

THE HISTORY
OF
BRITISH INDIA.

BY JAMES MILL, ESQ.

FOURTH EDITION WITH NOTES AND CONTINUATION,
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ADVERTISEMENT.

WHEN I consented to carry a new edition of Mill's History of British India through the press, I engaged to continue the History to the date at which the East India Company's charter was last renewed. The engagement was somewhat ill-considered. It was acceded to under an anticipation that the task could be accomplished with comparative facility, as a residence in Bengal during nearly the entire interval had made me familiar with the general course of the events which had occurred, and some of which I had at various times attempted to record. It was soon evident that I had much miscalculated.

However lively the impression which had been made by the interesting and important character of the transactions I had witnessed, I felt it to be my duty, before undertaking to narrate them, to consult all the available authorities of an original and authentic description in which they were to be traced. Foremost among these were the valuable but volumi-

nous Records at the India House; an unreserved access to which was readily granted by Sir John Hobhouse, the President of the Board of Controul, and W. B. Bayley, Esq., then Chairman of the Court of Directors. The obligation of making use of this privilege, however imperfectly, has caused an amount of labour and expenditure of time far exceeding my expectations.

Beside the manuscript volumes, to which the great bulk of the Records is necessarily confined, very extensive portions of them have been occasionally printed by order of Parliament, or under the authority of the Court of Directors. To these, also, it was necessary to refer, and the reference was not effected without incurring additional trouble and delay.

The third and last class of authorities to which extensive application has been made, consists of the published accounts of persons engaged or interested in the occurrences which they have related. There is a great body of contemporary evidence of this description, varying in merit and in weight, but exacting attention from all who wish to obtain an accurate knowledge of the origin and progress of events. The perusal in more or less detail of as many publications of this class as I could meet with, has contributed to retard the completion of my task beyond the limits within which I had trusted that it would have been concluded.

I have thought it necessary thus to account for the delay which has occurred, and which is not yet at an end. It has been occasioned by an anxious wish to offer to the public an historical work in which they may place some trust. Whether that object has been attained, remains to be determined; but the desire to merit confidence will, perhaps, be accepted as a sufficient excuse for the apparent tardiness of the writer.

H. H. WILSON.

LONDON,
25th November, 1844.

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BOOK I.
CHAP. I.

1805.

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RAJA OF BERAR.—*Dissatisfaction.—Relinquishment of Sambhalpur.*—SINDHIA.—*Pecuniary Difficulties.—Decline of Power.—Quarrels at his Court.—Conduct to Bhopal.*—HOLKAR.—*Exactions from the surrounding States.—Death of his Nephew, Kandi Rao,—of his Brother, Kasi Rao.—Derangement.—Tulasi Bhai, Regent.*—AMIR KHAN.—*His Rise and Power.—Rajputs.—RANA OF UDAYPUR. RAJAS OF JODHPUR AND JAYPUR.—Contest for the Hand of Krishna Kumari, Princess of Udaypur.—Mahatta Extortion.—Application of Jaypur for British Interference,—refused.—Policy of Holkar and Sindhia.—Amir Khan joins the Rana.—Death of the Princess.—Other Rajput Princes.*—BIKANER, KOTA, BUNDI, MACHERI.—Játs.—RAJA OF BHURTPORE.—RANA OF GOHUD.—*Treaty with him annulled.—Sikhs, their Origin and Constitution.—Rise of Ranjit Sing.—Remarks.*

THE recent hostilities between the British Government of India and the chiefs of the principal Mahratta states had entirely altered the relative position of the contending parties, and had engendered the elements of still more momentous change.

The Mahrattas had occupied through the latter half of the eighteenth century the chief place amongst the native states of India: they had brought under their sway the widest and most valuable portions of Hindustan, and had possessed themselves of the name and person of the Emperor of Delhi. On the first occasion on which they had come into collision with the British arms, they had inflicted upon them discomfiture and discredit; and

they had plunged into the late struggle, strong both in military resources and reputation, and confident that they should rid themselves of a dangerous and encroaching rival. The result had disappointed their hopes, and accelerated the aggrandisement of that power which they had trusted to overthrow.

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In the outset of the contest, native opinion had inclined to the Mahrattas; the close of the war had shaken belief in their superiority. Still, however, much of the prepossession in their favour survived their reverses, and the full consequences of the encounter seem to have been but imperfectly appreciated even by those who had been engaged in the strife. Engrossed by the care of providing for immediate pecuniary embarrassments, the British Government overlooked all political considerations; and, in its impatience to relieve financial pressure, threw away some actual and some prospective advantages, shrunk from the commanding elevation to which it had been raised, and by unseasonable moderation disseminated doubts of its vigour, and held out encouragement to future aggression. The Mahratta leaders, justly ascribing much of their adversity to internal disunion, misinterpreting the motives of their enemy's forbearance, and fretting under the losses and indignities they had sustained, accustomed themselves to undervalue the resources and energies of their conquerors, and to look forward to some favourable opportunity of repairing their reputation and recovering their territory. At the same time, with the improvidence inseparable from the character of Indian princes, they set on foot no adequate preparations for the realisation of their purposes.

BOOK I. Instead of profiting by the experience of the past, and the respite which had been granted to them;
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1805. instead of husbanding their means, consolidating their power, and cementing that union in which alone lay their safety, they wasted their strength in a petty and predatory warfare with the princes of Rajputana, or in intestine dissensions; and with territories almost depopulated, revenues utterly exhausted, troops wholly disorganized, and mutual animosities incurably exacerbated, they again provoked the resentment of the British Government when in the full exercise of its energies, and awakened to a clear perception of its true interests and of those of Hindustan. The last act of this extraordinary drama was then consummated. The Marquis of Hastings completed what Clive had begun, and all India acknowledged the supremacy of Great Britain.

As some time intervened before the predominance of the British power throughout India was finally established, we may, for the present, pause to contemplate the political condition of the country at the period at which the narrative recommences; and for a few years following; so as to form a correct notion of the extent of British dominion and authority, and of the circumstances and objects of the principal native states. We shall thus be better able to understand the character of those transactions which led to a renewal of the struggle, and to the final attainment of that commanding attitude which the British Government, after repeated proofs of forbearance, was at last compelled to assume.

The capture of Seringapatam and death of Tippoo

Sultan, in 1799, put an end to all fear of any formidable enmity in the south of India. Those events had added largely to the Company's territory in the Peninsula¹, and had restored the principality of Mysore to the representative of its former Hindu Rajas, on conditions the avowed intentions of which were, the entire command of the resources of the country in time of war, and a general controuling power over its government in time of peace. Tribute under the denomination of subsidy was also imposed upon the Raja, and provision was made for appropriating the whole of the revenue, subject to a pension to be paid to him in the event of his failing to fulfill his obligations.² The Raja, Krishna Raja Udayávar, was a minor, and the administration of the affairs of the state was intrusted to a native minister named Purnia, a Brahman, a man of ability and judgment, who distinctly understood the position in which Mysore was placed, and its entire dependence upon the power to which it owed its existence. As long as he lived, the connexion was maintained in a spirit of sincere submission on the part of the inferior, and of implicit confidence on that of the superior; rendering Mysore virtually an integral portion of the British Indian Empire.

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The western coast of the Peninsula was, with a few exceptions, British territory. At the southern

¹ By the Partition Treaty of Mysore, July 1799, territory yielding an annual revenue of 13,74,000 Cantarai Pagodas was reserved to the Mysore Raja. To the Company was assigned a portion that was valued at C. Ps. 7,77,000; to the Nizam lands to the amount of C. Ps. 6,07,000, and of C. Ps. 2,63,957 to the Peshwa. The shares of the two latter were subsequently transferred to the Company.—Collection of Treaties and Engagements with Native Princes and States of Asia, published in 1812, p. 441.

² Treaty with Mysore, 8th July, 1799, and supplementary treaties, 1803 and 1807.—Coll. of Treaties, pp. 454, 248, 302.

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extremity, the petty states of Cochin and Travancore were governed by their own Rajas. These princes had been rescued by the interposition of the British arms from the tyranny of Tippoo, and had agreed to pay a stipulated subsidy for the protection which they received.¹ The amount had however been determined without an equitable regard to the advantages for which it was an equivalent, or to the sources from which it was derived.² The demand became an exaction, and the payment speedily fell into arrear. A perpetual and undignified interchange of requisition and evasion ensued, and mutual dissatisfaction was the unavoidable result. This was more especially the case with the Raja of Travancore, as, upon the plea of danger from the designs of France, an additional subsidy had been levied upon him subsequently to the capture of Seringapatam; and, as he neither understood nor dreaded the peril, the cost of arming against its occurrence was felt to be both onerous and unjust. Discontent and indignation were consequently brooding over the councils of Travancore, and their dictates shortly afterwards impelled the Raja to an unavailing effort to throw off the burden under which he laboured.

Proceeding along the Malabar coast towards the

¹ The Raja of Cochin was made to pay to the Company a lakh of rupees annually; treaty, 1791.—Collection of Treaties, p. 421. An agreement was made in 1788 with the Raja of Travancore, by which he engaged to subsidize two battalions of Sipahis. In 1795, he agreed to maintain constantly one battalion. This was extended, in 1797, to three battalions, and one company of European artillery. In 1805, the Raja was compelled to pay for a fourth battalion.—Collection of Treaties, pp. 174, 170, 283.

² The gross revenue of Cochin was estimated at five lakhs of rupees, from which the charges of collection were to be deducted. The tribute was therefore about one-fourth of the net receipts. The total revenues of Travancore, in 1807, were estimated by the Resident at twenty lakhs of rupees: the Company's claim was nearly eight lakhs.—MS. Records.

north, a few districts of limited extent were subject to petty Mahratta chiefs, feudatories of Poona : and Goa, and a narrow territory around it, still remained to the Portuguese : as amicable relations subsisted with the superior states, the subordinate character of these dependencies, as well as their insignificance, divested them of all political consideration. Goa, indeed, was occupied by an English garrison. Farther to the north, the coast belonged to the Gaekwar or ruler of Guzerat ; whom a subsidiary treaty, and a connexion of the most intimate nature, attached inseparably to the interests of the British Government. Cutch, the adjacent country to the west, although independent, was distracted by civil broils, the chief parties in which appealed for assistance to the Presidency of Bombay. Sindh, the boundary province of India in this direction, was governed by independent princes, who had shewn themselves disinclined to entertain any correspondence with the Company's authorities. They exercised little or no influence upon the politics of India, as their situation and circumstances restricted their intercourse in a great degree to their western and northern neighbours, the Baluchis and Afghans.

The whole of the eastern or Coromandel coast of the Peninsula was British, with the exception of a small tract occupied by the Danish settlement of Tranquebar. The Nawab of the Carnatic and the Raja of Tanjore had been deprived of territorial revenue and political importance, and had been reduced to the irrevocable condition of pensioners of the East India Company. The province of Cuttack, which under the Mahratta govern-

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ment of Berar had intercepted the communication between the Presidencies of Bengal and Madras, now served to connect them; as it had been taken from the Raja in the late war, and had been permanently annexed to the Company's possessions, which now extended along the whole line of coast from the Gulph of Manar to the Delta of the Ganges.

Important additions to the British dominions in Hindustan had been effected by treaty or conquest during the administration of Marquis Wellesley. At its commencement, the Bengal Presidency was bounded on the north by the course of the Gandak river, and by the confluence of the Ganges and the Jumna. The cession of Gorakhpur by the Nawab Vizir, Sádát Ali, carried the boundary across the Gandak to the foot of the mountains of Nepal; and the transfer of the lower Doab, Furruckabad, and Bareilly, by the same prince, extended the British authority over the country of the Rohillas. The victorious career of Lord Lake rescued the upper provinces of the Doab from Mahratta spoliation, and brought them as far as to the north-west of Delhi under British influence or rule. Of the conquests on the west bank of the Jumna, a narrow strip of land alone had been retained; but its value was more than commensurate with its extent, as it included the important cities Agra, Mathura, and Delhi,—the first celebrated for its reliques of Mogul magnificence, the second sanctified by the religious veneration of the Hindus, and the third selected in every age of the history of India for the capital of those Hindu and Mohammedan monarchs who aspired to the universal

sceptre of Hindustan. Along with this imperial city the British became possessed of the person and family of the representative of the fallen dynasty of Timur, the venerable Shah Alem, alike distinguished by his descent and his misfortunes. Indebted to the British in the dawn of life for safety and support, he had passed through manhood to old age amidst an unvarying succession of danger, tumult, treachery, and disaster, and was happy to end his days in peace and security under the shelter of his early friends. However trifling the accession to the real power of the victors which might be thought to accrue from their holding in their hands the titular sovereign of Hindustan, and although the charge was not unattended by circumstances of anxiety and embarrassment, yet that the keeping of the person of Shah Alem was not devoid of political value might be inferred from the eagerness with which the prize had been disputed by military adventurers both Mohammedans and Hindus, and by the weight which chieftains the most lawless, and princes the most powerful, still attached to an order or a grant that bore the seal of the emperor, even though the document conferred but a nominal title to the honours or possessions which it purported to bestow. Shah Alem himself was an object of general sympathy, from the injuries or indignities which he had undergone from his own rebellious servants or his Mahratta allies; and the respectful and benevolent treatment which he experienced from his new guardians contrasted favourably with the conduct pursued towards him by their predecessors. There

BOOK I. can be no doubt that the change was most accept-
 CHAP. I. able to the Mohammedans of Hindustan, and con-
 1805. tributed essentially to conciliate their good-will
 and gain their allegiance.

The greater portion of the territory on the west of the Jumna which had been wrested from the Mahrattas was precipitately relinquished by Marquis Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow, but on the south-west the extensive province of Bundelkhand was permanently comprehended within the limits of the Presidency of Bengal. The district had been ceded by the Peshwa in commutation of territory in the south of India, which he had at first assigned to the Company in place of the amount which he had agreed to pay for a subsidiary force.¹ At the time when this exchange was effected, the authority of the Peshwa over any part of Bundelkhand was little more than nominal, and his claims were at best of a questionable character, as will be evident upon a brief review of the history of the province.

The Rajas of Bundelkhand pretend to trace their pedigree from the Solar dynasty of Hindu kings; Kusa, one of the sons of the mytho-heroic prince Ramachandra, having, it is said, migrated from Ayodhyá or Oude, and settled in Bundelkhand. The traditions of the Hindus in general do not countenance such a genealogy; and it seems not unlikely that the Bundela tribe were foreigners

¹ The annual revenue of these lands was computed to be 26 lakhs of rupees. Treaty of Bassein, 1802. Portions to the value of 19 lakhs were restored to the Peshwa, in lieu of which he ceded territory in Bundelkhand of the estimated annual value of 36 lakhs. Supplementary treaty, 1803.—Coll. of Treaties, pp. 233, 242.

and conquerors, who immigrated into the country¹ in comparatively modern times. They long struggled, with varied success, to maintain their independence against the Mohammedan kings of Delhi; but they sunk under a vigorous effort made in the beginning of the reign of Shah Jehan, and were compelled to acknowledge for a season the supremacy of the Mogul. This state of things was of no long duration: encouraged by the distracted condition of the empire during the latter years of Shah Jehan's reign, a chieftain named Champat Rai² led the way to the reassertion of the national independence. The task was prosecuted with improved success by his more celebrated son Chatrasál, and a new dynasty was founded by the latter, which reigned over the eastern division of the province: the western division was restored to the representatives of the ancient Rajas, who, however, renewed their professions of fealty to the throne of Delhi.

BOOK I.
CHAP. I.

1805.

The elevation of Chatrasál to the rank and power of Raja took place towards the end of the reign of Aurangzeb. The successors of that emperor, unable to make good their pretensions to

¹ Bundel-khand, "the portion of the Bundela," is not named in any ancient writings or inscriptions. The country is denominated Chaidya, the land of the Chedi, or Chandel, the name still borne by the agricultural population. The term Bundela is confined to the military chiefs, who never condescend to engage in the cultivation of the soil, and of whom the first is said to have been Devada Bir, a Rajput, who invaded and occupied the country some time in the 14th century.—Memoir on Bundelkhand, by Capt. J. Franklin; Tr. Royal Asiatic Society, i. 259.

² Authorities differ with respect to the birth and station of Champat Rai. One account makes him an officer in the service of the Raja of Urcha.—Franklin, as above. Another affirms his being a member of the ruling dynasty, and Raja of Urcha himself.—Pogson, Hist. of the Bundelas, p. 44. This could scarcely have been the case, although he might have been a kinsman of the Raja.

BOOK I. supremacy, acknowledged the new Raja. In the
 CHAP. I. reign of Mohammed Shah, however, Bangash Khan,
 1805. the Afghan governor of Allahabad, fell suddenly
 upon Chatrasál with an overwhelming force, and
 dispossessed him of his dominions. Chatrasál had
 recourse to the Mahrattas, who under the first
 Peshwa, Baji Rao, were at this time advancing
 slowly through Kandesh and Malwa to Hindus-
 tan. The opportunity of establishing their ascen-
 dancy in Bundelkhand, which was afforded by the
 application of the Raja, was promptly embraced;
 and Baji Rao with a large force surprised and
 defeated Bangash Khan, who was glad to escape
 with his life. The Mohammedan yoke was now
 thrown off for ever, but one not less oppressive
 was imposed, in the domination of the Mahrattas.
 In the first instance they replaced Chatrasál in his
 principality; but upon his death, which happened
 not long afterwards, the Peshwa, whom he had
 adopted as a son, succeeded by virtue of that adop-
 tion to one-third of the territory:¹ the other two-
 thirds were equally divided between the two sons
 of Chatrasál; one of whom, Hirdi Sah, became
 Raja of Panna, the other, Jagat Sah, of Jetpur.²

¹ The Mahratta records assert that this disposition of his Raj was the spontaneous effect of the Raja's gratitude.—Grant Duff, *Hist. of the Mahrattas*, i. 515. It is more probable that the cession was the price of the Peshwa's assistance, as intimated in the *Seir Mutakherin*, i. 282. In the memoirs of Amir Khan it is stated, that, after the expulsion of the Afghan, Chatrasál adopted the Peshwa, and at once divided his Raj into four parts, of which he retained one, and apportioned the other three between the Peshwa and his sons. Govind Pandit was nominated manager of the Peshwa's share, which included Ságar, Jhansi, and Kalpi, or a line of country in the centre of the province from the Nerbudda to the Jumna, by which the Mahrattas could readily march from the Dekhin to the Doab.—*Mem. of Amir Khan*, 55.

² The Raja of Panna, and the Rajas of Ajaygerb, Charkari, Bijawar, Jetpur, and Sarila, are respectively descended from these princes.

It was a condition of the arrangement made in favour of the Peshwa, that the government of Poona should guarantee to the descendants of Chatrasál the portions of the inheritance set apart for his sons. The stipulation was for some time faithfully observed; the sons of Chatrasál enjoyed their portions in peace, and parcelled them at their death amongst their posterity. Their example was imitated by their successors, subdivisions were infinitely multiplied, and Bundelkhand was filled with a swarm of petty Rajas too weak to defend themselves against Mahratta aggression, and too turbulent to refrain from those mutual hostilities by which their weakness was aggravated: the state of confusion and anarchy into which the province was thrown by the intestine divisions of its rulers, offered it as a tempting bait to military adventure; and a follower of Sindhia, Ali Bahadur, was induced to avail himself of the favourable opportunity.

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1805.

Ali Bahadur¹ was a Sirdar of some repute in the service of the Peshwa when he was dispatched by Nana Furnavez, the minister of Poona, with a body of troops to co-operate with Madhoji Sindhia in his incursion into Hindustan. He bore an efficient part in the operations which gave Delhi and Shah Alem to Sindhia, but was not altogether satisfied with the requital which his exertions had received. Ali Bahadur², therefore, quitted Sindhia, and at the

¹ The father of Ali Bahadur, Shamshir Bahadur, was the son of the Peshwa Baji Rao, a Brahman, by a Mohammedan woman. Agreeably to the ancient Hindu law, he was of the caste, which in this case was equivalent to the religion, of his mother; a characteristic illustration of the laxity of manners of the Mahratta court, and of Hindu indifference to religious creeds.

² According to Malcolm, Ali Bahadur separated from Sindhia upon

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CHAP. I.

1805.

A. D. 1790.

A. D. 1802.

instigation of Himmat Bahadur, who was the military leader and spiritual head of a large body of armed Gosains, combining the characters of religious vagrants and mercenary soldiers, and who had acquired some territory in Bundelkhand, he marched into the province with a considerable force, and in a few years reduced under his authority the greater part of the territories which had been distributed amongst the unworthy descendants of Chatrasál. The stronghold of Kalinjar alone resisted his impetuosity, and, after a siege of two years, he died in camp before its walls.¹ He left two sons, Shamshir Bahadur, and Zulfikar Ali. The former at the date of his father's death was at Poona: the latter, who was an infant, was thereupon raised to the principality by his uncle Ghani Bahadur; but Shamshir Bahadur speedily arrived to vindicate his claim to the succession, put his uncle to death, and assumed the sovereignty over his father's conquests. He was not long able to maintain his authority.

The exchange of territory accomplished by the Peshwa was a genuine exemplification of Mahratta diplomacy, for it transferred to the British Government the trouble of enforcing claims of questionable

the advance of the latter to Delhi.—Central India. Grant Duff states the separation to have taken place after the capture of Delhi.—Hist. Mahr. iii. 75. The memoirs of Amir Khan (p. 86) assert that he invaded Bundelkhand by command of the Peshwa. He no doubt professed to act as the Peshwa's officer, and hoisted the Zari Patka or regal standard of Poona.

¹ Ali Bahadur, to evince his determination not to relinquish the siege until the capture of the fortress, caused a house to be built near the fort for his residence. The Kiladar, not to be surpassed in bravado, sent him a present of some mango-seeds to sow in the garden to be attached to the new edifice, with an intimation that he might hope to take Kalinjar when the seeds should have grown to trees, and the trees should have borne fruit.—Pogson's Bundelas, p. 122.

validity, and granted to them districts over which the court of Poona had never exercised actual sovereignty. The cessions were taken chiefly from the recent conquests of Ali Bahadur, whose right had neither become confirmed by time nor by the recognition of the subjugated people; and whose possessions, although, inasmuch as they had fallen to a subject and officer of the Peshwa, they might be considered as in some degree dependent upon the head of the Mahratta state, yet had never acknowledged such dependence, nor contributed in any manner to his power or resources. The attempt of Shamshir Bahadur to establish himself in the country which his father had conquered was as much opposed to the pretensions of the Peshwa, as to the claims of the English founded upon them, and he was consequently treated as the enemy of both. His father's friend and coadjutor, the Gosain Hirmat Bahadur, foreseeing the inability of Shamshir Bahadur to resist this combination against him, speedily made terms with the British, and joined their forces on their advance into Bundelkhand. After an ineffectual show of resistance, Shamshir Bahadur was content to desist from opposition, and to accept a pension for himself and for his family, with permission to reside at Banda.¹ Hirmat Bahadur soon after died; his armed bands were dismissed upon the return of peace, and his descendants were settled upon a Jagir in the Doab.² So far, little difficulty was found in the introduction of

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¹ The titular Nawab of Banda is at present Zulfikar Ali, the brother of Shamshir Bahadur, who resides near Banda, and receives a pension of four lakhs of rupees.—Bengal and Agra Gazetteer, 1841, vol. ii. part 2, p. 283.

² Sekandra, in the district of Cawnpore. Ibid. p. 287.

BOOK I. British authority into those portions of Bundelkhand which were nearest to the Jumna and the division of Allahabad.

1805.

The establishment of a government in Bundelkhand that proclaimed order and insisted upon obedience was, however, no easy task. The feuds of the numerous petty Rajas, and the depredations of the Mahrattas, had filled the country with military adventurers, few of whom had other means of supporting themselves and their followers than levying contributions on the peaceable inhabitants, and plundering those who resisted their exactions. Nor did they respect the new acquisitions of the Company; and, as these had been left imperfectly guarded by the precipitate dismissal of the irregular battalions which during the war had been taken into British pay, and by the improvident reduction of the regular force below the necessity for its services, the leaders of the marauding bands were long suffered to disturb the tranquillity of the country, and prevent its return to order and good government. The inhabitants themselves, a bold and resolute race, habituated to the use of arms, and unaccustomed to legal controul, were little inclined to submit to civil jurisdiction or fiscal regulations; and, when unable to resist the enforcement of the laws or the collection of the revenues, they deserted their villages and augmented the ranks of the banditti. Where this was not the case, they not unfrequently entered into a compact with the predatory leaders to defraud the state of its dues, by paying to them a sum less than the public demand, and receiving in return an acquittance for the whole. With this evidence of

their having been compelled to pay their revenue, they claimed exemption from farther payment, alleging, with sufficient plausibility, that a Government, which could not defend them, could not claim fulfilment of their obligations, and pleading the impossibility of their paying double the amount at which they were assessed. The plea was admitted until its collusive origin was detected, and the refusal to grant exemptions on this account tended to put a stop to the fraud; but not until a loss of revenue had been sustained, the amount of which would have economically defrayed the expense of a protecting military force. Both the marauding chiefs and the refractory villagers derived support in their resistance to Government from the numerous small forts with which the province was studded: at the time of its occupation there were not fewer than one hundred and fifty within the limits of the Company's acquired territory, the greater proportion of which were eventually demolished, but not without opposition.

Amidst the many strongholds which were erected in Bundelkhand, two were remarkable for their position and strength. These were Ajaygerh and Kalinjar. They were both in the hands of adventurers who had risen to power by the usual methods of military rapine and violence, and who, by their own armed adherents, or the marauding hordes to whom they afforded shelter, spread desolation and alarm through the adjacent country. A vigorous effort, early made, might have planted the British standard on their walls with little difficulty; but as it was the policy of the Government to conciliate,

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CHAP. L

1806.

where to suppress and overawe would be attended with expense, it was determined in the councils of Calcutta that "a certain extent of dominion, local power, and revenue would be cheaply sacrificed for tranquillity and security within a more contracted circle." It was argued, that "it was not to be apprehended that the furtive depredations of roving banditti could be supposed to have intimidated the military power which had overthrown the combined force of the Mahratta confederacy, and that there was every reason to believe that the concessions which were proposed were not calculated to excite a renewal of the disorders by which they had been obtained."¹ Upon these principles, falsified as they were by the history of all past ages, and opposed to the opinions and recommendations of the principal civil and military functionaries and of the commander-in-chief,² the occupants of Ajaygerh and Kalinjar were left in possession of their fortresses; and to them³ and to other usurping chiefs the Government granted sunnuds, formally recognising and confirming their right of occupancy, upon conditions of general submission and allegiance. In like manner, but upon more legitimate grounds, the descendants of Chatrasál, who still retained portions of their patrimony, were confirmed in their possessions, but

¹ MS. Records. Proceedings of Bengal Government, 10th July, 1806.

² Lord Lake in a letter to the Government, recorded the 17th July, 1806, expressed his conviction, that, until Ajaygerh and Kalinjar were in possession of the Government, it would be impossible to maintain peace in Bundelkhand. Events fully corroborated the justice of his prediction.

³ Lakshman Dawa, the Kiladár of Ajaygerh, was allowed to keep his fort for two years upon payment of a small annual tribute, and to hold the district adjacent in perpetual farm. Darya Sing Chaubè, the Kiladár of Kalinjar, was confirmed in the occupancy of that fort and the adjacent district; 8th December, 1806.

their promise of allegiance was not to entitle them to protection; and so far was the doctrine of non-interference carried, that they were suffered to decide by the sword those disputes amongst themselves, to which the complicated questions of proprietary right to lands that had repeatedly changed masters could not fail to give rise. It was not until a change of administration in Calcutta had taken place that "it was deemed essential, not only to the preservation of political influence over the chiefs of Bundelkhand and its consequent advantages, but also to the dignity and reputation of the British Government, to interfere for the suppression of intestine disorder, by compelling that submission which it had till then been found impracticable to conciliate or command."¹

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CHAP. I.

1806.

The western portion of Bundelkhand was distributed among the Rajas of Dattea, Tehri, and Sampthar. They were descended from the ancient Rajas. They were acknowledged by the British as independent princes, and were bound to them by treaties of amity and alliance. No submission was required from them, and care was taken to avoid any obligation to defend them against foreign aggression. They remained, consequently, many years exposed to Mahratta insolence and spoliation, and were reduced to the verge of annihilation, when the course of events, and altered political views, brought them finally within the pale of British protection.

Such were the principal accessions to the territory of British India during the administration of

¹ Proceedings of Bengal Government, 8th September, 1807. Lord Minto had recently assumed charge of the Government.

BOOK I. Marquis Wellesley, and the position in which it was
CHAP. I. placed at the close of that of Sir G. Barlow with
1806. relation to some of the neighbouring princes. The
situation and circumstances of the more important
native states it will now be necessary to describe.

The great distinction of the native ruling powers was two-fold. They were either Mohammedan or Hindu. The latter comprised several varieties, and were mainly distinguishable as Mahrattas, Rajputs, Játs, and Sikhs.

Although extensive and populous territories still acknowledged the sway of some of the descendants of the Mohammedan conquerors of India, yet their political power was, in every instance of any importance, extinct; and, with one or two exceptions of little note or influence, they were either directly or indirectly dependent upon the British Government. They were its pensioners, or its subsidiary allies: the former compelled to forego all the attributes of sovereignty, except an empty title; the latter obliged to sheath their swords for ever, and rely for defence upon troops whom they alienated their dominions to pay, but over whom they held no command. At the head of the former class was the Great Mogul himself, the descendant and representative of Timur-lang.

The actual occupant of the throne of Delhi did not long survive his transition from a rigorous to a respectful state of captivity. Shah Alem died on the 18th of December, 1806. He was succeeded by his eldest surviving son, who took the title of Shah Akbar the Second. The father had experienced the misfortunes inseparable from a powerless

sceptre too severely to regret its resignation into hands able to wield it with vigour: the son, although no stranger to distress and peril, anticipated from the indulgence or indifference of his protectors a greater share of real power than it was convenient or safe to permit him to exercise. His attempts to break through the limits prescribed to him were for some time after his accession frequent and persevering; but they were for the most part of little consideration, except as paving the way for pretensions of a more ambitious tendency, and they were checked without much trouble or the exhibition of severity.¹ On one subject alone it was necessary to act with energy; and the manifestation of power and will, which was then called for, terminated the aspirations of Akbar the Second to become a king in more than name.

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1807.

The King of Delhi had several sons: of these, the eldest was considered to be entitled to the designation of heir-apparent, agreeably to the laws of succession upheld by the British Indian Government;

¹ A principal object of his majesty's ambition was the presentation of *Khelats*, or honorary dresses, to the princes of Hindustan, and, above all, to the Governor-General. As the acceptance of such a compliment is an admission of inferiority, it was of course declined. Having, however, obtained leave to send an agent to Calcutta to represent to the Government matters of public and private interest, Shah Akbar endeavoured to carry the point of the *khelat* by a little ingenuity. His envoy was instructed to present to Lord Minto an old cloak, which the king himself had worn, as a mark of personal regard; but he was to contrive to do this at a public audience, when the present would have assumed the character of an honorary distinction conferred upon the Governor-General by the King of Delhi. The device was easily seen through, and as easily frustrated: the cloak was thankfully accepted as a private gift, but the bearer was compelled to transmit it through the usual channel of communication, through the office of the Persian secretary. Such were the strange vicissitudes of fortune, that the Great Mogul was reduced to the necessity of trying to trick the chief functionary of a trading company into the acceptance of the greatest honour in native estimation which it was in his power to bestow!

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CHAP. I.

1808.

but, influenced by his favourite queen, Akbar Shah strove pertinaciously to obtain the recognition of his third son, Mirza Jehangir, of whom she was the mother, in that capacity. Although willing to withhold from the eldest son the immediate assumption of the title which it considered as his birthright, the Government of Bengal refused to gratify the wish of the king; and obliged him, on one occasion, to cancel and counteract honours and privileges which he had granted to Mirza Jehangir as indications of a purpose to raise him to the rank of heir-apparent.¹ Although obliged to give way for a season, the king, unable to resist female blandishments and tears, resumed his project; and the subject of debate might have long continued to estrange him from his European advisers, had not the rashness and presumption of the prince given occasion to the British Government to act decisively, and remove Mirza Jehangir from Delhi altogether.

Mirza Jehangir, having been empowered by the injudicious liberality of his mother to take into pay a body of armed retainers, occasioned so much discomfort and alarm within the palace by the turbulence which he encouraged and the excesses of which he partook, that his parents were at last convinced of the necessity of subjecting him to some controul, and the king was prevailed upon to allow the Company's Sipahis to mount guard at

¹ These were, 1, the use of the Aftábi, a flat circular parasol, carried by an attendant, not over the head, but on the side of a person, or palankín, which is next the sun; 2, the Tapach, a state cushion; and, 3, the Nalki, open state palankín. They were conferred in full Durbar, with the customary solemnities. By desire of the Government the Aftábi was discontinued, and the use of the other articles extended to all the princes, so as to deprive them of any specific significance.

the palace gates. A guard was accordingly stationed at the outer gates, when the followers of Jehangir took up a menacing position at the inner gateway, and insisted that the Sipahis should be withdrawn. The British Resident, Mr. Sétou, advancing to expostulate with them, was fired at and narrowly escaped being shot, as the ball struck the cap of a soldier who was close by his side. The Sipahis were then ordered to take forcible possession of the inner gates; and after a short conflict, in which some of the assailants were wounded, and several of their opponents were killed, the gates were carried, and the followers of the prince were dispersed. The prince gave himself up to the Resident, and was sent a state prisoner to Allahabad, where he resided until his death, abandoning all hopes of succession to a titular crown and passing his days in indolence and indulgence.¹ The king gradually ceased to exhibit outwardly any concern for his fate, and abstained from all endeavours to interfere with the disposal of the throne, or to acquire a greater portion of authority than it was thought fit to intrust him with: this resignation was rewarded by an increase of his pension, which

BOOK I.
CHAP. I.

1809.

24th July.

¹ He was at first lodged in the fort of Allahabad, but was afterwards removed to a building that had been a Mohammedan mausoleum, part of the monument of Sultan Khosru, without the city. The author saw him here in 1820. He was allowed considerable personal liberty, and was treated with as much consideration as was compatible with his security. He seemed to be cheerful and reconciled to his situation, and was said to have both the means and the inclination to forget political disappointments in personal enjoyment. He was a man of small stature and delicate features, of a pleasing though very dark countenance, and of elegant manners. He wore no turban nor any covering on his head, but let his long black hair, which shewed symptoms of more than ordinary care bestowed upon it, hang full upon his shoulders. It was impossible not to feel some sympathy for his humiliation, although there was nothing in his character or conduct to inspire respect.

BOOK I. had been promised conditionally by Marquis Welles-
 CHAP. I. ley, and was granted by Lord Minto.¹

1806.

A prince, second only to the King of Delhi in Mohammedan estimation, and far superior to that sovereign in wealth and power, the Nawab of Oude, was connected with the British Government by a subsidiary alliance. The precise nature of the connexion will have been made known by the ample details and discussions relating to it inserted in the preceding pages. For all objects of exterior policy the Nawab was a nonentity, and even in his interior administration he was expected to refer questions of any moment to the consideration of the British Resident, and to adopt no measures of importance without the concurrence of the Governor-General. The reigning Nawab, Sádát Ali Khan, was far from easy under the bonds which attached him to the

¹ The original pension was fixed at 76,500 rupees a month, to be provided for out of the revenues of certain lands in the district of Delhi set apart for that purpose; and a promise was made, that the allowance should be increased when the funds admitted of it. The extent of the increase was not specified. In 1809, the revenues of the assigned territory continued still short of the pension, but it was determined to increase the latter to one lakh of rupees per month, of which 7000 rupees were to be appropriated to the heir-apparent.—Governor-General's Minute, 17th June, 1809. Other augmentations have been since made, making the allowance, including stipends to members of the family both at Delhi and Benares, fifteen lakhs of rupees (150,000*l.*) per annum.—Bengal and Agra Gazetteer, ii. part 2. 362. His majesty has been long urgent for a farther increase, upon the plea that the revenues of the assigned lands have improved, but “it was never proposed either to limit the stipends by the amount of the produce of the territory, or to augment them to an extent equal to the revenue which the territory might eventually yield: the obligation which the British Government had imposed on itself was that of providing adequate means for the support of the king and his household in a manner suitable to the condition in which he was placed, while in policy it was inexpedient that the provision granted should exceed an amount sufficient for that purpose.”—Minute quoted by Captain Sutherland. The same authority states, that, if the civil and military charges upon what may be possibly meant by the assigned lands were deducted from their revenue, little would remain for the payment of the stipend of the King of Delhi.—Sketches of the Relations between the British Government of India and Native States; by Captain J. Sutherland, Calcutta, 1833.

British; but he had been raised by them to the throne, and, being of a timid and inactive character, could scarcely have maintained his dignity without the support of his allies. Even under their guardianship he lived in constant dread of domestic intrigue, and was perpetually haunted by unfounded suspicions that his nearest relatives were plotting against his throne and his life.¹ His chief gratification was the accumulation of treasure; and the curtailment of his revenues, consequent upon the enforced alienation of a valuable portion of his territory in commutation of the subsidy, was the main-spring of his dissatisfaction with the relations in which he stood to the Government of Bengal. He felt aggrieved, also, by the immunity from transit duties claimed by trading boats on the Ganges where it formed the boundary of Oude, under passes from the Company's custom-offices on the opposite bank, and agreeably to a commercial treaty into which he had reluctantly entered. The interference of the Resident was not unfrequently a source of mortification to him. So far had his discontent proceeded, that he renewed to Sir G. Barlow the proposition he had made to Lord Wellesley, to transfer the management of his dominions to his eldest son and make a pilgrimage to Mecca. When, however, the acquiescence of the Government was expressed, the project was apparently abandoned, as the proposal was never repeated. In his personal expenditure

BOOK I.
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 1806.

¹ His own brothers, Mirza Mehdi and Shahámat Ali, were accused by him of having instigated attempts to procure his assassination. The charges were investigated by the Resident under orders from the Government, and were proved to be void of any foundation. To appease the fears of the Nawab, the princes were obliged to leave Lucknow, and take up their residence at Patna in the Company's territories.

BOOK I. Sádát Ali was meanly parsimonious, and the amount
CHAP. I. of the public revenue was more than adequate to
1807. the public disbursements. The landholders were nevertheless exposed to the systematic extortion of contractors, to whom the Nawab farmed the assessments, and whom he authorised to levy their demands by the most violent and oppressive means.¹ Their exactions were as systematically resisted, and the Zemindars became habituated to refuse payment even of what was justly claimable, unless compelled by superior power. Their villages were not unusually fortified, and they resided in mud forts which were not easily captured by the unaided military of the Nawab. In this emergency it became necessary to have recourse to the subsidiary force, and the Company's battalions were employed to reduce refractory landholders and collect the revenue. As obvious objections to such a duty existed, the aid of the troops was always granted with reluctance; another subject of grievance to the Nawab, who considered himself entitled to command the services of a force which he virtually paid. The evil was not so serious in the early part of the reign of Sádát Ali as it subsequently became, and, upon the whole, the province of Oude was in a peaceable and improving condition; while the character and situation of the reigning prince en-

¹ The contractors rarely benefited by their bargains, as Sádát Ali was well versed in the art of squeezing the sponge when it had done its office. As soon as the contractors were thought to be sufficiently gorged, complaints against their oppression, which were never wanting, were readily listened to, and they were seized and imprisoned until they had poured into the Nawab's treasury the whole or greater portion of their spoils. Their incarceration depended upon their tenaciousness of the booty. In 1807, the Resident stated there were fourteen farmers of the revenue in prison in Lucknow, some of whom had been confined for years.—MS. Records.

sured his entire subservience to the political views and interests of the British Government.

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CHAP. I.

1806.

Another native Mohammedan sovereign, Sekandar Jah, titular Nizam, Şubahdár, or viceroy of the Dekhin, possessed of equally extensive territories, was also a subsidiary ally of the Company.¹ The alliance was more distasteful to him than to the Vizir; and his capricious and violent temper, and the frontier position of his country in contiguity to independent states, rendered the preservation of the political relations which had been established with him a subject of solicitude and apprehension. He had succeeded to the principality upon the demise of his father Nizam Ali, in 1803, without opposition, through the support of the British authorities; by whose interposition the menaced competition of one of his brothers, who enjoyed much more extensive popularity with the nobles and people of Hyderabad, was prevented. The sense of gratitude for this obligation was soon obliterated by the consciousness of loss of independence; and the ill-concealed discontent of the Nizam gave courage to many of his followers to organize a system of opposition to the British councils, and still further estrange the mind of their master from the connexion: they even contemplated its dissolution, and persuaded the

¹ By the treaty with the Nizam, dated 12th October, 1800, the subsidized force was finally fixed at eight battalions of Sipahis, or eight thousand firelocks, and two regiments of cavalry, or one thousand horse, with their complement of guns, European artillerymen, lascars, and pioneers. For the payment of this force the territories acquired by the Nizam under the treaty of Seringapatam, 13th March, 1792, and that of Mysore, 22nd June, 1799, were given back to the Company, with the exception of some districts north of the Tumbhadra river, for which Adoni and others to the south of it were exchanged: the annual revenues of the whole were estimated at twenty-six lakhs of Kanterai pagodas, about 874,000*l.* — Collection of Treaties, p. 188.

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CHAP. I.

1806.

Nizam, and perhaps credited it themselves, that it was practicable to form a combination with the Mahrattas by which the British might be humbled, and perhaps expelled from Hindustan. These suggestions gratified the enmity and flattered the pride of the Nizam; but he was too fondly addicted to low and sensual indulgence, too irresolute in purpose and contracted in intellect, to be capable of prosecuting a dangerous design with the steadiness, determination, and foresight indispensable to its success. Fortunately also for the ultimate preservation of his throne, his prime minister, Mir Alem, who had grown old in the service of the state, and had been an actor in many of the great events which had occurred in the Peninsula during the reign of the late Nizam,¹ was well aware of the relative strength of the British and Mahratta powers, and accurately appreciated his sovereign's situation. He knew, in fact, that the government of Hyderabad subsisted only as long as it remained under British protection, and that, the moment such protection should be withdrawn, the principality would be defenceless against Mahratta ambition, and would, at no remote period, fall under their yoke; he therefore sedulously advocated British influence at the court of Hyderabad, and was in requital supported

¹ Mir Alem was first employed in 1789 on a mission to Lord Cornwallis, and afterwards accompanied the Nizam's army to Seringapatam, where he conducted the negotiations for peace. In 1794 he was deputed to Poona, but failed in his negotiation. In 1798 he negotiated with the British Resident the treaty with the Nizam, and commanded the army which joined the British troops in the capture of Seringapatam. Some time after his return he fell into disgrace, and was unemployed between 1800 and 1803. In 1804, upon the death of Azim ul Omra, the prime minister, and at the recommendation of the British Resident, he was appointed to that office. He died in the 56th year of his age.

by that influence against the effects of his master's caprice and displeasure.

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CHAP. I.

1807.

Notwithstanding the efforts of Mir Alem and of several of the most respectable members of the court of Hyderabad to preserve unimpaired the continued friendship of the British Government, the conduct of the Nizam so manifestly threatened its forfeiture and the dissolution of the alliance, that even Sir George Barlow deemed the occasion such as to justify avowed interference. Mir Alem was in danger of assassination, and obliged to seek shelter with the Resident: secret communications were opened with Sindhia and Holkar: all appointments of influence and trust were conferred upon individuals notoriously inimical to the British connexion, and considerable bodies of armed men were in course of assemblage at Hyderabad. It became a question whether the menaced separation should be anticipated, or prevented; whether the connexion should be spontaneously relinquished, or its continuation should be authoritatively perpetuated. The conclusion was, that it should be maintained at all hazards. "The alliance with Hyderabad," it was argued, "could not be dissolved without subverting the foundations of the British power and ascendancy in the political scale of India, and without becoming the signal and instrument of the downfall of the remaining fabric of our political relations. If the subsidiary force were withdrawn, the territory alienated for its support would be required to be restored; and the power and resources which the British Government had a right to demand for its own support and security would be placed in the hands of a

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hostile party, avowedly eager, not merely for the abolition of the alliance, but for the destruction of the British Indian Empire: the weapons of which we were now masters would be turned against us; universal agitation, alarm, distrust, and turbulence would ensue; and elements of a renewed combination of hostile states against us would acquire an uncontrollable latitude of action and efficient means of success.”¹ Sir G. Barlow, therefore, concluded that the Nizam had no right to depart from the obligations of the connexion, and that they must be vigorously enforced. The political wisdom of the conclusion was undeniable, however at variance with the doctrine of non-interference, which even in regard to the Nizam had not long before been inculcated by the Bengal Government. The arguments upon which the resolution was formed are applicable to all similar relations, indicating the true character of subsidiary alliances as well as the difficulty and danger of their dissolution. The question of right has different aspects, according to the different positions of the contracting parties. The British Government might have the right, as it had the power, to enforce obligations which it considered essential to its own security and support; but the Nizam had an equal right to claim their abrogation, if he regarded them as non-essential to his security, repugnant to his feelings, derogatory to his character, and detrimental to the happiness and prosperity of his dominions. It was not a question of right, but of power; and, as the Subahdar of the Dekhin was no longer in a condition to assert his indepen-

¹ Minute of the Governor-General.

dence, he was under the necessity of submitting to whatever terms his European masters were pleased to impose.

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CHAP. L

1807.

The Nizam was indeed thoroughly alarmed by the tone which the Resident was authorised to assume. A ready source of intimidation always exists in the minds of native princes in the indeterminate laws of succession, and the readiness with which the ties of relationship are sacrificed to the temptations of ambition. The Nizam, like the Nawab Vizir, had brothers of whom he stood in fear, and of whose promptitude to become the instruments of British vindictiveness no native courtier or politician could entertain a doubt. That he would be deposed in favour of his younger brother was the immediate suggestion of his own suspicions, and they were confirmed by the sympathising fears of his family and adherents. He therefore changed the tenor of his conduct, readily acquiesced in the conditions¹ to which his assent was required, promised to repose entire confidence in Mir Alem and in the Resident, and engaged to dismiss from their offices, whether of a public or personal nature, and banish from his capital, certain individuals known to be hostile to the British interest, and appoint to their duties persons in whom the Resident

¹ They were, the dismissal from his presence and from office of persons hostile to the minister and the British alliance; the separation of the military from the civil command on the northern frontier, and the appointment to both duties of persons in the confidence of the Resident; admittance of the Resident to an audience whenever he requested it, without any conditions; due attention to the just claims of the British Government; the communication of all petitions and statements of a public nature without reserve to the minister; and, should any difference with him arise, the question should be referred to the British Resident.—MS. Records.

BOOK I. could confide. This last stipulation was not accom-
 CHAP. I. plished without the employment of military force
 1807. for an object, and with results strikingly character-
 istic of the disorganised state of the native princi-
 palities, and which therefore it may be of use to
 describe in some detail.

The chief favourite and principal adviser of the Nizam was Raja Mahipat Ram, a Hindu, who was originally employed as Dewan, or man of business, by Monsieur Raymond the commander of the French brigades. In this situation he had formed an intimacy with the prince Sekandar Jah, and upon the dispersion of the French force was taken into his service and obtained his confidence. Upon the elevation of the prince to the throne, Mahipat Ram received the honorary title of Raja, and was appointed to the united civil and military command of the north-west or Berar frontier. His public functions he discharged by deputy, and resided at Hyderabad, the intimate associate and secret counsellor of the prince. Aspiring to the supreme direction of public affairs, he became the opponent and enemy of the prime minister, and of those by whom he was upheld. His early connexions, and the injury to his fortunes consequent upon the breaking up of Raymond's corps, had no doubt disposed him to cherish unfriendly feelings towards Mir Alem's English friends; and he may honestly have desired, however inconsiderately he may have proposed, to liberate his sovereign from dependence upon a foreign power. Whatever may have been his motives, he was known to be implacably hostile to the British alliance, and he was one of those

whose removal from the court was inflexibly insisted on. He was also dismissed from his command, and ordered to withdraw to his personal Jagir. However unpalatable to the Nizam and to his favourite, Mahipat Ram, after some ineffectual endeavours to obtain a milder doom, was compelled to retire to his feudatory estates.

Raja Mahipat Ram was incapable of leading an inactive life, or abstaining from turbulence and intrigue. He collected a force of five thousand horse, whom he employed to dispossess some of his brother feudatories of their territories, and to levy contributions even upon the districts immediately subject to the officers of the Nizam; not, as there was good reason to suspect, without the connivance of his prince, who preferred the vexation and embarrassment of his minister to the peace of his subjects and the maintenance of his own authority. The remonstrances of the Resident compelled the Nizam at length to send a force against his vassal, but it was defeated; and Mr. Gordon, an officer who commanded one of his disciplined battalions, being wounded in the action and taken prisoner, was put to death after the engagement in the presence of the Raja. The Nizam's troops being either unable or unwilling to suppress the insurrection, it became necessary to adopt more vigorous measures; and a considerable portion of the subsidiary force¹, under its commandant Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor, marched against the Raja at Shahpur, whilst other divisions moved from the north and the south

BOOK I.
CHAP. I.

1808.

22nd Feb.
1808.

¹ Five companies H. M. 33rd; two battalions N. I.; two regiments N. C.; a brigade of artillery; and a body of the Nizam's troops.

BOOK 1. to intercept him in the event of his attempting to
 CHAP. I. retire into the adjacent Mahratta districts. Unable
 1808. to face the force sent against him, Mahipat Ram
 retreated towards Berar with the utmost expedition,
 and was followed by Colonel Montresor with equal
 celerity. The Raja contrived for three months to
 evade his pursuers, but with the loss of his guns,
 his baggage, and his infantry. His flight into Berar,
 where it was apprehended he would find numerous
 adherents, was prevented by the judicious movements
 of Colonel Montresor, and the advance of Lieutenant-
 Colonel Doveton with a division of the subsidiary
 force from the frontier of that province. Thus foiled
 in his purpose, Mahipat Ram directed his course to
 Kandesh. Turning to the west he crossed the Godaveri,
 May 23rd. Tapti, and Nerbudda rivers; and threw himself
 into the territory of Holkar, whither his pursuers
 did not consider themselves authorised to follow
 him. The detachment under Colonel Doveton was
 left to guard the frontier, and the main body
 returned to Hyderabad. Raja Mahipat Ram was
 no longer formidable: he was now a mere military
 adventurer at the head of a party of roving horse,
 willing to be retained by any foreign prince by the
 promise of pay and the prospect of plunder. He
 was accordingly engaged by Holkar; but the
 situation of that chief, his illness, and the troubles
 that distracted his court, rendered the engagement
 of little other value than the personal protection
 which it afforded him.

It was still thought advisable, in order to obviate
 the recurrence of mischievous intrigues at Hydera-

bad, to obtain possession of the person of Mahipat Ram, and applications to that effect were made to Holkar. In reply, the Mahratta declared that it was, and had always been, the Raja's intention to proceed to Calcutta and appeal to the Governor-General against Mir Alem and the Resident, to whose personal animosity he attributed his misfortunes; professing himself ready to retire from public life and settle at Benares, if the liberality of the British Government afforded him the means. This arrangement had been proposed before his insurrection, but he was now held to have forfeited any claim to favour; and a pension, although granted to his family, was refused to himself: his unconditional surrender was demanded, with which he declined to comply. There is no reason to suppose he was sincere in his professions, as at the same time he was writing to the Nizam, offering, if his sanction were declared, to come to Hyderabad with fifty thousand horse, which he affirmed Holkar and Amir Khan were prepared to dispatch to his assistance to enable him to shake off the English yoke.

It was not in the power, if it had ever been the practice, of Holkar to observe punctuality in the payment of his soldiery; and the funds of Mahipat Ram, although assisted by secret contributions from the Nizam, soon fell short of the means of maintaining a corps of any strength. After repeated mutinies for arrears of pay, the principal part of his followers deserted him: with the remainder he attached himself to the party in Holkar's camp which after that chieftain's insanity aimed at the direction of affairs, under the guidance of Tulasí Bhai, his

BOOK I.
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1808.

BOOK I. wife. The opposite faction, headed by a military
 CHAP. I. leader named Dharma Koar, having acquired a

1809. temporary superiority, Mahipat Ram was ordered to quit the encampment. Delaying to obey the order, he was attacked by a party of Dharma Koar's troops at a time when his own men were dispersed; and whilst he was remonstrating against the aggression, and professing his readiness to depart, he was shot in the tumult: his head was cut off, and cast like that of a common malefactor before the threshold of Holkar's tent. It was, however, given up to the entreaties of his friends, and burnt with the body; but his effects were confiscated, and the horses of his troopers were seized for the use of the state. Such was the fate of an individual whose influence had threatened to subvert the alliance between the Nizam and the British Government, and had endangered the tranquillity of India. He seems to have been a man of an active and enterprising character, whose chief error was embarking rashly in undertakings in which he had no possible chance of success.

The minister of the Nizam, Mir Alem, died on the 8th of January, 1809. A negociation for the nomination of a successor ensued, which was not unattended with difficulties; the British Government professing to leave it to the Nizam, whilst stedfastly resolved to suffer no one unfriendly to its interests to exercise the administration, and the Nizam with equal insincerity pretending to defer to the wishes of the Bengal Government, whilst secretly striving to secure its acknowledgment of a favourite of his own. A compromise was at length effected. Monir ul

Mulk, the choice of the Nawab, was appointed minister under a written engagement to maintain the British connexion unimpaired; but, as he was incompetent to the duties of his office, the real administration was vested in the hands of Chandu Lal as his Peshkár or deputy, a Hindu of experience and talent, who had been employed by Mir Alem in a similar capacity, and who, like him, was deeply impressed with the essential importance of the Resident's support, both to his own authority and to the integrity of the Nizam's dominions. The connexion with Hyderabad, after the brief interruption which has been described, was established on a firmer footing than before; and the growing habits of excess in which the Nizam indulged, as well as his natural timidity and indolence, enfeebled his own sentiments of aversion, and rendered them no longer objects of apprehension.

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CHAP. L

1809.

A subsidiary alliance¹ united the Peshwa also with the British Government of India, but the connexion was distinguished by some essential differences from those which had been formed with the Mohammedan princes: it was of more recent date and less stringent obligations: the Mahratta prince retained a much larger share of independence and power, and more consistently contemplated the opportunity of ridding himself of a controul which he equally felt to be intolerable, but which he had the policy

1805.

¹ By this, commonly called the Treaty of Bassein, dated 31st December, 1802, the Peshwa agreed to receive a permanent subsidiary force of not less than 6000 regular infantry, with the usual proportion of field-pieces and European artillerymen; for the regular payment of which, certain districts in the Dekhin were at first assigned, but were, as already noticed, commuted for others in Bundelkhand by a supplemental treaty, December, 1803.—Coll. of Treaties, p. 233.

BOOK I. to affect to submit to with cheerfulness and satisfac-
 CHAP. I. tion.¹ Baji Rao had entered into the alliance in a

1805.

moment of despair, when no other means were open to him of escaping from the violence of Holkar, but the treaty was scarcely concluded when he was busied in intrigues with the other Mahratta princes for its infraction. The unexpected close of the war with Sindhia and the Raja of Berar disappointed his projects, the discomfiture of the confederates showed him that it was vain to expect immediate release from his engagements, and his next object was to turn them to his advantage: there, also, he encountered various disappointments, and these contributed to enhance his discontent with the British Government, however veiled beneath the show of cordiality and good-humour. The Court of Poona entertained heavy pecuniary claims upon the Gaekwar and the Nizam for arrears of tribute, or for payments stipulated by treaty²: these claims the British Government undertook to investigate and adjust, but the accounts were long and complicated, and the equity of the demand not unfrequently

¹ For a time he appears to have imposed upon the Government of Bengal; as the satisfaction which he expressed was one of the arguments employed by Sir G. Barlow against the modifications of the treaty of Bassein, proposed by the Secret Committee.—Malcolm, Political History of India, i. 380.

² The amount of the demand upon the Gaekwar was nearly three millions sterling; upon the Nizam about six hundred thousand pounds. As an instructive illustration of the nature of such claims, and the unfailing source of dispute which they furnished to the native states of India, the Peshwa's account with the Gaekwar is particularised in the Appendix. It is clear that such an account never could be settled, and that it provided a permanent plea of quarrel whenever the creditor thought himself strong enough to insist upon a partial payment, another name for a contribution; or whenever the debtor, in the same belief of his power, thought fit to demand an abatement of the claim. The ascendancy of an umpire whose award is not to be disputed has put an end to all such grounds of contention.

questionable. The investigation proceeded slowly, and adjustment was deferred until the patience of the Peshwa was exhausted, and he felt as a grievance that interposition which barred his attempting to realise at least a portion of his demands by a more summary process. Another subject of grievance was the decided refusal of the Government to allow the Peshwa to use the subsidiary force as an instrument for the establishment of an unprecedented controul over some of his feudatories, and for their forcible expulsion from their Jagirs: this was especially the case with regard to Parasuram Srinivás, the Pratinidhi or principal hereditary noble of the Mahratta state, between whom and Baji Rao an inveterate feud had for some time subsisted.¹ The Peshwa advanced also unfounded pecuniary claims upon portions of Bundelkhand not included in the cessions he had made to the British; and demanded arrears of Chouth, the Mahratta tribute, from the independent Rajas of the province, as well as from the rulers of Jhansi, Kalpi, and Ságár, which his relations with the British, that prevented him from engaging in hostilities or entering into negociation with other princes without their participation, disabled him from asserting in the manner most agreeable to Mahratta policy. He likewise claimed a share of the contributions extorted by Holkar and Sindhia from the princes of Rajputana; and, attributing the difficulty of realising these demands to the non-appointment of such a representative in Hindustan as had been charged with the interests of the Peshwa anterior to the

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CHAP. L

1807.

¹ History of the Mahrattas, iii. 341.

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date of the British connexion, he was urgent with his allies to sanction the revival of the office of Sir-subha, or Peshwa's representative, in which character he proposed to send one of his principal officers into Bundelkhand. To this proposition an unqualified refusal was given, as it was obviously designed to replace the Peshwa in the position of titular head of the Mahratta confederacy, and to renew that system of combination which it had been the especial object of the treaty of Bassein to overturn. The nomination of an officer who should be acknowledged by Sindhia and Holkar as the Peshwa's delegate was also an infringement of the stipulation in the treaties with those princes, as well as with the Peshwa, by which internegociation of a political tendency was prohibited. The British Government, therefore, required the Peshwa to desist from the appointment of a Sir-subha, offering at the same time to mediate between him and the chiefs of Bundelkhand for the recovery of his just demands. The firm opposition made by Sir G. Barlow to this insidious project, in which it was ascertained that both Sindhia and Holkar had secretly concurred, inflicted upon Baji Rao severe disappointment and mortification. He professed, indeed, to place entire confidence in the wisdom and friendship of his allies, but it was evident that little reliance on his sincerity could be entertained; nor were positive proofs wanting of his being concerned in negotiations incompatible with the spirit and letter of his engagements to the British;¹ and it

¹ The villages taken from Sindhia, and transferred to the Peshwa, after the war had been secretly suffered to remain in the possession of the

was obvious that his conviction of the impossibility of forming an effective combination against their power, alone deterred him from new intrigues calculated to disturb the existing relations and endanger the tranquillity of India. The other members of the Mahratta confederacy were not in a situation favourable to their co-operation in his designs.

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1807.

The bonds of union with the Gaekwar or Mahratta ruler of Guzerat were of the most intimate description; and the maintenance of his authority, his very existence as a political power, depended entirely upon the assistance and support of his English allies. The contest for the occupation of Guzerat, adverted to in a former page, terminated in the acknowledgment of Fattih Sing.¹ Upon his death, in 1793, Govind Rao was recognised by the Government of Poona as Raja. He died in 1800, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Anand Rao, a prince of weak intellect and indolent disposition, who was incapable of conducting an efficient administration. A struggle for the management of affairs ensued. Kanhoji Rao, the eldest illegitimate son of Govind Rao, a bold and ambitious young man, at first secured to himself and his partisans all

1802.

former. The nomination of a Sir-subha, as mentioned in the text, was with the private concurrence of Sindhia and Holkar. When a quarrel had ensued between those two chiefs after the return of the latter to Hindustan, an envoy was sent by the Peshwa to mediate between them. As this was a palpable infraction of the treaty of Bassein, Baji Rao was called upon for an explanation. He at once disavowed his agent, and, in proof of his fidelity to his engagements, produced what were also evidences of his intercourse with the other chiefs, letters from Holkar and Sindhia declaratory of their desire to renew their subordination to the Poona Government. Baji Rao at the same time pretended a conviction that, although these proposals might have for their object the advantage of the writers, it was for his own advantage to adhere to the terms of the subsidiary alliance.—MS. Records; also Hist. of the Mahrattas, iii. 333.

¹ iii. 602.

BOOK I. the principal offices of the state; but after a short
 CHAP. I. time he was dispossessed of them by one to whom
 1803. the authority could be more safely and beneficially
 entrusted, Raoji Appa, who had been the minister
 of Govind Rao, a man of ability whose exercise of
 authority was not incompatible with the continua-
 tion of Anand Rao as titular sovereign. Kanhoji
 had recourse to Mulhar Rao, a cousin of his late
 father, who held an extensive Jagir under the Gaek-
 war, and was a chief of talent and enterprise. Rao-
 ji Appa, unable to oppose this combination, made
 urgent application to the Government of Bombay
 for the formation of a subsidiary alliance. The pro-
 posal was acceded to, and Major Walker, with a
 military detachment, was sent to his succour.¹ Mul-
 har Rao and Kanhoji were defeated: the former
 declared his submission to the new order of things;
 but Kanhoji kept aloof, and for some time devas-
 tated the country at the head of a predatory body
 of horse. He was ultimately routed by a British
 division under Major Holmes, and driven out of
 Guzerat. Raoji Appa retained the functions of
 prime minister and virtual ruler undisturbed, and
 Major Walker was appointed Resident at Baroda,
 the capital of the Gaekwar.²

¹ By the agreement entered into, the Gaekwar engaged to pay for the expenses of the military assistance granted to him, and for a permanent force to be furnished by the Company; and to cede in perpetuity the Pergunna of Chikli in the dependencies of Surat, with his share of the chouth or contribution levied on that city. These engagements were confirmed by a formal treaty in June, 1802. It was also provided that an assignment of territory should be made to the Company of the estimated annual revenue of 7,80,000 rupees, for the maintenance of 2000 native infantry; and, as the number was subsequently raised to 3000, with a company of European artillery, other lands were made over by a treaty dated in April, 1805, yielding with the former a total revenue of 11,70,000 rupees.—Coll. of Treaties, pp. 565-594, and schedule A. p. 601.

² Hist. of the Mahr. iii. 216.

When tranquillity was re-established, and opportunity was afforded for an inquiry into the condition of the Gaekwar's affairs, it was found that they were so irretrievably involved, that it was indispensably necessary, if it were thought desirable to continue the connexion, to extend the assistance to be afforded beyond military support, and to prop the rapidly declining resources of the principality with the funds and credit of the British Government. The annual disbursements greatly exceeded the annual receipts of the public treasury;¹ the revenues were intercepted by appropriations and mortgages, the fruits of former improvidence; heavy debts, bearing a ruinous rate of interest, were owing to the bankers and monied men; and long arrears of pay were due to the troops, the discharge of which was a necessary preliminary to their dismissal, and consequent diminution of public expenditure. The additional burthen imposed upon the state by the subsidy to be paid to the British force was quite incapable of being sustained; and it was evident not only that the engagement could not be fulfilled, but that national insolvency, general confusion and distress, and the dissolution of the Gaekwar's power, were unavoidable, unless vigorous means were promptly employed to administer present relief and ensure future amelioration. Fortunately the Resident was endowed with more than ordinary abilities, industry, energy, and judgment; enjoyed the unreserved confidence of his own Government; and speedily commanded the same implicit credit

BOOK I.
CHAP. I.

1803.

¹ The revenue of Guzerat was estimated at 50 lakhs of rupees per annum; the expenditure exceeded 82 lakhs.—MS. Rec.

BOOK I. with the Gaekwar, his minister, his chief officers,
 CHAP. I. and the monied and commercial members of the
 1803. community.¹

The first measure of reduced expenditure that was adopted, was, the discharge of the Gaekwar's troops, the need of whom was superseded by the subsidiary force; but for this purpose it was requisite to pay the arrears due to them, and the funds were to be raised. The British Government agreed to advance part of the sum required for this object, and to guarantee repayment of the remainder to opulent individuals, who, under that security, were willing to furnish what was requisite. The advances in both cases were to be liquidated out of assignments of territory, the revenues of which were to be collected and accounted for by the Company.² The money was supplied, but the

¹ This is strikingly expressed in the counterpart of the treaty of 1805, written by the Gaekwar himself, anticipating the possibility of his falling into the hands of his rebellious subjects or mutinous troops. He enjoins that, "in such a situation, his subjects will pay no attention to his orders, but hear what Major Walker has to say, strictly following his instructions." And the document concludes with these provisions: "Conformably to Major Walker's suggestions and wishes, the articles contained in this declaration were written, and to them I have given my assent; but in the event of any evil-disposed persons attempting anything unfair or unreasonable against my person, my Dewan, Raoji Appaji, his son, his brother, nephew, or relations, and Madhu Rao Tántia Maszandar, or even should I myself, or my successors, commit anything improper or unjust, the English Government shall interfere, and see in either case that it is settled according to equity and reason. I have also required of Major Walker on the part of the Company to promise that my state and government shall be permanent, and shall descend to the lineal heirs of the Musnud, and that the Dewanship shall be preserved to Raoji Appaji. In the last place, I desire to form the most intimate connexion with the Company, and that all business with the Poona Durbar may be jointly managed by the English Resident and my Vakeel. Given at Baroda, 28th July, 1802. (Signed) Anand Rao, Gaekwar; Sena-khás-khel, Shamshir Bahadur."—Coll. of Treaties, p. 569. These may have been the sentiments of the minister rather than of the Raja, but they were generally consistent with the conduct of Anand Rao.

² The amount required was 41,38,000 rupees (£413,800), of which the British Government advanced 19,67,000 rupees (£196,700): the rest was

reduction of the troops was not effected by pecuniary means alone.

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1803.

The most efficient portion of the Gaekwar's army consisted of a body of about seven thousand Arabs, a description of mercenaries whom it was formerly a frequent practice in the Peninsula to engage, and who bore a high reputation for fidelity and courage, but were equally characterised by turbulence and rapacity. These troops formed the garrison of Baroda, and were extremely averse to the loss of pay and privileges with which they were threatened. In order to evade their dismissal, they advanced the most extravagant demands, and, seizing upon the capital and person of the Gaekwar, refused to set him at liberty unless their claims were satisfied. Major Walker having endeavoured in vain to bring them to reasonable terms, Baroda was invested by the subsidiary force under Colonel Woodington, strengthened by a European regiment from Bombay. The Arabs defended themselves with spirit, and inflicted some loss on their assailants; but, after a siege of ten days, a practicable breach having been made in the walls, they capitulated on the promise that all arrears justly due to them should be paid, and they engaged in that event to disband and leave the country.

This transaction, and the flight of Kanhoji, restored tranquillity to Guzerat, and enabled the minister and the Resident to proceed without in-

provided by different Saráfs or bankers at Baroda under the Company's Bhándári—a general assurance that they should be repaid, not an absolute surety for repayment. An annual territorial revenue of 12,95,000 rupees was appropriated to the liquidation of the principal, with interest at nine per cent. per annum until the whole should be redeemed.—Coll. of Treaties, p. 601.

BOOK I.
 CHAP. I.

1806.

ruption in their projects of reform. Raoji Appa died in January, 1803, and was succeeded in his office of Dewan by his nephew Sitarám, who professed the same principles, and for a time pursued the same policy, as his uncle. The reduction of the expenditure proved however no easy task, as extravagance and dishonesty pervaded every department, and little reliance could be placed upon the co-operation of the servants of the state, who were themselves the chief plunderers and defaulters. Sitarám soon became weary of a duty so troublesome and unpopular, and lent himself to the prevailing practice of profusion; so that the whole labour and odium fell upon the Resident. He was ably assisted by Gangadhar Sastri, an accountant in his employment, who acquired at a subsequent date a melancholy celebrity in the political history of the Peninsula, as we shall have occasion to relate. The Resident was also firmly supported by the bankers and public creditors, who had a deep personal interest in the success of his proceedings.

The avowed exercise of British controul over the internal administration of the Gaekwar, which commenced under the authority of Marquis Wellesley, was continued on the same footing by Sir G. Barlow, although an admitted departure from his policy of non-interference. "The peculiar situation," he observed "of the affairs of the Gaekwar state, and the circumstances under which our connexion with that state has been established, and has become in a manner interwoven with its internal concerns, distinguish our relations with Baroda from those which

subsist with the other powers of India, although the general political relations and obligations are the same. The interference, therefore, which we are called upon to exercise, cannot be considered to constitute a deviation from those principles of policy which in our intercourse with other allies preclude our interference in the management of their internal concerns. It is evident that the alternative of our interference for the reform of the affairs of the Gaekwar is not merely the loss of the advantages to be derived from the efficacy of the alliance, but the positive dangers to which the certain ruin of the state would expose our most essential interests in that quarter of the Peninsula." These observations were undoubtedly just, but the spirit which they evince was eminently selfish, and no consideration of the benefit accruing to the Gaekwar was allowed to influence the maintenance of the connexion.

At the same time that the right and policy of interference were thus explicitly recognised, the economical timidity of the Bengal Government suspended the execution of a measure recommended by the Resident as essential to the realisation of the resources of Guzerat,—the enforced levy of the tribute due to the Gaekwar by his tributaries in Kattiwar. The obvious necessity, however, of rendering this source of legitimate revenue productive, and the expectation that a judicious display of the British power might prevent serious opposition, overcame the reluctance of the Governor-General; and a military detachment under the command of the Resident undertook the performance of the

BOOK I. Mulkgiri, or periodical collection of tribute by the
CHAP. I. march of troops through the province.

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Although correctly applicable to one division only, that occupied by the Katti tribe, the term Kattiwar designates the whole of the peninsula of Guzerat. The country was distributed amongst various tribes, of whom the Rajputs and Kattis were the most remarkable: subject to a number of petty chieftains of various degrees of power, and possessing domains differing in extent and value; sometimes connected with their neighbours by affinity of descent, but all equally independent in their own lordships; exercising the privilege of private war, and paying little more than nominal obedience to the paramount sovereign; presenting, in many respects, a resemblance to the kingdoms of Europe during the worst periods of baronial anarchy. The province had been regarded as tributary successively to the Mohammedan Kings of Guzerat, to the Mogul, and to the Mahrattas; but the tribute was never spontaneously paid, and its collection was only to be effected by a military progress amongst the states. Nor was this method always attended by success. The army of the Peshwa, or of the Gaekwar, even when amounting to twenty thousand horse, was not unfrequently resisted. The Rajas shut themselves up in their forts or castles, and from their battlements mocked the movements of cavalry. The villages, fortified by mud walls, impenetrable hedges, and the martial spirit of the population, were equally inaccessible; and the invaders were obliged to content themselves with laying the open country waste. Nor were they suffered to

carry off with impunity such plunder as they might have gathered; hordes of Katti and Rajput horse hovered round their advance and harassed their retreat, and the expedition not unusually terminated in disaster and disgrace.

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The diminished power and impaired resources of the Gaekwar had for several years prevented even such attempts at military coercion, and tribute accordingly had ceased. The spirit that now animated the counsels of the Government, and the means at its disposal, no longer permitted the chiefs of Kattiwar to resist its rightful demands with impunity. Having therefore received the sanction of his superiors, Major Walker marched with a division of the subsidiary force to Gotu, in the district of Murvi, to which place the several chieftains had been previously directed to send their representatives: the greater number complied with the requisition: the right of the Gaekwar's Government to levy a tribute was universally admitted, but it was not until after many attempts at delay and evasion that a settlement was accomplished, and the chiefs consented to pay the amount regularly, without waiting for the Mulkiri process of coercion. The sum of nine lakhs and a half of rupees was promised in perpetuity, and security was given for a term of ten years, renewable at its expiration. The security was characteristic. The sureties were persons boasting neither rank nor wealth, but who derived from the usages of the country inviolable sanctity, and were entitled to implicit trust. They were selected from the tribe of Chárans or Bháts, the hereditary bards, genealogists, and chroniclers of the

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BOOK I. principal Hindu races of the West of India, whose
CHAP. I. sacredness of person had been received as a substi-
 1807. tute for law in a condition of society which, whilst
 it felt the necessity of social obligations, could submit to none of the human restraints by which they are maintained and enforced. Superstition supplied the defect. The Cháran, if his pledge was violated, murdered himself or some member of his family; and the retribution for blood was believed to fall upon the head of him by whose default he had been impelled to make the sacrifice. The dread of such a destiny was generally of power to deter the least scrupulous from the violation of an engagement so guaranteed.¹ In some instances, additional securities were entered into by chiefs and persons of influence; and the rights of the Gaekwar, then established in Kattiwár, have never since been the subject of any serious contest. At the same time, the chiefs and people of the principal sea-ports of

¹ The following illustration of this usage is narrated by Lieut. Macmurdo:—"In the year 1806, a Bhat of Veweingaum, named Kunna, had become security on the part of Dossajee, the present chieftain of Mallia in Muchoo-kanta, for a sum of money payable to the Gaekwar Government: the time specified for payment arrived, and Dossajee refused to fulfill his engagement. Government applied to the surety, who, after several fruitless attempts to persuade Dossajee to comply with his bond, returned to his house, and, after passing some time in prayer, assembled his family and desired his wife to prepare a daughter, about seven years of age, for *traga*. The innocent child, taught from her earliest infancy to reflect on the sacred character and divine origin of her family, and the necessity which existed for the sacrifice, required no compulsion to follow the path by which the honour of her caste was to be preserved. Having bathed, and dressed herself in her best clothes, she knelt with her head on her father's knee, and, holding aside her long hair, she resigned herself without a struggle to the sword of this unnatural barbarian. The blood of a Bhat being sprinkled on the gate of the chieftain produced an instantaneous payment of the money: presents of land to the father, and a handsome mausoleum or *doree* to the daughter, marked the desire of the Rajput to avert the punishment supposed to await the spiller of a Cháran's blood."—Trans. Literary Society of Bombay, i. 281.

the Peninsula, all of whom were in the habit of committing piratical depredations on native commerce, were called upon to renounce piracy, to relinquish their claim to vessels wrecked on their coasts, to allow the free resort of merchant-ships from the territories of the Company or their allies, and to assent to the permanent residence of a commercial agent at their principal harbours. They generally acceded to these stipulations.¹

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The only active military operation which it became necessary to undertake was designed to adjust a difference between two chiefs of some consideration, and to demonstrate the ability as well as the determination of the Government of Guzerat to compel obedience. A body of Makránis, or mercenaries, natives of Mekran, in the service of the Raja of Purbandar, mutinying for arrears of pay, seized upon the fort of Kandorna belonging to the Raja, and sold it to a rival chief, the Jam of Noanagar. This transaction occurred after the arrival of the Resident and Gaekwar's minister in the province, and was held to be contempt of the superior authority, as well as disregard of private rights. The Jam was desired to restore the fortress; and, as he refused to comply with the requisition, the detachment marched against the place: batteries were erected, and in the course of a day, two practicable breaches being effected, the troops were drawn out for the assault, when the garrison surrendered. Kandorna had formerly sustained successfully a siege

¹ The sea-ports were Dhingi, Bate, Dwaraka, Amramra, Positra, Jooria, and Noanagar on the north coast, and different parts of Junagerh on the south. For the stipulations with them severally, and with other of the Kattiwar principalities, see Coll. of Treaties, pp. 602, &c.

BOOK I. of three months by the Gaekwar's army, and was
 CHAP. I. looked upon by the people as impregnable. Its
 1807. capture on the present occasion in so short a time
 impressed the native chiefs with a deep conviction
 of the uselessness of opposition to the British arms,
 and produced a sensible effect upon the progress of
 the negotiations.

The expedition into Kattiwār was considered as affording a favourable opportunity for asserting authority of a different description, and vindicating the outraged claims of natural affection. The Jhareja Rajputs of the province, and of the neighbouring principality of Cutch, were notorious for the murder of their female infants. Preferring the death of a daughter to a matrimonial alliance with an inferior race, and looking upon most races as inferior, precluded by custom from marrying her to a husband of her own tribe, the Jharejas believed it to be more humane to nip the flower in the bud, than to await the risk of its being blighted in maturer growth. A female child was almost invariably put to death as soon as born. The Government of Bombay had for some time past been anxious to eradicate this cruel and unnatural practice;¹ and Colonel Walker was instructed to endeavour to obtain from the chiefs a declaration of its incompatibility with the Hindu religion as well as with the laws of humanity, and a promise that they

¹ The head of the Bombay Government, Mr. Jonathan Duncan, had encountered, when Governor-General's agent at Benares, a similar custom among the Rajkumars, a Rajput tribe established in that province, and had succeeded in obtaining from them an engagement to abstain from the commission of the crime; this was in 1739.—Papers on Female Infanticide, printed by order of the House of Commons, 17th June, 1824, p. 22; the engagement is also printed, *ibid.* p. 8.

would desist from its perpetration. The negotiation was a subject of some delicacy; but the Resident by the weight of his character, and a judicious employment of the influence with which the situation and interests of the several chiefs invested him, overcame all difficulties, and carried the instructions of the Government into effect. An engagement was signed by all the principal chiefs for themselves and their fraternities, by which they pledged themselves to renounce the usage of killing their female children, to expel from their caste any person who should be guilty of the crime, and to submit to any penalties which the Gaekwar's Government and the British Resident should inflict for breach of the obligation.¹ For some time they seem to have adhered to the terms of the engagement, but the Resident and the Government were somewhat too sanguine in their belief that female infanticide was suppressed in Guzerat. It was not possible that the illusions of deep-rooted prejudice and long-established custom should instantly vanish before the voice of humanity and reason; and fear of punishment, the only agent of adequate power to work so sudden a change, could exercise but little controul where the detection of an offence committed in the impenetrable secrecy of domestic privacy was obviously almost impracticable. Accordingly, at a long subsequent date, there were grounds for believing that the crime was almost as common as it had been before the interposition of the British Government.² The

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¹ Report of his proceedings by Colonel Walker, 15th March, 1808.—Parl. Papers, 31.

² In 1817, there were but sixty-three Jhareja females living in all Katti-

BOOK I. sentiments of that Government have, however, been
CHAP. I. sufficiently made known to insure its marked dis-
 1807. favour to any chief suspected of violating the spirit
 of the original contract; and a sense of individual
 interest, with improved principles of action, manners
 softened by the continuance of tranquillity, and
 extended intellectual cultivation, must ultimately
 effect the extinction of a practice which is not more
 inconsistent with reason than repugnant to natural
 instinct.¹

The adjustment of the Kattiwar tribute tended materially to facilitate the improvement of the Gaekwar's finances, but their final settlement was retarded by the aversion which the new minister exhibited to the economical measures of the Resident, and the secret counteraction which he countenanced or practised. It became necessary, therefore, to re-model the administration. Sitarám was removed from the office of Dewan, the duties of which were assigned to his uncle, Baba Rao; whilst a general controuling and sanctioning authority was vested in Fatih Sing Gaekwar, the younger brother of the reigning prince, and heir to the throne. These ministers, holding their appointments by the tenure of the Resident's approbation, co-operated cordially with him, and results the most beneficial were speedily attained. In place of the seemingly hopeless condition of the public finances when the process of reform was commenced, when the expenditure nearly

war, born subsequently to the engagement with Colonel Walker.—Parl. Papers, 110. In a village called Draffa, containing four hundred families, there was not a single female child.—*Ibid.* 112.

¹ Note by Mr. Elphinstone when Governor of Bombay.—*Ibid.* 116.

doubled the receipts, the revenue of the Gaekwar was raised in the course of six years to sixty-five lakhs of rupees, and his expenses were reduced to fifty lakhs, leaving a surplus of fifteen lakhs applicable to the liquidation of his debts; perseverance in the same system for about a similar period was expected to ensure his liberation from pecuniary embarrassment, and the full command of all his resources.¹ The connexion which the Gaekwar had formed with the British had been attended therefore with unequivocal benefit to that prince, and, at the period at which we have arrived, was distinguished above all the existing subsidiary alliances, by implicit confidence, intimate union, and mutual satisfaction.²

The other Mahratta states, although they had acceded to relations of amity, had declined a closer alliance and the engagement of subsidiary troops. The most friendly chief amongst them was the Raja of Berar. A British Resident was admitted at his court, and exercised considerable influence in his counsels. Some of his ministers also were, with his knowledge and concurrence, in the receipt of pensions from the Government of Bengal, as compensation for private losses suffered from the late war. The Raja was, however, not altogether contented with his allies. His dominions had been heavily mulcted for his share in the recent hostilities.³ He had been compelled to cede part of

¹ MS. Records.

² Lieutenant-Colonel Walker left Baroda on account of ill-health in the beginning of 1809. He returned for a short time at the pressing solicitation of the Government of Bengal to superintend proceedings relating to the affairs of Cutch, but finally quitted India in 1810.

³ By the treaty of Deogaum, 17th December, 1803.—Coll. of Treaties, 261.

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that had been inflicted on him with the undeserved forbearance which the British Government had shown to Sindhia and Holkar, notwithstanding the more prominent part which they had taken in the operations of the war, and the more inveterate animosity which they had manifested. He claimed, therefore, at least equally favourable treatment, and a similar restoration of his dismembered territories; and in justification of his expectations he pleaded an implied promise of Lord Cornwallis, who, in a letter addressed to the Raja, had assured him of his "intention of compensating his losses to the utmost practicable extent consistent with equity and public faith." The letter was unquestionably authentic, and the tenor was sufficiently obvious, although the expressions were vague: a liberal interpretation of them would have replaced the Raja in possession of Cuttack, if not of Berar; but, as this would have been inconvenient, it was necessary to explain away the precipitate generosity of the noble writer. It was argued with some plausibility that it would be inconsistent with equity and public faith to resume the lands ceded to the Nizam, and it was maintained with less show of reason that it would be equally incompatible with justice to the British Government of India to deprive it of Cuttack. Ragoji Bhonsla's notions of justice were somewhat at variance with those of the Governor-General, and he not unnaturally demurred to the decision of a judge who sat in judgment on his own cause, and pronounced sentence in his own favour. He was

obliged to submit, but he acquiesced unwillingly. To fulfil in some degree the purpose of restitution intimated by Lord Cornwallis, it was proposed to cede to the Raja a tract of little extent or value west of the Wardá river, and the more considerable district of Sambhalpur on the east of Berar. The Raja declined to accept the former: the latter became, after a season, an unwilling and unprofitable dependency of Nagpur. Its cession was scarcely compatible with a strict observance of the obligations contracted with the people of the province when it came into British possession.

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The countries of Sambhalpur and Patna, forming an extensive tract, were, for the greater part, overrun with jungle; but they afforded support to a scanty population scattered about in detached villages, and subject to the authority of a number of petty Rajput chiefs, loosely connected by affinity or allegiance, but not unfrequently disunited and at variance. The Mahratta Rajas of Nagpur had availed themselves of the opportunity offered by the dissensions of the chiefs to interpose, and set up a claim of supremacy and exact payment of tribute; but they had never been able to establish any recognised influence or authority. The principle of the Mulkgiri of Kattiwár was therefore here also in practice: a body of troops was sent every third year into the province, which plundered the villages and devastated the fields, until its retreat was purchased by the payment of the sum demanded. This system of extortion, and the cruelty and spoliation with which it was enforced, had rendered the Mahrattas detested alike by chiefs and people, and they cor-

BOOK I. dially welcomed and assisted the British division,
 CHAP. I. which, in the late war, was sent in their direction.

1807. On that occasion they had readily promised allegiance to the British Government, on condition that they should be permanently retained amongst its subjects. As, however, little advantage to the resources of the Company's dominions was to be expected from so poor a dependency, the pledge given to its inhabitants was disregarded, and it was resolved to consign them again to their Mahratta oppressors. With a show of attention to its engagements, the British Government, at the same time that it announced to the chiefs its determination to relinquish its occupation of the country, pretended to ask their consent to the transfer; offering to grant to those who might prefer the abandonment of their homes to submission to the Mahrattas, waste lands in the adjacent province of Cuttack.

The determination of the British Government to abandon them filled the people of Sambhalpur and Patna with consternation, and they protested against the measure in the most earnest and affecting terms.¹ Their remonstrances were unavailing; and, after some negotiation, they were prevailed upon to promise acceptance of the offer of compensation elsewhere, and agreed to quit the country within a given period, for the settlement which was proposed to them in Cuttack. When the time assigned for

¹ A notion prevailed amongst the people that the province was ceded by the British Government in consequence of financial embarrassments. The head men of the villages thereupon assembled, waited upon Captain Roughsedge the commissioner, and offered on the part of their respective communities to make a free gift to him of half, or, if that were insufficient, of a still larger proportion of their property of every description, if the sacrifice would prevent their being abandoned.—MS. Records.

their emigration arrived, natural attachment to their native soil and the homes of their forefathers overcame their hatred and dread of the Mahrattas, and they refused to move, declaring it to be their resolution to remain upon their paternal lands, and defend them as they best might from the grasp of the spoiler. Advantage was immediately taken of their change of purpose: their tergiversation was held to exonerate the Bengal Government from the obligations of perpetual protection or equivalent compensation, and the recusants were abandoned to their fate.¹ One chief alone, Jujar Sing of Raigerh, allowed his allies no such pretext to shuffle off their responsibility: he had consistently refused to be a party to the agreement to leave the country, and declared himself resolved rather to suffer any extremities, leaving to the British Government the odium of a breach of faith. They were, therefore, obliged to except Raigerh from the cessions to

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¹ It is stated in a work which is in general of good authority, the Bengal and Agra Gazetteer, 1841, vol. ii. p. 312, "that Sambhalpur and Patna were restored to the Raja of Berar by General Wellesley, in ignorance of the intention of the Bengal Government to keep them as tributary dependencies; that many attempts were made to induce the Raja to forego the concession, and accept an equivalent; and that it was only upon finding him adhere pertinaciously to the promised restoration, that the Government consented at last to relinquish the provinces; at the same time, in order to reconcile the people to the proceeding, they were told, that, should events again bring them under British rule, they should become permanently subject to it." The statement does not seem to be correct. In the treaty of Deogaum, the 10th article confirms all treaties made by the British Government with the feudatories of the Raja; and the stipulation applies especially to the agreements with the Rajas of Sambhalpur and Patna, in which they had conditioned that they should remain permanently under British authority. Their districts were ceded to Nagpur by Sir G. Barlow in August, 1806, by a formal engagement, in the preamble of which it is stated that the Governor-General agrees to restore all the territory of Sambhalpur and Patna which was ceded by the Raja to the Company. It is clear, therefore, that up to the date of this restoration the provinces had been held by the Company; and no claim to them by the Raja, founded on a promise by General Wellesley, could have been preferred or recognised.—Coll. of Treaties, pp. 261. 300.

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Nagpur; but they accompanied the exception with strict injunctions to the Raja to avoid giving offence to the Government of Berar, on pain of forfeiting his claim to British support. A Mahratta force was sent against the other Rajas, which, with some trouble, and more by treachery than force of arms, reduced them to obedience.¹ At a subsequent era, and under a different system of policy, Sambhalpur was finally reannexed to the Presidency of Bengal.

Although deeply disappointed and annoyed by the refusal of the Bengal Government to understand the letter of Lord Cornwallis in the sense in which he interpreted it, the Raja of Nagpur was not in a position to resent its conduct or dispense with its friendship. He was pressed for large pecuniary payments by Sindhia and by Holkar: the latter threatened to exact the discharge of his demands at the head of an army, and the threat was subsequently carried into act by Holkar's colleague, Amir Khan. Instigated also by other Mahratta princes and the Nawab of Bhopal, with whom the Court of Nagpur was at enmity, and impelled by their own habits of plunder, the confederated marauding bands known by the designation of Pindaris committed constant depredations on the

¹ The fort of Sambhalpur was at the time of the cession in the hands of the Rani, the Raja being detained a prisoner at Nagpur. Finding himself unable to carry the place by force, the Mahratta general pledged his Government in the most solemn manner to release the Raja and acknowledge his authority, on the Rani consenting to a moderate tribute. Having thus thrown her off her guard, he took advantage of her confidence, in the course of the negotiations that followed, to surprise the fort before any defence could be offered. The Rani fled with a few followers; and having with great difficulty, and after much fatigue and suffering, escaped into the British territory, protection and a small monthly pension were granted her. She was one of those who at first entertained the proposal to emigrate into Cuttack, but who shrunk from its accomplishment.—MS. Records.

frontiers of Berar, and on more than one occasion pillaged the country even in the vicinity of the capital. Ragoji Bhonsla and his ministers were well aware that his only security against the aggressions of his countrymen was the British alliance, and they were careful, therefore, to maintain it unimpaired. The connexion added to the strength and reputation of the British Government, as it was obvious to all the native states, that the most ancient and respectable branch of the Mahratta confederacy was indebted for all the political consideration which it retained, to the friendly relations established between it and the British power, unincumbered by a subsidiary treaty, and not incompatible with its independence.

Of all the Mahratta princes engaged in hostilities with the British, Dowlat Rao Sindhia had suffered the severest military and political inflictions. The organised battalions which had rendered him irresistible to the native powers, and formidable to his European adversary, had been almost annihilated;¹ and, although much of the territory conquered from him on the west of the Jumna had been restored, he had been deprived of extensive tracts in Hindustan, and of all the reputation and authority he derived from the guardianship of the Emperor of

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¹ The regular infantry brigades in Sindhia's service at the beginning of the war consisted of seventy-two battalions, forming a disciplined force of 43,000 men in a highly respectable state of efficiency, with a large proportion of field artillery.—Malcolm's Central India, i. 138. After the war they were reduced to two brigades, under the commands severally of a Frenchman named Baptiste, and an Armenian of the name of Jacob; their discipline and organisation were greatly impaired.—Letters from a Mahratta Camp. There were other bodies of troops under native leaders, but they were of a still more imperfect and irregular description.—Prinsep, Transactions in India, i. 26.

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Delhi. He was precluded by positive engagements, as well as by his fear of the consequences of their infringement, from seeking to re-establish his ascendancy in the Mahratta confederation; and the sole object of his now humbled policy was to obtain money, on various pretexts, from the British Government, and from the neighbouring states.

The equivocal behaviour of Sindhia in the interval that elapsed between the treaty formed with him in 1803, and that with Holkar in 1805, virtually annulled the existing engagements, and rendered their renewal necessary. A new treaty was accordingly entered into with him, by which some of the stipulations of that of Sirji Anjangaum were abrogated, others confirmed.¹ The intercourse that ensued in the period immediately following had principally for its object the fulfilment of the stipulations then provided: it did little credit to either of the contracting parties, turning mainly upon matters of pecuniary interest, in which it was the aim of the Mahratta to get as much, and of the Governor-General to give as little, as possible. The disputes were characteristic.

The treaty of Sirji Anjangaum permitted Sindhia to hold within the British possessions certain districts granted him in Jagir by the King of Delhi;

¹ In the engagement now concluded, no notice was taken of the subsidiary treaty to which Sindhia had acceded in 1804. It might, therefore, be considered as virtually cancelled. It was in fact altogether nugatory. The force to be furnished by the British Government was not to be paid by the Raja, nor was it to be stationed in his territory. The arrangement amounted to no more than an agreement to furnish Sindhia with a body of troops whenever he should require them, if the purpose for which he required them was approved of by the Government of Bengal. It was very little probable that the latter would often give their sanction to Sindhia's military policy, and as little likely therefore that he would apply for troops. He never did make the application, and the treaty was a nullity.

and it secured to members of his family, and to some of his chief officers, compensation for lands held by them in the Doab before the war, either by a grant of similar Jagirs or of equivalent pensions, provided that the whole amount of revenue so alienated did not exceed the annual sum of seventeen lakhs of rupees. By the final treaty, Sindhia agreed to relinquish, from the 1st of January, 1805, pensions to the amount of fifteen lakhs of rupees a year. The Jagirs to individuals were continued, not merely as compensation for loss, but avowedly as bribes to purchase their voices for peace; or, as it was officially expressed, "to secure the support of influential officers in the councils of Sindhia, whose interests being affected by a war, they would oppose its occurrence." The same engagement contracted for a pension to the Maharaja himself of four lakhs of rupees a year, and a Jagir of two lakhs to his wife, and of one to his daughter. The Jagirs were eventually commuted to pensions, which lapsed with the death of the pensioners. These grants and commutations were the subjects of long and sometimes angry discussion.

Another contested item was the balance of an account between Sindhia and the Company, in which the former claimed arrears of pension, and of revenue collections for two years prior to 1805; which the latter admitted to a limited extent, but met with a counter-claim for the public and private property plundered from the British Residency in 1804, and for monies advanced and charges of collection. The sum claimed by Sindhia was nearly twenty-four lakhs of rupees; that demanded by the

BOOK I. Company, nearly twenty-seven lakhs. They agreed, however, to forego a portion of their claim, and admitted a balance in favour of Sindhia of 63,000 rûpees (6300L.), an amount which was vastly inferior to his expectations and his necessities: for the relief of the latter he was therefore obliged to look to other quarters.

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The quarrels of the Rajput princes, which will presently be more particularly adverted to, offered an ample field for the gratification of Mahratta rapacity, of which the Mahratta princes in Malwa were not slow to reap the harvest. The exhaustion of Sindhia's resources, and the impossibility of raising a revenue commensurate with his expenditure from his wasted and depopulated territories, crippled his movements, and disabled him from appropriating his full share of the spoil. His troops, still too numerous for his means, were repeatedly in a state of mutiny for arrears of pay, and had degenerated into a lawless horde of plunderers, who, in the realisation of their demands, made little difference between the country of friend or foe, and pillaged the districts of their own master and his allies as remorselessly as those of his enemies. The only prospect of providing them with an equivalent for pay, and of maintaining amongst them some degree of subordination, existed in the levy of contributions from the neighbouring princes; and from time to time considerable sums were exacted from the Rana of Udaypur, and the Rajas of Jodhpur and Jaypur, as arrears of tribute due under former engagements to the Mahrattas, or as the price of plighted military service, which was at

best but imperfectly rendered. But Holkar and Amir Khan had taken the disputes of the Rajputs under their management, and Sindhia was unwilling or unable to interfere with effect. After a feeble attempt at interposition, he was contented to allow some of his principal officers to take occasional part in the contest, whilst he directed his attention more especially to the prosecution of designs against the independence of Bhopal.

The principality of Bhopal presented the singularity of a petty Mohammedan power in the very heart of the Hindu states. It was founded at the close of the seventeenth century by Dost Mohammed, an Afghan adventurer in the service of the Emperor of Delhi, who, from being the superintendent of the small district of Bersia in Malwa, raised himself, by that mixture of courage, activity, treachery, and political cruelty, which is not uncommon in the character of his countrymen and which in the latter days of the Mogul empire was the usual title to temporary elevation, to the command of a territory of some extent, and the appellation of Nawab of Bhopal. His direct line continued through his three successors. The two last of these devoted their lives to religious meditation and prayer, and left the conduct of public affairs to their ministers, men of various characters and fortunes; whose administration often excited, and sometimes justified, the opposition and violence of the turbulent nobles and officers of the court. At this period the Dewan or minister of the Nawab was his kinsman, Vizir Mohammed, whose father had been slain in an unsuccessful insurrection, and

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whose youth had been spent in exile and predatory warfare: placed, after many vicissitudes, at the head of affairs, he brought to their administration the qualities of activity, courage, and prudence, which promised to restore the declining prosperity and reputation of Bhopal. He was not suffered to carry his projects to maturity. The son of the Nawab, Ghous Mohammed, jealous of his ascendancy, and apprehensive of his ambition, invited the Raja of Berar, and Dowlat Rao Sindhia, to invade the principality, in order to secure his succession to the throne. The invitation was readily accepted. The capital, Islam-nagar, was captured by the latter; and the city and fort of Bhopal were occupied by Sadik Ali, the general of the former. Little hope remained that the state would recover from the pressure of such a formidable combination.

In this state of things, the old Nawab, Haiyat Mohammed, died. He was succeeded by his son, who, finding that his allies purposed the dismemberment of his territory, reconciled himself to Vizir Mohammed, and continued him in the office of Dewan, trusting to his talents for the extrication of his country from the grasp of his enemies. His expectations were not disappointed. Vizir Mohammed conciliated Sindhia by promising to discharge the tribute which Ghous Mohammed had engaged to pay; and, with the assistance of the Pindaris, he repelled the forces of Berar. The ruin of his country was arrested for the time; but Vizir Mohammed was well aware of the inadequacy of his means to cope with such powerful adversaries, and, anticipating the repetition of their efforts for his

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destruction, endeavoured to interest the British Government in his favour. The system of policy then adopted, rendered his application ineffectual, and he was left to his own resources until a more auspicious period arrived, when the debt contracted to the Nwab of Bhopal, Haiyat Mohammed, for the assistance which he gave to General Goddard, and by which alone the British detachment was enabled to march unopposed from the Nerbudda to Surat, was repaid by the seasonable protection afforded to his descendant.

BOOK I.
CHAP. I.

1807.

The counsels of Sindhia were likewise distracted by the conflicting views of his principal officers and advisers, and the struggles that prevailed amongst them for the management of his affairs. Ambaji Ingliā, after having been confined, tortured, and plundered, as has been described, was restored to favour, and became the leader of a party opposed to the former ministers. In order to strengthen his influence, he invited Sirji Rao Ghatka, whom the British Government had banished by express stipulation from Sindhia's presence, to return to camp; and although the measure furnished his adversaries with a plea for alarming the prince, and inducing him once more to imprison and pillage Ambaji, yet, when the interdict was withdrawn by those who had pronounced it, and the Government of Calcutta no longer entertained an undignified apprehension of the intrigues of an individual, Sirji Rao resumed his place at Sindhia's durbar, and conducted, conjointly with Ambaji, the duties of the administration. Neither of them long survived the recovery of their authority. Ambaji Ingliā died

1809.

BOOK I. early in 1809. Sirji Rao Ghatka was killed in an
 CHAP. I. affray in the course of the same year.¹ Dowlat Rao,
 1809. after Ambaji's death, seized on his fortress of
 Gwalior, and for the greater part of his life con-
 tinued encamped in its vicinity, until his camp
 grew to be a considerable town, which is still the ca-
 pital of his descendants. No other change ensued :
 the same pecuniary embarrassments continued to be
 felt, and the same means of relieving them to be
 employed : the fruits of robbery and spoliation were
 dissipated by the wasteful and unprincipled system
 under which they were gathered, and the hordes of
 licensed banditti which were let loose upon the sur-
 rounding states were a source of weakness, not of
 strength, to the prince whom they nominally served.

¹ The importance attached to this individual by his special exclusion from Sindhia's presence as an article of treaty, gives interest to the following details of his death, derived from an authority on the spot:—"Sirji Rao had gone to the durbar and was earnestly pressing Sindhia to accede to some of his proposals ; to which the Maharaja as usual returned evasive and unsatisfactory replies, and ordered his equipage to be got ready to go to an elephant-fight. As he was about to depart, Sirji Rao repeated his remonstrances, and at length had the temerity to seize the skirt of his robe and endeavoured to detain him forcibly in his seat. Some of the Huzuriyas (personal attendants) present, incensed at such an insult, thrust him back ; and Sindhia escaped from the tent, giving an order to secure the minister's person. Sirji Rao drew his sword and resisted the execution of the order : a violent scuffle ensued, in which some individuals of both parties were killed and several wounded. At length Sirji Rao effected his retreat to his own tent, but was followed by the enraged party from the Deuri, headed by Anand Rao and Manaji Phankra, two distant relations of the Maharaja's family. In one minute the ropes of the tent in which the unfortunate minister had taken refuge were cut, and he himself dragged from beneath it ; and in the next he fell dead in the public street, pierced with a dozen wounds inflicted by his pitiless enemies. Sindhia is said to have given orders, when he heard of the scuffle, to spare his father-in-law's life, and from the known lenity of his disposition it is probable he did so. His pursuers either wilfully or ignorantly mistook these orders, and in all probability rejoiced at an opportunity of getting rid of a man who was an object of hatred to themselves, of dislike to their master, of terror to the whole army, and apprehension to every court in India."—Letters from a Mahratta Camp, by Captain Broughton, commanding the Resident's escort, 1809, p. 223.

The British Government, unable to rid itself of former impressions, continued to treat Dowlat Rao Sindhia with a guarded and timid policy for some time after his friendship had ceased to be an object of conciliation, or his enmity of fear.

BOOK I.
CHAP. I.

1809.

The power and resources of Jeswant Rao Holkar were in like manner for some time estimated rather by the mischief which he had inflicted, than any which he retained the ability to commit. The unmerited liberality which the British Government had evinced towards him had replaced him in the actual or prospective possession of an extensive and valuable territory,¹ and its selfish disregard of inconvenient obligations consigned to his rapacity the chieftains of Rajputana, particularly the Rajas of Bundi and Jaypur.² The motives of this uncalled for generosity were unintelligible to the native princes, and to Holkar himself; and both ascribed it to dread of his military talents, and incapability of providing longer for the exigencies of war. The necessary consequence of this notion was, the inflation of Holkar's ambition with the hope that he should soon be able to reunite under happier auspices the disjointed members of the Mahratta confederacy, and exact a severe retribution for the mutilation which they had

1806.

¹ The treaty with Holkar of December, 1805, restored to him the possessions of the Holkar family in Mewar, Malwa, Harauti, and the Dekhin. —Coll. of Treaties, p. 294.

² A declaratory article, added to the treaty by Sir G. Barlow, abrogated the second article, by which Holkar had renounced all right to Tonk-Rampura and the districts north of the Bundi Hills. The abrogation was interpreted by him as a virtual withdrawal of the protection granted to the Bundi Raja. By the eighth article of the treaty Holkar relinquished all claims of every description upon the British Government and its allies, amongst whom the Raja of Jaypur considered himself included: his claim was not admitted, as is subsequently noticed in the text.

BOOK I. suffered. So far was he from acknowledging the
 CHAP. L extent of the leniency which had been shown him,
 1806. that he immediately preferred, in insulting lan-
 guage, new and unreasonable claims; demanding the
 cession of additional lands in the Dekhin, and of
 eighteen districts in Hindustan, and the grant of
 Jagirs for his family and adherents.¹ Protracting
 his march southwards as long as he could find any
 one whom he might plunder, he levied contributions
 on his way from the petty chiefs whom the British
 Government professed to protect, or to regard as
 allies;² and he made no secret of his purpose to
 punish the Bundi Raja expressly for the aid which
 he had given during the war to the British. He
 had scarcely returned to his own domains when
 he addressed letters, or dispatched emissaries, to the
 other Malhratta princes, urging them to renew their
 ancient connexions, and prepare for another conflict
 with their common foe. They were suffering, how-
 ever, too severely from their recent discomfiture

¹ In one of his first letters he declared peremptorily that the districts which he claimed in Hindustan must be restored to him, and he insisted that others should be assigned to Amir Khan. The Bengal Government sheltered its dignity under the plea of an erroneous translation of his expressions having been made by Colonel Malcolm, through whom the letter had been transmitted, but apparently with little reason; and there was no question as to the general tone of the epistle. The Governor-General determined to take no offence, ascribing Holkar's language "to the unbridled violence of his temper." The application was answered by Lord Lake, with an intimation that its repetition might lead to a renewal of hostilities; and, although this intimation did not silence Holkar's pretensions, it induced him to urge them in more decent phraseology.—MS. Records.

² On his way through Hariana, which had been given to Abdul Samad Khan as a reward for his services in the war, Holkar levied contributions on the villages, and laid waste the lands. The Khan applied for military succour: this was refused him; but in consideration of the recent date of the grant, and the impossibility of his having had time to organise his resources, pecuniary compensation for his losses was awarded to him.—MS. Records.

to venture precipitately upon so dangerous an enterprise;¹ and, whatever the opinion which they might at first have been disposed to entertain of Holkar's courage and conduct, it was speedily effaced by his outrageous behaviour and eventual derangement.

BOOK I.
CHAP. I.
1807.

The first object of Holkar's policy after his return to Malwa was, the maintenance of a military force far beyond his own unaided resources. The plunder of his neighbours offered the only means of filling his treasury; and the quarrels of the Rajput princes unhappily afforded to him, even in a greater degree than to Sindhia, an opening for pecuniary exactions. On his return from the Punjab, Holkar halted for about a month in the Jaypur territory; and, whilst his army laid waste its fields, he received eighteen lakhs of rupees from the Raja as the price of his withholding his aid from the Raja of Jodhpur, with whom the Raja of Jaypur was at strife, and who, by giving shelter to Holkar's family when the Mahratta fled from Lord Lake, had established some claim to his gratitude. The money extorted from Jaypur precluded him from giving personal assistance to Jodhpur, but he evaded the strict fulfilment of the bargain by permitting his chief leader and intimate associate, Amir Khan, to carry his mercenary bands to whichever of the contending Rajas should bid most largely for their services. Holkar then occupied himself in the castigation of the Raja of Bundi, exacting from him heavy contributions, and in enforcing demands of a similar

¹ Sindhia, the Peshwa, and the Raja of Nagpur severally communicated these letters to the Residents at their courts.—MS. Records.

BOOK I. nature from Zalim Sing, regent of Kota. He then
 CHAP. I. withdrew to Rampura-Bampura, where his health
 1807. rapidly gave way to habitual intoxication and unrestrained indulgence, the effects of which were exacerbated by the compunctious visitings of conscience.

