ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES

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PREFATORY REMARKS.

THE Essays and Addresses contained in this volume are arranged with reference to their subject-matter, and not in the order in which they were written or delivered.

I have to thank the publishers of *Time* for permission to reprint the paper on "Social and Individual Reform," and the publishers of *Mind* for permission to reprint the paper on "The Philosophical Importance of a true Theory of Identity." The essay "On the true Conception of another World" formed the introduction to my translation of a portion of Hegel's "Æsthetic," and is now reproduced as throwing some light on the subjects of which the present volume treats. The occasions on which the several addresses were delivered are indicated in footnotes to each of them.

It may be of interest to some readers to know that the Ethical Society, on behalf of which four of the addresses were given, is a small association in London, modelled on the more powerful Ethical Societies of the United States, which have for their object to contribute by precept and in practice to spreading moral ideas and strengthening moral influences on a non-dogmatic basis.

I am well aware that I may incur a charge of presumption by enunciating definite views on certain social problems, without possessing an appreciable fraction of the practical experience which gives weight to the words of such authorities as Mr. and Mrs. Barnett, of Whitechapel. I can only plead that to me, as to others, there comes in various ways a definite though not extensive acquaintance with social facts, while those better instructed than myself are always willing to supply the deficiencies of my limited knowledge. I cannot think that any man with open and attentive eyes, and with confidence in his own impartiality, as based upon a rational view of life, does wrong in uttering the best reflections he can make on the way in which things are going, or the way in which he thinks they should go.

I should feel less diffidence in repelling any similar charge that might be brought on the score of the paper, "How to read the New Testament."

It is true that I have not a wide acquaintance with apologetic literature; but the demand for such an acquaintance as the condition of competence in dealing with these subjects may rest perhaps on a *petitio principii*, depending as it does on an isolation of phenomena which belong *prima facie* to the general province of philosophy and critical history. And the thought *will* not be entirely banished, that if those who are set down as mere dabblers in apologetic literature were to retort in kind and on their side to erect tests of competence, the tables might conceivably be turned. Moreover, in dealing with a positive question, we have nothing to do with sects and parties. I am not bound to know whether, in reading Reuss or Keim,

I am reading apologists or assailants; these labels have no positive import, and are relative to the ideas of the partizans who assign them. As a matter of fact, so far as the dates and discrepancies of writers are concerned, I could accept without any sacrifice of principle, statements which are to be found in the "Speaker's Commentary."

The three more strictly philosophical papers, V., VII., and IX., offer some considerations respecting the true nature of the "Idealist" revival in Germany and in England. As a return to the human and the concrete, finding its supra-sensuous world in the mind and activities of man, this intellectual impulse has been active amongst other vital forces in the nineteenth century movement. But like every great origination —Christianity is a case in point—it has developed a wealth of conceptions and formulæ which have tended to become hostile to the spirit which generated them, and has thus made foes of friends, and friends of foes. Like Christianity, also, it has produced its effect in spite of misconceptions, and has everywhere carried with it the organic ideas of an enlarged and purified Hellenism.

I will take the freedom to insist a little upon this aspect of the so-called German Idealism, because, owing in a large measure to the abundance and energy of its achievements, which needed for their expression an elaborate philosophical terminology, the enlightened public is hardly, perhaps, aware to how great an extent, as a mere matter of fact, it originated in a human enthusiasm wholly antagonistic to remote Ontology. It is quite true that the form taken by the revolutionary effort was that of transferring ontology and orthodoxy into a sphere

and medium in which they should have real significance, rather than that of making a clean sweep of them altogether. It is impossible to estimate the positive and negative aspects of such a transformation in a few sentences; but I wish to express my conviction, in contrast with the views which underlie certain recent criticisms of Hegel, that the human and vital import of his philosophy is its element of permanent value; and that the recognition of the human spirit as the highest essence of things, which is a stumbling-block to those whose hearts are with the orthodoxy which Hegel revolutionized, is the true and enduring result of the great epoch currently symbolized by his name. I will quote two passages from letters written by Hegel at the age of twenty-five; not that such letters, displaying as they do hesitation on essential matters, can be in any way decisive of controverted points in the philosopher's matured system of thought, but because they are startling illustrations of what, on reviewing the whole matter, I firmly believe to have been his dominant temper and purpose.

HEGEL[1] TO SCHELLING.

"*January*, 1795.

" . . . What you tell me of the theological and Kantian march of philosophy at Tübingen causes me no surprise. Orthodoxy cannot be shaken as long as its profession is interwoven with worldly advantage, and bound up with the structure of the State. An interest like this is too strong to be readily surrendered, and has an effect as a whole of which people are

[1] Rosenkranz's "Life of Hegel," p. 66 ff; and Hegel's "Briefe, Herausgegeben von Karl Hegel," p. 11 ff.

hardly aware. While this is so, it has on its side the whole troop —ever the most numerous—of clamorous devotees, void of thought and of higher interests. If a mob like this reads something opposed to their convictions (if one is to do their pedantic jargon the honour of calling it by that name), the truth of which they cannot deny, they will say, 'Yes, I suppose it is true,' and then go to bed, and next morning drink their coffee as if nothing had happened. Besides, they will lay hold of anything that presents itself, which will maintain them in their old routine. But I think it would be interesting to molest, in their ant-like industry, the theologians who are fetching up critical [Kantian] materials to prop their Gothic temple, to whip them out of all their refuges, till they could find no more, and should have to reveal their nakedness before the sun. Still, among the timbers which they drag off the Kantian bonfire in trying to arrest the conflagration of their fabric of dogmas, they will carry home with them some burning embers; they are bringing the terminology into general circulation, and are facilitating the general dispersion of philosophical ideas. I shall do all I can; I am convinced that nothing but perpetual shaking and shocking on all sides gives a chance of any ultimate effect of importance; something will always stick, and every contribution, even if it contains nothing new, has its value as encouraging and reinforcing intercommunication and sympathetic labour. Let us often repeat your appeal, 'We do not mean to be behind.' . . . Our watchword shall be Reason and Freedom, and our rallying-point the invisible Church."

THE SAME TO THE SAME.

April, 1795.

". . . From the Kantian system and its final completion I expect a revolution in Germany, starting from principles which are already present, and which only need to be systematised and applied to existing knowledge as a whole. No doubt there will always be an esoteric philosophy, and the idea of God as the absolute Ego will belong to it. In my most recent study of the "Postulates of Practical Reason" [Kant] I had had forebodings of what you plainly expounded to me in your last letter, and what Fichte's "Grundlage der Wissenschaftslehre" will completely open up to me. The consequences which will issue from these ideas will astonish a good many people. They will be dazzled at this supreme elevation by which man is so greatly exalted; yet why have people been so slow to form a higher estimate of man's dignity, and to recognise his capacity of freedom, which places him on a par with any spiritual beings? I think that there is no better sign of the times than this, that humanity is represented as so estimable in itself; it is a proof that the halo round the heads of the oppressors and gods of this world is disappearing. The philosophers will prove man's dignity, the people will learn to feel it, and will—not demand, but—simply appropriate their trampled rights.* Religion and politics have played each other's game; religion has taught what despotism desired, contempt for the human race, its incapacity for all good, its powerlessness to be anything in its own strength. But with

* Almost the same expressions occur in the fifth of Schiller's letters on Æsthetic Education, which are expressly referred to as a masterpiece in this same letter of Hegel. Hegel continued to consider these letters of Schiller as marking an epoch in the history of philosophy.

the spread of ideas as to how all should be, the nonchalance of respectable people in accepting all as it is, will vanish. . . . I constantly exhort myself out of [Hippel's] 'Lebenslaüfe,' 'Strive upwards to the sun, my friends, that the welfare of humanity may ripen soon. What matter for the hindering leaves and branches! Struggle through to the sun, and if you are weary, never mind! You will sleep all the better.'"

Now I am convinced that the feeling which blazes out in these letters persisted through Hegel's life as the fusing heat of his system. It is improbable that he was in all respects consistent; and no sensible man, above all, no Hegelian, could suppose that the main work of philosophy, after the lapse of half a century, is to repeat the formulæ in which his views were cast. But I believe that in the papers on philosophical questions which are printed in this volume I have rather understated than overstated the elements by which recent idealism is bound up with the humanising movement of this century, and will consequently affect the future of English philosophy.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

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ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES.

I.

*TWO MODERN PHILANTHROPISTS.**

THIS lecture is not exactly about a great man, or great men.† The men of whom I am going to speak are two very respectable tradesmen. Very likely there have been people counted as heroes, who were much less noble and much less useful than either of them. But what I should like would be not so much to make heroes of them as to try and understand their lives, not only their successes but their failures, and see why and how they were useful, and what teaching we ought to get from the way in which they were useful. The two philanthropists whom we are to talk about are the Englishman, George Moore, and the Frenchman, Jean Leclaire. I came to think of taking them for a subject in this way. Just a day or two before I was asked to lecture here, I had the good luck to listen to a lecture from a friend who was speaking about the religion of people who try to do good to others, about their real notions and beliefs as to their duties, and as to what sort of men they ought to be. And he said what a sad thing it

* A lecture given at a workman's club in London.

† The lecture was one of a series on great men.

was to see a man full of strength, energy, courage, and religious feeling, after he had made a large fortune and begun to give up his life to good works, *just lose his way in a fog.* The man he was speaking about was the merchant, George Moore, who spent the best part of half a century, an immense quantity of money, and enormous labour in trying to do all the good he could think of to all who needed help and teaching. So I thought I would read his life carefully, and see how it came out when one looked close at it. And then I thought I might put alongside it the life of another tradesman, who also made a big fortune (not so big as Moore's), and who also spent the best part of half a century, a great deal of money, and untiring energy in trying to help those who live by their labour.

This man was a Frenchman, and his name was Leclaire. He was born in 1801, five years before Moore, and died in 1872, four years before him. Each of them lived just about seventy years, and very nearly the same seventy years. They might have met after the siege of Paris, when Moore was in Paris, relieving the starving French (he took seventy tons of food there); but we do not hear that they did meet. Very likely they never knew each other's names.

These two men lived through a time of greater change, perhaps, than there has ever been before. In different ways they played their parts in this change; and the interest we have in them is to see how their work looks now, as time is making clearer what direction the changes have really been taking. It seems pretty plain now that all through Europe the great business of this century has been to arrange society in a more human way than before. I mean by arranging it in a *human* way, arranging it so that every man should be treated as a human being, capable of doing a man's work and

of exercising a man's will. The old arrangements, which some people say were better in their time than there have been since, the small workshop, and the personal loyalty to the master, were broken down, both by new ideas of human rights and duties, and also by new facts such as the growth of the industrial class, so that some changes had to come.

Carlyle says the French Revolution was really a revolution in men's minds, every one getting new thoughts as to what he ought to put up with, and what he might expect to do; and so every change in society is really a change in men's minds and characters; and the object in making social arrangements is, I suppose, just to give people the rights and duties which belong to their characters, and which will therefore preserve and strengthen the whole foundation of society. For the whole foundation of society is character. That is what we have to rely upon in employers and employed, in our fellow-citizens and in our children. If we cannot rely on a person's character, we do not know where to have him, and we cannot make a contract with him, or depend upon him in any way. So when there are a new set of ideas and new circumstances, when you have enormous masses of people, and these people have quite new claims and ideas in their minds, then there must be a time of great change, until their minds are suited to new arrangements, and new arrangements suited to their minds. This was what so many good men, who used to be called philanthropists, only learnt very slowly and in part. Their idea was rather to patch up the old machinery and not to think of what men's characters demanded; or rather, it was like as if you had a machine beginning to break down, and instead of renewing it out and out, you set another machine to help it. These philanthropists make one think of the captain of a ship who should come to one and say, "Look at my splendid pumps

pouring out thousands of gallons in the hour." "Yes," we should say; "but what a leak you must have in the ship. Can't you stop the leak?" And the illustration falls short, for our social pumps make the leak worse. I mean in this way. Suppose there is a trade which is very much underpaid or very irregular, so that every year a great many people in it are left without anything, or die, or leave widows and children without anything. What I call patching, or tinkering, or setting up pumps, is to establish a big charity to look after these people, to provide for the children, and to help the men who fall out of work. What you really want is to get the trade better arranged, so that the men in the trade shall have the right and the duty of providing for themselves and their families, and shall be able to carry it out. That is stopping the leak. We have all heard that prevention is better than cure; but the truth is, that in these great social matters there is no cure except prevention. London is all full of great machines for doing good, great societies for relieving people in distress; but their work does not come to an end. It goes on, and they are rather proud that it goes on. George Moore was one of these philanthropists, and had to do with starting numbers of these great machines.

His life is shortly told in outline; it is one of those lives of which in England we are rightly proud—the life of the self-made man. *Generally*, I think, these lives are more interesting for the first half than for the second, more interesting before he marries his master's daughter—they always marry their master's daughter—than after; but with George Moore the interest is kept up. He was not a commonplace man. He was born in 1806, in Cumberland, son of a small landowner who farmed his own land, what they call in Cumberland a "statesman." He was a bold, strong boy, and soon became a tremendous

wrestler, which was the fashion in Cumberland. At thirteen he was apprenticed to a provincial draper, but he was determined to get to London, and at nineteen he got up to London, having learnt all he could in Cumberland about the draper's business. He was a week without finding work, but he did pretty well in a public wrestling match, and I should say he was pretty near becoming a professional wrestler. Then at last a Cumberland man, who knew about his father, gave him a place in his big shop. Moore at once put himself to the evening school, for he was terribly ignorant. Education was scandalous in Cumberland, as Moore remembered when he became a rich man. But he did not like the retail work in the draper's, and in a year's time he got a place in a big wholesale lace house (1826).

Then it came out what he really was fit for. He was the most tremendous commercial traveller that ever was seen. They soon began to call him the Napoleon of travellers, the great general of salesmen, who could conquer and capture any customer. He was a little more like Napoleon than one can quite approve. "George" once met Groucock at a town in the North of England. Groucock invited him to sup with a friend after the day's work was over. The invitation was accepted. In the course of the evening their plans were discussed. George openly mentioned the town to which he was next due, and at what hour he would start. He afterwards found that Groucock had started the day before him, reached Belfast, and taken up all the orders for lace in the place. This caused some bitterness of feeling between the two travellers. But George, not to be outdone, immediately left Ireland for Liverpool. He worked the place thoroughly,

* Smiles' "Life of George Moore," page 79.

then started for Manchester, and travelled through the great northern towns, working night and day, until he had gone over the whole of the ground, and returned to London full of orders. This in its turn greatly chagrined Groucock, who had intended to take Lancashire on his way home." "Many* are the stories still told by commercial travellers about George Moore's determination to get orders. He would not be denied. If refused at first, he resorted to all sorts of expedients until he succeeded. On one occasion he sold the clothes off his back to get an order. A tenacious draper in a Lancashire town refused to deal with him. The draper was quite satisfied with the firm that supplied him, and he would make no change. This became known amongst the commercial travellers at the hotel, and one of them made a bet of £5 with George Moore that he would not obtain an order. George set out again. The draper saw him entering the shop, and cried out, 'All full! all full, Mr. Moore! I told you so before!' 'Never mind,' said George; 'you won't object to a crack.' 'Oh, no!' said the draper. They cracked about many things, and then George Moore, calling the draper's attention to a new coat which he wore, asked, 'What he thought of it?' 'It's a capital coat,' said the draper. 'Yes, first-rate; made in the first style by a first-rate London tailor.' The draper looked at it again, and again admired it. 'Why,' said George, 'you are exactly my size; it's quite new. 'I'll sell it you.' 'What's the price?' 'Twenty-five shillings.' 'What! that's very cheap.' 'Yes, it's a great bargain.' 'Then I'll buy it,' said the draper. George went back to his hotel, donned another suit, and sent the 'great bargain' to the draper. George

* Smiles' "Life of George Moore," pages 86, 87.

calling again, the draper offered to pay him. 'No, no,' said George, 'I'll book it; you've opened an account.' Mr. Moore had sold the coat at a loss, but he was recouped by the £5 bet which he won, and he obtained an order besides." The draper afterwards became one of his best customers. He fairly beat every one else off the road. I'll say a word later on about this part of his life. However, the result was that Groucock offered him a high salary to leave the house he was travelling for, and travel for them. Moore stood out for a partnership, and got it. This was in 1830, and this was the beginning of the great house in Bow Churchyard, Groucock, Moore & Copestake.

Then began Moore's hardest struggle; for eleven years he did not take a day's rest, and hardly a decent night's rest, travelling for the house all the time. And by about 1840 the house was thoroughly established, had three town travellers and ten country travellers. In 1841 he married his former master's daughter; in 1845 they set up a lace factory in Nottingham; in 1854 he took a big private house in Kensington Palace Gardens; in 1858 he bought an estate in Cumberland, including the place where he was born. Now we have seen him safe through; and if he had been a common man, he would have become an M.P. and a baronet, and perhaps we should have lost our interest in him. He was not a common man. He was asked to go into Parliament for Nottingham, and later on even for the city of London, and he refused. He thought he was not educated enough; and, besides, his time was quite full.

He had been a philanthropist as soon as he had any money at all, by subscribing to the Cumberland Society, a society for helping Cumberland men who fell into poverty in London. After 1841, when he lived more in London, and did not travel

so hard, he became what one might call a professional philanthropist. He had a sort of rage for collecting money for charitable and religious institutions; he collected for them just as he used to canvass customers for his firm. He said he wore out a pair of boots in collecting for one charity. He gave very large sums of money himself, and forced his friends to give large sums. In 1858 he was connected with thirteen institutions; and he worked hard, as a rule, for all institutions he was connected with. Now I want you to look at the chief things he did; and then afterwards we will try to make out the rights and wrongs of it.

First, in private life he put an immense number of young men in good situations, where they did well. Especially he made it his business to look after young Cumberland men when they came up to London.

Secondly, he paid great attention to the welfare of his employés in the warehouse. He insisted on their insuring their lives, and he was very anxious to provide religious services and religious instruction for them. I shall have a word to say about this.

Thirdly, he did a really great work in reforming education in Cumberland, his native county. He had suffered by the scandalous education in Cumberland in his boyhood. He got new schools built, new masters appointed, the endowed schools better managed. He went down and presided at the examinations, and gave prizes for them. And he arranged what he called a "walking library"; a library kept up by the subscriptions of nine villages, to which the books were taken round by a walking messenger. He did this a good deal because he felt the need we feel so strongly now, for helping people to carry on some sort of education after leaving school.

Fourthly, he started or kept going a great number of London charities. I will mention a few. The Cumberland Benevolent Society, which I have spoken of already. The Commercial Travellers' Schools, for the maintenance and education of the orphan children of commercial travellers. The Royal Free Hospital, for destitute cases only, and without letters of recommendation. He had a great deal to do with the Ragged Schools Movement, and started a Reformatory for discharged prisoners. And alongside of this it is most noticeable that he started in Cumberland the system of boarding out children instead of keeping them crowded together in workhouses. These things are only a few specimens of the work done by his restless energy. He also built a church and schools at Somers Town.

If we look back now at his long life, devoted to work of this kind, it seems to me that we must think that he had only mastered half the lesson of the nineteenth century. Of course such a life shows a great awakening in society—a real conviction of sin—a conviction that some attempt must be made to set things straight. And, further, it shows an immense advance in everything where what was wanted could easily be seen, and only better machinery was required. The improvement of education is the plain example of this.

Moore did a great deal, as a man of business, to reform Christ's Hospital (the Blue-coat School), as well as the Cumberland Schools. And then his energy in helping young men privately, and using his influence to keep them straight, was admirable. And, again, thorough religious principle was the motive of his action, and gave him his extraordinary faith and power. But here we must pause a moment and reflect. His religion was thoroughly genuine and earnest. But we might perhaps do well to ask one question: Did this religion

really mean a practical belief in the best human life? I suppose a man's religion is what he really believes in—what governs him from head to foot—what he thinks the only thing worth having and the only thing worth giving.

Now, what Moore was especially ready to give was, on the one hand, money and charitable machinery, and, on the other hand, religious instruction by books and missionaries. We can hardly help smiling when we hear that he bought hundreds and thousands of copies of religious books to send about the country, and he was a great supporter of home missions. The other practical duty constantly present to his mind was that of giving money. "What I gave, I have," was his favourite motto; that is, what he gave was not a loss to him. He felt, indeed, that all was worthless without sympathy; but still we must admit that his sympathy was not thoroughly thought out, and his religious work and his charitable work seemed to be separate. His charitable work did not consist in the attempt to build up a life, to arrange men's places and duties so as to meet the powers and needs of human character. And this building up is what I suppose is going to be the second half of the lesson of the nineteenth century. Take, for instance, his treatment of his own clerks and workmen in Bow Churchyard and in the factory at Nottingham. He was eager to give them daily prayer and religious instruction, and he was both just and benevolent in the way he paid them. But it is curious that in the last year of his life he suddenly gave away some £40,000 among them, feeling that they had done so much to make his fortune. This was tremendously munificent; but it occurs to one that it seems just to have struck him then that they had something to do with making his fortune, and money given like that is not as wholesome as what you earn.

There is a story of his old porter which rather annoys me.* Amongst those who were invited to the Hall† were the porters from Bow Churchyard. Some of the elder porters came first, amongst them John Hill, the oldest in the establishment. During their visit, Mrs. Moore went out one morning, and was crossing the park, when she came upon a venerable person, standing on a rising ground, staring about him with astonishment at the gardens and buildings. "Are you looking for somebody?" asked Mrs. Moore. "No," he said; "I am just looking round about, and thinking what a fine place it is, and how *we* helped to make it. I have really a great pride in it!" With tears in his eyes, old Hill told how he had worked forty years for the firm; how they had all worked hard together. "I was the *only* porter then," he said. "All has changed now. We are the biggest firm in the city. And yet," he continued, "those days do not look so far off either." John went up to the top of the Peel Tower and the Harbybrow. He looked along the valley to Whitehall, and round the surrounding hills. It was a grand estate, "Yes," he said, "*we* did it."

It seems to have been a sort of accident that Moore thought of treating the people as if they had something to do with the money they made. The old porter ought to have felt that he had made his own fortune too. And, again, observe Moore's tricks as a commercial traveller. They were not dishonourable; he never lost a friend by them; but they mean that trade was like war to him. All's fair in war, they say. He would do anything to sweep all the customers into his own net. His ideas were all in patches and scraps. He never thoroughly brought his religion to bear upon his trade.

* Smiles' "Life," page 287. † The house in Cumberland.

Take another question. His favourite institution was the Commercial Travellers' Schools. His very reason for urging their claims was that the Commercial Travellers were so badly paid; he said so in so many words. He fought like a lion for these schools, simply compelling people to subscribe. He said in his speeches he knew of cases of destitution among the travellers *merely* from being underpaid. He *did* tell the employers they should pay their men more; but if he had fought for that, as he fought for the charity, he might have saved these men from the prospect of their children having to depend on charity at all. I *think* that charity might very likely keep down their wages. The Royal Free Hospital is another case worth considering. We ought to know why it was established. "The Royal Free Hospital,* to which attention has been called, was founded in this way. In the winter of 1827, a wretched girl, under eighteen years of age, was seen lying on the steps of St. Andrew's churchyard, Holborn Hill, after midnight, actually perishing from disease and famine. All the hospitals were closed against her, because at that time letters of recommendation were required before patients could be admitted to the public hospitals, and then only on certain specified days. The girl died two days after, unrecognised by any human being. This distressing event being witnessed by the late Mr. W. Marsden, surgeon, he at once set about founding a medical charity, in which destitution and disease should alone be the passport for obtaining free and instant relief. On this principle the Free Hospital was established in 1828. Look at me! I am sick, I am poor, I am helpless, I am forlorn! such were the patient's credentials." "I† have continued to stick to it because it is free to all who are

* Page 211. † Page 212.

poor and destitute, without any order of admittance. I am sure this hospital is less abused than any other in London—as every applicant undergoes a strict ordeal of inquiry into his circumstances and position; whereas, at other hospitals the orders from governors get sadly abused, and many people who are able to pay get their medical attendance for nothing; the tendency of this arrangement being to pauperise the population." Moore collected immense sums of money for this. It was in begging for this that he wore off the soles of a pair of boots. Now, of course, there ought to be hospitals, because they can give treatment, skill, and attendance which people cannot get in their own homes, and also because they give experience to the doctors; and so it was very likely a right thing to do to set up this hospital. But we must notice that this is not quite the *reason* why the Royal Free was set up. It was set up not merely to relieve disease, but to relieve disease and *destitution*. This was his idea of not permitting it to be abused, to confine it to the destitute. But a free hospital is no *cure*, though it may be a *relief* for destitution. On the contrary, demand creates supply. If you put up a big house for destitute cases, you will have destitute cases to put in it. It was a simple, straightforward thing to do, to set up a great hospital; but it was not really even the beginning of the work of preventing the cases that it was meant to relieve. That requires arrangements to be made which go much deeper into people's circumstances, and put their life on a solid foundation—which cure by prevention. Another example. The Reformatory for Discharged Prisoners was a plan in which Moore took a great interest. This broke down; no satisfactory manager could be got. Here I think the reason is plain, and is shown by the way in which the same work is done more successfully now. I heard a letter read

only the other day from the Secretary of the Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society, which does a very good work now. He said,* "The length of time it takes to set discharged prisoners on their legs again is the length of time it takes to get them mixed up in common society, and their past forgotten." So that having an institution was absolutely opposed to the object to be attained. In a reformatory they were all kept together, and marked men for so much longer. Contrast with this Moore's very wise steps for boarding-out workhouse children.† To quote his own wise words: "The leading principle of the boarding-out system is to restore the child to family life, to create around it natural relations and natural ties. Under these conditions physical and moral health is improved, the natural affections are brought into play, and the child enjoys the liberty and variety of a home life. Thus sympathy is produced, the true basis for religious principles in after life. Family life is the means which God has instituted for the training of the little ones, and in so far as we assimilate our method to His, so far will be our success." This just shows how he hit on a truth where he had a simple experience to go upon. He knew what family life was, and that children ought to have it; but to deal by natural means with those other evils, pauperism, criminal class, underpaid labour, was what he did not think of. I ought to say that he set up the Porters' Benevolent Society, which was partly a charity, but I suppose a great deal supported by the trade. That was a step towards organising a trade.

Thus, though it is very dangerous to try and make general criticisms on a life so full of all kinds of good work, I would suggest that we should think of the time of Moore's life as a

* He was writing against any system of watching people by the police. Quoted from memory. † Page 371.

philanthropist in England, from 1841 about to 1876, as a time in which people were being awakened to their duties, and were trying to do what was necessary by money and machinery. For I think even the spread of religious knowledge is mere machinery, if it does not mean a religious life, a good, solid, honest life, thoroughly carried out through all its duties. But of course immense good was done both by obvious reforms in repealing bad laws, in starting education, in waking up the clergy—George Moore was a great hand at waking up the clergy,—and also by the failures or doubtful successes. To go back to the illustration I used, when you see the pumps pouring out their thousands of gallons an hour, you know there is a leak somewhere; and it is something to know that. When a man builds a reformatory for prisoners, and it breaks down, because no one can manage them, at least it shows that there is something to be done. But what was not on the whole grasped by the English religious philanthropists was that institutions have a tendency to take the place of duties; just as where rich people used to get their old servants into the charities which received candidates by votes. If they want to pension their old servants, let them do it themselves. Or, to put the same thing in other words, the real thing to work for is that every private person, and every trade, and every place or district, shall do his or its duties in a thorough and well-considered way, dealing with people who are their own belongings as really belonging to them. This life, in which your duties and purposes bind you together with other people, is, I suppose, what we ought to mean by the religious life or the best life; and it might be said that a philanthropist or reformer can do nothing at all unless he has this life himself, and sees how to make it possible for others. Of course you must have machinery, you must have hospitals and convalescent

homes, and perhaps endowed schools, but all these things ought to be merely instruments in the hands of men and of bodies of men, who do not forget their own immediate duties, and all that springs out of these duties.

Now I want to give you a sketch of a very different man. Leclaire was the son of a village shoemaker in France, born 1801. He left the village school at ten, and could then hardly read or write. He looked after cattle in the fields till he was twelve, and was sometimes mason and sometimes agricultural labourer for five years more. Then, at seventeen, he saw some haymakers returning to Paris and joined them, and on arriving in Paris, got a place with a house-painter as apprentice. He had a hardish time as apprentice, but in three years he seems to have become principal workman. Then, as soon as he got regular pay, he had to provide against being drawn for a soldier; that cost him £24, which he managed to save out of his first year's wages. Then, at about twenty, just as George Moore put himself to school, Leclaire got hold of books and taught himself all he could. And at twenty-six he set up for himself as painter and glazier, and two years later he got a contract to paint and glaze seven houses. He worked with his men, and paid them above the current rate of wages, and the work was unusually well and quickly done. In three or four years' time he had some large contracts, and his fortune was made, and soon after 1835 he was employing three hundred workmen. It was soon after this that he took the first step towards profit sharing, unless we call it profit sharing when he paid his men above the current rate. People are fond of asking where a man got his ideas. Where did Leclaire get the idea of profit sharing? In the first place Leclaire had a hard apprenticeship, and found it difficult to make his master pay him fairly; but I suppose many men have gone

through that experience without becoming social reformers in consequence. But no doubt that helped to fix it in Leclaire's mind that as things then stood the workman and master had opposite interests. Then, of course, at that time France was full of all sorts of theories. It is curious that Thomas Carlyle was writing to old Goethe, the German poet, in 1830, and he asks Goethe about the Saint Simonians, a society of people in Paris who were full of ideas about the right way of distributing the produce of labour. Carlyle says to Goethe what you may also read in "Sartor Resartus," last page but one: "Here also are men who have discovered, not without amazement, that Man is still Man; of which high, long-forgotten Truth you already see them make false application." Leclaire seems to have been influenced by the writings of their founder St. Simon, and Leclaire's application of the truth that Man is still Man was not a false application. He took up their inspiration without their nonsense. Besides this he studied both books and men; and they say that it was an economist who gave him the first hint that profit sharing was the only way to make the men's interest agree with the employer's. The *first* idea,* it seems to me, was to divide the *extra* profit among them; *i.e.*, all the profit they could make after the employer had had what he thought fair; and then later on, to make the workmen themselves gradually owners of the business, which they are now. This was about 1835. But we must remember that before he tried even the first step, Leclaire had already won the confidence of his men, and got a good set of men round him. In 1838 he started a Mutual Aid Society, something like one of our clubs, which the men subscribed to. The subscription was about 1*s.* 8*d.* a month,

* The details of Leclaire's work are largely drawn from Miss Hart's pamphlet on Leclaire.

and the sick pay 1*s.* 8*d.* a day for three months. Well, this Society had a rule that the members might break it up and divide the money belonging to it at the end of fifteen years; that would be in 1853. We shall see the end of that. In 1842 he began regular profit sharing; that is, he divided a share of the profits of the year among his forty-four best workmen, about £10 a head, and the profits went on increasing. He had a good deal of trouble about introducing this; once the government would not let him have a meeting of his men;—they thought it too much like Socialism: and the men, before the first year's profits were paid them, were inclined to think it was all a humbug, to bring wages down. He overcame their doubts by paying the money.

Then another difficulty came; the year 1853 came round—the end of the fifteen years—and the Mutual Aid Society was broken up, and the money divided, according to the rule. Each member got about £21. This was not at all what Leclaire wanted; he wanted the money kept together, and pensions paid out of it to men past work, and its capital to become part of the capital of the business. So the Society was started again next year, for another fifteen years, that would be till '69, but without any subscription from the men. Leclaire gave it a share of the profits instead; and this enabled him, six years later, in 1863, to get rid of the rule which permitted the Society to be broken up; because he threatened to stop the share of profits. In 1863, when the Society was made permanent, he did what he had no doubt intended all along, he made the Mutual Benefit Society a partner in the firm, and paid it 5 per cent. on its capital, and a share of the profits, the workmen *also* receiving a share of the profits directly, paid to each man. From this time the men began to own a part of the business, because the Society legally represented them. In

handing over the new statutes in 1864, Leclaire said to the men: "You are no longer day-labourers, working like machines, leaving off work when the hour has done striking. You are partners, working on your own account, and, as such, nothing in the workshop can be indifferent to you. Every one of you ought to look after the plant and the materials as if you had been especially appointed guardians of them." This was all settled in 1864, and then Leclaire retired to his country house near Paris, in order to let the men learn to manage without him; and some more changes were made, after the workmen had been consulted about them, in 1869. After 1869 Leclaire himself only drew 5 per cent. on his capital and took no profits; so that since that the men have really been owners of the business. Of course all this sounds a little as if it was just the fancy of a rich man to let them have his capital cheap and a share of his profits. But Leclaire always said it was not so, and that he would not have done as well for himself if he had kept on the common way of working. He said it was like earning £4 and giving £2 to his workmen, instead of earning only £1 and keeping it all to himself. Certainly the success of the house was extraordinary; it now employs some 1,100 workmen.

Now I will explain very shortly what the arrangements of the business are. There are two chief points in a business of this kind: who has the management, and what sort of position and prospects does the profit sharing give to the men. The concern is *governed* by the workmen, but not by the whole mass of them. There is a nucleus of picked men, some three hundred in number at present (the number is not fixed) which is the governing body. These men in their meeting elect the foremen every year, and when either of the two managing partners dies or resigns, they elect his successor.

The *management* of the business is left with these partners. The nucleus or "noyau" elects its own members, on recommendation of its own committee, and subject to the rules. Candidates must have worked five years for the house, and be between twenty-five and forty years of age.

The Mutual Aid Society contains about two hundred members, who must belong to the nucleus. It is managed by a committee of its own members. There is no subscription from the men, but it gets its funds from a share of the profits of the house. It has now an enormous reserve fund, and gives very high benefits to its members: life pensions of £48 to workmen over fifty, who have worked twenty years for the house, and half the pension continued to their widows. I am not quite sure if they give anything to workmen who are not yet members of the Society, except in case of accidents. In the ordinary course a workman may expect to be elected a member, and the number may increase.

