum enjoyed our guarantee of her jageers and possessions, and made this arrangement, for the security of her protégés and dependents, some years before her death.

† Vide Chap. I.

receiving their sanction for the prosecution of a systematic combination of measures, for the suppression of this growing evil. It was agreed, on all hands, that the necessity of such measures would soon be forced upon us; and it was consequently essential, that those intrusted with the direction in England, should thus early be apprised of the actual posture of affairs, and of the views respecting them entertained by those who had the means of closer observation. There seemed to be time to wait the effect of this representation; for there was no reason, at the date when it was made, to expect the occurrence of any thing to demand immediate operations in the quarter where the Pindarees and Putans had fixed themselves; while the Indian government found ample employment in the war with the Nipålese. For the present, therefore, it was deemed advisable to dispose our means in a defensive attitude, sufficient to prevent or repel incursions; and neither to advance to attack the Pindarees in their haunts, nor commence that extended plan of connected movements, which, though necessary to the entire suppression of these predatory hordes, might alarm the independent states by its contrast with our recent system of general and scrupulous neutrality.

The most effectual defensive measure, and the one most desirable in every point of view, seemed

to be, the establishment of a subsidiary alliance with the Bhoosla Raja, whereby the whole of our most exposed frontier, viz. the line from Bundelkhund to Cuttack, now defended by the single position of Midnapoor, where a regular battalion was stationed, would thenceforth be skirted by the dominions of a power in strict alliance; and a force upon the Nerbudda, communicating on one hand with the southernmost position of Bundelkhund, and on the other with the troops at the northernmost point of the Nizam's dominions, would completely guard the whole line of our possessions and those of our allies, as far as it was possible to protect them against an enemy so active as the Pindarees. This was a project nowise novel. The British government had, for several years, been endeavouring to prevail on Raghoojee Bhoosla to accede to such a proposition, but, as stated in the introductory chapter, could never conquer his repugnance and distrust. The negotiations for the purpose, which had been open since 1812, were finally closed while the Governor-general was on his progress up the river, by a decided refusal on the part of the Raja.

The best alternative that presented itself on failure of the Nagpoor connexion was, to extend the chain of positions from Bundelkhund to the Nerbudda, by means of a connexion with the states of Sâgur and Bhopâl, and thereby draw a

similar defensive line westward of the Nagpoor territories. The necessity of adopting this alternative, should operations ever be undertaken without the co-operation of the Bhoosla, was fully acknowledged in the course of those discussions upon the practicability and mode of suppressing the predatory associations, which had preceded the representation to the home authorities; but it formed part of that extended system, which it had been resolved not to commence upon for the present, in fear of alarming the independent states. Wherefore, although Lord Hastings resolved in the end to adopt this course, he would have deferred so doing, notwithstanding the disappointment in respect to Nagpoor, had not some indications appeared of a combination amongst the Mahratta powers, the danger of which required to be anticipated.

At the time of rejecting our alliance, it was discovered, that the Bhoosla was actually engaged in negotiating one of an offensive and defensive character with Sindheea, for the subjugation of the Bhopâl principality by their joint arms. One of the ostensible pretexts for this confederacy was, the necessity of a counter-preparation against the ambitious projects of the British government; which were inferred, as well from the attempt to establish our influence at Nagpoor, as from the stir of our military prepa-

ration, which denoted that active operations were meditated in some quarter or other, though the immediate direction was, at that time, involved in mystery. Sindheea's jealousy, ever keenly attentive to all our movements, was redoubled by this show of preparation; and it soon became evident, from his conduct towards the Pindarees, that, whatever might have been his previous intention, he had now no wish to suppress them. As a further consequence of this jealousy, intrigue began to be busy at the quarters of Ameer Khan and the durbar * of Holkur, and even with Runjeet Singh, the ruler of the Punjâb Seikhs. The Pêshwa was suspected to have joined these intrigues thus early, if not to have been the first author and instigator of them; a change having

* At the court of Holkur, affairs were, at this time, in the hands of Myna Bae and Tanteea Aleek ur, with whom Sindheea had considerable influence. The minister Tanteea paid a visit to Gwalior early in 1815, in order to negotiate a treaty of closer union and concert between the two families, for the prosecution of common objects, under the general direction of the Pêshwa, as supreme head of the Mahratta empire. The conciliation of the Pindarees by territorial grants in the respective dominions of both the families, and the concentration of the military force of both states for the prosecution of ambitious designs against the Rajpoots, were the most striking articles of this offensive and defensive alliance, apparent on the face of the copies of this agreement, delivered in the sequel. There is reason, how-

been observed in his conduct some time before, which will hereafter be more particularly adverted to. It is difficult exactly to define their immediate object or extent; whether merely defensive against any supposed designs on our part, for the further extension of our dominion, in a manner injurious to the interests of the contracting parties; or offensive also, in case of a favourable opportunity. The advance of Runjeet Singh's army to a position threatening the territory of the protected Seikhs, which took place immediately after the division at Loodheeana, under Sir David Ochterlony, was moved into the hills to attack Umur Singh, and the concentration of the Patans, under Ameer Khan, which occurred at a critical moment, and within a few marches of our Agra frontier, afford reason to

ever, to believe that there were other secret articles, which have not even yet been divulged. Indeed, it is well known that there was one such article levelled against Ameer Khan, and more than suspected, upon many accounts, that another aimed at the diminution or subversion of the British interest. In the end, the negotiation came to nothing, from a strong surmise that Sindheea's main object was to establish his influence at the court of Mulhar Rao, for the purpose of supplanting the family in their possessions. An opposite faction was also at work, and Tanteea Aleek ur, with Myna Bae, yielded very soon after to Balaram Set and Toolsee Bae, whereof the former was favourable to Ameer Khan and the Patans, and jealous of Sindheea.

suspect that the object of the confederacy was not purely defensive: but this is a point it is no longer important to investigate.

No sooner was Lord Hastings apprised of these intrigues, than he saw at once that their immediate result must have been the consolidation of the Mahratta power over the whole tract, separating the Bengal territories from those of our allies in the Dukhun, which must not only have cut off the Bhoosla for ever from any connexion with us, by rivetting his dependence on Sindheea; but have deprived us of the alternative offered in the connexion of Bhopâl, by the previous subjugation of that state. Urged by these considerations, he resolved no longer to hesitate in stepping forward to complete his defensive arrangements, by forming a connexion with Bhopâl and Sâgur, in despite of any efforts by the regular independent powers to counteract the design. It certainly was a bold stroke of policy; but it presented the double advantage of thwarting Sindheea's apparent design of establishing his influence over Nagpoor, and of rescuing another principality, whose existence promised us many most essential benefits; moreover, it served to complete those defensive measures, which the suspected disposition of the regular powers, and their present undisguised encouragement of the predatory bands, rendered more necessary than

ever for the security of our own provinces. Perhaps the very imposing boldness of the step, which exhibited a degree of vigour and resolution proportionate to the emergency, was its best recommendation to his Lordship's mind; inasmuch as it was calculated to impress on the native princes a sense of the vigilance and confidence of his administration.

A brief notice of the condition of Bhopál will not be here out of place. The territory of this state lies in the valley of the Nerbudda, and above the hills to the north, between the 77° and 78° of east longitude. The government has been vested in a Putan family since the days of Aurung-zeeb. The reigning chief in 1814 was Wuzeer Mohummed, who had acquired the succession, rather by proving himself the fittest of the family to sustain its declining fortunes in arduous times, than as the lawful heir by the rules of hereditary descent. The family had preserved their political independence against the most active efforts of the Mahrattas in the fulness of their military preponderance; although their position immediately between the Bhoosla and Sindheea made their territory the particular object of Mahratta jealousy, and presented, as long as it should remain inviolate, an effectual bar to the consolidation of the influence of that nation in this part of India. On a former occasion,

when General Goddard was sent by Warren Hastings with an expedition from Hindoostan, in execution of his sagacious plan of alarming the Mahratta powers, then confederated against us, into the acceptance of his own terms of peace, by penetrating through the very heart of their possessions, the existence of this independent principality was one of the principal encouragements to make the attempt. The family are still in possession of the strongest testimonials from General Goddard of the important services rendered him by the reigning Nuwab; indeed, the ultimate success of the enterprise, and the final accomplishment of that officer's wonderful march across an enemy's, and then unknown, country all the way to Surat, were mainly to be attributed to his having found this principality, in a state of independence and hostility to the Mahrattas, midway on the line of march.

The importance of saving such a friend, when a hostile combination of the Mahrattas was to be apprehended, must be obvious enough. Already, in execution of the offensive and defensive engagements between Sindheea and the Bhoosla, was the best appointed force of the former, that commanded by Colonel Baptiste, on one part of the frontier; while Sudeek Ulee Khan, with the troops of Nagpoor, approached it on the opposite side; and another division of Sindheea's troops,

that under Juswunt Rao Bhão, was also in the neighbourhood. No time was to be lost. Sind-heea had before frequently attacked this state, and even besieged its capital, but without success, owing partly to the incapacity of the commanders he employed and their general ignorance of the mode of attacking fortified places, and partly to the gallantry and skill of Wuzeer Mohummed's defence. The Maha-Raja, however, had never before entered Bhopâl with so efficient an army; and Baptiste's knowledge of European tactics, and long and successful practice in the various sieges he had hitherto conducted, seemed to leave but little hope that the Putan chief would be able to save himself and his dominions on this occasion.

His perpetual hostility to the Mahrattas had naturally made him look to us as a resource in the hour of extremity; and that hour was now fast approaching. He was, accordingly, induced to make a very earnest solicitation for our support; and, for that purpose, despatched an agent to Dehlee, who waited on Mr. Metcalfe, the British Resident there, and submitted, on behalf of his master, a specific proposition to be admitted within the pale of our protection. The first application to this effect, reached the Governor-general a short time before he made his determination as to the course to be adopted in regard to

the Pindarees ; but it was not until the preparations and designs of the Mahratta powers were more fully developed, that it was deemed necessary to take any steps in consequence. The measure, as above stated, was chiefly recommended as a precaution against the plots supposed to be in agitation ; and of these, the first symptoms appeared about the beginning of October. When his Lordship's mind was fully made up on the matter, he instructed Mr. Metcalfe to entertain the proposition of the Bhopál emissary ; and, in case he should be furnished with powers sufficiently ample and explicit, to conclude with him an engagement on the following basis :—“ The British government to afford its protection against the present designs of Sindheea and the Bhoosla, and a perpetual guarantee for the future ; the Nuwab to be left in complete independence in the management of his internal administration ; the British troops to have free ingress and egress through the Bhopál territories, together with every facility in the provision of their supplies and necessaries ; a fortress to be delivered as a present depôt, and, eventually, a spot to be allotted for a cantonment or permanent station ; the Nuwab to renounce all connexion with the Pindarees, and not to negotiate with other powers, except in concert with the British government, abiding by its arbitration in all dif-

ferences with them." However, as it was thought proper to hold out the prospect of some advantage by way of inducement to enter into an alliance of this nature, the recovery of all the territories of the state, then in the hands of the Pindarees, was to be proposed; and the Governor-general prepared himself to abandon the claim to a money consideration for the expense of defending the territory, though the demand of a proportion of the charge, if contested, was not to be hastily relinquished.

The negotiation with Nana Govind Rao, the legitimate chief of Sâgur, was intrusted to the political agent in Bundelkhund, Mr. Wauchope, and the basis of the connexion to be offered and concluded was precisely the same: a large proportion of the expense, it was, however, confidently expected, would be borne by the Nana, as the condition of our giving him possession, which he then had not.* On discovery that the agent at

* The territory of Sâgur was held at this time by the widow of Rughoonath Rao Bural, Rukhma Bæe, whose manager was Benaek Rao. Rughoonath Rao was the son of Balajee Govind Rao; and, dying without children, the next heir was Nana Govind Rao of Julaon, son of Gungadbur Govind, Balajee's own brother. The cousin, however, was opposed by the Bæe and Benaek Rao, and had not sufficient influence to get possession of his inheritance without our assistance, for which reason it was thought he would listen readily to our terms.

Dehlee had not full powers from the Nuwab of Bhopál, both negotiations were removed to Bundelkhund, which, from its vicinity to the two districts, seemed to be the most convenient spot for conducting them.

In support of the course of policy thus resolved upon, the troops in Bundelkhund were reinforced and held in readiness; the Nizam's subsidiary force was ordered to advance immediately from Jálna to Ellichpoor, near the northern extremity of the valley of Berar; the Poona subsidiary force to hold itself in readiness to act in its support, by moving on Jafurabad, in the neighbourhood of Jálna; at the same time, the Bombay government was directed to draw together the whole of the Goozerat troops at some point eastward of that province. The object of these military arrangements was to overawe the Mahratta powers and predatory bands, in the event of their evincing an inclination to obstruct the execution of the treaties which might be concluded. Colonel Doveton, the commandant of the Nizam's subsidiary force, began his march from Jálna on the 3d of November, 1814; and it was intended that, with this army, he should penetrate into Bhopál, to execute the protective stipulations of the treaty with the Nuwab.

The negotiations having been thus opened, Mr. Wauchope addressed a letter to the Nuwab

of Bhopâl, explaining at length the terms on which the Governor-general was disposed to receive that state under protection, in compliance with the solicitations of the agent of his court preferred at Dehlee. He hinted, also, at the Nuwab's bearing some part of the expense. An immediate answer was received from Wuzeer Mohummed, agreeing to all the stipulations proposed, with the exception of the delivery of a fort for a present depôt, and of bearing a part of the expense. For the discussion of these two points, he declared his intention of deputing an envoy, upon the return of the person he had sent to Dehlee, which was daily expected.

Mr. Wauchope had been placed in communication with the Residents at the courts of Sindheea and the Bhoosla, in order that he might keep them apprised, from time to time, of the state and progress of the negotiations: and these Residents had been instructed, so soon as they should be advised of the adjustment of preliminaries, to explain fully to the respective courts the designs of the British government, with the reasons for them, in such a manner as they might deem least likely to create alarm. This being the first occasion of departure from the delicacy of interference we had hitherto so rigidly observed, in respect to states circumstanced like Bhopâl and Sâgur, it was deemed necessary that the British

representatives at the courts of the independent princes should be prepared, both to assert the right of extending the pale of our protection to any power free to contract, and to rebut any imputation of intended injury to their interests resulting from such extension in the particular instance, by showing it to be simply a necessary precaution for the support of our own defensive system, and by no means designed or intended to thwart their respective views.

The Resident at Sindheea's court (Mr. Richard Strachey) conceiving the Nuwab of Bhopâl's unqualified assent to all the fundamental articles of the Governor-general's proposition to amount to a preliminary adjustment of the terms of alliance, proceeded forthwith to make the official communication to Sindheea of the intentions of the British government in respect to Bhopâl, on advice of the substance of the Nuwab's reply to Mr. Wauchope. Sindheea, on receiving the communication, inveighed in the strongest terms against our interference with the affairs of Bhopâl, declaring the principality to be one of his dependencies in Malwa, with which we were solemnly pledged, by treaty, to have no concern. The Resident denied that it fell within the terms of the treaty, asserting it to be a free and independent state. Gopal Rao Bhão, who took a prominent part in the discussion, declared the several places which had been

wrested from Wuzeer Mohummed by Sindheea at different times, to be cessions in lieu of tribute justly due, the account of which was still unsettled ; and represented our interference to prevent the enforcement of these his just dues, as tantamount to a positive declaration of war. In point of fact, according to the Mahratta notions of political justice, Sindheea had a good title to whatever he could extort from Bhopâl ; and, having been in the habit of making usurpations, and levying contributions on this territory as his peculiar and exclusive prey, he conceived no one else had any right to interpose. This is the meaning he attached to the word dependency. It was notorious, however, that Wuzeer Mohummed had long maintained a most glorious struggle for his independence ; and neither had himself, nor had any of the family before him, ever by treaty, or other act of any kind, acknowledged the supremacy of any Mahratta state. The discussions on this point grew particularly warm ; Sindheea taking an active personal part in them, and using language which might have been construed into menace : and when, at the close of the interview, Mr. Strachey requested that Colonel Baptiste might be ordered to refrain from active hostility against Bhopâl, until the Governor-general's instructions upon the Resident's report of the conference should arrive, the request was distinctly refused. Indeed,

considering that there was yet no actual treaty concluded with Bhopâl, the demand was, perhaps, rather premature. This conference took place on the last day of November ; and the tone then assumed by the durbar was nowise lowered at an interview obtained by Mr. Strachey's moonshee three days after.

Immediately on being apprised that this communication had been made to Sindheea, the Residents at the other Mahratta courts resolved, very properly, no longer to defer a similar explanation. The Nagpoor Raja required time to consider of his answer ; but, on being pressed by Mr. Jenkins, privately assured that gentleman that Sudeek Ulee Khan should be forbidden to join the army of Baptiste, or to act hostilely against Bhopâl. It was further ascertained, that this court would not oppose the advance of the subsidiary force at Ellichpoor through the portion of its territories which lay on the route from that station to Bhopâl, in case events should require its movement in that direction. A private correspondence, however, was kept up the whole time between the Bhoosla and Sindheea ; and the intrigues, which had before been commenced in other quarters, were carried on with renewed activity.

The Pêshwa, on being informed of the intentions of the British government, in respect to Bhopâl, professed to be highly satisfied, because

of the security that would result to the Jageers of several of his dependents in the neighbourhood. Amongst others, the Vinshorkur, in whose concerns he took particular interest, had large possessions about Ashta and Shujawulpoor, which the Pindarees and Sindheea's commanders were continually plundering, and of the greater part of which they had already divested him.

Notwithstanding the exterior appearance of amity assumed at Nagpoor and Poona, which, in the case of the former, was carried so far as to produce an offer by Raghoojee of a body of his troops to be taken into British pay, and the pressure of this offer with some importunity, there was still little reason to doubt that both these courts were heartily bent upon the combination, which accounts from every quarter, during the months of November, December, and January, reported to be organizing against the British power. Mahrattas, Putans, and Pindarees seemed, for the moment, to have forgotten all their mutual jealousies, under the notion that the moment was near at hand which would give the opportunity of a successful rise against our galling superiority. The discovery that we had planned an extensive war in the hills, in which their reasonings from past history led them to anticipate our certain failure, and this anticipation was favoured by the untoward events that marked the opening

of the campaign in that quarter, mainly contributed to lead all ranks to speculate on the speedy occurrence of such an opportunity. It was evident, however, that they were not yet prepared to act, nor had formed any consistent plan of future conduct.

The coincidence of several disasters and failures, which took place towards the end of 1814, at the precise juncture when Sindheea had assumed the decided tone which has been mentioned above, gave the Marquess of Hastings ground seriously to apprehend that the crisis was imminent. He resolved to be prepared for the worst at all points. The military arrangements which had been made in October, for the support of the Bhopâl negotiations, were not of a magnitude to meet the extent of combination, which seemed to be organizing against us in the course of December. Instead of being overawed by them, as had been expected, Sindheea had openly declared his resolution not to desist from hostility against that principality: and as the Governor-general was determined to persevere in the policy he had entered upon, it became necessary to extend the scale of preparation in that quarter, as well as to the north, so as to provide against all hazards. The whole disposable force of the Madras army was accordingly ordered into the field, under the personal command of Sir Thomas Hislop; by which means a body of

thirteen thousand men was brought together on the northern frontier of the British possessions in the Dukhun, at a point whence it could, at any time, move forward in support of the two subsidiary forces in advance. Reinforcements were, at the same time, ordered into Goozerât from the Bombay presidency; and it was his Lordship's intention, in case matters should come to an actual rupture with Sindheea, in confederacy with the Bhoosla and the predatory associations of Central India, immediately to assume the offensive on the side of the Dukhun, while he maintained such an attitude on that of Hindoostan, as he hoped would secure him from attack. This latter object, however, was not of easy accomplishment, while the Nipâl war continued to require such extraordinary exertions. There had been at one period of the season, upwards of forty-five thousand* fighting men engaged either in the hills or the Turace. The military establishments of the Bengal presidency were, however, scarcely sufficient, even in ordinary times, to man a frontier of upwards of fifteen hundred miles, from Loodhecana to Cuttack, in such a manner as not to

* According to the returns, there were at one time in the field,

Regulars	-	-	-	33,059
Irregulars	-	-	-	13,570
Making a total of	-	-	-	<u>46,629</u>

expose its weakness. Indeed, the whole frontier eastward of Mirzapoor was absolutely defenceless; and the Pindaree incursion of 1812 had completely manifested our vulnerability in that quarter. In this emergency, the following were the measures adopted. It had heretofore been the practice to leave nearly all the civil duties of the western provinces to be executed by the regular army; by which means the battalions were broken into detachments, and their discipline and efficiency very much impaired. From these duties they were instantly relieved; and until provincial corps should be formed for the purpose, the civil officers were ordered to take into their service such temporary bodies of armed men, as they might be able to procure on the spur of the occasion. An arrangement was at the same time effected, which contributed most materially to the advantageous display of the inadequate means left available for the defence of the provinces: viz. the calling out of the grenadier companies of the regiments of the line, not on actual service in the field, and forming them into independent battalions; while their place in the corps was directed to be filled up by supplemental companies. By this measure, an addition of seven battalions was at once made to the nominal force. Besides the above temporary expedients to meet the present exigency, consi-

derable levies of irregular horse and foot were authorized; and Lord Hastings further determined to make a permanent addition of three regiments to the regular army, and to form six provincial corps, for the civil duties of the upper provinces. The irregular levies are of such a nature, as to be available the very moment they are raised; and as the individuals, especially of the horse, generally come from those ranks most likely to be opposed to us, their enlistment is always a measure of obvious momentary expediency. The new regiments could not be rendered fit for duty in the current season; but the motive of this augmentation was a firm conviction of the insufficiency of the military establishment, even for ordinary times; more particularly since the Goorkha power had risen to such importance, that henceforth that frontier would require as much vigilance as the southern and western. The Burmese of Ava and Arracan had also lately assumed a tone which rendered it probable that it would soon become necessary to have a permanent force in this direction likewise; and neither they nor the Nipâlese had heretofore entered into the calculations which had regulated the extent of the Bengal establishments. Inclusive of all the provincial and local corps, this augmentation carried the Bengal army to no higher numerical amount than about eighty |

thousand fighting men; which was the whole force relied on for the preservation and protection of half a million of square miles*, with a population of forty millions, and a revenue of 12,000,000*l.* sterling.

Such were the provisions made by the Marquess of Hastings to meet the crisis expected to occur in the season of 1814-15. Had it happened then, instead of three years afterwards, these preparations would have been no more than sufficient. The gloomy aspect of the campaign in the hills in January, induced his Lordship to apply for two additional king's regiments from the Cape and Mauritius; and it was too late to countermand them, when the favourable turn of the tide had rendered their presence unnecessary.

It was, of course, some time before the above preparations could be put into a train of activity. The Madras army was not concentrated till March, when Sir Thomas Hislop assumed the command. By that time, however, it had become evident, that whatever necessity might have existed in December and January for military preparations on so large a scale, there was little chance that any part of the force assembled would be called into active service this season. The interference we had already exerted in favour of Bho-

* Including Oudh and the protected states, but not the other presidencies.

pâl, backed by such an appearance of precautionary vigilance, had proved sufficient to save the principality from attack; and the confederates not having yet gone the length of agreeing upon a specific plan of hostilities, which nothing on our part had occurred to precipitate, matters seemed, by general consent, to be subsiding into a state of repose, which, though wakeful and feverish, yet promised to last out the season. The Bhoosla Raja, on our requisition, arrested the advance of his troops; and Sindheea, notwithstanding his bullying refusal to abstain from hostile measures when requested by the Resident, took the first opportunity of quietly withdrawing his forces. A fair occasion for so doing was offered by the violent conduct of Juswunt Rao Bhào, whose differences with Colonel Baptiste proceeded to the length of obliging the Colonel to attack and drive him off. After this, Baptiste stayed some time in the neighbourhood of Bhopâl, negotiating with Wuzeer Mohummed; he then turned westward, ostensibly in pursuit of Juswunt Rao, leaving Bhopâl altogether unmolested.

Sindheea had before the end of December received a letter, addressed to him by the Governor-general on the subject of the discussions which had occurred at his durbar. This letter, after explaining the grounds on which Bhopâl was dealt with, as a state free to negotiate and conclude alli-

ances at will, professed a readiness to receive any statements and proofs to the contrary, that the durbar might have to exhibit; requiring, however, a suspension of all acts of hostility towards the Bhopál territory, until the question of its political independence should have been disposed of. The court immediately caught at this proposition, having, as it should seem, already come to the resolution not to hazard an open rupture, for which it was nowise prepared: after some delay, a paper of complaints was accordingly drawn up, asserting Bhopál to be one of the dependencies of Sindheea, but adducing no proof whatever; and further, accusing the British government of having interfered with Sindheea's rights and possessions, by the extension of its protection to some of the Bundeela chiefs;—a complaint now preferred for the first time, though the measure had been adopted some years before. The Raja of Nagpoor also gave in a similar paper of objections to our connexion with Bhopál; the arguments of which were too trivial to be worth the recital.

The object of the Marquess of Hastings in inviting these durbars to the adoption of such a course of proceeding was, to testify his adherence to that moderation, and regard to the rights of others, which had been the constant aim of the British government in its transactions with the native powers; and by opening a door to nego-

tiation, to prevent any sudden recourse to violent measures, likely to bring on a premature explosion. It should be recollected, that the Governor-general's principal view in proffering his protection to Bhopâl, had been to save that state from destruction, and thus prevent that union of interests between Sindheea and the Bhoosla, which must inevitably have ended in fixing the dependence of the latter on the former. The advantage of the connexion as a mere defensive arrangement against the Pindarees, howsoever important, would scarcely have induced his Lordship to step forward at the particular juncture, had not the other two objects been so intimately blended with the prosecution of the same line of policy. The salvation of the principality, however, and the obstruction of Sindheea's apparent views on Nagpoor, would as well be accomplished by a slow negotiation, which left things intermediately just as they were, as by the hasty employment of force, directed to the acquisition of the same objects. Should war be unavoidable in the end, still, in the then actual state of India, delay was necessary for the full development of our means, and for the removal of the unfavourable impression made by the early occurrences of the Goorkha campaign. In every point of view, therefore, the course adopted by the Marquess of Hastings was most judicious; inasmuch as, even granting that no satisfactory result

could ever be expected from negotiation, time at least would be gained; and time, in fact, was every thing. This resolution was formed early in December; and in furtherance of it, Mr. Wauchope was directed, on the arrival of the envoy from Bhopâl, to call upon him, in the first instance, to exhibit proofs of the independence of the principality.

All these matters remained in suspense the whole of the ensuing January; during which time, the Nuwab gave out that he was under British protection, addressing letters to the commandants of the two subsidiary forces in the Dukhun, and to other British authorities, as if engagements had been actually signed and executed. At the end of January, he addressed a letter to Mr. Wauchope, informing him that his Dehlee agent had returned and acquainted him with all that had passed; that his vakeel should accordingly set off for Banda as soon as the Mohurram* was over. No vakeel, however, was despatched before the 18th of March, or appeared at Banda until the 5th of April. It was positively ascertained that the Nuwab, satisfied of his security from the steps already taken by the Governor-general, imagined he might now look about for

* The sacred month in which the Koran was written: the first ten days of the month are kept as a season of mourning throughout Hindoostan, in memory of the unfortunate expedition of Hoosein, the son of Ulee.

other advantages, and had employed this interval in close negotiation with Baptiste and Sudeek Ulee Khan, not only while their armies were threatening his territory, when the excuse of imminent danger might have been admissable, but even after they had retired to a distance, and there was no longer any fear of an attack being meditated by the Mahrattas. Moreover, notwithstanding that it was an express stipulation of the Governor-general, to which he had distinctly declared his acquiescence, that he should not negotiate except in concert with the British government, he gave no intimation of any intention so to act, and carefully concealed the nature of his communications; even denying the having sent an agent to the quarters of Baptiste after his retrograde movement, though the fact had been public, and was universally known.

After such duplicity, it was not to be expected that negotiations, if opened at Banda, would be prosecuted with any cordiality on the part of the Nuwab. The Governor-general accordingly determined, in order both to mark his sense of the conduct pursued by the Nuwab, and to prevent his further trifling with the British government, to order his vakeel to be dismissed without an audience, as soon as he should appear at Banda. These orders were executed, and the negotiation thus broken off in April. Wuzeer Mohummed

was, at the same time, assured that no ill-will was harboured towards him; and that it was merely because his conduct had shown that he had not a proper sense of the value of the connexion offered to him, or of the spirit in which it ought to have been received, that the British government, for the present, withdrew from the discussion of it.

This result of the negotiation, and the insincerity of the Bhopâl chief's behaviour, which had been the occasion of its abrupt termination, were communicated in due course by the Residents at the respective independent courts. It was, however, distinctly asserted on the part of the Governor-general, in reply to the objections delivered in by Sindheea and the Bhoosla, that no proof or argument whatever had been adduced, that could be construed to limit or preclude the right of the British government to take the principality under protection on any future occasion, or to show that it had at any time been other than perfectly free and independent. No answer was made to this communication by either court; the point may, therefore, be considered to have been virtually conceded by the Mahratta potentates. The negotiation with the legitimate chief of Sâgur, which was merely an auxiliary measure to the connexion with Bhopâl, was abandoned at the same time; the delay and evasions of

the Nana, Govind. Rao, having shown that to him also, notwithstanding his original solicitations, the connexion had become a matter of indifference.

The season was verging towards its close, ere these events were finally concluded; yet the inimical disposition which had been testified by the powers of Central India had begun visibly to subside, or at least to be more guarded and disguised, through the extinction of any hope that an opportunity of breaking out would be offered by the operations of the mountain-war of Nipâl. The Governor-general felt, therefore, that it was unnecessary longer to maintain the same attitude of military preparation, which had been assumed under a different aspect of affairs. The Madras army was accordingly broken up, and the Goozerat force ordered back to its cantonments. The two subsidiary forces of the Dukhun remained for some time longer in the advanced positions they had occupied, with a view to afford as much protection to the territories of the Nizam and Pêshwa against predatory incursion, as the extended line to be defended would admit.

Thus ended the first season of active operations. The Nipâlese were soliciting peace with every appearance of sincerity; the native powers of Central India had been inspired with a degree of awe that

kept them quiet; and Bhopâl, though not yet linked in actual alliance with us, had been as effectually protected, as if the treaty had been signed. Moreover, the interest for its preservation, evinced on this occasion, promised to afford security for the future, by leaving the Mahratta princes under the apprehension of our again stepping forward in a similar manner to thwart a similar design. Wuzeer Mohummed seems evidently to have anticipated this consequence of his application to us; indeed, his whole conduct shows that it was his intention, for his own security, to avail himself of the reputation of our power, rather than of its actual exercise; and that he never had any serious thoughts of binding himself to us in any connexion, which would interfere with his political independence. This high-minded and ambitious chief was unwilling to forego the prospect of self-aggrandizement and extension of territory, at the expense of the regular as well as irregular powers, which hemmed him in on every side. His resort to us was a mere temporary expedient; and he wished to have no further intercourse, than was barely necessary to gain his purpose.

The policy of the Governor-general's offer of protection to Bhopâl has since been brought into question, on the ground of its tendency to give

birth to those very intrigues, and that very disposition to conspire against the British domination, from which he had apprehended danger to our interests. But the previous existence of these intrigues, as evinced by Sindheea's connexion with the Bhoosla, and by the concurring reports of the several British Residents at the native courts, was the principal, and perhaps the sole reason that induced Lord Hastings to adopt the measure; the object of which had been to anticipate, and thereby prevent, the pernicious consequences to be expected from the projects of the Mahrattas at the particular juncture. Doubtless, when the outset of the Goorkha war had been unpropitious, and when such extensive exertions were required for its prosecution, the risk of giving umbrage to the Mahratta powers and entailing fresh embarrassment would not, willingly, have been incurred, without a sense of most imperious exigency. But probably in the opinion of some people, the best argument in favour of the course taken is to be found in the result which actually followed, notwithstanding the unlooked-for disasters of the campaign. It will have been seen that the establishment of Sindheea's influence over the Bhoosla, and the destruction of Bhopál, were thereby completely prevented. And although the greater part of the force of the Bengal presidency was known

to be occupied in the hill country, and daily accounts of reverses in that quarter must have been eagerly circulated, the Mahrattas were nevertheless deterred, by the formidable aspect of the British preparations, from resenting in any way this undisguised and direct counteraction of their views.

CHAPTER VII.

HYDERABAD.—POONA.

1815—JUNE—JULY.

Rains set in—Hyderabad—Nizam's sons seize a dependent of the Residency—Guard set upon them obliged to retire—Troops called into Hyderabad—Their submission and confinement in Golkonda—Poona—Account of Bajee Rao—of the Gykwar—his relation to Peshwa—to British—Policy of Peshwa, and claims on Nizam—on Gykwar—Referred to British arbitration—Award as to Ahmedabad—Trimbukjee Dainglia—Gungadhur Sastree's negotiation—Intrigues at Brodera—Protest of British Resident—Renunciation of the arbitration—Gungadhur practised upon and gained over—Pilgrimage to Nassik—Sastree gives offence—his destruction planned—Pilgrimage to Pundurpoor—Dissimulation—Sastree murdered.