The animosity borne by the Peshwa to Holkar augmented his dissatisfaction with the favourable terms granted to that chief; and he strongly objected to the treaty which the British Government had concluded, that it conferred upon him rights and possessions to which he had no claim. In truth, Jeswant Rao Holkar had become the head of his house, partly by accident, partly by his own exertions. Tukaji Holkar, his predecessor, left two legitimate sons, Kasi Rao and Malhar Rao. His third son, Jeswant Rao, was his son by a concubine. Kasi Rao, the eldest son, was deformed in body and infirm in mind, and his unfitness for the administration of affairs induced the chief officers of the state to give the preference to his younger brother Malhar Rao. Sindhia took part with Kasi Rao; and, in the contest that ensued, Malhar Rao was killed, and Jeswant Rao, who had upheld his cause, was obliged to seek safety in flight. After encountering many vicissitudes, Jeswant Rao by a course of successful predatory devastation, in which he was deeply indebted to the companionship of Amir Khan, found himself strong enough to drive Sindhia's troops out of the territories of the Holkar family, and establish himself in their government in the name and on behalf of their lawful prince, Kandi Rao, the infant son of the murdered Malhar

Rao, who was at the time in Sindhia's hands, as well as Kasi Rao, his uncle. The latter was allowed his liberty, and gave himself up to Jeswant Rao; and, when the war with the British Government was projected, Sindhia, in order to secure Holkar's co-operation, resigned to him the charge of the boy Kandi Rao. At the time of Holkar's return from the Punjab, Kasi Rao was living peaceably at Nimaur, under the charge of Jeswant Rao's Gooroo, or spiritual guide, Chimna Bhao: his nephew, Kandi Rao, had accompanied him on his march.

BOOK I.
CHAP. I.

1807.

A body of Mohammedan horse in the service of Jeswant Rao having mutinied for arrears of pay, his nephew was delivered to them as a pledge for the promised liquidation of their demands. As the promises made to the mutineers were slow of accomplishment, it occurred to them to intimidate Holkar into more prompt compliance by proclaiming Kandi Rao the lawful Raja, and threatening to depose Jeswant Rao as a usurper.¹ The danger was imminent; the money was raised; the mutinous soldiers were paid and dismissed: they dispersed to their homes without any concern for the fate of the unhappy youth whom they had used as their instrument of intimidation, and abandoned him to those jealous apprehensions which they seem to have first excited. In a week Kandi Rao was no longer an object of fear. It was given out that he had died suddenly; but it was the universal belief that he had

¹ Malcolm's Central India, i. 242. According to Amir Khan's account of the affair, this plan of enforcing payment was adopted by his recommendation, not without a suspicion on Holkar's part that the whole was a device of Amir Khan to obtain an adjustment of his own claims.—Mem. of Amir Khan, 290.

BOOK I. been poisoned, if not by the orders, at least with
 CHAP. I. the acquiescence of Holkar.¹

1803.

To this crime succeeded an event which in current belief was of an equally atrocious character—the death of Kasi Rao. The accounts of this transaction vary in some of the details, although they correspond in the outline. Kasi Rao resided in a stronghold in the province of Nimaur, of which the governor was Chimna Bhao, the Gooroo of Holkar, and known to be his ready counsellor and agent in every deed of infamy and guilt. An insurrection under some military leaders had broken out in the adjoining district of Kandesh, and one of their parties attacked Chimna Bhao with a view to obtain possession of the person of Kasi Rao, and place him at their head. To disappoint their design, and prevent Kasi Rao from falling into their hands, Chimna Bhao caused him to be put to death. There does not appear to be any conclusive evidence that Holkar himself had suggested a pretended attack upon his minister as a pretext for the murder of his brother, or any reason to infer that the act was not solely attributable to the unpremeditated and reckless cruelty of Chimna Bhao.² The imputation of

¹ Central India, i. 244. Amir Khan asserts unhesitatingly that Holkar caused poison to be administered to his nephew, and so destroyed him; Mem. 307.

² According to Malcolm, on the authority of Bangash Khan, one of the insurgent Patan leaders, a party under his confederate, Dadan Khan, attempted the release of Kasi Rao, who was confined at Kargond, in Nimaur; to prevent which, Chimna Bhao had him murdered in the thicket some distance from the fort. According to the evidence of a Sipahi in the service of Chimna Bhao, present at the murder, Kasi Rao was killed in Bijaygerh, a fort also in Nimaur, from which Dadan Khan had attempted to carry him off. The dispatch from the Resident with Sindhia, reporting the transaction, agrees in making Bijaygerh the seat of the prince's detention; but states that, orders having been sent to bring him for greater security to Holkar's camp, Chimna Bhao was escorting him on the way,

being accessory to the deed was however fixed upon Holkar by common consent, and popular belief regarded his insanity as a just retribution for the murder of a nephew and a brother. He became subject to fits of mental derangement shortly after the death of Kasi Rao: they alternated with intervals of reason for about a twelvemonth, when they subsided into an unintermitted state of moody fatuity, which after a duration of three years terminated in death.

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CHAP. I.
1809.

The affairs of Holkar's dominions were conducted during his incapacity by his favourite mistress Tulasi Bhai and her minister Balaram Set; but their hands were too feeble to maintain a steady curb upon the disorderly troops and their aspiring captains, and the country speedily became the scene of plunder and confusion. The party in Kandesh under Dadan Khan and other Patan leaders acquired a

when he was attacked at night by Dadan Khan's men, and, in the affray that followed, Kasi Rao was accidentally shot. Amir Khan's story materially differs from the foregoing. He says, that the Bhils of Kandesh, being in insurrection, had got hold of the wife of Kasi Rao, and, she being pregnant, they declared that if the child were a boy they would make him Raja; that Chimna Bhao, being sent to quell the disturbance, took Kasi Rao along with him from Galna, where he had been detained; that on the march he set some of his own people to make a sham attack by night upon his camp, and, in the confusion thus occasioned, he pretended great alarm lest Kasi Rao should fall into the hands of the Bhils, and, to prevent it, ordered him to be put to death; the whole being in truth the device of Holkar. Although it is true that the Bhils were in a state of insurgency at this period, yet the policy of opposing a rival to Holkar was much more likely to have occurred to the Patans, and it was no doubt to guard against their availing themselves of the name of Kasi Rao that he was murdered by some such contrivance as is imputed to Chimna Bhao. Holkar denied that he had given orders to put his brother to death, and, ascribing it to accident, publicly expressed himself glad that it had occurred at a distance, as it might otherwise have injured his reputation. The varieties of the story afford a striking proof of the difficulty of coming at the circumstances of a fact even upon contemporary testimony. Mr. Prinsep hesitates to affix a date to this transaction; from the official correspondence it appears to have taken place about the middle of February, 1808.—Central India, i. 244; Mem. of Amir Khan, 313; MS. Records.

BOOK I. formidable consistency after the murder of Kasi
 CHAP. I. Rao. They placed at their head Mahipat Rao Hol-

1809. kar, first cousin of Jeswant Rao, and proclaimed him sovereign. The troops sent against them either joined their ranks or were defeated; and they had a fair prospect of success, when, unfortunately for their cause, they extended their depredations into the territories of Poona and Hyderabad, and imposed upon the British Government the duty of protecting its allies. The subsidiary forces of both states took the field. Colonel Wallace marched from Poona with one division, and Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton from Jálna with another. By a rapid cavalry movement of one hundred miles in forty-eight hours, Colonel Doveton came unexpectedly upon the insurgents whilst besieging Amalner, a fort belonging to the Nizam. Most of their horse, and part of their foot, were destroyed. The shattered remains took refuge amongst the hills north of Kandesh: they were vigorously followed thither by Colonel Wallace; and the leaders were seized and delivered to him by the Bhils, the inhabitants of the forests with which the hills are clothed. The Patan chiefs were conducted prisoners to Poona: Mahipat Rao escaped, but, separated from his military associates, he soon fell into obscurity and occasioned no further trouble.¹

A different destiny awaited another of Holkar's Mohammedan captains, who, by a singular combination of enterprise, craft, and good-luck, rose from the condition of a soldier of fortune to the recognised rank of an independent prince. Amir Khan

¹ MS. Records; Central India, i. 284.

was by descent an Afghan, whose grandfather had emigrated from Buner, and settled in Rohilkhand. From his earliest youth he had led the life of a soldier; seeking service, sometimes with a few followers, sometimes with a larger troop, in the armies of the various princes and leaders, who in the last days of the Mogul empire were ever ready to enlist adherents. For a considerable time his fortunes were precarious, and he was not unfrequently in want even of a meal; but he gradually became a captain of some note, and took a conspicuous share in different military and political transactions, of which Malwa and the valley of the Nerbudda were the principal field. He lent good aid to Vizir Mohammed in the defence of Bhopal; but, the resources of that chief being exhausted, he listened to proposals from Holkar, and united himself thenceforth steadily to his interests. Holkar was then making his escape from Nagpur, where he had been detained by the Raja; and had no greater following than a rabble of two or three hundred men, ill armed, undisciplined, and living by plunder. The junction of Amir Khan with a force respectable in numbers and equipment turned the tide of his fortunes, enabled him to possess himself of the territories of his family, and placed him in a position formidable to Sindhia, to the Peshwa, and the English. Amir Khan shared in his prosperity, and did not desert him in adversity. He accompanied Jeswant Rao, as we have seen, in his flight to the Punjab, and returned with him to Malwa. Although professing allegiance to Holkar, and acting in his name, Amir Khan retained the independent

BOOK I. command of his own troops, and held himself at
 CHAP. I. liberty to provide for their support by contribu-
 1609. tions levied at his pleasure from the princes in
 whose dissensions he found it profitable to interfere.
 After Holkar's insanity he interposed occasionally
 in the disputes that occurred at court, but large
 bribes secured his general support of Balaram Set
 and the Bhai. The necessity of raising funds for
 the payment of his soldiers after he had drained the
 coffers of the Rajputs impelled him, shortly after
 the date at which we have arrived, to turn his steps
 in the direction of Berar, and brought him, as we
 shall subsequently have occasion to notice, once
 more into collision with the Government of British
 India.¹

Such was the utter prostration of the Mahratta confederacy upon the close of the war: the Peshwa, chafing secretly under the fetters to which he had rashly submitted, but impotent to break them, and affecting to wear them with cheerfulness; the Gaekwar, saved from insolvency and ruin by the tutelage of his allies; the Raja of Berar, unable without the same assistance to protect his country from Pindari pillage and Afghan arrogance; Sindhia, humbly begging a paltry pittance from the power he had lately encountered with almost equal arms; and Holkar, intoxicated and insane, with his country devastated by his own rebellious soldiery, and his court disgraced by the turbulence and profligacy of

¹ Notices of the career of Amir Khan are to be found in Malcolm's *Central India*, Prinsep's *Administration of the Marquis of Hastings*, &c.; but the most authentic account is a kind of autobiography, or *Memoirs of Nawab Mohammed Amir Khan*, composed in Persian from his own dictation by Munshi Basáwan Lal, translated by H. T. Prinsep, Calcutta. 1832.

factionous competitors for the authority which he was no longer in a condition to exercise. Yet, notwithstanding this abject state of the two last-named chieftains, the Bengal Government persisted in its purpose of conciliating their good-will, by leaving them unquestioned licence to prey upon their still more feeble and disunited neighbours, the princes of Rajputana.

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That portion of Hindustan which extends from the districts bordering on the west bank of the Jumna to the desert that skirts the eastern borders of the Indus, and which lies between the Punjab on the north, and Malwa and Guzerat on the south, is collectively known as Rajawara or Rajasthan, as being in an especial degree inhabited by tribes allied by community of origin, institutions, and character, and claiming as Rajputs, or "sons of kings," to represent the military and regal caste of the primitive Hindus. The country was distributed at the period in question amongst a number of princes, some of whom were of comparatively little political importance, from the limited extent of their territory; whilst others, although ruling over more spacious tracts, were equally unimportant, from the sterility of the soil, and the scantiness of the population. Among these, three princes were acknowledged to be pre-eminent in rank and power, the Rana of Udaypur, the Raja of Jodhpur, and the Raja of Jaypur, so entitled from their respective capitals; but, more correctly speaking, the rulers of Mewar, Marwar, and Dhundhár, the names of their several principalities.

The Rana of Udaypur reigned over a rugged but

BOOK I. not wholly sterile territory on the north-west of
 CHAP. I. Malwa. He pretended to a direct descent from
 1807. Ráma, the mytho-historical monarch of Ayodhya, or Oude, through his son Lava, who migrated to the west. The Ranas of Udaypur are therefore regarded as members of the Suryavansa, or Solar dynasty of the Hindus; but, as Rajputs, they belong to the Sisodya branch of the Gahilote tribe. They are admitted to precedency over all other Rajput princes, who accept from their hands, upon succeeding to their principalities, an ornament worn upon the forehead, in confirmation of their accession.¹ From the time of the Mohammedan invasion of India, the Ranas of Udaypur were constantly engaged in warfare with the kings of Delhi, and repeatedly sustained fearful reverses. Driven from their capital, Chitore, they transferred their residence more to the west, where Udaya Raja built a city, named after him Uday-pur, towards the end

¹ Colonel Tod remarks, that, whilst the genealogies of many of the Rajput princes are questioned, the Hindu tribes yield unanimous suffrage to the ruler of Mewar as the legitimate heir of the throne of Rama, and style him Hindua-suraj, the Sun of the Hindus. He subsequently, however, adverts to the curious tradition mentioned by Abulfazi; *Ayin Akbari*, ii. 8, and repeated in fuller detail by Wilford, *Asiatic Researches*, ix. 233, of the descent of the Ranas of Udaypur from Naoshirwan, king of Persia, through his son Naoshizad. He is said to have rebelled against his father, and, being defeated, to have fled into Hindustan, whence he returned to Persia with an army of Indians: he was again defeated, and was slain in battle, but his issue remained in India, and from them the Ranas descended. Another legend traces the family to Maha-bhánu, daughter of Yezdegird, the last monarch of Persia.—*Annals of Rajasthan*, i. 233. Tod thinks it not improbable that there may have been a connexion between the Persian and Indian families. The late discovery in the west of India of coins of the general character of those of the Sassanian kings, and blending Indian and Persian portraits and inscriptions, establish the fact that some of those princes exercised authority either directly or through Indian feudatories on the confines of Hindustan, and render it possible that some such intercourse as that which subsequently united the royal house of Timur with the Rajput princes may have subsisted, and given rise to the tradition.—*Ariana Antiqua*, p. 400.

of the sixteenth century; and in the strong country in its vicinity they maintained their independence.

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Separated from Mewar by the Aravali Mountains on the north-west, lies the principality of Marwar, the capital of which is Jodhpur: great part of this country is a sandy desert, but it contains some fertile tracts, especially on its southern boundaries. The Raja of Jodhpur is a member of the Rahtore tribe of Rajputs, and traces his descent from the family that reigned over Kanoj at the period of the Mohammedan conquest; on which occasion two sons of the last prince, Jayadeva, fled to the west, and settled in the almost unpeopled districts of Marwar. From the elder brother descended the reigning dynasty; one of whom, Jodha, was the founder of Jodhpur in A.D. 1459: the younger is claimed as their ancestor by the chief Thakurs, or feudal nobles of the state. The Rahtores of Marwar, like the Gabilotes of Mewar, suffered many vicissitudes in their encounters with the Mohammedans; but, in the reign of Akbar and his two successors, their Rajas submitted to be treated as servants of the Mogul empire, holding high offices both civil and military, and becoming connected with the imperial house by giving their daughters in marriage to the Emperor or his sons. The bigotry of Aurangzeb forced them to take up arms in defence of their religion; and in a war of thirty years' continuance, although frequently defeated in the field, their spirit was unbroken, and their principality unsubdued. After the death of Aurangzeb, their friendly intercourse with Delhi was resumed, and they were seen taking a promi-

BOOK I. nent part in the disorders that ensued. The de-
 CHAP. I. cline of the empire freed them from all semblance
 1807. of vassalage, but their own dissensions and crimes
 were more fatal to their power and reputation than
 their subservience to the Emperor.

The country of Dhundhár, or, from its capital, Jaypur, lies on the north and east of Mewar and Marwar, extending towards the Jumna. It is the territory of the Kachwáha Rajputs, who consider themselves to be the posterity of Kusa, another son of Rama. The origin of the principality dates no earlier than the tenth century, and its capital was built only in the beginning of the eighteenth.

From its eastern position, the principality lay exposed to the attacks of the Patán sovereigns of Delhi; but it was not until the accession of the house of Timur that its Rajas became feudatories of the empire. From the reign of Baber they acknowledged the supremacy of the Mogul, and were distinguished as the principal officers and nobles of his camp and court. They were early connected also with the imperial house by marriage, several maidens of the race becoming the brides of the Mohammedan princes.¹ Raja Jaysing, the founder of Jaypur, was actively concerned in all the stormy transactions of the disastrous period which followed the death of Aurangzeb; until, observing the irretrievable ruin of the empire, and the irresistible progress of the Mahrattas, he made terms with

¹ Bhagwan Das is said to have been the first Rajput who submitted to an alliance with a Mohammedan family: his daughter was married to the son of Akbar, Prince Selim, afterwards the Emperor Jehangir. Mán Sing, nephew of Bhagwan Das, was a great favourite with Akbar; and was successively viceroy of Bengal, Bahar, the Dekhin, and Kabul.—Annals of Rajasthan, i. 353.

the latter, and withdrew from the politics of Hindustan, to the cultivation of the arts of peace, and the improvement of his country. He died in 1743. After his death, Dhundhár became a prey to intestine divisions and Mahratta spoliation.

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CHAP. I.
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At the close of the war with the Mahrattas, Rana Bhím Sing was reigning at Udaypur; Mán Sing was Raja of Jodhpur; and Jagat Sing, of Jaypur. Neither of them possessed the qualifications which the times demanded; the patriotic sentiments which should have suppressed selfish feelings and leagued them with their fellows, the judgment capable of estimating their own true interests, or the courage and energy necessary to maintain their independence. Listening alone to the dictates of personal enmity, they paralysed by their dissensions the valour of their subjects, and aided and abetted the foreign robber in the work of mutual destruction. The cause of quarrel by which they were at this time exasperated against one another was peculiarly characteristic of the race, and to be paralleled only in the poetical traditions of distant ages.

Krishna Kumari, the daughter of Bhím Sing, Rana of Udaypur, was a maiden of reputed beauty and of undoubted rank, and was consequently an object of desire to the other Rajput princes. Whilst yet a child, the Raja of Jodhpur, named also Bhím Sing, had made overtures for her hand; but the alliance was prevented by his death. She was then solicited in marriage by Jagat Sing of Jaypur, and his proposals were accepted by the Rana. An escort of three thousand troops was sent to Udaypur to convey the princess to Jaypur for the solemnisation of the

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nuptials, when the negotiations were interrupted by the rival pretensions of Mán Sing, the Raja of Jodhpur. He demanded the princess as the affianced bride of his predecessor, and declared that her marriage into any other family would bring indelible disgrace upon him and his tribe. Mán Sing is said to have been instigated to the assertion of his claims by one of his chief Thakurs, Sawai Sing, who, for purposes of his own, sought to involve his liege lord in hostilities with the surrounding states.

Bhím Sing, the preceding Raja of Jodhpur, left at his death his widow pregnant; and it was a condition of Mán Sing's accession, that, if the child should prove to be a boy, he should assign to the infant prince that portion of the royal domains which were regarded as the appanage of the heir-apparent. A boy was born; but, fearing to intrust him to the care of the Raja, the mother kept his birth secret, and the infant was sent privily to Pokarna, the castle of Sawai Sing, where he was concealed. At the expiration of two years his protector, finding the chief feudatories of Jodhpur greatly discontented by the preference given by the Raja to certain of his favourites, communicated to them the birth and existence of the prince, and secured their concurrence in the vindication of his claims. They repaired accordingly in a body to the Raja, and demanded the fulfilment of his engagement. Mán Sing, with some reason, required evidence of the genuineness of the pretended heir; but the Rani when appealed to, fearing, it was affirmed, for her own safety, denied that she had given him birth.

The chiefs were silenced, but not satisfied; and Sawai Sing awaited a more favourable season for advancing the pretensions of the youth whose cause he had espoused. It was with this view that he urged Mán Sing to demand the hand of the princess of Udaypur, anticipating the series of difficulty and danger in which he would be consequently involved. The anticipation was speedily realised. The party sent to Udaypur by Jagat Sing was attacked and routed; and the Rana was compelled to retract his assent, and affianced his daughter to Mán Sing. His rival was furious at the disappointment and the insult; and a war broke out between the two Rajas, which was equally destructive to all the Rajput principalities.

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From the time when the first Baji Rao established the ascendancy of the Mahratta power in Central India, the princes of Rajputana had been forced to pay the Chouth, the fourth part of their annual net revenue, or a sum arbitrarily estimated equivalent to a fourth, as a fixed tribute. The payment was at first made to the Government of Poona; but, as the authority of Sindhia and Holkar came to supersede that of the Peshwa, they claimed it as their right. The indefinite scale by which the tribute was measured, and the relative ability of the parties to enforce or resist the demand, rendered the actual amount payable undetermined; and it was no part of Mahratta policy to admit of a composition, as the vagueness of the sum afforded them a convenient plea for unlimited exaction. There was consequently a constant arrear due by the Rajput states, and a constant pretext for the desolating

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incursions of the Mahratta troops. In the division of the spoil, the Jaypur tribute was appropriated by Holkar; that of Udaypur and Jodhpur by Sindhia: but they had also conflicting pretensions each to a portion of the plunder of the other. The Peshwa had likewise his claims to a share, but his alliance with the British debarred him from their compulsory enforcement.

The Raja of Jodhpur lost no time in influencing the Mahratta chiefs to befriend his cause. Sindhia was already at variance with his rival, the Jaypur Raja having refused to pay some of his extortionate demands; and Holkar was indebted to him for protection which he had given to the family of that chieftain during his campaigns in Hindustan. The Raja of Jaypur disregarded the combination, in reliance upon the British Government, with which he had entered into alliance;¹ and which, in the treaty of peace with Holkar, as concluded by Lord Lake, had cancelled the Mahratta's claims upon its allies, and dispossessed him of all territory north of the Bundi Hills. The declaratory article of Sir G. Barlow, as already noticed, annulled these stipulations, and virtually excluded the Raja of Jaypur from the benefits of the alliance upon which he had depended; and it was not to be wondered at that he should have remonstrated strongly against his desertion. His abandonment was wholly indefensible. It was not to be controverted that a treaty had been contracted with him, by which the enemies of one of the contracting parties were to be considered as the enemies

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¹ The treaty is dated 12 Dec. 1803; the date of its ratification by the Raja is left blank.—Coll. of Treaties, p. 253.

of both; and the Raja, in the event of a dispute with any other prince, was entitled to British mediation and aid. When he required the fulfilment of the stipulations, he was told that "no treaty existed: it had been virtually abrogated by the non-performance of his part of the compact. He had recalled his troops from Monson's detachment during its retreat; he had not sent his forces to join the British army when it moved northwards, but dispatched them to Udaypur; and had not only failed to cut off Holkar's supplies, but allowed him to march through the Jaypur territory. He had no longer, therefore, anything to expect from the British Government." The Raja denied the justice of the charges adduced against him. He affirmed that his troops had separated from Colonel Monson with that officer's consent, and by the orders of Lord Lake; that although his forces were on their march to Udaypur, yet, as soon as their services were required, they suspended their march, and joined the Bombay army under General Jones, and that General Jones and Lord Lake had both furnished him with their written acknowledgments of the promptitude and efficacy of his co-operation. Lord Lake had also given him strong assurance of the stability of the alliance. He represented, that, if the British Government had been dissatisfied with his conduct at any particular time, it should at that time have expressed its displeasure, and at once have declared the alliance annulled. To have continued to employ the services of the Raja until they were no longer needed, and reserved all expression of dissatisfaction until it could be used as a pretext for getting quit of an in-

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convenient obligation, was both disingenuous and dishonourable; to desert an old friend because the tide was setting against him, was ungenerous and unjust; and the powers of India could not but regard the conduct of the Government of Bengal as a departure from that good faith which it had hitherto been its pride to preserve inviolate. The argument was incontrovertibly in the Raja's favour: the Government had continued to exact and receive from him services to which he was bound by treaty after the commission of those acts which they subsequently held to have virtually annulled it. Admitting that the Raja had broken his engagement, the Government, by accepting his aid as if no such breach had occurred, virtually admitted its non-occurrence, and recognised the engagement as still subsisting. It was however the inflexible policy of the Governor-General to abstain from interference, and the remonstrances and reasonings of the Raja of Jaypur were unavailing.¹ He was consigned to the equally inexorable policy of the Mahrattas; and the first-fruits of his desertion were the plunder of his country by

¹ The remonstrances of the Raja were strongly supported by Lord Lake, as noticed in a preceding volume. The Court of Directors also, although they did not enjoin the renewal of the alliance, disapproved of its dissolution, conceiving its justice extremely questionable; "as although the Raja had failed in the performance of his engagements during the war with Holkar, yet he had furnished assistance towards its conclusion at the instance of Lord Lake, and under an expectation held out by his Lordship that the protection of the British Government would be continued to him; and they thought it necessary to enjoin the Government of India to take care, in all its transactions with the native princes, to preserve its character for fidelity to its allies from falling into disrepute, and to evince a strict regard, in the prosecution of its political views, to the principles of justice and generosity." The sincerity of these expressions would have been less liable to question if the policy which they condemned had been countermanded.—Malcolm's Political Hist. of India, i. 390.

the disorderly bands of Holkar as they returned from the Punjab, and the payment to their leader of twenty lakhs of rupees as the price of his withholding assistance from the Raja of Jodhpur.¹

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In the war that followed, Holkar so far adhered to the bargain he had made as to refrain from joining in person either of the rival Rajas. It did not however prevent him from permitting Amir Khan to enlist his mercenaries in their quarrel.² The Patán entered into the service of Jagat Sing: the Raja of Jaypur was also joined by Sawai Sing and the nobles of Jodhpur who supported the claims of the posthumous son of their last Raja, and Mán Sing was deserted at the moment of encountering his enemies by almost all his principal chiefs. He was compelled to fly, and seek refuge in the citadel of Jodhpur; while the confederates overran and ravaged the rest of the country. They then laid siege to the capital: but it suited not the policy of Amir Khan to suffer the Raja's extermination; and taking, or affecting to take, umbrage at want of punctuality in the payment of his troops by the

¹ Holkar's Vakeels expressed their master's acknowledgments to Lord Lake for the abrogation of the treaty with Jaypur as a personal favour intended to conciliate him. The act was viewed in the same light by the Peshwa and Raja of Nagpur.—MS. Records.

² The Amir and Holkar got up a pretended disagreement as an excuse for the uncontrolled proceedings of the former at the latter's suggestion: according to his own story, he makes Holkar say, "You must now separate from me in public as in quarrel, so that our enemies and the world in general may see that your continuing to raise troops is a source of dissatisfaction and displeasure to me, and not done with my concurrence or sanction. We may still understand one another in case of occasion arising for us to rejoin our forces. When the Amir took formal leave in open durbar, harsh words passed between him and the Maharaj, and so to the time when the Amir mounted his palki, as in high displeasure. The Maharaj, running on foot some paces alongside, took hold of the feet of it, and made a show of endeavouring to soothe and appease the Amir. The Amir, however, pretended not to listen, but returned to his army;" p. 309.

BOOK I. Raja of Jaypur, he abandoned Jagat Sing, accepted
 CHAP. I. money and promises from Mán Sing,¹ and, marching
 1807. into the country of Jaypur, commenced a course of
 depredation which speedily compelled the Raja to
 break up the siege of Jodhpur, and hasten to the
 defence of his own dominions.

A double game was in like manner played by Sindhia. In the first instance he befriended the suit of the Jodhpur Raja, and contributed to the defeat of the troops sent to escort the princess to Jaypur;² but, having received payment of considerable sums affirmed to be due to him from the Rana, he professed to remain neutral in the contest. His principal captains were, however, allowed to side with either of the competitors. They ranged themselves under the banners of Amir Khan, and assisted to ravage Jodhpur until the harvest was gleaned; when Ambaji Ingliá renewed his connexion with Mán Sing, and Bapu Sindhia and Baptiste extended their marauding expeditions to the districts on the west of the Jumna, with which

¹ The terms of his compact with Mán Sing were, according to Amir Khan's statement, that he should pay four lakhs and fifty thousand rupees (£45,000) per mensem, besides taking a brigade into permanent service; and should further give the Amir a Jagir of four lakhs for kitchen expenses, and confer Jagirs also on his principal officers; p. 324.

² Tod has two apparently contradictory accounts of this transaction. In one place he states that Sindhia was encamped in the territory of Udaypur in the course of enforcing pecuniary demands upon the Rana; and that, having at the same time been denied a contribution from Jaypur, he insisted upon the dismissal of the Jaypur embassy. Upon the Rana's refusal he advanced with his brigades, defeated the troops of Udaypur joined by the Jaypur detachment, which he dispersed; and, encamping near Udaypur, compelled the Rana to submit to his conditions.—*Annals of Rajasthan*, i. 461. In another place he says, Mán Sing assembled three thousand horse, and, joining to them the mercenary bands of Heera Sing then on the frontier of Mewar, he intercepted the nuptial gifts of Amber; ii. 142. The first account is probably the more correct, as Tod was in Sindhia's camp; or it may be possible to reconcile the two.

the British Government had purposed to recompense the attachment of its adherents.

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The services of Amir Khan were not confined to the relief of Jodhpur from the presence of a victorious army, or to the retaliation of the havock which it had committed. He engaged to rid Mán Sing of an enemy more formidable than his rival Raja, and put an end to the internal divisions that in a still greater degree endangered his security, by the murder of Sawai Sing, and the extinction of the faction of which he was the head. Simulating a quarrel with Mán Sing, Amir Khan quitted him in seeming anger, and marched to Nagore, where Sawai Sing and the pretender had fortified themselves. Here he induced the Rahtore chief to believe that he might be bought over to their cause; and the advantages resulting from his alliance blinded the Rajput to the peril of unguarded intercourse with so perfidious a confederate. With the assumption of entire confidence Amir Khan visited Sawai Sing, and gave him the most solemn assurances of his sincerity: suspicion was completely disarmed, the visit was returned, and the Rajput was received in the tent of Amir Khan with every demonstration of respect and cordiality. Inventing a plausible excuse for a short absence, Amir Khan withdrew; the cords of one side of the tent were immediately let loose, and, whilst all within it were entangled beneath its folds, an indiscriminate fire of musketry and grape was poured upon them; Sawai Sing, his friends and attendants, those of Amir Khan himself, the dancing girls and musicians, all who had been present at the interview, were alike the victims of this mur-

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derous device. The death of his rebellious feudatory put an end to the danger and fears of the Raja of Jodhpur.¹ Nagore was plundered, but Dhokal Sing effected his escape, and found a protector in the Raja of Bikaner; until a superior force besieged the Raja in his capital, and compelled him to withdraw his protection, and pay a heavy fine for his hospitality. The young prince then fled to the British territories and there remained in security.

The state of affairs in Holkar's camp having called Amir Khan thither, the Rajput princes were relieved awhile from his exactions. Jaypur enjoyed but a brief respite, as Sindhia presently demanded compensation for the services rendered by his troops; services which he had pretended not to sanction, and which, in truth, they had never discharged. The claim was not admitted: upon which he led his army across the Chumbal, and sat down before Dhuni, which he fruitlessly besieged. Foiled in this object, he listened to proposals from the Raja, and agreed to accept seventeen lakhs of rupees as the price of his retreat, having inflicted upon the country damage to an infinitely larger amount.

Although the Rana of Udaypur had taken no part in the war, and had therefore given less occasion than his neighbours to any pretext for Mahratta

¹ According to Tod, the price of the crime was ten lakhs of rupees, and the two towns of Mundhiawar and Kuchilavas, each yielding an annual revenue of 30,000 rupees; ii. 150. Amir Khan states the sum at thirty-five lakhs of rupees, of which half was paid at the time. The conditions formerly agreed upon were renewed, with additional specifications; and Jagirs were promised to his son, his father-in-law, and others of his principal leaders. The Amir tells the story himself without any attempt at extenuation, and seems to regard it as an honourable exploit; pp. 347. 360.

extortion, he was obliged to drain his treasures in order to purchase the forbearance of both Sindhia and Amir Khan. The exhaustion of his resources was however less painful to him than the degradation which he felt in being obliged to treat them as equals, and the total want of deference which upstart adventurers and military robbers paid to his exalted rank and ancient descent. In his distress he applied earnestly for the intervention of the British Government, and offered the cession of one half of his territory if it would protect the other half from Mahratta spoliation. The same interposition was solicited by another Rajput prince, Zalim Sing of Kota, who, although he had wisely kept aloof from the contest between the rival Rajas, had nevertheless been repeatedly mulcted by Amir Khan and Sindhia; and the contending princes of Jaypur and Jodhpur made a similar urgent appeal to the Government of Bengal, pledging themselves to abide by its mediation, and to submit to any conditions it should please to impose. They depended upon its interference as an obligation which it was bound to fulfill as inheriting the paramount sovereignty of Hindustan. The dignity and power of the imperial court of Delhi had been appropriated by the Governor-General and the Council of Calcutta; and, along with the authority, the duties which the Emperors were accustomed to discharge had devolved upon them. The weaker states of India, they argued, had a natural right to look up to the British Government for protection against the ambition and rapacity of the stronger; and they denied that there was any valid excuse for its ques-

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tioning the right when it was fully capable of exercising the power. The Mahrattas, who were at that moment spreading terror and desolation from the Setlej to the Nerbudda, were wholly incompetent to offer any opposition to the arms and authority of the Company; and the Governor-General had only to speak the word, and universal tranquillity would be restored. The policy of this course, they maintained, was equally obvious with its justice and humanity; for the British territories would derive security and prosperity from the suppression of disorders, which excluded their population from all amicable intercourse with the surrounding countries, and kept their own frontiers in perpetual disquietude and alarm. To these representations the principle of non-interference was inflexibly opposed; and Central India was allowed to fall into a condition of anarchy and ruin, which was accelerated rather than arrested by the removal of the innocent cause to which its present misery was ascribed.¹

When all hope of the protection of the British Government was resigned, the Rana of Udaypur was driven to the unpalatable measure of retaining the services of Amir Khan: a fourth of his revenues was assigned to the Mohammedan leader, as the hire of one of his brigades to be employed in collecting the revenues and guarding the frontiers of

¹ So far was adherence to this policy carried, that when the Raja of Macheri, at the solicitation of the Rani of Jaypur, sent a party of horse to escort the women and children of the Raja to a place of safety in his country, he was enjoined by the Resident at Delhi, under the orders of the Government, to forego his purpose and recall his troops; and was told that any interposition whatever would be regarded as a breach of the alliance under which he claimed British protection, September, 1807.—MS. Records.

Mewar.¹ The influence thus obtained by Amir Khan in the counsels of Udaypur afforded an occasion for a new display of his recklessness of human life, and added another victim to the many whom he had unscrupulously sacrificed to his interest or his policy. He instigated the Rana to put his daughter to death. He also hinted, that, as the ally and friend of Mán Sing, he should, if he found an opportunity, carry her off by force and deliver her to the Raja; and he promised, if the Rana followed his advice, to assist him in recovering possession of a district in the hands of Mán Sing which he coveted. The natural reluctance of the father was overcome by the blended motives of policy, fear, and hope, and poison was administered to the princess.²

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The transactions in which the three principal Raj-

¹ The Amir relates this arrangement with great self-complacency, remarking that the Rana and he exchanged turbands in pledge of friendship; p. 399. It must have cost the "son of the Sun" many a bitter pang before he could stoop to such an interchange of marks of equality and fraternity with a Mohammedan trooper.

² Amir Khan relates this transaction without any reserve. According to his account, the Rana, after reflecting on his recommendation, said, "If you will pledge yourself to get for me Khali-rao from Raja Mán Sing, I will in that case contrive to get rid of my daughter after you shall have gone, using such means as shall create as little odium as possible." The Amir agreed to the condition; and the Rana, after his departure, caused poison to be mixed with his daughter's food, and so administered it to her. It happened that what she took was not sufficient to effect the purpose, and the princess guessed the object of her father; whereupon she sent him a message, that, as it was a matter that concerned the good of the Raja and the honour of his family, and it appeared that her living longer was inconsistent with these in her father's opinion, there was no occasion for him to have gone secretly to work, for that she was prepared to die by her own act. Accordingly, having bathed, and dressed herself in new and gay attire, she drank off the poison, and so gave up her precious life, earning the perpetual praise and admiration of mankind.—Mem. 399. According to Malcolin and Tod, the death of the princess, although suggested by Amir Khan, was pressed on the reluctant Rana by one of the Rajput nobles, Ajit Sing, whose memory on that account is execrated throughout Rajasthan. They both agree in the cheerful submission of the princess to the will of her father, and the grief of her mother, who died shortly afterwards.—Central India, i. 339; Annals of Rajasthan, i. 463.

BOOK I. put states were involved with the Mahrattas for
CHAP. I. some years subsequently to the restoration of peace

1807. between the latter and the English, have been described at some length, not only on account of their importance in the general history of Hindustan, but of their connexion with subsequent events, by which they were brought within the pale of that protection which they now solicited in vain. A brief notice will suffice for the remaining chiefs of the Rajput tribes.

The Raja of Bikaner, Surat Sing, was a member of the family which reigned over Marwar. His ineffective support of the pretender, Dhokal Sing, has been mentioned. After payment of the stipulated contribution he was left unmolested, the desert surface of his country offering little temptation to the marauder. The same circumstance, and the remoteness of its situation, protected the neighbouring state of Jeselmer, lying north-west of Marwar, and inhabited chiefly by the Bhatti tribe of Rajputs. Although secluded from the aggressions of the Mahrattas, domestic quarrels did their work as well.

In an angle formed between Jaypur and Malwa, the province of Hárávati, so called from its principal occupants the Hára Rajputs, was divided between Kota and Bundi. Kota was under the management of Zalim Sing, nominally minister, but exercising the authority of Raja; his sovereign being content to lead a life of ease and exemption from responsibility. By a remarkable association of craft, prudence, and resolution, Zalim Sing, although obliged to pay tribute and occasional extraordinary contributions, contrived to remain on friendly terms

with the Mahratta leaders, and to preserve his country from their ravages: he had also established a character for firm and faithful adherence to his engagements, and to his honour and integrity the chiefs of every nation and tribe were accustomed to intrust their families and their wealth.¹ The state of Bundi, which in the reign of Akbar was one of the most considerable Rajput principalities, had been reduced to narrow limits by a series of misfortunes and the enmity of Jaypur. In consequence of the latter, a former Raja had been dispossessed of his patrimony; but he had been reinstated by Malhar Rao Holkar, and had thence become a tributary of the Mahratta. His grandson, the ruling Raja at the time of Colonel Monson's retreat, had given the British detachment a free passage through his territories, and afforded every assistance within his means. Those whom he had befriended, abandoned him to the resentment which his conduct had provoked in their behalf; and for several years he was exposed to every species of insult and extortion, from the vindictive policy of Sindhia and Holkar.²

The only other Rajput principality of any consideration was that of Macheri, between the Jumna and Jaypur. Originally a feudatory of Jaypur, the Raja had taken advantage of the enfeebled condition of his liege lord, and had early in the Mahratta war placed his independence under the shield of British protection.³ The engagement was concluded during

¹ Ambaji Inglia and Amir Khan both placed their families in the safe keeping of Zalim Sing; and the former deposited at Kota his treasures, which were of considerable amount.—Central India, i. 493.

² Annals of Rajasthan, i. 501; Duff's Mahrattas, iii. 281. 311.

³ Coll. of Treaties, 251. The treaty was a general engagement of de-

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the administration of Lord Wellesley, in conformity to his policy of interposing a chain of independent native princes between the Jumna and the Mah-rattas. As this was contrary to the views of his successors, they would have thought it fortunate if the Rajas of Macheri and Bhurtpore, who were similarly circumstanced, could have been induced to seek the dissolution of the alliance: they were obliged to admit however, that, as the engagements had been contracted, it would be inconsistent with the credit of the Government to refrain from granting them protection against the menaced aggressions of Holkar. Notwithstanding reiterated assurances to this effect, the Raja of Macheri, alarmed by the abandonment of Jaypur, continued to apprehend a like desertion, until the obvious change in the counsels of Calcutta dissipated his fears.

It is equally unnecessary to enter at any length upon the condition of the Ját princes of Hindustan. Professing to descend from the illustrious tribe of Yadu, the Játs on the Jumna had been transformed, by the necessity of self-defence, from a race of pacific agriculturists, into a nation of soldiers and conquerors. Forced into martial distinction by the distractions of Hindustan which followed the reign of Aurangzeb, they continued, under a succession of warlike chieftains, to take a prominent and profitable part in all the troubles which ensued, until the establishment of the authority of Sindhia at Delhi. In this interval their leaders acquired extensive

defensive alliance: troops were to be sent to the aid of the Raja when required, after failure of mediation between him and any other prince with whom he might be at enmity. No subsidy or tribute was imposed.

and valuable possessions; and, although their power had been diminished by the superior resources of the Mahrattas, the representative of the original ruling family still retained a country of some extent, guarded by strong-holds, one of which was for many years a monument of British discomfiture. The Raja of Bhurtpore had become subsequently an ally of the British Government, and readily had recourse to its aid in moments of peril.¹ The successful defence of his fortress had, however, impressed him strongly with a mistaken estimate of his own importance, and in his intercourse with the protecting state he displayed equal arrogance and distrust.

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The only other prince of this tribe, the Rana of Gohud, was descended from a Ját leader who rose to distinction in the time of the first Bají Rao in the Peshwa's service. After the defeat of the Mahrattas at the battle of Paniput, he set himself up as independent ruler of the districts which had been intrusted to his charge; and his successor was allowed to retain them on condition of paying tribute to the Peshwa. The chiefs of Gohud were both by tribe and by position the enemies of the Mahrattas; and in this spirit the Rana, during the administration of Warren Hastings, joined the British, and rendered useful service to the detachment under Colonel Camac. After the peace he was left to his own unassisted means of defence, and these were insufficient to save him from the resentment of Madhoji Sindhia. His territory was invaded;

¹ For an account of the Játas, see Tod's Rajasthan, ii. 370; also a sketch of their history, Calcutta Quarterly Magazine, March, 1826.

BOOK I. the fort of Gwalior, which after its capture from
 CHAP. I. Sindhia by the British had been given to the Rana,
 1807. was re-taken; and the Rana was compelled to sur-
 render himself a prisoner, upon a verbal assurance
 of personal immunity. In the late war with the
 Mahrattas, Ambaji Ingliā, who governed Gohud on
 the part of Dowlat Rao Sindhia, went over to his
 enemies; and, as the reward of his desertion, a por-
 tion of the territory was guaranteed to him by
 treaty, whilst the Rana was replaced in the occupa-
 tion of the remainder.¹ The policy of Sir G. Bar-
 low, and his anxiety to conciliate Sindhia, led him
 to annul the treaty with the Rana of Gohud, upon
 the plea that he had not fulfilled its conditions, and
 that the agreement was therefore virtually can-
 celled. The territory was in consequence restored
 to Sindhia, and compensation was made to the
 Rana by the cession to him of Dholpur, which
 Sindhia had given up.² The stipulations of the
 treaty had pledged the Rana to efforts beyond his
 means; and his failure, as it proceeded from no
 defection on his part, was not a sufficient excuse for
 the violation of positive engagements. At the same
 time, it is evident that the British Government had
 formed an erroneous conception of the rights and
 power of the Rana of Gohud, and that Sindhia had
 good reason to complain of an arrangement which
 had converted a dependent of his government into
 an independent prince. The Rana himself, al-

¹ Ambaji was allowed to retain territory yielding a revenue of nine lakhs of rupees a-year. The portion assigned to the Rana was estimated at twenty-six lakhs.—Coll. of Treaties, pp. 256. 258.

² Second treaty with Kirat Sing, Rana of Gohud, 1806.—Coll. of Treaties, 298.

though not placed in the position which was at first designed for him, had no little cause for self-gratulation in his transformation from the condition of a prisoner and a fugitive, to that of a prince reigning in absolute sovereignty, under the security of British protection, over a portion of those domains the whole of which were held by his ancestors only through the sufferance of a Mahratta chieftain, subject to his exactions and liable to his resumption.¹

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Although seceders in some respects from the orthodox religion of the Hindus, the Sikhs retain so many essential articles of the Brahmanical faith, that they may be justly classed among the Hindu races. In their original institution, the Sikhs were a religious community, who, in consonance with the benevolent objects of their founder, Nanak Shah, a native of the Punjab, proposed to abolish the distinctions of caste, and to combine Hindus and Mohammedans in a form of theistical devotion, derived from the blended abstractions of Sufyism and the Vedanta, and adapted to popular currency by the dissemination of the tenets which it inculcated, in hymns and songs composed in the vernacular dia-

¹ The conduct of Sir G. Barlow in regard to the Rana of Gohud has been vindicated by high authority. In the debate on the India Budget in the House of Commons, 10th July, 1806, Sir Arthur Wellesley is reported to have asserted that Lord Wellesley had himself taken into consideration the expediency of restoring to Sindhia the territory of Gohud and the fort of Gwalior, and that the cession was not sooner made was owing to a want of confidence in the steadiness and consistency of Sindhia's counsels. Sir A. Wellesley states also that it had always been his opinion that Gohud and Gwalior ought to be restored to Sindhia. "Upon the whole," he concludes, "the committee will observe, that I consider Sir G. Barlow's treaty with Sindhia to have been consistent with the spirit of that which I was the instrument of concluding at the close of the year 1803; and that the late Governor-General, Lord Wellesley, intended to have carried into execution that part of its stipulations which refers to Gwalior and Gohud."—Hansard's Parl. Deb.

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lects. These still constitute the scriptural authority, the Grantha, the book of the Sikhs. The doctrines and the influence of the teachers gave a common faith to the hardy and intrepid population of the upper part of the Punjab, and merged whatever distinctive appellations they previously possessed in the new general designation of "Sikhs," or "disciples," which thenceforth became their national denomination. As their numbers increased, they attracted the notice of the Mohammedan rulers, and were subjected to the ordeal of persecution. They had recourse to arms: under a succession of military leaders, the sword became inseparably associated in their creed with the book; and their ranks were recruited by fugitives from political disorder and fiscal oppression, who readily adopted a faith which made but trifling demands upon their belief, and differed in few material points from that which they professed. Community of danger became the bond of both a religious and a social organization, and a nation grew out of a sect. As the birth-place of their founder Nanak, and of the teacher who in a still greater degree gave to the Sikhs their characteristic peculiarities, Guru Govind Sing, was the Punjab; it was there that they congregated and became organised, in spite of the efforts of the viceroys of Lahore for their suppression, until they had become masters of the whole of the country from the Setlej to the Indus.

The circumstances under which the Sikhs achieved their independence were unfavourable to the consolidation of their power. In their hostilities with the Mohammedans they acted without plan and

without an acknowledged head, and adopted a desultory system of warfare, in which different leaders collected their relations and friends, and unexpectedly fell upon their enemies and laid waste the country. As the means of opposing their incursions declined, they were emboldened to undertake operations of greater importance requiring concert and combination; and, for this purpose, the different Sirdars assembled occasionally at a public diet usually held at Amritsar, the site of their principal shrine. When the Afghans supplanted the Moguls in the government of the Punjab, the Sikhs experienced some severe reverses from the military skill and activity of Ahmed Shah; but after his death they were left at liberty to establish themselves as a political confederacy in the countries which they now occupy. The districts were divided amongst different associations termed Misals, implying assemblies of equals under chiefs of their own selection. The chief was to lead in war, and arbitrate in peace: he was treated with deference by the other Sirdars, but they recognised no obligation to obey his commands. Towards the end of the last century twelve principal Misals were formed, varying considerably in the extent of territory which they governed, and in the number of horse which they could bring into the field.¹

In the course of time the inherent defects of a military federation of this description began to be manifested, and individual ambition and ability to

¹ An interesting account of the Sikh federation will be found in the "Origin of the Sikh power in the Punjab," compiled by Mr. Prinsep chiefly from the report of Captain William Murray, Political Agent at Ambala; Calcutta, 1834.

BOOK I. assume that ascendancy which they were calculated
CHAP. I. to attain. Amongst the least considerable of the

1807. Misals was that of Surat-Chak, so called from the lands which the progenitors of the chief, Charat Sing, had originally cultivated. Charat Sing commenced a career of aggrandisement at the expense of his neighbours, which his son Maha Sing pursued with still greater success. The son of the latter, Ranjit Sing, had, however, surpassed both; and by a singular combination of courage and cunning he had brought most of the chiefs on the west of the Setlej under his controul. The chiefs on the east of that river, whose possessions were contiguous to the province of Delhi, professed, after the close of the Mahratta war, an undefined allegiance to the British Government; and some uncertainty with regard to the protection with which it was repaid compelled Ranjit Sing to proceed with caution in his project of extending his supremacy across the Setlej. That he was disappointed in his projects was attributable to the altered policy of the British Government upon the accession of Lord Minto to the office of Governor-General.¹

From the review that has been thus taken of the political circumstances of India during the administration of Sir G. Barlow, it is evident that the supremacy of the British power was virtually established, although matters were not yet sufficiently ripe for its open avowal. Some

¹ A description of the religious tenets of the Sikhs will be found in the Asiatic Researches, vol. xvii.; and a more general account of their origin and history is published in the eleventh volume of the same collection, by Sir John Malcolm. Mr. Prinsep's work, just referred to, describes their later progress and the rise of Ranjit Sing.

unnecessary forbearance was no doubt exhibited, and some degree of blame deservedly incurred for apprehensions needlessly entertained, and engagements unjustifiably violated; but it may be questioned if the policy of the Government did not, however undesignedly, promote the consummation which it was intended to avoid. It would have been easy, and it would have been generous, to have interposed in defence of the Rajput princes and rescued them from Mahratta rapacity; but, had the tranquillity of Hindustan been restored by a further expenditure of the resources of Bengal, the latter would have required a longer period for the renovation of its exhausted vigour, whilst the former would have been earlier placed in a condition to provoke and defy its resentment. The continued contests of the native princes operated favourably for the extension of British ascendancy: they disposed the weaker to welcome the approach of foreign protection, and they disabled the stronger from offering effective opposition. On the other hand, the suspension of military operations of any magnitude for several years afforded the British Government opportunity to accumulate and improve its resources, and, when again compelled to employ them, to put forth its energies with a might which made resistance to it hopeless, and elevated it to an eminence from which it directed without dispute the destinies of Hindustan.

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CHAPTER II.

Sir George Barlow, Governor-General.—State of the Finances.—Retrenchments.—Supplies.—Judicial and Revenue Arrangements for Cuttack, the Doab, and Bundelkhand.—Revenue Settlements in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces.—Separation of Judicial and Revenue Functions at Madras.—Murder of Europeans at Vellore.—Arrival of the Dragoons.—Fort retaken.—Military Inquiry.—Disposal of the Prisoners.—Causes and circumstances of the Mutiny.—Its Origin in religious panic occasioned by military Orders.—Similar Alarms at Hyderabad, Walajabad, and Nandidrúg allayed or suppressed.—Lord W. Bentinck and Sir John Cradock recalled.—Ultimate Decision of the Court of Directors.

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1806.

WHEN the provisional assumption of the government of India by Sir George Barlow, consequent upon the death of Marquis Cornwallis, was known in England, the Court of Directors determined to nominate him permanently Governor-General, and the nomination was acquiesced in by the Board of Controul. The principles of the policy which he pursued towards the native states have been sufficiently explained, and their consequences exhibited in the preceding pages. The other transac-

tions of his administration were for the most part of inferior interest, though scarcely of minor importance.

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The first cares of the new Governor-General were engaged by the state of the public finances, which had been seriously deranged by the expenses of the war. The charges had for some years past exceeded the revenues by a considerable amount, and the deficit had been supplied by loans contracted at a high rate of interest,¹ or by the application of the Company's commercial remittances to territorial disbursements. Heavy demands still remained for liquidation; the pay of the troops was seven and eight months in arrear; large sums were due on account of pensions to native chiefs and princes, and funds to meet these claims were for some time deficient.²

The restoration of tranquillity admitted of economical retrenchments in the principal article of public expenditure, the charges of the military department, and in nothing more than the dismissal of the irregular troops which had been taken into the British service during the war: these were disbanded, in several cases with injudicious haste; and Jagirs were assigned to some of their leaders in commutation of pay or pension. A present inconvenience was thus in a great measure obviated, but the newly acquired districts were burthened with establishments which even in the present day in

¹ A loan was opened in January, 1805, at 10 per cent., by which sicca rupees 2,12,47,000 (£2,640,000) were raised.

² The demands payable by the Bengal Government amounted in May, 1806, to ninety lakhs of rupees, to meet which not above forty lakhs were available.

BOOK I. some degree diminish the revenue that might else
 CHAP. II. be raised from them. Extensive reductions of the
 1806. regular forces were at the same time effected.

The economical principles which guided the proceedings of the Government of Bengal were equally impressed upon the attention of the subordinate Governments, and the importance attached to the object by Sir G. Barlow is fully shown by the language in which his views were communicated to Bombay and Madras. He reminded the supreme authorities at both Presidencies that, "the finances of the Company having been involved in extraordinary difficulties by the consequences of the late war, it had become the solemn duty of the different Indian Governments to establish a system of the most rigid economy through every branch of their civil and military expenditure;" and he therefore enjoined them "to abrogate all such charges as were not indispensable to the good government and security of the provinces under their controul. The extraordinary demands upon the public resources had arisen," he observed, "almost exclusively from the enhanced charges of the military departments; but the circumstances of India were now propitious to their retrenchment, as no danger was to be apprehended from French aggression, and the condition of the native states not in alliance with the Company precluded all apprehension of their possessing the means of making any impression upon the British power for a long course of years: that independently of this prospect of future tranquillity, derived from the preponderating power of the latter, the treaties which had been contracted with

Sindhia and other princes had been drawn up with a view to remove all grounds of difference, and to conciliate them by concessions which would render it their interest to preserve the relations of amity so established inviolate." The Governor-General suggested various specifications of retrenchment, and concluded by confidently hoping that in a short time the reductions from those sources would relieve all pressure upon the finances, and restore depreciated public credit, leaving a surplus to pay off the public debt and provide the Company's commercial investment.

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This last consideration, the provision of the investment of goods for sale in England, was, in fact, the main-spring of Sir G. Barlow's policy, as it was of that of the Company. It was the pressure upon their commercial credit and resources which the latter were most anxious to relieve; and, as their instructions to that effect found an obedient agent in the Governor-General, the necessary result was the sacrifice of all comprehensive political views to present commercial exigencies. The financial embarrassments of the Indian Governments were merely of a temporary nature: the return of peace necessarily reduced much of the immediate charge; and the revenues were rapidly increasing, from the valuable accessions of territory acquired during the war, and the certainty of their improvement under a regular and efficient system of administration. Nor was there any cause for alarm in the state of public credit, as, although it had been thought necessary to offer a high rate of interest, ten per cent. per annum, on a loan contracted in the

BOOK I. early part of 1805, the rate was not unprecedented
 CHAP. II. or unusual; and in the course of 1806 a loan was

1806. opened at eight per cent. per annum, with such entire success, as in the course of a few years to absorb all preceding and more burthensome obligations.¹ The rate then negotiated commenced a series of reductions of the interest of the public debt, which has for some years past nearly equalised the interest paid in India with that which commonly prevails in the kingdoms of continental Europe.²

The exertions made by Sir George Barlow for the diminution of the public expenditure were not in vain; and by the end of April 1807, the close of the Indian official year, shortly after which he relinquished his office to his successor, he had reduced the excess of annual charge to less than a half of its amount in 1805, and had matured a system of economy, which, in the first years of Lord Minto's administration, transformed the deficit into a surplus.³

¹ Sicca rupees 26,65,00,000, or about £30,000,000, were transferred and subscribed to this loan between 1805-6 and 1810-11, when it chiefly merged into a loan at no higher a rate than 6 per cent.

² The rates of interest now borne by the public debt of India are 4 and 5 per cent.

³ The statements appended to the Second Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, printed in May, 1810, present the following comparative view of the relative revenues and charges of India from 1804-5 to 1807-8.

	<i>Revenue.</i>	<i>Charge.</i>	<i>Excess of Charge.</i>
1804-5 . . .	£14,949,395 . . .	£16,487,346 . . .	£1,537,951
1805-6 . . .	15,403,409 . . .	17,672,017 . . .	2,268,608
1806-7 . . .	14,535,729 . . .	17,688,061 . . .	3,152,322
1807-8 . . .	15,669,905 . . .	15,979,027 . . .	309,122

By a statement in the author's possession, compiled in the office of the accountant-general in Calcutta, the returns of the three first years in Sicca Rupees are as follows :

In order to provide for the most urgent and immediate demands, funds were raised by a loan in 1805-6; by which, in the course of that and the following year, about four millions sterling were supplied to the treasury: the deficit which remained

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	<i>Revenue.</i>	<i>Charge.</i>	<i>Excess of Charge.</i>
1804-5 . S. R.	13,06,49,241	. S. R. 15,76,18,750	. S. R. 2,69,69,509
1805-6 . "	13,58,28,952	. " 16,44,88,747	. " 2,86,49,795
1806-7 . "	12,97,16,627	. " 13,99,23,581	. " 1,02,06,904
and in the fourth year,			<i>Surplus Revenue.</i>
. 1807-8 . "	13,87,59,682	. " 13,77,19,952	. " 10,39,730

which surplus, calculating the rupee at 2s., which is something less than its intrinsic value, is equal to £103,973. These particulars agree with the statements given by Mr. Tucker; of which he remarks, that, as they were prepared from official and authentic documents, they may be received with confidence.—Review of the Financial Situation of the East India Company, by H. St. George Tucker, p. 13. One source of difference in the two statements is the difference of exchange valuation. The old accounts of the East India Company were converted from Indian into English money at 2s. per current rupee (116 of which were equal to 100 Siccas) for Bengal, 8s. per pagoda for Madras, and 2s. 3d. per Bombay rupee: a valuation which, however correct according to the state of the exchange, was far above the intrinsic value of the coins; the current rupee at par being worth only 1s. 9d. 177, the pagoda 7s. 6d. 386, and the Bombay rupee 2s. 008.—Report of Select Committee on the Finances of the East India Company, August 1832, App. No. 20. In the above comparison of receipts and disbursements, the rate being the same on both does not very materially affect the result, but the excess conveys an exaggerated view of their amount to the extent of about one-seventh of the aggregate sums. Now, although the exchange values of the Indian currencies might be properly taken as the standard for their conversion into English money in regard to all receipts and disbursements, whether commercial or territorial, occurring in England, yet such a standard was wholly inapplicable to revenues and charges beginning and ending in India itself. The intrinsic value of the currencies, as compared with that of the British coinage, was in such case the least variable and most correct measure. The statements in Sicca Rupees, converted into Sterling at 2s. the rupee, would therefore be preferable, as nearer the truth; but their use is inconvenient, as affording results different from those given in the Parliamentary and India House accounts, the authorities most readily available: these will therefore generally be followed. In the present case, besides the difference of valuation, there is a discrepancy in the relative statements which is not easily accounted for. The annual accounts must have been made up either on different principles or for somewhat different intervals. The aggregate of the four years, adopting the conversion of the sicca into the current rupee, offers a near though not close approximation; the Parliamentary accounts making it £7,268,003, the Calcutta statements sicca rupees 6,47,86,478 (equal to current rupees 7,51,52,314, and, at 2s. the current rupee, to) £7,515,231.

BOOK I. was met by remittances from Europe, which, dur-
 CHAP. II. ing the three years from 1804-5 to 1806-7, exceed-
 1806. ed by two millions sterling the supplies realised
 in England from the proceeds of the Company's
 trade.

Besides the measures adopted for the removal of financial difficulties, the Indian Governments were occupied during the interval between the departure of Marquis Wellesley and the arrival of Lord Minto in extending and consolidating the revenue and judicial arrangements in various districts newly taken under their authority. Upon the annexation of the province of Cuttack to the Presidency of Bengal, commissioners were appointed to effect a settlement of the revenue with the landholders; and in September 1804 the latter were apprised that at the expiration of a twelvemonth a fixed assessment would be levied upon their lands, upon a just and moderate consideration of the receipts of former years. This announcement was confirmed by a regulation of the Government;¹ and the same enactment recognised the principle of substituting a quit-rent for a land assessment in respect to certain petty Rajas and Zemindars residing in the mountains and thickets of Orissa. All other sources of revenue which had existed under the Mahratta Government were abolished, with the exception of an excise upon spirituous liquors, and a capitation tax upon pilgrims to the temple of Jagannath. The latter was the subject of a further enactment² in the following year, by which the amount of the tax, the mode of levying it, and other circumstances con-

¹ Bengal Regulations. Reg. xii. 1805.

² Reg. iv. 1806.

ned with it, were defined, with a view to protect the pilgrims from the unwarranted exactions of the officers of the Government or of the temple, and to maintain order and security in the town of Jagannath-pur and its dependencies. At the same time, provision was made for the administration of justice in civil causes by the institution of a provincial court,¹ and a revision was effected of the system of police which had been previously in force in Cuttack. The duties of the police during the Mahratta Government had been intrusted to a body of armed men, termed Paiks, or foot-men; who were commanded by their own Sirdars or chiefs, and occupied lands exempt from rent, in payment of their services. They were subject to the general controul of the landholders within whose domains they were located, and the landholders were responsible to the Government for the prevention of disorders and robberies within the limits of their respective estates.* This system was unchanged; but, in order to fix upon the landholders a better defined authority and more distinct responsibility, they were formally invested with the title and powers of Darogas, or head-officers of police, under the general superintendence of the magistrate of the province.

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¹ Reg. xiv. 1805. A striking instance is afforded by one of the clauses of this regulation of the high value of money under the Mahratta Government, and its anticipated reduction under the British. In all disputes concerning obligations bearing interest which originated before October, 1803, the court was authorised to recognise the following rates: on sums not exceeding 100 rupees, 30 per cent. per annum; on larger sums, 24 per cent. per annum. Subsequently to the date specified, the rate of interest was restricted to 12 per cent. per annum.

* Reg. iv. 1804.

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The introduction of the Company's judicial and revenue regulations into the territories lastly acquired in the Doab and in Bundelkhand had been accomplished by previous enactments.¹ Those affecting the revenue were based upon the principle of an ultimate settlement in perpetuity in the Upper provinces as well as in Bengal, but postponing its conclusion to the expiration of certain definite periods. Two successive settlements were to be made for a term of three years each, and a third was to be concluded for a period of four years. On the close of each of the two first periods, the assessment was to be revised and augmented according to the progressive improvement which it was anticipated would have taken place in the value of landed property; and at the end of the three terms, forming an aggregate of ten years, it was proposed to conclude a perpetual settlement for all such lands as might be in a sufficiently improved state of cultivation to warrant the measure, on such terms as the Government should deem fair and equitable. This last stipulation, strictly interpreted, rendered the pledge of little worth; for it reserved to the Government the determination not only of the final rate of assessment, but of the condition of the lands to be assessed. A still more important modification of the original enactment was, however, introduced by Sir George Barlow. On the termination of the first triennial period of the settlement of the Ceded provinces, he added a clause to its renewal, which Lord Wellesley either overlooked or considered superfluous; and enacted, that the proposed settle-

¹ Regs. xxv. 1803; v. viii. ix. 1805.

ment of the revenue in perpetuity in the Ceded and Conquered provinces should depend upon the confirmation of the Court of Directors.¹ Their confirmation was never conceded.

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The principal legislative enactment at Fort St. George had for its object the discontinuance of the judicial powers theretofore given to the collectors of the revenue in the districts which had not been permanently assessed. Distinct courts of civil judicature were established in the several Zillas, and the separation of the judicial from the revenue department was completed in the territories of the Madras Presidency as well as in those of Bengal.² At the same time, the Supreme Court of Appeal was remodelled. It had hitherto been constituted of the Governor and Members of Council, a board already fully occupied. In their stead three Judges were appointed to the special duty of hearing appeals from the courts below, in addition to a Member of Council not being Governor of Madras, who was to act as Chief Judge.³ No enactment of any interest was promulgated during this period at Bombay.

In the midst of their pacific occupations the Governments of India were startled by the occurrence of an event unprecedented in the annals of British India, and inspiring fears for the solidity and per-

¹ "The Governor-General in Council hereby notifies to the Zemindars and other actual proprietors of land in the Ceded and Conquered provinces, that the Jumma which may be assessed on their estates in the last year of the settlement immediately ensuing the present settlement shall remain fixed for ever, in case the Zemindars shall now be willing to engage for the payment of the public revenue on those terms in perpetuity, and the arrangement shall receive the sanction of the Court of Directors."—Reg. x. 1807. Sect. v.

² Reg. ii. 1806.

³ Reg. iii. 1807.

BOOK I. manence of the empire,—the massacre of the Eu-
 CHAP. II. ropean officers and soldiers in the garrison of Vel-
 1806. lore by the native regiments on duty along with
 them. This happened on the morning of the 10th
 of July, 1806.¹

The fortress of Vellore, situated eighty-eight miles west from Madras, had been chosen, for the convenience of its position and the strength of its defences, as a safe residence for the family of Tippoo Sultan, which consisted of twelve sons and six daughters. The six elder sons were married, and had children : four of the daughters also were married, and the marriage of the fifth was in course of solemnisation when the mutiny broke out. Their families, with their connexions and followers, formed an assemblage of several hundred persons, all living in the former palace of the Nawabs of the Carnatic, within the fort. The princes had been treated with a degree of distinction and liberality better suited to their former dignity than their fallen fortunes. They were under no other personal restraint than the attendance of a guard when they moved out, and prohibition against going out of the fort without the written authority of the commandant of the garrison and the paymaster of their stipends. Their allowances not only provided amply for their wants, but enabled them to support some show of state, and to collect around them a swarm of needy

¹ The chief authorities for the following narrative and observations are, the MS. Correspondence of the Madras Government; Papers printed for Parliament in 1813; a Memorial addressed to the Court of Directors, and afterwards printed in 1810, by Lord William Bentinck; and Sir J. Cradock's Address to the Court, printed in the Asiatic Annual Register for 1807.

adventurers and vagrant mendicants, the willing instruments of mischief and eager fomenters of discontent.¹ The general charge of the princes and payment of their pensions were consigned to Lieutenant-Colonel Marriott. No other officer was allowed to enter the palace without the permission of the princes, and no European sentinel did duty within its precincts. The native sentries were posted only at the outer doors of the several dwellings. Colonel Marriott discharged also the duties of superintendent of police for the fort and the adjacent town of Vellore, the population of which had largely increased. The garrison of the fort consisted of four companies of his Majesty's 69th regiment, six companies of the first battalion of the 1st regiment of Native Infantry, and the second battalion of the 23rd. The Europeans were about three hundred and seventy in number, the natives fifteen hundred. The whole were commanded by Colonel Fancourt, the colonel of the 69th. Spacious barracks were severally appropriated to the use of the European and native troops. The officers occupied separate, and, for the most part, detached houses.

About three o'clock in the morning of the 10th of July, the tranquillity of repose was broken by the sudden discharge of fire-arms, and the sound was speedily repeated in various directions. The Sipahis had been assembled silently in their quarters under arms by their native officers, and led

¹ The four elder princes were allowed 50,000 rupees a-year each; the three next, 25,000 rupees; the two younger, 8,400 rupees; and the remaining three, 6,000 each. There were above 3000 natives of Mysore in the fort and adjoining Petta or town, and above 500 Mohammedan Fakirs. The whole population of the town was about 8000.

BOOK I. to unexpected assaults upon the European posts.
CHAP. II. The few English sentinels on duty at the main-
1806. guard and the powder magazine were shot or bayoneted almost before they were aware of their danger, and the possession of the magazine secured to the insurgents the sole supply of ammunition. Their chief body beset the European barracks, firing through the open doors and windows volley after volley, and repelling every attempt of its inmates to sally forth, by a murderous discharge of musketry, and the fire of a field-piece which they had planted opposite to the doorway. As soon as these attacks commenced, detachments were stationed to watch the dwellings of the officers, with instructions to fire upon any one who should come forth: and, in pursuance of the order, Colonel Fancourt, as he descended from his house, received a wound which proved fatal; and Lieutenant-Colonel M'Kerras, commanding the 23rd, was shot as he was hastening to the parade. After the barracks were surrounded, parties of the native soldiers forced their way into the houses of the Europeans, and put to death with unsparing ferocity all whom they could discover. Thirteen officers were killed, besides several European conductors of ordnance. In the barracks, eighty-two privates were killed, and ninety-one were wounded. The mutineers did not venture to enter the building, where they would have had to encounter the bayonets of the soldiers, but contented themselves with pouring their fire into the apartments; in which the men, unable for want of ammunition to return it, screened themselves against its effects as well as they were able by the beds and

furniture. Early in the morning, a few officers, who had collected in one of the dwellings and had successfully defended themselves, made their way to the barracks, and, placing themselves at the head of the survivors, forced a passage through the mutineers and ascended the ramparts, where they took post in a cavalier. Hence they reached the magazine, but were disappointed in their expectation of supplying themselves with powder, and were obliged to return to the ramparts, where they found cover above the main gateway and in a bastion at the south-east angle of the fort. In these movements they were exposed to a continued fire, by which all the officers were disabled and many of the men were killed; yet they maintained their ground with steadfast courage, and repeatedly drove back their assailants at the point of the bayonet.

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During the whole of these transactions an active communication was kept up between the mutineers and the palace, and many of the servants and followers of the princes were conspicuously active in the scenes of bloodshed and plunder which followed the first success. By some of these a flag, which had once belonged to Tippoo and bore his insignia,¹ was brought out of the palace and hoisted on the flagstaff amidst the acclamations of the multitude; but it was speedily pulled down by the men of the 69th as they passed the flagstaff in their way from the barracks to the ramparts. The indications of regularity and conduct which marked the first proceedings of the insurgents soon disappeared: subordination was speedily at an end; the Sipahis and

¹ A sun in the centre, with tiger stripes on a green field.

BOOK I. followers of the palace dispersed in quest of plunder ;
CHAP. II. and many who had been reluctant participators in

1806.

the mutiny, who began to fear its consequences, or who sought to secure the booty they had obtained, availed themselves of the confusion to leave the fort. No arrangements had been made to hold the fortress, or to withdraw to any other position, when the alarm was given that retribution was at hand.

Arcot, the ancient capital of the Carnatic, and the scene of Clive's celebrated defence, was about nine miles distant from Vellore. It was a military station ; and, among the troops cantoned there, was the 19th regiment of dragoons under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Gillespie. Information of the insurrection reached Arcot by six in the morning ; and a squadron of the 19th, with a strong troop of the 7th Native Cavalry, with Colonel Gillespie at their head, was immediately on the road to Vellore, the galloper guns and remainder of the cavalry being ordered to follow without delay. By eight o'clock the first party was before the gates of the fortress : the outer two were open, a third was closed ; but it was here that a few of the 69th had effected a lodgement, and some of the men, lowered by their comrades from the wall, opened the gate to the cavalry. There was still a fourth gateway, which was shut, and this was commanded by the mutineers so completely that it was necessary to wait for the guns to blow it open : they arrived about ten. Upon their approach, Colonel Gillespie caused himself to be drawn up to the rampart, where he put himself at the head of the party which had maintained the position, and descended

from the post to charge the insurgents, at the same moment that the gate was blown open and the dragoons rushed into the fort. No resolute resistance was offered: after a feeble and straggling fire, the insurgents scattered in all directions, and were cut down by the cavalry, or bayoneted by the men of the 69th. Between three and four hundred were slain, many were taken, the rest escaped by dropping from the walls. In the course of ten minutes the fort was again in the possession of the British troops, and an unsparing but not undeserved punishment had been inflicted on a great number of the mutineers. There still remained a multitude whose degree of participation in the mutiny and consequent destiny it was necessary to determine, and it was also of importance to discover the causes of so alarming an outbreak.

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The number of the prisoners was speedily increased by the apprehension of the fugitives in various parts of the country by the police or by the villagers, and by the spontaneous surrender of many who either were, or wished to be thought, innocent. Some of the latter were allowed to resume their military duties, but there were still above six hundred Sipahis detained in confinement at Trichanopoly and Vellore. A military tribunal had been in the first instance instituted for their trial, by which several of those whose guilt was substantiated were condemned to death.¹ The criminality of the rest was referred to a special commission, upon whose

¹ Three native officers and fourteen non-commissioned officers and privates were executed by sentence of a native court-martial.—General Orders by the Government, Fort St. George, 14th January, 1807.

BOOK I. proceedings the Government long hesitated to pro-
 CHAP. II. nounce a final sentence. Although little doubt could

1806.

be entertained that most of the Sipahis, whether in confinement or at large, were deeply implicated in the mutiny, yet it was impossible to procure satisfactory evidence of individual guilt, and it was incompatible with justice to condemn the whole upon probable imputation. To restore them to their military functions, was to insure impunity to insurrection; to set them at liberty and dismiss them, was to disperse over the country a number of desperate and dangerous men, whose example and instigations might lead to greater mischief. To transport the whole to Penang or the Cape, would be expensive and inconvenient, even if it were just. The opinions of the Governor and the Commander-in-chief were at variance; the former advocating the more lenient, the latter the severer course. The former eventually prevailed. The officers and men who were absent at the time of the mutiny, or who had given proofs of their fidelity on the occasion of its occurrence, remained on the strength of the army: the rest were discharged for ever from the service, with the grant to the officers of small pensions for their support, and the numbers of the regiments were erased from the army list.¹ The disposal of the prisoners remained undecided until the arrival of Lord Minto at Madras on his way to Bengal. It was then resolved that a final investigation should take place, and, with the exception of

¹ Two new regiments were formed in their place, the 24th and 25th, to which the European officers of the 1st and 3rd regiments, and such native officers and men as were not discharged, were respectively transferred.—General Orders, 14th January, 1807.

those against whom proof of plunder and murder could be adduced, and who were to be punished accordingly, the whole should be gradually enlarged, being dismissed from the service and declared incapable of being again enlisted. As by this time the agitation had subsided and the confidence of the native troops was restored, the decision was carried into effect without difficulty, and without being followed by any perceptible mischief. The ascertainment of the causes of the mutiny, and of the principal circumstances attending it, was equally a subject of prolonged deliberation and productive of conflicting opinions.

Although the storm had burst so suddenly upon the victims of its fury, indications of its approach had not been wanting, and careful and intelligent observation might have anticipated its violence and guarded against its consequences. It was known early in May that deep and dangerous discontent pervaded the troops in garrison upon the subject of orders regarding their dress and accoutrements, and rigorous measures were resorted to for its suppression. They had the usual effects of ill-judged severity. They stifled the utterance but aggravated the feelings, and embittered dissatisfaction by forcing it to assume the mask of acquiescence. Secret associations were formed, not only to resist the obnoxious orders, but to brave the penalty which insubordination incurred, by contracting guilt of a still deeper dye; and the native officers and men were gradually drawn into a conspiracy to murder all the Europeans in the fort, and elevate one of the sons of Tippoo to the sovereignty from which his father

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CHAP. II.

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BOOK I. had been hurled by foreigners and infidels. Not-
CHAP. II. withstanding the oath of secrecy by which silence
1806. was imposed on all who were enrolled amongst the
conspirators, intimations of the plot transpired suf-
ficient at least to have put the objects of it on their
guard. Not only were dark rumours of an ap-
proaching tumult current in the fort and Petta,
but in the latter a Mohammedan Fakir repeatedly
proclaimed in the Bazar the impending destruction
of the Europeans. Little regard was paid to his
denunciations, as they were uttered with a wildness
of manner and vagueness of language which in-
spired doubts of his sanity. Information still more
positive was equally disregarded. At midnight, on
the 17th of June, a Sipahi of the 1st regiment,
named Mustafa Beg, had come to Colonel Forbes,
the commander of the corps, and communicated
to him that a plot was concerted to murder
the European part of the garrison. The agitation
which the man exhibited, and the imperfectly
understood purport of his testimony, induced
the Colonel not only to doubt the authenticity of
his testimony, but to refer its investigation to a
committee of native officers, who, being all more or
less implicated in the conspiracy, reported of course
that Mustafa Beg was unworthy of credence, and
demanded his confinement as the punishment of
his calumnious aspersions. He was accordingly
placed under arrest, and so remained until the mu-
tiny and murder which he had in vain announced
had taken place.¹ The utter neglect of these inti-

¹ Mustafa Beg escaped during the tumult, but returned to the fort a few days afterwards, and was rewarded for his conduct by a pecuniary dona-

mations, and their vagueness and infrequency, might seem extraordinary, if there were not reason to believe that there prevailed at the time a more than even the usual estrangement between the European officers and the native troops, which is too often engendered by the contemptuous indifference entertained by the former for the feelings and opinions of the latter, and by their imperfect acquaintance with the native languages. Had there been any cordiality between the European officers and the native garrison,—had any one of them deserved the confidence and attachment of his men, it is not to be credited that only a single individual should have been found faithful among the many who were privy to the conspiracy, and that Mustafa Beg should have stood alone in his communications. Had there not also been some want of vigilance on the part of the officers of the garrison, it is difficult to conceive that they could have been so wholly unprepared for such a widely extended and desperate insurrection.¹

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tion of 2000 pagodas and a Subahdar's pension.—G. O. Madras, 7th Aug. 1806. A European woman, who had resided some years in Vellore, also apprised Colonel Fancourt that secret meetings were held by the Sipahis in the Petta, at which seditious language was held. No attention was paid to her testimony, as her character was disreputable.—MS. Proceedings of Court of Inquiry.

¹ Shortly before this transaction, Sir John Cradock, the Commander-in-chief, addressed a letter to the adjutant-general for circulation to the army, in which he stated his regret to find that it was the prevailing practice of the service to withhold from the native commissioned officers that respect and intercourse to which their situation and common opinion entitled them. The Court of Directors also remark, "We have too much reason to apprehend, that, to the neglect and disrespect manifested to the native officers by the European officers, the disposition to foment and conceal the dissatisfaction of the men is principally to be attributed." They also observe, "It has been represented to us that the deficiency in the knowledge of the languages of the country prevalent amongst the officers of the army may have operated as another cause of the absence of confidence between the European officers and the native troops. We are aware of the injurious

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The causes of this alarming occurrence necessarily engaged the attention of the public both in India and in Europe, and an acrimonious controversy ensued, which can scarcely be said even yet to be at rest. Not that there was any sufficient reason for difference of opinion. To an impartial judgment the real cause was liable to no misconception; but its admission involved inferences which were pressed by one party beyond their due limits, and of which the grounds were therefore denied altogether by the other. The question of converting the natives of India to the Christian religion was supposed to depend for its solution upon the origin of the massacre at Vellore. By those who were unfriendly to missionary efforts, as well as those who were apprehensive of their effects upon native feeling, the transac-

effects which this ignorance on the part of the European officers is likely to produce, and which we are informed prevails to a great extent.²² They proceed to suggest a plan for remedying the defect, but it has never yet been carried into operation. A general order of the Commander-in-chief, issued in August, 1806, announced that he would not recommend, nor would the Government approve of, any officer for a staff appointment who did not possess "means of distinct communication with the native army." A knowledge of Hindustani had previously been required from cadets as a condition of promotion, and from all officers as a qualification for the post of adjutant. Adverting to the disregard of Mustafa Beg's information, the Court observe, "We fear that Colonel Forbes's conduct upon that occasion proceeded from the same laxity of system, which, there is reason to suppose, prevailed at Vellore for a considerable period before the unfortunate mine was sprung."—Letter to Fort St. George, 29th May, 1807, printed for the House of Commons, 13th April, 1813. That the discipline of the garrison was relaxed, is proved by the evidence before the Committee as to a neglect of military duty on the very night of the mutiny; the punctual fulfilment of which might have detected something unusual amongst the native soldiery, and perhaps prevented the mischief. The European officer commanding the main-guard being summoned to go the rounds at midnight, declared himself indisposed, and directed the Subahdar to take his place. The Subahdar, in imitation of his superior, pleaded the same excuse, and delegated the duty to the Jemadar, who was one of the chief leaders of the conspiracy. His report was, of course, that all was well at the very hour when the mutineers were arming for the attack.—Proceedings of Committee of Inquiry; MS. Records.

tion was appealed to as decisive of the reasonableness of their fears, and as justifying their opposition. No better reply could be devised by the friends and supporters of missions than a denial that the Vellore mutiny had any connexion with the propagation of Christianity,—a denial in which they were undoubtedly wide of the truth.¹ The essential and main spring of the mutiny was religious principle, although its occurrence was influenced in the manner and season of its development by incidental and local excitement.

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Towards the end of 1805 the new Commander-in-chief at Madras, Sir John Cradock, had been led to adopt the project of reducing the regulations of the army to a systematic code. The article of dress, a favourite subject of consideration with military men, at least in time of peace, received all the attention which its importance demanded; and various regulations were drawn up regarding the regimentals and accoutrements of the native soldiery, with the avowed purpose of assimilating their ap-

¹ The Reverend Dr. Buchanan thus writes to the Government of Bengal: "I understand that the massacre of Vellore has been unaccountably adduced as some sanction to the principle of opposing the progress of the Christian religion in Bengal. I had opportunities of judging of the causes of that event, which were peculiar. I was in the vicinity of the place at the time. I travelled for two months immediately afterwards in the province adjacent with the sanction of Government, and I heard the evidence of Christians, Mohammedans, and Hindus, on the subject. That the insurrection at Vellore had no connexion with the Christian religion, directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely, is a truth which is capable of demonstration."—Letter from the Reverend C. Buchanan to the Governor-General, 7th Nov., 1807; Parliamentary Papers relating to Missionaries, &c., 14th April, 1813. Dr. Buchanan undoubtedly believed in what he asserted so roundly, but he was strangely misinformed. The most zealous and able defenders of the cause, Lord Teignmouth in his Considerations on the duty of diffusing Christianity in India, and Mr. Wilberforce in his speeches in 1813, afterwards published by himself, do not go to the same length: they only deny that the Vellore mutiny was connected with any unusual extension or activity of Missionary proceedings.

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pearance to that of the European troops. With this intention, the Sipahis were forbidden to appear on parade with ear-rings, or the coloured marks upon the forehead or face significant of sectarial distinctions; and they were commanded to shave their beards and trim their mustachios according to a standard model. The issue of these orders was suspended in a few instances by the prudence of commanding officers of corps; but they were generally known by the men, and almost universally interpreted to imply a design on the part of the Government to compel the native troops to assume the practices, and eventually the religion, of Europeans.¹ Other innovations in their dress and accoutrements, such as a particular undress jacket, black leather stocks, and a turnscrew, which some susceptible minds identified with a cross,² had previously occasioned wide-spread dissatisfaction; and the last drop of the cup was poured forth when a new pattern for a turban was devised, which in the apprehension of the Sipahis resembled a hat.³ This confirmed their fears, and insubordination was the result.

The first overt exhibition of the spirit thus gene-

¹ It was commonly said by the Sipahis, "We shall next be compelled to eat and drink with the outcast and infidel English, to give them our daughters in marriage, to become one people, and follow one faith."

² It appears that Sir J. Cradock was not responsible for the two former: they were certainly, however, in use.—Lord W. Bentinck's Memorial, p. 51.

³ It is not easy for persons unacquainted with the East to understand why so harmless a head-dress as a hat should have excited such horror; but, in the estimation of the natives, the hat is identified with the wearer, and, of itself, denotes a European and a Christian. The term *Topi-wala*, or hat-man, is a term that is commonly used for both. To substitute a hat for the equally national characteristic head-dress, the turban, was therefore considered to be a change of deeply significant import.

rated took place in the second battalion of the 4th regiment of Madras infantry, quartered in Vellore, early in May. The grenadier company refused to make up the turban, stating their repugnance to it honestly, and at first respectfully and with calmness. Their representations were received by the commanding officer of the regiment with extreme intemperance, and his violence¹ provoked some disorderly and unmilitary conduct; in consequence of which nineteen grenadiers were arrested, and sent to Madras for trial, by order of the Commander-in-chief, who announced his resolution to have the turbans made up and worn, and insisted on prompt and unhesitating obedience. Of the prisoners sent to the Presidency, two were sentenced

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¹ According to the official report, the captain of the grenadier company of the second battalion of the 4th regiment informed the lieutenant-colonel commanding the corps, that several of his men had waited upon him and expressed strong objections to the new head-dress on the part of the whole company. The colonel called the men before him and questioned them regarding their repugnance; when they stated firmly, though respectfully, that they were well aware of the consequences of disobedience, but that they could not consent to wear the new turban, as it would disgrace them for ever in the eyes of their countrymen. Some of the superior officers expressed themselves prepared to waive their objections; but, as the non-commissioned officers and privates persisted in their refusal, the former were immediately reduced to the ranks, and the latter placed in arrest. In the evening, when the battalion was mustered for parade, the men attended without their side-arms and refused to put them on: on which, the colonel deprived even the superior officers of their swords, and dismissed the battalion; some of the men of which, as they dispersed, called aloud, "Dhurtt! dhurtt!" meaning "Away! away!" but with a somewhat uncivil import. Upon the occurrence being reported to Colonel Fancourt, the commandant of the garrison, he went to the barracks and expostulated with the men; but they unanimously refused to wear the turban, affirming that it was really a hat. Colonel Fancourt took no further steps in the business beyond ordering their swords to be restored to the native commissioned officers. Some further excitement was manifested on the following day, but, as observed by the Court of Directors in their letter to Fort St. George, above cited, it was so obviously provoked by the injudicious conduct of the commanding officer that they would not have been surprised if a mutiny had immediately followed, attended with all the fatal consequences arising from the offended prejudice occasioned by so capricious and wanton an exertion of authority.—Parliamentary Papers.

BOOK I. by a native court-martial to receive nine hundred
 CHAP. II. lashes each, and seventeen to receive five hundred

1806. lashes each. The sentence was carried into execution in the two first instances;¹ in the others it was remitted, in consequence of the professed contrition of the culprits. The award showed that there was no hope of redress from temperate representation; especially as the Governor in Council took up the subject in the same unquestioning spirit as the Commander-in-chief, and published his determination to enforce the order, and to employ all possible means of suppressing any act of insubordination. This was the radical error of the whole proceeding: it proved to the native troops that they could expect no countenance from their European officers, no consideration for their feelings from the Commander-in-chief or the Government, and corroborated the suspicion that the latter was inflexibly bent upon the abolition of the distinctions of tribe and caste, and the compulsory introduction of an outward conformity at least to the practices of Christians.

In vindication of the course pursued by the Government, it was maintained that there were no reasonable grounds of objection to the turban; that it had been made up without hesitation in some corps; and that two respectable natives, a Mohammeden Syed and a Hindu Brahman, had given evidence that there was nothing in its construction that was incompatible with their religious faith. This

¹ Lord W. Bentinck says, the two ringleaders only received punishment.—Memorial, p. 3. See also Madras General Orders by the Commander-in-chief, 2nd July, 1806.

was no more than true; but although particular influences might in some cases have overcome the objection felt by the troops, and, as is not at all unusual among the natives of India, a few individuals of acknowledged respectability might have been more free from prejudice than their inferiors, yet it was undeniable that a very strong and widely propagated repugnance to the turban did exist in the army, and it would have been more just and generous in the Government, as well as more politic, to have refrained from rating the shape of a cap at a higher value than the affections of the soldiery.

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With regard to the order abolishing marks of caste on parade, and enjoining a particular cut of the beard and mustachios, it was urged in defence of the Commander-in-chief, that although not a part of the express military code, yet it had been introduced very generally in practice before the code was drawn up, and that similar prohibitions and injunctions had long been in force in several regiments. This also was no doubt true, but it evinced great ignorance of the native character to infer that a positive and universally applicable order to that effect might therefore be promulgated with impunity. The commanding officer of a Sipahi battalion who has acquired the confidence of his men can do much, even in opposition to their inclinations, without exciting that dissatisfaction which may be engendered by a formal order of the Commander-in-chief; and it can scarcely be considered peculiar to the natives of India, although in an especial degree to be predicated of them, that pre-

BOOK I. judices, which soften and dissolve before gentle and
 CHAP. II. judicious influence, commonly harden into intracta-

1806. ble rigidity when abruptly and harshly denounced. The practice of particular regiments, therefore, afforded no safe principle for universal legislation; and the inference displayed little acquaintance with the character or sentiments of the native army.¹

That the prejudices thus shocked, and the feelings thus exasperated, should have produced their fatal effects at Vellore, was no doubt attributable to an additional stimulus applied by the presence of the family of Tippoo Sultan. The followers and attendants of the princes, naturally ill-disposed towards the British Government, availed themselves of the opportunity afforded by the prevailing discontent, and contributed by all means in their power to confirm the impression which the Sipahis entertained of the ulterior objects of the innovations commanded; taunting them with the badges of Christianity which had been imposed upon them in the turnscrew and the turban, and calling upon them to die rather than apostatise from their faith. It was established by the evidence before the court and commission of inquiry, that some of the confidential servants of one of the princes, Moiz-ad-din, had been present at the secret meetings which had preceded the mutiny, and had brought, or pretended to bring, messages from the palace encouraging the mutineers; promising also, that, if the native troops would master the Europeans and hold the fort for

¹ So much of the order as related to sectarial marks and ear-rings was, in truth, not Sir J. Cradock's. It was circulated by his predecessor, Major-General Sir J. Campbell, 11th January, 1805, shortly before Sir J. Cradock's arrival.

eight days, they would be joined by other regiments, and by many of the principal Poligars, with whose aid the Mohammedan kingdom of Mysore would be re-established. The influence exercised by these instigations was the more immediate, from the circumstance that the first regiment of native infantry, which consisted principally of Musselmans, had been raised chiefly in Mysore, and many of the officers and men had served in the armies of Hyder and Tippoo. Former associations, therefore, as well as community of country and of creed, rendered them in a peculiar degree accessible to the persuasions of designing men, and hurried them into the perpetration of atrocities which the injury offered to their prejudices might not of itself have impelled them to commit. The source of the evil was still, however, the spirit which had been raised by the severity and inconsiderateness of the English authorities. Mischievous hands may have applied a torch, but no explosion would have ensued had not the materials of conflagration been previously accumulated.

That the mutiny of Vellore was of a purely political character, and arose out of a conspiracy to replace a Mohammedan dynasty on the throne of Mysore,—an opinion that was strenuously advocated by those who wished to shut their eyes against the evidence of its religious connexion,—was wholly incapable of demonstration. Even with regard to the sons of Tippoo themselves, no proof could be elicited that they had been concerned in the conspiracy. There was no evidence that the communications made to the conspirators in their name had proceeded from them, and it was clearly established

BOOK I. that prior to the mutiny they had never held personal intercourse with any of the insurgents. Al-

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though it appeared that during the tumult some of the Sipahis received refreshments at the houses of two of the princes, Mohi-ad-din and Moiz-ad-din, and that the Mysore flag was brought from the residence of the latter, yet it was also in evidence that they had shrunk from the clamorous invitations of the crowd to come forth and place themselves at their head, and that they had carefully abstained from every word and deed which might implicate them in the riot. No suspicion whatever attached to the elder members of the family; the younger were of too tender an age to be cognizant of such a project; and the utmost criminality that could be charged against some of the intermediate members of the fraternity was the possibility of their being aware of the agitation of a plot against the European part of the garrison, and their omission to give notice of it to the only European officer with whom they were allowed to communicate, Colonel Mariott. Attachment to the Company was not to be expected from them, but there was little to apprehend from their animosity. Their own characters and habits were a sufficient security for their harmlessness. They were bitter enemies to each other,¹ and were uniformly destitute of activity, enterprise, and courage. They had neither the spirit to conceive, nor the daring to execute, a project that demanded both; and, whatever may have been their own wishes or the participation of their adherents,

¹ It was believed in the palace, that, on one occasion, Moiz-ad-din had attempted to poison the eldest of his brothers.

there is ample reason to conclude that the sons of Tippoo were not personally the originators or instigators of the mutiny. As, however, their presence was calculated to keep alive the hopes of their adherents, and furnish a rallying point to the disaffected, they were removed from the Madras Presidency to that of Bengal, and placed under easy surveillance in the vicinity of Calcutta.¹

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Still more untenable were the opinions of those who beheld in the transaction the evidence of a general plot among the Mohammedans of the Dehlin to restore the sovereignty of Islam and expel the unbelievers; yet the Government of Madras was at first inclined to adopt this view, and declared its impression that a widely diffused confederacy had been formed to subvert the British power and raise that of the Mohammedans upon its downfall. The calm and sound judgment of Sir George Barlow saw the business in its true colours, and questioned the reality of any extensive or secret combination of the natives, and Lord William Bentinck retracted his opinion. It was nevertheless persisted in by Sir John Cradock and several officers of the Madras army, although no conclusive proofs were ever adduced, and probabilities were decidedly

¹ They were removed from Vellore, on the 28th of August, 1806, amidst an immense concourse of spectators, who manifested no sympathy in their fate, nor was it apparently any object of anxiety to themselves. They arrived at the Sand-heads on the 12th September, where the second, Abd-ul-Khalik, died: the rest were placed in suitable residences near Calcutta, under official surveillance, but no personal restraint. Moiz-ad-din, against whom circumstances were most unfavourable, was kept for some time in confinement, but was eventually liberated. Some of the brothers, and a multitude of descendants, still survive. One of the brothers, Jami-ad-din Hyder, who at the time of the Vellore mutiny was about ten years of age, spent some years in England, and died here in 1842.

BOOK I. against them.¹ Of whom was such a confederacy to
 CHAP. II. be composed? The Mohammedan princes of the

1806. Dekhin were not likely to feel any great sympathy for the descendants of a military adventurer whom, whilst living, they had despised, even while they feared him. The principal of them, the Nawab of the Carnatic and the Nizam, could not have entered into such an association without its coming to the knowledge of the English authorities; and no grounds, even for suspicion against them, were ever detected. It was still less probable that the Hindu Rajas and Poligars would engage in a scheme, the success of which must have brought back the days of Moslem bigotry, intolerance, and persecution. In short, all the evidence examined tended to show, beyond the possibility of cavil, that there had been no intercourse whatever between the family of Tippoo and any chief or princes out of the fort; and, although some of the mutineers talked vaguely of the support that was expected from one or two insignificant Poligars, yet neither messenger nor letter

¹ Much stress was laid upon information received from a native Subahdar of cavalry, who had been long in the service of the Company, and professed devoted allegiance to the Government; but all that was fairly deducible from his communications was, that the disaffection of the troops was more extensive than had been imagined. All the causes of this disaffection he declared it was difficult to state, but he expressed his belief that it arose principally from the intrigues of Tippoo's family and their adherents: he stated that a number of persons formerly in the Sultan's service, or their relations, were now serving in the native regiments, and that agents and friends of the family were employed all over the country in instigating discontent. That the Company's regiments had enlisted many of Tippoo's soldiers was well known, and that they and the Mohammedans generally were dissatisfied with the change of masters was highly probable; but there was no evidence of any agency set on foot by Tippoo's sons, and the discontent of the Hindu part of the army, much the most numerous, could scarcely be ascribable to intrigues in favour of a Mohammedan dynasty. The Subahdar's information was merely individual belief, unsupported by evidence of facts.—MS. Records; Lord W. Bentinck's Memorial, 103.

had ever been interchanged, and no warrant had been given by them for such a misuse of their names. BOOK I.
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A conspiracy of the Mohammedan princes was a 1806. mere shadow, created by an alarmist imagination, or by a wish to shift the responsibility from the real cause, the military orders, to one wholly visionary.

But positive proof that the mutiny originated in no political combination, was afforded by occurrences in other quarters. The feelings that instigated the mutiny at Vellore were likewise entertained by the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, and consequences equally serious were apprehended. There, however, the Resident, Captain Sydenham, and Colonel Montresor the commandant, had timely notice of the agitation that prevailed amongst the troops, and justly appreciated the cause. They took upon themselves the responsibility of disobeying the general orders of the Commander-in-chief, and published a cantonment order in which the Sipahis were told that they were wholly mistaken in supposing that any measures enjoined by the supreme authority could be intended in the smallest degree to infringe upon what the Government held so sacred as their religion; but that, as they had so misconceived the object of the order, the commanding officer of the subsidiary force had no doubt that the Commander-in-chief would countermand the obnoxious regulation, and in the meantime he directed the making up of the new turbans to be suspended. The effect of this judicious procedure was immediate, and calm and confidence at once revived among the troops. In the investigation which succeeded, it was found that some of the disaffected

BOOK I. nobles of the court of Hyderabad had taken advantage of the existing discontent to foment the irritation, and that one or two of the native officers had

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so far listened to their own fears and the counsels of pernicious advisers as to declare that they were ready to put the Europeans to death rather than become Christians. No other communion with Vellore could be traced than that of similar desperation, originating simultaneously from similar apprehensions.¹

At Walajabad, again, a like disposition was discovered, arising from a like cause. The order for the new turban was issued early in June, and was received with expressions of dissatisfaction. These were silenced for a while by the trial and dismissal of one of the ring-leaders; but, at the end of July, reports of a design of the men to murder their European officers excited the alarm of the latter.² The 1st battalion of the 23rd regiment of native infantry was marched out of the cantonments until the arrival of a party of dragoons from Arcot, when the corps was disarmed and all the native officers were put under arrest. The men submitted quietly to all that was required of them, and the investigation that took place showed that there had been

¹ Rumours the most extraordinary and incredible spread amongst the troops at this station; it was reported that the Europeans had a design to massacre the natives, that a hundred bodies without heads were lying on the banks of the Músa river, and that the Europeans had built a church which the heads of these decapitated trunks had been required to sanctify. There were other stories in circulation equally monstrous.

² Their discontent had been first manifested about the 24th July, in consequence of long drills and generally harsh or inconsiderate treatment. On one occasion, after a drill from sun-rise till 7, they were kept in the barracks till 12 cleaning their arms and accoutrements. On being dismissed, some angry and menacing exclamations were uttered.

great exaggeration in the tales which had inspired the panic ; and although some of the native officers and a few men of bad character had been active in aggravating the irritation caused by the general order, yet the majority of the men were innocent of any intention to commit violence. The dismissal of the incendiaries, and the revocation of the offensive orders, restored tranquillity, and no further indications of disaffection were displayed.

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It was not to be expected that a ferment so violent, and a catastrophe so dreadful, should at once have passed over and been forgotten ; and, accordingly, some months elapsed before confidence and security were restored. The Sipahis were slow to credit the sincerity of the Government, and, still suspecting its having entertained sinister designs, attributed their frustration to the mutiny at Vellore ; they therefore looked upon those who had fallen in the recapture of the fortress as martyrs for their faith, and in some places secretly solemnised their funeral obsequies. This was the case at Nandidrúg, where part of the 18th N. I., a regiment raised in Mysore, was stationed ; and, consequent upon the excitement thus occasioned, some wild and mischievous excesses were in contemplation : timely precautions prevented their commission, and, upon the discharge of some of those most deeply implicated, the rest expressed their contrition, and the agitation subsided. In truth, much of the excitement that prevailed during the latter months of 1806 was the work of the officers themselves : passing from one extreme to the other, they exchanged the supineness of security for the restlessness of

BOOK I. suspicion, credulously listened to every whisper of
 CHAP. II. insurrection, trembled at every idle tale of intended

1806. tumult and massacre, and kept both themselves and their men in a constant fever of aimless apprehension. The tranquillising operation of time, the repeated injunctions of both the local Government and that of Bengal to the officers to abstain from all manifestations of distrust, and the strongest assurances published to the troops that the British Government would ever respect their religious creeds, gradually allayed anxiety and re-established trust.¹

Upon considering, therefore, the utter improbability of any combined co-operation of the Mohammedan princes of the Dekhin with the sons of Tippoo, the absence of all proof of its existence, the extension of the discontent to places where no political influence in their favour could have been exerted, the prevalence of disaffection among the Hindus as well as the Mohammedans, and, finally, admitting the entire adequacy of the cause to the effect, there can be no reason to seek for any other origin of the mutiny than dread of religious change inspired by the military orders. Here, however, in fairness to the question of the conversion of the natives of India to Christianity, the nature of the panic which spread amongst the Sipahis requires to be candidly appreciated. It is a great error to suppose that the people of India are so sensitive upon the subject of their religion, either Hindu or Mohammedan, as to suffer no approach of controversy, or to encounter

¹ "The panic wore away, the Sepoys forgot their fears of an attack upon their religion, and the officers no longer slept with pistols under their pillows."—Lord W. Bentinck's Memorial, p. 40. For the Government proclamation see Appendix.

adverse opinions with no other arguments than insurrection and murder. On the contrary, great latitude of belief and practice has always prevailed amongst them, and especially amongst the troops, in whose ranks will be found seceders of various denominations from the orthodox systems. It was not, therefore, the dissemination of Christian doctrines that excited the angry apprehensions of the Sipahis on the melancholy occasion which has called for these observations, nor does it appear that any unusual activity in the propagation of those doctrines was exercised by Christian missionaries at the period of its occurrence. It was not conversion which the troops dreaded, it was compulsion; it was not the reasoning or the persuasion of the missionary which they feared, but the arbitrary interposition of authority. They believed, of course erroneously, that the Government was about to compel them to become Christians, and they resisted compulsory conversion by violence and bloodshed.¹ The lesson is one of great seriousness, and should never be lost sight of as long as the relative position of the

BOOK I.
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¹ The opinion that the Government had some such project in view was not confined to the Sipahis. Mir Alem, the veteran minister of the Nizam, and, as has been seen, the staunch friend of the English, expressed his surprise that the British Government should think it just or safe to compel the troops to wear the semblance of Christians; and a like astonishment was manifested by the ministers of Nagpur.—Letters from the Residents; MS. Records. Of the universality of the feeling, there is also published an impartial testimony. Purnia, the Dewan of Mysore, gave it as his opinion that the Hindus were more alarmed and dissatisfied than the Mohammedans.—Lord W. Bentinck's Memorial, 45. And Sir Thomas Munro writes: "However strange it may appear to Europeans, I know that the general opinion of the most intelligent natives in this part of the country is, that it was intended to make the Sepoys Christians."—Letter to Lord W. Bentinck, 11th August, 1806. This letter also shows, that, in a part of the Peninsula where the adherents of the family of Hyder were most numerous, there were no reasons for believing that any intrigues had been at work in their favour.—Life of Sir T. Munro, i. 363.

BOOK I. British Government and its Indian subjects remains
unaltered. It is not enough that the authority of

CHAP. II.

1806. the ruling power should never interpose in matters of religious belief, it should carefully avoid furnishing grounds of suspicion that it intends to interfere.

A subject of minor importance, but one that was agitated with no less vehemence, divided the chief civil and military functionaries at Madras; each endeavouring to get rid of the responsibility of having issued the obnoxious orders. Sir John Cradock urged in his defence that he had acted by the advice of his official military counsellors, the Adjutant-General and Deputy Quarter-Master-General, officers of experience and well acquainted with the temper and character of the native troops, who had seen nothing unusual or exceptionable in the proposed arrangements; and that, before the orders were embodied in the code, they had been submitted to the Governor in Council, and had received his sanction. To this Lord W. Bentinck replied, that it could not be expected that he or the members of Council were to read and comment upon every article of a voluminous code of military regulations compiled under the instructions of the Commander-in-chief, and for which he was responsible; that accordingly they sanctioned the regulations as a matter of form, examining those only which were designated as novel, and passing over those to which their attention was not directed as innovations upon established practice. In this manner they were not aware of the order regarding the marks of sect, and the trimming of the mustachios; although they did notice and authorise the

alteration of the turbans. The Governor of Madras seems to make light of the latter, and attaches most importance to the former; but certainly the shape of the turbans was the most immediate cause of the dissatisfaction of the soldiers, and Lord William Bentinck was as decidedly bent upon insisting on its adoption as was Sir John Cradock. Not only had he declared his determination to enforce obedience to the order, on occasion of the dislike expressed to it in May by the second battalion of the 4th; but late in June, when the Commander-in-chief began to apprehend evil consequences from the measure, and solicited the advice and authority of the Governor in Council, in order to be relieved from the anxiety and embarrassment under which he laboured in consequence of information he had received from several moderate and discreet officers of the almost universal objection which prevailed against the new turban; his willingness to rescind the order was overruled; the Government repeated their conviction that the pattern of the turban did not militate against any religious prejudice, and declared that they could not assent to give way to clamour arising from unfounded prejudice. It was proposed to substitute for the rescission of the order a proclamation, which, while it announced the determination of the authorities to enforce obedience, disclaimed all purpose of religious interference; but in the mean time information of a different tenor from the preceding having reached Sir J. Cradock, he was led to believe that the dissatisfaction had subsided, and that the proclamation was unnecessary. It would have been, no doubt, of little avail, as it ex-

BOOK I. pressed the obstinacy of the authorities in persisting
 CHAP. II. in the offensive innovation; but the inaccuracy of
 1806. the intelligence which suspended its publication
 was presently afterwards demonstrated by actual
 occurrences, and a proclamation of a different
 purport was put forth. The reference of the Com-
 mander-in-chief, and the manner in which it was
 received, are decisive of the degree of responsibility
 which attaches to the local Government; and how-
 ever injudicious may have been the conduct of Sir
 John Cradock in originating measures pregnant
 with such serious mischief, and however averse he
 may have been to acknowledge his error, the course
 pursued by Lord William Bentinck evinced an
 equal blindness to the consequences of the act, a
 still greater degree of inflexibility in its enforce-
 ment, and a similar ignorance and disregard of the
 feelings and prejudices of the native army. The
 spirit by which both functionaries were animated
 was the same—military absolutism,—a principle
 which, however just and necessary in the abstract,
 requires to be applied to practice with caution and
 judgment, and not without due consideration for the
 circumstances which may call for its exercise, the
 feelings which it may embitter, or the consequences
 which it may provoke.¹ Herein consisted the error

¹ That the same unbending rigour of discipline which may be necessary in the management of European soldiers, is not needed, or is injurious as applied to natives, we have had the testimony of competent judges: one of the latest, and not the least worthy of credit, says, "We are apt to fall into the error of measuring everything according to the standard of European discipline, forgetting the different characters of the native and the Englishman. There is an Asiatic sensitiveness and propriety in the conduct of the Sepoy, which renders the roughness and severity with which we treat English soldiers offensive and unnecessary towards him."—Relations of the British Government and Native States, by J. Sutherland,

of both Sir J. Cradock and Lord W. Bentinck, that they excluded every other view but that of military subordination.¹ The Court of Directors considered their conduct equally unsatisfactory: they were accordingly recalled; and although at a subsequent period, and upon a calmer review of the transaction, they acquitted Lord W. Bentinck and Sir John Cradock of a wanton or needless violation of the religious usages of the natives, yet they retained their opinion that those officers had been defective in not examining with greater caution and care into the real sentiments and dispositions of the Sipahis before they proceeded to enforce the orders for the turban. This decision seems to be fully justified by a dispassionate survey of the transaction. A careful and considerate investigation of the objections to the turban, which were advanced by the Sipahis in May, would in all likelihood have prevented the mutiny of July.

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Captain 3rd Bombay Cavalry, p. 10. It seems extraordinary, that, after so many years' experience, the character of the native army should be imperfectly understood, but recent events have shown that it is not even yet accurately appreciated by the Indian Government.