The profit sharing is managed like this. First, the workmen have their regular wages. Five per cent. is paid on capital as a first charge, I presume after wages are paid, then the net profits are divided into one half and two quarters. The one half is divided among all the workmen employed by the firm in proportion to their wages. This has been of late years pretty near twenty per cent., that is 4*s.* on every pound of wages. One of the two quarters of the profits goes to the two managing partners; and I must explain here, that the managing partners must have some capital in the business. So you may ask, How can a working man be elected managing partner, seeing that he will not have any capital? It is arranged in this way: the outgoing partner is not allowed to realize his capital till the incoming partner has bought him out, by means of his share of the profits. So this is a genuine arrangement.

It is really the fact that there is nothing to prevent quite a poor man from being elected partner, if his mates think him the best man.

Then there is still one quarter of the profits to account for; this goes to the Mutual Aid Society. So it comes to this, that three-quarters of the profits go to the workmen, directly and indirectly. There are about 1,100 workmen altogether. And beyond that, they can have capital in the business, and if so, the interest on capital so far goes to them. The Mutual Aid Society has about half its capital in the business, about £20,000, and some of the workmen have capital in it. They just get five per cent. on that. Capital gets no profits, only interest.

When a workman joins such a society, his future is, humanly speaking, in his own hands, *and* in the hands of all his mates. His profits depend upon how he works, *and* upon how they work; and his prospects depend upon his own good conduct, *and* upon the justice of the others—I mean their justice as to the rules about the benefits of the society, and as to his election into the nucleus, or to be foreman, or to the partnership. Of course, if the men are not wise and just, they will wreck the concern, and they will deserve to. And of course a business like this may fail, just as any business may fail, from ill-fortune, though I think it is not likely to fail from incautious speculation. All one can say in general is, that in a society like this, bar accidents, every man has open to him a really human life, in which the welfare of all depends on the heartiness and on the wisdom with which every man works for the common purpose, that is to say, does his duty.

I am not here to preach co-operation or profit sharing. I am merely speaking of the way in which Leclaire looked at the great duty of making a good solid life possible for the

people in his trade. There may be other ways of doing the same thing, and there are very great difficulties in doing it in this way. But I think every one must agree so far as this, that Leclaire had the right object before him, and went to work in the right spirit—in the only spirit in which a man can do any good, and in a spirit which always does good in any walk of life; that is to say, he made his reform by living his own life and doing his own duties with good heart and good sense, and contriving from time to time the arrangements which came naturally out of his relations in the way of business, when he looked at his business as a duty towards human beings. In his whole life nothing strikes me more than the singleness of his purpose and his extraordinary patience and foresight. It was forty years' persevering work from 1829, when he first paid his men more than the current rate of wages, till 1869, when he signed the last rules of the house. How thoroughly he saw that the whole success depended on intelligence and character; and what faith he had in producing them by education and habit! How gradually he began his work,—higher wages, then the Mutual Aid Society, then profit sharing, then the Mutual Aid Society broken up—he had to let them get confidence in the thing—then another Mutual Aid Society, which he at last persuaded them not to break up; and then finally, when he was over sixty, the putting the Society on a legally permanent footing, so that there should be pensions for every one. And then what foresight and self-denial, which shows the greatness of his character more than anything, in retiring from the direction of the business in 1864, so that they might learn to go on without him. After retiring in 1864, he wrote to the managing partner, "Every time that you see me in Paris say to me, 'What do you come here for? We don't want you; you forget that you are sixty-five years of age,

and that it is indispensable that we should learn to go on without you.'" But it is touching that in the time of the Commune, at the beginning of 1871, he went back to Paris. He said, "If Paris is blown up, I will be buried in its ruins with my workmen." He died in 1872, but till now the house has gone on prosperously under the management of the men.

This was what seems to me to be a thorough and single-hearted religious life, a life good in itself, and good in its effects on others. Leclaire's dream was, he said, "that a workman and his wife should in their old age have the wherewithal to live in peace, without being a burden upon any one." His life is not split up, not feverish, not patchy, like the other life we were speaking of. He was before his age; he grasped the true direction of the nineteenth century. His influence may seem at first sight narrower than that of our worthy George Moore, who had his finger in every pie, and was so devoted to missionaries. But think of this, 1,100 workmen for several years without a case of drunkenness! A great many hospitals might be built, and many hundreds and thousands of religious books might be distributed, without even beginning to lay the foundation of the good, self-supporting, well-arranged life which this son of a village shoemaker was able to bring into existence by straightforwardly managing the business of a painter and decorator as a duty towards human beings.

II.

*INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL REFORM.**

MY object in speaking here this evening is twofold. It is in the first place to illustrate, by two or three examples, what I take to be the true connection between the reform of individual life by individual exertions and the reform of social arrangements by the power of society; and in the second place, while discussing these examples, to indicate what seem to me to be some chief elements in a not remotely practicable social ideal.

I hope no one will think that I intend to disparage one of these kinds of reform in order to exalt the other. There are people whose minds are like a pair of scales: they can only hold two things at a time, and if one of the things goes up, the other must go down. I had better say plainly at once, that what I want to plead for is just the opposite of such an attitude. What has always impressed me as the most striking feature of social progress is the inseparable identity between these two aspects of reform. The operation of law seems to me to consist in ratifying by the sanction of the public power certain expressions and resolutions of the public mind; and the public mind is the mind of individuals, in so far as they co-operate for social judgment or for social action. Laws may be compared to the wood of a tree, or the skeleton of an

* An address given for the Ethical Society, and subsequently published in *Time*.

animal, each of which is indeed a rigid framework, but has been entirely moulded by the growth of the flexible parts which seem to hang upon it. But the illustration is not strong enough. Wood or bone may die, and yet retain its strength; but a dead law has no strength at all, and a law can be a dead letter without being repealed. Law has its strength as well as its birth in the public will. Thus the process which I want to look at is the process by which changes in the life of a people find their expression and completion in the acts of the public power, and by which, also, the acts of the public power are able to strengthen and support the life of a people. And the light in which I want to consider this process is that of a single movement and development, which takes the shape of law, or of public opinion, or of individual initiative, according to the needs of the moment; but is always in reality a growth of moral life, an extension and animation of our ideas of social duty.

I shall be sorry if the first example which I want to consider appears too trivial to bring before this audience. I confess that I do in part wish to insist on the enormous importance of certain duties and capacities that we are apt to regard as trivial.

On any Friday evening during the past winter you might have seen in a room, not five minutes' walk from this hall, two or three volunteer teachers, ladies, one of them a member of the Ethical Society, instructing six or eight lads in the elements of woodcarving. In Stepney and Ratcliff you might have seen similar classes, and others in a good many quarters of London. The teaching is not meant to be a preparation for the woodcarver's trade; it is less than that in one way, and more in another. It is less, because it does not aim at turning out finished workmen who could compete with professionals—in fact, the lads who are taught are already occupied in other

trades. It is more, because it does aim at awakening the more general interests and enjoyments of artistic knowledge, and at pointing out some of the features which constitute beauty in art and in nature. Of course there are many failures, and there are not any very grand results. Still, if a pupil is able to attend for any length of time, a certain change is produced in his mind; a new perception is awakened, a new interest is acquired; he sees things to which he was blind before, and enjoys things to which he was insensible before.

This is a small affair, and it does not seem very gigantic when we say that in Great Britain and Ireland there are more than four thousand such pupils undergoing such instruction, which is sought by the pupils and imparted by the teachers purely for love of the subject. In some cases these teachers are laboring men, who give their evenings to the work with that devotion which characterises hard-working men when their interest is awakened. Of course woodcarving is not the only subject taught. All the decorative, or lesser arts, find a place, and the nature of beauty and some idea of design is meant to be taught along with all of them.

Now I want first to look back ten years in the history of this movement, and then to look forward ten years.

Ten years ago there was nothing of all the teaching I have referred to, except just one lady in Shropshire, teaching one or two classes of country lads round her own home. Go a few years further back still, and there was not even this. There was nothing then but the writings and influence of Mr. Ruskin, and perhaps, for all I know, of Mr. William Morris, working on the genius of this lady, whose mind was being filled with the belief in the moral and educational value of beautiful handicraft. Gradually she set to work, gathered friends round her, adopted suggestions from others, formed a

small society. Three years ago this society took root in London, and it has now reached about six times the extent which it had then attained. "Good seed flies on the wings of the wind"; and the ideas of a great art-critic, and the daily toil of one woman in a remote country district, have already developed into a practical influence that is brightening thousands of lives.

But now suppose we look forward ten years. This is a more varied problem, because almost every plant branches out as it grows up. I will select three out of many possible ways in which I hope that this advance in educational practice will affect our institutions, and even our statute book.

1. Every one is crying out in his own particular language, whether with prayers or with curses, for educational reform. At the same time we all desire, I suppose, and it seems that we are to have, something or other in the way of local self-government. Now I do trust all this will end in throwing on the citizens of every locality the main power and reponsibility with regard to the education of their children, and of their lads and girls, who are growing up to manhood and womanhood. This is a branch of administration upon which the moral and material welfare of the people of these islands absolutely depends. Who is going to look after this branch of administration? There is only one answer. If you want a thing well done, do it yourself. I will quote the last words on education of a great man recently dead, who was for five-and-thirty years an English inspector of schools. Matthew Arnold wrote in February, 1888:—

"I wish to indicate certain points to which those for whose use the Report* is now designed will do well, I think, to

* "Special Report on certain points connected with Elementary Education in Germany, Switzerland, and France."

direct their minds. The first of these points is the need that those who use the popular school should arrive at clear and just notions of what they want their own school to be, and should seek to get it made this. At present their school is not this, but it is rather what the political and governing classes, establishing a school for the benefit of the working classes think that such a school ought to be. The second point is, that our existing popular school is far too little formative and humanising, and that much in it, which administrators point to as valuable results, is in truth mere machinery."

Therefore I say, that to create in every quarter of our large towns, and in every country district, a circle of men and women of the wage-earning class, who have had something of a humanising and formative training, and who are, as is always the result of such a training, enthusiasts for education in the largest sense, is a work of paramount importance for the future of our popular schools. It is a work which in ten years' time will leave a deep mark on our educational code, on our school buildings, and on our system of school management. And I will venture to say that no other equality of chances has a tenth part of the importance that belongs to equality in education.

You *can* secure this by taking in hand the management of the popular schools, and you *cannot* secure it in any other way.

2. I pass to another point of social equality. The distinguishing mark of social equality is, to my mind, identity of enjoyments. We used to be told by the good old school that the hunting-field and the racecourse kept English society together; and perhaps, before the growth of the great towns with their highly educated workmen, there was something in this. But of course the poorer people were lookers-on at these

things, rather than participators; they are not really amusements for the million, except in as far as the million take to betting. Now no doubt we all hope that, with proper provision of open spaces and public buildings, games and gymnastics will be more and more generally practised; but I want to refer now to other forms of enjoyment.

One is rather disinclined to say very much about museums and picture galleries and public libraries as means of enjoyment, because these places are now apt to be so very doleful and unattractive. This is partly the fault of the management, and partly the fault of the visitors. But when our common education gives us a little more feeling and insight for the human side of art and craftsmanship, then I think we shall care more to become acquainted with the history and fortunes of arts and crafts, the products of which are the direct outcome and record of the lives and feelings and labours of unnamed millions of our race. This is a point of view which we owe largely to Mr. Morris. Then I think the management, which will depend upon the local authority, will become more energetic and zealous, and the visitors will be more interested; and this will have the effect of making the museums and galleries less desolate and more hospitable and cheerful; and perhaps some day we may get as far as to have a public orchestra playing in some public room. When an interest like this becomes common and natural, it will no longer be thought priggish to care about these things, and they will be an important feature of our holiday life. This would be the beginning of a great social change, because all sensible people would more and more tend to spend their Sundays and holidays in the same way, and the rich people might lose something of their vulgar exclusiveness, and the poorer people something of their enforced narrowness of outlook. And a certain social

pride, in a citizenship that means a common life worth living, will grow up, and replace the brutal exclusiveness of classes. We should all feel that the best things were now for all, and not for the few, and that this was enough to prove that they were really the best things, because it is only the best things that can be for all. And this social pride would react on the administrative work of the local authority, and increase its energy, its thoroughness, and its public spirit.

And the same influences would leave their mark on a private life—the life of the family. I know quite well that the wealthy and orthodox infidel will say, with an affectation of practical insight, that people whose lives are a struggle cannot be expected to take pleasure in beauty and knowledge. And I agree so far as this—that they cannot be *expected* to take such pleasure. All I know is, that they do take it. I constantly hear and see conclusive proofs of this. A lady described to me the other day the resolution and enjoyment with which an Irish lad pursued his woodcarving in a mud cabin, in county Limerick; and it is not long since I heard how some *Scotch* lads actually preferred decorating their own homes to turning a penny by selling their work. This sounds like a miracle, but has the advantage of being a fact.

3. And these educational influences will ultimately produce an effect on the organisation of industry itself. The mere fact that the two greatest English writers on art of this or of any century have found it necessary to become writers on social economy, is enough to prove, if it wanted proving, that the national appreciation of workmanship and the national organisation of industry are but two aspects of the same thing. If I were to venture in passing to criticise the ideas of John Ruskin and of Mr. William Morris, I should say that the lifework of these two great men, co-operating with other influences, has

done more for us than they are themselves aware. It is our duty, I admit, at least to listen with respect to those from whom we have already learnt so much; but it is my own firm conviction that there is far less to be gained from their detailed speculations in social economy than from the nineteenth-century renaissance, the new birth, which they have been the chief agents in bringing about. Such teaching operations as those to which I have referred in the beginning of this lecture are merely an attempt to popularise what these great men have done, and belong, in a humble way, to the same line of advance. After all, no progress is isolated. The awakening of Europe is continuous, from the time of Goethe till to-day.

The organisation of industry will be affected by educational progress in various ways.

First, the public mind will learn to see in the productions of handicraft the expression of the life of the craftsmen, and will realize that a sense of beauty or fitness in the production cannot be divorced from a sense of duty towards the producer. Only health and happiness can produce sound workmanship and pleasant decoration. It is a saying of the fishermen's wives in Scotland when they are selling the fish, "It's no fish you're buying; it's men's lives." This is what we all must come to feel. In all the transactions of industry we are trafficking in the lives of men and women; and therefore we shall be ready to give aid and encouragement to organising their lives, we shall be ready and willing to legislate for their better health and comfort, and, above all things, we shall insist, for their sakes as for our own, that the workmanship shall be good and sound.

Secondly, then, I look for a change in the dignity of the craftsman. The old economy said that a respectable calling

was apt to be underpaid, because it took out part of its wages in public esteem. This view has its truth; but I feel sure that in the long-run public esteem promotes material welfare. Public opinion can strengthen organisation, and can to some extent prohibit unjust terms of partnership, though it cannot, of course, determine shares of profit in particular cases. It can confer importance and eminence, and these things react upon material welfare. At present I have no doubt that the skilled workman is under-esteemed and underpaid by comparison with persons of financial or secretarial skill, or with the so-called designer or architect. The reason is in part that the craftsman himself is not what he should be, is not an artist or a man of science, but is a mere mechanic; and then, as always happens, he is not expected to be more than this, and, because he is not expected to be, he is not. Two changes must come together: the craftsman must assert himself by becoming an artist, and the public must recognise him if he is, and condemn him if he is not. As a detail, I may say, in all high-class work, the workman should have the credit of what he makes with his own hands. His mark should be on it. I am told that an excellent start in this direction is being made at Toynbee Hall.

And further, the terrible problem of unskilled labour would not be left untouched. The range of skilled hand labour would be vastly extended; the field of unskilled labour might, in a corresponding proportion, be left to machinery. I cannot enter into this at length. It seems plain that the worst pinch is in the long hours of monotonous, soul-destroying, unskilled labour. I hope much from supplanting a good deal of this by interesting skilled labour, and frankly helping out the rest by machinery and shortening its hours.

These are the changes which we see before us, when we

look forward ten years from the educational point of view alone. It is impossible to draw the line between the individual and the social character of such reforms. The movement in question will, *e.g.*, *probably* affect the drafting of the Technical Education Bill; it will certainly affect its working. Converging results will spring from other influences. And it is as certain as any human prospect can be, that if we jointly and severally do our duty as friends, parents, electors to the local authority, managers of evening and of primary schools, and as human beings with humanising interests of our own, we can bring about changes of this kind in our social, educational, industrial, and recreative organisation, which will amount, in their cumulative effect, to no small instalment of a social revolution.

Now I turn to a subject which apparently differs from the last, in as far as the attempt to initiate progress has arisen more distinctly from legislation. But here, too, we shall find that we are really dealing with a thoroughgoing advance in the mind and character of the people.

It is only within the last half-century that the public attention has been given to the dwellings of the wage-earning class with the definite purpose of improving their condition. The statement needs this qualification, because the danger and misery of a mass of overcrowded tenements were observed in London as early as the time of Elizabeth.

The confluence of the people to London was even then largely caused by the unwise charity of the Londoners; and the growth of the population outside the city gates frightened the city for its trade, and the government both for health and for order.

But their remedy was not what we should call a constructive remedy. It consisted in proclamations against fresh

buildings within three miles of the city gates, and against overcrowding, and against inhabited cellars. People living in cellars in London are first mentioned about 1640, and Irish poor in St. Giles' in that year.

These proclamations did no good. London went on growing, and becoming more and more unhealthy. A writer about two hundred years ago says, "One way with another, a plague happeneth in London every twenty years."

There was more regulation within the city walls, but chiefly to secure cleanliness in the streets, and to provide against fire.

So it remains true that there was no attempt to improve the people's dwellings till half a century ago. In fact, there were *no sanitary* principles recognised in *any* dwellings before that time. I should suppose that our sanitary discoveries and legislation, and therefore our future system of local government, largely owe their origin to the labours of the men of science who perfected the compound microscope between 1820 and 1830. We may call to mind that the Prince Consort died of typhoid fever, and the Prince of Wales narrowly escaped a similar death. So our negligence in *purely* sanitary matters was tolerably impartial.

But a variety of philanthropic and political motives contributed in the years following 1832 to push forward this question. In particular, the outbreak of cholera in 1831, with a terribly unhealthy year in 1837, when a return of cholera was dreaded in London, acted strongly on the minds of reformers, which were then directed to the condition of the working classes. A whole heap of public inquiries were instituted, one of which resulted in Mr. Chadwick's report of 1842, "On the Condition of the Labouring Classes of Great Britain."

It is from about this time, in the Forties, that we must date the effective growth of public interest in the problem. This

interest, and the action taken in consequence of it, shows a pretty marked development, which it is worth while to glance at, although it is so complicated a subject that one can only touch a few typical points here and there.

To begin with, the movement has left its record in forty years of legislation, from 1845 to 1885. This legislation shows on the whole two tendencies: first, a tendency to widen the conception of the problem; and, secondly, as a result of this widening conception, to rely increasingly upon local authorities. The widening of the problem shows itself in the advance *from* legislation directed to removing a nuisance, an annoyance, or danger to the neighbours, *to* legislation directed to clearing whole areas that were unhealthy, *and rebuilding on them to the best advantage;* that is to say, recognising the provision of dwellings as a matter of public policy.

The Nuisance Removals Acts begin, I believe, in 1846. In 1855 the meaning of a "nuisance" is extended to include anything dangerous *to the inhabitants of the house itself*, such as overcrowding; in 1868, Torrens' Act marks a turning-point, because it provides for demolishing unsanitary houses, and *rebuilding* on *their sites;* and Cross's Act of 1875 applies the same principle to large areas. Both of these Acts attempt to keep the compensation down in the public interest; and Cross's Act forces the public authority to incur loss, if necessary, in selling the sites for the purpose of dwellings. This means that the public mind has passed from a negative to a positive idea of the remedy for the evil of bad dwellings.

There was one curious exception to this order of advance. In 1851 Lord Shaftesbury carried an Act which enabled the local authority to construct and hold buildings for lodging the wage-earning class. It did not give compulsory powers, but much could have been done without them. But the public

interest was not then awakened; no one stirred up the local authorities; and four years ago Lord Shaftesbury said he supposed no one but himself knew that the Act existed. It has been an absolute dead letter.

But on the whole the conception of the problem steadily widened from 1845 to 1875, and we may even say to 1885 considering that the commission which reported in that year took evidence on the question of the relation between rent and wages. The Charity Organisation Society's Committee of 1881 had previously gone into this difficult question. This shows that the mere sanitary problem had expanded into a set of problems affecting the whole position of the working class.

As to reliance upon local authorities, not to speak of the abortive Act of 1851, we may remember that the Metropolitan Board of Works was created in 1855. The vestries were enabled by that Act to appoint medical officers of health, and were given enormously important powers of making bye-laws under an Act of 1866. Torrens' Act of 1868 depended on the vestries; and Cross's of 1875 on the Board of Works.

Now I turn to the other side of the subject. Who were at work in and under all this legislation, and what did they effect? There have been, roughly speaking, four classes of reformers, beginning one after the other, but going on together.

First came a band of experts and philanthropists, like Lord Shaftesbury and Mr. Chadwick. It was they, I think, who set the ball rolling, partly as public men, by blue-books and Acts of Parliament. I do not think they can have effected very much before 1855; but they did slowly arouse public opinion, being ably seconded by three fearful visitations of cholera.

Secondly, as a first result of the wider public interest, came

the Model Dwellings Companies, started by people like Lord Shaftesbury, but consisting of middle-class citizens and men of business, who wanted to thrash out the question practically, and see what could be done by ordinary decent landlords. The first societies were more experimental and charitable; then, as the work was shown to be possible, they got bigger and more commercial. The first block of model dwellings was opened in London in 1847, the second in 1850; six more companies were formed in the next twelve years. In 1862, Mr. Peabody's first gift of £150,000 gave an impetus to the movement. Still the actual work done by all the societies together was in itself next to nothing. They housed about 17,000 individuals by 1868, over 30,000 by 1873, and 40,000 or 50,000 by 1881.

The population of London is supposed to increase by 65,000 every year, of whom 40,000 are of the wage-earning class, and the total number of houses built since 1848 is said to be hard upon half a million. So that, considered as a supply of dwellings, the work of the companies is a drop in the ocean. It has some uses, which I will speak of later.

Then, thirdly, the problem *deepened* as there arose a simpler and a deeper view of it. It is strange, but true, that in moral matters the simplest view comes last. Everything else catches our eye before our own most obvious duties, and they often have to be suggested to us by a great genius. It was, I believe, in the first instance, John Ruskin to whom the idea was due, in about 1864, of what is now known as the Octavia Hill system, which depends on the simple but not familiar idea that a landlord has a moral duty to his tenant. The system consists in the employment of trained women as agents and rent-collectors, who manage the property as any decent owner ought to manage it, but with a good deal of individual

supervision. This system is not essential or even desirable for the houses of first-rate artisans, but it is absolutely indispensable for the houses of people who have lost the habit of living in comfort and cleanliness. Without such a system no house that can be built would remain sanitary for a month with inhabitants of this class. This is not now a mere philanthropic experiment. It is a mode of managing house property extensively applied, under which probably several thousand families live decently and with a tendency to improve, who would otherwise live miserably with a tendency to deteriorate.

Lastly, about the same time a chance was given to the local authorities to do their duty, of which excellent use was made in two or three cases. The power to make bye-laws for inspection and registration of tenement houses under the Act of 1866 afforded the most simple means of controlling the state of the dwellings supply in every district. Down to 1884, however, only two districts had thoroughly gone into this work, with the result that in one district ten thousand persons, and in another thirty thousand were living in houses inspected and warranted as in fair sanitary condition. I am quite unable to understand why the ratepayers have not insisted on this simple process being adopted in every district of London. It costs the public nothing, so far as I know.

And under the head of the practical moral reformers I may mention the work familiar to most of us as that of the Committee of the Mansion House Council.

The *connection between* the reformers and the reforms is curious and interesting. It is a perpetual meeting of extremes. The private enterprise dwellings companies find they can build tenements, but they want cheap sites. The very unsocialistic Charity Organisation Society, five years after its foundation, examines into this question by its committee of

1873, and does much to procure Cross's Act of 1875, which deals with the problem of procuring cheap sites; and from the working of that Act the more drastic ideas now current have largely sprung. For instance, the Birmingham improvements were carried on under that Act. But these more drastic ideas, as represented in the Commission of 1885, have again forced us back to the conclusion that we *must* have more public interest, *and* a public authority more in touch with the public interest. The Act of 1885 says—I am not speaking in legal phrase—that it is the duty of the local authority to do its duty; and that is about the practical conclusion to which forty years of legislation have brought us. Just as private enterprise led up to legislation, so legislation leads up to individual duty. When you have not a good local authority with good servants, your law is a dead letter When you have, there is little, though there is something, to be desired.

Thus it seems that the widening and the deepening of the problem are not antagonistic to one another. The legislative reformer of to-day knows well that he is only arming with the public power a spirit and a purpose which the community must supply. The private enterprise reformer of to-day is not the *laissez-faire* economist, but is the citizen actuated by moral claims, and determined, whenever it is useful or needful, to transform his private action into that of the public power. The only question that arises is concerned with the precise degree of this use and need. In my opinion, such a matter of degree can only be determined in detail. I will illustrate the difference and the coalescence of the two points of view by reading some answers given by Miss Hill before the Commission of 1885 (p. 296). Miss Hill had been saying that she thought the ground landlord should be taxed, especially in view of the

enormous increase of value which he gets when his leases fall in. Lord Salisbury, in consequence of this answer, asks:—

Q. "You have not much sympathy for the ground landlord?"

A. "I have great sympathy for the ground landlord; he is a man whose power for good I believe in, and I have spent much of my life in getting people to become ground landlords."

Q. "You wish to multiply him, but to tax him?"

A. "Yes, and to see him tax *himself*."

It is fair to say that this has been done by the Duke of Westminster and others who have let land at reduced rates for dwellings. The line which she takes throughout is that only when private action runs against a barrier, it must have the power of transforming itself into public action. She thinks private action more flexible and more adapted to the particular problems with which she has to do. It is a question of efficiency, of setting forces at work on which you can really rely to produce the required effect.

I will not discuss these questions in general, but will say at once what sort of solution will, in my opinion, probably be found adequate.

The required agency is the performance of social duty, both on a large scale and in very minute matters of every-day life, guided by intimate local knowledge, inspired by neighbourly friendliness, and in case of necessity employing the public power. The agents in such an activity would naturally be the people of the community, in their various relations as neighbours, landlords, and tenants, or as builders, buyers, and sellers of houses; but the community must be able, in case of necessity, to transform itself into the public power—that is, in other words, it must enjoy an efficient system of local self-

government. This is the expression, the outward and visible sign, of the relations of neighbours with one another; and it will be what it deserves to be—just as good or as bad as the people themselves choose to make it.

To a really efficient government of this type very stringent powers might be entrusted, which it would be madness to entrust to any ill-informed or over-centralised authority.

Powers connected with building divide themselves into destructive and constructive powers. There are also important preventive powers, regulating the structure and surroundings of *new* houses. These preventive powers are pretty well agreed upon, I believe, and I need say no more about them except that they ought to be exercised. So, too, with the destructive powers. We are all of one mind that bad, unimprovable houses should be stamped out, without compensation to the owners for the buildings (the words of the Act of 1879 seem to me sufficient), and that bad but improvable houses should be inspected, and improved at the owner's expense, and kept under inspection. We start from this. What supply of houses there ought to be, admits of some question; but that bad houses should no more be tolerated than food unfit for human consumption admits of no question. The present law, if consolidated and acted upon, is sufficient to secure this.

The question of constructive powers is more difficult. I may put my view most clearly by saying that the local authority should have power to construct and manage dwellings for the working class; but that if I were elected on such an authority, I should strenuously oppose the use of the power except in extreme cases—that is to say, in order to disconcert anything like a ring or combination against the public interest.

The Glasgow improvers, whose work is the most successful

that has been done, had the power to build, but did not find any need to exercise it. The objections to exercising such a power largely are twofold :—

(1) If the public authority takes much of the burden, it must take it all, because it will drive private enterprise out of the field; and private enterprise can do the easy part of the work—providing high-class dwellings—as well as the public authority, and the hard part of the work—housing the classes who require Miss Hill's system—much better. Thus the community would be taking on itself a needless burden, and destroying a useful work. (2) The desirable course is to house in London only those people who must be there. To do this you must adjust the dwellings supply very carefully to the absolute need. If you build on a large scale at an artificially lowered rent, you actually subsidise employers of labour by building barracks for their employés. There are three hundred policemen and a number of letter-carriers living in the Peabody dwellings. This makes their pay equivalent to a higher pay, I suppose, and helps to induce them to stay in London or come to London.

Some clearances under Cross's Act are said to have cost £250 per family to be housed on them. No doubt this was very ill-managed. But if one was going to spend anything like that sum of money, would it not be better to get some employer to set up his trade in the country, and build him a nice healthy village away from London? You can build a beautiful four-roomed house for £250 in the country. I cannot doubt, though these things are hard to prove, that any really large operations in supplying dwellings under cost price in London must lower wages, and aggravate the congestion of population. We must make a stand some time, and say, "This area is full"; and I do not see why we should wait to do this until

we have massed the population in six-storey blocks to the verge of possible existence. The densest population in ordinary houses is two hundred and fifty per acre; the blocks house near a thousand.

Between destruction and construction there is the link of replacement. I said I would not encourage congestion; but I certainly would not permit forcible depopulation. At this moment the population of *Central London* is supposed to be decreasing. This is *in part* a healthy movement. The nearer the country the better for the wife and children. All one can say in general, is that the local authority should have stringent and flexible powers to take sites for necessary improvements, and to forbid demolition, or to annex conditions to it, or to enforce replacement, and perhaps to impose conditions on the laying out of new estates.

I will give as an illustration the way in which this system would have affected the person who projected the late demolitions in Chelsea. I am informed that over two hundred small houses were demolished on two sites, which do not comprise all the land that was cleared. Between one and two thousand persons must have been displaced. The rent of the smaller houses in Chelsea must rise in consequence, unless a large migration is caused. The owner may be about to replace, but I see no signs of it. Now he would have had to come to the local authority for permission, simply on the public ground that he was projecting an alteration in the dwellings supply of London. He might then have been forbidden to make his alteration, or some public improvement might have been exacted as a condition; all that depends on the circumstances of the case, as they might appear to persons with intimate local knowledge.

One word as to the rights of property. I would substitute for this rigid conception the more flexible conception of the

"continuity of society," meaning by this that you and I are bound to recognise in a reasonable way what your father and mine permitted to exist. How far, in what special degree, you recognise it is a question of detail. The things to be avoided are the *sudden* dislocation of life, and measures aimed at individuals.

The present state of things is this—the model dwellings companies and Miss Hill's system house altogether somewhere near a hundred thousand individuals—not less, maybe more. Their function is not to provide the dwellings supply of London. Private builders and workmen's building societies are well able to do this in the ordinary way.

What the model dwellings and Miss Hill's system can do is to extirpate, or make it possible to extirpate, the very worst plague-spots of London, because they attend to the needs of the class too troublesome for the private builder, and build on sites too awkward for the private builders. They have also shown the way to adapt buildings to the needs of various classes; the successive sets of dwellings are more cheaply built and better adapted to their purpose.

We must remember how influences radiate from every centre. Twenty thousand decent dwellings, a great part of which are in place of thoroughly bad ones, have a good deal of importance even in London.

The private builders have in part learnt their lesson, and are beginning to compete with the model dwellings. When they can do so successfully the main problem is really solved.*

* *In so far as* the low dividends of dwellings companies are caused, as has been recently *in part* the case, by the competition of private builders erecting houses of the same class, this lowness goes to show, not that the problem is insoluble, but that, in the quarter of London in question, it is solved, supply exceeding demand.

They and the companies can replace the unimprovable houses; it is for the local authority, aided and incited by private citizens, to demolish these, and to force improvement of the improvable houses. The worst pressure, due to the neglect of generations, ought never to recur. The worst faults of the old houses ought to be now impossible. A terrible amount remains to be done, but nothing which cannot be done by the due execution of the law, backed by the sympathy and activity of individual citizens.

Thus our two examples coalesce in a practical and practicable ideal; we look forward to a society organised in convenient districts, in which men and women, pursuing their different callings, will live together with care for one another, and with in all essentials the same education, the same enjoyments, the same capacities. These men and women will work together in councils and on committees; and while fearlessly employing stringent legal powers in the public interest, yet will be aware, by sympathy and experience, of the extreme flexibility and complication of modern life, which responds so unexpectedly to the most simple interference; they will have a pride in their schools and their libraries, in their streets and their dwellings, in their workshops and their warehouses. In such a society it appears to me to be a mere question of practical efficiency how far the organisers of labour should be the salaried servants of the State, or, *as they are now*, its moral trustees. This presents itself to me simply as a question of the amount of line, the degree of initiative, which the community allows to its agents in the performance of their duties. The only thing that I dread in the system known as Socialism is the cutting off individual initiative outside certain duties specified by rule. I do not see how either of the two great movements of which I have spoken this evening could have

made its way under a rigidly socialist *régime*. In England—and perhaps we differ in this from the Continent—our way of showing that a thing can be done is simply to go and do it. I do not see how Mr. Morris's influence could have reached its present extent if he had had to begin by knocking at the doors of a Science and Art Department, or of a School Board. On the other hand, of practical Socialism, *i.e.*, of the workman's ownership of the means of production, we cannot have too much.