THE preceding chapter has brought down the transactions of India to the month of June 1815. The rainy season then commences, which is usually the signal for the suspension of active warfare, and drives into cantonments the few remaining troops, that the hot months of April and May have not already compelled to seek such shelter. Yet even the rainy season of this year

was not without anxieties. Whilst a large body of troops was cantoned in Buhar, waiting the issue of the negotiations with Nipâl, which was to regulate its movements on the drying up of the waters, occurrences were passing in the Dukhun, at the two friendly courts of the Nizam and Pêshwa, which excited the most lively interest, and developed, in a manner not to be mistaken, the real disposition of those powers.

The Nizam's sons and relations were allowed to live freely in Hyderabad; and, after the manner of Moosulman princes all over the world, collected about them all the dissolute vagabonds of the city, by whose agency they prosecuted a regular system of insult and extortion upon the rich and quietly disposed part of the community. The swarms of desperate characters and Putan bravoës, that habitually infest the streets of Hyderabad, had found, in the scions of the reigning family, apt leaders for all their excesses, whose influence at the palace screened them from punishment for the most flagitious crimes; inso-much that even the ministerial authority was frequently insulted, and murders openly committed with impunity. The most profligate and debauched of the princes were the two youngest sons of the Nizam, Shumsham-ood-Doulah and Moobariz-ood-Doulah, with their cousin and brother-in-law, Inteeaz-ood-Doulah. These young men

were supported in their extravagancies by Tuh-neeut-oon-Nissa Begum, the mother, and Juhan Purwur Begum, the wife of the Nizam; and, shielded by this influence, carried their audacity to the utmost pitch; while the weakness and timidity of Raja Chundoo Lál, the minister, rendered nugatory his attempts to control them. On more than one occasion, their iniquities had been the subject of a direct representation from the British Resident to his Highness the Nizam, who had ordered them to be subjected to some restraint in consequence. Their intrigues, however, baffled the minister's attempts to carry these orders into effect; and not being prepared to go the length of securing their persons, he could produce no reformation in their conduct.

In the month of August, these libertines seized an attendant of the British Resident, with a view to extort money from him. Mr. H. Russell, the Resident, immediately complained of this indignity to the Nizam; who, resolving to place the young men in actual confinement, sent a party of his reformed infantry, under the command of Captain Hare, with orders to plant sentries about the houses in which they resided. In execution of his orders, Captain Hare marched first to the residence of Moobariz-ood-Doulah. On approaching it, he was fired upon from the houses on either side, in which Putans, armed with match-

locks, had been previously posted. Some loss was sustained on the occasion; and, amongst others, an officer of the Resident's escort was killed. After carrying one or two of the houses, and putting the armed people found in them to the sword for the sake of example, Captain Hare pushed on to the palace of Moobariz-ood-Doulah, where he found the gates closed, and other preparations made for resistance. He succeeded, however, in forcing open one of the gates with some six-pounders he had with him; but seeing the increased number of opponents, and that further perseverance in the attempt to execute his orders would probably cause the Putan population of the city to rise *en masse*, he retired to the house of Raja Chundoo Lâl, to wait for further instructions. Meantime, the Resident had called in the whole disposable force from the adjoining cantonment of Secundurabad; but finding the brigade there too weak to act against the city, and fearing that the present disturbance might lead to a general insurrection, he kept the detachment at the Residency, and immediately despatched requisitions, as well to Colonel Doveton, to move down on Hyderabad from the northern frontier, as to the officer commanding at Bellaree, to detach a reinforcement. In the interim, he suffered matters to remain in complete suspense. This gave the princes time to reflect

on the probable consequences of their inconsiderate conduct; and the violence of the Putan character soon gave way to the awful apprehension of what would be the result. Thus the ferment in the city subsided of itself; and the princes were easily induced to throw themselves on the mercy of the Nizam, in whose palace they took refuge. Mr. Russell urged the necessity of their strict confinement, and it was determined that they should be sent to the fortress of Golkonda. This sentence, however, was not carried into effect, until after repeated and very earnest solicitations of the Resident, who had to encounter the arts and intrigues of the Nizam's mother and favourite wife, as well as the indifference of the minister. When, at length, the princes were ordered off to Golkonda, the two Begums resolved to accompany them; and both actually went into voluntary confinement, hoping by this means to induce the Nizam soon to restore the offenders to favour. But his Highness coolly observed, on being informed of their departure, that they were very welcome to go, for he believed it was himself they had rather be rid of than the English; nor did he afterwards evince much anxiety to obtain the Resident's consent to the release of the culprits. The principal fomenters of the disturbance were shortly afterwards seized and executed, when Mr. Rus-

sell, seeing tranquillity thus quietly restored, countermanded the march of Colonel Doveton from the frontier, but retained the reinforcements he had received from the south; thinking it necessary to maintain the force cantoned at Secundrabad in a state of greater efficiency, as a security against the evidently hostile disposition of the Putan population of the Nizam's capital. By the end of September, this affair was completely settled, and order re-established on a firmer footing than before.

While Hyderabad was under the alarm of these disturbances, events and discussions of a much more serious nature were passing at Poona. It will be necessary to the due understanding of these, to enter into a somewhat detailed explanation of the character of Bajee Rao's policy, and the arts by which he had raised himself from the situation of a fugitive to that elevation of rank and power, which finally inspired the presumptuous confidence of ability to cope with the British nation.

It will be in the recollection of the reader, that Bajee Rao was the son of Rughoonath * Rao, or Raghooba, the uncle and murderer of Nurayun Rao, brother and successor to the great Madhoo Rao, who was the last of the family of the

* Vide Forbes' Oriental Memoirs; also Mill's British India, and the authorities there cited.

Pêshwas that wielded in his own person the undivided sovereignty of the Mahratta empire. The murderer was expelled by a combination of the chiefs; and the infant son of the murdered Nurayun was placed on the Guddee, with the name of Madhoo Rao Nurayun.

During the minority, the power of the state was in the hands of a triumvirate,—Madhjee Sindheea and Tukojee Holkur exercising independent authority in Hindoostan and Kandês, while Nana Furnuvees managed with uncommon ability the more difficult government of Poona and the southern territories. In 1795, the nominal Pêshwa, Madhoo Rao Nurayun, threw himself from a window of his palace in a sudden fit of anger, at a hasty word from Nana Furnuvees, whose guardianship and strict control were becoming irksome to a prince already arrived at years of maturity. He died on the spot, leaving as next heirs, the sons of Rughoonath, his father's murderer, of whom Bajee Rao, the eldest, was proclaimed: but, as he immediately commenced intrigues to rid himself of the Nana's ascendancy, a fruitless attempt was made by the latter to set up a younger brother, Chimna Apa. Bajee Rao, though young, was an adept in intrigue and dissimulation of all kinds. By calling in the aid of Sindheea, he first ruined the Furnuvees; and then, by availing himself of Holkur's rivalry with

that chief, set limits to the control which the latter aimed at exercising over his administration. When, after Tukojee Holkur's death in 1797, Sindheea had, by espousing the cause of one of the legitimate sons, and by circumventing and slaying the other, established his entire ascendancy over the concerns of this rival family, he made no scruple of straitening the Pêshwa's authority at Poona. To earn his favour, Bajee Rao put to death Eithojee, the brother of Juswunt Rao, both of whom were bastard sons of Tukojee Holkur. This act, which was committed in the firm belief that the Holkur interest was irretrievably ruined, occasioned the irreconcilable hatred of Juswunt Rao, and prevented a resort to the old policy of opposing the Holkur to the Sindheea party, when the fortunes of the former family were restored by the abilities and activity of the surviving bastard. Thenceforward, the only counterpoise to Sindheea seemed to be the British power; and as it was an early object of Lord Wellesley's policy, to detach the Poona state from the other Mahratta chieftains, and bring it under the influence of the British government, it became Bajee Rao's study to affect to receive favourably the overtures made him on the subject; and, by keeping up the appearance of a secret negotiation with the British Resident, to excite Sindheea's alarms, whenever

he had any point to carry. Though the intrigues and activity of Juswunt Rao, and other chiefs in Hindoostan, fomented underhand by Bajee Rao himself, diverted Sindheea from the affairs of Poona and the Dukhun, about the year 1800, and left the Pêshwa more free to pursue his own projects, still he had little authority over the powerful feudatories of the empire, but such as he derived from Sindheea's countenance and superior means; so that, until the victory of Juswunt Rao Holkur over their joint forces, and Bajee Rao's consequent flight from Poona into the Konkan, to throw himself under the protection of the English, he could be regarded as little better than a pageant in that chieftain's hands. The British army restored him to his capital, and to independent authority within the Poona territory; but bound him, as a condition of the alliance, in all transactions with the Nizam and with the independent Mahratta powers, such as Holkur and Sindheea, to square his policy to our views. Amongst other matters, it was specially provided in the treaty of Bassein, that the British government should arbitrate the claims of the Pêshwa on the Gykwar state, in case it should be found impossible to settle them by amicable adjustment. As it was out of this very adjustment that the discussions and events arose, which are about to be related, we shall be excused a

short digression, for the purpose of explaining the nature and origin of the claims in question.

The rise of the Gykwar's power in Goozerat was almost contemporaneous with that of the Pêshwa's at Poona. Pillajee Gykwar, the first of the family, was Potêl (managing proprietor) of a village near Poona. He entered the service of Trimbuk Rao, the Senaputtee, or general, of the Sutara dynasty, who, after the conquest of Goozerat, opposed in arms the ascendancy of the first Pêshwa. Pillajee was a principal officer of the Senaputtee, when the latter was defeated and slain in 1731. After a struggle with the Powars, and other Mahratta families, he obtained the chief management on behalf of the Senaputtee's descendants, and thus established his own power by the same arts the Pêshwa himself had practised towards the Sutara Raja. Dying in 1747, his son Damajee succeeded to his rule, and received the additional title of Shumsheer Buhadur, from the nominal head of the Senaputtee's family, which is the last act of authority that family appears to have exercised. The Gykwars made good their independence in the province against the Pêshwa's attempts to reduce them by force. Arms proving unavailing, negotiation was tried, in order to procure an acknowledgment of supremacy. In the course of it, Damajee engaged in a conspiracy against the Pêshwa's power, at

the head of which was the Dhubareea of Tulke-gâm. He marched his troops into the Dukhun, in support of the conspirators; and, on their failure, was himself circumvented by a truce, pending which he was surprised and taken prisoner by Balajee Pêshwa. He was not released till he had agreed to resign the half of his possessions in Goozerat, to acknowledge his holding the other half in fief of the Pêshwa, and to unite his forces with those of Balajee, in a joint expedition for the reduction of Ahmedabad, then in the tenure of the Moghuls. This place, if conquered, was to be similarly divided. Balajee's brother Rughoonath, father of Bajee Rao, commanded the Pêshwa's troops on this enterprise; and Damajee, having executed the first part of the treaty, in spite of the opposition of the ministry, who had conducted affairs during his captivity, Ahmedabad was reduced by their joint arms in 1753. Since then, Damajee continued a faithful dependent of the Pêshwa. He was present at the battle of Paneeput, in 1761, and attended at Poona, in aid of Rughoonath the regent during Madhoo Rao's minority. For his services on this latter occasion he obtained the grant of Goozerat in perpetuity, together with the title of Sêna Khas khêl, or commander of the special band. In the subsequent differences between the uncle and nephew, he took the part of the former; but

Madhoo Rao, being successful, punished him by the imposition of an annual tribute of five and a quarter lakhs of rupees, and the furnishing of a contingent of five thousand horse. Damajee died five years after, in 1768, when the succession was disputed between Govind Rao, the second son by the first wife, and Syajee, the eldest son by the second wife; which latter was almost an idiot, set up by Fütteh Singh, another son, with a view to personal aggrandizement. Pending this dispute, the Pêshwa was enabled to enhance his tribute by selling his countenance to the highest bidder; and Futteh Singh in the end carried the day, by agreeing to an annual payment of seventeen lakh seventy-nine thousand nine hundred rupees, and to a money compensation, in lieu of the contingent, of six lakh and seventy five thousand rupees. With the help of the British he expelled his rival, and then paid his tribute or not according to his own ability, and to the Pêshwa's means of enforcing it. It was, however, stipulated in the treaty concluded by us with Futteh Singh, in 1782, that he should pay to the Pêshwa the same tribute, and yield him the same obedience as before the treaty. Futteh Singh died in 1789; and there had since been three successions. In 1802, Anund Rao, the reigning Gykwar, received a British subsidiary force, and made several cessions to reimburse the

expense of an expedition, fitted out by the Bombay Presidency, to repel an invasion of his territory by Mulhar Rao Holkur. On the last day of 1802, the treaty of Bassein was also concluded with the Pêshwa. In 1803, territory, yielding a revenue of seven lakh and eighty thousand rupees, was ceded by Anund Rao in lieu of the subsidy; and the force being increased in the course of the year, further cessions were added to the amount of two lakh and ninety thousand rupees. The British government had since taken upon itself the guarantee of the Gykwar's debts, and the management of the greater part of his territory; and the cessions altogether amounted in 1814-15 to thirteen and a quarter lakh.

While we thus gradually and peaceably established a complete ascendancy in Goozerat, the Pêshwa's claims under the two engagements with Damajee and Futteh Singh were little attended to. At our suggestion, soon after the treaty of Bassein, Bajee Rao was induced to grant a farm of his share of Ahmedabad to the Gykwar for ten years. The fixed rent of this lease was regularly paid him; but no steps were taken to bring the other matters in dispute to an adjustment, Bajee Rao having never thought proper to advance his claims. The reason of this negligence may be found perhaps in the policy he was pursuing nearer home. The ten years that fol-

lowed the restoration of his authority at Poona, by the British arms, were systematically devoted by Bajee Rao to the humiliation of the old Mahratta families, who, enjoying large jageers and military tenures, on every occasion of ferment chose their party according as best suited their immediate interest, without conceiving themselves under the smallest obligations of fidelity and allegiance to the Pêshwa's legitimate authority. He had conceived a particular enmity against this class, from a conviction that the state to which he had been reduced by Juswunt Rao Holkur, and the necessity he had felt of applying to the British for succour (a step most derogatory to the Mahratta name and reputation) were owing entirely to his having been deserted in the hour of need by the immediate vassals of the empire. He seems, therefore, very early to have formed the resolution of seeking every means of reducing, and, if possible, of entirely dispensing with this formidable class. His plan was to entertain what troops he might need either by enlisting men singly, or in small bodies not exceeding one hundred under one commander; and as the opportunity offered, to model the large fiefs in such a manner as should leave the vassal in the most abject dependence on his superior lord. The British subsidiary force, which was ever prompt to enforce the Pêshwa's just rights, was an engine he relied on

for the re-establishment of his authority over these jageerdars; but, as this force was only available where right was on his side, he contrived to turn its name, and the apprehension created by its state of perpetual efficiency, to equal account, on many occasions, when perhaps he could not have commanded its actual service. In the course of the ten or eleven years following the treaty of Bassein, this policy had been successful in ruining by far the greater part of the old Mahratta families. The superior power of the jageerdars southward of Poona, most of whom were old dependents of the Sutara dynasty, combined with the circumstance of their having done good service to the Duke of Wellington, in the campaign which restored Bajee Rao to his capital, rendered it necessary for him to submit to our adjustment of his relative rights over these latter. He was, however, greatly discontented at the adjustment finally made by us in 1812, because it required him to renounce, in perpetuity, his groundless claim of sovereignty over Kolapoor and Sawuntwaree, and fixed and defined his other dues, which it is always a favourite object of the Mahratta policy to keep indefinite. Of course, having accepted the arbitration of the differences, we became the guarantee of its execution on both sides. It was now found to be Bajee Rao's artifice to hold the jageerdars to the fulfilment of their part of the

award with the utmost rigour, leaving, at the same time, such inducements to deviate from the letter of it, that some were occasionally found tripping, so as to forfeit our guarantee, and to give Bajee Rao a claim to our assistance towards their reduction. The case of the Rasteeas, very powerful southern jageerdars, is a notable instance. While urging to us the necessity of chastising their confirmed obstinacy and refusal to furnish their full quota of troops, Bajee Rao was privately assuring the family that he had no design to ruin them, and thus encouraging their resistance, until their utter destruction was finally effected by our agency.

By the year 1813-14, the uniform prosecution of this crafty policy had succeeded in effecting the consolidation of the Peshwa's authority over the whole of his Poona dominions; it had also filled his treasuries, as well by bringing into them the large revenue before appropriated by individuals, as by the rigid exaction of fines and penalties. Until these domestic objects had been attained, foreign affairs did not seem to occupy much of his attention; to them he now began to devote himself. The Peshwa's government had indefinite claims on the Nizam; amongst others, one for *chout* on the revenue of nearly his whole dominions, originating in concessions made in an hour

of extremity by Nizam Ulee Khan *, but neither intended nor expected to be observed, unless the same necessity should annually recur. These claims, however, the British government had engaged by the treaty of Bassein to adjust and determine; and Bajee Rao began about 1813-14 to be most importunate for an adjudication. After some time spent in pressing for a decision, the Supreme Government resolved, that the senior Assistant to the Resident at Poona should repair to Hyderabad with the ministers of the Poona state, and a commission be there instituted, to consider and ascertain the relative rights of the parties. From this time forth nothing more was heard of the Pêshwa's claims. He ceased to urge them the instant he found in us a readiness to perform our part of the engagement for their settlement; either from distrust of our arbitration, or from an unwillingness to have his dues fixed and set at rest for ever.

The claims on the Gykwar were brought forward at the same time, and the decennial lease of the moiety of Ahmedabad being about to expire, Bajee Rao gave notice of his intention to take the management into his own hands, and on no account to renew the lease. With respect to the

* The treaty which followed the defeat at Kurdla is here alluded to.

other matters at issue, it appeared, that four years before the conclusion of the treaties of Bassein and Brodera, the Gykwar had, through fear of Sindheea, agreed to pay up all arrears on Futteh Singh's engagement, besides fifty-six lakh for his own investiture. It was on this basis that Bajee Rao expected the present adjustment of his pecuniary demands. They had been suffered to lie by so long, that, when the account came to be made up, they were found to amount to a sum considerably exceeding three crore of rupees, of which upwards of two crore were on account of arrears of the tribute and commutation-money agreed to by Futteh Singh, the remainder for the moiety of acquisitions made by Damajee, subsequently to the capture of Ahmedabad, besides the item of fifty-six lakh above mentioned for the investiture of Anund Rao, and upwards of thirty-nine lakh in liquidation of an old account. The Gykwar had little to set off against these claims, and was evidently in no condition to make good so heavy a balance as would ultimately have proved to be due, if the account had been settled on this basis. At the suggestion of the British government, Gungadhur Shastree, the prime minister of the Gykwar state, came, under our guarantee, from Brodera to Poona, to endeavour to make some adjustment or compromise of these claims. He hoped also to obtain a renewal of the lease of

Ahmedabad, by offering some advance of rent. This latter object was in vain attempted in every possible shape. Accordingly, in June 1814, the Resident at Poona was obliged to consent to the half of Ahmedabad being delivered to the Pêshwa's officers; and orders were issued for the purpose. The soobaship was given by Bajee Rao to Trimbukjee Dainglia, who deputed an agent of his own to take charge of the Pêshwa's interests there. This Trimbukjee had risen from the meanest origin by the basest arts. He was first a menial servant; then one of the familiar companions of Bajee Rao, whose social hours were passed in witnessing exhibitions of the grossest debauchery; and had risen to favour by the conspicuous profligacy with which he ministered and assisted at such entertainments. Though known to have been some time a personal favourite, it was not till after the above appointment, and his nomination to command the contingent, when called out in 1814-15, that he was introduced by the Pêshwa to Mr. Elphinstone, as a person high in confidence. He thenceforward regularly assisted at all conferences, assuming at them a tone of arrogance and undisguised ambition, which seemed to advance him in his master's favour, in proportion as his tone was heightened; a clear indication of the change of Bajee Rao's sentiments or designs, and of his beginning to feel the British connexion

rather in the restraints it imposed on his desire to restore the Mahratta empire to its pristine splendour, than in the security it gave to the possession of what remained under his immediate sway. Mr. Elphinstone early marked this change; and gave a prophetic warning to his own government, that a serious rupture must inevitably ensue, if Bajee Rao persevered in giving ear to the flagitious counsels of this abandoned favourite. The transactions of every day, after this man's influence had been established, bore evidence of the truth of this prediction; and it was further attested by the conduct of the agent whom he sent to Ahmedabad, and who there commenced a course of intrigue and aggression, from which even the subjects of the British government in the adjacent districts did not escape unmolested.

Meanwhile Gungadhur Shastree, instead of meeting a reciprocal disposition to bring matters to a speedy adjustment, had to encounter systematic evasion and subterfuge. The Pêshwa's ministers showed no inclination to accommodate matters, and would not recede an iota from their demand. He began, therefore, to be sensible that his object could not be gained without larger sacrifices, either in satisfaction of the claims in dispute, or in personal gratifications to the ministers, than he felt himself authorised to consent to. This turn of the negotiation, in so far as it gave him

time, which he hoped would bring the Poona court to a right understanding of his master's means, and of the futility of pretensions so much exceeding them, was not unacceptable to the Gykwar envoy. But the objects of Bajee Rao, or rather of Trimbukjee, who seems from the first to have been intrusted with the whole conduct of this negotiation, equally required time for their development.

It happened, that the Gykwar minister had a rival for his official station at Brodera, in the person of Seeta-Ram, the former dewan of our choice, who was still supported by a strong party in the palace of the Gykwar, notwithstanding that the Shastree had, on Futteh Singh's elevation, obtained the entire control of affairs, by the direct interference of the British government. Since then, Seeta-Ram had been under some degree of *surveillance*, though by no means strict. Trimbukjee, however, availing himself of the Shastree's absence from Brodera, set on foot an intrigue, the object of which was to replace his rival in the ministry, to the Shastree's exclusion, and thus to establish the Peshwa's influence at the court of Brodera, in lieu of that of the British government. In furtherance of this plan, an agent, named Govind Rao Bundojee, came from Seeta-Ram, in October 1814, and was well received at Poona. A second agent, Bhugwunt Rao, came in the

month of January following; and on the Busunt Punchumee festival, by the good offices of Trimbukjee, they both obtained a favourable reception from the Pêshwa himself, at the public audience of that day, which occurred in February 1815. A letter was also procured in the hand-writing of Anund Rao, the nominal Gykwar, from which it would seem that he did not altogether discountenance these intrigues; and they were more openly espoused by a party amongst the women of his household. It should be observed, too, that they were most active just at the time when the reverses at the opening of the Goorkha campaign, and the state of the negotiations respecting Bhopâl, gave the Marquess of Hastings such strong reason to apprehend the worst from the disposition of the Mahratta powers towards the British interests.

On the first appearance of these intrigues, in October, Mr. Elphinstone protested against them; whereupon Bajee Rao's ministers did not affect to deny their existence, but, on the contrary, justified them on the ground that the Gykwar was a dependent of the Pêshwa, who was bound to look after his vassal's interests, that, through the Shastree's mismanagement, had been suffered to go to ruin. When Mr. Elphinstone argued, that his Highness's attempt to interfere was subversive of the British alliances with both states, our influence

having been instrumental in producing the existing arrangements at the court of Brodera, under authority acquired by treaties with the Gykwar, which the subsequent treaty of Bassein had formally recognized; the argument seemed to make little impression, and produced no relaxation in the activity with which the intrigues were carried on. In October, Mr. Elphinstone had confined himself to the request, that Gungadhur Shastree should be dismissed, since no good seemed likely to result from protracting an amicable negotiation with a party, whom it was endeavoured at the same time, by secret intrigue, to undermine and remove from office. However, at the Shastree's own request, he refrained from insisting on this point. Gungadhur, it seems, was himself unwilling to break off the negotiation, having still hopes of effecting an amicable compromise by delay; and he had been relieved from any fear in respect to the result of the intrigues at Brodera, by Seeta-Ram's being subjected to further restraint, at the instance of the English Resident at the court of the Gykwar. But in February, when it became evident to Mr. Elphinstone that the negotiation must come to nothing if conducted in the manner it had been, and when the arrival of the second agent from Seeta-Ram showed the increased and alarming vigour with which the intrigues were still pursued, he distinctly in-

formed the Pêshwa's government, that unless the right which had been asserted to interfere in the internal administration of the Gykwar's affairs were formally renounced, the Pêshwa must not expect the British government to arbitrate, or assist in enforcing his claims upon that state. At the same time, he demanded that the two agents of Seeta-Ram should either be delivered up, or at least discountenanced and dismissed as offenders and conspirators against the established government of the Gykwar principality; giving notice also, that unless the latter demands were complied with, he would break off the negotiation altogether, and the Shastree must return to Brodera by the end of March. As Bajee Rao was not disposed to make any renunciation of his asserted right, the negotiations, as far as the British Resident was concerned, were dropped on this ground; which was again most fully explained on the first day of the following month. Gungadhur was likewise recalled, and instructed to prepare for his departure; but he was subsequently, at his own request, allowed to enter into a private negotiation for the settlement of the matter, without the participation of the British government, if he saw a favourable opportunity, and could effect it within a reasonable time.

The bringing of matters so suddenly to this issue, completely disconcerted Bajee Rao and his

council; for the Pêshwa's government was in no condition to enforce any part of his claims, except by means of the British; and the main-spring of his intrigues with the faction opposed to Gungadhur was, the hope held out to them of granting in their favour better terms of settlement, than Gungadhur could obtain by our arbitration. The Resident having now made the Pêshwa's abandonment of all pretension of right to interfere with the Gykwar a condition of his exerting the British influence to obtain any thing from the present ministry of Brodera, while Bajee Rao firmly persisted in the resolution not to renounce the pretension, this posture of affairs reversed the case, so as to give Gungadhur a decided advantage: for he was at liberty either to join in insisting on the renunciation as a preliminary, and thus evade payment of any thing; or, by tendering a proposition for a separate adjustment on moderate terms, to save Bajee Rao from the supposed humiliation of publicly conceding the right to interfere. Every device was put in practice to induce Mr. Elphinstone to abandon this ground; but having once assumed it, and being sensible that, with a view to the maintenance of our existing influence and relations with the Gykwar, the right of a third power to interfere could on no account whatever be recognised, it was of course out of the question that he should recede. The consequence was,

that Bajee Rao and Trimbukjee immediately changed their behaviour towards the envoy, and now endeavoured by every art to win him over, and to induce him to remain at the durbar, notwithstanding his official recall. In this object they were successful. They commenced by opening a negotiation with every appearance of cordiality, the object of which was, to compromise the whole of the Pêshwa's claims past and to come, by the cession of territory yielding a revenue of seven lakh of rupees. This mode of adjustment was suggested by the Shastree himself, in order to flatter Bajee Rao's known eagerness for the extension of his personal dominions; and, certainly, it was the most favourable one for the Gykwar interests that could possibly be made; for, besides arrears, the annual tribute claimed amounted, including the commutation for military service, to upwards of twenty-four lakh. Having this adjustment very much at heart, the Shastree resolved to stay and pursue the negotiation, without the participation of the British Resident at Poona. Had there been occasion to refer to him, Mr. Elphinstone was of course prepared to resume the ground he had before made his stand upon; but so long as the treaty could be carried on without such a reference, he saw no objection to letting it take its course, and therefore allowed the envoy to stay and prosecute his own plans.

In this manner passed the month of March, without the dismissal of the Shastree. The negotiation continued open through the whole of April; in the course of which month, no effort was spared to win him over to the interests of the Poona court. The Pêshwa's daughter was offered to his son in marriage, and the chief ministry of the Pêshwa's affairs, that is to say, the situation held by Suda-Sheeo-Bhao Mankeshur, was tendered to his acceptance. There can be no doubt that he was dazzled by these offers, and not only gave a favourable ear to them, but contracted a degree of intimacy with Trimbukjee, through whom they were made, which was very unusual amongst natives of rank, and considering the previous animosity on both sides, rather extraordinary. In the month of May, Bajee Rao came to a determination to commence a series of pilgrimages, whereof the first was to be to Nassik, near the source of the Godaveree. The negotiation for the marriage was at this time in a state of so much forwardness, as to induce the Pêshwa to take his family with him to Nassik, and to make preparations to have the ceremony performed at that place; and in this idea the journey was commenced in May. In the mean time, however, Gungadhur had referred the proposed compromise of the claim on the Gykwar to Futeh Singh, the representative of Anund Rao; on whose part he, rather unexpectedly, met with a

decided repugnance to a territorial cession of any extent, howsoever [limited]. In the hope of surmounting this difficulty, he did not candidly explain it to the Pêshwa's government, but commenced a series of evasions for the purpose of gaining time. He also put off the marriage on various pretexts, not wishing it to take place, unless the adjustment was likewise effected, which he daily found it more difficult to accomplish. This conduct had the appearance of slight; and the Shastree having refused to suffer his wife to visit the wife of Bajee Rao, on the ground of the notorious licentiousness that prevailed in the palace of the Pêshwa, all these circumstances, superadded to the disappointment of failing to gain over a man so eagerly courted, produced a second change of disposition towards him, and revived the hatred that before subsisted in an aggravated degree, and with the further stimulus of personal pique for a private injury. Trimbukjee began to feel that he had committed his master in the matter of the marriage; to break off which, after the families had been brought to Nassik for the purpose, and after all the publicity of preparation, would bring ignominy on the head of the Mahratta nation. Bajee Rao, who was naturally of a suspicious and resentful temper, seems from this time to have vowed revenge, and found in his favourite a most willing instrument. A plan was ac-

cordingly laid for the assassination of the Shastree, and prosecuted with a depth of dissimulation which astonished even Mahratta duplicity. The terms of intimacy that subsisted between Trimbukjee Dainglia, and the object of this plot, had grown so extremely familiar, while matters were running smoothly on, that the former, in an unguarded moment of friendly conversation, acknowledged, that during their previous differences, he had resolved upon the other's destruction, and had even planned his death, in case he had taken his dismissal when Mr. Elphinstone began to press it. This had been communicated by the Shastree to Mr. Elphinstone during the journey to Nassik, and doubtless was enough to have put him on his guard, by showing the character of the man he had to deal with. Yet such was the art with which both Trimbukjee and his master continued their intercourse with him to the last, that although his destruction was meditated more than a month before it was put into execution, their victim never suspected any change of sentiment towards himself. When the Nassik pilgrimage was accomplished, he assented with the utmost confidence to Trimbukjee's suggestion of proceeding to Pundurpoor on the Bheema with a smaller equipage, and sent the greater part of his escort, and half the establishment of the mission, to wait his return at Poona. Particular anxiety was

shown that Bapoo Myral, a penetrating wary Mahratta, who had been associated with the Shastree in the mission, though in a subordinate character, should not accompany the court to Pundurpoor; but this was attributed to some personal dislike, supposed to be entertained against him, rather than to fear of his prudence and foresight. It was a more important point to keep Mr. Elphinstone, who had attended the Pêshwa as far as Nassik, from proceeding further; but the Resident needed no more, than to find that his attendance was not desired. While, therefore, the Pêshwa continued his route to Pundurpoor, this gentleman took the opportunity of visiting the more venerable remains of Ellora, to which the caprice of modern superstition did not attach an equal sanctity.

About the end of June or the beginning of July, Bajee Rao and Trimbukjee set off from Nassik, taking the devoted Shastree in their train. It was given out, as upon certain information received from several quarters, particularly from Nagpoor, whence an agent had arrived, that a design had been formed against the Pêshwa's life; and that Putan assassins had been engaged at Hyderabad for the purpose, who were on their way to execute their commission. Parade was made of every possible precaution against this imaginary danger. Access to Bajee Rao became more and more

difficult; and he travelled, quite contrary to his usual practice, surrounded by armed attendants. When the court arrived at Pundurpoor, these precautions were further increased; and the Shastree ascertained that Seeta-Ram's agent, Bundojee, had been again admitted to favour, and had come to Pundurpoor escorted by one of Trimbukjee's people. He complained of this, but had yet no suspicion of the designs against himself. On the 14th of July, the Shastree had been at an entertainment given to the Pêshwa. On his return at night, feeling indisposed, he gave orders that any one who should come with an invitation to go to the temple, should be told that he was unwell, and unable to attend. One Luchmun Punt came with such an invitation from Trimbukjee, and returned with that answer. The message was repeated, with notice, that as the Pêshwa himself was going in the morning, the crowd had retired, and he had better come immediately with a small retinue. The Shastree, still feeling unwell, refused a second time; but sent two of his suite in his place. On their arrival, Trimbukjee, who was waiting at the temple, said to one of them, (Roujee Mahratta,) "I have twice sent notice to the Shastree that he had better come to prayers now, but he refuses. I wish you would again try to persuade him." Roujee accordingly returned; and Gungadhur Shastree, fearing he might

offend Trimbukjee by a third refusal, set off with only seven unarmed attendants. On their way inquiries were overheard, in a whispering tone, "Which is the Shastree?" The answer given in the same tone, pointed him out as the person that wore the necklace. This did not attract particular notice, having passed in the confusion of a crowd. Arrived at the temple, the Shastree performed his devotions, and continued some time in talk with Trimbukjee. On his return, he left three of his seven attendants with an old family priest, whom he met at the temple, and walked back, escorted by a party of Trimbukjee's sepoys. He had not gone far, when three people came running up from behind, calling out to make room, and flourishing what seemed to be the twisted cloths used in clearing the way. On coming near the Shastree, one of them struck him from behind, and the blow proved to have been given with a sword;—others closed in from the front, and in an instant despatched him, wounding and putting to flight his four attendants. The Gooroo*, who was following from the temple with the other three, came up while the flambeaux, which had been thrown away, were still smoking, and found the body shockingly mangled. They had met five men with drawn swords running

* Family Priest.

back to the temple, where they had left Trimbukjee, just before they drew near to the spot. Thus, there could be no doubt that Trimbukjee had contrived and superintended the assassination. His conduct, when applied to next day by the Shastree's people, who demanded an investigation for the discovery of the murderers, confirmed his guilt. He said it was impossible to discover upon whom to fix suspicion, for the Shastree had many enemies; as, for instance, Seeta-Ram, who was under restraint at Brodera, and Kanojee, one of the Gykwar family, confined by the English in the Carnatic; avoiding, however, the least mention of Bundojee and Bhugwunt, though the former was known to be at Pundurpoor at the time. The Shastree's people got leave next day to return to Poona, where the rest of the mission was with Bapoo Myral; and it was intimated to them, that there was no necessity for their again approaching either the Pêshwa's or Trimbukjee's quarters. In the meantime, Bajee Rao, who heard of the murder the night of its occurrence, redoubled the precautions for his personal safety. Trimbukjee, too, never went out without a strong guard; both evidently apprehensive of retaliation. Not only was no investigation set on foot, but the matter was prohibited to be talked of; and spies were employed to give notice of such as offended in this respect, who were apprehended under Trimbukjee's au-

thority. Bundoojee and Bhugwunt came openly to Poona, where they lived without privacy or concealment.