¹ On receiving advice of the repugnance of the 4th regiment, Sir J. Cradock wrote to Colonel Fancourt to direct that those men whom the colonel had placed in confinement should be sent to Madras for trial, and that the non-commissioned officers of the 4th who had declined to wear the turban, and the commissioned officers, should immediately make it up and wear it, on pain of dismissal from the service. The officer commanding the 19th dragoons was ordered to march, if required by Colonel Fancourt, to Vellore, to assist in enforcing obedience. The Commander-in-chief would not admit of hesitation to the orders he had given.—Letter from the Commander-in-chief, 7th May; Memorial of Lord W. Bentinck, p. 92. Lord W. Bentinck justly observes of this letter, that military command never was expressed in higher or more imperious language. His own was something like it. "The opposition which has been experienced in the late change of turbans is destitute of any foundation in the law or usage of the Mohammedan or Hindu religion, and any persons who may persevere in that opposition cannot, in consequence, fail to be subjected to the severest penalties of military discipline."—G. O. by Government, 4th July; Memorial, p. 94.

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It will now be convenient to advert to the proceedings which during this period took place in Great Britain relating to the administration of the affairs of the Indian empire.

CHAPTER III.

Proceedings in England.—Refusal of the Directors to concur in the appointment of the Earl of Lauderdale as Governor-General.—Sir George Barlow recalled by the King's sign-manual.—Discussions in Parliament and with the Board of Controul.—Lord Minto appointed Governor-General.—Proceedings in the House of Commons.—Impeachment of Lord Wellesley by Mr. Paull.—Papers moved for.—Charges relating to the Nawab of Oude.—Nawab of Furruckabad.—Zemindar of Sasnee and others.—Proceedings interrupted by dissolution of Parliament.—Renewed by Lord Folkestone.—Impeachment abandoned.—Condemnatory Resolutions negatived.—Merits of the Oude question.—Motion for an Inquiry into the Assumption of the Carnatic negatived.—Censure of Lord Wellesley's Policy by the Court of Proprietors.—Appointment of a Select Committee of the House of Commons.—Diminished Import Trade of the Company.

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THE embarrassed state of the finances of the East India Company, attributed to the ambition and ex-

travagance of Marquis Wellesley, and the countenance which he had shown to the extension of the private trade, and consequent encroachment on the Company's commercial privileges, had excited a strong feeling of hostility to that nobleman's administration in the Court of Directors, which awakened a corresponding sentiment in the majority of the proprietary body. Weakened in political influence by the secession of many of his adherents, disheartened by the gloomy aspect of affairs in Europe, and broken in physical strength, Mr. Pitt was not inclined to support the measures of Lord Wellesley in opposition to the views which were entertained at the India House; and although he resisted, through the Board of Controul, the expression of the Court's disapprobation, yet he consented to give it full effect by the appointment of Lord Cornwallis, a nobleman of different character and principles. The death of that nobleman threatened to frustrate the purposes of his nomination; but the zeal with which his intentions were carried out by Sir G. Barlow, upon his assuming the government, forcibly recommended to the Court his continuance as Governor-General. They were at first allowed to hope that their wish would be complied with: but they were speedily disappointed, under circumstances which, as involving questions of some importance, merit to be detailed.

Information of the death of Marquis Cornwallis arrived in England at the end of January, 1806, upon the eve of the total change of Ministers which followed the demise of Mr. Pitt. A proposal to pay a public tribute of respect to the memory of Lord

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BOOK I. Cornwallis was one of the last measures of the retiring Administration: it was readily acceded to
CHAP. III.
1806. by their opponents, and it was resolved that his statue should be erected in St. Paul's cathedral.¹ The East India Company voted a grant to his heir of £40,000. The appointment of a successor devolved on the new Ministers, amongst whom Lord Minto was charged with the superintendence of Indian affairs as President of the Board of Controul; and by him a communication was made on the 14th of February to the Court of Directors, conveying his impression of the importance, in the actual state of affairs in India, of investing Sir G. Barlow without delay with the fullest powers, and recommending that he should be at once formally appointed Governor-General of India. The recommendation was immediately complied with, and the commission was made out and signed on the 25th of February. It was therefore with no small degree of astonishment that only ten days afterwards, on the 7th of March, the Court was apprised that Ministers had determined to supersede Sir G. Barlow in favour of the Earl of Lauderdale. It was in vain that the Directors remonstrated against so abrupt a change of determination, and urged the advantages of adhering to the original arrangement; until, finding that their remonstrances and arguments were ineffectual, they positively refused to cancel the appointment. The Ministry retaliated by a warrant under the King's sign-manual recalling Sir G. Barlow; and the Court was finally compelled to agree to a compromise, by which the Earl of Lauderdale

¹ Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd February, 1806.

ostensibly declined the acceptance of the office, and Lord Minto was nominated Governor-General.

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The difference which had thus arisen between the Directors and the Ministers afforded to the parliamentary adversaries of the latter a reasonable pretext for animadversions upon their conduct; and, in the House of Lords, Viscount Melville moved for copies of the correspondence which had taken place between the Court of Directors and the Board of Controul.¹ The course pursued by the Administration was vindicated by Lord Grenville, and the motion was negatived without a division.

In the correspondence with the Board, as well as in the debate in the House of Lords, it was manifest that there were two main points of difference between the contending parties; one of a private, one of a public nature. No exceptions to the Earl of Lauderdale were openly advanced by the Court; but, besides the preference of the individual in the instance of Sir G. Barlow, there is no doubt that the Earl of Lauderdale's known opinions in favour of free trade and popular government rendered him unacceptable to many of the members of the Direction.² On the other hand, although Ministers were profuse in their professions of the high sense which they entertained of the merits of Sir G. Barlow, yet his line of policy was not in accordance with the views of the leading members of the Cabinet; Lord

¹ Parl. Debates, 8th July, 1806.

² Lord Lauderdale was a zealous supporter of Mr. Fox's India Bill, and an opposer of the Company's privileges. In politics his opinions were extreme, and led him to advocate the principles of the French Revolution. He made himself conspicuous in the House of Lords by affecting a costume supposed to characterise Jacobinism.—Obituary notice, Gentleman's Magazine, 1839.

BOOK I. Grenville declaring, that the grounds on which he
CHAP. III. was ready to admit those merits being Sir G. Bar-

1806. low's zealous concurrence and effective co-operation in the measures and in the system of Marquis Wellesley, whose government was, in his opinion, the most splendid and glorious that India had ever known. The adoption of a totally opposite system by Sir G. Barlow must consequently have been utterly incompatible with his appointment to the office of Governor-General, in Lord Grenville's estimation. At the same time, the Directors complained with good reason of the inconsistency of the Cabinet in precipitately revoking an appointment which they had recommended, chiefly upon the grounds that it was necessary to arm Sir G. Barlow without delay with full authority to adjust and settle the various important matters which had been left undetermined or doubtful by the death of his predecessor. Intimation of his appointment would be so immediately followed by that of his supersession, that it was impossible he could have derived any additional power or consideration from an elevation so fleeting and delusive, or that in the interval he could have adjusted and settled any doubtful measures of public importance. Lord Minto maintained that he had distinctly apprised the Court that the arrangement was to be regarded as merely temporary, until there should be more leisure to give it that deliberation which its importance demanded. His letter, however, expressly stated that there was no intention of making any immediate change; and the Court, naturally inferring that a much longer period than that of ten

days was contemplated, resented the suddenness of the alteration as indecorous towards themselves, and unfair and unjust towards Sir G. Barlow. Intended disrespect to the Court was of course disclaimed; and, in recognition of the admitted value of Sir G. Barlow's services, a hope was expressed that he would continue to be a member of the Supreme Council. The change of appointment was persisted in. It was evident that the first announcement of the purposes of the Ministry was premature, and that either Lord Minto had acted without consulting his colleagues, or that, in the novel position of the party to which he was attached, they had not been fully aware of the value of the patronage, or of the necessity of securing, by means of it, parliamentary support.¹

A question of greater magnitude than the relative fitness of individuals was involved in the dispute, and the result awoke the Directors to the first distinct perception of the virtual power of the Crown to dispose at pleasure of the highest offices in India. It had been hitherto argued, that the clause in the act of 1784²—Mr. Pitt's bill—which gave to the Crown authority to recall any of the Company's servants, civil or military, and to compel them to vacate whatever situations they might hold, was intended only to prevent any improper abuse of the patronage of the Court, by enforcing the return of persons whom the partiality of friends in the Direc-

¹ Mr. Fox admitted that the appointment of Sir G. Barlow was made before the Administration was fully formed.—Parl. Deb. 10th March, 1806.

² 24 Geo. III. cap. 25, sec. 22.

BOOK I. tion, or the vehemence of partisans in the Court of
CHAP. III. Proprietors, might uphold in office, in spite of no-
1806, torious incompetency or misconduct. In such an
extreme case the Crown was empowered by the act
to interpose, but in no other; for the same act had
vested the appointment of their servants in India
exclusively in the Directors; and, although they
had been in the habit of communicating with his
Majesty's Ministers, in order to preserve that good
understanding which was essential to the conduct of
public affairs, yet they denied that they had thereby
relinquished a chartered right. "If," they enquired,
"the removal of a high public functionary in India
were to be combined with the appointment of a
particular successor nominated by the King's Minis-
ters, and the choice of the Court were confined to
that person alone, then would not the absolute ap-
pointment to the important situations of Governor-
General, or Governor of the subordinate Presi-
dencies, devolve in fact upon the Crown?" The
same arguments were repeated by Lord Melville.
He affirmed, that it was alike the intention of the
Legislature and the sense of the public, in the act
of 1784, that the Court of Directors should continue
to enjoy, without interference, the patronage of
India; and that the clause which gave to the Crown
the power of recall could not be fairly construed as
a transfer of the patronage, by enabling the Crown
to negative appointments made by the Court: and
he appealed to the recollection of Lord Grenville to
bear him out in his understanding of the spirit of
the act, in conformity to which alone its provisions
should be interpreted. In his reply to the Court,

Lord Minto confined himself to the question of right; admitting that of the Court to appoint, asserting that of the Crown to recall. Lord Grenville's answer to Lord Melville was, that laws were to be understood as they were expressed, and not according to the fancies or feelings of individuals; that the same objections which were now started had been made when the clause was enacted; and that it could not be contended, that, because the Crown had the power of negating an appointment, it followed that the whole of the appointments in India fell under the controul of his Majesty's Ministers. He granted, that, if it could be shown that the power had been exercised in the present instance merely for the purpose of procuring the appointment of a person whom Ministers wished to serve, it would be a violation of the law; but, although he denied that the measure originated in favour to Lord Lauderdale, he refused to assign any motives for the removal of Sir G. Barlow. He also denied that his removal was founded upon any systematic exclusion of the Company's servants from places of the highest authority in India; and observed, that such an insinuation came with a peculiarly ill grace from the members of the late Administration, who had exercised their patronage upon the same principle, and had sent out Marquis Wellesley, Marquis Cornwallis, and other noblemen to India. Lord Minto replied in a similar strain to a like representation from the Court of the injustice done to their civil servants by their exclusion from the chief dignities in India; and observed, that no disadvantage had resulted from the nomina-

BOOK I. tion to the first stations in that country of persons
 CHAP. III. who possessed rank and influence in Great Britain.¹

1806. He further remarked, that it was indispensable that the Government at home should have at the head of affairs in India an individual in whom they could implicitly confide, and of whose views they could feel assured: a principle which, the Court justly observed, might make the Governor-General the mere creature of a party, taking and leaving office with every change of Ministry, and regulating his proceedings in India less by a disinterested regard for the prosperity of that country, than by anxiety for the retention of power and place by his colleagues in England; and they maintained, with unanswerable justice, that the Governor-General of

¹ The absolute exclusion of the Company's servants from the highest offices in India was never advocated; it was only asserted, that, with regard to the appointment of Governor-General, advantage had resulted from the preference of persons of exalted station in Great Britain,—a proposition to which few of the Company's servants would hesitate to accede. With respect not only to the office of Governor-General, but to those of subordinate Governors, one of the most distinguished and respected of the Civil servants of the Company, the late Mr. Edmonstone, has left on record sentiments to which all who seek the real good of India will be inclined to subscribe. While admitting that there may be, and have been, splendid exceptions, Mr. Edmonstone observes, "My opinion has always been generally adverse to selecting the Governors from among those who have belonged to the service, because I think, that, with very few exceptions, an individual who has passed through the several gradations of the public service, and has consequently been known in the lowest as well as the highest grades, cannot assume that tone of superiority, nor exercise that degree of influence and controul, and attract that degree of deference and respect, which, in my judgment, contribute importantly to the efficient administration of the office of Governor, as regards both the European and native population. A person of eminence and distinction proceeding from England to fill that office, if duly qualified by character and talent, carries with him a greater degree of influence, and inspires more respect, than an individual who has been known in a subordinate capacity in India can usually command."—Evidence, Commons' Committee, 1832; Public Question 1701. There are other obvious advantages from the appointment of a person of rank and connexion to the office of Governor-General in particular, that more than compensate for any want of stimulus to exertion which the possibility of attaining so elevated a station might be thought to afford to the servants of the Company.

India ought to be unfettered by party and Ministerial obligations. The qualification of partisanship for the office of Governor-General of India, although first avowed by the Whigs, is too congenial to the selfishness of that party spirit which governs the national councils of Great Britain to want advocates amongst their opponents also; but it may be stated, in justice to those who succeeded to the short-lived Administration of 1806, that the principle did not regulate their practice. Lord Minto, although selected from the ranks of their adversaries, was allowed to remain undisturbed in the discharge of his Indian duties until he was superseded by the Court of Directors.

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The discussion that thus arose was not without ulterior consequences. Whatever were the ostensible motives of the disputants, however veiled by sophistical reasoning or unmeaning professions, there is no doubt that patronage was the prey contended for, and that which the original clause of the act of 1784 was intended unavowedly to appropriate. The true import of that clause was now brought to the test, and its meaning was proved to be the nomination of the Governor-General by his Majesty's Ministers. It had been proposed to effect this object in a conciliatory manner, by leaving the appointment with the Court of Directors, subject only to its contingent annulment by the Board through the power of recall: but, as on this occasion the Court manifested a disposition to assert a voice potential in the designation of a successor to the Marquis Cornwallis, the intimation was not disregarded; and, on the first subsequent opportunity for the re-

BOOK I. newal of the charter, a clause was inserted¹ more
CHAP. III. distinctly enunciatory of the power of the Crown,
 1806. by which the appointments to the offices of Governor-General, Governors of Madras and Bombay, and Commander-in-chief, which were made by the Directors, were declared thenceforth subject to royal approbation. The patronage has been since exercised upon this arrangement; and, as the Court can appoint no persons save those of whom it has been previously ascertained that the Board approves, the nomination is virtually exercised by the Administration of the day.²

The attention of the House of Commons was called to other subjects connected with the Government of India; and many of its deliberations were devoted, with little advantage either to India or to Great Britain, to a futile attempt to impeach the late Governor-General, Marquis Wellesley.

Mr. James Paull had resided some years in the principality of Oude,³ and had there carried on a lucrative traffic in the cotton manufactures of the country. His residence had necessarily the sanction of the British authorities; and, according to his own account, he enjoyed the favour of the Nawab

¹ 53 Geo. III. cap. 155, sec. 80.

² In the examination of Mr. Auber, the Secretary to the Court of Directors, before the Commons' Committee of 1832, the relative share of the Ministers and Directors in the patronage of the highest offices in India was a subject fully discussed. Mr. Auber contended stoutly for the power of the Directors, but was obliged to admit that no Governor-General or Commander-in-chief had ever been named by the Court of whom the Crown had disapproved, being in fact nominated upon a previous communication with the Board, while several instances of disapprobation of inferior appointments and their consequent annulment had occurred. The Directors in fact may be said to exercise a kind of selection, but it must be from individuals who they are assured will be acceptable to the Ministers.

³ He is noticed as agent for one of the Nawab's creditors in 1796.

until the period of a visit which he paid to England.¹ Upon his return, the Nawab strongly objected to his being again domiciled in Oude; but his objections were withdrawn in consequence of the intercession of the Governor-General,² and Mr. Paull repaired to Lucknow, "sensibly feeling the obligations he was under to his Excellency, for whom he had only sentiments of gratitude and profound respect."³ These sentiments were short-lived. Mr. Paull, soon after Lord Wellesley's resignation, returned also to England: his first step was the purchase of a seat in the House of Commons; his second, the institution of charges against his former patron and benefactor.

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In the prosecution of this purpose, Mr. Paull moved, on the 25th June, 1805, for the production of papers intended to illustrate the nature of the connexion established with the Government of Oude under the administration of Sir John Shore, and the changes it had undergone during that of Lord Wellesley; by which the Nawab, in defiance of justice, had been degraded and disgraced in the eyes of the world, and in the face of the most solemn treaties had been dispossessed of a territory which had a population of three millions of attached subjects, and yielded an annual revenue of nearly two millions sterling. Papers were also moved for, relating to the appointment of Mr. Henry Wellesley as Commissioner for the affairs of Oude;

¹ Private letter to Major Malcolm, Lucknow, 9th Feb., 1803; printed by Auber, *History of India*, ii. 387.

² Letter from Persian Secretary to the Nawab Vizir, 17th Sept., 1802.—Papers printed by order of Parliament, 17th July, 1806, No. 28.

³ Correspondence printed by order of Parliament, 16th June, 1806, No. 20.

BOOK I. which appointment, he not being a servant of the
 CHAP. III. East India Company, was in defiance of an act of

1806. parliament and a violation of the law. No opposition was made to the production of the papers; and subsequently similar documents were granted relating to Lord Wellesley's treatment of the Raja of Bhurtpore, the Nawab of Surat, and the Nawab of Furruckabad. The first charge was submitted to the House on the 23rd of April, 1806.

The tone of the preliminary proceedings sufficiently indicated their eventual result. The individual who had undertaken to establish the criminality of Lord Wellesley was ill qualified for the task, even if he had been provided with more tenable grounds for his accusations. The intemperance of his language was not redeemed by any powers of eloquence, or extenuated by the nature of his facts, and argued more of personal malignity than public spirit:¹ he stood wholly unsupported in the House, even by the members of the Court of Directors who were present, and who in that character had concurred in the unqualified reprobation of many of those measures of the Governor-General which were now brought under Parliamentary investigation.² He was opposed by both the political

¹ He accused, in his charge with respect to Oude, Lord Wellesley and Mr. H. Wellesley of committing murder, when speaking of the employment of a military force against the refractory Zemindars in the Ceded districts; and, on a subsequent occasion, he calls upon the House to consider the situation of India, from the accursed day when Marquis Wellesley set foot there, until the day of his departure, during which interval it exhibited a constant scene of rapine, oppression, cruelty, and fraud which goaded the whole country into a state of revolt.—Hansard's Parl. Debates, 23rd May and 6th July, 1806.

² Mr. Thornton observed, that impeachment was a step much stronger than anything which he was prepared to think the conduct of Marquis Wellesley, improper as he esteemed it, could warrant him in adopting;

parties in the Commons: by the one as participant of Lord Wellesley's measures; by the other on the principle that, although the system might be reprehensible, yet Parliamentary inquiry was neither necessary nor expedient.¹ And he derived no weight from popular interest, as it was engrossed by considerations of nearer and more vital importance.

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The first charge brought forward, the prodigal expenditure of Lord Wellesley's government, took the House by surprise, as it was unconnected with any of the papers previously moved for. Even Mr. Fox felt it incumbent upon him to remark upon so irregular a course. He observed, that "the honourable member had not told the House what were the documents to be laid before it in support of the charge, nor when they were to be produced: he understood, in fact, that the mover had really no documents, although he had proposed a day for discussion; and if, when that day should arrive, he should be unprovided with means to substantiate his charge,

and Mr. Grant, although he certainly judged inquiry to be necessary, did not deem it advisable to proceed to impeachment.—Parl. Debates.

¹ The sentiments of Mr. Fox are worthy of note, from the difference of his language on this occasion and that which he used during the proceedings against Warren Hastings. He said, "He, and others who agreed with him, had no wish to disparage the proceeding, or to throw obstacles in the way; but, because he disapproved of a system of measures, it did not follow that it was to be remedied by impeaching the individual. He and his honourable friend (Mr. Francis) had a good deal of experience on the subject: this was certainly not a proper time for inquiry; he might disapprove of, and strongly oppose systems; but he would not always think it necessary to resort to inquiries. Impeachment was a bad mode of proceeding, except in particular cases; and certainly it was not advisable to adopt it with regard to a Governor-General of India merely on account of his system. He could not be said to desert a person whom he never encouraged; but, since the trial of Mr. Hastings, they might say if they pleased, he shrunk from all India impeachments, or flew from them, or any other worse term might be employed, if worse could be found. To this he would make no answer."—Parl. Debates, 13th April, 1806.

BOOK I. he would find himself in a very awkward and un-
 CHAP. III. pleasant predicament." So ill concerted were Mr.

1806. Paull's proceedings, that, having moved that the charge be taken into consideration that day three weeks, the motion found no seconder. It was not until after some pause that Sir William Geary rose to second the motion; not, as he observed, from any conviction of the culpability of the accused, but because he thought that the dignity of the House required that the opportunity of proving charges of so grave a tenor should not be denied. The obvious necessity, however, of bringing forward written vouchers enforced an alteration. The motion was withdrawn, and, in its place, papers to show the relative expenditure of successive Indian administrations were moved for, and granted.

A tangible charge was at length elicited. Reverting to the treatment of the Nawab of Oude, and the appropriation of the Ceded districts, it was affirmed that in these proceedings Marquis Wellesley had violated subsisting treaties, and every principle of equity and right; had been regardless of his duty to the East India Company, his Sovereign, and his country; had contemned the Parliament, the King, and the laws; had dishonoured the British nation and name; and had in these respects been guilty of high offences, crimes, and misdemeanours. A second charge was subsequently brought forward, accusing the Governor-General of having unjustly and violently compelled the Nawab of Furruckabad to give up his territory. Evidence was heard on the Oude charge, which closed on the 4th of July. On the 6th Lord Temple moved that

the charge should be taken into consideration; but the motion was resisted on the plea of precipitancy, and, as further papers were requested, the discussion was postponed. On the following day a third charge was adduced, relative to the treatment of the Zemindar of Sasnee and other Zemindars.

BOOK I.
CHAP. III.
1807.

The end of the session put a stop to these proceedings; and, upon the dissolution of Parliament which ensued, Mr. Paull, having canvassed unsuccessfully the borough of Westminster, ceased to be a member of the House of Commons. The attack upon Lord Wellesley, however, was not abandoned: it was resumed by Lord Folkestone, but was urged in a more temperate strain, and for a different object; all purpose of impeachment being disavowed. A series of resolutions was proposed, condemnatory of the demands made upon the Nawab of Oude, in breach of the treaty of 1798, and the consequent sequestration of a considerable part of his dominions; but, after a prolonged discussion, the resolutions were rejected by a considerable majority. It was then moved by Sir John Anstruther, and carried by a majority equally numerous, that the Marquis of Wellesley, in executing the late arrangements in Oude, was actuated by an ardent zeal for the public service, and by the desire of providing more effectually for the prosperity, the defence, and the safety of the British possessions in India.

The character of the measures which were thus subjected to Parliamentary investigation has been explained in a preceding volume.¹ It is, therefore, unnecessary to do more in this place than to advert

¹ Mill, vol. vi. 193.

BOOK I. briefly to the principal arguments, which, amidst
CHAP. III. much irrelevant matter, were urged by either party.

1807. By those who sought to obtain a vote of censure on the Marquis it was maintained, that the Nawab of Oude was an independent prince, with whom, in that capacity, treaties had been contracted: that a treaty had been recently concluded with him (in 1798), by which his authority over his household, his troops, and his subjects, had been recognised; and an amount of subsidy, fully adequate to the expense of the largest force ever raised for the defence of Oude, had been exacted from him: that the Nawab had punctually discharged all demands arising out of this stipulation; and that there was nothing in his domestic circumstances and conduct, or in the aspect of foreign affairs, which called for so violent a measure as that of compelling him to convert a money payment into a territorial concession, and to give up half of his dominions, in order to secure the fulfilment of his pecuniary obligations: that the demand had been submitted to by the Nawab solely through his conscious inability to resist it; and that the injustice thus inflicted upon a native prince, the ally and friend of the Company, was calculated to bring discredit on the British name throughout India: that the acquisition of territory thus obtained was in opposition to the sentiments of the Court of Directors as expressed in a dispatch signed by them all, with one only exception; and was a violation of the declared sense of Parliament, which had expressly denounced territorial extension in India as contrary to the honour and wishes of the nation.

In opposition to these assertions it was affirmed, that the Nawab of Oude was not entitled to be regarded as an independent sovereign; the military defence of his territories having devolved upon the British from their first connexion with Oude, and their interposition in its internal government having been repeatedly exercised. The reigning prince was in fact indebted to that interposition for the rank he held; his predecessor, Vizir Ali, having been deposed, and himself placed on the throne, by the Governor-General. That the treaty of 1798 had reference to the actual position of the Nawab, but did not preclude interference whenever circumstances should urgently call for it. That subsequently circumstances had occurred which demanded strong measures, the Nawab having intimated his apprehensions that the impoverished and declining resources of his principality would not long suffice to pay the stipulated subsidy: that such a failure was to be anticipated from the maladministration of the Nawab, and his inability to maintain subordination and realise his revenues: that, while the means of keeping up an effective subsidiary force were likely to be thus deficient, the necessity of augmenting its strength had been rendered imperative; first, by the absence of adequate provision for internal defence; and secondly, by the imminence of external danger. The troops of the Nawab were a disorderly and disaffected body, a source rather of peril than of safety, whose reduction was highly advantageous to the state. Repeated menaces of invasion had been put forth by Zeman Shah, the ruler of the Afghans; and the

BOOK I.
CHAP. III.

1807.

BOOK I. presence of Sindhia's disciplined brigades under
CHAP. III. French officers upon the frontiers of Oude menaced
1807. the integrity of the principality, and imperiously
enjoined defensive preparations. Under these emer-
gencies, the annexation to the British Indian empire
of the districts in the Doab which were most ex-
posed to foreign aggression was indispensably neces-
sary for the security of both the protected and
protecting power.

It cannot be denied that the political interests of the British Government strongly recommended the appropriation of the Ceded provinces. Continued punctuality in the payment of the subsidy was an evident impossibility, from the diminishing resources of the Nawab; and the subsidiary force must have been reduced or disbanded, or kept up at the Company's cost. The condition of the districts in the Doab was also a subject of uneasiness, as, in the event of a collision with the Mahrattas, the movements of the British armies would have been embarrassed by the necessity of holding in check a disorganised and turbulent population. The readiest method of preventing such results was the establishment of the British authority in the territories in question, the maintenance of order, and the application of the revenues to the payment of the subsidiary force. That the measure, whilst it strengthened the British Government, would be conducive to the well-being of the people and the prosperity of the country, was to be anticipated; and upon these grounds the appropriation was susceptible of vindication: but that it consulted the dignity and power of the Nawab, or could be acceptable to his

feelings, it was absurd to pretend. He was helpless, and he acquiesced; but he was not so blind to his own interests as to be deceived by the specious plausibility with which the mutilation of his authority was pressed upon him; and there can be little doubt that the feeble efforts made in England to procure him redress had their origin in the fallacious hopes which he had been led to entertain of the reversal of the sentence of spoliation by the justice of the British Parliament.

BOOK I.
 CHAP. III.
 1808.

Notwithstanding the victory gained by the friends of Marquis Wellesley on this occasion, the ordeal which he had to undergo was yet incomplete. The minor charges relating to the Nawab of Furruckabad and the Zemindar of Sasnee were disposed of with the Oude charge, and no further notice was taken of the case of the Nawab of Surat. The charge of prodigal expenditure was also abandoned; as it had all along been admitted that the personal integrity of the late Governor-General was unimpeachable, and that his profusion was exclusively instigated by considerations of public credit or advantage. There remained, however, a topic which had been formerly brought forward by Mr. Sheridan,—the treatment of the Nawab of Arcot. He had moved for papers relating to the inquiry in December, 1802, but had then allowed the matter to drop. He still declined to renew its agitation, but he declared himself prepared to support any member who should introduce the question. Accordingly, on the 17th May, 1808, after an interval of five years and a half, Sir Thomas Turton moved a series of six resolutions, as grounds for the appointment of

BOOK I. a committee to inquire into the assumption of the
 CHAP. III. Carnatic. After an adjourned debate, the resolu-

1808. tions were rejected; and it was moved and carried, that it was the opinion of the House that the Marquis Wellesley and Lord Powis, in their conduct, relative to the Carnatic, appeared to have been influenced solely by motives of anxious zeal and solicitude for the permanent security, welfare, and prosperity of the British possessions in India.¹ Thus ended the discussions in Parliament respecting Lord Wellesley's administration; having had no other effect than that of excluding him from a share in the administration of affairs at home, when his co-operation would have been of value to Ministers and to the country.

A very different result attended the proceedings of the Court of Proprietors. In May, 1806, a motion was there made for the production of the correspondence that had taken place with the Board of Controul on the subject of the late wars in India; the main object being to confirm the condemnation of many of Lord Wellesley's measures which had been expressed by the Court of Directors in the draft of a letter to Bengal, the dispatch of which had been arrested by the Board of Controul. The documents having been printed,² a motion was made at a subsequent meeting, that "this Court, having considered the papers laid before it, most highly approve of the zeal manifested and the conduct pursued by the Court of Directors, and regard a firm adherence to the principles maintained by the

¹ The numbers were, for the motion 98, against it 19; majority 79.

² Papers printed for the use of the Proprietors, 7th May, 1806.

Court to be indispensably necessary to preserve the salutary authority over the government of India vested by law in the Court of Directors, to restrain a profuse expenditure of the public money, and to prevent all schemes of conquest and extension of dominion,—measures which the Legislature had declared to be repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of the nation; and this Court do assure the Court of Directors of their most cordial and zealous support, with a view to preserve unimpaired the rights and privileges of the East India Company.” After a debate of some length the resolution was submitted to decision by ballot, when a very large majority of the Proprietors expressed their concurrence in the views of the Directors.¹ It will not fall within the limits of this work to describe the proceedings of the Company at a date long subsequent; but it deserves to be noticed, as a remarkable instance of the inconsistency of public bodies, that, thirty years afterwards, the resolution, now so numerously and strenuously supported, was virtually negatived by the unanimous determination of the same Court of Proprietors to make a pecuniary grant to Lord Wellesley in recompense of his great services to the Company, and to erect his statue in the Court-room;² thus testifying their approbation of the general policy of his administration, and consequently of the principles of subsidiary alliances and territorial aggrandisement.

¹ The numbers were, in favour of the resolution 928, against it 195. Seven hundred and thirty-three Proprietors recorded their condemnation of Lord Wellesley's policy.—*Asiatic Annual Register*, 1806; *Proceedings*, India House.

² *Asiatic Journal*; *Proceedings at the India House*, 1st November, 1837, and 17th March, 1841.

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1808.

The only other proceedings of importance at home affecting the Company's interests were partly of a financial character, and partly preliminary to the discussion of a question the determination of which was now not very remote,—the renewal of the charter, which expired in 1813. On the 11th of March, 1808, Mr. Dundas moved the appointment of a select committee to inquire into the present state of the affairs of the East India Company. A committee was appointed accordingly; and to it was referred a petition submitted by the Company, praying that 1,200,000*l.* due to the Company by the Government might be repaid, and a like sum be advanced by way of loan, to enable the Company to provide for the deficiencies of their commercial resources, which had been occasioned by continued remittances of goods and bullion to India, and the suspension of investments in return, in consequence of the political circumstances of India, and the pecuniary wants of the Government of that country. On the 13th of June the report of the committee was presented, admitting a considerable balance to be due to the India Company by his Majesty's Government; and it was accordingly resolved that a sum not exceeding 1,500,000*l.* should be paid to the Company.

It was at the same time shown that a principal source of the diminished profits of the Company's commerce arose from the rapidly decreasing value of their imports, owing to the failing demand for one of those articles which they had hitherto, in great part, successfully inclosed against the trespassing of private trade. The improved and im-

proving cotton manufactures of England were beginning to exercise a sensible effect upon the similar products of Indian industry; and the import value of Piece-goods, which had hitherto formed a main item in the commerce of the Company, had fallen during the last ten years to one-sixth of its amount at the commencement of the term,—from nearly three millions sterling to less than half a million.¹

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¹ Imports, Piece-goods.	1798-9.	1807-8.
From Bengal	£1,219,828	260,262
Coast	1,560,470	136,177
Anjengo	193,202	36,381
	<u>£2,993,490</u>	<u>£432,820</u>

Report of Select Committee, No. 1, printed by order of the House of Commons, 12th May, 1810.

The trade in piece-goods was deemed of such importance at the renewal of the charter in 1793, that it was stated by the Committee of Correspondence, that without it the Company could not liquidate their political debts, still less furnish the means of participation to the public to the extent which was proposed.—Resolution 8th, April 1st, 1793.

CHAPTER IV.

Lord Minto Governor-General.—Sir G. Barlow Governor of Fort St. George.—Character and Policy of the Governor-General.—Determination to establish Order in Bundelkhand.—Description of the Hilly district of the province.—Colonel Martindell sent against Ajaygerh.—Affair of Rajaoli.—Ajaygerh surrendered.—Lakshman Dawa sets off to Calcutta,—leaves it again suddenly.—His Family put to death by his Father-in-law.—Operations

against Gopal Sing.—Nature of his Incursions.—His submission.—Storm of Kalinjar,—repulsed.—Fortress surrendered.—Treaties with the Raja of Rewa.—Settlement of Haryana.—The Sikh Chiefs east of the Setlej taken under protection.—Treaty with Ranjit Sing.—Embassy to Peshawar.—Revolutions of Afghanistan.—Disastrous Life of Shah Shuja.—Return of the Embassy.—Mission to Sindh.—Revolutions in the Government of that country.—Failure of Negotiation.—Intercourse between France and Persia.—Ill-concerted measures of the British Authorities.—Sir Harford Jones sent as Ambassador from England,—Sir John Malcolm from India.—Unsatisfactory result of the latter Mission.—Return of the Envoy.—A Military Expedition to the Gulph projected by the Bengal Government.—Sir Harford Jones departs from Bombay,—proceeds to Shiraz.—Prosecution of the Mission prohibited.—He perseveres,—reaches Tehran,—concludes a preliminary Treaty.—Disavowed by the Indian Government.—The Treaty confirmed.—Diplomatic relations with Persia taken under the management of the British Ministry.—Sir Gore Ouseley Ambassador.—Definitive Treaty concluded,—productive of little advantage.

BOOK I.
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1807.

THE nobleman on whom the government of India now devolved had been long engaged in public life, and had been for many years an active member of Parliament. Connected with the Whigs in political principle, and the personal friend of some of their great leaders, Sir Gilbert Elliot had been chosen as one of the managers for the Com-

mons in the trial of Warren Hastings, and to him had been intrusted the conducting of the proposed impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey.¹ The knowledge he had thus acquired of Indian affairs recommended him, upon the accession of his friends to power, to the office of President of the Board of Controul; and, when it was found impossible to overcome the repugnance of the Court of Directors to the appointment of the Earl of Lauderdale, he was readily acknowledged by both parties as eligible for the situation of Governor-General of India. Lord Minto was accordingly appointed. He left England in the *Modeste* frigate, and arrived at Madras on the 20th June, 1807. There, as has been noticed, he stayed a short time to assist in determining the final disposal of the Vellore prisoners, and, resuming his voyage, reached Calcutta on the 3rd July. Lord William Bentinck having at the same time been recalled, Sir George Barlow was nominated Governor of Fort St. George, and repaired thither in December of the same year.

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The sentiments which had been expressed at home, both by the Ministry and the Court of Directors, adverse to the system of policy followed by Lord Wellesley, necessarily imposed upon Lord Minto the obligation of adopting principles of a less ambitious tenor, and of pursuing the measures which had been instituted by Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow for the retrenchment of public expenditure and the preservation of external tranquillity. The general tone of the new Administration was, therefore, moderate and pacific; and the

¹ See vol. v. of Mill's History, p. 83.

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character of the Governor-General, delighting in the milder glories of internal prosperity, the amenities of domestic society, and the cultivation of literature and the arts, accorded with the spirit in which it was expected that his government should be carried on. At the same time, Lord Minto was not of a disposition to shrink from expense or exertion when they were recommended or required by the interests of the state over which he ruled; and various important transactions, arising out of Indian and of European politics, signalised his career, and exhibited not unfrequent departures from the policy of imperturbable forbearance and scrupulous non-interference which had been followed by his predecessors.

The enforcement of submission to authority, and the final establishment of order in the provinces recently annexed to the British territories, were among the first objects of the Governor-General's attention. The avoidance of interference in the quarrels of the petty Rajas of Bundelkhand, and the attempt to secure their allegiance and good-will by conciliatory means, had entirely failed. The impunity with which some of the most notorious patrons of the bands of free-booters, by whom the province was overrun, were suffered to retain possession of the districts they had usurped, served only to perpetuate depredation; and the uncontrolled liberty which had been left to the Rajas, of asserting by arms their own real or pretended rights to each other's lands, was productive of interminable disputes, and a disorganising repetition of internal warfare. It was obviously necessary, if it was worth while to retain the province, to adopt

a different mode of governing it; and a change of measures was resolved on. It was officially announced that the submission which milder means had failed to introduce should be established by force, and that the Government would compel, where necessary, obedience to its commands. The promulgation of these designs went far to effect their fulfilment. The Rajas who had hitherto believed that the interposition of the British Agent would be limited to advice only, which they had therefore ventured to treat with utter disregard, hastened, when they found that something more than mere advice was seriously contemplated, to refer their disputes to the decision of the superior authority; and lands and villages, long and fiercely contested, were awarded to those to whom it appeared upon investigation that they rightfully belonged, in most cases without any necessity for compulsive measures. It was not found possible, however, to exterminate the banditti who roamed through the country, as long as they found shelter and support in its principal fortresses; and it was rendered necessary, by the persevering contumacy of the castellans of the forts of Kalinjar and Ajaygerh, to employ a military force for their humiliation.

The province of Bundelkhand, which is generally a plain where it is contiguous to the Jumna, is encompassed on its southern and south-eastern confines by portions of the great Vindhya chain of hills, which stretches across India from the Ganges to the gulph of Cambay. The portions of the chain which border upon Bundelkhand, or are included within its limits, consist of four nearly

BOOK I. parallel ranges, running obliquely from north-east
CHAP. IV. to south-west, distinguished as the Vindhychal,

1808. Panna, Bhandar, and Thamian or Kaimur hills: they are not of great elevation, but rise one above the other as they extend to the south and west. They are separated by narrow valleys or table-lands of limited extent, which, as well as the hills, are for the most part rendered difficult of access by underwood and thick jungle. From the most northerly range, or Vindhychal, isolated elevations are thrown out northwards into the plain, forming a characteristic feature of this part of the country, and affording favourable positions for the construction of hill-forts:¹ two of these had been selected for the site of the forts above named, and Kalinjar and Ajaygerh were regarded by the Bundelas as impregnable, both from the natural difficulties of the approach to them, and the fortifications by which those difficulties had been enhanced.

The Kiladar of Ajaygerh, Lakshman Dawa, originally the captain of a band of plunderers, had become possessed of that strong-hold through the connivance of the officer who had been placed in command of it by Shamshir Bahadur, and who had been directed to give it up to the British authorities. Lakshman was permitted to retain the fort as a temporary arrangement, and to hold in Jagir the adjacent lands, on condition of paying a small annual tribute, and relinquishing the fortress at the expiration of two years, ending in 1808. The tribute was never paid, the term of occupancy had expired,

¹ Memoir on Bundelkhand, by Captain Franklin; Trans. Royal Asiatic Society, i. 259.

and no intention of giving up the fort was exhibited. A body of troops was therefore assembled, and sent under Colonel Martindell against Ajaygerh.

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No opposition was encountered by Colonel Martindell's detachment until they arrived at Rajaoli, a fortified hill about ten miles from Ajaygerh, which was occupied by a select body of Lakshman Dawa's troops. The ascent of the hill was by steep and narrow paths, overhung in many places by projecting rocks; from the shelter of which, parties of the enemy fired upon the slowly advancing troops. Driven from these stations they retreated to the summit of the hill, where they had constructed parapet walls, and behind them they made a resolute stand. As no ladders could be brought up with which to scale the wall, the assailants were recalled, and preparations made for resuming the attack on the following morning: the enemy evacuated the post during the night.¹

On the following day Colonel Martindell proceeded to Ajaygerh, and batteries were raised against the fort. Operations were, however, suspended by repeated messages from Lakshman Dawa promising to deliver up the fortress, and negotiations were protracted until the 11th of February in this expectation. Further delay was then refused, and the guns opened upon the principal gateways with such effect as in a few hours to lay three of them in ruins. On the two following days the firing was repeated, and early on the 13th a practicable breach was made. The Kiladar anticipated the assault by a

¹ The loss of the assailants was 28 Sipahis killed, and 115 wounded, including three officers, of whom Lieut. Jamieson of the light battalion died of his wounds.

BOOK I. timely surrender, and Ajaygerh was taken possession
CHAP. IV. of in the course of the day.¹ Lakshman Dawa gave

1809. himself up to Mr. Richardson, the Governor-General's agent, and was allowed to remain at large upon parole. His family removed from the fort, and found a residence in the adjacent town of Nao-sheher, where a tragedy ensued, not unprecedented in the history of the Hindus, and characteristic of native sentiments of personal honour.

Lakshman Dawa, in surrendering himself, cherished a hope that the British authorities would reinstate him in the possession of his fort, and addressed a petition to the agent, praying either that he might be restored, or that he might be blown from the mouth of a gun, as life without reputation was not worth preserving. As Mr. Richardson declined a compliance with either alternative, the chief resolved to make a personal appeal to the Governor-General, and secretly quitted the camp for the purpose of repairing to Calcutta. He managed his flight with so much skill that no traces of him were discovered until his arrival at the Presidency. He was treated with kindness, and left at large under the supervision of the police; but, as no hope was held out to him of recovering a possession to which his only titles were usurpation and fraud, he departed as unceremoniously as he had arrived, and endeavoured to effect his return to Bundelkhand: his flight was intercepted, and he was brought back to Calcutta, where he was detained until his death.²

¹ Official Dispatches and Government Orders; As. Annual Register, vol. xi.; Chronicle, p. 27.

² Lakshman Dawa died in the neighbourhood of Calcutta in November, 1828. He had from the first refused to accept any provision in place of

Upon the disappearance of Lakshman Dawa from camp, it was considered advisable to place his family in greater security as hostages for his conduct. They were ordered to prepare for removal into the fort, with assurances that they had nothing to apprehend from their detention; and that one of their male relatives, who had not forfeited the favourable opinion of the British Government, should be intrusted with their guardianship. Bajú Rao, the father-in-law of the absent chief, was instructed to conduct the party to their quarters. He undertook the office with apparent cheerfulness, and repaired for that purpose to the house in which the family resided. When a considerable interval had elapsed after his entrance into the house, and no person seemed to be coming forth, a native officer of the escort entered, and found the old man seated before the door of an inner room with a drawn sword in his hand. As the Subahdar approached, Bajú Rao retired into the chamber, and closed the door. Assistance being obtained, the door was forced; when the mother, the wife, the infant son of Lakshman Dawa, and four female attendants, were discovered lying dead on the floor, having been killed by Bajú Rao, apparently with their own consent, as no cry nor any expression of alarm or suffering had been heard. As soon as the door was

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the lands of which he had been dispossessed, and was for some time under the charge of the police. In 1811 his misfortunes affected his intellects, and he was placed under the care of the Company's medical officer at Aylpore, with whom he continued until 1822, when he appears to have recovered his understanding. He was not released from all restraint for two years longer, when he consented to receive a pension of 600 rupees a month. After his death the surviving members of his family were allowed to return to Bundelkhand.—MS. Records.

BOOK I. opened, Bajū Rao inflicted a fatal wound upon him-
 CHAP. IV. self. The catastrophe was in entire unison with
 1809. native feeling ; and several of the Bundela chiefs in
 camp hesitated not to avow, that, under similar cir-
 cumstances, they would have perpetrated a similar
 deed.¹

A protracted course of desultory and harassing hostilities had some time previously been commenced against Gopal Sing, a military adventurer who had usurped the district of Kotra, the inheritance of Raja Bakht Sing, a descendant of Chatrasál. The right of the Raja had been formally recognised by the British Government during the preceding administration, and he had been authorised to recover his lands; but, as he was not allowed to receive the assistance of British troops, the recognition and sanction were mere mockeries.² With the altered policy of the Government its grants became realities. A British detachment was sent to place the Raja in possession. The task was easily accomplished, and even Gopal Sing came into camp and professed submission. From motives which are unexplained, or from the instability of purpose which is not unfrequent in the native mind, he seems to have speedily repented of his acquiescence, and, departing abruptly from the British encampment, he retired with a few followers to

¹ MS. Records ; also As. Annual Register, vol. vi. ; History, p. 5.

² See the Ikrar Nama, or pledge of allegiance, and Sunnud granted to Raja Bakht Sing ; Coll. of Treaties, p. 331. The documents are dated 8th June, 1807. The first article of the answer to the Raja's solicitation to be reinstated runs, "Little doubt can be entertained that you will be able to establish your authority, and to settle the Pergunnas, independently of the aid and support of the British Government : at the same time, every proper and necessary aid which you may require, *with the exception of troops*, shall be furnished to you."

the thickets above the first range of hills. Sensible that direct resistance to the superior force of the supporters of Bakht Sing would be unavailing, he adopted a course of destructive irruptions; rushing down upon the plains and spreading terror and devastation in all directions whenever an opportunity occurred, and, when pressed by his enemies, taking refuge amongst the entangled and rugged country between the first and second ranges of the mountains. Although his parties were frequently overtaken and dispersed, they immediately re-assembled and renewed their depredations; and it became necessary to provide a permanent check upon their ravages. A cantonment was therefore established at Tiroha, at the foot of the first range, a few miles to the north-east of Kalinjar, from whence detachments were sent occasionally to guard the passes; the unhealthiness of the climate preventing the presence of a force above the ghats throughout the year. The marauding attacks of Gopal Sing were in some measure counteracted by these arrangements, but they continued at intervals to disturb the quiet and delay the pacific settlement of the country.

Towards the end of 1809, the concentration of the British force in Bundelkhand under Colonel Martindell, in a different quarter of the province, having drawn off the principal part of the troops opposed to Gopal Sing, the protection of the districts was left to the unaided resources of the Rajas of Panna and Kotra. They proved utterly inadequate to the duty. Their united contingents were defeated in an engagement with their more

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1809.

BOOK I. warlike adversary; and the country below the hills
 CHAP. IV. laid open to his attacks was remorselessly devas-

1810. tated, until his progress was stopped by a detach-
 ment under Major Kelly, which was sent from
 Colonel Martindell's camp at Chatterpur. As the
 force advanced, Gopal retired above the third range
 of ghats; in the vicinity of which the 1st battalion
 of the 16th native infantry, commanded by Captain
 Wilson, was stationed to keep him in check, while
 the rest of the detachment rejoined the main army.

Gopal Sing, finding himself more than a match
 for the force which remained to oppose him, re-
 sumed offensive operations; and being assailed in
 a strongly stockaded position near Kakarati in the
 Panna principality, by the detachment under Cap-
 tain Wilson, repulsed the assailants after they had
 suffered considerable loss, and compelled them to
 fall back towards the plains.¹ The junction of
 Major Delamain, with a squadron of the 2nd native
 cavalry, restored the superiority to the British; but
 Gopal, turning to the north amongst the hills, out-
 stripped their pursuit, and coming suddenly down
 upon Tiroha, which was feebly guarded, he plun-
 dered and set fire to the cantonments, before troops,
 dispatched from Ajaygerh as soon as the move-
 ment of Gopal Sing upon Tiroha was known, could
 arrive for its protection. Major Morgan, who com-
 manded the detachment, followed the retreating
 enemy; but whilst Gopal Sing, at the head of his
 horse, manœuvred so as to engross his attention,

¹ On this occasion, Gopal Sing showed that he united humanity with
 courage and conduct. Several of the wounded Sipahis having fallen into
 his hands, he had their wounds dressed, and sent them back to rejoin the
 detachment.

the infantry marched unperceived again upon Tiroha, where they not only completed such part of the work of destruction as they had left unfinished, but laid the adjacent town in ashes, after having first made themselves masters of much valuable booty. The audacity of this enterprise enforced the adoption of more vigorous measures, and Colonel Brown was detached from Colonel Martindell's camp, with the 1st native cavalry and one squadron of the 8th, to command the troops engaged in this harassing warfare. A battalion of native infantry under Major Leslie was also added to the force; and Gopal, unable to encounter such an armament, and having been surprised and roughly handled by Colonel Brown at Bichaund near Ajaygerh, reascended the passes, and took shelter in an entrenched position at Jhargerh above the second range of ghats. Captain Wilson, with a squadron of native cavalry, the 1st battalion of the 16th native infantry, three companies of the 7th, and a company of pioneers, was sent forward in pursuit. After a laborious march he ascended the hills unperceived, and arrived at Jhargerh almost before his approach was discovered. The defences consisted of a rampart and strong stockades situated upon a rocky eminence in a valley overgrown with bamboos and brushwood: they were accessible only on one face, the other sides being covered by almost impenetrable thickets; but the garrison, including Gopal Sing, were so much taken by surprise that their only thought was of escape. Guided by one of his prisoners, Captain Wilson effected his entrance into the main body of the works as they

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1810.

BOOK I. were evacuated by the enemy, who plunged into
 CHAP. IV. the thickets and disappeared. After burning the

1810. stockades, and levelling the fort, the detachment returned to its post at Kakarati. The setting in of the rainy season put a stop to further proceedings. Gopal retired to the south; and the troops were so stationed as to intercept his return to the north and west, and confine him to the rugged valleys between the Bhandar and Kaimur hills, towards the sources of the Sone and Nerbudda rivers.

As soon as the state of the country permitted, active measures were resumed: a division of the force under Captain Watson marched from Amghat on the 17th November, and on the morning of the 19th came upon a strong body of Gopal Sing's troops at the village of Bhamori, commanded by some of his principal Sirdars. The party was posted in two divisions: one in the village, occupying a brick fort; the other and larger in an adjacent grove, protected by a deep ravine. As soon as the ravine was turned by the native cavalry, the enemy's horse fled, and were pursued for some distance: the foot followed their example, and broke upon the first volley from the advancing column. The troops in the fort surrendered at discretion. About two hundred were killed and wounded, and above one hundred taken prisoners, with little loss on the side of the British. At the same time Major Kelly advanced from Lohagong, and Colonel Brown from the neighbourhood of Banda. The latter, after a long and fatiguing march, crossed the upper course of the Sone at Hardi Ghat, and overtook Gopal Sing near the village of Killeri, whither he

had retreated, after declining to accept an asylum offered him by the Raja of Rewa. His followers, consisting entirely of horse, were completely routed; and Gopal Sing escaped, almost unattended, into the jungle. Here he continued, however, to maintain himself and followers for several months, and, notwithstanding his repeated discomfiture, remained unsubdued.

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1811.

In the month of June, Gopal Sing emerged from his retreat at Kshirgaon in the country of the Berar Raja, and once more descended from the hills. His movements were closely watched by the detachments of Colonel Brown's force; and, having been nearly surprised by Captain Watson in the vicinity of Komtara, he retreated to the protection of his former asylum. Having received intelligence of his position, Colonel Brown moved with great secrecy and expedition, and came by surprise upon him on the night of the 26th June. The enemy's camp was pitched at the head of the Dowani pass in the Marao hills, in the dry bed of a swamp, protected by thick wood on every side, and accessible only by steep and narrow defiles. Through one of these the infantry advanced, and first gave intimation of their presence by a volley fired upon the camp. The enemy fled without attempting resistance: many were killed, and much plunder was recovered. The nature of the country and the approach of the monsoon again suspended pursuit; but, on the 7th September, the fortified post of Kshirgaon was attacked and carried by a detachment commanded by Captain Watson. Gopal Sing, once more an almost solitary fugitive, fled

BOOK I. into the district of Sagar; but, becoming now con-
 CHAP. IV. vinced of the hopelessness of so unequal a contest,

1812. he proffered his submission on the conditions of receiving a full pardon for his opposition, and provision being made for his family. The British Government, equally weary of a troublesome and unprofitable warfare, acceded to the terms, and granted him a Jagir of eighteen villages in the district of Panwari in Bundelkhand, which is still held by his descendants.¹ The transactions are worthy of record as an instance of the success with which personal activity and resolution, aided by a difficult country, but destitute of any other means than plunder and the devotedness of a slender band of adherents, baffled for a period of four years, and ultimately tired out, the resentment and the resources of a powerful antagonist.²

The final establishment of order and tranquillity in Bundelkhand was in a still greater degree dependent upon the reduction of Kalinjar; the strength of which fastness, and the vain attempts made in time past for its capture, impressed the natives with a universal belief of its impregnability, and inspired its Kiladar, Dariao Sing, with confidence to persist in his opposition to British authority, and to continue his scarcely covert encouragement of every predatory leader. The mischievous consequences of allowing Dariao Sing³ to retain possession of Ka-

¹ See the Sunnud granted to Gopal Sing on the 24th Feb., 1812; Report of Select Committee, August, 1832; Political Appendix, p. 561.

² For the operations against Gopal Sing, see the Asiatic Annual Register, vol. xii.; History, 40; Chronicle, pp. 9, 10, 61, 78; and Calcutta Annual Register, 1821; History, p. 76.

³ See p. 18, note.

linjar were vainly pointed out when the British authority was first introduced into Bundelkhand; but the system of endurance having now given place to a policy of a more resolute character, it was determined no longer to overlook his contumacy: a force was accordingly assembled at Banda,¹ the command of which was given to Colonel Martindell, and on the 19th January Kalinjar was invested.

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1812.

The fortified hill of Kalinjar is situated about twenty miles south-east of Banda, and about half that distance from the first range of hills. It rises from a marshy plain as an isolated rock to the height of above nine hundred feet, being at the base ten or twelve miles in circumference, and inclosing on the summit a table-land of more than four miles in circuit. On this plain were situated the residence of the Kiladar, the cantonments of the garrison, and several Hindu temples, apparently ancient:² the sides of the hill are abrupt, and are covered with an almost impenetrable jungle of bushes and bamboos, the haunts of beasts of prey

¹ A squadron of the 8th light dragoons, five companies of the 53rd foot, a squadron of the 1st N. C. and three of the 3rd, with six battalions of N. I., three companies of pioneers, a detachment of European artillery, and a battering train of twelve and eighteen pounders.

² In some places, mutilated inscriptions were found in characters said to be the same as those on the staff of Firoz Shah at Delhi. They have never been collected or published. Cave temples also are described, one of which is dedicated to Nila-kantha, a form of Siva, as a Linga. Kálanjara, the correct appellation of the mountain, is also a name of Siva—he who sees time itself decay—and all the Hindu traditions relating to this hill connect it with his worship. Kalbhiroop (or correctly, Kála-bhairava), whose colossal image is specified by Abulfazl as existing at Kalanjar, is an attendant of Siva, or one of his minor emanations. See the word Callinger, to which Kálanjara is commonly barbarously metamorphosed, in Hamilton's Gazetteer. A general description of the fort and its antiquities is given in Pogson's History of the Bundelas, but the latter have been but cursorily and imperfectly investigated.

BOOK I. and of innumerable monkeys. The crest of the
CHAP. IV. hill is formed of a ridge of steep black rock, which

1812. forms the base of a wall with loopholes and embrasures surrounding the whole of the summit. The Petta, or town, lies at the foot of the hill at the south-eastern angle; and the ascent thence to the fort is by a broad winding road cut along the eastern face of the rock, and defended by seven fortified gateways. Opposite to the north-eastern extremity, at the distance of about eight hundred yards, rises another detached elevation, the hill of Kálanjari, nearly as lofty as the main rock, but of much less extent: its sides are equally steep, and covered in like manner with a thick and entangled growth of low shrubs and bamboos.

After reconnoitring the defences of the fort, it was determined to erect batteries on the lesser hill; and, by the 26th of January, a path having been cleared of the jungle, four iron eighteen-pounders and two mortars were hauled up by main force to the top. Another battery of two eighteen-pounders was formed lower down on the shoulder of the hill; and another of two twelve-pounders nearer the foot, opposite to the great gateway of the fort. Negotiations having failed, the batteries opened on the 28th, on which day also possession was taken of the Petta. No attempt was made to disturb the construction of the batteries, and not a shot was fired from the fort until they opened; it being a point of Indian honour, it is said, for a fort not to fire until fired upon. When the firing of the besiegers commenced, that from the fort was feebly maintained and did little execution; and it

was expected, that, as soon as a breach should be made, the fortress would fall an easy conquest: an anticipation that was fatally disappointed.

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By the 1st of February the batteries had effected what was considered to be a practicable breach, and at sunrise on the 2nd the storming party advanced to the assault. The party consisted of the five companies of his Majesty's 53rd, and the flank companies of the native regiments, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Mawbey. As they ascended the hill, they were encountered by a brisk fire of matchlocks and volleys of heavy stones, until they made good their footing to within fifty yards of the breach, where they halted, under cover of an old wall. The top of the breach, and the wall on both sides of it, were crowded with matchlockmen, regardless of the fire to which they were exposed from the destruction of the parapet. Upon a given signal the assailing column rushed forward, in spite of the missiles with which they were saluted, and reached the foot of the parapet. Here they were arrested by the precipitous and mostly perpendicular rock on which the wall had stood, and which it was necessary to scale before they could arrive at the foot of the breach. Ladders were applied, but the irregularity of the surface rendered it difficult to fix them; and, as fast as the men ascended, they were knocked down by heavy stones hurled upon them by the defendants, or were shot by their matchlocks. Equal resolution was displayed on either side; but the disadvantageous position of the assailants rendered the conflict so unequal, that, after an unavailing struggle of about thirty-five

BOOK I. minutes, the storming party was recalled. The loss
 CHAP. IV. they sustained was severe:¹ that suffered by the
 1812. garrison was not less. The attempt was not un-
 availing; as the Kiladar, apprehensive of its repeti-
 tion, signified on the day following his acceptance
 of the conditions which he had previously rejected.
 Lands were assigned to him and the members of his
 family who held a united interest in Kalinjār, and
 they agreed to cede the fortress. This strong-hold,
 which had baffled Mahmud of Ghazni,² which had
 seen Shir Shah³ perish before its walls, and which
 had sustained a ten years' siege by Ali Bahadur,⁴ was
 thus added to the trophies of British conquest, and
 ceased to be the rallying point of lawless spoliation.
 After a brief occupancy as a military post it was
 dismantled and abandoned. The chiefs who had
 once bid defiance from its ramparts to the com-
 mands of the British Government became peaceable
 subjects, and their descendants are still enumerated
 amongst the Jagirdars of the province.⁵

¹ Capt. Fraser, Lieut. Rice, one serjeant, and ten men of the 53rd, were killed; ten officers and one hundred and twenty men were wounded. Lieut. Faithful, commanding the pioneers, and nearly half his men, were wounded. The Sipahis had no opportunity of coming into action.

² Mahmud besieged it in A. D. 1023, but made peace with Nanda, its Hindu Raja, and left it in his possession.—Briggs's *Ferishta*, i. 66.

³ Shir Shah laid siege to it in A. D. 1554, and was killed by the bursting of a shell, and consequent explosion of a powder magazine near which he was standing.—Briggs's *Ferishta*, ii. 123.

⁴ See above, p. 4.

⁵ Villages were assigned in perpetual Jagir, not only to Dariao Sing Chaubé, but to his coparceners, descendants equally of Ramkrishna Chaubé, to the number of eight.—See the separate grants, Report of Select Committee, August, 1832; App. Political, p. 562; also Bengal and Agra Gazetteer for 1841, vol. ii. part 2, p. 286. The Jagirs thus granted, as well as others of a similar class, to the number of twenty-seven, were exempted by a special regulation, xxii. of 1812, from the operation of the general regulations, and from the jurisdiction of the courts of civil and criminal judicature.

The conduct of Jay Sing Deo, the Raja of Rewa, a small principality situated on the east of Bundelkhand, in countenancing Gopal Sing and other free-booters, had for some time past been unsatisfactory; and, very soon after the reduction of Kalinjar, a party of the plunderers known as Pindaris penetrated by way of Rewa into the British territory of Mirzapur, apparently with the connivance of the Raja. It was obvious that he had either permitted their passage through his country, or that he had not the power to prevent it; and in either case the duty of self-protection suggested interposition. After some hesitation the Raja was compelled to accede to a treaty of friendship and alliance, by which his possessions were guaranteed, and his supremacy in the administration of his government acknowledged; but he was interdicted from communicating with foreign states, obliged to agree to the mutual delivery of enemies and rebels, and to promise co-operation in military affairs. The treaty was concluded in October, 1812.

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These arrangements were scarcely concluded when the Raja manifested a disposition to violate them. He objected to the establishment of a military post within his boundary; opposed a communication through his country between the British districts which it separated; treated the British political agents with indignity; and either suffered or instigated the petty chiefs of Singrana, his dependants, to commit various acts of aggression on the adjacent country under British protection. To punish their ravages, and compel the observance of the stipulated treaty, Colonel Martindell marched

BOOK I. into Rewa early in 1813. He had advanced near
 CHAP. IV. to the capital when the Raja solicited a suspension
 1813. of hostilities, and consented to enter into a new
 treaty, confirming the former stipulations, and en-
 gaging to pay the expenses of the military opera-
 tions. He shortly afterwards abdicated in favour of
 his son.

During the suspension of hostilities with the Rewa Raja, a party of Sipahis escorting military stores, marching to join the main force, and proceeding in the confidence of the armistice which had then been agreed upon, were suddenly surrounded near the village of Sathani by a strong body of horse and foot, by whom some of the men were killed and the baggage was plundered. The Raja disclaimed all participation in this atrocity; and it appeared to have been the unauthorised act of some of his feudatories, particularly the Raja of Sathani and Sarnaid Sing, Raja of Entouri. A force under Colonel Adams took the field immediately after the rains to punish the aggressors. The fort of Entouri was stormed and carried, after an obstinate resistance. Sarnaid Sing, disdaining to survive its capture, strewed a quantity of gunpowder upon a cloth, which he tied round his body, and, setting fire to it, terminated his existence. Some other forts were taken and destroyed; and the chiefs, alarmed, came into camp and submitted. A third treaty was then concluded with the Raja of Rewa; by which, upon his renewing the stipulations previously contracted, he was placed in possession of some of the lands which the contumacious Zemindars had forfeited, with certain reservations, under strict promise that he

would respect whatever guarantees the British Government had granted to any of his chiefs, and would refrain from molesting all such as had evinced towards it a friendly disposition. The Raja necessarily acquiesced, but the resentment felt by this petty court at an interference which it had provoked has perhaps scarcely yet given place to friendly feelings.¹

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1813.

These operations put an end for a time to all serious manifestations of the turbulent spirit by which the Bundelas have been long distinguished. A different race, but of a congenial temperament, in another portion of the western frontier, required, about the same period, similar coercion.

At the termination of the war, the extensive and fertile but thinly peopled district of Haryana, lying immediately west of Delhi, had been taken within the range of British supremacy. The inhabitants of the province, who were of the Ját race, a resolute and high-spirited tribe, had some years before taken advantage of the enfeebled administration of affairs at Delhi to throw off the allegiance which they had previously professed to the Mogul. Collected together in village communities they formed so many petty republics acknowledging no individual head; and, although combining occasionally against a foreign enemy, connected by no common tie of political interest or authority, and not unfrequently at deadly feud with each other. From time to time some Mahratta

¹ See the three treaties of the 5th Oct. 1812, 2nd June 1813, and 21st March 1814, with the Rewa Raja, in the collection of treaties printed by order of Parliament, 27th May 1818; also in a collection printed for the Proprietors, Aug. 1824.—Administration of the Marquis of Hastings. The operations are related in Calcutta Annual Register for 1821, p. 60.

BOOK I. or Mohammedan chieftain, or individual of their
 CHAP. IV. own body, established a military ascendancy over
 1809. them to a limited extent, and for a brief interval;
 and, in one instance, George Thomas, an Irish ad-
 venturer,¹ rendered himself the lord over a part of
 the province, with Hansi, its chief town, for his
 capital. His reign was of short duration; but its
 overthrow was not effected by the discontent of his
 subjects or the rivalry of his equals, and it demanded
 the overwhelming force of Sindhia's disciplined bri-
 gades, commanded by General Perron, to dispossess
 him. Haryana was then governed by Perron in
 the name of Sindhia, and, with the defeat of his
 troops, passed over to the British. The Govern-
 ment of the day, unwilling to retain the conquest,

¹ George Thomas arrived in India as a sailor about 1781. At Madras he deserted, and entered into the service of some of the southern Poligars; thence he made his way through the heart of India, and reached Delhi in 1787: he there received a commission in the brigade of Begum Sumroo, and rose to high favour; but, being supplanted in the Begum's good graces by some other adventurer, he quitted her service in 1792, and joined Apa Khande Rao, one of Sindhia's discarded captains, who was endeavouring to form an independent state in the country west of Delhi. He succeeded in his project, but, dying in 1797, his power fell to pieces, and George Thomas, thrown on his own resources, determined to conquer Haryana for himself. He succeeded so far as to make himself ruler of a petty principality, extending about 100 miles from N. to S. and in its broadest part about 75 miles from E. to W., comprehending 900 villages and several small towns. Hansi, which Thomas found in ruins, was restored and fortified by him, and, becoming his capital, was soon tenanted by between five and six thousand inhabitants. George Thomas was Raja of Hansi for four years, and had little to fear from any of his neighbours, until Sindhia's authority extended to Delhi, and introduced a power far superior to that of the European potentate. Thomas was besieged in Hansi by Du Perron with a strong and well-organised force, and surrendered on condition of being conveyed to a British station. The stipulation was observed, and he was conducted to the British frontier in January 1802. He thence proceeded towards Calcutta, with the purpose of returning to his native land, but was taken ill, and died at Berhampore in August. His career is a striking illustration of the distracted state of a country in which a common sailor, with no other aid than European energy, personal strength, and intrepid resolution, could raise himself even to ephemeral sovereignty.—See Life of George Thomas, by Colonel Francklin.

transferred it to several native chiefs in succession; but all found it impossible to establish their power without the assistance of British troops, and speedily resigned the unprofitable boon. The last of these, Abd-ul-samad Khan, a military leader of repute, who had joined Lord Lake early in the Mahratta war, and who had latterly received Haryana in recompense of his services, found himself compelled to follow the example of his predecessors, and the province was thrown again upon the hands of the British Government. As Haryana was conterminous with the districts of Delhi under British administration, the danger arising from the predatory and unrestrained habits of its population was not to be disregarded, and it was determined to provide against the evil by undertaking the immediate regulation of the country, and bringing the people under the authority of British functionaries. With this design the Honourable Mr. Gardner, assistant to the Resident at Delhi, proceeded with a strong escort into the province. Little difficulty attended his proceedings: most of the head-men of the villages obeyed his summons, repaired to his camp, professed allegiance, promised the regular payment of a stipulated revenue, and engaged to desist from intestine broils and from the plunder of travellers and merchants. Whatever may have been their sincerity, the prompt display, in two instances, of the determination of the Government to suffer no infringement of the compact awed them into the observance of their engagements. The people of Baliali, a large village of Jâts, who professed Mohammedanism, having robbed some traders almost

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in sight of the Commissioner's camp, a military detachment was sent against them. They fled into the adjacent country of Bikaner, and their village was destroyed. A more resolute resistance was encountered at another large village or town, that of Bhawani. The inhabitants of this place, notorious for the audacity of their depredations, carried off the camels and baggage of a party of Sipahis on their march to camp, and fired upon them as they approached the town. Immediate measures were taken to punish the aggressors. A force of four battalions of native infantry, one regiment of cavalry, a corps of irregular horse, with a train of artillery, commanded by Colonel Ball,¹ marched against Bhawani, and appeared before it on the 27th August: batteries were opened, and the walls were breached by noon of the 29th. An assault was made in two columns: the right was met by a sortie of the inhabitants, who fought with courage, but were driven back and followed into the fort; the left column also forced its way into the town, and, after an obstinate conflict, in which severe loss was inflicted on the enemy, the place was carried.² The transaction was productive of the good effects expected from it. The lawless and turbulent tribes of Haryana were made to feel that they had now a master. Submitting to a yoke which they could

¹ 1st battn. of the 9th, 2nd of the 18th, 1st of the 22nd, and 2nd of the 23rd, besides some companies of the 1st of the 10th, and 2nd of the 24th, with the 6th regt. N. Cavalry, and Skinner's horse.

² One officer, Lieut. O'Brien of the 1st batt, of the 22nd, was killed, six were wounded; eighteen privates were killed, and one hundred and fourteen wounded. The loss of the townfolk was officially estimated at more than a thousand.—Asiatic Annual Register, vol. xi.; History, p. 7; Chronicle, p. 67.

not shake off, they became in due time an orderly and obedient people, and, devoting themselves to agricultural occupations, rendered the province one of the most valuable districts subject to the British Government.

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1808.

A still more important departure from the principle of non-interference occurred in the same direction, and occasioned an extension of British supremacy to the frontier which still forms its north-western boundary,—the left bank of the Setlej. The success with which the Sikh chief, Ranjit Sing, had wrought his own aggrandisement at the expense of all his competitors on the west of the Setlej, encouraged him to pursue the same line of policy with respect to the Rajas on the east of the river, and to attempt to spread his influence and power across it to the Jumna. He was led to believe that he would not be obstructed in the execution of this project by the British; as, although the Government had accepted the proffered submission of the Sikh Rajas, it had required from them no positive stipulation of tribute or allegiance, and had contracted no formal engagement to protect them. He went to work, however, with his usual caution. A violent quarrel having taken place between the Rajas of Patiala and Naba, the latter called Ranjit Sing to his assistance. The call was promptly answered; and in October, 1806, that chief crossed the Setlej with a strong body of horse, and dictated terms of reconciliation to the contending parties. Some apprehension of his ulterior objects was entertained at Delhi; but a letter was received from him expressing his profound respect for the British Govern-

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ment, and no notice was taken of his proceedings. The result of this experiment confirmed him in the belief that he had no opposition to dread from his more powerful neighbours in establishing his authority over the states between the Setlej and Jumna; but, having other designs in view, or not considering matters sufficiently mature for the consummation of his purpose, Ranjit Sing departed, and re-crossed the Setlej in the beginning of 1807.

In the course of that year the wife of the Patiala Raja, who was at variance with her husband on account of her insisting upon an assignment of revenue for the use of her son, yet a minor, had recourse to Ranjit Sing, and he again crossed the Setlej into the Doab. The Sikh chiefs in this quarter now began to be seriously alarmed, and made an earnest application to the Resident at Delhi to defend them against the growing ambition of their countryman; protesting that they had ever considered themselves to be the subjects of the Company, and entitled to its protection. Before any reply could be received from Calcutta, the Raja and Rani had settled their dispute amicably, and had purchased the withdrawal of Ranjit by a valuable diamond necklace and a celebrated brass gun; but, before leaving the country, he levied contributions on some other petty Rajas, or seized upon their forts and confiscated their lands. His return was probably hastened by a knowledge of the negotiations going on at Delhi, and by a report, which the chiefs industriously circulated, that their application had been favourably considered. In order to discover the truth of this assertion, Ranjit addressed a

letter to the Governor-General, stating that he had learned that troops were assembling on the Jumna, and requesting to be informed of the cause. He declared his wish to continue on friendly terms, but ventured to add, "The country on this side of the Jumna, except the stations occupied by the English, is subject to my authority. Let it remain so."

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1808.

Although Lord Minto was resolved to resist the pretensions of Ranjit Sing to the exercise of any authority on the right bank of the Jumna, yet the policy of securing his concurrence in the scheme of defensive alliance, which it was sought to frame against the hostile designs upon India avowed by the Emperor Napoleon, suspended the announcement of the Governor-General's sentiments; and Ranjit was referred for a reply to Mr. (afterwards Sir Charles) Metcalfe, whom it had been determined to send on a friendly mission to the Sikh ruler. The envoy set out from Delhi in August 1808, and, crossing the Setlej on the 1st of September, reached the camp of Ranjit, at Kasur, on the 11th: his reception was at first courteous and cordial; but in a few days a different feeling was displayed, and much dissatisfaction was expressed that the British Government should hesitate to acknowledge the Jumna to be the boundary between the two states. Still further to evince his displeasure, and to induce the Rajas on the east of the Setlej to believe that the British envoy acquiesced in his designs, Ranjit broke up his camp, crossed the river with the envoy in his train, dispossessed the chief to whom it belonged of the fort of Farid Koth, seized upon Ambala, and exacted tribute from the Rajas of Shahabad and

BOOK I. Thanesar. As Sir C. Metcalfe had refused to follow
CHAP. IV. his extended march into the Doab, Ranjit retraced
1808. his steps, and returned to Amritsar, where the mission
awaited him. The circumstances which had influ-
enced the Governor-General's external policy had
now in some degree ceased, and it was no longer
necessary to temporise with the Raja of Lahore.
Ranjit was consequently apprised that the Rajas
between the two rivers were under British protec-
tion; that he might retain such acquisitions as he
had made on this side of the Setlej previously to
the existence of the relations which had been
formed with the protected states, but that he
must restore all that had been made subsequently;
and that, in order to guard against any future en-
croachments, a military post would be established
on the left bank of the river. The Raja strenuously
expostulated against this declaration; arguing, that
he had repeatedly exercised acts of authority in the
Doab of the Setlej and Jumna, without any objection
having been started by the British Government; that
appeals made to the British Resident at Delhi by
refractory chiefs had, to his certain knowledge,
received no countenance or encouragement; that
blood had been shed, and treasure expended, in
asserting a supremacy which he claimed as his right;
and that it was as unfriendly as it was inconsistent
to prevent his reaping the fruit of exertions which
had been suffered to come to maturity in seeming
acquiescence. He, therefore, requested a renewed
consideration of the subject; and in the mean time
he assembled his troops, and appeared resolved to
maintain his pretensions by arms.

Having come to the determination that the Setlej should be the limit of Ranjit Sing's acquisitions in that direction, with the exceptions above intimated, the British Government immediately commanded the advance of a sufficient body of troops to uphold their resolution. A detachment under Colonel Ochterlony crossed the Jumna in the middle of January, and proceeded to Ludiana, whilst an army of reserve under the command of Major-General St. Leger was prepared to support the advance, should protracted operations become necessary. The troops of Ranjit Sing fell back as Colonel Ochterlony's detachment approached; and an incident took place, under the observation of the Raja, which might have suggested to him their unfitness to encounter disciplined battalions.

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During the stay of the British embassy in the vicinity of Amritsar the anniversary of the Moharram occurred, and the deaths of Ali and his sons, Hasan and Hosain, were commemorated by the Shia Mohammedans of the envoy's escort with the public demonstrations of passionate sorrow and religious fervour usual on the occasion. The celebration gave great offence to the Sikh population of Amritsar, which is the site of their most sacred temple; and especially to the Akális, a set of Sikh fanatics who combine a religious and martial character. Headed by a party of these men, a numerous and infuriated mob attacked the envoy's camp: they were repulsed by the steadiness of the escort, although it consisted of but two companies of native infantry and sixteen troopers; but not until several of the assailants were killed, and many of the Sipahis were wounded.

BOOK I. Ranjit Sing came up at the close of the affray, and assisted in quelling a tumult which it was strongly

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The advance of the troops to the Setlej, and the experience of their quality which the affair at Amritsar afforded him, dissipated Ranjit Sing's dreams of conquest, and rendered him anxious to secure the forbearance and friendship of the British Government. Accordingly, on the 25th April, a treaty was concluded which stipulated that perpetual friendship should subsist between the British Government and the state of Lahore; that the former should have no concern with the territories and subjects of the Raja to the northward of the Setlej; that the Raja should never maintain on the left bank of the river more troops than were necessary for the internal duties of the territory acknowledged to belong to him, nor commit nor suffer any encroachment on the possessions or rights of the chiefs in its vicinity; and that the treaty should be null and void in the event of a violation of either of the preceding articles. Thus terminated all unfriendly discussions with the Sikh chieftain.¹ That he was deeply mortified by the result cannot be doubted; and there was reason to believe, that, if he could have relied upon effective support from Hindustan, he would not have submitted so peaceably to such a diminution of his power and disappointment of his hopes.²

¹ MS. Records; Prinsep's *Life of Runjeet Singh*, Calcutta, 1834, p. 64.

² There was credible evidence, that, during these discussions, a communication was kept up between the Raja and Sindhia, and unavowed agents were resident on either part at Gwalior and Lahore: a correspondence

Nor did he for some time lay aside his distrust of the ulterior designs of his European neighbour. An exaggerated notion of his resources, and suspicion of his ambitious projects, continued also for a considerable period to regulate the policy of the British Government towards him, and to suspend the establishment of a cordial intercourse almost to the term of the Raja's existence. During the last five years of his life, his confidence in British faith, and reliance on the principles of non-interference which had been originally professed, were fully confirmed by the cautious abstinence which had uniformly left him at liberty to extend his power over the independent principalities and states north and west of the Punjab without any interposition or even remark.¹

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The seasonable succour thus given to the petty Sikh chiefs between the Setlej and the Jumna^a put an end to the vague character of the connexion

with Sarji Rao Ghatka was also detected. Ranjit's sagacity, however, soon discovered the weakness to which the Mahrattas had been reduced.—MS. Records.

¹ Travellers in Ranjit's territories complain, even to a late period, of obstructions to their proceedings thrown in their way by his subordinate functionaries and officers, and ascribe these to private instructions issued by the Raja, whilst ostensibly he gave them permission to go wherever they wished, and institute whatever inquiries they pleased. This might have been the case with some of the first visitors of the Punjab; but, latterly, whatever impediments were experienced were most probably ascribable to the ignorance or impertinence of the subordinates.—See the travels of Moorcroft, Jacquemont, Vigne, &c.

² The chief of these were Sabej Sing, Raja of Patiala; Bhye Lal Sing, of Kythal; Jeswant Sing, of Nabs; Bhag Sing, of Jhind; Guru-dayal Sing, of Ludua; Jodh Sing, of Kalasia; Gopal Sing, of Manimajra; Daya Kunwar, Rani of Ambala; Bhangu Sing, Raja of Thanesar; Sodha Sing, of Mahawar; Jawahir Sing, of Bharup. The Patiala Raja had a revenue of six lakhs of rupees, and a force of 2000 horse and 1000 foot. The revenues of the other chiefs varied from one to two lakhs, and their troops from 500 to 1000 horse. There were about twenty others of still inferior importance, but all claiming independent authority over their vassals; presenting in fact a state of things very similar to that of the early feudal anarchy of Europe.—MS. Records.

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which had hitherto united them with the British Government, and rendered it necessary to define the reciprocal relations which were thenceforward to subsist: accordingly, a general declaration was circulated to them, announcing that the territories of Sirhind and Malüa had been taken under British protection; that it was not the intention of the Government to demand tribute from the chiefs, but that they would be expected to furnish every facility in their power to the movements of British troops through their districts, and to join the British armies with their followers whenever called upon. The several chiefs were permitted to exercise, and were guaranteed, the rights and authorities which they possessed in their respective territories; but supplies of European articles for troops, and horses for cavalry passing through them, were to be exempted from transit duties. The declaration conveying these provisions became the charter of rights to which the Sikh chiefs have been accustomed to refer for the settlement of all questions that have arisen between them and the British Government;¹ but the mutual relations of supremacy and subjection, appeals from the inferior to the superior in disputes amongst themselves or in domestic dissensions, and the imperative necessity of maintaining public order and security, speedily multiplied occasions of interposition, and, after no long interval, compelled the British Government to proclaim the right and the resolution to interpose.²

¹ Life of Runjeet Singh, 72.

² A public proclamation declaratory of the right and determination to interfere between the different Rajas in all cases of disputed territory, and

The regulation of successions was also a subject which from the first demanded the intervention of the protecting power;¹ and political expedience has dictated the enforcement of a principle recognised throughout the feudality of India, the appropriation of a subject territory in failure of lawful heirs by the paramount sovereign.²

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There is no satisfactory proof that the Emperor Napoleon ever seriously contemplated the invasion of India. In an early stage of his career, before his path to greatness was distinctly visible, he seems to have entertained some vague and wild dream of founding for himself an empire in the East.³ The conquest of Egypt, in addition to the purpose of establishing a French colony in that country which should divert the stream of commerce between India and Europe from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Bab-al-mandal, and thus annihilate one of the sources of British prosperity, had, according to Napoleon, for one of its objects, the

at the same time repeating the resolution not to interfere in the internal administration of justice between the chiefs and their subjects, was issued on the 11th August, 1811.—See Report of Select Committee, House of Commons, 1832; Appendix Political, p. 560.

¹ In 1812, the Raja of Patiala, having rendered himself insupportable to his subjects by his insane oppression, was deposed in favour of his son, a minor, under the regency of the Rani, by the British Government. The measure was obnoxious to some of the Raja's adherents; and one of them, an Akali, attacked the Agent, Colonel Ochterlony, in his palanquin, and severely wounded him.—Life of Runjeet, 76.

² Commonly to the exclusion of females, except in a few families where a contrary usage has prevailed. Some of the chiefships have so lapsed, the principal of which are Ambala and Thanesar.—Bengal and Agra Guide, 1841, vol. ii. part 2, p. 268. And, still more recently, Khytal.—Calcutta Journals, April, 1843.

³ According to his own assertion, if he had taken St. Jean d'Acree, he would have brought about a revolution in the East, would have reached Constantinople and the Indies, and changed the destinies of the world.—Las Cases' Journal, i. 206; Scott's Life of Napoleon, ii. 104, 111.

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formation of a basis from which to accomplish the invasion of India; but it is scarcely possible to believe that he could ever have gravely projected so impossible a scheme as that of sending sixty thousand troops upon camels across the deserts of Arabia, and barren wastes of Baluchistan, to the banks of the Indus.¹ The subsequent mission of General Gardanne to Persia, and the influence acquired at Tehran, regarded Russia more immediately than India, and were suggested by the community of political interests, as Persia and France were simultaneously engaged in hostilities with the former empire. Such, however, was the impression produced by these demonstrations, and such the dread of Napoleon's power and resources, that a French invasion of India was reckoned amongst the possible contingencies of the time, and one against which precaution was indispensable. In this conviction, the Governor-General of India deemed it advisable to endeavour to establish amicable relations with the frontier principalities of the Punjab and Afghanistan, and to renew a friendly understanding with the king of Persia. The mission to Ranjit Sing,

¹ L'Expédition d'Égypte avoit trois buts : établir sur le Nil une colonie Française ; ouvrir un débouché à nos manufactures dans l'Afrique, l'Arabie, et la Syrie ; partir d'Égypte comme d'une place d'armes pour porter une armée de 60,000 hommes sur l'Indus soulever les Marattes et les peuples opprimés : 60,000 hommes, moitié Européens, moitié recrutés des climats brûlants de l'équator et du tropique, transportés par 10,000 chevaux et 50,000 chameaux, portant avec eux des vivres pour cinquante ou soixante jours, de l'eau pour cinq ou six jours, et un train d'artillerie de 150 bouches à feu de campagne, avec double approvisionnement, arriveraient en quatre mois sur l'Indus. L'océan a cessé d'être un obstacle depuis qu'on a des vaisseaux, le désert cesse d'en être un pour une armée qui a en abondance des chameaux et des dromedaires.—Mémoires de St. Hélène, ii. 214. Scarcely less insane was his speculation of invading India by sea, and sending round the Cape a force of sixteen thousand troops under convoy of thirty-two ships of the line.—Las Cases' Journal, ii. 248.

which originated in this policy, has been adverted to, and we have now to notice the measures adopted with respect to the two other states.

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The political condition of Afghanistan was almost wholly unknown to the Government of Bengal. No English traveller had crossed the Indus¹ since Foster; and his journey was performed under circumstances of personal disguise and hazard, which restricted him to hasty and superficial observation. Little information was to be gathered from his narrative. It was known from original authorities, that, of the country occupied by the Afghan tribes, the eastern portion, including Kabul and Ghazni, had been usually dependent upon Delhi; and the western, comprising Kandahar and Herat, ordinarily subject to Persia. Upon the murder of Nadir Shah, king of Persia, Ahmed Shah, of the Durani tribe of Afghans, a leader of distinction in the Persian army, took advantage of the distracted condition of both India and Persia to found a kingdom, independent of either, extending from the Indus to Herat, and ultimately including parts of Baluchistan and Sindh. Ahmed Shah was succeeded by his son, Timur Shah, who enjoyed a long and tranquil reign under the shadow of his father's fame. Upon his death the Durani monarchy speedily fell to pieces. He left a number of sons necessarily competitors for the sovereignty.² Zeman Shah, although not the eldest

¹ Mr. Foster, a member of the Civil service of Bengal, returned from India to England, through the Punjab, Afghanistan, and Persia: he travelled on foot in the character of a pauper and garb of an Asiatic; and, although he communicates some novel information, yet his notices of the Afghans, amongst whom he was in much danger, are unavoidably meagre. — See his Travels.

² They were more than thirty. Humayun, the eldest, after a feeble

BOOK I. of these, made good his pretensions with the aid
 CHAP. IV. and support of his younger brother, Shuja-al-mulk,

1808. and retained a precarious occupancy of the throne for seven years. The injustice and insolence of his favourite Vizir provoked a conspiracy against him among the principal nobles of his court: it was detected; and one of the conspirators, Sirafrax Khan, chief of the Barikzei clan, to which Shah Zeman had been mainly indebted for his own elevation, was put to death. The act was fatal to the monarch; for Fatih Khan, the eldest son of Sirafrax Khan, immediately devoted his abilities and influence, which were considerable, to the service of Mahmud, a brother and rival of the king. Shah Zeman, deserted by his troops, was taken prisoner, deposed, and blinded, and Mahmud was made Shah.

The character of Mahmud was unequal to the exigencies of his perilous position. Indolent and timid, he transferred the cares of the government to his ministers, and, as long as his own ease and enjoyment were provided for, was wholly indifferent to the prosperity of his kingdom. By his injudicious partiality to his Persian guards, and the unbridled licence in which he suffered them to indulge, he offended both the religious prejudices and the national feelings of his countrymen, and provoked them to insurrection.¹ Shuja-al-mulk was

effort to maintain his right, was taken by Zeman Shah, blinded, and died in captivity. Zeman Shah, Mahmud, and Shuja-al-mulk, in their turns held temporary sway, and perished. Firoz-ad-din for some time occupied Herat, but was dispossessed, and fled to Persia, where he died. Shah Abbas, who was set up as king for a short time, also died in exile. These were the only members of the family who acquired notoriety.

¹ The Gholam Shâhis, or Kazal-bashis, the king's Persian guards, were obnoxious to the Afghans, not only from their insolence and licen-

called to head the insurgents; and, fortune abandoning Mahmud, his adherents were defeated, and he himself was taken prisoner. Shuja ascended the throne: a feeling of fraternal affection induced him to refrain from inflicting upon Mahmud the usual disqualification for sovereignty, loss of sight; and this act of clemency, which was so unusual in Afghan policy, proved ultimately his own destruction.

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During the five succeeding years Shah Shuja was nominal monarch of Afghanistan; but his authority and life were repeatedly endangered by the attempts of one or other of his brothers to supplant him, and by the aid which they received from the turbulent and factious nobles of his court, especially from the powerful family of which Fatih Khan was the head.¹ Towards the close of this period Mahmud escaped from confinement and fled to his son Kamran, who had been able, during his father's detention, to maintain himself at liberty on the western frontier of Afghanistan. Although joined by the Barakzei chief, the confederates were defeated by Shah Shuja, and his power seemed to be finally established on a secure foundation.² In-

tiousness, but their professions of the Shia form of Mohammedanism, which considers Ali as the rightful successor of Mohammed, and denounces imprecations on the three first Khalifs, Abu-bekr, Omar, and Othman, as usurpers. The Afghans are bigoted Sunis, and assert with equal zeal the lawfulness of the succession. An insurrection in Kabul, directed in the first instance against the Kazal-bashis, and ultimately against Mahmud as their patron, prepared the way for his deposal.—Elphinstone's *Kabul*, 8vo., vol. ii. 334.

¹ The sons of Sirafrax Khan, the hereditary chiefs of the Barakzei clan, were twenty-two in number: one of them, Dost Mohammed, the chief who has of late years acquired such extensive European celebrity, was then one of the youngest of the brethren.

² In August 1808, the Resident at Delhi reported, that, according to the latest advices from Afghanistan, the authority of Shah Shuja was fully established.—MS. Records.

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stead, however, of following up his success, and extinguishing the last sparks of rebellion by the expulsion or capture of Mahmud, he returned to enjoy his triumph at Peshawar, and with singular imprudence dispatched the principal part of his army to recover the province of Kashmir from the chief by whom the province was governed, and who was in arms against his sovereign.¹ It was at this season that the mission from Bengal arrived at Peshawar.

The embassy to Kabul was fitted out in a manner intended to impress the Afghans with an exalted opinion of the power and dignity of the Company, and was intrusted to a member of the civil service, Mr. Elphinstone, whose conversancy with the language and manners of native princes, and whose abilities, judgment, and personal character ensured its success, as far as the state of affairs permitted. Mr. Elphinstone left Delhi on the 13th of October; and, as it was uncertain whether Ranjit Sing would assent to the passage of the mission through the Punjab, the route followed traversed the hitherto untrodden wastes of Bikaner and Jesselmer to the frontiers of Bahawalpur, then a dependency of Kabul. Proceeding through Multan, the Nawab of which was also at that time, nominally at least, a feudatory of the Afghan monarch, the mission reached the Indus, and on the 7th of January crossed the river at Kaheri ferry. On the 5th of March Mr. Elphinstone entered Peshawar, whither Shah Shuja had recently returned from Kandahar.

¹ For the latter history of the Afghans, see Elphinstone's *Embassy to Kabul*, vol. ii. p. 279, and Conolly's *Overland Journey to India; Afghan History*, ii. 233. See also the later accounts of Burnes, Vigne, &c.

Although the envoy met with a courteous reception, and much cordiality prevailed between the members of the mission and the principal persons of the court, yet the objects of the embassy were never fully comprehended, nor was a feeling of distrust towards it ever entirely effaced. An alliance to resist a combined invasion of the French and Persians seemed to the Afghans to be a needless precaution, as the danger was avowedly contingent and remote, and as it was one with which they esteemed themselves competent to cope. The circumstances under which the alliance was sought, showed that British rather than Afghan interests were at stake, and the court not unreasonably desired to know what benefit was to accrue to them from the confederacy. It was shrewdly enough argued by the diplomatists of Peshawar that they could not come to any decision upon an *ex-parte* statement, and that in justice to themselves they ought to hear what an ambassador from France might have to urge before they made common cause with either French or English. To a treaty of defensive and offensive alliance generally they professed themselves to be willing to accede, as such an alliance proposed a reciprocal advantage; but they objected to enter into engagements intended solely for the protection of British India. They saw clearly that the British Government had a point to carry with the court of Kabul for interests of its own; and, when they found that the equivalent demanded was withheld, they concluded that some ulterior and unacknowledged purpose was entertained.

• The importance of the object which Shah Shuja

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and his ministers had in view—the assistance of the British—was speedily enhanced by the course of events. The troops sent to Kashmir were so entirely defeated that not more than two thousand men, dismounted, disarmed, and wholly disorganised, escaped. Mahmud immediately resumed the offensive, occupied Kandāhar and Kabul, and threatened Peshawar. The army was annihilated, the treasury was empty and the means of levying any considerable force were entirely deficient. In this emergency, a pecuniary grant was urgently solicited from the British Government; and such was the state of popular indifference with regard to the contending parties, and the readiness of the chiefs to sell their services to the highest bidder, that a compliance with the application would in all probability have secured the ascendancy of Shah Shuja, and have seated him firmly and permanently in his dominions.¹ The measure was warmly advocated by the envoy; but unhappily for the Shah, and for the fate of Afghanistan, doomed to a long and still uninterminated course of civil dissension and domestic anarchy, the policy of the British Government had undergone a change. The invasion of Spain by Napoleon, and the commencement of the Peninsular war, had indefinitely suspended the execution

¹ The people of the towns were in general well-affected towards Shah Shuja, who was recommended to them by his moderation and justice. The Hill tribes were indifferent, and followed their own chiefs, most of whom were ready to sell their services to the highest bidder. Ten lakhs of rupees would probably have turned the scale decidedly in favour of Shah Shuja, and have secured him a permanent ascendancy. The grant of pecuniary aid was advocated by Mr. Elphinstone, but the measure was not thought necessary by Lord Minto, expressly on the grounds that the change of affairs in Europe had indefinitely suspended, if not entirely defeated, the projects of France against British India.—MS. Records. 4

of his designs upon India, and had made it no longer necessary to conciliate the good-will or purchase the co-operation of the native states upon the frontier. It was therefore resolved to decline the grant of pecuniary aid in any form whatever, and to withdraw with unmeaning professions of amity from all intercourse with the Durani sovereign. The consequences of the ambition of the French Emperor thus vibrated to the heart of Asia; and his declaration, that the Bôurbons had ceased to reign, precipitated Shah Shuja from his throne, consigned him to a life of exile and to a disastrous death, and ultimately led to the infliction of an indelible stain upon the military reputation of the British in the East.

Notwithstanding the disappointment of his hopes of realising an equivalent advantage from the proposed connexion, Shah Shuja agreed to the terms of a treaty in which it was stipulated, that if the French and Persians, who were in alliance, should endeavour to cross Afghanistan on their way to India, the Shah should, to the extent of his power, oppose their march; that the expense attending such opposition should be defrayed by the British Government; that friendship and union should continue for ever between the contracting states; that they should in no manner interfere in each other's countries; and that the King of Kabul should permit no individual of the French nation to enter his territories.¹ The treaty was sent for ratification to Calcutta: it was signed there on the 17th of June; but, before it could be returned to Peshawar,

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¹ Coll. of Treaties, p. 301.

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neither king nor ambassador remained to exchange its authentication. Mr. Elphinstone, who had left the city on the 14th of June to await the restoration of tranquillity, received on his route the order for the return of the mission, and proceeded accordingly to the British territory by way of the Punjab. Shah Shuja marched against his rival: on the 29th of June his army, whilst yet in disorder after its march through the mountains, was surprised by Fatih Khan, and completely routed. The Shah fled; and, although he made several attempts to recover his authority, was uniformly unsuccessful. He then became the guest, and finally the prisoner, of Ranjit Sing; but effected his escape from Lahore, and found an asylum for many years at Ludiana, under the protection and with the support of the Government of India. At the end of 1832 he left his residence, and, proceeding to the westward, raised a force with which he defeated the troops of the Amirs of Sindh, and compelled them to pay him a pecuniary contribution. He then advanced to Kandahar, which he besieged. The Barakzei chiefs of that city having been joined by Dost Mohammed issued into the field, and an action took place which ended to the advantage of the Barakzeis. The Shah might, however, have recovered the supremacy, as many of the principal leaders of the enemy were prepared to desert to him; but he retreated precipitately from the contest, and hastened back to his place of refuge, to be thence conducted once more to Afghanistan,¹ under more propitious aus-

¹ Parliamentary Papers relative to Shah Shuja's expedition into Afghanistan, 1833-34; printed 20th March, 1839.

pices than had ever smiled upon his former efforts, —the avowed co-operation of Ranjit Sing and the Government of British India. The auspices were deceptive. The powerful support upon which he relied crumbled beneath his feet, and left him helpless and alone amidst inexorable foes and treacherous friends. The end of his chequered career followed close upon his abandonment; and the hand of an assassin terminated the life of a prince whose alliance the Government of India had once courted, whose expulsion from his dominions it had pitied and whose distress it had relieved, and whom, as fatally for him as for itself, it at last vainly engaged to replace upon his throne.

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The country of Sindh constitutes the most western limit of India along the southern course of the Indus. It was conquered by the Mohammedans in the commencement of the eighth century, and was retained as a dependency of Persia until its subjugation by Mahmud of Ghazni. Upon the downfall of his dynasty, the Sumras, a race of chiefs of Arab extraction, established themselves as independent rulers of the country, until they were dispossessed by the Sumas, who were Hindus, and who professed a nominal fealty to the Patan sovereigns of Delhi. In the reign of Akber, Sindh became more intimately attached to the Mogul empire; but the government of the province was usually intrusted to native chiefs, whose degree of subordination was regulated by the ability of the court of Delhi to compel obedience. Towards the close of the seventeenth century, the Kaloras, a race of religious teachers who pretended to derive their origin

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from the Abasside Khalifs, and who converted their reputation for sanctity into an engine of worldly aggrandisement, had become possessed of extensive territory in Sindh, and usurped an ascendancy in its government, which was legalised in the reign of Mohammed Shah of Delhi by the appointment of Nur Mohammed Kalora as Subahdar of Tatta. The vicegerent of Sindh was speedily relieved from his dependence upon Delhi, but was compelled to pay tribute to the conqueror, Nadir Shah. The death of that prince dissolved the connexion with Persia; but the new sovereign of Afghanistan claimed the like supremacy over the country, and Sindh became, nominally at least, subject to Kabul. Although confirmed by Ahmed Shah, the son and successor of Nur Mohammed, Mohammed Murad Khan, was deposed after a reign of a few years by his disaffected nobles; and his brother, Ghulam Shah Khan, was placed on the musnud in his room. After a turbulent and distracted reign he was succeeded by his eldest son, Sirafras Khan,¹ who in a few years was deposed by the heads of the Baluch tribes, who had now acquired a leading influence in the affairs of Sindh, and whose enmity he had incurred by putting Bahram Khan, the chief of Talpura, and one of his sons, Sobhdar Khan, for some offence to death. The confederates first placed a younger brother of Sirafras Khan, and then a cousin, upon the throne; but, dissatisfied with their own choice, successively removed them, and seated Ghulam Nabi Shah, a brother of Ghulam Shah, on the musnud. Shortly after his accession, Bijar Khan Talpura, another son

¹ He founded the present capital, Hyderabad, in 1182.

of Bahram Khan, returned to Sindh from Arabia, whither he had gone on pilgrimage, and undertook to revenge the death of his father. He was joined by his clan, and by their friends. Ghulam Nabi Khan immediately assembled his adherents, and a conflict ensued in which he was killed. Bijar Khan then marched against the capital, Hyderabad, where Abd-un-nabi Khan, the brother of the defeated sovereign, had fortified himself, and had put to death Sirafrax Khan, who had been confined there, and, along with him, other princes whose pretensions he thought likely to interfere with his own. Bijar Khan, unable to reduce Hyderabad, protested his readiness to acknowledge Abd-un-nabi as his sovereign, and faithfully adhered to his professions. The Kalora prince was acknowledged to be the paramount prince, and the head of the Talpura tribe became his hereditary minister. The authority exercised by Bijar Khan was not of long duration. In little more than two years he was assassinated by agents of the Raja of Jodhpur, with the connivance, or at the instigation, it is said, of Abd-un-nabi. The belief that the latter was implicated in the murder of Bijar Khan roused the vengeance of the Talpura tribe; and Abd-ullah Khan, the son of the deceased, expelled Abd-un-nabi from Sindh. Abd-ullah assumed the sovereignty.

Although assisted successively by the chief of Kelat and by the Raja of Jodhpur, Abd-un-nabi Khan was unable to recover his authority, and was obliged to have recourse to the Afghan monarch, Timur Shah, the son of Ahmed Shah. A force was placed at his disposal which his enemies were un-

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fectuated by the intermediation of the principal nobles.

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Shiraz, the Governor-General addressed dispatches to the court of Tehran, disavowing the public character of the ambassador; and, to Sir Harford Jones himself, orders were sent commanding him instantly to leave the country, with the intimation, that, on his failing so to do, any bills drawn by him on the Indian Governments after the date of such disobedience would not be discharged. His Majesty's plenipotentiary could not resist the weight of this argument, and signified his readiness to obey; but in the mean time he had pursued his negotiation with great activity, had accomplished the execution of a preliminary treaty, and had prevailed upon the King of Persia to send Abul Hasan Khan as his ambassador, in company with Mr. Morier, to England. The Governor-General consented to ratify the treaty, but peremptorily ordered Sir H. Jones to quit Persia, making over charge of the mission to a medical officer of the Company until the arrival of Sir John Malcolm, whom he still resolved to employ. On the other hand, orders from England directed Sir H. Jones to remain until the arrival of another ambassador in the person of Sir Gore Ouseley; and he continued in the country until after the winter of 1810, although not exercising apparently any ministerial functions. Sir John Malcolm arrived at Tehran in June 1810, — for no purpose apparently except to vindicate the dignity of the Governor-General of India, and put the Company to an unnecessary expense. His presence and services in Persia being speedily rendered unnecessary by the approach of Sir Gore Ouseley as his Majesty's representative at the Persian court, he left Tehran

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couragement¹ was given to it by the ruling authorities; and the factory having been attacked and plundered in a popular tumult, for which no reparation or redress was procured, the agency was discontinued. Circumstances now appeared more promising. Alarmed by the menaced interference of Shah Shuja on behalf of the expelled prince, Abd-un-nabi, the Amirs of Sindh had applied to Persia for succour, and a Persian army had been directed to march to their assistance. The death of Abd-un-nabi, and the embarrassments which Shah Shuja experienced at home, removed all ground of fear from Afghanistan, and the Amirs then became most apprehensive of peril from their allies. They thought it prudent, therefore, to oppose one powerful friend to another,—British India to Persia: they therefore began to conciliate the British Government, and sent an agent to Bombay to propose the renewal of the commercial intercourse that had formerly existed. The proposal was favourably entertained, and Captain Seton was sent as envoy to Hyderabad. A treaty of offensive and defensive alliance was concluded by the envoy with the Amirs; but, as the stipulations pledged the British Government to a reciprocity that was deemed inexpedient, the ratification of the treaty was withheld, and Mr. Nicholas Hankey Smith, a Bombay civil servant, was deputed to explain the cause, and to contract a less comprehensive engagement. After many delays and obstructions opposed to his journey by the ser-

¹ Ghulam Shah Kalora granted *perwana* in 1758 to a Mr. Sumption, in the service of the East India Company, exempting the goods he should import from all duties, and authorising him to build a factory at Aurangbunder, or at Tatta.—Coll. of Treaties, 488.

vants of the Amirs,—not, it was suspected, without their secret approval,¹—Mr. Smith reached Hyderabad on the 8th of August; and on the 23rd of that month a treaty was signed, which engaged that there should be eternal friendship between the two Governments, that vakeels or agents should be always mutually appointed, and that the French should not be permitted to form an establishment in Sindh.² The apprehension of a French invasion of India had subsided, and there remained no motive of weight for cultivating the friendship of a semi-barbarous and arrogant court; while the Amirs were equally disinclined to maintain an intimate intercourse with a power which they feared, and with which they thought they had reason to be dissatisfied, not only on account of the annulment of the treaty entered into with Captain Seton, but because they were apprised that any aggression upon the neighbouring state of Cutch, to the affairs of which we shall hereafter have occasion to recur, would be decidedly resisted. No beneficial result consequently followed the connexion formed at this period with the rulers of Sindh.

Negotiations of greater importance and of more durable consequences were at the same period set on foot with the Government of Persia. They opened inauspiciously, but their complexion was changed by the influence of political revolutions in the west; and the course of events in Europe cleared the road from Bushir to Tehran, and sub-

¹ A detailed account of the proceedings of the mission is given by Lieutenant (now Sir Henry Pottinger) in his *Travels in Beloochistan and Sindh*, p. 331.

² *Coll. of Treaties*, 306.

BOOK I. verted the influence which the French embassy had
 CHAP. IV. obtained at the latter city.

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Napoleon had endeavoured at an early date to establish a connexion with the King of Persia; and, when he projected the invasion of Egypt, the Directory, at his suggestion, sent secret agents to Tehran to prevail upon the reigning monarch Aga Mohammed, to make a simultaneous attack upon the Turkish provinces on the Euphrates. The unavowed character of the French emissaries perplexed the Persian sovereign: his death shortly afterwards, and the accession of Fatih Ali, caused their proposals to meet with but little attention, and no disposition was evinced to adopt the views of France. This disappointment, and the successful mission of Sir John Malcolm to Tehran by Marquis Wellesley, excluded the influence of France at the court of Persia for several years. An accredited agent, who was then sent, died shortly after having had an audience of the King, and all intercourse was again suspended.

In the beginning of 1806, Persia being engaged in hostilities with Russia, and dreading the advance of the Russian arms, gladly welcomed an agent from the French minister at Constantinople, and at his recommendation dispatched one of the nobles of the court to Paris to negotiate a treaty of offensive alliance. A second envoy from Tehran accompanied Monsieur Pontecoulant, who had been dispatched to Persia after the death of his predecessor, and who was now returning to France. This disposition of the Persian court coinciding with the political interests of the French Emperor, met with the most cordial encouragement, and a splendid

embassy was sent to Tehran under General Gardanne, who arrived at the Persian capital towards the end of December 1807. His suite consisted of twenty-five persons, mostly military, besides a number of artillery and engineer officers, and a considerable body of artificers. The draft of a treaty was speedily completed, and sent to Paris for ratification. It was stipulated that France should, either by force or negotiation, obtain from Russia, Georgia and other frontier provinces conquered from Persia; that the King of Persia should allow an army to march through his territories to invade India, should provide for its wants, and join it with all his force; that the island of Kharak should be ceded to France, and French factories should be admitted at Gombroon, Bushir, and other places; and that, if the Emperor required it, the King of Persia should exclude all Englishmen from his dominions. During the negotiations, and the interval of the ratification of the treaty, many of the French officers attached to the embassy were dispersed through the country, and were actively engaged in making military surveys of it and ascertaining its resources; while those remaining at the capital were as busily employed in drilling the new Persian levies, and instructing them in European discipline.