But though our judgment may differ on such questions as these, I wish to conclude by insisting that all I have said to-night remains true notwithstanding. If Socialism is to come, it will come quicker in this way; and neither it nor any other system can be good unless these things are done. If we simply stick to our work, the children who are born this year will be educated on a better system, and will find themselves, as they grow up, in a revolutionised society. Not that the revolution is something now future, which will one day be past. The revolution always has been going on, always is going on, and, above all, always will be going on. But there are critical moments when the public mind matures rapidly, and perhaps this is one of them. Our birthright is within our grasp, if we choose to grasp it. What is wanted is the habituation of the English citizen to his rights and duties, by training in organisation, in administration, in what I may call neighbourly public spirit. If, for example, London had the same traditions of public service as Berlin, we should have (allowing for the difference of size) an army of 7,200 citizens engaged in the administration of poor law relief as unpaid officials, with public authority, and with individual discretion. Unless we apprentice ourselves to the trade of citizenship, the days that are coming in England may show more disastrous specimens of

municipal government than New York itself has displayed. Warnings are not wanting. Such as the citizen is such the society will be; and the true union of social and individual reform lies in the moulding of the individual mind to the public purpose.

III.

*SOME SOCIALISTIC FEATURES OF ANCIENT SOCIETIES.**

IT always appears to me that the ideal of modern life may be simply summed up in the phrase "Christian Hellenism," or if this is ambiguous, then "humanised Hellenism."

I will begin by quoting, in the words of the greatest Greek statesman, reproduced by the greatest Greek historian, a description of Hellenism at its best. My quotations are drawn from the famous speech of Pericles, delivered 430 years before Christ, at the funeral of the Athenian citizens who fell in the first year of the war between Athens and Sparta. There is little doubt that Thucydides, who probably heard the speech, has fairly represented the topics and the spirit of it.

† "Before I praise the dead, I should like to point out by what principles of action we rose to power, and under what institutions and through what manner of life we became great. For I conceive that such thoughts are not unsuited to the occasion, and that this numerous assembly of citizens and strangers may profitably listen to them.

"Our form of Government does not enter into rivalry with the institutions of others. We do not copy our neighbours, but we are an example to them. It is true that we are called

* A lecture delivered for the Ethical Society.

† Jowett's Thucyd. ii. 35 ff.

a democracy, for the administration is in the hands of the many and not of the few. But while the law secures equal justice to all alike in their private disputes, the claim of excellence is also recognised; and when a citizen is in any way distinguished, he is preferred to the public service not as a matter of privilege, but as a reward of merit. Neither is poverty a bar, but a man may benefit his country, whatever be the obscurity of his condition. There is no exclusiveness in our public life, and in our private intercourse we are not suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbour if he does what he likes; we do not put on sour looks at him, which, though harmless, are not pleasant. While we are thus unconstrained in our private intercourse, a spirit of reverence pervades our public acts; we are prevented from doing wrong by respect for authority and for the laws, having an especial regard to those which are ordained for the protection of the injured, as well as to those unwritten laws which bring upon the transgressor the reprobation of the general sentiment.

"And we have not forgotten to provide for our weary spirits many relaxations from toil; we have regular public competitions [dramatic, musical, and athletic] and religious ceremonies throughout the year; at home the style of our life is refined; and the delight which we daily feel in these things helps to banish melancholy." "We are lovers of the beautiful, though simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and ostentation, but when there is a real use for it. To avow poverty with us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is doing nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the State because he takes care of his own household; and even those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no share in public business not

as a harmless but as a useless character; and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of a policy. The great impediment to action is in our opinion, not discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained by discussion preparatory to action." "We alone do good to our neighbours not upon a calculation of interest, but in the confidence of freedom and in a frank and fearless spirit. To sum up: I say that Athens is the school of Greece, and that the individual Athenian in his own person seems to have the power of adapting himself to the most varied forms of action with the utmost versatility and grace." "Such is the city for whose sake these men nobly fought and died; they could not bear the thought that she might be taken from them; and every one of us who survive should gladly toil on her behalf."

These pretensions were not too highly pitched. In the year in which this speech was delivered, the roll of Athenian citizens, numbering not more than 20,000 men capable of bearing arms, included not one or two only, but several of the greatest men of all time. Socrates was entering upon his missionary activity. Thucydides was gathering the ideas which were to be embodied in his immortal history. Pericles was ruling the fierce democracy by his intellect and his eloquence. Three of the world's greatest poets, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes, were moving the Athenians to tears and laughter. Æschylus had passed away just a quarter of a century before. Plato was to be born within two years after. Not six years had elapsed since those inimitable works of sculpture, which by an extraordinary chance have found their last refuge within a mile of this lecture-hall, had been hoisted into their places on the temple of Athene. Other buildings and their ornaments, hardly less splendid, were still in the minds or under the hands of Athenian artists. It is worth while to visit the

Elgin marble room at the British Museum, and to look at the majestic female figure which with five others was erected in the year 409 before Christ to support an Athenian temple roof, and to reflect on the high-minded energy of a people which could enrich the world by such a monument, after the first twenty years of a desperate struggle for existence.

Pericles was well within the mark when he called Athens the school of Greece. Not only was it the school of Greece, but it was the nursery of Europe. If we hold sacred the earliest source of that "virtue," or manliness, which is the morality of the free European citizen, it is not to Palestine but to Athens that we should make our pilgrimage. For the first time in the history of the world, so far as we know or can conjecture, the problem of uniting public authority with individual freedom was solved, and magnificently solved, in the free commonwealths of Greece. And when Socrates and his followers had expressed in undying language the essence of the civic life of their time, the moral consciousness of Europe had received the general outline and impress which, in spite of qualitative and quantitative variations, it still retains. I will read on this subject the words of a writer, who, whatever honour he might pay to Greece, stood second to none in his recognition of the peculiar claim of Christianity. The late Professor Green wrote in his work on Ethics :—

"The habit of derogation from the uses of 'mere philosophy,' common alike to Christian advocates and the professors of natural science, has led us too much to ignore the immense practical service which Socrates and his followers rendered to mankind. From them in effect comes the connected scheme of virtues and duties within which the educated conscience of

* "Prolegomena to Ethics," pp. 269-276.

Christendom still moves, when it is impartially reflecting on what ought to be done. Religious teachers have no doubt affected the hopes and fears which actuate us in the pursuit of virtue, or rouse us from its neglect. Religious societies have both strengthened men in the performance of recognised duties, and taught them to recognise relations of duty towards those whom they might otherwise have been content to treat as beyond the pale of such duties; but the articulated scheme of what the virtues and duties are, in their difference and in their unity, remains for us now in its main outlines what the Greek philosophers left it.

"When we come to ask ourselves what are the essential forms in which, however otherwise modified, the will for true good (which is the will to be good) must appear, our answer follows the outlines of the Greek classification of the virtues. It is the will to know what is true, to make what is beautiful, to endure pain or fear, to resist the allurements of pleasure (*i.e.*, to be brave and temperate), if not, as the Greek would have said, in the service of the State, yet in the interest of some form of human society; to take for one's self, and to give to others, of those things which admit of being given and taken, not what one is inclined to, but what is due."

This, then, is Hellenism, perhaps the most splendid product of any single epoch in the world's history. But Hellenism alone will not suffice for us. For Hellenism was founded on slavery; and the curse of this slavery may be seen in its philosophy, and even in its perfect art, exhibiting as it does a rigid severity in those ornaments and accessories which are the vehicle, for the free workman, of his humorous and inventive enjoyment. We demand, then, a human or Christian Hellenism; a Hellenism which shall realise the true freedom of every human being, not merely as the Greek thinker would

say, *if* his nature *were* unfit for slavery, but *because* his nature *is* unfit for slavery. It was Christianity that first in principle and then in practice broke down the distinction between Jew and Greek, between slave and free, and in so doing not only enlarged the area, but transformed the quality of virtue. My duty to humanity is not only something wider, but also something higher than my duty to my own class in my own country. If the higher standard set by our duty to man were as magnificently achieved as the Athenian of the great time achieved the lower standard of his duty to the body of Athenian citizens the ideal of Christian Hellenism, or Periclean Christianity, would be attained.

Now we have a tolerably complete knowledge of the legal and economical system of this brilliant community; and without for a moment supposing that we can transfer laws or usages directly from an ancient State inhabited by, say 120,000 free persons and 380,000 slaves, to a modern nation consisting of thirty million persons, all nominally free, yet there are certain points in their mode of attacking their social problems which still have instructiveness for us.

Socialism in the technical modern sense, that is, the complete collective ownership of the means of production, did not exist, I believe, in any ancient State; but socialistic features, in the way of a very positive relation, not a merely protective relation, between the life of the private citizen and the action of the public authority, were for good and for evil essential to ancient communities.

Now I do trust that no one will imagine that I want to cut the knot either for or against socialistic ideals by a reference to ancient history or to ancient authority. I am not so foolish. What I do think important is this: we cannot, it seems to me, at any moment, consciously determine more than the next

step in politics. But yet we who now live are shaping the whole future course of society; we are shaping it to some end which will be different from anything that we can predict, but will be the outcome, now unknown, of the progressive moral ideals which for a few short years are entrusted to our keeping. It is our duty therefore, not merely to do all we know, but to know all we can. Our action is continually altering the circumstances of life; the unknown future will be the result of the new circumstances combined with the ideas which men bring to meet them. And therefore, I think, it is not well that we should *always* be proposing definite plans or preaching definite crusades. It is useful too, just to let our minds be brought to bear upon each other, to give and take ideas about important interests of life, to teach ourselves not to shy at the newness of a new name, but to observe how, under conditions other than ours, human nature has succeeded or has failed in its great continual task. We thus gain practice in distinguishing the undying purposes of humanity from those methods and rules and customs which in our own country, or nation, or rank of life, have become perhaps too rigid, and appear inevitable. To discriminate the means from the end, the accidental from the essential, is the highest task of theoretical as of practical judgment.

I said that some socialistic features were essential to all ancient communities: I mean especially the Greek communities, and to some extent Latin communities. I am not speaking of what might be called primitive communism, although in Sparta, for instance, it seems as if that had joined hands with constitutional enactment: I am speaking of the conscious legislative and administrative policy of very highly civilised communities.

The truth of our assertion appears to some extent if we

merely call to mind what is rather a twice-told tale, the peculiar meaning which the term city or state bore for a Greek. The word which they employed was that from which our term politics is derived, but the city or state did not mean to a Greek merely the executive power, nor did politics mean the mere machinery of government or of legislation. To cut this matter short, I will say that whenever, in our highest mood, we speak of England or of Great Britain not only as our home and kindred, but as a historic force and as an ideal that claims our devotion, then we may have some conception of what a Greek meant when he spoke of my city or my country. The thousand complications or institutions which fill our lives with other purposes did not exist for him. It was to the state or city that he looked for his main activities and his main enjoyments. If, for example, we think of our great Church Societies and voluntary schools, or public charities, or again of the development of music or the drama, the activities which are thus brought to our minds would to a Greek be closely associated with the State.

And this tendency received a peculiar cast from the economic basis of the ancient commonwealth, as regarded its public revenue. On the whole and in ordinary times, the ancient commonwealth expected to pay its public expenses out of its public property, just like an Oxford College or a City Company. For example, the famous silver mines in Attica were the property of the State, which let them to private lessees under various kinds of agreement, but always, I think, so that a good part of the unearned increment would come back to the public. I am afraid that the extreme convenience of having silver mines at home led the State to look with covetous eyes at certain gold mines abroad, which were not its property. But if you are to plunder other nations, perhaps

it is as well to do so in the interests of the public as in the interests of private individuals. Or you may more truly say: it is better for the public to have clean hands, as, on the whole, I believe that the people now wish to have, whatever may be done in their name. And by this high standard we may judge that we are perhaps a little purer than the Athenians. However, my immediate point is that the ancient State had its own property, such as these silver mines, and did not rest principally upon taxation. To be *taxed*, on the other hand, was the mark of an alien, who paid for the protection which a citizen had of right. Indirect taxation, again, grew up in the great trading States, but was not, as with us, a natural and essential source of revenue.

Thus the citizen felt himself in the position of a man administering a trust fund for the common good, rather than in that of a man contributing more or less reluctantly to expenses which he would therefore wish to cut down. This feature gave a distinct impress to ancient finance; but the old system tended to break down under the stress of war and commerce, and then showed its vicious side in the tendency to throw the burden on others than the citizens by exacting tribute from dependencies and by making war self-supporting. At the same time, in case of actual need, the State would levy percentages on the citizens' property without any scruple whatever. I think it is acknowledged to-day that we do not *justify* the exaction of tribute from dependencies, however we may practically oppress them by our commercial arrangements. The tribute paid to Athens, however, was at first a very reasonable contribution by the Confederacy to the common defence; it was the pressure of later circumstances that made it more or less a mark of tyranny.

This economic self-dependence of the State, if it had a

selfish aspect, had also a very noble aspect. The organized community was there, as a material fact, to represent the higher life of the whole body of citizens: and no one could mistake it for a mere police organization maintained by reluctant contributions. And in Athens, under Pericles, this general characteristic of ancient communities took a marked and impressive form.

A word of digression may be permitted here.

I speak of Athens *under* Pericles. What does this mean? I answer with a quotation from Hegel.* "To be the first in the State among this noble, free, and cultivated people of Athens, was the good fortune of Pericles; which raises our estimate of his individuality to a level on which few human beings can be placed. Of all that is great for humanity the greatest thing is to dominate the wills of men who *have* wills of their own; for the dominating individuality must be both the deepest and the most vital; a destiny for a mortal man which now can hardly be paralleled." The second part of the defining sentence is what *Carlyle* invariably forgot; there is nothing great in ruling, if those who are ruled have no wills of their own; or in plain English, "any fool can govern with a state of siege." We will now look at the institutions of those who were governed by Pericles.

We have all heard, I think, Aristotle's pregnant summary of the origin and purpose of society. It *originates*, he said, for the sake of *life*, but *is* for the sake of *good* life; or in modern phrase, its origin or root is in necessity, but its purpose or its flower is perfection. I will mention a few of the Athenian civic institutions, separating them so far as is possible according to this natural distinction.

* "Hist. of Phil.," i. 350.

First, then, as to the material or economic basis of life.

In the time I speak of, there was at Athens no complete Poor Law. Slavery dispenses with a Poor Law. If a citizen fell into wretched poverty, I do not know that it was any one's duty to relieve him. But of constructive legislation to avert citizen pauperism there was a good deal, and I believe that, in the time I speak of, citizen pauperism was almost unknown. The constitutional history of Athens opens with a comprehensive agrarian reform, a hundred and fifty years before the speech of Pericles, which, whatever its details were, arrested the growth of serfdom, removed the immediate burden of debt from the cultivators of the soil, and succeeded by legislative enactment in effectually limiting the size of landed estates. I say "effectually," because nearly two hundred years later, after an enormous commercial and industrial development, we find that two-thirds of the citizen body were owners of land.

Further, it was according to law the duty of every citizen to teach his son a trade. Aliens who practised a trade were exceptionally permitted to become citizens, an early and most sagacious law, intended to encourage the introduction of new industries. And any citizen who had no visible occupation or means of subsistence was liable to be summoned and punished. This is quite just, if occupations are to be had. The children of citizens who fell in war were brought up at the public charge, and public support was extended to citizens crippled in war, and, probably later, to all citizens incapable of gaining a livelihood. But this was not done by a self-acting law, but by a special investigation in every case.

Another aspect of material life is the health of the people. Of course there was none of what we call sanitary science; but the direct common sense of the Greeks seems to have shown them the value of good air and good water. Athens

itself had been rebuilt hurriedly after the Persian War, with many narrow streets which were very likely wretched enough; but the harbour town, like many later Greek towns, was laid out on a comprehensive plan under professional advice, with a view to beauty and convenience, and no doubt also to air and light. The system of water-courses, public baths, drinking-fountains, gardens, gymnasia, concert-rooms, were all works of the State for the material good of the citizens in general. The terrible plague which desolated Athens in the Peloponnesian War was favoured by the over-crowding of the city with the country population that took refuge in it, and is no indication of the normal sanitary state of Athens.

If, again, we look at the industrial aspect of Athenian life, we find that the State not only encouraged industry by its general legislation, but in particular expended enormous sums on the harbour, the commercial harbour as well as the war harbour, with all its docks, warehouses, and fittings. One particular set of buildings, in which ships were laid aside for the winter, cost, we are told, a quarter of a million sterling, corresponding to an enormously greater sum to-day. This was a very large and very successful manipulation of capital in the interest of the economic development of the community. But the State did not, I think, carry on commerce or industry itself,—it stopped short of organising labour,—but rather supplied these general utilities to individuals, recouping itself to some extent by rates and tolls. The ancient State, we should observe, usually farmed out the public revenue and property, a very easy plan of management, and one which preserves the unearned increment for the public; but it leaves the task of organising industry to private enterprise, and is now regarded as a primitive method and as a mark of deficient organising power, although applicable in some particular de-

partments, for instance, in dealing with land. I fear, too, that somewhat tyrannous navigation laws and commercial laws were employed in order to force the trade of the Eastern Mediterranean into the harbours and markets of Athens, and with notable success. I do not think that expedients of this kind are entirely strange to the modern world.

Another contrivance for the benefit of Athenian citizens came to be felt as tyrannical. It had several times happened that the conquered lands of uncivilised people had been annexed and distributed among Athenian citizens, who did not cease to be citizens, and therefore formed valuable garrisons in important trading districts, and thus were themselves provided for. But the land-hunger growing, this was done more than once with the lands of *Greek* commonwealths which had offended the powerful city. Now, as we all know, there is no harm in plundering uncivilised nations, but it is a serious matter to plunder a civilised community that has powerful friends and knows how to make an outcry. So that this measure did bring Athens into conflict with the moral feeling even of that age. There is a joke in Aristophanes which represents the Athenian farmer as quite ready to believe that the whole world is going to be measured out and given to Athenian citizens. These things are just the seamy side of the single-hearted determination of the Athenians that their city should be prosperous. I think that modern democracies are a little more scrupulous, if they know what is going on.

Such are some of the principal ways in which the State cared for the necessities of life or the material welfare of its members. While I am writing this I see published in an evening paper the opinion of an American observer on the municipal activity of Glasgow, which appears in some respects to illustrate what the Athenian spirit might do to-day. But of

course the economical problem is very different for us from what it was for a slave state, although, to meet the want of slaves, we have machinery; and if we can get no good results out of the productivity of labour increased by this means, the fault must lie somewhere in our arrangements.

Now I go on to ask what the Athenian State did for the *moral* welfare of its citizens, with a view to the purpose of good life involved in the continued existence of society, as distinct from the material necessity in which its roots are planted.

The larger part of what the State thus did for the citizens consisted in its being for them what it was. I said that the State was to them all and more that, when we are at our best, our country is to us. We ourselves, Pericles says, have created a large portion of our country's greatness. The pronoun "we" is so often loosely employed, that it is hard to realise that these words were literally accurate. It is only the citizens of a small Sovereign State who can use such an expression with literal truth. No political interest known to us can compare with this intensity of direct relation. Whether, however, we may not, by a re-animation of the civic ideal, and the organization of municipal duties, regain the Greek solidarity in the spirit, though we cannot in the letter, is a question worth pondering.

But I will pass to more specific matters. It was obviously the distinct determination of Pericles and his age that at any cost—and the cost, both moral and material, was great—every Athenian citizen, rich or poor, leisured, professional, or wage-earning, should be able to exercise the essential functions of a citizen, and should share in the essential culture and recreations of a citizen. Citizenship to them was *a life*, not one or two rights or duties. We must remember that representative government was unknown, and therefore, if the

citizen was to share in political functions, his personal participation was necessary, in a degree which we have supposed to be entirely superseded by our representative institutions. Whether our representative institutions have not a little bit played us a trick in this matter, and whether, though we cannot all sit in the Imperial Parliament, yet some form of personal participation in the management of affairs is not necessary to the true life of a citizen—these are issues which are coming upon us again, and in the decision of which the spirit of the Greek ideal may possibly re-assert itself.

The conception of office or government to a Greek included all definite exercise of political power. To take part in the general assembly of the citizens, or in the proceedings of any Council or Board possessing executive authority, was thought of as an office or function of government, just as was the function of general or of magistrate. There was the more truth in this feeling because the executive officials were not a responsible ministry, but simply carried out the decrees of the assembly, so that any citizen might initiate some very important resolution. When it happened that a trusted adviser of the people was also an official, then he was rather like a powerful Prime Minister. But this was only a coincidence.

Now no doubt a great number of citizens did actually serve as officials in our sense of the term, all the lower offices at least being paid offices, and most of them annual offices, and moreover being in the shape of Boards or Commissions composed of a great number of members. It is curious that the more democratic way of appointing officials was always taken to be appointment by lot rather than election by vote. I suppose the feeling was that you want to get one of yourselves, and not the nominee of a party, nor necessarily a very distinguished man. It reminds one of our question

about labour representation; do we want a distinguished advocate briefed with labour views, or a genuine type of the labour class? I should think the advocate more effective for a particular measure, but the genuine man more trustworthy all round. It is best to have both, I should imagine. Election by vote was applied to a few skilled officials, but the ordinary officials were appointed by lot. No one would stand who was ridiculously incompetent; public opinion would take care of that in so small a society. And this custom alone was enough to give great reality to the political power of the citizens. If you stood for an office which went by lot, no insignificance of your own and no organised opposition could prevent your getting it.

We shall never introduce the lot in modern life; but we might introduce the system of serving the State in rotation, which has much the same effect in pressing ordinary people into the public service, and often discovering them to be much more competent than they knew. Besides, this makes it a duty to be competent for the public service, which is a duty worth enforcing, and makes the mass of citizens more careful and more expert as critics of what is done.

The ordinary Athenian, therefore, who could dispense with or intermit the exercise of his trade on condition of receiving a small salary for his year of office, was pretty certain, if he wished, to hold actual executive office several times in his life.

But this was not the burning question of the fully developed democracy. The burning question was whether the State was to take special precautions in order that the mass of citizens should practically be able to exercise two general governmental functions; that of sitting as jurymen, in the huge popular juries of 500 persons or more which were the

supreme tribunals of Athens, and that of speaking and voting in the popular assembly, which, assisted by certain officials and committees, actually conducted the affairs of the State. And the tremendous step by which Pericles determined the future of the democracy was the decision to pay the jurymen about $4\frac{1}{2}d.$ every day that they served, and to make another kind of payment with reference to the religious festivals, which I will mention directly. These were followed up on the proposal of some other politicians by the payment of the citizens whenever they attended the popular assembly.

It is worth while to pause for a moment here, and to consider the amount of these payments in relation to the wages or salaries customary at Athens.

Each of them did not, in the time I speak of, exceed half the day's wage of an ordinary workman. Even if earned every day, they would not suffice to support a family in comfort, and the popular assembly only took place as a rule four days in the month, so that it at least could not tempt a man to desert his trade. The juries, indeed, sat nearly every day, and a citizen who was on the panel for the year would hardly be able to exercise his trade that year. But most citizens had some little property, and therefore would be enabled by the payment to discharge their public function, though at a slight sacrifice. The idea was not that a man should live on his public function, but that, if anxious to discharge it, he should not be absolutely prevented by having to work. The risk was, of course, that the idle and incapable people should fasten on this occupation as a means of livelihood, and in time this evil did spring up.

We can hardly compare the actual wages or incomes of that time with our own; they all appear to us extraordinarily small, partly because of the enormously different purchasing

power of money; partly because of a real simplicity of life. We can, however, see that relatively speaking there was a far greater equality in the means of existence than there is to-day. Property was widely distributed, and regular wages or salaries were tolerably uniform through society, in spite of the depressing effect which slave labour must have produced on the payment of manual industry, and on its reputation. The Athenians were comparatively free from the prejudice against manual labour, as the speech of Pericles shows. The senator, the architect, the stone-cutter, the citizen soldier all received their ninepence a day. But members of some fashionable professions commanded fancy prices, *i.e.*, actors, singers, painters, and above all, teachers of oratory and politics. An ambassador, on the other hand, seems to have been thought highly salaried at half a crown a day. The truth is, that regular citizen callings were pretty uniformly paid from high to low; the "stars," especially travelling artists, secured higher remuneration.

This equality of wages is a very striking fact, and points to a healthy state of things. I suppose that no one now-a-days would grudge a certain recognition of special excellence in work, which in fact the great Greek artists and teachers did secure, in spite of prejudice and custom. But in the first place, the gigantic differences of remuneration now customary in society do not represent a proportional difference in merit, but on the contrary, are often quite fatal to excellence by changing art and science and technical skill into mere money-making; and, secondly, I must and will reiterate with the philosophers and moralists, and against, if necessary, all the existing appearances of society, that wages or property, one's share of the produce of society, is not there to reward one for doing work, but either to give one work to do, or

to enable one to do it; and it is by that standard alone that its adequacy must be judged. I am not saying that this can be secured, except by a more enlightened public opinion; I only say that in the highly refined society of Athens, in spite of considerable inequalities of wealth and much class feeling, it was much more nearly secured than now, and that the state of things in which it is secured is far more healthy and more noble than that in which it is not.

This was a digression. However this may be, it is certain that in the later age of Pericles about half a good day's wage was paid to every citizen who applied for it every time he attended the public assembly or served on a jury. And we see that as regards the assembly the purpose was achieved, and all citizens were able to attend it. Socrates was once encouraging a young man who was nervous about speaking in public, and asked him, "Why, are you afraid of the fullers, and shoemakers, and carpenters, and smiths, and peasants, and merchants, and shopkeepers? for these are the sort of people who compose the assembly." Of course the political experiment was precarious, and if you like, you may infer that in the end it failed. That is to say, the city was defeated in a disastrous war, which is admitted not to have been well managed after the death of Pericles; the empire, upon which the Athenians had come to depend for their trade, was lost; pauperism appeared in the ranks of citizens, and all the inherent selfishness of the ancient commonwealth came to the surface. Whether a different development might not have led to equal failure, without equal achievement, is a question that cannot now be answered. We have inherited from that democracy an imperishable legacy of history, of morality, of science and of beauty; and those who have most deeply

studied the connection between a nation's reflective thought and its political and social life, will be slowest to assert that even Plato, or Demosthenes, or Aristotle could ever have existed apart from the great democratic commonwealth in which they found so much to condemn.

One more analogous institution remains to be spoken of. The speech of Pericles alludes to games or competitions, and sacred ceremonies. Probably we have all heard something of the importance which the public religious festivals had in the public culture of a Greek State. The plays which were performed in the great open-air theatre were a part of these festivals, and were full of the sort of interest which appealed to the people, being sometimes splendid political satire and broad farce, and sometimes great tragedies turning on moral problems which excited and interested the Greek mind. In fact, these tragedies were not only great poems, but played the part of sermons and lectures and musical performances as well. They correspond to our Church services, only they were thoroughly popular, and yet on a much higher intellectual level. The citizens, when they attended these great shows, felt they were enjoying and profiting by something which belonged to them as citizens, and was a part of their citizen life. Therefore, just as we think that every one should be educated, and the Church should be open to any one who wants to go there—so long as it is a National Church—so it was the determination of Pericles that no citizen should be prevented by poverty from attending these performances. He might have opened the theatre free, but, I suppose in order to make the richer people pay, without having any invidious distinction between free seats and seats that were not free, he proposed to require a small entrance payment, but to furnish the entrance money from the public treasury to all citizens who

applied for it. This payment was at first about 3*d.* of our money; it was, like the others, a strictly defined payment, in order to make possible a distinct function essential to citizenship, just like our grants in aid of education, or still more, like the remission of school fees. The consequence, indeed, or at least the end of it, was that in the next century, when the citizen spirit had degenerated, they simply, under the pretext of a payment like this, divided among themselves the revenues which should have adorned the State in peace, or protected it in war. People will tell you that Pericles introduced the thin end of the wedge of this bad habit. Perhaps he did; all one knows is that great results were obtained by his measures, and might or might not have been obtained by any other measures.

I certainly think that no harm could be done if our municipalities were, for example, to maintain or subsidise first-rate public orchestras under really skilled direction. This would have an effect in the long run of which we can, under present conditions, have no conception.

On the same principles, again, rested the enormous expenditure upon the architecture of the city. I alluded to this in speaking of the sanitary and of the commercial foresight of the administration; but the most remarkable feature of all is the artistic decoration of the public buildings. One particular building, which took five years in erection, cost half a million sterling, and there are many more of equal splendour. The largest private properties we hear of at Athens are of nothing like the amount which was spent on a single public building —not a tenth part of it, I should suppose. This outlay may have been extravagance, and I fear it was partly drawn from the tribute of subject States; on the other hand, it was for the enjoyment and education of the whole citizen body, who thus walked about among new and complete works of art, the

weather-stained fragments of which *our* best art students are glad to copy laboriously. If the public was extravagant, the individual was simple in his tastes; and this concentrated magnificence was far less costly to the community than is to-day the luxurious and tasteless ostentation of the individual millionaire. I will read a passage from Demosthenes, delivered just eighty years after the speech of Pericles, in which he contrasts in this respect the age of Pericles with his own degenerate days.*

"Moreover, former times were times of *national* prosperity and splendour; no man then stood out above his fellows. The proof of it is this. Some of you may know the style of house of Themistocles or Miltiades, or of the illustrious men of that day; you see it is no grander than the mass of houses. On the other hand, the public buildings and edifices were of a magnificence and beauty such that posterity cannot surpass them—the gateway of the Acropolis yonder, the docks, the porticoes, and other permanent adornments of Athens. To-day your statesmen have vast fortunes; some of them have built for themselves houses grander than many of the public edifices; some, again, have bought up more land, than all of you who are here together hold. As for the public buildings which you erect and whitewash, I am ashamed to tell of their meanness and squalor."

Thus we have seen that to a very great extent, by administration and by custom and sentiment, essential social equality and refinement, with a general simplicity of individual life, were secured for a time at Athens. It is just worth mentioning, moreover, that special burdens were imposed in rotation on the wealthier citizens, but always conjoined with opportunities of distinction and good service. A man might be

* Butcher, "Demosthenes," p. 15.

called upon to fit out a ship of war, but then he would command it; or to bear the cost of the performance of a play, but then he would have credit for his taste and his liberality. So long as there was a genuine public spirit, I think this was a noble relation between the State and the individual. The idea of compulsory volunteer service is one that might be worth reviving.

One remark must be made with reference to the rapid decay of the system which I have briefly sketched. Economical socialism is no bar against moral individualism. The resources of the State may be more and more directly devoted to the individual's material well-being, while the individual is becoming less and less concerned about any well-being except his own. It is in this change that the decay of Periclean Athens consists, and that the hazard lies of all positive relations between the public authority and the necessities of individual life. The careful adjustment of means to ends, and of advantages to the functions which demanded them, did not save the Athenian commonwealth from a degradation which depended perhaps on the deeper tendencies of the age. But to this careful adjustment the measure of success that was achieved was undoubtedly owing, and after all that can be said against it, the system must in many respects command our grateful admiration.

I have tried to suggest here and there how an analogous spirit might embody itself to-day; but even if no special lessons are deducible from this glorious past for our very different conditions, it still is encouraging to know that a series of great statesmen did once succeed by a definite legislative and administrative policy in realizing such an ideal as Pericles describes, within a very highly civilized industrial and commercial society.

IV

*ARTISTIC HANDWORK IN EDUCATION.**

MANY influences combine at the present moment in favour of educational reform in a certain definite direction—the direction of what is sometimes called manual instruction.

First among these influences we might reckon the "Kindergarten" movement, tracing its descent from Fröbel, and through him, perhaps, from Rousseau, Schiller, and Goethe. The principle of this movement is, in Fröbel's own words, to impart "a human education by the appropriate training of the productive or active impulses." A fine and complete school on this principle—not a mere kindergarten—is Dr. Adler's school in New York, which our technical commissioners refer to as based on a method of "creative" education.

The idea of calling into play the productive impulse was not in itself new—the teaching of Latin versifying might be defended on this ground—but in its application to manual work, and to the early training of children, it was practically a new departure. The kindergarten employments, especially Fröbel's highest employment, clay-modelling, are closely akin to, and an excellent basis for, the kind of teaching which I am to discuss to-day.

* An address delivered before the Self-Help Society, at Oxford, on behalf of the Home Arts and Industries Association. This Association has no connection with any other Society for which I have lectured.

Another influence at work in a similar direction is that of the demand for natural-science teaching. The direct contact with objects—letting the boy feel, as Professor Huxley has said, the pull of the magnet for himself—the work of the microscopical or of the physical laboratory, and the elementary handwork required of the student in such laboratories, all tend to confer an instinctive grasp of principle, and a habitual accuracy of perception.

And, thirdly, we have to grapple with the urgent problem of what is known as technical education—that is, education in applied science and art, and in the use of tools. It is all-important that this problem should be rightly understood, and to a great extent I think that it is rightly understood. Assistance even in our commercial perplexities cannot be obtained from education which is not educational. In the Finsbury Technical College, under Professor Silvanus Thompson, no trades are taught. Sir Philip Magnus lays most stress on teaching the use of tools. On such teaching and such principles as are represented by him and by Professor Silvanus Thompson I have only to say that, although excellent, they depend for their efficiency on the material delivered to them by the elementary school, and on the faculties awakened by still more purely educational methods. We do not know of what British workmen are capable till we have seen a generation thoroughly educated *from the first* by vital and plastic methods.