With these events, the month of July 1815 was brought to a close. The proceedings instituted on the part of the British government, in consequence of this murderous outrage, will furnish the contents of a separate chapter.

CHAPTER VIII.

POONA CONTINUED.

AUGUST TO DECEMBER, 1815.

Resident—his resolves—Returns to Poona—Obtains proof against Trimbukjee—Demands audience—Presents a memorial—charging Trimbukjee—Calls subsidiary force from frontier—Bajee Rao hesitates—Asks proof—Evades receiving it—Gykwar mission threatened—Attempts to screen Trimbukjee—Hyderabad force called in—Expedients offered and refused—Instructions arrive—Second memorial thereon—Demand of Trimbukjee's surrender—Pêshwa's irresolution—Seizure of Trimbukjee and surrender—Reflections—Effect in Goozerat.

MR. ELPHINSTONE was at Ellora, when he heard of the Shastree's violent death, and of the suspicions attaching upon Trimbukjee; although the circumstances were as yet transmitted only by vague and indistinct report, he immediately saw the necessity of taking a decided part. The deceased was the avowed minister of an ally of the British government, who had come to a friendly court under the security of a special guarantee, for the purpose of assisting at an adjustment, which that government had undertaken

and had been called upon to make. Therefore, although the British government was no further a party to the negotiation, in which he had latterly been concerned, than is implied in his having entered upon it with the knowledge and tacit consent of the British representative, still nothing had occurred to annul the personal guarantee, on the security of which the Gykwar minister had ventured within the precincts of the Poona court. Under this impression, Mr. Elphinstone no sooner heard of the manner of his death, than he addressed a letter to the Pêshwa, expressive of his concern at the event, and demanding a rigorous investigation, with a view to the speedy detection and punishment of the murderers. He at the same time forwarded the intelligence to the Governor-general, soliciting special instructions for his guidance in every possible event; and expressing his intention, in the interim, to hasten back to Poona; and if his examination of the Shastree's people should fix the guilt on Trimbukjee, and it should be found inexpedient to wait the arrival of instructions, immediately to accuse that favourite, and demand of the Pêshwa his arrest and trial; in vindication of the insult offered to the British name and authority. He did not think it necessary or advisable to travel out of his way, in order to fix upon Bajee Rao himself a charge of participa-

tion; conceiving it more prudent, and, at the same time, quite as effectual for the sake of example, that the prince's minister and favourite, the adviser and instrument of the act, should be visited with the entire responsibility. Having formed this resolution, and called back the subsidiary force from Jâlna, where it was then cantoned, to Seroor, in order to be prepared for the worst, the Resident directed his assistant, who had remained behind at Poona, to offer his unqualified protection to the remainder of the Gykwar mission; and even, if it should be necessary, to announce a rupture of the subsisting alliance with the Pêshwa, as the consequence of any further attempt at violation. He then set off direct for Poona, where he arrived on the 6th of August. On the route, he met groups of pilgrims returning from Pundurpoor, all of whom agreed in giving the same account of the transaction, and in ascribing the perpetration of it to Trimbukjee. The Shastree was a Brahmin* of the highest caste, and of great reputation for learning and sanctity of character; the manner of his death,

* For some account of the sacrilegious horror with which the Hindoos regard the murder of a Brahmin, the European reader is referred to the narrative of Nerayun Rao's murder by his uncle Rughoonath, contained in Forbes' Oriental Mémoires. Shastree was an agnomen, or rather a title acquired by proficiency in the Shasters.

therefore, in a holy city, in the midst of a pilgrimage, at which myriads were collected, and in the very precincts of the temple of their resort, had inflamed the superstitious minds of all who witnessed it with more than ordinary horror and detestation of the crime. Returning to their homes in every direction, they communicated their feeling wherever they went, till it became the general sentiment of the Mahratta nation and Hindoo sect, to a degree quite unusual in a country, where the means of diffusing information are so limited. Arrived at Poona, Mr. Elphinstone made a very particular examination of the Shastree's people, and of every one likely to afford evidence or information. The result was, the clear establishment of the facts and circumstances above related; and the evidence was so minute and consistent in all its parts, as not to leave a shadow of doubt in respect to Trimbukjee's direct participation, and actual superintendance of the assassination.

Meantime, Trimbukjee and his master had augured, from the Resident's demand of investigation, as well as from the protection afforded to the remainder of the Gykwar mission, and the whole conduct of Mr. Elphinstone, that it was his resolution to take a decided course in the matter of the Shastree's murder. Both were con-

sequently in the utmost alarm and suspense respecting his intentions ; and began immediately to raise troops, and take every possible precaution for their personal safety. Trimbukjee hurried home to Poona, where he arrived on the 7th of August at night. One of his personal adherents, who had charge of the city in his absence, had waited on Mr. Elphinstone in the course of the day, apparently to sound his intentions ; but on being directly questioned as to what investigation had taken place, and how it was that Bhugwunt Rao and Bundojee were living at large, he was confused, and could give no answer. The Pêshwa himself entered Poona on the 9th by stealth, under cover of the night, in a close palanquin, without previous notice, without the troops being drawn out, or any one's going forth to meet him. This was the more extraordinary, because it was the day of the Dukshina * festival, when money is bountifully distributed among the Brahmins, thousands of whom were collected for the purpose ; and the Pêshwa had never yet been known to fail of presiding at the largess.

The whole city was in alarm at these unusual demonstrations. The rest of the Gykwar mission, under Bapoo Myral, were shunned by every one,

* For an account of this festival, see Scott-Waring.

and apparently regarded as victims already devoted to destruction. In vain were the utmost efforts made to quiet their fears. In this state of things, Mr. Elphinstone saw the necessity of taking his measures without waiting the Governor-general's orders, which, at the earliest, could scarcely arrive in a month from that date; an interval that would have allowed Trimbukjee to complete his preparations, and to remove, intimidate, or cut off the witnesses, and that must infallibly have driven the Pêshwa to make common cause with his minister; since, while the suspense continued, they both had common fears. On the 11th of August, therefore, the Resident demanded an audience, which was refused on the ground of indisposition. The demand was repeated next day, and evaded on the pretext, that an infant daughter had died, which rendered his Highness impure for three days. Unable longer to brook these subterfuges, especially as his object was to remove the cause of them, by relieving Bajee Rao from his state of suspense and personal alarm, he resolved to send a written note, which he had drawn out, to be presented at the audience, in case one could have been procured. The paper was sent to Suda Sheo Bhão, the usual channel of communication before Trimbukjee's late appointment; but he declined to present it, as did every other minister that

was applied to. At last Mr. Elphinstone resolved to send his moonshee with it openly, but all means of getting it delivered were still unsuccessful. Two people came, however, on the PĒshwa's part, apparently to sound the Resident as to its contents. He accordingly opened himself so far as to let it be seen that the paper only affected Trimbukjee, and that Bajee Rao was not personally involved in the charge; and would be so, only in the event of his continuing to countenance and support that favourite. After this explanation, the written paper* obtained a reception on the 15th of August. It began with expressing a conviction that the PĒshwa must have been desirous of revenging the foul murder of a foreign minister and a Brahmin like himself, had his ministers suffered the truth to reach his ears; but as it was evident they had not done so,

* Those who would ascertain the real merits of Indian diplomacy, and would possess themselves of the secret necessary to those employed in such negotiations, for baffling the arts, deceptions, and subterfuges of the treacherous Mah-ratta and wily Brahmin, should peruse Mr. Elphinstone's unassuming account of his part in these negotiations, in the record of his original correspondence with the Indian government. The whole of the account here given of the Poona affairs is but a meagre abstract of that correspondence. Mr. Elphinstone's letter of the 16th of August, on that part of the transactions now detailing, is perhaps as interesting a document as ever found its way into a record-office.

and, under the circumstances, could not be expected so to do, it had become necessary that it should reach his Highness through an unbiassed channel, on which account the British Resident addressed him upon the matter. The memorial proceeded to charge Trimbukjee with direct participation in the murder of Gungadhur Shastree, showing how the universal voice of the nation marked him out as the guilty person, while the circumstances of the transaction, his uniform conduct before and after it, his suppression of all investigation, even after it had been demanded by the British Resident, and his actual encouragement of those, who would otherwise have been objects of suspicion, brought the charge home to him in the clearest and most undeniable manner. After recapitulating the proofs, it thus continued :—“ On all these grounds, I declare my conviction of Trimbukjee Dainglia’s guilt, and I call upon your Highness to apprehend him, as well as Govind Rao Bundojee and Bhugwunt Rao Gykwar, and to deposit them in such custody as may be considered safe and trustworthy. Even if your Highness is not fully convinced of the guilt of these persons, it must be admitted, that there is sufficient ground for confining them ; and I only ask of you to do so, until his Excellency the Governor-general and your Highness shall have an opportunity of consulting on the subject.

I have only to add my desire, that this apprehension may be immediate. A foreign ambassador has been murdered in the midst of your Highness' court. A Brahmin has been massacred, almost in the temple, during one of the greatest solemnities of your religion; and I must not conceal from your Highness, the impunity of the perpetrators of this enormity has led to imputations not to be thought of against your Highness' government. Nobody is more convinced of the falsehood of such insinuations than I am; but I think it my duty to state them, that your Highness may see the necessity of refuting calumnies so injurious to your reputation. I beg you also to observe, that while Trimbukjee remains at large, his situation enables him to commit further acts of rashness, which he may undertake on purpose to embroil your Highness with the British government. He is at the head of the administration at Poona, and has troops at his command. He is likewise in charge of your Highness' districts, which are contiguous to the possessions of the British government, the Nizam and the Gykwar; and, even though he should raise no public disturbances there, I cannot but consider with uneasiness and apprehension, in what manner your Highness' affairs will be conducted. For these reasons, it is absolutely necessary that immediate steps should be taken; as your Highness will be held respon-

sible by the Governor-general for any acts of violence which Trimbukjee may commit after this intimation. I therefore again call on your Highness to adopt the course which I have pointed out to you as the only one which can restore confidence to the public ministers deputed to your court. They cannot otherwise enjoy the security necessary to transact business with your Highness; nor can they with safety even reside in the city: and every body will be obliged to take such steps as he may deem necessary for his own protection. One consequence of this will be, an interruption of your communication with the British government, until the measure I have recommended shall be adopted. I beg that your Highness' reply may be communicated through some person unconnected with Trimbukjee Dainglia." The memorial concluded with assuring his Highness, that the British government had no design whatever of interfering with the freedom of his choice of a successor to Trimbukjee, or with the independence of his internal administration; which the Pêshwa might perhaps have suspected was the ulterior object of this attack on his minister.

Nothing could have been better adapted to work on Bajee Rao's hopes and fears, and induce him to screen himself by sacrificing his favourite, than this memorial. The subsidiary force marched into its cantonment at Seroor, on the 17th of Au-

gust. Mr. Elphinstone had taken the precaution of strengthening the brigade of this force, which was regularly cantoned at Poona, by having another battalion marched in, as if to relieve one of those composing the brigade. But as soon as the memorial was received, he suffered the relieved battalion to join the main body at Seroor, thinking such a display of confidence would have a good effect at this time.

The Pêshwa was evidently embarrassed and irresolute. He sent a messenger to say, that he was considering the memorial, and to propose a distant day for an interview. The Resident declared himself particularly desirous of an audience; but intimated that he could not go to the palace, if he was to meet Trimbukjee there and at large. A day or two afterwards, a message came from the Pêshwa, through Suda Sheeo Bhão, declaring that Bajee Rao believed Trimbukjee innocent; but that if Mr. Elphinstone would undertake to prove the three distinct invitations, he would have him arrested. That gentleman at once closed with the proposal; but, though he did not cease to press the execution of the Pêshwa's part of this offer, it was perpetually evaded. The excuse set up by Trimbukjee for not ordering an immediate investigation on the night of the murder, was, that he was so busy sweeping the temple, that he did not hear of it in time. He thus admitted his

having been at the spot, whence the assassins issued, and to which they were seen to return after the act was perpetrated.

During this discussion, the situation of Bapoo Myral and the rest of the Gykwar mission became very critical. Mr. Elphinstone had, some days before, advised their coming and encamping close by the residency ; but Bundojee and Trimbukjee had been tampering with the escort, and had gained over the greater part, so that a strict watch was set on all their motions. On pretence of sending off the Shastree's children and family, the whole were marched a little way out of the city without disturbance ; but when it was proposed to move next morning to the residency, the escort broke out into open mutiny, and, under the pretext of demanding an advance of pay, surrounded Bapoo Myral and his people in such a manner, that escape was impossible. The difficulty of their position was manifest ; but to have attempted a rescue by the British troops at Poona, would infallibly have produced the massacre of the whole ; —the excuse of some disturbance being all that was needed to bring matters to this extremity. The Resident contented himself, therefore, with sending his guarantee of what money Bapoo Myral might promise ; and, with this security, the latter was enabled to win over half the mutineers, and to get quit of the other half without blood-

shed. The arrangement, however, cost a lakh and a quarter, which was advanced by the Resident in exchange for bills on the Gykwar treasury.

On the 20th of August, hearing that the levy of troops was going on with increased activity, Mr. Elphinstone remonstrated, declaring, that if this measure were not discontinued, he should be obliged to call in the subsidiary force to Poona, and take such measures for his own security, and for the interests of his government, as must lead to a rupture. In reply, a bullying message was received, stating, that howsoever desirous the Pāshwa might be to preserve the alliance, the person accused in this case was one of the greatest consequence; having ten thousand horse and five thousand foot at his devotion, besides fifty or sixty forts, and a territory yielding seventy-five lakhs of rupees; that therefore it was necessary to proceed with caution, as there were many difficulties in the way of the course recommended by the Resident. Direct attempts were, at the same time, made to intimidate and buy off the witnesses, whose evidence was known to constitute the proof possessed by Mr. Elphinstone. A further message was sent, declaring it not to be conformable even to English law to imprison before conviction; and that as yet no proof had been offered, that the assassins were

in Trimbukjee's service, or otherwise connected with him. These, and other arguments verbally adduced, were answered at length in a written communication, the matter of which it would be superfluous to detail.

In the mean time, the indications of an intention on the part of Bajee Rao, either to make common cause with the favourite, or to abet his flight into the country, where, under the pretext of rebellion, he might place the resources of the Poona state in direct hostility to the British government, were growing daily more strong and conclusive. Mr. Elphinstone in consequence applied to have the Hyderabad force marched from the valley of Berar to Jâlna, where it might be in readiness to act according to occasion. This application was nearly simultaneous with Mr. Russell's recall of that force to Hyderabad, for the settlement of the disturbance then excited by the Princes. Hoping, however, that nothing serious would arise at that court, the Resident at Poona repeated his request for a light force, at least, to take up the pursuit, in case Trimbukjee should fly before Colonel L. Smith, the commandant of the Poona subsidiary force. The Hyderabad commotion having subsided altogether in the interim, the whole of Colonel Doveton's army moved upon Jâlna at this requisition.

During the remainder of August, attempts were

made by the Pêshwa to induce the Resident to forego his demand of Trimbukjee's arrest, by the offer of several expedients,—none of which went further, than that the accused should absent himself from court and from Poona, pending the judicial investigation of his guilt or innocence, and lose his office. Of course, none of these offers could be listened to; but Mr. Elphinstone waited with some anxiety the receipt of the first orders on the subject from the Governor-general, before taking any further step. Those orders arrived on the 1st of September. They had been made out immediately on receipt of the first intelligence of the murder, which had been despatched from Ellora about the end of July, and had reached the Marquess of Hastings, at Futtehgurh, in the middle of August. His Lordship's instructions, assuming that there would be found sufficient evidence to fix the crime on Trimbukjee, provided specifically for every possible case of his surrender, or support by his master. In the event of his being delivered up for trial and punishment at the Resident's requisition, the British representative was authorised to gratify the Pêshwa, if necessary, with an assurance that the life of the offender was not sought by the British government, and that perpetual confinement would be the utmost severity exercised. But, in the event of that prince's refusing to bring his favourite to trial, or of his

affecting to consent to an investigation, and taking underhand means to render it nugatory, or of his refusing to deliver him up to punishment after the establishment of his guilt, Bajee Rao was to be held distinctly and personally responsible for the act: so, likewise, if he should abet Trimbukjee's escape from Poona, in order to raise the country; unless the flight should be attended with such circumstances as should acquit his Highness of any knowledge or participation. In the event of this responsibility being incurred, all communication was to be stopped, and preparations made to secure Bajee Rao's person, or at least to prevent his leaving the capital; but extreme measures were not to be resorted to, unless it should be hazardous to delay, or absolutely necessary to anticipate his Highness' designs. A letter was addressed to the Pêshwa himself by the Governor-general, in further support of the Resident's proceedings, which it was left to his discretion to present or not as he might deem expedient.

Thus assured of the Governor-general's unqualified support in the course he had adopted upon his own judgment, Mr. Elphinstone prepared a second memorial, which he delivered on the 4th of September, together with the Marquess of Hastings' letter. This memorial began by setting forth the tenor of the instructions just received; and declaring Bajee Rao to have already incurred

the responsibility adverted to in the Governor-general's letter, by systematic neglect of all investigation, and by evasion of the demand for the arrest of Trimbukjee, preparatory to his trial and punishment: it proceeded to require the immediate delivery of Trimbukjee to the British government, alleging his instructions to warrant the demand of capital punishment; but, out of regard for his Highness, and because he (the Resident) thought the expression of his Highness' anxiety might yet prevail with the Governor-general to spare his life, he should be contented with his delivery, until the receipt of further orders. The memorial went on to declare the alternative of a refusal of this demand to be, a suspension of all communication, and the calling in of the troops to Poona, where Mr. Elphinstone stated his intention still to remain, until he should be made acquainted with the ulterior wishes of the Governor-general, unless an attempt on the part of his Highness to leave Poona, or the continued levy of troops by his Highness, should render active hostility necessary in the interim.

Up to this time, Mr. Elphinstone had contented himself with demanding that the Pêshwa should himself hold Trimbukjee in restraint, until his trial should take place, as had been offered by Bajee Rao himself. The advance of this demand to that of the unqualified surrender of the accused

to the British government had become absolutely necessary ; for, with the disposition evinced by the Poona court, it was evident that any investigation, which might now be set on foot by its authority, would be the merest mockery in the world. It was most fortunate that the Governor-general's instructions, warranting such an advance of demand, arrived at the particular juncture ; for Bajee Rao was still evidently hesitating between the surrender of his favourite and the rupture of the alliance ; and the obloquy attending the former alternative seemed to have by far the most weight with him. At one time he had resolved to make common cause with Trimbukjee, and relays of horses had been placed for their joint flight from the capital ; from which course he was dissuaded only by Gokla, a southern jageer-dar, and one of the best military officers in his service. The second memorial of the 4th of September, with the Governor-general's letter, found the Pêshwa in this state of suspense ; and it was further communicated on the part of the Resident, that unless Trimbukjee should be seized in the course of the following day, the alternative threatened would be resorted to. His eyes seem to have been opened by this communication to the real danger of his situation. Nearly the whole of the night of the 4th of September was spent in consultation with the Bhão, Gokla, and another

person high in confidence, viz. Balooba, dewan of the Vinshorkur jageerdar. On the following morning the Bhão was sent with a message, that his Highness would confine Trimbukjee, on the condition that neither his life nor his surrender should be demanded. Mr. Elphinstone returned for answer, that he could hear nothing until the offender was seized. However, he thought it right to explain to the Bhão, that he conceived the surrender of Trimbukjee to the British government, and of Bundojee and Bhugwunt to that of the Gykwar, would satisfy all parties, and set the whole affair at rest; that no advantage would be taken of any disclosures by Trimbukjee after his confinement, and that the investigation should be urged no further. These assurances seemed to be necessary to quiet Bajee Rao's personal apprehensions. The result of the conference was reported by the Bhão, the same morning, and the whole of this day also was spent in consultation. In the night, it was resolved to send Trimbukjee to a hill fort, and the selection being left to him, he was sent off to Wusuntgurb, under an escort of two hundred Arabs, and a body of horse. The Bhão next morning waited upon the Resident, to acquaint him with what had been done, and to request that the Gykwar negotiation might be re-opened, and every thing go on as before. Mr. Elphinstone declared, that now Trimbukjee was

in confinement, the Pêshwa must be answerable that he did not escape or create disturbances; but that, before the matter could be considered as settled, he must be actually given up to the British government, according to the demand made, and the present instructions of his own court; for that he daily expected further orders, in answer to subsequent communications, those now acted upon having been issued before the late evasive conduct of his Highness was known; and he could not answer for what the next might contain. That, when received, he should be obliged to obey them to the letter, however injurious to his Highness' interests, unless the present demand should have been complied with in the interim; in which case, he should of course suspend their execution, till the Governor-general was informed of the compliance with his first demand. The confinement of Trimbukjee was believed throughout Poona to be a mere device to gain time; and the mode of it, together with the continuance in office of all his adherents, confirmed this impression.

The Bhão returned on the 7th of September, with an endeavour, by working on Mr. Elphinstone's feelings, to induce him to forego the demand for the delivery of Trimbukjee's person. He claimed to himself the merit of having induced the Pêshwa to confine that favourite, stating that he had

succeeded only by engaging personally that this would satisfy the British Resident. If, therefore, the further demand were still persisted in, he was himself in a dilemma, from which poison alone could extricate him. It was hardly credible that, knowing Mr. Elphinstone's sentiments and resolutions so fully as the Bhão must have done, he would so have pledged himself; but it was resolved, at all events, not to recede. The attempt was repeated next day with the same ill success: yet the Bhão survived his difficulties. Secret intrigues were also set on foot, through every medium likely to have influence at the British residency; but threats, entreaties, and persuasions were alike ineffectual. Levies of horse and foot were still making every where; and positive information was received, that it was the Pêshwa's intention to fly to the fort of Wye, and there raise the standard of the Mahratta empire. Mr. Elphinstone accordingly resolved no longer to delay calling in the main body of the subsidiary force from Seroor; and gave the Pêshwa notice of his having done so. This produced a message of remonstrance through the Bhão, which was answered in such terms as seemed most likely to fix the Pêshwa's wavering resolutions for the sacrifice of Trimbukjee. His surrender, it was announced, would be all the satisfaction expected; for that, except perhaps some atonement to the Gykwar for the murder of

his minister, nothing further would be demanded by the British government; that one word from his Highness now could accomplish this: but if he hesitated much longer, or attempted to leave Poona, an amicable settlement would be no longer possible. While this message was on its way, the Pêshwa had sent for Major Ford, an officer of the Company's service, who had raised and disciplined a brigade of infantry for his Highness, as part of his contingent. On his arrival, he was left with Chimnajee, Bajee Rao's brother, and Moro Dikshut, a minister who latterly had been growing into favour. These two consulted him on the best means of re-establishing the former terms of intercourse; and on his recommending the delivery of Trimbukjee, as the only measure he could suggest, went with his advice into the next room, whence they brought his Highness' consent. The mode of his delivery was accordingly arranged. A party of Major Ford's brigade was to bring him from Wusuntgurh; and the Pêshwa (as the Resident was told next day) had no objection to a party of the British troops accompanying, but this was declined. At the close of the conference with the Major, Bajee Rao appeared in person, and confirmed what the other two had agreed to, requiring Major Ford's engagement, that the act of surrender should replace every thing on the former footing; and that any fresh orders from the

Governor-general should be suspended, even should they arrive before he could acquaint Mr. Elphinstone. Gopāl Punt, the manager of the brigade business at court, accompanied Major Ford to the residency, and carried back thence the assurance, that on the delivery of Trimbukjee, every thing should révert to its former state; and that, except perhaps some satisfaction to the Gykwar, which must still be left to the Governor-general's discretion, no further demand or proceeding should be instituted in consequence of the Shastree's murder.

On the 11th of September, eight hundred and fifty men of the brigade marched from Poona, under the command of Captain Hick; and on the 19th they received charge of Trimbukjee; along with whom Bhugwunt Rao and Bundojee were delivered up at Poona, on the 25th; and next day the three prisoners were sent down to Tanna fort in Salsette, under charge of a light battalion and a regiment of cavalry, from the subsidiary force. The main body of that force, under Colonel L. Smith, returned on the 29th to Seroor.

Thus was accomplished, by negotiation, without a rupture of the alliance, and entirely through the spirit, firmness, and diplomatic ability of the British Representative, the important object of vindicating the honour and reputation of his nation, which had received the grossest insult, in

the murder of an ambassador, negotiating under its guarantee of protection. The Pêshwa had submitted to the humiliation of sacrificing his minister and favourite, in atonement for an act which had evidently been committed with his concurrence and participation. He had, in vain, tried every artifice and subterfuge to avert or delay the moment of submission; and when every attempt of this description had been baffled by the firmness and vigilance opposed to him, there can be no doubt that his inclination was, rather to risk a rupture of the alliance, than to submit. But his own good sense, and the representation of the Sirdars, in whom he placed his principal trust, satisfied him of the present insufficiency of his means to cope single-handed with the British power. It was evident, however, that henceforward we had nothing to expect but rancorous and malignant hate; and that the same fear, which had produced the important result on this occasion, would require to be constantly kept alive, in order to curb the natural bent of his mind. Mr. Elphinstone's conduct throughout the whole of this negotiation met with the Marquess of Hastings' particular approbation; and his Lordship felt, that the successful termination of the affair was mainly attributable to the prompt and decisive tone assumed and maintained from the outset to the close of the discussion.

On the whole, perhaps, it was fortunate that

the short-sighted violence of Trimbuljee brought matters thus prematurely to a crisis between his master and the British government. The unfortuna conduct of that favourite's administration, proceeding from ignorance, either real or affected, of the actual relations of the Peshwa at this period, had already given rise to so many infractions of the subsisting engagements, and of the treaty of Bassein in particular, that it would have been impossible to have suffered them to pass much longer without notice *. His measures must soon have

* In proof of this it may be sufficient to mention, that, on the 5th of the preceding May, soon after the court arrived at Nessel, the Resident had found it necessary to present a remonstrance against Trimbuljee's measures. The most important infraction of the treaty of Bassein was, a treaty made with a Guajarata Raja, the preamble of which declared it to be offensive against both the Nizam and Bhowah: this had been negotiated by Trimbuljee himself, after marching a hostile force into the Nizam's dominions, and occupying several of his villages. The affair took place about the preceding February, when Trimbuljee had been sent with some troops in pursuit of the Padara Sheah Dakh. The whole proceedings, however, was not only without the participation of the British government, as required by the treaty of Bassein, but the troops had drawn away an agent sent by the British Resident at Nigoor, to endeavour to settle a boundary dispute that had occurred in the neighbourhood between the officers of the Nizam and Bhowah; and Trimbuljee had put himself in possession of the disputed lands. Many similar infractions of the subsisting engagements, which had been pre-

come to the pass of compelling the British government to demand the displacement of the minister, as a pledge, that the frequent acts of offence, which had occurred under his administration, were without his Highness' countenance. In

duced by the conduct of his agent at Ahmedabad, were also brought forward in this remonstrance. Mr. E. then attributed these acts rather to the ignorance and Mahratta habits of the favourite, than to any deliberate design of breaking with the British government. But it cannot be denied, that the tone assumed at some of the discussions of that time was such as to indicate the most ambitious views. In one conference, the rights of the Pêshwa coming under discussion, Trimbukjee went so far as to assert his master's right to the *Chout* of Bengal, under the cession of Uleevurdee Khan, and to that of Mysoor, agreed to by Hyder Ulee: such was the temper of the man, who had been specially appointed a short time before to conduct business on behalf of the Pêshwa with the British Representative at his court. The high favour he still enjoyed made it difficult not to identify the Pêshwa with his minister. Had the Mahratta powers risen against the English in the year 1814-15, there can be little doubt, that Bajee Rao would have seized the first occasion to shake off his subsidiary connexion with us, and take his station amongst them: but he was not yet prepared to take the lead himself, and offer an example for their imitation, in the manner he did in 1817-18. Naturally suspicious and timorous, he would probably have preferred to take no active part, until he had seen what success attended others. The bolder plan he ultimately adopted, he was goaded to by the continual loss and disappointment he incurred, in the prosecution of that course of insidious attack which he commenced from this time forward.

such an event, Trimbukjee would have been backed by popular feeling, and have been regarded as the victim of our displeasure, for honestly preferring his master's interests to ours; and, at the other native courts, the Pêshwa would have made a strong case of the indignity put upon him, and represented it as a warning of the consequence of too close a connexion with a power so constituted as the British. In the issue to which matters were brought by the Shastree's murder, we stood forth in the character of avengers of the death of a Brahmin ambassador, and had the full advantage of the popular voice on our side, even among the Pêshwa's own subjects. This favourable impression lasted beyond the immediate occasion; insomuch, that two years afterwards, when a rupture occurred with nearly all the Mahrattá states, the cause of the British nation derived a vast accession of strength in public opinion, from recollection of the foul murder of this Brahmin, in which the quarrel had originated; and the indifference manifested upon the subsequent downfall of the Pêshwa's dynasty was owing, in a great measure, to its being regarded as a judgment on the reigning head of the family for his participation in this crime, polluted as he was already by the yet unexpiated murder of Nurayun Rao by his father Rughoonath.

The Shastree's death, as might have been ex-

pected, excited a considerable sensation throughout Goozerat. Futteh Singh and the party of the deceased, though they lamented the loss as irreparable, hoped from it, at any rate, the entire exoneration from all demands of the Poona government. On the other hand, the party in communication with Trimbukjee hoped, by his means and through the Pêshwa's influence and power, to bring about a revolution in the affairs of the court of Brodera. Seeta-Ram and his adherents were raising troops, and making preparations to act according to the turn events might take at Poona; a body of men, under a marauding chief in Seeta-Ram's interest, approached from Dhar so near as Dawud; and the two managers in Ahmedabad were acting in concert, and both levying horse and foot. Under these circumstances, the Bombay government had thought it advisable to detain the Goozerat force, which, on its presence becoming unnecessary in Central India, had before been destined to the adjustment of affairs in Kuch, whence some of the border tribes had been latterly in the habit of making predatory incursions into Goozerat. Every thing remained in a state of the most anxious suspense, until the amicable settlement of the discussions at Poona was known. It produced a simultaneous effect at Brodera and Ahmedabad. In the interim, Gungadhur Shastree's son was appointed

to all his father's offices, rather in demonstration of the sense entertained of the services of the deceased, than out of regard to any superior qualifications the son was thought to possess. After the delivery of Trimbukjee and the two agents of Seeta-Ram to the British authority, the two latter were transferred to the Gykwar, and confined in hill-forts within the dominions of that state. The Bombay government, however, resolved to prevent the occurrence of similar intrigues, by taking Seeta-Ram into their own custody; an arrangement to which the court of Brodera was not induced to accede without extreme difficulty.

The question of the degree of compensation to be afforded the Gykwar, for the murder of his minister and the representative of his court, was, in the following January, thus decided by the Governor-general, to whose arbitration it had been referred. Assuming the surrender of Trimbukjee, the actual perpetrator, to be an entire exculpation of the Pêshwa's government from any share or participation in the act, his Highness was declared to be exonerated from further responsibility, and, therefore, from the obligation to offer any specific atonement to the offended state. The Resident was, however, instructed to endeavour by persuasion to lead his Highness to make some handsome

provision for the family of the Shastree, as a spontaneous act of generosity: for the Supreme Government did not conceive itself to possess a right to make a special demand on this head. As a natural consequence of this view of the question, the negotiation for the settlement of the Pêshwa's claim on the Gykwar was directed to be re-opened at the point where it had been broken off, in the same manner as if the murder had never taken place. The Pêshwa occasionally revived it, but with little sincerity or interest; his mind being apparently engrossed with the prosecution of an object nearer his heart, which, from this time, he will be found to have pursued with more consistency and determination; viz. to bring about a general and secret combination of the Mahratta princes, directed against the British ascendancy. In the course of the negotiations respecting the surrender of Trimbukjee, Mr. Elphinstone was more than once assured that such a thing had been in agitation in the preceding season; but the Poona government assumed to itself credit for having abstained from giving direct encouragement to the project. Bajee Rao certainly was not then prepared to put every thing to hazard on such a risk; but from this time he seems to have resolved to do so, and himself to head the confederacy, as soon as it should be organized.