The war between Persia and Russia originated in the invasion of Georgia by the former power, and consequent recourse to the latter by the princes of Georgia, Heraclius and his successor Gurgein, the second of whom promised perpetual vassalage to Russia as the price of the aid solicited. The Persians had been driven out of the country, and they

BOOK I. had not only been foiled in every attempt to regain
 CHAP. IV. it, but had sustained many disastrous defeats, and

1808. had lost extensive tracts in Armenia and Daghestan. In the first moments of distress the court had applied to the Indian Government for aid, under the initiatory article of the treaty concluded in 1801, which pledged the two states to perpetual amity. This interpretation of the article was not concurred in by the Government of India, and armed assistance was declined. The refusal had alienated the court of Persia from the British connexion, and had thrown it into the arms of France. Unfortunately for its hopes, the peace of Tilsit, which was concluded before even the arrival of General Gardanne at Tehran, had united the Emperors Napoleon and Alexander in bonds of personal friendship and projects of mutual aggrandisement. Although not immediately avowed,—although a show of regard was displayed, and offers of mediation were professed,—yet at the very moment when the King of Persia was assured that the strongest intercession in his favour should be addressed to the Czar, his cause had been utterly abandoned, and the integrity of his dominions sacrificed to Russia, in exchange for licence to the French Emperor to pounce without check or hinderance upon Spain.

The presence of a French embassy at the Persian court had so far a beneficial operation, that it roused the authorities both in England and in India to a sense of the necessity of reacquiring some consideration at Tehran. Unluckily, their measures were taken without previous concert, and the result was an undignified and impolitic collision. The

Government of England, in communication with the Court of Directors, resolved to send an ambassador to Persia, in the person of Sir Harford Jones, who had held for several years the office of Company's Resident at Bagdad. He was accordingly nominated his Majesty's envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary; although his allowances and the cost of the mission were to be defrayed by the East India Company, and the envoy was ordered to act under instructions from the Governor-General. The Governor-General had in the mean time determined to dispatch his own representative; and Sir John Malcolm, who had concluded the former treaty, was again sent by Lord Minto in the same capacity to Persia.

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The appointment of an ambassador to Persia was one of the last acts of the administration of Earl Grey; and his departure was delayed by the change of ministry which took place in March, 1807. From this and other circumstances, Sir Harford Jones did not arrive at Bombay until April in the following year, and on his arrival found that Sir John Malcolm had preceded him to Bushir. In compliance with the orders of the Governor-General, he remained at Bombay until it should be ascertained in what manner the mission was received. Sir John Malcolm reached Bushir in May, and announced his arrival to the court, sending his dispatches by one of his officers, Captain Pasley. The letters were forwarded, but the messenger was detained at Shiraz until instructions should arrive from Tehran. After some delay they were received. The King, still clinging to the hope that

BOOK I. the intercession of France would procure the restoration of some of his lost frontier,—a hope in

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1808. which he was strengthened by the assurances of a Russian agent, and the protestations of the French ambassador,—chose rather to brave the resentment of his former allies than give umbrage to both France and Russia. Affecting, however, an equal unwillingness to displease the British Government, he directed one of his sons, Hosein Ali Mirza, governor of the province, to carry on the negociations with its representative at Shiraz. To this Sir John Malcolm strongly objected, as derogatory to the dignity of his Government. Believing, from the private information he received, that the French embassy had obtained too firm a footing at Tehran to be supplanted, and arguing that the connexion was a breach of existing engagements, and inimical to British interests, he abruptly sailed from Bushir, and repaired at once to Calcutta, where his representations induced the Governor-General to conclude that measures of intimidation or hostility were necessary; and orders were issued for fitting out a military expedition, which should occupy the island of Kharak, and hold the command of the navigation of the Persian Gulph.¹

The first impression entertained by the Governor-General, founded upon the envoy's dispatches, was, that the proceedings of Sir John Malcolm had been somewhat precipitate, and that no sufficient cause had been assigned for the total abandonment of the objects of the embassy. He had therefore authorised Sir Harford Jones, in the event of his predecessor's

¹ Malcolm's Political History of India, i. 415.

withdrawal, to prosecute his voyage "without a moment's delay, should the circumstances render, in his judgment, such a step advisable, without further reference to Bengal." The information which he subsequently received induced Lord Minto to believe that a representative of the British power would not be admitted to the presence of the King of Persia, and that a repetition of the attempt to obtain an audience would be incompatible with the dignity of the Government, while it would be productive of no advantage. Sir Harford Jones was consequently instructed to await the result of further deliberations. The countermand was too late. Before it reached Bombay, Sir Harford Jones, acting in the spirit of his first instructions, had sailed for Persia. He arrived at Bushir on the 14th of October. The aspect of affairs had changed. No progress had been made towards the restitution of any part of the Persian territory, and the court had begun to lose faith in the professions of the French. In this feeling of disappointment, regret for having given offence to the British Government, and apprehension of the consequences of its displeasure, found easy access to the Persian cabinet, and the arrival of his Majesty's ambassador at Bushir was regarded as a fortunate means of escaping from its embarrassments. Still, some reluctance seems to have been entertained to break so entirely with France as openly to sanction the advance of the mission to the capital; and, although an invitation to proceed to Shiraz was very soon forwarded, Sir Harford Jones consented to go thither upon no other se-

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curity for his ultimate reception at Tehran than the assurances of a native agent that on his arrival there he would find the official invitation from the King and his ministers to continue his journey to the presence. Upon this information, the envoy accompanied the Mihmandar who was sent to conduct him to Shiraz, and arrived there on the 1st of January. Some faint attempts to inveigle him into negotiations with the local authorities were easily baffled; and, all difficulties being surmounted,¹ the mission departed from Shiraz on the 12th of January. Sir Harford Jones entered Tehran on the 14th of the following month, the French embassy having quitted the city on the preceding day. During the stay of the mission at Shiraz, the dispatches from Bengal arrived, recalling the ambassador, and announcing the military projects of the Government. The information speedily transpired, and excited great alarm; to allay which, Sir Harford Jones assumed, as the representative of the Crown, a power independent of the Governor-General of India, and entered into a solemn pledge that no aggression should be committed upon the dominions of the King of Persia as long as his Majesty displayed a wish to preserve the amicable relations by

¹ Malcolm ascribes this to "the anticipated failure of the French to fulfil their extravagant promises, the alarm excited by the military preparations in India, and the cupidity of the Persian court, which had been strongly excited."—*Pol. Hist.* i. 415. Sir Harford Jones states, that Lord Minto accused him of having found his way to Shiraz by corruption.—*Account of the Mission to Persia*, i. 147. According to the plenipotentiary's own account, the King's willingness to receive him was stimulated by exaggerated descriptions of a valuable diamond included amongst the presents intended for his Majesty, and of which he himself remarks, "I so managed, that, at the expense of £10,000 to the Company, the Shah of Persia considered he had received twenty or twenty-five thousand pounds from his Majesty's envoy."—*Account of the Mission*, i. 144.

which he had been connected with the King of Great Britain.

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The appointment of an ambassador to Persia by the home Government had been regarded by the Governor-General as an injudicious departure from the practice of negotiating with that country through India. He protested against the innovation. Lord Minto argued, that it was inconsistent to expect from the Government of India effective precautions against any dangers on the side of Persia, without leaving to it the power of controuling the minister deputed to the Persian court; and directing the course and character of the negotiations to be carried on with it: that such a minister appointed in England might not only fail to appreciate the interests of British India, but might act in direct opposition to them; and might not only pledge the faith of its Government to measures unsanctioned by it, but even to such as were incompatible with its honour and safety: that the Indian Government was vested with the power of sovereignty within its own limits, and had been recognised in that character by the King of Persia. "It was in that character alone that we had been able to obtain those manifestations of respect, that regard to the claims of dignity, which amongst all nations of the world, but in an especial degree amongst Asiatic states, are essential to the maintenance of real power in the scale of political interest: this acknowledged character, as it constituted the basis, so it must form the cement, of our external relations. To depreciate therefore that estimation of the power and dignity of the British Government

BOOK I. in India, which under a just sense of its importance
 CHAP. IV. we have hitherto successfully laboured to preserve
 1809. among surrounding states, is to fix upon the British
 Government the stigma of deceit, to affect the re-
 putation of our public faith, and to expose us to
 much of the danger arising from a real loss of
 power, by diminishing that awe and respect with
 which the Government has hitherto been contem-
 plated, and on which the tranquillity and security
 of British India materially depend.”¹

Notwithstanding the earnestness with which Lord Minto asserted the sovereign prerogatives of the Governor-General of India, the transfer of diplomatic relations with Persia from that officer to the Ministers of the Crown was persevered in, and ambassadors to Persia have ever since been sent directly from Great Britain alone. The destinies of Persia are, in truth, so much more intimately interwoven with the political interests of the parent country than of India, the consequences deprecated by Lord Minto as likely to affect the latter are so much more calculated to exercise an influence upon the former, that the relations established, or to be established, with Persia, can no longer be consistently confided to the arbitrement of a delegated and subordinate functionary, however high his station or absolute his authority.

Until, however, the question was decided against him, Lord Minto showed himself resolved to exercise his power. Highly displeased at the determination of Sir Harford Jones to continue his journey from

¹ Lord Minto's letter to the Secret Committee, as quoted by Malcolm.—*Pol. Hist.* i. 417.

Shiraz, the Governor-General addressed dispatches to the court of Tehran, disavowing the public character of the ambassador; and, to Sir Harford Jones himself, orders were sent commanding him instantly to leave the country, with the intimation, that, on his failing so to do, any bills drawn by him on the Indian Governments after the date of such disobedience would not be discharged. His Majesty's plenipotentiary could not resist the weight of this argument, and signified his readiness to obey; but in the mean time he had pursued his negotiation with great activity, had accomplished the execution of a preliminary treaty, and had prevailed upon the King of Persia to send Abul Hasan Khan as his ambassador, in company with Mr. Morier, to England. The Governor-General consented to ratify the treaty, but peremptorily ordered Sir H. Jones to quit Persia, making over charge of the mission to a medical officer of the Company until the arrival of Sir John Malcolm, whom he still resolved to employ. On the other hand, orders from England directed Sir H. Jones to remain until the arrival of another ambassador in the person of Sir Gore Ouseley; and he continued in the country until after the winter of 1810, although not exercising apparently any ministerial functions. Sir John Malcolm arrived at Tehran in June 1810,—for no purpose apparently except to vindicate the dignity of the Governor-General of India, and put the Company to an unnecessary expense. His presence and services in Persia being speedily rendered unnecessary by the approach of Sir Gore Ouseley as his Majesty's representative at the Persian court, he left Tehran

BOOK I. in the following month.¹ There were consequently
 CHAP. IV. about the same period three English ambassadors in

1810. Persia, whose relative importance it must have perplexed the Persians to determine, although they were astute enough to take advantage of so much competition for their friendship, and make the better bargain for themselves.

By the preliminary treaty concluded between Sir Harford Jones and the ministers of the King of Persia it was stipulated that the articles should form the basis of a definitive treaty without alteration; that every treaty made by the King of Persia with any one of the powers of Europe should become null and void; and that he would not permit any European force to march through Persia towards India. That, should any European force invade or have invaded the territories of Persia, his Britannic Majesty would afford to the King of Persia a military force, or, in lieu of it, a subsidy and warlike ammunition; the number of the forces and the amount of the subsidy to be regulated by a definitive treaty. Should his Britannic Majesty make peace with the invading power, he should use his efforts to negotiate a peace also between it and Persia;

¹ A full account of the circumstances connected with Sir Harford Jones's embassy has been published by himself,—An Account of the transactions of his Majesty's mission to the Court of Persia in the years 1807-11, by Sir Harford Jones Brydges, Bart. A somewhat different view of them is given by Malcolm in his Political History of India. Some notice of the proceedings of the mission occurs in Morier's First Journey through Persia. Whatever may be the case with respect to the means employed, there is no denying that Sir Harford Jones effected his object; that he made his way to Tehran, and negotiated a treaty which, in substance, was confirmed by the British Government; and that the projected military expedition to the Gulph would have entailed a heavy cost, realised no solid advantage, and deeply, perhaps incurably, wounded the pride of the Persian monarch and the patriotism of his people.

but, in failure of success, the military or pecuniary aid should be still supplied as long as the invading force continued in the Persian territory, or until the conclusion of peace. That, if the Afghans or any other power should attack India, the King of Persia should furnish a force to assist in its defence. That, if any British troops should have landed at Kharak, or in any other Persian port, they should not possess themselves of such places, but be at the disposal of the King of Persia, subject to the alternative of a pecuniary payment in their place. That, if war should take place between the Afghans and the King of Persia, the King of Great Britain should take no part in it, except as a mediator at the desire of both parties. That the object of these articles should be regarded as mutually defensive; and, finally, a hope was expressed that the treaty might be everlasting, and produce "the most beautiful fruits of friendship between the two serene kings."

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A definitive treaty, in conformity to these stipulations, was entered into by Sir Gore Ouseley; but some of the conditions underwent a modification in England, and the final arrangements were not completed till 1814, when the terms were conclusively agreed upon. The defensive character of the treaty was more explicitly stated, and Russia was specified as the power against which the Persian frontier was to be defended. The amount of the subsidy was fixed at 200,000 tomans, about £125,000 per annum; and it was further agreed that the said subsidy should not be paid in case a war with any European nation should have been produced by an

BOOK I. aggression on the part of Persia. The other modifications little affected the preliminary conditions; and,

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 1810. at a subsequent date, the Persian court was compelled to relinquish the stipulated subsidy.¹ Little ultimate advantage accrued to either power from the intercourse which it had been considered so essential to the political interests of both to maintain.

¹ See the several engagements with Persia of 1809, 1814, and 1828, in the treaties printed by order of the House of Commons, 11th March, 1839.

CHAPTER V.

Appointment of Sir G. Barlow to the Government of Madras,—unacceptable to the settlement.—The state of popular feeling.—Commencement of agitation.—Case of Mr. Sherson.—Proceedings of the Commission for the investigation of the debts of the Nawab of the Carnatic.—Trials of Reddy Rao,—his conviction,—his pardon and death.—Affairs of Travancore.—Disputes between the Raja and the Resident.—Enmity of the Dewan,—sets on foot an insurrection,—abetted by the Dewan of Cochin.—Troops ordered to Travancore.—The Resident's house attacked,—his escape.—Operations of the Subsidiary force.—Murder of Europeans by the Dewan.—Army sent to the Province under Colonel St. Leger.—Storm of the Arambuli Lines.—Defeat of the Nairs at Quilon.—Advance to the Capital.—Submission of the Raja.—Flight of the Dewan.

— *Sanctuary violated. — Death of the Dewan. — Seizure and execution of his brother. — The body of the Dewan gibbeted. — Sentiments of the Bengal Government. — Disorganised condition of Travancore. — Administration of affairs by the Resident as Dewan under the Raja and his successors. — Restoration of prosperity. — Similar system and results in Cochin. — Disputes between the Governor and Commander-in-chief. — The latter refused a seat in Council by the Court, — his dissatisfaction and resignation. — Discontents of the Officers of the Coast army, — their causes. — Tent contract abolished. — Reasons assigned in the Quarter-Master-General's report offensive to Officers commanding corps, — demand a court-martial on Colonel Munro. — The Commander-in-chief places Colonel Munro in arrest. — Government cancels the arrest. — General Macdowall issues a General Order on the subject, and embarks for England. — Counter Order by the Government. — Subsequent severity. — Suspension of Major Boles. — Effect upon the Officers. — Orders of the 1st of May. — Violent proceedings at Hyderabad. — Mutinous conduct of the garrison of Masulipatam. — Threatened march of the troops to Madras. — Firmness of the Government. — Consequent arrangements. — Test proposed to the European Officers. — Appeal to the Native Troops. — Their allegiance. — The garrison of Seringapatam in open rebellion. — Colonel Close sent to Hyderabad. — Officers of the Subsidiary force sign the test, — their example followed. — Arrival of the Governor-General at Madras. — Courts-martial. — Sir Samuel Achmuty Commander-in-chief and Member of Council. — Proceedings in England. —*

Warm disputes in the Court of Directors.—Officers restored to the service.—Sir G. Barlow finally recalled.

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To compensate to Sir George Barlow for the dis-
appointment which had been inflicted upon him
by his supersession in the high office of Governor-
General, the Administration in England consented
to his eventual elevation to that dignity, and in
the mean while concurred in his nomination to the
government of Fort St. George.¹ He was accord-
ingly appointed Governor of Madras, and assumed
charge of his new duties at the end of December,
1807.²

Various circumstances conspired to render the
appointment of Sir George Barlow unacceptable to
the servants of the Company under the Madras
Presidency. His being a member of a different
service was one source of his unpopularity, and his
well-known character as a rigorous advocate and
unrelenting enforcer of measures of public economy
and retrenchment produced a still more universal
and profound impression adverse to his person and

¹ "He (Sir George Barlow) is now subjected to the discredit of being superseded in the Government-General; to the succession of which, after having once actually filled that high office, he stood for the third time appointed."—Protests of Messrs. Parry, Astell, Smith, and Bell, against the recall of Sir G. Barlow in 1812. So Mr. Grant in a separate protest observes, "I come now to speak of the order rescinding the appointment made of Sir G. Barlow, in May 1807, to be Governor-General of Bengal in succession to Lord Minto."—Dissents, &c., published by Sir Robert Barlow. Murray, 1813.

² The occurrences of Sir G. Barlow's administration are fully detailed, not only in the numerous pamphlets published both by his friends and enemies, but in the official documents relating to the transactions themselves, and to the discussions which they occasioned in the Court of Directors, which were printed by order of Parliament at the following several dates, 25th May, 1810; 1st April, 1811; 3rd May, 1811; 13th June, 1811; 21st June, 1811, and 15th April, 1812.

his government.¹ Unfortunately, he does not appear to have been qualified or disposed to dissipate the prejudices which anticipated his presence. His manners were reserved and unconciliating: a stranger at Madras, and of retiring habits, he gave his confidence too exclusively to the knot of civil and military functionaries by whom he was immediately surrounded: his notions of the claims of the executive powers of Government to prompt and unquestioning obedience were lofty and uncompromising; and in the stern exaction of acquiescence he undervalued apparently the necessity, which "every statesman ought to feel, of mutual accommodation and concession in the controversies and contentions of mankind, and was wanting in a liberal consideration for human feelings and infirmities." These defects were not counterbalanced, in the estimation of those whom he was set over, by the acknowledged merits of his public character, his conscientious sense of the importance of his duties, or his industry and ability in their discharge; nor was time allowed for the due appreciation of the excellence which, under an unattractive deportment, distinguished his private life. The state of society also at Madras, and the sentiments which had for some time pervaded the Coast

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¹ "I am under the necessity of avowing, with infinite regret, another very operating principle of these discontents, which have since matured themselves gradually, but without interruption, into the extremes of public disorder. I allude to the unjust but very general and vehement prejudices against the person and character of Sir G. Barlow, which may have been in some degree the unavoidable, but were certainly the unmerited, consequences of his firm and faithful discharge of ungracious and unpopular, but sacred and essential duties, not sought or relished by himself, but cast by circumstances peculiar to the times on the period of his administration in Bengal."—Letter from Lord Minto to the Secret Committee, 5th Feb., 1810; Parl. Papers, 1st April, 1811, p. 346.

BOOK I. army, had accumulated elements of discord which
 CHAP. V. the slightest breath was sufficient to set in agitation :
 1808. dissensions and discontents accordingly immediately
 burst forth, and rendered the administration of the
 new Governor of Madras a season of unprecedented
 private misery, and unexampled public peril and
 alarm.

The first occasion of offence occurred in the settlement of Madras, and followed closely upon Sir George Barlow's arrival. On assuming the reins of power, he found in progress an inquiry instituted by order of his predecessor, Mr. Petrie, into the conduct of a Mr. Sherson, a civil servant of some standing, of a respectable character, and a person much esteemed in society; who had held the office of superintendent of the public stores of rice laid in by the Government of Madras, to be retailed in small quantities to the people, as a precaution against the recurrence of those famines which had frequently desolated the Presidency. Charges of fraud in this department were preferred against Mr. Sherson, and a committee was appointed for their investigation. That abuses in an arrangement so liable to be abused seemed probable; but their nature and extent were undetermined, and the participation or cognizance of the principal unsubstantiated. His accounts submitted to the civil auditor were pronounced correct; yet, as they did not tally with the native accounts of the office, Mr. Sherson, and Mr. Smith the auditor, were both removed from their situations, and the former was suspended from the service pending the pleasure of the Court of Directors. An opinion generally prevailed that both

these officers had been harshly, if not unjustly, dealt with; and Sir George Barlow incurred much obloquy from having precipitately believed representations asserted to be interested or malicious.

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That he too hastily adopted a decided opinion in the matter, and, in his intolerance of supposed official speculation, inflicted severe punishment before its justice was undeniably established, was shown by subsequent events. A prosecution was commenced in the Supreme Court of Madras against Mr. Sherson, and after considerable delays, during which a change of Government had taken place, the cause came on for trial. Mr. Sherson was acquitted, not only of legal, but, in the opinion of one of his Judges, of moral criminality.¹ It was accordingly resolved by the Court of Directors, "that the severe measures adopted relative to Mr. Sherson had been founded upon erroneous grounds;" and he was restored by them to the service, with a pecuniary indemnification of 20,000 pagodas for his losses. The resolutions were confirmed in terms still more emphatic by the Court of Proprietors.²

Animosities still more violent and extensive were engendered by the part which the Governor of Madras deemed it incumbent upon him to take in support of a committee which had been appointed under an act of parliament for the investigation and adjustment of the debts of the Nawab of the Car-

¹ Sir John Newbolt: the other Judges were Sir Thomas Strange and Sir Francis Macnaghten.

² Report of Debate in the Court of Proprietors, 23d April and 5th May, 1815, by Mr. Fraser; London, 1815. Report of Proceedings in the Supreme Court, Madras, 28th March, 1814; Honourable Company v. Sherson and others.

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natic. The principles which had been enjoined by the Board of Controul in 1784 for the settlement of all claims upon the Nawab have already been described;¹ and, under this application, the amount of debt admitted at that date without any scrutiny, and which was known as the Registered debt, had been liquidated by May, 1804. But, besides the amount of debt so discharged, claims to a much greater extent had been advanced. These had been submitted to examination before a committee which was formed at Madras, the operations of which continued from 1785 to 1791. They allowed some of the demands brought before them, but left the far larger number for further investigation; and there the matter rested. When the entire revenues of the Carnatic were assumed by the Company's Government, it was considered but just to take the incumbrances along with them, and to pay off all valid demands upon the former Administration. An engagement to this end was concluded between the Company and the creditors in July 1805, and commissioners to make a settlement were nominated. In the year following, an act of parliament was passed for enabling the commissioners acting in execution of an agreement made between the East India Company and the private creditors of the Nabobs of the Carnatic the better to carry the same into effect.²

The engagement thus legalized by the Legisla-

¹ Vol. v. p. 36.

² Parliamentary Debates, April 14th and 16th, 1806. In moving for leave to bring in the bill, Mr. Hobhouse gave a full and perspicuous history of the arrangements which had been made for the liquidation of these debts.

ture provided that a fixed annual sum (3,40,000 pagodas, or £136,000) should be set apart from the revenues of the Carnatic for the payment of all such debts as should be admitted to be just and valid by commissioners appointed in England for their adjudication, assisted by similar commissioners at Madras; whose duty it should be to collect information and evidence, both oral and documentary, for transmission to the commissioners at home, in whom alone the power of final admission or rejection was vested: and, in order that the Indian commissioners might be as free as possible from all motives of local interest or influence, it was agreed that they should be appointed by the Governor-General, and that they should be selected from the Civil service of Bengal. Accordingly, at the period under review, three commissioners, who were members of the Bengal Civil service, were sitting at Madras to investigate the demands of persons claiming to be creditors of the Nawabs of Arcot, and producing bonds and other vouchers asserted to have been originally granted by those princes in acknowledgment of actual loans or real pecuniary obligations.

The long interval which had elapsed since the investigation of the Carnatic debts had been commenced, and the prospect which the present arrangement encouraged of their being ultimately paid, had not only protracted the existence of those vouchers which were of unimpeachable authenticity, but had prompted the fabrication of a vast mass of fictitious documents¹ in evidence of unreal transac-

¹ The extent of these forgeries and fabrications is shown by the result.

BOOK I. tions. It was not an easy task to discriminate
 CHAP. V. between the false and the true bonds; and the

1808. former, having long passed from hand to hand without question, had become, in the ordinary course of transfer, the property of individuals wholly unconnected with the original fraud, and entertaining no doubt of the goodness of the security. Many bonds of large amount had come very honestly into the possession of persons of rank and influence in the society of Madras, who were naturally and excusably interested in establishing the validity of deeds upon which their fortunes mainly depended. When, therefore, the commissioners from Bengal, early in 1808, entered upon their office at Madras, they found the difficulties, inseparable from the nature of their duty and the novelty of their position, aggravated by the opposition which they encountered. In this situation they gladly availed themselves of any assistance which offered a reasonable chance of affording them the information they were appointed to obtain; and they were fully justified in attaching consideration to the advice and opinions of a native named Reddy Rao, as he had been the principal accountant in the financial office of the late Nawab of Arcot, and was fully informed of the extent and character of the claims upon his master, and as he was a man of ability and had always been reputed respectable and honest.

Shortly after this selection had been made, a bond held by Reddy Rao himself came under the

The final report of the Carnatic commissioners, dated March 1830, states the amount originally claimed to have been above thirty millions sterling (£30,404,919 1s. 3½d.) The amount allowed was little more than two millions and a half (£2,686,148 12s. 8¾d.)

inspection of the commissioners. Its authenticity was challenged by Avadanam Papia, another native creditor. The commissioners, upon investigating the charge, pronounced the bond of Reddy Rao genuine, and prosecuted the witnesses Papia had brought forward, for perjury. Papia had the start of them, and carried his accusation of forgery before a magistrate, who committed Reddy Rao for trial. Regarding the prosecution as a mere trick intended to deprive them of essential assistance, the commissioners appealed to the Government of Madras; and upon their representations, and at their request, the law officers of the Company were ordered to conduct the defence of Reddy Rao. This measure and the proceedings against Papia filled all classes of creditors with alarm, inasmuch as the appearance of Government as a party in opposition to their claims, was calculated to deter the natives from giving any testimony which they might think unacceptable to the superior authorities, and might deprive the claimants in many instances of the only means by which they could substantiate their demands. Great excitement spread throughout the settlement; and many individuals, of high rank in the service and much consideration in society, inveighed vehemently against an arrangement which was attributed to the partiality and prejudices of the Governor. The Government persisted, and with reason; for no good cause could be assigned why the commissioners should be debarred from the aid of the legal advisers of the state. But, not satisfied

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BOOK I. of ill-timed and injudicious severity towards individuals were adopted, which had the appearance of
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a determination to substitute intimidation for inquiry. Indignant at the impediments which had been thrown in the way of the commissioners, the Government dismissed the magistrate, Mr. Maitland, by whom Reddy Rao had been committed; required Mr. Parry, a merchant residing at Madras, who had taken a conspicuous part in the opposition to the acts of the commission, to return immediately to Europe; and removed Mr. Roebuck, a civilian of long standing, from the situation he filled at the Presidency, to an office of inferior rank and emolument in the provinces, where he shortly afterwards died. In these manifestations of the displeasure of the Government undue and unnecessary rigour was exhibited. The opposition may have originated in interested motives, and may have been intemperate and indecorous; but some consideration might have been reasonably entertained for the feelings which the dread of loss of property could not fail to inspire, and the virulence of which would have been corrected by the steady perseverance of the commissioners in the calm and impartial performance of their functions. It was not in the power of any combination to defeat, however it might retard, the objects of the commission; and, although entitled to the support of the Government, it needed not its wrathful and vindictive interposition. The interference of authority also in this stage of the business, whilst proceedings in the highest court of judicature were pending, was, to say the least, exceedingly ill-timed, as it afforded a specious plea for

accusing the Government of a design to obstruct the administration of justice.

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The trial of Reddy Rao took place: the Chief Justice pronounced an elaborate judgment in his favour; the jury found him guilty. A new trial was moved for, but the decision was postponed; and in the mean time an indictment for perjury was preferred against a person named Batley, the English translator and secretary of the Nawab, and one of the witnesses on behalf of Reddy Rao. It was in fact a second trial of Reddy Rao, as it involved the question of the spuriousness of his bond. A verdict unfavourable to his cause was given by a special jury, in the conviction of the defendant.

A third trial was held: Reddy Rao was charged with having paid a debt due to another native with a forged bond, knowing it to be forged; and he was again found guilty by the jury. The Chief Justice, strongly persuaded of his innocence and of that of Batley, suspended delivery of the sentence, and referred the evidence through the Board of Controul to the King, recommending the defendants to his Majesty, "not as the objects of his mercy, but as suitors for his justice; conceiving prosecutions to be the King's, and that a greater evil could scarcely happen to society than that they should be suffered to become, by whatever means, the successful engines of wrong."¹ Necessarily guided by the opinions of the Chief Justice, the pardon of the Crown was granted; but before it reached Madras the chief actor in the scene had ceased to be amenable to

¹ Two letters from Sir Thomas Strange, 27th Feb. and 4th May, 1809, to the Right Honourable R. Dundas.—Parliamentary Papers, Carnatic debts.

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human judgment: Reddy Rao poisoned himself in little more than a twelvemonth after his last trial. He had not long continued, after that event, to enjoy the confidence of the commissioners. Suspicion was awakened: it was discovered that he was deeply implicated in the issue of the fabricated securities, and in other frauds upon the Nawab's treasury; and the very bond, the genuineness of which had been so tenaciously upheld by the commissioners, was reported by them to their fellow commissioners in London a forgery. The result was little calculated to gain credit or favour for the Governor of Madras, who, in his eagerness to maintain unimpaired the powers of the commissioners, had thrown the whole weight of his authority into the same scale with an impostor and a cheat; and, in defence of a knave, had inflicted on men of character and honour penury and disgrace, because in protecting valuable interests they had been betrayed into indiscretion and intemperance.¹

However inveterate the mutual ill-will which was engendered by these proceedings, they were far exceeded in intensity and importance by the dissensions which about the same time broke out between the Governor of Madras and a large division of the army. Before entering upon an account of the lamentable consequences attending them, it will be

¹ The best authenticated accounts of these proceedings are to be found in the papers printed for Parliament, 3rd May and 11th June, 1811, relating to the Carnatic debts. Ex-parte statements, which agree as to the main facts, are to be met with in the Parliamentary papers referred to: also in Marsh's Review of Sir G. Barlow's Administration; London, 1812: Exposure of the Misrepresentations and Calumnies in Marsh's Review; London, 1813: Short Narrative of the Late Trials, &c.; London, 1810: Correspondence of Messrs. Abbott, Parry, and Maitland, with the Court of Directors; London, 1813: and in other pamphlets.

advisable to notice the political occurrences by which they were preceded.

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The mutual dissatisfaction which had long subsisted between the Raja of Travancore and the British Government has been already adverted to. Towards the end of 1808 the subsidy which the Raja was bound to pay had fallen into a long arrear, and the Resident peremptorily demanded its liquidation. The Raja and his principal minister protested that the revenues of Travancore were incapable of supporting so heavy a burthen as the charge of four battalions of Company's troops, and required their reduction. The Resident replied by insisting on the dismissal of an imperfectly disciplined body of infantry in the Raja's service, called the Carnatic Brigade, as a useless and expensive corps, the discontinuance of which would obviate all difficulty regarding the subsidy. The Carnatic Brigade was looked upon by the Raja as an essential part of his dignity, and indispensable to his personal safety; and the proposal to disband it was treated as a preliminary step to the seizure of the Raja's person, and the annihilation of his authority. Appeals were made by the Raja to the Governments of Madras and Bengal, in which he asserted that the treaty of 1805 had been forced upon him; that he had been intimidated into its execution by the menaces of the Resident; and that the expense which it entailed upon the revenues of his principality were beyond their means of defraying it.¹ These assertions were denied by the Resident.

¹ An opinion seems to have prevailed that the difficulty in the realisation of the subsidy arose from the refusal of the Company's Government to

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Besides the cause of discontent arising out of the subsidy, which was common to the Raja and his counsellors, his Dewan or prime minister, Vailu Tambi, had personal grounds for fear and resentment. Considering him to be the chief instigator of the Raja's backwardness in fulfilling his pecuniary engagements, the Resident had insisted upon his removal from his situation, and the appointment of a minister more submissive to British controul. The Dewan professed himself willing to resign whenever a successor should be appointed; but, under cover of his pretended acquiescence in the Resident's will, he set himself to work to organise an insurrection of the Nairs, the martial population of Malabar, and to accomplish the murder of the Resident, whom he hated as the scourge of his country, and his own avowed and inexorable foe.

receive payment in pepper, agreeably to the terms of the original treaty; but, which having fallen in value, a money payment was demanded. In Sir Thomas Munro's examination before the Committee of the House of Commons in April, 1813, he was asked, "Have you not heard that the Raja originally entered into the treaty with great reluctance, and received our troops into his dominions, for the payment of which the pepper was agreed to be delivered?" his reply was, "I have not so heard." The notion may, perhaps, be traced to the Asiatic Annual Register for 1809, in which this account of the alteration from payment in pepper to that in money is assigned as a cause of the discontent of the Raja and subsequent disturbances. The statement is nevertheless erroneous. In the first correspondence with the Raja in 1788, the option of paying the subsidy in pepper or money was offered to him: he chose the latter. In 1793, a contract was entered into with him for the purchase of pepper for eight years, wholly unconnected with the subsidy. In 1795, an article of the treaty provided for the perpetuity of the pepper contract, subject to such modifications as should from time to time be agreed upon; but there was no stipulation that its price should form part payment of the subsidy. No allusion to such payment is contained in the treaty of 1805. The original contract provides that the pepper shall be paid for in goods; and, should they leave a balance, that should be paid in money. The commercial and political engagements were throughout distinct, and no complaint occurs in the correspondence on this account. The main ground of contention was the Carnatic Brigade.

He prevailed upon the Dewan of the Raja of Cochin to join him in the plot; and, giving encouragement to some French adventurers from the Isle of France who had landed from an Arab vessel on the coast of Malabar, spread abroad a report that a large French army was about to come to assist him to expel the English. He also wrote circular letters to the neighbouring Rajas to summon them to combine for the defence of their religion, which he affirmed the English designed to overthrow. His instigations were effectual: arms were collected, and the people were prepared secretly for their use. The popular excitement became known to the Resident, and at his request reinforcements were ordered to Travancore. His Majesty's 12th regiment and two native battalions were directed to move from Malabar; and his Majesty's 69th, and three battalions of native infantry, with artillery, were commanded to march from Trichinopoly to his succour.

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Alarmed apparently by these precautionary measures, the Dewan professed his readiness to resign immediately if his personal safety were guaranteed, and arrangements were made for his private removal from Alepi to Calicut on the night of the 28th of December. On that same night a body of armed men surrounded the house of the Resident. He had retired to rest, but was awakened by the indistinct noise of the approaching multitude; and, going to the window to discover the cause, was fired at by the assailants. Before an entrance could be forced, Colonel Macaulay, with a confidential servant, had time to hide themselves in a lower cham-

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ber, the door of which could not be easily distinguished from the exterior wall. The insurgents, having broken into the house, sought for the object of their vengeance throughout the night in vain. At daybreak they beheld a vessel under British colours entering the port, and other ships were discernible at a little distance making for the harbour. They now thought only of their own retreat, and hastily quitted the premises; affording Colonel Macaulay an opportunity of making his escape and taking refuge on board the vessel, which proved to be a transport with part of the reinforcement from Malabar. The more important division from Trichinopoly had been countermanded, the Madras Government giving ready credence to the simulated submission of the Dewan. The news of the insurrection obliged them to repeat their first directions, and in the middle of January the Trichinopoly force commenced its advance under the command of the Honourable Colonel St. Leger.

Before he was joined by the principal reinforcements from Malabar, Colonel Chalmers, commanding the subsidiary troops cantoned at Quilon, had commenced offensive operations. On the 30th of December he learnt that great numbers of armed Nairs had collected at a residence belonging to the minister, at no great distance to the north of the cantonments; and that an equally numerous body had assembled at Parúr, about ten miles to the south. His measures were promptly taken. Five companies of the 1st battalion of the 4th regiment of native infantry, with a field-piece, were detached to occupy a low hill commanding the Dewan's resi-

dence. They had scarcely reached the spot when they were attacked by the enemy in numbers greatly superior, but they maintained their ground during the night; and, being strengthened by the two flank companies of the 13th N. I. at day-break, they advanced against the Nairs, defeated them, and took possession of the house, with two brass and four iron guns, with which it had been converted into a temporary battery. Information being received that a body of the enemy above four thousand strong were advancing along the coast from the north, the detachment commanded by Major Hamilton proceeded to meet them. They were encountered at the estuary of the Kaladi river, where some had crossed the bar, while the Carnatic Brigade was drawn up on the other side of the stream. Those who had crossed were attacked and compelled to retreat, but the main body stood firm; while a strong division ascended the river, in order to pass it higher up and get into the rear of the British. At the same time news arrived that the force from the south, estimated at more than ten thousand men, was rapidly advancing, and it was judged prudent to recall the detachment to the cantonment. The retreat of the troops gave courage to the insurgents.

The increasing numbers and confidence of the Nairs obliged Colonel Chalmers to remain on the defensive at Quilon, where he was reinforced early in January by his Majesty's 12th regiment under Colonel Picton. On the other hand, the Dewan, having concentrated his forces, amounting to between twenty and thirty thousand men, with eighteen guns, advanced to Quilon, and on the 15th of

BOOK I. January attacked the British lines, defended by one
 CHAP. V. European regiment and three battalions of Sipahis.

1809. The action began at six in the morning; the enemy occupying a rising ground, from which their guns opened a fire on the British encampment. Leaving the 4th native infantry to cover the camp, Colonel Chalmers formed the rest of his troops in two columns, the right under Colonel Picton, the left under Major Hamilton, and led them against the Travancore force. A stout resistance was encountered, and a division of the enemy attempted at the same time to storm the camp. They were repulsed, and, after a conflict of five hours' duration, the whole were driven off the field, leaving seven hundred slain, and losing fifteen pieces of artillery. The British loss was comparatively trifling.

Thus foiled in his attempt upon Quilon, the Dewan directed a considerable division of his followers against what, promised to be an easier prey,—the post of Cochin, which was held by Major Hewitt with two companies of the 12th regiment, and six of the 1st battalion of the 17th native infantry. The enemy advanced on the 19th of January to the attack in three masses, each a thousand strong: the one on the left was met, charged, and routed. The victors then fell upon the other two bodies, which opposed a more resolute resistance, but were forced to give way. Desisting from further engagements in the field, they spread round Cochin on the side, land and covered the sea with their boats, so as to cut off all supplies. Before this manœuvre had produced serious distress, the Piedmontese frigate, with the Resident on

board, anchored off the town; and her boats, with some small armed vessels belonging to Cochin, quickly drove the enemy's flotilla into the river, pursued, and set it on fire. The blockade was consequently raised; but the enemy still continued in overpowering numbers in the vicinity of Quilon and Cochin, and straitened the resources and checked the movements of the subsidiary force, until they were called off by the approach of danger in other directions. During this interval they disgraced their cause by acts of atrocity, which served no purpose except that of provoking retribution. An assistant-surgeon of the name of Hume, travelling at night on the 30th of January, was seized on his route, and led into the presence of the Dewan; who, although he knew the young man personally, and had benefited by his professional advice, commanded him to be conducted to the seaside, where he was put to death and buried in the sand. About the same time a small vessel, with some of the soldiers of the 12th regiment on board, having touched at Alepi for supplies, the men were induced to land by the appearance of cordiality among the people, and assurances that part of the subsidiary force was in the neighbourhood. Unaware that hostilities had commenced, the men, thirty in number, disembarked, and as soon as they landed were made prisoners, and shortly afterwards murdered. This was also done by order of the Dewan, who thus effaced, by his perfidy and cruelty, whatever credit he might have claimed for zeal in the cause of his country and his prince.

Finding it no longer possible to avoid the cost of

BOOK I. military operations, the Government of Fort St.
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George resolved to act with vigour, especially as the advancing season of the year admitted not of further loss of time. Colonel Cuppage, commanding in Malabar, was ordered to enter the province of Cochin from the north, and join Colonel Chalmers, with his Majesty's 80th regiment and two battalions of native infantry; and Colonel St. Leger was directed to march immediately from Trichinopoly, with a force composed of his Majesty's 69th regiment, a regiment of native cavalry, and three battalions of native infantry,¹ besides a detachment of Royal artillery, and the 3rd Ceylon or Kafri regiment, which was to join from Ceylon. Two divisions, consisting of a European regiment and a battalion of Sipahis, severally commanded by Colonel Wallace and Lieutenant-Colonel Gibbs, were stationed in the Tinnivelly district and the vicinity of Wynâd, to keep the Travancoreans in check, and eventually co-operate with Colonel St. Leger's force. A proclamation was issued by the Madras Government, and distributed with Colonel St. Leger's advance, ascribing the necessity of military measures to the intrigues of the minister, and declaring that "the British Government had no other view than to rescue the Raja from the influence of the Dewan, to put an end to the power of that minister, and to re-establish the connexion of the

¹ The force consisted of his Majesty's 69th; both battalions of the 3rd native infantry; 1st battalion and one company of the 2nd battalion of the 13th; five companies of the 2nd battalion of the 10th native infantry; 6th native cavalry; a detachment of artillery and pioneers; a detachment of Royal artillery; and 3rd Kafri regiment from Ceylon. But the last did not join till after the capture of the Arambuli lines.

two Governments on a secure and happy foundation. BOOK I.
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The principality of Travancore is divided from the province of Tinnivelly by the southern portion of the mountain-chain which runs nearly parallel with the coast of Malabar, from the upper part of the Peninsula to Cape Comorin, and is usually known by the appellation of the Western Ghats. The mountains are lofty and covered with jungle, and present in general almost insuperable obstacles to the march of an army with baggage and artillery. The most practicable passes are situated near the southernmost extremity of the chain, where the mountains decline in elevation as they approach the sea; and through one of these, the pass of Arambuli or Aramuni, it was determined on this occasion to force an entrance into Travancore. The Arambuli pass was defended by formidable lines, consisting of a number of small redoubts, each mounting two or three guns, and connected by a strong wall of masonry. The whole extended about two miles along the sides of steep and rugged hills, and terminated at either extremity by a strongly fortified mountain flanked by impenetrable jungle. The high road from Palamkota led through the centre of the works, by a gateway which was commanded by two large circular bastions armed with several pieces of ordnance.¹ Colonel St. Leger arrived at the foot of the lines on the 6th of February; and, as the division was unequipped with a battering train, determined to attempt to carry the pass by surprise. On the night of the 10th, Major Welsh, with two com-

¹ Welsh's Military Reminiscences, vol. i. p. 288.

BOOK I. panies of the 69th, four flank and five battalion
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companies of the 3rd native infantry, quietly climbed the hill on which the southern works were erected, and, after six hours' arduous ascent, reached the foot of the wall unperceived. The ladders were planted, and the ramparts scaled, before any effective resistance could be opposed; and although a short stand was made, which was attended with some loss of life,¹ the redoubt was quickly in possession of the assailants. As soon as the day broke, the guns of the bastion were turned upon the defences of the pass, which they enfiladed; and, reinforcements being sent to Major Welsh, he was strong enough to attack the rest of the lines, and the whole of the works were speedily cleared of their defenders.

Having thus secured his entrance into Travancore, Colonel St. Leger advanced on the 17th of February into the interior; and dislodged, after a short action, a body of troops strongly posted, with nine guns, on the bank of a river near the village of Nagarköil. The next march brought the troops to the forts of Udagiri and Papanavaram, which were abandoned: the gates were set open, the garrisons had fled, and ensigns denoting submission were seen flying in every direction. Communications were shortly afterwards received from the Dewan and from the King, breathing a pacific spirit, and deprecating the nearer approach of the troops to Trivandrum, the capital. Having referred the letter of the King to the Resident, who was at Cochin, Colonel St. Leger marched to a position half-way

¹ Captain Cunningham of the 69th was the only officer killed.

between Udagiri and Kalachi on the coast, detaching a part of his force to occupy the latter, and open a communication with Colonel Chalmers at Quilon. This officer had continued to be hemmed in by the enemy during Colonel St. Leger's advance; but, having been reinforced by part of the 19th regiment, had, shortly before the communication now opened, rid himself of his opponents. Marching out of cantonments on the 21st February in two columns, severally commanded by Colonel Picton and Colonel Stuart of the 19th, he attacked the enemy's position in front of his encampment; and although they were five thousand strong, and were defended by batteries and entrenchments, he carried the works, captured their artillery, and dispersed their force. After the action, Colonel Chalmers marched towards the capital, and arrived at the high ground within twelve miles of Trivandrum much about the same time that Colonel St. Leger took up a similar position on the opposite side. About the same period also, the division under Colonel Cuppage crossed the frontier on the north without opposition, and advanced to Parúr. The country was now completely in the possession of the British: the Nairs disbanded, and retired to their homes; the Dewan, despairing of forgiveness, fled into the thickets; and the Raja, left to himself, hastened to tender his submission, and profess his readiness to conform to any conditions which the Resident should please to dictate.

The troops being concentrated round Trivandrum, Colonel Macaulay proceeded to the capital, and concerted with the Raja the conditions on

BOOK I. which tranquillity was to be restored, and the
 CHAP. V. prince allowed to retain possession of his dominions.

1809. The terms were adjusted by the 1st of March. The Raja consented to pay the arrears of the subsidy and the expenses of the war, and eleven lakhs of rupees were paid on the former account before the expiration of the month.¹ The Carnatic Brigade, and some Nair battalions in the Raja's service, were dismissed, and the defence of the prince and of his country was entrusted exclusively to the subsidiary force. A new Dewan, supposed to be in the interest of the English, and recommended by the Resident, was appointed. The invading forces were withdrawn immediately upon the conclusion of the treaty: a portion of the subsidiary battalions was permanently quartered in the proximity of Trivandrum; the rest returned to their former cantonments.

The zeal of the new minister in the cause of his English friends was promptly evinced by the active measures which were instituted for the capture of his predecessor. Traces of him were discovered among the mountains; and means were devised for preventing his being supplied with the necessaries of life by the peasantry, who had hitherto ministered to his wants. Reduced to extreme distress, the Dewan made his way, as a last resource, to the Pagoda of Bhagwadi, which from ancient usage enjoyed the privileges of a sanctuary. The emis-

¹ The Madras Government proposed that the guns and stores captured by the troops should become public property upon the payment to the army of their value, which should be charged to the Raja. The Government of Bengal justly objected to this double penalty, and directed the stores to be paid for by the Madras Government.—Appendix 43, Second Report of Select Committee, May, 1810; and MS. Records.

saries of the minister, although Hindus, disregarded the sanctity of the temple, forcibly entered it, and broke open the door of the chamber to which Vailu Tambi and his brother had retreated. As they entered the apartment, the Dewan was found expiring of wounds inflicted by his own hand, or, at his entreaty, by the hand of his brother, to save him from falling alive into the power of his unrelenting foes. The brother was seized, taken to Quilon, and hanged in front of the 12th regiment, drawn out to witness his execution, as an accessory in the murder of their comrades. The body of the Dewan was carried to Trivandrum, and exposed upon a gibbet, amidst, it was said, the acclamations of the people.

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The vindictive measures which were thus adopted by the Resident were defended by him upon the plea of their being no more than a just retribution for the foul treachery and sanguinary cruelty of the Dewan and his brother.¹ The Government of Bengal admitted the defensibility of the summary execution of the latter, upon the understanding that he had been implicated in the murder of Mr. Hume and the British soldiers; but condemned, in terms of merited reprehension, the vengeance which had pursued the crimes of the Dewan beyond his life. The ends of justice and the purposes of public security were attained, the Governor-General remarked, by the death of the Dewan; and the prosecution of a vindictive policy, when the object of it

¹ Beside Dr. Hume, and the men of the 12th, Vailu Tambi was accused of having put to death three thousand native Christians, charged with no crime but their religion.

BOOK I. had ceased to exist, was repugnant to the feelings
CHAP. V.
 1809. of common humanity and the principles of a civilized Government. He further observed, that although ostensibly the act of the Raja, yet it would not be believed by the public that it had not the Resident's sanction, and did not originate in his advice; and that had it been the Raja's act, with a view to impress upon the British Government the notion that he had not participated in the treachery of his minister, yet a sentiment of just abhorrence of the measure itself, and a regard for the reputation of the British Government, should have induced the Resident to prevent the exposure, or, if anticipated, to have publicly proclaimed his disapprobation.

The proceedings in Travancore were, in truth, among the least justifiable of the many questionable transactions by which the British power in India has been acquired or preserved. The protection of the Raja was, in the first instance, generous and politic; the military command of his country, subsequently, was necessary for objects of British policy, and was not incompatible with the pacific interests of the Raja and prosperity of his limited dominion. To impose upon him the maintenance of a force infinitely more numerous than was necessary for the defence of the country, and the cost of which heavily taxed its resources; to urge the exaction with unrelenting rigour; and to resent with unpitiful vengeance the passions excited by a deep sense of national wrong among a semi-barbarous and demoralised race,—were unworthy of the character of the British nation for justice and gene-

rosity, of the civilization it had attained, and the religion it professed.

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Notwithstanding the severities exercised upon the leaders of the late rising, and the submission which the irresistible superiority of the British arms had compelled, the spirit of disaffection after a while revived, and in less than two years the new Dewan was suspected of being concerned in a plot directed against the British authority. He had also suffered the payment of the subsidy again to fall into arrear, and improvement in this respect was not to be expected from the increasing infirmities and imbecility of the Raja. Under these circumstances, the Government of Bengal considered itself empowered by the fifth article of the treaty of 1805 to assume the management of the country, but suspended the final adoption of the arrangement until it should become unavoidable. Its necessity became apparent at last even to the Raja; and the new Resident, Colonel John Munro, at his request and with the authority of the British Government, took upon himself the administration of the principality as the minister of the Raja, or Dewan.¹ The condition of Travancore unquestionably required the intervention of a stronger and wiser controul. The Raja was a cypher: the Dewan usurped the whole power, and

¹ We have Colonel Munro's own statement that he accepted the office of Dewan at the request of the Raja. In answer to questions put to him, he states, "The treaty authorized the general interference of the British Government; but I assumed the charge of the administration at the express request of the Raja, with the authority of the British Government." And to the question, whether it was completely voluntary on the part of the Raja, he replies, "It was at the earnest request of the Raja."—Evidence of Colonel Munro; Select Committee of House of Commons, March, 1832. Hamilton therefore is wrong in stating that the arrangement took place under the Raja's successor.—Description of Hindostan, ii. 317.

BOOK I. employed it to defraud the prince and oppress the
 CHAP. V. people. Inadequate as were the resources to the

1810. public exigencies, the country laboured under the severest fiscal exaction: justice there was none, and a general state of disorganization prevailed. The judicious regulations introduced by Colonel Munro restored order, secured the administration of justice, and, whilst they liquidated the debt, and discharged the stipulated payments with punctuality, they more than doubled the revenues of the Raja, and in a still greater proportion lightened the burthens of his subjects.¹ The Raja died in 1812. He was succeeded by his sister, such being the order of inheritance among the Nairs of Travancore. Under the government of this lady, and the regency of her successor, Colonel Munro officiated as Dewan until the year 1814; when he restored the management of the state to a native Dewan, extricated from its embarrassments, with a greatly augmented revenue, and in a situation of complete internal tranquillity.²

¹ Evidence above referred to: also Extracts from Colonel Munro's Report to the Madras Government in 1818, quoted by Mr. Jones; App. Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons; Political, 4to. ed., p. 287. In three years, Colonel Munro, beside the current subsidy, "succeeded in paying eighteen lakhs of rupees due to the Company, and nearly six to individuals; in abolishing the most oppressive monopolies and taxes, and in settling the affairs of the country on the principles of justice and humanity." The land revenue was increased from nine to fifteen lakhs; the duty received from the tobacco monopoly, from five to eleven lakhs; and that on salt, from thirty thousand rupees, to two lakhs and thirty thousand: but, to the relief of the people, as many oppressive taxes and all illegal exactions were abolished.

² For the military transactions in Travancore, see Secret Letter from Fort St. George printed in the Second Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, App. 43; Madras Papers, 15th March, 1811, p. 15; Letter from the Court, 29th Sept. 1809, printed Parl. Papers, 22nd June, 1813, No. 10; Welsh's Military Reminiscences; the Asiatic Annual Register, vol. xi. History, ch. 3; and the General Orders of Government in the

Although the Raja of Cochin had abstained from actual hostilities and died during their continuance, not without suspicion of having fallen a victim to his unwillingness to engage in them, yet the participation of his minister in the projects of the Dewan of Travancore, which was unequivocally established, subjected the Raja's successor to the displeasure of the British Government. The Raja was accordingly condemned to pay a third of the expenses of the war, and to sign a new treaty, which added to the amount of his tribute the cost of a battalion of Sipahis in the field in place of his own troops, whom he was required to dismiss, beyond such as might be necessary for the collection of the revenue. As the state of his country differed little from that of Travancore, a similar system of reform was extended to Cochin, under the more immediate management of Captain Blacker, the Assistant Resident. Upon his departure Colonel Munro assumed the duty; and, under their joint superintendence, the like improvement was effected in Cochin which had been accomplished at Travancore.¹

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1803.

Whilst the Company's troops were thus employed in the coercion of refractory allies, and in extending the authority of the Government of Madras, the Governor and the Commander-in-chief engaged in a dispute which speedily involved a large portion of the Coast army in a contest with the civil power,

Chronicle of Madras Occurrences. The MS. Records have also been consulted.

¹ By the treaty of 1791 the Raja of Cochin paid a tribute of 100,000 Arcot rupees per annum. By this of the 6th May, 1699, he was compelled to pay in addition 1,76,937 Arcot rupees; making a total of 2,76,937 Arcot rupees.—*Coll. of Treaties*, 472.

BOOK I. and was productive of the most alarming and dangerous results.¹ Sir John Cradock had been suc-

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1809.

ceeded in the command of the Madras army by Lieutenant-General Hay Macdowall. The former had held, as Commander-in-chief, a seat in council: the Court of Directors had thought proper to refuse equal rank and emolument to his successors. The appeal of General Macdowall to the Court against this infringement of his dignities had been answered by the appointment of a civil servant to the vacant seat. The Commander-in-chief felt the exclusion as a personal grievance and affront, and, on the final extinction of his hopes, resigned his command; expressing his resignation in terms strongly indicative of the bitterness of his mortification and disappointment.²

¹ "The East India Company, and, I may add, the British empire in all its parts, never, I believe, was exposed to greater or more imminent danger."—Letter from Lord Minto, 15th Sept. 1809. "The late revolt of the officers of the Madras army is the most remarkable and most important event that has occurred in the history of the British Administration of India since our first acquisition of territory there. It led to the commencement of a civil war in the Carnatic; it threatened to involve the whole Peninsula in anarchy and blood; to encourage the numerous adherents of the fallen families of Tippoo, and Mohammed Ali, to insurrection; to incite the native powers to fall upon us whilst in this state of internal convulsion; and to subvert a Government which had successfully resisted the repeated attacks of the neighbouring states."—Paper accompanying Reply of Messrs. Grant and Astell to the Dissents of several Directors, &c.; Parl. Papers, 1st April, 1811, p. 45. We may be permitted now to think that this language is somewhat exaggerated.

² "The decision of the Court of Directors has placed me in so extraordinary, so unexampled, and so humiliating a predicament, that the most painful emotions have been excited; and sixteen months' experience has convinced me that it is impossible to remain with any prospect of performing my duty with credit to the East India Company, of acquiring for myself any reputation, or for doing justice to those over whom I am called to preside; divested of the power of selecting for commands by the restriction of military patronage, or of requiting the meritorious officer; deprived of the respectability which attaches in this country to a seat in council, and abridged in the usual emoluments of office."—Letter to Sir G. Barlow from the Commander-in-chief, 15th Jan. 1809; Parl. Papers, 25th May, 1810, part i. p. 8.

It has been mentioned, that, after the close of the Mahratta war, the Government of Bengal urgently pressed upon the subordinate Presidencies the necessity of extensive retrenchments. In conformity to these injunctions, various plans for reducing the military expenditure of the Presidency of Madras were suggested during the command of Sir John Cradock; some of which were acted upon, and deprived officers, in command of regiments or brigades, of different sources of emolument. These measures were naturally unpalatable to the army. The difference of military allowances between the Bengal and Madras services had long been a subject of discontent; and the assignment of commands to officers of his Majesty's regiments, in place of Company's officers, occasioned amongst the latter frequent murmurs. The personal feelings of the Commander-in-chief heightened his sympathy with the grievances of those under his command, and fostered their discontents;¹ and a state of disquietude and dissatisfaction pervaded the minds of the officers, which, as compliance with their expectations

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1808.

¹ Memorial of the Officers of the Madras Army to the Court of Directors, forwarded by the Commander-in-chief, with a Letter to the Government of Fort St. George, 23rd January, 1809. The Madras Government, viewing the sentiments expressed in the paper with extreme disapprobation, declined to transmit it to the Court until it had been laid before the Governor-General.—Parl. Papers, 25th May, 1810, No. i. p. 25. At an earlier date, 1st May, 1808, General Macdowall enumerates, as the seeds of discontent widely disseminated, the abolition of the Bazar Fund; the degradation of the military character, from the Commander-in-chief to the youngest ensign; the late reductions, and especially the abolition of the Tent Contract; and adds, "I much lament the expediency which occasioned these disgusting measures."—Extracts from Lord Minto's Letter to the Secret Committee, 6th Feb. 1810; Parl. Papers, 1st April, 1811, p. 346. The same letter supplies instances, if not of "the deliberate intention of the General to make the army an instrument of opposition and disturbance," as affirmed by Lord Minto, yet of great disposition to foment and heighten the prevailing discontents.

BOOK I. was little to be looked for, required to be allayed
CHAP. V.
 1808. by gentle management, and the avoidance of additional irritation. Unluckily, fresh occasions of excitement did occur, and that excitement was not gently dealt with.

Among the articles of retrenchment put in force by the Government of Madras was the abolition of what was known as the Tent Contract; an arrangement by which officers commanding native corps received a permanent monthly allowance, alike in cantonments as in the field, in peace as in war, on condition of their providing the men with suitable camp equipage whenever it might be required.¹ The retrenchment was originally suggested by Sir John Cradock; and he called upon Colonel John Munro, the Quarter-Master-General of the army, to report whether it was not practicable without detriment to the efficiency of the troops, and how it might best be accomplished. The report advocated the change, and submitted a mode of effecting it. The plan was approved of by Sir John Cradock, by Lord W. Bentinck, and by the Government of Bengal. It merely fell to Sir G. Barlow to carry it into execution. No share of the opprobrium was due to him, even if the measure deserved it; but, in fact, the contract was open to objections of so obvious a character, that no disinterested person could doubt the reasonableness of its abolition. The alteration was to be judged of, however, by those whose interests it affected, and in their esti-

¹ Letter from Sir John Cradock to Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, 7th Feb. 1807; and his reply, 30th June, 1807: Parl. Papers, 3rd May, 1811, p. 94.

mation it was a grievous wrong; but, unable to deny the defects of the system, or the expediency of its reform, their dissatisfaction found an excuse for its display in some unguarded expressions which occurred in the Quarter-Master-General's official report.

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1808.

The transaction of public business in India by written statements is not without its inconvenience; and one of these is, the temptation it offers to public functionaries to put upon record more than is always necessary or judicious. Such was the case with Colonel Munro. Not contented with indicating such objections as could not be disputed, he proceeded to specify others, which, although equally true in a general sense, were capable of individual application, and might be construed into an accusation that the officers in command of corps had consulted their own profit at the expense of the public service, and had appropriated the tent allowance without keeping up an adequate tent establishment.¹ The officers resented the impu-

¹ In enumerating the objections to the system, the Report specifies one of them as follows: "By granting the same allowances in peace and war for the equipment of native corps, while the expenses incidental to that charge are unavoidably much greater in war than peace, it places the interest and duty of officers commanding native corps in direct opposition to one another: it makes it their interest that their corps should not be in a state of efficiency fit for field service, and therefore furnishes strong inducements to neglect their most important duties." It would have been prudent to have omitted at least one half of this paragraph; but still, abstractedly considered, it was scarcely disputable. The measure no doubt, in theory, placed the interest and duty of the officers in opposition; but in practice it left it to be supposed that they did their duty, although their interests suffered. Unfortunately, the objections were preceded by the assertion, that "Six years' experience of the practical effects of the existing system of the camp equipage equipment of the army, and an attentive examination of its operation during that period of time, had suggested the objections." Here, therefore, was an assertion that, practically, the officers had preferred their interest to their duty: an assertion the more objectionable, as no proof was given; for, as the officers in their memorial justly replied, "If such a case

BOOK I. tation; and, although Colonel Munro earnestly dis-
 CHAP. V. claimed any intention of reflecting upon the honour
 1808. and integrity of any portion of the officers of the
 army, they refused to be appeased, and called upon
 the Commander-in-chief to bring him to a court-
 martial for aspersions on their characters as officers
 and gentlemen.

Upon the receipt of the charges against Colonel J. Munro,¹ the Commander-in-chief hesitated whether he should admit them, and referred the question for the opinion of the Judge-Advocate-General, who, after discussing the circumstances of the case, came to the conclusion that the charges were such as the accusers had no right to agitate or prefer.² The officers acquiesced in the decision, and solicited a suspension of the direct charge; substituting in its place a memorial to the Court of Directors, praying them to investigate the subject.³ Previously, however, to his being apprised of their change of purpose, General Macdowall had also viewed the matter

had occurred, why was it not noticed at the time?" They had reason to be offended; but still, as the offence grew out of an indiscreet mode of propounding undeniable generalisations, and was evidently not designed to apply to any particular case, they might have been satisfied with a declaration to that effect, and would no doubt have been so contented, had not an infectious irritability perplexed their sober judgments.—Parl. Papers, 3rd May, 1811, p. 96; ditto, 1st April, 1811, p. 65; ditto, 25th May, 1810, p. 13.

¹ See the charges, Parl. Papers, 25th May, 1810, p. 13.

² Letter from Colonel Leith, Judge-Advocate-General, to the Adjutant-General, 7th Nov. 1808; Parl. Papers, May, 1810, p. 17.

³ The memorial is printed, Parl. Papers, 3rd May, 1811, p. 79. The officers say, "Finding the mode (of court-martial) was considered by the Judge-Advocate-General to be irregular and ineffectual, they respectfully abide by that opinion for the present, and have solicited a suspension of the direct charge against the individual, whilst they have appealed to the candour and justice of the Court." The Government refused to forward it, as the question was considered to be settled: the Court disapproved of the refusal to transmit the memorial.—Parl. Papers, May, 1810, p. 13.

in a new light, and had determined that the charge should be entertained. On the eve of his quitting Madras, he placed Colonel Munro under arrest, to be brought to trial by the succeeding Commander-in-chief;¹ having, as he declared, received an opinion of much importance, in expectation of which he had suspended his decision. From what quarter this opinion proceeded is nowhere stated.

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It appears, however, that, in the interval that had elapsed since the charge was first brought forward, circumstances had occurred, which, in the state of the Commander-in-chief's feelings, were possibly not without some influence upon his determination. Major Blacker, of the Quarter-Master-General's department, was ordered to join the force in Travancore. Another officer, Captain Macdowall, who had been formerly employed in the province, remonstrated against the arrangement, and urged his own preferable claims. His pretensions were supported by the Commander-in-chief, who requested that the appointment might be reconsidered. This was on the 16th of January. On the 18th the Government of Madras declined to revise the nomination, reprimanded Captain Macdowall for the tone of his application, and threatened to remove him from the office he held. On the 20th Colonel Munro was placed under arrest; the effect of which was to compel the Government to revoke Major Blacker's appointment, as the temporary removal of his superior rendered his presence indispensable at the Presidency.² The close concurrence of these

¹ Parl. Papers, 25th May, 1810, p. 14.

² *Ibid.* p. 9.

BOOK I. events suggests the possibility of their connexion,
CHAP. V. and the likelihood that matters of comparative in-
 1809. significance, magnified into mischievous importance
 by the passions of the individuals interested, contri-
 buted to occasion the transactions which ensued.

As soon as Colonel Munro was made aware of the decision of the Commander-in-chief, he appealed to the Government, under whose authority he had acted, and by whom the measures he had recommended had been approved and adopted. This appeal was in the first instance forwarded through the Commander-in-chief; but, upon his refusing to be the channel of its transmission, it was addressed direct to the Governor in Council.

The subject of the communication was referred to the chief civil and military advisers of the Government, the Judge-Advocate-General and the Advocate-General, and fortified by their joint opinions that it was bound to protect the advisers of measures which it had made its own, the Government exercised the power with which it was intrusted by the Legislature; and, having first in vain requested, next commanded General Macdowall to release Colonel Munro from his arrest.¹ The tenor of the Commander-in-chief's commission subjected him so explicitly to the authority of the Governor in Council, that he was under the necessity of yielding obedience, protesting against what he designated as an undue interference. Nor was he satisfied with this expression of his indignation: on the eve of his embarkation for England he directed the publication of a General Order, in which he announced that his

¹ See the whole correspondence, Parl. Papers, 25th May, pp. 12—24.

departure alone prevented him from bringing Colonel Munro to trial for disrespect to the Commander-in-chief, for disobedience of orders, and for contempt of military authority, in having resorted to the power of the Civil Government in defiance of the judgment of the officer at the head of the army, who had placed him under arrest on charges preferred against him by a number of officers commanding native corps; in consequence of which appeal direct to the Honourable the President in Council, Lieutenant-General Macdowall had received a positive order from the chief secretary to liberate Lieutenant-Colonel Munro from arrest : and the order proceeded to stigmatize the conduct of Colonel Munro as destructive of subordination, subversive of military discipline, a violation of the sacred rights of the Commander-in-chief, and a most dangerous example to the service. General Macdowall therefore thought it incumbent on him, in support of the dignity of the profession, and his own station and character, to express his strong disapprobation of Colonel Munro's unexampled proceedings, and reprimanded him accordingly.¹

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Thus far the Government of Madras had acted with a degree of calmness and forbearance which derived additional lustre from the contrast which it offered to the violence of the Commander-in-chief. Instead of interposing to heal the wounds which the needless sensitiveness of the officers had suffered from the incautious but indefinite language of an official report, and which a few words of explanation

¹ General Orders by the Commander-in-chief, head-quarters, 28th Jan. 1809.—Parl. Papers, 25th May, 1810, p. 28.

BOOK I. from the writer, supported by their own good sense
CHAP. V. and the mediation of their common superior, must
1809. have convinced them were more imaginary than real,
General Macdowall echoed and aggravated their
complaints, and, mixing up their grievances with his
own, employed them as instruments with which to
assail the Government in the person of one of its
most meritorious and efficient servants. For the
Government of Madras to have allowed Colonel
Munro to fall a sacrifice to interested clamour or per-
sonal resentment on account of its own acts, would
have forfeited for ever its claim to the respect of its
subordinates. The opinions of Colonel Munro had
been called for by those who were entitled to de-
mand them, and so enjoined, it was his duty to state
his honest convictions without reserve. These con-
victions were pronounced by the Commander-in-
chief of the day to be his own; and the Madras
Government, the Government of Bengal, and the
Court of Directors all concurred in their justice
and truth, and took them as the principles of their
public acts. The responsibility of the subordinate
ceased when the supreme power — one acknow-
ledging no responsibility to its own servants—deter-
mined to identify his counsels with its own decrees;
and its decrees would have been issued in vain, if the
counsels which suggested them were to expose any
one of its instruments to be degraded and punished
by another. There can be no question, therefore,
that the Government of Madras was bound to shield
the Quarter-Master-General from the anger of the
Commander-in-chief; and that it was legally em-
powered so to interpose, was substantiated by the

enforced submission of the latter. His threats of what he would have done if he had remained, were like the fast-retiring wave of the Madras surf wasting itself in impotent foam and fury upon the beach.

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It happened, unfortunately for the character of the Madras Government and the tranquillity of the settlement, that, departing from the calm assertion of its own powers, and the dignified attitude it had hitherto held, the Government precipitated itself into a career of recriminatory and vindictive acts. Instead of regarding the general order of the Commander-in-chief as the idle ebullition of an angry spirit, the influence of which was neutralised by its own intemperance; instead of taking time to weigh deliberately the probable results of engaging in an angry contest; the Government instantly promulgated a public order¹ of scarcely less exceptionable phraseology, charging General Macdowall with having given utterance to insinuations grossly derogatory to the character of the Government, and subversive of military discipline and of the foundations of public authority, and with having on that and other recent occasions been guilty of violent and inflammatory proceedings, and of acts of outrage: accusations not wholly borne out by facts, even if it had been decorous to proclaim them. Taking advantage also of the non-reception of General Macdowall's formal resignation, the order cancelled his appointment, and removed him from the station of Commander-in-chief of the forces of Fort St. George: a somewhat superfluous mode of displeasure, as General Mac-

¹ The Commander-in-chief's order was not published till the 30th of Jan. The order of the Government is dated the 31st.

BOOK I. dowall was on board the ship which was to convey
 CHAP. V. him to England ; a destination he was not permitted
 1809. to reach, the vessel being lost at sea on the voyage.

If the Madras Government had vindicated its authority in more temperate language, and directed that the offensive order of the General should be expunged from the order-books of the army, it would have better preserved its consistency and secured its triumph. Had its indignation been allowed to expire with the cause which had provoked it, few would have been disposed to call its proceedings seriously into question ; and after a short period the superficial and inconsequential ferment, in the activity of which the Commander-in-chief was so vital an element, would have subsided. Unhappily, it was thought that enough had not been done to vindicate the authority and dignity of the Government. Measures were adopted which irritated the passions of the army more than anything that had yet occurred, and infused into the quarrel feelings of personal rancour, by which it had not yet been generally embittered. The order of the Government, which has been just described, concluded by suspending from the service of the Company Major Boles, the Deputy-Adjutant-General, for having signed and circulated the general order of the departing Commander-in-chief in the absence of his immediate superior, who had accompanied General Macdowall on board ship. Colonel Capper, the Adjutant-General, avowed himself responsible for the circulation of the order, and was included in the same penalty.¹ It was to no

¹ General Orders of the Government of Fort St. George, 31st Jan. and 1st Feb., 1809 ; Parl. Papers, 25th May, 1810, p. 29.

purpose that these officers pleaded the merely ministerial character of their duties, and the obligation, imposed upon them by military discipline, of executing the orders of the Commander of the forces. It was argued by the Government, that, by giving authenticity and currency to a paper which they could not but be aware was in the highest degree disrespectful to the Government, they were acting in direct violation of their duty to the latter, and thereby knowingly committed an illegal act, connected with views of the most reprehensible nature, which no authority could justify, and that they therefore deserved the punishment they had incurred. Colonel Capper sailed for England, and, like his superior, perished on the passage. To Major Boles it was intimated, that, if he acknowledged his error, the sentence might be mitigated; but he refused to admit that he had done wrong, and the penalty was enforced.

It is very possible that the Adjutant-General and his deputy were more inclined to take part with their military than with their civil superior, that they shared in the prevailing discontent, and that they were not unwilling instruments in the issuing of the offensive order. Still, the plea of military subordination was a plausible excuse, and one which was calculated to find favour with military men. It might be correct, as afterwards argued by the Judge-Advocate-General, that, even in the case of military men, the illegal commands of a superior are invalid; but then comes the question, by whom is the illegality to be determined? Nothing can justify disobedience of orders but the most unequi-

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vocal and universal recognition of the illegality; and, wherever a doubt is admissible, obedience is the safer course. That General Macdowall's order was illegal is a proposition by no means so self-evident as to obtain immediate and implicit assent, and was little likely to be so esteemed in the actual state of military feeling at Madras. It was possible, therefore, that those who obeyed it did not consider it to be illegal; and, although they saw that it was disrespectful, they did not hold their interpretation of its tenor to that extent only to be a sufficient reason for disobeying the positive commands of the Commander-in-chief.¹ At any rate,

¹ Major Boles avers that he does not consider the order illegal or directed against the Government, and that many officers of rank and experience in the King's and Company's services concurred with him in concluding it to be exclusively applicable to Colonel Munro.—Parl. Papers, 25th May, 1810, i. 37. General Maitland, at the time Governor of Ceylon, in an elaborate examination of the subject, maintains that there was no proof of the ministerial officers being aware of the illegality of the order, and that, if Major Boles erred, he erred on the right side; that the military law was completely positive on one side, and perfectly indefinite on the other; and that he followed a course vindicated by many precedents, instead of one for which no precedent could be pleaded.—Parl. Papers, 25th May, 1810, No. vi. p. 158. Although the Supreme Government considered the general order of General Macdowall to be of a seditious character, and that the Adjutant-General and his deputy in issuing it had become thereby guilty of sedition, (Parl. Papers, 20th May, 1810, No. iii. p. 13,) yet the Governor-General avows that the suspension of those officers gave him great uneasiness, as he anticipated that it would furnish a plausible, and to military minds a captivating, pretence for a more general combination against the Government than any of the circumstances which preceded it: that, although the merits of the question as an abstract point were clear and confident, yet they were not less likely to be questioned; and he felt assured that in the military world, which was the quarter of the greatest authority in such a controversy, the sentiment was likely to be nearly unanimous against the principle adopted by the Government of Fort St. George, whilst other opinions would be much divided.—(Parl. Papers, April, 1811, No. vi. p. 138.) The sense of the Court of Directors was still more decidedly expressed; as, immediately after the arrival of the first intelligence of the proceedings of the Madras Government, they ordered that Colonel Capper and Major Boles should be restored to the service. "As those officers were placed in a situation of difficulty, their removal from their respective emoluments on the staff would have been a sufficient mark of your displeasure, and we therefore direct that their suspension from our service be taken off."—Letter

the plea was urged in extenuation of the act, and it would have been prudent to have so accepted it; for it might easily have been foreseen, that to visit the offence with extreme punishment would excite general commiseration for the victims and unpopularity for the judge. The consequences were such as should have been anticipated. Addresses were immediately forwarded to Major Boles from all the divisions of the army, approving of his conduct, denouncing his sentence as cruel and undeserved, and proposing to raise by subscription an income equal to that of which the Government had deprived him. The type of the contest was now for the first time durably stamped upon it. Hitherto the officers of the army had felt aggrieved by the public acts of the Government: they now combined in hostility to the Governor. It was henceforward a struggle between men, rather than between principles; between Sir George Barlow and a body of officers, rather than between the Government and the army of Fort St. George.

An interval of three months had elapsed from the suspension of the officers of the Adjutant-General's department, when another general order of the Government, dated the 1st of May, announced a

from the Court, 15th Sept. 1809. When subsequent advice of the part taken by the officers in favour of Major Boles reached England, they rescinded the order and confirmed the suspension; "as it was to be inferred that he had become a rallying point for dangerous doctrines, with his own consent."—Letter from the Court, 29th Sept.; *Parl. Papers*, May, 1810, p. 13. They afterwards recur to their first view of the case, and state that they cannot discover any such inherent and obvious illegality as could justify the Adjutant or Deputy-Adjutant-General in refusing to obey the command they had received from Lieutenant-General Macdowall that the said order should be circulated to the army. "We therefore continue of opinion that Major Boles ought not to have been suspended from the service."—*Military Letter from the Court of Directors*, 5th February, 1811; *Parl. Papers*, April, 1811, p. 178.

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BOOK I. sweeping list of removals, supersessions, and sus-
 CHAP. V. pensions. Four officers of rank were suspended

1809. the service; an equal number were removed from their commands or staff appointments, and four were superseded in the command of battalions: among them were Colonels St. Leger, Chalmers, and Cuppage, who had recently performed such distinguished services in Travancore.¹ The officers thus punished were accused of having signed, and influenced others to sign, an address to Major Boles of the purport above stated; and of having signed, and influenced others to sign, a memorial which it was proposed to send to the Governor-General, in which the supposed grievances of the Madras army were detailed. Some of the offenders were also charged with having signed a statement in favour of General Macdowall, and forwarded it to him at Ceylon. Copies of these documents had come into the hands of Sir George Barlow, and were communicated by him to his council, with whose concurrence the order of the 1st of May was issued.²

Although it could not be denied that the officers of the army had entered into combinations which were as decidedly incompatible with their military obligations as their subordination to the Civil Government, yet it is very questionable if the mea-

¹ General Order, 1st of May, 1809; Parl. Papers, May, 1810, 2 A. p. 22. The officers suspended were Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable Arthur St. Leger, Major John De Morgan, Captain Josiah Marshall, Captain James Grant. Removed: Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Bell, Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Chalmers, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Cuppage, Captain J. M. Coombs. Superseded: Captain Smith, Major Keasberry, Major Muirhead, and Major Haslewood.

² Minute of the President in Council, with enclosures, 1st May, 1809; Parl. Papers, May, 1810, 2 A. 3.

asures adopted were politic or necessary. The statement of General Macdowall's conduct, and the memorial to the Governor-General, had been drawn up under the influence of that excitement which existed at the time of the embarkation of the Commander-in-chief; and the address to Major Boles originated in the occurrences immediately following. The feelings so vivid in the beginning of February had in some degree begun to cool even early in March; for at that time a circular letter was addressed by the new Commander-in-chief, General Gowdie, to the officers commanding the principal divisions of the army, desiring to know whether the memorial had been circulated amongst the officers under their command, and enjoining them to be vigilant in bringing them to a sense of their duty; and it is acknowledged by Sir G. Barlow himself, that, with one exception, the replies were in general perfectly satisfactory.¹ In fact, the memorial never was sent; and it is admitted that all intention of sending it had been abandoned, when it was made the ground of punishing those who were accused of having taken an active share in its signature and circulation.²

Another objectionable feature in this proceeding was its being based on private information, a copy of the memorial having been forwarded to Sir G. Barlow through a channel which he did not wish to reveal. Its existence was farther substantiated by the testimony of some of the country-born clerks in the offices of the military department, who had been employed to transcribe various papers by some

¹ Minute last cited.

² Minute ditto.

BOOK I. of the officers particularised. Their depositions
 CHAP. V. were taken privately. Their testimony was never
 1809. communicated to the accused, and might or might
 not have been true.¹ That papers such as were de-
 scribed had been in circulation, was not improbable;
 but to what extent some of the individuals con-
 demned were implicated in their distribution, had
 not been clearly established.² Several of them de-
 nied the justice of the charge; but denial was use-
 less, and proof would have been too late. Ac-
 cusation and condemnation were simultaneous; the
 officers so summarily punished were allowed no op-
 portunity of excuse or justification. They first
 heard of the charge against them when they read
 their sentence. No wonder that such treatment
 should have added fuel to flame.

A further unfortunate circumstance distinguished
 this general order of the 1st of May. With sin-
 gular ignorance of the extent to which the same
 sentiments pervaded the Madras army, and with
 a strange unconsciousness of the sympathy which
 fellowship in service and in fortunes is so apt to
 inspire amongst classes of men and particularly
 amongst the members of the military class, the Go-
 vernment thought fit to compliment the subsidiary
 force at Hyderabad for its satisfactory and exem-
 plary conduct in having resisted all participation in

¹ The examinations are appended to the President's minute.

² The officers of the artillery, under Colonel Bell's command, made "a solemn and unequivocal declaration that he had neither directly nor indirectly countenanced or influenced the circulation of any paper of the tendency alluded to in the order of Government." Colonel St. Leger and Major De Morgan denied having taken an active part in the circulation of the memorial, or influenced others to sign it. See their memorials in the Parl. Papers.

the improper and dangerous proceedings which the order described. Nothing could have been more mischievous.¹ The officers of the Hyderabad force instantly and indignantly repudiated the distinction, and, in their eagerness to show that it was undeserved, plunged headlong into a career far more violent and indefensible than any which had yet annoyed or alarmed the Government. They immediately published a letter to the army and to the officers suspended, in which they declared their entire disapprobation of the suspension and removal of so many valuable officers from the service and from their commands; their willingness to contribute to the support of those officers; and their determination to co-operate with the army in all legal measures for the removal of the cause of the present discontent, and the restoration of their brother-officers to the honourable situations from which they had been removed.² This was followed by an address to the Governor in Council, signed by a hundred and fifty-eight officers of the divisions of Jalna and Hyderabad, urging strenuously the restoration of the removed officers as the only measure likely to prevent the possible and probable consequences which they else apprehended; namely, the separation of the civil and military, the destruction of all discipline and subordination amongst the native troops, the ultimate loss of a large portion of the British possessions in India, and the dreadful blow it would inflict on the mother country.³ In

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¹ General Orders of the Government; Parl. Papers, May, 1810, 2 A. p. 24.

² Parl. Papers, May, 1810, 2 B. p. 24. • ³ Ibid. p. 26.

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 CHAP. V. presented to Colonel Montresor, commanding the
 1809. Hyderabad force, by his officers, of a still more
 outrageous description.¹

About the same time with this manifestation of the growing sentiments of insubordination at Hyderabad, an overt act of mutiny was committed by the Company's European regiment quartered at Masulipatam. The officers of this corps had partaken in the general feelings, and had been further irritated by the indiscreet harshness with which their commanding officer had visited some imprudent expressions of those feelings in a moment of conviviality. The men were also out of humour at being occasionally drafted to serve as marines on board of the ships of war in the Bay of Bengal. A report was current amongst them that the whole corps was to be broken up in this manner; and, when an order was issued for three companies to prepare for marine duty, the men refused to obey, and the officers placed their own colonel under arrest. The command was assumed by the next in rank, a managing committee of officers was instituted, and a correspondence was opened by them with the Hyderabad and other mutinous divisions. Colonel Malcolm, who was at Madras, preparing to

¹ On the 21st of July they presented to Colonel Montresor a paper which they styled their ultimatum, but pledging themselves to remain quiet until a reply from Government should be received. In this they demanded the repeal of the orders of the 1st May, the restoration of the officers suspended or removed, the removal from their staff appointments of the officers who had been the principal advisers of the Government, and the grant of a general amnesty to the discontented. The signatures of all the officers except those on the staff were affixed to the paper, and a joint movement from Jaina and Hyderabad on Madras was projected in case their demands were not complied with.—Parl. Papers, May, 1810, 2 C. p. 29.

proceed on his mission to Persia, was dispatched to Masulipatam to restore order and subordination: he was treated with courtesy, but returned to the Presidency without accomplishing the object of his mission, and strongly impressed with the persuasion that the revocation of the Government order would alone prevent a general and fatal insurrection.¹ In fact, on the 3rd of August garrison orders directed the regiment to hold itself in readiness for field service; a plan having been concerted for the junction of the troops from Masulipatam with those from Jalna and Hyderabad, and their united march to Madras, where they threatened to compel the restoration of the officers, and to depose Sir George Barlow from the post of Governor. Luckily for all concerned, these wild and criminal projects were arrested by the seasonable interposition of the Governor-General, and the return of the most violent and rash to a recollection of their duty.

The Government of Madras had thus, by unquestionable deficiencies in temper and discretion, brought matters to a position from which it was equally dangerous to advance or recede. Several of the most distinguished of its military servants counselled the rescission of the obnoxious orders, and the restoration of the suspended officers to the service.² Such a concession might have moderated the violence of the tempest, but its efficacy in pro-

¹ Parl. Papers, May, 1810, 2 B. p. 33, and 2 C. p. 1. Colonel Malcolm subsequently published "Observations on the Disturbances of the Madras Army," in two parts; London, 1812.

² By Captain Sydenham, the Resident at Hyderabad; by Colonel Montresor, commanding the subsidiary force; and by Colonel Malcolm.—Parl. Papers.

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1809. Government had acted with inconsiderateness and injustice, and possessed neither the strength nor the spirit to assert its legitimate rights; and it would have established a dangerous precedent, and encouraged, in time to come, those who felt or fancied a grievance, to resist the will of all future administrations, and seek redress by force and intimidation. There was an end of all civil government,—of all government,—if military combination was allowed to set aside constituted authority; if the army was suffered to dictate its own laws and choose its own officers; if the weapons, with which it was intrusted to defend the state against external aggression, were aimed against those functionaries who had been appointed to guide and govern in India the civil and military servants of the Company and subjects of the Crown. Justice demands that full weight should be given to these considerations in appreciating the conduct of Sir George Barlow at this crisis. His determination to uphold at every risk the rightful claims of the Government to the obedience of the army was defensible on the grounds of the responsibility, imposed upon him by his station, of preserving undisturbed the social relations of the civil and military power under his authority, of asserting the superiority of law over force, and of maintaining inviolate the principles of the constitution, which had been assigned to the various members of the Indian empire by the Legislature of Great Britain. Nor was the hazard of actual collision so imminent or so great as it

seemed to be from the menacing attitude which a part of the army had assumed. It was but a part, and a considerable portion had not yet taken any share in their proceedings. The Commander-in-chief, and the great majority of those officers who were highest in rank and most distinguished in reputation, and whose influence with those under their command was of most importance, were staunch advocates of the principles of order and military subordination; many, who had been involved in the proceedings by the vehemence of those around them, were known to be averse to the extremes to which they were urged; and it was to be expected, that, even of those who were loudest in their denunciations, many would pause before they incurred the guilt of actual rebellion. The Government of Madras was assured of the decided support of the Government of Bengal, and had the command of the resources of that Presidency, as well as of Bombay and Ceylon. The King's regiments steadily adhered to their duty; and there could be little doubt that the native soldiery, when the case was explained to them, would prefer the cause of the Government, from whom they derived their subsistence and hopes of promotion, to that of their officers, whose objects they imperfectly understood, and from whose triumph they could anticipate no advantage. Relying on these considerations, the Government of Madras entered upon the contest with promptitude and vigour.

In order to ascertain its own strength, and discover what proportion of the officers were well-affected, and at the same time to remove the dis-

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BOOK I. affected for a season from situations where they
 CHAP. V. might exercise influence or authority, the officers

1809. generally were called upon to sign a test pledging themselves to support the measures of the Government. Letters were addressed to the commanding officers of stations, furnishing them with the proposed form of the test, and instructing them to procure to it the signatures of the officers under their command, on penalty of being removed from their regiments to stations on the sea-coast, where they would be required to reside until the situation of affairs and the temper of men's minds should allow of their being again employed.¹ As the removal was avowedly temporary, and the recusant officers were not to forfeit their pay, all appearance of unnecessary harshness was avoided, and a reasonable plea for remaining neutral was supplied to the least violent. At the same time, the commanding officers of corps were ordered to assemble the native officers, and explain to them, and through them to the Sipahis, that the discontents of the European officers were entirely personal; that the Government had no intention to diminish the advantages which the men enjoyed, but, on the contrary, was anxious to improve them, and that it confidently relied upon their attachment and fidelity.² A general order to the same effect was also promulgated, and active measures were taken to secure its circulation. The

¹ Parl. Papers, May, 1810, 2 C. p. 41. The test or declaration ran thus: "We, the undersigned officers of the Honourable Company's service, do in the most solemn manner declare, upon our word of honour as British officers, that we will obey the orders and support the authority of the Honourable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, agreeably to the tenor of the commissions which we hold from that Government."—Ibid. 2 B. p. 9.

² Parl. Papers, May, 1810, 2 A. p. 30.

Company's troops were also so distributed in connexion with his Majesty's as to render the latter an efficient check upon the former, and all the available corps of the central division of the army were concentrated in the vicinity of the seat of Government.

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The majority of the officers, even of those whose loyalty and moderation had never been doubted, declined to sign the test, and were consequently removed from their stations.¹ The appeal to the native officers and men was very generally successful. Wherever the orders of the Government reached them, they expressed their resolution to remain faithful to their vows of allegiance, and to obey no commands but such as they should receive from Government direct, or from officers whom the Government should set over them. This separation of the men from their officers was calculated to relax the reins of discipline and sow the seeds of disorganization in the native army; but the Indian soldier is of a plastic nature, which, where his own immediate interests or prejudices are not concerned, soon takes and soon parts with impressions. The only situations in which the agitation was not suppressed without recourse to more stringent correctives were Mysore and Hyderabad.

In the former of these districts, the officers of the garrison of Seringapatam, rendered desperate by the measures of the Government for separating the native soldiers from their officers, rushed into un-

¹ Observations of Sir John Malcolm, p. 32. Colonel Bannerman states that the published returns show but one hundred and fifty signatures, out of thirteen hundred officers on the strength of the Madras army.—Dissent, Parl. Papers, April, 1811, 4. 23.

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bridled violence and open rebellion. Compelling a small detachment of his Majesty's troops to withdraw from the fort, they seized upon the public treasure, drew up the bridges, and placed themselves in an attitude of defiance; disobeying the orders of Colonel Davies, commanding in Mysore, and disregarding the remonstrances of the Political Resident, Mr. Cole. A detachment consisting of the 25th dragoons, a regiment of native cavalry, with a regiment of his Majesty's foot, and a native battalion, commanded by Colonel Gibbs, marched to Seringapatam, where they encamped; while a corps of Mysore horse, which had been supplied by the Dewan, was detached to intercept the advance of two battalions which were on their way from Chittledroog to reinforce the garrison. The Mysore horse met the battalions at some distance from Seringapatam about the 7th of August. No forcible opposition was offered until the 11th, when the Chittledroog force was in sight of the walls of Seringapatam, and of the camp of the detachment by which the fortress was observed. Encouraged by the proximity of the latter, the Mysoreans began to harass the march of the battalions, and were fired upon. The resistance was, however, feeble; for, upon the approach of the dragoons, the Chittledroog battalions broke and dispersed. The greater part effected their escape into the fort, the garrison of which had made a demonstration in their favour. The officer who commanded was wounded and taken prisoner; another died of fatigue and anxiety after reaching the fort. More than two hundred Sipahis and followers were said to have been killed

and wounded.¹ Of the dragoons one officer was wounded slightly. During the night the fortress cannonaded the encampment; and, although no great mischief was done, it was necessary to remove the tents to a safer distance. No further hostility was offered by either party.

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Hoping that the personal character of Colonel Close, the Resident at Poona, and his great popularity with the native soldiery, might enable him to exercise a salutary influence over the troops at Hyderabad, the Government called him from his political duties to take the command of the subsidiary force. He arrived at Hyderabad on the 3rd of August; and, notwithstanding some opposition, made his way to the cantonments, where he expostulated with such officers as were present, and with such of the native officers and men as showed a disposition to listen to his observations. Little effect was produced apparently by his intervention; and, having cause to apprehend personal restraint, he thought it more consistent with his own dignity and the intentions of the Government to withdraw from the cantonment to the Residency, and there await further instructions. Immediately upon his departure, the committee of officers summoned the divisions at Jalna, Masulipatam, and in the Northern Circars. The former made two marches in advance, and the

¹ The returns give nine killed, one hundred and fifty wounded, and two hundred and eighty-one missing. The officers of the Chittledroog battalion affirm that the men were ordered not to fire upon the Europeans, but only to defend themselves against the Mysore horse. The absence of all casualties among the dragoons, with the exception of one officer wounded, which was possibly the consequence of a misunderstanding, is a strong corroboration of this assertion.—Parl. Papers, May, 1810, 2 O. p. 40; also 2 F. p. 33, &c.; also Trial of Colonel J. Bell; Parl. Papers, April, 1811.

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latter were under orders to take the field, when, fortunately, the determinations of the officers at Hyderabad underwent a change. On the 11th of August they addressed a penitential letter to Lord Minto, who was expected to arrive at Madras; signed the test proposed by the Government of Fort St. George; and circulated to the several stations of the army a paper wherein they stated that imperious circumstances and mature reflection had induced them to sign the declaration, and they earnestly entreated their brother-officers to follow their example.¹ The defection of the Hyderabad force arrested the progress of the mutiny. The Jalna division returned to cantonments. On the 16th of August the garrison at Masulipatam tendered their adhesion, and gave up the fort to General Pater; and on the 23rd the garrison of Seringapatam submitted unconditionally, and evacuated the fortress. The declaratory test was universally signed, and a calm as profound as

¹ The motives which influenced the officers are recapitulated by Lord Minto in his letter of the 12th October, 1809, to the Secret Committee, par. 72. "They represent themselves to have proposed at no period anything beyond intimidation as a means of controuling Government, and exacting the concessions they required: they advanced from faction to sedition, from sedition to revolt, confident that each step they made towards further violence would be sufficient for their purpose. In this course they gradually arrived at the last narrow boundary which they had yet to pass before the commencement of civil war; and, while they yet hesitated on that last decisive step, the measures of Government convinced them that intimidation would fail, and, if they advanced further, the contest was actually to be maintained. They then describe their sense of the public evils incident to such a conflict, and their compunction at becoming the immediate instruments of such calamities; sentiments which terminated in a resolution to sacrifice their own objects and feelings to the public safety, and to submit themselves implicitly to the discretion of Government."² Although Lord Minto doubts, to its full extent, this account of their reasons for so suddenly stopping in their course, and ascribes it, in part at least, to a seasonable fear of failure; yet he admits that very many must have been urged onwards, against their own better judgments, by the impulse of example, and that these must have rejoiced at the first overture of retreat.—Parl. Papers, May, 1810, No. iv. p. 9.

the agitation had been alarming was at once restored.

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The causes which induced this seasonable reaction are sufficiently obvious. The officers had hitherto rushed forward in the blindness of their anger, without seeing whither it was likely to lead them; but they had now arrived at the very verge of the precipice, and another step would have consigned them to irretrievable infamy and ruin. It is impossible to believe that the most daring and desperate did not at this moment wish for an excuse to go no further. The senior officers in almost every command had throughout acted with so much moderation and judgment as to have secured the respect, although they had not been always able to repress the violence, of those subordinate to them; and their representations contributed to awaken in the minds of their younger brethren a truer perception of the perilous situation in which they stood. It is also little to be doubted that the disposition to retract derived confirmation from the apprehension of failure in advancing, and from a general belief that the native soldiery would fall off from their officers if the quarrel with the Government were urged to actual warfare.¹ These reflections had been for some time at work. Even in the almost universal rejection of the test, the indication of a returning sense of duty was manifested; as the chief ground of re-

¹ In several of the pamphlets published by the friends of the officers, it is asserted that "the Sipahis adhered to the officers to the last." Lord Minto observes, that "the officers never allowed themselves to doubt of the adherence of the Sepoy battalions."—Letter, 12th October, par. 16; Parl. Papers, May, 1810, p. 2. In general, however, the native officers and troops manifested little inclination to support their European officers against the Government.

BOOK I. fusul was not its general purport, but the possibility
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 1809. of its placing those who signed it in open hostility to those with whom they had been so far engaged in a common cause. Most of the officers declared themselves from the first willing to sign it, with the reservation that they should not be required to take up arms against their brother-officers. The readiness with which they acquiesced in their removal from their regiments and stations evinced a similar state of feeling; and it wanted only a beginning, an example of sufficient weight, for the change of sentiment to be universally and unequivocally exhibited. This was supplied by the conduct of the Hyderabad force, which had been foremost and most vehement in its opposition, and, having therefore the greatest sacrifice of personal feeling to make in yielding obedience, was the more deserving of imitation. With regard to the officers of the subsidiary force, they were of course influenced by the same motives as their companions in arms; and there is every likelihood that the arguments and advice and the character of Colonel Close materially affected their feelings, aided their judgment, and decided their determination. Another and very important circumstance came opportunely to alleviate the pain and efface the discredit of such a departure from their previous declarations. It had been known for some time past that it was the intention of the Governor-General to repair to Madras,¹ and assume in person an investigation into the proceedings of the army. It was now ascertained that he was on his way. To his justice and

¹ General Orders, Fort William, 20th July, 1809.

impartiality the officers looked with confidence, and felt assured that they had nothing to apprehend in him from personal resentment. Although they signed the test of the Madras Government, yet it was to Lord Minto, and not to Sir George Barlow, that the officers at Hyderabad, Masulipatam, and Seringapatam addressed their submission.¹

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Not that the officers of the Madras army had any reason to anticipate from the Governor-General a favourable award. His sentiments were known to be in accordance with those of the Governor in Council of Fort St. George. Communication of their proceedings, from the latter to the former, had drawn from the Supreme Government a review of the whole of the discussions, an elaborate vindication of the course pursued by the Government of Madras, and an unqualified condemnation of the insubordinate and seditious spirit which the officers had displayed.² The letter had been published at Madras, and circulated to the army; but, notwithstanding its general tenor, there was a calmness in its tone, and a reasonableness in its arguments, which opened a prospect of considerate as well as just decision. Whatever might be the sentence of the Governor-General, the sting of personality was removed; and it was the functionary, not the individual, who was expected to pronounce judgment.

It had been the purpose of Lord Minto to have sailed for Madras before the end of July; but his

¹ Address from the officers at Hyderabad to Lord Minto, 11th August; Parl. Papers, May, 1810, 2 F. 1. Declaration of those at Masulipatam; *ibid.* p. 12. Address of those at Seringapatam, 21st August; *ibid.* p. 46.

² Letter from the Supreme Government to the Governor in Council, Fort St. George, 27th May, 1809; Parl. Papers, May, 1810, No. iii.

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CHAP. V. Madras Government, with that singularly imperfect

1809. knowledge which it had on other occasions evinced of the real state of things, conveyed to him, that the agitation was rapidly subsiding, and that a fair prospect existed of the army's returning to a sense of duty.¹ As soon as he ascertained that the information was incorrect, he embarked, and reached Madras on the 11th of September. All parties anxiously awaited his fiat. It was not long delayed.² On the 25th of the same month a general order announced to the army the Governor-General's reprobation of their past conduct, and his resolution to inflict such punishment as might be commensurate with the offences committed. This determination was expressed in language designed and calculated to assuage all irritated feeling, and it was too evidently grounded upon the nature of the past transactions for its justice to be called in question. The necessity of vindicating the authority of the Government was based entirely upon abstract and incontrovertible principles, and the manner in which that vindication was to be exercised was qualified with the utmost possible leniency. The decision of the Governor-General was also distinguished by one remarkable peculiarity,—the more remarkable from the contrast which it presented to the whole course of Sir George Barlow's proceedings,—the non-exercise of absolute power; the abeyance of the right of the Governor-General to decree

¹ Letter from the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, 10th October, 1809, par. 37: also Minute of Governor-General, 15th July, 1809; Parl. Papers, May, 1810, No. iv. : and MS. Records.

² Parl. Papers, May, 1810, No. iv. p. 14.

punishment of his own will and pleasure ; and the reference of those who were charged with the highest degree of culpability to the judgment of their peers. A few only of the offenders were selected ; such as officers in command of stations or of bodies of troops, commandants of corps, and individuals conspicuous for violent and forward behaviour. For the two first, courts-martial were ordered ; to the others, the alternative was offered of investigation before the same tribunal, or dismissal from the service. The whole of the officers of the Hyderabad force were pardoned, in consideration of the important example which they had set of submission. Only three officers came under the first class, eighteen only under the latter ; a general amnesty tranquillised the rest. The order wound up with expressions of affectionate solicitude for the character and welfare of the Coast army, which sunk deep into minds that had so long been used to the language of unbending sternness and unqualified reproof, and which now laboured under the humiliating consciousness that personal resentment, however provoked, was no excuse for a dereliction of the first principles of military duty,—obedience to constituted authority, and allegiance to the state.

Shortly after the promulgation of this order, the trials commenced. Lieutenant-Colonel John Bell, the commandant of the garrison of Seringapatam, was charged with joining in, and with heading, the mutiny of the troops. The defence set up was, that he had consented to take the command only to prevent excesses ; that he exercised no real authority in the fort ; that he had signed the test without hesi-

BOOK I. tation himself, and that it was through his influence
 CHAP. V. the officers also finally signed it, and that the gar-
 1809. rison finally surrendered the fort in a peaceable
 manner. He was pronounced guilty, and sen-
 tenced to be cashiered. A like charge and sentence
 characterised the trial of Major Storey, who had
 consented to hold the command at Masulipatam,
 upon the arrest, by his brother-officers, of Colonel
 Innes, their common superior. A similar defence
 was offered, and the prisoner was recommended to
 the mercy of the Commander-in-chief. In both
 cases the sentences were held to be too lenient, and
 were sent back for revision; but they were adhered
 to by the courts, and eventually confirmed. Lieu-
 tenant-Colonel Doveton was charged with having
 moved his detachment from Jalna with a mutinous
 and seditious design against the Government of
 Madras. The defence was the same. Colonel
 Doveton, it was affirmed, had only ostensibly parti-
 cipated in a movement which he could not hinder,
 with a view so to controul it as to render it inoffen-
 sive: he also produced a private letter from the
 Resident at Hyderabad, sanctioning his accompan-
 ing the troops, if he could not prevent their march.
 He was consequently fully and honourably ac-
 quitted. This sentence also was disapproved of by
 the Commander of the forces, but was confirmed
 by the court. Colonel Doveton was nevertheless
 suspended by the Governor-General from the service
 pending a reference to the pleasure of the Court of
 Directors. Of the second class of officers, two,
 Lieutenant-Colonel Munro and Major Kenny, stood
 a trial, and were cashiered: the rest accepted the

alternative of dismissal.¹ Until the termination of the trials, Lord Minto continued at the Presidency of Madras; and when he quitted it, early in 1810, his authority was in some measure replaced by the presence of General Hewett, the Commander-in-chief of the Bengal army, who assumed the command of the army of Madras. At the end of 1810, General Sir Samuel Auchmuty relieved General Hewett from his duty, and, with the command of the army, took his place as member of Council; the Court of Directors having learnt too late from the recent dissensions how essential was the possession of a dignity, so vainly coveted by General Macdowall, to the cordial co-operation of their chief civil and military functionaries.

Thus terminated a struggle which at one period was thought to threaten the constitution of the Madras Presidency, and endanger the existence of the British empire in India. The danger, though not visionary, was perhaps exaggerated. The quarrel was less between public bodies than between individuals; and the army readily yielded to Lord Minto the allegiance which it had withheld from, and ultimately conceded with an ill grace to, Sir George Barlow. However unreasonable the aversion thus cherished, and however indefensible the extremities to which it hurried unthinking men, it cannot be affirmed that the feelings so widely spread were wholly without extenuation, or that the measures and character of the Governor were

¹ Report of the Trials; Parl. Papers, 1st April, 1811, No. vii. Letter from Lord Minto to the Secret Committee, 15th April, 1830; *ibid.* No. ix. p. 353.

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CHAP. V. disobedience. The Indian Governments of Sir

1809. George Barlow's day were wholly unaccustomed to have their proceedings canvassed or their wisdom impugned, and they were intolerant of opposition. This had been particularly the case in Bengal, where the imperious rule of Lord Wellesley, relieved by the brilliant results of his public policy, had been long accustomed to demand and receive prompt and unquestioning submission. Brought up in his school, it is not to be wondered at that Sir George Barlow carried with him to Madras the same exalted notions of the authority entrusted to him; and when, from the concurrent causes which have been adverted to, he found, both in the civil and military branches of his government, contravention and resistance, he not unnaturally referred them to unworthy motives, and stigmatised them as personal and factious. That much of the opposition which he encountered was personal was undoubtedly true; but it was not at first personal in a sense relating to him, so much as to the individuals themselves, advocating their own interests, and smarting under mistaken, perhaps, but not the less bitter, feelings of injury and injustice. These feelings might have been soothed, and their mischievous consequences prevented, by kindly consideration and temperate forbearance. General Macdowall had no right to complain of the Government of Madras for his exclusion from the Council; that was the act of the Court of Directors: but he had reason to feel aggrieved when Government gave that exclusion practical effect, constructing the plan of a campaign

without consulting him; or consulting him tardily and reservedly, and encroaching upon his pretensions to military patronage. Had he been treated with the same deference as if he had filled a seat at the council-board, all cause of offence would possibly have been removed; for, although warm and precipitate, his temper does not appear to have been unsusceptible of conciliation. When the season of friendly intercourse had passed, and General Macdowall had placed himself in the wrong by his unjustifiable violence in the case of Colonel Munro, the cancelling of the arrest was so necessary and so sufficient a vindication of the authority of the Government, that it must have ensured, after the first heats were allayed, the concurrence of the whole army. The annulment of the General's parting order was also a measure the propriety of which would have been little questioned, although the language of the order was undignified and intemperate. But the measures that ensued bore a different character, and were hasty and imprudent, and in some respects unjust. The suspension of the officers of the Adjutant-General's department for obeying the commands of their military superior; the condemnation of officers without charge or trial, upon private information; and their severe punishment for an unperpetrated offence—the intended transmission of a memorial which was never sent; all originated in that spirit of official despotism which conceived that its own judgment superseded all need of hesitation, all occasion for inquiry or trial. That Sir George Barlow conscientiously considered the station in which he was placed to be endowed with such prerogatives;

BOOK I. that it was the dignity, not so much of his own person
CHAP. V. or power, as of that of the office of Governor in

1809. Council of Fort St. George, may be granted: but the removal of Major Boles was regarded even by the Government of Bengal and the Court of Directors as unjust; and no less so were the orders of the 1st of May, which pronounced sentence upon meritorious officers for an uncommitted crime, upon private intelligence and without a trial. That they were most impolitic was proved by the irritation which they excited; and which, from a smouldering fire that might have burnt itself out among its own ashes, was thus fanned into a fierce and formidable flame. In the subsequent transactions, although the army was most deeply to blame, yet the Government was not exempt from fault. The stern unfeeling tone of its general orders, and the absence of all attempts at explanation or conciliation, were preserved in stoical consistency to the last; until the Government of Bengal introduced a new style, and did not disdain to blend the language of affectionate and paternal solicitude with the assertion of authority; and until, which was still more important, it condescended to lay aside the sword of justice, and send the accused to those tribunals to which they acknowledged themselves to be amenable. That a profound sense of public duty was the chief moving principle of Sir George Barlow's conduct it is impossible to doubt, but he trusted too exclusively to one only method of discharging that duty,—the exercise of absolute power.

Although anticipating the course of events, yet, in order to dispose finally of an unpleasant subject,

it will be advisable to advert in this place to the proceedings in England, to which the transactions at Madras gave rise. The public was speedily inundated by the statements of the opposite parties;¹ but the interest excited was inconsiderable, as attention was absorbed by the great interests of European politics. Several motions for papers were made in the House of Commons, and the documents were printed; but no ulterior proceedings were based upon them. It was rather different at the India House. The Court of Directors at first upheld the measures of the Government of Madras, and still more cordially approved of those of the Governor-General; but when the alarm had subsided, and the transactions were more calmly considered, a serious difference of opinion respecting the merits of Sir G. Barlow, urged with no little warmth and acerbity, divided the Court. The first struggle took place upon the appointment of the new Commander-in-chief to a seat in Council, which involved the question of displacing one of the actual members. After several days of debate, on one of which the Court was so equally divided, that, agreeably to law, the Treasurer determined the question by lot, Mr. Petrie, who had been opposed on many important matters to Sir George Barlow, was removed. The

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¹ In addition to the publications of Mr. Marsh, a gentleman of the legal profession, who, while at Madras, had been generally the adviser and advocate of Sir George Barlow's opponents, and of Colonel Malcolm, with the observations and replies which they produced, the principal authorities on either side are the following: 1. A View of the Policy of Sir George Barlow; in a series of Letters by Indus, 1810. 2. Letter from an Officer at Madras. 3. An Accurate and Authentic Narrative of the Dissensions at Madras. 4. Narrative of the late Trials, &c. 5. Account of the Discontents of the Madras Army. The two principal Reviews, also, took different sides of the question.