In presence of these new influences there is a certain danger that the attitude of reformers to existing educational methods should be unduly hostile. The three movements to which I have referred are each of them capable of being regarded as a revolution against mere book-learning. With any such attitude those who care for education can have no sympathy;

unless *mere* book-learning means book-learning which is not intelligent, and which arouses no interest. The cure for that defect would be, not less book-learning, but more. A pupil who in a true sense has *learnt to read*, has mastered a more valuable art than any handicraft. I do not say that there are very many such pupils in our elementary schools. But educational reform, as I understand it, aims, by a more vital and active instruction, at arousing the interest of the pupils, and at stimulating their craving for knowledge. We should regard the educational movement of this century as a single, many-sided progress. I am impatient when I hear our own faults laid at the door of our zealous and progressive educationists. Our own grudging spirit towards elementary education, our own cast-iron regulations, and our own demand to see something for our money, are the main causes of its mechanical character. I have spoken to an energetic teacher in a London school, skilled in kindergarten methods, and when I asked her, "Can you use kindergarten employments in your school?" she replied, "I do all I can with a division of sixty children." All work of this type needs separate and distinct preparation for each single pupil. If we are tempted to fancy that our educationists have no zeal for improved educational methods, we should bear in mind that the London School Board has tried to set up a carpenter's shop, but was promptly surcharged for it by the auditor; that this same Board employs a most efficient kindergarten instructress to supervise its infant schools; that in some large Board Schools, especially in Bradford and Birmingham, there is excellent elementary science teaching, all of which is training of hand and eye; and that an exhibition of appliances for improved geographical instruction has been held under the auspices of the Bradford School Board, at which there were shown models of the sur-

rounding district made by local schoolmasters, that prove their will and capacity to teach, by the modelling process, the structure of hill and valley in that beautiful region of Yorkshire. I may add that Her Majesty's Inspector at Bradford himself devotes two evenings in the week to holding a class in joiners' work in a cellar under a Board School, at which he is assisted by elementary teachers; and one teacher, he hopes, will shortly open a class for drawing, followed by construction of objects. I call that pretty good for a man who actively superintends the education of 80,000 children. America, too, affords good examples of the solidarity of the educational movement. Manual instruction is there becoming well established, and is splendidly successful. There is a fine Manual School in Chicago, established by the Commercial Club (a dining club of leading citizens) out of their own pockets, and worked with the best results. At the great Pullman works the woodcarving is all artistic handwork of a high class; and the decorative design throughout the States is said to be superior to what we have in England. "Oh, yes," it may be said, "this is the commercial and industrial acuteness of the Americans; no doubt they organize their education with a special view to industrial aptitude." But I believe that is just the reverse of the truth. The success of their education is due, I am informed, to the large ideas with which it is organized, and to their constantly aiming, as their central purpose, at the moral development of citizens.

In treating of the requirements of educational reformers, I have thus far spoken simply of instruction in the principles of *industrial* handicrafts. No one would deny the value of such training—the system known as "Slojd" is a very valuable form of it—and I hope to see a carpenter's shop attached to every elementary school throughout the country.

But there is something more that can be done, and that has been done, and this is, to combine with instruction in the general elements of handicraft a training in some branch of work that has artistic quality. We are not now speaking of great art; not of picture painting, for instance, or of any art that deals directly with human action and passion. We are speaking of what are called the lesser arts. It is not quite easy to define them. They might be called the decorative arts, but they include, for instance, glass blowing and pottery, which are not merely decorative, because the *whole object* has to be made in beautiful form. But all the lesser arts are decorative in the widest sense, that is to say, they are not independent; they have something to do with useful objects. They do not make a thing like a picture or a statue, having its whole reason of existence in its artistic value; at least, it is my feeling that when they try to do this, they are beginning to go astray. But yet, though not *wholly* independent, these arts are in some degree independent or free, and if they were not, they could not be fine art at all. It must be possible in a fine art for the craftsman to indulge himself, and express his enjoyment and his fancy, in the lines of the form or in the patterns and colours of the surface. This freedom has many degrees, and it is true that fine art is rooted in sound workmanship and fitting construction, and it is a little dangerous to distinguish fine art from handicraft. Still the distinction must be made, although it must be cautiously handled. Common joiners' work has not the same capabilities of expression as decorative carving, although, of course, a box or a door may be turned out in a pleasing way or in an ugly way.

Then, before going further, we must take notice of the point we have reached; that is to say, that the lesser fine arts are handicrafts, although they are something more. In learning

one of these arts, the pupil is trained from the beginning in the care of tools, the use of tools, precise measurement, certain and accurate cutting or modelling, and, above all, in the *love* of true and good execution, and I suppose this love of truth, if I may call it so, is the meeting-point of handicraft and fine art.

And then, moreover, these lesser arts, still considered as mere handicrafts, exercise those mental qualities which we call physical, aptness and precision of hand and eye, with great economy of muscular labour. The work is less of a mechanical toil, and more of a plastic training, than is the case, for example, with the blacksmith's trade. And this is of the utmost importance when we remember that we are speaking of evening classes for lads who will have been all day in the field or in the workshop. Great versatility and flexibility of talent is found to be imparted by training in these arts. Of course, however, there should be at the root of the whole system instruction in carpentering and in the way objects are put together.

But now we go a step further. I said that these arts are something more than handicrafts; however humble, yet they are branches of fine art, and are capable of *beauty*. I need not spend time in proving, here in Oxford, that the enjoyment of beauty is a good thing. I may assume, I think, not only that it is one of the best things in life, but that it is eminently wholesome for everybody. But I had better just point out how, in particular, the enjoyment and perception of beauty display their value in the sort of education which is our subject to-day. I am not going to say that beauty is valuable because it is useful; but I should like to point out how it becomes useful by reason of being so valuable.

The perception of beauty implies, above all things, an awakened mind. It consists in an active sympathy and insight, a fresh and vigorous spirit, that apprehends the expres-

sion, and the life, or truth, of all that it meets with, just as a great portrait-painter seizes a face or a figure. And so, when the sense of beauty is ever so little aroused, the mind has acquired a new organ. Nature, in the first place, with all its forms and movements and colours, becomes an endless source of interest. Experience shows, what we should expect, that plain country boys can thus have their eyes opened and see what they never saw before. You have a country wheelwright, who can carve a panel of oak leaves from nature, and who becomes an enthusiast for naturalistic design. This means that he has acquired the love of form, and the world is a different place to him after his eyes are thus opened. And, in the second place, this same awakening of the mind involves an appreciation of beauty in art. To begin with, the work of good art-workmen of to-day is put before the pupil as a model; and then his attention can be and should be gradually directed to the work of craftsmen belonging to other times and countries. It is something, for example, to open the eyes of Englishmen to the beauty of the stone or wood-carving of their Cathedral Churches; and we can hardly suppose that this beauty can be felt without strengthening the sense of a human and national inheritance, which is worth preserving and ennobling. And when we have, in every locality, those perfectly arranged and bounteously-filled museums of beautiful work, which are among the dreams that demand to be realized, then we may come to see what a force of interest and sympathy is implied in the awakened sense of beauty in art.

So far, then, we may fairly conclude that the lesser arts, not to speak of their advantages as handicrafts, are, as fine art, capable of doing for those whose education is necessarily short and practical, something analogous to what great literature ought to do for those whose education is longer and more

general. I am not admitting, of course, that *any* education ought to be *wholly* without literature.

It is my conviction that a Self-Help Society, in as far as it operates by educational means, will attain its purpose more successfully the more definitely it adheres to the largest view of education. And I mean by the largest view of education the persuasion that there is no form of training, the value of which is not ultimately moral. To aim in education at quick returns, at results commercially available, is simply to court failure. What can certainly—I had almost said easily—be done by a training in some branch of art, is to intensify the sense of the value of life. This sense, I take it, is the very root and spring of Self-Help. To heighten it, is to make life more worth living, and therefore more worth developing. I am anxious to make this point quite clear. Of course, in a society such as the Home Arts and Industries Association, many purposes and feelings are legitimately represented. But I think that I am justified in disclaiming for the Association any main intention of training professional art-workmen, or of encouraging amateurs of any class to gain a livelihood by the production of knick-knacks to sell at exhibitions or bazaars. The object of the Association, as I understand it, is educational in the largest sense. That is to say, its efforts are directed towards developing a capacity which is the birthright of a civilized human being. And this purpose is general, dealing with the leisure time of *all* working people, and *not* chiefly or exclusively with those who are engaged in the decorative trades.

Of course we are glad enough that men or boys should earn something in their evening hours, and we earnestly desire that local industries should be revived, and that the whole trade of decoration and design in this country should be

set upon the only solid foundation, that of a genuine love of beauty, and habit of beautiful production, engrained in the national mind. But none of these results can be securely attained except by a thorough-going devotion to the perception of beauty as one of the best things in life. If we teach in any other spirit than this, we instil the principles of ugliness in imparting the principles of beauty. Speaking for myself alone, the sort of tidings from our classes which I am glad to hear is, not that a lad is making a lot of money by selling his carving or his brass work, but, as I heard this spring, that a pitman in Midlothian walks a couple of miles to the class in the evening, because he enjoys the work; or that a gardener says he has been a gardener all his life, but he never knew the beauty of flowers till he was taught it in the Home Arts Class; or that the boys of a club in Whitechapel have made a bit of clay modelling or a window box of mosaic tiles to decorate their clubhouse; or that an Irish lad pursues his wood-carving, literally through thick and thin, in an Irish cabin where there is hardly a clean place to lay it down.

It was, I believe, in the simple determination to do something towards reviving the love of beauty among the people, that a lady several years ago established some small classes in wood-carving near her country home. At a later time these classes were united with others in different parts of England, Scotland, and Ireland for the purpose of sharing the use of models and designs, and generally with a view to the interchange of experience. The name first adopted was Cottage Arts Association; but by the time that, in the beginning of 1885, the London studio and office were established, the present name, "Home Arts and Industries Association," had been adopted. Three annual exhibitions have been held in London, the first in the summer of 1885, the third in the summer

of 1887. In the interval between these two dates the classes increased from 60 to about 200, and the number of pupils from, I suppose, 400 or 500 to about 2,000. (Now, January, 1889, there are over 4,000 pupils.)

The Association, as it stands at present, consists of two parts:—

1. Its actual mission is carried out by means of little evening classes, held chiefly by lady volunteers, also by many clergy and working men in various places throughout Great Britain and Ireland. In these classes the different branches of artistic handwork are taught to working lads and men, and I daresay to some girls, all of whom are simply attracted by the love of the pursuit. No previous knowledge is demanded of the pupils, and if any charge is made, it is very trifling.

2. These classes, however, would be of comparatively little value, but for the operations of the London centre. The office and studio there are in charge, not of mere letter-writing secretaries, but of ladies who thoroughly understand the various branches of the work, and are practically skilled in them. Advice and guidance, which are perpetually needed, go from there constantly to the little classes in London and the country, and more especially the entire artistic nutriment is supplied from that centre—that is to say, there is a special committee which collects and selects and produces designs such as seem good in themselves and suitable for instruction. These designs are circulated among the classes, just as if the office was a large circulating library of these things. And equally important with the designs are the models: bits of work of different kinds actually carried out by a good workman, and sometimes with part of the work only just begun, so as to show the process. These models are sent about by post, with the corresponding designs, and they show the pupils not

only how to set to work upon a particular design, but how to interpret outline designs in general, and what good work looks like. They are unanimously said to have a most inspiring effect on the pupils. It is exceedingly hard to meet the demand of the classes for supplies of these things; it is a question partly of money and partly of labour—labour so highly skilled as not to be reducible to a question of money. The society has had a roughish time of poverty, during which it has depended for its daily work mainly on the self-sacrificing labour of a band of good women. There can be no doubt whatever, although invaluable help has been given by men, that from the very beginning of the work the burden and heat of the day has been borne by women. The Society, though by no means wealthy, has now a certain breathing time, which it will use in placing itself fully on a level with all demands that can be made upon it.

Then, further, besides all this correspondence and supply of nutriment, the London studio organizes training classes, where intending teachers are trained in the work by professional instructors. And, also, all the appliances for work being there, and competent teachers on the spot, class-holders who come up to town for a day or two can go there and get special difficulties solved, and can have a single lesson in their subject, which is often of the very greatest use to them. These lessons, I ought to say, have to be paid for, and so have the courses of training at the studio. I believe *2s. 6d.* a lesson is the fee.

It is this constant communication with a centre where work is being carried on, and where competent and energetic workers are collecting experience and gathering stores of designs, that forms the distinctive merit of the Home Arts Association. But this subject of centralization raises some more questions of great interest which I will touch on very

shortly, viz., centralization in the supply of designs, in finance, and in control over the goodness of the class-work. After speaking shortly of these questions, I will return to what is perhaps of most immediate interest, the work of the little classes scattered up and down throughout the country.

I listened the other day to a most excellent paper upon Technical Education, read by a working man—a compositor by trade—and I was much struck by his horror of centralization. Whatever you do, he said in effect, for Heaven's sake do not centralize. Leave the localities free to find out the education that suits themselves. Don't let them be hampered with a board of theorists in London. His anti-governmental ardour was partly explained by the fact that he had been reading Herbert Spencer.

But the existence of this strong and healthy local self-feeling illustrates the point which I want to make about centralization in the supply of designs. I ought to observe, however, that *our* centre is not managed by theorists, but is a working school, which makes a great difference. Apart from this, the function of the centre, as I think we all understand it, is to be the focus of the capacities and resources of the Association. Of course, it must also keep the Society in contact with all other sources of help; it has books and museums within reach, and it welcomes the aid of men practically skilled in artistic subjects, but not exclusively devoted to Home Arts work. So that, especially in the beginning, the centre does seem a little independent, even despotic, and it will always have certain advantages in this way from its position in a metropolis. Merely to have the South Kensington Museum at command is an enormous advantage. Still, all the branches ought, as they come to have any independent ideas or talents, to re-act upon the centre. They ought all to help in the collection of

designs, which is a most laborious task. They can send up pieces of good work on loan; they can send up drawings, photographs, rubbings of beautiful things hidden away in country houses or in local museums. They can hunt up local carvers, and help in the laborious and costly work of providing models. And I hope, speaking for myself, that there is more than all this in the future. If the teaching given falls on good ground, if the love and perception of beauty revive throughout the country, together with a common practice of art, there will be some minds in which the perception will assume a creative form, and the practice of art will lead to the progress of design. If the movement has life in it, I think this must happen. Already some localities, especially Scotland and Ireland, have preferences for this or that class of design. These local preferences show the frame of mind out of which local schools might spring, and will at any rate influence in their degree the work of the whole Society. Centralization in this sense, an interchange of influences throughout the whole country by means of the centre, is the very life of an organization.

I just allude to the matter of finance, because it is analogous to that of design. At present the Society gets its money, as to some extent it gets its designs, wherever it can—from the general public; and it expends on the nutriment supplied to the classes immensely more than the minimum subscription covers. This must be so at first, and while the work is, as at present, rapidly progressing, because the classes are naturally poor when they first start, and have enough to do to meet their own expenses. But when classes become rich by sale of work, which is made possible for them by the assistance they receive at so very cheap a rate (5*s.* a year for each class), it will obviously become a recognised obligation that they should tax themselves to help in

extending to others the advantages by which they have so largely profited. This has, in fact, been done in some few cases; and such cases should supply a large item in the revenue of the Society, as the proportion of well-established classes to new ones increases. It should not be all giving on the side of the Central Society, either in the work of furnishing designs, or in the matter of expenditure. One-sidedness is equally unhealthy in both concerns.

I may be asked,—Then why do you not have a higher subscription for the classes? This subscription was originally 2*s.* 6*d.*, but has been raised to 5*s.*, and I think, personally, that there is an unanswerable reason for raising it no higher. You cannot have a tariff according to the wealth of your locality; many localities are very poor; your teachers, when they start a class, may be put to the expense of a pound or two for materials and tools; and it may often happen that they have not at first been able to interest many friends. Obviously the classes would often not be started at all if you asked for half-a-guinea or a guinea from a teacher who is to do hard work as a volunteer, and may besides be involved in some slight expense. On the other hand, I feel strongly that those who wish well to the cause, and whose locality is profiting in this way, ought to think about becoming ordinary guinea subscribers to the Association.

Then again: I have been asked at one of these lectures whether the Society has any *control* over the competence of the volunteer teachers throughout the country, and over the way in which they do their work. Well, the *genius loci* suggests the idea of an examination, but there is no entrance examination in which an intending teacher could be ploughed! But there is much more control in practice than one might think possible when any one can take or leave the work at

pleasure. The root of all the control is that most people who take up this work are in earnest and mean to do their best. That being so, the mere fact of receiving good designs and models, which they are glad to accept if only because they do not know where else to get any, has from the first an educating influence. Many volunteers, of course, are highly competent teachers when they begin; but nearly all are glad to receive advice and criticism from the studio; they appeal to it in their perplexities; and if they show work at the Exhibition, which they are eager to do, they find that it has to stand beside really good productions, of which I am happy to say there is now a pretty large supply. The work is judged, and obtains or does not obtain a certificate; the teacher is perhaps taken round the Exhibition by some competent person, or has a letter of criticism written to him or her. I do not speak as an expert; but I am informed that it is really wonderful to see the improvement which is thus effected in the work of a class. And, of course, the teachers are very eager, too eager, to sell; and on the whole, the best work sells best. When you see it all in a room together, the difference is striking even to a not highly-trained eye. I do not doubt that some horrors are perpetrated in the dark places of the land; we can only say that a steady pressure is kept up, which gradually raises the level of the work. Such a movement as this is essentially two-sided. A good teacher, it is said, will always be a learner; and it most be brought home to all of us who are interested in the progress of education, that in the mission which we find so fascinating, of educating the working classes, there is involved the corresponding mission of educating ourselves.

And now I will return to the point at which the organiza-

tion actually performs the function for the sake of which it exists; that is, to the little evening classes in London and the country, in which different branches of art are taught to working lads and men.

First, I will speak very shortly and generally of what is necessary in order to start a class, and then a little more fully of what, as it seems to me, should be the teacher's point of view in the education that is given.

In order to start a class, I believe that very little is wanted besides pupils and a teacher. You may ask me, with Scott's Antiquary, "And a little money would be necessary also, would it not?" and I should reply, with Hermann Dousterswivel, "Bah! one trifle, not worth talking about, might be necessaries." It is necessary to raise enough money to start with tools and materials, and to supply the class with them for some little time; because the work done at first will not be saleable. This may cost from £1 to £3 for a small class; the subscription to the Society for one branch of work is 5*s.* a year. This class *ought* to be small, especially if the pupils are all new to the work; some say four pupils, some say six; that is for one evening a week, and one teacher. The lesson is usually two hours; even that time is not too much to give the pupils the constant individual attention which they require. Of course, when some of them are a little advanced, more can be taken. The smallness of the class makes it easier to get a room. It is not difficult, as a rule, to get such a room for nothing, as will hold ten or a dozen pupils; many ladies hold classes at their own houses; many are held at mission rooms, or parish rooms, or working men's or boys' clubs. If there is rent, that is the most serious expense. Otherwise the expense is trifling. When work becomes saleable, a percentage should

be taken from the proceeds for the expenses of the class. On determining to start a class, the intending teacher should consult our secretary at the Royal Albert Hall, mentioning what branch of work is to be adopted, and will then receive instructions as to tools and materials, and leaflets of instructions in the process.

Of course there is the further question of what training the teacher may have had. I believe that any one who cares for the subject, and has a sound knowledge of drawing, can acquire the capacity of teaching one of these arts without any very lengthy training. But people differ immensely in the rapidity with which they learn. I should say that any one, even if familiar with the work already, would do very well to go through some lessons at the studio in order to become familiar with the way in which our teaching is usually carried on; or, it is possible to have a trained instructor down to start the class and prepare the teachers; and if a number of teachers or amateurs combine to take lessons, this need not be costly. Help can often be obtained from a local carver or metal-worker, who can ground the class thoroughly in the handicraft part of the work. It is really wonderful what has been done in remote classes by help of local professional teachers, and by something of a gift and strenuous self-education on the part of the class-holder. A great deal can be done by any one who will really take pains.

I ought to say that there are no general rules as to making the pupils pay for the lessons; personally, I am a strong charity organizationist, and I think that every one should be made to pay wherever it is possible. But I believe the classes are generally free, or the payments of 1*d.* a week or so are counted as instalments by which the pupils buy their tools.

The pupils are chiefly lads between thirteen and eighteen; some adult working-men, and some girls. It is *particularly* noticeable that the Association is as much, I had almost said more, for the roughest unskilled class than for the skilled mechanics. The classes include agricultural labourers (here is a beautiful piece of work by a country cowboy), shoeblacks, carmen, bricklayers, country carpenters, pitmen, as well as brass founders, watchmakers, and other town mechanics. All the instruction being evening and amateur, it interferes in no way with apprenticeship. On the contrary, it may be worked along with a gymnastic room or musical drill, to the extreme benefit of town lads. The Corstorphine class of twenty-eight boys, from which I have some beautiful brass work here, is worked in that way. The arts taught are wood carving, metal repoussé (brass, copper, or silver) and incised work, bent ironwork, sheet ironwork, clay modelling, carving in hardened chalk, mosaic of broken china or of tesseræ, and leather work. The report gives a tabular list of the classes, with their number and the kind of work.

The mode of teaching is hardly for me to speak of; but I will venture on one or two generalities which seem pretty clear. The object, of course, is not recreation, but yet the classes must be recreative in the sense that the pupils must come because they enjoy coming, and this, I believe, is one reason for beginning, as our teachers do, at once with manual work proper, and not, for example, with freehand drawing. Any boy likes to cut wood, or handle clay or cement, but the elementary part of drawing is less immediately attractive. And I believe this plan to be right in theory also. I do not think that design can be rightly created or rightly interpreted except through a mastery over the material for which it is intended. Of course, when the instinct of form is aroused, it demands

further cultivation by means of drawing, and in my view, the carving or modelling classes ought to act as feeders to any drawing classes within reach. This has actually happened in one case. A drawing class that was languishing was revived by the establishment of a carving class in the same locality. That is the ideal, I think.

I understand, too, that our elementary designs, even those which are little more than exercises, aim at showing beauty of outline, and some element of style. The boys are not kept at *mere* tool exercises in surface modelling, so as to acquire skill in finish before they go on to cut complete patterns. In short, the pupils are carried on rather fast, and taken into the spirit of the thing, rather than worried about pure mechanical finish. This does not mean that they are not made to cut their curves true and clean; if the workman fails in this, the spirit is gone at once. And I understand it to be the distinct duty of the teacher to labour at awakening the perception of beauty, to point out what is true and beautiful in design and what is not, to communicate, as occasion serves, something of the great ideas which govern such a writer as Mr. Ruskin, or, in art only, Mr. William Morris, and to explain, or at least to make familiar by well-chosen examples, the modifications undergone by the beauty of nature in passing into the beauty of decorative art. Here, for instance, is a description which I have heard of a lesson given by a lady who has a singular faculty of teaching. She used to show her pupils a drawing of a flower in a botany book (the class was held in winter—she would prefer to use the flower itself), and obtain their suggestions as to conventionalising it into a decorative design; she criticised their suggestions, made suggestions of her own, and at last decided upon a form which she drew on the blackboard; the class then moulded it in clay, and finally carved it in wood.

As to the results obtained, I wish to speak chiefly of the educational results pure and simple. But I will just say that in the first place the purely moral results of the mode in which the work is done is striking and obvious. The influence of the teacher, through perfectly natural intercourse, reaches the pupils without any admixture that might make them kick. The wholesome and interesting occupation, besides its positive value, is a substitute for things that are not desirable. I don't want to talk too like a missionary magazine, but I could tell you cases of parents' anxiety removed, and of lads kept straight and set straight, by the combined influence of the work and the teacher. Economically, in trades like the joiner's, of course a thoroughly neat-handed workman, who has taste and can do a nice bit of carving, is a valuable man, and the amateur workers make something by their work. They also acquire the habit of decorating their own homes, which is what we particularly wish. And then, educationally, with reference to the work itself, it is very hard to give a fair idea of the average productions, because they vary enormously. Not all the productions are in any way equal to the best of the exhibits here to-day, but it is obvious that the same teaching which produces excellent work from a man who has the gift, will produce work of the right spirit from a man of less natural talent. We must face the fact that we are speaking of purely amateur work, and we must not look to the mechanical perfection of things, but the training which is implied in the power and habit, acquired by rough working lads, of producing such things in their leisure time.

Before I sit down, I have just two more things to say. The first is, that it is all-important in any particular locality to make a beginning. The occupation of teaching is attractive, and is soon felt to be of extreme value. The relation to the

pupils is exceedingly civilizing for them, and does quite unobtrusively produce an enormous effect on their manners and on their lives. It is therefore, as a rule, not very hard to get helpers when a class is once seen at work. But some one, of course, must take the plunge and set the matter going. It is very easy to set going; the arrangements could not be more simple than they are. But if the first step is not taken by some one, of course there can be no result.

And the last thing I have to say is this. Do not let us imagine our efforts superfluous, from the idea that the State or the locality may shortly take up this task with larger means than ours. Whatever form the new system may assume, its actual working must depend on the material with which it has to work. Education does not consist in buildings, not even in workshops, nor in grants of money from Parliament, or out of the rates; it consists in the desire and the capacity of human minds to teach and to be taught. To awaken this desire, and to create this capacity, in a new direction, is the achievement not of years but of generations. Methods have to be evolved, and to become easy and familiar to teachers; an order of teachers has to be created, uniting experience with enthusiasm; the mind of the upper classes, as of the lower, has to be penetrated with a new sense of what makes life worth living. This, and nothing less, is the work in which we have the chance of helping, and any future organization must entirely depend for its efficiency on the progress which this work shall have made.

V.

*ON THE TRUE CONCEPTION OF ANOTHER WORLD.**

"With such barren forms of thought, that are always in a world beyond, Philosophy has nothing to do. Its object is always something concrete, and in the highest sense present."—Hegel's "Logic," Wallace's translation, p. 150.

IT will surprise many readers to be told that the words which I have quoted above embody the very essence of Hegelian thought. The Infinite, the supra-sensuous, the Divine, are so connected in our minds with futile rackings of the imagination about remote matters which only distract us from our duties, that a philosophy which designates its problems by such terms as these seems self-condemned as cloudy and inane. But, all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, Hegel is faithful to the present and the concrete. In the study of his philosophy we are always dealing with human experience. "My stress lay," says Mr. Browning,† "on the incidents in the development of a soul; little else is worth study." For "a soul" read "the mind," and you have the subject-matter to which Hegel's eighteen close-printed volumes are devoted.

* This Essay has been previously published as the introduction to a translation of a fragment from Hegel's "Æsthetic."

† Preface to "Sordello."

The present remarks are meant to insist on this neglected point of view. I wish to point out, in two or three salient instances, the transformation undergone by speculative notions when sedulously applied to life, and restrained from generating an empty "beyond," or other world, between which and our present life and knowledge there is a great gulf fixed. That the world of mind, or the world above sense, exists as an actual and organized whole, is a truth most easily realized in the study of the beautiful. And to grasp this principle as Hegel applies it is nothing less than to acquire a new contact with spiritual life. The spiritual world, which is present, actual, and concrete, contains much besides beauty. But to apprehend one element of such a whole must of course demand a long step towards apprehending the rest. It is for this reason that I propose to explain, by prominent examples, the conception of a spiritual world which is present and actual, in order to make more conceivable Hegel's views on the particular sphere of art. So closely connected, indeed, are all the embodiments of mind, his "Philosophy of Fine Art" may be said to contain the essence of his entire system.

We know, to our cost, the popular conception of the supra-sensuous world. Whatever that world is, it is, as commonly thought of, not here and not now. That is to say, if here and now, it is so by a sort of miracle, at which we are called upon to wonder, as when angels are said to be near us, or the dead to know what we do. Again, it is a counterpart of our present world, and rather imperceptible to *our* senses, than in its nature beyond contact with sense as such. It is peopled by persons who live eternally, which means through endless ages, and to whose actual communion with us, as also to our own with God, we look forward in the future. It even, perhaps, contains a supra-sensuous original corresponding to

every thing and movement in this world of ours. And it does *not* necessarily deepen our conception of life, but only reduplicates it.

Such a world, whatever we may think about its actual existence, is *not* the "other world" of philosophy. The "things not seen" of Plato or of Hegel are not a double or a projection of the existing world. Plato, indeed, wavered between the two conceptions in a way that should have warned his interpreters of the divergence in his track of thought. But in Hegel, at least, there is no ambiguity. The world of spirits with him is no world of ghosts. When we study the embodiments of mind or spirit in his pages, and read of law, property, and national unity, of fine art, the religious community, and the intellect that has attained scientific self-consciousness, we may miss our other world with its obscure "beyond," but we at any rate feel ourselves to be dealing with something real, and with the deepest concerns of life. We may deny to such matters the titles which philosophy bestows upon them; we may say that this is no "other world," no realm of spirits, nothing infinite or Divine; but this matters little, so long as we know what we are talking about, and are talking about the best we know. And what we discuss when Hegel is our guide, will *always* be some great achievement or essential attribute of the human mind. He never asks, "Is it?" but always, "What is it?" and therefore has instruction, drawn from experience, even for those to whom the titles of his inquiries seem fraudulent or bombastic.

These few remarks are not directed to maintaining any thesis about the reality of nature and of sense. Their object is to enforce a distinction which falls *within* the world which we know, and not *between* the world we know and another which we do not know. The distinction is real, and governs

life. I am not denying any other distinction, but I am insisting on this. No really great philosopher, nor religious teacher, —neither Plato, nor Kant, nor St. Paul—can be understood, unless we grasp this antithesis in the right way. All of these teachers have pointed men to another world. All of them, perhaps, were led at times by the very force and reality of their own thought into the fatal separation that cancels its meaning. So strong was their sense of the gulf between the trifles and the realities of life, that they gave occasion to the indolent imagination—in themselves and in others—to transmute this gulf from a measure of moral effort into an inaccessibility that defies apprehension. But their purpose was to overcome this inaccessibility, not to heighten it.

The hardest of all lessons in interpretation is to believe that great men mean what they say. We are below their level, and what they actually say seems impossible to us, till we have adulterated it to suit our own imbecility. Especially when they speak of the highest realities, we attach *our* notion of reality to what *they* pronounce to be real. And thus we baffle every attempt to deepen our ideas of the world in which we live. The work of intelligence is hard; that of the sensuous fancy is easy; and so we substitute the latter for the former. We are told, for instance, by Plato, that goodness, beauty, and truth are realities, but not visible or tangible. Instead of responding to the call so made on our intelligence by scrutinizing the nature and conditions of these intellectual facts—though we know well how tardily they are produced by the culture of ages—we apply forthwith our idea of reality as something separate in space and time, and so "refute" Plato with ease, and remain as wise as we were before. And it is true that Plato, handling ideas of vast import with the mind and language of his day, sometimes by a similar error refutes him-

self.* He makes, for instance, the disembodied soul see the invisible ideas. Thus he travesties his things of the mind as though they were things of sense, only not of *our* sense—thereby destroying the deeper difference of kind that alone enables them to find a place in our world. That his doctrine of ideas was really rooted, not in mysticism, but in scientific enthusiasm, is a truth that is veiled from us partly by his inconsistencies, but far more by our own erroneous preconceptions.†

There is, however, a genuine distinction between "this" world and the "other" world, which is merely parodied by the vulgar antitheses between natural and supernatural, finite and infinite, phenomenal and noumenal. We sometimes hear it said, "The world is quite changed to me since I knew such a person," or "studied such a subject," or "had suggested to me such an idea." The expression may be literally true; and we do not commonly exaggerate, but vastly underrate its import. We read, for instance, in a good authority, "These twenty kinds of birds (which Virgil mentions) do not correspond so much to our species as to our genera; for the Greeks and Romans, I need hardly say, had only very rough-and-ready methods of classification, just as is the case with uneducated people at the present day."‡ Any one may verify the same fact as regards the observation of flowers. Every yellow ranunculus is called a "butter-cup," every large white umbellifer a "hemlock." These, with hundreds of other differences

* "Endless duration makes good no better, nor white any whiter," is one of Aristotle's comments on Plato's "eternal" ideas, and is just, unless "eternal" conveys a difference of kind.

† We are apt to misinterpret Plato's language about astronomy in this sense. Plato is not decrying observation, but demanding a theoretical treatment of the laws of motion—a remarkable anticipation of modern ideas.

‡ "A Year with the Birds," by an Oxford Tutor.

of perception, affect the surroundings in which men consciously live, at least as much as a considerable degree of deafness or blindness. It is no metaphor, but literal fact, to say that man's whole environment is transformed by the training even of his mere apprehension of natural objects. But there is more in the matter than this. Without going into metaphysics, which I wish to avoid, I cannot, indeed, maintain that mind "makes" natural objects, although by enabling us to perceive them, it unquestionably makes our immediate conscious world. My individual consciousness does not make or create the differences between the species of ranunculus, although it does create my knowledge of them. But when we come to speak of the world of morals, or art, or politics, we may venture much further in our assertions. The actual facts of this world do directly arise out of and are causally sustained by conscious intelligence; and these facts form the world above sense. The unity of a Christian church or congregation is a governing fact of life; so is that of a family or a nation; so, we may hope, will that of humanity come to be. What is this unity? Is it visible and tangible, like the unity of a human body? No, the unity is "ideal;" that is, it exists in the medium of thought only; it is made up of certain sentiments, purposes, and ideas. What, even of an army? Here, too, an ideal unity is the mainspring of action. Without mutual intelligence and reciprocal reliance you may have a mob, but you cannot have an army. But all these conditions exist and can exist in the mind only. An army, *qua* army, is not a mere fact of sense; for not only does it need mind to perceive it—a heap of sand does that—but it also needs mind to *make* it.

The world of these governing facts of life is the world of the things not seen, the object of reason, the world of the

truly infinite and Divine. It is, of course, a false antithesis to contrast seeing with the bodily eye and seeing with the mind's eye. The seeing eye is always the mind's eye. The distinction between sense and spirit or intellect is a distinction *within the mind*, just as is St. Paul's opposition between the spirit and the flesh. Nevertheless the mind that only sees colour—sense or sense-perception—is different from the mind that sees beauty, the self-conscious spirit. The latter includes the former, but the former does not include the latter. To the one the colour is the ultimate fact; to the other it is an element in a thing of beauty. This relation prevails throughout between the world of sense and the world above sense. The "things not seen," philosophically speaking, are no world of existences or of intelligences co-ordinate with and severed from this present world. They are a value, an import, a significance, superadded to the phenomenal world, which may thus be said, though with some risk of misunderstanding, to be degraded into a symbol. The house, the cathedral, the judge's robe, the general's uniform, are ultimate facts for the child or the savage; but for the civilized man they are symbols of domestic life, of the Church, and of the State. Even where the suprasensuous world has its purest expression, in the knowledge and will of intelligent beings, it presupposes a sensuous world as the material of ideas and of actions. "This" world and the "other" world are continuous and inseparable, and all men must live in some degree for both. But the completion of the Noumenal world, and the apprehension of its reality and completeness, is the task by fulfilling which humanity advances.