While these events were passing at Poona, and, indeed, during the remainder of the year 1815, nothing of moment occurred at any of the courts of Southern and Central India. It was ascertained, however, that confidential agents, men of family and name amongst the Mahrattas, were still intriguing at each Mahratta durbar, with such secrecy, that the object of the intrigues could only be gathered from suspicion and rumour. Bajee Rao occupied himself in incessant endeavours to obtain, through Mr. Elphinstone, the release of his captive favourite; but all his efforts directed to this end were of course unavailing. In January 1816, the Governor-general addressed a letter to his Highness, in such terms as it was thought would be most effectual to extinguish all hope, that the British government would ever consent either to release or give up the custody of this eminent offender.

CHAPTER IX.

PINDAREES.—BHOPÁL.—NAGPOOR.

1815-16, MAY TO MAY.

Pindarees—Second reference to England—Army reduced—Operations of Pindarees—Party surprised—Successful expedition—Second—British provinces ravaged with impunity—Concert of Pindarees with Mahrattas—Intrigues of 1815-16—Holkur's court—Ámeer-Khan—Bhopál—Death of Wuzeer Mohammed—and of Raghoojee Bhoosla—Consequent deliberations—Bhopál alliance declined—Nagpoór—Pursajee—his incapacity—Apa Saheb—his pretensions—character—Dhurmajee Bhoosla—his intrigues—their ill success—Both parties court the British Resident—who waits instructions—their tenor—Alliance and terms offered—Transactions at Nagpoór—Dhurmajee confined—Apa Saheb regent—Seeks British alliance—Naroba—Negotiation—its progress—conclusion—and signature—Reflections—Subsidiary force called in—Further transactions at Nagpoor.

THE Marquess of Hastings had returned to the Presidency towards the close of the rainy season of 1815, more fully convinced than ever of the necessity of early undertaking the suppression of the predatory hordes, for which as yet no authority had arrived from England. Anticipating

that the Nipál war would have closed with the first campaign, his Lordship had prepared himself to devote, if not immediately, at least in the subsequent year, the unreduced strength of the armies of the Bengal Presidency to the accomplishment of the important object of securing the peace of Central India by the destruction of these lawless marauders. The assent of the home authorities to this undertaking could not appear doubtful to any one in Bengal: and, anticipating its arrival, he was desirous of acting while the late additions increased so much his military means, and before the extraordinary resources obtained from the Nuwab Vizeer should have been frittered away in expensive annual preparations of defence. But, as the expected sanction of the authorities in England to the adoption of this course of policy had not arrived, his Lordship did not feel himself at liberty to undertake the proposed measures. After some discussion, it was resolved to submit a second and more earnest reference of the question for the consideration of the authorities, to whom the Supreme Government was responsible, and, in the interim, it was deemed necessary, as soon as the Goorkha war should be terminated, to make every possible reduction of the military establishments, which was done by breaking up the grenadier battalions and other temporary arrangements of the preceding year.

Meantime, the Dussera of 1815 had been celebrated at Cheetoo's cantonment of Nemawur by a greater concourse of Pindarees, than had ever before been assembled at one point. Preparation was evidently making for an expedition of more than ordinary interest, in which every durra was to have its share. On the 14th of October, a body of nearly eight thousand, of all descriptions, was ascertained to have crossed the Nerbudda, and to have taken a southward direction. It soon broke into two parties, one of which was heard of as it passed the valley of the Taptee, and was beaten up in its bivouack on the 24th of October, by a party of the Nizam's reformed infantry under Major Fraser, in number about three hundred, accompanied by about a hundred horse. The completeness of the surprise allowed the infantry time to fire several volleys, by which the Pindarees suffered some loss before they could gallop off and disperse: but the horse would neither attack nor pursue, nor even (which is yet more extraordinary) join in collecting the booty. Indeed, no efforts could get them from between the advance and rear guard of the infantry, so that the loss suffered by the freebooters was comparatively trifling. This, and other examples of the degree of reliance to be placed on the Nizam's cavalry, induced the Supreme Government shortly afterwards to authorise the Resident at Hydera-

bad to exert his influence in procuring a similar reform to that already introduced by British officers into the infantry establishments, to be extended to the cavalry also, which were, of the two, deficient in perhaps the greater degree. A plan for the reform of the Nizam's horse was drawn up by Captain Sydenham, an officer employed in a diplomatic situation at Aurungabad: and, since its introduction, these troops * have been distinguished by more courage and activity, and are now in nothing inferior to the irregular horse of other establishments. The routed party of Pindarees were not deterred by the surprise they had suffered from continuing their depredations in a southerly direction till they reached the banks of the Kishna. The other party, which had proceeded south-eastward, was heard of at Ramtikee and Choupara in the Nâgpoor dominions. It thence traversed the Nizam's territories from north to south, till it also appeared on the northern bank of the Kishna, where no such danger was apprehended. The territories of the Madras presidency lay on the

* There were, from this time forward, six thousand of them continually in the field, whereof four thousand were under the command of British officers. The rest were furnished by Jageerdars, and fifteen hundred of them by Sulabut Khan of Ellichpoor. The reformed infantry consisted of six battalions, as mentioned in the introductory chapter.

southern bank, and were only preserved from devastation by the fortuitous circumstance of the river continuing not fordable for horses so unusually late as the 20th of November. Finding the Kishna impassable, the freebooters took a turn eastward, plundering the country for several miles along its populous and fertile banks, and committing every kind of enormity. On approaching the frontier of Masulipatam, they shaped their course northward, and returned along the line of the Godavuree and Wurda, passing to the east of all Colonel Doveton's positions, and making good their route to Nemawur, with an immense booty collected in the Nizam's dominions, and with utter impunity. The plunder obtained in this Luhbur was greater than that of any previous expedition; insomuch, that merchants were sent for from Ojein to purchase many of the valuables obtained, those of Nemawur not being sufficiently wealthy.

Elated at this success, a second expedition was planned and proclaimed very soon after the return of the first. Pindarees again flocked in from every durra, to join in it; and by the 5th of February, ten thousand, under different leaders, had again crossed from Nemawur, and were on their way S. S. E. in the route by which the former party had returned. The first that was heard of this body, after its crossing the Ner-

budda, was its appearance on the western frontier of the district of Masulipatam, under the Madras Presidency, on the 10th of March. From this point it shaped its course southward to Dubakoo; and next day made a march of thirty-three miles, in the course of which it plundered seventy-two villages, committing in each the most horrid cruelties upon the unarmed and inoffensive inhabitants. The following day (12th), after a march of thirty-eight miles, and the destruction of fifty-four villages, the horde arrived at the civil station of Guntoor, where they plundered a considerable part of the town, and the houses of all the civil officers. The government treasure and the persons of the British Residents were protected at the Collector's office, by the exertions of a few troops and invalids kept at the station for civil duties. It being no part of the design of the Pindarees to risk the loss of time or lives, they immediately moved off with what they could get; and before night there was not a single strange horseman in the neighbourhood. The whole had hurried off westward, making a march of fifty-two miles the next day in that direction. This body of marauders continued on the whole twelve days within the Company's frontier; and, after leaving Guntoor, swept through part of the Kirpa (Cuddapa) district, and recrossed the Kishna on the 22d of March. A squadron of the Madras 4th native

cavalry, detached against them from Hyderabad; arrived on the opposite bank just after they had made good the passage. It happened that a considerable force was at the time in the field a little further to the west, for the settlement of a disputed succession to the Kurnol Jageer; but, though it sent out detachments in every direction, and others were despatched from Hyderabad in their rear, the plunderers escaped from all with impunity. After recrossing the Kishna, the Luhbur seems by agreement to have separated into several bodies, in order the better to baffle pursuit and scour the country. The greater part moved westward, along the north bank of the Kishna, passing south of Hyderabad, until they approached the Pêshwa's dominions; when, turning short to the north, the whole retraced their steps to the Nerbudda in several divisions, and by various routes. The advanced guard of one body, led by Bheekoo Seyud, was heard of by Colonel Doveton, and overtaken, as it was passing the Ajunta range at Dewul Ghât, by a party of Mysoor horse, detached for the purpose. The Colonel himself had moved at the same time, under the guidance of a prisoner, to intercept the main body; it escaped, however, by a singular chance, and contrary to all expectation. The other parties, which had taken a more easterly course, met with no obstruction on their return; and it was ascertained that nearly

the whole of those who had passed the Nerbudda, in February, to engage in this expedition, had recrossed before the 17th of May, bringing a second immense harvest of booty within the year, and without having suffered any loss worthy of mention. Some idea may be formed of the extent of ravage and cruelty which marked the track of these banditti, from what was found to be the damage sustained by the Company's districts during the twelve days that they remained within the frontier. It was ascertained by a committee, sent to the spot for the express purpose of the investigation, that three hundred and thirty-nine villages had been plundered, one hundred and eighty-two individuals* put to a cruel death, five hundred and five severely wounded, and no less than three thousand six hundred and three had been subjected to different kinds of torture. The private loss of individuals was estimated by

* A great number of women destroyed themselves to escape violation. No less than twenty-five drowned themselves for this purpose, several with infants. At Mavolee, where some resistance was attempted by the villagers, the women, seeing their protectors about to be overpowered, set fire to the house in which they had assembled to abide the result; and no less than ten, with six children, perished in the flames. Another woman, having fallen into the hands of the savages, and seeing no other means of destruction, tore out her tongue, and instantly expired. Many similar horrors, and some barbarities even more revolting to humanity, will be found recorded at length in the Report of the Committee.

↑the committee at two lakh and a half of pagodas, about one hundred thousand pounds sterling.

It would seem that the Pindaree leaders had this season come to a resolution to respect the territories of the Mahratta chiefs, and to direct their ravages chiefly, if not exclusively, against those of the Nizam and of the British government. This had been publicly given out in the hordes: and some of the few stragglers that were left behind and taken, stated the same thing on their examinations. Such a resolution may have been the result of the secret negotiations carried on by the Mahratta agents, particularly Balajee Koonjur, a person of high repute, and formerly a minister of the Pêshwa. This man, having left Poona some years before in apparent disgrace, had latterly visited all the Mahratta courts, where he was received with marked attention, and evidently had some important business in hand. He was known to have had communication with the Pindarees, on his way to Nagpoor from Sindheea's camp, in the early part of 1815; and from that city he went to Cheetoo's cantonment at Nema-wur, as if purposely to make them a party to the intrigue he was conducting. It was an insidious kind of hostility, thus, under the mask of friendship and professions of attachment, to instigate the attacks of these irresponsible, unacknowledged bands; but it is not on that account the less likely to have been suggested by the hatred and fears of

the Mahratta chiefs, or recommended by their notions of morality. If any proof were wanting, that these enterprises of the Pindarees were undertaken in concert with the Mahratta powers, it might be found in the circumstance of the latter having afterwards chosen the particular moment of our prosecuting measures for the suppression of the predatory associations, to rise themselves against the British supremacy. Without some assurance of such support, whenever our strength should be put forth against them, the Pindaree leaders would scarcely have commenced, at this particular juncture, a plan of systematic depredation, pointedly aimed at the only power they had reason to fear. And if the plan of directing the Pindarees against us originated in the councils of the Mahratta durbars, it must be traced to intrigues anterior to those which accompanied and followed the discussions at the Poona court; although these may doubtless have helped to exasperate the national feeling against us.

A brief notice of the intrigues that passed in the season of 1815-16, will here, perhaps, be acceptable. While the Pêshwa was hesitating whether to abandon his favourite or the British alliance, he was naturally desirous of ascertaining how far he might reckon on the other Mahratta courts. He accordingly had taken measures to sound the Bhoosla and Sindheea; but the answer of neither arrived until Bajee Rao had been

forced to make his election for the surrender of his minister. It was ascertained, however, that both had given him to understand, that if he were willing fairly to commit himself and take the lead, he might depend on their co-operation; though, until he did so, they were not disposed to trust him, or to come forward, at the hazard of taking the whole consequences on themselves. Baptiste's force was specially applied for by Trimbukjee, through Sindheea's agent at Poona, the channel used by the Pêshwa to sound the disposition of that durbar. The answer was written in the form of a banker's letter to his correspondent. After assurances that Willoba Naeek (the Pêshwa) might have drawn at pleasure, the letter proceeded: "This banking-house 'is the Naeek's own; while your house is in want of cash" (meaning troops) "you must submit to the importunity of creditors" (the British). "The Naeek ought, therefore, to go about for some time on pretence of pilgrimage; but let him write a bill in his own hand, and, after that, wherever money is required, thither it shall be sent without delay." The letter was dated 11th of September, at the time the discussions were at their height; and it is not difficult to discover both the advice, the assurance, and the distrust conveyed under this puerile disguise.

The interest excited by these discussions, and by the state of the war and negotiations with

Nipál, were the matters which engrossed the chief attention of all the Mahratta powers during the season of 1815-16. Holkur's troops were collected and held in some state of preparation during the month of September; but the pecuniary embarrassments of that court were growing every day greater; insomuch, that, in December, the two regent widows, Meena Bacc and Toolsee Bacc, were obliged to fly with their ward, Mulhar Rao Holkur, to take refuge with Zalim Singh, the manager of Kota, until the mutinous disposition of the troops, who had for some time been sitting *dhurna** on the court for pay, could either be quelled, or their demands satisfied. They effected their escape on horseback after the young Holkur had been carried in procession with the Tazeea (the bier of Hoosein), during the Moohurram, and thus got off unsuspected to Zalim Singh's fort of Gungerial. Before April 1816, the two widows, connecting themselves with different parties, came to a final rupture; and Meena Bacc, suspecting that Toolsee Bacc's party had a design to seize her person, fled back for protection to a body of the

* *Dhurna* is a kind of incessant importunity practised by creditors, when they have no other way of recovering their debt. The *dun* sits outside the door, under a vow not to eat till paid; and, if a Brahmin, or of high caste, the creditor must practise similar abstinence until he pays. When troops sit *Dhurna*, they form a mutinous assemblage round the tent or palace of their sovereign or chief, and not unfrequently subject him to personal indignities and violence.

discontented troops. These, however, at the suggestion, it was supposed, of Toolsee Bacc and Balaram Set, her adviser, placed her under restraint, demanding their arrears from some private treasure she was suspected to possess.

Ameer Khan did not seem disposed to take any further advantage of this confusion, than by the more complete establishment of his own independence. But his influence was exerted in favour of Balaram Set, and contributed materially to aid him in supplanting Tantea Aleekur, who was very justly disliked and suspected by the Putans. In the earlier part of the season of 1815-16, Ameer Khan had been employed in settling the amount of the contribution he was to receive from Joudhpoor. The Raja, Man Singh, first employed his minister, Singhee Indraj, to negotiate this point; and then, from jealousy of his power and influence, intrigued with Ameer Khan to have him murdered. This was effected at a conference within the citadel, where two Putans were admitted to adjust with the minister the amount to be paid. The assassins were protected from the populace by the Raja, and sent back in safety to Ameer Khan, who, by agreement, held one of the gates of the city during the conference. This was the second assassination committed by the Putan chief at the suggestion of Raja Man Singh. Towards the end of the season, having adjusted matters with Joudhpoor, Ameer Khan made pre-

parations for a serious attack on Jypoor, as will hereafter be more particularly related; but it will be necessary first to mention some occurrences in which the British government were more immediately concerned, and which ended in giving us a position in Central India of no small importance, in the issue to which things were subsequently brought with the Mahrattas.

While the Pindarees were engaged in the second enterprise described above, two events had occurred, most propitious to the British interests in the quarter whence those marauders issued: these were the death of Wúzeer Mohummed, Nuzab of Bhopál, on the 17th of March 1816, and that of Raghoojee Bhoosla, on the 22d of the same month. The former was succeeded by his son, Nuzur Mohummed, a very young man — too young, it was to be feared, for the perilous circumstances of the principality, superadded to the troubles of a new succession. There was every reason, therefore, to apprehend that either the Mahrattas or the Pindaree chieftains in the neighbourhood would attempt to avail themselves of the occasion, to interfere in the concerns of Bhopál; in either of which cases, a second and more sincere application for our permanent protection of its legitimate prince was to be expected as a natural consequence. Raghoojee's successor was his only son, Pursajee Bhoosla, known before his ac-

cession by the name of Bala Saheb. The intrigues and passing occurrences of that court likewise promised equally to give the long-sought opportunity of establishing a subsidiary connexion with the Nagpoor state. The question, whether or no the Supreme Government should now direct its efforts to the accomplishment of these two objects, was thus forced upon the consideration of the Governor-general in council, in the month of April 1816.

There was but one opinion in respect to the policy of forming the connexion with Nagpoor, which was accordingly resolved upon the moment the question was brought forward. That with Bhopâl had hitherto been regarded rather as an alternative, to be adopted in consequence of the impossibility of forming one with Nagpoor, or as a necessary precaution against the designs of a hostile Mahratta confederation: now, however, it presented itself in a new light; and the point to be determined was, whether, having the means of establishing the British influence at Nagpoor, the advantage of extending it in the direction of the Nerbudda, whenever the occasion offered, by the annexation of Bhopâl, the territories of which lay opportunely contiguous, and presented advantages both of offence and defence against the Pindarees, did not call for its adoption yet more strongly than before. It was now recommended, not only as a measure of de-

fence in furtherance of the objects contemplated from the Nagpoor alliance, but also as a means of gaining a vantage ground for striking a blow at the predatory associations, whenever government might be free to adopt that course. The objections urged against forming such a connexion had their foundation apparently in the apprehension of the risk of giving umbrage to the Mahratta powers, which the steps taken in 1814-15 had proved to be an object of exaggerated alarm. Moreover, if the Nagpoor Raja were gained over to our side, that risk could scarcely be said to exist, or at the most, was a matter of comparative indifference to the British, after the successful close of the Nipâl war. At the same time, having once established an alliance with Nagpoor, and obtained from it a position for a considerable force on the Nerbudda, the defence of Bhopâl might be provided for by an additional brigade, in communication with that position; and this could be so chosen, as to form a connecting link with the force in Bundelkhund. The advantage of securing the resources of this state in our own interest, and depriving the Pindarees of the means they derived from it, especially when this could be accomplished with such apparent facility, were strongly felt by the Governor-general; who immediately perceived the incalculable benefit of this arrangement, both to the present interests of his government, and to the ulterior prosecution of a

systematic plan, for the entire suppression of those dangerous and rapidly increasing hordes of adventurers and banditti.

The Marquess of Hastings could not, however, consider these advantages, certain and considerable as they were, sufficient, in the actual state of things, to warrant a departure from the policy enjoined by the authorities in England. Towards the close of the month of April, therefore, a short time after the Nagpoor connexion had been resolved upon, his Lordship came to the resolution not to seek the Bhopâl alliance, even should the negotiations, which were then opened at Nagpoor, be brought to a favourable issue. The political agent in Bundelkhund, as well as the Resident at the durbar of Sindheea, both of whom had solicited instructions for their guidance, in the expectation of new overtures from Bhopâl, or of further attempts against that principality on the part of the Mahrattas, were accordingly desired to refrain from giving to such overtures any encouragement; and to maintain, on behalf of the British government, the strictest neutrality and indifference in regard to what might be passing at Bhopâl. They were, however, warned that there was no occasion to make public profession of this determination; as any such declaration would infallibly have the effect of needlessly inviting the cupidity and ambition of the turbulent neighbours of the principality, who probably might else be

restrained by the fear of a second protective interference. These instructions were strictly followed: and when, in the course of 1816, indirect overtures were made by the young Nuwab, they were answered by common-place expressions of courtesy and good-will, without meeting any further encouragement whatever.*

Affairs were, in the mean time, hastening to a crisis at the court of Nagpoor. Raghoojee's successor was nowise capable of conducting the government that had devolved upon him. He had been all his life reputed to be of a disposition flighty, and impatient of control; but a recent sickness had deprived him of sight, and he had lost the use of one of his arms by a stroke of the palsy, that had left him, moreover, completely bedridden. His mind had also been affected by these bodily afflictions, and was frequently observed to wander,

* In the beginning of 1817, an agent of the Nuwab, named Inayut Museeh, went over to Nágpoor, and there delivered a specific proposition, in writing, to Mr. Jenkins, the Resident, soliciting, on the part of Nuzur Mohammed, that the state might be admitted to the British protection, on the terms offered to Wuzeer Mohammed. This was followed up by a letter to the same effect, from the Nuwab himself to Mr. Wauchope, the political agent in Bundelkhund. On reference to the Supreme Government, it was still determined; after some deliberation, to adhere to the above resolution; but the Marquess of Hastings took the occasion to put his opinions on the question upon record, and to bring the subject to the special notice of the authorities in England.

insomuch as scarcely to be sensible of what was passing. Several instances of this were current in the way of public conversation: for instance, during the ceremony of burning his father's body, he made very indecorous complaints of its length, and accused the Brahmins of having some sinister design in thus detaining him. He publicly charged Apa Saheb of attempting his life, when some consecrated water happened accidentally to be sprinkled over him; and, on one occasion, in full durbar, expressed impatience as to what had become of his *mustaches*, forgetting that they had been shaved off, as a necessary circumstance of mourning for his father's death. There was, indeed, but one opinion respecting his utter incompetency to exercise the functions of his station; and all seemed to agree upon the necessity of an immediate resort to a provisional form of administration.

The next heir to the Raja was Moodajee Bhoosla, commonly called Apa Saheb, son of Vinkojee Bhoosla, (Nana Saheb,) the only brother of Raghoojee. The claims of an infant son of a daughter of Raghoojee were not held to come into competition with those of Apa Saheb, the nearest in the male line, except, indeed, in the case of his adoption by Pursajee; marriage being considered, by most classes of Hindoos, to transfer the bride to her husband's family, and to cut off herself and her descendants for ever from any claim on that of

her own parents. Apa Saheb was of an age and character to possess public consideration, and was naturally the person entitled to assume the regency; but he had been on ill terms with his uncle, Raghoojee, for some time before his death, in consequence of the Raja's having attempted the resumption of a large territory which the nephew had inherited from his father. It had been preserved to him, at last, by the aid of a remonstrance of the British Resident at Nagpoor; and this circumstance not only produced an irreconcilable difference between the two princes, but induced Raghoojee to have recourse to a series of measures, calculated to annoy and distress his nephew in every possible way. On his death-bed, however, Raghoojee, aware of his son's incapacity, sent for Apa Saheb, and placing his son's hand within that of his offended cousin, said, he made him the depositary of the family honour; endeavouring, by this tardy confidence, to secure his good offices towards Pursajee. But the ministers and favourites, who had been the instruments, if not the originators, of Raghoojee's persecution of his nephew, were not so easily reconciled to the idea of his assuming the supreme direction of affairs. A strong party accordingly formed itself, to oppose the claim of the heir-presumptive to the regency. It was headed by Dhurmajee Bhoosla, a *chela* or *élève* of the deceased Raja, who had risen to such

favour with him, as to be intrusted with the charge of a great part of his public and private treasures, amounting, as was supposed, to about a crore of rupees. This man was an unprincipled libertine, and had been the instigator and chief actor in those measures of extortion, which had marked the close of Raghoojee's life; and latterly rendered it dangerous for any man of wealth to reside or come within his dominions. Besides the large influence resulting from the control of the treasury, Dhurmajee had several partisans in the *muhul*, or women's apartment, and enjoyed a considerable share of popularity among the Arab mercenaries, who guarded the palace and person of the new Raja. The principal officers of the late prince's ministry joined this party, and formed a scheme for vesting the regency in Buka Bacc,* the favourite wife of the deceased; and further, for inducing his successor to adopt the infant grandson of Raghoojee, to the perpetual exclusion of Apa Saheb from all share in the administration, and ultimately from the succession itself. The intrigue first showed itself in an attempt to have some other than Apa Saheb nominated to officiate at the *sradh* of the deceased Raja, a ceremony always required to be performed by the nearest male heir, who being incompetent in the present

* Not Pursajee's mother, who was not then living.

case, the nephew, as next in the male line, had some sort of right to preside on his behalf.

Hearing of this intrigue, Apa Saheb openly expressed the highest indignation, professing his determination to resort to force, sooner than submit to be so superseded. His party, at the same time, talked loudly of the necessity of rescuing the government and public treasures from the hands of the worthless and designing individuals, who, under colour of the name, were usurping the authority of the young Raja. The popular voice was so strongly in his favour on this point, that Dhurmajee's party, not being yet prepared for extremities, disclaimed having ever meditated the supersession of the presumptive heir, or appointment of another person to officiate for Pursajee at the approaching *sradh*. A readiness was, at the same time, expressed to admit Apa Saheb to a share in the government on certain conditions; and efforts were made to bring about a reconciliation, but thwarted underhand by Dhurmajee. The *sradh* was quietly performed on the 1st of April, the nephew of the deceased officiating as principal actor in the ceremonies.

While matters remained in this unsettled state, both parties expressed the strongest desire for the return of Sreedhur Luchmun Pundit, who was still the nominal prime minister at Nagpoor, but, having found his influence with Raghoojee on the

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wane, had retired some months before the death of that prince, on pretence of a pilgrimage to Bunnarus, where he still remained. This man was regarded as the head of the English party at Nagpoor; and the object of these professions of intention to abide by what he might determine was, to prevent a more active interference on our part in their favour. Of this, both seemed apprehensive, though nothing was further from the Resident's thoughts. Dhurmajee had, however, an ulterior object in view; for so long as this suspense should continue, the power, as well as the treasures of the government, would remain at his disposal, in the same manner as they had been at the time of Raghoojee's decease. Thus every one seemed earnest in his protestations to Mr. Jenkins, the British Resident at Nagpoor, of a desire to maintain the best understanding with the English. Apa Saheb, in particular, made direct overtures through Juswunt Rao Ram Chundur, who was the negotiator of the treaty of Deogam, and had since been the appointed channel of communication between the Resident and this court. He proposed to accept the terms before offered to Raghoojee, and to receive a subsidiary force, on condition of support against the designs of the opposite faction.

Mr. Jenkins refused to interfere in this scene of intrigue until he should receive special orders

from the Governor-general; but lost no time in laying before the Supreme Government the real position of affairs at Nagpoor, asking instructions as to how far, in the actual state of the Raja's intellects, he might consider himself warranted in receiving the overtures, and listening to the propositions of the presumptive heir, previously to his acquiring any direct ostensible share in the government. This was a question that depended on the degree of Pursajee's incapacity. If it were such as to prevent his being considered a free agent in the choice of the responsible functionaries of his government, then, of course, any faction that should attempt to exclude the next heir, being of fit age, from a share in the administration, could only be regarded as usurpers, assuming the Raja's name as a mere cloak to their illegal proceedings. In submitting this question, Mr. Jenkins had evidently so decided an opinion of the malady of the reigning Raja, as to think it would be usurpation in Dhurmajee's party, if, representing themselves as the ministers of Pursajee's choice, they refused to allow Apa Saheb the exercise of a fair portion of control over their acts of administration. Wherefore, on the same principle as the latter would have been warranted in the employment of force to obtain his right, would he likewise be free to solicit foreign aid for the purpose; and the British at liberty to con-

nect themselves with his party, if solicited so to do, and to support his claims against the opposition of Dhurmajee, or of the other ministers of the late Raja.

By the way, it is observable, that the turn taken by these intrigues and divisions at Nagpoor had a direct and obvious tendency to introduce a foreign influence, at the invitation of either party or of both. If, therefore, we refrained from stepping forward, it was to be feared, that either Sindheea or the Pêshwa, or some of the Pindaree leaders, would succeed in establishing themselves to our perpetual exclusion: at the same time, since the contention lay entirely between the factions of Apa Saheb and of Dhurmajee, the legitimate Raja having no greater interest on the one side than on the other, we seemed to have no other object of solicitude, than to connect ourselves with the rightful cause, which appeared undoubtedly to be that of the cousin and presumptive heir.

In the month of April, as before mentioned, the Supreme Government came to the resolution of seizing the first opportunity to form a subsidiary alliance with Nagpoor. On hearing of the state of parties at that court, as described in the despatches of the Resident, the government further resolved, that in case Pursajee's malady should prove to be such as to render him utterly incapa-

ble of conducting public business, or of exercising the judgment requisite in the selection of fit persons for the functions of government; the next male heir, if of mature age, and possessed of the requisite qualifications, should be considered to possess an inherent right to represent the sovereign authority of the state; and that the British government would consequently hold itself free to negotiate with him directly, without any inquiry whether he derived his authority from the nominal and hereditary prince, or otherwise. Whether or not Pursajee was incapacitated by the malady under which he laboured, in the degree stated, was a point which must unavoidably be left to the discretion of the Resident, and the general feeling of those attached to the court. But supposing this to be the case, then, if Apa Saheb should be the next male heir in legitimate succession to Pursajee, Mr. Jenkins was instructed to negotiate with him as the rightful head of the state, and if practicable, to conclude a treaty on the basis of affording the aid of the British government in support of his just pretensions, upon the conditions of a subsidiary alliance. The utmost caution was, however, directed to be observed, in ascertaining the precise degree of Pursajee's incapacity; and some further inquiry was ordered into the other point, how far the heritable claims of the nephew were recognised by

the Mahratta law of succession, as preferable to those of the grandson by the daughter of Raghoojee. The first instructions on this subject were forwarded on the 15th of April. The division of the Hyderabad subsidiary force, then at Ellichpoo, in the valley of the Poorna, under Colonel Doveton, was placed at Mr. Jenkins's disposal, in case he should find it necessary to call for the whole or any part of it, in support of the cause of Apa Saheb, under the conditional authority conveyed in his instructions; or for the execution of the treaty of alliance and subsidy, in case the negotiations should be brought to this issue.

The terms of alliance to be proposed to the Nágpoor prince, varied in nothing from those which it had been attempted to establish in the lifetime of the late Raja. The Bhoosla state was to be incorporated in the league for the defence of the Dukhun, already subsisting between the British government, the Nizam, and the Pêshwa; and was to be ready, with its whole resources, when required for the purpose of promoting or securing that object. A contingent was, at all events, to be maintained in permanent efficiency, and ever ready to act with the British subsidiary force. This latter was to consist of not less than four battalions of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a due proportion of artillery; and was to be posted somewhere in the neighbourhood of the

Nerbudda, the Bhoosla bearing a proportion of the expense. His court was also to refrain from negotiation, except in concert with the British government, and to abide its arbitration of all differences with other powers. In short, the conditions were the same as have been explained in the first chapter, to constitute the relations of such other states as had accepted subsidiary alliances; the main object being to bring the Bhoosla into this class. In subsequent instructions regarding the conduct of this negotiation, the Supreme Government declared its wish, in the present instance, that whatever subsidy might be agreed on, should be stipulated in the shape of periodical money-payments; with a proviso, however, for the eventual substitution of a territorial cession in case of irregularity of payment, or of the occurrence of such a change of circumstances as should render an arrangement of this nature more desirable than at present. The reason for this unusual preference of money-payments was, that this subsidiary force must necessarily be thrown so much in advance upon the frontier, and be so continually in the field in chase of the Pindarees, as to raise a probability of embarrassment arising, from its having also to protect a territory of considerable extent, specifically assigned for its own support. Had a cession been demanded in the first instance, it could only have

been granted somewhere in the neighbourhood of the position to be occupied by the subsidiary force, for there were no other lands belonging to the state conveniently situated for the purpose.

Before Mr. Jenkins received any of these instructions, almost, indeed, before he was informed of his own government being prepared to contract the alliance, the contest had been brought to a crisis at Nagpoor, which produced renewed overtures of such a nature, as he did not hesitate to entertain on his own responsibility, from their consonance to the spirit of the orders under which he had acted upon former occasions. It has been mentioned before, that a reconciliation, which was attempted between the two rival factions, miscarried in consequence of Dhurmajee's secret counteraction. He not only induced Buka Bae, the regent proposed by his party, to reject with scorn the paper of reconciliation, when submitted to her for signature ; but, after first agreeing to sign himself, next day retracted his assent, unless upon the condition, that Apa Saheb would give him the security of the Punnee Putans. This is a class of Moosulman assassins, whose existence would not be tolerated under any other civil institutions, than those engendered by the misrule of the Nizam and the Mahratta princes. The singularity and binding force of their contracts consist in this, that, if once their pledge is

given for any one's personal security, they are notorious for never failing to redeem it, by the secret murder of the aggressor upon the person guaranteed.