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 CHAP. V. proved of the decision, and the reply of those who

1809. supported it, took a review of the whole of the transactions, and with equal ability and earnestness commended or condemned the policy of Sir George Barlow.¹ Similar discussions attended the appeals made by the dismissed or suspended officers; and at different dates their dismissal was both confirmed and cancelled. The milder counsels at last prevailed, and all who had been suspended or dismissed were pardoned and restored to the service.² In July, 1811, a motion was made for the recall of Sir George Barlow, but it was defeated under strong protests from some of the Court.³ The same motion was renewed and carried at the end of the following year, and was equally the subject of a protest by those members of the Court who had uniformly supported his measures and vindicated his reputation.⁴

¹ The proceedings and the dissents of Messrs. Bannerman, Baring, Inglis, Huddleston, Elphinstone, and Patterson, with the reply of Messrs. Grant and Astell, are printed in the Parl. Papers, 1811, No. iv.

² Most of the suspended officers were restored in 1811; those cashiered or dismissed, at subsequent dates.

³ The dissents of Messrs. Parry, Smith, Astell, Bebb, and Grant were published by Sir Robert Barlow, the brother of Sir George. Murray, 1813.

⁴ Little occasion now exists, perhaps, for an appeal to authority to determine the character of the proceedings of the Madras army; but there is very high military authority on the subject, that of the Duke of Wellington, who, amid the anxieties of his position in Spain at the end of 1809, felt a warm interest in the troops whom he had so often led to victory. The following passages occur in a letter, dated Badajoz, 3rd December, 1809, addressed to Colonel Malcolm.

"You cannot conceive how much I have felt for what has passed on the Madras Establishment. I scarcely recognise in those transactions the men for whom I entertained so much respect, and had so much regard, a few years back; and I can only lament that they, and the army, and the affairs of that Presidency in general, have been so much mismanaged. These transactions, and their causes, prove that it is not always the man who has the character of being the best natured, and one of the easiest disposition, who will agree best with those placed in authority over him, or those with whom he is to co-operate. They owe their origin to the disputes of the

persons in authority in India, that is to say, between the Governor and the Commander-in-chief. Both, but principally the latter, looked for partizans and supporters; and these have ended by throwing off all subordination, by relinquishing all habits of obedience, and almost by open resistance. Nothing can be more absurd than the pretext for this conduct.

“Colonel Munro’s opinion might be erroneous, and might have been harsh towards his brother-officers; but not only he ought not to have been brought to a court-martial for giving that opinion, but he ought to have been brought to a court-martial if he had refrained from giving it, when he was called upon by the Commander-in-chief to make him a report on a subject referred to his official consideration. The officers of the army are equally wrong in the part they have taken in the subsequent part of the question, which is one between the Governor and the Commander-in-chief, whether the former had a right to protect Colonel Munro from the acts of the latter, upon which question no man can have a doubt who has any knowledge of the constitution of Great Britain, and particularly of that of the Indian Governments. I, who have arrived pretty nearly at the top of the tree, should be the last man to give up any point of military right or etiquette. But I have no doubt whatever, not only that it was the right, but that it was the duty, of the Governor in Council to interfere to save Colonel Munro; and that if he had not done so, and the public had sustained any loss or inconvenience from his trial, or if the public attention had been drawn to the injustice of his trial, the Governor would have been severely responsible for the omission to perform his duty.

“So far for my opinion upon the main points of the question. As for the others, the conduct of officers upon the addresses, the orders issued, the resolutions entered into, the resignations of their offices, &c. &c., they are consequences of the first error; that is, of persons in authority making partizans of those placed under them, instead of making all obey the constituted authorities of the state. This conduct in the officers of the army would have been wrong, even if the cause had been just, and the Commander-in-chief had wished to screen Colonel Munro from the persecution of the Government; and it is really not worth while to take up my time in describing, or yours in perusing, a description of the folly, the inconsistency, or the breaches of discipline and subordination contained in all those documents. I have so much regard for the Madras army, to which I owe much, that I would sacrifice a great deal to have it in my power to restore them to that state of discipline, union, and respectability in which I left them in the year 1805; and I assure you that I shall rejoice most sincerely when I shall hear that their good sense and good temper have predominated over their feelings of party and their prejudices.”—*Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington*; Supplementary volume to the three first Parts, p. 231.

CHAPTER VI.

Foreign Policy of Lord Minto's Administration.—Invasion of Berar by Amir Khan,—a force sent to the aid of the Raja.—Amir Khan's defeat by the Berar troops,—retires before the British.—Disputes between the Peshwa and the Southern Jagirdars.—Compulsory adjustment.—Suppression of Piracy by the States of Wari and Kolapur.—Expedition against the Pirates of the Persian Gulph.—Joasmis,—their ferocity.—Destruction of Ras-al-Khaima and other Pirate stations.—Expedition to Macao.—Operations against the French and Dutch colonies in the Indian Seas.—Successful depredations of the French cruizers.—Expedition against Rodriguez,—its occupation.—Descent upon Bourbon.—Garrison of Rodriguez reinforced.—Second descent upon Bourbon, and capture.—Naval Transactions at the Isle of France.—French frigates in the harbour of Grand Port attacked by the English squadron.—Destruction of the English vessels.—Naval actions off the Islands between the blockading ships and the French frigates.—Arrival of the Armaments from Bengal and Madras.—Landing of the forces in Grande Baye,—march to Port Louis,—capitulation with the French Governor.—Blockade of the Dutch Islands.—Expedition against the Moluccas.—Capture of Amboyna,—of Banda,—and of Ternate.—Expedition against Java,—accompanied by Lord Minto.—Difficulties of the voyage—overcome.—Former operations.—Destruction of Dutch vessels at Gresik.—

Measures of General Daendels and of his successor, General Jansens.—Arrival of the fleet in the Roads of Batavia,—landing of the troops.—Occupation of Batavia.—Advance to Weltevreden.—Strength of Fort Cornelis.—Assault.—March of Colonel Gillespie's column,—surprise of the outwork,—defences forced,—explosion of a redoubt,—the fort taken,—the pursuit and dispersion of the Enemy.—Churbon and Madura occupied.—Final defeat of General Jansens.—Surrender of Java and its dependencies.—Mr. Raffles appointed Governor.—Colonel Gillespie Commander of the Forces.—Capture of Yodhyakarta.—Expedition against Palembang.—Sultan deposed.—Views of the Court of Directors.—Beneficial results of the British Administration in Java.

No events of any great political importance took place on the continent of India, the occurrence of which was likely to aggravate the anxiety experienced by the British Government from the dissensions that prevailed at Madras; but, during the same period, various occasions of minor moment had arisen for the exercise of its interference and the manifestation of its power. Of this character were the proceedings consequent upon the conduct of Amir Khan, of whom mention has been made in our preceding pages, and who provoked at this time the hostility of the Government of Bengal. Left without controul by the insanity of Holkar, and keeping together a numerous body of troops, for the payment of which he possessed no means of his own, Amir Khan, after exhausting the resources of the Rajput princes, was compelled to look abroad for

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BOOK I. plunder, and enlarge the field of his depredations.
 CHAP. VI. The Raja of Berar was selected as the victim of his
 1809. necessities.

In the commencement of his political career Jeswant Rao Holkar had been detained for some time as a prisoner at Nagpore, and, according to his own assertions, was pillaged by the Raja of jewels of very great value. Amir Khan now demanded, in the name of Holkar, the restitution of the jewels¹ or their price; and, as the demand was not complied with, he moved, in January 1809, to the frontiers of Berar with all his force, swelled to a large amount by the accession of the predatory or Pindari bands,² who had long spread terror through the dominions of the Bhonsla Raja by their daring and devastating incursions. No serious opposition was offered to Amir Khan's advance: he crossed the Nerbudda and proceeded to Jubbulpore, a considerable city of Berar, of which and of the surrounding country he took possession.

Although not bound by the terms of the existing treaty to give military aid to the Raja of Nagpore against his enemies, yet the aggression of Amir Khan was considered by the Bengal Government to demand its vigorous interposition. There were grounds for suspecting that his movements were not unconnected with the discontent of the Subahdar of Hyderabad; and although the assertions of his envoys at Nagpore, that their master had been induced

¹ MS. Records. Amir Khan mentions the manner in which Holkar became possessed of these jewels; but states that they were sold, and the produce was expended in raising troops, when he was seized by the Bhonsla Raja.—Life, p. 91.

² He states his force at 40,000 horse and 24,000 Pindaris.

to invade the country by the invitation of the Nizam, who had offered to defray the cost of a still more formidable armament, might not be deserving of implicit credit, yet the known sympathies of the parties rendered such a league between them far from improbable. The interests of the British power were therefore implicated with those of the Raja of Berar. "The question was not," as Lord Minto observed, "whether it was just and expedient to aid the Raja in the defence and recovery of his dominions, although in point of policy the essential change in the political state of India which would be occasioned by the extinction of one of the substantive powers of the Dekhin might warrant and require our interference; but whether an enterprising and ambitious Musselman chief, at the head of a numerous army irresistible by any power except that of the Company, should be permitted to establish his authority on the ruins of the Raja's dominions, over territories contiguous to those of the Nizam, with whom community of religion, combined with local power and resources, might lead to the formation of projects probably not uncongenial to the mind of the Nizam himself, and certainly consistent with the views and hopes of a powerful party in his court, for the subversion of the British alliance. Of such a question there could be but one solution;"¹ this was, the determination to defend the Raja of Nagpore: and Colonel Close was ordered to march with a competent division to expel Amir Khan from the Berar terri-

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¹ Minute of Governor-General, Oct. 1809; Malcolm's Political History, i. 402.

BOOK I. tory. As the objects of the expedition were in an
CHAP. VI. essential degree British, the assistance was wholly

1809. gratuitous, no compensation being demanded from the Raja. Amir Khan protested vehemently against the interposition; and appealed with unanswerable justice, although with no avail, to the stipulations of the existing treaty with Holkar, on whose behalf he pretended to act, which engaged that the British Government would not in any manner whatever interfere in his affairs: and, in a letter addressed by him to Colonel Close, he argued that the conduct of the Government was a manifest infraction of the treaty, and a breach of the solemn promises made to Jeswant Rao, that it would not meddle with his claims upon the Raja of Berar, nor oppose his exaction of contributions from any princes not in alliance with it. These representations were no longer likely to be of any weight. It was not at present a matter of deliberation whether a helpless Raja of Jaypur should be abandoned to the grasp of the spoiler, rather than a passing inconvenience should be encountered; but whether the desertion of a friendly power might not involve an injury to British interests, and a still greater injury to British reputation.

An army was accordingly assembled towards the end of 1809 on the eastern frontier of Berar, composed chiefly of the subsidiary troops from Jalna and Hyderabad; and another, of sufficient strength not only to protect the province from danger, but to undertake offensive operations if necessary, was collected in Bundelkhand. Before either force, however, could be fully formed and brought into

failure of their dividends, the depreciation of their stock, and their inability to perform the functions assigned to them in the government of British India. That, if the constitution of the British Indian empire were subverted, the civil and military services would be broken down; the tranquillity and happiness of the people of India, the interests of Britain in Asia, and the constitution at home, would be imminently endangered. That the object for which these evils were to be risked, the increase of the commerce, was illusory; as all experience had shown that it was not capable of increase. That the cause of the Company had been deeply injured by prejudice, ignorance, erroneous assumption, and, latterly, by extensive combinations, and by unfair representation, canvass, and intimidation. And finally, the Court, trusting that Parliament would decide, not on the suggestions of private interests, but considerations of national policy, approved of the firmness with which the Directors had maintained the interests of the Company, and enjoined them to persevere in the negociation with his Majesty's Ministers on the same principles.

Although unappalled by the dark catalogue of imaginary terrors which the interested fears of the East India Company had conjured up for the salvation of their monopoly, yet the obvious evils attending the transfer of the details of an extensive trade from one class of persons to others, and the confidence with which disappointment and ruin were predicted to those who sought to benefit by the transfer, compelled the Government to proceed with deliberation and caution, and prevented them from bringing the decision of

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of November, in a disadvantageous position at Jabra Ghat, when an engagement of several hours' duration took place; in which, after the loss of several of his best officers, and exposure to imminent personal peril, Amir Khan was completely defeated. He effected, however, his escape to Bhopal.

Being joined by Vizir Mohammed, and reinforced by the Pindaris, Amir Khan was soon in a condition to resume the offensive: he accordingly marched against Sadik Ali, who had fallen back to the strong post of Chouragerh, one stage to the south-west of Jubbulpore. The Berar troops were drawn up, with the fort of Chouragerh in their rear and a rivulet in their front, the approach to which was rendered difficult by deep ravines and much thorny jungle. Disregarding the advice of Vizir Mohammed to turn the position, Amir Khan attacked the enemy in front. Their line was defended by a numerous artillery, the fire of which told heavily upon the assailants as they slowly toiled to make good their way over the rough and broken ground. After suffering severely from this cause, Amir Khan was compelled to desist from the attack, and to retire once more into the friendly territory of Bhopal. Sadik Ali refrained from following up his advantage, being probably little desirous of its prosecution.¹ This was of no consequence, as the contest was virtually at an end. Foes more for-

¹ Memoirs of Amir Khan, p. 368. According to his own showing, he returned to Chouragerh after his second defeat; and so closely blockaded the Hyderabad force in its entrenchments there, "that the enemy could not breathe or scratch his head:" at the same time the Pindaris scoured the country in all directions. The descriptions of the different actions are animated, and, with some allowance for Amir Khan's personal exploits and perils, are in the main apparently accurate.

midable were now approaching the scene of action; Colonel Close had arrived at Amrawati on the 1st of December, and Colonel Martindell had moved to the confines of Bundelkhand: the former crossed the Nerbudda early in January. Well aware of his inability to cope with such enemies, Amir Khan divided his army, and, sending off his main body by a different route, marched from Bhopal to Bhilsa and Seronj. He was followed to the latter town by Colonel Close, but to no purpose. Pretending that his presence was urgently required by Tulasi Bai, Amir Khan abandoned his troops and set off hastily for Indore. All danger of a further invasion of Berar had therefore evidently ceased; and although for a season it was in contemplation to continue military operations until the complete destruction of Amir Khan's power should have been effected, yet the probability that the prosecution of this policy might lead to a protracted and expensive series of hostilities induced the Governor-General to depart from his original design, and content himself with the accomplishment of the main object of the armament. The troops were therefore recalled to their several stations in the Company's territories or those of their allies;¹ the campaign having served to display the power and the spirit of the Government, and the necessity of its interference for the preservation of a state, once held to be of primary consideration in

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¹ Colonel Close was invested with a discretionary power of acting upon his first instructions, but he was not disposed to take upon himself a responsibility from which the Governor-General shrank. The Court of Directors were "not satisfied with the expediency of abstaining from disabling any power, against whom we may have been compelled to take up arms, from renewing its aggressions."—Letter from Secret Committee; Malcolm, Pol. Hist. i. 405.

BOOK I. the political scale of Indian potentates, against the
 CHA. VI. attacks of a mere soldier of fortune and his pre-
 1810. datory cohorts.

The state of affairs at Poona demanded also about the same period the demonstration of the military power of the British Government. A spirit of reciprocal aversion had long subsisted between the Peshwa Baji Rao and the members of the Putwurdun family, who held extensive Jagirs in the southern portion of the Mahratta country on the frontiers of Mysore. These Jagirdars were the sons or relatives of Parushram Bhao, the distinguished officer who commanded the Mahratta army in the first war with Tippoo; and who, as the friend and colleague of Nana Furnavese, had borne a leading part in the expulsion of Baji Rao's father, Raghunath Rao, from the Peshwaship, and had been an active agent in a plot for the exclusion of Baji Rao himself from the succession.¹ A reconciliation had been effected, but little cordiality had been restored; and, after the death of Parushram, his descendants, engaged in constant and destructive hostilities with their neighbours, ascribed their sufferings to the continued animosity and intrigues of the Peshwa.² On the advance of the British army to reinstate Baji Rao, the

¹ In 1796; Grant Duff's *Mahratta History*, iii. 134.

² "Since 1800, when I was in this country before, it has been one continued contest for power and plunder between the different chiefs who have armies under their command: between the Putwurdun family and Gokla in the countries bordering on the Toombuddra, the Werda, and Malpoorba; between the Putwurduns and the Raja of Kolapore in those bordering on the Gutpurba and the Kishna."—Wellington Dispatches, i. 124. At this time, the beginning of 1803, the heads of the family were three brothers, sons of Parushram, Appa Saheb, Baba Saheb, and Dada Saheb, and their cousin, Chintaman Rao; each of whom commanded a force of about seven thousand horse and foot, with some guns.—*Ibid.* i. 93.

elder brother Apa Saheb was induced, by his regard for General Wellesley, to accompany him to Poona, and to contribute to the Peshwa's re-establishment.¹

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A seeming renewal of friendly intercourse was in consequence effected under Sir Arthur Wellesley's mediation, but the reconciliation was as insincere as before. It was not in the nature of Baji Rao to forgive an injury, and the Putwurduns were too well acquainted with his character to place any faith in his professions. They accordingly remained neutral in the following war, declining to send their contingents upon the Peshwa's requisition; but their neutrality was considered by General Wellesley to have been an important object for the Company's possessions, and to have been capable of extenuation by natural and excusable sentiments of nationality. This omission was made one ground of an application from the Peshwa after the war for the assistance of the British troops to dispossess the Putwurduns, and transfer their lands to one of his own officers, Bapooji Gokla; but Sir Arthur Wellesley firmly opposed the application, not only on account of the claims of the family to the regard of the British Government for the many proofs of attachment which they had exhibited, but on account of its manifest impolicy and injustice.² In conformity to his suggestions, the principles to be followed in adjusting the differences between the Putwurduns and the Peshwa were, to interfere in a certain degree, to

¹ Wellington Dispatches, i. 145, 173, 174.

² See the conference with Bapooji Gokla; Wellington Dispatches, ii. 121: and afterwards with the Peshwa's ministers, on the 1st March, 1804; ii. 140.

BOOK I. ascertain the extent of the service to which the
 CHAP. VI. Peshwa was entitled from the southern Jagirdars,

1810. to oblige them to afford it; and, on the other hand, to protect them from the oppression of the Peshwa's government, and to guarantee to them their possessions as long as they should continue to serve the Peshwa with fidelity.¹ Both parties were interested in preventing the practical adoption of these principles, and the final adjustment of the differences between them was long delayed.

1811. The interposition of the British Government had at once been effectual in arresting the attempts of the Peshwa to crush the Jagirdars: the subsidiary force afforded his only hope of accomplishing his purpose; and, its employment as the mere instrument of his revenge being prohibited, his power was paralyzed. It was not so easy to bring the Jagirdars to reason; especially as they were required to surrender certain lands which were not comprised in their original grants, and to which they were not legally entitled. Their obstinacy was only overcome by the movement of the subsidiary force to the Krishna; when, finding that the British Government

1812. was determined to uphold the rightful claims of the Peshwa, the chiefs consented to meet the Resident and Baji Rao at Punderpur, and attended them to Poona, where everything was definitively settled. The result was less satisfactory to Baji Rao than to the Putwurduns, as he had long hesitated to accede to any proposition which did not comprehend the entire resumption of their Jagirs,

¹ Wellington Dispatches, ii. 149.

and the annihilation of a powerful and obnoxious family.¹

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The presence of the troops in the field afforded a favourable occasion for the suppression of the piratical practices of the two petty Mahratta states, Wari and Kolapur, both possessing ports on the coast of the Concan, from which their vessels were accustomed to commit depredations on native commerce. Their lawless proceedings had been imperfectly repressed by the occasional presence of one of the Company's ships of war; but it was now resolved to put an end to the system, by depriving their rulers of the harbours which gave shelter to the pirates. The approach of the British troops soon awed them, however turbulently disposed, to submission; and the Desai of Wari was compelled to cede the fort of Vingorla, with its port and limits; while the harbour of Malwan, which included the forts and island of Severndroog and its dependencies, was given up by the Raja of Kolapur. Both states were bound to renounce piracy, and to permit no armed vessels to issue from their ports.²

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It had been found necessary at a previous period to undertake operations for the suppression of piracy of a more formidable description, and in the year 1809 an armament was dispatched from the western side of India to the Persian Gulph. Oman, the south-eastern province of Arabia, forms a triangle, the base of which borders upon the deserts; whilst one arm extends along the Indian ocean to Cape

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¹ Malcolm's Political History of India, i. 396.

² Grant Duff's Mahratta History, iii. 350: also Treaties with the Rajas of Kolapore and Sawant Waree; Collection of Treaties, 27th May, 1818.

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Musendom, and is met at that point by the other, which lies within the gulph. The former or eastern coast is subject to the Imam of Muscat, and is occupied by a well-disposed and commercial people. The inhabitants of the latter or western shore, thinly scattered from Cape Musendom through a distance of nearly four hundred miles, had, from a remote period, been so notorious for piratical habits as to have secured for their territory the denomination of the Pirate coast. Among these tribes the Joasmis were distinguished by their audacity and cruelty. They had recently embraced the reformation which Abd-ul-wahab had some years before introduced into Mohammedanism, and united to the fierceness of their lawless trade the ferocity of fanaticism. Profession of the faith of Islam, or instant death, was the fate of their captives. Their vessels, known as daos or bugalas, varying from one hundred and fifty to three hundred and fifty tons' burthen, and carrying from one hundred and fifty to two hundred men, were clumsily built, with a single mast, and mounted but a few guns. Singly, they were little formidable; but they usually sailed together in small fleets, from which a merchant-vessel was rarely able to extricate herself. For a considerable period they refrained from molesting English ships. The Company's armed vessels were instructed to exercise similar forbearance, and to confine themselves to repelling aggression. Emboldened by this policy, and impelled by their religious ardour, the Joasmis departed from the caution they had hitherto preserved, and no longer paid any respect to the British flag. In 1808 the Sylph, a small ship of only one hundred

tons, having on board the native Persian secretary of Sir Harford Jones, was attacked and captured in sight of the Nereide frigate; by which she was retaken, and the pirate vessels were sunk. In the next year the *Minerva*, a large merchant-ship, fell in with a fleet of daos, and, after a running fight of two days, was carried by boarding. The resistance and loss they had suffered had so exasperated the pirates, that every male Christian on board was murdered. It was no longer possible to permit the perpetration of such outrages, and it was determined to seek the Joasmis in their chief port, Ras-al-Khaima, inflict upon them a deserved punishment for their past crimes, and impair, if not annihilate, the means of future mischief.¹

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The expedition consisted of two of his Majesty's frigates, the *Chiffonne* and *Clorinde*, and six of the Company's armed vessels, in which nine hundred European soldiers and five hundred Sipahis were embarked. The flotilla was commanded by Captain Wainwright of the *Chiffonne*; the land division by Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, of his Majesty's 65th. The armament left Bombay on the 4th September. Off Cape Musendom it fell in with a fleet of twenty-seven daos: one was sunk, the others were dispersed. The force then proceeded to Muscat, the Imam of which, equally hostile to the Joasmis as pirates and

¹ Account of the Wahabis, by Sir Harford Jones, p. 211; Travels in Arabia, by Lieutenant Wellsted of the Indian navy, i. 243. Both mention that the prisoners, not Mohammedans, were brought singly to the gangway, where one of the pirates cut their throats, with the exclamation, Allah Akbar! God is great! According to Lieutenant Wellsted, the name, properly Johasmis, was derived from Johasm, a Mohammedan saint, who had pitched his tent on the promontory where their chief port was built, hence called Ras-al-Khaima, the Cape of Tents, i. 256.

BOOK I. as Wahabis, gave prompt assistance to the objects of
 CHAP. VI. the expedition. The squadron arrived off Ras-al-

1809. Khaima on the 12th of November. Notwithstanding its designation of Ras or head-land, the town was found to be situated on a low sandy peninsula, nearly a mile in length. The neck of the isthmus was defended by a wall, and the sea-face by batteries and entrenchments. It was also secure from the near approach of vessels of war by the shallowness of the water.

In consequence of this difficulty the bombardment of the town was impracticable, and it was determined to carry it by assault. By a skilful disposition the landing of the troops on the neck of the isthmus was effected at daybreak on the 13th of November; and, in spite of a vigorous resistance, the wall was escaladed. Guns were then brought up, and, under the cover of their fire, the troops penetrated into the town. All the principal houses, as usual in Asiatic cities, were flat-roofed; and from their roofs, and loop-holes in their walls, a murderous fire of matchlocks checked for a while the progress of the assailants. Their perseverance, however, triumphed: the town was abandoned by its surviving defenders, and by two o'clock Ras-al-Khaima was in the possession of the British. Although the place was filled with valuable merchandize, the spoil of piratical expeditions, no plunder was permitted: the dwellings and magazines were set on fire, and the whole was consumed, together with forty-eight large daos and a number of smaller vessels. Several towns of inferior note along the pirate coast shared the same fortune. Some escaped it by the sacrifice of their

boats, but in general the Arabs exhibited striking proofs of their national spirit. At the attack of the castle of Shinas, in particular, the most determined resistance was encountered. After a breach had been made, and the place was carried, the garrison retiring into two of the towers refused to surrender. Offers of quarter were made repeatedly to them in vain. They maintained an unceasing fire upon their enemies, and tossed back with the most deliberate resolution the hand-grenades and fire-balls showered upon them without giving them time to explode. Guns were brought to bear upon their defences, and the towers soon became a mass of ruins. At length one of the number gave himself up, and through his agency his companions were induced to believe that their lives would be spared, and to desist from a resistance which had been animated by a notion that no more mercy would be shown to them than they were accustomed to exercise towards their captives.¹ Above four hundred were killed. The others were protected with difficulty from the fury of the troops of the Imam of Muscat, of whom four thousand had joined the detachment, and who mostly belonged to a tribe which was at deadly feud with the Joas-mis. The place was delivered to the Imam. At Luft, also, on the island of Kishme, a desperate opposition was experienced, by which an officer and ten men were killed, and many of the men were wounded.

¹ "After the destruction of one of their forts, several of the Arabs were brought on board our ships as prisoners: while uncertain of their fate, and before their wounds were dressed, they were asked what fate they anticipated. 'The same immediate death as we should have inflicted on you had your fortune been ours,' was the stern and characteristic reply."—Wellsted's Travels, i. 219.

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The success of these operations struck a salutary terror into the pirate tribes of the coast of Oman, and procured for some years security for the commerce of the Persian Gulph. The habits, the native daring, and the fanaticism of these barbarians, gradually, however, resumed their influence, and impelled them to the revival of their predatory courses, which provoked a severer chastisement and more effectual suppression. This will be the subject of a future narrative. The armament employed on the present occasion returned to Bombay, and received the merited acknowledgments of the local and supreme Governments.¹

While thus busily and anxiously engaged in appeasing internal dissension, and in asserting the ascendancy of the British empire of India over the nations of Asia, the attention of Lord Minto was earnestly fixed upon objects of European as well as of Indian interest growing out of the war which raged in the Western hemisphere. Upon the occupation of Portugal by the French, and the flight of the Prince Regent to Brazil, the Bengal Government received orders from England to take military occupation of the Portuguese settlements in the East, to prevent their following the fate of the parent country. Goa had some time previously been partly under the protection of the British troops, the civil administration being left entirely to the Portuguese authorities; and it was deemed expedient to provide in a similar manner for the security of

¹ Asiatic Annual Registers, vol. xi. Chron. 161, and vol. xii. Chron. 122; Account of the Expedition against the Pirates of the Gulph of Persia in 1809; Asiatic Monthly Journal, vol. ii. 341.

Macao. A small expedition was accordingly embarked in June and July from Madras and Calcutta, the troops of which were commanded by Major Weguelin of the Bengal European regiment, and the ships by Rear-Admiral Drury.¹ The Madras division, with the Admiral, arrived off Macao on the 11th September. Their coming was unexpected, and by no means acceptable to their allies. Reluctant to part with any portion of their brief authority, and fearful of giving offence to the Chinese, the Portuguese authorities availed themselves of the absence of instructions from their own Court to resist as long as they could the disembarkation of the troops. Fortified with the sanction of the Viceroy of Goa, and determined to execute the instructions of the Government of Bengal, Admiral Drury disregarded the remonstrances and procrastination of the Governor of Macao; and, by landing the troops without his acquiescence, extorted from him a reluctant assent to the military possession of the defences of the town.

There was, however, a still more potential voice to be consulted—that of the Chinese. In some measure instigated by the intrigues of the Portuguese, but still more by becoming feelings of national dignity, the provincial Mandarins immediately objected in the strongest terms to the landing of the British troops. The Select Committee of Supra-

¹ The troops from Madras consisted of two companies of his Majesty's 80th regiment, and were embarked on the Russell and Greyhound ships of war: the former of which carried the Admiral. From Bengal, two companies of the European regiment and six hundred Sipahis were embarked in transports, and his Majesty's vessels Dover, Phaeton, Jaseur, and Daigneux.

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cargoes had induced the Governor-General to believe that the Chinese would be indifferent to the temporary occupation of Macao, and would consider it immaterial whether it was guarded by the troops of Portugal or Great Britain. They had not, however, ascertained the sentiments of the Chinese, and their conjectures were erroneous. The local officers were still more vigorously upheld by their principals at Canton; and the Viceroy, declaring that the unlicensed entrance of foreign soldiers into the territories of the Celestial dynasty was a violation of the laws of the empire, commanded their immediate withdrawal. It was in vain urged that Macao had been ceded to the Portuguese, that the English came as their allies, and that their only purpose was to defend it against the attacks of their common enemy the French. The Viceroy replied, that Macao was in all respects a part of the empire, that the British should have applied for permission to the Emperor before they landed their troops, and that it was as absurd as it was disrespectful to presume that their aid was required to protect any part of the Emperor's dominions from foreign aggression. He repeated his orders for the re-embarkation of the troops; and, finding that obedience was delayed, first put a stop to the trade with the Company's ships, several of which were at the time taking in cargoes, and then prohibited their being furnished with provisions and supplies.

Thinking that the objections of the Government might be overcome by persisting in the course pursued, the supracargoes prevailed upon the Admiral, against his own judgment, to repeat his applications,

and to repair in person to Canton, and demand an interview with the Viceroy. That functionary, though he declined to receive the Admiral, sent some Mandarins of rank to confer with his officers, and wrote a reply to his letters. The tenor of his declarations was unchanged : the withdrawal of the troops was insisted on as preliminary to all other discussion. The Admiral returned indignantly to his ships, and, still acting upon the suggestions of the supracargoes, threatened to blockade the port, and commanded all the Europeans to leave Canton. These measures were unavailing. An order arrived from Peking, whither information of the transaction had been dispatched, approving of the Viceroy's conduct, and commanding him, if necessary, to expel the intruders by force. The imperial commands were communicated to the Admiral: troops began to collect in considerable numbers along the shores of the Canton river, boats passing to the ships were fired upon, and everything indicated hostile proceedings unless the armament was withdrawn. Major Weguelin, who, with the Bengal detachment, had joined on the 20th October, concurred with the Admiral in conceiving that they were not warranted in carrying their instructions into effect, in direct contravention of the commands of the Emperor; and the supracargoes, sensible that further obstinacy might lead to more serious consequences than they had anticipated, at last counselled acquiescence. The troops were accordingly re-embarked on the 23rd December, after three months had been expended in the vain attempt to overcome the reasonable opposition of the Chinese to the unauthorized

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BOOK I. establishment of foreign troops upon their coasts.
 CHAP. VI. The reason of the case was not only clearly on their

1809. side, but their conduct exhibited a remarkable combination of firmness and forbearance. However unyielding in their resolution, no violence was resorted to; and, as soon as the ships and troops had departed, the trade was resumed, and carried on as quietly as if no interruption had occurred.

The failure of the expedition to Macao was more than redeemed by the success which attended the employment of the resources of British India in the furtherance of other objects of greater national importance; and it was reserved for Lord Minto's administration to accomplish the extirpation of those remains of the colonial possessions of France in the Eastern hemisphere that had so long been suffered to inflict humiliation and injury upon the subjects of a power which had only to will their extinction, and they ceased to be. The measures which led to the conquest of the Isles of France and of Java have now to be described.

It has been already noticed, that, notwithstanding the presence of a powerful naval armament in the Indian ocean,¹ armed vessels issuing from the French islands of Mauritius and Bourbon had throughout the war preyed upon the maritime trade of India almost with impunity: occasionally, indeed, they fell victims to their audacity,² and were made to

¹ In 1807, Admiral Pellew had under his orders, in different parts of the Indian seas, six ships of the line, sixteen frigates, and six sloops.

² Among the most gallant actions was one fought in the Balasore Roads in February, 1798, between *La Forte*, a frigate of the largest class, and the *Sybillé* of forty-four guns, Captain Cooke, which ended in the capture of the former, although Captain Cooke was killed; and one between *La Piedmontaise* and *San Fiorenzo*, of about equal force, in March, 1808. In

feel the superiority of British skill and prowess; but although they swept the seas from Madagascar to Java, and sometimes carried their depredations to the immediate vicinity of the British harbours,¹ they were for the most part singularly fortunate in avoiding the track of English frigates and men-of-war.² Their principal spoil arose from the capture of the merchant-ships employed in the trade of the Eastern seas, whose cargoes, often of considerable value, they carried for sale to the ports from which they had sallied; but they also inflicted serious damage upon the Company's commerce, and from time to time valuable Indiamen fell into their hands.³ The equipments of these vessels, which were well armed, and on the outward-bound voyage well manned, enabled them sometimes to resist successfully the attacks of their enemies; and, on one memorable occasion, a fleet of merchant-ships returning from China, under its senior captain, Cap-

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this also, which was a desperately contested engagement, renewed for three days successively, and terminating in the capture of *La Piedmontaise*, the commander of the English frigate, Captain Hardinge, fell.—*Asiatic Annual Register*, vol. ii. Chron. 87, and vol. x. Chron. 191. The official reports are given in both.

¹ The *Kent East-Indiaman*, Captain Rivington, was captured at the mouth of the Hoogly river by the *Confiance* privateer, M. Surcouf, in October, 1800, after an action of an hour and forty-seven minutes: her captain was killed. M. Surcouf for several years was distinguished for his intrepidity and successful enterprise: most of his prizes, and they were numerous, were taken in the upper part of the bay and along the Madras coast.—*Asiatic Annual Register*, vol. ii. Chron. 141.

² The merchants of Calcutta presented a petition to his Majesty's Government, imputing to the navy some degree of disinclination to exert themselves for the protection of the trade.

³ It was computed in October, 1807, that in the course of six weeks the losses by capture to the port of Calcutta alone exceeded thirty lakhs of rupees (£300,000). Between 1792 and 1810, the Company lost thirty vessels by capture: the cargoes of twenty-four of the number are stated to have been worth above £800,000.—*Commons' Committee*, 1830; *First Report*, App. vi.

BOOK I. tain Dance,¹ beat off a French squadron of vessels
 CHAP. VI. of war commanded by Admiral Linois. In some

1809. actions between single vessels a similar result reflected honour upon the Company's officers: but in general the merchantmen were unequal to contend with a French cruizer of respectable force; especially on their homeward voyage, when they had been weakened by the impressment of many of their best men on board his Majesty's ships of war. Latterly cases of this nature had become more frequent. In 1809 the Company's regular Indiamen, Europe and Streatham, were taken on their homeward voyage by the French frigate La Caroline; and the Charlton and United Kingdom, by La Venus. In the following year the Windham, Ceylon, and Astell, outward bound, were met off the island of Johanna by the French frigates Bellone and Minerve, and Victor corvette, and after an action which lasted from 2 P.M. until dark the two former struck. The Astell escaped under cover of the night. It was high time to rescue the commerce of India from the risk and peril to which it was exposed, and to vindicate the pretensions of the British navy to the undisputed sovereignty of the ocean.

The most obvious means of paralysing the energies of the naval power of France, which still lingered in the East, was to take from her ships those places in

¹ The China fleet, consisting of sixteen ships, on the 14th of February, 1804, off Palo Aor, in the Straits of Malacca, fell in with the French squadron under Admiral Linois, consisting of the Marengo of seventy-four guns, two frigates of forty-four guns each, and two brigs. On the 15th, after some manœuvring and the exchange of a short fire between the French line and the headmost ships, Admiral Linois stood off under all sail, deterred from a closer contest by the gallant bearing of the China ships.—Asiatic Annual Register, vol. vi. Chron. 102; Brenton's Naval History, iii. 336.

the Indian ocean where they found a shelter and obtained supplies. This might have been effected at a much earlier date; but, for reasons not easily comprehensible, the Company's Governments had been interdicted from engaging in any expedition against the islands, as involving a certain expense both for their reduction and maintenance: ¹ a piece of parsimonious prodigality, in which even the pecuniary saving bore no ratio to the pecuniary loss; as the value of the captured ships, and the charges of their convoy and equipments, far outbalanced in the end the cost which in the beginning would have been incurred by the conquest of the colonies. The views of the home Administration at this period underwent a change, and the Government of Bengal and the chief naval officers in the Eastern seas were authorized to adopt arrangements of a more enterprising description. It was at first proposed to attempt nothing more than a rigorous blockade of the Isle of France and Bourbon by the squadron at the Cape of Good Hope under Admiral Bertie; but, as this was impracticable as long as the blockading ships depended upon the distant settlements of the Cape or of Bombay for their supplies, it was determined to occupy the small island of Rodriguez, lying about one hundred leagues east of the Isle of France, and establish upon it magazines, with stores and provisions for the refitting and revictualling of the blockading squadron. A small force of two hundred Europeans and an equal number of natives,

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¹ "At the commencement of the present war, intimation had been given to the East India Company to guard them against expending large sums in expeditions against the French islands."—Speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 10th January, 1812; Hansard's Debates.

BOOK I. commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Keating, was
 CHAP. VI. dispatched from Bombay under convoy of his Ma-
 1809. jesty's ship *Belliqueux*, Commodore Byng. They
 arrived off the island on the 4th of August, and
 found upon it only three Frenchmen, engaged in
 growing vegetables for the use of the larger islands.
 Rodriguez was about fifteen miles long from east to
 west, and seven from north to south. Wood and
 water were plentiful, and various vegetables were
 raised. The stores were landed, and additional sup-
 plies were sent for; and Colonel Keating adopted
 all necessary precautions in order to strengthen him-
 self in his position. The captures made in 1809
 and 1810, however, showed that, whatever benefits
 might ultimately result from the occupation of Rod-
 riguez, it was not followed by that of an effectual
 blockade of the French islands. French frigates
 had continued to sail from their ports, and returned
 to them with splendid and valuable trophies of
 victory.

Although the position thus taken up proved in-
 adequate to the entire prevention of maritime de-
 predation, yet it had the advantage of enabling the
 English men of war to remain more steadily and
 continuously in those seas, cramping the enemy's
 operations, occasioning frequent distress in the
 islands for want of supplies, and affording a salient
 point from which to harass and annoy them by oc-
 casional demonstrations or actual inroads. With
 this purpose, as well as to determine how far ul-
 terior and more definite measures were practicable,
 the forces at Rodriguez, both military and naval,
 were strengthened, and in September 1809 an ex-

pedition proceeded from Rodriguez to the Isle de Bourbon.

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A body of four hundred European and native troops were embarked in his Majesty's ships *Nereide* and *Otter*, and the Company's cruizer *Wasp*. Off Port Louis, in the Isle of France, they were joined by his Majesty's ships the *Raisonnable*, *Commodore Rowley*, and the *Sirius*, Captain Pym. The whole proceeded to Bourbon, off the eastern extremity of which they arrived on the morning of the 20th of September. In the evening a detachment, raised to six hundred men by the addition of seamen and marines, was disembarked to the southward of Point de Galotte, about seven miles from St. Paul, the chief town on the western side of the island. The disembarkation was unperceived by the enemy; and the troops had marched, and were in possession of two of the principal batteries on the east of the town, commanding the shipping, before their approach was apprehended. On the advance of a column to storm a third battery, they came upon the garrison, now collected, and reinforced by a hundred men of the troops of the line serving on board the frigate *La Caroline*, then lying in the bay with her prizes. The position of the enemy was strong, and was supported by eight pieces of artillery. Their defence was resolute, and it was not until the main body of the assailants was concentrated that they gave way. By half-past eight, the whole of the batteries, and the town and magazines, were in the hands of the English; and, the escape of the ships being prevented by the squadron, they were obliged to surrender. The French ships taken

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were the Caroline frigate, of forty-six guns, and some small trading vessels; but, besides a gun-brig and some small traders, two Indiamen, the Streatham and Europe, were recovered: the troops were then re-embarked.

Upon hearing of this attack, a body of troops under the command of General Des Bruslys, the governor of Bourbon, marched from St. Denis, and made their appearance on the hills on the evening of the 23rd. Finding St. Paul in possession of the English, they retired during the night, rendering it useless to continue the preparations which had been made for the relanding of the troops. A convention was then concluded between the English commander and the commandant of St. Paul for a suspension of hostilities for three days, during which the English were to remain unmolested in the occupation of the town. The death of Des Bruslys, who destroyed himself,¹ occasioned the prolongation of the armistice; during which the public property was, agreeably to the stipulated convention, put on board the ships; and, the objects of the expedition having been accomplished, the squadron with the captured vessels returned to Rodriguez.²

The success which had attended the proceedings of so feeble an armament confirmed the determination of the Government of Bengal to attempt, without waiting for specific instructions from home, the

¹ He left a paper intimating his having committed suicide, to avoid death on the scaffold; and recommending his wife and children to Providence, and those who could feel for them. His family, at the request of his widow, was sent with a cartel to the Mauritius.

² Official report, and other details; Asiatic Annual Register, vol. xi. Chron. 155.

complete reduction of the French islands; and in the beginning of 1810 a reinforcement of sixteen hundred European and as many native troops was dispatched to Colonel Keating, to enable him to undertake the complete subjugation of the Isle de Bourbon. The expedition arrived at Rodriguez on the 20th of June, but from the unfavourable state of the weather they were unable to proceed to their destination until the 3rd of July. They were then conveyed to Bourbon under convoy of a strong squadron of his Majesty's navy, consisting of the *Sirius*, the *Iphigenia*, the *Magicienne*, and the *Ne-reide*, commanded by Commodore Rowley, in the *Boadicea*, and arrived off the point of debarkation on the 6th. Colonel Keating on this occasion had determined to proceed at once against *St. Denis*, the capital, in the hope of preventing protracted operations in the interior of the country, consisting chiefly of rugged, and in part inaccessible, mountains. The squadron accordingly sailed to the northern coast, where the forces, previously distributed into four brigades, were appointed to land at two different points: the first brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser, being directed to debark at *Grande Chaloupe*, and proceed by the mountains against the west side of the town; whilst the other three brigades, under Colonel Keating himself, were intended to land on the east of it, at *Rivière de Pluies*, and to cross the rear of the town to the river *St. Denis*.

About two o'clock on the 7th of July, the ships having reached their stations, the landing of the principal divisions was commenced, and about three

BOOK I. hundred men of the 3rd and 4th brigades, under
 CHAP. VI. Colonels Campbell and Macleod, with a party of

1810. seamen under Captain Willoughby of the *Nereide*, were put on shore. The weather, which had hitherto been moderate, became suddenly tempestuous: the surf rose with such violence that the boats were stove in pieces on nearing the shore, and the disembarkation of the rest of the troops became impracticable. The division on shore was necessarily left without support; but, after a communication from the commander-in-chief,¹ Colonel Macleod advanced to a battery on the Breton river at Ste. Marie, which he carried, and where he was unmolested during the night.

The attempt to land at this spot was seen from the town, but the debarkation was considered to be impossible, from the fury of the surf, and the principal attention of the enemy was directed to the division under Colonel Fraser. His brigade, which was composed of his Majesty's 86th regiment and part of the 6th regiment of Madras native infantry, with a small detail of artillery and pioneers, on board of his Majesty's ship *Sirius*, had been more fortunate. They reached their destination off Grande Chaloupe early on the forenoon of the 7th July, and immediately effected a landing without loss, although exposed to a harassing fire from the light troops of the enemy. As soon as the landing was accomplished, Colonel Fraser pushed on with his Europeans alone to the vicinity of the town, and

¹ Lieutenant Foulstone, of his Majesty's 69th, volunteered to be the bearer of Colonel Keating's orders: he was carried in a boat to the edge of the surf, and then swam through it to the shore.

occupied the heights above it to the westward, so as to cut off all communication between the capital and St. Paul. In the mean time the Magicienne and Boadicea, with the 2nd and 4th brigades, and the chief military stores and artillery, finding little chance of effecting a landing at Rivière, sailed to Grande Chaloupe in the night, and early on the 8th landed the troops on board. Before they could move forward in force, the business had been decided. The courage and activity of Colonel Fraser's division had reaped the full harvest of that good fortune which had given them the lead in the attack upon St. Denis.

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Having been joined during the night of the 7th by the rest of his force, Colonel Fraser on the morning of the 8th, leaving the Sipahis to protect his rear, descended from the hill with the Europeans, and soon fell in with the enemy, drawn up in two columns, each with a field-piece, on the plain, supported by the heavy cannon of a strong redoubt upon their flank. On reaching the plain, the regiment was ordered to charge, when they immediately rushed upon the enemy with the bayonet, and broke them. The French attempted to form behind the parapet of the redoubt, but they were pushed so closely that they were unable to make good their footing, and left the redoubt in the possession of the British, who turned some of the guns found in it against the town, and were enabled more effectually to reply to the batteries by which the latter was defended. At four o'clock in the afternoon a flag of truce was sent out from the town to negotiate for its surrender. By that time

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the bulk of the expedition, which had been sent on to Grande Chaloupe, had arrived, and advanced to St. Denis, whilst the 3rd brigade had also come up from the east to take its part in the assault.¹ Dispositions for storming were made, when it was prevented by the submission of the commandant, Colonel St. Susanne. By the terms of the capitulation which ensued, the whole of the island was ceded to the British with all public property: the troops of the line surrendered themselves prisoners of war, to be sent to the Cape or to England. Colonel St. Susanne was allowed to proceed to the Isle of France on parole; and Mr. Farquhar, of the Bengal Civil service, who had been appointed by Lord Minto in the confidence of success to the government of the island, assumed charge of its administration. Proclamations were issued by him, assuring to the inhabitants the secure possession of their property on their remaining peaceable and obedient, and promising them the provisional observance of the established forms of law and government, and the maintenance of the established religion of the colony. This important acquisition was effected with little loss; or eighteen killed and fifty-nine wounded. One officer only, Lieutenant J. S. Munro, of his Majesty's 56th, was amongst the former.²

The capture of Bourbon, so creditable to both the military and naval forces employed, for the

¹ There is a slight difference between the report of Colonel Keating and that of Colonel Fraser: the latter says that Colonel Drummond joined him at four with the 2nd brigade; the former, that he himself arrived at that time, and commanded dispositions to be made for a general attack.

² Asiatic Annual Register, vol. xii; Official details, Chron. pp. 27, 117.

judgment by which it had been planned and the spirit by which it had been accomplished, was followed by a series of singular disasters suffered by the navy, ascribable to no deficiency of courage or conduct, but to an imperfect acquaintance with the scene of action, and the want of sufficiently experienced pilotage. The achievements which were projected would no doubt have been successful, could they have been executed with the promptitude with which they were conceived.

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The operations against Bourbon had been carried on without any attempt at interruption from the Isle of France, in consequence of the absence of the principal naval strength of the French. On the 20th of August the *Bellone*, *Minerve*, and *Victor* returned, bringing with them the captured *Indiamen*, the *Windham* and *Ceylon*. Finding *Port St. Louis* blockaded, they made for the harbour of *Grand Port*, also called *Port Impérial*, on the south-eastern or windward side of the island. On nearing the *Isle de la Passe*,¹ a small islet with a fort lying off the mouth of the harbour about three miles from the land, which had been taken, and was now occupied by a small detachment from Bourbon, the French squadron was surprised by a hostile fire from the guns of the fort, and of the *Nereide* frigate, which had been stationed off the island. With some loss the French vessels made their way into the harbour; but their prize, the *Windham*, not keeping up with the rest, was recaptured by Captain Pym with the boats of the *Sirius*,

¹ It had been taken on the 14th of August by the boats of the *Sirius* and *Iphigenia*, and was garrisoned by one hundred and thirty men from Bourbon.

BOOK I. which was cruising in the neighbourhood in main-
 CHAP. VI. tenance of the blockade. Sending off his prize to

1810. Bourbon, Captain Pym, in communication with Cap-
 tain Willoughby of the *Nereide*, determined to at-
 tack the French ships in the harbour, and on the
 22nd of August the two frigates stood in for that
 purpose. Unfortunately the *Sirius* grounded, and
 could not be got off until the next day, when the
Iphigenia and *Magicienne*, under Captains Lambert
 and Curtis, arrived to take part in the engagement.
 The delay that had occurred had afforded the gover-
 nor, General Decaen, time to reinforce the crews
 of the vessels with seamen and soldiers, and to
 strengthen the batteries which had been erected on
 this part of the coast since the capture of the *Isle*
de la Passe, and which mounted sixty guns. These
 were fully manned, and were supported by all the
 troops that could be assembled, and a numerous
 body of militia and volunteers.

The firing commenced at a little after 5 P.M. on the
 23rd. The *Nereide* anchored within half pistol-shot
 of the *Bellone* and *Victor*. The *Magicienne*, in fol-
 lowing her, grounded in such an attitude that very
 few of her guns could bear upon the *Minerve*, to
 whom she was opposed; but the *Iphigenia* anchored
 on her larboard quarter, and relieved her of her
 antagonist. The *Sirius* again unluckily took the
 ground nearly out of gun-shot, and was disabled
 from rendering effectual aid. The French ships
 were soon driven out of their line, but into a posi-
 tion which enabled them to work their guns with
 advantage. Their loss of men was constantly re-
 paired by troops from the shore; and the batteries

and musketry on land poured a galling fire upon the British vessels, which were incapable of management.

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The contest was nevertheless continued until after dark. At ten o'clock, the *Nereide*, which also had previously grounded, having most of her guns disabled, the greater part of her crew killed or wounded, and being exposed to the fire of the land-batteries as well as of the shipping, struck her colours;¹ but the French, not noticing or not perceiving that this was the case, continued firing upon her for some hours, until not a man on board remained unhurt. The firing continued with occasional interruption through the night. On the morning of the 24th, all hope of success being necessarily abandoned, it was determined to endeavour to retreat. The *Magicienne* being unmanageable, and on the point of sinking, was quitted by her crew, who set her on fire and retired on board the *Iphigenia*. On the 25th the *Iphigenia* warped out of the action, and attempted to extricate the *Sirius*; but, finding this impracticable, she also was set on fire in the evening, and exploded. The *Iphigenia*, the sole remaining ship, contrived by extraordinary exertion to get back to the *Isle de la Passe*, where she landed the surviving crews of the other vessels. In this situation, without provisions, and surrounded by a vastly supe-

¹ The report published by order of the Government of Bengal, Calcutta Government Gazette, 18th Oct. 1810, states that the *Nereide* drifted on shore, and was taken possession of by the enemy: the account in the text is from the *Nereide's* log.—Brenton's *Naval History*, iv. 468. The French account asserts that her colours were flying at daybreak, but that information of her helpless situation had been previously received from a French prisoner on board, who made his escape and swam to the *Minerve*, and that from that time she was not fired on.

BOOK I. rior force of the enemy,—the *Astrea*, *Venus*, and
 CHAP. VI. *La Manche* frigates, with the *Entreprenant* sloop,
 1810. having on the 27th come round from Port Louis, whilst those recently engaged were rapidly refitting, —Captain Lambert found himself under the necessity of capitulating, and surrendered to Captain Hamelin, the commodore of the French squadron. It was stipulated that the crews should be prisoners of war, but to be sent immediately on parole or in exchange to one of his Britannic Majesty's forts. The convention was ratified by General Decaen, the governor of the Isle of France, so far, that he consented to send the prisoners, after the expiration of a month, to England or the Cape of Good Hope upon condition of their not serving again until exchanged.¹

The only British ship of war now left of the blockading squadron was the *Boadicea*; and Commodore Rowley was unable to prevent the blockade of the Isle de Bourbon, which was established by the French frigates *Astrea* and *Iphigenia*, who intercepted several of the transports arriving with troops and stores for the destined expedition against the Isle of France. On the 12th of September, however, the *Africaine* frigate, Captain Corbett, arrived from England; and Commodore Rowley, thus reinforced, immediately put to sea. The French fri-

¹ *Asiatic Annual Register*, vol. xii; *History*, p. 8, *Chron.* 65: *Brenton's Naval History*, iv. 466. A translation of General Decaen's official proclamation after the action is published in the *Calcutta Government Gazette Extraordinary*, 25th November, 1810. Some gasconading was excusable on such an occasion, but in the main the account is candid and temperate: the loss of the French is probably undervalued at four officers and thirty-three men killed, and one hundred and twelve wounded; the latter included M. Du Perrée, the captain of the *Bellone*. In the *Nereide* alone one hundred and sixteen were killed, and many of the wounded died on landing. Captain Willoughby was wounded, but recovered with the loss of an eye.

gates fled, and the English gave chase. The Boadicea being a heavy sailer, the French vessels soon shot far a-head, followed closely by the Africaine. Captain Corbett, apprehending the escape of the enemy, brought them to action, whilst the Boadicea was five miles astern. The wind died away. The Africaine was overpowered: the captain was killed, and the senior lieutenant was obliged to strike his colours. The balance of strength again turned in favour of the French; but the Boadicea, being joined by the Otter sloop and Staunch gun-brig, continued the chase. The enemy's frigates were little inclined to renew the contest; and, having taken out such of her crew as were unhurt, they abandoned the Africaine in a crippled condition. Rowley returned with her to St. Paul on the 18th of September.

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Commodore Rowley had not been many hours at anchor when three sail appeared in the offing, two of which had suffered in their masts and rigging. He immediately made sail in pursuit of them, attended by the Otter and Staunch. The vessel that appeared not to be disabled had another ship in tow, which she cast off, to save herself by flight. The third, having no top-masts, bore up to assist her consort, but was soon obliged to strike to the superior force of the Boadicea; whilst the crippled vessel yielded at once to the Otter. The former proved to be the French frigate Venus; the latter, the Ceylon, an armed Indiaman from Madras, which had been captured that morning, after a smart engagement, by the Venus and the Victor corvette, the vessel that had escaped. The resolute resistance made by

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the Ceylon, and the damage she had inflicted upon the Venus, were the main causes of her own recovery, and of the capture of the Venus. On board the Ceylon was Major-General Abercrombie, who commanded the expedition now on its way from India.

The struggle thus far honourably maintained by the French was now soon to terminate, and an effort proportioned to the object was about to put an end to their maritime depredations in the seas of India. Shortly after the action last noticed, or early in October, Vice-Admiral Bertie in the Nisus frigate arrived from the Cape of Good Hope in the bay of St. Paul. Great exertions had been made to refit and equip the vessels which had been captured; and eleven days after the Vice-Admiral's arrival he was able to put to sea with the Boadicea, Nisus, Africaine, Venus, now named the Nereide, and the Ceylon, well manned and supplied. With this squadron he proceeded to Port Louis, off which he arrived on the 19th October. Finding that of the enemy's vessels lying in the harbour not more than two were ready for sea, he left the Boadicea, Nisus, and Nereide to maintain the blockade, and resumed his voyage to Rodriguez, to join the expedition which had been directed to rendezvous at that island. On his way he fell in with the squadron from India under Rear-Admiral Drury, proceeding to the same destination, and in company with them arrived at Rodriguez on the 3rd of November. The division from Bombay was already present, and that from Madras made its appearance three days afterwards. It was not until the 21st October that the

armament from Bengal arrived. As the season was far advanced, and the period was approaching when the winds in these latitudes become variable and violent hurricanes occur, the commander of the expedition considered it of the utmost importance that no further time should be lost; and accordingly preparations had been made for the embarkation of the troops that had previously arrived, and for the supply of the vessels from Bengal with such stores as they might require without their dropping anchor. As soon as this operation was effected, the whole of the fleet was under weigh, and early on the 29th November came to anchor off the point selected for debarkation in Grande Baye, near the north-east extremity of the island, about fifteen miles north from the capital, where it had been previously ascertained that a fleet might be anchored in the narrow passage between a small island called from its outline Gunner's Quoin, and the main-land, and where openings in the reefs allowed many boats to enter abreast. A landing in force at this place had been deemed impracticable, as it was supposed that vessels of burthen could neither make their way through the reefs of rocks which formed the exterior barrier of the bay, nor find anchorage outside, from the great depth of water close to the rocks. It had been, however, ascertained by the officers of the navy, that a passage between the rocks could be accomplished, and that a fleet might lie at anchor in the situation to which it had been actually conducted. No opposition was experienced, and the whole of the force was landed by three o'clock in the afternoon. The troops had been distributed into

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BOOK I. five brigades.¹ The first, under Colonel Picton,
 CHAP. VI. consisted of his Majesty's 12th and 22nd regiments,

1810. and the right wing of the Madras volunteer battalion; the second, under Colonel Gibbs, of his Majesty's 59th, with three hundred of the 89th and a company of the 87th, and of the left wing of the Madras volunteers; the third brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Kelso, was formed of the 14th regiment and the second battalion of the Bengal volunteers; and the fourth, commanded by Colonel Macleod, of the 69th regiment, of the Madras native flank battalion, with three hundred marines; the fifth brigade was composed of his Majesty's 65th, a troop of the 26th dragoons, and the first battalion of the Bengal native volunteers. There was also a reserve division, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Keating, comprising the 84th regiment, the flank companies of some other corps, and the Bombay native troops. These, with the artillery and a large body of seamen, formed a force of about eleven thousand men. To oppose them General Decaen had not more than two thousand Europeans, including the crews of the ships of war, a considerable number of colonists, and a body of African slaves, without discipline, and badly armed.

As soon as the troops could be formed, the force

¹ The European force was composed of his Majesty's regiments, the 12th, 14th, 22nd, 56th, 59th, 65th, 69th, 84th, and 89th, the Bengal and Madras artillery, and a company of the 26th dragoons; six thousand three hundred strong: and two thousand seamen and marines. The native troops from Bengal and Madras consisted of four volunteer battalions and a party of Madras pioneers, three thousand men: altogether, eleven thousand three hundred. The squadron consisted of the *Illustrious* 74, and the frigates *Cornwallis*, *Africaine*, *Boadicea*, *Nisus*, *Clorinde*, *Cornelia*, *Menelaus*, *Psyche*, *Ceylon*, *Nereide*, *Phœbe*, *Doris*, and *Vesper*, besides sloops and gun-brigs.

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moved towards Port Louis. The road followed the direction of the coast for the first five miles, passing through a thick wood much entangled with brush-wood, through which the men made their way with great difficulty and fatigue. No enemy was seen until, on clearing the wood, the heads of the columns were fired upon by a small picquet, by which Lieutenant-Colonel Keating, Lieutenant Ashe, and some men of the advance, were wounded. The enemy were quickly dispersed, and greater injury was inflicted by the excessive heat of the weather and want of water. Several of the officers and men employed in the laborious duty of bringing on the artillery and stores sunk under their exertions, and fell dead on the march.¹ After clearing the wood, the army bivouacked for the night.

On the following morning the march was resumed, with the purpose of reaching the capital; but the excessive heat and scanty supply of water compelled General Abercrombie to halt, about five miles short of Port Louis upon the bed of the Pamplermousse river. On the 31st the force again advanced, and, soon after it had moved, came upon the enemy, who had taken up an advantageous position in front with several field-pieces. The European flank battalion, which formed the advance, was led against them by Colonel Campbell of the 33rd; and, by a spirited charge, put them to flight, with the loss of their guns. The success was dearly purchased; Colonel Campbell, and Major O'Keefe of the 12th regiment, being killed whilst gallantly leading their men to

¹ Among those who perished from heat and fatigue were Lieutenant Dove of his Majesty's 14th, and Captain Yates of the City of London Indiaman.

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the charge. After the repulse of the enemy, the army resumed its march, and drew up in front of the lines defending Port Louis, preparatory to an assault on the following morning, whilst the ships of war, which had now come round to the harbour, should cannonade the town from the sea. This catastrophe was prevented by the offer of General Decaen to capitulate; and, the terms of his surrender being agreed upon, the Isle of France became subject to the British crown. The advanced period of the season rendering it unadvisable to protract the contest, terms more favourable than were merited, although less so than those demanded,¹ were granted. The troops of the garrison and crews of the ships of war were to be conveyed in English ships to European France, instead of becoming prisoners of war; taking with them all property declared to be private. The ships in the harbour, with all stores and public property, fell to the captors. The inhabitants were secured in the continuance of their religion, laws, and customs.² Thus instantaneously disappeared the fancied strength of the Isle of France when once the vigour of British India emancipated itself from the visionary obstacles which the selfish fears of the British Cabinet had opposed, and the imperfect information of the Indian Government had encouraged.

¹ Decaen had the effrontery to demand that the French frigates, with all their crews and appointments, should be relinquished for the conveyance of the troops to France. "Que pour ce transport je conserverai les quatre frégates de S. M. l'Empereur, La Manche, La Bellone, L'Astrée, et La Minerve, ainsi que les corvettes La Victoire et L'Entreprenante, avec leurs officiers et équipages, armements et munitions, et approvisionnement." He must have expected the reply, "Altogether inadmissible."—Calcutta Government Gazette, February 9, 1811.

² Asiatic Annual Register, xii.; History, p. 15: Calcutta Government Gazette, February 9th, 1811: London Gazette Extraordinary, February 13, 1811.

The very effort that was ultimately made evinced the strength of the misconception that had invested the capture of the Mauritius with such unreal danger; and the conquest, although creditable to the spirit with which it was undertaken, reflected but little honour on the British arms. The Isle of Bourbon was restored to France at the peace. The Isle of France, or the Mauritius, as it was originally designated, is still subject to Great Britain.

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The settlements of Holland in the Eastern Archipelago had never, even after their enforced submission in common with the parent country to France, afforded to any great extent the means of harassing the trade of India. French privateers only occasionally haunted the roads of Batavia or cruized amongst the islands of the Archipelago. Still, however, they constituted a rallying point, which was likely to become of more consideration after the destruction of those asylums which lay more in the route of the Indian trade; and it was incompatible with the interests of India and the policy of England longer to permit the presence of an enemy in any part of the Eastern hemisphere. The first measures for this purpose that were sanctioned contemplated only a rigorous blockade of Java and the Spice islands; but it was soon found that the instructions of the home authorities, issued in ignorance both of the localities of the islands and political relations of India with the principalities on the east of the bay of Bengal, were impracticable and mischievous. The numerous and intricate channels among the islands of the Archipelago could be effectually blocked up only by the employment of the whole of

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the naval armament in the Indian seas; and the enforcement of laws so unintelligible to the plain sense of the Burmese and Malays as those of blockade, could have no other effect than that of irritating and alarming them, and interrupting their traffic with our own settlements, even if it did not lead to a piratical warfare against the country trade. It was judged, therefore, by Lord Minto and Admiral Drury to be the more safe as well as more honourable plan to adopt a decided course, and, instead of confining their attempts to an unavailing blockade of the Dutch islands, attempt their annexation to the Crown of England. No great difficulty in accomplishing this object was anticipated; as, although reinforcements had arrived at Java from Europe, and the island was commanded by an officer in the interest of France, yet the Moluccas it was known were indifferently prepared for resistance, and among the Dutch colonists at Batavia there existed a strong party who preferred open conquest by Britain to their insidious subjugation by the Emperor of France.

In conformity to these views, an expedition on a small scale was fitted out from Madras against the Molucca islands, consisting of his Majesty's ships *Dover*, *Cornwallis*, and *Samarang*, having on board part of the Madras European regiment and a small body of artillery: the troops were commanded by Captain Court, the squadron by Captain Tucker of the *Dover*. They left Madras on the 9th October, 1809, and by the middle of the following February arrived off the island of *Amboyna*, the most considerable of the Dutch Spice islands and seat of government. The vessels anchored off the town, situated

at the bottom of a small bay, beneath a line of low hills, and defended by batteries along the beach as well as on some of the neighbouring heights, and by Fort Victoria, mounting a number of heavy ordnance. As the elevations on the left and in the rear of the town commanded its defences, it was determined to carry them; and, whilst the squadron occupied the attention of the enemy by a vigorous cannonade, the troops, aided by seamen and marines, were landed on the right of the bay unnoticed. The party consisted of about four hundred men, and were divided into two bodies; one led by Captain Phillips, the other by Captain Court. The first stormed a battery erected upon an elevation near at hand, the hill of Wanitu, and carried it after a resolute resistance, in which the Dutch officer commanding the post was killed. Captain Court's party had to make a circuitous détour to the south of the town, and were further delayed by the rugged surface of the country. By sunset they reached their destination, a height above Fort Victoria, surmounted by a redoubt, which was abandoned as they entered it from the rear. During these operations the ships had kept up a brisk cannonade on the sea-face of the town, and had been exposed to a cross-fire from the batteries in front, or on either side of it, from which the evening land-breeze enabled them to draw off. On the following morning, the batteries in the possession of the British opened on the town and fort, and soon silenced their fire. A summons to surrender was thereupon sent to the Dutch governor, and was promptly obeyed. A capitulation was entered into, by which the garrison, composed

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BOOK I. of more than thirteen hundred Europeans and Ma-
CHAP. VI. lays, laid down their arms to a third of their number.

1810. The Dutch troops were sent to Java, where the commandant was tried and shot by order of General Daendels. The Malays were taken into the British service, and were advantageously employed in some of the succeeding operations. Amboyna, once the scene of British disgrace and suffering, acknowledged their authority during the remainder of the war.¹

During the winter and spring months succeeding the conquest of Amboyna, Captain Tucker reduced the smaller islands in its vicinity. In the commencement of the year, the *Caroline* and *Piedmontaise* frigates, and *Baracouta* brig, under the command of Captain Cole of the *Caroline*, with additional details of the Madras European regiment, commanded by Captain Nixon, were dispatched to reinforce the troops at Amboyna, and provide for its security. Captain Cole was authorised, if he saw a reasonable prospect of success, to make a descent upon the *Bandas*, a cluster of small volcanic islands south-east of Amboyna; the principal of which were *Great Banda*, or *Banda proper*, and *Banda Neira*, separated by a narrow strait. The latter was selected for attack, although defended by two forts—*Forts Belgica* and *Nassau*, by batteries mounting one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, and by a force of above seven hundred regular troops besides militia. These were stationed towards the northern extremity of the island, where a landing had been effected in 1801, when the place

¹ *Asiatic Annual Register*, xii. ; *History*, p. 21.

was taken by Admiral Rainier, and where it was expected the disembarkation would be repeated; but Captain Cole landed, with a party of two hundred seamen and soldiers, on the eastern side during the night, in a heavy squall of wind and rain, which effectually concealed his movements. A battery close to the landing-place was surprised, and its defenders made prisoners, without firing a shot; and, a guide having been procured, Captain Cole directed his march to Fort Belgica, about half a mile distant. The men advanced in profound silence, reached the foot of the ramparts unperceived, applied their scaling-ladders, and cleared the wall. The greater part of the garrison had been drawn off to strengthen the main body of the troops of the island, and but few men with the Governor had been left in the fortress. These, after a feeble resistance, endeavoured to escape by the gate, but they were met by a party of sailors; and, in the conflict which ensued, the Governor and several of his men were killed. When the day dawned, the British flag waved over Fort Belgica, which completely commanded the town and its defences. Upon the threat of Captain Cole to lay the former in ashes, the officer who was second in command agreed to surrender the island. A valuable booty rewarded the intrepidity and conduct which had so brilliantly achieved a valuable acquisition without suffering any loss.

At the same time Ternate was taken by Captain Tucker with a detachment of Europeans, the seamen and marines of the *Dover*, and some of the newly enlisted Amboyna corps. Captain Tucker arrived off the island on the 25th August; but light and baffling

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winds kept him off the shore, and a landing was not practicable before the 28th. A hundred and seventy men were landed in the night with intent to surprise the forts and batteries which guarded the bay. The difficulties of the approach frustrated the scheme, and the men were re-embarked. Early in the morning they were again put on shore; and, whilst the frigate engrossed the attention of the enemy, they proceeded unobserved to an eminence supposed to command the fort of Kayomaira, the principal Dutch post. They arrived on the hill at noon, but to their great vexation they found that the fort was screened from their view by an intervening forest. They then endeavoured to proceed by an inland route, but, after incessant exertion throughout the day, it was found impossible to disencumber the path of the immense trees which had been cut down and piled across it. Turning to the right, they followed the course of a rivulet which led to the beach, and brought them about ten o'clock within eight hundred yards of the fort before they were discovered. Disregarding a smart fire of grape and musketry, they rushed forward, escaladed the walls, and carried the fort. On the following morning the combined operations of the detachment and frigate overpowered the other defences of the bay, and by the evening the town and island were surrendered. Few casualties impaired the exultation of the victors. Their conquest completed the reduction of the Moluccas, and Java with its dependencies alone remained in the possession of the Dutch.¹

¹ Asiatic Annual Register, xii.; History, 27; Chronicle, 80; Official Dispatches.

Prior to the departure of Lord Minto for Madras the practicability of the subjugation of Java had been brought under his consideration by Mr. Raffles, originally a member of the Penang Government, but who had attracted the notice of the Governor-General by his acquaintance with the languages and political circumstances of the tribes of the Archipelago, and had been in consequence appointed the Governor-General's agent at Malacca. After Lord Minto's return to Bengal, the subject was resumed: Mr. Raffles came round to Calcutta for the sake of its more commodious investigation, and his statements so entirely satisfied the Governor-General of the feasibility of the measure, that he determined to undertake it upon his own responsibility. Its execution was, however, deferred until the result of the expedition against the French islands should be known; and in the interval the design received the prospective sanction of the authorities in England. No time was lost in preparing for the expedition. The King's regiments, which had returned to Madras¹ from the Mauritius, were immediately re-embarked, with the addition of the 78th regiment of foot and a portion of the 22nd dragoons; whilst in Bengal his Majesty's 59th, four battalions of Sipahi volunteers, the 20th, or marine regiment, details of pioneers, and artillery, horse and foot, with the Governor-General's body-guard, were assembled under the command of Colonel Wood. The command of the whole was vested in Sir Samuel Auchmuty, the Commander-in-chief at Madras. The Bengal troops sailed early in March, and reached

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¹ The 14th, 69th, and 89th: the Madras pioneers were also re-embarked.

BOOK I. the appointed rendezvous at Malacca by the end of
CHAP. VI. April. Lord Minto accompanied them in the Mo-
 1811. deste frigate, in the capacity, as he expressed him-
 self, of a volunteer. The Madras force sailed in
 two divisions: the first, under Lieutenant-Colonel
 Gillespie, on the 18th of April; and the second,
 under Lieutenant-Colonel Gibbs, on the 29th. At
 the same time Sir Samuel Auchmuty embarked in
 the Akbar frigate, and Commodore Broughton com-
 manding the fleet sailed in the *Illustrious*. It was
 fortunate that their departure had not been de-
 layed, for on the 3rd of May a tremendous hurri-
 cane set in at Madras, in which a great number of
 vessels, including the *Dover* frigate, were driven
 ashore and lost. The fleet had reached the outer
 edge of the vortex, and felt but little of the vio-
 lence of the storm. The whole of the expedition
 was collected at Malacca by the 1st of June: but
 this was much later than had been intended, the
 period having been delayed by the necessity of
 awaiting the return of the troops and transports
 from the Mauritius; and it now became a question
 of some anxiety whether and by what route the
 fleet could proceed.

The setting-in of the south-west monsoon ren-
 dered it highly inexpedient to attempt the usual
 navigation through the Straits of Banca. Besides
 the danger to which the ships might be exposed
 from tempestuous weather, it was certain that the
 passage would be tedious, and the commencement
 of military operations in Java could not take place
 earlier than the rainy season of October and No-
 vember, when the climate would become unhealthy,

and the troops be disabled by sickness. The same objections applied to the track round the north-east of Borneo; and there remained only the passage along the south-west coast of that island, in which the fleet would be sheltered from the fury of the monsoon, and would be assisted on their way by the breezes from the land. This route was accordingly strongly recommended by Mr. Raffles, upon the authority of Captain Greigh, of the Minto brig, by whom it had been surveyed. It was as strongly objected to by the chief naval authorities, who pronounced it to be impracticable; but Lord Minto, confiding in the information of Mr. Raffles, decided the controversy in favour of the inner passage, and led the way in the *Modeste*. The difficulties were easily surmounted under Mr. Greigh's skilful pilotage. In six weeks the fleet cleared the intricate channels, through which it had passed without a single accident, crossed the sea from the point of Sambas, and anchored on the 2nd of August off the north coast of Java. Had not the presence of the Governor-General decided the question, we have his own testimony that the enterprise must have been suspended until the following year.¹

The island of Java had for some time been almost lost sight of amid the convulsive revolutions which had shaken the parent country. The last of these pretended to extinguish the national integrity of Holland, and reduce it to an integral department

¹ Parliamentary Debates, 10th January, 1812; Thanks to the army and navy, and to Lord Minto. Life of Sir Thomas S. Raffles, p. 90. Lord Minto remarks in a letter to the Court, "The attempt must have been abandoned for the present year if I had yielded to the predicted difficulties of the passage."

BOOK I. of France. Such a degradation could not fail to
 CHAP. VI. excite deep dissatisfaction both at home and abroad;

1811. and the inhabitants of the Dutch colonies, more removed from the influence of the French Government than their countrymen in Europe, were in general more abhorrent of the alteration. Apprised of the prevalence of these feelings, and of the weakness of the administration of Java, Sir Edward Pellew had, in 1807, urgently pressed Sir George Barlow to sanction an expedition against the island; for the reduction of which he required no more than a thousand Europeans, and as many native troops, in addition to the resources of the vessels under his own command. The economical policy of the Bengal Government was, however, averse to any undertaking which involved expense; and the disinclination was fortified by the prohibitory orders of the Court of Directors against embarking in enterprises, which possibly they regarded as affecting the interests of the nation more immediately than those of the Company. The Admiral was permitted, however, to amuse himself with a simple demonstration. Taking on board five hundred men and some artillery at Madras, Sir E. Pellew sailed on the 20th of October, 1807, with his squadron,¹ for Gresik, a harbour on the east coast of Java, where it was known that several Dutch vessels of war were laid up. He arrived off Point Parko on the 5th of December, and pursued his course with little opposition to Gresik, where he burnt three

¹ The squadron consisted of the *Culloden* and *Powerful* seventy-fours, *Caroline* and *Fox* frigates, and *Victoria*, *Samarang*, *Seafflower*, and *Jaseur* sloops.

line-of-battle ships and an Indiaman, and destroyed the fort and batteries. By a convention with the Council of Surabaya the fleet abstained from doing further damage, on condition of being furnished with supplies, which were accordingly provided. The facility with which this success was achieved demonstrated the feebleness of the Dutch force in Java, and the favourable disposition of the inhabitants.

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The impunity with which the demonstration had been followed, awakened the attention of the French Emperor to the condition of Java; and he immediately ordered arrangements to be instituted, in order to place it in a state of greater security. Reinforcements were sent out; and General Daendels, an officer of tried activity and resolution, was appointed governor. Unchecked by any respect for private rights, and unscrupulous in the means by which his ends were attained, General Daendels studied only how to improve the military attitude of the island, and prepare it for a contest of which he anticipated the approach. Every consideration gave way to this design, and the inhabitants were compelled to submit to enormous exactions, in order to raise funds by which the army might be reorganised and recruited, the existing fortresses repaired, new and formidable works erected in the vicinity of the capital, and ample provision made for a vigorous defence against future invasion. He was not, however, allowed to test the efficiency of his foresight: on the eve of the arrival of the expedition he had been recalled to France, and was succeeded by General Jansens, who had been go-

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governor of the Cape of Good Hope when it was taken by the English, and had recently arrived at Batavia with a reinforcement of several frigates and a body of one thousand European troops.¹ The whole of the troops on the island were estimated at seventeen thousand men, natives and Europeans, of whom thirteen thousand were concentrated in the lines of Cornelis, a position strong both by nature and art, about eight miles from Batavia.

The fleet, the command of which had been assumed by Rear-Admiral Stopford, in the *Scipio*, and which with transports and brigs mustered above ninety sail, having on board about twelve thousand troops, European and Indian, in nearly equal proportions, anchored in the bay of Batavia on the 4th of August. A landing was immediately effected at Chilingyi, a village ten miles east of Batavia. No opposition was met with, disembarkation at this point not having been anticipated. The army was moved forwards two miles, in two divisions; one on the road to Cornelis, the other fronting that to Batavia. No effort of any importance was made to disturb them; and, the horses and guns having been landed on the 5th, a general advance was ordered towards the capital. On the night of the 7th, the van, commanded by Colonel Gillespie, crossed the Anjole river by a bridge of

¹ The removal of Daendels was a source of great mortification to him, and he was urgent with his successor to abstain from the assumption of authority until after the expedition should have arrived, and been, as he confidently asserted, defeated. Although it is possible that his military talents might have enhanced the difficulty of the conquest, and delayed its accomplishment, yet the number and equipment of the invading force, and the resources at the command of the Government of India, ensured ultimate success.

boats, and by dawn huddled near the suburbs. In the course of the day a small detachment was sent into the city; by whose presence the work of plunder commenced by the Malays and Javanese was arrested, and large stores of colonial goods were saved from the flames. Many of the principal inhabitants had been compelled by General Jansens to quit Batavia; but those who remained, readily submitted. In the evening, a large part of the advance was quartered in the town. During the night an attempt at surprise was made by the enemy; but, finding the place occupied in greater force than they expected, they speedily retired.

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On the morning of the 10th of August, the advanced division marched out of Batavia towards the cantonments of Weltevreden, which they reached by daybreak. The cantonments were abandoned; but a division of the Dutch army, under General Jumel, the second in command, had taken up a strong position about a mile from Weltevreden, on the road to Cornelis. Their right was protected by a canal called the Slokan: their left was exposed; but the approach both in front and on the flank was embarrassed by pepper plantations and marshy ground, as well as defended by an abatis, with which the enemy had blocked up the road. From behind this entrenchment, they opened a fire of four horse-artillery guns with grape; whilst the infantry, posted in two villages, kept up a brisk fire of musketry on the advancing columns. The guns were answered with effect by those of the British artillery, and the musketry was replied to by the skirmishers, whilst an attempt was made to

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turn the enemy's left flank. After some delay, arising from the nature of the ground, the attempt succeeded. The villages were set in flames, and the British troops rushed forward to the charge. The enemy broke, and were pursued with vigour until they took shelter under the guns of Cornelis.¹ The main body of the army came up towards the close of the engagement, and took post at Weltevreden; having secured a free communication with the town and shipping, a healthy and commodious station for the troops, and the command of the resources of the country. Three hundred guns were found in the arsenal at Weltevreden, besides great quantities of ammunition and military stores.

Preparations were immediately made for an attack upon Cornelis, which Général Jansens expected to be able to maintain against all assaults until the rainy season should set in, and sickness should compel the retreat of the invaders. His post was an entrenched camp between two rivers, the Slokan on the east, and the river of Batavia on the west. The latter was unfordable and the banks were steep and overrun with jungle: the former was more practicable, but it was defended by powerful batteries and redoubts; one of which was on the near side of the river, for the protection of the only bridge that had been left standing. The space between the rivers in front, above six hundred yards, was guarded by strong entrenchments and redoubts, and was difficult of access from the ruggedness of

¹ Their loss was severe; that of the British was inconsiderable: but several officers were wounded; of whom Lieutenant Duffield of the horse artillery died of his wounds. Lieutenant Munro of his Majesty's 78th was killed.

the ground. A like space in the rear of the works was still more strongly fortified. The whole circumference of the lines extended nearly five miles, and was defended by two hundred and eighty pieces of cannon.

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Although the necessity of an ultimate assault was anticipated by the Commander-in-chief, yet he thought it expedient to try the effect of regular approaches; and a battering train having been landed, and batteries constructed, the army broke ground on the night of the 20th of August. It was not till the morning of the 24th that the batteries could be opened with effect, and during the interval a furious cannonade was kept upon the works by the enemy, by which some loss was sustained. On the 24th the guns opened upon the enemy's lines, and, notwithstanding the greater number of their ordnance, with much more decided effect. The principal redoubt was repeatedly silenced, and many of the guns in their batteries were dismounted. On the 25th the cannonade was resumed, and returned with spirit: but although the enemy suffered severely both in men and guns, yet it was evident that no practicable breach could be made until the batteries were considerably advanced; an operation involving delay, and demanding from the seamen and troops an amount of exertion to which, from the heat of the weather and the excessive labour they would have to undergo, they were unequal. In the mean time the enemy were daily adding to their defences, and using every means to render them impregnable. The period therefore had arrived at which the place must be carried by storm,

BOOK I. or a protracted and exhausting course of warfare
 CHAP. VI. would become inevitable.

1811. The comparative facility of an approach on the enemy's right by the Slokan, and the possibility of carrying by a *coup de main* both the redoubt which was on this side of the river, and the bridge by which the river was crossed, recommended the principal attack to be made in that direction. The assault was intrusted to Colonel Gillespie, having under his orders the infantry of the advance, and a part of the right brigade of the line commanded by Colonel Gibbs. At the same time two other attacks were to be made upon the enemy's lines; one, under Lieutenant-Colonel Macleod, against the principal redoubt in the angle of the enemy's front and left; and the other, under Major Yule, upon the bridge leading to the rear: whilst the main body of the army threatened the front.¹

Colonel Gillespie's column marched soon after midnight on the 26th. The troops had to make a considerable *détour* through a difficult country, intersected by ravines, and parcelled out in pepper plantations and betel gardens. The darkness of the night aggravated the intricacy of the path; and when, towards morning, the head of the column had ap-

¹ The troops under Colonel Gillespie were the two flank battalions, consisting of the grenadiers of the 78th regiment, and of the 5th and 6th native volunteer battalions, the light companies of the 14th, 59th, 69th, 78th, and of the light infantry battalion and 4th native volunteers, the rifle companies of the 14th, 59th, and 78th, five companies of the 89th, dismounted dragoons and body-guard, a body of marines, and Madras pioneers. Colonel Gibbs' column was formed of the grenadiers of the 14th, 59th, and 69th, first battalion of the 59th, and 4th and light infantry volunteer battalions. Colonel Macleod led the 69th regiment. Major Yule had under his orders the grenadiers of the 20th native infantry, two companies of his Majesty's 69th, the flank battalion of the reserve, with a detachment of the Madras pioneers and artillery, and a troop of the 22nd dragoons.

proached near to the works, information was brought to Colonel Gillespie that the rear division had fallen behind. A short halt was ordered; but as it was impossible to remain unobserved after daybreak, and a retreat in the presence of the enemy might hazard the success of the expedition, Colonel Gillespie determined to make the assault at once, trusting that the strayed column would be guided aright by the firing, and would be in time to support him before he was seriously engaged.

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The morning dawn showed the enemy's videttes at hand, and the column was challenged. The men, as commanded, reserving their fire, rushed forward with the bayonet; and the picquets were destroyed, and the advanced redoubt was carried almost as soon as the alarm was given. At the same moment the grenadiers of the 78th, under a heavy fire from the enemy, carried the bridge over the Slokan, a slight structure which might with ease have been demolished. As soon as the passage was effected, Colonel Gillespie, turning to the left, stormed a second redoubt, which was within the lines; and notwithstanding the superior numbers of the enemy, and a spirited resistance, which caused the loss of many brave officers and men, carried it at the point of the bayonet. Each of these redoubts mounted twenty eighteen pounders, besides several twenty-four and thirty-two pounders.

The division of Colonel Gibbs having, as was anticipated, been guided to the scene of action, by the cannonade, had hastened on to take their share in the conflict; and, having crossed the Slokan, the grenadiers of the 14th, 59th, and 69th regiments

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moved against a redoubt on the right, which they stormed, and carried with the bayonet in the most gallant manner. They had scarcely gained possession when the powder magazine¹ attached to it exploded with a stunning sound, and scattered piecemeal the mutilated limbs of both defenders and assailants. This awful occurrence was followed by a momentary pause; but the batteries of the enemy soon opened again upon the attacking column. The assailants had, however, now gained a firm footing within the lines, and proceeded with renewed spirit to storm the remaining redoubts to their right and left.

In the mean time an active cannonade had been maintained on the front, where the enemy had erroneously expected the main attack would have been made, and under this persuasion had refrained from reinforcing their troops on the right. The column directed to the rear was unable to cross the river, as the bridge was burnt, and was obliged to remain contented with firing upon the enemy from the opposite bank. The detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Macleod carried the redoubt against which they had been sent, but, unfortunately, with the loss of their commander. The success of the assault on the right, however, soon opened a free access to the entrenchment, and the British entered Cornelis in every direction.

When most of the redoubts had been stormed, and daylight rendered objects distinct, the enemy's reserve, composed of several battalions, with twenty

¹ It was said to have been purposely fired by some of the enemy's officers, who perished in the explosion. No advantage accrued to the enemy from the catastrophe.

pieces of horse artillery, besides heavy guns, and a large body of cavalry, was seen drawn up on the plain in front of the barracks and lesser fort of Cornelis, the guns of which commanded the approach. The duty of dispersing these was consigned to the 59th, and was gallantly effected by that corps, who not only drove them from their position, but captured the fort. The dragoons and horse artillery then coming up, Colonel Gillespie placed himself at their head, and pursued the fugitives for ten miles, cutting off great numbers, and completing the disorganization of their army. Those who sought refuge in the thickets were killed or dispersed by the 14th regiment and detachments of the Bengal volunteers. The efforts of their officers to keep them together as far as Beutenzorg, where entrenchments had been thrown up, and a second stand was to have been made, entirely failed, and the fate of Java was decided. Six thousand prisoners were taken, mostly European troops, including a regiment of voltigeurs recently arrived from France. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was likewise very considerable. The victory was not won without loss also to the assailants. In the previous operations, and in the assault of Cornelis, the killed and wounded amounted to nearly nine hundred, of whom eighty-five were officers.¹

Although the dispositions of the Commander-in-chief rendered the fall of Cornelis little doubtful,

¹ The officers who were killed, or who died of their wounds, were, Lieutenant-Colonel C. Macleod, his Majesty's 69th, and Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, 75th : Captains Kennedy, 14th ; Oliphant, 59th ; and Ross, 69th : Lieutenants Hutchins, 22nd dragoons ; Waring, Lloyd, Litton, and Macpherson, 59th ; Hipkins, 69th ; Coghlan, 14th ; Macdonald, 5th battalion volunteers ; and Murrall, ditto 6th : and Ensign Wolfe of his Majesty's 59th.

BOOK I. yet that it was accomplished so quickly, and with a
CHAP. VI. loss which, though severe, was disproportionate to

1811. the strength of the position and the importance of the capture, was mainly attributable to the decision and activity of Colonel Gillespie. Had he paused for the junction of the rear division, had he delayed an instant to attack the exterior redoubt, and make good his passage over the Slokan, the difficulties of the attempt would have been immeasurably enhanced, and success would have demanded infinitely greater sacrifices. The same promptitude and courage characterised his subsequent movements. The defeat of the reserve and the pursuit of the flying foe; the final dispersion of the enemy's troops, and the impossibility of again concentrating a force of any consideration, were mainly attributable to his exertions. That the troops he commanded were worthy of their leader is an additional proof of his military merit.

After the annihilation of his army, General Jansens, with a small body of horse, retired to the eastern districts of Java. A squadron of frigates, with the marines and a Bengal battalion under Colonel Wood, was immediately dispatched to Cheribon, and arrived there two days after General Jansens had passed. The place was immediately surrendered. Another expedition proceeded to Madura, off the north-eastern extremity of Java, and occupied that island. On the 5th of September Sir S. Auchmuty proceeded against General Jansens, who had assembled a force consisting chiefly of native horse, and taken up a strong and fortified position at Jatu, about six miles from Samarang. The vessels arrived

off the latter port on the 12th, and the troops were landed on the following day, the town being abandoned. On the 16th they came in sight of the enemy, about eight thousand strong, principally natives, with twenty pieces of cannon, drawn up on some high and rugged hills forming the southern boundary of a valley across which lay the road. The troops with Sir S. Auchmuty were not above one thousand in number, consisting of the 14th and 78th regiments, with the grenadier company of the 3rd volunteer native battalion, and details of artillery and pioneers, with six field-pieces. Having established his guns on the heights facing the enemy, so as to keep down their fire, Sir S. Auchmuty directed the troops to cross the valley and ascend the hills opposite. The advance was made with the greatest alacrity and firmness; the valley was traversed with little loss; and, as soon as the heights were ascended, the enemy retreated in confusion. As they consisted chiefly of cavalry, they easily outstripped pursuit; but on learning that they showed an inclination to rally under the cannon of the small fort of Onarang, about four miles from the field of battle, Sir S. Auchmuty marched thither without halting, again put them to flight, and occupied the fort. This was the last effort made by General Jansens. Finding that no dependence could be placed on the only troops he was now able to collect, he proposed immediately after the action to treat for a capitulation. A cessation of arms for twenty-four hours was allowed him; and, after some hesitation on the part of General Jansens, a treaty was signed. By this it was stipulated that

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BOOK I. Java and its dependencies should be surrendered to
CHAP. VI. Great Britain; that all the military should be pri-

1811. soners of war; and that the British governor should be left unfettered in regard to the future administration of the island, the guarantee of the public debt, and the liquidation of the paper money.¹

Thus, as Lord Minto observed, an empire, which for three centuries had contributed greatly to the power, prosperity, and grandeur of one of the principal and most respected states of Europe, had been wrested from the short usurpation of France and added to the dominion of the British crown, and converted from a seat of hostile machination and commercial competition into an augmentation of British power and prosperity. The reduction of Java left the Eastern seas without an enemy, and the merchant-vessels of Great Britain and of British India were at liberty to pursue their peaceful and beneficent course without dread of molestation or fear of plunder. The value of the conquest was perhaps inadequately appreciated in England, but the acknowledgments of the Prince Regent were conveyed to the army and navy.² Medals were bestowed upon the King's and Company's officers who had distinguished themselves in the expedition, and

¹ General Jansens had been formerly governor of the Cape of Good Hope when it was taken by the English. Adverting to this disaster, the French Emperor, on his departure for the government of Java, significantly remarked, "Souvenez-vous, Monsieur, qu'un Général François ne se laisse pas prendre une seconde fois." He had little reason to look for much favourable consideration on his return to France.

² In the debate in the Commons on the vote of thanks to Lord Minto and the army and navy for the reduction of the Isles of France and Java, Sheridan and Whitbread professed to doubt if the acquisitions were worth the cost of money and life by which they had been made. These doubts were clearly the mere effusions of party spleen.

Lord Minto was raised to the dignity of Earl of BOOK I.
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After the reduction of Java, the government of 1811.
the island was placed in the hands of Mr. Raffles, with the designation of Lieutenant-Governor of Java and its dependencies, and the command of the troops left on the island was conferred upon Colonel Gillespie. Some time elapsed before the authority of the new government was established. The Dutch colonists, who could have no particular affection for the French, and who had experienced the overbearing and extortionary spirit of that military rule which was modelled upon the despotism to which France was subject, were for the most part well pleased with the change; but some of the native chiefs, deeming the season propitious for the subversion of all European ascendancy, manifested a hostile disposition which it became necessary to suppress. Among these chiefs, one of the most powerful was the Sultan of Yodhyakarta, who declared open war against the British, and called upon his countrymen to join him for their expulsion. Having in vain attempted to come to a friendly understanding with the Sultan, Colonel Gillespie conducted a force against his capital, and carried it by storm. The Sultan was taken prisoner and exiled to Penang, and his son was placed on the throne. The capture of Yodhyakarta, a place of great extent and some strength, defended by one hundred thousand troops, who, although defective in arms and discipline, were not wanting in intrepidity and fierceness, added another laurel to the wreath won by British valour, and intimidated the native princes

BOOK I. into a peaceable submission to a government whose
CHAP. VI. conciliatory policy they had subsequently occasion to
1812. compare with the oppression which they had been
accustomed to suffer from the Dutch.

Previously to the contest with the Sultan of Yodhyakarta, it had been found advisable to dispatch an expedition against the Sultan of Palembang, a state on the north-east coast of Sumatra. Shortly after the conquest of Java, commissioners had been sent to the Sultan to renew the engagements in which he was held by the Dutch. They had been obliged to return without effecting their object: the Sultan denied that any such engagements had ever existed, and asserted that the Dutch factory had been abandoned before the reduction of Java. To remove living evidence of the falsehood of this assertion, he razed the Dutch fort and factory, and caused the members of the factory at Palembang, now become the subjects of the British Government of Java, to be murdered. To punish this atrocity, and enforce the stipulation which had long been maintained in regard to the trade with Banca especially, a force was sent against the Sultan in March, 1812, commanded by Colonel Gillespie. He arrived off the Palembang river on the 18th of April, and the troops ascended the river in boats. No resistance was offered; and, upon the approach of the detachment to Palembang, the Sultan fled, leaving his capital and principality at the disposal of the victors. Colonel Gillespie with a small party landed on the night of the 25th of April; and, being joined by the principal part of his force on the following morning, commenced an in-

investigation into the character and behaviour of the fugitive prince. The process seems to have been summary. Upon the depositions of two natives who had been sent to Palembang by the British Government of Java, and who accused the Sultan of the murder of the Dutch, he was declared to have forfeited his sovereignty by various acts of rapine, treachery, and barbarity, contrary to the laws of nations and his existing engagements with the Dutch, to whose right the English Company had succeeded in virtue of the cession of Java and its dependencies. A proclamation to this effect in the Malay language was read. At the same time it was announced that the Commander of the forces had selected Pangerang Adipati, the Sultan's brother, in consideration of his virtues, and the love, esteem, and veneration with which he was regarded by the people of the country, to fill the vacant throne. This person was accordingly declared true and lawful Sultan of Palembang and its dependencies, under the title of Sultan Ratu Ahmed Najam-ud-din. The first use made of his power by the new Sultan was to enter into a treaty by which he ceded the island of Banca, a dependency of Palembang valuable for its mines of tin, in absolute and perpetual sovereignty and possession to the English. On the 18th of May, Colonel Gillespie, leaving with the prince whom he had crowned a hundred men for his defence, returned to Java, taking possession of Banca on his way. The measures thus adopted by Mr. Raffles were approved of by the Governor of Bengal.¹

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¹ Most of the particulars given in the text are derived from Thora's

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Although the Court of Directors had sanctioned the expedition against Java, their views did not go beyond the expulsion or reduction of the Dutch power, the destruction of their fortifications, the distribution of their arms and stores to the natives, and the evacuation of the island. Lord Minto, however, was not prepared to expose the Dutch colonists without a government or without arms to the vindictive passions of the Javanese;¹ to consign a rich and prosperous island to an indefinite perpetuation of the elements of disorder and bloodshed; or to throw away the advantages, both commercial and political, which the occupation of Java ensured to British India and to Great Britain. He therefore recommended to the Court a reconsideration of their orders; and, upon the conquest of the island, committed it to a government composed partly of the civil and military officers of the Company, and partly of respectable colonists well affected to the English. Under their combined administration Java soon came to enjoy an unprecedented amount of tranquillity and prosperity. The country was divided into districts, each of which was placed under the management of a European Resident, who was charged with the general collection of the revenue, and the distribution of justice according to such laws as were in force, and which were unexceptionable in principle. The infliction of torture and mutilation was at once abolished; and natives were admitted to juries, from

Conquest of Java. Major Thorn served as Deputy Quarter-Master-General to the forces in Java.

¹ Letter from Lord Minto to Mr. Raffles, February, 1811; *Life of Raffles*, p. 23.

which they had under the Dutch regime been excluded. The farming of the revenues and imposts was abandoned, and the collections were made directly by the officers of the Government according to fixed rates. The arbitrary exaction of an undefined proportion of the crops was discontinued, and a settlement of a specified amount for a given period entered into with the occupants of the land. All forced requisitions of labour were prohibited, transit duties were abrogated, and the duties on external trade equalised. It were foreign to the scope of this work to dwell longer upon the improvements effected in Java whilst under British authority; but the prevalence of undisturbed internal order and peace, concurrently with the improving resources of the state, evidenced a material advance in the productive industry of the people, and an amelioration of their condition.¹

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The question of retaining Java as a colony of the Crown, or of leaving it under the government of the East India Company, had been left undetermined by the British Administration, amid the mighty transactions which at this period involved the destinies of the world. One of their results was the re-establishment of the Netherlands as an independent monarchy, and the revival of those relations of amity which had at various intervals united Great Britain and Holland. In the spirit of the connexion thus re-established, the British Go-

¹ The revenues of Java realised, in 1805-6, rupees 492,128. General Daendels, in 1809, raised them to 800,000. In 1814 they amounted to 5,368,065. For this and other facts, see "Substance of a Minute recorded by Sir Thomas S. Raffles, with Appendix; printed (not published) by Black and Co., London, 1814: also his *Life, and History of Java*.

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vernment, without weighing with sufficient deliberation the circumstances which the altered political condition of Europe had created, and with a dereliction more liberal than politic of its own interests, hastened to replace the Dutch in their ancient Eastern possessions; and by a convention with the United Netherlands, dated 13th of August, 1814, engaged to restore all the colonies, with exception of the Cape of Good Hope and some places in the West Indies. Java was consequently among the cessions. The more pressing calls at home upon the attention of the Batavian Government delayed its availing itself immediately of the generosity of its ally; and Java did not reassume the character of a Dutch colony until the end of 1816, five years after it had been conquered by the armament from Bengal. Sir T. Raffles was spared the pain of resigning his power to the Dutch commissioners, by the appointment of Mr. Fendall, of the Bengal service, to the government of Java in the beginning of the same year.¹

¹ Some measures of the administration of Mr. Raffles had been disapproved of by the Court of Directors, particularly his alienation of the public domains in order to raise funds, in place of re-issuing a greatly depreciated paper currency, under an emergent demand for money, and the inexpedience of drawing on Bengal. Charges implicating his integrity had also been preferred against him; which, although acknowledged in most unqualified terms by the Court to be utterly unfounded, seem to have produced a bias unfavourable to him in the mind of Lord Moira, and to have had some influence in his supersession. His provisional appointment, by Lord Minto, to be Resident at Bencoolen was confirmed, and he repaired thither after a visit to England, where he received the honour of knighthood in the end of 1817.—*Life*, p. 290.

CHAPTER VII.

Return of the Governor-General from Java.—Internal Administration.—Indications of future Hostilities.—Relations with Hyderabad and Nagpore.—Misgovernment of Oude.—Interference of the Government of Bengal.—Differences between the Nawab and the Resident.—The latter supported by Lord Minto.—Defects in the Judicial and Revenue Systems of the British Government.—Mohammedan and latter Hindu Systems.—Concentration of Functions.—Judicial officers.—Circumstances counteracting defective Administration.—State of Civil and Criminal Justice.—Consequences of establishing Civil Courts,—multiplication of Suits,—arrears of Decisions,—no effective remedy applied.—State of Criminal Judicature,—similar arrears.—State of Police.—Classes of Robbers,—prevalence of Dakoiti, or Gang robbery,—atrocities perpetrated,—difficulty of detection and conviction.—Evils of excluding Native co-operation,—attempts to recover it,—failures. Superintendents of Police and Special Magistrates appointed.—Employment of Informers.—Diminution of Dakoiti.—Revenue System,—review of.—Proprietary right of the Sovereign not of Hindu but of Mohammedan origin.—Doctrines of the latter.—Notions of the people.—Nature and extent of public demand under the Hindus and Mohammedans in earlier and later times,—from whom demanded.—Variety of Proprietary rights.—Village communities,—their origin,—legislation,—colonisation,—

conquest.—Traces of property extinguished by the exactions of the Government, and Village communities destroyed,—in some provinces,—not in all.—Variety of Organization,—different rights of the members,—peculiarities of constitution,—general identity.—Classes of tenants,—perpetual,—temporary.—The Public Revenue how realised.—Revenue officers.—Head-men of villages,—modifications of the office.—Function of Zemindar,—degree of his proprietary right,—contingent advantages,—consideration among the people.—Course adopted by the British Government.—Permanent Zemindari settlement ordered for Madras.—Commencement of Ryotwar settlement.—Principles of assessment urged by Lord W. Bentinck,—abandoned by the Government of Madras.—Village settlements formed.—Perpetual settlement at Madras prohibited by the Court of Directors.—Settlement of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces of Bengal.—Commission of Inquiry,—recommend delay of a permanent assessment,—recommendation disregarded by the Government.—Expected advantages of permanency,—not realisable,—illusory nature of the provision;—moderate assessment all that is essential,—principle discountenanced in England.—Permanent settlement of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces forbidden.—Regulations for the protection of the Ryots.—House-tax,—resistance at Benares,—repealed.—Religious riot at Benares.—Missionaries in Bengal,—established at Serampore,—checked by the Government.—Lord Minto's encouragement of Oriental Literature,—interest in the College of Fort William.—Financial operations.—Close of Lord Minto's Administration.

THE Governor-General returned from Java to Calcutta towards the end of 1811; and the remaining period of his administration was occupied with the resumption and prosecution of measures affecting the welfare of British India in its amicable relations with the neighbouring states and its allies, and in the promotion of its internal prosperity.

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The peace of India remained undisturbed; but various indications occurred of an approaching necessity for departing from the pacific principles which had generally regulated the policy of the Government. On the north, the Court of Nepal had asserted claims to territory within the Company's boundaries which were questioned or denied; and had instigated, or allowed its subjects to commit, encroachments and outrages which demanded serious notice. In the south, the style assumed by the officers of the King of Burma in their intercourse with the English functionaries at Chittagong, arising out of insurrections in the intermediate province of Aracan lately conquered by the Burmese, revealed an arrogant and usurping spirit which it would probably require force to repress. On the western frontier, the banditti known as Pindaris were becoming daily more confident and daring; and in 1812 a party of them violated the integrity of the British dominions, broke through the boundaries, and advanced to the wealthy commercial city of Mirzapore, which they threatened to plunder. The approach of troops saved it from destruction, and the Pindaris retired. To prevent the repetition of a similar irruption, treaties were formed with the

BOOK I. Rajas of Tehri and Rewa,¹ by which they were bound
 CHAP. VII. to close the passes in their several principalities

1812. against the Pindari incursions, and a cordon of troops was stationed along the frontier from Bundelkhand to Midnapore. At the same time that these precautions were taken, it was foreseen that they would be mere palliatives; and a time was contemplated when it would be necessary to undertake a system of military and political operations calculated to strike at the root of this great and increasing evil.² The period was not long deferred; but the arrangements adopted belong to a different administration. The same was the case with the course that was ultimately pursued with respect to Nepal and Burma; and we may therefore suspend their consideration until the power of the British Government was exerted to place its rights beyond dispute, to secure its confines from aggression, and to eradicate the predatory pestilence which had so long preyed upon the strength, and wasted the energies, of Central India.

The subsidiary alliance with Hyderabad had undergone no material alteration since the interference of the Government of Bengal in the appointment of a minister. The Nizam, discontented and sullen, took little concern in public business, and sought consolation for wounded pride in sensual indulgence. His minister, Munir-al-Mulk, equally indolent and incapable, followed his sovereign's ex-

¹ Treaty with Raja Bikramajit of Tehri, 23rd December, 1812. The treaties with the Rewa Raja have been previously referred to.—Treaties with Native Chiefs, xlix.

² Secref Letter from Bengal, 2nd October, 1812; Papers, Pindari War, p. 14.

ample; and all the labour, but with it much of the authority, devolved upon the Hindu subordinate, Chandu Lal. Strong also in the assured support of the Resident, the Dewan made but an indifferent use of his responsibility, and to his own purposes and emolument sacrificed the interests of the prince and the prosperity of the people. At the recommendation of the Resident, Chandu Lal consented to the reorganisation of the military contingent which the Nizam was bound by treaty to furnish, and, instead of a body of irregulars, to maintain a standing disciplined force under British officers. This was gradually increased to above twelve thousand men, horse and foot, and proved itself of eminent service in the subsequent war. Its chief value in the estimation of the minister was the weight which it gave him in his dealings with the Court, and the coercive means it enabled him to employ against refractory landholders, and farmers of the revenue, on occasions when the aid of the subsidiary brigades was withheld. The sanction of the Government was given to the arrangement. A similar plan was recommended to the Peshwa, and he also assented to the formation of a disciplined brigade under British officers.¹

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The necessity which has been described of interfering for the defence of the Raja of Nagpore naturally directed the attention of the Government to the permanent maintenance at his expense of a military force. Negotiations with this view were opened; but the objections of the Raja to a sub-

¹ Report, Select Committee, 1832; Political Appendix, pp. 133, 266.

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subsidiary alliance were not to be overcome, and the arrangement was deferred.¹

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A long, and occasionally an uneasy, discussion with the Nawab of Oude engaged at this time in an especial manner the deliberations of the Government and of the Court of Directors. The frequent applications made by the Nawab for the services of the subsidiary force in the compulsive collection of the revenues of Oude had occasioned extreme dissatisfaction in the minds of both the local and the home authorities, as they were well aware that the troops were in this manner often employed on duties incompatible with their military character, and were converted into instruments of extortion and oppression. Supported by the sanction and injunctions of the Court of Directors, the Governor-General determined, towards the close of 1810, to express to the Nawab in an unqualified manner the sentiments with which his fiscal administration was regarded, and the conclusions of the Bengal Government that a change of system was indispensably necessary. A letter was accordingly addressed to him by Lord Minto, earnestly recommending to him to institute a reform which should be based upon the fundamental principles of a moderate assessment, to be made by the officers of Government immediately with the landholders, without the intervention of a contractor or farmer of the revenue. The settlements were to be made for a fixed term of years, and the occupants of the land were to be guaranteed in their occupancy as long as the amount of the assessment

¹ Report, Select Committee, 1832; Political Appendix, p. 227.

was regularly discharged. Other reforms, relating to the police and the administration of justice, were suggested at the same time; and the Resident was instructed to use an urgent and decided tone in pressing these recommendations upon the consideration of the Nawab.