I pass to the interpretation, neither technical nor controversial, of one or two of Hegel's most alarming phrases.

The "infinite" seems to practical minds the very opposite

of anything real, present, or valuable. As the description of life, it is the mere negation of the life we know; as the description of a purpose, it is the very antithesis of any purpose that we can conceive to be attainable; as the description of a being, it appears to be formed by denying every predicate which we attach to personality. And I could wish that Hegel had not selected this much-abused term as the distinctive predicate of what is most real and most precious in life. He adhered to it, no doubt, because his infinity, though different in nature to that of common logic, yet rightly fills the place and meets the problem of that conception. I will attempt to explain how this can be, and what we are discussing when we read about infinity in the Hegelian philosophy.

It is an obvious remark, that infinity was a symbol of evil in Hellenic speculation, whereas to Christian and modern thought it is identified with good. Much idle talk has arisen on this account, as to the limitation of the Hellenic mind. For, in fact, the Finite ascribed to Pythagoras, and the idea of limit and proportion in Plato or in Aristotle, are far more nearly akin to true infinity than is the Infinite of modern popular philosophy. Infinite means the negation of limit. Now, common infinity, which may be identified in general with enumeration *ad infinitum*—the *false* infinity of Hegel—is the attempt to negate or transcend a limit which inevitably recurs. It arises from attempting a task or problem in the wrong way, so that we may go on for ever without making any advance towards its achievement. All quantitative infinity—which of course has its definite uses, subject to proper reservations—is of this nature. A process does not change its character by mere continuance, and the aggregate of a million units is no more free from limitation than the aggregate of ten. A defect in kind cannot be compensated by mere quantity.

We see the fallacious attempt in savage, barbaric, or vulgar art. Meaningless iteration, objectless labour, enormous size, extravagant costliness, indicate the effort to satisfy man's need of expression by the mere accumulation of work without adequate idea or purpose. But such efforts, however stupendous, never attain their goal. They constitute a recurrent failure to transcend a recurrent limit, precisely analogous to enumeration *ad infinitum*. A hundred thousand pounds' worth of bricks and mortar comes no nearer to the embodiment of mind than a thousand pounds' worth. To attempt adequate expression by mere aggregation of cost or size is therefore to fall into the infinite process or the false infinity.

Another well-known instance is the pursuit of happiness in the form of "pleasure for pleasure's sake." The recurrence of unchanging units leaves us where we were. A process which does not change remains the same, and if it did not bring satisfaction at first, will not do so at last.* We might as well go on producing parallels to infinity, in the hope that somehow or somewhere they may meet. An infinite straight line may serve as a type of the kind of infinity we are considering.

Infinity in the Hegelian sense does not partake in any way of this endlessness, or of the unreality which attaches to it. Its root-idea is self-completeness or satisfaction. That which is "infinite" is without boundary, because it does not refer beyond itself for explanation, or for justification; and therefore, in all human existence or production infinity can only be an aspect or element. A picture, for instance, regarded as a work of fine art, justifies itself, gives satisfaction directly and without raising questions of cause or of comparison, and is in this sense—*i.e.* in respect of its beauty—regarded as "infinite."

* See note above, p. 96.

When, on the other hand, we consider this same work of art as an historical phenomenon, as a link in a chain of causation —*e.g.*, as elucidating the development of a school, or proving the existence of a certain technical process at a certain date—then we go beyond itself for its interest and explanation, and depress it at once into a finite object. The finite is that which presents itself as incomplete; the infinite, that which presents itself as complete, and which, therefore, does not force upon us the fact of its limitation. This character belongs in the highest degree to self-conscious mind, as realized in the world above sense; and in some degree to all elements of that world —for instance, to the State—in as far as they represent man's realized self-consciousness. It is the nature of self-consciousness to be infinite, because it is its nature to take into itself what was opposed to it, and thus to make itself into an organized sphere that has value and reality within, and not beyond itself. If false infinity was represented by an infinite straight line, true infinity may be compared to a circle or a sphere.

The distinction between true and false infinity is of the profoundest moral import. The sickly yearning that longs only to escape from the real, rooted in the antithesis between the infinite and the actual or concrete, or in the idea of the monotonous "*infini*" which is one with the "*abime*" or the "*gouffre*," is appraised by this test at its true value. It is seen to rest on a mere pathetic fallacy of thought and sentiment. So far from the infinite being remote, abstract, unreal, nothing but the infinite can be truly present, concrete, and real. The finite always refers us away and away through an endless series of causes, of effects, or of relations. The infinite is individual, and bears the character of knowledge, achievement, attainment. In short, the actual realities which we have in mind when, in philosophy, we speak of the infinite, are

such as a nation that is conscious of its unity and general will, or the realm of fine art as the recognition of man's higher nature, or the religious community with its conviction of an indwelling Deity.

Now, whether we like the term Infinite or not, whether or no we think that man's life can be explained and justified within the limits of these aims and these phenomena, there is no doubt that these matters are real, and are the most momentous of realities. In acquainting ourselves with their structure, evolution, and relation to individual life, we are at least not wasting time, nor treating of matters beyond human intelligence.

There is a very similar contrast in the conception of human Freedom. "Free will" is so old a vexed question, that, though the conflict still rages fitfully round it, the world hardly conceives that much can turn upon its decision. But when in place of the abstract, "Is man free?" we are confronted with the concrete inquiry, "When, in what, and as what, does man carry out his will with least hindrance and with fullest satisfaction?" then we have before us the actual phenomena of civilization, instead of an idle and abstract Yes or No.

Man's Freedom, in the sense thus contemplated, lies in the spiritual or supra-sensuous world by which his humanity is realized, and in which his will finds fulfilment. The family, for example, property, and law are the first steps of man's freedom. In them the individual's will obtains and bestows recognition as an agent in a society whose bond of union is ideal—*i.e.*, existing only in consciousness; and this recognition develops into duties and rights. It is in these that man finds something to live for, something in which and for the sake of which to assert himself. As society develops he lives, on the whole, more in the civilized or spiritual world, and less in the

savage or purely natural world. His will, which is himself, expands with the institutions and ideas that form its purpose, and the history of this expansion is the history of human freedom. Nothing is more shallow, more barbarously irrational, than to regard the progress of civilization as the accumulation of restrictions. Laws and rules are a necessary aspect of extended capacities. Every power that we gain has a positive nature, and therefore involves positive conditions, and every positive condition has negative relations. To accomplish a particular purpose you must go to work in a particular way, and in no other way. To complain of this is like complaining of a house because it has a definite shape. If freedom means absence of attributes, empty space is "freer" than any edifice. Of course a house may be so ugly that we may say we would rather have none at all. Civilization may bring such horrors that we may say, "Rather savagery than this"; but in neither case are we serious. Great as are the vices of civilization, it is only in civilization that man becomes human, spiritual, and free.

The effort to grasp and apply such an idea as this can hardly be barren. It brings us face to face with concrete facts of history, and of man's actual motives and purposes. True philosophy here, as everywhere, plunges into the concrete and the real; it is the indolent abstract fancy that thrusts problems away into the remote "beyond," or into futile abstraction. Plato, the philosopher, knows well that the mind is free when it achieves what, as a whole, it truly wills. But Plato, the allegorist and imaginative preacher, refers the soul's freedom to a fleeting moment of ante-natal choice, which he vainly strives to exempt from causal influence. Pictorial imagination, with its ready reference to occurrences in past and future, is the great foe to philosophic intelligence.

Finally, it is impossible to omit all reference to the notion of an immanent Deity, which forms the very centre of Hegel's thought. When an unspeculative English reader first meets with Hegel's passionate insistence that God is not unknowable, that He necessarily reveals himself as a Trinity of persons, and that to deny this is to represent men as "the heathen who know not God," he feels as if he had taken sand into his mouth. He is inclined to ask what these Neo-Platonic or mediæval doctrines are doing in the nineteenth century, and why we should resuscitate dead logomachies that can have no possible value for life or conduct. Now, I must not attempt here to discuss the difficult question of Hegel's ultimate conception of the being of God, and I am bound to warn any one who may read these pages that I only profess to reproduce one—though by far the most prominent—side of that conception. But, subject to this reservation, I have no hesitation in saying, that our own prejudices form the only hindrance to our seeing that Hegel's subject-matter is here, as elsewhere, human life. He gives us what he takes to be the literal truth, and we will have it to be metaphor. Verbally contradicting Kant, he accepts, completes, and enforces Kant's thought. "Revelation can never be the true ground of religion," said Kant; "for revelation is an historical accident, and religion is a rational necessity of man's intelligent nature." "Revelation is the only true knowledge of God and ground of religion," says Hegel, "because *revelation consists in the realisation of God in man's intelligent nature.*" We are, however, not unaccustomed to such phrases, and our imagination is equal to its habitual task of evading their meaning. We take them to be a strong metaphor, meaning that God, who is a sort of ghostly being a long way off, is, notwithstanding, more or less within the knowledge of our minds, and so is "in" them, as a book

which is actually in London may be in my memory when I am in Scotland. Now, right or wrong, this is not what Hegel means. He means what he says; that God is spirit or mind,* and exists in the medium of mind, *which is actual as intelligent, for us at any rate, only in the human consciousness.* The thought is hard from its very simplicity, and we struggle, as always, to avoid grasping it. We imagine spirits as made of a sort of thin matter, and so as existing just like bodies, although we call them disembodied. And then we think of this disembodied form as an alternative to human form, and suppose spirit to have somehow a purer existence apart from human body. This error really springs from imagining the two as existences of the same kind, and so conflicting, and from not realising the notion of spirit as mind or self-consciousness, which is the only way of conceiving its actual presence in our world. Mind uses sensuous existence as its symbol; perhaps even needs it. The poet who has hit Hegel's thought so nearly,† fails here:—

"This weight of body and limb,
Are they not sign and symbol of thy division from Him?"

Here we leave the track of the higher Pantheism for that of vulgar mysticism. Spiritual being is conceived as somehow incompatible with bodily shape, either because incapable of any concrete embodiment, or because it has a quasi-material shape of its own. Now, this is just the reverse of the Hegelian idea. According to Hegel, it is only in the human form

* The fusion of these meanings in the German "Geist" gives a force to his pleading which English cannot render. He appeals, e.g., triumphantly to "God is a Spirit," as not "a ghost," but "mind."

† See Tennyson's "Higher Pantheism," especially the fine lines:—
"Speak to Him then, for He hears, and Spirit with spirit can meet,
Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet."

that intelligence can for us find its full expression. The notion of a spiritual body other than and incompatible with the natural body does not arise. Spirit exists in the medium of consciousness, not in a peculiar kind of matter. The spiritualization of the natural body is not to be looked for in an astral or angel body, but in the gait and gesture, the significance and dignity, that make the body of the civilized man the outward image of his soul, and distinguish him from the savage as from the animal. The human soul becomes actual itself, and visible to others, only by moulding the body into its symbol and instrument. It ought to have been an axiom of physiology, Hegel says, that the series of animated forms must necessarily lead up to that of man. For this is the only sensuous form in which mind could attain adequate manifestation. Thus anthroponiorphism in fine art is no accident, nor an unworthy portrayal of Divinity. If the Deity is to be symbolized to sense, it must be in the image of man. The symbol is not, indeed, the reality, as the sensuous image is not conscious thought; but this is a defect inherent in artistic presentation, and not attributable to anthropomorphism in particular.

It is obvious that, in the light of such a conception, a speculative import can be attached to the doctrine of the Incarnation, and Hegel's reading of Christian ideas is, in fact, to be interpreted entirely in this sense. This is not the place to go deeper into such views, which, however profound, may perhaps continue to seem non-natural expositions of Christian dogma. I am only concerned to show how here, also, the speculative idea, operating upon the concrete and actual, generates a fresh and inspiring insight into life and conduct. Few chapters of anthropology are more thorough, profound, and suggestive than Hegel's account of the "actual soul";

i.e., of the habits and attributes which make the body distinctively human by stamping it with the impress of mind. Nor has philosophic insight ever done better service to the history of religion than in grasping the essence of Christianity as the *unity* (not merely the *union*) of the Divine and human nature.

Among the things which are spiritually discerned, an important place belongs to beauty. As a boundary and transition between sense and thought, it is peculiarly fitted to illustrate the reality which we claim, in contradistinction to mere sensuous appearance, for what is best in life. Many who distrust Hegelian formulæ are convinced that beauty at least is real. They will admit that fine art and the recognition of beauty are not trifles, not amusements, but rank high among the interests that give life its value. All such will find themselves in sympathy with the purpose of a great philosopher who has bent all the power of his genius and his industry to vindicating a place for art as an embodiment of the Divine nature, that is to say, of the fundamental purpose which reveals itself in the history of the human spirit.

VI.

*THE KINGDOM OF GOD ON EARTH.**

MUCH is said in the New Testament, with very various meanings, about the Kingdom of Christ or the Kingdom of God. I want to consider, this evening, some of the forms which this idea has taken in the New Testament and elsewhere, and what meaning it can have for us to-day.

I. "Sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven." "Grant that we may sit, the one on Thy right hand, and the other on Thy left, in Thy kingdom." "Now he is comforted, and thou art tormented." In such passages as these we think that we find two ideas which have had enormous influence on the world.

1. Heaven is to right the wrongs, and to compensate the injustices of this world. "Thou in thy lifetime receivedst thy good things, and likewise Lazarus evil things; but now he is comforted, and thou art tormented." Part of this natural conception has been a comfort to those for whom the world seemed to have nothing but misery, and part has rudely represented a wild feeling of justice. But at all times, and especially in modern times, it has had another and a very mischievous influence. It can be turned round the other way. God, we think, will look after those who are ill-off on earth,

* An address given for the Ethical Society.

and therefore we need not trouble ourselves about them. Heaven becomes a sort of poor-law, to which we refer the cases of distress that we do not know how to deal with. We even feel very virtuous in doing this. It is so humble of us to be content with this world's goods, and to leave the next world to our poorer neighbours. And it makes everything easy; it cuts the knot of all those troublesome questions, how every member of a great nation can have a man's share in the work and knowledge of the world. Let him read his Bible and believe what he is told, and then, after a few years, which do not much matter, he will be as well off as an emperor; or perhaps better, for he will go to heaven, and many emperors will not.

This belief has great power for good and for evil. It has raised men's estimate of their dignity, and has made them feel the value of a soul. But it has made them careless of the world in which they live, and has narrowed their notions of duty and of manliness. Life must not be split up into a present of endurance, and a future of enjoyment. Injustice must be redressed, beauty enjoyed, knowledge won, and goodness attained, here on this earth of ours.

2. Then there is the other common idea, very like the last. "Great is your *reward* in heaven." "Thy Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee openly." This is the notion, not very marked, I think, in the New Testament, of a moral government of the world by rewards and punishments. The Churchmen who write about religion have made a fatal delusion out of this conception too. But I do not think that sensible people have taken it very seriously. We all know that we are not to do good for the sake of what we expect to get by it; and if a preacher tells us that we are to be good Christians in order to go to heaven and keep out of hell, we

think that he does not quite understand what he is saying. A man who tells you that is mixing up two notions. One notion is that you are to obey God's will in order to gain the pleasure of heaven and escape the pains of hell. And the other notion is that you are to obey God's will, because in doing that you get rid of the bad in your own heart, and make your will rest or repose in the good will. This hope of finding peace, of resting your will in something greater than yourself, of being at one with the good purpose of humanity, is the very mainspring of life. But it is here on earth that we want our will to be good, and to get rid of the bad in our own hearts. There is no reason in putting it off to a future life, of which we know nothing. If we must have something future to hope for, let us put our hopes on our children, and do something to carry them out. However, this desire to be good and to be at one with a society of good people is the root of our life. But that other notion, that we are to be good in order to gain the pleasures of heaven, is very wrong, or rather, it is absolute nonsense. I should like to explain why I say that it is absolute nonsense.

A man is good when his will is good, and bad when his will is bad. It all depends upon what kind of thing he really has at heart when he acts. It does not depend on what he does, if you look at it from the outside. If a man says he meant well, when he did not, then he is a hypocrite. But we all know that a man may really mean well, and yet may make a mistake and do great harm. Then we do not call him a bad man, though we may call him a fool. This shows that it is the will which makes a man good or bad, and a man's will is his choice; it is what his heart is really set on when he acts. So, when we talk of being good or doing good, for the sake of what we can get by it, this can only be a pretence of being or

doing good. You may do, for reward, something that on the outside looks like doing good, but it is not doing good, because the will is selfish—your heart is set on your own pleasure or comfort, and not on a substantial good for its own sake. A man who really thought of nothing but getting safe to heaven would be as bad as a man in a shipwreck who thought of nothing but getting himself safe into a boat. There are a few such people, I daresay. But of course most people are better than they make out. When they speak of reward and punishment, they do not mean merely pleasures and pains; they mean, in part at least, the goodness which causes the pleasure, and the badness which causes the pain. We can see that true Christians have never thought the reward the chief thing. St. Paul was ready to give up his own reward, to be accursed from Christ, if that would save the souls he loved. And to go from great things to small, there is a fine scene in a novel which I once read. A young man is afraid to go to the rescue of some people in a flood, because he has a conviction that if he is drowned then, he will go to hell. And the old man, an old Scotchman, to whom he tells this, shouts out to him in reply, "Better be damned doing the will of God than saved doing nothing." This is the instinct of true religion revolting against the false doctrine of rewards; and I believe that this revolt has the sympathy of all true Christians.

Of course this fancy of rewards and punishments has had its uses. It has enabled people to believe against appearances that good was stronger than evil. And it has helped to *make* good stronger than evil. We cannot judge these old beliefs fairly, unless we think of the power they had and the way in which they were used. In rough ages it was a gain that men should recognise anything as above themselves. There is a striking picture in a poem of Longfellow's of a

monk forcing a Norman Baron in England, on his death-bed, to set his serfs free.

"In his chamber, weak and dying,
Was the Norman Baron lying;
* * * *
And, as on the sacred missal,
He recorded their dismissal,
Death relaxed his iron features,
And the Monk replied, 'Amen.'"

I do not say that this picture represents a fact; but no one can doubt that the thought of heaven and hell must often have reinforced the appeal of conscience, and kept alive the persuasion that there was a power higher than the sword.

These were the old convictions about heaven and the kingdom of God,—that it was an invisible future world, in which wrong was to be righted, and good and bad men rewarded and punished. These fancies have not in reality a great place in the New Testament; but they were known to the Greeks and to many other nations. Plato speaks with scorn of the priests and charlatans of his time, four centuries before Christ, who go about telling men that they can make it all safe for them in the next world by their prayers and ceremonies. So these notions are as old as civilized mankind; and the right way to look at them is to see that people naturally came upon them when they felt sure that there was a right somewhere, and that it was better to be good. The last thing people understand is what is before their eyes. It is so much easier just to fancy that something used to be, or that something will be, instead of looking patiently at what actually is. Men look round them and see that the world seems very bad, but they feel sure that there is a real good somewhere; and so they make up a story that it was all very good once, and then the devil put it wrong; but God will put it all right again some

day,—at least for some of us. It is just as people say, "How do there come to be so many kinds of plants and animals?" And they answer that God created them a long time ago, and Adam gave them names. Well, of course, if we look carefully at what is under our eyes, we see that this is a fantastic idea. The kinds of plants and animals are always changing now, precisely as they always have been changing since they began.

Just in the same way, when you look patiently and carefully at the world we live in, you see that those ideas of another world are nothing but imperfect explanations or reflections of the good that is being worked out in this world, and are of no value, excepting as they contribute to the furtherance of this real good. Good is not a thing which can be made up by deferred payments.

3. In the same way, again, God has been thought of as a king or master, somewhere outside the world we live in, and the Bible as the book of his decrees; as if God could make anything right by choosing to command it. This is the old meaning of revelation; that man had no way of knowing God's will, and so God had this book written to tell us what his will was, and we have to do everything that is commanded in this book. Of course this idea turns things upside down. Things are not right because the Bible says them, but the Bible says them, *if it does say them*, because they are right. And when we say now that anything is God's command, we ought to know that we are using a figure of speech, which means something quite different from the command of a person outside ourselves and having power over us.

4. And this makes an enormous difference; because, if you have a master in heaven, whose orders you must obey, and if he has had a book written to tell you what to do, then the

most important people in the world are the people who spend their lives in interpreting this book. And in fact, as you and I have not time to be studying a book written in Hebrew and Greek all our lives, we should be under the thumb of these gentlemen, who say they know all about it, and some of them even say they have a special commission from God to tell us about it, and we are not to listen to any one else. This is plainly a mere dream. There is no great harm in talking of a revelation, but it means nothing in the world but our own common sense and reason, dealing with the circumstances of our lives.

All these ideas,—compensation, rewards and punishments, God's commands in the Bible, the authority of the clergy,—are closely connected together. They are all fancies that men have had, just as though they were children, and being children, knew that they must be treated like children. Children do things because they are told, until they have learnt to behave themselves. And so men had to learn to behave themselves, only they had to fancy that there was a parent or schoolmaster looking after them. They naturally invented the only sort of instruction they could receive.

II. But then, in the New Testament we find yet other ideas mixed with those which we have been speaking of. The kingdom of God is within you (or perhaps "among you"); it is like leaven; it is like a seed; it is not of this world. This might mean it is in heaven, but I do not think it does; I think it means that the kingdom of God is not what people in this world call a kingdom. The New Testament writers did, in fact, think that the next world was to be on earth, and that it was to begin soon, and had in truth begun already. But we must not count this altogether on our side, because there was to be a miraculous end to the old earth, and a new one was to

be made. Still, we may fairly say that they thought the kingdom of God was a moral kingdom; that it was to come on earth; that it was something quite close to them; and that it had partly begun with Christ's life. The idea of the Church grew up in place of this conviction, when the belief in Christ's coming gave way.

This moral kingdom of God is what is meant in the prayer, "Thy kingdom come," which is explained by the next petition, "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." Most of the New Testament writers, and, it would seem, Christ himself, expected this kingdom to come within a man's lifetime. We may leave out these words, "as in heaven," which belong to the fancies of which we have been speaking, fancies that the good which we do not see here is real somewhere else.

But the kingdom of God on earth, is here, as the Lord's prayer implies, in as far as what we call God's will is done on earth. But now there is a question which stares us in the face.

What have we men to do with God's will? The question has two forms:—

1. How are we to know what is God's will? and

2. Why should we do God's will when we do know it?

We have destroyed the vulgar answers to these two questions. I will repeat briefly how we have destroyed them. They were—"We are to know God's will from his inspired revelation in the Bible," or "from the Catholic Church"—a very mischievous doctrine; and "we are to do God's will because he will reward or punish us according as we do it or not." The first of these answers is a mistake, because books and men are just books and men, and they cannot have authority except by convincing our own minds. And the

second is an absurdity, because the nature of what we do depends upon our will in doing it; and if what we will is to get a reward, then our action is not good. Rewards and punishments are legal sanctions and not moral influences.

There is only one true way of answering these questions. We must know what is right, what we call God's will, by finding it in our own will. And we must do what is right, what we call God's will, because we find that it is our own will. We must look at it in this way.

If we come to think over our lives, and to ask ourselves what fills up the greater part of our thoughts and purposes, we shall find, if we are decent people, that it mostly comes back to our station in life,* and the duties that are recognised by ourselves and by others as belonging to it; and also in certain duties and interests, usually connected with our station, which we have taken up and made our own. A man can hardly live without something or other which is required of him by others, and which he requires of himself. Those whom we call idle people have their duties, but partly they are mistaken about them, partly they neglect them. In judging morally you must take a man's own point of view, at least in part. You and I may think fox-hunting a waste of time and money; but a master of fox-hounds does not think himself an idle or useless man. He does what he and all his friends believe to be a social duty; and it is very necessary that we should recognise this, because it helps us to see that man really does not exist as man without *some* station and duties. Our station and its duties are the greatest part and the simplest part of the right will or the good will, which is also our own will. Without

* This portion of the address consists in the main of an attempt to popularise the ideas contained in Mr. F. H. Bradley's "Ethical Studies," and especially in Essay V. of that work, "My Station and its Duties."

this object and interest in life, a man is like a boat without sail or helm. This sounds rather commonplace, and it *is* rather commonplace. If it were not, in a sense, known to every one, I do not see how it could be imagined to be every one's guide through life. If a preacher should come here and tell us that he had a brand-new set of duties, which we never heard of before, that we ought to do, I should myself be inclined to vote for sending him away again. Still, most things that we know have a good deal in them that we do not notice. And I will try to point out some truths about our station and its duties which we are apt to forget.

Our station and its duties:—

1. Tells us what to do, for it is the very heart and spirit of our little individual life; and

2. It gives the reason for doing what we ought to do; for, just because it is the heart of our individual life, it raises our weak and ignorant will into the good will, which is the *real* will that unites mankind together.

1. Our station and its duties is the heart and spirit of our own little life. I may say that I make no distinction, morally, between rights and duties. That which our station demands of us is a duty, if the difficulty in doing it is in ourselves, and a right if the difficulty is in some one else. Suppose you are the head of a family. That is part of your station. It is the *duty* of the head of a family to rule and educate his children; and it is the *right* of the head of the family that his children should obey him, and that they should attend to their schooling; and it is his *right*, moreover, that society should provide, somehow, that there shall be schools and teachers. Then, again, it is the *right* of the *children* to be properly ruled and taught to behave, and to be educated; and it is the *duty* of the children to obey the head of the family, and to make the

best use of their schooling. It is the *duty* of society to see that there shall be schools and teachers, and it is the *right* of society that both the head of the family and the children shall do their part in making proper use of the schools and teachers. The same social good or social purpose is a right or a duty, according to the source of the opposition it meets with.

Now these requirements or demands, which are recognised by society, and which we recognise in our turn, make us what we are. Apart from them we should be nothing at all. Suppose a man has a brain fever, and all these ideas and purposes are wiped out of his mind. Suppose he forgets that he has a wife and children, forgets how to do his daily work, and does not know his friends when he meets them, does not remember the kindnesses which have been done him, nor the services which he owes to others; the man may still be alive, and you may know his face, but his own self, all that made up his individual life, is lost and has vanished. I have heard of some one to whose wife this happened; and when, two years after the loss of her mind, the poor lady died, her husband said, "In fact, I lost my dear wife two years ago."

This helps to show how we ourselves are really made up of all these ties and relationships, all these rights and duties, purposes, feelings, and hopes. We spoke about people's ideas of the invisible world. Here is the invisible world which really does concern us, which is our own very self, which we and all others recognise, and which has its existence simply in this invisible fact, that it is so recognised. And this, our own self, is what makes up our own will, by giving us something definite to do, which is the particular purpose of our own particular self. This is the chief thing that tells us what to do.

Perhaps this seems too simple, and it may be said, "Every decent man does the duties of his station; cannot something

be suggested which is higher and harder than that?" I shall try to answer this question in part, presently, but first I must confess that the whole principle of what I am saying is against overmuch dictating and giving moral advice. I know well enough what *I* ought to do; but it is very difficult to talk about what other people ought to do, because one does not know the ins and outs of their station. But if any one says that he habitually does all the duties of his station, thoroughly, with good heart and good sense, one would be inclined to suspect in one's own mind that his standard is rather low. A few points may be enumerated, by way of illustrating what one's station really means. There are the simple duties of honesty and thoroughness in all work; there is education; there is wise and painstaking help of our neighbours; there is wise management of societies or clubs which we have to do with; there is forming an enlightened judgment on trade questions and on questions that concern us as citizens; and there is the attempt to make the tone of our society a little higher, more full of real interests, more free from vice and vulgarity. Every man is responsible for the tone of the society in which he moves, and for the influence which he spreads round him, hour by hour.

I do not know whether all this is really so simple, *when you come to act upon it.* Plato wrote an account of an imaginary commonwealth, in which goodness was to be the ruling principle. And the one great root of all virtue in this commonwealth was simply this, that in it every one was to mind his own business. Plato thus thought one's station and its duties the root of all the virtues. And he was right. But Plato's commonwealth, in which every one was to mind his own business, has become a by-word for an impossible imagination.

2. Then, again, I said our station and its duties give the

reason for doing right. It not only gives us something to do, but it makes us feel that what we do is right. This is the very root of the matter.

There are two ways of doing what you have to do. You may do it like a machine, or you may do it like a man. If you do it like a machine, that is not really doing the duties of your station, for our station is, above all things, to be men. He who is a machine has no heart in his work. His family and his country mean nothing to him. Most likely it is not his own fault, but all the same this is very sad. But now I want to speak of the other way of working. We all know what it is to feel that we are not alone in our work; that we are working together with others for a common good, and each doing the best he can. One who feels this about the duties of his station is a man, and not a machine. He knows, indeed, that he can do very little with his single arm. Even a great statesman or a great poet is merely guiding the forces or uttering the feelings of mankind. If a man thinks of the common purpose, of the good cause, and knows his will and effort are devoted to it, then he will not complain because he can do so little. The great thing is that his will is at one with the real will or the right will; and because it is so, he is content in the common work, and knows he is doing right. Think of a family all working hard to make their living. One of the children will earn only a little compared with the father; but if the child does his best, and puts his heart into it for the common good, then he has a right to be satisfied in the happiness of the family as the achievement of his purpose. A man who does the duties of an undistinguished station with goodwill is just the same in society as such a child is in a family. He is not a wheel in a machine, nor an animal trying to get food; but he is a man whose will is inspired by the common

purpose of mankind, and whose little private piece of work is a pledge to him that the general purpose is *his* purpose.

This, then, is why we should do God's will, that is, why we should do our duty. If "why" meant a reason outside the duty, like a reward or punishment, then it would be nonsense, as we saw, to ask *why* we should do our duty. But the reason why we do it is that we find the good will to be really and at bottom our own will. That is to say, it is through our station and its duties that we take hold of our humanity and bring it home to our particular selves. On the one hand, the good will is ourself; and on the other hand, it is the common aim and spirit of society and of mankind. The goodness of our own particular private will consists in grasping this common aim and spirit, and applying it in the particular duties of our daily life, which gains all its reality and vigour from its particular form of this aim or purpose, and vanishes, as we saw, if the common purpose is entirely destroyed in us—if a man forgets his family, and his work, and his friends.

All that we mean by the kingdom of God on earth is the society of human beings who have a common life and are working for a common social good. The kingdom of God has come on earth in every civilized society where men live and work together, doing their best for the whole society and for mankind. When two or three are gathered together, co-operating for a social good, there is the Divine Spirit in the midst of them.

And there is something more, which may meet a difficulty that I mentioned just now. A man may be a good doctor or a good painter, or a good engine-driver, and yet he may be a brute, or a liar, or a cheat. How will the duties of his station prevent this? First, we saw just now that there is a good deal belonging to our station which we are apt to forget. A

man's station is not merely his trade. His family and his neighbours and the commonwealth are part of it. If he does his duty to all of these with sense and goodwill, there will not be room for very much vice. But then, secondly, we must bear in mind that he is to make his own particular will harmonize with the purpose of society; now any vice or sin would so far cut him off from that, and make a contradiction between the spirit in which he seeks his own particular pleasure, and the spirit in which he seeks the common good. No man can serve two masters. The bad will is our own particular will, when it rebels against the moral spirit of society.

And this common spirit or conviction of society explains another difficulty. It may be asked, Are we to stand still for ever? Are we not to try to be better than people are now? Are we to obey society, and never to reform it? I do not think that this difficulty really perplexes any one, though it sounds very formidable. Of course every society is moving, and has a spirit of reform in it, and an ideal before it. We can only live by striving after an ideal; but our ideal must not be a whim of our own vanity, not something all for ourself and by ourself. It must be a social ideal, rooted in and founded upon what is real. Every sound ideal grows out of something real. For we saw that our very self, our life, is a purpose; and this purpose *is* the ideal which is in great part real as well as ideal. Thus a great nation, such as England, is a living real purpose, which exists, and prescribes our ideal to us. To-day is real and to-morrow is ideal, but you cannot draw a line between them. Our own life, and still more the life of a nation, is something that goes beyond the present moment; and so, in trying to be better and to do better, we are only carrying out the higher mind of society. We are born into our ideal, just as we are into our actual life. Of

course the reformer does not in truth *invent* his ideal; it is "in the air."

I do not think it matters whether we call the community in which we have our station a Christian community. If we keep the substance of Christianity, we may let the shadow, the name, take care of itself.

III. Is the kingdom of God on earth a *Church?* I will say a very few words about this. Wherever there is a community of persons working together for a social good, there is a portion of the kingdom of God on earth. A visible Church, like the Church of England, or of Rome, if it is useful for good life, may be a part of the kingdom of God on earth. But a family, or a nation like the English nation, is a far more sacred thing than any Church, because these are what prescribe our duty and educate our will.

What we are to remember about a visible Church, like the Church of England, is this. It is a good thing if it makes our wills good, and points out, or helps us to feel, duties which form a part of the good will. We judge whether a Church is a useful society just as we judge any other society. "By their fruits ye shall know them." But we must remember that no visible Church, Christian or Comtist, has any authority; and no church service is a duty, except in as far as it makes us better.

On the other hand, we may say if we like, that the kingdom of God on earth is the same thing as the invisible Church; "the blessed company of all faithful people." I will explain directly what I mean by faithful. The invisible Church, like true religion, is wide enough for all mankind. It is invisible, not because it is in heaven—for it is on earth,—but because it extends so far in past and future, and is bound together not by such symbols as buildings or creeds, or books, but by

the great achievements and purposes which form the life of mankind.

IV. I wish, before I conclude, to say something of what we mean by religion. I have been speaking about the duties of our station and the spirit in which we ought to do them. I said that we ought to feel that we are not alone in our work, and that the good purpose which others achieve is ours, just as our good purpose is theirs. This is, so far, morality.