The distrust of Apa Sahib, intimated in the assumption of such a pretext for rejecting the reconciliation, joined to the known profligacy of Dhurmajee's character, made every one suspicious of his real designs. It was also discovered, that Dhurmajee had sent invitations to men of this description to come over from Hyderabad and Ellichpoor, a thing which gave great disgust to the leading people of all parties at the Nagpoor court. His behaviour was moreover offensively overbearing to every body; insomuch, that all but men of desperate fortunes were alienated and disgusted. Apa Sahib was encouraged by this posture of affairs to take measures for seizing him in the palace where he resided; and having secured the concurrence of the principal people about the person of the Raja, as well as of Pursajee himself, who seems to have been brought to declare himself in favour of his cousin, and consented to his acting in this, as in all other matters, as he might think best, a body of Apa Sahib's personal retainers was marched into the fort of Nagpoor; and Dhurmajee secured without resistance or difficulty, together with his public and private treasures. This measure was effected on the evening

of the 11th of April, 1816; having been precipitated by a sense of the necessity of crushing this intriguer, before his command of treasure and connexion with the Punnee Putans should have made him formidable. Pursajee showed more energy on this occasion than could have been expected from his usual habits: for, when Apa Saheb's party was approaching the palace, there were not wanting some who represented their coming as hostile and dangerous to himself, and endeavoured to procure an order from the Raja for their being resisted, which the Arab mercenaries were well enough inclined to obey. Pursajee, however, had no personal alarm, and forbad any resistance; declaring that Apa Saheb had full power in all things.

Three days after Dhurmajee's apprehension, the ceremony of seating the Raja on the Guddee, which is the formal act of installation, was publicly performed, and Apa Saheb was, on the same day, solemnly declared to be vested, by the Raja himself, with the sole and entire conduct of the public affairs, under the title of Naeab-o-Mokhtar—Deputy with full powers. The English gentlemen at Nagpoor were present at the ceremony; and Mr. Jenkins was the first to offer his own congratulations and those of the government he represented, upon the auspicious commencement of the new reign.

Though Apa Saheb had thus quietly obtained the apparent object of his wishes, in being publicly acknowledged regent with full powers, he was still by no means so certain of retaining the quiet enjoyment of the dignity, as to cease to regard a subsidiary connexion with the British as a most desirable measure of security, in the unsettled state in which he found all around him. The chief offices of the government were still held by the ministers of Raghoojee, the greater part of whom had joined in the conspiracy for his exclusion. There was danger in attempting their immediate displacement, lest they should declare Pursajee's competency to resume the reins himself; and, by alarming him with fears for his life, obtain from him a formal revocation of the late nomination to the regency. The ministers, indeed, though professing their ready acquiescence in the late arrangement, assumed a tone of independence by no means compatible with the Asiatic notion of the deference due from a minister to his master. Thus Naroba, the Chitnavees, or secretary of state, took an early opportunity to wait upon the new regent, in order to inform him, that if he wished to be served zealously by himself, it would be necessary that the course of foreign policy, pursued by Raghoojee in the latter part of his life, should be maintained; particularly alluding to the communications that had for some time

been passing between Raghoojee, on the one hand, and the Peshwa, Sindheea, and Holkur, on the other, the object of which was to promote a spirit of concert and union amongst all the Mahrattas, directed against the British ascendancy. Naroba adverted also to another intrigue, which, it seems, had been in train some time before the death of Raghoojee, and had in view the endeavour, through the medium of English gentlemen returning to their native country, to open a direct communication with the King of England, in order to procure the restoration of the provinces of Cuttack and Berar, for a present consideration of thirty lakhs of rupees. Such an intrigue, it is firmly believed, never had being, except in the machinations of a wily Mahratta of the name of Pursaram Rao; who, understanding a little of the English language, had address enough to persuade the deceased Raja, that nothing was easier than to open such a channel, and had procured considerable sums of money, under pretence of forwarding the project. In this intrigue Naroba wished the government of Nagpoor to persevere, being himself the dupe of Pursaram's imposture.

The regent was induced, by distrust of Naroba, immediately to communicate what had passed to Mr. Jenkins, hoping thereby to secure his active support, in measures directed to the removal of this man, whose office he intended for his private

dewan Nagoo Punt. Naroba, however, had induced Sudeek Ulee Khan to accompany him, when he made this communication of his views and principles; and, as this man was one of the principal commanders of the Bhoosla military, upon whose affection he knew he could place no reliance, Apa Saheb felt himself under the necessity of temporizing with the Chitnavees, not feeling sufficient confidence in his own means to take the decided part his inclinations prompted. The desire of removing this, and others of his uncle's ministers, for the purpose of introducing men of his own choice, joined to the necessity he felt of disbanding, or at least re-organizing the military establishments, which caused him so much alarm, were the motives that urged him to the determination of connecting himself in a subsidiary alliance with the British government, on the terms which had been offered to the late Raja. He was apprehensive, however, that, in the event of his forming such a connexion, an effort would be made to impose upon him a ministry made up of the party of Sreedhur Luchmun Pundit, which it was supposed that Mr. Jenkins favoured. Accordingly, although the regent had resolved upon the alliance, he would not employ Juswunt Rao Ramchundur in the negotiation of it, knowing his anxiety for Sreedhur's recall, and restoration to favour and authority. This point Juswunt Rao

had frequently pressed, both upon Apa Saheb and upon the Resident. Indeed, he was rather disappointed at the lukewarmness evinced, by the latter's refusing to make an earnest representation of the necessity of the immediate recall of his patron to settle the affairs of the court.

The persons employed by Apa Saheb were his private dewan, Nagoo Punt, and Nurayun Pundit, a minister of the late Raja, who had early espoused his party. The negotiation was commenced by a visit of Nurayun to the Resident, on the night of the 22d of April, the very same day on which Apa Saheb had consulted Mr. Jenkins about the removal of Naroba from office. Great mystery was observed upon the occasion; and, in the course of the interview, Nurayun presented a paper, written in the regent's own hand, signifying "That Nagoo Punt and Nurayun Pundit enjoyed his entire confidence, and were commissioned to open his (Apa Saheb's) inmost wishes to Mr. Jenkins, if he were disposed to meet them with equal cordiality." Having shown this paper, Nurayun invited the Resident to declare the views of his own government. Mr. Jenkins explained, that he was in daily expectation of receiving detailed instructions from the Governor-general; but that the views of his government were sufficiently apparent from what had passed in the previous negotiation with Raghoojee, and as he had no reason

to believe that they had undergone any alteration, he should be prepared to meet the negotiators on the part of Apa Saheb, without waiting the arrival of fresh orders. It was accordingly agreed, that both Nagoo Punt and Nurayun Pundit should have a conference with Mr. Jenkins, at the residency, on the night of the 24th of April.

Now that the heir-presumptive's pretensions were backed by Pursajee's late nomination to the regency, and he had thus become the recognized head of the Bhoosla state, our Representative had no doubts as to the propriety of receiving his overtures; and in the absence of any ground for supposing that the views of his own government in respect to Nagpoor had changed, since the miscarriage of the negotiations in 1814, he resolved to renew them on the same basis without further delay. He was naturally desirous of availing himself of this favourable disposition while it lasted; a course particularly necessary, considering the wavering characters of the native princes, and the total absence of any thing like systematic policy in most of their acts and resolutions.

The conference took place, according to appointment, on the night of the 24th. Nagoo Punt explained candidly his master's motives for desiring the alliance; but after much unreserved discussion on both sides, it was agreed to proceed no further, until Mr. Jenkins should have received

his instructions. On the same evening, Apa Saheb himself sent for the Resident's moonshee, and after mentioning his desire to contract the alliance on the terms proposed to Raghoojee, declared, that besides the four battalions and a regiment of cavalry before proposed to be stationed on the Nerbudda, he must have another English battalion at Nagpoor, for his personal security.

Mr. Jenkins received his first instructions on the 25th of April; and a further conference was held on the 27th, when a Persian draft of the treaty proposed to Raghoojee being produced, the conditions were fairly discussed, article by article. The basis of the negotiation was at once agreed to; and the only points remaining to be settled after the first conference were—the strength of the subsidiary force—the amount of the subsidy—and the nature and strength of the contingent to be furnished by the Bhoosla state. A further question was agitated by the Mahratta negotiators, viz. the mode in which the regent was to be assured of the personal support of the British government against the designs of the domestic factions of Nagpoor. As both parties were equally sincere in their desire for the alliance, it was not long before all these points were satisfactorily adjusted. The strength of the subsidiary force was fixed at six battalions and a regiment of cavalry; the increase being made on the application of Apa

Saheb; who was informed that less than two battalions could not safely be cantoned at Nagpoor, without support, in case he required a British force at that point. An article was further inserted in the treaty, by which it was stipulated, that two of the battalions of infantry should be stationed near the court of the Raja, one of which might be elsewhere employed on emergency; but not less than one complete battalion should always remain for his Highness' personal security. The subsidy demanded was an equivalent to the field charges of the force to be furnished, which was estimated at eight lakh of rupees; and this amount had been agreed to, and a territorial cession fixed upon as the mode of payment, when Mr. Jenkins ascertained from his instructions, that, in the present instance, money-payments at Nagpoor were to be preferred. In order to procure this substitution, an abatement of half a lakh of rupees was made in the amount; and it was stipulated, that the expediency of commuting this for a territorial cession at a subsequent period should be considered and determined by mutual consent; but that the British government should be entitled to demand such cession, in the event of any irregularity in the payments. With respect to the contingent, five thousand horse and three thousand foot was at first mentioned; but in consideration of the poverty of the state, which was strongly repre-

sented by the Mahratta negotiators, it was finally fixed at three thousand horse and two thousand foot, in the regulation of the discipline and internal management of which the British Resident at the court was to have the right of offering advice.

Some difficulty occurred in settling the mode in which the regent was to be assured of the support of the British government to his personal interests. Some such assurance seemed to be a *sine quâ non* with the Mahratta negotiators. It was at last agreed, that the treaty should purport to be concluded "With Moodajee Bhoosla (Apa Saheb) exercising with full powers all the functions of the government on behalf of the Maha-raja Pursajee Bhoosla," thus involving a complete recognition of the authority of Moodajee; in addition to which, Mr. Jenkins engaged that the Governor-general's answer to the formal letter, to be written on its ratification, should contain a distinct assurance of support to Apa Saheb's administration of affairs, so long as Pursajee might remain in his present state of mental incapacity. The Mahratta negotiators were very urgent to have a stipulation introduced, that cows and bullocks should not be killed within the Nagpoor territory. But this was refused as unusual; and they were obliged to rest satisfied with a verbal assurance, that the custom which prevailed at

Poona should also be observed here, and no bullocks or cows be killed, on any account, within the city itself; but the troops, when in the field, or at a distance, were not to be restricted in this particular. All matters having been thus satisfactorily adjusted, the treaty was finally executed on the 27th of May. Apa Saheb's signature was affixed, with great secrecy, in the night, at the house of Nagoo Punt, one of the negotiators; and it was agreed not to make it public, until the approach of the subsidiary force, which Mr. Jenkins promised immediately to call in from Ellichpoor, should remove every apprehension for the consequences of the expected displeasure of the adverse factions.

It may be proper to mention, that early in the negotiation, and with a view to expedite its conclusion, the Resident had promised, on the part of the British government, a pension of twenty-five thousand rupees a-year to Nagoo Punt, the chief negotiator, and of fifteen thousand to his colleague, both to commence from the signature of the treaty, and subject to the approbation of their master. Written engagements to this effect were accordingly delivered to both in the regent's presence, immediately on receipt of the signed treaty. These were to be commuted for sunuds under the Governor-general's seal, which it was engaged to procure. Apa Saheb seemed well

pleased with the arrangement : indeed, a similar one had followed the treaty of Deogam, when Sreedhur Pundit and Juswunt Rao Ramchundur obtained similar pensions of thirty and fifteen thousand rupees. The treaty was ratified by the Governor-general in council on the 15th of June, and the assurance of personal support to Apa Saheb's administration, during the continued incapacity of Pursajee, was conveyed in the letter of congratulation addressed to that prince on the 13th of July following.

Thus was accomplished the most important extension of the system of our relations with the native powers of India, that had taken place since the general settlement of them ten years before. On our part, it was hoped, that the alliance would have the effect of detaching the Bhoosla for ever from the other members of the Mahratta confederation ; at the same time that it gave us a most important vantage ground, whence to launch our operations against the Pindarees and those who might venture to support them. Judging from subsequent events, it would seem to have been regarded by the other contracting party as a mere stepping-stone to absolute authority in internal affairs, a necessary expedient at the moment for breaking a formidable aristocratic faction, backed by a still more formidable soldiery ; but one that might be cast away so soon as the

object should have been securely gained. The parties obtained, each of them, much of the advantage calculated upon, though the result entirely answered the views of neither.

Immediately after the execution of the treaty, an express was sent off to summon the subsidiary force to Nagpoor. The Resident had previously acquainted Colonel Doveton with the progress of the negotiations, and prepared him to receive a summons of this nature. That officer had, accordingly, held in readiness a force of the exact strength agreed upon in the treaty, giving the command to Colonel Walker of the 3d Madras cavalry. This force left the neighbourhood of Ellichpoor on the 1st of June; and, crossing the Wurda at Amner on the 6th, arrived at the distance of one march from Nagpoor on the 8th of June. Here the main body halted; and two battalions, brigaded under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Scott, marched into the Bhoosla capital on the 10th, Colonel Walker accompanying them. The treaty, which had not till then been so much as suspected, was published in the city on the preceding day. On the 18th of June, a cantonment was fixed upon for the Nagpoor brigade, about three miles to the west of the city. It was the Resident's intention that the remainder of the subsidiary force should move immediately to Pandoorna, there to canton during

the rains, before it took up its final position on the banks of the Nerbudda near Hoshungabad. The continuance of the intrigues at Nagpoor, however, induced our new ally to request that the departure of the main body might be postponed. Not only Naroba and his faction, but the Baees of the Muhul, and, amongst the rest, Kashee Bae Pursajee's wife, complained loudly of the conclusion of the treaty by Apa Saheb, without previously consulting them; declaring it to have been a condition of their acquiescence in his nomination to the regency, that they should be consulted in all matters of importance. The treaty itself was not the ground of their complaint; on the contrary, they avowed their readiness to give more advantageous terms, and made distinct overtures for the purpose to Mr. Jenkins. But the regent's breach of personal faith awakened all this virulence; and so rancorous was the enmity, that at last, fearing assassination, and having been dissuaded from accepting a personal guard of our troops, Apa Saheb, on the 27th of June, went to live at a garden-house adjoining the newly-chosen cantonment of the brigade, as the only place where he could feel himself in security. The issue of these dissensions will be detailed in a subsequent chapter.

CHAPTER X.

JYPOOR, &c.

1816, APRIL TO OCTOBER.

Jypoor alliance—Orders from England—Suspended—resumed—debated—resolved upon—Military preparations—Negotiation—protracted—broken off—Internal condition of Jypoor—Fresh overtures—and negotiation—Again broken off—Nagpoor affairs—Sindheea's supineness—and offer to Jypoor—Pêshwa's conduct—and intrigues—Trimbukjee's escape—Communications with Bajee Rao in consequence.

THE Nâgpoor alliance was not the only object which engaged the attention of the Supreme Government during the hot season and the rains of 1816. The Goorkha war had no sooner been brought to an end, than it was resolved to endeavour to bring the state of Jypoor within the sphere of British protection; and the negotiations and military arrangements, commenced for this purpose, were simultaneous with the occurrences at Nagpoor, detailed in the preceding chapter.

The circumstances under which the first connexion of the British government with Jypoor was formed, in 1803, and broken off in 1806, will be familiar to those at all conversant with the political history of India. They are recorded in the work of Sir John Malcolm,* which appeared in 1811. One effect of that publication was, that it produced a revolution in the sentiments of those intrusted with the home administration of the affairs of our Indian empire, in conformity with the spirit of whose policy, the previous treaty with Jypoor had been dissolved, and the principality abandoned to the oppression and exaction of the Mahrattas and Putans. Regretting the policy adopted towards this state in 1806, the secret committee issued orders from England, on the 23d of December 1813, for taking it again under protection. These arrived on the 10th of June 1814, at the time when the Supreme Government had found itself forced into war with the Nipålese, and had prepared to refer the expediency of offensive measures against the predatory associations to the previous consideration of the authorities in England. When the execution of these orders came to be discussed, it was agreed, that the renewed connexion with Jypoor might well form part of the compre-

* Political History of India.

ensive plan proposed for the reduction of the freebooters; that singly, it was an object of little importance, while it might involve us with the Mahrattas, and prematurely bring on the necessity of the immediate prosecution of the very course it had been resolved to defer. These arguments prevailed; and the home authorities afterwards admitted the propriety of this postponement of the execution of their orders at the particular juncture.

On the Governor-general's return from the western provinces, in September 1815, conceiving the Goorkha war to be near its conclusion, his Lordship came prepared with a proposition then to carry the measure into effect. However, the suspense in regard to Nipál, and the ultimate renewal of war in that direction, prevented the matter from being immediately taken up. After the final termination of hostilities, towards the end of March, the proposition was renewed; indeed, the question was forced upon the Indian government, by the increasing distresses of Jypoor, and by the earnest applications of its Raja, Jugut Singh, the son of our former ally, Purtab Singh, to be received under the wing of protection.

In the course of that month it had been ascertained that Ameer Khan was collecting the whole of the Putan forces, for the attack of Raja

Jugut Singh in his capital of Jynugur; ostensibly to force upon him a change of ministers, but evidently with the design of reducing the state, if possible, to complete subjection. There was no reason, therefore, to doubt the Raja's sincerity in the pressing overtures he made to Mr. Metcalfe through his agents at Dehlee, accompanied by an offer to submit to any sacrifices that might be demanded. These were soon followed up by similar solicitations and offers, made directly to the Supreme Government, by the Raja's resident vakeel at the presidency.

Under these circumstances, it became necessary forthwith to decide upon the course of policy to be adopted in regard to Jypoor; and the question was fully considered and discussed. It was again urged at the Council Board that the proposed alliance ought to form a part of the general plan of operations against the predatory bands, and, therefore, should be suspended till the sanction of the home authorities should allow that plan to be commenced upon;—that the premature adoption of this insulated measure, by immediately involving us with Ameer Khan and the Putans, and possibly also with Sindheea, who made equal advantage of exactions from Jypoor, which a connexion with the British must put an immediate stop to, would necessarily bring on that extended scale of opera-

tions, and produce that change in the political relations of our eastern dominions, which had been regarded with so much alarm;—that the approbation of the postponement by the Supreme Government of execution of the previous orders from England, was to be regarded as a virtual recall of them, or at least, as an acquiescence in the opinion, that the measure should only be prosecuted as part of a general system, without being desirable on its individual account. Giving to these arguments all the weight which they derived from the respectable quarter whence they proceeded, the Marquess of Hastings, nevertheless, considered the government to be free to take Jypoor under its protection, in obedience to the orders of 1813, whenever the measure might be deemed expedient;—and that this freedom of action was not in the least affected by the approval of postponement at a juncture, when circumstances were obviously unfavourable. His Lordship thought, also, that the measure was highly desirable in itself, abstracted from any general plan of operations, inasmuch as it would cripple the resources of one of the predatory powers, and save a fine and eventually useful territory from ruin and devastation. At the same time he conceived, from former experience of Sindheea's disposition, that it was not likely to involve us in extensive opera-

tions, as it was easy to overawe both that chieftain and the Putans, by demonstrations similar to those which had proved effectual pending the former negotiations with Bhopâl. He also considered the actual difficulties of Jypoor to have arrived at a crisis, that rendered the delay of a further reference quite inadmissible.

In conformity with his Lordship's opinion, it was resolved to entertain the Raja's overtures; and orders were issued to Mr. Metcalfe to that effect, on the 20th of April 1816. The terms were to correspond exactly with those offered to Bhopâl in 1814-15: but Jypoor, having greater resources, though for the present in a most exhausted condition, was to be called upon to defray eventually the greater part of the charge to be incurred in its protection. To carry into effect the alliance, in case of its being formed, troops were to assemble in the neighbourhood of Mutra and Rewaree, sufficient for the formation of two armies of nine thousand men each. It was intended that Sir David Ochterlony should take the command of one of them; and that both should be ready to advance on the first requisition of the Resident at Dehlee, in order to drive the Putans beyond the Jypoor frontier. With a view, at the same time, to hold Sindheea and the Mah-rattas in check, the troops at Cawnpoor and in Bundelkhund were directed to be on the alert;

and the four subsidiary forces were ordered respectively to positions, whence they might overawe the whole of Sindheea's and Holkur's dominions, while they covered, as far as was practicable, the territories of our own allies. The Goozerat force was to move to Brodera; the Poona subsidiary force to Jálna; the Nizam's to Ellichpoor; and the Bhoosla Raja's, immediately on its then expected establishment, to the banks of the Nerbudda. There would thus be a display of nearly forty thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry, besides artillery, and the contingents of the native powers, in readiness to put down any disposition that might be shown, to obstruct the execution of the plan determined on by government.

It may be right to mention, that the Jypoor territory lay entirely to the north and west of the Chumbul; and the principality, so far from being included amongst those Rajpoot states with which we had bound ourselves by treaty with Holkur and Sindheea not to interfere, at the time of forming those treaties, was actually under British protection,—the resolution to dissolve the alliance having been subsequently formed; wherefore, there was evidently no argument arising out of our relations with the Mahrattas, on which our right to renew the alliance could be disputed.

Before the military arrangements above specified were brought to any forwardness, the negoti-

ation had already been some time in progress. To return to it: Mr. Metcalfe, on receipt of his instructions, took an early opportunity of communicating to the Jypoor vakeel, that he was ready to receive the overtures of the principality, in case an agent duly empowered to conclude engagements on its part should present himself. Notwithstanding the earnestness with which entreaties were made to be taken under protection, while it was understood to be a matter of principle with us not to extend our political relations beyond their existing limits, it became evident, after this communication, that there existed no corresponding desire to bring matters speedily to a point. Ameer Khan only threatened Jypoor, when Mr. Metcalfe made this offer to negotiate. He had actually invested the capital before the negotiators arrived at Dehlee, furnished with full powers. As long as the Putans continued to press the siege, the negotiation proceeded with apparent alacrity. Every thing, indeed, was soon agreed to, except the amount of subsidy to be paid by the Raja: this point, also, was at length settled. Mr. Metcalfe had begun with a demand of twenty-five lakh of rupees,—the amount of the total charge of the troops to be furnished for the protection of the state. He was afterwards induced to lower his demand to fifteen lakh of rupees for the permanent subsidy, with the accommodation of considerable

reimissions during the first five years, in consideration of the impoverished condition of the territory. Pending the siege of Jynugur, the negotiation was kept in that state, that an hour's time would have sufficed for its completion. It seems, however, that a separate negotiation was kept up all the while with Ameer Khan; and the threat of bringing down upon him a British force, which a mere signature could instantly effect, was held out as an inducement to his raising the siege. He withdrew early in the month of July, after having failed in several attempts to carry some strong positions, necessary to cover his approaches to the city; but not without exacting a stipulation to receive a sum of money as the ransom of the Raja's territory from plunder, and as the consideration for reducing Madhoorajpoor, a town in the jageer of one of the Raja's family, then in rebellion against him. The first stipulation was observed on neither side; but Ameer Khan, with part of his troops, moved down to reduce Madhoorajpoor, in execution of the last article; doubtless with the object of appropriating it to himself. Other bodies of the Putans immediately spread themselves over the surface of the country, plundering, as before, in every direction.

About the time that these terms were made with Ameer Khan, every thing had been settled at Dehlee; but the Jypoor agents were forthwith

instructed to bring forward a new demand, viz. that our troops should reduce Tonk and Ram-poora, and reannex them to Jypoor, in addition to the other stipulations. These places had been taken by us from Holkur, and restored at the peace of 1805. They were now held on his behalf by Ameer Khan, whom we had agreed to expel from the Raja's own possessions; and, as these towns had at some distant period been subject to Jypoor, this was the ground of their reduction being now demanded. The negotiation was of course broken off upon the advance of this new demand; indeed, the Supreme Government had previously directed it to be brought to some decided issue, on first observing the insidious way in which it was conducted by the other side. The indifference manifested by the durbar of Jypoor, on this occasion, to the advantages attending a closer union with the British, is perhaps in part attributable to the general reluctance felt by the petty independent princes to make any indissoluble alliances, on terms calculated to interfere with the unrestrained latitude of political action they had hitherto enjoyed. All our alliances with states of this description have necessarily, as observed in the introductory chapter, a character of dependence on their part, and on that account are not very palatable. Yet a more obvious mode of accounting for the disinclination experienced on

this occasion may be found in the actual circumstances of the internal government of Jypoor. The whole territory was parcelled out into hereditary tenures of the nature of the fiefs or baronies of the feudal system : over these the Raja, a weak man, had much about the same degree of influence and authority, as was possessed by the weakest of the kings of England, when the same system prevailed in that country. The continual war of factions was prosecuted with the utmost virulence. Since the preceding November, the Jypoor ministry had been twice changed. Manjee Das's party, which was the most aristocratical and most hostile to the Putans, had ultimately gained the ascendancy ; and the strong national spirit it succeeded in exciting amongst the Rajpoots, was one of the principal instruments by which the enterprise of Ameer Khan was successfully resisted. No member of this aristocracy, however, was disposed willingly to exchange a state of things, which left so wide an opening to his hopes and ambition, for the perpetual repose and tranquillity that must result from the introduction of our influence. This disposition might be expected to have prevailed, even if we had offered a settlement on the basis of leaving matters as we found them ; but there was reason for the aristocracy to suspect, that our guarantee of maintaining the Raja's authority comprehended

the enforcement of his just dues from themselves; and their suspicions naturally made them oppose the completion of the alliance. Besides, their success in baffling the Putans with their native means alone, had added much to the pride of their independence, and increased their aversion to allow the interference of a foreign power in their concerns.

It was in the beginning of August that Mr. Metcalfe broke off the negotiation, dismissing the agent, Sunkur Das, who had been sent on behalf of Jugut Singh. The Supreme Government had hopes, that some little longer experience of the excesses of the Putans would produce a better feeling in the leading men of this principality; and not wishing to punish the duplicity of their past conduct, by making it a ground of perpetual exclusion from the benefits of future alliance, empowered the Resident to receive any new overtures that might bear the aspect of more sincerity. It was resolved, at the same time, thenceforward to make no military preparations, until a treaty should be actually signed and executed, in order to prevent the recurrence of a fruitless expense. Before the close of September, the knowledge of the final rupture of the negotiation produced a stir amongst the factions of Jynugur; and a considerable party expressed great dissatisfaction against Manjee Das, to whom the failure was at-

tributed. To quiet the murmurs of this party, for the event showed it was with no real design of completing the alliance, agents were again sent off to Dehlee, the minister's brother being associated with Sunkur Das in the mission. On the 17th of November they arrived at Dehlee, and soon after waited on the British Resident. At the first audience they declared, that, knowing the wishes of the British government, from what had passed at the former negotiation, they had come to conform to them, and to sign the treaty before proposed; but that they wished first to submit a few requests to the Governor-general, leaving it to his generosity to accord them or not. The reduction and delivery of Tonk and Rampoorra was their first request; this Mr. Metcalfe refused to forward or listen to; the second was for jageers or pensions to the negotiators, similar to what had been granted at Nâgpoor; and the third, for a promise that they should always have a good-tempered gentleman as Resident. The request for pensions, as a matter of stipulation, was absurd, considering that the negotiation was not on the footing of reciprocal advantage, and that there was no object to be acquired by the British worth a pecuniary sacrifice; the occasion of our treating at all being the compliance with their solicitation for salvation by our means from impending ruin. Mr. Metcalfe, having combated these points rather with ridicule than

argument, proceeded to state an omission in the draft of treaty before discussed, viz. the stipulation for our arbitration of all foreign disputes and claims, either for or against the principality. The greatest objections were raised to the insertion of any such article; the chief of which appeared to arise from an apprehension, that it might extend to the adjudication of the title to the Raj of Jypoor, to which there was more than one claimant against Jugut Singh, particularly a pretender still living, who had been supported at one time by Sindheea. The scruples of the negotiators in respect to this article could not be got over, even although this construction was disavowed. The conference accordingly broke up, with a distinct explanation to Sunkur Das and his colleague, that the insertion of this new article was insisted upon under special orders from the Supreme Government; consequently, that the point could on no account be conceded. Two days were allowed them to consider of it: the third was fixed for a second conference, at which they would be expected to sign the treaty, with this article introduced, either in the form proposed, or so modified as might be agreed upon in the interim; or if matters could not be adjusted by that time, the negotiation would be dropped altogether. This restriction in point of time was necessary, to prevent the government of Jypoor from again making its

advantage of the show of negotiation, without any intention to bring it to a point. Continued opposition being manifested to the stipulation for our arbitrament, it occurred to the Resident, that the secret reason might be, the fear lest the liquidation of certain bonds, given at different times to Putan Sirdars, would be comprehended under its terms. To exclude this interpretation, he agreed so to word the article, as to confine it to claims of tribute or other demands on the part of Sindheea and Holkur as independent powers. In this form the negotiators waived their objections to the stipulation. But when the time came for the treaty to be signed, a new and extraordinary objection was started to the usual engagement to procure the ratification of Raja Jugut Singh within fifteen days. The negotiators seemed to wish our Representative to be satisfied with their signature, and to act upon their treaty, without requiring its ratification by their master. They were told, however, in answer, that, if they objected to this article, they must take their immediate departure; and as they made no other reply than to solicit a delay of twenty days for the discussion of the point, not for procuring the required confirmation, the treaty was a second time abruptly terminated, with no more successful issue than the former.

It was now most evident, that the object of the Jypoor administration was, to keep open a

negotiation, not to conclude a treaty. Manjee Das, a short time after the return of the agents, declared publicly to the British newswriter at Jynugur, that he had never authorised the negotiators at Dehlee to agree to any stipulation for a money payment. It is difficult to conceive what could have been the object of this extraordinary communication; but it was supposed to arise from a wish to ingratiate himself with the party adverse to the British alliance. He lost nothing in their eyes by this public profession of duplicity; and on its being made matter of remonstrance by the Resident at Dehlee, replied only by evasion and further falsehood; declaring, that the amount of subsidy was what he had not agreed to; although, when the agents presented themselves the second time, it was distinctly explained beforehand, that, unless they were empowered to sign the treaty before proposed, of which the specific money stipulation formed an item, they could not be listened to; and the negotiators, after this intimation, declared, at their first audience, that they had come empowered to sign.

Immediately on the rupture of the first negotiation in August, the military preparations which had been made for its eventual support were suspended; and the troops destined for this being now available for other service, a force was di-

rected to be formed under Lieutenant-colonel Adams, of the 10th B. N. I., and to hold itself in readiness to proceed to the Nerbudda at the close of the rains, in order to relieve the Madras troops there stationed, under Colonel Walker, and forming for the present the Nagpoor subsidiary force.

In the mean time, Apa Saheb, who in June had taken refuge at a garden-house adjoining to the new cantonment, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, became relieved from his alarms: Having seized and confined Naroba, the secretary, and established another of the widows of Raghoojee in the control of the interior of the palace, and care of the Raja's person, in the room of Buka Bae, he returned to the city, and his authority was, in appearance, firmly established by the end of August. Goojaba Dada, who had likewise been an opponent of the Regent, but was in the main a moderate man, and besides a relation, was merely debarred from indiscriminate access to the Raja's person; and Sudeek Ulee Khan, seeing the turn affairs had taken, paid assiduous court to the Naeeb, and in a very short time acquired an influence seemingly little inferior to that of Nagoo Punt and Nurayun themselves. The two last-mentioned favourites, indeed, complained to Mr. Jenkins, that the interested counsels of this officer had induced Apa

Saheb to renounce his original design of reducing and reforming his military establishments, by which means Sudeek Ulee Khan had preserved to himself the chief military authority, with all its corrupt emoluments. In October, however, the old advisers of Apa Saheb so far prevailed, as to induce him to apply for a battalion, to be raised and disciplined by British officers, on the model of the reformed infantry of the Nizam's service. The Governor-general acquiesced at once in the proposal, and nominated officers for the purpose. The object of this application was, to provide a further counterpoise to the Arabs, whose fidelity to himself he still mistrusted, on account of their known personal attachment to the son of Raghoojee, their late master. Yet this step seemed to indicate a degree of confidence and cordiality towards his new allies, little consistent with the treachery of his subsequent conduct. To say the truth, there is ground to conclude, from this and other symptoms, that Apa Saheb, while Pursajee remained alive, was not engaged in the conspiracy, which had been for some time in progress for a general rising of the whole Mahratta nation.

In the beginning of October, Colonel Walker moved to take up the position assigned to him, on the banks of the Nerbudda. His operations in that quarter, and the effect of the appearance

of a British force so near the immediate haunts of the Pindarees, together with their plans and expeditions for the season of 1816-17, will more properly form the subject of a separate chapter. But it may first be necessary to notice briefly what was passing during the rains at the other Mahratta courts.