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The interference which was thus exercised by the Government of Bengal in the internal regulation of the affairs of Oude was grounded upon the article of the treaty of 1801, in which the Nawab “engaged to establish in his reserved dominions such a system of administration, to be carried into effect by his own officers, as should be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and calculated to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants; and that his Excellency would always advise with, and act in conformity to, the counsel of the officers of the Honourable Company.” The explanation subsequently given by Lord Wellesley to the Nawab of the principles which were to regulate the intercourse between the two states amplified the expressions of this article; and whilst it declared that the Resident was to be the representative of the Governor-General, and the channel by which the sentiments and counsels of the British Government were to be communicated, enjoined that functionary to treat the Nawab with the utmost degree of respect, conciliation, and attention, and to maintain cordial union and harmony in all transactions.

How this was to be accomplished when the sentiments of the Nawab differed from those of the Resident? what security was provided for the acquiescence of the former in the counsels of the

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latter? who was to determine whether the counsels of the British Government and of its representative were really calculated to promote the interests of the prince and his people? and by what means compliance was to be enforced consistently with the degree of independence which the Nawab was allowed to retain? were questions which the vague and indefinite phraseology of both treaty and explanation left for the embarrassment of Lord Wellesley's successors.

On the present occasion all these sources of perplexity occurred. Professing himself willing and desirous to defer to the advice of the British Government, the Nawab entertained insuperable and not unreasonable objections to the propositions submitted to him. It was recommended to him to take as a model, the arrangements introduced into the Ceded provinces with, it was affirmed, entire success; to relinquish the practice of farming the revenues; to institute an inquiry into the productiveness of the lands; and, upon a determination of their value, to settle with the proprietors a moderate rate of assessment for a period of three years. To these recommendations the Nawab at first gave his general assent; but he started doubts as to the practicability of their execution, the delays and difficulties which would attend the valuation of the lands, and the impossibility of finding functionaries qualified and fit to form settlements with the landholders. On the other hand, the Resident, Major Baillie, sanguine in his expectations of success, treated the Nawab's doubts as evasive, and, instead of observing the conciliatory course prescribed by Lord Welles-

ley, pressed the reform with a degree of positiveness and importunity which furnished the Nawab with a fresh cause of alarm, and led him to apprehend that the Resident's objects were to take into his own hands the nomination of the revenue officers and an inquisitorial scrutiny into his revenues. Each charged the other with a virtual infraction of the treaty; the Resident accusing the Nawab of disregarding the advice of the British Government, and the Nawab complaining that he was not permitted to judge what measures were conducive to the prosperity of his people, or carry them into effect through the agency of his own servants. There were several other sources of disagreement, arising chiefly out of the advocacy by the Resident of the rights and claims of the members of the Nawab's family, or of individuals taken under his especial protection, in opposition to the wishes of the Nawab. In most of these cases the conduct of the Resident might be defended, either by existing or implied engagements with the British Government; but it necessarily reminded the Nawab of the unreality of the independence with which Lord Wellesley had pretended to invest him in all matters of a private and domestic nature.

After much lengthy correspondence and various personal conferences, in which the Nawab under the operation of fluctuating feelings repeatedly promised acquiescence, and as often evaded the fulfilment of his promises, the Government of Bengal, then administered by General Hewett as Vice-President during Lord Minto's absence at Java, determined to refrain from urging the question of

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reform further. They argued that it would be of little avail to enforce the Nawab's adoption of a plan the execution of which he could easily, and would most certainly, frustrate; that his objections to any particular scheme of reform could not be construed into a systematic disregard of the counsels of the British Government, for which, on the contrary, he professed the utmost deference; and that, consequently, to have recourse to the only method of compulsion which could be contemplated, that of denying him the services of the subsidiary force for the suppression of insubordination and resistance to his authority, would be an unjustifiable departure from the conditions of the alliance. Whilst expressing therefore extreme dissatisfaction with the Nawab for the insincerity and prevarication which he had displayed, the Resident was instructed to relinquish for the time all further efforts to obtain his consent to the proposed reform.¹ With regard to the employment of British troops against refractory Zemindars at the requisition of the Nawab's collectors, the Government confirmed a resolution to which they had previously come, of not allowing their employment without an investigation by the Resident of the occasion which demanded it.

The question of reform remained unagitated during part of 1812, but causes of disagreement were not wanting. In the commencement of the year an

¹ Letter from the Bengal Government to the Court of Directors, 15th October, 1811, in which the negotiations with the Nawab are detailed: Report, Select Committee, 1832; Political Appendix, 414. The correspondence between the Nawab, the Resident, and the Government, are printed also in the "Oude Papers," printed for the Proprietors of East India Stock, June, 1824.

application was made by the Nawab for troops to put down an insurrection; but the Resident, ascertaining that the disturbance was of no importance, and was connected, as usual, with the exactions of the farmers of the revenue, insisted on the prior investigation of the merits of the case, or the deputation of his own agents for the purpose. The Nawab declined compliance, and no troops were sent. Shortly afterwards, some of the Nawab's proceedings encroaching on the rights of the Bhao Begum of Fyzabad, the widow of his father, were opposed by the Resident, as these rights had been guaranteed by treaty. This interference in his domestic concerns was a source of severe mortification to the Nawab, and he strenuously denied the right of the Resident to interpose. Towards the close of the same year, the Government of Bengal had its attention called to outrages and robberies committed on the British frontiers by marauding gangs from Oude, whom the Nawab's officers were either unable or unwilling to restrain. As this evil had been the frequent topic of unavailing representation, it was now announced to the Nawab that the plunderers would be pursued into his country by the British troops without his permission if his acquiescence were withheld. All these sources of vexation produced a formal complaint of the Nawab against the Resident for insolent and arrogant behaviour: the charge was met by the Resident's denial, and a recriminatory accusation of an improper want of respect to the British representative in the tone and style of the Nawab's correspondence. The Government pronounced their entire approbation of the

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BOOK I. Resident's conduct, and required the Nawab to
CHAP. VII. adopt a more deferential style of address.

1813. These proceedings for a while intimidated the Nawab into professing his resolution to conform to the wishes of the Government in all things: but the imperfect execution of his promise drew from Lord Minto,¹ in July, 1813, an address of remonstrance and expostulation, reminding him that the British Government had a right, founded upon the basis of the subsidiary treaty, to propose such reforms in his internal government as it deemed essential, and that he was held by the same treaty under an obligation to follow such advice; that he had admitted the necessity, and both verbally and in writing had given assurances of his acquiescence in a manner little less authentic and formal than if they had been reduced to the form of a treaty, and equally binding on his honour and good-faith; notwithstanding which, he had retracted his consent, and opposed the most determined resistance to the efforts made by the Resident, acting under the positive orders of the Government, to induce him to abide by the terms of his engagements. Lord Minto declared also, that, upon receiving the Nawab's acquiescence, the British Government would have been entitled, and was perhaps required, to insist on his carrying the proposed plan into effect at once; and instances the patience and respect with which his objections had been listened to and refuted, as undeniable proofs of its forbearance and moderation. Not a single argument against the

¹ Letter from the Governor-General to the Nawab Vizir, 2nd July, 1813; Oude Papers, p. 506.

plan had been adduced but had been respectfully entertained, deliberately examined, and successfully combated; and the doubts and fears still professed by the Nawab could be ascribed to no other motives than a decided resolution to oppose the introduction of reform altogether, in the vain hope that the Government would ultimately abandon the question in despair. The Nawab was assured that no lapse of time, no change of circumstances, would ever induce the British Government to relinquish a measure which it considered essential to the happiness and prosperity of Oude, the ease and reputation of the Nawab, and the best interests of both states. He was also warned, that, if he persisted in his refusal, he would violate an express stipulation of the treaty; and he was requested seriously to consider the consequences in which he might involve himself by such a course of conduct. Lord Minto therefore expressed his confident expectation that the reform recommended would be carried into effect without further opposition or delay. The Governor-General explained his views upon the other points under discussion in a like peremptory strain.

Fortified with the decision of the Government, the Resident proceeded to insist upon the Nawab's immediate adoption of the measures proposed, and, in his ardour and impatience, demanded for the British Government a degree of participation in the ordinary administration of Oude scarcely warranted by the spirit or letter of the existing engagements, when he maintained that every act whatsoever—the lease of a district in farm, the institution of a court of justice in the capital, the change of any police

BOOK I. regulation,—without the previous concurrence of
 CHAP. VII. the Governor-General, was a direct violation of the

1813. treaty, for which the Nawab might be made responsible; or, in other words, might be divested of all authority whenever it pleased the Government to call him to account. That such minute and vexatious interference was intended by the original contract, may be reasonably questioned; but the present discussions showed the extreme difficulty of defining the just limits of interposition, and the unavoidable tendency of all such political associations to render the will of the controuling power the sole standard of the necessity of its interference. The Nawab became alarmed, and, in the month of September, he announced his final determination to give immediate operation to the project of reform, by dispatching officers to adjust an equitable assessment; and he instituted arrangements for affording satisfaction on the minor topics of dispute. Before any important results could be realised from these preliminary measures, the Government of India passed into other hands, and different views influenced the counsels of Lord Moira.

Although the countries which had been brought under British sway had derived from it the benefits of exemption from foreign invasion and internal disorder for some years, yet the progressive amelioration of the condition of the people had failed to keep pace with the expectations and hopes of their rulers. This was and is still to be ascribed to radical defects in the systems of judicature and revenue which had been introduced; and which, although they were based upon just and benevolent principles,

were too entirely of a European complexion to be readily identifiable with the very different aspects of society which existed in Hindustan. They had been framed upon insufficient inquiry, and had been brought in abruptly, without having been suffered to grow up gradually and spontaneously with the continuance of the new and anomalous constitution of things to which they owed their origin. They were still only in the course of adaptation to circumstances; and it was, and has since continued to be, the anxious object of both the local and home authorities to provide a remedy for those defects which their development displays.¹ The subject has been already treated of at some length; but as the observations made in a former volume were in some degree anticipatory, and the facts on which they were founded belong to the period now under review, as also they were restricted to the Bengal provinces, some further notice of them here may not be superfluous or out of place.

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Whatever may have been the case when the Mohammedan and Hindu governments were in full vigour, it was undeniable that, for a considerable time before the establishment of British supremacy, the people of India had been unaccustomed to any regularly organised and administered system of law or justice. In Upper India, Mohammedan domination had left few and obscure traces of Hindu institutions; and those which they had substituted,

¹ In 1813 the Court of Directors circulated queries regarding the working of the Judicial system in India, to several of their most distinguished servants then in England. The questions and replies are printed in the Selections from the Records at the East India House printed by order of the Court, vol. ii.

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never very pure or perfect, had almost equally disappeared in the anarchy by which Hindustan had long been distracted. The same was very much the case with the territories under the Madras Presidency that had been subject to the Mohammedans; and, if Hindu usages lingered in the Mahratta states, they had lost much of their primary character amid the irregular and arbitrary practices of the ruling authorities. The main principle that everywhere regulated the administration was the concentration of absolute authority; and the same individual was charged with the superintendence of revenue, justice, and police, with little to guide or restrain him except his own perceptions and sentiments of equity, and a prudent consideration for his own safety and advantage. Even in the best of times the sovereign, whether King or Raja, was the fountain of law and justice; and the Subahdar, the Nawab, the Jagirdar, all holding delegated or usurped authority, claimed the same prerogative. The Kazi, or Nyayadhipati, Mohammedan and Hindu expounders of the law, were sometimes retained in principal towns as judges of civil and criminal law; but their authority was ill defined, their labours were ill paid, and justice received little profit from their nomination. The police of cities was also in some places under the authority of an appointed officer, the Fojdar or Kotwal, who was responsible to the governor of the district or city; but in the villages and in the country the village head-men, or Patéls, where such existed, and in other parts the Zemindar, who combined the character of landholder and collector of the revenue, claimed

the charge of the police, and the decision of civil and criminal suits. The leading object of the native governments was the realisation of the largest possible amount of revenue; and all persons engaged in this duty, whether as fiscal officers or as farmers and contractors, were armed with plenary powers both as magistrates and judges: a pertinacious appeal from those whom they oppressed might sometimes reach the ears of their superiors, but in general this resource was imperfectly available, and the people were left to the uncontrolled will of individuals.¹

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¹ All the Bengal civilians concur in stating, that, according to their belief, no remains of ancient institutions existed in Bengal. Of the state of law and justice among the people, the following are some of the results of their observations: "The people had no idea of being protected by law against abuses of power. When an *Aumil* (a native revenue or executive officer) was guilty of gross injustice and oppression, they might endeavour to get rid of him by a clamorous remonstrance in a body to the authority to which he was accountable for his conduct; but, generally speaking, they were quite at his mercy. Probably they had no conception of a more safe and rational system until they saw the effects of the judicial regulations of 1793. The spirit of the old institutions of Hindustan survived their formal abolition as long as the Company's servants united the offices of collector, judge, and magistrate."—Ernst, *Records*, i. p. 27. "During the Mohammedan government in Bengal, in the large *Zemindaris*, consisting of several *pergunnas*, it was usual to have *pergunna Cutcheris* (courts), and the *Tehsildar* (collector) of the *pergunna*, who was the *Zemindar's* agent, decided in civil suits; village *Gomashtas* (agents) also exercised the same authority, and recourse was frequently had to arbitration by their orders. The *Zemindars* and their *Dewans* also decided civil suits according to the ancient Hindu custom. In cities and large towns, and in each *pergunna*, *Kazis* were appointed, who decided in civil suits. They appear to have been the judicial officers on the part of the *Nawabs*, but the *Zemindars* never gave up their right of deciding in civil suits."—Cox, *ibid.* p. 47. "Every province in India is divided into small tracts called villages: the affairs of every village are managed by two head-men, the *Potail* and the *Curnum*; the *Potail* is the chief of the village, and acts in it as judge, magistrate, and collector."—Munro, *ibid.* 106. "The authorities by whom civil justice was administered were the following: in the country, the *Potail*; over him the *Mamlutdar* (district collector), and *Sirsubahdar* (head of a large division); and above all, the *Peshwa*, or his minister. *Jagirdars* administered justice in their own lands; the great ones with little or no interference on the part of the Governments. In some towns there was a judicial officer called the *Nyáyádesi*, (the same as *Nyáyádbipati*, superintendent of *Nyáya*—justice,) who tried causes under the *Peshwa's* authority; and any person whom the *Peshwa* pleased to authorise might conduct

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Incompatible as such a state of things must be with the feelings and principles of Europeans, its effects upon the condition of the inhabitants of India were not wholly subversive of their happiness. The persons placed over them belonged to themselves, were assimilated in religion and language, conversant with their usages, and not regardless of their good opinion. Their decisions, although not guided by a code of laws, were founded upon an accurate knowledge of persons and things; and, when not distorted by sinister influences, were commonly conformable to equity and good-sense. The proceedings of these self-constituted courts were simple, and their sentences summary; they were not embarrassed or retarded by complicated forms and technical pleadings; and the people escaped the tax upon their money and time, which more elaborate judicature imposes. Another advantage contributed to counteract the defects of the system. In the absence of courts of justice provided by the state, the people learned to abstain from litigation; and, when disputes among them arose, submitted them to the arbitrement of judges chosen among themselves.¹ This expedient had probably descended from ancient times, in which it had been a recognised element of Hindu judiciary administration under the denomination

an investigation, subject to his highness's confirmation."—Elphinstone's Report on the Mahratta Provinces; Selections from the Records, iv. p. 188.

¹ "With all these defects, the Mahratta country flourished, and the people seem to have been exempt from some of the evils which exist under our more perfect government: there must, therefore, have been some advantages in the system to counterbalance its obvious defects, and most of them appear to me to have originated in one fact; that the Government, although it did little to obtain justice for the people, left them the means of procuring it for themselves."—Elphinstone; Selections, iv. 194.

of Pancháyat;¹ but it had fallen into desuetude in most parts of India, and subsisted, in any degree of efficiency, only in the south.² Although the Panchayats were not inaccessible to personal bias or corruption, and their proceedings were occasionally irregular and tedious, yet they were suited to the circumstances and congenial to the feelings of the people, and supplied the place of better organised and more solemn tribunals.³

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¹ From the Sanscrit word *pancha*, or *puncha*; *panche*, quinqve, five: the court being originally, perhaps, formed of that number, but in common practice it was exceeded. Mr. Elphinstone says, "The number was never less than five, but it has been known to be as great as fifty."—Elphinstone; Selections, 180.

² Sir Henry Strachey says, "I do not recollect any remains of ancient Hindu institutions, not even the Panchayet; but, the term being well known in Bengal, it is probable that the thing exists in some parts of the Bengal provinces, and that it is occasionally resorted to voluntarily by the Hindus in disputes concerning casta, and perhaps in matters of village accounts and boundary disputes. I remember no instance of parties in a suit proposing a reference to the Panchayet. Our civil courts never discourage any kind of arbitration; they constantly recommend it to the parties, who will never agree to it."—Answers; Selections, p. 53. All the Bengal civilians state the same. Mr. J. A. Grant, of Bombay, says of the Panchayats on that side of India, "They direct their attention chiefly, I believe, to matters of discipline and ceremonial observance, connected with the customs and usages of their several sects. They exercise no judicial authority."—Selections, ii. 102.

³ It was especially in the Mahratta provinces that "the Panchayet might be considered as the great instrument in the administration of justice."—Elphinstone. Mr. Elphinstone, Colonel Munro, and Colonel Walker speak favourably of their operations, although from the details specified they seem to have been clumsy instruments. The members were selected by the parties, and were not uninfluenced by the hope of presents from one or both: the attendance of the members was very irregular, and there seem to have been no efficient means of compelling punctuality; "it was generally effected by the intreaties of the party interested." Proceedings were seldom recorded: "in villages the Panchayet was often conducted in the way of conversation, and nothing was written but the decision, and not always that." "Throughout the whole proceedings the Panchayets appear to have been guided by their own notions of justice; they consulted no books, and it was only on particular points of Hindu law that they referred to a Sastrí (one learned in the law) for his opinion." The Panchayat had no power to enforce its decrees; they required to be confirmed and executed by an officer of Government, to whom "for this cause frequent references were required, and he exercised a considerable influence on the progress of the trial." Notwithstanding these imperfections, the Panchayat must have exercised a be-

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Upon the establishment of regular courts of justice under the government of the East India Company, the novelty of a channel exclusively dedicated to the hearing and determining of complaints, and a belief that they would be investigated in an upright and impartial spirit, produced inconveniences which had not been foreseen. Every one who had, or fancied he had, a wrong to redress, resorted to the courts; and the numbers of the suitors speedily became so numerous, that the means of hearing and adjudicating their cases were wholly insufficient.¹ The jurisdiction of each court comprehended an extent of country and an amount of population vastly beyond the powers of a single establishment. The very qualities which constituted the peculiar recommendations of the new courts added to their insufficiency.² As little as possible was left to individual discretion. Deliberate forms and prescribed modes of procedure, whilst they secured exactness, impeded dispatch. Reference to the regulations of the Government, and to the written authorities of Hindu and Mohammedan law, retarded decision; and the multiplication of opportunities of appeal

neficial influence, as it enjoyed great popularity; as is proved by the current phrase, "Panch-Parameswara," Panchayet is God Almighty.—Elphinstone; Selections, iv. 191.

¹ In 1797, the number of suits instituted was 330,977, although the western provinces had not been acquired: they began to decrease from 1803, and in 1813 were only 184,790.—Selections from the Records, iv. 34.

² In the Bengal Presidency the population subject to a Zilla court was generally about a million. The Zilla of Midnapore was one hundred and thirty miles long by forty to fifty broad.—Sir Henry Strachey and others. At Madras the Zillas were more compact, and generally contained about half a million inhabitants.—Cockburn. "The Ceded districts, at first divided into three, since into two, Zillas, contain about twenty-nine thousand square miles,—about the extent of Scotland, but more populous."—Thackeray; Answers to Queries; Selections.

from one tribunal to another encouraged and perpetuated litigation. The unavoidable deficiencies of laws, which, whether Hindu, Mohammedan, or English, were devised for wholly different conditions of society, and had not yet become adapted to the changes still in progress, with the unfitness of some of the European judges, from their imperfect knowledge of the languages of the country and the habits of the people,¹ as well as their ignorance of the principles of law and their occasional negligence, contributed to aggravate the defects of the system, and to obstruct the course of judgment. Arrears became in consequence so numerous, and decisions were so long delayed, as to amount to a virtual denial of justice. Attempts were made from time to time to remedy these imperfections: charges and fees were imposed, in order to render justice more expensive and discourage litigation; additional courts were established, at a cost which became burthensome to the state; additional powers were given to the judges, and the privilege of appeal was subjected to new limitations;—measures in some respects exceptionable, and in all inoperative; and the accumulation of arrears, although to a less extent, still continued to constitute a serious evil.² To the most obvious remedy, the multiplication of courts and judicial functionaries in an equally pro-

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¹ "There is a want of something like professional knowledge, that is, knowledge of the general principles of law, in both the Zilla and provincial judges; and part of the persons in the judicial line are not fit for that part of the service."—Dorin; Selections.

² The suits depending in Bengal at the end of 1802 were 170,706; at the end of 1813, 145,168: for the clearance of which it was estimated that three years would be required in the Zilla, and four in the provincial courts.—Commons' Committee, 1832; Judicial; Appendix, vii. 479.

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 CHAP. VII. adding to the number of European magistrates.¹

1813. Any considerable augmentation of native judges, who were employed to a limited extent, and whose services were much more economical, was resisted by a violent prejudice against their agency. Their fitness for the office, as far as it required ability and knowledge, was generally admitted; but it was maintained that their notorious want of integrity rendered it impossible that justice could be distributed to the people through so corrupt and impure a channel.² The imputation was not perhaps

¹ The annual expense of the judicial establishment in Bengal was calculated by Lord Cornwallis at £306,000. In 1809-10 it had risen to £806,000. The whole cost at the three Presidencies was at that time £1,260,840. In 1813 it was £1,572,492.

² "I think it quite out of the question to trust the natives with any principal part in the administration of justice. I am not aware that they want the ability sufficient to decide ordinary questions with tolerable skill, but even the better sort of them are notoriously open to corruption; there is scarcely any thing like principle among them. I know there are some who think these native judges do more harm than good, and should be dispensed with altogether."—Dorin. "The natives can rarely, I fear, be exclusively trusted with the administration of justice; and, in any part of the judicial system allotted to their execution, they must be superintended by Europeans."—Falconar. Sir Henry Strachey, Colonel Munro, and Colonel Walker entertain different views. "It is my opinion that all the judicial functions of Bengal might gradually be thrown into the hands of natives, and that the business would be as well conducted under our regulations by the natives as by Europeans; in some respects better, and at one tenth of the expense." And again: "I am of opinion that, with respect to integrity and diligence, the natives may be trusted with the administration of justice. I think no superintendence of Europeans necessary." "We place the European beyond the reach of temptation; to the native we assign some ministerial office with a poor stipend of twenty to thirty rupees a month; then we pronounce that the Indians are corrupt, and that no race of men but the Company's servants are fit to govern them."—Sir H. Strachey. "In a civilized populous country like India, justice can be well dispensed only through the natives themselves. It is absurd to suppose that they are so corrupt as to be altogether unfit to be entrusted with the discharge of this important duty: if they were so, there would be no remedy for the evil; their place could never be supplied by a few foreigners imperfectly acquainted with their customs and language." Again: "Give a native judge from five hundred to one thousand rupees a month, he will decide thrice as many causes as a European. He might be corrupt; turn him out and try another,

wholly unmerited, but the charge was much too unqualified, and the evils anticipated were greatly exaggerated. Nor was it sufficiently considered by what means they might be remedied : whether they might not be checked, if not prevented, by better pay, higher dignity, vigilant superintendence, and occasional disgrace ; whether natives might not be influenced as well as Europeans by the hope of reward and fear of punishment. Corruption could not be universal. The temptation could not in every case outweigh the risk ; and no account was made of the force of public opinion, to which the natives of India are not insensible. It seems also to have been forgotten, that, for centuries prior to the introduction of European agency, law and justice had been administered solely by natives ; yet society had been held together : and there had been times when, according to the testimony of travellers and historians, India had been populous and flourishing, the people thriving and happy. This was still the case in some parts of the country ; and, if it was not so more generally, the cause was to be found in the absence of good government and the prevalence of internal disorder, in which all institutions had been overturned, and the principles as well as the practice of justice had disappeared. It was taking a narrow and ungenerous view of the question to draw a con-

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and another. Make it worth his while to retain his post, and he will cease to risk its forfeiture. If we pay the same price for integrity, we shall find it as readily amongst natives as Europeans."—Munro. "The aim of the preceding observations has been to show that the natives of India may, in respect to integrity, be trusted with the administration of justice ; and that some of the civil offices of government may be confided to them with safety and advantage."—Walker; *Answers to Queries; Selections*; vol. ii. There will be subsequently occasion to advert to later opinions on this subject.

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clusion unfavourable to the native character from the state in which it had been left by the recent times of trouble, and, overlooking what it had been in better days, deny the probability of its amelioration under more propitious circumstances. The truth was beginning to be discerned; and, amid the prevalence of a contrary opinion, some few of the Company's servants warmly advocated the extended employment of the natives in the administration of justice as the only practicable means of proportioning the supply to the demand. The question continued in suspense, and little advance was made in the improvement of the judicial system in Bengal during Lord Minto's government. Measures were, however, in progress which were brought to maturity under his successor. Changes of more considerable magnitude took place at Madras, but they also underwent important modifications at a shortly subsequent period.¹

¹ Bengal Regulation xiii. of 1808 enacted that the origination of civil suits of five thousand rupees and upwards should be transferred from the Zilla to the provincial courts; and Regulation xiii. of 1810 provided that decrees might be passed by one judge in sundry cases where two had been necessary, and that the fees on the institution of suits should be partly or wholly returned when the parties settled the cause by arbitration. At Madras, in 1808, Regulation v. enacted the payment of fees on the institution and trial of suits. Regulation vi. empowered the senior judge of the courts of circuit and appeal to take his tour of circuit duty. Regulations viii. to xiii. effected a new arrangement of the jurisdiction of the Zilla courts in the different divisions of the Madras provinces, and established four courts of appeal and circuit. In 1809, Regulation vii. provided for the occasional appointment of Zilla judges, extended the jurisdiction of the registers, limited appeals, and provided head native commissioners in certain cases. Regulation viii. defined the duties and powers of judges of the provincial courts acting singly. Regulation x. increased the number and powers of native commissioners; and Regulation xii. limited and regulated the right of appeal. Up to the year 1808, the Regulations of the Bombay Presidency were framed as nearly conformable to those of Bengal as circumstances would admit, with exception that, while the Mohammedan law was there alone applicable to the decision of criminal trials, the Hindus under the Bombay Presidency were allowed the benefit of the laws

Delays of a similar nature, although not to a like extent, were found to prevail in the administration of criminal justice ; and, in a great measure from a like cause, the inadequacy of the provision made for its distribution. An evil of a still more pernicious tendency originated in the assignment of the duty of magistrate to the city or district judge. If as judge he devoted his attention to the civil suits in arrear, the business of the magistrate was necessarily interrupted, and an interval might intervene between the apprehension of a prisoner and his commitment, which sometimes subjected the innocent to the punishment of the guilty, and detained for an indefinite period a person in confinement against whom no charge could be substantiated.¹ The same remedy that was applicable to the former case was here also obvious, and the separation of incompatible duties was a necessary preliminary to their effective discharge. For this purpose the Bengal Government associated the Zilla and city judges in some instances with magistrates having a special or joint jurisdiction in criminal matters only, or gave them the aid of assistant magistrates, acting in general subordinately to, but upon emergencies independently of, the judges. Other enactments were passed for the more effective conduct of previous investigation by the local officers, for admission to bail upon charges not

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of their religion in all trials, of whatsoever description, wherein they were the defendant or accused parties. At this period the Government of Bombay exercised the right, with which it was invested by the 47th of George III. sect. iii. chap. 68, of making Regulations of its own authority ; and in this and subsequent years the following Regulations provided for the more effective administration of civil and criminal justice : 1808, Regulation ii. ; 1812, Regulations iii. to xi. ; 1813, Regulations ii. iv. vii. ix.

¹ Fifth Report, p. 69.

BOOK I. of a heinous nature, for the dismissal of frivolous
 CHAP. VII. complaints, and the avoidance of all unnecessary
 1813. delay between the apprehension of a person accused
 and his examination before the magistrate.¹ The
 criminal, as well as the civil judicature, was the
 object of progressive legislation.²

The state of the police formed in Bengal a more immediate subject of solicitude than even the defects of the administration of civil or criminal justice. The Lower provinces of the Presidency were infested by the increasing numbers and audacity of various classes of robbers, who, under the designations of Dakoits, Choars, Kuzzaks, Budhuks, or Thugs, infested the country, and not unfrequently added murder to robbery. The Kuzzaks were mounted robbers, who occasionally singly beset the high roads, or, having collected in parties, attacked and plundered whole villages. The Budhuks and Thugs were distinguished by their practice of strangling unsuspecting travellers, with whom they contrived to fall in upon a journey. The Dakoits and Choars were robbers who assembled in gangs, and, entering the villages by night, attacked the house of some one person reputed to possess valuables or money. These last were the

¹ Regulation xvi. of 1810.

² Regulations ix. 1807, and iii. 1812. Madras Regulation i. 1810 provided for the apprehension and punishment of persons resisting or evading the processes of the courts: Reg. i. of 1811 directed quarterly jail deliveries to be held in certain Zillas: Reg. iv. of 1811 had for its general scope the objects of the Bengal Regulations: Regs. iv. of 1807, and iii. of 1812, the more speedy trial and punishment, or acquittal, of persons charged with offences not of a heinous nature; this also enjoined the Zilla magistrates to furnish an annual report of all cases depending on the 31st of December before them or their assistants. The Bombay Regulations are cited above.

most formidable. Their depredations were first noticed in 1772, when they were described by the Committee of Circuit as individuals not driven to such courses by want, but robbers by profession, and even by birth, following the profession from father to son. But, however true this may have been at the period of the report, there was no doubt that latterly many of the members of the several gangs were not professional banditti, but were urged by necessity to enlist in the gangs, or sometimes were compelled by force or fear to join them.¹ Aided by such recruits from the peasantry, the Dakoits acquired greater strength and confidence, and from 1800 to 1810 kept the country in perpetual alarm.² Extraordinary efforts became necessary for their suppression.

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¹ "In accounting for Decoyty or robbery in a Zilla, our first step ought to be to examine the condition of the Ryots, and we shall always find in their poverty and oppression the chief cause of this evil."—Tytler, Considerations on the State of India, i. 374. "A gang of Decoits does not consist entirely of professed robbers: many of the party are poor honest industrious people who are seized for the service of the night."—Letter from E. Strachey, Judge of Rajshahi; Fifth Report, App. 588.

² In the language of Lord Minto, "a monstrous and disorganised state of society existed under the eye of the supreme British authorities, and almost at the very seat of that Government to which the country might justly look for safety and protection. The mischief could not wait for a slow remedy; the people were perishing almost in our sight; every week's delay was a doom of slaughter and torture against the defenceless inhabitants of very populous countries."—Minute, 24th Nov. 1810; Parl. Papers, 1st July, 1819, p. 23. His lordship's language, and that which was generally employed on this occasion by the members of the Government and by the judges, is liable to the charge of exaggeration. At this very time, when it was said by the judicial secretary that "there was no protection of person or property to the people of India," it was very possible for an individual unconnected with the judicial department to be scarcely aware that such a crime as gang-robbery existed. In dwelling upon the absolute amount of crime, its proportional ratio to the population is imperfectly adverted to. According to official returns, the total number of murders, including those committed by Dakoits, in the Lower provinces, was in the year 1813 two hundred and ten, the population being above thirty-seven millions.—Commons' Committee, 1832; App. Judicial, p. 506.

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The Dakoits, although in their aggregation and in their following acknowledged leaders or Sirdars they bore an analogy to the brigands of the south of Europe, or the banditti of the middle ages, yet resembled more nearly some of the illegal confederations which have been organised in modern days and more civilised communities in Europe, in their assembling by night only, and dispersing and following peaceable occupations during the day, most of them being engaged in the cultivation of the soil or following mechanical trades. Individuals among them were well known as Sirdars, by whom their expeditions were projected, and by whose orders the gang was assembled at an appointed spot, generally a grove near the village to be attacked. The members of the gang, who were secretly known to the Sirdars, and sometimes to each other, repaired to the place variously armed, chiefly with swords, clubs, and pikes, and some with matchlocks. Their numbers varied from ten or fifteen to fifty or sixty. When collected, their marauding excursion was usually preluded by a religious ceremony, the worship of the goddess Durgá, the patroness of thieves, typified by a water-pot or a few blades of grass. The ceremony was conducted by a Brahman of degraded condition and dissolute life. Having propitiated the goddess by the promise of a portion of their spoil, they marched with lighted torches, and little attempt at concealment beyond disguising their faces by pigment, or covering them with masks, to the object of their expedition, usually the dwelling of some shop-keeper or money-changer, in which it was expected to discover treasure. Occasionally the

motive of the attack was vengeance; and information given by the householder, or some of his family, against any of the members of the gang, brought upon him the resentment of the whole fraternity.¹ Upon entering the village, it was customary to fire a gun, as a signal to the inhabitants to keep within their dwellings: the house against which the operation was designed was then surrounded; and, whilst some of the gang forced an entrance, others remained as a guard without. Unless exasperated by resistance, or instigated by revenge, the Dakoits did not commonly proceed to murder; but they perpetrated atrocious cruelties upon such persons as refused to give them, or were unable to give them, information regarding property which they suspected of having been concealed, burning them with lighted torches or blazing straw, or wrapping cloth or flax steeped in oil round their limbs and setting it on fire, or inflicting various tortures, which caused immediate or speedy death.² The object being accomplished, and the booty secured, the gang retired before daylight, and the in-

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¹ Mr. Secretary Dowdeswell's Report, Sept. 1809. Of the three cases of which he gives the trials in abstract, one of which has been cited by Mr. Mill, v. 553, two originated in revenge.—Fifth Report, App. 604.

² In one hundred and four houses attacked by Dakoits in the course of thirteen months, eight persons were wounded, three were tortured, and five killed.—Dowdeswell's Report, *ibid.* 606. In 1813, the whole number of Dakoitis under the Bengal Presidency was six hundred and ninety; in which seventy-one persons were killed, two hundred and forty-six tortured and wounded. The returns show characteristic differences between the Lower and Upper provinces:

	<i>Dakoitis.</i>	<i>Murdered.</i>	<i>Tortured and Wounded.</i>
Lower provinces . .	505	31	149
Upper provinces . .	185	40	97

In the latter more were murdered and fewer wounded in little more than one third of the robberies; proofs of more fierceness but less cruelty.—Commons' Committee, 1832; App. p. 506.

BOOK I. individuals resumed their daily occupations. Such
 CHAP. VII. was the terror inspired by their atrocities, and such
 1813. the dread of their revenge, that few of their neighbours ventured to inform or give evidence against them, although well aware of their real character and proceedings. The police, intimidated or corrupt, rarely interfered until the robbery was completed and the perpetrators had disappeared; and their interposition was far from welcome to the people, as their unprofitable and vexatious inquiries had frequently no other purpose in view than the extortion of money as the price of forbearing to drag the villagers, unwilling witnesses, before the European magistrate, or even of falsely accusing them of being accessory to the crime.¹

The Zilla judge, who according to the existing system administered, as has been mentioned, both the criminal as well as the civil law, and was charged also with the duty of police magistrate, necessarily resided in the capital town of his jurisdiction, which might be a hundred miles remote from the scene of a robbery. Fully occupied with his other duties, it was impossible for him to pay frequent visits to places at any considerable distance from his station; and not only was local investigation therefore impracticable, but it was impossible for him to exercise a vigilant personal supervision over the officers of the police. The police jurisdictions were originally intended to include tracts of about twenty miles square; but they were of greater or less extent, according to circumstances, and usually embraced a numerous popu-

¹ Dowdeswell's Report, and Letters of the Judges preceding.

lation. Each of these was under a head officer or Daroga, who had at his disposal from twenty to fifty armed men, a very inadequate force in many cases to maintain order amongst the inhabitants of the district. To render them still more ineffective, the pay of the whole, the Daroga included, was barely sufficient for their support, and they were almost of necessity corrupt. Little or no assistance was to be expected from the people. Their ancient institutions had been broken up either directly or indirectly by the regulations of the Government. The Zemindars had been formerly charged with the management of the police, and were held accountable for all acts of robbery or violence committed within their Zemindaris. They abused their power and neglected their duty in some cases; and they were relieved of the one, and deprived of the other, in a summary manner,¹ and they were little inclined to interest themselves in a troublesome and thankless office. The instruments employed under them had been of two classes: one, under the term Paiks and Chokidars, attached to them and their agents personally; the other, known as Pasbans, Nigahbans, or Háris, connected with the villages: the former were the police of the whole district, the latter the watchmen of their respective hamlets. Both were paid chiefly by allotments of land rent-free, or held at a low quit-rent under the Zemindar.²

¹ By Reg. xxii. of 1793: on the grounds that the clause in their engagements which had formerly invested them with the authority had not only been found nugatory, but in numerous instances proved the means of multiplying robberies and other disorders, from the collusion which subsisted between the perpetrators of them and the police-officers entertained by the Zemindars and farmers of the land.

² Their numbers may be estimated from those of one district. In Burd-

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When he ceased or was forbidden to have any concern with the police, he had no inducement to keep up a police establishment; and, when it was intimated that the allowances formerly made to him for the expense were withdrawn, he either levied the same rent upon the allotments of the watchmen and Paiks as on any other of his Ryots, or he resumed the land. The Paiks were generally dismissed: the village watchmen lingered, but in a state of poverty and inefficiency which rendered them worse than useless. It was of little avail, therefore, to place them by law under the authority of the new Darogas, and to enact that they should be kept up and duly registered: the enactments were disregarded, and the native police establishments ceased to exist, or were in no condition to give effectual aid in preserving the public peace. They were much more likely to be in concert with its disturbers.¹

The evil consequences of having so completely excluded native co-operation had long been urged upon the consideration of the Government by many of its ablest officers, and one of its first remedial measures was to reinvest the Zemindars with a portion of their former authority. Regulations were accordingly enacted, by which respectable inhabitants of

wan, in 1788, there were two thousand four hundred Pasbans or village constables, and nineteen thousand Paiks.—Judicial Letter from the Court of Directors, Nov. 1814; Parl. Papers, 1 July, 1819, p. 48.

¹ Reg. i. 1793 reserved the option of resuming the whole or part of such allowances as had been made to the Zemindars for keeping up police thanas, or the produce of any lands which they might have been permitted to appropriate for the same purpose. "Extensive resumptions were made under this clause; resumptions were also made by the Zemindars; and the effect of both was to reduce the native police to a state of want, which drove them to a life of robbery and plunder for a subsistence."—Letter from the Court; Parl. Papers, 1819, p. 50.

the several provinces were commissioned to act as Amins or superintendents of police: they were authorised to receive written charges of all offences of a heinous nature, issue warrants for the apprehension of offenders, and send the persons so apprehended to the police Darogas; to apprehend, or cause to be apprehended, without warrant, persons engaged in the actual commission of a heinous crime or flagrant breach of the peace, and have them conveyed to the nearest police thanna; they were enjoined to assist the Darogas on all occasions; to send them information, and see that the village watchmen did their duty; to obey the magistrate's orders in instituting any inquiry, and to furnish him with a monthly report of the persons whom they had apprehended; and they were declared liable to prosecution in the criminal court for any act of corruption, extortion, or oppression done by themselves or any person acting under their authority.¹

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In these regulations for enlisting persons of credit and influence in the preservation of the public peace, there were several radical defects which ensured their failure. These police Amins were not only to give their services without pay, but, "considering the description of persons from whom they were to be selected, it was not expected that they would require any distinct establishment of public officers at the charge of Government to enable them to perform the duties required of them." They were, in fact, to pay a police as well as perform its functions. It is not surprising that few should have been willing to accept the office. Even had

¹ Bengal Regs. xii. and xiv. 1807.

BOOK I. these unreasonable stipulations been omitted, it was
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Actuated by that spirit of exclusive reliance upon European agency which had been engendered by the institutions of Marquis Cornwallis, the Government of Bengal strengthened the department of the police by the appointment of two superintendents of police, one for the Lower and one for the Western provinces.

¹ Bengal Reg. v. 1810.

² Bengal Regs. ix. 1808; iii. 1812.

³ Dowdeswell's Report; Fifth Report, App. 614.

⁴ Reg. iii. 1812.

These officers, acting in concert with the magistrates, or, as occasion required, independently of them, were not restricted to any particular station or defined district, and were enabled to exercise a more immediate supervision over the Darogas and police establishments, and to apprehend and punish offenders in a more prompt and vigorous manner.¹ The arrangement was beneficial. But, besides these officers, magistrates were appointed with special powers to suppress the crime of gang-robbery in the districts adjacent to Calcutta, which were its principal seats. Selected for their personal intelligence and activity, and for their knowledge of the languages and customs of the people, at liberty to devote their whole energies to their particular duties, and armed with large discretionary powers, they speedily arrested the mischief; but in their zeal they had recourse to unjustifiable rigour, and were almost as severe a scourge to the country as the Dakoits themselves. The inhabitants of the villages were indiscriminately apprehended upon insufficient evidence: many of them were acquitted upon trial after having been long detained in prison: some died in confinement.²

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¹ Regs. x. 1808; viii. 1810.

² At Muddenpore, some treasure having been plundered by Dakoits, one hundred and ninety-two persons were apprehended upon the charge of an informer: one hundred and forty-two were released upon examination, forty-six were committed, six were pardoned upon a pretended confession; for it turned out on the trial of those committed, who were detained in prison above a year, that the whole were innocent, the charge having been a fabrication. Three of the prisoners died in jail.—Sir H. Strachey; Answers to Queries; Judicial Records, ii. 70. At Nadiya, two thousand and seventy-one persons were apprehended as Dakoits from the 20th of May, 1808, to the 31st of May, 1809; of whom no less than one thousand eight hundred and twenty-eight had been taken up as men of bad character and on vague suspicion, forty-four only had been convicted before the Court of Circuit during two sessions, three hundred and sixty-nine had been released by the magistrate, two hundred and sixty-eight acquitted by

BOOK I. It was argued in defence of this procedure, that,
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the court. Of those who remained in jail after the first sessions of 1809, the greater part had not been brought up for trial at the two sessions which followed, but still remained in confinement. On the 31st of May, 1809, there were no less than one thousand four hundred and seventy-seven prisoners in the Nadiya jail who had not been examined. Besides the two thousand and seventy-one prisoners above specified, a considerable number of persons had been apprehended as Dakoits during the same period by Messrs. Blacquiére and Leyden, the magistrates of the twenty-four Pergunnas and joint magistrates of Nadiya, and by their Goyendas, who, instead of being examined and tried, were sent down to the Presidency and there kept in confinement.—Judicial Letter from the Court, 1st Oct. 1814; Parl. Papers, June, 1819, p. 25.

powerful engine had been wielded.¹ These were the sentiments of many of the most confidential advisers of the Government, and they predominated in its counsels. Notwithstanding this view of the case, and admitting the efficacy of the Goyenda system in the districts which were most disorganised, and in hands better adapted to a harsh than delicate handling of a public nuisance, it was shown by contemporary experience that such extreme and mischievous methods were not indispensable, and that the evil was susceptible of alleviation by a milder treatment. In one district at least, that of Burdwan, gang-robbery, once as prevalent there as in other places, was nearly extinguished in the course of a twelvemonth by very different measures. The instruments employed were the neglected and undervalued institutions of the country animated by skilful superintendence and encouragement: the landholders and head-men of the villages and of various trades were called upon to enter into engagements for the performance of those duties, which it was personally explained to them they were expected to fulfil; and the village watchmen were punished for neglect or connivance, and rewarded for courage and good conduct. Attempts to deprive them of their service-lands were sedulously resisted, and the villagers were encouraged to give them more liberal subsistence. In this instance it was unequivocally shown that the co-operation of the people was to be had, and that when had it was efficacious.²

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¹ Dowdeswell's Report, p. 615.

² In the year 1810, Mr. Butterworth Bayley was appointed to the office

BOOK I.
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1813: Notwithstanding this evidence of the feasibility of a different system, no attempt was made to act upon it on a more extensive scale; and the only enactments of the Government, in addition to those already adverted to, placed the rewards which had been given for the apprehension of Dakoits upon safer principles. The amount payable upon conviction was augmented: it was made payable wholly, or in part, where conviction could not be established, if circumstances justified the apprehension of the prisoner; and it was to be withheld, even where conviction ensued, if it appeared that improper means had been pursued by the informer. Rewards for meritorious exertions, and remuneration for expense incurred in cases not specified, connected with the discovery and apprehension of offenders, were also authorised. The combined operation of the measures of the Government was not without effect:

of magistrate of Burdwan. In Feb. 1811, the Circuit judge reports that "gang-robbery, formerly so prevalent, had become nearly extinct; and a regular system had been introduced which promised fair to secure the co-operation of the community in the detection and apprehension of offenders." The causes of improvement are thus detailed by Mr. Bayley; "The uniform punishment and dismissal from office of the village watchmen wherever there was any appearance of neglect or connivance on their part in robberies, and the rewards which were constantly given to them for any proof of bravery, activity, or good conduct in opposing or apprehending Dakoits; the exertions made by him for obtaining a more adequate subsistence for the village watchmen, by carefully preventing all attempts on the part of the Talookdars to resume any part of the Chakeran lands, and by encouraging the head villagers to subscribe a more liberal remuneration for the support of their Chokidars than had before been customary." The Mandals, who were the principal fixed residents, and were vested by long usage with considerable local authority and immunities, and the Chokidars under them, were the chief classes upon whom Mr. Bayley relied for information and aid in the improvement of the police. He however took Moochulkas not only from them, but also from the landholders, gomashas, venders of spirituous liquor, pawnbrokers, gold and silversmiths, &c., explaining to them personally the duties they were enjoined to perform, and the practices from which they were expected to refrain.—Letter of Court, 9th Nov. 1814; Parl. Papers, June, 1819, p. 53. In this letter the Court take a general review of the past and actual state of the police in Bengal.

the crime of gang-robbery, although not wholly eradicated, was materially checked, and during the latter part of Lord Minto's administration it became much less frequent, and was less marked by cruelty and bloodshed.

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Shortly prior to the appointment of Lord Minto, a controversy had commenced between the authorities in England and in India respecting the course to be pursued with respect to the final settlement of the revenue from the land in those parts of the British territory where a settlement was yet to be effected, comprising the Ceded and Conquered provinces under the Presidency of Bengal, and the provinces in the south of India which had been annexed to the Madras Presidency by the humiliation and downfall of the Mohammedan Government of Mysore. Opinions at home had undergone a material change. Principles, which but a few years before had met with universal assent, were now called in question; and measures, which had received the sanction and commendation of the Court of Directors, the Board of Controul, and of successive administrations, and which had been eulogised by high authorities as the results of consummate wisdom and enlightened disinterestedness,¹ were now stig-

¹ "The distinguished character of Lord Cornwallis, and the authority which the permanent settlement derived from the approbation of Mr. Pitt, of Mr. now Lord Grenville, and the late Lord Melville, justly clothed it with an awful veneration, which for many years precluded the agitation of any question as to its merits."—Commons' Committee, App. p. 67; Observations on the Revenue System of India, by the Right Hon. John Sullivan. In the Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 9th April, 1813, Lord Wellesley observed, "Every Governor of India had acknowledged the justice and policy of the principle of the permanent settlement, and he was satisfied that every person qualified to be a Governor of India must do the same. It formed the corner-stone of the Government of India, and the extension of the principle to the Conquered provinces would found a solid basis

BOOK I. matised as improvident and precipitate, as originating in defective knowledge and erroneous ana-

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1813. logies, and as equally detrimental to the prosperity of the state and the happiness of the people. The leading members of the Bengal and Madras Governments, trained in the school of Lord Cornwallis, and, with the exception of the Governor-General himself, the instruments and coadjutors of that nobleman in framing the perpetual settlement of Bengal, and in extending its provisions to Madras, tenaciously adhered to the principles of that settlement, and strenuously urged its universal adoption. The principal authorities of England, on the contrary, influenced by the proceedings and sentiments of some distinguished revenue officers of the Presidency of Madras, first suspended, and finally prohibited, the conclusion of an assessment in perpetuity in those provinces to which it had not been extended.¹ To render this change of purpose intel-

for that Government to rest upon." On the same occasion Lord Grenville urged the insertion of a clause in any charter to be granted to the Company declaratory of the adherence of the Indian Government to the principle of permanency.

¹ The Select Committee of the House of Commons, in their celebrated Fifth Report, printed July, 1812, first publicly called the principle in question, employing what Marquis Wellesley termed ambiguous words, tending, according to Lord Grenville, if not to discredit the original measure, at least to discountenance its proposed extension. This Report is known to have been the composition of Mr. Cumming, at that time superintendent of the revenue and judicial department in the office of the Board of Controul, who was an implicit believer in the excellence of the Ryotwar settlement as advocated by Sir Thomas Munro.—Commons' Committee, 1832, App.; Revenue remarks by Mr. Sullivan. We have also the testimony of Mr. Courtenay, between fifteen and sixteen years secretary to the Board of Controul, that the opposition to the permanent Zemindari settlement originated in the Board, not in the Court: "I may here mention, that the system known by the name of Sir T. Munro's system was the work of the Board, and in many parts of it was opposed by the Court. The same observation applies to many matters concerning the revival or maintenance of ancient native institutions, and the employment of natives in public functions." And again:

ligible, it will be necessary to take a brief survey of the condition of the agricultural population of India, and the principles upon which the realisation of the revenue derived from land was founded, previously to the establishment of the British Government, as well as of the proceedings of the British Government subsequently to those which have been already described in connexion with the permanent settlements made by Lord Cornwallis.

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Land is the main source of the revenue of the British Government of India. That Government follows in this respect the principles and practice of its predecessors, both Mohammedan and Hindu; and, while it avails itself of a convenient and profitable means of making provision for the public charges, it consults the advantage, and conforms to the notions and feelings, of the people.¹

¹ "When I said that Sir T. Munro's system was the work of the Board, I meant that it was taken up and countenanced by the Board rather than by the Court."—Commons' Com. 1832, App. ; Public answers, 292. 1685.

¹ "In India the land has always furnished the chief revenue of the state, and taxes are immediately imposed upon it."—Minute of Lord Teignmouth, Fifth Report, App. 205. "By the ancient law of the country the ruling power is entitled to a certain proportion of the produce of every beega of land, demandable in money or kind, according to local custom, unless it transfers its right thereto for a time, or in perpetuity."—Preamble to Reg. xix. 1793. "Any change from established custom in India gives rise to a great deal of dissatisfaction. The land-rent is what the people readily pay; and, although it may appear exorbitant, it is a revenue that is paid without much difficulty. A tax in any other shape, however small, is comparatively disliked."—Christian, Evidence, Lords' Committee, 1830; Question 848. "Nine-tenths probably of the revenue of the Government of India is derived from the rent of land, never appropriated to individuals, and always considered to be the property of Government: and to me that appears to be one of the most fortunate circumstances that can occur in any country; because, in consequence of this, the wants of the state are supplied really and truly without taxation. As far as this source goes, the people of the country remain untaxed."—Mill, Evid., Select Committee of House of Commons, 1831; Question 3134. The proportion was overrated, as was subsequently remarked by the Committee; it was about six-tenths: nor, as there will be occasion to remark, was it quite correct to say that the rent of land was never appropriated to individuals.

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But, this fact being stated, there occur sundry questions, which, although repeatedly and laboriously investigated, have not yet been answered in such a manner as to secure universal acceptance. They may be briefly resolved into the following: 1. In what character did the native Governments claim a revenue from the land? 2. What were the nature and extent of their demands? 3. By what class or classes of the people were those demands discharged? 4. Upon what principles were the demands of the British Government regulated? We shall endeavour to elicit a reply to these queries from the mass of conflicting statements by which the subject has been obscured; but, as the space which can be devoted to the inquiry is unavoidably disproportionate to the quantity of unmethodised materials which have been accumulated with a view to its elucidation, it will be necessary to select for description only a few of the most important points, omitting many of less moment, though of scarcely inferior interest.¹

I. The demand made by the Sovereign has been commonly referred to his character of proprietor of the soil. It has been maintained that it is by his

¹ The principal authorities consulted for the following passages in the text are, The Fifth Report of the Select Committee of 1810, printed 1812, 1 vol. folio; Selections from the Revenue and Judicial Records at the India House, printed by order of the Court of Directors, 1820-1826, 4 vols. folio; Reports of the Select Committees of both Houses of Parliament in 1830, 1831, and 1832, with evidence and appendices, reprinted by order of the Court of Directors, 16 vols. 4to; Colonel Wilks's History of the South of India; Sir J. Malcolm's Central India; Mr. Elphinstone's History of India; Rouse on the Land Tenures of India; General Briggs on the Land-tax of India; General Galloway on the Law and Constitution of India; Mr. Tucker on the Financial Situation of the East India Company; Colonel Sykes on the Land Tenures of the Dekhin; Mr. Thomason on the Revenue Settlement of Azinghur; and a variety of tracts and papers.

permission only, and with his sanction, that the land is occupied, and that the occupant sows his seed and reaps his crops; that whatever produce is in excess of the bare subsistence of the cultivator and cost of cultivation, is the property of the king; that it is rent, not revenue, to which he is entitled, for he is the one universal landlord; that this is the character in which the sovereign appears in the laws and institutions of the Hindus, in the laws of the Mohammedan conquerors of India, and in the practice of all modern native governments, and in which he is recognised universally by the people.¹

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Notwithstanding the positiveness with which it has been affirmed that the proprietary right of the sovereign is indissolubly connected with the ancient laws and institutions of the Hindus, the accuracy of the assertion may be reasonably disputed. In adducing the authority of Hindu writers in favour of the doctrine, two sources of fallacy are discernible. No discrimination has been exercised in distinguishing ancient from modern authorities; and isolated passages have been quoted, without regard to others by which they have been qualified or ex-

¹ See Mill, *History of India*, i. 305, and notes; also Grant's Reports on the Northern Circars and the Revenues of Bengal; and the Minute of Lord Cornwallis, Fifth Report, App. 473. Colonel Munro says, "Nothing can be plainer than that private landed property has never existed in India except on the Malabar coast."—Revenue Sel. i. 94. And the Board of Revenue observe, "We concur with Colonel Munro in thinking that Government is virtually the proprietor of the soil."—*Ibid.* 486. Such also is Mr. Fortescue's opinion with respect to the Western provinces; and at a long subsequent date, "As to the proprietorship, my belief is, that the Government is the proprietor of the land, and that the person occupying it is well satisfied with the occupation, paying the rent."—Lords' Committee, 1836, Evid., Question 511. And on the opposite side of India Colonel Barnewall asserts that the people in Guzerat claim no property in the soil. Government is vested with the property in the lands; and, as landlord, entitled to the rent, or a share of the produce equal to it.—Commons' Committee, 1832, Evid. 1755.

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plained.¹ If due attention had been paid to these considerations, it would have been found that the supposed proprietary right of the sovereign is not warranted by ancient writers; and that, while those of later date seem to incline to its admission, they do not acknowledge an exclusive right, but one concurrent with the right of the occupant; they acknowledge a property in the soil, not the property of the soil. In the older jurists we find, indeed, the right of kingly power over the whole earth asserted; and the right is based, with every semblance of historical truth, upon conquest: but there is no attribution of ownership to the king, nor is there any trace of a royal property or estate.² Proprietary

¹ As observed by Mr. Mill, i. 307 and note, the Digest of Hindu law compiled by the desire of Sir William Jones, and translated by Mr. Colebrooke, favours the proprietary right of the sovereign, particularly in stating, that, if no special engagement for a term of occupancy has been made, the occupant may at any time be dispossessed by the Raja in favour of a person offering a higher revenue.—i. 461. Colonel Wilks accuses the Pundits, who compiled the Digest, of falsifying the law; but the charge is undeserved. The original passages of the Digest are not the law, they are the opinions of the compiler as to the meaning of the law; and it is open to any one to contest or admit the interpretation according to the purport of the ancient texts, which are also given. It is also necessary to collate this passage with what follows; it will then be found that Tarka-Panchánana, the compiler, does not deny proprietary right in the subject, he only infers the co-existence of concurrent rights: "There is property," he says, "of a hundred various kinds in land:" and, when treating of sale without ownership, he observes, "The property is his who uses the land where he resides, and while he uses it; and thus, when land belonging to any person is sold by the king, it is sale without ownership."—i. 475. The sale is illegal.

² The texts of Menu, which have been cited in proof of the proprietary right of the Raja, have been misunderstood. In B. viii. v. 39, the phrase rendered by Sir W. Jones "lord paramount of the soil," is *Bhumer-adhipati*, supreme ruler of the earth: the title *Adhipati*, "over-lord," no more implies ownership in this text than when it is used to denote the head-man of a village, *Grámádhpati*; or governor of a district, *Désádhpati*. In another text, in which the authority of a king is intimated to be analogous to that of a husband over a wife, the sources of property in subjects are also enunciated: "Ancient sages have called this earth (*Pr̥thivi*) the wife of *Prithu*; they have called the field his who has cut down the thicket; the wild beast his whose shaft has slain it."—B. ix. v. 44. The subjection

right is vested in the individual who first clears and cultivates the land: it is therefore referred to colonisation; a source which, as regards India and the Hindus, is probably in a great degree historical. The king may occupy unclaimed or uncultivated lands, as well as a subject; he has no preference: if he appropriates them, he must give away half to the Brahmans; if they are appropriated by a subject, the king claims only the share of the produce assigned to him by law. Concurrent and not incompatible rights and claims are thus clearly recognised; and the king's dues are based, not upon any indefeasible right of property, but in the first instance upon conquest, and in the second upon protection.

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The notion of the proprietary right of the sovereign is rather of Mohammedan than Hindu origin. The doctrines of the Mohammedan jurists are somewhat at variance on this matter. Those who belong

of the earth by Prithu is clearly an allegory of its conquest by the military caste; see Vishnu Purana, p. 103. The compiler of the Digest expressly states that the king's proprietary right is "denied by some, because Menu has only declared that subjects shall be protected by the king."—i. 471. Menu then, even according to the Pundits, is not authority for this doctrine. Another ancient lawgiver, Yajñawalkya, is quoted in the Digest to show that the king has no particular property even in unclaimed or uncultivated ground; if a subject choose, he may occupy it without leave, giving the Raja his due.—i. 461. Another writer of antiquity, Jaimini, the author of the Mimamsa, also denies the king's ownership: "The kingly power is for the government of the realm and the extirpation of wrong, and for that purpose he receives taxes from husbandmen and levies fines from offenders; but the right of property is not thereby vested in him, else he would have property in house and land appertaining to the subjects abiding in his dominions. The earth is not the king's, but is common to all beings enjoying the fruit of their own labour."—Colebrooke on the Mimamsa Philosophy, Trans. Royal Asiatic Society, i. 458. Mr. Elphinstone justly concludes, from the Hindu laws on this subject, that as the king's share was limited to one-sixth, or at most to one-fourth, there must have been a proprietor for the other five-sixths, or three-fourths, who must obviously have had the greatest interest of the two in the whole property shared.—History of India, i. 42.

BOOK I. to the school which has been chiefly followed in
 CHAP. VII. India, maintain the right of individual ownership:

1813. yet they do so with considerable reservation, for they restrict the appropriation of all uncultivated land to the king; assign to him the property of all except arable land; authorise him to dispossess any occupant who neglects to cultivate his land, and transfer it to another;¹ and entitle him to claim the whole of the net produce of cultivation. Other Mohammedan lawyers assert unequivocally, that in all conquered countries, and India is in their estimation a conquered country, although the inhabitants may be suffered to retain the occupancy of their lands, the property of them is vested in the sovereign.² It is apparently to these doctrines, to the long continuance of Mohammedan domination over a large portion of India, and to the influence which it indirectly exercised over the states that remained subject to Hindu princes, that the notion of the proprietary right of the sovereign owed its general and popular acceptance.

For upon whatever system of law that impression

¹ The Hindu law, as it appears in Menu, does not go this length: it provides only, that, in case of neglect to cultivate, the owner shall be fined ten times the amount of the king's share, if his own fault; five times, if that of his servants.—B. viii. v. 243. There is not a word of confiscation or transfer.

² Galloway on the Law and Constitution of India, p. 101. According to this writer, a high authority in matters of Mohammedan law, the school of Abu Hanifa was that which was chiefly followed in Hindustan; and this jurist affirms that in conquered countries the people paying the legal impost preserved their proprietary rights. General Galloway also states that this is denied by the Shafia and Malikia schools; according to which the lands, although retained by the people, become the property of the sovereign.—Ibid. 45. It is worth observing, that all the authorities cited by Mill, i. 308 note, with exception of Diodorus and Strabo, whose testimony is not entitled to very great deference, derive their opinions from their observation of the state of things under the Mohammedan governments.

was founded, and whether erroneous or just, there is little reason to doubt that in later times at least it has prevailed very widely amongst the people,¹ and regulated the practice of the native governments. This gives the question its importance. Abstractedly considered, it signifies but little whether the king be called the lord of the soil, or by any other title; but, when in this capacity he superseded all other rights, it became no longer a matter of mere speculation. Acting upon this principle, the native rulers required that a formal grant should legalise the occupation of all waste land, and sequestered estates of which the cultivation was neglected or the revenues unpaid; fixed at their pleasure from time to time the proportion of the produce which the occupant was to pay, claiming indeed the whole of the net produce as the rent; and turned out actual occupants in favour of others offering a higher amount of payment. The almost universal practice of recent times transferred these rights and powers to contractors and farmers of the revenue, from whom the prince exacted as much as he could obtain, and then left them at liberty to extort all they could, and by whatever means they could, from the people. His right to do so was not questioned, but its

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¹ The belief of Mr. Fortescue with regard to the opinions of the people of the Western provinces has been already cited, note, p. 413. The Abbé Dubois is a good representative of the popular notions prevailing in the Dekhin, and he says, "The lands which the Hindus cultivate are the domain of the prince, who is sole proprietor: he can resume them at pleasure, and give them to another to cultivate."—Description of the People of India, p. 496. The author has heard the same sentiment expressed repeatedly by well-informed Hindus from the Upper provinces. They have admitted the full right of the Government to dispossess any occupants whatever, although, if the customary demands were paid, such act would be considered harsh and oppressive. In Bengal the notion has probably been effaced by the Company's regulations: the Zemindars have been taught a different lesson.

BOOK I. exercise through such instrumentality was resisted
 CHAP. VII. where resistance was thought likely to succeed ; and
 1813. the consequences of the system were such as might
 have been anticipated—the decline and disorganisa-
 tion of the country.

The proprietary right of the sovereign derives then no warrant from the ancient laws or institutions of the Hindus, and is not recognised by modern Hindu lawyers as exclusive, or incompatible with individual ownership. It is the doctrine of one of the schools of Mohammedan law; it has influenced the practice of the later native governments, and it had obtained a very general belief among the people. The popular belief was however modified by the remembrance of original rights and the remains of primitive institutions; and while in theory the people admitted the right of the prince to the lands they tilled, yet in practice they very commonly regarded them as their own as long as they paid to the sovereign his undisputed share of the produce. Unhappily for them, this share was of late rarely regulated by any other standard than their ability to comply with the exactions of their rulers.

II. The ancient Hindu law enacts that the demand of the Raja shall be levied in kind. The king is to have a proportion of the grain; a twelfth, an eighth, or a sixth.¹ It is also declared, that in time of war, if he should take one-fourth, he would

¹ Menu, B. vii. v. 30. The commentator explains the several rates to depend upon the quality of the land, and the labour required to bring it into cultivation; the highest rate being levied on the best, the lowest on the worst sort of land: the assessment was therefore irrespective of the actual crops.

commit no sin.¹ A fourth of the actual crop constituted therefore the utmost limit of demand, and that only in time of war, under the ancient Hindu system; and this proportion evidently left such a share to the cultivator as was equivalent to a profit upon his cultivation, or to a rent, enabling him at his will to transfer the task of cultivation to tenant farmers, and placing him in the position of a landed proprietor as far as ownership of rent is evidence of such a tenure.² The Mohammedan law established a totally different proportion. It extended the claim of the Crown to the whole of the net produce; assigned to the cultivator only so much of the crop as would suffice for one year's subsistence of himself and his family, and for seed; and reduced him to the condition of a mere labourer on his own land. The whole of the profit or the rent went to the sovereign, who thus became the universal landlord.³ The more equitable spirit and sounder judg-

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¹ It has been argued that this law would furnish a plea to the Raja to exact a fourth at all times, as a case of necessity could always be made out; but this is not possible consistently with a due regard to the language and obvious intention of the law. The passage should be thus rendered: "A Kshatriya, in time of calamity, protecting his subjects to the utmost of his power, is liberated from sin although taking a fourth part." The verse occurs in the section which treats of the conduct of the different castes in times of distress, and is detached from the passages concerning revenue. That the distress here indicated means time of war is clear enough from the passage that immediately follows: "for battle is his duty; he should never turn his face from fight: protecting the cultivators with his sword, let him levy taxes in a lawful manner."—v. 119.

² Such Mr. Mill considered it, and remarked, that there was no ownership of rent in India as in Europe.—Commons' Committee, 1831; 3288. The assertion was incorrect: there was ownership of rent as long as the native Governments suffered it to continue; and there still is such ownership under the British Government, where the assessment is light.

³ "When the Imam conquers a country, if he permits the inhabitants to remain on it, imposing the Kharāj on their lands and the Jezia on their heads, the land is their property." Not very valuable property it should seem, for "Imam Mohammed has said, regard shall be had to the culti-

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ment of Akbar limited the demand of the sovereign to one-third of the average produce of different sorts of land; the amount to be paid preferably in money, but not to be increased for a definite term of years.¹ Under more modern Governments, whether Hindu or Mohammedan, the demand seems to have fluctuated from a third or half of the gross produce, to the whole of the net produce, or even to have exceeded those proportions;² leaving to the cultivator in-

ventor: there shall be left for every one who cultivates his land as much as he requires for his own support till the next crop be reaped, and for that of his family, and for seed. . . This much shall be left him; what remains is Kharáj, and shall go to the public treasury." This is the dictum of a great lawyer of the Hanifia school, Shams-ul-Aima of Sarakhs; and a firman of Aurangzeb directs his officers to levy the Kharáj according to the holy law and the tenets of Abu Hanifa.—Galloway, 40, 43. Here is evidently the origin of the sovereign's claim to the whole of the rent. The unhappy "infidel" cultivator had to pay a capitation tax besides.

¹ Ayin Akbari, i. 306, 314. The term was fixed, in the 24th year of the reign, for ten years; but the general assessment, or Jama-bandi, of Toral-Mal was apparently intended to last for an indefinite period.—Ibid. Appendix.

² In the south of India, Harihara Rai, of Bijnagar, one of the latest independent Hindu principalities, fixed the rate at one-fourth of the gross produce, fixing it on each field, and requiring a money-payment. The Mohammedan Governments exacted half the gross produce of the irrigated lands, and a money-rate equal to from thirty to forty per cent. of the value of the unirrigated and garden produce.—Revenue Selections, i. 895. According to the Parásara Madhaviya, a work on law by the minister of Harihara, the king's share was one-sixth.—Wilks, i. 154. In the Western provinces the Government share was considered to be half the net produce.—Fortescue; Lords' Committee, Evidence, Question 531. Or even half the gross produce.—Ibid. 532. "But the rule authorizing the exchequer to take as revenue one-half of the produce in the hands of Government is in a great manner nominal; for in the unsettled districts we do not, I believe, on an average, get more than one-fourth."—Mackenzie; Commons' Committee, 1832, Evid., Question 2671. Mr. Mill also thinks it impossible that such a proportion should ever have been taken.—Commons' Committee, 1831, Question 3887. But he observes, correctly enough, with regard to the practice of later times, "According to all I can gather from the practice of former Governments, the Government demand was never less than the full rent, in many instances probably more; not unfrequently as much more as could be raised without diminishing the number of inhabitants and desolating the country."—Ibid., Question 3114. The state of many parts of India, when first reduced to British authority, showed that these checks had not always operated; and that the exactions of improvident and arbitrary princes, enforced through the agency of farmers of the

sufficient means of subsistence, and not unfrequently compelling him to abandon in despair the cultivation of the lands which his forefathers had tilled, and to which his strongest affections chained him, extortion being thus punished by dearth and depopulation.

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III. According to the principles of the Mohamedan law, and the consequences to which they led, the classification of the parties interested in the produce of the soil was exceedingly simple. Two only were recognised, the Ryot or cultivating tenant, and the Raja, or rent-owning landlord; the first earning a scanty support by his labour, the second claiming the whole of the surplus return on his property. Such were the conclusions of the first inquirers into the tenure of lands in India. There were found, indeed, persons intervening between the state and the cultivators, but these it was affirmed were in every case persons to whom the state had delegated its powers or transferred its rights: they were not—and this was in some important respects quite true—proprieters of the soil: there were no such persons,—at least, there were no persons who had a right to intercept, without a special grant to that effect, any portion of the rent or profit of cultivation. Further investigation showed that the

revenue, had thinned the population, and consigned extensive and fertile districts to the denizens of the forest.

¹ So General Galloway: "The truth is, that between the sovereign and the Reb-ul-arz, (master of the ground,) who is properly the cultivator, no one intervenes who is not a servant of the sovereign."—p. 42. "The land has been considered the property of the Circar and the Ryots; the interest in the soil has been divided between these two, but the Ryots have possessed little more interest than that of being hereditary tenants."—Thackeray, Fifth Report, App. 992.

BOOK I. latter propositions were not altogether accurate: the
 CHAP. VII. structure of agricultural society in India was not so

1813. exceedingly simple; a variety of proprietary rights and privileges had survived the disintegrating operations of foreign conquest, foreign laws, oppressive government, and popular misconception, and required to be carefully studied and correctly understood before it could be safe or just to come to any unalterable conclusion. Traces of individual proprietary rights, of personal ownership of rent, were extensively discoverable; and, where they were faint or extinct, it was because the rapacity of the ruling power had dimmed or extinguished them.

A peculiarity in the disposition of landed property in India, which was early observable, was its distribution among communities rather than among individuals. The earliest records describe the agricultural population as collected into groupés, villages, or townships, having attached to the particular village or town in which they resided an extent of land the cultivateable portion of which was sufficient for their support, and which was apparently cultivated in common.¹ The internal administration of the affairs of the village was left, in a great measure, to the people themselves, under the general superintendence of an officer appointed by the

¹ Menu, vii. 120, and viii. 237. The Madras Revenue Board affirm the village system is as old as Menu: "That venerable legislator alludes to disputes about boundaries just as they occur at present, and directs a space of four hundred cubits wide, round small villages, and twelve hundred round large ones, to be left for pasture. This could not have been done if the land had been exclusive private property, for in that case the owner would have made the most of his land, and not left it waste for the public use of the inhabitants; and boundaries of fields and farms, rather than of villages, would have been disputed."—Revenue Selections, i. 487.

Raja, by whom the police was regulated, the government revenue was collected, and justice was administered, in communication with the principal persons of the village. The general scheme of these village corporations has been repeatedly described.¹ Besides the officers of the government, and the individuals who composed the community strictly so called, the village comprised a varying number of persons who received small portions of the crops as the hire of services rendered to the whole, and persons also not members of the original establishment, but who were allowed to reside within the village as independent artificers and tradesmen, or even as cultivators of the lands bought or rented from the proprietors. Establishments of this nature were found in their greatest completeness in different parts of the south of India, where Hindu principalities had been longest preserved: but they were also met with in the western provinces of Hindustan, where their organisation had assumed something of a military character; and vestiges of them were not wholly obliterated even in Bengal.

The circumstances which led originally to this distribution of the lands among detached communities are now beyond the reach of history. It may have been the result of a legislative provision, devised for the ready realisation of the revenue and

¹ See the description in the first volume of Mill, p. 313, from the Fifth Report; Elphinstone, *History of India*, i. 120, and App. 476; and Wilks, *Southern India*, i. 117. In a deed of gift by the minister of Bukka Raya, king of Vijayanagar, dated 1109, Saka (A. D. 1187), the following list of village officers is given:—1. Reddi, or Pedda Reddi, head-man. 2. Karnam, accountant. 3. Purohit, priest. 4. Blacksmith. 5. Carpenter. 6. Money-changer. 7. Kavel, village watcher or police officer. 8. Potmaker. 9.

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1813. but there is no record of its institution or its author. Tradition ascribes it to the spontaneous agreement of mankind in an early stage of society,¹ and it may have been suggested to the first Hindu settlers in India by the necessities of their situation. Whatever may have been its origin or antiquity, there is no reason to believe that the village communities now in existence can boast of any remote date or legislative creation. They represent with differing degrees of fidelity the primitive forms from which they are copied; but they have deviated in various respects from the original type, and are in many instances, probably in all, of comparatively recent date. They are most commonly the growth of modern colonisation or conquest, and the peculiar features which they present have been modelled by the occurrences from which they have sprung.

The political revolutions of later times, and probably of earlier days also, have occasioned frequent migrations of the people of India from one part of the country to another. Centuries have elapsed since the region was fully peopled; perhaps it never was wholly occupied: at any rate, abundance of waste land has for a long time past been available, and parties from the neighbouring or from distant tracts have located themselves upon unoccupied spots, with

Washerman. 10. Barber. 11. Barikudu, messenger or menial. 12. Chakri, shoemaker or worker in skins and leather. These are essentially the same as the Bara-ballowati of other authorities, though some of the names differ; and, in place of the leather-worker, some places have a water-carrier.—Ellis on Mirasi right, App. p. 36. Traces of village institutions were found by General Briggs in Bengal; Land-tax, Supplement: although there, as in other places, the corporation, or association of persons constituting the proprietary and governing body, had disappeared.

¹ Vishnu Purana, p. 45.

or without the cognisance of the ruling power, not likely to throw obstacles in the way of those who purposed to convert an unproductive wilderness into a source of revenue.¹ The settlers would of course be either of the same family, the same caste, or the same tribe; and would be linked together through succeeding generations by community of origin, as well as of property. There is an active spirit of aggregation at work in Hindu society: the very institution of caste, which disjoins the people as a whole, combines them in their subdivisions; like the process of crystallisation, which destroys the uniformity of the mass by the condensation of the particles. But this is not the only source of reintegration; there prevail other combinations of tribe or avocation, some of which would be sure to influence the movements of a body of settlers on a new soil, and unite them into a village community or corporation. The necessity of combination, in order to protect themselves against the financial oppressions of the state, or against unauthorised plunderers and assailants, would further contribute to cement their union, and would give it consistency and duration.²

In like manner, where the occupation of the new country was an act of violence and aggression com-

¹ See the instructions of Aurangzeb to his collectors, as cited by General Galloway, 55.

² Instances of recent colonisation are specified by Mr. Thomason. "A family of Chandel Rajputs emigrated from the Jonpur district, and settled at Purgunna Natherpur, where they acquired much land." "The rise of some Ahir (shepherd) communities illustrates the formation of such bodies by sufferance. Familiar with the forest (in the Azimghur district), they fixed their residence in some favourable spot, and began to cultivate; and, when a settlement (of the revenue) came to be made, appeared to be the most convenient persons with whom to enter into engagements for the land."—Account of the Settlement of Azimghur, by J. Thomason, Esq.; Journal, Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. viii. p. 96.

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mitted against their neighbours, or against the barbarous tribes inhabiting extensive tracts in different parts of India, identity of kindred, caste, or tribe, as well as of interest, would unite the first assailants, and would extend a bond of union to their successors. Such transactions are known to have occurred within very recent periods.¹ In some instances one village community has fallen upon another, and ousted it from its possessions: in others, a military adventurer has assembled his kinsmen and followers; and, having conquered an extensive tract, has parcelled it out amongst his chiefs, very much upon the plan of a military fief. Time, the fiscal measures of the Government, and the partition of inheritance among the descendants of the conquerors, have loosened the original compact; and the village, once held by an individual upon condition of military service to a chief, may have assumed the form of a village municipality, or it may still retain many features of its original feudal character.² In some places the original occupants have

¹ Mr. Thomason supposes the original conquest of Azimghur by Rajputs, some time prior to the twelfth century, to have been the general foundation of the existing proprietary right of the soil; and recently, "Achar and its dependent villages was held by a tribe of Kaut Rajputs. The Dhunwars, (another Rajput clan,) of the neighbouring estate of Khulsa, were more powerful: they attacked and massacred most of the Kauts. This took place only a few years before the cession. Some of the family fled into the neighbouring district of Ghazipur, then in British possession, and have since in vain attempted to recover their rights."—J. B. As. Society, viii. 96. During the course of the inquiry preceding the permanent settlement, it was found that the Pergunna of Mongir was divided among the descendants of two Rajputs, to whom the family tradition ascribed the first settlement of the country under grants from the Emperor Humayun, having taken it from the wild inhabitants of the wilderness, which it then was, without the smallest vestige of cultivation.—Letter from Mr. Davis, Assistant Collector on Deputation, 11th August, 1790; Fifth Report, 238.

² Such is the case with the greater part of the Zemindaris along the western frontier of Bengal, where, while the peasantry are mostly of the

been driven away or exterminated: in others they appear as serfs or slaves attached to the soil and accompanying its transfers, or being sold independently of the land.¹

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From these sources, — legislation, colonisation, and conquest, — and from the two latter especially in modern times, may be derived the origin of the village communities of India, or confederations of a definite number of individuals claiming a certain extent of land as their common property, and a right to all advantages and privileges inherent in such property, subject to the payment of a proportion of the produce to the state. When that proportion absorbed all the profits of cultivation, the members of the commune who claimed the ownership of the lands were reduced to the condition — which has

wild forest tribes, Koles, or Gonds, the proprietors of the villages are Rajputs. That these latter came as conquerors as late as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is well known amongst themselves, and the origin of their possessions by allotment from the chief on the tenure of military service is also admitted. The relation between the holders of the several lots, and the representatives of the first leader, or the Rajas, is more or less perfectly preserved, but it retains almost universally some impress of its origin. See the remarks on tenures in Sambhalpur, Mill, i. p. 309, note. A similar state of things prevails in the Pergunnas of Palamú, Sirguja, Chota Nagpur, and others in the same direction. An interesting account of the origin and progress of the feudal Zemindari of Palamú was printed, but not published, by the late Mr. Augustus Prinsep, of the Bengal Civil Service. Mr. Prinsep was disposed to find similar feudal institutions in many of the Zemindaris of Bengal and Behar.

¹ In Malabar and Canara, where the land was very generally divided and occupied as separate and distinct properties, the labourer was the personal slave of the proprietor, and was sold and mortgaged by him independently of the land. In the Tamil country, where land belonged more to communities than individuals, the labourer was understood to be the slave of the soil rather than of any particular person. In Telingana, where it was difficult to trace the remains of private property in the land, the labourers, usually of the degraded or outcast tribes, were free.—Minute, Board of Revenue, Madras, Jan. 1816; Revenue Sel. i. 887. Mr. Thomason, describing the agricultural labourers of Azimghur, speaks of them as having been, under former Governments, predial slaves, who were beaten without mercy for misconduct, and were liable to be pursued and brought back if they attempted to escape.—J. B. Asiatic Soc. viii. 115.

BOOK I. been ascribed, incorrectly it may be thought, to all
 CHAP. VII. the agricultural population of India—of persons cul-

1813. tivating the ground with their own hands and by their own means.¹ When the further exactions of the officers of the state, and the usurpations which in the absence of all government they perpetrated, reduced the proprietors to extreme distress and insignificance, the village corporations were broken up, and the traces of proprietary right so completely obliterated as to suggest a belief that it had never existed. Such seems to have been the state of the peasantry in Bengal and Telingana. In other places, in Canara, in the Dekhin, in Bundelkhand, and the Western provinces,² the right of property was better preserved. Where either the demands of the Government had been more moderate, or the villagers by union and courage, or combination and craft, had resisted or evaded extortion, they retained their character of proprietors, living upon the profits of their own lands.³ The state of the coun-

¹ Mill; Commons' Committee, 1831, Evid. §114.

² Thus in Canara and Sonda, where the lands had, until a late date, been lightly assessed, the Government demand having been as low as one-tenth of the produce, and never more than a third, the lands were generally sublet, the proprietors sometimes cultivating a portion: none of them held any large estates; few averaging, in the best of times, a rent of more than fifty pagodas (or about twenty pounds) a-year. The respective rights of the Government to the land revenue, and of the proprietor to the land, were well known: an ancient grant to a temple specified the grant to be the Government share of the rent, because the land belonged to the proprietor, and could not therefore be given away by the state.—Fifth Report, 803; Life of Sir Thomas Munro, iii. 161.

³ The term village Zemindars has been generally applied to these proprietors in Hindustan.—Fortescue; Thomason, &c. Janamkars, or birthright holders, is their name in Malabar.—Board of Revenue, Madras. Amongst the Mahrattas they were called Thalkaris, holders of the Thal, (Sthal, or land,) or Watan-dars (holders of the country); Coates on the Township of Lony; Trans. Literary Society of Bombay, iii. 226: and in the Tamil countries of the Peninsula, Mirásis, or Mirásdars (inheritors). Of the latter

try, the habits of the people, and the subdivision of property by the laws of inheritance, prevented the aggregation of large estates, or the formation of a landed aristocracy; and the agricultural proprietors were therefore little else than petty farmers, employing, superintending, and not unfrequently assisting the labourers: but they were in a position to preserve their hereditary rights, and to perpetuate the organisation of the village communities. Much variety, however, prevailed in that organisation, not only in proportion to the degree of entireness in which it had been preserved, but from circumstances

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Mr. Ellis observes, "Miras, originally signifying inheritance, is employed to designate a variety of rights differing in nature or degree, but all more or less connected with the proprietary possession or usufruct of the soil or of its produce."—Ellis on Mirasi right; Selections, 810. The Selections have injudiciously omitted the Appendices of this valuable document, full of important historical illustration, which no one but Mr. Ellis was competent, from a profound knowledge of the languages and literature of the South of India, and from enlightened experience, to furnish. In the Appendix, which with the text was printed at Madras in 1818, we find the following concluding view of Mirasi tenure. "The Cani-sudantrau, or proper Mirasi right, though founded on the principles of the general law, implies peculiar privileges and an independent enjoyment of landed property by the actual cultivator, unknown in other parts of India, and confined, in fact, to those provinces of the South which formerly constituted the dominions of the ancient Tamil princes: this mode of holding landed property, and several of the incidents appertaining to it, are not in resemblance only, but in fact, the same as those which prevailed among our ancestors previously to the introduction of fensual tenures into Europe, and which is usually designated by the term *allodium*, with which the word *Canyatchi* (entire and absolute possession) in derivative meaning intimately corresponds. One of the most remarkable incidents in Mirasi is, the periodical interchange of lands, which, in Tonda-mandalam at least, was anciently universal; the holding of them in severalty being a modern practice. Now this was also a practice common to the nations among whom the allodial possession of land primarily obtained, and from whom it passed to their Frankish and Saxon descendants; as Tacitus observes, 'The fields are occupied, in proportion to the number of cultivators, in turns by all, and are then divided among them according to the rank of each: the extent of the plains facilitates this partition. The cultivated fields are interchanged every year, and yet land remains.'—*De Mor. Germanorum*, c. 26. Were I to endeavour to describe the mode of periodical repartition practised in every Arudicadei village in Southern India, I could not convey my meaning in more appropriate or precise terms."—p. 85.

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connected with its history which were no longer to be verified. A village or villages had sometimes a single proprietor, more commonly a greater number; but these were associated under a variety of conditions. Sometimes they held in common, sometimes in severalty; and the rights which they claimed were of various descriptions. They were mostly reducible to two chief classes, the rights of property and the rights of privilege: they were both hereditary, but the latter only were indefeasible, and subsisted where the former had been lost. In their capacity of joint proprietors of village land the members of the association generally inherited rather a definite proportion of the whole than any specific spot of ground. Sometimes the same family cultivated the same fields for successive generations; but it was more usual to arrange amongst themselves for fresh allotments from time to time, and to distribute different parcels of land in distant parts of the village estate to the same individual, according to the qualities of the soil, and in conformity to regulations sanctified by prescription. In their character of parties responsible to the Government for a portion of its demands they sometimes paid it individually, in proportion to their shares; but it was more usual to make the apportionment amongst themselves, and pay the whole collectively through their head-man or head-men. The shares, or the land where the land was cultivated separately, might be mortgaged, or let, or sold; but the act ordinarily required the concurrence of the other members of the community, in whom also the right of pre-emption was vested. The alienation of the land to a stranger

did not carry with it of necessity his admission to the municipality, or give him any voice in the management of the affairs of the village; neither did it divest the person to whom the share or land had belonged, of his right to interfere in the counsels of the community, to assist in auditing the village accounts, or to receive his portion of any emoluments which were derivable from the fees paid for permission to exercise any trade or calling in the village by persons not originally belonging to it, or from any other source. Should he at any time become able to resume his land, he was at liberty to do so. A variety of minor regulations diversified the village constitution in different parts of India; but the general plan and most characteristic features were everywhere essentially alike, and established the virtual existence of a proprietary right in the soil, enjoyed by certain classes of the people, wherever it had not been infringed or abrogated by the usurpations or exactions of arbitrary rule.¹

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¹ Occasionally an entire village might have become the property of a single individual; Minute, Sir Edward Colebrooke, Selections, iii. : but in general the lands were divided into an indeterminate number of subdivisions amongst the descendants of the original stock, or those holding in right of them. Their right to a certain number of shares was fixed, but adjustments took place from time to time according to the pleasure and convenience of the parties interested; the divisions were effected either by integral allotment, or by fractional parts of each description of the land, to be divided according to its quality. By the former method the shares were compact; by the latter they consisted of many particular spots situated in different quarters. In some villages, although comparatively few, the lands are undivided; yet this circumstance neither alters nor affects in any way the right of property in them. When the lands are undivided, each sharer usually continues to cultivate the same fields. A proprietary share is considered large at two hundred and fifty bégas, an ordinary one about seven bégas; some are as small as two bégas.—Fortescue on Tenures in the District of Delhi; Selections, iii. 404. The proprietary right may rest either in a single individual or in a community: the latter may divide among themselves the profits of the estate, either according to their ancestral shares, or some arbitrary rule having reference to the quantity of land which each

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The existence of proprietors of the soil not depending upon manual labour involved of necessity the existence also of a class or classes of persons willing to undertake the task of cultivating the land, paying a rent for the occupancy transferred to them for that purpose. Such persons accordingly were found in all places where the proprietors themselves had not been reduced to the level of a labouring peasantry; as was the case in much of the territory of the Peninsula, in the Mahratta provinces, and in Hindustan. They were not wholly wanting even in Bengal.¹ It would occupy too

member cultivates.—Thomason; J. B. Asiatic Soc. viii. 98. In various places, what was considered the original number of shares remained unaltered; but the distribution came to the same thing as their multiplication, it being in fractional parts: thus, some members might have a whole share, some a half, or some a hundredth part. This was the case in the Tamil countries; and the Thals of the Mahratta villages, and Péns and Thokas of the Western provinces, seem also to have represented the original shares, and indicated the number of persons among whom the land was first divided.—Colebrooke, Sykes, &c. In the South of India the lands are of two kinds, privilege and proprietary: the former belong to the whole village, and a member can sell his share only; the latter may be cultivated collectively or separately. In the former case shares only are subjects of sale, in the latter the land is saleable.—Minute, Board of Revenue, Madras; Selections, i. 904. The other statements of the text rest also upon these authorities.

¹ In the Western provinces there were the Kudeem, or ancient Ryot; the Páhi, the itinerant or temporary Ryot; and the Kumera, or labourer: there was also the Kamín, or partial cultivator, an artizan or the like, cultivating a few bigas at his leisure.—Fortescue; Selections, i. 406. In Azimghur there were the three classes, but generally resolved into two: Ashraf, respectable; and Arzal, low.—Thomason; J. B. As. Society, viii. 112. In Bengal the cultivators were long since distinguished as holding Khud-kasht and Pai-kasht lands; the former cultivated by a permanent and resident, the latter by a temporary and migratory, tenant.—Harington, Analysis B. Regulations; Introduction. The Zemindari Regulations have merged the proprietor into the Khud-kasht cultivator, who was probably the permanent tenant. But there are other designations, less known, which preserve the distinctions; the Praja, (or subject,) having the right to sell; the Kalpa, paying him rent, and, while so doing, having the right of occupancy; and the Patti-dar, holding of the same by annual lease.—Briggs, Land-tax of India, Supplement, 500. In the South of India, in the Tamil countries, tenants are termed Paya-karis, cultivating persons: the permanent, Ul-kudi Paya-karis; the temporary, Para-kudi Paya-karis: in Malabar, Patom-karis, rent-payers: in Canara, Gabinis, literally tenentes; Múla-

much space to specify the various tenures by which they hold, and it will be sufficient to advert to them as distinguishable into two principal classes: the one possessing a right of perpetual occupancy as long as the stipulated rent was paid; the other having only a temporary possession, either for a definite number of years, or being tenants at will. The former might have tenants under them, and sublet the land, remaining themselves responsible to the individual or community of whom the land was held; they were also allowed to mortgage, but not to sell. The tenants for a term were bound of course by the tenor of their agreements: the tenants at will were often little better than mere labourers, and sometimes were degraded to the condition of slaves.

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From this sketch of the distribution of landed property in India it follows, that, whatever might have been the law or the theory, individual proprietary right, identifiable with ownership of rent, had a very extensive existence even to the latest periods of native administration. The precise nature of the title under which it was enjoyed was not always the same, nor was it always perhaps easy of verification; but, whether originating in ancient institutions, in colonisation, or in conquest, it had a real and substantial vitality, and animated the exertions of the

gahinis, radical or permanent tenants; Chali-gahinis, moveable tenants.—Madras Revenue Board; Selections. In the Mahratta countries the tenant is termed Upari, an "over" or "outer" man, an alien; Sukhwas, an abider at ease; a Mahiman, or guest: but the only tenure here known seems to be that of a tenant by agreement or lease.—Sykes, Land Tenures of the Dekhin. Of these denominations, some are Sanscrit, some Arabic, some vernacular, but they are all significant; and, had their significations been properly understood, little doubt could ever have been entertained as to the character of the persons to whom they were applied.

BOOK I. great body of the cultivating population, until it was
CHAP. VII. destroyed or wrested from them, partially at least,
 1813. by the progress of events, and by the extortion,
 injustice, and ignorance of their rulers.

IV. The produce of cultivation being divided between the proprietor or cultivator and the sovereign, it was necessary that the latter should provide agents to determine and realise his share. With this view, under the Hindu system an officer was placed, as has been noticed, at the head of every village or township, who was accountable to a superior in charge of ten villages; he again was responsible to the superintendent of one hundred villages, and he to the head of a thousand villages.¹ This last, the governor in fact of a province, paid the revenue into the royal treasury. The Mohammedan Governments adopted divisions, corresponding in a great measure with those of the Hindus, but the organisation was less definite:² and in the anarchy of the declining empire, and in the general employment of the agency of revenue contractors, little trace was left of the primitive institutions beyond the head-man of the village, and the chiefs of one or two large but undefined portions of territory; the former designated in various parts of India as Mokkadam, Mandal, or Patel, the latter known chiefly in Bengal and Hindustan as Talukdar or Zemindar.

The head-man of a village was the only func-

¹ Menu, vii. 119, 123; Elphinstone's History of India, i. 39.

² In Bengal we have the Grāma or Gaon, the village; the Taraf, the Parganna, and the Taluk or Zemindari, for the larger divisions.—Harington's Analysis, ii. 67. Among the Mahrattas, the Patel, the Déamukh, and Sir-dés-mukh, for the gradation of officers.—Sykes; Journal Royal As. Society, ii. 208.

tionary that was identified with the primitive institution, and who had lived on with it through all the revolutions which India had experienced.¹ Although, however, the office subsisted, it had not escaped alteration. The tendency of all public employment in India, from the office of the prime-minister to the function of village watchman, to become hereditary, is familiarly known. The station of head of a village followed the prevailing bias. From being an officer nominated by the sovereign,² he came to claim the post in virtue of his descent: the family became permanently grafted upon the village, and the representative of it regarded the superintendence of its affairs as his right. It is not unlikely that from the first the duty was entrusted to a leading member of the community, who, while he was acceptable to his townsmen, would be most competent to promote the interests of the state by his influence and responsibility. Time wrought other changes: the family decayed or disappeared; new men usurped the authority, or were elected by different portions of the community. The notion of

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¹ "In every village, according to its extent, there are one or more head-men, known by a variety of names in various parts of the country, who have in some degree the superintendence and direction of the rest. I shall confine myself to the term 'Mandal:' he assists in fixing the rent, directing the cultivation, and making the collections."—Minute by Lord Teignmouth; Fifth Report, 193. He particularises the Mandals of Birbhám, Purnia, and Rajshahi, districts of Bengal. "Amongst the crowd of proprietors, the managers and leaders of the villages are the Mocuddims. These have been from time immemorial the persons through whom the rents of the village have been settled and collected, and who have adjusted the quota of each sharer."—Fortescue; Selections, i. 406.

² In the Mahratta countries the confirmation of the head of the state continued to be regarded essential to the validity of the Patel's authority. "The Patels about Poona say they hold their Patelships of the Emperor of Delhi, or one of the Sattara kings; but many of them must hold of the Peshwa."—Township of Lowy; Bombay Trans. iii. 153.

BOOK I. property as well as privilege became attached to
 CHAP. VII. the succession; and the person holding the office

1813. sold or mortgaged it, or a part of it, and introduced a colleague.¹ Different castes found admission into the village society, each having its own head; or different branches of the same family chose to be severally represented.² The headship was thus divided amongst fewer or more individuals. Nor was this a partition of a barren title or a post of honour: it was an apportionment of shares in certain fees, perquisites, and profits attached to the situation, founded upon the provision made originally for the remuneration of the head-man, but extended to a variety of objects not contemplated in the primary institution. From these and other sources of pecuniary benefit, the office became in some parts of India a means of acquiring wealth, and an object of competition.³

¹ The Patelship is hereditary and saleable, but the office is looked upon as so respectable, and the property attached to it is considered so permanent, that there are few or no instances of its being wholly sold, although part of it has been so transferred. This has given rise to there being two Patels in many villages, and in some three or four.—Bombay Trans. iii. 184.

² General Briggs found in a village near Calcutta, peopled by Moham-medans and Hindus, four Mandals; three for the former, one for the latter.—Supplement, Land-tax. And in a village near Madras, three Pedda-kars, or head-men; one for each caste of the population.—Supplement; Coll., &c. Colonel Sykes gives an amusing and instructive account of the solemn arbitration of a dispute in which two Patels of a village had sold a third of the office to a third party, for money wherewith to pay the public revenue. They subsequently contested the full advantages which the transfer was maintained to convey: a verdict was given against them in a Panchayat of Patels, who apportioned to each his separate share of precedence and emolument. Among other things it was decreed that each was to have a pair of shoes a-year from the village shoemaker, two bundles of fire-wood on festival-days from the village menials, three pots of water daily from the watchmen, and a third of all sheeps' heads offered to the goddess Bhaváni. What was still more valuable, a similar partition was enacted of the rent-free lands attached to the office, and of all lands that might lapse from families becoming extinct.—Tenures of the Dekhin; Journal Royal Asiatic Society.

³ The founder of the family of Sindhia was a Patel: Madhaji affected

The officers to whom the Mohammedan designations of Talukdars and Zemindars applied, indicated less distinctly their Hindu original. They differed in little except in a greater extent of authority and amount of collection, and not always in that; and it will be sufficient in this place to confine our inquiries to the latter.¹ Conflicting speculation has confounded our conceptions of the character of the Zemindar: some of the perplexity has arisen from the application of the term to different classes of persons, and some to the combination of different characters in the same class of persons. In some places the title Zemindar signifies the proprietor of the soil, either as landlord or cultivator, in his individual capacity, or as a member of a village community: in some places it denotes a sort of feudal proprietor, either paramount or subordinate: and in others, an individual responsible to the Government for its share of the revenue of a district of greater or less extent; deriving this responsibility from inheritance, and claiming also as a hereditary right an allowance out of the Government share for maintenance, and as compensation for the trouble and responsibility of collection.² It was in this latter capacity that

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the title, whence the popular saying, "Madhaji Sindhia made himself master of India by calling himself a Patel."—Malcolm, *Central India*, i. 124. Holkar, the Bhonsia Raja, and others, took not only the title, but claimed the office and its emoluments in particular villages.—Sykes, *Land Tenures*.

¹ A Talook comprehended only a few villages or a small tract of ground. The Talook-dar, or holder of a 'dependancy,' sometimes held under a Zemindar, sometimes immediately under the Government, to whom his collections were paid. In the language of the Company's Regulations the latter is called an independent Talookdar. The Hindu name, Choudri, (a word of uncertain etymology, but apparently derived from Chaturtha-dhari, the receiver of a fourth part,) was sometimes applied to a Zemindar.—Harington's *Analysis*, ii. 63.

² Of the first class are the Zemindars of the Western provinces, as already

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the Zemindar became first conspicuous in the fiscal arrangements of the Governments of British India, and was regarded as having a claim to property in the soil.

Nor was this notion altogether without foundation. The whole of the district for the revenues of which a Zemindar was accountable, or any very considerable part of it, might not be his absolute property; but there is reason to believe that he was rarely a mere functionary of the Government, having no property nor interest whatever in the soil. In his case, as well as in that of the head of a village, individuals were no doubt appointed to represent the Government in a particular locality because they had extensive possessions in it, which conferred upon them local authority and influence on the one hand, and on the other afforded to the state a substantial security for the realisation of its demands. The additional power which his relation to the Government placed in his hands was liable to be used by the Zemindar for his own advantage, and oppor-

noticed; and of the second, the Zemindars of the border districts of Bengal, also adverted to. The Zemindars of Orissa, according to Mr. Stirling, are also the representatives of feudal chiefs, holding their lands by the tenure of military service; *Asiatic Researches*, xv. 229: So are the ancient Zemindars of the Northern Circars, and the Poligars of the Dekhin appear to have had the same origin. The last class were found chiefly in Bengal, but also in Hindustan. Their claim to a portion of the Government revenue only is clearly expressed in various Sunnuds or grants of the Mogul Government. One of these, quoted in the original by Mr. Thomason, dated 1609, is a grant made by Jehangir to a converted Hindu, and his descendants for ever, of twenty-four Purgannas in the province of Allahabad; from the Jumma or annual revenue of which he is to deduct one hundred and twenty-five thousand rupees for his Nan̄kar or subsistence, and one per cent. for Zemindari dues (*Abwáb-i-zemindari*).—*J. Bengal Asiatic Society*, viii. 91. Mr. Shore (Lord Teignmouth) refused to admit a Sunnud to be a foundation of Zemindari tenure; *Fifth Report*, 204: but that was because he maintained the Zemindars to be proprietors of the land. Mr. Grant refers their origin to the time of Akbar.—*Ibid.* 632.

tunities were not likely to be wanting which enabled him to appropriate to his own uses the rights both of individuals and the state. The latter not unfrequently waived its own claims in his favour by grants of waste land, or by the assignment to him of the rent of different places in perpetuity for his subsistence; the right to the hereditary possession of which was admitted even when the Zemindar was relieved from all share in the collection of the revenue, was incapable by reason of age or sex of performing the duty, or when he declined to engage for the amount of the Government claim.¹ Besides this assignment, the Zemindar received a

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¹ For this the term is Nánkár, literally, source of bread; General Galloway explains it "bread for work;" it is much the same thing, meaning subsistence-money. In the Sunnud last referred to it was a specified sum to be deducted from the whole rent, but it was more usually the rent or Government share of the produce of certain tracts of land within the Zemindari set apart for the support of the Zemindar.—Harington, ii. 65; and Fifth Report, 633. Mr. Trant identifies Nankar with Nijot, the own proper cultivated land of the Zemindar.—Evid. Com. Committee, 1832; Question 2037. Agreeably to the tenor of the Sunnud quoted in the preceding note, the Nankar was a pension assigned upon the revenue without specifying any obligation to collect the revenue, and hence the foundation, probably, of all such claims. It was rather a special grant to individuals than to the Zemindars as a class, and consequently was retainable where the duty of collecting the revenue was resumed or declined. There was another allowance, the Malikana, the origin of which is not so obvious: properly, it denotes the right of the Malik or owner; but, until the Zemindars were acknowledged to be owners by the British Government, it did not belong to them. It not improbably originated (as General Galloway supposes) in the reservation to the owner of a part of his proper share, amounting to ten per cent. of the estimated rent where the whole land had been oppressively assigned away from him—p. 91. In the course of time it seems to have been appropriated by the Zemindars, and to have been converted by them into an hereditary claim for ten per cent. on the Government collections; and finally it was secured to them professedly in the capacity of proprietors of the soil, and therefore independently of official function, by the imperfect knowledge of the British Government.—Regulation viii. 1793, clause xlv. The same Regulation secured to recusant Zemindars their Nankar lands also, as long as the joint amount of Malikana and Nankar did not exceed ten per cent.—Cl. xxxvi. Certainly the Zemindars had no right to Malikana independently of employment in fiscal duties; and their right to Nankar depended upon the nature of the original assignment under which it was held, or the degree in which it was their Nij or own property.

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per-centage upon the actual collections, or what were understood to be the actual collections; and he was authorised to impose, for his own benefit, taxes upon the industry of the people,—an authority of which he amply availed himself.¹ The distracted state of public affairs, and the imbecility of the native Governments, left the Zemindars still more at liberty to pursue schemes of personal aggrandisement and profit, to encroach upon the rights of the people, and withhold the dues of the Government; until, in some instances at least, they raised themselves to the station of petty princes, levied troops and built forts, and defied the sovereign and his immediate representatives. To the people the encroachments of the Zemindars upon the Government claims were either acceptable or indifferent, and they were not without equivalent advantages, which reconciled them to a curtailment of their own rights. As long as they were allowed to remain upon their lands, it made no difference to

¹ The unwarrantable exactions of the Zemindars are alluded to in the instructions of the Bengal Government of 1769; and some striking illustrations are given by Mr. Sisson in his report, dated April, 1815. "One man buys a house, and celebrates his occupation of it by a religious ceremony; more than double the cost is exacted from his Ryots: the birth of a grandson costs him twelve hundred rupees; he collects from them on this account five thousand. Another has his house burnt; he not only extorts more than the value, but makes it an annual permanent charge to the Ryots. A third makes an annual progress through his estate, travelling in great state; the Ryots are taxed with the cost. A Zemindar buys an elephant; the Ryots pay for it. Every public or private religious ceremonial is an occasion of taxation: not a child can be born, not a head shaved, not a son married, not a daughter given in marriage, not a member of the family dies, but it is a plea for extortion."—Sisson, Report on Rungpore; Selections, i. 390. This was the state of things in Rungpore so late as 1815, and under the British Government: it could not have been much worse under the native Governments. It was the same in the South of India, although there these extra cesses are said to have been brought to the credit of the Government, no doubt very imperfectly.—Comm. Committee, 1832; Col. Sykes, 1957.

them whether the rent they paid went to the Zemindars or the viceroys of the Sultan. The former lived and died among them, generation after generation; they mixed with them on a variety of occasions; they expended money upon public festivals, and supported public institutions; they kept up a large following and an expensive household, and, through many different channels, refunded to the peasantry of the country the money which had been extorted from them. The revenue was spent among those from whom it was raised. When, therefore, the Zemindar was not more than usually oppressive and extortionate; when he was satisfied with the proportion of the produce which usage had established to be his due, and with the occasional imposts or cesses which experience had taught the cultivators to anticipate; he was looked up to with respect, or even with affection, and the people were ever ready to take up arms in defence of his person and possessions. It was not surprising, therefore, that he should have been confounded, by those who first contemplated him in this condition, as the hereditary landlord of a large estate and the proprietor of the soil; although, had they duly considered the limited amount of his acknowledged share of the proceeds of that estate, it might justly have inspired doubts of the validity of his claims to the produce of the whole. It had that result with some; and hence arose one argument in favour of the proprietary right of the sovereign, upon which the measures of the British authorities in 1793 were founded.

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V. The proceedings of the Marquis Cornwallis,

BOOK I. recognising the Zemindars of Bengal, Behar, and
 CHAP. VII. Orissa as proprietors, and fixing for ever the amount
 1813. to be paid by them, have been already detailed;

their results also, as far as they had been then ascertained, have been described.¹ The early arrangements adopted for the settlement of the revenue of the Ceded and Conquered provinces have also been adverted to; and it only remains to notice the course of proceedings which had been followed at Madras. The territory subject to Bombay was still too circumscribed to require separate notice.

Immediately after the conclusion of the perpetual settlement in Bengal, the home authorities directed its extension to the Presidency of Madras: its introduction was delayed by the difficulty of discover-

¹ Vol. v. 517. It may be convenient here to refer to the following authorities. The proprietary right of the Zemindars was advocated at an early date by Mr. Francis, in opposition to Warren Hastings, who urged in favour of a proposed commission of inquiry, that it would tend to secure to the Ryots the perpetual and undisturbed possession of their lands. * Mr. Francis replied, "The state does not consist of nothing but the ruler and the Ryot; nor is it true that the Ryot is the proprietor of the land. The true landlord is the Zemindar."—Minutes of Hastings and Francis, Nov. 1776. Mr. Shore says: "I consider the Zemindars as proprietors of the soil, to the property of which they succeed by right of inheritance."—Fifth Rep. 203. The doctrine was next advocated by Mr. Rouse, in a dissertation on landed property in Bengal, 1791. On the other hand, it was stoutly contested by Mr. Grant: "There is not in the northern Circars, any more than within the rest of the wide circle of the British dominions in India, with exception of a few instances, a single individual among the native Hindoos, calling themselves Rajas or Zemindars, who have the smallest pretension, in form, right, or fact, to an inch of territorial property."—Fifth Rep. 633. But he erred in confining the right of property exclusively to the sovereign. Mr. Place, at a somewhat later date, 1799, took up the claim of the Ryots or husbandmen, at least, in the neighbourhood of Madras.—Fifth Report, 714. Most recent evidence is adverse to the claim of the Zemindars in any other character than that of hereditary collectors or farmers of the public revenue; but, inasmuch as it is exclusive, it is just as erroneous as all that has preceded it. Mr. Tucker's definition is also applicable in many instances, though not universally: "The Zemindar was the hereditary administrator, I should say, of the reveaue, with a beneficial interest in the land."—Commons' Committee, 1832; Evid. 1813.

ing individuals with whom the engagements were to be concluded, for the intervention of persons analogous to the Zemindars of Bengal between the cultivating population and the Government was generally unknown. The reiterated injunctions of the Court of Directors, and the positive orders of the Bengal Government, caused Zemindars to be discovered or created; and several regulations were passed in the course of 1802, declaratory of their proprietary right, and announcing the principles of a perpetual settlement, which, after some interval, was effected in the districts that had been longest subject to the authority of the Madras Government.¹

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Whilst these arrangements were in progress, a settlement on entirely different principles had been commenced in the territories latterly conquered from Mysore. As their circumstances and resources were imperfectly known, it was deemed prudent, before forming any assessment in perpetuity, to institute a detailed survey with a view to the determination of its amount, and in the interval to conclude temporary arrangements with the actual occupants of the lands. These proceedings, undertaken for the ultimate purpose of effecting a permanent Zemindari assessment, gave rise to a new system of revenue administration, since designated Ryotwar, or a settlement individually and immediately with the Ryots, meaning by the term the actual cultivators of the soil. The survey was conducted by Colonel Reade, having for his assistants Lieutenants Munro, Macleod, and Graham; the former of whom, afterwards Sir Thomas Munro,

¹ The northern Circars, the Jagir, part of Salem, Madura, and Tinnevely.