Even this morality requires some faith. It is not possible to act, unless you believe that what you are trying to do can be done. In every-day life we do not trouble ourselves with a general belief; but we never doubt that the particular aim which we have in view is possible in the nature of things. If we did not believe this, we should be paralysed. We should not even eat, if we did not believe that food would sustain life.

Thus, in every-day life we need the belief that the good is a reality. If we hold this belief more distinctly and more intensely, it amounts to this, that *nothing but good is* a reality.

This faith is what people mean by religion. Of course it is a faith in spite of appearances. But it does not recognise the appearances against it as worth noticing. A man, in as far as he has this faith, does not admit that the bad in his own heart is his real self at all, and so he does not admit that the bad in the world is the reality of the world. This has been twisted, like everything, as if religion could mean that you were to be indifferent to sin, because you say, "It really does not belong to me." That is sham religion. The truth is that nothing gives such force in getting rid of evil as this belief that the good is the only reality. Nothing gives such confidence in a battle as thinking that your enemy is only a sham. Stopping short of the good seems something mad and incredible, when you believe that nothing else is real. Yet, on the other hand,

the man who has this faith is not worried or uneasy. He knows that he is on the side of the reality, and his heart is one with it, and he is not afraid of anything. Even his own wickedness is like something that comes to nothing, and is sure to fade away, as long as his heart is really and truly set right.

The difference between morality and religion seems then to be that in morality we know that the good purpose is real, in religion we believe that nothing else is real. It is the same faith, differently held.

An all-important truth follows from this—from religion and morality being the same in principle. The *duties of religion are the same as the duties of morality.* If we speak of duties to God, we mean the same duties as duties to man. Worship or prayer, in the sense of meditation, are good things if they help us to do our real duties. But it is a sad degradation of words to speak of a ceremony in a church as Divine Service.

And it follows from this that there is only one religion; though there are many creeds, and for every creed a particular book and tradition. All these creeds and Churches and ecclesiastical precepts are mere vehicles of one religion, and what each of them superadds in forms, ceremonies, and doctrines are mere historical accident, and belong to the childhood of humanity.

These ideas are not new. It would be ridiculous to try and invent new ideas about what men are to find in their inmost hearts. European morality, in all its essentials, was built up in life and expressed in language more than two thousand years ago, by men who lived and spoke and wrote in the cities of ancient Greece. One of such men, the story goes, being asked by another, "How shall I educate my son?" replied, "Make him a citizen of a city that has good

laws." And when three hundred citizens of Sparta had fallen before overwhelming numbers in a battle that largely contributed to save Europe from an Asiatic despotism, a great Greek poet could devise for their grave no better epitaph than the two simple lines which say, "Go, you who pass by, and tell the Spartans that we lie here in obedience to their commands."

And the citizen of Athens, when he attained the age of eighteen, and his name was entered on the civic register, received in an ancient temple the shield and spear which symbolised his entrance into the citizen army, and publicly made oath to the following effect: "I will not dishonour my sacred shield. I will not abandon my fellow-soldier in the ranks. I will do battle for our altars and our homes, whether aided or unaided. I will leave our country not less but greater and nobler than she is now entrusted to me. I will reverently obey the citizens who shall act as judges. I will obey the laws which have been ordained, and which in time to come shall be ordained, by the national will. And whoever would subvert the laws, or would disobey them, I will not suffer him, but I will do battle for them, whether aided or unaided. And I will reverence our ancestral temples. Of which things the gods are my witness." This formula errs, to our minds, both by omission and commission,* yet the root of the matter is in it, and I have always regarded it with reverence as, to the best of my knowledge, the earliest European creed.

The Christian religion deepened and widened these convictions, and proclaimed that the freedom of living well was the birthright of humanity, and not merely of the noble, the

* The word translated "greater" means in the first instance "larger," and I fear that this meaning was realized in the Athenian disposition.

citizen, the wealthy, or the wise. For Divinity, the Christian religion said, was to be looked for in the spirit of man, implying, as we now see, that it need be looked for *nowhere else.* This was the distinct announcement of what had really been working in the mind of Greece and Rome. I should like to read you a paraphrase of some verses by Lucan, written, I suppose, a few years before the date at which the Gospel of Matthew was composed. The hero of his poem, Cato, had been asked by a friend to make some inquiry of the oracle of Jupiter Ammon in Africa, which they passed in their march. And Cato, in the poem, answers thus:—

"What wouldst, my friend, that Cato should inquire?
Needs he be told what conscience bids desire?
Whether 'twere better die in arms, and free,
Than see Rome sink into a tyranny?
If man's mere life be nought that merits praise,
And to live long but lengthens out his days?*
If that the just can fear no violence,
Nor fortune against virtue do offence?
If 'tis enough that men will what they should,
And triumph adds no lustre to the good?
All this we know, nor is our certain sense
One jot more sure for Ammon's evidence.
Heaven lies about us, and we do its will,
Not uninspired, though all the shrines be still;
God needs no language, for at birth he taught
All man can know, and that is all he ought:
Nor has Jove willed in Afric's burning zone
To preach his truth to wandering tribes alone;
Nor buried here, amid the shifting sands,
That revelation all the world demands;
For where is God, but in the earth and sea,
And clouds and sky—and truth and purity?
Why blindly seek we other gods to know?
God is where'er we look, where'er we go."

* He implies that life is desirable not for its length, but only for its nobleness.

And if I may conclude with a further quotation—for I think that it strengthens us to feel that we are not alone—I will read an extract from a work written one hundred years ago by a man whose name is honoured wherever the great thinkers of Europe are known. By this work, the philosopher Kant sounded the death-knell of European superstition in a deeper strain than his contemporaries Hume or Voltaire. And the new reformation which began in that springtime of genius has advanced steadily during the present century, which it will undoubtedly characterize in history. Kant wrote as follows in his work entitled, "Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason":—

"The moral capacity of man is the foundation and the interpreter of all religion. Religion, for this reason, must come to be gradually liberated from all arbitrary ordinances, from all commands which rest merely on history, and which unite men in the advancement of the good for a time only, and by means of the creed of a Church. . . . The leading strings of sacred tradition, with its appurtenance of rules and observances, which did good service in their time, gradually become superfluous, and even become a bondage when man approaches years of discretion. When he was a child he understood as a child, and he found that scriptural learning and even a sort of church-philosophy agreed very well with commands imposed upon him from without. But when he becomes a man, he puts away childish things. The degrading distinction between layman and priest disappears. True freedom demands equality. But equality is not anarchy, because every one obeys the law—not a command imposed upon him, but the law which he dictates to himself. This law he cannot but regard at the same time as the will of the Ruler of the world, presented to man by his own reason. And this will

unites all men invisibly into a community, which before was very meagrely represented and foreshadowed by the visible Church." (The conception of a Ruler of the world, apparently external to the spirit of man, and of a future life, continued in Kant's philosophy as survivals, though they are, in my judgment, quite unessential to it.) "All this is not to be expected from an external revolution" (Kant was writing during the French Revolution); "which is attended with storm and violence, and yet has an effect largely dependent upon chance. In a new constitution thus created, any maladaptation has to be reluctantly borne with for centuries, because it could not be altered without another equally dangerous revolution.

"The transition to a new order of things ought rather to be effected by the principle of a pure religion according to reason, considered as a Divine revelation constantly being made to all men through their reason only. Such a principle, when once grasped by mature consideration, will be realized by gradually progressive reform, in so far as its realization depends upon human intelligence; revolutions are providential, and you cannot reckon on their results.

"But we may reasonably say that the kingdom of God is come on earth, as soon as ever the principle has taken root, generally, and in the public mind, that the creeds of the Churches have gradually to pass into the universal religion of reason, and so into a moral, that is, a Divine community on earth; although the establishment of such a community may still be infinitely remote from us. For this principle, because it contains the motive force of a continual approach to perfection, is like a seed which grows up, and scatters other seed such as itself; and it bears within it invisibly the whole fabric which will one day illuminate and rule the world. Truth and goodness have their basis in the natural disposition.

of every human being, both in his reason and in his heart. And because of this affinity with the moral nature of rational beings, truth and goodness will not fail to spread in every direction. Hindrances arising from political and social causes, which may from time to time interfere with this expansion, serve rather to draw closer the union of hearts in the good. For the good, when once it has been clearly perceived, never abandons the mind.

"This, then, though invisible to the human eye, is the constantly progressive operation of the good principle. It works towards erecting in the human race, as a community under moral laws, a power and a kingdom which shall maintain the victory over evil, and secure to the world under its dominion an eternal peace."

These words were published in 1793, and in consequence of the book which contained them, the veteran philosopher, then in his seventieth year, received a warning from the Prussian Government, and had to undertake to teach no more about religion. And we may be glad that they now appear to us to be no dangerous speculation, but the utterance of the most sober common sense; for it is none the less true that they contain the essence of European civilization,—a hard-won inheritance, which it is our duty, in the words of the Athenian's oath, to leave to others, "not less, but greater and nobler, than it is now intrusted to us."

VII.

*HOW TO READ THE NEW TESTAMENT.**

I HAVE planned this lecture in the hope that I may, perhaps, interest or help some among us by explaining some considerations which have forced themselves on my mind in my own attempts to understand the New Testament. I am not a theologian or critic by profession, but I claim that we all have a right to apply our intelligence to these questions, using such books as are generally accessible; and I believe that in this way, if we are fairly cautious, we may attain to substantial knowledge and ideas valuable for our lives.

The volume which we are accustomed to call the New Testament is a collection of twenty-seven separate writings by a variety of authors. The title which is still given to it (as I have it here on the title-page of the Revised Version), "The New Testament of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ," indicates the light in which the volume is regarded.

It is regarded, by all who think of it according to the description I have quoted, as a book written by a special inspiration for the instruction of later ages, containing an authentic history and a systematic doctrine revealed as the official charter of the Christian Church. And the book is therefore employed for the purpose of establishing certain matters of history and doctrine forming the faith and the creed

* An address given for the Ethical Society

of a certain set of Churches which are founded on this supposed historical revelation.

If we wish ever to understand the New Testament, we must put away from us all these ideas. We must not regard it as written by a special inspiration in order to reveal the truth to later ages. We must not regard all the twenty-seven books as of equal value. We must not suppose that all the writers of these books had the same principles, or the same purposes, or the same capacity, or the same nearness to the time and ideas of Jesus Christ. We must not think that the language of these writings has a supernatural depth, which in theory is too profound for human apprehension, and in practice admits of any interpretation we may choose. We must not, above all, clog ourselves in reading the New Testament with the theological ideas of the Catholic or Protestant Church, which are wholly strange to the grand and simple sentiments that influenced the Apostolic age. We must not, in short, consider the New Testament as the Holy Scripture of a Church. Histories and letters which are used as the sacred books of a Church can never be understood in their actual meaning. A Church must have a theology, and its theology must grow with its necessities. And all the theology which its requirements force upon it will certainly be proved out of its Holy Scriptures, if it has any.

I have one word of explanation to offer before I go further. It is often said that we should avoid negative teaching; that we should never pull down, but only build up. I accept the spirit of this precept, which appears to me to contradict its letter. Denial, a wise writer * has said, is the rejection of a lesser truth in favour of a greater, and at least in presence of

* Oliver Wendell Holmes.

doctrines which bar us out from a spiritual treasure, it has been my own experience that a few plain denials are welcome, because they alone can open the avenues of hope. Nor, perhaps, is this explanation necessary here to-night. The idols which we must gently push out of our way are sadly timeworn, and I doubt if they are held very precious.

So I want you to accompany me to-night in casting a glance at the writings of the New Testament in the time of their origin, before any one thought of them as an official revelation or as the charter of a new religion.

I will read from a very respectable and popular work an *extreme* statement of the ideas which make havoc with popular interpretation of the New Testament, *both* orthodox *and* hostile. We must remember this; these unwarranted ideas shut up this book against thousands who might find it a help to right feeling and to good conduct.

"* Now, again (when the New Testament was written), holy men are moved by the Holy Ghost, and their office in connection with this latter revelation is *first* to record, in the four Gospels, the life, death, and resurrection of the Word who was made flesh and dwelt among us; *secondly*, in the Acts of the Apostles, to narrate some results of His servants' 'testifying to him in Jerusalem, in Judea, and in Samaria, and in the uttermost parts of the earth'; *then*, 'in their Epistles, to unfold the truths respecting Him 'in all the fulness of the blessing of the Gospel of peace'; and *finally*, in the Apocalypse, 'to show unto His servants the things which must shortly come to pass in relation to the destinies of His kingdom in the world.' This part of Holy Scripture (*i.e.* the New Testament) is therefore emphatically the revelation of Jesus Christ."

* Paragraph Bible, Pref. Remarks. The italics are mine.

Few writers now, I am well aware, would put forward such conceptions as these in such guileless innocence. Yet their main result and purport lingers even where we least expect to find it. All who shrink from handling the New Testament as they would handle any other book are in some degree the heirs of this false tradition. Not only in orthodox literature, but in Unitarian writings and in works of the advanced Continental school I find a tendency to substitute unintelligent praise for appreciative study, and to treat the character of Jesus as something so high that it is beyond the reach of human apprehension.

But, it may be asked, are we not to study a great character, and the records of a great age, with *reverence?* The question is rather, to my mind, have we earned the right to be reverent? Reverence is not a cheap and easy frame of mind; it is the hard-earned privilege of worshipping the greatness which we have trained ourselves to know. It is easy to say to Jesus, "Lord, Lord;" it is not so easy to learn the lessons which Jesus taught. Let us handle the New Testament fearlessly; let us enter into its spirit thoroughly; and then we shall have the right to reverence its greatness.

Now I turn to glance at the origin and leading ideas of the New Testament, and first a few words about the name New Testament itself.

The name New Testament, or new Covenant—Testament is probably a mistranslation—indicates the idea of a single revelation, the charter of a new religion. This idea grew up by degrees in about 150 years after the death of Jesus.* It was not till after that interval of time that a collection of writings was called "The New Testament," and was reckoned as standing on the same level with the law and prophets of the Old Testament scriptures. There are only two places in

* Reuss, "Gesch. d. Kanons," sect. 217.

the New Testament writings where the name "Scripture" seems to be given to any New Testament book. One of these is in the 2nd Epistle of Peter,* a late and not very valuable writing; the other is in 1 Timothy, also a very late book, where the word scripture probably applies only to the quotation from the Old Testament. The name New Testament was no doubt derived from the words of Jesus, which really rest on the authority of Paul (1 Cor. xi. 23), followed by Matthew xxvi. 28, "This is my blood of the covenant" (or new covenant)—the idea being worked out by Paul in Galatians iv. 24, in an argument which compares the new covenant of Christ's Gospel with the old covenant of the law given from Sinai. Then, as the writings that concerned Christ's life and teaching came to be collected and appealed to, first by heretics and then by the orthodox, as evidence of what the original gospel was, these writings very gradually became an authority on matters of belief. Then—and it is just an instance of the strange legal, literal interpretation of those days—these books were sometimes called the "deed" of the new covenant, as if you were speaking of a memorandum of a lease, or perhaps of a treaty between two nations. And then, for shortness sake, instead of "the deed of the new covenant," the collection of books was called the new covenant, or, probably by a mistranslation, the New Testament† or will. This was, as I said, 150 years after the death of Christ, and it was about the same time that the writings began to be called Scripture, which is the word for inspired or infallible writings. "Scripture" in the New Testament itself, except in the places I mentioned, always refers to the law and the prophets of the Old Testament. The

* 2 Pet. iii. 16; 1 Tim. v. 18.

† "Novum Testamentum" first in Tertullian (d. about 223 A.D.). Reuss, "Geschichte des Kanons," sect. 303

New Testament writers regarded the law and the prophets as inspired, and interpreted them quite as badly as the later Church interpreted the New Testament writers. It might be possible to think for a moment that 1 Cor. xv., "Christ died for our sins 'according to the Scriptures,'" referred to the Gospel history, standing as the Gospels do in our New Testament before the Epistles; but of course the Gospels were not written till after Paul's death. "According to Scripture" means "in fulfilment of the Old Testament prophecies." *

Thus, by the time when the writings of which we are speaking had come to be called the New Testament, being thus put on a level with the Old Testament, and to be treated as Holy Scripture, the ideas of the age of Jesus and of Paul had passed away, the theologians, both heretic and orthodox, had begun their work, and the New Testament record had become their battle-field. From this time forward the New Testament became more and more the official charter of a Church, its dignity and authority increased, and the possibility of understanding it diminished.

If we want to come to close quarters with the New Testament writings, we must first of all get some idea (I.) Of the dates at which, and of the order in which they were written, and then (II.) we must go on to put together, chiefly out of the books themselves, the general movement of ideas and sentiments which they share, in spite of the very different purposes with which they were severally written.

I. The production of the more important books of the New Testament began about twenty years after the death of Jesus; and extended over a period of about a century. I may divide this period for convenience sake into four lesser periods.

1. The first period is from about 54–55 A.D., when the first

* Isaiah liii. 9, 10; Hosea vi. 2.

of Paul's Epistles which we have was written, to Paul's death, probably in 64 A.D., in the persecution under Nero, at Rome. In this ten years, there were written, for certain, the four great Epistles of Paul, Galatians, two to Corinthians, and Romans, in this order. The historical notices in these Epistles are the earliest and most certain records about Christianity. Especially, the first two chapters of Galatians are of surpassing historical interest.

On the other hand, it is quite certain that the Epistle to the Hebrews was not written by Paul, and it probably does not belong to this ten years.

All the other Epistles are doubtful in various degrees, which we need not enter into now. Any one who wants to enter into the mind of Paul, should certainly go *first* to the four undoubted Epistles, and of these, first to Galatians.

2. The second period may be taken as from the death of Paul to the capture of Jerusalem by the Romans; six years, 64–70, A.D. This capture is a great landmark in the history of the New Testament writings, because it put an end to all present hope of a triumphant restoration of the Jewish monarchy. In that way it did much to spread the true interpretation of Christ's gospel of the kingdom; and in judging of the date of any New Testament writing, it is always an important question whether that writing seems to assume that the temple services, which ceased after 70 A.D., are still going on at Jerusalem. The two important writings that clearly belong to this time are the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Revelation of St. John, both of them in different ways being full of allusions to Jerusalem and the temple-worship, and the Revelation recording the history of a particular time in the war.

3. The third period we may take from the destruction of

Jerusalem (A.D. 70) to the writing of the fourth Gospel. In it, first of all, there grew up gradually the first three Gospels, Luke being decidedly later than Matthew and Mark.* The Acts of the Apostles followed not very long after Luke, and the Gospel called St. John's was very likely later still. The Epistles called St. John's seem of the same time as the Gospel called St. John's. As to the date of this Gospel, we really do not know it. No one thinks of placing it much before 100 A.D., and some think it was more nearly 150. These dates make no difference of principle. Even if it was written in the year 100 A.D., John, the disciple of Jesus, did not write it. It was not written by an old man of 90 or 100. We see, then, that the history and philosophic divinity come last in order of time, as the need for them begins to be felt.

4. And then we may just notice a fourth period, which *may* fall within the last, because the end of the last is uncertain; but I have made it sequent, because we can fix the beginning of this by the persecution under Trajan. It extends from the first systematic persecution, beginning soon after 100, to the organization of the Catholic Church as a kingdom of this world. 1 Peter and 2 Timothy seem to allude to the persecution, while Titus and 1 Timothy show the later growth of Church and creed. 1 Timothy iii. 16 reads like the fragment of a liturgy.

We see, therefore, how very gradually the New Testament writings came into being; and we must remember that they came into general knowledge still more gradually. There is, as a rule, no trace of any care on the part of the writer or of the congregation for the preservation of his writings, for public instruction in them, or for their collection into a volume. The writers of the New Testament, at least the earlier ones, treated

* Internal evidence is in favour of regarding Mark as the latest of the three.

their books as carelessly as Shakespeare treated his plays. Some of Paul's letters are certainly lost. Among "spiritual gifts," such as prophecy and exhortation, no place is given to teaching by means of the pen. The great Church Historian writes (* Euseb., "Hist. Eccles." iii. 24, quoted in Reuss, "Histoire du Canon," p. 21): "Guided by the Holy Spirit and endowed with miraculous power, the apostles carried everywhere the tidings of the kingdom of God, taking very little care to communicate it in writing because they had to fulfil a more exalted task. . . . Paul, the first of them in power of speech and truth of ideas, left behind him only a very few letters, and those exceedingly short, although he might have said much more which had been revealed to him alone. The other companions of the Lord, the twelve apostles and the seventy disciples, were just as well informed as those who made written records, and yet only two did this, and they for special reasons." And a very early writer says (Papias, first half of second century, in Euseb. Reuss, *ib.*), "I did not think that the books were so valuable to me, as what I learnt from a living and abiding voice" (*i.e.* from tradition). And so we find that letters belonging to the early part of the second century seem to quote these books as a matter of convenience, but without assigning them any authority whatever.

From all these dates and facts we see how hopelessly unreal is the notion of a systematic inspired revelation, built upon a solid historical basis. There was no system. There was no idea of a special inspiration like that ascribed to the Old Testament prophets. Paul, at any rate, went on no solid historical basis. The order of the books was *not* Gospels first as foundation of fact, then Epistles as commentary on Gospels, then prophecy to complete the book by a revelation of the future.

* Euseb. d. 340 A.D.

The real succession of the writings was less simple, but more natural. First there came the fiery letters of the missionary to the Gentiles, with few or no facts and confused artificial reasonings, but glowing with the first flush of a great human idea; then came the prophecy of the Jewish believer, expressing his hope even in the crisis of his country's agony, which he took to be the sign of the Lord's immediate return; and at last, after this hope had proved a delusion, came the late and gradual attempts to commit to writing, and to interpret worthily, the fragmentary tradition of the life that was beginning to seem distant after the interval of more than half a century.

II. And now we must attempt to sketch some growth of ideas in the first age of Christianity, such as to be in harmony with the true arrangement and fair interpretation of the New Testament writings. We shall again, as it happens, take four periods, but they are not the same that we took in speaking of the books; because now we have to begin with the preaching of Jesus, which was, of course, not recorded in a book at the time. It is worth mentioning, as regards the relation of the books to any general ideas or doctrines, that nearly all of the books, especially the earlier ones, were written on particular immediate occasions, and in no sense for the benefit of posterity. The exceptions are, perhaps the Epistle to the Hebrews, certainly Luke's Gospel, and "John's" Gospel, both of which profess to be written with a view to instruction. (Westcott, "Social Aspects of Christianity," p. 179.) "The Epistles to the Thessalonians were due to an exceeding desire to learn something of the state of the Church from which Paul had been suddenly hurried away, when 'once and again Satan had hindered him'* from visiting them. The Corinthians,

* 1 Thess. ii. 18.

by their divisions and disorders, no less than by their questions, drew from him the portraiture of love and the apostolic statement of the gospel of the resurrection. The apostasy of the Galatians stirred him to a burning denunciation of legal righteousness. Even the studied exposition of the Faith to the Romans was due, in part, to the frustration of his purpose to visit them." *

We shall see, moreover, that the New Testament writers lived entirely in the belief that Christ's second coming was at hand, which prevented any suggestion of the need for a written revelation from ever entering their minds, at least until after the destruction of Jerusalem.

I will divide the early Christian movement, for mere convenience sake, into four epochs, to which we may give the following names, from their principal characteristics. Of course, such divisions and names are only meant to give a clue in reading; they cannot help leaving out a very great deal.

1. The principle. "The kingdom of God is within you" (Luke xvii. 21). Christ's Gospel of the Kingdom. From about 33 A.D.

2. Its application. "Whether Jews or Greeks, whether bond or free" (1 Cor. xii. 13). Paul's Gospel of Humanity. Paul's Mission to Gentiles. From about 40 A.D.

3. The Divine ideal. "God is a Spirit, and they that worship Him must worship in spirit and in truth." "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free" (John iv. 24, and viii. 32). "John's" Gospel. 130 (?) A.D.

4. The worldly reality. "The Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth" (1 Tim. iii. 15). The Catholic Church. 150 A.D. and later.

* Rom. i. 13.

1. The teaching of Jesus is described in Matthew's Gospel as preaching the gospel of the kingdom, which is more fully called either the kingdom of heaven or the kingdom of God. This gospel or message, though perfectly simple and straightforward, was so thorough and so true, that it affected at once the two chief aspects of human life—man's own heart and his relations in society.

We must clear away from our minds all such ideas as that the kingdom of heaven means a future life in Paradise, that salvation means being saved from eternal punishment, that eternal life means living for ever in another world, or that forgiveness of sins means the doctrine of the atonement by the merits of Christ. Jesus may have had some ideas which we must pronounce quite unreasonable, but tradition constantly misunderstood him, so that it is impossible to say exactly, for example, how far he believed in his own miraculous second coming to judge the world, or in eternal punishment. It is quite possible that he did more or less accept these ideas. But of course he did not say what is put in his mouth about the siege of Jerusalem, and so the sayings about his second coming and the judgment may not be authentic either.

We must go upon the bulk of the simple sayings and parables, which there is no special reason to doubt, in the first three Gospels; and if any one persists that we cannot really tell what Jesus said, then I can only answer that it does not really very much matter, for in that case we must congratulate ourselves that the Gospel-writers were so lucky as to invent these things. A schoolboy once said that it was not at all certain whether Homer's poems were written by Homer or by another person of the same name. So I do not much care whether Christ's sayings were said by Christ or by another

person of the same nature. But the tremendous contrast of the first three Gospels with the fourth makes us think the first three historical by comparison.

Take as the key to the whole, the words (Luke xvii. 21) "The kingdom of God is within you," or "is already among you." Remember that this expectation of a kingdom was the form under which the Jews were familiar with the notion of a good time coming, and some of them no doubt thought of it more as a time of greatness and glory, others as a time of reform and righteousness. Kingdom of "heaven" is the same as kingdom of God; it was only used, I believe, because the Jews did not like mentioning the name of God, just as people say, "Thank Heaven," instead of "Thank God." Salvation, eternal life, the world to come, forgiveness of sins, must all be interpreted in the same way as the kingdom of heaven; partly meaning a state of mind which begins at once and is the essential change, and partly certain consequences, such as being fit for the miraculous community of the saints on earth. The new Jerusalem in John's Revelation is on earth; it comes down from heaven. This was the universal expectation. When Jesus says, "Thou art not far from the kingdom of God," it is just like saying, You have very nearly obtained salvation or eternal life, or forgiveness of sins. You have nearly brought yourself to the true will to be righteous which *is* eternal life. And consequently the world to come does not mean a life in heaven; it means the whole good time which had begun with Christ's first coming. Then, starting from this centre, the idea of a good time, or time of reform, which was coming and had already begun, you find it naturally involving two sides, which cannot really be separated. One of these you have in the sermon on the mount, and the other especially in the parables that deal with the kingdom of heaven,

especially the parables of the grain of corn and the mustard seed (Mark iv. 26; Matt. xiii.).

That is to say, the good time, on the one hand, is to consist in righteousness of heart and life, in genuine human morality, in putting away the selfish will. "He that loseth his life shall find it." And it is to consist, for this very reason, on the other hand, in a purification of human society and the formation of a righteous community not restricted to any nation, rank, or creed. John the Baptist strikes the note to begin with. "Think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father; for I say unto you, God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham." If human righteousness and love are the one thing needful, then all the barriers of class and of caste and rank and creed are condemned already, and must go. It is again impossible to make out how far Jesus threw away the national pretensions of the Jews. It was a question that split the Apostolic society to its foundation, and the tradition of what Jesus did and said flatly contradicts itself.* It constantly happens that a man stops short in the application

* Matt. x. 5, 6.—Instructions to the Twelve *not* to go to Samaritans or Gentiles. (This in Matthew only.)

Matt. xv. 24.—Jesus says he was only sent to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, and in Mark vii. 24, there is the same story, without those words, but still bearing strongly against helping the heathen; but the moral of the story is that the *faithful* heathen *may* be accepted. According to Luke, which is supposed to be the Pauline Gospel, Jesus went through Samaria (so, too, in John), and Luke *alone* gives the famous parable of the Good Samaritan. The idea of preaching to all nations is in all the Gospels, but, so far as the Synoptics are concerned, in the most legendary part of them. Of course you may say that it only means the Jews in foreign countries, but I do not know that any one will believe you. And then there are the parables of the Vineyard and the Marriage Feast, involving the rejection of the Jews.

of his own principles in what a looker-on thinks quite an unaccountable way. And Jesus may have stopped short in this way. At best he cannot have said quite plainly how far he went, or the disciples could hardly have quarrelled about it afterwards; and the one thing we know for certain is that they did.

But there is one set of Jesus' sayings which leave no mistake about the two aspects of his gospel—and these are his indignant sayings. Indignation is not compatible with Divinity; if Christ knew that he was God, and had created these poor priests and pedants, it would have been a bit of stage-play to be indignant against them. But apart from this question, the point is that a spiritual religion, which demands rightness of heart and character as the only law, can make no truce with idle forms and ceremonies, or with the orthodoxy of a priestly caste, or with the selfishness of classes, or the exclusiveness of nations. The kingdom of heaven, which is a kingdom of the heart and mind, must also, and for that reason, be founded on freedom, and be as wide as humanity. Take such a saying as "Not that which goes into the mouth defiles a man"; or again, "The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath"; "who devour widows' houses, and for a pretence make long prayers"; "love to pray in the synagogues or in the corners of the streets." "Why do ye transgress the commandments of God because of your tradition?" And consider the act of cleansing the Temple, which was a direct defiance to the priestly system. All these things show just how a moral or rational religion must be free and universal. They carry out John the Baptist's saying, mentioned above, that it is no use claiming to be Abraham's children; for "God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham."

I. do not speak of the whole morality of Christ's gospel, simply because we have no time to-night, and I only hope to give a clue to the main idea of it. But in order to show what I mean by handling the New Testament fearlessly, I will say that one great sentiment of Jesus runs very near to sentimentalism. I mean the warnings against worldliness. Nothing, indeed, was ever more brilliantly true than the saying about the cares of this world and the deceitfulness of riches, which choke the word, so that men's lives become barren. It means, I suppose, much what I heard a friend say the other day, when he observed of a particular class of persons in a particular town, "Those respectable people are the very devil." Still I say that it is a perilous position to go about telling people to take no thought for the morrow, and to sell all they have and give to the poor. The *spirit* of it is that they should give *themselves and* all they have to the good cause; but here, as elsewhere, the letter killeth. If there is nothing baser than a life of decorous self-indulgence, there is nothing nobler than a life of thoughtful and dutiful citizenship; and here I think that Jesus had something to learn from Pericles. Hear what the greatest of Greek statesmen says: "We are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and ostentation, but when there is real use for it. To avow poverty with us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in doing nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the State because he takes care of his own household; and even those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs not as a harmless but as a useless character; and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of a policy." To my

ear there is a manliness in these words which just at some moments I could fancy that I miss in the sermon on the mount.

I repeat before going further; the principle of Jesus was certainly hostile to the exclusiveness of the Jews, and *implied* that his religion was a religion for the whole world. And he evidently made this plain to his enemies. The suggestion that was fatal to him was that he would destroy the Temple. Probably he had said that the Temple service was doomed. There is no reason to suppose the witnesses against him were false witnesses, except in the sense that they were hostile witnesses. On the other hand, he started on *a reform of Judaism*, and there is no sign that he meant to found a new religion. There were no Christians in Jesus' lifetime. It makes one think of John Wesley, who was for the greater part of his life under the delusion that he could avoid breaking from the Church of England. In both cases it was the necessities of the foreign missions that brought about the decision.

2. Now we go on to the second period, the application of the principle, and what we find at first is, that though Christ had been put to death as a heretic, yet the community of disciples, not yet called Christians, were able to continue at Jerusalem after his death. This must mean that they had fallen back into a more liberal sect of Jews; there were plenty of sects among the Jews, and one more was nothing remarkable. This is not at all unlikely; it is rather the more likely thing. A new movement would tend to attract numbers of people who did not know really what it meant, and when the great leader was taken away, their commonplace ideas would assert themselves. We can see that neither the disciples nor the Gospel-writers understood Jesus. Even the author of the fourth Gospel explains the saying about

destroying the Temple by a forced interpretation about the resurrection (John ii. 19).

But, in a short time, at Jerusalem, some events happened which the Book of Acts—written sixty years or more afterwards—has evidently confused and disguised. Some of the Jews belonging to Greek towns, who were in Jerusalem, could not agree with the old Jewish congregation; the historian puts it down to a complaint about the distribution of the charity. Well, most of us know what a quarrel is; it is seldom on one point only. But you will observe that the men who were appointed in consequence of the dispute do not merely look after the charity, but evidently initiate a religious advance, in which Stephen's preaching is a chief element. And then, immediately, a persecution begins, just on the same charge that was fatal to Jesus. The *false* witnesses (there is no reason to suppose they did not tell the truth) affirmed they had heard Stephen say that "Jesus of Nazareth shall destroy this place (the temple), and change the customs which Moses delivered us." And the speech ascribed to Stephen confirms the charge in effect. "The Most High," he says, "dwelleth not in a temple made with hands" (a quotation from 1 Kings viii. 36). Then Stephen was put to death and the disciples had to leave Jerusalem, and some of them went to Antioch and, apparently, preached to the Greeks (not merely Grecian Jews) there; and we are told the name "Christians" arose there (it is a Latin name, but might easily be introduced there).