Sindheea made no effort to avail himself of the distractions at the Bhoosla court, consequent upon the death of Raghoojee : indeed, the expedition with which the treaty of subsidiary alliance was negotiated by Mr. Jenkins, and the secrecy observed in the conduct of that affair, had left no time for the operation of foreign intrigue, much less for the machinations of a durbar, so slow in its deliberations as that of Gwalior. In the same manner this chieftain refrained entirely from further interference in the affairs of Bhopâl ; so that the young Nuwab, having retained his father's counsellors in their offices, continued to make head against the Pindarees, and to command their respect : keeping up at the same time an active correspondence with the political agent in Bundelkhund, explaining every thing that passed between him and the freebooters, and professing his desire to become, or at least to be considered, a dependant of the British dominion. Neither did Sindheea make any effort whatever, in the course of 1816, to curb or reduce the Pindarees,

notwithstanding that the subject was specially brought to his notice by the British Resident, on more occasions than one. His constant reply was, that repeated orders had been issued, prohibiting their violation of the British territories; and that time and negotiation were necessary to bring the refractory chiefs to implicit obedience. It was explained in private to the Resident upon one occasion, that Sindheea's plan was to inveigle the chiefs to an interview, and, by seizing their persons, to deprive the durras of their leaders, and cause their dissolution. It was evident, from the general tenor of his conduct, that he began to be alarmed, lest he should be visited with the whole responsibility for an evil, which his weakness had suffered to grow up within his dominions. He was moreover beginning to have a more accurate notion of his relative strength than he had entertained before the discussions in 1814, when he thought, by the loftiness of his tone, to restrain the British government from interfering with Bhopâl. In short, anxiety and alarm were fast succeeding to the jealous rivalry and contentious spirit, which the violent among his courtiers still vainly flattered him was the policy warranted and demanded by his relative position among the powers of India. To this cause, and to habitual tardiness of judgment, is to be attributed the supineness with which Sindheea witnessed the extension of our influence

over the dominions of the Bhoosla; and which, though it in the end produced the determination to temporise with both parties, and, if possible, to keep well with both, till he could see the probable issue of affairs, yet prevented any exertion to court our favour by a vigorous and early effort against the Pindarees, the common enemy. Another reason for his want of energy at this juncture may be found in the circumstance, that his best troops, under Baptiste, were fully employed in the siege of Raghoogurh, a fort belonging to a Rajpoot named Raja Jysingh. That active chief, while his own strong-hold was closely invested, succeeded in a sudden surprise of Baptiste's fort of Sheepoor, where the son and part of the treasure of the Colonel had been deposited for safety. This occurred in the beginning of June; and, though the fort of Raghoogurh fell in the following August, Jysingh, as a partisan, gave full occupation to the whole of Baptiste's division, and had good success in several light skirmishes and attacks on detachments and convoys during the whole of the rains, and even up to the close of the cold season. At length, having lost his late conquest of Sheepoor also by the treachery of his garrison, he went off with his followers to form a new band of Pindarees, and was not unsuccessful in his depredations on the territories of Sindheea, more particularly on Baptiste's assigned lands.

Yet, notwithstanding the indifference manifested by Sindheea to the passing occurrences at Nag-poor and on the Nerbudda, the opening of the British negotiation with Jypoor, seemed to waken him to the policy of a counter-exertion, for the purpose of securing some personal advantage. He accordingly opened a similar negotiation, tendering the assistance of his military means towards restraining the Putans; and, in furtherance of this object, sent a reinforcement to Bapoo Sindheea at Ajmeer, to add to the efficiency of his establishment in that quarter. The Jypoor durbar amused Sindheea for some time with the hope of accepting his protection, pretty nearly in the same manner as they amused the British government; but the Mahratta meeting this conduct with reciprocal duplicity, opened a further negotiation with Ameer Khan, and in proportion as coolness was evinced on the part of the Raja, pretended a cordiality with the Putan, in the hope of alarming the Jypoor ministry by the apprehension, that his weight would be thrown into the opposite scale. But Jypoor had no real design of connecting itself with any one; and while it relied on the known disposition of the British to afford it protection, as a sufficient resource against any extremity the united efforts of the Putans and Sindheea could reduce it to, reckoned also upon the deterring influence of this knowledge, as its best protection against any

actual design on their part to drive it to this last resort. Sindheea's plans came, therefore, to the same issue with the British negotiations; that is to say, produced no result whatsoever.

At the court of Poona nothing particular occurred; but the conduct of the Pêshwa's government was an alternation of concessions, subservience, and conciliation, and of a spirit of recrimination and litigious opposition. The prince himself assumed either character, with a versatility, that seemed to baffle every attempt to penetrate his real disposition and intentions. In this spirit, at one time, he ordered extensive levies of horse and foot, and at another reduced his establishments to the lowest possible ebb; at one time he complained of the delays thrown in the way of the adjustment of his claims on the Nizam and Gykwar; at other times himself created new and very childish ones. All the while, every nerve was strained to procure the release of Trimbukjee, and every advantage, personal as well as national, was offered to Mr. Elphinstone, through various channels, to engage him to forward this grand object of desire. Active intrigues were at the same time carrying on in Hindoostan and Goozerât, and special agents deputed to all the Mahratta courts, to persuade them to join the proposed coalition; promising advantages to those who were not prepared for open hostility, if they would but aid, by keeping up the

appearance of concert; for from such a course the hostile party anticipated a reduction of our tone, and a greater degree of deference to the general wish of the Mahratta nation. The British Residents exerted themselves with activity to penetrate into all these intrigues, and generally with complete success. Those of the Pêshwa at the court of Holkur, were made the subject of a special remonstrance, and produced abundance of protestations, but no change of conduct. Even Futeh Singh Gykwar was a party to these designs, and gave way for some time to the dangerous counsels of low companions, and men adverse to the British connexion; but this disposition was overcome in him without any resort to strong measures, by the operation of his own good sense, and experience of the solid advantages of the alliance, and by the judicious advice and moderation of the Resident at his court.

On the 12th of September, to the surprise of all, Trimbukjee Dainglia succeeded in escaping, from his confinement in Tannah, notwithstanding that the precaution had been taken of garrisoning the fort entirely with Europeans, of whom a guard was continually mounted to observe his personal movements. The escape was effected at eight o'clock at night, through a hole in the wall of the privy, which being detached from the place of actual confinement, communicated on the other

side with a stable belonging to one of the officers of the garrison. By accustoming the sentries to attend him to this place at the same hour of the night, their suspicions were lulled to sleep, and he was suffered to enter alone, while the sentry with the light remained without, in a situation whence he could not see what passed within. The preparations for this escape were made by a man who had, with this design, taken service as *sæes*, or horsekeeper, to the officer living in the adjoining premises, and who disappeared along with the prisoner. His communications with Trimbukjee are supposed to have passed while he was leading the horse under his care near the prison-door and the terrace, on which Trimbukjee was allowed to walk; for at these times this *sæes* was generally observed to be singing Mahratta songs, which the European sentries did not understand or suspect. It was some minutes before the escape was discovered, and the night being dark and rainy, Trimbukjee had slipped off his clothes and crossed the rampart by a rope previously attached to one of the guns, before the alarm was given; and thus gained the other side of the narrow and shallow channel separating Salsette from the Mahratta territories, before measures could be taken to intercept the passage.

The Resident at Poona was informed of this event by express. He immediately communicated

the news to the Pêshwa ; declaring that the Governor-general would expect the utmost efforts to be made by his Highness for the re-apprehension of this delinquent, as a necessary proof of attachment to the British government ; while to afford him protection, either overtly or underhand, would infallibly produce the mischiefs that had been avoided by his surrender. Bajee Rao wished to avail himself of the escape, to alter the terms on which his favourite had before been given up, and to make his own exertions for the re-apprehension conditional, on receiving a promise, that the prisoner should hereafter remain in his own custody. This attempt was of course resisted : but the fugitive for some time eluded all efforts to discover the place of his retreat ; and there could be no doubt that Bajee Rao abetted his concealment, notwithstanding his open professions to the contrary.

Thus have the political events of India been traced to the close of the rainy season of 1816, about the middle of the month of October of that year.

CHAPTER XI.

PINDAREES.

OCTOBER TO APRIL, 1816-17.

Nagpoor subsidiary force moves to the Nerbudda—Pindarees alarmed—Their first effort—Grand expedition in three divisions—First to Ganjam—Second to Bidur—Surprised by Major M'Dowell—Exploit of Sheikh Dulloo—Third to Ahmednugur—Surprised by Major Lushington—Ganjam penetrated—Lt. Borthwick's pursuit—First party intercepted—Reflections—Resolution to extirpate the hordes—Motives—Sindheea—Holkur—Dya-Ram of Hutras—His fort invested and bombarded—His escape—Fort taken.

EARLY in October 1816, Lieutenant-colonel Walker had moved, as above mentioned, with the main body of the Nagpoor subsidiary force, to take up the position assigned to him on the southern bank of the Nerbudda. By the 25th of the month, his defensive line was completed. It extended from Choonee, or Chaonee, which lies twenty-seven miles S. S. W. of Hoshungabad, to Sirinugur, one hundred and twenty miles east of the same place. With all the advantages of favourable ground, the force, consisting of but five battalions of infantry,

and one regiment of cavalry, was evidently unequal to the defence of so extended a line; more especially as the Raja's contingent was yet in no condition to afford effectual assistance. One of Colonel Walker's posts was no less than ninety miles distant from its nearest *appui*. But the first appearance of a British army in the valley of the Nerbudda spread consternation amongst the Pindarees; and Cheetoo's durra, which occupied the cantonment of Nemawur, on the northern bank, a little lower down the river, prepared to retire, with their families, in the direction of the Ghâts, into Malwa. In the apprehension of an immediate attack, the preparations which had been making for an expedition to the south, when the river should be fordable, were suspended: and some time was lost by the chiefs of durras, in forwarding entreaties to Sindheea for an asylum for their families in some of his numerous strongholds, while they prepared for a desultory contest with the army, whose approach they daily expected. Sindheea openly rejected all such applications, notwithstanding that they were accompanied with an intimation, that unless he helped them in this emergency, his territories should no longer enjoy immunity from ravage. Some of his military commanders, however, and a party in his ministry, privately gave them hopes of ultimately obtaining their object, in case matters came

to extremity ; assuring them that all public acts and professions were merely intended to save appearances with the English.

Emboldened in some measure by these assurances, and by observing that the British troops did not cross the Nerbudda, the several durras came to the resolution of pushing small parties between Colonel Walker's posts, and round his flanks, and thus pursuing the same system of predatory incursion into the British territories, that had in the past year been so successful. On the 4th of November, a party crossed near Hindia, half of which proceeded on the Boorhanpoor road, and the other half towards Tamboornee. Colonel Walker immediately moved with a light force upon Hurda, to intercept their route ; and after a vain pursuit for some distance along the Boorhanpoor road, succeeded, by a sudden march eastward, in falling in with the latter party, while bivouacked in the jungle on the night of the 5th. This body suffered an inconsiderable loss, and fled precipitately back across the river. Similar attempts to pass were not renewed till the 13th, when the plan which had been agreed upon by the chiefs, in the interim, was carried into execution. Cheetoo's durra still continued in force to the west. At the same time, large bodies moved to the east, and upwards of five thousand passed the river in sight of the infantry post, on the ex-

treme right of Colonel Walker's line, with a rapidity of movement, which baffled the efforts of the infantry to impede or harass their march, while, as the Pindarees knew, the regiment of cavalry was on the opposite flank. In this manner the passage was effected, in sufficient numbers to form two *luhburs*, (expeditions), one of which continued its progress due east, and, penetrating by the route of Mundela, Chuteesgurh, and the forests and mountains forming the northern and eastern frontier of the Nagpoor dominions, burst suddenly into the Company's district of Ganjam, with the evident and avowed intention of turning thence north-eastward to Cuttack and Jugurnath. By good fortune, the turbulent character of the Rajas and landholders of Ganjam had caused the district to be well furnished with troops, and the *luhbur* was driven back before it could penetrate to any distance, as will presently be mentioned more particularly. The other body of these Pindarees took a southward direction, and passed within twenty miles of Nagpoor with impunity, notwithstanding that an effort was made to intercept them, by a light detachment from the infantry brigade remaining at that city. They then crossed the Wurda into the Nizam's territory, before Colonel Doveton could bring up troops for the defence of that line, from the position he occupied to shut the southern Ghâts of

the valley of the Poorna, in which quarter he was looking out for these marauders. This body, which at the lowest estimate amounted to six thousand, was on the Godavuree, at Neermul, on the 15th of December, and at Bidur on the 21st; up to which point it had marched leisurely without interruption, or fatiguing its horses, plundering a broad line of country on either side of its track. The *luhbur* continued some time in the neighbourhood of Bidur, while the chiefs remained indecisive as to the prosecution of the ulterior design of penetrating into the Company's ceded districts on the other side of the Kishna and Toombodra. Their indecision proved the ruin of the enterprise, as it afforded time for a light force, detached from Hyderabad for this purpose, under Major M'Dowell, to give the main body a complete surprise, about thirty miles to the west of Bidur. This occurred before daylight in the morning of the 15th of January; and such was the security into which the Pindarees had been lulled by their hitherto uninterrupted progress, that the infantry were close in upon the tents of the chiefs before they were discovered, and hardly a man of the party was mounted, by the time the first volley was discharged. The greater part of the horses and booty of the main division of this *luhbur* was abandoned, on the rapid advance of the infantry; and the dispersion was so complete, that

nothing was afterwards thought of by those composing it, except their personal safety and return. One leader, however, indignant at the want of energy betrayed by those vested with the chief command of the expedition, had carried away a body of from three to five hundred, a few days before this discomfiture; and, passing rapidly across the Pêshwa's territory, descended into the Konkan by the Amba Ghât in the western range, and thence shaped his course due north, plundering the western shores of India, from the seventeenth to the twenty-first degree of north latitude, and returning by the valley of the Taptee, and the route of Boorhanpoor. The conductor of this bold enterprise was a man named Sheikh Dulloo, and the singular hardihood of the exploit, joined to the uncommon skill and rapidity with which it was conducted, saved it from the fate which overtook every other expedition of the kind this season. The only loss Sheikh Dulloo sustained from British troops was, when, on his return to the Nerbudda, in the following March, he found the ford, by which he hoped to recross to Cheetoo's durra, guarded by a redoubt occupied by a havildar's party of our sepoy. Several of his men were shot in attempting to dash across; but Sheikh Dulloo himself, with his main body, and best-mounted followers, retiring from the ghât, boldly swam the river lower down, though not

without a further loss of men and horses, several of whom were drowned in the attempt. The ill mounted and less daring of the band dispersed and fled into the jungul on the southern bank of the river, where the greater part were cut off by the wild inhabitants of the neighbourhood. Of two hundred and sixty Pindarees of the first and second classes, of which the band had consisted when it separated from the *luhbur* at Bidur, only one hundred and ten rejoined the durra; but these brought a rich booty in their saddles; and the brilliancy of the achievement added even more to their reputation than its success had done to their wealth.

Besides the above two bodies of Pindarees, which had turned the right flank of Colonel Walker's line, another detachment from Cheetoo's durra had succeeded in making good its route by the Boorhanpoor road, as above mentioned. It was subsequently reinforced, and succeeded in passing the valley of the Taptee and ghâts of Berar, notwithstanding the dispositions made for their defence. This body passed between Aurungabad and Jâlna, on the 28th of November, and moved direct upon Ahmednugur. The Poona subsidiary force was not this season in position for the defence of the Pêshwa's frontier against such incursions, as a considerable part of the light troops had been called down to the south, where

their presence was required, to awe Apa Dusae into submission. This man was a powerful southern jageerdar, who had subjected himself, by continued contumacy, to the penalty of a forfeiture of one-third of his jageer; and the forfeiture was enforced by calling down a British detachment at the close of the rainy season, which did not completely effect the object until the middle of December 1816. On the 25th of this month, while on his route to the northward with the 4th Madras native cavalry, which had formed part of the force employed to the south, Major Lushington obtained intelligence that the above-mentioned body of Pindarees was somewhere to the S. E. of Poona. He was at the time at Peepulwaree, twenty-five miles distant; but as the Pindarees were ignorant of his being in the neighbourhood, and were plundering at their leisure in fancied security, there was every hope of falling in with them: at all events, he resolved to make the effort. After an unremitting march of upwards of fifty miles, from one o'clock in the morning of the 26th, the Major succeeded in coming up with the *luhbur*, at the time the Pindarees were cooking and eating after a long march. The surprise was complete; and, as the ground was favourable for the pursuit of cavalry, a very large proportion was cut up. The loss of the freebooters was estimated to be very great, as between seven and eight hundred

were left on the field. The only casualty on the part of the British was the death of Captain Darke, who received a spear through the body. A man of his troop had turned from the charge of a Pindara, armed in this manner; and, indignant at the sight, this spirited officer himself rushed forward, and fell a victim to the superiority of the weapon in skilful hands. The Pindara was immediately cut to pieces by Captain Darke's men. This *luhbur*, like that surprised a few days afterwards by Major M'Dowell, suffered so severely, that it similarly broke up, and fled back to the Nerbudda in the utmost confusion. However, before the remnant of either could arrive on the banks of that river, the passes and ghâts were so well guarded, that the greater part of the fugitives perished, and but few reached the durras they had left in November. A small body of those surprised by Major M'Dowell, was conducted across the river with great skill by its leader, who succeeded in making his way by the Charwa road, before the party sent to intercept him by Colonel Walker arrived to occupy it.

The Ganjam expedition is the only one that remains to be accounted for. This body was composed almost entirely of men from Wâsil Mohammed's durra. It crossed the British frontier in the middle of December, marching upon Kimmedy; to which place, Lieutenant Tweedle, who was on the

frontier with a company of Madras native infantry, retired as the *luhbur* advanced. Emboldened by this, the Pindarees attacked the town, and succeeded in burning and plundering part of it on the night of the 19th of December, though Major Oliver was there with three companies of infantry. Having ascertained that their camp was but two miles distant, this officer determined to surprise it before morning, and met with complete success; occasioning considerable loss to the *luhbur*, notwithstanding the smallness of his force, and his utter want of cavalry. In the course of the following morning the whole band moved off, taking the direct road to Ganjam, before which station they appeared on the 25th. They plundered part of the town in haste, and retired through Goomsir. Lieutenant Borthwick instantly commenced a most active pursuit. On the 27th he fell in with about one thousand, of whom he destroyed twenty men and fifty horses; but, not satisfied with this success, he resolved to beat up the Pindaree camp, which, in their confidence, from knowing the British troops to be infantry only, he rightly judged would not be far off. Leaving a jemadar's party to pursue the direct road, he himself, with fifty men of his company, took a circuitous route, so as to fall upon the enemy from the opposite quarter. His success was very brilliant; and, soon after, the Pindarees disappeared from the province, aban-

doing the hope of being able to penetrate into Cuttack, and disheartened by the losses already sustained.

In the mean time, the advance division of the Bengal troops, destined to relieve Colonel Walker, had moved down to the Nerbudda; and Major M'Morine, who commanded, leaving a detachment at Jubulpoor on his arrival at that point on the 1st of January, so disposed the rest of his force, under Colonel Walker's orders, as to extend the defensive line thence to Sirinugur, and allow of the Madras troops, before stationed at the latter point, being called in to strengthen and complete the chain of posts from Sirinugur to Hoshungabad and Choonee. Wâsil Mohummed, seeing these further preparations, became apprehensive for the safety of the *luhbur* he had sent out, and despatched *hurkaras* in every direction to warn them against returning by the same route they had gone, and with positive injunctions to keep well to the north. This, however, availed them little; for Lieutenant-colonel Adams, who was in the course of January moving down in the same direction with the main body of the Bengal troops, sent forward parties to occupy the ghâts and passes from Chandya northwards to Bundelkhund, so as effectually to intercept the return of any body of marauders from the east towards the Sâgur district, near which Wâsil Mohummed had fixed his head-quarters. These

arrangements completely answered the purpose. On the 24th of January, Captain Caulfield, who was furthest in advance, heard of the approach of the *luhbur* from Ganjam, and fell upon them in the night with a squadron of the 5th Bengal cavalry, while attempting to return by the Chandya road. He captured four hundred horses; and the number of the slain was estimated at the same amount. Ramzan Khan, the leader of the party, was ascertained to be amongst these: the chief next in rank had previously fallen in one of Lieutenant Borthwick's attacks. The fugitives, after this discomfiture, made an effort to escape by a pass yet further to the north; where, on the 26th, they fell in with Major Clarke, and the main body of the 5th Bengal cavalry, who cut up about one hundred and fifty more. This expedition, therefore, which was the only one that penetrated the British frontier, suffered yet more severely than either of the other two. A small part of the advance, that had passed between Chandya and Jubulpoor, before Colonel Adams's detachments had taken up their positions, were all of those engaged in it who escaped unmolested in their return homewards.*

No further attempt was made this season to pass into the Dukhun, or to get beyond the de-

* This party was hotly but unsuccessfully pursued by infantry from Jubulpoor, under Major Popham.

fensive posts, connecting the frontier of our possessions in Bundelkhund with those of the Bhoosla Raja. From January forward the Pindarees carried on their trade of plunder for mere subsistence, and exclusively above the ghâts in Malwa; while such was the alacrity of the troops occupying the defensive line, that, towards the end of the season, a band from Wâsil's durra having ventured too far to the eastward, to ravage the country between Bundelkhund and Sâgur, was surprised and driven back with loss by the rapid advance of a squadron of the 4th Bengal native cavalry, under Captain Ridge, from their post at Lohargâon. A party that came to the bank of the Nerbudda to reconnoitre, and ascertain the practicability of a passage, was in like manner stopped by the guard on the southern bank, while Major Clarke (the Bengal troops having by that time completely relieved those of Madras) crossed the river with cavalry at a different ford, and cut them up as they retired across the valley in their way to the hills that form the barrier of Malwa.

Such were the proceedings of the Pindaree hordes during the season of 1816-17, and such the military operations against them. Their plan of depredation this year embraced a more ample expanse of territory, than had ever before been attempted, extending from shore to shore of the peninsula of India, and including all the interme-

diatc provinces that had been spared the ravage of the preceding year. The report of Lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Hislop to the Marquess of Hastings represented their different columns as amounting by his estimate to twenty-three thousand horse. This inroad had been foreseen to the full extent, and the precautionary measures of the British were consequently on a proportionate scale of magnitude. After the Bengal troops had crossed the Nerbudda to relieve Colonel Walker, there were no less than thirty-two thousand regulars of the King's or Company's forces between that river and the Kishna, besides the reformed infantry and cavalry of the Nizam, and the Peshwa's brigade; troops, which, though paid by our allies, were in effect devoted to the same service with their officers. In addition to the above force in advance, the utmost efforts had been made to arm the northern frontier of our immediate possessions in the Dukhun, in order to guard against a similar attempt to that of the preceding year; so that altogether the military effort on the side of Madras was nearly as great as it would have been in the event of operations of the most decisive kind. Notwithstanding all this, it was rather to good fortune on our part, and to a relaxation of vigilance and activity on that of the enemy, than to our own exertions, that we must attribute the overtaking of the two larger bodies, and their

severe chastisement by Majors Lushington and M'Dowell. So, likewise, the opportune march of Colonel Adams to the south most materially contributed to afford the means of completely intercepting the third expedition, which had penetrated into Ganjam. Thus it was accident, not the merits of our defensive policy, that had yielded us so much more brilliant successes this year than the last; and no argument could be drawn from them in favour of the security of any combination of defensive arrangements. To build a system for the future, however, upon the experience of this season, as if it were sufficient to provide only for similar results, would involve an annual preparation on the same enormous scale of expense; and even by the most favourable calculation, would not secure our provinces from invasion, and our subjects from the horrors of Pindaree ravage, although we might, in some cases, happen to inflict signal vengeance on the marauders, on their way homeward incumbered with spoil.

The insufficiency of stationary posts of defence was abundantly shown by the early success of the Pindarees in penetrating Colonel Walker's line; and it stands to reason, that if a light assailant of this description be allowed time to ascertain precisely at what points the covering force may be expected to be found, he will always be able so to choose his line of route, and to regulate the length

of his marches, as to baffle the utmost vigilance of such stationary defenders, when they are under an interdict not to advance and meet the danger, or crush it in the embryo. The conviction of this disadvantage produced an alteration of policy before the close of the season : for Colonel Adams obtained permission to cross the Nerbudda, and the officers in post to the south of Bundelkhund to advance westward even into Sâgur, in case an enemy should approach : whereas antecedently, the southern bank of the Nerbudda, or more generally the frontier of our own territories and that of our protected allies, had been fixed as the limit of their operations. The two successful affairs of April were attributable to this judicious alteration.

The policy and views entertained respectively by the British government, and by the native potentates of India, regarding the Pindarees, in the course of this season, will now be shortly explained. The Governor-general in council had, as before mentioned, come to the resolution of waiting the arrival of the sanction of the home authorities to commence offensive measures for their suppression. In the interval, the Marquess of Hastings trusted, that the advantage of defence acquired by the Nagpoor alliance might, in some degree, deter, or at least enable us to repel aggression, either on ourselves or our allies. Early in the season, however, he became sensible of the futility of such

expectations; and even before the storm had burst upon Ganjam, the council came to the unanimous resolution to defer no longer the extirpation of these banditti. On the 21st of December 1816, this determination was formed, and Lord Hastings gave immediate notice of his intention to proceed in person to the scene of action, and to spare no efforts to accomplish the object in spite of any obstacles that might be raised by open or secret foes. With respect to the time, it was resolved not to commence until the following season, unless the formation of the Jypoor alliance should require operations against Ameer Khan, in which case his Lordship proposed to enter upon immediate action. This not having taken place, his departure for the upper provinces was fixed for the following rains, that is to say, the month of June or July 1817. It was still considered doubtful, whether Sindheea would be induced to co-operate with us in this important object, or yield to the importunity of alternate entreaty and menace, addressed to him from the several durras. The certain opposition of Ameer Khan, or at least of his Putan mercenaries, and the probable secret counteraction of the Pêshwa, were confidently anticipated: but with the resources of the Nizam and of the Bhoosla, who was supposed to be equally staunch, added to our own strength in that quarter of India, there appeared little hazard of failure. But

his Lordship resolved to place himself above that little, by calling into play the whole disposable means of the three presidencies, according to a comprehensive plan, which will hereafter be particularly developed. The resolution to undertake active measures was formed not only without any assurance of support from the home authorities, but at a time when the Supreme Government had reason to believe that a contrary disposition prevailed at the India House.

It must be observed, that there had not yet been time to learn their sentiments on receiving information of the storm having burst upon their own district of Guntoor. This intelligence arrived in England in the course of the month of September 1816, and seems to have wrought an immediate change in their aversion to offensive operations. When the Supreme Government resolved to wait no longer for the expected sanction from home, no answer to its second reference had yet been received.

The repeated violations of our own territory, and the experience of the utter futility of defensive arrangements, irresistibly impelled the Governor-general to this course; and his Lordship felt confident, a confidence justified by the result, if the result of a measure can ever be admitted to afford a fair test of its merit, that a knowledge of these circumstances would awaken the authorities

in England to a sense of the magnitude of the evil, and the imperative duty and necessity of eradicating it. The reasons for postponing the commencement of operations till the close of the rains, unless prematurely brought on by the issue of the Jypoor negotiation, will be obvious, when the time requisite fully to prepare so extensive a plan of military and political movement, and the vast advantage of commencing with the whole of the fair season to look forward to, are taken into consideration. The current of events appeared also to be daily tending to produce a state of public feeling and opinion more and more favourable to our views. The successes against the Pindarees, the increasing alarm and anxiety of Sindheea, the prospect of further improving our connexion with Nagpoor, and of comprehending Jypoor within the circle of our influence, as well as the time thus given for the newly-formed pacific relations with Nipál to take effect, all contributed to recommend that government should reserve the execution of its resolve, until the following season. There was every prospect, that the work would then be accomplished in one campaign; and the event has shown that the expectation was just. Wherefore, although the effort for this purpose must necessarily be on the largest and most expensive scale, still the ultimate saving of charge and increase of reputation, from avoiding a war-

fare protracted indefinitely from year to year, were objects worth any sacrifice, and only to be ensured by having an entire season to act in, after a due allowance of time for previous preparation.

It will not be necessary to detain the reader, by stating at length the views of the several native princes, in respect to the Pindarees. Their aggressions on ourselves and our allies were more than once brought to the notice of Sindheea, by order of the Supreme Government; and in proportion as we became earnest in representing the evil, this chief redoubled his protestations of hostility to the hordes, while his generals and ministers continued to give them even open encouragement. A commander was at last appointed to conduct an expedition, that was to extirpate the whole race of Pindarees: but, when the army was to be collected, delays and difficulties began to be started in such number, that, in the end, Balajee Inglia, the officer nominated, never stirred from Gwalior. Some anxiety was shown, when the apprehension of our immediately advancing to the north of the Nerbudda was most lively; and care was taken to have troops in readiness to act according to the course of events. Beyond that point, the activity of this durbar did not reach. But we so far availed ourselves of Sindheea's professions and general policy, as to assume, that we were at perfect liberty to pursue the freebooters

beyond his frontier, though it was not thought expedient to define the matter, by desiring any formal recognition of the right.

Holkur's durbar, during the season 1816-17, was agitated by a violent struggle between the party of Ameer Khan, whose agent Ghufoor Khan was at the head of the Putan interest, and had the regular battalions at his beck, and that of the native Mahrattas, who had followed the fortunes of the family, and into whose hands Toolsee Baeé the regent had latterly thrown herself and her ward, the young Mulhar Rao. The former minister, Balaram Set, having been thought to favour the Putan faction, was arrested and put to death in prison; and the differences between the two parties went so far, as to produce what was called a battle, though it amounted to no more than a distant cannonade. The season passed without reconciliation or the complete reduction of either party: and Sindheea, who had at one time shown a disposition to interfere, in order to effect an accommodation, refrained in the end, and withdrew the force he had kept in the neighbourhood for the purpose. One consequence of these disturbances was, the release of Kureem Khan, the most noted of the Pindaree leaders, who had hitherto been kept under the appearance of some restraint.

The occurrences at the courts of Poona and

Nagpoor, during the season 1816-17, will be given in the following chapter. The operations against the fort of Hutras in the Dooab, as they had considerable effect in calming the public mind of the native population of our own western provinces, and preparing them for the events that were to follow, will here find its proper place of notice. Soon after the Supreme Government had determined on the suppression of the predatory bands, indeed before the close of the month of December, the continued contumacy of Dya Ram and Bhugwunt Singh, two zemindars of the Dooab, was brought particularly under the notice of Lord Hastings and the council, together with some further recent acts of unprovoked aggression upon peaceable residents within the Agra district. The rank of both these chieftains was that of mere talookdars, or renters of portions of land, but they held very strong forts; and the government, on its acquisition of the province from Sindheea, the possessions of both lying in the Uleegurh district, behaved towards them with its usual consideration, and, so long as their quota of revenue was regularly paid, a strict conformity with the equalizing laws of our system was not enforced upon them. Presuming upon this moderation, and upon the strength of their fortresses of Hutras and Moorsan, they both levied arbitrary duties, harboured thieves and robbers, and, disregarding the autho-

riety of the courts of judicature, which they were bound to respect, sported with the persons and properties of the peaceable and well-disposed in their neighbourhood. At last, the Supreme Government felt itself called upon to resent this conduct; and it was particularly politic not to pass it over at this time, as a rising of the Putan population of Rohilkhund a few months before, to oppose an ordinance for the regulation of the police of cities and towns, showed the minds of the people in this part of our dominions to be very unsettled. That insurrection had, indeed, subsided on the failure of the armed mob to overpower a small party of but three* companies of Sepahees, which had been marched into the city of Burelee, where the green flag of Mohummed had been hoisted by the malcontents. Still, in the probability of extensive war with the Mahrattas and Putans, necessarily involving the risk of a successful inroad from beyond our frontier, the mischief would be incalculable, if the slightest idea of the internal

* The exemplary conduct of this detachment, and of Captain Boscawen its commander, would deserve a much more particular notice, if the plan of this narrative would allow of such a digression. The Rohillas penetrated the square, into which the detachment was compelled to form itself, before the fourth side could be completed by the falling in of the picquets and light infantry. They were literally blown out again by the bold manœuvre of turning one of the guns at the angles inwards, loaded with grape.

instability of our power were suffered to go abroad. It was therefore important to strike a blow, that should impress all ranks with a proper estimate of our vigour and military means.

Hutras was reckoned one of the strongest forts in India. Dya-Ram was a Jât, and derived no small accession of confidence and estimation, from being a relation of the Bhurtpoor Raja, with whom he claimed equality of rank. The fort was kept in the completest state of repair, and every improvement that was introduced into our neighbouring fortress of Uleegurh, such as preparing a covered way, raising a glacis, and levelling the height of the ramparts, was carefully copied by this suspicious chief. At the close of 1816, it was resolved to reduce both Dya-Ram and Bhugwunt to the level of subjects, and to employ an overwhelming force for the purpose, as well to bear down all opposition, as to give *eclat* to the measure. The divisions from Cawnpoor, from Meeruth, and from Muttra, were accordingly ordered to concentrate on Hutras, and place themselves under the immediate command of Major-general Marshall, the commanding officer in the field. On the 11th of February, the place was invested on all sides. Dya-Ram was then summoned to surrender a gate of his fort and allow of its being dismantled. After some evasion on his part, and a negotiation, which

lasted till the 16th, he finally refused; when the siege immediately commenced. The Kutra, or fortified town, was breached and evacuated on the 23d. Approaches were then made to the fort, and batteries erected under a smart, though ineffectual fire from the ramparts. By the 1st of March the works of the besiegers were completed, and, on the following morning, forty-five mortars and three breaching batteries of heavy guns began to play on the fort. Such powerful means had never yet been employed against any fortified place in India. The effect was beyond measure destructive and astonishing to the garrison. The batteries continued to play till the evening, when, at five o'clock*, a magazine disproportionately large blew up within the place, destroying half the garrison and nearly all the buildings. The effect is described to have been awful. Dya-Ram with a few horse made his escape in the dark the same night; and, though challenged and pursued by a picquet of the 8th dragoons, got off with little damage. The rest of the garrison, in attempting to follow, were driven in and obliged to surrender at discretion. Bhugwunt Singh agreed to dismantle his fort on the first summons; and thus was this important object gained,

* The other magazine, one of yet larger dimensions, was likewise found penetrated by a shell; but the fuse had dropt out.