BOOK I. became subsequently more especially identified with
 CHAP. VII. the system.¹ The objects they were directed to

1813. determine were, the extent of the land in cultivation, the quality of the different sorts of land, the tenure by which it was held, the value of the different crops, and the share of the produce to which the Government could justly lay claim. An annual adjustment was to be made with each cultivator for the land he cultivated, at a maximum money rent for each field, according to the circumstances and capability of the land, whatever might be the produce: the amount to admit of reduction where the necessity of reduction was shown, and to vary from year to year, until the inquiry should be sufficiently matured to allow of its being determined for ever.²

The proceedings of the revenue survey were first directed to the districts of the Baramahal and Salem. They were extended to the Ceded Provinces above the Ghats, after the capture of Seringapatam, under the conduct of different officers who had been mostly trained under Colonel Reade. There was some variety in their methods of discharging the duty,³ and

¹ Military collectors were appointed to this duty by Lord Cornwallis expressly because "few of the civil servants were acquainted with the country languages, and were therefore obliged, both from habit and necessity, to fall into the hands of Dubashes (interpreters).—Letter to the Court of Directors, May, 1792; Fifth Report, 744. It appears that the implied rebuke was not without effect, as in the subsequent settlements several civilians were employed; although this was the effect of positive orders from Marquis Wellesley, repeatedly confirmed by the Court of Directors, that civilians only should be so employed.—Commons' Committee, 1832. Public. App. (M.)

² Letter of Colonel Munro to the Board of Revenue, 30th Nov. 1806, with instructions to the surveyors, &c.—Fifth Report, 783.

³ "The revenue surveys under the Madras Presidency were not regulated by any uniform rule, and in some respects were, perhaps, defective in principle. The most ample discretion was vested in the local officer on whom this duty was imposed in each district; and the details naturally

still more in the rate of their assessments: but their operations were equally based upon the measurement of the lands, both cultivated and waste; the determination of their fitness for particular crops;¹ the money valuation of the estimated produce of the land in cultivation, and its partition between the cultivator and the Government; the rate varying from one-third of the supposed value of the gross produce to little less than a half, or forty-five per cent.² The measurements and valuations were made in the first instance by native surveyors, but the final assessment by the head collector himself in personal conference with the Patels and principal Ryots of every village. Reference was also had to the recorded collections of the native Governments; and, where the total of the survey assessment exceeded it materially, some remission was granted.

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varied with the particular views of the individual."—Campbell on the Land Revenues of India; Commons' Committee, 1832, App. 44. See also the Reports from the collectors Munro, Ravenshaw, Hurdis, Garrow, Wallace, &c.; Fifth Report, 745.

¹ In the first instance the land was distinguished into three sorts: Nanja, wet, or that which was supplied with water by irrigation; Panja, which depended wholly upon rain: in these, rice and various other grains were reared. The third kind of land was that fit for miscellaneous products other than grain—tobacco, pepper, cotton, and vegetables. Each of these was subdivided into a variety of species, according to their fertility: as many as twenty distinctions of each class are enumerated in Colonel Munro's instructions to his assessors; but they were directed to restrict their specifications to ten kinds of dry land, eight of wet, and six of garden ground.—Instructions, &c. as above cited.

² Colonel Munro observes of the Ceded districts, and of the Dekhin, that the mode of assessment in force there limits the Ryot to two-thirds of the gross produce, but reduces it in fact nearly to a half. His own assessment was forty-five per cent., but as a permanent rate he proposed to reduce it by one-fourth; so that the total being . . . 100

Deduct Government share . . .	45
Less one-fourth	11½

Final deduction	33½
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Leaving to the Ryot per cent. . . 66½.—Fifth Report, 342.

BOOK I. Remissions were also made upon the realisation
 CHAP. VII of the year's revenue, if the season had proved un-
 1813. favourable or the crops defective.

The incidents of the Ryotwar settlement attracted the attention of Lord William Bentinck during his administration of the government of Madras, and led him to the conclusion that the Zemindari system was incompatible with the true interests of the Government and the community at large. The right of private property in the soil, ascertained by Colonel Munro to exist in Canara, satisfied him that, although similar rights might elsewhere have been trodden down by the oppression and avarice of despotic authority, yet they still existed, and were to be discovered in every village. To create Zemindars, and invest them with a property to which they could have no claim but the arbitrary will of the state, was neither calculated to improve the condition of the people, nor provide for the future security of the Government.¹ The Zemindari settlements were in consequence arrested, and the principle of the formation of a permanent settlement with the Ryots was thenceforth to regulate the revenue arrangements at Madras. The determination was of short duration.

The survey assessment of the Ceded provinces above the Ghats was scarcely completed² when the Government of Madras was induced to entertain a doubt whether it was not desirable to relinquish the Ryotwar system, and substitute for it some plan of

¹ Minutes of Lord W. Bentinck, and Memoir of Mr. Thackeray; Fifth Report, 912.

² It commenced in 1802, and was finished in 1807.

settlement approximating more nearly to that of estates permanently assessed. The Board of Revenue, to whom the subject was referred, adopted a view unfavourable to the continuance of the Ryotwar system, chiefly on the grounds of its incompatibility with the judicial regulations recently introduced at Madras, by which all questions of revenue were removed from the cognizance of the revenue authorities to regular courts of justice.¹ As long as a country was unsettled, and great discretionary authority was vested in the collector, the Board admitted that a survey settlement with the Ryots was well calculated to develop the capabilities of the country, and detect and remedy abuses; but when the settlement was effected, and regular courts of law were established, the power of discretionary and summary decision was necessarily withdrawn from the collector, and all disputes were referable to legal tribunals, which could not possibly provide for the numerous cases that so many and such minute disputes, as must arise under the Ryotwar system, would bring under their cognizance. The permanence of the Ryotwar system depended also upon the reduction of the assessment, as proposed by Colonel Munro, by one-fourth of its amount; a sacrifice

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¹ The question was first brought forward and was fully treated by Mr. Hodgson, who had been a member of a committee appointed to inquire into the causes of the failure of the permanent settlement in Dindigul.—*Selections*, i. 581. It is also worthy of remark, that at this date Colonel Munro had gone to England, and Sir George Barlow had succeeded Lord W. Bentinck at Madras. The great advocate of the Ryotwar system was absent, and the head of the Government was naturally biased in favour of a system, “a large portion of which had engaged his attention for twenty years, and which he had deliberately resolved on accelerating in the Ceded and Conquered provinces” of the Bengal Presidency.—*Minute of Mr. Colclouke*, *Sel.* i. 45.

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which the exigencies of the Government did not allow it to contemplate. The Board therefore recommended, and the Government resolved, that the Ryotwar plan should be abandoned,¹ and that of village leases substituted; the villages being let to the head of the village, or principal cultivator, for a term of three years, for the annual payment of a sum determined by the aggregate collections of former years, or the survey rent where it could be depended on. The regulations of the Government, it was asserted, were fully adequate to protect the Ryots against the oppression of the renter. The course thus pursued was sanctioned by the Court of Directors, who at this period seem to have been persuaded that no advantage was to be expected from the further prosecution of the Ryotwar assessments.² In finally approving of the arrangement, however, they intimated that they were not anxious for the early extension of the principle of permanency into any of the territories into which it had not been introduced, and restricted the Madras Government from concluding such a settlement in any district without the previous sanction of the Court.³

¹ Revenue Letter from Fort St. George, 24th Oct. 1808; Selections, i. 483.

² Extracts of Dispatches from the Court, 30th August 1809. The Court also dwell upon the obvious defects of the system,—the minuteness of investigation which it involves, the necessary employment of countless native agents, the impossibility of effectually preventing their malpractices, and the difficulty of adjusting the rents to all the varieties of seasons and public events; and conclude, that, “although the plan intelligently followed up might be well calculated to discover the resources of a country, yet it was not to be preferred for constant practice; and the doubt which Lieut.-Col. Munro has properly stated, whether it be equally well fitted for the improvement of a country as for the discovery of its resources, would, they were strongly inclined to believe, be resolved in the negative.”—*Selec. i. 598.*

³ The date of this letter, Dec. 1811, accounts for the change of opinion which it expresses.—*Selections, i. 600.*

The prohibition against concluding a settlement in perpetuity in any of the Madras territories was announced scarcely in time to prevent the Government of Fort St. George from pledging itself to the measure. The results of the triennial settlement, although in several instances unfavourable, were considered sufficient guides to the determination of the utmost capabilities of the land, and the consequent limitation of the Government demand. The benefits of the measure required, it was affirmed, no discussion; and the only points for consideration were the time and mode of carrying it into operation. With regard to the former, it was concluded that the period had arrived at which the Government might proceed to a final settlement of the land revenue without any risk of compromising the public interests; and, with regard to the latter, that the preferable method was that of the Mouzawar or village settlement. It was resolved, therefore, to proceed at once to conclude a settlement for ten years with heads of the villages singly, or with any respectable inhabitants of the village or district, or, in the event of their refusal, with any responsible individuals, conditioning that the amount of revenue to be paid by them should become a permanent settlement at the end of the ten years if approved of by the Court.¹ Their approval was not to be expected: and, in the reply of the Court, the grant of the proposed decennial leases was prohibited, or, if already granted; they were to be declared terminable at the end of the ten years: the principle of permanency was discarded, and positive orders

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¹ Letter from Fort St. George, 29th Feb. 1812; Sel. i. 513.

BOOK I. were given for an immediate return in all possible
 CHAP. VII. cases to annual and individual settlements with the

1813. cultivators—to the Ryotwar assessments. The orders were complied with. Sir George Barlow was presently afterwards removed from the government of Madras, and the revenue discussions terminated for the present at that Presidency.¹

The discussions in Bengal turned principally upon the question of permanency. With whom the settlement should be made had scarcely yet become a subject of consideration with the Government, which looked everywhere for Zemindars; but among its functionaries, and particularly in the unsettled districts, a conviction had begun to spread that the question of tenure was still to be investigated. The fact was brought to the notice of the Government more distinctly than it had hitherto been by the members of a special commission which had been appointed to superintend the engagements that were to be concluded with the landholders in the Ceded and Conquered provinces upon the approaching expiration of those which were in force.² It was at the same time announced to the Zemindars and other actual proprietors of land in the Ceded and Conquered provinces that the revenue which might be assessed on their estates in the last year of the settlement which was now to be made should remain fixed for ever, in case the Zemindars were willing to engage for the payment of the public revenue on those terms in perpetuity, and the arrange-

¹ The letter of the Court is dated 16th December, 1812; Sel. i. 525. In the following August a long and able minute of the Board of Revenue is recorded in vindication of their views and proceedings.—Ibid. 577.

² Regulations x. 1807; vi. 1808.

ment should receive the sanction of the Court of Directors.

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The commissioners, Messrs. Cox and Tucker, entered upon their duties at the end of 1807. Early in the following year they submitted a report of their proceedings,¹ and a description of the several collectorates in the districts which they had visited; and they came to the conclusion that a permanent settlement of the revenue of the Western provinces was at that moment premature, and might be injurious to the people, while it would be necessarily attended by a material sacrifice of the public resources. The right of property in the cultivated lands was in many cases contested. It remained to be determined with what parties a settlement should be effected. Lands were held free upon tenures the validity of which required proof, and there were extensive waste lands of which the rightful appropriation was to be ascertained. At least a fourth of the arable land was yet uncultivated, and neither the resources of the provinces nor their means of improvement were known. Although, therefore, professing to be fully aware of the advantages which might be expected from a perpetual limitation of the Government demand, the commissioners recommended that the announcement of a permanent settlement should be suspended, and that the period for which the engagements were to be renewed should be devoted to the diligent accumulation of the information essential to its establishment on safe and equitable principles. Their recommendations were at variance with the established opinions

¹ Selections, i. 45.

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of the Supreme Council. Mr. Colebrooke, one of the members, objected to their reasonings, that they were the same which had been overruled or refuted in the discussions preceding the permanent settlement of Bengal; and that experience had confirmed their fallacy, as the design of the permanent settlement of 1793 had been fully accomplished in that part of India. The same advantages were therefore to be expected from the application of a like measure to other places; and the Government was pledged, by the terms of the preceding regulations, to its immediate adoption in the Ceded and Conquered provinces.¹ Mr. Lumsden, the other member of Council, although differing in some respects from his colleague, came to the same conclusion; and Lord Minto, after a deliberate consideration of all the proceedings, declared himself satisfied of the sound policy, or rather the urgent necessity, of no longer delaying to settle the revenue assessment of the Western provinces in perpetuity.² The determination of the Government was disapproved of in England. The Court of Directors declared, indeed, that they neither meant to undervalue the advantage of the permanent settlement in Bengal, nor to desert the principle on which it was formed; but it was evident that the principle was reluctantly entertained, and that doubts began to be suggested whether its consequences were not embarrassing to the Government, without yielding an equivalent benefit to the people.³

¹ See the purport of the regulations referred to in a former place, p. 114.

² Revenue Letter from Bengal, September, 1808.

³ Revenue Letters to Bengal, 1st Feb. and 27th Nov. 1811; Sel. iii. 5.

The expense of any scheme of administration must be proportionate to the advance of a state in wealth and power. The more numerous the people, the more extensive the territory, the more complicated the internal and external relations, the more costly must be the machinery of the Government. The golden age has not yet come back; and from time to time all countries must be placed in situations in which an unusual application of all available resources is indispensable for their safety. It were most impolitic, therefore, if it were possible, to fix for ever impassable bounds to the public revenues, in ignorance of the possible extent of future exigencies. Such a limit was of course never in contemplation: but it was anticipated that the restriction of the Government demand upon the land would be followed by a proportionate improvement of the estates of the landholders; that capital would accumulate, expenditure increase, and the people be placed in circumstances favourable to an augmented consumption of articles both of necessity and luxury; that a system of indirect taxation, like that which is the main source of revenue in Europe, might be introduced into India; and that in the end the revenue of the Government would augment with the augmented affluence and prosperity of the country. These anticipations had been indulged in without a due consideration of the obstacles which impeded their realisation; without a due regard for

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These and similar dispatches are referred to as the letters of the Court of Directors, as they are so designated in the Records. Agreeably to the evidence cited in a former note, they would with more propriety be termed the letters of the Board of Controul.

BOOK I. the manners, the wants, and the feelings of the
CHAP. VII. people. It would be scarcely prudent to predict

1813. that those obstacles will never be overcome; but many and great changes must take place before they can be so far surmounted as to justify a Government of India in ceasing to look to the land as the principal feeder of the public exchequer. It were an act of suicidal improvidence prematurely to divest itself of so commodious and productive a source of revenue to any extent which may not be in excess of the fair claims and reasonable expectations of the agricultural population, and which is consistent with their own usages and opinions.

With respect also to the interests of the agricultural population, the advantages of a permanent settlement are in a great measure illusory. The basis upon which it rests is a proportion of the produce, a third or a half; and this is then determined to be a definite and unvarying quantity. But it is universally admitted that it is almost impossible to ascertain with precision the absolute total produce of any given portion of land; and the proportional produce must be fixed therefore in most cases by conjecture, involving one of the well-known evils of the permanent settlement—great inequality of assessment. The total produce indeed cannot be fixed by regulation: it must vary both in quantity and quality with the amount of labour and skill bestowed upon its production, and upon the recurrence of favourable or unfavourable seasons. The proportion, however, being a fixed unvariable amount, does not fluctuate with the causes of fluctuation; and, in the event of peculiarly unpropitious circumstances,

this amount may be equal in quantity, not to a half, but to the whole of the crop. In answer to this it may be said, that in favourable times the fixed rate may bear a lower proportion to the whole, and that a bad year consequently is compensated for by a good one; but what then becomes of the principle of permanency, for the cultivator pays at different periods a different rate of rent? To have to make provision, whilst he prospers, against a possible reverse, subjects him to uncertainty as much as if his payments varied from year to year: and to suppose that the Indian cultivator will exercise such foresight, is to expect a total revolution in his character and habits. The futility of such an expectation was shown in the immediate effects of the permanent settlement,—the ruin of the greater number of the Zemindars, and the sale of those lands of which they had been constituted proprietors, for arrears of revenue.

If a variable ratio is unavoidable when calculated upon the produce in kind, it is still more obviously inevitable where, as in the case of the permanent settlement, the Government demand has been calculated upon the estimated money value of that produce. That this value should remain unaltered for ever is as impossible as that society should stand still; a stagnation less to be looked for in India than in any other part of the world amid the elements of incessant change that are daily springing up from the novel ascendancy of European principles and forms of civilization. A fall in the price of silver, and augmentation in the prices of labour and commodities, are a virtual abatement of the re-

BOOK I. venue assessment : a rise in the value of silver, and
 CHAP. VII. fall in the price of grain, are a virtual enhancement.

1813. The same might be the result of an extraordinarily abundant harvest, and consequent diminution of demand ; by which prices might be so depreciated, that the sale of a farmer's whole produce might fail to realise the fixed money value of the Government share.¹ It is evident, therefore, that a permanent settlement, or an unvarying amount of revenue derivable from a money valuation of an unchanging quantity of produce, is invariable or permanent only in terms.

It does not follow that because a Government refrains from declaring that it will at no time, and on no occasion, raise its demand, that it is therefore to discourage the industry of the agricultural population, or obstruct the accumulation of capital, by constantly keeping up its demands at a maximum rate. There is a principle of permanency which is more essential to the prosperity of the country than

¹ In the assessment made by Colonel Briggs in Kandesh, the people were at first highly pleased with the settlement, which was formed with the villages upon the average collections of ten years. At first it fell lightly ; but, the assessment being paid in money, it became heavy when the price of grain declined. When the country was first taken under British management, the price of grain was about four shillings a bushel ; in four years, in consequence of increased cultivation and diminished demand, from the absence of troops and other circumstances, it had fallen to sixteen pence the bushel : it was quite impossible, therefore, the villagers could pay the same amount in money in the fourth year as they had done in the first. The public revenue of Kandesh, notwithstanding increased cultivation, therefore, was reduced from sixteen lakhs of rupees to eleven, and eventually to six lakhs.—Lords' Committee, 1830 ; Evidence, Question 4049. So also Colonel Barnewall, speaking of Guzerat, observes, that in consequence of the continuation of tranquillity, and the reduction of public establishments, the bulk of the population has become agricultural, and the supply of grain so far exceeds the consumption, that agricultural produce is no longer saleable at its former prices : the profits of the farmer are consequently diminished, and he is unable to pay the revenue demand of the Government.—Commons' Committee, 1832 ; Evid. Political, 151.

that of a nominally perpetual assessment,—the invariable recognition of the right of the proprietor of the soil to a rent from his estate. As long as the Government constitutes itself sole landlord, and appropriates the whole, or nearly the whole, of the rent, there can be no accumulation of capital, no advance in wealth, no creation of collateral resources among the mass of the population, for whatever period the assessment may be fixed. A moderate rather than a perpetual settlement is the real want of the people. Speculators in revenue, middlemen, Zemindars, may be anxious for a permanently definite amount of the Government demand; which, while it limits what they are to pay, permits them, as did the settlement of Lord Cornwallis, to crush the cultivator under exorbitant exactions: but there is every reason to believe that the actual occupants and cultivators think and care little about the question of permanency.¹ It may be convenient to all parties to adjust the assessment for a term of years; but as long as the amount is not extortionate,

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¹ The evidence of Mr. Fortescue on this subject, as regards the people of the Upper provinces, is conclusive. According to him, the Ryots or cultivators know little or nothing about a permanent settlement, and have no desire for its introduction: some dislike the notion from fear of its affecting their local interests, and such as are desirous of it are so from the representations which interested persons have made to them of its advantages; that is, Zemindars of the village engaging for the revenue as landholders, and who expect to derive from it the authority which they are told that it confers upon the Zemindars of the Lower provinces.—Commons' Committee, 1832; Questions 2330-2340. Mr. Mackenzie observes: "If not hated by the people (of the Upper provinces), we are without the slightest hold on their affections. This seems, it may be proper to remark, to have no connexion with the permanent settlement, on which the very few who were interested never probably relied, and of which the great body of the landholders never heard. Of some thousand petitions which I received when in the Western provinces, and of many tens of thousands of petitioners whom I saw and talked with, not one touched upon this point."—Commons' Committee, 1832; General App. 212.

BOOK I. and a persuasion exists that it will not be increased
CHAP. VII. without an adequate cause, the agricultural popula-

1813. tion of India will be contented; for they will be as prosperous as they can become under the universal institution of infant marriages, the equal partition of inheritance, the few wants which the nature of the climate and the condition of society impose, and the entire absence of the countless objects of needless expenditure which in part disgrace and in part dignify society in Europe. Upon these and similar grounds the authorities in England had learned to question the advantages of a permanent settlement as affecting the interests either of the people or the state.

In addition to the objections which might be urged to the measure generally, there was undoubtedly ample reason to question the propriety of its immediate adoption in the particular case of the Ceded and Conquered provinces. The experience acquired in Bengal had established the mischievous consequences of precipitancy. Even Mr. Colebrooke, who asserted that it had answered the objects proposed by it, was obliged to admit that the persons whose benefit it was intended to promote,—the Zemindars, whom it was designed to enrich,—had not profited by the beneficence of the Government; the greater number of them were in fact utterly ruined. Wholly unaccustomed to punctuality in their payments to the state, and bred up in habits of prodigality and improvidence, they speedily fell into arrears; for the recovery of which, under the stringent enactments of the Government, their estates were immediately and absolutely dis-

posed of by public sale. In the course of a few years, many of the Zemindars whom the settlement of 1793 had proposed to transform into a landed aristocracy had been reduced to indigence, or had utterly disappeared; and families, which had survived the successive revolutions of the native Governments, vanished before the inflexibility of the Company's regulations.¹ Nor was the situation of the Ryots bettered by the change. Originally left to the arbitrary will of the Zemindars, the exactions to which they were exposed were tempered by the beneficial influence of a long-established intercourse with their ancient landlords. To the new purchasers of the Zemindaris, who were mostly men who had grown rich in the service of the English, and were residents of Calcutta or other commercial towns, their tenantry were merely objects of speculation, from whom they proceeded to extort the largest possible return for the capital which had been invested in the purchase. Under such task-masters the cultivators were soon reduced to the state of a pauper peasantry, scarcely gleaning a subsistence from the soil, and in no con-

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¹ " My impression is, that a very small proportion of those with whom the permanent settlement was made are now owners of the land, very great alienations of the land being made in the first year of the settlement." —Mill, Commons' Committee, 1831; Question 3210. In Question 3997 allusion is made to the statement of the Fifth Report, that in 1796 one-tenth of the whole of the lands in Bengal, Behar, and Orissa were put up to sale. Mr. Tucker and several other well-informed officers of the Company affirm, that the number of estates put up for sale is no evidence of the number of sales; but Mr. Tucker admits, that of the three largest Zemindaris, those of Rajshahi, Nadiya, and Burdwan, the whole of the first, and part of the second, had been sold prior to 1799, and that a very considerable number of estates passed into the hands of the merchants and bankers of Calcutta.—Evid. Commons' Committee, 1832; Revenue. Question 1861. Even as late as 1821-2, when the sales were much fewer than in the years immediately following the settlement, the number of estates sold for arrears of revenue was 396.—Ibid. Q. 2603.

BOOK I. dition to swell the coffers of the state by their con-
 CHAP. VII. sumption of taxable commodities.¹ To disregard the

1813. lesson, and repeat the same errors elsewhere, would have been wholly indefensible; and it was so obviously the duty of the Government to guard against the evils which could not fail to follow the conclusion of a perpetual settlement upon imperfect information, that it is difficult to comprehend how the measure should have found advocates among men of tried ability and mature knowledge. Their advocacy was fruitless. The Court of Directors persisted in their prohibitions;² and the Government of Bengal was compelled to rescind a regulation which had enacted that the amount of revenue levied in the last year of the temporary settlement then subsisting should be fixed for ever.³ At the same time, in conformity to previous enactments, it was provided, that, with respect to those estates which the commissioners should think sufficiently improved to justify such an arrangement, the assessment on them should be revised, and a rate be fixed in perpetuity. The provision was inoperative, as was probably expected. No estates

¹ The injurious operations of the permanent settlement of Bengal upon both the old Zemindars and the Ryots are detailed in the Fifth Report, 60; see also Mill, v. 518, 522. Sir Charles Metcalfe observes of the Bengal permanent settlement, that it was an experiment, in the results of which he can discern no benefit that should induce its repetition. It not only sacrificed the prospective rights of the Government for ever, but, by declaring those to be proprietors who were not proprietors, it in effect destroyed the rights of all the proprietors and cultivators.—Commons' Committee, 1832; App. 469. Mr. Mackenzie states, that the Bengal assessment led to the greatest possible inequality, and left everything in a state of utter darkness and confusion.—Ibid. Evidence; Q. 2581.

² Letter from the Government of Bengal, 11th July 1812.—Selec. i. 134.

³ Regulations x. 1807; and ix. and x. 1812.—Selec. i. 162.

were found that had reached the utmost limit of improvement.¹

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A difference of opinion also prevailed with respect to the method by which the resources of the unsettled provinces were to be ascertained. To the suggestions of the Court that the scheme of the Ryotwar assessment followed at Madras should be applied to them, the Government of Bengal justly objected its inapplicability to a territory where the lands were jointly occupied and cultivated by numerous owners, held together by a community of tenures imperfectly understood. To form engagements with individual occupants was quite as likely to invade and overturn the rights and privileges of the landed proprietary as the Zemindari settlement had done; and to deal separately with individual cultivators tended to disorganise and dissolve the village communities,—thereby depriving the people of the salutary habit of regulating their own concerns, and the Government of a ready and economical channel by which the revenue might be realised.² Instead of forming engagements with the associated proprietors, represented by respectable persons of their own election, it would be necessary to let loose upon the land a swarm of locusts in the shape of

¹ Letter from the Court, 16th March, 1813; Sel. i. 136.

² Sir C. Metcalfe, although friendly to the principle of Ryotwar assessment, objected to its introduction into the Western provinces, because it appeared to him that it must tend to loosen and ultimately dissolve the ties which bind the village communities together. Instead of all acting in union with a common interest as regards the Government, and adjusting their own separate interests among themselves according to established usage, each would have his separate independent arrangement directly with the Government, and could hardly fail to be thereby less linked with his fellows. The village constitution, which could survive all outward shocks, might be easily subverted with the aid of the Government regulations and the courts of justice.—Commons' Com. 1832; App. p. 471.

BOOK I. numberless subordinate collectors and assessors,
 CHAP. VII. whose exactions from the people it would be im-

1813. possible to check, and whose frauds upon the state it would be equally impossible to discover. Whether, therefore, the interests of the Government or its subjects were considered, a Ryotwar assessment was regarded, and with reason, as alike objectionable.¹ There was less reason in the objections urged against the preliminary measure of a survey of the lands to be assessed. It was affirmed that the plan had been repeatedly tried, and had been attended with so much inconvenience and such unsatisfactory results, that the Government felt satisfied the most experienced and capable of its revenue officers would deem the revival of it an evil burthensome and oppressive to the people, and unproductive of any substantial benefit to the pecuniary interests of the state. In preference to such a mode of obtaining a knowledge of the resources of the country it would be advisable to rely upon the Zemindari and village accounts, although it was admitted that they were not unfrequently false or fabricated. Such a preference was evidently dictated by strong and unfounded prejudice. Revenue surveys may very possibly be conducted in such a manner as to be vexatious to the people and unprofitable to the Government: the conclusions to which they lead may not be entitled to unqualified credit: but experience has demonstrated that they can be carried on without giving any offence to the people; while, although they may not be exempt from error, they furnish

¹ Revenue Letter from Bengal, 17th July, 1813; and Second Minute of Mr. Colebrooke; Sel. i. 179.

the only safe means of making an approach to accuracy in determining the productive value of the land.¹ At this point the discussion ceased. Different views influenced the measures of the succeeding Administration.

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Some attempts were instituted by the Government of Bengal to repair the evil which had been occasioned by the long neglect of the Government to exercise that interference which at the time of the permanent settlement it had avowedly retained the right to exert in protection of the equitable claims of the Ryots.² At first some intention was manifested of acting upon the power so reserved; and the Zemindars had been in the same year prohibited from imposing any new imposts, from cancelling leases legally obtained, or refusing to grant others for a specific amount of rent.³ The main object of the Government in the regulations then and subsequently passed was, however, evidently its own security, originating in an apprehension that the Zemindars might plead the difficulty of realising their demands from the Ryots in extenuation of

¹ The exceedingly defective sources of information on which, prior to the establishment of surveys, assessments were based, are thus enumerated by Mr. Mackenzie: "Our settlements were made in haste, on general estimates or surmises, on accounts never believed to be accurate, and never brought to any clear test of accuracy, on the offers of speculators, on the biddings of rivals, on the statements of candidates for employment seeking credit with Government by discoveries against the people, on information of all kinds generally worthless."—Letter to Mr. Villiers, Commons' Committee, 1832; Evidence, 417.

² Section 8, Reg. i. of 1793, declares, that "it being the duty of the ruling power to protect all classes of the people, and more particularly those who from situation are most helpless, the Governor-General in Council will, whenever he may deem it proper, enact such regulations as he may think necessary for the protection and welfare of the dependent Talookdars, Ryots, and other cultivators of the soil."

³ Reg. viii. 1793.

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their failing to pay the demands of the state. Under these impressions, it was enacted that no leases should be granted for a period longer than ten years; and that, when a Zemindari was sold for arrears of revenue, all existing engagements should be void from the day of sale, the purchasers being entitled to collect from the renters according to the undefined rates and usages of the country.¹ Finally, a power was vested in the landholders of summarily distraining for rent.² The result of these measures was to place the Ryot completely in the hands of the Zemindar, and to enable the latter to raise his rents at pleasure. It was therefore found necessary to interpose, and a regulation was subsequently enacted³ by which the limitation of the leases was abrogated: they were authorised to be granted for any period, and on any terms to which the parties should mutually agree, in the hope that they would thus be obliged to come to some definite understanding, instead of leaving the door open to oppressive fraud and endless litigation, which the appeal to so vague a standard as that of usage rendered perpetual. It was also decreed, that, in the event of an attachment or sale of a Zemindari, the leases should not be annulled within the year in which the attachment or sale should have taken place; that where the collections were regulated by pergunna or district rates, and those rates were not fixed by anything more precise than custom, they should be of the same amount as those which were actually paid in the neighbourhood upon lands

¹ Regs. xlv. 1793, and iii. of 1796.

² Reg. vii. 1799.

³ Reg. v. 1812.

of like quality, or they should not exceed the maximum rate paid upon the same land during any one of the three preceding years. No enhancement of existing rates was to take place, except under an engagement to that effect, or a formal and written notice of the specific amount to be required during the ensuing year being served upon the tenant. Process of distraint was prohibited, except after due notification in writing having been given; and agricultural implements and cattle were exempted from seizure. Process was also to be suspended where the defaulter engaged by bond or sufficient security to institute a suit for the trial of a contested demand within a reasonable period. The latter clauses of this enactment were beneficial; but the liberty given to the Zemindar to frame engagements for an indefinite period, and on such conditions as the parties might agree to, was speedily interpreted into an authority to dispossess even the Ryots claiming hereditary occupancy if they refused to accede to his demands, however exorbitant.¹ The limitation of the Government assessment in the Western provinces rendered it necessary to limit also the engagements between individuals in those provinces;² and in the same districts the collectors were authorised, under the Board of Commissioners, to investigate the titles by which la-kharáj or rent-free lands were held. Rules were also passed for the occasional subdivision of estates held in common, so that the holder of a joint undivided property might have his share verified and separately assessed.³

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¹ Letter to Government of Bengal, 15th Jan. 1819; Selections, i. 360.

² Reg. xiv. 1812.

³ Regs. viii. and ix. 1811.

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In order to extend the public resources of the Government, it was thought advisable to impose a tax upon houses in the several towns and cities of Bengal, Behar, Orissa, and Benares :¹ religious buildings were exempted. Such a tax had been levied for some years without any difficulty or obstruction in Calcutta, and it was not expected that any serious opposition would be offered to it in other cities. The Government was mistaken. The measure was regarded as an innovation, and was vehemently opposed. At Benares especially the resistance was most violent, and was curiously characteristic of the peculiarities both of the place and the people.

As soon as the intentions of the Government became known, great excitement prevailed throughout the city, and meetings of the different castes and trades were held to determine upon the course to be pursued. No obstruction was offered to the persons employed to assess the houses; but the shops were closed, every kind of occupation was abandoned, and such numerous crowds assembled on the outskirts of the town, that it was judged expedient by the magistrate to call to the assistance of the police a detachment of troops from the neighbouring cantonments. Their services were not needed, as the people quietly dispersed; but on the same day a solemn engagement was taken by all the inhabitants to carry on no manner of work or business until the tax was repealed. Everything was at a stand: the dead bodies were cast unceremoniously into the river, because there were none to

¹ Reg. xv. 1810.

perform the obsequial rites; and the very thieves refrained from the exercise of their vocation, although the shops and houses were left without protection, — the people deserting the city in a body, and taking up their station halfway between Benares and Secrole, the residence of the European functionaries, about three miles distant. A petition was presented to the magistrate, praying him to withdraw the odious impost, and declaring that the petitioners would never return to their homes until their application was complied with: a reference to Calcutta was all that was in the magistrate's power.

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Whilst awaiting for a reply from the Government, the people of Benares continued assembled, and were joined by many persons from the surrounding districts: the number was computed at more than two hundred thousand, comprehending the aged and infirm, women and children. They were supplied with food regularly at the expense of the opulent classes, and were actively enjoined to unanimity and perseverance by their religious guides and teachers. Their conduct was uniformly peaceable; passive resistance was the only weapon to which they trusted. They continued in the open air throughout the day, but many returned at night to their homes.

In this manner about a fortnight passed.¹ The Government somewhat misconceiving the character of the assemblage, and at any rate deeming it impolitic to yield to any semblance of intimidation, ordered the enforcement of the tax, and the dispersion of the multitude, if necessary, by force. A sufficient strength had been collected for the pur-

¹ From the 26th December, 1810, to the 5th January, 1811.

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pose; but, before the receipt of the orders, time, reflexion, and discomfort had enfeebled the vigour of the opposition, and the people had for the most part returned to their dwellings. The determination of the Government caused them to reassemble, with the avowed determination of marching in a body to Calcutta to petition the Governor-General personally for redress; but this was a much more arduous undertaking than a bivouac in the immediate vicinity of Benares, and could not be prosecuted with the same unity of purpose. Every householder engaged, indeed, either to go himself, to send a representative, or contribute his quota to the expense of the journey; and a number of persons met, and made one march towards Calcutta: but the defaulters were so numerous, and so many of those who had set out deserted by the way, that the leaders were sensible of the futility of the scheme, and wanted only a decent excuse for its relinquishment. This was furnished by the interposition of the Raja of Benares, who, at the desire of the Government officers, repaired to the party, overtook them, and counselled them to turn back, and rest contented with the renewed representation of their grievances through the usual official channel in a quiet and respectful manner. His advice was followed, and a second petition was presented, to which in due time attention was paid.¹

¹ Personal information and MS. Records. The public petitions proceeding from native communities in India which are much intermixed with Europeans are rarely of a genuine native character. They betray more or less European, and particularly professional, prompting. At Benares there were few Europeans, no lawyers; and the petition of the inhabitants was most probably of their own unaided dictation. It is a document not without interest, as it not only expresses the sentiments of the people on the

In consequence of this opposition, and the universal unpopularity of the tax, it was repealed.¹ In the following year it was revived in a modified form, and limited in its application to the cities of Dacca, Patna, and Murshedabad. In those towns it was to be applied to the payment of a municipal police, to be appointed and maintained by a committee of natives chosen by the inhabitants of each ward in the presence of the magistrate: to these committees also was intrusted the office of assessing the different shops and dwellings of their respective wards, the whole not to exceed a maximum average rate.² Some opposition was made to the arrangement at Dacca, but it was finally carried into operation.

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Although not connected with any of the financial measures of the Government of Bengal, nor resulting from any of its acts, yet it may be useful to advert in this place to a formidable tumult by which the tranquillity of the city of Benares was interrupted in the year preceding that in which the house-tax excited the discontent of its inhabitants; as the disturbance was characteristically illustrative of the peculiarities of one of the most remarkable towns in India, and of the discordant elements of Indian society, which are alone restrained from frequent and destructive conflict by the vigilance, vigour, and impartiality of the ruling power.

Benares is *the* holy city of the Hindus: it is

occasion on which it was presented, but shows that they were well informed of the proceedings and views of their rulers. It is therefore given in the Appendix.

¹ Reg. vii. 1812.

² Reg. xiii. 1813.

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1813. crowded with celebrated shrines : pilgrimage to it is an atonement for all sin : to die within its precincts is a certain passage to eternal felicity. Such advantages ensure it a large resident population, and attract to it a numerous resort of Hindu pilgrims. The character of both classes is in general accordance with the reputed sanctity of the place : its efficacy in expiating crime, and purifying from iniquity, could be of little benefit to any but the wicked and the profligate, and those who tenant or frequent the city are for the greater part such as stand most in need of its expiatory virtues. The population is, however, not wholly Hindu. Benares is a town of extensive commercial and manufacturing activity, and has always comprised a considerable body of Mohammedans engaged principally in manufactures. Its convenient situation had also, at the period under review, recommended it as the residence of several Mohammedans of high rank, members of the reigning family of Oude, or the Imperial house of Delhi ; and their servants and retainers were numerous and disorderly. Religious differences could not fail to find in such a mixed multitude ready instruments of quarrel, and the mutual animosity which at all times animated the followers of Brahmá and Mohammed was at this time more than usually inveterate. It had unfortunately happened that some of the moveable feasts of the Mohammedans had occurred simultaneously with some of the most popular Hindu festivals ; and the multitudes which were collected, and the feelings which were excited, threatened a violent collision. The precautions of the English functionaries suspended the season of

its occurrence, but were unable to prevent it from eventually taking place, and towards the close of 1809 an open rupture could no longer be delayed.

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During the sovereignty of the Mohammedans, Aurangzeb and other bigoted princes had forcibly taken from the Hindus of Benares several of their temples to transform them into mosques, and had allowed and encouraged the Mohammedans of the city to erect religious edifices in the immediate neighbourhood of those places which were esteemed most sacred by the Hindus. In this manner, in one part of the city an Imam-bara, a building for the occasional devotions of the Musselmans, was built in immediate proximity to a *Lât* or stone column typical of Bhairava, one of their subordinate deities, but held by the Hindus in peculiar veneration. As the *Lât* and its neighbour were both much frequented by the followers of the different religions, their encounters gave frequent rise to angry feeling and reciprocal objurgation. On the morning of the 21st of October, a number of both parties having been assembled, they proceeded from abuse to blows; and, in an interchange of missiles which ensued, part of the ornamental architecture of the Imam-bara was injured, and a hut serving as a temporary temple to the deified monkey Hanumán was demolished, and the idol was knocked over. The intervention of the police prevented further mischief on the spot; but the affray was renewed in another part of the town, and, swords and clubs being had recourse to, several persons were killed or wounded before the disturbance could be suppressed.

The presence of the magistrate and a small de-

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tachment of Sipahis restored the appearance of tranquillity; but they were no sooner withdrawn than the tumult recommenced. The Mohammedan weavers assembled in the evening in great numbers, and, repairing quietly to the Hindu Lât, heaped a quantity of combustibles round it and set them on fire, and, when the stone was hot, threw cold water upon it, by which it was split to pieces.¹ Intelligence of this profanation reached the Hindus late in the evening, and filled them with horror and fury. Measures were taken to prevent the effects of their resentment on the following morning; but, before a sufficient force could arrive, an enraged multitude had set fire to the Imam-bara, killed four or five of the persons attached to it, and sprinkled with the blood of a hog the tombs of those who had been interred in its consecrated vicinity. From thence they moved to destroy the Mohammedan tombs at a burial-ground of reputed extraordinary sanctity, adjacent to a shrine dedicated to Fatima the wife of Ali; and, although defended by a Sipahi guard and a number of Mohammedans, the mob partly effected their purpose before reinforcements arrived in sufficient strength to render their attempts unavailing. Other armed bands of Hindus had at the same time assailed the quarters of the town occupied chiefly by the Mohammedans, murdering all

¹ In the memorial addressed by the Hindus to the magistrate, extenuating their own conduct and calling for redress against the Mohammedans, they gravely averred that the Lât resisted every effort for its demolition, until the Mohammedans killed a cow and a calf, and threw the blood upon the column. It then trembled and broke. Some of the fragments were afterwards collected, purified by immersion in the Ganges, and enshrined in a hollow copper cylinder which was set up where the stone column formerly stood.

who came in their way, and plundering and setting fire to their houses, until their excesses were arrested by the military dispositions which the magistrate and the commander of the troops were able to effect. The Sipahis, although of both persuasions, discharged their duties with perfect impartiality and military steadiness: the police, equally mixed, had early taken part in the conflict according to their respective creeds. The extent of the mischief inflicted, or of the loss of life, was imperfectly ascertained; but the disturbance was not suppressed until about twenty Mohammedans had been killed and seventy wounded. The principal actors in the tumult were the Rajputs and Gosains: the Brahmans and principal inhabitants sat fasting upon the steps by the river-side, night and day, during the continuance of the disorder, and were with some difficulty prevailed upon to return to their dwellings on the afternoon of the 23rd. On the following day the temples which had been closed were reopened, and this event was followed by the opening of the shops and the bazars, and the restoration of tranquillity. Some of the most active and violent of the ringleaders were apprehended and punished, and arrangements were adopted to prevent the recurrence of a like popular commotion. The resort of persons of all descriptions from every part of India, and the dissolute and riotous conduct of a large proportion of its inhabitants or visitors, rendered the maintenance of order and tranquillity in the sacred city of Benares, for some time at least, a troublesome and imperfectly accomplished task; but the unrelaxing firmness of British rule, a better knowledge of the

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British character, and the improving intelligence of the people, gradually lightened the labour, and, ten years after the transactions described, Benares was regulated with as much facility as any other city in the territories of the Company.¹

Among the various objects of internal administration at this season which deserve notice as marking the first steps of important changes still in progress, and likely at some future period to exercise a momentous influence upon the destiny of the British Indian empire, must be comprehended the efforts which were made in Bengal to promulgate the truths of Christianity. The South of India had for many years been the field of missionary labours. In the beginning of the seventeenth century the church of Rome had sent thither men of extraordinary ability and energy, who, by completely discarding all the indulgences of European civilisation, living among the natives as natives, applying themselves with intense diligence to the study of the languages and literature of the country, and acquiring a mastery over the vernacular dialects which has perpetuated the writings of several European authors as standard Tamil and Telugu compositions, obtained a widely extended influence over the people, and formed a numerous body of professed believers in Christianity.² The political agitations of Europe

¹ In 1820 the writer was in the habit of traversing every part of Benares without fear of molestation or insult. The materials for the beautiful map of Benares, executed not long afterwards by his lamented friend, Mr. James Prinsep, were collected by him in the city, in fearless reliance upon the good disposition of the people, which he invariably experienced.

² *Lettres Edifiantes*; *Asiatic Researches*, vol. xiv.; Hough's *Christianity in India*, ii. 400. See also his evidence, Commons' Committee, 1832, Public. He estimates the Roman Catholics in 1823 at between three and four hundred thousand.—Question 1852.

severed the teachers from their congregations, and the latter remained Christians in little except the name. To the Jesuit missionaries succeeded those of the Lutheran church: they were sent to India, in the first instance, not by Great Britain, but by Denmark;¹ but the example was not lost upon the former, although it was for some time but feebly imitated. Some pecuniary assistance was granted to the Danish mission; and at last missionaries were sent direct, at the expense of the Society for promoting Christian Knowledge. One or two individuals found their way to Bengal,² and instituted missionary operations there; but the chief field was long confined to Madras, and other stations on the Coromandel coast. The persons employed were natives either of Denmark or Germany. They were for the most part men of learning and talent, of simple habits, and kindly temperaments; and, although their success in the conversion of the heathen was not very encouraging, they were objects of general esteem and respect to both natives and Europeans, and wrought an impression favourable to the ultimate reception of the doctrines which they taught.

At length, at the close of the eighteenth century,

¹ Pearson's *Life of Swartz*, i. 12.

² A Mr. Kiernander went from Madras in 1758, and, notwithstanding many difficulties and discouragements, he laboured there for some years with exemplary piety and diligence, and with considerable success.—*Life of Swartz*, i. 126. It was to him that Dr. Buchanan probably alluded when he stated that the Protestant mission in Bengal commenced in 1758. Before 1770, religious tracts were translated into the Bengali language; and Hindu converts preached to their countrymen in the time of Hastings, in the town of Calcutta. This mission continued its labours till about the year 1790, when the supply of missionaries from Europe failed.—Letter to the Government of Bengal, printed in Parliamentary Papers, 14th April, 1813.

BOOK I. a private individual, a member of the Baptist communion, with zeal as fervent as that of the Ger-

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1813. man missionaries of the South, and inferior to them only in a less scholastic education, William Carey, the son of the master of a small free-school at Paulerspury, a village in Northamptonshire, by trade a shoemaker, and subsequently a preacher in the chapels of the society of which he was a member, early conceived the project of undertaking a mission to Bengal; and, in the face of the most disheartening difficulties, succeeded in its execution. Being unable to obtain permission to proceed to India in a Company's vessel, he procured a passage in a Danish ship, and arrived in Bengal destitute of money and friends at the end of 1793. After a short interval of want and anxiety, he obtained employment as superintendent of an indigo factory in Dinajpur, and remained in that situation for some years; pursuing, as far as circumstances permitted, his missionary calling, labouring assiduously in the study of the Sanscrit and Bengali languages, and applying his acquirements to the translation into them of the Holy Scriptures. The sufferance of the Government permitted his unauthorised residence in the country, averse as was the policy of the day to the admission of Europeans; and his diligence, his learning, and piety secured him friends. His communications with his correspondents in England, the prospects of success which his hopes rather than his experience dictated, and the example of his ardour and his perseverance, animated their zeal; and a society was formed, and funds were raised, for the purpose of sending other missionaries to his assistance.

They arrived in 1799; but, having come to Bengal without the licence of the Court, were not suffered to remain in Calcutta. The Danish settlement of Serampore offered them an asylum; and there they fixed themselves, with the permission of the Governor, and subsequently with the express sanction of the King of Denmark. They were immediately joined by Mr. Carey, and a fraternity was organised which set to work upon a definite system; and by preaching in the native languages, by forming schools for native children, by the composition of tracts and translations of the Scriptures, commenced a pious warfare against the false doctrines of the Moham-medan and Hindu religions, which has been carried on ever since with unrelaxed vigour, and with improving prospects of eventual triumph.¹

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The administration of Lord Wellesley, although it avoided giving direct encouragement to the Baptist missionaries, or recognising them in that capacity, was upon the whole propitious to their exertions. The learning of their principal was one of their chief recommendations to the favour of the Marquis, and Mr. Carey was appointed one of the professors of the College of Fort William soon after its institution; thus obtaining a place of distinction in the recognition of the Government, and a certain and liberal means of subsistence. The establishment of schools for European children, and of a printing-press and paper-manufactory at Serampore, evinced the industry, and added to the resources of the missionaries: they were further aided, not only by the funds of their own community, but

¹ *Memoir of William Carey, D.D., by Eustace Carey; London, 1836.*

BOOK I. by those of other religious bodies, at whose expense,
 CHAP. VII. especially at that of the British and Foreign Bible
 1813. Society, versions of the Scriptures into a great variety of the Indian dialects were executed; and they grew daily in wealth, consideration, and confidence under the countenance of the Government.

The immediate successor of Lord Wellesley, Sir George Barlow, looked upon the proceedings of the Serampore missionaries with a less favourable regard. Entertaining, in common with most of the Company's servants of that day, a dread of the multiplication of uncovenanted European residents in India, he was disinclined to relax any of the restraints which the Legislature had imposed, and refused to sanction the continued presence of any new arrivals who had not provided themselves with a licence from the Court. The teaching of the missionaries had also begun to excite some uneasiness among the natives of Calcutta, and the connexion of the mutiny at Vellore with their religious apprehensions imposed upon the Government the obligation of setting the minds of their native subjects at ease with respect to the designs of their rulers, by the public prohibition of those expedients resorted to by the missionaries which were most likely to offend the religious sentiments and exasperate the feelings of the people.¹ The missionaries were allowed to retain the dwelling which they occupied as a chapel in Calcutta, and perform divine service in it in the Bengali language

¹ Dr. Buchanan acquits the Governor-General of any hostility to the dissemination of Christianity: on the contrary, he says of him, "Sir G. Barlow has often expressed his approbation of the means used for the diffusion of Christianity in India, and sincerely desires its success."—Letter to Government; Parl. Papers.

as usual, and no restriction was imposed on their private instructions or scriptural translations; but they were forbidden to preach in the public streets, to send itinerant native preachers through the villages, or to distribute gratuitously controversial and religious tracts. They considered it prudent to yield to the storm, and promised to conform to the wishes of the Government in all respects in which they could conscientiously acquiesce.¹

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The degree of the conformity rendered did not, however, satisfy the Government of Bengal; as one of the first acts of Lord Minto's Government was a renewal of the injunctions which Sir G. Barlow had been obliged to adopt, and the menace of still more rigorous restrictions.

Pamphlets in Bengali and Persian had been published, which, in the judgment of the Governor-General in Council, were calculated to excite among the native subjects of the Company a spirit of religious jealousy and alarm, which might eventually be productive of the most serious evils. The distribution of such publications, and the public preaching of the missionaries and their converts at the very seat of Government, might be supposed to have received the sanction and approval of the supreme authority; and the prevalence of such an impression would both augment the danger, and render more difficult the application of a remedy. Whatever might be the propriety of exposing the errors of the Hindu or Musselman religion to persons of those persuasions who sought instruction in the Christian faith, it was contrary to the system of protection,

¹ Memoir of Dr. Carey, 483.

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which the Government was pledged to afford to the undisturbed exercise of the religion of the country, to obtrude upon the great body of the people, by means of printed works, exhortations involving an interference with their religious tenets. The obligation, therefore, to suppress within the limits of the Company's authority in India treatises and public preachings offensive to the religious persuasions of the people, was founded on considerations of necessary caution, of general safety, and national faith and honour. Accordingly, it was deemed necessary to direct that public preaching in the mission-house of Calcutta should be discontinued, and to renew the prohibition of the issue of religious tracts; and, in order to bring the missionary press more immediately under the controul of the officers of the Government, the missionaries were commanded to remove it from Serampore to Calcutta.¹

To the orders and injunctions of the Government the missionaries proffered a temperate and judicious reply. They disowned and condemned the language of a pamphlet which had given the greatest offence, —a scurrilous account of Mohammed, which had called forth the remonstrances of the most respectable Mohammedan inhabitants of Calcutta,—and attributed it to the intemperance of one of their converts, who had translated it into Persian: they pledged themselves for greater caution in future, but deprecated the removal of their press, as subjecting them to great inconvenience and ruinous expense. The tone of their representations disarmed

¹ Letter from Bengal to the Secret Committee, 2nd Nov. 1807, with its enclosures; Parl. Papers, 14th April, 1813.

the Government of its rigour; and they were allowed to continue their preaching in their chapel, and to remain at Serampore, on condition that every work that issued from the press should be submitted to the inspection of the secretary to Government. The condition was acceded to; and, as the general conduct of the missionaries was more guarded, no further interference with them ensued. The alarm of the Government was perhaps more violent than the occasion called for, but the check opposed to precipitate and indiscreet zeal was not detrimental to the ultimate extension of Christianity. Little benefit had accrued or was likely to accrue from street preaching, and virulent language was ill calculated to convey conviction. The attention of the Serampore missionaries was thenceforth more entirely given to the establishment of schools and the translation of the Scriptures; means more safe and certain, although their fruits might more slowly come to maturity.¹

Although a sense of public duty imposed upon the Governor-General the obligation of checking the over-zealous haste of the missionaries of Serampore, his personal feelings ensured to their literary efforts his constant and warmest encouragement. The associate in early life of some of the most distinguished ornaments of the literary society of Great Britain, Lord Minto brought with him to India an enlightened and cultivated taste, and a generous

¹ In the representation to the Government made by the missionaries, which is dated in September, 1807, they state that they had baptized upwards of one hundred natives.—Parl. Papers. No great number in eight years, reckoning from 1799 only: if from 1794, a still more inconsiderable proportion.

BOOK I. sympathy with every indication of intellectual excellence. His liberal aid was therefore given to
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1813. the works published at Serampore, whether translations of the Scriptures, or publications tending to make the language and literature of India more generally known and more easily acquired.¹ The same feelings led him to befriend those natives of India who professed the literature of their country; and the first printing-press, established and conducted solely by native enterprise and skill, and for the purpose of substituting the productions of the press for the manuscripts hitherto in use, owed its existence to his patronage. But it was in his connexion with the College of Fort William that his sentiments were most especially manifested; and one great object of his administration was to carry into full operation, as far as the orders of the home authorities allowed, the views of the illustrious founder of the institution.² The result was highly beneficial: the junior servants of the Company were animated to honourable exertions, which formed the foundation of their future distinction; their seniors were induced to apply their knowledge and acquirements to the instruction of their younger brethren; and a number of natives of talent, exer-

¹ Several Grammars and Dictionaries, and other rudimental books, in Bengali, Telinga, Mahratta, and Sanscrit, were printed at Serampore, chiefly at the cost of the Government. Pecuniary assistance (ten thousand rupees) was afforded to the Malay translation of the Scriptures; and aid was liberally given to the Serampore translation of the Ramayana, the works of Confucius, and other literary publications.—Roebuck's Annals of the College of Fort William.

² It was not mere official phraseology, for Lord Minto was not addicted to its use, when in his last annual address he observed, "No part of my public duties have excited in my mind a more cordial concern or more lively interest than those which are attached to the office of Visitor of this College."—Annals of the College of Fort William, p. 376.

cising over their countrymen the combined influence of learning and religion, who were engaged in the service of the college, derived from their employment some compensation for that neglect to which the decay and extinction of native patrons of rank had subjected them, and learned to identify their interests with those of a foreign and intrusive race. To them, and to their European associates, were owing a variety of useful works in the languages and literature of the East, intended to facilitate their acquirement, and bring within the reach of the Oriental student the means of becoming familiar with the laws and institutions, the religion and the character, of the people. Every attempt so directed was encouraged and aided by Lord Minto.¹

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The last class of measures to which we shall advert, regard the financial condition of India during Lord Minto's administration.

The necessity of as rigid a pursuance of the system of economy commenced by Sir G. Barlow as was consistent with the interests and honour of the empire was equally impressed upon his successor; and during the whole term of his government a careful avoidance of expenditure was adhered to, carried in some cases perhaps to a hurtful excess. The occasions which called for military demonstrations, the extraordinary embassies which were fitted out, and

¹ Amongst other arrangements, a plan was proposed by the Governor-General for the foundation of Hindu colleges at Nadiya and Tirhoot, to counteract the want of public encouragement afforded to native literature by princes, chieftains, and opulent individuals under the native Governments, and who had lost both the means and the inducement to continue their patronage under the British Government. He had also in contemplation to found similar institutions for the cultivation of Mohammedan literature.—Minutes by Lord Minto, 6th March, 1811: Commons' Committee, 1832; Public; App. p. 825.

BOOK I. the expeditions undertaken against the maritime
 CHAP. VII. possessions of France, disturbed the equable tenor

1813. of financial retrenchment, and involved unusual demands upon the public treasury: but these interruptions were only temporary; and the general result was an augmented amount of the revenues of British India, a diminution of its burthens, and no enhanced rate of charge.

It has been already mentioned that the arrangements effected by Sir G. Barlow secured for the first year of Lord Minto's administration, according to one system of computation, a surplus receipt, or, according to a different set of accounts, reduced the excess of charge to an inconsiderable sum: the same diversity of result, arising from the same cause, prevails in the following year; but from thence to the close of the period both statements agree in showing a considerable net local revenue after providing for the interest of the public debt: the surplus of the last year amounted to little less than two millions sterling.¹ A considerable proportion of this arose from the improved revenues of the unsettled provinces under the Presidency of Bengal, and the imposition of new taxes at Madras: the rest, from the reduction of the rate of interest which the Government was enabled, by the flourishing state of its finances, to effect.

The history of the Indian debt presents a singular picture of the growth of public credit along

¹ According to the statements furnished to the Committee of the House of Lords, the surplus was £1,988,000. In Sicca rupees it was S. R. 1,45,33,190, which, at two shillings to the rupee, is £1,453,319. For a more particular comparison between the two periods as expressed in the home accounts, see Appendix.

with the increase of financial embarrassment, and of the increase of embarrassment with the augmentation of the public resources. In proportion as the British Indian empire has extended its boundaries, and added to its revenues, so have the means at its command been found inadequate to extraordinary emergencies, and it has been obliged from time to time to apply for aid to the funds of individuals; and, notwithstanding the additions thus made to its incumbrances, its credit has never failed to procure the assistance that was needed, on terms much lower than the ordinary profits of capital, or the rates of interest prevailing in transactions between individuals. In fact, the amount of the public debt is far from burthensome on the state; and the inconvenience which it occasions is fully compensated by the connexion which it maintains between the Government and the fundholders, a large proportion of whom are natives of the country, and who are thus interested in the stability of the ruling power.¹

In 1792 the Indian debt, bearing interest, little exceeded seven millions sterling: the interest exceeded six hundred thousand pounds, bearing a proportion of eight and six tenths per cent.² In 1799 the debt had risen to ten millions; and in the short interval of five years, the season of Lord Wellesley's conquests, it was more than doubled, amounting in 1805 to nearly twenty-one millions, with an annual

¹ Calcutta Annual Register, 1821; Historical Sketch, 18.

² This was the average rate. Loans opened in 1790-1, 1796-7, and 1798-9, bore twelve per cent.—Government Notices; Bengal and Agra Gazetteer, 1841, vol. ii. part ii. 459.

BOOK I. interest of £1,791,000. During the two following
 CHAP. VII. years the continued effects of the previous period of
 1813. prodigality were still felt, and the debt went on in-
 creasing; so that in 1807 it amounted to more than
 twenty-six millions, bearing an interest of £2,228,000.
 In 1813-14 the amount of debt remained much the
 same, being twenty-seven millions; but the interest
 amounted to £1,636,000, being a permanent dimi-
 nution annually of £592,000.¹ This was effected
 by the successful opening of loans in August and
 December, 1810, at an interest of six per cent., to
 which the whole of the outstanding obligations
 were transferred; the capital of British India, and
 the credit of the Government, having thus gone on
 improving, so that in about twenty years the rate
 of interest on public securities was reduced from
 twelve per cent. to half that proportion.

Another important change followed the flourish-
 ing state of the finances, and the payment in Eng-
 land of the principal as well as of the interest of
 loans contracted in India ceased to form one of
 their conditions. When this provision was first in-
 troduced, it was thought likely to lead to the trans-
 fer of the whole of the Indian debt to Europe,
 where it might either be discharged out of the
 profits of the Company's trade, or by money bor-
 rowed at a much lower rate of interest. For these
 purposes the Indian Government of 1785 was au-

¹ Second Report, Commons' Committee, 1810, App. 8. It must be borne in mind that these sums are higher by one-seventh than they should be, according to the intrinsic value of the Indian currencies. The real debt of 1806-7, in Sicca rupees, was 23,15,30,125, say £23,153,000; and the amount of interest, Sa. rs. 1,97,13,929, or £1,971,000.—Official Documents; Lords' Committee, 1830, App. C. No. 3.

thorised to grant bills at eighteen months' date on the Court of Directors, for the principal of the debt then owing, to the extent of six crores of rupees, at the exchange of 1s. 8*d.* the current rupee, at the option of the lenders; and in the first year they took advantage of it to the extent of about a fourth of the principal sum. In the following year the amount applied for was so trifling, that the arrangement was looked upon as a failure; a result ascribed by the Government to the low rate of exchange, the remote date at which the bills were payable, the advantages made in India by holding Government securities, and the more advantageous means of remittance through foreign channels.

On the renewal of the charter in 1793 the principle of the plan was recognised, and it was provided that the Indian debt should be in this manner gradually transferred to England, until it was reduced to two millions sterling, the exchange being fixed at 1s. 11*d.* the current rupee. For some time the amount transferred reached the prescribed limit of the bills to be drawn, or £500,000; but it ultimately diminished, and in 1803-4 ceased altogether. The demand for funds in India, the existence of profitable means of remittance by the extension of the private trade, and the conditions of new loans granting for the interest, bills at 2s. 6*d.* the Sicca rupee, payable six months after sight, and ensuring similar payment of the principal when due, held out inducements even to the European fundholders to leave their capital in the Indian treasury. With the return of peace in India capital was less in demand there; while the political state of Europe,

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the high price of bullion, and the depression of the public funds, rendered its transmission to England highly advantageous. The consequence was a run upon the home treasury, which was productive of much embarrassment; and the pressure was aggravated temporarily by the measures adopted under the orders of the Court for its relief,—the resolution of the local Governments to pay off all the debts the principal of which was demandable in England, in the event of the lenders declining to transfer the security to a new loan opened in 1810, which offered no such condition. The arrangement was so far successful that of twenty-three millions, to which the home treasury was liable, more than thirteen were transferred to the new loan; rather more than three were paid in cash by the local Governments; and six millions and a half remained to be discharged by bills upon the Court. It was for the purpose of meeting this demand that the Company had recourse to Parliament for aid. The inconvenience was gradually surmounted; and, although in 1812 under the terms of a new six per cent. loan the option of demanding payment of the principal by bills on England was partially restored, the home funds were not again exposed to so severe a demand.¹

Nor had the resources at home been subjected to these heavy demands without corresponding efforts having been made in India to provide for them.

¹ Petition of the Company to Parliament; Second Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, May 1810, App. 6-10; Bengal and Agra Gazetteer, 1841, vol. ii. part ii. 454; Details of Public Loans; Report of the Commons' Committee, 1832, article Finance.

During the three concluding years of Lord Minto's administration, the supplies remitted from India exceeded the value of the Company's investments to the extent of nearly ten millions sterling.¹ Of the amount so remitted nearly two millions were in bullion;² a circumstance which was unprecedented in the history of the commerce of India, and intimated an approaching change in the terms of its intercourse with Europe. The transaction was also of peculiar importance at the season of its occurrence: the movements of the vast armies which were working out the deliverance of Europe from military despotism depended in a great measure upon the wealth of England. The occasion called for and deserved the application of all her resources; and, although bearing but a small proportion to the extent of her efforts, the treasuries of her Indian empire furnished a not inconsiderable nor unimportant contribution.³

The close of Lord Minto's honourable and successful labours was now approaching. The influence

¹ Excess of supply to London :

in 1811-12	Sa. rs. 3,46,49,832 at 2s. 6d.	£4,331,229
1812-13	2,71,49,075	3,393,634
1813-14	1,60,00,000	2,000,000

£9,724,863

—Financial Letter from Bengal; Papers relating to Finances of India, printed by order of the Court of Proprietors, March, 1824, p. 18.

² Bullion remitted to England :

in 1811-12	Sa. rs. 40,42,407 at 2s. 6d.	£ 505,301
1812-13	85,44,983	1,068,123
1813-14	22,82,359	285,295

£1,858,719

As the price of bullion was high in England, the remittances realised more than even the exchange value.

³ Alison's History of Europe, viii. 63, ix. 701.

BOOK I. of party spirit, so long suspended, was at length
 CHAP. VII. allowed to operate; and the continuance in office of
 1813. an administration based upon principles opposed to
 those of the ministers by whom the Governor-General
 had been nominated was found incompatible
 with the longer duration of his power. Circum-
 stances had also imposed upon the ministers the
 duty of conferring office upon another distinguished
 personage; and the endeavours of the Earl of Moira
 to carry into effect the wishes of the Prince Re-
 gent for the formation of a ministry which should
 connect the actual servants of the Crown with his
 early friends, however unsuccessful, entitled him
 to the consideration both of the Prince and of his
 advisers. It was consequently proposed to reward
 his exertions by his appointment to the govern-
 ment of India, and to make way for him by the
 removal of the Governor-General. A resolution
 was accordingly moved by the Chairman, under the
 dictation no doubt of the Board of Controul, that
 Lord Minto should be recalled. No reason for the
 measure was assigned; but it was adopted in oppo-
 sition to the tenor of a letter received from Lord
 Minto's friends, expressing his wish to be relieved
 in January 1814. This letter was assigned as the
 reason for the immediate appointment of Earl
 Moira; but, as objected by one of the opponents of
 the arrangement, Mr. Charles Grant, the plea was
 delusive, as no one could pretend to assign it as a
 sufficient reason for proceeding to the choice of a
 Governor-General in November 1811, whose pre-
 sence at Fort William could only be necessary in
 January 1814. On the same occasion it was deter-

mined to supersede Sir George Nugent as Commander-in-chief, Lord Moira uniting both the civil and supreme authority; and not only to rescind the conditional appointment of Sir G. Barlow as Governor-General, but to remove him from the government of Fort St. George. These several measures were made the subject of strong protests by several leading members of the Direction;¹ but the objections were overruled by the predominating spirit of ministerial obligations, and the change took place. Earl Moira was appointed Governor-General of India and Commander-in-chief; and General Abercromby, the commander of the forces at Fort St. George, was nominated for a time Governor of Madras. Lord Minto survived but a short time his return to his native country; he died in the course of the same year. Few Governors-General have stronger claims upon the gratitude of those over whom or for whom they ruled. No one ever more conscientiously or disinterestedly laboured for the happiness of the people of India, for the prosperity of the East India Company, or the honour and advantage of Great Britain. Other administrations may have been signalised by more stirring events and more splendid triumphs; but British India never enjoyed a more healthy and contented condition, never made a more sure and steady though an unpretending advance in social improvement, than during the government of Lord Minto.

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¹ See Dissents of Edward Parry, W. Astell, George Smith, and John Bebb, Esqrs., 20th Dec. ; and separate Dissent of Mr. Charles Grant, 30th Dec. 1813: published by Sir Robert Barlow, 1813.

BOOK I. The term of Lord Minto's government was coeval
 CHAP. VII. with a material change in the character of the su-
 1813. perior authorities under whom the power of him-
 self and his predecessors had been immediately
 held. The East India Company ceased to retain
 the monopoly of the East India trade. The circum-
 stances which led to this event we shall now pro-
 ceed to detail.

CHAPTER VIII.

Embarrassed finances of the Company.—Application to Parliament for assistance.—A Loan granted.—Inquiry into abuse of patronage.—Renewal of the Charter.—Previous Correspondence with the Board.—Demands of the Court.—Propositions of Mr. Dundas—objections of the Court—communication suspended—revived.—Determination of Ministers to open the Trade with India resisted, but finally acceded to by the Company.—Claims of the Outports.—Change of the Ministry.—Lord Buckinghamshire President of the Board.—Consequences of delay.—Resistance to the claims of the Outports.—Appeal to Parliament.—Resolutions proposed by Lord Castlereagh in the House of Commons; by Lord Buckinghamshire in the House of Lords.—Application of the Company to be heard by counsel granted.—Questions at issue—political—commercial.—Trade with India and with China, peculiarities of

the latter—secured to the Company.—Struggle for the Trade with India.—Arguments of the Company—of the Merchants.—Company consent to take off restrictions from the Export, not from the Import trade.—Financial and political evils anticipated and denied—attempt to substantiate them by evidence.—Opinions of Warren Hastings and others respecting the unrestricted admission of Europeans—extension of Trade—Independent resort of Missionaries, &c.—Debates in the House of Commons—first and second Resolution carried—debate on the third.—Debates on the Report of the Committee.—Thirteenth Resolution adjourned—debate on it resumed—carried.—Other clauses suggested.—Bill finally passed in the Commons.—Debates in the House of Lords—previous discussions—Bill passed.—Proceedings in the Court of Proprietors.—Charter accepted.—Remarks.

THE appointment of a Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1803 to inquire into the state of the affairs of the East India Company has already been adverted to; as have the measures which, in compliance with their recommendation, were adopted by the Parliament for the relief of the financial embarrassments of the Company, by the discharge of a portion of the debt due to them by the public. The Committee continued, with occasional modifications, to sit through the four succeeding years, and presented to the House in that period different reports, which were drawn up with remarkable diligence and ability, and furnished a mass of authentic information upon every im-

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portant subject relating to the internal administration of the Indian empire.

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The relief afforded to the Company in 1808 by the sum of £1,500,000 received from the Government, together with more than usually favourable sales of merchandise, enabled the Court of Directors to provide for the wants of that and the following year without requiring further assistance. This state of prosperity was of no long duration, and in the beginning of the session of 1810 the Company were again obliged to apply to Parliament for pecuniary aid.¹ A deficit of two millions was anticipated in the receipts of the year ending March, 1811, as compared with the receipts; arising from the excessive and unexampled drafts made upon the Court, amounting to nearly five millions, from India, in discharge of the Indian debt, and from the unexpected losses sustained in the Company's shipping;² many of their vessels having, in the course of the last two years, been taken by the enemy, or perished at sea. As the state of the money market rendered it unadvisable to increase the Company's capital stock, as empowered by law, the Court applied to the House for such aid as it should see fit to grant, the property of the Company being offered as ample security for the repayment of a loan from the public. The petition was referred to the Committee, by whom the correctness of its purport was confirmed.³

¹ See petition of the East India Company for relief; Parl. Debates, 13th April, 1810.

² In the years 1808-9 and 1809-10, fourteen large vessels, chartered by or belonging to the Company, were captured or were lost at sea: their cargoes alone were valued at more than a million sterling.—First Report, Commons' Committee, 1830, App. iv.

³ Report from Select Committee, ordered to be printed 11th May, 1810.

Shortly afterwards, a second petition was presented,¹ praying for a further settlement of the amount due by the public to the Company: it was also referred to the Committee, but does not seem to have been made the subject of any special report. The time was unpropitious to the Company's applications, as the Government was straining the resources of the country to the utmost to provide for the magnitude of the national expenditure, and was floundering amidst the intricacies of the Bullion question. The urgency of the case, and the vital importance of maintaining unimpaired every form of public credit, gave irresistible weight to the appeal; and, after some discussions, a bill was passed on the 14th of June, 1811, for a loan of one million and a half to the Company.² In the following year the Company petitioned the House of Commons for permission to raise two millions upon bond; and a bill was brought in for the purpose, which, after some slight opposition, was passed. In June, 1812, a second application for a loan of two millions and a half was made to the House of Commons, and, although strenuously opposed by Mr. Creevy, complied with.³

Transactions affecting the moral credit of the Court of Directors had also, shortly before this period, been brought under the consideration of Parliament, and an alleged abuse of patronage was made the subject of inquiry. It was brought forward by the members of the Court themselves, in consequence of a report having prevailed that ap-

¹ Parl. Debates, 14th May, 1810.

² Parl. Debates, 10th May, 1811.

³ Parl. Debates, 9th and 15th June, and 3rd and 7th July, 1812.

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 CHAP. VIII. had been sold. On the 10th February, 1809, it

1813. was moved by Mr. Smith, seconded by Mr. Grant, that a Committee of the House of Commons should be nominated to inquire into the existence of any corrupt practices in the distribution of the patronage of the Court of Directors. A Committee was accordingly appointed, which, in the course of a few weeks, reported the result of the investigation. The report exonerated the members of the Court from any imputation of a violation of the oath by which they were solemnly pledged, neither directly nor indirectly to accept any pecuniary consideration whatever on account of the appointment or nomination of any person or persons to any place or office in the service of the Company:¹ but it appeared in evidence that the persons to whom they had given appointments had, in some instances, sold them to third parties; and that a traffic had been carried on for situations in their India service without their participation or knowledge.² Three civil and twenty military appointments were traced as having been sold. The obtaining of such situations by purchase being prohibited under penalty of their forfeiture, the appointments were cancelled; but, as the punishment fell heaviest on those who were not the offending parties,—the young men holding the appointments,—much sympathy was excited for their situation, and other appointments

¹ This formed part of the general oath to be taken by each Director according to clause 160 of the 33rd of George III.

² It appeared that the price of a writership was about £3,500; that of a cadetship varied from £150 to £500.—Report of Committee, p. 2 to 8; and Evidence.

were given to them by different members of the Court.¹

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The main question, however, which occupied the attention of the Court of Directors and his Majesty's Ministers was the renewal of the Company's charter. The term for which this had been granted in 1793 expired on the 10th April, 1814. It had been provided that notice of the cessation of the charter should be given to the Company three years before it expired; and accordingly, on the 4th of March, 1811, the Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, and it was ordered, that the Speaker should signify in writing to the Directors of the East India Company that the Company's commercial privileges would cease and determine on the date above specified.

The renewal of the charter had for some time previously been the subject of a correspondence between the Board of Controul and the Crown.² On the 30th of September 1808 Mr. Dundas addressed a letter to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, suggesting that it was now advisable to ascertain whether the Court of Directors were desirous to agitate the question, and submit it to the early consideration of Parliament. Early in the month following, the Chairs, after consulting with the Secret Com-

¹ Report of Committee appointed to inquire into the existence of abuses in the disposal of the patronage of the East India Company; printed by order of the Court of Proprietors, March 1809. See also Parl. Debates, vol. xiii.; and Asiatic Annual Register, Proceedings India House, vol. xii.

² The several communications with the Board, and various documents connected with the discussion, from 1808 to July 1813, were printed by order of the Court of Directors, for the information of the Proprietors, in a series of fifteen papers, entitled "Papers respecting the Negotiation for a Renewal of the East India Company's exclusive Privileges," London, 1812-1813.

BOOK I. mittee of Correspondence, expressed their concurrence, considering that the interests of the public

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1813. and the Company would be best consulted by an early renewal of the charter: they professed at the same time the readiness of the Court to pay due attention to any modifications that might be proposed, if they were compatible with the main principles of the existing system, for the conduct of the trade and the political administration of the Government of India. The views of the Directors were more fully developed in a letter addressed to Mr. Dundas on the 16th December, consequent on a personal conference which had been held with him. In this document they asserted the right of the Company to their territorial possessions, and stated their expectation that in a new charter the Proprietors would be permitted to benefit by an enhanced rate of dividends on their stock proportioned to the improvement of the revenues of India; that the aid of the British public would be contributed towards the liquidation of the Indian debt; and that arrangements would be devised for an equitable apportionment of the military expenditure incurred in the prosecution of interests of purely British origin, and not fairly chargeable to India. Twenty years were required for the term of the new charter. The tone of the address was bold, particularly at a moment when the Company was a suppliant for pecuniary aid; and the eagerness to extract an augmented dividend out of the anticipated improvement of revenue, instead of proposing to apply such additional revenues either to the reduction of the public debt or the benefit of the

people of India, savoured more strongly of the little selfishness of a trading company than of the liberality becoming a great and enlightened Government.

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In his reply, dated the 13th Jan. 1809, Mr. Dundas, although admitting in substance the advantage of adhering to the system of commerce and administration which had been sanctioned by the existing charter, declined to acknowledge the claim of the Company to a right to the territory of India, and considered it premature to discuss the proportion of benefit that was to be derived by the Company or the public from any improvement in the finances of India until the debt should be discharged. In like manner, the liquidation of the debt must be contingent on the appropriation of the revenues; as, if the disposal of them should be assumed by the public, it would be impossible to disregard the fair claims of the Company, or their creditors, to a reimbursement of the expenses incurred in the acquirement of the territory. He admitted that the Company had also a right to expect that the public should defray the cost of all hostile operations growing out of a state of war in Europe, whether India became the scene of them or was likely to be their aim.

In the letter from the Chairs of the 16th Dec. all specific allusion to the Company's exclusive commercial privilege had been carefully avoided. The phrase employed, "a regulated monopoly of the trade,"¹ implied of course that the commerce was to be left

¹ "The system by which the Legislature has continued to the Company the government of the territories acquired by it in the East, with a regulated monopoly of the trade, has been held by the most eminent persons conversant with that quarter and its affairs to be the most expedient both for the foreign and domestic interests of this country."—Letter from the Chairs to the Right Honourable Robert Dundas, 16th December, 1808; Papers, p. 9.

BOOK I. on its actual footing,—the assignment of a certain
CHAP. VIII. amount of tonnage to private merchandise in ships
1813. taken up by the Company, and the sale of private
import goods through the Company's establishments.
Mr. Dundas was more explicit: he announced to the
Court that his Majesty's Ministers would not concur
in an application to Parliament for the renewal of
any privileges which should prevent the merchants
and manufacturers of Great Britain from trading to
and from India, and the countries within the limits
of the Company's exclusive trade, the dominions of
the Emperor of China excepted, in ships and vessels
hired or freighted by themselves. He also intimated
that it was thought advisable to adopt some plan
for the consolidation of the Indian army with the
troops of the Crown serving in India, in order to put
an end to the jealousies and divisions which had so
repeatedly occurred between the two branches of
the military service in that country, and to the
divided responsibility which had hitherto impaired
the efficiency of both. He thought this would be
found practicable without interfering with actual
arrangements, or weakening the authority of the
local Governments or of the Court over his Majesty's
regiments employed in the Company's possessions.
These intimations were anything but acceptable to
the Court; and they replied, that, if the suggestions
were acted upon to the extent which the terms
seemed to convey, they would effectually supersede
and destroy not merely the rights of the Company,
but the whole scheme of Indian administration es-
tablished by the previous acts of the Legislature, and
consequences fatal to the Company and most detri-

mental to the nation would infallibly ensue. Although, therefore, willing to take into consideration the means of supplying the trade of private merchants with more beneficial and extensive accommodation as far as was consistent with the preservation of the Company's rights, the Court declared that they could not recommend to their constituents to seek a renewal of the charter upon conditions which would despoil it of all its solid advantages, deprive the Company of their most valuable privileges, and incapacitate them from performing for themselves and the nation the part hitherto allotted to them in the Indian system.

The negotiation here came to a pause, and the Ministers, unwilling to engage in a contest with the Company whilst heavily embarrassed by the state of public affairs, and finding that the notice of the House was not likely to be yet attracted to the question of the Company's charter, determined not to press the subject. At the end of 1809 the Court announced their readiness to resume the discussion; but no notice seems to have been taken of their challenge until the end of 1811, when the President of the Board, now Lord Melville, apprised the Directors that his Majesty's Ministers could not recommend to Parliament the continuance of the existing system, unless they were prepared to assent that the ships as well as goods of private merchants should be admitted into the trade with India under such restrictions as might be deemed necessary. If the Court would agree to the enlargement of the trade, he was prepared to discuss the measures it might be necessary to devise.

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In their reply to Lord Melville the Court consented, however reluctantly, to propose to the Proprietors the opening of the trade; repeating their opinion, that, whilst it would be productive of serious inconvenience to the political administration of India, it would not realise to the nation the benefits which were expected from it. In support of their assertions, they referred to the accounts of the trade which had been submitted to the Select Committee. Influenced too, no doubt, by the measures which they understood to be in contemplation by the merchants of the commercial and maritime towns in various parts of the British islands, they expressed their confident belief that no intention was entertained by his Majesty's Ministers of trying the hazardous experiment of dispersing over all the ports of England and Ireland a trade now brought with so much advantage, both to the Company and the public, to the single port of London. The letter also entered into details exhibiting the magnitude of the Company's transactions, and vindicating the Company from the accusations which had been urged against it, and from the objections to the continuance of a system which they believed to rest, not upon the grounds of individual interest, but upon the firm basis of national advantage.

On the day preceding the date of this letter, a paper of propositions to be submitted to Lord Melville had been approved of by the Court of Directors, and was accordingly communicated to him on the 6th of March, 1812. To these propositions, or hints, as they were denominated, his lordship replied on the 12th; and as the main object of the propositions

had been to secure the continuance of the arrangements of the act of 1793, proposing only to adopt such modifications as should give greater facilities to the private trader, but no greater extension to the trade, they met with no favourable reception. The President of the Board of Controul told the Court plainly, that, as far as related to the India trade, they did not appear to have succeeded in showing that any detriment would accrue to the public interests either in this country or India, or ultimately even to the interests of the Company, from the introduction of private adventure; and he refused to acquiesce in any arrangements which imposed a restriction upon an improved commercial intercourse with India, approving of such only as were intended to restrain unauthorised settlements in that country, and to secure a strict monopoly of the trade with China. A petition, framed in consonance with the views of the Board, was accordingly prepared, and, being concurred in by a Court of Proprietors held on the 2nd of April, was presented on the 7th to the House of Commons, praying for a renewal of the charter.

The announcement of the cessation of the East India Company's exclusive privileges was, we have contemporary evidence, received at first with very little interest. Men's minds were engaged with mighty events, by which the interests of commerce were overshadowed; and it seemed scarcely worth while to dispute for the profit of any particular branch of trade, when the independence of nations was at stake. By degrees, however, attention was drawn to the topic; and the Parliament had no

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sooner met than a deluge of petitions poured upon the House, assailing the principle of monopoly, condemning the career of the India Company, calumniating the motives of the Directors, and advocating the abstract right of all British subjects to a participation in every branch of external commerce. The language of the petitions was prompted by the same spirit against which it was levelled. The petitioners looked only to their own anticipated advantages, and in their selfish eagerness would have trampled upon all prudent precaution and opposing claims. A quarrel speedily sprung up amongst themselves for the spoils at which they grasped; and the merchants and ship-owners of London found, with no small dismay, that the unavowed monopoly which they had enjoyed under the protection of the Company's privileges, of a portion of the trade and the whole of the shipping, was no longer to remain uninvaded. Bristol, Liverpool, Glasgow, and many other outports had merchants, vessels, docks, and warehouses; and demanded not merely to be permitted to send goods to India, but to bring back its products to their own doors in their own ships, and to be liberated from all dependence whatever upon the metropolis.¹ Not only were petitions to this effect presented, but delegates from the outports were sent up to London and formed into a committee empowered to act for the mercan-

¹ Resolutions of the Buyers of Piece-goods, 21st April, 1812; Merchants, Manufacturers, Traders of London, 25th ditto; Petition ditto; Papers respecting the negotiation, p. 133, &c. See also petitions to the House of Commons from the Merchants, Shipowners, &c. of London, and others, interested in the trade with India, and in the tea-trade; *Parl. Debates*, 6th May, 1812.

tile communities of the several places, and watch over their interests. Besides the outports, almost every trading and manufacturing town of any consideration joined in petitioning against the renewal of the Company's charter.¹

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Up to the beginning of 1812, the pretensions of the outports had excited apparently but little attention, and had received little countenance from the Ministers. Although Lord Melville had resisted the attempt of the Court to restrict the export trade to the port of London, he had nowhere intimated any inclination to extend the imports in a similar manner. On the contrary, he had concurred in the sixth proposition of the Court, which provided that the whole of the Indian trade should be brought to London, and that the goods should be sold at the Company's sales and under the Company's management, as likely to secure and facilitate the collection of the duties upon articles imported from India and China. Had, therefore, his propositions been acceded to in the first instance, it seems not unlikely that the Ministers would have been pledged to support the sale and warehousing system of the Company, and the advantages realised therefrom would have been preserved. The delay which the repugnance of the Court had caused, had given the opponents of the Company an opportunity to advocate the claims of the outports; and the change of Administration which occurred at this season, and which placed the Earl of Buckinghamshire at the head of the Board

¹ See Parliamentary Debates, Session of 1812; Petitions from Birmingham, Manchester, Sheffield, Nottingham, Blackburn, Paisley, Dundee, Perth, Belfast, and many other places in the three kingdoms.

BOOK I. of Controul, was another event which was unpropititious to their pretensions.¹ It was soon evident
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 1813. that the Company must forego all hope of profit derivable, directly or indirectly, from the trade with India.

The conferences and correspondence with the Board still continued; and, as the opinions of the new President of the Board of Controul were in favour of the claims of the merchants of the outports, the proceedings that had taken place were reported to the Proprietors at large. The sentiments of the Directors could not fail to find an echo in such an assembly, and a series of resolutions was moved and carried in a General Court, held on the 5th May, to the following purport:—That the measure of opening the outports to vessels of all descriptions from India was fraught with consequences ruinous to the Company, and to the long train of interests connected with it: the removal of the trade from London would render large and important establishments useless, and throw many thousand persons out of bread. That a departure from the course of public sales would be injurious to the trade; and, by dispensing with the interposition of the Company, smuggling to an unlimited extent would be uncontrollable, to the great detriment of the public revenue. That the consequences must be, the destruction of the Company's China trade, the

¹ This nobleman, as Lord Hobart, had been Governor of Madras from 1794 to 1798. He had experienced the inconvenience to which the Indian Governments had been exposed in having to provide, amidst the financial embarrassments resulting from expensive warfare, for the Company's investments.—See Memoir of the late Earl of Buckinghamshire, Monthly Asiatic Journal, January 1817.

failure of their dividends, the depreciation of their stock, and their inability to perform the functions assigned to them in the government of British India. That, if the constitution of the British Indian empire were subverted, the civil and military services would be broken down; the tranquillity and happiness of the people of India, the interests of Britain in Asia, and the constitution at home, would be imminently endangered. That the object for which these evils were to be risked, the increase of the commerce, was illusory; as all experience had shown that it was not capable of increase. That the cause of the Company had been deeply injured by prejudice, ignorance, erroneous assumption, and, latterly, by extensive combinations, and by unfair representation, canvass, and intimidation. And finally, the Court, trusting that Parliament would decide, not on the suggestions of private interests, but considerations of national policy, approved of the firmness with which the Directors had maintained the interests of the Company, and enjoined them to persevere in the negociation with his Majesty's Ministers on the same principles.

Although unappalled by the dark catalogue of imaginary terrors which the interested fears of the East India Company had conjured up for the salvation of their monopoly, yet the obvious evils attending the transfer of the details of an extensive trade from one class of persons to others, and the confidence with which disappointment and ruin were predicted to those who sought to benefit by the transfer, compelled the Government to proceed with deliberation and caution, and prevented them from bringing the decision of

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the question before Parliament during this session, notwithstanding it was one of the topics adverted to at the opening of the session in the speech from the throne. Previously to its introduction, another attempt was made by the Ministers to obtain the acquiescence of the Company in the proposed extension of the import trade, as preliminary to any other arrangements; and, as the attempt was unsuccessful, they intimated that it would be for Parliament to determine whether, if the Company still thought the extension of the commerce incompatible with their administration of the government of India, measures might not be devised that would effect the opening of the trade, and at the same time provide for the administration of the government of India by some other means than the intervention of the Company, upon principles consistent with the interests of the country and the integrity of the British constitution.¹ This intimation closed the discussion on the part of the Administration. The Court of Directors were equally resolute, and they were supported by the great body of the Proprietors. After a meeting of the latter, which was repeatedly adjourned, a series of resolutions was adopted,² which recapitulated the principal arguments in favour of the continuance of the present system, approved entirely of the firmness of the Direction in regard to the vital question of admitting the outports to share in the import trade of India, expressed their opinion that on no consideration whatever should this point be conceded,

¹ Letter from the Earl of Buckinghamshire, 4th Jan. 1813; Papers, 181.

² Proceedings of a General Court of Proprietors, 26th Jan. 1813; Papers, 194.

and declared their conviction that they might approach Parliament with confidence, persuaded that the wisdom of that enlightened body would never consent to the sacrifice of the clear and positive interests of one class of men to the contingent advantages of another, nor demolish a mighty practical system which had been raised by such immense exertions, in order to place its materials at the disposal of interested speculation. Conformably to these resolutions, a petition was presented to the House of Commons on the 22nd February, 1813, in which the Company prayed for the renewal of the privileges granted in 1793, and deprecated any interference with the China trade, or any extension of the import trade from India to the outports of Great Britain. Another petition was submitted at the same time, soliciting from the nation payment of a debt claimed by the Company of £2,294,426.¹ A similar petition was presented to the House of Lords.

On the 22nd of March, 1813, the subject was introduced into the House of Commons, in a Committee of the whole house, by Lord Castlereagh, who, after some general observations in which he bore testimony to the excellence of the Company's Indian government, declared it to be the wish of the Government not to interfere with the political system unless compelled so to do, although circumstances imperiously demanded the relaxation of their commercial privileges. He accordingly submitted to the House a series of resolutions, which proposed to renew the charter of the Company for a further period, to continue to them during that

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¹ Parl. Debates, 22nd Feb. 1813; see also Papers, p. 252.

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term the exclusive right of trading with China, but admitting to the trade with India, under certain restrictions, the mercantile community of Great Britain. Some general discussion of the principles on which the resolutions were founded ensued, but the Committee agreed that the resolutions should be read *pro forma*, and taken into consideration at an early date. In the House of Lords similar resolutions were laid on the table by the Earl of Buckinghamshire, and on the motion of the Earl of Liverpool they were referred to a Select Committee. It was agreed by the Lords that the petitioners should be heard by their counsel, with permission to examine evidence, should it be deemed necessary, in compliance with an application to that effect from the Company. The same indulgence was accorded by the House of Commons, and evidence was heard at the bars of both Houses in support of the Company's objections to the measures proposed by the Administration.¹ In order to form an accurate notion of the tenor and character of the testimony thus adduced, it will be convenient here to offer a summary recapitulation of the objects and arguments of the conflicting parties.

In the first instance, two great questions were involved in the consideration of the renewal of the charter—first the political, and secondly the commercial claims of the Company. The Court of Directors claimed the territory of India in the Company's possession as theirs by right of conquest, achieved originally with money derived from the profits of their trade: they had paid for it, and it was theirs. But

¹ Proceedings of Court of Proprietors, 24th March, 1813; Papers, p. 305.

then came the question, What was the Company? of whom was it composed? and the answer was necessarily that it consisted of the dutiful and loyal subjects of the King of Great Britain: and a further doubt inevitably followed, how they could reconcile the duties of obedience to their sovereign with the regal powers which they pretended to exercise in India. This anomalous position was a sufficient confutation of their claims, without adverting to the conditions and circumstances under which an association of merchants had been permitted to acquire extensive dominions. Waiving the question of right, however, the Administration was not only disinclined to put down the Company's authority, but was anxious to leave them in the undisturbed enjoyment of the privileges and advantages which it conferred. The public was either indifferent to this branch of the discussion, or preferred that the territory of India should be administered through the Company; as the distribution of the patronage which it secured to those that had the nomination to the greater portion of the Indian appointments was safer in their hands than in those of the Ministers, more likely to be innocuously distributed, and not in danger of being used as an instrument of parliamentary corruption—an article of barter exchangeable for a vote.

The second question, the commercial privileges of the Company, was also distinguishable under two heads—the trade with China, and the trade with India. Both of these their mercantile antagonists sought to wrest from them; but the Ministers came to their rescue, and were disposed to listen to the

BOOK I. arguments of the Court in defence of the monopoly
CHAP. VIII. of the trade with China. This trade was carried on

1813. under peculiar circumstances. The Chinese Government entertained a violent jealousy of foreign intercourse, and confined the trade not only to a single port, but to a single society,—to a certain number of native merchants of Canton incorporated under the designation of Hong,—interdicting the rest of its subjects from trafficking with strangers. There was no field, therefore, for competition; no possibility of multiplying demand by reduced prices, as the people at large were excluded from the market; and the only effect of the increased resort of English merchants would be to place them more entirely at the mercy of the Chinese Hong. Prompt to take offence, and affecting, possibly entertaining, utter indifference for foreign trade, the Government of Canton upon every petty disturbance or cause of alarm was ready to place an embargo upon all shipments whatever; and it had often required the experienced judgment, local knowledge, and personal influence of the members of the Company's factory at Canton to prevent or remedy occasions of umbrage, and preserve the trade from suspension, or restore it when interrupted. There was great reason to apprehend that from the ignorance or incaution of British traders and sailors, subject to no national controul, and setting the Chinese authorities at defiance, frequent interruption, if not a total stop to the trade, would occur; to the serious discontent of the people of England, to whom tea had become a necessary of life, and to the irreparable injury of the revenue, which realised nearly four millions a

year of duty upon this article of import.¹ It was maintained, indeed, that there were no just grounds for apprehending such a catastrophe. The Americans had traded largely with China without supracargoes or factory, yet had never given offence; and the appointment of a British consul would provide sufficiently a local authority, to which the resident merchants and the crews of British vessels might be made amenable. The salutary effects of this latter measure were regarded, however, as doubtful; and it seemed not improbable that the immunity of the American trade from obstruction was in part attributable to the Company's establishment, which without actual authority exercised an influence over all the foreign trade, at Canton favourable to its prosperity. It was also argued, that, if an unlimited intercourse with China were permitted, it would be impossible to prevent smuggling, by which the revenue would be injuriously affected; and although the impossibility was denied, yet undoubtedly this argument had great weight with the Administration, who were unwilling, amidst the enormous pressure upon the finances of the country during the momentous transactions of this period upon the Continent, to hazard the diminution of a resource so valuable and so easily realised as the duty upon tea paid by the Company. Accordingly from the first they declared their determination to uphold this part of the monopoly, and to exclude private traders from the China seas.

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¹ Considerations on the China Trade, by Sir G. Staunton, Bart., communicated in the first instance to the Earl of Buckinghamshire, and subsequently to the Court of Directors; Papers, &c. p. 281.

BOOK I. The struggle therefore was for the India trade.
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 1813. the Company with the anti-monopoly doctrines, which, started by Adam Smith, were now received as axioms in the new and growing school of political economists: and although it was undeniable, that, had not the Company possessed originally an exclusive trade with India, that trade would never have been established on a secure and permanent footing, and not a rood of land in India would have owned the rule of Great Britain; yet the necessities which fully justified the monopoly for many years had gradually disappeared before its continuance, and no sufficient reasons could now be assigned for excluding the merchants of Britain from a commercial intercourse with British India, especially as that intercourse was open to the people of America and to all foreign nations. The Court of Directors were unable to offer any valid objections of a commercial nature. Their only argument was, that admission to the trade would end in disappointment; that the merchants who so eagerly sought to be allowed to engage in the commerce would find they had miscalculated the benefits they derived from it. The experience of two centuries, they affirmed, had fully determined the nature and extent of the trade with India; and proved past questioning that it could not be carried beyond the bounds to which it had attained, and which yielded so little profit, that the trade was scarcely worth the Company's retaining. The imports from India were of a limited description, and were either on the decline in competition with the raw produce of

America, as cotton; or with the products of home manufacture, as cotton goods; or they were incapable of more than a fixed and circumscribed consumption, as was the case with indigo and various drugs and spices. The same applied to the exports: they could not be increased; the climate, the religion, and the usages of the people were all opposed to the consumption of British goods and manufactures; and nothing English that could be sent to India was likely to find a sale, except among the few British residents in the country. The interval that had elapsed since the renewal of the last charter had given to these conclusions the sanction of experience; as the amount of tonnage then provided for the private trade had never been fully occupied, and not a single new article of export had suggested itself to the interested enterprise of the individual trader.

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The more ardent of the advocates of free trade denied the justice of the conclusions drawn by the Court. The little profit attending the Company's trade they ascribed to the prodigal expense of the Company's operations, the want of good management, and the absence of judicious speculation. The delays and expenses to which the private trade was subjected under the Company's controul sufficiently accounted for the limited demand that had been made for the tonnage: yet, notwithstanding these obstacles, the Court's own returns showed that the private trade was on the increase; and, notwithstanding the assertion that no new article had been introduced, it had been found profitable to send out cotton manufactures to India. They treated

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as monstrous and untenable the assertion that no extension of trade was possible amongst the millions of the Indian population.¹ The more moderate argued, that, although it was very possible that such an extension as was sometimes anticipated, might not be effected in India itself, or amongst the Hindus, yet that there was a considerable body of Mohammedans whose habits were less unpromising; and in the Indian Ocean, the Gulph of Persia, and the Eastern Archipelago, new channels of trade might and would no doubt be opened out by the activity and enterprise of the private trader: that, at any rate, the experiment was worth trying, as it could only leave the trade as it found it; and if, as was pretended, it yielded little or no profit to the Company, that was a reason the more why they should not be unwilling to part with it. The exigencies of the commerce of Great Britain probably weighed more with the Ministers than the arguments and assertions of either party. Excluded from the Continent by the decrees of Napoleon, the merchants and manufacturers were labouring under alarming difficulties; and the country was menaced with severe distress unless some new vent for the issue of its industrial products could be discovered, some new hopes could be held out to animate and encourage the drooping energies of manufacture and

¹ It was stated by Lord Castlereagh, that in the last twenty years the export of cotton manufactures to India had increased from £2000 to £108,000, and was clearly a growing trade.—Debates, June 2, 1813. See also Evidence of Mr. Brown and Sir Robert Peel, App. First Report. Mr. Sullivan, 3rd June, says, the average export of manufactured cottons from 1792 to 1796 was £730, whilst between 1807 and 1811 it was £96,980: the amount of the exports of private trade had doubled within the period of the charter.

trade. To this great state necessity the interests of a single corporation were bound to yield; and the Company, with however bad a grace, were compelled to consent that vessels from any of the ports of Great Britain should be allowed to export British produce and fabrics to the territories of India under their authority. They still, however, insisted on the condition that the cargoes which the merchants imported from India should be brought to London, deposited in the Company's warehouses, and sold at the Company's sales. Upon this point they resolutely resisted the wishes of the Government.

The arguments with which they opposed the extension of the imports from India to the outports of Great Britain were, the injury that it would inflict both upon the Company and the metropolis, rendering the extensive and valuable docks and warehouses appropriated during many years to the India trade no longer available, and throwing out of employment thousands of persons hitherto dependent upon their establishments; the impossibility it would involve of regulating the supplies by the demand, which was the effect of the Company's sales,—the Company keeping back, even to their own loss, the goods they imported, when they found that the market was overstocked. But the chief points upon which they rested their objections were, the impossibility of preventing smuggling in Britain; and checking the unlicensed and unlawful navigation in the Indian seas, which must result from extending the trade to other ports than that of London. The replies of the representatives of the outports were, either of a general tenor, the same with

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which the principle of the Company's monopoly had been assailed; or they were specially urged against the limitation of the import trade to the port of London, which they denounced as unnecessary, unjust, and impolitic. It was not necessary for the protection of the revenue, for experience had shown that the Government duties could be levied elsewhere with as much regularity and security as in London: it was unjust, because every mercantile place was entitled to the same protection as the capital; and it would be only a transfer of the monopoly from the East India Company to the merchants of London, to give to them alone the privilege of importing goods from India: and it was impolitic, because the superior dispatch and economy of the outports were requisite to secure an equality in the market with foreign nations. With regard to the duties, the Ministers also took the care of them upon themselves, their realisation being more the business of the State than of the Company; and they would not admit that any greater danger could accrue to the Company's authority in India from the homeward than the outward trade, as the increased resort of Europeans to India was quite as likely to be the consequence of the one as of the other. The Court of Directors had also impaired the force of their own objections on this ground, by acceding to the unlimited extension of the outward-bound trade to any of the ports of the United Kingdom. Notwithstanding this palpable objection to the arguments of the Court, the dangers resulting from the opening of the trade to their political interests were pressed upon the Ministers with still more urgency

than the peril of their commercial; and their tenure of the sovereignty of India was declared to be contingent upon the preservation of their mercantile privileges. The dangers were of two kinds,—one financial, one political.

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The revenues of British India, it was affirmed, had never been equal to the territorial charges: the deficit had been made good partly by money borrowed either in India or in England, and partly by the profits of the Company's trade. Large payments on account of Indian loans, and of expenses growing out of the Indian system,—such as, the supplies of stores and the pensions of retired officers, civil and military,—had also to be made in England; for which the commercial capital of the Company was wholly insufficient, and for which the sums required were raised by remittances of goods from India or China, and the proceeds of the sales at the India House. Should these sources of supply fail in consequence of the diversion of the trade to private hands, money would be wanting for current disbursements: and, should the profits of the trade be taken away, the excess of the charge of the Indian territory, the interest of the debt, and the dividends on the stock could no longer be provided for; in which case the Company's stock would be valueless, and their obligations could not be discharged. The business of the Indian administration could no longer be carried on by them, and the rescission of their commercial privileges was therefore equivalent to the annihilation of their political existence,—to the subversion of that system which the sense of the nation, the testimony of all preceding Administrations, and the professions

BOOK I. of the present Ministers, agreed to recognise as that
CHAP. VIII. which was best fitted to maintain the British domi-

1813. nion in India. These arguments were, however, disposed of in a great measure by the continuance to the Company of the monopoly of the tea-trade, from which it was admitted that their commercial profits were principally, if not wholly, derived. How far their territorial expenses had been defrayed by their commercial gains, was also a matter of some uncertainty, as the accounts of both had been hitherto blended in such a manner as to render it difficult to distinguish to which head many of the charges correctly appertained. According to the Company's adversaries, the Company's investments were largely indebted to the territorial revenue.

Thus driven from all the disputed posts,—most of which, to say the truth, were utterly untenable,—the Company had recourse to their last great stay, the danger of an unlimited resort of Europeans to India. It was asserted that merchants and agents would of necessity follow the trade, and that great numbers of persons would settle in the country, upon whose steps craftsmen and labourers would necessarily follow; and European colonization, however slowly, would surely take place. Once established, it would, after the example of the American colonies, lead to independence, and India would be lost to Great Britain. Even before this consummation took place, extreme embarrassment and no small peril would be encountered. The weak and timid natives of India would be the victims of European fierceness and brute force. If they failed to resist, they would be subject to cruelty and

oppression, which the Company's functionaries would be unable to prevent: if, taking courage from their numbers, they ventured at resistance, scenes of tumult and bloodshed must follow, which could not fail to menace the stability of British rule. In either case there was an immediate or a remote danger that the loss of India would follow the opening of the trade.

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These apprehensions had, as above remarked, been partly neutralized by the assent which the Court had actually given to the extension of the trade to India, and it was not difficult to show that they were exaggerated and visionary. The resort of Europeans growing out of the agency of commerce could neither be numerous nor mischievous. It would be necessarily confined to the principal settlements, where alone trade could be largely and profitably carried on, and where the persons engaged in it would be immediately under the eye of the most efficient and powerful officers of the state. The class of persons who would take up their abode there would be peaceable merchants, factors, and agents; not classes amongst whom matter deep and dangerous to the Government was likely to be fostered. Labour in India was too plentiful and too cheap to hold out any inducement to the most numerous and disorderly classes of the community at home to emigrate, and all danger of popular commotion from such a source was therefore imaginary. But, it was argued, some of the settlers would attach themselves to the soil, and a class of agricultural as well as commercial colonists would be formed, by whom ultimate independence would be achieved. To the objection, that

BOOK I. the land was fully occupied, that there was no room
CHAP. VIII. for new cultivators, the answer was, that the new

1813. colonists would displace the natives; but this could be effected only in one of two ways—by violence, or by purchase. The former implied that there was neither law nor government in the country, and counted vastly too much upon the non-resistance of the natives, who have everywhere been found ready to fight for their lands, and who in many parts of India are destitute neither of strength nor spirit. Purchase involved the transfer of capital from England to India, to be invested in property of very equivocal advantage at least, and little likely to be attended with profit under European management and the Company's revenue enactments. The climate and the habits of the two people rendered it utterly impossible that a European should compete with a native farmer in the cultivation of crops of rice, and the claims of the state to three-fifths of the net produce held out little prospect to the European cultivator of realising a fortune. It was not to be doubted also, that the climate, in some parts of India at least, was unfavourable to the full developement of the European organisation; and, with diminished physical energy, would engender an inferior degree of intellectual vigour: so that the children of Europeans, born and bred in the country, would sensibly degenerate; and the course of a few generations would, in all probability, find them rather below, than above, the level of the native population. These were facts, however, unknown, or kept out of sight, by those who held out colonization and independence as bug-bears to the advocates of free trade;

and the phantoms had so far an influence upon the determinations of the Government, that it was thought advisable to take precautions to prevent their substantial existence. It was agreed that no persons, except those in the Company's employ, should be allowed to go to India as residents, without a licence either from the Company or the Board of Control; and that the Indian Governments should retain authority to send out of the country any individual from whom they might think it advisable to withdraw the licence to reside in India. This was considered a sufficient concession to the real or affected panic of the Court. And with regard to any embarrassments that might arise from the diminished remittances from India to meet the demands upon the Company, the Ministers engaged that, if it should arise without any fault of the Company, they would use their influence with Parliament to afford the necessary relief, as far as equivalent means might exist in India.¹

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The improbability of the extension of the trade, and the great risk attending the attempt to effect its extension, were the especial points which the Company endeavoured, by the witnesses whom they called, to impress upon the Parliament; and with

¹ The arguments in favour of the continuance of the Company's exclusive privileges are to be chiefly found in the letters from the Chairs to the Board of Control, and the petitions of the Company to Parliament, printed in the Papers respecting the negotiations, &c. Those of the advocates of free trade, in the petitions of the several towns, and in a shoal of contemporary pamphlets: among which may be noticed *Considerations on the Trade with India*, London, 1807; and *Letters on the East India Company's Monopoly*, published at Glasgow. Nor was the Company without its supporters; amongst whom one of the most respectable was Mr. Robert Grant, the author of the "*Expediency of continuing the system of the Trade and Government of India*, 1813."