This account in the Acts leaves not much doubt as to what had really happened. The Greek-speaking Jews, compared to the orthodox Hebrew disciples, were like English-speaking members of some little Welsh or Irish congregation; they spoke the tongue of the civilized world, and were accustomed to its life and thought. Such men would naturally seize on

the universal side of the gospel, and say,—"This is not an affair of reforming your little local Church; it is a matter for the whole world, and we shall go and preach it to everybody." (Just notice the *exact* point here; the Jews were always willing to receive Gentiles who would become Jews, and their prophets had prophesied that all the world would come into the kingdom of the Messiah. What the Jews could not endure was preaching that men might enter into the Kingdom of God without becoming Jews.) And further; of course Jesus and Paul are both hard on the wisdom of this world; and it is true that simple straightforward minds are specially accessible to new truths. Nevertheless, Greek was the language of Christianity. Jesus no doubt spoke a dialect of Hebrew, but the Roman world could no more be converted in Hebrew than the world of to-day could be converted in Welsh. Christianity became a universal religion when it was preached in Greek: and it gained by the change, in capacity of development and application, if it lost in becoming subject to theological superstition. The fourth Gospel could not have been written in Hebrew, and I question if Paul's noblest ideas could have been thought or expressed in Hebrew.

It is clear that Stephen and his party to some extent anticipated the ideas of Paul, drew upon themselves a furious persecution, and in their dispersion gave rise to Gentile Christianity (that is, to Christianity as a new religion). These events might be perhaps two years after the death of Jesus.

Then happened what, second to the ministry of Jesus, is the most important event in the history of the world—the conversion of Paul. His own plain story of this and of his conduct in consequence is in Galatians (first two chapters), and we should put together with that his account of the

appearances of Jesus in 1 Cor. xv., of the Lord's Supper in 1 Cor. xi. 23, and the passage in 2 Cor. xii., which shows that he was subject to trances. The account in the Acts is intended to represent Paul as always guided by the old Church at Jerusalem, and to give Peter an equal initiative in preaching to the Gentiles. It is quite unhistorical.

What forces itself upon us as the true account is this: Paul, when he used to persecute the Christians, of course had heard their story about the resurrection and the appearances, and we must suppose did not believe it. Then he had a trance or vision in which he thought he saw Christ, and that turned him round and made him believe it was all true. That explains how he persists in saying *apparently*, that he received all his gospel, facts and all, directly from the Lord. This is not certain of 1 Cor. xv. about the death and resurrection of Jesus, but comparing the other places it is far the most natural interpretation; and anyhow he says it of the Lord's Supper. One does not like to suppose that this account was a mere hallucination, and passed from Paul into the Gospels, but if he never heard it from anybody, it must have been so.

But, however he came to his views, we have his own writings to tell us what they were, and so far we are better off than trying to learn about Christ. The centre of his doctrine was what I have ventured to call the Gospel of Humanity, and was implied rather than affirmed in Christ's gospel of the kingdom. The extraordinary force of this gospel is shown by the hold which the new religion gained in Paul's lifetime on the very centre of the civilized world.

The central doctrine of Paul had, like all sound moral conceptions, a double aspect, just as was the case with the gospel of the kingdom, and I may add, just as was the case with Plato's idea of righteousness. I suppose we might speak of

Paul's central idea as "justification by faith only." * To mention this doctrine fills the mind with echoes of theological dispute. I will only make two suggestions with a view to helping any one who is reading St. Paul. First: he says in so many words † *what* the faith is—a belief in the risen Christ and in his Divinity—and secondly, if you ask what that belief means, for Paul, you must look for the answer in his idea of the spiritual oneness of all believers ‡ in and with Christ. These —*in* and *with* Christ—are the two aspects of Paul's doctrine. Being one *with* the risen Christ, means that the particular believer has put away his bad will, is dead to sin, and has thoroughly submitted his heart and soul to the dominion of the good will, that is, the mind of Christ. ‡ Being one *in* the risen Christ means that the society of believers form what Paul calls the "body of Christ," that is, a spiritual unity which is Divine and yet human, and as wide as humanity. Faith means realizing this oneness in and with Christ. This great comparison of the relation between human beings in society to that between the parts of a living body was introduced into moral thought by Plato, and has been, perhaps, the most fruitful of all moral ideas. I will put side by side a text from Plato and one from Paul. Plato writes in his dialogue about a Commonwealth § (notice that his principle, like Paul's and Christ's, is two-sided; he starts to show what righteousness is, and embodies it in the form of a society): "Is not that the best-ordered State which most nearly approaches to the condition of the individual,—as in the body, when but a finger is hurt, the whole frame, drawn towards the soul and forming one realm under the ruling power thereof, feels the hurt and sympathizes all together with

* *e.g.* Rom. iii. 28.
† Rom. x. 9.
‡ 2 Cor. iv. 10; Rom. vi. 5.
§ Republic, v. 462.

the part affected, and we say that the man has a pain in his finger; and the expression is used about any other part, which has a sensation of pain at suffering, or of pleasure at the alleviation of suffering? Very true, he replied, and I agree with you that in the best-ordered State there is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you describe. Then, when any one of the citizens experiences any good or evil, the whole State will make his case their own, and either rejoice or sorrow with him? Yes, he said, that is what will happen in a well-ordered State." Compare with this 1 Cor. xii. 12. "For as the body is one and hath many members, and all the members of the body, being many, are one body so also is Christ. For in one spirit were we all baptized into one body, whether Jews or Greeks, whether bond or free, and were all made to drink of one spirit. . . . And whether one member suffereth, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it. Now ye are the body of Christ and severally members thereof." Plato was speaking of a very limited visible community, Paul of the invisible community of all faithful people. Those splendid words, "whether Jews or Greeks, whether bond or free," just make all the difference. They are the war-cry of the enthusiasm of humanity. And the battle which Paul fought so hotly against Judaism or "the law," in phrases and arguments very strange to our ears, about the works of the law and the two covenants, and the circumcision, and the gospel preached to Abraham—this was *our* battle, the battle of freedom for all time. "Ye, brethren, were called for freedom—for the whole law is fulfilled in one word, even in this, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself'" (Gal. v. 13). I do not know how a man could speak plainer than Paul speaks in that particular text.

Thus I need hardly go back to say that justification by faith does not mean salvation from eternal punishment by believing historical facts. It means, as Paul says elsewhere, a new creation *of the man*, a conviction that right is the law of the world, and an entire devotion to this law which gives strength for or rather *is* a complete victory over sin (Gal. vi. 15). I do not suggest that any one can now believe these doctrines as Paul believed them, encumbered with the resurrection of the body and the Divinity of Christ, and with a sort of general imputation against human nature, what he calls the flesh, which implies a confusion between two different things, natural impulse, and wilful selfishness. We cannot believe these things, but any one who reads carefully will find that they are a very small proportion of Paul's convictions, in comparison with the simple human truth of his gospel.

3. Now I have hardly enough time to speak of the two remaining periods. But I will just point out with regard to the Divine ideal, the fourth Gospel, that it is not a *pure* advance on Jesus and Paul. It gives in one sense the most rational account of religion; but it also shows a beginning of theological superstition, and, in addition, it shows a very coarse and material fancy, a heightening of the miraculous details which is almost painful to read. The most startling miracle, the raising of Lazarus, is in it only, and is exaggerated by the allusion to the time the body had been in the grave. And at Cana, "Thou hast kept the good wine until now," is a coarse exaggeration. The fourth Gospel is wholly unhistorical in the narrative, and the Divinity of Christ, which originates in the Messiahship of Jesus, is here represented in an extreme, far beyond even Paul's idea of it, as something which Christ remembered himself to have had before he came on earth.

On the other hand, "John" treats all the disputes of Paul's

time as settled and done with. The universal destiny of Christianity is a simple fact with him.* Instead of the second coming of Christ to judge the world, Paul's idea of spiritual oneness is carried out in the notion of the Holy Spirit, which is to represent Christ and God in the mind of man. The intellectual position of Christianity is quite new, and much bolder than it was; it stands complete as the absolute truth and freedom, with a calm acceptance of what Paul seemed to puzzle out with pain and labour.

This ideal marks the turning-point of Christian thought; in one sense it brings insight into the spirit of Christ to its highest perfection; in another sense it begins the degeneration of spiritual religion into theological superstition; a doctrine something like that of the Trinity begins to show its head, and the whole simplicity of the life of Jesus is destroyed. We do not realize the enormous gulf between the fourth and the first three Gospels, because, in reading the first three, we start with ideas which we, or others for us, have drawn from the fourth.† I will read a striking passage from a good orthodox critic (Westcott, v. n).

"The first three Gospels differ at first sight as to the time, the scene, the form, and the substance of the Lord's teaching. If we had the first three Gospels alone, it might be supposed that the Lord's ministry was completed in a single year; that it was confined to Galilee till the visit to Jerusalem, at the Passover, by which it was terminated; that it was directed in the main to the simple peasantry, and found expression in

* The great text in St. John, and in many ways the greatest in the New Testament, is iv. 23, "The hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth. God is a spirit, and they that worship Him must worship in spirit and in truth."

† Westcott in "Speaker's Commentary," Introduction to St. John's Gospel, p. 77; quotation is from p. 79.

parables and proverbs, and clear, short discourses which reach the heart of the multitude; that it was a lofty and pure, yet practical exposition of the law by One who spake as man to men. [I may say plainly that all this is just what I do believe.] But, if we look at St. John, all is changed. In that, we see that the public ministry of Christ opened as well as closed with a Paschal journey; that, between these journeys, there intervened another Passover and several visits to Jerusalem; that He frequently used modes of speech which were dark and mysterious, not from the imagery in which they were wrapped, but from the thoughts to which they were applied; that, at the outset, he claimed in the Holy City the highest prerogatives of Messiah, and, at later times, constantly provoked the anger of His opponents by the assumption of what they felt to be Divine authority." And then he goes on to show that the first three Gospels and the fourth have, even, very few facts in common.

Of course he has to demonstrate that both narratives are historical; I can only say that I am glad *I* have not the task before me. The fourth Gospel was written, as we saw, from forty to seventy years after Paul's death, and from seventy to a hundred years after Christ's.* It belongs altogether to another atmosphere from theirs.

I must point out one simple sign of increasing remoteness from history at this point. The story of the Ascension is not in Matthew's Gospel. It is not in Mark's, if you omit what is shown as a later addition in the Revised Version. In Luke, the Ascension is the same day as the resurrection, obviously, as Christ passed upwards from the place of departed

* Taking Westcott's date for the gospel, 97 A.D., the intervals would be thirty-three years and sixty-two years respectively. Can this make any difference of principle?

spirits to heaven. (Same belief explicitly in the "Ep. of Barnabas," Reuss, G. d. K. 234, n.) In John, if you omit chapter xxi., which is late, Christ was on earth eight days after the resurrection, and taking chapter. xxi., more than eight days. In the Acts of the Apostles, forty days is the interval. There *is* the legend growing before your eyes. What did Paul think, being the earliest of our witnesses? I should imagine that he did not distinguish the resurrection from the ascension, and that the appearances of which he speaks took place from heaven; he does not distinguish them as different from his own vision.

4. This epoch had begun, of course, long *before* the fourth Gospel was written; in a sense, Paul writes about Church discipline to the Corinthians. But if you look carefully at 1 and 2 Timothy, which are not genuine letters of Paul, you will agree, I think, that they attach enormously greater importance to questions of organization, and belong to a quite new order of ideas as compared with St. Paul, and a *divergent* order of ideas as compared with the author of John's Gospel; which Gospel, however, does show, both in its systematic method and in its theological substance, the influence of an organized Church. Very likely both these books were written about the same time as the fourth Gospel.

You will notice that in these books there is great anxiety about "the faith," almost as if it were a creed; I *doubt* if Paul uses the word thus in the four certain Epistles; in the beginning of Galatians he says rather "the gospel," that is simply the message he had preached, not anything traditional or fixed in a Church. Instructions about the officers of the Church are given in detail. That is to say, the distinction of clergy and laity is beginning to show its head, which led to our horrible use of "ecclesiastic" and even of "church" as confined to the officials of the Church. Both Jesus and Paul would have

fought to the death against any distinction, except one of mere convenience, between clergy and laity. And in the Second Epistle of Peter, as we saw, Paul's letters are alluded to as Scripture, which means that an official collection was becoming recognised as an authority; and the same Epistle shows that Christ's second coming, or at least, the nearness of it, was beginning to seem doubtful, and that it was also beginning to be regarded as dreadful. Nothing could be more significant than the loss of faith in the second coming, combined with turning to a written record.

It is clear, too, from these Epistles, and from other history, that the clamour of all sorts of wild theorizing became louder and louder in the second century, and the Church organized its theology in self-defence. Definitions and distinctions were introduced quite foreign to the mind of Christ or Paul. Every phrase that an Evangelist or St. Paul had used to force the great facts of religion upon men's minds, was interpreted coarsely and literally, or wildly and fantastically. Ideas of authority, permanence, infallible tradition, scriptural inspiration, took the place of the idea of membership in the kingdom of heaven.

Synods and councils came to be held, having authority in matters of faith. Some of the earliest synods were about the burning question when Easter was to be celebrated.* *Paul* had had a word to say about such observances to the Galatians: "Ye observe days and months and seasons and years. *I am afraid of you, lest by any means I have bestowed labour upon you in vain*" (Gal. iv. 10).

In short, the religion of the Catholic Church became a law, like that against which Paul had fought, but no doubt with

* Gibbon, vol. ii., p. 193 (ch. 15). Guizot's note.

larger and nobler elements; and Christendom has lived under this law and has called it Christianity to the present day. The difference is, that the Church has preserved in its books the principle of truth and freedom, and it has at some times and in some degree borne witness to this principle. There is nothing at all strange in the fact that we now, after seventeen centuries, can see the meaning of the New Testament more truly than it has been seen since it was written. It is quite in accordance with experience that this should be so. The ideas of great men are apprehended very slowly, and a free and rational society must *in part* exist before the dream of such a society can be rightly interpreted. This does not at all deny that the earlier and less free interpretations of the New Testament, with the imperfect societies in which they arose, have been conditions of the more free and more rational society of to-day.

Now I should like to sum up a few suggestions which I have found useful.

(1.) We should read chiefly the chief books, the undoubted letters of Paul, and the four Gospels. The other books should be judged by these, and used to fill up our knowledge of the age and its varying tendencies. Acts especially should be carefully compared with what Paul's own letters say. It is well to get hold of some of the books which are not in the New Testament collection to see the same tendencies getting more extravagant.* (No one doubts, I believe, that every Gospel and Epistle in the New Testament is better than any book of the same kind which was not received into the New Testament. This is the sole foundation, in fact, for the idea of inspiration. The first century *was* a great religious epoch.)

* "Bible for Young People," vol. 5, p. 105

(2.) We should read patiently, but not slavishly. If, after giving careful attention, we fail to understand a passage, or we think it is plainly wrong and foolish, let it be so. We must not twist the meaning to make it come right. I hold that the English intellect has been kept back a hundred years by the habit of intellectual evasion, which has its roots in our slavish fears of the Bible. We must not go text-hunting; we must *read* continuously, and follow the writer's meaning.

(3.) We should bear in mind the order and something like the dates of the books—at least so as to know when they were *not* written. More particularly, we must remember that all the Gospels are later than Paul's letters; that the Acts is *very much* later than Paul's letters, and puts a gloss on the facts; and that John's Gospel belongs to quite a different age from the other Gospels. We must not *expect* the same kind of thing from the different books. If we ask the right questions they will tell us no lies.

(4.) We must be on our guard against the language of our own translation. Every important word in it (nearly every word) is charged for us with the results of 1,700 years of controversy, none of which *could* be in the minds of those who used the words in the original. Learning to interpret is like learning to draw; we have to get rid of our acquired ideas, and try only to see what is simply given to our eye. "Father" and "Son" are simple words. But when I read them in the New Testament I am assaulted by ideas about the Trinity; and so, too, when I read about the Holy Spirit, notions about a *person* come to my mind. Try as we may, we shall hardly regain the simplicity of these ideas. On the other hand, it is silly to speak as if writers meant nothing by their words: yet their meaning was not, except in John, philosophical. Their words were expressions *for* a fact, not definitions *of*

a system. In R.V. Romans v. 11, "reconciliation" now stands in place of "atonement,"—a great gain. The idea of expiatory sacrifice is much strengthened by Hebrews, which is not Pauline.

(5.) I find it useful to read advanced criticism—useful morally as well as intellectually. It stimulates attention, strengthens grasp, makes the writer's mind intelligible, and so brings it near and enables us to enter into it. People call it "picking holes"; but this is great nonsense. When we feel our writer to be of like passions as we are, then it is, and not till then, that we can sympathize and appreciate. Did you ever notice that there are five warnings in dreams in the first two chapters of Matthew? or that in Luke the ascension is the same day as the resurrection? These little things, and others greater, just take us into the heart of the world we are dealing with. I would read Matthew Arnold's "Literature and Dogma" and "St. Paul and Protestantism;" and, if you can get them in a library, "The Bible for Young People," or "The Protestant Commentary." Of course you will find no book without faults.

(6.) And lastly, our power of understanding the New Testament will depend largely upon experience of other books—not specially critical books. Generally, we can only gain judgment and insight by reading; and specially, we must be familiar with other great ages and great ideas if we want to understand early Christianity. It is a remarkable and a noble admission of the great orthodox divine whom I have quoted to-day, that, in his account of the social gospel of the New Testament, he has owed much to his study of Comtism. It would be a shallow and ungenerous retort to suggest that Comtism might have been enough for him without the New Testament. We want all the light we can get; there would be no sense in casting aside a great religious record because a great writer has

helped us to see its value. I would certainly read Westcott's "Social Aspects of Christianity." Where he says you must believe in the Fall of Man and in the Resurrection, I should simply say, "No, I must not." But it is a good book, with especially interesting notices of Francis of Assisi, who was never a priest, it seems, but a great secular reformer, and of George Fox, the Quaker.

Robert Owen's clear views illustrate the opposition to religion as external *law*. He said the first condition of reform was to put an end to all *religions* as diverting attention from the real conditions which determine character; he thought this the only chance for *religion*. His view of human nature was shallow; but practically, as against the prejudices of his time, his suggestions were almost entirely right. He wrote a book called "The New Moral World"—this *name* is a very good equivalent for Christ's phrase *The Kingdom of Heaven*. Mazzini, or any work dealing with his life or views, is also well worth reading.

No one can feel more acutely the extreme difficulty of reading the New Testament aright than one who has enjoyed what is ironically called a good religious education. And I have often wished, in the bitterness of my heart, that the New Testament could be buried for a hundred years, and discovered afresh in a wiser age. But man must untie, with patience and labour, the knots which man has tied; and it is our task, and the task of a future moral education, to regain, for ourselves and for our children, some clue to the religion of Jesus and of Paul.

VIII.

*THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPORTANCE OF A TRUE THEORY OF IDENTITY.**

I SHOULD like to explain very shortly why I have chosen this particular subject. Those of us who are especially accused of being interested in German philosophy are tempted either to give battle along the whole line, as by discussing the nature of reality, or to make everything seem all the same in all systems, as may easily be done by a sympathetic treatment of any special subject. I was desirous, if I could, to select a point which should be important in its bearings, but yet perfectly definite, so as to be explained, I hope, with some approach to precision. I believe myself that this is the *only* fundamental question which is or ever has been at issue between distinctively English thinkers and German idealist thinkers, as such; but when I say the *only* question, of course I include in it its consequences, and it is the object of this paper to indicate very briefly how far-reaching these are. Other alleged differences, such as the distinction between *a priori* and experiential philosophy, or that between a belief in the absoluteness and in the relativity of knowledge, I take to be pure misunderstandings.

In order to state the question precisely, I will take it first in its logical form, although in this particular form English

* Read before the Aristotelian Society, and subsequently published in *Mind*.

so by disbelieving in identity altogether; and it would not be true, for a spiritual identity will always express itself as a legal one.

I should like to try and illustrate this point of real identity by one further example. We here, the members of the Aristotelian Society, have in our minds, *quâ* members, a really identical purpose and endeavour, and consciousness of certain facts, just as actually and truly as we are actually and truly sitting round an identical table. It is not the fact that we are a number of separate individuals or atoms, each completely real in his sensuous identity, and merely cherishing, in addition, certain ideas which happen to resemble each other. In as far as this is fact, it is so in the sense that our moral being has enough in other relations to fill it up and make it real, apart from what we are and do as members of this Society. But in as far as our membership plays any part in our consciousness, so far this real identity actually and in sober earnest forms a part of our being as the individuals that we are, and our solidarity as a Society is only another aspect of a real identity which is recognised in a different form by each several member of the Society, according to his individual relations to it. It may be said: "But our ideas and purposes in respect of the Society are not all the same; they are probably not all even in agreement." But our ideas of the table are not all the same; our perceptions of it are certainly all different—the different angles at which we see it answer for that. No one can prove that we all see it of the same colour, and if we do not, our perceptions of it are even discrepant. Yet we say it is the same table, because, in our worlds which we severally construct and maintain, it fills a corresponding place, and so we do not say that there are as many tables as people; but

we call it one and the same table which we all perceive. And so, because this Society to which we belong is recognised by each of us in certain purposes which are relative to the corresponding purposes of others, and which assign different people the places necessary to common action, we call it the same Society, which really exists in the ideal and practical recognition of it by its members, and is something in them which is the same in all of them, and without which they would be so far devoid of a real solidarity which they now possess.

If we once begin trying to exclude difference from identity, we can never stop. The comparison of Locke's discussion with Hume's is interesting in this respect. Hume follows much the same lines as Locke, but bears more distinctly in mind that in explaining an identity which includes difference—*e.g*, personal identity—he is not expounding a fact, but is, according to his own principle, accounting for a fallacy. The problem is, of course, as old as Heraclitus. If we want to free identity from differences, we must go to atomic sensation, and then we cannot. Any limit which we place upon real identity has only a relative value, depending upon the aspect in which the terms are compared. If we try to make such a limit absolute, it at once becomes arbitrary.

And by accepting such a limit we may be driven into an opposite extreme, through lumping together all that lies beyond our limit. It seems to me that the Comtists do this in erecting Humanity as an object of worship; they know that all ideas of solidarity or real identity among men are apt to be taken as fiction, and they think it as cheap to have a big fiction as a small one. So they take an object, I think, in which it is really very hard to show a centre

AB is AB. In point of fact, the letters, taken as mere letters, are atomic existences, and the judgment cannot be represented by their help. If they are used algebraically, *i.e.*, for elements in a numerical whole, the question is different.

What, then, is Identity? The judgment is the simplest, and perhaps the ultimate expression of it. An identity is a universal, a meeting-point of differences, or synthesis of differences, and therefore always, in a sense, concrete. Or we may speak of it as the element of continuity that persists through differences. We may illustrate this idea by comparing it with Locke's notion of identity. "In this consists identity, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we considered their former existence, and to which we compare the present" ("Essay," Bk. ii., ch. 27). In spite of this demand for the exclusion of difference, Locke gives a very fair working account of personal identity, by limiting the points within the personality which do not vary, and ascribing identity in virtue of them. But he forgets that these points are not isolable from differences, and cannot be treated as identities simply on the ground of their not varying. If a thing is pronounced truly identical with itself only in as far as we exclude the differences of its states, attributes and relations, identity falls into tautology, which is really incompatible with it.

Let us take such a judgment as "Cæsar crossed the Rubicon." In order to give this its full meaning we must not try to cut it down as Lotze in one place does ("Logic," § 58), reducing Cæsar to mean merely a creature that crossed the Rubicon; this would be A is A again. Precisely the point of the judgment is that the same man united in himself or persisted through the different relations, say, of being conqueror of Gaul and of marching into Italy. The Identity is

the Individual, or the concrete universal, that persists through these relations. And if you ask what in particular this is, and try to whittle away the differences and leave the identity, you will find that when the differences are all gone the identity is all gone too. In the case of two outlines which partly coincide, you cannot speak of the coincident part as the same, except by an ideal synthesis which identifies it first with one of the two outlines and then with the other.

Identity, then, cannot exist without difference. In other words, it is always more or less concrete; that is to say, it is the centre or unity or continuity in which different aspects, attributes, or relations hold together, or which pervades those aspects, or persists through them. It is quite accurately distinguishable from difference in known matter, but it is not isolable from difference. The element of identity between two outlines can be accurately pointed out and limited, but the moment they cease to be two, it ceases to be an identity.

This is the most vital point of recent Logic. The universal is no longer treated as an abstraction, but, so to speak, as a concretion, so that violent hands are laid even on the inverse ratio of intension to extension. We can no longer see why the universal, within which a certain element falls, should be more abstract than that element; why, for example, the state should be a more abstract existence than the citizen.

A very good instance of this way of looking at universals is the treatment of proper names* as indicating universals, because they indicate persistent subjects. Most people have some sort of *schema* which helps them to handle their philosophical ideas. The traditional *schema* of the universal—even Mill's, I should say, though he helped to show the way out

* *E.g.*, Sigwart, "Logik," i. 83.

of it—was, I suppose, extent of area. The greater universal included the wider surface, and was more abstract. The *schema* I should now use would be more like a centre with radii, or simply a subject with attributes, the greater universal having the more or more varied radii or attributes, and being therefore the more concrete. Such a *schema* is particularly in harmony with taking an individual as designated by a proper name for the example of a universal.

The recognition that a universal is an identity, and *vice versâ*, is to be seen dawning on Mill, who usually denies the operation of identity in inference, in a very interesting foot-note in the "Logic" (i. 201) directed against Mr. Spencer, who answers it in "Psychology" (i. 62, note). Mr. Spencer is more of an atomist, I believe, than any one else has ever been, for he says that the syllogism must have four terms; *i.e.*, the middle term is not identical in its two relations, but only similar.

The concrete view of the universal has a result antagonistic to the whole tendency which began with the class-theory of predication (closely connected with the law of Identity), and ended with Quantification of the Predicate and Equational Logic. Of course these researches have been both curious and important; but in as far as they aim at reducing the judgment to an identity without difference, they are off the track of living thought. Jevons's idea of Identity is very difficult; I can hardly suppose it to be thought out. But what he says ("Principles of Science," pp. 16, 17) about the negative symbol which indicates difference, "or the absence of complete sameness," means, I think, that he considers difference an imperfection in identity. Jevons writes the judgment, "All Dicotyledons are Exogenous," as "Dicotyledons = Exogens," which he takes to mean, I suppose, that the two classes are

composed of the same individuals; *i.e.* their identity is in the mere sameness of the individuals. What this judgment really means is that in a particular kind of subject, a kind of tree, the different attributes of having two seed-leaves and of making fresh wood on the outside are conjoined, with a slight presumption of causality. The whole point and significance of the identity depends on the depth of the difference. So that though you can, under certain conditions, take the one term and deal with it as if it was the other, yet that is only a *consequence* of the real import of the judgment; the real point and import is to look at the two together, as united in the same subject.

In Psychology the difference between the conception of concrete and abstract identity shows itself in the theory of Association, especially in the attitude taken up towards the law of Association by Similarity. If Identity is atomic or abstract, *i.e.*, excludes difference, then you cannot speak of your present impression as being identical, or having identical elements with a former impression which, *qud* former, is by the hypothesis different; and, consequently, you must say that the first step in Association always is to go from your present impression back to another impression which is like it, before you can get to the adjuncts of that former impression, of which adjuncts the revival by association is to be explained. This first step is Association by Similarity, which, according to what was till recently, I believe, the received English theory, must always precede Association by Contiguity, that is, the transition to those adjuncts of the former impression, the recalling of which by something in present consciousness is the problem to be explained. The *theoretical* question at issue is mainly the degree in which the processes of consciousness are homogeneous at its different levels. Association of particulars

might lead up to Inference from particulars to particulars, but could never lead up to the activity of judgment and inference considered as the interconnection of universals.

The question of *fact* which is involved in this question of theory is one of extreme interest. It is whether we do, in what is called transition by association, go from the presented element to the quite different context which it recalls, through a distinct particular reproduction of a former impression similar to that now presented. If this is so, we go to Contiguity always through Similarity, and in doing so we revive our former impression (I adopt the language of the theory, though, if there is no identity, we cannot *revive a former impression*, but only one like it) with complete exactness, just as if we were taking a print out of a portfolio. And the idea that we do this is attractive, because in some cases we appear to be aware of doing it in a striking way—of going right back into a former and similar state of consciousness, before we go on to the further adjuncts contiguous with that former state of consciousness.

But I do not think that this popular idea will really bear examination in the light of facts. It is plain that, as a rule, the element in present perception which sets up an association is not a particular complete in itself, and operative by calling up a former separate or self-complete particular resembling it. On the contrary, the element which sets up an association can be seen very easily (if we think of hourly, normal occurrences of the process, and not merely of striking examples in which a picturesque memory is at work), to be a characteristic *in* a present *complex* perception, not itself sensuously isolable, but identical with something *in* a former complex perception, and recalling directly, without intermediation of a similar particular, some adjunct of the former

complex perception. And this adjunct, the idea whose reproduction is to be explained, is not itself a particular, but is a complex dominated by a type or rule of interconnection, which does not appear in the mind with its old particular content, but with a new one largely furnished and modified by the present content of consciousness.* The more closely we examine the matter, the less we shall think that contents brought up by association reappear in their old form, like prints out of a portfolio, or involve an intermediate reproduction of the old case similar to the new perception which starts the process. The illusion comes from seeking out very elaborate examples. The common cases in which association and inference can barely be distinguished are perfectly good instances, and show the continuity of the intellectual function. I hear a rumbling in the street and think that an omnibus is passing, or a double knock and know that the letters have come. I do not go back to the last particular rumble or postman's knock, or expect letters like the last which came.

The interest of those who believe in concrete Identity, in thus reducing the two "Laws of Association" to the one Law of Contiguity, is to enforce the idea that the content of consciousness is never merely simple or particular, and that in association, as in judgment, the universal or meeting-point of differences furnishes the true guide to the intellectual process.

This reduction is beginning to be accepted (*e.g.*, Mr. Sully mentions it, and Mr. Ward in some degree adopts it), not perhaps in the full sense here claimed for it, but merely as a preferable statement of the operation of ideas which are particulars. I doubt, for example, whether Mr. Sully has

* It will be obvious to all who are familiar with the subject, that I am borrowing largely from Mr. Bradley's chapter on "Association" in "Principles of Logic."

abandoned the Scotch or English ground of atomism in ideas. But to recognise identity as the universal makes the associative process far simpler, and homogeneous with the whole remaining evolution of consciousness.

In Ethical Philosophy the desire to exclude difference from identity produces analogous difficulties to those which we have noticed in Logic and Psychology. If, in short, difference is excluded from identity, how are you ever to get from one self-identical particular to another, whether in inference, or in association, or in moral purpose, or in political obligation? In the sciences that deal with human action the natural atom to start from is, simply putting atom into Latin, the individual human being. Of course an individual human being is a concrete universal, as we saw in speaking of what is meant by a proper name; but as his unity is pressed upon us by merely perceptive synthesis, we are apt to treat it as a datum, or to draw a sharp line between the unity of the individual human being, as a datum of reality, and the unity of human beings in identical sentiments, ideas, purposes or habits, as something not a datum, not real, the mere creation of our comparing intelligence. A striking example of such a point of view on Ethical ground is the passage in "Methods of Ethics," p. 374, where Prof. Sidgwick speaks of testing the feeling of common sense towards the sum of pleasure as an ethical end, by supposing that there was only a single sentient conscious being in the universe. Of course it is allowable to suppose, for the sake of argument, alteration in a state of things which we know to be actual; but nobody—least of all so cautious a writer as Prof. Sidgwick—would remove in his supposition so enormous an element of the case as man's social life, unless he supposed it to belong less really to the individual's moral identity than his existence as a living body does.

This is simply not the fact. Of course, if a plague carried off all men in the world but one, that one might *retain* his social consciousness and habit of mind. But apart from further religious assumptions, that consciousness would be an illusion, and the man's self would be a mutilated fragment for which no real life was possible. The fairer case to put, which we can observe in fact but too often, is to suppose that the body lives on, but that the real identity with society and humanity—the universal consciousness—is extinguished in that one body by disease. Then we see that it was not in the least a metaphor, but an absolutely literal truth, to say that the man's real self—what he was as a moral being and in part as a legal person—consisted in a system of universals, or identities including difference—*viz.*, the consciousness of certain relations which, as identities in difference, united him with family, friends and fellow-citizens. "Identities in difference," such, *e.g.*, as a man's relation to his son; it is like the case of the two outlines which I mentioned. The two men are bound together by certain facts known to both of them, certain sentiments and purposes, all of which they both share, but in regard to which each of them has a different position from the other, apart from which difference the whole identity would shrink into nothing.

In Political Philosophy, again, we may notice Mr. Spencer's social atomism, curiously doubled with a comparison of the body politic to the living body, in which the state is taken, roughly speaking, as a unit, among units, instead of being taken as a real identity throughout the whole. It is a strange fate for Plato's famous simile of the organism to have its contention retorted in this way. A justification might be found for Mr. Spencer by pressing home the idea of a spiritual identity as against an external or legal one, and probably that is the sort of meaning which he has in mind, but he is barred from saying

writers have sometimes seen and satirised the absurdity of the view which, in my opinion, they accept in all other provinces of philosophy.

The logical law of Identity, A is A, is susceptible of many interpretations; but they all fall, I think, between two extremes. The one extreme is to take the principle as a demand that in every judgment there shall be some identity or positive connection between subject and predicate, which is merely symbolised by the repetition of an identical letter. This view we need not trouble ourselves with; it is nothing at all, unless further explained. But the other extreme is to take A is A as a statement of the *sort* of identity which the judgment aims at: *i.e.*, as a type of the fullest, completest, most thorough identity, compared with which the identity in an ordinary intelligible judgment is incomplete and falls short of being genuinely identity at all. Hamilton's statement ("Logic," i. 80) is of this kind. The law of Identity means "Everything is equal to itself." I should state the view, then, which I propose to apply and to controvert as being that perfect identity consists in the entire exclusion of difference.

The importance of this view consists in its atomic tendency. If we were to attach moral implications to theoretical views, this doctrine might be burdened, more fairly than materialism, with the chief associations which are supposed to be objectionable in materialistic conceptions. I say this by way of illustration of its importance, and not in the least believing that such associations ought to be introduced into philosophical reasoning. But the ground for connecting any such associations with this ideal of perfect Identity without difference lies in what Plato would have called its *eristic* character, that is, its tendency to exclude from judgment, and therefore from truth and knowledge, all ideal synthesis. Not, of course,

that ideal synthesis ever has been or can be excluded from judgment; less deception would be possible if this were so; but what may and does happen is that an arbitrary line is drawn across various contents of knowledge, and their identity is denied from the point at which some little effort or some little education begins to be needed in order to recognise it. In fact, all ideal syntheses which we can find out to be such are pronounced to be fictions.