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without any sacrifice of lives ; the casualties * of the assailants in the siege being too insignificant to mention ; while the impression of the utter futility of resistance spread far and wide through Hindoostan, and even through the remote Dukhun, where it materially influenced the subsequent conduct of the Mahratta chiefs and kiladars.

* Killed—one European, five natives.

CHAPTER XII.

NAGPOOR.—POONA.

1817, JANUARY TO JUNE.

Nagpoor—Ram Chundur Wagh—Sudeek Ulee Khan—Apa Saheb goes to Chanda—intrigues—death of Pursajee—by violent means—Accession of Apa Saheb—Change of policy—Intrigues with Peshwa—Poona—Peshwa's duplicity—Trimbukjee levies troops—is covertly supported—Resident's proceedings—Discussions with the Durbar—Subsidiary force called down—Intercourse suspended—effect—Operations against Trimbukjee—their success—Colonel Smith called in to Poona—terms of demand—refused—Poona invested—Bajee Rao submits—Governor-general's instructions—Conduct of Peshwa—New treaty signed—its conditions—Reflections—Military movements.

EVENTS, that led to very important results, were passing at Nagpoor and Poona, while the British were engaged with the Pindarees in the manner above-described. At the former court, a party had been rapidly rising into favour, which threatened completely to undermine the influence possessed by those of the ministry, who had been instrumental in bringing about the sub-

sidinary alliance with the English. At the head of this party was Ramchundur Wâgh, the commander of Apa Saheb's private troops, before his elevation to the regency; a man who had the character of a daring, deep-designing Mahratta. The Naeëb was himself of a restless disposition, and a great lover of intrigue; and it was not long before he showed a decided preference to the counsels most suited to this turn of mind. Instead of giving his attention to the reform of his internal administration, the object which the moderate men endeavoured to press upon him, he greedily listened to schemes for the concentration of all power in his own hands or those of his immediate dependants. Nagoo Punt was of that class; but Nurayun Pundit was one of the old advisers of Raghoojee; and having been the immediate instrument, whereby the British alliance had been effected, he was early thought to be too much attached to that nation, and to have its objects more at heart than those of the Bhoosla family. So long, however, as Pursajee lived, and as there was a party in the state possessed of influence not derived from himself, Apa Saheb felt his dependance on his English allies, and did not venture to break finally with Nurayun, who was supposed to enjoy their fullest confidence. A plan was, therefore, laid to relieve the Naeëb from every source of apprehension on this head:

and, in the course of January 1817, the following expedients were practised to carry it into effect.

It will be recollected, that Sudeek Ulee Khan had been received into apparent favour by Apa Saheb, instead of being degraded along with Naroba, the late secretary. He had contrived to make his peace through Ramchundur Wagh, but was too independent in power and influence for the reconciliation to be complete. The large assignments of territory he enjoyed were also an object of envy, as well to the prince, as to the favourites by whom he was surrounded. Nagoo Punt and Nurayun were in the mean time, at the Resident's desire, continually urging a reform of the contingent furnished to the British under the treaty. The duty of providing and maintaining the stipulated force out of his assignments had been thrown upon Sudeek Ulee Khan; and its notorious incompleteness and inefficiency had afforded ground of continual remonstrance. After having for some time seemingly favoured the system as well as the individual, Apa Saheb resolved to avail himself of these complaints for the ruin of Sudeek Ulee; whilst, by making it appear that the measure was forced upon him by the British, and by leaving the execution to them, he hoped himself to escape the odium that would infallibly attend it.

On some slight pretence, towards the end of January 1817, the Naeeb left Nagpoor, and went to the strong fort of Chanda, situated about seventy miles south of the capital. Immediately after his departure, Nagoo Punt waited on Mr. Jenkins, with pressing instances, that he would take the opportunity of seizing the person of Sudeek Ulee, by means of the British troops at Nagpoor. He declared that Apa Saheb's principal reason for leaving the city was, to allow of this arrest; and showed a written authority, in the hand-writing of the regent, in proof that his sanction had been obtained. The paper, it is true, contained only an assurance, that Nagoo Punt had his entire confidence, and that a communication from him might be considered as authentic; but it is very unusual for Mahratta princes to give more specific credentials to those whom they entrust with communications of the highest importance. The first overture on the subject was made on the 22d of January. On the Resident's hesitating to afford his direct interference, the request was repeated at subsequent interviews, when both Nagoo and Nurayun were earnest in soliciting him to act. Some further credentials were shown in testimony of Apa Saheb's desire in the matter; and as Sudeek, hearing that intrigues for his ruin were afoot, had begun to fortify his house, and make

other defensive preparations, this circumstance was urged, together with sundry proofs that had been obtained of his being in correspondence with the Pindarees, to enforce the immediate necessity of strong measures. After some reflection, Mr. Jenkins finally resolved not to stir in a case of so much importance, without a written or verbal application from the prince himself, which should prevent the possibility of his afterwards disavowing the act or pretending to be dissatisfied at it. But he strongly advised the ministers to execute the arrest with their own people, assuring them of his support in case it should be necessary, and only requiring that they, as the ostensible ministers, should take the responsibility of the deed in the first instance on themselves. For this Nagoo Punt was not prepared; for he knew, that though Apa Saheb would have been glad enough to have seen the ruin of Sudeek, he was far from wishing that it should appear to be his own act. Finding himself, therefore, unable to move the Resident from this judicious resolution, he immediately rejoined his master at Chanda, leaving Sudeek Ulee Khan, for the present, without further molestation. The ruin of this officer was, however, only part of the plot, with the maturation of which the retirement of Apa Saheb to Chanda was connected. On the morning of the 1st of February,

Pursajee Bhoosla, the reigning Raja, was found dead in his bed, without any alteration for the worse having been observed in his general health, or in the particular complaints under which he had for some time laboured. At the moment, no suspicion attached to any one; and though it was whispered about that the Raja had met his death by violent means, Mr. Jenkins, who made private inquiries to ascertain the fact, could trace the reports to no certain source. He accordingly concluded them to be no more than the common rumours, which in India always attend the sudden death of a man in power; and, as the previous ailings of Pursajee made it less extraordinary that he should come to such an end, he treated the reports so lightly, as not even to mention them in his despatches to the Supreme Government, announcing the event. Afterwards, however, when, upon Apa Saheb's deposition, free access was obtained to the servants and women of the interior of the palace, it was positively ascertained, that Pursajee was strangled about two o'clock in the morning; and there was reason to believe, that an unsuccessful attempt had previously been made to administer poison in an offering of prepared betel leaf,* presented to him early in the same night by one of the Baees of the

* Pursajee rejected it, finding it bitter.

palace. Ramchundur Wagh himself appears to have come to the palace about midnight, and to have given directions for the perpetration of the deed. Its actual execution was entrusted to a man named Mun Bhut, who afterwards rose to great power, and was a prime mover of the treacherous attack made on the residency in the November following.

Pursajee was thirty-nine years of age. His body was burnt on the 10th of February; and his wife, Kashee Bae, ascended the funeral pile, and sacrificed herself upon it. Apa Saheb was immediately proclaimed successor to the Raja, by the name of Moodajee Bhoosla. The day of good omen for the new Raja's formal installation was not declared until the 21st of April following; but this did not prevent his at once assuming the titles and dignities of the head of the Bhoosla state.

Upon Apa Saheb's accession and return from Chanda, Sudeek Ulee Khan was received with marked attention; and, as Nurayun, one of the ministers, who had pressed the British Resident to complete his downfall, was treated with a coolness equally pointed, it was for some time matter of doubt, whether the plot for the ruin of the former had really originated with his Highness. It was soon afterwards pretty evident, that his secret disposition was as little favourable to the

one as to the other : but some motives still existed, for practising deception towards the Moosulman soldier ; while his elevation to the undivided honours of the Raj, under the sanction and formal recognition of the British government previously obtained, rendered it no longer necessary for the prince to keep on terms with the minister, whom he suspected of favouring the British interest. About the end of February, Nurayun Pundit was especially removed from the conduct of the department of communication with the British Resident ; and at first Pursaram Rao, the very person whose intrigues in the lifetime of Raghoojee, Apa Saheb had himself betrayed to the Resident, before his own elevation to the Regency, was appointed in his stead. Mr. Jenkins remonstrated against the causeless removal of Nurayun, observing that the disgrace of this minister had the appearance of being occasioned by his having exerted himself to induce his Highness to execute faithfully the treaty of alliance, especially that part of it which provided for the maintenance of the contingent in a state of efficiency ; that the default in this respect, and the removal of the minister who had attempted to prevent it, were calculated to give the British government a very unfavourable impression of his disposition towards the alliance ; which was yet further increased by the selection of such a man as Pursaram, to con-

duct the public communications with the English Resident. Apa Saheb was bent on the removal of Nurayun, and therefore would only listen to the remonstrance so far, as to nominate Ramchundur Wâgh to the office, instead of Pursaram, who was obnoxious on such plausible grounds.

Reference being made to the Supreme Government, it was determined not to authorise any more pressing instances for the restoration of Nurayun, through fear of increasing the new Raja's incipient dislike of the alliance. His sacrifice was, therefore, submitted to, notwithstanding that it was considered most evident, that his disgrace was owing to his exertions to procure the punctual execution of the treaty. Immediately on the fall of Nurayun, Nagoo Punt combined with Ramchundur Wâgh: and, in a very short time, every official station was filled by the new Raja's personal dependants. A persecution was also commenced against Goojaba Dada, who, fearing for his life, took refuge first with Nagoo Punt, and afterwards at the British Residency, whence he was ultimately conducted in safety to Allahabad. In the mean time, negotiations were openly kept on foot with the resident vakeels of the Pêshwa, of Sindheea, and of Holkur: and, although circumstances arose at Poona, which placed Bajee Rao for a short time on a footing of direct hostility with the British, his

representative at Nagpoor received daily letters and had daily audiences with the new Raja, making communications, the substance of which was withheld from the British Resident, in direct violation of the treaty concluded only twelve months before. Indeed, from the time that Apa Saheb felt himself secure in the full possession of the honours and authority of the Raj, he ceased to regard the British alliance as a necessary prop to his rule, and began to be sensible of the humiliation of appearing to the Mahratta nation as the first of the Bhoosla dynasty who had made a voluntary sacrifice of political independence. It is true, there had not yet been time for the alliance to operate as a restraint on his personal direction of internal or external affairs ; but it was not difficult for the designing men about him to convince him that it must ultimately have that effect. He, therefore, eagerly listened to the invitations of the agents of the other Mahratta powers, to unite with them for the purpose of shaking off the connexion : nor was his personal vanity insensible to the flattery with which his alliance was courted, and to the distinction of being thought of so much consequence to the success of the coalition. Henceforward he lent himself wholly to the designs of Bajee Rao ; and, in April and May, when matters were on the eve of a rupture with the latter, it was ascertained, that assurances of

mutual support had passed between the two courts. But it is now time to state specifically the nature of the occurrences at Poona, to which allusion has more than once been made.

Trimbukjee Dainglia's escape, in September, has been already noticed. The place of his retreat could not be traced; but, during the early part of the ensuing cold season, he remained in perfect quiet; and though, as might have been expected, his master made no exertions to seize him, still it could not be discovered that he either harboured or gave him ostensible support. There was, consequently, no interruption of the good understanding maintained by his Highness with the British government. On the contrary, studious efforts were made by him to win Mr. Elphinstone's confidence; and, in this view, he solicited to be made a party to the plans which were, in the course of the season, supposed to be meditated by us against the Pindarees, and made a parade of issuing orders to his agent at Sind-beea's camp, to refrain from intrigues, and only to meddle in the politics of that durbar, as far as they might have relation to his claims in Hindoostan; and even in them to do nothing without communication with the British Resident. He also professed a disposition to be satisfied with a very moderate composition for all his demands on the Gykwar, taking six lakh of rupees a-year, and

giving up every thing else, but the right of investiture. The display of such an accommodating spirit, at a time when it was scarcely expected, was not at first attributed to a design in Bajee Rao to deceive the British Government. It was thought rather to have its origin in the desire to keep well with us at all events, however hostile his secret inclinations might be. The Marquess of Hastings resolved to encourage this disposition: and accordingly a copy of a remonstrance, made in January to Sindheea, on the subject of the late incursion of the Pindarees into Ganjam, was forwarded to Poona, together with some explanation of the grounds on which the British government proposed to take early measures for the suppression of these hordes. This communication his Highness received in the course of February, with every demonstration of satisfaction at the confidence thus reposed in him.

In the mean time, the plot he had contrived was drawing to maturity. In the course of the months of January and February, Mr. Elphinstone heard of the collection of troops in the Mohadeo hills, to the south of the Neera, and about fifty miles south-east of Poona. He early represented the circumstance to the Pêshwa, who, with every appearance of alacrity, sent out a party of Gokla's troops to quell the supposed

insurrection; protesting all along that he had himself heard nothing of the matter, and did not believe the existence of any thing of the kind. The detachment went to the spot, and reported that no insurgents were to be found or heard of; though it lay for some time encamped in the neighbourhood of the Mohadeo temple, holding daily communication with the armed bodies that had been there assembled. Early in March, it was distinctly ascertained that Trimbukjee was himself in that part of the country, and had for some time been making extensive levies. The 18th of March was talked of as the day appointed for his open appearance in arms; and the direct participation of Bajee Rao was evident, as well from general report, and from the conduct of the detachment sent to suppress the insurrection, as from positive information received of actual interviews between his Highness and that delinquent at Phoolshuhur, a village about fifteen miles from Poona, which he gave many frivolous reasons for making the place of a lengthened stay. Large remittances of money, to the parts in insurrection, were also traced through several hands, in a manner that left no room to doubt their having been made from Bajee Rao to Trimbukjee and his adherents. The Peshwa and his ministers persisted in stoutly denying the existence of any insurrection, or levy of troops, in

the neighbourhood of Mohadeo. At the same time, all his Highness' forts were ordered to be put in a state of complete repair, and extensive levies of horse and foot were going on even at Poona and the vicinity; besides which, agents were sent with money into Malwa and other quarters, to invite men to the Dukhun, in order to enter his service.

Up to the 24th of February, Mr. Elphinstone had considered the insurrection as levelled equally against the Pêshwa's government and the interests of the British nation, and his communications with the Durbar were made in that belief. On that day, however, the reply of the Pêshwa's officer sent to quell it was put into his hands, which, combined with the other circumstances alluded to, satisfied him of the necessity of taking up the matter in its proper light, that is to say, as an underhand attempt of the prince himself to shake the British power. The early part of March was spent in remonstrances on one side, and on the other, in denials of the existence of any insurrection or assemblage of troops, and in protestations of readiness to do any thing that might be suggested, and to send troops to any place that might be named to put it down. Mr. Elphinstone declared he wanted no troops, that he should employ the British troops in dispersing the insurgents, and that the presence of those of his Highness would

only lead to confusion : he demanded other proofs that the insurrection was not encouraged underhand ; such as the placing Trimbukjee's known adherents and the members of his family under restraint, instead of which they were continued in office and in favour. He demanded also, that the enlistment of troops by his Highness should be discontinued, and the late extraordinary levies disbanded : that the repairs of fortresses, and the measures that were taking for storing them with grain and ammunition, should cease ; adding, that while such things were going on, there could be no reliance on his Highness' sincerity, as such preparations could be meant against no other than the British. On one occasion early in March, Bajee Rao remonstrated against the style of the Resident's communications, declaring them to be of a threatening nature, and calculated to produce a rupture. Generally, however, he met them by an outward show of acquiescence. Thus, on the 11th of March, part of Trimbukjee's family was placed under nominal restraint, and other ostensible measures taken of the same cast ; while the most liberal promises were continually made, to discontinue every thing which gave offence. But the preparations continued with the same activity and more secrecy, as well at Poona and its neighbourhood, as in Kandés and other parts ; and Trimbukjee's insurrection in the south was grow-

ing every day into more importance. About the middle of March, Mr. Elphinstone resolved to call down the subsidiary force, and to employ it forthwith in the suppression of the insurrection, and eventually against Poona, in case Bajee Rao's conduct should render it necessary. On the 21st of March, he solicited special instructions for the case of a continuation of these hostile preparations, and of the covert support of Trimbukjee's rebellion; stating it to be his intention to break off all communication with his Highness in the interim, and to announce the present relations of amity to be at an end, leaving it to his Lordship in council to restore them, with such demand of security for the future, as he might deem it proper to require. In communicating this to the Peshwa, he stated his intention to assure him there was no design of committing acts of direct hostility, unless his Highness' preparations should render such proceeding necessary, or unless his Highness should attempt to leave Poona; in either of which cases, hostilities against himself would be commenced, without waiting the Governor-general's orders.

On the 1st of April these intentions were carried into effect: the continued preparations of Bajee Rao, which went the length of even collecting gun-bullocks for the artillery in his arsenal at Poona, and of sending all the treasures, jewels, and wardrobe of his palace there to his strongest fort of Rygürh,

having rendered it necessary no longer to defer bringing matters to this issue. Accordingly, on that day the Resident sent in a note, wherein, after reproaching his Highness with the wantonness of the aggression on the British government, which he had been abetting underhand, and after recapitulating the abundant proofs of his so doing, and of his preparing for hostility throughout his whole dominions, he notified the intention of immediately employing the subsidiary force for the suppression of the insurrection, and eventually for the support of the British interests against his Highness himself; declaring that the good understanding between the two governments was now at an end, but that his Highness had one chance left of restoring it, that of disarming and waiting the Governor-general's determination, which if he showed a disposition to try, no act of hostility would take place against himself, though any attempt to leave Poona would be held a decided indication of war. The Poona brigade was ordered to hold itself in readiness, and Colonel Leighton, its commanding officer, was desired to take such precautions as he might deem necessary for the security of the residency and cantonment. Affairs were left in this posture at Poona, while the main body of the subsidiary force, which had previously been put in motion from the frontier, was formed into several divisions, whereof, one lightly equipped,

and under Colonel Smith's personal command, hastened down to the southward to operate against the insurgents. Major M'Dowell, with the detachment that had beat up the Pindarees on the 15th of January, being still in the neighbourhood of Bidur, was at the same time called in to Tooljapoor to co-operate; and another force, under Lieutenant-colonel Thompson, was also summoned northward from the ceded districts of the Madras presidency. Mr. Elphinstone, in placing matters on this footing with the Pêshwa, acted in conformity with the instructions he had received from Lord Hastings during the first discussion respecting Trimbukjee, which had provided for the case of his leaving Poona, and raising disturbances in the country under the covert support of his master, and had prescribed the particular course now adopted in that event. The circumstances were completely analogous; the only difference being, that the delinquent had escaped into the interior, after having been surrendered to us, instead of before.

Bajee-Rao was greatly alarmed when he saw matters brought to this issue. He sent his ministers to assure the Resident of his disposition to do any thing that might be required, in order to restore things to their former state. It was distinctly explained, that this was now become impossible, as it depended entirely upon the nature of the

instructions that might be received, in which most probably securities for the future would be made a condition precedent to the renewal of the former terms of friendship between the governments; that his Highness had to choose between two lines of conduct; if he resolved to accede unconditionally to what the Governor-general would determine, he would disband his new levies, and place his forts in their former condition, bringing back his treasure, and showing other signs of confidence; if he only waited the arrival of instructions to make up his mind, whether he would declare war or not, and wished to be understood so to do, he would leave things exactly in their present posture, but must take the consequences of the further loss of confidence resulting from the preference of the latter course. In the progress of the month, it was communicated to him through Major Ford, who still continued to be consulted and treated with confidence, that if his Highness seized and delivered up Trimbukjee before the arrival of the Governor-general's expected instructions, as he had done before, his conduct might again warrant the Resident in suspending their immediate execution, and restore at once the former relations of amity. The month was consumed in insincere negotiation on the part of the Mahratta court, evincing alternate resolutions to submit and to resist. More than once preparations were made for his departure

from Poona ; but the natural indecision and timidity of Bajee Rao's character kept him fixed to the spot to the last moment, in anxiety to know the extent of the demands that would be made upon him. Yet, instead of disarming in the interim, he increased the activity of his preparations.

During this suspense, the troops had begun to act against the insurgents. On the 7th of April, a body of one hundred newly raised troops were traced to the village of Junta, and there disarmed by Colonel Smith, and their chief confined. This was all that was done to the south of Poona ; for the Pêshwa's influence had so completely set the country against us, that although that officer, with the light divisions, scoured all the neighbourhood in which the insurgents had been collected, no information or assistance could be got at any of the villages, nor could any other party of their force be discovered. They had, indeed, decamped from that part of the country immediately on the approach of the troops, with the design of removing the seat of war into Kandês. A body of four thousand, chiefly horse, after having got clear off from Colonel Smith, was heard of in its way to the north by Major Smith, who commanded one of the detachments posted to cover Poona on the east. It was instantly pursued, and after a chase of one hundred and fifty miles in four days, the

Major succeeded in overtaking the party, about a march westward of Toka on the Godavuree. This body had fallen in with and cruelly murdered Lieutenant Warre, an officer of the artillery, travelling with a small escort. When attacked, they made little resistance, but dispersed with the loss of no more than fifty or sixty, for want of cavalry to pursue.

A more brilliant affair occurred in Kandês, where Godajee Dainglia, a relative of Trimbukjee, was busily collecting partisans. Upon calling down Colonel Smith to the south, measures had been taken to put the Nizam's troops and the Hyderabad subsidiary force in motion, to counteract the designs of the insurgents to the north. Captain Sydenham, the political agent at Aurnugabad, being apprised of Godajee's operations, despatched Captains Davies and Pedlar with a *rusala*, in number about six hundred, of the reformed horse, and a small party of the reformed infantry of the Nizam, to the frontier of that prince's dominions in that direction, giving them instructions, if they should hear of the collection of troops, and could find an opportunity of striking a blow, to attack and disperse them without ceremony. Such an opportunity occurred on the 20th of April, when, after a rapid advance of fifty miles into Kandês, Captain Davies succeeded in falling in with a body of two thousand, whereof

near three hundred were Arab infantry, the whole under Godajee himself. They took up a good position, and showed face; whereupon Captain Davies resolved not to wait for the infantry, but at once to charge sword in hand with the horse he had in advance. The charge was completely successful, insomuch that the loss of the enemy was not less than four hundred left on the field. It should be noticed, that these were the same troops that two years before had refused to advance against a body of routed Pindarees. But they were now acting under the influence of the confidence inspired by an able commander, and were impelled by the sense of duty created by the novel assurance of regular pay. Of Captain Davies' men, seventy-four were killed and wounded. Both the officers were amongst the number of the latter, a circumstance not to be wondered at; for the nature of the service required the example of a personal exertion on their part, which neither was of a disposition to spare. The new distinctions of modern warfare, which assign the use of the arm to the private soldier, and that of the head only to the superior, had not yet found their way amongst the class of men led by Captain Davies on this occasion. Several of the enemy fell by his own hand before he received his wound, which fortunately was not severe. Captain Pedlar's was more so, but still not dangerous. Nothing could

be more creditable to the national character, than the exhibition, afforded by this conflict, of the superiority of troops similarly modelled, armed, and disciplined, and differing in no respect whatever from the enemy, except in the circumstance of their being led by the cool judgment and enterprising courage of British officers.

Meanwhile, affairs were coming to a crisis at Poona. On the 20th of April, Mr. Elphinstone found it necessary to increase the British force there, by calling in Colonel Smith with his light division. He gave notice to Bajee Rao that he had so done, stating the reasons, but assuring him that it would produce no alteration of his resolution to commit no act of direct hostility, unless his Highness compelled him to it, for he should still wait the receipt of his expected instructions. Discussions with the ministers and emissaries of his Highness continued as before, without producing any satisfactory result. On the 25th of April, a private letter reached the residency from Mr. Secretary Adam, which opened in some degree the views of government, by showing the unconditional surrender of Trimbukjee, in case nothing should have been done by the Pêshwa in the interval, to be an indispensable preliminary to any new accommodation with him. The full instructions, which were despatched only the day after, the 7th of April, were detained for a fort-

night, by an insurrection which broke out in Cuttack, and at this unlucky moment interrupted the Dâk* communication between Calcutta and Poona. Colonel Smith arrived at Poona on the 26th, and took up ground at the village of Kirkee. On the 3d of May, the Resident heard of the insurrection in Cuttack, and of the Dâk communication being cut off; he accordingly resolved to wait till the 6th for the chance of receiving the desired instructions, and, if not then arrived, to act on the imperfect intimation he had already received of the Governor-general's wishes. On that day, no further despatch having arrived, Mr. Elphinstone solicited a private audience of his Highness the Pêshwa, in order to apprise him that the only terms on which the British Government could consent to any accommodation with his Highness, after what had passed, were, his engaging to surrender Trimbukjee within a definite period, and his giving substantial security not to fail in this particular. Bajee Rao, who seemed prepared for the communication, distinctly refused the preliminary proposed, with the appearance of very unusual coolness of determination. He did not rest his case on his want of ability to apprehend the fugitive, for he would not even bind himself to make exertions for the purpose.

* Dâk—post, conducted by native carriers on foot.

On the next day, a written note was sent in to the same general purport as the verbal communication, but specifically requiring a covenant to surrender Trimbukjee within one month, and to deliver the three hill forts of Singurh, Poorundur, and Rygurh, as pledges for its performance. Twenty-four hours were allowed for his Highness to come to a final determination on this proposition; if not in the affirmative, immediate hostility was denounced. The note was received with apparent indifference, nor were its contents noticed until the morning of the 8th, when the time had nearly expired, and the troops were marching from the cantonment of the Poona brigade and from the village of Kirkee, to take up positions, according to a plan previously settled, so as completely to invest the city. The fears of this irresolute prince then predominated. None of his advisers, excepting Gokla and the commandant of his artillery, recommended a resort to arms. About ten o'clock in the morning, he sent vakeels, promising to agree to the terms, and to surrender the forts without delay. They were accordingly taken possession of in the course of that and of the following day. Rygurh was a place of peculiar strength, as indeed were both Poorundur and Singurh: but no difficulty was made in the delivery of them under the stipula-

tion. On these preliminary terms, the Peshwa was admitted to throw himself upon the ultimate determination of the Governor-general in council, as to the conditions on which a final accommodation should be made with him; but he was given to understand, that he must not expect the treaty of Bassein to be implicitly renewed.

On the 10th of May, arrived the instructions of Lord Hastings in council. They prescribed exactly the course already adopted, so far as it had gone; but provided distinctly for the three cases: first, of the actual surrender of Trimbukjee, or sincere efforts of his master to seize him, before the arrival of the instructions; secondly, of the positive inaction of the prince up to that time; and thirdly, of his refusal or further evasion, after the Resident's receipt of the instructions, and communication of the enhanced demand to be made upon him in the second case. In the first case, the relations of the treaty of Bassein were to be restored, and every thing placed on the footing of the previous settlement, made on the surrender of Trimbukjee in 1815. In the second case, the demand of the surrender of that delinquent within a time specified, and of hostages for performance, was to be a positive preliminary to any accommodation; with the further understanding, that no renewal of friendship could take place, without the delivery of greater securities for the future,

than the treaty of Bassein afforded. In the last case, that of decided war, the person of the prince was to be seized, and a temporary arrangement made for the government of the country. The further securities, to be insisted on in the second case, were, cessions of territory, including the fort of Ahmednugur, to the extent of twenty-nine lakh of rupees, applicable to the raising and pay of a force of five thousand horse and three thousand foot on our own establishment to replace the contingent of his Highness' troops, stipulated in the treaty of Bassein*, but never furnished in full upon any one occasion: also, the surrender to the British of all claims on Goozerât, Bundelkhund, and in Hindoostan; and, generally, a renunciation of the supremacy of the Mahratta empire. The renewal of the farm of Ahmedabad to the Gykwar, and the restoration of affairs in that quarter to the footing established by Colonel Walker, were to form part of the new arrangement; and the opportunity was to be taken of settling some points of minor importance, which had for some time been the subject of mutual irritation. The Resident prepared himself to execute these instructions, as soon as the month assigned for

* The treaty of Bassein stipulated twice the quantity; but was subsequently modified by the treaty of general concert for the defence of the Dukhun, concluded between the British, the Nizam, and the Peshwa.

the apprehension of Trimbukjee should expire. But he informed Bajee Rao of their arrival, and of the intimation therein, that his Highness had so far lost the Governor-general's confidence, as to have incurred the demand of greater securities for the future, without acquainting him with the probable extent of this ulterior demand. In the early part of the month, no sincere efforts were made to seize Trimbukjee, notwithstanding the security given; indeed, on the night of the 13th of May, every thing was ready for the prince's flight from Poona, and he was on the point of departure; even so late as the 17th, he issued pay to his troops and kept up the appearance of a resolution to break finally with the British. On the 20th, however, he made up his mind to the opposite course. The adherents and family of Trimbukjee were put in durance, and proclamations issued in every direction, offering two lakh rupees, and a rent free village of one thousand rupees a-year, guaranteed by the British government to any one, who should bring in the person of the fugitive. Copies of the proclamation were given to the Resident, that he might aid in their circulation. This conduct satisfied every body of the Peshwa's present sincerity: indeed, it placed Trimbukjee's apprehension, in a manner, beyond the influence of his master's caprice. Mr. Elphinstone accordingly resolved to consider these exer-

tions as a sufficient atonement, and to accept his submission at the end of the month, if his conduct were not changed in the interval, whether the culprit should be seized or not, for delivery according to the letter of the covenant. On the 23th of May, Major Ford was authorised to acquaint the Pêshwa of the general nature of the demands that were to be made upon him, under the Governor-general's late instructions; and on the 1st of June following, the Resident went in person, and explained, article by article, a draft he had prepared of the new treaty. This varied from the instructions in some few points of minor importance; and in one material item, the amount of the cessions, fixing them at thirty-four instead of twenty-nine lakh of rupees, in order to cover extraordinary expenses of staff equipment, &c. of the forces to be raised and substituted for the Pêshwa's contingent, provision for which had been overlooked in the former estimate.

The Pêshwa and his minister endeavoured with much dexterity, to reduce the sum of these demands, taking the ground of intreaty, and reliance on the compassion and generosity of the British government. It was urged by the ministers, that their master's offences, whatever they might have been, did not deserve so heavy a punishment, or one so grating to his Highness's feelings; that we seemed to expect a strictness of

fidelity beyond all reason, and more than a native potentate had it in his power to observe; and that, if we enforced so rigorous a fine, the world would cry out against us, and accuse his Highness of folly, in having originally formed the connexion with us. Since proof of the wide scope of Bajee Rao's machinations against our interests was pouring in from every quarter, Mr. Elphinstone was inflexible in insisting on every article of his draft. On the 7th of June, the month allowed for the apprehension of Trimbukjee having expired, he demanded that the treaty should immediately be signed, the only proof of submission that could now be given; no reduction having been made in the levies of troops, and Trimbukjee not having been delivered up as agreed upon. Six days more were consumed in further discussion of the several items, and particularly in disputes respecting the districts to be ceded and the rates at which each should be taken. At length, on the 13th of June, the treaty was signed according to the original draft. The following is the substance. Article 1st renounces Trimbukjee Dainglia, engages to punish his adherents, and to surrender his family to the British government, as hostages for his never being again countenanced. Article 2d re-establishes the treaty of Bassein, except as now modified. Article 3d explains more specifically the former engagement not to take Euro-

peans or Americans into the service of the Pêshwa. Article 4th engages, in further execution of the previous stipulation, respecting his Highness's conduct to other native powers, not to receive or send vakeels or communicate in any manner, except through the British Resident: further, renounces the character of supreme head of the Mahratta empire. Article 5th commutes his Highness's past claims on the Gykwâr for an annual payment of four lakh of rupees, in case Anund Rao should consent; if he should not, arbitration to be made under the treaty of Bassein: renounces all prospective claims unconditionally. Article 6th exchanges the proviso for the Pêshwa's contingent of five thousand horse and three thousand infantry, for an engagement to furnish to the British government the means of maintaining an equal force. Articles 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th, provide for the transfer and *arrondissement* of territories to be ceded for this purpose, with their forts, according to a schedule, and for the date and operation of the cessions from the 5th of June, the commencement of the Hindoo year. Article 11th authorises the discretionary increase of the subsidiary force, and its employment in reducing the ceded districts. Article 12th cedes Ahmednugur, with a glacis of two thousand yards, and engages to furnish pasture lands for the subsidiary force. Articles 13th and 14th cede to us

all the Pêshwa's rights over Bundelkhund, in Malwa, or elsewhere in Hindoostan. Article 15th renews the farm of Ahmedabad to the Gykwar, for an annual payment of four and a half lakh of rupees; exclusive, however, of the Katteewâr tribute. Article 16th ratifies the settlement of Pundurpoor, made the 6th of July 1812, for the adjustment of the Pêshwa's relative rights over the Jageerdars, and restores the Rasteea's forfeited Jageer. Article 17th stipulates the restitution of Melghât an usurpation of Trimbukjee from the Nizam, in violation of the treaty of Bassein*. Article 18th provides for the exchange of the ratifications in the usual manner.