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this view several of their most distinguished servants were interrogated before the House. The first person called was Warren Hastings; and, as if impelled by a sudden conviction of the undeserved severity with which he had been treated by a former House of Commons, and by a spontaneous wish to offer him such atonement as a unanimous tribute of personal respect could render, the members rose, as one body, upon his entrance into the House, and stood until he had assumed his seat within the bar. Similar indications of veneration accompanied his withdrawal. The House of Lords received him also with marked courtesy and attention. The contrast between his position now, and that which he held in the same presence twenty-seven years before, when he was arraigned of atrocious crimes and misdemeanors before both Houses, must have been some, though a tardy and insufficient, compensation for the unmerited neglect in which he had since passed his unobtrusive life.¹ His evidence was confirmatory of the assertions of the Company. He expressed it as his opinion, that if Europeans were admitted generally to go into the country, to mix with the inhabitants or form establishments amongst them, the consequence would certainly and inevitably be the ruin of the country: they would insult, plunder, and oppress the natives, and no laws enacted from home could prevent them from committing acts of licentiousness of every kind with impunity. A general feeling of hostility to the Government would be excited; and

¹ Of his reception he merely remarks, in a letter to a young friend, "I have lately received two most convincing and affecting proofs of my having outlived all the prejudices which have during so many past years prevailed against me."—*Life of Warren Hastings*, iii. 458.

although the armed force might be of sufficient strength to suppress any overt acts of insurrection, yet the stability of the empire must be endangered by universal discontent. The opinions of Lord Teignmouth, Colonel Malcolm, Colonel Munro, and other distinguished servants of the Company were of a similar tendency, and deprecated strongly the unrestricted admission of Europeans to the interior of the country. Experience had proved, they affirmed, that it was difficult to impress even upon the servants of the Company, whilst in their noviciate, a due regard for the feelings and habits of the people; and Englishmen of classes less under the observation of the superior authorities were notorious for the contempt with which, in their national arrogance and ignorance, they contemplated the usages and institutions of the natives, and for their frequent disregard of the dictates of humanity and justice in their dealings with the people of India. The natives, although timid and feeble in some places, were not without strength and resolution in others; and instances had occurred where their resentment had proved formidable to their oppressors. It was difficult, if not impossible, to afford them protection, for the Englishman was amenable only to the courts of British law established at the Presidencies; and although the local magistrate had the power of sending him thither for trial, yet, to impose upon the native complainants and witnesses the obligation of repairing many hundred miles to obtain redress, was to subject them to delay, fatigue, and expense, which would be more intolerable than the injury they had suffered. There was in fact,

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therefore, no redress; and the only security that the natives enjoyed was the power vested in the Government of removing a troublesome and mischievous European from the provinces to the Presidency, or even, if necessary, of sending him altogether out of India. As long as those powers continued to be vested in the local Governments, and as long as the resort of Europeans to India was regulated by licences granted by the authorities either in England or in India, it was thought by some of the witnesses that no great danger was to be apprehended. According to Colonel Malcolm, however, the restrictions could not be too stringent or severe.¹

In all the questions, however, to which these replies were given, it was assumed that not only an unrestricted but an unlimited and numerous influx of Europeans would follow the opening of the trade, and that the Europeans would settle as colonists. Admitting the inferences to be legitimate, the premises did not appear to all the witnesses to be equally indisputable. Thus Colonel Munro, in particular, stated his opinion that, although in the first instance the number of Europeans might be considerably augmented, yet by degrees that number would be limited by the amount of the trade, for the regulation of which alone their residence would be advantageous. They would not become manufacturers, on account of the superior skill and economy of the natives; they could not hold land, as that was prohibited by the Company's regulations:

¹ See Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committees of both Houses of Parliament in 1813, printed by order of the Court of Directors for the information of the Proprietors.

and, supposing it to be desirable that the law were repealed, it was not likely that Europeans could colonize to any extent; they would be borne down by the superior population of the natives, more industrious and economical than themselves.

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The several witnesses agreed also as to the improbability of the trade with India being susceptible of any material extension. The simple habits of the people, taught them by the nature of the climate and the condition of society, rendered them, even where able to purchase superfluities, little inclined to provide them. A few opulent natives at the chief cities occasionally purchased articles of European furniture and apparel, in compliment to their European friends, but commonly put them aside and made no use of them.¹ Their superfluous wealth was expended in the marriages of their children or at religious festivals, in domestic indulgences or on the ornaments of their women. The vast majority of the people were, however, devoid of the means of buying European manufactures, even if there existed amongst them any propensity to make use of them.²

¹ A fourth of the second share of the prize-money of Seringapatam was to be paid to the Nizam, and, with a prudent regard for the interests of British trade, the Government of Madras thought it expedient to convert the amount into broad-cloth, plate, china, glass and the like, in order to initiate his Highness and his Court into a taste for the elegant superfluities of European living. The articles were graciously received; but all were consigned to the Toshak-khana, or magazine of rare and valuable commodities. On visiting this magazine, the Resident found many rooms filled from the floor to the ceiling with European articles, most of which had been presented to the Nizam and his father by the Governors of the French and English settlements: some as old as the time of Duplessy and Bussy, sent direct from the court of Louis XV. Of course the greater portion had become the nests of the white ant and the moth.—Evidence of T. Sydenham, Esq. before the House of Commons; Minutes, p. 527.

² Various testimonies were given of the cheapness of labour and the trifling amount sufficient for the maintenance of the natives. According to returns obtained by Colonel Munro whilst in India, upon a population of

BOOK I. Here, again, the same sagacious officer, Colonel
 CHAP. VIII. Munro, placed the question in its true light. Al-

1813. though he admitted that the Hindu was as unalterable in his habits as it was possible to be, and had in all probability adhered to them ever since he was first known to the Greek invaders of his country, yet he denied that the people of India entertained any invincible prejudices against foreign fabrics: it was entirely a question of price: whenever we could undersell the Hindus in any article which they required, it would find its way into the interior of the country without much help from the British merchant, and in spite of all regulations to prevent it. At the same time, he did not conceive it likely that there would be such a reduction of price as could bring British manufactures into competition with those the natives required and could produce in their own country. He was not aware what elements were even then at work to raise the British manufacture of one of the necessaries of life, cotton cloth, upon the ruin of the fabrics of India.

A question of still graver importance, although not affecting the continuance of the Company's privileges, was the expedience of adopting measures for the dissemination of Christianity amongst the natives of India. The advantages of placing the Company's chaplains under episcopal authority had been pressed upon the attention of the Company and the public

two millions of inhabitants, the average annual expenditure of each individual for clothes, food, furniture, and all the necessaries of life, did not exceed 25s.: the average expenditure of the rich being 40s.; that of the middling classes, comprising the whole of the agricultural and manufacturing classes, 27s.; and that of the poorest, 18s. It was not likely that any of these classes should furnish consumers of European commodities.—
 Min. of Evidence p. 204.

some years before,¹ and the Administration was willing to give effect, in part, to the arrangements so suggested. The appointment of a bishop and archdeacons was calculated to give consistency and vigour to the clerical establishment of British India, and was not likely to excite any hostile feelings amongst the natives, as long as they had no cause to suspect that it was the purpose of the Government to employ such agency as instruments of their conversion. To this extent, therefore, the Ministers and the Company were disposed to go: but there were not wanting a number of zealous persons who endeavoured to force upon them the adoption of provisions in the new charter for the communication of the light of Christianity to the benighted heathens of India, and for affording sufficient opportunities to the benevolent persons who should be desirous of going to India for that purpose; or, in other words, to authorise and assist the exertions of the missionaries. Petitions to this effect had been presented to both Houses of Parliament, and the members naturally therefore wished to hear the sentiments of those who were best qualified to judge of the probable consequences of any attempt of the Government to introduce the Christian religion. There was no hesitation or disagreement in the reply. All concurred in asserting that not only the attempt, but any notion amongst the natives that such an attempt would be made, was pregnant with the most fatal consequences: it would not only defeat the object for which it was made, and prevent the diffusion of that religion it was intended to establish,

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¹ In a memoir on the expediency of an Ecclesiastical establishment for British India, by the Rev. Claudius Buchanan, 1805.

BOOK I. but would lead to universal fear and discontent, and
 CHAP. VIII. would in all likelihood end in the overthrow of the

1813. British empire. Divided as were the people of the country by religious differences and distinctions of caste, any dread of violence to their several forms of belief would unite them in a common cause; would convert timidity into desperation, and subordination into defiance; and would kindle a flame which, in its progress, would destroy not only the British Government, but all who professed the faith it was designed to propagate. Even Lord Teignmouth, although connected with the religious party, admitted that considerable peril might be apprehended from indiscreet zeal; that, from the experience which the natives had had of the disposition of the Government during very many years to pay every attention to their civil and religious prejudices, they never could be brought to believe that it meant to impose upon them the religion of this country; that any enactment for the conversion of the natives, having the appearance of a compulsory law upon their consciences, would be attended with very great danger; and that it would be advisable to leave in the hands of the local Government the controul to be exercised over persons professing to teach Christianity in India.¹

A variety of conflicting evidence relating to the

¹ See the Resolutions of a meeting of the Protestant Society for the protection of Religious Liberty, 2nd March, 1813; Papers, &c. 276: of a special meeting of the Church Missionary Society, 24th April, 1813; of the meetings of the members of the Church of Scotland, the Wesleyans, Baptists, and others, in March and April, 1813; in the Missionary Register for April of that year. The subject was also warmly discussed in various pamphlets: Lord Teignmouth and Mr. Fuller taking the lead on the side of missionary encouragement; and Messrs. Scott Waring, and T. Twining, among those who denied its expedience or safety.

difficulty of repressing smuggling, and the expedience of continuing the China monopoly, was also heard. The officers of the outports generally maintained that there existed as much security for the realisation of the duties at the several harbours as in London. The weight of authority, however, was against them; and difficulty was anticipated, although it might not be insuperable. The evidence of the Company's officers who had resided in China was also of a character more entitled to credit than that of the merchants, who attempted to qualify or deny the descriptions which were given by Sir G. Staunton and Mr. Davies of the peculiarities under which the trade with the Chinese was conducted, and the danger of its being lost should an indiscriminate traffic be allowed.

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On the 25th of May the subject was again brought before the House of Commons. Lord Castlereagh, presuming that the members were now in possession of the evidence, was desirous of entering upon the discussion, and coming to a conclusion without further delay. Some opposition was made to an early day, on the ground of there not being time to read over the minutes of evidence; but it was overruled, and on the 31st the House went into a Committee on the Resolutions. The first resolution purported that the privileges, authorities, and immunities granted to the East India Company by any acts of parliament then in force, should be continued for a further period of time to be limited, except as far as hereafter modified and repealed. In objecting to this, Mr. Bruce, the Company's historiographer, recapitulated the history of the Com-

BOOK I. pany, the attempts that had been made to interfere
CHAP. VIII. with their exclusive rights, the little success with
 1813. which they had been attended, and the services rendered to the trade, and the prosperity of the state, by the Company; and he argued that any deviation from the existing system would be productive of dangers and losses both commercial and political, of the destruction of the Company's trade both with India and China, and of the subversion of their Indian empire. It would be a melancholy reflection, he concluded, to have lived to see one political and financial error lose to the country its American colonies; and to be convinced that the proposed resolutions, if passed into a law in opposition to a most full and complete body of evidence, would in a short time probably lose its Indian empire to Great Britain.¹ He was followed by Mr. Charles Grant junior, who impressed upon the House the peril of disturbing a system of administration under which the people of India were prosperous and happy, for the sake of imaginary commercial advantages which never could be realised. The good of the people of India was the real point at issue; and this could not be promoted by letting loose amongst them a host of desperate, needy adventurers, whose atrocious conduct in America and in Africa afforded sufficient indication of the evils they would inflict upon India. The Company had been charged with having excited wars in India, and furnished an exception to the general rule that peace and tranquillity were the insepa-

¹ Substance of the Speech of J. Bruce, Esq.; Black, Parry, & Co., 1813: also Hansard's Debates, 31st May, 1813.

rable attendants of commerce: and by whom was this charge made? by the advocates of the slave-trade, the people of Liverpool. The natives of India deprecated all change: he gave utterance to their prayers when he conjured the House not to make them the subjects of perilous speculation, and, for the sake of local insignificant interests, barter away their happiness. The commercial merits of the question were more particularly dwelt upon by the father of this speaker, Mr. Charles Grant senior, who, as Chairman and member of the Court of Directors, and a gentleman of great ability and experience, had taken the lead in the defence of the Company's privileges. He urged the arguments already adverted to, of the impossibility of materially extending the trade, which he was satisfied to observe was now generally admitted. He denied that the union of the character of merchant and sovereign was prejudicial to the country over which the Company ruled; that any loss had attended their commercial transactions, the commerce having not only supported itself, but contributed to the expenses of the administration of the territory: he asserted that the remittances made to England were necessary for territorial charges in that country; and that they were better effected through goods than the bills of private merchants, of whose solvency they could not always feel secure. He maintained the right of the Company to their territorial possessions, having been acquired at their own hazard and expense. In reply to the inconsistency of apprehending a dangerous resort of Europeans to India if merchandise were brought from thence to the out-

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ports, and not anticipating the same from vessels fitted out by them for the export trade, he observed that, if ships were not allowed to carry their return cargoes to the outports, the ships fitted out from those ports would be comparatively few. Of the reality of the danger, the whole body of the evidence was full. The transfer of the trade from London to the outports would yield no advantages to the kingdom at large; whilst it would be injurious to the metropolis, and dangerous to India.

Amongst the speakers on the opposite side, Mr. Canning was principally distinguished. He very justly observed, that, of all the questions ever discussed in the House of Commons, the present was one in which on both sides the greatest exaggeration prevailed. He bore no enmity to the Company, and was desirous of supporting all their just claims: but he could not admit their claim to the rightful sovereignty of India; or that the anomaly of their position should impair the principle, that, whenever British subjects acquired dominion, it was comprehended within the permanent dominion of the empire. When Parliament were legislating on the government and commerce of India, it was as clearly competent to do so, as to enact laws respecting any other British possessions properly denominated colonies. He would admit, however, the Company to retain their sovereign capacity as a concession, not as a right; but, if it should seem good to take it away, it was the right of the Parliament so to legislate, and not in the right of the East India Company to plead their possession. With regard to the objections offered to the open-

ing of the trade on account of the anticipated misconduct of those who would engage in it, he thought it was rather hard and unprecedented language for the advocates of the Company to say to the merchants, "You are a pack of piratical ragamuffins, who want to lay our villages in ruins and blood, and to carry away our children into captivity: we have heard of the horrible traffic you carried on for the slave-trade a century without shame, and would not abandon without a struggle." Fortunately for the private trader, the right and power of interference did exist in Parliament, who would consider the question in all its bearings, without heeding the exaggerated pretensions of those commercial lords of Asia to dominions acquired by British enterprise, and yet held by British arms.

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After witnessing the changes in the systems of judicature and revenue, and in the military organisation, which had been effected by the Company's Governments, he could not believe in the alleged immutability of the native character and habit, which was to render impracticable any extension of the trade with them; and still less could he imagine that a people, who had been quiet and submissive for three thousand years, should lose those qualities all of a sudden if a few pedlars were allowed to travel in the country with a pack of scissiors or other hardware at their backs. The question was, not the admission of British merchants to trade without restrictions, but their trading subject to restrictions and regulations. He conceived the general principle to be pretty well disposed of, except between the classes who went to the extreme

BOOK I. length of contending, on the one side, that the
CHAP. VIII. Company should be abolished, and those who, on

1813. the other, maintained that not a single feather should be taken from their plume of sovereignty; but whilst he did not apprehend any insuperable difficulty in providing for the government of India independent of the Company, yet he was ready to admit that the system had many advantages, and was desirous to continue it in their hands as long as it did not degenerate into a system of exclusion. The first resolution was carried without a division.

The second resolution, proposing to continue the monopoly of the tea-trade with the Company, was discussed on the succeeding day. It encountered some opposition from Mr. Marryatt, Mr. Ponsonby, and Sir J. Newport; who argued that it was impolitic and unjust to exclude British subjects from a trade to which foreigners were admitted, and that, by opening the trade, the public would be supplied with better tea at a lower price, the prices of teas in America being much lower than those at the Company's sales. In reply it was asserted, that the Company put up their teas at little more than cost price; and that, if the rates were enhanced by the buyers, it was their act, not the Company's. Whilst also it was not denied that the American prices were lower, it was asserted by Mr. Grant that the comparison was fallacious; as the articles, although bearing similar appellations, were entirely different, and the American teas were of inferior quality. This was contradicted; but the arguments which had influenced the Select Committee—the fear of exciting the jealousy and provoking the opposition

of the Chinese Government, and the inexpediency of hazarding valuable and readily realisable revenue which the duty on tea under the present system secured,—proved successful; and this resolution was also carried without a division. The other resolutions, with reservation of the third, seventh, eighth, and thirteenth, were also agreed to.

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On the 2nd of June the discussion of the third resolution took place. This resolution, which gave permission to the ships of private merchants to sail from any port in Great Britain to any port within the limits of the Company's charter, and to return to certain of the outports, had been qualified by various clauses, having for their object both the security of the Company and individuals; the most important of them making it necessary for vessels trading with India to have licences from the Company, but empowering the Board of Controul to issue licences when refused by the Court of Directors, if not satisfied with the grounds of the refusal. The debate was opened with a speech from Mr. Rickards, objecting altogether to the continuance of the Company's privileges, and denying the existence of that prosperity amongst the people of India which they had been described as enjoying under the Company's administration; attributing much of the misery that existed to the pressure upon the national industry arising from the Company's monopoly, and looking for its relief only to the extension of a demand for the produce of the country through the enterprise of the private trader. He was replied to by Mr. Grant. The singularity of the debate was a long and elaborate speech

BOOK I. from Mr. Tierney, who, in opposition to the senti-
 CHAP. VIII. ments of his colleagues, maintained that, looking
 1813. to the distinguished character and generally con-
 curring tenor of the evidence adduced in favour of
 the Company, and the total absence of any evi-
 dence on the opposite part, the existing system
 ought not to be interfered with. In fact, there was
 a gross inconsistency in the resolution: a Court
 of Directors, that could not be trusted with the
 commerce of India, was to be confirmed in the go-
 vernment,—twenty-four execrable merchants were
 to make excellent political governors! But there
 was no charge against the Company: the main object
 of the act of 1793, the happiness of sixty millions,
 had been attained. The government of India, he
 asserted, was well and ably administered, and was
 not to be subverted for the sake of a little more
 trade. Amongst all the arguments in favour of the
 benefits that were to accrue to the people of India
 from a free trade, he had never heard it proposed to
 allow one manufacture of India to be freely import-
 ed into Great Britain. It was true that they would
 allow cotton-twist: but then, having found out that
 they could weave by means of machinery cheaper
 than the Indians, they said to them, “Leave off
 weaving; supply us with the raw material, and we
 will weave for you.”¹ Now, although this was a na-

¹ The history of the trade of cotton cloths with India affords a singular exemplification of the inapplicability to all times and circumstances of that principle of free trade which advocates the unrestricted admission of a cheap article, in place of protecting by heavy duties a dearer one of home manufacture. It is also a melancholy instance of the wrong done to India by the country on which she had become dependent. It was stated in evidence that the cotton and silk goods of India up to this period could be sold for a profit in the British market at a price from fifty to sixty per cent. lower than those fabricated in England. It consequently became necessary

tural principle enough for merchants and manufacturers, it was rather too much to talk of the philanthropy of it, or to rank the supporters of it as in a peculiar degree the friends of India. If, instead of calling themselves the friends of that country, they should profess themselves its enemies, what more could they do than advise the endeavour to crush all Indian manufacture? What would be said of the East India Company if they were to show as decided a preference to the manufactures of the natives of India under their protection as we did to the manufactures of England? It appeared to him that the alterations in the resolutions had been proposed for no other purpose than to conciliate the clamour of the merchants, and he would defy any man to point out anything like the good of India being the object of any of the resolutions. In conclusion, he expressed his opinion that either the present system must be maintained, or the Company set aside altogether. Lord Castlereagh, in reply to Mr. Tierney, urged adherence to the middle course which had been proposed by the Ministers. In the adjourned debate on the following day, Mr. Sullivan recapitulated the circumstances which had

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to protect the latter by duties of seventy and eighty per cent. on their value, or by positive prohibition. Had this not been the case, had not such prohibitory duties and decrees existed, the mills of Paisley and of Manchester would have been stopped in their outset, and could scarcely have been again set in motion, even by the powers of steam. They were created by the sacrifice of the Indian manufacture. Had India been independent, she would have retaliated; would have imposed preventive duties upon British goods, and would thus have preserved her own productive industry from annihilation. This act of self-defence was not permitted her; she was at the mercy of the stranger. British goods were forced upon her without paying any duty; and the foreign manufacturer employed the arm of political injustice to keep down and ultimately strangle a competitor with whom he could not have contended on equal terms.

BOOK I. taken place on the renewal of the charter of 1793,
CHAP. VIII. and the measures advocated in 1800 by Mr. Dundas

1813. for the extension of private trade, by the admission of India-built shipping belonging to merchants in India at that time, and observed that all the arguments brought forward against the propositions now before the House were then urged with greater force and ability than was now evinced in the discussion: the result of a compromise made with the Company had demonstrated the futility of all objections against the private trade, which had largely increased during the period of the charter. Mr. Prothero vindicated the merchants of the outports from the sarcastic observations of Mr. Tierney, and maintained that they had shown their moderation in not insisting upon larger concessions than it had been deemed expedient to grant. Mr. Baring denied the advantages, and expatiated on the dangers of augmenting the facilities already given to private trade. Several other members took part in the debate; but the discussion turned chiefly upon the general merits of the measure, and went over the grounds previously exhausted. The resolution was carried without a division; and the remaining resolutions being agreed to, with a reservation that some of them would be considered more fully on the bringing up of the report, the House was resumed, and the report of the Committee, consisting of the resolutions in detail, was received.¹

On the 14th, when the report was taken into consideration, Sir J. Newport moved that it should be postponed to that day three months, expressly

¹ See Appendix.

with a view of inducing the House in the next session to abolish the monopoly altogether. Lord Castlereagh expressed his opinion that such an abolition would be a serious calamity, and that Ministers would be guilty of a dereliction of duty if they agreed to any postponement of the question. Mr. Whitbread passed some severe strictures on the Ministers for culpable delay in bringing the question forward, and then hurrying it to a decision: he accused Lord Castlereagh of inconsistency, who, when President of the Board of Control nine years before, had declared that the Company was unable, and ought not, to exist longer; and yet now argued that it ought to be supported. He completely agreed with the sentiments which had been expressed by Lord Grenville in the House of Lords, disputed the eulogium which had been passed upon the Company's administration, considered the evidence given in their behalf as prejudiced and contradictory, and declared that the information was insufficient: one thing only was clear, there should be no compromise; if the Company ought to be destroyed, destroy it; if it ought to be maintained, maintain it: he voted for further delay. Mr. Tierney also urged delay, which Mr. Canning opposed; and, upon a division, the amendment was rejected by a considerable majority. The debate on the resolutions was adjourned.

On resuming the discussion on the 14th June, Mr. Howorth argued the necessity of asserting in the preamble a declaration of the sovereignty of India residing in the Crown; and Sir J. Newport proposed a motion to that effect. Lord Castlereagh objected to the amendment, that it was unnecessary;

BOOK I. that it was raising a doubt where none had been
CHAP. VIII. suggested; and that it would be well to consider

1813. what Parliament had done on a former occasion, when the charter was renewed, and when it had not been thought advisable to accompany resolutions of a practical and specific character with principles of universal applicability. Mr. Grant said that the East India Company had never laid claim to the sovereignty of the country; they had only asserted that right in the soil which they conceived to be given them by the charter. The amendment was negatived. Lord Castlereagh then moved that the term for the duration of the charter should be twenty years, which Mr. Ponsonby proposed should be shortened to ten; in which he was supported by Mr. Creevey, who, however, gave a decided negative to the whole of the resolution. Lord Castlereagh maintained that a period of less than twenty years would be insufficient to enable Parliament to judge of the merits or defects of the system about to be established, and reminded the House that they retained the power of superintending and controuling the proceedings both of the Company and the Ministers. Mr. Canning voted for the shorter period; and Mr. Whitbread declared that, from what he had heard in the course of the debate, he should vote against the resolution. The Company had governed India badly, and had no right to the monopoly of the trade with either India or China. The amendment was rejected, but the minority was considerable. On the duration of the exclusive trade to China Mr. Canning also divided the House, proposing to limit it to ten years; a motion intended, no doubt,

to propitiate his Liverpool constituents. It was carried against him. An attempt was made, upon the third reading of the resolution, by Mr. Baring, to restrict the return trade to the port of London at least for a period of five years: but it was vigorously opposed by the representatives of the maritime towns, and especially by Mr. Canning, who denounced the proposition as an insidious attempt to destroy the whole scheme which Parliament had devised; for the outports, thwarted, crippled, and confined by such a regulation, would abandon the trade, and then the Company would again possess its monopoly undisturbed. The resolution was carried. Some further discussion ensued upon other clauses and resolutions, but they were agreed to; except the thirteenth, the debate on which was adjourned: it being understood that a bill should be, in the mean time, brought in on the other resolutions, and that they should be sent to the Lords.

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The thirteenth resolution, the object of which professed to be the affording of facilities and encouragement to missionaries to India, was the subject of a separate discussion on the 22nd June. In opening the debate, Lord Castlereagh felt it necessary to correct an erroneous impression that had gone abroad, that the resolution was intended to encourage an unrestrained and unregulated resort of persons to India for religious purposes: this was not the case. It was never conceived by the authors of the resolution that an unrestrained resort of persons with religious views would be consonant with the tranquillity and security of the British possessions in India; although they thought that no danger could

BOOK I. arise from allowing a certain number of persons, un-
 CHAP. VIII. der the cognizance of the Court of Directors, who
 1813. were again controuled by the Board of Commis-
 sioners, to proceed as missionaries to India: with
 this impression he proposed the adoption of the re-
 solution.

The principal speaker on this occasion was Mr. Wilberforce, who gave utterance to the sentiments of the whole religious party of the kingdom. He denied that the only object of the resolution was to secure to such missionaries as the Board of Controul should sanction, permission to go to India, and to remain there as long as they should continue to exercise the duties of their office in an orderly and peaceable manner. Another, perhaps a principal object, as expressed in the words of the resolution, was to enlighten and inform the minds of our Indian subjects, by which he understood their education; and from the diffusion of knowledge, the progress of science, and the circulation of the Scriptures in the native languages, he anticipated even more than from direct missionary exertion. He also disclaimed, as preliminary to the discussion, all intention to advocate for the conversion of the natives the influence of Government. With regard to the inveteracy and unalterableness of the prejudices and superstitions of the Hindus, Mr. Wilberforce argued, from their submission to so many changes in the constitution of the government and the administration of the laws, that they were not so incapable of adopting new opinions as had been represented: nor were they incapable of change, even in their religious sentiments; as was evinced by the multitude

of Mohammedans who formed part of the population, and who must have originated from conversion; by the formation of a whole nation, that of the Sikhs, who within a few centuries had thrown off the restrictions of the Hindu religion; and by the prevalence of numerous sectarial divisions amongst the Hindus themselves: nay, the work of conversion to Christianity had been going on for the last century with signal success, and there were at that moment hundreds of thousands of native Christians in the East Indies. So little were the Hindus indisposed towards the doctrines of the Gospel, that the most zealous, laborious, and successful missionaries, such as Swartz and others, had been the most esteemed and beloved of all Europeans among all classes of natives. In answer to the assertions of those witnesses who had vindicated the moral character of the Hindus, and affirmed that, if practicable, it was not desirable to effect their conversion, he quoted largely from a memoir on the Moral State of India by Mr. Grant, from the opinions of the judges and magistrates given in answer to a call from Lord Wellesley to report upon the moral condition of the people, and from the Appendix to the Fifth Report, to establish the general depravity of the people of Hindustan; and intimated that the opinions which had been expressed to the contrary only proved the justice of Burke's sarcasm, that Europeans were commonly unbaptized on the passage to India. The charge that he was bringing an indictment against the whole population of India, who had done nothing to deserve his enmity, he indignantly repelled; and accused those of being the worst enemies of the

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people of India who would keep those miserable beings bowed down under the yoke which oppressed them. The course he was recommending tended as much to their temporal as to their spiritual advantage; for the evils consequent upon the institutions and superstitions of the Hindus pervaded the whole mass of the population, and embittered the domestic cup in almost every family. Such were the effects of the distinctions of caste, which were more degrading and intolerable than the fetters of West Indian slavery; of the practice of polygamy; of infanticide; of the burning of widows, of whom ten thousand were annually sacrificed in Bengal alone; of the obscene and bloody rites of their idolatrous ceremonies; and of the destruction of human life, as instanced in the worship of Jagannath in Orissa, in whose service it had been computed, taking in all the various modes and forms of destruction connected with it, that one hundred thousand human beings were annually expended. Mr. Wilberforce then vindicated the character of Dr. Buchanan, and maintained the accuracy of his statements; and he defended the conduct of the Baptist missionaries in Bengal,¹ and claimed for them the merits of discretion and moderation, as much as for piety and learning. The statements and reasonings of Mr. Wilberforce were contradicted by a few of the members; but no serious opposition was made to the resolution, and it passed the House.

On the 28th June the resolutions were presented to the House in the form of a Bill, which, however, was not to be suffered to pass without further discuss-

¹ See the preceding chapter.

sion, although little of novelty could be adduced by the speakers. On this occasion Mr. Grant entered into a long defence of the Company's government of India, in reply to the censures pronounced upon it by Mr. Rickards; and Mr. Lushington vindicated the moral character and the religious practices of the people of India from the unqualified and exaggerated assertions of Mr. Wilberforce. On the 1st July several clauses again underwent examination, but the thirteenth clause was the principal topic of debate. Sir J. Sutton, although friendly to the principle of the clause, objected to the open avowal that persons were to be sent to India for the propagation of Christianity, as its only effect would be to alarm and irritate the feelings of the people of India; and he therefore moved as an amendment, that, instead of the expression in the clause "for the above purposes,"—the propagation of Christianity,—it should be declared "expedient to send persons to India for various lawful purposes." Lord Castlereagh objected to the amendment, although in the wording of the clause he had endeavoured to satisfy other feelings than his own. But the clause enacted nothing; it declared nothing; it made no provisions for enforcing our religion, or abolishing that of the natives of India: it simply gave the weight and sanction of Parliament to the principle; but, so far from taking away or doing anything to interrupt or abolish the religion of the natives, its free exercise was in this very bill secured to them. Mr. Marsh then at great length replied to the former address of Mr. Wilberforce. He considered the provision as a most portentous

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novelty in Indian legislation. In all former modes of policy for the government of India, the inviolability of the religious feelings and customs of the natives was considered a sacred and undisputed axiom: a departure from that policy would shake our empire in that part of the world to its centre. The natives of India could not distinguish between the projects of those who had worked themselves up to a morbid enthusiasm on the subject, from plans countenanced by the authority and intended to be effectuated by the power of the state. They were too tremblingly sensitive on the subject of their religion, and too little versed in the nature of parliamentary proceedings, to be able to separate the acts and opinions of a large portion of the country acting permissively under the state, from the authentic and solemn act of the state itself. To give a licence to a missionary to go out to India, was to impair the authority of the Government abroad to send him back if he misconducted himself; and the probability of his so doing was sufficiently evinced by the dispatch from the Governor-General of the 2nd November, 1807, which stated several alarming instances of misguided and intemperate zeal, and of low and scurrilous invective circulated in the native languages against the feelings, prejudices, and belief of the people. Mr. Marsh then entered into a detailed argument to prove that the mutiny at Vellore, and the dangerous plots which were concerted in other parts of the Peninsula, originated in an alarm excited amongst the natives of their enforced conversion; which fears were confirmed by the activity of the missionaries in the Madras set-

tlement, instigated by the unusual countenance which they had received for some time previous to the massacre. Was it possible, he asked, that the House would fall into such a fit of absurdity and fanaticism, or be visited with so fatal a fatuity, as not to keep so awful an event before them in the grave discussion of matters affecting the religion of the country? Mr. Marsh then proceeded to question the practicability of converting the people of India to Christianity in spite of the existing institutions, and particularly that of caste; the loss of which, consequent upon the adoption of a new creed, subjected the neophyte to the most cruel of all martyrdoms—to separation from all the sweets of social communion, the ties of friendship, the charities of kindred, and all that life contains to support and adorn existence. He denied that the missionaries were fit engines to accomplish the greatest revolution that had yet taken place in the history of the world. He could not, he observed, sufficiently admire the inconsistencies and contradictions of some of the most ardent advocates of the clause; of those who would most jealously exclude from India persons invited thither by commercial enterprise, and having an obvious interest in carrying on a quiet, prudent, and conciliatory intercourse with the natives; and yet would throw open every port in the dominion to swarms of individuals whose nature and character it is to consider themselves absolved from all human restraints, and free from all human motives, in effecting the objects of their calling. Nay, the same reasoners, who would persuade us that the Hindus were unsuscepti-

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1813. ble of change in regard to the use of European manufactures, would have us believe that they were ready eagerly to welcome whatever articles of spiritual novelty might be imported. The doctrine, that the people of India were so brutalized by the grossness of their superstition as to be incapable of any redeeming virtue, he denounced as founded on the falsest assumption; and vindicated their moral and intellectual worth from the calumnies with which it had been assailed by partial and prejudiced testimony. The moral obligation to diffuse Christianity, binding and authoritative as he admitted it to be, vanished when placed against the ills and mischiefs which were likely to follow its application to India. There never was a moral obligation to produce war and bloodshed and civil disorder; such an obligation would not exist, were the wildest barbarians the subjects of the experiment: but when, in addition to considerations sanctioned by justice and policy, it was remembered that the people we were so anxious to convert were in the main a moral and virtuous people, not uninfluenced by those principles of religion which give security to life and impart consolation in death, the obligation assumed a contrary character, and common sense, reason, and even religion itself cried out aloud against our interference.¹ The support given to the amendment proposed by Mr. Marsh necessarily produced a reply from Mr. Wilberforce. He defended the missionaries from the opprobrious terms which had been applied

¹ Substance of the Speech of C. Marsh, Esq., in a Committee of the House of Commons on the 11th July, 1813, revised by the speaker: London, 1813.

to them by Mr. Marsh, and denied that the transactions at Vellore were in any degree connected with their proceedings. He had the authority of the Governor of Madras and the Court of Directors for ascribing it to the military regulations which had been issued, and the extreme severity with which the manifestation of reluctance to obey them had been punished. The unsoundness of the conclusion drawn from this affair might inspire a reasonable distrust of the correctness of the persuasions entertained by the opponents of the measure with regard to the extreme sensitiveness of the people of India in regard to their religion, when the attempt to convert them was made in a spirit of conciliation, and when no other means were thought of but argument and persuasion. In fact, there were two remarkable instances on record of successful endeavours to root out inveterate and pernicious practices in India: the prohibition of sacrificing at the change of every moon many victims, chiefly children, to the river Ganges, which had been enacted by Lord Wellesley; and the suppression of infanticide in Guzerat, by the interposition of Colonel Walker. The law had been obeyed without a murmur; the interposition had brought down on Colonel Walker the benedictions of the people. One such instance as either of these was a sufficient encouragement to go forward, prudently and cautiously indeed, but with firmness and resolution.

It was not enough, however, to question the reality of the danger with which it had been endeavoured to intimidate the friends of the missionary exertions. It was time, Mr. Wilberforce added,

BOOK I. for him to speak out, and to avow that he went much
 CHAP. VIII. further than he had yet gone; he maintained not

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only that it was safe to attempt by reasonable and prudent methods to introduce into India the blessings of Christian truth, but that true imperious and urgent policy prescribed the same course. He could not think that the British empire in India rested on a secure foundation; on the contrary, as long as the people and their rulers were separated from each other by such total differences of sentiment and opinion as now existed, it was impossible that the two should be united, or that the Government could depend upon the permanent attachment of its subjects, whatever benefits its administration might confer. Would we deserve their affection and secure our power, we should endeavour to perpetuate our influence by the gradual introduction and establishment of our own principles and opinions; of our own laws, institutions, and manners; and above all, as the source of every other improvement, of our religion, and consequently of our morals. The illustrious Albuquerque, when governor of Goa, forbade the burning of widows; and, so far was this from exciting popular discontent, that no governor was ever so much beloved. Long after his death, when a Moor or a Hindu had suffered wrong and could obtain no redress, he would go to Albuquerque's tomb and make an offering of oil at the lamp which burned before it, and call upon him for justice.¹

¹ These statements rest upon the authority of the Commentaries of the son of Albuquerque, and were furnished to Mr. Wilberforce by Mr. Southey. —Substance of Speeches, &c., p. 93.

But, after all, what was demanded? not that the Legislature should immediately devise and proceed without delay to execute the great and necessary work, but that it should not substantially and in effect prevent others from engaging in it; or rather that the Government should not be prevented from having it in its power to grant licences to proper persons to proceed to India, and continue there, with a view to disseminate Christianity. The commonest principle of toleration would grant much more than this: it was toleration only that was asked for; the advocates of the measure disclaimed all idea of proceeding by methods of compulsion or authority. The amendment that was now proposed came under a plausible and specious appearance, which only rendered it more dangerous. It proceeded from a spirit professedly favourable to the clause, and objecting only to its publicity. On this head, however, nothing was really to be apprehended, as it was in evidence that the greatest difficulty existed in making matters of the utmost interest known amongst the people: news and information of all kinds were slowly and inaccurately circulated in India. If the people should read the clause, which was extremely improbable, they would find in it expressed, for the first time Mr. Wilberforce believed, a clear recognition, an effectual security, of their right to preserve their religious principles and institutions sacred and inviolate; the clause would, therefore, produce satisfaction rather than discontent on that very subject of religion. Nor would the object of the enactment be effected merely by securing the power of licensing mission-

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BOOK I. aries: by affirming the duty of enlightening the
 CHAP. VIII. minds and improving the morals of our East Indian

1813. fellow-subjects, it established the principle, and laid the ground for promoting education and diffusing useful knowledge of all kinds among them. When truth and reason should obtain access to the understanding of the natives, they would reject the profane absurdities of their theological, and the depraving defects of their moral, system: they would thus be prepared for the reception of Christianity. To omit the clause would be to omit from the act all mention whatever of religion or morals, and would leave the case as it was left by the charter of 1793, when, although the resolutions of both Houses of Parliament fully recognised the obligation of endeavouring to communicate to the natives of India the blessings of Christianity, yet, as it formed no part of the act of the Legislature, the body whose business it was to carry the provisions of that act into execution could not be chargeable with neglecting any duty which that statute ordained; when, so far from favouring, they rather thwarted and hindered the attempts of the missionaries. The neglect which was imputable to the former House of Commons would be still more glaring on the present occasion, as the subject had been brought so fully to its notice: and if, after all that had been urged, the same omission took place, it would be necessarily inferred that the Parliament upon due deliberation had disapproved of the project which had been offered by the advocates of Christianity; and the whole question had come to this, that, as Christianity was the religion of the British empire in Europe,

the religion of Brahma and Vishnu was to be the acknowledged system of our Asiatic opinions.¹

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Some further discussion ensued upon the subject of the proposed amendment, but it was rejected upon a division. Another attempt was made to get rid of the clause, upon a motion made by Mr. A. Robinson on the 12th June, when the report of the bill was received from the Committee. It was supported by Mr. Forbes and Mr. Tierney, and opposed by Mr. Stephen and Mr. Wilberforce, and rejected.

The main provisions of the bill having thus been carried, no opposition of any importance was made to the remaining clauses. Some additional provisions were suggested: one by Mr. R. Smith, for the appropriation of a sum of money for the promotion of native literature in the East, and the establishment of a native college or colleges; and Mr. W. Dundas proposed the appointment of a Scotch clergyman to each of the Presidencies, the majority of the British resident in India being Scotch, and of the Presbyterian communion. The latter proposition was withdrawn, upon the assurances of Mr. Thornton and Mr. Grant, members of the Direction, that the East India Company would do not only what was necessary, but all that could be required for the maintenance in India of clergymen of the Church of Scotland. A clause was proposed by Mr. P. Moore to enable the servants of the Company who had resided ten years in India to come to England

¹ Substance of the Speeches of W. Wilberforce, Esq., on the clause in the East India Bill for promoting the religious instruction of the natives of India, on the 22nd of June, and 1st and 12th of July, 1813, published by the speaker: London, 1813.

BOOK I. and return to India, retaining their rank in the ser-
 CHAP. VIII. vice, without the customary form of receiving per-

1813. mission from the Proprietors; but this was objected to by Lord Castlereagh, on the ground that it was not the policy of the Government to multiply facilities for the return of the Company's most experienced servants to England. An attempt was made to delay the third reading of the report until the Proprietors of East India stock should have had time to read and consider the bill in its amended shape. Lord Castlereagh, however, considered that any delay would subject the House to inconvenience at so advanced a period of the season, and the bill accordingly was read and passed.

The resolutions adopted by the House of Commons were communicated to the House of Lords on the 17th June, and went through similar stages. They were introduced by the Earl of Buckinghamshire, and supported principally by Lords Liverpool and Melville; and opposed by Lord Grenville, Earl Grey, the Marquis of Lansdowne, and the Earl of Lauderdale, the latter of whom recorded a strong protest against the passing of the bill. The subject had undergone a fuller discussion at an earlier period of the session, on the 9th April, upon the motion of Marquis Wellesley for various papers, chiefly illustrative of the financial and commercial condition of the Company prior to 1812. On this occasion the Marquis regretted that the matter had not been submitted to Parliament at a time and under circumstances more fitted to its magnitude, before passion and prejudice had perplexed and interrupted the course of calm deliberation; before,

on the one hand, an idea had gone forth that the Government of the East India Company was incapable of improvement, or, on the other, a wild and frantic notion had been set afloat of throwing open the whole trade to India. The principles of political economy, however true in the abstract, were inapplicable to a case so complex as that of the Company, in which commercial and sovereign interests were intimately blended by the manner in which they had grown up together. Such a combination might be anomalous, but it was practically good: it ought not to be altered merely on account of its anomalous character.

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Lord Wellesley then advocated the continuation of the Company's commercial privilege of exclusive trade to India as well as to China. It might be true, although he did not admit the fact to the extent to which it had been asserted, that the former was attended with loss; but it did not therefore follow that it ought to be taken away: it was very possible for one branch of an extensive commerce to be less profitable than others, and yet the connexion between them be so intimate that its discontinuance would expose the whole to ruin. This was the case with the Company; and the Indian trade was equally essential to the maintenance of their commerce with China, and of the political administration of the government of India. Nor was it less essential to the interests of Great Britain that the trade with India should be subject to restriction; as, if it were thrown open, he was certain the products of the Indian loom would supplant the cotton manufactures of the country in all the

BOOK I. foreign markets, and would essentially interfere even
 CHAP. VIII. with their domestic consumption. The questions

1813. then were, What had been the effects of the combination of powers? were they so mischievous as to require a total change, or so beneficial as to deserve careful and considerate improvement? In his opinion, there never was an organ of Government so administered as to demand more of estimation than the East India Company: that administration had been productive of strength, tranquillity, and happiness; the arts of peace and agriculture now flourished where ruin and desolation had prevailed; the situation of the natives had been ameliorated, and the rights of property secured, by the permanent settlement, the extension of which, in due season, to other provinces than those in which it had been established was alone wanting to its entire success. No Government had better fulfilled its duties towards its subjects than that of India.

Lord Wellesley then criticised the several resolutions *seriatim*. Of the first he remarked, that the exceptions it provided for, not only impaired, but destroyed, the whole benefit of the grant: of the third, that allowing British subjects to trade with India, was of a similar tendency; and that the unrestricted influx of Europeans involved great danger to the stability of the Government and the happiness of the people. The power of sending back unlicensed persons, now exercised by the Government, could not co-exist with a free trade; nor could individuals engaged in the trade be limited to the Presidencies. They would have a right to seek for a market in the interior; and, once scattered over

the country, they would endanger the efficacy of the Government, and outrage the prejudices and habits of the natives.¹

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The extension of the import trade to the out-ports, Lord Wellesley insisted, was objectionable on various grounds: the danger of interference with the national manufactures, the additional expense and difficulty of guarding against illicit speculation, and the injuries it would produce upon the commerce and the shipping of the port of London. If the question were one of a free trade in the true sense of the word, he would not oppose it; but if the House could not give freedom of trade without injuring great political rights, and without destroying vast capitals which had been expended on the undoubted understanding and good-faith of the existing system, they could not be justified in acceding to the measure.

His lordship then proceeded to notice what he

¹ Lord Wellesley's advocacy of the Company's retention of their Indian trade was, in spirit at least, a wide departure from the sentiments he had formerly expressed, when he affirmed "that the interests of the Company and of the British nation were undivided and inseparable with relation to this important question, and that every principle of justice and policy demanded the utmost possible facility to the British merchants in India for the export of Indian merchandise beyond the amount of the investment which the Company's capital was able to provide for; and for which branch of commerce, if capital did not exist in India, no dangerous consequences could result from applying to it funds derived from Great Britain." Beneficial consequences, he affirmed, would certainly result to the British empire in India from any considerable increase of its active capital. The extension of the trade would not, he argued, necessarily produce a proportional augmentation in the number of British agents resorting to India; and, if it should, the local Government would controul their operations with more ease than it could those of foreign agents to whom the trade was then open. The noble writer was obliged, by his position, to insert some saving clauses regarding the preservation of the Company's exclusive privileges, but his main object was decidedly to vindicate at that period the policy of giving ample space and verge enough to private commerce.—Letter from the Marquis Wellesley to the Court of Directors, 30th Sept. 1800; printed London, 1812.

BOOK I. regarded as omissions in the resolutions. He had
 CHAP. VIII. never advocated the separation of the royal autho-

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rity from that of the Company, but he thought that some improvement was required : a most essential point was, that the local Governments should know to whom they were responsible. The instructions sent out to them, however important, were now liable to be disavowed at pleasure ; there was no provision for this purpose. Not a word was said of the army, except as regarded the quota of King's troops ; but he thought it highly essential to define a limit between civil and military duties, by which all difficulties and disputes might be avoided ; and he considered also that it was the duty of the Government to devise some means of conferring honours on the Company's officers, who were now held forward to the public much less frequently than officers in other parts of the world, and felt that honours and distinctions conferred for services not more meritorious than their own were withheld from them. Whilst approving of the proposed addition to the ecclesiastical establishment, he thought it important to take care that there should be no collision between the Government and the Church establishment with regard to their respective powers ; and he was surprised to find that nothing had been said regarding the education of either the civil or military servants of the Company. He thought it would be the most dignified and proper mode of combining religion with learning in India, as we were accustomed to see the association in England, by connecting the proposed Church establishment with the College of Fort William.

With respect to extending Christianity to the natives of the East, Lord Wellesley declared there was no person less willing than himself to throw a shade over so bright a prospect; but, if success was to be expected, it must proceed from temperate and gradual proceedings: the measure should not appear to be recommended by the authority of the Government, because in the East the recommendation of the ruler is supposed to be almost equivalent to a mandate. He never heard when in India of any danger from the missionaries: he had always considered those who were there in his time as a quiet, orderly, discreet, and learned body; and he had employed many of them in the education of youth, and in translating the Scriptures into the languages of the East. He had regarded it as his duty to have the Scriptures translated, to give the natives access to the fountains of divine truth. He thought that a Christian Governor could not have done less, and he knew that a British Governor ought not to do more. In conclusion, he observed, that if a project had been formed for the complete demolition of the Company, and the creation of an entirely new system, the plan might have been called bold and decisive; but in the scheme now proposed no such vigour was to be traced. The Company was to be continued as the organ and instrument, without any power or authority, and was to be called upon to discharge duties which it was incapacitated from performing: no commensurate advantage was offered to the country; the revenues would be endangered, the manufactures be perhaps ruined, and no additional benefit could be derived from an open trade. He

BOOK I. therefore felt it his duty to resist any general alteration of the system; and in order to place his views
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The Earl of Buckinghamshire, in reply to Lord Wellesley's objections to a free trade, quoted the dispatch written by the latter as Governor-General in 1800, when he had strenuously urged the enlargement of the private trade, and denied that any great influx of Europeans was likely to arise from it, or the impossibility of maintaining an effectual controul over their proceedings even if their number should increase. If such were the opinions of the noble lord when he was Governor-General of India, he could scarcely expect to excite in the minds of the members of that House an apprehension of dangers which did not alarm him in the responsible situation he then held. Lord Buckinghamshire then repeated the arguments used in the other House, maintaining the probable increase of the import trade from India, the practicability of providing against smuggling; and concluded by anticipating no results injurious to the Company, but substantial benefits to the great interests of the commerce of the United Kingdom.

The Earl of Buckinghamshire was followed by Lord Grenville, who took a view of the subject differing from those of both the preceding speakers. The present deliberations of the House embraced the whole question of our future relations with India, the government of a vast empire, and the regulation of the British commerce with every port

and country between the southern promontories of Africa and America. It was a deception to speak of any existing rights by which a consideration so immense and momentous could be circumscribed. The charter of the East India Company was originally granted, and had since been renewed, for limited periods. On their lapse the trusts and duties of that great corporation, its commercial and political monopolies, expired together. All public right, all public interest in the subject, thenceforth devolved on British legislature, bound by no previous grant, fettered by no existing law, and having regard only to the principles of moral duty, and to the rules of a wise policy and enlightened government.

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The measures that had been heretofore adopted Lord Grenville considered as experiments which had not always been successful, and which furnished no precedent for the course now to be pursued. Whatever was to be done was not therefore to be placed out of the reach of revisal, even for the period proposed: twenty years would at any time be too long a period for farming out the commerce of half the globe, and the sovereignty of sixty millions of men; and it was still more so at a season when the events, not of twenty years, but of the next twenty months, might be decisive of the whole fate and fortunes of the British empire. He therefore thought that the continuance of any plan that might be devised should be limited to the return of peace.

Lord Grenville then proceeded to assert that the primary object to be regarded in the present arrangement was, not the confirmation of the Com-

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pany's privileges, but the distinct avowal of the principle that the sovereignty of India resided in the sovereign of Great Britain. To ask whether any territory, dominion, or political authority in any quarter of the globe could be conquered by British arms, or acquired by British negotiation, otherwise than to the British Crown, were to ask whether we lived under a monarchy or a republic. The assertion, because it was undeniable, was not indifferent. A manly avowal of the sovereignty of the Crown would have prevented many of the evils experienced in India from conflicting and ambiguous authority, was necessary for the effective controul of British subjects in India, and still more for the restraints to which, upon the restoration of peace, foreign nations would be exposed in their intercourse with that country, as they would never submit to be excluded from free access at the will of a trading company, claiming despotic power over that vast empire, not as the delegates of their own king, but as the pretended ministers of a deposed Mogul, a feigned authority derived from an extinct dominion.

The sovereignty which we had hesitated to assert, we were now compelled to exercise; and Parliament was once more called upon to give laws to India. And what was the plan pursued? the very reverse of that which should have been followed. The interests of the people of India, their security, their happiness, their improvement, were first to have been provided for; and then, but far below them, the interests of Great Britain. Instead of this, the plan of the Ministers and the recommendations of

Lord Wellesley had in view the entire or partial perpetuation of the privileges of the East India Company. To neither of these would he give his concurrence.

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The existence of the blended character of merchant and sovereign, on which the whole of the Indian system was based, was, in Lord Grenville's opinion, an anomaly inconsistent with all sound principles of commerce and of government: no sovereign ever traded for a profit; no trading company ever yet administered government for the happiness of its subjects. The unerring principles of political economy had never been so fully illustrated as in the history of the East India Company. For fifty years they had exercised dominion over a country the commerce with which had from the earliest ages enriched all who had engaged in it, and in the last few years since the renewal of the charter they had lost by their trade four millions sterling. With the country which they governed they lost by the commerce which they monopolised; and they traded with profit only to China, where they had neither sovereignty nor monopoly, —not even the common benefit of free access, being condemned to a commercial quarantine in the solitary emporium of Canton.

But it was not so much for its own sake, it was asserted, that the commerce of the Company was not to be interfered with; but because its preservation was absolutely necessary to enable the Company to conduct the government of India, and this government could only be beneficially administered through their instrumentality. This Lord Grenville denied.

BOOK I. If it was true that British India was in the happy
CHAP. VIII. and prosperous state in which it was described to be,

1813. the merit was not due to the Company's administration: as long as that continued uncontroled, scarcely an interval of three years could be found in which the inherent vices of the system did not forcibly compel the interposition of Parliament. The law of 1784 was the source of whatever benefits India had enjoyed: it was the line of demarcation between the bad and good government of that country. It was a delusion, therefore, to relinquish any just hopes of extending the commerce of the country, from the fear of embarrassing the Company's political function. He was ready to admit, however, that, if the patronage of the Company were transferred to the Crown, it must weigh down the balance of the constitution; but he thought it very possible to devise a middle course. The highest offices of the Government of India were already in the gift of the Crown. For all the servants of the Company, civil or military, below the Council, the regulations actually in force might still be continued; and all that remained for disposal was the appointment of writers and cadets. The former might be chosen by competition from the great public schools and universities: the latter might be nominated, by some fixed course of succession, from the families of officers who had fallen in the discharge of their duties. These were mere suggestions; but he entertained no doubt that, if the occasion should call for such provisions, they might be so contrived as to preserve the integrity and efficacy of the Indian services, without adding in the slightest degree to ministerial influence.

Lord Grenville next maintained that the continuance of the Company's trade was not expedient for the sake of effecting remittances to meet the demands payable in England on account of the Government in India. If a subsidy were wanted for the Continent, the Ministers would never think of sending their agents to the ports and manufactories to purchase the goods in which the remittances would really be made: they would contract as cheaply as they could; probably by open competition with merchants for their bills, through which their whole purpose would be at once effected. A similar course might be pursued in India. No doubt, all such remittances must be in some degree detrimental to the prosperity of India, constituting a drain for which no return was made but in protection and good government; yet, if conducted through an open trade, and regulated by a due consideration of the state of the country, he saw no reason to believe them incompatible with its rapid and permanent improvement. One obvious compensation, however, to India, was to throw her markets open to British capital and enterprise; and secure to her, as far as legislation could secure it, the fullest benefit of the most unqualified commercial freedom.

The arguments against opening the trade, on the grounds that it was unsusceptible of profit or extension, were then combated by the noble earl. The skill and vigilance of the private trade would realise a profit, where the Company's management entailed a loss: the private trade, under all the disadvantages under which it laboured, had augmented; and the

BOOK I. Americans had carried on a lucrative and growing
 CHAP. VIII. commerce with India until it was interrupted by hos-

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tilities. All history showed that commerce would increase by commerce, and industry by industry. India was no exception to the universal law; and her people would derive from the extension of trade, as every other people had done, new comforts and new conveniences of life, new incitements to industry, and new enjoyments, in just reward of increased activity and enterprise. The same principles applied to the trade with China, the exclusive possession of which by the Company he should as deeply lament.

Alluding to the tone adopted in the Fifth Report when speaking of the permanent settlement, Lord Grenville expressed his entire concurrence with Lord Wellesley in the wisdom and benevolence of the arrangement, and his dread of the disposition intimated by the language of the report, if not to discredit the original measure, at least to discountenance its proposed extension. He thought it, therefore, highly necessary to insert in the new act a declaration of the principle, such as it was declared in 1784; and to place the Government of India under the obligation of applying, at a convenient season, to the Ceded and Conquered provinces the system of settlement effected in Bengal. Above all he wished, by a solemn and authoritative declaration of this purpose, to prove to the natives the permanency of the principle of right, and to impress them with a conviction that a British Legislature estimated the security of their property far above the possible increase of its own revenue.

Lord Grenville then briefly adverted to the diffi-

culties attending the military part of the Indian system; the only remedy for which he conceived to be the open establishment of the King's authority over that, as well as other parts of his dominion: to the defects of the administration of justice, the state of the present internal legislation and police, and the unauthorised power of taxation in the local Governments, all of which required deliberate consideration: and he concluded by pronouncing an unqualified encomium on Marquis Wellesley's collegiate institution, the plan of which was limited and mutilated, and existed only as a wreck of its first noble design. Of the establishment by which it was partially replaced in England he spoke with strong disapprobation and regret: not that he objected to any degree of attention that could be given to the earliest instruction and discipline of those who are destined for the Indian service; but he objected decidedly to their separation in education from youths of their own age and station in life, and to the formation of them into a separate class. Instead of rejecting, they should, he thought, have eagerly embraced the advantages which the great public seminaries afforded; not only for what they professed to teach, but for what was there only to be found, that best of all education to a public man, which forms the mind to manly exertion and honourable feeling,—the education which young men receive from each other in the numerous and mixed society of their equals, collected from various classes of society, and destined to various ways of life.¹

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¹ Speech of Lord Grenville on the Marquis of Wellesley's motion in the House of Lords on Friday the 9th of April, 1813; published under the revision of the speaker, London, 1813.

BOOK I. The Earl of Liverpool briefly replied in defence
 CHAP. VIII. of the resolutions, and the House agreed to the
 1813. motion for papers made by Marquis Wellesley.¹

The passing of the bill by the House of Commons, and the certainty that it would suffer no material, if any, changes in the House of Lords, imposed upon the Court of Directors the necessity of submitting to their constituents the alternative of either accepting or refusing the charter now offered. They resolved to recommend its acceptance; as, although it involved changes which they had firmly opposed, and which could not but be injurious to the Company's trade with India, yet, in the retention of the exclusive trade with China, and the provisions made for the payment of the Company's dividends, it presented sources of profit and security which might in some degree compensate for the losses which it inflicted. The wild and sanguine expectations of an indefinite extension of the trade had been so far subdued by the arguments of the Court and the general voice of men of Indian experience, that the merchants were likely to embark in it with caution and moderation: consequently there was less reason than at first to apprehend a sudden and numerous influx of Europeans into India, by which its tranquillity would be endangered; or of a great resort of vessels to the Eastern seas, by which a mischievous and illicit trade with China might be carried on. The regulations respecting the size of the ships admissible into the trade, the licensing of persons to proceed to India, and the additional powers of controul over them when in India, vested in the local Govern-

¹ Parl. Debates in the House of Lords, 9th April, 1813.

ments, were further calculated to alleviate these apprehensions. The fears of the Court for the security of the dividend, on which, as had been repeatedly urged, the Company's efficiency for the discharge of their political functions depended, had been proportionably abated: on this latter subject the first views of the Ministers had been materially modified by the representations of the Court.

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By the engagements finally adopted the commercial profits of the Company were not to be liable for any territorial payment until the dividend was first satisfied; and, if in any year the fund for the dividend should fall short, the surplus of territorial income for the year preceding was to be liable for the deficiency. By the last charter a million sterling per annum was to be reserved from the surplus revenue as a provision for the Company's investment; a condition wholly nugatory, as no surplus existed. By the present it was stipulated that a sum equal to the disbursements at home on territorial account should be paid yearly out of the revenues for investment; and this secured to the Company commercial capital in India to an equal amount, in addition to the proceeds of goods and stores exported from England. With regard, also, to the amount of Indian debt transferred home, the bill contained an important provision; that, in case sufficient funds should not remain after payment of the dividend to discharge all such bills as should be drawn for the interest of loans contracted in India before the 10th April, 1814, the residue of those bills should be discharged in such manner as Parliament should from time to time direct. In all

BOOK I. these respects, therefore, the security of the divi-
CHAP. VIII. dend, of the home funds, and of annual advances in
1813. India for the investment, the new charter might be
considered an improvement on that which the Com-
pany held.

The additional powers of controul vested in the Board of Commissioners by the bill were no doubt mortifying to the Court of Directors ; but they mostly fell within the scope of the general powers given to the Board by former acts, and their operation would depend upon the spirit in which they were exercised. If that spirit were temperate and just, it would be practicable to carry on the Company's business : if they were used in a way which men of character and liberal feeling could not brook, the issue might be serious to the system of the Company.

Upon a careful consideration then of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the bill, the Court, although they deeply felt the loss of power and privilege which it inflicted upon the Company, recommended to the Proprietors to accept the charter ; trusting that if obstacles to its execution should arise, and the Company be unable, after a fair trial should have been given to it, to act under its provisions, the Parliament which had prescribed the terms would be disposed to relieve them of the burthen. Should such relief not be given, the Company would have the time and the means of making a more deliberate and safe bargain with the public than if they threw up their privileges at the present moment ; whilst there would then be a better opportunity of providing also for the future govern-

ment of those immense possessions which the Com- BOOK I.
pany had acquired for the country; possessions of CHAP. VIII.
which the interests must ever be dear to them, 1813.
and the most powerful of the motives for continu-
ing as long as they could with safety in the manage-
ment of that empire which had so much flourished
under their care, and for the prosperity of which
their system appeared to be peculiarly calculated.¹

The recommendations of the Court of Directors were communicated to the Court of Proprietors held on the 16th and adjourned to the 21st July; and it was finally resolved, that although the Court could not contemplate the bill with satisfaction, yet, deferring to the sense of the Legislature, and relying on its wisdom and justice in the event of the expectations held out by the act being disappointed, they determined to accept the charter. The thanks of the Proprietors were voted to the late and present Directors for the talent, zeal, and perseverance with which they had struggled to maintain the rights and support the interests of the Company.²

Thus closed a contest in which the first serious blow was inflicted on the monopoly of the East India Company, after it had been enjoyed by them for two centuries. During this period a mighty empire had been raised upon the narrow foundations of exclusive commerce. Upon no other basis could the edifice have been reared. An indiscriminate resort of individual, unconnected, and often

¹ Minute of a Committee of the whole Court of Directors, 15th July, 1813; Papers, &c. p. 492.

² Proceedings of a General Court of Proprietors, 21st July, 1813; Papers, &c. 521. See also the Debates on the Charter at the India House during the first six months of 1813; separately published, London, 1813.

BOOK I. hostile competitors could not have been attended
CHAP. VIII. with a consistent or enduring course of operations;

1813. and must have subjected the trade with India to a feeble and precarious existence, dependent upon the caprice and venality of the subordinate officers of the native governments, and momentarily menaced with extinction by the follies and passions, the avarice and the ignorance of Asiatic despots. Adventurers isolated and at variance with each other would have been in no situation to resist injustice, repel aggression, or avenge wrong: much less would they have been able to place their commerce in an attitude not merely of defence but of defiance, and to apply the resources which it furnished to the acquirement of political power. In the struggle for sufferance which they would have had to maintain in their limited ambition of effecting a successful trading speculation, it could never have dwelt within their imaginations to gain a firm and lasting footing on the soil of India, to put down and set up princes, to seize upon and hold amidst difficulty and danger masterdom and sway. The oneness of the Company for so long a period consolidated their commercial system, enabled them to baffle and defeat rivalry and opposition, to exact retribution for injury, and, as the field expanded, to extend their views beyond the circumscribed horizon of purely commercial profit. At the same time, this result, although inseparable from the system, was neither projected nor foreseen by its authors, and was brought to maturity in spite of their repeated disapproval, or at best with their reluctant and unwilling confirmation. The East India Company's territorial

dominion was not the acquisition of the Company so much as of the Company's servants, who, often in disregard of the wishes of their masters, and sometimes in disobedience of their positive commands, entered with no common audacity, determination, and foresight, in the promising path which the distracted state of Indian politics laid open to their ambition; and, with energies and talents of more than ordinary natures, applied the superior resources of civilisation to secure rich fragments of the scattered reliques of native misrule, and remodelled them into the rudiments of power, of infallible future expansion. This was not the work of the Company, although it never could have been brought to pass by any other instrumentality than that of the Company's Indian servants. It was the work of Clive, of Hastings, of Cornwallis, and of Wellesley, aided and impelled by the irresistible force of circumstances, by the inconsiderateness and temerity of the native princes of India, and by the superior energy of the European character.

Whatever its origin, however, the system was now mature; and, whatever the assertions of the Company's advocates, it was no longer in need of national commercial sacrifices for its continuance or development. On the contrary, the longer duration of the connexion was mischievous. As sovereigns of India, it was the duty of the Company to look alone to the interests of the people whom they governed; as a trading body, it was their interest to secure to themselves as large a pecuniary profit as such a capacity justified. An exclusive privilege of trade, that barred all competition, necessarily pre-

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cluded the people of India from purchasing foreign commodities at the lowest price, and from realising the fullest value for the proceeds of their own industry. To the people of India the Company's monopoly was as injurious as it was to individual enterprise in Great Britain; and the period had undoubtedly arrived when the best interests of both countries demanded its extinction.

Although extraordinary talents, zeal, and perseverance were displayed in the discussion on both sides, yet we are now able to decide from events that there was little of sound judgment or prophetic prescience in any of the contending parties. The twenty years of the renewed charter rolled away; and colonisation, which was so confidently predicted as its unavoidable consequence, was as little probable at its close as at its commencement.¹ Neither had it been found more difficult than before to protect the native population from the turbulence or violence of European settlers. The predictions, equally confident, that the trade was unsusceptible of extension, and that no new article of export could be introduced,—predictions in which the most intelligent officers of the Company concurred, and to which even the advocates of free trade, however reluctantly, assented,—were signally falsified. The trade, both export and import, did obtain a considerable augmentation under the new system; and articles entirely unknown in the annals of Indian

¹ The whole number of applications for licences between 1814 and 1832 was but 1547: of these, 1253 were complied with by the Court, and 71 by the Board; making the whole number of persons, not in the service, who proceeded to India with leave in the course of eighteen years, 1324.—Commons' Committee, 1831; General Appendix, p. 368.

imports were exported thither from Great Britain to an immense amount, to the extinction of several similar products of domestic labour.¹ This effect was prepared for, as has been noticed, by an iniquitous abuse of the power of Great Britain in excluding from her own consumption the principal manufactures of India, and in opening the ports of India to those of Britain free of charge; but its actual occurrence was little anticipated by any of those who urged or resisted the removal of the restrictions on the trade.²

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The proceedings that took place on this occasion have been detailed at length, because it is of import-

¹ The value of the whole of the private trade with India was, in 1814-15, Rupees 13,54,19,460, or £13,549,146; in 1826-7 it was, Rupees 14,83,33,640, or £14,833,364: being an increase of £1,284,218. The latter period affords an unfavourable view of the state of the trade, as it was one of commercial depression. The average value of the whole private trade for fifteen years subsequently to 1814-15 was more than seventeen crores or seventeen millions sterling per annum, being an advance of nearly four millions a year.—Lords' Committee, 1830, App. B. 5, and C. 40. In 1813-14 the value of cotton goods imported into Bengal was £47,000. In 1827-8 it was £561,000. In the former year cotton yarn was unknown: in the latter the value imported was £188,000. Spelter was another article of import not known at the earlier date. At the latter it was imported to the value of nearly £120,000.—Wilson's External Commerce of Bengal. These articles were permanent innovations; for in 1843-44 the value of yarn imported into Bengal alone is reported to be £515,000, of piece-goods £1,516,667, and spelter £68,000.—Wilkinson, Report External Commerce of Bengal, 1843-4.

² There seems to have been but one person connected with the trade to India who distinctly anticipated the possibility of such a revolution; and this was not on the present, but on a former occasion. In a debate on a motion for papers to illustrate the comparative value of private British and foreign trade with India, in the House of Commons on the 14th March, 1806, Mr. Alderman Prinsep, speaking of the probable substitution of raw cotton for cotton goods in the ships of private traders, made the remarkable observation, that a sufficient supply of the raw material would accelerate the period which he saw approaching, when the natives of India should be supplied with cloth made in England of their own cotton, leaving to the mother country all the profits of freight, agency, commission, insurance, and manufacture: all these and many other beneficial results would follow an extension of the private trade.—Hans. Parl. Debates, 14th March, 1806.

BOOK I. **ance that a readily accessible record should be pre-**
CHAP. VIII. **served of the sentiments of the many very eminent**

1813. **persons who, both in Parliament and in the Direction, took a principal part in the discussions, and because the nature of the connexion which united the trade of the East India Company with the sovereignty of India now first underwent a fundamental change. It may also be of use to contemplate the spirit by which the opinions of wise and good men were unconsciously inspired, and to observe how personal interests and cherished prejudices distorted principle and darkened judgment. With few exceptions, and those exercising little or no influence, the charter of 1793 was discussed upon no widely or liberally comprehensive views, upon no distinct perception of the advantages which it might realise for Great Britain, upon no generous purpose of providing India with a compensation for the evils inseparable from the sovereignty of strangers. Professions of a concern for the interests of India were, it is true, not unsparingly uttered, but it would be difficult to show that the majority of the parties who engaged in the discussion were solely instigated by a disinterested regard for the welfare of the Indian subjects of the Crown. The Ministers, it was evident, had mainly in view the extension of their own influence; and, as the bill proceeded, made obvious sacrifices to party, and adopted clauses to which they were themselves indifferent or opposed, in subservience to particular interests, in order to conciliate parliamentary support. In their original correspondence with the Court no mention was made of the outports, and the extension to them of the import trade from India**

was extorted by their clamour and perseverance. BOOK I.
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 The legislative encouragement yielded to missionary labours was also a graft upon the original design, 1812.
 with the purpose of propitiating a numerous and influential party. Nor were they negligent of their own advantages; and in the provisions made for the nomination to the episcopal see, and for the confirmation of the appointments to the highest temporal situations, extended, as far as they were then prepared to extend it, the patronage of the Crown. The advocates for the authorised extension of missionary efforts, although they might claim the merit of disinterestedness, were little entitled to credit for candour or discretion. Placing implicit and indiscriminating reliance upon exaggerated and erroneous descriptions of the condition and character of the Hindu and Mohammedan population of India, they disregarded the danger of precipitately attempting their reform, and overlooked the possible peril, that, where a state withholds its protection from the national faith, the people may exercise the right, as they have the power, of protecting it for themselves. The merchants and manufacturers of the United Kingdom avowedly looked only to their own profits; and, in the struggle between London and the out-ports, was re-acted the battle for exclusiveness which had previously been fought between the London merchants and the Company. Deprived of the monopoly of the trade, the Company made a stand for warehouses and sale-rooms; and, despoiled of these, sought consolation in the security of their dividends. All these motives and considerations were appropriate and venial as regarded the indivi-

BOOK I. dual and peculiar interests and feelings of the per-
CHAP. VIII. sons concerned, but they were little worthy of their
1813. collective capacity of arbiters of the destinies of
India.

END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

APPENDIX.

I.

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CLAIMS OF THE PESHWA UPON THE GAEKWAR.

*Schedule of the Sums due to the Poona State from
the Gaekwar's Government.*

	<i>Rupess.</i>	<u>No. I.</u>
Balance of an account settled in 1798 . . .	39,82,789	
On account of presents . . . 7,79,000		
On account of troops (3000) not maintained 6,75,000		
	14,54,000	

N. B. These sums have been accumulating for
ten years 1,45,40,000

Damaji Gaekwar conquered the country of the Babi, upon condition of assuming half, and delivering the other half to the Peshwa; and that a karkoon on the part of the Government should settle this: and a memorandum be given in of the division, and that the places were to be given up in the year 1740, and whatsoever was due before this period was to be remitted. This was never carried into effect. In the year 1771 the Gaekwar paid one lakh of rupees, and in the next agreed to pay 25,000;

Carried forward . . . 1,85,22,789

No. I.		<i>Rupees.</i>
	Brought forward . . .	1,85,22,789
	and, when Fateh Sing Gaekwar should come, then it should be executed. This was settled in 1765, but has never been carried into effect; therefore a lakh of rupees per year is due for thirty-seven years	37,00,000
	In the year 1794 the dignity of Sena-khás-khel-Shamshir Bahadur was granted to Govind Rao Gaekwar, besides lands, for which 56,38,001 rupees were given. He died; and the same honours and lands were granted to his son, for which he is to pay	56,38,001
	The whole amounting to	R ^{ees} 2,78,60,790

In the year 1796 it was agreed that 3000 horsemen should be furnished, and upon a requisition 4000; and that one of the Gaekwar's relations should remain at court; and that the troops should at all periods be in readiness, and, if not necessary, that a sum of money should be given in lieu.

Ahmedabad is under two authorities, but the same arrangements continue as under Madhu Rao; and, if any deviation should have been admitted, let it be abolished.

You agreed, in the year 1792, to give the Sirkar three of your best elephants and five horses; but it has not been done: therefore fail not to do it now.

In the year 1793 you borrowed, through our intervention, the sum of one lakh of rupees, for which we were securities, and agreed to pay the bills drawn upon you; but this has not been done: therefore do so now, and pay the interest.

You were also bound to present a lakh of rupees' worth of jewels; but this has not been done: do so now, and adhere to the engagements which were concluded in the time of Madhu Rao.

You owe Balaji Naik Bhora Soukar a sum of money, No. I.
 for which Government became security. Liquidate this
 at the rate of one lakh of rupees per annum, and so treat
 Mulhar Rao and his family as to prevent his complaints
 reaching Government.

In addition to this, engagements were also made in
 which you admitted the sum of R^{ms} 78,33,212
 but only paid 28,13,325

So that there is still a balance of . . R^{ms} 50,19,887
 Let this be settled.

You have held the village of Rani, in the
 Pergunna of Sandi, for these thirteen years,
 which was worth 2000 rupees per annum. Pay
 this money, and deliver up the village to the
 Kamavisdar 26,000

50,45,887

and wherever the villages have been assessed let the money
 be returned.

Several of the papers having been destroyed or laid
 aside during the irruption of Holkar, the accounts cannot
 be completely made out; but, as the records are found,
 other items shall be inserted.

In the year 1796 bills were drawn upon you: let an
 account be furnished.

II.

PAGE 70.

Holkar's Proposition, 11th Dec. 1807, to Sindhia.

1. His highness the Peshwa is our sovereign, and we No. II.
 are his servants. Let us therefore, like our ancestors,
 continue to obey his orders.

No. II. 2. Let us keep on friendly terms with the Bhonsla and other Sirdars of the Peshwa, and let us consult with them on all occasions.

3. Let the agreements which passed between us at Subbulgerh under the sanction of our oaths be abided by, and let not the terms of friendship which existed between our ancestors be departed from.

4. Any Aumils or officers of either party, who may proceed into the country of the other with a force, will take the greatest care to preserve the country. Should they, contrary to the orders of their master, exact any money from the country, their master will account for it.

5. Should any new enterprise be contemplated, it shall be carried on by mutual consultation.

6. That our friendship may be preserved, and doubts between us be done away, let neither endeavour to tamper with the army of the other; and, should any Sirdar quit the service of either party, let him not be retained by the other.

7. The money collected by Meer Khan from the Mahauls of Sadourah and others, the five Mahauls, shall be repaid to Maharaja Dowlat Rao Sindhia.

8. Let the money which may have been collected by the Soobahdars of one party from the Mahauls of the other since the settlement of differences at Subbulgerh be accounted for mutually.

9. Let a respectable Vakeel from each party attend the Durbar of the other. Let the tribute from the other Rajas and wealthy chiefs unconnected with us, as the Gaekwar and others, remain in the hands of those who have been accustomed to collect them. In this we have no concern. Should, however, it so happen that any new arrangement in regard to them should be proposed, let it be prosecuted by our joint counsels and consent.

10. If any of the ministers or Aumils of either part should treacherously seek the protection of the other, let him not be protected, but delivered over to the state he

belongs to; but, if he be a man of rank, let the matter of dispute be fairly inquired into and adjusted. No. II.

11. Let the tributes for Jaypore and Joudhpore continue to be collected as they were in the time of our ancestors. You (Sindhia) will not create any disturbance in the country of Jaypore, nor will I (Holkar) interfere in the country of Marwar (Joudhpore).

Let these eleven propositions be well considered, and an answer returned to them.

III.

PAGE 140.

Proclamation.

THE Right Honourable the Governor in Council No. III.
 having observed that in some late instances an extraordinary degree of agitation has prevailed among several corps of the native army of this coast, it has been his Lordship's particular endeavour to ascertain the motives which may have led to conduct so different from that which formerly distinguished the native army. From this inquiry it has appeared that many persons of evil intentions have endeavoured, for malicious purposes, to impress upon the native troops a belief that it is the wish of the British Government to convert them by forcible means to Christianity; and his Lordship in Council has observed with concern, that such malicious reports have been believed by many of the native corps.

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council deems it therefore proper in this public manner to repeat to the native troops his assurance that the same respect which has been invariably shown by the British Govern-

No. III. ment for their religion and for their customs will be always continued; and that no interruption will be given to any native, whether Hindu or Musselman, in the practice of his religious ceremonies.

His Lordship in Council desires that the native troops will not give belief to the idle rumours which are circulated by enemies of their happiness, who endeavour with the basest designs to weaken the confidence of the troops in the British Government. His Lordship in Council desires that the native troops will remember the constant attention and humanity which have been shown by the British Government in providing for their comfort, by augmenting the pay of the native officers and Sepoys, by allowing liberal pensions to those who have done their duty faithfully, by making ample provision for the families of those who may have died in battle, and by receiving their children into the service of the Honourable Company, to be treated with the same care and bounty as their fathers had experienced.

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council trusts that the native troops, remembering these circumstances, will be sensible of the happiness of their situation, which is greater than that which the troops of any other part of the world enjoy; and that they will continue to observe the same good conduct for which they were distinguished in the days of General Lawrence, of Sir Eyre Coote, and of other renowned heroes.

The native troops must at the same time be sensible, that if they should fail in the duties of their allegiance, and should show themselves disobedient to their officers, their conduct will not fail to receive merited punishment; as the British Government is not less prepared to punish the guilty than to protect and distinguish those who are deserving of its favour.

It is directed that this paper be translated with care into the Tamul, Telinga, and Hindoostanee languages, and that copies of it be circulated to each native battalion; of which

the European officers are enjoined and ordered to be careful in making it known to every native officer and Sepoy under their command. No. III.

It is also directed that copies of the paper be circulated to the magistrates and collectors under the Government, for the purpose of being fully understood in all parts of the country.

Dated in Fort St. George, the 3rd December, 1806.

IV.

PAGE 176.

Extract from Lakshman Dawa's Petition to the Agent of the Governor-General in Bundelkhand, 27th March, 1809.

You, Sir, told me that you would say everything you could for me to the Governor-General, and do all in your power for me. You also desired me to continue near you: accordingly, I remained in your presence. My condition and case is this:—For some years I have kept an army, with which I have plundered a number of Brahmans, villagers, and peasants; and also fought against your forces, and destroyed a great number of your people. I entertained twelve hundred men for these six years, seven or eight hundred of whom have perished in these transactions. I have behaved in an unparalleled, ungrateful, and rebellious manner to your Government; so as no one in this country never behaved, nor ever will. I did not give up the fort of Ajaygerh, as I promised to do, within two years; neither did I pay the money which I promised to pay. The greatest ingratitude and faithlessness appear against me. I have become infamous all over Bundelkhand. All the peasantry are in expectation of my death. All the Brahmans, Mahájans, servants, Sipahis, Hindus, Muts-

No. IV. eddis, brothers, connexions of my own father far off or near, all the Rajas, Fojdars, Amils, religious, educated, Gods, Jagirdars, Pádárthis, Byragis, Fakirs, the whole of the inhabitants, great and small, are wishing every instant to be my last. I would that their wishes were fulfilled. If I continue to exist, I had better not remain in this country; my death were preferable. I have four or five people sitting under the fort of Ajaygerh. Having called them to you, you will advise them respecting me, and blow me and my family away from the mouth of a cannon. This will be well for me, and it will accord with the wishes of all. They will be pleased, and I wish it. If I consent not to this, I am a liar, and agree to be regarded as hateful to God.

If I hesitate, I call upon God to bear witness. Favour me with this punishment, and it will be well for me. I beg you to reflect upon it, and order it to be done; and I beg of you to give my brothers and connexions two villages each for their support. If what I have requested be not agreeable to you, I beg you will exalt me as you have done other Rajas, or still more. The way to exalt me is to give me a lakh of rupees in money, and all my own country, as well as what is mentioned in the Sunnud given to me by Captain Baillié. If this, Sir, should please you, it is well; if not, pray blow me from a cannon's mouth. The last is honour; the first a mere nothing. Do whichever you please, I shall be content. I cannot be content with anything else. I pray you, consider it well. May the sun of your fortune perpetually shine!

V.

PAGE 268.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Head Quarters, Choultry Plain, 28 Jan. 1809.

General Order. By the Commander-in-chief.

THE immediate departure of Lieutenant-General Macdowall from Madras will prevent his design of bringing Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, Quartermaster-General, to trial for disrespect to the Commander-in-chief, for disobedience of orders, and for contempt of military authority, in having resorted to the power of the Civil Government in defiance of the judgment of the officer at the head of the army, who had placed him under an arrest on charges preferred against him by a number of officers commanding native corps; in consequence of which appeal direct to the Honourable the President in Council, Lieutenant-General Macdowall has received a positive order from the Chief Secretary to liberate Lieutenant-Colonel Munro from arrest.

No. V.

Such conduct on the part of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro being destructive of subordination, subversive of military discipline, a violation of the sacred rights of the Commander-in-chief, and holding out a most dangerous example to the service, Lieutenant-General Macdowall, in support of the dignity of the profession and his own station and character, feels it incumbent on him to express his strong disapprobation of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro's unexampled proceedings, and considers it a solemn duty imposed upon him to reprimand Lieutenant-Colonel Munro in general orders; and he is hereby reprimanded accordingly.

(Signed)

T. BOLES,
Adjutant-General.

VI.

PAGE 272.

Fort St. George, 31st Jan. 1809.

General Order. By Government.

No. VI. It has recently come to the knowledge of the Honourable the Governor in Council that Lieutenant-General Hay Macdowall did, previous to his embarkation from the Presidency, leave to be published to the army a general order, dated the 28th instant, in the highest degree disrespectful to the Government; in which that officer has presumed to found a public censure on an act adopted under the immediate authority of the Governor in Council, and to convey insinuations grossly derogatory to the character of the Government, and subversive of military discipline and of the foundation of public authority.

The resignation of Lieutenant-General Macdowall of the command of the army of Fort St. George not having been yet received, it becomes the duty of the Governor in Council, in consideration of the violent and inflammatory proceedings of that officer on the present and on other recent occasions, and for the purpose of preventing the possible repetition of farther acts of outrage, to anticipate the period of his expected resignation, and to annul the appointment of Lieutenant-General Macdowall to the command of the army of this Presidency.

The Governor in Council must lament, with the deepest regret, the necessity of resorting to an extreme measure of this nature: but, when a manifest endeavour has been made to bring into degradation the supreme public authority, it is essential that the vindication should not be less signal than the offence; and that a memorable example should be given, that proceedings subversive of established

order can find no security under the sanction of rank No. VI.
however high, or of station however exalted.

The general order in question having been circulated under the signature of the Deputy Adjutant-General of the army, it must have been known to that officer, that, in giving currency to a paper of this offensive description, he was acting in direct violation of his duty to the Government. As no authority can justify the execution of an illegal act, connected, as that act obviously in the present case has been, with views of the most reprehensible nature, the Governor in Council thinks it proper to mark his highest displeasure at the conduct of Major Boles, by directing that he shall be suspended from the service of the Honourable Company.

The general order left by the Commander-in-chief for publication, under date the 28th instant, is directed to be expunged from every public record; and the Adjutant-General of the army will immediately circulate the necessary orders for this purpose.

By order of the Honourable the Governor in Council.

(Signed)

G. BUCHAN,

Chief Secretary to Government.

VII.

PAGE 438.

Zemindari Sunnud granted by Jehangir.

It has happened in this propitious time that Abhiman No. VII.
Sing, Zemindar of Mahanagar in Nizamabad, has embraced Islamism, and been honoured with the title of Raja Nadir Dowlat Khan. We have therefore bestowed upon him twenty-two Pergunnas in Soobah Allahabad, from the commencement of the Khuneef crop, and according to the specification below. Our illustrious sons and rulers of the

No. VII. provinces and Mootsuddies must ever use their strongest endeavours perpetually to maintain this grant, and confirm the Zemindari of the above Pergunnas to the afore-mentioned person and his descendants for ever. They will deduct 1,25,000 rupees as his Nankar from the total Jumma payable to the Government, in order that he may spend it; and the fixed allowance per village and per-centage in the Jumma and other Zemindari dues from his support. This Sunnud will not require renewal. Dated Rubbee ool Akhir 15th, in the 4th year of the reign. (Specification on the reverse.) Pergunnas twenty-two (then follow their names). Nankar 1,25,000 rupees. Zemindari dues per village two rupees, per-cent. one rupee.—J. Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. viii. p. 93.

VIII.

PAGE 469.

*The Petition of all the Inhabitants of the City of Benares,
etc. etc.*

SHEWETH,

No. VIII. That we, your humble petitioners, have been nourished from our infancy by the fostering care of the British Government, and have been protected from every evil. During the government of Mr. Hastings especially we enjoyed ease and tranquillity, when, by the abolition of the tax on pilgrims, the fame of the Government was extended from one end of India to the other. In like manner, in the time of the Marquis Cornwallis we enjoyed various advantages: the Sayer and town duties, and other descriptions of oppressive duties, were abolished. The affairs of this province were committed to the administration of Mr. Duncan; and such was the indulgence extended to us, that, for the first time, Vakeels were appointed in the courts of justice

on the part of Government, and the claims of Government were henceforward judged and determined in common with the claims of other people. A considerable sum of money was also appropriated for the expense of the Hindoo college, and hundreds of people obtained Jageers, pensions, and donations: the people of all descriptions were secured in the enjoyment of their laws and their religion, together with the customs and usages to which they had been long habituated. The fame of the Government extended itself throughout the world; everything submitted to its will, and the population of the country increased with its prosperity.

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When the court of justice was originally established at Benares, the fees payable on the institution of suits were fixed at the rate of five per cent.; but the people claimed the interposition of the Governor-General's agent at this place, and the fees were reduced in consequence to the rate of one per cent. We fully expected that in a short time these also would be abolished, but after that gentleman went away they were again increased; and by the introduction of the stamp duties, transit and town duties, by the Phatuckbundee and other new institutions, your petitioners were reduced to distress and wretchedness.

During the last five years the seasons have proved unfavourable; the harvests have been injured by drought, hail, and frost; and the price of every article of consumption has increased twofold. In this state of things, Regulation xv., 1810, is introduced; and the tax it imposes, by affecting all ranks of people, has thrown the subjects of your Government into consternation. Accordingly, a number of people, in the confident expectation of obtaining that indulgence which Government has always been accustomed to extend to its subjects, exposed themselves to the inclemency of the season, and, with nothing to cover them but the heavens, bowed their faces to the earth in supplication: in this state of calamity several of them perished. We presented some petitions, setting forth our distresses to

No. VIII. the magistrate; and, as we did not obtain our object, we petitioned the provincial court, but from our untoward fate we were again unsuccessful. In this state of trouble the proclamation of the 13th of Jan. 1811 was issued, under the impression that your petitioners were in a state of disobedience to the Government; which we humbly represent was never even within our imagination. In implicit obedience to this proclamation, as to the decree of fate, we got up, and returned to our homes, in full dependence upon the indulgence of the Government. We set forth our distresses as below stated: we hope that you, under the authority vested by Government in its officers, upon the exercise of which the welfare of the country depends, will be pleased to translate this our petition, and forward it to the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, that, under the provision contained in clause 1st, Regulation xli., 1793, we may obtain relief. The indulgent disposition which is invariably manifested by the Government induces us to entertain a confident hope that the petition of its afflicted subjects will be complied with.

[The following representation relates to Regulation xv., 1810, and the proclamation of the 13th of January 1811.]

First. By Regulation xxiii., 1793, the expense of the police establishments was to be defrayed by a tax levied from the merchants, traders, and shopkeepers, who were considered one of the most opulent classes of the people; but, by the rules in Regulation vi., 1797, the Regulation above mentioned was rescinded, and it was declared that the tax was a source of vexation to the contributors. The Vice-President in Council accordingly resolved to abolish this tax, and to substitute the duties on stamp paper in the room of it. Sire, when the vexations to which the people were exposed by being subjected to the tax are so fully known to you, there can be no necessity for us to employ much detail in representing them; and let it be understood that the persons who then were affected by

Regulation xxiii., 1793, are not now in a condition better calculated to submit to it. In the new Regulation the tax includes every one; thousands who have not wherewithal to subsist are affected by it: hence to extend the tax to everybody will be the cause of general ruin.

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Secondly. The protection of the people is the duty of the Government. The Governments to which we were formerly subjected established the transit and other duties upon traders to defray the expenses of protecting us; in other words, for the support of the police. Expenses of other descriptions were defrayed by the produce of the Baitoolmaul; and, although these duties still continue to be levied in Benares, the expense of the roads and the general protection of the country, such as the establishment of police and so forth, was also provided for at the settlement of the province: besides this, the stamp duties were established to defray the expense of the police, as well as the Phatuckbundee, which has, however, been abolished by the proclamation of the 13th January. These various resources for the support of the police well merit the attention of the Government.

Thirdly. In Regulation xv., 1810, it is stated, that, as the tax had been introduced into Calcutta, it should be also introduced into Benares. Sire, the ground of Calcutta is the particular property of Government: it was originally Government property, and became inhabited according to the usages established in England: all consented to pay the tax on the same principle as if it were a ground-rent; and every one, according to his means or pleasure, took ground and built upon it. But it is otherwise in Benares, where the ground is the property of its inhabitants, who have held it by purchase or other means from time immemorial.

Fourthly. In Regulation xv., 1810, it is declared, that all places of worship are to be exempted from the tax; and the whole extent of the city of Benares as contained within the Punchkos is, in fact, a place of worship, there positively is not a point of ground within it which is other-

No. VIII. wise. Let this be ascertained by a reference to the Shaster. Besides this, former Governments, on all occasions of exercising their authority, treated this city with peculiar indulgence; and the British Government also has done the same, as is instanced in the exemption of Brahmins from capital punishment: hence the city of Benares should be especially exempted from the tax on houses.

Fifthly. The means of procuring subsistence in these times, such as they are, are well known to Government. From the annihilation of the profits of our labour, from the increase of the taxes, from calamities which have raised the price of every article of consumption, from the abolition of the Tehseeldarree system, and from the bankruptcy of the merchants, your petitioners are reduced to such a state, that multitudes are unable to clothe and feed themselves, or support and educate their families: hence numbers, who supported themselves in a respectable manner, have been robbed of their respectability by distress. Had it not been for the native colleges of Calcutta and Benares, there would not have been an educated or well-bred man to be found throughout the country. How, then, is it possible to pay the tax?

Sixthly. Thousands of people in these times have not a kourree in the world; and if, in order to realise the tax, their household property shall be sold, as is prescribed in the Regulation, to what extremities will they not be reduced?

Seventhly. Since the commencement of the English Government the rules contained in the Shera and Shaster, together with the customs of Hindostan, have invariably been observed: it will be found in the Shera and Shaster that houses are reckoned one of the principal necessaries of life, and are not accounted disposable property. Even creditors cannot claim them from us in satisfaction of their dues; and in this country, in the times of the Mahomedan and Hindoo princes, houses were never rendered liable to contributions for the service of the state.

Eighthly. Men of business possess no ostensible property but their houses. Houses are the foundation of all worldly affairs, whether in the collector's office, or in the courts, or in mercantile transactions. If the tax is enforced, what with providing the means of paying it on the one hand, and what with the apprehension of future innovations from the interference of Government on the other, such general distrust will be excited, that there will no longer be any reliance on the security of property: all mercantile transactions, all worldly affairs, will be overturned, and the public at large will become distracted.

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Ninthly. By the usages of this country, the rights of the Government as they were exercised in the times of the Mahomedan and Hindoo princes do not weigh heavy upon its subjects: hence it is that under the English Government, in the sale of estates to realise the public revenue, the houses of the landholders are exempted. If the tax is enforced, the public mind will, for many reasons, be filled with apprehensions.

Tenthly. Although Government certainly devotes particular care and expense to the protection of the inhabitants of the cities, yet the town and transit duties, the mint and stamp duties, the registry of deeds, the duties arising from the quarries and the Abkarree, &c. &c., all of which multiply in proportion to the extent of the population, are levied in a greater degree from the inhabitants of cities than from those who live in the interior.

Eleventhly. If the tax is enforced, the rent of houses will increase; and many of the people, who are come from distant places to reside in this city and rent the houses they occupy, will no longer continue to remain in it. People will build no more stone houses; and in that case many classes of workmen, such as carpenters, blacksmiths, masons, &c. will be left without employment, and the city will be depopulated.

Twelfthly. Those who, from the fame of the justice and protection to be found under the English Government,

No. VIII. are come from distant countries to reside in the city of Benares, and whose residence in it adds to the population of the place and benefits thousands, will by the introduction of the tax be disheartened. They will go away, and multitudes will be ruined.

Thirteenthly. The Regulations enacted by the Marquis Cornwallis were extended to Benares, and we your petitioners, satisfied with those Regulations, lived happy and contented: the whole country increased in fertility and population, and the resources of Government were improved, at least so it appeared to us, though we know not if it appears so to the wisdom of the Government.

Fourteenthly. As a number of persons continued for some time assembled together to complain, Government conceived there was a disturbance, and it was so declared in the proclamation of the 13th of January, 1811. Sire, if an order be passed relating particularly to one individual, and other persons combine to support him, it might in that case be denominated a disturbance. As the introduction of the tax affected every individual of every class, every one presented himself to obtain justice. Thousands of men and women, all the old and the infirm, Brahmins, devotees, and Pundits, who have no occupation but prayer and penance, abandoned their houses and were among them. None were armed, even with a stick. The manner and custom in this country from time immemorial is this: that, whenever any act affecting every one generally is committed by the Government, the poor, the aged, the infirm, the women, all forsake their families and their homes, expose themselves to the inclemency of the seasons and to other kinds of inconveniences, and make known their affliction and distress, that the Government, which is more considerate than our parents, may observe their condition and extend indulgence to its subjects. Besides this, when the Brahmins in general are involved in distress, it is incumbent on all Hindoos to abstain from receiving sustenance, and any one who presumes to deviate from this

custom must incur general opprobrium. If your petitioners, by assembling together in this manner, can be considered to have created a disturbance, it is our misfortune. No. VIII.

[The next representation respects the houses of Benares.]

First. Many Mohullahs are upon ground which pays revenue to Government, and ought accordingly to be exempted.

Secondly. Many houses and several parts of the city are held by grants from the native princes and from the Honourable East India Company, and these are of the same nature as Ultungah: besides which, thousands of people subsist on the bounty of Government.

Thirdly. Many of the Seraies and other public places were built by the Mahomedan princes or by their principal officers, and ought to be exempted.

Fourthly. There are hundreds of houses in this city the proprietors of which pay rent for the ground they are built upon, while the owner of the ground receives the rent as his right; which right has never been disputed by any Government. The house having been built by its proprietor, he holds it like household furniture, exempt from taxation; the materials of which it is built are liable to town and transit duties, and to the quarry duties, which are of course paid upon requisition. Many pieces of ground, and several of the houses above mentioned, are let to Government by the proprietors, and such proprietors cannot in consequence be called upon to pay the tax.

Fifthly. Many houses have been purchased by their present proprietors at public auction, with the permission of Government.

Sixthly. Many houses which belonged to the Baitoolmaul have been purchased by their present proprietors from the Government, who, on paying the value of them to Government, were put into possession.

Seventhly. Many houses are still in the Baitoolmaul, and the occupants pay rent for them to Government.

No. VIII. Eighthly. Many houses have been bestowed upon Brahmins and Fucqueers; and these houses, like Kishnapun; and according to established rules, must be exempted.

Ninthly. Many benevolent and humane people lend their houses for the accommodation of pilgrims and travellers, in the hope by so doing to obtain the blessing of Providence: many lend them out of civility to their friends. If the tax is enforced, civility and benevolence will be excluded from the world.

Tenthly. Many houses have been built by persons of rank in former times; these houses are deserted and fallen to ruin. Those to whom these houses have lineally descended are unable to repair them; they inhabit, perhaps, but one room, without even the means of subsistence: such persons surely deserve indulgence.

Eleventhly. Many houses are mortgaged, and in the possession of the mortgagee. The tax cannot be paid by the mortgager, because he is without the means of paying it; nor can it be paid by the mortgagee without diminishing the legal profit derivable from the established rate of interest.

Twelfthly. Many houses belong to the Nawaub Vizier and other persons of distinction, such as Manmundil and Rajmundil.

Thirteenthly. Several men of rank, such as the Moghul princes, reside in Benares by order of Government: they have either received their houses from Government, or have built them themselves.

Fourteenthly. Many of the buildings of this city are either Hindoo or Mahomedan places of worship, or pious bequests. After exempting buildings of these descriptions and the houses above mentioned, it will appear upon inquiry that the produce of the tax will not be worth the consideration of Government, which expends laks of rupees for the welfare of its subjects and for the general prosperity of the country.

Our existence and everything we possess have been bestowed upon us by the liberality of Government. Your No. VIII.
 humble petitioners feel themselves totally unable to contend, even in litigation, with a Government so powerful; but, perceiving that the Government is always disposed to be kind and indulgent, we have presumed to represent what our imperfect understandings have suggested to us. The indulgence of Government has given us the power to make this our representation; and, at all events, we hope for its indulgence and the forgiveness of our offences.

(Translated.)

IX.

PAGE 484, NOTE.

*Comparative Statement of the Revenues and Charges of
 British India in the Years 1807-8 and 1813-14.*

1807.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.	No. IX.
Receipts	£9,972,000	4,928,000	770,000	15,670,000	
Charges	£6,372,000	5,194,000	2,059,000	13,625,000	
			Surplus Revenue	£2,045,000	
			Deduct Interest on Debt	£2,226,000	
			Supplies to England	123,000	
				£2,354,000	
			Deficit in 1807-8	£309,000	
1813-14.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.	
Receipts	£11,172,000	5,297,000	759,000	17,228,000	
Charges	£ 7,133,000	4,893,000	1,589,000	13,617,000	
			Surplus Revenue	3,611,000	
			Deduct Interest on Debt	£1,537,000	
			Supplies to England	116,000	
				£1,653,000	
			Surplus in 1813-14	£1,958,000	

No. IX.

ITEMS OF AUGMENTED RECEIPT.

	Bengal.		Madras.		Bombay.	
	1807-8.	1813-14.	1807-8.	1813-14.	1807-8.	1813-14.
Mint	£17,000	9,000	"	16,000	"	6,000
Post-Office	35,000	43,000	17,000	20,000	"	6,000
Stamps	"	16,000	"	31,000	"	"
Judicial	413,000	104,000	"	26,000	"	6,000
Customs	511,000	322,000	114,000	190,000	167,000	108,000
Land Rev ^e .	3,729,000	3,928,000	1,040,000	893,000	417,000	37,000
Do. Ced ^d . P.	1,718,000	2,271,000	"	"	"	206,000
Do. Ced ^d . & Conq. do. }	1,013,000	1,664,000	"	"	"	291,000
Salt	1,895,000	1,779,000	"	155,000	"	"
Opium	801,000	964,000	"	"	"	"
Marine	"	31,000	"	9,000	"	46,000
Carnatic	"	"	1,027,000	1,131,000	"	"
Tanjore	"	"	502,000	436,000	"	"
Mysore	"	"	1,399,000	1,519,000	"	"
Nizam	"	"	718,000	685,000	"	"
Travancore	"	"	46,000	91,000	43,000	"
Cochin	"	"	"	32,000	"	"
Farms and Licences }	"	"	57,000	62,000	143,000	53,000
Dutch Settle- ments }	"	"	7,000	"	"	"

TOTAL INCREASE OF REVENUE.

1813-14	£17,228,000
1807-8	15,670,000
Increase	£ 1,558,000

Of which the Increase in Bengal was £1,200,000
 Madras 369,000

The Deficit in Bombay 1,569,000
 11,000

Net Increase £1,558,000

INCREASE OF LAND REVENUE IN BENGAL.

Lower Provinces	£199,000
Ceded ditto	553,000
Conquered ditto	651,000
	£1,403,000

These particulars are compiled from the Revenue statements of the Second Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, 1810, and the Report of the Committee of the House of Lords, 1830. The smaller sums, below a thousand, are purposely omitted. It must be borne in mind also, that, at the valuation of the rupee adopted in the Reports, all the sums are about one-seventh too high.

No. IX.

X.

PAGE 540.

Resolutions (communicated by the Honourable the House of Commons to the Right Honourable the House of Lords at a Conference) respecting the Affairs of the East India Company.

1. RESOLVED, That it is expedient that all the privileges, authorities, and immunities, granted to the United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies by virtue of any act or acts of parliament now in force, and all rules, regulations, and clauses affecting the same, shall continue and be in force for a further term of twenty years; except as far as the same may hereinafter be modified and repealed.

No. X.

2. Resolved, That the existing restraints respecting the commercial intercourse with China shall be continued, and that the exclusive trade in tea shall be preserved to the said Company during the period aforesaid.

3. Resolved, That, subject to the provisions contained in the preceding Resolution, it shall be lawful for any of his Majesty's subjects to export any goods, wares, or merchandize, which can now, or may hereafter, be legally exported from any port in the United Kingdom to any port within the limits of the charter of the said Company,

No. X. as hereinafter provided; and that all ships navigated according to law, proceeding from any port within the limits of the Company's charter, and being provided with regular manifests from the last port of clearance, shall respectively be permitted to import any goods, wares, or merchandize, the product and manufacture of any countries within the said limits, into any ports in the United Kingdom which may be provided with warehouses, together with wet docks or basins, or such other securities as shall, in the judgment of the Commissioners of the Treasury in Great Britain and Ireland respectively, be fit and proper for the deposit and safe custody of all such goods, wares, and merchandize, as well as for the collection of all duties payable thereon, and shall have been so declared by the Orders of his Majesty in Council in Great Britain, or by the Order of the Lord Lieutenant in Council in Ireland: Provided always, that copies of all such Orders in Council shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament in the session next ensuing.

4. Resolved, That as long as the Government of India shall be administered under the authority of the said Company according to the provisions, limitations, and regulations hereafter to be enacted, the rents, revenues, and profits arising from the territorial acquisitions in India shall, after defraying the expenses of collecting the same, with the several charges and stipulated payments to which the revenues are subject, be applied and disposed of according to the following order of preference.

In the first place, in defraying all the charges and expenses of raising and maintaining the forces, as well European as native, artillery and marine, on the establishments in India, and of maintaining the forts and garrisons, there, and providing warlike and naval stores: Secondly, in the payment of the interest accruing on the debts owing, or which may hereafter be incurred, by the said Company in India: Thirdly, in defraying the civil and

No. X. England shall have been reduced to the sum of three millions of pounds sterling, then and thereafter the surplus proceeds which shall be found to arise from the revenues of India, and the profits upon the trade, after providing for the payments aforesaid, shall be applied to the more speedy repayment of the capital of any public funds or securities which have been or may be created for the use of the said Company, the charges of which have been or may be directed to be borne by the said Company, in virtue of any act or acts of parliament; and that any further surplus that may arise shall be set apart, and from time to time paid into the receipt of his Majesty's Exchequer, to be applied as Parliament shall direct, without any interest to be paid to the Company in respect or for the use thereof; but nevertheless to be considered and declared as an effectual security to the said Company for the capital stock of the said Company, and for the dividend of 10½ per cent. per annum in respect thereof, not exceeding the sum of twelve millions of pounds sterling; and that of the excess of such payments, if any, beyond the said amount of twelve millions, one-sixth part shall, from time to time, be reserved and retained by the said Company for their own use and benefit, and the remaining five-sixths shall be deemed and declared the property of the public, and at the disposal of Parliament.

7. Resolved, That the said Company shall direct and order their books of account, at their several Presidencies and settlements in India, at their factory in China, at the island of St. Helena or elsewhere, and also in England, to be so kept and arranged as that the same shall contain and exhibit the receipts, disbursements, debts and assets, appertaining to, or connected with, the territorial, political, and commercial branches of their affairs; and that the same shall be made up in such manner that the said books shall contain and exhibit the accounts of the territorial and political departments separately and distinctly from such as appertain to, or are connected with, the commer-

cial branch of their affairs; and that the arrangement of accounts so to be made shall be submitted to the ap-
probation and sanction of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India. No. X.

8. Resolved, That it is expedient to make provision for further limiting the granting of gratuities and pensions to officers, civil and military, or increasing the same, or creating any new establishments at home, in such manner as may effectually protect the funds of the said Company.

9. Resolved, That all vacancies happening in the office of Governor-General of Fort William in Bengal, or of Governor of either of the Company's Presidencies or settlements of Fort St. George or Bombay, or of Governor of the forts and garrisons of Fort William, Fort St. George, or Bombay, or of Commander-in-chief of all the forces in India, or of any provincial Commander-in-chief of the forces there, shall continue to be filled up and supplied by the Court of Directors of the said United Company, subject nevertheless to the approbation of his Majesty, to be signified in writing under his royal sign manual, countersigned by the President of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India.

10. Resolved, That the number of his Majesty's troops in India to be in future maintained by the said Company be limited; and that any augmentation of force exceeding the number so to be limited shall, unless employed at the express requisition of the said Company, be at the public charge.

11. Resolved, That it is expedient that the Church Establishment in the British territories in the East Indies should be placed under the superintendence of a Bishop and three Archdeacons; and that adequate provision should be made, from the territorial revenues of India, for their maintenance.

12. Resolved, That it is expedient that the statutes and regulations framed, or to be framed, by the Court of Directors for the good government of the College esta-

No. X.

 blished by the East India Company in the county of Hertford, and of the Military Seminary of the said Company in the county of Surrey, as well as the establishment of offices connected therewith, or the appointment of persons to fill such offices, be subject to the controul and regulation of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India; and that the power and authority of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India shall be construed to extend to the issuing or sending orders or instructions to the Court of Directors, for the purpose of their being transmitted to India, respecting the rules and regulations and establishments of the respective colleges at Calcutta and Fort St. George, or any other seminaries which may be hereafter established under the authority of the local Governments.

13. Resolved, That it is the duty of this country to promote the interest and happiness of the native inhabitants of the British dominions in India; and that such measures ought to be adopted as may tend to the introduction amongst them of useful knowledge, and of religious and moral improvement. That, in the furtherance of the above objects, sufficient facilities shall be afforded by law to persons desirous of going to and remaining in India for the purpose of accomplishing these benevolent designs: provided always, that the authority of the local Governments, respecting the intercourse of Europeans with the interior of the country, be preserved; and that the principles of the British Government, on which the natives of India have hitherto relied for the free exercise of their religion, be inviolably maintained.