If we take A is A in the sense to which I object, as meaning that the real type which underlies the judgment is an identity without a difference, we simply destroy the judgment. There is no judgment if you assert nothing; and if there is no difference between predicate and subject, nothing is asserted. Of course in "A man's a man" we make some difference between the two terms: one means man in his isolation, the other man in his common nature, or something of that sort.

If I were asked how I should represent a true Identity, such as a judgment must express, in a schematic form with symbolic letters, I should say the problem was insoluble. Every A is B would be much better than Every A is A; but as the letters are not parts in any whole of meaning, they are things "cut asunder with an axe," and such a formula could only correspond to a proposition like "London Bridge is one o'clock," *i.e.*, to a spurious judgment, which would be mere nonsense.

One might try Every A is AB, which would be suitable in some respects; but then, what is the use of repeating the A when you have it once already in the subject? The whole difficulty would arise again in endeavouring to explain the connection between A and B in AB; and besides, a qualification in the subject would be demanded to account for the qualification in the predicate, and we should have to recur to

of identity. You can do something with an ideal human nature embodied in an individual, or with a national consciousness and history; but is there really anything at once definite and valuable that links together all humanity as such, including the past?

It often occurs to one to ask oneself, whether all this question is not largely verbal. Supposing we take identity to exclude difference, and therefore practically banish identity from the world altogether, and instead of it use the term similarity or resemblance, and attach certain consequences to certain degrees and kinds of similarity, would philosophy suffer any loss? When Hume explains continued identity as a current fiction, does he not explain it quite as well as any one could who called it a fact? When Mill treats consciousness as an ultimate inexplicability, does he not in that very passage state the nature of consciousness as well as any one could who professed to be able to explain it? There is something in this, in so far as we analyse contents, as Locke and Hume do in their discussions, and distinguish what consequences attach to what resemblances, or, as Hume would call them under protest, identities.

This can be done, by the process of defining and precisely limiting the points of resemblance in respect of which inferences are drawn, such as those inferences which we draw from what we call personal identity. An indiscernible resemblance between two different contents, in specified respects, will do whatever identity will do, because it is identity under another name. The self-contained identity of the separate contents is broken down when you admit that one of them can be indiscernibly like the other, and yet also remain different from it. In that case the contents form a coherent system or unity in multiplicity, which is the essence of identity.

The only objection to this is the confusion of terminology, and so of thought, which is involved in putting ordinary similarity, the essence of which is not to be precisely analysed and not to establish a middle term or centre, on the same level as "exact likeness," which establishes a middle term or centre of unity. We know that in ordinary similarity the things pronounced similar remain separate, and you cannot infer from one to the other. On the other hand, in indiscernible likeness or identity there is a systematic unity between the elements in question, which is as real as the elements themselves. Therefore, to dispense with concrete identity involves a confusion of the case in which the transition or unity is "objective"—*i.e.*, as real as the content itself—with the case in which the content is self-contained and merely has a certain echo of another content, so that the similarity of the two may be called subjective; that is to say, that it is not precisely referred to any element in the content itself. In the one case the unity of the contents is real, in the sense that it is definitely a part of themselves; in the other case it is a fiction, in the sense of being somehow added on to them by a confused perception.

It is quite possible to examine into the bearings and nature of a fiction or artificial structure, and English philosophy, from Hobbes to Mill, has done much good work in this attitude. But putting aside the theoretical inconvenience, which I have tried to point out in detail, of assuming the wrong kind of unit, there is also an important practical effect on the theoretical interest. People will not pay the same attention to what they think secondary or artificial as to what they think a reality in its own right. Reality means to us something that resists efforts to destroy it, and refuses to be remodelled at our pleasure, and everything which is artificial

or made up, though of course it exists, seems arbitrary and capable of being remade in another way, especially if we believe that the units when separated would retain a value which, in fact, they only have in synthesis. And for that reason anything artificial seems less fundamental, and less worth detailed investigation, than what is thought to have a nature that cannot be got rid of, and that includes all we need care about.

I should like, in conclusion, to illustrate this effect by more general considerations. The effect is, I repeat, the outcome or embodiment of an idea that difference is detrimental to identity (the logical formulation of the doctrine is not, of course, responsible for the whole effect or embodiment); and it consists in a sceptical attitude towards the real unity of every system or synthesis which can be seen to be a synthesis. And by "real" I mean having equal reality with the individuals which enter into the synthesis, so as to form an integral part of their nature, and not to rank as something which may be thus or otherwise without fundamentally affecting those individuals.

This feature is extremely remarkable in the otherwise brilliant history of British philosophy. I suppose that in the theory of material evolution England stands unrivalled. In the theory of spiritual evolution, apart from some excellent recent treatises on the simpler phases of anthropology, and apart from the recent Germanised movement itself, England has not a single work of the first class, and hardly a single work of the second class, to show. Of course Herbert Spencer fills a large place in the world's eye, and has no doubt made important general contributions to the theory of evolution. But I think it would almost be admitted that he is more of a theorist than of a historical inquirer, and at best his inquiries

are very limited in range. On the evolution of fine art we have not merely no philosophy, but we have not the material for it; we have no native *history* of fine art of any distinction, if we except the life-work of Mr. Ruskin. The history of religion, of morals, of law, of philosophy, and also history as such, have met with no complete philosophical treatment. I believe there is no tolerably good edition of Plato's "Republic," or of Aristotle's "Ethics" or "Politics" (till the last few days),* that has been made by an Englishman for the use of Englishmen. The same is true of the New Testament, though there I am told that other nations share our deficiency; but they do not share the deficiencies of our general treatment of theological subjects, which till lately testified to the same curious apathy on the part of philosophical students.

Our logic, even, has only of late—I should say not till Mill's "Logic" appeared—really attempted to assume a vital and organic character as a genuine analysis of the intellectual world. Our analytic psychology and metaphysic, while it has from time to time shaken the world by the acuteness of its questions, has, as it always seems to me, almost wilfully declined to engage in the laborious task of answering them.

Such observations as these may be taken as an attack on British philosophy. I do not mean them to be so; I do not doubt that the philosophy of Great Britain will creditably stand comparison with that of any nation in the world, excepting always, in my judgment, the ancient Greeks. But I do think that not enough attention is usually paid to what is, so far as I know, the wholly unparalleled fact, which a mere glance at a bookshelf containing the works of the great British philosophers will convince us of, that they have understood the limits of

* Mr. Newman's edition of the "Politics" was published shortly before this paper appeared in *Mind*.

their subject quite differently from the philosophers of other countries. The qualities which have hitherto been displayed in British philosophy—I mean in the really effectual part of it—have been, as it seems to me, only a portion of the characteristics of the race which has produced it. Penetration and audacity, a power (so to speak) of leading the forlorn hope, have been the characters by which British philosophy has at times left a decisive mark on the thought of the world; but it has hardly shown the power of comprehensive organization and continuous growth which in practical life, and I suppose in physical science, put the British people at the head of the nations. We do hear sometimes that even in practical organization, when it has grown so elaborate as to demand conscious and reflective development, we tend to come short; *e.g.*, in education and in the means of modern war.

This national peculiarity, which can hardly as a matter of fact be denied, is no doubt a defect of our good qualities; and it is perhaps not fanciful to connect it with our insular position, which may cut us off more than we are aware from the impression of a real unity and continuity in a very various life. No one can read Goethe's recollections of his boyhood without feeling how, for example, the pageants of the empire which he witnessed at Frankfort helped to call out his pregnant sense of organic continuity. More especially I suppose that the secondary results of the Renaissance which led up to the splendid development of genius in Germany, about a hundred years ago, were choked in England largely by the political causes which led to the victory of Puritanism.

It seems to me, therefore, that the recent interest in German philosophy, which has shown itself in some meritorious and perhaps in some rather laughable forms, is not an accident, but is an aspect, however humble, in the great intellectual

movement of the nineteenth century, and brings with it, however awkwardly, an element in which the abstract thought of this country has hitherto been deficient; that is, a faith in those higher forms of human solidarity which are only created, maintained, and recognised by intelligent effort. We must remember that while Kant and Hegel are annoying our philosophers, Rousseau, Schiller, and Goethe, who have the same ideas in their practical shape, are at the other extreme of society, under the name of Froebel, reforming our infant and elementary schools, and that perhaps our very economical and commercial existence is at stake in the degree to which the national mind can be awakened to the real value of the world of truth and beauty. The actual history of the Germanising movement in England would be well worth tracing. I suppose Coleridge and Carlyle represent two early aspects in it; Carlyle's laborious historical work is quite as characteristic of it as Coleridge's rather ineffective philosophising.

The logical aspect of such a movement as this is the transition from an idea of exclusive or abstract identity to one of pregnant or concrete identity. I should say the transition began in England between Hamilton and Mill. This idea has not been overwhelmed by the reaction which has set in in Germany against Hegelianism, but remains a permanent and vital gain to logic. A nation does not lose what a teacher like Goethe, not to speak of Hegel, has taught it; and we should be much mistaken if we fancied that our common logic was already on a level with that of Prantl and Sigwart, because it is innocent of Hegelianism, against which they are in reaction. The reaction is simply a way of thoroughly appropriating what has been done, and making sure that we understand it. The state of innocence is something very different and inferior.

IX.

*ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN "KNOWLEDGE" AND "OPINION."**

I AM privileged to speak this evening before a society of philosophical students in the city which has been called the modern Athens. It appeared to me, therefore, that I might not inappropriately lay before the Society some thoughts on that central question by the treatment of which in ancient Athens the first foundations were laid of a European philosophy.

The question, "Is there such a thing as knowledge, and, if there is, by what features may we recognise it?" had, I take it, a far more radical bearing in Plato's time than in our own. For us, it is a matter of extreme scientific and also of ethical interest to define the grounds and principles on which, and subject to which, human thought can claim to apprehend the nature of things. The idea of the unity of the world is vital even to those who think that they deny it. But, except in some remote theoretical sense, no one does, or can deny it to-day. The great inheritance of science and philosophy is to logic, as civilized law and religion to moral reflection, or as the fine art of the world to the perception of beauty. If anything bewilders us in the proceedings of nature, we set it down, as a mere matter of course, to our own ignorance. Nor

* An address given before the Edinburgh University Philosophical Society.

does any one seriously dispute the main content of civilized morality, or the universal value of beauty. Our theories are tested by these things, and not these things by our theories. But in Plato's time these great objective supports were largely wanting to philosophy; though doubtless the civilization which he knew seemed much larger to him than, by comparison, and owing to our ignorance, it now seems to us. In the way of systematic knowledge, we think there was only a little mathematics; in the way of moral consensus, only the institutions, and the not very stable convictions of his own small country, and to some extent of the Hellenic world; in the way of realized beauty, the products of the short-lived maturity of one only, though that the most gifted, among nations. I cannot but think that the suggestion that these principles and activities belonged to no coherent unity, and possessed therefore no absolute and universal validity, was in his day a natural and probable suggestion to a degree which we cannot for a moment imagine. If now, for example, the mysterious debility were to strike Great Britain, which has struck other nations that in their time have led the world, we should look, I suppose, with confidence to Europe and to America for successors who could carry on the torch of science and of civilization. But if in Plato's time the educated and politically civilized society of Hellas, and more especially of Athens, was to be crushed, or, as he clearly foresaw, to deteriorate, where was the philosopher to look for the hope of humanity?

Therefore, it seems to me, we should consider Plato's account of scientific knowledge, although drawn from the acutest analysis of experience, as in part a *prophecy*, which the later history of the world has wonderfully accomplished and defined. To complain that Plato did not say, and did not indeed know in precise detail, what he meant by his dialectic,

is to complain of a philosopher for possessing the genius that could lay down the universal conditions of a science for which the actual materials did not in his time exist. He had to work with only a few fragments of organized experience, and in face of a world apparently relapsing into moral chaos; but perhaps the difficulty thus occasioned is compensated not only by his genius, but by the burning reality which the questions of philosophy thus acquired for him.

Of these burning questions the chief and typical one was that which I mentioned: Is there such a thing as knowledge, and what are its distinctive features?

We all know how the question is introduced in the fifth book of the "Republic." Politics, Plato says in effect, are a science; you will never get government properly organized till it is in the hands of people who have some grasp of principles. And in support of this suggestion he goes on to explain where the distinction lies between the mind as grasping a unity of principle, and the mind as wandering through a variety of particulars. I will not follow the discussion in Plato's sense, but will merely mention what throws light on the question before us. Plato draws many contrasts between the world of opinion and the world of science; but the central contrast which is the focus of all the others is this, that opinion may make a mistake, but science is infallible. And the fundamental question which I should like to discuss this evening is what we mean by any such conception as that of the infallibility or necessity of science, and what limitations we must observe in applying it.

In the main, we shall not improve much upon Plato. According to him Opinion was liable to err because, in fact, it constantly contradicted itself. And it contradicted itself because its content was *relative*, but *not defined*. And its

content was not defined, because it was merely an aggregate of perceptive or traditional judgments, which no attempt had been made to analyse or to reconcile. The "many" or "manifold," which is constantly recurring in Plato, as the characteristic content of popular opinion, obviously means not merely separate *objects* or *sensations*, but isolated and therefore conflicting *judgments*. Thus we hear of the many popular formulæ, *νομιμά*, of "beauty and justice," and again of "the many justices," that is, cases of justice regarded as rules of justice; and so of the "many beauties," *i.e.* conflicting standards of beauty. He is thinking of minds filled with unrationalised instances which appear as fluctuating standards and conflicting judgments.

And because its content is unrationalised, therefore the world of opinion tends to coincide with the world of sense, and is, of course, spoken of as the world of the things that are seen in contrast with the world of the things that are understood. The Greek expressions δόξα and δοκεῖ ("seeming," and "it seems to me") lend themselves to this distinction. I do not suppose that these words indicate sensuous appearance, as do φαίνεσθαι and φαντασία, but they do indicate a contrast with active thought, a sort of personal acceptance as opposed to a universal conviction. And Plato, in the "Republic," as we know, sweeps into the category of opinion or fallacious appearance even the representations of fine art, because they can be considered as images or imagery, and therefore as sensuous.

Science, or knowledge, on the contrary, was infallible, in the sense that its content was single, and its inmost nature therefore excluded the possibility of contradiction or fluctuation. Not that its content was other than relative, but then, being relative, it was defined. Of course there is no confusion or contradiction in relativity when you know to what your terms

are relative. Relativity in this sense is the root of scientific necessity.

And thus, moreover, being defined, the content of science was necessarily *intellectual*. It is impossible to have a connected system of conditions in the shape of unanalysed perception or traditional judgments. And so the object or content of science was spoken of as the world of things understood, in contrast to the world of things perceived by sense. We are not here concerned with any materialising misconceptions, of Plato's or of our own, respecting that intelligible world. There is no question whatever that the unseen world which Plato was labouring to describe was the world of science and of morality—the connected view which gives meaning at once to nature and to human life.

I suppose that the account which we should now accept of this distinction between knowledge and opinion would be essentially founded on that of Plato; but the conditions of modern thought have driven home one or two important points on which his language is not and could not be absolutely unambiguous.

In the first place, we must be very cautious in accepting the opposition between the world of science and the world of sense. We have not in exclusive use the convenient Greek term, "it appears to me." We recognise no peculiar connection between opinion and sense. We speak without a blush of "*scientific opinion*," and even of "*scientific authority*." Our opinions are a sort of *débris* of antiquated science and political or theological tradition, of general maxims and half-understood principles. They have not, we are inclined to think, enough immediate touch with the world of sense-perception. Their fault is rather intellectual confusion than imperfect abstraction from sense.

Our science, on the other hand, seems closely bound up with sense-perception. Nor, again, should we ever dream of ranking Fine Art among unreal illusions, because it is, and must be, largely sensuous. The extremes of our mental world seem to have met, and even to have crossed. Our chaotic opinion is intellectualised, and our coherent science is materialised. If we try to distinguish the world of things seen from the world of things understood, where are we to bestow that act of seeing which a distinguished microscopist begins by describing as "an act of the pure understanding"?

The fact is, that there are correlative misapprehensions attaching to this idea of a world of sense-perception, which we must take care to avoid. Sensation, we are too apt to say, is illusory or false. This is incorrect. What we ought to mean is that sensation is not true; but for the same reason for which it is not true, it is also not false; for it is not a judgment at all, and nothing but judgment can be true or false. On the other hand, if we mean to say that sense-perception, such as human seeing or hearing, is illusory, as Plato too often appears to imply—that may or may not be; these activities are judgments, and may no doubt be false, but also may be true.

There is, indeed, a secondary difficulty affecting the truth of any perceptive judgment which is *bonâ fide* a singular judgment, because its subject is to some extent unanalysed, and therefore not accurately conditioned. But when you are once fairly started on the continuous evolution of judgment, you will find it very hard to draw any intelligible line between judgments affected by this secondary difficulty, and judgments which are not so affected, or are so in a less degree. And granting that judgments affected by it may intelligibly be called "nearer to sense," it still remains quite untrue that judgments dealing with the determinate concrete objects of our perceptive

world are necessarily judgments thus near to sense. As Plato says, our primary remedies against sensuous illusions are number and measure; and so-called sensuous objects, as they exist for civilized and for scientific minds, are penetratingly determined at least by measurement and enumeration.

Thus, we must clearly realize that knowledge and opinion both exist in the medium of judgment, that is, of thought. That marvellous dialectician, common language, forces *us* most commonly to say, "I think," when a Greek would have said, "It seems to me." And though one may be tempted in a moment of irritation to exclaim with Dr. Whewell, "Do you call that *thinking?*" yet, philosophically speaking, if a judgment is made, it *is* thinking, and we must be quite clear that our distinction between science and opinion is a distinction within the world of thought, which is a single world, and to which the objects of human sense-perception emphatically do belong.

Then, in the second place, and as a consequence of this generic oneness of our world, we must guard ourselves against finding the differentia of knowledge in any isolated principle which may seem to commend itself to us as peculiarly intellectual in origin or by contrast. We shall do no good by comparing one isolated judgment with another in order to accept that which is more remote from experience or concrete reality. We need not hope, that is to say, to distinguish part of knowledge as the content from part as the form of thought, or to enumerate a list either of innate or of *a priori* principles of the mind. It has been said, and by an illustrious Idealist thinker, "Two pure perceptions, those of time and space, and twelve pure ideas of the understanding, were what Kant thought he had discovered to be the instruments with which the human spirit is furnished for the manipulation of experience. Whence these strange numbers?" Directly you men-

tion them, you feel that you cannot insist on them in that rigid form. And if, or in as far as Plato meant that science was in the long run to hit upon an abstract ultimate first principle, or principle external to its content, from which knowledge was to be suspended as a coat hangs from a peg, then, and so far, he wavered in his conception of the nature of truth. It might be questioned, for example, what he had in his mind when he said of the mathematical sciences, "How can the whole system amount to knowledge, when its beginning, middle, and end are a tissue of unknown matters? It is, in fact, no more than an elaborate convention." We should of course say, and should have expected him to say, that in any conceivable system of knowledge the beginning, middle, or end are only known by being in the system, and *ipso facto* become unknown, if regarded in abstraction from it. And I do not think this would be at variance with what he had in his mind. Probably his difficulty was that, as he constantly hints, the greater whole of knowledge was beyond his power to construct; there was, therefore, a *saltus* or discontinuity round the edge of the mathematical sciences relatively to the whole of knowledge. It was not that he expected to find some law of Causation, or law of Uniformity, or Principle of Identity to which they could all be attached. He evidently was convinced that "the truth is the whole."

Thus we must look for the infallibility or necessity which distinguishes knowledge from opinion, *not* in the distinction between intellect and sense, *nor* in the distinction between an empirical and a necessary judgment (unless explained in quite a peculiar way), *but* in the degree of that characteristic which makes it in the first place thought, and in the second place, knowledge, at all.

All thought is determination, or connection, or definition;

but popular thought is insufficient determination, and for that reason is self-contradictory. Every judgment determines a unity by a relation; but as every unity is a centre of relations, it is plain that until the unity has been exhaustively analysed, all its different relations will seem to conflict, because each of them will claim to include the whole of it. And the only remedy for such conflicts is, accordingly, further determination, as Plato explains with unsurpassed clearness in the seventh Book. As determination progresses, then, the unity of thought is maintained; but its differences, which were at first merely found together, come to be systematically arranged, and to have their reciprocal bearings quite precisely defined. So then every part of the system becomes charged with the meaning of the whole, and the relativity of the different elements becomes a source of necessity, instead of a source of confusion. Two terms are relative in this scientific sense when you can tell what form the one will have, by looking at the form of the other. Plato is apt to allude to the apparent contradiction between the appearance of an object seen at a distance and that of the same object seen close at hand. But of course to an educated eye there is no such contradiction; the one appearance under one condition necessarily involves the other under another condition. The contradiction *would* arise if the angle subtended by the object were the same at two different distances. The estimate of real size, as formed by an educated eye, is a consequence or combination of the various appearances combined with other evidence, and does not vary with the distance at which the object happens to be seen. We do not judge a man to be very small when we see him a long way off, nor to grow bigger as he comes nearer. In fact, we more generally make too much allowance for distance, and think a man taller at a distance then he really turns out to

be when we see him near. The various angles subtended at different distances do not contradict but confirm one another, because their conditions are made explicit; if we confuse their conditions, they will contradict one another. A railway engine coming towards one at full speed does seem to *move*, because one has no time to adjust the perception of distance to the angle subtended by the object, *i.e.*, to distinguish the perception under one condition from the perception under another.

Thus it results that the possibility of contradiction is removed and turned into confirmation in as far as experience is organized as a single system of determinations. It is in this sense alone that science has a claim to be infallible or necessary.

But now, if this is so, how far does this kind of infallibility take us? To what extent does it justify us in even asserting that we have knowledge at all?

To begin with, we cannot show, strictly speaking, in this way or in any other, that it is impossible for a change of relations to occur without a change of conditions. We can only say that the suggestion is unmeaning to us, as it involves the saying and unsaying, or being and not-being of the same matter in the same relation. To do and undo is for us simply to leave nothing done; we therefore disregard this contingency; in other words, we assume the unity of reality, which assures us that what is once true is always true, and that what turns out to be not true never was true. *Our* problem is, how can we be assured that we are making no mistakes? We are powerless if it is suggested that we may be making no mistake, and yet may be in error. That falls outside our discussion to-night.

But there are difficulties more relevant to our problem.

The necessity of science does not provide against our

determinations being insufficient, as is plain from the progressive character of science.

There are at first sight two degrees of this insufficiency, though ultimately they may have the same root.

First, there is confusion of conditions. That is to say, you may lay down a connection between condition and consequent, in which by some error of identification you have simply placed one condition or consequent where you ought to have placed another. I will give two examples, one of a more or less debateable case, the other of an extreme case.

The old Wage-Fund theory said, as I understand it, that the wages of labour with a given population depended on the total amount of capital available, and destined in the minds of capitalists, to be paid in the shape of wages. In one sense, this is a truism, *i.e.*, on a given pay-day the whole amount paid divided by the number of persons to whom it is paid, gives the average wage. But in the more real sense, viz., that this fund is a pre-existent fixed quantity, the amount of which actively decides the rate of wages, the doctrine is now disputed, and generally held, I believe, to have been overthrown. Wages are paid out of the produce of labour, and not out of a pre-existing fund, and the capitalist very likely gets his hands on the produce actually before he parts with the wages, which therefore are not limited by the amount of a pre-existing fund. The old Wage-Fund theory perhaps rested on a confusion between the truism which I first mentioned, and the very real connection that exists in various ways between the amount of plant or stock in a country, which is Auxiliary capital, not Wage-Fund capital, and the productivity and general employment of its labour, which in their turn affect the rate of wages.

Now how, if at all, does the necessity of science maintain

itself in the overthrow of this doctrine? In some such way as this, that the postulates and conditions which made such a doctrine necessary to the scientific system, will continue after its overthrow to be fulfilled by some more or less cognate doctrine, liberated from the confusions which disfigured this one. We shall still speak, I suppose, of the importance of saving. We shall still be aware that an undertaking like the Forth Bridge could only be carried out by a country with an enormous command of accumulated wealth, and that, with a given population, the best chance of raising wages lies in increasing the amount of capital productively employed. Only we must not restrict capital to wage-fund capital, but must include in it, for example, machines and materials.

Now the necessity of the science consisted in the demand for a representation of all these relations and conditions, which, as their determinations advance in accuracy, mould and remould the doctrine that is to satisfy them, but *without sacrificing its identity of content or function.* The alteration of such a doctrine is like the transformation of gills into lungs, or the substitution of a Westinghouse continuous brake for a hand-brake on a train. You pass from one fulfilment of certain organic demands to another.

As an extreme case, where the connection seems quite irrational, I will just mention what Swift wrote, that once when he was half-asleep, he fancied he could not go on writing unless he put out some water which he had taken into his mouth. He was confusing between writing and speaking, of course. There really is a necessity in the background even there.

In the second place, a science may be precise as far as it goes, but may omit some entire sphere or branch of fact, as Euclidean geometry is now said to omit certain kinds of space. Against this possibility there, *prima facie*, is no theoretical

resource except in a postulate of exhaustiveness, viz., that our knowledge bears some appreciable proportion to the whole of Reality. I incline to think that we take this postulate on ethical grounds, *i.e.*, we are convinced that Reality will not so far dwarf our knowledge as to annihilate our life or wholly frustrate our purposes. It ought to be mentioned, too, that probably a science which is not complete cannot be *truly* systematic.

Of course you may cut the knot of all these discussions by saying that sciences which make mistakes are not science. But this would not help us, because then we should say that our question is, how far the sciences are characterized by science.

In the third place, the systematic character of scientific necessity is in itself a limitation on the extent and application of that necessity. For if and in as far as the systematic character is lost, then and so far the necessity is lost too. It has been said of political economy, that if you do not know it all, you do not know it at all. This is true in strict theory of every science and of all science. So that the scientific judgment, transferred by the help of language into a mind not equipped with the body of knowledge, is science no longer. It has become mere opinion, mere authority. This explains the curious contempt which practical men have, as a rule, for the evidence of scientific experts. Scientific authority is a contradiction in terms. Unhappily the scientific mind itself often forgets this, and offers, like Thrasymachus, to put its doctrine into men's souls by physical force. But this is impossible. Knowledge can only be communicated as knowledge. You cannot claim the necessity of science for a scientific conclusion torn from its organism and hurled into the sphere of opinion. Think of the popular interpretations

of any such propositions as, "The soul is a substance," or, "Sensation is subjective."

But here we have arrived at the end of our negatives, and the balance begins to turn.

If, for the reason just stated, Knowledge cannot refute Opinion; neither, for the same reason, can Opinion refute Knowledge. An individual judgment and a universal judgment cannot be contradictory in the strict sense. The judgment, "If A is B, then C is D," is not affected by the judgment, "C is not D." They are in different planes, and do not meet. Before you can bring the two into relation, you must ascertain how A and B are behaving in the case, when it is alleged C is not D. Then we shall find, in proportion as the hypothetical judgment belongs to a thoroughly organized body of science, that it is easy to incorporate the new determination in the old system. I will once more take an example from political economy. The economical doctrine says that prices determine rent, and rent does not determine prices. But of course it is a common opinion that a tradesman in a fashionable street is compelled to charge higher prices than a tradesman in a less fashionable street, in order to recoup himself for the higher rent which he has to pay. If we put out of sight the alternative of his obtaining a larger sale, I should suppose that this *might* be the fact, although one would imagine that he would have fixed his prices so as to obtain the greatest profit, even if his profit was not to go in rent. But waiving this argument again, and admitting the alleged fact, what does it amount to? What made his landlord ask for that high rent, and what made the tradesman contract to pay it? Why, that both of them thought that the prices necessary to pay this rent could be got out of the public in that locality. You can-

not put up your prices just as you please; and if you cannot get the prices necessary to pay your rent, why, then you cannot pay your rent out of the proceeds of the business, and the rent must come down; and, no doubt, if you are under a lease, *or competing for housroom with other occupations that pay better*, you may say to the public, "Really I am *forced* to *try* to keep my prices up." But strictly the reason for this is not that the prices do not determine the rent, but that they obviously do, and the tradesman is crushed between two determinations of his rent, legal and economical; only, being unable to revise his bargain, he may try to hold the prices up with both hands, so to speak; and with a friendly circle of customers, or a circle who need him in their district, to some extent he may succeed. But in some such way as this the relation between the scientific doctrine and the popular opinion is not, I think, very hard to see, when you look at the matter all round. And of course it does modify the doctrine a little bit; but on the whole, *when you analyse* the alleged case, it joins on pretty easily to the science. The science, of course, primarily considers what a man will freely bargain to do; it never denies that a man may have a loss thrown upon him by a bad bargain which he cannot revise, and that *so far* his rent, which is naturally the consequent, will become for him the condition, because he cannot alter it.

If, then, we try to state the positive value of the so-called infallibility of science, it appears to reduce itself to this—that the organization of a province of experience is an affirmative of actual achievement, which may be subsequently modified or transformed, but cannot be lost or cancelled. We cannot guarantee the particular formulation of an isolated principle; but then we know that identity does not depend on particular formulation, but on continuity of function. I should be very

sorry to predict in what precise terms the Principle of Sufficient Reason may be stated by philosophers a hundred years hence. But that the determinate relativity of the parts of experience will be embodied in some principle or other, is as certain, I think, as that there will be science at all.

'It may be objected that we are guaranteeing the whole of knowledge in general, but no element of it in particular, and that this is illusory. To those who cannot conceive a concrete continuous identity I think it *is* illusory, and ought to be. You cannot, as they would wish, fix and separate any portion of knowledge. Every element of it must take its chance in the systematic development of the whole. Therefore, when speaking of knowledge in general, you can only affirm its self-identity in general. But to any one who can see a meaning in saying, for example, that Christianity to-day is the same religion that it was 1,800 years ago, this idea of continuous pervading identity will present no difficulty. A substantive identity, we think, can persist through difference, and, can indeed, only be realized in differences.

While, on the other hand, if a certain difficulty attaches to this view, yet it throws an all-important light on the nature of knowledge. It shows us that the necessity of knowledge depends upon its vitality. Axioms and dogmas, traditions and abstract principles, equally with unanalysed perception, are not knowledge but opinion. The life of knowledge is in the self-consciousness which systematically understands, and you cannot have it cheaper. We know *not* "as much as is in our memory," *but* "as much as we understand." A science which accepts foreign matter, data to be learnt by heart, is so far not a science. But one who has *understood* anything, has a possession of which he cannot be deprived.

Any one who speaks thus confidently is sure to be asked,

"What are his metaphysical presuppositions?" It would be more to the point, in my judgment, to ask him if he has obtained any metaphysical *results*. His only presupposition is, I think, that there is something presented to him which it is worth while to analyse. The principles involved in this analysis, such as the unity of reality, are no doubt operative from the first, but are only established in a definite form by the analysis itself. And any view, more strictly metaphysical, as to the precise ultimate nature of the unity of Reality, would be a still further result, which may or may not be obtained. That mind, in its essence, is one, and that the unity of man with himself and with nature is a real unity, seem to be principles demanded by the facts of science and of society. It is also true that a reality which is not for consciousness is something too discrepant with our experience to be intelligible to us. But whether the human mind will ever form to itself a conception that will in any degree meet the problem of a total unity of Reality, is a question the answer to which must lie in the result of analysis, and not in its presuppositions.

Thus we abide by the position that the characteristic in which Knowledge differs from Opinion is the degree in which, as a living mind, it has understood and organized its experience. The criticism of Goethe's Mephistopheles on the traditional logic is perfectly just. It is well to take every mental process carefully to pieces; but it is essential to bear in mind that the pieces are elements in a living tissue, in a single judgment, and that in their detachment as "one, two, and three," they are not knowledge. So far from being a mechanical science, logic is perhaps the most vital and scientific of all the sciences. It accepts nothing from perception or from authority, and gives nothing to learn by heart. It depends on no intuition of space, and on no list of elements. Its only task

is to understand the process of understanding, the growth and transformations of thought.

This is the conception with which logic began in Plato, and which has never been entirely lost. In the old Dominican Church of Santa Maria Novella, at Florence, there is a series of frescoes illustrative of education, familiar to us through Mr. Ruskin's description under the name of the Strait Gate. One of these paintings has a peculiar attraction for the student of modern logic. Next but two after the Narrow Gate itself, which indicates the entrance to good life, there is placed over a head of Aristotle the allegorical figure of logic. This beautiful figure is drawn, as Mr. Ruskin points out, with remarkable strength and grace; it is most probably from the pencil of Simone Memmi, of Siena, early in the fourteenth century. In her left hand the figure holds the scorpion with its double nippers, emblem of the dilemma or more generally of the disjunctive or negative power of thought; but in her right hand she holds the leafy branch, symbolising the syllogism, conceived as the organic or synthetic unity of reason. This suggests an ideal worthy of the age of Dante, however little it may have been attained in the explicit logical theory of that time.

It is some such ideal of knowledge that has, as we may hope, been making itself more and more imperatively felt since the revival of letters in Europe; and the view which it involves, of the true distinction between Knowledge and Opinion, is merely one branch of that principle of the unity of mind, which is fraught with consequences of inestimable importance for all aspects of life in the present day. We cannot —such is the lesson we have to learn—we cannot elevate the human mind by any fragmentary treatment, by any communication or assistance which does not stimulate its healthy

growth as a single living thing. In fine art, in the province of social rights and duties, in morality, in politics, and especially in the interconnection of all these spheres, it is no less true than we have found it to be in science, that the mind must grow and advance either all together, or not at all.

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