The schedule alluded to in Article 7 specifies the following territories: 1st, the Konkan, or country between the sea and the western ghâts, to the north of the high road from Poona to Bombay, rated by Mr. Elphinstone at eleven lakh of rupees, but alleged by the Pêshwa's minister to yield considerably more; 2d, the whole of the Pêshwa's possessions in Goozerat, estimated at ten lakh of rupees, exclusive, however, of Ahmedabad, Oolpar, and the Gykwar's commutation-payment for past claims; 3d, the Katteewâr tribute, taken at four lakh of rupees; 4th, the forts of Darwar and Koosigul, with sufficient territory in the

* Vide note to page 319.

neighbourhood and south of the Wurda to make the entire annual revenue ceded equal to thirty-four lakh of rupees. The cessions were to be immediate, except the lands in the Carnatic, the extent of which would depend upon what might be found to be the value of the Konkan; but the two forts named were to be surrendered forthwith.

This treaty was ratified by the Governor-general on the 5th of July, 1817. It contains provisions for the settlement of all those points, that for a long time before had been the subject of acrimonious discussion at the Poona durbar, as well as for securing the British government, as far as seemed possible, against a continuance of his Highness's treachery and secret hostility. The engagement being avowedly compulsory, and involving an aggrandizement of our own territories at the expense of our late ally, the first that had been made upon any Mahratta state since the settlement of 1805-6, was undoubtedly calculated to increase the apprehension and alarm, with which our power and policy were regarded. But the measure was exacted and warranted by Bajee Rao's indisputable perfidy; and the detection of it at the moment when we were on the point of entering on a connected plan of operations, directed to the extirpation of the predatory hordes, would have justified a still further reduction of

the means of this prince than was actually effected, nay perhaps, have warranted his entire suspension from the exercise of any kind of authority and influence pending those operations. Subsequent events showed the danger of restoring him to any share of power, until the projected measures had been completed. It was hardly to be expected, that his pride could ever forgive the humiliation he had been subjected to, or that the sense of comparative weakness, which had been the motive of present submission, could for a moment influence his speculation on those ulterior chances, held out by the enterprise in which we were about to engage. This speculation, not his present condition, was the obvious source of all his subsequent treachery, and of all his past intrigues. Yet perhaps the risk was unavoidable; for an attempt to remove the head of the Marhatta nation entirely from power and consideration would, at this juncture, have been productive of much confusion, and must have contributed to exasperate the hostile disposition of that nation to an earlier, and probably a more general ferment, at a moment too when we were less prepared. On the whole, there was equal moderation and justice in exacting, by way of safeguard against an ally of detected perfidy, whose services to a certain extent we were entitled to

expect, that in lieu of the contingent he was himself bound to furnish to the cause, he should provide the means of maintaining an equal body at our own immediate disposition. As for the appeals made to our liberality and compassion, after the final resolution to submit was taken, these were very justly allowed to have no weight in mitigating the terms imposed: such motives can have no legitimate influence, until confidence be completely re-established; and no part of the Peshwa's conduct, from the time of our first connexion with him, had left an impression of his character, that entitled him to be restored to it, more particularly after what had passed so recently. The cessions now demanded, though extensive, were by no means a dead loss to his exchequer; for he would henceforward be saved the expense of supporting, from his own resources, the troops they would enable us to keep up. It should be recollected, that Bajee Rao had for ten years enjoyed the benefit of the British subsidiary force, without any corresponding pecuniary sacrifice on his part: for the cession of his Bundelkhund revenues, by way of subsidy, was a surrender of what he never had really possessed, what required an expensive military force to occupy, and what any other power would have been free to undertake the conquest of. For

these reasons, it is fair to presume, that Bajee Rao will not be thought to have been too hardly dealt with on the present occasion.

The subsidiary force returned to Seroor immediately after the execution of the treaty, in order to prepare itself to take a part in the general operations of the ensuing season. One battalion, however, was detached to take possession of the cessions in the Konkan. The force that had moved into Kandês, under Colonel Doveton, succeeded in keeping under that part of the country, and ultimately in expelling from it Trimbukjee and his adherents. What most contributed to this was the gallant storm of a strong hold occupied by them, of the name of Dorana. Colonel Scott, of the 22nd Madras N. I., appeared before it, with a detachment on the 10th of July, and resolved immediately to attempt an escalade. Making ladders of his tent-poles, he forthwith attacked the Petta, and carried it in several places. The garrison retired into the fort; which, alarmed at observing the further preparations for storming that point also, they likewise surrendered. After this, Trimbukjee's adherents ceased to make head, and he himself retired to Choolee Muheshwur on the Nerbudda, where he spent the rainy months with a few followers. Colonel Doveton moved back to his cantonment of Jâlna on the 17th of July.

APPENDIX.

Papers and Documents referred to in Vol. I.

A.

(Referred to in Page 76. 80.)

Translation of a copy of the written Opinions of the Principal Goorkha Chiefs, on the Question of Peace or War with the British Government.

Question submitted by the Raja of Nipal.

Disputes exist between me and the English. The Governor-general has written to me that he has given orders to the Judge and Collector to establish their authority, (in the disputed lands on the Gourukpoor frontier,) and that he shall not think it necessary to repeat his intimation on that subject. How then is my Raj to exist? In my judgment, an appeal should be made to arms. Do you deliberate, and give me a decided and united opinion.

Reply of General Bheem Sein Thapa.

Through the influence of your good fortune, and that of your ancestors, no one has yet been able to cope with

the state of Nipâl. The Chinese once made war upon us, but were reduced to seek peace. How then will the English be able to penetrate into the hills? Under your auspices, we shall by our own exertions be able to oppose to them a force of fifty-two lakhs of men, with which we will expel them. The small fort of Bhurtpoor was the work of man, yet the English, being worsted before it, desisted from the attempt to conquer it; our hills and fastnesses are formed by the hand of God, and are impregnable. I therefore recommend the prosecution of hostilities. We can make peace afterwards on such terms as may suit our convenience.

Reply of Kajee Rundoj Singh Thapa.

What General Bheem Sein has stated is good. Alexander overthrew empires, but failed to establish his authority in our mountains. There is, however, one source of apprehension. The Hill Rajas have been expelled from their dominions. They will disclose the secrets of the hills, and will assuredly conduct the English into those regions. When the Rajas shall unite and co-operate with the English, the latter will acquire confidence, and force their way into the country. I therefore recommend a temporizing policy for a time, or even to concede a portion of what is now actually in their possession, as preferable to war. By such a course, the machinations and intrigues of our enemies will best be defeated. I have thus stated what has occurred to my mind.

Reply of Raj Gooroo Runnat Pundit.

I conceive that the will of the Sovereign is paramount to all other considerations, but having been asked my

opinion, I proceed to deliver it, leaving the Sovereign to adopt it or otherwise at his pleasure. Hitherto we have contrived to effect our purpose one way or another, but for the future, it seems to me that without an adjustment of the boundary dispute to their satisfaction, the English will not recede. As yet we have received no injury (calling for an appeal to arms); I propose, therefore, that of the territory of the Nuwab Vizeer, which has come into the possession of this state, (meaning of the usurpations on the Gourukpoor frontier,) half should be relinquished as the price of peace. If the English resolve on hostilities, we cannot maintain ourselves in those possessions, for we cannot cope with them in the plains or Turæe, though in the hills we have nothing to fear. I have thus stated my opinion, but am at the same time ready to yield to the better judgment of others.

Reply of Kajee Dilbunjun Pandé (or Panre.)

The Gooroo has made himself personally acquainted with the designs and proceedings of the English, and conceives them to be decidedly inimical. It is well. But are we inferior to the English, that we should yield to them? They cannot invade our territory: if they attempt it, they must be repulsed; for should they once succeed in penetrating, all the concerns of this Raj will be thrown into confusion. If their efforts are directed against the Turæe of this state, and they excite disturbances there, can we not retaliate? and how will they be able to protect their own territories?

Reply of Chountra Bum Sah—of Kajee Umur Singh Thapa—and of Hustodeel.

We have enough to do to manage the territory we

possess. But if circumstances drive us into war with the English, by the influence of the auspicious fortune of this Raj, we should fight and conquer. The present time however is not favourable. The English, seeing their opportunity, have put themselves into an attitude of offence, and the conflict, if war be now undertaken, will be desperate. They will not rest satisfied without establishing their own power and authority, and will unite with the Hill Rajas, whom we have dispossessed. We have hitherto but hunted deer; if we engage in this war, we must prepare to fight tigers. If the Raja would listen to our advice, we would recommend the relinquishment, for the present, of all lands recently occupied, so as to avoid a rupture. For if matters be pushed to extremity with the English, the whole concerns of the state will be thrown into confusion. Matters in this quarter (i. e. in the western hills, of which these three chiefs were governors) are already in a distracted condition, and other parts of the Goorkha territory will similarly become the scene of disorder. The advocate of war, he who proposes to fight and conquer the English (alluding to Bheem Sein,) has been bred up at court, and is a stranger to the toil and hardships of a military life. Even now that he proposes war, his place is about your person. By the influence of the auspicious fortune of this Raj success would crown our efforts in the event of a rupture: but our life has been passed in traversing forests, with hatchets in our hands to collect wood and leaves, and still we pursue the same occupation. War we know to be an arduous undertaking; it is so for veteran troops, and for raw recruits must be much more so. There is an old saying, that they best transact their

master's business who exercise the greatest prudence and circumspection.

APPENDIX A. CONTINUED.

(Referred to in Page 76.)

Translation of Instructions sent by the Raja of Nipal to General Umur Singh Thapa, governor of Palpa, on the Gourukpoor frontier.

I send you a copy of the opinions of all the principal chiefs. They differ widely from one another; but the result is a determination for war. Purchase, therefore, and lay up in store, all the grain you can procure, and send an account of the treasure and gunpowder at your command. Establish a chain of posts from Sooleana to the Gunduk river, and entertain all the recruits you can. Let the property of all persons between the ages of twelve and forty, who may refuse to join in the war, be confiscated, and allow every man a seer of rice for subsistence while he may serve. I have issued orders for calling out the population here, and for establishing a chain of posts along the frontier. You must strengthen the forts of Nonakoh. Five hundred Telingas (regular sepoy) will be despatched to reinforce the troops under your command.

Send daily reports of what passes in your quarter, and prepare for active hostilities.

Dated, Chyt, 1871, Sumbut,

corresponding with 2d April, 1814.

APPENDIX.

B.

(Referred to in Pages 80, 180, 191, and passim.)

From Umur Singh and his sons, Ram Das, and Urjun Thapas, to the Raja of Nipal, dated Raj-gurh, 2nd March, 1815.

A copy of your letter of the 23d December, addressed to Runjoer Singh, under the Red Seal, was sent by the latter to me, who have received it with every token of respect. It was to the following purport. "The capture of Nalapanee by the enemy has been communicated to me from Gurhwal and Kumaon, as also the intelligence of his having marched to Nahu: having assembled his force, he now occupies the whole country from Barapursa to Subturee and Muhotree. My army is also secretly posted in various places in the junguls of the mountains. An army under a general has arrived in Gourukpoor, for Palpa, and another detachment has reached the borders of Beejypoor. I have further heard that a general-officer has set off from Calcutta, to give us further trouble. For the sake of a few trifling objects, some intermediate agents have destroyed

the mutual harmony, and war is waging far and wide. All this you know. You ought to send an embassy to conciliate the English, otherwise the cause is lost. The enemy, after making immense preparations, have begun the war, and unless great concessions are made, they will not listen to terms. To restore the relations of amity by concession is good and proper; for this purpose it is fit, in the first place, to cede to the enemy the departments of Bootwul, Palpa, and Sheeraj, and the disputed tracts already settled by the commissioners towards Barah.* If this be insufficient to re-establish harmony, we ought to abandon the whole of the Turace, the Doon, and the low lands; and if the English are still dissatisfied on account of not obtaining possession of a portion of the mountains, you are herewith authorized to give up, with the Doon, the country as far as the Sutlej. Do whatever may be practicable to restore the relations of peace and amity, and be assured of my approbation and assent. If these means be unsuccessful, it will be very difficult to preserve the integrity of my dominions from Kunka Teestta to the Sutlej. If the enemy once obtain a footing in the centre of our territory, both extremities will be thrown into disorder. If you can retire with your army and military stores to pursue any other plan of operations that may afterwards appear eligible, it will be advisable. On this account, you ought immediately to effect a junction with all the other officers on the western service, and retire to any part of our territory which, as far as Nipál, you may think yourself capable of retaining. These are your orders."

* Meaning the twenty-two villages on the Sarun frontier.

In the first place, after the immense preparations of the enemy, he will not be satisfied with all these concessions, or if he should accept of our terms, he would serve us as he did Tippoo; from whom he first accepted of an indemnification of six crores of rupees in money and territory, and afterwards wrested from him his whole country. If we were to cede to him so much country, he would seek some fresh occasion of quarrel, and at a future opportunity, would wrest from us other provinces. Having lost so much territory, we should be unable to maintain our army on its present footing, and our military fame being once reduced, what means should we have left to defend our eastern possessions? While we retain Bisahur, Gurhwal is secure: if the former be abandoned, the Bhooteas of Ruwain will certainly betray us. The English having thus acquired the Doon and Ruwain, it will be impossible for us to maintain Gurhwal; and being deprived of the latter, Kumaon and Dotee will be also lost to us. After the seizure of these provinces, Achain, Joomlee, and Dooloo, will be wrested from us in succession. You say, "that a proclamation has been issued to the inhabitants of the eastern kurats;" if they have joined the enemy, the other kurats will do so likewise, and then the country, Dood Koossee, on the east, to Bheeree, on the west, cannot be long retained. Having lost your dominions, what is to become of your great military establishments? When our power is once reduced, we shall have another Knox's mission, under pretence of concluding a treaty of alliance and friendship, and founding commercial establishments. If we decline receiving their mission, they will insist; and if we are

unable to oppose force, and desire them to come unaccompanied with troops, they will not comply. They will begin by introducing a company; a battalion will soon after follow, and at length an army will be assembled for the subjection of Nipal. You think that if, for the present, the low lands, the Doon, and the country to the Sutlej, were ceded to them, they would cease to entertain designs upon the other provinces of Nipal: do not trust them! they who counselled you to receive the mission of Knox,* and permit the establishment of a commercial factory, will usurp the government of Nipal. With regard to the concessions now proposed, if you had, in the first instance, decided upon a pacific line of conduct, and agreed to restore the departments of Bootwul and Sheeoraj, as adjusted by the commissioners, the present contest might have been avoided. But you could not suppress your desire to retain these places, and, by murdering their revenue officer, excited their indignation, and kindled a war for trifles.

At Jythuk we have obtained a victory over the enemy. If I succeed against General Ochterlony, and Runjoor Singh, with Juspao Thapa and his officers, prevail at Jythuk, Runjeet Singh will rise against the enemy. In conjunction with the Seiks, my army will make a descent into the plains; and our forces, crossing the Jumna from two different quarters, will recover possession of the Doon. When we reach Hurdwar, the Nuwab of Lukhnow may be expected to take a part in the cause; and, on his accession to the general coalition we

* Meaning apparently that the British would restore the fallen faction of the Pandes, and by their means govern Nipal.

may consider ourselves secure as far as Khunka. Relying on your fortune, I trust that Bulbhudur Koonwur, and Rewunt Kajee, will soon be able to reinforce the garrison of Jythuk; and I hope, ere long, to send Punt Kajee with eight companies, when the force there will be very strong. The troops sent by you are arriving every day; and when they all come up, I hope we shall succeed both here and at Jythuk.

Formerly, when the English endeavoured to penetrate to Sundowlee, they continued for two years* in possession of Bareh Pursa, and Muhotree; but, when you conquered Nipal, they were either destroyed by your force, or fell victims to the climate, with the exception of a few only, who abandoned the place. Orders should now be given to all your officers to defend Choudundee, and Choudena in Bejypoor, and the two kurats, and the ridge of Mahabharut. Suffer the enemy to retain the low lands for a couple of years: measures can afterwards be taken to expel them. Lands transferred under a written agreement cannot again be resumed; but if they have been taken by force, force may be employed to recover them. Fear nothing, even though the Seiks should not join us. Should you succeed now in bringing our differences to an *amicable* termination by the cession of territory, the enemy, in the course of a few years, would be in possession of Nipal, as he took possession of the country of Tippoo. The present, therefore, is not the time for treaty and conciliation. These expedients should have been tried be-

* Alluding to the expedition under Major Kinloch, when the Turæe was occupied for two years; an event that Umur Singh was old enough to have witnessed.

the Seiks and Goorkhas towards the Jumna, the chiefs of the Dukhun may be expected to join the coalition, as also the Nuwab of Lukhnow, and the Salik-Ramee-Leech*. Then will be the time for us to drive out the enemy, and recover possession of the low countries of Palpa, as far as Bejypoor. If we succeed in regaining these, we can attempt further conquest in the plains.

There has been no fighting in your quarter yet; the Choudundee and Choudena of Beejypoor, as far as the ridge of Mubabharut and Sooleana, should be well defended. Countries acquired in four generations, under the administration of the Thapas, should not be abandoned for the purpose of bringing matters to an amicable adjustment, without deep and serious reflection. If we are victorious in the war, we can easily adjust our differences; and if we are defeated, death is preferable to a reconciliation on humiliating terms. When the Chinese army invaded Nipal, we implored the mercy of Heaven by offerings to the Brahmins, and the performance of religious ceremonies; and, through the favour of one and intercession of the other, we succeeded in repulsing the enemy. Ever since you confiscated the Jageers of the Brahmins, thousands have been in distress and poverty. Promises were given that they should be restored at the capture of Kangrah; and orders to this effect, under the red seal, were addressed to me, and Nyn Singh Thapa. We failed, however, in that object, and now there is universal discontent. You ought, therefore, to assemble all the Brahmins, and promise to restore to them their lands

* It is not known who Umur Singh means by the Salik-Ramee-Leech; and some other of his names of places and persons differ from any in common use.

and property, in the event of your conquering and expelling the English. By these means, many thousand worthy Brahmins will put up their prayers for your prosperity, and the enemy will be driven forth. By the practice of charity, the territory acquired in four generations may be preserved, and through the favour of God, our power and dominion may be still further extended. By the extension of territory, our military establishment may be maintained on its present footing, and even increased: the numerous countries which you propose to cede to the enemy, yielded a revenue equal to the maintenance of an army of four thousand men, and Kangra might have been captured. By the cession of these provinces, the reputation and splendour of your court will no longer remain. By the capture of Kangra your name would have been rendered formidable; and though that has not happened, a powerful impression has, nevertheless, been made on the people of the plains by the extension of your conquests to the Sutlej. To effect a reconciliation, by the cession of the country to the west of the Jumna, would give rise to the idea that the Goorkhas were unable to oppose the English, would lower the dignity of your name in the plains, and cause a reduction of your army to the extent of four thousand men. The enemy will moreover require the possession of Bisahur, and after that the conquest of Gurhwal will be easy; nor will it be possible, in that case, for us to retain Kumaon, and with it we must lose Dotee, Acham, and Joomlah, whence he may be expected to penetrate even to Bheree. If the English once establish themselves firmly in possession of a part of the hills, we shall be unable to drive them out: the countries towards the

Sutlej should be obstinately defended; the abandonment of the disputed tracts in the plains is a lesser evil; the possession of the former preserves to us the road to further conquest. You ought, therefore, to direct Gooroo Rungnath Pundit, and Dulbunjun Pandeh, to give up the disputed lands of Bootwul, Sheeraj, and the twenty-two villages in the vicinity of Bareh, and thus, if possible, bring our differences to a termination. To this step I have no objections, and shall feel no animosity to those who may perform this service. I must, however, declare a decided hostility to such as, in bringing about a reconciliation with the English, consult only their own interest, and forget their duty to you. If they will not accept these terms, what have we to fear? The English attempted to take Bhurtpoor by storm; but the Raja Runjeet Singh destroyed an European regiment, and a battalion of sepoy. To the present day they have not ventured to meddle with Bhurtpoor again; whence it would seem that one fort has sufficed to check their progress. In the low country of Dhurma they established their authority; but the Raja overthrew their army, and captured all their artillery and stores, and now lives and continues in quiet possession of his dominions. Our proffers of peace and reconciliation will be interpreted as the result of fear; and it would be absurd to expect that the enemy will respect a treaty concluded under such circumstances. Therefore, let us confide our fortunes to our swords; and, by boldly opposing the enemy, compel him to remain within his own territory;—or, if he should continue to advance, stung with shame at the idea of retreating, after his immense preparations, we can then give up the lands in dispute, and adjust our differences.

Such, however, is the fame and terror of our swords, that Bulbhadur, with a force of six hundred men, defeated an army of three or four thousand English. His force consisted of the old Gourukh and Kurrukh companies, which were only partly composed of the inhabitants of our ancient kingdom, and of the people of the countries from Bheree to Gurhwal; and with these he destroyed one battalion, and crippled and repulsed another. My army is similarly composed; nevertheless, all descriptions are eager to meet the enemy. In your quarter you are surrounded with the veterans of our army, and cannot apprehend desertion from them: you have also an immense militia, and many Jageerdars, who will fight for their own honour and interests. Assembling the militia of the low lands, and fighting in the plains, is impolitic;—call them into the hills, and cut the enemy up by detail, (a passage here the sense of which cannot be discovered). The enemy is proud, and flushed with success, and has reduced under his subjection all the western Zemindars, the Ranas, and Raja of Kuhlor, and the Thakooræen, and will keep peace with no one. However, my advice is nothing. I will direct Ram Doss to propose to General Ochterlony the abandonment, on our part, of the disputed lands, and will forward to you the answer which he may receive. All the Ranas, Rajas, and Thakooræen, have joined the enemy, and I am surrounded; nevertheless, we shall fight and conquer, and all my officers have taken the same resolution. The Pundits have pronounced the month of Bysakh,* as particularly auspicious for the Goorkhas;—d, by selecting a fortunate day, we shall surely con-

* Commencing about the 10th or 12th of April.

quer. I am desirous of engaging the enemy slowly and with caution, but cannot manage it, the English being always first to begin the fight. I hope, however, to be able to delay the battle till Bysakh, when I will choose a favourable opportunity to fight them. When we shall have driven the enemy from hence, either Runjoor or myself, according to your wishes, will repair to your presence. In the present crisis, it is very advisable to write to the Emperor of China, and to the Lama of Lassa, and to the other Lamas; and for this purpose, I beg leave to submit the enclosed draft of a letter to their address; any errors in it, I trust, will be forgiven by you; and I earnestly recommend that you will lose no time in sending a petition to the Emperor of China, and a letter to the Lama.

APPENDIX

C.

(See Page 206.)

Treaty of peace between the Honourable East India Company and Moha Raja Bickram Sah, Raja of Nipal, settled between Lieutenant-colonel Bradshaw, on the part of the Honourable Company, in virtue of the full powers vested in him by his Excellency the Right Honourable Francis, Earl of Moira, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, one of his Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, appointed by the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company to direct and control all the affairs in the East Indies, and by Sree Gooroo Gujraj Missur, and Chunder Seekur Opadheca, on the part of Moharaja Kurman Jodh Bickram Sah Behaudur Shumsheer Jung, in virtue of the powers to that effect vested in them by the said Raja of Nipal.

WHEREAS war has arisen between the Honourable East India Company and the Raja of Nipal, and whereas the parties are mutually disposed to restore the relations of

peace and amity, which, previously to the occurrence of the late differences, had long subsisted between the two states, the following terms of peace have been agreed upon.

Article 1st.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable East India Company, and the Raja of Nipal.

Article 2d.—The Raja of Nipal renounces all claim to the lands which were the subject of discussion between the two states before the war; and acknowledges the right of the Honourable Company to the sovereignty of those lands.

Article 3d.—The Raja of Nipal hereby cedes to the Honourable the East India Company, in perpetuity, all the undermentioned territories, namely :—

First,—The whole of the low lands between the rivers Kali and Raptée.

Secondly,—The whole of the low lands (with the exception of Bootwul Khas) lying between the Raptée and the Gunduk.

Thirdly,—The whole of the low lands between the Gunduk and Koosee, in which the authority of the British government has been introduced, or is in actual course of introduction.

Fourthly,—All the low lands between the river Mechee and the Teesta.

Fifthly,—All the territories within the hills, eastward of the river Mechee, including the fort and lands of Nagree, and the pass of Nagarcote, leading from Morung into the hills, together with the territory lying between that pass and Nagree. The aforesaid terri-

tory shall be evacuated by the Goorkha troops within forty days from this date.

Article 4th.—With a view to indemnify the chiefs and barahdars of the state of Nipal, whose interests will suffer by the alienation of the lands ceded by the foregoing article, the British government agrees to settle pensions, to the aggregate amount of two lakh of rupees per annum, on such chiefs as may be selected by the Raja of Nipal, and in the proportions which the Raja may fix. As soon as the selection is made, Sunuds shall be granted under the seal and signature of the Governor-general for the pensions respectively.

Article 5th.—The Raja of Nipal renounces for himself, his heirs and successors, all claim to, or connexion with, the countries lying to the west of the river Kalee; and engages never to have any concern with these countries or the inhabitants thereof.

Article 6th.—The Raja of Nipal engages never to molest or disturb the Raja of Sikhim in the possession of his territories; but agrees, if any differences shall arise between the state of Nipal and the Raja of Sikhim, or the subjects of either, that such differences shall be referred to the arbitration of the British government, by whose award the Raja of Nipal engages to abide.

Article 7th.—The Raja of Nipal hereby engages never to take or retain in his service any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American state, without the consent of the British government.

Article 8th.—In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the two states, it is agreed that accredited ministers from each shall reside at the court of the other.

Article 9th.—This treaty, consisting of nine articles, shall be ratified by the Raja of Nipal within fifteen days from this date; and the ratification shall be delivered to Lieutenant-colonel Bradshaw, who engages to obtain and deliver to the Raja the ratification of the Governor-general within twenty days, or sooner, if practicable.

Done at Segoulee, on the 2d day of December, 1815.

(L. S.) [Signed] PARIS BRADSHAW, Lt.-col. P. A.

(L. S.) [Signed] GUJRAJ MISUR.

(L. S.) [Signed] CHUNDUR SEEKHUR OPADHEEA.

Received this treaty from Chundur Seekhur Opadheea, agent on the part of the Raja of Nipal, in the valley of Muckwanpoor, at half-past two o'clock, p. m. on the 4th of March, 1816, and delivered to him the counterpart treaty on behalf of the British government.

[Signed] D. OCHTERLONY,
Agt. Governor-general.

Translation of an engagement (Ikrarnama) in the Hindee language, executed at Mukwanpoor Mande, by Kajee Bukhtawur Singh Thapa, and Chundur Seekhur Opadheea, Plenipotentiaries on the part of the Raja of Nipal, and forwarded by General Sir David Ochterlony along with the above treaty.

At the time of delivering the treaty, Major-general Sir David Ochterlony was pleased to observe, that the Right Honourable the Governor-general had not authorised him to accept the treaty, and that he could not encourage any hope of those indulgences of which a prospect

had been held out by Lieutenant-colonel Bradshaw, being granted in addition to the treaty; that his Lordship indeed would not grant them, and that he (the general) would not recommend him to do so; that nothing beyond what was stated in the treaty would be allowed. Accordingly, we, Sree Kajee Bukhtawur Singh Thapa, and Chundur Seekhur Opadheea, have agreed to what Sir D. Ochterlony has required; in testimony whereof, we have executed this Razeenama, and delivered it to the Major-general, dated 5th of Soodee Phagun, 1872, Sumbut, corresponding with Tuesday the 4th of March, 1816.

A true Translation.

[Signed]

J. MONCKTON,

Persn. Secretary to Government.

From the Raja of Nipal, received on the 18th March, 1816.

On the 21st of Maug, 1872, Sumbut, corresponding with the 2d of February, 1816, I had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter, dated 13th of January, stating that it was your hope and expectation to have been able to address me in the language of friendship and congratulation, on the renewal of the former relations of amity between the British government and the state of Nipal; but that unfortunately that hope and that expectation had been defeated and frustrated by the extraordinary conduct adopted by my government, in refusing to ratify a solemn treaty concluded by my authorized agents, stated by myself and my ministers to have been vested with full powers; intimating, however, at the same time, that there was yet time to avoid the danger to which I had exposed myself, namely,

that the instant ratification of the treaty, and its transmission to Major-general Sir David Ochterlony, would avert the impending evil, and would even induce your Lordship to consider the propriety of relaxing from the rigour of some parts of the engagement, but that any delay would be fatal; adding also, that your letter would be forwarded to me by the Major-general, who was vested with the command of the British force advancing into my territory, and with the conduct of all political affairs with my government.

The relations of harmony and friendship between the Honourable English Company and this state, by the favour of the British government, had subsisted without any difference of interest for a period of fifty years; and my ancestors were always grateful for its kindness. I also had no other wish but that of conforming to ancient rule; and the British government likewise conducted itself, as usual, in the spirit of kindness. Were I, indeed, to attribute the late transactions either to error on my side, or to unkindness on the part of the British government, I should be wrong;—I ascribe all this war and tumult solely to the malignity of fortune. I nevertheless flattered myself that your Lordship still had my welfare at heart. Accordingly, when your Lordship addressed your letter of friendly admonition to me, I considered the counsel and advice which it contained to be all for my own good. I wished therefore, agreeably to your Lordship's injunctions, and for my own interests, to transmit the treaty by the hands of a confidential officer to Major-general Sir David Ochterlony; but, unfortunately, my evil destiny led me to delay its transmission; and, in the mean time, Sir David Ochterlony

advanced with the British army to Mandee, near Muckwanpoor.

As I had no other object in view than the restoration of peace and friendship between the two states, I successively dispatched Kajee Bukhtawur Singh Thapa, and Chundur Seekhur Opadheea, with the ratified treaty to Sir David Ochterlony, who knowing your Lordship's favourable disposition towards me, and being himself also kindly disposed, opened a communication with Kajee Bukhtawur Singh, for the restoration of peace and amity, and received the treaty from the hands of that officer and Chundur Seekhur Opadheea; delivering to them at the same time, in exchange, for the purpose of being forwarded to me, the counterpart of it, under your Lordship's seal and signature, which I have since received.

Sir David Ochterlony caused Kajee Bukhtawur Singh, and Chundur Seekhur Opadheea, to execute a separate engagement in the Hindee language, (Ikarnama,) the contents of which will be made known to your Lordship by the Major-général's communications. I hereby confirm that engagement.

It only remains for me to express my hope that your Lordship will manifest your generosity and magnanimity in such a manner as to secure to this state the same rank and consideration which it has hitherto enjoyed: a compliance with this request is not inconsistent with the dictates of liberality and benevolence.

I trust that your Lordship, believing me to be ever anxious for the pleasing accounts of your health, will continue to gratify me by kind letters.

(A true Translation,)

[Signed]

J. MONCKTON,

Persn. Secretary to Government.

APPENDIX

D.

(See Page 207.)

Treaty, Covenant, or Agreement entered on by Captain Barre Latter, Agent on the part of his Excellency the Right Honourable the Earl of Moira, K. G. Governor-general, &c. &c. &c. and by Nazir Chama Tinjen, and Macha Timbah, and Lama Duchim Longdoo, Deputies on the part of the Raja of Sikhimputee, being severally authorised and duly appointed for the above purposes.

Article 1st.—The Honourable East India Company cedes, transfers, and makes over, in full sovereignty, to the Sikhimputee Raja, his heirs or successors, all the hilly or mountainous country situated to the eastward of the Mechee river, and to the westward of the Teesta river, formerly possessed and occupied by the Raja of Nipal, ceded to the Honourable East India Company by the treaty of peace signed at Segoulee.

Article 2d.—The Sikhimputee Raja engages, for himself and successors, to abstain from any acts of aggression or hostility against the Goorkhas, or any other state.

Article 3d.—That he will refer to the arbitration of the British government any disputes or questions that

may arise between his subjects, and those of Nipál, or any other neighbouring state, and abide by the decision of the British government.

Article the 4th,—He engages for himself and successors to join the British troops with the whole of his military force, when employed within the hills, and in general to afford the British troops every aid and facility in his power.

Article the 5th,—That he will not permit any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American state, to reside within his dominions without the permission of the English government.

Article the 6th,—That he will immediately seize and deliver up any decoits, or notorious offenders, that may take refuge within his territories.

Article the 7th,—That he will not afford protection to any defaulters of revenue, or other delinquents, when demanded by the British government through their accredited agents.

Article the 8th,—That he will afford protection to merchants and traders from the Company's provinces; and he engages that no duties shall be levied on the transit of merchandize beyond the established custom at the several Golahs, or marts.

Article the 9th,—The Honourable East India Company guarantees to the Sikhimputee Raja and his successors, the full and peaceable possession of the tract of hilly country specified in the first article of the present agreement.

Article the 10th,—This treaty shall be ratified and exchanged by the Sikhimputee Raja within one month from the present date, and the counterpart, when con-

firmed by his Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-general, shall be transmitted to the Raja.

Done at Titallya, this 10th day of February, 1817, answering to the 9th of Phagoon, 1873, Sumbut, and to the 30th of Maugh, 1223, Bengal æra.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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